

Photo courtesy of Maj John T. Quinn II

Marines from Company B, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, provide a checkpoint in Cap-Haïtien. The light armored vehicles had a psychological as well as physical presence.

mand of the Military District of the North, had a good command presence and the insight to understand his position. Ticking off the items on his agenda, Jones told Josephat just how much combat power he had ashore, which had a visible effect on the Haitian officer. He declared his principle concerns were the security of his force and the security of the local populace. For him, the two were inextricably linked. Jones said he knew the Haitian army and police had “violated the security” of the citizens of Cap-Haïtien in the past. (He was almost certainly thinking of the incidents that had occurred earlier in the day.) Jones would not tolerate any further acts of intimidation and it would be up to Josephat to control his forces to prevent excesses. If that did not happen, the Marines would begin active patrols of the town. Jones made it clear the Marines did not intend to cooperate with the Haitian army in running joint patrols, but he did want the two sides to exchange liaison officers.¹⁴

Both Colonel Jones and Major Greenwood were satisfied with the outcome of the

encounter—Jones because Josephat had been agreeable and Greenwood because his commander had emerged from the compound in one piece. Nevertheless, the Marines did not let down their guard on their first night ashore. As Major Herman C. Broadstone, commander of Task Force Hawg, put it: “The concern now is the night. Even though everything ran smoothly today ... we still have to be concerned about renegade forces that might be hostile to [the] American presence. There’s always the possibility of someone who doesn’t listen to the Haitian commander and starts taking potshots at us.” On the airport perimeter, the Marines dug foxholes and positioned their machine guns. Two-man sniper teams—one man with a sniper rifle and the other with a pair of high-power binoculars—carefully chose positions where they could look out over their surroundings and become so familiar with them they could react instantly to any changes that might mean danger. For most Marines, there was a 75 percent alert (three-quarters of the men awake) during the hours of darkness.¹⁵

The night was quiet, apart from the sounds of drumming and singing Marines throughout the area heard at odd intervals during the night. These were almost certainly happy sounds, although some Marines wondered if they were listening to some kind of sinister voodoo ritual.¹⁶

Tensions between the Marines and the Haitian army increased during the blisteringly hot days from 21 to 24 September. On the morning of 21 September, there was a small but typical drama at one of the main traffic circles guarded by a few Marines in two light armored vehicles, which did not look light with their eight sturdy wheels and protruding guns. There was a ring of portable concertina wire around the Marine outpost. When two armed Haitian soldiers waded through the inevitable crowd, two Marines armed with M16 rifles jumped down from their vehicles and walked to the edge of the wire to confront their Haitians counterparts. The crowd fell silent as the two sides eyed each other in silence. In the end, the Haitian soldiers simply turned around and walked away, which was a real crowd pleaser—the bystanders burst into cheers and applause. Simply by their presence, the Marines had protected them from the soldiers.¹⁷

In a similar incident, a Haitian policeman threatened one of his countrywomen with his

weapon and nearby Marines had to train their weapons on him before he backed down. Throughout the day, Haitian civilians approached Marines with reports that Haitian police and soldiers were harassing, beating, and detaining ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide supporters. The Marine task force took concrete action when the reports were confirmed after another instance of Haitian crowd control.¹⁸

In the late afternoon, a U.S. Army psychological operations group attached to the SPMAGTF drove slowly through the northern part of the town broadcasting through loudspeakers an appeal for law and order in Creole to calm the situation. Hundreds of Haitians fell in behind the detachment's two humvees, which became sort of an electronic pied piper. It was a happy crowd until Haitian policemen with "batons the size of ax handles" waded in and started beating anyone they could reach. The Army detachment was too small to take any action apart from driving quickly from the area and to the SPMAGTF command post, which was still in the port area but now at a slightly better location. The Army noncommissioned officers reported to Major Greenwood, who in turn took them to Colonel Jones.¹⁹

Jones was incensed and dispatched troops to find Josephat and bring him to the command



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In addition to static checkpoints, there were roving patrols. Here, Marines from Battery B, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, patrol the road between the port of Cap-Haïtien and the Haitian military headquarters in the old town.



Photo courtesy of Maj John T. Quinn II

Marines stand outside the command post of Company E, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, on 22 September. The company's mission that day and during the following days was to patrol crowded parts of the city and monitor Haitian police stations.

post. But he was nowhere to be found—it turned out later he had left the city to confer with his superiors in the capital—and Jones had to make do with two of Josephat's subordinates. He made it clear the Marines would not tolerate any further excesses by Haitian police or soldiers. If Haitian officers could not control their men, the Marines would do it for them. According to one account, when he finally spoke with Josephat himself, he added if he and his officers "did not get it right," the Marines could wind up shooting at Haitian soldiers.²⁰

To reinforce his words with actions, and to restrain his Haitian counterparts, Jones decided to increase the Marine presence around Haitian military and police installations. Marines would establish patrol bases in the city and patrol up to and around those installations. This was a departure from the initial policy of keeping Marines mostly at their positions at the airport, the port, and at various key points throughout the city.

The bulk of the patrolling fell to Company E, 2d Marines, commanded by Captain Richard L. Diddams, Jr., which had been moved to the port area. At midday on 22 September, the company set out on a patrol of the city, which began around 1100 and took most of the afternoon.

Heavily laden in the 100-degree heat, the Marines stepped off in a tactical formation. But crowds of Haitians soon engulfed the troops and changed the formation such that the Marines were almost touching one another as they moved slowly through the shouting, waving, and dancing Haitians.²¹

Captain Diddams made a round of the local police stations with his company. At the first stop, the crowd instinctively backed 50 feet away when the Marines halted in front of the building. Diddams went in and told the police through a translator the Marines had come in peace as part of the negotiated settlement, but added they would not tolerate further acts of violence by the police. The Marines then inventoried the Haitians' weapons and emerged from the building to even louder and more ecstatic cheers from the crowd.²²

Diddams repeated much the same routine at the next two police stations, where he encountered a more hostile reception. At one location, a policeman emerged when the captain approached and blocked the entrance. Diddams asked, "How are you doing?" The policeman just shook his head in reply. Someone in the crowd yelled a warning and one of Diddams' lieutenants moved his platoon closer to the captain. Diddams

remembered later that, expecting violence, the crowd "went wild." But the policeman backed down, and with hand gestures, invited the Marines inside to inventory their weapons.²³

In the late afternoon, Diddams moved his company to a Catholic school a few blocks west of the center of town, which was to be the company's base for the next few days. Around sunset, the company was treated to an unusual kind of sunset parade. Singing and dancing Haitians carrying live chickens along with placards to welcome the

The last significant event of the day was the dissemination of a report, based on human intelligence collected by a counterintelligence team, that a clash with the Haitian army was "inevitable."

