

The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 13. Seoul as a Battlefield

- [1] Almond, *UN MilOps*, 13.
- [2] *Ibid.*
- [3] MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 37.
- [4] MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 37; Irick interv, 16 Nov 54.
- [5] MajGen D. G. Barr (USA) ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 5 Oct 50.
- [6] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 133–135.
- [7] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [8] 1st MAW SAR, Annex Jig:Easy; Karig, *Korea*, 259.
- [9] *Ibid.*, Annex Item:Sugar; Col M. I. Volcansek, Jr. interv, 15 Mar 55.
- [10] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Oboe.
- [11] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:Peter.
- [12] LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 11 May 55; and LtCol H. S. Roise interv, 11 May 55.
- [13] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen; Taplett interv, 11 May 55; and Maj R. A. McMullen interv, 25 Aug 54.
- [14] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 286–287.
- [15] The description of this fight is based upon the following sources: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54; and Babe-Paolino interv, 15 Nov 54.
- [16] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 284–285.
- [17] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 288–289.
- [18] *Ibid.*
- [19] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter, Queen Queen; MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 38–39.
- [20] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter.
- [21] 3/1 SAR.
- [22] *Ibid.*
- [23] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter.
- [24] *Ibid.*
- [25] 32d Inf *War Diary*, 18–30 Sep 50.
- [26] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 294–295.
- [27] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Roger Roger; and Maj J. D. Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54.
- [28] *Ibid.*; and Capt H. H. Harris—Capt R. R. Van Cleve interv, 10 Aug 54.
- [29] As is frequently the case after heavy fighting, 3/5's SAR contains inaccuracies in its account covering 24–27 September, leaving the reader with the impression that the entire spur leading into the city was secured on the 26th. In retracing the progress of the attack during interviews with the authors, both Lieutenant Colonel Taplett and Captain (now Major) McMullen agree that the foregoing account is correct.
- [30] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Peter Peter; 2/1 SAR; Sutter—Codispoti interv, 25 Jan 55; and Cummings interv, 12 Oct. 54.
- [31] Capt N. R. Stanford, "Road Junction", *Marine Corps Gazette*, 35 no. 9 (Sep 51):16–21.
- [32] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Capt F. B. Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.
- [33] 32d Inf *War Diary*, 18–30 Sep 50.

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] MarCorps Board *Study*, II-B, 42.

[36] The following narrative is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Roger Roger; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54; Harris—Van Cleve interv, 10 Aug 54; and Maj W. R. Earney, *Notes on Operations of 3d Bn, 7th Mar, in South Korea* (Earney Notes), MS.

[37] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.

[38] Contact on 26 September was between rearward elements of the 1st and 5th Marines, not between assault units.

[39] *Ibid.*

[40] 2/1 SAR; and Cummings interv, 12 Oct 54.

[41] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.

[42] *Ibid.*


[43] 2/1 SAR.

[44] Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.

[45] 32d Inf *War Diary*, 18–30 Sep 50.

[46] 2/1 SAR; and Capt T. Culpepper interv, 9 Feb 55.

[47] *Ibid.*; Bridges interv, 18 Oct 54; and Carlon interv, 1 Mar 55.




SEOUL ASSAULT PLAN

26 SEP 50

SHOWING DIVISION & REGTL BOUNDARIES





THE BATTLE OF SEOUL

SHOWING ATTACKS BY 5th MARINES, 1st MARINES, & 32d INF


25 SEP 26 SEP 27 SEP

NK COUNTERATTACKS OF 25 & 26 SEP

APPROXIMATE X CORPS FRONT, 2400 27 SEP


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YARDS



The Inchon-Seoul Operation
Notes
Chapter 14. The Drive to Uijongbu

- [1] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex How How.
- [2] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 312–313.
- [3] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen.
- [4] *Ibid.*, Annex Roger Roger.
- [5] *Ibid.*, Annex Peter Peter.
- [6] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 308, 338–339.
- [7] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 27 Sep 50, *Notes*, 313–315.
- [8] CinCFE msg to CG X Corps, 28 Sep 50.
- [9] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Peter Peter.
- [10] Col E. H. Forney memo to authors, Dec 54.
- [11] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 29 Sep 50.
- [12] U.S. MilAcad, *Operations in Korea*, 18–19.
- [13] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 318.
- [14] *Ibid.*, 318–319, 336–337. Both “Kimpo” and “Kumpo” are used in reports to designate the same area—the peninsula formed by the mouth of the Han. The first name was derived from the airfield, of course, and the second from the principal town of the peninsula.
- [15] 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex Queen Queen:basic rpt and Peter.
- [16] *Ibid.*, Annex Roger Roger.
- [17] This section is derived from: 1st MarDiv SAR, Annexes Oboe Oboe and Roger Roger; 1st MAW SAR, Annex Item:Queen; Col H. L. Litzenberg interv with HistDiv, 22 Apr 51; Hammond interv, 17 Aug 54; and Capt R. T. Bey interv, 17 Nov 54.
- [18] Lieutenant Colonel Hinkle, the former 2/7 commander, had been wounded and evacuated on 28 September.
- [19] O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 2–3 Oct 50.
- [20] Capt J. E. Dolan memo to authors, 24 Nov 54.
- [21] *Ibid.*
- [22] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 342; 1st MarDiv SAR, Annex George, 7.
- [23] Wonsan fell without a fight on 10 October, before the Marines embarked, to ROK units advancing up the coastal route.
- [24] O. P. Smith, *Notes*, 365–366.
- [25] Summaries and statistics for Marine air have been derived from: 1st MAW SAR, Annexes Able, Item, Jig, Queen, and Sugar; also E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air over Inchon-Seoul,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, 36, no. 6 (Jun 52): 19–27. Note that the total of 2,774 combat sorties includes 38 flown by two aircraft of VMF–312, which began operating from Kimpo nine days before the rest of the squadron arrived.
- [26] VAdm A.D. Struble ltr to authors, 3 May 55.
- [27] 1st MarDiv SAR., Annex William William.
- [28] MarCorps Board *Study*, II–B, 45–46. Here again it may be noted that later reports, not available when this study was made, indicate that duplicate claims were entered for four of these 44 tanks, with two others unaccounted for in records. The actual total, therefore, is 38.



**PURSUIT OF THE NKPA
&
CAPTURE OF UIJONGBU
28 SEP -- 3 OCT 1950**



The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 1. Problems of Victory

- [1] The story of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and Marine Aircraft Group 33 in the Pusan Perimeter has been told in Volume I of this series, and Volume II deals with the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in the Inchon-Seoul operation.
- [2] Col C. W. Harrison, interview (interv) 22 Nov 55. Unless otherwise noted, all interviews have been by the authors.
- [3] US Dept of State, *Guide to the UN in Korea* (Washington, 1951). Yugoslavia abstained from the vote, and the USSR, then boycotting the Council, was absent.
- [4] *Ibid.*
- [5] Maj J. F. Schnabel, USA, Comments on preliminary manuscript (Comments).
- [6] JCS memo to Secretary of Defense (SecDef), 7 Sep 50. Unless otherwise stated, copies of all messages cited are on file in Historical Branch, HQMC.
- [7] JCS message (msg) WAR 91680, 15 Sep 50; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, 2 vols (Garden City, 1955–1956), II, 359.
- [8] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 360; MajGen Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur, His Rendezvous with History* (New York, 1956), 397. Commenting on the JCS authorization Gen MacArthur stated, “My directive from the JCS on 27 September establishing my military objective as ‘. . . the destruction of the North Korean Armed Forces’ and in the accomplishment thereof authorizing me to ‘. . . conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations north of the 38th parallel in Korea. . .’ made it mandatory rather than discretionary . . . that the UN Forces operate north of that line against enemy remnants situated in the north. Moreover, all plans governing operations north of that Parallel were designed to implement the resolution passed by the UN General assembly on 7 October 1950, and were specifically approved by the JCS. Indeed, the military objectives assigned by the JCS, and the military-political objectives established by said resolution of the UN could have been accomplished in no other way.” Gen D. MacArthur letter (ltr) to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 24 Feb 56.
- [9] JCS msg 92985, 29 Sep 50. For a differing interpretation see Whitney, *MacArthur*, 398.
- [10] JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50.
- [11] CinCUNC msg to CinC North Korean Forces, 1 Oct 59, in *EUSAK War Diary (WD)*, 1 Oct 50, Sec II; JCS msg 92762, 27 Sep 50.
- [12] US Ambassador, England msg to Secretary of State, 3 Oct 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 361–362. The information was forwarded to Tokyo but MacArthur later claimed that *had* never been informed of it. *Military Situation in the Far East. Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Eighty-second Congress, First Session, To Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his assignments in that area* (Washington, 1951, 5 vols.), (hereafter *MacArthur Hearings*), 109.
- [13] JCS msg 92801, 27 Sep 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 360; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 397. Italics supplied.
- [14] Resolution of 7 Oct 50 in *Guide to the UN in Korea*, 20.
- [15] JCS msg 93709, 9 Oct 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 362; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 404.
- [16] C/S FECOM memo to JSPOG, 26 Sep 50. Copy at Office of The Chief of Military History (OCMH).
- [17] Maj J. F. Schnabel, *The Korean Conflict: Policy, Planning, Direction*. MS at OCMH. See also: Capt M. Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command,” *Army*, vii, no. 4 (Nov 56), 38–44, 65.
- [18] Schnabel, *The Korean Conflict*.

[19] *Ibid.*, and CinCFE *OpnPlan* 9–50. Copy at OCMH.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] CinCFE msg C 64805, 28 Sep 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 361; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 397–398.

[22] JCS disp 92975, 29 Sep 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 361; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 398. All dates in the narrative and in footnotes are given as of the place of origin of the action. Thus, 29 September in Washington was actually the 30th in Tokyo.

[23] UNC *Operation Order (OpnO)* 2, 2 Oct 50.

[24] LtGen E. A. Almond, USA, (Ret.) ltr to Col J. Meade, USA, 14 Jun 55.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] *Ibid.*; Schnabel, *The Korean Conflict*; Blumenson, “MacArthur’s Divided Command.” Gen MacArthur stated: “If such a dissension existed it was never brought to my attention. To the contrary, the decision to retain as a function of GHQ command and coordination between Eight Army and X Corps until such time as a juncture between the two forces had been effected was, so far as I know, based upon the unanimous thinking of the senior members of my staff . . .” MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 56. Gen Wright has stated: “Neither General Hickey, General Eberle, nor I objected to the plan, but we did feel that X Corps should have been made part of the Eighth Army immediately after the close of the Inchon-Seoul operation.” MajGen E. K. Wright, USA, ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 16 Feb 56.

[27] JSPOG memo to C/S, FECOM: “Plans for future operations,” 27 Sep 50. Copy at OCMH.

[28] 1stMarDiv *Special Action Report for the Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation, 8 Oct–15 Dec 50* (hereafter 1stMarDiv SAR), 10.

[29] 1stMarDiv SAR, 10 and MajGen Oliver P. Smith, *Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division during the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–51* (MS), (hereafter Smith, Notes), 370–371.

[30] *Ibid.*

[31] ComNavFE *OpnPlan* 113-50. Copy at OCMH.

[32] *Ibid.*, B, 11.

[33] X Corps *OpnO* 3, 2 Oct 50.

[34] MajGen Oliver P. Smith: *Chronicle of the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950-1951* (MS), (hereafter, Smith, *Chronicle*), 54

[35] Gen Wright stated, “There was definitely *not* a complete lack of planning data. I doubt if any operation ever had more planning data available. It may not have been in General Smith’s hands on 3 October, but it was available.” Wright ltr, 16 Feb 56.

[36] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units: “Planning Information,” 3 Oct 50.

[37] Special Report 1stMarDiv, in CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Rpt #1*, annex DD, 11; 1stMarDiv *Historical Diary (HD)*, Oct 50; X Corps *OpnO* 4, 4 Oct 50.

[38] Smith, *Chronicle*, 54.

[39] *Ibid.*, 55.


[40] ComSeventhFlt *OpnO* 16–50, 5 Oct 50.


[41] *Ibid.*


[42] The description of Wonsan is based upon: GHQ, FECOM, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, Theater Intelligence Division, Geographic Branch, *Terrain Study No. 6, Northern Korea*, sec v, 13–16; 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 15–50, annex B, sec 2, 1, 3, 10 Oct 50; and 1stMarDiv SAR, annex B (hereafter G-2 SAR), sec 2, 1.

[43] 1stMarDiv SAR, 10. The classes of supply are as follows: I, rations; II, supplies and equipment, such as normal clothing, weapons, vehicles, radios, etc, for which specific allowances have been established; III, petroleum products, gasoline, oil and lubricants (POL); IV, special supplies and equipment, such as fortification and construction materials, cold weather clothing, etc, for which specific allowances have not been established; V,

ammunition, pyrotechnics, explosives, etc.







The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 2. The Wonsan Landing

- [1] 1stMarDiv Embarkation Order (*EmbO*) 2-50, 6 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 394.
- [2] G-2 SAR, 2. JANIS is the abbreviation for Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies.
- [3] 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 16-50, 10 Oct 50.
- [4] EUSAK *War Diary Summary (WD Sum)*, Oct 50, 14-16.
- [5] CinCFE *OpnPlan* 9-50 (*Alternate*), 8 Oct 50.
- [6] C/S Notes in X Corps *WD* 10-25 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne, "Report of . . . Operations . . . 25 Jun 50 to 1 Jan 51," 11; Smith, *Chronicle*, 57-59; and Capt Walter Karig, *et al*, *Battle Report: The War In Korea* (New York, 1952), 301-302. According to Gen Wright, MacArthur's G-3, "Admiral Joy may have 'discussed' this often with the Commander-in-Chief, but no one ever 'argued' with him." Wright ltr 16 Feb 56.
- [7] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.
- [8] Smith, *Chronicle*, 59.
- [9] ComPhibGruOne "Operations Report," 10. SCAJAP is the abbreviation for Shipping Control Authority, Japan. Under this designation were American ships lent to Japan after World War II, of which many were recalled during the Korean War to serve as cargo vessels.
- [10] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex D (hereafter G-4 SAR), 2.
- [11] *Ibid.*, 3.
- [12] These totals were authorized: C-Rations for five days; individual assault rations for one day; POL for five days; Class II and IV supplies for 15 days; and five units of fire (U/F). *Ibid.*; 1stMarDiv *Administration Order (AdmO)* 13-50, 8 Oct 50. A unit of fire is a convenient yardstick in describing large quantities of ammunition. It is based on a specific number of rounds per weapon.
- [13] G-4 SAR, 1.
- [14] *Ibid.*, 3.
- [15] ComNavFE msg to ComPhibGruOne, CG 1stMarDiv and others, 0200 8 Oct 50.
- [16] 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035 11 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex QQ, appendix A (hereafter 1/5 SAR), 4, appendix B (hereafter 2/5 SAR), 6, and appendix C (hereafter 3/5 SAR), 4.
- [17] CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 0752 11 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 373.
- [18] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex RR (hereafter 7thMar SAR), 9; Smith, *Notes*, 399, 409; 1stMar *HD Oct 50*, 3.
- [19] 1stMarDiv *Embarkation Summary*, 16 Oct 50; and "Special Report 1stMarDiv," 12.
- [20] 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 17-50, 10 Oct 50.
- [21] ". . . Division [1stMarDiv] Advance Parties were flown to Wonsan in accordance with a definite plan which materialized just before we set sail from Inchon. As a matter of fact the personnel for these parties and even some of the jeeps were already loaded out and had to be removed from the shipping prior to our sailing." Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n. d.
- [22] CG's Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 10-25 Oct 50; Smith, *Chronicle*, 59.
- [23] X Corps *Operation Instruction (OI)* 11, 14 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 385.
- [24] According to General Smith, "The reason for issuing 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 17-50 was to provide for an administrative landing in sheltered waters just north of Wonsan where there would be easy access to the existing road net. The ship-to-shore movement provided for in 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 16-50 was retained intact. This plan [*OpnO* 17-50] had to be dropped when it was found that Wonsan Harbor was completely blocked by mines, and that it would be much quicker to clear the approaches to the Kalma Peninsula where we eventually landed . . . 1stMarDiv dispatch [1450 24 Oct] cancelled both 1stMarDiv *OpnOs* 16 and 17 and provided for an administrative

landing on the Kalma Peninsula as directed by CTF 90.” Gen O. P. Smith ltr to authors, 3 Feb 56. Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, letters may be assumed to be to the authors.

[25] CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, VI, 1090.

[26] *Ibid.*, VI, 1088–1089; Smith, *Notes*, 404; Karig, *Korea*, 301. See also ADVATIS Rpt 1225 in EUSAK *WD*, 24 Oct 50.

[27] CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, VI, 1004; Dept Army, Joint Daily Situation Report (D/A Daily SitRpt) 105; Karig, *Korea*, 311–314.

[28] Minesweep Rpt #1 in X Corps *WD* 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE Intelligence Summary (IntSum) 76; ComNavFE Operations Summary (OpSum) 201; D/A Daily SitRpt 105; Karig, *Korea*, 315.

