Timber

Timber production also declined dramatically after independence. Production of logs dropped from 555,000 cubic meters in 1973 to below 40,000 cubic meters in 1981 and 1982. Nonetheless, the government was interested in promoting production to supply local manufacturing. Some valued woods, such as mahogany, grow in the rain forests in Cabinda, where there are also eucalyptus, pine, and cypress plantations. A new state forestry company was established in 1983 with aid from Cuba to revive the industry in Cabinda, and by 1985 log production had risen to 113,000 cubic meters. In 1986 the Panga-Panga enterprise of Cabinda, which manufactured pressed wood, exported 123 million square meters of sheets to Italy.

Fishing

Fishing was a major industry before independence. In the early 1970s, there were about 700 fishing boats, and the annual catch was more than 300,000 tons. Including the catch of foreign fishing fleets in Angolan waters, the combined annual catch was estimated at 1 million tons. Following independence and into the late 1980s, however, the local fishing industry had fallen into disarray, the result of the flight of local skilled labor and the return of the fishing boats to Portugal. By 1986 only 70 of the 143 fishing boats in Namibe, the port that normally handled two-thirds of the Angolan catch, were operable. Furthermore, most of the fish-processing factories were in need of repair. Once an exporter of fish meal, by 1986 Angola had insufficient supplies for its own market.

Some of the foreign fishing fleets operating in Angolan waters were required by the government to land a portion of their catch at Angolan ports to increase the local supply of fish. Fishing agreements of this kind had been reached with the Soviet Union, which operated the largest number of boats in Angolan waters, and with Spain, Japan, and Italy. Spain also agreed to help rehabilitate the Angolan fishing industry in exchange for fishing rights. In other cases, the government allowed foreign fleets to export their entire catch in exchange for license fees.

In the mid-1980s, the government began rehabilitating the fishing industry, especially in Namibe and Benguela provinces. The first priority was to replace and repair aging equipment. To accomplish this goal, the government was receiving a significant amount of foreign assistance. In 1987 the EEC announced plans to provide funds to help rebuild the Dack Doy shipyards and two canning

plants in Tombua. Spain sold Angola thirty-seven steel-hull boats for US$70 million, and fourteen modern fishing boats were on order from Italy.

Industry

Under the Portuguese, the manufacturing sector grew rapidly because of the substantial increase in the size of the white settler population, the creation of a large domestic market for goods, and the strict exchange controls imposed in 1962 that encouraged investment in local industry. The manufacturing sector was dominated by light industries that produced consumer goods, especially the food-processing industry, which accounted for 46 percent of the value of manufactured output in 1973. In contrast, heavy industries accounted for only 22 percent of output. When the settlers fled, most small manufacturing firms were left without their clerical work force, their managers, and even their owners; in 1976 only 284 out of 692 manufacturing businesses were operating under their old management. In reaction to the decline in the manufacturing sector, in March 1976 the MPLA government enacted the Law on State Intervention and nationalized all of the abandoned businesses. However, by 1985 industrial production was only 54 percent of its real value in 1973.

In the years immediately following independence, the government spent large sums to put plants back into operation, but its plans were overly ambitious, and it overestimated the state's capacity to keep factories supplied with necessary materials and inputs. In the early 1980s, investment was cut drastically, as the government sought to control expenditures and the foreign exchange deficit. Because of limited funding, projects were more carefully selected, and there was clearer recognition of the need for simultaneous restructuring in other sectors, particularly those supplying raw materials for manufacture. By 1986 approximately 180 companies were operating in the manufacturing sector, and their output was equal to about 13 percent of GDP. Of that amount, state-run companies accounted for 56 percent.

Among the most acute problems for industrial rehabilitation were shortages of raw materials, unreliable supplies of water and electricity, and labor instability. The decline in domestic production of many raw materials has been especially critical in the decline in local manufacturing. For example, by 1986 only a small fraction of the 8,000 tons of cotton needed annually by the textile industry was supplied locally, while during the early 1970s Angola exported raw cotton. The deterioration of the water supply system has also damaged many industries, especially breweries, as

have cutoffs in electricity supply. Furthermore, labor problems, a consequence of a shortage of skilled workers and disincentives to work for wages in an inflated economy, have depleted the local work force. Foreign exchange constraints have also prevented many industries from importing the necessary raw materials.

Electric Power

Angola is especially well endowed with potential sources for the production of electricity, both hydroelectric (estimated in 1986 at 7,710 megawatts potential capacity) and thermal (using locally produced oil). By 1986, however, a total of only 367 megawatts of generating capacity existed at the country's main power stations. Power stations on four rivers traditionally supplied most of the electricity consumed in the main urban areas: the Cambambe station on the Cuanza River and the Mabubas station on the Dande River provided electricity to the capital and the north, the Biópio and Lomaum stations on the Catumbela River supplied cities in the central provinces, and the Matala station on the Cunene River was the main source of power in the south. The Ruacaná station, also on the Cunene River near the border with Namibia, was under South African control during much of the 1980s. In addition, thermal stations in Luanda, Namibe, Cabinda, Huambo, Biópio, Uíge, and Lubango supplied power. However, these regional power systems were not connected. Furthermore, there were separate local grids in Cabinda and in the diamond-mining area of Lunda Norte Province.

Repairs were needed on the electrical system because of deteriorating equipment and the sabotage of stations and distribution lines. The central system has been hit repeatedly by UNITA, which in the 1980s put the Lomaum station and a substation at Alto Catumbela out of commission. Many of the power lines in the central area and in the northwest have also been cut by UNITA. Therefore, many businesses have installed their own generators and produce approximately 20 percent of the total electricity generated in Angola. In the late 1980s, the government was going ahead with plans to build a 520-megawatt hydroelectric station on the Cuanza River at Capanda to augment the northern system. The government had also reached an agreement with Brazil and the Soviet Union for financial and technical assistance in building the station for an estimated US$900 million.

Food Processing

The food-processing industry suffered not only from the general economic constraints in Angola but also from government-

Workers build drying racks at a small government-run fishing village.

imposed import restrictions. By 1988 the industry depended almost entirely on imports for its raw materials. By 1985 food processing had reached only 37 percent of its 1973 level. The most successful branches of the industry were maize processing (84 percent of the 1973 level), wheat milling (57 percent), and brewing (55 percent). Since independence, there have been some major investments in brewing and soft drinks, sugar processing, baking and flour milling, and vegetable oil production. The government controlled the bread-making industry and operated eight bakeries. Considerable improvements have been made in factory equipment to boost production; nevertheless, production came to a standstill twice in 1985 because of a lack of wheat flour.

War and the sudden departure of Portuguese technicians in 1975 adversely affected sugar production. The main problems were a decline in cane production and a deterioration in the quality of cane. Formerly grown on large Portuguese-owned plantations, cane was produced in the 1980s by state-run organizations assisted by Cuban technical advisers. After the Portuguese abandoned the plantations, most of the sugarcane plants were not maintained. The sucrose content in Angolan sugarcane dropped from a pre-1975 average of 9.5 percent to an average of only 3.5 percent in 1987, making it necessary to grow nearly three times as much cane to produce the equivalent amount of sugar. Among many other problems that aggravated sugar production were the shortage of water for irrigation, lack of equipment and fertilizers, theft, and poor drainage in the cane fields. Furthermore, there has been a large decline in the area cultivated, inappropriate cane varieties have been introduced, and machinery in the sugar mills has become dilapidated. Although some sugar was exported at the end of the colonial period (18,303 tons in 1973), an average of about 55,000 tons a year was imported from Cuba between 1979 and 1986.

Light Industry

By 1986 light industry, which included textiles, clothing, tobacco, soaps, matches, and plastic and wood products, had almost been restored to its preindependence level of production. The largest investments in light industry have been in two large textile projects: the Africa Têxtil plant in the city of Benguela (US$15 million), completed in 1979, and the Textang-II plant in the city of Luanda (US$45 million), completed in 1983. They each had a production capacity of more than 10 million square meters of cloth per year but have produced far less because of shortages of cotton. Other notable investments have been in wood processing (US$12 million), with projects in Cabinda and Luanda.

Assembling chairs and finishing wood at a small furniture factory

The state-owned National Textile Company (Emprêsa Nacional de Têxteis—Entex) has also suffered from a shortage of cotton. Founded in 1980, Entex had factories throughout the country and the capacity to produce 27 million square meters of cloth per year. By 1987, however, the company was turning out only 12 million square meters. Likewise, the production capacity of blankets was nearly 1.7 million per year, but only 900,000 were produced in 1986. Adding to Entex's problems, one of its major factories, Textang-I, was shut down in 1986 because of a lack of treated water and damage from mud. By 1987 no stocks of raw materials or spare parts had been replaced.

Similarly, plastics production under a state-run company was only about half of installed capacity. Operating factories abandoned by the Portuguese after 1976, the state agency suffered from a lack of materials and from aging equipment. It employed foreign technical assistants but had also been training Angolan workers at home and overseas.

Heavy Industry

By 1985 heavy industry was producing only 35 percent of its 1973 output. The main branches of this sector were the assembly of vehicles; production of steel bars and tubes, zinc sheets, and other metal products; assembly of radio and television sets; and manufacture of tires, batteries, paper, and chemical products. There have been large investments to rehabilitate steel production. Nevertheless, although imports of steel dropped from more than 58,000 tons in 1980 to 35,000 tons in 1986, Angola still imported most of its finished steel goods, including tubes, sheets, and plates.

