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COVER

A woman in a rural village outside of Hargeisa, the capital of the African region known as Somaliland, which is the subject of the first article. The image, taken 14 June 2011, appears courtesy of the photographer, Susan Schulman, an internationally acclaimed video/photojournalist.

For more information on Schulman's work, visit her site (http://www.susanschulman.co.uk) and her page at the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting (http://pulitzercenter.org/people/susan-schulman).

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

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President's Foreword

What should be the role of the United States and other foreign powers in unstable areas of the world? This question, which is as pertinent as it has ever been, may seem like an issue for presidents, cabinet members, and flag officers—and it is—but it also affects the military and foreign policy establishments all the way down to ground level, where junior officers, enlisted troops, and State Department/USAID personnel are engaging the local populations. Indeed, those of us who have served in a military or civilian capacity among the people in Iraq or Afghanistan will recognize many similarities in the challenges that we faced with those Robert Angevine describes that confronted the U.S. Army in the Philippines a century ago. The author quotes one Constabulary officer who noted that he "had to know not only military work, but he also had to be an executive as well as a tactful politician."

It is also important to know the local culture, including landmark historical events and how the memory of them continues to have impact. In his article on the Battle of Maiwand, fought by the British in Afghanistan in 1880, Erich Wagner quotes our current commanding officer with Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Lieutenant General Richard P. Mills, as saying that the Afghans regularly reminded him in 2010 of "the Maiwand War" and of how their ancestors had made Afghanistan the "the graveyard of empires." As Wagner writes, and vividly details in his piece, "the memory of those times is still alive in the community."

Instability has been the order of the day in Somalia for decades now, but Peter Pham's article offers at least some hope from the northern part of that country, which is known as Somaliland. Pham, who is widely recognized as one of the leading experts on the region and is a senior advisor to U.S. Africa Command, posits that lessons from the Somaliland experience may be applicable in other countries.

The challenges of Somalia, as well as the positives of what is transpiring in Somaliland, should be on the minds of those dealing with the rapidly evolving circumstances in the Middle East and

North Africa in the wake of 2011's "Arab Spring." In our final piece, Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns outlines U.S. policy in that region, which is suddenly in the midst of escalated transition. Perhaps nowhere else is the question with which I began more relevant as we watch what courses the new and old governments and militaries in that area will take. The articles presented in this issue provide excellent grist for discussion of this and other questions, as well as information that should be useful as we prepare for what lies ahead.

Thomas M. Murray
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
President, Marine Corps University

Somaliland War Memorial, Freedom Square, Hargeisa, Somaliland. Photo courtesy of Abdillahi Ahmed Abdillahi (Kow Media Corp.).

The Somaliland Exception

Lessons on Postconflict State Building from the Part of the Former Somalia That Works

by J. Peter Pham

In the more than two decades since the collapse of the last entity that could be reasonably described as the central government of Somalia, the Texas-sized territory has become the byword for state failure, stubbornly resisting no less than 14 attempts to reconstitute a national government. The current internationally backed effort, the unelected and ineffectual Transitional Federal Government (TFG),[1] just barely manages to maintain a presence in a few of the districts of its bombed-out capital, Mogadishu—and that much only thanks to the presence of the approximately 10,000 Ugandan and Burundian troops that make up the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).[2] The foreign security force is needed because, while

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Pham is director of the Michael S. Ansari Africa Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. He is also vice president of the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa (ASMEA), an academic organization that represents more than 1,000 scholars of Middle Eastern and African Studies at more than 300 colleges and universities in the United States and other countries, and editor in chief of ASMEA's refereed *Journal of the Middle East and Africa*. The author of numerous books, essays, and reviews on U.S. foreign and defense policy and African politics and security, Dr. Pham has served on the Senior Advisory Group of the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) since its creation.

[1] It should be noted that while the TFG and its predecessor entities have received various expressions of support from the international community, most states have been reluctant to actually accord it formal recognition. While the United States, for example, never formally severed relations with Somalia after the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, neither has it officially recognized any of the 15 transitional authorities, including the current TFG, as a sovereign government. In fact, in a legal brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in early 2010, the solicitor general of the United States and the legal advisor of the State Department noted that "since the fall of that government, the United States has not recognized any entity as the government of Somalia." See *Mohamed Ali Samantar v. Bashe Abdi Yusuf, et al.*, Brief of Amici Curiae Academic Experts in Somali History and Current Affairs [Lee Cassanelli, J. Peter Pham, I. M. Lewis, Gérard Prunier, and Hussein Bulhan] in Support of the Respondents, 27 January 2010, http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-10/08-1555_RespondentAmCuSomaliExperts.pdf; also see *Mohamed Ali Samantar v. Bashe Abdi Yusuf, et al.*, Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, January 2010, http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-10/08-1555_AffirmanceAmCuUSA.pdf.

[2] Nathan Mugisha, "The Way Forward in Somalia," *RUSI Journal* 156 (June–July 2011): 26–33.

TFG politicians, led by their president and parliamentary speaker, dicker endlessly over the few remaining assets of the former Somali Democratic Republic, large sections of the country have fallen under the de facto control of the Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen ("Movement of Warrior Youth," better known as al-Shabaab). This militant Islamist movement was declared a "specially designated global terrorist" by the U.S. Department of State in 2008; a "listed terrorist organization" by the Australian government the following year; and in 2010, a "proscribed organization" under the Terrorism Act by the British government and a "listed terrorist group" by the Canadian government.[3]

Al-Shabaab...was declared a "specially designated global terrorist" by the U.S. Department of State.

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the absence of any authority capable of opposing them, Somali pirates have wreaked havoc with global commerce from the Gulf of Aden to the Gujarati Coast of India as emboldened marauders seize ships in order to extort ransoms that continue to spiral upward into the millions of dollars.[4] Additionally, in July 2011, amid the worst drought in East Africa in 60 years, the United Nations (UN) declared two Somali areas to be in a state of famine and warned that the crisis could quickly engulf

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[3] U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Designation of al-Shabaab as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist," Public Notice 6137, 26 February 2008, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/102448.htm; Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Media Release of Attorney General Robert McClelland MP and Minister for Foreign Affairs Stephen Smith MP, "Listing of Al-Shabaab as a Terrorist Organization," 21 August 2009, http://www.foreignminister. gov.au/releases/2009/fa-s090821.html; Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organizations) (Amendment) Order 2010, No. 611, 4 March 2010, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2010/uksi_20100611_en_1; Government of Canada, Ministry of Public Safety, "The Government of Canada Lists Al Shabaab as a Terrorist Organization," 7 March 2010, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2010/nr20100307-eng.aspx?rss=false.

[4] J. Peter Pham, "Putting Somali Piracy in Context," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28 (July 2010): 325–41; and Pham, "The Failed State and Regional Dimensions of Somali Piracy," in *The International Response to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities*, ed. Frans-Paul van der Putten and Bibi T. van Ginkel (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010), 31–64; see also Martin N. Murphy, *Somalia, The New Barbary? Piracy and Islam in the Horn of Africa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

all eight regions of southern Somalia and spread beyond, putting more than 12 million people across the Horn of Africa at risk of starvation.[5]

In the midst of this dire landscape, it is all the more remarkable that an apparent oasis of stability has nonetheless emerged: the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, located in the northwestern part of the former Somalia, occupying a territory coterminous with the onetime British protectorate. Since they broke away from the rest of Somalia in 1991, Somalilanders have managed to not only establish external security and internal stability—enough of the latter, in fact, to have developed what is arguably the most democratic politics in the subregion—but have done so without the benefit of international recognition of their existence or much foreign development assistance. Thus the lessons from Somaliland's successful peace- and state-building processes may be applicable not only to efforts to bring stability to other Somali areas, but also to postconflict situations elsewhere around the globe.

In the midst of this dire landscape, it is all the more remarkable that an apparent oasis of stability has nonetheless emerged: the self-declared Republic of Somaliland.

A Brief Introduction to the Somali People

Somali culture has traditionally been a pastoral, nomadic one, with an overwhelming majority of the population engaged in the herding of camels (the prestige wealth par excellence), sheep, goats, and, in a few favorable areas, cattle. Somali social identity is historically rooted in paternal descent (*tol*), meticulously memorial-

[5] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "Somalia: United Nations Declares Famine in Two Regions," 20 July 2011, http://www.unocha.org/top-stories/all-stories/somalia-united-nations-declares-famine-two-regions. "Famine" has a technical definition in relief work and is formally declared when acute malnutrition rates among children exceed 30 percent; more than 2 people per 10,000 die per day; and it is determined that the general population is unable to access food and other basic necessities.



ized in genealogies (*abtirsiinyo*, "reckoning of ancestors"), which determines each individual's exact place in society. At the apices of this structure are the "clan-families" (*qabiil*). According to the most generally accepted divisions, the following are the major clan-families among the Somali: Darod, Dir, Hawiye, Isaq, Digil, and Rahanweyn.

The first four, historically predominantly nomadic pastoralists, are reckoned "noble" (*bilis*) clans, while the Digil and Rahanweyn, also known collectively as "Digil Mirifle," who were traditionally cultivators and agro-pastoralists in the fertile area between the Shabelle and Juba rivers, occupy a second tier in Somali society. The latter also speak a dialect of Somali, *af-maymay*, which is so distinct from the *af-maxaa* of the former that it is "properly a not mutually intelligible language," according to British anthropologist I. M. Lewis.[6] A third tier also exists in Somali social hierarchy, consisting of minority clans whose members, known collectively as *Sab*, historically carried out occupations such as metalworking and tanning which, in the eyes of the nomadic "noble clans," rendered them ritually unclean.[7] The significance of the Somali social identity for politics cannot be understated. As Lewis once put it:

> It is of the first importance to appreciate that a Somali genealogy is not a mere family tree recording the historical descent and connections of a particular individual or group. Whatever its historical significance, in the sphere of politics its importance lies in the fact that it represents the social divisions of people into corporate political groups. By reference to his ancestors, a man's relations with others are defined, and his position in Somali society as a whole, determined. Thus an understanding of the political relations between groups requires a knowledge of their genealogical relationships.[8]

Since the clan-families were generally too large and too widely dispersed to act as politically cohesive units—although in more recent years, the advent of mass communications and social media have resulted in rendering the segmentary solidarity of their members a significant factor in national politics[9]—they were subdivided into

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[6] I. M. Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland: Culture, History, Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 3.

[7] I. M. Lewis, *The Modern History of Somaliland: From Nation to State* (New York: Praeger, 1965), 5–7.

[8] I. M. Lewis, *A Pastoral Democracy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 2.

[9] See A. Osman Farah, Mammo Muchie, and Joakim Gundel, eds., *Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa* (London: Adonis & Abbey, 2007).

clans (*qolo*) and subclans by descent in the male line from an eponymous ancestor at the head of each clan lineage. Within the clan, the most clearly defined subsidiary group is an individual's "primary lineage" (*jilib*), which also represents the limits of exogamy, and within which an individual's primary identification is with what has been described as the "diya-paying group" (from the Arabic *diya*, "blood-wealth").

The diya-paying group, consisting as it does of kinsmen with collective responsibility for one another with respect to exogenous actors, is the most basic and stable unit of Somali social organization. The unity of the group is founded not only on its members' shared descent from a common ancestor four to eight generations back, but also a formal political contract (*heer*) between themselves so that if a member kills or injures someone outside the group, the other members are jointly responsible for that action and will collectively make reparation. Conversely, if one of its members is injured or killed, the diya-paying group (*reer*) will either collectively seek vengeance or share in whatever compensation is paid. While these relations are rooted in familial ties, historically, Somali society has demonstrated itself to be highly adaptable, being open to both the formation of new alliances and even the emergence of new identities.[10] Lewis, arguably the foremost living authority on Somali history and culture, has observed that "the vital importance of this grouping, in an environment in which the pressure of population on sparse environmental resources is acute, and where fighting over access to water and pasture is common, can hardly be overemphasized" since it is "upon his diya-paying group, and potentially on wider circles of clansmen within his clan-family, that the individual ultimately depends for the security of his person and property."[11]

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[10] Maria H. Brons, *Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?* (Utrecht, The Netherlands: International Books, 2001), 99–113.

[11] I. M. Lewis, *Making and Breaking States in Africa: The Somali Experience* (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2010), 8–9.

If Somali identity is firmly rooted in clan relationships, it is also closely linked with Muslim faith. As one contemporary Somali scholar observes, "If one listens to a Somali individual talking, one would hear many Islamic concepts and Islamic vocabulary even though that person is not conducting a religious ceremony—this shows the extent to which Islam is present within Somali culture."[12] The geographical proximity to and commercial connections with the Arabian Peninsula have profoundly shaped the Somali. Not only were they early converts to Islam, virtually exclusively adhering to Sunni Islam and following the Shāfiʿī school (*madhab*) of jurisprudence (which, although conservative, is open to a variety of liberal views regarding practice),[13] but the four "noble" clan-families have traditionally claimed descent from Arab forebears connected with the family of the Prophet Muhammad. More than any other factor, this cultural background explains the decision of postindependence Somalia to join the Arab League in 1974.

If Somali identity is firmly rooted in clan relationships, it is also closely linked with Muslim faith.

Islam among the Somali historically found its expression in various movements, the most popular being the Sufi brotherhoods (*tarīqa*, plural *turuq*), especially that of the Qadiriyya order, although the Ahmadiyya order, introduced into Somali lands in the nineteenth century, was also influential, and the Salihiyya order also present.[14] While traditional Islamic schools and scholars (*ulamā*) played a role as focal points for rudimentary political opposition to colonial rule, especially in Italian Somalia, their role in the politics of the Somali

[12] Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peacebuilding* (London: Pluto Press/Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2010), 50–51.

[13] I. M. Lewis, *Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1994), 167.

[14] I. M. Lewis, *Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-Based Society* (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1998).

clan structure was neither institutionalized nor particularly prominent. In part, this is because historically, sharia was not especially entrenched in Somalia; being largely pastoralists, the Somali relied more on xeer (customary law) than on religious prescriptions.[15]

Historical Background

Until the 1960s, "Somalia" never existed as a political entity, notwithstanding the general cultural and linguistic unity of the Somali people. As Lewis observes, "They were a nation, not a state.... The six major divisions of the nation (the Dir, Isaq, Darod, etc.) did not combine together to confront the world, nor did they regularly act as stable or autonomous political units within the Somali political system."[16] European colonial expansion into East Africa in the 1880s added yet another layer of division to the Somali, partitioning the lands they inhabited into five separate territories: the Protectorate of French Somaliland (Côte Français des Somalis), based in Djibouti; the British Protectorate of Somaliland, with Hargeisa as its principal town; the Italian colony (Somalia Italiana), eventually centered on Mogadishu; the Northern Frontier District of the British Colony and Protectorate of Kenya; and the area absorbed by Ethiopia that became known as the Ogaden after its most prominent Somali residents. The vastly different subsequent experiences of colonialism in each of the regions created by the European powers were to have significant long-term consequences.[17]

Until the 1960s, "Somalia" never existed as a political entity.

The Italians sought to settle and transform their colony by encouraging citizens to grow newly introduced commercial crops on their plantations, like bananas, which would, in turn, be exported to

[15] See Michael van Notten, *The Law of the Somalis: A Stable Foundation for Economic Development in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Spencer Heath MacCallum (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2006).

[16] Lewis, *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, 27.

[17] I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of the Somali*, 4th ed. (Oxford: James Currey, 2002), 40–62.

Italy by Italian companies that were awarded monopolies. Especially after the Fascists came to power in Italy, there was an emphasis on the distinction between "natives" and their "natural rulers," and authority was increasingly centralized. The colonial regime set about supplanting xeer and other traditional Somali usages with institutions imported from Italy.[18]

In contrast, the British originally did not even intend to assume control over more than the coast, which they viewed as necessary for the security of their Yemeni holdings from potential French expansionism out of Djibouti as well as being a good source of mutton for the garrison they stationed in Aden. Accordingly, the British extended their reach into the hinterland in response to the protracted uprising against the various foreign invaders led by the "Mad Mullah," Sayyid Muhammad 'Abdille Hassan.[19] British authorities went so far as to ban Christian missionaries from Somaliland and otherwise actively discouraged settlers. Lewis notes that when he arrived there in 1955, "the entire Protectorate establishment consisted of less than 200 senior officials, of whom 25 were locally recruited Somalis"—preferring to leave such governance as was needed on a day-to-day basis in the hands of Somali elders.[20]

Somalia itself was born out of a union between the British Protectorate of Somaliland, which became independent as the State of Somaliland on 26 June 1960, and the former colonial territory then being administered by Italy as a United Nations trust, which received its independence five days later. Under the influence of the African nationalism fashionable during the period, the two independent states entered into a union, even though, common language and religion notwithstanding, they had undergone very different colonial experiences and never had the occasion to develop a common

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[18] Robert L. Hesse, *Italian Colonialism in Somalia* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

[19] Robert L. Hesse, "The 'Mad Mullah' and Northern Somalia," *Journal of African History* 5 (November 1964): 415–33; see also E. R. Turton, "The Impact of Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the East Africa Protectorate," *Journal of African History* 10 (October 1969): 641–57.

[20] Lewis, *Blood and Bone*, 5.

national identity. Very little thought was apparently given, either by enthused Somali nationalists or their international supporters, as to whether the European-style centralized state that was hastily created was necessarily appropriate for the diffuse nature of Somali society. In fact, the merger was so rushed that a number of international law scholars have subsequently questioned the legal validity of the act of union itself.[21]

Somalilanders quickly regretted the entire exercise, in no small measure because of the discrimination that the predominantly Isaq northerners suffered at the hands of the numerically superior members of clans from other regions. Within less than a year of the union, when its draft constitution was put to a vote, most Somalilanders boycotted the referendum; of those who cast a ballot, a solid majority rejected the charter.[22] Lacking widespread political legitimacy, Somali politics quickly degenerated so that by the time the army commander, Muhammad Siyad Barre, seized power in October 1969, "it had become increasingly clear that Somali parliamentary democracy had become a travesty, an elaborate, rarefied game with little relevance to the daily challenges facing the population."[23]

Very little thought was apparently given… as to whether the European-style centralized state that was hastily created was necessarily appropriate for the diffuse nature of Somali society.

[21] Eugene Cotran, "Legal Problems Arising Out of the Formation of the Somali Republic," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 12 (July 1963): 1010–26; Anthony J. Carroll and B. Rajagopal, "The Case for an Independent Somaliland," *American University Journal of Law and Politics* 8 (1993): 653–62; and Michael Schoiswohl, *Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of Non-Recognized De Facto Regimes in International Law: The Case of "Somaliland"* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004), 150–56.

[22] I. M. Lewis, "Integration in the Somali Republic," in *African Integration and Disintegration*, ed. Arthur Hazlewood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 251–84.

[23] Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), 14.

A year after taking over, Siyad Barre proclaimed the Somali Democratic Republic, an officially Marxist state, and tried to stamp out clan identity as an anachronistic barrier to progress that ought to be replaced by nationalism and "scientific socialism." The nonkinship term *jaalle* ("friend" or "comrade") was introduced to replace the traditional term of polite address *ina'adeer* ("cousin"). Traditional clan elders had their positions abolished or, at the very least, subsumed into the bureaucratic structure of the state. At the height of the regime's "modernization" campaign, it became a criminal offense to even refer to one's own or another's clan identity.[24]

Given how deeply rooted the clan identity was (and still is), it was not surprising that Siyad Barre not only failed in his efforts to efface the bonds, but he himself fell back on his own kinship networks. With the exception of his long-time defense minister and sometime prime minister, Mohamed Ali Samantar, a Sab whose humble origins made it highly unlikely that he could ever lead a coup d' état against his benefactor, Siyad Barre's most trusted ministers came from his own Darod clan-family: the Marehan clan of his paternal relations; the Dhulbahante clan of his son-in-law, Ahmed Suleiman Abdulle (head of the notorious National Security Service); and the Ogaden clan of his maternal relatives. The dictator's "MOD" coalition—so-called because of the initials of the three clans involved—led him into the disastrous Ogaden War (1977–78), a clumsy attempt to exploit the chaos of the Ethiopian revolution to seize the territory in the Haud Plateau that Siyad Barre's irredentist kinsfolk viewed as "Western Somalia." The influx of more than a million Ogadeni refugees following the Somali

Siyad Barre… tried to stamp out clan identity as an anachronistic barrier to progress that ought to be replaced by nationalism and "scientific socialism."

[24] David D. Laitin, "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Somalia," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 14 (September 1976): 449–68.

military's humiliating defeat at the hands of the Ethiopians and their Soviet and Cuban allies created enormous problems for the Somali state. These challenges were only exacerbated when half of the Ogadeni refugees were placed in refugee camps erected by the regime in the middle of Somaliland, the historical territory of their traditional rivals, the Isaq. When the Ogadeni, who were already restive because of political discrimination and the intentional neglect of development in their region, objected, they were violently repressed.[25]

The Somali National Movement

In response to these abuses, Isaq in the diaspora had been meeting to discuss their options. At various times, they attempted to engage with other dissident groups, including even the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). This organization was led by military officers from the Majeerteen clan of the Darod who had mounted an unsuccessful coup attempt against the regime in April 1978 and whose surviving members had set up a guerrilla force based across the border in Ethiopia. Ultimately, however, following a conference held at the International Student Union of London University on 18 October 1981, this Isaq group founded the Somali National Movement (SNM). Over the next decade, these two opposition organizations, and others like them, all motivated by grievances that had their origins in Siyad Barre's clumsy management of the clan dynamics, would bring down not just the dictatorship, but the Somali state itself.[26]

Although the SNM was born out of the profound sense of marginalization felt by the Isaq and other northern clans and subclans, its initial objective was not to break up the union, but, after overthrowing Siyad Barre, to decentralize power in conformity with the basic diffuse structure of the traditional Somali society. The official communiqué

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[25] Africa Watch, *Somalia: A Government at War with Its Own People—Testimonies about the Killings and the Conflict in the North* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1990).

[26] I. M. Lewis, "Nazionalismo frammentato e colasso del regime somalo," *Politica Internazionale* 20 (1992): 35–52.

from the founding conference affirmed that the challenge was "to find a lasting solution to the question of clanism without, in the process, destroying Somali society as we know it."[27] The group's founders envisioned a future dispensation where power was devolved to regions.

At the very time the SNM was organizing abroad, back in Somaliland, a group of young people, including physicians, teachers, and other professionals, had tried to organize themselves voluntarily to provide the social services that the regime was neglecting in their region. Unfortunately, this public-spirited initiative was viewed with suspicion by government officials who arrested some of those involved as "subversives." After brutal interrogations, the prisoners were put on trial before one of the notorious "national security courts" in Hargeisa in February 1982. When supporters of the accused—all of whom were condemned to long prison sentences—protested the sham proceedings, regime forces responded by firing indiscriminately into the crowd, killing a number of demonstrators. Subsequently, the Siyad Barre government imposed even more oppressive measures upon the region.

Following the crackdown, SNM leaders made contact with Ethiopian authorities and, like their SSDF counterparts before them, received permission to open a base on Ethiopian soil. From there, SNM recruiters fanned out to their own clan territories along the border to appeal to their fellow clansmen or lineage members for support. Given the regime's heavy-handed reaction to dissent, the response the new movement received was overwhelming. Isaq troops in the Somali military readily deserted to join the SNM, while some officers remained behind, ostensibly loyal to the regime, but secretly providing support to the opposition. Expatriate workers in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states sent contributions to help pay SNM fighters, which made joining the burgeoning opposition even more attractive to unemployed northern youth. SNM fighters were able to live off the land, supported by their clans.[28]

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[27] Quoted in Lewis, *Blood and Bone*, 199.

[28] Gérard Prunier, "A Candid View of the Somali National Movement," *Horn of Africa* 13/14 (1990/1991): 107–20.

As the 1980s wore on, the fight became a full-scale guerrilla war, with increasingly bold SNM attacks provoking even more brutal reprisals against local civilian populations, which only served to drive more people into joining the antiregime forces. Things got so far out of hand that, in 1988, Siyad Barre's air force actually perpetrated one of the most bizarre war crimes in the annals of armed conflict: taking off from the airport in Hargeisa, the squadron bombed the runway it had just left as well as some 90 percent of the surrounding city before flying back to the capital.[29] Subsequently, the city was systematically razed and its ruins strewn with landmines; of its preconflict population of almost 300,000, fewer than 2,000 remained. In the end, 300,000 Somalilanders fled into Ethiopia, while hundreds of thousands more became internally displaced.[30]

The refugee camps in Ethiopia proved to be somewhat serendipitous for the SNM and, indeed, for the future political evolution of Somaliland. As its leadership focused its attention on an ever-widening war to topple Siyad Barre, the SNM turned over a number of administrative functions—including the distribution of food and other aid, the adjudication of disputes, and the recruitment of new fighters—to the elders of the Isaq and their allied clans. A traditional council of elders (*guurti*) was eventually formed to advise the SNM's governing central committee. The partnership of the elected leadership of what had become a veritable national liberation movement—many of whom had been in the diaspora—and

The partnership of the elected leadership of what had become a veritable national liberation movement… and traditional clan leaders gave the SNM a broad legitimacy.

[29] This may be the only known instance in warfare in which an air force squadron took off from an airfield, bombed it, and flew away.

[30] Iqbal Jhazbhay, *Somaliland: An African Struggle for Nationhood and International Recognition* (Johannesburg: South African Institute for International Affairs/Institute for Global Dialogue, 2009), 32–33.

traditional clan leaders gave the SNM a broad legitimacy that the regime in Mogadishu ultimately found impossible to counter.

Renewed Independence (1991–2001)

By early 1990, Siyad Barre had lost control of most of northern Somalia due to the separate advances of the Isaq-led SNM in the northwest and the largely Majeerteen SSDF in the northeast. By late January of the following year, the dictator had packed himself inside the last functioning tank belonging to his once-powerful military and headed for the Kenyan border, ignominiously abandoning Mogadishu to yet another brace of clan-based forces, the predominantly Hawiye militias of Muhammad Farah 'Aideed and Ali Mahdi.

In Somaliland, unlike other parts of Somalia, conflict was averted following the collapse of regime forces. Although some reprisals took place, the SNM and Isaq clan leaders generally made an effort to reach out to representatives of other clans in the territory, including the Darod/Harti (Dhulbahante and Warsangeli subclans) in the east and the Dir (Gadabuursi and Ise subclans) in the west. In January 1991, for example, as rebel forces approached the main Gadabuursi town, Borama, a cease-fire was negotiated through the efforts of a senior officer who was one of the few members of that subclan in the SNM leadership. Gadabuursi elders were invited to join other leaders from all of the region's clans to attend a conference the following month, which formalized a cease-fire across Somaliland.

At this point, there were no moves toward secession. However, when Hawiye leader Ali Mahdi—who did not even control all of Mogadishu—unilaterally declared himself "president of the whole of Somalia from Zeila to Ras Kamboni," the northern clansmen saw history repeating itself.[31] With broad popular support, elders representing the various clans in Somaliland met in Burao for a clan conference (*shir beleed*). On 18 May 1991, the forum agreed to a

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[31] John Drysdale, *What Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders* (London: HAAN, 1994), 140.

resolution that annulled the northern territory's merger with the former Italian colony and declared that it would revert to the sovereign status it had enjoyed upon the achievement of independence from Great Britain and within the borders of the same. The then-serving chairman of the SNM, Abdirahman Ahmed Ali (known as "Tuur," meaning hunchback), was appointed by consensus to be interim president of Somaliland for a period of two years, with the SNM's executive committee serving as his cabinet and the movement's central committee acting as a temporary legislature.

In January 1993, the Somaliland clans sent representatives to Borama for another shir beleed. Interestingly, while the apportionment of seats at this and the previous conference was determined along clan lines in a rough attempt to reflect the demographics of the territory,[32] the actual decision making was by consensus. Moreover, this conference constituted within itself a governing council of elders (*guurti*) whose members were themselves representatives of councils at the clan level. The national *guurti* then proceeded to meet for much longer than the month originally planned. The assembly did not, in fact, adjourn until May. In that time, it achieved some astonishing results and, it should be noted, did so with very little international support.[33] I. M. Lewis observed that the results "are all the more impressive when contrasted with the much less effective, elaborate, high-cost peace and reconstruction conferences organized externally for Somalia as a whole by the United Nations and other international bodies."[34]

The Borama conference first, and perhaps most extraordinarily, certified that the SNM had accomplished its mission of liberating

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[32] In fact, in order to accommodate a broad representation of minority clans, two Isaq clans—the Habar Yoonis and the Habar Awal—gave up some of the seats originally allotted to them on a strict proportional basis. The council's final roster saw the various Isaq clans with 90 delegates, the Harti with 30, and the Dir with 30. See Michael Walls, "The Emergence of a Somali State: Building Peace from War in Somaliland," *African Affairs* 108 (July 2008): 484.

[33] With the exception of about $100,000 begrudgingly donated from the international community, the entire process of local, regional, and national conferencing was essentially financed through self-help.

[34] Lewis, *Making and Breaking States in Africa*, 147.

the country, thanked it for its service, and transferred power away from it. Amazingly, the SNM accepted the decision and was then dissolved. In a singular act of self-abnegation, the victorious liberation movement not only did not cling to power, but it did not even reinvent itself as a political party to compete with others.

Second, the conference dealt with issues of representation and power sharing by institutionalizing clans and their leadership into the system of governance. In a creative mix of Western and traditional institutions, the elders produced an interim Peace Charter and a Transitional National Charter.[35] The Peace Charter set up a legal system that restored xeer as the basis of positive law while also acknowledging the role that Islamic jurisprudence plays in an overwhelmingly Muslim society. The National Charter provided for an executive branch (*Golaha Xukluumadda*) with a president, vice president, and cabinet ministers; a legislature comprised of an upper house of elders (*Golaha Guurtida*) and a lower house of popularly elected representatives (*Golaha Waiillada*); and an independent judiciary. In essence, as one veteran observer of Somaliland's political formation has commented, "Government became a power-sharing coalition of Somaliland's main clans, integrating tradition and modernity in one holistic governance framework."[36]

"Government became a power-sharing coalition of Somaliland's main clans, integrating tradition and modernity in one holistic governance framework."

Finally, the Borama conference elected a civilian, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, who had briefly been prime minister of independent Somaliland in 1960 as well as democratically elected prime minister of Somalia between 1967 and the military coup in 1969, to serve as president of Somaliland for a two-year period, during which time a definitive constitution was supposed to be prepared. While Egal laid

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[35] Mark Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland* (Oxford: James Currey, 2008), 77–136.

[36] Jhazbhay, *Somaliland*, 41.

the foundations for future progress by establishing governmental institutions, demobilizing the former guerrillas, setting up a rudimentary revenue system, and otherwise preparing the groundwork for future economic development, conflicts between certain opportunistic political figures pushed Somaliland to the brink of civil war between 1994 and 1996. In the midst of the tensions, constitutional draftsmanship was placed on the back burner and the government extended its mandate twice. A national reconciliation conference, which met in Hargeisa from October 1996 until February 1997, patched up the differences and adopted another interim constitution that increased representation of clan and political minorities in the two houses of parliament and provided for a multiparty system.