[29] ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” in CinCPacFlt, *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, 13–15; ComSeventhFlt, “Chronological Narrative,” in *Ibid.*, 7.

[30] CTG 95.6 msg to CTF95, CTF77 11 Oct 50 in G–3 Journal, X Corps *WD* 10–25 Oct 50; ComNavFE OpSum 215; ComNavFE IntSum 82; Karig, *Korea*, 315.

[31] VAdm A. D. Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.

[32] ComPatRon 47, “Special Historical Report,” in CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, H4; ComUNBlockandCortFor, “Evaluation Information,” 5, 15; Karig, *Korea*, 318–322.

[33] ComNavFE OpSum 219; ComNavFE IntSum 82.

[34] ComFltAirWing 6, “Evaluation information,” in CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, D8.

[35] Smith, *Notes*, 404–407; Karig, *Korea*, 324–326.

[36] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 404–405; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 11–12; LtCol H. W. Edwards, “A Naval Lesson of the Korean Conflict,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, lxxx, no. 12 (Dec 54), 1337–1340; Karig, *Korea*, 324–326; 1stMarDiv G–1 Journal 20 Oct 50.

[37] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Smith, *Notes*, 404; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56.

[38] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12; Struble Comments, 16 Mar 56.

[39] *Ibid.*, 11; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex VV, (hereafter 7thMTBn SAR), 2; ComPhibGruOne msg to BuMed, 0034 27 Oct 50.

[40] CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 1119 24 Oct 50 in G–3 Journal, X Corps *WD* 10–25 Oct 50.

[41] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 12–13; Smith, *Notes*, 407; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50; Smith ltr, 3 Feb 56.

[42] Unless otherwise stated this section is based on: 1stMAW *HD*, Oct 50; 1stMAW SAR, annex K (hereafter MAG–12 SAR), 1, appendix G (hereafter VMF–312 SAR), 3, 5–6; and Smith, *Notes*, 433–441.

[43] E. H. Giusti and K. W. Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no. 7 (Jul 52), 19–20; 1stMAW SAR, annex K, appendix H (hereafter VMF(N)–513 SAR), sec 6, 2.

[44] 1stMAW SAR, annex J, appendix Q (hereafter VMF–214 SAR), 2.

[45] Giusti and Condit, “Marine Air at the Chosin Reservoir,” 20; 1stMAW *HD*, Oct 50; TAC X Corps *OpnO* 2–50, 15 Oct 50, in *Ibid.*

[46] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex WW (hereafter VMO–6 SAR), 2.

[47] EUSAK *WD Sum*, Oct 50, 13–23.

[48] *Ibid.*, 25–30.

[49] Schnabel, *The Korean Conflict*.

[50] EUSAK *WD Sum*, Oct 50, 11–20.

[51] *Ibid.*, 20–32.

[52] The following summary of the Wake Island meeting is primarily based on: Gen O. N. Bradley, Comp., *Substance of Statements Made at Wake Island Conference on October 15, 1950* (Washington, 1951); and Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 364–367. These accounts are strongly objected to in MacArthur ltr, 24 Feb 56. For a differing

account of the meeting see: C. A. Willoughby and J. Chamberlain, *MacArthur 1941–1951* (New York, 1954), 382–383; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 384–395, 416; and Gen D. MacArthur, “Gen. MacArthur Makes His Reply,” *Life*, xl, no. 7 (13 Feb 56), 107–108. Participants in the conference besides Truman and MacArthur were: Secretary of the Army Frank Pace; Ambassador Philip Jessup; Ambassador to Korea John Muccio; General Bradley; Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Admiral Arthur W. Radford, CinCPacFlt; Averell Harriman; and BrigGen Courtney Whitney of FECOM Headquarters.

[53] By way of comparison, MacArthur paid tribute to the Marine Corps’ highly technical system of tactical air employment: “Ground support is a very difficult thing to do. Our marines do it perfectly. They have been trained for it. Our own Air and Ground Forces are not as good as the marines but they are effective.”

[54] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50; Schnabel, *Korean Conflict*.

[55] CinCUNC msg CX 67291, 24 Oct 50; X Corps *WD Sum*, Nov 50, 5.

[56] JCS msg 94933, 24 Oct 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 372.

[57] CinCFE msg 67397, 25 Oct 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 372.

[58] CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50.

[59] EUSAK *WD*, 23 Oct 50.

[60] X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50.

[61] “Summary of Activities, 21 Oct,” in *Ibid.*; ComPhibGruOne “Operations Report,” 13; Smith, *Notes*, 404–407; Struble Comments, 14 Mar 56.

[62] 1stMarDiv *OpnPlan 4–50*, 22 Oct 50. “G–3 (Col Bowser) and G–4 (Col McAlister) landed by boat at Wonsan through a very narrow swept channel on the 23rd or 24th of October. Advance Parties of the Division were contacted at this time and a reconnaissance of the entire Wonsan area was made to select and mark administrative assembly areas for units of the Division. Included in this reconnaissance was the St. Benedict Abbey, which was selected as the assembly area for the 7th Marines in view of its projected employment to the north shortly after landing.” Bowser Comments.

[63] X Corps *WD*, 10–25 Oct 50; X Corps G-3 Journal, in *ibid.*; Smith, *Notes*, 285.

[64] 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex PP (hereafter 1stMar *SAR*), 4; and Smith, *Notes*, 407–409. The orders covering the actual debarkation of troops were contained in CTF 90 msgs to CTG 90.2, 0240 and 0910 23 Oct 50; CTG 90.2 msg to CTE 90.22, 1328 25 Oct 50; and CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 1450 24 Oct 50. The order to land was given in CTF 90 msg to CTG 90.2, 0707 25 Oct 50.

[65] “At the time of the administrative landing we thought that we might as well use the planned ship-to-shore movement for scheduled waves in order to avoid making a new ship-to-shore plan. In this way we were able to execute by referring to our original plan [OpnO 16–50] for the assault landing without issuing an entire new order.” Bowser Comments.

[66] 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex OO (hereafter 1stTkBn *SAR*), 2–8.

[67] 1stAmphTracBn *HD Oct 50*, 2–3.

[68] 1stMar *SAR*, 4; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1355 26 Oct 50.

[69] 7thMar *SAR*, 12; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1628 26 Oct 50. For a detailed account of the tragedy of St. Benedict’s, see Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USNR, *The History of the Chaplains Corps, U.S. Navy*, (MS) V.

[70] 1stMarDiv, *SAR*, annex QQ, (hereafter 5thMar *SAR*), 8.


[71] 11thMar *UnitReport (URpt)*, 21–28 Oct 50.

[72] The concluding narrative of this chapter is derived from 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annexes MM (hereafter 1stSPBn *SAR*), 5–8, and UU (hereafter 1st CSG *SAR*) 6 and 1stSPBn, *HD for Advance Party*, 1–2.

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Notes
Chapter 3. First Blood at Kojo

- [1] *Newsweek*, xxxiv, no. 18 (30 Oct 50), 30.
- [2] Smith, *Notes*, 403; Col A. L. Bowser, Comments, n. d. See also FMFPac Staff Study: "The Establishment of a Balanced Fleet Marine Force Air-Ground Force in the Western Pacific," 19 Oct 50.
- [3] Smith, *Notes*, 403.
- [4] CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2001 27 Oct 50. Firewood being scarce in Korea, it was sometimes booby trapped.
- [5] Smith, *Notes*, 385; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex C (hereafter G-3 SAR), 5. The assignment went to 1/1. See Col J. Hawkins ltr to CMC, n. d., and LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to CMC, 8 Feb 56 for a discussion of the lack of planning and intelligence resulting from this order being received while underway.
- [6] Smith, *Notes*, 393-394; G-3 SAR, 5-6.
- [7] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 18-50*, 28 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 2146 28 Oct 50.
- [8] Smith, *Chronicle*, 66; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, 22 Mar 56; LtGen E. A. Craig, "Notes concerning Wonsan Administrative Landing and events immediately following, October 26, 1950 to November 5, 1950," 4 Sep 56.
- [9] This section is derived from: 1/1 msg to 1stMarDiv, 1750 27 Oct 50; 1stMar SAR, 4; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 7; 1stMar *HD*, Oct 50, 4; X Corps *Periodic Operations Report (POR)* 30; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Capt G. S. Belli Comments, n. d.
- [10] Hawkins ltr, n. d. It should be remembered that Hawkins made his dispositions before learning that the ROKs had taken the supply dump with them.
- [11] Maj W. C. Noren, Report of 27-28 Oct 50, revised and annotated in ltr to authors, 22 Nov 55; (hereafter Noren rpt); Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv, 27 Oct 55; Maj R. P. Wray ltr to CMC, 24 Jan 56.
- [12] Hawkins ltr, n. d.
- [13] 1stMar *HD*, Oct 50, encl 2, 1; Noren rpt; Bridges interv 4 Nov 55.
- [14] 1/1 telephone call (tel) to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; G-2 X Corps Rpt in G-3 Journal, X Corps *WD*, 29 Oct 50; X Corps *Periodic Intelligence Report (PIR)* 33.
- [15] 1stMarDiv SAR, 26; X Corps *PIR* 41, annex 3; 1stMarDiv *PIR* 20, encl 2.
- [16] 1stMar SAR, 4; Noren rpt; Bridges interv, 4 Nov 55.
- [17] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 2130 31 Oct 50; Wray ltr, 24 Jan 56.
- [18] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon the 1stMar SAR 4-5, appendix II, 2; Noren rpt; Bridges interv 4 Nov 55; Barrow interv 27 Oct 55; 1stMar, *HD Oct 50*, encl. 2; 1; Wray ltr, 24 Jan 56; Hawkins ltr, n. d.; Statement of Lt James M. McGhee, 15 Feb 51.
- [19] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex SS, appendix 2 (hereafter 2/11 SAR), 14.
- [20] Capt R. M. Taylor tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1545 28 Oct 50.
- [21] VMF(N)-513 SAR, sec 6, 6; VMF(N)-513 *WD Oct 50*; 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0050 29 Oct 50; Maj W. B. Noren Comments n. d.
- [22] Capt R. B. Robinson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 6 Feb 51; Hawkins ltr, n. d.
- [23] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0700 28 Oct 50; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1825 29 Oct 50.
- [24] 1stMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.
- [25] 1/1 msg to 1stMar, 1000 28 Oct 55. As Col Hawkins points out, the request for instructions refers to his only orders being to defend the ROK supply dump which no longer existed. Hawkins ltr, n. d.
- [26] CG's Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 28 Oct 50; Craig "Notes . . . Oct 26-Nov 5, 1950"; G-3 1stMarDiv tel

- to G-3 X Corps, 1215 28 Oct 50; 1stMar *HD, Oct 50*, 4; LtCol R. E. Lorigan ltr to CMC 7 Dec 55.
- [27] 1/1 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1415 28 Oct 50; Hawkins ltr, n. d.
- [28] 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1840 28 Oct 50.
- [29] Craig, "Notes . . . 29 Oct–Nov 5, 1950" ; Col A. Sutter Comments n. d.
- [30] Barrow interv, 28 Oct 55.
- [31] CTF-90 msg to USS *Wantuck*, 0839 28 Oct 50; VMO-6 *SAR*, 23.
- [32] 1stTkBn *SAR*, 9, 11; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1650 29 Oct 50.
- [33] 1stSPBn *SAR*, 5-6; 1stMar *SAR*, 6; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex TT (hereafter 1stAmph TracBn *SAR*) 4-5, appendix 2, 3-4.
- [34] Craig ltr, 4 Sep 55; Smith, *Notes*, 450.
- [35] 2/1 *SAR*, 3; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1816 29 Oct 50; 1stMar Fwd *ISUM*, 1900 29 Oct 50.
- [36] VMO-6 *HD Oct 50*; VMO-6 *SAR*, 3.
- [37] Smith, *Notes*, 451; Noren Comments.
- [38] Smith, *Notes*, 451; CG's Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 29 Oct 40.
- [39] Smith, *Notes*, 451-452; 1stMar *SAR*, appendix 5, 2; Noren Comments.
- [40] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to ExecO 1stMar, 1450 30 Oct 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMar Div, 1521 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMarFwd, 2355 31 Oct 50; 1stMarAdv msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1900 1 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 453-454; 1stMar *SAR*, 6-7; Hawkins ltr, n. d.; Sutter Comments.
- [41] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 18-50*, 28 Oct 50; ComPhibGruOne, "Operations Report", 13-14; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, 12; X Corps *WDs*, 29 Oct-8 Nov 50.
- [42] 1stMarDiv *POR* 98; CG X Corps msg X11890; X Corps *OI 14*, 29 Oct 50; X Corps *OI 16*, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CO 1stMar, 31 Oct 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to 1stMar, 1803 2 Nov 50.
- [43] 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8; CO 1stMar msg to 2/1, 1825 2 Nov 50; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 3 Nov 50; 2/1 msg to 1stMar, 1820 3 Nov 50; 2/11 *SAR*, 14-15; Sutter Comments.



The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
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Chapter 4. Majon-ni and Ambush Alley

- [1] CO 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1900 28 Oct 50; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 7, 2.
- [2] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1730 27 Oct 50. See also CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1515 27 Oct 50; 1stMar *OpnO 9-50*, 27 Oct 50; 1stMarDiv *AdmO 14-50*, 27 Oct 50.
- [3] Col T. L. Ridge, *Notes on Operations in North Korea*, 9 Sep 55 (hereafter Ridge, *Notes*) and comments on preliminary draft, 28 Feb 56; Andrew Geer, *The New Breed* (New York, 1952), 203.
- [4] Smith, *Notes*, 393-394; G-3 *SAR*, 5-6.
- [5] Except where otherwise indicated, this section is based on: Ridge, *Notes*; and Comments, 28 Feb 50; LtCol E. H. Simmons ltr, 14 Jan 56; 1stLt Charles R. Stiles, "The Dead End of Ambush Alley," *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvi, no. 11 (Nov 51), 38-45.
- [6] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 14; Capt A. J. Strohmenger, ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 16 Sep 55; 3/1 msg to 1stMar, n. t. 2 Nov 50.
- [7] This section is based upon LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 4 Nov 55 and ltr, 14 Jan 56.
- [8] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 4.
- [9] *Ibid.*, 5; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56.
- [10] LtCol T. L. Ridge, interv with HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Aug 51.
- [11] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 8; 1stMarDiv *PIRs 21* and *22*.
- [12] The account of the How Company ambush is derived from: 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 5; VMF-312 *SAR*, 8-9; 3/1 memo: "Summary of Friendly Situation as of 1600," 2 Nov 50; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8, 3; 2/11 *SAR*, 16; Simmons interv, 4 Nov 55; and ltr, 14 Jan 56; Capt R. A. Doyle Comments, n. d.; Maj C. E. Corley Comments, n. d.
- [13] As a result of this experience a radio which could contact planes was later requested. 3/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, n. t. 2 Nov 50.
- [14] LtCol V. J. Gottschalk interv, 21 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle Comments; Cdr R. J. Fleischaker Comments, n. d.
- [15] Col T. L. Ridge, ltr, 28 Nov 55; R. A. Doyle Comments.
- [16] C-3 composition is a powerful, putty-like explosive used chiefly by military engineers for demolitions work.
- [17] S-2 1stMar to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1200 2 Nov 50; 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1115 2 Nov 50; VMF-312 *SAR*, 8-9; 1stTkBn *SAR*, 11; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8, 2-3; 1stLt J. L. Crutchfield ltr to CMC, 23 Jan 56.
- [18] 1stAirDelPlat, *HD*, Nov 50; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8, 3.
- [19] The rest of this section is based upon these sources: Maj R. H. Barrow interv, 7 Oct 55; ExecO 1stMar tel to G-3, 1stMarDiv 3 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2010 5 Nov 50; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 8, 3-4.
- [20] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 5; 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 9; Ridge ltr, 28 Nov 55; Narrative of Capt H. L. Coffman, n. d.
- [21] S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0945 7 Nov 50. 1stMar *SAR*, 10, 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 5-6; 2/11 *SAR*, 17; Capt C. R. Stiles ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, 25 Jan 56; Corley Comments.
- [22] The account of the Easy Company ambush is derived from: 1stMar *URpt (S-3)* 9; 2/1 *SAR*, 6-7; Col A. Sutter Comments 2 Feb 56; TSgt H. T. Jones ltr, n. d.
- [23] 3/1 *SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50*, 6. 1stMar ISUM, 1200 9 Nov 50; 2/11 *SAR*, 17; Capt R. A. Mason Comments, 25 Jan 56. See also Corley Comments.
- [24] 2/1 *SAR*, 7. Ridge, *Notes*.
- [25] Geer, *The New Breed*, 215.
- [26] VMO-6 *SAR*, 8; X Corps, *Guerrilla Activities X Corps Zone*, Nov 50, 1; 1stMarDiv *PIR 18*; 2/11 *SAR*, 17.

[27] Col T. L. Ridge interv, 22 Nov 55.

[28] 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50, 6. 1stMarDiv URpt (S-3) 9. 1stMar SAR, 11; 2/11 SAR, 17. The “Bouncing Betty” type of antipersonnel mine was equipped with a spring which sent it several feet into the air to explode with maximum destructive effect.

