



**MAP II**  
**Action of 1/1 at Horseshoe Ridge, 3/1 on 902,**  
**and Subsequent Withdrawals, 23-25 April**





**The East-Central Front**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 7. Advance to the Punchbowl**

- [1] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret), "The Truth About Korea," *Life*, 11 May 53.
- [2] CG X Corps msg of 1500, 3 Jun 51; 1stMarDiv *HD*, May 51.
- [3] 2/1 *HD*, May 51.
- [4] 1stMarDiv *HD*, May 51
- [5] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2359 24 May 51.
- [6] CO 7thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 2050 26 May 51; Col W. F. Meyerhoff, ltr of 8 Aug 58.
- [7] CO 5thMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 24 May 51, in 5thMar *In & Out* #13.
- [8] James T. Stewart, *Airpower, The Decisive Force in Korea* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1957) 13-15, 84-86; 1st MAW *HD*, May 51, Pts 4 and 5, Fifth Air Force Frag orders (hereafter listed as FAF FragOs), 20-31 May; 1st MAW *HD* May 51, Pt 1, G-3 PORs for 20-31 May; *Ibid.*, Pt 2, Staff Jrn G-3, 25 May, 26 May, 27 May, 31 May; EUSAK *Cmd Rept*, May 51, Sec II, Bk 4, Pts 5 and 6, Encls 20-31, PORs, sections entitled G-3 Air.
- [9] *Ibid.*, VMF(N)-513 *HD*, 27 May 51.
- [10] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, May 51, 24; Gen G. C. Thomas, USMC (Ret.), interv of 6 Jun 58; LtGen E. M. Almond, USA (Ret.), ltr of 22 May 58.
- [11] Col R. G. Davis, comments, n.d.; *HDs* for 1stMarDiv, 5thMar and 7thMar for May 51.
- [12] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 21 Aug 58.
- [13] LtCol D. W. McFarland, ltr of 21 Aug 58.
- [14] *Ibid.*
- [15] Col B. T. Kelly, interv of 9 Jun 58.
- [16] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 2, II, 523-537.
- [17] Gen E. E. Partridge, USAF, ltr of 28 Jun 59.
- [18] *FMFPac Visit* 21-31 May 51, 5, 6.
- [19] MAG-12 *HD*, May 51, 24, 25 and 27 May; 1st MAW *HD*, May 51, Summary and Chronology for 19, 24, 27 and 28 May 51.
- [20] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CG X Corps, 31 May 51.
- [21] 1st MAW *HD*, May 51, Pt 2, Assessment Rpt for 31 May 51.
- [22] 1st MAW *HD*, May 51, Pt 1, App II, 2; Chronology, 31 May; MAG-12 *HD* Jun 51, Chronology and 12 Jun.
- [23] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based on the following sources: X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Jun 51; *HDs* of 1st MarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, and VMF-214 for Jun 51.
- [24] 5thMar *UnitReport (URpt)*, Jun 51, 35.
- [25] Descriptions of Operation STRANGLE are based on *Pac Flt Interim Rpt* No. 3, Chapter 10, 10-45 to 10-47; and on 1st MAW *HDs*, May to Jul 51, G-3 PORs, G-3 Journal entries, Assessment Rpts.
- [26] 1st MAW *HDs* May-Jul 51, Summaries; MAG-12 and MAG-33 *HDs* May-Jul 51, Summaries.
- [27] Summarization from DivAirO memo of 26 Jun 51 to CG 1stMarDiv.
- [28] 1st MAW *HD*, Jun 51, Pt 1, Chronology, 15 Jun.
- [29] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1915 2 Jun 51.
- [30] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 1830 3 Jun 51; *HDs* of VMF-214 and VMF-323, Jun 51.
- [31] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, VI, 6-6, 6-7; 1stMarDiv *Special Action Report (SAR)*, Jun 51.
- [32] The account of the KMC attack is based upon these sources: 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jun 51; "KMC Operations in Korea, Jun 51," n.d., by Col C. W. Harrison, then KMC senior adviser.


[33] The KMC's drew fuel and ammunition from the 1st Marine Division and rations from the ROK Army. Other classes of supplies were obtained generally on a catch-as-catch-can basis with some aid from KMC Headquarters in Pusan.


[34] *HDs* of 1stMarDiv and 1stMar, Jun 51.

[35] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 8 Jun 58. Other sources for this section are the *HDs* of 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, and VMF-214.


[36] Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on the *HDs* of the 1stMarDiv, 7thMar, 1/7, 2/7, and 3/7 for Jun 51.


[37] MajGen W. S. Brown, USMC (Ret.), ltr to Maj W. T. Hickman, 22 Apr 57.





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**The East-Central Front**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 8. The Truce Talks at Kaesong**

- [1] This section is based on by Peter Kihss, "One Year in Korea," *United Nations World*, Vol. 5, No. 7, July 1951, 21–23.
- [2] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Jun 51.
- [3] *U.S. News and World Report*, 13 Feb 53, 40–41.
- [4] *UN World*, Vol. 5, No. 10, Oct 51, 10.
- [5] U.S. State Department Publications 3573, Far East Series 30, pp. 352-363.
- [6] Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN (Ret.), *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 176, hereafter Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*. One of Admiral Joy's last services to his country before his death in 1956 was the writing of this book. Other sources for this section are William H. Vatcher, Jr., "Inside Story of Our Mistakes in Korea," *U.S. News and World Report*, 23 Jan 1953, 35-36; E. Weintal, "What Happened at Kaesong and What is in Prospect," *Newsweek*, 23 Jul 1951, 38; Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray.
- [7] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 4–5.
- [8] *Ibid.*
- [9] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jun 51, 55.
- [10] CO 1stMar msg to CG 1stMarDiv, 0815 27 Jun 51.
- [11] Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 6 Feb 58. It is interesting to note that there was no mention of the patrol base concept in the then current *Field Service Regulations, Operations, FM 100–5*, published by the Department of the Army in August 1949.
- [12] Unless otherwise specified, the remainder of this section is based on 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jul 51, 7-11; Col C. W. Harrison's account, "KMC Attack on Taeu-san, 8-11 July 1951;" Col G. P. Groves, ltr of 9 Apr 58.
- [13] X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Jul 51, 13; 2dInfDiv *HD*, Jul 51, 13–19.
- [14] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 6–10, 129, 140; Carl Berger, *The Korean Knot* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), 141-151; Comments n.d., Col J. C. Murray.
- [15] Gen J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.), "The Truth About Korea," *Life*, 11 May 53, 133.
- [16] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 166.
- [17] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jul 51, 18.
- [18] *Ibid.*
- [19] CG XCorps, CITE X 21568.
- [20] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Apr 51, 1080110.
- [21] *Ibid.*
- [22] VMO–6 Daily Flight Log, 23Apr51.
- [23] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: Elizabeth L. Tierney, Historical Branch, G–3, HQMC, statistics compiled from VMO–6 reports of Aug 50 to Jul 51; HMR–161 *HD*, Sep 51; 1stMarDiv type "C" rpt on assault helicopters, 4 Oct 51; Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky* (Harper, 1954), based on Marine records, 151–158.
- [24] CO USS *Consolation* rpt to ComNavFe, 26 Jan 52.
- [25] This section, except when otherwise noted, is derived from the following sources: Rpt of Joint Army–Navy Mission at HQMC, 9 Nov 51, in G–4 Files; *Instructional Information, Vest, Armored*, M-1951, G–4 Files, HQMC; LCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 54; Capt Louis Kirkpatrick (MC) USN, ltr of 22 Jun 54; Capt D. G. McGrew, ltr of 2 Jul 54; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, USMC, ltr of 30 Jun 54.

[26] Quotations are from *Instructional Information, Vest Armored, M-1951*. The italicized words were in the original.

[27] Quoted in James T. Stewart, *Air Power, The Decisive Force in Korea* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1957), 22–23.

[28] *Ibid.*


[29] MAG-12 *HD*, Jun 51, Summary and Chronology, 30 Jun; MAG-12 *HD*, Jul 51, Chronology, 13 Jul.


[30] “Rpt of Visit to Far East by CG, FMFPac, and his staff during the period 27 August to 12 September 1951,” 17 *ff.*

[31] Berger, *The Korean Knot*, *op. cit.* 144–145.

[32] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Aug 51, 3–5.

NON-FATAL		FATAL	
	<i>Percent</i>		<i>Percent</i>
Head .....	10	Head .....	20
Chest .....	10	Chest .....	50
Abdomen .....	10	Abdomen .....	20
Upper Extremity .....	30	Upper Extremity .....	5
Lower Extremity .....	40	Lower Extremity .....	5





**The East-Central Front**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 9. Renewal of the Attack**

- [1] Sources are 1stMarDiv *HD*, Aug 51, 3–5; Col B. T. Kelly’s contemporary “Notes on my Service in Korea, 14 Apr–13 Sep 1951” (hereafter Kelly, *Notes*).
- [2] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based on 1stMarDiv *HD*, Aug and Sep 51; X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51; 2/7 and 3/7 *HD*, Aug and Sep 51; Kelly, *Notes*; Col G. P. Groves, ltr of 8 Apr 58.
- [3] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 4, 7.
- [4] X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 41–42; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 5–6.
- [5] This section, except when otherwise specified, is based on the following sources: EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 38–53; X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 8–14; 7th Mar *HD*, Sep 51; 1st, 2d, and 3d Bns of 7th Mar, *HDs* for Sep 51.
- [6] LtCol E. G. Kurdziel interv, 13 Jun 58.
- [7] CG 1stMarDiv ltr to CinCPacFlt, 4 Oct 51, enclosure (1) “Observations on Close Air Support for the 1st Marine Division during 5–23 September 1951.”
- [8] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, VI, 6–6, 6–7; 1stMarDiv *SAR*, Jun 51.
- [9] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–18; Chap. 10, 10–12, Chap. 15, 15–20, 60–61; Gen G. C. Thomas interv, 21 Jan 59.
- [10] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, Chap. 9, 9–14.
- [11] Sources for this section are as follows: EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 35–53; X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 9–12; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 10–16; 1st Marines *HD*, Sep 51; 1/1, 2/1, and 3/1 *HD*, Sep 51; Class “C” Rpt, *Employment of Assault Helicopters*, 1–6; Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky* (New York, 1954), 159–162, (hereafter *Cavalry of the Sky*).
- [12] CMC ltr to CO MCAS, Quantico, 3 Dec 47.
- [13] *Cavalry of the Sky*, 157.
- [14] Auxiliary airstrips in Korea had an “X” designation and fields in the “K” category were major installations. Those in proximity to U.S. Army centers were designated “A.”
- [15] LtCol H. W. Edwards, interv of 20 Feb 61.
- [16] Sources for this section are the same as for the previous section except when otherwise noted.
- [17] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 19–20.
- [18] Jane Blakeney, ed., *Heroes, U.S. Marine Corps, 1861–1955* (Washington, 1957), Joseph Vittori Medal of Honor Citation, 45.
- [19] *Ibid.*, Pfc Edward Gomez citation, 38.
- [20] On 14 September, LtCol Horace E. Knapp, Jr., the previous commanding officer of 1/1, was severely wounded while reconnoitering forward positions. He was evacuated, and the executive officer, Major Edgar F. Carney, Jr., commanded until LtCol John E. Gorman assumed command at noon on the 16th.
- [21] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified are as follows: 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 19–23; 5thMar *HD*, Sep 51, 14–19; 1st, 2d, and 3dBn, 5th Mar, *HD.*, Sep 51; LtCol Houston Stiff, interv of 25 Jun 58; Maj G. P. Averill, “Final Objective,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 40, no. 8 (Aug 56), 10–16.
- [22] *Cavalry of the Sky*, 162.
- [23] 1st Marine Division losses of 33 killed and 235 wounded during the three-day attack were incurred for the most part by the 5th Marines in general and 2/5 in particular. Enemy casualties of this period were reported as 972 KIA (265 counted) and 113 prisoners.

**The East-Central Front**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 10. The New Warfare of Position**

[1] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 47. Other sources for this chapter are comments and criticisms by the following officers, all but one of whom are U.S. Marines. Ranks in each instance are those held at the time of interview or correspondence.

General J. A. Van Fleet, USA (Ret.); General G. C. Thomas, Lieutenant General J. T. Selden; Brigadier Generals V. H. Krulak, S. S. Wade, R. G. Weede; Colonels G. P. Groves, B. T. Hemphill, K. L. McCutcheon, J. H. Tinsley, F. B. Nihart, G. D. Gayle, W. P. Mitchell, J. F. Stamm, F. P. Hager, Jr.; Lieutenant Colonels H. W. Edwards, J. G. Kelly; Major R. L. Autry.

[2] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 53.

[3] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Oct 51, 5–6 and Plate 1; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 3.

[4] *Ibid.*, 29–30.

[5] *Ibid.*, 7–9 and Plate No. 4.

[6] *Ibid.*, 5–6, and Plate No. 1.

[7] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 3.

[8] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Sep 51, 47.

[9] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 3–4, 18–22.

[10] The balance of this section is based on the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 18–24, and on 1/1 and 3/1 *HD*, Sep 51.

[11] Sources for the action on Hill 854 are the 1/1 and 3/1 historical diaries for September 1951.

[12] 3/1 *HD*, Sep 51, 8.

[13] Sources for this section, unless otherwise specified, are the following: DivReconCo *HD*, 1stShorePartyBn *HD*, HMR–161 *HD*, Sep 51; Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” 7–13; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 162–165.

[14] Messages of congratulation are quoted from HMR–161 *HD*, Sep 51.

[15] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Sep 51, 4, 31–32.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] The remainder of this section is based upon the Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” Part II, 1–9; HMR–161 and 1stShorePartyBn *HD*, Sep and Oct 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 165–167.

[18] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “The Employment of Assault Helicopters,” Part II, 4.

[19] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 1–3.

[20] Type “C” Spec Rpt, “Employment of Assault Helicopters,” Part II, 5–9. Other sources for Operation BUMBLEBEE are HMR–161 and 1st ShorePartyBn *HD*, Oct 51, and *Cavalry of the Sky*, 167–170.

[21] *Cavalry of the Sky*, 171.

[22] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise specified, is based on the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 3–12.

[23] This account of the raid is derived from the 1/7 *HD*, Oct 51, and the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 7.

[24] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 7–8.

[25] 1/1 *HD*, Oct 51, 16; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 7.

[26] CO 1stMarDiv msg to USS *Toledo*, 1232 30 Oct 51 in G-3 msgs, Oct 51.

[27] *Cavalry of the Sky*, 172–173.

[28] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Oct 51, 2.

[29] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Nov 51, 9.

[30] *Ibid.*, 32.

[31] The remainder of this section, unless otherwise specified, is derived from the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Nov 51, 1–20.

[32] The initials TOT stand for Time on Target—an artillery order calling for all guns to time their firing so that projectiles will hit the target simultaneously.

[33] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Nov 51, 42.

[34] HMR-161 *HD*, Nov 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 174.

[35] References to the Panmunjom decisions are based upon the following sources: William H. Vatcher, Jr., *Panmunjom, The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations* (New York: F. Praeger, 1958), 72–94, 232–237; Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 40–52.

[36] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Nov 51, 58.

[37] X Corps *Cmd Rpt*, Nov 51, 15–16.

[38] The source for the remainder of this section, unless otherwise stated, is the 1stMar-Div *HD*, Dec 51, 1–17.

[39] LtCol Harry W. Edwards, memo to G-3 dtd 3 Feb 1959.


[40] Maj J. Angus MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” MS available in Historical Archives, G-3, HQMC.


[41] Maj G. Fink, interview of 16 Dec 1960; Extract of Interim Historical Report, Korea War Crimes Division, cumulative to 30 Jun 1953, 18.


[42] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 104–105; Maj J. A. MacDonald, “The Problems of Marine POWs,” *op. cit.*

[43] HMR-161 *HD*, Dec 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 175–176. Two of the original 15 HRS-1 aircraft had been damaged in accidents, but one was later restored to action with parts cannibalized from the other.

[44] VMO-6 *HD*, Jun–Dec 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 146, 180–181.








HMR-161  
OPERATIONS  
1951

MAP 21



**The East-Central Front**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 11. Winter Operations in East Korea**

[1] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 52, 1–2.

[2] *Ibid.*, 1, 6, 7.

[3] 1/5 *HD*, Dec 51, 31; 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 52, 3.

[4] Sources for this account of the raid, unless otherwise specified, are Maj J. B. Ord, Jr., interv of 3 Sep and 24 Oct 58; and Appendix VI, 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan 52, a five-page special action report of the operation.

[5] Later in the chapter this innovation will be described.

[6] Sources for this section, unless otherwise indicated, are the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Jan, Feb, and Mar 52, and *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 4, IX.

[7] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 4, IX, 9–11.

[8] LtCol G. W. Hardwick, “Summary of Marine Corps Experience with IRB [Insulated Rubber Boot], Rpt of 8 May 1951.” Other sources for the development of the boot, also found in G–4 files, Headquarters Marine Corps, are as follows: G. E. Folk, Abstract of Bowdoin College Rpt, Jun 1951, “The Penetration of Water into the Human Foot;” G–4 Rpt, “Resume of Activity re Insulated Rubber Boot,” 7 Feb 1952; G–4 Rpt, “Boot, Rubber, Insulated, Cold Weather,” 28 Nov 51; G–4 Rpt, “Fact Data Sheet, Boot, Insulated, Rubber,” n.d.; MajGen J. T. Selden memo to CMC, 26 Apr 52.

[9] Sources for this section, except when otherwise specified, are the following: ACofS, G–4, Rpts of 2 Jan, 29 Feb, and 15 May 52 (in G–4 files, Headquarters Marine Corps); Rpt of Test (Project 671) by MCEB, Quantico, Va., 3 Jan 1952; LtCol G. A. Hardwick, ltr of 30 Jun 1954; LtCdr F. J. Lewis (MSC) USN, ltr of 21 Jun 1954.

[10] ACofS, G–4, “Instructional Information, Vest, Armored, M–1951,” 5–6.

[11] Capt D. W. McGrew, Jr. to LtCol G. W. Hardwick, ltr of 4 Feb 52.

[12] ACofS, G–4, “Report of Field Test of Armored Vest, M–1951,” 15 May 51.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Sources for the helicopter operations described in this section are the following: HMR–161, *HD*, Jan and Feb 51; *Cavalry of the Sky*, 176–175. Veterans of the Korean conflict will recall that “changie-changie” meant “swap” in the pidgin English serving as a conversational medium between Americans and Orientals. Hence it was applicable to a relief operation.

[15] This section, unless otherwise specified, is based upon the 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 52, 1–12; and *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 4, 9–11 to 9–14.

[16] 11thMar *HD*, Feb 52, 13; Col B. T. Hemphill comments, 20 Jan 59.

[17] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Feb 52, 3.

[18] 1stMarDiv *PIR* No. 486, Feb 52.

[19] The battleship *Wisconsin* had a main battery of 16-inch guns with a maximum range of about 23 miles. The heavy cruiser *St. Paul* had a main battery of 8-inch guns with a maximum range of 16 miles.

[20] U.S. Marine Corps Landing Force Bulletin No. 6, “Night Vision and Night Combat,” 5 Dec 53. See also Bulletin No. 18, “Battlefield Illumination,” 4 Jun 56.