In 1983 the government established a company to process scrap metal. The Northern Regional Enterprise for the Exploitation of Scrap Metal, located in Luanda, had the capacity to process 31,000 tons of scrap metal and produced 7,125 tons of processed scrap metal in 1985, its first year of operation. The government claimed that the efforts of this enterprise had saved US$1.4 million that would have been spent on importing scrap metal. The government planned to establish another company in Lobito, with the financial support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).

The government also controlled the automobile assembly industry through a company founded in 1978 after a Portuguese firm had been nationalized. The company consisted of a factory that assembled light vehicles; a plant, possibly at Viana, that assembled buses and heavy trucks; and a factory at Cunene that built the chassis

for all these vehicles. The light vehicle factory was particularly affected by the cutback in imports in 1982, and its output fell in 1983–84 to only 20 percent of capacity. Likewise, the bus and truck plant has experienced shutdowns because of a lack of parts. Inputs for the automobiles came from state-owned companies that produced paint, plastic seats, metal tubing, and rubber tires.

Construction Materials

Despite official support for the construction materials industry, by 1985 production of building materials still fell far short of government hopes. In 1988 the government was rehabilitating the Angolan Cement Company (Emprêsa de Cimento de Angola— Cimangola), which accounted for 90 percent of Angolan production. Cimangola was founded in 1954 and was declared a mixed enterprise after independence, with part-Danish ownership. In 1973 Cimangola produced 582,300 tons of cement, but in 1985 it produced only 183,600 tons. In 1988 the government was planning to double the production capacity of the Cimangola plant on the outskirts of Luanda through the installation of another kiln, bringing production capacity up to 750,000 tons.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Roads

The Portuguese left Angola with a relatively well-developed road network that totaled about 70,000 kilometers, 8,000 of which were paved. Since 1975, however, many bridges have been blown up, many vehicles have been destroyed, and many roads have been subject to attack by UNITA guerrillas, necessitating military convoys for road transportation. In the late 1980s, roads and railroads were still exposed to sabotage and ambush. Rural-urban trade and supply bottlenecks limited most inland industries, and transport and communications services suffered from labor shortages. The highest priority has been given to repairing the bridges linking the provincial capitals.

Railroads

In the 1980s, three different 1.067-meter gauge rail systems ran from the hinterland to major ports on the Atlantic Ocean (see fig. 10). The longest line (1,394 kilometers) was the Benguela Railway. It linked the port of Lobito with the central African rail system that served the mining regions of Shaba (Zaire) and the Zambian Copperbelt. The Benguela Railway had a rail spur to Cuima, near Huambo. In late 1988, it was operating only between Lobito and Benguela. In the south, the 899-kilometer Namibe

Figure 10. Transportation System, 1988

ZAIRE

Luachimo

Lucapa

Cuango

Saurimo

Luau

Luena

Lumbala
Nguimbo

ZAMBIA

Cuito
Cuanavale

Chiume

Mavinga

BOTSWANA

International boundary
National capital
Road
Railroad
Airport
Major port
Minor port

0 50 100   200 Kilometers
0   50   100   200 Miles

Railway linked the port of Namibe to Menongue, with branches to Chiange and to the Cassinga iron ore deposits. In the north, the Luanda Railway ran from Luanda to Malanje, with rail spurs to Caxito and Dondo. In addition, a 123-kilometer, narrow-gauge line that had run from Porto Amboim to Gabela was closed as of 1987.

All three major systems have been subject to guerrilla attacks, and service on the Benguela Railway in particular has been severely affected. By May 1986, an estimated US$69 million worth of damage had been inflicted on the line, and the company that oper- ated it had accumulated more than US$200 million in losses by 1986. Observers estimated that at least US$180 million would be needed to rehabilitate service on the line and that repairs would take five years. Similarly, traffic on the Namibe Railway has declined because of attacks by UNITA and because of the closure of the Cassinga iron mines, which had provided the line with most of its freight. Finally, by 1986 the Luanda Railway was carrying only one-fifth of the level carried in 1973, a consequence of guer- rilla attacks and the deterioration of the line.

The rehabilitation of the "Lobito corridor" has been adopted as an official SADCC project. The project included the purchase of more locomotives and wagons and the upgrading of the entire Benguela Railway from Lobito to the Zaire border. The project also included the development of the Lobito port at a cost of about US$90 million.

Ports

The decline in rail traffic has led to a decrease in activity at the country's major ports—Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe. In 1988 Luanda's port was in disrepair. It had berths for eleven ships, with adjacent rail sidings, and forty-one cranes; however, only two of the sidings and few of the cranes were operational. Dockside clear- ance was slowed not only by the nonfunctioning equipment but also by the estimated labor force daily absenteeism rate of 40 per- cent to 50 percent. The volume of freight handled by Luanda in 1986 had fallen to only 30 percent of its 1973 level.

Lobito was the main terminal on the Atlantic Ocean for the Ben- guela Railway, and in 1988 it was Angola's most efficient port. The port's management was better organized and more compe- tent than that of Luanda. In addition, there was much less pilfer- age at Lobito than at Luanda. Nonetheless, by 1986 it operated at one-fifth of its 1973 level, primarily because of the loss of Zam- bian and Zairian traffic on the Benguela Railway.

Namibe, too, was hampered by inoperable equipment and loss of traffic. The volume of cargo handled there dropped sharply

after the halt of iron ore exports, leaving the ore terminal idle.

In addition to minor general cargo ports at Ambriz, Benguela, Porto Amboim, Sumbe, and Tombua, there were major petroleum-loading facilities at the Malongo terminal in Cabinda Province and at the Soyo-Quinfuquena terminal at Soyo. In the late 1980s, some of the minor ports were taking on greater importance as road transportation became increasingly disrupted by UNITA ambushes.

To help rectify some of these transportation problems, the government had contracted with West German and Danish companies to improve port operations and to establish repair and storage facilities. The government was also involved in training pilots, sailors, and mechanics and also sent students to Portugal, Cuba, and the Soviet Union to study merchant marine subjects.

Air Transport

In contrast to other transport methods, air transport has grown, partly in response to the difficulties of land transport. The state-run national airline, Angola Airlines (Linhas Aéreas de Angola—TAAG; formerly known as Transportes Aéreos de Angola), has been highly profitable and in 1984 posted pretax profits of US$12.7 million. The airline benefited from high passenger and cargo load on its flights, the low price of jet fuel in Angola, and the low wages paid to employees. In 1988 TAAG was planning to refurbish its fleet of Boeing 737s and 707s. Because of United States opposition to the sale of American aircraft to Angola, TAAG was expected to purchase its new aircraft from Airbus Industrie of France.

Domestic service linked Luanda with Benguela, Cabinda, Huambo, Lubango, Malanje, Negage, and Soyo. Because of unrealistically low fees, demand for domestic flights was heavy. Boarding a flight, even with a confirmed reservation, was often problematic, and flight schedules were undependable. Although it operated only domestic flights before independence, TAAG has since established an extensive international route network based at the country's major airport at Luanda. TAAG offered service from Luanda to the African countries of Zaire, Zambia, Mozambique, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Congo. The company's international routes served Havana, Lisbon, Moscow, Paris, and Rome.

Telecommunications

Telecommunications in Angola have also improved since independence. The number of telephone subscribers has grown from 24,500 in 1974 to 52,000 in 1986. Luanda was estimated to have two-thirds of all telephones. Two state bodies were responsible for telecommunications: the National Telecommunications

Company (Emprêsa Nacional de Telecomunicações—Enatel) for domestic service, and the Public Telecommunications Company (Emprêsa Pública de Telecomunicações—Eptel) for international service. Enatel included twenty automatic and thirty-six manual telephone exchanges and three telex centers. Eight of the eighteen provincial capitals had automatic local and interurban services; interurban links were provided by microwave and troposcatter systems. International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat) links were provided via an earth station at Cacuaco. In December 1986, Angola resumed contacts with Intersputnik, the Soviet-sponsored international space telecommunications organization, and planned to incorporate the station at Cacuaco into the Intersputnik system. To ensure continuous international communications, in 1986 the government announced plans to install a second earth station at Benguela.

Balance of Payments, Finances, and Foreign Debt

Balance of Trade and Payments

Despite generally large trade surpluses, the national current account has been in deficit since statistics were first published in 1978. Trade surpluses have been outweighed by large deficits on "invisibles"—primarily interest and profits, transport costs, and technical assistance payments. The largest part of the outflow for interest and profits was accounted for by the payments of state-run petroleum companies abroad for amortization of their loans (see table 11, Appendix A).

By 1988 the medium-term and long-term capital account had been positive for many years because of large inflows from loans, most of which were granted by the Soviet Union on concessional terms. The centralized planning system strictly controlled external borrowing, and each year the Ministry of Planning set a ceiling on borrowing, following consultations with the National Bank of Angola (Banco Nacional de Angola—BNA).

Most of Angola's debt has been contracted on concessional terms. The effective rate of interest on medium-term and long-term debt was only 4.9 percent in 1985, and the average loan maturity was about seven years. Out of a total of US$3.25 billion in disbursed and undisbursed debt, US$2.06 billion was owed to the Soviet Union for military purchases. This amount carried very attractive terms: an annual interest rate of 3 percent and repayment over ten years, including a three-year grace period. In contrast, only 11.5 percent of loans from creditors outside Comecon were granted on a concessional basis.