[29] Air Off 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1445 12 Nov 50; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1845 12 Nov 50; LnO 1stMar tel to 1stMarDiv, 1530 14 Nov 50; G-3 1stMar Div tel to S-3 1stMar, 1600 14 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv POR 146; 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50, 3-4, 6-7; 2/1 SAR, 9; 1stMar SAR, 11-12; Capt Max W. Dolcater, USA, *3d Infantry Division in Korea* (Tokyo, 1953), 73; Ridge Comments, 28 Feb 56.

[30] 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50. General Ruffner, Chief of Staff of X Corps, later commented: “Personally, I always had a feeling that the Marines did a masterful job at Majon-ni. To begin with, it was a very tough assignment and in the second place I always felt that it broke up what remained of organized units in the North Korean Army that would otherwise have given us a tremendous amount of trouble in our backyard at Wonsan. A lot of determined enemy action on our perimeter at Wonsan would have been most disconcerting, troublesome, and unquestionably slowed down our subsequent movement to the north.” MajGen C. L. Ruffner ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 13 Jan 56.

[31] 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50, 7.

[32] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 13-14; X Corps WD, 29 Oct 50; X Corps POR 35.

[33] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 145; X Corps WD, 5 Nov 50; X Corps POR 40.

[34] Division of Publication, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State, *United States Relations with China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949* (hereafter *U.S. Relations with China*), (Washington, 1949), 318, 331.

[35] ComPhibGruOne, “Operations Report,” 14-15; ComNavFE msg to NavFE, 0204 30 Oct 50; X Corps POR 150; LtGen E. A. Craig ltr, 20 Feb 56.

[36] X Corps OpnO 6, 12 Nov 50.


[37] 1stMar OpnO 19-50, 5 Nov 50; X Corps msg X 14010 9 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 459-460. 1/5 had been initially assigned as the standby BLT but was replaced by 1/1 on its return from Kojo.


[38] 1stMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv 1030 and 1910, 9 Nov 50; 1stMar URpt (S-3) 9; 1stTkBn SAR, 14. Ruffner ltr 13 Jan 56.

[39] X Corps OpnO 6, 12 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 492-493; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 73; CG 1stMarDiv msg to subordinate units, 2305 11 Nov 50.

[40] 1stMarDiv POR 145; Smith, *Notes*, 494; 1/1 msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1845 15 Nov 50; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 73.

[41] 2/1 SAR, 9-10; S-3 1stMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 2245 15 Nov 50; 3/1 SAR 7 Oct-25 Nov 50; 1stMar SAR, 12; 1stMarDiv POR 154; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 73; Sutter Comments, 2 Feb 56.





The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 5. Red China to the Rescue

- [1] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 18-50*, 28 Oct 50; Smith, *Notes*, 463-464.
- [2] 7thMar SAR, 12; CO 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 28 Oct 50; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0850 1 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv *OpnO 18-50*, 28 Oct 50. See the detailed account of the move in Col R. G. Davis Comments, 7 May 56. RCT-7 did not receive all of its cold weather clothing until after it reached Koto-ri. MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 18 Jul 56; LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 17 May 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56.
- [3] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2118 31 Oct 50; CO 5thMar msg to CO 1/5, 1013 1 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 463-464; 5thMar SAR, 8-9; 5thMar *URpt 2*; 1/5 SAR, 5; 3/5 SAR, 5; Col A. L. Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.
- [4] 1stMarDiv msg to 1stTkBn, 1750 31 Oct 50; 1stTkBn SAR, 11. The move was made 1 Nov. 11thMar *URpt 2-28 Oct 50*.
- [5] CG's Diary in X Corps *WD*, 2 Nov 50. Smith, *Notes*, 463-464. The Special Operations Company was a commando-type U.S. Army organization, generally employed in such operations as raids and reconnaissance. The strength, weapons, and organization depended on the mission.
- [6] 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1300 2 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv *PIR 9*.
- [7] EUSAK *WDs* 29 Oct-1 Nov 50.
- [8] Maj J. B. Wilson and Capt W. G. Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [9] Smith, *Notes*, 534; 1stMarDiv *PIR 4*; 1stMarDiv SAR, 30. These prisoners were later interrogated by Gen Almond himself and formed the basis of the first official report of Chinese intervention. Almond Comments, 21 Jun 56; FECOM msg C 67881, 31 Oct 50.
- [10] Maj R. B. Crossman, Capt C. R. Puckett, and Capt D. W. Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; HqBn, 1stMarDiv (hereafter HqBn) *URpt 8 (Supplementary)*, 2. Maj Webb D. Sawyer, CO 2/7 and Maj James F. Lawrence also made helicopter reconnaissances of the same ground looking for possible flanking routes to Koto-ri. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56.
- [11] Smith, *Notes*, 523-524. See also: Smith, *Chronicle*, 70.
- [12] Richard L. Walker, *China under Communism* (New Haven, 1954), 111-112; Order of Battle Branch, Office of the AC/S G-2, HQ Eighth United States Army (Fwd), *CCF Army Histories* (hereafter *CCF Army Histories*), 1.
- [13] *U.S. Relations with China*, 43-44, 207, 323.
- [14] Quoted in George Moorad, *Lost Peace in China* (New York, 1949), 33.
- [15] *U.S. Relations with China*, 352-363.
- [16] *U.S. Relations with China*, 358.
- [17] *Ibid.*, xiv-xv.
- [18] Marines remained in Tsingtao until early 1949.
- [19] The first blows between the Marines and the Chinese Communists took place not in Korea, but along the Peiping-Tientsin highway as early as October, 1945.
- [20] *U.S. Relations with China*, xiv-xv.
- [21] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the following sources: GHQ, FECOM, *Order of Battle Information*, *Chinese Third Field Army* (1 Mar 51) and *Chinese Fourth Field Army* (7 Nov 50); 164-MISDI, ADVATIS, and ADVATIS FWD rpts in EUSAK *WDs*, *passim*; X Corps *PIRs*; 1stMarDiv *PIRs*; 1stMarDiv SAR, 30; G-2 SAR, 16-18; Far East Command, Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS), *Enemy Documents*, *Korean Operations*, *passim*; Fleet Marine Force Pacific (FMFPac), *Chinese Communist Forces Tactics in Korea*, 5-11; Maj R. C. W. Thomas, "The Chinese Communist Forces in Korea," *The Army Quarterly*, Oct 52 (digested

in *Military Review*, xxxii, no. 11 (Feb 53), 87); LtCol Robert F. Rigg, *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (Harrisburg, 1951); Walker: *China Under Communism*.

[22] Walker, *China under Communism*, 51-76.

[23] FMFPac, *CCF Tactics*, 9.

[24] ADVATIS FWD Rpt 0213 in EUSAK WD, 14 Nov 50; G-3 SAR, 21-22.

[25] There is some evidence of an attempt to supply troops from division stocks. See ADVATIS 1245 in EUSAK WD, 4 Dec 50, and 164-MISDI-1176 in *Ibid.*, 1 Nov 50. Normal CCF doctrine, however, held that a division should be committed to combat for about six days and then withdrawn to replenish its supplies and replace casualties. This procedure, naturally, definitely limited the extent of an attack by the CCF and prevented the maintenance of the momentum for an extended offensive. MajGen D. G. Barr testimony in *MacArthur Hearing*, 2650; Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.

[26] X Corps msg X 11792; G-2 SAR, 21-22; SSgt Robert W. Tallent, "New Enemy," *Leatherneck Magazine*, xxxiv, No. 2 (Feb 51), 12-15; 3/1 SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 11.

[27] Mao Tse-tung: *Strategic Problems of Chinese Revolutionary Wars*, Ed by LtCol F. B. Nihart (Quantico, 1951), 17-18. Adapted from an English translation published in the *China Digest*, of Hong Kong.

[28] *Ibid.*, 4.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] LtGen E. M. Almond Comments, 22 Jun 56.

[31] Excerpt from a series of three articles, "Look, This is the American Way of Life," used as a primer in the "Hate America" campaign. Quoted in Walker, *China Under Communism*, 13.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Mao, *Strategic Problems*, 31.

[34] *Ibid.*


[35] Bowser Comments, 23 Apr 56.

[36] The above description was derived from S. L. A. Marshall, "CCF in the Attack" (EUSAK Staff Memorandum ORO-S-26), 5 Jan 51.

[37] 3/1 SAR 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 9. The remainder of the section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: *Ibid.*; G-2 SAR, 13-45; 1stMar SAR, 28-29; 5thMar SAR, 38-44; EUSAK *Combat Information Bulletin No. 4*; FMFPac, *CCF Tactics*, 1-5.

[38] These weaknesses, however, were confined to the early months of CCF participation in the Korean conflict. Following the peace talks in the summer of 1951—an interlude with the enemy exploited for military purposes—the Chinese gradually built up to an equality with UN forces in mortars and artillery.

[39] 164-MISDI-1232, 1260, 1266, 1274, and 1275 in EUSAK WD, 19, 26, and 28 Nov and 1 Dec 50; ADVATIS FWD #1. Rpt 0271 in EUSAK WD 4 Dec 50; X Corps *PIR 81*, Annex 2; G-2 SAR, 17-18.



The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 6. The Battle of Sudong

- [1] Descriptions of the briefing session and reconnaissance flight are based on LtCol H. J. Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56.
- [2] Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56; Maj M. E. Roach Comments, 17 May 56. The quotation is from Litzenberg.
- [3] 7thMar SAR, 5, 7.
- [4] *Ibid.*, 3. Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.
- [5] 1stMarDiv PIR 6. Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [6] X Corps WD Sum, Nov 50, 24.
- [7] 1stMarDiv PIR 6.
- [8] *Ibid.*
- [9] 1stMarDiv PIRS 7 & 8; Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [10] The account of 2 Nov, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: 1stMarDiv SAR, annex SS, appendix 3 (hereafter 3/11 SAR), 3; G-3 SAR, 16; 7thMar SAR, 12; VMF-312 SAR, 8–9; VMF(N)-513 SAR, sec 6, 10; Col H. L. Litzenberg interv by HistDiv HQMC, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; LtCol F. F. Parry interv by HistDiv HQMC, 4 Apr 51; Caps D. C. Holland, J. G. Theros, and H. G. Connell interv by HistBr G-3 HQMC, n. d.; W. J. Davis interv, 18 Oct 55; 1stLt W. F. Goggin interv by HistDiv HQMC, n. d.; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1157 2 Nov 50; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Col A. L. Bowser Comments, n. d.; LtCol M. A. Hull Comments, n. d.; Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56; Capt W. J. Davis Comments, 15 Apr 56; Bey Comments, 24 Apr 51.
- [11] This section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: G-3 SAR, 18–19; 7thMar SAR, 13, n. p.; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; 3/11 SAR, 3; 1stMarDiv PIRs 9 & 10; Litzenberg interv 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Parry interv, 4 Apr 51; Holland-Theros-Connell interv, n. d.; Wilson-Graeber interv, 20 Oct 55; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; Geer, *The New Breed*, 228–235; Capt William J. Davis, “Nightmare Alley,” *Leatherneck Magazine*, MS.; Narrative of SSgt R. E. McDurmin, 23 Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.; W. J. Davis Comments, 15 Apr 56; Maj W. E. Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, n. d.
- [12] Due to 2/7’s difficulties on Hill 698 Charlie Company was unable to move position until dusk. As Col Davis has pointed out, this was fortuitous because it allowed Charlie to move into position unseen by the Chinese and was a major factor in trapping the Chinese in the valley the next morning. R. G. Davis Comments, 3.
- [13] LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.
- [14] 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50. Since neither D nor F Companies was involved at this time, the information must have come from E. Capt Bey, however, doubts if either of the probing attacks received by E Company was made by more than 20 men. Capt R. T. Bey Comments, 24 Apr 56.
- [15] X Corps PIR 44, annex 2; 1stMarDiv PIR 10; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1530 3 Nov 50; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 51.
- [16] *Ibid.*
- [17] The demolition had little more than dramatic effect, however, since the Songchon river bed was negotiable to vehicles of all types.
- [18] Sawyer Comments.
- [19] *Ibid.*; X Corps PIR 44, annex 2; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0721 3 Nov 50; 7thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1315 3 Nov 50; and Geer, *The New Breed*, 235–236.
- [20] 3/11 SAR, 3; Maj W. R. Earney Comments, n. d.

- [21] VMF-312 SAR, 12.
- [22] VMF(N)-513 SAR, 11. The others on this flight were Capt Edwin Pendry, 1stLt Warren J. Beyes, and 1stLt William E. Jennings.
- [23] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 27; 7thMar SAR, 13; R. G. Davis Comments, 7–9; Vorhies Comments.
- [24] 7thMar SAR, 13; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51.
- [25] Goggin interv; Hull Comments.
- [26] Bey Comments, 24 Apr 56.
- [27] 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; and Capt E. R. Delong interv, 18 Oct 50.
- [28] 1stMarDiv SAR, EE (hereafter HqBn SAR), 10; HqBn URpt 8, 2–3; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [29] *Ibid.*, Goggin interv; Delong interv, 18 Oct 50; and 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2125 3 Nov 50; Hull Comments.
- [30] 7thMar SAR, appendix 4, 4; ADC 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1320 3 Nov 50; and Delong interv, 18 Oct 50. Casualty figures could only be estimated in after action reports, since all 7th Marines' records were destroyed before the withdrawal from Yudam-ni in early December 1950. Throughout the remainder of this volume, only those casualty figures for the Division as a whole can be reported with consistent accuracy.
- [31] 7thMar SAR, 14; 3/11 SAR, 3; Goggin interv; HqBn URpt 8, 2–3; 7th Mar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 0804 and 1508 4 Nov 50.
- [32] X Corps PIR 44, annex 2; 1stMarDiv PIRs 11 and 12, encl 1; 7thMar SAR, n. p.
- [33] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex NN (hereafter 1stEngrBn SAR), 8; and 7thMar SAR, n. p.
- [34] G-2 SAR, 34; and 7thMar SAR, n. p.
- [35] 1stMarDiv PIR 10.
- [36] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1508 4 Nov 50.
- [37] The advance to Chinhung-ni and the engagement with enemy tanks is derived from: 7thMar SAR, 13; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; Geer, *The New Breed*, 236–237; and P. G. Martin ltr to HistBr G-3 HQMC, 21 Oct 55; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0045, 5 Nov 50; R. G. Davis Comments, 13–15; Maj R. B. Crossman Comments, n. d.; Shea Comments, 30 Apr 56.
- [38] Available records do not indicate whether tank number three should be credited to VMF-312 or to VMF(N)-513, both of which had close-support flights in the area.
- [39] 7thMar SAR, 13; and 1stMarDiv POR 116.
- [40] 7thMar SAR, n. p.; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; Dowsett Comments, 29 May 56.
- [41] HqBn URpt 8, 3; and Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55.
- [42] *Ibid.*
- [43] 7thMar SAR, 13; 3/11 SAR, 3.
- [44] VMF(N)-513 SAR, 12.
- [45] HqBn SAR, 12; HqBn URpt 9, 2; Crossman-Puckett-Sharon interv, 20 Oct 55; and Geer, *The New Breed*, 237–238; Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56. This was the last employment of Recon by the 7th Marines. On 7 November it was detached and ordered back to Majon-dong to patrol the road to Huksu-ri and the division's left flank.
- [46] The fight for Hills 891 and 987 is derived from 7thMar SAR, 13–14; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; 3/11 SAR, 3; VMF-312 SAR, 9; VMF(N)-513 SAR, 13; 1stMarDiv *OpnO 19–50*, 5 Nov 50; Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; W. J. Davis interv, 18 Oct 55; 1stMarDiv PIRs 12 & 13; Aide-de-Camp, CG 1stMarDiv tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1130 5 Nov 50; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 1035, 1200, 1330, 1900, 2130, and 2215 5 Nov 50, and 1145, 1245, 1410, 1425, 2055, and 2245 6 Nov 50; 7thMar ISUM 14; 1stMarDiv POR 122; and Geer, *The New Breed*, 237–

240; Capt H. H. Harris Comments, n. d.; Earney Comments, 2-8; Capt M. P. Newton, "The Attack on 'How' Hill," (MS); Roach Comments, 7 May 56.

[47] Smith, *Chronicle*, 73.

[48] One Chinese took all the pounding from supporting arms that he could, then climbed out of his bunker and walked into G Company's lines to surrender. On interrogation he pinpointed his regiment: one battalion on Hill 987, one on Hill 891, and the reserve battalion in the saddle between 987 and 1304. Roach Comments, 7 May 56.

[49] 7thMar SAR, 14.

[50] *Marine Corps Board Study* (hereafter *MCB Study*), II-C-16. *CCF Army Histories*, 31, states that the 124th was in action in west central Korea by the middle of November.

[51] 7thMar SAR, 14; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; Roach Comments, 7 May 56.

[52] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55; CG's Diary in X Corps *WD*, 8 Nov 50; Roach Comments, 7 May 56.

[53] 7thMar SAR, 13-14; Geer, *The New Breed*, 243-247; Goggin interv.

[54] Earney-Harris-Mooney interv, 20 Oct 55.

[55] Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 45.

