

Marine Corps Advisors

The SC MAGTF will significantly enhance the options available to the CCDR in seeking to meet BPC requirements. The personnel, training, and logistics support enhancements resident in the SC MAGTF will constitute versatile and potent capabilities. However, the Marine Corps will be developing additional forces specifically trained and equipped




to provide **security assistance (SA)** to selected partner nations. Security assistance is currently executed through SCETC and Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) with several initiatives focused on foreign military sales and specialized training provided by these organizations. However, recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to the recognition that a more robust SA capability is needed within the Marine Corps. That increased capability will be addressed through the development of Marine Corps advisors.

A Marine Corps Training and Advisor Group (MCTAG) was commissioned by the Commandant in October 2007. Initially established to address staffing and sourcing requirements for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MCTAG's purpose is to source the Marine Corps' advisory capability to support mission requirements that exceed those of SC MAGTFs. An embryonic capability now, it will eventually grow to constitute a cadre of trained advisors organized into regional branches that deploy scalable teams of Marine advisors to partner nations. Marine Corps advisors will also facilitate the development of critical relationships and enable civil-military operations and security cooperation opportunities by serving as an interface with partner nation military forces assisting regional MARFOR interaction with select US and partner nation government agencies, including the US country teams and attachés.

Marine advisors will establish enduring relationships that facilitate the interaction between the SC MAGTF and partner government agencies

and security forces with whom they will be working. Supportive to the efforts of the SC MAGTF, Marine advisors will constitute a significant enabler that enhances the effectiveness of the SC MAGTF in the future security environment. Figure 7 depicts the complementary relationship of Marine Corps advisors and the SC MAGTF in BPC efforts.



Note: Tasks under Long War emerging missions are illustrative. Actual tasks will be identified through mission analysis and consultation with partner nations.

Figure 7

When not deployed, Marine advisors will provide training to SC MAGTF and other units designated to conduct BPC events. Marine advisors will be capable of supporting SC MAGTF pre-deployment training programs as well as providing reinforcement to cultural and language training provided by the CAOCL. Ultimately, the Marine advisors will provide a critical continuity for Marine efforts to engage across the shaping and deterrence phases of operations.

Figure 8 provides a notional deployment scheme that illustrates how the Marine advisors and SC MAGTF will work in a complementary manner. The SC MAGTF will not be in the Marine advisors' chain of command, but SC MAGTF will nonetheless establish critical relationships with the Marine advisors. Based upon the CCDR security cooperation plan (SCP), the regional MARFOR will command and control both Marine advisors and SC MAGTFs. The deployment schedule of Marine advisors and SC MAGTF will be offset to ensure effective continuity of capacity building efforts within the theater of operation. The maintenance of relationships between US forces and partner nation military leaders is thus enabled. A significant benefit of this offset in deployment schedules will be the ability of the Marine advisors to facilitate the introduction of newly arriving SC MAGTF elements into the theater. In order to preclude a loss in the persistent nature of this US presence, the MEU operating in the region also will be available to conduct training while the SC MAGTF elements transition into theater.




Figure 8

Guiding Principles for the Long War

In conducting the kinds of missions required to effectively shape the environment and deter potential adversaries, our leaders will be guided by enduring principles that serve as touchstones to our personnel in ensuring they are properly prepared for operations against the irregular adversary. Marine operations will be planned and executed in accordance with the following principles:

Naval Character. More than ever before, our linkage with the Navy must be firm and based on shared understanding and vision. The Marine Corps must maintain its Naval roots to shape the environment and effectively deter adversaries. With the advent of *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, this includes refining our relationship with the Coast Guard. In the future, more Marines than ever will be deployed aboard Navy and potentially Coast Guard shipping, either in GFSs and MEUs. Furthermore, amphibious forcible entry, long a hallmark Marine capability, must remain both viable and potent as a means of projecting power ashore at the time and place of our choosing.



Lethality. First and foremost, the Marine Corps is a warfighting force whose paramount task is to fight and win our Nation's battles. Marine units must remain trained, equipped, and oriented toward engaging our Nation's adversaries and achieving decisive end states at the tactical and operational levels in order to achieve the CCDR's objectives across the entire range of military operations.