*Cranes unloading cargo
at Lobito
Courtesy Richard J. Hough*

*A dock at the port in Luanda
Courtesy Richard J. Hough*

The government has taken steps to reverse the growth in imports of services, proposing new programs to train Angolans to provide key technical assistance. At the Second Party Congress in December 1985, the government proposed several steps to give priority to national companies when awarding building contracts; to cut less essential services, such as transport expenditures and international telephone and telex usage; and provisionally to suspend private transfers abroad. In particular, in March and June 1986 the government placed severe restrictions on salary transfers abroad by foreign resident workers and foreign aid workers.

Finances

Banking was a monopoly of the state-run BNA, which controlled currency, loans, and foreign debts for the private and state sectors. Reflecting the general liberalization of state economic policies adopted in 1986, the BNA has provided credit for foreign investors and has tried to encourage foreign banks to establish operations inside Angola. The BNA handled all government financial transactions and played an important role in setting fiscal policy, especially regarding permissible foreign loans and the establishment of annual ceilings on imports. The bank has been notably unsuccessful, however, in halting the decline of the kwanza, which in late 1988 traded on the parallel market for up to 2,100 per United States dollar—barely one-seventieth of its theoretical value. In fact, because the local economy was based more on barter than on monetary exchange, the BNA's primary impact has been in the area of foreign loans, which have become increasingly important to the economy.

Foreign Debt

Angola's total disbursed external debt, much of which was owed to the Soviet Union and its allies for arms purchases, totaled about US$4 billion in mid-1988. There was only a 0.3 percent rise in medium-term and long-term debt in 1986, but the buildup of arrears after the crash in oil prices resulted in a 145 percent increase in short-term debt. Arrears accounted for US$378 million, including US$224 million owed to Western countries. In 1986 the Soviet Union (Angola's largest creditor), Brazil (the second largest), and Portugal agreed to reschedule debt payments.

By the end of 1986, some debt payments were running seven to eight months late, and some Western export credit agencies denied Angola most medium-term and long-term credits. The depreciation of the United States dollar, to which the Angolan kwanza was tied, has added to the balance of payments pressure.

This situation existed because Angola's oil sales were denominated in United States dollars, while many of its imports were priced in relatively stronger European currencies. By 1987 Angola's accumulated arrears (US$378 million) and its debt-service obligations (US$442 million of principal and US$196 million of interest) equaled nearly half of its exports of goods and services.

The government in 1987 attempted to put together a financial arrangement to repay its external debts over a fifteen-year period. The minister of finance proposed raising US$1 billion on the international capital market through the issue of fifteen-year, floating-rate notes to pay off its arrears to Western creditors, to prepay principal due on nonpetroleum-related debts, and to provide approximately US$125 million in revenue. The Paris Club (see Glossary), however, turned down the proposal because of its complexity, uncertainty over its success, and the cost implications for the creditor countries. To provide an alternative, the Europeans advised Angola that they would consider debt rescheduling if the government would seek membership in the IMF. Subsequently, President dos Santos announced in August 1987 that his government intended to apply for membership in the IMF and the World Bank.

*   *   *

Information on Angola continues to be difficult to obtain. For many years, government policies and the ongoing insurgency discouraged visits by international organizations, journalists, and scholars. By the late 1980s, however, more information was becoming available. The most comprehensive source on the economy is Tony Hodges's *Angola to the 1990s*. Specific material on economic background can be gleaned from Malyn Newitt's *Portugal in Africa* and Gerald J. Bender's *Angola under the Portuguese*. Publications of multilateral organizations, such as the UN and the World Bank, are helpful for data on various aspects of the economy. Useful periodicals include the Economist Intelligence Unit's quarterly *Country Report, Jeune Afrique, West Africa, Jornal de Angola, Africa Economic Digest, Africa Research Bulletin, Marchés tropicaux et méditerranéens, Afrique-Asie,* and *Africa Hoje.* (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 4. Government and Politics

Angolans march at a political rally.

AFTER THIRTEEN YEARS of guerrilla warfare, Angola final-
ly escaped from Portuguese colonial rule in 1975, but with few of
the resources needed to govern an independent nation. When an
effort to form a coalition government comprising three liberation
movements failed, a civil war ensued. The Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de
Angola—MPLA) emerged from the civil war to proclaim a Marxist-
Leninist one-party state. The strongest of the disenfranchised move-
ments, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—UNITA),
continued to battle for another thirteen years, shifting the focus
of its opposition from the colonial power to the MPLA govern-
ment. In late 1988, the social and economic disorder resulting from
a quarter-century of violence had a pervasive effect on both in-
dividual lives and national politics.

Angola's 1975 Constitution, revised in 1976 and 1980, ratifies
the socialist revolution but also guarantees some rights of private
ownership. The ruling party, renamed the Popular Movement for
the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party (Movimento Popular de
Libertação de Angola-Partido de Trabalho—MPLA–PT) in 1977,
claimed the power of the state. Although formally subordinate to
the party, the government consolidated substantial power in its
executive branch. The president was head of the MPLA–PT, the
government, the military, and most important bodies within the
party and the government. In his first nine years in office (1979–88),
President José Eduardo dos Santos further strengthened the
presidency, broadening the influence of a small circle of advisers
and resisting pressure to concentrate more power within the
MPLA–PT. His primary goal was economic development rather
than ideological rigor, but at the same time dos Santos considered
the MPLA–PT the best vehicle for building a unified, prosperous
nation.

Among the first actions taken by the MPLA–PT was its con-
version into a vanguard party to lead in the transformation to
socialism. Throughout the 1980s, the MPLA–PT faced the daunting
task of mobilizing the nation's peasants, most of whom were con-
cerned with basic survival, subsistence farming, and avoiding the
destruction of the ongoing civil war. Only a small minority of
Angolans were party members, but even this group was torn by
internal disputes. Factional divisions were drawn primarily along

racial and ideological lines, but under dos Santos influence within the MPLA–PT gradually shifted from *mestiço* (see Glossary) to black African leadership and from party ideologues to relative political moderates.

Mass organizations were affiliated with the party in accordance with Marxist-Leninist dogma. In the face of continued insurgent warfare and deteriorating living standards, however, many social leaders chafed at party discipline and bureaucratic controls. Dos Santos worked to build party loyalty and to respond to these tensions, primarily by attempting to improve the material rewards of Marxist-Leninist state building. His greatest obstacle, however, was the destabilizing effect of UNITA and its South African sponsors; Angola's role as a victim of South Africa's destructive regional policies was central to its international image during the 1980s.

In December 1988, Angola, South Africa, and Cuba reached a long-sought accord that promised to improve Luanda's relations with Pretoria. The primary goals of the United States-brokered talks were to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and remove Cuba's massive military presence from Angola. Vital economic assistance from the United States was a corollary benefit of the peace process, conditioned on Cuba's withdrawal and the MPLA–PT's rapprochement with UNITA. Despite doubts about the intentions of all three parties to the accord, international hopes for peace in southwestern Africa were high.

Background

Political units in southwestern Africa evolved into complex structures long before the arrival of the first Portuguese traveler, Diogo Cão, in 1483. The Bantu-speaking and Khoisan-speaking hunters the Portuguese encountered were descendants of those who had peopled most of the region for centuries. Pastoral and agricultural villages and kingdoms had also arisen in the northern and central plateaus. One of the largest of these, the Kongo Kingdom, provided the earliest resistance to Portuguese domination (see Kongo Kingdom, ch. 1). The Bakongo (people of Kongo) and their southern neighbors, the Mbundu, used the advantage of their large population and centralized organization to exploit their weaker neighbors for the European slave trade.

To facilitate nineteenth-century policies emphasizing the extraction of mineral and agricultural resources, colonial officials reorganized villages and designed transportation routes to expedite marketing these resources. Colonial policy also encouraged interracial marriage but discouraged education among Africans, and the resulting racially and culturally stratified population included

people of mixed ancestry (*mestiços*), educated Angolans (*assimilados*—see Glossary) who identified with Portuguese cultural values, and the majority of the African population that remained uneducated and unassimilated (*indígenas*—see Glossary). Opportunities for economic advancement were apportioned according to racial stereotypes, and even in the 1960s schools were admitting barely more than 2 percent of the school-age African population each year.

Portugal resisted demands for political independence long after other European colonial powers had relinquished direct control of their African possessions. After unsuccessfully seeking support from the United Nations (UN) in 1959, educated Luandans organized a number of resistance groups based on ethnic and regional loyalties. By the mid-1970s, four independence movements vied with one another for leadership of the emerging nation (see African Associations, ch. 1).

The MPLA, established by *mestiços* and educated workers in Luanda, drew its support from urban areas and the Mbundu population that surrounded the capital city. The Union of Peoples of Northern Angola (União das Populações do Norte de Angola—UPNA) was founded to defend Bakongo interests. The UPNA soon dropped its northern emphasis and became the Union of Angolan Peoples (União das Populações de Angola—UPA) in an attempt to broaden its ethnic constituency, although it rebuffed consolidation attempts by other associations. The UPA, in turn, formed the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—FNLA) in 1962, when it merged with other northern dissident groups.

A variety of interpretations of Marxist philosophy emerged during the 1950s and 1960s, a period when Western nations refused to pressure Portugal (a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—NATO) to upgrade political life in its colonies. The Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português—PCP) helped organize African students in Lisbon and encouraged them to press for independence. A campaign of arrests and forced exile crushed most Angolan nationalist leadership, but in Portugal underground antifascist groups were gaining strength, and Angolan liberation movements flourished. The MPLA established its headquarters in Léopoldville, Belgian Congo (present-day Kinshasa, Zaire), and in 1962, after a period of exile and imprisonment, Agostinho Neto became head of the MPLA.