Marines and proclaim their support for Aristide filled the bleachers at the nearby soccer field. At one point in the celebration, they simultaneously raised the American flag and sacrificed the chickens. The Marines were puzzled by the ceremony until their translator explained it was to symbolize the rebirth of their country.²⁴ The last significant event of the day was the dissemination of a report, based on human intelligence collected by a counterintelligence team, that a clash with the Haitian army was "inevitable."²⁵ *

* The following is an excerpt from 2d Battalion, 2d Marines' Intelligence Log: 22 Sept. 1994: There was an increase in pro-Aristide and pro-U.S. demonstration. There was also an equal increase in police brutality to civilians. ... Two Haitians were received by the BAS [Battalion Aid Station] claiming to have been beaten by local police. One man had injuries that indicated he was bludgeoned and the other had a bullet wound entering and exiting his right thigh. ... Occasional reports were received from civilians that the police were telling the crowds that the U.S. troops were in Haiti to dominate the country. Civilians paid no attention to the police claims. By this time it had also become clear that Marine positions were being actively surveilled. Marine STA [Surveillance and Target Acquisition] teams in the port facility observed individuals in buildings adjacent to the Marine position studying U.S. activity with binoculars. On the evening of the 21st [the previous day] a vehicle approached Golf Company's perimeter, turned off its lights and stopped. The two passengers got out and stood in place, watching the Marines within the perimeter. At 1415 a Marine from Golf Company approached an individual videotaping the Marine activities. Upon approach the Haitian fled. Civilians in the area claimed he was a member of the Cap-Haïtien police (he was not in uniform). Civilians claimed to be no longer afraid of the local military and police due to the Marine presence. At 1945, a Division Reconnaissance team ... reported three shots fired from a semiautomatic weapon.

The next day was relatively uneventful. The port and airport were quiet, the biggest threats to the Marines at those locations being heat and boredom. Company E continued to patrol the town and encountered visibly hostile reactions from their Haitian counterparts. They heard from Haitian civilians that a number of *attachés*, the semi-official Haitian paramilitary auxiliaries, were in nearby buildings discussing what action they could take against the Marines, who later broke up a small rock-throwing incident between *attachés* and civilians.²⁶ The battalion intelligence officer collected additional reports of police misconduct, along with rumors that some Haitians planned to recruit and train a "patriotic resistance" group. Overall, relations between the Marines and the local authorities remained tense.²⁷

On the morning of the 24th, the men of 2d Battalion, 2d Marines' 81mm mortar platoon were ordered to conduct an unusual mission: take their humvee to the flight line at the airport to meet a U.S. Army helicopter and pick up Lieutenant Colonel Josephat and two other senior Haitian officers. Josephat had returned from Port-au-Prince with his superiors and they wanted to talk to Colonel Jones. Even the Marines driving the humvee, who knew nothing about previous exchanges between Jones and Josephat, could tell the Haitian officers were uncomfortable during the drive from the airport to the command post.²⁸

One of the senior officers was Brigadier General Henri Maynard, the inspector general of the Haitian army. The other was Colonel Martial Romulus, its operations officer. Romulus spoke English reasonably well and delivered the message, which had apparently been coordinated with his commander in chief, Brigadier General Raoul Cedras: the Haitian army acknowledged the friction between its forces and Marines in Cap-Haïtien, but now wanted to "reestablish" cooperation and conduct joint operations. Jones stopped the conversation and told them the Marines did not intend to conduct joint operations with the Haitian army. He repeated the same message he had delivered to Josephat and his subordinates: he would not tolerate any further acts of violence against the citizens of Cap-Haïtien by Haitian authorities. If Haitian officers could not control their own troops, Jones would. At one point, Colonel Romulus intimated the Haitian army was responsible for the security of Jones' Marines. Jones replied, "No," it was the other way around. The meeting did not last long and the Marines from the mortar platoon soon drove the visitors

from Port-au-Prince back to the airport. When he left Colonel Jones, Josephat looked even more uncomfortable than when he had arrived.²⁹

Josephat returned by himself later that day to talk to Jones again and told him he would try his best to control his troops. Jones was left with the impression his Haitian counterpart was really saying he was losing control of his troops and the situation.³⁰

Meanwhile, Company E was running platoon-sized patrols from its base at the Catholic school. The routes included the prison and other army and police installations. The 70 or so Haitians at the prison and the main army barracks were caught off guard by Marine patrols early in the day, which seemed to upset them. Later patrols found the prison and the barracks virtually deserted.³¹ There was a certain irony in deserting the prison because of the proximity of Marines. With exceptionally thick plaster walls, it had been built during the 1920s as the Marine Barracks in Cap-Haïtien, and though it was now a virtual ruin, the building still bore signs of its former occupants. Late in the afternoon, Company E's Marines heard gunshots and received a report that a Haitian army major had fired five rounds over the heads of a crowd.³²

Captain Diddams decided to establish a presence at two potential trouble spots during the night—the two police stations, designated Objectives 1 and 2, where he had faced a hostile reception from Haitian policemen on 22 September. He wanted a squad-size presence at each position by 1700 with a lieutenant or staff sergeant on the scene. He planned to rotate the squads every four hours. The initial result was a standoff at Objective 1, the block-long central police headquarters.³³

On one side of the narrow street outside the headquarters, Haitian policemen played cards on the sidewalk or went about their business inside the building, where doors and windows were open. "On the other side of the street, their backs against a building wall, 14 Marines stood in full battle dress," weapons locked and loaded. They stood in the open, without any cover, where the two sides could face each other without involving any of the bystanders off to the sides. Several hundred Haitians stood at either end of the block, hurling insults at the Haitian policemen and cheering the Marines from behind cordons, which held them back.³⁴ The officer in charge was First Lieutenant Virgil A. Palumbo, a 24-year-old Naval Academy graduate who had completed the

demanding Infantry Officer Course at the Basic School and was Company E's most experienced platoon commander.

Diddams had a premonition about Objective 1, and around 1830 went to see for himself what was happening there. His translator told him the crowd of some 250 civilians was urging the Marines to shoot the police and conveying the rumor there were *attachés* in the neighborhood that were planning to attack the Marines. Diddams noticed the squad automatic weapon gunners were lying down next to their weapons, which were at Condition 3 (with the ammunition belts out of the guns). The Marines armed with M16 rifles were at Condition 1, with a round in the chamber and the weapon on safe. In accordance with the dictates of good tactical sense, the squad leader had already assigned fields of fire. Diddams decided the lieutenant, whose mission

The lieutenant reacted immediately by firing two rounds from his M16, one into the chest of each of the Haitians. As if on cue, the lieutenant's Marines followed suit and opened fire on the Haitians in front of them, who were scrambling—perhaps for cover, perhaps for their weapons.

was to control the police and the crowd, had the situation well in hand and went on to the battalion command post.³⁵

Around 1900, there was a flurry of phone conversations in the station, followed by a heated argument among several of the Haitian policemen standing in or near the doorway directly across the street from the lieutenant, who was not more than 30 feet away. One of the Haitian policemen then reached for his pistol while another raised his Uzi sub-machine gun. Unfortunately for them, they were both looking directly at Lieutenant Palumbo while they were raising their weapons.