Agility. With the defining characteristic of the future security environment being uncertainty, our Marine forces must be a balanced force that can be rapidly tailored to meet a diverse array of challenges and requirements. This ability to rapidly shift and adjust to changing battlefield conditions includes being mentally, physically, and materially ready for the unexpected and will place a great deal of responsibility on our junior leaders.

Deployability. Marine forces must be prepared for rapid, efficient movement to distant operating locations. This requires Marines and Marine units that are properly trained and equipped to move by surface and air to reception areas for follow-on employment on the ground and in littoral areas. An expeditionary mindset on the part of our Marines and families is a critical aspect of this deployability.

Self-sufficiency. In addition to being forward deployable, Marine units must be capable of operating for extended periods in remote, austere locations far from normal logistical support networks. This requirement for self sufficiency will be especially critical in supporting the disaggregated, distributed elements of the SC MAGTF as it performs its security cooperation and BPC tasks in undeveloped areas. From robust organic logistics support capabilities resident at the small unit level, to existing intra-theater sustainment provided by the regional CCDR, logistical self sufficiency will be a paramount principle to maintain.

Adaptability. Working with partner nations possessing widely different levels of military capability, Marine forces must be able to adapt their approaches in a manner that provides the most reliable development and training value to the audience. In some cases, this adaptability will allow Marines to conduct civil affairs activities that strengthen the ties between citizens and responsive governments. In other cases, this adaptability will allow Marines to help professionalize a militia into a competent, capable military force. In still others, Marines may participate in high spectrum training exercises with technologically advanced allies whose capabilities match or even exceed our own.

Interoperability. Marine forces must continue to maintain the ability to integrate and operate with joint forces and interagency, non-governmental, and multinational partners. This interoperability denotes systems, capabilities, organization, and cultural awareness working in harmony across all elements of an operation.

Foundations of Marine Operations

In order to facilitate the application of the principles described above, the Marine Corps must reaffirm some foundational tenets of Marine Corps success, while implementing new ones. Successful employment of the operational approach laid out in this concept requires:

Leadership and Professionalism: This constitutes the paramount foundation of Marine operations at home and abroad. This concept will place an even higher premium on the requirement for effective leadership and professionalism from our most junior leaders. With the increase in distributed operations, leadership and professionalism, particularly among the NCO ranks, will be critical to mission success. This requirement is not only critical to the success of our Marines themselves, but also in shaping the environment and deterring potential adversaries. In many cases, the performance of Marines and their leaders will prove to be the decisive factor that shapes the environment and determines the future stability of a country or region.



Maneuver Warfare: The Marine Corps' enduring philosophy for warfighting remains relevant and important to our success in the lower intensity phases of conflict such as shaping, deterring, and enabling of civil authority. Rather than wearing down the enemies' defenses, maneuver

warfare strives to penetrate and tear down enemy systems. The aim of maneuver warfare is to render the enemy incapable of effective resistance by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion – his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole. This approach is the more effective means of warfighting



than the traditional approach that strives to physically destroy the adversary through the incremental attrition of each of his components.⁹ Maneuver warfare is especially relevant in seeking to address the elusive, irregular foe that is emerging as the threat. By effectively shaping the adversary's environment, the Marine Corps can leave the irregular foe powerless, vulnerable, and utterly lacking in popular support.

Task Organized, Combined Arms Capable, Multi-Purpose Marines:

Marines must continue to operate as scalable, task organized teams focused on bringing the synergistic effects of the MAGTF to bear on our nation's opponents. These effects may be as simple as two riflemen supporting one another or as complex as information operations in support of a MEF-level security cooperation plan. The MAGTF concept is a proven formula that must be preserved – an enduring legacy on which the Marine Corps and our Nation can depend. Marine forces will preserve their capability as general purpose forces. Although some missions traditionally associated with SOF will be performed by Marine units, with capabilities that are more “SOF-like” in appearance, Marine forces will remain focused on a conventional orientation that allows for employment in accordance with “traditional” Marine combat missions.



Cultural Awareness: In seeking to assure and support friends and allies while simultaneously deterring adversaries, Marines must continue to understand the critical importance of cultural sensitivity. Marines who are culturally and linguistically adept provide a significant force enabler to a CCDR. Conversely, failure to understand the critical importance of culture and language in establishing and maintaining foreign relationships can have severely detrimental effects. To instill greater cultural awareness, more emphasis will be placed on this enabler through increased cultural training and initiatives designed to create a more culturally aware and adept Marine Corps.