Neto, a physician, poet, and philosopher, strengthened the MPLA's left-wing reputation with his rhetorical blend of socialist ideology and humanist values. He also led the group in protests

against enforced cotton cultivation, discriminatory labor policies, and colonial rule in general. MPLA and UPA leaders agreed to cooperate, but long-standing animosities led members of these two groups to sabotage each other's efforts. Within the MPLA, leadership factions opposed each other on ideological grounds and policy issues, but with guidance from the Soviet Union they resolved most of their disputes by concentrating power in their high command. Soviet military assistance also increased in response to the growing commitment to building a socialist state.

In April 1974, the Portuguese army overthrew the regime in Lisbon, and its successor began dismantling Portugal's colonial empire. In November 1974, Lisbon agreed to grant independence. However, after centuries of colonial neglect, Angola's African population was poorly prepared for self-government: there were few educated or trained leaders and almost none with national experience. Angola's liberation armies contested control of the new nation, and the coalition established by the Alvor Agreement in January 1975 quickly disintegrated (see Coalition, the Transitional Government, and Civil War, ch. 1).

Events in Angola in 1975 were catastrophic. Major factors that contributed to the violence that dogged Angola's political development for over a decade were the incursions into northern Angola by the United States-backed and Zairian-backed FNLA; an influx of Cuban advisers and, later, troops providing the MPLA with training and combat support; South African incursions in the south; UNITA attacks in the east and south, some with direct troop support from Pretoria; and dramatic increases in Soviet matériel and other assistance to the MPLA. Accounts of the sequence of these critical events differed over the next decade and a half, but most observers agreed that by the end of 1975 Angola was effectively embroiled in a civil war and that growing Soviet, Cuban, South African, and United States involvement in that war made peace difficult to achieve.

International recognition came slowly to the MPLA, which controlled only the northern third of the nation by December 1975. A small number of former Portuguese states and Soviet allies recognized the regime, and Nigeria led the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in granting recognition. The FNLA and UNITA attempted unsuccessfully to establish a rival government in the Angolan town of Huambo, but no one outside Angola recognized their regime. By the end of 1976, Angola was a member of the UN and was recognized by most other African states, but its domestic legitimacy remained in question.

A view of Lobito, one of Angola's largest cities
Courtesy Richard J. Hough

MPLA leader Neto had avoided ideological labels during the struggle for independence, although the MPLA never concealed the Marxist bias of some of its members. Neto viewed Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy as a means of unifying and organizing Angola's diverse society and of establishing agricultural growth as the basis for economic development. He also hoped to avoid disenfranchising urban workers or encouraging the growth of a rural bourgeoisie, while maintaining crucial military support from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

One of the MPLA's many slogans, ''people's power'' (*poder popular*), had won broad support for the group before independence, especially in Luanda, where neighborhood self-help groups were formed to defend residents of poor and working-class neighborhoods against armed banditry. This movement was quickly curtailed by the police, but people's power remained a popular symbol of the demand for political participation. After independence, despite constitutional guarantees of people's power, the slogan became a symbol of unrealized expectations. President Neto, despite his democratic ideals, quickly developed an autocratic governing style. He introduced austerity measures and productivity campaigns and countered the resulting popular discontent with an array of security and intelligence operations.

Industrial workers, who were among the first to organize for people's power, found their newly formed unions absorbed into the

MPLA-controlled National Union of Angolan Workers (União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos—UNTA), and the party began to absorb other popular organizations into the party structure. Students, laborers, and peasant farmers agitated against what they perceived as a *mestiço*-dominated political elite, and this resentment, even within the ranks of the MPLA itself, culminated in an abortive coup attempt led by the former minister of interior, Nito Alves, in May 1977.

In the aftermath of the 1977 Nitista coup attempt, the MPLA redefined the rules for party membership. After the First Party Congress in December 1977 affirmed the Central Committee's decision to proclaim its allegiance to Marxist-Leninist ideals, the MPLA officially became a "workers' party" and added "-PT" (for "Partido de Trabalho") to its acronym. In 1978 its leaders began a purge of party cadres, announcing a "rectification campaign" to correct policies that had allowed the Nitista factions and other "demagogic" tendencies to develop. The MPLA-PT reduced its numbers from more than 100,000 to about 31,000, dropping members the party perceived as lacking dedication to the socialist revolution. Most of those purged were farmers or educated *mestiços,* especially those whose attitudes were considered "petit bourgeois." Urban workers, in contrast to rural peasants, were admitted to the MPLA-PT in fairly large numbers.

By the end of the 1970s, the ruling party was smaller, more unified, and more powerful, but it had lost standing in rural areas, and its strongest support still came from those it was attempting to purge—educated *mestiços* and *assimilados.* Progress was hampered by losses in membership, trade, and resources resulting from emigration and nearly two decades of warfare. The MPLA-PT attempted to impose austerity measures to cope with these losses, but in the bitter atmosphere engendered by the purges of the late 1970s, these policies further damaged MPLA-PT legitimacy. Pursuing the socialist revolution was not particularly important in non-Mbundu rural areas, in part because of the persistent impression that *mestiços* dominated the governing elite. National politicians claimed economic privilege and allowed corruption to flourish in state institutions, adding to the challenges faced by dos Santos, who became MPLA-PT leader in 1979.

Structure of Government

The Constitution

Adopted in November 1975, independent Angola's first and only Constitution dedicates the new republic to eliminating the vestiges

of Portuguese colonialism. The Constitution provides numerous guarantees of individual freedom and prohibits discrimination based on color, race, ethnic identity, sex, place of birth, religion, level of education, and economic or social status. The Constitution also promises freedom of expression and assembly.

Constitutional revisions in 1976 and 1980 more clearly establish the national goal of a revolutionary socialist, one-party state. As revised, the Constitution vests sovereignty in the Angolan people, guaranteed through the representation of the party, and promises to implement "people's power." It also emphasizes the preeminence of the party as policy-making body and makes the government subordinate to it. Government officials are responsible for implementing party policy. Economic development is founded on socialist models of cooperative ownership.

Other constitutional guarantees include health care, access to education, and state assistance in childhood, motherhood, disability, and old age. In return for these sweeping guarantees, each individual is responsible for participating in the nation's defense, voting in official elections, serving in public office if appointed or elected, working (which is considered both a right and a duty), and generally aiding in the socialist transformation.

Despite its strong socialist tone, the Constitution guarantees the protection of private property and private business activity within limits set by the state. National economic goals are to develop agriculture and industry, establish just social relations in all sectors of production, foster the growth of the public sector and cooperatives, and implement a system of graduated direct taxation. Social goals include combating illiteracy, promoting the development of education and a national culture, and enforcing strict separation of church and state, with official respect for all religions.

The Constitution also outlines Angola's defense policy. It explicitly prohibits foreign military bases on Angolan soil or affiliation with any foreign military organization. It institutionalizes the People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola—FAPLA) as the nation's army and assigns it responsibility for defense and national reconstruction. Military conscription applies to both men and women over the age of eighteen (see Armed Forces, ch. 5).

Executive Branch

The President

Executive authority is vested in the president, his appointed ministers, and the Defense and Security Council (see fig. 11).

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, *Angola to the 1990s*, London, 1987, 12.

Figure 11. Structure of the Government, 1988

The president is selected as head of the MPLA–PT by the Political Bureau. His authority derives first from his status as head of the MPLA–PT and then from his preeminence in government. President dos Santos, like his predecessor, had wide-ranging powers as the leading figure in politics and the military. He was commander in chief of the armed forces and chairman of the Council of Ministers. He was also empowered to appoint and dismiss a wide variety of national and provincial officials, including military officers and provincial commissioners. The president could also designate an acting president from among the members of the MPLA–PT Political Bureau, but if he died or were disabled, his successor would be chosen by the Central Committee.

Council of Ministers

In late 1988, the Council of Ministers comprised twenty-one ministers and ministers of state. The seventeen ministerial portfolios included agriculture, construction, defense, domestic and foreign trade, education, finance, fisheries, foreign relations, health, industry, interior, justice, labor and social security, petroleum and energy, planning, state security, and transport and communications. Ministers were empowered to prepare the national budget and to make laws by decree, under authority designated by the national legislature, the People's Assembly, but most of the ministers' time was spent administering policy set by the MPLA–PT.

In February 1986, dos Santos appointed four ministers of state (who came to be known as ''superministers'') and assigned them responsibility for coordinating the activities of the Council of Ministers. Their portfolios were for the productive sphere; economic and social spheres; inspection and control; and town planning, housing, and water. Twelve ministries were placed under superministry oversight; the ministers of defense, foreign relations, interior, justice, and state security continued to report directly to the president. This change was part of an effort to coordinate policy, reduce overlapping responsibilities, eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, and bolster the government's reputation for efficiency in general. Most ministers and three of the four ministers of state were also high officials in the MPLA–PT, and their policy-making influence was exercised through the party rather than through the government.

Defense and Security Council

In May 1986, the president appointed eight respected advisers to the Defense and Security Council, including the ministers of

defense, interior, and state security; the ministers of state for the economic and social spheres, inspection and control, and the productive sphere; the FAPLA chief of the general staff; and the MPLA–PT Central Committee secretary for ideology, information, and culture. The president chaired the council and gave it a broad mandate, including oversight and administration in military, economic, and diplomatic affairs. He strengthened this authority during the council's first five years by treating the council as an inner circle of close advisers. By 1988 the Defense and Security Council and the Political Bureau, both chaired by the president, were the most powerful decision-making bodies within the government and party, respectively.