[56] Marshall, *CCF in the Attack*. See also FECOM, *Terrain Study No. 6*, XIX-8; R. G. Davis Comments; Dowsett Comments, 29 May 56; Cdr J. C. Craven, USN, Comments, n. d.

[57] 7th Mar SAR, 15-16; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1400 10 Nov 50; Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56.

[58] 2/5 SAR, 10; CG 1stMarDiv msgs to CO 5thMar, 1605 and 2202 3 Nov 50; CG X Corps msg X 11939, 3 Nov 50; CO 5thMar msg to 2/5, 1/11, A/Engr, ATCo, 4.2'' MCo, 2100 3 Nov 50; 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 2.

[59] 2/5 SAR, 10.

[60] CO 1/5 tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1820 8 Nov 50; "Special Reconnaissance of the 1st Bn 5thMar, 7-9 Nov 50," 10 Nov 50.


[61] 2/5 SAR, 10, 32.


[62] 1/5 msg to 5thMar, 1956 10 Nov 50; 1/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 5; 5thMar *URpt 4*.


[63] 5thMar *URpt 4*; 1/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 6.

[64] 5thMar SAR, 12; 5thMar *URpt 4*.

[65] 1stMAW SAR, annex K, appendix I (hereafter VMF(N)-542 SAR), 1-8.







ACTION OF 4-5 NOVEMBER AND FUNCHILIN PASS

- Advances made 4 November
- - -→ Advances made 5 November
- ★ CCF Strongpoints



MAP-10

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 7. Advance to the Chosin Reservoir

- [1] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr, 20 Feb 56.
- [2] HqBn SAR, 10–11; Smith, *Notes*, 513–514; CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2200 3 Nov 50; MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, 4 May 56.
- [3] HqBn SAR, 10–11; Smith, *Notes*, 513–514. Some explosive, too unstable to be moved, was left in the caves. Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56.
- [4] Smith, *Notes*, 472–473; G–3 SAR, 21. The previous day an A/Tks patrol had killed an estimated 150 NKs in a short fire-fight west of Munchon. 1stTkBn, SAR, 12.
- [5] CG X Corps msg X12075, 5 Nov 50; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 69; Smith, *Notes*, 473.
- [6] ComNavFE msg to CinCFE, 0010 12 Nov 50.
- [7] The account of the guerrilla attack at Kowon is derived from: 1stAmphTracBn SAR, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn *HD*, Nov 50, 3; Statement of Pvt Richard J. Foster, n. d.
- [8] G–3 SAR, 24; 1stTkBn SAR, 13.
- [9] The description of this fight at Yonghung is based upon: 1stAmphTracBn SAR, 5–6; 1stAmphTracBn *HD*, Nov 50, 3; Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 69; G–3 SAR, 24; X Corps *POR* 42; and *1stMarURpt (S–3)* 9; D/Tks tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 0955 8 Nov 50.
- [10] CO I Co [sic] 1stAmphTracBn tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 2215 7 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 475–478.
- [11] Smith, *Notes*, 475–478; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD* 7 Nov 50.
- [12] Smith, *Notes*, 475–478; CG X Corps msg X12270, 9 Nov 50.
- [13] 1st CSG SAR, 8.
- [14] GHQ/UNC msgs 2977 and 2979, 3 and 5 Nov 50, as cited in Schnable, *Korean Conflict*.
- [15] Ninth Report of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea, for the Period 1 to 15 November 1950 in Dept State, *United Nations Action in Korea* (Washington, 1951), 9.
- [16] C/S USA msg 95790, 3 Nov 50; Truman *Memoirs* II, 373.
- [17] Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 373; CinCFE msg C68285, 4 Nov 50.
- [18] CinCFE msg C68396, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; JCS msg 95878, 5 Nov 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 375–376; Whitney, *MacArthur*, 405–411.
- [19] CinCFE msgs C68456 and CX68436, 7 Nov 50; Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 377.
- [20] Smith, *Notes*, 552–553.
- [21] X Corps *OpnO* 6, 11 Nov 50.
- [22] X Corps *Special Report on Chosin Reservoir*, 27 Nov to 10 Dec 50, 9; X Corps *WDSum*, Nov 50, 5.
- [23] X Corps *WD Sum*, Nov 50, 4–5.
- [24] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to Gen C. B. Cates, 15 Nov 50. Gen Almond comments: “I am very mindful of the skepticism of General Smith in all of the supply plans that X Corps conceived and I sympathize with his viewpoint very thoroughly. However, in my mind there was always the assistance to be gained by air supply either drop or landing them and the counterpart of that, the evacuation to be expected by plane from the air field that we were to build.” Almond ltr, 22 Jun 56.
- [25] Smith, *Chronicle*, 31.
- [26] This section is based on: X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 9; and X Corps *WDSum*, Nov 50, 5–6, 51–52.
- [27] 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 21–50, 13 Nov 50. The orders for the seizure of Hagaru and the 5th Mar’s movement of a battalion to Koto-ri had been issued in CG 1stMarDiv FragO, 2130 12 Nov 50. Hagaru was occupied without a

fight at 1300 on the 14th. CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1437 14 Nov 50.

[28] Smith, *Notes*, 592–594.

[29] Bowser Comments.

[30] 1stMar SAR, 13.

[31] Smith, *Notes*, 614; LtGen F. Harris ltr, 24 Aug 56.

[32] LtCol J. H. Partridge interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 25 Jun 51, 31–32.

[33] 1stTkBn SAR, 18. 1stEngrBn had been ordered to prepare the MSR for tank use on 6 Nov. CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stEngrBn, 1530 6 Nov 50.

[34] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1229 18 Nov 50; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 39–40.

[35] Kenneth W. Condit, “Marine Supply in Korea,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 53–54.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 2345 20 Nov 50; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex HH (hereafter 1stMedBn SAR), 4–7.

[38] 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 22–50, 17 Nov 50.

[39] 1stMar SAR, 12; G–3 X Corps tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 1220 18 Nov 50; 26thROK msg to 3dInfDiv, 1030 19 Nov 50.

[40] Smith, *Notes*, 638–639; X Corps *OI* 17, 22 Nov 50. See also G–3 X Corps tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 1850 20 Nov 50, in G–3 Journal, X Corps *WD*, 20 Nov 50.

[41] Smith, *Notes*, 638–639; 1stMarDiv *POR* 164.

[42] 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 23–50, 23 Nov 50.

[43] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex II (hereafter 1st MTBn SAR), 4, 7; 7th MTBn SAR, 2–3.

[44] CG X Corps msg X12811, 20 Nov 50. Italics added.

[45] See Memo Chairman JCS to SecDef: “Chinese Communists Intervention in Korea,” 9 Nov 50; and Truman, *Memoirs*, II, 372.

[46] JCS msg 95949, 6 Nov 50; CinCFE msg CX 68411, 7 Nov 50; Schnable, *Korean Conflict*. See also Karig, *Korea*, 376–378.

[47] Schnable, *Korean Conflict*. Bombing of the bridges ceased 6 December with the freezing of the Yalu. OCMH, *Report from the Secretary of Defense . . . on Operations in Korea*, (Draft No. 1), Pt. V, 3–4.

[48] X Corps ltr to Subordinate Commands, 16 Nov 50.

[49] This was the only American unit ever to push as far north as the border. On the Eighth Army front a regiment of the 6th ROK Division reached the Yalu on 26 October, only to be cut off and badly mauled a few days later in the first CCF attacks. EUSAK, *WDSum*, Oct 50, 38, 44.

[50] CinCUNC Communique 12, 24 Nov 50.

[51] EUSAK *WD*, 24 Nov 50.

[52] X Corps *OpnO* 7, 25 Nov. 50.

[53] CG X Corps msg X 13069, 24 Nov 50; CG’s Diary in X Corps *WD*, 25 Nov 50; Smith, *Notes*, 727.

[54] Smith, *Notes*, 727–729.

[55] *Ibid.*, 728; EUSAK *WD*, 26 Nov 50.

[56] It is interesting to note that this is an increase of 95,741 over EUSAK’S estimate of the day before. EUSAK *PIR* 136, encl. 2, 3, in EUSAK *WD*, 25 Nov 50.

[57] EUSAK *PIR* 137, 4, and encl 4, 3, in EUSAK *WD*, 26 Nov 50.

[58] 1stMar SAR, 13, and appendix 6, 4; 1stMar *HD*, Nov 50, 2; 1stMarDiv msg to COs 11th & 1stMars, 1350, 22 Nov 50.

[59] 5thMar SAR 15–18. Smith, *Notes*, 626.

[60] 7thMar SAR, 19–20; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 Jul 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, n. d.

[61] 5thMar SAR, 18; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 2101, 25 Nov 50.


[62] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 24-50*, 26 Nov 50.

[63] Smith, *Chronicle*, 89.

[64] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935, 26 Nov 50.

[65] X Corps, *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 32; 1stMarDiv *PIR* 33.

[66] Smith ltr, 15 Apr 56. See also Smith, *Chronicle*, 79, 82, 87.



The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 8. Crisis at Yudam-ni

[1] 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 8–9.

[2] 5thMar *OpnO* 39–50, 26 Nov 50.

[3] The transport priority given the move of the 5th Marines prevented H&S and Weapons (—) Companies from moving to Yudam-ni. Fox Company moved to Toktong Pass on the 27th while How Battery of 3/11 remained at Hagaru to support Fox Company. The two rifle companies of 2/7 at Yudam-ni were assigned to 1/7 for operational control. MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 7 Sept 56.

[4] Col Roise states that he was attached to the 7th Marines in the absence of the Commanding Officer, 5th Marines. The record does not indicate a formal attachment. Col Litzenberg appears to have acted in his capacity as senior officer present. See Col R. L. Murray Comments, n. d.; Col H. S. Roise Comments, n. d.; LtCol H. J. Woessner Comments, 13 Nov 56.

[5] 7thMar *SAR*, 20; 2/5 *SAR*, 14; 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 8–9; Litzenberg Comments, 19 and 20 Jul 56; Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56. Roise Comments.

[6] 2/5 *SAR*, 14.

[7] 7thMar *FragO*, 1850 26 Nov 50; 7thMar *SAR*, 20–21.

[8] Cooke had taken over the company on 12 November, and Lieutenant H. H. Harris reverted to ExecO.

[9] Unless otherwise stated this section is derived from: 7thMar *SAR*, 20–21; RCT 7 *URpt* 5; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; 2/5 *SAR*, 15–18; 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 9; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex SS, appendix A (hereafter 1/11 *SAR*), 8–9; VMF-312 *SAR*, 15; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1945 27 Nov 50; LtCol M.A. Hull Comments, n. d.

[10] Feehan, on 15 Nov 50, had relieved LtCol Ransom M. Wood who had commanded 1/11 since its arrival in Korea with the 1st ProvMarBrig on 2 Aug 50.

[11] While returning to the rear to bring up reinforcements, George Company's commander, Capt Cooney, was mortally wounded. LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 24 Jul 56.

[12] This section is derived from: 5thMar *SAR*, 19–20; 7thMar *SAR*, 21; 1/5 *SAR*, 11–12; 2/5 *SAR*, 15–18; 3/5 *SAR*, 13.

[13] Yudam-ni itself is 3500 feet above sea level.

[14] Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. Z. Freeman, 7 Mar 51.

[15] LtCol Lockwood had relieved Maj Sawyer as CO 2/7 on 5 Nov.

[16] Four M-4 tanks of the Provisional Tank Platoon had attempted to come through from Hagaru but gave up the attempt when all slid off the road. Later on the 27th one M-26 succeeded in completing the trip, but the Chinese cut the road before the others could follow. 1stTkBn, *SAR*, 21.

[17] 7thMar *SAR*, 42–43; 5thMar *SAR*, 45–50; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex FF (1stServBn); 1stMTBn *SAR*, 9; Roach Comments, 24 Jul 56.

[18] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from 7thMar *SAR*, 21, n. p.; RCT 7 *URpt* 5; 2/5 *SAR*, 17–18; 2/5 *HD* Nov 50, 9; CO 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 2253 27 Nov 50, 1000 and 1250 28 Nov 50; Capt Samuel Jaskilka, "Easy Alley," *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxv, no. 5 (May 51), 15–18; Maj S. Jaskilka Comments, n. d.

[19] 1stMarDiv *SAR*, 31–32; G-2 *SAR*, 15, 30–31; *CCF Army Histories*, 13, 21.

[20] Unless otherwise stated the sources for this section are: 7thMar *SAR*; RCT 7 *URpt* 6; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; 2/5 *HD*, Nov 50, 9–10; 2/5 *SAR*, 18–19; CO 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv, 0810 and 1000 28 Nov 50; Jaskilka, "Easy Alley," 18–19; Capt M.P. Newton Comments, n. d.


[21] LtCol Harris, son of MajGen Field Harris, had relieved Maj Roach on 11 Nov.


[22] ATIS, *Enemy Documents: Korean Operations*, Issue 84, 38. Except where otherwise noted, this section is based on: *Ibid.*, 26–43; LtCol R. D. Taplett interv, 3 May 56; 1stLt R. T. Bey ltr to Maj A. C. Geer, 26 Jun 52; RCT 7 *URpt* 5; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMar Div, 1000 28 Nov 50; 7thMar SAR, 21; CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0730 28 Nov 50; 3/5 SAR, 13–14; Hull Comments; Capt J. H. Cahill ltr, 3 Jul 56. The ATIS translation contains a number of detailed and apparently accurate critiques of small unit actions. An earlier translation is to be found in ATIS, *Enemy Documents: Korean Operations*, Issue 66, 87-134.


[23] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 20 Jul 56.


[24] Unless otherwise noted, this section is derived from: 1/5 SAR, 12–13; 1/5 *HD*, Nov 50; 7thMar SAR, 21; 7thMar *URpt* 5; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Murray Comments; Hull Comments; Cdr J. H. Craven Comments, 24 Aug 56; Maj W. E. Kerrigan ltr, 7 Sep 56; Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56; 1stLt R. E. Snyder Comments, 15 Sep 56.

[25] Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52.













THE BATTLE OF NORTHWEST RIDGE





ACTION AT 3/5'S CP

CCF Attacks



MAP-15

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 9. Fox Hill

- [1] 3/11 SAR, 6; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex SS, appendix 4, (hereafter 4/11 SAR), 5.
- [2] 1/11 SAR, 8; 4/11 SAR, 5; LtCol W. McReynolds interv, 26 Nov 56.
- [3] Col R. G. Davis Comments, 30 Nov 56
- [4] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from; Geer, *The New Breed*, 288–290; Lynn Montross, “Ridgerunners of Toktong Pass,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no. 5 (May 53), 16–23; 7th Mar ISUM 67; and 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50.
- [5] The following section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from Capt R. C. McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no.3 (Mar 53), 16–23; Montross, “Ridge runners of Toktong Pass,” 16–23; 7thMar SAR, 20–21; 7thMar URpt 5; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Cpl D. R. Thornton interv by Capt A. Z. Freeman, 3 Jul 51; 1stLt C. C. Dana and Ssgt R. R. Danford interv by Capt Freeman, 4 July 51.
- [6] These figures would indicate the complete destruction of a CCF Battalion.
- [7] The description of 3/5’s counterattack is derived from: 5thMar SAR, 21–22; 3/5 SAR, 14; Taplett interv, 3 May 56; Capt D. B. Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56 and statement, n. d.
- [8] Cashion ltr, 16 Jul 56, estimates the opposition came from 25–30 Chinese.
- [9] The account of Company C’s counterattack is derived from 5thMar SAR, 21; 1/5 SAR, 12–13; 7thMar SAR, 21; 7th Mar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; 1/5 HD, Nov 50, 8; Maj L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Bey ltr, 26 Jun 52; ATIS *Enemy Documents: Korean Operations* Issue 66, 130–134, and Issue 84, 38–43; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 27 Jun 56; Capt E. E. Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56; SSgt R. C. Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55.
- [10] L. R. Smith interv, 31 May 56; Geer, *The New Breed*, 285.
- [11] 5thMar SAR, 12–13; Collins Comments, 19 Jun 56.
- [12] The account of the action of Hill 1240 is derived from: 5thMar SAR, 12; 1/5 SAR, 12–13; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1000 28 Nov 50; Geer, *The New Breed*, 288; Capt H. L. Dawe, Jr., Comments, n. d.
- [13] 3/5 SAR, 14, and 2/5 SAR, 18; 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0840 28 Nov 50.
- [14] *Ibid.*; Jaskilka, “Easy Alley.”
- [15] 2/5 HD, Nov 50, 9–10.
- [16] 5thMar SAR, 21; 2/5 SAR, 19; Col J. L. Stewart interv 13 Jun 56.
- [17] *Ibid.*; Col R. L. Murray Comments, n. d.
- [18] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 5thMar, 1650 28 Nov 50.
- [19] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 7thMar, 1627 28 Nov 50.
- [20] *Ibid.*; 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1050 28 Nov 50.
- [21] 2/5 SAR, 19.
- [22] The account of C/5’s rescue, is derived from: 7thMar SAR, 21; 7thMar msgs to CG 1stMarDiv 1150, 1200, 1450, 1550, 1915, 2040 28 Nov 50, and 0144 29 Nov 50; 7thMar msg to 2/7 0515 28 Nov 50; Geer, *The New Breed*, 290–291.
- [23] This account of Company F’s activities on 28 Nov is derived from: 7thMar SAR, 18–24; McCarthy, “Fox Hill,” 16–23; Thornton interv, 3 Jul 51; Dana-Danford interv 4 Jul 51; Geer, *The New Breed*, 300–302; Statement of Cpl C. R. North, n. d.
- [24] 5thMar SAR, 48; Stewart interv, 13 Jun 56; 4/11 SAR, 5; McReynolds interv, 26 Nov 56.
- [25] Keyes Beech: *Tokyo and Points East* (New York, 1954), 196.
- [26] This account of the Composite Battalion is derived from the following sources: Narrative of Maj W. R. Earney, n. d., 5–8; 3/7 SAR, n. p.