One of the major accomplishments of Egal's time in office that deserves to be singled out is the demobilization of former fighters—both SNM and those belonging to clan militias—and their disarmament. A key component of the effort was the creation of a broad-based Somaliland National Demobilization Commission (NDC) based on the president's recognition of "the need to ensure that the demobilisation effort be led by representatives of all clans and that it not be perceived as an imposed state or mono-clan structure."[37] Interestingly, the lack of international support led the government to adopt a community-based strategy with the active mobilization of clan elders, religious leaders, and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to carry out the demobilization campaign.[38] Elders from all clans and subclans were recruited to oversee the removal of heavy weapons from populated areas and to verify their destruction, or at least cantonment in remote locations. The removal of weapons from urban areas was followed by the removal of militias, with a number of

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[37] Matt Bryden and Jeremy Brickhill, "Disarming Somalia: Lessons in Stabilisation in a Collapsed State," *Conflict, Security & Development* 10 (May 2010): 246.

[38] Aside from a discrete amount from the UN Development Program, which financed the start-up of the NDC and its initial retaining of an advisory team of ex-combatants from Zimbabwe, there was little outside funding for the effort.

those demobilized being retrained as members of a national police force following a six-month course at an encampment near Maandheera, halfway between Hargeisa and the port of Berbera.

State Building (2001–2011)

Before his unexpected death in 2002, Egal finally saw the completion of the drafting of a permanent constitution to replace the long-standing temporary charter. The new document was approved by 97 percent of the voters in a May 2001 referendum. Much like the National Charter, the Somaliland constitution provided for an executive branch of government, consisting of a directly elected president and vice president and appointed ministers; a bicameral legislature, with an elected house of representatives and an upper chamber of elders, the *guurti*; and an independent judiciary. After Egal's death, his vice president, Dahir Riyale Kahin, succeeded to the presidency. Kahin—who hails from the Gadabuursi, rather than the majority Isaq—was elected in his own right in a close election in April 2003.[39] Despite the margin of victory for the incumbent being just 80 votes out of nearly half a million cast, the dispute was settled peaceably through the courts. Multiparty elections for the house of representatives were held in September 2005, which gave the president's Ururka dimuqraadiga ummadda bahawday ("For Unity, Democracy, and Independence," UDUB) party just 33 of the 82 seats, with the balance split between two other parties, the KULMIYE Nabad, Midnimo iyo horumar ("Peace, Unity, and Development," KULMIYE), and the Ururka Caddaalada iyo Daryeelka ("For Justice and Development," UCID).[40]

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[39] For further information on the 2003 presidential election, as well as the local elections conducted in 2002, see International Crisis Group, *Somaliland: Democratisation and Its Discontents*, ICG Africa Report No. 66 (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003).

[40] For additional details on the 2005 elections, see Adan Abokor, Steve Kibbel, Mark Bradbury, et al., *Further Steps to Democracy: The Somaliland Parliamentary Elections, September 2005* (London: Progressio, 2006); Ragnhild Hollekim, Stig Jarle Hansen, and Geir Moe Sorensen, *Somaliland: Elections for the Lower House of Parliament, September 2005* (Oslo: NORDEM, 2006); and International Republican Institute, *Somaliland September 29, 2005 Parliamentary Election Assessment Report* (Washington, DC: IRI, 2006).

Without significant external support, the Somalilanders found that the demobilization of the former SNM fighters, the formation of new national defense and security services, and the extraordinary resettlement of more than 1 million refugees and internally displaced persons fostered the internal consolidation of their renascent polity. Additionally, the establishment of independent newspapers, radio stations, and a host of local NGOs and other civic organizations reinforced the nation-building exercise. The stable environment thus created helped facilitate substantial investments by both local and diaspora businessmen who have built, among other achievements, a telecommunications infrastructure that is more developed than that of some of Somaliland's neighbors. Coca-Cola has even announced the opening of a $10 million bottling plant in Hargeisa.[41]

One needs to single out the educational sector as not only a bridge between Somalilanders in the diaspora and their kinsmen at home, but also an important impetus for the reconstruction and development of the region. The showcase of this is Amoud University, the first institution of its kind in Somaliland, which opened in Borama in 1997. The school took its name from a high school that was the first institution of its kind under the British protectorate and was the alma mater for many distinguished Somalilanders. The university was founded as a modest joint effort by local citizens, who assumed responsibility for the initiative, and their relations abroad, especially in the Middle East, who raised money for it and sent textbooks and other supplies. The institution opened with just two academic departments: education and business administration. The former was created because of the dire need for teachers in the country; the latter because of the opportunities

Somaliland's political progress stalled for a period in recent years due to the repeated postponement of presidential and legislative elections beginning in 2008.

[41] Sarah McGregor, "Coca-Cola Invests $10 Million in Somaliland Bottling Plant," *Bloomberg Businessweek*, 31 May 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-05-31/coca-cola-invests-10-million-in-somaliland-bottling-plant.html.

for employment in the private sector as well as the possibility of graduates starting their own businesses. Even a noted Somali critic of Somaliland's quest for independence has praised Amoud for having "underscored the preciousness of investing in collective projects that strengthen common values and deepen peace" and "given the population confidence that local resources can be mobilized to address development needs."[42] Subsequently, universities have been established in Hargeisa (2000), Burco (2004), and Berbera (2009, although this institution has its origins in an older College of Fisheries and Maritime Management).

Unfortunately, Somaliland's political progress stalled for a period in recent years due to the repeated postponement of presidential and legislative elections beginning in 2008. From this author's firsthand observation,[43] it would appear that while the crisis was homegrown, outside actors, especially the European Commission (EC) and the NGO Interpeace, exacerbated the situation, however unintentionally. First, the nomination of the National Election Commission (NEC) by the president and the opposition-controlled parliament took longer than expected. Then the government in Hargeisa, the EC, and Interpeace reached an agreement to undertake a new voter registration initiative throughout Somaliland that would result in the issuance of a combination voter and national identification card—an admitted important symbolic goal for a nascent state. Complicating the exercise further, the NEC, with the agreement of Somaliland's political parties, decided that the card would carry biometric data in addition to a photograph of the bearer. The whole process only began in October 2008 and was soon thereafter interrupted by suicide bombings by al-Shabaab. When the process resumed, it was carried out with great enthusiasm and dispatch by both government and donors, so much so that fingerprint data was not collected from more than half of those registered and multiple registrations clearly took place in a number of localities.

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[42] Abdi Ismail Samantar, "Somali Reconstruction and Local Initiative: Amoud University," *World Development* 29 (April 2001): 654.

[43] The author was present and/or in contact with all parties involved throughout the process.

Eventually, an internal compromise worked out in late September 2009 by all three of Somaliland's political parties (with encouragement from Ethiopia and the United Kingdom) extended the term of the president and vice president until one month after the holding of elections—at a date not specified—thus preventing escalation of the crisis into violence, but still not holding elections. While the election problem is rooted in Somaliland's internal politics, the outside actors did their local partners no favors by backing a process that was highly problematic from the onset and then, in the case of Interpeace, becoming embroiled as a party to the expanded conflict.[44]

Fortunately, good sense and some timely mediation by the traditional clan elders won the day, and the internationally monitored presidential election in June 2010 was praised by the foreign observers for having been "peaceful, without major incident and generally [meeting] international standards."[45] The result was the defeat of incumbent Dahir Riyale Kahin, the election of Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud ("Silanyo"), a British-trained economist who had served as chairman of the SNM from 1982 until 1990, and a smooth transition between the two—a virtually unheard of occurrence in the region. In the view of a number of legal and political scholars, this success reinforced Somaliland's case for international recognition that has thus far eluded it.[46] As a recent report by the South Africa-based Brenthurst Foundation concluded,

> Recognition of Somaliland would be a most cost-effective means to ensure security in an otherwise troubled and problematic region. Moreover, at a time when "ungoverned spaces" have emerged as a major source of global concern, not least in

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[44] Markus V. Hoehne, "The Current Election Crisis in Somaliland: Outcome of a Failed 'Experiment'?" *Horn of Africa Bulletin*, October 2009, 1–4.

[45] International Republican Institute, "Somaliland Holds Credible Presidential Election," press release, 27 June 2010, http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/somaliland-holds-credible-presidential-election.

[46] See Benjamin R. Farley, "Calling a State a State: Somaliland and International Recognition," *Emory International Law Review* 24 (2010): 777–820.

> this region of the world, it is deeply ironic that the international community should deny itself the opportunity to extend the reach of global governance in a way that would be beneficial both to itself, and to the people of Somaliland. For Africa, Somaliland's recognition should not threaten a "Pandora's box" of secessionist claims in other states. Instead it offers a means to positively change the incentives for better governance, not only for Somaliland, but also in south-central Somalia.[47]

A Somali Fix for the Somali Problem

Although none are likely to risk the loss of face by ever admitting it, the example of Somaliland's progress by leveraging the strength and resilience of traditional institutions to build a sustainable polity amid the chaos of the former Somalia has not been lost on Somalis in other regions. While they lack the historical and international legal arguments that Somalilanders can claim, Darod clan members in the northeastern promontory of Somalia have also demonstrated the success of the building-block model for the country and the wisdom of working with the deeply ingrained clan identities among the Somali.[48] In 1998, tired of being held back by the constant violence and overall lack of social and political progress in central and southern Somalia, traditional clan elders of the Darod clan-family's Harti clan—including its Dhulbahante, Majeerteen, and Warsangeli subgroups—meeting in the town of Garowe opted to undertake a regional state formation process of their own, estab-

The internationally monitored presidential election in June 2010 was praised by the foreign observers.

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[47] Christopher Clapham, Holger Hansen, Jeffrey Herbst, et al., *African Game Changer? The Consequences of Somaliland's International (Non) Recognition*, Brenthurst Discussion Paper 2011/05, June 2011, http://www.thebrenthurstfoundation.org/Files/Brenthurst_Commisioned_Reports/BD-1105_Consequences-of-Somalilands-International-Recognition.pdf.

[48] Martin Doornbos, "When is a State a State? Exploring Puntland, Somalia," in Doornbos, *Global Forces and State Restructuring: Dynamics of State Formation and Collapse* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 175–94.

lishing an autonomous administration for what they termed the "Puntland State of Somalia." After extensive consultations within the Darod/Harti clans and subclans, an interim charter was adopted. This charter provided for a parliament whose members were chosen on a clan basis and who, in turn, elected a regional president, the first being Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed who, in 2004, went on to become, much less successfully, president of the TFG.[49] Unlike Somaliland, however, which has opted to reassert its independence, Puntland's constitution simultaneously supports the notion of a federal Somalia and asserts the region's right to negotiate the terms of union with any eventual national government.[50]

Other less developed political entities are also emerging out of processes currently at work elsewhere among the Somali. In the central regions of Galguduud and Mudug, for example, the local residents set up several years ago something they call the "Galmudug State," complete with its own website.[51] In 2009, they elected a veteran of the old Somali military, Colonel Mohamed Ahmed Alin, to a three-year term as the second president of what describes itself as "a secular, decentralized state." An analogous process is taking place in Jubaland along the frontier with Kenya, apparently with the encourage-

Unlike Somaliland… which has opted to reassert its independence, Puntland's constitution simultaneously supports the notion of a federal Somalia and asserts the region's right to negotiate the terms of union with any eventual national government.

[49] Kinfe Abraham, *Somalia Calling: The Crisis of Statehood and the Quest for Peace* (Addis Ababa, Ethopia: Ethiopian International Institute for Peace and Development, 2002), 445–63.

[50] While the region's constitution still formally commits it to being a part of a future federal Somalia, the lack of progress in the southern and central parts of Somalia and the lackluster performance of the TFG have caused Puntlanders to edge closer to outright secessionism. In late December 2009, the regional parliament voted unanimously to adopt a distinctive flag (hitherto the flag of Somalia had been used), coat of arms, and anthem.

[51] "Galmudug State," http://www.galmudug.com.

ment of the government of the latter, which wants a buffer zone between its territory and the areas controlled by al-Shabaab in southern Somalia. In April 2011, it was announced that a new autonomous authority, "Azania," had been inaugurated with the TFG's own resigned defense minister, Mohamed Abdi Mohamed ("Gandhi"), as its first president.[52] Meanwhile, another self-declared administration, "Himan Iyo Heeb," originally established in 2008 by Habar Gidir clansmen in central Somalia, north of Mogadishu,[53] has apparently become active again.[54] There are similar stirrings among the Hawiye in the Benadir region around Mogadishu and among the Digil/Rahanweyn clans farther south.

Whatever their respective shortcomings, by leveraging the legitimacy they enjoyed by virtue of deeply rooted kinship ties as well as historical and geographical bonds, traditional leaders in Somaliland—and, to varying extents, their counterparts in other Somali regions—have managed to deliver to their constituents a relatively high degree of peace, security, economic progress, and rule of law, despite the lack of international recognition or much outside involvement. Put another way, they have combined sociologist Max Weber's "traditional legitimacy" and "legal right" with service provision in order to establish a sustainable political arrangement, "an order beside the state."[55] As counterinsurgency theorist David Kilcullen has observed,

> Somalia is virtually a laboratory test case, with the south acting as a control group against the experiment in the north. We have the same ethnic groups, in some cases the same clans

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[52] Richard Lough, "Kenya Looks to Somali Troops, Militia to Create Border Buffer," Reuters, 16 August 2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE77F0D320110816.

[53] Ramadan Haji Elmi, "Himan and Heeb—From Hardship to Harmony," Madasha website, 2 November 2011, http://www.madasha.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=338:himan-a-heeb-from-hardship-to-harmony&catid=41:opinions.

[54] Shabelle Media Network (Mogadishu), "Himan Iyo Heb Calls for Participating in Ending Inter-Clan Hostilities," AllAfrica.com, 5 July 2011, http://allafrica.com/stories/201107050714.html.

[55] Dustin Dehéz and Belachew Gebrewold, "When Things Fall Apart—Conflict Dynamics and an Order Beside the State in Postcollapse Somalia," *African Security* 3 (January 2010): 1–20.

> or even the same people, coming out of the same civil war and the same famine and humanitarian disaster, resulting from the collapse of the same state, yet you see completely different results arising from a bottom-up peace-building process based on local-level rule of law versus a top-down approach based on putting in place a "grand bargain" at the elite level.[56]

The role played by the clans has been vital to the relatively successful efforts by the Somaliland government to avoid both major internal conflict and embroilment in the violence affecting most of southern Somalia. It was traditional clan elders who negotiated questions of political representation in key forums. In circumstances where elections were impossible, representatives were designated by clan units from among their members through a deliberative process in which all adult males had an opportunity to participate and where decisions were made on a consensual basis. The resulting social contract enjoys a profound political and social legitimacy that derives from broad buy-in across many groups.

Another trait that the authorities in Somaliland and those in several of the de facto autonomous regions of Somalia—albeit to a lesser extent in the case of the latter—share with each other, but not with the TFG in Mogadishu, has been the fact that they have been largely self-supporting with respect to governmental finances. It has been argued that one of the most significant factors undermining state formation in Africa has been a limited revenue base, that is, a dependence on foreign aid and/or natural resource extraction for revenue. Throughout the world, the experience has been that taxation as a means of raising revenue not only provided income for the state, but also facilitated a greater cohesion between the state and its stakeholders. In contrast, the virtual absence of taxation in postcolonial Africa has resulted in regimes that are largely decoupled from their societies.[57] From this perspective, it is most telling that

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[56] David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 156.

[57] Jeffrey Herbst, "War and the State in Africa," *International Security* 14 (Spring 1990): 117–39.

the most advanced state-building project among the Somalis has been in Somaliland, where the government collects taxes and license fees from business and real estate owners and imposes duties on the trade in khat (the mildly narcotic evergreen leaf chewed by many in the region) as well as imports and exports through the port of Berbera. The government of Somaliland has actually adopted a supply-side approach by managing to increase revenue by more than halving the sales and income tax rates (from 12 to 5 percent and from as much as 25 to 10 percent, respectively). Responding to this success, the World Bank has undertaken to train tax officials, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has agreed to build 10 inland revenue centers across the region.[58] The funds raised have been spent in a manner that could hardly be more transparent: the introduction last year of universal free primary and intermediate schooling through the elimination of parent fees.

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Somaliland also makes its own contribution to the collective security of the international community. Not only has its minuscule coast guard kept Somaliland's 460-mile coastline largely free from piracy, but the region has even been deemed secure enough that, in December 2009, the Obama administration transferred two ethnic Somalis from the terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to Hargeisa rather than risk sending them to the insecure conditions presided over by the TFG in Mogadishu.[59] In

[58] Sarah McGregor, "Somaliland Government Plans to Enforce Compliance on Tax, Double Revenue," Bloomberg, 31 March 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-31/somaliland-government-plans-to-enforce-compliance-on-tax-double-revenue.html.

[59] Jeremy Pelofsky, "U.S. Sends 12 Guantanamo Detainees to Home Countries," Reuters, 20 December 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/20/us-guantanamo-transfers-idUSTRE5BJ0YJ20091220.

a way, the latter development could have been anticipated given the many accounts published by journalists over the years of the eagerness of senior U.S. Department of Defense civilian and military officials for a policy change that would enable them to shift to engaging Somaliland over security issues.[60]

Perhaps most importantly in the context of the rising tide of Islamist militancy in southern and central Somalia is the fact that, as one of the most astute observers of contemporary Somali society has noted, this reliance—especially in Somaliland—on the older system of clan elders and the respect they command "has served as something of a mediating force in managing pragmatic interaction between custom and tradition, Islam and the secular realm of modern nationalism," leading to a unique situation where "Islam may be pre-empting and/or containing Islamism."[61] The consequence of having an organic relationship between Somali culture and tradition and Islam appears to assure a stabilizing, rather than disruptive, role for religion in society in general and religion and politics in particular. In Somaliland, for example, while the population is almost exclusively Sunni Muslims and the *shahāda* (the Muslim profession of the oneness of God and the acceptance of Muhammad as God's final prophet) is emblazoned on the flag, sharia is only one of the three sources of jurisprudence in the region's courts, alongside secular legislation and xeer. On the other hand, given the limited resources of the Somaliland government, Quranic schools play an important role in basic education.

In December 2009, the Obama administration transferred two ethnic Somalis from the terrorist detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to Hargeisa.

[60] Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S. Debating Shift of Support in Somali Conflict," *Washington Post*, 4 December 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/03/AR2007120301096.html.

[61] Iqbal Jhazbhay, "Islam and Stability in Somaliland and the Geo-politics of the War on Terror," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 28 (August 2008): 198.

Alongside these popular institutions stand equally well-received secular charities like Hargeisa's Edna Adan Maternity Hospital, founded in 2002 by Edna Adan Ismail, the former foreign minister of Somaliland, which provides a higher standard of care than available anywhere else in the Somali lands for maternity and infant conditions as well as diagnosis and treatment for HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases and general medical conditions. Thanks to this integrative approach, the northern clans have largely managed to "domesticate" the challenge of political Islam in a manner that their southern counterparts would do well to emulate.

Encouragingly, there have been indications that the international community may finally be coming to the same realization. In September 2010, Ambassador Johnnie Carson, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, announced a "dual-track policy" that included greater engagement with government officials from Somaliland and other regions with an eye toward "looking for ways to strengthen their capacity both to govern and to deliver services to their people."[62] Likewise, after long refusing to even acknowledge their existence, the African Union's Peace and Security Council has directed its commission chairperson, Jean Ping, to "broaden consultations with Somaliland and Puntland as part of the overall efforts to promote stability and further peace and reconciliation in Somalia."[63] Of course, it remains to be seen whether or not concrete policies that would actually implement these directives are developed and executed.

Conclusion: Some Lessons for Postconflict State Building

The failure of Somalia's TFG and its predecessors to prevail over their opponents and bring an end to the conflict has less to do with the complaints often voiced regarding a lack of outside assistance,

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[62] Johnnie Carson, "Remarks to the Press from the UNGA," 24 September 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/spbr/2010/147922.htm.

[63] African Union, Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the 245th Meeting, 14 October, 2010, PSC/MIN/1 (CCXXXXV), 3.

especially of the military kind, than other factors over which external actors can have little positive effect. Specifically, if the regime fighting an insurgency is unable or unwilling to take the steps to achieve internal political legitimacy, no outside intervention will be able to help it to "victory," as even a cursory review of the relationship between legitimacy and military force in civil wars will confirm.[64] In this regard, it would have been helpful if someone had recalled the insight of I. M. Lewis from 2004:

> If further progress is to be achieved in state formation, Somali politicians will surely have to come out of "denial" and start seriously exploring how clan and lineage ties can be utilized positively. Perhaps they could learn from their nomadic kinsmen who unashamedly celebrate these traditional institutions. Here a less Eurocentric and less evolutionary view of lineage institutions by Western commentators, social scientists, and bureaucrats might help to create a more productive environment for rethinking clanship (i.e. agnation) positively.[65]

Nor is it especially productive to continue the pretense that Somalia is still a state when it has long ceased to function as one.[66] The only result this has produced has been to encourage the rent-seeking behavior and corruption of TFG officials without in any way advancing the ostensible objective of restoring a modicum of security and governance to even all 16 districts of Mogadishu.[67]

Somaliland's leaders, in contrast, achieved peace and established the foundations of a viable polity precisely because they understood

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[64] See J. Peter Pham, "Somalia: Insurgency and Legitimacy in the Context of State Collapse," in *Victory Among People: Lessons from Countering Insurgency and Stabilising Fragile States*, ed. David Richards and Greg Mills (London: RUSI, 2011), 111–34.

[65] I. M. Lewis, "Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox," *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 74 (November 2004): 508.

[66] J. Peter Pham, "Somalia: Where a State Isn't a State," *Fletcher Forum on World Affairs* 35 (Summer 2011): 133–51.

[67] Bronwyn Bruton and J. Peter Pham, "How to End the Stalemate in Somalia," *Foreign Affairs* online, 3 October 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68315/bronwyn-bruton-and-j-peter-pham/how-to-end-the-stalemate-in-somalia.

and used indigenous mechanisms and traditional institutions in their state-building enterprise. By engaging clan elders, religious figures, members of the vibrant Somali business community, and civil society actors in a fairly inclusive process, they laid a political and social governance foundation for success despite challenging conditions. By relying on practices hallowed from time immemorial and familiar to the populace, they also purchased the time and gained the political space that was needed to make advances that might have otherwise been too difficult in the immediate aftermath of the conflict. Even the disadvantages they had to overcome—the lack of both natural resources and ready access to donor budgetary assistance—proved to be blessings in disguise since they forced the government to depend instead on local revenue streams and, consequently, to be more attentive to constituent groups. As it turns out, this very dynamic "appears to have been at the heart of the development of modern, representative governments in Europe," according to political economist Nicholas Eubank.[68] Overall, Somaliland's experience illustrates how a process that is viewed as legitimate and supported by the populace can also address the international community's interests about issues ranging from humanitarian concerns to maritime piracy to transnational terrorism.[69]

Somaliland's experience illustrates how a process that is viewed as legitimate and supported by the populace can also address the international community's interests about issues ranging from humanitarian concerns to maritime piracy to transnational terrorism.

[68] Nicholas Eubank, "Peace-Building without External Assistance: Lessons from Somaliland" (Working Paper 198, Center for Global Development, Washington, DC, January 2010), 22, http://www.cgdev.org/files/1423538_file_Eubank_Somaliland_FINAL.pdf.

[69] J. Peter Pham, "The Somali Solution to the Somali Crisis," *Harvard Africa Policy Journal* 6 (2010): 71–84.

The political and social conditions present in Somaliland in the wake of the implosion of the former Somali state are far from readily generalizable to other postconflict situations. However, it is also true that, as Michael Walls has written, "at a time when developments in the southern and central Somali territories provide such cause for despair, it is important to recognize and attempt to learn from the different reality that pertains in Somaliland, where local resources have been effectively employed in the cause of achieving a lasting peace and what appears to be a viable system of democracy."[70] Moreover, as analyst Seth Kaplan has summarized it, "The UN, Western governments, and donors have tried repeatedly to build a strong central government—the kind of entity that they are most comfortable dealing with—in defiance of local socio-political dynamics and regional history."[71] Despite the abundant evidence clearly indicating that bottom-up efforts, especially when they reinforce the connection between legitimate local nonstate structures to state or protostate institutions, have a greater chance of success, the inability or even unwillingness to act on this knowledge in Phase IV and Phase V stabilizing and rebuilding operations results in the repeated capture of otherwise well-intended efforts by self-appointed political leaders whose lack of legitimacy—traditional or electoral—contributed to provoking the crisis that necessitated the intervention in the first place. The real shame is that this all-too-often-repeated error has, in recent years alone, not only wasted billions of dollars, but also shattered countless lives in some of the most vulnerable corners of the globe. Fortunately, the

The experience of Somaliland underscores the fact that, even in the middle of the most unpromising of circumstances, there are always choices, and the right ones can deliver some truly exceptional results.

[70] Walls, "Emergence of a Somali State," 489.

[71] Seth Kaplan, "Rethinking State-Building in a Failed State," *Washington Quarterly* 33 (January 2010): 82.

experience of Somaliland underscores the fact that, even in the middle of the most unpromising of circumstances, there are always choices, and the right ones can deliver some truly exceptional results.

Painting by Frank Feller depicting ***The Last Eleven at Maiwand.*** Courtesy of the Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University Library.

"The Bones of the British Lying in Maiwand Are Lonely"

A Victorian Battle and Its Continuing Impact on Afghan Memory

by Erich Wagner

Then the Mullah will raise his voice and remind them of other days when the sons of the prophet drove the infidel from the plains of India, and ruled at Delhi, as wide an Empire as the Kafir holds today: when the true religion strode proudly through the earth and scorned to lie hidden and neglected among the hills: when mighty princes ruled in Bagdad, and all men knew that there was one God, and Mahomet was His prophet. And the young men hearing these things will grip their Martinis, and pray to Allah, that one day He will bring some Sahib—best prize of all—across their line of sight at seven hundred yards so that, at least, they may strike a blow for insulted and threatened Islam.

Winston S. Churchill, *The Malakand Field Force*[1]

A little more than a year after an incredulous British public learned in February 1879 of the disaster that befell a British column at Isandlwana in South Africa, Queen Victoria's subjects were once again "upset at their breakfast"—to paraphrase Michael Caine in

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[1] Winston S. Churchill, *The Malakand Field Force* (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1901), 12.

Zulu—when they learned of another immense debacle. This time, the strange, foreign name haunting the newspapers was "Maiwand." It was the greatest defeat Britain's soldiers sustained during their attempt to pacify the North-West Frontier of India, a 400-mile-long by 100-mile-wide swath of empire inhabited by untamed tribes, landowners, and farmer-bandits, virtually all Muslims.[2]

Approximately 40 miles west of Kandahar, the spiritual birthplace of the Taliban, lies the baking desert town of Maiwand in Afghanistan's Helmand Province. On 27 July 1880, soldiers of the Queen again claimed a piece of foreign dirt "Forever England." Here, in stultifying heat, an Afghan host of approximately 8,500 regular Afghan infantry and cavalry soldiers, bolstered by 15,000 religious warriors known as *ghazis*,[3] under the command of Sirdar Ayub Khan, ruler of Herat, succeeded in overwhelming and thoroughly defeating a well-disciplined British column on open ground.[4] In the process, a line regiment of British infantry, the 66th (Berkshire) Regiment, was virtually annihilated. Collectively, the Afghan warriors—who, in a haunting bit of foreshadowing, were called *talibs*—"dished 'em up in style," as Kipling, the bard of British imperialism, might have said.[5] Out of 2,564 officers and men engaged, the British sustained

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[2] Isandlwana was the greatest of the martial defeats during the 64 "small wars" of Queen Victoria's long reign, but Maiwand was the second largest. For descriptions of the North-West Frontier, see Leigh Maxwell, *My-God-Maiwand!* (London: Leo Cooper, 1979).

[3] *Ghazis* were the backbone of any Afghan tribal army. Described by Brigadier General Henry F. Brooke as "so concerned are they that if they can only kill an infidel, their future happiness is secured, that they are perfectly indifferent as to whether they lose their life in the attempt or not; in fact, I believe they rather desire to be killed and so enter at once on all the delights of a Mahomedan Paradise." They usually wore white and provided leadership to the ordinary tribesman. See Maxwell, *My-God-Maiwand*, 20.

[4] This column, although British, was complemented by native infantry regiments and native cavalry.

[5] Winston Churchill identified *talibs* as the most fanatical of the enemies facing the British in the Afghan frontier wars. He wrote that "they live free at the expense of the people." Colonel William G. Mainwaring, in an official British report on the Battle of Maiwand, wrote of how particular Afghan fighters wearing black turbans would charge the British infantry lines and, upon reaching a British soldier, would proceed by cutting open his throat; of these suicidal Afghan fighters, Mainwaring revealed, "they were called the Taliban." Churchill, *Malakand Field Force*, 10; Mainwaring quoted by Robert Fisk in an author talk, Seattle Public Library, 26 September 2008, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfQYhU1IfbQ.

grievous casualties: 962 killed, 161 wounded, 331 camp followers killed, and more than 2,685 horses and other transport animals killed or captured. Put another way, 37 percent of the brigade did not survive the battle and ensuing retreat.[6]

The Battle of Maiwand was part of a British military intervention to stop perceived Russian influence on tribal factions in Afghanistan, as England felt her control of India was threatened. During the course of the Second Anglo–Afghan War (1878–80), Great Britain triumphed in the majority of battles; the calamity at Maiwand was the one notable exception. And, like such Victorian disasters in the past—Cawnpore and Isandlwana—vengeance was thorough; retribution, quick; and motivation, determined.

This grand Afghan victory against British colonialism is vital to understanding the mentality of the Afghan fighter in today's war, placing it in its proper historical context, and comprehending the nature of the war that is currently being waged by both sides. A decade after international intervention in Afghanistan following the attacks of 11 September 2001, some scholars still contend that little is understood about the tribes and ethnic groups that make up the country.[7] A senior intelligence officer for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, U.S. Army Major General Michael T. Flynn, admonished the U.S. intelligence community for, while "having focused the overwhelming majority of our collection efforts and analytical brainpower on insurgent groups, our vast intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are

37 percent of the brigade did not survive the battle and ensuing retreat.

[6] Maxwell, *My-God-Maiwand*, 253. See also Richard Stacpoole-Ryding, "Transport & Veterinary Services at Maiwand," *The Last Stand* 1 (2009): 29–34, http://maiwandjournal.victorianwars.com/The%20Last%20Stand%20-%20July%202009.pdf.