The lieutenant reacted immediately by firing two rounds from his M16, one into the chest of each of the Haitians. As if on cue, the lieutenant's Marines followed suit and opened fire on the Haitians in front of them, who were scrambling—perhaps for cover, perhaps for their weapons. Some Haitians may have fired at the Marines. In any case, the small space was filled with flying lead that killed eight Haitian policemen outright and wounded three others, two of whom died of



Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

Marines examine the bullet holes around the entrance to the police station where the shooting occurred between Company E, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, and Haitian police.

their wounds before they could be evacuated. One American, a Navy boiler technician named Jose Joseph who was there to translate for the lieutenant, was wounded in the leg. Although it seemed like an eternity to the Marines, the fire-fight probably lasted less than a minute, and perhaps even less than 30 seconds. When it was over, the Marines were in a state of stunned amazement. "It was," said Lance Corporal Jerry Acton, "like [the shootout at] the OK Corral."³⁶

Along with a motorized reaction force that sealed off the area, Captain Diddams and the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hartley, hurried to the scene. Colonel Jones quickly decided his best course of action was to find Josephat and take him to Objective 1 to control his troops. He drove through the dark, narrow streets to the Haitian commander's house, a modest but attractive home near his headquarters, but could not find him. The colonel then joined Diddams and Hartley at the police station, where he could make out the pockmarked walls and the eight dead Haitians lying in the street.³⁷

Virtually everyone in Cap-Haitien heard the firing. Some Marines even reported seeing tracer

rounds; nothing was very far in the small city. Company E's 60mm mortars immediately started firing illumination rounds, followed by the battalion's 81mm mortars, lighting up the very dark




Photo courtesy of Maj John T. Quinn II

Senior Haitian officers, anxious to reduce the conflicts, arrive at SPMAGTF headquarters on 25 September to discuss and defuse the situation.

tropical night. There was still little, if any, electricity for lighting in Cap-Haïtien, a lingering result of the embargo. When Palumbo's Marines stopped firing, they looked for cover. In the flickering half-light of the illumination rounds, Lieutenant Palumbo saw what appeared to be an injured Marine. He ran to the form and discovered, to his immense relief, it was a bit of low-lying shrubbery.³⁸

Meanwhile, Marines at Objective 2 reacted to the sounds of the gunfight by disarming the Haitian policemen they were watching. The Haitians were quick to surrender. A few minutes later, Company E's Marines at the school reported two or three incoming pistol or rifle shots, and one Marine at that compound fired his pistol at a Haitian who had pointed a shotgun in his direction. He missed and the Haitian disappeared into the night.³⁹

Back at the police headquarters, the adrenalin started to ebb and the question became, what next? Should the Marines storm the objective or wait for daylight? There were still a number of Haitians inside the building; would they fire on the Marines? The decision was made to coax them out, and a translator set to work on a loudspeaker broadcasting appeals for surrender into the

night. At first, the wrong Haitians surrendered. Civilians who lived in the close quarters around the police station thought the message was for them and came out into the streets with their hands up.⁴⁰

After about an hour of hard work, six Haitians emerged from Objective 1, one of them severely wounded. The other five were taken prisoner, but released a few hours later on Colonel Jones' orders. The wounded Haitian was medically evacuated to the USS *Wasp* and soon recovered enough from his wounds to tell reporters the Haitians at the police station had no intention of starting a firefight with the Marines, and that most of the Haitians there that night had not even been armed.⁴¹ But when the Marines entered the building the next day they found more than 100 weapons, some loaded and ready to fire.⁴² *

The 25th was the kind of day most Marines detest: niggling inquiries from higher headquar-

* John R. Ballard mentions the initial uncertainty about the Haitian response to the incident. U.S. commanders wondered if other members of the Haitian army would seek to avenge the shooting. Ballard also concluded the shooting was justified under the rules of engagement and describes how the incident fit into the overall context of the operation. (Ballard, *Upholding Democracy*, p. 115)



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The day after the incident at the police station was one of conferences with senior American officials. Here Col Thomas S. Jones (back to the camera) confers with LtGen Henry H. Shelton (left), commander of Joint Task Force 180, and the United States Ambassador to Haiti William L. Swing.

ters and a large group of senior visitors who appeared to have come to second-guess the commander on the spot. The delegation, which flew to Cap-Haïtien from the capital in the morning, had a unique composition: the Haitian leader, General Cedras; the American Ambassador to Haiti, Mr. William Lacy Swing; and General Shelton. They descended on the SPMAGTF command post with their respective entourages wanting to discuss the events at Objective 1. During the talks they discovered the bodies of the Haitian policemen were at the nearby Combat Service Support Detachment 29 storage facility in body bags—the local hospital had refused to accept the bodies. General Cedras wanted to see the corpses. The bags were produced and unzipped for the general and his aides, who conducted a short, impromptu memorial ceremony.⁴³

When he returned to the discussion at the group, General Cedras demanded the immediate relief and court martial of Colonel Jones “for atrocities.” General Shelton dismissed that possibility out of hand, and instead gave General Cedras a lecture on the United Nations resolution,

which legitimized the occupation and use of force. General Cedras had to content himself with venting his spleen on the Haitian soldiers present for, among other things, not being able to produce Lieutenant Colonel Josephat, who had simply disappeared and would not reappear for the duration of the operation.⁴⁴

Before he left, General Shelton reassured Colonel Jones, saying the Marines’ actions had shown General Cedras the U.S. forces in Haiti were prepared to back up their words with actions. Perhaps the Haitians had learned their lesson. Nevertheless, Jones had to answer questions for the rest of the day, and to repeat over and over to reporters and callers from Norfolk and Washington that he was 100 percent behind Lieutenant Palumbo. He said he did not know who fired first, but he hoped it had been the lieutenant, who had been in a threatening situation and was paid to make difficult on-the-spot decisions. His life and those of his Marines had been threatened, and he had to act.⁴⁵

Jones’ command post did not have the time to convert itself into an oversized public affairs



Photo courtesy of Maj John T. Quinn II

While senior officers talked, the Marines continued to seize weapons from the Haitian army and police.



DVIC DD-SD-99-0375

Crowds of Haitian civilians follow Marines through the dusty streets of Grand Riviere du Nord. The mission was to secure Haitian army and police armories.

office. All around were signs the Haitian armed forces were collapsing and the Marines needed to fill the void. Like Josephat, Haitian soldiers were shedding their uniforms and disappearing. The prison in the old Marine barracks was now completely abandoned, prisoners and all. Jubilant crowds started to ransack police stations and army barracks. When the Marines withdrew their cordon around Objective 1 at midday, Haitian civilians dashed in to stare at the bloodstains on the fading yellow walls and to remove everything of value. Next to the bloodstains, someone painted in Creole: "This is just the beginning of things to come."⁴⁶ A similar incident occurred at Haitian army headquarters—the crowds rushed in as the soldiers literally went over the hill. This was initially more worrisome because the Marines had not yet secured the armory. Colonel Jones led a detachment of his troops over to the compound to reestablish order, confiscate approximately 25 weapons from the crowd and remove hundreds of other weapons for safekeeping.⁴⁷

Given the collapse of authority in his area of operations, Jones expedited a long-planned series of raids to outlying jurisdictions to secure Haitian army and police armories. The colonel himself led the first helicopter-borne raid, which departed a few hours behind schedule at 1430 on 25

September. When the reinforced platoon from Company F in its CH-53D Sea Stallion helicopters, escorted by Cobra gunships, reached its destination at Lembe some 20 kilometers southwest of Cap-Haïtien, the Marines received an incredible reception from the local citizenry. The Marines made their way through the jubilation to the local garrison, only to find its commander, who had a bad reputation, was nowhere to be found. To make matters worse, the armory was locked. Somewhat angry, Colonel Jones ordered his troops to break down the door. They found the armory nearly empty, with signs the bulk of the weapons had been moved. This ratified the decision to expedite the raids. Now even more displeased, Jones told the unfortunate Haitian corporal who had not fled that he had a choice: find the weapons or come with the Marines. Jones left it to the corporal's imagination as to what "come with the Marines" meant and his eyes widened. Within 15 minutes he produced his commander, who in turn agreed to produce the weapons. He came back 30 minutes later, empty-handed, saying he was afraid the Cobras would fire on him if they saw him load the weapons onto trucks. This was irritating, but it made sense. After being reassured about the Cobras, the Haitian departed again, and this time returned 45 minutes later with