[27] Beech, *Tokyo and Points East*, 197.

[28] This description of the third night on Fox Hill is derived from McCarthy, "Fox Hill," 21.

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 10. Hagaru's Night of Fire

- [1] This section is derived from: 1stMar *HD*, Nov 50, 2; 3/1 *SAR*, 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 2–3; Col T. L. Ridge ltr, 22 Sep 55, and Comments, 7 Jun 56; LtCol E. H. Simmons Comments, n. d.
- [2] Ridge, *Notes*; LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 1 Dec 55.
- [3] Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 17 May 56.
- [4] Smith, *Notes*, 689–690.
- [5] D/Engr *SAR*.
- [6] 1stEngrBn *SAR*, 11; and Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51.
- [7] 3/1 *SAR*, 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 4; 1stTkBn *SAR*, 21; 3/1 msg to CO 1stMar, 1845 28 Nov 50.
- [8] *Ibid.*; Narrative of Maj C. E. Corley, n. d.
- [9] 3/1 *SAR* 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 4; and 1stLt R. C. Needbon [sic] interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 28 May 51.
- [10] VMO–6 tel to G–2 1stMarDiv, 1015 28 Nov 50; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1100 28 Nov 50; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1103 28 Nov 50.
- [11] This section is based on Ridge, *Notes*, and Comments, 7 Jun 56; Narrative of Capt R. E. Carey, 3 Feb 56. The need for NCOs in rifle platoons was so pressing that the former intelligence chief, TSgt James E. Sweeney, had been transferred from the S–2 Section just before the move to Hagaru.
- [12] The possibility of an attack from the East Hill area was considered, since Chinese forces were known to be east of the hill. Col Ridge states “I assume[d] that the build up of such forces would not allow their capability of a strong attack.” Ridge Comments, 7 Jun 56.
- [13] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon the following sources: 3/1 *SAR* 26 Nov–15 Dec 50; Ridge, *Notes*; Maj A. J. Strohmenger ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 17 Aug 55; Corley narrative; Narrative of Maj J. R. Fisher, n. d.; Simmons Comments.
- [14] Smith, *Notes*, 695–696; CG 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, 1015 28 Nov 50.
- [15] CG Diary, in X Corps *WD*, 28 Nov 50; X Corps *WDSum*, Nov 50, 16.
- [16] Narrative of Major C. L. Sitter, n. d.
- [17] This was made official by CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, 1625 28 Nov 50.
- [18] Ridge, *Notes*, 27–28.
- [19] “CO 2/7 and his headquarters were not given a specific mission because it was assumed that his uncanceled order from CO 7th Marines would require his further efforts in the relief of Fox Company.” Ridge Comments, 7 June 56.
- [20] This section, unless otherwise noted, is based on: 3/1 tel to CO 1stMar, 2100 29 Nov 50; Ridge, *Notes*; Simmons interv, 1 Dec 55 and Comments; Fisher narrative; Corley narrative; Narrative of Capt R. L. Barrett, Jr., 9 Aug 55; Capt J. H. Miller ltr to authors, 10 Oct 55; and Sgt K. E. Davis ltr to authors, 20 Oct 55.
- [21] K. E. Davis ltr, 20 Oct 55.
- [22] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 45. Ridge Comments, 7 Jun 56, questions whether the floodlights were on during the whole attack.
- [23] Smith, *Chronicle*, 93.
- [24] Corley narrative.
- [25] References to Co D, 10th Engr Bn, USA, are based on Lt Norman R. Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” in Capt John G. Westover, Ed., *Combat Support in Korea* (Washington, 1955), 206–208.
- [26] 1stMar tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 0230 29 Nov 50.
- [27] Rosen, “Combat Comes Suddenly,” 209.

[28] *Ibid.*, 209–210; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 1445 29 Nov 50.

[29] Narrative of Capt N. A. Canzona, 28 Mar 56.

[30] Capt Benjamin S. Read (as told to Hugh Morrow): “Our Guns Never Got Cold,” *Saturday Evening Post*, ccxxiii (7 Apr 51), 145.

[31] Strohmenger ltr, 17 Aug 55.

[32] Corley and Barrett narratives.

[33] POW reports stated that the Chinese assault force in this sector had been one regiment. CIC tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 1715 29 Nov 50.

[34] Capt R. E. Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Myers Comments.

[35] VMF-312 SAR, 15–16.

[36] Myers Comments state: “High ground was taken. But [we] could not control movement of the enemy on the reverse side. As a result [we] could not stay on top.”

[37] Myers Comments.

[38] Canzona narrative, 28 Mar 56. Col Brower points out that the Chinese positions were defiladed from artillery fire. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. d.

[39] 3/1 SAR 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 9–10; Ridge, *Notes*; Carey narrative.

HAGARU DEFENSIVE PERIMETER

28-29 November 1950


————— Perimeter
 - - - - - Perimeter abandoned during night

————— Railroad

▨ Marsh




MAP-17



ITEM COMPANY

HOW COMPANY

	Lt Fisher				
Lt Degerne	Lt Hall	Lt Needham	Lt Barrett	Capt Corley	Lt Mason
1st	3d	2d	1st	Lt Endsley	2d
				3d	



The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 11. Task Force Drysdale

- [1] This section is based upon the following sources: 1stMar SAR, 13–14; 1stMar *Urpt (S–3) 13*, 1–2; VMF-312 SAR, 16; LtCol D. M. Schmuck interv, 2 Apr 56; Maj W. L. Bates, Jr., interv by HistDiv HQMC, 16 Mar 53; Col D. M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.
- [2] Schmuck Comments.
- [3] 1stMar SAR, 14, and appendix 10, 6; CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1815 and 1930 27 Nov 50.
- [4] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar, 1058 28 Nov 50.
- [5] The remainder of this section is based upon: 2/1 SAR, 12–13; HqBn *URpt 12*. LtCol J. C. McClelland, Jr., ltr, 21 Feb 56; Col A. Sutter Comments, n. d.
- [6] LtCol R. E. Lorigan Comments, 16 May 56.
- [7] Unless otherwise specified, this section is based on: CO 41st Commando ltr to CG 1stMarDiv, 30 Nov 50; 1stTkBn SAR, 23–27; Smith, *Notes*, 859–868; Maj C. L. Sitter ltr to Col T. L. Ridge, 4 Oct 55; TSgt G. D. Pendas ltr to HistBr G–3, 18 Dec 55; Narrative of Capt M. J. Capraro, 2 Feb 56; Narrative of Capt J. D. Buck, 27 Jan 56; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM, “41 Commando,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii no. 8 (Aug 51), 28–32; 1stMar tel to G–3 1stMarDiv, 1705 29 Nov 50; and Lt Alfred J. Catania, “Truck Platoon in Korea,” in Westover, *Combat Support in Korea*, 53–57; LtCol D. B. Drysdale, RM, Comments, n. d.
- [8] Unless otherwise noted, the sources for this section are the same as the preceding, plus: Statement of Capt M. C. Capraro, 12 Feb 51; MSgt E. F. Grayson, Sgt E. J. Keeton, and Cpl E. McCardell interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 17 Feb 51; Capt M. C. Capraro interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; CWO D. R. Yancey interv by Capt Shutts, 11 Feb 51; Sgt C. W. Dickerson, Cpl C. W. Williams, Sgt M. L. Estess, SSgt J. B. Nash, and TSgt C. L. Harrison interv by HistDiv HQMC, 25–31 Jul 51; Col H. S. Walseth interv by Capt Shutts, 26 Jan 51; LtCol J. N. McLaughlin Comments, 5 Nov 56. Nash, Harrison, Dickerson, Estess, and Williams were among the men captured with McLaughlin. They escaped from Chinese imprisonment several months later.
- [9] Maj McLaughlin was one of the TTU instructors who had transferred to the X Corps Staff. He was an Assistant G–3 and Corps liaison officer with 1stMarDiv.
- [10] Distances are approximate, since it is understandable that estimates made by participants in the darkness varied a great deal.
- [11] LtCol Chidester and Maj Eagan were still missing at the end of the conflict, when the exchanges of prisoners took place. From the information that LtCol McLaughlin has been able to secure, it appears that both officers died of wounds prior to reaching a prison camp. McLaughlin Comments, 5 Nov 56.
- [12] *Ibid*. A postscript to the Hell Fire Valley fight was written the following spring in front-page headlines announcing the escape from a CCF prison camp of 17 enlisted Marines and a soldier. Among them were five NCOs who contributed firsthand accounts for these pages. Of the 44 Marines listed as MIA, a total of 25 either escaped or survived their prison camp experiences and were liberated in Operation Big Switch.
- [13] This section, except where otherwise specified, has been derived from the following sources: 3/1 SAR 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 4–5, 8–9; 1stTkBn SAR, 24–25; Ridge, *Notes*; Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; Jochums ltr, 16 Dec 55; Canzona narrative, 27 Mar 56; Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56.
- [14] This account of Marine supporting fires on the night of 29–30 November is based on: Carey narrative, 3 Feb 56; LtCol E. H. Simmons interv, 22 Mar 56; 3/1 SAR 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 4–5.
- [15] X Corps *OI 19*, 29 Nov 50.
- [16] Smith, *Chronicle*, 95; X Corps *WD Sum*, Nov 50, 16–17; CG’s Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD*, 30 Nov 50.
- [17] Col E. H. Forney, *Transcript of Special Report, Deputy Chief of Staff, X Corps, 19 August, 21 December*

1950, 3.

[18] Smith, *Chronicle*, 95. These decisions were confirmed by CG X Corps msg X 13522, 1 Dec 50.

[19] X Corps *OpnO* 8, 30 Nov 50. See also X Corps *WD Sum, Nov 50*, 16–17; and CG's Diary Extracts in X Corps *WD* 30 Nov 50.

[20] MAG–12 *HD Nov 50*, 8; 1stMAW *HD Dec 50*; CO MAG–12 msg to Movement Report Office (MRO) Tokyo, 0805 2 Dec 50 in *ibid.* VMF–312 *HD, Dec 50*.

[21] ComPhibGruOne, *Action Report for Hungnam Redeployment, December 1950*. 1.

[22] Miller ltr, 10 Oct 55.

[23] 3/1 *SAR* 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 5; Ridge, *Notes*.

[24] Sources for the balance of this section are as follows: Smith, *Chronicle*, 97–100; 3/1 *SAR* 26 Nov–15 Dec 50, 5–6; Ridge, *Notes*; Sitter ltr, 4 Oct 55; Canzona narrative, 8 Mar 56; Pendas ltr, 18 Dec 55; Carey ltr, 14 Feb 56; Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 10 Apr 56.

[25] Ridge, *Notes*; Smith, *Notes*, 854.

[26] The sources for the operations of Task Force Faith, unless otherwise noted, are: Statement of Capt Edward P. Stamford, n. d., 2–15; Statement of Dr. Lee Tong Kak, n. d.; Capt Martin Blumenson, USA, “Chosin Reservoir,” in Capt Russell A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea*, 63–86; X Corps *WD Sum, Nov 50*, 33–34. Chinese accounts of these actions may be found in *ATIS Enemy Documents: Korean Campaign*, Issue 84, 7–15 and 20–25. LtCol Faith had distinguished himself in World War II as aide to MajGen Matthew B. Ridgway, then commanding the 82d Airborne Div.

[27] VMF(N)–542 *SAR*, sec C, 1–2; VMF(N)–542 *HD*, Dec 50, 1–2; 1stMAW *SAR*, annex J, (hereafter MAG–33 *SAR*), sec B, 5, 8–9. See also descriptions of air support in 1stLt H. S. Wilson interv by Capt J. I. Kiernan, Jr., 29 Jan 51; 1stLt K. E. Kiester interv by Capt Kiernan, 25 Jan 51; Capt C. P. Blankenship interv by Capt Kiernan, 26 Jan 51; and 1stLt W. R. Lipscomb interv by Capt Kiernan, 18 Feb 51.

[28] The courageous Army officer was awarded posthumously a Congressional Medal of Honor.

[29] The account of the rescue of survivors from Task Force Faith is based upon: 1stMarDiv *SAR*, annex Q (hereafter DivSurgeon *SAR*), n. p. and appendix II, 10; Statement of LtCol O. L. Beall, n. d.; 1stMarDiv *POR* 197; Smith, *Notes*, 902–906; and Smith, *Chronicle*, 98, 100.

[30] 1stMarDiv G–3 Journal 1–2 Dec 50, entry 18; G–3 1stMarDiv tel to S-3 11–2 Mar, 1150 2 Dec 50.

[31] *Ibid.* Estimates of the number of soldiers evacuated by air from Hagaru as casualties run as high as 1500, but no accurate records were kept. Any such total, moreover, would have to include men from the Army units stationed at Hagaru as well as survivors of the Task Force Faith disaster.

[32] DivSurgeon *SAR*, n. p.; Smith, *Notes*, 990–994, and *Chronicle*, 1 Dec 50; Capt E. R. Hering, “Address Before U.S. Association of Military Surgeons,” 9 Oct 51; and “Address Before American Medical Association Convention,” 14 Jun 51.

[33] VMO–6 *SAR*, 14–15; Smith, *Notes*, 844.


[34] *Ibid.* See also Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky* (New York, 1954), 134–136.

[35] DivSurgeon *SAR*, n. p.; Smith, *Notes*, 990–991, and *Chronicle*, 98–99.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] Smith, *Notes*, 1001–1004. Col J. H. Brower Comments, n. d.

[38] Smith, *Notes*, 1001–1004.



KOTO-RI PERIMETER

28 November - 7 December


RAILROAD

TANKS


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

500 YARDS

MAP-19



D/TKs & AT/5 — G/1 — 41 Cmdo — B/31 — HqBn — B/TKs
17 tks 22 veh 31 veh 22 veh 66 veh 12 tks





EAST HILL ATTACKS

30 November

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 12. Breakout From Yudam-ni

- [1] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1750 29 Nov 50.
- [2] XCorps *OI 19*, 29 Nov 50.
- [3] Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 57. Maj McReynolds had already placed his battalion under Col Litzenberg as senior officer present. LtCol W. McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
- [4] LtCol H. A. Feehan Comments, 1 Aug 56. McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
- [5] Smith, *Notes*, 918-919.
- [6] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is derived from: RCT 5 and RCT 7 *Joint OpnO 1-50*, 30 Nov 50; X Corps *OpnO 8*, 30 Nov 50; 7thMar *SAR*, 22-23; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; 2/5 *SAR*, 20-21; Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55; Gen O. P. Smith Comments, 13 Nov 56; Col J. L. Winecoff Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. D. Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
- [7] A copy had been sent out earlier with the pilot of an evacuation helicopter but it did not reach the Division CP until 1 December. Winecoff Comments.
- [8] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th and 7thMars, 1920 30 Nov 50. See also Smith, *Notes*, 923-924.
- [9] This account of the organization of the "Damnation" Battalion is based upon: Narrative of Maj W. R. Earney, n. d., 9-10; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56. "I trust," commented Gen Litzenberg dryly, "that the green neckerchiefs were all made of *torn* parachutes!"
- [10] Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 55.
- [11] *Ibid.*, McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
- [12] This section is derived from: RCT-5 and RCT-7 *Joint OpnO 2-50*, 1 Dec 50; 5thMar *SAR*, 26-27; 3/5 *SAR*, 15; 7thMar *SAR*, 23; Smith, *Notes*, 923-927; Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 58-59; Col J. L. Stewart Comments, n. d.; LtCol R. V. Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; Narrative of LtCol R. G. Davis, 11 Jan 53; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56; Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56; McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.
- [13] After the cease-fire of July 1953, the remains were returned to the United States, in accordance with the terms of the Korean Armistice.
- [14] The description of the withdrawal of 1/5 and 3/5 is based on: 5thMar *SAR*, 26; 1/5 *SAR*, 15-16; 3/5 *SAR*, 15; LtCol R. D. Taplett and Maj R. E. Whipple, "Darkhorse Sets the Pace," *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxvii, no. 6 (Jun 53), 22-23; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 25 Jul 56.
- [15] 5thMar *SAR*, 26-27; 7thMar *SAR*, 23; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; 1/5 *SAR*, 15-16; 2/5 *SAR*, 21-22; 3/5 *SAR*, 15. CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50.
- [16] Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
- [17] 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.
- [18] 3/7 *SAR*, n. p.; R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1935 1 Dec 50; LtCol R. G. Davis interv by Capts K. W. Shutts and A. Z. Freeman, 6 Apr 51; Maj E. M. Hovatter Comments, 19 Jul 56.
- [19] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based on Davis narrative; Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr 51; and Capt W. J. Davis interv, 4 Jun 56.
- [20] Descriptions of 3/5 operations in this section are based on the 3/5 *SAR*, 15; Taplett and Whipple, "Darkhorse Sets the Pace," II, 46-50; Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.
- [21] 11thMar *SAR*, 7; *MCB Study*, II-C-72.
- [22] "Item Company upon relief was temporarily non-effective. In fact it ceased to exist except on paper. Some of the survivors were assigned to G/5 and the wounded who were able to walk were assigned to a provisional rifle

unit organized from H&S Co and under the command of Lt George Bowman.” Taplett Comments, 9 Aug 56.

