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MARINE CORPS ORDER 5580.3

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: VIOLENCE PREVENTION PROGRAM

Ref: (a) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Final
Recommendations of the Fort Hood Follow-on Review,"
August 18, 2010
(b) MARADMIN 240/11
(c) MCO 1752.5A
(d) MCO 5300.17
(e) MCO 1754.11
(f) MCO 1720.2
(g) SECNAV M-5510.30
(h) MARADMIN 647/11
(i) ASIS/SHRM WVPI.1-2011 American National Standard for
Workplace Violence Prevention and Intervention
(j) United States Office of Personnel Management OWR-09,
Dealing with Workplace Violence, A Guide for Agency
Planners, February 1998
(k) SECNAV M-5210.1
(l) SECNAVINST 5211.5E
(m) United States Department of Justice NCJ 170612,
Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment
Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials, July 1998
(n) JAGINST 5800.7F
(o) MCO 5210.11E
(p) MCO 12713.6A
(q) MCO P5354.1D
(r) Defense Civilian Personnel Advisory Service Guide,
Workplace Violence Prevention and Response, May 2012

Encl: (1) Violence Prevention Program

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.

1. Situation

a. The Secretary of Defense directed the Department of Defense (DOD) respond to lessons learned from Fort Hood by taking actions as outlined in reference (a). In response to DoD requirements, this Order establishes Marine Corps Violence Prevention Program policy and guidance per the references. Additionally, this Order defines warning signs/indicators of potential violence, outlines reporting requirements, and provides guidance for command response to reported warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

b. Violence may manifest itself in various ways on and off Marine Corps installations, and the warning signs/indicators of potential violence described in the enclosure may be used in the proactive evaluation of the potential for violence. This program incorporates best practices adapted from Federal agencies and private sector organizations.

c. This Order is not intended to, and does not, create any entitlement, cause of action or defense in favor of any person out of a failure to prevent acts of violence outlined in this Order. It is Marine Corps policy to provide a safe environment for all Marines, civilian personnel, family members, and visitors. Acts or threats of harm or violence (either explicit or veiled) are crimes that will not be tolerated. No limitations are hereby placed on the lawful prerogatives of the Marine Corps or their officials.

2. Mission. Establish and maintain a comprehensive Marine Corps Violence Prevention Program in order to prevent violence on our installations and throughout our service.

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations

(1) Commander's Intent

(a) Our personnel are our most valuable resource and their protection is of paramount importance. This program is designed to protect our Marines, other service members, civilian employees, family members, contractors, customers, and visitors from any act of physical violence against persons or property, physical or verbal threats, intimidation, harassment, or other inappropriate, disruptive behavior that causes fear for personal safety at or outside of the work site.

(b) Violence prevention includes efforts to assess, investigate, mitigate and respond to behaviors that may precede acts of harassment, intimidation, threats, violence, as well as behaviors consistent with radicalization and insider threats. Harassment, intimidation, threats, violence and inappropriate behaviors will not be tolerated. The intent of this program is to prevent violence, and that requires a lean and efficient process where internal and external expertise and assets are leveraged to provide a unit commander/supervisor informed courses of action to prevent violence.

(c) Leadership is the key to violence prevention. Through leadership, commanders and leaders create a culture that discourages unlawful violence and encourages increased reporting of warning signs/indicators of potential violence. To facilitate that goal, commanders shall ensure all leaders, supervisors, and personnel within their command are familiar with this Order and the guidance published in the enclosure.

(d) All individuals must maintain awareness related to their role and responsibilities outlined in the enclosure and report such warning signs/indicators of potential violence in a timely manner via the chain of command or appropriate entity such as another supervisor, Provost Marshal's Office (PMO)/Marine Corps Police Department (MCPD), contractor representative, or through a web-based or anonymous reporting system. Recognizing and reporting warning signs/indicators of potential violence are the foundations of this program and are the responsibility of all personnel. Those best positioned to recognize warning signs/indicators of potential violence being exhibited by an individual are his/her family, friends, co-workers, and immediate supervisor; in short, those whom he/she most frequently interacts with. All personnel must understand and apply the principles of recognition and reporting described in this Order.

(2) Concept of Operations

(a) Successful violence prevention requires a multi-disciplinary approach. The Violence Prevention Program will be executed at the unit level within the Force Preservation Council (FPC) process, per reference (b). In addition, this program is intended to work in collaboration with existing prevention and response programs such as sexual assault, substance abuse, and family advocacy (references (c), (d), and (e)), but not amend or replace them. The Violence Prevention Program will leverage the

Naval Criminal Investigative Service's (NCIS) Threat Management Unit (TMU) to provide threat assessment subject matter expertise on a case-by-case basis.

(b) Whether violence manifests itself as family violence, workplace violence directed at a fellow Marine or civilian, or an act targeting an installation at large, the warning signs/indicators of potential violence displayed by the perpetrators of these types of crimes often have commonality. Violence Prevention Program collaborative efforts will focus on evaluating warning signs/indicators of potential violence and information sharing that will enable commanders, leaders, and supervisors to make better informed decisions as it relates to inappropriate behaviors, threats, and violence. All personnel are encouraged to report warning signs/indicators of potential violence in order to achieve the objectives and goals of this program.

(c) While this program will be implemented at the unit level through the FPC, the enclosure provides detailed information to assist FPCs in efforts to prevent violence primarily through recognizing, reporting, and responding to warning sign/indicators of potential violence.

(d) Definitions applicable to this Order are defined in Appendix A.

(e) The key tenets of the program are as follows:

1. Recognizing the warning signs/indicators of potential violence per Chapter 1 of the enclosure.

2. Reporting the warning signs/indicators of potential violence in a timely manner via the chain of command or appropriate entity which may include a supervisor, PMO/MCPD, contractor representative, or a web-based or anonymous reporting system such as the installation Inspector hotline, Eagle Eyes, or NCIS Text Tip hotline per Chapter 2 of the enclosure.

3. Responding to warning signs/indicators of potential violence and preventing violence per Chapter 3 of the enclosure and utilization of the inquiry guidelines and threat assessment process per Appendices B and C.

(f) Although the warning signs/indicators of potential violence may forecast violent behavior that includes sexual assault; response to sexual assault does not fall within

the scope of this program. The Violence Prevention Program does not afford restricted reporting to victims of any crime. Guidance regarding the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program (SAPR) can be found in reference (c). The following are distinct tenets of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program that must be executed in parallel with, but not connected to, the Violence Prevention Program:

1. Commanders will not conduct an independent command inquiry or investigation of an alleged sexual assault. All sexual assault cases should be immediately referred to the appropriate Military Criminal Investigative Organization (MCIO).

2. All efforts shall be made to protect the restricted reporting options for sexual assault victims by educating personnel on the correct avenue to receive help if sexually assaulted (e.g., the Uniformed Victim Advocates (UVA)).

3. The personnel that can preserve the restricted reporting option are: Victim Advocates (VA; includes UVA); Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARC); Counselors; and Healthcare Providers (HCP).

(g) Although the warning signs/indicators of potential violence may also indicate that an individual is considering self-directed violence, suicide prevention does not fall within the scope of this program. Though there are some similar risk factors/warning signs of both suicide and perpetration of violence, there are also key differences. Individuals who are at risk of suicide commonly have a mood disorder such as depression or anxiety, have been victims of violence/abuse, want to escape from their own emotional pain by killing themselves, and rarely have anti-social personality traits. Commonly, individuals who perpetrate violence, show signs of anti-social personality disorder, have a history of perpetrating violence, and tend to hurt others to cope with their own emotional/psychological issues. Thus, the response to a person who shows signs of suicide needs to be different than for an individual who shows signs of perpetrating violence. If an individual is identified as having thoughts of suicide, he/she shall be referred to the appropriate resources in accordance with the Marine Corps Suicide Prevention Program per reference (f).

b. Subordinate Element Missions

(1) Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations
(DC, PP&O), Security Division (PS)

(a) Responsible for all crime prevention programs; serve as lead agency for program management including coordination of all violence prevention training within the Marine Corps.

(b) Coordinate with the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC, M&RA) and other Services to establish and maintain methods (e.g., systems, memoranda of agreement or understanding (MOAs, MOUs), inter-service support agreements (ISSAs)) to facilitate the timely exchange of information between the other Services and the Marine Corps on violence cases involving Marines, other service members, family members, civilian employees, and contractors working on a Marine Corps contract occurring on non-Marine Corps installations.

(c) Coordinate with commanding officers and command security managers to ensure proper Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS) reporting requirements under the Continuous Evaluation Program of reference (g) are understood regarding reports of violence or warning signs/indicators of potential violence whether perpetrated or threatened.

(d) Coordinate with the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (CG, MCCDC) and Commanding General, Training and Education Command (CG, TECOM) to assist with the deployment of established training on violence prevention as required. Assist in ensuring the developed training curricula are kept current.

(e) Monitor violence prevention program efforts throughout the Marine Corps.

(f) In coordination with DC, M&RA, develop a Functional Area checklist for the violence prevention program to be used by commanders at all levels and for use during program inspections.

(2) Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
(DC, M&RA)

(a) Responsible for all behavioral health programs and behavioral health prevention; in coordination with Headquarters Marine Corps, Health Services (HQMC, HS) support

DC, PP&O as the lead for coordinating violence prevention within the Marine Corps.

(b) Coordinate with DC, PP&O to establish and maintain methods (e.g., MOAs, MOUs, ISSAs) to facilitate the timely exchange of information between the other Services and the Marine Corps on violence cases involving Marines occurring on non-Marine Corps installations.

(d) Ensure SAPR, Family Advocacy Program (FAP), and Behavioral Health counselors coordinate with commanders, as well as unit health services personnel, to provide support to the Violence Prevention Program as described in this policy.

(e) Update references (c) through (f) as appropriate.

(f) Support DC, PP&O in developing a Functional Area checklist for the Violence Prevention Program to be used by commanders at all levels and for Inspector General of the Marine Corps (IGMC) use during inspections.

(3) Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (CG, MCCDC)

(a) In collaboration with DC, PP&O, develop an appropriate violence prevention training event(s) and incorporate into the Marine Corps Common Skills (MCCS) Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual.

(b) Develop and implement a plan to integrate the violence prevention training event into Officer and Enlisted entry level training.

(c) Develop and implement a plan to integrate the violence prevention training event into mentoring and values based training courses for sustainment while Marines attend career level schools.

(4) Commandant of the Marine Corps Safety Division (CMC (SD)). Ensure the Marine Corps safety program supports efforts to prevent violence.

(5) Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Division of Public Affairs (CMC (PA))

(a) Support PS with development of an issue-based public information plan to support implementation of the Violence Prevention Program.

(b) Use the following themes to support internal communication to Marine audiences, including active duty and reserve Marines worldwide, their families, other service members who serve on Marine Corps Installations, civilian employees, and contractors who work on Marine Corps Installations:

1. This is a commander's program.
2. This program is anchored in awareness.
3. First recognize; then report.
4. If you see warning signs/indicators of potential violence, report them (Text Tip, Chain of Command, PMO/MCPD).
5. If you see a crime or believe a crime to be imminent, notify law enforcement immediately.
6. Early recognition of warning signs/indicators of potential violence interrupts escalation to acts of violence.
7. Take care of your buddy... Marines don't let their buddies cross the line.
8. Early assessment by a multi-disciplinary team provides the best chance to intervene and help before a crime is committed or adverse action is required.
9. This program is not a method for victims of sexual assault to make restricted reports; victims of sexual assault seeking to make a restricted report should contact their UVA/VA, SARC, counselor, or health care provider.

(6) Inspector General of the Marine Corps (IGMC)

(a) Coordinate with PS regarding the integration of the provisions of this Order in the Functional Area checklist.