[7] Tim Foxley, "Countering Taliban Information Operations in Afghanistan," *Prism* 1 (September 2010): 79, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/prism1-4/Prism_79-94_Foxley.pdf.

trying to persuade."[8] Perhaps, but during the last few years there has been an outpouring of literature on Afghanistan's tribal dynamics from such analysts and scholars as Antonio Giustozzi, Thomas Ruttig, and Gilles Dorronsoro, to name a few.[9] Moreover, "tribal engagement" has certainly been one of NATO/ISAF's prominent enthusiasms.[10] In point of fact, tribal and ethnic factors are included in current analyses, and in some cases, the focus may be overemphasized by counterinsurgents, in the process neglecting the equally important historical antecedents. It is this shortfall in Afghan history that this article will—albeit only partially—address.

The subject of this article provides a clear example of this deficiency. An unclassified intelligence report from 22 January 2009 identified a request for "research regarding Afghan holidays (e.g., Nawruz), commemorative days (e.g., Ashura), and events of importance (e.g., Battle of Maiwand)." In response to a specific query about the Battle of Maiwand, the intelligence community provided a disheartening answer regarding this yearly Afghan celebration that lends credence to Flynn's argument and illustrates a lack of cultural awareness that

The Afghans are not fighting only this war, they are fighting with and alongside ghosts of their past.

[8] Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, "Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan" (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2010), http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf.

[9] Antonio Giustozzi has spent more than a decade visiting, researching, and writing on Afghanistan. See Giustozzi and Noor Ullah, "'Tribes' and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980–2005" (London: Crisis States, Research Centre, September 2006), http://necsi.edu/afghanistan/pdf_data/Tribes_and_Warlords_in_Southern_Afghanistan_1980-2005.pdf. Thomas Ruttig is codirector of the Afghanistan Analysts Network. He has published numerous articles and papers on Afghanistan, including "How Tribal Are the Taliban? Afghanistan's Largest Insurgent Movement between its Tribal Roots and Islamist Ideology," Afghanistan Analysts Network, April 2010, http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/20100624TR-HowTribalAretheTaleban-FINAL.pdf. Gilles Dorronsoro, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment, is an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey, and South Asia. See Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).

[10] See, for example, Jim Gant, *One Tribe at a Time* (Los Angeles: Nine Sisters Imports, 2009), http://www.stevenpressfield.com/2009/10/one-tribe-at-a-time-4-the-full-document-at-last/.

befalls our warfighters in Afghanistan: "The Battle of Maiwand, a major defeat of the British by Pashtuns, took place on July 27th, 1880. It is not known how this date is observed."[11]

The current U.S. Forces Counterinsurgency Qualification Standards for Afghanistan commanders includes as one of its required individual and unit skills the necessity to "understand population's perceptions toward Coalition forces."[12] If this skill is to be accomplished, an understanding of the impact of the Battle of Maiwand on Afghan memory is paramount. Perhaps, as the remainder of this analysis will illustrate, the cultural and historical factors—Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*, an inclination for a particular people to act a particular way structured by unique historical realities—were not effectively included in planning for recent operations in Helmand Province.

The 130-Year War: Afghan Memory

This is the land of the Afghans and the sons of this soil cannot be deceived,
Therefore withhold your hands, as your agents cannot succeed.
Listen, oh child of imperialism, to my views and thoughts:
Don't play with fire, and sit quietly,
For I am the Afghan who made the British flee.

Old Afghan song

The Afghans are not fighting only this war, they are fighting with and alongside ghosts of their past. Afghan journalist and filmmaker Nelofer Pazira has written a moving account of her life in war-torn Afghanistan. Titled *A Bed of Red Flowers: In Search of My Afghanistan*,

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[11] Human Terrain System, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center, Cultural Knowledge Report, RRC-AF4-09-0001, 22 January 2009.

[12] Counterinsurgency (COIN) Qualification Standards for Afghanistan, August 2010, Task 6, CJOA-A COIN MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK: Conduct Information Operations, http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/ISAF%20COIN/CJOA_A%20COIN%20Task%204%20Conduct%20Information%20Ops%20Clean.docx.

the 2005 book reacquaints readers with the history of the country. Pazira fled Kabul for Canada in 1989 with her family, but her love for Afghanistan still burns, and she provides insight into the power of the memory of the 1880 battle for Afghans. "They say in Afghanistan that once a battle has been fought," she writes, "the sound of a marching army will always echo on that spot . . . [and the] cries of pain and agony, the roar of anger, the cheers of victory . . . remain in the memory of the soil." As journalist Jean MacKenzie observed in 2009, "The Battle of Maiwand may not rank alongside Trafalgar, Waterloo, or Gettysburg in the annals of military history [in the rest of the world], . . . but the tale of valiant Afghan warriors triumphing over a superior British army is imbibed with mother's milk in Helmand." The very word "Maiwand," Pazira reminisced, "used to make me feel proud." One refrain from a nationalist song goes, "We will remind them of [The Battle of] Maiwand, and we will reach Washington / We are the soldiers of Islam, and we are happy to be martyred."[13]

"Even a child knows the history," Muhammad Amman, an 85-year-old Pashtun resident, recalled of the long-ago battle. "A king gathered the people to vanquish the British—a great victory." Locals claim British bones from the fallen on the battlefield still turn up in the region's farmland and irrigation canals. "We do not want British guns here. They should remember what happened the last time they came to Maiwand," Sayed Jumma Agaha, a Taliban advocate, told a reporter in 2006.[14]

Maiwand is a symbol of pride for all Afghans and for Helmandis in particular. Historical reality often gets embellished when retold,

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[13] Pazira, *A Bed of Red Flowers: In Search of My Afghanistan* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 331–32; MacKenzie, "The 130-Year War," GlobalPost, 6 November 2009, http://www.globalpost.com/notebook/afghanistan/091106/the-130-year-war; "We are the Soldiers of Islam," song lyrics published on *Al Emarah*, 1 January 2007 (translation: AfghanWire).

[14] Declan Walsh, "We'll Beat You Again, Afghans Warn Brits," *Mail & Guardian* online, 3 June 2006, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2006-07-03-well-beat-you-again-afghans-warn-brits (first quote); Richard Beeston, "Is History About To Repeat Itself As The Great Game Starts Again? *Times* (London), 4 March 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article737352.ece (second quote). (For free access, see reprint on *Afghanistan News Center*, http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/news/2006/march/mar52006.html.)



however, especially in societies relying on oral transmission. In the Pashto retelling of Maiwand, the level of casualties inflicted is often inflated, while those sustained (five times greater) is diminished, and the numeric disproportionality of the conflagrants is conveniently overlooked. Afghans in Helmand talk about the victory as if it were yesterday, and all claim that their forefathers were there. "I had never heard of the Battle of Maiwand when I first went to Helmand in the fall of 2006," wrote MacKenzie, "but by the time I left in the spring of 2008, it had become a fixture in my mental landscape."[15] When soldiers of Britain's Parachute Regiment moved into Camp Price just outside Gereshk (18 miles east of Maiwand) in May 2006, their commander had his first meeting with local officials. It took the Afghans just 10 minutes to bring up the Battle of Maiwand. Then-Major General Richard P. Mills, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, ISAF Regional Command Southwest, remembered that Afghans would constantly remind him of their previous victory in "the

[15] James Fergusson, *Taliban: The Unknown Enemy* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo, 2010), 174; MacKenzie, "130-Year War."

Maiwand War" and how they and their forefathers were responsible for making Afghanistan "the graveyard of Empires."[16]

Even the new Afghan army proudly identifies itself with the legacy of the battle. The Afghan National Army's (ANA) 215th "Maiwand" Corps was activated in April 2010, and ISAF sees raising such indigenous forces as these as the most effective means to establish local, enduring security. The battle has even found its way into the operational naming convention. While the system for generating operational names for military campaigns has changed over the years, and different countries assign varying essentials to such assignments, military and civilian commanders now often focus on inspirational monikers to define, and some might argue, to justify the mission for their warfighters and public audience. Indicative of the pride Afghans as a whole share in the battle is the name the new ANA chose for its first Afghan-planned, resourced, and executed operation apart from Coalition forces: Operation Maiwand. It took place in June 2007 and centered on Andar District in Ghazni Province, an area known for its infestation of antigovernment elements.

Maiwand is a symbol of pride for all Afghans and for Helmandis in particular.

Afghan Heroes and Heroines from the Battle of Maiwand

Today, in a garden near where the 66th Regiment made its last stand, lies the memorial to the Afghan soldiers killed during the fight. A pillar "crowned by a Muslim dome with star crescent, standing in the midst of a garden of white mulberry trees, enclosed by a wall of brick and stone," are 400 graves of Afghan warriors, regular soldiers, and ghazis, each aligned toward Mecca. A distance away, senior

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[16] Christina Lamb, "Death Trap," Times (London), 9 July 2006, republished on *e-Ariana*, http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/5B7043B3175779F5872571A6002D3D03?OpenDocument; author interview with Major General Richard P. Mills, USMC, 27 April 2011, Washington, DC (hereafter Mills interview).

officers and chieftains felled during the battle are interred. Still today, Afghan tribesmen visit the graves of their forefathers.[17]

In the United States, where roughly 300,000 people of Afghan descent live, markets and kabob houses are named in memory of Maiwand. In Kabul, the Battle of Maiwand is commemorated on everything from banks to streets. Jaid-e-Maiwand, a main throughway and bustling bazaar in Kabul, bears its name. At one end of this street, a commemorative pillar known as the Minar-i-Maiwand, designed by Ismatulla Saraj, was erected by King Zahir Shah in 1959 in the town square. It is several stories high, bears bronze plates on all four sides, and today is seen plastered with political advertisements.

Sardar Muhammad Ayub Khan, the ruler of Herat and commander of the Afghans during the Maiwand battle, is revered as a freedom fighter and national hero in Afghanistan. His moniker became the "Victor of Maiwand," and many nineteenth-century poets composed ballads about the "Ghazi of Maiwand" and celebrated him for thoroughly bloodying the world's mightiest army. He died on 7 April 1914. The Victor of Maiwand now rests alone in his glory in a small marble mausoleum in the Durrani graveyard near Wazir Bagh, just outside the old walled city of Peshawar, Pakistan. Sadly, in 2010, his handcrafted white marble tomb was desecrated by relic hunters, and his gravestone, created by the government of Afghanistan during the reign of King Habibullah Khan, bearing a Persian inscription that lavished much praise, was chiseled and broken.[18]

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[17] Maxwell, *My-God-Maiwand*, 246–47 (quote); Tom Coghlan, "British Head for Afghan Land of Hate," *Telegraph* (UK), 26 October 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1501535/ British-head-for-Afghan-land-of-hate.html. Interestingly, as an aside, 33 years ago, the Baker Street Irregulars, an organization of Sherlock Holmes enthusiasts founded in 1934, asked the Afghan government for permission to put up a monument to Dr. Watson on the Maiwand battlefield. Watson, Sherlock Holmes' fictional sidekick, was wounded at the battle. No official decision has been made, but the perplexed Afghans simply do not understand why the club wishes to put a monument to a man who never existed on a battlefield where they were decisively beaten. Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 411.

[18] Rashid Khattak, "Vandalism of Victor of Maiwand's Tomb Goes Unnoticed," Khyber.org, 6 June 2010, http://www.khyber.org/articles/2010/VandalismofVictorofMaiwandsTom.shtml.

The Afghan communist government of the Soviet War years, the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (PDRA), established a merit medal in his name. The award's inscription in Dari reads, "Madal-e Dawlati Ghazi Muhammad Ayub Khan Fatih-e Maiwand," or "State Medal of Ghazi Muhammad Ayub Khan, Victor of Maiwand."

Afghanistan's Joan of Arc: Malalai of Maiwand

Ask any Helmandi child about the Battle of Maiwand and he or she will recite the story of the gallant and resplendent Malalai, who inspirited the deflated Afghan tribesmen at the battle's turning point. In a rare national biography by a native author, Abdul Raouf Binava passionately painted the picture of Afghanistan's most famous heroine. During the battle, Malalai, an Afghan camp follower, shamed the ghazis into action at a crucial point in the fighting by tearing off her veil and using it as a rallying flag. "The Afghan army was near defeat from exhaustion and thirst and the Afghan flag had fallen from the band of its bearer who had been wounded. At this

very moment, a young Afghan woman named Malalai arrived and lifted the Pashtun national flag and shouted a *jandei* [ancient tribal chanted poem]:

> With a drop of my sweetheart's blood
> Shed in defense of the Motherland
> Will I put a beauty spot on my face
> Such as would put to shame the rose in the garden.
> If you come back alive from the Battle of Maiwand,
> I swear, my sweetheart, that the rest of your days
> You will live in shame.[19]

British reports say that Malalai was on the rooftop of houses in a nearby village. Soon after her exhortation, she was felled by a well-placed Martini-Henry bullet from a British soldier.

At the battle's conclusion, Ayub Khan allowed a rare honor for the deceased woman.

> [After the Battle of Maiwand] Afghan Conquerors were going to bury their Martyrs. Ayub Khan asked, Who is this girl . . . ? Someone replied, She is "Malalai," the daughter of a shepherd, the resident of Maiwand. Another replied, "She is very brave, so she should be buried along with Martyrs." Ayub Khan replied, "Well said." All the Imams and . . . soldiers of the holy war prayed, asking her Forgiveness from Almighty Allah . . . and then submitted her to soil.[20]

And in thus a manner, almost entirely by story in a populace where only 28 percent are literate, the legend of the national heroine birthed out of the Battle of Maiwand is repeated to schoolchildren of both genders to this day.[21]

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[19] Melody Ermachild Chavis, *Meena, Heroine of Afghanistan: The Martyr Who Founded RAWA, the Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan* (New York: St. Martin's, 2003), 13. The *jandei* (poem) is also the inscription on the Minar-i-Maiwand (commemorative monument) in Kabul.

[20] Zamunj Ghazyan, *Our Warriors: The Life of Our Prominent National Warriors* (Afghanistan, n.d.), 453. See http://www.afghanforums.com/showthread.php?16215-Afghanistan-Celebrated-Figures.

[21] The Central Intelligence Agency's *World Factbook* records that the Afghan population's literacy rate stands at 28.1 percent. See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html.

Factually, little is known about Malalai of Maiwand. British reports about the battle do not mention a woman as such, for many plausible reasons. Her age, as variously numbered in books or retold orally, was between 12 and 17. Few Afghan history books mention her, and there is little information about her in school texts. She appears almost exclusively in poems, speeches, and songs. Muhammad Siddiq Farhang's three-volume *Afghanistan in the Past Five Centuries*—one of the most distinguished works of Afghan history—fails to even reference her.[22] That said, she is very much alive in popular memory as a national symbol of resistance. Her grave lies to the east of the village of Karez, and locals view it as a shrine. The highest award for women in Afghanistan is the "Malalai, Heroine of Maiwand" Medal,[23] reserved for women who are deemed to have accomplished great deeds for the community. Afghans worldwide "friend" the several Facebook pages revering her, and YouTube videos praising her in songs are routinely posted and watched. Maternity hospitals, including the Malalai Maternity Hospital in Kabul, and girls' schools (Lycée Malalaï, a Franco-Afghan school for girls in Kabul, for example) are dedicated in her memory. Her name is one of the most common for baby girls. Even a women's magazine has been named after her.[24] The memory of Afghanistan's Joan of Arc lives on in Malalai Joya, the country's most outspoken female politician, named one of *Time* magazine's 100 Most Influential People for 2010, who proudly bears her prenomen. Like her

[22] Muhammad Sediq Farhang, *Afghanistan Dar Panj Qarn-i Akhir* [Afghanistan in the Past Five Centuries] (Mashad, Iran: Intisharat-I Darakhshash, 1992); Pazira, *Bed of Red Flowers,* 138.

[23] Also known as the "Malalai Qahraman" medal.

[24] Chavis, *Meena*, 12, 173; Tasha G. Oren and Patrice Petro, eds., *Global Currents: Media and Technology Now* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 176.

namesake of the nineteenth century, she too has removed her burka in her twenty-first-century quest for liberation.

The Great Game: Afghanistan, one of the theatrical events of the 2010 season currently touring the United States, is a British series of short plays on the history of Afghanistan and foreign intervention. This triptych of theater is composed of three one-act plays, each by a different playwright, each exploring a critical period of modern Afghan history. In *Duologue*, by Siba Shakib, one of the main characters is visited by the spirit of Malalai. During this play, the recorded views of journalist William Dalrymple, General Stanley A. McChrystal and a top aide, and former Oxfam Director Matthew Waldman give their summaries of the contemporary status of the Afghan war.[25]

Malalai's memory is now invoked to legitimize the recruitment of female fighters.[26] Ayman Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's deputy and "al-Qaeda's #2 man," once tried to persuade Mullah Omar, founder of the Taliban, to allow girls' education, basic schooling, and even combat training in Afghanistan. He used the example of Malalai. But Omar refused, saying the "presence of women at the fight or among soldiers would lead to a breakdown in discipline."[27] As potential male suicide bomber recruits dwindle through attrition, Muslim insurgents worldwide had increasingly turned to female bombers. Because of cultural sensitivities, lack of suspicion, and the collective reluctance of indigenous forces to search women, they have proven to be a very successful tactical tool. Until recently, the Taliban has resisted and largely avoided their use. Today, however, their implementation has looked more appealing as the Taliban becomes increasingly threatened.[28]

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[25] George Heymont, "Meanwhile, Back in Afghanistan . . . ," *Huffington Post*, 1 December 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-heymont/meanwhile-back-in-afghani_b_790209.html.

[26] Matthew P. Dearing, "Female Suicide Bombers, The New Threat in Afghanistan," *Small Wars Journal* blog, 24 July 2010, http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/07/female-suicide-bombers-the-new.

[27] Ibid.; Christopher Dickey, "Women of Al Qaeda," *Newsweek*, 12 December 2005 (quote).

[28] Matthew P. Dearing, "Agency And Structure As Determinants Of Female Suicide Terrorism: A Comparative Study Of Three Conflict Regions" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2009), http://www.tribalanalysiscenter.com/PDF-External/NPS-Female%20Suicide%20Bombers.pdf.

As usual in cultures with poor formal education, scholarly written history often relies on Western writers. Pazira laments that "there is an intriguing sentence—a single, extraordinary line—in the British account of Maiwand that states that "among the ghazis of Maiwand there were 12 women who were admitted as ghazis and were allowed to remove their 'purdahs' (veils) on condition that they followed the ghazis into action, and took water, etc., etc., to the wounded."[29] Of these rare Afghan heroines, only Malalai's name is remembered and celebrated today. Her name, Abdul Raouf Binava wrote, "is written in gold in Pushtun history," and her memory still shames countrymen into battle to this day.[30] The Taliban has recently reversed its prohibition on poetry and songs accompanied by music in order to appeal to its followers and the greater Afghan population, and the iconic Malalai features prominently in this symbology.[31]

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[29] Pazira, *Bed of Red Flowers,* 139.

[30] Abdul Raouf Binava, *Les Femmes Afghannes* (1944), as quoted in Pazira, *Bed of Red Flowers*, 138.

[31] Jeffrey Brown and Daniel Sagalyn, "Poetry as a Weapon of War in Afghanistan," PBS *NewsHour*, 25 March 2011, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/art/blog/2011/03/taliban-poetry.html. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the impact of the memory of the Battle of Maiwand on the British imagination, a few quick examples will illustrate that it was not lost on politicians or the military. Then-Major General Richard P. Mills, USMC, acknowledged that "the British, like the Afghans, have long memories" and that they were sentient of the hallowed ground over which they maneuvered. (Mills interview.) Newspapers reported in 2008 that British soldiers had recovered from the Taliban/al-Qaeda several Martini-Henry rifles taken from the bodies of their Victorian forebears during the defeat, and repatriated them as antiques back to England. (Keith Howitt, "Soldiers in Helmand Unearth British Rifles Lost in 1880 Massacre," 8 June 2008, *Independent* [UK], http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/soldiers-in-helmand-unearth-british-rifles-lost-in-1880-massacre-842497.html.) The military addresses its colonial past with predeployment education packages if only in order to counter the Taliban propaganda. British General David J. Richards noted a factor in the ferocity of the Helmand fight was "the Maiwand thing." (Frank Ledwidge, *Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan* [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011], 63.) In a Parliamentary discussion on the war's strategy in May 2010, a Conservative Party politician argued that the war in Afghanistan was based on "aims that are completely devoid of a study of history." He noted that "on 21 July last year, on the Helmand River, the same regiment was in action against the same tribesmen, against a very similar political background . . . exactly the same position as when almost 1,000 Britons lost their lives on 21 July 1880 in the Battle of Maiwand." ("Queen's Speech Debate: MPs Urge Rethink On Afghanistan," BBC Mobile, 26 May 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/house_of_commons/newsid_8704000/8704679.stm.)

> Are you aware Malalay [*sic*] that Angrez[32] has once again come to your home? Your brothers are there, but now their zeal and faith has become rusty. Some people have sold their fate for a few dollars. But thanks to the Malalays your brothers have now woken up and with their efforts the days of the colonialists are numbered.

The Current Fight: "The Colonial Present"

Are you too coward[ly] to go to Afghanistan and defend the "Legacy of Maiwand"?!

Abu Sayed, Afghanistan Online Discussion Forums[33]

Afghans do not compartmentalize this twenty-first-century fight from the others in their turbulent past. In the psyche of the Pashtuns, resistance to foreign invaders goes back 3,000 years, set amid some of Earth's most rugged backdrop. In the last several centuries, these conflicts have also had the undertones of Islamic fundamentalism. Ustad Rafeh, a professor of Pashtun history at Kabul University, condenses it in this manner:

Afghans do not compartmentalize this twenty-first-century fight from the others in their turbulent past.

> You had 60,000 troops and the best artillery, but it was Pashtuns who surrounded Kabul and killed 17,000 of you as you tried to escape [referencing the First Anglo–Afghan War (1839–42) and the defeat at the Battle of Gandamak in 1842]. The rulers of your Empire thought this was an accident; they couldn't accept such a defeat, so they attacked again, in 1880. We killed 12,000 of you that time, at

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[32] Pashto name for the English/British.

[33] Abu-Sayed, reply 23, Afghanistan Online Discussion Forums, 20 November 2008, http://www.afghanistanonlineforums.com/cgi-bin/yabb2/YaBB.pl?num=1227102429/37.

> Maiwand. The same with the Soviets in 1979: most of their original army was destroyed. What makes you think that it will be any different for America this time?[34]

To the Afghans it seems like yesterday; it is a self-conscious "colonial present." Over nearly a century of conflict between Britain and Pashtuns, a mutual respect and hatred was fostered. General Sir Frederick Roberts, who relieved the besieged survivors of Kandahar,[35] warned posterity that "it may not be very flattering to our *amour proper*, but I feel sure I am right when I say that the less the Afghans see of us the less they will dislike us."[36] The story is almost always the same. Similar to other colonial wars throughout history, it seemed impossible for the fragmented Pathan nation to act together against the common foe,

> Memory is blind to all but the group it binds—which is to say … that there are as many memories as there are groups, that memory is by nature multiple and yet specific; collective, plural, and yet individual. History, on the other hand, belongs to everyone and to no one, whence its claim to universal authority. Memory takes root in the concrete, in spaces, gestures, images, and objects; history binds itself strictly to temporal continuities, to progressions and to relations between things. Memory is absolute, while history can only conceive the relative.
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> — Pierre Nora
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> "Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire," *Representations* 26 (Spring 1989): 8.

[34] James Fergusson, "Taliban: Greatest Guerrilla Insurgency?" Channel 4 News, 16 August 2010, http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/world/asia_pacific/afghan+taliban+greatest+guerrilla+insurgency/3744777. In this article, Professor Rafeh refers to the First Anglo–Afghan War and the retreat from Kabul in 1842. However, there were only just over 21,000 troops in the Army of the Indus (including 6,000 non-EIC troops raised by the Sikhs) when it advanced into Afghanistan in 1839, and only 4,200 troops, of whom 700 were Europeans (plus 12,000 camp followers), involved in the retreat. As it happens, quite a large number of British accounts of the Second Anglo–Afghan War mention seeing the bones of the dead from the last stand of the 44th at Gandamak in January 1842. Similarly, the dead at Maiwand numbered 962.

[35] Kandahar is where the remnants of Burroughs's brigade had retreated and also included the rest of the field force that had not gone out to Maiwand.

[36] Frank L. Holt, *Into the Land of Bones: Alexander the Great in Afghanistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 4.

even when the holy men were fanning the flames of war. The Battle of Maiwand was unique in this respect.[37]

Victory almost always begets pride in a people, especially when irregulars defeat professional armies. Indeed, in 1979, Brigadier General Suleiman of the Afghan army told author Leigh Maxwell, "The threat of an armed peasantry in Afghanistan is now so well appreciated abroad that not even the British will ever dare invade us again!"[38] Yet Ayub Khan's Pyrrhic victory immediately produced concern in his tribal force. He was aware a new British Bengal Army column under Lord Roberts was soon to seek revenge, or, as one British officer put it, "to inflict one of those terrible lessons of the game of war which our little army is compelled now and then to teach." Khan sent an emissary to try and form a treaty with him, claiming that Maiwand had not been his fault, truly stating that he had been attacked, asking how the matter could be resolved between himself and the British, with whom he wished to be friends. The subsequent British defeat had been the will of God. The local Kandahari tribesmen were terrified of the revenge that they expected the British to inflict, and as a result even buried the dead Anglo-British bodies in mass graves and forbade the usual mutilation that Afghan tribesmen relish to this day.[39] In April 1881, the last British troops marched out from Kandahar after expelling the entire Afghan population from the city. On 1 May 2006, they returned to Helmand as part of the ISAF relieving their American counterparts.

Given their tumultuous past, Helmand was an interesting choice for the place where the British forces were deployed.

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[37] Another rising of Pathans occurred in 1897–98 on the frontier that was comparable, but no great victory was secured.

[38] Maxwell, *My-God-Maiwand*, 251.

[39] Waller Ashe, ed., *Personal Records of the Kandahar Campaign by Officers Engaged Therein* (London: David Bogue, 1881), 179 (quote); Peter Hopkirk, *The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia* (New York: Kodansha International, 1994), 400; Maxwell, *My-God-Maiwand*, 4, 216.

The Afghans' fear has remained to this day.

Given their tumultuous past, Helmand was an interesting choice for the place where the British forces were deployed. Anthropologists undoubtedly would argue it was *sans* their advice. The British public was generally unaware that their troops were being sent into the area where their predecessors had gone 125 years previously.[40] Things began to degenerate from the start of the new British deployment and evolved into fighting "as intense as anything the British Army has seen since Korea," according to a 2006 BBC report. The 1st Battalion of the Rifle Brigade, whose predecessors were the 66th (Berkshire) Regiment, was sent to Helmand and sustained loss of life. The Union Jack above British convoys was interpreted by the Taliban as a good omen. "In Afghanistan we welcome guests," Haji Payeed Mohammed, a local opium producer, observed. "But they should come for one night and leave again in the morning. The British have come here three times and been defeated. This will be the fourth time."[41]

A popular Afghan conspiracy theory was revived with great vigor in Helmand: the British forces are deliberately fouling up the government of Helmand in retaliation for their 1880 defeat.[42] "The British are known as a defeated force here," Wadir Safi, professor at Kabul University, noted. "Now people think they have come to take their revenge." The infusion of British forces in Helmand, he feared, could have a negative impact on the overall counterinsurgency goal. "Every year we celebrate Afghan independence from [the] British.... In school history books and in tales, people are told of the bravery of empty-handed Afghans against the well-equipped British army." As mentioned before, this is the celebration noted above of which

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[40] Richard J. Stacpoole-Ryding, e-mail to author, 21 November 2010. Stacpoole-Ryding is the author of *Maiwand: The Last Stand of the 66th (Berkshire) Regiment in Afghanistan, 1880* (London: History Press, 2008).

[41] "3 Commando: Hunting the Taleban", BBC *Panorama*, 3 December 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/6187660.stm; Coghlan, "British Head for Afghan Land of Hate."

[42] "Afghanistan: All in the Mind," editorial, *Guardian* (UK), 11 June 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jun/11/afghanistan-us-david-cameron-editorial.

Coalition intelligence forces were unaware. The 2007 celebration was a bitter one for Helmandis, who considered it marred by the presence of their old enemy, whom they collectively believe just wanted revenge. "I am not happy about this day," one shopkeeper protested. "We should celebrate when there are no more Brits on our soil. We see them now going around Helmand as if they inherited this land from their fathers."[43]

While divergent theories about the British occupation arise depending on which Helmandi is asked, vindictiveness is almost always at the root of his superstition and inherent Anglo-aversion. GlobalPost correspondent Jean MacKenzie was astonished when an Afghan friend told her with certainty that the British had come to Helmand because they wanted to avenge the blood of their ancestors: "People here have this history in their hearts. They hear all the stories—it is just a few generations, not so very far away. The memory of those times is still alive in the community. People do not think any differently now than they did then." She dismissed it as foolishness until she had heard it 20 or 30 times, from people in all walks of life and from many different socioeconomic strata. "They go crazy when they see the cemetery and just kill any Afghans they can find," another told her. It does not matter that this is nonsense; as perception is often reality, Afghans believe it. "It's not as if it was all that long ago," said yet another, illustrating the lengthy memory of this culture. One Afghan transplant in Australia told the writer, "I almost had a heart attack when news first reached me that British forces would be concentrated in Helmand. This move would not only have given the enemy a terrific propaganda victory, but it also would have raised suspicions among Afghans toward allied intentions."[44]

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[43] Aziz Ahmad Tassal, "British Presence Mars Independence Celebration," Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 27 August 2007, http://iwpr.net/report-news/british-presence-mars-independence-celebration.

[44] Jean MacKenzie, *The Battle for Afghanistan: Militancy and Conflict in Helmand* (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2010), http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/helmand.pdf (first quote); MacKenzie, "130-Year War" (second and third quotes); Abby Saleh, e-mail to author, 24 July 2010 (fourth quote).

Mullah Abdul Salam Hanafi, a chieftain in the Alizai tribe who has openly joined the new Afghan government, expressed his conviction that the United Kingdom was behind all the problems experienced by the people of Helmand Province, telling a journalist in 2010 that "the British are seeking revenge for their defeat at the 1880 Battle of Maiwand during the Second Anglo–Afghan War. The 66th Berkshire Regiment and a number of Indian native regiments were virtually destroyed in a Pashtun victory that also cost thousands of Afghan lives."[45]

Afghans consider the British their quintessential enemy. Calling someone "son of an Anglesi" (Englishman) can start a fight among Pashtuns. Some describe Britons in derogatory terms, including one involving sexual relations with donkeys. One Kabul editorial writer in 2000 recalled "slaughtering the British troops like cattle during the historic Maiwand war."[46] Pashto folklore is replete with tales depicting the English as untrustworthy and hostile to Islam while glorifying the Afghan (primarily Pashtun) defeat of the British in the three famous Anglo–Afghan Wars in 1842, 1880, and 1919, collectively called "The British Invasion" (*De Angreezaano Tee-rai*).