9 MCDP 1 *Warfighting*, (Washington DC: Headquarters Marine Corps) p. 73

Methods

In order to conduct the kinds of missions required to achieve success in the Long War, the Marine Corps will require innovative methods and capabilities that enhance our ability to contribute to national security. Some of the methods outlined below are traditional while others are emerging and require further refinement to be optimized. In the end, the goal that we seek is to achieve a globally deployable, networked Marine Corps focused on increasing the capabilities of partner nations while effectively deterring potential adversaries and decisively defeating known enemies.

Navy-Marine Corps Team – With the sustainable, credible forward presence capability that amphibious shipping provides, the paramount joint relationship that the Marine Corps will maintain is with the US Navy. This is a familiar relationship that harkens back to the founding of our Corps. However, recent operations have seen an increased requirement for Marines to conduct sustained operations ashore. While it is clear that Marines will be land-based for many of the future distributed operations and BPC missions that the Marine Corps will conduct, our naval capabilities will continue to be critically important. Specifically, the ability to be transported, sustained, and even protected through our partnership with the US Navy and Coast Guard will enable mission success. The advent of the Navy’s GFS concept as a persistent sea base for operations is particularly important and relevant to the Marine Corps. This relationship with the Navy includes an increased requirement for the operationalization of MPS. By enabling routine access to the equipment stored and maintained aboard MPS, the ability of our Marines to project a persistent presence ashore will be significantly enhanced.



Distributed Operations – With advances in technological and logistical capabilities, Marine commanders are increasingly able to disaggregate tactical units to execute effective, decisive actions, activities and operations on the ground. Distributed operations is a technique applied to an

appropriate situation wherein units are separated beyond the limits of mutual support. Distributed operations are practiced by general purpose forces, operating with deliberate dispersion, where necessary and tactically prudent, with de-centralized decision-making consistent with commander's intent to achieve specific advantages over an enemy. Distributed operations relies on the ability and judgment of Marines at every level and is particularly enabled by excellence in leadership to ensure the ability to understand and influence an expanded



operational environment. When facing irregular forces or forces operating in complex terrain, distributed operations may allow the commander to expand his area of influence. During security cooperation, shaping, and deterrence, the decentralized action enabled by distributed operations will permit wider, more diverse application of power and influence. This same capability afforded through distributed operations can be leveraged to enable rapid re-aggregation or reinforcement where military power projection must be quickly applied.

Globally Networked – Forward-deployed Marines operating in remote locations will require robust information system architectures to receive, disseminate, and transmit information critical to operational flexibility and global awareness. These information systems must appropriately safeguard sensitive or classified information while being reliable, rugged, and capable of long-range communications.

Adaptive Force Packaging – Marine forces will be tailored to provide the right mix of personnel and equipment to conduct the tasks required. To achieve optimal objectives, this will require increased joint and inter-agency resources to provide efficient and effective force packages tailored to specific missions.

Regionalization – Cultural awareness and linguistic expertise will be critical force enablers to Marine efforts at civil-military operations, security cooperation and security assistance. To facilitate the concentration of the right skills in the right units, Marine units will be assigned specific regional orientations that facilitate the assignment of personnel holding the right skill sets. Furthermore, Marines will receive specialized regional



training that is tailored to the assigned mission. Personnel assignment policies will be modified for FAO, RAO, linguists, and other personnel with specialized training or backgrounds in order to maximize the full potential of such Marines in prosecuting Marine and joint missions. These changes in personnel assignment policies will focus on selected billets within units that source the SC MAGTF, while avoiding a wholesale restructuring of the tables of organization of these units.

Science and Technology (S&T) Investment – The task of training and equipping the force to meet the above objectives will require continued research and development of technologies that facilitate application of the right force at the right time. The S&T investment will enable US Marine units to operate more effectively in a resource constrained environment to accomplish both traditional and non-traditional missions. Investments will be made that will cover the spectrum of weaponry, language translation, personnel protection, mobility, command and control



support systems, ISR collection and fusion, non-lethal technologies, logistics, medical, information operations and virtual training environments. Experimentation with using the products of the S&T efforts will be used toward developing partner capacity.

