The Forgotten Service in the Forgotten War: 
The U.S. Coast Guard’s Role in the Korean Conflict
Scott T. Price

On June 25, 1950 six North Korean infantry divisions, supported by large armor and artillery forces, brutally attacked its neighbor, South Korea. The onslaught caught the South, as well as much of the world, completely by surprise. As the Soviet-equipped divisions advanced towards the capital, Seoul, Coast Guard officers stationed on the peninsula received word that they would have to evacuate.

The officers were based at the former Imperial Japanese naval facility of Chinhae, South Korea where they had been training the nucleus of what would become the South Korean navy. This little known operation was a typical example of the Coast Guard’s role during the coming conflict; based in obscurity but nevertheless important to the United Nations’ efforts to halt and reverse the Communist onslaught.

The Coast Guard’s missions for any post-World War II conflicts were largely spelled out by the Navy. In 1947 the Chief of Naval Operations suggested that in future conflicts the Coast Guard should limit its contribution to those peacetime tasks in which it specialized. His suggestion stated that the Coast Guard’s “war time functions and duties assigned should be those which are an extension of normal peacetime tasks.” Additionally, “Coast Guard personnel, ships, aircraft and facilities should be utilized as organized Coast Guard units rather than by indiscriminately integrating them into the naval establishment.”[1] These duties included port security, maritime inspection and safety, search and rescue, and patrolling ocean stations. These, therefore, were the Coast Guard’s primary missions during the Korean War.[2]

Chinhae

In 1946 the U.S. Army, which commanded the military forces in South Korea, asked for a contingent of active-duty Coast Guard officers to organize, supervise, and train a small Korean coast guard. Captain George McCabe, a Coast Guard hero of World War II, was the first to command the Coast Guard contingent, which arrived in South Korea on 23 August 1946. Indeed, he actually commanded the nascent Korean Coast Guard until the Korean government appointed Lieutenant Commander Sohn Won Yil as its first native commanding officer. From then on, McCabe and Sohn commanded the service jointly.

Their task was extremely complicated. First, they had to establish an enlisted training facility and begin recruiting operations. Then they needed to establish an officer candidate program to train officers to command the service. They also agreed to develop an academy, complete with a four-year degree program much like the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London. Due to a pressing need for personnel, however, the degree program was cut to two years. Despite the language difficulties, a lack of equipment, and a high initial desertion rate, McCabe and his staff successfully nurtured the beginnings of a new coast guard.

They acquired former Japanese navy warships to serve as training vessels and refurbished equipment left behind by the Japanese occupation forces. In general the Coast Guard did what it has always done, successfully fulfilled an assigned task with little or no resources.[3] The whole structure of this effort, however, was soon to undergo a significant change.

In May 1948 Commander William C. Achurch arrived in Korea and became the “Head Advisor to Commander, Service Forces, Korean Coast Guard” and commanding officer of the U.S. Coast Guard Detachment at Chinhae.[4] When the South Korean government decided that it would change its coast guard to a navy in 1948, the active duty U.S. Coast Guard officers returned home. As one officer put it, “The U.S. Coast Guard didn’t feel obligated to train a foreign navy and the U.S. Coast Guard Detachment was withdrawn.”[5] The U.S. Army then hired a number of retired or reserve officers and men to assist the new Korean Navy, including
Commander Achurch.

Training continued unabated for the next few years. The training teams continued to struggle with a number of difficulties including cultural differences and as always, funding. The base gained some notoriety when Achurch hosted a conference between the Nationalist Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-shek and the president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee for a three-day meeting in August of 1949. Later, President Rhee became a frequent visitor to the base as his interest in his new navy grew.

On the 19th of August, 1949 a World War II Coast Guard veteran, Commander Clarence M. Speight, retired from the service for a physical disability, took over Achurch’s duties as “Advisor Chief, Korean Navy.”[6] Achurch remained as the commanding officer of the Coast Guard contingent. Both men wore their uniforms proudly and carried on the operation as a Coast Guard commanded team.

**Invasion**

Commander Speight found himself in Taiwan preparing a new vessel for the Korean Navy when the North Koreans attacked. His wife and two children in Seoul fled to Inchon. Speight arranged for their transport on board a freighter bound for Tokyo and he then returned to Seoul. Six hundred fifty other refugees swarmed on board the freighter designed to carry only twelve passengers. Mrs. Speight and her two children stayed on the main deck for the three-day trip despite the cold weather and rain. Speight barely managed to leave Seoul and watched as the large bridge over the Han River was blown up. After crossing the river on a small boat, he eventually made it to Pusan where he met up with Commander Achurch.[7] Both were ordered back to the United States in July.

**Pacific Ocean Stations**

The ocean station program, established before World War II, proved to be a vital war-time Coast Guard task and was perhaps the most direct contribution made by the Coast Guard to the United Nations’ effort. Cutters assigned to the stations carried teams of meteorologists from the U.S. Weather Bureau. These men carried out weather observations, assisted by specialists in the Coast Guard crew. The cutters also served as aids to navigation by providing checkpoints for military and commercial maritime and air traffic and communication “relay” stations for aircraft on transoceanic flights. They provided needed medical services to merchant ship crews as well as any others in need and served as search and rescue platforms. Some aircraft actually ditched near the cutters and were quickly rescued, such as the famous rescue of the *Bermuda Sky Queen* by the crew of the *Bibb* in 1947.

Coast Guard cutters were stationed at two ocean stations in the Pacific prior to the outbreak of the Korean conflict. In concert with the Navy, the service decided to add three additional stations in the North Pacific. [8] The new stations provided complete weather data and greater search and rescue coverage for the growing trans-Pacific merchant and military traffic brought on by the Korean conflict. Indeed, 95 percent of the war material bound for Korea went by ship but nearly half of the personnel went by air, making the ocean station vessels a vital link in the United Nations’ logistic effort. Furthermore, the Coast Guard established a chain of air search and rescue detachments on islands throughout the Pacific to supplement the search and rescue capabilities of the Ocean Station cutters. Cutters were also assigned to these search and rescue stations to augment their search and rescue capabilities.

With the addition of the new stations, the Coast Guard needed to find vessels to augment the already extended cutter fleet. Fortunately a ready source existed within the mothball fleets of the Navy. The Navy turned over a number of destroyer escorts, which the Coast Guard commissioned as cutters. The old war-horses had served as convoy escorts in World War II, 33 of which had been manned by Coast Guard crews during the war. These vessels were refitted with a shelter on the stern for weather balloon storage and armed with depth charges.
and a variety of anti-aircraft weapons. The first two to join the Coast Guard fleet were the *Koiner* and the *Falgout*. Once commissioned, the new cutters underwent shakedown training under the supervision of the Navy and then sailed to their new homeports.[9]

Ocean station duty could be monotonous at one moment and terrifying the next, as the vessels rode out storms that made the saltiest sailors green. One crewman noted: "After twenty-one days of being slammed around by rough cold sea swells 20 to 50 feet high, and wild winds hitting gale force at times, within an ocean grid the size of a postage stamp, you can stand any kind of duty."[10]

The *Koiner*’s operations provide a good example of the duty. After she arrived in Seattle, where she joined the cutters *Bering Strait*, *Klamath*, *Winona*, and the *Wachusett*, a hodge podge fleet of ex-Navy seaplane tenders and 255-foot Coast Guard cutters, she was first sent to Ocean Station Nan in the North Pacific. There she steamed in endless circles around the ocean station for three weeks before being relieved by the cutter *Lowe*.

While on the ocean station the crew quickly fell into a routine. They assisted the five weather observers from the San Francisco office of the U.S. Weather Bureau who accompanied each patrol. Radar and radio were manned around the clock. Twice daily the crew launched 6-foot diameter helium filled balloons that measured air temperature, pressure, and humidity to an altitude of 10 miles. They launched another smaller balloon to measure wind speed and direction.