"I almost had a heart attack when news first reached me that British forces would be concentrated in Helmand."

Pashtuns have been quite successful using jingoism by citing previous British humiliations in their efforts to persuade countrymen of their nationalistic responsibilities to again rise up and not allow their vaunted enemy to reoccupy their homeland. "Fight the invader. Your grandfathers are scratching in their graves to get at the grandsons of the British soldiers they fought," one elder earnestly advocated. Pashtunwali (the collective code of honor that binds and

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[45] Former Taliban Commander Alleges UK Supports Taliban, Regrets Joining Government, *Terrorism Monitor* 26 (2010): 2, http://www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_008_55.pdf.

[46] Tassal, "British Presence Mars Independence Celebration"; Walsh, "We'll Beat You Again"; "Kabul Paper Hails Afghanistan's Independence Throughout History," *Kabul Sangar*, August 2000 (quote).

obligates every Pashtun) and *nang* (respect) are the highest order of responsibility for men. Pashtun psychology requires that eventually, one will take his revenge on an enemy, no matter how long it takes. As one Pashto proverb puts it, "If a Pakhtun [*sic*] took his revenge after 100 years, it means that he is still in a hurry." The obligation to join the fight against the British is such that a person is considered a sinner for abandoning the responsibilities of *da'wah* (issuing a summons) and jihad in this regard. Many young men gave heed to this call in large numbers.[47]

The Taliban rejoiced when they heard that the British were coming to Helmand. Exploiting this emotional and psychological trigger, the Taliban have played up local grievances in a well-developed public relations strategy by using war stories from the Second Anglo–Afghan War. One Taliban commander sardonically declared, "Fighting the British feels like unfinished business for many of us." This "old friend" made Taliban recruiting that much easier and fit well into their marketing motif of appealing to nationalistic pride against foreign invaders. "They are children of the same army who were killed and buried in Helmand, and they will soon be reunited with their grandparents," the Taliban's senior commander in Helmand, Mullah Razayar Noorzai, boasted.[48] In anticipation of the arrival of British forces to the area in 2006, the Taliban launched a

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[47] Dan O'Neill, "Wise Words of Past Forgotten In Modern Warfare," *South Wales Echo*, 29 June 2011, http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/columnists/2011/06/29/wise-words-of-past-forgotten-in-modern-warfare-91466-28959525/ (first quote); Raj Wali Shah Khattak, Fida Mohammad, and Richard Lee, "The Pashtun Code of Honour," *Central Asia*, Summer 2009, http://www.asc-centralasia.edu.pk/Issue_65/01_The%20Pashtun_Code_of_Honour.html; Shahmahmood Miakhel, "The Importance of Tribal Structures and Pakhtunwali in Afghanistan," Dawat Independent Media Center, 22 January 2010, http://www.dawatfreemedia.org/english/index.php?mod=article&cat=pashto&article=163 (second quote).

[48] Michael Hughes, "Taliban Use Persuasion Over Force to Fuel Insurgency in Helmand," Examiner.com, 17 September 2010, http://www.examiner.com/afghanistan-headlines-in-national/taliban-use-persuasion-over-force-to-fuel-insurgency-helmand; Peter Tomsen, *The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 174 (first quote); Massoud Ansari, "I Have 600 Suicide Bombers Waiting for Your Soldiers," *London Sunday Telegraph*, 26 March 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/1514028/I-have-600-suicide-bombers-waiting-for-your-soldiers.html (second quote).

propaganda campaign invoking Pashtun history and nationalism. The September 2006 edition of the Taliban publication *Murchal* recounted "the jaw-breaking response to England" in the previous century,[49] and Ayub Khan's memory was invoked in a 2010 poem posted on the official Taliban website Shahamat after the joint Afghan and NATO operations began in Marjah: "There is the sound of sword of Ayub in Marja [*sic*] and death once again embraces Maknaten [*sic*].[50] Our pride has scared the world stiff and that is why it (the enemy) is trembling."[51] A revered tribal elder in 2009 chided, "The bones of the British lying in Maiwand are lonely. We will make sure they have company very soon."[52] Taliban *shabnamah*, commonly referred to as "night letters," are used by jihadists and rebels to remind people of what they can and cannot do, and the associated punishments. The collective historical memory of Maiwand for Afghans has even been used in these *shabnamah* to frame the intellectual argument against popular support of the Hamid Karzai government and Coalition forces.

Mullah Mohammad Omar himself settled down in Maiwand District after the end of the Soviet War, established a madrassa, and formed the initial cadre of the Taliban there in 1994. He released a statement on National Day in 2007 claiming that

> the 88th anniversary of independence comes at a time when Afghanistan once again has returned back to the colonization of those occupying forces, as a result of which our houses are destroyed, our children are orphaned, our brave and courageous combatants either are martyred very ruthlessly or are sent to jail.[53]

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[49] "Sacrifice," *Murchal*, September 2006 (translated from Pashtu), as quoted in *Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words?*, Crisis Group Asia Report No. 158 (Washington, DC: International Crisis Group, 2008), http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/158_taliban_propaganda_winning_the_war_of_words.ashx.

[50] Referring to British envoy to Kabul Sir William Hay Macnaghten, murdered by the Afghans during the First Anglo–Afghan War of 1839–42.

[51] "Afghan Taliban Use Songs, Poetry To Influence Opinion," BBC Monitoring, 23 February 2010.

[52] MacKenzie, "130-Year War."

[53] "Message of the Islamic Emirate in Honour of the 88th Anniversary of Independence in Afghanistan," Al Emarah, 18 August 2007 (translation: AfghanWire), as quoted in *Taliban Propaganda*.

Omar further announced that "once we won the Maiwand war in the nineteenth century and now we will win this second Maiwand war in the twenty-first century."[54]

The Taliban also played upon the long-held fear of British revenge. The positioning of Camp Bastion, the main British base in Afghanistan, close to Maiwand was viewed as an attempt to humble the Pashtuns. The ANA's special forces compound actually occupied the old fort that was manned by the British back in 1880. Mohammed Khwaja, a Taliban recruiter in Helmand, morbidly taunted the British when he heard of their return. "We thought that it would be between us and the U.S., but it looks like the souls of the British buried in the Helmand after they were killed by the Afghan warriors in the nineteenth century may be feeling bored. Now they are calling their grandchildren to be reunited with them in hell."[55]

The Taliban also played upon the long-held fear of British revenge.

Noorzai, excited about his new "fair chance to kill them [the British]," vowed in 2006 to unleash a brigade of 600 suicide bombers against the British army.[56] Undoubtedly, Noorzai evoked the memory of an event that occurred only six months prior to the Maiwand battle. Afghan scholar David Loyn recounts the story of the first recorded suicide attack in Kandahar on 17 January 1880:

> This morning a man who had been allowed to enter the outer gate of the citadel with a load of wood threw it down and attacked Sergeant Miller, of the Engineers, with a knife. A

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[54] Waheedullah Massoud, "Hopes and Fears as NATO Takes Command in South Afghanistan," *e-Ariana*, 27 July 2006, http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/8EFCCF35E298F3A1872571B8003FC5CE?OpenDocument.

[55] Bahlol Lohdi, "Britain's Afghan Quagmire," Anti-War.com, 28 December 2006, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/lohdi.php?articleid=10229; Massoud Ansari, "'Suicide-Ready' Taliban Lie in Wait for Troops," *London Sunday Telegraph*, 19 February 2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/1510909/Suicide-ready-Taliban-lie-in-wait-for-troops.html (quote).

[56] Ansari, "I Have 600 Suicide Bombers."

> Havildar of Sappers standing by hit him with a pickaxe before he had time to strike. The *ghazi* was not well known here, but his dress showed him to be a *talib-ul-ulm* of the country beyond Kelat-o-Chilzai. He was of extremely small frame and very much emaciated.[57]

Nureddin, or Abu Ahmed as he preferred to be called, one of the creators of *Al-Samud*, ("Perseverance" or "Stay Put"), the Taliban's monthly Arabic-language house magazine, added his own personal warning to the current fight: "My father and grandfather told me, 'You have to fight the Russians.' Now I tell my son, 'You must fight the Americans.' The first thing we teach our children is 'Allah.' The second is fighting the Americans. As for the British, they are making the same mistakes they made before—they will experience a second Maiwand." Another writer posted to a jihadist website, "They've forgotten their heavy losses with the brave Afghan Mujahidin of Maiwand." Amir Sultan Tarar, a former Pakistani intelligence officer who trained Mullah Omar, said in 2009, "When people in Helmand heard the British were coming back, the cry went up all over: 'Remember Maiwand? Our old enemy has come to the same area where they were once defeated to take revenge.' Then everyone, Taliban and non-Taliban, joined together. They told me on the phone, 'Don't worry, we'll make sure the Brits don't have an easy time.'"[58]

"The first thing we teach our children is 'Allah.' The second is fighting the Americans."

Perhaps most indicative of the depths of visceral animosity toward the British and deep-seated significance the Battle of Maiwand holds

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[57] David Loyn, *In Afghanistan: Two Hundred Years of British, Russian and American Occupation* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 94.

[58] Robert Fisk, "Glossy New Front in Battle for Hearts and Minds," *Independent* (UK), 2 April 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-glossy-new-front-in-battle-for-hearts-and-minds-1934020.html (first quote); second quote from http://www.medioteka.net/search/video/1/mujahidin+.html; Christina Lamb, "The Taliban Will 'Never be Defeated,'" *Times* (London), 7 June 2009 (third quote).

in the minds of the locals in Helmand is best illustrated by an unverified rumor in the Kandahar area that Anti-Afghanistan Forces (AAF) were digging up bones from British graves for the purpose of grinding the bones into powder and using the remnants in IED construction.[59] ISAF requested an intelligence report to be generated addressing how Islamic law viewed such behavior and the scientific plausibility of this chemically being of value. An intelligence analyst told the author that the resulting report noted the traditional Islamic disallowance of grave defilement and postulated that, while calcium could be used as an ingredient to make bombs, it would seem that the use of the bones for such purposes was more for propaganda than practical reasons. British veterans of the Second Anglo–Afghan War did report, however, that their soldiers' graves "had been dug up and their bones cast out and scattered."[60]

Conclusion

> *Playing chess by telegraph may succeed, but making war and planning a campaign on the Helmand from the cool shades of breezy Shimla (in India) is an experiment which will not, I hope, be repeated.*
>
> British officer, a survivor of Maiwand,
> in a letter home following the battle.[61]

In January 2011, the British withdrew their last soldiers from Helmand, signifying an end to this latest excursion. The British campaigns of the nineteenth century left a deep emotional scar on the Afghan psyche. These memories were based on an amalgamation of emotional histrionics: indigenous xenophobia of foreigners, martial

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[59] Human Terrain System, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Reachback Operations Center, Cultural Knowledge Report, RRC-AF4-09-0005, 18 April 2009.

[60] Ian Knight, *Marching to the Drums: Eyewitness Accounts of War from the Kabul Massacre to the Siege of Mafikeng* (London: Greenhill Books, 1999), 147.

[61] Ashe, *Personal Records of the Kandahar Campaign*, 98.

pride, sketchy history, and collective paranoia, all doctored in a cauldron of religious fundamentalism, transmitted orally as popular history by a mostly illiterate population.

Conflict within and between countries based on tribes, clans, religion, and political ideology is well examined, and the importance and applicability of cultural anthropology to contemporary conflict is understood. General David H. Petraeus, USA, stated in 2009 that, at the outset of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, "we did not have the depth and breadth and sheer number of experts on local circumstances."[62] There are potentially unintended consequences when a country makes decisions without fully understanding the habitus of the locals in security-stability zones. Prior to the first round being fired on an irregular battlefield, policy makers and military forces can increase their ability to preserve and protect the innocent while destroying insurgents if they have an ethnographic understanding of the likely adversaries—*and* the friendlies and neutrals. If the goal is to sway people in our favor, all aspects of the populations must be considered, including the historical nuances of the environment, particularly if that environment includes a Western colonial past.[63] By understanding the power and meaning behind what animates "small" warriors, the character of an insurgency can be assessed in a more rigorous manner, and a granular understanding of the situation at hand and operational repercussions will follow.

International attempts to influence the ethnic groups and tribes of Afghanistan persist. If, as General Sir David J. Richards, ISAF commander in southern Afghanistan, stated, NATO is establishing a "psychological ascendency over the Taliban," then a cultural understanding of the impact of the victory at Maiwand in the minds of the indigenous people is paramount. "Besides fighting terrorism, it is important to know local sensitivities, culture, and traditions, and

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[62] General David H. Petraeus, speaking on 23 September 2009, in Nicholas J. Schlosser and James M. Caiella, eds., *Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2011), 171.

[63] Flynn et al., "Fixing Intel."

we hope that NATO understands that," one Afghan analyst noted. "To take control of a post or a place is temporary. But win hearts and minds, and you win the war. You leave no support for the enemy in public and that is victory."[64]

Wars occur in specific geographic, political, military, and historical contexts. This context shapes the nature, intensity, and route the conflict takes. There is no doubt that the British arrival in Helmand motivated the Taliban. The Afghans'—or more specifically, the Pashtuns'—distrust of the British has enormously helped them draw on historical parallels to gain wider popular support for their cause. The UK government was aware that its past colonial history might be exploited by the Taliban as a propaganda opportunity, despite the fact that London, Washington, and Canberra saw it as a twenty-first century mercy mission. In 2006, the British commander in Helmand, Colonel Gordon Messenger, said, "There is a major difference with our presence here this time. It is that we're here to help them, we're on their side, and they know that." Patrick Mercer, British army veteran and Tory member of Parliament, acknowledged on the 130th anniversary of the Maiwand defeat that "if we are not careful, our enemies will bring up this and make it look like a defeat when it isn't; it is simple military logic. The perception of this is all important."[65]

The British campaigns of the nineteenth century left a deep emotional scar on the Afghan psyche.

The Taliban convinced many that the British were in Helmand Province to avenge Maiwand. Mohammad Hanif Hanifi, a senator from a neighboring province, expressed the commonly held view that

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[64] Massoud, "Hopes and Fears as NATO Takes Command in South Afghanistan."

[65] Tom Newton-Dunn, "Welcome to the Alamo," *Sun* (UK), 25 February 2006, http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/article39207.ece (first quote); Tim Shipman, "UK Troops to Quit Afghan 'Honey Pot': U.S. Forces Take Over Sangin, Where 99 Britons Died," *MailOnline* (UK), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1292555/British-troops-pulled-Sangin-Afghanistans-deadliest-zone.html, 7 July 2010 (second quote).

"their predecessors were defeated in Helmand, and that is why they are creating insecurity in the province." Current Helmand Governor Gulab Mangal explained the "on the ground" impact of this perception: "Security has developed much more rapidly in the areas where the U.S. Marines have taken over than in the districts under the British. This is most likely because with the Americans there is much less historical sensitivity." Haji Abdul Wahid, a construction engineer from Kandahar's Dand District asked, "What did the British do when they were in Helmand? Did they finish the insurgents and now they want to finish insurgents in Kandahar? No, they increased the fighting in the area and killed many ordinary women, men, children, and elders. I think the behavior of British is like they want to take revenge for their soldiers killed in our history. But please tell them not to do this. If you want to burn us, maybe you will be burned with us too in this fire."[66]

Future insurgency strategists need to look to colonial history and pay weighty consideration to its memory when laying out battle plans.

In contemporary entanglements, groups attempting to disrupt the stabilization process will tie Western forces to narratives of colonialism and outside intervention. While Afghanistan is the product of many different episodes of colonialism, the "British Invasion" fosters particularly passionate reactions. From a distribution of forces perspective, when U.S. troops ceded control of the south in 2006, ISAF would have been wiser to deploy any NATO forces other than the British in the heartland of the Taliban; at the time, there were 41 other nations with troops in Afghanistan. As a result, it is almost inconceivable that the British were chosen to be sent there

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[66] Wahidullah Amani, "British Get Blamed for Helmand Security Problems," *ARR*, Issue 271, 7 November 2007, http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allArticles/7AFDCF9C3F37D46A8725738F002AD4E9?OpenDocument (first quote); Hughes, "Taliban Use Persuasion" (second quote); Ben Farmer, "Kandahar: Lawless Centre of Taliban Resurgence," Telegraph (UK) online, 23 April 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/7624943/Kandahar-lawless-centre-of-Taliban-resurgence.html (third quote).

considering the emotional attachments.[67] Author James Fergusson states that, to the Afghan mind, "the return of the Brits in 2006 was an Allah-driven invitation to a punch-up: round four of a conflict between two nations that had been at it intermittently for 170 years," likening it to a "jam-jar to a swarm of wasps."[68]

Future insurgency strategists need to look to colonial history and pay weighty consideration to its memory when laying out battle plans. Granted, options might not always exist due to troop availabilities, but in this case, there were force-deployment alternatives. Ultimately, the British deployment against the Taliban within a Pashtun zone may well have retarded the objective of reducing the Taliban insurgency to a tractable level.

From an information operations perspective, both ISAF and the Karzai government should have addressed this issue after the British were chosen. UK chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Graham E. "Jock" Stirrup, in December 2008 acknowledged that the Taliban "have beaten us to the punch on numerous occasions, and by doing so they've magnified the sense of difficulty and diminished the sense of progress. This is down in part to their skill, and in part to our own failings." Likewise, Amrullah Saleh, former director of Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security, observed that Kabul should have aggressively countered the Taliban's use of Maiwand as a recruitment tool and the British revenge motive but failed to do so.[69]

As previously discussed, the new Afghan army has used Maiwand in its naming of forces and operations, and, interestingly, both President Karzai and ISAF have recalled the battle for other purposes as well. While promoting the new Afghan National Army in 2011, Karzai proclaimed, "We should strive to establish a professional,

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[67] Canada was to oversee Kandahar and Dutch forces moved into Uruzgan. For in-depth understanding of the Parliamentary debates on whether to send the British to Helmand, see *UK Operations in Afghanistan: Thirteenth Report of Session 2006-07* (Great Britain: Parliament, The Stationary Office, 2007).

[68] Fergusson, *Taliban*, 173–74.

[69] Amrullah Saleh, conversation with author, Washington, DC, 8 December 2010.

organized, and credible army which should serve Afghanistan's national interest. . . . All the Afghan forces and people took part in the Maiwand War commanded by Ayub Khan." Similarly, U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Daniel F. Kelley recently adopted the memory of the Maiwand battle to motivate Helmandis to reject the Taliban: "People look to Maiwand and go, 'Hey, we beat the British right here. Why can't we beat the insurgency right here as well?'"[70]

Whitehall had not anticipated the hornets' nest Helmand would prove to be. Initially, Britain sent a task force of only 3,300 troops, of which only 650 were infantry, to pacify Helmand Province, which, as one recent scholar notes, is three times the size of Wales. The ensuing fight, NATO commander in southern Afghanistan General David Richards said, proved to become the fiercest British forces had been involved in since the Korean War.[71]

U.S. Marines assumed tactical control of Helmand Province from British forces in the spring of 2010 and were surprised by the lack of progress in the region. Some U.S. officers suggested that the British were too easy-handed in dealing with the Taliban, with one U.S. general going as far as to say "they had made a mess of things."[72] According to recently released cables, Karzai told U.S. officials that he was puzzled why security in Helmand had deteriorated after the arrival of British troops.[73] If this contention is true, one can only conjecture that perhaps a root of this complacency stemmed from an Anglo desire

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[70] "Afghan Leader Wants Independent, Professional Army," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 9 January 2011 (first quote); Tara Brautigam, "Afghan-Canadian Governor Declares War on the Poppy in Kandahar's 'Wild West'," *Canadian Press*, 27 March 2011, http://www.1310news.com/news/national/article/203553--afghan-canadian-governor-declares-war-on-the-poppy-in-kandahar-s-wild-west (second quote).

[71] "Allies Balk at More Troops for Afghanistan," *Financial Times* (UK), 30 August 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b100648c-384d-11db-ae2c-0000779e2340.html#axzz1SelcIkFe.

[72] Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "A Twofold Conflict in Helmand," *Washington Post*, 4 September 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/03/AR2010090305996.html; Andrew Woodcock, "Wikileaks: British Forces' Afghan Campaign Slammed by U.S. General," *Belfast Telegraph*, 3 December 2010, http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/british-troops-lsquomade-a-mess-of-helmandrsquo-said-us-general-15020214.html#ixzz1GdGVW98y (quote).

[73] Woodcock, "Wikileaks."

not to further fan the flames of 130-year-old embers. It is well known that the British even paid the Taliban in Helmand 300 dollars per month not to attack their forces and provided them identification cards based on their acceptance of this money. Former Taliban commander Mullah Abdol Salam Hanafi told reporters he believed the British did this, in part, because the British desired an opportunity to be in Helmand again, because "the people of Helmand had fought and defeated them . . . [and] their martyrs [are] in Maiwand."[74]

The negative perception of foreigners, which is something Afghans are still confronting today, was shaped by the three Anglo–Afghan Wars, with an emphasis on the second. Afghan memory of Maiwand is that the Pashtuns, outnumbered and outgunned, defeated a better equipped army because of sheer will to succeed and defend the homeland. The impact of the British campaign was so powerful that it forever shaped their idea of foreigners: i.e., if an Afghan refers to an Italian in Pashtu, they will say *Anglesi*, which literally means English; or *Farang*, which derives from the English "foreigner," or the French "frank/franken." The very idea of non-Muslim and non-Central/South Asian foreigners derives from the Anglo–Afghan Wars. The *Anglesis* were everything they knew, and everything they hated. This contributed to the difficult task the British experienced upon their return to Helmand. On the emotional level, Pashtuns really perceive their presence as lethal, and they connect that to Maiwand directly. As a result, winning the hearts and minds of Afghans was even more challenging for the government and its international allies.

Karzai told U.S. officials that he was puzzled why security in Helmand had deteriorated after the arrival of British troops.

The Second Anglo–Afghan War ended with little but vast expenditures in blood and treasure and solidification of future enmity

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[74] "Former Taliban Commander Accuses UK of Supporting Afghan Insurgents," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 June 2010.

on the part of Afghans. Sir Stafford Northcote, during a Parliamentary debate on 25 March 1881, presciently warned his peers—and posterity—of the psychological impact on Afghans if current military endeavors were not concluded successfully: "If you retire from the battlefield, though your success may be fairly set against the defeat of Maiwand, it will remain in the minds of many people of that country and will be impressed on them effectually from without, that though you were successful in action, your strength was insufficient to enable you afterwards to reap the fruits of your success."[75]

Counterinsurgents must seek understanding of historical ethnography prior to engagement in order to calibrate the consequences of future actions and comprehend the fractures of political impasses. The majority of Coalition soldiers and policy makers, like many in the media, neither know the context of the historical present nor the importance of events of the past. More than a century and a quarter after the Battle of Maiwand, however, Pashtun warriors of southern Afghanistan continue to resist, rousing fighters to their cause with deeply embedded memories of an old victory over a historical foe.

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[75] *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. 259 (London: Parliament, 1881), 2032.

Filipino Constabulary soldiers, Manila, Philippine Islands, 1903. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, DC.

The Use of Indigenous Forces in Stability Operations

The Philippine Constabulary, 1901–1917

by Robert G. Angevine

The U.S. military experience in the Philippines following the Spanish–American War has attracted a significant amount of historical attention in recent years as an example of a successful counterinsurgency effort.[1] Accounts of American attempts to pacify the Philippines typically concentrate, however, on the role of the regular Army during the years immediately following the end of the war, particularly the period from 1899 to 1902. This focus on the role of conventional military forces in the immediate aftermath of the war has overshadowed the role played by less traditional organizations, particularly indigenous security forces such as the Philippines Constabulary, in the conduct of long-term stability operations.

The United States created the Constabulary in 1901 as a paramilitary police force to maintain order on behalf of the newly established civil government in the Philippines and to continue the pacification of the archipelago as the regular Army presence in the islands diminished. The Constabulary, which initially consisted of Filipino enlisted men trained and officered by Americans, sought not

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[1] See, for example, Jayson A. Altieri, John A. Cardillo, and William M. Stowe III, "Practical Lessons from the Philippine Insurrection," *Armor*, January–February 2007, 26–34; Robert M. Cassidy, "The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency," *Parameters* 36 (Summer 2006): 47–62; Timothy K. Deady, "Lessons from a Successful Counterinsurgency: The Philippines, 1899–1902," *Parameters* 35 (Spring 2005): 53–68; and, most notably, Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000); and Linn, *The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

only to establish a safe and secure environment, but also to provide humanitarian assistance following natural disasters, to improve transportation and communication, to promote better public health, and to foster good governance by inspecting the municipal police and monitoring the actions of local officials. Over time, the Constabulary transitioned into a largely Filipino-led force that would form the nucleus of the Philippine Army in 1935.

Two factors contributed to the Constabulary's ability to extend government control to remote areas of the islands and gain the acceptance of the Filipino population. First, members of the Constabulary understood the cultural, social, and political geography of the Philippines and negotiated that terrain effectively. Constabulary officers learned local laws, customs, and dialects. The Constabulary's enlisted men served in their native provinces and had close connections to local elites. More broadly, the Constabulary consistently sought to work closely with the local populations and win their allegiance by accommodating local prerogative whenever possible. Second, Constabulary officers and enlisted men were well trained, committed to patrolling the country frequently, and willing to perform a variety of tasks outside their official duties. Their competence, presence in local communities, and provision of important economic and social services helped the Constabulary win over local residents.

The diverse physical and cultural terrain of the Philippines complicated the Constabulary's efforts to stabilize conditions in the islands and help the civilian government maintain order.

The Human Terrain of the Philippines

The diverse physical and cultural terrain of the Philippines complicated the Constabulary's efforts to stabilize conditions in the islands and help the civilian government maintain order. The Philippine archipelago comprises more than 7,000 islands. Three major island


PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
MAP SHOWING
PRINCIPAL MINERAL DISTRICTS
PREPARED BY THE
DIVISION OF MINES
BUREAU OF SCIENCE
LEGEND
Gold
Copper
Iron
Coal
R.R. completed
R.R. partly completed or projected
Lighthouses
FORMOSA
Batan Islands
Aparri
Laoag
Vigan
Tuguegarao
Candon
S. Fernando
Baguio
Bolinao
Dagupan
Cabanatuan
S. Cruz
Tarlac
Baler
Iba
Subic
Manila
Polillo
Mariveles
Cavite
Balayan
Batangas
Calapan
Paluan
Mindoro
Mangarin
Culion
Romblon
Lagonoy
Virac
Tabaco
Sorsogon
Laoang
Calbayog
Catbalogan
Borongan
Samar
Capiz
Panay
Iloilo
Cuyo
San Jose
Siliay
Bacolod
Tacloban
Ormoc
Cebu
Negros
Bohol
Tagbilaran
Surigao
Dumaguete
Puerto Princesa
Depitan
Cagayan
Misamis
Iligan
Tucuran
Malabang
MINDANAO
Cotabato
Davao
Cagayan Sulu
Zamboanga
Jolo
Siasi
Sandakan
BORNEO
Bonday
SULU ARCHIPELAGO
SULU SEA
PALAWAN
SOUTH CHINA SEA
PACIFIC OCEAN
Ordnance Survey Office, Southampton, 1909.

groups stretch from north to south: the Luzon islands, which include the largest and most populous island of Luzon as well as Mindoro and Masbate; the Visayas islands, which include Samar, Leyte, Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Bohol; and the Mindanao islands, which include the island of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, a string of islands extending to Borneo that includes Basilan, Jolo, and Tawi-Tawi.[2]

The population of the Philippines was characterized by tremendous ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity. One Constabulary officer estimated in 1913 that there were 24 or more different ethnic groups in the Philippines, each with a distinctive dialect and set of customs and beliefs. On Luzon alone, there were at least five major ethnic groups, and each spoke a different language. Only a small percentage of the population spoke Spanish. Relations among the various ethnic and tribal groups were often strained and sometimes violent. The most significant division was between the Christian majority and a number of ethno-linguistic groups on the southern islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago that shared a belief in Islam and were called Moros by the Spanish. The Moros had fiercely resisted Spanish attempts to exert greater control of the southern islands.[3]

Elites exercised almost absolute authority in local politics. Outside the capital of Manila, Spanish colonial authorities had operated through tribal chieftains, who were appointed as local governors or village heads. Over time, wealthy landowners and businessmen also occupied positions of local authority and a well-defined elite class, the principales, emerged. The principales provided peasants with land, seed, and protection. In exchange, they received a portion of the peasants' crops and their public deference. The antipathy engendered among the principales by the excesses of the Spanish colonial police in the late nineteenth century may have

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[2] Linn, *Philippine War*, 15.

[3] R. A. Duckworth-Ford, "The Philippine Constabulary and Its Work," 28 May 1913, in folder 300-09.1, Philippine Constabulary, John R. White Papers, University of Oregon Libraries, 4 (hereafter White Papers); Linn, *Philippine War*, 15; Anthony James Joes, "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines, 1898–1954," in Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, eds., *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2008), 37–38.

helped erode the legitimacy of Spain's colonial state.[4] Winning the support of the principales without becoming subservient to them was an important challenge for the Constabulary.

Creating the Constabulary

When U.S. forces captured Filipino nationalist leader Emilio Aguinaldo in March 1901, most of his supporters complied with his wishes and laid down their arms. A number of Aguinaldo's lieutenants refused his appeal, however, and continued to fight. By the summer of 1901, the United States was faced with the twin challenges of organizing a government for the portions of the Philippines it controlled and pacifying the remaining pockets of resistance, principally the southwestern Luzon provinces of Batangas, Laguna, and Tayabas and the island of Samar.[5]

The population of the Philippines was characterized by tremendous ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity.

One of the first steps the United States took to stabilize the situation in the Philippines was to establish civil government. On 16 March 1900, President William McKinley formed the Second Philippine Commission, with William Howard Taft as chairman, and granted it legislative and limited executive powers to administer the islands. On 4 July 1901, the military nominally transferred all executive powers to the commission, thus giving birth to civil government and making Taft the first civil governor.[6]

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[4] Linn, *Philippine War*, 15–16; Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 41–42, 173; Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 32.

[5] Brian McAllister Linn, *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 13–14; Russell Roth, *Muddy Glory: America's "Indian Wars" in the Philippines, 1899–1935* (West Hanover, MA.: Christopher Publishing House, 1981), 19.

[6] John M. Gates, *Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 236.

The actual transfer of power occurred more gradually. The new government lacked sufficient personnel experienced in civil affairs to execute all of its responsibilities immediately. Army officers, however, had organized municipal governments, built roads, established schools, and even served as provincial governors and revenue collectors. Consequently, notes historian John M. Gates, "the military continued to play a key role in the development of civil government at the local level."[7]

The Philippines Constabulary was "the armed police force of the Government of the Philippine Islands."