End State

The net effect of the implementation of this concept will be a Marine Corps that is better positioned to address the challenges of an uncertain security environment. Through the increase in forward deployed, task organized Marine units operating afloat and ashore, CCDRs will have greater flexibility in how they choose to shape the environment and deter enemies in their AOR. These Marine units will provide a more persistent presence aimed at deterring and defeating our nation's adversaries, while providing a uniquely tailored capability to invest in our regional partners and allies with the training and advanced capabilities to enable partner militaries to manage internal and regional instability. If efforts to shape the environment and deter threats fails, our full spectrum capable Marines will be well positioned to transition to high spectrum combat operations to defeat our Nation's adversaries.



This concept features subtle differences from previous concepts. Marines will preserve the capabilities as general purpose forces that fight and win our Nation's battles. Marines will continue to deploy aboard Naval shipping for service in the world's littoral areas. However, some new initiatives including the SC MAGTF and Marine advisors will better prepare Marines for working with foreign civil authorities and militaries in a manner that builds credible, capable foreign governments and security forces in countries aligned with the interests of our country.

For the individual Marine, this operating concept will present many challenges and opportunities. The demands inherent in engaging an irregular enemy will require Marines to be both agile and flexible in their mindset, prepared to adapt quickly based on changes in the environment. Our Marines will require a greater understanding of the impact that cultural norms and political structures have on operations within the regions in which they are operating. Initiatives such as regional specialization, cultural training, and enhanced training

focused on civil-military operations and security cooperation will prepare Marines to meet these demands while presenting unique opportunities to broaden themselves on both professional and personal levels.

For Marine families, this force employment concept will provide relief from the operational tempo that has been the norm over the past several years. The 1:2 deployment-to-dwell rotation cycle combined with the increase in overall Marine Corps force structure will provide a flexible and sustainable operational tempo for the future while significantly reducing the strain on our Marines and their families. The ultimate goal remains a return to a 1:3 deployment-to-dwell rotation cycle. This goal will be realized as conditions around the world permit. Our families remain stalwart contributors to the success enjoyed by our Corps. Ensuring we support our Marine families is critical to our continued success.

This increase in deployment-to-dwell rotation cycle combined with the Marine Corps' growth in force structure will result in the ability to train to full spectrum operations while projecting Marines to locations across the globe where they can provide the most lasting effect. As a result of this persistent Marine presence and increase in foreign civil authority and security force capabilities, our



irregular adversaries will be denied the safe havens from which they have been able to previously operate. Extremists, terrorists, insurgents, and trans-national criminals that had been previously operating with impunity in under-governed spaces will come under increasing pressure from legitimate regional stakeholders capable of taking the necessary measures to deter or reduce these threats.

Ultimately this concept represents a continuation of the enduring legacy that has seen Marines most ready when the Nation is least ready. Forward-deployed with our Navy partners in the unstable

regions of the world, our Marines will bring the fight to the enemy, through effective deterrence and decisive engagement, while empowering our friends with capabilities that support US efforts to bring economic prosperity and freedom to regions of the world that yearn for these opportunities.

Send in the Marines

Persistent and Episodic Engagement to Shape the Security Environment




Figure 9

Glossary

advanced logistics support site–(NWP 4-01) A location used as the primary transshipment point in the theater of operations for fleet logistic support. Also called ALSS.

aviation combat element – (DOD) The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is task-organized to conduct aviation operations. The aviation combat element (ACE) provides all or a portion of the six functions of Marine aviation necessary to accomplish the MAGTF's mission. These functions are antiair warfare, offensive air support, assault support, electronic warfare, air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles. The ACE is usually composed of an aviation unit headquarters and various other aviation units or their detachments. It can vary in size from a small aviation detachment of specifically required aircraft to one or more Marine aircraft wings. The ACE itself is not a formal command. Also called ACE.

catastrophic challenges – (NDS) Catastrophic challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.

civil affairs– (DOD) Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA.

civil-military operations – (DOD) The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by

designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO.

combatant command – (JP 1-02) A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

combatant commander – (JP 1-02) A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR.

conventional forces – (DOD) 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using non-nuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces.

cooperative security location – (NDS) A diverse array of austere facilities. They have little or no United States personnel assigned and are intended for contingency access, logistical support, and rotational use by operating forces. Also called CSL.

crisis – (DOD) An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates conditions of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives.

disruptive challenges – (NDS) Disruptive challenges may come from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current US advantages in key operational domains.