The crew also checked water temperature every four hours down to a depth of 450 feet with a bathythermograph instrument. Serving as a floating aid to navigation, they contacted passing aircraft and ships by radio and provided radar and navigation fixes. The contact with anyone from the outside world, even if only for a brief moment, at least broke up the monotony for the crew. Then there were the daily drills such as fire, collision, and boat drills. For recreation they had movies, pistol matches, skeet shooting, volleyball games, and fishing. Though this was often enough to keep from going stir crazy, the crew invariably counted the days until their next liberty.[11]

After returning to Seattle the crew of the destroyer escort received welcome liberty. Then she set sail for Ocean Station Victor, midway between Japan and the Aleutian Islands, via the Midway Islands. While at Midway she stood search and rescue standby duty, then set sail for Victor for another three-week tour of duty. When relieved there, she sailed on to Yokosuka, Japan for a twelve-day layover, which included liberty for all hands. Afterward she steamed once again out to the North Pacific to Ocean Station Sugar. Another three weeks later her relief arrived and the *Koiner* returned to Seattle.[12] And so it went, month by month, year by year.

These cutters assisted a number of merchant ships and aircraft that were transiting the North Pacific during the war. The *Forster* assisted the largest number of vessels while on patrol. Her crew searched for and found the MV *Katori Maru* drifting and burning on 16-17 August 1952. Thereafter they assisted five more merchant and fishing vessels. The Pacific ocean station cutters in all assisted over 20 merchant and Navy vessels, including one transoceanic airliner, during the war.[13]

During 1950 Station Nan was the busiest of all the ocean stations, reporting that the cutters gave 357 radar fixes per patrol. Each patrol averaged over 700 hours on station. The cutters steamed an average of 4,000 miles per patrol.[14] These numbers increased considerably after the patrols were lengthened and expanded after the start of the Korean conflict. Twenty-four cutters served on the stations that fell within the perimeters of the Korean conflict and thus, they and their crews earned the Korean Service Medal (see Appendix B). Unsung but always ready, the cutters insured the timely and safe arrival of United Nations’ troops and supplies throughout the Korean conflict.

**Pacific Search and Rescue Airstations**

The Coast Guard established a number of Pacific air search and rescue detachments throughout the
Pacific in support of the Korean operation. The Coast Guard commissioned air detachments on Wake and Midway islands and increased the strengths of the existing detachments at Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands.\[15\]

One of the most dangerous search and rescue cases undertaken by the Coast Guard took place off the coast of mainland China in early 1953. Communist Chinese forces shot down a Navy P2V Neptune in the Formosa Strait while the aircraft was on a covert patrol along the Chinese coast. The crew ditched their burning plane and escaped into a life raft to await rescue. The Coast Guard search and rescue station at Sangleys Point responded to the call for assistance by immediately scrambling one of its two Martin PBM-5G Mariner seaplanes. In command was Lieutenant “Big John” Vukic, one of the most experienced seaplane pilots in the Coast Guard. Vukic and his crew of seven took off and flew their large aircraft towards Communist China and imminent danger. They were followed by the other PBM shortly thereafter, piloted by then-Lieutenant Mitchell A. Perry.

After arriving on scene Vukic noticed that the seas were running 15-feet. Even though the survivors managed to climb into a raft he thought they must have been suffering from hypothermia. He decided to attempt an open water landing, always a dangerous affair but something he had done many times successfully. With darkness setting in he landed near the survivors. His crewman managed to pull these men on board while other crewman prepared a jet assisted packs for each side of the aircraft. These devices, known as JATO [Jet Assisted Take-Off] packs, permitted aircraft to lift off in an extremely short take-off run. While the Coast Guard crew rescued all eleven in the raft, two other Navy crew, in a separate raft, were swept ashore and captured by the communist Chinese. Not knowing their fate, Vukic taxied his big PBM near the crash site searching for them.

After fifteen minutes, with the seas rising he gave up the search and attempted to take off. The JATO rockets fired as the PBM lifted into the air. Vukic remembered: “There was a 15-foot sea and a 25-mile wind.” He feared that the heavy seas would swamp the amphibian if he waited for the seas to abate or a surface ship to come to their aid. Weighing each of the consequences, he decided to fly. Vukic remembered “Everything was rolling very well and I thought it was in the bag. And so I fired my JATO bottles to help my plane get airborne.” Suddenly the plane lurched to the left. He saw the left wing float rise above the sea but the port engine seemed to be losing power. He quickly decided to ditch and made for the crest of a wave with the plane’s hull. “My seat suddenly broke and that was the last thing I knew.”\[16\] The PBM slammed back into the sea and broke up.

Once again the Navy survivors were back in the water, at least, the seven that survived this crash. Vukic managed to escape as well and inflated a raft. He pulled two surviving Navy crew in with him. He said “We were so cold we didn’t care who got us, just so they had a fire to keep us warm.”\[17\] Two others of his Coast Guard crew, Aviation Machinists Mate Joseph Miller and Aviation Mechanic Robert Hewitt, also managed to escape before the PBM sank. These men were eventually rescued by the Navy destroyer U.S.S. Halsey Powell later that night. But the other five Coast Guard and four Navy crewmen never made it out of the sinking PBM and they perished. All five of these Coast Guardsmen received the Gold Lifesaving Medal posthumously (see Appendix A).

Port Security

Anticommunist sentiment in the country, already at a fever pitch after the communist victory in China the year before, was only aggravated by the North Korean attack. As a result, the government reacted against domestic communist activity. President Harry Truman signed Presidential Executive Order 10173, thereby implementing the Magnuson Act, which authorized the Coast Guard to conduct duties it had carried out during both World Wars to insure the security of U.S. ports “from subversive or clandestine attacks.”\[18\]

The Coast Guard established port security units to take charge of and secure the major ports of the United States. Their function was to prevent sabotage and insure the timely loading and sailing of merchant ships,
especially those sailing to Japan and Korea to deliver ammunition needed by the United Nation forces. The most controversial power extended to the Coast Guard was the authority to check the backgrounds of merchant sailors, longshoremen, warehouse employees and harbor pilots, in order to determine their loyalty, or lack thereof, to the United States. [19]

The immediate problem with implementing these duties was the lack of personnel. There was no organized reserve program of any great scale as the World War II program had been emasculated with the demobilization of the United State’s military at the end of the war. Indeed, in June 1949 there were only 252 enlisted reserve personnel, and a few women SPARs [the nickname of the Coast Guard’s Women’s Reserve] working at headquarters. [20] The President, through a supplemental appropriation, approved the immediate increase in financing necessary to implement an organized reserve. The budget for the following year did show a substantial funding increase that permitted the Coast Guard to expand and develop an adequate reserve to meet the service’s new demands.

Fears of a Eastern-bloc freighter sailing into a port, armed with a nuclear bomb, gave the service a unique Cold War task. Since the Soviet Union and its communist allies had no long-range bomber force and ballistic missiles were ten years in the future, delivery of a bomb by a vessel sailing into an unsuspecting port and then being detonated was the most likely form of nuclear attack on the United States. [21] From August 1951 every vessel entering into a U.S. anchorage had to notify Customs of its intended destination and cargo 24 hours before it was to arrive. The names of these vessels were passed to the appropriate Captain of the Port and Coast Guard patrol boats identified and checked each, boarding and examining those that appeared suspicious.

The boats patrolling harbor entrances in the major ports were occupied 24 hours a day and in New York, for example, there were two stations on continuous duty. For the next two years off the coast of New York, near the Ambrose lightship station, the Coast Guard inspected over 1,500 ships. Each of the two patrols inspected an average of 40 vessels per month with each inspection lasting four hours. Armed with Geiger counters, they searched for atomic weapons, general explosives, and bacteriological weapons, but never found anything worth reporting. [22]

Special explosive loading detachment teams conducted the incredibly dangerous job of supervising the loading of ammunition. It was sometimes conducted under the most primitive conditions. On the coast of Oregon, for example, ammunition was transported from the Umatilla Ordnance Depot to a loading site on the Columbia River about 10 miles downstream from the Depot. A privately owned tow and barge company held the contract for transporting government goods down the river. Coast Guard officers and men supervised the loading of the ammunition onto barges that each held 500 tons. Typically one powered vessel would push two barges at a time down the 200 miles to the Beaver Ammunition Storage Point, accompanied by an armed Coast Guardsman. [23] The ammunition was then loaded onto cargo vessels for transportation to Korea.

