

CHAPTER 18

Logistics, 1970-1971

Supplying III MAF—FLC Phases Down—The End of Naval Support Activity Da Nang Engineer Support—Motor Transport—Medical Services

Supplying III MAF

Throughout its last year and a half of operations in Vietnam, III MAF continued to rely for supply, maintenance, and service support on Force Logistic Command (FLC). At the beginning of 1970, Brigadier General Mauro J. Padalino commanded FLC. A New Jersey native and combat veteran of World War II and Korea, Padalino as a colonel in 1965 had headed FLC's predecessor, the Force Logistic Support Group. The following year, he helped plan the organization of Force Logistic Command. He subsequently spent two years at the Marine Corps Supply Center, Barstow, California, and in June 1968 took command of the 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR) on Okinawa. He received his star in September 1969 and returned to Force Logistic Command two months later.

General Padalino had under him 396 Marine and 18 Navy officers and 7,391 Marine and 145 Navy enlisted men, most of them concentrated at Camp Books, the large FLC cantonment northwest of Da Nang. FLC, under operational control of III MAF and administrative control of FMFPac, was organized around the Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Maintenance Battalions of the 1st Force Service Regiment and also included Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) B, the 7th Motor Transport Battalion, and the 1st and 3d Military Police Battalions.*¹

The three 1st FSR battalions conducted most of the centralized logistic activities of FLC. Headquarters and Service Battalion provided administrative, communications, and motor transport assistance to other elements of Force Logistic Command and units of III MAF. It also operated the III MAF Transient Facility, through which passed all incoming and outgoing personnel, and the R&R Processing Center. Supply Battalion received, stored, and distributed all types of supplies. It also manned a central control point for stores accounting, operated ammunition supply points (ASPs), baked most of III MAF's breadstuffs, and packed and cleaned equipment for embarkation. Maintenance Battalion repaired all types of Marine ordnance and ground equipment, except for items re-

*The MP units were under III MAF operational control. For details of their operations, see Chapter 14.

quiring extensive overhaul or rebuilding, which were shipped to 3d FSR on Okinawa or to bases in Japan and the United States.*² The 3d FSR also provided critical supply, maintenance, and service support, and dispatched contact teams as requested by Commanding General, FLC and approved by Commanding General, FMFPac.

Force Logistic Support Group B, also headquartered at Camp Books, directly supported the 1st Marine Division. Composed of the Headquarters and Service, Maintenance, Supply, and Truck companies of the 1st Service Battalion,** the FLSG maintained logistic support units (LSUs) at Hill 55, An Hoa, and LZ Baldy to serve respectively the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines. Each LSU consisted of two officers and an average of 65 enlisted Marines. It drew rations, fuel, and ammunition from FLC for issue to the battalions of its supported regiment, repaired many equipment and ordnance items, and operated a laundry. At Chu Lai, Sub-Unit 1 of FLSG-B, redesignated LSU-4 in April, issued ammunition and provided maintenance and laundry service for the 9th Engineer Battalion, MAGs -12 and -13, and the 1st Combined Action Group.***³

*Under Marine Corps doctrine, a force service regiment furnishes all types of logistic support to a division, a wing, and force troops when deployed, and when reinforced provides the nucleus for a MAF logistics group. The FSR requisitions, stores, and issues all classes of supplies to the ground forces and to Marine airbases. When authorized, the FSR also coordinates with other Services and theater commands to obtain common item support. The division and wing, through their own organic logistic units, perform most of their own internal maintenance and supply distribution. A unique feature of the FLC, as organized in Vietnam, was the assimilation of the divisions' organic service battalions into the centralized FLC structure as the nucleus of the FLSG.

**This was the organic logistic support element of the 1st Marine Division but in Vietnam such battalions were merged into FLC, which meant, among other things that they ceased to maintain their own separate supply stocks and accounts.

***Until the 3d Marine Division redeployed in November 1969, FLC had controlled two FLSGs: FLSG-A/1st Service Battalion at Da Nang and FLSG-B/3d Service Battalion at Dong Ha and Quang Tri. In November 1969, the 3d Service Battalion redeployed to Okinawa. FLSG-A then was deactivated and FLSG-B moved to Da Nang, where it assumed control of the 1st Service Battalion. FMFPac MarOps, Overview, pp. 56-57; FLSG-B ComdC, 15Mar66-16Sep70, in FLC ComdC, Sep70.

The entire complex III MAF logistic effort was built on the speed and accuracy of automated data processing. A computer arrived in Vietnam with the first logistic support elements. By early 1970, III MAF had consolidated control of the three data processing platoons (DPPs) now attached to FLC and a separate data processing section (DPS) with the 1st MAW under an Automated Services Center (ASC). The ASC used 500 separate computer programs to carry out over 300 record-keeping tasks. Computers produced financial reports, kept warehouse locator files and supply inventories up to date, did much of the requisitioning of supplies, and maintained unit pay records.⁴

The division and wing had their own logistic capabilities and responsibilities. Since the 1st Marine Division had given up its organic 1st Service Battalion to FLC and maintained no separate supply stock or account of its own, each of the division's battalions drew supplies and services from FLC, either directly or through a logistic support unit. Elements of a single battalion could draw from different elements of FLC. During March 1970, for example, the forward command post and Company L of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, located on Hill 65, received daily resupply directly from FLC by truck. Company I of the battalion, on Hill 37, was resupplied by truck from Hill 65. Company K, split between Hills 52 and 25, depended on helicopter lifts from the An Hoa LSU for its resupply. Company M, at An Hoa, drew directly from the LSU there.⁵

Helicopter resupply of the division depended heavily on the activities of the 1st Shore Party Battalion.* This battalion, organic to the division, deployed a company with each infantry regiment. Shore party helicopter support teams (HSTs) at each LSU assembled and prepared supplies for helicopter pickup. Landing zone control teams with the rifle companies located and marked LZs, briefed the crews of incoming helicopters, and supervised unloading. Liaison teams at battalion CPs received control teams; battalion commanders or S-4s consolidated the requests and assigned delivery priorities.⁶

When 1st Shore Party Battalion was redeployed during Keystone Bluejay in March 1970, Company C of the battalion remained in Vietnam, fulfilling the vi-

tal HST role until final redeployment on 30 April 1971. The nucleus of an HST team usually included two or more MOS 1381 shore party men and one or more communicators. The actual composition depended on such factors as the size of the supported unit, the permanency of the LZ, and the helicopter activity anticipated. Major James G. Dixon, who commanded Company C from August to November 1970, recalled the performance of his HST Marines:

Corporals and sergeants and even lance corporals did yeoman work as "mini" air controllers at their respective LZs. They directed the movement of the helicopters; marshaled and positioned cargo; rigged assorted supplies and equipment; manifested and directed passengers; and effected the hookup of external slingloads. All these responsibilities combined to make the LZs hubs of activity and lifelines of the supported unit at remote fire support bases such as Ryder, Hill 510, and Dagger.*⁷

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing drew upon both Navy and Marine sources for logistic support. The wing received nonaviation Marine Corps supplies and ammunition through Force Logistic Command; for replacement aircraft, spare aviation parts, most vehicles, and aircraft maintenance support, however, it relied on a complex of Navy agencies. Commander Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet (ComNavAirPac), a subordinate of CinCPacFlt, was ultimately responsible for aviation logistic support of the 1st MAW, as well as of fleet carrier aircraft groups.** The wing requisitioned its Navy material from the Navy Supply Depots (NSDs) at Yokosuka, Japan, and Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines.*** Until September 1970, NSD Yokosuka, and after that date, NSD Subic, contracted for and oversaw major repair and rebuilding

*Assuming another role previously handled by the battalion, Company C also provided forklift support to division units.

**Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific Fleet, was a "type commander" under CinCPacFlt, responsible for Pacific Fleet aircraft, carrier aircraft, and other assigned aviation units and facilities, including those of the Marines. Responsibilities of a type command, which FMFPac also was, included primarily logistic readiness and training. ComNavAirPac, ComdHist, 1970, OAB, NHD.

***In May 1970, Pacific Fleet decided to shift all aviation logistic support for units in the Western Pacific from NSD Yokosuka to NSD Subic. This changeover began on 1 September 1970 and was completed by mid-January 1971. All requisitions for aviation supplies after 1 September 1970 went through Subic. Commander, Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Operations of Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, FY 71, pp. 4-7; U.S. Naval Supply Depot, Subic Bay, R.P., ComdHist, 1 Jan-31Dec70, pts. I and II; U.S. Naval Supply Depot, Yokosuka, ComdHist 1970 and ComdHist 1971; all in OAB, NHD.

*Shore party battalions were established originally to control movement of men and equipment across the beach. As helicopters became part of Marine amphibious operations, the battalions expanded their missions and training to include support of airborne assaults.

of Marine and Navy aircraft at plants in Japan. On Marine logistic support questions, the wing usually dealt directly with FMFPac, and on Navy matters it communicated through FMFPac with ComNavAirPac and Naval Air Systems Command. Complicating the situation, Commander, Fleet Air, Western Pacific (ComFAirWestPac) occasionally gave instructions directly to the wing or its subordinate units regarding transfers of individual aircraft between Marine squadrons and fleet carriers. III MAF became involved in some wing logistic matters, but the scope of its responsibility was unclear. Colonel William C. McGraw, Jr., 1st MAW G-4, commented in mid-1970:

Sometimes you wonder who you're supposed to go ask something. We normally would come through [FMFPac]. A couple of times we got criticized for it because it should have gone to III MAF. I'm not real clear in my mind just what functions they get into . . . They shouldn't be worried about aircraft assignments or aircraft maintenance or supply problems or anything like this.⁸

Within the wing, each aircraft group stored and issued its own supplies and did routine maintenance and limited repair of its aircraft. Civilian teams from naval aircraft repair facilities, attached to the groups under the Special Techniques for Repair and Analysis of Aircraft Damage Program, augmented the groups' battle damage repair capabilities. The wing shipped aircraft to Japan for major rebuilding and periodic rehabilitation. Marine Wing Support Group 17 furnished Marine Corps supply, postal, disbursing, and post exchange service for all 1st MAW elements, maintained ground equipment and SATS launching and recovery systems, and conducted all shipment of aircraft into and out of Vietnam.* The wing operated the Semi-Automatic Checkout Equipment (SACE) complex at Da Nang, which diagnosed the ills of sophisticated avionics systems.⁹

The III MAF logistic system, perfected during five years of warfare, in the main worked smoothly. Temporary shortages of 175mm ammunition, some artillery and vehicle spare parts, and radio batteries occurred; III MAF, however, quickly remedied them by borrowing from the Army or by securing emergency shipments from Marine supply facilities on Okinawa or in the United States. Many infantry battalions suffered from a chronic shortage of qualified supply

officers and had difficulty obtaining prompt replacement of wornout clothing. Nevertheless, for the most part, unit commanders had few major supply worries. As Colonel Edmund G. Dering, Jr., the 7th Marines commander, put it: "The ammo flows in there . . . You never have to think about it. POL flows in there; you never have to think about it." Indicative of the general abundance and quality of supply, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, while operating in the Arizona Territory in February 1970, received weekly helicopter lifts of "frozen steaks, containers of milk, bread and all the onions, catsup, salt, needed for a company-size cookout every Sunday."¹⁰


FLC Phases Down

As III MAF combat forces diminished during the various redeployments, so did Force Logistic Command and the support elements associated with it. The 1st Shore Party Battalion redeployed during February 1970, in Keystone Bluejay. It left its Company C, attached to the 1st Engineer Battalion, to continue supporting the 1st Marine Division. During February, also, the FLC deactivated its 7th Separate Bulk Fuel Company and transferred its personnel to the new Bulk Fuel Company in the Supply Battalion. In March, FLC closed the logistic support unit on Hill 55. The 1st Marines, which had moved its CP and the bulk of its forces northward to relieve the 26th Marines, now drew its supplies and maintenance support directly from FLC. Through redeployment and ordinary rotation, FLC reduced its total strength by about 2,000 Marines during Keystone Bluejay.¹¹

Force Logistic Command underwent another major reduction in Keystone Robin Alpha, including redeployment of the 1st Service Battalion and deactivation of FLSG-B. In mid-May, while planning for the new redeployment was still going on, the FLSG deactivated its Supply and Maintenance companies. It transferred Marines from these companies stationed at the LSUs to the Supply and Maintenance Battalion of FLC. During July, FLC completed plans for deactivating FLSG-B and transferring control of the LSUs to Supply Battalion. FLSG-B's Truck Company ceased operations on 15 August. On 1 September, Supply Battalion assumed operational and administrative control over the logistic support units. By 15 September, all 1st Service Battalion companies had been reduced to zero strength, and on that date the battalion colors left Vietnam for Camp Pendleton.

As FLSG-B prepared for deactivation, LSU-1 at An Hoa and LSU-4 at Chu Lai gradually reduced activity

*MWSG-17 redeployed to Iwakuni in July-August 1970, leaving in Vietnam its structural Fire Department, Postal, Disbursing, EOD, and Data Processing sections, among others. MWSG-17 ComdCs, Jul-Aug70.



and transferred surplus supply stocks to Da Nang. On 2 August, anticipating the evacuation of An Hoa, FLC established a new battalion-size LSU-5 on Hill 37, initially to support 5th Marines units relocating there and later to serve the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines. The An Hoa LSU closed on 21 September. On 15 October, as the last Marines pulled out of Chu Lai, LSU-4 turned its ammunition supply point over to the U.S. Army and disbanded.¹²

During Keystone Robin Alpha, two of FLC's data processing platoons redeployed. They left behind DPP-16, with its IBM Model 360/50 computer, at FLC, and Data Processing Section 28, equipped with an older IBM 1401, at 1st MAW. These two data processing units, which combined under one roof at FLC in March 1971, continued supporting III MAF and then the 3d MAB until redeployment of the last Marine forces.¹³

Initial Keystone Robin plans had called for Force Logistic Command to reduce the strength of 1st FSR to 2,856 Marines by 15 October. FLC itself was to be deactivated by mid-December and replaced by a 2,000-man Provisional Service Battalion, Da Nang. This plan was based on the assumption that another regiment would redeploy in Keystone Robin Bravo between 15 October and 31 December, coincident with withdrawal of III MAF, 1st Division, and 1st MAW Headquarters and activation of 3d MAB. In August, after MACV exempted the Marines from Keystone Robin Bravo, III MAF revised its plans, so as to retain FLC through the remaining redeployments, with 2,800 men in the FSR plus the 1st MP Battalion and a reinforced company of force engineers—a total strength of around 3,800.

To lessen administrative manpower requirements and keep as many of its remaining Marines as possible "down at the bottom . . . kicking boxes," FLC reduced the number of companies in its Headquarters and Support, Supply, and Maintenance Battalions. Maintenance Battalion had deactivated one company in July due to a shortage of replacements. In mid-October, Headquarters and Service Battalion eliminated its Communications Company, replacing it with a platoon attached to its Support Company. Supply Battalion at the same time reduced its Bulk Fuel, Ammunition, and Ration companies each to a platoon under its Supply Company.¹⁴

At the conclusion of these reductions, on 23 October, Brigadier General James R. Jones replaced Brigadier General Padalino as FLC commander. Jones,

a Texan and veteran of Guam and Iwo Jima, like Padalino was no stranger to III MAF logistics. During 1967-1968, Jones had commanded successively FLSG-A and FLSG-B and served as G-3 of Force Logistic Command. In September 1969, he had followed Padalino to command 3d FSR. Promoted to brigadier general on 15 August 1970, Jones again followed Padalino to FLC two months later.

FLC phased down slowly during Keystone Robin Charlie and Oriole Alpha. On 4 March 1971, as the 5th Marines redeployed, LSU-3 at LZ Baldy ceased operations. The following month, Maintenance Battalion reduced three of its companies to platoons. On 23 April, the flag of the 1st Force Service Regiment was transferred to Camp Pendleton, but the regiment's three battalions stayed at Da Nang to finish the massive job of shipping out five years of accumulated Marine Corps material.* During May and June, the FSR battalions and Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion gradually reduced their troop strength while continuing to support the 3d MAB. The last element of the shore party company redeployed on 22 June. By the 26th, Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Maintenance Battalions, their tasks completed, had been reduced to zero strength and deactivated.

The End of Naval Support Activity Da Nang

Force Logistic Command was only one component of the United States military logistic system in I Corps. For most supplies and for a wide variety of services, III MAF depended on Naval Support Activity (NSA) Da Nang.

At the end of 1969, NSA Da Nang, commanded by Rear Admiral Robert E. Adamson, Jr., consisted of over 10,000 United States Navy personnel and employed a civilian work force of 69 Americans and over 5,800 Vietnamese. Another 123 Americans and over 4,800 Vietnamese and other Asians worked for NSA's private contractors. Originally established in 1965 to support III MAF, NSA Da Nang was under the operational control of the Commander, United States Naval Forces, Vietnam (ComNavForV). Administratively, and for budgetary purposes, it was under Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet.

NSA Da Nang operated the port of Da Nang, which it had substantially enlarged and improved, as well as satellite ports at Cua Viet and Tan My in northern I Corps and Sa Huynh and Chu Lai in the southern

*With the return of the 1st FSR colors to Camp Pendleton, the 5th FSR, located there, was redesignated the 1st FSR.

provinces. With a fleet of over 250 lighters and other small craft and vast warehouses, storage lots, and tank farms around Da Nang, NSA handled all incoming and outgoing military cargo. It stored and issued the rations, fuel, and other supplies used in common by United States forces. NSA's Navy Public Works Branch furnished electricity and water to American cantonments and operated the Da Nang military telephone exchange. Its civilian contractors maintained camp generators, air conditioners, and perimeter lights. NSA managed Navy and Marine real estate holdings. Its large naval hospital at Da Nang was a major component of III MAF's medical support.¹⁵

When United States Army forces moved into I Corps in 1967-1968, they also received logistic support from NSA Da Nang. The Army early in 1968 established U.S. Army Support Command (USASuppCom) Da Nang, to perform for its units functions roughly equivalent to those of Force Logistic Command. This organization, under the operational control of the Commander, 1st Logistical Command, U.S. Army, by late 1969 had grown to a strength of about 7,500 supply and transportation troops. It included a field depot at Da Nang and two general support groups, the 26th and the 89th, which supported Army units respectively in northern and southern I Corps.¹⁶

As the I Corps logistics system had evolved up to this point, the Navy through NSA Da Nang, acted as wholesale provider of commonly used supplies and service support. The Marines and Army, through FLC and USASuppCom Da Nang, distributed supplies drawn from the NSA to their own forces and procured and issued their own ammunition and those stores and equipment unique to their particular Services. FLC in addition supported the 2d ROKMC Brigade, while USASuppCom Da Nang established petroleum pipelines for use of all Services, as well as providing unserviceable property disposal and mortuary assistance. After redeployment of the 3d Marine Division and relocation of FLSG-B to Da Nang, the Army support command furnished common supply and port facilities for the Marine elements remaining in northern I Corps.*

*These units were the 5th 175mm Gun Battery; one 8-inch howitzer platoon; two medium helicopter squadrons; the 3d and 4th Combined Action Groups; a platoon of 3d Bridge Company; the 3d Force Reconnaissance Company; a 3d Marine Division SCAMP detachment; the Operations Company, 1st Radio Battalion; a detachment of MAG-16; two ASRT detachments; the 5th CIT; and the 11th ITT; a total of 2,730 Marines. FLC Fact Sheet, Subj: Logistic Support of Marines Remaining in NICTZ, dtd 18Dec69, Tab K-3, FLC ComdC, Jan70.

In May 1969, as redeployment planning began, Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, proposed that the missions of NSA Da Nang be assumed by the Army, which already furnished common service support for United States forces everywhere but in I Corps.* Zumwalt secured approval in principle of his plan from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CinCPacFlt), with the proviso that the end of Navy common service support would occur only in conjunction with redeployment of Marine combat forces. General Abrams, ComUSMACV, also endorsed Zumwalt's proposal and in late May ordered USARV to make a preliminary study of the costs and manpower requirements of an Army logistics takeover in I Corps. USARV initially responded cautiously, noting the uncertainty of redeployment plans and recommending that for the time being the Navy continue its support mission.¹⁷

Lieutenant General Nickerson, the III MAF commander, when informed early in June of these preliminary steps, vehemently protested. He expressed complete satisfaction with his Navy support and urged that logistics arrangements in I Corps not be disrupted at a time when the enemy threat remained significant and major redeployments and realignments of allied combat forces were in prospect. Emotion played a large part in the initial Marine reaction. Colonel Wilbur F. Simlik, III MAF G-4, recalled: "We seemed to have a great fear of losing Navy support. NSA had done such a marvellous job for a number of years With NSA leaving, we had a great sinking feeling of despair."¹⁸ Colonel Miller M. Blue, who became G-4 in February 1971, said years later that it was a mistake to close down NSA so early:

This error caused a multitude of problems, especially in public works support; specifically electrical power requirements. I personally made many late night trips to the

*Since 1966, the U.S. Army's 1st Logistical Command, a subordinate command of USARV, had furnished port and transportation facilities and common item supply support for all United States forces in Vietnam outside I Corps. In I Corps, the Navy, by direction of CinCPac, had been given responsibility for both tactical and logistic operations. Under 1st Logistical Command were two major base depots at Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay and five support commands responsible for different areas, including USASuppCom Da Nang. If reinforced, a support command, such as that at Da Nang, could perform most functions of NSA Da Nang. In addition, Army engineer support could be furnished by another USARV element, U.S. Army Engineer Command, Vietnam. LtGen Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., USA, *Logistic Support*, Department of the Army Vietnam Studies (Washington; Department of the Army, 1974), pp. 9-11.

old NSA compound to find someone in the Army to get the generators running again so we could have power in, among other places, COCs and communication centers sometimes unsuccessfully.¹⁹

III MAF Marines had become accustomed to working with NSA, and many relationships were rooted as much in tradition as formal Inter-Service agreement: According to Colonel Simlik:

There were . . . many areas that were covered by the old Gunnery Sergeant to Chief routine, where a number of years ago a Gunnery Sergeant had gotten a Chief to take care of a certain function and a certain area of support, small that it may be, by seeing that he got a couple of bottles of booze or a case of beer And all of this was unwritten, of course, and passed on from Gunnery Sergeant to Gunnery Sergeant and Chief to Chief. We knew that there were great areas that we could never find out and get written down in a contract, and we had a . . . fear that the Army would not respond.²⁰

In spite of III MAF reluctance, planning for the Army takeover of NSA Da Nang's functions went inexorably forward.²¹ Marines still viewed the loss of services of NSA with resignation: "The termination of the logistics support role of the U.S. Navy was precipitous," recalled Colonel James A. Sloan, who served as III MAF plans officer in later 1969 and early 1970, "and was so as the result of the determination of Vice Admiral Zumwalt. The feeling I had was that the Navy was deploying on a schedule, that 'Vietnamization' was reality and those forces remaining had best be prepared to fill the vacuum."²²

In September 1969, at Zumwalt's suggestion, MACV established a joint Army-Navy planning group, located at Da Nang, to work out the practical details of gradually shifting common service support over to the Army as the Marines pulled out. The group, chaired by the Army, included representatives of MACV, USARV, NavForV, III MAF, 1st Logistical Command, NSA Da Nang, Army Support Command Da Nang, and Force Logistic Command. Divided into subcommittees on specific logistic functions,* the group worked through October determining requirements for personnel, equipment, and funds, defining problems, and proposing solutions.

On 15 November, with both joint studies and Marine redeployments well under way, General Abrams

instructed the Service components to develop a support turnover schedule for presentation to MACV by 1 January 1970. Abrams directed that the final Army assumption of common support would follow the redeployment of Marine combat units, but that particular functions not required for sustenance of III MAF should be transferred earlier whenever possible, subject to the concurrence of III MAF.

Another month and a half of planning and inter-Service negotiation followed Abram's order. NavForV pressed for early Army takeover of ports and activities no longer needed by the Marines in northern I Corps. NavForV also indicated that after the Army assumption of common support, it would disestablish NSA Da Nang and replace it with a smaller Naval Support Facility primarily concerned with small-craft maintenance and assisting the South Vietnamese Navy. III MAF emphasized the need to move slowly and carefully in transferring any functions to the Army and reiterated that most Navy common support should continue until all Marine combat forces had left Vietnam. USARV sought the loan or transfer of Navy facilities and equipment to supplement Army logistic resources in I Corps. The Army and Navy also tried to work out terms for renegotiating and, if necessary, prorating payment for the various civilian support contracts. Each Service anticipated a reduced budget in the new fiscal year, and each was trying to minimize the cost to itself of supporting the forces in I Corps. How large those forces would be remained an unanswered question throughout most of the planning. The logisticians did not have access to the highly classified projections of future troop redeployments.

Discussions dragged on past the MACV 1 January deadline. On 21 January, General Abrams instructed the Services to submit a plan by 5 February, based on guidelines laid down by him. Abrams set 1 July 1970 as the date for final turnover of common service support in I Corps to the Army. This was the beginning of the new fiscal year, and change at that point would simplify funding and the negotiation of new support contracts. The changeover was to occur on 1 July even if Marine combat forces remained. USARV in that case would furnish whatever common support the Marines required. The Army was to take over as many I Corps common support functions as possible before the deadline, while the Navy was to transfer or loan to USARV any equipment the Army needed to assume the support mission. In response to this directive, the component commands quickly completed a timeta-

*The subcommittees were: Facilities Engineering, Construction, Communications, Medical, Ammunition, Inter-Service Support Agreements, Transportation, Petroleum, Contracts, Class I, Property Disposal, Civilian Personnel, Security, Finance, Supply, Maintenance, and Aviation.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A373371
A Marine from the 7th Engineer Battalion hoses down a bulldozer as the unit prepares its heavy equipment for reembarkation to Okinawa in August 1970.

ble calling for a gradual transfer of functions, to begin in northern I Corps during February. Both NSA Da Nang and US Army Support Command Da Nang now developed detailed plans for their own roles in the changeover.

Preliminary turnovers of equipment and a few facilities in northern I Corps had begun in November and December 1969. On 15 February 1970, Naval Support Activity Da Nang disbanded its detachments at Sa Huynh and Cua Viet; elements of USASuppCom Da Nang took over operation of both ports. A month later, the NSA detachment at Tan My, near Hue, ceased operations. Its function, as well as other supply and support activities at Hue and Phu Bai, were assumed by the Army support command. At Da Nang during March, NSA's public works division turned over operation of the telephone system, as well as some cargo handling functions. The NSA hospital began reducing nonessential activities in preparation for deactivation. On 26 March, the Army took over all fuel storage and issue operations at Da Nang and Chu Lai. During April, NSA Da Nang transferred its public works maintenance shops at Phu Bai and Tan My to the Army's facilities maintenance contractor.²³

In early May, III MAF asked MACV to halt further scheduled turnover actions until the entire timetable could be reviewed in the light of changed redeployment plans. Common service support turnover planning had been predicated on another redeployment closely following Keystone Bluejay and on both these redeployments being "Marine-heavy," but Marine participation in Bluejay had been reduced and the subsequent withdrawal now would not begin until mid-summer. This meant that larger Marine combat forces would be left after 1 July than originally expected. III MAF questioned whether USARV, with its own resources diminished by redeployment, could support adequately this larger Marine force and suggested that the Navy slow down the transfer of logistic responsibilities until more Marines had left.

MACV in response called a common service support conference, which met at Saigon from 15 to 17 May. At the conference, NavForV insisted that facilities transfers, contract negotiations, and budget planning had gone too far to permit any postponement of the turnover beyond 1 July. USARV declared that it could furnish the Marines all the support they now received from NSA, but it became apparent in the discussions that the Army authorities did not yet comprehend the extent and variety of those services. MACV directed that the 1 July turnover deadline be met and instructed the Services to finish working out methods. During May and June, representatives of III MAF, USA Support Command Da Nang, and Force Logistic Command met frequently to coordinate a smooth transfer and draw up interservice support agreements detailing exactly what supplies and services the Army would furnish to III MAF. By 28 June, III MAF and USARV had approved these agreements.²⁴

Meanwhile, the turnover continued. The NSA Da Nang Hospital closed on 15 May, and step by step the Navy handed over its Da Nang public works functions and port facilities to the Army Support Command. USARV reinforced the Da Nang support command with 2,000 additional officers and men, drawn from elsewhere in Vietnam. The reinforcements included the 1,000-man 5th Transportation Command,* which moved to Da Nang from Qui Nhon in late May and early June and occupied the former NSA Hospital complex. On 1 June, NSA disestablished its detachment at Chu Lai. By the 30th, it had transferred or

*This command consisted of terminal service, POL barge, tug, and small boat companies and detachments. The unit took over many of NSA Da Nang's harbor craft.

terminated all its remaining functions and activities at Da Nang. NSA Da Nang was deactivated on the 30th; the following day, its successor organization, Naval Support Facility Da Nang, was commissioned, with headquarters at Camp Tien Sha in East Da Nang. That same day, 1 July, the Army-Marine interservice support agreements went into effect. In a separate action on the 1st, III MAF turned its Transient Facility and R&R Processing Center over to Army management.²⁵

As the USASuppCom Da Nang assumed most of NSA Da Nang's support functions, III MAF and USARV worked out plans for the Army to furnish ammunition to Marine ground units. Negotiations on this subject began early in 1970, but the Marine Corps decided to delay the ammunition turnover past 1 July, until nearer the time of the final Marine withdrawals. Under the plan, Force Logistic Command eventually was to hand over its three ammunition supply points (ASPs) and most of their stocks to the Army, which would issue ammunition to Marine units as required. On 12 October, III MAF transferred control of its ASP-3 at Chu Lai to the Army. During December, III MAF and USARV established 15 March 1971 as the date when the Army would assume complete responsibility for issuing ammunition to Marine ground forces, under an interservice support agreement. Gradually, III MAF shipped excess stocks of Marine-peculiar ammunition out of Vietnam and transferred the rest to the U.S. Army and ARVN. The Marines shifted aviation munitions from the ASPs to the MAG-11 and MAG-16 bomb dumps. On 15 March 1971, control of ASP-2, the principal ground ammunition storage facility near Da Nang, passed to U.S. Army Support Command Da Nang, as did custody of 6,800 tons of munitions. Two months later, the Marines handed ASP-1, their remaining Da Nang area ammunition facility, over to the South Vietnamese, who had been using a portion of it for storage of their own ammunition since early 1970.²⁶

The shift of common service support of III MAF from NSA Da Nang to the U.S. Army Support Command Da Nang was attended by a variety of problems. At the outset, the Army was short of small-boat pilots and crewmen for port operations; the Da Nang support command had to borrow Navy personnel and hire civilian workers for this purpose. Marines found Army logistic organization fragmented and confusing. XXIV Corps had little role in logistic matters, forcing III MAF to deal with USASuppCom Da Nang, 1st Logistical Command, and separate engineer and other

technical commands. Disagreements arose over interpretation of the interservice agreements, many resulting from belated discovery of informal arrangements that had not been covered. Most important, U.S. Army Support Command Da Nang, like other Army elements, labored under a sharply reduced FY 1971 budget and simply could not afford the quantity and variety of supplies to which the Marines had been accustomed.²⁷

The turnover of logistic support to the Army had especially disruptive effects on the maintenance of III MAF camps and facilities. Developed piecemeal over the years from what were initially expected to be temporary installations, these facilities required continuous and extensive repair and rebuilding. Navy-installed generators, air conditioners, water and sewage pumps, and other pieces of equipment by mid-1970 were old and nearly worn out. The Army support command did not stock spare parts for many of these items. NSA Da Nang had turned over its own spares, but these stocks had run low as NSA closed down. Inevitably, equipment breakdowns and long delays in repairs plagued the Marines. To make matters worse, USASuppCom Da Nang and the Army Engineers were short of technicians and equipment for repair of such vital items as perimeter lights. The international work force of Philco-Ford the Army's civilian facilities maintenance contractor, further complicated operations. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Fails, S-4 of MAG-16 and facilities manager for Marble Mountain Air Facility, recalled: "There was an American company using Taiwanese supervisors for Korean assistant supervisors, to work with the Vietnamese . . . [All these nationalities] . . . working with Vietnamese under an Army command, supporting a U.S. Marine Corps unit that normally gets its support from the Navy, just became a nightmare . . ." ²⁸

All the commands concerned labored diligently to solve or at least alleviate facilities problems. USASuppCom Da Nang, Philco-Ford, and the Army Engineers furnished all the assistance they could. Marine commands supplemented these efforts by self-help, occasionally resorting to unorthodox methods to obtain needed material. When the Navy public works warehouse at Da Nang closed down, Lieutenant Colonel Fails "found out that some of the equipment they had . . . would be available to any U.S. military unit that wanted it and would sign for it." Fails and the MAG-16 staff acted quickly:

The next morning, with the concurrence . . . of the group commander, . . . we launched out every flat-bed . . . we could lay our hands on, with some of the Marine Corps' finest scavengers. We flew over an advance party by helicopter and made literally a pre-dawn assault on the warehouses We had clerks with us We needed everything We started a shifting, rotating convoy, and I think we got 40-some truckloads . . . of stuff out of there We were able to take that material and upgrade our facilities considerably.²⁹

In spite of many difficulties, the Army support command succeeded in sustaining III MAF during a period of diminishing Marine strength and low-intensity combat. III MAF developed a generally harmonious working relationship with the Army command. According to Colonel Simlik, the III MAF G-4, the "people in the Army who were involved in the transfer were people we knew personally and had the greatest confidence in." Brigadier General Leo J. Dulacki, III MAF Chief of Staff, summed up the predominant Marine evaluation of Army support: "The Army logistical command performed well and did not leave III MAF wanting."³⁰

Engineer Support

At the beginning of 1970, three Marine engineer battalions were deployed in I Corps. The 1st Engineer Battalion, organic engineer unit of the 1st Marine Division,* reinforced by Company A (-), 5th Engineer Battalion, performed light construction throughout the division TAOR, maintained water points, swept sections of highway for mines, and conducted the 1st Marine Division Land Mine Warfare School.** Of III MAF's two force engineer battalions, the 7th, with the 1st Bridge Company attached, did heavy construction in the Da Nang area, maintained and improved highways, and made clearing mine sweeps. The 9th Engineer Battalion, with its CP and three companies at Chu Lai and part of the fourth company at Tam Ky, concentrated most of its efforts on clearing mines from Route 1 between Chu Lai and the Ba Ren River and preparing the roadbed for paving. This battalion also included a provisional land clearing company and

provided construction and other support to the Americal Division.*

In addition to these Marine engineer units, the four-battalion 45th U.S. Army Engineer Group and four U.S. Navy Mobile Construction (Seabee) Battalions were operating in I Corps at the beginning of 1970. Until 9 March, III MAF, as senior United States command in the corps area, supervised the entire engineering effort. After that date, XXIV Corps assumed this responsibility. III MAF retained operational control of its two force engineer battalions, which were under administrative control of the 1st Marine Division. The division had both operational and administrative control of the 1st Engineer Battalion. With Marine, Army, and Navy elements all involved in large projects, engineer coordination in I Corps was a complex task. Colonel Nicholas A. Canzona, the 1st Marine Division G-4, commented: "I never saw so many engineers in all my life working in a given area, and . . . I don't think I've ever seen so much attention and confusion as to who is supposed to do what and why."³¹

During 1970, redeployments drastically reduced Marine engineer strength. Company A (-), 5th Engineer Battalion and Company A, 9th Engineer Battalion left Vietnam in Keystone Bluejay. In late March 1970, the 9th Engineer Battalion moved its CP to the Da Nang area and located its three remaining engineer companies at Tam Ky, Hill 34, and LZ Baldy. The battalion relinquished its minesweeping and construction mission on Route 1 south of Tam Ky while continuing to work on and sweep the highway from Tam Ky north to Baldy. On 19 July, as part of Keystone Robin Alpha, the 7th Engineer Battalion, with the exception of its Company A, and the 9th Engineer Battalion stood down. Even during their stand-down period, the engineers were kept busy: "As combat engineer platoons were freed from their supporting role when their infantry battalions stood down, they immediately went to work on dismantling pre-engineered buildings in the FLC compound for shipment to Okinawa," recalled Major James G. Dixon, who commanded Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion from February to June 1971. He noted, "A late engineer project for one combat engineer platoon newly out of the field was installation of a security fence around the USAID com-

*A division engineer battalion normally consists of 769 officers and men in a headquarters company, an engineer support company, and three engineer companies. Its primary mission is close combat engineer support of the division, and it is organized to provide one company in direct support of each infantry regiment, hence the battalion is equipped for light, temporary construction.

**For details of operations of the Land Mine Warfare School, see Chapter 14.

*A force engineer battalion, of 1,115 officers and men in a headquarters company, a service company, and four engineer companies, is equipped for larger and more permanent construction tasks than is the division engineer battalion.

pound in downtown Da Nang, a drastic change of environment for these versatile engineers."³²

The 7th and 9th Engineer Battalions embarked for the United States in September. Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, which had been reinforced to almost 300 officers and men, was placed under administrative control of FLC and attached to Maintenance Battalion. Under III MAF operational control, the company assumed on a reduced scale the missions of its parent battalion.³³ During February and March 1971, the 1st Engineer Battalion redeployed in Keystone Robin Charlie, leaving its Company A, with Company A, 7th Engineers, as engineer element of the 3d MAB. Major Dixon, who redeployed with the last engineer companies in June 1971, later observed that during the final stages of redeployment "the demand for engineer support was overwhelming . . . and continued to exceed resources through the last engineer unit's departure" ³⁴

As long as they remained in Vietnam, all three Marine engineer battalions expended much effort and material in roadbuilding and repair. Their activities were part of a general allied program to create a passable road net throughout I Corps, both to promote economic development and to facilitate ARVN maneuver, especially after the Americans and their helicopters had departed. The Marines concentrated on Route 4, running east to west from Hoi An to Thuong Duc, and the unpaved stretch of Route 1 between the Ba Ren River and Baldy. During April 1970, elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion widened Route 4 between Hill 52 and Thuong Duc into a two-lane fair-weather road. Between 26 April and 24 July, the 7th Engineer Battalion improved a six-mile segment of the same route east of Hill 37 into an all-weather, though unpaved, highway. Working on this heavily-mined stretch, the Marine engineers lost two men killed, 29 wounded, and had eight pieces of machinery destroyed. Elements of the battalion labored past their 19 July stand-down date to finish the job. By early 1971, the 1st Engineer Battalion, in cooperation with the Seabees, had paved the 12 miles of Route 4 between Route 1 and Dai Loc. On Route 1 itself, Marine engineers hauled rock and dirt and helped with grading in preparation for paving of the road by the Seabees. The Quang Nam floods of October-November 1970, which submerged most roads and bridges under five feet or more of water, proved the worth of the engineers' efforts. Most bridges and surfaced highways in the province emerged with only

minor damage, and Marines and Seabees soon had the major routes open again for traffic.³⁵

All three engineer battalions regularly swept assigned segments of highway for buried mines. Sweep teams employed electric mine detectors and also bought large amounts of ordnance from Vietnamese civilians under the Voluntary Informant Program.* During July 1970, for example, 17 teams from the 1st Engineer Battalion swept over 1,550 miles of road. They detected and destroyed 10 buried mines and purchased 78 ordnance items, ranging from American and Communist grenades to 105mm artillery rounds.³⁶

In accord with allied Vietnamization policy, Marine engineers during March 1970 began training minesweep teams for Quang Nam Province and Quang Da Special Zone. The 1st Engineer Battalion mine warfare school established a special two-day course for ARVN and Regional Force soldiers and dispatched a contact team to various Vietnamese commands. By the end of May, 176 Vietnamese had graduated from the course and 316 had received instruction from the mobile team. During June, the 1st Marine Division, Quang Nam Province, and QDSZ agreed on a timetable for Vietnamese takeover of particular highway segments. Actual turnover of responsibility fell behind schedule due to shortages of equipment and Vietnamese procrastination, but gradually, as Marine engineers redeployed, the South Vietnamese began sweeping longer and longer stretches of road. They continued to rely heavily on the Americans for advice and equipment maintenance.³⁷

Throughout the war, the enemy had benefited from a network of caves, tunnels, and fortifications, burrowed out during many years, that honeycombed Viet Cong strongholds such as the area south of Da Nang. To destroy these fighting positions and escape routes, as well as remove concealing foliage, Marine engineers engaged in "land-clearing," systematically bulldozing bare selected portions of countryside. For this purpose, III MAF and XXIV Corps had organized the 2d Provisional Clearing Company. The company consisted of a command group from the 9th Engineer Battalion with men and equipment from both force engineer battalions and from the 26th and 39th U.S. Army Engineer Battalions.

Land-clearing operations followed an established pattern. GVN authorities designed the target areas, and the military unit in the TAOR of which the oper-

*For details on this program, see Chapter 14.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A800395

Marine PFC Kyle E. Pruitt mans his .50-caliber machine gun during a Marine "Rough Rider" supply convoy. The Marines placed armored plates and mounted machine guns on trucks to protect the convoy from enemy ambushes. Note the improvised seat.

ation would take place furnished normally a company-size security force. The land-clearing unit then established a base camp, and its bulldozers began scraping the assigned area section by section. As they cleared trees and brush, the heavy tractors caved in most trenches, tunnels, and bunkers and detonated or uncovered boobytraps. Engineers blew up any ordnance not exploded by the tractors, as well as tunnels and bunkers too deep or strong for the bulldozers to demolish.

During the first part of 1970, the Land Clearing Company worked mostly in the area southeast of Hoi An. Between 19 March and 25 May, it cleared 11,345 acres, obliterated 1,483 bunkers, filled in 5,000 yards of trenches, crushed 118 yards of tunnels, and uncovered 526 pieces of ordnance. On 27 May, with redeployment of the Marine engineer battalions imminent, XXIV Corps disbanded the 2d Provisional Land Clearing Company. From then until redeployment, the remaining Marine engineers participated in occasional land-clearing operations. They also helped prepare previously cleared ground, for example on Go Noi Island, for cultivation by resettled refu-

gees.³⁸ Major Dixon remembered the effects of the often hazardous work of the remaining engineers performed on Go Noi during April and May of 1971: "Harassed by detonation of unexploded ordnance caused by harrow blades, the engineers resolutely operated their equipment over countless acres of arable land creating a source of livelihood and sustenance to the resettlement hamlets located nearby."³⁹

In areas not being farmed, jungle vegetation soon returned, but the Viet Cong could not quickly rebuild their tunnels and fortifications. Colonel Wilcox, the 1st Marines commander during the first part of 1970, reported that land-clearing "really helped our situation below Da Nang." It restricted enemy movement and "gave them no place to stage for their attacks."⁴⁰

Although III MAF was decreasing in size, the engineers still faced seemingly endless requirements for camp and firebase construction and rehabilitation. Elements of all three engineer battalions each month built or rebuilt bunkers, watch towers, barbed wire entanglements, huts, showers, and latrines. They installed or improved electric and water systems. For the 1st MAW during 1970, the engineers constructed 170

steel and concrete "Wonderarch"* shelters at Da Nang Airbase and Marble Mountain, to protect aircraft against rocket and mortar fire. In the field, engineers, lifted into positions by helicopter with minidozers and other equipment, constructed fire support bases for both ARVN and Marine operations.⁴¹

As Marines withdrew from Vietnam, the engineers demolished the installations they had built earlier. During September and October 1970, elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion, assisted by heavy equipment operators from Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, leveled much of An Hoa Combat Base. Using an average of 127 men and 20 pieces of earthmoving equipment per day, the engineers dismantled or demolished 340 buildings and flattened fortifications, leaving intact only the airfield, the industrial complex, and the small portion of the facility to be occupied by the ARVN.⁴²

Base demolition accelerated during early 1971. During February, engineers from Company C, 1st Engineer Battalion, with helilifted bulldozers, destroyed OP Roundup and FSB Ryder in the Que Sons. Ironically, the 1st Engineer Battalion had finished rehabilitating huts and fortifications at Ryder only the previous September. In March and April, following the sequence of Marine relinquishment of territory, the engineers leveled camps, firebases, and OPs nearer Da Nang. For each position to be demolished, Lieutenant Colonel Daryl E. Benstead, 1st Engineer Battalion commander, or a member of his staff, first reconnoitered the site with representatives of the occupying unit and prepared a destruction schedule and plan. After division review and approval of the plan, engineers, usually brought in with their equipment by helicopter, would strip the position of all useable material and then bulldoze the fortifications.⁴³ Major Dixon later described this process, known then as "demilitarization:"

De-militarization became a well used term at those bases not retained by either U.S. Army or Vietnamese forces, and where total destruction exceeded resources. The engineers

would destroy command and perimeter bunkers and any other facility that could be used as a shelter for incoming fire, thus preventing their use by the VC.⁴⁴

The local Vietnamese would then pick the cantonment clean, usually leaving nothing but a bare hilltop.

The engineers were hard pressed during the final months of redeployment to accomplish all the tasks necessary before the MAB departed Vietnam. They operated water points and leveled numerous camps, firebases, OPs, and IOD sites near Da Nang, as well as on remote hilltops. In addition, they provided combat engineer support to the 1st Marines, the last infantry regiment in Vietnam. The support given by Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion and by its sister unit, Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion, which was commanded during the period by Major Gilbert R. Meibaum, "was substantial, mission essential for the Brigade and closely and harmoniously coordinated by the Brigade Engineer Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Benstead."⁴⁵

Motor Transport

At the beginning of 1970, III MAF included four motor transport units. The 1st Motor Transport Battalion, reinforced by Company A, 5th Motor Transport Battalion, was under operational control of the 1st Marine Division, as was the 11th Motor Transport Battalion, a force troops unit.* These battalions furnished tactical and logistical transportation for the division. Force Logistic Command had operational control of the large Truck Company of the Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st FSR, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion, another force troops unit newly

*The 1st Motor Transport Battalion was an organic element of the 1st Marine Division and consisted of a headquarters and service company and three truck companies. Each truck company was normally equipped with 30 2½-ton cargo trucks and with 1½-ton cargo trailers for use by supported units. Each truck company was also equipped with maintenance, recovery, and refueling vehicles. The 7th and 11th Motor Transport Battalions were elements of Force Troops and were assigned the mission of reinforcing the land transport of MAF elements for tactical, logistic, and administrative movement of troops, supplies, and equipment. Each of the force motor transport battalions consisted of a headquarters and service company, three truck companies and a transportation company. The truck companies were equipped with 31 5-ton cargo trucks, and the transportation company had 30 tractor prime movers, 45 high bed trailers, and 2 25-ton, low bed trailers. LtCol Morris S. Shimanoff, Comments on draft ms, 9May83 Vietnam Comment File.

*Introduced late in 1969, "Wonderarches" were constructed of bolted steel sections covered with 12 inches of high-strength concrete. Each semi-cylindrical structure was 48 feet wide by 70 feet long and housed one aircraft. Besides protecting the planes from high-trajectory fire, the shelters were designed to reduce the danger of a fire and explosion in one aircraft spreading to others. FMFPac, MarOps, Dec69, p. 80.

moved to Da Nang from Quang Tri. Both of these organizations supported FLC, as well as other III MAF elements. Truck Company, which had a variety of specialized vehicles as well as a fleet of 2.5- and 5-ton trucks, coordinated the "Rough Rider" convoys to bases in southern Quang Nam, such as Baldy, and furnished gun trucks* for escort.

Most motor transport units redeployed late. Company A, 5th Motor Transport Battalion, which had been supporting the 26th Marines, and the 7th Motor Transport Battalion left in Keystone Bluejay; but only Company C, 1st Motor Transport Battalion, redeployed in Keystone Robin Alpha. In Keystone Robin Charlie, the H&S Company and Company B, 1st Motor Transport Battalion and the entire 11th Motor Transport Battalion redeployed. Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion and the FLC Truck Company remained behind in support of 3d MAB, standing down respectively for redeployment and deactivation in mid-June 1971.

In spite of the extensive tactical and logistic use of helicopters, III MAF still relied heavily on trucks for cargo movement. The logistic support units and major bases received most of their stocks by road convoy. During 1970, accordingly, the Marine motor transport battalions drove over 3,000,000 miles, hauling 566,646 tons of freight and 1,297,533 passengers. Over improved and increasingly secure highways, trucks now could reach most Marine positions in Quang Nam. Daily resupply convoys ran to Hill 37, An Hoa, Baldy, and other bases, although for safety from mines, most troops bound for outlying areas still went by helicopter.⁴⁶

Viet Cong mines remained a significant threat to Marine truckers, in spite of generally improved security and constant minesweeping. The stretch of Route 4 east of Hill 37, part of the land supply line to that position, was especially dangerous. In an effort to reduce personnel casualties from detonations, the Marines since early in the war had attached sandbags and pieces of boiler plate to cabs and other vital areas of their vehicles; but this improvised armor could not stop most of the fragments that caused the severest

injuries and its weight reduced truck efficiency and carrying capacity.

During 1968, at III MAF request, the Marine Corps had begun developing light, easily attached and removed armor kits for 2.5- and 5-ton trucks. By mid-1970, these kits had been designed, tested, and manufactured. Separate cab and bed components could be installed in a few hours without special tools or modification of the vehicle. Made of 5/8-inch wrought armor steel, the plates weighed about half as much per square foot as sandbags and could stop fragments of the most powerful mines. During September, delivery of the kits began to the 1st and 11th Motor Transport Battalions. By the end of the year, the 1st Battalion had installed 62 cabs and 19 bed kits in its 2.5-ton trucks and cab kits in two wreckers and two tankers. The 11th Battalion had armored the cabs of 82 of its 5-ton trucks and the beds of eight.⁴⁷

The kits quickly proved their worth. On 4 November 1970, a 1st Motor Transport Battalion truck, serving as command vehicle of a convoy with both cab and bed kits installed, hit a 30-pound mine on Route 4 about a mile east of Hill 37. The explosion tore the truck in half, but all four Marines on board survived. Although all were injured by being hurled from the vehicle, none of the Marines suffered fragment wounds or loss of limb. The armor kits were recovered with only minor damage and later installed in other trucks.⁴⁸ In similar incidents during the following weeks, truck armor repeatedly saved Marine lives. Force Logistic Command, which initially had not ordered armor for its trucks, made haste to do so. By early 1971, Truck Company was installing kits in its vehicles.⁴⁹

Medical Services

At the beginning of 1970, III MAF included the 1st Medical Battalion, reinforced by Company A, 5th Medical Battalion, which maintained a 300-bed 1st Marine Division hospital. The 1st Hospital Company, a force troops unit, which had operated a 100-bed treatment facility, was preparing to stand down for redeployment. About 100 Navy medical officers, 2,300 medical service corpsmen, and 1,781 hospital corpsmen were attached to division, wing, FLC, and Combined Action Force units. Two Navy hospital ships, the USS *Repose* (AH 16) and the USS *Sanctuary* (AH 17), each with a capacity of about 800 patients, were on station off I Corps to treat the more seriously wounded and sick. At Da Nang, the 600-bed Naval Support Activity Hospital afforded most of the services of a

*Gun trucks were the standard 2½-ton or 5-ton trucks with the cargo beds armored on the sides with steel plating and the floors covered with sandbags. Each truck mounted a .50-caliber machine gun and was equipped with a radio for convoy control, adjustment of supporting arms, and calls for medical evacuation. These trucks also carried tools and vehicle spare parts.

general hospital in the United States, including a full surgical capability, preventive medicine and medical research units, a blood bank, and an optical shop. When necessary, III MAF could use facilities of the 95th U S. Army Evacuation Hospital at Da Nang.⁵⁰

While the Naval Support Activity Hospital afforded MAF units basic medical care, the 1st and 11th Dental Companies provided a broad range of dental services to units of III MAF from 1970-1971. The 1st Company, which numbered 26 Naval officers and 40 enlisted men in March 1970, operated 15 dental facilities for the 1st Marine Division in the Da Nang TAOR, including permanent clinics at the 1st Division command post at Da Nang, 5th Marines Headquarters at An Hoa, 7th Marines Headquarters at LZ Baldy, and 3d Battalion, 5th Marines Headquarters at Hill 65, as well as operating mobile surgical vans capable of supporting units along the major roads throughout the TAOR. The 11th Dental Company, slightly smaller than the 1st, serviced the wing, FLC, and III MAF Headquarters until September 1970, when 1st Dental Company redeployed, and then provided support for all Marine units remaining until 28 May 1971, when the final detachment of the 11th Company redeployed. Captain Meredith H. Mead, DC, USN, who assumed command of the 1st Dental Company in March 1970, recalled the support which the dental companies provided:

All these clinics had from one or more dentists and dental techs depending on the number of personnel to be served . . . All had high speed handpieces powered by a gasoline air compressor. This was the latest in field dental equipment. Many of the dental chairs were not field type but were old chairs sent from the States. The 1st Dental Company had a trailer fitted out as a mobile dental office to rotate among those people in more remote locations . . . [The 11th Dental Company] had a very good modern prosthetic laboratory for fabrication of dentures. It included an automatic casting machine that was used to make partial dentures from [a] chromium cobalt alloy. It was better than many laboratories in the States.⁵¹

During 1969, III MAF and XXIV Corps had established a joint medical regulating center by placing a Navy-Marine regulating section with its Army counterpart at the 95th Evacuation Hospital. As helicopters picked up casualties throughout I Corps, the pilots would contact the regulating center on a dedicated radio frequency and report the number of patients and the type and severity of the wounds or illness. The regulator then checked a status board showing the facilities, specialists, and space available at each hospi-

tal, directed the helicopter to the appropriate destination, and notified the hospital that casualties were on the way. On 10 April 1970, after XXIV Corps became the senior U.S. command in I Corps, the Marines and Navy deactivated their portion of the joint regulating unit. The U.S. Army 67th Medical Group then took over medical regulation for all of I Corps, including III MAF.⁵²

Admissions to the hospitals serving III MAF reflected the declining level of combat. Of 16,821 patients treated during 1970, 21 percent were battle casualties. By comparison, in 1969, out of 22,003 hospital patients, 26 per cent had been wounded in combat; and in 1967, a year of heavy fighting, combat wounded had accounted for 39 per cent of 23,091 admissions.⁵³

During 1970, redeployments and deactivations rapidly reduced III MAF's medical support facilities. The 1st Hospital Company left Vietnam on 27 February in Keystone Bluejay, followed on 12 March by Company A, 5th Medical Battalion. On 13 March, the *Repose*, which had been on duty in Vietnamese waters since February 1966, sailed for the United States and deactivation.⁵⁴

For Marines, the most dramatic medical support reduction was the closing on 15 May of the NSA Da Nang Hospital. More than any other aspect of the NSA phasedown, this action aroused concern among III MAF commanders that the Marines would be left without adequate facilities, especially if the intensity of combat should increase during the summer. In the face of III MAF requests for postponement of the closing, ComNavForV remained adamant while at the same time assuring the Marines that the Navy in emergencies would furnish all necessary support. Through FMFPac, III MAF appealed to CinCPacFlt and CinCPac, again to no avail. III MAF finally approached ComUSMACV. General Abrams upheld the Navy's decision on the closing date, but, as General Dulacki recalled, "he gave his full and personal assurances that in the event the situation required, the Marines would be provided full medical support even if it meant moving an Army hospital into ICTZ."⁵⁵

The NSA Hospital closed on schedule, leaving III MAF with the facilities of the 1st Medical Battalion and the USS *Sanctuary*, backed by the Army 95th Evacuation Hospital. As battlefield action remained limited in scale and intensity, this medical support proved more than adequate. During September, in Keystone Robin Alpha, Company C, 1st Medical Bat-

talion redeployed. The rest of the battalion, except for Company A, redeployed in April 1971 in Keystone Robin Charlie. Company A remained the principal

medical element of 3d MAB. The *Sanctuary* left for the United States on 1 May. Company A stood down on 2 June and redeployed on the 25th.⁵⁶

CHAPTER 19

The Logistics of Redeployment

The 'Mixmaster' of Personnel—'Mixmastering' of Equipment and Real Estate

The 'Mixmaster' of Personnel

The most complex logistic problem facing III MAF throughout 1970-1971 was the redeployment of men and equipment. Redeployment was not simply a matter of the whole force ceasing operations, packing up, and leaving Vietnam. Instead, in each withdrawal, selected units or parts of units had to be extricated from continuing active operations. The departing units had to exchange most of their personnel and much of their equipment with other organizations still in combat before embarking by sea and air for destinations in the Pacific or the United States. Colonel Hershel L. Johnson, Jr., who assumed command of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines in August 1970, later explained: ". . . the many problems of accountability and the necessary preparation for turnover of equipment to other units was a task which would have been difficult under the best of circumstances. The requirement to transfer critical personnel, many of whom could assist in accountability problems, was understandable, but served to aggravate the situations."¹

At the same time, portions of Force Logistic Command's large reserve material stocks had to be disposed of either by shipment out of Vietnam or by transfer to other United States or Vietnamese Armed Services. The traffic was not all one way. Normal rotations of personnel and restockage and replacement of equipment had to continue, but the flow through the manpower and materiel "pipelines" had to be regulated so as to leave III MAF at the prescribed reduced strength at the end of each redeployment increment. Due to the length of time involved in moving men and supplies through the pipeline, achievement of the proper level at any point required almost impossibly precise calculation and operational coordination.

For each redeployment, the White House and Defense Department, in consultation with MACV, determined the number of troops to be withdrawn and the beginning and concluding dates of the withdrawal. MACV, in turn, apportioned the troops to be removed among the Services and received from the component commanders a list of specific units to be redeployed. CinCPac and the Joint Chiefs of Staff reviewed and

approved the troop list and determined the destinations of the units leaving Vietnam. The particular Services established personnel policies for each withdrawal and developed their own plans and transportation requirements for movement of men and supplies. Finally, CinCPac, on the basis of information provided by the Services, would prepare a tentative schedule for sea and air movements. At a final CinCPac movement conference, representatives of all concerned commands would apportion aircraft and shipping and establish a definite timetable for the withdrawal.²

FMFPac, headquartered at Camp Smith, Hawaii, was the central Marine Corps coordinator of redeployment planning and execution. FMFPac, at the direction of HQMC, represented the Marine Corps in consultations with other Pacific commands. In conjunction with III MAF, it suggested Marine units for redeployment. It transmitted manpower and logistic guidance to III MAF and coordinated movement of men and equipment from South Vietnam to other Marine bases in the Pacific and the continental United States.³ Until July 1970, Lieutenant General Henry W. Buse, Jr., a Naval Academy graduate and winner of the Silver Star in World War II, commanded FMFPac. Buse's replacement, Lieutenant General William K. Jones, also a World War II veteran who had earned a Silver Star Medal at Tarawa and a Navy Cross at Saipan, had had first-hand experience with redeployment. As commander of the 3d Marine Division during 1969, Jones had conducted its relocation from northern I Corps to Okinawa.

According to Colonel Simlik, the III MAF G-4, the relationship between FMFPac and III MAF on redeployment matters was "constant and close and personal."⁴ Both Buse and Jones made frequent trips to Da Nang for observation and consultation. At the same time, both FMFPac commanders maintained a close and friendly working relationship with Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CinCPac. General Jones recalled that McCain:

. . . thought highly of my predecessor, General Buse, whom he used as a close friend and confidant and he complimented me by taking me in under the same ground rules.

We had a special phone that was a dedicated phone from him to CGFMFPac and that phone rang quite regularly He included CGFMFPac in everything and treated him as a component commander, although of course he wasn't The relationship between CinCPac and CGFMFPac and CinCPac staff and CGFMFPac staff was very, very cordial.⁵

Besides maintaining contact with higher headquarters through FMFPac, III MAF regularly sent representatives to the CinCPac movement planning conferences and other meetings concerned with redeployment. III MAF passed redeployment directives to subordinate commands; coordinated plans for unit reliefs, stand downs, and embarkations; and dealt with MACV, the other Services within Vietnam, and the South Vietnamese on such matters as equipment turnovers and real estate transfers. The 1st Marine Division, 1st MAW, and FLC had primary responsibility for preparing men and equipment for embarkation and moving them to piers and airports on schedule. For this purpose, the 1st Marine Division in January 1970 activated a Logistic Operations Center under the G-4. The Division Embarkation Officer and his staff continually inspected redeploying units and assisted subordinate units in making inventories and other preparations.⁶

The plans for redeployment increments were drafted in terms of units to be redeployed or deactivated and total numbers of troops to be deducted from the authorized strength of each Service in Vietnam. To carry out the Marine Corps portion of each plan, HQMC and FMFPac had to determine which individual Marines to redeploy to bring III MAF down to the required size and assign the men thus selected to departing units. In deciding who should redeploy and who should stay, the Marine commanders had to strike a balance between contradictory military requirements. Lieutenant General Jones explained:

It was necessary to consider a whole host of complex problems such as the retention of needed skills in WestPac, readiness of remaining as well as redeploying units, the need for key personnel in each redeploying unit, tour equity for the individual Marine. Many of these considerations are counterproductive and finding the right combination has been a real experience in every sense of the word.⁷

In practice, tour equity overshadowed all other considerations. Those Marines with the fewest months remaining in their current 12-month tours normally were selected for each redeployment. In Keystone Bluejay, men who had served nine months or more of their tours were considered eligible; in Keystones Robin Alpha and Robin Charlie, Marines whose tours were

scheduled to end on or before a particular month were earmarked for redeployment. Eligible Marines with skills urgently needed by remaining III MAF units were kept in Vietnam in each redeployment, while a few noneligibles needed to guard and maintain equipment in transit were sent home early. This was not always the benefit it seemed to be, as such assignments frequently entailed long, dull voyages on amphibious ships packed with miscellaneous vehicles and stores.

Since III MAF units always included Marines with a mixture of end-of-tour dates, no redeploying unit could simply leave with its existing personnel. Instead, in a process nicknamed the "mixmaster," each unit selected for redeployment to Hawaii or the continental United States transferred its noneligible Marines to organizations staying in Vietnam and at the same time filled its ranks with eligible Marines from other commands. As a result, few units returned to the United States composed of Marines who had served with the unit in Vietnam. Units bound for Okinawa and Japan underwent much less "mixmastering." In order to maintain combat readiness, these commands embarked with their existing personnel, including Marines otherwise eligible for redeployment, who simply completed their Western Pacific tours at their new stations.⁸

To implement these complex manpower reshuffles, HQMC delegated broad transfer and reassignment authority to FMFPac. The FMFPac staff broke down each redeployment into numbers of Marines of each rank, grade, and skill who were to be redeployed from the 1st MAW, 1st Marine Division, and Force Logistic Command, either by transfer to redeploying organizations or by normal rotation. A liaison team from FMFPac, located at III MAF Headquarters, briefed the commands on these strength reduction requirements and where necessary assisted in their implementation. Each of the major III MAF subordinate commands, through its G-1 section, then screened its own personnel for Marines eligible for redeployment, arranged for the necessary transfers between units, and prepared and issued the thousands of individual orders and transportation requests required. FMFPac, besides overseeing this "mixmaster," periodically halted or reduced the flow of replacements to III MAF to assure compliance with post-redeployment manpower ceilings. FMFPac also directed special transfers of III MAF personnel to units on Okinawa and in Japan, both to reduce numbers in Vietnam and to rebuild other Western Pacific commands.⁹

This complicated process did not always go smoothly. Late notification of the highly classified redeployment plans often forced the division, wing, and FLC to do their own planning and implementation on extremely short notice. Compounding this problem, the exact strength and composition of Marine units varied almost from day to day, due to casualties, rotations, and replacements.* With the aid of computers, the various staffs could make the necessary calculations in time for the results to still be valid; but the different headquarters often worked from different data bases. Inevitably, mistakes occurred. Personnel redeployments were attended by much organizational disruption and individual frustrations.

Marine commanders almost universally deplored the impact of the "mixmaster" on unit effectiveness and on the well-being of the individual Marine. For both redeploying and nonredeploying units, mass personnel transfers resulted in the loss of key Marines and undermined morale and efficiency. In Keystone Robin Alpha, VMFA-314 was "mixmastered" three times in as many months because of changes in redeployment plans; finally officers from squadrons staying in Vietnam had to be assigned to temporary duty with VMFA-314 to fly out the squadron's aircraft. Unavoidably, with such personnel turbulence, "the man didn't know who he worked for; the supervisor didn't know who was working for him."¹⁰

As one redeployment increment followed another, a Marine with most of his Vietnam tour yet to serve

*A HQMC handbook for manpower planners, issued in 1969, likened the Marine Corps manpower system to a bath tub with a faucet at one end and a drain at the other. Water constantly flows in from the faucet and runs out the drain. The objective of the "plumber"/manpower planner is to adjust this flow so as to keep a given number of gallons (Marines) in the tub at any one time and to assure that each gallon spends a fixed length of time (tour of duty) in the tub. The basic rate of flow could be calculated with this equation: rate of flow (manpower input) equals the number of gallons in tub (strength) divided by the time in tub (tour length). By this formula, to keep III MAF at a strength of 24,000 Marines, each serving a 12-month tour, required a monthly replacement rate of 2,000 men (24,000 divided by 12 months). This was an oversimplification, since casualties in Vietnam and attrition from various causes elsewhere in the system would force adjustments in the replacement flow to compensate. To plan a redeployment, one had to calculate normal inflow and outflow, allow for attrition, and then determine how much additional water had to be bailed out to bring the water level down to a set point by a given time. Add to this the further complication that the "water" in fact was not uniform, but was a mixture of different temperatures (ranks and skills) which had to be kept in a prescribed balance. G-1 Division, HQMC, "The Plumber's Helper: for Manpower Planners" (Washington: HQMC, 1969).



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A355179
BGen Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., in khaki and facing the formation, greets returning Marines from Vietnam on board the USS Mobile (AKC 115) at San Diego.

might be shunted from organization to organization, sometimes too rapidly for his own mail to follow him. According to General Armstrong:

As units folded up and left Vietnam, a young fellow would go from the 7th Marines . . . to the 5th Marines; then, as one of their outfits would leave, they'd shift him to a different outfit and finally [he] ended up in the 1st Marines. And then if he still had the most time to do, why he'd end up in the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines because that was the unit that was going to go home last . . . In a period of six months, he might have been in seven organizations.¹¹

In each redeployment, security requirements prevented commanders from informing their troops concerning who was going home and when. The resulting spate of rumors and contradictory information adversely affected morale. Delayed instructions or last-minute changes in instructions kept commanders themselves uncertain who could redeploy almost to the moment that troop movements were ordered. As Colonel Robert W. Teller, the 1st MAW Chief of Staff put it, "you're a day before the boats are sailing and you still don't know who's leaving town."¹² The repeated alterations of plans for Keystone Robin Alpha forced HQMC to revise the individual redeployment criteria after embarkations actually had begun,

rendering ineligible Marines who had already received aircraft or shipping assignments. Out of 1,400 1st Marine Division troops in one Keystone Robin Alpha embarkation unit, 512 had to be told they were not redeploying. Other Marines, as a result of staff work incomplete for lack of time, found themselves leaving Vietnam without permanent new station assignments. These unfortunates included General Armstrong. The 3d MAB commander recalled:

CG, FMFPac had to send me temporary duty orders so I could leave the country [with 3d MAB]. I did not have the advantage of a permanent change of station (PCS) assignment . . . I went back to Hawaii and stayed there on temporary duty assignment for three weeks before my assignment came through.

Another who was affected was Colonel Don H. Blanchard, the chief of staff of the 1st Division, who was held at Camp Pendleton for more than a month awaiting orders.¹³

Manpower shortages, both in overall strength and in particular ranks and specialties, plagued III MAF during and between redeployment. Anticipating an early redeployment following Keystone Bluejay, HQMC and FMFPac reduced replacements to III MAF. This action resulted in severe personnel shortages when Keystone Robin Alpha was delayed until July 1970. By that month, the division and wing each were about 1,000 Marines below their manning levels,* with deficiencies in aviation specialists and field grade officers among the shortages.¹⁴ Throughout late 1970 and early 1971, the flow of replacements was uneven and unpredictable. In the 1st Marine Division, according to Colonel Hugh S. Aitken, the G-1, "The input flow . . . varied so considerably that we were either faced with . . . a significant excess of personnel or a significant shortage . . . Very seldom did the division stabilize at its authorized strength ceiling." Repeatedly, the division found itself with surpluses of some specialists and shortages of others. Advance information on the composition of new replacement drafts often proved inaccurate. Aitken reported: "We . . . try to plan for 350 O3s [riflemen] coming in in a given month, and we end up with 50 of those and maybe 200 communicators . . . The entire personnel plan for that

month and succeeding months is useless at that point." Aitken attributed these deficiencies to the difficulty of maintaining uniform, up-to-date strength information at all the headquarters involved in manpower movement and assignment.*¹⁵

Redeploying units began embarkation preparations two or more months before their scheduled date of departure. While still conducting combat operations, they began taking inventory of their equipment and packing or disposing of everything not immediately required for their missions. They cancelled requisitions and began sending nonessential vehicles and material to staging areas near Da Nang. The 5th Marines, which embarked in March 1971, established an Embarkation Readiness Center at Hill 34, the CP of its 1st Battalion, in December 1970, to process and store its equipment. By the beginning of March, when it stood down from operations, the regiment already had packed and prepared 85 percent of the material with which it would embark.¹⁶

Units normally stood down two or three weeks before embarkation and moved to secure cantonments near Da Nang. There, they "mixmastered" their personnel and finished packing and turning in supplies and equipment, often drawing transportation, messing, and other support from nonredeploying commands. During March 1971, Major Francis M. Kauffman, Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, described to his men what they could expect during stand-down:

This will be a fast moving, stressful period while we transfer personnel to other in-country units, to Okinawa, or to ConUS. At the same time, all equipment must be cleaned, checked by technicians, packaged for shipment and staged for embarkation. The next few weeks require cooperation all around. You can expect hard work, crowded living conditions at first, many inspections and formations . . . Many of you will not be on the lines again.¹⁷

Few redeploying organizations left Vietnam *en masse*. Instead, during stand-down, units gradually lost strength from transfers and individual redeployments by air or ship. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, which stood down in February 1971, dropped during the month from 33 Marine officers and 1,066 enlisted men to 22 officers and 230 men. It sent 441 Ma-

*The number of Marines of particular ranks, grades, and MOSs in a particular type of unit is established by its table of organization (T/O). The Marine Corps, in Vietnam and elsewhere, was forced by overall manpower shortages to keep most organizations at less than T/O strength. This reduced strength was called the "manning level," normally established as a percentage of T/O strength.

*The automated Marine Corps Manpower Management System (MMS) was designed to permit accurate measurement of strength at any time, but due to a shortage of trained personnel to operate it, the system in Vietnam was undermined by errors. The 1st Marine Division had a MMS error rate of 15-17 percent until early 1971. Aitken Debrief.

rines to the United States and transferred 395 to the 1st Marines and Force Logistic Command.¹⁸ At the appointed embarkation date, after a farewell parade, at least a token command group with the unit colors would emplane for their new station. Other contingents would board ships to accompany their unit's heavy equipment.

'Mixmastering' of Equipment and Real Estate

At the beginning of each redeployment, FMFPac instructed units concerning which categories of equipment and supplies to take with them and which items of equipment to turn in to FLC for redistribution to the Marine Corps or other United States and allied forces. Until Keystone Robin Alpha, units left Vietnam with their standard allowances of clothing, weapons, and vehicles and with some medical supplies, packaged fuel and lubricants, and spare parts. They divested themselves of all rations, ammunition, bulk POL, and extra or special southeast Asia allowance equipment. Units being deactivated left most of their material in Vietnam. III MAF "mixmastered" equipment, as well as Marines, so that the newest items and those items in the best condition remained with the organizations still committed to combat. Aircraft squadrons, for example, exchanged airplanes to keep in Vietnam those most recently returned from progressive aircraft rework (PAR).^{*} Redeploying units as a result often embarked with unserviceable equipment; of 90 MAG-16 vehicles loaded on one LST, only one was driven on under its own power. To alleviate this difficulty MAG-16 early in 1971 stationed a group staff officer familiar with redeployment plans at Futema to inform the MAG-16 elements there what material to expect in shipments from Vietnam and to help material repair and rehabilitation. As redeployment progressed, however, the loads of gear that were retrograded were organized more carefully and were in better shape.¹⁹

The intricacies of reshuffling personnel and equipment affected some units more adversely than others. Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Wehrle, who was the executive officer and then commanding officer of Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division from September 1970 to May 1971, recalled that his battalion became heavily reinforced with both people and

equipment. The vehicles, alone, that Headquarters Battalion acquired through this process created a great burden because they had to be cleaned, painted, and restenciled before they were loaded on the ships. The battalion became responsible for the condition of the vehicles, many of which were marginally serviceable, and had to meet the "Department of Agriculture requirement that these vehicles be showroom clean before they could be returned to the continental U.S." This requirement was made more difficult because the one steam jenny in the motor transport platoon in Service Company was of little value when it was working well and at the time it was barely working. "Even if it had been in top working order," said Wehrle, "we had another problem and that was the limited amount of water that we had because of the repeated breaking of the line coming from the airfield over to the division." Lastly, the motor transport platoon's size had been depleted by redeployment of personnel.

In an effort to meet the deadline, Wehrle hired Vietnamese and placed them on a round-the-clock work schedule. Vehicles were rolled on their sides and Marine supervisors "literally put Vietnamese on them like ants with knives, what have you, scraping to get the grease, mud, and everything off of them." According to Wehrle, just a few days before redeployment, the Army provided Headquarters Battalion with efficient steam jennies:

... they would set up almost like a conveyor belt line, ... and I'd bring a convoy of vehicles through and they would turn their steam jennies loose on them and clean up the last amount of dirt that was on them. But this was touch and go and, as I recall, we finished up the last vehicles, I believe, the day before we were to move them to Da Nang and stage them.

Finally, before the vehicles were actually staged to be reloaded, they were repainted and stenciled and displayed for the Vietnamese to pick what they wanted. "This went to them as military assistance," said Wehrle, and what remained "was embarked and returned to Camp Pendleton."²⁰

The experience of Communication Support Company (CSC) of 7th Communication Battalion, which in September 1970 assumed responsibilities of the deactivated 5th Communication Battalion, was as frustrating as Headquarters Battalion after inheriting the 5th's equipment including 137 vehicles. For the next 10 months, CSC labored to clean, paint and, in general, rehabilitate the equipment to a degree acceptable for retrograde from Vietnam. Although CSC finally succeeded in cleaning and retrograding all salvageable

^{*}Under the PAR system, at specified intervals, each Marine aircraft in Vietnam was shipped to aircraft plants in Japan for complete disassembly and rehabilitation. PAR intervals ranged from 18 months for A-4s to 25 months for UH-1Es. FMFPac MarOps, Dec66, pp. 77-78.

ble gear which had been transferred to its accounts, thousands of man-hours were spent preparing unwanted acquisitions and their organic gear which included over 100 vehicles, prime movers and towed loads, 25 CONEX boxes of miscellaneous equipment, as well as maintenance, radio and microwave equipment shelters. And all this was accomplished while CSC provided the preponderance of equipment, facilities, and personnel for the brigade communications center. Major Robert T. Himmerich, who commanded CSC prior to redeployment, observed years later: "Units and organizations that made up III MAF and then 3d MAB should have displaced from Vietnam to wherever ordered and taken their equipment and supplies with them. Deactivation should have been effected only after all accounts were settled."²¹

III MAF redistributed excess equipment turned in by departing units, and in some instances also regular allowance equipment,* under priorities and programs established by FMFPac and MACV. Generally, Marine units still in Vietnam had first claim, followed by the Vietnamese Marine Corps and the 2d ROKMC Brigade. On 1 August 1970, MACV initiated Project 805, a program under which all equipment of departing units, both standard allowance and excess, was screened for items needed by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Later in 1970, MACV established a similar program to meet the needs of United States Services in Vietnam. Any excess Marine unit equipment not selected for either of these programs went to FMFPac organizations outside Vietnam or to rebuild mountout and mountout augmentation (MO/MOA)** stocks throughout the Pacific.²²

*This was known as Table of Equipment (T/E) allowance and included the unit's weapons and vehicles.