Legislative Branch

The principle of people's power was enshrined in the 223-member People's Assembly, which replaced the Council of the Revolution as the nation's legislature in 1980. The primary purpose of the People's Assembly was to implement some degree of participatory democracy within the revolutionary state and to do so outside party confines. People's Assembly delegates did not have to be party members, and many were not. The planned electoral process was the election of 203 delegates to three-year terms by an electoral college. The electoral college, in turn, would be elected by universal suffrage. The remaining twenty delegates were to be elected by the Central Committee of the MPLA–PT. During the 1980s, implementation of this plan was obstructed by security problems and bureaucratic snarls. In 1980 the Central Committee elected all People's Assembly members. In 1983 the government's lack of control over many rural areas, combined with a dearth of accurate census data, prompted dos Santos to postpone the elections. The 1986 elections, actually held in 1987, consisted of mass meetings at which the names of nominees were presented on a list prepared by the existing People's Assembly. A few names were challenged and removed, but these lengthy public discussions did not constitute the democratic process required by the Constitution.

The People's Assembly met every six months to approve the national budget and development plan, enact legislation, and delegate responsibilities to its subcommittees. It also elected the twenty-five-member Permanent Commission to perform assembly functions between sessions. The president headed the Permanent Commission, which was dominated by members of the MPLA–PT Political Bureau. The subordination of the People's Assembly to the MPLA–PT was ensured by including high-level party officials among the former's appointed members and by frequent

reminders of the preeminence of the party. The government's intention was to create people's assemblies at all levels of local administration in order to establish a government presence in remote areas and promote party-government contacts. The planned assemblies were an important symbol of people's power, although they were also intended to be controlled by the party elite.

Judicial System

The Ministry of Justice oversaw the nation's court system, which comprised the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, people's revolutionary courts, and a system of people's courts. High-level judges were appointed by the minister of justice. The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals heard cases involving national officials and appeals from lower courts. People's revolutionary courts heard accusations related to national security, mercenary activity, or war crimes. They presided over both military and civilian cases, with senior military officers serving in a judicial capacity in military cases (see Conditions of Service, Ranks, and Military Justice, ch. 5). Appeals were heard by appellate courts in each provincial capital.

People's courts were established in the late 1970s by the National Court Administration of the Ministry of Justice as part of a nationwide reorganization along Marxist-Leninist lines. The people's court system comprised criminal, police, and labor tribunals in each provincial capital and in a few other towns. The MPLA–PT Political Bureau appointed three judges—one professional and two lay magistrates—to preside over each people's courtroom and assigned them equal power and legal standing. Although the professional judges had substantial legal training, lay judges were appointed on a rotating basis from among a group of citizens who had some formal education and several weeks' introductory legal training. Some were respected leaders of local ethnic groups. No juries were empaneled in either civil or criminal cases, but judges sometimes sought the opinion of local residents in weighing decisions.

Local Administration

As of late 1988, Angola was divided into eighteen provinces (*províncias*) and 161 districts (*municípios*) (see fig. 1). Districts were further subdivided into quarters or communes (*comunas*), villages (*povoações*), and neighborhoods (*bairros*). Administration at each level was the responsibility of a commissioner, who was appointed by the president at the provincial, district, and commune levels and elected at the village and neighborhood levels. The eighteen

provincial commissioners were ex-officio members of the execu-
tive branch of the national government. The supreme organ of state
power was the national People's Assembly. Provincial people's
assemblies comprised between fifty-five and eighty-five delegates,
charged with implementing MPLA-PT directives. People's assem-
blies were also envisioned, but not yet operational in late 1988,
at each subnational level of administration.

In 1983 the president created a system of regional military coun-
cils to oversee a range of local concerns with security implications.
High-ranking military officers, reporting directly to the president,
headed these councils. Their authority superseded that of other
provincial administrators and allowed them to impose a state of
martial law within areas threatened by insurgency. The bound-
aries of military regions and the provinces did not coincide exactly.
Until 1988 ten regional military councils were in operation. In early
1988, however, the Ministry of Defense, citing this structure as
inadequate, announced the formation of four fronts (see Constitu-
tional and Political Context, ch. 5).

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party

Background

During the 1960s, the MPLA established its headquarters at Kin-
shasa, Zaire, and then at Lusaka, Zambia, and Brazzaville, Con-
go. The MPLA's scattered bases and diverse constituent groups
contributed to disunity and disorganization, problems that were
exacerbated by personal and ideological differences among party
leaders. The first serious split occurred in 1973, when Daniel
Chipenda led a rebellion, sometimes termed the Eastern Revolt,
in protest against the party's *mestiço*-dominated leadership and
Soviet interference in Angolan affairs. Chipenda and his followers
were expelled from the MPLA, and many joined the northern-
based FNLA in 1975. Then in 1974, about seventy left-wing MPLA
supporters based in Brazzaville broke with Agostinho Neto. This
opposition movement became known as the Active Revolt. Shortly
after independence, a third split occurred within the party, cul-
minating in the 1977 coup attempt by Nito Alves. Later in 1977,
the MPLA transformed itself into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard
party and launched a lengthy rectification campaign to unify
its membership, impose party discipline, and streamline decision-
making processes.

In 1980 Angola was governed by a new head of state under
a newly revised Constitution. The nation's first legislature, the

People's Assembly, served as a symbol of people's power, but state organs were clearly subordinate to those of the party. Within the MPLA-PT, channels for political participation were being narrowed. Both government and party leaders established a hierarchy of organizations through which they hoped to mobilize rural populations and broaden political support. At the same time, MPLA-PT leaders launched programs to impose party discipline on the party's cadres and indoctrinate all segments of society in their proper role in political development.

Overall goals were relatively easy to agree upon, but poverty and insecurity exacerbated disagreements over specific strategies for attaining these objectives. By the mid-1980s, the party had three major goals—incorporating the population into the political process, imposing party discipline on its cadres, and reconciling the diverse factions that arose to dispute these efforts. Some MPLA-PT officials sought to control political participation by regulating party membership and strengthening discipline, while others believed the MPLA-PT had wasted valuable resources in the self-perpetuating cycle of government repression and popular dissent. President dos Santos sought to resolve disputes that did not seem to threaten his office. However, much of the MPLA-PT's political agenda, already impeded by civil war and regional instability, was further obstructed by these intraparty disputes.

Structure

The Political Bureau reported in 1988 that the MPLA-PT had more than 45,000 members. Its social composition, an important aspect of its image as a popular vanguard party, consisted of approximately 18 percent industrial workers, 18 percent peasants, 4 percent agricultural wage earners, and 60 percent described by the Political Bureau as ''other classes and social strata interested in building socialism.'' However, the fact remained that many party members were still government employees, members of the petite bourgeoisie the MPLA had denounced so loudly in the 1970s.

The central decision-making bodies of the MPLA-PT included the Political Bureau, Central Committee, and the party congress, each headed by the president as party chairman (see fig. 12). A hierarchy of committees existed at the provincial, district, and village levels; the smallest of these, the party cell, operated in many neighborhoods and workplaces. The MPLA-PT's organizing principle was democratic centralism, which allowed participants at each level of the organization to elect representatives to the next higher

171

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*MPLA-PT--Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party
(Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola-Partido de Trabalho--MPLA-PT)

Source: Based on information from Keith Somerville, *Angola,* Boulder, 1986, 88–89; and
 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Workers' Party, *Angola: Trabalho
 e luta,* Paris, 1985, 68.

Figure 12. Structure of the MPLA-PT, 1988

level. MPLA–PT policy guaranteed open discussion at each level, but majority decisions were binding on the minority, and lower-level bodies were bound by higher-level decisions. Party hierarchies were incomplete in most areas, however, because of low literacy rates, poverty, and security problems. Many lower-level party functionaries therefore had roles in both party and government.

Political Bureau

The Political Bureau's eleven full members and two alternates were elected from among Central Committee members to assume the responsibilities of the committee between its sessions and to control the policy direction of the party. This small group wielded substantial power within the MPLA-PT, and its authority and membership overlapped that of the Central Committee Secretariat. In late 1988, the Political Bureau and the Defense and Security Council were the most influential bodies in the party and government, respectively.

Central Committee

Although the Central Committee was formally subordinate to the MPLA-PT party congress, in late 1988 the ninety Central Committee members wielded greater influence over party policy. The Central Committee assumed control between sessions of the party congress, and members of the Central Committee were influential in setting the congressional agenda.

Central Committee actions were implemented under the direction of its Secretariat, which in late 1988 consisted of nine department heads elected from the Central Committee. The Secretariat was responsible for directing day-to-day party work, collecting and analyzing information, preparing guidelines, and recommending courses of action in accordance with party congress policy.

Subordinate to the Central Committee Secretariat were seventeen specialized auxiliary agencies, which in late 1988 included the departments of administration and finance, agriculture, culture and sports, defense and security, economic and social policies, education, energy and communications, executive personnel, foreign relations, industry, information and propaganda, legal system, mass and social organizations, organization, policy and ideology, public welfare, and state agencies. These departments worked in cooperation with provincial and lower-level party organizations to implement Central Committee directives.

Party Congress

Theoretically the supreme body within the MPLA-PT, the party congress was actually controlled by top party officials. Following its first regular session in 1977 and an extraordinary session in 1980, the party congress was expected to convene once every five years. Most of the 630 delegates to the 1985 Second Party Congress were elected from among provincial committees, with most members of the Central Committee and all members of the Political Bureau

as delegates. The party congress was responsible for setting the party's overall policy direction, confirming the Political Bureau's choice of party chairman and president, and electing the Central Committee members, who retained the decision-making authority of the party congress between sessions.