Loran Station at Pusan

The LORAN [LOnge Range Aid to Navigation] station at Pusan is one of the truly unsung Coast Guard stories of the war. Established to assist the growing air and sea traffic brought on by the Korean conflict, the station’s crew has the distinction of being the only Coast Guard personnel serving under a Coast Guard command on the peninsula during the fighting. It was code named ELMO-4. [24]

The prospective commanding officer of the station, Lieutenant John D. McCann, USCG, reconnoitered the area around the city of Pusan, which gave the LORAN station its official Coast Guard designation, and picked a hill some twenty miles from the city. His crew consisted of twelve men who served on a one-year tour. On June 6 1952 the U.S. Air Force generously agreed to support the station logistically, relieving the 14th Coast Guard District of such responsibilities. The support included providing for the security of the station.
Despite attacks by local vandals and some guerrilla units, as well as a typhoon in August of 1952, construction progressed with the assistance of units of the U.S. Army and logistically supported by the U.S. Air Force. By the time ELMO-4 was ready to begin operation the station boasted modern plumbing, electric clothes washing machines, and a hot water heater. McCann noted “We are probably living on one of the most comfortable bases in Korea. But don’t forget that we built it ourselves. Last August all we had were tents.”[25]
The only Coast Guard outfit in Korea began transmitting its signal on 5 January 1953. In concert with the other eight Coast Guard-manned LORAN stations in the Far East, including stations O’Shima Island in Tokyo Bay, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, these lonely Coast Guard outposts provided around-the-clock navigation assistance to United Nations’ maritime and air forces.

Conclusions

With the signing of the cease-fire on 26 July 1953, the Coast Guard demobilized quickly. The Coast Guard abandoned the ocean stations added for wartime purposes and decommissioned the destroyer escorts. All of the overseas air detachments and search and rescue stations were decommissioned as well and the service returned to its normal peacetime operations.

The Korean War left a few legacies for the Coast Guard. Port security was now a preeminent mission of the service in large part due to fears generated by the Cold War. Force levels had increased to well over what they were before North Korea invaded its neighbor. Indeed, the service almost doubled in size from its 1947 low of just over 18,000 men and women until June, 1952 when 35,082 officers and enlisted men served on active duty, including 1,600 reservists.[26] Women also continued to serve in the Coast Guard, albeit in far fewer numbers than served during World War II. In November 1952, 215 SPAR officers and 108 enlisted SPARs served in the reserve and 15 officers and 19 enlisted served on active duty.[27]

The final and, perhaps, most important legacy was that the future leaders of the service would look for a more active role for the Coast Guard in any conflict. Worried that its vital duties during the Korean War still left the Coast Guard in obscurity, future commandants would offer Coast Guard forces for use in combat areas. This is exactly what happened some ten years later during another Communist onslaught in Asia, Vietnam.
Appendix A. Coast Guardsmen Who Received the Gold Lifesaving Medal in Korea

Aviation Ordnanceman First Class Joseph R. Bridge, USCG
Chief Aviation Electronicsman Winfield J. Hammond, USCG
Aviation Machinist's Mate Third Class Tracey W. Miller, USCG
Aviation Electronicsman First Class Carl R. Tornell, USCG
Lieutenant (junior grade) Gerald W. Stuart, USCG

These men perished in a rescue attempt off the coast of China on 18 January 1953. All were awarded the Gold Lifesaving Medal posthumously.
Appendix B. Coast Guard Units Eligible for the Korean Service Medal

USCGC *Bering Strait* (WAVP 382)
USCGC *Chautauqua* (WPG 41)
USCGC *Durant* (WDE 489)
USCGC *Escanaba* (WPG 64)
USCGC *Falgout* (WDE 424)
USCGC *Finch* (WDE 428)
USCGC *Forster* (WDE 434)
USCGC *Gresham* (WAVP 387)
USCGC *Ironwood* (WAGL 297)
USCGC *Iroquois* (WPG 43)
USCGC *Klamath* (WPG 66)
USCGC *Koiner* (WDE 431)
USCGC *Kukui* (WAK 186)
USCGC *Lowe* (WDE 425)
USCGC *Minnetonka* (WPG 67)
USCGC *Newell* (WDE 442)
USCGC *Planetree* (WAGL 307)
USCGC *Pontchartrain* (WPG 70)
USCGC *Ramsden* (WDE 482)
USCGC *Richey* (WDE 485)
USCGC *Taney* (WPG 37)
USCGC *Wachusett* (WPG 44)
USCGC *Winnebago* (WPG 40)
USCGC *Winona* (WPG 64)

Commander, Coast Guard Far East Section, Tokyo

Coast Guard Merchant Marine Detachment, Japan

LORAN Station Bataan
LORAN Station Pusan
LORAN Station Ichi Banare, Okinawa
LORAN Station Iwo Jima
LORAN Station Matsumae, Hokkaido
LORAN Station Niigata, Honshu
LORAN Station Oshima, Honshu
LORAN Station Riyako Jima
LORAN Station Tokyo, Honshu
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Notes

[2] The Coast Guard stayed under the control of the Treasury Department for the duration of the Korean conflict.
[17] Ibid.
[21] Ibid., p. 281.
[22] Assistant Commandant Rear Admiral A.C. Richmond reported "To date we have found nothing that resembled an explosive of any kind." Joseph J. Ryan, "Coast Guard Checks 1,500 Ships But Turns Up No Atomic Weapons," New York Times, 26 February 1953.
[23] Letter, J.M. Jacobs to PACM Dave Cipra, 4 January 1983. Copy in possession of Coast Guard Historian's
Office Korean War subject file.
[25] "Only Coast Guard Outfit in Korea Attached to 17th," Knight Life, p. 4. Copy in possession of Coast Guard Historian's Office Pusan LORAN Station unit file.
[26] Johnson, p. 285; Although the Coast Guard demobilized to some extent after the signing of the Armistice, the service still stood at nearly 30,000 in 1954.
Coast Guard Photo Essay

Coast Guard LORAN Station Pusan, code-named Elmo #4 near Pusan, South Korea in November, 1952. The Coast Guard quickly built the base and put it into operation to satisfy the need for adequate navigational services to United Nation's forces during the conflict.

Coast Guard LORAN Station Pusan, code-named Elmo #4 near Pusan, South Korea in November, 1952. View of the transmitting antenna.

Aerial view of the Coast Guard LORAN Station Pusan, code-named Elmo #4 near Pusan, South Korea in November, 1952. The station was the only Coast Guard manned station on the Korean peninsula during the war.

A Coast Guard Martin PBM-5G Mariner. A seaplane such as this crashed while attempting to rescue the crew of a Navy P5M Neptune in 1953 off the coast of China. These large, twin-engine seaplanes were in wide use in the Coast Guard from 1943 through 1956. Note the detachable landing gear.
A Coast Guard Martin PBM-5G Mariner. A seaplane such as this crashed while attempting to rescue the crew of a Navy P5M Neptune in 1953 off the coast of China. These large, twin-engine seaplanes were in wide use in the Coast Guard from 1943 through 1956. The "R-22" painted on the side of the seaplane's nose indicates its radio call sign "Rescue 22."

A Coast Guard Martin PBM-5G Mariner taking off with the assistance of a JATO pack. A seaplane such as this crashed while attempting to rescue the crew of a Navy P5M Neptune in 1953 off the coast of China. These large, twin-engine seaplanes were in wide use in the Coast Guard from 1943 through 1956.

John Vukic (as an Ensign in this photo) was the pilot of the Coast Guard PBM-5G that attempted to rescue the crew of a Navy P5M Neptune off the coast of China. He was one of the most experienced seaplane pilots in the Coast Guard.