DVIC DD-SD-99-03581

Col Thomas S. Jones speaks with Haitian security forces during a weapons seizure at Grand Riviere du Nord.

a large truckload of weapons, which were then loaded onto the helicopters. Jones left a few rifles and pistols for the Haitian authorities and flew back to Cap-Haitien.⁴⁸ *

There were similar raids on succeeding days. On 26 September, the operation went to the town of Grand Riviere du Nord (where, some SPMAGTF Marines remembered, the legendary Marine Herman H. Hanneken had been the captain of the *Gendarmerie*); on 28 September to Le Borgne and Petit Bord du Borgne; and on 1 October to the town of Ouaniminthe near the border with the Dominican Republic.⁴⁹ ** The Marines found the situation at Grand Riviere du Nord to

be like that in Lembe, while Le Borgne and Petit Bord du Borgne were small outposts of five or six soldiers with 10 weapons. The crowds already had overrun the outposts, and by the time the Marines arrived on scene, everyone was subdued, perhaps because they already had used up all their energy. On the other hand, the last raid, at Ouaniminthe, was certainly not the least. The weapons cache there was the largest the Marines found at any location.⁵⁰ ***

* JTF 180 considered it important to reduce the number of weapons in general circulation in Haiti and worked aggressively to this end. (See Ballard, *Upholding Democracy*, p. 113, and Maj Forrest L. Marrion, USAFR, "Captured Weapons and the Weapons Buyback Program in Haiti, September 1994-March 1995, USACOM Special Historical Study," Norfolk, VA: Office of the Command Historian, n.d.)

** Hanneken received the Medal of Honor in 1919 for leading a daring raid to find and kill the Haitian bandit leader Charlemagne Peralte.

*** As combat artist Capt Charles G. Grow recorded: "On 26 September, the SPMAGTF commander, Col Thomas S. Jones, and a platoon from Company F of BLT 2/2 flew to Grand Riviere du Nord to seize weapons at a military police company barracks. The low-level helicopter ride over the countryside was exhilarating. Huge crowds of cheering Haitians deafened the Marine platoon as it made its way from the soccer field to the yellow barracks in the center of town. Thousands of spectators watched and waved banners as the Marines emptied the building of weapons. A Toyota pickup truck was piled high with rifles and ammunition and escorted back to the LZ [landing zone]. The cache included many M1 Garands and '03 Springfields; the latter were likely left over from the 1915-1934 Marine intervention, judging by their age and condition. The day was a grand success." (Capt Charles G. Grow, "Combat Artist Preserves Haiti Service Scenes on Paper," *Fortitudine*, Winter 1994-1995, p. 13)



Sketch by Capt Charles G. Grow
On 28 September, Marines from Company G, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, are applauded by local citizens as they move through the streets of Petit Bord du Borgne.

In the wake of the raids, the Marine task force inserted U.S. Army Special Forces A Teams into the larger towns of Lembe and Grand Riviere du

Nord to begin the lonely and difficult task of serving as outposts and trying to restore a semblance of order.⁵¹ Now the SPMAGTF was free to devote more energy to resurrecting the infrastructure of Cap-Haïtien. The Combat Service Support detachment already had cleared some of the mounds of garbage and sewage from city streets and canals, removed derelict fishing vessels and small merchantmen which were blocking access to the port, and delivered supplies to the local hospital, where treatment and care was very basic. Jones wanted to turn on the lights in town. As he put it, the local population had given the Marines a great reception and he wanted to give them something tangible in return. And so, after a lot of hard work by Marine engineers under the direction of the SPMAGTF Carib's executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel John D. McGuire, the lights came on again in Cap-Haïtien on the evening of 29 September. It was, in the restrained words of Captain John T Quinn, II "a very popular measure."⁵²

Even before turning on the lights, Lieutenant Colonel McGuire, the de facto civil-military operations coordinator on scene, had been looking for a charity or nongovernmental organization that could distribute food to the still very hungry population. He faced the same problem that SPMAGTF Marines and sailors had encountered when delivering supplies to the local hospital:



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Marines in Cap-Haïtien stand ready to maintain order during a pro-Aristide demonstration scheduled for 30 September. However, as the picture suggests, the streets were largely empty because many townspeople were more interested in going to the SPMAGTF's food distribution centers.



Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

The crowds at the food distribution points grew to where the SPMAGTF felt it necessary to position amphibious assault vehicles to maintain order.

finding someone who was responsible and efficient but not associated with the abuses of the previous regime and not disposed to divert the supplies to their own needs. In the end, the Marines decided to establish and run their own distribution points.⁵³

On 30 September and again on 1 October, two distribution points opened for business. The reaction to the giveaway was enthusiastic—so enthusiastic that, on 30 September, a large pro-Aristide demonstration in the heart of town fizzled as would-be demonstrators migrated to the distribution points. The relief operation went well and Haitians who wanted food lined up in an orderly fashion and waited their turn. But, there was one day at one of the distribution points when Marines could not control the crowds despite the use of pepper spray, and had to close early. First Lieutenant Daniel Q. Greenwood, 2d Battalion's 81mm Mortar Platoon commander, remembered that, after the site opened around 0900, the crowd of hundreds grew and extended in single file for four or five city blocks. The Marines of Battery B, 10th Marines, conducted crowd control in the streets around the compound and the 81mm platoon provided perimeter security. The situation deteriorated as the food ran out. Two-thirds of the

crowd received nothing. Several scuffles between Haitians broke out but were easily controlled by the Marines. Interpreters helped to disperse the crowd, and by 1400 the situation had returned to normal.⁵⁴ The result was the somewhat incongruous picture of grim and businesslike Marines with fixed bayonets guarding their relief effort from then on.

The next phase was turning the area of operations over to the Army and loading back onto the amphibious ships in accordance with the long-standing plan for the Marines to land, secure the area and depart, the classical equation for Marine operations. The process had begun as early as 25 September when advance elements of the U.S. Army's 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, began to arrive in Cap-Haitien. When the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, arrived on the afternoon of 1 October, loading began in earnest. It was complete by 1600 on 2 October. A few hours later, the special task force sailed for Roosevelt Roads for a thorough equipment wash down, another traditional Marine evolution after a landing on foreign shores and mandated by Department of Agriculture regulations to limit the spread of disease through parasites. After the better part of a week in port, the Marines reloaded their equip-

ment and boarded their ships again to return to Haitian waters, where they served as a floating reserve until 17 October. After a few more days of steaming, the amphibious ready group docked at Morehead City, North Carolina. Most of the Marines returned to Camp Lejeune and SPMAGTF Carib was deactivated.⁵⁵

Reflecting on the operation in the months that followed, Colonel Jones and Major Greenwood, his operations officer, felt a justifiable sense of satisfaction with their accomplishments. First among Jones' reflections was that Marines had not had to land with guns blazing. While no one was able to muster much sympathy for the Haitian army, there would have been many civilian casualties in the small, congested city.