Nor did the establishment of civil government eliminate the need for an armed force to maintain order and continue pacification efforts. The Army had broken the back of the Filipino resistance and captured Aguinaldo and his leadership, but the insurrection had degenerated into guerrilla warfare that could drag on indefinitely, with scores of minor chieftains still in the field. There were also a number of criminal bands that had become more powerful during the lawlessness of insurrection.[8]

Although some provinces, such as Batangas and Laguna on Luzon, remained rebellious, the civilian authorities in the Philippines insisted that the colonial government assume the lead in pacification efforts. Secretary of War Elihu Root agreed. He was trying to transform the Army into a modern military organization and wanted to focus the service's attention on improving training and discipline for conventional military duties.[9] Moreover, the Army was hard pressed to support the continued presence of large numbers of troops in the Philippines. The capture of Aguinaldo and the formation of a civil government had convinced the American public that the native uprisings in the Philippines were over and U.S. troops could come home. The president's,

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[7] Ibid., 239; Linn, *Philippine War*, 200–203.

[8] John R. White, *Bullets and Bolos: Fifteen Years in the Philippine Islands* (New York: Century Co., 1928), 7–8.

[9] Linn, *Philippine War*, 217–19.

and by extension the Army's, ability to ask Congress for significant funds for operations in the Philippines was limited. The civilian government, for its part, derived its legitimacy from the widespread belief that organized resistance was over. Admitting otherwise by maintaining a significant military force in the Philippines would have undermined the new government.[10]

To provide the civilian government with a force capable of ensuring law and order and conducting limited irregular warfare, Luke E. Wright, the chairman of the Commerce, Franchises, and Police and Prisons Committee of the Philippine Commission, proposed the creation of a native police force trained and officered by Americans. Wright modeled his proposal on approaches employed by the British in India and Burma, the Dutch in Java, and the Canadians in their Northwest Territory. After overcoming some initial opposition, Wright proposed passage of Organic Act 175, which recommended creation of an insular police force. The ordinance was approved on 18 July 1901, and the Philippine Constabulary was established on 8 August 1901.[11]

On 4 July 1902, President Theodore Roosevelt officially declared peace in the Philippines and thanked the U.S. Army for its service in the islands. As responsibility for the enforcement of law and order shifted to the civil government and the Philippine Constabulary, the number of regular Army troops in the Philippines rapidly declined from its high of nearly 70,000 in 1900 to 27,000 in 1902. The passage of the Brigandage Act (November 1902), which defined any resistance to U.S. authority as banditry rather than insurrection, further increased the responsibilities of the Constabulary.[12]

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[10] Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 25; Margarita R. Cojuangco, "Islands in Turmoil," in Cojuangco, ed., *Konstable: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, 1901–1991* (Manila: ABoCan, 1991), 5.

[11] Cojuangco, "Islands in Turmoil," 6–7; Don P. Branson, "Recollections of Service in the Philippine Constabulary, 1907–1915," Don P. Branson Papers, University of Oregon Libraries, 91; Colonel W. C. Rivers, "The Philippines Constabulary," n.d., in Philippine Constabulary folder, box 6—Manuscript Material, White Papers; Heath Twichell, Jr., *Allen: The Biography of an Army Officer, 1859–1930* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974), 118.

[12] Victor Hurley, "Blades in the Sun: The Story of Captain Leonard Furlong," unpublished manuscript in the Leonard Furlong Papers, part of the Charles W. Furlong Papers, University of Oregon Libraries, 58; Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 26; Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 155.

According to the organization's official manual, the Philippines Constabulary was "the armed police force of the Government of the Philippine Islands." Its purpose was "maintaining order, preventing and detecting crime, and enforcing the laws." The Constabulary was also charged with preventing and suppressing brigandage, unlawful assemblies, riots, and insurrections. The unofficial duties of the Constabulary were far more wide-ranging. The Constabulary opened trails and mapped uncharted areas of the Philippines; built bridges, marketplaces, schoolhouses, docks, culverts, and churches; worked closely with the Bureau of Health to eradicate cholera and with the Bureau of Agriculture in its campaigns against rinderpest and surra; inspected the police force of every municipality; set up telephone poles and telegraph lines; provided medical assistance to local residents; and headed relief work during floods, typhoons, and volcano eruptions.[13]

Manning the Constabulary

Once the Constabulary was created, it had to be manned. Initially, officers were drawn from the ranks of the volunteer forces that had served in the Philippines, a few natives, and handpicked noncommissioned officers (NCOs) from the regular Army. Most of the officers had significant military experience but lacked police training and were unfamiliar with the Philippines and its people. After 1905, most new officers came from military colleges and universities in the United States.[14] These later officer candidates had even less preparation for service in the Philippines than their predecessors.

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[13] Hurley, "Blades in the Sun," 139–40, 182; Former American Officer, "What of the Original Philippine Constabulary," *Philippine Magazine*, n.d., in PC Officers Association folder, Maurice P. Alger Papers, University of Oregon Libraries (hereafter Alger Papers); H. H. Bandholtz, *Annual Report of the Director of the Constabulary for the Fiscal Year 1910* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1910), 4; General Order 17, 20 February 1903, Philippine Constabulary General Orders 1903 folder, Alger Papers; Cojuangco, "Islands in Turmoil," 19; Rene R. Cruz, "The Colonial Experience," in Conjuangco, *Konstable*, 47; Branson, "Recollections of Service," 48.

[14] Branson, "Recollections of Service," 90; Twichell, *Allen*, 121; Cojuangco, "Islands in Turmoil," 10; Branson, "Recollections of Service," 90.

One newly commissioned lieutenant noted that he and his fellow new officers had read some articles and War Department reports and had looked up the Philippines on a map, but he confessed that "we have almost no idea of what it will be like." Another admitted that he was not even sure what the Constabulary's duties were and accepted his commission largely because jobs were scarce at the time.[15]

Given the Constabulary's broad duties, its officers were expected to possess a wide range of skills. As one senior Constabulary officer noted, "An officer must be somewhat of a sanitary engineer; he must know something of road building and bridge building; he must certainly have a practical knowledge of criminal law and procedure. If, in addition, he is a veterinarian, doctor, druggist, forester, and architect, he will have opportunity to apply that knowledge." Another observed that a Constabulary officer "had to know not only military work, but he also had to be an executive as well as a tactful politician." It was also important to know the penal code and to speak Spanish or a local dialect.[16]

Given the Constabulary's broad duties, its officers were expected to possess a wide range of skills.

To ensure that its officers had at least some of the technical knowledge and cultural awareness necessary to perform the myriad tasks expected of them, the Constabulary established a training program in 1904. The purpose of the program was to provide new officers with basic knowledge of Constabulary regulations, Philippine laws, and language. Officer training was formalized and expanded with the creation of the Constabulary School in February 1905. New officers attended a three-month course before assignment to work in the provinces. Students were tested on the Constabulary manual, provincial

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[15] Maurice P. Alger, "A Young, Very Young, 'Teniente' Arrives," Recollections, Mementos, and Photos folder, Alger Papers, 1 (quote); Branson, "Recollections of Service," 17–18.

[16] Duckworth-Ford quoted in Hurley, "Blades in the Sun," 103 (first quote); McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 87; Branson, "Recollections of Service," 23 (second quote).

and municipal code, the acts of the Philippine Commission, drill regulations, topography, administration papers, Philippine and constitutional law, Spanish, and general fitness. The school's curriculum was expanded to six months in 1914 and nine months in 1916.[17]

The Constabulary also placed significant emphasis on learning native dialects. The first Constabulary chief, Henry T. Allen, demanded that all officers undergo a crash course in local law, customs, and dialects. In 1911, Constabulary Chief Harry H. Bandholtz declared that he would not recommend for promotion any officer in any grade who was not qualified in a dialect. Although Maurice Alger was viewed as one of the best young officers in the Constabulary, his superiors believed that "he will not be of his highest value until he is able to speak a native dialect."[18] In 1912, the director of the Southern Luzon Constabulary District reported that 11 American officers had qualified in a local dialect during the past year. Of the 28 American line officers in the district, 13 were qualified in a dialect. Of the 15 who were not qualified, 9 had been in the service for less than a year. Officers who were not natives of the Philippines who could prove their ability to speak and read one of the local native dialects received an extra 50 dollars per year. Similarly, officers who were natives of the Philippines who were able to read and speak English also received an extra 50 dollars per year.[19]

The Constabulary's enlisted men, who were native Filipinos, contributed at least as much to its ability to effectively negotiate the

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[17] Cruz, "Colonial Experience," 43–44; Graduation Record of Maurice P. Alger, 9 December 1908, Military Record folder, Alger Papers; H. H. Bandholtz, *Annual Report of the Director of the Constabulary for the Fiscal Year 1910* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1910), 14.

[18] Cojuangco, "Islands in Turmoil," 10; Official Circular 13, 25 March 1911, Vol. 5: Circulars, 1911, Henry Gilsheuser Papers, University of Oregon Libraries (hereafter Gilsheuser Papers); Summary of all records of Lt. M. P. Alger, 28 August 1916, Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary, Military Record folder, Alger Papers (quote).

[19] Director of the District George D. Long, "Report for the year ended June 30, 1912, District of Southern Luzon," in official letter to Executive Inspector, Philippine Constabulary, 30 July 1912, Correspondence July–September 1912 folder, roll 5, frame 5, Harry H. Bandholtz Papers, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan (hereafter Bandholtz Papers); *Manual for the Philippines Constabulary, 1907* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1907), 83.

cultural terrain of the Philippines as its officers did. Allen had employed native soldiers while commanding a battalion of the 43d Infantry on Leyte in 1900 and believed strongly in the efficacy of native troops.[20] "In chasing down robber bands," he argued, "the native troops, well-officered by American and native leaders, are unquestionably more efficient than American troops." Support for Allen's views came from an Army lieutenant serving in the Philippines, who observed in 1909 that "scouts and constabulary know more about the people and country than regular troops, and they can often show you some new wrinkles in getting information, scouting, etc." Among the native troops who enlisted were a number of former insurgents, who Allen valued for their knowledge of the country and the enemy, including the locations of safe houses and meeting places.[21]

The Constabulary's enlisted men, who were native Filipinos, contributed at least as much to its ability to effectively negotiate the cultural terrain of the Philippines as its officers did.

In contrast to the Spanish practice of employing native paramilitaries far from their homes in areas inhabited by their traditional tribal enemies, the Constabulary typically drew its troops from the provinces in which they served. The goal, according to Wright, was to eliminate the usual "disposition to abuse and oppression . . . when native military . . . forces were operating among . . . hereditary enemies." Moreover, as one Constabulary officer later explained, "Men enlisted in the same province in which they serve have the advantage of knowing the trails and roads, and of speaking the local dialect." The Constabulary ensured that its troops had the support of local elites by requiring each recruit to have recommendations from at least two prominent men in his community, but it prevented them from becoming

[20] Twichell, *Allen*, 111; Cojuangco, "Islands in Turmoil," 11 (Allen quote).

[21] Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 48 (quote); Cojuangco, "Islands in Turmoil," 12.

instruments of the elite, as the municipal police were, by placing them under the leadership of American officers.[22]

Enlisted men were trained within their companies. A general order issued in November 1903 established schools of instruction at all Constabulary posts. Noncommissioned officers and NCO candidates received two hours per week of instruction. They learned the regulations and general orders of the Constabulary, the penal code and criminal procedures of the Philippines, and basic map skills. They also studied the making of complaints, swearing out of warrants, questioning of witnesses, and taking of depositions. Other enlisted men received one hour of instruction per week on "those things that every soldier should know, such as orders, regulations, pay, allowances, various kinds of courts, penalties for offenses, etc." Troops also had one hour of drill per day. The Constabulary manual stressed that "thorough instruction of the noncommissioned officers and men in their various duties is most essential."[23]

Constabulary Operations

The Constabulary operated as small, highly dispersed units in squad strength, sometimes in platoon strength, and very rarely with a company of 50 men. The small unit size allowed these forces to cover more territory with an equivalent number of troops. Bandholtz argued that a Constabulary force could cover four to five times more territory than an equivalent number of regular Army troops. A company's area of responsibility typically included 10 to 20 towns and 100,000 to 200,000 people.[24]

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[22] General Order 17, 20 February 1903, Philippine Constabulary General Orders 1903 folder, Alger Papers; Twichell, *Allen*, 123; Wright quoted in McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 87; Col. W.C. Rivers, "The Philippines Constabulary," n.d., in Philippine Constabulary folder, box 6—Manuscript Material, White Papers (second quote).

[23] General Order 82, 21 November 1903, Philippine Constabulary General Orders 1903 folder, Alger Papers (first quote); *Manual for the Philippines Constabulary, 1907*, 122.

[24] Hurley, "Blades in the Sun," 119; H. H. Bandholtz to A. C. Carson, 18 April 1907, Correspondence Apr. 11–20, 1907 folder, roll 2, frame 36, Bandholtz Papers; Branson, "Recollections of Service," 91.

In the event of major unrest, the dispersion and small size of Constabulary units could leave them vulnerable to attack. When occasional violence escalated into full-scale armed insurrection on Samar in 1904, the scattered, small Constabulary detachments were frequently overwhelmed by large groups of Pulajans, lawless bands that may have originally been inspired by hopes of religious salvation but had shifted their focus to sowing terror and reaping plunder. Unable to restore order, the Constabulary turned over responsibility for eastern Samar and much of the interior to the Army. By the summer of 1906, Samar was largely pacified and back under colonial control.[25]

To head off such unrest before it began, the Constabulary emphasized the importance of patrolling. Constabulary units were urged to "patrol the country in their vicinity by night and day as frequently as the strength of the force will allow." One of the principal objectives of the patrols was to interact closely with the population in order to obtain information. Even in relatively calm areas, constant patrolling allowed the Constabulary to "keep in touch with the people and to prevent the entry of or the formation of ladrone bands."[26] As the 1907 Constabulary manual noted, "Constabulary inspectors who are most successful in keeping in close touch with the people and in convincing them that the Constabulary is their friend, desiring to protect and aid the community, often render great service in helping to allay local disagreements or to smooth away differences that might give rise to disturbance." The manual added that taking an interest in local affairs and even assisting in local celebrations might enable the officers to make friends who would assist them greatly in their work.[27]

The Constabulary typically drew its troops from the provinces in which they served.

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[25] Ronald G. Machoian, *William Harding Carter and the American Army: A Soldier's Story* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 205–7; Brian McAllister Linn, "The Pulahan Campaign: A Study in U.S. Pacification," *War in History* 6 (January 1999): 56–57; Roth, *Muddy Glory*, 100–110.

[26] *Manual for the Philippines Constabulary, 1907,* 125.

[27] Ibid., 23.

The Constabulary also sought to maintain good relations with local civil authorities. In the Constabulary's early years, the relationship was often strained and sometimes hostile. The native provincial governors were often suspicious of the Constabulary, which they felt was established to watch over them. Part of the problem was that Constabulary officers had charged friends of several leading politicians with supporting the insurgents.[28] Members of the Constabulary were warned in a general order in 1903 that "any disrespect or discourtesy offered by an officer or enlisted man of the Constabulary toward the governor of the province shall be cause for instant dismissal from the corps." Similarly, senior inspectors were reminded in the 1907 Constabulary manual that "their ability to work in harmony with provincial governors and other officials measures in a great degree their success." They were expected to recognize the authority of the provincial governor and treat him accordingly. The directors of the Constabulary's five geographic districts were supposed to visit each station in their district at least twice a year and consult with provincial governors and other officials in order to monitor Constabulary conduct in the district.[29]

Most of the municipal police forces were at best inefficient and at worst corrupt.

It was not just relations between the Constabulary and provincial governors that were strained. One of the Constabulary's duties was to inspect the municipal police. However, most of the municipal police forces were at best inefficient and at worst corrupt. Bandholtz observed in 1904 that "I have not yet seen a police force of any town in which I could have confidence." The law allowed the municipal police to be discharged every two years, at the same time the term of the municipal presidente expired. The new presidente would discharge all the police

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[28] Hurley, "Blades in the Sun," 104; W. C. Rivers, "The Philippines Constabulary," n.d., in Philippine Constabulary folder, box 6–Manuscript Material, White Papers; Cruz, "Colonial Experience," 38, 46, 49.

[29] General Order 11, Philippine Constabulary, 6 February 1903, Philippine Constabulary General Orders 1903 folder, Alger Papers; *Manual for the Philippines Constabulary, 1907*, 12, 18.

and replace them with new political appointees. The municipal police thus became part of the local official's political machine. Despite the problems inherent in this arrangement, Constabulary officers were instructed to restrain their criticism in order to avoid alienating the local population. According to the Constabulary manual, their attitude toward municipal officials was to be one of "helpful assistance and not of criticism or faultfinding." They were urged to "convince local officials that the Constabulary is the friend and protector of the people and not a harsh and unsympathetic critic."[30]

The Constabulary's accommodation of local prerogative was critical to its success. The McKinley administration, the civilian government in the Philippines, and the Army recognized that they could not govern a country as large and diverse as the Philippines without substantial cooperation from the Filipinos. Establishing the conditions under which the Filipinos could largely govern themselves was essential.[31]

Intelligence

The Constabulary's intelligence collection efforts also emphasized understanding the local culture and working closely with the local population in order to obtain the most useful information. In 1903, the chief of the Constabulary was directed to organize an information division. The information division reported directly to the chief and consisted of one superintendent, three inspectors, two detectives, one draftsman, and one clerk.[32] The head of the division was supposed to keep the chief advised regarding events in Manila and the provinces

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[30] H. H. Bandholtz to W. C. Rivers, 27 May 1904, Correspondence Jan.–June 1904 folder, roll 1, frame 35, Bandholtz Papers; Bandholtz, *Annual Report of the Director of the Constabulary for the Fiscal Year 1910* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1910), 10; *Manual for the Philippines Constabulary, 1907*, 20. Eligibility for the office of presidente (mayor) was limited to local elites, including local chieftains, large landowners, and prominent businessmen, who exercised near total control over local politics. See Linn, *Philippine War*, 15–16.

[31] Linn, *Philippine War,* 197; Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 173.

[32] General Order 18, 25 February 1903, Philippine Constabulary General Orders 1903 folder, Alger Papers. For a detailed and highly critical discussion of the Constabulary's Information Division, see McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, 175–205.

and on the best methods for handling any situations that arose. The officers selected to serve in the information division were chosen for their character and intelligence, their proficiency in the native languages, their knowledge of the country and its inhabitants, and their tact and judgment. In 1905, Allen wanted an officer who spoke Tagalog and was familiar with the Philippines to head the information section. He chose Captain Rafael C. Crame, a native Filipino who had fought with Aguinaldo against the Spanish and joined the Constabulary in 1902.[33]

Although the Constabulary had an information division, primary responsibility for the collection of intelligence rested with Constabulary units in the field. Senior inspectors and other officers were expected to obtain information through their own efforts and those of their men. Officers' reports from the field often commented on topics such as popular sentiment, the local economy, the progress of the local schools, the ethnic composition of particular towns, and the names of local headmen.[34] The key to obtaining useful intelligence, the Constabulary leadership stressed, was winning the confidence and respect of the people. As the Constabulary manual noted, "In dealing with outlawry or fanaticism, the best information and results can be obtained from the people themselves. This is especially true when the officers or agents have made efforts to acquaint themselves with the locality and the ideas of those who live in it."[35]

The Moro Campaign

The Constabulary's contribution to the long campaign against the Moros of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago from 1903 to 1913 highlighted how effective it could be when it capitalized on its

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[33] Cruz, "Colonial Experience," 29–30.

[34] See, for example, Noe C. Killian, "Narrative Report for February 1915," 28 February 1915; Killian, "Report on the Islands of Tapul and Lugas," 15 July 1915; and Killian, "Report on the Island of Balabac, Palawan," 30 October 1915, folder 3—Miscellaneous, Noe C. Killian Papers, University of Oregon Libraries.

[35] *Manual for the Philippines Constabulary, 1907*, 26, 76.

knowledge of the cultural terrain to perform a policing function. In contrast to the military functions it performed in other campaigns on Luzon and in the Visayas, the Constabulary largely performed civil functions in the Moro campaign. It supported the regular Army, which assumed the lead role.

During the Philippine–American War, the U.S. Army signed the Bates Agreement with the Sultan of Sulu, Jamalul Kiram II, guaranteeing him tribute payments and noninterference with Moro laws and customs in exchange for recognition of U.S. sovereignty. In June 1903, however, the Philippine Commission abrogated the treaty by creating Moro Province and establishing a military government. The offices of the provincial government and much of the legislative council were filled by military personnel. The commander of the Army's Department of Mindanao also served as provincial governor. In August 1903, Major General Leonard Wood was appointed to both positions.[36]

The key to obtaining useful intelligence, the Constabulary leadership stressed, was winning the confidence and respect of the people.

The Moros' social practices and customs were alien to most Americans. Moro society was based on Islam, piracy, slavery, and polygamy.[37] Even more troubling to U.S. military and civilian leaders in the Philippines were the Moros' constant attacks on U.S. soldiers and coastal towns. Soon after taking office, Wood concluded that the answer to what he called the "Moro Problem" was to buy off the local chiefs; eradicate what he viewed as the barbaric social institutions of the Moros, including clan government, slavery, blood feuds, and Islamic law; and impose American institutions.[38]

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[36] Kramer, *Blood of Government*, 217; Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 37.

[37] Joes, "Counterinsurgency in the Philippines," 38.

[38] Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 35–37.

As part of the effort to extend American institutions into Moro Province, a new Constabulary district that encompassed Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago was established on 1 October 1903. To man the posts in the new district, the Constabulary decided to enlist Moros. The Army, however, had strong reservations about using Moros for Constabulary service in the district. Previous experiments with recruiting native soldiers had used troops from one district to police or fight tribesmen of another district. Critics feared that Moros would be unwilling to fight other Moros and would desert with their weapons. Despite the Army's reservations, Moros comprised one-third of the Constabulary troops in Mindanao within a few months. Initially, they were allowed to comprise only a portion of each company. Eventually, however, the Constabulary formed entire companies of Moros.[39]

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Incorporating Moros required the Constabulary to adapt to local culture. All pork products were banished from the mess. Moro troops replaced the standard uniform hat with a fez so the brim would not interfere with their daily prayers. Constabulary leaders also learned to rotate the officers of Moro units less frequently because the Moros became extremely devoted to officers who had demonstrated fairness and bravery.[40]

Meanwhile, Wood chose to confront the Moros and force them to civilize or be punished. His aggressive policies culminated at Bud Dajo on the island of Jolo in March 1905. Hundreds of Moros had fled to the 2,000-foot volcanic crater in order to escape American attempts to impose a head tax. Wood dispatched 800 soldiers and constables to disperse the Moros. The American assault resulted in

[39] Hurley, "Blades in the Sun," 61, 70–72; Coats, "Philippine Constabulary," 354–55.

[40] Hurley, "Blades in the Sun," 72.

hundreds of dead Filipino men, women, and children, as well as combined Army and Constabulary losses of 21 dead and 73 wounded. Wood was roundly criticized for his aggressive actions, but his close friend President Roosevelt protected him by promoting him out of the governorship to command the Army's Philippines Division in Manila, where he became a supporter of a more conciliatory policy toward the Moros.[41]

Wood's successor, Tasker H. Bliss, abandoned the practice of escalating minor skirmishes into full-fledged military campaigns. Instead, he treated the raiding, murder, and tribal feuds common to the province as criminal actions. Bliss relied on the Constabulary to hunt down all but the most dangerous outlaws and kept his soldiers as a reserve. Army troops only engaged in hostilities if a vital principle was at stake or if a chief acted in defiance of U.S. authority. The provincial government scrupulously honored Moro rights. It also encouraged commercial development by holding fairs, promoting native industry, and contracting locally for labor and products. The result of Bliss's policies was significant progress in the pacification of the Moros.[42]

John J. Pershing succeeded Bliss and maintained his benevolent policies. Pershing strengthened provincial finances, improved roads, held trade fairs, increased school attendance, reformed sanitation, and improved public health. Like Bliss, he typically treated Moro violence as criminal behavior and used the Constabulary for all but the most serious cases.

The exception to Pershing's policy of accommodation was his decision in 1911 to enforce a 1908 order allowing the governor to disarm Moros throughout the province. Pershing believed that disarmament was the only way to end the recurring blood feuds, outlawry, and tribal skirmishes that troubled the region. Pershing's decision created problems for the Constabulary. Bandholtz

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[41] Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 38–39.

[42] Ibid., 39–40.

complained in 1911 that "the disarmament of the Moros is simply raising hell." Men from the Constabulary's Moro companies were deserting with their weapons. After collecting more than 300 guns on the island of Tawi-Tawi, the senior Constabulary officer on the island reported, "I feel as one does after having an aching tooth pulled and I think the Moros feel the same."[43]

Disarmament also prompted a rebellion in Jolo, where 1,300 Moros fortified the old battlefield at Bud Dajo. After convincing the majority to abandon the position, Pershing was able to outlast the rest by surrounding them with 1,000 troops and ribbons of barbed wire and withstanding more than a week of assaults. The result was only 12 Moros killed and 3 Americans wounded.[44]

Bliss relied on the Constabulary to hunt down all but the most dangerous outlaws and kept his soldiers as a reserve.

In 1913, Moros on Sulu again rebelled against efforts to disarm them. As many as 10,000 fled to the mountain of Bud Bagsak in January but agreed to surrender their weapons after Pershing surrounded them and negotiated for months. When Moros again fled to Bud Bagsak in June, Pershing responded by dispatching a number of scout companies to the scene. The scouts assaulted the Moro fortifications on Bud Bagsak with massed rifle and artillery fire. More than 500 Moros were killed, as many as 10 percent of whom were women and children. Pershing lost 15 dead and 25 wounded.[45]

The Battle of Bud Bagsak marked the end of the Moro campaigns. Pershing had been urging the withdrawal of the regulars, but Major General J. Franklin Bell, the commanding general of the

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[43] H. H. Bandholtz to W. C. Rivers, 28 October 1911, Correspondence Oct. 16–31, 1911 folder, roll 4, frame 51, Bandholtz Papers (first quote); Extract of letter from Lt. V. L. Whitney, 15 January 1912, in Mark L. Hersey to Henry Gilsheuser, 13 Feb. 1912, Vol. 1: Correspondence, Personal, 1912–14, Gilsheuser Papers (second quote).

[44] Linn, *Guardians of Empire*, 40–41.

[45] Ibid., 41.

Philippines Division, had resisted until the Jolo Moros were pacified. After the battle, Bell complied with Pershing's request. The scouts were concentrated at four battalion-strength posts located to allow them to move rapidly throughout Moro Province in the event of further outbreaks. An uneasy peace was established, although piracy, homicides, and tribal wars still occurred.[46]

Filipinization of the Constabulary

As the civil government of the Philippines established its authority throughout the archipelago, it sought to gradually increase the percentages of native officers and enlisted troops in the Constabulary. By 1910, nearly a fourth of the Constabulary's officers were Filipino.[47] In November 1911, a Filipino assemblyman introduced a bill to give all future appointments and promotions in the Constabulary to Filipinos. Several Manila newspapers endorsed the idea. Bandholtz doubted the measure would succeed. He claimed that the Constabulary had already made "every reasonable and sensible effort" to recruit qualified young Filipinos for service in the Constabulary. He also felt confident that no American governor-general would agree to such a proposition.[48]

Francis Burton Harrison, the American governor-general of the Philippines from 1913 to 1921, promoted Filipinization of all government functions, including the Constabulary, during his tenure. In 1913, the civil government passed a law that allowed American officials and government employees with no less than ten years of service to retire with one year's pay if they applied within three months of the law's passage. If they failed to apply, there was nothing to prevent their dismissal without notice or pay. The result was a mass

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[46] Ibid., 41–42.

[47] William C. Rivers, "The Philippines Constabulary," *Manila Times,* 4 February 2010, reprinted in J. Rod Farinas, ed., *Philippine Constabulary: 75 Years of Service to the Nation* (Manila: Constable & INP Journal, 1976), 34.

[48] H. H. Bandholtz to Manuel Quezon, 11 November 1911, Correspondence Nov. 1–15, 1911 folder, roll 4, frame 33, Bandholtz Papers.

exodus of Americans from the Philippine government. The number of American officials shrank from 3,000 to 600, and the number of Filipino officials increased to more than 13,000. The Constabulary was hit particularly hard. James G. Harbord, chief of the Constabulary in 1913, also helped more Filipinos become officers by introducing a system for the promotion of enlisted men to officer rank.[49]

The Filipinization of the Constabulary accelerated during World War I. In 1916, Harrison reduced officers' base pay and ended the bonuses for dialect knowledge, longevity, and special services. Many American officers left the Constabulary to join the Army, set up their own businesses, or work for American companies. More Filipinos filled the officer positions vacated by the Americans. The process culminated in December 1917 when Constabulary Chief William C. Rivers left for the war and Rafael Crame, the former head of the Constabulary's intelligence division, became the first Filipino Constabulary chief.[50]

Conclusion

The Philippine Constabulary's success in the conduct of stability operations was attributable, at least in part, to its awareness of the diverse cultures and languages of the Philippines and its emphasis on frequent interaction with the Filipino people. The Constabulary's use of troops, including former insurgents, who were natives of the province in which they served and its respect for their culture won it favor and confidence among local populations and facilitated the collection of intelligence. The emphasis placed on language skills, respect for local authority, and knowledge of national, provincial, and municipal laws among the officer corps fostered amicable relations with local elites and improved the ability of the Constabulary to work

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[49] White, *Bullets and Bolos*, ix–x; Cruz, "Colonial Experience," 51.

[50] Ibid., 52–53; Filemon V. Tutay, "Birth and the Vivid Past," in Farinas, *Philippine Constabulary*, 13; Cruz, "Colonial Experience," 55–56, 60.

closely with the native population. The Constabulary's frequent patrols reinforced the close bond its units had established with the people. As a result, the Constabulary was able to minimize many disagreements that might have led to civil unrest and to obtain better intelligence regarding the principal threats to law and order.

The Constabulary's recognition of the broad range of tasks required during stability operations and its willingness to perform them also increased its effectiveness. Constabulary officers were presumed to possess a wide variety of skills. Although the Constabulary was not always able to attract such polymaths, the expectation helped to foster a mind-set that increased the organization's effectiveness. In many locations throughout the Philippine archipelago, the Constabulary was the only governmental presence for miles. Had it refused to assume responsibility for some of the tasks the local population expected the government to perform, it may have weakened the people's faith in the government and strengthened the hand of insurgents and outlaws. In the end, the Constabulary's ability to overcome the organizational challenges it faced while economically and effectively performing the varied tasks demanded of it enabled the U.S. military to reduce its presence in the islands.

The Philippine Constabulary's success in the conduct of stability operations was attributable, at least in part, to its awareness of the diverse cultures and languages of the Philippines and its emphasis on frequent interaction with the Filipino people.