(b) Coordinate Command Inspection Program support with PS.

(7) Chaplain of the Marine Corps. Ensure all chaplains assigned to Marine Corps units are fully aware of the contents of this Order and receive the baseline training applicable to their position.

(8) Commanders of units required to maintain an FPC (in accordance with reference (h))

(a) Establish a command violence prevention program in conjunction with the FPC that encompasses Marines, service members, civilian employees, family members, and assigned contract employees.

(b) Ensure personnel are aware of the warning signs/indicators of potential violence outlined in Chapter 1 of the enclosure and conduct/document training per this Order.

(c) Ensure reporting of warning signs/indicators of potential violence in a timely manner per Chapter 2 of the enclosure.

(d) Ensure appropriate assessment and response to reports of warning signs/indicators of potential violence, threats, and threatening behaviors as outlined in Chapter 3 and Appendices B and C of the enclosure.

(e) Ensure reporting of suspected, alleged or actual incidents of violence immediately to the appropriate law enforcement entity after ensuring the physical safety and well-being of the victim(s).

(f) Establish clear standards for personal behavior and hold those identified to be offenders accountable.

(g) Take appropriate actions to protect and support the targeted victim(s) of potential or actual violence.

(h) Assign a violence prevention officer (VPO) to the unit FPC. Ensure this appointment does not create a conflict of interest with other duty assignments. The following billets are not recommended for appointment as the VPO: SARCs, UVA, VA, legal officers, Family Readiness Officers (FRO), safety office personnel, or chaplains. Specific duties of the VPO are described in Chapter 3 of the enclosure.

(i) Conduct training per Appendix D of the enclosure. Ensure violence prevention training is included in

pre-deployment briefs and work-up procedures as required. Pre-deployment training may include customs, mores, radicalization and insider threat issues as it relates to violence prevention.

(j) Ensure minimization of re-victimization of targeted victims by:

1. Ensuring, as appropriate, targeted victims and offenders do not remain in the same work and/or living area.

2. Protecting the interest and privacy of targeted victims to the maximum extent possible.

3. Limiting access to documents identifying targeted victims (e.g., incident reports, charge sheets, military protective orders, etc.) to only those with a need to know in compliance with reference (l).

4. Fostering a command environment that encourages the reporting of warning signs/indicators of potential violence without fear of reprisal.

(k) Publish a unit violence prevention policy statement. See Appendix F for a sample. Ensure local level violence prevention policy and procedures are included in a local order, such as the unit FPC order.

(l) Coordinate with Civilian Human Resources Offices (APF and NAF) before implementing local violence prevention policy and procedures to ensure labor obligations are fulfilled.

(9) Installation Provost Marshals/Police Chiefs

(a) Provide a person to serve as the installation violence prevention program representative. Specific duties of this representative are described in Chapter 3 (paragraph 3c) of the enclosure.

(b) Incorporate violence prevention into existing installation crime prevention programs.

(10) Installation Civilian Human Resources Offices

(a) Provide a person to serve as the installation violence prevention program representative. Specific duties of this representative are described in Chapter 3 (paragraph 3c) of the enclosure.

(b) Provide supervisory training which may include basic leadership skills (e.g. setting clear standards of conduct and performance, addressing employee problems promptly, using probationary wisely), performance management, counseling, discipline, ADR, and other management tools.

(c) Provide technical expertise and consultation to help commanders and supervisors determine the appropriate course of administrative action for civilian employees.

(d) Ensure accurate position sensitivity and risk designations are established for all civilian employee positions.

(e) Cooperate with security and external investigators in connection with required background investigations.

(f) Ensure local labor obligations are fulfilled regarding violence prevention program implementation.

(g) Advise on proper referrals for fitness for duty exams.

(11) Medical Officer to the Marine Corps. Ensure all health services personnel assigned to Marine Corps units are fully aware of the contents of this Order and receive the baseline training applicable to their position.

(12) Supervisors and Managers

(a) Take all threats seriously; when in doubt, contact Installation Provost Marshals/Police Chiefs and/or HRO for advice.

(b) Inform employees of installation workplace violence prevention program policies and procedures.

(c) Ensure employees know specific procedures for dealing with workplace threats and emergencies, and how to contact first responders and other safety and security officials.

(d) Ensure employees with special needs are aware of emergency evacuation procedures and have assistance, as necessary, regarding emergency evacuation situations.

(e) Ensure events are properly and timely investigated and addressed.

c. Coordinating Instructions. Training will be conducted and funded by PS and coordinated via separate correspondence.

4. Administration and Logistics


a. Submit recommendations concerning this Order to the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, Security (PS) via the appropriate chain of command.

b. Records shall be managed according to National Archives and Records Administration approved dispositions per reference (k) to ensure proper maintenance, use, accessibility and preservation, regardless of format or medium.

5. Command and Signal

a. Command. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Total Force.

b. Signal. This Order is effective the date signed.



R. T. TRYON
Deputy Commandant for
Plans, Policies and Operations

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1. File this sheet like a directive in the master directives file.
2. The locator sheet is not used in place of "charge out" cards.

RECORD OF CHANGES

Log completed change action as indicated.

Change Number	Date of Change	Date Entered	Signature of Person Incorporated Change

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Chapter 1

Recognize: Warning Signs/Indicators of Potential Violence

1. General

a. In many situations, an act of violence is preceded by some form of behavior that signals the violence to come. Understanding this phenomenon affords us the opportunity to recognize those precipitating behaviors and implement preventive response courses of action. Identifying warning signs/indicators of potential violence early and intervening can de-escalate the potential of a violent act occurring.

b. While certain behaviors raise concern, they do not necessarily mean someone will commit a violent act. No one type of conduct can predict whether someone will or will not commit a violent act. It's often difficult to differentiate between the "troubled" or "difficult" individual, versus an individual who poses a threat. Assessing a pattern of escalation of warning signs/indicators of potential violence, as well as understanding the full range of factors and circumstances involved (including an individual's motives, intents, potential actions, and ability to carry out those actions) are key aspects to preventing violence. The escalation of warning signs/indicators of potential violence can alert commanders, leaders, and supervisors to possible problems that require further inquiry and potential intervention. The Priority Risk Scale below depicts some of the types of warning signs/indicators of potential violence that may be observed in each risk category.

c. It is important to understand the warning signs/indicators of potential violence listed below are not inclusive of every possible human behavior that could potentially indicate a propensity for violence. No such list exists. The behaviors identified below are known indicators based on case studies and industry best practices, but also must be considered within the context of each unique situation. The danger of treating this as an inclusive list is twofold:

(1) Users don't recognize behaviors that aren't listed. This limits the program to only those behaviors that we know based on previous violent incidents and known behavioral science. This unintentionally restricts our greatest asset, which is the intuition of our people.

(2) Users look for a formula, where one behavior plus another must equal a specific outcome and therefore a pre-determined response is appropriate. Unfortunately, no such formula exists when dealing with the complexity of human behavior. Therefore, the danger is that users fail to consider the full context of the scenario, the totality of information, any precipitating events, the personality of the subject, and myriad other factors that make every single case as unique as the individuals involved.

d. Recognizing the warning signs/indicators of potential violence is the foundation of this program and is the responsibility of all personnel on our installations. Those best positioned to recognize warning signs/indicators of potential violence being exhibited by an individual are his/her family, friends, co-workers, and immediate supervisor; in short, those he/she most frequently interacts with. Violence prevention requires all personnel to understand and apply the principles of recognition described in this chapter.

2. Priority Risk Scale

a. Moderate Risk - relatively nonspecific behaviors from a person expressing concerns with personal and/or organizational issues.

(1) A Moderate Risk means there is not a clear and immediate threat of violence toward an identified target. The subject appears to be insufficiently influenced by current circumstances to engage in a dangerous act.

(2) Specific concerns include a progressive decline in physical and/or psychological health and/or worsening of organizational climate.

(3) Related warning signs/indicators of potential violence for moderate risk behavior may include:

(a) A distorted perception of being picked on (e.g., verbal comments, emails, letters, body language, etc.).

(b) Unusual weight loss or gain.

(c) Significant change in hygiene or appearance.

(d) Holding grudges (e.g., bringing up past issues, not moving on after an issue is resolved, making comments

blaming someone, making comments about getting back at someone for a perceived wrong, etc.).

(e) Non-violent criminal behavior (e.g., vandalism, criminal mischief, harassment, intimidation, larceny).

(f) Belligerence, insubordination.

(g) Encourages disruptive/disobedient behavior.

(h) Inappropriate communications to employees, leadership, or management; includes email, spoken words, phone calls, gestures, notes, letters, pictures, internet postings.

(i) Statements demonstrating fascination with incidents of violence.

(j) Numerous conflicts with leaders, supervisors and other Marines or employees.

(k) Strong racist or sexist behavior.

(l) Challenges chain of command/supervisor's legal or administrative authority to do things, continuously references the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), or "threatens" to make regulatory body complaints, regularly articulates unreasonable grievances (e.g., person complains about the installation, boss, commander, etc. in an exaggerated manner).

(m) Social withdrawal.

(n) Excessive perception of isolation and being alone (e.g., verbal comments, emails, letters, body language, moods).

(o) Excessive perception of rejection (e.g., verbal comments, emails, letters, body language, moods).

(p) Being a chronic targeted victim of violence.

(q) Low work interest and poor job performance.

(r) Extreme changes in behavior.

(s) Life changing event (e.g., recent death of a significant person, family or parenting crisis, marital problems, divorce, separation, financial losses).

(t) Obsession (e.g., being consumed by someone, something, an incident, or issue to the point where the individual's mind becomes completely occupied by it).

(u) Diminishing inhibitions.

(v) Sense of inevitability (e.g., foregone conclusion, something is going to happen regardless of anything else, nothing one can do about it).

(w) Membership in fringe groups; having infamous individuals as heroes.

(x) Prior voluntary or involuntary commitment to a mental, psychiatric or substance abuse hospital.

(y) History (to include prior diagnosis) of health or character problems that compromise coping or enhance appeal of violence, to include:

1. Any medical or psychological condition resulting in reduced inhibitions, impaired judgment or thinking, increased anxiety or disorganized thinking, or other behaviors indicating increased risk of harm to themselves or others.

2. Schizophrenia or psychosis (delusions, hearing or seeing things that others cannot hear or see).

3. Bipolar disorder (several days of unusually elevated mood and increased goal-directed activity).

4. Personality disorder.

a. Repeated unlawful behavior.

b. Repeated deceitfulness and manipulation of others for personal gain.

c. Impulsivity.

d. Irritability and aggressiveness, intense and inappropriate anger, or repeated physical fights.

- others.
- e. Reckless disregard for the safety of
 - f. Consistent irresponsibility.
 - g. Lack of remorse or indifference toward harming others.
 - h. Emotional instability.
 - i. Inability to empathize with others.
 - j. Exaggerated sense of personal entitlement.

b. High Risk - a threat of violence, usually toward an identifiable, but non-specific target. The subject currently lacks immediacy, a specific plan, or a specified plan of violence.

(1) High Risk behavior indicates a threat is real and feasible, often with a vengeful, menacing quality, but lacking the level of specificity and credibility of an Extreme Risk. The target may be incompletely identified or unknown to the subject (e.g., still in the planning phase without a specific target identified). The threatened action may be vaguely defined, unrealistic, or impractical in design. High Risk behavior may also result in a volatile workplace climate or close connection to worksites previously or currently experiencing threats of violence.

(2) Related warning signs/indicators of potential violence for this rating level may include:

(a) Substance abuse - alcohol, prescription drugs, illegal drugs.

