



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A164539

*Tired Marines of Company F, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, unwind during a pause in the fighting on Bunker Hill. Tank, artillery, air, and ground Marines participating in the battle gave up one outpost but took another, one that added strength not only to the outpost defense but also to the main line.*

supporting weapons laid down final protective fires that prevented this latest attack from gaining momentum. Fate then intervened when the crew of an M-46 tank triggered the shutter of its searchlight and illuminated a force of Chinese massing in a draw. Before these soldiers could launch their assault, fire from tanks, artillery, and mortars tore into the group, killing or wounding many and scattering the survivors.

Even though Marine-supporting weapons had deflected this planned thrust, the Chinese regrouped, called in additional supporting fire, and plunged ahead. The bombardment by mortars and artillery attained a volume of 100 rounds per minute before ending at about 0400, when the enemy realized that he could not overwhelm Bunker Hill and called off his attack, at least for the present. When the threat abated, Demas withdrew his company to the main line of resistance, leaving the defense of Bunker Hill to Captain Scranton's Company B.

The quiet lasted only until late afternoon. At 1640, the Chinese attacked during a thunderstorm, avoiding the use of mortars or artillery, presumably to achieve surprise, but once again the attack failed. The Chinese refused, however, to abandon their attempts to seize Bunker Hill. At 0040, 16 August, a Chinese battalion attacked behind mortar and artillery fire, penetrating to the crest of the hill. Captain Scranton, whose Company B held the hill, called for reinforcements, and a platoon from Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, arrived as this assault was ending. The enemy again probed the hill with fire but did not press the attack. Before Company C, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, relieved Scranton's unit, it came under artillery fire three more times.

The succession of Marine companies that took over Bunker Hill had to repel seven attacks before the end of August, but only one, on the night of 25-26 August, threatened to overrun the outpost.

The struggle for Bunker Hill cost the Marines 48 killed, 313 seriously wounded, and hundreds of others who suffered minor wounds. The number of known Chinese dead exceeded 400 and total casualties may have numbered 3,200. The month ended with Bunker Hill in Marine hands.

The capture of Bunker Hill by Colonel Layer's Marines and its subsequent defense relied on the deadly use of supporting arms, ranging from the tanks that had spearheaded the diversion against Siberia, through mortars and artillery, to aircraft. The searchlight-carrying M-46s, for example, helped illuminate Chinese troops massing to counterattack the hill and opened fire on them. Marine and Air Force fighter-bombers hit the enemy on Siberia, helped seize and hold Bunker Hill, and hammered the approaches to Stromboli, where F4Us dropped 1,000-pound bombs and napalm. Marine MPQ-14 radar directed nighttime strikes against Chinese artillery positions. In addition, Marine artillery played a critical role, especially the box-me-in fires planned for emergencies. The 11th Marines fired 10,652 shells in the 24 hours ending at 1800 on 13 August, a volume not exceeded until the final months of the war in 1953. Although supplies of explosive shells proved adequate at this time, illuminating rounds tended to be in short supply.

The Marines of 1952 were fighting a war of unceasing attrition far different from the succession of bloody campaigns, interspersed with time for incorporating replacements into units withdrawn from combat, that had characterized the war against Japan. Men and equipment had to be absorbed during sustained fighting to replace not only combat losses, but also administrative attrition

## Casualties and Courageous Hospital Corpsmen

The fighting at Bunker Hill would have been even deadlier for the Marines had it not been for their protective equipment and the excellent medical treatment available from battlefield first-aid stations to hospital ships off the coast. According to regimental surgeons, 17 wounded Marines would certainly have died had they not been wearing the new armored vest. Moreover, the steel helmet used in World War II had again proved its worth in deflecting or stopping shell fragments or nearly spent bullets. The heavy vest, though it undeniably saved lives, proved an enervating burden in the heat and humidity of the Korean summer and contributed to dehydration and heat exhaustion, but the advantage of increased safety—along with improved morale—more than outweighed the disadvantages.

The uniformly sloping terrain of Bunker Hill caused the Hospital Corpsmen assigned to the Marines to set up their forward aid stations on the reverse slope, overlooked by the Jamestown Line, to obtain protection from flat trajectory fire and direct observation by the enemy. Wounded Marines being evacuated from the aid stations for further treatment ran the risk of mortar and artillery fire. A shortage of tracked armored personnel carriers, which would have provided a measure of protection from hostile fire and a less jolting ride than ordi-

nary trucks, increased both the danger and the discomfort. Moreover, the stretcher rapidly became a precious item, since so many of the limited supply were being used for the time-consuming trip to surgical facilities some distance to the rear.

The 1st Medical Battalion had three collecting and clearing companies, two of which supported units committed on the division's main line of resistance while the third supported units on the Kimpo Peninsula. Located about six miles behind the line was the division hospital, a 200-bed facility staffed and equipped to provide definitive care for all types of cases. Serious cases or cases requiring specialized care were evacuated by helicopter, ambulance, hospital train, rail bus, or plane to a hospital ship at Inchon, Army Mobile Surgical Hospitals, or to the Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

The Surgeon General of the Navy, Rear Admiral Herbert L. Pugh, evaluated the medical support that he observed during the Bunker Hill fighting. He declared that medical treatment had been successful for a variety of reasons: the armored vest and steel helmet, of course; skilled Navy surgeons with access to a reliable supply of blood for transfusions; evacuation by helicopter to surgical facilities ashore or, if necessary, to hospital ships; and the courageous effort of Navy Hospital Corpsmen serving alongside the Marines.

Courtesy of Frank D. Praytor, USMC





caused by a fixed period of enlistment and a definite tour of duty in Korea. To help man his combat battalions, General Selden on 12 August directed rear-area units to provide replacements for the 1st Marines; within two days, some

200 men, most of them volunteers, joined the regiment's infantry units. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., approved flying 500 infantry replacements to Korea. Lieutenant General Franklin A.

Hart, in command of the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, requested a delay to make sure he could assemble the necessary air transport; he could, and on 21 August the replacements arrived in Korea. The Commandant also approved

## Change of Command

**O**n 29 August 1952, Major General John T. Selden, shown on the left in the accompanying photograph, relinquished command of the 1st Marine Division. His tenure as commanding general, which began in January 1952, earned him the U.S. Army's Distinguished Service Medal for conducting "successful operations against the enemy." During World War II, he had commanded the 5th Marines on New Britain and served as Chief of Staff, 1st Marine Division, in the conquest of Peleliu in the Palau Islands. After leaving Korea, he served on the staff of the Commander in Chief, U. S. Forces, Europe, until 1953 when he assumed command of Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton, California, from which post he retired in 1955. General Selden died in 1964 and was buried with full military honors in Arlington National Cemetery.

Born at Richmond, Virginia, in 1893, Selden enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1915 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in July 1918. Instead of being sent to France, he received orders to convoy duty in USS *Huntington*. Between the World Wars, he served in Haiti and China and at various posts in the United States. He attended the Senior Officers' Course at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, joined the 1st Brigade, which formed the nucleus of the 1st Marine Division, and participated in maneuvers at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When war came, he served in a variety of assignments in the Pacific before joining the 1st Marine Division in time for the New Britain campaign.

Command of the 1st Marine Division in Korea passed to Major General Edwin A. Pollock, a native of Georgia who graduated from The Citadel, South Carolina's military college, in 1921. He promptly resigned his commission in the Army Reserve and on 1 July accepted an appointment as a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. His early career included service in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua, on board ship, and with various installations and units in the United States.

Promoted to lieutenant colonel in April 1942, he commanded the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Guadalcanal, where on the night of 20-21 August, he earned the Navy Cross for his inspired leadership in repulsing a Japanese attack at the Tenaru River. He became a colonel in November 1943 and afterward saw action on New Britain and at Iwo Jima.



National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A164605

Following the war he served at Marine Corps Schools and Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, and at Headquarters Marine Corps. As a major general, he took over the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, before being reassigned to Korea, where he succeeded General Selden in command of the 1st Marine Division. General Pollock led the division in Korea from August 1952 until June 1953, in the final weeks of the war.

After Korea, General Pollock returned to Quantico as director of the Marine Corps Education Center, and then was assigned as commander Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island, South Carolina, before coming back to Quantico as Commandant of Marine Corps Schools. In 1956, he was appointed Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, followed by a tour as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, from which post he retired in 1959. General Pollock served in several capacities on The Citadel's Board of Visitors before his death in 1982.

Selden's request to increase by 500 men each of the next two scheduled replacement drafts.

### Fighting Elsewhere on the Outpost Line

As the month of August wore on, any lull in the action around Bunker Hill usually coincided with a surge in the fighting elsewhere, usually on the right of the main line of resistance, the segment held by the 5th Marines, commanded after 16 August by Colonel Eustace R. Smoak. On 6 August, while Colonel Culhane still commanded the regiment, the Chinese began chipping away at the outpost line in front of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which consisted of Outposts Elmer, Hilda, and Irene.