Hundreds of opposition Muslim Brotherhood supporters alleging electoral fraud chant during a standoff with riot police outside a counting center in the Shubra el-Kheima neighborhood of Cairo, Egypt, 28 November 2010. Photo by Ben Curtis, Associated Press.

"Translating the Promise of Political Change"

Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns on U.S. Policy in the Wake of the Arab Spring

edited by Kenneth H. Williams

The so-called Arab Spring, which spread from Tunisia across North Africa and the Middle East in the early months of 2011, accelerated change in the region to a rate that hardly anyone imagined. Analysts had long noted the seeds of discontent, but protests had not made much previous impact against the repressive regimes of that area.[1]

As governments fell in Tunisia, Egypt, and ultimately Libya, with others teetering in the balance, countries across the world—the United States perhaps foremost among them—were faced with the daunting and unexpected task of providing support for the transitional governments and economies emerging in the evolving Middle East. What follows is a concise outline of U.S. policy as of late 2011 as presented by Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns at the Middle East Institute's 65th Annual Conference.[2]

Burns became deputy secretary of state in July 2011 following three years as undersecretary for political affairs. Previous postings included ambassador to Russia (2005–2008), assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs (2001–2005), and ambassador to Jordan (1998–2001). He entered the foreign service in 1982 and holds the rank of career ambassador. Williams is senior editor for *Marine Corps University Journal* and Marine Corps University Press. The journal thanks the Middle East Institute for agreeing to publication of this presentation.

[1] For the views of leading analysts just before the Arab Spring ignited, see Kenneth H. Williams, ed., *Rethinking a Middle East in Transition* (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press with the Middle East Institute, 2011), which documents the proceedings of the Middle East Institute's 64th Annual Meeting in November 2010. For an overview of events in the first months of 2011 and an examination of the motives driving the upheaval, see Robin Wright, *Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Arab World* (Simon & Schuster, 2011). See also the Middle East Institute's 2011 online Viewpoints series on *Revolution and Political Transformation in the Middle East*—Vol. 1: *Agents of Change* (http://www.mei.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=jybrSIM2jXA%3d&tabid=541); Vol. 2: *Government Action and Response* (http://www.mei.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=iWxucTAIkf4%3d&tabid=541); and Vol. 3: *Outcomes and Prospects* (http://www.mei.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=QnpP0vmNOX8%3d&tabid=541).

[2] William J. Burns, "Banquet Address," Middle East Institute's 65th Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, 16 November 2011. Aside from introductory remarks, the presentation is presented in full.

Since I was last here [in 2009], we have all witnessed a wave of historic change in the Middle East, as consequential in its own way as the changes that emerged so dramatically out of Europe and Eurasia two decades ago. Two thousand eleven has been a truly transformative year. It brought us the first successful popular revolution in the region in over 30 years, and then the second and the third. As the brave citizens of Syria are showing every day, another revolution is underway, aimed firmly at realizing the long-suppressed universal rights of the Syrian people.

It all began when a desperate Tunisian street vendor, tired of too many indignities and too many lost hopes, set fire to himself and sparked a revolution still burning across an entire region.[3] That single act, at once tragic and noble, symbolic and catalytic, has brought the Middle East to a moment of profound transformation, one that was unimaginable a quarter-century ago. Importantly, it is a transformation truly driven from within. It is not about us, as tempting as it often is for Americans to think in those self-absorbed terms.

The status quo between Palestinians and Israelis remains combustible and unsteady.

But even if it is not about us, it certainly matters enormously to us. A workable American strategy for a rapidly changing Middle East has several dimensions. In recent months, both President [Barack H.] Obama and Secretary [of State Hillary Rodham] Clinton have spoken about this in detail. I'd like to focus on two of these dimensions: first, support for a greater political openness in the democratic transitions unfolding in different ways across the region; and second, support for the economic openness and opportunities which are critical to the success of those transitions.

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[3] The self-immolation of fruit vendor Mohamed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010 is widely cited as igniting the revolution in Tunisia that spread quickly to other countries. Wright, *Rock the Casbah*, 15–21; Marc Fisher, "In Tunisia, Act of One Fruit Vendor Unleashes Wave of Revolution through Arab World," *Washington Post*, 26 March 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-tunisia-act-of-one-fruit-vendor-sparks-wave-of-revolution-through-arab-world/2011/03/16/AFjfsueB_story.html.

I fully recognize that no American strategy can succeed based on those two elements of policy alone. We face growing challenges in regional security, particularly given the threat posed by Iran's nuclear ambitions and serial interference in the affairs of its neighbors. There has never been a moment when strengthening our security cooperation with our GCC partners[4] mattered more, nor is there a more important task before us than continuing to build a strong partnership with Iraq and encouraging its reintegration into the Arab world.

Similarly, we simply cannot afford to neglect the unfinished business of Middle East peace. Some people saw the absence of banners criticizing Israel or supporting Palestine among the hundreds of thousands of Egyptians gathered in [Cairo's] Tahrir Square at the beginning of the year as a sign that the Palestinian issue no longer mattered so much. Nothing could be further from the truth. The status quo between Palestinians and Israelis remains combustible and unsteady, and it is no more sustainable than the sclerotic political systems that have crumbled in recent months. As President Obama said in his speech at the State Department on May 19, we all know that a lasting peace will involve two states for two peoples: Israel as a Jewish state and the homeland for the Jewish people, and the state of Palestine as the homeland for the Palestinian people. The core issues of the conflict must be negotiated, but the basis of those negotiations is clear: a viable Palestine, a secure Israel. The president also offered key principles to guide negotiations on borders and security.[5]

I wish I could say that we have made substantial progress toward realizing the president's vision. I cannot. As all of you in this knowledgeable and committed audience know, the reality is a lot more sobering. Despite exhaustive efforts, we are not where we need to be.

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[4] The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, better known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consists of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait. See GCC's official site: http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng/.

[5] Barack H. Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa," U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 19 May 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa.

But we are determined to press ahead with our partners in the Quartet and in the region.[6] The president laid out a vision with the elements for successful negotiations, and it is crucial for the parties to respond and use what he offered to break the impasse.

If the pursuit of regional security and Arab–Israeli peace remain core ingredients in our strategy, the past year has driven home another truth: that stability is not a static phenomenon and that support for democratic transitions and economic opportunity are also extraordinarily important ingredients in successful American strategy. Two years ago, I spoke here at MEI [Middle East Institute] about the dangerous shortage of economic and political hope confronting the region.[7] I recall that with an ample dose of humility. It was hardly a novel thought, and anyone who had read the Arab Human Development Reports over the past decade could see the tinder that was accumulating,[8] even if it was very hard to see what exactly would happen when a spark was lit. The truth is that this is a moment of enormous promise for peoples and societies who for far too long have known far too little freedom, far too little opportunity, and far too little dignity. It is a moment of great possibility for American policy, a moment when home-grown, people-driven protests have repudiated al-Qaeda's false narrative that change can only come through violence and extremism.

But it is also a moment of considerable risk, because there is nothing automatic or preordained about the success of such transitions. As much as it is in our interests to support the emergence of more transparent, more accountable, and more responsive governments that will ultimately make stronger and more stable partners, the journey is likely to be very complicated, very uneven,

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[6] The Quartet on the Middle East, often referred to simply as the Quartet, includes the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia.

[7] William J. Burns, "2009 Annual Conference Keynote Address," Middle East Institute 63d Annual Conference, Washington, DC, 10 November 2009, http://www.mei.edu/Events/EventArchive/TranscriptsSummaries/tabid/507/ctl/Detail/mid/1644/xmid/813/xmfid/22/Default.aspx.

[8] See United Nations Development Programme, "Arab Human Development Reports," http://www.arab-hdr.org/.

and at times very unsettling. We must accept that democratic transitions are often messy and unpredictable. We must accept democratic choices and engage with all emerging political forces committed to pluralism and nonviolence, and we must reject the old dictators' conceit that we really have only two choices: the autocrats you know, or the Islamic extremists you fear.

Furthermore, we must accept that we are going to have differences with democratic governments, sometimes significant differences. Governments that are accountable to their populations are going to behave differently than autocratic governments did. It won't always be easy to work with them. We also know from transitions in other regions that there is a danger of authoritarian retrenchment or violent instability, especially if economic stagnation persists and newly elected leaders don't produce practical improvements in people's daily lives. For these reasons, we have a huge stake in the success of postrevolutionary transitions where citizens are seeking inclusive political systems where none existed before.

Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya hold the potential to shepherd the Middle East into a new era.

Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya hold the potential to shepherd the Middle East into a new era, one defined by free, fair, and credible elections, vibrant civil societies, and accountable and effective institutions. Tunisia, which lit the spark of the new Arab awakening, held the first truly democratic elections in its history last month. Whereas a turnout of 70 percent in the Arab world once signaled a rigged election, today it is a sign of Tunisians' determination to chart their own future.

We too are invested. This year, America has committed about $60 million to offer expertise to political parties and poll watchers, strengthen civil society, and promote freedom of expression. The remarkably peaceful and orderly conduct of these elections and the embrace of multiparty democracy just 10 months after [Tunisian

President Zine el-Abidine] Ben Ali fled the country have set the standard for the rest of the region.

We will begin to see a breadth and diversity of political groupings as the people of the region are allowed to give voice to their views. As Secretary Clinton said last week in a speech at the National Democratic Institute [NDI], we will judge the parties of the region not on what they call themselves, but on what they do.[9] We should be less concerned about which parties win or lose than about whether democracy wins or loses in the process. Democracy means more than elections. It means the protection of fundamental freedoms and equal rights for all, including women and minorities.

In Egypt, we must not underestimate the importance and the consequence of the transition underway there. Long the cultural and political leader of the Arab world, Egypt can offer another powerful signal when it begins its own elections later this month. But successful parliamentary elections, for all the effort they require, are only a first step. It is important in Egypt's own self-interest to see competitive presidential elections follow soon after; steps to consolidate an elected civilian-led government; and the continued emergence of a strong and independent Egyptian civil society to safeguard the principles of democracy.

We continue to urge leaders and citizens in the region… to stay ahead of the wave of demand for democratic change.

Libya too has won its liberty. This victory over tyranny is a testament not only to the bravery and determination of the Libyan people, but also to the undeniable potential of international partnership and American leadership. But much work remains. After contending with [former Libyan leader Muammar] Qaddafi himself, Libya must now contend with Qaddafi's legacy of eviscerating Libyan

[9] Hillary Rodham Clinton, "Keynote Address at the National Democratic Institute's 2011 Democracy Awards Dinner," Andrew W. Mellon Auditorium, Washington, DC, 7 November 2011, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/11/176750.htm.

institutions and civil society. The TNC [Transitional National Council] has made good progress in its brief existence, against overwhelming odds. We look forward to welcoming a new interim government and to close and continued cooperation as they consolidate authority, secure dangerous weapons, and focus attention on the difficult task of building a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic future for Libya.

That so many Egyptians, Tunisians, and Libyans risked their lives to demand freedom, dignity, and opportunity inspired us all. But these are not the only nations where citizens calling for universal rights and more responsive governments demand our support. We continue to urge leaders and citizens in the region, in Jordan and Morocco for example, to stay ahead of the wave of demand for democratic change. We are closely following Jordan's efforts to enact additional reforms, including new laws on elections and political parties, and we will continue to support Jordanians as they navigate their own path to the dignity, political openness, and economic opportunity that they so richly deserve. As Morocco prepares for elections next week, we are looking to the government and a new parliament to implement promised reforms and to show the Moroccan people that political institutions can change their lives for the better.

In countries where protests have emerged but change is uncertain, such as Bahrain, we will continue to urge swift and meaningful political reform, dialogue between government and opposition, and respect for human rights, including the right to peaceful protest. As Secretary Clinton said at NDI, meaningful reform and equal treatment for all Bahrainis are in Bahrain's interest, in the region's interest, and in ours, while endless unrest benefits Iran and extremists. We will continue to urge the Bahraini government to undertake concrete reforms and uphold the principles of justice and accountability.

In Yemen, we have spent months working with our Arab and European partners to persuade President [Ali Abdullah] Saleh to follow through on his promise to transfer power and allow a

democratic transition to begin. It is time—in fact, it is long past time—for him to live up to his commitments.

In Syria, President [Bashar al] Assad is attempting to hold back the future at the point of a gun. This strategy may work for a time, costing the lives of more innocent Syrians, but it cannot prevail. The United States has condemned the atrocities committed by the Syrian regime and, working with the international community, continues to step up pressure, including a robust and growing set of sanctions and coordinated diplomatic efforts to further isolate the regime. It is no small thing that the Arab League decided a few days ago to suspend Syria's membership or that some of Assad's neighbors are starting to call on him to step aside.[10] This makes it abundantly clear that the Assad regime's brutality can no longer be tolerated.

In Syria, President Assad is attempting to hold back the future at the point of a gun.

For all Iran's tough talk, nowhere is the disconnect between rulers and ruled greater than it is today in Iran. Nobody is fooled by Iran's hypocrisy, when Iran pays lip service to democracy elsewhere then brutally denies it to the Iranian people.

A second element of our strategy that I want to highlight this evening, partnering to create broader economic opportunity, flows out of our conviction that political transitions cannot succeed without confidence in a better economic future. As President Obama has said, just as democratic revolutions can be triggered by a lack of individual opportunity, successful democratic transitions depend upon an expansion of growth and broad-based prosperity. Revitalized, open, and regionally integrated economies are key to ensuring the success of democratic institutions.

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[10] By the end of November, the Arab League went even further, imposing economic sanctions against Syria. Neil MacFarquhar and Nada Bakri, "Arab League Approves Syrian Sanctions," *New York Times*, 28 November 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/world/middleeast/arab-league-prepares-to-vote-on-syrian-sanctions.html.

In the short term, we need to be clear-eyed: the unrest and uncertainty that have accompanied the new Arab awakening have strained already-difficult economic circumstances. But there is a far deeper deficit, the one outlined starkly in the Arab Human Development Reports year after year. We need to nurture economic systems where talent is cultivated and rewarded, where entrepreneurs and innovators are unleashed to enrich their societies, where nations can trade with their neighbors and compete in the global economy.

To support the democratic transitions underway in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, we have created a new office, the special coordinator for Middle East Transitions, to organize all the tools at our disposal to help them succeed.[11] We are working with Congress to ensure that even in difficult times at home, we get the resources we need to seize the strategic opportunity that the new Arab awakening represents. The enterprise funds we are seeking to establish in Egypt and Tunisia and the ongoing work of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation will help people in the region access capital to start and grow their own businesses, providing hope for a better economic future.[12]

The unrest and uncertainty that have accompanied the new Arab awakening have strained already-difficult economic circumstances.

In the end, this is about translating the promise of political change into real, palpable hope for a better economic future and about giving

[11] The U.S. Department of State opened the Middle East Transitions Office in September 2011 under the leadership of Ambassador William B. Taylor Jr., who holds the title of special coordinator. For more on the operations of the office, see Taylor, "Special Briefing on U.S. Support for the Democratic Transitions Underway in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya," U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, 3 November 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/176653.htm.

[12] The Overseas Private Investment Corporation, an agency of the U.S. government, in July 2011 approved $500 million in lending to small businesses in Egypt and Jordan and in November 2011 authorized $150 million for investment in sectors such as consumer foods, manufacturing, and financial services for the Middle East and North Africa. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, "OPIC Board Approves $150 Million for Investment in Egypt and MENA Region," 9 November 2011, http://www.opic.gov/news/press-releases/2009/pr110911.

new leaders the tailwind they need to navigate bumpy transitions amid high expectations. Conventional assistance, no matter how generous, will not be enough, nor will a short-term approach. We must help these countries empower individuals to make their own economic as well as political choices and grow a real middle class.

The revolutions in countries like Egypt and Tunisia were driven by a firm rejection of a past where prosperity was confined to a narrow segment of society. As we saw in Egypt, economic liberalization that fails to achieve inclusive growth is a false path to prosperity. That is why we are working with Congress to achieve $1 billion in debt swaps, so that the Egyptian government can use those resources for the benefit of the Egyptian people, especially the younger generation.

This kind of genuine economic reform process will require that leaders have visions compelling enough to drive what will be tough and sometimes unpopular choices. That is why we and our European partners must think and act more ambitiously to open up trade and investment across the region. Through the G8's Deauville Partnership, we are mobilizing the world's leading economies and international lending institutions to support the transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya as well as the major reforms underway in Jordan and Morocco.[13] As G8 president next year, we will keep high-level attention on these transitions and on the imperative of regional economic integration across the Middle East and North Africa.

As President Obama noted in May, if you take out oil exports, this entire region of over 400 million people exports roughly the same amount as Switzerland. That is exactly why the president has

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[13] The G8 leaders announced the Deauville Partnership during the summit at that location in May 2011. The G8 finance ministers outlined the economic portion of the partnership in September. See G8, "The Deauville Partnership: Helping the Arab Countries in Their Transition to Free and Democratic Societies," Deauville, France, 27 May 2011, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/2011-partnership-en.html; G8, "Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Springs," Deauville, France, 27 May 2011, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2011deauville/2011-arabsprings-en.html; G8, "Deauville Partnership Finance Ministers' Meeting: Communiqué," Marseilles, France, 10 September 2011, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm110910-deauville-en.html.

proposed a new Middle East trade and investment partnership. Just as European Union membership served as an incentive for reform in Central and Eastern Europe 20 years ago, so should the vision of prosperous, thriving, integrated economies and the promise of market access to the United States and Europe create a powerful impetus for reform in the Middle East and North Africa.

We should be ambitious and creative in how we promote trade and investment, just as we have been in the Asia–Pacific region, where we are launching the Trans-Pacific Partnership.[14] This groundbreaking initiative will bring together the United States, eight Asia–Pacific and Western Hemisphere partners, and eventually future members in a single trading community, using the highest standards. In the Middle East, we need to seize the moment of opportunity ahead of us and find ways to leverage the promise of market access and regional integration to encourage countries to raise their standards and pursue policies that drive growth that benefits all their people.

This is about translating the promise of political change into real, palpable hope for a better economic future.

Let me add that promoting trade and investment is not simply the work of governments. Many in this room have an opportunity to play an important role in this story, making the investments that allow the citizens of the region to achieve a better life for their children and their children's children. This means supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, investing in education, and launching initiatives to empower the region's youth with the knowledge and skills they need to make it in a global economy.

Our own American Revolution, over 230 years old, remains a work in progress. Certainly the same can be said of the new Arab awakening. It is not over in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, where there is

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[14] See Office of the United States Trade Representative, "Trans-Pacific Partnership," http://www.ustr.gov/tpp.

very hard work ahead in building democratic institutions and economic hope. It is not over in Syria, where the Assad regime may be able to delay changes with brutality but where there is no going back to the way things were. And it is not over in Bahrain, Morocco, and Jordan, where genuine reform is the only path for progress.

The struggles ahead in the Middle East are deeply complicated and fertile ground for pessimism. It is a fact that the Middle East is a place where pessimists rarely lack for either company or validation. But I remain convinced of the continuing value of the kind of stubborn, clear-eyed optimism and vision that have animated American diplomacy in the Middle East at its best moments in the past.

Whenever I talk about optimism, one of my Russian friends invariably reminds me of one of the many typically fatalistic Russian definitions of an optimist: someone who thinks that tomorrow will be better than the day after. I actually have something a little different in mind. I think tomorrow is going to be very tough, as people across the Middle East struggle with transitions that are only just beginning and challenges that will outlive the regimes that perpetuated them. But if we can approach the historic challenges before us—from Arab–Israeli peace, to regional security, to promoting economic opportunity, to supporting democratic transitions—in a thoughtful and integrated way, if we can mobilize a sense of common cause and initiative among partners in the region and around the world, then the day after tomorrow and the years that lie ahead can offer a great deal of promise, and a great deal will be possible.

We should be ambitious and creative in how we promote trade and investment.

Book Reviews



Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. By Matthew Kroenig. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010. Pp. xii, 233. $68.50 cloth; $22.95 paper.)

Why would any state help another gain nuclear weapons? The question is a vexing one. On the whole, both hawks and doves agree that increasing the number of nuclear states, especially in already volatile regions, is not a good idea. Western logic generally dictates that the threat of nuclear warfare is universal, and thus increasing said threat, by increasing the number of nuclear-armed states, is a strategic detriment, not a benefit.

And yet, over the course of the last 50 years, many states have either sanctioned or directly assisted other nations with the development of technology necessary to fabricate nuclear arms (plutonium reprocessing, uranium enrichment, and warhead design). To pick a few salient examples: the Soviet Union (USSR) helped China in the late 1950s; France aided Israel in the early 1960s; Italy assisted Iraq in the late 1970s; China helped both Pakistan and Iran throughout the 1980s; and Pakistan (through the infamous Khan network) aided Iran, North Korea, and Libya through the 1990s and early 2000s. Why?

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Matthew Kroenig, a professor of government at Georgetown University who recently served as a special adviser on nonproliferation in the

Office of the Secretary of Defense, grapples with this question directly in *Exporting the Bomb*. Kroenig's theory, which he backs up with pages and pages of empirical calculations, attempts to reframe the strategic assumptions regarding the benefits of proliferation for chronic offenders like France, China, and Pakistan. The argument is, at its core, rooted in an observation that is striking in its simplicity and plausibility: "the spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states" (p. 3). It is a strategic argument for why weak states promote the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other weak states: because it destabilizes the hegemony of stronger states.

The argument has a bracing freshness to it in its attempt to generalize a lot of historical proliferation behavior into a predictive model, and in its avoidance of seeing these proliferation activities as the result of bad apples, economic incentives (selling the bomb), or vaguely contingent circumstances. The bulk of the book is taken up with working through the argument, developing an empirical model for it, and discussing how it stacks up against other theories of proliferation when compared both quantitatively, through the use of the model, and qualitatively, through the use of historical case studies.

As a historian with an inherent distrust of using quantitative models to explain political choices, I was most interested in Kroenig's qualitative, historical chapters. His approach seems to work exceptionally well for explaining why Gaullist France aided Israel in the acquisition of the bomb in the 1960s. At least in this case, the archival record appears to bear out the logic of the argument. For France, a nuclear Israel would be an asset, as it would serve to complicate the goals of Egypt, which France saw as a direct security threat because of Egyptian actions in Algeria. Giving Israel the bomb would serve to reorient Middle Eastern politics in a way that would not adversely affect France's interests, even if it did affect the interests of both the United States and the USSR, which lobbied extensively to avoid Israeli proliferation. (The United States only acquiesced to the idea of an Israeli bomb after it was a done deal.)

It is easy to see why power-projecting states like the United States and the USSR thought that proliferation in areas of their interest was not necessarily a positive thing, even if they did, at times, help their allies on the road to the bomb. The USSR assisted China very materially with its nuclear program until the Sino–Soviet split. And though Kroenig does not warrant this as an act of proliferation under his specific definition of "sensitive

nuclear assistance," the United States essentially accepted that British participation in the Manhattan Project would lead to a bomb for the United Kingdom in the postwar period.

But it is not clear that Kroenig's argument holds true in every instance of proliferation he surveys. With France, the availability of opened archives makes it much easier to determine who made the relevant decisions and why they made them. The other main case study considered by Kroenig, that of Pakistan and the A. Q. Khan network, is much murkier. While there is much to indicate that very high levels of the Pakistani state were involved to some degree in permitting, if not outright encouraging, Khan's proliferation activities, it is unclear whether ascribing some sort of strategic logic to the overall activity is the most useful form of analysis. (And with a state as relatively fractured as Pakistan, it is unclear whose strategic logic one ought to be paying the most attention to.) Looking at relative gross domestic products may not reveal the underlying economic motivations in such a situation, for what is a small amount of money for a state may be very enticing for individuals. This sort of nuance is not accommodated for in Kroenig's model, which tends to abstract states as uniform, consistent entities. Was there a clear strategic logic to the Pakistani proliferation? And whose logic matters the most in such a situation? We cannot know at this point. We may never know for sure. Kroenig's loose way of getting out of such uncertainties is to argue that his model is "probabilistic," but it is hard to understand what is meant by that in terms of real-world activity.

These reservations aside, Kroenig's book is no doubt a valuable contribution to the literature and should be read widely by those interested in the history, present, and future of nuclear proliferation. His argument provides a new approach to the strategic discussions of proliferation that have been raging for some decades now, a way out of the narrow dichotomy of the "more is better" versus "more is worse" debate. American policy makers in particular should take note that appeals to universal dangers may seem like a welcome change to those who would benefit from destabilization of the old order.



A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. By Artemy M. Kalinovsky. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011. Pp. 304. $27.95 cloth.)

Artemy Kalinovsky's *A Long Goodbye* makes for fascinating reading, not only for scholars, but also for anyone interested in the consequences of invading and occupying Afghanistan. Kalinovksy, a faculty member at the University of Amsterdam, uses both Afghan and Russian sources (along with a few American ones) to draw a detailed picture of the Soviet decision making that resulted in the 1979–89 intervention in Afghanistan. He also provides a number of photographs and maps that help to elucidate his arguments. Wisely, he does not push the parallels to the current American involvement because they emerge all too obviously from the history that he recounts.

MARY E. SAROTTE, professor of history and of international relations at the University of Southern California, is author of *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (2009). She is a former White House Fellow and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was supposed to be quick—Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko thought it would be over "in a month" (p. 24)—but instead it lasted a decade. The author estimates that it killed 13,000 Soviet troops and injured 40,000 more. The Afghan losses can only be estimated; Kalinovsky believes that they were between 800,000 and 1.2 million. He also argues that, as a result of the tragedy, the Soviet leadership lost its desire to conduct

further interventions. Kalinovsky finds that the main beneficiaries of this change of heart were the Poles; as he shows, deliberations in Moscow over whether to send Soviet troops to Poland were influenced by the experience of the Red Army in Afghanistan (p. 213).

Kalinovsky begins by investigating the question of why Moscow invaded in the first place, in the interest of supporting communist leaders in Kabul. He concludes that it was mainly due to a hunger for legitimization: "by the 1970s, aid to the Third World had become a key component of the Soviet bloc's legitimacy as a superpower" (p. 12). It was also an expression, he finds, of the high level of Cold War tensions in the 1980s. Once there, Moscow's main goals should sound familiar to anyone cognizant of American involvement in Afghanistan: to fight the enemy while training and developing indigenous government and security organizations, and to make these organizations "attractive to the population" (p. 13).

The author's main interest, however, is in the question of why it took the Soviet Union so long to bring its troops home, since evidence shows that Moscow quickly realized that it had gotten into a "quagmire" (p. 2). Kalinovsky believes that the most important reason Moscow hung on in Afghanistan was that political leaders feared undermining their own status and believed that "the USSR could help stabilize Afghanistan . . . and make the Kabul government more acceptable to its people" (p. 2). Interestingly, Kalinovsky points out one factor that did not determine Moscow's actions, namely the demoralizing effects of the Afghan conflict on the troops. Such effects were of no importance to Soviet political leaders, the author finds; they "played little if any role in their decision making on the war" (p. 45).

It was Mikhail Gorbachev who would finally realize a withdrawal. Gorbachev felt that "Moscow could no longer support leaders unconditionally, so long as they professed loyalty to the Soviet model" (p. 79). By 1986, there was a consensus in Soviet leadership that "involvement in Afghanistan had to end" (p. 93). Gorbachev would sign the Geneva Accords in April 1988, which would ultimately lead to the conclusion of Soviet withdrawal in February 1989.

One of the most interesting aspects of the book is the author's summary of what followed Soviet withdrawal. As a former American undersecretary of state, Michael Armacost, put it, "we weren't that interested in what happened in Afghanistan internally. We were just interested in getting the Russians out" (p. 188). Washington's lack of interest in developments in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal, and the consequences of funding mujahideen fighters such as Osama bin Laden, look deeply unfortunate in light of what followed on 11 September 2001.

Kalinovsky makes clear that his focus is on Soviet decision making, but one wishes that he had explored the thinking of Afghan leaders a bit more. Also, his statement that the Cold War was a contest between "two ways of life and two paths to modernity" (p. 10) seems odd in a book that looks at a Cold War group not interested in either the Soviet or the American path, namely political Islamists. These are minor quibbles with a very solid work of history, however. Kalinovsky's book skillfully shows how interventions "become tragedies not only for the civilians caught up in conflict and the soldiers sent to fight, but also for the intervening powers themselves" (p. 227).



Strengthening Peace in Post-Civil War States: Transforming Spoilers into Stakeholders. Edited by Matthew Hoddie and Caroline A. Hartzell. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Pp. x, 246. $90.00 cloth; $29.00 paper; $29.00 e-book.)

Scholars and policy makers are increasingly recognizing that ending civil wars is only half the battle; maintaining peace is an equal or even greater challenge. This new book, edited by Matthew Hoddie and Caroline A. Hartzell, examines this crucial task of creating long-lasting, self-perpetuating peace following civil war violence. The volume criticizes the overemphasis in the field on examining the use and effectiveness of international peacekeepers. Its contributors argue that we should instead focus our attention on the various ways by which third-party actors can change the perceptions of actors and foster a sense that peace serves their interests—or changing potential spoilers into stakeholders. The volume focuses on two specific, complementary tactics that third parties can use: restructuring institutions, and soft intervention.

ANDREW G. REITER is assistant professor of politics at Mount Holyoke College and has published on post-authoritarian and post-conflict politics. He is coauthor (with Leigh A. Payne and Tricia D. Olsen) of *Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy* (2010).

The first half of the book examines the process of restructuring institutions, which the editors define as "replacing failed governing structures with new state institutions intended to enhance the security of citizens" (p. 2). Here the argument is that scholars and policy makers are over reliant on democratization, particularly on holding elections, following civil war. The focus on political participation, they contend, is problematic and can lead to renewed conflict. The book thus purports to emphasize alternative approaches to institutional reform.

The reader expects discussions of other types of institutions that should be reformed, tactics that third parties can use to reform them, and other types of policy-relevant empirical analyses. But in this area, the volume disappoints. Chapter 2, by David Lake, is a solely theoretical chapter, arguing for a new "relational" approach to conceptualizing legitimacy in postconflict environments, and a reorientation away from elections and toward reforms that focus on security and order. Yet no specific institutions or types of reforms are discussed, nor are any empirical examples presented.

Chapter 3, by Philip Roeder, draws on conflicts in the Caucasus states, including Chechnya, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, to argue that unitary states are more stable than segmented states following conflict. Moreover, third parties should be cautious of funding civil society in the latter cases. But it is unclear how widely applicable the findings from this one region are, and other than this larger decision to unite or devolve power, there is little discussion of any actual institutional reform processes.

Shaheen Mozaffar's essay focuses on electoral reform (despite the volume's contention that the discussion needs to be shifted away from this area), arguing that the same types of proportional representational voting systems succeeded in some cases and failed in others. Mozaffar then makes the obvious argument that electoral reform does not happen in a vacuum and depends on a variety of other factors related to the conflict and post-conflict environment. The first half of the book thus concludes with very little for scholars and policy makers to take away. There are few conclusions to draw from this section other than a sense that reforming institutions is difficult, must take context into consideration, and should be done with an eye toward creating a peace that actors feel is superior to alternative options.