(b) Preoccupation with violence, police, military (consider context), or survivalism:

- 1. Inappropriate pictures of violence.
- 2. Intimidating comments about violence.
- 3. Writings that are disturbing/unsettling about violent acts (e.g., stories, essays).

4. Personally created artwork or drawings that are disturbing/unsettling.

(c) Browsing or visiting internet websites that promote or advocate violence or terrorism, or have terrorism themes without official sanction in the performance of duty.

(d) Expressing hatred or intolerance of American society and culture.

(e) Statements indicating approval of the use of unlawful violence to resolve a problem in the U.S.

(f) Statements indicating desperation (over personal or professional problems).

(g) Threatening or intimidating behavior including, but not limited to e-mail, spoken words, gestures, notes, letters, pictures, and/or internet postings.

(h) Anger, hostility, temper tantrums.

(i) Persistent pursuit.

(j) Aggressive sexual behavior.

(k) Morbid jealousy (e.g., range of irrational thoughts and emotions together with associated unacceptable or extreme behavior in which the dominant theme is a preoccupation with a partner's sexual unfaithfulness based on unfounded evidence).

(l) Uncontrolled anger.

(m) Impulsive and chronic hitting, intimidating, and bullying behaviors.

(n) History of discipline problems.

(o) Intolerance for differences/prejudicial attitude.

(p) Identification with or membership in hate/extremist groups.

(q) Sympathetic to violence promoting organizations (e.g., extremists, hate groups, gangs).

(r) Expresses support or advocating support for terrorists.

(s) Statements made comparing terrorists to freedom fighters or revolutionaries.

(t) Refusing/resisting to deploy due to personal, political or religious reasons (e.g., Conscientious objector).

(u) Expresses outrage against military operations.

(v) Expresses a duty to protect a foreign community, when the expressed "duty" conflicts with the individual's current role/mission or the interests of the United States.

c. Extreme Risk - when a subject has made a clear and immediate threat of violence to an identifiable target(s); directly stated threat of violence; clearly identified a target (person, worksite, property or organization); has stated a specific description of the intended violent act, including the means, opportunity, and motivation to carry out the threat. Extreme Risks also include insider threat activities that may indicate that acts of violence are imminent.

(1) Threats:

(a) Are specific and credible.

(b) Have a stated intention by subject to seriously harm or kill themselves and/or others, or may be directed at a specific worksite.

(c) Often have a vindictive, revengeful quality in which retribution plays a role.

(2) For an Extreme Risk, the degree of danger increases and credibility is enhanced by:

(a) Indications that the subject has specific knowledge of the location, activities, and/or personal life of the target.

(b) The extent that the threatened action is realistic or practical in design. However, threatened actions that do not appear realistic or practical should not be discounted as the plan is potentially influenced by fantasy or

altered reality depending on the mental/psychological state of the subject.

(c) Repeated, escalating, and increasingly detailed threats.

(d) A progressive decline in the individual's physical and/or psychological health. Particular attention should be given when a subject previously exhibiting a progressive decline is suddenly happy, or even euphoric. This may indicate the subject has determined a potentially violent course of action and is at peace with his/her resolution.

(e) A person experiencing intolerable levels of frustration or stress.

(3) Related warning signs/indicators of potential violence for this rating level may include:

(a) Physical abuse of spouse and/or children.

(b) Past history of violent and aggressive behavior.

(c) Misuse of firearms/weapons such as inappropriately bringing a weapon to the workplace, brandishing a weapon in the workplace, making inappropriate references to guns, or exhibiting a fascination with weapons or destructive power.

(d) Homicidal or suicidal thoughts/expressions.

(e) Active psychotic symptoms such as hearing voices or delusions.

(f) Advocates unlawful violence, the threat of unlawful violence, or unlawful use of force to achieve goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature.

(g) Associated with terrorists without official sanction in the performance of duty.

(h) Possesses or is seeking items that would be useful to terrorists, but are not required for the individual's performance of normal duties.

(i) Seeks spiritual sanctioning for unlawful violence or seeks spiritual sanctioning to justify violence based on their religion.

(j) Provides financial or material support to a terrorist organization or to someone suspected of being a terrorist.

(k) Expressing an obligation to engage in violence in support of terrorism, violence, extremist groups, or inciting others to do the same.

(l) Purchasing bomb making materials, or obtaining information about the construction of explosives not required for the individual's performance of normal duties.

(m) Engaging in para-military training with anti-US individuals.

(n) Distributing terrorist literature via the internet, which is not required for the individual's performance of normal duties.

(o) Applying for membership in a violent/terrorist group.

(p) Adopting an extremist ideology.

(q) Expressing loyalty to terrorists.

(r) Collecting intelligence for terrorists.

(s) Talking knowingly about future terrorist events.

(t) Expressing intent to commit a terrorist act.

(u) Traveling overseas for terrorist training.

(4) Each of the above listed behaviors is a clear sign there is a significant problem; none should be ignored. By identifying the problem and dealing with it appropriately, leaders may be able to prevent violence from happening. Commanders, supervisors and contractor organizations should ensure the appropriate staff member(s) (e.g., VPO) is/are prepared to assist their people in dealing with such situations. When civilian employees are involved, ensure the HRO is immediately contacted for assistance and guidance on the

disciplinary process and labor obligations for civilian employees. Some behaviors require immediate law enforcement involvement, others constitute actionable misconduct and may require disciplinary action, and others indicate an immediate need for counseling intervention through Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) Behavioral Health, Military OneSource, or a Civilian Employee Assistance Program (CEAP) referral. See the following examples:

(a) Immediate law enforcement notification examples may include situations such as a person physically assaulting another person, holding a weapon and verbally threatening bodily injury against a person, or stated or written threats of bodily injury against a specific person.

(b) Actionable misconduct examples may include situations where no crime has been committed that requires PMO/MCPD involvement, but an offense punishable under the UCMJ, law, regulations, or policies has occurred and may be addressed by a commander or supervisor, such as negligent damage to personal or government property, harassment, prejudicial behavior, insubordination, inappropriate communications, visiting unauthorized websites, or a person making conditional threats.

(c) Immediate need for counseling intervention examples may include situations such as persons doing harm to themselves, substance abuse, persons demonstrating possible mental problems, persons showing signs of stress or significant emotional distress, life changing event, uncontrollable anger, family problems, problems getting along with co-workers, or as a follow on action to subparagraphs (a) and (b) above.

Chapter 2

Reporting

1. General

a. All Marine Corps personnel and all personnel aboard Marine Corps installations have a duty to report recognized warning signs/indicators of potential violence. Although warning signs/indicators of potential violence do not forecast violence, there are many negative and dangerous outcomes possible when preventive actions are not taken. In order for commanders/supervisors to craft and implement appropriate responses, they require as much information as is available, which requires the active engagement of all personnel in reporting recognizable warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

b. Reporting of warning signs/indicators of potential violence enables the violence prevention process to take place, as described in Chapter 3. Reporting warning signs/indicators of potential violence is how we take care of our fellow Marines, other service members, civilian employees, family members, contractors, customers, and visitors. It is foundational to the success of this program and requires all personnel take this responsibility seriously.

2. Reporting Options

a. If there are signs that violence is imminent, an act of violence or crime has already occurred, or if a person has dire concerns for his/her safety or the safety of others, contact PMO/MCPD or the appropriate law enforcement authority immediately.

b. For Marines, service members, and contracted and civilian employees the primary means of reporting warning signs/indicators of potential violence will be through their chain of command or immediate supervisor. If the individual is not comfortable utilizing this approach to report warning signs/indicators of potential violence, the following options are available:

(1) Another appropriate level leader or supervisor. This is a reporting option if the person who is displaying warning signs/indicators of potential violence is in your chain of command or is an immediate supervisor.

- (2) Unit VPO.
- (3) Appropriate law enforcement (PMO/MCPD).
- (4) Human Resources Office.

c. Personnel who are contractors, retirees, family members, or visitors, and do not have a chain of command or office structure, shall report warning signs/indicators of potential violence and crimes to PMO/MCPD or to the activity security manager or the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR).

d. Anonymous Reporting Systems

(1) TextTip. This is a commercial-off-the-shelf system purchased and deployed by NCIS to allow anonymous reporting. The system allows three methods of reporting. All three of these methods encrypt the reporter's data to protect anonymity, yet allow NCIS to contact the reporter through an anonymous user alias to gather further information about the report.

(a) Web-based.

- 1. Visit www.ncis.navy.mil in your web browser.
- 2. Click the "Text & Web Tip Hotline".
- 3. Complete the form.

(b) Text.

- 1. Text "NCIS" to 274637 from your cell phone.
- 2. Receive a response with your assigned anonymous alias.
- 3. Begin dialogue.

(c) Smartphone Application (available for Android and iOS).

- 1. Visit App Store and download "Tip Submit Mobile".

2. When using for the first time, select a username and password.

3. When submitting a tip, complete the form and select "Submit".

(2) Other localized anonymous reporting systems.

Chapter 3

Respond

1. General

a. This is a commander's program. Recognition and reporting of warning signs/indicators of potential violence are critical elements of this program; however, the responsibility to take preventive action rests with the commander. By design, this program will increase the flow of information up the chain of command, but with that comes an increased trust in every commander's ability to deploy the correct resources to resolve issues before disciplinary or punitive actions are required. In keeping with the intent of the Force Preservation Councils (FPC), established by references (b) and (h), this program is designed to increase information flow and improve accessibility to organic and non-organic resources.

b. This program uses the established FPC process to leverage multi-disciplinary team personnel (see paragraph 3f below) to identify solutions to de-escalate a situation with an individual exhibiting warning signs/indicators of potential violence and trending toward a potentially violent incident.

c. If there are signs that violence is imminent, an act of violence has already occurred, or if a person has dire concerns for his/her safety or the safety of others, contact PMO/MCPD immediately. Targeted victims of threats should be warned that threats have been made against them.

2. Using the FPC Process. The FPC process is articulated in references (b) and (h). Information flow and reporting will be conducted within the FPC framework per reference (b). Actions related to reports of warning signs/indicators of potential violence are executed within the FPC at the lowest level appropriate. Processing of warning signs/indicators of potential violence information within the FPC allows visibility and synthesis of information while preventing single points of failure. Though reference (b) and (h) require the FPC to meet a minimum of once monthly for active duty units and semi-annually for reserve units, commanders shall use the FPC as often as required based on the level of threat and the urgency associated with individual cases involving warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

3. Roles and Responsibilities. In addition to the roles and responsibilities identified in reference (b) and paragraph 3b of this Order, this paragraph identifies personnel and describes specific responsibilities required in the execution of this program.

a. Commanders

(1) Conduct warning sign/indicator of potential violence initial inquiries and/or threat assessments, per Appendices B and C, with multi-disciplinary support as appropriate. Determine if there is reason to believe that there is a risk to human life.

(2) The time sensitivity of the initial inquiry should be based on the initial information received and modified appropriately as facts are gathered. If at any time during the threat assessment it is believed that violence is likely and/or in progress, PMO/MCPD shall be notified immediately.

(3) Locally track all reports of warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

(4) Notify PMO/MCPD when an individual is terminated, suspended or discharged from the military as a result of a violent incident so the person can be barred from the installation.

b. Violence Prevention Officer. The VPO's primary responsibility is to serve as a violence prevention subject matter expert for the commander. It is recommended a person assigned as the VPO not have duties that may present conflicts of interest between potentially time sensitive tasks. Non-Appropriated Funds (NAF) personnel shall not be assigned duties as a VPO. Personnel assigned as Marine and Family (MF) Program representatives for prevention and response programs (e.g., UVA, SACO, FRO) should not be employed in this capacity. VPO responsibilities are as follows:

(1) Assist with conducting initial inquiries and threat assessments as it relates to warning signs/indicators of potential violence and escalation of behaviors.