Because the battalion manned the outposts only in daylight, the Chinese simply occupied Elmer, farthest to the southwest, after dusk on 6 August and employed artillery fire to seal off the approaches and prevent the Marines from returning after daybreak. The Chinese took over Outpost Hilda on the night of 11 August, driving back the Marines sent to reoccupy it the following

morning. The same basic tactics enabled the enemy to take over Outpost Irene on the 17th. During an unsuccessful attempt to regain the third of the outposts, Private First Class Robert E. Simanek saved the lives of other Marines by diving onto a Chinese hand grenade, absorbing the explosion with his body, suffering severe though not fatal wounds, and earning the Medal of Honor.

Heavy rains comparable to the downpour of late July turned roads into swamps throughout the Marine sector, swept away a bridge over the Imjin River, and forced the closing of a ferry. Bunkers remained largely unaffected by flooding, but the deluge interfered with both air support and combat on the ground. Since the rain fell alike on the U.N. and Chinese forces, activity halted temporarily when nine inches fell between 23 and 25 August.

### Bunker Hill and Outpost Bruce


The Chinese greeted the new division commander, Major General Edwin A. Pollock, by exerting new pressure against the Bunker Hill complex, now held by

Captain Stanley T. Moak's Company E, 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, attached temporarily to the regiment's 3d Battalion. On the night of 4 September, Chinese gunners began shelling the outpost and probing its right flank, but small arms fire forced the enemy to pull back.

The resulting lull lasted only until 0100 on 5 September, when Chinese mortars and artillery resumed firing, concentrating on Hill 122, Bunker Hill. Apparently confident that the barrage had neutralized the defenses, the attackers ignored cover and concealment and moved boldly into an unexpected hail of fire that drove them back. After regrouping, the enemy attacked once again, this time making use of every irregularity in the ground and employing the entire spectrum of weapons from hand grenades to artillery. This latest effort went badly awry when a force trying to outflank Bunker Hill lost its way and drew fire from Marines on the main line of resistance. The attackers tried to correct their mistake only to come under fire from their fellow Chinese who had penetrated the extreme right of Bunker Hill's defenses and may have mistaken their comrades for counterattacking Marines. Amid the confusion, Moak's company surged forward and drove the enemy from the outpost. The Marines of Company E suffered 12 killed and 40 wounded in routing a Chinese battalion while killing an estimated 335 of the enemy.

Yet another diversionary attack on Outpost Stromboli coincided with the thrust against Bunker Hill. The Marines defending Stromboli sustained no casualties in breaking up an attack by an enemy platoon supported by machine guns.

The 2d and 3d Battalions of Colonel Smoak's 5th Marines





## Private First Class Alford L. McLaughlin

**A** 24-year-old native of Leeds, Alabama, he listed in the Marine Corps in 1945. Awarded a Purple Heart Medal in August 1952, his heroism again was recognized during the struggle on Bunker Hill on the night of 4-5 September 1952, while serving as a machine gunner with Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. His citation reads, in part:

When hostile forces attacked in battalion strength during the night, he maintained a constant flow of devastating fire upon the enemy, alternating employing two machine guns, a carbine and hand grenades. Although painfully wounded, he bravely fired the machine guns from the hip until his hands became blistered by the extreme heat from the weapons and, placing the guns on the ground to allow them to cool, continued to defend the position with his carbine and grenades. Standing up in full view, he shouted words of encouragement to his comrades above the din of battle and, throughout a series of fanatical enemy attacks, sprayed the surrounding area with deadly fire accounting for an estimated one hundred and fifty enemy dead and fifty wounded.

Remarkably, he survived this battle, made a continuing career in the Marine Corps, and eventually retired in 1977 as a master sergeant.


## Hospital Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold

**B**orn in Staten Island, New York, in 1931, he enlisted in the Navy and was assigned in 1951 to the Marine Corps where he bore the designation of "medical field technician." In Korea, while serving with 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, he was killed on 5 September 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

Benfold resolutely moved from position to position in the face of intense hostile fire, treating the wounded and lending words of encouragement. Leaving the protection of his sheltered position to treat the wounded, when the platoon area in which he was working was attacked from both the front and rear, he moved forward to an exposed ridge line where he observed two Marines in a large crater. As he approached the two men to determine their condition, an enemy soldier threw two grenades into the crater while two other enemy charged the position. Picking up a grenade in each hand, HC3c Benfold leaped out of the crater and hurled himself against the onrushing hostile soldiers, pushing the grenades against their chests and killing both the attackers.

In 1994, the Navy named a guided missile destroyer, USS *Benfold* (DDG 65), in his honor.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A49766-A



Navy Medicine Photo Collection

fought to defend their outpost line—from Allen in the west, through Bruce, Clarence, Donald, Felix, and Gary, to Jill in the east—against a succession of attacks that began in the early hours of 5 September. At Outpost Bruce—manned by Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, under Captain Edward Y. Holt, Jr.—a company of attacking infantry followed up a savage barrage. Private First Class Alford L. McLaughlin

killed or wounded an estimated 200 Chinese, victims of the machine guns, carbine, and grenades that he used at various times during the fight, and survived to receive the Medal of Honor. Private First Class Fernando L. Garcia, also earned the nation's highest award for heroism; though already wounded, he threw himself of a Chinese grenade, sacrificing his life to save his platoon sergeant. Hospitalman Third Class

Edward C. Benfold saw two wounded Marines in a shell hole on Outpost Bruce; as he prepared to attend to them, a pair of grenades thrown by two onrushing Chinese soldiers fell inside the crater. Benfold picked up one grenade in each hand, scrambled from the hole, and pressed a grenade against each of the two soldiers. The explosions killed both the Chinese, as Benfold sacrificed himself to save the two




## Private First Class Fernando L. Garcia

**B**orn in 1929 in Utuado, Puerto Rico, and inducted into the Marine Corps in 1951, he was killed at Outpost Bruce in the Bunker Hill area on 5 September 1952 while serving as a member of Company I, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines. The first Puerto Rican to be awarded a Medal of Honor, his citation reads, in part:

While participating in the defense of a combat outpost located more than one mile forward of the main line of resistance, during a savage night attack by a fanatical enemy force employing grenades, mortars, and artillery, Private First Class Garcia, although suffering painful wounds, moved through the intense hall of hostile fire to a supply point to secure more hand grenades. Quick to act when a hostile grenade landed nearby, endangering the life of another Marine, as well as his own, he unhesitatingly chose to sacrifice himself and immediately threw his body upon the deadly missile, receiving the full impact of the explosion.

The enemy then overran his position and his body was not recovered. In his honor, a camp at Vieques in Puerto Rico and a destroyer escort, USS *Garcia* (DE 1040), were named after him.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A403017

wounded Marines, earning a posthumous Medal of Honor.

When dawn broke on 5 September, Holt's Company I still clung to Outpost Bruce, even though only two bunkers, both on the slope nearest the Jamestown Line, survived destruction by mor-

tar and artillery shells. The commander of the 3d Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Oscar T. Jensen, Jr., rushed reinforcements, construction and other supplies, and ammunition to the battered outpost despite harassing fire directed at the trails leading there.


Marine and Air Force pilots tried to suppress the hostile gunners with 10 air strikes that dropped napalm as well as high explosive.


On the morning of 6 September, the defenders of Outpost Bruce beat off another attack, finally calling for box-me-in fires that temporarily put an end to infantry assaults. At dusk, however, the Chinese again bombarded the outpost, this time for an hour, before attacking with infantry while directing long-range fire at neighboring Outpost Allen to the southwest. The Marines defending Outpost Bruce survived to undergo further attack on the early morning of 7 September. Two Chinese companies tried to envelop the hilltop, using demolitions in an attempt to destroy any bunkers not yet shattered by the latest shelling.

For a total of 51 hours, the enemy besieged Outpost Bruce before breaking off the action by sunrise on the 7th. At Bruce, the site of the deadliest fighting in this sector, the Marines suffered 19 killed and 38 wounded, 20 more than the combined casualties sustained defending all the other outposts manned by the 2d and 3d

*The 1st Marine Division commander, MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, left, welcomes the United Nations commander, Gen Mark W. Clark, USA, to the division's area. Gen Clark had succeeded Gen Matthew B. Ridgway, who took over as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower.*

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A167677





Battalions, 5th Marines. Chinese killed and wounded at Outpost Bruce may have totaled 400.

### Pressure on Korean Marines

At the left of the line held by the 1st Marine Division, the frontage of the Korean Marine Corps veered southward, roughly paralleling the Sachon River as it flowed toward the Imjin. The Korean Marines had established a series of combat outposts on the broken ground between the Sachon and the

Jamestown Line. On the evening of 5 September, while the outposts manned by the 5th Marines were undergoing attack, Chinese artillery and mortars began pounding Outpost 37, a bombardment that soon included Outpost 36 to the southwest and an observation post on Hill 155 on the main line of resistance, roughly 1,000 yards from the boundary with the 1st Marines.