One of the Coast Guard's primary state-side tasks was to supervise the loading of ammunition and other
dangerous cargoes throughout U.S. ports. Here was a primitive loading site at Umatilla, Oregon. The barge is being loaded with bombs needed used by the U.N. air forces in Korea. Each barge carried 500 tons of explosives to the Beaver Ammunition Storage Point where it was offloaded onto ships for shipment to Japan and Korea.

One of the Coast Guard's primary state-side tasks was to supervise the loading of ammunition and other dangerous cargoes throughout U.S. ports. Here was a primitive loading site at Umatilla, Oregon. The barge is being loaded with bombs needed by the U.N. air forces bombing North Korea. Each barge carried 500 tons of explosives to the Beaver Ammunition Storage Point where it was offloaded onto ships for shipment to Japan and Korea.

The Coast Guard contingent that assisted in developing a South Korean Coast Guard and Navy. The contingent first arrived soon after the end of World War II and members, including LCDR William Achurch, left, evacuated the peninsula on the heels of the North Korean attack in 1950.

The USCGC Durant, a Navy destroyer escort commissioned into Coast Guard service. The Coast Guard acquired a number of Navy destroyer escorts to fill the gap in available cutters due to the increase in the number of ocean stations the service was tasked with operating. The DE's were outfitted essentially as they had been during World War II with the exception of the addition of a weather balloon shack and launching platform.
The USCGC Bering Strait departing Honolulu Harbor on her way to her ocean station.

The USCGC Bering Strait departing Honolulu Harbor on her way to her ocean station.

The Coast Guard commissions the USCGC Finch, 24 August 1951. CPT Chauncey Moore, USN, the commander of Florida Group, supervises the transfer of the Finch to Coast Guard control. The Finch's commanding officer, CDR George R. Boyce, USCG, stands to the rear on the right.

The USCGC Ramsden returns to Honolulu after a five month patrol in the Pacific. She served on the ocean station in the Northwest Pacific, 1953. Interestingly a Coast Guard crew manned the destroyer escort during World War II but remained a commissioned Navy warship. During her second career with a Coast Guard crew, she became a commissioned Coast Guard cutter.
The cutter Lowe sails out for a trial run prior to sailing for the Pacific.

The USCGC Vance in December, 1952. Note the PBM flying beyond her stern.

The crew of the Coast Guard cutter Chincoteague rearm the hedgehog anti-submarine mortar. During the Korean conflict every cutter was heavily armed, including anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons.

Senior Weather Bureau observer Edward J. Fencl seated at a RADIOSONDE receiver-recorder aboard the cutter Abesecon computes from a continuously moving graphic tape tracings transmitted from a balloon-borne RADIOSONDE transmitter high up in the atmosphere. His computations tell him the pressure, humidity, temperature, and wind velocity at various altitudes the balloon has reached.
Duty on a weather station could be rough! Here, during a heavy storm, the cutter Matagorda's bow is thrust out of the water while on ocean station duty in 1951. The cutters maintained their stations through the worst weather.

40mm gun drill on board a cutter while on ocean station duty.

A Coast Guard crewman readies a bathythermograph. The device recorded sea water temperature to a depth of 450 feet.

Crewmen prepare to release a weather balloon while on ocean station duty.
A crewman determines the velocity of surface winds by the use of an anemometer, one of the many instruments utilized by the ocean station cutters.

"In quest of 'PIBALS': That is to say: PIBALS are measurements of the direction and intensity of winds aloft obtained by tracking the movement of a small free balloon which has an assumed ascensional rate. The tracking is done visually with a special type of transit known as a theodolite. As these men, on board a cutter, prepare to gather this type of weather information, the man at the theodolite gets the instrument set while his partner awaits the word to let the balloon go."

"RADIOSONDE WEATHER BALLOON IN FLIGHT: A weather balloon is seen here at the instant of release from the deck of the cutter Absecon, just before the weight of the radiosonde transmitter is felt. Note the flattening of the upper side of the balloon."
The Korean naval base at Chinae, first established by a Coast Guard advisory team after the end of World War II. Chinae was a former base of the occupying Imperial Japanese.

7 February 1950. Discussing the value of and use of training aids with LCDR Chai, the liaison officer to the American advisors of the Korean Naval Academy. CDR William Achurch, the senior advisor to the Korean Navy, is on the left.

CDR Achurch and his wife entertain Chiang Kai-shek at the base at Chinae, during his visit to the base in August, 1949. He was establishing his Nationalist Chinese forces on the island of Formosa during this time after his defeat by the Communist Chinese.
Historiography of the Korean War
Allan Millett

[This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of The Journal of Military History under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is here reproduced in revised form with the gracious permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum, and the Society for Military History.]


John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, The Forgotten War. America in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Times Books, 1987).


### Causes of the War

A civil war--as Korea surely was--has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Chosin dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to Czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, and thirty-five years of misery.


Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations which survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th Parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams, and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyingju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung, and Shannon McCune, eds., *U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982* (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).


Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1, *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, *The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals, and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.


**U.S. Political Direction**

After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental President, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume *Memoirs* (Garden City, N.Y.:


The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision, June 24-30* (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.

### Koreans on the War

Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives--except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention, remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention, deep sadness over the consequences of the war, pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans, a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere, and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being, and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, *The Korean War and International Law* (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, *Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, *The Korean War, 1950-1953* (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, *Foreign Intervention in Korea* (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, *Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong,


**Military Allies, Political Doubters**

The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (K MAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, *K MAG in War and Peace* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism, and incompetence in the ROKA officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-53 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Sin-Yip, *From Pusan to Panmunjom* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yip, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-50. The late Ching Il-Kwin, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation-building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, *Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).


**The Armed Forces**

The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, *The Test of War, 1950-1953* (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense" series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. 3, *The Korean War* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.


The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations Korea* (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World


Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the Marine division and aircraft wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects. Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959* (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, *Hoyt S. Vandenberg* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea* (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).

**Logistics and Coalition Warfare**

Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition

The Allies


At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from fourteen countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia, and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, and Sweden.

Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, *The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War*, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.

The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the

Special Operations


Russia and the War

From the beginning there were the Soviets—until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of Communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor
continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby—a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.—has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the *Bulletin of the Cold War International History Project* and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.


**China and the War**


Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, *The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective* (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan---or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism, and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan, and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine, and Jackie Hiltz, eds., *America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors, especially the Asians, offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.

The publishing event of the fiftieth anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, *Han'guk Chinjaeng-sa* (1966-1977) in six volumes. *The Korean War*, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the *Korean War* is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.
Table 1.—The Far East Command, June-August 1950

CINCPAC
CINCPACFLT

CINCFE
SCAP
CINCAFFE
CINCUNC*
8 July

NAVFE

FEAF

JAPLOGCOM*
25 August

Eighth Army

SEVENTH FLEET*
27 June

TF 90 PhilFLE
TF 93 NavFleet Philippines
TF 94 NavFleet Marianas
TF 96 NavFleet Japan

Fifth Air Force

Bomber Command*
8 July

*Commands assigned or created subsequent to commencement of Korean hostilities.
Table 2.—NAVAL FORCES IN JAPANESE WATERS, 25 JUNE 1950

**TASK FORCE 90. AMPHIBIOUS FORCE, FAR EAST.** Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle.
- **Mount McKinley (F)**.............................. 1 AGC
- **Cavalier**.............................................. 1 APA
- **Union**.................................................. 1 AKA
- **LST 611**............................................... 1 LST
- **Arikara**................................................ 1 ATF

**TASK FORCE 96. NAVAL FORCES, JAPAN.** Vice Admiral C. T. Joy.
- **Task Group 96.5. Support Group.** Rear Admiral J. M. Higgins.
  - **Task Unit 96.5.1. Flagship Element.**
    - **Juneau (F)**........................................... 1 CLAA.
  - **Task Unit 96.5.2. Destroyer Element.**
    - **Destroyer Division 91:** **Mansfield (F), De Haven, Collett, Lyman, K. Swenson**...... 4 DD.
  - **Task Unit 96.5.3. British Commonwealth Support Element.**
    - Comdr. I. H. McDonald, RAN.
    - **HMAS Shoalhaven**.................................... 1 PF.
  - **Task Unit 96.5.6. Submarine Element.**
    - Lt. Comdr. L. V. Young.
    - **Remora**.............................................. 1 SS.