(2) Track all reported warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

(3) Generate and maintain records of all documentation and records related to reports of warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

(4) Ensure threat assessment and case management materials (reports, evidence, as well as witness and victim statements) are properly secured (lockable cabinet or as required by the level of sensitivity of the materials), retained, and destroyed/discarded as outlined per references (k) and (l) and other appropriate regulations.

(5) Conduct follow up actions to assist with the threat assessment when directed by the commander.

(6) Attend the VPO training described in Appendix D.

c. Violence Prevention Program Representative

(1) Serve as the installation Violence Prevention Representative (VPR) as a nexus to law enforcement capabilities (e.g., NCIS TMU, PMO/MCPD, local law enforcement) and a subject matter expert for the Violence Prevention Program.

(2) Disseminate promotional communications about recognizing and reporting warning signs/indicators of potential violence throughout the installation

(3) Maintain a contact list of installation multi-disciplinary team personnel.

(4) Attend the VPR training described in Appendix D.

(5) Be prepared to perform the functions of the VPO in situations where a subject is not covered by a defined unit FPC.

(6) Be prepared to assist commanders/VPOs across the installation as an additional resource upon their request, to include the conduct of threat assessments.

d. Force Preservation Council. The FPC will use the Violence Prevention Program policy and procedures provided in this Order for reports of warning signs/indicators of potential violence. As needed, provide subject matter expertise during initial inquiries, threat assessments, and the FPC process to help commanders and their designees gather information and develop prevention courses of action. Multi-disciplinary team

members that may contribute to the Violence Prevention Program process by assisting the FPC include:

- (1) Installation Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC).
- (2) Family readiness officer.
- (3) Antiterrorism officer.
- (4) Chaplain.
- (5) Mental health/occupational medicine professional.
- (6) Marine Corps Community Services (MCCS) Behavioral Health/FAP/IDC representative.
- (7) Substance Abuse Counseling Center representative.
- (8) Legal counsel.
- (9) Safety Office representative.
- (10) Human Resource Officer (HRO) Representative.
- (11) Equal Employment Office (EEO) representative.
- (12) Union representative.
- (13) School counselor (if a student is involved).
- (14) Other appropriate Federal law enforcement.
- (15) Local or Host Nation law enforcement representative.
- (16) Victim and Witness Assistance Program (VWAP) representative.
- (17) Security manager.
- (18) Installation VPR.
- (19) Facilities representative.
- (20) Public affairs.

(21) Contractor management.

(22) And others that may be able to support the Threat Assessment.

e. Total Force. All personnel shall report warning signs/indicators of potential violence per Chapter 2 of this Order.

f. NCIS TMU. The NCIS TMU is headquartered at NCIS headquarters in Quantico, VA. The TMU consists of a team of psychologists, analysts, agents and other personnel as needed to provide assessments of potential threats to Department of Navy personnel and property. Every NCIS field office has at least one agent who has been trained by TMU and who goes through annual threat assessment refresher training. While the TMU frequently provides assessments of non-criminal acts/behaviors, consistent with NCIS's role within the Department of Navy as the agency responsible for investigating felony crimes, its primary role in the threat assessment arena is to assess activities or behaviors that could potentially result in violent or criminal behavior. The TMU is an important resource available to commanders and FPCs during threat assessments.

4. Violence Prevention Program Process. The Violence Prevention Program process includes six activities: conducting an initial inquiry, conducting a threat assessment, developing courses of action, monitoring the situation, case closure, and information sharing.

a. Initial Inquiry. Warning signs and indicators of potential violence may be recognized and reported by anyone. After being notified of a warning sign/indicator of potential violence, an initial inquiry should be conducted at the lowest level possible. Appendix B of this Order provides guidelines for conducting initial inquiries into reported warning signs/indicators of potential violence. The intent of the initial inquiry is to verify the report of warning signs/indicators of potential violence. The initial inquiry consists of information collection and an initial evaluation. The initial inquiry does not include completing a comprehensive investigation of the facts or a threat assessment, but rather focuses on completing an initial and timely collection of information. Once the initial inquiry is completed, the information is provided to the unit chain of command up to the VPO, where it can be assessed and presented to the commander and/or FPC as required. Due to the severe consequences

associated with workplace violence incidents, all initial inquiries into the display of warning signs/indicators of potential violence must be reported to the VPO via the chain of command even if preventive/corrective action has already been implemented by leadership below the FPC level.

b. Threat Assessment. Appendix C of this Order is a guide for conducting a threat assessment. A threat assessment is a process used to gather and analyze more detailed information that can then be used to inform preventive response courses of action. Threat assessments are intended to be conducted only after a commander has been informed of a verified warning sign/indicator of potential violence or an otherwise potentially violent situation. The threat assessment process is intended to follow an initial inquiry, as described in paragraph 4a above. The VPO is the unit subject matter expert for conducting threat assessments and he will use all resources at his/her disposal to assist in this assessment to include multi-disciplinary team members of the FPC and the installation VPR.

c. Course of Action Development. This is the point in the process where the VPO and the team members of the FPC combine the information and analysis from the threat assessment with their collective knowledge, experience, and training to develop recommendations for the commander to ultimately prevent our personnel from escalating to violence.

(1) Graduated Response Guide. The following are actions for each case of reported warning signs/indicators of potential violence:

(a) Moderate risk. Response to moderate risks includes an initial inquiry (see Appendix B) on the validity of specific complaints or concerns, reasonable monitoring, and intervention at the individual and/or organizational unit level, as required.

(b) High risk. Response to high risks includes initiating or continuing an initial inquiry and conducting a threat assessment, case monitoring, and intervention at the individual and/or organizational unit as determined by the FPC.

(c) Extreme risks. Response to extreme risks includes:

1. Identifying any immediate security concerns.

2. Notifying PMO/MCPD of the situation, who may notify NCIS TMU. After consultation with PMO/MCPD, conducting a comprehensive threat assessment if appropriate and PMO/MPCD or NCIS is not conducting an investigation.

3. Preventing the potential violence by removing the means and/or opportunity. When time permits, the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) should be consulted prior to taking action against an individual.

4. Immediately warning/notifying the potential target(s).

5. Making additional notifications as required.

(2) Security Activities. The following list of actions is appropriate for mitigating a verified threat.

(a) Start time log of protective actions and responsibilities assigned to individuals.

(b) Notify SJA/regional counsel office and PMO/MCPD regarding the threat.

(c) Warn targeted victims of threats made and others in supervision, management, public relations and operations, with a "need to know".

(d) Implement security protection at the targeted victim's work locations (or home if the targeted person lives on a military installation).

(e) Provide protection activities for targeted victims to include escorts if required.

(f) Security briefings.

(g) Issue cell phones and/or get contact information for all parties involved.

(h) Relocate targeted victims to shelters, other work locations, other geographic locations.

(i) Protect proprietary computer information, retrieval systems and assets.

(j) Assign new computer access, voicemails, email and remote access. Do not deactivate original email accounts or voicemail account.

(k) Retrieve ID badges, keys, card, and credit cards. Ensure response force has access to targeted victim's original location as well as access to the relocation area.

(l) Consider surveillance of the subject.

(m) Note the risk at public forums, conferences, meetings, and trade shows where the subject may have easier access to installation leaders, targeted victims or assets.

(n) Coordinate activities with prosecutors, police and special law enforcement agencies as appropriate.

(o) Coordinate any additional measures deemed appropriate to safeguard personnel (e.g. debarment from base, access control measures).

(3) Considerations for Handling Case Materials. The intent of these requirements is to provide greater granularity to assist commanders and VPOs to handle violence prevention cases within the FPC process.

(a) Create a list of potential physical and documentary case materials.

(b) Make copies of all documents received.

(c) Keep a running list of the case materials you receive and examine.

(d) Have a document receipt, tracking, and return protocol (also known as a "chain of custody" procedure).

(e) Keep case materials in a secure area accessible only to those with a "need to know" and per protection of PII.

(f) Make sure you get an acknowledgment receipt in writing if you take custody of original documents or case materials.

(4) Considerations for Developing a Threat Assessment Report

(a) Determine the audience for the report and who will need access.

(b) Ensure that recommended disciplinary measures are appropriate to the offense.

(c) Attach relevant documents to the report for easy access to the reader.

(d) Be concise.

(e) Separately research and report on workplace issues above and beyond those raised in the complaint that the initial violent incident fact finding inquiry uncovered.

(f) If a juvenile is a witness/subject of a violent incident fact finding inquiry, work with PMO/SJA to determine how to document the information.

(g) Only include facts and "relevant" information in the report.

d. Situation Monitoring

(1) After a threat assessment is completed, and the violence prevention courses of action have been developed and implemented, the behaviors of the subject and targeted victim shall be monitored. Monitoring may include confirming whether the subject is:

(a) Complying or refusing unit recommendations, instructions or orders.

(b) Decreasing/ending inappropriate harassing, threatening, intimidating behaviors.

(c) Reducing the intensity and frequency of inappropriate behaviors.

(d) Utilizing available support systems to include:

1. Available family/significant others.

2. MCCS Behavioral Health.

3. Civilian Employee Assistance Program (CEAP).

4. Community agencies.

(e) Participating in treatment.

(2) Monitoring of the targeted victim may include confirmation of whether or not the targeted victim is, or continues to:

(a) Report less or no inappropriate contact from subject.

(b) Display significant fear, distress, and anger over situations.

(c) Participate in supportive activities with EAP, community agencies, and treatment programs.

e. Information Sharing

(1) Information should be shared within the unit, FPC, and multi-disciplinary team members as required and to the fullest extent possible within existing laws and directives.

(2) CEAP counselors are prohibited by confidentiality regulations from disclosing information obtained from employees without their written consent unless an employee poses a threat to himself/herself or others. If an employee poses a threat, the counselor generally will advise the employee that necessary information will be reported to appropriate authorities, regardless of whether written consent is provided.

(3) NCIS (TextTip) and other automated systems are used to report anonymously.

(4) Timely and appropriate information sharing will help to establish a common operating picture (COP) across the broader group of organizations/agencies involved (e.g., Department of Defense, USMC, NCIS, Federal law enforcement, local/state law enforcement, counselors, etc.). Once a COP system is implemented within the Marine Corps, it will be used to share information for incident response/management.

(5) Warning signs/indicators of potential violence for sexual assault, family violence, and substance abuse are inter-related and contribute to the overall violence prevention program. The Marine Corps Violence Prevention Program relies on collaboration between these programs. The collaborative efforts of these programs will increase the Marine Corps' ability to

effectively prevent, mitigate, and appropriately respond to warning signs/indicators of potential violence. The key tenets of the violence prevention program are recognizing the warning signs/indicators of potential violence, reporting this information in a timely manner via the chain of command or appropriate entity, and responding in a timely and appropriate manner to prevent a violent act from occurring. The sharing of information will enable unit FPCs to establish the COP necessary to develop realistic and accurate options for commanders/leaders to utilize during their decision making process. It is possible that situations involving more than one program will occur and it is important to share information in those cases to the extent authorized by current laws.

f. Case Closure

(1) The commander, at the FPC level, of the person being monitored is the decision maker for closing case monitoring. The VPO may consider making the recommendation for closing case monitoring when the subject has changed his/her unacceptable behavior over time.

(2) The VPO may also confirm the supportive intervention courses of action that encouraged and helped the subject are effective, and are still involved with the subject.

(3) The VPO may maintain contact, at regular intervals, with sources of information who can verify appropriate functioning of the subject.

(4) The case may be considered for closure when it is possible to summarize:

(a) Why the subject was originally considered a threat.