[21] 1st MarDiv *HD*, Feb 51, App No. 5. Other sources for this chapter are comments and criticism by the following officers: (Ranks listed below are those held at time of interview or comment.) Gen. G. C. Thomas; LtGen J. T. Selden; BrigGen S. S. Wade; BrigGen C. R. Allen; Col J. H. Tinsley; Col F. B. Nihart; Col J. F. Stamm; Col B. T. Hemphill.

**The East-Central Front**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 12. The Move to West Korea**

- [1] Wilford G. Burchett: *This Monstrous War* (Melbourne, 1953): J. Waters, 121–122. Burchett was a Communist free lance correspondent for left-wing newspapers. He wrote several books and articles lauding the Communist cause in the Korean War.
- [2] *Ibid.* General Van Fleet did not “hurl” his troops against anything. He began limited offensives for the purpose of improving Eighth Army morale and maintaining offensive spirit. See Gen James A. Van Fleet, ltr of 28 Feb 59.
- [3] C. Turner Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 28.
- [4] FECom G–2 Intelligence Summary, 18 Sep 51.
- [5] Joy, *How Communists Negotiate*, 53.
- [6] *Ibid.*
- [7] Col J. C. Murray, Comments, Jan 59.
- [8] BGen V. H. Krulak, Comments, Jan 59.
- [9] Previous chapters discuss the background and development of these innovations.
- [10] Col B. T. Hemphill, Comments, 30 Jan 59.
- [11] 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 52, 1–2.
- [12] EUSAK *Cmd Rpt*, Mar 52, 13–14.
- [13] Sources for this section are 1stMarDiv *HD*, Mar 52, 9–10; 1st MT Bn *HD*, Mar 52; 7th MT Bn *HD*, Mar 52.
- [14] Col T. A. Culhane, Jr., Comments, 4 Mar 59, and others.
- [15] *Ibid.*
- [16] Col F. B. Nihart, Comments regarding author James Michener’s visit to 1stMarDiv, ltr of 23 Mar 59.
- [17] Gen O. P. Smith, USMC (Ret.), ltr of 28 Jan 59.
- [18] *PacFlt Interim Rpt* No. 3, 15–25.
- [19] See Ridgway’s Declaration of Faith, Chapter 1.



**Operations in West Korea**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 1. Operations in West Korea Begin**

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1st Marine Division Staff Report, titled “Notes for Major General J. T. Selden, Commanding General, First Marine Division, Korea,” dtd 20 Aug 52, hereafter Selden, *Div. Staff Rpt*; the four previous volumes of the series *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950–1953*, namely, Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, *The Pusan Perimeter*, v. I; *The Inchon-Seoul Operation*, v. II; *The Chosin Reservoir Campaign*, v. III; Lynn Montross, Maj Hubard D. Kuokka, and Maj Norman W. Hicks, *The East-Central Front*, v. IV (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1954–1962), hereafter Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea—Central Front*, v. IV; Department of Military Art and Engineering, U.S. Military Academy, *Operations in Korea* (West Point, N. Y.: 1956), hereafter USMA, *Korea*; David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964), hereafter Rees, *Korea*, quoted with permission of the publisher. Unless otherwise noted, all documentary material cited is on file at, or obtainable through, the Archives of the Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

[2] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen John T. Selden, Mar 54.

[3] China did not attend. Instead, it received an advance copy of the proposed text. President Chiang Kai-shek signified Chinese approval on 26 July. A few hours later, the Potsdam Declaration was made public. *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943* (Department of State publication 7187), pp. 448–449; *The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference)*, 1945, v. II (Department of State publication 7163), pp. 1278, 1282–1283, 1474–1476.

[4] The 7th Marines was on its way to Korea at the time of the Inchon landing. The brigade, however, joined the 1st Division at sea en route to the objective to provide elements of the 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT).

[5] For a discussion of the hardships facing the landing force, see Montross and Canzona, *USMC Ops Korea—Inchon*, v. II, *op. cit.*, pp. 41–42, 59–60, 62–64.

[6] In World War II, the Japanese developed a logistical base east of Inchon. When the Japanese surrendered, the Army Service Command temporarily took over the installation, naming it Ascom City. Maj Robert K. Sawyer, *Military Advisers in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War* (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1962), p. 43n.

[7] Montross and Canzona, *USMC Ops Korea—Chosin*, v. III, p. 161.

[8] On 9 January 1951, General MacArthur was “directed to defend himself in successive positions, inflicting maximum damage to hostile forces in Korea subject to the primary consideration of the safety of his troops and his basic mission of protecting Japan.” Carl Berger, *The Korea Knot—A Military-Political History* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), pp. 131–132, hereafter Berger, *Korea Knot*, quoted with permission of the publisher.

[9] The 1st KMC Regiment was again attached to the Marine Division on 17 March 1951 and remained under its operational control for the remainder of the war. CinCPacFlt Interim Evaluation Rpt No. 4, Chap 9, p. 9–53, hereafter *PacFlt EvalRpt* with number and chapter.

[10] Command responsibility of 1st MAW changed on 29 May 51 when Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman succeeded General Harris.

[11] The Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Commission, Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, has described how the Communists in Korea concocted incidents “calculated to provide advantage for their negotiating efforts or for their basic propaganda objectives, or for both.” Examples of such duplicity are given in Chapter IV of his book, *How Communists Negotiate* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1955), hereafter Joy, *Truce Negotiations*, quoted with permission of the publisher. The quote above appears on p. 30.

[12] Col Franklin B. Nihart comments on draft MS, Sep 66, hereafter *Nihart comments*.

[13] Marine commanders and staff officers involved in the planning and execution of the division move were alarmed at the amount of additional equipment that infantry units had acquired during the static battle situation. Many had become overburdened with “nice-to-have” items in excess of actual T/E (Table of Equipment) allowances. Col William P. Pala comments on draft MS, 5 Sep 66, hereafter *Pala comments*.

[14] Heavy equipment and tracked vehicles were loaded aboard LSDs and LSTs which sailed from Sokcho-ri to Incheon.

[15] Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 16 Sep 59, hereafter *Culhane ltr*.

[16] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52; CIA, *NIS 41B*, South Korea, Chap I, Brief, Section 21, Military Geographic Regions, Section 24, Topography (Washington: 1957–1962); Map, Korea, 1:50,000, AMS Series L 751, Sheets 6526 I and IV, 6527 I, II, III, and IV, 6528 II and III, 6627 III and IV, and 6628 III (prepared by the Engineer, HQ, AFFE, and AFFE/8A, 1952–1954).

[17] The two other reasons were the weakness of the Kimpo defenses and abandonment of plans for an amphibious strike along the east coast. Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea*, v. IV, p. 253. Planning for a Marine-led assault had been directed by the EUSAK commander, General Van Fleet, early in 1952. The Marine division CG, General Selden, had given the task to his intelligence and operations deputies, Colonel James H. Tinsley and Lieutenant Colonel Gordon D. Gayle. On 12 March General Van Fleet came to the Marine Division CP for a briefing on the proposed amphibious assault. At the conclusion of the meeting the EUSAK commander revealed his concern for a possible enemy attack down the Korean west coast and told the Marine commander to prepare, in utmost secrecy, to move his division to the west coast. Lynn Montross, draft MS.

[18] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar ComdDs, Mar 52; 1st KMC RCT Daily Intelligence and Operations Rpts, hereafter KMC Regt UnitRpts, Mar 52; Kimpo ProvRegt ComdDs, hereafter KPR ComdDs, Mar-Apr 52.

[19] KPR ComdD, Mar 52, p. 13.

[20] The following month the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion would be added to the four regiments on line, making a total of five major units manning the 1stMarDiv front. It was inserted between the Kimpo and 1st KMC regiments.

[21] Commandant, Korean Marine Corps ltr to CMC, dtd 20 Sep 66, hereafter *CKMC ltr*.

[22] 1stMar ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2.

[23] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App IX, p. 1.

[24] LtCol Harry W. Edwards comments on preliminary draft MS, *ca.* Sep 59.

[25] Col Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 25 Aug 59, hereafter *Henderson ltr I*.

[26] Col Sidney S. Wade ltr to Deputy AsstCofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd 25 Aug 59.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] Rees, *Korea*, p. 295.

[29] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52, p. 7.

[30] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52; 1st MAW ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52.

[31] In Korea, fields near U.S. Army installations were known as “A”; major airfields carried a “K” designation; and auxiliary strips were the “X” category.

[32] MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon comments on draft MS, dtd 1 Sep 66.

[33] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of General Christian F. Schilt, USMC (Ret.), Jun 59 rev.

[34] Robert Sherrod, *History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II* (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952), p. 26, hereafter Sherrod, *Marine Aviation*.

[35] 1st MAW ComdD, Mar 52, p. 2.

[36] Unit commanders also changed about this time. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Smith, Jr. assumed command of the Checkerboard squadron from Lieutenant Colonel Joe H. McGlothlin, on 9 April.

[37] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–75. The Haeju–Chinnampo region, noted in the surveillance mission, is a coastal area in southwestern North Korea between the 38th and 39th Parallels.

[38] VMFs–212 (LtCol Robert L. Bryson) and –323 (LtCol Richard L. Blume) left an east coast field for a flight mission over North Korea and landed at K–6 thereafter, also completing the move without closing down combat operations. The relocation in air-fields was designed to keep several squadrons of support aircraft close to the 1st Marine Division. Col E. T. Dorsey ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66.

[39] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 52.

[40] The Korean Marine Corps placed the artillery count at 240 weapons ranging from 57 to 122mm. *CKMC ltr*.

[41] *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 4, p. 10–38.

[42] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 31, dtd 2 Apr 52.

[43] *Henderson ltr 1*.

[44] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, KPR ComdDs, Apr 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 35, dtd 16 Apr 52.

[45] Chapter III discusses in detail the construction of bunkers.

[46] One of those wounded was Corporal Duane E. Dewey, a machine gunner. He was wounded twice, in fact, the second time from an exploding enemy grenade which he had rolled upon to shield two nearby comrades. Dewey somehow survived, and the following March, after release from the Marine Corps, he went to the White House where he received the Medal of Honor, the first to be presented by the new President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. (Duane E. Dewey Biog. File)

[47] *Culhane ltr*.

[48] LtGen Merrill B. Twining ltr to Deputy Asst CofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd 19 Aug 54.

[49] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpt* No. 4, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 46, dtd 17 Apr 52.

[50] Colonel Flournoy became regimental CO on 10 April, succeeding Colonel Wade.

[51] Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion had been attached to the Kimpo Provisional Regiment since 31 March and Company B was supporting MAG–33 at Pohang.

[52] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpt* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; 1st MAW, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, Apr 52; Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky—The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), hereafter Montross, *SkyCav*, quoted with permission of the publishers.

[53] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, 10–73.

[54] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–50.

[55] Rotary wing aircraft assigned were two types, HTL–4 and HO3S–1. The former is a two-place, plastic-dome Bell product; the latter, the first helicopter operated by the Marine Corps, is an observation-utility, three-passenger Sikorsky-made craft. HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, *Marine Corps Aircraft, 1913–1965*, Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet (Washington: 1967 ed.) pp. 34, 38.

[56] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, pp. 10-2, 10-108. This record was established despite the fact that the Marine squadron, with 10 jets, flying out of K-3 (Pohang) was more than 150 miles further from most targets than the other major photo unit, the 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron of the 67th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, based at K–14 (Kimpo).

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 10–59.

[58] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Clayton C. Jerome, Jul 58, rev.

[59] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, 1st CSG, 11thMar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52; 1st CSG UnitRpts, Apr 52.

[60] The Support Company moved to Ascom City on 14 Jun 52.

[61] One artillery weapon, in particular, as well as the Marine tanks habitually drew the fury of Chinese counter-fire. The heavy destructive power of the U.S. Army 8-inch, self-propelled howitzers firing on tough Chinese defensive positions, generally brought down on their own emplacements a rain of enemy shells, so sensitive were enemy commanders to these hard-hitting weapons. *Pala comments.*

[62] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9–39.

[63] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to CMC, dtd 6 Sep 66, hereafter *Henderson ltr II.*


[64] *Ibid.*


[65] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 12, p. 12–18. The medical officer's report to CinCPac noted that a vast improvement "in the spaces allocated for the care of the sick and wounded" had been made.


[66] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–69, p. 10–73.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 10–68. Flights were not made in heavy fog. Test use by the Marine Corps Equipment Board of some of the equipment needed to navigate under conditions of reduced visibility was nearing the end of its development cycle.

[68] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23 Jul 53, Subj: Type "C" Rpt: "Civilian Affairs and the Korean Service Corps, Mar 52–May 53," hereafter CG, 1stMarDiv ltr, *Civ Afrs and KSC*; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52; HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Mar–Apr 52.









MAP 3

K White



MAP 4

E Wilson



**Operations in West Korea**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 2. Defending the Line**

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Cdr Malcolm W. Cagle, USN and Cdr Frank A. Manson, USN, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1957), hereafter Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; James A. Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations, Korea* (Washington: [Div. of Naval Hist], 1962), hereafter Field, *NavOps, Korea*; John Miller, Jr., Maj Owen J. Carroll, USA, and Margaret E. Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953* (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1958), hereafter Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*.

[2] General Van Fleet, CG, EUSAK since April 1951, had advocated a program in which South Korean troops would be rigorously trained to take over an increasingly greater part of the UNC defense efforts in Korea. See Mark W. Clark, *From the Danube to the Yalu* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 185, hereafter Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, quoted with permission of the publishers.

[3] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9; No. 5, Chap. 8; West Coast Island Defense Element ComdDs, Feb–Oct 52, hereafter *WCIDE ComdD*, with date; East Coast Island Defense ComdDs, Jan–Oct 52, hereafter *ECIDE ComdD*, with date; Col William K. Davenport ltr to CMC, dtd 27 Jun 52, Subj: Type D Report of duty as Commander West Coast Island Defense Element (CTE 95.15); Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Field, *NavOps, Korea*.

[4] Evidence of Chinese concern about such rear area attacks is apparent in the countermeasures taken: “Order of Battle reports indicated that a total of three North Korean Corps and three Chinese Communist Armies were engaged in coastal defense operations on the east and west coasts of North Korea.” *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 5, p. 8–79.

[5] CinPac Weekly Intel Digest No. 23–52, dtd 6 Jun 52, included as App. 17 to *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–110.

[6] First Lieutenant Joseph S. Bartos, Jr., a former All-American football great, also distinguished himself during the Yang-do action. His cool, resourceful, and valiant leadership during the two-day defense earned him the Silver Star Medal. BGen Frank M. Reinecke comments on draft MS, dtd 25 Aug 66.

[7] Field, *NavOps, Korea*, p. 426.

[8] CTE 95.15 ComdD, 1 Feb–31 May 52, p. 8.

[9] Colonel Davenport later pointed out that the enemy could easily employ high-powered rifles against Ho-do occupants, that resupply posed problems to his command, and that at times the enemy could even walk to Ho-do over the winter ice. Col William K. Davenport ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7 Sep 66.

[10] A T/E is a listing of equipment that a unit needs to accomplish its mission. Tables vary according to type of unit and its mission.

[11] Commenting on logistical matters, Colonel Kenneth A. King, who during 1952 commanded first the WCIDE and then 1st CSG, was of the opinion that the main difficulty lay “not in getting requisitions filled, but in getting delivery of what was approved” due to the fact Marines were not assigned to processing of requisitions and delivery of supplies. He had high praise for the concern and assistance of 1st MAW units as well as Captain G. L. G. Evans (RN) of HMS *Ocean* and various other United Kingdom ship captains. Colonel King further commented that “for the benefit of Marines who may have to serve in isolated areas, and I imagine this often prevails in Vietnam today, it cannot be emphasized too strongly that the Marine Corps should be very reluctant to leave the support of any of its elements, no matter how small, to other services or nationalities.” Col Kenneth A. King ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24 Aug 66.

[12] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section has been derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 10; No. 5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW ComdDs, May–Aug 52; MAG–12 ComdDs, Jun, Aug 52; Robert F. Futrell. *The*

*United States Air Force in Korea, 1950–1953* (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961), hereafter Futrell, *USAF, Korea*.

[13] 1st MAW ComdD, Feb 52, quoted in *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–45.

[14] Two months earlier, FAF had begun “a program for training pilots in close air support techniques. . . . Initially, all training missions for this division were flown by Air Force aircraft.” The flights, not in response to specific requests, were assigned by the G-3, I Corps. CG, 1stMarDiv ltr to CG, FMFPac dtd 23 May 52, Subj: CAS sum for pd 1 Jan–30 Apr 52, cited in *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–196. These flights ceased just before the ones from MAG–12 began. 1st MarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 4. A 1st MarDiv staff officer, who had observed the frequency of General Jerome’s visits to the division CP to discuss the new close air support training program, has credited the two Marine CGs for their “great amount of coordinated personal aggressiveness in bringing this about.” Col Robert A. McGill comments on draft MS, Sep 66, hereafter *McGill comments*.

[15] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8–54.

[16] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–36.

[17] 1st MarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2.

[18] Col Russell E. Honsowetz ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14 Sep 66.

[19] As an Air Force spokesman noted, “. . . the AN/MPQ–2 radars introduced into Korea in January 1951 were Strategic Air Command bomb scoring radars and not tactical equipment. This would explain the large vans.” Robert C. Futrell, Historian, Hist Studies Br USAF Hist Div, comments on draft MS, dtd 12 Oct 66. Dr. Futrell authored the definitive unclassified history of Air Force operations in Korea, previously cited as *USAF, Korea*.

[20] These letters indicate first, the type of installation; next, the kind of electronic equipment; and finally, its purpose. In this case, M-mobile”ground installation, P-radar, and Q-intended for a combination of purposes. The figure indicates the model number in the developmental history of the equipment.

[21] HistDiv, Air Univ, USAF, *United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 1950–30 June 1952*, USAF Hist Study No. 72 (Washington, 1955), p. 159, hereafter USAF, *Ops in Korea*, with appropriate number. The Air Force operations were published in three books, numbered 72, 73, and 127.

[22] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 435–436.

[23] General Mark W. Clark had succeeded Ridgway as UN Commander on 12 May 1952. Ridgway was to take over as the new Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, 1 June, replacing General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was returning to the United States.

[24] Cited in Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 435.

[25] USAF, *Ops in Korea*, No. 72, p. 156.

[26] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 436–437.

[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 452–453 and Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*, pp. 443–445.

[28] MajGen John P. Condon ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 1 Oct 66.

[29] MAG-12 ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-4.

[30] The AU is the attack version of the Marines’ famed World War II fighter, the F4U Corsair.

[31] MAG-12, ComdD, Aug 52, p. D-2.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. D-3.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. D-4.

[34] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 616.

[35] TACC is the senior agency for controlling all tactical aircraft and air warning functions; the TADC performs similar functions in an area controlled by the TACC. JCS, *Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage* (Short title: JD), JCS Pub. 1 (Washington, 1964), p. 141, hereafter *JCS, JD*.

[36] VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Jun 52, App II, p. 5. Mention of a flak analysis program first appeared in the March 1952 records of MAG-33. Aircraft losses on interdiction strikes (the program was not applicable to CAS

missions) dropped for the next several months. When Lieutenant Foley transferred to the night squadron, he took his system with him and had it put into operation there. LtCol Kenneth S. Foley interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 24 Mar 66.