  - **Mine Squadron 3:**
    - **Mine Division 31:** **Redhead, Mocking Bird, Osprey, Partridge, Chatterer, Kite**........... 6 AMS.
    - **Mine Division 32:** **Pledge (F), Incredible, Mainstay, Pirate**.............................. 4 AM.

1 On loan from Seventh Fleet. 2 In reduced commission. 3 In reserve.
**Table 3.—SEVENTH FLEET, 25 June 1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Group 70.6. Fleet Air Wing 1.</th>
<th>Vice Admiral A. D. Struble.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VP 28</td>
<td>9 P4Y-2.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP 47</td>
<td>9 PBM-5.</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Group 70.7. Service Group.</th>
<th>Captain J. R. Tepper.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Piedmont</em> (F)</td>
<td>1 AD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Navasota</em></td>
<td>1 AO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Karin</em></td>
<td>1 AF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mataglo</em></td>
<td>1 ATF.</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Segundo</em> (F), <em>Catfish</em>, <em>Cabezon</em>,</td>
<td>4 SS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Remora</em></td>
<td>1 ASR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Florikan</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Rochester</em> (FF)</td>
<td>1 CA.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Task Group 77.2. Screening Group.</th>
<th>Captain C. W. Parker.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Division 31 less <em>Keyes</em> and <em>Hollister</em> plus <em>Radford</em> and <em>Fletcher</em>: <em>Shelton</em>, <em>Eversole</em>, <em>Radford</em>, <em>Fletcher</em></td>
<td>4 DD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Division 32: <em>Maddox</em>, <em>Samuel L. Moore</em>, <em>Brush</em>, <em>Taussig</em></td>
<td>4 DD.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th>Task Group 77.4 Carrier Group.</th>
<th>Rear Admiral J. M. Hoskins.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Valley Forge</em> (F)</td>
<td>1 CV.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Relieved by *Pickerel* 11 July.  
2 On loan to Naval Forces Japan.  
3 Relieved by *Greene* 30 June.
**Table 4.—Commonwealth Naval Forces, 30 June 1950**

**Task Group 96.8. British Commonwealth Forces.**

**Rear Admiral Sir W. G. Andrews, RN.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>HMS Triumph</em></td>
<td>1 CVL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>HMS Belfast</em> (P), <em>HMS Jamaica</em></td>
<td>2 CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>HMS Cossack</em>, <em>HMS Consort</em>, <em>HMAS Bataan</em></td>
<td>3 DD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>HMS Black Swan</em>, <em>HMS Alacrity</em>, <em>HMS Hart</em>, <em>HMAS Shoalhaven</em></td>
<td>4 PF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5.—NAVAL OPERATING COMMANDS, 25 June–20 July 1950 (NavFE OpOrds 5–50 (revised), 8–50)

COMNAVFE
COMNAVFORJAP
CTF 96

COMMANDER
SEVENTH FLEET

Task Force 90
PhibFor FE

Task Force 77
Striking Force
Task Group 77.7
Replenishment Group
Task Group 70.6
Fleet Air Wing 1

TG 96.1 Movement Group
  Escort Group, 5 July
  Fleet Activities Japan-Korea, 17 July
TG 96.2 Search and Reconnaissance Group
  Naval Air Japan, 12 July
TG 96.3 Scojap
TG 96.4 Towing and Salvage Group
  Service Group, 17 July
TG 96.5 Naval Support Group
  East Korea Support Group, 5 July
TG 96.6 Minesweeping Group
TG 96.7 Republic of Korea Navy, 10 July
TG 96.8 RN and RAN, 30 June
  West Korea Support Group, 5 July
TG 96.9 Submarine Group, 11 July
Chapter 1. Gathering War Clouds

[2] The Brussels Treaty was signed 17 March 1948 by the Benelux countries, plus England and France. It was another regional collective defense arrangement within the framework of the United Nations and modeled to a considerable extent after the Rio Treaty. (*A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941–49*, Department of State, p. 1333.)
[2A] The treaty was originally signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, The Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Later, in February 1952, Greece and Turkey signed, and Western Germany entered in May of 1955, to make a total of 15 nations.
[2B] The 38th parallel of North Latitude measures 19,648 miles around the globe. The part that crosses Korea—196 miles—is exactly one percent of the whole. Few latitude lines span more land than 38º North; it crosses 12 countries, including the United States, China, and Russia.
[10] During the “National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy” hearings which followed, Chairman Vinson stated as follows: “. . . The rumors became so prevalent and it was floating around to such an extent in Congress that it was necessary for me, speaking on behalf of the Committee, to see the Secretary of Defense and get a statement to the effect that he wasn’t going to transfer the Marines to the Army and he wasn’t going to transfer Marine aviation to the Air Force.” p. 386.
[15A] General Vandenberg is referring to the CVA-58, the USS *United States*, whose construction had been cancelled by the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson.
[16A] General Carl Spaatz, USAF, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, had written in *Newsweek*, 17 October, 1949, that “The Navy now spends more than half its total appropriations in support of naval aviation. The result is that the nation is dissipating its wealth and wasting aviation talent in supporting two air forces.

“This is dangerous. Nothing less than United States air supremacy is at stake. This leadership can not be
maintained unless the country’s military air resources are pooled and placed under the control of one organization.

[17] Ibid, p. 52; also p. 525.
[22] Ibid, Testimony of Admiral (then Captain) Arleigh A. Burke, who was to become Chief of Naval Operations on 17 August 1955, p. 255.
[23] Ibid, Testimony of Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, p. 349, et al. Admiral Denfeld was to be subsequently relieved as CNO on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews.
[27] Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, October 6–21, 1949, p. 536.
[28] Ibid, p. 466.
[29A] On 10 June 1956, the Italian Catholic Action newspaper, Il Quotidiano, published what is said were missing portions of Nikita Khrushchev’s now famous speech attacking Stalin which were not included in the version released by the U.S. State Department. Herein, the newspaper stated that Khrushchev recognized Soviet responsibility for the Korean War. The theory advanced is that Stalin’s jealousy of Red China’s dictator, Mao Tsetung, caused him to embroil Red China and the U.S. in Korea so that he might emerge the undisputed dictator. According to the Roman newspaper, these were Khrushchev’s words:

“His (Stalin’s) anti-realistic consideration of the attitude of the Western Nations in the face of developments in Asia has contributed to the risky situation for the entire socialist cause such as developed around the war in Korea.”

[30] On page 1740, Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “Military Situation in the Far East,” Secretary Acheson explained how Korea came to be excluded from the U.S.’s defensive perimeter: “... The United States had certain points which were a defensive perimeter. At those points (Okinawa, Philippines) United States troops were stationed; there they would stay and there they would fight.

“In regard to other areas, I said nobody can guarantee that; but what we can say is that if people will stand up and fight for their own independence, their own country, the guaranties under the United Nations have never proved a weak reed before, and they won’t in the future. I think that is a fairly accurate statement of what has happened. . . . .

“What I said here (in the Press Club Speech of 12 Jan. 1950) is almost exactly what Mr. Dulles was saying in Korea in June 1950.”

[31] See pages 1990–2, Hearings before House Armed Services Committee. Regarding these intelligence reports, Secretary of State Dean Acheson said: “I do not believe there was a failure of intelligence. . . . . Intelligence was available to the Department prior to the 25th of June, made available by the Far East Command, the CIA, the Department of the Army, and by the State Department representatives here and overseas, and shows that all agencies were in agreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic existed at that time, but they were all in agreement that its launching in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent.
The view was generally held that since the Communists had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimidation, such means would continue to be used rather than overt military aggression.”