(b) The changes in the subject's thinking and behavior that negate the original concerns.

(5) Case records will be retained per reference (k). All records, including personally identifiable information (PII), will be protected and maintained per appropriate directives and policies including reference (l).

Appendix A

Definitions

1. Definitions. Provision of definitions in this policy is intended for ease of use only. This policy does not supersede existing policies that define terms relevant to specific programs. Where applicable, governing policies are cited and the definition provided is accurate as of the publishing of this order. Definitions authored elsewhere are provided here for ease of use; however, references should be checked when using the definitions in any formal capacity to ensure use of the most recently authored definitions.

a. Assault. Assault is any willful attempt to inflict injury upon another person when coupled with an apparent ability to do so, or any intentional display of force that would give the targeted victim reason to fear or expect bodily harm. An assault may be committed without touching, striking, or inflicting bodily harm to another person.

b. Crime. An act or an omission, defined in law, and made punishable by constituted authority through a judicial proceeding for the protection of society.

c. Domestic Violence. Per DOD Instruction 6400.06, an offense under the United States Code, the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or State law involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force or violence against an intimate partner, or a violation of a lawful order issued for the protection of an intimate partner, who is:

(1) A current or former spouse.

(2) A person with whom the abuser shares a child in common; or

(3) A current or former intimate partner with whom the abuser shares or has shared a common domicile.

d. Fact finding. Gathering specific details of who was involved, when, where, behavioral descriptions of what occurred, names of witnesses, and confirmation that what is being reported did in fact happen. This process occurs after the initial inquiry and may be conducted as part of the threat assessment. The VPO or person assigned shall gather information to establish a situational context of incidents requiring fact finding.

Leaders, supervisors, managers and employees are required to cooperate with the fact finding process.

e. Force Preservation Council. Per references (b) and (h), Force Preservation Councils are formalized and implemented to better develop Marines, combine resources, enhance unit cohesion, and instill Marine leaders with the necessary skills to maintain a resilient, healthy, and proactive force. The intent of the FPC process is for every Marine to receive full access to the resources and leadership needed prior to a problem or issue becoming career or life threatening. This non-punitive Council enhances the collaboration between leaders and Marines, enhances leadership development, provides a channel to needed resources, and supports Marine total fitness. No Marine should be "left behind" because they lack knowledge or access to available resources. FPCs provide a proactive suite of resources for junior leaders to develop comprehensive plans to assist Marines in reaching their potential. The responsibility for executing recommendations, tracking progress, and providing updates to the FPC is a leadership responsibility resting with the Marine's chain-of-command. Commands have the latitude to tailor the mechanics and specific construct of their FPC to their unit size, structure, location, geographic dispersion, and mission.

f. Harassment. Harassment is an act committed by a person that makes either another or others feel uncomfortable, threatened, disturbed, offended, intimidated, or oppressed.

g. Homicide. The killing of one human being by another human being.

h. Initial Inquiry. The intent of the initial inquiry is to verify the report of warning signs/indicators of potential violence. See Appendix B for more information.

i. Insider threat. An insider threat is defined as anyone authorized access to an installation who is a threat to persons or entities. This includes uniformed personnel, current, former or contract employees, and other civilians who meet this criterion. Insider threats may encompass threats of violence, violent actions, espionage, sabotage, or other criminal or non-criminal behaviors that may adversely affect good order and discipline.

j. Intimidation. Intentional behavior which would cause a person of ordinary sensibilities fear of injury or harm.

k. Outsider threat. For purposes of this Order, an outsider threat is defined as anyone whose place of work, residence, or unit is not on a Marine Corps installation. However, the individual(s) observed exhibits inappropriate behaviors, makes verbal or non-verbal threats, or displays physical conduct that threatens personal safety or property which reasonably could be interpreted as intent to cause harm. Examples of an outsider threat include the criminal element, estranged spouse or significant other, disgruntled discharged service member, disgruntled terminated employee or potential terrorist. Outsider threats may encompass threats of violence, espionage, sabotage, or other criminal or non-criminal behaviors that may adversely affect good order and discipline.

l. Radicalization. The process of adopting an extremist belief system to include the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence as a method to effect societal change.

m. Sexual assault. Per reference (c), sexual assault is defined as intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of force, physical threat, or abuse of authority, or when the victim does not or cannot consent. Sexual assault includes rape, nonconsensual sodomy (oral or anal sex), indecent assault (unwanted, inappropriate sexual contact or fondling), or attempts to commit these acts. Sexual assault can occur without regard to gender or spousal relationship or age of victim.

n. Stalking. Act or acts of intentionally and repeatedly following, watching, or harassing another person or a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear death or bodily harm to himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family.

o. Subject. Someone who may be exhibiting warning signs/indicators of potential violence, but is not believed to have committed a crime.

p. Targeted victim(s). Person(s) being threatened or potentially targeted by threatening behavior.

q. Threat. Inappropriate behavior, verbal or non-verbal, or physical conduct that threatens personal safety or property that reasonably could be interpreted as intent to cause harm.

(1) Indirect threat. Aims to evoke fear of consequences brought about not by the individual who poses the threat, but by other parties; or a threat that tends to be vague, unclear, and

ambiguous. The plan, the targeted victim, the motivation, and other aspects of the threat are masked (e.g., "If I wanted to, I could kill everyone who works here!"). While violence is implied, the threat is phrased tentatively.

(2) Direct threat. Identifies a specific act against a specific targeted victim. A threat that is delivered in a straightforward, clear, and explicit manner (e.g., "I am going to shoot LtCol Commander.").

(3) Verbal threat. Spoken words that threaten personal safety or property that reasonably could be interpreted as intent to cause harm.

(4) Non-verbal threat. Gestures and/or unspoken actions that convey a threat without verbalizing it.

r. Threat assessment. The process of identifying behaviors that may signal an individual's preparation to commit a violent act, assessing those behaviors in the context of that individual's history of behaviors and other known incidents of violence that have demonstrated those behaviors, identifying the level of risk from the information attained, and using professional judgment and objective, appropriate tools to provide a comprehensive assessment, and present the findings of the assessment to the requestor in such a way as to qualify the opinion and its limitations appropriately. See Appendix C for more information.

s. Verbal abuse. The use of words that cause emotional and/or psychological harm to the person to whom they are being spoken.

t. Violence. The intentional and unlawful act, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological, or physical harm.

u. Violence Prevention Officer. The VPO's primary responsibility is to serve as a violence prevention subject matter expert for the commanders of units required to maintain an FPC in accordance with references (b) and (h). VPO's are personnel designated to receive reports and/or initial inquiries on individuals displaying warning signs/indicators of potential violence and to conduct threat assessments when directed by the commander. See chapter 3 for details.

v. Violence Prevention Program. Violence prevention program refers to the collection of policies, resources, training, and technologies adopted by an organization to aid in the prevention and mitigation of violent incidents.

w. Violence Prevention Representative. The person serving as the Violence Prevention Program subject matter expert at an installation. See Chapter 3 for details.

x. Workplace. The workplace is any location either permanent or temporary where an employee performs any work-related task and includes, but is not limited to, all common areas on a Marine Corps installation, unit spaces/buildings/structures, schools, recreational areas/facilities, fitness centers, parking lots, athletic fields, roadways, bachelor enlisted quarters, Marine Corps Exchanges, and training areas.

y. Workplace violence. Behaviors and actions, including harassment, intimidation, non-verbal threats, verbal threats, verbal abuse, sexual assault, stalking, assault, and homicide, occurring in or related to the workplace.

Appendix B

Initial Inquiry Process

1. General

a. This appendix provides guidelines for conducting initial inquiries into reported warning signs/indicators of potential violence. The intent of the initial inquiry is to verify the report of warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

b. After being notified of a warning sign/indicator of potential violence, an initial inquiry should be conducted. The initial inquiry is composed of information/data collection and initial evaluation. The initial inquiry does not include completing a comprehensive investigation of the facts or a threat assessment, rather completing an initial and timely collection of the above information.

c. Once the initial inquiry is completed, the information is provided to the unit chain of command and addressed through the FPC.

2. Information Collection. The intent of this step is to collect information regarding warning signs/indicators of potential violence witnessed by others. Information/data collection may include:

a. Is there an immediate threat of violence or crime? If yes, call PMO/MCPD.

b. Who is reporting and are there witnesses; if so, who and where are they?

c. Who is displaying the warning signs/indicators of potential violence?

d. Who is/are the targeted victim(s)?

e. What warning signs/indicators of potential violence were observed; to include non-verbal expressions and gestures?

f. What, if any, incident occurred?

g. Where did the incident take place?

h. When were the warning signs/indicators of potential violence witnessed?

i. What precipitated the warning signs/indicators of potential violence, if known?

j. What were the exact words, including the tone and level of voice?

3. Initial Evaluation

a. After completion of information collection, the initial evaluation is conducted to verify the report. The initial evaluation should include determining whether a life threatening situation is imminent or in progress. If there is reason to believe that there is a risk to human life, personnel will make an immediate notification to PMO/MCPD. The notification should be made as soon as the individual is made aware that violence is imminent or in progress.

b. The credibility, accuracy and veracity of the information is considered when analyzing the information/data. After analyzing the reported and collected information/data, the report is considered initially verified if the event is more likely than not to have occurred.

4. Notification. The initial inquiry is documented and presented to the unit chain of command and FPC.

Appendix C

Threat Assessment Process

1. General

a. This Appendix is a guide for conducting a threat assessment, which is the process used to gather and analyze information that is then used to inform preventive response courses of action.

b. Threat assessments are to be conducted per this Appendix only after a commander has been informed of a verified warning sign/indicator of potential violence or an otherwise potentially violent situation. The VPO is the unit subject matter expert for conducting threat assessments. This Appendix is not meant to interfere with either administrative or criminal investigations/prosecution. The threat assessment process is intended to follow an initial inquiry, as described in Appendix B.

c. This Appendix provides a well-defined and comprehensive description of the threat assessment process, however, it is critical to the success of the program that this process does not hinder the thorough and timely provision of recommendations to the impacted commanders/supervisors.

d. Threat assessments are authorized to be conducted when no law enforcement/criminal investigation is being conducted by PMO/MCPD or NCIS and when directed by the commander. These assessments may also be conducted after approval from PMO/MCPD or NCIS while an investigation is ongoing or after the completion of the investigation by PMO/MCPD or NCIS.

e. Reasons to complete a threat assessment include the following:

(1) To increase safety of personnel on our installations, with an immediate focus on the safety of any targeted victims.

(2) Provide options for targeted victims.

(3) Monitor the subject.

(4) Help the FPC assess the level of danger.

(5) Define the current and potential threat situation.

(6) Form a basis for prevention planning.

(7) Assist in analyzing vulnerabilities.

(8) Identify an intervention course of action to mitigate potential violence and/or de-escalate the situation including identification of the specially trained personnel, manpower, logistical, equipment, and administrative support required to prevent a potential incident.

2. Gather Information

a. If an initial inquiry has already been conducted (per Appendix B), then that information will serve as the starting point for the VPO (or other designated individual) when conducting a threat assessment. Some information acquired during the initial inquiry may need to be updated based on lapsed time or other factors. If no initial inquiry has been conducted, the VPO should begin by using the list of questions provided in Appendix B.

b. Corroboration of Facts. As many people as possible with information should be interviewed, as well as the subject, to assess the accuracy, validity, and veracity of reported warning signs/indicators of potential violence. Subjects should be interviewed last. Other individuals who know the subject may be sources regarding the subject's history of behaviors, interests, motives, and past and current capacity to carry out the threat to others, or to the targeted individual(s). Information sources may include:

(1) The targeted victim(s).