Regional Organization

The basic unit of the party was the cell, which consisted of between three and thirty members within a workplace or small neighborhood. Each cell elected a sector committee, which in turn elected a rural village committee or urban neighborhood committee, as appropriate. These committees, in turn, elected district and provincial committees. Higher-level committees were supposed to meet every two years and elect executive functionaries to set their agendas and retain minimal authority between meetings. An important task in each committee was the election of a party control commission to combat factionalism and promote cooperation among party functionaries within the region. At each level, control commission members were confirmed by the next higher level body before assuming office.

Operations

In addition to a chronic shortage of cadres, the MPLA–PT faced numerous obstacles in its first decade as a ruling body. By late 1988, the MPLA–PT party structure had not yet matured enough to respond temperately to criticism, either from within or from without. Party leaders dealt harshly with their critics, and political participation was still carefully controlled. Impeded by civil war, insurgency, economic problems, and the perception of elitism within its party ranks, the MPLA–PT campaign to mobilize grass-roots support remained in its early stages. Party membership was a prerequisite for effective political action, but channels of entry into the MPLA–PT were constricted by the party's entrenched leadership and centralized authority structure. Critics of the MPLA–PT, in turn, felt that after a quarter-century of warfare, they were being underserved by a large government apparatus that was preoccupied with internal and external security.

Factionalism also slowed the implementation of MPLA–PT programs. Rather than a strong, unified, vanguard leadership, the MPLA–PT presented an elite cadre torn by racial and ideological differences. Racial stratification, the legacy of colonial rule, permeated the party and society, providing a continuous reminder of economic inequities. The MPLA–PT had not established a reputation as a leader in the struggle to end racial discrimination,

*Villagers in Benguela Province showing support for the government
at an impromptu rally
Courtesy Richard J. Hough*

in part because of its roots among student elites selected by colonial officials. Many early party leaders were *mestiços* who had studied in Europe; some had married whites and were removed from the cultural background of their African relatives. Moreover, some Angolans still identified Marxist philosophy with European intellectuals rather than African peasants.

Ideological splits also grew within party ranks during the first nine years of dos Santos's regime, overlaying racial divisions. Divergent views on the role of Marxism in Angola produced clashes over domestic and foreign policy. Some African MPLA-PT leaders placed nationalist goals ahead of ideological goals, such as the radical transformation of society, and one of their nationalist goals was the elimination of *mestiço* domination.

The lines between racial and ideological factions tended to coincide. On the one hand, strong pro-Soviet views were often found among the party's *mestiço* leaders, who were inclined to view Angola's political situation in terms of revolutionary class struggle. In their eyes, ethnic, regional, and other subnational loyalties were obstacles to political mobilization. Black African party militants, on the other hand, often viewed racial problems as more important than class struggle, and they hoped to shape the MPLA-PT into a uniquely Angolan political structure. For them, Soviet intervention brought new threats of racism and foreign domination. Traditional ethnic group leaders were, in this view, vital to grassroots mobilization campaigns. Race and ideology did not always coincide, however. A few staunch ideologues were black Africans, while a small number of *mestiços* espoused moderate views and favored nonaligned policies.

Political Environment

In many Third World states, the president was the paramount leader, and in this regard Angola was no exception. Its president, José Eduardo dos Santos, combined strong party loyalty with political pragmatism. This loyalty had political and personal bases. Dos Santos owed much of his success to the MPLA, which he had joined in 1962 at the age of nineteen. The party sponsored his study at Baku University in the Soviet Union from 1963 to 1970. In 1974 MPLA leader Neto appointed dos Santos to the Central Committee, which elected him to its elite Political Bureau; this group elected him to succeed Neto, who died in 1979. Dos Santos traveled to the Soviet Union a few weeks later to confirm his revolutionary agenda as president.

Dos Santos's loyalty to Marxism-Leninism was founded in his student years in the Soviet Union, where he also married a Soviet

citizen (who later returned to her homeland). There, he developed his belief in the vanguard party as the best strategy for mobilizing Angola's largely rural population. At the same time, however, he professed belief in a mixed economy, some degree of decentralization, an expanded private sector, and Western investment. Like many African leaders, he did not equate political eclecticism with internal contradiction, nor did he view Angola's political posture as an invitation to Soviet domination.

Dos Santos did not embrace Marxism for its utopian appeal; his view of Angolan society after the envisioned socialist transformation did not lack internal conflict. Rather, he viewed Marxist-Leninist organizational tenets as the most practical basis for mobilizing a society in which the majority lacked economic and educational opportunities. A small vanguard leadership, with proper motivation and training, could guide the population through the early stages of national development, in his view, and this approach could improve the lives of more people than capitalist investment and profit making by a small minority. During the 1980s, because trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe failed to develop and because Western technical expertise appeared vital to Angola's development, dos Santos favored improved political relations with the West as a step toward peace and greater prosperity. Although he had scorned his predecessor's shift in the same direction in the late 1970s, dos Santos denied that his move signaled a weakening commitment to Marxism.

Despite his strong party loyalty, in the late 1980s dos Santos was known as a political pragmatist. He sometimes spoke out against the MPLA-PT's most extreme ideologues and took steps to limit their influence. He openly criticized the results of the rectification campaign of the late 1970s, which, in his view, had removed too many loyal members from the party's rolls. He also recognized that the campaign had alienated much of the nation's peasant majority, that they remained indifferent toward party programs in the late 1980s, and that they had not benefited from many MPLA-PT policies.

Political pragmatism was not to be confused with a liberal style of governing. In response to security crises and public criticism, dos Santos ordered arrests, detentions without trial, and occasional executions. He concentrated power in his office and narrowed his circle of close advisers. He enlarged the executive branch of government by appointing new ministers of state to coordinate executive branch activity and convinced the MPLA-PT Central Committee to entrust him with emergency powers. Dos Santos also persuaded party leaders to empower him to appoint regional military

councils that had sweeping authority over civilian and military affairs in unstable regions of the country and that were answerable only to the president.

Dos Santos further consolidated his hold on executive authority in April 1984 by establishing the Defense and Security Council (see Executive Branch, this ch.). In 1985 he enlarged the party Central Committee from sixty to ninety members and alternates, thus diluting the strength of its staunch ideological faction.

Undermining potential opponents was not dos Santos's only motivation for consolidating power within the executive branch of government. He was also impatient with bureaucratic "red tape," even when justified in the name of party discipline. Accordingly, the primary qualification for his trusted advisers was a balance of competence, efficiency, and loyalty. Rhetorical skills, which he generally lacked, were not given particular priority; ideological purity was even less important. His advice for economic recovery was summed up as "produce, repair, and rehabilitate." The direct, relatively nonideological governing style exemplified by this approach earned dos Santos substantial respect and a few strong critics.

Economic and security crises worsened during the first nine years of dos Santos's presidency, draining resources that might have been used to improve living standards and education. The president rejected advice from party ideologues, whose primary aim was to develop a sophisticated Marxist-Leninist party apparatus. Rather than emphasize centralized control and party discipline, dos Santos embraced a plan to decentralize economic decision making in 1988. He then appointed Minister of Planning Lopo do Nascimento to serve as commissioner of Huíla Province in order to implement this plan in a crucial region of the country.

The 1985 Second Party Congress assented to the president's growing power by approving several of his choices for top government office as party officials. Among these was Roberto de Almeida, a member of the Defense and Security Council in his capacity as the MPLA-PT secretary for ideology, information, and culture and one of dos Santos's close advisers. Party leaders elected Almeida, a *mestiço,* to both the MPLA-PT Central Committee and the Political Bureau.

Demoted from the top ranks of the party were the leading ideologue, Lúcio Lára, and veteran *mestiço* leaders Paulo Jorge and Henrique Carreira (nom de guerre Iko). The split between ideologues and political moderates did not render the party immobile, in part because of dos Santos's skill at using Angola's internal and external threats to unite MPLA-PT factions. The ever-present UNITA

A utility crew in Luanda fixes a street lamp.

Maintenance workers surface a length of road.

insurgency provided a constant reminder of the frailty of the nation's security.

Mass Organizations and Interest Groups
Mass Organizations

Three mass organizations were affiliated with the MPLA–PT in 1988—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement (Juventude do Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—JMPLA), the Organization of Angolan Women (Organização da Mulher Angolana—OMA), and the UNTA. Each was founded as an anticolonial social movement during the 1960s and transformed into a party affiliate when the MPLA–PT became a vanguard party in 1977. Although these groups were formally subordinate to the party in accordance with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, they continued to operate with relative autonomy. Strict party ideologues objected to this independence and sometimes treated organization leaders with contempt. The resulting tensions added to public resentment of party discipline and became a political issue when Neto accused leaders of the JMPLA, the OMA, and the UNTA of supporting the Nitista coup attempt of 1977. Alves, the coup leader, had criticized MPLA–PT leaders for bourgeois attitudes and racism, and many people in these organizations supported Alves's allegations.

In the late 1970s, mass organizations became an important target of the rectification campaign. Their role in society was redefined to emphasize the dissemination of information about party policy and the encouragement of participation in programs. Throughout most of the next decade, MPLA–PT officials continued to criticize the lack of coordination of organizational agenda with party needs. The mass organizations became centers of public resentment of MPLA–PT controls, but these groups were not yet effective at organizing or mobilizing against MPLA–PT rule.