To this particular dispatch, the G-2 section of the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) headquarters attached the following comment:

“Comment: The People’s Army will be prepared to invade South Korea by fall and possibly by spring of this year indicated in the current report of armed force expansion and major troop movements at critical 38th parallel areas. Even if future reports bear out the present indication, it is believed civil war will not necessarily be precipitated. . . .” Secretary Acheson also called attention to a G-2 CINCFE comment made 25 March 1950 on their estimate of the probability of civil war in Korea:

“It is believed there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer. The most probable course of North Korean action this spring or summer is furtherance of its attempt to overthrow the South Korean government by the creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic through guerilla activities and psychological warfare.”


An observation team of the UN commission on Korea forwarded a report of an inspection trip dated 24 June 1950 which said that they “had, in the course of a two-weeks inspection trip, been left with the impression that the Republican Army was organized entirely for defense and (was) in no condition to carry out a large scale attack against the forces in the north.” The observers found that the ROK forces were disposed in depth all along the 38th parallel with no concentration of troops at any point, that a large number of ROK forces were actively engaged in rounding up guerrillas, and were, in any case, entirely lacking in the armor, heavy artillery, and air support necessary to carry off an invasion of North Korea.

Blair House, in Washington, was being used as the temporary Executive Mansion pending repairs to the White House itself.

All paraphrased excerpts.

Background Information on Korea, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report No. 2495, 11 July 1950, p. 48.

Ibid, p. 53.
### Table 6.—Pohang Attack Force

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force 91. Landing Force.</td>
<td>Major General Hobart Gay, USA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacron 1.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Group 90.2. Transport Group.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 AGC, 1 APA, 3 AKA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Group 90.3. Tractor Group.</td>
<td>Captain N. W. Sears.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 USN LST, 15 Scapar LST, 2 ATF, 1 ARS, 6 LSU.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 DD, 1 AM, 6 AMS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 APD, 1 UDT detachment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 APD, 1 ATF.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beachmaster Unit detachment, 1 UDT detachment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Group 90.5. Follow-up Shipping Group.</td>
<td>Captain D. J. Sweeney.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 AP, 12 Scapar LST, 4 Maru.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 CLAA, 3 DD, 1 RAN DD.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Close air support from Seventh Fleet; deep air support from FEAF; patrol aircraft from Task Group 96.2.

1 From Task Group 90.7.  
2 From Task Group 90.3.  
3 2 DD from Task Group 90.4.
THE PERIMETER TAKES FORM
24 July – 1 August
Table 7.—Naval Operating Commands, 21 July–11 September 1950

(NavFE Opord 5-50, revisions of 21 July ff)

COMNAVFE
COMNAVFORJAP
CTF 96

COMMANDER
SEVENTH FLEET

Task Force 90
PhibFor FE

Task Force 77
Striking Force
Task Force 79
Service Squadron 3
Task Group 70.6
Fleet Air Wing 1
Task Group 77.3
(Task Force 79)
Formosa Patrol

TG 96.1 Fleet Activities Japan-Korea
TG 96.2 Naval Air Japan (Fleet Air Japan)
TG 96.3 Seajap
TG 96.4 Service Group
TG 96.5 Japan-Korea Support Group
TE 96.50 Escort Element
TE 96.51 East Korea Support Element 1
TE 96.52 East Korea Support Element 2
TE 96.53 West Korea Support Element
TG 96.6 Minesweeping Group
TG 96.7 Republic of Korea Navy
TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group
TG 96.9 Submarine Group
The Period of Crisis
25 Aug.-4 Sept. 1950

[Map showing various locations and movements during the period specified.]
The Russian Bomber Incident 4. Sep. 1950

- Radar contact 1320
- Contact splits 1333
- Shot down 1343
- THOMAS DD
- Bomber opens fire
- 1338 Merged plot
- 1337 Twin-engine bomber sighted
- 1335 CAP-4F4U 12,000 feet
- Estim. speed 150 kts
- alt 12,000 feet
- CAP-4F4U 12,000 feet

TF77 1330

Shantung Pen. (China)
Table 8.—FAR EAST COMMAND ORGANIZATION, INCHON AND WONSAN LANDINGS

CINCFE
SCAP
CINCAFFE
CINCUNC

NAVFE

* EIGHTH ARMY

JOINT TASK FORCE 7
11-20 September
3-31 October

FIFTH AIR FORCE

Bomber Command

Units assigned from NavFE and Seventh Fleet

Combat Cargo
Command
10 Sept. #

When Commanding General assumes command ashore, X Corps reverts to the direct control of CINCFE and Joint Task Force 7 is dissolved.
Table 9.—*Joint Task Force 7: Inchon*

**Joint Task Force 7.**

**Vice Admiral A. D. Struble.**

**Task Force 90. Attack Force.**

Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle.

1-2 AGC, 1 AH, 1 AM, 6 AMS, 3 APD, 1 ARL, 1 ARS, 1 ATF, 2 CVE, 2 CA, 3 CL (1 USN, 2 RN), 1 DE, 12 DD, 5 LSD, 3 LSMR, 4 ROKN PC, 1 PCEC, 8 PF (3 USN, 2 RN, 2 RNZN, 1 French), 7 ROKN YMS, 47 LST (30 Scajap), plus transports, cargo ships, etc., to a total of approximately 180.

**Task Force 91. Blockade and Covering Force.**

Rear Admiral Sir W. G. Andrewes, RN.

1 CVL, 1 CL, 8 DD.

**Task Force 92. X Corps.**

Major General E. M. Almond, USA.

1st Marine Division, Reinforced; 7th Infantry Division, Reinforced; Corps troops.

**Task Force 99. Patrol and Reconnaissance Force.**

Rear Admiral G. R. Henderson.

2 AV, 1 AVP, 3 USN and 2 RAF Patrol Squadrons.

**Task Force 77. Fast Carrier Force.**

Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen.

2-3 CV, 1 CL, 14 DD.

**Task Force 79. Service Squadron.**

Captain B. L. Austin.

2 AD, 1 AE, 2 AF, 1 AK, 3 AKA, 3 AKL, 4 AO, 1 AOG, 1 ARG, 1 ARH, 1 ARS, 1 ATF.
The Inchon Approaches
Aug. Sep. 1950

Nautical miles
THE INCHON ASSAULT, 15 Sept. 1950

Tidal range averages 30 feet. Datum of soundings is 5 feet below mean low tide.

To Transport Area

196
TABLE 10.—NAVAL OPERATING COMMANDS, REORGANIZATION OF
12 SEPTEMBER 1950

COMNAVFE
COMNAVFORJAP
CTF 96

COMMANDER
SEVENTH FLEET

Task Force 95
U.N. Blockading
and Escort Force

Task Force 90
PhibFor FE

Task Force 77
Striking Force
Task Force 79
Service Squadron 3
Task Force 78
Formosa Patrol
Task Group 70.6
Fleet Air Wing 1

TG 96.1 Fleet Activities
Japan-Korea
TG 96.2 Fleet Air Japan
TG 96.3 Scalap
TG 96.4 Service Group
TG 96.8 Escort Carrier Group
TG 96.9 Submarine Group

TG 95.1 West Coast Group
TG 95.2 East Coast Group
TE 95.21 East Coast Element 1
TE 95.22 East Coast Element 2
TG 95.6 Minesweeping Group
TG 95.7 ROK Navy
Table 11.—JOINT TASK FORCE 7: WONSAN

**Joint Task Force 7.**

**Task Force 90. Attack Force.**

Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle.

2 AGC, 2 APD, 4 PF (1 RN, 2 RNZN, 1 French), 1 PCEC, 9 APA, 15 T-AP,
10 AKA, 5 LSD, 1 LSM, 3 LSMR, 48 LST (30 Scraajp), 20 LSU, MSTs
shipping as assigned.

**Task Force 92, X Corps.**

Major General E. M. Almond, USA.

**Task Force 95. Advance Force.**

Rear Admiral A. E. Smith.

Task Group 95.2. Covering and Support Group.

Rear Admiral C. C. Hartman.

3 CA, 1 RNCL, 6 DD (1 RN, 1 RAN, 1 RCN).

Task Group 95.6. Minesweeping Group.