Chinese infantry, who had crossed the Sachon near Outposts 36 and 37, attacked both of them.

Two assaults on Outpost 37, which began at 1910, may have been a diversion, for at the same time the enemy launched the first of three attacks on Outpost 36. The final effort, supported by fire from tanks and artillery, overran the hill, but the Chinese had lost too many men and too much equipment—at least 33 bodies littered the hill along with a hundred abandoned grenades and numerous automatic weapons—forcing the enemy to withdraw the survivors. The Korean Marines suffered 16 killed or wounded from the platoon at Outpost 36 and another four casualties in the platoon defending Outpost 37.

Clashes involving the outposts of the Korean Marine Corps continued. The South Koreans dispatched tank-infantry probes and set up ambushes. At first, the Chinese responded to this activity with mortars and artillery, firing a daily average of 339 rounds between 12 and 19 September, about one-third of the total directed against Outpost 36. An attack by infantry followed.

Before sunrise on the 19th, Chinese troops again infiltrated across the Sachon, as they had two weeks earlier. They hid in caves and ravines until evening, when they advanced on Outposts 36, their principal objective, and 37, along with Outposts 33 and 31 to the south. A savage barrage of more than 400 rounds tore up the defenses rebuilt after the 5 September attack and enabled the Chinese to overwhelm Outpost 36. Shortly after midnight, a South Korean counterattack seized a lodgment on the hill, but the Chinese retaliated immediately, driving off, killing, or capturing those who had regained the outpost.

With the coming of daylight, Marine aircraft joined in battering





National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A165912

*MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, center, accompanied by Col Kim Suk Bum, commanding officer of the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, talks with members of the 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company concerning Marine air support for Korean Marine operations.*

enemy-held Outpost 36. Air strikes succeeded in hitting the far side of the hill, destroying mortars and killing troops massing in defilade to exploit the earlier success. Two platoons of Korean Marines—supported by fire from tanks, mortars, and artillery—followed up the deadly air attacks and regained Outpost 36, killing or wounding an estimated 150 of the enemy.

### Further Action Along the Line

In late September, while fighting raged around Outpost 36 in the sector held by the Korean Marines, the Chinese attacked the combat outposts manned by Colonel Layer's 1st Marines, especially Hill 122 (Bunker Hill) and Hill 124 at the southwestern tip of the same ridge line. The enemy struck first at Hill 124, attacking by flare-light from four directions but failing to

dislodge the squad dug in there, even though most of the Marines suffered at least minor wounds.

The entire ridge from Hill 124 to Hill 122 remained under recurring attack for the remainder of September, especially Bunker Hill itself, where the enemy clung to advance positions as close as 30 yards to Marine trenches. The Chinese frequently probed Bunker Hill's defenses by night, and the Marines took advantage of darkness to raid enemy positions, using portable flamethrowers and demolitions to destroy bunkers while fire from tanks and artillery discouraged counterattacks.

Tests earlier in the year had proved the theory that transport helicopters could resupply a battalion manning the main line of resistance. The next step was to determine if rotary wing aircraft could accomplish the logistical support

of an entire frontline regiment. For the five-day period, 22-26 September, Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 successfully supplied the 7th Marines with ammunition, gasoline, rations, and made a daily mail run. All but valuable cargo, such as mail, was carried externally in slings or wire baskets.

As October began, the Chinese saluted the new month with heavier shelling, the prelude to a series of attacks on outposts all across the division front from the Korean Marine Corps on the left, past the 1st Marines and Bunker Hill, to the far right, where the 7th Marines, commanded by Colonel Thomas C. Moore, Jr., had taken over from the 5th Marines, now in reserve. To make communications more secure, Colonel Moore's regiment redesignated Outposts Allen, Bruce, Clarence, Donald, Gary, and Jill, replacing proper names, in





National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A165528

*Gen Lemuel C. Shepberd, Jr., center, Commandant of the Marine Corps, looks at enemy positions while touring frontline Marine positions. LtCol Anthony J. Caputo, left, commanding officer of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, briefs the Commandant on the situation.*

alphabetical order, with the randomly arranged names of cities: Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle.

On the left, Chinese loudspeakers announced on the night of 1 October that artillery would level the outpost on Hill 86, overlooking the Sachon River, and warned the defenders to flee. When the South Korean Marines remained in place, a comparatively light barrage of 145 rounds exploded on the hill and its approaches, too few to dislodge the defenders. On the following evening at 1830, the Chinese resumed firing, this time from the high ground beyond Hill 36, and extended the bombardment to all the outposts within range. The Korean Marines dispatched a platoon of tanks to silence the enemy's direct-fire weapons, but the unit returned without locating the source of the enemy fire. After the tanks pulled back, Chinese artillery fire intensified, battering all the outposts until one red and one green flare burst

in the night sky. At that signal, the guns fell silent, and infantry attacked Outposts 36, 37, and 86.

Outpost 37, the northernmost of

*During Operation Haylift in late September, Sikorsky HRS-2 helicopters of HMR-161 lift cargo from the 1st Air Delivery Platoon area to the sector occupied by the 7th Marines. The cargo net slung under the helicopter greatly increased its lift capability.*

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A166041





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166198

*Replacements step ashore at "Charlie Pier." Brought from transports by landing craft, the Marines would board waiting trains for the four-and-one-half-hour trip to the division's lines.*

night of 2 October, a Chinese assault overran the outpost, forcing the Korean Marines to find cover at the foot of the hill and regroup. At mid-morning on the 3d, artillery barrages and air strikes pounded the enemy at Outpost 86, scattering the Chinese there and enabling a South Korean counterattack to regain the objective. The Korean Marines dug in, but on 6 October the Chinese again prevailed, holding the outpost until a South Korean counterattack in the early hours of the 7th forced them down the slope. At about dawn on that same morning, the enemy mounted yet another counterattack, advancing behind a deadly artillery barrage, seizing and holding Outpost 86, and ending this flurry of action on the outpost line in front of the Korean Marine Corps.

### Focus on 7th Marines


Although October passed rather quietly for the 1st Marines—except

for recurring probes, patrols, and ambushes in the vicinity of Bunker Hill—violent clashes erupted along the line held by the 7th Marines. The enemy began stubborn efforts, which persisted into 1953, to gain control of some or all of the nine combat outposts that Colonel Moore's regiment manned on the

high ground to its front.

The 7th Marines took over seven outposts when it relieved the 5th Marines, renaming them, from left to right, Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle. At the point—later known as the Hook—where the frontline veered southward toward the boundary with the British Commonwealth Division—the 7th Marines set up Outpost Warsaw. A second new outpost, Verdun, guarded the boundary between the Marine and Commonwealth divisions. An average of 450 yards separated four of these outposts—Detroit, Frisco, Seattle, and Warsaw—which occupied hills lower than those on the left of the regimental line and therefore were more easily isolated and attacked.

As they did so often, the Chinese began with a diversionary thrust, jabbing at Detroit before throwing knockout blows—artillery and mortar fire preceding an infantry attack—at Seattle and Warsaw. An enemy company overwhelmed the reinforced platoon on Warsaw on 2 October, but the Marines fought stubbornly before falling back. Private Jack W. Kelso picked up a grenade thrown into a





## Private Jack W. Kelso

**B**orn in 1934 in Madera, California, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1951. In Korea, he was awarded a Silver Star medal for heroism in August 1952. As a rifleman with Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, he was killed on 2 October 1952 near Sokchon. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

When both the platoon commander and the platoon sergeant became casualties during the defense of a vital outpost against a numerically superior enemy force attacking at night under cover of intense small-arms, grenade and mortar fire, Private Kelso bravely exposed himself to the hail of enemy fire in a determined effort to reorganize the unit and to repel the onrushing attackers. Forced to seek cover, along with four other Marines, in a near-by bunker which immediately came under attack, he unhesitatingly picked up an enemy grenade which landed in the shelter, rushed out into the open and hurled it back at the enemy.

Although painfully wounded when the grenade exploded as it left his hand, and again forced to seek the protection of the bunker when the hostile fire became more intensified, Private Kelso refused to remain in his position of comparative safety and moved out into the fire-swept area to return the enemy fire, thereby permitting the pinned-down Marines in the bunker to escape.




Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A164983

## Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins

**B**orn in 1925 in Seneca, South Carolina, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1950. While serving as a platoon guide for Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, he gave his life on 7 October 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

With his platoon assigned the mission of re-taking an outpost which had been overrun by the enemy earlier in the night, Staff Sergeant Watkins skillfully led his unit in the assault up the designated hill. Although painfully wounded when a well-entrenched hostile force at the crest of the hill engaged the platoon with intense small-arms and grenade fire, gallantly continued to lead his men. Obtaining an automatic rifle from one of the wounded men, he assisted in pinning down an enemy machine gun holding up the assault.