**As forces in readiness, Marine Corps units maintained special stocks of reserve supplies to support them during initial deployment. These stocks were divided into two 30-day blocks. The first, designated the Mountout block, was supposed to be held by the unit and move with it. The second, or Mountout Augmentation block, was carried by the service support unit (FSR or service battalion) responsible for support of the combat unit for which the block was intended. During 1965-1966, Marine units had brought both these blocks into Vietnam and used them up. The blocks had not been reconstituted during the war. In December 1968, FMFPac began planning to rebuild them, using excess material resulting from anticipated redeployments. The effort got under way in July 1969, with redeployment of the 3d Marine Division, based mainly on use of excess equipment from units; but it did not achieve great momentum until FLC and the 3d FSR on Okinawa were able to release their excess supplies during late 1970 and early 1971. Soper, "Logistics," pp. 210-211; FMFPac, MarOps, Jun70, pp. 40-41, Dec70, p. 69.

To supervise and coordinate implementation of these programs, III MAF established a Redistribution Center under its G-4. This staff unit supervised equipment transfers between Marine organizations and to the South Vietnamese and other United States and allied forces. Colonel Allan T. Wood, III MAF G-4, observed: "You won't find this organization on a T/O, for it was never provided for, and it's an exceptional requirement existing only in . . . redeployment."²³

III MAF took special care in selecting and preparing equipment for MACV's Project 805. Thirty to 35 days before a Marine unit was to redeploy, III MAF compared the unit's list of equipment, both standard allowance and excess on hand for United States and Hawaii-bound units and excess on hand only for organizations going to Okinawa or Japan, against a MACV list of RVNAF needs. III MAF then nominated the appropriate items to HQMC for turnover. After HQMC arranged for one-for-one reimbursement in kind by the Army and approved the transaction, Marine technicians carefully inspected each item as the owning unit stood down. Equipment offered to the

CH-46 Sea Knight aircraft from Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 are lined up at the Tien Sha Deep Water Pier near Da Nang for redeployment.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A422854



South Vietnamese had to meet exacting standards set by III MAF. Trucks, for instance, could have surface scratches and mildewed seat cushions; but engines, transmissions, brakes, instruments, horns, lights, and windshield wipers had to work; the battery had to have at least nine months of life left; and a vehicle could not have over 17,000 miles on its speedometer. After the Marines weeded out substandard pieces, representatives from the ARVN 1st Area Logistic Command inspected the equipment again and selected what they wanted.

Between the start of Project 805 in August 1970 and the end of Marine participation in it in May of the following year, III MAF/3d MAB offered 11,480 separate items to the South Vietnamese. These items included radios, mine detectors, grenade launchers, machine guns, rifles, pistols, trucks, night vision sights, 105mm howitzers, and even war dogs. The Vietnamese accepted 10,733 of these offerings, an acceptance rate for Marine equipment of 94 percent. By contrast, of the much larger amounts of material offered by the U.S. Army, the Vietnamese took only about 15 percent. Marines attributed this difference to their own stringent pretransfer inspections and more careful preparation.²⁴ Colonel Kenneth McLennan later noted that while Project 805 served the Army and the RVNAF, it was not "simply an altruistic effort on the part of the Corps." The Marine Corps "received either dollar credit or replacement in kind in CONUS for every item turned over."²⁵

By the time the last 3d MAB units left Vietnam, the Marines had redistributed 328,000 pieces of unit equipment valued at \$50,409,000. Of the dollar value, 86.7 percent remained within the Marine Corps, most of it in Western Pacific commands. Another 8.7 percent by value went to the RVNAF and 3 percent to the South Korean Marines. The MACV interservice transfer program in Vietnam, which had gotten off to a late start, accounted for only 1.6 percent.²⁶

As units redeployed, Force Logistic Command grappled with the problem of disposing of five years of accumulated supplies and equipment. At the beginning of 1970, FLC estimated that it had over 170,000 tons of material to be redeployed in its operating stocks

and maintenance "float,"* plus another 3,800 tons of property organic to its own units and 259,156 square feet of vehicles. During the year, turned-in equipment from departing organizations and the arrival of requisitioned supplies, no longer needed, enlarged the mass of material for which FLC was directly responsible. Since FLC had to maintain reserve stocks in proportion to III MAF strength, it defined its equipment redeployment problem and measured success in terms of disposing of "excesses." Excesses were a matter of accounting definition. Colonel Robert W. Calvert, G-3 of FLC, explained:

The . . . stock account is constantly changing . . . from receipts, turn-ins, inventory gains and losses, recomputation of requisitioning objectives, and then one of the major factors that affects the excesses is the reduction in forces. You get a reduction in force and your excesses go way sky high.²⁷

Disposition of FLC excesses, like that of unit equipment, followed policies and priorities established by the Department of Defense and Headquarters Marine Corps. Fundamental was General Chapman's often-repeated injunction to pull out of Vietnam every usable piece of Marine Corps material worth more than five dollars. FLC did its best to comply with the spirit, if not the letter, of this policy. In redistributing excess supplies and equipment not part of the regular allowance of units ("non-table of equipment," or non-T/E equipment), reconstitution of Western Pacific MO/MOA stocks received first priority, followed by replenishment of Western Pacific operating stocks. The Marine Corps offered material not required for these purposes to the Pacific Command Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA), an organization established by the Department of Defense to shift supplies among American military and civilian agencies in the Pacific. FLC stock excesses not picked up by PURA flowed back into the Marine Corps supply system for use within the United States and elsewhere.²⁸

During January 1970, Force Logistic Command opened a Retrograde Facility for repair, salvage, packing, and storage of FLC material and that turned in by units to be prepared for shipment. Built by Marine engineers about a mile from FLC Headquarters at Camp Books, the Retrograde Facility consisted of workshops; loading ramps; hardstands; vehicle wash racks; 10,300 square feet of maintenance area; 244,000

*Unlike Marine units, Army organizations normally did not redeploy with their equipment. Instead, they left it in depots for later disposition or transfer. Marine units, by contrast, prepared their own equipment for RVNAF or other transfer and turned it over right at their stand-down cantonments. Wood Debrief.

*The maintenance float was a reserve of large pieces of equipment which could be issued temporarily to units to replace items turned in for repair.

square feet of paved, open storage; and 4,200 square feet of covered storage. The facility's staff of 50 Marines could prepare for embarkation any item of equipment from an M16 rifle to a 60-ton tank. During peak activity, Marines of the facility processed an average of 1,000 ordnance items, 500-800 pieces of communication equipment, and 400-500 vehicles per month. Marines of the facility also salvaged and shipped out brass cartridge cases and reconditioned and reissued jungle camouflage uniforms, and collected damaged body armor and sent it to the 3d FSR on Okinawa for repair and reuse.²⁹

FLC began preliminary steps in early 1970 to consolidate, control, and use up its supply stocks. During January, FLSG-B set up its own Disposal/Redistribution Collection Point for handling its excesses as they developed. FLC in March established procedures for cancelling units' equipment requisitions and meeting their requirements instead with items left by redeploying organizations. In May, FLC launched a "Care and Store" program. Under the program, work crews pulled particular categories of supplies out of storage, opened the packages, discarded deteriorated items, repacked the rest, and where possible placed the repacked material in warehouses rather than open lots. FLC also tried to collect each supply item at one storage location. In January, FLC had 190,000 separate entries in its storage locator file; by October FLC had reduced the number of entries to 80,000, partly by issue and shipment and partly by rearrangement of the stock. Marines of the Supply Battalion recovered barbed wire and stakes from vacated American fortifications, cleaned them, and packed them for shipment to the 3d FSR.³⁰

In November 1970, Force Logistic Command undertook a final sustained effort to identify and dispose of its excesses. Marines of Supply Battalion, assisted by Marines of Maintenance Battalion, made a detailed inventory and inspection of FLC's operating stocks, to determine how much material listed in the accounts actually was on hand and in what condition. Maintenance Battalion at the same time reviewed the equipment "float" in the light of reduced III MAF strength to determine how much of the float was now in excess. By 12 November, FLC had computed the value of excesses at \$15,000,000. Brigadier General James R. Jones, CGFLC, years later stated: "Excess material then had to be screened against established priorities, packed and embarked for various destinations. At the same time, requisitions had to be can-

celled for items no longer needed and an effort made to halt or divert to new destinations items already shipped before they reached Vietnam and added to the existing surplus."³¹

For the next six months, all elements of FLC labored to find and eliminate excesses. In the process, the command had to overcome a number of problems. Much material in warehouses and storage lots turned out to have been misidentified or mislocated, often as a result of mistakes by Vietnamese civilian employees unfamiliar with the English language. Other equipment had deteriorated in outside storage in the heat and humidity. Supply Battalion's Preservation, Packing, and Packaging (PP&P) Facility, its work load vastly increased, ran short of packaging material and manpower. FLC shifted Marines from other elements into the packaging shop and eventually reorganized the PP&P facility into three separate production lines, so that Marines not trained in packaging and preservation could work on the least complicated items.

Paperwork procedures had to be revised to move the required volume of supplies in the limited time available. FLC and the Marine Corps Supply Activity (MCSA) in Philadelphia developed shortcuts to speed disposition of various items. In January 1971, HQMC authorized FLC to declare certain types of equipment unserviceable or obsolete on its own authority, whereas previously FLC had to submit a Recoverable Item Report (RIR) to Philadelphia on each piece. These actions reduced message traffic and saved the Marine Corps both time and money. Bottlenecks developed in the PURA system. Excesses offered through PURA had to remain available for 75 days, during which period FLC could not ship or otherwise dispose of them. Any increase item resulted in a new PURA offering for that item, entailing further delay of its disposition. Brigadier General Jones recalled that "FLC broke this logjam by monitoring the items which had been offered to PURA and subsequently at selected intervals force releasing selected quantities of these PURA-reported excess items to the Marine Corps supply system."³²

Force Logistic Command mounted a major effort to halt shipment of supplies requisitioned but no longer needed. Material requisitioned from the Marine supply system in the United States could take up to 160 days to reach Vietnam; as redeployments proceeded much of it became excess en route due to withdrawal of the ordering unit or reduction of the required FLC operating reserves. By November 1970, this material, known as "excess due-ins" had a total



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A373827

A self-propelled 155mm howitzer backs onto the ramp of the Landing Ship Tank Pitkin County (LST 1082) at Da Nang as the Marines in 1971 continue their redeployment from Vietnam. Note the head of the driver can be seen under the barrel of the gun.

value of \$8,100,000. To remove these excesses from its books, FLC had to trace the requisitions through the system and cancel them, as well as stop or divert the actual goods in transit. FLC finally resorted to block cancellation of all requisitions for III MAF units except those specifically identified as still necessary, and FLC arranged for stoppage of the material wherever it was then in the "pipeline." As a result of close cooperation between FLC, the 3d FSR, and MCSA Philadelphia, this procedure proved effective, and "by the end of May 1971, the value of excess due-ins had been reduced to \$2,400."³³

In March 1971, FLC began shipping out its remaining supply stocks. By the end of the following month, the command had emptied most of its warehouses and storage lots. The Marines also carried away many of the warehouses themselves. To meet a need for storage

at Marine bases in Okinawa and Japan, III MAF early in 1971 obtained permission from MACV to dismantle and remove 55 prefabricated steel Butler buildings from its installations. Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion took the structures apart and by early May FLC had packed the components and sent most of them out of Vietnam.³⁴

Between 12 November 1970 and 26 April 1971, Force Logistic Command disposed of \$23,000,000 worth of excess supplies and equipment, including the \$15,000,000 initially identified and material subsequently turned in by units or arriving from the United States. In the same period, FLC reduced its occupied storage space from 800,000 cubic feet to 501,000. Of the material thus redistributed, 3 percent by value was used to reconstitute Pacific mountout and mountout augmentation stocks; 25 percent went into

Pacific operating supplies; 7 percent was taken up through PURA; 53 percent returned to the Marine Corps supply system; and 12 percent was disposed of as unserviceable.³⁵

FLC's large-scale effort to recover all possible equipment and supplies loaded Marine bases on Okinawa and in Japan with much unusable material. Some officers said that the receiving commands were not warned of the poor condition of the material that was arriving. Brigadier General James R. Jones, later viewed the retrograde of material differently, challenging the suggestion that commands in Okinawa and Japan became repositories for unusable gear:

There was never a directive or policy to retrograde unusable/unserviceable supplies (expendable items). Units did acquire unserviceable (but repairable) equipment through the various exchange programs but not in excess of authorized equipment allowances. Unserviceable equipment retrograded by FLC to the 3d FSR on Okinawa was within the commands' authorized allowances and ability to repair.³⁶

"While the massive retrograde of III MAF material and equipment did cause storage difficulties and equipment repair backlogs at bases on Okinawa and in Japan," the recovery effort nevertheless contributed to rebuilding Marine Corps logistic readiness in the Pacific. In July 1971, Lieutenant General Jones, CGFMFPac, could report that Western Pacific mount-out and mountout augmentation stocks had been fully reestablished.³⁷

All equipment and supplies being shipped back to the United States, whether by redeploying units or by FLC, had to meet exacting standards of cleanliness set by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Public Health Service to prevent the introduction of Asian insect pests and contagious diseases into the United States. USDA and Public Health Service inspectors closely examined each shipload of vehicles and cargo; nothing could go on board without their approval. Packing boxes had to be of termite-free, unrotted wood. All containers, closed vehicle bodies, and shipborne aircraft had to be sealed and treated with specified amounts and types of insecticides and rat poisons. Vehicles used for years in Vietnam's mud and dust had to be treated with a mixture of fuel oil and kerosene, scraped with wire brushes to remove caked soil and vegetation, and then hosed down with water under high pressure. Having cleaned the vehicle, Marines had to sand and spot paint all areas requiring it, coat unpainted metal surfaces with protective oil, and carefully pack all tools and acces-

sories. After the unual dusty and muddy drive to the dock, they had to wash the vehicle once again before it could be embarked. Helicopters, which also picked up much Vietnamese dust and dirt, were if anything more difficult to decontaminate. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Fails, MAG-16 S-4, estimated that clearing a single CH-46 required up to 100 man-hours of labor, "if the bird was in reasonable shape" to begin with.³⁸

Owning units were responsible for cleaning and preparing the equipment they were taking with them, while FLC packaged and decontaminated its own equipment, as well as excess items turned in by redeploying organizations. Both FLC and the 1st Engineer Battalion assisted redeploying units in preparing their equipment. Force Logistic Command, besides furnishing packing and cleaning materials, provided washdown ramps at its Retrograde Facility for use of other organizations. The 1st Engineer Battalion set up a vehicle washing facility at its cantonment and maintained last-minute washing points at the Da Nang Deep Water Piers and at two of the LST ramps.³⁹

While most redeploying fixed-wing squadrons could fly their aircraft to their new stations,* helicopters posed a special embarkation problem. Some redeploying helicopter squadrons simply flew on board LPHs, but as MAG-16 prepared for its final redeployments in early 1971, it was apparent that many aircraft would have to be loaded on other types of amphibious and cargo vessels at the Deep Water Piers. Since the wharves lacked space for landing and decontaminating an entire squadron at one time, the helicopters would have to be cleaned and protected at Marble Mountain for the voyage and then towed the 12 miles to the docks through a heavily populated area vulner-

*Fixed-wing squadrons displacing to the United States and Hawaii conducted trans-Pacific flights (TransPacs), involving planned stops in the Philippines and on Guam, Wake, and Midway or Johnston Island, with aerial refuelling at the midpoint of each leg of the trip. Besides refuelling the planes in the air, KC-130Fs of VMGRs -152 and -352 transported squadron maintenance and control personnel and equipment to meet the aircraft at each stopover. The Marine Corps had used this system since the early 1960s to move squadrons between the United States and the Western Pacific. It saved expense and helped maintain squadron integrity. By the time the last TransPac out of Vietnam, VMA(AW)-225 to MCAS El Toro, was completed on 10 May 1971, 590 Marine aircraft had made the crossing, either eastbound or westbound. Only three aircraft had been lost due to equipment failure, and no crewmen had been killed or injured. FMFPac MarOps, May-Jun71, pp. 19-22, recapitulates TransPac operations, listing each separate redeployment.

able to enemy infiltration. MAG-16 had previously moved individual aircraft to the Deep Water Piers without harassment, but the 23 or 24 helicopters of an entire squadron constituted a target worth the risk to the enemy of setting up a large ambush.

Beginning with the redeployment of HMM-364 in March 1971, MAG-16 conducted a series of convoys in which helicopters were towed from Marble Mountain to the deep water piers. Each convoy required elaborate planning, rehearsals, and security measures. Movement began around midnight; and no one, except the group commander and key staff officers, was told the convoy date until two hours before departure. A truck carrying several armed Marines towed each helicopter, and the column included fire engines, bulldozers, and cranes. Army MPs blocked all side roads intersecting the convoy route, holding people and vehicles beyond grenade range. Marine drivers and guards had instructions that "if an aircraft is attacked or somebody throws a grenade in it, push it in the ditch and keep the other[s] . . . moving." As a result of these precautions, all convoys completed the two- and one-half hour trip without incident. In the largest movement, on 18-19 May, MAG-16 transported 47 aircraft to the piers in a single night—37 CH-46Ds, 3 CH-53Ds, and 7 UH-1Es.⁴⁰

Of the total number of Marines redeploying during 1969-1971, about 30 percent left Vietnam by ship. The rest departed on commercial aircraft chartered by the Military Airlift Command and allocated by MACV. In contrast, 90 percent of tonnage of all Marine equipment and cargo went by sea. Most of this cargo, as well as most surface-transported Marines, traveled in Navy amphibious vessels furnished by CinCPacFlt. Each Keystone redeployment required most of the amphibious shipping in the Western Pacific, from LPHs to LSTs. During each redeployment, one of the two Seventh Fleet Special Landing Forces stood down temporarily to permit the vessels of its amphibious ready group to join in the sealift. Pacific Fleet when necessary diverted additional ships from the Eastern Pacific. LSTs shuttled troops and cargo to Japan and Okinawa. To move freight, especially FLC's excess stock, the Marines took advantage of every available amphibious ship, including LSTs returning to the United States to be broken up for scrap. FMFPac Headquarters closely watched ship movements and informed FLC whenever a ship was due to arrive at Da Nang with empty cargo space. FLC then quickly diverted Marines from other jobs to prepare cargo already designated

for embarkation and to haul it to the piers. During Keystone Bluejay alone, FLC squeezed 94,000 square feet of vehicles and 486,000 cubic feet of freight onto eastbound amphibious ships. Between 1969 and 1971, reliance on Navy ships saved the Marine Corps about \$18,000,000 in commercial freight costs, as well as affording useful embarkation training to both Marines and ships' crews.⁴¹

As Marines left Vietnam with their supplies and equipment, III MAF and later 3d MAB had to dispose of an increasing number of empty bases and camps. III MAF possessed exclusive authority to transfer or demolish OPs, most firebases, and other combat positions; but later installations, such as An Hoa, Baldy, and the Division Ridge complex, had to be first offered to the other United States Services and the South Vietnamese under procedures established and supervised by MACV. During most of 1970, the Navy Civil Engineering/Real Property Office at Da Nang maintained the records on Marine as well as Navy installations and performed most of the staff work on base transfer. On 1 October, as a result of continued Navy reductions in force, III MAF had to take over management of its own real estate. III MAF then established a Real Estate/Base Development Officer under its G-4 staff section. The office consisted of a Marine major assisted by a Navy engineer lieutenant, two draftsmen, and a clerk-typist. This office, which continued in operation under the 3d MAB, notified MACV when Marine camps became vacant, and prepared the documents for offering and transferring the installations.⁴²

Real estate transfers, especially to the South Vietnamese, were a complex, often frustrating task. Property turnovers included elaborate paperwork. Colonel Wood, III MAF G-4, reported: "It takes a minimum of four separate, detailed reports to transfer a piece of property We finally end up . . . with a heavily detailed report and a legal agreement which must be bilingual . . . and signed by the respective commanders for both governments."⁴³ The secrecy of redeployment planning prevented III MAF and other U.S. commands from opening base turnover discussions with the Vietnamese until late in each withdrawal. The Vietnamese, who were poorly organized and equipped to manage their own facilities, made decisions slowly and only after much haggling and American pressure. Most important, as American strength diminished, more camps were available than the remaining allied forces needed or could protect.

Colonel John W. Haggerty III, the MAF G-3, pointed out in late 1970:

One of the problems . . . all over is going to be getting rid of real estate We don't want [the ARVN] to end up doing nothing but guarding property But we've got so darn much . . . real estate in Vietnam, not just the Marine Corps but everybody, that it takes twice the ARVN forces just to guard it all. . . .⁴⁴

In spite of these difficulties, III MAF gradually rid itself of its surplus real estate. III MAF turned over 26 camps and bases in Keystone Robin Charlie and Oriole Alpha. The Marines tried to leave each installation immaculate and in good repair. Major General Widdecke, the 1st Marine Division Commander, according to his G-4, "was very interested in the Marine Corps image in turning over this property" and insisted that electric fixtures and toilets must work and that screens and doors on huts be correctly installed. At combat positions, under division orders, "all waste will be buried [and] bunkers, trenches and fighting holes will be left in place."⁴⁵

III MAF also tried to clean up its battlefield. In April 1970, Lieutenant General McCutcheon instituted a program to find and retrieve wrecked Marine tanks, amphibian tractors, aircraft, trucks, and other large pieces of equipment that littered the Quang Nam countryside after five years of war. Marines from FLC's Maintenance Battalion assisted by division and force engineer elements, located 144 hulks. Using cranes, bulldozers, and recovery vehicles, work crews

extricated the wrecks and dragged them to the U.S. Army Property Disposal salvage yard. On one occasion, Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion dug up and turned in seven amphibian tractors buried near the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines CP at Camp Lauer. This particular recovery required 714 man-hours of work and the employment of 13 cranes, tractors, and other pieces of earthmoving and salvage equipment. Helicopter support team Marines of Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion, also played a large role in retrieval of abandoned gear. For HST Marines this salvage mission usually required "an early morning home LZ helicopter pickup and insertion at a remote site to effect helicopter retrieval of downed aircraft and destroyed equipment." The mission often demanded ingenuity of HST Marines "to gain access and rig the lifts." Of the 144 wrecks located, Marines had removed 125 by April 1971. The Marines could have retrieved the remaining 19 hulks only at excessive risk to men and equipment and hence left them where they were.⁴⁶

The immense logistic effort accomplished its intended purpose. When the last ship of Keystone Oriole Alpha, the USS *Saint Louis* (LKA 116), sailed from Da Nang on 25 June 1971, the only major pieces of Marine Corps material left behind were several Butler buildings packed on trailers and awaiting pickup by a commercial roll-on-roll-off cargo vessel. General Armstrong reported: "As far as I know, that's the only usable property that belonged to us that was still there."⁴⁷

PART VI
THE CLOSE OF AN ERA

Morale and Discipline

*A Time of Troubles—Atrocities, Rules of Engagement, and Personal Response—'Friendly on Friendly'
The Challenge to Authority: Race, Drugs, Indiscipline—'Fragging' and Operation Freeze
Training and Morale-Building—Cohesion or Disintegration?*

A Time of Troubles

For III MAF, the last year and a half of ground operations in Vietnam was a time of troubles. The decline in combat, combined with increasingly critical public and mass media scrutiny of the military actions of all Services, brought into prominence two long-standing and distressing problems: the protection of noncombatants in a battle fought among and for control of the people, and the prevention of accidental killing and wounding of Marines by their own fire. These problems lent themselves to the traditional military solutions of intensified training and rigorous enforcement of operating procedures, rules of engagement, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

More complex and difficult to deal with were the manifestations among Marines of the racial upheaval, antiwar dissent, and generational conflict plaguing American society in the early 1970s. These manifestations added up to a many-faceted challenge to command authority. Black militancy, expressed in forms ranging from haircuts and hand signs to mass confrontations and assaults, set Marine against Marine. The youth drug culture, imported from the United States, found fertile soil in Vietnam, where cheap narcotics abounded. Political dissent, encouraged and sometimes organized by a militant segment of the antiwar movement, raised the threat of mass disobedience of orders. All these forms of discontent merged into a general attitude of resentment and suspicion toward authority among many enlisted Marines, an attitude that occasionally erupted in deliberate attempts to murder officers and NCOs, the heinous crime known by the slang term, "fragging." Of this turbulent period, Sergeant Major Edgar R. Huff, Sergeant Major of III MAF, later observed: "If I were asked to sum up the 'Marine Experience' in Vietnam, I would say that the Corps grew far too fast and that this growth had a devastating impact on our leadership training and combat effectiveness.*¹

*Sergeant Major Huff had the unique experience of twice having been the senior enlisted man in III MAF. Towards the end of his first tour in Vietnam (1967-1968) during which he was awarded the Bronze Star and Purple Heart Medals, he served as Sergeant

III MAF, following general Marine Corps policy, adopted two main lines of approach to its disciplinary problems. On one hand, III MAF reemphasized traditional Marine values of pride in country and Corps, discipline, and loyalty to unit and comrades, while displaying the determination to punish gross violations of orders and regulations. The Marine Corps used existing legal and administrative procedures to purge its ranks of the most persistent offenders. On the other hand, III MAF tried to understand and make allowances for the pride and resentment of young Black Marines, sought ways to prevent drug abuse by education, and sponsored efforts to find common ground between a tradition-minded leadership and an often antitraditional rank and file. Although most Marines recognized that unrest was largely confined to the rear areas, where leadership is often put to its severest test, they also found that the problems were widespread and not amenable to simple or fast solutions. The balance between established, still valid standards of military discipline and professional conduct and accommodation to irreversible social and cultural change was not easy to find. That search was still under way as the last Marines of the 3d MAB left Vietnam.

Atrocities, Rules of Engagement, and Personal Response

On the evening of 19 February 1970, Company B, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, operating in the Viet Cong-dominated countryside south of FSB Ross, sent out a five-man roving patrol.² Called a "killer team," the patrol had the mission of setting ambushes near the many pro-VC hamlets in the Que Son Valley to catch enemy troops or underground members moving in and out. Of the members of the team, Lance Corporal Randell D. Herrod, the leader, had been in Vietnam for seven months; PFC Thomas R. Boyd, Jr., had spent six months in the war, and Private Michael A. Schwartz, three months. The remaining two patrol members, PFCs Samuel G. Green and Michael S.

Major, III MAF. In 1970-71, he was again Sergeant Major, III MAF and took part in the headquarters withdrawal from Vietnam. Henry I. Shaw, Jr. and Ralph W. Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps* (Washington: MCHC, 1979), pp. 79-80.

Krichten, had been in Vietnam only a month. None of these Marines, except Herrod, was considered proficient in night patrolling, although all had volunteered for the mission. Herrod, recently transferred from the 3d Marine Division, was awaiting court-martial for unauthorized absence. He was acting as team leader on this occasion because better qualified men were fatigued by days of continual combat.

January and February 1970 had been difficult months for Company B. The company had helped defend FSB Ross against the 6 January sapper attack. On 12 February, Company B had nine Marines killed in a well-executed enemy ambush. Weeks of day and night operations had brought the men close to exhaustion, and boobytrap casualties had compounded anger and frustration at the 12 February losses. The company commander, First Lieutenant Louis R. Ambort, a 23-year-old from Little Rock, Arkansas, reflected the tension in the unit in his instructions to Herrod's patrol. Ambort, according to subsequent accounts, exhorted his men to "get some damned gooks tonight" and avenge the company's casualties. He gave the impression that age, sex, and military status were not to be taken into account, although the platoon sergeant made a point of warning Herrod before the patrol went out that the lieutenant really meant only enemy soldiers.

In the field, the "killer team" moved to the small hamlet of Son Thang (4),* about two miles southwest of Ross, inhabited by a group of known Viet Cong families. The people in Son Thang had refused both American and GVN offers of relocation to a safer area, preferring to stay near where their men were fighting. Under the rules of engagement for this area, night patrols could enter such hamlets to search for VC; this night, Herrod's team entered Son Thang (4). The Marines went to a hut and called out the occupants, all women and children. One woman broke for a nearby treeline. The Marines shot her and then, allegedly at Herrod's command, gunned down the others. They went on to two more huts, ordered the inhabitants of each to come outside, and cut them down with small arms fire. In all, 16 Vietnamese—five women and 11 children—died that night in Son Thang (4).

Returning to the company position, the patrol reported a fight with 15-20 armed Viet Cong and claimed to have killed six.³ Lieutenant Ambort passed the report on to battalion and regiment. The next morning, another 1st Battalion patrol, acting on a report from Vietnamese civilians, found the bodies in Son Thang (4). When battalion headquarters challenged Ambort's initial report, the lieutenant at first stuck by it and produced an SKS, actually taken some time before, as a weapon captured in the nonexistent fight. Later, he admitted that he had made a false action report. Information on the incident moved rapidly up the division chain of command. On 20 February, Major General Wheeler, the 1st Marine Division commander, reported to III MAF that a "possible serious incident" had occurred, involving elements of Company B and the civilians of Son Thang (4).⁴

The Son Thang (4) incident was not the first of its kind in the Vietnam conflict. In fact, in most earlier counterinsurgency campaigns, conducted by the United States and other western and nonwestern nations, the butchery at the small hamlet would not have been viewed as unique. Even in the conventional and relatively gentlemanly American Civil War, Union commanders summarily shot and hanged rebel bushwackers, burned towns and farms, and threatened retaliation against civilians for irregular acts of resistance. During his 1864 march through Georgia, General William T. Sherman ordered Confederate prisoners driven ahead of one of his columns to find or detonate enemy road mines. In the Philippines in 1901, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller was court-martialed for directing the execution of 11 treacherous native guides.* Brutality charges, some of them valid, marred the pre-World War II Marine occupation of Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.⁵ In Vietnam, such cruelties were no part of American policy. Nevertheless, the fear, rage, and frustration of battle against an evasive enemy, compounded often by deficient unit training and leadership, by individual personality defects, and by racial and cultural prejudice, led to isolated incidents of murder or abuse of prisoners and civilians and mutilation of enemy dead.

*On American maps, this hamlet was named Thang Tay (1) and this name appeared in initial dispatches. Later everyone substituted Son Thang (4), which was the hamlet name used by Que Son District authorities.

*Waller was acquitted. The entire court-martial, convened by the Army, later was ruled invalid, as Waller's Marines had not been formally assigned to Army command when the incident occurred.

Battlefield abuses and “war crimes”* had become a major public issue in the United States by the time Herrod’s patrol entered Son Thang (4). The furor stemmed from revelation of the My Lai incident of 16 March 1968, in which Americal Division soldiers had shot several hundred unresisting Vietnamese noncombatants in Quang Ngai Province. Evidence that Americal Division commanders and staffs had falsified reports and suppressed investigation of this crime further disturbed political leaders and ordinary citizens alike. By early 1970, 16 Army officers—including First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr., whose platoon was involved in the My Lai shooting—and nine enlisted men were awaiting court-martial on charges related to the massacre. A special Army investigating team headed by Lieutenant General William R. Peers, USA, was examining the allegations of a coverup and soon would confirm its occurrence. Peer’s findings would ruin the careers of 14 senior officers, including Major General Samuel W. Koster, former Americal Division commander. Congress had begun its own My Lai investigation.

Since mid-1965, when Marine riflemen first moved out into the countryside around Da Nang, III MAF commanders had attempted to enforce discrimination in the use of firepower and ensure firm but compassionate treatment of Vietnamese civilians. Television coverage of Company D, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines’ assault on the village of Cam Ne, a VC stronghold, in which civilians’ huts were allegedly burned indiscriminately in August 1965 dramatized both the military and the public relations importance of this problem.** In combat amid heavily populated hamlets, against an enemy who used the people to conceal and shield him, commanders often found it difficult to distinguish between a deliberate atrocity and the accidental result of misjudgment by troops

*War crimes are defined by a number of international agreements, including the Hague and Geneva conventions and the precedents developed in the post-World War II Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of Axis leaders. Most provisions of these codes affecting the actions of individual soldiers on the battlefield are embodied in the manuals and rules of engagement of the United Armed Services and in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and battlefield offenses are charged as violations of the UCMJ in accordance with policy which preceded the Vietnam war. U.S. Army Field Manual FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare* (1956), para 507b. Sydney D. Bailey, *Prohibitions and Restraints in War* (New York: Oxford United Press, 1972.).

**For details of the Cam Ne incident, see Jack Shulimson and Maj Charles M. Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam 1965: The Landing and the Buildup* (Washington: MCHC, 1978), pp. 61-64.

under fire. Nevertheless, when clearcut battlefield crimes occurred, III MAF charged and court-martialed the offenders and reported the facts to superior headquarters. To the extent appropriate, the command informed the press about pending cases and their disposition. From 1965 to 1971, 27 Marines who served in Vietnam were convicted of the offense of murder in cases in which the victim was Vietnamese.*6

III MAF’s response to the Son Thang (4) incident followed this established pattern. Brigadier General Leo J. Dulacki, then III MAF Chief of Staff, recalled that Son Thang, while not on the scale of My Lai, “was still a despicable atrocity, and there was concern that it would be blown up to the proportions of My Lai regardless of how III MAF handled the incident.” Dulacki said, “disappointedly,” that at the lower levels in the early stages of the investigation there were signs that the atrocity should be “hushed up.” Nevertheless, the command “handled the case according to law and out in the open.”7

III MAF passed the earlier 1st Marine Division serious incident report through III MAF on to Headquarters Marine Corps. The Commandant, General Chapman, closely followed the case. He instructed the 1st Marine Division which had responsibility for investigating and if necessary courtmartialing offenders, to report developments to Headquarters daily through FMFPac.** These daily reports continued until 6 March. Eventually, to facilitate the conduct of trials, the division, with FMFPac concurrence, declassified all its messages concerning the investigation. Through-out, III MAF kept the news media fully informed. Reviewing the incident years later, General Dulacki said that in the early stages of the legal process the press showed little interest, “in fact, one of the earliest press reports emanating from Vietnam complimented the Marine Corps for the forthright and candid manner” in which “it handled the case, making favorable comparisons with My Lai. It wasn’t until much later, as a result of the political maneuvering

*Moreover, 16 Marines were convicted of rape, while 15 were convicted of manslaughter. Few of these offenses were committed in the heat of battle. For example, in *U.S. v. Stamatis*, NMC 70-3765, and *U.S. v. Sikorski*, NMC 70-3578, the victim of manslaughter was a South Vietnamese soldier who was a drug pusher. Maj W. Hayes Parks, Head, Law of War Branch, International Law Division, ltr to Col John E. Greenwood, dtd 30May79.

**Marine Corps Order 5830.4, dtd 30Apr70, established this as standard reporting procedure for commands investigating misconduct by their personnel which led to damage to lives and property of foreign nationals.

on behalf of certain parties to the case, that it became somewhat of a *cause celebre*.”⁸

After an informal investigation, Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Cooper, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines commander, on 23 February removed Lieutenant Ambort from command of Company B. The following day, the battalion convened a formal pretrial investigation under Article 32 of the UCMJ,* and charged the five members of the patrol with murder. At the same time, the office of the Division Staff Judge Advocate appointed an investigating officer and furnished military lawyers as counsel for both the government and the defendants.⁹

Reports of the charges in the American press provoked letters of protest to Marine Corps Headquarters. Most of the letter writers questioned the justice of prosecuting young men for doing the killing they had been trained and sent to do. The protestors also stressed the emotional pressures of counter guerrilla operations as mitigating circumstances for the Marines' offense. Replying to these letters, Headquarters spokesmen carefully avoided comment on the facts of the Son Thang case, but they declared as a general principle:

There is no denying that the ordeal of combat puts extreme pressures on the Marines fighting in Vietnam. However, the Marine Corps is fighting in Vietnam in the name of a nation which requires certain standards of civilized conduct to be maintained even under the trying circumstances of combat. Those standards do not permit the intentional killing of persons, such as civilians or prisoners of war, who are not actually participating in combat. When there is an allegation that such an event has occurred appropriate action must be taken in accordance with the law.¹⁰

The Article 32 investigation began on 12 March and continued until the 23d. As a result of it, Major General Widdecke, who had replaced the injured Wheeler

*Such an investigation is required whenever preliminary evaluation of facts pertaining to a crime or charge indicates that a general courtmartial may be recommended. During the pretrial investigation, the accused may be represented by counsel and may present witnesses or cross-examine those called by the convening authority. The hearings are transcribed, and the investigating officer makes recommendations to the convening commander as to disposition of the case, in this instance to the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. If a general courtmartial is recommended, the findings go for review and approval to the higher commander with general courtmartial convening authority, in this case to the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. 1st MarDivO P5800.1B, dtd 5Feb70, Tab B-6, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb70, prescribes in detail procedures for the Article 32 investigation, as well as other aspects of division legal procedures.

as 1st Marine Division commander, on 15 May referred four of the patrol members to trial by general courtmartial, Lance Corporal Herrod and Private Schwartz on charges of premeditated murder and PFCs Green and Boyd on charges of unpremeditated murder. The division dropped charges against Kritchen, who had agreed to testify for the prosecution. After a separate investigation, General Widdecke imposed nonjudicial punishment on Lieutenant Ambort for making a false official report. Punishment consisted of a letter of reprimand and the forfeiture of \$250 pay for each of two months.

Trials of the four murder defendants began in June with that of Schwartz, and ended on 30 August with the verdict on Herrod. Herrod and Boyd retained civilian attorneys, while Schwartz and Green were represented by military defense counsel. Legal maneuvers by the defense in the Federal courts, inquiries by the defendants' Congressmen, and charges of brig brutality toward Green—the only black among the accused—complicated the proceedings. The results of the trials were mixed. Military courts found Schwartz guilty on 12 of 16 counts of premeditated murder and Green guilty on 15 of 16 counts of unpremeditated murder. Schwartz and Green received sentences respectively of life and five years at hard labor,* in addition, both were sentenced to forfeiture of all pay and allowances and dishonorable discharge. Boyd was tried, at his own request, before a military judge sitting alone and won acquittal on all charges. In the final Son Thang (4) trial, a full military court acquitted Herrod after a vigorous defense conducted by two state senators from Oklahoma, Herrod's home state. On 15 December 1970, Major General Widdecke reduced the prison terms of Schwartz and Green, both of whom had been moved from Da Nang to the Camp Pendleton brig, to one year each but let stand the rest of their sentences. The varied results of the trials brought some press and Congressional protest and even ridicule, but the Marine Corps had allowed the legal system to work without manipulation; and it had been willing to acknowledge and attempt to punish wrongdoing by its own men.¹¹

Most civilian casualties resulted from errors of judgment in combat or misdirected fire, not deliberate murderous intent. In the short, sharp firefights in or

*The maximum penalty for premeditated murder under UCMJ was death, but General Widdecke had directed that the case be tried as noncapital, which made the maximum punishment life imprisonment.

near hamlets that characterized the war in Quang Nam, it was all too easy for women, children, or old people to be hit by stray bullets and grenades. Keyed up Marines in night ambushes found the impulse to fire at any moving figure difficult to resist, even though the moving figure could be a child violating curfew rather than an attacking Viet Cong. Employment of air strikes and artillery fire, necessary to hold down Marine casualties, could also kill and maim large numbers of noncombatants. On 15 April 1970, for instance, Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines engaged enemy troops near Le Bac (2), about five miles northeast of An Hoa. The company called in jets and Cobra gunships; a dozen enemy troops died in the action, but so did about 30 people in the nearby hamlet.*¹²

In an effort to avoid such tragedies, MACV and its subordinate commands, including III MAF, early in the war had issued elaborate rules of engagement (ROE), prescribing procedures for employing all types of weapons and for humane treatment of prisoners and noncombatants. All commands were supposed to train and retrain their troops in these procedures and principles. The 1st Marine Division, in an order issued in March 1968 and still in effect in 1970, required its subordinate units to include ROE instruction in the initial orientation of newly arriving troops and to provide refresher training in this subject to each Marine every two months during his Vietnam tour. The division syllabus, based on the MACV ROE, emphasized employment in all situations of the minimum force required for self-protection or mission accomplishment and enjoined "patient and compassionate" treatment of Vietnamese civilians.¹³

The public uproar in the United States over My Lai led to new command interest in enforcing the ROE and the laws of war, especially after the Army investigation of the massacre cited lax or nonexistent instruction in these subjects as a contributing cause.** In the

*The 1st Marine Division launched an investigation of this incident, after civilians reported it to the OP on Hill 119. Viet Cong radio broadcasts in May claimed Le Bac (2) had been another My Lai-style massacre; the 1st Marine Division established, however, that the civilian casualties had been caused by the air strikes, not by small arms fire.

**In the years immediately after the Vietnam War, all the Services, under DOD direction, improved the amount and quality of the training of their personnel in the basic laws of war and in the procedure for reporting war crimes by both United States and enemy forces. For a brief survey of these efforts, see Maj W. Hays Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul- and Aug76, *passim*.

1st Marine Division, according to Major General Widdecke, concern over the legal, moral, and tactical implications of My Lai created "an atmosphere of uncertainty" among newly arrived lieutenants. "This uncertainty," Widdecke reported on 28 April to General McCutcheon, "is illustrated by a question often asked during advanced indoctrination training, 'What is an atrocity?'" An increased division concern over civilian casualties, Widdecke continued, "impacts directly both on planning and on clearances for fire missions; and may result in targets not attacked for lack of positive identification on the remote possibility of injury to noncombatants."¹⁴

On 13 May 1970, Lieutenant General McCutcheon, responding to the Son Thang (4) and other incidents, sent a message to all III MAF unit commanders. In it, he emphasized that "It is imperative that measures to preserve the lives and property of noncombatants receive constant command attention." McCutcheon directed all commanders to review the rules of engagement and "ensure strict compliance with their provisions." He concluded by repeating: "Continuing command attention is mandatory."¹⁵

Whatever the degree of command effort and effectiveness in carrying out these instructions, it was difficult to translate the principles of the ROE into terms meaningful to the individual Marine on patrol or in ambush. The 4th Combined Action Group, located in Quang Tri Province, made a determined attempt to do this. On 16 May 1970, the group instituted a new ROE instruction program for all its Marines and corpsmen. Instruction was based on 19 specific tactical questions and answers, most of which emphasized the need to identify targets before opening fire. The tactical catechism, which was to be considered "directive in nature," included such questions as:

Q. While in ambush position, you see a human figure at 200 meters moving toward you. The figure appears to be armed, but cannot be further identified. Should you shoot?

A. No. Wait for the target to get closer, and make use of the starlight scope to identify the target. Only when you are reasonably sure the target is enemy may you shoot. If need be, when the target is at its closest point, use a challenge or illumination in an effort to identify the target.

Q. While in an ambush position, an unarmed person wearing civilian clothes walks into the killing zone. Should you shoot him?

A. No. This is probably just a curfew violator. Curfew violators do not rate being shot. Curfew violators should be halted by a challenge and apprehended, preferably by a PF.

Q. Two armed enemy soldiers are spotted talking to some civilians next to some inhabited hooches. The range is 150 meters. Should you shoot?

A. You may not shoot until the enemy move so that the civilians are out of the line of fire. If you are lucky, this will happen and you will get your kill. In terms of winning the war in your area, it is better to let some VC get away than it is to kill some civilians along with them.

On the more aggressive side, the questionnaire pointed out that, if troops came under fire from huts, or from an enemy force with huts in the line of fire, the Marines could shoot back. "Use proper care, but if you happen to hit some civilians you will not be held at fault."¹⁶

Efforts to limit civilian casualties continued until the end of Marine ground combat. The reduction in intelligence and preemptive artillery fire missions during September-October 1970 had this as one of its objectives. Early in 1971, the 1st Marine Division began attaching liaison officers from the appropriate districts to the Marine headquarters controlling major operations in populated areas. The Vietnamese officers, presumably familiar with their areas of responsibility, were at once to expedite political clearance of supporting fire and to keep such fire away from places inhabited by noncombatants. The division directive announcing this program again exhorted regimental and battalion commanders to "continue to emphasize the importance of minimizing noncombatant casualties," and instructed them to "exercise caution in employing supporting arms near areas where noncombatants are located."¹⁷

Besides trying to enforce the rules of engagement, III MAF attempted to improve the individual Marine's attitude toward the South Vietnamese people. Marine commanders had realized early in the war that ignorance, fear, prejudice, and hatred contributed not only to major battlefield crimes but also to innumerable minor insults and violations of personal rights which could turn potential Vietnamese friends into enemies. To instill favorable attitudes in Marines toward their allies, III MAF during 1966 had instituted the Personal Response Program. Administered by the G-5 and S-5 staff sections in close cooperation with command and unit chaplains,* the program was designed to en-

hance the individual Marine's understanding and appreciation of Vietnamese culture, traditions, religions, and customs. A Marine so trained, it was hoped, would recognize that a Vietnamese, while different from himself in many ways, was nevertheless a fellow human being whose behavior made sense in terms of his own values and whose rights deserved respect.

Throughout 1970-1971, personal response activity continued at all command levels. The III MAF personal response officer, a member of the G-5 section, presented monthly briefings at the Combined Action Force School and at other Da Nang area Marine, Army, and Air Force commands. The MAF personal response staff also prepared instructional materials on special topics, for instance Tet holiday traditions. At the request of units, the section conducted attitude surveys of Vietnamese residents and employees, to determine their response to American actions and identify points of conflict. Guides from the section took Marines on tours of religious shrines and museums in Da Nang.¹⁸

The 1st Marine Division G-5 Personal Response Section carried on what it described as "a multifaceted effort aimed at improving the attitude of the individual Marine toward the Vietnamese people." A division personal response contact team traveled from unit to unit, to present classes in "Attitude Improvement," Vietnamese history and culture, and the Vietnamese language. The division, like III MAF, sponsored cultural guided tours of Da Nang.* Each regiment and separate battalion was required to conduct its own personal response program, centered on an "Attitude Improvement" orientation lecture by the chaplain for all newly-arrived Marines. Units supplemented this initial training with whatever other activities the commanding officers deemed appropriate, using their own resources and the division contact team. Unit commanders had to report quarterly to the Division G-5 on subjects covered, hours of instruction, and total numbers of Marines involved. In addition, some units established personal response councils, to determine troop reaction to the program and report to the commander on particular problems in dealing with the local people.¹⁹

Marine commands at times went to great lengths to placate offended Vietnamese. On 24 April 1970, elements of Headquarters Company, 1st Marines made a search of Khanh Son hamlet, a more or less friendly

*Navy chaplains attached to III MAF had done much to originate and develop the Personal Response Program, but by 1970 disagreement existed among chaplains as to whether involvement with what was in many respects a military program compromised their religious mission. For details of the controversy, see Cdr Herbert J. Bergsma, CHC, USN, *Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam, 1962-1971* (Washington: MCHC, 1985), pp. 183-85, hereafter Bergsma, *Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam*.

*During most of this period, Da Nang City, and most other Vietnamese civilian communities, were "off-limits" to Marines at all times, unless on particular military missions.

community close to the division CP. The Marines, assisted by a counterintelligence team, officers of the Vietnamese national police Special Branch, and two ARVN interpreters, acted on a report that a VC reconnaissance squad was in the hamlet, which was also a suspected center of drug traffic, black marketeering, and prostitution. In the course of an otherwise uneventful and unproductive operation, medical corpsmen with the Marines drew blood samples from 13 women and gave them penicillin shots on suspicion that they were diseased prostitutes.

The hamlet residents and their chief viewed this action as an insult and protested to the Hoa Vang District Chief. Rumors spread that the Americans were taking Vietnamese blood for transfusions for American casualties. The district chief transmitted the protest to Colonel Edward A. Wilcox, the 1st Marines commander on 12 May. Three days later, Colonel Wilcox, the district chief, and other officials met with the protestors at the Khanh Son hamlet council station. Colonel Wilcox expressed "official regrets" and "apologized" for the forced medical treatment and assured the people that it would not be repeated. His remarks satisfied the villagers concerning the Marines' part in the incident, but the Vietnamese still demanded a separate apology from the ARVN interpreters. The 1st Marine Division then made its own investigation of the affair. In August, on the basis of the findings, Major General Widdecke sent letters of caution to the previous division G-2 and the 1st Marines regimental surgeon, and a formal letter of admonition to the assistant S-2 of the 1st Marines, for failing to follow prescribed procedures in planning and conducting the search.²⁰

The effectiveness of these measures in improving the attitudes of Marines and Vietnamese toward each other is impossible to measure. To the end, probably, dislike or distrust, tempered by wary tolerance dictated by self-interest, were the dominant sentiments on both sides. Tension was constant and violence never far below the surface as the Marines redeployed, but III MAF never gave up the effort to maintain a measure of humanity and compassion in the conduct of an often savage war. How much worse the situation might have been had the command not made the effort, the tragedy at Son Thang (4) clearly indicated.

'Friendly on Friendly'

As enemy contact diminished during 1970-1971, the Marine casualty rate from what was graphically labelled "friendly on friendly" fire incidents took a

heavy toll of Marines. In a single bad month, August 1970, the 1st Marine Division lost nine men killed and 37 wounded by their own fire, as opposed to 18 killed and 140 wounded by the enemy. Throughout 1970, misdirected supporting arms, mostly artillery accounted for 10 Marines dead and 157 injured, the equivalent of a rifle company put out of action. "Intramural fire fights" between small infantry units resulted in 20 Marines killed and 89 wounded. Firearms and ordnance accidents took another 32 lives and injured 298 Marines, enough men for two more rifle companies.²¹

In a particularly serious incident on 17 August 1970, Company M, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines shelled itself with its own 60mm mortars, losing four Marines and a Viet Cong woman prisoner killed and 28 Marines wounded.²² During a counterrocket artillery fire mission on 12 October, a 100 mil error in elevation brought 34 rounds from a Marine battery down on Hieu Duc District Headquarters west of Da Nang. The accidental shelling killed a U.S. Army major and a Popular Force soldier and wounded five American soldiers and a PF. Misaimed rounds from this mission hit Hill 10, injuring three Marines.²³ Early in November, a reconnaissance team in the mountains northwest of Da Nang called a fire mission on moving troops they thought were enemy. Three men from Company I, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines died in the ensuing barrage and four were wounded. The patrol's route into the reconnaissance team's AO had not been plotted at the FSCC.²⁴

"Friendly on friendlies" had a number of causes. The small-unit saturation patrolling fundamental to pacification and counterrocket tactics entailed a high but necessary risk of accidents. Major John S. Grinalds, 1st Marines S-2, explained:

The dilemma we had was, do we drive the squads and ambushes close enough to each other so that the VC are denied the time and the distance to move in their rockets and set them up and fire them and also run the risk of "friendly on friendlies?" Or do we hang back and reduce the risk of "friendly on friendlies" and let . . . chance take its course so far as firing the rockets?

We elected to drive the squads and patrols close to each other and it just took pretty tight coordination to try and prevent any incidents. In the main we were successful . . .²⁵

The strain of continued enemy contact was also conducive to accidental shootings. According to Colonel Theodore E. Metzger, commander of the Combined Action Force, most "friendly on friendlies" among his troops "happened in CAPs where they've been in contact . . . for about two months, steady contact, heavy

contact You get jumpy, as you well know, and I think this is a good part [of the problem]."²⁶

While tactics and the combat situations were contributory causes, the overwhelming majority of incidents resulted from carelessness and from what Major General Widdecke called "an ignorance or lack of application of basic military fundamentals." Small infantry units often collided inadvertently because of map-reading and land navigation errors. Forward observers and fire support coordination center personnel transmitted incorrect map coordinates, and FSCCs sometimes did not follow prescribed fire mission clearance procedures. Gun crews set fuses improperly, selected wrong powder charges, or misaimed their guns. Carelessness was almost the sole cause of the large number of firearms and ordnance accidents in rear areas. In the 1st Marine Division, the .45 caliber pistol, the M16 rifle, and the various grenade types were major casualty-producers in the hands of Marines disregarding established safety procedures or "skylarking with the weapon." Brigadier General Simmons, 1st Marine Division ADC, declared: "Forty percent of these cases were caused by .45 caliber pistols, failure to inspect, and a round in the chamber when it wasn't authorized."²⁷

Marine commanders relied primarily on continuous and intensive training to reduce "friendly on friendlies." The infantry regiments regularly included such subjects as forward observer procedures, map reading, and land navigation in their troop orientation and refresher training. They also conducted firearms and ordnance safety programs, supervised by the division inspector. Beginning in mid-1969, the 11th Marines cooperated closely with the infantry regiments to improve artillery fire control. The artillery regiment tried to ensure precision in its own operations at every stage, from the fire direction center to the gun crew, by emphasizing exact adherence to procedures and thorough mastery of necessary skills. On 22 May 1970, the division convened the first in a series of quarterly friendly fire incident seminars. Chaired by the commander of the 11th Marines and with representation from all units using supporting arms, the seminars facilitated the exchange of information on accidents and methods of prevention.²⁸

On 24 August 1970, in response to a series of friendly fire incidents, Major General Widdecke directed all 1st Marine Division regiments and separate battalions to instruct their men "repetitively" in map reading, land navigation "to include thorough orientation on

immediate local terrain and emphasis on use of the compass," identification and challenge procedures, fire discipline, and the use and coordination of both organic and external supporting arms. He ordered regimental and battalion commanders to report to him by 1 September on their actions and plans for carrying out this training. He warned in conclusion: "I will hold every officer and Marine personally responsible for insuring the professional use of arms against the enemy rather than their destructive and counterproductive employment against our own Marines." Each friendly fire incident, Widdecke promised, "will be rigorously investigated to determine command responsibility and possible dereliction." This order produced no radically new unit safety programs, but regiments and battalions continued to include the subjects Widdecke specified in their regular training schedule.²⁹

To reduce accidental shootings and explosions in rear areas, III MAF enforced a number of safety procedures. These included prohibition of borrowing or lending weapons and of chambering rounds unless "required by the tactical situation and so directed by competent authority or the individual is under enemy attack or attack is imminent." No Marine was to discharge a weapon unless cleared to do so by "competent authority" or "unless necessary for the protection of human life." Unless specifically directed to the contrary, Marines were not to enter cantonments, compounds, or buildings with rounds in the chamber of their weapons. Regulations forbade "horseplay or unauthorized handling" of arms and prohibited possession of weapons or ordnance not issued by proper authorities. All shoulder weapons were to be carried at sling arms "except in tactical situations at the option of the tactical commander."³⁰

On 21 October 1970, in a strongly worded message, Lieutenant General McCutcheon enjoined strict enforcement of these regulations by all commands. He threatened criminal prosecution of violators and concluded:

The basic job of a Marine is to bear and properly use his assigned weapon. Any violation of these procedures for weapons control by a Marine and/or his supervisors casts serious doubt as to the stability, maturity, dependability and responsibility of those involved and the right to bear the name Marine and any rank above private.³¹

Responding to McCutcheon's directive, the 1st Marine Division on 8 November promulgated a strict weapons-safety SOP. It provided for frequent inspec-

tion of weapons in the hands of troops, tight control of the issue of grenades and other ordnance, frequent inspection of working and living areas for contraband arms and explosives, and, where possible, supervised cleaning of all weapons. Commanders in secure rear areas could withhold even the issue of small arms ammunition, unless needed for guard or other duty. On 6 January 1971, the division restricted issue of the .45 caliber pistol, a major instrument of accidents, to men whose jobs actually required it. The division authorized commanders to withdraw .45s from men who did not need them even if they were entitled to pistols under the table of equipment. Commanders were to rearm such individuals with M16s and make sure they received thorough safety instruction on that weapon.³²

As a result of these command efforts, and of slackening combat and Marine redeployments, the total number of "friendly on friendly" casualties declined during 1970, and the incidence of some categories of accidents in relation to troop strength diminished. In 1969, the 1st Marine Division suffered an average of 34.9 friendly fire casualties per month; in 1970 it suffered 23 per month, and in the first months of 1971, 1.7. During 1969, the division had 0.5 supporting arms accidents per 1,000 men; it had 0.2 such incidents per thousand during 1970. The rate of individual weapon friendly fire mishaps, on the other hand, remained at a constant 0.4 per thousand in both 1969 and 1970. Grenade and other explosions increased in frequency, from 0.5 per thousand in 1969 to 0.7 per thousand in 1970. Accidental discharges declined from 0.7 incidents per thousand men to 0.5 per thousand. Clearly, the fatal combination of young men and deadly devices was far from neutralized.*³³

The Challenge to Authority: Race, Drugs, Indiscipline

By 1970, all the Armed Services were confronting, to varying degrees, a deterioration of discipline. Riots and acts of sabotage occurred at Army bases and on Navy ships; a few small units in Vietnam refused *en*

*These figures do not include "occupational and operational incidents" (for example, falls, burns, and drownings) and automobile accidents, both of which took a toll of Marines. The occupational incident rate in the division rose from 3.2 per thousand in 1970, although actual losses dropped slightly from 21 killed and 1,020 injured to 21 killed and 961 injured. The vehicle accident rate remained about constant, at 0.7 per thousand in 1969 and 0.6 per thousand the following year. Twelve Marines were killed and 120 hurt in accidents in 1969; three were killed and 94 injured in 1970. 1st MarDiv G-1 Summary, dtd 31Mar71, in 1st MarDiv Command Information Notebook, dtd 10Apr71, 1st MarDivDocs.

masse to advance into combat. In some strife-torn units in Vietnam officers faced the daily threat of assassination ("fragging") by their own men. Military personnel in the United States and overseas joined radical groups dedicated to ending the war and revolutionizing the Services. Drug abuse and minor defiance of regulations were widespread. Militant blacks set themselves apart by the use of "Black Power" symbols and rituals; they engaged in demonstrations and confrontations over alleged discrimination and occasionally attacked white officers and enlisted men.³⁴ This unrest in the military reflected the divisions within American society over Vietnam, race, and the conflict of generations, but it also showed the effects on the Services of the long war. Rapid manpower turnover, a decline in training standards and personnel quality, and boredom and restlessness as combat action diminished all undermined discipline and morale. In addition, "the quality of some of our enlisted Marines was deficient in terms of education," said Sergeant Major Huff of III MAF. "They lacked seasoning and there was no time to train them properly. Black and white Marines who had these deficiencies were shoved into the front line units and this was the group that suffered the high casualty rates . . ." As Huff, a black Marine, and others have noted, combat units in the field experienced far fewer difficulties:

The fact that our line units performed with little of the racial problems seen in rear areas is a tribute to the officers and staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of those units. It is interesting to note that most of the black officers and NCOs were in line units. In my opinion, their presence there and the common bond they shared with their white counterparts helped sustain the combat effectiveness of those commands.³⁵

In the six years of large-scale Marine Corps participation in the war, 730,000 men passed through the ranks of a Corps that had a peak strength of 317,000.* This meant, according to Major General Edwin B. Wheeler, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 at HQMC, that "We have turned over an average of half the Marine Corps each year for the past six years."³⁶ Only 46,500 officers and enlisted men remained on duty continuously during that period. Compounding the problem, 50 to 60 percent of the one-term Marines had enlisted for only two years. Their Marine experience consisted of initial training, a Vietnam tour, and return to the United States for a short time before discharge.

*In contrast, during World War II, the Marine Corps, with a maximum strength of 485,000, passed 600,000 men through its ranks.

Inevitably, these Marines lacked the seasoning and Marine Corps indoctrination afforded by longer service. Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, ADC of the 1st Marine Division, pointed out that the Marine arriving in Vietnam in 1971 "was probably only 13, 14, or 16 years old when this thing . . . began So he grew up in a different high school environment than his predecessor did, five or six years ago, and he brought many of the attitudes of that environment into the Marine Corps with him." Those attitudes included acceptance of drugs and, for many blacks, racial militancy.³⁷

For III MAF Marines, circumstances in Vietnam compounded tensions and conflicts imported from the United States. As the Marines' part in the war diminished, more and more men, especially in support units, operating in the secure rear areas, found extra time on their hands and few places except overcrowded clubs in which to spend it. Boredom led to excessive drinking, drug use, and fights, often fights between blacks and whites. In combat, continuous small-unit activities were at once dangerous and seemingly devoid of measurable success. General Dulacki, then Chief of Staff, III MAF later observed:

The complex nature of the war and the tediousness of the day-to-day job of some Marines in Vietnam created frustrations. It was frustrating to the commanders who sought and expected to achieve readily and visibly successful results from their multifaceted operational efforts. It was so different from other wars. And it took time for each new arrival to learn that it was different. At times it appeared to sap the souls and the spirit of the men.³⁹

In many III MAF cantonments, poor living conditions contributed to troop discontent. Housing, improved at best, had deteriorated; with redeployment in prospect, few resources were available for rehabilitation. Lieutenant Colonel William R. Fails, MAG-16 S-4, described the living areas at Marble Mountain as "squalid." "The density," he recalled:

was almost intolerable The enlisted men's area . . . had been strong-backed tents and now [they] had tin roofs on them. They were probably three or four feet apart, with 15 or 20 men living in each little hut There were literally acres of them As a unit withdrew, if we had the

opportunity, and we found many opportunities, we would simply knock those sheds down to give them some daylight, air to breathe.⁴⁰

Above all, the prospect of redeployment itself undermined morale and discipline. Men found it difficult to maintain a sense of purpose in a war that was ending without decisive results. In MAG-16, according to Fails, "the typical reaction could go one of two ways. Either, 'I've only got a few more months or weeks to earn all my medals, so I can be a hero,' or the opposite: 'I'm not going to be the last one shot down.'"⁴¹

Of all the manifestations of the breakdown of military cohesion, black militancy was potentially the most disruptive and, for many white Marines, the most difficult to understand. In 1969, a sociologist concluded in a study of Army enlisted men: "military life is characterized by an interracial egalitarianism of a quantity and of a kind that is seldom found in the other major institutions of American society."⁴² This statement appeared to apply as well to the Marine Corps. During the late 1960s, blacks made up about 10 percent of Marine strength.* Black and white Marines worked and lived together in integrated units; all military specialties were open to Marines of every race; formal discrimination in promotions, assignments, and military justice was forbidden; black officers and NCOs led white troops; on-base housing and recreation facilities were completely desegregated. In Vietnam, black Marines participated in all aspects of the war effort. Five earned the Medal of Honor; countless others won Navy Crosses, Silver Stars, and lesser decorations. To the senior black Marines, who recalled the segregated World War II Corps, it seemed that blacks had become fullfledged members of the Marine "family."

Nevertheless, racial tension and potential conflict existed within the integrated Marine Corps as in all

*The Marines first enlisted substantial numbers of blacks in World War II in segregated defense battalions and ammunition and depot companies. Integration came, as for the other Services, in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Integrated Marine units were the rule in the Korean War. See Shaw and Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps*, *passim*.

the Services. While blacks and whites mingled on the job, they usually reseggregated themselves off duty. Many liberty areas near Marine bases had *de facto* white and black sections, which members of the wrong race entered at their own peril. In spite of the abolition of formal discrimination in duty assignments, relatively few black recruits possessed the educational and social advantages to qualify for the more highly technical military specialties; hence, the number of black Marines in combat units and unskilled billets was out of proportion to their percentage of Marine strength. Among Marine officers, blacks were conspicuously underrepresented. In the 1st Marine Division, blacks made up 13 percent of total strength during 1970 but accounted for only 1.2 percent of officer strength.*⁴³ The Marine Corps still contained prejudiced whites, even after years of integration; their persecution of black Marines ranged from verbal insult to punitive abuse of the disciplinary and military justice systems. Blacks continued to encounter discrimination in off-base private housing and other facilities. They complained that military clubs and post exchanges rarely catered to their taste in music, food, and personal items.

Young blacks entering the Marine Corps in the late 1960s and early 1970s were not predisposed to accept these remaining real and imagined slights calmly. Years of civil rights agitation and progress had instilled in them a strong racial pride and an intolerance of even the appearance of second-class treatment. Many, especially those from lower-class urban backgrounds, had grown up distrusting all authority. Confronted with a largely white chain of command, they readily interpreted even legitimate decisions unfavorable to themselves as discriminatory. While most black Marines loyally did their duty and asked only for fair play, most also, to one degree or another, felt the new racial pride and expressed it with "Afro" haircuts, "Black Power" symbols and salutes, and requests for "soul" food in the messhalls and "soul" music in the clubs. They often congregated by race in living areas and on liberty. A minority of militants, loosely organized around a few aggressive, sometimes criminal, individuals, actively sought trouble. They carried the use of

"Black Power" symbols to extremes and attempted to create or intensify racial grievances. The militants tried to form an alternative power structure to the chain of command and to this end used violence against nonconforming blacks as well as whites. Depending on the issue and the circumstances, the militants secured varying degrees of moderate black support.⁴⁴


Black militancy and racial grievances proved an explosive mixture. Beginning in 1968, outbreaks of racial violence occurred at Marine bases around the world. Typically, trouble began with quarrels in enlisted men's clubs and recreational facilities and culminated in gangs of blacks roaming the base attacking white Marines. Less frequently, white gangs retaliated with assaults on blacks, or groups of up to 50 whites and blacks confronted each other. In the first eight months of 1969, Camp Lejeune reported 160 assaults, muggings, and robberies with racial overtones. The camp's troubles reached a climax on the night of 20 July 1969, when groups of blacks assaulted 15 white Marines, one of whom died. Similar racial flareups took place in Hawaii, Japan, and Okinawa. After a two-week tour of Marine commands in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, General Chapman declared: "There is no question about it . . . We've got a problem."⁴⁵

On 2 September 1969, General Chapman issued ALMAR 65, a directive to all Marines on "Race Relations and Instances of Racial Violence within the Marine Corps."⁴⁶ The Commandant began by declaring that acts of violence between Marines "cannot be tolerated and must stop," and that:

It is now and has long been our policy in the Marine Corps that discrimination in any form is not tolerated. It had similarly been our policy that a fighting organization such as ours must have a solid foundation of firm, impartial discipline. It is in the context of these two basic policies that we must take measures to dispel the racial problems that currently exist.

Chapman instructed all Marine commanders to make "positive and overt efforts to eradicate every trace of discrimination, whether intentional or not, especially in promotions." He directed them to maintain full, frank, and open communication with all their troops on racial matters, so as to refute disruptive false rumors and prevent misinformation. Chapman urged all officers and NCOs to follow the established principles of Marine Corps leadership in combating racial strife, calling attention to the commander's role as teacher and guide to his men. In the most controversial portion of his directives, Chapman instructed commanders to permit wearing of the "Afro/Natural

*On the other hand, 12.2 percent of staff NCOs and 7.3 percent of NCOs in the division were black. In 1967, the black-white officer ratio in the Marine Corps was 1-150, as compared to 1-30 in the Army, 1-60 in the Air Force, and 1-300 in the Navy. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military* (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), ch. 5.



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A194696

BGen James R. Jones, Commanding General, Force Logistic Command, introduces Gen Leonard C. Chapman, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, who will discuss the implications of ALMAR 65 about racial relations to the audience of junior officers at III MAF.

provided it conforms with current Marine Corps regulations.” He forbade the making of “Black Power” salutes and the wearing of “Black Power” symbols at regular formations and in rendering military courtesy to the flag, the national anthem, and individual Marines but declared: “Individual signs between groups and individuals will be accepted for what they are—gestures of recognition and unity.” While such actions should be “discouraged,” they “are nevertheless expressions of individual belief and are not, in themselves, prohibited . . . They are grounds for disciplinary action if executed during official ceremonies or in a manner suggesting direct defiance of duly constituted authority.”

Chapman’s conditional permission of “Afro” haircuts and “Black Power” signs drew criticism from many Marines, who argued that it constituted special privilege for a minority and was inherently divisive.⁴⁷ Others contended that ALMAR 65 simply recognized a division that already existed and offered a valid approach to overcoming it within Marine traditions and discipline. Lieutenant General William K. Jones,

CGFMFPac, for example, defended the Commandant’s action on haircuts, pointing out that “All he did was to restate what our regulations were all along. I have always been against the Marine officer or NCO who, because of his own personal values, would insist that a white sidewall is the only acceptable haircut.”⁴⁸

Besides issuing ALMAR 65, Headquarters Marine Corps during 1969 established an Equal Opportunities Branch and started a drive to recruit more black Marine officers. Progress in resolving racial conflict, however, was slow. In mid-1970, officers of a Reserve public affairs unit, in a study of Marine Corps race relations, concluded: “Compliance with ALMAR 65 varies greatly among . . . commands.” The officers reported that the apparent softening toward black militancy had created a “backlash” among many white Marines and that other Marines—both black and white—refused to admit that a racial problem existed.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, ALMAR 65 had set the course along which III MAF tried to move in dealing with its own racial tensions.

During 1970, III MAF felt the effects of the gener-

al racial unrest. The 1st Marine Division alone reported 32 racial incidents* between January and October 1970: "5 group confrontations with authority, 3 organized petitions, 19 assaults, 2 intragroup dissents, and 3 fraggings." The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Force Logistic Command also suffered outbreaks of violence, including a grenade attack on the FLC Maintenance Battalion enlisted men's club that killed one Marine and injured 62. Most incidents took the form of fights between small groups of Marines after an altercation in a club, or several-to-one assaults on individuals, with the attackers most often blacks. Whites occasionally attacked blacks, such as the FLC Marine who went after two black Marines and a black corpsman because, according to the incident report, he was "fed up with their racially oriented activities." On occasion, blacks fought other blacks, evidently in an effort to coerce or intimidate nonmilitants. Black Marines came forward to identify the black perpetrators of several attacks on whites. Almost all incidents occurred in cantonments and rear areas. Marines searching for the VC/NVA while on patrol in the rice paddies or mountains of the Da Nang TAOR, in contrast, were drawn together by the threat common to all which the enemy presented, and only rarely were disciplinary problems of any magnitude encountered.⁵⁰

III MAF commanders attributed their racial troubles primarily to the general causes: black distrust of a white command; resentment of alleged inequities in promotion, assignments, and military justice; and the presence of black militants and white racists. Yet the Vietnam situation had its own effects on Marine racial tension. Especially at Chu Lai, where the American Division surrounded MAGs -12 and -13, Marine black militants drew reinforcements from the much larger Army black population. Lieutenant General McCutcheon recalled: "Some of the race . . . problems that we had, mainly crowd gathering, deliberations on the part of the black brothers in defense of themselves . . . nearly always could be traced to the fact that some Army blacks had infiltrated the area and sought out our militant blacks . . ." McCutcheon added, however, that racial problems of the period reached far beyond the military domain: "They were not only big problems within the military in Vietnam, they

were big problems, and in my opinion even bigger, within the civilian community back here in the United States."⁵¹

Enlisted clubs were a center of conflict, as military activity diminished and off-duty Marines crowded inadequate facilities. In MAG-13, according to Colonel Laurence J. Stien, the group commander, reductions in the fixed-wing sortie rate resulted in 2,000 men trying to use clubs built to accommodate 450. "If you dump these kids loose on a hot day," he reported, "they end up in the club system. And the clubs . . . are not made for things like this." If a traveling floor show were scheduled for an evening, men would go to the club early to secure seats and spend several hours drinking beer. Stien described the results:

They won't even get up and go over and get a hamburger and get food in their stomach to absorb the alcohol they're consuming. They will not go to the mess hall because they want that seat. So by the time the show starts, you run up with a delicate situation. A lot of the young people, who cannot hold the alcohol they consume, . . . end up tipsy. And let somebody . . . , black or white, walk on somebody else's foot . . . , and the first thing you know you've built into an incident.⁵²

Lack of information or misinformation contributed to racial tension, especially if it concerned a matter as vital to the individual Marine as redeployment eligibility. Colonel Robert L. Parnell, Jr., III MAF G-1, pointed out: "[If] you let 10 white engineer troops go home three months before five black engineer troops who came in at the same time . . . we ought to, for fundamental reasons as well as for racial relations, tell the troops why those 10 are going home earlier than those five."⁵³

III MAF and its subordinate commands attacked the racial problem on the principles of ALMAR 65. Commanding officers emphasized fair treatment of all Marines and made efforts to root out remnants of discrimination, at the same time taking strong action against violent militants. In October 1970, Lieutenant General McCutcheon, drawing an analogy to his personal fight against cancer, set the tone of III MAF's approach:

Like human cancer this problem of racial minorities can have two outcomes. It can kill us if we don't operate soon enough. It can make us even stronger as a Corps and a nation if we face facts now and solve it. Let's continue to move out toward that end, but do so as mature, reasonable men in a sane, peaceful, nonviolent manner.⁵⁴

The 1st Marine Division relied heavily on platoon-level leaders—officers and NCOs—to head off racial

*The division defined a racial incident as "a disagreement, disobedience and/or major act of violence perpetrated between or by individuals or groups with ethnic difference as a probable cause." 1st MarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information notebook, Apr71, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71.

trouble. During 1970, the division issued to each small unit leader a pamphlet on "The Racial Situation, Equality of Treatment and Opportunity."⁵⁵ Designed to guide junior officers and NCOs in carrying out the division "policy of equal treatment and opportunity," the pamphlet, distributed as a division order, called for "non-preferential" policies toward all Marines. It placed responsibility for ensuring this on the platoon leader and warned that prejudice, often covert, did exist and that the leader must be alert to spot it. "The platoon leader must make it his business to find out whether all of his Marines do, in fact, enjoy equality of treatment. The only way this can be done is by self-education and by talking with his Marines individually and collectively." The pamphlet enjoined candid discussion of the racial problem within small units and called attention to opportunities for promotion and officer candidacy open to black Marines. Following ALMAR 65, the pamphlet declared the Afro haircut permissible within regulations; it urged leaders to avoid arbitrary appearance standards that went beyond regulations, as blacks viewed these as directed against them. Officers were to treat "Black Power" greetings and symbols as legitimate expressions of racial unity and pride, but the use by any Marine of "any signs, symbols, or gestures for the purpose of inciting or antagonizing or when they convey disrespect for authority is prohibited and . . . cause for disciplinary action." The pamphlet summed up:

The platoon leader must express a positive attitude concerning the racial situation in the 1st Marine Division. He must be willing to discuss all aspects of the issues and seek to create understanding among his troops. The challenge is presented. Fundamentally, it is no different from others faced as a leader. To avoid it, or neglect it, is to fail. Meet the challenge with mental awareness and tenacity. Your success will make you "stand tall" among your fellow Marines!