[23] This section is based on R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53; Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51; Fridrich interv, 21 Apr 56; R. G. Davis interv, 6 Apr 51; and W. G. Davis interv, 4 June 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 20 Aug 56; Hovatter Comments, 19 Jul 5.

[24] 2/5 SAR, 22; Stewart Comments; McReynolds Comments, 15 Aug 56.

[25] 1/5 SAR, 16; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55.

[26] The description of the fight on Hill 1542 is derived from: ATIS *Enemy Documents: Korean Campaign*, Issue 66, 88-93; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; Litzenberg ltr, 7 Aug 56; Maj W. R. Earney ltr to Gen Litzenberg, 16 Jul 56.

[27] General Litzenberg points out that “it was necessary for 3/7 to maintain protection for the main column until it passed by Hill 1542. They [3/7] held high enough to keep Chinese small arms fire at a sufficient distance from the Road.” Litzenberg Comments, 7 Aug 56.

[28] Litzenberg interv, 27-30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 61. Other sources for this section are as follows: LtCol Taplett interv, 8 Jun 56 and Comments, 9 and 14 Aug 56; TSgt E. L. Knox interv, 30 May 56; *MCB Study*, II-C-78-80; Taplett and Whipple, “Darkhorse Leads the Way,” II, 49-50; Smith, *Notes*, 932-946; R. G. Davis narrative, 11 Jan 53; 5thMar SAR, 29; Geer, *The New Breed*, 338-341.

[29] Stewart Comments.

[30] Sources for this section, unless otherwise noted, are the same as those for the last and: 3/1 tels to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0430 and 1715 4 Dec 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to 11thMar, 0730 4 Dec 50; 7thMar tels to G-3 1stMarDiv, 0830 and 0925 4 Dec 50; G-31stMarDiv tels to 3/1, 0950 and 1330 4 Dec 50; Stevens Comments, 25 Jul 56.


[31] MAG-33 SAR sec B 6-7; VMF-214 SAR, 5; 1stMAW *HD*, Dec 50.


[32] Since the four rifle companies had been left on key points, controlling the last two and a half miles into Hagaru, the column consisted mostly of H&S and Weapons Company personnel. Davis Comments, 20 Aug 56.


[33] Lieutenant Meeker, dispatched from Hagaru with fuel, was unable to get through to the stalled artillery because of Chinese fire. Some of his men, however, did pass the Chinese block and served as part of CWO Carlson’s improvised gun crew. Capt E. L. Meeker interv, 19 Jul 56.

[34] Taplett interr, 8 Jun 56.

[35] Smith, *Notes*, 948.







Unit	1 Dec.	2 Dec.	3 Dec.	4 Dec.
George Company	114	96	84	80
How Company	180	167	131	73
Item Company	143	41	41	41
Total	437	304	256	194

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 13. Regroupment at Hagaru

- [1] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex T (Post Exchange), n. p. Smith, *Notes*, 1017–1018.
- [2] Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, U.S. Navy, Public Information Release, 21 Apr 51; LCdr J. H. Craven, (ChC) USN, interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 22 Oct 52; Hering, “Address Before U.S. Association of Military Surgeons, 9 Oct 52.”
- [3] *Ibid.* Study of the frostbite casualties of the Chosin Reservoir campaign led to the adoption of the thermal boot as an effective preventive measure during the operations of the following two winters of the Korean conflict.
- [4] 2/1 SAR, 16; LtCol W. S. Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56; X Corps, *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 93; Smith, *Notes*, 844; VMO-6 SAR, 13–18.
- [5] Smith, *Notes*, 998–999.
- [6] X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 93.
- [7] Maj Paul A. Noel, Jr. interv, 4 Dec 56.
- [8] *Ibid.*, Smith, *Notes*, 998–999.
- [9] X Corps *OI* 22, 2 Dec 50.
- [10] This section, except where otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: G-1 SAR, 6–7 and G-4 SAR 6–7, appendix 3–5; X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*; Smith, *Notes*, 1011–1015, and *Chronicle*, 103–105; Forney, *Special Report*, 3–5; Maj M. J. Sexton interv by HistDiv, HQMC, 6 May 51.
- [11] Smith, *Notes*, 977–978; *Chronicle*, 103–106.
- [12] 1stMarDiv *G–3 Journal*, 5–6 Dec 50, entry 7; Maj H. E. Hood, memo: Close Air Support, 11 Feb 51; Wilson interv, 29 Jan 51.
- [13] HqBn *URpt 13*; G-4 SAR, appendix II, 2–3; LtCol F. Simpson Comments, 24 Sep 56.
- [14] G-4 SAR, appendix II, 3–5.
- [15] Smith, *Notes*, 1010.
- [16] 1stMarDiv *OpnO* 25–50, 5 Dec 50. Other sources for the remainder of this section are: 1stMarDiv *AdmO* 20–50, 4 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv Destruction Plan, Hagaru Area, 4 Dec 50; Smith, *Chronicle*, 104–106.
- [17] Smith, *Notes*, 1025, 1051; CG’s Diary in X Corps *Command Report Annex (CR)*, 4 Dec 50.
- [18] CG 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, Hagaru, 2000 4 Dec 50; 5thMar SAR, 30–31.
- [19] 1stMAW *OpnO* 2-50, 5 Dec 50; 1stMAW, “Summary of Air Support for 6 Dec,” 5 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv SAR, annex CC (Air Officer), 6–7; CinCPacFlt, *Interim Evaluation Report No. 1*, III, 225–226; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 5 Oct 56; Maj H. D. Kuokka interv, 13 Dec 56. 1stMAW *HD, Dec 50*. The VMF-214 pilots casually made their transition from shore to carrier base between sorties.
- [20] 1stMarDiv SAR, annex SS (hereafter 11Mar SAR), 8. As a consequence of the loss of nine 155mm howitzers during the last night of the Yudam-ni-Hagaru breakout, 4/11 was reorganized into two firing batteries of four howitzers each.
- [21] *Ibid.*, 1stMarDiv *POR* 209, 6 Dec 50; LtCol W. McReynolds Comments, 16 Aug 56.
- [22] Smith, *Notes*, 1058–1060; HqBn, *HD, Dec 50*, 5.
- [23] This section, except when otherwise noted, is based upon the following sources: 5thMar SAR, 31–32; 1/5 SAR, 17–18; 2/5 SAR, 27–29; Smith, *Notes*, 1031–1033; Geer, *The New Breed*, 353–357; Capt S. Smith, 1stLt J. R. Hines (sic) and 1stLt J. H. Honeycutt, interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 4 Feb 51; Alvarez ltr, 18 Oct 55. Col R. L. Murray, Comments, n. d.
- [24] 2/5 SAR, 28–29.
- [25] Capt G. E. Shepherd, “Attack to the South,” (MS), 10–13.

[26] Since the ground to the left of the MSR was too cut up to permit advance through the high ground, the Provisional Battalion was to operate from the valley and clear enemy from noses found to be occupied. Litzenberg Comments, 5 Oct 56.

[27] Sources for this section, except where otherwise noted, are: 7thMar SAR, 24; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; Smith, *Notes*, 1029-1031, 1033-1047; RCT-7 *URpt 6*; 1stLt J. B. Chandler, "Thank God I'm a Marine," *Leatherneck Magazine*, xxiv, no. 6 (Jun 51), 25-26; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg, *Recollections of the Action from Hagaru to Koto-ri*, 6-7 December 1950, 2 Oct 56, and Comments, 5 Oct 56; Col R. G. Davis Comments, 28 Sep 56; Sawyer Comments, 7 Sep 56; LtCol H. T. Milne Comments, 24 Sep 56; LtCol M. E. Roach Comments, 27 Nov 56.

[28] Litzenberg *Recollections*, 2 Oct 56.

[29] 1stLt J. G. Theros, interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 16 Feb 51; Litzenberg *Recollections*, 2 Oct 56.

[30] 1stMAW SAR, Annex I (VMR-152), 11-12, and annex K, appendix J, (hereafter MTACS- 2SAR), 25; Air Officer's Rpt, in X Corps CR, 6 Dec 50; LtCol J. N. Swartley ltr to authors, 15 Oct 56.

[31] 1stMarDiv msg to 7thMar, 1030 7 Dec 50; CO RCT 7 FragO, 0930 7 Dec 50.

[32] Unless otherwise noted the description of the movement of the division trains is based on: HqBn, *HD, Dec 50*, 6-9; HqBn, *URpt 13*; Maj F. Simpson interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 11 Apr 51.

[33] This description of the headquarters convoy fight is based on: *Ibid.*; Cpl G. L. Coon, "Versatility," *Leatherneck Magazine*, xxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 18-19; Simpson Comments, 24 Sept 56; MTACS-2 SAR, 19; Maj C. C. Lee interv by Capt S. W. Higginbotham, 7 Feb 51, Comments, 14 Aug 56, and ltr 1 Nov 56.

[34] Col J. L. Stewart Comments, n. d.


[35] The description of the operations of the 5th Marines and 3/1 are based on: 3/5 SAR, 17; 3/1, SAR, 26 Nov-15 Dec 50, 7; 5thMar SAR, 32-34; 1/5 SAR, 18-19; 2/5 SAR, 29-30, 37.


[36] Descriptions of the operations of the engineers at Hagaru are based on these sources: 1st Engr Bn SAR, 13; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 50; Narrative of Capt N. A. Canzona, 13 Jul 56.

[37] Sexton interv, 16 May 51.

	KIA	DOW	MIA	WIA	Total Battle	Non- Battle ¹
30 Nov.....	27	6	6	183	222	102
1 Dec.....	27	14	6	111	158	134
2 Dec.....	55	2	33	231	321	180
3 Dec.....	16	1	6	194	217	196
4 Dec.....	10	6	4	202	222	582
Totals	135	29	55	921	1140	1194

¹ 1stMarDiv SAR, annex E (Division Adjutant), appendix II, 3.







THE LAST NIGHT AT HAGARU

6-7 DECEMBER 1950

-  Marine Positions
-  Railroad
-    Tanks
-  Road



MAP-27



Dates	KIA	DOW	MIA	WIA	Totals
6 Dec.....	32	4	7	218	261
7 Dec.....	51	16	0	288	355
Totals	83	20	7	506	616 ¹

¹ Div Adjutant SAR, Appendix II, 3.

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 14. Onward from Koto-ri

- [1] Smith, *Notes*, 1056.
- [2] Col A. Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56; Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56.
- [3] Bartley ltr, 7 Feb 56. This section is also based on 1stMar SAR, 18–24, and the 2/1 SAR, 15–18.
- [4] Not so fortunate was 2/31, which lost 5 KIA and 10 WIA expanding the perimeter to the south on 3 Dec. CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1850 3 Dec 50.
- [5] Smith, *notes*, 1069–1071.
- [6] “Carrier Deck,” *Leatherneck Magazine*, xxxiv, no. 3 (Mar 51), 19–20; 1stMar SAR, 23; 2/1 SAR, 17–18; 1stEngrBn SAR, 13; 1stMedBn SAR, 12; and VMO-6 SAR, 17–18; 1stMAW SAR, 7; BrigGen E. C. Dyer Comments, n. d.
- [7] 1stMedBn SAR, 3–7.
- [8] *Ibid.* See also Smith, *Notes*, 995–998, 1110–1112.
- [9] Smith, *Notes*, 1063–1064.
- [10] X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 17–18; Forney, *Special Report*, 3.
- [11] Smith, *Notes*, 1063–1064; X Corps *Special Report, Chosin Reservoir*, 20–24; X Corps *OI 26*, 5 Dec 50; and Dolcater, *3d Infantry Division in Korea*, 90; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 2115 6 Dec 50; CG X Corps msg X 13811, 7 Dec 50; Col D. M. Schmuck Comments, n. d.
- [12] Except when otherwise specified, this section is based on the following sources: Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–63; Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 15 Jul 51, 72–73; Smith, *Notes*, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1109; 1stEngBn SAR, 3–14; Geer, *The New Breed*, 361–362, 369; LtCol J. H. Partridge Comments, n. d.
- [13] Smith, *Notes*, 1057–1059, 1075, 1095–1097; Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 48–53; 1stEngBn SAR, 13–14.
- [14] Partridge interv 25 Jun 51, 48–53; Capt C. W. Hospelhorn, “Aerial Supply in Korea,” *Combat Forces Journal*, I, no. 10 (May 51), 29–30.
- [15] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 26–50*, 7 Dec 50. The task organization remained as it was during the move from Hagaru to Koto-ri. For the regimental orders, see 1stMar *OpnO 16–50*, 7 Dec 50; 5thMar *OpnO 44–50*, 7 Dec 50; and 7thMar *Frag O*, 7 Dec 50. Other sources for this section are: 11thMar SAR, 9; and Smith, *Notes*, 1062.
- [16] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 1st, 5th, 7th Mars, 1stTkBn, 1100 8 Dec 50.
- [17] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: *Ibid.*; 1stMar SAR, 19–20, 24–26; 1stMar *URpt (S-3) 13*; Bates interv, 16 Mar 53, 108–112; Geer, *The New Breed*, 364–368; Col D. M. Schmuck, LtCol D. W. Bridges, LtCol W. L. Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; special mention should also be made of the two-part article, “Last Barrier,” by S. L. A. Marshall in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxvii, no. 1 (Jan 53), 20–23, and no. 2 (Feb 53), 40–46; LtCol D. W. Bridges interv, 14 Dec 56.
- [18] Litzenberg interv, 27–30 Apr and 10 Jul 51, 68–69.
- [19] FSCC tel to G-3, X Corps, 1245 8 Dec 50 in G-3 Journal; X Corps *C*, 8 Dec 50; RCT-7 *URpt 6*; 7th Mar SAR, 25; 3/7 SAR, n. p.; MajGen H. L. Litzenberg Comments, 17 Nov 56; LtCol W. Morris Comments, 15 Oct 56.
- [20] 7thMar SAR, 25; RCT-7 *URpt 6*; CO 1/7 msg to CO 7thMar, 1341 8 Dec 50; Geer, *The New Breed*, 362–363. LtCol W. D. Sawyer Comments, 26 Oct 56.
- [21] 1/5 SAR, 19; S-3 5thMar tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, 1800 8 Dec 50; Maj Stewart tel to CO 5thMar, 1940 8 Dec 50; 5thMar SAR, 34; Smith, *Notes*, 1072.
- [22] G-3 1stMarDiv tel to CO 1stEngBn, 1325 8 Dec 50; G-3 1stMarDiv tel to G-3 X Corps, 1450 8 Dec 50, in

G-3 Journal, X Corps *CR*, 8 Dec 50; D/Engrs *SAR*, 10.

[23] 2/1 *SAR*, 18–19.

[24] Smith, *Notes*, 1112–1113; Smith, *Chronicle*, 110. According to the terms of the Armistice of 27 July 1953, the remains were delivered to the Americans after the cease-fire.

[25] 1stMar *SAR*, 24–26; Bates interv, 16 Mar 53, 108–112; Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Marshall, “Last Barrier, II,” 40–46; Schmuck Comments.

[26] 7thMar *SAR*, 26; RCT-7 *URpt 6*; 3/7 *SAR*, n. p., 1stMar *SAR*, 25; 3/1 *SAR*, 8; 5thMar *SAR*, 35; 1/5 *SAR*, 19; Smith, *Notes*, 1077, Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56.

[27] Sawyer Comments, 25 Oct 56.

[28] *Ibid.*, Schmuck Comments.

[29] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 56–65.

[30] Smith, *Notes*, 1114; *Chronicle*, 111–112.

[31] Partridge interv, 25 Jun 51, 66.

[32] Smith, *Notes*, 1077; Narrative of Col E. W. Snedeker [Apr 51].

[33] HqBn *HD Dec 50*, 9; 1stMTBn *SAR*, 13; Simpson interv, 11 Apr 51; LtCol F. Simpson Comments, 22 Oct 56.

[34] 7thMar *SAR*, 26; 3/11 *SAR*, 9.

[35] 1stMarDiv *PIR 47*. Bates interv, 16 Mar 53; Schmuck-Bridges-Bates interv, 8 Aug 56; Schmuck Comments.

[36] 7thMar *SAR*, 26; 11thMar *SAR*, 9–10; Smith, *Chronicle*, 112; 1stMTBn *SAR*, 14; Gen O. P. Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.