When an enemy grenade landed among Staff Sergeant Watkins and several other Marines while they were moving forward through a trench on the hill crest, he immediately pushed his companions aside, placed himself in position to shield them and picked up the deadly missile in an attempt to throw it outside the trench. Mortally wounded when the grenade exploded in his hand, Staff Sergeant Watkins, by his great personal valor in the face of almost certain death, saved the lives of several of his comrades.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A403014

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

bunker that he and four other Marines from Company I, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, were manning. Kelso threw the live grenade at the advancing Chinese, but it exploded immediately after leaving his hand. Although badly wounded, Kelso tried to cover the withdrawal of the other four, firing at the attackers until he suffered fatal wounds. Kelso earned a posthumous Medal of Honor, but heroism

alone could not prevail; numerically superior forces captured both Warsaw and Seattle.

The Marines counterattacked immediately. Captain John H. Thomas, in command of Company I, sent one platoon against Warsaw, but the enemy had temporarily withdrawn. The lull continued until 0145 on the morning of 4 October, when a Chinese platoon attacked only to be beaten

back by the Marines holding Warsaw.

Meanwhile, Captain Thomas mounted a counterattack against Seattle early on the morning of 3 October, sending out two squads from the company's position on the main line of resistance. Despite Chinese artillery fire, the Marines reached the objective, but Seattle proved too strongly held and Thomas broke off the counterat-



tack. As dusk settled over the battleground, Marine aircraft and artillery put down a smoke screen behind which the counterattack resumed, but the Chinese succeed-

ed in containing the two squads short of the crest. To regain momentum, another squad—this one from Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, which had

come under the operational control of the 3d Battalion—reinforced the other two, but the Chinese clinging to Seattle inflicted casualties that sapped the strength of the

## Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr.

**B**orn in 1929 in Hartford, Connecticut, he was appointed a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve 1952 and then ordered to active duty. He died heroically at "The Hook" on 26 October 1952 while serving as an artillery forward observer of Battery F, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines. The citation for his Medal of Honor award reads, in part:

Skinner, in a determined effort to hold his position, immediately organized and directed the surviving personnel in the defense of the outpost, continuing to call down fire on the enemy by means of radio alone until this equipment became damaged beyond repair. Undaunted by the intense hostile barrage and the rapidly closing attackers, he twice left the protection of his bunker in order to direct accurate machine-gun fire and to replenish the depleted supply of ammunition and grenades. Although painfully wounded on each occasion, he steadfastly refused medical aid until the rest of the men received treatment.

As the ground attack reached its climax, he gallantly directed the final defense until the meager supply of ammunition was exhausted and the position overrun. During the three hours that the outpost was occupied by the enemy, several grenades were thrown into the bunker which served as protection for Second Lieutenant Skinner and his remaining comrades. Realizing that there was no chance for other than passive resistance, he directed his men to feign death even though the hostile troops entered the bunker and searched their persons. Later, when an enemy grenade was thrown between him and two other survivors, he immediately threw himself on the deadly missile in an effort to protect the others, absorbing the full force of the explosion and sacrificing his life for his comrades.

In 1991, Skinner Hall at Quantico, Virginia, was dedicated in his honor.

## Second Lieutenant George H. O'Brien, Jr.

**B**orn in Fort Worth, Texas, in 1926, he enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1949. Ordered to active duty in 1951, he entered Officer Candidate School and was commissioned in 1952. As a rifle platoon leader with Company H, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, in the battle for the Hook on 27 October 1952, he was awarded a Medal of Honor with a citation, which reads, in part:

O'Brien leaped from his trench when the attack signal was given and, shouting for his men to follow, raced across an exposed saddle and up the enemy-held hill through a virtual hail of deadly small-arms, artillery and mortar fire. Although shot through the arm and thrown to the ground by hostile automatic-weapons fire as he neared the well-entrenched enemy position, he bravely regained his feet, waved his men onward and continued to spearhead the assault, pausing only long enough to go to the aid of a wounded Marine. Encountering the enemy at close range, he proceeded to hurl hand grenades into the bunkers and, utilizing his carbine to best advantage in savage hand-to-hand combat, succeeded in killing at least three of the enemy.

Struck down by the concussion of grenades on three occasions during the subsequent action, he steadfastly refused to be evacuated for medical treatment and continued to lead his platoon in the assault for a period of nearly four hours, repeatedly encouraging his men and maintaining superb direction of the unit.

He received a second Purple Heart Medal in January 1953, and after the war, he joined the Reserves and was promoted to major.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A301998



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A49768





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A165717

*Riflemen of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, take a break from frontline duty long enough to buy "luxuries" from the regimental Post Exchange truck. The truck toured the frontline twice a month offering Marines a chance to buy such items candy, cameras, and toilet articles.*

counterattack. While the Marines regrouped for another assault, the 11th Marines pounded the outpost with artillery fire. At 2225 on 3 October, the Marines again stormed the objective, but Chinese artillery prevailed, and Seattle remained in Chinese hands.

The loss of Outpost Seattle, the recapture of Warsaw, and a successful defense of Frisco against a Chinese probe on the night of 5 October did not mark the end of the effort to seize the outposts manned by the 7th Marines, but only a pause. The regiment's casualties—13 killed and 88 wounded by 3 October when the Marines suspended the attempt to retake Seattle—caused the 7th Marines to shuffle units. The 3d Battalion, commanded until 13 October by Lieutenant Colonel Gerald F. Russell, had suffered most of the casualties. As a result, while Russell's battalion reduced its frontage, the 1st Battalion, under

Lieutenant Colonel Leo J. Dulacki, moved from the regimental reserve to take over the right-hand portion of the Jamestown Line. Dulacki's Marines manned the main line of resistance from roughly 500 yards southwest of the Hook to the boundary shared with the Commonwealth Division, including Outposts Warsaw and Verdun. Colonel Moore thus placed all three battalions on line, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Caputo's 2d Battalion on the left, Russell's 3d Battalion in the center, and now Dulacki's 1st Battalion on the right.

The 7th Marines completed its realignment just in time to meet a series of carefully planned and aggressively executed Chinese attacks delivered on 6 and 7 October against five combat outposts and two points on the main line of resistance. The Marines struck first, however, when a reinforced platoon from Company C, 1st Battalion, attacked toward

Outpost Seattle at 0600 on 6 October. Mortar and artillery fire forced the platoon to take cover and regroup, even as the Chinese were reinforcing the outpost they now held. The attack resumed at 0900. Despite infantry reinforcements, air strikes, and artillery, the Marines could not crack Seattle's defenses and broke off the attack at about 1100, after losing 12 killed and 44 wounded. The attackers estimated that they had killed or wounded 71 Chinese.

On the evening of the 6th, the Chinese took the initiative, by midnight firing some 4,400 artillery and mortar rounds against the outpost line and two points on the main line of resistance. On the left of Colonel Moore's line, the enemy probed Outposts Carson and Reno, and on the right he stormed Warsaw, forcing the defenders to call for box-me-in fire that severed the telephone wire linking the outpost with the Jamestown Line. The first message from Warsaw when contact was restored requested more artillery fire, which by 2055 helped break the back of the Chinese assault, forcing the enemy to fall back.

The most determined attacks on the night of 6 October and early hours of the 7th hit Outposts Detroit and Frisco in the center of the regimental front. To divert attention from these objectives, each one manned by two squads, the Chinese probed two points on the main line of resistance that had already been subjected to artillery and mortar bombardment. At 1940 on the night of the 6th, an attacking company that had gained a foothold in the main trench on Detroit fell back after deadly fire stopped the enemy short of the bunkers. Two hours later, the Chinese again seized a segment of trench on Detroit and tried to exploit the lodgment. The Marines

reacted by calling on the 11th Marines to box in the outpost. Communications failed for a time, but at about 2115 the defenders of Detroit requested variable-time fire for airbursts over the bunkers, which would protect the Marines while the enemy outside remained exposed to a hail of shell fragments. The artillerymen fired as the Marines on Detroit asked, but the outpost again lost contact with headquarters of the 3d Battalion.

Two squads set out from the Jamestown Line to reinforce the Marines from Company G, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, manning Outpost Detroit. The Chinese frustrated this attempt with artillery fire but in the meantime again abandoned their foothold on Detroit, probably because of the shower of fragments from Marine shells bursting above them. The respite proved short-lived, however, for the enemy renewed the attack shortly after midnight and extended his control of the hill despite further scourging from the 11th Marines. A six-man Marine patrol

reached the outpost, returning at 0355 to report that the Chinese now held the trenchline and bunkers; only two of the Marines who had manned Detroit escaped death or capture. The attempt to break through to the outpost ended, and by 0630, the Marines engaged in the effort had returned to the main line of resistance.