(2) Witnesses.

(3) Co-workers.

(4) Supervisors (current and previous).

(5) Family members, previous spouses/significant others, if cooperative.

(6) Contractors.

(7) Previous employers.

(8) Personnel records.

c. Fact Finding

(1) Answers to the following questions may provide the VPO with critical information necessary to complete a threat assessment:

(a) What is the FPC's initial impression? Does the FPC believe a threat exists?

(b) What was the context of the incident?

(c) Is there a specific plan of action?

(d) Is there a known type of intended violence or harm?

(e) Is there an obvious escalation of behaviors?

(f) Where is the subject now?

(g) What specific language, actions, and/or gestures were identified?

(h) Is there information as to when, where, and how a threat or act of violence may be perpetrated?

(i) Are there known recent stressful events, personal problems, losses?

(j) Does the subject possess or have access to weapons, explosives, ammunition?

(k) Does the subject lack a social support system?

1. Family.

2. Friends or social activities.

3. Religious affiliation.

(2) It may be necessary to review numerous types of information when completing the threat assessment. These factors include identifiers, background information and current life circumstances, as well as early warning signs of potentially violent behavior.

(a) Identifiers:

1. Name and aliases.
2. Date of birth.
3. Social security number.
4. Current address.
5. Names and addresses of close relatives.
6. Physical description and photographs.
7. Handwriting sample.
8. Driver's license number.
9. Employment information.
10. Public information/records.
11. Weapons ownership/registration.

(b) Background Information:

1. Education and training.
2. Criminal history/driving record.
3. History of violent behavior including domestic violence.
4. Military record (i.e., Service Record Book, Officer Qualification Record, etc.)
5. History of disciplinary or behavioral issues.
6. History of expertise with and use of weapons.
7. Marital and relationship history.
8. Employment history.

- MySpace, etc.).
9. Social networking tools (Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, etc.).
 10. History of grievances, transfers.
 11. History of harassing others.
 12. History of committing child abuse.
 13. Interest in extremist or radical groups.
 14. History of alcohol or substance abuse.
 15. Travel history; especially travel behaviors to the alleged targeted victim's community, workplace, residence, recreational activities, etc.
 16. Previous lawsuits filed by or against the subject.

(c) Current Work and Life Situation

1. What was the subject's threat, or behaviors of concern that made others "uncomfortable" or alarmed?
2. Who or what is the target of the threats?
3. What is/has been the relationship between the subject and the targeted victim?
4. Has the subject engaged in visiting, approaching, harassing, menacing, intimidating, and stalking-like behavior towards the targeted victim?
5. Do the targeted victims and co-workers express a sense of fear and being made "uncomfortable" by the subject's behaviors and communications?
6. What is the subject's known history of work-related threats and violence?
7. Does the subject show evidence of emotional decomposition, poor job performance, or substance abuse?
8. Has the subject made references to homicide, suicide, weapons, or other incidents of violence, or to subjects who commit violent acts?

9. Has the subject shown fascination/intense involvement with fascist, paramilitary, extremist, survivalist, or police type activities?

10. Has the subject been "making lists", "documenting others", and/or conducting investigations or "surveillance" of others?

11. Are there indications of self-mutilation, cruelty to animals, domestic violence, and/or fire-setting?

12. Is there evidence of bizarre, delusional, anti-social, and/or substance abuse behavior?

13. Is the subject experiencing known work-related stressors or "losses"?

14. How does the subject feel about the installation, leadership, managers, co-workers, Marines, family members, etc.?

15. Has the subject described a plan, means, motive, place, or target for violence?

16. What stability factors/support systems are present for the subject?

17. Review available subject communications: emails, letters, diaries, computer/Internet searches, voicemails, complaints, etc.

18. Has the subject tried to circumvent security procedures, perimeters, etc.?

19. What type of access does the subject have to the victim? Family members? Co-workers? Others?

20. How "organized" does the subject appear to be?

3. Analysis Process. Once the above data has been compiled, it shall be analyzed in terms of its credibility, accuracy and veracity. This is a continuous process as new information becomes available. The intent behind conducting a thorough analysis is to identify the nature of the present risk in order to allow preventive measures to be taken by the appropriate

personnel before violence is perpetrated or a crime is committed.

a. Purpose. The purpose is to determine:

(1) If the subject displayed early warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

(2) If the subject has the motive, means, plan and intent to act out the threat or attack a specific individual or installation facility.

(3) The level of risk based on probability and severity.

(4) Whether action, progressive discipline, counseling, termination, criminal and/or administrative charges, or psychiatric evaluation is appropriate.

b. Analyzing the subject's behaviors. It is also important to determine if the subject's behaviors:

(1) Are unacceptable.

(2) Violate organizational policies.

(3) Pose a threat either to himself, herself, or to others.

(4) Have reached the criteria for:

(a) Criminal prosecution.

(b) Involuntary commitment.

(c) Coaching.

(d) Counseling.

(e) Discipline.

(f) Removal/termination.

(5) Can be managed within organizational capability.

(6) Need outside support to assess severity and assist with the management of the situation.

c. Fundamentals to consider when conducting an analysis

(1) Violence is a process as well as an act. Violent behavior does not occur in a vacuum and incidents often are the culmination of long-developing identifiable trails of problems, conflicts, disputes and failures.

(2) Violence is often the product of an interaction among three factors:

(a) The subject who takes violent action.

(b) Stimulus or precipitating conditions that lead the subject to see violence as an option, "way out", or solution to a problem or life situation.

(c) A setting that facilitates or permits the violence, or at least does not attempt to stop it.

(3) A key to the resolution of threat assessment cases is identification of the subject's "pre-attack-related" early warning signs/indicators of potential violence. Subjects of targeted acts of violence often engage in discrete behaviors that usually precede and are linked to their threatening and violent acts. They consider, plan, and prepare before engaging in violent behavior. They often become "mission" driven.

(4) Heightened risks to the installation occur when the subject:

(a) Includes the installation, or its personnel, into his/her own delusional system.

(b) Vows retaliation or vengeance at a future date for alleged wrong.

(c) Possesses resolute and unchangeable beliefs.

(d) Claims permanent disability as a result of a compensation claim or alleged or real injury, related to working at the organization.

(e) Makes specific threats to targeted victims or assets.

(f) Recently experienced a precipitating "loss" (e.g., significant relationship, health, financial setback, or job status change).

d. Limitations of Conducting an Analysis

(1) It is difficult to precisely determine the probability and impact of an individual's intentions.

(2) It may be difficult to ascertain the level of vulnerability.

(3) Trying to eliminate risk is inappropriate and not feasible.

(4) It must be discreet and tactful.

(5) It is information dependent.

(6) It is a "snap shot" in time, only valid for the period of time.

e. Questions to Consider during the Analysis Process

(1) What is the motive?

(2) Has there been a pattern of early warning signs?

(3) Is there an established escalation of behaviors (increasing in intensity and frequency)?

(4) Is there a history of violence or overt aggression?

(5) Is there an obsessive focus on unresolved issues?

(6) When analyzing the subject and the circumstances surrounding the scenario, it is helpful to obtain information on the targeted victim(s):

(a) History of reports.

(b) Motivation of reports.

(c) Possibility of unintentional or intentional misinformation.

(d) Is the threatened individual a chronic victim? Is the individual in a position or situation that typically receives threats or inappropriate contacts?

(e) Is the targeted victim connected to a controversial situation or have they been in the media recently?

(f) Is their report being made out of fear, desperation, retaliation, safety, or desire for attention?

(g) Is there a possibility that the information being reported was skewed, misunderstood, or fabricated?

Appendix D
Training Program

1. Introduction

a. This Appendix describes training required to implement and maintain an effective violence prevention program. In these courses, participants will learn their specific roles in preventing violence.

b. Due to the significant number of personnel to be trained at varying levels, the methods of instruction may include large group lecture, on-line/web-based instruction, large and small group discussion, case studies, and small group activities. During initial rollout, PS will provide a cadre of qualified instructors to provide training to all personnel. Future efforts may include development of a train-the-trainer program to allow commanders to internally manage training requirements.

2. Programs of Instruction

COURSE: AWARENESS COURSE

TARGET AUDIENCE: Total Force

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: Large Groups (100 plus) and/or web based training

LENGTH: 1.5 Hours

TRAINING LOCATION: CONUS/OCONUS or on-line

COURSE DESCRIPTION: This course provides the target audience with the skills required to recognize the warning signs/indicators of potential violence. Topics include a review of MCO 5580.3, defining what violence is and is not, understanding the history of violence, how to recognize warning signs/indicators of potential violence, and how to react if you become involved in a violent incident. Insider threats and radicalization, as well as reporting protocols will be discussed.

SUSTAINMENT: Every calendar year (must be completed by 31 Dec) via instructor lead or web-based training.

COURSE: RECOGNITION COURSE

TARGET AUDIENCE: Company grade officers, SNCOs, NCOs and First Line Civilian Supervisors

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: Large Groups (50 plus) or Web-based Training

LENGTH: 1/2 Hour

TRAINING LOCATION: CONUS/OCONUS

COURSE DESCRIPTION: This course builds on what was previously taught to the audience in the Awareness Course. Topics include: a review of MCO 5580.3, defining what violence is and is not, understanding the history of violence, and how to recognize the warning signs/indicators of potential violence of someone who may be displaying such behaviors. Students will also learn the process related to recognizing and reporting warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

SUSTAINMENT: Every calendar year (must be completed by 31 Dec) via instructor lead or web-based training.

COURSE: TEAM COURSE

TARGET AUDIENCE: Bn/Sqdn commanders, field grade officers, Company Commanders, Senior SNCOs (E-8/E-9), Civilian Mid-Level Managers, organic multi-disciplinary SMEs, and FPC Members.

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 25-30

LENGTH: 4 Hours

TRAINING LOCATION: CONUS/OCONUS

COURSE DESCRIPTION: This course provides the target audience with the skills required to recognize and properly manage reports of warning signs/indicators of potential violence and prevent violence. Topics include: a review of MCO 5580.3, defining what violence is and is not, understanding the history of violence, and how to recognize the warning signs/indicators of potential violence of someone who may be displaying such behaviors. Topics that are also covered include discussion pertaining to insider threats and radicalization as well as

protocols related supporting a comprehensive fact finding inquiries for reported warning signs/indicators of potential violence.

SUSTAINMENT: New team members will require initial training within 60 days of assignment to FPC. Individuals who have lapsed service as a FPC Member of greater than one year will be required to re-train.

COURSE: VIOLENCE PREVENTION OFFICER COURSE

TARGET AUDIENCE: Personnel assigned as a unit VPO, Gunnery Sergeant or higher or Civilian GS-9 or higher from a Unit/Command

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 24

LENGTH: 24 hours

TRAINING LOCATION: CONUS/OCONUS

COURSE DESCRIPTION: The target audience for this course is personnel who will serve as a resource to commanders during the initial assessments of warning signs/indicators of potential violence. Training for participants will include: how to properly conduct threat assessments and implement the immediate action steps based on the initial findings. Topics covered during this course include: an in-depth review of MCO 5580.3, defining what violence is and is not, understanding the history of violence, and how to recognize the warning signs/indicators of potential violence of someone who may be displaying such behaviors. Insider threats and radicalization and reporting protocols will be discussed in detail. Participants will learn data collection and general interviewing skills. Threat assessment tools, support and reporting and follow-up requirements will also be discussed in detail.

SUSTAINMENT: New VPOs will require initial training prior to assignment to this duty. Individuals who have lapsed service as a VPO of greater than one year will be required to re-train.