Captain R. T. Spofford.

1 DD, 1 APD, 2 DMS, 3 AM, 7 AMS, 1 ARG, 1 ARS, 8 JMS.

Task Group 96.2. Patrol and Reconnaissance Group.

Rear Admiral G. R. Henderson.

1 AV, 1 AVP; 3 USN, 1 RAP Patrol Squadrons.

Task Group 96.8. Escort Carrier Group.

Rear Admiral R. W. Ruble.

2 CVE, 6 DD.

**Task Force 77. Fast Carrier Force.**

Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen.

4 CV, 1 BB, 1 CL, 16 DD.

**Task Force 79. Logistic Support Force.**

Captain B. L. Austin.

Units assigned from Service Squadron 3 and Service Division 31.
THE ADVANCE INTO NORTH KOREA
1-26 Oct. 1950

[Map of Korea showing military operations and movements during the advance into North Korea in October 1950.]
18 RETREAT IN THE WEST, CONCENTRATION IN THE EAST
26 Nov.-11 Dec. 1950

[Map of Korea with various labels and arrows indicating movements and locations such as Chinnampo, TV77 Replenishment Area, etc.]
**Table 12.—AIRCRAFT EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL IN X CORPS ZONE DURING THE PASSAGE OF TOKTONG PASS, 3 DECEMBER 1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total effort handled by Air Defense Section, MTACS 2, Hamhung:</th>
<th>140</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flights</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average number of aircraft per flight</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portion assigned to Close Support Section, MTACS 2, Hagaru:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Flights</td>
<td>45  (32%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>197 (55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average number of aircraft per flight</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Source of aircraft assigned to Close Support Section, Hagaru:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VMF</td>
<td>117 (59%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TF 77</td>
<td>80 (41%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assignment of flights by Close Support Section, Hagaru:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To close-in search and attack in the Yudam-ni-Hagaru area</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To close support of the movement from Yudam-ni</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Controlled by:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d Bn RCT 5, leading the advance, then center column</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Bn RCT 7, in forward part of column</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RCT 5, in Toktong Pass</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d Bn RCT 7, covering right flank, then rearguard</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Bn RCT 5, rearguard until passed through 3/7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To support at Hagaru, controlled by 3d Bn RCT 1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To support at Koto-ri, controlled by 2d Bn RCT 1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A DAY AT THE RESERVOIR. TF77 air strikes

Not shown 117 marine sorties from Yonpo and BADONG STRAIT

3 Dec. 1950

CCF DEPLOYMENT

Nautical miles
Table 13.—Hungnam Task Organization

**Task Force 90.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 AGC</td>
<td>Captain C. A. Printup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ARG, 1 ARL, 2 ARS, 1 ATF.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Element 90.03. Control Element.</td>
<td>Lt. Comdr. C. E. Allmon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 APD, 1 PCEC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Task Group 90.2. Transport Group.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 APA, 3 AKA, 2 APD, 1 PCEC, 3 LSD (9 LSU embarked), 11 LST, 27 Scapul LST, plus MSTS shipping assigned.</td>
<td>Captain A. E. Jarrell.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Task Group 90.8. Gunfire Support Group.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CA, 4 DD, 3 LSMR, plus 1 CA and DD from TG 95.2.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Task Group 95.2. Blockade, Escort, and Minesweeping Group.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rear Admiral J. M. Higgins.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 CA, 4 DD, 6 PF, plus DMS, AM, AMS from TG 95.6.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Seventh Fleet.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Force 77. Fast Carrier Force.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BB, 1 CL, 1 CLAA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-22 DD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Group 77.3. Carrier Group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 CV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2 CVE, 0-1 CVL, 3-8 DD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Group 79.2. Logistic Support Group.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Units assigned from Service Squadron 3 and Service Division 31.

1 Units assigned to two task elements.
Table 14.—Hungnam Air Deployment

**U.N. Squadrons on Hand**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>F9F</th>
<th>F4U</th>
<th>F7FN</th>
<th>Embarked F9F</th>
<th>Embarked F4U</th>
<th>AD</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 December</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 December</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 December</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 December</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Aircraft on Hand** (Computed on the basis of complements: CV 80, CVL 30, CVE 24, VMF 24, VMFN 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Shore Based</th>
<th>Embarked</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 December</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 December</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 December</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 December</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Plus 35th Fighter-Bomber Group (2 USAF, 1 RAAF F-51 squadrons).
Withdrawal from Hungnam and Inchon
12 Dec. 50-15 Jan. 51
Table 15.—Ammunition Expended in Bombardment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>December</th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
<th>March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16-inch</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>997</td>
<td>994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-inch</td>
<td>3,357</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>2,395</td>
<td>1,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-inch</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>3,290</td>
<td>6,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-inch</td>
<td>15,357</td>
<td>3,468</td>
<td>13,385</td>
<td>43,360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTERDICTION, 1951.

KOREAN AIR DEPLOYMENT
1. March 1951
9 USN squadrons
6 USMC
8 USAF
1 RAAF

STRANGLE AREA

TASK ELEMENT 95.11

FIFTH AIR FORCE

POHANG 1 FSG

PUSAN EAST 3 FSI

CHINHAE 2 FSI

FIFTH AIR FORCE Fighter Groups in Kyushu.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Rail bridges inoperable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoeryong south to Chongjin</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chongjin south to Pukchong</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland from Tanchon, Songjin, and Kilchu</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pukchong south to Wonsan and inland to the Chosin and Fusen Reservoirs</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonsan west to Yangdok</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wonsan south to Chorwon and Kumwha</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily average sightings</td>
<td>January</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad cars</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated percent of total enemy rail or road traffic, transpeninsular route excluded:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East coast rail</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East coast road</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West coast rail</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West coast road</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 18.—Growth of Western Pacific Naval Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>U.S. only June 1950</th>
<th>U.S. and U.N October 1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Carriers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort and Light Carriers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyer Types</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minecraft</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGC/APA/AKA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST (including Scajap)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-AP/Merchant Ships</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### U.S. Navy Personnel, Western Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1950</td>
<td>10,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1950</td>
<td>33,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1950</td>
<td>59,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1951</td>
<td>66,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1951</td>
<td>70,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1951</td>
<td>74,335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 19.—Service Force Deployment to the Western Pacific  
(Yard Types Omitted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>29 June 1950</th>
<th>1 August 1950</th>
<th>15 September 1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKL</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOG</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARH</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSD</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|       | 4            | 17            | 27                |
Table 20.—MSTS Trans-Pacific Shipping Requirements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cargo</th>
<th>Required monthly quantities</th>
<th>Required monthly arrivals</th>
<th>Required ships in the pipe line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provisions</td>
<td>78,000 tons</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General cargo</td>
<td>381,000 tons</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>103,000 tons</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>50,000 tons</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel oil</td>
<td>1,663,000 bbls.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel oil</td>
<td>675,000 bbls.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline</td>
<td>1,419,000 bbls.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping required</td>
<td>1,419,000 bbls.</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21.—Distribution of Major Combat Ships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Atlantic Fleet</th>
<th>Pacific Fleet</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Atlantic Fleet</th>
<th>Pacific Fleet</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fleet carriers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light carriers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escort carriers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 22.—Communist and U.N. Transport, Winter 1951-52

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Locomotives</th>
<th>Rolling Stock</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>6-7,000</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>7,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>8,314</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE  
(RADM J. H. Doyle)  
USS Mt. McKinley (AGC-7)  
(CAPT C. A. Printup)  
USS Cavalier (APA-37)  
(CAPT S. S. Bowling)  
USS Union (AKA-106)  
(CAPT G. D. Zurmuhlen)  
USS LST 611  
(LT J. C. Wilson)  
USS Arikara (ATF-98)  
(LCDR K. A. Mundy)  