Meanwhile, at about 2000, a Chinese company hit the two squads from Company H that held Outpost Frisco, north of Detroit. The assault troops worked their way into the trenches, but airbursts from Marine artillery reinforced the small arms fire of the defenders in driving the enemy back. The Chinese renewed the attack just after midnight, and two Marine squads advanced from the main line of resistance to reinforce Frisco, only to be stopped short of their goal by fire from artillery and mortars. Companies H and I of Russell's 3d Battalion made further attempts to reach Frisco during the early morning, but not until 0510 did a reinforced platoon from

Company I arrive and take control.

During the final attack, Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins, despite earlier wounds, took an automatic rifle from a more badly injured Marine and opened fire to keep the platoon moving forward. When a Chinese grenade landed near him, he seized it, but it exploded before he could throw it away, fatally wounding Watkins, whose leadership and self-sacrifice earned him a posthumous Medal of Honor. A second platoon from Company I joined the other unit atop the hill, and at 0715 Frisco was declared secure.

To keep Frisco firmly in Marine hands, however, would have invited attrition and ultimately required more men than General Pollock and Colonel Moore could spare from the main line of resistance. Consequently, the 7th Marines abandoned the outpost. The regiment had yielded three outposts—Detroit, Frisco, and Seattle—but forced the Chinese to pay a high price, estimated to include 200 killed. The losses suffered by the 7th Marines totaled 10 killed, 22 missing, and 128 wounded, 105 of them seriously enough to require evacuation.

Since the Chinese also wrested Outposts 37, 36, and 86 from the Korean Marine Corps, the 1st Marine Division had lost six combat outposts of varying tactical importance. The lost outposts and those that remained in Marine hands had no value except to the extent their possession affected the security of the Jamestown Line. As a result, the Marines remained wary of mounting major counterattacks; to provide continued protection for the main line of resistance, General Pollock would rely on nighttime patrols and listening posts to supplement the remaining outposts and replace the captured ones.

*During the battles of October 1952, a number of Marine bunkers on the Jamestown Line were severely damaged by Chinese mortar and artillery fire.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A167465







Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166429

*The Marine in the foreground reads while others talk or sleep just before jumping off into "no-man's-land" on the Hook.*

Unlike the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, which experienced shortages of spare parts, especially for its newer planes and helicopters, the 1st Marine Division emerged from the outpost fighting with few supply problems except for communications gear. The Army helped with replenishment by releasing essential spare parts from stocks in Japan, and new radio, telephone, and teletype equipment also arrived from the United States. The Army, moreover, tapped its stocks for new trucks to replace the division's worn-out vehicles. To operate the logistics network more efficiently, the division placed the re-equipped truck units

in direct support of the infantry regiments instead of keeping them in a centralized motor pool. The change reduced both the total mileage driven and vulnerability to artillery fire. In another attempt to improve logistics, the Marines increased from 500 to 800 the number of Korean laborers serving with each of the front-line regiments.

### Chinese Attack the Hook

The fighting for the outposts that raged early in October died down, although the Chinese jabbed from time to time at Bunker Hill and continued their nighttime

patrolling elsewhere along the Jamestown Line. During the lull, Colonel Smoak's 5th Marines took over the center of the division's line from the 1st Marines, which went into reserve, improving the fall-back defense lines, undergoing training, and patrolling to maintain security in the rear areas. As the division reserve, the 1st Marines prepared to counterattack if the enemy should penetrate the main line of resistance. Indeed, the regiment had to be ready to help block a Chinese breakthrough anywhere in I Corps, which held the western third of the United Nations line.

With the 1st Marines now in reserve, Colonel Moore's 7th Marines manned the right of the division's line placing all three battalions on line and keeping only one company from the 3d Battalion in reserve. To replace this company, Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Barrett, the 3d Battalion's new commander, organized a platoon of cooks, drivers, and other members of the headquarters into an improvised platoon that served as his unit's reserve. Barrett's thinly spread 3d Battalion manned two combat outposts—Berlin and East Berlin, the latter established on 13 October—besides defending the center of the regimental line.

To the left of Barrett's unit, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Caputo defended its portion of the regimental line and maintained three combat outposts, Carson, Reno, and Vegas. Like Barrett's battalion in the center, Caputo's Marines held a sector with few vulnerable salients that the aggressive Chinese might pinch off and capture.

On the far right of the regimental line, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's 1st Battalion held the dominant terrain feature in the reg-

## Distant Strikes to Close Air Support

During the struggle over the combat outpost line, from late July through early October, the 1st Marine Division benefited from a shift in aerial strategy. Long-range interdiction, an important element of U. S. Air Force doctrine, gave way to a policy of hitting the enemy wherever he might be, whether exercising control from the North Korean capital of Pyongyang or massing to attack Bunker Hill or some other outpost.

United Nations aircraft hit Pyongyang hard in July and again in August. The 11 July attack consisted of four separate raids, the last of them after dark. The operation, named Pressure Pump, blasted headquarters buildings, supply dumps, and the radio station, which was silenced for two days. Of 30 individual targets attacked on the 11th, three were obliterated, 25 damaged in varying degrees and only two survived intact. On 29 August, three daylight raids damaged 34 targets on a list of 45 that included government agencies—among them the resurrected Radio Pyongyang—factories, warehouses, and barracks.

According to Colonel Samuel S. Jack, chief of staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, a shift of emphasis away from long-range interdiction caused the Far East Air Forces to endorse the wing's using its aircraft primarily to respond to requests for support from the 1st Marine Division. Even as the Air Force became more cooperative, Army commanders complained about the air support they received and began agitating for a more responsive system, like that of the Marine Corps, that would cover the entire battlefield. General Mark W. Clark, the United Nations commander since May 1952, refused, however, to tamper with the existing system that in effect gave the Far East Air Forces, an Air Force headquarters, "coordination control" over the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and channeled requests through a Joint Operations Center. Instead, he called for increasing the efficiency of the current arrangement to reduce reaction time.

During the defense of Bunker Hill in August, 1,000 sorties, most of them by Marines, bombed and strafed the attacking Chinese. In early October, when the fighting shifted eastward to the outposts manned by the 7th Marines, the wing flew 319 close air support sorties.

Besides coming to the aid of their fellow Marines on the ground, crews of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing supported the U. S. and South Korean armies. In July, for example, eight heavily-armed and armored AU-1 Corsairs from Marine Attack Squadron 323 attacked Chinese mortar positions, antitank weapons, and troop concentrations opposing the Republic of Korea's I Corps. Rockets, 1,000-pound bombs, napalm, and 20mm fire killed an estimated 500 of the enemy. Similarly, four




National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A133864  
*Col John P. Condon, left, commanding officer of Marine Aircraft Group 33, shows BGen Clayton C. Jerome, the area strafed in the largest Marine jet strike of the Korean War.*

pilots from Marine Fighter Squadron 311 helped the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division by destroying three bunkers and two artillery pieces while collapsing some 50 feet of trench.

In operations like these, weather could prove as deadly as antiaircraft fire. On 10 September, as 22 Panther jets were returning from a strike near Sariwon, fog settled over their base. Sixteen planes landed safely at an alternate airfield, but the others flew into a mountain as they approached the runway, killing all six pilots.

Marine helicopters continued to fly experimental missions, as when Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 deployed multiple-tube 4.5-inch rocket launchers from one position to another, thus preventing Chinese observers from using, as an aiming point for effective counterbattery fire, the dust cloud that arose when the rockets were launched. The same squadron, using 40 percent of its assigned helicopters for the purpose, delivered enough supplies to sustain the 7th Marines for five days. Problems continued to nag the helicopter program, however. The Sikorsky HO3S-1 light helicopter—used for liaison, observation, and casualty evacuation—had to be grounded in October to await spare parts.





imental sector, the Hook, where the high ground that defined the Jamestown Line veered sharply to the south. Outposts Seattle and Warsaw had protected the Hook, but only Warsaw remained in Marine hands. To restore the security of the Hook, Dulacki set up a new outpost, Ronson, some 200 yards southeast of enemy-held Seattle and 275 yards west of the Hook. Ronson guarded the western approaches to the Hook, while Warsaw commanded the lowlands east of the Hook and a narrow val-

ley leading eastward toward the Samichon River.

If the Chinese should seize the Hook, disastrous results might follow, for the Hook held the key to controlling the Samichon and Imjin valleys. Its capture could expose the rear areas of the 1st Marine Division and force that unit and the adjacent Commonwealth Division to fall back two miles or more to find defensible terrain from which to protect the northeastern approaches to Seoul. Because of the Hook's importance,

Colonel Moore set up his headquarters on Hill 146 near the base of the salient.

Opposite the 7th Marines, the Chinese had massed two infantry regiments, totaling some 7,000 men, supported by 10 battalions of artillery ranging in size from 75mm to 122mm and later to 152mm. The enemy, moreover, had learned during the fighting at Bunker Hill and along the outpost line to make deadlier use of his artillery, massing fires and, when the Marines counterattacked, imitating the box-me-in fires used by the 11th Marines. In preparation for an attack on the Hook, the Chinese massed their artillery batteries within range of the salient, stockpiled ammunition, and dug new trenches that reached like tentacles toward the various elements of the outpost line and afforded cover and concealment for attacking infantry.