[37] FAF CbtOps Notam No. 6-10.1 cited in App. 9, *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-199.

[38] *Pala comments; Nihart comments*. Both of these officers, the former artillery, the latter infantry, recall flak suppression firing late in 1951 or early in 1952 when the division was on the eastern front. Colonel Nihart pointed out, in addition, that “such expedients and new tactics went on for some time before getting into the regimental commander’s reports.”

[39] 1stMar ComdD, Jun 52, p. 2.

[40] LtCol Gerald T. Armitage interv by HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 15 Aug 61.

[41] MajGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12 Oct 66.

[42] An SOP, standing operating procedure, is a set of instructions for conducting operations that lend themselves to established procedures. *JCS, JD*, p. 133.

[43] With respect to the effect of enemy fire on attack aircraft, the CO, MAG-33 later commented that “Antiaircraft artillery has a direct deterioration effect on pilot accuracy, particularly with regard to care in getting on target and doing a precise job.” CO, MAG-33 ltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 25 Jul 52, quoted in *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9-76.

[44] *Henderson ltr II*.

[45] CO, MAG-12 Spdltr to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 2 Jul 52, Subj: Comments on 11th Mar Flak Suppression SOP, cited in *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 5, Chap. 9, p. 9-78.

[46] *Henderson ltr II*.

[47] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Apr-Jun 52; 5thMar ComdDs, Apr-Jun 52; 7thMar ComdD, Jun 52; 11thMar ComdDs, Apr-May 52; 1/5 ComdD May 52; 1/7, 2/7 ComdDs, May 52.

[48] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 52, p. 1.

[49] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-51.

[50] LtCol Bruce F. Hillam comments on draft MS, dtd 31 Aug 66.

[51] A type of proximity fuze, the V.T. depends upon an external source, such as an electronic signal, rather than the force of ground impact, to detonate the shell at a predetermined height over the target.

[52] 1stMatDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 4.

[53] The 7th Marines advanced to the line to relieve the 5th Marines in the center sector on 11 May.

[54] The artillery regiment had earlier developed the “box-me-in” fires for outpost defense. If under heavy attack the outpost could call for these preplanned close-in fires that completely surrounded the position. In event of radio or wire communication failures, the outpost could call for “box-me-in” or “Fire VT on my position” by signal flare or other pyrotechnic device. *Henderson ltr II*.

[55] This support squad itself was later ambushed. The heavy casualties it received prevented its further participation in the raid. KMC Regt UnitRpt 53, dtd 4 May 52.

[56] This position, the site of the mid-April battle, along with several others had been abandoned when the division withdrew its OPLR late in April. Infantry regiments dispatched frequent patrols in an attempt to discourage the enemy’s incorporating the hill into his own OPLR.

[57] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 10.

[58] Lieutenant Colonel Nihart believed that the heavy enemy shelling, which had caused the early retirement of his battalion, had been possible either because Chinese mortar and artillery positions were so well camouflaged that intelligence had not located them or else so well protected that UNC counterbattery fire had failed to destroy them. *Nihart comments*.

[59] 5thMar ComdD, May 52, p. 9.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

[61] This force and its mission at various times were known as “Task Force Jig” or “Operation Snatch.”

[62] Maj Kenneth A. Seal comments on draft MS, dtd Oct 66. At the time of this attack, Lieutenant Seal commanded the 2d Platoon, A/1/7.

[63] Two Marines killed in the action were later posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Corporal David B. Champagne, A/1/7, was responsible for saving the lives of the three other members of his fire team. When a grenade fell in their midst, Champagne grabbed it to hurl back to CCF positions. Just as it cleared his hand, the grenade exploded, showering lethal shrapnel into the body of the 19-year-old Rhode Islander. One of the C/1/7 reinforcement Marines, Private First Class John D. Kelly, had conducted a one-man assault against a dug-in Chinese machine gun crew. Though painfully wounded during this encounter, he disposed of the enemy, then reduced a second weapons bunker. While firing point-blank into a third position the brave Marine was fatally wounded. This 1/7 action was the first in the western Korea defense to result in multiple Medal of Honor awards.

[64] 1/7 ComdD, May 52, pp. 17–18.

[65] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52; 5th Mar ComdDs, Apr, Jun 52; 7thMar ComdDs, May–Jun 52; 1/7 ComdD, May 52; KMC Regt UnitRpt 120, dtd 30 Jun 52.

[66] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–33.

[67] BGen Austin R. Brunelli ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 13 Sep 66, hereafter *Brunelli ltr*. The division chief of staff during more than half of 1952, Colonel Brunelli later observed that the “school produced more effective patrolling and . . . contributed to reducing our casualties.”

[68] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 8.

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] Selden, *Div Staff Rpt*, p. 16.

[71] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8; and 1stMarDiv, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 52.

[72] Colonel Moore took over regimental command on 11 June. The former CO, Colonel Honsowetz, had been named Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3 of the 1st Marine Division.

[73] The leadership, bravery, and unselfish devotion to duty earned for Sergeant Shuck the Medal of Honor, an award made to 14 Marines during the fighting in West Korea. During the earlier part of the war, 28 Marines had received the Medal of Honor. Of these, 17 were awarded posthumously. Five Navy hospital corpsmen, all attached to the 1st Marine Division, also earned the MOH. These awards, with one exception, were for heroism under combat conditions during the 1952–1953 period of the Korean War.

[74] In the TOT technique, participating units time their initial volleys to ensure that their shells arrive on the target at the same time.

[75] Among division commanders in the I Corps area, General Selden was not alone in his grave misgivings of this method of gaining information about the Chinese. Major General A. J. H. Cassels, 1st Commonwealth Division, shared with the Marine commander the belief that such operations were too costly for the intended purpose. *McGill comments* and Brigadier C. N. Barclay, *The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950–1953* (Aldershot, England: Gale and Polden Ltd., 1954), p. 127, hereafter Barclay, *Commonwealth*.

[76] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 52.

[77] The material in this section is derived from the 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52.

[78] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9.

[79] *Brunelli ltr.*

[80] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9–27.

[81] 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 52, p. 4.

[82] FMFPac ComdD, Jul 52, App VIII, Encl (7), Anx (E).

[83] FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App I, Enci (35).


[84] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 10–198.

[85] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Selden, *Div Staff Rpt; PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv, 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Jun–Jul 52.

[86] The KSC was a ROK quasi-military organization for logistical support of the UNC. Personnel were drafted from those rejected for Army service. Each KSC unit had a cadre of ROK officers and enlisted. All types of labor except personal services were performed by these Koreans. During its period in western Korea, the 1st Marine Division was supported by the 103d KSC Regiment of 5,222 men. CG, 1stMarDiv, *Civ Afrs and KSC*, pp. 8–9.


[87] Col Harry D. Clarke ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 1 Sep 66.

[88] This included employment of the 60-inch searchlight for night illumination, maintenance of boats for debris removal, and operation of the M–4 ferry. Other preparations by the division, of a non-engineer nature, included positioning of 13,000 life-saving floatation devices for use by frontline troops should they become shut off from planned evacuation.



MAP 6


K. White





### OBJECTIVES FOR I/5 ATTACK

9 MAY 1952



MLR

**Operations in West Korea**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 3. The Battle of Bunker Hill**

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jul-Aug 52; 1stMar, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52; 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 52.
- [2] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 52, p. 2.
- [3] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
- [4] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 18 Jun 52, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, App. I, p. 5.
- [5] 1/5 ComdD, May 52, p. 12.
- [6] HqBn, 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 52, p. 27.
- [7] *Ibid.*
- [8] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 52, p. 5.
- [9] “The Chinese attack by ‘shovel’ proved effective and difficult to combat. They burrowed forward almost continuously, even under direct observation. Every foot of advance provided added opportunity to attack Marine COPs with greater impunity. While this activity possibly provided Marines with target practice in both small arms and mortars, these CCF working parties in a narrow trench 7 to 10-foot deep probably took very few casualties.” Col William R. Watson, Jr. ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 18 July 67.
- [10] *A Volunteer Soldier’s Day: Recollections by Men of the Chinese People’s Volunteers in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 193, hereafter CPV, *Recollections*.
- [11] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8–90.
- [12] LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr., “Random Notes on Korea,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 11 (Nov 55), p. 29, hereafter Batterton, *Korea Notes*.
- [13] CO 5thMar msg to 5thMar units, dtd 20 Apr 52, in 5thMar ComdD, Apr 52, #2, App. II, p. 6.
- [14] Since bunkers were in everyone’s mind and frontline units were heavily involved in the bunker-construction program, it is felt likely “someone in G-2 arbitrarily assigned the name.” Col Gerald T. Armitage ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 6 July 67, hereafter *Armitage ltr*.
- [15] Two days earlier Colonel Layer had taken over the command from Colonel Flournoy.
- [16] Lieutenant Colonels Gerald F. Russell and Anthony Caputo, respectively, commanded 3/7 and 2/7 at this time.
- [17] 1stMarDiv PIR 657, dtd 13 Aug 52.
- [18] Frequently cartographers use elevations for names of hills. Heights on the Korean maps are in meters, and many of these hills derive their name (i.e., number) from their elevation. For changing meters to feet, the conversion factor 3.28 is used.
- [19] A saddle, the low point in the crest line of a ridge, is much in appearance like the side view of a riding saddle.
- [20] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 9–11 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.
- [21] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, App. VII, p. 1.
- [22] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from: Encl (1) to CG, FMFPac ltr 0762/161 over A9 to CMC, dtd 25 Nov 52, Subj: “Summary of 1stMarDiv Sit from 20 July–20 Oct 52,” hereafter FMFPac, *1stMarDiv Sum, Jul–Oct 52*; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 2/1, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52.
- [23] Recalling the Marine seizure of Bunker, the G-3, 1stMarDiv at that time expressed the view that “taking these places was easy but holding them under heavy Chinese artillery and mortar fire was extremely costly. Our counterbattery fire was ineffective because we were limited to from one to eight rounds per tube per day,

depending on the weapon, by Army order, because of an ammunition shortage.” Col Russell E. Honsowetz MS comments, dtd 15 Jun 67, hereafter *Honsowetz ltr II*.

[24] Initially the diversionary attack against Siberia and subsequent assault against Bunker had been made by Marines of 2/1 since Siberia was in the 2/1 sector. On 12 August operational control was transferred to 3/1 as the fighting continued at Bunker, in the area of responsibility of the left battalion sector.

[25] From the division reserve, Captain Anthony J. Skotnicki’s company, I/3/7, was en route to take over the I/3/1 sector. As an interim measure, Captain Byron J. Melancon’s Company H extended its MLR positions to the right to cover the Company I area.

[26] Unless otherwise noted, the material for this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 12-13 Aug 52; 1stMar, 1/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.

[27] A characteristic of 4.5-inch rocket launcher is the discharge of 24 rounds in quick succession, called a ripple. A battery of six launchers can fire 144 rounds on target in less than a minute.

[28] 1stMarDiv PIR 658, dtd 14 Aug 52.

[29] Selden, *Div Staff Rpt*, p. 19.

[30] During the fighting on the 13th, Hospitalman John E. Kilmer was mortally wounded while “administering aid to the wounded and expediting their evacuation.” Though wounded by enemy mortars, he continued his life-saving efforts until another barrage took his life. He had died shielding a wounded Marine undergoing emergency treatment. Hospitalman Kilmer, a distant cousin of poet Joyce Kilmer, became the first of four corpsmen serving with the 1st Marine Division to be awarded the Medal of Honor during the trench warfare in western Korea.

[31] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 3/1, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52.

[32] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.

[33] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 4-16 Aug 52; 1st Mar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Aug 52; MAGs-12,-33 ComdDs, Aug 52.

[34] Two days later, Colonel Lambrecht, flying a F3D twin jet night fighter with his radar operator, Second Lieutenant James M. Brown, disappeared while on a night flight. The last known position of the plane was over the Yellow Sea, 50 air miles west of Pyongyang. At about that point the aircraft faded from the radar screen. Efforts to re-establish communications failed. It was reported that observers at sea sighted a crash and explosion at about this same time. Extensive search failed to uncover any trace of the Marines or their aircraft.

[35] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, pp. 3-4.

[36] BGen Frederick P. Henderson ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC and MS comments, dtd 20 Jun 67, hereafter *Henderson ltr III*.

[37] *Armitage ltr* and comments, p. 12.

[38] Many of these targets were CCF choke points, dumps, and weapons emplacements. Targets were identified and confirmed by a highly developed system that employed air spotting, aerial photographic interpretation, artillery evaluation, and POW interrogation.

[39] The use of fighting lights to illuminate targets for tank gunners had been undertaken in July, but the results were inconclusive, owing to failure of one of the bulbs of the two lights tested. 1st TkBn ComdD, Aug 52, App. VI, Encl. 2. Declared the G-3, 1stMarDiv: “The diversion on Siberia was 100 percent effective, due largely to the new tank battle lights which we were using for the first time.” *Honsowetz ltr II*.

[40] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: FMFPac, *1st-MarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52*; *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar ComdDs, Aug 52.

[41] CG, FMFPac, Lieutenant General Hart, requested the Commandant to delay decision until FMFPac could survey the combat replacement situation and aircraft availability. After a quick evaluation of both these factors,

General Hart on the 14th recommended approval. FMFPac ComdD, Aug 52, App. I, Encl. (6). The air lift of 500 replacements to Korea was an “all out effort for Marine Aviation Transport based on the West Coast. This general support of Korean based forces demonstrated the total capability of Marine Aviation in support of ground forces.” MajGen Samuel S. Jack to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 27 Jun 67, hereafter *Jack ltr*.

[42] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 12. p. 12-8.

[43] 3/1 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 4.

[44] Earlier, on 13 August, a flare drop requested by the 1st Marines went awry when the aircraft got off course and dropped the flares forward of the 5th Marines main line. 1stMarDiv G-3 Jn1, 13 Aug 52.

[45] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52, p. 2.

[46] MajGen John T. Selden ltr to Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., dtd 14 Aug 52.


[47] *Armitage ltr* and draft MS comments, p. 7. For further details of the Bunker Hill action, see *Armitage ltr* in v. V, Korean comment file.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[51] As the military situation changed in Korea to become increasingly one of a battle of position and attrition, the Marine Corps Basic School, Quantico, Va. curriculum was revised to give greater emphasis to tactics of positional warfare. Close attention was paid to terrain evaluation, employment of infantry units, offensive and defensive use of automatic and supporting weapons, night counterattacks, field problems of reverse slope defense, and even tasks of “research into WW I—and the American Civil and Revolutionary Wars for the tactic of Reverse Slope defense.” *Armitage ltr*.





**IST MARINES SECTOR  
OF JAMESTOWN  
(Division Center)  
8 AUGUST 1952**

- Outposts in right battalion sector
  - x Hill designation
  - MLR
- 0 500 1000 1500  
Yards

MAP 9

K. White





**Operations in West Korea**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 4. Outpost Fighting Expanded**

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 661-675, dtd 18-31 Aug 52; 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1 ComdDs, Aug 52.
- [2] Command responsibility for this sector changed on 20 August, when Lieutenant Colonel William S. McLaughlin took over the battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Cross.
- [3] To escape the murderous hostile fire, the Marines sought shelter in a trench nearby. During the ensuing clash, a Chinese grenade landed in the midst of the Marines. Private First Class Robert E. Simanek, E/2/5, unhesitatingly threw himself upon the deadly missile an instant before it exploded. Although gravely wounded, his courageous action prevented injury or death to fellow patrol members. The following year, President Dwight D. Eisenhower presented the Medal of Honor to the Detroit, Michigan Marine for his “daring initiative and great personal valor.”
- [4] 1stMarDiv PIR 669, dtd 25 Aug 52.
- [5] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of MajGen Edwin A. Pollock, Jan 56, rev.
- [6] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 2/1, 3/1, 2/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 188-189, dtd 6-7 Sep 52.
- [7] Normally a component of the 2d Battalion, Company E had been attached to the 3d Battalion on 1 September when the company took over the Bunker Hill outpost. The relieved Company H was then attached to 2/1, the reserve battalion, from 1-3 September.
- [8] On 20 August Lieutenant Colonel Altman became the commander of 3/1 in relief of Lieutenant Colonel Armitage.
- [9] Colonel Smoak had relieved Colonel Culhane on 15 August.
- [10] Although 1/5 (Lieutenant Colonel Alexander W. Gentleman) was the regimental reserve at this time, the regiment had assigned one company to 2/5, manning the right sector.
- [11] Still another award of the Medal of Honor was to come out of the action that ended on 5 September. Hospitalman Third Class Edward C. Benfold had ministered aid to several wounded Marines and was searching for others who needed medical attention when he saw two wounded Marines in a shell crater. Just as he neared its edge two grenades fell into it and two Chinese prepared to assault the Marines. “Picking up a grenade in each hand, Benfold leaped out of the crater and hurled himself against the onrushing hostile soldiers, pushing the grenades against their chests and killing both. . . . He gallantly gave his life for his country.” Medal of Honor citation, case of Hospital Corpsman Third Class Edward C. Benfold, USN, 4168234.
- [12] Contemporary records of the 1st KMC Regiment for 1952-1953 identify this as Outpost 37. Current reviewer comments refer to this hill as OP 67. LtCol Kim Yong Kyu, ROKMC, ltr to CMC, HQMC, dtd 5 Jul 67.
- [13] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 195-202, dtd 13-20 Sep 52.
- [14] 1st MarDiv ComdD, Sep 52, App. I, # 8.
- [15] *Ibid.*
- [16] When the 7th Marines took over this sector from the 5th in early September, the names changed to Carson, Vegas, Detroit, and Seattle respectively. COP Bruce was also redesignated as Reno. Since the old names of the outposts were well known to the enemy, for purposes of security it was decided to identify them differently. U.S. cities were selected.
- [17] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 7thMar, 2/1 ComdDs, Sep 52.
- [18] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: FMFPac, *1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52*;

1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1-7 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRS 706-713, dtd 1-8 Oct 52; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7 ComdDs, Oct 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 214-220, dtd 2-8 Oct. 52.

[19] The outpost at the extreme right flank was given the name "Verdun" because of its World War I connotation of "They shall not pass." Col. Leo J. Dulacki ltr to Hd, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2 Jun 67, hereafter *Dulacki ltr*.

[20] During the latter stage of the fight for Warsaw, a Chinese soldier tossed a grenade into a bunker shared by five Marines. Private Jack W. Kelso, of I/3/7, quickly picked up the missile and ran outside with it. As he was throwing the grenade back to the Chinese, it went off in his hand. Disregarding his wounds, the Marine moved back inside the shelter, directed the other four to return to the MLR, and went outside to cover their exit. As he was firing at the advancing Chinese soldiers, Private Kelso was hit several times by enemy bullets. His "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life" was later recognized in the posthumous award of the Medal of Honor.

[21] This squad was from Company A (Captain Frederick C. McLaughlin), which came under the operational control of 3/7 at 1130 on 3 October, relieving Company C (Captain Paul B. Byrum). The latter company had reported to the 3d Battalion from regimental reserve at 2130 the previous day. Company D was sent immediately to reinforce the hard-pressed Company I.