Both officers were satisfied with how the special task force had performed. Greenwood again emphasized his conclusion the operation had showcased the capabilities of a conventional Marine Corps regimental staff and of a SPMAGTF, with their ability to deploy and adapt to a variety of ambiguous situations in short order. This adaptability would be given form three years later when the Commandant of the Marine Corps,

General Charles C. Krulak, described future urban operations as the "three block war," where Marines "can expect to be providing humanitarian assistance in one part of the city, conducting peacekeeping operations in another and be fighting a lethal mid-intensity battle in yet a third part of the city."⁵⁶

Since the SPMAGTF came with its own floating airfield and supply dump, air operations and logistics were almost completely trouble-free. Colonel Jones commented that, if there were any unsung heroes, they were Major Lance R. McBride of the Combat Service Support detachment and Major Mark C. Dobbs, the task force's logistics officer. Jones went on to say the successful landing at Cap-Haïtien had demonstrated the value of rehearsals and aerial reconnaissance, especially reconnaissance from the Kiowa Warrior helicopter. Once ashore, the various attachments—such as the psychological operations detachment, the linguists and the Special Forces, which kept their finger on the pulse of the outlying towns—had also proven their worth.⁵⁷

Colonel Jones emphasized two intangible lessons. One was that "cooperation ... with the for-



Photo courtesy of Capt Charles G. Grow

Marines from Companies E and F, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, augmented the vehicle-mounted Marines. With fixed bayonets they stood behind billows of concertina wire. One Marine, forward of the line, and in an almost gentle gesture, tries to guide and restrain the crowd at the food distribution point.



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Their mission with Operation Uphold Democracy accomplished, members of Company F, 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, board a U.S. Navy air cushioned landing craft for the ride back to the USS Wasp.

mer perpetrators of abuse and violence never work[s].” His point was that to “win the hearts and minds of the populace—essential in a Haiti-type scenario—U.S. forces cannot support the symbol of past repression.” And that was one of the most satisfying aspects of the operation. It was, Colonel Jones said, profoundly moving to see “literally thousands of men, women and children, tears streaming down their faces, chant and celebrate in sheer jubilation.” While they may not have understood the concept of democracy, they felt the “yoke of oppression” being lifted from their shoulders.⁵⁸

But what impressed Jones the most about the operation was the performance of the small unit leaders, the lieutenants, sergeants and corporals. They had successfully confronted “uncertainty, disorder and ambiguity ... in emotionally charged ... and potentially deadly street[s] when decisions [had to] ... be made instantaneously,” when there was no time to find out what the captain or the colonel wanted to do. Guided by clear rules of engagement, they had acted with common sense, discipline, restraint, and decisiveness.⁵⁹

Looking at Uphold Democracy from his van-

tage point as Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command, General John J. Sheehan, USMC, came to the same conclusion. The operation had demonstrated the value of detailed yet flexible joint force planning. But more than anything, it had been a platoon commander’s war, its success was tied more to the actions of lieutenants and sergeants than to the plans of generals or admirals. Like the refugee operations that started in 1991 in the Caribbean, it was the selection, education, and training of small unit leaders that determined the outcome of the operation long before any Marines embarked for Haiti.⁶⁰

Epilogue

After the Marines left Haiti, General Shelton’s Joint Task Force 180 continued to consolidate the gains of the occupation. In mid-October 1994, the military dictator, General Cedras, stepped down and left the country forever. His departure paved the way for the triumphant return of President Aristide, who remained as popular as the Haitian military had been unpopular. Five weeks after the initial landing, General Shelton and the XVIII

Airborne Corps redeployed to the United States, leaving Joint Task Force 190 in charge. Its commander, Major General David C. Meade, USA, was also commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division. That division formed the initial core of the remaining occupation forces which operated in Haiti for some five months before ceding control in March 1995 to a smaller multinational force subordinate to the United Nations Mission in Haiti. This multinational force also was American-led and included a U.S. contingent, which served in country until March 1996, when all but a handful of U.S. troops returned home. By then there was a new Haitian national police force on the

streets and the now-defunct Haitian armed forces were fast becoming an unhappy memory.

The after-action analyses written in 1997 and 1998 were guardedly optimistic about the future of Haiti. The United States-United Nations forces had created a "safe and secure" environment for Haiti to recover from years of oppression, nothing more and nothing less.⁶¹ The analysts concluded that Operation Uphold Democracy and its successors had given Haiti "critical breathing space," a chance to recover from the embargo and create a working democracy. What happened next was up to the government of Haiti, not the U.S. military.⁶²

NOTES

Chapter 1 Operation GTMO

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5. Ibid, p. 18; BGen George H. Walls, Jr., 13Nov92 intvw (Oral History Collection, MCHC), hereafter Walls intvw.
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8. Col Gary A. Blair intvw, 25Feb94, hereafter Blair intvw.
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20. CJTF GTMO msg 111957ZDec91 (MCRC).
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24. Walls intvw.
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26. CJTF GTMO msg 111957ZDec91.
27. Anon, "Tent City Living Up to Its Name," *Jacksonville Daily News*, 14Dec91, p. 1A.
28. Ibid.; JTF, Operation GTMO, briefing book dtd Jan92.
29. Ibid.
30. JTF J-2, Operation Take Charge, video tape dtd Dec91.
31. Ibid.; Walls intvw; Berry intvw; MB Guantanamo Bay Comd for 1991 (MCHC); CO, MB Guantanamo Bay, Humanitarian Service Medal Input, 24Feb92 (MCRC); CJTF GTMO msg 160401ZDec91 (MCRC). The 16 December message contains an incomplete date/time group when referring to the first day of rioting, which all other sources put as 15 December.
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- also: MB ComdC for 1991 (MCHC).
34. CJTF GTMO msg 160401ZDec91 (MCRC) refers to another message, CJTF GTMO 152300ZDec91, The Deployment of Additional Forces, which was most likely Gen Walls' formal request for reinforcements.
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 39. Ibid.
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 67. Ibid, at Appendix I is a breakdown of costs.
 68. BGen George H. Walls, Jr., 22Mar92 intvw (NHC Oral Interview, Accession Number 937032).
 69. See Neal intvw.
 70. Marine Corps lessons Learned System, Numbers 31737-33346 and 31240-10665, both dated 29Mar92. See also Poggi intvw.
 71. See Poggi intvw, Walls intvw, and Tom Bartlett, "Operation Guantanamo," *Leatherneck*, Apr92, pp. 36.