Against the formidable concentration of Chinese troops and guns, Colonel Moore's regiment could muster 3,844 Marines, officers and men, supported by 11 Navy medical officers and 133 Hospital Corpsmen, three Army communications specialists, and 746 Korean laborers with their 18 interpreters. As in the earlier fighting, the 7th Marines could call upon the 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the 11th Marines, and other Marine supporting weapons including rocket batteries, tanks, and aircraft. Army artillery and Air Force fighter-bombers reinforced the firepower of the division.

In the words of Staff Sergeant Christopher E. Sarno of the 1st Marine Division's tank battalion: "Korea was an artilleryman's paradise." It seemed to him that the Chinese always fought by night, making effective use of an arsenal of weapons. The burp guns and mines were bad, Sarno said, but

the worst was the artillery, which "could blast a man's body to bits so that his remains were picked up in a shovel."

The static battle line obviously placed a premium on artillery, especially the 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the Army and Marine Corps. Indeed, by mid-October 1952 American batteries were firing these shells at a more rapid rate than during the bloody fighting in the early months of 1951, when United Nations forces advanced beyond the 38th Parallel and conducted offensive operations like Killer and Ripper. By the fall of 1952, firepower, especially

artillery, dominated the battleground, as probes, patrols, ambushes, and attacks on outposts took the place of major offensives.

Because of the demand of artillery support, the rationing of 105mm and 155mm shells became necessary. During the last 11 days of October, a quota prevailed, at least for purposes of planning. In support of the 7th Marines, each 105mm howitzer might fire a daily average of 20 rounds and each 155mm howitzer 4.3 rounds. The 81mm mortars located in each battalion also suffered from a shortage of shells, and even hand grenades were now scarce. To do the work

of mortars and artillery, Colonel Moore employed tripod-mounted, water-cooled .30-caliber machine guns. These weapons employed the techniques of World War I, engaging targets like potential assembly areas with indirect fire based on map data and adjusted by forward observers, as well as aimed direct fire.

The enemy initiated his attack on the Hook by battering the salient and its combat outposts with mortar and artillery fire; an estimated 1,200 rounds exploded among the trenches and bunkers on the Hook and Outposts Ronson and Warsaw between dusk on 24 October and dawn on the 25th. The Marine defenders, aided by detachments from the Korean Service Corps, struggled to keep pace with the destruction, repairing damage as best they could during lulls in the bombardment only to face new damage when the shelling resumed.

While shoring up trenches and bunkers, the 7th Marines fought back. In the hardest hit area, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's 1st Battalion returned fire with its own mortars, machine guns, and recoilless rifles, while the regimental mortars and tanks joined in. Despite the shortage of high-explosive shells, the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, fired some 400 105mm rounds in response to the first day's Chinese bombardment, 575 rounds on the 24 October, and 506 on the 25th, balancing the need to conserve ammunition against the worsening crisis. Air strikes also pounded the enemy massing near the Hook and the two nearby outposts, including attacks by four Panther jets from VMF-311 that dropped high explosives and napalm on Chinese troops massing some 750 yards east of the salient.

During the 24 hours beginning

*Ammunition carriers step aside to let litter barriers pass with a wounded Marine during the battle for the Hook.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166424





National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A169052

*The crew of Number 5 gun, Battery L, 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, loads its 155mm howitzer after receiving word to prepare for a fire mission.*

at 1800 on the 25th, Chinese gunners scourged Colonel Moore's regiment with another 1,600 mortar and artillery shells, most of them exploding on the ground held by Dulacki's battalion. The shelling abated briefly on the 25th but resumed, convincing the division's intelligence officer, Colonel Clarence A. Barninger, that the enemy was planning a major attack to overwhelm the Hook and gain control of the Samichon Valley. Barninger warned the division's commander, General Pollock, well in advance of the actual attack.

The Chinese fire diminished somewhat on the morning of 26 October, but the Hook remained a dangerous place. On that morning, Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki took advantage of a lull to inspect the defenses, only to be knocked down by the concussion from an enemy shell. He escaped with bruises and abrasions and continued his rounds. The intensity of the bombardment increased later in the morning and continued after dark in preparation for attacks on Outposts Ronson and

Warsaw and the Hook itself.

Chinese troops stormed Ronson at 1810 on 26 October after three days of preparatory fire that had collapsed trenches, shattered bunkers, and killed and wounded Marines at both outposts and on the Hook. At Ronson, 50 or more of the enemy penetrated the

*Chinese shells explode in the valley below as Marines on the Hook move about in their trenches.*

defensive artillery concentrations, overran the position, and killed or captured the members of the reinforced squad manning the outpost.

At about the same time, a Chinese company split into two groups and attacked Outpost Warsaw simultaneously from the east and west. A box-me-in barrage fired by the 11th Marines could not prevent the assault troops for closing in on the defenders, led by Second Lieutenant John L. Babson, Jr. The Marines at Warsaw fought back with grenades, pistols, and rifles, using the latter as clubs when ammunition ran out. Taking cover in the wreckage of the bunkers, they called for variable-time fire directly overhead. Hope lingered that the rain of shell fragments had saved Warsaw, but after four hours of silence from the garrison, Colonel Moore reluctantly concluded that Warsaw was lost, its defenders either dead or captured. Lieutenant Babson was one of those killed.

While the fate of Warsaw still

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166773






remained in doubt and a platoon from Captain Paul B. Byrum's Company C was preparing to reinforce the outpost, a flurry of Chinese shells battered the Hook. Colonel Moore reacted by sending Captain Frederick C. McLaughlin's Company A, which Byrum's unit had just relieved, to help Company C defend the salient. Moore also directed that the 1st Battalion have first call on the regiment's supply of ammunition. In addition, the 1st Marine Division lifted the restrictions on artillery ammunition fired in support of the Hook's defenders.

Under cover of artillery and mortar fire, a Chinese battalion launched a three-pronged attack on Dulacki's 1st Battalion. By 1938 on the 26th, Chinese infantry first threatened the main line of resistance southwest of the Hook itself, to the left of the salient and roughly halfway to the boundary with the 3d Battalion. Within a few minutes, a second attack hit the very nose of the Hook, while a third struck its eastern face. Mingled with the assault troops were laborers carrying construction materials to fortify the Hook after the three prongs of the attack had isolated and overrun it.

The thrust along the ridge that formed the spine of the Hook continued until the Chinese encountered the observation post from which Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr., was directing the fire of the 11th Marines. The lieutenant organized the defense of this bunker, running from cover when necessary to replenish the supply of small arms ammunition. He was still calling down artillery fire when the attackers overran the Hook. He then told his men to play dead until other Marines counterattacked. For three hours, they fooled the Chinese who entered the bunker. Finally, an



National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A165743

*MajGen Paul A. Kendall, center, I Corps commander, receives a tactical briefing from Col Russell E. Honsowetz, operations officer of the 1st Marine Division. To MajGen Kendall's right is MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, 1st Marine Division commander, and to Col Honsowetz' left Col Thomas C. Moore, commanding officer of the 7th Marines.*


enemy soldier became suspicious and threw a grenade inside. Skinner rolled onto the grenade, absorbing the force of the explosion and saving the lives of two of his men. His sacrifice resulted in the posthumous award of the Medal of Honor.

To the left of the Hook, the assault force outflanked a platoon of Company C, led by Second Lieutenant John W. Meikle, but he succeeded in pulling back the flanks to form a perimeter. East of the Hook, on the 1st Battalion's right, other elements of Company C formed another perimeter. In the 400 yards separating the two, scattered groups from Byrum's company struggled to close the gap.

Help for Company C began arriving at about 2330, after the Chinese had overrun the Hook, when the first elements of McLaughlin's Company A, sent to reinforce Byrum's Marines, made contact with Meikle's perimeter to

the left rear of the captured salient. The arrival of reinforcements enabled the members of Company C, scattered between the two perimeters, to form a blocking position on a ridge running east and west a few hundred yards to the rear of the Hook. At 0300 on the 27th, Colonel Moore committed the regimental reserve, Company H, 3d Battalion. General Pollock ordered the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, from the division reserve into the sector held by Moore's 7th Marines.

The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, had the mission of counterattacking the Chinese who had seized the Hook and penetrated the Jamestown Line. Anticipating commitment in this critical sector, the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sidney J. Altman, had already drawn up a basic plan for such a counterattack and personally reconnoitered the area. Now Altman's Marines prepared to exe-



cute that plan. Tank gunners, mortar crews, and artillerymen battered the recently captured Outpost Warsaw, other Chinese troop concentrations, firing batteries, and supply routes. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing also joined in, as Grumman Tigercat night fighters used the ground-based MPQ radar to hit the main Chinese supply route sustaining the attack, dropping their bombs less than a mile west of the Hook.