[22] At the same time one company, I/3/7, became the regimental reserve, having been relieved on the MLR at 1500 the previous day by A/1/7.

[23] During the predawn attempt to retake Frisco on 7 October, Staff Sergeant Lewis G. Watkins, I/3/7, although already wounded, led his rifle platoon in the assault against Frisco. When an enemy machine gun impeded their progress, Staff Sergeant Watkins grabbed a wounded man's automatic rifle to help get the assault moving forward again. At that instant, an enemy grenade landed in the midst of the Marines. Staff Sergeant Watkins immediately seized it. Just as he was about to hurl it away it exploded in his hand. The grenade took the sergeant's life but he had saved his fellow Marines. For his bravery Staff Sergeant Watkins was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

[24] FMFPac, *1stMarDiv Sum, Jul-Oct 52*.

[25] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 9; 1st MAW ComdDs, Jun-Oct 52; MAG-12 ComdDs, Jun, Sep 52; MAG-33 ComdD, Aug 52; MACG-2 ComdD, Sep 52; VMA-312 ComdDs, Sep-Oct 52; VMA-323 ComdDs, Jun-Jul, Sep 52; VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Jun-Jul 52; VMJ-1 ComdD, Jul 52; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Rees, *Korea*.

[26] The 1st MAW chief of staff during this period, then Colonel Samuel S. Jack, offered the opinion that "the Fifth Air Force was most sympathetic to Division requirements for close air support from Wing sources. The Eighth Army in the Joint Operations Center proved to be the principal limiting factor in the assignment of air in accordance with these requests. Also, requirements that Division CAS requests filter through I Corps and JOC constituted a major factor in Wing response." *Jack ltr*.

[27] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 482.

[28] Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, pp. 208-209.

[29] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 482.

[30] Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 209. "I told you so" leaflets were dropped after the raid to impress the inhabitants with the importance of believing the warning leaflets. USAF, *Ops in Korea*, No. 127, pp. 36, 37.

[31] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 489.

[32] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9-53.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 9-143.

[34] The first Marine night ace was Captain Robert Baird, who shot down six Japanese planes between 9 June and

14 July 1945. Sherrod, *Marine Aviation*, p. 404. Lieutenant Andre's first four planes were also downed during World War II. See Appendix F for Marine air kills during the Korean War.

[35] VMA-312 ComdD, Sep 52.

[36] The exchange program "appears to have originated with the participation—at Tactical Air Command's invitation—of two Marine Corps and two Navy pilots . . . in the fall of 1947." Within two years, the program designed to "indoctrinate selected Air Force and Navy pilots in the air operational and air training activities of each other's service, had received Department of Defense approval." On 1 October 1949 the program went into effect. Initially the exchange period was one year, but after the Korean fighting broke out, the period was reduced to approximately three months. Marine participation began late in 1951. Atch 1 to Hq, USAF (AFCHO) memo to Maj J. M. Yingling, HQMC, dtd 16 Jan 67 in v. V, Korean comment file.

[37] On 15 September, Major Gillis had shot down a solo MIG-15.

[38] *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-77.

[39] MAG-33 ComdD, Aug 52, p. 16.

[40] Although not definitely proven, there were "some indications of false radio beacons being used by the enemy in clandestine operations in the K-2 area." *Jack ltr*.

[41] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9; 1st MAW ComdD, Oct 52; HMR-161 ComdDs Aug-Sep 52.


[42] *Henderson ltr III*.


[43] For example, on 25 September, rain soaked the cardboard cover of the rations, adding extra weight to each preloaded lift of these Class I supplies. On the other hand, a heavier load could have been used at times. As the helicopter used up its fuel, a commensurate increase in cargo could have been carried.

[44] Spare parts shortages are "inherent in the introduction of new equipment into the field and prior to the development of usage data." A major effort was made at this time by 1st MAW to improve its critical spare parts support by improved stock control procedures and complete inventory. *Jack ltr*.

[45] On 4 April Lieutenant Colonel Alton L. Hicks assumed command of the battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Jacob E. Glick relieved him on 3 August.


[46] Communication with General Kendall's I Corps consisted of radio-teletype, telephone, radio relay, courier plane, and motor messenger. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-68. The 11th Marines also had an additional 1,100 miles of communication wire. *Henderson ltr III*.





MAP 13

K.White



**Operations in West Korea**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 5. The Hook**

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CG, 1stMarDiv, *Info for CG, FMFPac*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 706–736, dtd 1–31 Oct 52; 7thMar ComdD, Oct 52; LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. memo to Dir, MarCor Hist, HQMC, dtd 28 Oct 52, Subj: Notes on 7th Marines' Action (Defense of "The Hook"), 26–27 Oct 52, hereafter Heinl, *memo*.

[2] Responsibility for this part of the 7th Marines line changed on 13 October, when Lieutenant Colonel Barrett took command of 3/7 from Lieutenant Colonel Russell. The latter then was assigned as division senior liaison officer to the KMC regiment.

[3] Heinl, *memo*. The originator of this memo, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., was an experienced Marine officer and military historian who had just been assigned to the division for duty. Temporarily attached to the 7th Marines as an observer, his brief visit there happened to coincide with the beginning of the Hook battle.

[4] Quoted in LtCol Herbert F. Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Operations in Korea and Their Effects on the Defense Policy of Canada* (Ottawa: The Army Historical Section, Canadian Forces Headquarters, 1966), p. 213.

[5] The Marine division artillery regiment reported that in late October nine battalions of Chinese artillery, ranging from 75 or 76mm guns or howitzers to 122mm howitzers, opposed the 7th Marines. It was estimated that one other 122mm battalion was also emplaced north of the right division sector. In addition to these CCF units, elements of a 152mm self-propelled howitzer unit were also believed to be in the area. Late in November two batteries of 152mm howitzers were tentatively located about 4,000 yards west northwest of the Hook. Disposition had been determined "as a result of crater analysis, shell reports, sound plots, and capabilities of the weapon." 11thMar ComdD, Nov 52, "Enemy Artillery Activity Rpts," Nos. 21, 23, dtd 1, 21 Nov. 52.

[6] *CPV, Recollections*, p. 360.

[7] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 24–26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 729–732, dtd 4–27 Oct 52; 7th Mar, 1/7, VMA–323 ComdDs, Oct 52; Heinl, *memo*.

[8] 11thMar ComdD, Oct 52, App III, Sheet 3. Eighteen of the weapons (the 623d Field Artillery Battalion) had just moved into the Marine sector and begun operating on 14 October. The unit remained under I Corps operational control, with the mission of providing general support reinforcing fire.

[9] Later in 1951, during the UN Summer-Fall offensive, ammunition consumption had again risen sharply, creating concern among corps commanders and occasioning one of them to remark to a subordinate, "We have the distinct impression that two of your battalions are trying to compete for a world's record." Capt Edward C. Williamson, *et. al.*, "Bloody Ridge," ms OCMH, 1951, cited in James A. Huston, *The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775–1953—The Army Historical Series* (Washington: OCMH, 1966), v. II, p. 632.

[10] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App I, No. 19.

[11] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8–71.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] For example, during the latter part of the month each rifle company in the Hook battalion was limited to 150 hand grenades. The total 11-day allowance for Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's 81mm mortars was 475 rounds. 1/7 ComdD, Oct 52, App. III.

[14] Heinl, *memo*.

[15] 1stMarDiv PIR 729, dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2. Ronson, the Hook, and Warsaw are within the 1,000-meter square, CT 1010.

[16] Heinl, *memo*.

[17] 1stMarDiv Intell. Est., dtd 19 Oct 52, p. 8, filed with the divisions PIRs for that month.

[18] *Dulacki ltr.*

[19] Heinl, *memo.*

[20] Due to the width of the Hook sector, it was necessary to keep all three rifle platoons in the line. A reinforced platoon from the battalion reserve outposted Warsaw. While Company A was on line, a Company C platoon manned the outpost; when Company C was relieved on 26 October, a Company A platoon was sent to Warsaw.

Maj Frederick C. McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Jan 70, hereafter *McLaughlin ltr.*

[21] On 24 October, Battery M of the battalion was temporarily relaid to provide additional support to Colonel Moore's regiment.

[22] The flight had been scheduled to attack active artillery positions 3 1/2 miles north of the Carson-Reno-Vegas area. When some of their ordnance was unexpended after putting these guns out of action, the planes were ordered to take on the trench target.

[23] Within the division there were no reports of sightings of unusually large groups of enemy soldiers in this area. In fact, there were fewer enemy seen on the 26th than any other day since 18 October. During the 23d and 24th, about 100 enemy had been observed almost a half mile closer to the Hook than the hideout area used on the 26th. 11thMar ComdD, Oct. 52, p. 12; 1stMarDiv PIR 729, dtd 24 Oct 52, p. 2.

[24] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, 26 Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 723, 734, dtd 27, 29 Oct 52; 7thMar, 11th Mar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn, VMF (N) -513 ComdDs, Oct 52; Heinl, *memo.*

[25] The 1/7 commander, who was uninjured by the blast, might have become a believer that day in the military cliché, "Rank hath its privileges," for Brigadier A. H. G. Ricketts (29th British Infantry Brigade, 1st Commonwealth Division), who was standing near Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki, was untouched. The British division was scheduled to take over responsibility for the Hook sector in early November.

[26] Prior to the enemy's steady shelling of the Hook, the trenches were six feet deep. The preparatory fires of the past several days had been so intense that in nearly all areas the trenchline had been leveled by the time of the Chinese attack. "I am convinced that the Chinese didn't realize that they had penetrated our MLR or they would have exploited the penetration." Col Russell E. Honsowetz ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 26 Jan 70.

[27] The material in this section has been derived from 7thMar, "Summary of Action, 26 Oct-1 Nov 52, Hook, Reno, Ronson"; 2/7 ComdD, Oct 52.

[28] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27-28 Oct 52; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/7, 4/11, 1st TkBn, VMAs-121, -212, -323 ComdDs, Oct. 52.

[29] At 0545 on the 25th, Company I (Captain John Thomas), then the regimental reserve, and Captain Belant's Company H, responsible for the right sector of 3/7, had exchanged roles.

[30] Another Medal of Honor resulting from the Hook action was awarded posthumously to Second Lieutenant Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr. for "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity." Lieutenant Skinner, whose twin brother was also a Marine officer, had been assigned as an artillery forward observer with F/2/11. When the Chinese attack hit the MLR, Lieutenant Skinner organized the surviving Marines in defense of their observation post. Fighting off the enemy and calling down defensive artillery fire on the assaulting Chinese, he delayed capture of the position. Twice he left the bunker to direct fire on the enemy and get more ammunition.

When the Communists finally overran the bunker, Lieutenant Skinner instructed his fellow Marines to pretend they were dead; during the next three hours several different enemy groups frisked the inert Marines without discovering their ruse. Later, when a skeptical enemy soldier hurled a grenade into the bunker, Lieutenant Skinner unhesitatingly rolled on top of the missile, shielding the two surviving Marines. By thus absorbing the full force of the explosion, he sacrificed his life for theirs. (2dLt Sherrod E. Skinner, Jr. Biog. File)

[31] The new squadron commander had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Fletcher two days earlier. This

flight was the first of two CAS attacks in behalf of the Hook forces that the new commanding officer participated in that day.

[32] During this action, the company suffered 15 killed, 71 seriously wounded, and 6 slightly wounded. 3/1 ComdD, Oct. 52, p. 3.

[33] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Oct 52.

[34] As a part of the reorganization, H/3/1 remained in the right sector, and Company C, of the Hook battalion, filled in the middle. Company A was in position on the friendly side of that part of the ridge held by Captain Byrum's Company C. During the afternoon of the 28th, I/3/1 and H/3/7 also left Lieutenant Colonel Dulacki's area to rejoin their parent organizations.

[35] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 734-735, 741, dtd 29-30 Oct 52, 5 Nov. 52.

[36] The CCF casualty figures were derived from a comparison of reports of participating Marine battalions, the 7th Marines, and division. In addition to these losses caused by Marine infantry units were enemy casualties listed by the artillery and tank battalion command diaries and records of participating air squadrons; these supporting arms figures amount to 468 casualties, more than one-third the total number.

[37] During the Task Force Drysdale operation, in November 1950, more than 40 Marines had been seized by the enemy. Maj James Angus MacDonald, Jr., "The Problems of U.S. Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea" (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Maryland, 1961), App. G, pp. 261-262, hereafter MacDonald, *POW*.


[38] Comments by Dr. Robert F. Futrell, USAF Historian, in ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 2 Feb 70: "The Air Force position about the accumulation of munitions at frontline units was that by exercising supply discipline and refraining from combat, the enemy could hoard and build supply over a period of time."


[39] 1stMarDiv PIR 738, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 3. The Chinese also used hand grenades in searching the bunkers. All of these explosives had been widely employed during World War II.


[40] 1stMarDiv PIR 741, dtd 5 Nov 52, Encl. 2, p. 2.

[41] 1/7 ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI.

[42] CG, FMFPac ComdD, Nov 52, App IV, Encl (8), Anx G, p. 4. During the Hook fighting, General Hart also witnessed the helicopter deployment of the 4.5-inch rockets. He was impressed with the progress that had been made in this helicopter-ground team performance, particularly the speed and efficiency with which these weapons could be set up to fire and then displaced to a new position.








MAP 17

K. White



**Operations in West Korea**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 6. Positional Warfare**

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Oct–Nov 52; 1stMarDiv PIRs 737–738, dtd 31 Oct–1 Nov 52; KMC Regt UnitRpts 238–244, dtd 24–30 Oct 52.
- [2] KMC Regt UnitRpt 216, dtd 4 Oct 52, p. 2.
- [3] KMC Regt UnitRpt 243, dtd 31 Oct 52, pp. 5–6.
- [4] The attack on the 31st took place after the KMC 5th Battalion had taken over the right regimental sector, at 1700, from the 3d Battalion. The Chinese often deliberately timed their outpost attacks to coincide with a relief of lines. Company personnel of both the 5th and 3d Battalions were on line during the fighting. KMC Regt UnitRpts dtd 1 Nov 52, p. 4; 245, dtd 2 Nov 52, p. 4.
- [5] KMC Regt UnitRpt 244, dtd 1 Nov 52, pp. 1,4. A different account as to size of attacking units is given in Maj Kang Shin Ho, ROKMC ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 30 Apr 70, which states two reinforced enemy companies assaulted COP 33 and an estimated enemy battalion struck COP 31.
- [6] *Ibid.*
- [7] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Barclay, *Commonwealth*; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front—United States Army in the Korean War* (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1966), hereafter Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*.
- [8] For details of this action see Canadian Department of National Defence ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70 in v. V, Korean comment file.
- [9] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 392.
- [10] Quoted in Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*, p. 461.
- [11] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Dec 52; Berger, *Korea Knot*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Robert Leckie, *Conflict—The History of the Korean War, 1950–1953* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1962), hereafter Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.
- [12] Eisenhower had resigned his commission, following his return to the States in April to seek election.
- [13] Joy, *Truce Negotiations*, p. 156. The proposal was a “complete armistice agreement” not merely another offer to solve the prisoner question.
- [14] Quoted in Berger, *Korea Knot*, p. 153.
- [15] Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 240.
- [16] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Nov 52–Jan 53; 1stMar ComdDs, Nov 52–Feb 53; 5thMar ComdD, Dec 52; 7thMar ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53; 11th Mar ComdDs, Jan–Feb 53; 2/1 ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdD, Jan 53; MAG–12 ComdD, Jan 53; MAG–33 ComdD, Oct 52; MACG–2 ComdD, Feb 53.
- [17] At this time a new limiting point between the division and British division was also established. This slightly reduced Marine division frontage to 33 miles and allowed the two MLR regiments to shorten their lines and maintain somewhat larger reserve units. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8–23.
- [18] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to GOC, 1stComWelDiv, dtd 29 Oct 52, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Oct 52, App. II, p. 6.
- [19] GOC, 1stComWelDiv msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 19 Nov 52, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52, App. I, p. 3.
- [20] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of LtGen Vernon E. Megee, 1959.
- [21] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 5, Chap. 9 and No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Nov 52; 1st MAW ComdDs, Oct 52, Jan–Feb 53; MAG–12 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan 53, Mar 53; MAG–33 ComdDs, Nov 52, Jan–Mar 53; VMA–121 ComdDs, Nov–Dec 52; VMF–115

ComdDs, Nov–Dec 52; VMF(N)–513 ComdDs, Oct 52–Jan 53; HMR–161 ComdDs, Jul 52, Nov–Dec 52, Jan 53; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Montross, *SkyCav*.

[22] A total of 1,362 CAS sorties were flown, with 443 for the 1st Marine Division. Interdiction missions numbered 1,842, plus additional miscellaneous and air reconnaissance flights. 1st MAW ComdD, Oct. 52.

[23] Montross, *SkyCav*, p. 189.

[24] A relatively small number of night med evac flights was also being flown by HMR–161. During March 1953, for example, in transferring 283 casualties to the hospital ships, squadron helicopters made only 15 flights at night.

[25] Col Glenn R. Long ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 11 Jun 67.

[26] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 10–76.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 10–80.

[29] *PactFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9–81.

[30] *PctFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 10–80.

[31] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 582.

[32] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jan–Feb 53; 1/1 ComdD, Feb 53; HMR–161 ComdD, Feb 53; Montross, *SkyCav*.

[33] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No.6, p. 10–133.

[34] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.

[35] The following month, HMR–161 engaged in a four-day ammunition resupply operation for the division. Except for one day, the 22d, all available helicopters were assigned to that mission, beginning 20 March. HMR–161 also had a new CO by that time, Colonel Owen A. Chambers who had taken over from Lieutenant Colonel Carey on 15 March.

[36] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: KPR ComdDs, Jun, Aug, Oct–Dec 52, Jan–Mar 53; 1st AmTracBn ComdDs, Mar–Dec 52, Jan–Mar 53.

[37] On the west, the Yom River similarly separates the Kimpo Peninsula from Kanghwado Island, second in size of all Korean islands and a base for friendly intelligence operations.

[38] Identified as elements of the 195th CCF Division of the 65th CCF Army and an unidentified CCF division, in a revised EOOB issued in December. Previously, units of the 193d CCF Division were at the front in this far western sector. KPR ComdDs, Oct–Dec 52.

[39] Colonel Tschirgi had taken command of the KPR on 1 December from Colonel Richard H. Crockett, who previously relieved Colonel Staab (the original KPR commander) on 31 August.

[40] Comprising a platoon from Company B and several headquarters elements, the provisional company was disbanded on 14 June when Company B that had been supporting MAG–33 at Pohang was reassigned to the battalion.

[41] Formerly the executive officer, Major Saussy took over unit command on 7 November, when Lieutenant Colonel Wheeler was transferred to the 5th Marines. Lieutenant Colonel Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr., became the next commanding officer on 16 March 1953.

[42] The material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8.

[43] The 1st Commonwealth Division, to the Marine right, utilized a different defense system. Instead of relying on the COPs forward of the main line of defense as major deterrent positions, the British preferred to include all strategic terrain features within the MLR itself. They followed a policy of active patrolling to the front and, at night, occupied selected ground sites, preferring to fight the enemy from their main battle positions rather than from more isolated COP positions. *PactFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap, 9, pp. 9–92, 9–93.