SUPPORT FORCE  
(RADM J. M. Higgins, ComCruDiv 5)  
1 CL—Juneau  
(CAPT J. C. Sowell)  
DesDiv 91 (CAPT H. C. Allan)  
4 DDs—Mansfield  
(CDR E. H. Headland)  
De Haven  
(CDR O. B. Lundgren)  
Collett  
(CDR R. H. Close)  
Swenson  
(CDR R. A. Schilling)  
Minron 3  
6 AMs—Redhead  
(LTJG T. R. Howard)  
Mocking Bird  
(LTJG S. P. Gary)  
Osprey  
(LTJG P. Levin)  
Partridge  
(LTJG R. C. Fuller, Jr.)  
Chatterer  
(LTJG J. P. McMahon)  
Kite  
(LTJG N. Grkovic)
The Sea War in Korea

Notes

Chapter 2. Retreat to Pusan

[1] Interview, October 1950.
[1A] A time difference of fourteen hours exists between Korea and Washington. For example, Sunday noon in Washington is two o’clock Monday morning in Korea. Crossing the international dateline westward in mid-Pacific at the 180th degree of longitude, the calendar is moved forward one day. The time used hereafter in this book will be that of the place in which the event occurred.
[2A] Destroyers were HMS *Cossack* (CAPT R. T. White, DSO) and HMS *Consort* (CDR J. R. Carr); frigates were HMS *Black Swan* (CAPT A. D. H. Jay, DSO, DSC), *Alacrity* (CDR H. S. Barber) and HMS *Hart* (CDR N. H. H. Mulleneux, DSC).
[2B] Thus, for the first time, General MacArthur received operational (but not tactical) control over large carriers. This operational control was exercised through COMNAVF and ComSeventhFleet:

> “Never once throughout the course of the Pacific war did that Headquarters (MacArthur’s) exercise direct tactical command of a single fast carrier. . . . Both King and Nimitz feared the consequences of placing fast carriers under the supervision of a headquarters (MacArthur’s) which so evidently looked upon them as expendable. Marines and escort carriers were later assigned to the Southwest Pacific area.” ([*The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*, Isley and Crowl, p. 92.])
[3A] The term “Striking Force” was retained until 25 August 1950 when, by Commander Seventh Fleet Operation Order #14-50, the term “Fast Carrier Force” was used.
[4A] The North Korean Air Force before the war had been estimated at 54 aircraft—33 YAK-type fighters and 21 IL-type attack bombers. Their primary operating fields were Pyongyang, Wonsan, Sinanju, and Sinuiju.
[5] The forces which carried the 24th Division to Korea as designated by COMNAVF OpOrder 7–50 were the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TF 90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Mount McKinley</em> (Captain Carter A. Printup)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Cavalier</em> (Captain Daniel J. Sweeney)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Union</em> (Captain G. D. Zurmuehlen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LST 611</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 SCAJAP LSTs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TG 96.6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Juneau</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>HMS Jamaica</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Mansfield</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>De Haven</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Swenson</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Collett</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>HMS Black Swan</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>HMS Alacrity</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>HMS Shoalhaven</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
HMS Hart

Arikara


[7] Commander Pollock was killed in an air accident in the United States on 6 November 1952.

[7A] High velocity aircraft rocket.


[8A] The Key West Agreement resulted from a conference in Key West, Florida, 11-14 March 1948, between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following this conference, the Secretary of Defense issued a statement which, in seven parts, laid down the common functions of the Armed Forces and the specific functions of the JCS, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The second listed primary function of the Air Force was “To be responsible for strategic air warfare.” This is defined as: “Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s warmaking capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentrations of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.”


[12] Thus, in 1943, the Army Air Force in the War Department publication FM 100-20, (Command and Employment of Air Power, July 1943, p. 12, para 16) stated its opinion of close air support: “In the zone of contact, missions against hostile units are most difficult to control, are most expensive, and are, in general, least effective. Targets are small, well-dispersed, and difficult to locate. In addition, there is always a considerable chance of striking friendly forces. . . . .”

[13] During the Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee in October 1949, Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, made a statement about close air support that read like prophesy in July 1950: “. . . If war should come tomorrow, the Tactical Air Squadrons of the Navy and Marine Corps would have to provide the major part of the troop air support, even as they did in the beginning of the last war. What we have is able to move on short notice—would that it were more.” (Page 197, National Defense Program—Unification & Strategy).


[14A] This suggestion was vetoed in Tokyo because of TacRonOne’s participation in the preliminary planning for Inchon landing, already then underway.


[15A] JOC, Taegu was a joint Army-Air Force center located at Taegu, although it temporarily retreated to Pusan when the perimeter shrank. Still later, the JOC moved to Seoul where it remained for the duration.

[15B] With the arrival in Korea on 3 July of the one under-strength battalion of the 21st Infantry, 24th Division, were two TACPs (Tactical Air Patrol Parties) and one L-5 VHF-equipped flivver airplane known as “Mosquito.” One of the two TACPs was assigned to the 24th Division, one to the ROK forces. The L-5 airplane was put to use as an independent observation and spotting plane. As additional units of the 24th Division arrived, other TACPs and “Mosquito” aircraft arrived. But it was with these first TACPs and airplanes that the Task Force 77 airplanes were trying to perform close air support.

[15C] In addition to the communication trouble, there was the practical difficulty of Korean names. They were difficult to pronounce and understand over the radio, and many names were similar.
ANGLICO is an abbreviation for “Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.”

COMNAVFE dispatch 270732Z July (paraphrased excerpt). Between 26 August and 4 September, Captain Charles E. Crew, USMC, of the ANGLICO trained a total of nine TACPs, all Air Force personnel. These TACPs were trained at Camp McGill, near Tokyo, and later served with the Army’s 7th Division. Of the nine officers in charge of these parties, four were pilots who had done close support in Korea. Eight of the nine thought the Navy system of close air support superior.

Use of the WAC charts meant that pin-pointing a target was impossible. Only a general area, such as a village or stream, could be indicated.

COMNAVFE 190046Z Aug 50 (excerpt paraphrased).

COMNAVFE 220945Z Aug 50 (excerpt paraphrased).

At this conference, FEAF was represented by four generals and one colonel; the Navy, by one captain from COMNAVFE, two commanders and two lieutenant commanders representing ComCarDiv-3.

For the Philippine Sea, her appearance in the Korean theater culminated two months of intense effort. An Atlantic Fleet carrier, the Philippine Sea had arrived in San Diego on 10 June 1950. She was originally scheduled to relieve Valley Forge on 1 October 1950. Upon outbreak of the Korean war, Philippine Sea was ordered forward. CAG-11 (CDR R. C. Vogel, USN) received emergency orders to embark prior to sailing 5 July. This air group had not finished its training cycle, and its jet squadrons had only recently received new aircraft. An intensive ten days’ training was accomplished in the Hawaiian area en-route to the Far East.

It is a high compliment to both ship and air group that despite these handicaps, their performance in Korea was outstanding.

Typical load for close air support: (a) F4U: 800 rounds ammunition; one 1,000-pound bomb; eight 5-inch rockets; four hours’ endurance; (b) AD: 400 rounds ammunition; three 500-pound bombs; twelve 5-inch rockets; four hours’ endurance.

During this period, the two carriers operated for two days, replenishing each third day.

COMSEVENTHFLT 010344Z Sept 50 (paraphrased).

For a complete account of these Marine battles, see U.S. Marine Operations in Korea; the Pusan Perimeter, by CAPT Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, and Lynn Montross.


Sec. VII, SecDef memo dtd 21 April 1948. Incidentally, this same definition remains in Naval Warfare
[29] In a Far East Air Force Mission Summary dated 16 Nov 1950, missions as far distant as twenty miles in advance of friendly forces were listed as “close air support.”

[30] In the period between 26 July and 3 Sept 1950, almost half of the Navy’s close air support sorties were delivered outside the bomline.

[30A] In comparison, the 12th Army in Europe during World War II had only 35 close support aircraft per division.

[30B] Records indicate that 80 percent of the Marine strikes were directed by Tactical Air Control Parties.

[31] Army Air Support Center letter ATASC-D 373.21 of 1 December 1950, Encl 1, Sect 2, para 12.