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement

The JMPLA was founded in 1962 and converted into a training ground for MPLA–PT activists in 1977. It claimed a membership of 72,000, mostly teenagers and students, in 1988. The JMPLA conducted military exercises and political study groups, measuring success within the group primarily by an individual's commitment to the socialist revolution. The Second Congress of the JMPLA was held on April 14, 1987, a date that was also celebrated as National Youth Day.

Despite the symbolic and practical importance of the political role of the nation's youth, MPLA–PT officials generally had a derisive attitude toward JMPLA leaders during the 1980s. At the MPLA–PT congresses of 1980 and 1985, party officials criticized youth leaders for their failure to encourage political activism. They also remonstrated against youth group officials for the bourgeois attitudes, materialism, and political apathy they detected among children and teenagers. One measure of these problems was the continued urban influx among young people, which impeded MPLA–PT efforts at rural mobilization.

MPLA–PT leaders assigned the JMPLA the task of guiding the national children's organization, the Agostinho Neto Organization of Pioneers (Organização dos Pioneiros Agostinho Neto—OPA). The goal of the OPA was to educate all children in patriotic values, socialism, and the importance of study, work, and scientific knowledge. Founded as the Pioneers in 1975, the group took the name of the nation's first president at its second conference in November 1979, following Neto's death. JMPLA leaders generally viewed the OPA as a recruiting ground for potential political activists.

National Union of Angolan Workers

The UNTA was organized in 1960 in the Belgian Congo (present-day Zaire) to assist refugees and exiled MPLA members in their efforts to maintain social contacts and find jobs. Managing the UNTA became more difficult after independence. The UNTA headquarters was transferred to Luanda, where the shortage of skilled workers and personnel for management and training programs became immediately evident. UNTA leaders worked to transform the group from an adjunct to a national liberation army to a state labor union, but encouraged by the ''people's power'' movement, many workers thought the MPLA victory entitled them to assume control of their workplace. UNTA leaders found that workers' rights were sometimes given a lower priority than workers' obligations, and at times industrial workers found themselves at odds with both the government and their own union leadership. These tensions were exacerbated by the demands of militant workers who favored more sweeping nationalization programs than those undertaken by the government; some workers opposed any compensation of foreign owners.

During the early 1980s, Cuban advisers were assigned to bring industrial workers into the MPLA–PT. With their Angolan counterparts in the UNTA, Cuban shop stewards and union officials undertook educational programs in technical and management

training, labor discipline and productivity, and socialist economics. Their overall goal was to impart a sense of worker participation in the management of the state economy—a difficult task in an environment characterized by warfare and economic crisis. By late 1988, the Cubans had achieved mixed success. Some of the UNTA's 600,000 members looked forward to the prosperity they hoped to achieve through MPLA-PT policies; many others felt their links to the government did little to improve their standard of living, and they were relatively uncommitted to the construction of a socialist state. UNTA officers did not aggressively represent worker interests when they conflicted with those of the party, and the fear of labor unrest became part of Angola's political context.

Organization of Angolan Women

The OMA was established in 1963 to mobilize support for the fledgling MPLA. After independence, it became the primary route by which women were incorporated in the political process. Its membership rose to 1.8 million in 1985 but dropped to fewer than 1.3 million in 1987. The group attributed this decline to the regional destabilization and warfare that displaced and destroyed families in rural areas, where more than two-thirds of OMA members lived. In 1983 Ruth Neto, the former president's sister, was elected secretary general of the OMA and head of its fifty-three-member national committee. Neto was reelected secretary general by the 596 delegates who attended the OMA's second nationwide conference on March 2, 1988.

During the 1980s, the OMA established literacy programs and worked to expand educational opportunities for women, and the government passed new legislation outlawing gender discrimination in wages and working conditions (see Conditions after Independence, ch. 2). MPLA-PT rhetoric emphasized equality between the sexes as a prerequisite to a prosperous socialist state. At both the First Party Congress and the Second Party Congress, the MPLA-PT Central Committee extolled contributions made by women, but in 1988 only 10 percent of MPLA-PT members were women, and the goal of equality remained distant. Through the OMA, some women were employed in health and social service organizations, serving refugees and rural families. More women were finding jobs in teaching and professions from which they had been excluded in the past, and a very small number occupied important places in government and the MPLA-PT. However, most Angolan women were poor and unemployed.

In addition to leading the OMA, Ruth Neto also served on the MPLA-PT Central Committee and as secretary general of the

The government has had difficulty mobilizing support from peasant farmers.

Pan-African Women's Organization (PAWO), which had its head-quarters in Luanda. The PAWO helped sponsor Angola's annual celebration of Women's Day (August 9), which was also attended by representatives from neighboring states and liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia.

Interest Groups

Peasant Farmers

In the early 1970s, rural volunteers were the backbone of the MPLA fighting forces, but after independence few peasant fighters were given leadership positions in the party. In fact, most farmers were purged from the party during the rectification campaign of the late 1970s for their lack of political commitment or revolutionary zeal. Criteria for party membership were stricter for farmers than for urban workers, and a decade later MPLA–PT leaders generally conceded that the worker-peasant alliance, on which the socialist transformation depended, had been weakened by the rectification campaign. When debating the reasons for this failure, some MPLA–PT members argued that their urban-based leadership had ignored rural demands and implemented policies favoring urban residents (see Effects of Socialist Policies, ch. 2). Others claimed that the party had allowed farmers to place their own

interests above those of society and that they were beginning to emerge as the rural bourgeoisie denounced by Marxist-Leninist leaders in many countries.

Policies aimed at rural development in the early 1980s had called for the establishment of state farms to improve productivity of basic foodstuffs in the face of shortages in equipment and technical experts. Cuban and Bulgarian farm managers were put in charge of most of these farms. These advisers' objectives were to introduce the use of mechanization and chemical fertilizers and to inculcate political awareness. By the mid-1980s, however, the salaries of foreign technical experts and the cost of new equipment far outweighed revenues generated by these state enterprises, and the program was abandoned.

Many farmers reverted to subsistence agriculture in the face of the spreading UNITA insurgency and what they often perceived as government neglect. Convincing them to produce surplus crops for markets presented formidable problems for party leaders. UNITA forces sometimes claimed crops even before they were harvested, and urban traders seldom ventured into insecure rural areas. Even if a farmer were able to sell surplus crops, the official price was often unrealistically low, and few consumer goods were available in rural markets even for those with cash (see Agriculture, ch. 3).

In response to the apparent intransigence of some rural Angolans, the MPLA-PT attempted another strategy for mobilizing political support by creating farmers' cooperatives and organizing them into unions to provide channels of communication between farmers and party leaders. In late 1988, these unions represented only a small percentage of the rural population, but some party leaders still expected them to succeed. Rural resentment of the urban-based MPLA-PT leadership was still fairly widespread, however, and this resentment contributed to the success of UNITA in Angola's southern and eastern provinces.

Traditional Elites

In the late 1980s, President dos Santos was working to strengthen his support among the nation's traditional leaders. Every few weeks, he would invite delegations of provincial and local-level representatives to meet with him, and Angop would headline these meetings with "the chiefs." Their discussions focused on regional economic and social concerns and served the important political purpose of demonstrating the government's desire to avoid confrontation and to secure support in rural areas.

The MPLA had a neutral relationship with traditional elites before independence, in part because the urban-based party had

little contact with ethnic group leaders, whose following was strongest in rural areas. After independence, in its determination to improve the national economy and infrastructure, the MPLA called on people to rise above ethnic and regional loyalties, labeling them impediments to progress in the class struggle. Early MPLA rhetoric also condemned many religious practices, including local African religions. Such policies provoked the contempt of some traditional leaders.

Crises were dampened somewhat by the party's often confrontational relationship with the civil service during the early 1970s. Civil servants, as representatives of the colonial regime, had often clashed with traditional leaders or had otherwise subverted their authority. The MPLA, in contrast, condemned the elitist attitudes of bureaucrats who were employed by the colonial regime, thus gaining support from traditional rulers. At the same time, however, the party drew much of its support from the petite bourgeoisie it condemned so loudly, and much of the civil service remained intact after independence.

By 1980 MPLA-PT efforts to consolidate support in outlying regions were evident. Party officials appointed ethnic group leaders to participate in or lead local party committees in many areas. Merging traditional and modern leadership roles helped strengthen support among rural peasants who would have otherwise remained on the periphery of national politics. Although success was limited to a few areas, this program allowed dos Santos to maintain a balance between national and regional interests. Even some party ideologues, initially inclined toward strict interpretations of Marxist-Leninist dogma, voiced the belief that populist elements might be appropriate for a Marxist regime in an African context.

Religious Communities

The MPLA-PT maintained a cautious attitude toward religion in the late 1980s, in contrast to its determination in the late 1970s to purge churchgoers from the party. A 1980 Ministry of Justice decree required all religious institutions to register with the government. As of 1987, eleven Protestant institutions were legally recognized: the Assembly of God, the Baptist Convention of Angola, the Baptist Evangelical Church of Angola, the Congregational Evangelical Church of Angola, the Evangelical Church of Angola, the Evangelical Church of South-West Angola, the Our Lord Jesus Christ Church in the World (Kimbanguist), the Reformed Evangelical Church of Angola, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the Union of Evangelical Churches of Angola, and the United Methodist Church (see Christianity, ch. 2). Roberto de Almeida,

the MPLA-PT Central Committee secretary for ideology, information, and culture, admonished church leaders not to perpetuate oppressive or elitist attitudes, and he specifically warned that the churches would not be allowed to take a neutral stance in the battle against opponents of the MPLA-PT regime.