By the beginning of 1970, all Marine, Army, Navy, and Air Force commands in I Corps Tactical Zone had formed "Leadership Councils" to supplement the regular chain of command in coping with racial tension. After the change of command in March 1970, a XXIV Corps Leadership Council, with representation from all major subordinate elements, capped this structure. In the 1st Marine Division, the division G-1, with the executive officers of regiments and separate battalions, and the division sergeant major, composed the Division Leadership Council. Each regiment and battalion had its own council, with membership "to be determined by the Commanding Officer." The councils had as their mission "monitoring and recommend-

ing appropriate action on reports of racial tensions and incidents."⁵⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Bernard E. Trainor, the commander of the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion in late 1970, was among the officers who found the leadership councils a valuable tool in combating racial unrest: "The first task which faced the Marine Corps was to learn and understand the nature of the racial phenomenon we were witnessing. In my judgment it was in pursuit of this end that valuable devices such as leadership councils were conceived and established."⁵⁷

During 1970, these councils met regularly, but their purpose and value came into question. Many commanders regarded them as disruptive alternatives to the regular chain of command and complained that their meetings degenerated into a debating platform for militants or into general "gripe" sessions about nonracial issues. Reflecting these objections, Lieutenant General Jones declared in mid-1971 that leadership councils "obscure the chain of command, reduce the authority and responsibility of the commander and foster a dangerous precedent of rule by committee . . . Weak and vacillating commanders," Jones continued, "were prone to overly depend on these bodies."⁵⁸

In response to complaints of this nature and after surveying the experience of its subordinate commands, the 1st Marine Division on 15 February 1971 revamped its leadership council system. The division retained its own Leadership Council to "advise the Commanding General on race relations, transmit reports of information and recommendations concerning race relations, and serve as a focal point for the collection of information bearing on racial understanding and activities." Unit commanders now were "not required" to form councils but could do so "at their option." If formed, unit councils should define their concerns broadly, "including race relations," but "should not be used as a forum for the airing of personal 'gripes.'" The division cautioned commanders that "the existence of Leadership Councils may invite personnel to circumvent the chain of command which is counterproductive to the exercise of fundamental leadership."⁵⁹

Besides forming leadership councils, most commands experimented with "race relations" or "human relations" classes designed to bring white and black Marines together to discuss racial problems. On 13 March 1970, for instance, Force Logistic Command established a "dynamics of group discussion" course,

taught by the command chaplain, for leadership council members from its subordinate units. Later, on 21 March, FLC instituted a required Race Relations course for all personnel. Each unit was to provide its own instructors; the FLC G-1 section would furnish lesson plans and teaching materials. The prescribed syllabus called for four hours of instruction divided into five periods dealing respectively with "Individual and Group Communications, Promotion System, Opportunities through Education, Rights and Responsibilities, and Cultural Influences on the Contemporary American Scene."⁶⁰

Marine Wing Support Group 17 tried a less formal and more intensive program. Group Chaplain Lieutenant Commander James G. Goode established a human relations seminar. Each class of both black and white Marines met four hours a day, one day a week, for three weeks, for general discussion of racial attitudes and conflicts. The seminar included from 12 to 16 sergeants and below who were selected or had volunteered to participate. Following conclusion of discussions, group and squadron commanders and the sergeant major were informed of the thoughts expressed. Copies of a report which summarized discussions and tapes of some discussions were provided to commanders. While race relations were often the focus, subjects covered included officer and enlisted relations, drug abuse, and the relationship of the individual Marine to the command and to the Marine Corps at large. Throughout, Chaplain Goode tried to make the men "walk around in each other's shoes" so as to reach a "broader understanding of each other as human beings, and not as a particular racial or ethnic individual."⁶¹

Whatever formal programs were instituted, the burden of keeping racial peace fell on regimental, group, battalion, and squadron commanders and their junior officers and NCOs. Success required a careful day-to-day mixture of repression and conciliation. Some commands imposed evening curfews in their cantonments to reduce assaults and prevent militant gatherings. In MAG-13, Colonel Stien posted sentries to keep Army blacks out of his camp after 1800 each night and had his squadron commanders and executive officers attend floor shows at the enlisted clubs to keep order. Commanders made special efforts to identify and get

rid of black militant leaders. When possible, they used disciplinary action or administrative discharges; if militants failed to give solid grounds for such action, many commanders resorted to transfer. In the 1st MAW, group commanders, by informal agreement, frequently moved known militants from unit to unit. Colonel Neal E. Heffeman, commander of MAG-11, explained: "It didn't matter where you sent him; just break it up and transfer him Even though he was still being transferred within the wing . . . this leader, malcontent, had to start all over, establish his reputation, reform his gang" Such efforts could backfire, however, as they intensified the fears of more moderate blacks that the "white" command had singled out all of their race for persecution.⁶²

Unit experience with racial strife and response to it varied. The Combined Action Force was one of the few commands to have relatively little racial unrest. The CAF commander, Colonel Theodore E. Metzger, later explained:

While the CAF had the undoubted advantage of exercising real selectivity in accepting new CAP Marines, it also offered each Marine an assignment of obviously great significance to the people of Vietnam. There weren't many CAF Marines who didn't quickly grasp this fact. The average Marine who fought with a CAP platoon was in my opinion, representative of the best qualities of America.⁶³

Most commanders balanced repression with conciliation. They tried to find and correct genuine abuses, so as to deny the extremists valid issues. Colonel Hayward R. Smith, MAG-16 commander, used leadership council meetings to collect specific complaints. "I found," he reported, "that . . . if I showed them in the next hour, or the next day, that something was being done about the things that they had a justified [complaint] on, then I didn't have any problem, because the hard core . . . are very hard pressed to get any followers when they don't have any bitches" ⁶⁴ Colonel Wilcox of the 1st Marines followed a similar policy. "We kept the channels of communication open pretty well with all Marines, black and white," he reported. "We had a viable request mast* procedure and we let these guys talk and get it out of their system. And that often solved the problem. As long as they could talk to somebody . . . it solved the problem."⁶⁵ When a racially sensitive film came to the MAG-13 club system, Colonel Stien, warned of

*These programs were forerunners of a Marine Corps-wide program of Human Relations Seminars, established in mid-1972. Shaw and Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps*, pp. 76-77.

*Request mast is a procedure under which a Marine is given an opportunity to present a problem or grievance to any officer in his chain of command.

potential violence by his white and black NCOs, initially prevented its showing. He allowed it to be screened later, after preparatory discussions with his troops, and no incidents resulted.⁶⁶

Controlling prejudiced white NCOs could be a delicate problem. In the Communication Company, Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division, according to one officer, he perceived that some of the "most capable staff NCOs" were unfairly treating blacks in the unit. They were making formal charges that could lead to courtmartial and administrative discharge.

... it became obvious to the blacks that they were being identified ... as targets ... they became very nervous ... We were dealing with some very capable and one-of-a-kind staff NCOs, technicians who were the only ones in Vietnam who knew how to repair certain kinds of equipment, so we couldn't sacrifice the troop [nor] sacrifice the staff NCO ... What the junior officers would do is we would appear in office hours with these troops and very politely destroy the case, if in fact it was a case that should be destroyed, without irritating the staff or the senior officers to the point at which they turned on us ...⁶⁷

Black NCOs were of varying effectiveness in mediating between commands and the young black Marine. III MAF had many strong black non-commissioned leaders, including Sergeant Major Huff, who served from October 1970 to the redeployment of III MAF Headquarters in April 1971. General McCutcheon remembered Huff, who had been a Marine since 1942, as "a pretty effective sergeant major," but he noted that many senior black NCOs had little in common with militants of the new generation. The latter often referred to the older blacks as "'Oreos,' black on the outside and white on the inside."⁶⁸ On the other hand, the 1st MAW, according to Major General Armstrong benefited from the presence on the wing inspector's staff of a "high quality" black staff sergeant "who is independent enough not to have been labeled as an Uncle Tom by most blacks."⁶⁹ Recalling III MAF's struggle to deal with race relations, Sergeant Major Huff offered another reason why black Marine leaders were only marginally effective:

Two things stand out in my mind ... Senior black SNCOs felt left out when the Corps implemented its human relations program; no one consulted them to determine how best to cope with the young black Marine who he had to supervise daily ... Both black and white SNCOs felt that the human relations program was forced down their throats.

Huff also believed that the problems the staff NCOs had dealing with the many leadership challenges in Vietnam resulted from two temporary officer pro-

grams—in which NCOs were commissioned to fill the void in the junior officer ranks—that diluted the quality of Marine noncommissioned officers: "These two programs tore the heart out of the very group the Corps had traditionally relied upon to be the bedrock of its stability."⁷⁰

In some units white junior officers, often working informally with black NCOs, also played a mediating role. A white Marine captain recalled: "Largely the ones that were able to do the talking were the younger officers who had grown up and were impressed as youth, or were impressionable during their youth, when the whole change in the racial feeling in this country was coming about, so they could relate somewhat to the other side of the fence."⁷¹

Through formal programs and informal day-to-day adjustments, III MAF avoided major racial outbreaks during 1970-1971. In some commands, the situation appeared to improve. The 1st Marine Division, for example, reported 29 racial incidents during the first six months of 1970, an average of 0.2 incidents per 1,000 of strength per month. In the last six months of the year, only eight incidents occurred, a rate of 0.1 incident per 1,000 men per month.⁷² In spite of such encouraging indications, commanders realized that only time, effort, and constant vigilance could overcome the racial polarization afflicting the Corps. Sergeant Major Huff later offered his perspective of the racial unrest of the period and the Marine Corps' handling of it:

Indeed Black militancy existed, but unit response to this problem was far from being effective. Many commands reacted to the surface problem with little in-depth information. Black militancy was never the awesome threat it has been given credit for being and if this idea is given credence in the hearts and minds of future officers and SNCOs then I fear the Corps could again find itself on the horns of a dilemma.⁷³

Next to racial tension, the growing incidence of drug abuse was the most troubling personnel problem facing Marine commanders. Even more than racial conflict, drug abuse achieved crisis proportions comparatively suddenly. Major General Alan J. Armstrong, 1st MAW commander, told a briefing at FMFPac Headquarters in mid-1971: "Those of you that think you know a lot about the drug problem, if you were not out there in the last year, you need to reappraise your thoughts."⁷⁴

The group chaplain of MWSG-17, Commander James G. Goode, USN, conducted a "Social Interest Survey," in 1970 to determine the extent of drug use

and to try to identify when, where, and why it started. His survey illustrated the size of the problem in III MAF. Administered to 1,241 Marines of MACG-28 and MWSG-17, whose responses remained anonymous, the survey indicated widespread use of drugs, predominantly marijuana, throughout the command. The findings of the survey were so sensitive at the time that the command did not want it released. As Chaplain Goode recalled:

An attitude of total disbelief of the findings was expressed at the wing headquarters level. It appeared as though commands did not want to believe the immense drug involvement of the Marines. The ostrich syndrome was in effect: "If we don't know about it, it will go away," Or "Tell me what I want to hear."⁷⁵

In the 1st Marine Division, the total number of drug-related administrative and judicial disciplinary actions increased from 417 in 1969 to 831 in 1970; these figures reflected intensified command concern, as well as expanded usage. The 1st Medical Battalion Neuropsychiatric Clinic diagnosed 3 drug abuse cases in 1968, 62 in 1969, and 143 in 1970. Unit commanders estimated during 1970 that 30-50 percent of their men had some involvement with drugs. Among III MAF Marines, marijuana was the most prevalent narcotic, followed by various locally produced stimulants and barbiturates. Heroin use remained rare until late 1970, when cheap and plentiful supplies of this dangerous drug, which earlier had appeared among U.S. Army units farther south, finally reached I Corps. Black and white Marines, from all social, economic, and educational levels used drugs in about equal proportion. Recognizing the obvious danger of drug use in a combat environment, troops in the field commonly avoided narcotics. Tolerance of drug use, even among drug users, while pursuing the enemy was very limited, but in rear areas and support units drug use at times reached epidemic proportions.⁷⁶

The effects of widespread drug abuse on military operations were difficult to determine. Brigadier General Simmons declared it was "impossible to quantify just how debilitating drug use may have been to the 1st Marine Division." "In general," he explained, "poor performance attracts attention which leads to revelation of drug use. But this does not 'prove' that drug use caused the poor performance nor does it give any indication of how many 'good' performers use drugs." Major General Armstrong, on the other hand, reported that at least one 1st MAF unit "had a heroin problem that I viewed as an operational problem, no longer an administrative problem."⁷⁷

Like racial conflict, the rising incidence of drug abuse came into III MAF from American society. In Vietnam, the abundance of cheap, relatively pure quality drugs, coupled with lax GVN enforcement of its own narcotics control laws, made it easy for Marines who arrived with the habit to continue it and facilitated experimentation by the uninitiated. Colonel Robert W. Teller, 1st MAF Chief of Staff, declared: "It's something in the climate that you're in out there. You can walk out on the road anywhere and for a dollar get a package of 'weeds.'" At Camp Books, the FLC contonment, according to the Security Company commander, "the kids would come up and toss the marijuana over the wire to sentries, day and night."⁷⁸

As both civilian and military drug abuse became a public issue in the United States, III MAF, like other Vietnam commands, had to receive and brief a steady stream of delegations concerned with the problem. During August and September 1970, a Deputy Assistant to the President, a Department of Defense Drug Abuse Control Committee, and a group of staff members from the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee visited III MAF and other Marine commands at different times for briefings and investigations. In January 1971, members of the House Armed Services Committee made the same tour and received the same information.⁷⁹

The visitors learned that III MAF relied heavily on troop education to prevent drug abuse. Commands employed all available media to impress upon the individual Marine the moral evils, legal consequences, and physical hazards of drugs. To help small-unit leaders educate their men, and to help them spot the presence and effects of drugs, the 1st Marine Division issued a platoon leaders' pamphlet similar to the one it distributed on the racial situation. The pamphlet included an extensive glossary of drug slang. To supplement unit efforts, III MAF, the division, and the wing organized special drug education teams to give detailed and, it was hoped, hard-hitting antidrug presentations. Commanders found that young, articulate, informed enlisted men and NCOs were their most effective teachers. III MAF during late 1970 used as its principal drug lecturer a former Milwaukee city probation officer, attached as a PFC to the G-1 section. This Marine had extensive experience in counseling drug-addicted civilian offenders.⁸⁰

By early 1971, most major commands had created drug abuse councils, similar in function to leadership councils and composed of G-1, medical, legal, and

chaplain's representatives. Formally constituted drug abuse education contact teams traveled from unit to unit. In the 1st Marine Division, according to General Simmons, 18,000 Marines heard the division drug presentation during 1970. "In other words," he reported, "just about every Marine hears this lecture at least once during his tour in Vietnam. How much good does it do? I'm not sure."⁸¹

Where education failed, III MAF resorted to punishment. Units routinely searched vehicles entering and leaving their compounds for hidden drugs and conducted inspections of troop living and working areas. When they could, they arrested and prosecuted Marines who sold or regularly used drugs. Finding the offenders, however, and obtaining evidence against them proved difficult, since peer pressure and outright threats inhibited enlisted men against testifying. American military justice could not touch Vietnamese suppliers. Marines who were caught dealing in or using drugs received courts-martial or administrative discharges,* under a general policy of purging from the ranks Marines with any degree of drug involvement. Only first offenders or "one-time experimenters," at the commander's discretion,** might undergo lighter punishment and secure a chance to redeem themselves.⁸²

*Drug possession and use were absolutely contrary to regulations and the UCMJ. Article 1270 of the Naval Regulations prohibited possession and use of narcotics, except for authorized medical purposes, on board any Navy ship or installation and by any member of the Naval Service. The UCMJ defined possession or use of marijuana or any other habit-forming narcotic as an offense under Article 134, Paragraph 213b, "Disorders and Neglects to the Prejudice of Good Order and Discipline in the Armed Forces." Convicted narcotics offenders could receive maximum sentences of dishonorable discharge, confinement for 10 years at hard labor, reduction to private, and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Marijuana offenders were subject to identical punishment, but with a maximum imprisonment of five years. In the Marine Corps, addiction, habitual use, or unauthorized use or possession of narcotics were grounds for administrative "discharge for unfitness," along with sexual perversion, shirking, failure to pay debts, and repeated infection with venereal disease. An unfitness discharge was ordinarily an undesirable discharge. Alcoholism, by contrast, entailed an unsuitability discharge, which normally was honorable or general. *Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual* (MCO P1900.16, 1968), paras 6016-6018.

**The CMC on 9 February 1970 permitted all commanders exercising general courtmartial jurisdiction to authorize or direct retention or direct discharge of any enlisted man involved with narcotics use or possession. Previously administrative discharges for narcotics involvement had required HQMC review and approval. CMC msg to ALMAR, dtd 9Feb70, Fldr 1900 (HQMC Central Files).

During late 1970, this policy became a subject for debate within and outside the Marine Corps. Some officers at the working level viewed strict enforcement of punishment and discharge as a waste of trained men. A communications officer in charge of Marines specially cleared to work with classified messages pointed out: "If a guy was caught with drugs he'd lose his clearance and then that was one less worker . . . , so it was very painful to us to have a highly skilled kid busted."⁸³ Increasingly, commanders and medical officers came to view drug abuse as a medical and social problem rather than a crime and suggested that users who voluntarily asked for help be exempted from punishment and offered rehabilitation assistance. Such a policy could rescue valuable military manpower and prevent the dumping back into society of ex-servicemen handicapped by drug dependence and unfavorable discharges. By mid-1970, a number of Army commands in the United States and at least one division, the 4th, in Vietnam, had instituted amnesty and treatment programs for users who turned themselves in. In August 1970, a DOD military/civilian task force on combating drug abuse included amnesty in its list of recommendations.⁸⁴

Until well after the redeployment of the 3d MAB, the Marine Corps took an adamant stand against amnesty. On 10 October 1970, General Chapman stated this position in a strongly worded message to all commands: "The Marine Corps cannot tolerate drug use within its ranks. Those who experiment with drugs can expect to be punished. Those who become addicted will be separated Both types of user introduce unnecessary operational risk, as well as an unwholesome environment." Concerning rehabilitation Chapman added:

The Marine Corps is neither funded nor equipped to carry the burden of noneffective members for the inordinate length of time that civilian institutions are finding necessary to achieve the rehabilitation of addicts. Even then the reversion rate is discouragingly high. In any case our medical resources are sufficiently taxed by duty-connected physical problems without intentionally taking on clinical or rehabilitative responsibilities As Marine Corps strength reduces to a post-Vietnam commitment level, the premium on professionalism goes even higher. We will only enlist or retain those who will conscientiously meet and maintain high standards. Drug users do not fit into that category.⁸⁵

Within III MAF, General Chapman's policy statement created much confusion and disagreement, especially over what degree of drug abuse should be considered sufficient to dictate expulsion from the Ma-



Marine Corps Historical Collection

LtGen Henry W. Buse, Jr., and his successor as commanding general, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, LtGen William K. Jones, a former 3d Division commander, salute the colors during the change of command ceremony at Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii in June 1970.

rine Corps. Lieutenant General McCutcheon interpreted the policy as “a restatement of what we are doing,” which meant that “the first minor offender, one time experimenter or possessor of inconsequential amounts,” at the unit commander’s discretion, could be given a second chance. “If he does straighten up, he stays and if not, then he goes out.”⁸⁶ Other commanders nevertheless, felt themselves constrained by Chapman’s directive to adopt a very harsh policy in spite of dislike for its implications. Colonel Hugh S. Aitken, 1st Marine Division G-1, summed up the problem in March 1971:

Is the one-time experimenter a kid that smokes a marijuana cigarette; or is the one-time experimenter a kid that does it for a weekend; or is the one-time experimenter the kid that goes on a week-long jag on marijuana and never touches it again . . . ? And what is the user . . . ? We are putting a lot of youngsters out of the Corps with undesirable . . . type discharges, without, I believe, a clear understanding of the policy at all levels. And the policy . . . is being interpreted in the extreme . . . ⁸⁷

Even more serious, according to Major General

Armstrong, the Commandant’s policy, by eliminating any incentive for users to surrender voluntarily, hindered the discovery and removal of drug addicts from units. Late in 1970, Armstrong deliberately went against CMC policy to deal with an immediate crisis. A “rash” of drug-related incidents in MAG-16, in Armstrong’s opinion, had “reached the stage . . . of creating a possible danger to flight operations.” The group executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Guay, with the consent of the group commander and the assistance of the chaplain and medical and legal officers, proposed a temporary amnesty as a “short-range solution” to reducing drug use. Armstrong authorized implementation of the plan, under which Marines who came forward of their own free will were kept out of the disciplinary system and received aid from a group drug action team. At the end of February 1971, the MAG-16 chaplain, Lieutenant John B. Fitzgerald, reported: “The . . . program combating drug abuse is showing its effectiveness. Both chaplains, legal [officers], flight-surgeons, and Squadrons are working together.” Marines who asked for help took

part in counseling sessions and also in civic action projects. After a few months of operation, Armstrong ended the program, on the grounds that it had achieved the objective of alleviating the MAG-16 drug problem. He recalled later that he “caught a good bit of static” for introducing it; but he insisted: “I felt that we had an operational problem; I took an operational solution at the time. It worked If I’m ever faced with the same situation again, I’ll do as I did then.”*⁸⁸

Compared to race and drugs, political dissent and refusal to engage in combat were minor problems for III MAF. Antiwar and radical groups, such as the American Servicemen’s Union and the Movement for a Democratic Military, won adherents and established coffee houses and underground newspapers at Marine bases in the United States, Okinawa, and Japan, but few agitators appeared in III MAF units. Those who did found themselves under close command surveillance and lacking outside civilian support, accomplished little. III MAF reported no collective refusals of Marines who were unwilling to go to the field to fight with their units although some individual Marines refused, but these were generally individual cases of combat fatigue or disobedience and the commanders treated them as such. In many units, disregard for Marine Corps standards of appearance and military courtesy was common; especially to veteran NCOs, the general attitude of junior enlisted Marines seemed defiant and hostile. On their side, enlisted

men expressed anger at an impersonal “Green Machine.” These tensions never reached massive proportions, although they contributed to occasional acts of violence against officers and NCOs.⁸⁹

To rid itself of problem Marines of all sorts, during 1970 III MAF relied increasingly on administrative discharges.** Early in the year, General Chapman anticipating post-Vietnam manpower reductions, ordered all commanders to “clean house” by administratively separating men who did not meet Marine Corps performance and disciplinary standards. The commands in Vietnam took full advantage of this policy. In October 1970, for instance, the 1st Marine Division directed that “Individual Marines whose service is characterized by a record of substandard performance of duty, numerous minor disciplinary infractions, or diagnosed character behavior disorders” be processed for administrative discharge. Many division Marines fitted into those categories. During 1969, the division issued 121 administrative discharges; in 1970, it issued 809.⁹⁰

From the commander’s point of view, administrative discharge had the great virtue of ridding the unit of troublemakers comparatively quickly, by relatively simple procedures. The Military Justice Act of 1968, which went into effect on 1 July 1969, had lengthened and complicated the military judicial process;*** but an administrative separation could be accom-

*The Marine Corps today (early 1986) has a general drug exemption program under policies and procedures prescribed by DOD and the Secretary of the Navy. The program is “a legal guarantee of exemption from adverse disciplinary and/or administrative consequences which may result from the disclosure . . . of personal drug abuse for the purpose of facilitating treatment or rehabilitation.” It is now “the policy of the Marine Corps to prevent and eliminate drug abuse within the Marine Corps and to restore to full duty those Marines who have abused drugs and who have potential for continued useful service.” The exemption privilege can be exercised only through voluntary disclosure and only once by any individual. Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5300.12, dtd 25Jun84.

**Administrative discharges could be honorable, general, or undesirable; the two most unfavorable types of separation – Bad Conduct Discharges and Dishonorable Discharges – could be issued only by sentence of courtmartial. Administrative discharges could be given on a number of grounds. The most common grounds were Convenience of the Government, Unsuitability, and Undesirability. Discharges on the first two of these grounds had to be honorable or general; discharge for unfitness had to be undesirable unless circumstances in a particular case warranted an honorable or general discharge. On most grounds, either the CMC or the individual’s superior in the chain of command having general courtmartial convening authority could issue an administrative discharge, but cer-

tain cases—such as unsuitability by reason of sexual deviance and unfitness due to active sexual perversion—had to be referred to the CMC, as did drug cases until early 1970. A Marine proposed by his commander for undesirable discharge was entitled to a hearing before a board of officers convened by the appropriate commander with general courtmartial authority. The defendant automatically received military counsel and could retain a civilian lawyer at his own expense; he could present witnesses on his behalf and question the command’s witnesses. The board then would recommend either retention or discharge, subject to review by the commander convening the board, who could accept the decision, modify it in favor of the defendant, or set it aside and convene a new board. *Marine Corps Separation and Retirement Manual* (MCO P1900.16), paras. 6002, 6005, 6009-6021, 6024.

***Under the Military Justice Act of 1968, both special and general courtmartial, had to be tried with the full panoply of a certified military judge and judge-advocate prosecution and defense counsel. Further, most offenders of any type could have their cases tried by courtmartial. This created an immediate strain on the limited number of military lawyers with the commands. The 1st Marine Division, to alleviate this problem, created a “County Courthouse” of continuously sitting military courts at division headquarters to try all special courts-martial from the various battalions. See 1st MarDivO P5800.1B, dtd 5Feb70, in 1st MarDiv ComdC, Feb70.

plished in about 30 days. Commanders, therefore, often preferred the administrative procedure to court-martial, even for offenders they believed merited the more severe penalties a court could impose. Administrative discharge, according to a judge advocate with Force Logistic Command, "cut out [in] the least expensive way those persons who are not going to succeed, those persons who are nonrehabilitable, and those persons who just can't hack it."⁹¹

'Fragging' and Operation Freeze

The slang term "fragging," which in aviation referred to the issuing of fragmentary mission orders, acquired a more sinister connotation during the last years of ground combat in Vietnam. The 1st Marine Division concisely defined the new meaning of the term: "a deliberate, covert assault, by throwing or setting off a grenade or other explosive device, or the preparation and emplacement of such a device as a boobytrap, with the intention of harming or intimidating another."⁹² More specifically, "fragging" usually denoted the attempted murder of an officer or NCO by an enlisted man, often by means of an M26 fragmentation grenade.

American commanders had been attacked by their own men in earlier wars, but in Vietnam the frequency of such incidents increased dramatically and they received extensive and—in some radical groups—sympathetic publicity.⁹³ III MAF, like other component commands in Vietnam, had to meet this new threat from within its ranks. During 1970, in the 1st Marine Division, one Marine died and 41 others were injured in 47 fraggings. The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and Force Logistic Command also had their share of these crimes. FLC suffered the most costly single fragging of the year on the night of 5 February, when a Marine tossed a grenade into the crowded patio of the Maintenance Battalion enlisted men's club. The resulting explosion killed one Marine and wounded 62. Marine commanders reviewing the record of these outrages found little consolation in the knowledge that the U.S. Army problems were even more severe. During 1970, the 1st Marine Division, with its 47 fraggings, had an incident rate of 0.2 per thousand.⁹⁴

Fraggings in III MAF plagued both secure rear areas and forward positions. In the 1st Marine Division, 62 percent of the assaults during 1970 took place in cantonments near Da Nang; 38 percent occurred at combat and fire support bases, observation posts, and

battalion CPs. Clubs and living areas were favorite targets, with grenades typically rolled through a hut or bunker entrance or exploded against a wall. Lower-ranking enlisted men committed most fraggings, commonly against NCOs and junior officers.⁹⁵ The motives for fragging were as varied as the tensions afflicting III MAF. A few fraggings, including the one in Maintenance Battalion, appeared to have been racially motivated. Others reflected anger and resentment at a particular small-unit leader or were efforts to get rid of an incompetent or particularly aggressive commander. Many fraggings were committed under the influence of alcohol or drugs or for drug-related reasons, for example pusher-buyer disputes or intimidation of informers. Probably the majority of fraggings resulted from individual personality disturbances. Brigadier General Simmons observed:

In a surprising number of cases after it happens . . . we learn things like, "Oh, yeah, we were worried about Bill. He'd been acting funny." Or so-and-so said he was going to frag the gunny. . . . Or they say, "We were watching him."⁹⁶

The perpetrators of fraggings were difficult to find, and if found they were even harder to convict. As was true in narcotics cases, enlisted Marines hesitated to turn in their peers. According to Lieutenant General Jones, "We were faced with the typical teen-age nosqueal syndrome." Fear of being fragged themselves if they came forward also helped silence potential witnesses. For the authorities, frustration often resulted. In the Maintenance Battalion fragging, the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) eventually arrested four enlisted Marines, but Marine courts-martial acquitted all the defendants.⁹⁷

In mid-1970, III MAF instituted Operation Freeze, designed to make escape more difficult for fraggers and conviction more certain. Lieutenant General Jones had developed the program during 1969 while commanding the 3d Marine Division. As Commanding General, FMFPac, Jones passed the concept on to Lieutenant General McCutcheon. Jones recalled:

They were having another rash of fragging in III MAF . . . and I went out on a visit there and had a big session with all the division commanders and I told Keith about my division order. And I said, "Keith, you've got to stop this." He agreed . . . of course. So I sent my order to him and he took it, and he wrote a III MAF order based on that order.⁹⁸

By the end of 1970, most III MAF commands had put Operation Freeze into effect. Under the system, each unit reacted to a fragging or other violent act ac-

ording to prearranged and previously rehearsed procedures. Military police or an infantry reaction force immediately closed all entrances and exits of the cantonment and cordoned the area of the incident. Company and platoon commanders assembled their men and called roll; they took into custody any Marines from other units found in their areas. All NCOs and other enlisted Marines then went to their living quarters and stayed there until they received further orders, while specially assigned teams searched the incident site and each hut or barracks. Meanwhile, the unit legal officer, assisted by NIS and Criminal Investigation Division personnel, set up an interrogation point, where each Marine, brought from his quarters, underwent private questioning about the incident. The interrogators, as General Jones put it, would "call in each Marine and point out to him his responsibilities as a man, as a Marine, as a Christian." This process continued until suspects had been identified and arrested. During it, the unit cancelled all leaves and suspended personnel rotations.⁹⁹

As an auxiliary to Operation Freeze, FMFPac and III MAF issued a steady stream of orders and messages designed to impress upon the individual Marine the "cowardly context" of fraggings and other acts of violence and to convince him that "identification of criminals is the responsibility of every citizen" and "is not playing the role normally attributed to being an informer." Of more practical value, the commands promised protection, if necessary by transfer out of Vietnam, to any Marine who volunteered information.¹⁰⁰ The 1st Marine Division in addition imposed strict control of grenades and other explosive devices and conducted frequent inspections* of troop quarters for potentially dangerous materials. The division also emphasized preventive action. A division order in mid-December 1970 directed small-unit leaders to "be alert as to behavior or symptoms which may signal the possibility of a violent act" and where appropri-

ate to arrange for the immediate medical treatment, transfer, or administrative separation of potentially dangerous men. Commanders were to keep close watch on such possible fraggers and withhold weapons from them "except in the extreme case where their lives might be endangered by enemy action."¹⁰¹

By the end of 1970, Operation Freeze and its associated measures appeared to be producing results. In the first half of the year, the 1st Marine Division solved only 10 of 26 fraggings. During July, August, and September, division units made arrests in five of 10 cases, and in the last three months of the year the division solved seven out of 11 fraggings. In two cases during December, individual Marines, responding to the offer of protection, furnished information that led to arrests, confessions, and convictions. Only two fraggings, neither of which caused any casualties, occurred between January and April 1971. The division G-1 staff attributed this encouraging trend to the effectiveness of Operation Freeze and to the fact that "few, if any, such incidents . . . occur in . . . units standing down."¹⁰²

Training and Morale-Building

Besides trying to remedy specific disciplinary problems, III MAF carried on a broad training and morale-building effort. The necessity for training increased as combat diminished and an often false sense of security led to slackness in the field. Repeatedly, regimental and battalion commanders had to remind their small-unit leaders to follow correct tactical procedures. In May 1970, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Johan S. Gestson, commanding the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, declared: "Ambushes are often compromised by Marines smoking, coughing, or talking and fire power is not effective frequently." He directed his company and platoon commanders to "take immediate corrective action to upgrade marksmanship and discipline in ambushes."¹⁰³ At the end of his tour as commander of the 1st Marines, Colonel Wilcox observed: "The best training the Division could get is to get out of Vietnam and . . . get people teaching . . . fire support, fire discipline, fire control, sensors, and a lot of other things that . . . we're awful shaky on."¹⁰⁴

While unable to follow Wilcox' advice about getting out of Vietnam, the 1st Marine Division did the next best thing. It conducted continuous training aimed at preparing Marines to "fight aggressively and intelligently in a counterinsurgency environment" and to "maintain the individual Marine's readiness to

*Commanders had to observe a fine legal line between inspection and search. Inspection was "a legitimate review of persons and property to insure the fitness and readiness of the unit to execute its mission." A search "has as its purpose the uncovering of physical evidence to support an apprehension or charge There must be reason to believe that a crime has been committed and that the fruits of the crime or other evidence may be found on the person or property to be searched." Nevertheless, unannounced inspections were "legitimate forms of military inspections," during which officers could seize contraband material, including unauthorized ordnance. 1stMarDivO 5830.1, Subj: Standing Operating Procedures for Prevention of Crimes of Violence, dtd 13Dec70, tab B15, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec70.

redeploy to other combat/combat ready zones." Following division guidelines, each battalion regularly put its men through refresher weapons and tactics instruction. Colonel James E. Harrell, commander of the 26th Marines in 1970, said that Lieutenant Colonel William C. Drumright designed a retraining program for the 2d Battalion to counter the bad habits that were often developed:

He took in one platoon for 10 days and conducted fire team and squad training. He went back to basics, even marksmanship and grenade throwing. It was . . . a most successful program since it was a unit program. By the little statistics we were able to gather in the remaining time we had in country, it appeared that casualties went down in retrained platoons especially during night patrols and ambushes.¹⁰⁵

The retraining touched other areas also: rules of engagement, Vietnamese customs, and race relations. The cycle was concluded with a steak and egg breakfast, followed by an inspection, usually by Lieutenant Colonel Drumright or his executive officer. Other units developed similar programs. The division operated formal schools for officer and NCO leadership, scout-sniper instruction, and mine and boobytrap countermeasures, with monthly student quotas allotted to each regiment. Each month, division Marines, with others from the wing and FLC, attended the III MAF Vietnamese Language and Combined Action Force schools or went to Okinawa for specialized technical courses.¹⁰⁶

Each battalion managed a complex variety of training activities. During April 1970, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines held staff officers' and NCOs' schools. Each rifle company conducted training in employment of supporting arms, ambush tactics, leadership, racial problems, and the rules of engagement; all incoming Marines received combat firing instruction on the battalion rifle range. Seventy-five percent of battalion Marines attended drug abuse classes taught by the division drug contact team. Twenty-seven men went to a division class in operation and maintenance of the experimental XM-191 Multi-Shot Portable Flame Weapon. The battalion sent 40 men to the division mine and boobytrap school, 2 officers to officers' leadership school, and 10 NCOs to staff NCO and NCO leadership schools. Two Marines attended division 16mm projectionist school, and eight took a course on multi-channel radio equipment.¹⁰⁷

Other III MAF elements conducted similarly extensive training. In Force Logistic Command, for instance, the Supply Battalion, 1st FSR regularly instructed its

Marines in marksmanship, weapon and motor vehicle safety, first aid, and defense against nuclear, biological, and chemical attack. The battalion held seminars on drugs and personal response and classes on proper treatment of civilians. Battalion Marines took courses each month in one or more supply specialties, and the battalion's Ration Company trained bakers from FLC, the division, and the wing.¹⁰⁸

All Marine commands provided extensive troop recreation facilities and personnel services. At the beginning of 1970, the III MAF G-1 staff, in addition to its prescribed functions, operated a Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Center at China Beach in East Da Nang and the Freedom Hill Day Recreation Center just west of Da Nang Airbase. III MAF coordinated R&R assignments and travel for all United States personnel in I Corps. It sponsored and scheduled USO and other professional entertainment groups, and it had charge of Armed Forces motion picture distribution. As part of its exchange of roles with XXIV Corps, III MAF, in late February 1970, turned its entertainment scheduling and film distribution responsibilities over to the U.S. Army 80th Special Services Group.¹⁰⁹

The Freedom Hill Recreation Center, one of III MAF's largest entertainment facilities, served 6,000-7,000 off-duty Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen each day; it was open most days of every month. The center included an indoor 35mm motion picture theater and fully equipped bowling lanes. Due to its location, Freedom Hill catered largely to rear-area troops rather than frontline riflemen. Colonel Wilcox, the 1st Marines commander, commented: "Every time I drove past Freedom Hill, it bothered me. It seems to me that's an investment in manpower and facilities for the wrong people." III MAF retained control over Freedom Hill until 28 February 1971, when the center came under Army management during the final Marine redeployments.¹¹⁰

The division, wing, and FLC maintained their own recreational facilities. Early in 1970, the division had 12 officers' clubs, 21 staff NCO and NCO clubs, and 26 enlisted men's clubs in operation, as well as 16 post exchange stores and 1 main and 11 unit post offices. Besides a comparably complete club system, the 1st MAF boasted a hobby shop complete with a model car racing track and a golf pro shop with a driving cage. Force Logistic Command units enjoyed equally elaborate facilities, including post exchanges with civilian gift shops and concessions.¹¹¹

Individual regiments and battalions developed their own off-duty amenities, some of which, even in deployed infantry units, were extensive. The 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, south of Da Nang, described its troop services in language reminiscent of a resort advertisement:

The Enlisted Club has a large outdoor theater which features nightly movies and weekly floor shows. An outstanding beach on the South China Sea with facilities for parties is very popular. A lifeguard is on duty and swimming is permitted at noon and late afternoon on a daily basis. In addition to nightly movies, Special Services provides a weight room, a well stocked reading room and a wide assortment of athletic equipment. Commercial services in the cantonment include a Marine Corps Exchange, laundry, photo shop, and gift shop. Camp Lauer, the battalion headquarters cantonment, has an efficient mess hall which provides three hot meals to approximately 600 men on a daily basis.¹¹²

Ground combat units, however, found very little time or opportunity to cycle units to the rear for recreation even as redeployment approached. "During my stay (at Camp Lauer) we were far too busy to utilize much recreation," recalled Lieutenant Colonel William V. H. White, commander of 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, "but during low threat periods we did bring individual platoons from the rifle companies to get a little rest and time on the beach."¹¹³

The clubs and other recreational facilities, extensive as they were, only partially alleviated the discomfort and boredom of life in often crowded cantonments in a tropical climate. For units in remote or outlying Marine positions, for example at Chu Lai, the amenities were much less elaborate. In many commands, reductions in military activity increased the burden on spare-time amusement facilities to, and in some cases beyond, capacity.

To meet the troops' religious needs, each III MAF battalion or larger organization had one or more Navy chaplains. These hard-working men, besides holding regular worship services in the cantonments, used every opportunity to carry religious support to Marines in the field. In the 7th Marines, according to Colonel Edmund G. Dering, Jr., "on Sunday afternoon, my whole command and control helicopter package went to the chaplains, and I wanted to see the plan where they made every effort to get out to every . . . unit and hold something . . . It's just symbolic. It's what you stand for." Chaplains conducted Bible classes, religious retreats, and discussion groups. They counseled troubled Marines and visited the wounded and sick in the hospitals and prisoners in the brig. They played a major part in the civic action and personal response

programs, as well as assuming much of the burden of teaching race relations seminars and drug abuse classes.*¹¹⁴

Each Marine had the chance to take at least one week of "Rest and Recreation" (R&R) outside the country during his Vietnam tour. Under a program administered by MACV, regularly scheduled military flights left Da Nang each month for Hong Kong, Bangkok, Okinawa, Manila, Tokyo, Taipei, Sydney, and Honolulu. The division, wing, and FLC received monthly allocations of seats on these flights. Through the Special Services officers of their G-1 staffs, the major commands apportioned seats among their subordinate units in proportion to their manpower strength. Individual Marines could apply to their unit commanders for particular R&R cities and dates. The units distributed the available leave on the basis of their own internal policies, usually giving Marines longest in Vietnam preference among dates and places. Commands occasionally used extra R&R as a performance award. During early 1971, for example, the 1st Marine Division offered a "mini-R&R" to Hong Kong or Bangkok to any man who uncovered a Communist rocket.¹¹⁵

Marines bound for or returning from R&R passed through the III MAF R&R Processing Center, part of the larger III MAF Transient Facility. Operated by the Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st FSR, the Transient Facility was located near Freedom Hill. Navy Seabees had completed its construction early in 1969. The facility included two terminal buildings, a mess hall, and Southeast Asia huts and barracks for temporary housing of Marines awaiting transportation to R&R, as well as those joining or leaving III MAF. Each month, the R&R portion of the transient facility accommodated over 10,000 men from all American commands in I Corps. III MAF operated the facility until 1 July 1970, when USARV took it over as part of the Army assumption of common service support.¹¹⁶

III MAF and the 1st Marine Division provided additional R&R opportunities within Vietnam. All officers and men were eligible for three-day rest periods at the III MAF China Beach R&R Center. Each quarter, organizations received quotas for China Beach, as they did for overseas R&R, and distributed them according to unit internal policies. A Marine using China Beach retained his right to a trip outside Vietnam. The China Beach facility, located in East Da

*For a detailed account of Navy chaplains with III MAF, see Bergsma, *Chaplains with Marines in Vietnam*.

Nang just north of Marble Mountain Air Facility, contained an exchange, a USO center, and a cafeteria and snack bar. Marines could attend films, go swimming in the South China Sea, work out in a gymnasium, or avail themselves of the tennis courts, softball field, shuffleboard and volleyboard courts, and archery range. The entire complex had as its objective "to provide . . . billeting, messing, and recreational facilities in a relaxed atmosphere."¹¹⁷

To give infantry companies temporary relief from the strain of constant operations, the 1st Marine Division during 1969 established a "Stack Arms" center at Camp Lauer, what was then the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion's and then in mid-1970 the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines' cantonment south of Marble Mountain. Infantry companies, in rotation, spent 48-hour stand-down periods at this camp, in effect a simpler and smaller version of China Beach. Here, relieved of all regular duties, the riflemen could enjoy beer, steaks, sports, swimming, and leisure. Regimental commanders regarded "Stack Arms" as an excellent morale-builder, but limited facilities allowed each company to take advantage of the program only twice a year.¹¹⁸

During 1970, Colonel Edmund G. Dering, Jr., instituted a similar program within the 7th Marines. On a monthly basis each rifle company in the regiment went back to a 7th Marines base for 72 hours of rest and rehabilitation. According to Dering, "only the most distressing of operational requirements, actual contact or commitment with the enemy" could force a company to skip its scheduled rest period. The program was designed to give the men a little rest, update administrative records, repair weapons and individual equipment, and return to the field three days later refreshed. Dering recalled:

This was not a rest break, . . . as they marched in, they were relieved of their weapons by armorers. Weapons were tagged, any deficiencies noted, and they were turned over to the armorers for repair. The troops continued to march, were stripped down, and were examined by corpsmen and medical officers for health problems and so on. After this examination and the notes and comments were taken for care . . . the troops continued on for a complete washdown and usually that afternoon a steak dinner, a little kind of beer-bust or something in a safe, secure area.

On the second day weapons were prepared, personnel records were updated—birth recorded, promotions rendered—and in the afternoon when the weapons were returned, weapons were fanfired and zeroed. Supplies, rations, and ammunition were issued on day three, and the men were mustered outside the billets where a battalion or regimental inspection was conducted. When the inspection

was complete, the Marines shouldered their packs and weapons, the chaplain offered a blessing and a moment of prayer, and the company, which was not permitted to return to their billeting area, marched back out into their area of operations.¹¹⁹

Military recreation facilities were much needed during III MAF's last year of combat, because Marines, like other American personnel, were effectively forbidden access to the Vietnamese civilian economy. XXIV Corps and III MAF during 1970 kept the city of Da Nang, and all other Vietnamese towns, villages, and hamlets, off-limits to troops unless they were on official business with written authorization from unit commanders or staff section heads. The commands also placed a 2000-0600 nightly curfew on movement outside United States bases and effectively closed all Vietnamese businesses and places of entertainment, as well as private homes, to American military personnel. Only advisors and other Americans who had to attend social engagements with counterparts were exempt from this ban. By these stringent regulations, the commands hoped to improve military security, reduce prostitution and the drug traffic, and prevent confrontations between American troops and the increasingly hostile civilian population.¹²⁰

On 25 April 1971, XXIV Corps partially relaxed these restrictions; it opened Da Nang City to off-duty personnel between 0600 and 2300 each day. 3d MAB followed the new policy, but it required all Marines going into Da Nang to travel in vehicles provided by their units and with an on-duty armed driver and guard in each. The first open week in Da Nang passed without major incident, although the CORDS city advisor considered it a poor test, since it was the week before a payday. Still, he reported, "bars, restaurants, souvenir stores, cycle and Honda drivers have enjoyed a bonanza," and Vietnamese national police at the air base had intercepted many incoming prostitutes on civilian flights from Saigon. Da Nang remained open throughout the 3d MAB's remaining time in Vietnam.¹²¹

Besides furnishing recreation and services for their troops, III MAF commanders by late 1970 were devoting much thought and effort to solving what they called the "communication" problem. Lieutenant General Jones summed up the widespread concern: "Simply stated," he declared, "we aren't getting the word out. We aren't spending enough time making Marines understand what we're trying to achieve and why." In the same vein, General Chapman exhorted commanders to "establish communications through

the chain of command . . . from the very top to the very bottom, and back up again."¹²²

Efforts to reopen communication took many forms. Force Logistic Command set up a special information telephone, manned 24 hours a day by members of the G-1 staff, to answer Marines' questions about administrative and personnel matters. Individual officers had their own approaches to communicating with troops. Lieutenant General Robertson, when visiting a unit, preferred to talk with enlisted Marines:

. . . individually or in twos or threes—needle them a little and get a feel for them. I learned long ago if you've got your own antennas up and you're really listening, a young Marine doesn't have to complain in a loud, direct manner for you to realize there may be a problem he's trying to tell you about.¹²³

Whatever their personal approaches, Marine commanders had had the realization forced upon them that, as Major General Armstrong put it, "We've got a . . . lot of people in this younger generation it's going to take a little extra to get through to."¹²⁴ As with so many other problems of the war, this one had to be placed in the category of "Unfinished Business" as the last Marines left Da Nang.

Cohesion or Disintegration?

It is impossible to measure with any precision how severely the deterioration of morale and discipline affected III MAF's military performance. Commanders almost unanimously denied that trouble in the ranks had any adverse influence on operations. Typically, Lieutenant General McCutcheon declared that, in his estimation, III MAF never approached a critical loss of cohesion and that Marine disciplinary problems were "nowhere near the extent that the Army . . . experienced."¹²⁵ Colonel Stien, who had faced significant racial disorder in MAG-13, cautiously echoed

McCutcheon's assessment. "I felt," Stien said, "as though I was capable of taking care of the problem but I didn't like what I might have to do."¹²⁶ In spite of racial tension, drug abuse, occasional fraggings, and general dissension, III MAF until the final redeployments continued to carry out daily operations requiring a high degree of skill and coordination, while at the same time managing a series of complicated redeployments. Nevertheless, the fact that the question of troop reliability even arose demonstrated the severity of the internal problem, as did the amount of command attention devoted to race relations, drug education, and other personnel matters unrelated to the combat mission.

A glass is either half-full or half-empty depending on the viewpoint of the observer. Against the statistics on racial incidents, drug use, fraggings, accidents, and atrocities must be set the fact that thousands of Marines continued to do their duty to the end. Many daily risked death and mutilation for a cause that perhaps a majority of their civilian contemporaries, as well as substantial numbers of their country's most eminent leaders, denounced as immoral or dismissed as no longer important to national security. Sergeant Major Huff later observed that despite all of the unrest in III MAF during the latter stages of the war "the majority of the Marines I met in Vietnam met the challenge presented to them in stride; no one knows this better than General Giap of the NVA."¹²⁷ At the end of his tour in command of the 1st Marines, Colonel Wilcox paid tribute to this military "silent majority:"

I saw daily . . . examples of raw courage, selflessness, and dedication that made me both proud and humble . . . to have been serving with those men They really put it on the line, day in and day out I just really am tremendously proud to have been a part of them.¹²⁸

U.S. Marine Advisors and Other Activities

*U.S. Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps—The Vietnamese Marine Corps in Lam Son 719
The Marine Advisory Unit and Solid Anchor—Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
The Special Landing Force—Marines on the MACV Staff—Embassy Marines—Conclusion*

U.S. Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps

U.S. Marine Advisors supported the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) from its activation in October 1954. Originally a part of the Naval Advisory Group (NAG), which was responsible to ComUSMACV, the Marine Advisory Unit (MAU) was the link between the VNMC and the American command. At the beginning of 1970, the MAU was commanded by the Senior Marine Advisor (SMA), Colonel William M. Van Zuyen, and had a Marine strength* of 39 officers and five enlisted men. In addition, the staff usually had one Navy doctor as medical advisor and two corpsmen. American Marines from all general occupational fields—combat, combat support, and combat service support—rounded out the MAU staff. Marines advised most VNMC staff sections, and since VNMC battalions tended to maneuver tactically in two large elements, common MAU practice was to have two Marine advisors with each battalion, one with each element, and three advisors with each brigade.¹

Activated in 1954, the VNMC was formed from old French-organized commando and riverine units. The VNMC was originally assigned to conduct amphibious and riverine operations as part of the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). From 1954 to 1971 the VNMC expanded from a strength of 1,150 officers and men to 13,500,² growing from a brigade- to a division-size organization, while gaining separate service status. From its very beginning the VNMC was an important combat element of the RVNAF. As part of the General Reserve, it fought in all four Corps areas, and during the 1968 Tet Offensive helped retake the Citadel in Hue City.

Relying on U.S. Marine Corps advisors from the start, the VNMC, unsurprisingly, reflected this influence in its recruiting, organization, and training. Like its American counterpart, the VNMC recruited

volunteers and did not draft. Its recruiting program stressed patriotism and challenged “young men to prove themselves equal to rigorous, disciplined life.” This proved to be as effective in Vietnam as it was in the United States. Thirteen enlisted recruiting teams were located throughout the country. By mid-1971, 610 men were being enlisted monthly, which was enough to replace “normal attrition” and keep up with authorized strength increases. Officers were appointed from varied sources: the National Military Academy, the two-year infantry school for reserve officers, and the 12-week officer course for meritorious NCOs.³

The MAU emphasized the importance of training. By 1971 the VNMC Training Command, located northwest of Thu Duc in Military Region III near Saigon, could accommodate 2,000 students and provide basic recruit and advanced individual infantry training, as well as officer, NCO, and sniper courses.

Since 1956 some 200 VNMC officers and a number of enlisted men had attended courses in the United States and Okinawa. Included were 14 lieutenants and two captains who had attended either the U.S. Marine Corps Basic School or Amphibious Warfare School at Quantico during 1957 and 1958 and now held key positions, including Commandant, in the VNMC. One-fourth of the training command instructors had been through U.S. Marine recruit training, the Drill Instructor School at San Diego, and had completed the U.S. Marine Corps Marksmanship Instructor Course. Offshore training gave the VNMC vital knowledge and skills, and also created “a basis for common understanding between MAU personnel and the Vietnamese—a factor essential to the successful advisory effort.”⁴

The mission of the MAU was to “foster a VNMC capable of conducting amphibious, riverine, helicopterborne, and ground operations, and to assist in establishing a sound, enduring logistical and administrative procedure within the VNMC.”⁵ The MAU also closely monitored the Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF) program that supported the Vietnamese Marines.

The VNMC requisitioned most of its supplies and equipment through the RVNAF supply system until

*The task organization of the MAU was increased in the spring of 1970 to include 56 officers and 22 enlisted Marines. Col Richard F. Armstrong, Comments on draft ms, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File). Armstrong's comments include a memo depicting the changed T/O. See also monthly historical summaries for personnel breakdowns.

1966, the year MASF was established. Under MASF the American Marine advisors furnished the VNMC material not commonly used by other RVNAF Services or needed to equip new units. Responsibility fell on the MAU to verify VNMC requirements and determine which must be met by MASF. The MAU also conducted periodic inventories of U.S. equipment held by the Vietnamese Marines and made recommendations to upgrade their equipment.

In 1971 the MAU had set these goals: increase VNMC strength to 13,462 by the end of the year; provide full and continuing MASF support, including training the VNMC in the proper use and maintenance of equipment; improve individual and unit training; and improve living conditions for Vietnamese Marines and their families. While advisory efforts in the past had concentrated on improvement of combat skills, the MAU now emphasized logistics. American Marine advisors worked vigorously to develop a "definitive supply management system within the VNMC." In short, the Marine Advisory Unit readjusted "the nature of its support" as the VNMC demonstrated self-sufficiency in specific areas.⁶

To improve VNMC morale and esprit de corps, as well as battlefield effectiveness, and to strengthen allegiance to the Government of South Vietnam, the MAU and VNMC worked to improve the health and well-being of the Vietnamese Marines' families. American Marine advisors put many man-hours into civic action projects to better the lot of the Vietnamese Marines and their dependents. Projects included operating a pig farm for low-cost meat and a commissary with foods at reduced rates; building dependent housing; upgrading base camps; and constructing a new hospital. In 1971 the SMA reported that "more must be and is being done, primarily by the Vietnamese themselves, but with extensive MAU assistance."⁷

With its American Marine advisors, the VNMC conducted primarily battalion-size operations in 1970. The year began slowly with the Vietnamese Marines searching for an elusive enemy. In late January, however, while operating in Chuong Thien and Kien Giang Provinces, southwest of Saigon in IV Corps as part of Amphibious Task Force 211, a battalion of Brigade A made heavy contact. In the early morning hours of the 22d, the *K-2* and *K-6 Battalions* of the

The relative simplicity of a South Vietnamese Marine Corps battalion command post during the fall of 1970 is depicted below. Capt Peter C. Anderson, Assistant Advisor to the 6th VNMC Battalion, left, is shown with Maj Tung, center, and his staff.

Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC





Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC

A South Vietnamese Marine "Cowboy" holds his transistor radio while perched on a field hammock. The so called "Cowboys" were South Vietnamese Marine enlisted men assigned to the advisors to assist the Americans with minor chores in the field.

T18 Regiment, a VC main force unit, launched a coordinated ground attack at 0340 against a rifle company and elements of the Headquarters and Service Company of the 1st VNMC Battalion. The brigade command post and Battery B, which was in direct support of the company in contact, were simultaneously attacked by mortars.

The VC conducted a diversionary attack from the south while at the same time concentrating the main attack from the east. Following a 100-round 82mm and 60mm mortar preparation, the enemy assaulted under the cover of .50 caliber machine gun and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. The VC could not penetrate the Marine perimeter. In a "fiercely contested hand-to-hand encounter" the Marines halted the VC advance and forced the enemy to fall back. The 1st Battalion commander then maneuvered two companies to reinforce the contact, and block the enemy's withdrawal. The reinforcing companies immediately discovered and attacked the VC medical evacuation unit responsible for the removal of enemy casualties from the bat-

tlefield, killing another 16 and forcing the unit into "full disorganized retreat." Meanwhile, the rifle company which was initially hit conducted an aggressive counterattack, pursuing the VC battalion relentlessly. Two platoons of Marines maintained contact with the fleeing enemy. As the VC battalion retreated to the east, the 2d VNMC Battalion conducted a heliborne assault, reestablishing contact with the enemy in mid-afternoon. The action continued until 2300, when the VC broke contact. Total enemy losses were 95 killed and four captured, against 24 Marines killed.⁸

Brigade B, consisting of the 1st, 4th, and 5th VNMC Infantry Battalions and a battery of the 2d VNMC Artillery Battalion, accompanied by their American Marine advisors, participated in Operation Tran Hung Dao IX, the GVN incursion into Cambodia. The Marines joined the operation on 9 May 1970 when Amphibious Task Force 211, including Brigade B, moved up the Mekong River toward Phnom Penh. The 1st VNMC Infantry Battalion landed at 0950 south of

Neak Luong where intelligence reports indicated the enemy *MR 2 Headquarters* was located. Contact was immediately made and 23 VC/NVA were killed. Amphibious Task Force 211 continued north to the Neak Luong ferry site and the bulk of the brigade, was put ashore at 1400. The brigade established defensive positions on both sides of the ferry site while relieving the 14th ARVN Regiment. In a battalion-size contact on the 11th, the 4th Battalion killed 38 more enemy and captured numerous weapons and equipment, as well as four tons of small arms ammunition.

Elements of the 5th Battalion made contact with an estimated NVA battalion and regimental headquarters entrenched on Hill 147 in the vicinity of the village of Chaeu Kach on 14 May. The fight began when the pilots of the light observation helicopters of a U.S. Army air cavalry unit supporting the 5th Battalion saw a SKS rifle leaning against the wall of a building near the village. When the helicopters were fired upon, two platoons along with the battalion executive officer and the assistant battalion advisor were inserted about 500 meters south of Chaeu Kach.

Heavy fighting developed around 1650 with automatic weapons, recoilless rifle, and B-40 rocket fire concentrated against the platoons, while the command and control helicopter was taken under machine gun fire. The battle lasted through the night. Eight "Black Pony" (OV-10s) and 16 "Sea Wolf" (helicopter gunships) air strikes were flown by U.S. Navy units, enabling the Marines to consolidate their positions and continue to attack the hill. Fire support was also

provided by the VNMC artillery battery supporting the 5th Battalion and by a Vietnamese C-47 equipped with Gatling guns. By 0830 on the 15th, despite heavy resistance, the objective was taken by the 5th Battalion. The enemy losses were 49 killed and one heavy machine gun, one B-40 rocket launcher, and numerous small arms, grenades, ammunition, and equipment captured. Vietnamese Marine losses were five killed and 10 wounded.⁹

On 28 May Brigade A, consisting of the 2d, 6th, 7th, and 8th VNMC Infantry Battalions and the 2d VNMC Artillery Battalion (-) (Rein), replaced Brigade B in the Neak Luong area of operation. From then until 4 June the Vietnamese Marines engaged the enemy in their most intense combat in Cambodia. The 2d Battalion conducted an assault on the 28th into Pre Veng, a provincial town just north of Neak Luong. During the ensuing six-day engagement, in which the 2d Battalion was reinforced by the 4th Battalion on the 29th, 295 NVA were killed and seven crew-served and numerous individual weapons were captured, while the VNMC suffered seven killed. In heavy house-to-house fighting, the VNMC employed supporting arms extensively with devastating effect. The heaviest contact in Pre Veng occurred between 0700 and 2000 on the 30th when the 2d Battalion killed 137 NVA. During this same period the 4th Battalion killed 32 more and captured nearly 1,700 rifles. Captain Edward O. Bierman, an American advisor, later recalled the importance of the operation to the VNMC:

LtGen Hoang Xuan Lam, Commanding General, I Corps, center of group and wearing beret, discusses Lam Son 719 operation with newsmen at Khe Sanh forward base. Col Francis W. Tief, Senior Marine Advisor to the VNMC, third from the left, looks on.

Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC





Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC

A U.S. base area near the Cambodian border is shown after all U.S. forces including Marine advisors have been ordered back to South Vietnam. The pig in the foreground, oblivious to less important matters, has found a comfortable mud hole in which to wallow.

Marine advisors, still assigned to Brigade B, were not allowed to accompany the VNMC during the battle because Pre Veng was just over the 25-mile limit.* The battle, however, served as a major test of the ability of the VNMC to operate independent of their advisors.¹⁰

After a relative lull in the fighting in the Neak Luong-Pre Veng area of operations in Cambodia, combat intensified from 14-16 June. The 2d Battalion was again drawn into action first. At 0145 on the 14th, 2d Battalion positions in the Pre Veng area were hit with about 100 82mm mortar rounds followed by an NVA ground assault. By daylight 43 NVA were dead, as were six Marines. The 7th Battalion was lifted by helicopter into blocking positions to the east and northeast of Pre Veng while the 2d Battalion was counterattacking on the morning of the 14th. Meanwhile, the 6th Battalion and artillery units began moving by road from Neak Luong to Pre Veng. The 6th Battalion arrived on the 15th. In position as the blocking

force as the 2d Battalion pushed the retreating NVA towards them, the 7th Battalion killed another 63 enemy and captured 10 AK-47s, 1 Browning automatic rifle, a .50 caliber antiaircraft machine gun, and much ammunition. Contact ended on the morning of the 16th. In all 112 NVA were killed while the VNMC had 21 killed.¹¹

In late June the VNMC changed the designation of its brigades which, under the revised system, were numbered according to the infantry battalions they included. Brigade B in July, for example, became Brigade 256, consisting of the 2d, 5th, and 6th Infantry Battalions.

In a staff change on 2 July, Colonel Francis W. Tief relieved Colonel Van Zuyen, assuming command of the MAU. His Assistant Senior Marine Advisor was Lieutenant Colonel Alexander P. McMillan, who had joined the MAU on 1 April 1970 when he relieved Lieutenant Colonel Tom D. Parsons. MAU strength was then 51 Marine officers, 7 NCOs, 1 PFC, and 2 Navy corpsmen.

*When allied forces entered Cambodia in the spring of 1970, American units and advisors were not permitted to penetrate the border more than 25 miles.

During July 1970 the VNMC participated in Operation Vu Ninh 12. Conducted in MR 1 under operational control of Quang Da Special Zone, Brigade 256 and its American Marine advisors began the operation on 14 July with the establishment of two fire support bases in the mountains 24 kilometers southwest of An Hoa Combat Base in Quang Nam Province. Called Base Area (BA) 112, this mountainous region, often covered by double and triple canopy, concealed a complex trail network along which the enemy operated one of "the most active logistical distribution points" in South Vietnam. BA 112 was a natural marshaling area and afforded the VC/NVA operating in the region a sanctuary, as well as lines of approach from which to launch rocket and ground attacks against allied units and installations in Da Nang and the populated lowlands of Quang Nam.

Intelligence reports preceding the operation suggested that large caches of supplies and equipment were located in BA 112. While numerous base camps of platoon and company size were destroyed, only light and sporadic contacts with the enemy were made, and the caches of arms, ammunition, and other supplies discovered were of moderate size. In addition, the 6th Battalion found an abandoned VC hospital containing small quantities of medical supplies.

The VC/NVA reacted with rocket and mortar attacks to the establishment of two more fire support bases in late July and early August as Vu Ninh 12 continued. In the only sizeable contact of the operation, the 6th VNMC Battalion repelled a VC ground attack, killing 26 and capturing five individual weapons and a 75mm recoilless rifle. A total of 59 enemy had been killed during the operation by the time Brigade 256 displaced to An Hoa Combat Base on 20 August.¹²

In late September 1970, the VNMC again redesignated its brigades numerically: Brigade A became 147, B became 258, and C became 369. These designations were permanent.

The VNMC relocated to the vicinity of Khe Sanh in northern I Corps in February 1971. Maneuvering as a division for the first time,* the VNMC was one of three RVNAF divisions and other assorted units slat-

ed to participate in Operation Lam Son 719, the GVN raid into Laos. This was the most significant operation during 1971, and perhaps the whole war to that date. Lam Son 719 would test the RVNAF's ability to coordinate and control corps-size forces in an area reputed to be an enemy stronghold. The results of Lam Son 719 would be mixed. In addition to encountering sizeable and fierce enemy opposition, which caused heavy casualties, the RVNAF would suffer from hesitant leadership and inexperienced staffs which proved unable to direct an operation of such magnitude and complexity. The RVNAF would also be handicapped by its inability adequately to coordinate supporting arms, particularly since U.S. advisors and liaison personnel were forbidden from accompanying the ARVN and VNMC into Laos. Overhead helicopterborne fire support coordinators (U.S. Marine advisors) were provided to the VNMC, but their presence was sporadic because of weather and helicopter availability. Consequently, fire support was inadequate during the most crucial phases of the operation.¹³

The Vietnamese Marine Corps in Lam Son 719

A South Vietnamese operation in Laos was conceived in late 1970 after intelligence reports indicated that NVA forces were preparing a big offensive in northern I Corps. Aerial reconnaissance missions reported an increase in troop and vehicular movement down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Agents and POW interrogations pointed toward a large-scale attack sometime between the first of the year and mid-summer.

In December 1970, ComUSMACV, General Creighton W. Abrams, divulged his plan for an incursion into Laos to cut the enemy's lines of communication where the vast network of trails and roads comprising the Ho Chi Minh Trail passed through the city of Tchepone. In severing these lines, Lam Son 719 was intended temporarily to distract the enemy and delay any buildup of men and material for an anticipated offensive, thereby also facilitating the redeployment of American combat units during 1971.¹⁴

The GVN offensive into Cambodia, which began in April 1970, had established the precedent for cross-border operations, and Washington had agreed to a limited thrust into Laos. In January 1971 General Abrams approved a plan developed by a combined I Corps and XXIV Corps planning group. III MAF was not involved. The plan called for a four-phased operation in which the VNMC Division would be committed during Phase II.

*"This was the first time the VNMC was committed as a Division," observed Brigadier General Tief years later. "The ACMC (Assistant Commandant, Marine Corps) VNMC, Colonel Bui The Lan, was designated as the division commander. The MAU placed officers in key staff advisory positions. Overall the division staff functioned well. Strong rapport between MAU advisors and the VNMC was the key." BGen Francis W. Tief, Comments on draft ms, 13Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Tief Comments.

Following Phase I of Lam Son 719, during which Route 9 was reopened from FSB Vandegrift, east of Khe Sanh, to the Laotian border, the 7th Battalion and a command group of Brigade 147 were inserted on 1 March by helicopter into the Marine AO in Laos, about 15 miles southwest of where Route 9 intersects with the Laotian border. Brigade 258, consisting of the 1st, 3d, and 8th Infantry Battalions and the 3rd Artillery Battalion, crossed the border on the 4th and 5th of March and began operations northeast of Brigade 147, just south of Route 9 along the plateau near the border of Laos and RVN. Although the VNMC was not accompanied by its American Marine advisors on the ground in Laos, advisors were frequently airborne in command and control Hueys in the vicinity of VNMC units. Captain Marshall N. Carter recalled:

The MAU immediately established an advisor with an experienced VNMC officer as airborne coordinator (in an Army UH-1 command and control bird) during daylight hours. In the VNMC division combat operations center, we had another advisor constantly on the net assisting in coordinating artillery, helicopter support, airstrikes, etc. This worked very effectively during the entire operation.¹⁵

Operating out of FSB Delta, Brigade 147, which now included the 2d, 4th, and 7th Infantry Battalions, and 2d Artillery Battalion, encountered determined enemy resistance almost immediately. On 5 March the NVA attacked the 4th Battalion with mortars followed

by a ground assault. Fighting throughout the day, the 4th Battalion killed 130 NVA (30 by air) and captured 20 weapons while suffering six Marines killed. The battalion killed 18 more on 6 March and discovered 100 enemy bodies in the area of a B-52 strike conducted the day before. The 4th Battalion killed another 38 in moderate to heavy contacts on the 8th and uncovered two mass graves containing 55 more NVA, including a company commander.¹⁶

The 2d Battalion of Brigade 147, patrolling southwest of FSB Delta, also made heavy contact on 7 March. Engaging an estimated two NVA companies at 1430, the battalion killed 145, including 47 killed by helicopter gunships. The 2d Battalion also captured large quantities of supplies and equipment while sustaining 14 killed and 91 wounded. The following afternoon the 7th Battalion of Brigade 147 engaged an NVA platoon, killing 11 without incurring any casualties of its own.

Brigade 258, with its CP at FSB Hotel, four to five miles northeast of Brigade 147, experienced lighter enemy activity. In a series of small-scale contacts from 6 to 8 March, units of Brigade 258 killed 46 NVA while suffering one Marine killed and 19 wounded. During the same period Brigade 369, consisting of the 5th and 9th Infantry Battalions and the 1st Artillery Battalion, patrolled the area around the Division CP at Khe Sanh out to three to four miles from the base itself,

During a ceremony at the Vietnamese Marine Thu Duc Training Center, troops stand in formation to receive awards for their participation in the Cambodian incursion. The following spring during Lam Son 719 in Laos, the Marines encountered stiff opposition.

Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC



experiencing only light and sporadic contacts with the enemy which resulted in 10 kills.

Enemy response against individual and often widely separated South Vietnamese units in Laos, such as Brigade 147, followed a pattern. RVNAF units initially met light to moderate resistance on patrols, and their fire support bases were subjected to sporadic indirect fire attacks. The enemy then began to progressively build up forces around fixed positions, increasing indirect fire attacks and antiaircraft fire. Beginning around 18 March, the NVA had started to concentrate forces, estimated at two regiments, around FSB Delta. This enemy buildup coincided with the start of Phase III of Lam Son 719, the phased extraction of units from Laos, which was complicated by increasing NVA pressure against widely dispersed and, therefore, vulnerable South Vietnamese units.

Brigade 147 initially had occupied FSB Delta with one battalion securing the base and two battalions operating to the south. After its arrival, the brigade worked hard to improve defensive positions. On the 13th the first salvos of 130mm artillery rained down on Delta, and by the 17th the NVA had occupied "defilade positions" on Delta's steep slopes which were secure from small arms and indirect fire from the base. From these positions antiaircraft gunners fired on resupply and evacuation helicopters. Tactical air and gunships struck 10 active enemy gun positions, but the gunners would relocate and continue to attack the daily stream of helicopters which supported FSB Delta.¹⁷

On the 18th, outlying battalions began sweeping back toward Delta to clear enemy positions around the base. In one intense firefight that day, the 7th Battalion killed 95 NVA. The 4th and 7th Battalions, upon arrival at Delta, assumed essentially defensive positions because the NVA had so thoroughly invested the area. Compounding this dilemma the brigade commander consistently refused to clear artillery and air strikes within 1,000 meters of the base because of lack of confidence in the accuracy of his supporting arms.

NVA indirect fire attacks intensified progressively. Between 0700 and 1800 on the 19th, FSB Delta came under "heavy enemy fire" from 130mm artillery and 122mm mortars on six separate occasions, leaving six Marines dead and 39 wounded. By the 20th NVA soldiers were firing small arms at incoming helicopters from positions dug under the base's perimeter wire. Combining antiaircraft and indirect fire on Delta's landing zone, the NVA had virtually halted resupply

and medical evacuation operations. Although Colonel Lan, the VNMC division commander directing operations from Khe Sanh, overrode the restrictions placed on the clearance of supporting fires by the commander of Brigade 147, the VNMC could not break the enemy siege.

At 0600 on the 21st, two NVA regiments, later identified by POWs as the *29th* and *803d* of the *324B Division*, launched a heavy ground attack against Delta, preceded by mortar fire and what appeared to be 75mm direct fire from tank guns. Despite the intense combat, seven helicopters landed during the day with resupplies, but all were hit and one destroyed. The fight raged on through the night.¹⁸

General Lam disapproved the Marines' request for evacuation of FSB Delta on the night of the 21st, but demanded the evacuation of artillery from the base, although helicopters had not been able to land. Lam also allocated 2,000 rounds of 8-inch and 5,000 rounds of 155mm artillery to support Brigade 147, but it was of no use. The assistant senior marine advisor, Lieutenant Colonel McMillan, later noted:

At the point that General Lam finally committed long-range artillery support to assist in the extraction of the brigade from FSB Delta, . . . he was fully aware that all long-range artillery had already been withdrawn to a range that precluded their providing any support.¹⁹

Alluding to the friction between the I Corps commander and the Marine Division, Colonel Tief said that General Lam remarked, "Now the Marines will have to fight."²⁰

Years later McMillan recalled the troubled relationship between the I Corps commander and the Vietnamese Marines during this critical period:

From the very outset of the retrograde operation, it was apparent that General Lam, the corps commander, was bent on isolating Brigade 147 on the battlefield. Perhaps it would be too strong to state that it was a deliberate effort to bloody the Marines. However, the fact [was] that the airborne, the rangers, and the 1st ARVN had all suffered grievously during the operation, [and] the Marines were the only unit achieving local battle success and still tactically intact; and the conscious refusals at corps level to provide any long-range artillery support to the brigade certainly lends credence to the conclusion that more than the fortunes of war were involved.²¹

*"This remark was a reflection of General Lam's personal animosity toward CMC-VNMC," recalled Brigadier General Tief. "It was unwarranted since the RVN Marines were the only ones who fought and won during Lam Son 719." Tief Comments.

The attack continued on the 22nd, and at 2000 10 enemy tanks, all equipped with flame throwers, joined the battle. The Marines destroyed three tanks within or near the perimeter—two by light antitank assault weapons, the other by an antitank mine. A fourth tank was destroyed south of the base by tactical air strikes. The ability to resupply the Marines remained extremely tenuous and two helicopters were shot down attempting to “free drop and parachute supplies.”

Tactical air was employed in a desperate attempt to suppress enemy antiaircraft fire, and gunships fought to strip the sides of FSB Delta of the entrenched enemy. The NVA, nevertheless, penetrated the perimeter and consolidated positions in the center of the fire base.* The Marines were ordered to pull back from the center to either end of Delta and prepare to counterattack after a napalm strike. But the strike was diverted in favor of a higher priority mission and never arrived. At this time the brigade commander ordered his Marines to withdraw. “The order to withdraw was given by the division commander after consultation with CMC-VNMC and the SMA,” recalled Colonel Tief. Brigade 258 was to secure a landing zone and provide a secure area for evacuation of Brigade 147.²²

Brigade 147 then had to fight its way through two enemy base camps and nine NVA tanks in blocking positions while clashing repeatedly with NVA forces deployed in the streambeds leading to friendly lines. It was during this series of actions that I Corps and XXIV Corps refused to provide “8-inch or 155 support,” Colonel Tief said later. “Brigade 258 had occupied the key terrain in the west valley” which XXIV Corps said could not be held. Denied the heavy artillery support the MAU felt was needed, “MAU and VNMC officers worked out an artillery support plan using the VNMC artillery units exclusively. It worked; the position was held.”²³

When the SMA was informed by the Army artillery liaison officer that the VNMC could have the requested heavy artillery, the SMA informed him that it was no longer necessary because Brigade 258 had been

moved to a position from which it could provide artillery support. On the morning of the 23d, Brigade 147 broke through enemy lines and linked up with elements of Brigade 258 to the northeast. The 3rd Battalion of Brigade 258 secured a landing zone, and over the following 24 hours, Brigade 147 was lifted back to Khe Sanh.

The last elements of Brigade 258, which had encountered far less resistance during some 20 days in Laos, were withdrawn on 25 March. Small groups of Marines cut off in the withdrawal from Delta continued to filter out of Laos by foot. A group of 26 Marines fought their way out to rejoin the division at Khe Sanh on 27 March, leaving 37 missing of an original total of 134 when FSB Delta was evacuated.

During the siege and withdrawal from FSB Delta from 21-23 March, Marines estimated that 600 enemy were killed around the base by Brigade 147 and an estimated 400 were killed in a B-52 strike on the 21st. Some 200 individual weapons were captured and 100 destroyed as were 60 crew-served weapons. In addition to the missing, friendly casualties during the 21st and 22d of March were 60 Marines killed and 150 wounded. The close-in combat of the month had brutal effects on both sides. The Marine division as a whole from 1-27 March killed over 2,000 NVA and captured or destroyed over 800 weapons, while suffering 335 killed and 768 wounded.