[44] The military crest is that point along the slope of a hill from which maximum observation up and down the hill can be obtained. The topographical crest is the highest point on a hill or ridge.

[45] Commenting on the heavy destruction of Hook fortifications by CCF preparation, one 7th Marine company commander stated: "Enemy artillery and mortars did tend to destroy the protective wire. We noted especially that the Canadian 'Random Wire,' although it tended to move about under fire, did hold together and continue to offer good protection." *McLaughlin ltr.*

[46] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Feb–Mar 53; 1stMar ComdD, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdDs, Feb–Mar 53; 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/5, 2/5, 1/7 ComdDs, Feb 53.

[47] For a detailed account of the tank action in the CLAMBAKE raid see Col Clyde W. Hunter ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 6 Jun 70, in v. V, Korean comment file.

[48] 1/5 ComdD, Feb. 53, App. IVc, dtd 19 Feb 53, p. 5.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] In order to assure better close air support during the assault, an SOP for the airborne tactical controller was proposed and drafted by MAG–12 for 1st MAW approval. The plan utilized the marking of targets by rocket and subsequent corrections to be made by the FAC. This enabled MAG–12 aircraft "to scramble, fly a CAS mission at the Division front and be back at the field at K–6 in approximately 40 minutes." Col Wayne M. Cargill ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 8 Jan 70.

[51] 5th Mar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 20 Feb 53, p. 3.


[52] Lieutenant Colonel Peatross had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel McLaughlin as battalion CO on 11 Sep 52.


[53] Beginning morning nautical twilight is that period before sunrise or after sunset (BENT, or beginning evening nautical twilight) when visibility is limited to approximately 300 yards.

[54] 5thMar ComdD, Feb 53, App. VI, dtd 28 Feb 53, p. 5.

[55] In nearly three hours of firing, the 11th Marines and its reinforcing and attached units, including the 1st Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, expended 11,881 rounds. Indicative of the meticulous planning that preceded an operation such as CHARLIE is the 11th Marines report of this raid. 11thMar ComdD, Feb 53.


[56] Prior to the raid various combinations of flamethrower fuels and pressure were extensively used. The purpose was to determine the maximum effective range of the flamethrower teams in order to "neutralize the hand-grenade throwing potential of the enemy, this being one of the major problems confronting assault elements on other raids." Final tests resulted in flame being thrown more than 40 yards up hill. 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, App. IVf, p. 3.





MAP DIAGRAM 20

K. White



**Operations in West Korea**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 7. Vegas**

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, 1stMar, 5thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar ComdD, Apr 53, Special Action Rpt Period 26–30 Mar 53, “Battle of the Cities,” hereafter 5thMar SAR “Cities”; Maj Norman W. Hicks, “U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1952–1953 with Special Emphasis on Outpost Warfare” (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Maryland, 1962), hereafter Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; 1stLt Peter Braestrup, “Outpost Warfare,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 37, no. 11 (Nov 53) and “Back to the Trenches,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 3 (Mar 55); MSgt Robert T. Fugate, “Vegas, Reno, and Carson,” *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 6 (Jun 53), hereafter Fugate, “Vegas.”
- [2] Since the first of the year division intelligence reports had given the CCF the capability of mounting limited objective attacks ranging from company to regimental size. *PacFlt EvalRpt*, p. 9–28, quoting 1stMarDiv PIR 860, dtd 4 Mar 53.
- [3] The 1st KMC Regiment had been redesignated the 1st KMC/RCT on 15 Dec 52. Continuing under opcon of the 1stMarDiv, the Korean RCT consisted of four infantry battalions, plus attached artillery, armor, engineer, and service units. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8–64.
- [4] To the Marine division right were the U.S. 2d Infantry, ROK 1st, and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions.
- [5] No stranger to the 5th Marines, Colonel Walt had served with this regiment during World War II at Guadalcanal, Cape Gloucester, and Peleliu. He had commanded, on separate occasions, 2/5 and 3/5 and had earned two Navy Crosses for combat leadership and bravery.
- [6] Normally Ava was a squad-size outpost. Prior to and during the late March attacks, all 5th Marine COPs were strengthened.
- [7] Company B from 1/1 had been assigned to operational control of 2/1 when the latter unit relieved 1/7 on line on 10 March. The increased personnel enabled the battalion to position a company-size detachment at the strategic high ground, COP 2, that overlooked Panmunjom and the critical truce talk site.
- [8] Regimental command changed 27 March when Colonel Glenn C. Funk, former commanding officer of the 1st Shore Party Battalion, was assigned to the 7th Marines, succeeding Colonel Haffner, who became G-2.
- [9] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv, 11thMar, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1st MAW, MAGs–12,–33 ComdDs, Mar 53.
- [10] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1/5, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities.”
- [11] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Reno Report, by Capt Henry A. Checklou, dtd 12 Mar 53, p. 4.
- [12] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, Inspection of COP Vegas Report, by Capt Henry A. Checklou, on 26 Mar, dtd 31 Mar 53, p. 4.
- [13] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnl, 26–27 Mar 53; 1st–MarDiv PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIRs 86–53, dtd 27 Mar 53, 87–53, dtd 28 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR, 18–28 Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; Fugate, “Vegas.”
- [14] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, dtd 4 Apr 53, p. 2.
- [15] 1/5 ComdD, Mar 53, p. 10.
- [16] At both Reno and Vegas the Marines had moved into the caves for protection from VT fire. This was the plan in event of an overwhelming enemy attack. In contrast, the detachment at Carson fought from covered fighting holes and employed the cave there only to get their wounded out of direct fire. 5thMar SAR “Cities,” pp.

2–3.

[17] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnl, 26–27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 883, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIR 86–53, dtd 27 Mar 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11 ComdDs, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; VMO–6, HMR–161 ComDs, Mar 53; MacDonald, *POW*; USMC Biog.

[18] Statement by LtGen Lewis W. Walt, as cited in Eloise Engle, *Medic* (New York, N.Y.: John Day, May 1967), p. 211.

[19] In 1956, a newly-completed school in Alexandria, Virginia was named the Francis C. Hammond High School and dedicated in his memory.

[20] 1/5 and 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53. At this time 1/5 had suffered 5 killed, 30 wounded, 21 wounded not evacuated, 39 missing (personnel at Reno), or 95. Reports from 3/5 showed 1 killed, 8 wounded/evacuated, and 40 missing (at Vegas), or 49.

[21] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 27 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR Nos. 882–4, dtd 26–28 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIR 86–53, dtd 27 Mar 53, 87–53, dtd 28 Mar 53, 88–53, dtd 29 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar “Artillery in the Defense of Outpost Vegas, 26–30 Mar 53,” hereafter 11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; MAGs–12, –33, VMAs–212, –323; VMFs–115, –311, VMF(N)–513 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, “Vegas”; USMC Biog.

[22] Fugate, “Vegas,” p. 20.

[23] Statement cited in personnel record of HMC(SS) William R. Charette, USN. He was the only corpsman during the Korean War who was awarded the Medal of Honor and lived to receive it.

[24] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnl, 28 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 884, annex 340–MISP–53–12, POW Rpt and 1stMarDiv PIR 885, annex 340–MISP–53–13, POW Rpt; 1st MAW PIRs 88–53, dtd 29 Mar 53 and 89–53, dtd 30 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; MAGs–12, –33, VMAs–212, –323, VMFs–115, –311 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, “Vegas”; USMC Biog.

[25] The Marine NCO was to be posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, presented a year after the action, on 29 March 1954.

[26] 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnl, dtd 28 Mar 53.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] The material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMar Div PIRs 884–5, dtd 28–29 Mar 53; 1stMar ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMar SAR.

[29] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnl, 28–29 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 884–6, dtd 29–31 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIR 89–53, dtd 29 Mar 53; 5th Mar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 3/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cities”; 11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; Fugate, “Vegas.”

[30] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnl, 29–31 Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 885–887, dtd 29–31 Mar 53; 1st MAW PIRs 8–53, dtd 29 Mar 53 and 90–53, dtd 30 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 2/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Mar 53; 5thMar SAR “Cites”; 11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; MAGs–12, –33, VMAs–212, –323, VMFs–115, –311 ComdDs, Mar 53; Fugate, “Vegas.”

[31] Fugate, “Vegas,” p. 74.

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 887, dtd 31 Mar 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/5 ComdDs, Mar 53;

11thMar SAR “Arty Defense”; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; MacDonald *POW*; Jane Blakeney, *Heroes—U.S. Marine Corp, 1861–1955* (Washington, D.C.: Blakeney, 1957); Leckie, *Conflict*; Fugate, “Vegas”; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, “A Year in Korea,” *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53); *New York Times*, 29–31 Mar 53; *Washington Post*, 29–31 Mar 53.

[34] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to COs, 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, KMC, KPR, dtd 31 Mar 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53, App. II, p. 9.

[35] 5thMar SAR “Cities,” p. 8.

[36] Heinecke, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

[37] CMC msg to CG, 1stMarDiv, dtd 30 Mar 53, cited in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Mar 53, App. I, p. 7.


[38] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 31 Mar 53, in MAG–12 ComdD, Mar 53, App. VII-3.


[39] CROKMC ltr to CMC, dtd 2 Feb 1971, hereafter *ROKMC Comments*.


[40] See Appendix G for complete text of citation. Previous awards were as follows: 1stProvMarBrig (for 2 Aug–6 Sep 50 period), 1st MAW (3 Aug 50–26 Feb 51), and 1stMarDiv (15–27 Sep 50).














**Operations in West Korea**  
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**Chapter 8. Marking Time (April-June 1953)**

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv, 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr 53; Berger, *Korea Knot*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Leckie, *Conflict*; M/Sgt Robert T. Fugate, "Freedom Village," *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 7 (Jul 53), hereafter Fugate, Freedom Village."
- [2] Leckie, *Conflict*, p. 373.
- [3] CG, Eighth Army msg to CG, 1stMarDiv and others, dtd 4 Apr 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53, App. I, p. 1.
- [4] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 415.
- [5] With resumption of truce negotiations, the 1st Marines, whose left battalion sector was immediately adjacent to the Panmunjom neutral zone between the two battle lines, took certain precautionary measures. The regiment set up radio communication with the UN base camp at Munsan and reactivated its rescue task force. This unit was on alert to evacuate the UN truce team from Panmunjom in the event of Communist hostile action or any threat to security. While the talks were in session, a forward covering group, composed of a reinforced rifle company and 1st Tank Battalion platoon, occupied the high ground east of Panmunjom at COP 2. Here the Marine rescue force maintained close surveillance of the enemy in the Panmunjom peace corridor as well as the safe arrival and departure of the UN truce team shuttled in by helicopter or motor convoy. 1stMar ComdD, Apr 53, pp. 5, 14 and App. II, pp. 1-4.
- [6] The battalion's new commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Francis "X" Witt, Jr., who a week earlier had succeeded Lieutenant Colonel Francis W. Augustine.
- [7] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap 9; Commander Naval Forces, Far East (ComNavFE), "Operation Little Switch-Apr 53"; ComNavFE Rpt of Intelligence Processing; ComNavFE Rpt, 24 Jul 53; FMFPac ComdD, Apr 53 (#1); FMFPac ComdD, May 53 (Pt. 2), rpt LtCol Fisher to CG, FMFPac, subj, "Debriefing of Returned POWs"; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; MacDonald, *POW*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Fugate, "Freedom Village"; *New York Times*, 19-21 Apr 53; *Washington Post*, 19-21 Apr 53.
- [8] The 684 UNC prisoners returned in LITTLE SWITCH represented 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 British, 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, 1 Greek, 1 South African, 1 Filipino and 1 Netherlander.
- [9] *New York Times*, dtd 20 Apr 53, p. 1.
- [10] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- [11] In brief, these were: (1) that the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC) take custody of Chinese nonrepatriates but give Korean POWs the option of settling either in North or South Korea, as they wished; (2) that troops from just one country (India) be used to guard nonrepatriates, rather than the unwieldy five-nation force earlier proposed by the Communists; and (3), that specific procedures, which were clearly spelled out, be followed for granting political asylum to returning prisoners who refused repatriation.
- [12] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFLt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 896-900, dtd 8-12 Apr 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Apr 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr 53.
- [13] Official records are at variance on this point. The 2/5 command diary indicates that the battalion continued the exercise on 16-17 April, returning the latter date. The 5th Marines report categorically indicates that

MARLEX XX was cancelled on 15 April, because of the weather.

[14] Now under a new regimental commander, Colonel Tschirgi, who had joined the 5th Marines on 14 April, succeeding Colonel Walt, newly assigned division G-3.

[15] Throughout the three-day action, gun tanks from Companies A and B (the forward reserve unit) and the regimental antitank company fired a total of more than 1,469 90mm shells to neutralize enemy positions and weapons.

[16] This same date was significant because it marked the first time a searchlight-guided night close air support mission was flown by 1st MAW in the division sector.

[17] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Apr–May 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 22 Apr–13 May 53; 1stMar ComdDs, Apr–May 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar ComdDs, May 53; 1st EngrBn ComdDs, Apr–May 53; Hermes, *Truce Tent*.

[18] News story (AP), Robert D. Tuckman, Seoul, dtd 12 May 53, 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, p. 1.

[19] The two divisions had also seen combat together early in WW II, at Guadalcanal. Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 27 Sep 70, hereafter *Heinl ltr*.

[20] Soon after assuming command of the Eighth Army, in mid-February, General Taylor had begun to stress the need for a complete eight-week training program for reserve divisions before reentering the line, detailed rehearsal of patrols, and more frequent rotation of artillery battalions to maintain their basic mobility. Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 391.

[21] The regiment was newly-commanded by Colonel Nelson, the former UN Personnel and Medical Processing Unit officer, who succeeded Colonel Adams as CO, 1st Marines on 1 May.

[22] On 23 April, 2/7 had relieved 1/7 in the left battalion sector and 1/7 became the regimental reserve. There was no change in 3/7's location in the right sector. These were the positions for transfer with the Turkish troops in early May.

[23] *ROKMC Comments*.

[24] Final relief was largely complete at this time. Exceptions were the 7th Marines reserve battalion, 1/7, relieved by TAFC forces at 0350 the following day and a few remaining Marine rear echelon elements that closed out the sector on 7 May.

[25] The 1st Tank Battalion was now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. McCoy, who had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Williamson on 16 April 1953.

[26] The tanks were not kept in exposed firing positions at all times. They were parked in protected, defilade revetments and were periodically driven into the firing slots to zero in on targets of opportunity. One tank might thus use any of several slots, and in cases of major attacks reserve tanks could reinforce. LtCol Robert J. Post ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May 70, hereafter *Post ltr*.

[27] Later, the Turkish forces were to place three battalions forward [adding the 2d], with a fourth in reserve.

[28] General Clarke had succeeded General Kendall on 10 April 1953.

[29] CG, I Corps msg to CGs, 1stMarDiv, 25th InfDiv, dtd 6 May 53, in 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. I, p. 2.

[30] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 5, Chap 6, No. 6, Chaps. 7, 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, May–June 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 22 Apr–30 Jun 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st EngrBn, HMR-161, VMO-6 ComdDs, May–June 53; Field, *NavOps, Korea*.

[31] Relief from the Eighth Army defense line provided the first opportunity for expansion of the 1st Marine Division amphibious training to regimental level. Amphibious training in battalion-sized MARLEXES had been under way since June 1952, upon transfer of the Marines to the western coastal sector. This had, in fact, “produced an extra dividend as [their] amphibious retraining program, conducted throughout the summer in the Tokchok Islands, was apprehensively observed by the enemy.” Field, *NavOps, Korea*, p. 430.

[32] CTE 90.85 constituted the MARLEX training element of TF-90, Amphibious Force Far East, redesignated

Amphibious Group Western Pacific earlier that month.

[33] 1stMarDiv msg to addressees in 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 22 May 53.

[34] MAR RCT LEX II, Opn Plan I, App. 1 to Annex B, dtd 9 May 53, p. 1, in 7thMar ComdD, May 53.

[35] DivInfo, HQMC, Biography of Gen Randolph McC. Pate, Jan 56, rev.

[36] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 15 May, 28-30 May 53; 11thMar, 2/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, May-Jun 53; 1st MAW ComdD, May 53; 1st MAW PIR 136-53, dtd 14-15 May 53 and PIR 150-53, dtd 28-29 May 53; VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311 ComdDs, May 53; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951-1953*.

[37] Total ammunition expenditure by the 11th Marines and the 25th Division artillery batteries was 11,527 rounds, to the Chinese output of approximately 10,000 rounds. 11thMarDiv ComdD, May 53, p. 13.

[38] 11thMar ComdD, May 53, dtd 27 May, p. 19.

[39] Some historians indicate that the 120th Division initially sent four battalions forward in the action, with two against the main objective, Vegas. Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 463.

[40] Discussing the Army employment of tanks in fixed MLR positions, Lieutenant Colonel Post recalled that although many Marine tankers were originally opposed to this procedure, "I am forced to confess that it worked well in that static defensive situation." A major advantage resulting from this change was that tanks effectively linked the MLR with rear area CPs through land line and radio. While initial preparatory fire often tore out the phone lines, the radios worked well and this was "generally the only reliable means of communications with the scene of action." *Post ltr*.

[41] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 462.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 464.

[43] 1st TkBn ComdD, May 53, p. 3.

[44] CG, I Corps msg to CG, 7thInfDiv, CG, 25thInfDiv, CG, 1stMarDiv, GOC, 1stComWelDiv, CG I Corps Arty, dtd 9 Jun 53 in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jun 53, App. I, p. 1.

[45] The strong likelihood of such attacks at this time had been noted by Eighth Army in a warning issued the previous day that reminded all commanders to be "particularly alert" at this time. CG, 8th Army msg to CG, 1stMarDiv and addressees, G-3 Jnl, dtd 24 Jun 53.

[46] This change was due to the existing policy of not having a United States unit serving under operational control of a Korean commander. Had the 7th Marines or other U.S. unit been so committed, it is expected that a provisional task force would have been created for the assignment, under a non-Korean commander. *PctFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-20. Actually, the 7th Marines alert on the 25th was of such short duration that no mention of it appears in the regimental command diary, although the fact is so noted in division records. The 1st KMC/RCT was ordered to move out from the Indianhead area at 1630 on 26 June and came under operational control of 1st ROK Division at 1540, 27 June. By 0100 the following day, it had relieved 11th ROK Regiment. *ROKMC Comments*.

[47] 11thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 15.

[48] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 4, Chap 10, No. 5, Chap 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53; 1/7 ComdD, Apr 53, App. IV, Rpt of Night Air Strikes; 1st MAW, MAGs-12, -33, VMAs-121, -212, -323, VMFs-115, -311, VMF(N)-513, VMJ-1 ComdDs, Apr-Jun 53; VMA-312 ComdDs, Apr-May 53; VMA-251 ComdD, June 53; VMO-6 ComdD, Apr 53; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*.

[49] CG, 1stMarDiv msg to CMC, dtd 18 Apr 53; in 1stMarDiv ComdD, Apr 53, App. II, p. 2.