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2. Ibid., and MGen Michael J. Williams intvw, 14Dec95, hereafter Williams intvw.
3. MarForLant Fax to II MEF G-5 17May94.
4. Shissler intvw
5. Richard Jerome and Meg Grant, "Cool in the Hot Seat," *People*, 26Aug94, pp. 85-86.
6. LtCol John R. Allen intvw, 24Aug96, hereafter Allen intvw; Shissler intvw.
7. Ibid.
8. MajGen Michael J. Williams diary, entry for 22Jun94, hereafter Williams diary.
9. Allen intvw.
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17. Ibid.
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19. Copy in GTMO/Haiti Collection, MCHC. See also 2d Bn, 6th Mar ComdC, Jul-Dec 94 (MCHC).
20. Allen intvw.
21. LtCol John M. McAdams, Jr., intvw 6Dec96, hereafter McAdams intvw.
22. Col Douglas C. Redlich intvw, 12Apr96, hereafter Redlich intvw; and Captain Franz J. Gayl intvw, 11Dec96, hereafter Gayl intvw.
23. Williams intvw.
24. Steven Greenhouse, "Islands to Let U.S. Process Haitian Refugees," *The New York Times*, 4Jun94, p. A 4.
25. Gayl and Redlich intvws.
26. CJFT 160 msg 200253ZJun94.
27. MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 9-10. This was an unofficial command chronology since MarFor 160, being an ad hoc group, was not required to submit an official chronology to HQMC.
28. McAdams intvw.
29. Ibid., Redlich intvw, MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 17.
30. MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 19-20.
31. Williams diary entry for 22Jun94.
32. Ibid.
33. Williams diary entry for 24Jun94.
34. Williams diary entry for 27Jun94.
35. Williams diary entry for 4Jul94.
36. Williams diary entry for 10Jul94.
37. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 18.
38. Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Shelves Plan to Transfer Haitians to Third Countries," *The New York Times*, 3Aug94, p. A 8.
39. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 19.
40. Ibid., p. 29 and CJTF Grand Turk msg 151830zJul94.
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42. Ibid., p. 31 and Williams diary entries for 13 and 14Jul94.
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44. Williams diary entry for 18Jul94.
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47. Ibid., pp. 26-28.
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52. CJTF Grand Turk msg 252215ZJul94; Williams diary entry for 17Aug94.
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54. MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 6-7.
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57. Williams diary entry for 6Jul94.
58. CJTF 160 Det Jamaica 0618000ZJul94.
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62. Williams diary entries for 7Jul94, 8Jul94, and 13-14Jul94.
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64. Williams diary entries for 15Jul94, 21Jul94, and 22Jul94; Graham, "Tent City."
65. Ibid.
66. Williams diary entry for 28-29Jul94.
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68. Williams diary entry for 1Aug94; see also Shissler intvw.
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72. Ann Devoy, "U.S. to Double Refugee Capacity at Guantanamo," *The Washington Post*, 25Aug94, p. A 1.
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78. Williams diary entry for 27Aug94.
79. Maj John E. Stone intvw 19Mar97, hereafter Stone intvw; Col John R. Allen memo to author, 5Mar00.
80. Allen intvw.
81. Allen intvw; Stone intvw.
82. Williams diary entries for 29Aug94 and 1Sep94.
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84. See, for example, Williams diary entry for 6Sep94.
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Chapter 3

Crisis

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3. Williams diary entry for 6Sep94.
4. Williams diary entry for 9Sep94.
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9. Ibid., pp. 47-48; Gayl intvw.
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11. Himes intvw.
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14. Salasko intvw; Allen intvw.
15. Salasko intvw; Hime intvw; Shissler intvw.
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17. Ibid.; Salasko intvw.
18. Ibid.; Himes intvw.
19. MarFor ComdC, p. 48.
20. Ibid., p. 49; Gayl intvw; Redlich intvw.
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22. MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 49-50.
23. Ibid.; Gayl intvw.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.; MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 50-51.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.; Gayl intvw.
28. Williams diary entry for 10Sep94; MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 51.
29. Ibid., p. 52.
30. Stone intvw.
31. Ibid.
32. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 52.
33. Stone intvw; Significant Events Timeline.
34. MB Guantanamo Bay, COC Log for 11Sep94.
35. Ibid.; MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 52; Significant Events Timeline. The MarFor 160 ComdC contains an apparent typographical error, placing some of these events on 12 September.
36. Salasko intvw.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.; Allen intvw.
39. Williams intvw.
40. Himes intvw.
41. Allen intvw.
42. Ibid.; see also Significant Events Timeline.
43. Williams diary entry for 11Sep94.
44. Allen intvw.
45. Ibid.; MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 53.
46. Stone intvw; Allen intvw.
47. Gayl intvw; MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 54. Once again, the date in the latter source is incorrect. The Williams diary and the Significant Events Timeline contain the correct date for the security sweep.
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49. Ibid., p. 57; Gayl intvw.
50. MarFor ComdC, p. 57.
51. Significant Events Timeline; Allen intvw; MarFor 160 ComdC, pp. 57-58.
52. Ibid., p. 58.
53. Ibid., p. 60; Allen intvw.
54. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 60.
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56. Allen intvw; Stone intvw.
57. Ibid.; MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 62.
58. Allen intvw; Stone intvw.
59. Allen intvw.
60. Ibid.; Significant Events Timeline.
61. MarFor 160 ComdC, p. 63.
62. Williams diary entry for 11Sep94.
63. Williams diary entry for 26Sep94.
64. Significant Events Timeline in Col John R. Allen papers; Redlich, Allen intvws.
65. Williams diary entry for 15Sep94.
66. Shissler intvw.
67. Williams diary entry for 20Sep94.
68. Williams diary entry for 24-25Sep94.
69. Ibid.; see also Williams diary entry for 28Sep94.
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72. Allen, "Humanitarian Operations."
73. Beavers intvw.
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 79. Beavers intvw; Salasko intvw; Capt Kevin P. McLernon intvw, 11Nov95, hereafter McLernon intvw.
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 84. McClernon intvw.
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 87. Ibid.
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 89. Ibid. See also: Maj Forrest L. Marrion, USAFR, Development of a Haitian Public Security Force September 1994-March 1995 (Norfolk, VA: Office of the Command Historian, n.d.)
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 93. Maj Gilbert Desroches intvw, 2Jan96, hereafter Desroches intvw. See also: Anon., "Officials in Panama Say They'll Accept 10,000 from Haiti," *The New York Times*, 5Jul94, p. A 7; John A. Pitts, Migrant Resettlement Operations, Supplement Number 2 to U.S. SouthCom Command History (Miami: U.S. SouthCom, 1998)
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 109. Ibid.
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 112. Desroches intvw.
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 119. Capdepon and Desroches intvws.
 120. Capdepon intvw.
 121. Capdepon and Desroches intvws; Desroches ltr, 28Jan97; MCSFCo msg 101450ZDec94.
 122. Ibid.
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 124. Ibid.; MCSFCo msg 101450ZDec94.
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Chapter 4

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3. Ibid.; see also John R. Ballard, *Upholding Democracy, The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994-1997* (Westport, Ct: Praeger, 1998), hereafter Ballard, *Upholding Democracy*.
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Appendix A

Marine Units

Operation GTMO

- 2d Force Service Support Group
 - Detachments, Headquarters and Service Battalion
 - Detachments, Battalion Service Support Group 6
 - Detachments, 8th Engineer Support Battalion
- Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force, Guantanamo Bay
- Battery H, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines (Nov-Dec91)
- Detachments, Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team Company
- 2d Battalion, 8th Marines (Dec91)
- Detachments, Command Element, II Marine Expeditionary Force

Operation Sea Signal (Jamaica and Guantanamo Bay)

- 2d Force Service Support Group
 - Detachments, Headquarters and Service Battalion
 - Detachments, 2d Landing Support Battalion
 - Detachments, 8th Engineer Support Battalion
 - Detachments, 2d Maintenance Battalion
 - Detachments, 2d Supply Battalion
 - Combat Service Support Detachment 61
- 2d Battalion, 4th Marines/2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Jun-Sep94)*
- Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force, Guantanamo Bay
- Detachments, 2d Tank Battalion (Reinforcing Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force)
- Command Element, 8th Marines (Sep-Dec95)
- Detachments, Command Element, II Marine Expeditionary Force
- Detachments, 2d Marine Air Wing
- Detachments, 2d Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group
- Detachments, Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune
- 1st Battalion, 2d Marines (Sep-Dec94)
- Detachments, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines
- Detachments, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines
- Detachments, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines
- Detachments, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
- Detachments, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division
- Composite Company, 23d Marines (Nov-Dec94)

* The designation for 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, was changed to 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, in July 1994.