Lam Son 719 had demonstrated the weaknesses of both the VNMC division and the ARVN assigned to General Lam's I Corps. At the command level, Colonel Lan, the VNMC division commander, was at first “reluctant to impose on the autonomy of the brigade commander,” a practice “which had been buttressed by years of custom within the VNMC. This resulted in an inability to maintain an accurate assessment of the tactical and logistical situation, which in turn led to an inability to generate a cohesive plan for the division as a whole.” The brigade commander's refusal to clear close supporting fires, bred by lack of confidence in the ability of VNMC artillery to compute and fire high-angle defensive fires, enabled the enemy to achieve fire superiority. “The brigade commander's inexplicable failure to launch aggressive ground action to clear the ground around FSB Delta” permitted the NVA to concentrate their antiaircraft fire to preclude aerial resupply, necessitating the withdrawal from Delta.²⁴

Assessing the performance of the ARVN I Corps staff, the senior Marine advisor levelled some equally

*Lieutenant Colonel Marshall N. Carter years later recalled a dangerous situation which occurred at Delta because of a scheduled Arlight attack: “At one point one of the VNMC brigades had been driven off the firebase . . . at about midnight and into an area scheduled for a 2:00 AM arlight strike. It was with great difficulty that we were able to have the B-52s, only 30 minutes or so away from the target abort the mission. Had this not been done, the entire brigade would have been hit since they had moved into the 2-3 grid-square area of the arlight.” LtCol Marshall N. Carter, Comments on draft ms, 28Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File).



Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC

Col Francis W. Tief, who assumed command of the Marine Advisory Unit in June 1970, is shown with South Vietnamese officers at the U.S. Army 101st Airborne Division (Air-mobile) command post during Lam Son 719 asking for additional helicopter support.

stern criticism. Colonel Tief said that, while he understood the logic for the VNMC receiving a low priority for air support during the early stages of the operation, when the 1st ARVN and Airborne Divisions were heavily engaged, the low priority later came close to meaning “no priority.” Tief added that only through his “direct appeals” did the situation improve, but even during the withdrawal phase of Lam Son 719, priority in assignment of tactical air went to the ARVN, “even though the resupply situation on FSB Delta was becoming critical.” Corps artillery support was equally deficient because of a similar priority system. Tief concluded that the extreme conditions which demanded withdrawal might have been averted had Brigade 147 been given higher priority fire support before the enemy was preparing to breach the wire and had even occupied positions between FSB Delta and the withdrawal route to Brigade 258. In his after action report, Tief also suggested that RVNAF politics affected tactical operations: “The personal attitude of

the CG, I Corps, toward the Marine division and the interplay between him and the Commandant of the VNMC were responsible for significant tactical considerations, without doubt. The extent to which political decisions overrode tactical ones is difficult to gauge.”²⁵

Summarizing the operation, Colonel Tief lauded the Marines of the division:

The combat units of the Marine Division performed admirably in the face of the strongest enemy forces they have yet encountered. Brigade 147, the most severely tested, has taken great pride in the way it came out of Laos. Troops were improvising equipment items—packs [made] from sandbags and communications wire—in order to return to action immediately. Brigade 258 performed well under steady, if less spectacular pressure. Brigade 369 . . . was never committed. . . . It experienced . . . little contact in its AO west of Khe Sanh.²⁶

The SMA went on to say that “the brightest spots in the action at FSB Delta were the performances of

the individual Marines and their company and battalion level leadership.” The three battalion commanders, though wounded, retained unit integrity while fighting their way to link-up with Brigade 258. “Within 24 hours after returning to Khe Sanh, the battalions of Brigade 147 were operational and redeployed in the hills southwest of the division CP—and in contact with the enemy.”²⁷

The Marine Advisory Unit and Solid Anchor

Ca Mau Peninsula, “unmatched in desolation,” is on the southern tip of South Vietnam in An Xuyen Province. Essentially a mangrove swamp with trees rising to 60 feet and triple canopy covering a tidal floor, the peninsula remains inundated at high tide and during the rainy season. Overland transportation south of Ca Mau City is virtually impossible. Boats and aircraft are required for any degree of mobility. South of the Cua Lon River, the inhabitants are Viet Cong,


their families, and refugees from Nam Can Village, which was destroyed in the wake of the 1968 Tet Offensive. Numerous defoliated strips of jungle south of the Cua Lon served to reinforce the impression of uninhabitability.

The Cua Lon and its tributaries, nevertheless, are rich in seafood, and growing throughout the region is an indigenous tree that produces the highest quality charcoal found in Vietnam, making the area lucrative for those who would work it. Because of the difficulty of ground operations south of the Cua Lon, the VC operating there were essentially unchallenged. As late as mid-1970 this portion of An Xuyen Province was exempt from the pacification goals assigned the commanding general of Military Region 4.

ComNavForV established an advanced tactical support base, called Sea Float, on the Cua Lon River near Nam Can in 1968. Sea Float consisted of several

Several U.S. Marine Advisors pose at the Khe Sanh Combat Base in the spring of 1971 during Operation Lam Son 719. From left to right: Maj John G. Miller; Maj William C. Stroup; Maj Thomas G. Adams, partially hidden; and Maj Frederic L. Tolleson.

Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC



AMMI* pontoon barges lashed together in a cluster in mid-stream. The base provided logistical support for U.S. Navy river patrol operations in An Xuyen Province. By early 1970, the base's vulnerability had become a "matter of mounting concern." Though the base had not been attacked, during a two-month period in the spring of 1970 eight VC swimmer-sappers were killed by concussion grenades, which had been thrown from the barges about every 15 minutes. A land base was designed to replace Sea Float to provide a more inhabitable and operable installation, as well as one that could be better defended.

The planned facility ashore would include a 250x600-meter cantonment. Built on "a 17 million dollar sand pile," the new base was named Solid Anchor. The installation was almost complete in August 1970. By September all operations were moved ashore, and Sea Float was discontinued. In early 1971 construction of a 3,000-foot runway on Solid Anchor was finished, in addition to large storage areas, a pad for the helicopter detachment (Sea Wolves), and many boat mooring spaces.²⁸ Ships as large as LSTs could easily come up river to Solid Anchor, and a U.S. Navy LST-type logistic support ship was maintained for many months there.²⁹

Since 1968 the Navy had conducted waterborne operations from Sea Float, employing river patrol craft to raid VC units. At no time were allied ground forces operating for prolonged periods in the Sea Float AO. While the 21st ARVN made occasional forays into the drier areas of the province, its units never stayed long because the tides made the terrain so marginally habitable. Not until the fall of 1970 did ComNavForV consider improving the offensive and defensive capability of what in 1970 had become known as Solid Anchor by basing an infantry battalion there. The 6th VNMC Battalion and an artillery battery arrived at Solid Anchor in early September and immediately moved into the AO and began operating against an enemy who tried to stand and fight rather than evade. Despite the 6th Battalion's success in killing some 85 VC in the first two months of operations, however, Solid Anchor continued to be troubled by a host of operational and organizational difficulties.

A more incongruous and diverse grouping of units in a relatively small command could not have been found outside of Solid Anchor. In addition to the new-


ly arrived VNMC units, the melange included Seabees, Sea Wolves, SEALs, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams, and combat service support units. OV-10 "Black Ponies," Sea Lords (riverine forces), and administrative and logistic helicopters were also based there.

The Solid Anchor cantonment was defended by about 70 Vietnamese irregular infantry and an equal number of CIDGs. Special Forces advisors and a handful of Kit Carson Scouts, who frequently accompanied the SEAL teams on patrol, further diversified the organization of the base. When in mid-summer 1970 ComNavForV, Vice Admiral Jerome H. King, decided the Solid Anchor population of 600-700 and the \$78 million real estate investment warranted increased security, the MAU sent advisors to Solid Anchor to develop and implement a coordinated base defense plan and to instruct the Vietnamese in the use of the 81mm mortar. An additional advisor was assigned to the staff of Rear Admiral Herbert S. Matthews, Deputy, ComNavForV, who was also the advisor to the deputy CNO of the VNN. Although the MAU developed "an explicit detailed plan," the Solid Anchor command struggled through most of the fall to coordinate tactical operations.³⁰

Solid Anchor had also been plagued with a series of personnel and logistic problems. These alone were sufficient to have "tried the patience of any responsible commander."³¹ Because of the austerity of Solid Anchor existence, U.S. Navy personnel assigned there were assembled from other in-country units and ordered to Nam Can for 90 days temporary additional duty. Major John G. Miller, MAU G-3, observed that "this resulted, predictably, in a universal short timer's attitude and all its associated evils." Living conditions, which included electrical power and running water, were quite comfortable within the cantonment. But the isolation of the base and transitory nature of the personnel created an atmosphere of loneliness and martyrdom "thick enough to cut with a knife." The G-3 Advisor noted further that the organization of Solid Anchor was, in effect, a coalition of allied military units operating semi-autonomously:

The SEALs and Sea Wolves in particular tended to operate with an unwarranted spirit of independence. The VNN was in a class by itself, exhibiting a blatant disregard for practically everything except personal comfort and safety. The VNN's lack of discipline was manifested most frequently in failure to carry out operational orders and haphazard firing into friendly unit AOs.³²

*Named for its inventor, Dr. Amirikan. An improvement over the World War II pontoon barge, it was used lashed together in groups that became helipads, living facilities, and logistical bases.



Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC

U.S. Marine Maj William H. Dabney is shown at Dong Ha talking on a field telephone before the beginning of Operation Lam Son 719 into Laos.

Relations between the U.S. and Vietnamese Navies were tense, and because of weak leadership at all levels, "VNN forces never functioned effectively."³³ In a message to the Commander of Solid Anchor, the commander of Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 complained of the conduct of the irregular troops. Not only had they been caught stealing the Seabees clothes, breaking into their mess lines, and walking into the mechanic shops with armed hand grenades, the Vietnamese had beaten up three Seabees.³⁴

To begin to shore up the many problems at Solid Anchor, in October, Admiral King, "with the agreement of Rear Admiral Tran Van Chon, the VNN CNO, sent Captain Eugene I. Finke, USN, the Senior Naval Advisor to the VNN, on temporary duty to command CTG 116.1 at Solid Anchor." Captain Finke used his

*Vice Admiral Jerome H. King, Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, later noted that "on 9 December, because of insubordinate conduct, the VNN EOD personnel departed Solid Anchor for Saigon on orders of the VNN Chief of Naval Operations to face disciplinary charges." King Comments.

extensive experience in dealing with the Vietnamese to begin to restore order and discipline while increasing the scope of combat operations. In late November Captain Finke was recalled to Saigon to resume his primary duties as Senior Naval Advisor. Admiral King replaced Captain Finke with the SMA, Colonel Tief, "on the basis of his experience in ground and amphibious warfare, with the mission of intensifying offensive operations against the VC in the Solid Anchor AO."³⁵

When Colonel Tief assumed command, he discovered that mending Solid Anchor's many problems would not be a simple task. "The area resembled a zoo," recalled Colonel Tief. "Nobody was truly in charge. Internal wrangling was rife."³⁶ The 6th VNMC battalion commander, for example, encamped across the river from Solid Anchor, refusing to allow his troops onto the base or to allow Vietnamese from other units into his camp. Captain Marshall N. Carter, the MAU assistant G-3 Advisor, was also critical of the apparent lack of military discipline within TG 116.1:

The uniform of the day was anything the individual wanted to wear. The NCO watch standers appeared in sandals, peace symbols, headbands, and cutoff dungarees or civilian trousers. This atmosphere existed for several days and then ceased. The problem of low level leadership continued throughout the SMA's tour and without his very strong leadership at all levels the situation would have been tragic.³⁷

Aside from the personnel and morale problems which lingered, there were operational concerns which posed an even more direct threat to the security of the base. The infantry, artillery, naval, and air units operating in the Solid Anchor AO needed fire support coordination "of the most professional sort." The lowest level where this coordination could be provided was by the commander of Solid Anchor, CTG 116.1, but effective coordination had been hindered by lack of experienced people to organize and man a naval operations center (NOC), differences in operating procedures of units working in the AO, and by the "reluctance on the part of some units to have their activities coordinated." To begin correcting the deficiencies the SMA brought with him a captain from the MAU to be the ground operations officer and added another advisor to the 7th VNMC Battalion,* which had replaced the 6th in November, because most of the ground operations were of company size.³⁸

*Colonel Tief observed later that the replacement of the 6th VNMC Battalion with the 7th was a good move because the "battalion commander was aggressive and experienced." Tief comments.

Recognizing the chaotic state of the Solid Anchor command, Colonel Tief reorganized the staff, setting up an N-1, N-2, N-3, N-4—personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics sections—and established a base defense officer and a base commander. The N-2, N-3, and base defense officers were Marines from NavForV. Under N-3, infantry patrols were now coordinated by a ground operations officer from the MAU and surface operations by a Navy officer. According to Captain Carter, who was made ground operations officer, “the main purpose of consolidation of the staff was to get people into responsible positions and knock off all the bullshit that had been going on for months where no one would accept responsibility for actions and operations poorly run and poorly coordinated.”*³⁹

Under Colonel Tief, operational planning became “quite detailed” and coordination “quite complex.” The assets and capabilities of all the units, American and Vietnamese, were carefully integrated to make the Solid Anchor command more tactically effective. A typical battalion operation might employ Army and Navy aircraft, American and Vietnamese Navy river craft, naval gunfire ships, and aerial observers, as well as the 7th VNMC Battalion. “The operational level was purposely kept high to keep the enemy confused,” said Captain Carter. “Large troop movements were made into the Dam Sol Secret Zone,” which had not been entered previously by allied forces.⁴⁰ Colonel Tief later recalled the efforts of the organizational and operational initiatives:

The U.S. advisors began to function in high gear, with MAU officers setting the example. The advisory team blossomed. The Sea Wolves detachment (U.S. Navy helicopters) was outstanding. They performed way beyond expectations, flying all missions and wreaking havoc with the VC throughout the AO . . . areas that had not been entered in years by RVN were attacked. The Nam Can area became a poor refuge for the VC. Nam Can village grew to 2 times its earlier size. Charcoal and shrimp, the major products of the area, began moving to the city market north of the AO . . . in short, the Solid Anchor situation got cleared up. The base finally began to serve the purpose for which it had been built.⁴¹

When he took command of Solid Anchor in December, Colonel Tief requested an additional VNMC

*Years later Carter said that MAU personnel “were just getting things sorted out when Tief was relieved for political reasons.” Carter comments.

battalion* to allow operations by CTG 116.1 at some distance from Solid Anchor without weakening the base defense. The Vietnamese JGS denied his request and at the same time indicated “impatience” with Major General Nghi, commanding general of the 21st ARVN Division, for his “slowness in replacing the Marines with forces from his own assets—delaying the Marines’ return to the JGS reserve role.” By the end of January 1971, a 250-man ARVN battalion, “battle-weary from fighting in the U Minh Forest,” was sent to Nam Can to replace the 7th VNMC Battalion.⁴²

Rear Admiral Matthews and Major General Nghi worked out “a curious command relationship agreement in which CTG 116.1 had operational control of the battalion, but Major General Nghi had ‘supervision.’ In other words, the battalion commander would have a clearly defined channel of appeal if he didn’t like the orders issued to him by CTG 116.1.” Although the ARVN battalion performed well in its first two operations under the SMA’s control,** Colonel Tief “felt this to be an untenable command situation, stating so verbally and by message to ComNavForV.” While the controversy boiled, the Chief of Staff, 21st ARVN Division, “logged a false accusation of disrespect against the SMA, which was passed” through DepComUSMACV to ComNavForV “along with a request for the SMA’s relief as CTG 116.1. ComNavForV acquiesced.”⁴³

Admiral King later said that his deputy, Rear Admiral Matthews, “attempted to resolve the personal and command relationship problems between the CG, 21st ARVN Division, and Colonel Tief, but both officers had taken positions from which they could not retreat.” Admiral King reasoned that “since the survival of Solid Anchor depended upon support from the 21st ARVN Division,” the “political” impasse had to be ended. Noting that Colonel Tief had “accomplished his basic mission of strengthening the defensive posture and intensifying offensive activities at Solid Anchor,” Admiral King relieved him with Cap-

*Command relations at Solid Anchor were complex and created continuous problems during Colonel Tief’s brief assignment as CTG 116.1. When Colonel Tief assumed command, there were at least two additional oddities: a Marine was in command of a naval base, and for the first time a VNMC unit was under operational control of a VNMC advisor.

**Colonel Tief reported that the “ARVN battalion commander and his U.S. Army advisor both acknowledged that there was no difficulty in their operating under CTG 116.1 operational control. The political problem was originated and fueled at the 21st ARVN Division CP.” Tief Comments.



Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC

A panoramic view of the Cau Mau Peninsula Solid Anchor Project. Solid Anchor was an Advanced Naval Tactical Base to support river patrol activities in An Xuyen Province in South Vietnam, with Col Francis W. Tief, the Senior Marine Advisor, in command.

tain Robert E. Spruit, USN, on 25 January 1971. Tief immediately returned to his duties as Senior Marine Advisor. Solid Anchor, though only partially complete, was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy on 1 April 1971.⁴⁴

*Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire
Liaison Company*

When U.S. Army units followed the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade into Vietnam in 1965, a naval gunfire support requirement ensued.* In response, Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO was activated in Hawaii on 20 May 1965 and flown to Saigon, reporting in-country on 29 May "with two shore fire control par-

*The primary mission of ANGLICO is to support a U.S. Army or allied division, or elements thereof, by providing the control and liaison agencies associated with the ground elements of the landing force in the amphibious assault, or in other type operations where support is provided by naval gunfire and/or naval air. ". . . Control and liaison teams are further assigned to lower echelons . . . to provide the necessary personnel and communications . . . to request, direct, and control the support. . . . The teams are qualified to enter combat by means of parachute." FMF Manual 7-2.

ties (each comprised of a liaison team and a spot team), an additional naval gunfire spot team, two radar beacon teams (shipping navigational aids), and ancillary support personnel." Initially comprised of 12 officers and 98 enlisted Marines, Sub-Unit One reached an operational peak in 1968 when it had teams deployed at 27 locations in Vietnam, including a 118-man air/naval gunfire platoon supporting the ROK Brigade.⁴⁵

In January 1970, the 21 Marine and 9 Navy officers, and the 192 enlisted Marines and 2 Navy enlisted men of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Simpson's Sub-Unit One were deployed in 24 locations from northern I Corps to the Ca Mau peninsula. Among the units supported by naval gunfire liaison and spot teams were the 1st ARVN Division forward CP at Dong Ha; the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division (Mech), U.S. Army, in Quang Tri; XXIV Corps in Phu Bai; the 2d ROKMC Brigade, in Hoi An; the Naval Advisory Group in the Rung Sat Special Zone; the 1st Australian Task Force in Nui Dat; and the 21st ARVN Division in Ca Mau.⁴⁶

Since most of the fighting in Vietnam was concentrated around the heavily populated coastal regions, naval gunfire had proven a ready and flexible means of support. Mobility and speed of naval ships allowed for rapid massing of fire at any point or area target, provided that sufficient naval gunfire ships were patrolling Vietnam's coastline. Naval gunfire was available around the clock and, unlike air support, was relatively unaffected by inclement weather. In addition, it offered a wide selection of firepower, from the 81mm mortars of river patrol boats to the 16-inch rifles of the USS *New Jersey*. The 5-inch multiple rocket launchers of inshore fire support ships were also used a great deal in Vietnam, particularly in MR 1 where a shallow beach gradient kept deeper draft ships out of bombardment range. The mainstay of naval gunfire support throughout the war, however, was the 5-inch gun of American destroyers, which alternated between fire support and carrier escort duty.

Seventh Fleet, which controlled the naval gunfire ships, was a separate command from MACV, hence, a "unique" procedure for fire support evolved. Within the Seventh Fleet's cruiser-destroyer group, a designated task unit provided MACV with fire support ships. Composition of the unit varied as ships came from and went to other operational or repair and replenishment commitments. But the command element—called gunline commander—remained relatively constant. This was usually a destroyer squadron or division commander.

Based on priorities set by MACV for each of the four military regions, the gunline commander published periodic ship availability messages. These messages reflected ship assignments or changes to the gunfire support unit, as well as when and where naval gunfire was to be employed. After receipt of the message, and at least 48 hours before the scheduled arrival of the support ship, the senior U.S. military commander, advised by the naval gunfire liaison officer in the MR being supported, assigned inbound ships to specific fire support areas and furnished spotter identification and radio frequencies.

The naval gunfire liaison officer/spotter supporting the designated ground combat unit briefed the ship as it reported on station. The report included friendly positions and scheme of maneuver, general enemy situation, anticipated gun employment, trajectory, and friendly aircraft coordination measures, rules of engagement, navigational aids, and communications. From then on a triangular relationship was maintained among the ship, spotter, and the liaison team collo-

cated with the supported unit's fire support coordination center.⁴⁷

To improve the quality of naval gunfire support provided through this complex arrangement, two successive gunline commanders came ashore in February 1970 for extensive briefings from Sub-Unit One representatives. In addition, the weapons officer from CTG 70.8, which was then providing naval gunfire, visited with the ANGLICO staff in Da Nang, and the TG's "representative in conventional ordnance fire control" traveled throughout "a good portion of Vietnam attempting to trouble-shoot for the ships on the gunline."⁴⁸ Despite these liaison visits, however, effective fire support was not always provided. During March 1970, for example, Colonel Simpson reported that the problems were caused "as a result of frequent changes in gunline commanders, approximately every three weeks." Noting that the gunline commander has the prerogative to move ships into any position he chooses to provide support, Colonel Simpson observed that since the gunline commander is not familiar with the ground tactical situation, he should "logically rely upon the Corps NGLO's [naval gunfire liaison officer] request for support to base his decision." To correct the problem, Colonel Simpson recommended that the tours of gunline commanders at a station be increased to a minimum of three months.⁴⁹

Aside from coordination difficulties with the Navy and the in-bore explosion problems caused by some defective 5"/54 ammunition, Sub-Unit One—in conjunction with supporting ships—provided generally reliable support throughout the four corps areas from January 1970 to June 1971. In July, for example, ANGLICO naval gunfire spot teams controlled the firing of 19,102 rounds during 3,356 missions, accounting for 5 confirmed enemy dead, 23 estimated dead, and 70 secondary explosions. An average of four destroyers and one cruiser were on station most of the month. ANGLICO forward air controllers controlled 66 close air support missions, delivering 13,000 pounds of ordnance, which resulted in eight enemy confirmed dead, four estimated dead, and caused one secondary explosion.

Support provided by the air/naval gunfire platoon which was assigned to the ROKMC brigade in Hoi An included the full breadth of ANGLICO capabilities. Besides planning, coordinating, and controlling naval gunfire and close air support, the platoon coordinated all forms of helicopter support—medevac, assault lift, resupply, control of armed helicopters, and the complete range of helicopter support team operations.

Each battalion tactical air control party (TACP) maintained two-man landing zone control teams with each of the ROKMC rifle companies, affording them the only direct English-speaking link with American combat and combat service support. During July the TACP with the brigade controlled 59 medevacs and over 2,700 resupply missions, delivering over 3,000,000 pounds of supplies.⁵⁰

ANGLICO Marines earned the praise of the 2nd ROKMC Brigade in August 1970. During Operations Golden Dragon 6-2 and 6-3, which were initiated by the 2nd and 3rd ROKMC Battalions and accounted for 38 VC/NVA killed, Marine TACPs controlled heavy air support for Korean maneuver units. In addition, one ANGLICO Marine performed heroically when a Huey gunship providing suppressive fire was shot down during a medevac.

Lance Corporal K. K. Rabidou distinguished himself by sprinting to the downed aircraft through a heavily boobytrapped area while ignoring small arms fire. At the site of the crash he pulled three of the crewmen's bodies out of the burning helicopter in spite of rockets and ammunition being in danger of "cooking off." Unfortunately, the crewmen were dead." Rabidou received the Bronze Star Medal for his actions.⁵¹

With the takeover of III MAF's command responsibilities in I Corps by XXIV Corps in March 1970, Sub-Unit One's NGLO, located with XXIV Corps in Phu Bai assumed responsibility for naval gunfire support for all of I Corps, which had previously been coordinated by the III MAF NGLO. The III MAF/I Corps NGLO billet was then eliminated following the XXIV Corps-III MAF command shifts, and from then on Sub-Unit One controlled all naval gunfire support in Vietnam.

June 1971 saw the rotation of about a quarter of Sub-Unit One personnel. This necessitated an increase in training and, with the reduction of liaison teams supporting allied units throughout the four military regions, caused a temporary 10 percent shortage of enlisted personnel. Even with this limitation, Sub-Unit One was able to meet its requirements.

Throughout 1970, Sub-Unit One had coordinated missions for allied units which accounted for over 325 confirmed VC/NVA killed while estimating an additional 400 killed. As combat generally declined in 1971 with the gradual redeployment of American forces, so did the activity of ANGLICO units progressively decline. Air/naval gunfire missions fell in May to 577,

accounting for 15 enemy killed, and in June to 576, resulting in only two enemy killed. Sub-Unit One deployed 20 Marine officers and 147 enlisted men, and 8 naval officers and 2 enlisted men at 14 locations in the four corps areas at the end of June. When Lieutenant Colonel D'Wayne Gray* relieved Lieutenant Colonel Eugene E. Shoultz in July 1971, following the redeployment of 3d MAB, the last Fleet Marine Force element in South Vietnam was Sub-Unit One.⁵²

The Special Landing Force

The last Special Landing Force operation of the war was Defiant Stand, a combined 2d ROKMC Brigade and 26th Marines amphibious operation on Barrier Island, 20 miles south of Da Nang, from 7-19 September 1969. With the redeployment of the 3d Marine Division in the fall of 1969, areas of operation of remaining allied units in I Corps were adjusted, necessitating that all three battalions of the 26th Marines, which had formerly rotated SLF duties, operate ashore in the Da Nang TAOR until the regiment redeployed in Keystone Blue Jay. As a consequence the 3d Marine Division, now headquartered on Okinawa, provided the battalion landing teams for the SLF which had returned to the mission of Pacific Command reserve.⁵³

During 1970 and 1971 the 3d Marine Division provided two SLFs for the two amphibious ready groups (ARGs) which constituted the Pacific Command reserve. The 9th Marines rotated its battalions to SLF duty, from January 1970 to June 1971, with one BLT afloat at a time. Embarking from Okinawa and training ashore, primarily in the Philippines, the SLFs spent an average of two days a month off the coast of Vietnam, usually in the South China Sea or the Gulf of Tonkin. ARG/SLF readiness normally required the first BLT to be able to go ashore in Vietnam within 120 hours. The second BLT, which was usually not afloat, would take much longer. But even when ARG/SLF Bravo** stood down from January-May 1971 so that ARG Bravo shipping could be used to redeploy units in Vietnam, CinCPacFlt said that SLF Bravo "could be landed in Vietnam, by ARG Alfa, 168 hours after its own SLF was landed," should the need arise.⁵⁴

*Lieutenant General Gray in 1984 was Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps.

**The 4th Marines provided a second BLT during the last 18 months of large-scale operations in Vietnam. While 4th Marines BLTs occasionally passed through Vietnam waters, they spent much time ashore in Okinawa and were never committed to support operations from January 1970 to June 1971.

The 9th Marines rotated different battalions to SLF duty about every three months in 1970-1971. Once deployed from Okinawa, the monthly cycle of the ARG/SLF usually included taking ready station in Vietnam's coastal waters for two or more days, either preceded or followed by an amphibious landing or an administrative unloading in the Philippines and about a week of training ashore. On 5 August 1970, for example, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H. Polakoff's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines embarked from White Beach, Okinawa as the ground element of Colonel William F. Saunders, Jr.'s, ARG/SLF Alpha. Along with Lieutenant Colonel Robert G. Miller's Medium Helicopter Squadron (HMM) 164 (Rein) on board ARG shipping, the SLF took station off the coast of Vietnam from 10-11 August. The ARG then steamed to the Philippines where the 2d Battalion offloaded for training at the SLF Camp from mid- to late August, reembarking on 30 August. ARG/SLF monthly cycles were occasionally altered with visits to other ports.⁵⁵

From January to March 1971, the SLF, which had been redesignated to the 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) in late 1970, provided limited support for two operations in Vietnam, which differed from its normal monthly posting in Vietnam's coastal waters. The flagship of ARG Alpha (TG 76.4) USS *Iwo Jima* (LPH 2) and the USS *Cleveland* (LPD 7) lent minor helicopter and communications assistance to the ARVN in Operation Cuu Long 44/02 in MR 4 during mid-January. Marine Helicopters of Lieutenant Colonel Herbert M. Herther's HMM-165, operating from the *Iwo Jima*, flew a few logistical missions "between the *Iwo Jima* and the *Cleveland*, or between the ships and Phu Quoc Island," which is in the Gulf of Thailand just off the coast of Cambodia. No SLF ground forces participated in the operation, and no Marine casualties were sustained.⁵⁶

The 31st MAU also participated in Operation Lam Son 719* in February and March 1971, feinting an amphibious raid in the vicinity of the NVA airfield at Vinh, located along the coast of North Vietnam, in "order to influence a change in the disposition of enemy forces operating in Southern NVN [North Vietnam]." The 31st MAU was ordered to begin an emergency backload on 1 February on board ARG Alpha shipping, the full nature of the alert not yet having been received. Colonel Lawrence A. Marousek, the MAU commander, conferred with Rear Admiral Walter D. Gaddis, CTF-76, on board the USS *Paul Revere*

(APA 248) on 6 February regarding the SLF's role in Lam Son 719 and that same day published an operation order with the following mission statement:

... conduct raid against air facilities at Vinh airfield
 ... alternate mission is to conduct raid against Port of Quang Khe to destroy one or more of the following: ferry ... SW Radar Site ... Cuu Dinh POL storage and terminal facilities south ... and to interdict lines of communication.

The concept of operations of the order specified that the "length of time ashore [would be] less than 24 hours" and restricted to daylight hours. Lieutenant Colonel Francis X. Frey, commanding the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, and Lieutenant Colonel Herther, not knowing until long after embarkation that the raid would be a feint, extended rotation tour dates* of their Marines until special operations in conjunction with Lam Son 719 were complete.⁵⁷

Daily rehearsals were conducted from a holding area in the Gulf of Tonkin from 17 February to 6 March. The rehearsals included extensive communications exercises for the MAU and ARG staffs and mock assault lifts, without boarding helicopter teams, from the *Iwo Jima* and *Cleveland*. On 4 March, Admiral Bernard A. Clarey (CinCPacFlt), Vice Admiral Maurice F. Weisner (ComSeventhFlt) and Rear Admiral Gaddis (CTF-76) received a briefing and observed rehearsals and then, satisfied, departed. The ARG Alpha/31st MAU role in Lam Son 719 was terminated on 7 March when ARG Alpha steamed for Okinawa where 1st Battalion, 9th Marines would replace the 3d Battalion.⁵⁸

Following the feint at Vinh during Lam Son 719, the 31st MAU returned to its usual monthly cycle from March through June when the 3d MAB finally redeployed. Only from mid- to late May was the cycle appreciably altered when at the request of CinCPacFlt the MAU was placed on 72-hour response time rather than 120. This temporary adjustment resulted from FMFPac's desire to have the SLF "backstop" 3d MAB while it was standing down. As a prelude to CinCPacFlt's decision, Major General Arthur H. Adams, Deputy Commanding General, FMFPac, advised Lieutenant General William K. Jones, Commanding General, FMFPac, on 23 April that 3d MAB was concerned about its increasing vulnerability to enemy attack from 8 May onward as principal MAB combat units (1st Marines, VMA-311, VMA(AW)-225) stood down for increment VII redeployment. Adams said

*In 1970-1971 the standard overseas tours for Fleet Marine Force Marines was 12 months.

*For details on Lam Son 719 see Chapter 11.

that the MAB's ability to defend itself was much reduced during the final redeployment period. Accordingly, Lieutenant General Jones informed Lieutenant General Robertson, Commanding General, III MAF, that he was "concerned about the possibility of VC/NVA initiated actions directed at inflicting a significant loss upon 3d MAB during the critical embarkation period of Increment VII." Jones recommended that at the 26-30 April Seventh Fleet Conference, plans be made to ensure that American forces were in the "best possible posture" to respond quickly and effectively to needs in Vietnam.⁵⁹

Admiral Clarey requested that ARG Alpha/31st MAU assume a 72-hour reaction time to MR 1 beginning 12 May, subject to continuing evaluation of risks in I Corps as 3d MAB redeployed and the Army's 196th Brigade assumed responsibility for security of the entire Da Nang TAOR. Operating under this new requirement, the 31st MAU commanded by Colonel Robert R. Dickey III, including the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fitz W. M. Woodrow, Jr., and Lieutenant Colonel Alvah J. Kettering's HMM-164, reloaded from the Zambales Training Area in the Philippines and sailed for RVN waters on board ships of ARG Alpha on 19 May.⁶⁰ The 31st MAU took station in Vietnam's coastal waters on 21 May and was then directed to conduct "a communications exercise, and flight operations using maximum helicopters available" to accentuate the MAU presence in Vietnam waters during what was considered a critical period. Concurrent with 31st MAU's operations off the coast, Colonel Dickey and Captain J. O'Neil, CTG 76.4, flew from the flagship, USS *New Orleans* (LPH 11), to make a liaison visit with Major General Armstrong, Commanding General, 3d MAB, in Da Nang. Following this visit and the completion of amphibious exercises at sea, the ARG steamed for Taiwan.⁶¹

From 1-30 June 1971, the 72-hour response time for the SLF was again extended to the normal 120 hours as the 3d MAB population ashore dwindled and the 196th Brigade became progressively more familiar with defense plans for the Da Nang TAOR.⁶² The SLF played an important role, particularly during March-June 1971, although it was never committed ashore. General Armstrong later noted:

. . . I must say this: It was always a comfort to Com-USMACV, particularly during the withdrawal phase. I remember an awful lot of message traffic in which the commander of MACV was reluctant to let the SLF get very far away when people were closing down along the beach. He

wanted . . . the flexibility where he could run the SLF up and down the coast and quickly put it where it could be used. I think that's the best argument you could make for it.⁶³

Marines on the MACV Staff

The Marine Corps was well represented among the principal staff positions in MACV during 1970-1971. Brigadier General William F. Doehler, Deputy J-3, MACV, headed the list of senior Marine officers in key staff billets in late 1970 and early 1971. Other officers among the 245 Marines in MACV* in January 1971 were Colonel Jack W. Dindinger, Director, Combined Intelligence Center, J-2; Colonel Robert R. Baker, Chief, Special Operations Division; Colonel David A. Clement, Chief, Research and Analysis Division; Colonel James P. Kelly, Chief Plans and Requirements Division, J-4; Colonel Joseph Koler, Jr., Chief, U.S. and SEATO Division, J-4; Colonel Verle E. Ludwig, Deputy Information Officer; Colonel Anthony Walker, Chief of the Command Center; and Colonel Francis W. Tief, Senior Marine Advisor, Navy Advisory Group.⁶⁴

The size of Marine representation, officers and enlisted men, on the MACV staff varied during the course of the war. In March 1966, a year after the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade landed at Da Nang, 41 officers and 45 enlisted Marines served on the staff. A year later the Marine Corps had 82 officers and 199 enlisted Marines assigned. In January 1969 total Marine strength on the MACV staff had fallen to 157, then jumped to 278 the next year. From that point forward, during the final 18 months of III MAF redeployment, Marine representation generally declined, leaving 186 Marine officers and enlisted men by 30 June 1971.⁶⁵

Marine officers on the MACV staff characterized interservice relationships as very professional during this period and, generally, devoid of service parochialism for a number of reasons. "We all got along very well,"

*Marines in MACV during this period were divided into MACV staff and MACV field positions, the great majority of which were in the staff category. One unique field group, however, was the Republic of Korea Liaison Team under Marine Major Russell Lloyd, Jr., consisting of three officers and 10 enlisted Marines. Formerly attached to the Force Logistic Command, the team was transferred from III MAF to MACV in April 1971. The team coordinated the shifting of the responsibility for logistic support of the Korean Marines from the III MAF FLC to the U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang. According to Major Lloyd, his team "supported 7,200 ROK Marines and ROK Army personnel collocated with the [Korean Marine] Brigade." LtCol Russell Lloyd, Jr., Comments on draft ms, n.d. [ca. Jul86] (Vietnam Comment File).

recalled Colonel Ludwig, "General Abrams was outstanding at getting good cooperative work from everybody." In addition, the demanding roles of officers in principal staff positions lessened the tendency toward parochialism among Marine officers and the officers of the other Services. Colonel Ludwig said that staff officers "worked such long hours" that there was "little time for socializing." The fact that "Marines were parceled all over town" in and around Saigon also "controlled relationships." While many senior staff officers lived in a trailer camp near MACV Headquarters, Ludwig lived in a "villa area out in Saigon" so that the public information officer could hold once a month "off the record meetings in the villa" with the press.⁶⁶

The work of Marine officers in MACV was, in some cases, distinctly different from previous staff experiences. Colonel Dindinger directed the Combined Intelligence Center (CICV) along with his Vietnamese counterpart, Lieutenant Colonel Le Nuygen Binh, from June 1970 to June 1971. Working under the Director of Intelligence Production, J-2, MACV, Colonel Charles E. Wilson, U.S. Army, Dindinger and Binh coordinated the efforts of a staff of 500, "of which 300 were U.S. and 200 ARVN at the start of the period, while as a function of Vietnamization this ratio was reversed by the end of the period." Dindinger described the function of CICV as the "provision of finished intelligence to ComUSMACV, the MACV staff and subordinate U.S., ROK, Australian and New Zealand field forces." Eight subordinate branches were tasked functionally to process information: Administration, Supply, Order of Battle, Area Analysis, Pattern Analysis, Imagery Interpretation, Captured Material Exploitation, and Intelligence Data Bank (IBM 360). Dindinger later explained the organization:

Each of these branches contained a U.S. and an ARVN component that physically worked side by side, and each had a U.S. and RVN branch head. This arrangement which was in effect when I arrived, was continued during my tour, and tended to be synergistic as to results.

CICV products generally fell into two forms, "responses to specific requests or regular periodic reports." Pattern Analyses requested from commands in all four Corps areas were among the common specific requests, while enemy base area studies were representative of the regular periodic reports. Among the one-time CICV efforts during 1970-1971 were the temporary assignment of a lieutenant colonel of CICV



Courtesy of Col John G. Miller, USMC
U.S. Marine Maj Gene A. Adams, Jr., during ebb tide, looks unhappily across desolate mud flats and the Cua Lon River at the Navy Solid Anchor facility.

to the military component of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Talks "to provide intelligence input" and the exploitation of previously unexamined Chinese Communist "antiaircraft material from Cambodia after friendly access to that country had been gained."⁶⁷

Colonel Richard H. Rainforth filled the unique billets of liaison officer to MACV and, separately, to Seventh Air Force through August 1970. As liaison for MACV, Rainforth and his successors—Colonel Lewis C. Street III until 4 October 1970, then Colonel Stephen G. Warren until III MAF redeployed in April 1971—provided personnel support for transient Marines passing through Saigon and protocol for all visitors with Marine Corps interest. Technical representatives from defense contractors and civilian attorneys representing Marines in Vietnam were among those in the latter category. Rainforth also provided Marine Corps representation on various boards, councils, and committees, whose interests ranged from matters dealing with the Vietnam regional exchange to auditing commercial entertainment to determine "suitability, classification, and how much they should be paid." As liaison to Seventh Air Force, Rainforth and his successors were III MAF and 1st MAW's point men on all aviation matters. They were, for example, the intermediaries on flight safety investigations of joint concern and on the crucial subject of "single management," they were readily available to present the Marine Corps view when issues arose.

Rainforth said that his job was simplified tremendously by the other Marine officers, especially the lieutenant colonels, on the MACV staff. "These people were terrific," said Rainforth. "They would call me every time there was a ripple, trying to keep it from becoming a wave . . . and I'd journey up to Da Nang . . . to carry messages back and forth and see what the feeling was up there." Colonel Rainforth also lauded the Marines in Saigon for the quality of their joint service, saying, "they're never going to knock [the Marine Corp's] joint representation."⁶⁸

Senior Marine officers on the MACV staff echoed Rainforth's view of the performance of Marines and of the officers of other services with MACV. "The staff worked well," recalled Ludwig. "I shared the general impression that General Abrams was an amazing and phenomenal individual, and relationships were all very professional."⁶⁹ Colonel Dindinger later voiced the same opinion:

My strongest remaining impression is that of the high degree of cooperation and harmony which was maintained. CICV had U.S. Marines, soldiers, sailors and airmen, as well as Vietnamese soldiers and civilians, working together on difficult problems with short deadlines, and the level of acrimony and friction was consistently minimal.⁷⁰

Embassy Marines

Company E, Marine Security Guard (MSG) Battalion, fielded an average of five officers and 145 enlisted Marines during the first half of 1970 to protect the American Embassy in Saigon. In contrast, Company C, which was headquartered in Manila, Republic of the Philippines, deployed about 120 Marines in 14 locations throughout Southeast Asia, including a detachment of five Marines in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Activated on 1 February 1969, Company E was commanded from January to November 1970 by Captain Herbert M. Steigelman, Jr.⁷¹

Primary responsibilities of Company E were to safeguard classified material and protect American personnel and property at the Embassy. To accomplish this mission the company was organized into three elements: a headquarters section of two officers and 10 enlisted Marines; an interior guard force of two officers and 90 enlisted Marines; and an exterior guard force of one officer and 46 enlisted Marines.

Exterior security would normally be the responsibility of the host country. Company E was the first Marine Security Guard unit tasked to provide external security—essentially a tactical mission in Saigon—to an American Embassy. Partially as a result of the at-

tack on the American Embassy during Tet 1968, a reinforced rifle platoon was formed to control access into the compound and provide a reaction force in the event of another attack. Unlike the exterior guard force, the two platoons assigned to interior guard duty were trained Marine security guards. In addition, a detachment of seven Marines was selected as the Ambassador's Personal Security Unit (PSU). The PSU provided compound security and conducted route reconnaissance when the Ambassador left the compound. All posts, vehicles, and buildings in the compound were connected by a sophisticated communications system, known as the "Dragon Net," which was manned by a five-man detachment.⁷²

Dignitaries and senior ranking officers were provided security by Company E Marines during official visits to the American Embassy. From 1-2 January 1970, Vice President Spiro T. Agnew met with Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and other officials during a brief stay in Vietnam. General Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Joseph W. Daily, toured Company E's area on 9 January. In July, Secretary of State William Rogers stayed with the Ambassador for three days, and in August, Vice President Agnew returned again for another two days of meetings with Ambassador Bunker.⁷³

During 1971 the average monthly strength of Company E was five officers and 150 enlisted Marines, representing an increase of about 10 men from 1970. The personnel change was brought about by added security responsibilities. In May 1971 five Marines were sent to Da Nang on temporary additional duty to establish external security functions for the American consulate there. An additional five Marines reinforced the security element in June when the Marine Security Guard Detachment at the American consulate was formally activated. The Da Nang detachment was comprised of one NCO and nine watchstanders who were under the operational control of the consulate general and the administrative control of Company E.⁷⁴

Embassy Marines were involved in civic action programs, as virtually all other Marine units in Vietnam. Company E held a party on 24 December 1970 for the Vietnamese children of the Go Van Number II Orphanage. The children were fed at the Marshall Hall enlisted quarters and later at Marine House Number Two were presented with gifts by Santa Claus. The gifts were donated by personnel of USAID, the Embassy,

and JUSPAO. Four months later, Company E assumed sponsorship of My Hoa Orphanage. On Easter Sunday 1971, Embassy Marines visited the children of the orphanage, bringing gifts of food, clothing, and toys which had been shipped by the American Legion auxiliaries of Punta Gorda and Naples, Florida, and by the citizens and merchants of Immokalee, Florida through the efforts of the mother of Company E's Gunnery Sergeant Robert M. Jenkins.⁷⁵

Although Marines were screened closely for security guard duty, Company E, like all other sizeable Marine commands in Vietnam, had its share of discipline and drug problems. From January to June 1971, Captain William E. Keller, Jr., who took command in November 1970, conducted company-level nonjudicial punishment on 27 Marines, while two more Marines were dealt with at battalion level. Five of the Marines disciplined were ultimately removed from duty when found unsuitable for retention in the Marine Security Guard program. An additional five Marines during the same period were recommended for discharge by reason of unfitness for possession of dangerous drugs.*

On 29 April 1971 at the American Embassy Compound, the Chief of Missions, Saigon, Vietnam, the Honorable Ellsworth Bunker, presented the Meritorious Unit Commendation to Company E "for meritorious service as the immediate defense and security force for the U.S. Mission, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam, from 1 February 1969 to 31 December 1970." Two months after the Ambassador presented the award, Company E joined Sub-Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, and the Marine Advisory Unit as the only U.S. Marine commands remaining in Vietnam. The MSG detachment in Saigon, which would be transferred on 30 June 1974 to Company C, headquartered in Hong Kong, would ultimately be the last American unit evacuated from South Vietnam on 30 April 1975, nearly four years after the Marine Corps tactical role ended in that country.⁷⁶

Conclusion

With President Nixon's commitment to the American public to reduce troop levels in Vietnam, the Marine presence decreased in strength from some 55,000

*In June 1971, the commander of Naval Forces Vietnam established a program requiring that all personnel, regardless of rank, departing Vietnam on permanent change of station orders undergo urinalysis examination for detection of opium or derivatives. Those identified as users were treated at the Detoxification Center, Nha Be and were then evacuated to U.S. Naval Hospital, San Diego.

to a mere few hundred between January 1970 and June 1971.

Throughout the redeployment cycle, two significant and fundamental features of the large-scale Marine presence in Vietnam remained constant: the essential air-ground character of Marine units and the focus on small-unit counter guerrilla tactics. A Marine air-ground team existed until the final redeployment of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade in June 1971. Building on the tactical successes of 1968-1969, which had left the enemy battered and exhausted, III MAF, now concentrated in the Da Nang TAOR, stepped up its grassroots counter guerrilla campaign. The Marines expanded the Combined Action Platoon concept—incorporating Marine infantry companies—with the Combined Unit Pacification Program. To enhance mobility and to facilitate controlling areas of operation with fewer forces during the latter stages of redeployment, Marine infantry regiments requested and received helicopter detachments which were prepositioned with ground forces to expedite response time to enemy contacts or sightings.

The enemy was on the defensive during the last 18 months of Marine operations. Although the pacification goals established for 1970 by MACV were not entirely met, the steady decline in VC/NVA offensive activity from 1970-1971 and the return to terrorism and subversion, combined with the enemy's reliance on indirect fire and limited objective ground attacks, gave indication the enemy was either hurting or biding his time as redeployment proceeded.

Vietnamization was given increased emphasis during this period. General Abrams' "One War" strategy of 1968-1969, which emphasized that the small-unit counter guerrilla war and the big-unit war were mutually supporting and interdependent, was continued in 1970-1971 with the RVNAF assuming proportionately greater responsibilities as American forces redeployed. To better pursue the goals of Vietnamization, the size of the RVNAF increased progressively. By June 1971 the ARVN, VNN, VNMC, RFs and PFs of the RVNAF numbered 1,058,237.

General Lam, who commanded Vietnamese forces operating in the five provinces of I Corps, maneuvered 36 ARVN infantry battalions, 5 ARVN cavalry battalions, and 5 VNMC infantry battalions during the final months of Marine redeployment in 1971. In addition to the U.S. Army forces remaining in I Corps following the departure of the Marines, the Vietnamese regulars were augmented by the RFs and PFs,

which Marine CAP and CUPP units had tried to develop into independent and self-sufficient units. While General Lam's forces were much improved, they were still relatively limited in number to control effectively a military region that was 220 miles long and from 30-75 miles wide. In spite of that, the ARVN seemed to be holding their own as Marine redeployment moved forward, and the RFs and PFs began to conduct more offensive operations. There were still ominous indicators that, while the enemy appeared to be in decline, the GVN had demonstrated only limited capability of winning the war with far less American assistance.

As measures of RVNAF progress, the allied offensives into enemy sanctuaries within the boundaries of border nations during 1970-1971 achieved some success but also demonstrated Vietnamese weakness and left lingering doubts whether the escalating pace of redeployment was compatible with the progress of Vietnamization. The invasion of base areas in Cambodia in 1970 cost the enemy dearly in men, arms, ammunition, and supplies and rendered him temporarily incapable of mounting an offensive. The South Vietnamese move into Laos in February and March 1971 was less successful, even though MACV estimated that the NVA lost some 13,000 killed to the RVNAF's reported 1,500.

Evaluating the VNMC performance in Laos during Operation Lam Son 719, American Marine advisors observed that the companies and battalions fought well, but the brigades and the division exhibited many of the deficiencies apparent in other Vietnamese forces. Relative to the progress of Vietnamization, therefore, Lam Son 719 showed clearly that body counts and other statistical measurements of battlefield performance could not necessarily be translated into conclusions concerning operational success or failure. In the broader analysis Lam Son 719 unveiled the grave weakness that Marines had observed in the RVNAF in large-scale operations: the inadequacies in high level staff work; the questionable ability to maneuver effectively units of greater than battalion size; the reluctance of commanders to delegate authority to staffs; the absence of long-range logistical planning; the dis-

regard for the rudiments of supply discipline; and the inability to exercise communications security. Lam Son 719 also revealed the technological dependence—tactically and logistically—that the United States had bred into the RVNAF.

For the U.S. Marines this 18-month period was one of dramatic change, aside from the total draw-down of the remaining 55,000 Marines in III MAF. Lieutenant General John R. Chaisson, who was Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps in May 1971, remarked of this stage of the war, "We had adopted, from 1969 on, the idea that we were in the postwar period."⁷⁷ Following the redeployment of 1969, the focus in 1970-1971 for the Marine Corps, therefore, was finely balanced between maintaining tactical control of Marine areas of operation while encouraging Vietnamization, and conducting a systematic and orderly redeployment, a gargantuan task, especially for logisticians.

Acting on General Chapman's guidance to take every item worth five dollars or more with them, III MAF logistical planners meticulously inspected and inventoried material, dismantled installations, redistributed equipment, and transferred facilities and real estate from January 1970 to June 1971. The III MAF Redistribution Center, created in May 1970 to reduce excesses of equipment before the redeployment, coordinated the transfer of Marine Corps gear valued at \$50,409,000 and numbering over 325,000 separate items. Most of these went from Vietnam to Marine commands, ranging from the Western Pacific to the west coast of the United States. The 3d MAB ended ground combat operations, other than local security around installations, on 7 May 1971. Within three weeks Marine combat air operations ceased and by 4 June all Marine real estate had been turned over to either the ARVN or the U.S. Army. The last units of the 3d MAB left Vietnam by sea and air on 25 and 26 June. Only Sub-Unit One, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company; the Marine Advisory Unit; the Embassy Marines; a handful of technicians; and Marines on the MACV staff remained. For the Marine Corps, the war reverted to an advisory effort.

Notes

PART I A Contracting War

CHAPTER 1

THE WAR IN I CORPS, EARLY 1970

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from: MilHistBr, Office of the Secretariat, General Staff, HQ, USMACV, Command History 1969 and Command History 1970, hereafter cited as MACV ComdHist with appropriate year; Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, Operations of U.S. Marine Forces, Vietnam, January through December 1970, hereafter cited as FMFPac, MarOpsV with month and year; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Jun 70; and BGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1969-1972," in *The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1974), hereafter cited as Simmons, "Marine Operations."

III MAF in January 1970

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, p. 32; FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun 70; III MAF 4th Quarterly Written Summary, Combined Campaign Plan 1969, dtd 17Jan70, Encl 8, 1st MarDiv Admin Files; hereafter 4th Quarterly Plan, 1969; Combined Action Force ComdC, Jan70.
2. Maj Miles D. Waldron, USA, and Sp5 Richard W. Beavers, "The Critical Year 1968: The XXIV Corps Team" (U. S. Army Center of Military History), hereafter cited as XXIV Corps History 68, pp. 2-3, 14-15, 77-78; MACV ComdHist 1969, I, ch. V, p. 44; 4th Quarterly Plan 1969.
3. Simmons, "Marine Operations," 4th Quarterly Plan 1969.
4. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb70, p. 19; 4th Quarterly Plan 1969.
5. MACV ComdHist 1969, I, ch. IV, pp. 1-5; FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun70.
6. Biographical Files (RefSec, MCHC); LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., intvw, Jan73, (Oral HistColl, MCHC) hereafter Nickerson intvw.
7. MACV ComdHist 1970, III, p. E-3.
8. MACV ComdHist 1969, I, ch. III, p. 88; MACV ComdHist 1970, I, ch. V, pp. 89-90; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, p. 42.
9. MajGen Ormond R. Simpson, Debriefing at FMFPac, 15Dec69, Tape 4695, (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Simpson Debrief; refer also to LtGen H. Nickerson, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 10Mar70, Tape 4806 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
10. Simpson Debrief.

Allied and Enemy Strategy, 1969-1970

11. A convenient statement of the Marine concept of the relationship between pacification and large-unit operations can be found in FMFPac, MarOpsV, pp. 4-5.

12. MajGen Lloyd B. Ramsey, USA, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Ramsey Comments.
13. Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, intvw, 4Apr83, p. 8 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
14. MACV Comd Hist 1969, I, ch. II, pp. 3-7, 14-17; Kevin P. Buckley, "General Abrams Deserves a Better War," *The New York Times Magazine*, 5Oct69, pp. 34-5, 120-31, offers a summary of Abrams' strategy and a sketch of his personality.
15. MACV ComdHist 1969, I, ch. I, pp. 1-4.
16. Ibid, I, ch. III, pp. 47-48, 94-97; the command history quotes long passages from Resolutions 9 and 14.
17. All of these plans are summarized in Ibid. I, ch. II, pp. 1-8, and II, ch. VII, 1-2.

The III MAF/ICTZ Combined Plan for 1970

All material in this section is drawn from the III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 13Dec69, hereafter III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970. Footnote citations in this section refer to the plan and list only locations of the material within the plan.

18. Anx B, pp. 1-1, 1-2.
19. Anx L, pp. L-1-L-3.

Troop Redeployment—Keystone Bluejay

20. III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, pp. 2-3.
21. MACV ComdHist 1970, II, ch. VII, p. 2; HQMC Messages.
22. MACV ComdHist 1969, I, ch. IV, pp. 11-13, 20-24; Simmons, "Marine Operations," pp. 128, 132.
23. Simmons, "Marine Operations," p. 132; FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun70, p. 2.
24. Ibid., p. 133; MACV ComdHist 1969, I, ch. V, p. 177.
25. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, comments on draft ms, 8Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dulacki Comments.
26. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret), intvw 24Oct74, pp. 91-2, 97-8 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dulacki intvw.
27. Col Floyd Waldrop, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Waldrop Comments.
28. Dulacki Comments.
29. HQMC Messages; *New York Times*, 7Nov69, and 5 Dec69.
30. Dulacki intvw, pp. 96-98, HQMC Messages; Dulacki Comments.
31. MACV ComdHist 1970, I, ch. IV, p. 10.
32. HQMC Messages; LtGen William J. Van Ryzin, intvw, 20Apr71, p. 65 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
33. Dulacki Comments.
34. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 64-65. The 26th Marines was attached to the 1st Marine Division, but the tank, engineer, amphibian tractor, reconnaissance, and other elements which would be attached to it to form an RLT had been designated in advance so that they quickly could be detached from their parent formations to establish the RLT. Col Ralph A. Heywood, debriefing at

FMFPac, dtd 15Dec69, Tape 4732 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Heywood Debrief.

35. LtGen William K. Jones, comments on draft ms, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File).

36. III MAF OPlan 183-69, dtd 1Sept69; USMC Fact Sheet on Personnel Policy in Keystone Bluejay, dtd Jan70.

37. MACV ComdHist 1970, I, ch. IV, pp. 23-24; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, pp. 29-30, 34-35, Feb70, pp. 27-30, Mar70, p. 30.

38. FMFPac, MarOpsV, pp. 27-28, 30; 1st MAW ComdC, Jan70, Feb70.

39. FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun70, pp. 43-44; FMFPac, MarOpsV, p. 29; CAF ComdC, Mar70.

The Change of Command in I Corps

Additional sources for this section are from III MAF AAR, Opn Cavalier Beach, dtd 18Apr70, hereafter Cavalier Beach AAR.

40. ComUSMACV Directive 10-11, dtd 1Nov68, III MAF Admin Files.

41. III MAF ComdC, Jan70, p. 7.

42. XXIV Corps Hist 68, pp. 5-11, 14-17, 20-24, 86-87.

43. ComUSMACV memo to CGIIIMAF and other commanders, Subj: Reduction in Force, dtd 3Aug69, III MAF Admin Files.

44. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 14Aug69; ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 25Aug69 in III MAF Admin Files.

45. CG III MAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 30Oct69; III MAF Admin Files.

46. Cavalier Beach AAR; Draft Terms of Reference for III MAF, dtd 7Feb70, III MAF Admin Files.

47. MACV, Draft of Proposed Changes to Directive 10-11, dtd 16Feb70, III MAF Admin Files.

48. Col George C. Fox, debriefing at FMFPac, 6May70, Tape 4807, (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Fox Debrief.

49. Dulacki intvw, pp. 105-107.

50. Dulacki Comments.

51. Cavalier Beach AAR.

52. CAF ComdC, Mar and Sept 70.

53. Asst C/S, G-3, III MAF memo to CGIIIMAF, dtd 16Feb70; Cavalier Beach ARR.

54. BGen Leo J. Dulacki, debriefing at FMFPac, Jun70, Tape 4853 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) hereafter, Dulacki Debrief and Dulacki Comments.

55. Ibid and Dulacki intvw, pp. 113-114.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. XXIV Corps OpO 2-C-70 (Cavalier Beach), dtd 1Feb70.

59. Col Herbert L. Wilkerson, debriefing at FMFPac, 13July70, Tape 4892, (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Wilkerson Debrief.

60. III MAF ComdC, Mar70, p. 8.

61. Biographical Files (RefSec, MCHC); LtCol William R. Fails, USMC, *Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, 1978), pp. 109-13, hereafter Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*.

62. K. B. McCutcheon to The Group Division, Aetna Life Insurance Co, dtd 26Feb1937, LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon Papers (PC 464, Collections Sec, MCHC), hereafter McCutcheon Papers.

63. III MAF ComdC, Apr70, p. 16.

64. Dulacki Debrief; Cavalier Beach AAR.

65. Dulacki Comments.

66. Ibid.

67. Wilkerson Debrief; Dulacki Debrief.

68. Dulacki Debrief.

69. Ibid.

70. Dulacki Comments.

CHAPTER 2

THE WAR CONTINUES

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is derived from: III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, JanJun70; MACV ComdHist, 1970; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Jun70; Simmons, "Marine Operations."

Overview and the Defense of Da Nang

Additional material to the above for this section includes: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 5th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 26th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar70; 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.

1. MACV ComdHist 1970, I, ch. V, p. 7.

2. Ibid., III, pp. E10-E12; Fox Debrief.

3. MACV ComdHist 1970, III, E10, E12.

4. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, pp. 17-18, Feb70, pp. 16-19.

5. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb70, pp. 19-20.

6. XXIV Corps 1st Quarterly Written Summary, Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 16Apr70, Encl 2, 1stMarDiv Admin Files.

7. General Officer Biographical File, (RefSec, MCHC), hereafter, General Officer Bio File.

8. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Apr70; Simmons, "Marine Operations," p. 136.

9. General Officer Bio File.

10. 1stMarDiv OpO 301A-YR, dtd 16Dec70, Anx C.

11. Ibid.

12. Simmons, "Marine Operations," p. 141; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, p. 22.

13. Simmons, "Marine Operations," p. 136.

14. 1st Mar Div G-2 Overview, 30Jun70 and 1st Mar Div G-2 Overview, 31Dec70, both in 1stMarDiv Documents; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.

15. 1stMarDiv G-2 Overview, 30Jun70, 1stMarDiv Documents; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 12-16.

16. MACV ComdHist, 1970, I, ch. IV, pp. 32-33.

17. RVN JGS Memo dtd 7Feb69, in 1stMarDiv Documents; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, p. 22; LtCol William Blakely, Jr., USA, Deputy Province Senior Advisor, memo to CGIIIMAF, dtd 24Apr70 (McCutcheon Papers); Col Noble L. Beck, debriefing at FMFPac, 16Jul70, Tape 4893 (OralHistColl, MCHC); Col Floyd H. Waldrop, debriefing at FMFPac, 19Aug70, Tape 4926 (OralHistColl, MCHC), hereafter Waldrop Debrief.

18. ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 13Dec69, pp. 23-24; Waldrop Debrief.

19. 1stMarDiv G-3 Ops Summary, dtd 29Jun70, 1stMarDiv Documents; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan70, p. 3.

20. 1stMarDiv FragO 7-70, dtd 11Feb70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb70; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar70, pp. 21-22.

21. 1stMarDiv Oplan 2-70, dtd 22Apr70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Apr70, tab B-28.
22. III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.
23. CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv adcon/opcon, dtd 1Jan70 in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-5 Jan70.

The Inner Defenses:

Northern Sector Defense Command and Southern Sector Defense Command

24. Col William C. Patton, comments on draft ms, 15Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File) and 11th Mar ComdC, Mar-Apr70.
25. 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.
26. 1st Tank Bn ComdCs, Jan-Feb70; for the attack on Op Piranha, see 1st Tank Bn Jnl 4Jan70.
27. 1st Tank Bn ComdC, Mar70; 1/5 ComdCs, Mar-Jun70.

The 1st and 26th Marines: The Rocket Belt

Additional material in this section is drawn from: 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70 and 26th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Mar70.

28. CO 1st Mar memo to CG1stMarDiv, dtd 4Feb69; CG1stMarDiv memo to CGIIIMAF, dtd 25Mar69.
29. CO 26th Mar rpt to CG1stMarDiv, dtd 22Jan70; Col Ralph A. Heywood Debrief.
30. LtCol Pieter L. Hogaboom, comments on draft ms, 10Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).
31. 26th Mar ComdC, Jan70; 1/26, 2/26, 3/26 ComdCs, Jan-Feb70; Heywood Debrief.
32. 1/26 ComdC, Jan70, p. III-2.
33. 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdCs, Jan-Feb70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, p. 3.
34. Wilkerson Debrief.
35. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, p. 3; 2/26 ComdC, Jan70, pt. III; 3/26 ComdC, Feb70, pt II; LtCol Godfrey S. Delcuze, intvw by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, 13Feb70, Tape 4768, and 1stLt William R. Purdy, intvw by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, 11Feb70, Tape 4768 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Delcuze intvw or Purdy intvw.
36. Wilkerson Debrief.
37. Purdy intvw; HMM-263 ComdC, Jan70; pp 2, 10. During January LtCol Warren G. Cretney's HML-367 (Cobras) also flew in support of Kingfisher patrols; see HML-367 ComdC, Jan70, p. 4.
38. Purdy intvw.
39. Cpl James D. Dalton, intvw by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, 11Feb70, Tape 4768 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dalton intvw.
40. 2dLt John C. Swenson, intvw by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, Tape 4768 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
41. Dalton intvw.
42. Ibid.
43. Purdy intvw; 1/1 ComdC, Jan70, Spt Rpt No. 37.
44. Delcuze intvw; Purdy intvw.
45. Col William V. H. White, comments on draft ms, 6Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File).
46. 1st Mar ComdC, Mar70; 26th Mar ComdC, Feb-Mar70; 1/26 and 2/26 ComdCs, Feb-Mar70.
47. 3/26 ComdC, Feb-Mar70; 3/1 ComdC, Mar70.
48. 26th Mar ComdC, Mar70.

49. 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdCs, Mar-Jun70.
50. 2/1 ComdC, Jun70, pp. 1-2, II-2.
51. 2/1 ComdC, Feb70, p. 19.
52. 1/1 ComdC, Apr70, p. 21.
53. Spt Rpt No. 256, 1/1 ComdC, Mar70.
54. 2/1 ComdC, Apr70, pp. 29-30; Medal of Honor Citation, LCpl Emilio A. De la Garza, Jr., USMC, and biography, Jul71 (RefSec, MCHC).
55. 3/5 FragO 10-70, Anx A, in 3/5 ComdC, Feb70.
56. 1st Mar ComdC, Apr70, pp. II-C-1, II-C-1, II-C-2; 1/1 OpO 4-70, dtd 9Apr70, and Supp Intell Rpt, OpO Hung Quang 1/32, 15-27Apr70, both in 1/1 ComdC, Apr70; see pp. 17-24, same source, for events of the operation.
57. 3/1 ComdC, Apr70, p. 11.
58. 2/1 ComdC, Apr70, p. 9.
59. 3/1 ComdC, Apr70, pp. 12-13; 2/1 ComdC, Jan-Jun70.
60. Heywood Debrief.
61. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 6-8. For an example of the system in action, see 3/1 AAR on Rocket Attack, dtd 27May70, tab 23, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, May70. Casualty figures in 1stMarDiv G-3 Ops Sum, dtd 29Jun70, 1stMarDiv Documents.

The 5th Marines: Thuong Duc, An Hoa, and Arizona Territory

Additional materials in this section are drawn from 5th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70 and 1/5, 2/5, and 3/5 ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.

62. 1stMarDiv G-3 Ops Sum, dtd 29Jun70, 1stMarDiv Documents; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, pp. 4-5, Feb70, p. 4.
63. 1stLt Harold B. Lamb, intvw by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, 7May70, Tape 4857 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Lamb intvw.
64. 3/5 ComdC, Jan70, p. 5.
65. 5th Mar ComdC, Mar70, p. 3; 1/5, 2/5, 3/5 ComdCs, Mar70.
66. 1/5 ComdC, Mar70, pp. 2-2, 3-2.
67. 1/5 ComdC, Mar70, Lamb intvw.
68. Summary of Pacifier Ops, 15 March-21 Jun70, 1stMarDiv Documents; 1/5 ComdC, May70, p. 2-3; 2/5 ComdC, May70, p. 7.
69. 1/5 ComdC, Jun70, pp. 2-1 through 2-3.
70. Summary of Pacifier Ops, 15 March - June 70, 1stMarDiv Documents.
71. 2/5 ComdC, Apr70, pp. 4-5.
72. 2/5 ComdC, May70, pp. 4-7.
73. Ibid., pp. 4-8.
74. 2/5 ComdC, Jun70, pp. 6-7.
75. 3/5 ComdC, Mar-Jun70.
76. 3/5 ComdC, Apr70, pt. III.
77. 3/5 ComdC, June70, pt. II.
78. 1/5 ComdC, Feb70, pp. 3-4.
79. 1/5 ComdC, Jan70; 3/5 ComdC, Apr-May70.
80. 2/5 and 3/5 ComdCs, Apr70.

The 7th Marines: The Que Son Mountains

Additional material for this section is taken from 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70 and 1/7, 2/7, and 3/7 ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.

81. Ramsey Comments.
82. Simmons, "Marine Operations," p. 131; 1stMarDiv G-3 Op Sum, dtd 29Jun70, 1stMarDiv Documents.

83. 1/7, 2/7, 3/7 ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.
 84. 2/7 Jnl, 14-15Jan70 in 2/7 ComdC, Jan70.
 85. 1/7 Jnl, 26Jun70 in 1/7 ComdC, Jun70.
 86. Unless otherwise noted, all details of the attack on FSB Ross are taken from the following: 7th Mar SitRep, dtd 6Jan70, 7th Mar ComdC; 1/7 ComdC, Jan70; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 6Jan70 in MACV Telecons, Jan70; 3/11 ComdC, Jan70, p. 22; the following interviews by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, all on Tape 4734 (Oral HistColl, MCHC): Capt Edward T. Clark, 12Jan70, hereafter Clark intvw; 1stLt Louis R. Ambort, 6Jan70, hereafter Ambort intvw; 1stLt William G. Peters, 12Jan70, hereafter Peters intvw; 2dLt R. Peter Kemmner, 6Jan70; SSgt John C. Little, 12Jan70; Sgt James P. Hackett, 7Jan70, hereafter Hackett intvw; LCpl William T. Smith, 13Jan70.
 87. Peters intvw.
 88. Ambort intvw.
 89. Clark intvw.
 90. Ibid; Peters intvw.
 91. Hackett intvw.
 92. Details of the 12 February action are drawn from: 1/7 Jnl, 12-13Feb70, in 1/7 ComdC, Feb70; and the following interviews by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, all on Tape 4769 (Oral HistColl, MCHC): 1stLt Louis R. Ambort, 17Feb70, hereafter Ambort intvw, Feb 70; 2dLt Robert B. Kearney, III, 17Feb70; PFC Gary E. Freel, 17Feb70.
 93. Ambort intvw, Feb70.
 94. 1/7 FragO 1-70, dtd 8Mar70 and 1/7 Jnl 9, 16Mar70, in 1/7 ComdC, Mar70.
 95. 7th Mar SitRep, 24Apr70 in 7th Mar ComdC, Apr70; 2/7 Jnl 24Apr70 in 2/7 ComdC, Apr70.
 96. 2/7 ComdC, Apr-May70.
 97. 2/7 ComdCs, Mar-Jun70. This policy also was intended to improve discipline in a battalion plagued with racial tension; see Col Vincent A. Albers, Jr., "Case Study: Analysis of Racial Tension" (Paper prepared for class at Naval War College, 3 Feb 74), p. 4.
 98. 2/7 Jnl, 6May70 in 2/7 ComdC, May70.
 99. 2/7 ComdC, Mar70, pp. 1-3; 2/7 Jnl, 9-10Jun70, in 2/7 ComdC, Jun70.
 100. 3/7 OpO 3-70, dtd 23May70, in 3/7 ComdC, May70; 3/11 ComdC, May70, p. 7.
 101. Details of the conditions encountered in this operation are taken from the following interviews with 1stMarDiv Historical Team, all on Tape 4864, (Oral HistColl, MCHC): 1stLt Deryll B. Banning, 20Jun70; 2dLt William N. Lindsay, III, 20Jun70; 2dLt Wallace L. Wilson, Jr., 20Jun70, hereafter Wilson intvw; Col Karl Mueller, comments on draft ms, 19Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
 102. Wilson intvw.
 103. Ibid.
 104. Lindsay intvw.
 105. 7th Mar ComdC, Jun70, pp. 7-8; 3/7 ComdC, Jun70, p. 13; Wilson intvw.
 106. 3/7 ComdC, Jun70, pt. II; Wilson intvw.
 107. Lindsey intvw.
 108. Ibid.
 109. 3/7 FragO 3-70, dtd 20Jun70, in 3/7 ComdC, Jun70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 5.
 110. 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 3/11 ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.
 111. 3/11 ComdC, May70, p. II-3.
 112. 2/7 ComdC, Jun70, pp. 5-6.
 113. 3/7 ComdCs, May-Jun70.

114. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 6; 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Jun70; 1/7, 2/7, 3/7 ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.

Results

115. These figures are compiled from the monthly summaries in 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.
 116. 1stMarDiv G-3 OpSum, dtd 29Jun70, in 1stMarDiv Documents.

CHAPTER 3

THE CAMBODIA INVASION AND CONTINUED REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING, APRIL-JULY 1970

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist 70, I, III, and Supplement; and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-July 70.

The War Spreads into Cambodia

- MACV ComdHist 70, III, Anx C, pp. 35-47, 104-108.
- FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 33-34, Jun70, p. 36.
- Col G. C. Fox, debriefing at FMFPac, 6May70, Tape 4806 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Fox Debrief.
- MACV ComdHist 70, Supplement, p. 9; FMFPac, MarOpsV, July70, pp. 2, 13.
- FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 10, 24-25; Jun70, p. 16.

Redeployment Planning Accelerates: Keystone Robin Alpha

- MACV ComdHist 70, Supplement, p. 8.
- HQMC Message Files.
- MACV ComdHist 70, I, ch. 4, p. 11; Supplement, p. 9.
- HQMC Message Files; Maj R. J. Johnson, memo for the record, Subj: Meeting with MACV J-3, dtd 29May70, and memo for the record, Subj: Telecon with LtCol Doublet, dtd 30May70, in III MAF G-3 Keystone Robin File, hereafter III MAF G-3 KSR.
- III MAF, memo for the record, Subj: Redeployment/Reassignment of III MAF Elements, dtd 30May70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
- MACV ComdHist 70, I, ch. 4, p. 12; HQMC Message Files.
- Dulacki Comments.
- HQMC Message Files; III MAF, memo for the record, Subj: Redeployment Planning-Keystone Robin, dtd 16Jun70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
- ComUSMACV msg to III MAF and Other Commands, dtd 23Jun70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
- CinCPac msg to III MAF and Other Commands, dtd 19Jun70 and CinCPac msg to Pacific Commands, dtd 11Jul70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
- Col H. L. Wilkerson, memo for the record, Subj: Force Planning, dtd 9Jun70, III MAF G-3 KSR; Dulacki Debrief.
- Col F. H. Waldrop, debriefing at FMFPac, 19Aug70, Tape 4926 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

18. III MAF, memo for the record, Subj: Discussions with XXIV Corps Staff, dtd 14Mar70, III MAF G-3 Phase 4 Miscellaneous File; III MAF, memo for the record, Subj: Force Planning, dtd 13Jun70, III MAF G-3 KSR; Dulacki Debrief.

Plans for the 3d MAB

19. Col N. L. Beck, debriefing at FMFPac, 16Jul70, Tape 4893 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Beck Debrief.
20. LtGen William J. Van Ryzin, USMC (Ret.), intvw, 26Mar75, pp. 27-8 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Van Ryzin Transcript.
21. HQMC, MCO3120.3A, Subj: The Organization of MAFTF, dtd 18Aug70, quoted in LtCol Kenneth J. Clifford, USMCR, *Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine Corps, 1900-1970* (Washington, D. C.: Hist & Museums Div, HQMC, 1973), pp. 111-112.
22. HQMC Message Files.
23. LtGen H. Nickerson msg to LtGen H. W. Buse, dtd 6Jan70, HQMC Message Files.
24. HQMC Message Files.
25. LtGen H. Nickerson msg to LtGen H. W. Buse, dtd 12Feb70 and MGen W. G. Thrash msg to LtGen K. B. McCutcheon, dtd 11Mar70, in HQMC Message Files.
26. MGen W. G. Thrash msgs to LtGen K. B. McCutcheon, dtd 11 and 17 Mar70; LtGen K. B. McCutcheon msg to LtGen H. W. Buse, dtd 19Mar70; in HQMC Message Files.
27. CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 19Mar70, in III MAF G-3, III MAF Redeployment File.
28. LtCol T. P. Ganey, Action Brief, Subj: Proposed MAB Hq T/O, dtd 26Mar70, and III MAF AC/S G-3 memo to Distribution List, Subj: Draft T/O for a MAB Hq, dtd 26Mar70, in III MAF G-3 MAB Hq&Hq Co T/O File.
29. III MAF AC/S G-4 memo to C/S, Subj: Substantiation of the Requirement for a MAB Engineering Section, dtd 2Apr70, in III MAF G-3 MAB Hq & Hq Co T/O File; see the same file for other correspondence and comments on the proposed T/O.
30. For revisions of the T/O, see *Ibid.*; Dulacki Comments.
31. HQMC Message Files; Fox Debrief.
32. *Ibid.*
33. III MAF Agenda Item for WIEU Briefing MACV Hq, 18Apr70, Subj: Phase IV Redeployment, dtd 17Apr70, in III MAF G-3, MAB Redeployment File; Maj Robert T. Himmerich, comments on draft ms, 28Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Himmerich Comments.
34. III MAF Fact Sheet, Subj: Mission and TAOI for a MAB, dtd 8Apr70, in III MAF G-3, MAB Redeployment File.
35. Maj R. J. Johnson, memo for the record, Subj: Redeployment Planning, dtd 8Jun70, III MAF G-3 KSR; Dulacki Debrief; Beck Debrief.
36. Col H. L. Wilkerson, memo for the record, Subj: Brigade Planning, dtd 29Jun70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.
37. LtGen K. B. McCutcheon msg to LtGen W. K. Jones, dtd 22Jul70, HQMC Message Files; Planning Document for Building the MAB Hq, dtd 24Jul70, in 1st MarDiv Documents.