[50] Confirmed damage assessment in this period: 75 enemy KIA, 5 WIA; 25 bunkers, 12 personnel shelters, 20 mortar positions, 32 automatic weapons positions, 1 ammunition bunker, and 1 37mm AA position destroyed; 1

supply area, 3 weapons damaged; 1,545 yards trenchline destroyed; and 190 secondary explosions or fires. Due to operating conditions, these figures represented only 80 percent of the total flights made on which TAOs confirmed results. VMF(N)-513 ComdDs, Apr-May 53.

[51] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-106, quoting 1stMarDiv Training Bulletin No. 5-53, dtd 10 Jun 53.

[52] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-70.

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 10-99.

[54] Also characterized by squadron members as the "tired old Tigercats" in reference to the war-weary, 1945-vintage aircraft. VMF(N)-513 ComdD, May 53, p. 6.

[55] CO, 19th Bomber Group (Col Harvey C. Dorney, USAF) msg to CO, VMF(N)-513 (LtCol Robert F. Conley), n.d., reading: "19th Bomber Group Airborne Commander and crews participating in attack on Sinanju Bridge Complex, 11 April, have high praise for night fighter protection. All feel that without their protection severe damage or loss of B-29's would have resulted." VMF(N)-513 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 6.

[56] Prior to early May, VMA-312 had been based aboard the USS *Bataan* (CVL-29). The carrier itself was scheduled for relief from the Korean Theater shortly before the new afloat MAG-12 squadron reported in, and a transfer was made by 312 to the new, larger escort carrier on 8 May.

[57] Comments *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-33: "Severe tactical operations weakness developed throughout the war in Korea which can be traced directly to the individual pilot rotation system. These weaknesses are inherent in any system which precludes pre-combat unit training of pilots in the tactical squadron with which they later go into combat. The situation is aggravated further when pilots, many of them inadequately pre-combat trained, are rotated through combat engaged units so rapidly that squadron esprit cannot develop to a degree which will insure a high standard of tactical efficiency."

[58] MAG-12, since 1 April, had been under Colonel Edward B. Carney, who assumed command upon reassignment of Colonel Bowman to the States.

[59] See Chapter VI.

[60] The magnitude of the VMJ-1 work load can be gauged by one day's peak effort of 5,000 exposures, which, if laid end to end, would cover a strip of ground one and one half miles long." *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, Chap. 10, p. 10-67.

[61] MAG-35 ComdD, May 53, p. H-2.

[62] VMA-312 ComdD, May 53, p. G-2.

[63] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-65.

[64] Between 15-18 April the west coast carrier squadron was under a FEAF order restricting normal interdiction missions. This was to protect UNC sick and wounded POWs in transit from China to Kaesong for final exchange at Panmunjom. VMA-312 air operations were held to CAS along the bomblines. "Marine fliers of the 'Checkerboard' squadron proved adept at this unusual role [CAS support missions along the front lines], and received a 'well done' from JOC Korea as the Corsairs flew more than 100 close air support sorties from 16-18 April." *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10, p. 10-110.

[65] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.

[66] Their respective locations were: 7th Division, at the extreme right of I Corps sector; and further east, the 3d Division occupied the corresponding right flank of IX Corps sector. VMF-311 concentrated on the 7th Division targets while VMF-115 efforts were devoted primarily to the 3d Division.

[67] MAG-33 ComdD, Apr 53, p. 51.

[68] This figure does not include sorties by VMA-312 (carrier-based), VMO-6, or HMR-161, the latter two under operational control of the 1st Marine Division.

[69] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 631.

[70] *Ibid.*

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] CG, FAF msg to CG, 1st MAW, dtd 17 Jun 53, in 1st MAW ComdD Jun 53 (Vol I), p. 3 and App. IV (Vol III).

[73] Presentation of this second Korean PUC to the 1st MAW was made by South Korean President Rhee in impressive ceremonies 12 June at MAG-33 headquarters, K-3. Among the many ranking military officials attending the ceremony was Admiral Radford, former CinCPacFlt, and newly-appointed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[74] MAG-12 ComdD, Jun 53, p. C-1.

[75] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 5, Chaps. 2, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 2, 9; WCIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; ECIDE(U) ComdDs, Oct 52-Jun 53; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Field, *NavOps, Korea*.

[76] Locations given on WCIDE map, Chapter II.

[77] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-128. See also Chapter II.

[78] An average day's enemy harassment consisted of 4, 7, 10, or at the most approximately 28 rounds of fire. WCIDE ComdDs, *passim*.

[79] See Chapter II and ECIDE map.

[80] ECIDE ComdD, Oct 2, p. 1.

[81] Field, *NavOps, Korea*, p. 434.

[82] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 2, p. 2-5.

[83] *Ibid.*

[84] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Feb 53, p. 1. Seventh Fleet intelligence estimated that there were no less than "21 active batteries emplaced on Wonsan Bay and within range of our islands." *Heinl ltr.*

[85] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jan 53, p. 3.


[86] Another record at this time was the spate of senior visiting officers. Seven times during the month no less than 15 flag and general officers had taken their turn inspecting the ECIDU command headquarters at Yo-do. Services represented were the Marine Corps, U.S. Army, Korean Marine Corps, ROK Navy, and ROK Army. "One local statistician computed the total number of stars for the month (one side of the collar only) as 38," the monthly report brightly noted. This was believed possibly an all-time high for any headquarters in the Korean theater, short of the Eighth Army. ECIDE(U) ComdD, Mar 53, p. 1.


[87] The previous T/O for the ECIDU was 5 officers and 30 enlisted USMC, 15 USN attached primarily to the Navy maintenance unit, and 55 officers and 1,217 enlisted KMCs.

[88] ECIDE(U) ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.

[89] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar ComdDs, Jun 53.

[90] 5thMar ComdD, Jun 53, p. 1.





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**Chapter 9. Heavy Fighting Before the Armistice**

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *Pac Flt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ltr to CMC 3/cpc, A16-13, n.d., Subj: Berlin and East Berlin Action, Rpt of, in 1stMarDiv Summary of Activities, Jul 53 (G-3) file (Records Group 127, 61A-2265, Box 74, FRC, Alex., Va.), hereafter *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 1-9 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53.
- [2] *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt.*, p. 1.
- [3] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- [4] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, July 53; 1stMar Div G-3 Jnls, 1-10 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 992, dtd 8-9 Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 2/11, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1st MAW, VMF-311, VMO-6, HMR-161 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; MacDonald, *POW*.
- [5] Discussing this phase of operations, the 2/7 commander stated: "As it turned out we were in great shape with both Marines and Turks fighting side by side in some instances. We had a great rapport with the Turks in that they had previously relieved 2/7. In fact, they made us honorary members of their battalions, giving each 2/7 Marine one of the unit patches." Col Alexander D. Cereghino ltr to Dir MCHist, HQMC, dtd 19 Jun 70.
- [6] On 7 July, 2/11 had become the direct support battalion for the 7th Marines
- [7] The ridge on which COP Berlin was located was split by two valleys. Both of these and the ridge itself served as approaches to the Marine MLR. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-169.
- [8] *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*, p. 2.
- [9] 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2.
- [10] Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*, p. 136.
- [11] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 9 Jul 53.
- [12] On 9 July Company C relieved Company B on the MLR in support of the 7th Marines. Both tank companies had been in action with the TAFC during the entire 60-day period the division was in I Corps reserve. Due to the rotation system, however, Baker Company had been on line longer and transferred to the rear ranks for a "much needed test and rehabilitation." 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, p. 3.
- [13] Later it was determined that only two were actually captured and they were subsequently repatriated. MacDonald, *POW*, p. 211.
- [14] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 10-17 Jul 53; 1st MarDiv PIRs 923-930, dtd 10-17 Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 2/5, 1/7, 3/7, 2/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hermes, *Truce Tent*.
- [15] The 1st KMC/RCT turned over its sector of the 1st ROK Division front to the 1st ROK Regiment at 1800 on 8 July and relieved the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment on 12 July. *ROKMC Comments*.
- [16] Spoonbill Bridge was submerged under 11 feet of water and destroyed by the pressure against it on 7 July. Flood conditions existed again on 14-15 July when the Imjin crested at 26 feet at Libby Bridge. Roads in the vicinity were impassable for three days. Resupply of forward companies was made via Freedom Bridge. One command diary writer, discussing the elaborate series of six moves made by 1/1 during July, added a touch of unconscious humor when he observed, "During the month, it seemed as if the Battalion was constantly on the move . . . Rain hampered these moves considerably. The weather between moves was generally clear and dry." 1/1 ComdD, July 53, p. 1; 1st TkBn ComdD, Jul 53, pp. 5, 11-12, 23; *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, pp. 9-68, 9-136.

[17] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 470.

[18] *ROKMC Comments*.

[19] One, who died that morning, was squad leader Sergeant Stephen C. Walter, posthumously presented the Navy Cross. Also awarded the nation's second highest combat medal for extraordinary heroism in a patrol action on 16–17 July was Private First Class Roy L. Stewart, of the 5th Marines.

[20] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 10, No. 5, Chap. 9, No. 6, Chap. 10; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIR 924, dtd 10–11 Jul 53; 1st MAW, MAGs–12, –33, VMAs–121, –212, –251, –323, VMF(N)–153, VMF-311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*.

[21] Marine Attack Squadron 251 (Lieutenant Colonel Harold A. Harwood) administratively joined MAG–12 on 6 July for 323, which had rotated back to MCAS, El Toro three days earlier. Movement of –251 aircraft to Korea could not take place, however, until 12 July. When VMA–323 (Major Woten) departed, the famous “Death Rattlers” had the distinction of being the Marine tactical (VMA/VMF) air squadron in longest service during the Korean War. The unit's final combat mission on 2 July brought its total Korean operations to 20,827 sorties and 48,677.2 hours. On 6 August 1950, roaring up from the flight deck of the USS *Badoeng Strait*, the VMA–323 Corsairs (then VMF-323) had launched their opening blow against North Korean installations, led by Major Arnold A. Lund, CO. The initial Marine air offensive action of the Korean War had been flown three days earlier by VMF–214. This unit was reassigned to CONUS in November 1951, giving the Death Rattlers the longest continuous service flight record. Jul 53 ComdD, 1st MAW, p. 2; *USMC Ops Korea-Pusan*, v. I, pp. 89–90, 98; VMF–214 Squadron History, HRB.

[22] Individual reports by the two groups result in a slightly higher figure. MAG–12 recorded 2,001 combat sorties (including more than 400 flown by carrier-based VM–332, not in the 1st MAW sortie rate). MAG–33 listed 945 sorties, or a combined group total of 2,946 for the month. ComdDs Jul 53 MAG–12, p. C-1 and MAG–33, p. I.

[23] Colonel Stacy was group commander until 24 July, when he was detached for assignment to 1st MAW as Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2. He was succeeded at MAG–33 by Colonel John L. Smith.

[24] Wing casualties for July 1953 were listed as three killed, seven missing, and two wounded in action. Names of enlisted crew members on flights are not always given in air diaries, which accounts for the discrepancies.

[25] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 933–934, dtd 19–21 Jul 53; 1stMar ComdD, Jul 53; 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11 3/11, 4/11, 1stTkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar Preliminary Special Action Report, period 8–27 Jul 53 in ComdD, Jul 53, hereafter 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs–12, –33, VMAs–121, –212 ComdDs, Jul 53.

[26] The 19th of July, ironically, was the date that truce negotiators working at Panmunjom had reached final agreement on all remaining disputed points. Staff officers were scheduled to begin drawing up details of the armistice agreement and boundaries of the demilitarized zone. *USMA, Korea*, p. 51.

[27] Company E and a detachment of the 81mm mortar platoon from the 2d Battalion remained on line. They were attached to the 3d Battalion when the sector command changed.

[28] Three Marine, one TAFC, and two Army battalions.

[29] At a routine conference that same morning attended by CG Eighth Army (General Taylor), CG I Corps (General Clarke) and CG 1st Marine Division, the earlier decision about not regaining the outposts was affirmed. General Taylor maintained the positions “could never be held should the Chinese decide to exert sufficient pressure against them” and recommended instead that the sector be organized on a wide front defense concept. Actually, following the initial Berlins attack of 7–8 July, a discussion about possible readjustment of the Marine sector defense had been initiated by General Pate. A staff study recommending that just such a “strongpoint”

concept (rather than the customary linear defense) be adopted had been completed by Marine Division officials on 15 July. I Corps staff members had concurred with the study and it was awaiting consideration by CG, I Corps when the Berlins were attacked for the second time on 19 July. *CG, 1stMarDiv, Berlin Rpt*, pp. 3–4.

[30] Commenting on this point, the I Corps commander noted: “The outposts in front of the MLR had gradually lost their value in my opinion because, between the MLR and the outposts, minefields, tactical wire, etc. had made their reinforcement and counterattacks very costly.” Resupply was thus restricted to narrow paths on which the CCF had zeroed in and “holding poor real estate for sentimental reasons is a poor excuse for undue casualties.” Gen Bruce C. Clarke, USA, ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 20 May 70.

[31] The new squadron commander had taken over 16 July from Major Braun.

[32] BGen Manly L. Curry ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 28 May 70, hereafter *Curry ltr*.

[33] Tank and artillery ammunition allocations had been cut 50 percent the afternoon of the 19th, with a subsequent reduction of normal destruction missions and elimination of H&I fires. ComdDs Jul 53 1st TkBn, p. 3 and App. 2, p. 4 and 1/11, p. 5.

[34] 3/7 ComdD, 20 Jul 53, p. 5. With respect to the number of enemy casualties that night, battalion, regimental, artillery support, and division command diaries given differing accounts. Other figures cited are: 9 CCF killed, between 234–284 estimated killed, and 630 estimated wounded.

[35] Subsequently, it was learned that of 56 Marines unaccounted for at the time, 12 were actually captured. They were returned after hostilities ended. Several men from 1st Marines units under operational control of the 7th were also taken in this battle. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 212, 268–269.

[36] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, dtd 21–28 Jul 53; 1stMarDiv PIRs 935–941, dtd 21–27 Jul 53 and 942, dtd 7 Aug 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11th Mar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, 3/7, 1/11, 2/11, 3/11, 4/11, 1st TkBn ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; MAGs–12, –33, VMAs–121, –212, –251, VMFs–115, –311 ComdDs, Jul 53; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Miller, Carroll, and Tackley, *Korea, 1951–1953*; Martin Russ, *The Last Parallel: A Marine’s War Journal* (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1957); USMA, *Korea*.

[37] One additional flight expending three 1,000-lb. bombs was made 22 July by a single AD from replacement squadron VMA–251. This was the unit’s first combat sortie in support of the 1st Marine Division after its indoctrination flights. VMA–251 also flew four MPQ flights for the 7th Marines in the early hours of 24 July, the day the outposts were attacked again. VMA–251 ComdD, Jul 53.

[38] A similar incident had occurred on 7 July when the 7th Marines was attacked while in the process of relieving a regiment of the 25th Infantry. *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9–58.

[39] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” Aug 53, p. 4.

[40] One participant remarked: “I think the Boulder City action . . . is the classic example of where the Army system worked well. The tanks were generally given credit for saving the position, and I seriously doubt our ability to have done the job under the previous system, which would have required the tanks to move to the scene after the action had begun.” *Post ltr*.

[41] In retaliation, between 2200 and 0600, the four tanks at Hill 119 drew 2,200 rounds of enemy mortar and artillery.

[42] The British were not hampered by any ammunition restrictions at this time. The excellent liaison between the 11th Marines and Commonwealth Division Artillery resulted in a humorous incident. After the battle of 24–25 July, a young British artillery officer arrived at a Marine regimental CP. He identified himself as being from the unit that had provided artillery support to the Marines the previous night, for which he was profusely thanked. Before his astonished audience he then unrolled an impressive scroll. This proved to be a bill enumerating the various types and amounts of projectiles fired and specifying the cost in pounds sterling. When he felt the Marine staff was properly flabbergasted, he grinned and conceded waggishly: “But I am authorized to settle for two

bottles of your best whiskey!” *Curry ltr.*

[43] Seventh Marines units were Companies D and E, and elements of the 4.2-inch Mortar Company.

[44] Casualty breakdown: 181 killed, 86 missing, 862 wounded and evacuated, 474 wounded (not evacuated), and 10 non-battle deaths.

[45] During this period 186 Marines were killed and 1,798 listed as casualties.

[46] Col Gordon H. West ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 1 Jul 70, hereafter *West ltr.*

[47] Minor realignments of the military line of demarcation were made in the center sector to include a few miles of territory gained by the Communists in their massive July offensive there. Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 292; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 640; Leckie, *Conflict*, p. 385.

[48] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 26-28 Jul 53; 1st MarDiv PIR 941, dtd 27 Jul 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53; 1stMar, 5thMar, 7thMar, 11thMar, 3/1, 3/5, 2/7, 4/11 ComdDs, Jul 53; 1stMar SAR “Berlins”; HRS Log Sheet, dtd 21 Aug 67 (n.t., about Korean War Casualties, prepared on request for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC); Leckie, *Conflict*; Capt C. A. Robinson and Sgt D. L. Cellers, “Land of the Morning Calm,” *Midwest Reporter* (Jul 68).

[49] Msg 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoting Cease Fire and Armistice Agreement, IUS-OP-9-53.

[50] *Ibid.*

[51] See Map 33 for Eighth Army dispositions on the last day of the war.


[52] 1stMar SAR “Berlins,” p. 5.


[53] The CO of the direct support artillery battalion in the defense of Boulder City, recalled that “on the evening of the 27th, with the Armistice only hours away, 2/11 received heavy Chinese artillery fire apparently directed at the batteries. Of the many rounds . . . 80% were duds and no damage was done. Numerous time fuzed shells detonated hundreds of meters above ground. We figured that they were using up old rounds to keep from hauling them back north.” *West ltr.*


[54] 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53 (Folder 3), CTF-91 msg to ComNavFE, dtd 27 Jul 53.


[55] 1stMarDiv, ComdD, Jul 53, p. 2. One Marine officer, Major General Louis Metzger, who at the time was Executive Officer, Kimpo Provisional Regiment, recalled how voices of the Chinese Communists’ singing and cheering drifted across the Han River that night. “It was an eerie thing . . . and very depressing.” MajGen Louis Metzger comments on draft MS, dtd 1 Jul 70, hereafter *Metzger comments.*

[56] 1stMarDiv ComdD, *op. cit.*, and Rees, *Korea*, p. 434.









**Operations in West Korea**  
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**Chapter 10. Return of the Prisoners of War**

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs, Jul–Sep 53; 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, Jul–Aug 53; 1st MAW ComdD, Jul 53; 11thMar, MAG–33 ComdDs, Jul 53; HRS Subject File VE23.2.S8 “CMC Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File #1 “Prisoners of War—Korea—General”; HRS Subject Files “Prisoners of War—Korea—News Clippings, folders #1, #2, #3”; Korea War casualty cards from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, Personal Affairs Br, Code DNA, HQMC; MacDonald, *POW*; Berger, *Korea Knot*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War—A Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1963), hereafter Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, quoted with permission of the publisher; Field, *NavOps, Korea*; Hermes, *Truce Tent*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*; USMA, *Korea*; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, “Big Switch,” *Leatherneck*, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov 53), hereafter Heinecke, “Big Switch”; *Life Magazine*, Jul–Aug 53 issues; *New York Times*, 5 Aug–6 Sep 53; *Washington Post*, 5 Aug–6 Sep 53.