foreign area officer – (USMC proposed) Commissioned Marine officers who, through a combination of graduate education, language training, and in-country training or significant language and cultural experience, attain regional, linguistic, and cultural expertise in specific geographic regions.

foreign internal defense – (DOD) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID.

forward operating sites–(NDS) Scalable facilities intended for rotational use by operating forces that can support a range of military operations on short notice. They may have a small permanent presence and often house pre-positioned equipment. Also called FOS.

global commons – (SHDCS) International waters and airspace, space, and cyberspace.

ground combat element – (DOD) The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is task-organized to conduct ground operations. It is usually constructed around an infantry organization but can vary in size from a small ground unit of any type, to one or more Marine divisions that can be independently maneuvered under the direction of the MAGTF commander. The ground combat element itself is not a formal command. Also called GCE.

information operations – (DOD) Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Also called IO.

irregular challenges – (NDS) Unconventional methods to counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents.

irregular warfare – (JP 1-02) A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will. Also called IW.

logistics combat element – (DOD) The core element of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that is task-organized to provide the logistics support necessary to accomplish the MAGTF mission. The logistics combat element varies in size from a small detachment to one or more Marine logistics groups. It provides supply,

maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and a variety of other services to the MAGTF. The logistics combat element itself is not a formal command. Also called LCE.

major combat operations – (MCO JOC) Large-scale operations conducted against a nation-state(s) that possesses significant regional military capability, with global reach in selected capabilities, and the will to employ that capability in opposition to or in a manner threatening to US national security. Also called MCO.

Marine expeditionary brigade – (JP 1-02) A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a brigade service support group. The Marine expeditionary brigade, commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of a Marine expeditionary force, or alone. It varies in size and composition and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a Marine expeditionary force. The Marine expeditionary brigade is capable of conducting missions across the full range of military operations. Also called MEB.

Marine expeditionary force – (JP 1-02) The largest Marine air-ground task force and the Marine Corps' principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine force service support groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across the range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. Also called MEF.

Marine expeditionary unit – (JP 1-02) A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around an infantry battalion reinforced, a helicopter squadron reinforced, and a task-organized combat service support element. It normally fulfills Marine Corps forward seabased deployment requirements. The Marine expeditionary unit provides and immediate reaction capability for crisis response and is capable of limited combat operations. Also called MEU.

maritime prepositioning ships – (JP 1-02) Civilian-crewed,

Military Sealift Command-chartered ships that are organized into three squadrons and are usually forward deployed. These ships are loaded with prepositioned equipment and 30 days of supplies to support three Marine Expeditionary Brigades. Also called MPS.

operational preparation of the environment – (JP 3-13) Non-intelligence activities conducted to plan and prepare for potential follow-on military operations. Also called OPE.

regional affairs officer – (USMC proposed) Commissioned Marine officers who, through graduate level education or experience, have attained regional/cultural expertise in specific geographical regions.

seabasing – (Seabasing Joint Integrated Concept v 1.0) The rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-deployment of joint force combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). These capabilities expand operational maneuver options, and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.

security cooperation – (DOD) All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Also called SC.

security assistance – (DOD) Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA.

traditional challenges – (NDS) Traditional challenges posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.

References

England, Gordon. Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, June 2005)

FY-08 Marine Corps Security Cooperation (SC) Implementation Strategy

Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington DC, Department of Defense, 12 April, 2001)

Joint Publication 3-0, Operations (Washington DC, Department of Defense, September 2001)

Joint Strategic Assessment (Washington DC, The Defense Intelligence Agency, September 2006)

Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Environment, Second Edition (Quantico VA: Concept and Plans Division, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, June 2007)

MCDP-1, Warfighting, (Washington DC: United States Marine Corps, June 1997)

MCIA-1586-001-05, Marine Corps Midrange Threat Estimate: 2005-2015 (Quantico VA: Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, August 2005)

Multi-Service Concept for Irregular Warfare (Quantico VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command and US Special Forces Command Center for Knowledge and Futures, August 2006)

Rumsfeld, Donald H. National Defense Strategy of the United States, (Washington DC: Department of Defense, March 1, 2005)

Seabasing, (Quantico VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, August 2006)

Joint Strategic Assessment 2006-2026, (Washington DC, The Defense Intelligence Agency, September 2006), p. 3

T H E L O N G W A R