PART II

Summer and Fall-Winter Campaigns, 1970

CHAPTER 4

THE SUMMER CAMPAIGN IN QUANG NAM, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1970

New Campaign Plans

Unless otherwise noted, all material in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist, 70, I, III, and Supplement; and FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jul70.

1. MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. 2, pp. 9-11.
2. *Ibid.*, II, ch. 7, pp. 16-20, ch. 14, pp. 1-4; Beck Debrief.
3. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, p. 22; Beck Debrief; Waldrop Debrief; Dulacki Debrief.
4. Beck Debrief.
5. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, p. 2; HQMC Message Files.

Summer Offensive: The 7th Marines in Pickens Forest

Additional sources for this section are: 7th Marines ComdC, Jul-Sep70; 7th Marines CAAR, Operation Pickens Forest, dtd 18Sep70, hereafter 7th Mar PF CAAR; Col E. G. Darning, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 10Aug70, Tape 4958 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Darning Debrief.

6. Darning Debrief.
7. 2/7 ComdC, Jul70; Sgt T. R. Carl, intvw with 1stMarDiv Historical Team, 17Jul70, Tape 4901 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Darning Debrief.
8. 1stMarDiv G-2, Briefing Notes, Subj: Enemy Logistics System in Quang Nam Prov, dtd 30Jun70, in 1stMarDiv Documents; Briefing Notes, Subj: Enemy BAs 112 and 127, dtd 30Jun70; 1stMarDiv Documents.
9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, pp. 3, 22-23; 5th Marines ComdC, Jul70; Beck Debrief; Waldrop Debrief.
10. Beck Debrief.
11. Darning Debrief; 7th Mar PF CAAR; Opn Pickens Forest Forecast, dtd 16Jul70, 1stMarDiv Documents.
12. 7th Mar OpO 3-70, dtd 10Jul70, Anx C, in 7th Mar PF CAAR.
13. For details of the reconnaissance activities, see patrol reports Air Hose (15-16 Jul70) and May Fly (15-16 Jul70) in 1st Recon Bn, Patrol Reports, Jul70.
14. Darning Debrief.
15. 3/11 ComdC, Jul70.
16. 2/7 CAAR, Opn Pickens Forest, dtd 31Aug70, hereafter 2/7 PF CAAR, in 7th Marines PF CAAR.
17. Darning Debrief.
18. *Ibid.*; 7th Marines PF CAAR.
19. Darning Debrief.
20. 1/7 ComdC, Jul70; 2/7 PF CAAR; 1/5 ComdC, Jul70; 11th Mar ComdC, Jul70; 3/11 ComdC, Jul70.
21. 2/7 ComdC, Jul70; 1stLt Omer L. Gibson, intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 3Aug70, Tape 4942 (Oral HistColl, MCHC) gives an AO's view of the action.
22. 1/5 ComdC and Staff Jnl, Jul70.
23. Waldrop Debrief; LtGen K. B. McCutcheon msgs to LtGen W. K. Jones, dtd 27 and 31Jul70, HQMC Message Files.
24. 7th Mar FragO 32-70, in 7th Mar PF CAAR; 3/11 ComdC, Aug70.
25. Waldrop Debrief.
26. 7th Mar S-3 Jnl, 20Aug70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Aug70; 2/7 Jnl, 20Aug70 in 2/7 ComdC, Aug70.

27. 2/7 Jnl, 21Aug70, in 2/7 ComdC, Aug70.
28. 2/7 PF CAAR.
29. 3/11 ComdC, Aug70; 2/7 PF CAAR; 7th Mar PF CAAR, pp. 5-7.
30. 7th Mar PF CAAR, pp. 14-16.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 11, 14, 20.
32. Waldrop Debrief.
33. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, pp. 22-23, Aug70, pp. 7-8, 26; Waldrop Debrief.

The 1st and 5th Marines Continue the Small-Unit War

Additional materials for this section are: 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul-Sep70; 1st Mar ComdC, Jul-Sep70; and 5th Mar ComdC, Jul-Sep70.

34. 1stMarDiv FragO 35-70, dtd 1Aug70; 1st Mar FragO 27-70, dtd 6Aug70, in 1st Mar ComdC, Aug70; 11th Mar ComdC, Jul70, p. 10, Aug70, p. 11; 1/5 ComdC, Aug70.
35. 1stMarDiv, Division Sensor Briefing, dtd 12Dec70, 1stMarDiv Documents; LtCol C. M. Mosher, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 17Sep70, Tape 4959 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
36. 1/1 ComdC, Jul-Sep70; 2/1 ComdC, Jul-Sep70; 3/1 ComdC, Jul-Sep70.
37. 2/1 ComdC, Sep70.
38. The account of this operation is based on: 2/1 CAAR, dtd 5Aug70, in 2/1 ComdC, Aug70; 2/1 ComdC, Jul70; 1st Mar ComdC, Aug70; Maj J. S. Grinalds, debriefing at FMFPac, 4May71, Tape 4967 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), Grinalds Debrief.
39. 2/1 CAAR, dtd 5Aug70, in 2/1 ComdC, Aug70.
40. 1st Mar ComdC, Sep70; 11th Marines ComdC, Sep70; 3/1 ComdC, Sep70.
41. 5th Mar ComdCs, Jul and Aug70.
42. Waldrop Debrief.
43. LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, Comments on draft ms, 17Oct83 (Vietnam Comment File).
44. 1/5 ComdCs, Jul-Sep70.
45. 2/5 and 3/5 ComdCs, Jul-Sep70.
46. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, pp. 21-22; 5th Mar ComdC, Jul70; 2/5 ComdC, Jul70.
47. 5th Mar FragO 24-70, dtd 26Jul70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Aug70, p. 23.

Combat Declines, But the Threat Continues

48. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 1-2, Sep70, p. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, p. 17.
49. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 1-2; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul-Sep70; III MAF ComdC, Jul-Sep70.
50. MACV ComdHist, 70, III, pp. E12-E14.
51. *Ibid.*, III, Anx G, pp. 4-9.
52. *Ibid.*, III, Anx D, pp. 26-28.
53. LtGen John R. Chaisson, Position Paper on Viet Nam, n.d. (ca late70-early71), Item 38, Chaisson Papers (General Officers Collection, MCHC)

Deployment Plans Change: More Marines Stay Longer

54. Van Ryzin Transcript, pp. 3-6.
55. MACV ComdHist, 70, Supplement, pp. 10-11; JCS msg to CinCPac, dtd 1Aug70; JCS msg to CincPac, dtd 4Aug70, in III MAF G-3 KSR.

56. Fox Debrief.
57. Undated notes, Aug 70 in III MAF G-3 KSR; HQMC Message Files.
58. HQMC Message Files; CGIIIMAF msg to 1st MAW and 1stMarDiv, dtd 12Sept70, III MAF G-3 KSR.
59. Simmons, "Marine Operations," p. 138.
60. 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Keystone Redeployment Update, dtd 1May71, in 1stMarDiv Documents.
61. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 29Sep70, III MAF G-3 KSR; MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. 4, pp. 24-26.
62. Briefing for Gen McCutcheon on Proposed MAB Organization, dtd 20Aug70, in 1stMarDiv Documents.
63. HQMC Message Files.

CHAPTER 5

OFFENSIVES AND REDEPLOYMENTS: IMPERIAL LAKE, CATAWBA FALLS, AND KEYSTONE ROBIN ALPHA, JULY-OCTOBER 1970

Unless otherwise noted, material for this chapter is derived from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug and Sep70; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70; 7th Mar ComdC, Aug 70; Darning Debrief; Col Ralph F. Estey, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 14Dec70, Tape 4979 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Estey Debrief.

Preliminaries to Imperial Lake

1. Darning Debrief.
2. Estey Debrief.
3. Darning Debrief.
4. 3/7 FragO 3-70, dtd 20Jun70, in 3/7 ComdC, Jun70; Darning Debrief.
5. 3/7 ComdC, Jun70.
6. Col Edmund G. Darning, Jr., Comments on draft ms, 25Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Darning Comments.
7. 7th Mar FragO 35-70, dtd 23Aug70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Aug70; 1/7 ComdC, Aug-Sep70; 2/7 ComdC, Aug-Sep70; 3/7 ComdC, Aug-Sep70.
8. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 7, 25-26.
9. 7th Mar, Opn Ripley Center CAAR, dtd 27Sep70, Box 12, 1stMarDiv Admin Files; 2/7 ComdC, Aug70; 2/7 Jnl, 30Aug70, in *Ibid.*

Operation Imperial Lake

Additional materials for this section are: 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70; 7th Mar ComdC, Sep70.

10. CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 30Aug70, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70; 7th Mar OpO 4-70, dtd 30Aug70, 7th Mar ComdC, Aug70; 2/7, OpO 12-70, dtd 30Aug70, 2/7 ComdC, Aug70.
11. 11th Mar ComdC, Aug70; 3/11 ComdC, Aug70.
12. Col Robert H. Piehl, comments on draft ms, 23Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
13. 2/7 ComdC, Sep70; 1st MAW ComdCs, Aug-Sep70.
14. 2/7 ComdC, Sep70; 2/7 Jnl, 5-12Sept70, in *ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*

16. 2/7 ComdC, Sep70; for LtCol Albers's comments on the "duck hunter" scheme of maneuver, see 1stMarDiv, Press Release No. 1057-70, dtd 21Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Press Releases, Oct70; see also LtCol Vincent A. Albers, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
17. 3/11 ComdC, Sep70.
18. 3/7 CAAR Opn Nebraska Rapids, dtd 17 Sep70, in 3/7 ComdC, Sep70.
19. 7th Mar ComdC, Sep70; 3/7 ComdC, Sep70; 3/11 ComdC, Sep70.
20. 7th Mar ComdC, Sep70, p. 16; 2/7 ComdC, Sep70; 2/7 Jnl, 18Sep70, in Ibid.
21. 2/7 ComdC, Sep70.
22. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, pp. 22-23; for the 2d Battalion claims, see 2/7 ComdC, Sep70.

Keystone Robin Alpha Redeployments Begin

Additional materials for this section are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul-Sep70; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul-Sep70; 1st MAW ComdC, Jul-Sep70; Simmons, "Marine Operations."

23. MAG-13 ComdC, Sep70.
24. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep70, p. 26.
25. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon msg to LtGens Sutherland and Lam, dtd 5Sep70, HQMC Message Files.
26. 1stMarDiv, Warning Order, dtd 3Sep70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-5Sep70.
27. 1stMarDiv, FragO 47-70, dtd 8Sep70, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 6-12Sep70.
28. 1stMarDiv, Agenda Item for 1stMarDiv, 2d ROKMC Brig, QDSZ Wkly Conference Scheduled for 11Sep70, Subj: Realignment of TAOR Boundaries and Establishment of RVNAF AOs, dtd 9Sep70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; 1stMarDiv C/S memo, Subj: Summary of Discussion—QDSZ/2d ROKMC Bde/1stMarDiv Conference, dtd 19Sep70, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sept70.
29. Co G/2/5, Cupp Progress Rept for Sep70, dtd 4Oct70, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; 1/7ComdC, Sep70.

Operation Catawba Falls

Additional material for this section is: 2/11 CAAR, Opn Catawba Falls, dtd 9Oct70, Box 12, 1stMarDiv Admin Files, hereafter 2/11 Catawba Falls CAAR.

30. 5th Mar ComdC, Aug70; 3/5 ComdC, Aug70.
31. 3/5 ComdC, Aug70.
32. 1stMarDiv FragO 52-70, dtd 16Sep70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 13-19Sep70.
33. 2/11 Catawba Falls CAAR; 2/11 ComdC, Sep70.
34. CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 19Sep70, 1st Mar ComdC, Sep70.
35. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70; 2/11 Catawba Falls CAAR.

The Regiments Realign

36. 1st Mar ComdC, Sep70; 1/1 ComdC, Sep70; 2/1 ComdC, Sep70; 3/1 ComdC, Sep70.
37. 5th Mar ComdC, Sept70; 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; 3/5 ComdC, Sep70; 2/7 ComdC, Sep70.

38. 2/11 ComdC, Sep70; 3/11 ComdC, Sep70.
39. 1/5 ComdC, Sep and Oct70.
40. 7th Mar ComdC, Sep-Oct70; 1/7 ComdC, Sep-Dec70; 2/7 ComdC, Sep and 1-12Oct70; 3/7 ComdC, Sep-Oct70.
41. *Sea Tiger*, 9Oct70, in 3/5 ComdC, Oct70.
42. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, pp. 27-29; III MAF ComdC, Oct70, p. 20; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Sep-Oct70.
43. 1stMarDiv, FragO 55-70, dtd 11Oct70; 1st Marines FragO 38-70, dtd 12Oct70, 1st Mar msg, Subj: Execution of 1st Mar FragO 38-70, dtd 15Oct70; all in 1st Mar ComdC, Oct70. CG1stMarDiv msg to 1st Mar, 5th Mar, 11th Mar, 1st Engr Bn, 11th MTBn, dtd 14Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 11-19Oct70; Col James G. Dixon, comments on draft ms, 11May83 (Vietnam Comment File).
44. CO1stMar msg to 1st Mar, dtd 15Oct70, in 1st Mar ComdC, Oct70; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct70; 2/5 ComdC, Oct70.

CHAPTER 6

THE FALL-WINTER CAMPAIGN IN QUANG NAM, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1970

Unless otherwise noted, source material for this chapter is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct-Dec70; III MAF ComdC, Oct-Dec70; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct-Dec70; Estey Debrief.

New Campaign Plans and Changes in Tactics

1. XXIV Corps/MR1 Combined Fall-Winter Military Campaign Plan, 1971, dtd 8Sept70, Box 5, 1stMarDiv Admin Files.
2. MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. 2, pp. 11-17.
3. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, pp. 3-4, 13-14.
4. Estey Debrief.
5. 1stMarDiv, FragO 62-70, dtd 19Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 20-31Oct70.
6. BGen E. H. Simmons memo to CGFMFPac, dtd 24May71; 2/1 ComdC, Sept70.
7. CG1stMarDiv msg to COs, 1st, 5th, 11th Mar, dtd 19Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 20-31Oct70; Col P. X. Kelley ltr to CG1stMarDiv, Subj: Restricted Fires on Intel and Preemptive Targets, dtd 20Oct70, Box 6, 1stMarDiv Admin Files; 11th Mar ComdC, Oct-Dec70.
8. LtGen K. B. McCutcheon msg to LtGen W. K. Jones, dtd 2Dec70, HQMC Message Files.
9. 1st MAW ComdC, Oct70; Estey Debrief; Maj Gen Alan J. Armstrong intvw, 25Sept73, pp. 24-26 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter, Armstrong Transcript.
10. Armstrong Transcript, pp. 25-26.
11. 1st Mar ComdC, Nov70.
12. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Oct70, pt. 2; 1stMarDiv, G-3 Briefing Notes, dtd 5Dec70, in 1stMarDiv Documents.
13. 1stMarDiv FragO 61-70, dtd 18Oct70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct70; for an account of the 7th Marines' plan, see Darning Debrief.
14. 1stMarDiv FragO 60-70, dtd 6Dec70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-11Dec70; Estey Debrief.

The Course of the Fall-Winter Campaign

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct-Dec70; and 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct-Dec70.

15. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, p. 17; Oct70, pp. 15-16; Nov70, pp. 14-15; Dec70, pp. 14-15.
16. FMFPac MarOpsV, Oct70, pp. 2, 26.
17. 5th Mar ComdC, Oct-Nov70; 1/1 ComdC, Oct70, pt. 3; 2/1 ComdC, Oct70, pt. 2 and tab 4-27.
18. Col Rex C. Denny, Jr., comments on draft ms, 6Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File); Gen Kenneth McLennan, comments on draft ms, 28Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).
19. 1st Mar ComdC, Oct70, pt. 2, sec C, p. 5.
20. Col John W. Chism, USA, comments on draft ms, 19Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
21. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, pp. 20-21; MAG-16 ComdC, Oct70, pt. II.
22. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Nov70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, pp. 4, 7, 13-14.
23. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 38; LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 10Nov70, HQMC Message Files.
24. 1stMarDiv FragO 70-70, dtd 17Dec70; CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 19Dec70; both in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 12-20Dec70.

Operation Imperial Lake Continues

Additional sources for this section are: 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct-Dec70; CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, Subj: Opn Imperial Lake, dtd 4Dec70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-11Dec70, hereafter 1stMarDiv, IMP LK Rept; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct-Dec70; Estey Debrief.

25. 5th Mar FragO 37-70, dtd 29Sept70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Sept70; 5th Mar FragO 38-70, dtd 11Oct70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Oct70; 1/5 ComdC, Oct70; 3/5 ComdC, Oct70.
26. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Oct70, pt. 2; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct70, pt. 2; 1stMarDiv, IMP LK Rept.
27. 5th Mar FragO 39-70, dtd 18Oct70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Oct70; 1stMarDiv, IMP LK Rept.
28. 1/5 ComdC, Oct70, pt. 2; 2/5 ComdC, pts. 2 and 3; 1stMarDiv Press Release 1096-70, dtd 31Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Press Releases, Oct70.
29. 2/5 ComdC, Oct70, pt. 2; 1stMarDiv Press Release 1099-70, dtd 28Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Press Releases, Oct70.
30. 2/5 ComdC, Oct70, pt. 3; 1stMarDiv Press Release 1118-70, dtd 14Nov70, in 1stMarDiv Press Releases, Oct70.
31. 1st Recon Bn, Patrol Debriefing, Policy Game (PPB), Co A, dtd 1Nov70, tab A-38 in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Oct70; 2/5 ComdC, Oct70, pt. 3; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct70, pp. 21-22; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, p. 6.
32. 5th Mar ComdC, Oct70, pt. 3.
33. 1stMarDiv, IMP LK Rept; 1/5 ComdC, Nov70, pts. 1 and 2; 2/5 ComdC, Nov70, pt. 2; 3/5 ComdC, Nov70, pts. 2 and 3.
34. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Nov70, p. 18; LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 10Nov70, HQMC Message Files; 1/5 ComdC, Nov70, pt. 2.
35. 2/5 ComdC, Nov70, pt. 3; 5th Mar ComdC, Nov70, pt. 2.
36. This quotation, and other biographical material on LtCol Leftwich, is from LtCol William G. Leftwich biographical file (RefSec, MCHC).
37. Patrol Debrief Rush Act, dtd 27Nov70, Patrol Report, Warcloud Impossible and Wage Earner, dtd 22Nov70, both in 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Nov70; see also *ibid.*, p. 3; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Nov70, p. 19.
38. Col Franklin A. Hart, Jr., comments on draft ms, 5Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

39. 1stMarDiv, IMP LK Rept; 1st Mar ComdC, Dec70; 2/1 ComdC, Dec70, pt. 3; 1/5 ComdC, Dec70; 2/5 ComdC, Dec70, pt. 2; 3/5 ComdC, pts. 2 and 3.
40. Estey Debrief.
41. 5th Mar ComdC, Dec70, pt. 3; 3/5 (Fwd), Imperial Lake Jnl, 24-25Dec70, in 3/5 ComdC, Dec70.
42. 1st MAW ComdC, Oct70, p. 4, Nov70, p. 4, Dec70, p. 4; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, pp. 2-3; 3/5 ComdC, Dec70, pt. 3.
43. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70, p. 20.
44. Estey Debrief.

5th Marines in the Lowlands: Noble Canyon and Tulare Falls I and II

45. 2/5 ComdC, Oct-Dec70.
46. 3/5 ComdC, Oct-Dec70.
47. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct70, p. 22, Nov70, p. 21; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct70, pt. 2; 3/5 ComdC, Oct-Nov70.
48. 1stMarDiv Press Release 1154-70, dtd 10Dec70, in 1stMarDiv Press Releases, Dec70.
49. 5th Mar ComdC, Nov70, pt. 2, and 5th Mar Sitrep, dtd 4Nov70, in *ibid.*; 2/5 ComdC, Nov70.
50. 1stMarDiv, IMP LK Rept; 1stMarDiv FragO 56-70, dtd 1Oct70, tab B-49, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct70; 5th Mar OpO 3-70, dtd 1Oct70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Oct70; for casualties, see *ibid.*, pt. 2; MACV ComdHist, 70, III, p. E15; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, p. 6.
51. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 27Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 20-31Oct70; 5th Mar ComdC, Oct-Nov70.
52. Estey Debrief; 1stMarDiv, G-3 Briefing Notes, dtd 5Dec70, 1stMarDiv Documents.
53. 3/5 Jnl, 3Dec70, in 3/5 ComdC, Dec70.
54. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70, p. 17; 5th Mar ComdC, Dec70, pt. 2.

1st Marines Operations, October-December 1970

Additional sources for this section are: 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Dec70; and 1st Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec70.

55. 1st Mar FragO 040-70, dtd 21Oct70, in 1st Mar ComdC, Oct70; 1st Mar FragO 043-70, dtd 18Dec70, in 1st Mar ComdC, Dec70.
56. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sept70, p. 22; 1st Mar ComdC, Sept70; 1/1 ComdC, Sept70, pt. 3.
57. For day-by-day events of the siege, see 1/1 ComdC, Oct70, pt. 3; 1stMar ComdC, Oct70; 1stMarDiv Press Release 1070-70, dtd 17Oct70, in 1stMarDiv Press Releases, Oct70.
58. 1/1 ComdC, Oct-Nov70.
59. CG1stMarDiv msg to 1st and 11th Mar, dtd 24Oct70, in 1st MarDiv Jnl File, 20-31Oct70; CG1stMarDiv msg to III MAF, dtd 8Dec70, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-11Dec70; 1st Mar Sitreps, 7 and 13Dec70, in 1st Mar ComdC, Dec70; 1/1 ComdC, Nov70, pt. 1, Dec70.
60. 2/1 ComdC, Oct70; 2/1 FragO 39-70, dtd 10Nov70, tab 2-2 in *ibid.*, Nov70.
61. 2/1 S-2 Jnl, 15-16Nov70, in 2/1 ComdC, Nov70.
62. 2/1 S-2 Jnl, 18Nov70, in 2/1 ComdC, Nov70; see also *ibid.*, pts. 2 and 3; 1st Mar ComdC, Nov70; Grinalds Debrief.
63. 2/1 ComdC, Dec70, pt. 3.
64. 3/1 ComdC, Oct-Dec70.
65. *Ibid.*, Nov70; 1st Mar Sitrep, dtd 7Nov70, in 1st Mar ComdC, Nov70.

66. 3/1 FragO 44-70, dtd 31Dec70, in 3/1 ComdC, Dec70.
67. 1st Mar ComdC, Nov-Dec70; 2/1 S-3 Journal, 28Nov70, in 2/1 ComdC, Nov70; 1/1 ComdC, Dec70, pt. 1.
68. 1st Mar ComdC, Oct-Dec70; 1/1, 2/1, and 3/1 ComdCs, Oct-Dec70.
69. 1st Mar msg to 2/1, dtd 16Dec70 (passing on message from 1stMarDiv of 13Dec70), tab 4-20, in 2/1 ComdC, Dec70.
70. Casualty and rocket statistics are compiled from 1st Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec70.

The War in Quang Nam at the End of the Year

71. 1stMarDiv, Command Information Summary, G-1 Section, dtd 31Dec70, 1stMarDiv Documents.
72. 1stMarDiv, G-2 Briefing Notes, dtd 1Dec70; 1stMarDiv, Command Information Summary, G-2 Overview, dtd 31Dec70; both in 1stMarDiv Documents; III MAF ComdC, Oct-Dec70.
73. BGen E. H. Simmons memo to CGFMFPac, Subj: Debriefing, Vietnam Service, 15Jun70-24May71, dtd 24May71, 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter Simmons Debrief; see also 1stMarDiv, Command Information Summary, G-3 Overview, dtd 31Dec70, in 1stMarDiv Documents.

PART III Pacification

CHAPTER 7

PACIFICATION 1970: PLANS, ORGANIZATION, AND PROBLEMS

Unless otherwise noted, the information contained in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist, 70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Dec70; and Chester L. Cooper, Judith E. Corson, Laurence J. Legere, David E. Lockwood, and Donald M. Weller, *The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam*, 3 vols. (Arlington, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1972), hereafter *IDA Pacification Study*. Documents from the supporting material for the latter study will be cited as Pacification Study Docs. This chapter also draws much material from: Col W. W. Hixson, debriefing at FMFPac, 5Oct70, Tape No. 4698 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Hixson Debrief and Col C. J. Peabody, debriefing at FMFPac, 8Sept70, Tape No. 4956 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Peabody Debrief.

Pacification: The Nationwide Perspective

1. Commandant Jacques Hogard, "Guerre Revolutionnaire et Pacification," *Review Militaire d'Information*; Jan57, pp. 21-24; quoted in *IDA Pacification Study*, 3, p.107.
2. III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 13Dec69, Anx R, pp. 19-20.
3. *IDA Pacification Study*, 3, pp. 280-282, 314-315.
4. *Ibid.*, 2, pp. 268-271.

The 1970 GVN Pacification and Development Plan

An additional source for this section is Republic of Vietnam, Central Pacification and Development Council, Plan for Pacification

and Development 1970, in Pacification Study Docs, hereafter cited as GVN 1970 P&D Plan.

5. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, p. 4; Gen C. W. Abrams ltr to Distribution List, Subj: GVN 1970 Pacification and Development Plan, n.d., in GVN 1970 P&D Plan.
6. *IDA Pacification Study*, 3, p. 313.
7. GVN 1970 P&D Plan, p. 1.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-12.
9. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, p. 56.
10. GVN 1970 P&D Plan, pp. 16-18.

Pacification Plans and Organization in Military Region 1

All quotations from Colonel Hixson not otherwise footnoted are taken from the Hixson Debrief.

11. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec69, pp. 24-31, Feb70, pp. 11-13.
12. *Ibid.*, Jan70, pp. 12-15.
13. The following description of the CORDS organization in ICTZ is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Summary and Overview, pp. 45, 47-48; Hixson Debrief; MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 7, p. 66.
14. Hixson Debrief.
15. *Ibid.*
16. LtCol Warren E. Parker, USA, comments on draft ms, 11Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Parker Comments.

Pacification Situation in Quang Nam, Early 1970

An additional source for this section is: LtCol Warren E. Parker, USA (Ret.), PSA, Quang Nam, Completion of Tour Report, dtd 20Apr70, in the files of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. (CMH), hereafter Parker Report.

17. Fact Sheets on Quang Nam Province Government and American and Vietnamese Support, in QSDZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
18. Maj J. S. Grinalds intvw, 8May71, pp. 7-9 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Grinalds Transcript.
19. Col Nguyen Van Thien, QDSZ, memo, dtd 16Jan70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
20. Col Ennis C. Whitehead, Jr., USA, AsstDepCORDS (Military), memo, Subj: Relationships in Quang Da Special Zone, dtd 18Jul70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
21. Fact Sheets on Quang Nam Province Government and American and Vietnamese Support, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; monthly reports of PSA, Quang Nam, to MACCORDS, in files of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., hereafter cited as CMH Files.
22. Parker Comments.
23. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Summary and Overview, p. 41; III MAF and 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec 70; Hixson Debrief; Peabody Debrief.
24. Simmons Debrief; the quotation is from undated memo in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70, tab B-21; the same source contains memos for the record of the conferences; other records of the conferences are contained in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
25. Simmons Debrief.
26. Parker Report.
27. *Ibid.*; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, pp. 19-20; PSA, Quang Nam, Report to MACCORDS for Period 1-31May70, dtd 1Jun70, in CMH Files.

28. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar70, p. 12, gives the HES figures for the end of February 1970. For continued VC underground and guerilla strength, consult Grinalds Transcript, *passim*. See also III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 13Dec69, Anx R, pp. 20-1.
29. Parker Report.
30. Hixson Debrief.
31. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 27; Peabody Debrief.
32. Col P.X. Kelley ltr to CG1stMarDiv, Subj: Restricted Fires on Intel and Preemptive Targets, dtd 20Oct70, Box 6, 1stMarDiv Admin Files.

CHAPTER 8

THE STRUGGLE FOR SECURITY: COMBINED ACTION

Unless otherwise noted, the information contained in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist, 70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Dec70; and *IDA Pacification Study* and *Pacification Study Docs*.

Combined Action Platoons

Additional sources for this section are: Combined Action Force Fact Sheet, dtd 31Mar70, in CAF History & SOP Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs, hereafter CAF Fact Sheet; Col T. H. Metzger, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 13 July 70, Tape 4899 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Metzger Debrief; Lt Col J. J. Tolnay, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 19May71, Tape 5009 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Tolnay Debrief.

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, pp. 19-20; CAF ComdC, Jan70; 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th CAG ComdCs, Jan70.
2. CAF ComdC, Jan-Feb70.
3. CGXXIV Corps LOI to COCAF, dtd 3May70, in CAF ComdC, Mar70; *ibid.*, Jul70.
4. III MAF O 3121.4B, Subj: SOP for the Combined Action Program, dtd 22Jun68, in CAF History and SOP Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs; CGXXIV Corps, LOI to COCAF, dtd 3May70, in CAF ComdC, Mar70; CAF Fact Sheet; Tolnay Debrief; Col Theodore E. Metzger, comments on draft ms, 22Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Metzger Comments.
5. Metzger Comments.
6. Consul F. T. McNamara, Political Advisor to CGXXIV Corps, ltr to LtGen Melvin Zais, dtd 14Mar70 and Col T. H. Metzger ltr to CGXXIV Corps via C/S XXIV Corps, Subj: Consulate-CORDS Survey of CAP villages, comments concerning, dtd 24Mar70, both in CAF History & SOP Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs, hereafter Metzger ltr Mar70.
7. Metzger Debrief; CAF Fact Sheet.
8. For curriculum of the school, see CAF ComdC, Feb70.
9. Metzger Debrief.
10. Metzger ltr Mar70; 3d CAG ComdC, Mar70, pt. II; 2d CAG ComdC, Oct70, pts. I and II.
11. CGXXIV Corps LOI to COCAF, dtd 3May70, in CAF ComdC, Mar70.
12. Metzger Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec69, p. 32; CAF Fact Sheet, see especially Encl 7, "A Discussion of the Mobile CAP Con-

- cept;" 4th CAG ComdC, May-Jun70. For the change in mission of the RF and PF, see MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, p. 31.
 13. 2d CAG ComdC, Mar70, pt. II; for month-by-month CAG operations, see 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th CAG ComdCs, Jan70 through month of deactivation.
 14. CAF Fact Sheet; Metzger Debrief.
 15. CAF Fact Sheet.
 16. 4th CAG ComdC, Jan-Feb70; 3d CAG ComdC, Jan and Mar70.
 17. Metzger Debrief.
 18. Tolnay Debrief.
 19. 3d CAG ComdC, May-Jun70.
 20. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar70, p. 14, Dec70, p. 32; CAF ComdC, May70, pt. III; 1st CAF ComdC, Mar, Jul70; 2d CAG ComdC, Feb-Apr, Aug70; 4th CAG ComdC, Apr-May70.
 21. LtCol D. F. Seiler ltr to COCAF, Subj: Vietnamization of CAP Areas in the 1st CAG, dtd 19Apr70, in CAF ComdC, May70, hereafter Seiler ltr.
 22. *Ibid.*
 23. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, p. 17.
 24. For civic action details and statistics, see 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th CAG ComdCs, Jan through month of deactivation 70.
 25. Metzger Comments.
 26. Metzger Debrief; Metzger also believed that the CAGs needed full-time chaplains and more medical and dental services for their Marines.
 27. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 92-93; the quotation is from Tolnay Debrief.
 28. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 92-93.
 29. Tolnay Debrief.
 30. Tom Harvey, comments on draft ms, 16Jan84 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Harvey Comments.
 31. Metzger ltr Mar70; Seiler ltr; 1st CAG ComdC, Feb70, pt. II; 4th CAF ComdC, Jan-Jul70.
 32. 4th CAG ComdC, Feb70, p. 11.
 33. 4th CAG Spot Report, dtd 12Jan70, in 4th CAG ComdC, Jan70.
 34. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 92-96; Metzger Debrief; for the ambush of the Binh Ky CAP, which occurred on 8Jul, see 2/1 S-2 Jnl, 8Jul70 and S-3 Jnl 8Jul70, both in 2/1 ComdC, Jul70.
 35. Harvey Comments.
 36. Tolnay Debrief. The CORDS survey early in 1970 found village response to CAPs generally favorable; see Consul Francis T. McNamara, Political Advisor to CG XXIV Corps, ltr to LtGen Melvin Zais, dtd 14Mar70, in CAF SOP & History Folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs.
 37. CAF Fact Sheet; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Summary and Overview, p. 39.
 38. Francis J. West, Jr., *The Village* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 283-287.
- #### Reducing the Combined Action Force
39. LtGen H. Nickerson, Jr., debriefing at HQMC, 17May70, Tape 6000 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); BGen G. E. Dooley, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 23Dec69, Tape 4733 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
 40. Dulacki Debrief.
 41. HQMC Message Files.
 42. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb70, p. 15; May70, pp. 17-18; CAF ComdC, Apr70, pt. III; 2d CAG ComdC, Feb70, pt. II; May70, pt. II; 3d CAG ComdC, Apr70, pt. II; 4th CAG ComdC, Apr70, pt. II; Metzger ltr Mar70.

43. CAF ComdC, May-Jun70.
44. Metzger Debrief, CAF ComdC, Jul70; 4th CAG ComdC, Jul70, pt. II.
45. CAF ComdC, Aug70, pts. II and III; Sep70; 1st CAG ComdC, 1-13 Sep70, pt. II; 2d CAG ComdC, Aug70, pts. II and III, Sep70, pts. I and II; 3d CAG ComdC, Jul70, pt. II; Aug70, pt. II, 1-7Sep70, pt. II.
46. 4th CAG ComdC, Jul70, pt. II; 1st CAG ComdC, Jun-Aug70; 3d CAG ComdC, Aug70, pt. II.
47. CAF ComdC, Sep70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep70, p. 12.
48. 2d CAG OpO, dtd 23Dec70, in Miscellaneous Sheets/Documents Folder, Box 4, Pacification Study Docs.
49. Tolnay Debrief.
50. 2d CAG ComdC, Sep-Nov70.
51. Ibid., Sep-Dec70; Tolnay Debrief.
52. Col Don R. Christensen, comments on draft ms, 12Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File).
53. This quotation, and unless otherwise noted, the material in the rest of this section is drawn from Tolnay Debrief.
54. Spot Reports, dtd 1 and 3Mar71, III MAF Jnl File, 1-12Mar71.

Building on Success: The Combined Unit Pacification Program

In this section, extensive use has been made of two sets of interviews: Capt D. J. Robinson II, et. al., M/3/1 in the CUPP intvws by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, 18Jan70, Tape 4735; and 1stLt T. M. Calvert, et.al., A/1/7 in the CUPP intvws by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, 25-27 May70, Tape 4848, both in Oral HistColl, MCHC. These tapes will be cited respectively hereafter as 1st Mar CUPP Intvws and 7th Mar CUPP Intvws, preceded by name of interviewee.

55. Dulacki intvw, pp. 68-70.
56. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov69, pp. 17-18, Dec69, pp. 35-36.
57. Col J. W. Haggerty III, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4965 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Haggerty Debrief; 3/5 FragO 9-70, dtd 6Feb70, in 3/5 ComdC, Feb70; Capt D. J. Robinson II, 1st Mar CUPP Intvws.
58. Haggerty Debrief.
59. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, pp. 21-22; 1st Mar ComdC, Jan70; 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, dtd Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70; 3/26 ComdC, Jan70; 3/5 ComdC, Feb70.
60. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar70, p. 15, Apr70, p. 18; 1st Mar ComdC, Mar70; 3/5 ComdC, Mar70; 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70.
61. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Sep70, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Dec70, in 2/5 ComdC, Dec70; 2/1 ComdC, Sep70; 3/5 ComdC, Sep70.
62. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70; for comparison, see Capt D. J. Robinson II, 1st Mar CUPP Intvws.
63. 3/5 FragO 9-70, dtd 6Feb70, in 3/5 ComdC, Feb70.
64. Sgt Danny H. Walker, 7th Mar CUPP Intvws; 1stLt T. M. Calvert, 1st Mar CUPP Intvws; 3/5 ComdC, Jul70.
65. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Apr70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Apr70.
66. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, p. 20; 7th Mar CUPP Progress Reports, Jan, Mar, Apr, Jun, and Jul70, in 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan Mar, Apr, Jun, and Jul70; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Sep70, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; 3/5 ComdC, Apr-Jun70.

67. 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Nov-Dec70, in 2/5 ComdC, Nov-Dec70.
68. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, p. 12; 7th Mar CUPP Progress Reports, Jan-Sep70, in 7th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Sep70; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Sep-Dec70, in 2/5 ComdCs, Sep-Dec70.
69. Cpl Mitchell Y. Jefferies, 7th Mar CUPP Intvws.
70. 2dLt R. H. Mansfield III, 7th Mar CUPP Intvws.
71. 2dLt G. T. Olshevsky, 1st Mar CUPP Intvws.
72. 2dLt J. D. Hopkins, 1st Mar CUPP Intvws; Sgt D. H. Walker, 7th Mar CUPP Intvws.
73. PFC D. A. Bronzy, 7th Mar CUPP Intvws; Capt D. J. Robinson II, 1st Mar CUPP Intvws.
74. 3/26 ComdC, Jan7, pt. III.
75. Sgt D. H. Walker, 7th Mar CUPP Intvws.
76. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70; 2dLt R. H. Mansfield III, 7th Mar CUPP Intvws.
77. Cpl M. Y. Jefferies, 7th Mar CUPP Intvws.
78. 2dLt R. H. Mansfields III, *ibid*.
79. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jan70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jan70; for additional impressions of village reaction to the CUPPs, consult 1st Mar and 7th Mar CUPP Intvws, *passim*.
80. Sgt W. J. Dignan, 1st Mar CUPP Intvws.
81. Cpl M. Y. Jefferies, 7th Mar CUPP Intvws.
82. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Mar70, in 7th Mar ComdC; CUPP actions and casualties can be followed month by month in the 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan-Sep70; the 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep-Dec70; and in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Dec70, section on Pacification and Rural Development. Simmons Debrief gives a division-level evaluation of the CUPP program.
83. 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jul70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jul70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, p. 12.
84. Darning Debrief.

CHAPTER 9

THE SPECTRUM OF PACIFICATION AND VIETNAMIZATION, 1970

Unless otherwise noted, the information contained in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist, 70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Dec70; and *IDA Pacification Study* and Pacification Study Docs.

Line Units in Pacification

1. For the plans for a typical large County Fair in 1970, see 2/1 OpOrder 001-70, dtd 22May70, in 2/1 ComdC, May70; for results of this cordon and search, see 2/1 S-3 Jnl, 27May70, in *Ibid*.
2. 3/1 ComdC, Oct, Nov, Dec70; Grinalds Debrief.
3. Grinalds Debrief. LtGen Zais, the XXIV Corps commander, favored shorter County Fairs to minimize civilian resentment; see LtGen M. Zais, USA, Opening Remarks at XXIV Corps Commanders' Conference, 22Mar70, in Melvin Zais Papers, U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
4. 1stMarDiv Staff Memo, Subj: Summary of Discussion, QDSZ Conference, 20Mar70, dtd 23Mar70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70, tab B-21; III MAF OPlan 18-70 (Rice Denial), dtd 9Sep70, in III MAF ComdC, Sep70.

5. MACV ComdHist, 70, ch. 8, pp. 61-66; 1stMarDiv Fact Sheet, Subj: Plans for Election Security, dtd 27Aug70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; for a typical regimental election security order, see 7th Mar FragO 27-70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Jun70.
6. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 19-20.
7. Darning Debrief; 7th Mar FragO 17-70, in 7th Mar ComdC, Apr70.
8. 2/7 OpOrder 8-70, dtd 16Apr70, in 2/7 ComdC, Apr70.
9. Darning Debrief; 2/7 ComdC, Apr-May70.
10. Darning Comments.
11. 2/7 ComdC, Apr-Jun70; 1/7 ComdC, Apr-Jun70.
12. 2/1 ComdC, Sep, Nov70; Grinalds Debrief.

Kit Carson Scouts in 1970

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 15-16; 1stMarDiv, Kit Carson Scouts, Background Data, dtd 21Jun70, and 1stMarDiv, KCS Program Fact Sheet, ca. Aug70, both in Narrative Notes 1970 Notebooks, 1stMarDiv Documents.

13. For salaries see MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8 p. 74; MACV on 31Mar71 raised all KCS salaries 2,500 piastres per year to keep their wages comparable to ARVN pay scales.

Targeting the VCI

14. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, p. 39.
15. III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 13Dec69, Anx R, pp. 4-5.
16. *IDA Pacification Study*, 2, 7-11; MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, pp. 39-40; GVN 1970 P&D Plan, Anx II, pp. 2-3.
17. 1stMarDiv, Briefing Notes, "Viet Cong Infrastructure in Quang Nam Province," dtd Apr70, in Enemy OOB Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; Grinalds Debrief; Maj J. S. Grinalds intvw, 8May71, pp. 9-15 (Oral HistColl MCHC), hereafter Grinalds Transcript.
18. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 19-20.
19. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 71-3.
20. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, pp. 40-41; *IDA Pacification Study*, 2, pp. 91-95; GVN 1970 P&D Plan, Anx II.
21. III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 13Dec69, Anx C.
22. Parker Report; PSA, Quang Nam, Report to MACCORDS for 1-30Jun70, dtd 1Jul70, CMH Files.
23. Capt Charles O. Pflugrath, USA, memo to PSA, Quang Nam, Subj: Status of PHX/PH in Quang Nam Prov, dtd 26Nov70, in Quang Nam Prov PHX/PH Briefing Folder, Box 1, Pacification Study Docs, hereafter Pflugrath Memo.
24. Pflugrath Memo; Parker Report; Quang Nam PSA, Comments on Phung Hoang, Nov70, in Quang Nam Prov PHX/PH Briefing Folders, Box 1, Pacification Study Docs; Grinalds Debrief; Grinalds Transcript, pp. 34, 86-87.
25. III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 13Dec69, Anx C.
26. 2/1 CAAR, dtd 5Aug70, in 2/1 ComdC, Aug70; Grinalds Debrief.
27. LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 10Nov70, HQMC Message Files; Grinalds Transcript, pp. 17-18.
28. Grinalds Debrief; Grinalds Transcript, pp. 53-54; Acting PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV, for Period 1-31Dec70, dtd 3Jan71, in CMH Files; 1st MarDiv/2d ROKMC

- Brig/QDSZ Conference Agenda, dtd 4Dec70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
29. Grinalds Debrief; LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Sutherland, dtd 6Dec70, HQMC Message Files.
30. Grinalds Debrief.

Civic Action 1970

31. Lt D. R. Nicoll, "Civic Action—What Is It?," in U.S. 7th Air Force, Civic Action Newsletter, 31Mar70, Att. 1, hereafter cited as Nicoll, "Civic Action."
32. Col Louis S. Hollier, Comments on draft ms, 31Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File).
33. Ibid.
34. III MAF/ICTZ Combined Campaign Plan 1970, dtd 13Dec69, Anx H.
35. 1stMarDiv G-5 Overview, dtd 31Dec70, in Narrative Notes 1970 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
36. Peabody Debrief.
37. Capt Meredith H. Mead, USN, comments on draft ms, 8Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).
38. Peabody Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 25-26.
39. Col Clifford J. Peabody, comments on draft ms, 19Apr86 (Vietnam Comment File).
40. Peabody Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec69, pp. 40-41; Col Khien, Prov Ch, Quang Tri, memo to CGIIIMAF Subj: 3d MarDiv Childrens Hospital, dtd 2Sep70; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Child Care Center, dtd May71; 3d MAB Supplemental Data Sheet C, Subj: Child Care Center, dtd 27Apr71; all in Narrative Notes 1971 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
41. 3/5 ComdC, Apr70, pp. 3-8.
42. Debrief of Col Garth K. Sturdevan, C/S, FLC, dtd 12Jun70, tab E; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, p. 28; III MAF ComdC, Sep70, pp. 26-27; for an example of civic action by an aircraft group, see MAG-16 ComdC, Feb70.
43. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 16-18, Dec70, p. 27; MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. 5, pp. 57-58; CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, Subj: Summary of Go Noi Island Resettlement Project, dtd 7Aug70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70, hereafter 1stMarDiv, Go Noi Summary; Col N. L. Beck, debriefing at FMFPac, 16Jul70, Tape 4893 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Beck Debrief; and Metzger Debrief.
44. 1stMarDiv, Go Noi Summary; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 18-19.
45. 1stMarDiv Staff Memo, Subj: Summary of Discussion—2d ROKMC/QDSZ/1stMarDiv Conference, 26Jun70, dtd 26Jun70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70, tab B-21; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 18; 2d CAG ComdC, Jul70, pt II; Metzger Debrief.
46. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, p. 23, Aug70, p. 28, Sep70, pp. 16-17, Dec70, pp. 27-28.
47. For a general discussion of the continuing doctrinal confusion over civic action, see Nicoll, "Civic Action."
48. 2d CAG ComdC, Jul70, pt. III, p. 14.
49. Peabody Debrief.
50. Ibid.
51. Grinalds Transcript, p. 103.
52. Simmons Debrief.

Communist Counter-Pacification Efforts

The continuing terrorist activity during the year can best be followed through the III MAF, 1stMarDiv, and 1st, 5th, and 7th Mar

ComdCs and the ComdCs of the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th CAGs for 1970 which contain the Marines' count of incidents in their areas of operation.

53. 1st CAG ComdC, Feb70, pt. III, p. 1.
54. 2d CAG ComdC, Mar70, pt. II.
55. 4th CAG ComdC, May70, pt. III; 2d CAG ComdC, Jun70, pts. II and III, see also *ibid.*, Jul-Dec70.
56. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 20-21.
57. 5th Mar Jnl, 13Jun70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Jun70; 3/5 ComdC, Jun70, pt. II, and Jnl, 13Jun70.
58. PSA, Quang Nam, Report to MACCORDS for 1-31May70, dtd 1Jun70, CMH Files.
59. Grinalds Transcript, p. 56; Grinalds Debrief.
60. 3/5 Jnl, 21Mar70, in 3/5 ComdC, Mar70; this incident had a tragic aftermath when members of a CUPP unit grenaded a bunker into which they thought the VC had fled, killing two civilians, one a five-year-old boy, and wounding three others.
61. 2/1 ComdC, Sep70, pt. II, sec. C; 3/5 Jnl, 14Nov70, in 3/5 ComdC, Nov70; 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 19Dec70.
62. VC propaganda leaflet, n.d.
63. 1st CAG ComdC, Jan70, pt. III, p. 6.
64. 2d CAG ComdC, Jan70, pt. III.
65. This account of the fight at Phu Thanh is drawn from the following sources: 1st Lt Thomas S. Miller, et. al., intvws by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, dtd 15-16Jun70, Tape 4868 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Phu Thanh Interviews, preceded by name of interviewees; 7th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jun70; in 7th Mar ComdC, Jun70; MajGen Widdecke msg to LtGen McCutcheon, dtd 11Jun70, HQMC Message Files.
66. Cpl Robert M. Mutchler, Phu Thanh Interviews.
67. *Ibid.*
68. Cpl Robert M. Mutchler, 1stLt Thomas M. Miller, both in Phu Thanh Interviews.
69. 1stLt Thomas M. Miller, in *ibid.*
70. 5th Mar Jnl, 30Aug70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Aug70.
71. Cpl Robert M. Mutchler, Phu Thanh Interviews.
72. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 104-105.

Vietnamization

73. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 7, pp. 1-3, 15-16.
74. 1stMarDiv O 5080.10, dtd 7Jun70, Supporting Document 5 in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jun70.
75. PSA, Quang Nam, Report to MACCORDS, 1-30Jun70, dtd 1Jul70, CMH Files; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 25, Aug70, pp. 26-27; 1stMarDiv Staff Memo, Subj: Summary of Discussion QDSZ Conference, 24Apr70, dtd 26Apr70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70, tab B-21.
76. These negotiations can be traced through the record of the 1stMarDiv/QDSZ/2d ROKMC Conference, tab B-21, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70; 1stMarDiv G-3, QDSZ Agenda Item, dtd 19Jun70, 1stMarDiv Agenda Item for QDSZ Conference of 28Aug70, Subj: Turnover of Mine Sweeps, dtd 25Aug70, both in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
77. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, pp. 67-68; MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 7, pp. 37-39; FMFPac, MarOps, Jul70, p. 21; 1st Mar ComdC, Feb70, Jun70; 3/1 ComdC, Feb70, May70, Jun70; 1/5 ComdC, Apr70.
78. 1stMarDiv Staff Memo, Subj: Summary of Discussion, QDSZ Conference, 27Mar70, dtd 28Mar70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70,

tab B-21; CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 22Jul70, in XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH; MajGen Armstrong msg to LtGen Sutherland, dtd 3Aug70, in HQMC Message Files; Grinalds Transcript, pp. 7-9.

79. CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70, XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH; MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 7, p. 99; Acting PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-31Dec70, dtd 3Jan71, in CMH Files; favorable Marine views of the South Vietnamese forces can be found in the following interviews, all in Oral HistColl, MCHC: Grinalds Debrief; Grinalds Transcript, pp. 121-22; LtGen H. Nickerson debriefing at HQMC, 17May70, Tape 6000, hereafter Nickerson Debrief (HQMC); Col R. A. Heywood, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Dec69, Tape 4732; Col G. C. Fox, debriefing at FMFPac, 6May70, Tape 4806; Dulacki Debrief; Hixson Debrief.
80. CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70; LtGen Sutherland msg to Gen Rosson, Dep ComUSMACV, dtd 10Aug70, in XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH.
81. CGIIIMAF msg to CG XXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70, in *ibid.*
82. Nickerson Debrief (HQMC); Beck Debrief; *IDA Pacification Study*, 2, pp. 64-70.
83. Grinalds Debrief; PSA, Quang Nam, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-30Nov70, dtd 1Dec70, in CMH files.

Results, 1970

84. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, pp. 8-11, 89-90; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, p. 22, Nov70, pp. 9-11.
85. *IDA Pacification Study*, 3, p. 330; see also 3, pp. 322-339.
86. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 26-29; MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, p. 24; Acting PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-31Dec70, dtd 3Jan71, CMH Files.
87. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 8, pp. 48-49.
88. PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-31Jul70, dtd 2Aug70, in CMH Files.
89. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 29-30; for 1969 figure, see Dec69, p. 30; Hixson Debrief.
90. PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for period 1-31Jul70, dtd 2Aug70, and for period 1-30Sep70, dtd 1Oct70, both in CMH Files; Hixson Debrief; Peabody Debrief; CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70, in XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH.
91. Nickerson Debrief.
92. Sir Robert Thompson, *Peace Is Not at Hand* (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1974), p. 78.
93. CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 9Aug70, in XXIV Corps Message Files, CMH.

PART IV

Winding Up and Winding Down

CHAPTER 10

ALLIED STRATEGIC AND REDEPLOYMENT PLANS FOR 1971

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from MACV ComdHist, 70 and ComdHist, 71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct-Dec70; Jan-Feb71; III MAF ComdC, various dates.

Military and Pacification Plans for 1971

1. MACV, ComdHist, 71, ch. 1, pp. 7-8, ch. 4, pp. 5-8.
2. MR 1/XXIV Corps Combined Campaign Plan 1971, dtd 29Dec70, Box 9, RG 338 (71A7122), FRC, Suitland, Md., hereafter 1/XXIV Corps CCP71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 24.
3. MR 1/XXIV Corps CCP71, Anx L; LtGen James W. Sutherland, USA, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, period 18Jun70-9Jun71, dtd 31Aug71 (Copy in MCHC); XXIV Corps ORLL, period ending 30Apr71, dtd 17May71 (Copy in MCHC); XXIV Corps LOI, CCP71, dtd 5Jan71, Box 9, RG 338 (71A7122), FRC, Suitland, Md; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, 24Apr73 and 24Aug76, pp. 71-72 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Robertson Transcript.
4. MACV ComdHist, 71, I, ch. 7, pp. 1, 9-10; *IDA Pacification Study*, 3, pp. 339-343.

Final Plans for Redeployment and the MAB

Additional sources for this section are: 3d MAB Planning Notebook, 1st MarDiv Documents, hereafter 3d MAB Notebook; Message Files, LtGen James W. Sutherland, in U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., hereafter Sutherland Messages.

5. Robertson Transcript; Col F. A. Hart, Jr. memo to Asst C/S G-3, 1st MarDiv, Subj: Artillery Mix for 3d MAB, dtd 4Nov70, 3d MAB Notebook; Col J. W. Haggerty, Debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4965 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); LtGen Jones msg to LtGen Van Ryzin, dtd 26Sept70, HQMC Msg Files.
6. CincPac's views are summarized in LtGen Jones msg to LtGen McCutcheon, dtd 4Nov70, HQMC Msg Files.
7. LtGen Sutherland msg to Gen Abrams, dtd 9Nov70, in Sutherland Messages.
8. Gen Abrams msg to LtGen Sutherland, USA, dtd 14Nov70, Sutherland Messages.
9. Col F. A. Hart, Jr. memo to ADC, 1st MarDiv, Subj: MAB Planning Conference of 5 November 1970, dtd 5Nov70, 3d MAB Notebook, hereafter MAB Conference Memo; Gen Abrams msg to Distribution List, dtd 3Nov70, HQMC, Msg Files.
10. MAB Options and Trooplists for 3d MAB Options, dtd 31Oct70, 3d MAB Notebook.
11. MAB Conference Memo.
12. LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 5Nov70, HQMC Msg Files.
13. LtGen Jones msg to Gen Chapman, dtd 7Nov70, and Gen Chapman msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 7Nov70, HQMC Msg Files; Col F. A. Hart, Jr. memo to ADC, 1stMarDiv, Subj: MAB Structure Planning, dtd 8Nov70, 3d MAB Notebook.
14. Col F. A. Hart, Jr., memo to ADC, 1stMarDiv, Subj: Increment VI Redeployment and 3d MAB Planning, dtd 10Nov70, 3d MAB Notebook.
15. Draft of msg from CG1stMarDiv to CGIIIMAF, dtd 11Nov70, 3d MAB Notebook.
16. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 32.
17. MajGen Widdecke msg to LtGen McCutcheon, dtd 14Nov70 and McCutcheon msg to Widdecke, dtd 28Nov70, HQMC Msg Files.
18. The details of schedule planning can be followed in 3d MAB Notebook; III MAF ComdC, Jan71, pp. 20-26; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70, p. 22.
19. MajGen Armstrong msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 15Dec70, and LtGen Jones msg to Armstrong, dtd 22Dec70, HQMC Msg Files;

Organization Chart, III MAF (Rear), dtd 1Jan71, 3d MAB Notebook. 20. Simmons, "Marine Operations," p. 142; III MAF ComdC, Jan71, p. 7; LtGen Jones msg to LtGen Robertson, dtd 5Feb71, HQMC Msg Files.

A New Commander for III MAF

21. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 20Oct70; LtGen Jones msg to LtGen McCutcheon, dtd 7Nov70; LtGen McCutcheon msg to Gen Abrams, dtd 12Nov70; ComUSMACV msg to LtGens McCutcheon, Sutherland, and Jones, dtd 14Nov70; LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 15Nov70; LtGen Jones msg to Gen Chapman dtd 16Nov70; all in HQMC Msg Files.
22. Lt Gen Herman Nickerson, Jr., intvw, 10Jan73, pp. 115-17 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
23. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Louis Metzger, dtd 28Nov70, and ltr to MajGen George A. Bowman, dtd 11Dec70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers; Simmons, "Marine Operations,"
24. Robertson Transcript, p. 56.

Military Situation in Quang Nam and Military Region 1, Early 1971

25. III MAF ComdC, Jan71, p. 6; FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun71, pt. IV; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 29.
26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 12; MACV ComdHist, 71, I, ch. 8, p. 29; 1stMarDiv msg, dtd 31Dec70, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-10Jan71; CGXXIV Corps, Daily Forecast of Operations, dtd 28Jan71, in III MAF Jnl File, 22-30Jan71.
27. XXIV Corps, 1st Semi-Annual Written Summary, CCP71, dtd 17July71, Box 9, RG 338 (72A7122) and BGen Charles A. Jackson, USA, Dep Sr Advisor, I Corps, memo to LtGen Sutherland, Subj: Territorial Artillery for I Corps/MR 1, dtd 9Jan71, RG 319 (319-74-051), both in FRC, Suitland, Md.; Acting Prov Sr Advisor, Quang Nam, Report to MACV for Period 1-31Dec71, for period ending 31Jan71, dtd 2Feb71, and for period ending 28Feb71, dtd 3Mar71, all in CMH Files; CGXXIV Corps msg to PSAs of Quang Nam and Quang Ngai, dtd 4May71, Box 25, Folder 26, RG 319 (72A6443), FRC, Suitland, Md.
28. Robertson Transcript, pp. 47-49.
29. For an optimistic assessment of the enemy situation, see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, p. 7, and Dec70, p. 12; Grinalds Debrief.
30. LtGen James W. Sutherland, USA ltr to MajGen Thomas M. Tarpley, USA, dtd 1Feb71, Box 6, Folder 1, RG 319 (319-74-051), FRC, Suitland, Md.
31. MACV ComdHist, 71, I, ch.4, p. 21, II, Anx E, pp. 15-17.

CHAPTER 11

MARINES IN OPERATION LAM SON 719

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from: MACV ComdHist, 70, and ComdHist, 71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Apr71; and III MAF ComdC. Also extensively relied upon for events in Lam Son 719 is XXIV Corps, Operation Lam Son 719 AAR, dtd 14May71, MACV Microfilm Records, Reel 158, MCHC, hereafter XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR. Much material on the role of Marine aviation in the offensive is taken from 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, "A History of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 1 November 1970 -14 April 1971," hereafter 1st MAF ComdHist70-71. The III MAF commander's view is in Robertson, Transcript.

The Preemptive Strike: Lam Son 719

1. XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR; 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, pt. II, ch. 4, p. 4; MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, pp. 15-17.
2. Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret), *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, N.Y., 1976), pp. 271-272.
3. This account of the plans for Lam Son 719 is based on MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, pp. 15-25, and XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR.
4. Col Verle E. Ludwig, comments on draft ms, 14Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
5. Robertson Transcript, p. 59; 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, p. B-8; III MAF ComdC, Feb71, pp. 19-20; CGIIIMAF msg to CG1stMAW and CG1stMarDiv, dtd 6Feb71, Box 25, RG 319 (72A6443), FRC, Suitland, Md. On 21Jan71, XXIV Corps issued a cover plan aimed at deceiving the enemy as to the purpose of the concentrations of troops for Lam Son 719; see CGXXIVCorps msg to Subordinate Units, dtd 21Jan71, in III MAF Jnl File, 13-21Jan71.
6. Robertson Transcript, p. 43.
7. The following account of the Laotian offensive is based on: MACV ComdHist, 71, Anx E, passim.; LtGen James W. Sutherland, Jr., USA, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, Period 18Jun70-9 Jun71, Copy in MCHC, pp. 29-30, hereafter Sutherland Debrief; ComUSMACV, msg to CJCS, dtd 14Feb71; ComUSMACV msgs to CJCS and CincPac, dtd 16Feb71 and 1Mar71; Gen Weyand msg to Adm McCain, dtd 13Apr71, all in MACV Documents, FRC, Suitland, Md., Copies in MCHC; XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR.
8. MajGen Nguyen Duy, *Lam Son 719* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979); Col John G. Miller, comments on draft ms, 19Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Miller Comments.
9. For summaries and comments on ARVN deficiencies, see: MACV ComdHist, 71, II Anx E, passim.; Lam Son 719 Working Papers and Notes, MACV Microfilm Records, Reel 100, MCHC; LtCol Robert R. Darron, intvw 3Jun76 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), pp. 41-45, hereafter Darron Transcript. See also XXIV Corps Lam Son AAR; MajGen Alan J. Armstrong intvw, 25Sept73, p. 31 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Armstrong Transcript; LtGen Marshall N. Carter, comments on draft ms, 28Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Carter Comments.
10. LtGen Sutherland msg to Gen Abrams, dtd 18Mar71, MACV Documents, Suitland, Md., copy in MCHC is an example of the U.S. concern about the speed of the Vietnamese withdrawal.
11. The armored brigade losses are summarized in XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR; for the artillery pieces abandoned, see MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 43. See also Miller Comments.

Marine Fixed Wing Air Support and the ASRT

12. Robertson Transcript, pp. 59-62.
13. 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, pt. II, ch. 4, p. 6; 1st MAW ComdC, Feb71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 25. It should be noted that the sortie and bomb tonnage figures in the command chronology differ from those in the 1st MAW ComdHist, which are lower (for example 5508 sorties in the ComdHist to 534 in the ComdC). Throughout the accounts of Marine aviation in Lam Son 719, we have used the command history's figures where there is disagreement among the sources, as some apparently exclude missions in Laos that were not in support of the ARVN offensive.
14. 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, p. A-1; 1st MAW News Release No. 137-71, in 1st MAW ComdC, Mar71.

15. 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, pt. II, ch. 5, p. 6; 1st MAW ComdC, Mar71 and 1-14 Apr71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 28. For a summary of Air Force operations, see MACV ComdHist, 71, Anx E, pp. 39-42.
16. MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 39.
17. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 57-58, Jan-Feb71, p. 25, Mar-Apr71, pp. 29-30; 1st MAW ComdHist 70-71, pt. II, ch. 4, pp. 20-21, ch. 5, p. 6; 1st MAW News Release No. 175-71, 1st MAW ComdC, Mar71.
18. XXIV Corps ORLL, period ending 30Apr71, dtd 17May71, copy in MCHC.

Marine Helicopters Over Laos

Additional sources for this section are: HMMH-463 ComdC, Jan-Mar71; HML-367 ComdC, Jan-Mar71; and MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, debriefing at FMFPac, 29June71, Tape 5010 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Armstrong Debrief.

19. Darron Transcript, pp. 64-65; MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 44.
20. Robertson Transcript, pp. 64-65.
21. 3d MAB News Release No. 6-71, dtd 25Apr71, 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71.
22. HMMH-463 ComdC, Jan-Feb71; 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, pt. II, ch. 4, pp. 7-9, B-10—B-12.
23. MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 20; 1st MAW News Release No. 91-71, 1st MAW ComdC, Feb71; Darron Transcript, pp. 42-43.
24. Robertson Transcript, pp. 62-64; XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR, Anx N, App 1.
25. XXIV Corps ORLL, period ending 30Apr71, dtd 17May71, p. 8, copy in MCHC.
26. 3d MAB News Release No. 6-71, dtd 25Apr71, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71; 1st MAW COC, msg to III MAF COC, dtd 26Feb71, in III MAF Journal & File, 19-28Feb71.
27. Armstrong Debrief; see also Armstrong Transcript, pp. 21-23, and Darron Transcript, pp. 50-52.
28. FMFPac, Citation for Distinguished Flying Cross for Capt Robert F. Wemheuer, in Hist&MusDiv Citation Files, 1971; 1st MAW News Release No. 141-71, in 1st MAW ComdC, Mar71.
29. FMFPac, Citations for Navy Commendation Medals for Capt Henry J. Cipolla and GySgt Ronald S. Severson, in Hist&MusDiv Citation Files, 1971; Darron Transcript, pp. 65-67.
30. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 22-23, 28-29; 3d MAB News Release No. 39-71, dtd 13May71 (delayed) in 3d MAB Jnl File, May71, describes a typical day of Cobra operations; FMFPac, Citation for Air Medal for Maj Malcolm T. Bird, and Citation for Air Medal for 1stLt Michael L. Bartlett, both in Hist&MusDiv Citation Files, 1971.
31. Armstrong Transcript, p. 12; HML-367 ComdC, Feb71; 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, p. A-1.
32. Quoted in 3d MAB News Release No. 6-71, dtd 25Apr71, 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71.
33. 3d MAB News Release No. 9-71, dtd 30Apr71, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30 Apr71.
34. HMMH-463 ComdC, Mar71; XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR, Anx N, App 1.
35. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 24-25; XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR, Anx N, App 1; for comparative Army helicopter statistics, see MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, pp. 37-39.

Marine Trucks on Route 9

Additional sources for this section are: Co C, 11th MT Bn CAAR, dtd 24Feb71, in 11th MT Bn ComdC, Feb71, hereafter Co C CAAR.

36. CGIIIMAF msg to CGs of 1st MAW and 1stMarDiv, dtd 6Feb71, Box 25, RG 319 (72A6443), FRC, Suitland, Md.
37. Robertson Transcript, pp. 59-60.
38. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 37; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb71, p. 27; Co C CAAR.
39. The following account of Co C's operations is taken from Co C CAAR; and XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR, Anx N, App 2.
40. Robertson Transcript, p. 43.
41. 1stMarDiv FragO 5-71, dtd 14Feb71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 9-16Feb71.
42. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb71, p. 21.
43. XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR, Anx N.
44. Headquarters Bn, 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Feb-Mar71; Capt Ronald C. Hood III, intvw, tape 6345 (Oral HistColl, MCHC). See also Himmerich Comments.

Diversion Off Vinh

An additional source for this section is LtCol Jon R. Robson and Maj William J. Sambito, intvw, 28June76, Tape 6178 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Robson/Sambito Intvw.

45. CinCPac msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 31Dec70, in CinCPac Message Files, Navy History Division.
46. ComUSMACV msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 4Feb71, MACV Documents, FRC, Suitland, Md., copy in MCHC.
47. 31st MAU ComdC, Jan71, p. 2; BLT 3/9 ComdC, Feb71; Robson/Sambito Intvw.
48. 31st MAU ComdC, Feb71, p. 2.
49. 31st MAU, Proposed OPlan 1-71, dtd 6Feb71, tab F, 31st MAU ComdC, Feb71; BLT 3/9 OPlan 1-71, dtd 7Feb71, in 3/9 ComdC, Feb71.
50. 31st MAU ComdC, Feb71, pp. 3-4; CGXXIV Corps msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 7Feb71; CTG76.4/CTG 79.4 msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 7Feb71; CGIIIMAF msg to CG 1st MAW, dtd 7Feb71; all in III MAF Jnl File, 31Jan-8Feb71; Robson/Sambito Intvw.
51. Robson/Sambito Intvw; BLT 3/9 ComdC, Feb71.
52. The following account of the diversion is drawn from 31st MAU ComdC, Feb-Mar71; BLT 3/9 ComdC, Feb-Mar71; and Robson/Sambito Intvw. All quotations not otherwise cited are from the latter source.
53. Robson/Sambito Intvw.
54. Capt Tracy H. Wilder, Jr., USN, comments on draft ms, 14Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File)

Results of Lam Son 719

55. MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 34; Gen Weyand msg to Adm McCain, dtd 13Apr71, MACV Documents, FRC, Suitland, Md., copy in MCHC.
56. MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E, p. 45; see also pp. 33-35.
57. Sutherland Debrief, pp. 6-7.

CHAPTER 12

LAST OPERATIONS OF III MAF, JANUARY-MARCH 1971

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Mar71; MACV ComdHist, 71; III MAF and

1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Mar71. Army documents cited from Records Groups 319 and 338 are located in the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md. Extensive use has been made of the Robertson Transcript.

Plans for the Army Takeover of Quang Nam

1. Col J. W. Haggerty, III, Debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4965 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
2. Robertson Transcript, pp. 70-71.
3. The following account of this conference is based on LtCol J. C. Love memo to Asst C/S G-3, 1stMarDiv, Subj: Turnover of Marine Responsibility/Property to U.S. Army, dtd 26Jan71, in 3d MAB Planning Notebook, 1stMarDiv Docs, hereafter cited as Love Memo.
4. For 196th Brigade operations in Antenna Valley, see CGXXIV Corps msg to III MAF, dtd 13Jan71, and CG23dInfDiv msg to XXIV Corps, dtd 14Jan71, both in III MAF Jnl File, 13-21Jan71.
5. Love Memo; Robertson Transcript, pp. 72-73.
6. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Feb71, III MAF Jnl File, 31Jan-8Feb71; CG1stMarDiv msg to Units of 1stMarDiv, dtd 8Feb71, 3d MAB Planning Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.
7. Gen Abrams msg to LtGen Robertson and other Commanders, dtd 17Feb71, in Sutherland Message Files, U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH); MACV ComdHist, 71, Supplement, p. 9.
8. CG23dInfDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 18Feb71, in 23d Div Msg File, Box 1/2, 72A811, RG 338; CG23dInfDiv msg to XXIV Corps, dtd 12Mar71, III MAF Jnl File, 1-12Mar71; 23dInfDiv FragO 14-71, dtd 21Mar71, III MAF Jnl File, 13-25Mar71; 196th Inf Bde, Admin/Logistics Plan 1-71 (Dominion Run), related to OPlan 4-71, dtd 21Mar71, Box 1/2, 72A811, RG 338.
9. Robertson Transcript, pp. 70-71.
10. CG23dInfDiv, LOI No. 12, Subj: Repositioning of the 196th Infantry Brigade, dtd 24Mar71, Box 9, 72A5711, RG 319; Robertson Transcript, pp. 70-71.

Operations in Quang Nam, January-February 1971

All award citations are from Microfilm Citation Files, RefSec, MCHC, hereafter Microfilm Citation Files.

11. III MAF ComdC, Jan71, pp. 16-17; Col E. A. Timmes, debriefing at FMFPac, 14Dec70, Tape 4980 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Timmes Debrief.
12. Timmes Debrief.
13. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 14; XXIV Corps 1st Semi-Annual Written Summary, CCP71, dtd 17Jul71, Box 9, 72A7122, RG 338; III MAF ComdC, Feb71, pp. 8, 13-14; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan and Feb71; CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 13Jan71, 1stMarDiv FragO 1-71, dtd 13Jan71, both in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 11-20Jan71; Bronze Star Citations for SSgt Jack D. Flannery, MGySgt George E. Whitehurst, SSgt Edward S. Fugier, Sgt James A. Roy, and Cpl Larry R. Favreau, 1971, Microfilm Citation Files.
14. III MAF ComdC, Feb71, pp. 13-14.
15. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 4-5, 13-14; Senior Advisor, 1st Task Force Operations Summary, dtd 3Feb71, III MAF Jnl File, 31Jan-8Feb71, gives ARVN disposition on a typical day.
16. MACV ComdHist71, I, ch. 4, p. 21.
17. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 5Jan71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-10Jan71; CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 15Mar71, 2/1 ComdC, Mar71; 1/1 ComdC, Jan71, II-B, p. 1, II-C, p. 3.
18. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan-Feb71; 1/1, 2/2, and 3/1 ComdCs, Jan-Feb71.

19. 1st Mar FragO 001-71, dtd 3Jan71, in 2/1 ComdC, Jan71.
 20. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan71, sec II-C, p. 5, Feb71, sec II-B, pp. 1-2.
 21. 1st Mar FragO 002-71, dtd 13Jan71, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan71; 1st Mar FragO 003-71, dtd 8Feb71, and FragO 004-71, dtd 22Feb71, *Ibid.*, Feb71; 1stMarDiv FragO 6-71, dtd 7Feb71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-8Feb71.
 22. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 6; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan71, pp. 19-20, 22; 1st Mar ComdC, Jan71, sec II-B, pp. 1-3, sec II-C, pp. 1-4; 1/1 FragO 03-71, n.d., in 1/1 ComdC, Jan71, see also pt. III, pp. 1-3; 3/1 ComdC, Jan71, sec II-C, p. 1; 1/11 ComdC, Jan71, p. 9.
 23. 1stMarDiv FragO 2-71, dtd 20Jan71; 1stMarDiv msg to 1st and 11th Mar, 1st Recon Bn, dtd 10Feb71; both in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 11-20Jan71 and 9-16Feb71; 1/11 ComdC, Jan-Feb71; 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jan-Feb71, 3d 8-Inch Howitzer Battery (SP) ComdC, Jan71.
 24. 1stMarDiv FragO 3-71, dtd 29Jan71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 21-31Jan71; 1st Mar ComdC, Feb71; 3/1 ComdC, Feb71; Bronze Star Citation for LCpl Paul Barkley and Supporting Documents, Reel 76, Microfilm Citation Files.
 25. 5th Mar ComdC, Jan-Feb71; 1/5, 2/5, 3/5 ComdCs, Jan-Feb71.
 26. 1stMarDiv msg to 5th Mar, dtd 6Jan71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-10Jan71; 1/5 ComdC, Jan71.
 27. CG 1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Jan71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 11-20Jan71; 5th Mar ComdC, Feb71; 2/5 and 3/5 ComdCs, Jan-Feb71; 1/11 ComdC, Feb71.
 28. 3/5 Forward CP Journal, 1-31Jan71, in 3/5 ComdC, Jan71.
 29. 2/5 ComdC, Jan71, pp. 4, 14-20.
 30. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Jan71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 11-20Jan71; casualty figures are taken from III MAF ComdC, Jan-Feb71.
 31. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan71, p. 23; HML-367 ComdC, Jan-Feb71.
 32. FMFPac, MarOpV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 1-2, 8-9; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan71, pp. 18-23; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Jan71, dtd 4Feb71, in 2/5 ComdC, Jan71; CORDS Quang Nam PSA Report for period ending 31Jan71, dtd 2Feb71, CMH Files, describes the South Vietnamese pacification campaign.
 33. 5th Mar ComdC, Feb71, p. 2; 2/5 ComdC, Jan71, p. 11.
 34. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb71, p. 22; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, Feb71, dtd 2Mar71, in 2/5 ComdC, Feb71.
 35. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Feb71; 5th Mar ComdC, Feb71, p. 8.
 36. FMFPac, MarOpV, Jan-Feb71, p. 1.