[2] Marine Corps prisoners, including their unit designations and date of release (or death), are listed in MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 249–273.

[3] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9–134.

[4] Clarke, *Danube to Yalu*, pp. 298–299.

[5] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 44.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] For at least two Marines their return home was news in itself. Captain Paul L. Martelli, VMF–323, had been reported KIA. First Lieutenant Robert J. O’Shea, of division headquarters, the son of Marine Brigadier General George J. O’Shea (Ret), had also been thought dead by his family. He had been reported missing in July 1951 and had not been carried on the official POW list released the following December.

[10] HRB Subject File: “#1, ‘Prisoners Of War—Korea—General,’ ” HQMC Div Info release, n.d., n.t.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 48.

[14] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Aug 53, App. VI, p. 12.

[15] As the exchange got underway, General Mark Clark was on a trip to the U.S. Unable to greet the returning prisoners, as he had at LITTLE SWITCH, the UNC Commander had a welcoming letter waiting for each repatriate. A booklet especially prepared for returning POWs which contained a quick fill-in on world news and sports events they may have missed as prisoners was also given each returnee. *Washington Post*, dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 3.

[16] HRS Subject File: #1. “PRISONERS OF WAR—Korea—General,” *Washington News* article, dtd 26 Aug 53 from Panmunjom, “Officers’ Fate Worries Army,” by Jim G. Lucas.

[17] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 225.

[18] Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, p. 651.

[19] *Life Magazine*, v. 35, no. 11 (15 Sep 53), p. 42.

[20] Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, p. 651.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Life Magazine*, v. 35, no. 7 (17 Aug 53), p. 22.

[23] *Metzger comments*.

[24] Clark, *Danube to Yalu*, p. 299.

[25] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE 23.2.S8 “CMC Statements on Korean POWs”; HRS Subject File: “Korea—Korean War—General”; MacDonald, *POW*; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea—East-Central Front*, v. IV; Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967), hereafter Ridgway, *Korean War*; Heinecke, “Big Switch.”

[26] HRS Subject File: “VE 23.2.S8—CMC Statements on Korean POWs,” CMC Statement dtd 14 Apr 54, p. 2.

[27] Heinecke, “Big Switch,” p. 58.

[28] Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea*, v. IV, p. 201.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] In July 1951, fighting had quieted down all along the UNC front, as a result of truce talks initiated by the Communists. This conveniently provided the enemy, at that time hard-pressed, a much-needed breathing spell. The lull in ground fighting continued until late August when the truce negotiations were suspended.

[31] HRS Subject file “Korea—Korean War—General,” article *Washington Times-Herald*, dtd 20 Aug 53, by Walter Simmons, p. 27.

[32] For further details of this action, see MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 33–43; Montross and Canzona, *USMC Ops Korea—Chosin*, v. III, pp. 140–141, 225–235; and Reese, *Korea*, p. 162.

[33] Records indicate that 3 officers and 18 enlisted died while in captivity. Three officers and 3 enlisted POWs were also presumed to have died. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 257–259.

[34] The number of American servicemen returned was approximately 4,428 of 7,190 captured during the war. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1966 edition, “Prisoners of War—Korean War,” p. 519B. Earlier DOD “Tentative Final Report of U.S. Battle Casualties in the Korean War,” cited by MacDonald, *POW*, p. 230, indicated 7,140 Americans were captured, 4,418 recovered, and 2,701 died. Either way, the percentages remain the same.

[35] A similar mishap had dire consequences for Major General Dean of the Army. Cut off from his unit, he was attempting to return to the U.S. line. Lacking a compass he walked to the southwest—and thereby into NKPA hands—instead of the southeast where U.S. troops were then heavily engaged in the fierce battle of the Pusan Perimeter.

[36] A radio-jeep driver, Private First Class Barnett, was returning to his unit when he made a wrong turn and, instead, came upon a group of North Koreans. The enemy fired and halted the vehicle, quickly taking Barnett prisoner. Beaten, searched, and interrogated, the Marine was placed in a heavily-guarded cellar. For several days he was given only a few crackers to eat. On the third night, unaccountably, the Koreans took him along on an attack. As they neared the objective, Barnett noticed that all but one of his NKPA guards had gotten ahead of him. He deliberately fell, throwing a rock in the face of the nearby guard, and raced for safety. Successfully eluding his captors, Private First Class Barnett later rejoined his own forces. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 8–10.

[37] One Marine who had conducted volunteer AAA reconnaissance missions over North Korea was Lieutenant Colonel Charles W. May, CO of the 1st 90mm AAAGunBn. In December 1951 he was lost in such a mission—the same flight in which Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, of VMA–121, was captured. MajGen A. F. Binney ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14 Sep 66.

[38] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 139.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

[40] Recapitulation of facts from MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 260–269 and *passim*.

[41] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea—East-Central Front*, v. IV; Barclay, *Commonwealth*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

- [42] Although some American prisoners were taken in the summer of 1950, it was not until the late autumn that large numbers of men taken in several major engagements created a need for a permanent prison-camp system. Rees, *Korea*, p. 330.
- [43] Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, pp. 423–424.
- [44] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 63.
- [45] Rees, *Korea*, p. 330.
- [46] The Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War later adjudged Pak's to have been "the worst camp endured by American POWs in Korea." MacDonald, *POW*, p. 104.
- [47] Barclay, *Commonwealth*, p. 190.
- [48] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 127.
- [49] Negotiations broke down at this point. No other list was offered by Communist officials until the first exchange of wounded POWs, 17 months later, in the April 1953 LITTLE SWITCH operation. Montross, Kuokka, and Hicks, *USMC Ops Korea*, v. IV, p. 223.
- [50] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 138.
- [51] *Ibid.*, p. 164.
- [52] *Ibid.*, pp. 165–166.
- [53] *Ibid.*, p. 190.
- [54] *Ibid.*, p. 195.
- [55] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Barclay, *Commonwealth*; Clark, *Danube to Yalu*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.
- [56] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 61. One former Marine POW commented: "The 'lenient policy' applied to the 'liberated soldiers,' who had supposedly been 'liberated' from the American capitalists by the Chinese People's Volunteers. Unless a prisoner accepted this absurd concept, he was a 'war criminal' and subject to being treated as such. The North Vietnamese use this same characterization ('war criminal') in reference to U.S. POWs when queried by U.S. representatives at the Paris talks." MajGen John N. McLaughlin ltr to Dir, MCHist, HQMC, dtd 17 Jul 70.
- [57] Rees, *Korea*, p. 337.
- [58] There were, for example, instances when POW columns were being marched north and the NKPA treatment was so rough that "Chinese guards intervened to protect the prisoners from the North Koreans." MacDonald, *POW*, p. 43.
- [59] *Ibid.*, p. 60.
- [60] Rees, *Korea*, p. 334.
- [61] *Ibid.*, p. 335.
- [62] Davies was the only one of the four captured UNC chaplains who survived the war. During his imprisonment, he visited hospitalized POWs at the makeshift hospital near Camp 2 and held weekly community services. Another well-remembered chaplain was Captain Emil J. Kapaun, Chaplains Corps, USA. The Catholic priest stole food and sneaked into the enlisted compounds at Camp 5 to distribute it. His heroic behavior and selfless interest in his fellow-men were an inspiration to fellow POWs. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 77, 136.
- [63] Rees, *Korea*, p. 336.
- [64] *Ibid.*, p. 337.
- [65] Some analysts have pointed out that the Lenient Policy with its "emphasis on confession and repentance, and its propaganda exploitation" closely resembled POW indoctrination tactics developed by the Russians with their German prisoners in World War II. Rees, *Korea*, p. 338.
- [66] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

[67] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 175.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 180.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 182.

[70] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10; MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*.

[71] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 121.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

[73] A hollowed-out compartment of the leg was used to hide written records on deaths, atrocities, and other administrative data. Ultimately, the records were brought back to the U.S. The Air Force officer was a cousin, interestingly enough, of the chief Allied truce negotiator, General Harrison. MacDonald, *POW*, p. 227, and *Washington Post* dtd 5 Aug 53, p. 1.

[74] The crucifix was brought back to freedom by Camp 2 POWs and later placed in the Father Kapaun High School, in Wichita, Kansas. MacDonald, *POW*, p. 172.

[75] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

[76] Parachuting from his burning plane after it was struck by hostile AA fire, Captain Flynn duplicated an earlier action from World War II. In July 1945 he had bailed out of an aircraft similarly hit by fire while on a combat patrol over Japan. Biog File, HRS, HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC.

[77] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 185.

[78] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[79] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

[80] *New York Times*, dtd 30 Aug 53, p. 2.

[81] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 79.

[82] *Ibid.*

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

[84] *Ibid.*, p. 186.

[85] *Ibid.*, pp. 186–187.

[86] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MacDonald, *POW*; Korean War casualty cards from Statistical Unit, Casualty Section, HQMC.

[87] Leckie, *Conflict*, p. 389.

[88] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 84, reporting news stories in *The Washington Post*, dtd 27 Aug 53, p. 7, and *Saturday Evening Post*, 25 Aug 51, p. 109.

[89] Roster of this May 1951 escape group: 1stLt Cold, H&S/3/7; MSgt Dunis, Military Police Co; SSgt Harrison, MPCo; SSgt James B. Nash, MPCo; Sgt Charles W. Dickerson, 1stTkBn; Sgt Morris L. Estess, 1stSigBn; Sgt Paul M. Manor, A/7 MT Bn; Cpl Clifford R. Hawkins, 1stTkBn; Cpl Ernest E. Hayton, 1stTkBn; Cpl Frederick G. Holcomb, 11thMar; Cpl Leonard J. Maffioli, 1stTkBn; Cpl Theodore R. Wheeler, 1stServ Bn; Cpl Calvin W. Williams, Hq, 1stDiv; PFC John A. Haring, 7thMar; PFC Theron L. Hilburn, 1stTkBn; PFC Charles M. Kaylor, W/2/7; PFC Paul J. Phillips, A/7 MTBn; and PFC Charles E. Quiring, 5thMar. MacDonald, *POW*, pp. 260–263.

[90] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 169.

[91] *Ibid.*

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[93] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE23.2.S8 “CMC Statements on Korean POWs”; Biog File, HRB, HistDiv, HQMC; MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Elliot Harris, *The “Un-American” Weapon—Psychological Warfare* (New York: M. W. Lads Publishing Co., 1967); Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

[94] MacDonald, *POW*, p. 3.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 236–237, address to U.S. Army Chaplain School, 1957.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 88.

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 238.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 220.


[100] *Ibid.*, p. 223.

[101] *Ibid.*, p. 237.

[102] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

[103] *Ibid.*, p. 230.

[104] Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*, pp. 541–542.



MAP 34

K. White

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**Chapter 11. While Guns Cool**

- [1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul–Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type “C” Rpt—Defense of “C” Sector, 27 Jul–31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records currently retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 30 Jul–31 Aug 53; 1stMar Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul–31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (contains brief histories of 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, AT Co/1, 4.2-inch MortCo/1); 5thMar Hist of Def of “D” Sector, 27 Jul–31 Oct 53, Folder #3; 5thMar Hist, same period, Folder #4 (brief histories of 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, AT Co/5, 4.2-inch MortCo/5, DMZ Police Co/5), dtd 26 Dec 53; 7thMar Hist of Defense, 27 Jul 53–10 Feb 54 (brief histories 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, AT Co/7, 4.2-inch MortCo/7), Folder #5; 1stMarDiv-Type “C” Rpt—Defense of ‘C’” Div Sect, 27 Jul–31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st Engr Bn, 1st MT Bn, 7th MT Bn, 1st KMC Regt, 2d KMC Regt).
- [2] 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnl, dtd 2 Aug 53.
- [3] 1stMarDiv ComdD Aug 53, App. VII, Annex E to IMARD–00–10–53, p. 2.
- [4] 7thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #5.
- [5] Co H Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (2), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
- [6] 1st KMC Regt Rpt, dtd 7 Apr 54, p. 1, in 1stMarDiv Type “C” Rpt, Folder #6.
- [7] 5thMar Hist, dtd 26 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.
- [8] Other modifications and deadline extensions included: (a) withdrawal of all military forces, supplies, and equipment from coastal islands and waters north of the 38th Parallel within 5 days increased to 10 days; (b) Personnel and equipment to be evacuated from Korea only through those ports of entry specified in the armistice agreement. 1st MAW ComdD, Vol. III, Jun 53, Msg from CinCUNC to CG, AFFE, COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, info 1st MAW and others, dtd 17 Jun 53.
- [9] 1stMarDiv Folder “Withdrawal to and Organization of Post Armistice MBP 1MARD–OP–11–53–July 1953,” dtd 27 Jul 53.
- [10] *Ibid.*
- [11] Co H Rpt, *op. cit.*, p. 1, 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
- [12] 7thMar Hist, dtd 28 Jan 54, p. 5, Folder #5.
- [13] 1/7 Hist, in 7thMar Hist, p. 4, Folder #5.
- [14] 5thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #4.
- [15] 1/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #3.
- [16] 3/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
- [17] Co I Rpt of Post-Armistice Activities, Encl (3), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
- [18] *Ibid.*
- [19] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #4.
- [20] 1st EngrBn Rpt, dtd 19 Apr 54, p. 3, Folder #6.
- [21] Co G Rpt of Post–Armistice Activities, Encl (1), CO 3/5 ltr ser 00208, dtd 11 Jan 54, p. 1, in 3/5 Hist, Folder #4.
- [22] KSC units were deactivated shortly thereafter. Following a EUSAK order in August to begin discontinuing use of the Korean laborers, the number of KSC workers was reduced. By the end of October, the 103d KSC Regiment attached to the division had been completely disbanded.

- [23] 1/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.
- [24] 4.2-inch Mort Co/5, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.
- [25] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 3, Folder #4.
- [26] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul-31 Aug 53; Demilitarized Zone Police Co Rpt, dtd 18 Dec 53, in 5thMar Hist, Folder #4; MSgt Paul Sarokin, "DMZ Marines," *Leatherneck*, v. 37, no. 10 (Oct 54), hereafter Sarokin, "DMZ Marines."
- [27] With the exception of the DMZ Police, all persons entering the DMZ for salvage were required to check their weapons at the zone entry.
- [28] 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
- [29] 1stMarDiv ComdD, Sep 53, p. 2.
- [30] Sarokin, "DMZ Marines," p. 23.
- [31] The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission supervised all phases of implementation of the armistice. It consisted of the Secretariat and 20 neutral nations inspection teams staffed by personnel from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
- [32] 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnl, dtd 1 Aug 53, msg CG I U.S. Corps to addrees, dtd 31 Jul 53.
- [33] Demilitarized Zone Police Co/5 rpt, p. 4, in 5thMar Hist, Folder #4, *op. cit.*
- [34] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type "C" Rpt Defense of "C" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records retired in 61 A2265. Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 July-31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (contains brief histories of individual units); 5thMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, in Folders #3 and #4; 7thMar Hist of Defense of "D" Sector, 27 Jul 53-10 Feb 54, in Folder #5; 1stMarDiv Type "C" Rpt Defense of "C" Div Sect, 27 July-31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st EngrBn, 1stMTBn, 7th MTBn, 1st KMC Rgt, 2d KMC Rgt).
- [35] 2/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, dtd 12 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.
- [36] *Ibid.*
- [37] 5thMar Hist, pp. 6-7, Folder #3.
- [38] 1st EngrBn Rpt, Operations during 27 Jul-31 Oct 53, dtd 19 Apr 53, p. 4, Folder #6.
- [39] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, Chap. 10; AnlRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug 54; AnlRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55; 1st MAW ComdDs, Aug-Sep 53; MAGs-12, -33 ComdDs, Aug-Sep 53; MSgt Roy E. Heinecke, "Four Star Visit," *Leatherneck*, v. 37, no. 1 (Jan 54).
- [40] *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 6, p. 10-74.
- [41] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #1, p. 1.
- [42] 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #2, msg ComNavFE to all units, dtd 16 Aug 53.
- [43] AnRpt CMC to SecNav for FY 1954, dtd 11 Aug. 54, p. II-2.
- [44] The Task Force was subsequently redesignated as the 1st Marine Brigade, FMF, in May 1956.
- [45] A fuel bingo is the amount of fuel needed by a pilot to reach home base plus enough additional fuel to divert to an alternate airfield.
- [46] Field, *NavOps, Korea*, pp. 456-457.
- [47] AnlRpt of CMC to SecNav FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55, p. 3, quoting statement made by SecDef in Dec 54 on forthcoming departure of 1stMarDiv from FECOM.
- [48] Postwar commanders of 1stMarDiv to date had been Major General Robert H. Pepper, who succeeded General Pate, and served from 12 May 54-22 Jul 54; Major General Robert E. Hogaboom, 23 Jul 54-17 Jan 55; and General Twining, beginning 18 Jan 55.
- [49] CGs, 1st MAW, in the immediate post-armistice period were: Major General Megee, until 4 Dec 53; Major

General Albert D. Cooley, 5 Dec 53–25 Mar 54; Brigadier General McCaul, 26 May 54–24 Aug 54; Brigadier General Marion L. Dawson, 25 Aug 54–24 Sep 55; and Brigadier General Jack, 25 Sep 55–30 Jun 56.



**Operations in West Korea**  
**Notes**  
**Chapter 12. Korean Reflection**

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, 1951–1954, hereafter *Rpt of SecDef*; *PacFlt EvalRpts*, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; Marine Corps Board Study, An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), vs. I and II, hereafter *USMC Board Rpt*, held in James C. Breckinridge Library, MCDEC, Quantico, Va; A Summary of the General Officers' Conference, HQMC, 19–21 Aug 53, hereafter *Generals' Summary*, at Breckinridge Library; 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, Summary of USMC Action in Korean War; *USMC Ops Korea*, vs. I, II, III, IV, *passim*; Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962* (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1962), hereafter Heinl, *Soldiers of Sea*; Release “1st Marine Division ‘The Old Breed’” from 1st MarDiv folder, HRB RefFile; Release “Outline of the First Two Years of the 1st Marine Division in Korea,” HistBr, G–3 Div, HRS Folder; *CheVron*, MCRD, San Diego, Calif., v. 27, no. 31 (2 Aug 68), p. 4–5, “From Camp Pendleton to Inchon—18 Years Later, LtGen E. A. Craig, 1st Provisional Brigade CG, Recalls Experiences in Korea,” Cpl C. N. Damopoulos, hereafter *CheVron*.

[2] *CheVron*, pp. 4–5.

[3] *Ibid.* Even though Marine air and ground forces had on occasion operated jointly ever since the 1920s, air support in the early days was considered a subsidiary rather than integral part of the team. The doctrine of Marine close air support was formulated in WW II but not fully employed before the end of hostilities.

[4] Quoted in *USMC Ops Korea*, v. II, p. 46. Admiral Doyle was Commander of Amphibious Forces for the Pacific Fleet.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[6] Semianl Rpt of SecNav (1 Jan–30 Jun) 1953, p. 185.

[7] See Appendix E. Percentages represent Marine ground only; air casualties have been deducted. Of 1st MAW casualties of 432 (258 KIA, 174 WIA) during the entire war, 103 were KIA and 41 WIA during the April 1952–July 1953 period cited above.