### Action at Outpost Reno

While the 3d Battalion prepared to counterattack the Hook, the enemy made a new thrust at the 7th Marines. Early on the morning of 27 October, the Chinese attacked Reno, one of the outposts manned by Lieutenant Colonel Caputo's 2d Battalion. Some two miles west of the Hook, the battalion's three outposts formed an arrowhead aimed at Chinese lines, with Reno at the point, Carson on

the left, and Vegas on the right.

The pattern of hostile activity opposite the 7th Marines earlier in October persuaded General Pollock's intelligence specialists that the enemy had given first priority to seizing Caputo's three outposts. This estimate of Chinese intentions caused the 11th Marines to plan concentrations in front of the 2d Battalion, while Caputo set up strong ambush positions to protect the threatened outposts.

On the night before the assault on Reno, Captain James R. Flores led a reinforced platoon from Company E into the darkness. The patrol's destination was a camouflaged ambush position about 300 yards south of Reno and halfway between Carson and Vegas. At midnight, noises to the front alerted Flores and his men that the enemy had infiltrated between them and the outpost and were preparing to attack Reno from the rear. The ambush force alerted the Marines defending the outpost of

the danger behind them and opened fire when the force, estimated at two Chinese companies, seemed on the verge of attacking. Although raked by fire from the front and rear, the enemy fought back, holding the Marines in check until they could break off the action and make an orderly withdrawal to the main line of resistance.

Quiet enveloped Outpost Reno until 0400 on the 27th, when a Chinese platoon attacked from the northwest, assaulting in two waves. The Marines on Reno beat back this first attack, but a second thrust from the same direction broke through the perimeter. The defenders took cover so that variable-time artillery fire bursting overhead could maul the enemy. The tactics worked to perfection, forcing the Chinese to abandon their lodgment after some 40 minutes of fighting

### Counterattacking the Hook

After the ambush by Marines behind Reno, while the outpost's defenders were fighting off the subsequent Chinese assaults, Captain McLaughlin's Company A passed through the line established by Byrum's Marines and began advancing toward the Hook. Enemy mortar and artillery fire stopped McLaughlin's unit short of the objective, forcing him to order his Marines to dig in and hold the ground they had gained.

When McLaughlin's counterattack stalled, Colonel Moore attached the last of the regimental reserve—Company H, 3d Battalion, under Captain Bernard B. Belant—to Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's 1st Battalion. At 0505, Belant reported to Dulacki, who directed him to renew the counterattack. Within three hours, Company H stood ready to attack

the Chinese, whose bridgehead encompassed the Hook itself and a crescent of ridges and draws extending from the spine of that terrain feature and embracing a segment of the main line of resistance about a half-mile wide.

As Belant led his unit forward, it rapidly covered the first 200 yards before Chinese small arms, mortar, and artillery fire shifted to meet the threat. The company commander pressed the attack, however. Second Lieutenant George H. O'Brien, Jr., led his platoon over the ridge to his front, the men zigzagging as they ran toward the Chinese-held trenchline. A bullet struck O'Brien's armored vest, knocking him down, but he scrambled to his feet and continued toward the enemy, pausing only briefly to help a wounded man. Throwing grenades and firing his carbine, he silenced the Chinese weapons in a bunker and led his platoon toward the Hook itself. This headlong assault, which

*Marines climb an improved trail to bring ammunition to machine gunners on the Hook.*

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166423



earned O'Brien the Medal of Honor, broke through the Chinese perimeter and approached the enemy-held bunkers on the Hook before being contained by hostile mortar and artillery fire. The remainder of Company H widened the crack that O'Brien's platoon had opened and captured three prisoners as it overran the southeastern portion of the Hook before a fierce shelling forced the advance elements to find cover and yield some of the ground they had taken.

Marine aircraft helped Company H advance onto the Hook, attacking reinforcements moving into battle and the positions from which the Chinese were firing or adjusting fire. Key targets included the former Marine outposts of Irene, Seattle, and Frisco, along with the frequently bombed main supply route and those enemy troops trying to dislodge the Marines who had gained a foothold on the Hook. Fire from Marine tanks and artillery engaged some of the same targets and proved deadly against trenches and bunkers that the Chinese had seized. The howitzers also joined mortars in counterbattery fire.

At midday on 27 October, after General Pollock had released Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, to Colonel Moore's control, the counterattack to regain the Hook entered its final phase. Company I would drive the enemy onto the Hook, after which Company H, the unit that had penetrated the Chinese perimeter earlier in the day, was to take over the right of the 1st Battalion's line, relieving Company B, which would make a final assault on the Hook and recapture both the Hook and Outpost Warsaw.

Captain Murray V. Harlan, Jr., who commanded Company I, launched his attack early in the

afternoon. The 1st Platoon, which led the way, seized the crest of the ridge to its front at 1350 and began advancing toward the Hook behind a barrage laid down by the 11th Marines. The Chinese reacted to the threat from Harlan's company with deadly artillery and mortar concentrations directed against not only the advancing Marines, but also Colonel Moore's command post and the weapons along the Jamestown Line that supported the assault.

Despite severe casualties, Harlan's Marines pushed ahead, at times crawling from one outcropping in the shell-torn earth to another. After pausing to reorganize at about 1635, the company moved, a few men at a time, onto the Hook, regaining the bunker where Lieutenant Skinner had sacrificed his life for his men and forging ahead against die-hard Chinese in collapsed bunkers and trenches. The deadliest fire came, as always, from enemy mortars and artillery shells that plunged steeply onto the Hook before exploding. Company I took such cover as it could find, but terrain afforded concealment and greater protection from flat-trajectory than from high-angle-fire weapons.

By midnight on 28 October, Company B had threaded its way through a maze of shell craters and moved into position to the left of Company I. Shortly afterward Company B began what Dulacki had planned as the final assault on the Hook. Small arms fire and a shower of grenades from the Chinese positions stopped the Marines as they attacked with rifles and grenades of their own. After exchanging fire with the enemy for perhaps 90 minutes the company fell back to obtain cover and called for mortar and artillery fire. The shelling battered not only the strongpoints immediately to the





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A166425

*A Marine casualty arrives at a rear aid station for emergency treatment and evacuation to a hospital. Ammunition carrier in the background starts uphill with belted ammunition.*

front of Company B, but also the enemy's supporting weapons and the routes of reinforcement and replenishment that passed through the Chinese-held outposts of Warsaw and Ronson. The Marines renewed the assault at 0340, broke through, and by 0600 overran the Hook. Afterward, elements of Colonel Moore's regiment reoccupied Warsaw and Reno, which the enemy had abandoned.

A dense fog settled over the Hook as Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's battalion killed or captured Chinese stragglers and reorganized the defenses. The battle for the Hook and its two outposts, along with the diversionary action at Outpost Reno, cost the Chinese 269 dead and wounded, a number verified as best the Marines could, and perhaps another 953 casualties that escaped verification. In preventing the enemy from gaining a

permanent tactical advantage at the Hook, the Marines lost 70 killed, 386 wounded, and 39 missing, of whom 27 were prisoners of the Chinese. At Reno, nine Marines were killed and 49 wounded.

During the struggle for the Hook, Chinese mortars and artillery proved as deadly as usual in both defending against Marine attack and battering Marine defenses. The enemy sent additional soldiers immediately behind the assault troops, intending that they exploit any breakthrough by the earlier waves, but the tactics failed to accomplish the intended purpose. Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki believed that the gambit failed because too few junior officers were on hand to commit the reserve at the precise moment to maintain momentum.

Dulacki also found flaws with his Marines. Judging from the fre-

quency of malfunctions, they did not appear to be cleaning and caring for their weapons, as they should. Dulacki also expressed concern that the Marines had become too willing to seek the cover of bunkers during Chinese attacks, gaining protection from shell fragments—though not from satchel charges or direct hits by large-caliber shells—at a sacrifice in fields of fire. He believed that infantrymen should build and fight from individual positions with at least some overhead cover, rather than from large bunkers in which several defenders might be isolated and attacked with explosive charges or trapped if a direct hit collapsed the structure.

### Renewed Action Against Korean Marines

From the Hook, the fighting returned to the sector of the South Korean Marines on the left of the 5th Marines. The most vulnerable points along the segment of the Jamestown Line held by the Korean Marines were Combat Outposts 39, 33, 31, and 51. Outposts 39, 33, and 31 were located near the boundary with the 5th Marines and manned by the 5th Battalion, Korean Marine Corps, which had relieved the 3d Battalion on the afternoon of 31 October. The 2d Battalion of the Korean Marine Corps maintained Combat Outpost 51, in front of its lines.