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Company E, 2d Battalion, 25th Marines (Sep-Oct94)

Company F, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines (Oct-Nov94)

3d Battalion, 2d Marines (Jul-Oct95)

Detachments, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion (Jul-Oct95)

3d Battalion, 6th Marines (Jan-Feb95)

1st Battalion, 6th Marines (Sep-Dec95)

Operations Able Vigil and Able Manner (Seaborne Interdiction of Migrants)

Detachments, 2d Tank Battalion

Detachments, 10th Marines

Detachments, Headquarters Battalion, 2d Marine Division

Detachments, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Detachments, 8th Marines

Operation Safe Haven (Panama)

Marine Corps Security Force Company, Panama

Operations Support Democracy and Uphold Democracy (Haiti)

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit

3d Battalion, 6th Marines

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266

MEU Service Support Group 24

Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean

Detachments, Headquarters, 2d Marines

2d Battalion, 2d Marines

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264

Combat Service Support Detachment 29

Battery B, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines

Company B, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Appendix B

Marine Commanders

Operation GTMO

Commanding General/Commanding Officer, Joint Task Force GTMO

BGen George H. Walls, Jr. (Nov91-Mar92)

BGen Richard I. Neal (Jun-Aug92)

Col Lawrence R. Zinser (Dec92-Mar93)

Marine Forces/Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force, Guantanamo Bay

Col Gary A. Blair (91-92)

Col John T. Murray (92-94)

2d Battalion, 8th Marines

LtCol James C. Hardee

Operation Sea Signal

Commanding General/Commanding Officer, Joint Task Force 160

BGen Michael J. Williams (May-Oct94)

BGen Raymond P. Ayres, Jr. (Oct94-Feb95)

Col John C. McKay (Nov95-Apr96)

Marine Forces (MarFor) 160*

Col Douglas C. Redlich (May-Oct94)

Col Douglas O. Hendricks (Oct94-Mar95)

Col Kevin E. Leffler (Mar-Aug95)

Col Michael R. Lehnert (Aug-Nov95)

Joint Security Group JTF 160

BGen Raymond P. Ayres, Jr. (Sep-Oct94)

Col Jennings B. Beavers II (Oct-Dec94)

2d Battalion, 4th Marines/2d Battalion 6th Marines

LtCol John R. Allen**

1st Battalion, 2d Marines

LtCol Dennis J. Hejlik

3d Battalion, 2d Marines

LtCol Joseph V. Medina

1st Battalion, 6th Marines

LtCol Jack K. Sparks

Marine Barracks Ground Defense/Security Force, Guantanamo Bay

Col John M. Himes

* The commanding officer, MarFor 160 was also commander, JTG Bulkeley from August 1994 to November 1995.

** The designation for 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, was changed to 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, in July 1994.

Operation Safe Haven

Marine Corps Security Force Company
Maj Gilbert Desroches

Operations Support Democracy and Uphold Democracy

Commanding Officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit
Col Martin R. Berndt

Commanding Officer, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean
Col Thomas S. Jones

2d Battalion, 2d Marines, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean
LtCol George S. Hartley

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Caribbean
LtCol Anthony J. Zell

Combat Support Service Detachment 29, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean
Maj Lance R. McBride

Appendix C

Chronology of Caribbean Operations

Sep 1991	Haitian Armed Forces overthrow President Aristide.
Oct 1991	Haitian migrants set sail for Florida to escape political and economic oppression.
22-25 Nov 1991	Under command of BGen George H. Walls, Jr., JTF GTMO deploys to Guantanamo Bay to care for rescued migrants.
5-17 Dec 1991	Disturbances in migrant camps at Guantanamo Bay.
Feb 1992	JTF GTMO begins to repatriate migrants to Haiti.
24 May 1992	Administration announces that rescued migrants will be returned to Haiti while JTF GTMO continues to downsize.
Aug 1992-Jun 1993	JTF GTMO runs camp for HIV-positive Haitian migrants.
Jul 1993	U.S./U.N. initiative to restore President Aristide culminates in Governor's Island Accord.
Oct 1993	The USS <i>Harlan County</i> unable to disembark U.S./U.N. peacekeepers at Port-au-Prince.
Oct 1993	Governor's Island Accord considered as a dead letter in wake of the <i>Harlan County</i> incident.
Jan 1994	JTF 180 established under LtGen Henry H. Shelton to plan for invasion of Haiti.
18 May 1994	JTF 160 established under BGen Michael J. Williams to care for new seaborne migrants.
Mid-Jun 1994	Operation Sea Signal begins: Haitian migrants processed on USNS <i>Comfort</i> off Jamaica.
Jun 1994	MarFor 160 begins to construct camp on Grand Turk.
6 Jul 1994	General Williams shifts his flag from Jamaica to Guantanamo.
Jul-Aug 1994	Haitian migrants processed by ArFor 160 at Camp McCalla in Guantanamo.
Aug 1994	MarFor 160 returns from Grand Turk to process Cubans at Camp Bulkeley and other overflow camps in Guantanamo.
9 Sep 1994	First Cuban migrants break out of camps, disorder begins.
10-11 Sep 1994	Disorders continue and escalate.
12-13 Sep 1994	Order restored during Operation Clean Sweep.
Mid-Sep 1994	"Quality of life" and security upgrades begin at Guantanamo.
19 Sep 1994	Main effort of JTF 180 lands at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, in Operation Uphold Democracy.
20 Sep 1994	As part of JTF 180, Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Caribbean lands at Cap-Haïtien, Haiti.
Sep-Oct 1994	8,600 Cuban migrants relocated to camps in Panama.
1-2 Oct 1994	SPMAGTF Carib withdraws from Cap-Haïtien, Haiti.
7 Dec 1994	Cuban migrants in Panama begin series of outbreaks.
8-15 Dec 1994	Marine Corps Security Force Company (Panama) plays pivotal role in restoring order.
Feb 1995	Cuban migrants return from Panama to Guantanamo.
Feb-Apr 1995	"Quality of life" phase continues in Cuban camps at Guantanamo.
2 May 1995	Announcement of new parole policy for Cuban migrants.
Aug-Oct 1995	Lotteries for parole into United States in Cuban camps.
Oct 1995	Last Haitian migrants at Guantanamo go to U.S. or return to Haiti.
31 Jan 1996	Last Cuban migrant departs Guantanamo for United States.
Feb-Mar 1996	Repatriation of JTF 160 equipment and personnel.
2 Feb 1996	Formal ceremony to disestablish JTF 160.

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Mar 1996

Remaining U.S. troops return home from occupation duty in Haiti.

11 Apr 1996

Last members of JTF 160 cease work at Guantanamo.