[37] 5thMar *SAR*, 34–36; 1/5 *SAR*, 20; 2/5 *SAR*, 31; 3/5 *SAR*, 17–18; LtCol J. W. Stevens, II, Comments, 19 Oct 56.

[38] 1stMar *SAR*, 26; 2/1 *SAR*, 19; 1stMar (S-3) *URpt 13*, 16–17. The Marine Provisional Tank Platoon had reached Koto-ri with only two M4A3 tanks, one of which had to be cannibalized. Then the platoon was disbanded and integrated with its remaining M4A3 into B and D companies. All the other tanks in the column were M-26s

[39] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1700 10 Dec 50; Col C. A. Youngdale Comments, 19 Nov 56.

[40] MajGen E. W. Snedeker Comments, n. d., and MajGen A. D. Mead, USA, ltr to Gen Snedeker, 6 Dec 56.

[41] This is probably the same action referred to in 3dInfDiv *CR, Dec 50*, as occurring at 0130 11 Dec. The account of the Sudong ambush is based on: 1stMar *SAR*, 26; 1stMar *URpt (S-3) 13*, 18; Narrative of Col W. C. Winston, USA, 14 Jan 55; Cpl M. L. Wasson ltr to Col Winston, 16 May 51; Cpl D. E. Klepsig interv by H. L. Page, Jr., 6 Mar 52; Capt N. A. Canzona and J. C. Hubbell, “The 12 Incredible Days of Col John Page,” *Readers Digest*, lxxix, no. 4 (Apr 56), 84–86. The Page and Winston material is in the possession of Capt Canzona.

[42] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to COs 1st, 5th, and 7thMars, 1530 9 Dec 50.

[43] 1stMar *OpnO 16–50*, 7 Dec 50. This order issued before the decision to send the tanks down the MSR in one group makes no mention of protecting the armor.

[44] 1stMar *URpt (S-3) 13*, 18; Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.

[45] Neither Capt Bruce F. Williams, commanding Baker Company, nor his platoon leaders realized that Hargett’s men were screening the rear of the tank column. Maj B. F. Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56.

[46] This description of the ambush at the rear of the tank column is based upon: Capt E. C. Hargett, interv by HistBr, G-3, 14 Dec 53; Maj W. Gall, 1stLt R. B. Grossman [sic], 1stLt F. R. Kraince, 1stLt E. C. Hargett, 2dLt C. E. Patrick, and 2dLt D. W. Sharon, interv by Capt K. A. Shutts, 11 Feb 51; *MCB Study*, II-C-111–113; Smith, *Notes*, 1087; HqBn *URpt 14*; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56; Maj E. C. Hargett Comments, 17 Oct 56.

[47] Developed by the scientists of the Naval Field Medical Research Laboratory at Camp Lejeune, the ordinary utility jackets contained thin plates of fiberglass which would stop most shell or grenade fragments. Five hundred jackets had been air-shipped to the 1st Marine Division for field tests, but other supplies had a higher priority

during the Chosin Reservoir campaign and only the 50 garments sent to Recon Company were worn in combat. Lynn Montross, "Development of Our Body Armor," *Marine Corps Gazette*, xxxix, no. 6 (Jun 55), 10–16. The full story of the development of body armor, one of the most important tactical innovations of the Korean conflict, will be told in the next two volumes of this series.


[48] CO 1stTBn tel to G-3 1stMarDiv, n.t., 11 Dec 50, gives tank personnel losses as 4 MIA.

[49] 1stTkBn SAR, 36; Snedeker narrative, Apr 51; Statement of N. A. Canzona, n. d.; Williams Comments, 26 Dec 56.

[50] Schmuck Comments.

[51] LtCol Sutter interv, 8 Aug 56.

[52] Smith, *Notes*, 1091.



Date	KIA	DOW	MIA	WIA	Totals ¹
8 Dec.....	29	8	4	127	168
9 Dec.....	6	7	1	46	60
10 Dec.....	7	5	8	45	65
11 Dec.....	9	4	3	38	54
Totals	51	24	16	256	347

¹ DivAdjutant SAR, appendix II, 3.

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign
Notes
Chapter 15. The Hungnam Redeployment

[1] *Time, the Weekly Newsmagazine*, lvi, no. 25 (18 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 18-19.

[2] *Time*, lvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50), (Pacific Edition), 9.

[3] *Newsweek*, xxxvi, no. 24 (11 Dec 50) 11. "Such quotations," comments General MacArthur, referring to the excerpts from *Time* and *Newsweek*, "certainly do not reflect the mood of the American public at the time, but rather the emotional reaction of irresponsible writers. . . . Neither [of the two news magazines] had the slightest access to the basic information and factors which involved the decisions and operations of our government and its higher military commanders. . . . The unreliability of these nonprofessional estimates of the situation is indeed eloquently demonstrated by comparing them with the actual military reports by the commands involved." Gen D. MacArthur ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 17 Oct 56.

[4] The Division Embarkation Section began revision of its standby embarkation order on 10 December and the following day was able to issue Embarkation Order 3-50. EmbO memo to HistO, subj: Historical Diary, 19 Dec 50.

[5] Smith, *Notes*, 1065-1066, 1119; 1stMarDiv memo: "Plan for receiving 1stMarDiv Units, Hamhung-Hungnam area," 0800 8 Dec 50.

[6] Except when otherwise noted, the remainder of this section is based on the following sources:

ComPhibGruOne, *Action Report, Hungnam*, 1-2, 4-6; Forney *Special Report*, 5-7; X Corps, *OpnO 9*, 5 Dec 50; X Corps, *Special Report on Hungnam Evacuation*, 2-3; X Corps *OI 27*, 9 Dec 50; Gen L. C. Shepherd, Jr., ltr to MajGen E. W. Snedeker, 25 Oct 56.

[7] ComNavFE endorsement on CG FMFPac ser 8432, 6 Dec 50. "Although it was not necessary for me to exercise my command functions," commented General Shepherd, "I had been orally directed to do so by both Admirals Radford and Joy if I considered it expedient. As I recall, I was directed to take charge of the naval phase of the evacuation of Hungnam as Representative of the Commander, Naval Forces, Far East. In compliance with these instructions I exercised close overall supervision of this phase of the operation and made suggestions to both Admiral Doyle and General Almond relative to the embarkation and evacuation of the Marine Forces from Hungnam." Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56.

[8] The sources of this section, unless otherwise states, are as follows: Forney, *Special Report*, 8-18; *MCB Study*, II-C-114-115; ComPhibGruOne *Action Report, Hungnam*, 5-10, 25; 1stMAW *HD, Dec 50*, 1-2; Smith, *Notes*, 120-1123; Maj R. W. Shutts, *Report on Amphibious Withdrawal of the U.S. X Corps from Hungnam, Korea*, 1-9; *MGCIS-1 HD, Dec 50*; X Corps *OpnO 10*, 11 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv *EmbO 3-50*, 11 Dec 50; Shepherd ltr, 25 Oct 56; LtGen W. H. Tunner, USAF, ltr to MajGen Snedeker, 8 Dec 56.

[9] LtGen T. J. Cushman Comments, n. d.; *MAG-12 WD, Dec 50*.

[10] Unless otherwise stated, the sources for this section are the same as for the last.

[11] VAdm J. H. Doyle ltr, 5 Oct 56.

[12] 1stAmphTracBn *HD, Dec 50*, 5.

[13] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50, with attached report from Gen Almond and a Navy announcement in *New York Times*, 27 Dec 50.

[14] Smith, *Notes*, 1126. A detailed account of the arrival of the 1st Marine Division at Pusan and Masan will be found in the first chapter of Volume IV of this series.

[15] CinCFE Special Communique, 26 Dec 50.

[16] General MacArthur's comments are as follows: "This, again, is a non-professional estimate belied by the facts and the viewpoints of all senior commanders present It was the purpose of Red China to overwhelm

and annihilate, through a 'sneak' attack, the Eighth Army and X Corps by the heavy assault of overwhelming forces of a new power, not heretofore committed to war, against which it knew or rightly surmised there would be no retaliation. This plan was foiled by our anticipatory advance which uncovered the enemy's plot before he had assembled all of his forces, and by our prompt strategic withdrawal before he could inflict a crippling blow of a 'Pearl Harbor' nature. . . . This was undoubtedly one of the most successful strategic retreats in history, comparable with and markedly similar to Wellington's great Peninsula withdrawal. Had the initiative action not been taken and an inert position of adequate defense assumed, I have no slightest doubt that the Eighth Army and the X Corps both would have been annihilated. As it was, both were preserved with practically undiminished potential for further action. I have always regarded this action, considering the apparently unsurmountable difficulties and overwhelming odds, as the most successful and satisfying I have ever commanded." MacArthur ltr, 17 Oct 56.

[17] Air Officer SAR, 4.

[18] The material in this section is derived from: MAG-12 SAR, annex C, 10; VMF-214 SAR, annex F, 23; 1stMAW SAR, annex J, appendix S (VMF-323), 4, 9, 11; 1stMAW SAR, 5-7; Maj H. D. Kuokka Comments, n. d.

[19] MGCIS-1 *HD Dec 50*, 2; MTACS-2 *HD Dec 50*, 7.

[20] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise noted, is based upon: Smith, *Notes*, 1149-1161, 1222.

[21] 1stMAW *HDs, Oct-Dec 50*.

[22] VMF-312 *HD, Dec 50*, 2.

[23] ComNavFE msg to CinCPacFlt, 0858 1 Oct 50; CinCPacFlt msg to ComNavFE, 2245 2 Oct 50; CG 1stMAW msg to CO VMR-152, 0620 12 Oct 50; VMF-152 SAR, 6; Col R. R. Yeaman Comments, 19 Sep 56 and 6 Nov 56. By 25 December when VMR-152 returned to Navy control it had flown 729,790 miles in Korean lifts and carried 8,068,800 pounds of cargo, 234,000 pounds of mail and 11,314 passengers, including 4276 casualties.

[24] 1stMAW SAR, annex K, appendix F (VMF-311), 2; VMF-311 *HD, Dec 50*.

[25] MajGen O. P. Smith ltr to MajGen F. Harris, 20 Dec 50.

[26] VMO-6 SAR, 20; LtCol V. J. Gottschalk, *Transcript of Informal Remarks at HQMC*, 17 May 51.

[27] Smith, *Notes*, 1146-1149. See Appendix E for a day-by-day accounting of Marine casualties.

[28] Smith ltr, 21 Oct 56.

[29] A CCF army consisted of three or four divisions and therefore might be considered generally the equivalent of a U.S. corps. This account of CCF units and movements is derived from the *MCB Study*, II-C-116-125, which in turn is based on an analysis of CCF prisoner interrogations and captured enemy documents. The Board, consisting of senior officers, was given the mission in 1951 of preparing "an evaluation of the influence of Marine Corps forces on the course of the Korean War, 4 Aug 50-15 Dec 50."

[30] Translations of CCF documents referred to in this section are found in HQ 500th Military Intelligence Group, Document 204141, "Compilation of Battle Experiences Reported by Various in their Operation Against U.S. Forces in Korea." Among the units covered are the 20th, 26th, and 27th Armies.

[31] 1stMarDiv *PIR* 47, encl. 1. The four armies referred to by the POW were the 20th, 26th, 27th, and 30th. Actually the 30th Army did not exist, as one of its divisions had been attached to each of the other three armies.

[32] *MCB Study*, II-C-125.

[33] Quotations in this section, except when otherwise noted, are from the *MCB Study*, 11-C-125-127.


[34] Xenophon, *The Anabasis of Cyrus*, Henry C. Dakyns, trans., in F. R. B. Godolphin, *The Greek Historians*, (2 vols., New York, 1942), II, 297-298.

[35] *Time*, lvii, no. 9 (26 Feb 51).

[36] Gen Douglas MacArthur, CinCUNC, *11th Report of the Operations in Korea of United Nations Forces*, 31 Jan 51. See Appendix H for transcript of Presidential Unit Citation awarded to the 1stMarDiv and the Distinguished Unit Citation awarded to the 1stMAW.


[37] RAdm J. H. Doyle ltr to MajGen O. P. Smith, 2 Mar 51.


[38] 1stMarDiv memo 238-50, 19 Dec 50.




The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 1. Interlude at Masan

- [1] This section is based on 1st Marine Division (1stMarDiv) Historical Diary (*HD*), Dec 50, 1–12; MajGen O. P. Smith, *Notes on the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War* (hereafter Smith, *Notes*), 1239–1242; and BrigGen E. A. Craig, Comments, 4 Jun 57.
- [2] CG 1stMarDiv FragO, 1515, 18 Dec 50.
- [3] CG XCorps msg X 15292, 18 Dec 50; Eusak msg GX–35290-KG00, 19 Dec 50.
- [4] Smith, *Notes*, 1244–1245.
- [5] The remainder of this section is based upon Smith, *Notes*, 1264–1274.
- [6] Gen M. B. Ridgway as told to H. M. Martin, *Soldier, The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York, 1956), 196–211, hereafter Ridgway, *Memoirs*.
- [7] *Ibid.*, 204–205.
- [8] LtGen E. A. Craig, USMC (Retd), ltr of 4 Jun 57. All letters, typed interviews, and other documentary sources cited in footnotes are on file in the archives of the Historical Branch, G–3, Headquarters Marine Corps.
- [9] Gen Douglas MacArthur, ltr of 6 Jun 57 to MajGen E. W. Snedeker.
- [10] EUSAK Command Report (*Cmd Rpt*), Dec 50.
- [11] Memorandum from commanding general to all troops of Eighth Army, 21 Jan 51.
- [12] The source for the remainder of this section is Ridgway, *Memoirs*, 205–207.
- [13] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are Smith, *Notes*, 1280–1292, 1294, 1295, 1303; 1stMarDiv Periodic Logistics Reports (*PLR*) 2, 11.
- [14] LtGen E. A. Craig, ltr of 4 Jun 57.
- [15] ComPhibGruOne Action Rpt, Hungnam, 5–10, 25.
- [16] For a detailed account of the “amphibious operation in reverse,” see the last chapter of Volume III of this series.
- [17] CinCPacFlt *Interim Evaluation Report (PacFlt Interim Rpt)* No. 2, II, 621–758.
- [18] TacRon-1 War Diary (*WD*), Dec 50.
- [19] HDs and WDs of VMF–323, VMF–214, and VMF–212; *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 1939–1960.
- [20] The material in this section is derived from the following sources: *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 463–620; Chief, Army Field Forces Headquarters, Tactical Air Command, Joint Training Directive for Air-Ground Operations; and CMC, ltr to Dist List re “Analysis of CAS Systems,” 19 Aug 52.
- [21] 1stMarDiv *HD* Dec 50, 12–13; Smith, *Notes*, 1258–1259.
- [22] EUSAK msg GX–20179–K600, 27 Dec 50.
- [23] CG X Corps msg X 16070, 28 Dec 50.
- [24] This account of the Kyongju conference is derived from Smith, *Notes*, 1269–1271.





<i>Items of equipment</i>	<i>T/E allowance</i>	<i>Shortages 23 Dec 50</i>	<i>Shortages 31 Dec 50</i>
Bags, sleeping	23,000	3,585	0
Machine gun, Browning, Cal. 30, M1919A4	1,398	338	0
BAR, 30 cal.	904	441	0
Carbine, 30 cal., M2.....	11,084	2,075	0
Launcher, rocket, 3.5", M20.....	396	105	0
Howitzer, 105mm	54	8	0
Howitzer, 155mm	18	9	0
Glasses, field, 7x50.....	1,740	1,305	1,006
Tank, Med., M4A3, dozer, 105 mm.	12	7	7
Tank, med., M-26, 90mm.....	85	16	12
Truck, $\frac{1}{4}$ T., 4x4.....	641	105	58
Truck, $1\frac{1}{2}$ T., 6x6, cargo.....	54	3	0
Truck, $2\frac{1}{2}$ T., 6x6, cargo.....	737	124	33
Radio set, SCR 536.....	474	211	211
Radio set, SCR 619.....	137	74	49
Telephone, EE8	1,162	58	58




The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 2. The CCF January Offensive

- [1] EUSAK msgs GX 20332–KG00 and GX 20335 KG00 31 Dec 50; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51, 4.
- [2] Smith, *Notes*, 1315.
- [3] Sources for this section are EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jan 51, 4–5, 7, 9, 27, 62–65.
- [4] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 5 Jun 57.
- [5] Ridgway, *Memoirs*, 215.
- [6] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jan 51, 9, 62, 64, 82, 92.
- [7] USAF Hist Study No. 72, *U.S. Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict*, 1 Nov 50–30 Jun 52, (hereafter cited as AHS–72) pp. 188–196. The term “net” denotes a network of radio stations, all on a single frequency for a specific purpose.
- [8] The term “scramble” in military aviation parlance refers to an expeditious takeoff in response to an emergency call or an alert. With highly trained personnel, it is a pattern rather than a panic.
- [9] AHS–72, 47, 48; PhibGru–3 *WD*, Jan 51.
- [10] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51, 4; EUSAK msg G–1–628–KGG, 8 Jan 51.
- [11] EUSAK msg GX–1–661–KG00, 9 Jan 51.
- [12] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 1–51*, 9 Jan 51.
- [13] Smith, *Notes*, 1279.
- [14] 1stMarDiv *OpnO 2–51*, 10 Jan 51.
- [15] Smith, *Notes*, 1285–1286, 1307–1308.
- [16] Material relative to Marine replacements has been derived from FMFPac *HD*, Dec 50 and Jan 51.
- [17] The balance of this section is derived from the Dec 50 and Jan 51 historical diaries of VMF–352, VMR–152, 1st MAW, and FMFPac.
- [18] This section is based on the 1st MAW and MAG–33 *HDs* of Jan 51; Fifth Air Force History (hereafter to be designated FAF), Dec 50 and Jan 51; AHS–72, 35–37; EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jan 51, Sec II, 12, 63, 64–65; *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 969, 1062; Mobile Construction Battalion Two (hereafter MCB–2) Report of Activities for Jan 51; Col T. J. Noon, interv of 5 Jun 58.
- [19] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51.
- [20] U.S. Military Academy, *Operations in Korea*, 28–29.
- [21] Richard L. Walker, *China Under Communism* (New Haven, 1955), 119, 307.
- [22] *Ibid.*, 13.
- [23] The day had not yet dawned when the hydrogen bomb would have a much greater potentiality for frightfulness.
- [24] Gen M. B. Ridgway, *Memoirs* (New York, 1956); Gen J. M. Gavin, *War and Peace in the Space Age* (New York, 1958); Gen M. D. Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet* (New York, 1959).