Keystone Robin Charlie Begins

37. FMFPac, MarOpV, Jan-Feb71, p. 2, 32; III MAF ComdC, Feb71, pp. 17, 19, 22; MAG-11 ComdC, Feb71; 1st MAW ComdHist70-71, pt. II, ch. 4, pp. 2-3, App B, pp. 7-12; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb71, p. 21.
 38. FMFPac, MarOpV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 31-32, Mar-Apr71, pp. 29, 33-34; ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 24Feb71, CG1stMAW msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 26Feb71, in III MAF Jnl File, 19-28 Feb71.
 39. 1stMarDiv FragO 4-71, dtd 8Feb71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-8Feb71; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb71, p. 25; 3/5 ComdC, Feb71.
 40. 11th Mar ComdC, Feb71, pt. II; 1/11 ComdC, Feb71; 1st Mar ComdC, Feb71, sec II-C, pp. 1-2; CGXXIV Corps msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 15Feb71, III MAF Jnl File, 9-18Feb71; CG1stMarDiv msg to 11th Mar, dtd 16Feb71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 9-16Feb71.
 41. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 16Feb71, III MAF Jnl File, 9-18Feb71, pp. 5, 12-13.
 42. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 23Feb71; CG1stMarDiv msg to 1st Mar, 1/5, and 11th Mar, dtd 18Mar71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File,

17-28Feb71 and 15-31Mar71; 1stMar msg to CG1stMarDiv, dtd 20Feb71, 3d MAB Planning Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; 1stMarDiv OpO 1-71, dtd 28Feb71, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar71, tab B-14, also p. 21; 2/5 ComdC, 1-22Mar71.
 43. 1st Mar FragO 005-71, dtd 1Mar71, 1st Mar ComdC, Mar71; 1/5 ComdC, Feb-Mar71; CG 1stMarDiv msgs to 1st Mar, dtd 10 and 15Mar71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-14Mar71, 15-31Mar71.
 44. 1/11 ComdC, Mar71.
 45. 1/5 ComdC, Mar71, pt. III; 1st Recon Bn, ComdC, Mar71.
 46. 1st Mar FragO 006-71, dtd 19Mar71, 1st Mar ComdC, Mar71; 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdCs, Mar71.
 47. 1/11 ComdC, Mar71.
 48. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar71, pp. 20-21; 11th Mar ComdC, Mar71, pt. II; 5th Mar ComdC, Mar71, 26Mar-13Apr71; MAG-11 ComdC, Mar71, p. 4; MACG-18 ComdC, Mar71, p. 4; 1st MAW ComdHist 70-71, II, ch. 5, pp. 2-3, App B; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 5.
 49. 1/1, 2/1, 3/1 ComdCs, Mar71; 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Mar71.
 50. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 23-25.
 51. *Ibid.*
 52. CG1stMarDiv msg to 1st Mar, dtd 27Mar71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 15-31Mar71; 1st Mar msg to 1/1, 2/1, and 3/1, dtd 27Mar71, in 3/1 ComdC, Mar71.
 53. 1stMarDiv Change 2 to 1stMarDiv FragO 61-70, dtd 28Mar71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 15-31Mar71; FMFPac, MarOpV, Mar-Apr71, p. 7.

The Pacification Effort Diminishes

54. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, p. 9; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb71, p. 22; CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 11Feb71, and msg to 1st Mar, dtd 13Feb71, CG 1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 18Mar71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 6-16Feb71, 15-31Mar71; 1/1 ComdC, Mar71, pt. III, p. 2; msg to 3/1, dtd 17Feb71, in 3/1 ComdC, Feb71.
 55. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar71, p. 21; 5th Mar ComdC, Feb71, p. 3; 5th Mar CUPP Progress Report, 1-31Mar71, dtd 9Mar71, in 2/5 ComdC, 1-22Mar71.
 56. 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, p. 17; CG1stMarDiv msg to 5th Mar, dtd 13Mar71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 15-31Mar71.
 57. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 11; 2d CAG ComdC, Jan-Mar71.
 58. CORDS Quang Nam PSA, Report for period ending 31Mar71, dtd 2Apr71, CMH Files; 2d CAG ComdC, Mar71.
 59. LtCol John J. Tolnay, debriefing at FMFPac, 19May71, Tape 5009 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Tolnay Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 10.
 60. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 5Mar71, Folder 24, Box 25, 72A6443, RG 319.
 61. Tolnay Debrief.
 62. 2d CAG ComdC, Feb71; for civic action details, see III MAF, 1stMarDiv, and 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Mar71, and ComdCs for subordinate units for the same period.
 63. CORDS Quang Nam PSA, Report for period ending 31Mar71, dtd 2Apr71, CMH Files; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan71, p. 29, Feb71, p. 28, Mar71, p. 27.
 64. 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Marine Corps Reserve Civic Action Fund for Vietnam, dtd May71, tab 18 in 3d MAB Fact Sheets, May71.
 65. CORDS Quang Nam PSA, Report for period ending 28Feb71, dtd 3Mar71, CMH Files.
 66. Robertson Transcript, pp. 83-84, MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, debriefing at FMFPac, 29Jun71, Tape 5010 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); BGen Edwin H. Simmons, transcript of orientation talk to new lieu-

- tenants in 1stMarDiv, ca. early 71 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), p. 45; *Sea Tiger*, 15Jan71, p. 3; for typical traffic incidents, see 1st MP Bn ComdCs, 1970-1971; an unusually serious Marine-ARVN confrontation is reported in CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 27Feb71, Folder 24, Box 25, RG 319 (71A6443).
67. CGIIIMAF msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 6Mar71, Folder 24, Box 25, 72A6443, RG 319; Robertson Transcript, p. 61.
68. BGen Edwin H. Simmons memo to CG, FMFPac, Subj: Debriefing, Vietnam Service, 15Jun70-24May71, 1stMarDivDocuments.
69. Robertson Transcript, pp. 83-84.

The Enemy Grows Bolder

70. III MAF ComdC, Jan71, pp. 17-18, Feb71, pp. 14-15, Mar71, pp. 16-17; the disarming of the PSDF is in 5th Mar ComdC, Jan71, p. 3.
71. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan71, sec II-B, p. 1; Spot Report, dtd 16Jan71, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 11-20Jan71; III MAF ComdC, Feb71, pp. 14-15. Innumerable other instances of terrorism can be found in III MAF, 1stMarDiv, and subordinate unit ComdCs.
72. 2/1 S-2 Jnl, 27Mar71, in 2/1 ComdC, Mar71; see also *Ibid.*, sec III-A, p. 1; 2/1 Spot Report, dtd 4Mar71, III MAF Jnl File, 1-12Mar71.
73. 1st Mar msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 16Mar71, 1st Mar ComdC, Mar71; 1stMarDiv msg to Subordinate Units, dtd 17Mar71, 2/1 ComdC, Mar71; CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 27Mar71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 15-31Mar71; III MAF ComdC, Mar71, pp. 14, 16; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar71, pp. 15-16; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 17.
74. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 16-18; III MAF ComdC, Mar71, p. 11; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar71, pp. 17-18; 1st Mar ComdC, Mar71, sec II-B, p. 1.
75. Unless otherwise noted, the following account of the battle of Duc Duc and the role of Marine helicopters in it is based on: XXIV Corps ORLL, period ending 30Apr71, copy in MCHC; CG3dMAB msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 22Apr71, in Narrative Notes 1971 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; III MAF ComdC, Mar71, pp. 15-16; CORDS Quang Nam PSA Report for period ending 31Mar71, dtd 2Apr71, CMH Files; HML-367 ComdC, Mar71; Documents Supporting Distinguished Flying Cross Citations for SSgt Karl S. Brooks and Sgt Donald B. Jelonek, Reel 88, Microfilm Citation Files; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71.
76. HML-367 ComdC, Mar71.
77. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 12-13; 2d CAG ComdC, Mar71.
78. 3/1 ComdC, Mar71, pt. III-A, p. 11; Bronze Star Citation for 1st Lieutenant Steven A. Kux, Reel 103, Microfilm Citation Files.
79. III MAF ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pp. 12-13; 1stMarDiv ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pp. 16-17; 1st Mar ComdC, 1-14Apr71, sec II-B, p. 1.
80. 3d MAB CG's Command Information Notebook, Apr71, p. G-2-6, 1stMarDiv Documents; 1stMarDiv ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pp. 14-15.
81. III MAF ComdC, 1-14Apr71, p. 12.

CHAPTER 13

THE MARINES LEAVE DA NANG

Operations in Southern Quang Nam, 1-13 April 1971

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is taken from MACV ComdHist, 71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, May-Jun71;

- III MAF ComdC, 1-14Apr71; and 1stMarDiv ComdC, 1-14Apr71. All citations to numbered Record Groups (RGs) refer to records in the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Md., unless otherwise indicated. Frequent reference is made to 196th Bde situation reports Box 3/4, RG 338 (73A1545), hereafter cited as 196th Bde SitRep with dates(s).
1. 1/1 ComdC, 1-13Apr71; 2/1 ComdC, 1-14Apr71; 3/1 ComdC, 1-14Apr71.
 2. 1stMarDiv ComdC, 1-14Apr71, p. 17.
 3. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret.), conversation with author, 25Aug76.
 4. III MAF FragO 8-71, dtd 7Apr71, in III MAF Jnl File, 7-14Apr71; 1st Mar FragO 007-71, dtd 7Apr71, in 1st Mar ComdC, 1-14Apr71.
 5. MajGen Roy E. Moss, comments on draft ms, 27Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Moss Comments.
 6. 1st MAW ComdHist 70-71, ch. III, p. 3.
 7. Events of this operation can be followed in detail in 2/1 S-2 Operational Journal, Operation Scott Orchard, 8-11Apr71, in 2/1 ComdC, 1-14Apr71. This account is also based on: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 7-8; III MAF ComdC, 1-14Apr71, p. 8; 1st Mar ComdC, 1-14Apr71; 1/11 ComdC, 1-14Apr71; HML-367 ComdC, 1-14Apr71; Co. A, 1st Recon Bn, ComdC, 1-14Apr71, Patrol Reports for Teams Stone Pit, Achilles Roadtest, Lynch Law, and Ice Bound.
 8. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 10Apr71, and msg to 1st Mar, dtd 14Apr71, in 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-14Apr71; 1st Mar ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pt. II-C, pp. 1-2; 3/1 ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pt. II; 1/11 ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pt. II; CG23dInfDiv msg to Subordinate Commands dtd 10Apr71, Box 25, Folder 25, RG 319 (72A 6443); 196th Bde SitReps, 5-6Apr71, 11-12Apr71, 12-13Apr71; CGUSARV msg to II FForceV and CGXXIV Corps, dtd 30Mar71, Box 25, Folder 24, RG 319 (72A 6443).

Activation and Operations of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade

This section draws heavily on: 3d MAB Planning Notebook in 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter cited as 3d MAB Notebook; and Armstrong Debrief.

9. LtGen Jones, msg to LtGen Robertson, info MajGen Wilson, dtd 5Feb71, HQMC Message Files.
10. BGen Edwin H. Simmons memo to C/S III MAF, Subj: 3d MAB Planning Staff, dtd 24Feb71, 3d MAB Notebook; see also LtCol J. C. Love memo to G-3, 1stMarDiv, Subj: Activation of 3d MAB Hq, dtd 3Feb71 3d MAB Notebook.
11. CGIIIMAF msg, dtd 27Feb71, quoted in C/S, 3d MAB, Memo for the Record, Subj: Weekly Activities Summary, dtd 8Mar71; C/S 3d MAB, Memo for the Record, Subj: III MAF Coordinating Conference, dtd 6Mar71; C/S 3d MAB, Memo for the Record, Subj: 3d MAB Planning Staff Meeting of 10Mar71, dtd 11Mar71; C/S 3d MAB, Memo for the Record, Subj: Meeting with Headquarters Commandants of III MAF, 1stMarDiv, and 3d MAB, dtd 11Mar71; LtCol J. C. Love memo to G-3, 1stMarDiv, Subj: 1st MAW Integration into 3d MAB, dtd 5Feb71; all these documents are in 3d MAB Notebook.
12. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret.), conversation with author, 25Aug76; CGFMFPac msg, dtd 15Mar71, quoted in C/S 3d MAB memo to CG III MAF, Subj: Weekly Activities Summary, dtd 22Mar71, 3d MAB Notebook.
13. The Simmons quotation is from BGen Edwin H. Simmons memo to CGFMFPac, Subj: Debriefing, Vietnam Service

5Jun70-24May71, dtd 24May71, 1stMarDiv Documents. Armstrong's remarks are from Armstrong Debrief. Planning Document for Building the MAB Headquarters, dtd 24Jul70; 1stMarDiv Artillery Officer memo to C/S, 1stMarDiv, Subj: Div FSCC/MAB FSCC, dtd 14Mar71; both in 3d MAB Notebook; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 2-3.

14. 3d MAB, Proposed Increment VII Standdown and Departure Schedule, dtd 22Mar71, 3d MAB Notebook.

15. C/S 3d MAB, Memo for the Record, Subj: 3d MAB Staff Meeting, dtd 26Mar71, Ibid; III MAF ComdC, 1-14Apr71, p. 17; Capt Ronald C. Hood III, intvw, 3Mar78, Tape 6345, (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Himmerich Comments.

16. MACV ComdHist, 71, Supplement, pp. 10-11; 1stMarDiv ComdC, 1-14Apr71, p. 19; 1st Mar FragO 008-71, dtd 12Apr71, in 1st Mar ComdC, 1-14Apr71, also Ibid., pt. II; 1/1 ComdC, 14-30Apr71, pt. 11; 1/11 ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pt. II; 2d CAG ComdC, 1-14Apr71.

17. 2/1 FragO 009-71, dtd 12Apr71, in 2/1 ComdC, 1-14Apr71; see also Ibid., pts. II and III.

18. Robertson is quoted in *Sea Tiger*, 14Apr71; III MAF ComdC, 1-14Apr71, p. 6; 1stMarDiv ComdC, 1-14Apr71, p. 19; 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, p. 21.

19. Col Don H. Blanchard, comments on draft ms, 2Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).

20. 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, p. 4; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 3, 20, 32-33.

21. 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, p. 17; MAG-11 ComdC, 16-30Apr71, p. 4; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, p. 19.

22. 1st Mar ComdC, 14-30Apr71, pt. II; 2/1 ComdC, 15-30Apr71; 3/1 ComdC, 15-30Apr71, pt. II; 2d CAG ComdC, 14-30Apr71; Co A, 1st Recon Bn ComdC, 14-30Apr71, p. 3.

23. 1/11 ComdC, 14-30Apr71, pt. II and S-3 Journal; 1st Mar ComdC, 14-30Apr71, pt. II, gives the figures on rounds fired and the details of the artillery bombardment of La Bong.

24. Senior Advisor, 1st Task Force, msg to Dep Sr Advisor, ICorps/MR 1, dtd 18Apr71, Box 25, Folder 25, RG 319 (72A 6443); FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 16.

25. 3d MAB FragO 07-71, dtd 22Apr71, in 3d MAB Jnl File, 14-30Apr71; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Operations Review for ACMC Visit, dtd 30Apr71, in Narrative Notes 1971 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; 1/1 ComdC, 1-13Apr71, pt. II; 2/1 ComdC, 15-30Apr71, pt. III; 3/1 ComdC, 15-30Apr71, pt. II; CG23dInfDiv msg to CGXXIV Corps, dtd 23Apr71, in 23d Div Message File 1971, Box 1/2, RG 338 (72A811).

26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 44; 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, p. 19.

27. The quotation is from 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, pp. 10-11, see also pp. 13-14; 1st Mar ComdC, 14-30Apr71, pt. II; XXIV Corps ORLL, period ending 30Apr71, dtd 17May71; 23d Div ORLL, period ending 15Oct71, dtd 1Nov71, copies in MCHC.

28. 3/1 ComdC, 15-30Apr71, pt. II.

29. 196th Bde SitRep, 29-30Apr71.

30. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr71, p. 6.

31. These figures are drawn from 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, pp. 4, 13-16, 42; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr, p. 6.

The End of Keystone Robin Charlie

32. LtCol Robert E. Wehrle, comments on draft ms, 9May83 (Vietnam Comment File).

33. MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx F, App 1, pp. 6-7; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 33-36; 1stMarDiv ComdC, 1-14Apr71, p. 18; 1/5 ComdC, 1-15Apr71, pt. II; MACG-18 ComdC, 1-14Apr71, pt. II; MWHG-1 ComdC, 1-14Apr71, p. 3, and 15Apr-30Jun71, pp. 3-4.

34. The Nixon quotation and description of the ceremony is in 1stMarDiv News Release No. 591-71, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, 14Apr-30Jun71; also in Ibid., see p. 16 and 1stMarDiv, Division Bulletin No. 5060, dtd 28Apr71; *New York Times*, 1May71.

35. 1stMarDiv News Release No. 592-71, dtd 30Apr71, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, 14-30Apr71, also Ibid., p.12.

Keystone Oriole Alpha: The Final Stand-Down

36. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 5, MayJun71, pp. 2, 4; 1st Mar FragO 009-71, dtd 26Apr71, in 1st Mar ComdC, 14-30Apr71; 1st Mar ComdC, 1-9May71, pt. II; 3/1 ComdC, 1-9May71, pt. II; 1/11 ComdC, 1-12May71, pt. III and S-3 Journal; CG 3d MAB msg to 1st Mar, dtd 24Apr71, 3d MAB Jnl File, 14-30Apr71; 2d CAG ComdC, 1-11May71; MAG-16 ComdC, May71, pt. II.

37. 196th Bde SitRep, 30Apr-1May71.

38. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 1-2; 3d MAB ComdC, May71, pp. 14, 31; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Operations Review for ACMC Visit, dtd 30Apr71, in Narrative Notes 1971 Notebook, 1stMarDivDocuments; 2/1 ComdC, May71.

39. The fight at Dai Loc is described in 3d MAB Journal Entry, dtd 2May71, in 3d MAB Jnl File, May71, and in Quang Nam Prov Sr Advisor, Report for period ending 31May71, dtd 2Jun71, CMH Files; casualty statistics for the battles in Dai Loc District are in FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 6-7; Grinalds Debrief and Tolnay Debrief contain optimistic assessments of RF/PF performance.

40. 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p. 12; 3d MAB Jnl File, May71.

41. Moss Comments.

42. 3d MAB FragO 02-71, dtd 4May71, in 3d MAB Jnl Files, May71; 3d MAB ComdC, May71, pp. 12-13; 3d MAB Historical Summary, dtd 7May71, Narrative Notes 1971 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter 3d MAB HistSum, 7May71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 4-5, 7; 1/11 ComdC, 1-12May71, p. 2-2; 2d CAG ComdC, 1-11May71; 1st MP Bn ComdC, May71, pp. 4-5.

43. 3d MAB HistSum, 7May71.

44. Ibid.

45. 196th Bde SitRep, 7-8May71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 3.

46. 1st Mar ComdC, 10May-30Jun71, pt. II; 3/1 ComdC, 9 May-30Jun71, pt. II; for a brief summary of the 1st Marines' Vietnam service, See FMFPac MarOps, May-Jun71, pp. 3-4.

47. 1/11 ComdC, 1-12May71, S-3 Journal, and 13May-30Jun71, pt. III.

48. Robertson Transcript, p. 83; 1st Recon Bn ComdC, 1-13May71, pt. III; 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p. 15.

49. CG3d MAB msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 14May71, in 3d MAB Jnl File, May71; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Operation Review, ACMC visit, dtd 30Apr71, in Narrative Notes 1971 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.

50. The quotation is from 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p. 36; see also Ibid., 14-30Apr71, p. 24. The deactivation of 2d CAG is described in 2d CAG ComdC, 1-11May71, and Tolnay Debrief. For the ceremony at the Quang Tri Child Care Center, see 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p. 23, and 3d MAB Supplemental Data Sheet D, Subj: Child Care Center, ca. May71, Narrative Notes 1971 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.

51. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 11-17; MAG-11 ComdC, May71, p. 5; MAG-16 ComdC, May71, pt. II.
52. 2/1 ComdC, May71, pt. III, Jun71, pt. III; 1/11 ComdC, 13May-30Jun71, pt. III.
53. The quotation is from MajGen Armstrong msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 6Jun71, HQMC Message Files. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 7-9, 52-53; 3d MAB ComdC, Jun71, pp. 6, 17; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jun71, pp. 8-9; MAG-16 ComdC, Jun71, pt. II.
54. MajGen Armstrong msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 6Jun71, HQMC Message Files.
55. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 57-60, contains a schedule of ship departures and the final figures on men and supplies redeployed.
56. Armstrong Debrief. For the plans, see Armstrong msg to LtGen Jones, dtd 31May71, HQMC Message Files.
57. Armstrong Debrief.
58. Ibid.
59. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 59-60; 3d MAB ComdC, Jun71, p. 6.
60. Himmerich Comments.

Quang Nam after the Marines Left

Unless otherwise indicated, material in this section is drawn from 196th Infantry Brigade, CAAR, Operation Caroline Hill, dtd 20Jul71, Box 39, RG 319 (319-73-51), hereafter cited as Caroline Hill CAAR.

61. Caroline Hill CAAR; 23d Inf Div FragO 14-71, dtd 21May71, in III MAF Jnl File, 13-15Mar71; Col William S. Hathaway, USA, transcript of intvw by 3d Military History Detachment, U.S. Army (Interview No. VNIT 890, CMH), p. 4.
62. MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx H, p. 13; XXIV Corps, 1st Semi-Annual Written Summary, CCP71, dtd 17Jul71, Box 9, RG 338 (72A7712); 23d Inf Div ORLL, period ending 15Oct71, dtd 1Nov71 (Copy in MCHC), pp. 3-4, 6; Caroline Hill CAAR; Quang Nam Senior Advisor, Report for period ending 31May71, dtd 2Jun71, in CMH Files.
63. MACV ComdHist, 71, I, ch. 4, pp.21-2; 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p.13; Lam's concern is expressed in CGI Corps msg to Quang Nam Province Chief, dtd 15May71, repeated in CGXXIV Corps msg to CG23dInfDiv, dtd 19May71, Box 9, Folder 37, RG 319 (72A5711).
64. LtGen James W. Sutherland, Jr., USA, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, period 18Jun70-9Jun71, dtd 31Aug71 (copy in MCHC).
65. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, info CGXXIV Corps, dtd 5Aug71, Box 9, Folder 39, RG 319 (72A5711).
66. XXIV Corps, 2d Semi-Annual Written Summary, CCP71, dtd 23Jan72, Box 9, RG 338 (72A7122); Da Nang City Advisor, Report for period ending 31Dec71, dtd 3Jan72, in CMH Files.

CHAPTER 14

CONTINUING OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS, 1970-1971

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Dec70, Jan-June71; and 1stMarDiv Comd C, Jan-Dec70, Jan-Apr71.

Protecting the Da Nang Vital Area

Additional sources for this section are: 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, Subj: Defense of the Da Nang Vital Area, dtd 12Aug70, hereafter cited as 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, and 3d MP Bn, Briefing for BGen Simmons, dtd 12Aug70, hereafter 3d MP Bn Briefing, both in Narrative Notes 1970 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents. Unless otherwise noted, all material is drawn from 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jan-Dec70 and Jan-Jun71 and 3d MP Bn ComdC, Jan-Jun70.

1. Quoted in Chester L. Cooper, Judith E. Corson, Laurence J. Legere, David E. Lockwood, and Donald M. Weller, *The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam*, 3 vols. (Arlington, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1972), 2, 247-248, 253. For social and economic problems in the DVA, see also CORDS Da Nang City Advisor Reports, Jan-Dec70 and Jan-Jun71, in CMH Files.
2. Organization Chart in CGIIIMAF Folder, Vietnam, vol. 2, Socio-Political, 1970, tab I, III MAF Mixed Topics File: LtGen Herman Nickerson, Debriefing at FMFPac, 17Mar70, Tape 6000 (Oral Hist-Coll, MCHC).
3. 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, pp. 1-3, tab C-1; 1st MAW OpOrder 303-YR, dtd 1Jan70, Anx E (Ground Defense). For background on Marine base defense methods and the arrival of the 1st MP Bn, see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb66, pp. 41-42, and Jun66, p. 33.
4. 3d MP Bn ComdC, Jan70; 3d MP Bn Briefing.
5. 3d MP Bn ComdC, Jun70, p. 3, 23Aug-15Oct70; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Aug70, p. 2; 3d MP Bn Briefing; 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, pp. 3-4, tabs G and H.
6. 1st MP Bn Fact Sheet, tab F-1; see also tab D-1; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jul70, pp. 4-5.
7. 1st MP Bn ComdC, Mar71, p. 4.
8. Dulacki intvw, pp. 83-84.
9. Dulacki Comments.
10. 1st MP Bn ComdC, May70, p. 10, Jul70, p.10, Oct70, pp. 9-11.
11. BGen Stewart C. Meyer, USA, Acting C/S XXIV Corps, ltr to CO, 366th Tactical Fighter Wing, dtd 3Jul71 (319 74 O51), RG 319, 23d Inf Div OpO 4-71, in 23d Div Op Planning Files 71 (72A753), RG 338, both in FRC, Suitland, Md.

Base Defense

12. This description of the An Hoa defense system is taken from 5th Mar OpO 1-70 (Defense of An Hoa Combat Base), dtd 26 Apr70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Apr70.
13. 5th Mar OpO 4-70 (Defense of Baldy Combat Base), dtd 25Oct70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Oct70.
14. 1/5 OpO 1-71, dtd 9Jan71; 1/5 FragO 1-71, dtd 4Jan71; 1/5 FragO 2-71, dtd 11Jan71; all in 1/5 ComdC, Jan71.
15. For the Keystone Robin Charlie troop redeployments, see 2/1 FragO 4-71, dtd 21Mar71, in 2/1 ComdC, Mar71.
16. For rocket and mortar fire statistics, see 1stMarDiv, Command Information Summary, Dec70, dtd 21Jan71, in Narrative Notes 70 Notebook, and 1stMarDiv Command Information Summary, Apr71, dtd 31Apr71, in Command Information Notebook, Apr71, both in 1stMarDiv Documents.

Intelligence: Collection and Use

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF ComdC, Jan-Dec70, Jan-Apr71; 1st MAW ComdC, Jan-Dec70, Jan-Apr71; Defense

Communications Planning Group Liaison Office No. 1, Briefing, Subj: Duffel Bag in 10 Minutes, dtd Feb69, in Narrative Notes 69 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter cited as Duffel Bag Briefing; 1stMarDiv, Sensor Program Briefing, dtd 12Dec70, in Narrative Notes 70 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter cited as 1stMarDiv Sensor Briefing; and BGen Edwin H. Simmons memo to CGFMFPac, Subj: Debriefing, Vietnam Service, 15Jun70-24May71, 1stMarDiv Documents, hereafter cited as Simmons Debrief. Extensive use has been made of the following tapes and transcripts, all in the Oral History Collection, History and Museums Division: Nickerson Transcript; Col Edward W. Dzialo, debriefing at FMFPac, 2July70, Tape 4888, hereafter Dzialo Debrief; Col John W. Canton, debriefing at FMFPac, 22Dec69, Tape 4737, hereafter Canton Debrief; Col John W. Haggerty III, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4965, hereafter Haggerty Debrief; Col Edward A. Timmes, debriefing at FMFPac, 14Sept70, Tape 4980, hereafter Timmes Debrief; LtCol Charles M. Mosher, debriefing at FMFPac, 17Sept70, Tape 4959, hereafter Mosher Debrief; Grinalds Debrief; and Grinalds Transcript.

17. Dulacki intvw, pp. 11-13.
18. Dulacki Comments.
19. Simmons Debrief.
20. VMO-2 ComdC, Jan-Dec70; Simmons Debrief.
21. The quotations are from Dzialo Debrief. 1st MAW G-2 ComdC, Feb70, Sept70; VMJ-1 ComdC, Jan-Jul70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 3-4; 1st MarDiv, OpO 301A-YR, dtd 10Dec69, Anx B (Intelligence); Dulacki intvw, p. 20; Canton Debrief.
22. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jan-Dec70, Jan-Mar71; Mosher Debrief; Haggerty Debrief; for infantry unit intelligence responsibilities, see 1stMarDiv, OpO 301A-YR, dtd 10Dec69, Anx B (Intelligence).
23. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, p. 3; Dzialo Debrief.
24. Timmes Debrief.
25. Quotation is from Grinalds Debrief; Timmes Debrief comments on importance of the capture of the Quang Nam Security Section documents.
26. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, pp. 12-16; Timmes Debrief; Grinalds Debrief comments on different questioning priorities of ITTs and CITs; Capt B. D. Voronin, debriefing at Camp Butler, Okinawa, 1971, 5065 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
27. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 38-39.
28. Grinalds Debrief; see also Grinalds Transcript, pp. 41-42.
29. SOP for the VIP is in 1stMarDiv Order 7000.4C, dtd 17Jul70, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, tab B-14; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, p. 16.
30. Nickerson Transcript, pp. 38-39; Dulacki Transcript, pp. 11-13, also recounts the difficulty of working with local agents; Dzialo Debrief emphasizes the necessity for agent networks among the people in waging a counter guerrilla campaign.
31. This account of signal intelligence is drawn from 1st Radio Bn ComdC, Jan-Dec70, Jan-Apr71. Besides monitoring enemy communications, the battalion also listened to American transmissions, noting and reporting violations of communications security.
32. Col Robert H. Piehl, comments on draft ms, 28Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File)
33. Haggerty Debrief; see also Mosher Debrief.
34. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 13-14; for early Marine Corps involvement in sensor development and use, see LtCol Robert R. Darron intvw, 3Jun76, pp. 90-8, 105-08 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Darron Transcript.
35. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 14-15; Duffel Bag Briefing, pp.

4-11. By early 1970, the Marines were using the Phase III system of sensors, roughly the third generation of the devices, in terms of sophistication of both sensing and transmitting capabilities; for the points of distinction between various models, see Darron Transcript, p. 110.

36. 1stMarDiv Sensor Briefing; Mosher Debrief.
37. Duffel Bag Briefing, p. 11; the quotation is from Col James R. Weaver, debriefing at FMFPac, 27Aug70, Tape 4981 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Weaver Debrief.
38. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 15-19; 1stMarDiv Sensor Briefing; Timmes Debrief.
39. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 19-20; 1st MAW G-2 ComdC, Mar70, pp. 2-3; Weaver Debrief; Mosher Debrief.
40. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 14-15, Jan-Feb71, p. 7, Mar-Apr71, p. 8; 1stMarDiv Sensor Briefing; 1stMarDiv, Command Information Summary, G-2 Overview, dtd 12Jan71, Narrative Notes 70 Notebook, and 1stMarDiv G-2 Overview, dtd 31Mar71, in 1stMarDiv Command Information Notebook, Mar71, both notebooks in 1stMarDiv Documents; Mosher Debrief. According to LtCol Mosher, MajGen Widdecke, as division commander, emphasized sensors less than his predecessor, MajGen Wheeler.
41. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 127-132; Simmons Debrief. For other comments on sensors, pro and con, see Timmes, Dzialo, and Mosher DebrieFs and FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 13, 18.
42. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb70, p. 9, Dec70, pp. 18-19; Dulacki intvw, p. 22; Canton Debrief; Dzialo Debrief; Haggerty Debrief; for activities of the division and wing G-2 sections, see for example 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70, pp. 10-15, and 1st MAW G-2 ComdC, Jul70, pp. 3-5. The division G-2 contained 46 officers and 110-115 enlisted men in mid-1970, see Mosher Debrief.
43. Grinalds Debrief; Metzger Debrief; 1stMarDiv/2d ROKMC Bde/QDSZ Conference Agenda, dtd 4Dec70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; Timmes Debrief; Acting PSA, Quang Nam Province, Report to ComUSMACV for the period 1-31Dec70, dtd 3Jan71, CMH Files.
44. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, p. 4; 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, pp. 7-10, May71, pp. 8-10; 1st Radio Bn ComdC, Mar71, pt. III, 1Apr-30June71.

The Boobytrap War

Additional sources for this section are: 1stMarDiv, Division Order P3820.2B, dtd 9Dec69, Subj: Countermeasures against Mines and Boobytraps, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, tab B-2, hereafter 1stMarDiv Mine/Boobytrap SOP; and the following 1st Marine Division historical interview tapes, all located in the Oral History Collection, History and Museums Division: Maj Dale D. Dorman, et. al. Boobytraps in the 2/1 TAOR, 3-4Feb70, Tape 4771, hereafter 2/1 Boobytrap intvws; 1st Lt Jack W. Klimp, et. al., Enemy Boobytraps Encountered by G/2/1, 29-30Apr70, Tape 4836, hereafter G/2/1 Boobytrap intvws; Enemy Boobytraps Encountered by H/2/1 and F/2/1, 6-10May70, Tape 4847, hereafter H & F/2/1 Boobytrap intvws; and 2dLt Herbert B. Stafford, et. al., Enemy Boobytraps, H/2/5, 10-11July70, Tape 4904, hereafter H/2/5 Boobytrap intvws. Interviews from these tapes will be cited by name of interviewee followed by the short title of the tape.

45. Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intvws.
46. Maj Dale D. Dorman, Ibid. For an instance of Vietnamese children planting a boobytrap, with disastrous consequences to themselves when they accidentally set it off, see 2/1 ComdC, Apr70, p. 6.

47. The first quotation is from Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intvws; the second is from Col Floyd H. Waldrop, debriefing at FMFPac, 19Aug70, Tape 4926 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Waldrop Debrief; the third is from Cpl Ted L. LeMay, H&F/2/1 Boobytrap intvws.

48. Maj Dale D. Dorman, 2/1 Boobytrap intvws; consult also 1stLt Burton I. Cohen, G/2/1 Boobytrap intvws.

49. Grinalds Debrief; consult also Sgt James G. Ingall, G/2/1 Boobytrap intvws, and Maj Dale D. Dorman, 2/1 Boobytrap intvws.

50. The following account of this incident is drawn from: SSgt Thomas G. Ringer, H/2/5 Boobytrap intvws, and 5th Mar Jnl, 22Apr70, in 5th Mar ComdC, Apr70.

51. CG1stMarDiv msg to DistribList, dtd 20Aug70, in Leadership & Discipline Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.

52. Sgt William Stanley, H&F/2/1 Boobytrap intvws; other comments on morale and tactical effects are Grinalds Transcript, pp. 124-125, and SSgt Thomas G. Ringer, H/2/5 Boobytrap intvws.

53. Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intvws; 2/1 ComdC, Jun70, pts. II and III. See 1/7 Jnl, 28May70, 1/7 ComdC, May70, for indications of Marine suspicion about the origins of ordnance children were turning in.

54. Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intvws .

55. 1stMarDiv Mine/Boobytrap SOP; 3d MP Bn ComdC, Mar70, p. 4; 3d MP Bn Briefing; 1st MP Bn ComdC, Aug70, p. 5.

56. 2dLt James R. Lindholm, G/2/1 Boobytrap intvws; for an instance of a dog tripping a boobytrap, see 1st MP Bn ComdC, Mar71, p. 17.

57. CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, Subj: Boobytrap Incident, dtd 4Dec70, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-11Dec70, is a typical injunction to Marines not to tamper with boobytraps or try to disarm them, including an account of the most recent example of a Marine ignoring this advice.

58. Sgt Thomas F. Massey, G/2/1 Boobytrap intvws; 1stMarDiv Mine/Boobytrap SOP.

59. Capt Dennis J. Anderson, 2/1 Boobytrap intvws.

60. Grinalds Transcript, pp. 123-124.

61. Grinalds Debrief; 2/1 ComdC, May, Jun, Jul, and Aug70.

62. Col William V. H. White, comments on draft ms, 6Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File).

63. Waldrop Debrief sums up the activities of the 5th and 7th Marines.

64. Maj Wallace M. Greene III, "Countermeasures against Mines and Booby Traps," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec69, pp. 31-32.

65. CG1stMarDiv msg to DistribList, dtd 20Aug70, in Leadership & Discipline Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.

66. Maj Dale D. Dorman, 2/1 Boobytrap intvws. 1stMarDiv Mine/Boobytrap SOP sums up training duties of unit commanders.

67. This account of the school's activities, including the quotations, is based on 1stMarDiv Public Affairs Office, Release No. 1069-70, dtd 17Oct70; also FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 76-77; and 1stMarDiv Command Information Summary, Dec70, dtd 12Jan71, G-3 Overview, in Narrative Notes70 Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents; hereafter 1stMarDiv ComdInfSum, Dec70; and 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Jan70 through Mar71.

68. 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Aug70, p. 1, Oct70, pts. II and III, Feb71, pt. II, Mar71, pt. II; Co A, 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, 14-30Apr71.

69. 1stMarDiv ComdInfSum, Dec70; 1stMarDiv G-3 Overview, Mar71, dtd 31Mar71, in 1stMarDiv Command Information Notebook, Mar71, 1stMarDiv Documents.

70. The account of this incident is taken from 1stMarDiv Press Release No. 1132-70, dtd 22 Nov70, and 2/5 Jnl, 22Oct70, in 2/5 ComdC, Oct.70.

71. Nickerson Transcript, p. 55. For an example of continuing division exhortations to Marines to take basic precautions, see 1stMarDiv, DivO 10126.1D, Subj: The Wearing or Carrying of Individual Combat Equipment, dtd 25 Dec70, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70, tab B-21.

72. For the 1970 casualty figures, see 1stMarDiv ComdInfSum, Dec70; for the 10Jan71 incident, see III MAF ComdC, Jan71, p. 11; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan71, p. 18; and 2/5 Jnl, 10Jan71, in 2/5 ComdC, Jan71.

73. Simmons Debrief.

PART V Supporting the Troops

CHAPTER 15

FIXED-WING AIR OPERATIONS, 1970-1971

Unless otherwise noted, information in this chapter is taken from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70, May-Jun71; MACV ComdHists, 70 and 71; 1st MAF ComdCs, Jan70, 1-14Apr71; 1st MAF ComdHist; and LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970," in History and Museums Division, HQMC, *The Marines in Vietnam 1954-1973* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), pp. 162-195, hereafter cited as McCutcheon, "Aviation in Vietnam." Extensive material also has been drawn from McCutcheon Papers and from MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, File of Papers Relating to Air Ground Relationships, 1969-1970, MCHC, hereafter cited as Armstrong Air/Ground File. The following interviews and debriefings from the Oral History Collection, History & Museums Division have been used extensively: LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon intvw, 22Apr71, hereafter McCutcheon Transcript; MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, debriefing at FMFPac, 29Jun71, Tape 5010, hereafter Armstrong Debrief, and intvw, 25Sep73 and 2Oct73, hereafter Armstrong Transcript; MajGen William G. Thrash, debriefing at FMFPac, 2Jul70, Tape 4850, hereafter Thrash Debrief; and Col Richard H. Rainforth debriefing at FMFPac, 20Aug70, Tape 4927, hereafter Rainforth Debrief.

1st MAF Organization, Strength, and Deployment

All information on 1st MAF strength, organization, and locations is taken from appropriate issues of FMFPac, MarOpsV, and the 1st MAF ComdCs.

1. MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. 6, p. 1.
2. Col Robert L. LaMar debriefing at FMFPac, 26Jun70, Tape 4852, Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter LaMar Debrief.
3. BGen Leo J. Dulacki, debriefing at FMFPac, Jun70, Tape 4853, (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
4. MajGen George S. Bowman, Jr., ltr to MajGen McCutcheon, dtd 23Dec69, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.
5. MajGen William G. Thrash, 1st MAF Briefing for Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., dtd 10Jan70, Armstrong Air/Ground File, here-

after Thrash, CMC Briefing; Col James R. Weaver, comments on draft ms, 18Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

6. Thrash Debrief; Col Walter E. Sparling debriefing at FMFPac, 9Nov70, Tape 4975 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Sparling Debrief; LaMar Debrief; Rainforth Debrief.

Coming to Terms with Single Management

This section is based on material from HQMC, Operational Control of III MAF Air Assets Reference File, Oct68-Oct70, in MCHC, hereafter cited as HQMC Air Control File. Extensive use also has been made of Gen Lucius D. Clay, Jr., USAF (Ret.), intvw, 6Oct77 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter cited as Clay Intvw.

7. MACJOO msg to CGIIIMAF, Subj: Single Management of Strike and Reconnaissance Assets, dtd 7Mar68, in G-3 III MAF Command Relations File, Nov68-27Dec70; McCutcheon, "Aviation in Vietnam," pp. 175-177, and McCutcheon Transcript, pp. 8-1; and Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 341-344, give the Marine and MACV views on the background and reasons for imposition of single management.

8. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 343-345. For Marine arguments against single management and proposals for overturning it, see HQMC Air Control File, passim.

9. LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., intvw, 10Jan73, pp. 88-90 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Nickerson Transcript; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Norman J. Anderson, dtd 14Sep70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.

10. Col Stanley G. Dunwiddie, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, Jun70, Tape 4891 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Dunwiddie Debrief.

11. The quotation is from Rainforth Debrief. HQMC Point Paper, Subj: Employment of Marine Corps Aviation in Land Combat Operations, dtd 31Dec69, in Operational Control of MAF Air Assets, Point Papers/Talking Papers/Misc. File; Thrash, CMC Briefing.

12. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Homer S. Hill, DC/S (Air), dtd 22Aug70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers; see also Rainforth Debrief.

13. ComUSMACV memo to CGIIIMAF, Subj: Proposed MACV Directive 95-4, dtd 25Dec68 and CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 12Jan69, HQMC Air Control File; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to LtGen Frank C. Tharin, DC/S (Plan&Policies), dtd 30Mar70, and ltr to MajGen Norman J. Anderson, dtd 14Sep70, both in Box 10, McCutcheon Papers; Rainforth Debrief.

14. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Charles S. Quilter, CG 1st MAW, dtd 19Nov68, Box 12, McCutcheon Papers.

15. For McCutcheon's view on the operational control issue, see HQMC Point Paper, Subj: DC/S (Air) Comments on Proposed CMCM 42-68, dtd 26Sep68, in Operational Control of III MAF Air Assets, Point Papers/Talking Papers/Misc. File; and McCutcheon, memo to DC/S Plans and Policies, Subj: SMS, dtd 14Nov68, in HQMC Air Control File.

16. USMACV Directive No. 10-11, dtd 5Apr70, in G-3 III MAF Command Relations File, Nov68-27Dec70; LtGen McCutcheon ltr to LtGen Frank C. Tharin, dtd 25Apr70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.

17. CGIIIMAF memo to ComUSMACV, Subj: Proposed Revision to MACV Directive 95-4, submission of, dtd 6Jul70, in HQMC Air Control File. For background to this draft, see LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Jones, info Gen Chapman, dtd 1Jul70, III MAF message files; LtGen McCutcheon ltr to BGen Homer S. Hill, 7Jul70, and ltr to LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., dtd 16Jul70, both in Box

10, McCutcheon Papers; also McCutcheon Transcript, p. 7.

18. McCutcheon ltr to Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., dtd 16Aug70, in HQMC Air Control File.

19. USMACV Directive No. 95.4, dtd 15Aug70, HQMC Air Control File; Rainforth Debrief.

20. McCutcheon Transcript, p. 7-8.

21. MajGen Homer S. Hill ltr to LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, dtd 31Aug70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers; this box contains numerous other comments on Directive 95.4 and explanation of it by McCutcheon, as does HQMC Air Control File.

22. Clay Intvw; LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, 24Apr73, pp. 66-7 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); McCutcheon Transcript, pp. 7-8.

23. Col Stephen G. Warren, comments on draft ms, 11Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

24. Clay Intvw; Armstrong Debrief; see also Armstrong Transcript, pp. 10-11, 28-30.

25. 1st MAW, ComdHist, pt. III, p. 15; Clay Intvw.

26. CMC memo to CGs FMFLant, FMFPac, and MCDEC, Subj: U.S. Air Operations in RVN, dtd 14Oct70, HQMC Air Control File.

27. Armstrong Transcript, pp. 30-32.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

Attacking the Ho Chi Minh Trail

29. MACV ComdHist70, pt. I, ch. VI, pp. 20-21.

30. Thrash, CMC Briefing.

31. McCutcheon, "Aviation in Vietnam," p. 182.

32. This account of Commando Bolt and Commando Bolt Assassin missions is based on: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 37, Dec70, p. 53; 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 1, p. 8; Col Neal E. Heffernan, debriefing at FMFPac, 29Jun70, Tape 4890 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Heffernan Debrief; and the following interviews by the 1st MAW Historical Team, all located in the Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv: Capt Lawrence G. Karch, 9Jan70, Tape 4756; 1stLt Walter F. Siller, Jr., 9Jan70, Tape 4757; Maj Carl H. Dubock, 9Jan70, Tape 4759; Capt Terrill J. Richardson, 6Apr70, Tape 4826; Maj John H. Trotti, 10Mar70, Tape 4784; 1stLt Arthur A. Vreeland, 6Jul70, Tape 4936; hereafter cited by name of interviewee and tape number.

33. 1stLt Arthur A. Vreeland, Tape 4936.

34. Capt Lawrence G. Karch, Tape 4756.

35. This description of TA-4F operations is based on: H&MS-11 ComdC, Jan-Sep70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep70, p. 23; Heffernan Debrief; LaMar Debrief; Capt Dallas J. Weber, intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 4May70 Tape 4838 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Weber Intvw.

36. Weber Intvw.

37. VMCJ-1 ComdC, Jan-Jul70; Rainforth Debrief.

38. Thrash, CMC Debrief; see also 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 1, p. 13; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, pp. 23-24; and Sparling Debrief.

39. Marine Corps Command Center (MCCC), Items of Significant Interest, dtd 5-6 May70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 33-34; VMEA-122 ComdC, May70; VMEA-314 ComdC, May-Jun 70.

40. MACV ComdHist70, I, ch. VI, p. 113; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 36-38, Jul70, pp. 31-32, Aug70, p. 35, Sep70, p. 23, Oct70, p. 22; H&MS-11 ComdC, Sep70; Col Robert W. Teller, debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4897 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Teller Debrief; Armstrong Transcript pp. 11, 68.

41. MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. VI, pp. 105-111, and ComdHist, 71, I, ch. VI, pp. 9, 29-30; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon msg to LtGen William K. Jones, dtd 27Sep70 and 24Oct70, and LtGen

Sutherland msg to LtGen McCutcheon, MajGen Milloy, MajGen Hennessey, BGen Jackson, and BGen Hill, dtd 9Oct70, in III MAF Message Files.

42. 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. I, pp. 5-8, 11-14, ch. 2, pp. 3-7; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, pp. 19-20, Dec70, pp. 53-55; VMA(AW)-225 ComdC, Nov70; VMA-311 ComdC, Nov70; VMEA-115ComdC, Dec70.

43. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon msgs to LtGen William K. Jones, dtd 24Oct70 and 9Nov70, and LtGen Jones msgs to McCutcheon, dtd 14Nov70, all in III MAF message files.

44. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 29, 48; VMCJ-1 ComdC, 1Jan-14Apr71 and 15Apr-30Jun71; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: EA-6A Deployment to Da Nang, RVN, dtd 1May71.

45. 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. III, pp. 6-7; VMA-311 ComdC, 1-7May71.

Air Support Trends in Military Region 1

46. MACV ComdHist, 70, I, ch. VI.

47. Thrash Debrief.

48. Monthly sortie totals for the entire year 1970 are given in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 47.

49. For a breakdown of air sorties by type of aircraft and forces supported, see *Ibid.*, p. 44.

50. Capt Charles W. Fish, intvw by 1st MAW Historical Teams, 14Apr70, Tape 4834 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Fish intvw.

51. MACV ComdHist, 70, Supplement, pp. 1, 24-25; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 41.

52. Col Frank A. Shook, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 5Oct70, Tape 4966 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Shook Debrief; Sparling Debrief; Rainforth Debrief.

53. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 20-21, Mar-Apr71, pp. 21-23.

Controlling Air Support

Additional source for this section is 1st MAW OpO 303-(YR), dtd 1Jan70, hereafter OpO 303-(YR), 70.

54. This description of the system for calling for and controlling strikes is drawn from: OpO 303-(YR), 70, Anx C; Maj John J. McNamara intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 13Apr70, Tape 4833 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter McNamara intvw; Shook Debrief; LaMar Debrief; Fish intvw.

55. Fish intvw; consult also Rainforth Debrief.

56. 1stLt Dennis R. Darnell intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 4May70, 4839 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Darnell intvw.

57. OpO 303-(YR), Anx C; Shook Debrief; McNamara intvw; Capt Terrill J. Richardson intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 6Apr70, Tape 4826 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

58. Unless otherwise noted, all material on the Beacon system is from: 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 5, pp. 15-16, 54-55; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 30-32; Sparling Debrief.

59. Sparling Debrief.

60. Armstrong Debrief; the following two interviews by the 1st MAW Historical Team and in the Oral HistColl, MCHC, sum up operating problems with the Beacon: 1stLt James J. Ewing, 4May70, Tape 4860; and 1stLt Robert C. McIntyre, 3Aug70, Tape 4943.

61. 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 3, p. 12; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 57-8; McNamara intvw; Fish intvw.

62. The quotation is from Armstrong Transcript, pp. 13-14; FMFPac,

MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 29-30, and May-Jun71, p. 17-18; Sparling Debrief; LtGen McCutcheon msg to LtGen Sutherland, dtd 22Sep70, III MAF message files.

CHAPTER 16

HELICOPTER OPERATIONS AND NEW TECHNOLOGY, 1970-1971

Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based on the sources cited at the beginning of Chapter 15.

Improving Helicopter Support of the 1st Marine Division

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF, Board Report for Utilization, Command, and Control of III MAF Helo Assets, dtd 25Apr69, hereafter cited as Youngdale Report.

1. LtCol James W. Rider, comments on draft ms, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rider Comments.

2. Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., Green Letter No. 17-69, dtd 4Nov69.

3. Youngdale Report, *passim.*, especially pp. 5-6; MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, Director Development Center, ltr to Gen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., dtd 19Nov69, in Armstrong Air/Ground File, see also Armstrong Transcript, pp. 14-15.

4. Thrash, CMC Briefing; also ltr to MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, dtd 19Jan70, in Armstrong Air/Ground File.

5. Armstrong Debrief; Thrash, CMC Briefing; Shook Debrief; Dunwiddie Debrief; McNamara intvw; Fish intvw.

6. Col Haywood R. Smith debriefing at FMFPac, 5Oct70, Tape 4970 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Smith Debrief; 1st MarDiv Bulletin 1500, dtd 9Mar70, tab B-9, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar70.

7. 1stLt Michael D. Langston intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 4May70, Tape 4892 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

8. Rider Comments.

9. 1stLt George S. Bennett intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 3Aug70, Tape 4945 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

10. Grinalds Debrief.

11. Rider Comments.

12. Thrash Debrief; Shook Debrief; for the Youngdale Board recommendation, see Youngdale Report, p. 15.

13. Armstrong Transcript, pp. 21-23; 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 4, pp. 27-31.

14. Armstrong Transcript, p. 43.

15. Armstrong Debrief.

Helicopter Operations

Helicopter sorties figures and other statistics are drawn from FMFPac, MarOpsV, for the appropriate months and from the year-end summary in the Dec70 volume, p. 41.

16. Teller Debrief.

17. *Ibid.*; Youngdale Report, pp. 16-19, specifies the flight hours for each helicopter type; Shook Debrief.

18. Sparling Debrief.

19. Smith Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar70, pp. 26-27, summarizes development of the Cobra force; Cobra tactics are described

in 1stLt Herbert P. Silva intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 15Jun70, Tape 4880 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Silva intvw, and 1stLt Fulton H. Beville intvw by 1st MAW Historical Team, 8Apr70, Tape 4827 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

20. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Oct70, p. 34, describes the Cobra engine replacement. For the ammunition problem, see Smith Debrief. The final quotation is from Silva intvw.

21. Thrash Debrief; see also Thrash, CMC Briefing.

22. HML-167 ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71; the quotation is from *ibid.*, Jun71.

23. Quotation is from Sparling Debrief; Thrash, CMC Briefing; Thrash Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar70, p. 28; Lamar Debrief; for accounts of the changing mission of the CH-53, consult the following 1st MAW Historical Team interviews, in Oral HistColl, MCHC: 1stLt James A. Motisi, 9Jul70, Tape 4939, hereafter Motisi intvw; and 1stLt Michael P. Hayes, 10Aug70, Tape 4943, hereafter Hayes intvw.

24. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 32; Hayes intvw; HMH-463 ComdC, Jan-Jun70.

25. Armstrong Transcript, pp. 40-41.

26. *Ibid.*

27. Unless otherwise noted, this account of Thrashlight operations is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 33-36, Sep70, pp. 21-22; Thrash Debrief; Lamar Debrief; Hayes intvw; and LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Louis Metzger, dtd 28May70, and ltr to BGen Homer S. Hill, dtd 1Jun70; both in Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.

28. Hayes intvw.

29. LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to BGen Homer S. Hill, dtd 17Jun70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.

30. Thrash Debrief, Motisi intvw.

31. HMH-463 ComdC, Jun70-May71; see Chronology for Sep70 for participation in Operation Tailwind. MAG-16 ComdC, Sep70, p. II-1, contains a description of the operation, although not mentioning Laos by name.

32. Armstrong Transcript, pp. 11-13; LtGen McCutcheon msgs to LtGen Jones, dtd 17Sep70 and 27Sep70, and msg to LtGen Sutherland, info Gen Abrams, dtd 17Sep70, III MAF Message Files.

New Ordnance and Aircraft

Additional sources for this section are: 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 2, pp. 16-17, ch. 4, pp. 3, 13-19; and FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, pp. 25-26, Jan-Feb71, pp. 39-41, Mar-Apr71, p. 26, and May-Jun71, pp. 18-19.

33. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, pp. 25-26.

34. 1st MAW ComdHist, pt. II, ch. 4, pp. 13-19.

35. 1st MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Cobra AH-1J Combat Evaluation, dtd 30Apr71; see also Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, pp. 154-157; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 26.

Aviation Achievements and Costs

36. Personnel losses are compiled from 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec70 and Jan to 1-14Apr71; aircraft losses are summarized in FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 56, Jan-Feb71, pp. 28-29, and Mar-Apr71, p. 30.

37. McCutcheon, "Aviation in Vietnam," p. 195.

CHAPTER 17

ARTILLERY AND RECONNAISSANCE

Artillery Operations, 1970-1971

Unless otherwise noted, information in this section is drawn from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/1Jun71; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan70-14Apr71; 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71; 1/11 ComdCs, Jan70-May71; 2/11 ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71; 3/11 ComdCs, Jan70-Sep70; 4/11 ComdCs, Jan70-Sep70; 1/13ComdCs, Jan-Mar70; The following debriefings were drawn upon extensively; both are located in the Oral HistColl, MCHC: Col Don D. Ezell debriefing at FMFPac, 8Apr70, Tape 4837, hereafter Ezell Debrief; and Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 2Sep70, Tape 4952, hereafter Reid Debrief. Unless otherwise noted, all oral history interviews and debriefings cited are in the Oral HistColl, MCHC.

1. 11th Mar msg to 11th Mar adcon/opcon, dtd 19Jan70; 1st Mar Div OpO 301A-YR, dtd 10Dec69, Anx F (Artillery): for positions, see the ComdCs for Jan 70 referred to in the compendium footnote.

2. 1st 175mm Gun Battery (SP) ComdC, Jan70; 3d 175mm Gun Battery (SP) ComdC, Jan70; 1st 8-Inch Howitzer Battery (SP), ComdC, Jan70; 3d 8-Inch Howitzer Battery (SP) ComdC, Jan70.

3. 5th 175mm Gun Battery (SP) ComdCs, Jan-Feb70.

4. For the role of the towed 155mm howitzer, see LtCol William Plaskett, Jr., "New Life for Towed 155 Howitzer," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb69, p. 51. 2/11 ComdC, Aug70, pp. 6, 9, covers the battalion's use of the 155s.

5. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan69, p. 45.

6. 1st MarDiv OpO 301A-YR, dtd 10Dec69.

7. Reid Debrief; for an example of a special preemptive fire plan, in this case covering the June 1970 provincial elections, see 3/11 ComdC, Jun70, pt. II.

8. Ezell Debrief.

9. *Ibid.*; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, pp. 2-3.

10. Ezell Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov69, p. 3, Apr70, pp. 3-4, Aug70, p. 7, Overview, p. 15; Reid Debrief. LtCol Pieter L. Hogaboom, comments on draft ms, 10Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File); FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov69, p. 3.

11. 11th Marines ComdC, Aug70, p. 6, outlines the IOD team training program. Ezell Debrief details many FO "tricks of the trade."

12. 3/11 ComdC, Jan70, pt. III; 11th Mar ComdC, Jan70, p. 5; Col Floyd H. Waldrop, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

13. The quotation is from Ezell Debrief; for the link to Kingfisher missions, see 3/11 S-3 Jnl, dtd 10Mar70, 3/11 ComdC, Mar70; for the supposed prisoner incident, see 3/11 S-3 Jnl, dtd 29Jan70, in 3/11 ComdC, Jan70; for previous incident also see 1/11 S-3 Jnl, dtd 29Jan70, 1/11 ComdC, Jan70.

14. Col Edwin M. Rudzis, comments on draft ms, 11Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rudzis Comments.

15. LtCol Charles R. Dunbaugh, comments on draft ms, 10May83 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. Col Edward A. Wilcox debriefing at FMFPac, 4Jul70, Tape 4889, hereafter Wilcox Debrief.

17. Ezell Debrief. The IOD received high praise from most III MAF

and 1st Marine Division commanders and staff officers; for examples, consult Col John S. Canton (III MAF AC/S G-2) debriefing at FMFPac, 22Dec69, Tape 4737, hereafter Canton Debrief; Col Edward Dzialo (III MAF G-2) debriefing at FMFPac, 2Jul70, Tape 4888; and Col Ralph F. Estey (III MAF AC/S G-3) debriefing at FMFPac, 14Dec70, Tape 4979.

18. Co D, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Report "Pal Joey K," dtd 12Aug70, tab A-25, 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Aug70. For other probes against IOD sites, see 11th Mar ComdCs, Nov70, pt. III, Dec70, pt. III, and Jan71, pt. II.

19. 3/11 ComdC, May70, pt. III: see also 1/11 ComdC, Aug70, p. 11; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 13-14; and Ezell Debrief.

20. 11th Mar ComdCs, Sep70, p. 6, Oct70, pt. III; 11th Mar S-2 Jnl, 24-30Nov70, in 11th Mar ComdC, Nov70; 11th Mar S-2 Jnl, 2Dec70, in 11th Mar ComdC, Dec70; casualty statistics are from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 13-14.

21. Rudzis Comments.

22. Ibid.

23. Ezell Debrief; AO section activities are covered month by month in 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71; for an example of engagement of radio intercept targets, see 3/11 ComdC, Jul70, pt. III.

24. 1stMarDiv Order 1560.4, dtd 6Mar71, in 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 16-18; May-Jun71, p. 57; Reid Debrief. The Tinder computer tapes, both data base and program, are now in the National Archives; duplicates of this material are in the MCHC.

25. Ezell Debrief; McCutcheon Transcript p. 33; for H&I fire reduction at the battalion level, see 1/11 ComdC, Sep70, p. 5.

26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, pp. 2, 32-33; for an example of plans for a heliborne provisional battery and for firebase deployments, see 1/11 ComdC, Aug70, p. 12, and 2/11 ComdC, Oct70, p. 7.

27. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 2-3; Reid Debrief; Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr., memo to CG1stMarDiv, Subj: Artillery Raid of 30May70, summary of, dtd 1Jun70, Item 103 (1), 1stMarDiv Admin Files; 11th Mar ComdC, May70, p. 5; 2/11 ComdC, May70, p. 6.

28. Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr., memo to CG1stMarDiv, Subj: Summary of Artillery Raid of 2Jun70, dtd 3Jun70, Item 103 (2), 1st MarDiv Admin Files; 11th Mar ComdC, Jun70, pp. 4-5; 2/11 ComdC, Jun70, pp. 6-7.

29. Col John D. Shoup, Comments on draft ms, 15Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Shoup Comments.

30. 1stMarDiv OpO 301A-YR, dtd 10Dec69, Anx E (Fire Support Coordination); Ezell Debrief.

31. Shoup Comments.

32. Wilcox Debrief: Some of the IOD teams were under the operational and administrative control of various battalions of the 11th Marines; others were directly controlled and administered by the artillery regimental headquarters. 11th Mar ComdCs, Jul70, p. 6. Sep70, p. 6.

33. Reid Debrief; Ezell Debrief discusses coordination problems with ARVN.

34. For examples of Marine support for ARVN operations, see 2/11 ComdCs, Feb70, Mar70, Apr70, May and Jun70 and 4/11 ComdC, Jun70. The Hai Van FSCC is covered in 1/11 ComdCs, May70, pp. 9-10, Jul70, p. 10, Aug70, pp. 11-12.

35. Ezell Debrief; 11th Mar ComdCs, Apr70, pp. 4-5, May70, p. 5; 2/11 ComdC, Apr70, p. 6.

36. 11th Mar ComdC, Jan70-Mar71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70;

pp. 10-11; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71.

37. McCutcheon Transcript, p. 33.

Reconnaissance Operations, 1970-1971

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/Jul71; 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71; 1st Force Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Aug70; 3d Force Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Feb70. Extensive use has been made of Col William C. Drumright debriefing at FMFPac, 17Aug70, Tape 4928 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Drumright Debrief. All oral history interviews cited in this section are from OralHistColl, MCHC. Extensive use also has been made of Lieutenant Commander Ray W. Stubbe, CHC, USN, "Paddles, Parachutes, and Patrols: A History of Specialized Reconnaissance Activities of the United States Marine Corps" (ms, MCHC, 1978), hereafter Stubbe, PPP.

38. 3d Force Recon Co ComdC, Jan70; Stubbe PPP, pp. 539-542; Canton Debrief; BGen George E. Dooley, debriefing at FMFPac, 23Dec69, Tape 4733.

39. 1st Force Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Feb70.

40. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Mar70, pt. I; 3d Force Recon Co ComdC, Jan70; Stubbe PPP, pp. 542-543; 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, Mar70.

41. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jun70, p. 6; for the various types of patrol activities, see 1st Recon Bn Patrol Reports, Jan70-Mar71, filed with 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71, and 1st Force Recon Co Patrol Reports, Jan-Aug70, in 1st Force Recon Co ComdCs, Jan-Aug70.

42. Drumright Debrief.

43. Col George C. Fox, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 of III MAF during the first half of 1970, criticized the reconnaissance Marines for being too aggressive on patrol and compromising their main mission by initiating too many fights. Consult Fox's debriefing at FMFPac, 6May70, Tape 4807.

44. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 4-5; Drumright Debrief.

45. The following account of the 14 June 1970 action is based on: Co E, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Report "Flakey Snow," dtd 14Jun70, tab A-155, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Reports, Jun70; and Sgt Frank E. Diaz, intvw by 1stMarDiv Historical Team, 23Jun70, Tape 4866. Quotations are from the Diaz intvw.

46. 1stLt Peter F. Goetz, intvw by 1st MAF Historical Team, 10Aug70, Tape 4948. All quotations from Lt Goetz are from this tape.

47. Co C, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Report "Movable," dtd 3Sep70, tab A-22, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Reports, Jun70.

48. Drumright Debrief.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid.; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, p. 4; for an example of a reconnaissance attack on a camp, see Co B, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Report, "Clay Pipe," dtd 8Aug70, tab A-38, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Reports, Aug70.

51. For the tiger incident: Patrol Report "Rockmat," dtd 8May70, tab B-13, 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, May70. For the extraction accident: Co B, 1st Recon Bn, Patrol Report "Chili Pepper," dtd 2Sep70, tab A-7, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Reports, Sep70. The Leftwich crash is covered in Chapter 6.

52. Drumright Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, p. 9, Aug70, p. 5.

53. Drumright Debrief; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon ltr to MajGen Rathvon McC Tompkins, dtd 14Jul70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.

54. The quotation is from *ibid.* For details and schedule of the indoctrination course, see 1st Recon Bn Order 3500.1, dtd 16Jan70, 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jan70.
55. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 5-6; 1st Recon Bn Bulletin 3500, dtd 10Mar70, and Bulletin 1510, dtd 7May70, in 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, Mar70 and Jun70, describe the courses respectively for ARVN and Korean troops. Consult also Drumright Debrief.
56. 1stMarDiv staff memos, Subj: QDSZ Conferences, dtd 2Mar70, 26Apr70, 10May70, 16May70, 24May70, and 4Jul70, tab B-21 in 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Mar, Apr, May, and Jul70. For comment on limited South Vietnamese reconnaissance capabilities, consult LtCol Charles M. Mosher, debriefing at FMFPac, 17Sep70, Tape 4959.
57. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Aug-Sep70; 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, Aug70; Stubbe, PPP, p. 547; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 17; Col John W. Haggerty, III, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4965, hereafter Haggerty Debrief.
58. Haggerty Debrief; 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Oct70, pt. II; Co B, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Report "Impressive" (PPB), dtd 18Oct70, tab A-19, 1st Recon Bn Patrol Reports, Oct70, details operations of the first patrol base in the Que Sons and summarizes advantages of this method of operation.
59. LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, comments on draft ms, 17Jan86 (Vietnam Comment File).
60. 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, Dec70, tab G, and Feb71, tab D; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 17.
61. 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Mar71; Co A (Rein), 1st Recon Bn ComdCs, 1-14Apr71, 15-30Apr71; 1-13May71.

CHAPTER 18

LOGISTICS, 1970-1971

Material for this chapter is drawn from: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/Jul71 and Overview; FMFPac, ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71; III MAF ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 3d MAB ComdCs, 13Apr-Jul71; FLC ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71. Much information is drawn from Col James D. Soper, "A View from FMFPac of Logistics in the Western Pacific, 1965-1971," in *The Marines in Vietnam: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1974), pp. 200-217, hereafter Soper, "Logistics." Extensive use has been made of BGen Mauro J. Padalino debriefing at FMFPac, 26Oct70, Tape 4971, hereafter Padalino FMFPac Debrief, and debriefing at HQMC, 8Jan71, Tape 6135, hereafter Padalino HQMC Debrief, both in Oral HistColl, MCHC. Unless otherwise noted, all oral history tapes and transcripts cited in this chapter are located in the Oral HistColl, MCHC.

Supplying III MAF

Additional sources for this section are: 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; and FLSG ComdCs, Jan70-Sep70, in FLC ComdCs.

1. FLC ComdC, Jan70, p. 3, and tab K-2.
2. 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71, contain ComdCs of Headquarters and Service, Supply, and Maintenance Bns. For details of the III MAF equipment maintenance system, see FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jun70, pp. 42-44, Dec70, pp. 73-74; and Soper, "Logistics," pp. 206-207.

3. FLSG-B ComdCs, Jan-Sep70.
4. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 55-57.
5. 3/5 ComdC, Mar70, pt. III; 1stMarDiv Order P4400.7E, dtd 15Apr70, tab B-16, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Apr70; Col Miller M. Blue debriefing at FMFPac, 3Feb71, 4987, hereafter Blue Debrief.
6. 1st Shore Party Bn ComdC, Jan70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, pp. 40-43.
7. Colonel James G. Dixon, comments on draft ms, 11May83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dixon Comments.
8. Col William C. McGraw, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 20Jul70, Tape 4896, hereafter McGraw Debrief; Col Lawrence J. Stein, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4973. For details of FMFPac's role in aviation logistics, see FMFPac ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71, especially pt. II. VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN, *Mobility, Support, Endurance: A Story of Naval Operational Logistics in the Vietnam War, 1965-1968* (Washington: Naval History Division, 1972), pp. 17-18, outlines Navy Logistic command responsibilities, including those for aviation support.
9. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Overview, p. 53, Jan70, pp. 40-41, Aug70, p. 44, Dec70, pp. 86-87; MWSG-17 ComdCs, Jan-Aug70.
10. Col Edmund G. Dering, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 10Aug70, Tape 4958; 1/5 ComdC, Feb70, p. 3-7. For various supply shortages, consult: Col Ernest R. Reid, debriefing at FMFPac, dtd 2Sep70, 4952; FLC ComdC, Jan70; FMFPac MarOpsV, Jun70, p. 45, Aug70, p. 43; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan70, p. 26, Aug70, p. 30, Sep70, p. 30.

FLC Phases Down

11. 1st Shore Party Bn ComdC, Feb70; Co C (Rein), 1st Shore Party Bn ComdC, Mar70; 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Mar70; 1st FSR ComdC, Mar70; FLSG-B ComdC, Mar70, in FLC ComdC, Mar70.
12. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep70, pp. 27-29; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Sep70, p. 29; FLSG-B ComdCs, May-Sep70; FLC ComdC, Jul70; 1st FSR ComdCs, May70, Sep70, Oct70.
13. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 55-57.
14. Col Robert W. Calvert, debriefing at FMFPac, 12Oct70, Tape 4969, hereafter Calvert Debrief; 1st FSR ComdCs, Jun70, Jul70, Oct70; FLC ComdC, Dec70.

The End of Naval Support Activity Da Nang

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF I Corps Tactical Zone Common Service Support Responsibilities File, 3Jun69-1Feb70, hereafter cited as III MAF CSS File; U.S. Naval Support Activity, Da Nang, ComdHist 69 and ComdHist 70 (OAB, NHD), hereafter USNSAD ComdHist, with year; 47th Military History Detachment, USA, "History of the US Army Assumption of the Common Service Support Mission from the U.S. Navy in I Corps Tactical Zone, Republic of Vietnam," dtd Aug70 (Folder 5, Box 7, 71A2312, FRC, Suitland, Md.), hereafter cited as Army CSS History; and Cdr Frank C. Collins, Jr., USN, "Maritime Support of the Campaign in I Corps," in *The Marines in Vietnam: An Anthology and Annotated Bibliography* (Washington: History and Museums Div, HQMC, 1974), pp. 232-253, hereafter Collins, "Maritime Support." Extensive use has been made also of MajGen Wilbur F. Simlik intvw, 14Oct77, Tape 6239, hereafter Simlik intvw; and Dulacki Debrief.

15. Collins, "Maritime Support," pp. 232-233, 236-240; USNSAD ComdHist 69, p. 19.
16. Army CSS History, pp. 2-4; Maj Donald R. Davis, intvw by 15th

Military History Detachment, U.S. Army, dtd 26Jun70 (Folder 4, Box 7, 71A2312, FRC, Suitland, Md.), hereafter Davis intvw.

17. ComNavForV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 3Jun69, III MAF CSS File.

18. CGIIIMAF msg to ComNavForV, dtd 4Jun69, in *ibid.*; Simlik intvw.

19. Col Miller M. Blue, comments on draft ms, 5Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

20. Simlik intvw.

21. This account of the NSA Da Nang phasedown planning is based on: III MAF CSS File; USNSAD ComdHist 69, p. 137; Army CSS History, pp. 5-7; Davis intvw; III MAF ComdC, Jan70, p. 28.

22. Col James A. Sloan, comments on draft ms, 6Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File).

23. Collins, "Maritime Support," pp. 252-253; USNSAD ComdHist 70, pp. 2-5.

24. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret), ltr to Oral History Unit, MCHC, dtd 8Nov77; III MAF ComdC, May70, pp. 22-23, Jun70, p. 24; FLC ComdC, May 70, p. 4, Jun70, p. 4; Admin III MAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 19May70, Admin FMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 20May70, III MAF Message Files; BGen Dulacki msg to BGen Houghton, dtd 19May70, FMFPac Message Files.

25. III MAF ComdC, Jul70, p. 22; FLC ComdC, Jul70, p. 4; USNSAD ComdHist 70, pp. 6-12; Army CSS History, pp. 16-17, tab 1.

26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, p. 25, Mar-Apr71, p. 46; FMFPac ComdCs, 1Jan-30Jun70, p. 25, 1Jul-31Dec70, p. 44; III MAF ComdCs, Dec70, pp. 24-28, Jan71, p. 22, Mar71, pp. 20-21; FLC ComdC, Jan70, p. 4 and tab H, Oct70, p. 4, Dec70, p. 4, Mar71, p. 7; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Class V(W) Munitions, dtd 2May71; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Class V(A) Munitions, dtd 2May71; 3d MAB ComdC, 1-28Jun71, p. 8.

27. III MAF ComdCs, Jul70, p. 21, Aug70, p. 20, Sep70, p. 21; Army CSS History, pp. 26-27; Padalino FMFPac Debrief; Calvert Debrief; Blue Debrief; Dulacki Debrief; Col Allan T. Wood, debriefing at FMFPac, 24Nov70, tape 4983, hereafter Wood Debrief.

28. LtCol William R. Fails intvw, 2Jan79, Tape 6365, hereafter Fails intvw; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon msg to LtGen William J. McCaffrey, USA, dtd 16Sep70, III MAF Message Files.

29. Fails intvw; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon msg to LtGen William J. McCaffrey, USA, dtd 20Sep70, III MAF Message Files, expresses McCutcheon's appreciation of prompt Army response to Marine requirements.

30. Simlik intvw; LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret), ltr to Oral History Unit, MCHC, dtd 8Nov77.

Engineer Support

Additional sources for this section are: 1st Engineer Bn ComdCs, Jan-Mar71; 7th Engineer Bn ComdCs, Jan-Aug70; and 9th Engineer Bn ComdCs, Jan-Aug70.

31. Col Nicholas A. Canzona debriefing at FMFPac, 4Mar70, Tape 4796; III MAF ComdC, Mar70, p. 24; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan70, p. 25.

32. Dixon Comments.

33. FLC Order 5400.7, dtd 8Aug70, tab K, FLC ComdC, Aug70; FLC ComdC, Nov70, tab F-1; 1st FSR ComdC, Jul70; Co A, 7th Engineer Bn ComdCs, 19-31Jul70 and 1-10Jun71.

34. Dixon Comments.

35. LtGen Herman Nickerson debriefing at FMFPac, 10Mar70, Tape 4806, explains the strategic significance of road building; FMFPac,

MarOpsV, Apr70, p. 32, Jun70, pp. 41-42, Nov70, pp. 22-23, Mar-Apr71, p. 47; III MAF ComdC, Jul70, p. 21; 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Apr70; 7th Engineer Bn ComdC, Jul70.

36. 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Jul70, pp. 1-4; 1stMarDiv Order P3820.2B, dtd 9Dec69, Subj: Countermeasures against Mines and Boobytraps, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec69, tab B-12, describes enemy road mining techniques and Marine countermeasures.

37. 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Mar-May70; 9th Engineer Bn ComdC, Jul70, p. 5; Co A (Rein), 7th Engineer Bn ComdC, 21-31Dec70; 1stMarDiv G-3, Summaries of Discussion, 2d ROKMC/QDSZ Conference, 13Mar70, 5Jun70, 19Jun70, 28Aug70, tab B-21, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70; 1stMarDiv Staff Memo, Subj: Summary of Discussion QDSZ/2d ROKMC 1stMarDiv Conference, Nov70, dtd 9Nov70, tab B-21, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Nov70; 1stMarDiv Agenda Items for 1stMarDiv/2d ROKMC/QDSZ Weekly Conferences, dtd 19Jun70, 28Aug70, and 25Oct70, in QDSZ Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents.

38. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 38-40; 9th Engineer Bn ComdC, Jan70, May70; 7th Engineer Bn ComdC, Apr70, p. 12, Jul70; 1st Engineer Bn ComdCs, Jan-Mar71.

39. Dixon Comments.

40. Col Edward A. Wilcox debriefing at FMFPac, 4Jul70, Tape 4889, hereafter Wilcox Debrief; 2/1 ComdC, Jun70, pt. II-B, gives an example of cleared areas being overgrown again.

41. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Feb70, p. 31, details construction of the Wonderarches; 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Aug70, contains instances of Marine engineer aid in constructing ARVN firebases.

42. 1st Engineer Bn ComdCs, Sep-Oct70.

43. *Ibid.*, Feb-Mar71; Co A, 1st Engineer Bn ComdCs, 1-13Apr71, 14-30Apr71.

44. Dixon Comments.

45. *Ibid.*

Motor Transport

Additional sources for this section are: 1st Motor Transport Bn ComdCs, Jan70-Mar71; 7th Motor Transport Bn ComdCs, Jan70 and 1Feb-13Mar70; 11th Motor Transport Bn ComdC, Jan70-Jun71; Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71, in the 1st FSR ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; FLC ComdCs, Apr-Jun71.

46. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 82-83.

47. *Ibid.*, Aug70, pp. 42-43; III MAF ComdC, Sep70, p. 21; 1st Motor Transport Bn ComdC, Dec70; 11th Motor Transport Bn ComdC, Jan71.

48. CO, 1st Motor Transport Bn, memo to CG 1stMarDiv, Subj: Report on mine effect; antiframegmentation armor kits . . . for 2½ tons "M" series vehicles, dtd 12Nov70, in 1st Motor Transport Bn ComdC, Nov70.

49. 11th Motor Transport Bn ComdC, Nov-Dec70; Blue Debrief; Wood Debrief; FMFPac ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec70, pp. 43-44; Headquarters and Service Bn, 1st FSR ComdC, Jan71; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 84; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon to MajGen Louis Metzger, dtd 28Nov70, Box 10, McCutcheon Papers.

Medical Services

Additional sources for this section are: 1st Medical Bn ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; and 1st Hospital Co ComdCs, Jan70 and 1-26Feb70.

50. III MAF ComdC, Jan70, pp. 34-35; Collins, "Maritime Support," pp. 248-249; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May70, pp. 37-38.
 51. 1st Dental Co ComdC, Mar-Sep70; 11th Dental Co ComdC Mar70-May71; Capt Meredith H. Mead, DC, USN, comments on draft ms, 8Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).
 52. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 81-82.
 53. Ibid., Dec67, p. 105, Dec69, p. 77, Dec 70, p. 80.
 54. 1st Hospital Co ComdC, 1-26Feb70; 1st Medical Bn ComdC, Mar70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar70, p. 36.
 55. LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret), ltr to Oral History Unit, MCHC, dtd 8Nov77; Simlik intvw; CGIIIMAF msg to ComNav-ForV, dtd 13May70, and CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13May70, III MAF Message Files.
 56. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 80; 1st Medical Bn ComdCs, Sep70 and 1-14Apr71; 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p. 21; Co A, 1st Medical Bn ComdC, 8-25Jun71.

CHAPTER 19

THE LOGISTICS OF REDEPLOYMENT

Unless otherwise noted, this chapter is based on: FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/June71; III MAF ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1stMarDiv ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; 3d MAB ComdCs, 15Apr-Jun71; FLC ComdCs, Jan70-Jun71; Soper, "Logistics;" Padalino FMFPac Debrief and HQMC Debrief; Lt Gen William K. Jones intvw, 5Jun73 (Oral Hist-Coll, MCHC), hereafter Jones Transcript; McCutcheon Transcript; Armstrong Transcript and Armstrong Debrief; Col Hugh S. Aitken, debriefing at FMFPac, 4Mar71, Tape 5007 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Aitken Debrief. Much material also has been drawn from BGen James R. Jones, Debrief of Tour as CG Force Logistic Command, for period 23Oct70 to 15Jun71, dtd 4Jun71, hereafter Jones FLC Debrief, and from CinCPacFlt, Pacific Fleet Operations Review, Jan-Jun71 (OAB, NHD), hereafter PacFltOps Review, with month.

The 'Mixmaster' of Personnel

- Colonel Herschel L. Johnson, Jr., comments on draft ms, 14Apr83 (Vietnam Comments File).
- For a typical planning sequence, that for Keystone Robin Alpha, see CinCPac msg to III MAF, dtd 19Jun70, in G-3 III MAF Keystone Robin File. Soper, "Logistics," pp. 203, 209, describes earlier planning efforts for the redeployments as a whole.
- FMFPac ComdCs, 1Jan-30Jun70, 1Jul-31Dec70, 1Jan-30Jun71.
- Simlik intvw.
- Jones Transcript, pp. 77-78.
- III MAF ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71; Simlik intvw; III MAF OPLAN 183-69, dtd 1Sep69, is the basic III MAF redeployment plan and outlines the division of responsibility among subordinate commands; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan70, p. 25; 1stMarDiv Order 4400.25A, dtd 2Dec70, tab B-6, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70; FLC ComdC, Jan70, p. 6, and tab K-4.
- LtGen William K. Jones, presentation to 1971 HQMC General Officers' Symposium, tab J, 1971 General Officers' Symposium Book, hereafter Jones, 1971 Symposium Presentation.
- Redeployment criteria for Keystones Bluejay and Robin Alpha are published in III MAF *Sea Tiger*, 30Jan70, 6Feb70, 14Aug70,

21Aug70; those for Keystone Robin Charlie are in CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 19Jan71, 2/1 ComdC, Jan71.

- Jones, 1971 Symposium Presentation; III MAF OPLAN 183-69, dtd 1Sep69, Anx I (Personnel); FMFPac ComdC, 1Jan-30Jun70, pp. 13-14, 1Jul-31Dec70, p. 32; *Sea Tiger*, 13Nov70, describes the FLC personnel transfer system; BGen Louis H. Wilson msg to BGen Leo J. Dulacki, dtd 30Jan70, III MAF CSS File; CGFMFPac msg to CGs III MAF, 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, FLC, I MAF, 3dMarDiv, 1st MAW (Rear), MCB Camp Butler, CO 3d FSR, dtd 15Sep70, III MAF Message Files; CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 19Jan71, 2/1 ComdC, Jan71.
 - Col Walter E. Sparling, debriefing at FMFPac, 9Nov70, Tape 4975 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Sparling Debrief; McCutcheon Transcript, pp. 18-19; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 23Mar70, FMFPac Message Files; Armstrong Debrief; McGraw Debrief. These are only a sampling of the debriefing and messages expressing concern at the efforts of the "mixmaster."
 - Armstrong Transcript, p. 9.
 - Col Robert W. Teller, debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4897 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
 - Armstrong Transcript, pp. 4-5; Admin FMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13Aug70, and CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 15Aug70, III MAF Message Files, discuss the impact of the Keystone Robin Alpha changes. Consult also: Col Lawrence J. Stien, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4973 (Oral HistColl, MCHC), hereafter Stien Debrief; Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 3Aug70, Tape 4925 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Armstrong Debrief; Col Don H. Blanchard, Comments on draft ms, 2Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).
 - FMFPac ComdC, 1Jul-31Dec70, pp. 6, 11; MajGen William G. Thrash, debriefing at FMFPac, 2Jul70, Tape 4850 (Oral HistColl, MCHC); Col Paul B. Henley, debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4898; Wilcox Debrief.
 - Aitken Debrief.
 - III MAF OPLAN 183-69, dtd 1Sep69, outlines the basic redeployment sequence, as does FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 46-48. 5th Mar ComdCs, Dec70-Mar71 recount that regiment's preparations.
 - "1/5 News about the Pros," dtd 24Mar71, in 1/5 ComdC, Mar71. III MAF used the 9th Engineer Battalion cantonment and later Hill 34 as stand-down areas; see Col John W. Haggerty III, debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4965, hereafter Haggerty Debrief; and 1/5 ComdC, Feb71, pt. II. For assistance to withdrawing units by a still-active unit, see 3d 8-Inch Howitzer Battery ComdC, 15-30Apr71, pt. III.
 - 3/5 ComdC, Feb71, pt. III.
- #### 'Mixmastering' of Equipment and Real Estate
- III MAF OPLAN 183-69, dtd 1Sep69, Anx E (Logistic), dtd 25Sep69; CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 19Dec69, CMC msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 31Dec69, III MAF Force Reduction Planning File, 17Dec69-7Jan70; CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 11Mar70, III MAF Message Files; FLC Order 4500.2, dtd 9Mar71, tab F, FLC ComdC, Mar71; Stien Debrief; Fails intvw; also LtCol William R. Fails, comments on draft ms, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File).
 - LtCol Robert E. Wehrle intvw, 9May83 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
 - Maj Robert T. Himmerich, comments on draft ms, 28Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).
 - FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, pp. 38-39, Dec70, pp. 68, 70-72,

- Jan-Feb71, pp. 33-34; Jones, 1971 Symposium Presentation; Soper, "Logistics," p. 211; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Equipment Redistribution, dtd 2May71.
23. Wood Debrief, FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 70-71, Mar-Apr71, p. 38.
24. Final statistics are in 3d MAB ComdC, May71, p. 16. 1stMarDiv Order 4520.1, dtd 14Oct70, tab B-22, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct70, sets standards for equipment to be transferred. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov70, pp. 23-25. III MAF/3d MAB CG's Command Information Notebook, Apr71, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71; Padalino Debrief; Wood Debrief.
25. Gen Kenneth McLennan, comments on draft ms, 28Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File).
26. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 50-51; the MACV interservice equipment program was delayed by problems in working out procedures; consult Wood Debrief.
27. Calvert Debrief; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Aug70, p. 38; FLC Sheet, Subj: Shipping of Retrograde Materials, dtd 19Dec69, tab K-5, FLC ComdC, Jan70; Jones FLC Debrief, p. 1.
28. The CMC instruction is quoted in Jones Transcript, p. 69, and 1stMarDiv Fact Sheet, Subj: Limited Technical Inspection of Retrograde Material, dtd 14Feb71, in 3d MAB Planning Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 67-70; Jones FLC Debrief; and Soper, "Logistics," pp. 208, 211.
29. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, p. 77, Mar-Apr71, p. 38; FLC Fact Sheet, Subj: Retrograde Facility, dtd 14Dec69, tab K-1, FLC ComdC, Jan70; News Clipping, Supply Bn ComdC, Feb71, in 1st FSR ComdC, Feb71.
30. FLSG-B ComdCs, Jan-Feb70, in FLC ComdCs, Jan-Feb70; FLC Bulletin 4235, dtd 7Mar70, tab Q, FLC ComdC, Mar70; Calvert Debrief; Supply Bn ComdC, Oct70, in 1st FSR ComdC, Oct70.
31. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 48-50; Jones Debrief and MajGen James R. Jones, comments on draft ms, 24Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Jones Comments, 24Mar83.
32. Jones FLC Debrief; LtCol James F. Helsel intvw, 17Mar71, Tape 4989 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
33. Padlino FMFPac Debrief; Jones FLC Debrief; Jones Comments, 24Mar83.
34. Supply Bn ComdC, Mar-Apr71, in 1st FSR ComdCs, Mar-Apr71; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Transfer of Butler Buildings, dtd 2May71; III MAF ComdC, Jan71, p. 20; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan-Feb71, pp. 35-36, Mar-Apr71, p. 47, May-Jun71, pp. 49-50; Co A (Rein), 7th Engr Bn ComdC, 14-30Apr71.
35. Jones FLC Debrief and FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, p. 43, give the statistics and percentages.
36. Simlik intvw and Col Roy L. Reed debriefing at FMFPac, 14Aug70, Tape 4923, emphasize the amount of unserviceable equipment removed. Fails intvw describes the MAG-16 liaison arrangement. Jones Comments, 24Mar83.
37. Jones, 1971 Symposium Presentation announces the MO/MOA reconstruction.
38. III MAF OPlan 183-69, dtd 1Sep69, Anx E (Logistics), dtd 25Sep70, App 3; FLC Bulletin 4600, Subj: Instruction for the Medical and Agricultural Treatment and Processing Procedure in Force Logistic Command for Retrograde Vehicles and Material, dtd 14Apr70, tab L, FLC ComdC, Apr70; 1stMarDiv Bulletin 4600, dtd 5Jul70, tab B-3, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jul70; FLC Order P4032.1A, dtd 14Dec70, tab H, FLC ComdC, Dec70; Simlik intvw; Stien Debrief; Fails intvw.
39. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Mar-Apr71, pp. 37-38; 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Sep70, Feb71.
40. Fails intvw; MAG-16 ComdC, Mar-Jun71.
41. Soper, "Logistics," pp. 205, 214-215; III MAF OPlan 183-69, Anx E (Logistics), dtd 25Sep69; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Apr70, p. 31, Dec70, pp. 65-66, Mar-Apr71, p. 36; PacFltOps Review, Jan70, p. 21, Feb70, pp. 22, 46, Mar70, pp. 17-18, Apr70, p. 22, Jul-Sep70, pp. 20-21, Oct-Dec70, p. 35, Jan-Mar71, p. 31; FMFPac Briefing Slides, n.d., in G-3 III MAF Keystone Robin File, 24Apr-9Dec70.
42. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec70, pp. 72-73; III MAF ComdC, Nov70, p. 20; 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Status of Real Property, dtd 2May71; Blue Debrief.
43. Wood Debrief.
44. Haggerty Debrief; MACV ComdHist, 1970, II pp. 36-40; LtGen James E. Sutherland, Jr., USA, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, period 18Jun70-9Jun71, dtd 31Aug71, pp. 21-22 (copy in MCHC). For an example of Vietnamese foot-dragging on an OP turnover, see CO, 1st Mar msg to CG1stMarDiv, dtd 19Feb71, 3/1 ComdC, Feb71; CG1stMarDiv msg to Co 1st Mar, dtd 1Mar71, 3/1 ComdC, Mar71; and 1st Mar msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 10Apr71, 3/1 ComdC, 1-14Apr71.
45. Blue Debrief; CG1stMarDiv msg to Distribution List, dtd 8Feb71, 3d MAB Planning Notebook, 1stMarDiv Documents. For base turnovers, see III MAF ComdCs, Jul70-Apr71, and 3d MAB Fact Sheet, Subj: Status of Real Property, dtd 2May71.
46. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Sep70, p. 27, Mar-Apr71, p. 45; Maintenance Bn ComdC, Apr70-Apr71, in FSR ComdCs, Apr70-Apr71; 1st Engineer Bn ComdC, Feb71; Blue Debrief and Dixon Comments.
47. Armstrong Debrief.

PART VI

The Close of an Era

CHAPTER 20

MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

Unless otherwise noted, material in this chapter is drawn from FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jan70-May/June71; and III MAF, 1st MAF, 1st MarDiv, and FLC ComdCs, Jan70-Apr71. Extensive use has been made of the Leadership and Discipline Notebook (1stMarDiv Documents, MCHC), hereafter cited as L & D Notebook. Frequent use has been made of the following interviews and briefings, all in the Oral HistColl, MCHC: McCutcheon intvw; Armstrong intvw; and Armstrong Debrief.

A Time of Troubles

1. SgtMaj Edgar R. Huff, comments on draft ms, 25Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Huff Comments.

Atrocities, Rules of Engagement, and Personal Reponse

Additional sources for this section are: HQMC Son Thang Incident Document File, hereafter cited as Son Thang File, with folder

number. Extensive material has been drawn from: Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), hereafter Lewy, *America in Vietnam*; and Maj W. Hays Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Aug70, pp. 16-22, Sep76, pp. 33-39, hereafter Parks, "Crimes in Hostilities," with date and page numbers.

2. Unless otherwise noted, this account of the Son Thang incident is based on: HQMC Point Paper, Subj: Incident of 19Feb70 at Song Thang (4) . . . , dtd 2Mar70, Son Thang File, folder 1; Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 327-328; CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 25Feb70, FMFPac Message File; CG1stMarDiv msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 27Feb70 and 15Dec70, and CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 3Mar70, all in III MAF Message Files.

3. The initial false reports are in 1/7 Journal, 19Feb70, 1/7 ComdC, Feb70, and 7th Mar SitRep, dtd 19Feb70, 7th Mar ComdC, Feb70.

4. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 20Feb70, III MAF Message Files.

5. William T. Sherman, *Memoirs of General William T. Sherman*, 4th ed, 2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Webster and Co., 1891), vol 2, p. 194, see also pp. 174-175. For a detailed account of the Philippines incident, see Joseph L. Schott, *The Ordeal of Samar* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964). For allegations against Marines in the Dominican Republic, see Capt Stephen M. Fuller and Graham A. Cosmas, *Marines in the Dominican Republic, 1916-1924* (Washington: History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1974), pp. 32-33.

6. Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, p. 456, reprints these statistics from the Judge Advocate General, Military Justice Division, U.S. Department of the Navy. For earlier atrocity incidents and their disposition, see Jack Shulimson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1966, An Expanding War* (Washington: History and Museum Division, HQMC,), pp. 244-246; Philip Caputo, *A Rumor of War* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), ch. 17 recounts the legal proceedings against a Marine officer and several enlisted men charged with killing two Vietnamese civilians; in this case, the men were acquitted or charges were dropped.

7. Dulacki Comments.

8. Ibid. and Dulacki intvw, pp. 107-110; messages on the incident are in III MAF Outgoing Message Files, 14Jan-31Mar70, and Incoming Message Files, 13Feb-18Mar70; for declassification, see CGFMFPac msg to CG 1stMarDiv, dtd 23Aug70 and CG 1stMarDiv msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 24Aug70, III MAF Incoming Message files 29Jul-15Sep70.

9. 1/7 ComdC, Feb70; HQMC Point Paper, Subj: Incident of 19Feb70 at Son Thang (4) . . . , dtd 2Mar70, Son Thang File, folder 1.

10. Col Max G. Halliday, Head Military Law Branch, JAG, ltr to Mrs. Kenneth D. Coffin, dtd 19Mar70, Son Thang File, folder 1; this folder contains numerous protest letters, with answers worded essentially as the one cited.

11. This summary of the trials is based on III MAF Incoming Message Files, 19Mar-11May70, and Son Thang File, folders 2, 3, and 4.

12. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 21May70; CG1stMarDiv msg to CMC, dtd 7Jun70, III MAF Incoming Message Files, 19Mar-29Jul70.

13. 1stMarDiv Order P1500.31A, dtd 24Jan70, tab B-33, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan70; CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 27Feb70, III MAF Outgoing Message Files, 14Jan-31Mar70; CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 4Mar70, III MAF Outgoing Message Files, 4Mar-13May70;

CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 3Mar70, III MAF Incoming Message Files, 13Feb-18Mar70; 1stMarDiv Order 03330.2B, dtd 6Dec69, tab B-6, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec69.

14. MajGen Widdecke msg to LtGen McCutcheon, dtd 28Apr70, III MAF Incoming Message Files, 19Mar-22May70; Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 366-367, discuss general deficiencies in U.S. Law of War training.

15. CGIIIMAF msg to III MAF, dtd 13May70, CGIIIMAF Personal/Official Correspondence File, Feb-Nov70.

16. CO 4th CAG msg to 4th CAG, dtd 16May70, 4th CAG ComdC, May70; see also CO 4th CAG Circular, Subj: Fire Discipline, dtd 23Apr70 in Ibid; and CAF Order 3300.1, dtd 17May70, in CAG SOP and History folder, Box 2, Pacification Study Docs.

17. 1stMarDiv msg to All Units, dtd 4Jan71, 1stMarDiv Jnl File, 1-10Jan71.

18. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Summary and Overview, p. 45; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec70; *Sea Tiger*, 16Oct70, described the III MAF cultural tours.

19. 1stMarDiv Order 5710.8B, dtd 9Oct70, tab B-13, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct70; see also DivO 1050.4, dtd 3 Feb70, tab B-4, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb70. For an example of regimental Personal Response efforts, see 1st Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec70; 3/5 ComdC, Apr70, p. 3-9, describes activities of a unit Personal Response Council.

20. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 21Jul70, III MAF Incoming Message Files, 22May-29Jul70; CGIIIMAF ltr to CG MR 1, dtd 16Aug70, CG IIIMAF Personal/Official Correspondence File, Feb-Nov70.

'Friendly on Friendly'

Additional sources for this section are: Simmons Debrief and BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Orientation Talk to 1st Lieutenants, 1st Marine Division, n.d., ca. early 1971, hereafter Simmons Orientation Talk.

21. CG1stMarDiv msg to Distribution List, dtd 24Aug70, L&D Notebook; Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 34, 38, 40, 43.

22. 3/7 ComdC, Aug70; CG1stMarDiv msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 18Aug70, 21Aug70, 29Aug70, 16Sep70, III MAF Incoming Message Files, 29Jul-15Sep70, 16Sep-29Oct70.

23. 1st Mar ComdC, Oct70; 1st Mar SitRep, 12Oct70, in ibid., Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 35-37; Col Lawrence R. Dorsa, comments on draft ms, 9Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

24. 1st Mar ComdC, Nov70; 3/1 ComdC, Nov70, pt. 3, sec A; Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 37-38.

25. Gtinalds intvw, pp. 119-120.

26. Col T. E. Metzger debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4899.

27. CG1stMarDiv msg to Distribution List, dtd 24Aug70, L&D Notebook; Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 34-35, 40; Simmons Debrief; 1stMarDiv Order 5100.9B, dtd 8Nov70, tab B-11, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Nov70; Col Don D. Ezell debriefing at FMFPac, 8Apr70, Tape 4837, hereafter Ezell Debrief.

28. 1stMarDiv Order P5100.31A, dtd 24Jan70, tab B-33, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan70; Col E. H. Waldrop debriefing at FMFPac, 19Aug70, Tape 4926; Ezell Debrief; 1stMarDiv O 3100.5, dtd 19Aug70, tab B-8, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Aug70.

29. CG1stMarDiv msg to Distribution List, dtd 24Aug70, L&D Notebook.

30. CGIIIMAF msg to 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, FLC, 1st Radio Bn, 2d

CAG, Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO, dtd 21Oct70, L&D Notebook, summarizes the instructions previously in effect.

31. Ibid.

32. 1stMarDiv Order 5100.9B, dtd 8Nov70, tab B-11, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Nov70; CG1stMarDiv msg to Distribution List, dtd 6Jan71, L&D Notebook.

33. 1stMarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information Notebook, Apr71, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, p. G-1-6.

The Challenge to Authority: Race, Drugs, Indiscipline

Additional sources for this section are: David Cortright, *Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military Today* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1975), hereafter Cortright, *Soldiers*; Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), hereafter Moskos, *Enlisted Man*; and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Ralph W. Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps* (Washington: History and Museums Division, 1975), hereafter Shaw and Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps*. Extensive use has been made of the following oral history materials, all in the Oral HistColl, MCHC: LtGen William K. Jones intvw, 13Apr73, hereafter Jones intvw, Apr73; Col Neil E. Heffernan debriefing at FMFPac, 26Jun70, Tape 4890, hereafter Heffernan Debrief; Col Haywood R. Smith debriefing at FMFPac, 5Oct70, Tape 4970, hereafter Smith Debrief; Col Laurence J. Stien debriefing at FMFPac, 15Oct70, Tape 4973, hereafter Stien Debrief; Col Robert W. Teller debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4897, hereafter Teller Debrief; Fails intvw; Capt Ronald C. Hood, III, intvw, 3Mar79, Tape 6345, hereafter Hood intvw.

34. Cortright, *Soldier*, passim., is a detailed overview of military unrest, from a radical perspective. Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, pp. 158-161, approaches the situation from a more pro-military viewpoint.

35. Huff Comments.

36. MajGen Edwin D. Wheeler, Remarks to Marine Corps General Officers' Symposium, Jul71, tab E, 1971, General Officers' Symposium Book.

37. Simmons Orientation Talk, p. 14; George W. Ashworth, "Marine Corps Ponders Its Footing on Peacetime-Level Basis," *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 May70.

39. Dulacki Comments; Dulacki intvw, p. 106.

40. Fails intvw; see also Supply Bn, 1st FSR *Scuttlebutt*, 1Feb70, tab B, encl i, 1st FSR ComdC, Jan70.

41. Fails intvw.

42. Moskos, *Enlisted Man*, p. 121.

Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, DivO 5390.1, dtd 17Jan70 (copy in Racial Problems Folder, box 5, McCutcheon Papers), hereafter 1stMarDiv, *The Racial Situation*.

44. Shaw and Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps*, pp. 69-71; Majors A. S. Painter, G. S. St. Pierre, and H. C. Sweet, Jr., rept, Subj: Race Relations in the United States Marine Corps, dtd Jun70 (Negro Marines—Race Relations File RefSec); Senior Member Inquiry Team memo to CG Marine Corps Base, Camp Smedley D. Butler, Subj: Report of Racial Turbulence Inquiry, dtd 4Oct71 (News Releases/Miscellaneous Folder, "Blacks in the Marine Corps" Backup File).

45. Chapman is quoted in Shaw and Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps*, pp. 72-73.

46. CMC msg to ALMAR, dtd 2Sep69 (Negro Marines, ALMAR-65 Subject File, RefSec).

47. For examples of views critical of the permission of "Black Power" symbols, see Simmons Brief and GySgt Joe Lopez intvw, 21Feb70, Tape 4749, hereafter Lopez intvw.

48. Jones intvw, Apr 73, pp. 85-86.

49. Majors A. S. Painter, G. S. St. Pierre, and H. C. Sweet, Jr., rept, subj: Race Relations in the United States Marine Corps, dtd Jun70 (Negro Marines—Race Relations, RefSec).

50. 1stMarDiv Talking Paper, dtd 2Oct70, L&D Notebook; HQMC Summary of Significant Racial Incidents at Marine Corps Installations, Aug68-Nov71 (Negro Marines—Race Relations File, RefSec); CG1stMAW msgs to CGIIIMAF, dtd 29Dec70, 3, 4, and 7Jan71 (III MAF Incoming Message Files, 7Dec70-14Jan71).

51. McCutcheon intvw, pp. 13, 14, 16; consult also Simmons Debrief and Stien Debrief.

52. Stien Debrief.

53. Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 3Aug70, Tape 4925, hereafter Parnell Debrief.

54. *Sea Tiger*, 16Oct70; quoted in Shaw and Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps*, pp. 77-78. See also McCutcheon intvw, p. 15.

55. 1stMarDiv, *The Racial Situation*. See also Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 11-13; and 1stMarDiv Talking Paper, dtd 2Oct70, L&D Notebook.

56. 1stMarDiv Order 5420.1A, dtd 14Dec69, tab B-18, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec69.

57. LtCol Bernard E. Trainor, CO, 1st Recon Bn, ltr to CG1stMarDiv, n.d. circa. 1970-71 (Vietnam Comment File).

58. LtGen William K. Jones remarks to Marine Corps General Officers' Symposium, Jul71, tab J, 1971 General Officers' Symposium Book. See also Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 12-13; and CG1stMAW to CGFMFPac, dtd 30Aug70 (III MAF Incoming Message File, Aug-14Dec70).

59. 1stMarDiv Bulletin 5420, dtd 10Jan71, tab B-7, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan71; 1stMarDiv Order 5420.1B, dtd 15Feb71, tab B-3, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb71.

60. FLC Order 1500.6, dtd 13Mar70, tab N and FLC Order 5350.1, dtd 21Mar70, tab R, both in FLC ComdC, Mar70.

61. LCdr James G. Goode, CHC, USN, intvw, 3Jul70, Tape 4935, hereafter Goode intvw; Cdr James G. Goode, CHC, USN, comments on draft ms, 28Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Goode Comments.

62. Heffernan Debrief; Smith Debrief; Stien Debrief; Teller Debrief; Hood intvw.

63. Col Theodore E. Metzger, comments on draft ms, 22Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Metzger Comments.

64. Smith Debrief.

65. Col Edward A. Wilcox debriefing at FMFPac, 4Jul70, Tape 4889, hereafter Wilcox Debrief.

66. Stien Debrief.

67. Hood intvw.

68. McCutcheon intvw, p. 15. For background on SgtMaj Huff, see Shaw and Donnelly, *Blacks in the Marine Corps*, pp. 79-80.

69. CG1stMAW msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 30Aug70 (III MAF Incoming Message Files, Aug-14Dec70).

70. Huff Comments.

71. Hood intvw.

72. 1stMarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information Notebook, Apr71, in 3d

MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71, p. G-1-5g; Simmons Debrief.

73. Huff Comments.

74. Armstrong Debrief.

75. Goode Comments.

76. 1stMarDiv Platoon Leader's Pamphlet, *The Drug Problem*, tab B-9, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar71, passim., hereafter *The Drug Problem*; 1stMarDiv Talking Paper, dtd 2Oct70, L&D Notebook; Dulacki intvw, pp. 103-104; Hood intvw.

77. Simmons Debrief; Armstrong Debrief.

78. Teller Debrief; Capt Jerry K. Taylor intvw, 29Mar71, Tape 4997. For views on the U.S. origin of the Vietnam military drug problem consult: Armstrong intvw, p. 48; Dulacki intvw, pp. 98-102.

79. CGIIIMAF msgs to CGFMFPac, dtd 31Aug70 and 11Sep70; CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 12Jan71 (III MAF Outgoing Message Files, 3Aug70-24Jan71); III MAF ComdCs, Aug70, Sep70, Jan71.

80. *The Drug Problem*; 1stMarDiv Bulletin 6710, dtd 28Mar71, tab B-B-13; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar71; FLC Order P6710, dtd 13Dec70, tab F, FLC ComdC, Dec70; *Sea Tiger*, 11Sep70.

81. Simmons Orientation Talk, p. 16.

82. CGFMFPac msg to FMFPac, dtd 27Aug70, L&D Notebook, describes basic drug policy. See also: Armstrong Debrief; Maj I. W. Neely intvw, 21Feb70, Tape 4748, hereafter Neely intvw, describes one unit's efforts to break up drug-using groups of Marines.

83. Hood intvw.

84. For the 4th Division amnesty, see *Washington Post*, 23Jul70, p. 1. The DOD drug task force recommendations are summarized in *Sea Tiger*, 2Oct70, and in *U.S. News and World Report*, 31Aug70, p. 26. Marines occasionally voluntarily turned themselves in for drug treatment; see Maintenance Bn ComdC, Apr70, in 1st FSR ComdC, Apr70.

85. This message is quoted in Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 17-18.

86. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 19Oct70 (III MAF Incoming Message Files, 16Sep-29Oct70); CGIIIMAF msg to CG1stMarDiv, dtd 22Oct70 (III MAF Outgoing Message Files, Aug-14Dec70.)

87. Col Hugh S. Aitken's debriefing at FMFPac, 4Mar71, Tape 5007, hereafter Aitken Debrief.

88. Armstrong intvw, pp. 46-49, see also p. 24; Armstrong Debrief; MAG-16 Group Chaplain ComdC, Feb71, in MAG-16 ComdC, Feb71.

89. Stien Debrief describes handling of a radical agitator in MAG-13. Wilcox Debrief deals with combat refusals in the 1st Marines. For general disciplinary problems, see: Goode intvw; Lopez intvw; Col Donald E. Morin intvw, 13Aug70, Tape 4909; Capt John S. Papa intvw, 24Feb70, Tape 4750, hereafter Papa intvw.

90. Gen Leonard F. Chapman, remarks to 1970 General Officers' Symposium; BGen R. G. Carney, Jr., presentation to 1970 General Officers' Symposium; both in 1970 General Officers' Symposium Book. See also CG3dMarDiv msg to 3dMarDiv, ca. May69 in LtGen William K. Jones Intvw Backup File (OralHistColl, MCHC), hereafter CG3dMarDiv msg, ca. May69; 1stMarDiv Bulletin 1900, dtd 7Oct70, tab B-6, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Oct70; 1stMarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information Notebook, Apr71, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71.

91. Papa intvw. See also Aitken Debrief; Simmons Debrief.

'Fragging' and Operation Freeze

92. 1stMarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information Notebook, Apr71, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71.

93. Cortright, *Soldiers*, pp. 46-47, for example, calls fragging an essential tool of soldier democracy.

94. Division statistics are in 1stMarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information Notebook, Apr71, p. G-1-5h, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71. For the Maintenance Battalion incident, see Maintenance Bn ComdC, Feb70, in 1st FSR ComdC, Feb70; and McCutcheon intvw, p. 16. USARV statistics are summarized in Lewy, *America in Vietnam*, p. 156.

95. 1stMarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information Notebook, Apr71, p. G-1-5h, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71; Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 27-8.

96. Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 29-30, 33; Papa intvw; Jones intvw, pp. 44-47, 49-50. For an obviously drug-related attempted fragging, see 1st MP Bn ComdC, Jan71, p. 11. The intended victim in this case was the handler of a dog trained to sniff out marijuana.

97. Jones intvw, pp. 40-42; Maintenance Bn ComdC, Mar70, in 1st FSR ComdC, Mar70; and *Washington Post*, 16Jun70, p. 15, cover the outcome of the Maintenance Battalion fragging investigation.

98. Jones intvw, pp. 40-42, 47, 83; CG3dMarDiv msg, ca. May69.

99. For typical Operation Freeze order, see 2/5 Order 3120.1 dtd 8Sep70, in 2/5 ComdC, Sep70; Simmons Orientation Talk, p. 29.

100. CGFMFPac msg to FMFPac, dtd 13Nov70; CG1stMarDiv msg to 1stMarDiv, dtd 15Nov70, L&D Notebook; 1stMarDiv Order 5830.2, dtd 19Dec70, tab B-17, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70.

101. 1stMarDiv Order 5830.1, dtd 13Dec70, tab B-15, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec70; Simmons Debrief.

102. 1stMarDiv/3d MAB CG's Information Notebook, Apr71, p. G-1-5h, in 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71.

Training and Morale-Building

103. 3/5 Jnl, 2May70, in 3/5 ComdC, May70; in the same vein, see CO, 1st Mar msg to 1st Mar, dtd 25Dec70, tab 4-30, 2/1 ComdC, Dec70.

104. Wilcox Debrief. For similar views, see BGen Charles S. Robertson debriefing at FMFPac, 2Feb70, Tape 4797; and Col Herbert L. Wilkerson debriefing at FMFPac, 13Jul70, Tape 4892.

105. Col James E. Harrell, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

106. 1st MarDiv Order P1500.31A, dtd 24Jan70, tab B-33, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan70, outlines the division training objectives and methods. For regimental training efforts see 1st, 5th, 7th, and 11th Mar ComdCs, for 1970 and 1971.

107. 3/1 ComdC, Apr70, p. 14.

108. Supply Bn ComdC, Jan70, in 1st FSR ComdC, Jan70.

109. Parnell Debrief; III MAF ComdC, Feb70, p. 14.

110. Wilcox Debrief; III MAF ComdCs, Jan70-Feb71.

111. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb70, p. 1st MAW ComdC, Jan70; 1st FSR ComdC, Jan70.

112. 2/1 ComdC, Sep70, pt. 2, sec A. For a description of similar facilities in FLSG-B, consult Neely intvw.

113. Col William V. H. White, comments on draft ms, 16Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File).

114. 1st MarDiv, 1st MAW, and FLC ComdCs, 1970-1971; Col Edmund G. Dering Jr., debriefing at FMFPac, 10Aug70, Tape 4958, hereafter Dering Debrief.

115. 1stMarDiv Order 1710.10D, dtd 11May68, tab B-6, 1st MarDiv ComdC, May68, lays out basic 1stMarDiv R&R procedures. See also 1stMarDiv Order 1710.10E, Change 2, dtd 11Dec69, tab B-15, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Dec69; and 1st MarDiv Div Bulletin 1710, dtd 28Mar70, tab B-30, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Mar70. Supply Bn procedures are in *Scuttlebutt*, 1Feb70, Supply Bn ComdC, Jan70, in 1st

FSR ComdC, Jan70. Rocket R&R is recalled in Simmons, "Marine Operations, 1969-1972," pp. 142-143.

116. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Nov68, pp. 54-55; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Jun70.

117. 1st MarDiv Order 1710.2b, dtd 22Jan70, tab B-30, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jan70.

118. 1stMarDiv Order 1710.14A, dtd 25Feb70, tab B-24, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb70. For comment on the program, consult Wilcox Debrief and MajGen Ormond R. Simpson debriefing at FMFPac, 15Dec69, Tape 4695.

119. Darning Debrief; See also Col Edmund G. Darning, taped comments on draft ms, 25Jul83 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).

120. 1stMarDiv Order 1050.4, dtd 3Feb70, tab B-4, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Feb70.

121. 3d MAB Bulletin 11240, dtd 29Apr71, tab A-4, 3d MAB ComdC, 14-30Apr71; CORDS Da Nang City Advisory Group rept for period ending 30Apr71, dtd 5May71 (U.S. Army Center of Military History).

122. CGFMFPac msg to FMFPac, dtd 20Nov70; CMC msg to all General Officers and all Commanding Officers, dtd 7Dec70; L&D Notebook.

123. LtGen Donn J. Robertson intvw, 24Apr73, pp. 56-57; FLC Bulletin 1740, dtd 23Nov70, tab H, FLC ComdC, Nov70.

124. Armstrong Debrief.

Cohesion or Disintegration?

125. McCutcheon intvw, p. 16.

126. Stien Debrief.

127. Huff Comments.

128. Wilcox Debrief; for another basically favorable view of the Marines serving in Vietnam, see Simmons Orientation Talk, pp. 3-4.

CHAPTER 21

U.S. MARINE ADVISORS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES

U.S. Marine Advisors and the Vietnamese Marine Corps

Unless otherwise noted material in this section is drawn from SMA Monthly Historical Summaries, hereafter SMA HistSum and date; FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1970-71; MACV ComdHist, 70 and 71.

1. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 34-36; SMA HistSum Jan1970; Col Richard F. Armstrong, comments on draft ms, n.d., and LtCol Pieter L. Hogaboom, comments on draft ms, 10Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File); see also SMA, "VNMC/MAU Historical Summary, 1954-1973," a concise history of the VNMC and MAU.

2. MACV ComdHist, 70, II, ch. 7, pp. 9-10.

3. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 38-43.

4. Ibid., p. 40.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., pp. 42-43.

7. Ibid., p. 43.

8. SMA HistSum, Jan70.

9. SMA HistSum, 15 and 22May70; Col Richard F. Armstrong, comments on draft ms, n.d. (Vietnam Comment File). For general background also see BGen Trau Dinh Tho, *The Cambodia Incursion*

(Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979).

10. SMA HistSum, 29May and 5Jun70; Col Edward O. Bierman, comments on draft ms, 22Jul83 (Vietnam Comment File).

11. SMA HistSum, 19Jun70.

12. SMA HistSum, Jul and Aug70.

13. SMA Lam Son 719 CAAR, Mar71, hereafter cited as Lam Son 719 CAAR.

The Vietnamese Marine Corps in Lam Son 719

14. For general background on Lam Son 719 see MACV ComdHist, 71, II, Anx E; XXIV Corps Lam Son 719 AAR; and MajGen Nguyen Duy Hinh, *Lam Son 719* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1979), hereafter Hinh, *Lam Son 719*.

15. LtCol Marshall N. Carter, comments on draft ms, 28Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. SMA HistSum, Mar71.

17. SMA HistSum, Mar71; Hinh, *Lam Son 719*, pp. 93-96.

18. Lam Son 719 CAAR; SMA HistSum, Mar71.

19. BGen Alexander P. McMillan, comments on draft ms, 19Apr71 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter McMillan Comments; Lam Son 719 CAAR.

20. BGen Francis W. Tief, comments on draft ms, 13Apr83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Tief Comments.

21. McMillan Comments.

22. Tief Comments.

23. Lam Son 719 CAAR; Tief Comments.

24. SMA HistSum 19-25 Mar 1917; Lam Son 719 CAAR,

25. Lam Son 719 CAAR; SMA memo for the Admiral, dtd 26Mar71.

26. Lam Son 719 CAAR.

27. Ibid.

The Marine Advisory Unit and Solid Anchor

Additional sources for this section are SMA HistSums, 1970-71; SMA G-3 Advisor Solid Anchor Chronology and Comment, hereafter G-3 Advisor Report; Asst G-3 Advisor Recollection of Solid Anchor, hereafter Carter Report.

28. G-3 Advisor Report.

29. VAdm Jerome H. King, comments on draft ms, 10Jun83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter King Comments.

30. Carter Report; G-3 Advisor Report.

31. NavForV, Monthly HistSum, Dec 1970.

32. G-3 Advisor Report; Carter Report.

33. Ibid.

34. NavForV, Monthly HistSum, Dec 1970.

35. King Comments.

36. Tief Comments.

37. Carter Report.

38. G-3 Advisor Report; Tief Comments; Carter Report.

39. Ibid.

40. Carter Report.

41. Tief Comments.

42. G-3 Advisor Report.

43. G-3 Advisor Report; Tief Comments; Carter Report.

44. King Comments.

Sub-Unit 1, 1st Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, MarOpsV, 1970-71, and Sub-Unit 1, 1st ANGLICO, ComdCs, 1970-71, hereafter SU-1 ComdC and date.

45. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71, pp. 23-24.
46. SU-1 ComdC, Jan70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71.
47. FMFPac, MarOpsV, May-Jun71.
48. SU-1 ComdC, Feb70.
49. SU-1 ComdC, Mar70.
50. SU-1 ComdC, Jul70; FMFPac, MarOpsV, Jul70, pp. 30-31.
51. SU-1 ComdC, Aug 1970.
52. SU-1 ComdC, Jan70-Jun71.

The Special Landing Force

53. FMFPac, MarOpsV, Dec69, CinCPac ComdHist, 1970; 26th Marines ComdC, Sep69.
54. 9th Mar ComdCs, 70-71; 31st MAU ComdCs, 70-71.
55. TG 79.4/SLF Alpha ComdC, Aug70.
56. 31st MAU ComdC, Jan71; ComUSMACV msg to Com-SeventhFlt, dtd 30Jan71 in 31st MAU ComdC, Jan71.
57. CTG 79.4 msg to CTF 76, dtd 6Feb71 in 31st MAU ComdC, Feb71.
58. 31st MAU ComdC, Feb-Mar71.
59. MajGen A. H. Jones msg to LtGen W. K. Jones, dtd 23Apr71, LtGen W. K. Jones msg to MajGen A. J. Armstrong, dtd 22May71, and LtGen W. K. Jones msg to LtGen D. Robertson, dtd 24Apr71, all in FMFPac Message Files, Jan-May71; 31st MAU ComdC, May71.
60. Ibid.
61. CTG 79.4 msg to 1stBn, 9th Mar, and HMM-164, dtd 20May71 and CTG 76.4 msg to AIG 461, dtd 24May71, in 31st MAU ComdC, May71.

62. LtGen W. K. Jones msg to MGen A. J. Armstrong, dtd 22May71, FMFPac Message Files, Jan-Jun71.
63. MajGen Alan J. Armstrong intvw, 2Oct73, p. 46 (Oral Hist-Coll, MCHC).

Marines on the MACV Staff

64. Status of Forces (SOF), Jan-Jun70.
65. SOF 1966-71.
66. Col Verle E. Ludwig, telephone intvw, 10Apr84, hereafter Ludwig intvw.
67. Col Jack W. Dindinger, comments on draft ms, 28Mar83 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dindinger Comments.
68. Col Richard H. Rainforth debriefing at FMFPac, 20Aug70 (Oral HistColl, MCHC).
69. Ludwig intvw.
70. Dindinger Comments.

Embassy Marines

71. Co E MSG Bn ComdC Jan-Jun70.
72. Maj Edward J. Land, Jr., comments on draft ms, 31May83 (Vietnam Comment File); Co E MSG Bn, ComdC, Jan70-Jun71.
73. Co E MSG Bn, ComdC, Jan-Aug70.
74. Co E MSG Bn, ComdC, Jan-Jun71.
75. Co E MSG Bn, ComdC, Dec70-Apr71.
76. Co E MSG Bn, ComdC, Mar-Jun71; Co C MSG Bn, ComdC, Apr75.

Appendix A

Marine Command and Staff List

January 1970-June 1971

III MAF Headquarters, 1Jan70-14Apr71

CG LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.	1Jan-9Mar70
LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon	9Mar-23Dec70
LtGen Donn J. Robertson	24Dec70-14Apr71
DepCG MajGen George S. Bowman, Jr.	1Jan-9Mar70
DepCG (Ground) MajGen Edwin B. Wheeler	1Jan-26Apr70
MajGen Charles F. Widdecke	27Apr70-14Apr71
DepCG (Air) MajGen William G. Thrash	1Jan-30Jun70
MajGen Alan J. Armstrong	1Jul70-14Apr71
C/S BGen Leo J. Dulacki	1Jan-15Jun70
BGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr.	16Jun-9Dec70
BGen William G. Joslyn	10Dec70-14Apr71
DepC/S Col Sam A. Dressin	1Jan-2Sep70
Col Robert W. Kersey	3-27Sep70
Col Eugene H. Haffey	28Sep70-14Apr71
DepC/S Plans Col James A. Sloan	1-13Jan70
Col John R. Thurman, III, USA	14Jan-9Mar70
G-1 Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr.	1Jan-31Jul70
Col Lavern J. Oltmer	1Aug70-14Apr71
G-2 Col Edward W. Dzialo	1Jan-30Jun70
Col Forest J. Hunt	1Jul70-14Apr71
G-3 BGen Thomas H. Miller, Jr.	1Jan-15Jun70
Col Herbert L. Wilkerson	16Jun-8Jul70
Col Charles H. Ludden	9Jul70-14Apr71
G-4 Col Wilbur F. Simlik	1Jan-4Jun70
Col Allan T. Wood	5Jun-23Nov70
Col Kenneth McLennan	24Nov-18Dec70
Col Warren E. McCain	19Dec70-14Apr71
G-5 Col Clifford J. Peabody	1Jan-4Sep70
Maj Donald E. Sudduth	5Sep70-8Jan71
Col William L. McCulloch	9-19Jan71
Maj Donald E. Sudduth	20Jan-14Apr71

Headquarters & Service Company

CO/III MAF Headquarters Commandant	
Col Frank X. Hoff	1Jan-15Jun70
LtCol James C. Klinedinst	16Jun-11Nov70
LtCol William J. Spiesel	12Nov70-14Apr71

1st Marine Division Headquarters, 1Jan70-14Apr71

CG MajGen Edwin B. Wheeler	1Jan-26Apr70
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MajGen Charles F. Widdecke	27Apr70-14Apr71
ADC BGen Charles S. Robertson	1-31Jan70
BGen William F. Doehler	1Feb-15Jun70
BGen Edwin H. Simmons	16Jun70-14Apr71
C/S Col Charles E. Walker	1Feb-27Feb70
Col Noble L. Beck	28Feb-12Jul70
Col Eugene H. Haffey	13Jul-26Sep70
Col Don H. Blanchard	27Sep70-14Apr71
DepC/S Col Hugh S. Aitken	4Feb-28Feb70
G-1 Col Robert E. Barde	1Jan-31Aug70
Col Hugh S. Aitken	1Sep70-3Feb71
Col William M. Herrin, Jr.	4Feb-14Apr71
G-2 Col Edward A. Wilcox	1Jan-9Feb70
LtCol Charles M. Mosher	10Feb-25Mar70
Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr.	26Mar-29Jul70
Col Albert C. Smith, Jr.	30Jul70-14Apr71
G-3 Col Floyd H. Waldrop	1Jan-18Aug70
Col Don H. Blanchard	19Aug-26Sep70
Col Ralph F. Estey	27Sep-30Nov70
Col Leon N. Utter	1Dec70-14Apr71
G-4 Col Nicholas A. Canzona	1Jan-27Feb70
Col Miller M. Blue	28Feb70-1Feb71
Col William L. McCulloch	2Feb-14Apr71
G-5 LtCol Vincent A. Albers, Jr	1Jan-31Jan70
Col Louis S. Hollier, Jr.	1Feb70-1Jan71
Col Richard B. Baity	2Jan-14Jan71

Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division

CO Col William C. Patton	1Jan-22Mar70
Col John H. Keith, Jr.	23Mar-30Jun70
Col Edwin M. Young	1Jul-15Dec70
Col William M. Herrin, Jr.	16Dec70-3Feb71
Col George M. Bryant	4Feb-3Apr71
LtCol Robert E. Wehrle	4-14Apr71

1st Marines

CO Col Herbert L. Wilkerson	1Jan-9Feb70
Col Edward A. Wilcox	10Feb-28Jun70
Col Paul X. Kelley	29Jun70-9May71

1st Battalion, 1st Marines

CO LtCol Godfrey S. Delcuze	1Jan-15Mar70
LtCol Charles G. Little	16Mar-8Jul70
LtCol Robert P. Rose	9Jul70-3May71

2d Battalion, 1st Marines

CO LtCol William V. H. White 1Jan-15May70
 LtCol William G. Leftwich, Jr. 16May-12Sep70
 LtCol Donald J. Norris 13Sep70-13Mar71
 LtCol Roy E. Moss 14Mar-19May71

3d Battalion, 1st Marines

CO LtCol Thomas P. Ganey 1-9Jan70
 LtCol Frank M. Boyd 10Jan-18May70
 Maj Pierre L. LeFevre 19-24May70
 LtCol William M. Yeager 25May-17Sep70
 LtCol Marc A. Moore 18Sep70-3May71

5th Marines

CO Col Noble L. Beck 1Jan-10Feb70
 Col Ralph F. Estey 11Feb-26Jun70
 Col Clark V. Judge 27Jun70-25Mar71

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol Joseph K. Griffis, Jr. 1Jan-14Feb70
 LtCol Cornelius F. Savage, Jr. 15Feb-28Aug70
 LtCol Bernard E. Trainor 29Aug-19Nov70
 LtCol Franklin A. Hart, Jr. 20Nov70-16Apr71

2d Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol James T. Bowen 1-13Jan70
 LtCol Frederick D. Leder 14Jan-25Jul70
 LtCol Thomas M. Hamlin 26Jul70-22Mar71

3d Battalion, 5th Marines

CO LtCol Johan S. Gestson 1Jan-6Apr70
 LtCol William R. Kepart 7-14Apr70 (Acting)
 LtCol Johan S. Gestson 15Apr-17Aug70
 LtCol Herschel L. Johnson, Jr. 18Aug70-14Mar71

7th Marines

CO Col Gildo S. Codispoti 1Jan-28Feb70
 Col Edmund G. Dering, Jr. 1Mar-4Aug70
 Col Robert H. Piehl 5Aug-10Oct70

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Frank A. Clark 1-15Jan70
 LtCol Charles G. Cooper 16Jan-25Jul70
 LtCol Theophil P. Riegert 26Jul-18Sep70
 Maj John J. Sheridan 19-22Sep70

2d Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Arthur E. Folsom 1Jan-9Apr70
 LtCol Vincent A. Albers, Jr. 10Apr-12Oct70

3d Battalion, 7th Marines

CO LtCol Ray G. Kummerow 1-30Jan70
 LtCol Gerald C. Thomas, Jr. 31Jan-27Jun70
 LtCol Kenneth L. Robinson, Jr. 28Jun-5Sep70
 LtCol Franklin A. Hart, Jr. 6Sep-10Oct70
 Maj Daniel J. O'Connor 11Oct-13Oct70

11th Marines

CO Col Don D. Ezell 1Jan-24Mar70
 Col Ernest R. Reid, Jr. 25Mar-30Aug70
 Col Edwin M. Rudzis 31Aug-28Mar71

1st Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol John D. Shoup 1Jan-13Feb70
 LtCol Lawrence R. Dorsa 14Feb-11Aug70
 LtCol Gene H. Martin 12Aug-2Dec70
 LtCol Bruce F. Ogden 3Dec70-13May71

2d Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Vonda Weaver 1Jan-23Mar70
 LtCol Donald C. Stanton 24Mar-14Jul70
 Maj George W. Ryhanych 15Jul-2Nov70
 Maj Carlos K. McAfee 3Nov70-21Mar71

3d Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Karl N. Mueller 1Jan-6Apr70
 LtCol David K. Dickey 7Apr-12Oct70

4th Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol James F. Burke, Jr. 1Jan-2Apr70
 LtCol Vaughn L. DeBoever 3Apr-9Oct70

1st Battalion, 13th Marines

CO LtCol Donald H. Strain 1Jan-19Feb70
 LtCol Harold Schofield 20Feb-19Mar70

26th Marines

CO Col James E. Harrell 1Jan-19Mar70

1st Battalion, 26th Marines

CO LtCol James C. Goodin 1-12Jan70
 LtCol Arnold J. Orr 13Jan-16Mar70
 Maj Joseph F. Flynn 17-19Mar70

2d Battalion, 26th Marines

CO LtCol William C. Drumright 1-26Jan70
 Maj Donald L. Humphrey 27Jan-19Mar70

3d Battalion, 26th Marines		1st Hospital Company	
CO LtCol John J. Unterkofler	1Jan-15Mar70	CO Capt G. R. Hart, USN	1Jan-26Feb70
LtCol Gayle F. Twyman	16-19Mar70		
1st Reconnaissance Battalion		1st Dental Company	
CO LtCol John J. Grace	1-26Jan70	CO Capt Perry C. Alexander, USN	1Jan-2Mar70
LtCol William C. Drumright	27Jan-10Aug70	Capt Merideth H. Mead, USN	3Mar-5Oct70
LtCol Edmund J. Regan, Jr.	11Aug-12Sep70		
LtCol William G. Leftwich, Jr.	12Sep-18Nov70	3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion	
LtCol Bernard E. Trainor	19Nov70-25Mar71	CO LtCol David G. Mehargue	1-28Jan70
1st Engineer Battalion		1st Force Reconnaissance Company	
CO Maj Walter M. Winoski	1-30Jan70	CO Maj William H. Bond, Jr.	2Mar-3Jun70
LtCol Walter F. Glowicki	31Jan-31Dec70	Maj Dale D. Dorman	4Jun-4Aug70
LtCol Daryl E. Benstead	1Jan-31Mar71	Capt Norman B. Centers	5-19Aug70
7th Engineer Battalion		1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW)	
CO LtCol William G. Bates	1Jan-6Aug70	CG MajGen William G. Thrash	1Jan-30Jun70
Maj Richard Gleeson	7-24Aug70	MajGen Alan J. Armstrong	1Jul-14Apr71
9th Engineer Battalion		AWC BGen Ralph H. Spanjer	1Jan-4May70
CO LtCol Edward K. Maxwell	1Jan-22Feb70	BGen Robert F. Conley	5May-7Aug70
LtCol John P. Kraynak	23Feb-24Aug70	BGen William R. Quinn	30Aug70-14Apr71
1st Shore Parry Battalion		C/S Col Robert W. Teller	1Jan-30Jun70
CO LtCol Richard F. Armstrong	1Jan-11Mar70	Col Jack R. Sloan	1Jul-14Apr71
1st Motor Transport Battalion		G-1 Col Grover S. Stewart, Jr.	1Jan-15Feb70
CO LtCol Morris S. Shimanoff	1Jan-2Jun70	Col Paul B. Henley	16Feb-11Jul70
LtCol Joseph J. Louder	3Jun-15Sep70	Col Donald Conroy	12Jul70-14Apr71
LtCol Charles A. Rosenfeld	16Sep-23Oct70	G-2 Col James R. Weaver	1-23Jan70
LtCol Robert E. Burgess	24Oct-6Dec70	Col Jerry J. Mitchell	24Jan-31Jan70
LtCol Richard B. Talbott	7Dec70-22Mar71	Col Walter E. Sparling	1Feb-15Apr70
Maj Joseph A. Galizio	23Mar-31Mar71	Col Jerry J. Mitchell	16Apr-5Oct70
11th Motor Transport Battalion		Maj Joseph G. Roman	6Oct-8Nov70
CO LtCol William R. Kephart	1Jan-14Feb70	Maj Eric J. Coady	9Nov70-24Feb71
LtCol Richard L. Prather	15Feb-26May70	Col Vernon Clarkson, Jr.	25Feb-14Apr71
Maj William H. Walters	27-31May70	G-3 Col Robert L. LaMar	1Jan-18May70
LtCol Alan D. Albert, Jr.	1Jun-24Oct70	Col Walter E. Sparling	19May-6Nov70
LtCol Charles A. Rosenfeld	25Oct70-23Apr71	Col Rex C. Denny, Jr.	7Nov70-14Apr71
1st Tank Battalion		G-4 Col William C. McGraw, Jr.	1Jan-2Jul70
CO Maj Joseph J. Louder	1Jan-15Mar70	LtCol John M. Dean	3Jul-27Jul70
1st Medical Battalion		Col Boris J. Frankovic	28Jul70-28Feb71
CO Capt James W. Lea, USN	1Jan-12Jun70	Col Dellwyn L. Davis, Jr.	1Mar-14Apr71
Capt Thomas R. Turner, USN	13Jun-19Jul70	Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 (MWHG-1)	
Cdr William A. Elliot, USN	20Jul70-14Apr71	CO Col Laurence J. Stien	1Jan-11May70
		LtCol William R. Smith	14May-5Mar71
		LtCol Gordon H. Buckner II	6Mar-14Apr71
		LtCol Paul S. Frappollo	15Apr-30Jun71
		Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 1 (H&HS-1)	
		CO LtCol Henry F. Witter	1Jan-6Feb70
		Maj William S. Humbert III	7Feb-31Jul70

Maj Fred J. Cone	1Aug-28Dec70	Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263)	
Maj Louis F. Gagon	29Dec70-14Apr71	CO LtCol Walter R. Ledbetter, Jr.	1Jan-19Feb70
LtCol Paul S. Frappollo	15Apr-16May71	LtCol Earnest G. Young	20Feb-25Jul70
Maj Thomas P. Kirland	17May-30Jun71	LtCol Louis K. Keck	26Jul70-26Mar71
		Maj Dennis N. Anderson	27Mar-15May71
Marine Wing Support Group 1 (MWSG-1)			
CO Col Laurence J. Stien	1Jan-11May70	Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 361 (HMH-361)	
LtCol William R. Smith	12May70-5Mar71	CO LtCol Charles A. Block	1Jan-6Jan70
LtCol Gordon H. Buckner, II	6Mar-14Apr71	Maj Richard A. Govoni	7Jan-28Jan70
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 1 (MWCS-1)			
CO Maj Allen B. Ray	1Jan-5Jun70	Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 (HMM-364)	
Maj Andy J. Sibley	6Jun-3Dec70	CO LtCol Charles R. Dunbaugh	1Jan-24Feb70
Maj Richard S. Kaye	4Dec-30Jun71	LtCol Peter C. Scaglione, Jr.	25Feb-15Sep70
		LtCol Henry W. Steadman	16Sep70-23Feb71
		Maj Neil R. Vanleeuwen	24Feb-12Mar71
Marine Wing Facilities Squadron 1 (MWFS-1)			
CO LtCol Norbert F. Schnippel, Jr.	1Jan-12Mar70	Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463)	
Maj William E. Dodds	13Mar-8Jul70	CO LtCol Raymond M. Ryan	1-7Jan70
Maj Billy G. Phillips	9Jul-16Nov70	LtCol Charles A. Block	8Jan-10Sep70
Maj James R. Griffin	17Nov-30Jun71	LtCol Robert R. Leisy	11Sep70-4Mar71
		LtCol Thomas S. Reap	5Mar-18May71
		Maj Myrddyn W. Edwards	9May-29May71
Marine Aircraft Group 16 (MAG-16)			
CO Col James P. Bruce	1Jan-6Mar70	Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (HMM-161)	
Col Haywood R. Smith	8Mar-3Oct70	CO LtCol Bennie H. Mann, Jr.	1Jan-16Jul70
Col Lewis C. Street III	4Oct70-21Jun71	Maj Lewis J. Zilka	17Jul-15Aug70
Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16 (H&MS-16)			
CO Maj Malcolm T. Hornsby, Jr.	1Jan-14Feb70	Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMH-262)	
LtCol Wyman U. Blakeman	15Feb-26Mar70	CO LtCol Richard A. Bancroft	1Jan-17May70
LtCol Robert P. Guay	27Mar-5Jul70	LtCol Gerald S. Pate	18May-23Nov70
Maj Franklin A. Gullledge, Jr.	6Jul-11Aug70	LtCol Frank K. West, Jr.	24Nov70-7May71
LtCol Clifford E. Reese	12Aug-21Oct70	Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367 (HML-367)	
Maj James M. Perryman, Jr.	22Oct-23Nov70	CO LtCol Warren G. Cretney	1Jan-14Mar70
Maj Charles H. Pitman	24Nov70-25Feb71	LtCol Harry E. Sexton	15Mar-21Oct70
Maj Con D. Silard, Jr.	26Feb-15Jun71	LtCol Clifford E. Reese	22Oct70-31May71
Maj Dennis R. Bowen	16Jun-20Jun71		
Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16)			
CO LtCol Peter C. Scaglione, Jr.	1Jan-25Feb70	Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2)	
LtCol Charles R. Dunbaugh	26Feb-28May70	CO LtCol Stanley A. Challgren	1Jan-12Jan70
LtCol Louis K. Keck	29May-25Jul70	LtCol James M. Moriarty	13Jan-31Jan70
Maj Peter E. Benet	26Jul-8Nov70	Marine Air Control Group 18 (MACG-18)	
LtCol John M. Dean	9Nov70-20Apr71	CO Col Stanley G. Dunwiddie, Jr.	1Jan-27Jun70
LtCol David A. Spurlock	21Apr-15Jun71	Col Charles T. Westcott	28Jun-14Sep70
Maj Carmine W. DePietro	16-20Jun71	LtCol Francis L. Delaney	15Sep70-14Apr71
Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 167 (HML-167)			
CO LtCol John E. Weber, Jr.	1Jan-8Apr70	Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 18 (H&HS-18)	
LtCol Douglas A. McCaughey, Jr.	9Apr-4Dec70	CO Maj Herbert E. Hoppmeyer	1Jan-8Mar70
LtCol Richard J. Blanc	5Dec70-10Jun71	LtCol Robert W. Fischer	9Mar-30Jul70
		Maj John P. Fox	31Jul-28Oct70

Maj Douglas V. Stowell 29Oct70-1Jan71
 Major Robert T. Roche 2Jan-22Feb71
 Maj Leon E. Obenhaus 23Feb-9Apr71

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3)

CO LtCol John H. Dubois 1Jan-21Apr70
 Maj Pasquale J. Florio 22Apr-10Aug70
 Maj George S. Prescott 11Aug-5Sep70
 Maj Victor J. Fulladosa 6Sep-1Oct70
 LtCol William C. Simanikas 2Oct70-2Jun71

Marine Air Control Squadron 4 (MACS-4)

CO Maj Robert W. Molyneux, Jr. 1Jan-30Apr70
 Maj Ronald G. Richardson 1May-7Jul70
 Maj Lionel M. Silva 8Jul-2Sep70
 Maj Theodore M. Quinlin 3Dep-2Oct70
 LtCol Lyell H. Holmes 3Oct70-30Jan71
 Maj George S. Prescott 31Jan-14Apr71

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (MAG-11)

CO Col Neal E. Heffernan 1Jan-18Feb70
 Col Grover S. Stewart, Jr. 19Feb-18Jun70
 Col Albert C. Pommerenk 19Jun70-10Jun71

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11 (H&MS-11)

CO LtCol Richard F. Hebert 1Jan-10Apr70
 LtCol Speed F. Shea 11Apr-25Sep70
 LtCol Arthur R. Anderson, Jr. 26Sep70-1Jun71

Marine Air Base Squadron 11 (MABS-11)

CO LtCol Paul A. Manning 1Jan-6Apr70
 Maj Donald F. Crowe 7Apr-18Dec70
 LtCol Clayton L. Comfort 19Dec70-10Jun71

Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron 1 (VMCJ-1)

CO LtCol Bob W. Farley 1Jan-14Apr70
 LtCol Paul A. Manning 15Apr-14Jul70

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542 (VMFA-542)

CO LtCol Keith A. Smith 1Jan-31Jan70

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 242 (VMA [AW]-242)

CO LtCol Thomas L. Griffin, Jr. 1Jan-2Jan70
 LtCol Stanley P. Lewis 3Jan-19Aug70
 Maj Patrick J. McCarthy 20Aug-11Sep70

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 225 (VMA [AW]-225)

CO Maj Peter M. Busch 1Jan-11Jan70
 LtCol John J. Metzko 12Jan-6Jun70
 Maj Patrick J. McCarthy 7Jun-19Aug70

Maj Marcus T. Fountain, Jr. 20Aug-15Oct70
 LtCol John A. Manzione, Jr. 16Oct70-30Apr71

Marine Observation Squadron 2 (VMO-2)

CO LtCol Stanley A. Challgren 1Jan-11Jan
 LtCol James M. Moriarty 12Jan-17Sep70
 Maj Carl B. Olsen, Jr. 18Sep-26Nov70
 LtCol Edward P. Janz 27Nov70-31Mar71

Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)

CO Col Paul B. Henley 1Jan-4Feb70
 Col James R. Weaver 5Feb-25Feb70

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 12 (H&MS-12)

CO LtCol Joseph J. Went 1Jan-27Jan70
 Maj Charles A. Dixon 28Jan-25Feb70

Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)

CO LtCol George J. Ertlmeier 1Jan-18Feb70
 LtCol Henry F. Witter 19Feb-25Feb70

Marine Attack Squadron 211 (VMA-211)

CO LtCol Louis Gasparine, Jr. 1Jan-25Feb70

Marine Attack Squadron 223 (VMA-223)

CO LtCol James W. Lazzo 1Jan-28Jan70

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311)

CO LtCol Arthur R. Hickel 1Jan-12Feb70

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (MAG-13)

CO Col Thomas E. Murphree 1Jan-17May70
 Col Lawrence J. Stien 18May-15Oct70

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 13 (H&MS-13)

CO Maj Frank J. Horak, Jr. 1Jan-4Feb70
 Maj Josephus L. Mavretic 5Feb-14Apr70
 LtCol Robert W. Chapin 15Apr-30Sep70

Marine Air Base Squadron 13 (MABS-13)

CO LtCol Richard D. Revie 1Jan-12Mar70
 Maj Daniel T. Benn 13Mar-25Apr70
 LtCol Robert A. Christy 26Apr-6Jun70
 Maj Daniel T. Benn 7Jun-2Sep70
 Maj Michael J. Fibich, Jr. 3Sep-15Oct70

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115)

CO LtCol Donald P. Bowen 1Jan-2Mar70
 LtCol John V. Cox 3Mar-22Jul70
 LtCol Michael Mura 23Jul70-28Feb71

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 (VMFA-122)

CO LtCol John K. Cochran 1Jan-6Jan70
 LtCol Robert E. Howard, Jr. 7Jan-12Jul70
 Maj Ross C. Chaimson 13Jul-8Sep70

Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314 (VMFA-314)

CO LtCol Thomas J. Kelly 1Jan-6Jun70
 LtCol Robert A. Christy 7Jun-12Sep70

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VMA-311)

CO LtCol Arthur R. Hickle 1Jan-31May70
 LtCol James M. Bannan 1Jun-10Oct70
 LtCol Jerome T. Hagen 11Oct70-12May71

Marine Wing Support Group 17 (MWSG-17)

CO Col Richard A. Savage 1Jan-8Feb70
 Col Harvey L. Jensen 9Feb-6Aug70

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 17 (H&MS-17)

CO LtCol Dalvin Serrin 1Jan-6Aug70

Wing Equipment and Repair Squadron 17 (WERS-17)

CO Maj William F. Farley 1Jan-20Feb70
 LtCol George J. Ertlmeier 21Feb-6Aug70

11th Dental Company

CO Capt Van L. Johnson, Jr., USN 1Jan-6May70
 Capt Frank D. Grossman, USN 7May70-17Jan71
 Cdr William P. Armstrong, USN 18Jan-14Apr71
 Capt James J. Lyons, USN 15Apr-30Jun71

Force Logistic Command/1st Force Service Regiment

CG BGen Mauro J. Padalino 1Jan-22Oct70
 BGen James R. Jones 23Oct70-14Apr71
 CO Col Harold W. Evans, Jr. 16-26Jun71
 C/S Col John L. Tobin 1Jan-17Jun70
 Col Robert W. Calvert 18Jun-2Jul70
 Col Garth K. Sturdevan 3Jul70-8Jun71
 Col Harold W. Evans, Jr. 9Jun-15Jun71
 G-1 LtCol John E. Redelfs 1Jan-31Jul70
 LtCol Ralph D. First 1Aug70-10Jun71
 Capt David R. Little 11Jun-26Jun71
 G-2 LtCol Robert L. Solze 1Jan-9Oct70
 Maj Amilcar Vazquez 10Oct70-26Jun71
 G-3 Col William W. Storm III 1Jan-24Mar70
 Col Robert W. Calvert 25Mar-10Oct70
 Col Harold W. Evans, Jr. 11Oct70-8Jun71
 Maj John R. Wuthrich 9Jun-26Jun71
 G-4 LtCol Maurice H. Iwins, Jr. 1Jan-13Sep70
 LtCol Charles G. Boicey 14Sep-22Dec70
 LtCol Charles R. Poppe, Jr. 23Dec70-26Jun71

G-5 Maj Robert E. Johnson 1Jan-17Apr70
 Maj Ronald E. Bane 18Apr-14Jun70
 Maj Robert E. Johnson 15Jun-17Jun70

Headquarters & Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

CO LtCol Lewis R. Webb 1Jan-16Oct70
 LtCol Donald J. Burger 17Oct70-2Jun71
 LtCol Edward E. Crews 3Jun71-26Jun71

Supply Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

CO Col Robert W. Calvert 1Jan-24Mar70
 Col Donald E. Morin 25Mar-14Aug70
 Col Charles F. Langley 15Aug70-10May71
 LtCol Eugene R. Puckett 11May-11Jun71
 Maj Ronald L. Fraser 12Jun-26Jun71

Maintenance Battalion, 1st Force Service Regiment

CO LtCol Edward C. Morris 1Jan-3Apr70
 LtCol Don D. Beal 4Apr-21Sep70
 LtCol William F. Sheehan 22Sep70-18Feb71
 LtCol Edward E. Crews 19Feb-30May71
 Capt William E. Phelps 31May-17Jun71

Force Logistic Support Group Bravo, 1st Service Battalion (Rein)

CO Col Donald E. Morin 1Jan-12Mar70
 Maj Norman L. Young 13Mar-30Jun70
 LtCol Donald J. Burger 1Jul-15Sep70

1st Military Police Battalion

CO LtCol Speros D. Thomaidis 1Jan-1Jun70
 LtCol Newell T. Donahoo 2Jun-17Nov70
 LtCol John Colia 18Nov70-12Jun71

3d Military Police Battalion

CO LtCol Charles Fimian 1Jan-8Aug70

7th Motor Transport Battalion

CO LtCol Richard L. Prather 1Jan-13Feb70
 Maj Lawrence E. Davies 14Feb-19Feb70

5th Communication Battalion

CO LtCol Dale E. Shatzer Aug70-17Sep70
 Maj Gerald F. Baker 18Sep-4Oct70

Force Logistic Command Attached Units**1st Radio Battalion**

CO LtCol Delos M. Hopkins 1Jan-29Jun70
 Maj Donald J. Hatch 30Jun-29Jul70
 LtCol Edward D. Resnik 30Jul70-14Apr71

Combined Action Force Headquarters 11 Jan-21Jan71*

CO Col Theodore E. Metzger 11Jan-8Jul70
 Col Ralph F. Estey 9Jul-21Sep70
 LtCol John J. Tolnay 22Sep70-21Jan71

**CAF Headquarters was organized on 11Jan70 under III MAF until 26Mar70, and then XXIV Corps assumed control until 1Sep70. It then reverted to III MAF control until 21Jan71 when it was redesignated 2d Combined Action Group Headquarters.*

1st Combined Action Group*

CO LtCol David F. Seiler 1Jan-30Jun70
 Maj George N. Robillard, Jr. 1Jul-13Sep70

**1st CAG was deactivated on 13Sep70.*

2d Combined Action Group

CO LtCol Don R. Christensen 1Jan-21Sep70
 LtCol John J. Tolnay 22Sep70-11May71

3d Combined Action Group*

CO Col John B. Michaud 1Jan-4Feb70
 LtCol Claude M. Daniels 5Feb-7Sep70

**3d CAG was deactivated on 7Sep70.*

4th Combined Action Group*

CO LtCol John J. Keenan 1Jan-17Feb70
 Maj Robert D. King 18Feb-26Jun70
 Maj Willis D. Ledebor 27Jun-25Jul70

**4th CAG was deactivated on 25Jul70.*

3d Marine Amphibious Brigade Headquarters, 14Apr-28Jun71

CG MajGen Alan J. Armstrong 14Apr-28Jun71
 ABC BGen Edwin H. Simmons 14Apr-24May71
 BGen James R. Jones 25May-14Jun71
 C/S Col Boris J. Frankovic 14Apr-10Jun71
 G-1 Col Lavern J. Oltmer 14Apr-28Jun71
 G-2 Col Forest J. Hunt 14Apr-28Jun71
 G-3 Col Rex C. Denny, Jr. 14Apr-6Jun71
 G-4 Col William L. McCulloch 14Apr-28Jun71
 G-5 Maj Donald E. Sudduth 14Apr-28Jun71
 G-6 Col Urban A. Lees 14Apr-3Jun71

Headquarters Company

CO LtCol Richard B. Talbott 14Apr-28Jun71

1st Marines

CO Col Paul X. Kelley 14Apr-9May71

1st Battalion, 11th Marines

CO LtCol Bruce F. Ogden 14Apr-13May71

3d 8-inch Howitzer Battery

CO Maj William J. McCallum 14Apr-24May71

Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

CO Maj Harlan C. Cooper, Jr. 14Apr-3May71

Company A, 1st Engineer Battalion

CO Maj James G. Dixon 14Apr-23Jun71

Company A, 7th Engineer Battalion

CO Maj Gilbert R. Meibaum 14Apr-10Jun71

Company C, 1st Shore Party Battalion

CO Maj Richard W. Sweet, Jr. 14Apr-21Jun71

Company A, 1st Motor Transport Battalion

CO Capt Plin McCann 14Apr-15Jun71

Company A, 1st Medical Battalion

CO Cdr Thomas A. Grossi, USN 14Apr-11May71
 Lt Ivan D. Howard, USN 12May-22Jun71

11th Dental Company

CO Capt James J. Lyons, USN 15Apr-30Jun71

Marine Wing Headquarters Group 1 (MWHG-1)

CO LtCol Paul S. Frappollo 15Apr-30Jun71

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 1 (H&HS-1)

CO LtCol Paul S. Frappollo 15Apr-16May71
 Maj Thomas P. Kirland 17May-30Jun71

Marine Wing Facilities Squadron 1 (MWFS-1)

CO Maj James R. Griffin 15Apr-30Jun71

Marine Wing Communication Squadron 1 (MWCS-1)

CO Maj Richard S. Kaye 15Apr-30Jun71

Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (MASS-3)