Appendix D

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

Able Manner	The Coast Guard/Navy operation to interdict and rescue Haitian migrants in the summer of 1994, augmented by shipboard security teams from 2d Marine Division.
Able Vigil	The extension of Able Manner in late summer 1994 when thousands of Cuban migrants set sail for Florida; also augmented by shipboard security teams from 2d Marine Division.
ArFor	Army Forces, here the abbreviation for the Army component of a JTF.
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group, a group of amphibious ships, with Marines embarked.
CinCLant	Commander in Chief, Atlantic, the parent command in Norfolk, Virginia, of Navy and Marine forces deployed to the Caribbean in 1991.
CSSD	Combat Service Support Detachment, the logistics component of a MAGTF.
CP	Command Post.
EPW	Enemy Prisoner of War.
flexicuffs	Lightweight plastic strips for use as temporary handcuffs.
FMFLant	Fleet Marine Forces, Atlantic, 1991 title for the Marine organization subordinate to CinCLant.
FSSG	Force Service Support Group, the designation for the major Marine Corps commands that provide logistical support to operating components.
GDF	Ground Defense Force, the MCSFCo when augmented by the platoon of sailors from Rodman Naval Station, Panama; the term was also part of the official title of Marine Barracks, Guantanamo Bay.
GTI	Grand Turk Island, one of the Turks and Caicos Islands.
GTMO	Operation GTMO, the operation to care for Haitian migrants at Guantanamo Bay from 1991 to 1993. Although an abbreviation, GTMO (pronounced "git'mo") was the official codename of the operation.
Humvee	High mobility medium wheeled vehicle, the official designation of the medium-sized tactical vehicle that replaced the jeep to carry personnel and light cargo. Humvee is the nickname for the official HMMWV abbreviation.
J-2	The intelligence component of a JTF staff.
J-3	The operations component of a JTF staff.
J-4	The logistics component of a JTF staff.
JTF	Joint Task Force, a task force with components from more than one Service.
JTG	Joint Task Group, a subordinate component of a JTF.
LantCom	Atlantic Command, until 1993 the title for the headquarters of the unified command in Norfolk, Virginia, commanded by CinCLant.
LCAC	Landing Craft, Air-Cushioned, the military version of the hovercraft.
LCU	Landing Craft, Utility, conventional landing craft for ship-to-shore movement.
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force, a composite Marine unit task-organized for expeditionary operations, includes air, ground and support components.
MarFor	Marine Forces, the abbreviation for the Marine component of the JTFs.
MarForLant	Marine Forces, Atlantic, after 1993 the title used for the Marine component of the forces under Commander in Chief, USACom.
MCHC	Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

MCSFCo	Marine Corps Security Force Company, the formal title for the Marines at Marine Barracks, Panama.
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force, here II MEF, the umbrella command subordinate to FMFLant and, later, MarForLant; 2d Force Service Support Group, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, and 2d Marine Division were subordinate to II MEF.
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit, a Marine amphibious force package built around a battalion landing team, composite helicopter squadron and support detachment.
NavFor	Navy Forces, abbreviation for the Navy component of a JTF.
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, usually a term for rescuing civilians.
ROE	Rules of Engagement, typically regulating the use of deadly force.
S-2	Intelligence component of a battalion or regimental staff.
S-3	Operations component of a battalion or regimental staff.
S-4	Logistics component of a battalion or regimental staff.
Safe Harbor	Interim codename for Operation GTMO.
Safe Haven	Codename for the operation to care for Cuban migrants in Panama in 1994 and 1995.
Safe Passage	Codename for the operation to return Cuban migrants from Panama to Guantanamo Bay in early 1995.
Sea Signal	Operation Sea Signal, the codename for JTF 160's operations to care for Cuban and Haitian migrants from 1994 to 1996.
SouthCom	Southern Command, the unified command based in Panama that covers operations in Latin America.
SPMAGTF	Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force, a type of MAGTF.
STA	Surveillance and Target Acquisition, Marines performing reconnaissance functions.
Support Democracy	Codename officially in use from Sep 1993 to Sep 1994 for operations to restore the legitimate government of Haiti; focus was on maritime interdiction.
TCI Uphold Democracy	Turks and Caicos Islands, a British dependency north of Cuba. Codename officially in use from May 1994 to Mar 1995 for operations to restore the legitimate government of Haiti; covers invasion and occupation of Haiti.
USACom	U.S. Atlantic Command, a designation for CinCLant in use after October 1993, subsequently changed to Joint Forces Command. Headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia, it was the parent command of JTF 160.

Appendix E

Citations

JOINT TASK FORCE GTMO

CITATION:

The Joint Task Force Guantanamo distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service from 22 November 1991 through 2 July 1993. During this period, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and coastguardmen of Joint Task Force Guantanamo provided emergency temporary humanitarian assistance to Haitian migrants under extraordinary circumstances that involved international interest. The Joint Task Force off-loaded over 35,000 migrants from Coast Guard and Navy vessels and provided them shelter, security, nourishment, and medical attention. It also coordinated multi-agency operations to identify, process, and transport Haitians to the United States, back to Haiti and to other countries. With empathy and dedication to duty, the Joint Task Force professionally aided large numbers of migrants during a period of extreme tension, simultaneously serving United States immigration interests and furthering United States international policy. These difficult tasks were accomplished in a superior fashion over many months despite political and legal controversy, limited logistical support, overwhelming numbers of migrants, and the extraordinary nature of this non-doctrinal mission. By their exemplary performance of duty, the members of Joint Task Force Guantanamo have brought great credit to themselves and to the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 31st day of March 1994

John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

JOINT TASK FORCE 160

CITATION:

The Joint Task Force 160, Guantanamo distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious achievement from 20 May 1994 to 19 May 1995. During this period, the soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen, and coastguardsmen of Joint Task Force 160 provided emergency temporary humanitarian assistance to both Cuban and Haitian migrants under extraordinary circumstances that involved international interest. The Joint Task Force interdicted on the high seas, transported and off-loaded over 50,000 Caribbean migrants from Coast Guard and Navy vessels, and provided shelter, security, nourishment, and medical attention. It also coordinated multi-agency operations at various centers throughout the Caribbean to identify, process, and transport Cuban and Haitian migrants to the United States, safe haven locations, and back to Haiti or Cuba. With empathy and dedication to duty, the Joint Task Force professionally aided large numbers of migrants during periods of extreme tension, while simultaneously serving U.S. immigration interests and furthering U.S. immigration interests and U.S. national policy. These difficult and complex tasks were accomplished in a superior fashion over many months despite political and legal controversy, limited logistical support, overwhelming numbers of migrants, and the extraordinary nature of this non-doctrinal mission. By their exemplary performance of duty, the members of Joint Task Force 160 have brought great credit upon themselves and the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 23rd day of June 1995.

John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

MAJOR GILBERT DESROCHES, USMC

CITATION:

Major Gilbert Desroches, United States Marine Corps, distinguished himself by exceptionally meritorious achievement while serving as Commander, Marine Security Force Company, Rodman Naval Station, Panama, on 8 December 1994. Major Desroches deployed his company to Empire Range, Panama, as part of a quick reaction force in support of Joint Task Force Safe Haven to help repel an uprising by a large group of detained personnel. Major Desroches and his Marines moved to the vicinity of Contractor's Hill where they were confronted by the advancement of approximately 500 riotous Cubans. Greatly outnumbered, Major Desroches quickly and expertly analyzed the situation and placed his company in a blocking position. Although Cubans in three commandeered vehicles attempted to breach the company's position, he exhibited exceptional leadership, discipline, and courage, enabling the Marines to effectively halt the Cuban advance. Major Desroches, with effective dialogue, calmed the outraged mob and convinced them to return to their camp. His exceptional initiative helped defuse a potentially volatile situation. The distinctive accomplishments of Major Desroches reflect great credit upon himself, the United States Marine Corps, and the Department of Defense.

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