The official attitude toward religion reflected the ideological split in the party leadership. Staunch party ideologues, who had purged almost all churchgoers during the rectification campaign of the late 1970s, opposed leniency toward anyone claiming or recognizing moral authority outside the regime. But as they had done in regard to traditional leaders, the president and his close associates weighed the balance between ideological purity and political necessity and soon moderated their antireligious stance. Political opposition had not coalesced around religious leaders, and, in general, the fear of religious opposition was weakening in the late 1980s.

Employing Marxist-Leninist diatribes against the oppression of the working class, only the most strident ideologues in the MPLA-PT maintained their opposition to religion. The Roman Catholic Church was still strongly identified with the colonial oppressor, and Protestant missionaries were sometimes condemned for having supported colonial practices. More serious in the government's view in the late 1980s was the use by its foremost opponent, Jonas Savimbi, of the issue of religion to recruit members and support for his UNITA insurgency. Savimbi's Church of Christ in the Bush had become an effective religious affiliate of UNITA, maintaining schools, clinics, and training programs.

Small religious sects were annoying to MPLA-PT officials. The ruling party suspected such groups of having foreign sponsors or of being used by opponents of the regime. To the government, the sects' relative independence from world religions was a gauge of their potential for political independence as well. Watch Tower and Seventh-Day Adventist sects were suspect, but they were not perceived as serious political threats. However, the Jehovah's Witnesses were banned entirely in 1978 because of their proscription on military service.

During the late 1980s, security officials considered the small Our Lord Jesus Christ Church in the World to be a threat to the regime, despite the fact that the Mtokoists, as they were known, were not particularly interested in national politics (see Internal Security, ch. 5). Their founder, Simon Mtoko (also known as Simão Toco), had been expelled from Angola by the Portuguese in 1950 for preaching adherence to African cultural values. He returned to Angola in 1974 but soon clashed with MPLA leaders over the regime's authority over individual beliefs. He opposed the party's

Marxist rhetoric on cultural grounds until his death in 1984. After his death, officials feared the group would splinter into dissident factions. The church was legally recognized in 1988 even though Mtokoists clashed with police in 1987 and 1988, resulting in arrests and some casualties.

Political Opposition

After thirteen years of national independence, Angola's armed forces, FAPLA, remained pitted against UNITA in a civil war that had erupted out of the preindependence rivalry among liberation armies. The FNLA and the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda—FLEC) lost popular support during the first decade of independence, and, as a result, in 1988 UNITA remained the only serious internal threat to the dos Santos regime. Few Angolans expected either UNITA or government forces to achieve a military victory, but the political impact of the UNITA insurgency was substantial nonetheless (see The Enduring Rival: UNITA, ch. 5).

Jonas Savimbi established UNITA in 1966. Leading a group of dissident members from the northern coalition that included the FNLA, he established a rival liberation movement that sought to avoid domination by Holden Roberto and his Bakongo followers (see Angolan Insurgency, ch. 1). UNITA recruits from Savimbi's Ovimbundu homeland and from among the Chokwe (also spelled Cokwe), Lunda, Nganguela (also spelled Ganguela), and other southern Angolan societies sought to preserve elements of their own cultures (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). Some southerners also maintained centuries-old legacies of distrust toward northern ethnic groups, including the Bakongo and the Mbundu.

Savimbi's legitimacy as a dissident leader was acquired in part through the reputation of his grandfather, who had led the Ovimbundu state of Ndulu in protest against Portuguese rule in the early twentieth century. From his father, Savimbi acquired membership and belief in the United Church of Christ, which organized Ovimbundu villages into networks to assist in mission operations under colonial rule. One of these networks formed the Council of Evangelical Churches, a pan-Ovimbundu umbrella organization that united more than 100,000 people in south-central Angola. They were served by mission schools, training centers, and clinics, with near-autonomy from colonial controls. Local leaders, who staffed some of these establishments, voiced their demands for greater political freedom, and colonial authorities moved to suppress the Council of Evangelical Churches as pressures for independence mounted in the 1960s.

The territory in southeastern Angola controlled by UNITA in the late 1980s included part of the area that had been administered by the Council of Evangelical Churches before independence (see fig. 16). Here, many people supported Savimbi's struggle against the MPLA-PT as an extension of the long struggle for Ovimbundu, not Angolan, nationhood. UNITA-run schools and clinics operated with the same autonomy from Luandan bureaucratic control as their mission-sponsored counterparts had before independence.

Ethnic loyalties remained strong in the southeast and other UNITA-controlled areas of rural Angola. Class solidarity, in comparison, was an almost meaningless abstraction. Savimbi was able to portray the class-conscious MPLA-PT in Luanda in terms that contrasted sharply with models of leadership among the Ovimbundu and other central and southern Angolan peoples. He described party leaders as a racially stratified elite, dominated by Soviet and Cuban advisers who also provided arms to suppress the population. The MPLA-PT's early assaults on organized religion reinforced this image. Many rural Angolans were also keenly aware that the party elite in Luanda lived at a much higher standard than did Savimbi's commanders in the bush. And they carefully noted that people in rural areas under MPLA-PT control still lived in poverty and that the government bureaucracy was notoriously inefficient and corrupt.

UNITA's regimented leadership, in turn, presented itself as the protector of rural African interests against outsiders. Through Savimbi's skilled public relations efforts, his organization became known as a local peasant uprising, fighting for political and religious freedom. Savimbi had no headquarters in other countries and took pride in the humble life-style of his command in Jamba, well within UNITA-held territory. On this basis, he won some support in the south and east, gained volunteers for UNITA forces, and slowed government efforts to extend MPLA-PT control into the countryside. In the late 1980s, however, international human rights organizations accused UNITA of human rights abuses, charging that UNITA was intimidating civilians to force them to support UNITA or to withhold support for the MPLA-PT.

For the government, the ever-present threat of the UNITA insurgency served a number of useful purposes. It helped rally support for party unity in the capital and surrounding areas. The government was able to capitalize on the reputation for brutality that grew up around some UNITA commanders and the destruction of rural resources by UNITA forces. Young amputees in Luanda and other towns provided a constant reminder of the several thousand land mines left in rural farmland by Savimbi's troops.

*In the late 1980s, amputees such as these could be found
in towns and villages throughout the country.
Courtesy International Committee of the Red Cross (Yannick Müller)*

UNITA activity also provided an immediate example of the party
ideologues' stereotype of destabilization sponsored by international
capitalist forces. These forces were, in turn, embodied in the region-
al enemy, South Africa. The UNITA insurgency also enabled the
MPLA–PT government to justify the continued presence of Cuban
troops in Angola, and it helped maintain international interest in
Angola's political difficulties.

The regional accord reached in December 1988 by Angolan,
South African, and Cuban negotiators did not address Angola's
internal violence, but in informal discussions among the par-
ticipants, alternatives were suggested for ending the conflict (see
Regional Politics, this ch.). Western negotiators pressured the
MPLA–PT to bring UNITA officials into the government, and
even within the party, many people hoped that UNITA
representatives—excluding Savimbi—would be reconciled with the
dos Santos government. Savimbi, in turn, offered to recognize dos
Santos's leadership on the condition that free elections, as promised
by the 1975 Alvor Agreement, would take place after the withdrawal
of Cuban troops.

Mass Media

The government nationalized all print and broadcast media in

189

1976, and as of late 1988 the government and party still controlled almost all the news media. Angola's official news agency, Angop, distributed about 8,000 issues of the government newsletter, *Diário da República,* and 40,000 copies of *Jornal de Angola* daily in Luanda and other urban areas under FAPLA control. Both publications were in Portuguese. International press operations in Luanda included Agence France-Presse, Cuba's Prensa Latina, Xinhua (New China) News Agency, and several Soviet and East European agency offices.

Under the scrutiny of the MPLA–PT, the media were limited to disseminating official policy without critical comment or opposing viewpoints. The Angolan Journalists' Union, which proclaimed the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Constitution, nonetheless worked closely with the MPLA–PT and pressured writers to adhere to government guidelines. Views differing slightly from official perceptions were published in the UNTA monthly newsletter, *O Voz do Trabalhador,* despite active censorship.

Rádio Nacional de Angola broadcast on medium-wave and short-wave frequencies in Luanda and eighteen other towns. Radio broadcasts were in Portuguese and vernacular languages, and there were an estimated 435,000 receivers in 1988. In the late 1980s, people in central and southern Angola also received opposition radio broadcasts from the Voice of Resistance of the Black Cockerel, operated by UNITA in Portuguese, English, and local vernaculars. Limited television service in Portuguese became available in Luanda and surrounding areas in 1976, but by 1988 there were only about 40,500 television sets in the country.

Angop maintained a cooperative relationship with the Soviet news agency, TASS, and Angola was active in international efforts to improve coordination among nonaligned nations in the field of communications. Information ministers and news agency representatives from several Third World nations were scheduled to hold their fifth conference in Luanda in June 1989—their first meeting since 1985, when they met in Havana. The Angop delegation was to serve as host of the 1989 conference, and Angolan information officials in the government and party were to chair the organization from 1989 to 1992.

Angola was also a leader among Portuguese-speaking nations of Africa. Students from these nations attended the Interstate Journalism School in Luanda, which opened May 23, 1987, with support from the Yugoslav news agency, Tanyug. In September 1987, journalists from these five Lusophone nations held their third conference in Bissau, Guinea-Bissau. A major goal of this group was to coordinate cultural development based on their common language, but an important secondary goal was to demonstrate support for