The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 3. The Pohang Guerrilla Hunt

- [1] MajGen F. M. McAlister ltr, 17 Jun 57.
- [2] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jan 51.
- [3] 1stMarDiv Periodic Intelligence Report (*PIR*) 87-94, 17-22 Jan 51.
- [4] Units of these armies, it may be recalled, were not identified again in the CCF order of battle before the middle of March 1951. Until that time, the possibility of these enemy troops being used for a surprise stroke had to be taken into consideration.
- [5] Smith, *Notes*, 1339.
- [6] This section, unless otherwise stated, is based on the January historical diaries of the following organizations: 1st MAW; MAG-33; MAG-12; VMF-312; VMF-214; VMF-323; VMF(N)-513; VMF(N)-542; MWSS-1; FMFPac. Another source is *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 969.
- [7] VMF-212 *HD*, Jan 51; USS *Bataan* (CVL-29) Action Rpt, "Operations off the West Coast of Korea, 15 Jan-7 Apr 51 ;" USS *Bataan* *WD*, Jan 51; Col R. W. Wyczawski, interv of 2 Jun 58.
- [8] 5thMar *WD*, Jan-Feb 51.
- [9] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51.
- [10] The remainder of this section, except when otherwise noted, is based on 1stMAW *HD*, Jan 51 and VMF(N)-513 *HD*, Jan 51. See Glossary in Appendix A for explanations of aircraft designations.
- [11] VMF(N)-542 *HD*, Jan 51.
- [12] VMF-312 *HD*, Jan 51.
- [13] 1stMarDiv *PIR* 116, Encl 1.
- [14] *HDs* of 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, VMF(N)-513, and VMF-323 for Jan 51.
- [15] Organized from units of RCT-1 on 25 January when Colonel Puller was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. On that date Colonel McAlister assumed command of RCT-1.
- [16] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 50, 11.
- [17] Maj J. R. Jones ltr, 24 Jun 57.
- [18] 1stMarDiv *PIR* 105, 5 Feb 51; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 51, 13.
- [19] *Ibid.*
- [20] 1stMar *WD*, Feb 51.
- [21] References to the 1st KMC Regt in this chapter are based on Smith, *Notes*, 1450-1458, and Col C. W. Harrison, *Narrative*, n.d., 1-15. Previous periods of KMC attachment to the 1stMarDiv are described in Vols I, II, and III of this series.
- [22] What would normally have been the 4th KMC Battalion was designated the 5th because the Korean word for 4th is the same as the word for death and is considered unlucky.
- [23] Col C. W. Harrison, *Narrative*, 8-9; VMF(N)-513 *HD*, Feb 51.
- [24] VMF-323 *HD*, Feb 51.
- [25] Smith, *Notes*, 1378.
- [26] VMO-6 *HD*, Feb 51.
- [27] Smith, *Notes*, 1369.
- [28] 1stMarDiv Periodic Operations Report (*POR*) 18 Jan-15 Feb 51, 71-159.
- [29] Smith, *Notes*, 1441-1445.
- [30] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51.



The East-Central Front
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Chapter 4. Operation Killer


- [1] Ridgway, *Memoirs*, 216.
- [2] IX Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51; Smith, *Notes*, 1462–1465.
- [3] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51, Sec 1, 52. Comments by Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret), 13 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser, 14 Feb 58.
- [4] LtCol H. T. Milne, ltr of 3 Dec 57; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51.
- [5] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51; Comments by Gen M. B. Ridgway, USA (Ret), 4 Oct 57, and BrigGen A. L. Bowser, 14 Feb 58.
- [6] The balance of this section, unless otherwise specified, is derived from the *HDs* for Feb 51 of the 1st MAW, MAG–33, VMF–214, VMF–312, VMF–323, VMF(N)–513, and VMF–311.
- [7] *Naval Aviation News*, Apr 51, 8.
- [8] VMF–323 *HD*, 15 Feb 51.
- [9] *Naval Aviation News*, Apr 51, 8.
- [10] 1st MAW and MAG–12 *HDs*, Feb 51.
- [11] MajGen H. L. Litzenberg, ltr of 14 Jun 57.
- [12] MIG Alley was the name the American airmen gave the area along the Yalu River where Communist jets were active.
- [13] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, 1–2, 20.
- [14] *Ibid.*
- [15] *Ibid.*, 2, 22, and 1stMarDiv OpnO 6–51.
- [16] *Ibid.*, 22–24.
- [17] IX Corps msg in 1stMarDiv *In&Out* #9.
- [18] CG 1stMarDiv, msg of 12 Feb 51 to CG EUSAK.
- [19] LtGen O. P. Smith, ltr of 28 Jul 53.
- [20] Ridgway, *Memoirs*, 218–219.
- [21] Maj W. E. Kerrigan, ltr of 25 May 57.
- [22] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, 4.
- [23] Comment by Col J. L. Stewart, 25 Oct 57.
- [24] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, 4-5.
- [25] Statistics are from EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51, G–3 Air Rpt.
- [26] 2/1 *HD*, 16 Dec 51, 15–16.
- [27] LtCol F. B. Mayer, ltr of 8 May 57.
- [28] This account of the tank-infantry patrol is based on Maj R. P. Wray’s ltr of 6 May 57.
- [29] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, 2, 5–6.
- [30] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sec III, Bk 4, Pt 5, 23 and 24 Feb; 1st MAW *HD*, 22–24 Feb 51.
- [31] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Feb 51, Sec 2, 23.
- [32] MajGen Oliver P. Smith, *Chronicle of the Operations of the 1st Marine Division During the First Nine Months of the Korean War, 1950–1951* (MS), (hereafter, Smith, *Chronicle*), 24–25 Feb 51.
- [33] 5th and 7th Marines *HDs*, Feb 51.
- [34] FEAF *Operations History*, Vol II, 300–306; Comment by Col J. H. Partridge, 10 Dec 57.
- [35] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, Sec 1, 53.
- [36] Except when otherwise noted, this section is derived from the 1stMatDiv *HD*, Mar 51, 2–5; 7thMar *HD*, Mar

51, 2–6; IX Corps *Cmd Rpt* No. 4, Mar 51, 31–32; EUSAK *Cmd. Rpt*, Sec 1, Mar 51, 53–59; LtCol Edwin H. Simmons narrative, n.d.; Comment by Col Wilbur F. Meyerhoff.

[37] FM 70–10, *Mountain Operations*, 41–46.


[38] Shepherd Papers, 27 Apr 51, Encl. 4. This is a file of documents in the Marine archives relating to problems of JOC control in the spring of 1951.


[39] Shepherd Papers, Encl 2, a ltr from Gen Shepherd to CMC, dtd 9 Mar 51. DEVASTATE BAKER was the call sign of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron–2 (MTACS–2), which coordinated the assignment of aircraft to tactical air control parties (TACPS).



The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 5. Operation Ripper

- [1] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51.
- [2] IX Corps *PIR* # 169; IX Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 21.
- [3] This section, except when otherwise stated, is derived from the IX Corps *Cmd Rpt* and the 1stMarDiv *WD* for Mar 51.
- [4] A CCF Army, composed of three or four infantry divisions supported by artillery, is comparable to a U.S. corps.
- [5] Compilation from 1st MAW Sqdns' *HDs*, 7 and 8 Mar 51.
- [6] 7thMar *HD*, Mar 51; VMF-323 *HD*, Mar 51; Capt Clayton O. Bush, ltr of 11 Aug 57.
- [7] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 51, 8.
- [8] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 68–70.
- [9] IX Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 35–37.
- [10] *Ibid.*
- [11] FMF Status Sheet, 31 Mar 51.
- [12] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, Plate 17. Figures do not include personnel in hospitals or clearing stations. UK and Australian statistics are not separated in available records.
- [13] *Ibid.*
- [14] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 95.
- [15] IX Corps msg IXACT-1053 (122100) in 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 51.
- [16] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv; CO 1stMar, 1300 15 Mar 51.
- [17] LtCol W. D. Sawyer, interv of 30 Aug 57; Field Manual 9-1980, AF 136–137. This was not the first nor the last time that M-83 fragmentation (butterfly) bombs became a deadly nuisance to friendly forces.
- [18] Unless otherwise specified, references to changes in 1st MAW units are derived from the historical diaries of the units concerned for February, March, and April 1951.
- [19] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, 11, 1038, 1039. A “bogey” is an unidentified plane.
- [20] LtCol H. E. Allen, interv of 26 Feb 59.
- [21] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2130 15 Mar 51.
- [22] 2/1 *HD* 16 Dec 50 to 30 Apr 51, 21–22; VMF-214 *HD* Mar 51, 25–26.
- [23] Smith, *Chronicle*, 17 Mar 51.
- [24] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 51, 10; VMF-214 and VMF-323 *HD*, Mar 51.
- [25] Col C. W. Harrison, *Narrative*, Mar-Apr 51, 2–3.
- [26] 1stKMCRegt *POR*, 24 Mar 51.
- [27] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 51, 18–19.
- [28] Smith, *Chronicle*. 1 Apr 51.
- [29] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58.
- [30] Col J. L. Stewart, ltr of 25 Oct 57.
- [31] The following description is from: 7th Mar *HD*, 8 Apr 51, 5; IX Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Apr 51, Bk III, Vol 2, PORs #574 and 575 of 8 Apr; Shepherd Memo, 27 Apr 51, encl (7) “Excerpt from Maj Hewitt rept;” 1stMAW *HD*, Apr 51, App VII, “Staff Journal G-3 Section,” 9 Apr.
- [32] 1st MAW G-3 Staff Journal, 9 Apr, *op. cit.*





The East-Central Front
Notes
Chapter 6. The CCF Spring Offensive

- [1] This section is based upon the following documents: IX Corps *CmdRpt* 5, Apr 51, Sec 3, Intelligence; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; *PIR* 171, 179, 180.
- [2] EUSAK, IX Corps and 1stMarDiv G-2 *PIRs*, 1-20 Apr 51.
- [3] 1stMarDiv *HD* Apr 51, 47-48; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1830 21 Apr 51.
- [4] Capt D. E. Fowler, "Operations at the Hwachon Dam, Korea," *The Military Engineer*, Jan-Feb 1952, 7-8.
- [5] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51.
- [6] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col J. H. Partridge, ltr of 17 Mar 58.
- [7] CO KMC Regt msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2335 22 Apr 51, in *KMC In&Out* #1; Col C. W. Harrison, *Narrative*, Mar-Apr 51.
- [8] Compilation of data from 1stMAW sqdn *HDs*, Apr 51; *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 1051, 1071.
- [9] *Ibid*.
- [10] 1st MAW *HD*, 20 Apr 51; VMF-312 *HD*, 20 Apr 51.
- [11] Sgt Paul G. Martin, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 2 Jul 56.
- [12] CG 1stMarDiv msg to COs 5th, 7th, 11th Mar, 1st KMC, Tk, and EngBns, 2224 22 Apr 51 in Div *In&Out* #21.
- [13] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO 1stMar 2130 and 2232 22 Apr 51 in Div *In&Out* #12; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51, 6 and 50.
- [14] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51.
- [15] Sources for this 1/5 action are 5thMar *HD*, Apr 51; LtCol John L. Hopkins interv of 24 Jan 58; Maj J. T. Cronin, ltr of 30 Jan 58; Capt P. T. McGahn, interv of 27 Jul 56.
- [16] CG 1stMarDiv msg to CO KMC Regt, 0910 23 Apr 51.
- [17] This account of the 7th Marines' fight is based on the following sources: 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58; Col R. G. Davis, Comments, n.d.; Col H. Nickerson, comments of 25 Feb 58; Col W. F. Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26 Feb 58.
- [18] *HDs* of VMF-323, VMF-214, and VMO-6 for Apr 51.
- [19] Gen M. B. Ridgway, ltr of 29 Jan 58.
- [20] Compilation of data from 1st MAW squadrons for 23 Apr 51.
- [21] VMF-212, MAG-33, and MAG-12 *HDs* for Apr 51.
- [22] Gen J. S. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58.
- [23] *HDs* of 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar for Apr 51; MajGen O. P. Smith, *Chronicle*, 23-24 Apr 51; MajGen E. W. Snedeker, ltr of 12 Feb 58; Col J. T. Rooney, ltr of 26 Feb 58; Col H. Nickerson, ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col W. F. Meyerhoff, ltr of 25 Feb 58; Maj R. P. Wray, ltr of 27 Apr 58; LtCol J. F. Coffey and Maj N. B. Mills, interv of 4 Apr 58.
- [24] Sources for operations of the two Army artillery battalions are: Gen W. M. Hoge, USA (Ret.), ltr of 3 Feb 58; LtCol Leon F. Lavoie, USA, ltr of 5 Feb 58; LtCol Roy A. Tucker, USA, ltr of 30 Nov 57; LtCol John F. Coffey, USMC, ltr of 9 Feb 58; Capt Russell A. Gugeler, USA, *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington, 1954), 162-173.
- [25] 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, and 7thMar *HDs*, Apr 51; LtCol E. A. Simmons, interv of 12 Jun 57.
- [26] 2dLt J. M. Reisler, ltr to family of 1 May 51.
- [27] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; 1stMar *HD*, Apr 51.
- [28] Col H. Nickerson Jr., ltr of 13 Feb 58; Col R. E. West, comments, n.d.

- [29] VMO-6 *HD* for Apr 51.
- [30] LtCol R. P. Wray and Maj N. W. Hicks, interv of 16 Dec 59.
- [31] Capt R. A. Gugeler, USA, *Combat Actions in Korea*, 170-172
- [32] Summary of data from 1st MAW *HDs* for 24 Apr 51.
- [33] *EUSAK Cmd Rpt.*, Apr 51, Sec I, 98, 100, 101; Brig C. N. Barclay, *The First Commonwealth Division* (Aldershot, 1954), 69-70.
- [34] 7thMar *HD*, Apr 51.
- [35] 1stMar *HD*, Apr 51.
- [36] Gen O. P. Smith USMC (Ret.), ltr of 11 Feb 58.
- [37] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2040 27 Apr 51.
- [38] CO IX Corps *IXACT 1370*; 1stMar *HD*, Apr 51; 5thMar *HD*, Apr 51; 7thMar *HD*, Apr 51. A “ripple” normally consists of 144 rounds fired simultaneously by six launchers.
- [39] CG IX Corps msg to CG 1stMarDiv with plans for withdrawal, 28 Apr 51.
- [40] 1st MAW *HD*, Apr 51, Pt #1, Chronology 22-30 Apr and App VI, PORs #46 (23 Apr) and 54 (1 May).
- [41] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Apr 51; 5thMar *HD*, Apr 51; 7thMar *HD*, Apr 51.
- [42] BrigGen A. L. Bowser, ltr of 14 Feb 58.
- [43] *EUSAK Cmd Rpt*, Apr 51, 115-118.
- [44] *Ibid.*
- [45] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 766.
- [46] Col Merritt Adelman, ltr of 10 Feb 58.
- [47] 11thMar tel to G-2 1stMarDiv, 4 May 51; CG 1stMarDiv msg to CG X Corps, 9 May 51; X Corps msg X9613, 10 May 51.
- [48] Gen J. A. Van Fleet USA (Ret.), ltr of 24 Mar 58.
- [49] Unless otherwise specified, accounts of the CCF offensive of 16 May 51 are based on the following sources: *EUSAK Cmd Rpt*, May 51, 12-18; 1stMarDiv *HD*, May 51; CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2015 17 May 51.
- [50] This account of 3/7's action is derived from 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, 1stTkBn, and 3/7 *HDs*, May 51; Col B. T. Kelly, interv of 28 Dec 57.
- [51] VMO-6 *HD*, May 51.
- [52] 5thMar *HD*, May 51.