COURSE: INSTALLATION VIOLENCE PREVENTION REPRESENTATIVE COURSE

TARGET AUDIENCE: Personnel assigned as VPR, active duty master sergeants and above and civilian employees GS-9 and above.

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS: 24

LENGTH: 40 hours

TRAINING LOCATION: CONUS/OCONUS

COURSE DESCRIPTION: The target audience for this course is those who will serve as the VPR. Training for participants will include: how to properly conduct threat assessments and implement the appropriate action steps. Topics covered during this course include: an in-depth review of MCO 5580.3 defining what violence is and is not, understanding the history of violence, and how to recognize the warning signs/indicators of potential violence of someone who may be displaying such behaviors. Insider threats and radicalization, as well as, reporting protocols, will be discussed in detail. Participants will learn interviewing skills and protection strategies to be used during a subject interview. Threat assessment tools, support, reporting and follow-up requirements will be discussed in detail.

SUSTAINMENT: New VPRs will require initial training prior to assignment to this duty. Individuals who have lapsed service as a VPR of greater than one year will be required to re-train.

Appendix E

Case Study: Fort Hood Incident

1. Introduction

a. On 5 November 2009, a single gunman opened fire in the Soldiers Readiness Center at Fort Hood, Texas. During the shooting spree the accused gunman, Major Nidal Hasan, killed 13 people and wounded another 43 individuals who were at the Center. Seen as the deadliest assault of its kind at a military installation in the United States, numerous questions were immediately asked about Major Hasan's past history, and if any indicators were present before the incident which would have led authorities to believe he was considering taking this type of action.

b. In the aftermath, the FBI and the Army's Criminal Investigative Division (CID) continue to conduct the investigation and the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood collected information concerning the incident.

2. Chronological Sequence. The following items represent a historical view of Major Nidal Hasan prior the attack on 5 November and each will be used as discussion questions in paragraph 3 below.

a. Item 1. Major Nidal Hasan (hereafter referred to as Hasan) was born in Virginia and graduated from the Uniform Services University of Health Sciences (USUHS) with his medical degree in 2001. In the years that followed he completed his residency in Psychiatry at Walter Reed Army Medical Center.

b. Item 2. Classmates described Hasan as a devoted Muslim who would disrupt class to depart for prayer and who believed in the tenets of a radical Islamic follower. Fellow classmates reported such actions to superior officers who decided "disciplinary" action was not warranted. During a research project that was required for completing the residency (Walter Reed calls the practice, "Psychiatry Scholarly Activity Oral Presentation at the Psychiatry Regularly Scheduled Conference"), Hasan did not choose a psychiatric topic, *per se*, but one entitled, "Koranic World View as it Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military." The slide presentation developed by Hasan promoted Islamic law over the U.S. Constitution. Excerpts from classmates include: "Nidal, do you consider Sharia law to

transcend the Constitution of the United States?" "Yes" Hasan said. "We asked him if homicidal bombers were rewarded for their acts with 72 virgins in heaven and he responded, I've done the research - yes."

c. Item 3. Hasan had made open comments to superior officers that had them questioning his loyalty to the U.S. and his ability to perform in a war zone.

d. Item 4. Before arriving at Fort Hood, Hasan had received "outstanding" evaluations by his superiors, in spite of numerous complaints by peers and other senior ranking officers. There were indications that Hasan was sent to Fort Hood as a "fresh" start opportunity. Also the official evaluations outlined high evaluation marks yet his direct supervisor warned higher-ups he had failed a physical by being overweight and that he was a chronically unprofessional officer with a poor work ethic.

e. Item 5. Hasan transfers to Fort Hood.

f. Item 6. After arriving at Fort Hood, Hasan made contact with and became an ardent supporter of Anwar al-Awlaki, a well-known Islamic extremist cleric, whose teachings included inciting violence against the United States. A fellow Muslim officer at Fort Hood said Hasan's eyes "lit up" when speaking about al-Awlaki's teachings. In an e-mail sent by Hasan to al-Awlaki, Hasan stated, "I can't wait to join you in the afterlife." Hasan also asked al-Awlaki when *jihad* is appropriate, and whether it is permissible if innocents are killed in a suicide attack. In the months before the shooting, Hasan increased his contact with al-Awlaki to discuss how to transfer funds abroad without coming to the attention of law enforcement.

g. Item 7. Al-Awlaki had a website with a blog on which he shared his views. On 11 December 2008, he condemned any Muslim who seeks a religious decree "that would allow him to serve in the armies of the disbelievers and fight against his brothers." In another blog post Hasan stated, "Blessed are those who fight against [American soldiers], and blessed are those shuhada [martyrs] who are killed by them."

h. Item 8. A review of Hasan's e-mails indicated that he had visited and often communicated on websites known for their radical Islamist ideas. Six months prior to the attack at Fort Hood, Hasan had been heard by authorities making comments which

likened a suicide bomber to a soldier who throws himself on a grenade to save his colleagues and sacrifices his life for a "more noble cause". Additionally, within the same time-period Hasan made the following comment to fellow co-workers, "Muslims should stand up and fight the aggressor and that we should not be in the war in the first place." He also made outlandish comments condemning America's foreign policy and claimed that Muslims had the right to rise up and attack Americans. Federal law enforcement officials stated Hasan had come to their attention at least six months prior as a result of internet postings that discussed suicide bombings and other threats. Hasan's online signature stated he was a psychiatrist specializing in Behavioral Health - Mental Health - Life Skills, and containing the acronyms "SoA (SWT)". According to investigators, the acronym "SoA" is commonly used on jihadist websites as an acronym for "Soldier of Allah" or "Servant of Allah", and the acronym "SWT" is commonly used by Muslims as short hand Arabic for "subhanahu wa ta'ala" (Glory to God). The signature card neglected to mention his military rank.

i. Item 9. Investigators dismissed the e-mail postings and viewed them as general questions about spiritual guidance with regard to conflicts between Islam and military service, and judged them to be consistent with legitimate mental health research about Muslims in the armed services.

j. Item 10. Six months prior to the attack at Fort Hood, Hasan had his bumper sticker, "Allah is God", scraped off his car by another tenant (a Soldier who had recently returned from an Iraq deployment) at the apartment building who was later arrested for criminal mischief.

k. Item 11. Hasan was reportedly "fighting" orders to be deployed to Afghanistan (mistakenly reported as Iraq) at the end of the month, claiming that he was the victim of harassment and insults because of his Arab background and his faith.

l. Item 12. In the apartment building where he lived, Hasan was known as a loner and was often made fun of by other residents due to his wearing traditional Muslim clothes and carrying a Koran.

m. Item 13. Days before the attack, Hasan gave a neighbor his apartment furniture and explained he was going to be deployed to a war zone. On the same day of the attack, Hasan paid the neighbor to clean his apartment and asked her to return the key to the apartment to the landlord.

3. Discussion Questions. This paragraph provides questions and answers based on the chronological sequence identified above in paragraph 2 and designed to facilitate group discussion. Review each item to determine if it represents a warning sign/behavior indicator of potential violence, and if it does, who should have taken action and what that action should have been.

a. Item 1 does not present any information that could be considered a potential indicator.

b. Item 2 may represent a potential problem due to Hasan's actions and openness to radical Islamic views. Classmates believed they had done all they could since his actions were reported to the appropriate supervisors.

(1) Questions

(a) What warning signs were displayed or witnessed?

(b) What are the appropriate response options?

(2) Answers

(a) Warning signs/indicators of potential violence:

1. Moderate:

a. Diminishing inhibitions.

b. Belligerence and insubordination.

2. High:

a. Sympathetic to Islamic fundamentalist or other extremist causes.

b. Statements made comparing terrorists to freedom fighters or revolutionaries.

3. Extreme: Advocates unlawful violence, the threat of unlawful violence, or unlawful use of force to achieve goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature.

(b) Suggested response options include:

1. Once the behavior was reported, the appropriate leader/supervisor, should have conducted an initial

inquiry into the reported behaviors/statements made by Hasan. An initial inquiry is conducted to collect information and determine the validity of a reported warning sign/indicator of potential violence. Initial inquiries will normally be conducted at the small unit leader level.

2. The VPO should have advised the unit commander, who should have directed a threat assessment be conducted. Threat assessments are conducted only after a commander has been informed of a verified warning sign/indicator of potential violence. The VPO is the unit subject matter expert for conducting threat assessments.

3. The statements made by Hasan at this point should be considered in their context which was a classroom setting and as part of a "study". A well-trained unit VPO and FPC conducting a comprehensive threat assessment should have been able to properly evaluate the nature of the statements made by Hasan as well as the level of concern or credibility of the statements. At a minimum, the warning signs/indicators of potential violence should have been raised to Hasan's command using a multi-disciplinary team, such as an FPC. Hasan's commander, with support from the multi-disciplinary team, should have appropriately counseled Hasan and/or taken other corrective measures to address the behavioral issues.

c. Item 3 indicates Hasan's continued openness to discuss his religious views, to the level that his superior officers questioned his loyalty to the United States Army and his sworn duty. At this point, however, it does not appear that superior officers took any action against Hasan.

d. Item 4 illustrates that Hasan's superior officers were not addressing his dissident views. Potentially the reason behind their lack of action, even to the point of giving an "outstanding" evaluation, may have been a reluctance to discipline one of only two Muslim Army psychiatrists.

(1) Questions

- (a) What warning signs were displayed or witnessed?
- (b) What are the appropriate response options?

(2) Answers for warning signs/indicators of potential violence

(a) Moderate:

1. Diminishing inhibitions.
2. Low work interest and poor job performance.

(b) High:

1. Sympathetic to violence promoting organizations (e.g., Islamic fundamentalist, extremist, Hate Groups, Gangs, etc.).
2. History of discipline problems.
3. Expresses a duty to protect a foreign community, when the expressed "duty" conflicts with the individual's current role/mission or the interests of the United State.

(c) Extreme: Adopting an extremist ideology.

(3) Suggested response options include:

(a) Certainly, as additional information was collected regarding statements made by Hasan (items 3 and 4), Hasan could have been subject to administrative or disciplinary action. In terms of assessing the threat, the VPO, NCIS TMU, along with the multi-disciplinary team should be engaged in assessing whether or not his remarks or other actions represented an escalation in behaviors and posed a credible threat.

(b) A psychological evaluation or more robust investigation could have uncovered whatever "deep seeded" views of Hasan. The evaluation could have provided the unit the information it needed to complete a thorough threat assessment. This in turn would have enabled the FPC to provide Hasan's command the information needed along with potential courses of action and/or recommendations to make an informed decision regarding this case.

(c) Under the Marine Corps Violence Prevention Program, the NCIS TMU could have been consulted by the VPO via the VPR.

e. Item 5. Hasan transferred to Fort Hood. If Hasan was permitted to continue his U.S. Army service and transferred to

Fort Hood (because of extenuating circumstances exhibited by his superiors), the information collected and/or the results of any threat assessment would have been documented by the VPO. This would have enabled appropriate personnel at Fort Hood to access the historical information if additional warning signs/behavior indicators were exhibited. The historical information coupled with current warning signs and indicators of potential violence would have enabled the unit VPO, NCIS TMU, and the gaining command's multi-disciplinary team to make a more comprehensive assessment and determine if an escalation of behaviors by Hasan was being displayed.

f. Item 6 depicts his willingness to seek information that is contrary to the prescribed tenets on "fighting the war on terrorism".

g. Item 7 reflects the types of propaganda to which Hasan was exposing himself and the radical encouragement he was receiving from a known radical Islamic leader. This is clearly an escalation of behaviors. Intrusive leadership would certainly have discovered his blog had he been the subject of a threat assessment and were he tracked by his leadership, up to and including the FPC level command.

h. Item 8 is an example of the importance of recognition and reporting warning signs and indicators of potential violence using the chain of command to the appropriate FPC level command where all reports can be fused and factored in to a comprehensive risk assessment. Had Hasan's superiors and investigative agencies communicated on his actions and assessed his mental stability, they could have increased the probability of addressing his issues earlier.