The second half of the book is devoted to "soft" intervention, defined as "actions by third parties that are intended to foster peace through means falling short of the use of military force" (p. 2). Chapter 6, by Daniel Rothchild and Nikolas Emmanuel, sets out to define and explain soft intervention. The authors delineate three main types, all of which can be conceptualized as a reward for complying with the peace process or a punishment for noncompliance, including funding/sanctions; the granting or stripping of recognition and authority; and the extension or removal of cultural and political protections. In generating this typology, the authors draw on the efforts of the United States in several postconflict African cases.

In chapter 7, Terrence Lyons follows up with an examination of efforts to transform militarized actors into political parties, drawing (briefly) on

seven recent conflicts from around the world. Yet this chapter is mostly about elections (again), and there is very little third-party intervention discussed at all—indeed, in many cases, the armed groups seem to take the initiative themselves to reform into viable political parties.

Michael Foley, in chapter 9, examines the effectiveness of soft intervention tactics on civil society in three separate conflicts: El Salvador, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Northern Ireland. He concludes that international leverage is limited in affecting civil society actors and can, at times, be harmful. The chapter thus concludes with a set of six guidelines for policy makers attempting to influence civil society actors following conflict.

Finally, Susan Woodward, in chapter 9, examines the use of soft intervention to change the interests of key economic actors. She argues that there is often little support for such endeavors, due to an over reliance on the standard package of liberalizing economic policies following conflict, but that third parties can effectively target private, local entrepreneurs and make a difference on the ground.

Overall, this edited volume does well to move the debate away from efforts to secure peace to the necessity of maintaining peace in civil war areas. The extended discussion and typology of soft intervention is also an important contribution to the field, and several chapters illustrate and analyze specific soft intervention strategies that will be of interest to the policy community. In general, however, the book falls short in many areas. Readers will be frustrated by the lack of connection between chapters and between the two sections of the book. Moreover, the volume's lack of specificity provides the reader with very little sense of what institutions should actually be reformed and how, or what policies by third-party actors should actually look like. This book represents a good initial step into exploring postconflict peace-building policies, but it will need to be built upon by other scholars to be very useful for practitioners on the ground.



Democracy's Arsenal: Creating a Twenty-First-Century Defense Industry. By Jacques S. Gansler. (Cambridge, MA: MIT University Press, 2011. Pp. xiv, 432. $45.00 cloth; $32.00 e-book.)

Procurement policy directly affects anyone in combat: it decides whether or not what is desperately needed is provided either on time, or ever. Unfortunately, this book does not offer either a readable explanation of the subject or a usable recipe for fixing what everyone knows is badly broken.

In repetitious form, the book lays out a series of platitudes:

- ❏ The current system is badly broken and unaffordable.
- ❏ We are fighting a new kind of war, so the platform-centric model for which U.S. defense procurement was designed is obsolete.
- ❏ The future belongs to network-centric methods and tactics (i.e., software is dominant over hardware).
- ❏ Our "generals" (including admirals) continue to design the defense system to fight the "last war."
- ❏ Globalization can and should solve many of our problems, and a lot of European systems are both less expensive than ours and a lot better.
- ❏ We spend far too much seeking the last possible bit of performance (i.e., we gold-plate).
- ❏ Congress is ham-handed in its endless interventions.

History of any sort (before about 1990) is apparently irrelevant, and even the history that is cited is treated superficially. (What can history possibly tell us about the new kind of twenty-first-century warfare?)

Buried in this book is what amounts to a PhD thesis describing all the ways in which the U.S. Department of Defense buys hardware and services, but I doubt that many readers will persevere long enough to get to it. Errors of detail make this reviewer wonder whether any of the description is particularly accurate. The book uses numerous quotations, often to reiterate rather obvious points. The reader can decide whether some of them are from real authorities, or only from pop-culture ones. We get the distinct impression that the author cannot distinguish policy statements from what actually happens. More generally, the author seems ignorant of the substance of defense procurement, which is what matters to those who use its products in combat.

The book's descriptions of foreign defense industries, to contrast them with U.S. policy and practice, seem to exemplify the combination of credulity when reading government policy statements and inattention to realities. For example, the rosy description of the Chinese defense industry omits the Cultural Revolution, whose echoes still affect current production. Thus the author is apparently unaware that the Chinese are still unable to make advanced fighter engines because they lack sufficient metallurgical skill. He repeats the Cold War error that the Soviets ran competitive design bureaus; most Soviet-era design bureaus were specialists, and competition was quite limited. He seems unaware of very embarrassing recent British procurement disasters, such as the upgraded Nimrod. He writes that the French have been very successful in fighter sales, apparently unaware that this statement was true a few years ago but seems not to apply, at least yet, to the current Rafale. Overall, European weapons and services looked a lot better before they had to fight more or less on their own in Libya.

NORMAN FRIEDMAN is a strategist and historian who has published numerous books, including 14 volumes on U.S. and British warships and naval weapons, amounting in part to a study in procurement policy, its evolution, and its consequences. He has also published a study of network-centric warfare (*Net-Centric Warfare: How Navies Learned to Fight Smarter in Three World Wars* [2009]) and one on the potential of armed unmanned aircraft (*Unmanned Combat Air Systems: A New Kind of Carrier Aviation* [2010]).

Details matter. For the author, the current Joint Strike Fighter is a triumph of multinational production, which is one of his major hopes. In fact, its price has escalated, perhaps beyond affordability, because it has been impossible to control the cost of the software and computing power used to make up for the platform performance sacrifices originally made to limit its price. We are unable to trade off software capabilities the way we might trade off, say, airplane speed to cut cost. This is an urgent (but unmentioned, in this book) current defense (and civilian) problem. The book's paean to a network system for troops that requires 95 million lines of software code is chilling rather than encouraging. Anyone who still thinks that software is both cheap and easy to relate to customer needs ought to be buried in the ruins of NMCI (the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet, which users called "no more computing infrastructure").

Then there is the business of the "last war." Which last war? The war in Afghanistan has interesting parallels with that in Vietnam. We face insurgents who have a sanctuary (which is less possible to bomb than North Vietnam) and who are receiving outside aid from various quarters. It is not clear just what "winning" would mean (does this sound familiar?). Maybe we ought to be looking back; maybe history is really worth thinking about. With Vietnam, the author apparently means the war we imagined could explode if the Cold War heated up. His solution for the peer competitor problem (China, for example) is treaties that will avoid problems. The record of such agreements is mixed at best, and China in particular is often accused of having blithely violated agreements on such subjects as missile proliferation.

It might, incidentally, be argued that the Arab Spring (which to this reviewer seems to have been triggered by the invasion of Iraq and the subsequent events there) may create viable Middle Eastern governments that will find it very much in their own interest to suppress subversives like al-Qaeda. Some of these post-Spring governments will presumably support al-Qaeda and its ilk, but in that case, we will be threatening them with quite ordinary forms of warfare; we will not be "fighting among the people." Maybe there is less "revolution" coming than the author proclaims.

Some other history may also be worth reviewing. The U.S. Navy had the longest history of large-scale, high-technology procurement within the U.S. defense establishment, and at least in the past it had an excellent reputation for management. Yet defense procurement, as it has evolved at least since the time of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, has been based on

the supposed lessons taught by the Air Force and, to a much lesser degree, the Army. This book is no exception, and its naval examples are even less accurate than its air force and ground forces ones.

It does not take a former undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics (which the author was) to tell everyone that our procurement system is in deep trouble; everyone knows it. Getting to a better system will be difficult because there are real, if unfortunate, reasons for the many problems we have. The author says that 9/11 was such a shock that we will all be inspired to do better. How believable is that, a decade later?



God's Century: Resurgent Religion and Global Politics. By Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011. Pp. 276. $25.95 cloth; $22.50 paper; $11.69 e-book.)

The "secularization thesis" posited by Peter Berger in the 1960s, predicting that religious groups would diminish in size and relevance across the globe as modernity, assumed to be secular, surged, is now widely considered, even by Berger himself, to have been inaccurate. In the face of resurgence of religion in many populations, and no signs of this abating soon, political scientists Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Samuel Shah see "God's Century" as a fitting alternative characterization for the trajectory of modernity into the twenty-first century.

JENNIFER S. BRYSON is director of the Islam and Civil Society Project at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, NJ. She has a doctorate in Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations from Yale University and formerly worked as a civilian intelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency.

The authors attribute the resurgence in public religion to three factors: (1) religious communities embracing public activism within their concepts of sacred calling; (2) disappointment in unfulfilled promises of secular ideologies (socialism, for example); and (3) religious communities increasingly seeking freedom from state control.

Their focus is on the four largest religions of the world—Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, and Islam—with some treatment of other religions along the way. The authors observe dramatic variance in the behavior of religious actors within individual religions. Following their evidence, they do not see any religion functioning as a monolith. Instead, they find the nature of a particular subgroup's ideology within a religion, regardless of

the religion, a stronger indicator for behavior than the religion itself, especially when paired with how a particular government structure handles religion. Moreover, the engagement of religious actors has a thrust and intensity that is distinct from involvement of those with secular ideologies.

The purpose of the study is to go beyond observing that religion matters in the world today to seeking to understand *how* religion matters. Central to the authors' findings is that the interplay of the nature of religious views about public engagement ("the set of ideas that a religious community holds about political authority and justice" [p. 9]) with the degree of independence or integration in religion-state relations offers an indication as to whether the fervor of religious actors' engagement will contribute to peace and stability or to violence and the prolonging of conflicts. In other words, "When states deny religious actors autonomy and independence, and when those actors adopt political theologies that accept violence as a means to achieve their ends, the mix is volatile" (p. 150). The opposite pattern emerges in the authors' case studies of religious groups oriented to peacemaking and democracy promotion: these constructive religious actors are able to be most effective when their aspirations include independence from states *and* the governing structures are neutral toward religious groups.

In situations of civil war, the authors of *God's Century* find that civil wars that include aspirations to religious control of political power, relative to nonreligious civil wars, last longer, are more destructive, recur more often, and today are an increasing proportion of all civil wars. Toft, Philpott, and Shah observe increased tendencies to violence, including terrorism, by religious actors who aspire to religious control of state power (what the authors call "integration"), and they find states that favor integration prove to be less successful in countering terrorism than states that are structured to be neutral (not opposed, but just neutral) toward religious actors.

Yet the prospects for the century ahead are not all gloom and doom. *God's Century* also examines examples of Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, and Hindus engaged in religiously motivated support for democracy and peace. The authors observe a pattern of increased impact of these actors for common social good when the religious actors do not seek political power and the governing bodies allow participation, indeed, but not special status for any religious group in the structures of power.

This work is tightly organized, written in clear prose, and the authors pack their large topic into 223 pages. They provide clear definitions of key

terms such as "secularization," "religion," "religious actors," and "political authorities." Tables and figures throughout the book provide concrete examples of what the authors found in their research studying interactions of religious actors and governments in countries throughout the globe. They keep this informative, insightful book accessible while not compromising on substance.

As we proceed during "God's Century" in the years ahead, the findings of this study have practical, and potentially quite significant, implications for development of U.S. strategy and policy. "The United States and other Western states," the authors observe, "will mostly likely succeed by encouraging regimes that treat religion neither as a prisoner nor a courtier but as a respected citizen" (p. 18).



Shi'ism: A Religion of Protest. By Hamid Dabashi. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011. Pp. x, 448. $29.95 cloth; $18.95 paper.)

Hamid Dabashi has embarked on an ambitious project to explain to a broad audience the "heart" and "soul" of Shi'ism from its birth to the present in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Such endeavors are likely to fail, and this one presents no exception. In a prelude of three and half pages, the author sets out in a poetic and poststructuralist fashion to explain what Shi'ism is. Descriptions such as "vindictive," "Shi'ism is revolt," and "Shi'ism is to say 'No!'" (p. xiii) reconfirm widespread stereotypes of the religion as antiestablishment, which is precisely Dabashi's central argument of the book, namely that Shi'ism is the religion of protest. The reader is left to wonder which Shi'ism, in which country, which century, and which context, and for whom and to which audience.

The author is not particularly careful about the political implications of such statements, as for one thing, they feed directly into the fears and fantasies of Western audiences. Secondly, the labeling of Shi'ites as inherently antistate actors justifies their repression and marginalization on multiple global and local levels. It also sidelines the very important Indian histories of Shi'ism in which this tradition did not really develop an antistate tendency in the Mughal Empire or the Deccan Sultanates, and in the case of Awadh even entered in close proximity to the state establishment.

In the introduction, relying on the work of Sigmund Freud, the religion is analyzed through a clinical discourse and diagnosed to be

a "son-religion" (p. 14). This early in the book, the author has already painted a picture of a rather monolithic entity called Shi'ism that is quasi-pathological and angry and has reduced an entire religious tradition to the categories of Central European psychoanalysis—in other words, provincializing Islam in good old Orientalist fashion. Chapter 1 begins with the author's childhood memories and explains in very general terms the time of the Prophet and the creation of Islam. The opening of chapter 2 is similarly personal in tone and begins with a poem by the well-known Iranian poet Forugh Farokhzad (pp. 49–53)—while it is supposed to be about the doctrinal foundations of Shi'ism. Dabashi's postmodern style of analyzing Shi'ism, cutting and pasting what does not go together, runs the danger of inadvertently arguing that Shi'ism is everywhere and nowhere, thus reducing every identity in the Islamic world to a religious essence. Chapter 3 discusses the battle of Karbala, while chapters 4 and 5 give a rather general and poorly structured overview of the history and intellectual production of medieval period of Shi'ism. Chapter 6 discusses the disintegration of Safavid rule and the European encroachment of Iran.

ROSCHANACK SHAERY is a postdoctoral fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity in Göttingen, Germany. She is author of S*hi'ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities* (2008) and is currently completing a manuscript titled *Lebanese Detainees in Syria: Transnationalism, Piety, and Suffering.*

As the first part of the book comes to an end, the reader is led to assume that Shi'ism must be an essentially Iranian religion, as there is no mention yet of Shi'ism in Iraq nor Lebanon, as had been promised, places that for the sake of a historical overview should have taken some precedence over the era of modern Iran. The first part reads like personal impressions of an educated Iranian to a Western audience to reconfirm the supposedly eccentric qualities of Shi'ism based on gender theory, philosophical thoughts, and poetry. The author may not be aware of the service he renders to Sunni hardliners who envision Shi'ism precisely along such lines, highlighting only its presumed Iranian identity and what they consider its highly peculiar

expressions, thus justifying the exclusion of Shi'ism from what they define as mainstream Islam.

In part two of the book, the author returns to clinical discourse to explain the visual and aesthetic expressions of Shi'ism and argues repeatedly throughout the following three chapters that "a deeply traumatic split divides the matters of Shi'i politics from the manners of its aesthetic manifestations" (p. 210). There is therefore "a politics of de-sedimented reality on one side, and an aesthetics of formalized representation on the other" (p. 210). The liberal use of psychoanalytical terminology to discuss politics and aesthetics sideline class, gender, region, state-society tensions, and other dimensions of identity making that motivate the production of Shi'ite aesthetics, if such a thing could be pinpointed at all. Chapter 8 includes several factual mistakes, as the author argues that "in the encounter with colonial modernity, the sectarian bifurcation between Shi'ism and Sunnism altogether disappears—not communally dissolved but politically overwritten by the more compelling cause of an anticolonial encounter with the West—thus robbing Muslims of one among many of their most potent dialectical latitudes in crafting regenerative worldly perspectives" (pp. 228–29). Scholars of the modern Middle East, especially of the Arab East, know that this claim is highly questionable and that sectarian tensions were produced and/or overcome at various moments with various degrees of success.

In part three of the book, the author finally addresses the topic of Shi'ites in Iraq and Lebanon, albeit very briefly and in a more journalistic manner. This section is even more experimental in structure and content. In a rather bizarre and unprofessional manner, Dabashi delivers intense ad hominem attacks against respected scholar of Shi'ism Vali Nasr, calling him, among other things, "a native informant" (p. 295) who along with "Saudi shaykhs and military warlords, and violent al-Qaeda operatives" has "a common interest in dividing the Muslim world along sectarian lines to better dominate it" (p. 303–4). Dabashi concludes that instead, "sectarian thinking in and out of Muslim communities is always a matter of

external political manipulation of internally dormant doctrines" (303), thus stripping Muslims of any agency and presenting them as victims in a move to rescue them as sectarian beings.

Finally, one of Dabashi's most striking arguments in this section is that current political alliances between the Iranian government, Hezbollah, and Hamas point to the recently reemerging cosmopolitan nature of Shi'ism (p. 297). The disagreements between Hamas and the Iranian government, not to speak of those between the ruling elite in Iran and Hezbollah, are sidelined in the image of a cosmopolitan merry-go-round religion which seemingly dictates the actions of Shi'ite political leaders.

Greenback Planet: How the Dollar Conquered the World and Threatened Civilization as We Know It. By H. W. Brands. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2011. Pp. 139. $25.00 cloth.)

Greenback Planet narrates the history of the U.S. "dollar" very broadly and briefly, from the colonial period to the present, with an emphasis on its more recent development. A new history of the dollar is much needed, but unfortunately, this book buys brevity and simplicity of exposition at the expense of historical understanding and accuracy. Its author, acclaimed writer-historian H. W. Brands, is a gifted storyteller with only a tenuous grasp of monetary history and theory. His yarns woven together create an ornamental cloth of great beauty, but when turned to practical purposes, the material proves at best a frail and worthless fabric that leaves readers clad in the tattered rags of conceptual confusion.

ROBERT E. WRIGHT is Nef Family Chair of Political Economy and director of the Thomas Willing Institute for the Study of Financial Markets, Institutions, and Regulations at Augustana College in South Dakota. He is author or coauthor of 14 books on financial history and public policy, including *One Nation Under Debt* (2008) and *Fubarnomics* (2010).

Whereas *The Money Men: Capitalism, Democracy, and the Hundred Years' War Over the American Dollar* (2006) leaned heavily on Brands's strengths—biography and political history—*Greenback Planet* ultimately rests on the author's weakest point, economic history, and it shows throughout. Recent scholarship, for example, portrays J. P. Morgan's role in the financial system very differently than Brands does in his account. Little wonder, given that of the thousands of serious secondary sources on U.S. monetary and financial history available to him, Brands cites only three. He mostly references his own books and a handful of printed primary sources and biographies, which

he uses to craft climactic scenes and dialogues rather than to enlighten readers about the (d)evolution of the nation's monetary system.

Books about money need to explicate the concept at their heart because money, despite its surface simplicity, is little understood by most scholars, let alone the general readers that *Greenback Planet* obviously seeks to reach. The chronological narrative that Brands spins does not fill the void and in fact often conflates distinct concepts like the unit of account, the abstract measure by which the economic value of dissimilar goods is compared, with the medium of exchange, the actual thing (coin, note, or accounting entry) transferred in trade. By lumping discrete monetary, financial, and fiscal concepts together under the vague rubric of the dollar, Brands is able to range broadly without ever seriously engaging monetary policy issues. Ultimately, the dollar becomes responsible for everything, including the 9/11 attacks, as Brands raises it into the force that "made America rich . . . [and] saved democracy" (p. 119)! And by ignoring important theoretical concepts like the "trilemma" or "impossible trinity" of international finance (the impossibility of simultaneously maintaining fixed exchange rates, free capital flows, and discretionary domestic monetary policy), his descriptions of crucial turning points in U.S. monetary history, including Franklin D. Roosevelt's devaluation of the dollar and Richard M. Nixon's closing of the gold window, ring hollow.

Other serious technical errors abound. Contrary to the book's claims, merchants issued bills of exchange, not bills of credit (p. 5); individuals drew drafts against their creditors, not checks against their reputations (p. 5); the Coinage Act of 1792, not the Bank of the United States, determined the "strength" of the dollar (pp. 5–6); and government deposits did not constitute that bank's reserves, specie (gold and silver coins) did (p. 7). In addition, the dollar rested no more squarely on gold in 1907 than before (p. 25); it did not became the world's leading currency during World War I (p. 35); the French mattered more than modestly in world finance in the interwar period (p. 38); most commercial banks did not invest heavily in equities before the Great Crash of 1929 (p. 43); the failure of the Federal Reserve to react to the Depression had more to do with the gold standard than with a dearth of leadership (p. 43); poor and middling individuals need insurance at least as much as the rich do (p. 70); under Bretton Woods, America could run out of gold but not dollars (p. 72); devaluation and depreciation are not synonymous (p. 82); the first iteration of the euro was a unit of account, not an electronic currency (p. 104); and so on.

Those and other misunderstandings, too technical and nuanced to describe in short compass, greatly undermine the author's authority on this admittedly complex subject. Readers deserve a new, high quality historical treatment of the dollar, but this elegantly composed book falls too short on substance to serve.



Powers of Exclusion: Land Dilemmas in Southeast Asia. By Derek Hall, Philip Hirsch, and Tania Murray Li. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, and Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2011. Pp. vii, 257. $35.00 paper.)

This innovative and carefully crafted book is part of the output from the Canadian-funded research project Challenges of the Agrarian Transition in Southeast Asia (CHATSEA) (2005 to 2010). The global transformation from agrarian-based societies to those that are urbanized, industrialized, and market-based (known as the agrarian transition) provides the backdrop to this study, which specifically looks at rural land and the power relations structuring access to land in seven of the eleven Southeast Asian states: Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. Maps are provided to assist those unfamiliar with the region, while an appendix supplies a brief "land history" of each, from the precolonial through colonial and independence eras up to the 1990s or 2000s. The reference list is comprehensive.

LESLEY POTTER is associate professor of resource management in the Asia–Pacific Program of the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University in Canberra. She has worked on issues connected with agriculture and small farmers in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, for more than 30 years. She contributed chapters to two of the CHATSEA studies and is familiar with the program.

The first chapter establishes the theoretical basis for the argument of the book. Reasoning that some kind of exclusion of outsiders is inevitable for any type of land use, the authors focus on "the changing means by which different social groups have gained or lost access to land in the 1990s and 2000s, and on the implications of exclusion for rural social relations" (p. 4). The four main processes at work, which they term "powers of exclusion," are

identified as: regulation, where states set the rules; force—violence or threats of violence by states and other actors; the market, where price may limit access; and legitimation—establishing "the moral basis for exclusive claims" (p. 5). Also noted is "exclusion's double edge," where creating security for one group of actors generally produces insecurity in another. There are always winners and losers, though the losers are sometimes overlooked.

Five of the six chapters that follow provide a detailed analysis of different types of exclusions, using case-study materials from one or more of the selected states. The sixth chapter deals with protests and mobilizations against evictions. Reclaiming ethno-territories, by Dayaks in Kalimantan and Montagnards in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, are some of the conflicts analyzed, together with the 1997 mass action organized by the Assembly of the Poor in Bangkok. The conclusion reiterates the "powers of exclusion" with a look toward the future in a discussion of the world financial crisis in 2008 through 2009 and the perhaps surprising discovery of "a renewed faith in agriculture as a vehicle for national growth and as a route to well-being" (p. 205).

Chapter 2, "Licensed Exclusions: Land Titling, Reform and Allocation," presents case studies from Thailand, Laos, and the Philippines. While land titling is called "the perfection of exclusion" (p. 36), it has been modified by heavy expenses and local conditions, as in the Philippine Certificates of Ancestral Domain Title, where the lands are communally held and may not be sold. States attempting land reform may legitimate their decisions on grounds of both efficiency and morality (p. 56). However, if land reform is too politically difficult, legitimation may shift to the easier option of land settlement.

Chapter 3 deals with environmental and conservation issues, termed "ambient exclusions." There is discussion of the fate of those who dwell in lands designated as "forest" by governments, some of which may be locked up in national parks, as in the Lore Lindu National Park in Indonesia. A fierce debate is noted in the conservation literature "over the rights of nature versus the rights of local communities" (p. 67). Community Based Natural Resource Management in Cambodia and conservation issues surrounding the Nam Theun 2 hydropower project in Laos are explored in some detail.

The title of chapter 4 is "Volatile Exclusions: Crop Booms and their Fallout." Materials used here include oil palm in Malaysia, especially the Borneo state of Sarawak; farmed shrimp in Thailand; and coffee in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. "Post-Agrarian Exclusions: Land

Conversion" (chapter 5) relates especially to land resumption by urban growth (Cavite in the Philippines); tourism (Bali); and large dams (Hoa Binh in Vietnam).

Chapter 6, "Intimate Exclusions: Everyday Accumulation and Dispossession," is the most interesting and different as it explores the inner workings of village life. Do people try to keep land relatively evenly distributed (as in the now-rejected myth of "shared poverty" in Java) or craftily seek to benefit from each other's misfortune or slowness to act? Tania Murray Li's "Enclosure and Class Formation in Upland Sulawesi" certainly suggests the latter, while studies in Vietnam are more mixed.

This is an excellent book for its innovation, the care in which its arguments are mounted, and the depth, range, and accuracy of its joint scholarship. However, it is not an easy read, as its chapters are so packed with facts and ideas that they are at times rather indigestible.



The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future. By Elizabeth C. Economy. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010 [2d ed.]. Pp. xi, 364. $65.00 cloth; $19.95 paper.)

XUEHUA ZHANG is a visiting scholar of environmental and resource economics in the Department of Economics at Stanford University. She is a consultant on China's environmental, energy, and climate policy. Her specialty is institutional development of environmental monitoring, compliance, and enforcement. Her dissertation was titled "Enforcing Environmental Regulations in Hubei Province, China: Agencies, Courts, Citizens."

With one-fifth of the world's population and an economy growing at approximately 9 percent per year, how China deals with its enormous environmental challenges has profound impacts on its future and the global society. For organizations and individuals who are concerned about our environmental future and in sustainable development, *The River Runs Black*, written by Elizabeth Economy, is a must read. The book is built on a solid analysis of the existing literature as well as the author's years of field research. It not only provides a comprehensive picture of China's environmental challenges, but also examines the historical roots of those problems and the influence of China's emerging environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Economy points out that China's unprecedented economic growth in the past three decades has dramatically increased resource scarcity and degraded China's land, water, and air to an alarming degree. The devolution of authority to provincial and local officials has allowed them to blindly pursue local economic growth with few consequences for ignoring environmental issues. This has severely damaged China's environmental protection efforts. The result is a public health crisis and social unrest over

environmental issues popping up throughout the nation, as well as enormous economic costs. The interplay of economic reform and environment has engendered a wide range of social, economic, and political challenges.

China's leaders who increasingly recognized the impact of environmental degradation have moved aggressively to establish formal environmental institutions, draft environmental laws, and undertake large-scale environmental programs. However, as Economy notes, China's legal system is known for lack of transparency and independence, poorly defined laws, weak enforcement capacity, and ill-trained judiciary. These conditions fail to provide a foundation for China's environmental battles. The Ministry of Environmental Protection and local environmental agencies with insufficient authority, funding, and staff are incapable of effectively enforcing laws. The third prong of China's environmental protection effort, the Chinese court system, has provided increasingly strong support for environmental enforcement, but the effects remain limited.

Perhaps the most significant feature of China's strategy in mitigating its macro-environmental threats is, arguably, the continued utilization of campaigns to implement large-scale initiatives. Economy analyzes China's campaign mentality primarily in the context of the Green GDP and water pollution and concludes that all those campaigns failed to achieve the desired results. I am wondering whether the national emission-reduction and energy-saving campaign, which has set aggressive mandatory targets in the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans (2006–15), differs from previous campaigns and might bring some lasting effects on China's environment and energy future.

Economy argues that China's traditional environmental attitudes, institutions, and policy approaches provide little foundation for building a sound environmental apparatus. Contrary to popular belief that current environmental problems are primarily an outcome of the Chinese Communist Party's rule since 1949, Economy reminds readers that the roots of China's environmental crisis run even deeper. Throughout Chinese history, resource exploitation and environmental degradation occurred frequently as a result of the relentless drive of China's leaders to amass power, consolidate territory, develop the economy, and support a burgeoning population. Chinese history suggests "a long, deeply entrenched tradition of exploiting the environment for man's needs, with relatively little sense of the limits of nature's or man's capacity to replenish the earth's resources" (p. 55).

Economy believes that greater change may be forthcoming from forces outside the Chinese government, including international and domestic NGOs and multinationals, and devotes nearly half of her book to the roles of those organizations in shaping China's environmental protection future. The international community has played an essential role in China's transformation from a state with almost no environmental protection apparatus, legal system, and environmental education to one that is now equipped with numerous environmental bureaucracies, a comprehensive legal infrastructure, and a vast, ongoing environmental education. Nevertheless, international influence is limited and many cooperative ventures have failed to achieve their full potential. Economy suggests that China's leaders invest the necessary political and financial capital to build a strong enforcement capacity and to develop an effective incentive system in which environmental best practices will thrive.

A unique perspective of this book is that China's leaders have chosen to follow the path taken by the East Europeans and Asians over a decade ago to support the existence of environmental NGOs. Economy gives an informative overview of how environmental NGOs in Eastern Europe and other Asian countries have become a medium for social and political changes. In several Eastern European countries, environmental groups and activists were key players in the downfall of communist regimes; in the Asia Pacific region, environmental activists also became closely linked with democracy activists and agitated for broader political reform. Economy's investigation of the evolution of environmental NGOs in China reveals some intriguing signs of potential political changes that might occur. The new generation of China's environmentalists has come to believe that "environmental work may lead to greater democracy in China . . . the NGO movements are creating democracy" (p. 177). With the Chinese government fully aware of the possibility of environmental NGOs growing into a potentially threatening political movement, it has strived to retain vital control over NGOs. Economy holds, however, that the Chinese leadership will be no more adept than the East Europeans at managing reform while avoiding revolution. She projects that the environment has the potential to serve as a locus for broader political discontent and further political reforms in China.

So what do the environmental challenges imply for China's future? Some readers might be left with the impression that China's environmental degradation is irreversible. My interpretation is that the book places hope in

China's fast-growing, albeit nascent, environmental NGOs and believes that the environmental and resource degradation will become a medium for social and political changes in China. Now the question one might have is whether China will be able to balance the needs of a burgeoning population through economic growth with the country's natural resources even if social and political changes do take place. I believe that the Chinese government and people need to rethink the consumption-based development model and be innovative in pursuing human development. China has the potential to lead the world's efforts in creating a sustainable future.



The Age of Airpower. By Martin van Creveld. (New York: Public Affairs, 2011. Pp. xii, 498. $35.00 cloth; $17.99 paper.)

While airpower existed before the invention of aircraft, it was only with World War I that aviation played a significant role. Since that time, airpower has been a major component of many military forces. In *The Age of Airpower*, Martin van Creveld traces the evolution and effectiveness of airpower from its inception to the present. He also investigates a number of the controversies surrounding the employment of airpower. The result is a broad, insightful, and even-handed look at the use of not only airplanes, but also missiles and unmanned aerial systems. *The Age of Airpower* is a book that anyone with an interest in aviation should read.