[8] Lynn Montross, “Development of Our Body Armor,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 6 (Jun 55), p. 16.

[9] Statement by Gen Omar N. Bradley, USA, as quoted by Gen G. C. Thomas, Col R. D. Heinl, Jr. and RAdm A. A. Ageton, *The Marine Officer's Guide* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1956), p. 130.

[10] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 6, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 4, Chap. 10; *USMC Board Rpts*, vs. 1–11; *Generals' Summary*; AnlRpt SecNav 1952–1953; *USMC Ops Korea* vs. I–IV, *passim*; Monograph, *A Brief History of Marine Corps Aviation*, (HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1960); Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*; Sherrod, *Marine Aviation*; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part I, Pusan to the Reservoir: The Acid Test,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 41, no. 5 (May 57), pp. 22–27; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part II, January 1951 to the Armistice,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 41, no. 6 (Jun 57), pp. 22–26; Brochure, Change of Command Ceremonies, 11 Jul 56, First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, 1st MAW folder, HRB ref. file.

[11] Quoted in Andrew Geer, *The New Breed—The Story of the U.S. Marines in Korea* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), pp. 94–95, quoted with permission of the publisher.

[12] LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea,” Part I, *Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1957, p. 45.

[13] Technically, FAF had also been the controlling agency for air support during Pusan operations. Marine aviation units, as a component of an integrated Fleet Marine Force, however, were directed to fly support for 1st

ProvMarBrig as their highest priority. Except for the formality of checking in with the FAF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at JOC, 1st MAW units operated under the Marine Corps-Navy CAS doctrine. During the Seoul-Inchon campaign, control of air operations came under ComNavFE, since it was an amphibious operation, and the air system followed Marine-Navy doctrine. USMC Board Rpt, v. I, p. IV-B-9, 14.

[14] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9-82.

[15] "1st MAW in Korea," *op. cit.*, Part II, Jun 57, p. 23.

[16] With phaseout of the Corsairs in 1952, the VMF squadrons were subsequently redesignated as attack units.

[17] In August 1952, FAF had introduced a new policy limiting pilots to one pass on general support or interdiction missions and two passes on CAS flights.

[18] MajGen V. E. Megee, GO 153, dtd 27 Jul 53, quoted in 1st MAW, Part II, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

[19] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 6, Chap. 9; *USMC Board Rpt*, v. I; *Generals' Summary*; *USMC Ops Korea*, vs. I-IV, *passim*; Montross, *SkyCav*.

[20] Montross, *SkyCav*, p. 108.

[21] *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 10 (Oct 55), p. 61 quoting Eugene E. Wilson., *Wings of the Dawn* (Hartford, Conn.: Connecticut Printers, Inc., 1955).

[22] By contrast, in 1945 World War II campaigns the Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal had visited hospital ships and praised the air evacuation methods then in use when he commented, "I went aboard the *Samaritan*, where Navy surgeons and corpsmen were already dealing with the casualties from the day and night before." Capt Clifford P. Morehouse, *The Iwo Jima Campaign*, (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1946), p. 139.

[23] HistBr outline, p. 4.

[24] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 533-534.

[25] Hermes, *Truce Tent*, p. 184, comments: "In order to insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he [Ridgway] suggested that procurement be started on a scale that would permit manufacturers to expand production immediately."

[26] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, p. 534.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 535.

[29] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Semianl Rpts of SecDef (including SecNav), 1951-1955; *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; *USMC Board Rpt*, vs. 1-11; *Generals' Summary*; Brochure titled "Historical Outline of the Development of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 1941-1950 (Preliminary)," held at HRB; HRS Log Sheet of Korean War Statistics prepared for Policy Analysis Br., HQMC, dtd 21 Aug 67; Ernest H. Giusti, *The Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve in the Korean Conflict, 1950-1951* (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1967 ed.), hereafter Giusti, *Mobilization, MCR*; *USMC Ops Korea*, vs. I-II; Public Affairs Unit 4-1, *The Marine Corps Reserve—A History, 1916-1966* (Washington: Division of Reserve, HQMC, 1966); HQMC Press Kit, "Men of Color," issued July 1968; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1961).

[30] Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac, 1941-1950, p. 49.

[31] With 7,779 men in 1stMarDiv and 8,973 in the 2dMarDiv, even "had they been combined into a single unit, its numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one war-strength division." Giusti, *Mobilization, MCR*, p. 9.

[32] Semianl Rpt of SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 187.

[33] *USMC Ops Korea*, v. II, p. 23.

[34] Giusti, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[35] Even as late as July 1952, the influx of Class III volunteer reserve pilots, many of whom lacked adequate recent precombat flying experience, had presented a serious wing personnel problem and resulted in on-the-job training for pilots in the VMO-6 fixed-wing section. As another measure to improve squadron operational proficiency and partially correct weaknesses of the individual pilot rotation system and fast turnover, a 100-mission ceiling was inaugurated in February 1953. This applied to aviators in the VMF/VMA tactical units, with the exception of VMF(N)-513 pilots who were rotated after 60 missions.

[36] Assignment of Negro personnel in the armed forces continued to expand as a result of the President's 1948 Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity. The Far East Command in July 1951 and the European Command in April 1952 initiated steps towards the racial integration of combat units, followed by similar programs for service units. Semianl Rpt SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun 1952), p. 21.

[37] For detailed breakdown of figures, see 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW ComdDs, Apr 53 and *PacFlt Eval Rpt* No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9-54, Chap. 10, p. 10-29. Also, *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8-33 and No. 4, Chap 9, p. 9-26.

[38] Previously, Marine Corps views had been represented at the JCS level by the SecNavn or CNO.

[39] *Generals' Summary*, p. 1.

[40] Thomas, Heintz, and Ageton, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[41] *Generals' Summary*, p. 96.

[42] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt Eval Rpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9, 10; *USMC Board Rpt* vs. I-II; 1st Marine Division Training Bulletin No. 5-53, "Lessons Learned," dtd 10 Jun 53, hereafter *Lessons Learned 5-53*; *Generals' Summary*; Futrell, *USAF, Korea*; Heintz, *Soldiers of Sea*.

[43] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-2.

[44] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-5. Subsequently, the division's ground readiness was rated as excellent; a conservative estimate placed individual unit amphibious readiness at between 25 and 60 percent; and indicated a 30-day training period would bring the division to complete amphibious readiness. *Generals' Summary*, p. 53.

[45] *Lessons Learned 5-53*, p. 19.

[46] Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*, p. 107.

[47] *Lessons Learned*, *op. cit.*

[48] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-84.

[49] Basically, these consisted of a no-hostile-act three-mile circular area radiating from Kaesong; a six-mile radius forbidding FAF planes in the skies over Kaesong and another two-mile, no-fly radius over Panmunjom; and various other prohibitions on military craft, air-dropped leaflets, and firing of artillery to include propaganda shell leaflets.

[50] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-78.

[51] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 4, p. 9-37.

[52] *Generals' Summary*, p. 39.

[53] Between December 1950-July 1953, the 1st Marine Division took 2,445 *NKPA/CCF*, with an additional 656 enemy seized by its attached 1st KMC/RCT, or a total of 3,101. Marine capturing units included Headquarters Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, the three infantry regiments, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion. An additional 4,792 POWs were also taken by the 1st Division in the early Inchon-Seoul operations. G-1 Folder, Aug 53 (Box 4), "Personnel Periodic Rpt." No. 94, dtd 15-31 Aug 53; *USMC Board Rpt*, v. I, p. II-B-46.

[54] *Generals' Summary*, p. 39.

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] Much of the unwritten but basic policy mitigating against full use of Allied air superiority stemmed from the desire to employ "humanitarian" standards in the UNC war effort. Following WW II there had been wide criticism of the "moral wrong of massed air bombardment" as well as employment of the atomic bomb by the

U.S. to hasten the end of the war. The UNC goal, in Korea, was to avoid needless civilian casualties and for air strikes to be directed against purely military targets. Futrell, *USAF Korea*, p. 41.

[57] *Ibid.*, p. 402.

[58] Comments Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 430–431: “Despite the fact that responsible Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force commanders had decided that the rail-interdiction attacks would best accomplish the United Nations mission in Korea, Eighth Army subordinate commanders were gravely dissatisfied with the limitations [96 sorties daily for the entire Eighth Army front, decided upon by EUSAK-FAF in November 1951] placed on close support.” One of those dissenting subordinates at the time was CG, 1st Mar Div. Following the September 1951 heavy fighting in the Punchbowl area, General Thomas officially described the Marine division’s air support as unsatisfactory and stated his division had “taken unnecessary casualties because its air support had not been adequate or timely.” Average elapsed time between the division’s CAS requests and its 187 approved missions that month had been nearly two hours. Only 32 immediate air-support requests had been filled within 30 minutes.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 432.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 296.

[61] *Ibid.*, pp. 435–436.

[62] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9–58.

[63] Cagle and Manson, *Sea War, Korea*, p. 270.

[64] Futrell, *USAF, Korea*, pp. 437–438.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 434.

[66] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9–45.

[67] By contrast: in FY 1951, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1stMarDiv were 7,000 of total 14,028 CAS sorties, or 50 percent; for FY 1953, the figure was 4,912 of total 14,540 CAS sorties, or 32.4 percent. *Generals’ Summary*, Chart C, following p. 58.

[68] Quoted in Heinl, *Soldiers of Sea*, p. 647.

[69] MajGen V. E. Megee, “Tactical Air Support of Ground Forces,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), p. 17.

[70] The bomblines had been moved in to an average of 3–4,000 meters from the MLR in December 1952 to expose more targets to the “mass” strike treatment.

[71] *PacFlt EvalRpt* Chap. 1, No. 6, p. 1–15.

[72] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 10–3.

[73] For a penetrating discussion of interservice problems dealing with air-ground liaison and communications, use of FACs, and CAS capability, etc., see U.S. Congress, Rpt of Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on Armed Services, Otis G. Pike, Chairman (House of Reps., 89th Congress, 1 Feb 66), Washington: GPO, 1966.

[74] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *PacFlt EvalRpts* No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9; *Generals’ Summary; Lessons Learned 5–53*; 1stMarDiv PIR 942, dtd 7 Aug 53; 1st MAW PIR 127–53, dtd 7 May 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy Ground Situation #1–53 (end-of-war analysis); 1st MAW PIR 169–53, dtd 18 Jun 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy Air Situation 1–53, dtd 20 May 53 (end-of-war analysis); 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI: Comments on Tactics, Techniques, and Equipment, pp. 1–12; J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime—The History and Lessons of Korea* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1969); S. L. A. Marshall, *The Military History of the Korean War* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1963); S. L. A. Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill—The American Fighting Man in Action, Korea, Spring 1953* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1956), quoted with permission of the publisher; Ridgway, *Korean War*; Hicks, *Outpost Warfare*; Batterton, *Korea Notes*.

[75] If the enemy advanced closer than 50 yards, by closely following under heavy preparatory fires, he could

- penetrate the position. At this close range, normal box-me-in artillery fires were not close enough to break up the attack. *Lessons Learned 5-53*, p. 10.
- [76] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-29.
- [77] Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill*, p. 24.
- [78] *Ibid.*, p. 116.
- [79] *Lessons Learned, 5-53*, p. 11.
- [80] 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4.
- [81] Batterton, *Korea Notes*, p. 34.
- [82] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6 p. 9-58 citing Eighth U.S. Army PIR No. 948.
- [83] *Lessons Learned 5-53*, p. 2.
- [84] Col F. P. Henderson, "Amphibious Artillery of the Future," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 12 (Dec 55), p. 30.
- [85] See Chapter VI.
- [86] Marshall, *Military History of Korean War*, p. 72.
- [87] 1st MAW PIR 127-53, Encl (1), p. 1.
- [88] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-41.
- [89] *Ibid.*, No. 5, p. 8-31.
- [90] *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-82.
- [91] *Ibid.*
- [92] Marshall, *Pork Chop Hill*, pp. 20-21.
- [93] Marshall, *Military History of Korean War*, pp. 77, 78.
- [94] Semianl Rpt SecNav (1 Jan-30 Jun), 1951, p. 187.
- [95] Joy, *Truce Negotiations*, p. 39.
- [96] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-173, *passim*.
- [97] Col J. C. Murray, "Prisoner Issue in the Korean Armistice Negotiations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 39, no. 9 (Sep 55 ), p. 30.
- [98] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- [99] See "1stMarDiv, 1st KMC Regt. and Its Relationship to the 1stMarDiv," "SAR" File (Korea), Type "C" Rpt.
- [100] The course of the war, particularly its protracted and static nature, had led to growing national apathy and opposition, particularly on the U.S. home front. In late 1950, national opinion polls found that 80 percent of the people were in favor of the war and seven months later that 67 percent were against it. On the Korean front lines, morale was generally highest during heavy ground actions or large scale air attacks. *Washington Post*, dtd 12 Jul 70, p. A-17; *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 1-16.
- [101] Rees, *Korea*, p. 33.
- [102] Ridgway, *Korean War*, p. viii.
- [103] Rees, *Korea*, p. 431. In the three years of war, North Korea had gained 850 square miles of territory southwest of the Parallel, while the ROK acquired 2,350 square miles north of the original June 1950 boundary.
- [104] Collins, *War in Peacetime*, p. 175.
- [105] Official records show that the 1stMarDiv inflicted approximately 59,805 CCF casualties (11,957 KIA; 15,111 estimated WIA or KIA; 32,643 estimated WIA; and 94 POWs) during the Apr 52-Jul 53 period on the western front. For the same time, Marine infantry casualties were approximately 13,000 plus some 2,500 for its 1st KMC/ RCT.
- [106] Marshall, *Military History of Korean War*, p. 2.
- [107] Anl Rpt of the CMC to SecNav, FY 1955, p. 3.
- [108] Collins, *War in Peacetime*, pp. 3-4.





(12/28/50) Hungnam is destroyed by a Navy demolition team as UN forces evacuate the port city.



(9/23/51) USS *Toledo* (CA-133) fires 5 inch salvo at enemy installations in Wonsan, Korea.



(9/14/50) USS *Rowan* (DD-782) escorts USS *Mt. McKinley* (AGC-7) off the Korean coast en route to Inchon.



(3/18/52) The heavy cruiser USS *St. Paul*, (right) goes alongside the battleship *Wisconsin*, (center) to transfer wounded South Korean Marines while destroyer *Buck*, (left) gets her mail.



(8/7/51) The destroyer *Mason* is dwarfed by the towering, mist covered mountains of North Korea. *Mason* was teamed with the battlewagon *New Jersey* on a special mission of bombarding Communist troops lodged in the ridges pictured in the foreground when this photo was taken.



(7/1/51) On 29 June 1950, cruiser *Juneau* (CLAA-119) is the first Navy ship to fire her guns at the North Korean invaders.



USS *Juneau* (CLAA-119) at anchor in Kagoshima Wan on 25 June 1950, first day of the war.



Destroyer *Lyman K. Swenson* (DD-729) at sea in 1953.



(1/10/53) Providing anti-aircraft and anti-submarine protection for ships of Task Force 77, destroyer *Collet* cuts through the Sea of Japan off the coast of Korea.



Destroyer *Collet* (DD-730) in the 1950s.



Destroyer *Mansfield* (DD-728) in 1953.



(12/14/50) A temporary wooden bow is attached to USS *Mansfield* after losing her bow to a mine in Korean waters.



The destroyer *Dehaven* (DD-727), decks awash in a rough sea, refuels from an aircraft carrier off the coast of North Korea, typifying Navy "on the spot" replenishment.



(10/12/51) The veteran heavy cruiser *Toledo* takes its battle station off the East coast of Korea as part of Task Force 77.



(12/10/52) USS *Rochester* (CA-124) in a Japanese port preparing for her third cruise in Korean Waters. The heavy cruiser compiled an impressive record in two previous tours in the Far East, having aided in the amphibious landing at Inchon and the evacuation of Hungnam.



(1/24/51) Officers and enlisted men of the cruiser *Rochester* line the decks of the ship on arrival at Pearl Harbor to watch hula dancers performing on the dock



Heavy cruiser *Rochester* (CA-124) in 1952.



(10/21/50) USS *Helena* (CA-75) fires a broadside salvo at Chong Jin, Korea, 39 miles from the Soviet border.



Heavy cruiser *Helena* (CA-75) in the 1950s.



A cruiser and destroyer take a break from combat operations to refuel from a U.S. Navy oiler in 1951.



Destroyer *George K. MacKenzie* (DD-836) while at sea in February, 1951.



(12/23/50) The heavy cruiser *Saint Paul* fires a salvo turning night into day.




In this photograph, six vessels moored alongside the repair ship Jason represent four nations in the UN naval forces operating off Korea. The vessels are: USS *Hamner*, USS *Gloucester*, Colombian ship ARCC *Amirante Padilla*, Australian HMAS *Murchison*, South Korean ROK *Taedong*, and USS *Dextrous*.



(6/18/52) The battleship *Iowa* (center) takes fueling lines from a Navy tanker (top) during refueling operations off the coast of Korea. A destroyer (bottom) takes fuel from the *Iowa*.



(12/13/52) USS *Waxbill* (AMS-39) under fire by enemy shore batteries while laying a smoke screen in Wonsan Harbor, Korea.



(12/28/50) USS *Begor* (APD-127) lies at anchor ready to load the last UN landing craft as a huge explosion rips harbor installations at Hungnam.



(5/19/51) British cruiser Kenya replenishes its depleted fuel and ammunition stores in a Far East port after completing an extended cruise in Korean waters. The cruiser is a unit of the United Nations Blockading and Escort Force commanded by RADM Allan E. Smith, USN.



(1/23/53) The gun captain of this ice-covered mount inspects the de-icing job before him aboard the carrier *Oriskany* (CVA-34) in Korean waters.



(4/2/52) The battleship *Wisconsin's* 40-mm guns open fire on a Communist railroad train as the Seventh Fleet flagship presses her attack on Red transportation facilities close to the coastline.



Battleship *New Jersey* sailors watch F4U Corsair fighters landing aboard the aircraft carrier *Boxer* (CV-21).



(5/14/52) Row after row of 16-inch powder charges on the deck of USS Iowa at a port in southern Japan.



(7/1/50) Crewmen stand alert at the gun turrets of the cruiser *Rochester* (CA-124).



Destroyer *Ernest G. Small* (DD-838) in 1952.



Damage control efficiency saved the destroyer *Smalls* when she struck a mine off the coast of Korea. The destroyer backs slowly toward Japan where temporary repairs will make the ship seaworthy for a trip to the United States.



The destroyer *Ernest G. Small* (DD-838), with its temporary bow, at dock in 1951.



(10/24/50) Two Seventh Fleet minesweepers work in a North Korean minefield at Wonsan, prior to invasion.



The crew of a disposal boat brings in a mine at Wonsan Harbor, Korea.



(8/22/50) The 8-inch guns of No. 3 turret on a U.S. Navy cruiser take a North Korean military target under fire off the east coast of Korea.



(10/16/50) An unscathed church amid the rubble of Pohang verifies the pin point accuracy of U.S. naval bombardment.



The American cruiser *Toledo* on the Korean East Coast during a shore bombardment.



An LSMR (Landing Ship Medium, Rocket) sends up flaming rockets.