An assault against these four hilltop outposts would represent an extension of the attacks in early October that had overrun three other South Korean outposts—86 to the south, 36, and 37. The dominant terrain feature in this area was Hill 155 on the main line of resistance in the sector of the 5th Battalion, a promontory that overlooked not only the Sachon Valley

and the Chinese activity there, but also the Panmunjom corridor and its environs. The enemy made no attempt to disguise his designs on the outposts and ultimately the hill, unleashing a savage bombardment—more than 3,000 rounds during the 48 hours ending at 1800, 31 October—that rocked the South Korean positions, especially Outposts 39 and 33.

The anticipated Chinese attack began at 1830 on the 31st, when the Chinese probed Outposts 39 and 33, apparently in an attempt to exploit any confusion resulting from the 5th Battalion's relief of the 3d. Artillery fire blocked these enemy jabs but did not end the night's fighting. At 2200, an eight-minute bombardment struck the four outposts in preparation for infantry assaults against all of them.

On the right, a Chinese company pressured the platoon of South Korean Marines holding Outpost 31 until 0155, when defensive fire prevailed and the attack ended. At Outpost 33, another enemy company broke through a perimeter manned by only two South Korean squads, which clung to parts of the hill until 0515 when, with the help of artillery fire, they drove off the Chinese.

Two enemy companies attacked Outpost 39, the nearest of the four to Hill 155. The platoon of South Korean Marines deployed there yielded some ground before taking advantage of defensive artillery concentrations to eject the Chinese by 0410. The enemy again probed the outpost two hours later, but soon broke off the action on the right of the sector held by the South Korean Marines.

On the left, four Chinese companies attacked Combat Outpost 51, the most heavily defended of the four, since an entire company had dug in there. It was also the



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A168017

*Men of the 5th Marines eat hot chow cooked and brought up to them on the front-lines from the battalion command post to the rear. Marines often ate in relays so as not to hamper operations*

most remote of the outposts, 2,625 yards from the main line of resistance, and this vulnerable location may have persuaded the enemy to scrimp on shelling. Except for 20 rounds of 90mm fire from Soviet-built tanks, the bombardment here was lighter and less effective than at the other three outposts. Three Chinese companies attacked Outpost 51 from the southwest and another from the north. After some initial gains, the attack lost momentum and ended at 0330.

### Period of Comparative Calm

Despite the clashes involving the Korean Marines, a lull settled over the division following the fierce action at the Hook. Elements of the Commonwealth Division assumed responsibility for the Hook itself on 3 November, but the 11th Marines continued to fire in support of the salient's British

defenders. On the night of 18-19 November, for example, Marine artillerymen fired some 2,000 rounds to help break up a Chinese attack.

Meanwhile, the 1st Marines replaced the 7th Marines in manning the right of the division's main line of resistance. On 22 November, the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, in regimental reserve, provided one company for Operation Wakeup, a raid on Chinese positions opposite Combat Outposts Reno and Vegas. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Warren, assigned the mission to Captain Jay V. Poage's Company D, which attacked just before dawn. The operation succeeded mainly in demonstrating the strength of the Chinese, whose defensive fire stopped the attack short of the objective and frustrated the plan to seize and interrogate

## Life in the Bunkers

Upon arriving on the Jamestown Line, the 1st Marine Division made use of log-and-sandbag bunkers, which Second Lieutenant William Watson, described as a simultaneous curse and blessing. Although the structures provided "places of some comfort to which Marines went to get dry and sleep and to escape incoming [fire]," the "sandbag castles" lured men out of their fighting positions. Once inside a bunker, the Marines could be killed or wounded not only by a direct hit by a heavy shell that collapsed the structure, but also by a grenade or explosive charge hurled inside.


Given the vulnerability of bunkers and their effect on aggressiveness, it was no wonder, said Watson, that he and his fellow junior officers had received no formal instruction in bunker placement or construction. "They didn't teach bunker building at Quantico," he recalled. "Who would have dared?" In a Marine Corps trained "to assault and dominate the enemy," anyone foolish enough to advocate the use of defensive bunkers would probably have been shipped at once to Korea where he might well have found himself building the very structures that had resulted in his being sent there.

Life in the bunkers gave rise to unique problems, not the least of which was trash disposal. As the bunkers and trenches proliferated on the main line of resistance and the outpost line, the troops manning them—whether American or South Korean Marines or Chinese soldiers—generated vast amount of refuse. Both sides, reported Second Lieutenant John M. Verdi, a Marine pilot who flew a hundred missions and for a time controlled air strikes from a bunker on the static battle line, did an adequate job of policing the main line of resistance, but the combat outposts posed a more difficult challenge. By day activity in a confined and exposed area could attract hostile fire, and by night policing up might interfere with planned fires, the movement of patrols, or the establishment of listening posts. As a result, trash accumulated around the outposts, especially those of the Marines who not only ate more than their enemy, but consumed food that came in cans or packages that could be more easily discarded than carried away, even with the help of Korean laborers.

Trash attracted rats, nicknamed "bunker bunnies" because of their size. The Marines waged war against them but with partial success at best. Verdi recalled that one Marine used his bayonet to pin a scurrying rat to a sandbag, but the screams of the dying varmint proved so unnerving that the hunter had to borrow a pistol to finish off his prey.

Mines planted by Marines could be as dangerous as those laid by the Chinese, or so Verdi believed. The Marines charted their minefields, selecting a starting point and an azimuth, then planting the mines at specific intervals to form rows a certain distance apart. An error with the compass or a mistake in recording the information would render the chart useless, and the map itself might disappear, destroyed as a result of enemy action or simply lost during the relief of a unit. A return to mobile warfare, or a truce that required removal of the old minefields, would increase the danger.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A169578



prisoners. Patrols, ambushes, and less ambitious raids continued for the balance of the year.

On the same day as Operation Wakeup, South Korean police captured two infiltrators in the rear area of the Kimpo Provisional Regiment. Although the Han River interposed a barrier to large-scale attacks, the occasional infiltrator

managed to cross and lose themselves among the 80,000 civilians living on the Kimpo Peninsula. A few of these infiltrators struck on 1 December, ambushing a jeep driving on the main supply route. Some two-dozen bullets tore into the vehicle, but only one struck the lone occupant, wounding him in the knee.

### Situation at Year's End

During 1952, the Korean fighting assumed a pattern far different from that for which the Marines sent to Korea in previous years had prepared. Mobility gave way to stalemate. The battlefield now resembled the trench warfare of World War I more than the sudden





Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A167563

*Two 48-ton Patton tanks wait to receive firing orders before their Marine drivers wheel them up onto earthen ramps behind the main line of resistance where they would fire on enemy positions as artillery.*

amphibious thrusts and rapid campaigns of World War II in the Pacific. If the amphibian tractor symbolized the role of Marines in the war against Japan, the bunker, built of logs and sandbags on both the main line of resistance and the line of outposts that protected it, represented the war along the Jamestown Line.

The final months of 1952 saw changes of leadership within the 1st Marine Division. On 5 November, Colonel Moore handed over the 7th Marines to Colonel Loren E. Haffner, and Colonel Hewitt D. Adams replaced Colonel Layer in command of the 1st Marines on the 22d. On 10 December, Colonel Lewis W. Walt assumed command of the 5th Marines from Colonel Smoak. Colonel Harvey C. Tschirgi took over the Kimpo Provisional Regiment on 1 December from Colonel Richard H. Crockett, who had replaced Colonel Staab, the unit's original commander, on 31 August. General Pollock remained in command of the division as the new year began and the stalemate continued.

In December, President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower made good his campaign promise to "go to Korea," but it was not yet possible to predict the consequences, if any, of his visit. The war remained unpopular with the American people, threats posed by the Soviet Union in Europe seemed more dangerous than the Chinese menace in the Far East, and the negotiations at Panmunjom had stalled over the question whether prisoners of war could refuse repatriation. The only hope, as yet a slim one, for resolving the issue of repatriation lay in the adoption by the United Nations of an Indian proposal to create a special commission to address the issue.

*Honors are rendered for President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower during his visit to the 1st Marine Division. Standing to Eisenhower's left are MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, the division commander, and Gen Mark W. Clark, USA, the United Nations commander.*

1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Dec52




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**B**ernard C. Nalty was a civilian member of the Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, from October 1956 to September 1961. He collaborated with Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Edwin T. Turnbladh on *Central Pacific Drive*, a volume of the *History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in*



*World War II* series. He also completed more than 14 short historical studies, some of which appeared in *Leatherneck* or *Marine Corps Gazette*. He joined the history office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1961, transferred in 1964 to the Air Force history program, and retired in 1994. Mr. Nalty has written or edited a number of publications, including *Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents*, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military*, *The Vietnam War*, *Tigers Over Asia*, *Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh*, and *Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the U.S. Air Force*. In addition, he participated in the Marines in World War II commemorative series, writing *Cape Gloucester*, *The Green Inferno* and *The Right to Fight: African-American Marines in World War II*.



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