(1) Questions

(a) What warning signs were witnessed in items 5, 6, and 7?

(b) What are the appropriate response options?

(2) Warning signs/indicators of potential violence answers

(a) Moderate:

1. Diminishing inhibitions.

2. Low work interest and poor job performance.

(b) High:

1. Sympathetic to violence promoting organizations (e.g., Islamic fundamentalist, extremist, hate groups, gangs, etc.).

2. Statements indicating approval of the use of violence to resolve a problem.

3. Threatening or intimidating behavior including email, spoken words, gestures, notes, letters, pictures, and internet postings.

4. Expresses outrage against military operations.

(c) Extreme:

1. Homicidal or suicidal thoughts/expressions.

2. Seeks spiritual sanctioning for unlawful violence or seeks spiritual sanctioning to justify violence based on their religion.

3. Associated with terrorists without official sanction in the performance of duty.

4. Provides financial or material support to a terrorist organization or to someone suspected of being a terrorist.

(3) Suggested response options include:

(a) A "fellow officer" should have reported the inappropriate comments. Upon being notified of the statements, Hasan's unit commander/supervisor should engage the FPC regarding the situation. The VPO would then inform the Violence Prevention Program Representative, who would contact NCIS TMU.

(b) Whether or not the previous command ordered a psychological evaluation or conducted a thorough threat assessment, those actions should be mandated at this point (ordered by Hasan's command). The threat assessment would have provided additional information that would have contributed to

building a more complete picture that Hasan was clearly escalating on the path to violence.

(c) Once the information from the psychological evaluation and threat assessment results were collected, the FPC (to include the VPO and the installation SJA) would be in a position to advise the commander of level of threat that Hasan posed as well as offer recommended courses of action.

(d) With all members of the multi-disciplinary team viewing the same information, to include NCIS, a likely course of action would be to process Hasan for administrative separation and debar him from Fort Hood.

i. Item 9 illustrates a failure of investigative agencies to recognize Hasan's actions as warning signs of potential violence. This information, in conjunction with previous indicators of potential violence, would have increased the opportunity for Hasan's chain of command to intervene prior to the shooting.

j. Item 10 reinforces Hasan's beliefs, but does not provide additional indication of radicalization.

k. Item 11 indicates that military leadership, at the peer level, may have created a hostile work environment. Although authorities did not believe Hasan's claims, his immediate chain of command should have conducted an initial inquiry of the alleged incidents.

l. Item 12 probably would not have added to pre-attack indicators without a report from the residents at the apartment complex, some who were military.

m. Item 13 does not by itself lead to an adverse behavioral indicator, but would have been an indicator if authorities had the complete "profile" of Hasan, and had talked to residents at the apartment complex based on an investigation of his background.

(1) Questions

- (a) What warning signs were witnessed in items 8-12?
- (b) What are the appropriate response options?

(2) Warning signs/indicators of potential violence
answers

(a) Moderate:

1. Distorted perception of being picked on.
2. Social withdrawal.

(b) High:

1. Statements indicating desperation (over family, financial, and other personal problems).
2. Refusing/resisting to deploy due to political or religious reasons.

(c) Extreme: A person experiencing intolerable levels of frustration or stress.

(3) Suggested response options include:

(a) If at this point Hasan is still in the Army, the VPO with support from the multi-disciplinary team should review the updated information and continue to assess the situation.

(b) Based upon all of the other information collected during the assessment process, the VPO, in coordination with the PMO/MCPD, NCIS TMU and local law enforcement, should look into the circumstances regarding the vandalism to his personal vehicle. Additionally, in coordination with the PMO/MCPD, NCIS TMU, and local law enforcement, possible interviews with his neighbors could have yielded information valuable to understand his state of mind.

(c) Most importantly, talking to Hasan's colleagues who would have had first-hand knowledge of his fervent desire not to deploy to Afghanistan would have provided invaluable information to the FPC. All of this information, collectively, could have provided the necessary information for the FPC to come to the determination that Hasan was truly a threat. The FPC could make the recommendation to not deploy Hasan and more importantly, as a result of his actions, behaviors and strong views, recommend that Hasan be administratively separated from the Army.

4. Findings/Conclusion. A comprehensive violence prevention program with a designated process should have led to decisions, as previously discussed, that would have very likely averted the disaster that took place at Fort Hood. An appropriately trained and equipped VPO with supporting multi-disciplinary team could have allowed for the collective and comprehensive evaluation of information, which in turn could have been used to provide actionable options to commanders.

5. Warning Signs/Indicators of potential violence Recapitulation. This paragraph is a compilation of the known warning signs/indicators of potential violence exhibited by Hasan throughout his time within the Army.

a. Moderate Risk Warning Signs

(1) Distorted perception of being picked on. A cousin of Hasan's claimed that Hasan had been harassed by his fellow Soldiers because of his ethnicity. The cousin also stated, "He was dealing with some harassment from his military colleagues. I don't think he's ever been disenchanting with the military. It was the harassment". Hasan hired a military attorney to try to have the issue resolved and tried to get out of the military. Hasan's aunt also said that Hasan sought discharge because of harassment relating to his Islamic faith. Additionally, a Soldier who lived in the same apartment complex vandalized his car.

(2) Belligerence or insubordination. Hasan would frequently walk out of class to pray. Despite objections from classmates and requests from peers to sit back down so he didn't disrupt class, Hasan still continued to sit in the front of the class and leave for prayer.

(3) Social Withdrawal. Hasan was described as being a "loner" by supervisors and co-workers both at Walter Reed and Fort Hood.

(4) Diminishing inhibitions. Hasan had no issues with expressing his opinions about Sharia law vs. U.S. Constitution. A retired officer who worked with Hasan at the military base in Texas, alleged Hasan had angry confrontations with other officers over his views.

b. High Risk Warning Signs

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(1) Sympathetic to Islamic fundamentalist groups. Hasan's business card describes himself as a psychiatrist specializing in Behavioral Health - Mental Health - Life Skills, and contains the acronyms SoA (SWT). The cards neglected to mention his military rank.

(2) Sympathetic to violence promoting organizations (e.g., Islamic fundamentalist, extremist, hate groups, gangs, etc.). Peers asked Hasan pointedly, "Nidal, do you consider Sharia law to transcend the Constitution of the United States?" to which Hasan replied, "Yes." Also, a classmate told TIME, "We asked him if homicidal bombers were rewarded for their acts with 72 virgins in heaven" and he responded, "I've done the research - yes." Note: This was during a research project that was required for completing the residency. Hasan's psychiatric topic was entitled, "Koranic World View as it Relates to Muslims in the U.S. Military." The presentation promoted Islamic law over the U.S. Constitution.

(3) Threatening or intimidating behavior including email, spoken words, gestures, notes, letters, pictures, internet postings. Based on written testimony from Fort Hood co-workers, Hasan had several angry exchanges with fellow officers about the war.

(4) History of discipline problems:

(a) Hasan failed a physical because he was overweight.

(b) Based on excerpts from his fitness report, Hasan was an unprofessional officer with a poor work ethic.

(5) Statements indicating approval of the use of violence to resolve a problem.

(a) "Hasan stated Muslims should stand up and fight the aggressor and that the United States should not be in the war in the first place.

(b) "Hasan was making outlandish comments condemning our foreign policy and claimed that Muslims had the right to rise up and attack Americans.

(6) Refusing/resisting to deploy due to political or religious reasons. Hasan was reportedly "fighting" orders to be deployed to Afghanistan at the end of the month, claiming that

he was the victim of harassment and insults because of his Arab background and his faith.

(7) In one of the e-mails, Hasan wrote al-Awlaki, I can't wait to join you in the afterlife. Hasan also asked al-Awlaki when *jihād* is appropriate, and whether it is permissible if innocents are killed in a suicide attack.

c. Extreme Risk Warning Signs

(1) Advocates unlawful violence, the threat of unlawful violence, or unlawful use of force to achieve goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature.

(a) Testimony by fellow classmates that he believed suicidal bombers would in fact (his words) be met by 72 virgins in heaven.

(b) Federal law enforcement officials have said Hasan had come to their attention at least six months ago because of internet postings that discussed suicide bombings and other threats.

(c) Hasan gave away possessions.

(2) Seeks spiritual sanctioning for unlawful violence or seeks spiritual sanctioning to justify violence based on their religion.

(3) A person experiencing intolerable levels of frustration or stress. Again, related to his pending deployment, Hasan expressed frustration and desperation to get out of his pending deployment.

(4) Provides financial or material support to a terrorist organization or to someone suspected of being a terrorist. In the months before the shooting, Hasan increased his contacts with al-Awlaki to discuss how to transfer funds abroad without coming to the attention of law authorities.

(5) Adopting an extremist ideology. Comments made to superior officers that brought into question his loyalty to the United States and his ability to perform in a war zone.

6. Case Study Conclusion. Certainly, some of the above warning signs came to light after the incident; however, multiple groups of people had information that, at a minimum, should have

warranted an initial inquiry followed by a comprehensive threat assessment. The comprehensive threat assessment conducted by an appropriately trained VPO and reviewed by the FPC team members would have concluded that Hasan was a threat. The warning signs/indicators of potential violence from both of his duty stations together should have raised red flags in sufficient time to intervene prior to the shooting.

Appendix F

Sample Unit/Department Violence Prevention Policy Statement

From: Unit Commander
To: Distribution List

Subj: UNIT VIOLENCE PREVENTION POLICY STATEMENT

1. It is the [Unit Name]'s policy to promote a safe environment for its employees. The xxxx unit is committed to working with its Marines and employees to maintain a work environment free from acts of harassment, intimidation, threats of violence, and other disruptive behavior. While this kind of conduct is not pervasive within our unit, no unit is immune.

2. Every organization may be affected by disruptive behavior at one time or another. Harassment, intimidation, threats, violence and other disruptive behavior in our workplace will not be tolerated; reports of any of these types of behaviors will be taken seriously and will be dealt with appropriately including reporting to Provost Marshal's Office (PMO)/Marine Corps Police Department (MCPD). Such behavior can include oral or written statements, gestures, or expressions that communicate a direct or indirect threat of physical harm.

3. If a Marine/employee makes a threat and or commits an act of intimidation or violence that is substantiated by an appropriate law enforcement agency, the commander shall take appropriate action using the full range of options at his/her disposal.

4. We need your cooperation to implement this policy effectively and maintain a safe working environment. Do not ignore warning signs/indicators of potential violence or harassing, intimidating, violent, threatening or other disruptive behavior. If you observe or experience such behavior by anyone on the installation, whether he or she is a unit member or not, report it immediately to a leader, supervisor, manager, PMO/MCPD or Naval Criminal Investigative Service's (NCIS) Threat Management Unit (TMU). Leaders, supervisors, and managers who receive such reports shall seek advice from the Violence Prevention Officer (VPO) at xxx-xxxx regarding conducting an inquiry into the situation and initiating appropriate action.

5. Threats that require immediate law enforcement involvement, assaults and other suspected crimes, shall be reported immediately to PMO/MCPD at xxx-xxxx or 911.

6. I will support all efforts made by leaders, supervisors, and managers in dealing with harassing, intimidating, threatening, violent or other disruptive behavior in our workplace and will monitor whether this policy is being implemented effectively. If you have any questions about this policy statement, please contact the unit VPO, xxx xxxxxxxx, at xxx-xxxx.

I. M. COMMANDER