GREGORY A. THIELE, major, USMC, recently graduated from the Australian Command and Staff College in Canberra.

Van Creveld begins by discussing the roots of airpower in early balloons in the mid-1800s. The book concludes with an attempt to peer into airpower's future. In between, it examines both the rise of airpower and the effect of cruise missiles and nuclear weapons on the utility of airpower.

Perhaps most interesting is the author's discussion regarding the effectiveness of airpower in both conventional and unconventional conflicts. He concludes that airpower reached the height of its effectiveness during World War II. For a variety of reasons since, the utility of airpower has declined. This does not mean that airpower will disappear from the modern battlefield, but that it is unlikely to achieve the decisive role envisioned by Italian theorist Giulio Douhet. In *The Command of the Air* (1921), Douhet prophesied that airpower would become a force capable of bringing victory

in war unaided. Van Creveld refutes Douhet's argument decisively. While not everyone will agree with the author's conclusions, every point is buttressed with numerous historical examples.

The book is laid out more or less chronologically, although the discussion of the use of airpower in counterinsurgencies is held until the last section of the book. Van Creveld believes that airpower will still play a vital role in any future conventional conflicts but that it is unlikely to be the decisive element in determining a conflict's outcome. During counter-insurgency operations (van Creveld points out that insurgents almost never have much in the way of airpower at their disposal), airpower's record of accomplishments is generally poor (reconnaissance and transport aside). Further hobbling airpower's utility, van Creveld also believes that most states purchase aircraft that are not well suited to the tasks that they are called upon to perform during counterinsurgency operations.

Van Creveld makes a powerful argument that airpower is in decline and that, in its current form, it is of limited utility during counterinsurgency operations. If these points are true, then several questions must naturally follow: What is the proper role of airpower in future conflicts? How can it be used most effectively? What types of aircraft are best suited to fulfill the roles that are envisioned? What changes to current organizations will this require? The author offers no answers to these questions, but the book does provide a thorough historical context that should aid the reader as he or she considers such issues.

This is a book that should be read by every leader who wants to gain a better understanding of airpower. As with all of van Creveld's books, *The Age of Airpower* requires the reader to think carefully as he or she reads. It is not light reading and will require reflection to fully understand the arguments.



War in a Twilight World: Partisan and Anti-Partisan Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1939–1945. Edited by Ben Shepherd and Juliette Pattinson. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Pp. xv, 262. $80.00 cloth.)

Glasgow Caledonian reader in history Ben Shepherd and University of Strathclyde lecturer in history Juliette Pattinson, in association with the German Historical Institute of London, organized a conference in Glasgow in June 2007 on the topic of partisan and anti-partisan warfare in German-occupied Europe, 1939 to 1945. The conference was an opportunity to present and discuss new research in this field. From the keynote address by Evan Mawdsley on "Anti-German Rebellions and Their Place in Allied Grand Strategy" to the informal and lively discussions over dinner and drinks at the Café Cossachok, a range of topics and insights were covered by the international group of scholars. These included "views from above and lessons for the present." Shepherd and Pattinson noted the conclusions derived were "relating to the effects of higher-level strategic perceptions; to the potential, then as now, for directing a policy of 'disaggregation' against insurgents; to the importance of situating counter-insurgency warfare within the context of wider policies which are receptive to the needs of the occupied population and its social and cultural characteristics; and to the necessity of fielding counter-insurgency forces which not only are well resourced, but which also, in stark contrast to the anti-partisan formations which the Germans so often deployed, conduct themselves in ways that cultivate the population rather than alienate it."

CHARLES D. MELSON is chief historian for the U.S. Marine Corps History Division. His most recent book, *Operation Knight's Move* (2011), which recounts the German raid against Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito in 1944, was published by Marine Corps University Press.

A conference goal was to publish the papers to a broader audience, which was accomplished in two ways. First was in a special issue of the *Journal of Strategic Studies* (vol. 31, no. 5). Papers published addressed one or more of the range of factors involved, and not solely the military ones that shaped the conduct of partisan and anti-partisan activities. Some of the factors were ideology; the changing and increasingly destructive nature of twentieth-century warfare; the conditions in the field that both partisans and anti-partisans faced; each side's economic needs; cultural and psychological factors; and the political structures of the German Third Reich and occupied countries. The journal was structured along lines similar to the conference, based on the availability of papers that were presented at the conference in written form. The result was a satisfying proceeding of the conference, including Mawdsley's central lecture, the conference organizers' introduction, and interim conclusions. Highlighted was the value of conferences or meetings that are made up of a wide variety of experts that challenge individual views, particularly for military and academic participants.

In 2007, I presented a paper to the Society for Military History on German counterinsurgency in the Balkans, followed by participating in the partisan and anti-partisan conference in Glasgow. The result was a greater appreciation of the sophistication and depth of understanding of German measures against resistance. From this I followed with a paper that considered "German Counterinsurgency Revisited" at the University of Calgary in 2009, to be published in the *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* (vol. 24, no. 1). Recently, some of the most enduring interpretations of World War II have been subject to revision. Indeed, military historians are using innovative and often interdisciplinary methods to answer original questions and offer new perspectives in established debates. With advances in Holocaust studies and departures from the evidence presented at Nuremburg, this allows German occupation policies to be reconsidered. Conditions that were specific were separated from general circumstances in occupation campaigns. Presented is new background into German experience in suppressing rebellion in World War II. With the understanding that military theorist Carl von Clausewitz saw defense as stronger than offense, I argued this was behind a German preference for conflicts of annihilation or destruction, particularly in dealing with rebellion. As such, considered is 1) Background (1831–1932)—from Clausewitz and experience up through the World War; 2) Doctrine (1933–1945)—from what was available in Germany; and 3) Practice

(1942–1944)—from specific examples, in this case by revisiting operational history in one tertiary theater: Yugoslavia, the German Southeast Theater. My work with this article benefitted from the contributors to the volume under review.

War in a Twilight World is an even more developed conference product, a new work that focuses on the theme of the partisan and anti-partisan struggle that took place in Eastern Europe, to include Poland, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, through 1945. Shepherd and Pattinson provide an original introduction to the work, covering context and issues considered in the broadest sense. This is followed by three individual parts, with forewords by Evan Mawdsley on the Soviet Union, Paul Latawski on Poland, and Klaus Schmider on Yugoslavia. In addition, each part includes a select bibliography. Nine well-documented articles follow, written by authoritative authors addressing a range of subjects within their areas of expertise. For scholars, as well as the forces and populations involved, Eastern Europe was the theater of extremes, which are still being reconciled with to this day some 70 years or so later. Addressed were questions that ranged from "who, what, when, and where" to the more complex issues of "why."

This is a handsome and useful work for academics in related fields, for current participants in the global war on terrorism seeking broader context and "lessons" from the past, or those desiring a change from the editorial and media approach taken by most short-sighted commentators. As such, I strongly recommend this publication for those engaged in professional military education (PME) as a chance to get "out of the box" of the PME comfort zone. Education and execution are related and not limited to just "ivory towers" or "foreign fields" of conflict. Academic conferences have results, and this edited collection of papers is an excellent example of this.



Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936–1943. By David J. Ulbrich. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011. Pp. xiv, 285. $35.95 cloth.)

The three decades before World War II were a period of dramatic change within the U.S. Marine Corps. Under the direction of energetic and innovative commandants such as John A. Lejeune and John H. Russell, the Corps redefined its mission from serving as a small naval constabulary force responsible for providing shipboard security and conducting armed diplomatic interventions into a multi-division, amphibious assault force specializing in advance base seizure and defense. David J. Ulbrich's new book, *Preparing for Victory: Thomas Holcomb and the Making of the Modern Marine Corps, 1936–1943*, closely examines one of the most influential architects of this transformation. This well-researched and cogently argued volume explores how the Marine Corps' 17th Commandant worked to transform the Corps into an effective fighting force ready and capable of participating in the first major Allied counteroffensive against Japan in 1942.

While much has been written on the development of amphibious warfare doctrine and its implementation during the first years of World War II by historians such as Allan Millett, Donald Bittner, and Kenneth Clifford, this is the first work to focus specifically on Holcomb's commandancy. Thus the monograph is not so much a biography of Holcomb (only the first chapter concerns his life before 1936), but a close and detailed examination of his tenure as Commandant, his leadership style, and the creation of the Fleet Marine Force. Drawing on the documentary records of the Navy and Marine Corps, as well as personal papers collections and numerous recorded oral histories, it makes a major contribution to the scholarship on the history of the Marine Corps during World War II and the immediate prewar era.

As Ulbrich demonstrates, Holcomb faced a myriad of challenges and obstacles upon becoming Commandant in 1936. Like Army Chief of Staff General Malin Craig and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark, Holcomb was forced to prepare his service for war despite limited manpower (about 17,000 Marines) and an inadequate budget, all in the face of a strongly isolationist American public. However, while Craig's term as chief of staff ended in 1939 and Stark's term as chief of naval operations a few months after the Pearl Harbor attack, Holcomb continued to serve as Commandant until the end of 1943, well into World War II. Thus Holcomb confronted the same challenges as Craig and Stark's successors, General George C. Marshall and Admiral Ernest J. King. Ulbrich argues that Holcomb's visionary, methodical, and shrewd leadership style made him well-suited to accomplish both tasks.

NICHOLAS J. SCHLOSSER is a historian with the U.S. Marine Corps History Division, Quantico, Virginia. He is currently completing a study of the Marine Corps' contribution to the development of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine. He is coeditor (with James M. Caiella) of *Counterinsurgency Leadership in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Beyond* (2011) and editor of *U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2004–2008: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (2010).

According to the author, Holcomb was "the right person in the right place at the right time to become Commandant in 1935" (p. 41). Despite his lack of seniority when he was selected, his billets commanding various Marine units in China, the Philippines, and in World War I, as well as his education at the Naval War College and Army War College, gave him extensive experience. Furthermore, his administrative skills and service as the commandant of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico gave him the background necessary to prepare the Marine Corps for its advance base mission. While his predecessors had made significant and often pathbreaking progress in developing the theories of amphibious warfare, it was Holcomb who made these theories into reality, transforming the Marine Corps "from a marginal service to become the nation's premier amphibious assault force" (p. 187). The numbers alone attest to the significant transformation that took place under Holcomb's watch: when he retired in 1944, the Marine Corps numbered 385,000.

Ulbrich contends that four factors came together to make Holcomb an exceptionally strong and effective Commandant: "he was a progressive manager, meticulous planner, visionary leader, and a shrewd publicist" (p. 2).

Over the course of his seven years as Commandant, Holcomb successfully reformed and reorganized Headquarters United States Marine Corps into a more efficient and effective organization. He also effectively navigated the halls of Congress, building collegial relationships with potential allies such as Carl Vinson and Melvin Maas to ensure that the Marine Corps would have the budget, equipment, and personnel necessary to fight a possible war with Japan. In regard to Holcomb's skills at dealing with Congress, Ulbrich quotes a telling statement from Marine Major General Charles Lyman, who declared following budget negotiations in 1938 that "there was no Commandant between [George] Barnett and Holcomb who could have achieved the result of the last six months—I take off my hat" (p. 61).

Holcomb also effectively used public affairs programs to increase recruitment, seeking opportunities to demonstrate the tactical proficiency of Marine aviation, sending Marines to community affairs when possible, and speaking at public engagements throughout his commandancy. Along with ensuring that the Marine Corps had the funds and resources to build the Fleet Marine Force, he also focused considerable effort and energy on preparing that force for amphibious operations. He worked to develop and acquire adequate landing craft for forced entries in Pacific atolls and helped initiate the development and acquisition of both personnel landing craft equipped with bow ramps and tracked amphibious vehicles capable of crossing the hazardous reefs that surrounded so many Pacific islands. Holcomb also oversaw the Marine contributions to fleet amphibious exercises, including FLEX 5 and FLEX 6. As Ulbrich shows, evidence of the rational, progressive, and efficient nature of his administration can be discerned throughout the Marine Corps, from the Marine Corps headquarters down to the Corps' major subordinate commands.

While Ulbrich acknowledges Holcomb's considerable accomplishments, his study is no hagiography. Indeed, his critical examination of Holcomb's complex attitudes about race stands as one of the strongest aspects of the book. As Ulbrich demonstrates, Holcomb fiercely contested President Franklin D. Roosevelt's order to accept African American recruits into the Marine Corps. Nevertheless, he followed his commander in chief's orders. Ulbrich does not attempt to soften or explain away the Commandant's attitudes by simply stating he was a man of his time. He does, however, do an excellent job of contextualizing those attitudes, demonstrating that Holcomb's beliefs could be traced to the prevailing racism that dominated the upbringing (40 percent Southern) and service

experiences (in the Caribbean and Central America) of many Marines of the time. Drawing on the scholarship of Heather Marshall, Ulbrich demonstrates how the racial hierarchies that shaped much of Holcomb's worldview led him to try and block allowing African Americans into the Corps but accept Native Americans. Ulbrich further expands on this issue in his coda examining Holcomb's tenure as U.S. minister to South Africa, where the shock of encountering a society based on the principles of apartheid led Holcomb to revise and rethink some of his prejudicial attitudes. As Ulbrich concludes, "Minister Holcomb's official views on race relations thus gradually shifted away from what they had been when he was Commandant Holcomb" (p. 181).

Ulbrich's study is a welcome addition to the historiography of the Marine Corps and amphibious warfare. The book shows that Holcomb should not only be counted among the most notable and influential Marine Corps commandants such as Lejeune and Alexander A. Vandegrift, but also alongside the major wartime service chiefs like Marshall and King. In the mid-1930s, amphibious warfare and the Fleet Marine Force were largely theoretical in nature. As this work effectively shows, it was Holcomb who made that theory into a reality and created a Marine Corps ready to fight World War II.

The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, Vietnam, and the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment. By David Zierler. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011. Pp. xii, 245. $59.95 cloth; $24.95 paper.)

The last Agent Orange defoliation mission dispersed herbicides over the Republic of Vietnam more than 40 years ago. Between 1961 and 1971, at least 9,100 missions to defoliate large swaths of land in order to improve visibility and deny enemy cover were flown by the Air Force Operation Ranch Hand. To a lesser extent and much more controversially, Ranch Hand's mission was also to destroy "unfriendly crops" thought to provide sustenance to enemy forces. (The Army also expended a small percentage of the 20 million gallons sprayed for base perimeter and small-area defoliation; small amounts were apparently used by the brown-water Navy as well.) While Operation Ranch Hand was rolling in Vietnam, slightly different formulations of the same herbicides were in widespread use in United States, and contrary to common belief, often at the same high concentrations used in Vietnam. (One of the herbicides, Agent White, remains the most widely used herbicide in the world today.)

David Zierler provides an interesting and creative account of the development of the plant-growth regulating hormones, of the scientists who created them, and of the scientists who vigorously opposed their use in Vietnam. One of them, Arthur Galston, a Yale biologist, coined the term "ecocide" to signify the grave ecological costs of defoliation. Zierler draws a picture of the politics of science in government, in the military, and in the scientific establishment itself, and how scientific activism contributed to the end of Operation Ranch Hand. He has done an excellent job of pulling together primary-source material and developing a coherent, well-written narrative of this aspect of the military herbicide story. I do have some bones to pick with details of interpretation, and especially with the cumbersome

presentation of the bibliography—I found myself referring back to Zierler's dissertation to find the references more easily—but overall, he is to be commended for a job well done.

The Agent Orange story is complex, and Zierler tries to tackle the complexity with an even hand. The steadfast position taken by the United States, then and now, is that herbicides used as defoliants are tactical weapons, not weapons of chemical warfare, thus placing them outside the purview of agreements like the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Much of the world has always disagreed. There is also major scientific uncertainty about the long-term effects of exposure to the herbicides, particularly to Agent Orange, with its highly toxic contaminant, dioxin. The Vietnamese government and some scientists are convinced that an epidemic of birth defects and cancer ensued. Most scientists just aren't sure, and for decades, despite several acts of Congress and strong recommendations by the Institute of Medicine, various factions in the U.S. government and funding agencies have blocked definitive studies to try to tease out an answer to these questions. The list of compensable diseases developed by the Department of Veterans Affairs, in consultation with the Institute of Medicine, is largely based on studies of workers and communities exposed to herbicides, not veterans. My own work has shown that at least 2.5 million, perhaps even 4 million, Vietnamese were directly sprayed by defoliant, and tens of thousands of U.S. troops served in heavily sprayed areas, but definitive epidemiological studies have still not been done.

JEANNE MAGER STELLMAN is professor emeritus, special lecturer, and former deputy head of the Department of Health Policy and Management, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia University. She has been a principal investigator on two research studies on the effects of Agent Orange and related herbicides and is completing work on a National Library of Medicine grant linking locations and exposures to herbicide sprays.

It is ironic that Operation Ranch Hand, with 25 Fairchild C-123s at peak operations in 1969, was actually a minor player in the overall war effort. Damage to the terrain from B-52 bombing, from incendiary devices, and from the mechanical destruction of forests using conventional methods was easily as great as from defoliation that covered 12 percent of land, often with only a single spray run, thus making tree recovery possible. Also, in the 1960s, Agent Orange appeared to be relatively benign, especially compared to the deadly, now banned, chlorinated hydrocarbons and organophosphates

then in common use "at home." It was Agent Blue, the organic arsenical used to desiccate rice crops, which raised alarm bells of toxicity, not the growth hormones Agent Orange and White. Despite all this, a man-in-the-street interview today would surely have Agent Orange near the top of the list of problems associated with Vietnam.

It is also ironic that the scientific lobbying and expeditions to Vietnam that Zierler describes very well took place when Operation Ranch Hand was already rapidly winding down and contracts with suppliers had already been canceled. Military herbicides have not been used anywhere after Vietnam, but ecological catastrophes of war continue. There are many potential books in Zierler's future.

Book Notes

Compiled by Andrea L. Connell

Command and Development

Thinking about Leadership. By Nannerl O. Keohane. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. ix, 312. $27.95 cloth; $27.95 e-book.) Tackles various issues regarding leadership, including traits that make a good leader; the role of gender in attaining and wielding power; ethics; and the relationship between leaders and followers.

Nothing Less than Victory: Decisive Wars and the Lessons of History. By John David Lewis. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. 368. $29.95 cloth; $29.95 e-book.) Looks at six major wars, from the Greco-Persian and Theban through World War II, in an effort to compare offensive and defensive military operations, and makes a case for the value of the strategic offensive.

America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II. By Peter J. Schifferle. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010. Pp. 304. $39.95 cloth.) An examination of how the U.S. Army's experience in World War I influenced and shaped the curriculum of officer training at Fort Leavenworth and ultimately contributed to victory in World War II.

Lifting the Fog of Peace: How Americans Learned to Fight the Modern War. By Janine Davidson. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010. Pp. 256. $30.00 paper; $30.00 e-book.) A history of the United States' involvement in counterinsurgency and stability operations and an assessment of how the military learns and adapts to these circumstances.

Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution. By Ira D. Gruber. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010. Pp. xi, 360. $55.00 cloth; $30.25 e-book.) How British officers' choices of books on war laid the foundation for the nineteenth-century professionalization of their nation's corps, their understanding of warfare, and the conduct of operations in the American Revolution.

Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace. Second Edition. By J. L. Granatstein. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011. Pp. ix, 688. $39.95 paper.) An updated history of the Canadian army from its origins in New France to its role in Afghanistan.

Historical Context

Stalin's Genocides. By Norman M. Naimark. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. 163. $26.95 cloth; $16.95 paper; $16.95 e-book.) Author argues that the mass killings under Stalin in the 1930s were acts of genocide and that the Soviet dictator was behind them.

Cataclysm: General Hap Arnold and the Defeat of Japan. By Herman S. Wolk. (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2010. Pp. 300. $24.95 cloth.) Examines General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold's role during the Pacific War of 1944–45 in the context of planning for the destruction of Japan. Concentrates on Arnold's leadership in crafting the weapons, organization, and command of the strategic bombing offensive against Japan.

Books as Weapons: Propaganda, Publishing, and the Battle for Global Markets in the Era of World War II. By John B. Hench. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010. Pp. xi, 264. $35.00 cloth.) Describes the partnership between American publishers and the U.S. government to fight propaganda, win hearts and minds of the Allies, and re-educate the defeated enemy during and after World War II.

Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World: A Concise History. By Rebecca E. Karl. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010. Pp ix, 216. $74.95 cloth; $21.95 paper.) A short history of Mao Zedong's intellectual and personal development within the context of the Chinese revolutionary movement and his legacy up through the Beijing Olympics in 2008.

The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North. By Allan R. Millett. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010. Pp. xx, 644. $45.00 cloth.) The second volume in the distinguished military historian's trilogy details the 12-month period from North Korea's invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 through the end of June 1951.

Forgotten Warriors: The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, the Corps Ethos, and the Korean War. By T. X. Hammes. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010. Pp. xvi, 258. $36.95 cloth.) Details the background, development, and combat action of the title air-ground brigade, which helped secure the Pusan Perimeter in 1950.

The Line: Combat in Korea, January–February 1951. Edited by William T. Bowers. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2008. Pp. vii, 376. $40.00 cloth; $40.00 e-book.) Author uses interviews and historical research focusing on individual soldiers and junior leaders to document this pivotal time period in the Korean War.

A Century of Revolution: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Violence during Latin America's Long Cold War. Edited by Greg Grandin and Gilbert M. Joseph. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010. Pp. 443. $94.95 cloth; $25.95 paper.) Through analysis of events in Chile, Columbia, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru, the authors explore the topics of revolutionary change and political violence in twentieth-century Latin America.

Guerrilla Odyssey: Modernization, Secularization, Democracy, and the Fadai Period of National Liberation in Iran, 1971–1979. By Peyman Vahabzadeh. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii, 289. $29.95 cloth.) Examination of the rise and fall of the Iranian People's Guerrillas (OIPFG), an urban, secular, leftist political organization.

Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic. By Judith Armatta. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010. Pp. ix, 576. $39.95 cloth.) A lawyer's eyewitness account of the prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.

A Short History of the Jews. By Michael Brenner. Translated by Jeremiah Reimer. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. xi, 421. $29.95 cloth; $24.95 paper.) Historical narrative of the Jewish people from biblical times until today, including a survey of the latest scholarly perspectives in Jewish history.

Current Subjects of Interest and Areas of Engagement

The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State. By Noah Feldman. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. Pp. 200. $22.95 cloth; $12.95 paper; $12.95 e-book.) Defines and examines the history of sharia—the law of the traditional Islamic state.

Rethinking Islamic Studies: From Orientalism to Cosmopolitanism. Edited by Carl W. Ernst and Richard C. Martin. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2010. Pp. ix, 312. $59.95 cloth; $29.95 paper.) These essays map the trajectory of the study of Islam and offer approaches to the theoretical and methodological frameworks that have traditionally dominated the field.

Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism. By John Calvert. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Pp. ix, 377. $29.50 cloth.) Biography of the influential Egyptian who established the theoretical basis for radical Islamism in the postcolonial Sunni Muslim world.

Religious Politics and Secular States: Egypt, India, and the United States. By Scott W. Hibbard. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. Pp. xi, 306. $60.00 cloth; $30.00 paper.) A comparative analysis of the politics of three ostensibly secular societies regarding the remaining influence of conservative renderings of religious traditions.

The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in Post-Gulf War Iraq. By Denise Natali. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010. Pp. xiii, 158. $24.95 cloth.) Author explains the transition of the Kurdish north from a once-isolated outpost to an internationally recognized autonomous region and how it has influenced the relationship between the Kurdistan region and Iraq's central government.

Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia. By Toby Craig Jones. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. 320. $29.95 cloth.) This study details how environmental forces—oil, water, land, and agriculture—have shaped and influenced Saudi Arabia's modern political institutions and ideologies over the past 80 years.

Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. By Robert D. Kaplan. (New York: Random House, 2010. Pp. xi, 366. $28.00 cloth; $17.00 paper; $11.99 e-book.) Author details the importance of the Indian Ocean region—from the Horn of Africa to the Indonesian archipelago and beyond—to American power in the twenty-first century.

India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability in South Asia. By Sumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Pp. 152. $21.50 cloth; $14.50 paper.) Two authors of comprehensive books on South Asia's nuclear era offer competing theories on the transformation of the region and what these patterns mean for the world's next proliferators.

The Scorpion's Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan—And How It Threatens America. By Zahid Hussain. (New York: Free Press, 2010. Pp. 244. $25.00 cloth.) The author chronicles how and why Islamist extremist groups based out of the Pakistani tribal regions have increased their power and support, based on reporting inside Pakistan and interviews with militant leaders and military and intelligence sources.

Awakening Giants, Feet of Clay: Assessing the Economic Rise of China and India. By Pranab Bardhan. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Pp. vii, 172. $25.95 cloth; $25.95 e-book.) Provides a picture of China's and India's complex political economies at a time of global reconfiguration and change.

Allies of the State: China's Private Entrepreneurs and Democratic Change. By Jie Chen and Bruce J. Dickson. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. 220. $45.00 cloth.) Drawing on extensive fieldwork, this book explores the extent to which China's private sector supports democracy.

The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. By Gardner Bovingdon. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Pp. 280. $45.00 cloth.) Covers the history of Xinjiang and its population of Uyghurs (Chinese Muslims) and documents this group's struggles to achieve autonomy, independence, and recognition in the face of repression from the Chinese government within the context of the war on terrorism.

Failed Sanctions: Why the U.S. Embargo against Cuba Could Never Work. By Paolo Spadoni. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010. Pp. xv, 224. $34.95 cloth.) Author argues that the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba has not been very effective and has actually contributed to the recovery of the Cuban economy.

Gangs, Pseudo-Militaries, and Other Modern Mercenaries: New Dynamics in Uncomfortable Wars. By Max G. Manwaring. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010. Pp. vii, 256. $45.00 cloth.) Explores the prominent role "gangs" play in twenty-first-century irregular warfare through the use of case studies.

Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop It. By Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Pp. 349. $30.00 cloth; $20.00 paper; $18.00 e-book.) Explores the origins of suicide terrorism and strategies to

stop it through an examination of every suicide terrorist attack worldwide from 1980 through 2009.

Flawed Diplomacy: The United Nations and the War on Terrorism. By Victor D. Comras. (Sterling, VA: Potomac Books, 2010. Pp. ix, 256. $23.96 cloth.) From his perspective as one of the five UN Security Council-appointed international monitors on the measures being taken against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the author explores the international political realities and institutional problems inherent in how the UN has dealt with counterterrorism measures and its successes and failures in this area.

Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military. By Derek S. Reveron. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010. Pp. xi, 208. $29.95 paper.) Argues that promoting allies' militaries has become essential for U.S. national security. Provides an analysis of the shift in U.S. foreign policy from coercive diplomacy to cooperative military engagement and reasons why the U.S. military should be used in this context.

Violent Non-State Actors in World Politics. Edited by Klejda Mulaj. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Pp. vii, 475. $45.00 cloth.) Volume of essays follows the political, economic, and social processes behind the emergence of violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) and the ways they manipulate crises.

Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. By Robert Jervis. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010. Pp. 248. $27.95 cloth; $19.95 paper.) This book examines the politics and psychology of two intelligence failures: the belief that the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had an active weapons of mass destruction program in 2002.

Foreign Policy, Inc.: Privatizing American's National Interest. By Lawrence Davidson. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2009. Pp. 184. $35.00 cloth; $35.00 e-book.) Traces the history, evolution, and growing influence of private-interest groups and their impact on U.S. foreign policy.

Power and the Past: Collective Memory and International Relations. Edited by Eric Langenbacher and Yossi Shain. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010. Pp. 256. $29.95 paper.) This volume of essays explores how the memory of past events alters how countries interact in the present, how memory shapes public debate and policy making, and how memory may aid or impede conflict resolution.

The Fear of Barbarians: Beyond the Clash of Civilizations. By Tzvetan Todorov. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010. Pp. 233. $27.50 cloth; $18.00 e-book.) Drawing on history, anthropology, and politics, the author argues that the West must overcome its fear of Islam if it is to avoid betraying the values it claims to protect.

The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment. Edited by Richard Youngs. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. Pp. 206. $60.00 cloth.) Evaluates the efficacy of the European Union's efforts toward democratic reforms and human rights initiatives around the world.

Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace. By Christopher J. Fettweis. (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2010. Pp. 272. $29.95 cloth.) An examination of international politics in which the author claims the threat of war between great powers is unlikely and transnational threats can be contained.

Combating Weapons of Destruction: The Future of International Nonproliferation Policy. Edited by Nathan E. Busch and Daniel H. Joyner. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2009. Pp. ix, 360. $69.95 cloth; $24.95 paper.) Essays by experts in nonproliferation studies that examine challenges faced by the international community and propose directions for national and international policy making and lawmaking.

Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. By Wendy Brown. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010. Pp. 167, $25.95 cloth.) Examines the nature of state power in a globalized world through analysis of the subject of national wall building.

Selling War in a Media Age: The Presidency and Public Opinion in the American Century. Edited by Kenneth Osgood and Andrew K. Frank. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010. Pp. ix, 304. $44.95 cloth; $24.95 paper.) Essays regarding how modern presidents have influenced, coerced, directed, and led public opinion over matters of war and peace since 1898.

The Battle for Hearts and Minds: Uncovering the Wars of Ideas and Images Behind the Global War on Terror. By Timothy S. McWilliams. (North Charleston, SC: On-Demand Publishing, 2011. Pp. v, 273. $19.95 paper.) Traces the "war of ideas and images" (propaganda and media) from the prewar debates following 11 September 2001 through military action in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Imperial Moment. Edited by Kimberly Kagan. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. Pp. 268. $52.50 cloth.) In this series of essays, authors identify periods of transition across history that reveal how and why empires emerged.

Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present. Edited by Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moon. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. Pp. 453. $99.95 cloth; $29.95 paper.) Explores the social impact of America's more than 700 military bases throughout the world by examining interactions between U.S. troops and members of host communities.

Humanitarians in Hostile Territory: Expeditionary Diplomacy and Aid outside the Green Zone. By Peter W. Van Arsdale and Derrin R. Smith. (Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press, 2010. Pp. 352. $89.00 cloth; $34.95 paper.) Practical lessons for humanitarian aid workers, social scientists, and diplomats who find themselves working outside the safety "green zones" in challenging environments.

The Atlas of Global Inequalities. By Ben Crow and Suresh K. Lodha. (Berkley: University of California Press, 2011. Pp. 128. $21.95 paper.) Exploration of the topic of inequalities, including income and wealth, social conditions, political rights, and health issues through world, regional, and country maps and graphics.

Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2011: A Project of the Center on International Cooperation. Edited by Andrew M. Sinclair and Benjamin C. Tortolani. (Boulder, CO: Reinner, 2011. Pp. vii, 317. $27.50 paper.) Summaries of military peace missions around the world in 2010, including charts, statistics, and maps.

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