CO LtCol William C. Simanikas 15Apr-2Jun71

Marine Aircraft Group 11

CO Col Albert C. Pommerenk 14Apr-10Jun71

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 11 (H&MS-11)

CO LtCol Arthur R. Anderson, Jr. 15Apr-1Jun71

Marine Air Base Squadron 11 (MABS-11)

CO LtCol Clayton L. Comfort 15Apr-10Jun71

Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 225 (VMA (AW)-225)

CO LtCol John A. Manzione, Jr. 15-30Apr71

Marine Attack Squadron 311 (VBA-311)

CO LtCol Jerome T. Hagen 15Apr-12May71

Marine Aircraft Group 16

CO Col Lewis C. Street III 14Apr-21Jun71

Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron 16 (H&MS-16)

CO Maj Con D. Silard, Jr. 15Apr-15Jun71
 Maj Dennis R. Bowen 16Jun-20Jun71

Marine Air Base Squadron 16 (MABS-16)

CO LtCol John M. Dean 15-20Apr71
 LtCol David A. Spurlock 21Apr-15Jun71
 Maj Carmine W. DePietro 16-20Jun71

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 167 (HML-167)
CO LtCol Richard J. Blanc 15Apr-10Jun71

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 262 (HMM-262)
CO LtCol Frank K. West, Jr. 15Apr-7May71

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (HMM-263)
CO Maj Dennis N. Anderson 15Apr-15May71

Marine Light Helicopter Squadron 367 (HML-367)
CO LtCol Clifford E. Reese 15Apr-31May71

Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 463 (HMH-463)
CO LtCol Thomas S. Reap 15Apr-18May71
Maj Myrddyn W. Edwards 19May-29May71

Force Logistic Command
CG BGen James R. Jones 14Apr-14Jun71
Col Harold W. Evans, Jr. 16-26Jun71

1st Military Police Battalion
CO LtCol John Colia 14Apr-12Jun71

Communication Support Company, 7th Communication Battalion
CO Maj Robert T. Himmerich 14Apr-22Jun71

2d Combined Action Group
CO LtCol John J. Tolany 14Apr-11May71

Appendix B

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

- A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attack aircraft.
- A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, jet attack aircraft in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-based Marine attack squadrons.
- A-6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, twin-seat, attack aircraft specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness.
- AAR—After Action Report.
- ABCCC—Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center, a U.S. Air Force aircraft equipped with communications, data link, and display equipment; it may be employed as an airborne command post or a communications and intelligence relay facility.
- AC-47—Douglas C-47 Skytrain, twin-engine, fixed-wing transport modified with 7.62mm miniguns and used as a gunship.
- AC-119—Fairchild Hiller, C-119 military transport aircraft remodified into a gunship with side-firing 7.62mm miniguns.
- ADC—Assistant Division Commander.
- AdminO—Administrative Officer.
- Adv—Advanced.
- AFP—Armed Forces Police.
- AGC—Amphibious command ship. The current designation is LCC.
- AH-1G/J—Bell Huey Cobra helicopter specifically designed for close air support.
- AK-47—Russian-designed Kalashnikov gas-operated 7.62mm automatic rifle, with an effective range of 400 meters. It was the standard rifle of the *North Vietnamese Army*.
- AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport combat-loaded cargo in an assault landing. LKA is the current designation.
- ALMAR—All Marines, a Commandant of the Marine Corps communication directed to all Marines.
- ALO—Air Liaison Officer, an officer (aviator/pilot) attached to a ground unit who functions as the primary advisor to the ground commander on air operation matters.
- ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, an organization composed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for control of naval gunfire and close air support. ANGLICO personnel normally provided this service while attached to U.S. Army, Korean, and ARVN units.
- AO—Air Observer, an individual whose primary mission is to observe or to take photographs from an aircraft in order to adjust artillery fire or obtain military information.
- AOA—Amphibious Objective Area, a defined geographical area within which is located the area or areas to be captured by the amphibious task force.
- APA—Attack transport ship, a naval ship, designed for combat loading elements of a battalion landing team. LPA is the current designation.
- APC—Armored Personnel Carrier.
- APD—Airborne Personnel Detector.
- APT—Armed Propaganda Team, a South Vietnamese pacification cadre who carried weapons in self-defense as they attempted to convince South Vietnamese villagers to remain loyal to the government.
- Arc Light—The codename for B-52 bombing missions in South Vietnam.
- ARG—Amphibious Ready Group.
- Arty—Artillery.
- ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- ASP—Ammunition Supply Point.
- ASRT—Air Support Radar Team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides ground controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons release for attack aircraft.
- B-3—North Vietnamese military command established in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam to control military operations in Kontum, Dar Lac, and Pleiku Provinces.
- B-40 rockets—Communist rocket-propelled grenade.
- B-52—Boeing Stratofortress, U.S. Air Force eight-engine, swept-wing, heavy jet bomber.
- BA—Base Area.
- Barrel Roll—Codename for air operations over Laos.
- BDC—Base Defense Commander.
- BGen—Brigadier General.
- BLT—Battalion Landing Team.
- Bn—Battalion.
- Brig—Brigade.
- C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft. The C-117D was an improved version of the C-47, the military version of the DC-3.
- C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.
- CAAR—Combat After Action Report.
- CACO—Combined Action Company.
- CAF—Combined Action Force.
- CAG—Combined Action Group.
- CAP—Combined Action Platoon.
- Capt—Captain.
- CAS—Close Air Support.
- CBU—Cluster Bomb Unit.
- CCC—Combined Campaign Plan.
- Cdr—Commander.
- CEC—Construction Engineer Corps.
- CG—Commanding General.
- CH-37—Sikorsky twin-engine, heavy transport helicopter which carries three crew members and 20 passengers.
- CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-engine, tandem-rotor transport helicopter, designed to carry a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops.
- CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a single-rotor, heavy transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an aver-

- age payload of 12,800 pounds. Carries crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops.
- Chieu Hoi*—The South Vietnamese amnesty program designed to attract Communist troops and cadre to defect to the government cause.
- CICV—Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam.
- CID—Criminal Investigative Division.
- CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnamese paramilitary force, composed largely of Montagnards, the nomadic tribesmen who populate the South Vietnamese highlands, and advised by the U.S. Army Special Forces.
- CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific.
- CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
- CIT—Counter Intelligence Team.
- Class (I-V)—Categories of military supplies, e.g., Class I, rations; Class II, POL; Class V, Ammunition.
- Claymore—A U.S. directional antipersonnel mine.
- CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.
- CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army.
- CNO—Chief of Naval Operations.
- CO—Commanding Officer.
- COC—Combat Operations Center.
- Col—Colonel.
- Combined Action Program—A Marine pacification program which integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Force platoon in a Vietnamese village.
- ComdC—Command Chronology.
- ComdHist—Command History.
- ComNavForPac—Commander, Naval Forces, Pacific.
- ComNavForV—Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam.
- ComUSMACV—Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- CORDS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, the agency organized under MACV in May 1967 and charged with coordinating U.S.-Vietnamese pacification efforts.
- COSVN*—*Central Office of South Vietnam*, the nominal Communist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam.
- County Fair—A sophisticated cordon and search operation in a particular hamlet or village by South Vietnamese troops, police, local officials, and U.S. Marines in an attempt to screen and register the local inhabitants.
- CP—Command Post.
- CPDC—Central Pacification and Development Council, the South Vietnamese government agency responsible for coordinating the pacification plan.
- CRC—Control and Reporting Center, an element of the U.S. Air Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Air Control Center, which conducted radar and warning operations.
- CRIMP—Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and Modernization Plan.
- CSC—Communications Service Company.
- CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone.
- CUPP—Combined Unit Pacification Program, a variation of the combined action concept and involving the integration of a Marine line company with a Popular Force or Regional Force unit.
- DAIS—Da Nang Antiinfiltration System.
- DASC—Direct Air Support Center, a subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control of close air support and other direct air support operations.
- D-Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation.
- DD—Navy destroyer.
- DIOCC—District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center.
- Div—Division.
- DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.
- DOD—Department of Defense.
- DPP—Data Processing Platoon.
- DPS—Data Processing Section.
- DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).
- DSA—District Senior Advisor.
- DSS—Da Nang Special Sector.
- Dtd—Dated.
- Duster—The nickname for the U.S. Army's tracked vehicle, the M-42, which mounted dual 40mm automatic weapons.
- DVA—Da Nang Vital Area.
- EA-6A—The electronic-countermeasures version of the A-6A Intruder.
- ECM—Electronic Countemeasures, a major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions against enemy electronic equipment or to exploit the enemy's use of electromagnetic radiations from such equipment.
- EF-10B—An ECM-modified version of the Navy F-3D Skynight, a twin-engine jet night-fighter of Korean War vintage.
- ELINT—Electronic Intelligence, the intelligence information gained by monitoring radiations from enemy electronic equipment.
- Engr—Engineer.
- EOD—Explosive Ordnance Device.
- F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber.
- FAC(A)—Forward Air Controller (Airborne).
- FDC—Fire Direction Center.
- FFV—Field Force, Vietnam I and II, U.S. Army commands in II and III Corps areas of South Vietnam.
- FLC—Force Logistic Command.
- FLSG—Force Logistic Support Group.
- FLSU—Force Logistic Support Unit.
- FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.
- FO—Forward Observer.
- FRC—Federal Records Center.
- Front 4*—A Communist headquarters subordinate to *MR-5* and responsible for Quang Nam Province.
- FSB—Fire Support Base.
- FSCC—Fire Support Coordination Center, a single location involved in the coordination of all forms of fire support.
- FSR—Force Service Regiment.
- Fwd—Forward.
- FWMF—Free World Military Force.
- G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e.g., G-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2, intelligence; G-3, operations; G-4, logistics, and G-5, civil affairs.
- Gen—General.
- Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation.
- Grenade Launcher, M79—U.S.-built, single-shot, breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters.
- Gun, 175mm, M107—U.S.-built, self-propelled gun which weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum

- range of 32,800 meters. Maximum rate of fire is one round every two minutes.
- GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- H&I fires—Harassing and Interdiction fires.
- H&MS—Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron.
- H&S Co—Headquarters and Service Company.
- HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air guided missile, designed to defend against low-flying enemy aircraft and short-range missiles.
- HC(A)—Helicopter Commander (Airborne).
- HE—High Explosive.
- Hectare—A unit of land measure in the metric system and equal to 2.471 acres.
- HES—Hamlet Evaluation System, the computerized statistical data system used to measure pacification in the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam.
- H-Hour—The specific hour an operation begins.
- HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC—Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, the Vietnam-era predecessor of the History and Museums Division.
- HLZ—Helicopter Landing Zone.
- HMH—Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron.
- HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron.
- Hoi Chanh—A Viet Cong or North Vietnamese defector under the *Chieu Hoi* amnesty program.
- Howitzer, 8-inch (M55)—U.S.-built, self-propelled, heavy-artillery piece with a maximum range of 16,900 meters and a rate of fire of one round every two minutes.
- Howitzer, 105mm, M101A1—U.S.-built, towed, general purpose light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters and maximum rate of fire of four rounds per minute.
- Howitzer, 155mm, M114A towed and M109 self-propelled—U.S.-built medium artillery with a maximum range of 15,080 meters and a maximum rate of fire of three rounds per minute. Marines employed both models in Vietnam. The newer and heavier self-propelled M109 was largely road-bound, while the lighter, towed M114A could be moved either by truck or by helicopter.
- Howtar—A 4.2 (107mm) mortar tube mounted on a 75mm pack howitzer frame.
- HST—Helicopter Support Team.
- "Huey"—Popular name for UH-1 series of helicopters.
- ICC—International Control Commission, established by the Geneva Accords of 1954 to supervise the truce ending the First Indochina War between the French and the Viet Minh and resulting in the partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel. The members of the Commission were from Canada, India, and Poland.
- ICCC—I Corps Coordinating Council, consisting of U.S. and Vietnamese officials in I Corps who coordinated the civilian assistance program.
- I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which included the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.
- IDA—Institute for Defense Analysis.
- I MAF—I Marine Amphibious Force.
- I MEF—I Marine Expeditionary Force.
- Intel—Intelligence.
- Intvw—Interview.
- IOD—Integrated Observation Device.
- ITT—Interrogation/Translator Team.
- J—The designation for members of a joint staff which includes members of several services comprising the command, e.g., J-1 would refer to the staff members responsible for personnel; J-2, intelligence; J-3, operations; J-4, logistics; and J-5, civil affairs.
- JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.).
- JGS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese).
- JTD—Joint Table of Distribution.
- JUSPAO—Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office.
- KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C-130 Lockheed Hercules.
- KIA—Killed in Action.
- Kingfisher operations—Heliborne combat patrols for quick reaction operations.
- Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents.
- L-Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour the helicopters land in the landing zone.
- LAAM Bn—Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion.
- LCM—Landing Craft Mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks, and trailers directly onto the beach.
- LCVP—Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, a small craft with a bow ramp used to transport assault troops and light vehicles to the beach.
- LGB—Laser Guided Bomb, popularly known as the "smart bomb."
- LKA—The current designation for an attack cargo ship. See AKA.
- LOC—Lines of Communication.
- LOI—Letter of Instruction.
- LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters. It had both a submersible well deck and a helicopter landing deck.
- LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked helicopters.
- LSA—Logistic Support Area.
- LSD—Landing Ship, Dock, a landing ship designed to combat load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provide limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts. It lacks the helicopter landing deck of the LPD.
- LST—Landing Ship, Tank, landing ship designed to transport heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach.
- Lt—Lieutenant.
- LtCol—Lieutenant Colonel.
- LTDS—Laser Target Designation System.
- LtGen—Lieutenant General.
- Ltr—Letter.
- LVTE—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Engineer, a lightly armored amphibian vehicle designed for minefield and obstacle clearance.
- LVTH—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Howitzer, a lightly armored, self-propelled, amphibious 105mm howitzer. It resembles an LVTP with a turret for the howitzer.
- LVTP—Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel, an amphibian vehicle used to land and/or transport personnel.
- LZ—Landing Zone.
- MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade.
- MABS—Marine Air Base Squadron.
- Machine gun, .50-caliber—U.S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, air-

- cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters.
- Machine gun, M60—U.S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.
- MACS—Marine Air Control Squadron, provides and operates ground facilities for the detection and interception of hostile aircraft and for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft in the conduct of support operations.
- MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- MAF—Marine Amphibious Force.
- MAG—Marine Aircraft Group.
- Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions and regiments as opposed to local guerrilla groups.
- Maj—Major.
- MajGen—Major General.
- MarDiv—Marine Division.
- Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e.g., 3d Marines.
- MASS—Marine Air Support Squadron, provides and operates facilities for the control of support aircraft operating in direct support of ground forces.
- MAU—Marine Advisory Unit, the Marine advisory unit under the Naval Advisory Group which administered the advisory effort to the South Vietnamese Marine Corps; not to be confused with a Marine Amphibious Unit.
- MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing.
- MCAF—Marine Corps Air Facility.
- MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station.
- MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center.
- MCO—Marine Corps Order.
- MCOAG—Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group.
- MCSA—Marine Corps Supply Agency.
- MedCap—Medical Civilian Assistance Program.
- MedEvac—Medical Evacuation.
- MIA—Missing in Action.
- MilHistBr—Military History Branch.
- MO—Mount Out.
- MOA—Mount Out Augmentation.
- Mortar, 4.2-inch, M30—U.S.-built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard; weapon weighs 330 pounds and has maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute.
- Mortar, 60mm, M19—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded weapon, which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.
- Mortar, 81mm, M29—U.S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled; it has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon ammunition used.
- Mortar, 82mm—Soviet-built, smooth-bore, mortar, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.
- Mortar, 120mm—Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built, smooth bore, drop or trigger fired, mortar which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.
- MR—Military Region; corps tactical zones were redesignated military regions in 1970, e.g. I Corps Tactical Zone became Military Region 1 (MR 1).
- MR-5—*Military Region 5*, a Communist political and military sector in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps. NVA units in MR-5 did not report to COSVN.
- Ms—Manuscript.
- MSG—Marine Security Group.
- Msg—Message.
- NAC—Northern Artillery Cantonment.
- NAG—Naval Advisory Group.
- NAS—Naval Air Station.
- NCC—Naval Component Commander.
- NCO—Noncommissioned Officer.
- NGLO—Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer.
- NLF—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist-led insurgency against the South Vietnamese Government.
- NMCB—Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees).
- NMCC—National Military Command Center.
- NOD—Night Observation Device.
- NPF—National Police Field Force.
- NSA—Naval Support Activity.
- NSD—Naval Supply Depot.
- NSDC—Northern Sector Defense Command.
- Nui—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain.
- Nung—A Vietnamese tribesman, of a separate ethnic group and probably of Chinese origin.
- NVA—*North Vietnamese Army*, often used colloquially to refer to a North Vietnamese soldier.
- O-1B—Cessna, single-engine observation aircraft.
- OAB, NHD—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division.
- Ontos—U.S.-built, lightly armored, tracked antitank vehicle armed with six coaxially-mounted 106mm recoilless rifles.
- OpCon—Operational Control, the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned for specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.
- OpO—Operation Order, a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the execution of an operation.
- OP—Outpost or observation point.
- OPlan—Operation Plan, a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession; it is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.
- OpSum—Operational Summary.
- ORLL—Operations Report/Lessons Learned.
- OSJS (MACV)—Office of the Secretariat, Joint Staff (Military Assistance Command Vietnam).
- OV-10—North American Rockwell Bronco, twin-engine aircraft specifically designed for light armed reconnaissance missions.
- Pacifier operations—A variation of Kingfisher quick reaction operations.
- PAVN—*Peoples Army of Vietnam* (North Vietnam). This acronym was dropped in favor of NVA.

- PDC—Pacification and Development Councils.
- PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed in the defense of their own communities.
- Phoenix program—A covert U.S. and South Vietnamese program aimed at the eradication of the Viet Cong infrastructure in South Vietnam.
- PIIC—Photo Imagery Interpretation Center.
- POL—Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants.
- Practice Nine—The codename for the planning of the antiinfiltration barrier across the DMZ.
- PRC-25—Standard radio used by Marine ground units in Vietnam that allowed for voice communication for distances up to 25 miles.
- Project Delta—A special South Vietnamese reconnaissance group consisting of South Vietnamese Special Forces troops and U.S. Army Special Forces advisors.
- PRU—Provincial Reconnaissance Unit.
- PSA—Province Senior Advisor.
- PSDF—Peoples Self-Defense Force, a local self-defense force organized by the South Vietnamese Government after the enemy's Tet offensive in 1968.
- QDSF—Quang Da Special Zone.
- QRF—Quick Reaction Force.
- R&R—Rest and Recreation.
- Recoilless rifle, 106mm, M401A1—U.S. built, single-shot, recoilless, breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained rate of fire of six rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters.
- Regt—Regiment.
- Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification program started in 1966.
- Revolutionary Development Teams—Specially trained Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned to individual hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and civilian assistance tasks on a local level.
- RF-4B—Photo-reconnaissance model of the F4B Phantom II.
- RF-8A—Reconnaissance version of the F-8 Chance Vought Crusader.
- RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific area.
- Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic, 7.62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 pounds with a full 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.
- Rifle, M16—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic, 5.56mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 3.1 pounds with a 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 12-15 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.
- RLT—Regimental Landing Team.
- ROK—Republic of Korea.
- Rolling Thunder—Codename for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam.
- Rough Rider—Organized vehicle convoys, often escorted by helicopters and armored vehicles, using Vietnam's roads to supply Marine bases.
- Route Package—Codename used with a number to designate areas of North Vietnam for the American bombing campaign. Route Package I was the area immediately north of DMZ.
- ROE—Rules of Engagement.
- RPG—Rocket-Propelled Grenade.
- RRU—Radio Research Unit.
- Rural Reconstruction—The predecessor campaign to Revolutionary Development.
- RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
- RZ—Reconnaissance Zone.
- S—Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels. S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; S-2, intelligence; S-3, operations; S-4, logistics; and S-5, civil affairs.
- SAM—Surface to Air Missile.
- SAR—Search and Rescue.
- SATS—Short Airfield for Tactical Support, an expeditionary airfield used by Marine Corps aviation that included a portable runway surface, aircraft launching and recovery devices, and other essential expeditionary airfield components.
- SCAMP—Sensor Control and Maintenance Platoon.
- SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
- 2d AD—2d Air Division, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam prior to the establishment of the Seventh Air Force.
- SecDef—Secretary of Defense.
- SecState—Secretary of State.
- Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam.
- Seventh Fleet—The U.S. fleet assigned to the Pacific.
- SFD—Surprise Firing Device, a euphemism for a boobytrap.
- SID—Seismic Intrusion Device, sensor used to monitor movement through ground vibrations.
- SitRep—Situation Report.
- SKS—Russian-designed Simonov gas-operated 7.62mm semiautomatic rifle.
- SLF—Special Landing Force.
- SMA—Senior Marine Advisor.
- SOG—Studies and Operations Group, the cover name for the organization that carried out cross-border operations.
- Song—Vietnamese for "river."
- SOP—Standing Operating Procedure, set of instructions laying out standardized procedures.
- SPIE—Special Patrol Insertion/Extraction line.
- Spt Rept—Spot Report.
- Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft.
- Sparrow Hawk—A small rapid-reaction force on standby, ready for insertion by helicopter for reinforcement of units in contact with the enemy.
- SSDC—Southern Sector Defense Command.
- Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos.
- Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which small Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks on targets of opportunity.
- Strike Company—An elite company in a South Vietnamese infantry division, directly under the control of the division commander.
- TAC(A)—Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne), an officer in an airplane, who coordinates close air support.
- TACC—Tactical Air Control Center, the principal air operations installation for controlling all aircraft and air-warning functions of tactical air operations.

- TACP—Tactical Air Control Party, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system designed to provide air liaison to land forces and for the control of aircraft.
- TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center, an air operations installation under the Tactical Air Control Center, which directs aircraft and aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.
- TAFDS—Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System, the expeditionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields. It uses 10,000-gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel.
- TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all enroute air traffic and air defense operations.
- Tank, M48—U.S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crew of four; primary armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30-caliber and one .50-caliber machine gun; has maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.
- TAOC—Tactical Air Operations Center, a subordinate component of the air command and control system which controls all enroute air traffic and air defense operations.
- TAOC—Tactical Area of Coordination.
- TAOI—Tactical Area of Interest.
- TAOR—Tactical Area of Responsibility, a defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support.
- TE—Task Element.
- TE—Table of Equipment.
- TG—Task Group.
- Tiger Hound—Airstrikes in Laos directed by U.S. Air Force small fixed-wing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles into southeastern Laos.
- TO—Table of Organization.
- Trung-si*—A South Vietnamese Popular Force sergeant.
- TSF—Transitional Support Force.
- TU—Task Unit.
- UCMJ—Uniform Code of Military Justice
- UH-1E—Bell "Huey"—A single-engine, light attack/observation helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three; it can be armed with air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns.
- UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transport helicopter with a crew of three, carries eight to 12 combat soldiers, depending upon weather conditions.
- USA—U.S. Army.
- USAAG—U.S. Army Advisory Group.
- USAF—U.S. Air Force.
- USAID—U.S. Agency for International Development.
- USARV—U.S. Army, Vietnam.
- USASuppComDaNang—U.S. Army Support Command, Da Nang.
- USIA—U.S. Information Agency.
- USMC—U.S. Marine Corps.
- U.S. Mission Council—Council, chaired by the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and including ComUSMACV, which developed and coordinated U.S. policy within South Vietnam.
- USN—U.S. Navy.
- VC*—*Viet Cong*, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam; a contraction of the Vietnamese phrase meaning "Vietnamese Communists."
- Viet Minh*—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French in the first Indochina War.
- VCI*—*Viet Cong Infrastructure*.
- VIS—Vietnamese Information Service.
- VMA—Marine attack squadron (in naval aviation, the "V" designates "heavier than air" as opposed to craft that are "lighter than air").
- VMF(AW)—Marine Fighter Squadron (All-Weather).
- VMFA—Marine Fighter Attack Squadron.
- VMCJ—Marine Composite Reconnaissance Squadron.
- VMGR—Marine Refueller Transport Squadron.
- VMO—Marine Observation Squadron.
- VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force.
- VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade.
- VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps.
- VNN—Vietnamese Navy.
- VT—Variable timed electronic fuze for an artillery shell which causes airburst over the target area.
- WestPac—Western Pacific.
- WIA—Wounded in Action.
- WFRC—Washington Federal Records Center.

Appendix C

Chronology of Significant Events

January 1970-June 1971

1970

- 6 January An estimated force of 100 VC attacked Fire Support Base Ross, which was then occupied by Companies A and B of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, the battalion headquarters group, and two artillery batteries. Thirteen Marines were killed and 63 were wounded while the VC left 39 dead behind.
- 8 January Building on the combined action platoon concept, III MAF formally established the Combined Unit Pacification Program (CUPP). Under the CUPP, Marine rifle companies deployed their squads in hamlets to work with the RFs and PFs much like the CAPs did. The CUPP differed in that the rifle companies were given no special training, and the Marine units remained under operational control of parent regiments, generally operating within the regiment's AO.
- 11 January III MAF formally activated the Combined Action Force, incorporating the four combined action groups (CAGs) under its own headquarters rather than through an assistant chief of staff within III MAF. In January the CAF included 42 Marine officers and 2,050 enlisted men, along with 2 naval officers and 126 hospital corpsmen. The 20 combined action companies and 114 combined action platoons worked with about 3,000 RFs and PFs at the time.
- 18 January A North Vietnamese spokesman said that allowing POWs to send a postcard home once a month and to receive packages from home every other month was, in effect, a means of accounting for those captured.
- 26 January President Nguyen Van Thieu appealed to friendly nations for continued aid, saying he would go his own way if allied policies were not in accord with the South Vietnamese government's.
- 28 January Troop movement for Keystone Bluejay, the first redeployment of 1970, began and continued until 19 March. Among the ground and aviation units redeployed were 26th Marines, VMAs -223 and -211, VMFA-542, HMMH-361, and MAG-12.
- 31 January Enemy traffic along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in January increased to 10 times what it was in September-October 1969.
- 31 January III MAF strength in Vietnam was 55,191.
- 5 February At the Paris peace talks, the enemy produced the first letter of a POW held in South Vietnam by the VC. This act took place in response to heavy pressure from the U.S. and South Vietnamese.
- 17 February President Nixon said the military aspects of Vietnamization were proceeding on schedule.

- 19 February Lieutenant General Nickerson and Lieutenant General Zais briefed General Abrams on the planned Army takeover of ICTZ on 9 March. Abrams sanctioned the arrangement proposed by Nickerson whereby III MAF, while becoming subordinate to XXIV Corps, still remained parent unit of 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, preserving the integrity of the Marine air-ground team concept in Vietnam.
- 5-9 March During Operation Cavalier Beach, III MAF relocated to Camp Haskins and XXIV Corps moved from its headquarters in Phu Bai to Camp Horn.
- 9 March Lieutenant General Herman Nickerson, Jr., passed operational command of I Corps to Lieutenant General Melvin Zais, USA, and simultaneously passed command of III MAF to Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon.
- 9 March III MAF turned command of I Corps over to XXIV Corps. Major elements of III MAF at the time included the 1st Marine Division (Rein), 1st MAW, and FLC.
- 19 March The 26th Marines, which had received a Presidential Unit Citation for the defense of Khe Sanh, departed Vietnam. Following the regiment's departure, the 1st Marines was left to control the Rocket Belt, an area of some 534 square kilometers.
- 19 March The U.S. said that its recognition of Cambodian sovereignty would continue following the seizure of power from Prince Norodom Sihanouk by General Lon Nol.
- 26 March The Combined Action Force was placed under the operational control of XXIV Corps while remaining under the administrative control of III MAF.
- April During April the Marine Corps stopped taking draftees.
- 14 April Major General C. F. Widdecke relieved Major General Edwin B. Wheeler as Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, and as Deputy Commander, III MAF.
- 21 April President Thieu said that the Vietnamese could gradually assume greater responsibilities as the Americans withdrew from Vietnam but that the South Vietnamese would require more aid from allies.
- 23 April The 1st Force Service Support Regiment was closed down and transferred to Camp Pendleton.
- 27 April Following a helicopter crash on 18 April Major General Edwin B. Wheeler, who broke a leg on impact, was replaced by Major General Charles F. Widdecke.
- 30 April President Nixon announced that several thousand American troops supporting the RVNAF invasion entered Cambodia's Fishhook area bordering South Vietnam to attack the supposed location of the headquarters of the Communist military operation in South Vietnam. American advisors, tactical air support, medical evacuation teams, and logistical support were also provided to the RVNAF. On 9 May Brigade B of the VNMC crossed the Cambodian border and at 0930 landed at Neck Luong to begin operations. Allied troops in Cambodia increased to 50,000 by 6 May. Withdrawal of American units from Cambodia was completed when the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) returned to South Vietnam on 29 June.

- 29 April Beginning this date RVNAF and U.S. Army forces conducted search and destroy operations in a dozen base areas in Cambodia adjoining II, III, and IV Corps in South Vietnam. A U.S.-Vietnamese naval task force also swept up the Mekong River to open a supply line to Phnom Penh, the Cambodian capital.
- 1-31 May The VC progressively returned to guerrilla warfare and terrorism in 1970. During May the VC in Quang Nam killed 129 civilians, wounded 247, and kidnapped 73. Most of the latter was interpreted as being forcible recruitment of young males.
- 3 May III MAF approved a 1st Division request to demolish the Da Nang Antiinfiltration System (DAIS), the line of minefields, cleared land, barbed wire fences, and electronic sensors which had been developed to stop enemy infiltration of the Rocket Belt. Never fully constructed or manned, the DAIS was regarded as ineffective by most Marines because farmers and water buffaloes could not be distinguished from rocket-bearing enemy.
- 4 May Four students at Kent State University in Ohio were killed by soldiers of the U.S. National Guard who had been called to halt riots which were stimulated in part by the Cambodian invasion.
- 4 May The Senate Foreign Relations Committee accused President Nixon of usurping the war-making powers of Congress by allowing American troops to participate in the RVNAF's invasion of Cambodia. A day later President Nixon responded, saying American troops would penetrate no further than 19 miles and would be withdrawn by 1 July 1970.
- 6 May Que Son District Headquarters in Quang Nam Province received some 200 rounds of mortar fire followed by a ground attack of an enemy force estimated at greater than battalion strength. Marines of Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, supported by artillery aided the besieged RF/PF units. Friendly losses were 11 killed, including one American, and 41 wounded; 27 enemy were killed.
- 11 June To terrorize the villagers of Phu Thanh—a village near the Ba Ren Bridge where CUPP team Number 9 of 1st Platoon, Company A, 7th Marines operated—elements of the *V-25th Main Force Battalion* and the *T-89th Sapper Battalion* (VC) attacked at 0200, killing 74 civilians, many of them women and children, wounding 60 seriously, and destroying 156 houses.
- 11 June Thanh My Hamlet eight kilometers southwest of Hoi An, was attacked by the VC/NVA, resulting in 150 civilians killed and 60 wounded. In destroying the hamlet the enemy left behind 16 dead.
- 21 June Da Nang was hit by nine 122mm rockets, killing seven civilians, wounding 19, and destroying seven houses.
- 30 June The Naval Support Activity Da Nang was deactivated and the following day Army-Marine service support agreements went into effect.

- 1-2 July Major General Alan J. Armstrong replaced Major General William G. Thrash as Commanding General, 1st MAW.
- 2 July To unify command and strengthen the administration of the RVNAF President Nguyen Van Thieu incorporated the regional and popular forces into the Vietnamese Army and redesignated Corps Tactical Zones as Military Regions (MRs). Under the reorganization the corps deputy commander conducted major offensive operations in the MR while the MR deputy commander, in charge of territorial defense and pacification, commanded the RFs and PFs. Concurrently, MACV and the Vietnamese Joint General Staff completed plans to incorporate the Civilian Defense Groups into ARVN Border Defense Ranger Battalions.
- 3 July The Hai Lang PF Platoon; RF group 1/11 and Companies 121 and 122; and CAPs 4-3-2 and 4-1-2, located nine kilometers southeast of Quang Tri City, were attacked by an enemy force of unknown size. Supported by gunships and artillery, the allies killed 135 enemy and captured 74 weapons while losing 16 killed and six missing in action.
- 6 July A house fact-finding mission to South Vietnam filed a report expressing optimism about ending the war. The report also noted that South Vietnam's major problem was its economy.
- 15-16 July Operation Barren Green was launched by elements of the 5th Marines in the northern Arizona Territory south of the Vu Gia River to prevent the VC/NVA from collecting the ripened corn of this fertile region. A second operation, Lyon Valley, was initiated by the 5th Marines on 16 August in the mountains bordering the Arizona Territory to further limit the movement of food to the *38th NVA Regiment*, known to be staged in base camps there.
- 16 July Marine units, primarily of the 7th Marines, began Operation Pickins Forest south of the An Hoa in the Song Thu Bon Valley.
- 16 August Operation Lien Valley was begun by 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (-) about 11 kilometers southwest of An Hoa.
- 20 August A DOD study indicated that about three of 10 servicemen interviewed had used marijuana or other drugs.
- 30 August Thirty South Vietnamese senators were elected in voting marked by terrorist attacks and charges of fraud. Forty-two civilians were killed.
- September By the end of the month, the 1st and 5th Marines and 2d Battalion, 7th Marines were the only maneuver units remaining in the field.
- September TAORs were realigned as 7th Marines and some combat and service support units stood down.
- 1 September With the deactivation of all CAPs outside Quang Nam, XXIV Corps returned operational control of the CAF to III MAF.
- 5 September The 5th Marines began shifting elements of its infantry regiments to assume responsibility of the 7th Marines' area of operations in the Que Son area, as the 7th Marines began preparations to stand down from combat operations.
- 21 September The Combined Action Force headquarters in Chu Lai was deactivated, leaving only the 2nd CAG operating in Quang Nam Province.

The approximately 600 Marines and Navy corpsmen integrated their operations with 31 PF and three RF platoons distributed throughout Quang Nam.

- 1 October In a ceremony attended by Lieutenant General McCutcheon, CG, III MAF; Lieutenant General Sutherland of XXIV Corps; Lieutenant General Lam of I Corps; and Major General Widdecke, CG, 1st Marine Division, the regimental colors of the 7th Marines were trooped for the last time in Vietnam. That same day the regimental command group departed Vietnam for Camp Pendleton, California.
- 8 October MACV completed plans to redeploy another 40,000 troops by the end of the year, which would leave some 344,000 in Vietnam.
- 14 October At the request of Colonel Clark V. Judge, Commander of the 5th Marines, the 1st MAW decentralized helicopter support by dispatching six CH-46Ds, four AH-1G gunships, one UH-1E command and control aircraft, and usually a CH-53 to LZ Baldy on a daily basis. The helicopter package, operating under the control of Colonel Judge, was provided to improve the regiment's mobility and tactical flexibility.
- 15 October The last Marines left An Hoa, turning the base over to the South Vietnamese.
- 22 October Employing the 51st ARVN Regiment, the 1st Ranger Group, the 2d and 3d Troops of the 17th Armored Cavalry Squadron, over 300 RF and PF platoons, the People's Self-Defense Force, and the national police in a province-wide offensive against the VC, Lieutenant General Lam launched Operation Hoang Dien, the I Corps commander's most ambitious, essentially South Vietnamese pacification operation to that date.
- 31 October MACV promulgated the Allied Combined Campaign Plan for 1971. Reflecting the changing emphasis of the war, the plan emphasized the RVNAF's increasing assumption of tasks previously assigned the redeploying Americans.
- 2 November A large construction effort got underway to repair damage caused by monsoon flood waters.
- 21 November TG 79.4 was redesignated 31st Marine Amphibious Unit (31st MAU), no longer SLF Alpha.
- 23 November Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird reported that a joint American force conducted an unsuccessful helicopter raid on Son Toy prisoner of war camp 20 miles west of Hanoi on 19 November. The prisoners had been moved some weeks before.
- December The 1st Marine Division, which had a strength of over 28,000 the previous January, had shrunk to some 12,500.
- 1 December The 1st LAAM Battalion was deactivated in Twentynine Palms, California. The battalion was one of the first units to arrive in Vietnam in 1965.
- 3 December American strength in Vietnam was down to 349,700, the lowest since 29 October 1966.

- 9 December The Senior Marine Advisor, Colonel Francis W. Tief, relieved Captain Eugene I. Finke, USN, as commander of TG 116.1 at the Solid Anchor base in the Ca Mau peninsula.
- 10 December President Nixon warned that if North Vietnamese forces increased the level of fighting in South Vietnam as American forces were withdrawn, he would begin bombing targets in North Vietnam again.
- 24 December Lieutenant General Keith B. McCutcheon was relieved as Commanding General, III MAF by Lieutenant General Donn J. Robertson.

1971

- 1 January RVNAF allies ceased to have Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAORs). Instead, only the RVNAF had them, while allied units were assigned Tactical Areas of Interest (TAOIs), which generally encompassed the same areas as their previous TAORs. From then forward the ARVN assigned areas of responsibility to allied commands.
- 1-31 January Enemy activity was in apparent decline. In January 1970, allied forces had sighted 4,425 enemy troops, but from September through December 1970 only 4,159 were spotted.
- 6 January Secretary of Defense Laird said that Vietnamization was running ahead of schedule and that the combat mission of American troops would end the following summer.
- 23 January CINCPac approved standing down ARG Bravo from 29 January-1 May 1971. ARG Alpha would remain on 120-hour reaction time during the period.
- 30 January Phase I of Operation Lam Son 719 began with elements of the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mech), USA, advancing from FSB Vandegrift toward Khe Sanh. On 8 February the ARVN entered Laos to begin Phase II. The RVNAF units swept areas of operation from 7 to 16 March during Phase III and began Phase IV, the withdrawal, on 17 March. The last South Vietnamese troops exited Laos on 6 April.
- 3 February-
 - 10 March During the RVNAF-coordinated Operation Hoang Dien 103, units of III MAF, 1st MAF, 2d ROKMC, 51st ARVN Regiment, 146th PF Platoon, 39th RF Company, and PSDF combed the Da Nang TAOR lowlands and lowland fringes, killing 330 VC/NVA, while the allies lost 46 killed, including two Americans.
 - 8 February President Thieu announced that South Vietnamese troops entered Laos in operation Lam Son 719. No American ground troops or advisors crossed the border.
 - 12 February Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) Alfa/31st Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) arrived off the coast of North Vietnam, 50 miles east of the City of Vinh. From then until 6 March the ARG/MAU con-

- ducted daily amphibious and communications exercises in an effort to cause the North Vietnamese to divert forces to respond to a potential raid at Vinh while Lam Son 719 was ongoing.
- 17 February The MACV commander directed that from 1 May to 30 June during Keystone Robin Charlie the entire 3d MAB would be redeployed.
- 2 March Brigade 147, VNMC made a heliborne assault into Laos during Lam Son 719, at FSB Delta, and relieving ARVN forces operating there.
- 24 March DOD announced that the North Vietnamese had begun moving long-range artillery into the western end of the DMZ.
- 29 March An estimated two battalions of the *38th NVA Regiment* reinforced by two Viet Cong battalions, attacked Duc Duc district headquarters just southwest of An Hoa, killing 103 civilians and kidnapping 37, while destroying 1,500 homes.
- 14 April III MAF relocated to Okinawa this date and 3d MAB was officially established in RVN.
- 15 April The strength of 3d MAB on its activation was 1,322 Marine and 124 Navy officers and 13,359 Marine and 711 Navy enlisted men. The ground combat element was the 1st Marines and the air element consisted of two aircraft groups, MAG-11 and MAG-16. The MAB also included numerous combat support and service support units.
- 15 April The last four CUPP squads of Company M, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines were deactivated, ending the CUPP program. In 18 months of existence, the CUPP program had accounted for 578 enemy killed while Marines lost 46 killed.
- 30 April President Nixon welcomed home the 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton.
- 30 April At the end of April, 3d MAB included the following units: HQ, 3d MAB; RLT-1; 1/1; 2/1; 3/1; 1/11; Sub-Unit 1, 1st Anglico; MAG-11; VMA-311; Det, VMO-6; MAG-16; HML-367; HML-167; HMM-263; HMM-463.
- 14 April Lieutenant General Robertson, Commanding General, III MAF, relocated to Camp Courtney, Okinawa. Major General Armstrong, CG, 1st MAW, assumed command of all units remaining in RVN, reporting to CG, XXIV Corps for operational control as CG, 3d MAB. Command of 1st MAW was passed to CG, 1st MAW (Rear) and Major General Widdecke, CG, 1st Marine Division relocated to MCB, Camp Pendleton, California, reporting to CG, FMFPac for operational control.
- 3-4 May Marines from Quantico and Camp Lejeune were deployed in Washington, D.C. to assist the police in controlling anti-war protesters.
- 7 May 3d MAB units ceased ground combat operations and fixed-wing aviation operations.
- 11 May The 2d Combined Action Group headquarters was deactivated, signalling the end of Marine Corps pacification and civic action campaigns in Vietnam.

- 12 May Operation Imperial Lake ended in which 305 VC/NVA were killed while Marines had 24 killed.
- 4 June The 3d MAB turned over its last piece of real estate in Vietnam, Camp Books, to the U.S. Army.
- 9 June Lieutenant General W. G. Dolvin, USA, relieved Lieutenant General J. W. Sutherland, USA, as Commanding General, XXIV Corps.
- 21 June American troop strength in RVN was down to 244,900.
- 26 June The 3d MAB closed its headquarters.
- 27 June The 3d MAB was deactivated.

Appendix D

Medal of Honor Citations

January 1970-June 1971

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS RAYMOND MICHAEL CLAUSEN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving with Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263, Marine Aircraft Group 16, First Marine Aircraft Wing, during operations against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam on 31 January 1970. Participating in a helicopter rescue mission to extract elements of a platoon which had inadvertently entered a minefield while attacking enemy positions, Private First Class Clausen skillfully guided the helicopter pilot to a landing in an area cleared by one of several mine explosions. With eleven Marines wounded, one dead, and the remaining eight Marines holding their positions for fear of detonating other mines, Private First Class Clausen quickly leaped from the helicopter and, in the face of enemy fire, moved across the extremely hazardous, mine-laden area to assist in carrying casualties to the waiting helicopter and in placing them aboard. Despite the ever-present threat of further mine explosions, he continued his valiant efforts, leaving the comparatively safe area of the helicopter on six separate occasions to carry out his rescue efforts. On one occasion while he was carrying one of the wounded, another mine detonated, killing a corpsman and wounding three other men. Only when he was certain that all Marines were safely aboard did he signal the pilot to lift the helicopter. By his courageous, determined and inspiring efforts in the face of the utmost danger, Private First Class Clausen upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL EMILIO ALBERT DE LA GARZA, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a machine gunner with Company E, Second Battalion, First Marines, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on April 11, 1970. Returning with his squad from a night ambush operation, Lance Corporal De La Garza joined his platoon commander and another Marine in searching for two enemy soldiers who had been observed fleeing for cover toward a small pond. Moments later, he located one of the enemy soldiers hiding among the reeds and brush. As the three Marines attempted to remove the resisting soldier from the pond, Lance Corporal De La Garza observed him pull the pin on a grenade. Shouting a warning, Lance Corporal De La Garza placed himself between the other two Marines and the ensuing blast from the grenade, thereby saving the lives of his comrades at the sacrifice of his own. By his prompt and decisive action, and his great personal valor in the face of almost certain death, Lance Corporal De La Garza upheld and further enhanced the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL JAMES DONNIE HOWE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Rifleman with Company I, Third Battalion, Seventh Marines, First Marine Division during operations against enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam. In the early morning hours of May 6, 1970, Lance Corporal Howe and two other Marines were occupying a defensive position in a sandy beach area fronted by bamboo thickets. Enemy sappers suddenly launched a grenade attack against the position, utilizing the cover of darkness to carry out the assault. Following the initial explosions of the grenades, Lance Corporal Howe and his two comrades moved to a more advantageous position in order to return suppressive fire. When an enemy grenade landed in their midst, Lance Corporal Howe immediately shouted a warning and then threw himself upon the deadly missile, thereby protecting the lives of the fellow Marines. His heroic and selfless action was in keeping with the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service. He valiantly gave his life in the service of his country.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL MIGUEL KEITH
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a machine gunner with Combined Action Platoon 1-2-3, III Marine Amphibious Force, operating in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam. During the early morning of 8 May 1970, Lance Corporal Keith was seriously wounded when his platoon was subjected to a heavy ground attack by a greatly outnumbering enemy force. Despite his painful wounds, he ran across the fire-swept terrain to check the security of vital defense positions, and then, while completely exposed to view, proceeded to deliver a hail of devastating machine gun fire against the enemy. Determined to stop five of the enemy approaching the command post, he rushed forward, firing as he advanced. He succeeded in disposing of three of the attackers and in dispersing the remaining two. At this point, a grenade detonated near Lance Corporal Keith, knocking him to the ground and inflicting further severe wounds. Fighting pain and weakness from loss of blood, he again braved the concentrated hostile fire to charge an estimated twenty-five enemy soldiers who were massing to attack. The vigor of his assault and his well-placed fire eliminated four of the enemy while the remainder fled for cover. During this valiant effort, he was mortally wounded by an enemy soldier. By his courageous and inspiring performance in the face of almost overwhelming odds, Lance Corporal Keith contributed in large measure to the success of his platoon in routing a numerically superior enemy force, and upheld the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and of the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

STAFF SERGEANT ALLAN JAY KELLOGG, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Platoon Sergeant with Company G, Second Battalion, Fifth Marines, First Marine Division, in connection with combat operations against the enemy in the Republic of Vietnam on the night of March 11, 1970. Under the leadership of Gunnery Sergeant (then Staff Sergeant) Kellogg, a small unit from Company G was evacuating a fallen comrade when the unit came under a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from a numerically superior enemy force occupying well-concealed emplacements in the surrounding jungle. During the ensuing fierce engagement, an enemy soldier managed to maneuver through the dense foliage to a position near the Marines, and hurled a hand grenade into their midst which glanced off the chest of Gunnery Sergeant Kellogg. Quick to act, he forced the grenade into the mud in which he was standing, threw himself over the lethal weapon, and absorbed the full effects of its detonation with his body, thereby preventing serious injury or possible death to several of his fellow Marines. Although suffering multiple injuries to his chest and his right shoulder and arm, Gunnery Sergeant Kellogg resolutely continued to direct the efforts of his men until all were able to maneuver to the relative safety of the company perimeter. By his heroic and decisive action in risking his own life to save the lives of his comrades, Gunnery Sergeant Kellogg reflected the highest credit upon himself and upheld the finest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Appendix E

List of Reviewers

Marines

Gen Kenneth McLennan, USMC (Ret)

LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, USMC (Ret)

LtGen William K. Jones, USMC (Ret)

LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr., USMC (Ret)

LtGen Donn J. Robertson, USMC (Ret)

LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Alan J. Armstrong, USMC (Ret)

MajGen George S. Bowman, Jr., USMC (Ret)

MajGen James R. Jones, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Marc A. Moore, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Roy E. Moss, USMC (Ret)

MajGen Kenneth L. Robinson, Jr., USMC

MajGen Herbert L. Wilkerson, USMC (Ret)

BGen George L. Bartlett, USMC (Ret)

BGen Robert F. Conley, USMC (Ret)

BGen John S. Grinalds, USMC

BGen Donald L. Humphrey, USMC (Ret)

BGen Alexander P. McMillan, USMC (Ret)

BGen Thurman Owens, USMC (Ret)

BGen Albert C. Pommerenk, USMC (Ret)

BGen Charles S. Robertson, USMC (Ret)

BGen Francis W. Tief, USMC (Ret)

Col Vincent A. Albers, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Richard F. Armstrong, USMC (Ret)

Col Richard B. Baity, USMC (Ret)

Col Robert E. Barde, USMC (Ret)

Col Richard S. Barry, USMC (Ret)

Col Edward O. Bierman, USMC (Ret)

Col Don H. Blanchard, USMC (Ret)

Col Miller M. Blue, USMC (Ret)

Col Clarence W. Boyd, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col George M. Bryant, USMC (Ret)

Col Robert R. Calvert, USMC (Ret)

Col Marshall N. Carter, USMCR

Col Alphonse V. Castellana, USMC (Ret)

Col Don R. Christensen, USMC (Ret)

Col David A. Clement, USMC (Ret)

Col Gildo S. Codispoti, USMC (Ret)

Col Barry S. Colassard, USMC (Ret)

Col Rex C. Denny, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Edmund G. Dering, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Jack W. Dindinger, USMC (Ret)

Col James G. Dixon, USMC (Ret)

Col Lawrence R. Dorsa, USMC (Ret)

Col Sam A. Dressin, USMC (Ret)

Col James E. Fegley, USMC (Ret)

Col Phillip J. Fehlen, USMC

Col George C. Fox, USMC (Ret)

Col Jesse L. Gibney, USMC (Ret)

Col Walter F. Glowicki, USMC (Ret)

Col Robert E. Gruenler, USMC (Ret)

Col Max G. Halliday, USMC (Ret)

Col James E. Harrell, USMC (Ret)

Col Franklin A. Hart, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Neal E. Heffernan, USMC (Ret)

Col Frank X. Hoff, USMC (Ret)

Col Louis S. Hollier, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Forest J. Hunt, USMC (Ret)

Col Sanford B. Hunt, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Herschel L. Johnson, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Clark V. Judge, USMC (Ret)

Col James P. Kelly, USMC (Ret)

Col Robert D. King, USMC (Ret)

Col Ray G. Kummerow, USMC (Ret)

Col Robert L. La Mar, USMC (Ret)

Col Willis D. Ledeboer, USMC (Ret)

Col Frederick D. Leder, USMC (Ret)

Col Pierre L. LeFevre, USMC

Col Charles G. Little, USMC (Ret)

Col Verle E. Ludwig, USMC (Ret)

Col Warren E. McCain, USMC (Ret)

Col Laurence A. Marousek, USMC (Ret)

Col Karl N. Mueller, USMCR (Ret)

Col Donald J. Norris, USMC (Ret)

Col W. Hays Parks, USMCR

Col Robert L. Parnell, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Tom D. Parsons, USMC (Ret)

Col William C. Patton, USMC (Ret)

Col Clifford J. Peabody, USMC (Ret)

Col Robert H. Piehl, USMC (Ret)

Col Lewis E. Poggemeyer, USMC (Ret)

Col Edward D. Resnik, USMC (Ret)

Col Raymond E. Roeder, Jr., USMC (Ret)

Col Robert P. Rose, USMC (Ret)
 Col Edwin M. Rudzis, USMC (Ret)
 Col Dale E. Shatzer, USMC (Ret)
 Col John D. Shoup, USMC (Ret)
 Col James A. Sloan, USMC (Ret)
 Col Albert C. Smith, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 Col Lewis C. Street III, USMC (Ret)
 Col William J. Tirschfield, USMC
 Col John J. Unterkofler, USMC (Ret)
 Col Leon N. Utter, USMC (Ret)
 Col Floyd H. Waldrop, USMC (Ret)
 Col Anthony Walker, USMC (Ret)
 Col Stephen G. Warren, USMC (Ret)
 Col James R. Weaver, USMC (Ret)
 Col Vonda Weaver, USMC (Ret)
 Col William V. H. White, USMC (Ret)
 Col Robert L. Willis, USMC (Ret)
 Col Walter M. Winoski, USMC (Ret)
 Col William M. Yeager, USMC (Ret)
 Col Edwin M. Young, USMC (Ret)

LtCol Alan D. Albert, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol James T. Bowen, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Frank M. Boyd, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol John Colia, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Harlan C. Cooper, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Denver T. Dale III, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Claude M. Daniels, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Godfrey S. Delcuze, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Edmund H. Dowling, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Charles R. Dunbaugh, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol William R. Fails, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Johan S. Gestson, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Leroy H. Gonzales, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Pieter L. Hogaboom, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Delos M. Hopkins, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Lawrence G. Karch, USMC
 LtCol John J. Keenan, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol William E. Keller, Jr., USMC
 LtCol James C. Klinedinst, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Russell Lloyd, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 LtCol David G. Mehargue, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Gilbert R. Meibaum, USMC
 LtCol Charles M. Mosher, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Richard L. Prather, USMC (Ret)

LtCol James W. Rider, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Charles A. Rosenfeld, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol David F. Seiler, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol John J. Sheridan, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Morris S. Shimanoff, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Thomas H. Simpson, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Robert E. Wehrle, USMC (Ret)
 LtCol Kenneth C. Williams, USMC (Ret)

Maj Gerald F. Baker, USMCR (Ret)
 Maj Robert E. Burgess, USMC (Ret)
 Maj Robert T. Himmerich, USMC (Ret)
 Maj Edward J. Land, Jr., USMC (Ret)
 Maj Dellas J. Weber, USMC (Ret)

SgtMaj Edgar R. Huff, USMC (Ret)

MSgt John F. Hare, USMC (Ret)

Army

Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret)
 LtGen John R. Thurman III, USA (Ret)
 LtGen John M. Wright, Jr., USA (Ret)
 MajGen Lloyd B. Ramsey, USA (Ret)
 Col John W. Chism, USA (Ret)
 LtCol Warren E. Parker, USA (Ret)
 LtCol Robert R. Rafferty, USA (Ret)

Navy

Adm Maurice F. Weisner, USN (Ret)
 VAdm Walter D. Gaddis, USN (Ret)
 RAdm Herbert S. Matthews, Jr., USN (Ret)
 Capt Perry C. Alexander, USN (Ret)
 Capt James G. Goode, USN, CHC
 Capt Merideth H. Mead, USN (Ret)
 Capt Tracy H. Wilder, USN (Ret)
 Cdr John B. Fitzgerald, USN, CHC

Others

Mr. Thomas Harvey

Appendix F

Distribution of Personnel Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

(Reproduction of Status of Forces, 30 January 1970)

UNIT	NOTE	* ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		No I CTZ		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER			
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
HEADQUARTERS																								
HQ, FMF, PAC																								
FMF, PAC	3	92	1	8MAY69																				
H&S BN, FMF, PAC	3	1864	50	14MAY69														92	1					
CAMP S. D. BUTLER		558		15JAN70									558					1864	50					
CASUAL		171		15JAN70									171											
HOSPITALIZED	5	676		15JAN70											295							381		
HQ, V MEB																								
1ST CIVAFGRP		82	4																	82	4			
H&SCo, 5TH MEB		1331	48																	1331	48			
HQ, FORTRPS, FMF PAC																								
HQCO, FORTRPS		273	27																		273	27		
HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG																								
HQCO, 1ST MAR BRIG		252	26																		252	26		
HQ, I MEF																								
HQ, 3D MARDIV																								
HQBN, 3D MARDIV		1532	56										1532	56										
HQ, III MAF																								
H&SCo, III MAF		1122	29		1122	29																		
1ST CAG		518					518																	
2D CAG		648			648																			
3D CAG		365						365																
4TH CAG		365							365		365													
HQ, 1ST MARDIV																								
HQBN, 1ST MARDIV	3	2233	45		2184	45																	49	
INFANTRY																								
1ST MARINES																								
HQ CO		268	9		268	9																		
1ST BATTALION		1158	54		1158	54																		
2D BATTALION		1137	58		1137	58																		
3D BATTALION		1144	55		1144	55																		
3D MARINES																								
HQ CO		331	7																			331	7	
1ST BATTALION		1446	84															1446	84			1312	50	
2D BATTALION		1312	50																			1308	55	
3D BATTALION		1308	55																					
4TH MARINES																								
HQ CO		174	6										174	6										
1ST BATTALION		926	54										926	54										
2D BATTALION		924	52										924	52										
3D BATTALION		996	56										996	56										
5TH MARINES																								
HQ CO		353	9		353	9																		
1ST BATTALION		1135	58		1135	58																		
2D BATTALION		1122	57		1122	57																		
3D BATTALION		1118	58		1118	58																		
7TH MARINES																								
HQ CO		341	11		341	11																		
1ST BATTALION		1168	57		1168	57																		
2D BATTALION		1246	56		1246	56																		
3D BATTALION		1026	46		1026	46																		
9TH MARINES																								
HQ CO		372	11										372	11										
1ST BATTALION	1	1479	76																				1479	76
2D BATTALION	1	1612	80																				1612	80
3D BATTALION		983	64										983	64										
26TH MARINES																								
HQ CO		311	7		311	7																		
1ST BATTALION		1184	53		1184	53																		
2D BATTALION		1128	53		1128	53																		
3D BATTALION		1128	55		1128	55																		
ARTILLERY																								
11TH MARINES																								
HQ BTRY		479	8		479	8																		
1ST BATTALION		621	18		621	18																		
2D BATTALION		601	17		601	17																		
3D BATTALION		605	17		605	17																		
4TH BATTALION		561	11		561	11																		

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STRENGTH RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		PHU BAI		No I CTZ		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
MAG-56																						
H&MS-56		461																		461		
MABS-56		423	2																	423	2	
MATCU-74		93																		93		
HMM-167		300																		300		
HML-267		393	5																	393	5	
HMM-265		192																		192		
HMH-363		323																		323		
MATCU-75		53																		53		
	USMC	29,091			7,363	3,374	638	0	1,907	2,864	1,533	11,034	378									
	USN	461			124	72	3	0	23	38	26	167	8									
AVIATION TOTAL		29,552			7,487	3,446	641	0	1,930	2,902	1,559	11,201	386									

* UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT DAY-TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN PERIODS.
 ** UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTH REPORT DATE IS 16JAN70.

RECAPITULATION OF FMFPAC PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

		ASSIGNED STRENGTH	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	No I CTZ	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
GROUND TOTAL	USMC	78,919	39,465	1,569	365	987	17,061	295	3,764	11,892	3,521
	USN	3,476	1,730	21	0	19	980	0	165	405	156
AVIATION TOTAL	USMC	29,091	7,363	3,374	638	0	1,907	2,864	1,533	11,034	378
	USN	461	124	72	3	0	23	38	26	167	8
GRAND TOTAL	USMC	108,013	46,828	4,943	1,003	987	18,968	3,159	5,297	22,926	3,899
	USN	3,937	1,854	93	3	19	1,003	38	191	572	164

- NOTES:
- FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLP'S.
 - FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO VARIOUS LOCATIONS IN RVN.
 - PERSONNEL IN "OTHER" ARE ASSIGNED TO IT, ITT, SSC, CI TEAMS, RED EYE AND NUCLEAR ORDNANCE PLATOONS.
 - STRENGTH INCLUDED IN 1ST AND 3D TANK BATTALIONS.
 - THE 59T PERSONNEL LISTED IN "OTHER" ARE HOSPITALIZED AT LOCATIONS OTHER THAN OKINAWA, BUT ARE CARRIED ON THE ROLLS OF CASUAL COMPANY, MCB, CAMP BUTLER
 - AT SUBIC
- * UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATION ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT DAY-TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN PERIODS.
 ** UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTH REPORT DATE IS 16JAN70.

Appendix G

Distribution of Personnel Fleet Marine Force, Pacific

(Reproduction of Status of Forces, 21 April 1971)

UNIT	NOTE	UNIT COMMANDER	LOCATION	STRENGTH		MAJOR EQUIPMENT
				USMC	USN	
FMFPAC						
HO FMFPAC						
		LTGEN W. K. JONES	HAWAII			
H&SBN		COL R. G. LAUFFER	CAMP SMITH	1043	90	
HO SQDN		LTCOL C. E. DORFFELD	KANEHOHE	61		2/UH-34D, 2/US-2B, 1/C-47J
11TH CIT		CAPT K. W. CLEM				
DET 2, 21ST DENTAL CO		CAPT M.R. HAMILTON (USN)	CAMP SMITH		8	
1ST ANGLICO		MAJOR J. B. LEONARD, JR.	KANEHOHE	154	2	
SU 1, 1ST ANGLICO		LTCOL E. E. SHOULTS	MACV SAIGON	180	9	
SU 2, 1ST RADIO BN		MAJOR L. K. RUSSELL	KANEHOHE	128		
TOTAL HO FMFPAC				1566	109	
WESTPAC						
HO 3D MAB						
		MAJGEN A. J. ARMSTRONG	DANANG			
H&SCO		LTCOL W. J. SPIESEL		397	13	2/155 HOW TD, 3/81 MORT
1ST RADIO BN (-)		LTCOL E. D. RESNIK	STANDING DOWN	36		
COMM SPT CO, 7TH COMM		MAJOR R. T. HIMMERICH	DANANG	338		
2D CAG		LTCOL J. J. TOLNAY	HOI AN	557	35	
5TH CIT		1STLT J. L. ALLINGHAM	DANANG	13		
TOTAL HQ 3D MAB/				1341	48	
HQBN, 1ST MARDIV (-)	3	LTCOL R. E. WEHRLE	STANDING DOWN	119		
RLT-1						
1ST IT		WO F. W. SCHAFFER	DANANG	2		
7TH IT		1STLT R. L. HOMSEY	STANDING DOWN	2		
3D CIT		CAPT W. J. KNIPPER	DANANG	18		
3D ITT		CAPT M. R. LAMB		14		
13TH ITT		1STLT C.H. ANDERTON, JR.	STANDING DOWN	2		
2D SSCT		1STLT J. E. MANCUSO		2		
CO A, 1ST ENGR BN		MAJOR J. B. DIXON	DANANG	271	2	
1ST MED BN (-)		CDR W.A. ELLIOT III (USN)	STANDING DOWN	33	269	
11TH MT BN		LTCOL C. A. ROSEFELD		60	10	
CO A, 1ST MT BN		CAPT P. MC CANN	DANANG	96	1	
DET, HQ BTRY, 11TH MAR				49		

UNIT	NOTE	UNIT COMMANDER	LOCATION	STRENGTH		MAJOR EQUIPMENT
				USMC	USN	
CO C (REIN), 1ST SP BN		MAJOR R. W. SWEET, JR		95		
CO A, 1ST RECON BN(REIN)		MAJOR H. C. COOPER, JR.		218	16	
DET, 1ST FORCE RECON BN						
1ST MARINES		COL P. X. KELLEY	DANANG			
HQCO		CAPT H. W. GARDNER		264	8	3/106MM RR
1ST BN		LTCOL R. P. ROSE	STANDING DOWN	1029	68	9/106MM RR, 10/81 MORT
2D BN		LTCOL R. E. MOSS	DANANG	1137	63	8/106MM RR, 10/81 MORT
3D BN		LTCOL M. A. MOORE		1195	56	8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
1ST BN, 11TH MAR		LTCOL B. F. OGDEN	DANANG	786	18	6/M-30 MORT, 18/105 HOW TD, 1/81 MORT
3D 8" BTRY		MAJOR W. J. McCALLUM		243	5	1/M51, 6/8" HOW SP
TOTAL BLT-1				5635	517	

FLC		BGEN J. R. JONES	DANANG			14/105 HOW TD, 1/155 HOW SP, 1/155 HOW TD, 2/106MM RR, 11/81 MORT
H&SBN		LTCOL D. J. BURGER		762	47	
MAINT BN		LTCOL W. F. SHEEHAN		497	13	2/M51 VTR
SUPPLY BN		COL C. F. LANGLEY		810	32	
1ST MP BN		LTCOL J. COLIA		675	10	3/81 MORT
CO A, 7TH ENGR BN		MAJOR G. R. MEIBAUM		262		
TOTAL FLC				3006	102	
MAG-11/MAG-16						
DET, H&MS-1		MAJOR L. F. GAGNON	STANDING DOWN	118		
DET, MMFS-1		MAJOR J. R. GRIFFIN		42		
DET, MMCS-1		MAJOR R. S. KAYE		38		
DET, 3D SSCT		CAPT D. R. PHELPS		1		
DET, 11TH FORCE DENTAL CO (-) (REIN)		CDR W.P. ARMSTRONG (USN)		1	60	
DET, H&MS-18		MAJOR L. E. OBENHAUS	STANDING DOWN	20		
MAG-11		COL A. C. POMMERENK	DANANG			
H&MS-11		LTCOL A.R. ANDERSON, JR.		603		2/C-117D, 3/TA-4F
MABS-11		LTCOL C. L. COMFORT		567	22	
VMA-311		LTCOL J. T. HAGEN		208	1	24/A-4E
VMA(AW)-225		LTCOL J.A. MANZIONE, JR.	STANDING DOWN	289	1	12/A-6A
DET, VMO-6		LTCOL E. P. JANZ	DANANG	53		4/OV-10A
MASS-3		LTCOL W. C. SIMANIKAS	DANANG	223	1	

UNIT	NOTE	UNIT COMMANDER	LOCATION	STRENGTH		MAJOR EQUIPMENT
				USMC	USN	
MAG-16		COL L. C. STREET III	MARBLE MOUNTAIN			
H&MS-16		MAJOR C. D. SILARD, JR.		490		5/CH-46D
MABS-16		LTCOL J. M. DEAN		665	28	
HML-167		LTCOL R. J. BLANC		207		23/UH-1E
HML-367		LTCOL L. E. REESE		241	1	22/AH-1G, 4/AH-1J
HMM-262		LTCOL F. K. WEST, JR.		248	1	22/CH-46D
HMM-263		LTCOL L. K. KECK		197	1	20/CH-46D
HMH-463		LTCOL T. S. REAP		229	1	18/CH-53D
MATCU-68		MAJOR B. D. COLLINS		61		
TOTAL MAG-11/MAG-16				4501	117	
TOTAL 3D MAB				14,483	784	
HI MAF		LTGEN D. J. ROBERTSON	CAMP COURTNEY			
HQCO				185		
TOTAL HQCO HI MAF				185		
3D MAR DIV (-) (REIN)		MAJGEN L. METZGER	CAMP COURTNEY			
HQBN		COL W. D. POMERY		1419	37	
17TH ITT		1STLT G. H. JOHNSON, JR.	CAMP HANSEN	9		
1ST SSCT		CAPT T. L. STROHECKER	CAMP COURTNEY	7		
7TH ITT		CAPT A. R. ARBISI	CAMP HANSEN	10		
15TH ITT		1STLT B. R. KRAMER		8		
11TH ITT			ENR CAMP HANSEN			

4TH MARINES		COL R. T. HANIFIN, JR.	CAMP HANSEN			
HQCO		MAJOR R. F. LUSK		211	6	
1ST BN		LTCOL P. M. JOHNSON		1088	32	8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
2D BN		LTCOL W. H. NUTLY	BLT	1092	42	8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
3D BN	1	LTCOL A. J. CASTELLANA	CAMP HANSEN	1072	34	8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
9TH MARINES		COL J. V. McLERNAN	CAMP SCHWAB			
HQCO		CAPT M. H. CRAFTON		202	5	
1ST BN	2	LTCOL F.W.M. WOODROM, JR.	31ST MAU CAMP SCHWAB	1047	37	8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
2D BN		LTCOL F.J. JOHNSON, JR.		1164	30	5/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
3D BN		LTCOL B. S. SNELL		937	30	8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
12TH MARINES		COL J. J. SNYDER	CAMP FUJI			
HQ BTRY (-)		CAPT D. J. LABOISSIERE		188	6	4/155 HOW TD
2D BN	16	MAJOR W. K. KRAMER		491	12	18/105 HOW TD
3D BN	16	MAJOR C. A. HENRY		477	11	18/105 HOW TD
4TH BN (-) (REIN)		LTCOL K. G. PATTERSON		366	11	18/155 HOW TD
3D PLAT, 1ST 8" HOW BTRY	4					2/8" HOW TD
3D MED BN (-)		LCDR K. W. GRAY (USN)	CAMP HANSEN	117	160	

UNIT	NOTE	UNIT COMMANDER	LOCATION	STRENGTH		MAJOR EQUIPMENT
				USMC	USN	
3D DENTAL CO		(USN) CAPT W. J. KENNEDY, JR.	CAMP COURTNEY	5	67	
3D SERV BN (-)		COL D. J. HUNTER	CAMP HANSEN	719	17	
3D TANK BN (-)		LTCOL C. R. STIFFLER		650	10	50/M48 TANKS, 8/M67 TANKS 4/M51 VTR
3D MT BN (-)		MAJOR J. F. SHERRY, JR.	CAMP SCHNAB	185	6	
3D RECON BN (-)		LTCOL T. R. STUART		322	22	
3D ENGR BN (-) (REIN)		LTCOL D. D. CREWS, JR.		750	9	
CO D (REIN), 7TH ENGR		MAJOR D. R. CONER	CAMP BAGUE			
3D SP BN (-)		LTCOL R. L. ANDERSON		322	23	
1ST AMTRAC BN (-)		LTCOL J. G. BUCKMAN	CAMP SCHNAB	580	11	99/LVTP-5, 10/LVTP-5 COMD, 3/LVTR
7TH COMM BN (-)		LTCOL M. W. McCOURTY		453	6	
9TH MT BN (-)		MAJOR J. R. TRAYLOR	CAMP HANSEN	270	7	
1ST HOSPITAL CO (CADRE)		LT H. D. CASH (USN)		28	13	
TOTAL 3D MAR DIV.				14,209	644	
3D FSB		COL R. E. ROEDER, JR.	CAMP FOSTER			
H&SBN		LTCOL J. B. HARRIS		814	28	
SUPPLY BN		LTCOL J. W. FRIBERG		1022	27	
MAINT BN		CAPT C. W. SHIVER		44		
TOTAL 3D FSB				2723	55	
1ST MAW (JAPAN)		BGEN R. F. CONLEY	INAKUNI			
MWHG-1 (-)		LTCOL G. H. BUCKNER II		791		
H&HS-1 (-)		LTCOL P. S. FRAPPOLLO		821	31	
MWFS-1 (-)		MAJOR J. R. GRIFFIN		141		
MWCS-1 (-)		MAJOR R. S. KAYE		205		
MAG-18 (-)		COL C. T. WESTCOTT	INAKUNI			
H&HS-18 (-)		CAPT F. A. TOVAL		84		
11TH FORCE DENTAL CO (-)		LCDR G. W. OATS (USN)				
3D SSCT (-)						
MAG-15		COL R. R. MILLER	INAKUNI			
H&MS-15		MAJOR M. P. CADY		473		4/TA-4F
MABS-15		MAJOR L. K. GRISSETT		310	12	
MABS-2 (-)		LTCOL T. G. DAVIS		138		

VNFA-232		LTCOL J. S. ROSENTHAL	INAKUNI	262	1	13/F-4J
VNFA-115		LTCOL R. R. POWELL		290		10/F-4B
MATCU-60		1STLT J. W. LEFLAR		42		
7TH CIT		WO J. A. CANONICO		13		
MAG-12		COL R. L. McELROY	INAKUNI			
H&MS-12		MAJOR W. A. McINTYRE		481		6/TA-4F, 2/A-4E

UNIT	NOTE	UNIT COMMANDER	LOCATION	STRENGTH		MAJOR EQUIPMENT
				USMC	USN	
MABS-12		LTCOL J. L. DRIEGER		320	23	
VMA-211	17	LTCOL D. G. GASCOIGNE	CUBI PT	197	2	19/A-4E
VMA(AW)-533		LTCOL G. L. RUTLEDGE	IWAKUNI	230	1	11/A-6A
VMCJ-1		LTCOL C. A. HOUSEMAN		350	1	6/EA-6A, 7/RP-4B
MATCU-62		1STLT W. F. HAIZLIP		41		
SU 1, H&MS-12						
TOTAL 1ST MAW (JAPAN)				4368	71	
(1ST MAW (OKINAWA))			OKINAWA			
MAG-36		COL R. J. ZITNIK	FUTEMA			
H&MS-36		LTCOL R. E. SKINNER		475		14/CH-46D, 5/CH-53D
MABS-36		MAJOR B. C. DARR		477	19	
MATCU-66		CAPT W. S. ROGERS		36		
MACS-8		LTCOL M. S. JOLLY, JR.		268	1	
HMM-164		LTCOL A. J. KETTERING		204	1	9/CH-46D
HMM-165	2	LTCOL H. M. HERTHER	31ST MAW	256	4	14/CH-46D, 3/CH-53D, 3/UH-1E
HMH-462		LTCOL R. E. DYER	FUTEMA	190		14/CH-53D
VMO-6		A. H. BLOOM		172		10/OV-10A, 12/UH-1E
VMGR-152		LTCOL R. W. DUPHINEY		314	1	9/KC-130F
DET, MASS-2						
MWSG-17		COL T. E. MULVIHILL	IWAKUNI			
H&MS-17		LTCOL E. W. GILBERT		400	6	7/C-117D, 3/C-54/D/R/S
WERS-17 (-)		MAJOR W. T. SINNOTT		182		
SU 1, WERS-17		WO E. Q. HICKS		39		
TOTAL (1ST MAW (OKINAWA))				2983	32	
TOTAL 1ST MAW				7351	103	
TOTAL (H&MAB)				24,468	802	
TOTAL WESTPAC				38,951	1586	
EASTPAC						
1 MAF		MAJGEN C. F. WIDDECKE	CAMPEN			
H&SCO						
1ST MAR DIV (-) (REIN)		MAJGEN C. F. WIDDECKE	CAMPEN			
PROV HQBN, 5TH MAB, 1ST MARDIV		COL R. N. DURHAM				
H&SCO, 5TH MAB, 1ST MARDIV		MAJOR R. A. ANDERSON		1444	39	
1ST CIT		CAPT B. B. VORONEN		20		
5TH ITT		CAPT F. L. STOLZ		11		
9TH ITT		CAPT L. J. JANSEN		10		
19TH ITT		CAPT A. D. BREWIN		9		
23D ITT		CAPT R. D. TOMLIN		13		
25TH ITT		CAPT H. K. LEE		14		
13TH CIT (CADRE)		1STLT W. C. MANTZ				
21ST ITT		CAPT R. R. WELPOTT		9		

UNIT	NOTE	UNIT COMMANDER	LOCATION	STRENGTH		MAJOR EQUIPMENT
				USMC	USN	
9TH SSCT			CAMPEN	9		
SENSOR CONTROL & MGMT PLAT		CWO A. L. SELLECK, JR.		26		
DET, HQBN, 1ST MARDIV (CADRE)			CAMPEN			
1ST CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP (CADRE)		MAJOR W. T. MACY		189	7	
COMM SPT CO, 9TH COMM BN		MAJOR R. K. MILLER		290		
3D MARINES (CADRE)		LTCOL K. L. CHRISTENSEN	CAMPEN			
HQCO (CADRE)		1STLT B. C. IFFT		166	19	
2D BN (CADRE)		CAPT R. F. KEHRES		82		8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
3D BN (CADRE)		MAJOR D. J. O'CONNOR		81		8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
5TH MARINES		COL C. V. JUDGE	CAMPEN			
HQCO		1STLT R. E. CAMPBELL		105	6	2/81 MORT
1ST BN		LTCOL F. A. HART, JR	ENR CONUS	174	1	8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
2D BN		LTCOL T. M. HAMLIN	CAMPEN	260	16	8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
3D BN		LTCOL H. L. JOHNSON, JR.		176	1	5/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
7TH MARINES		COL A. A. MONTI	CAMPEN			
HQCO		CAPT W. O. MOORE, JR.		189	7	8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
1ST BN (CADRE)		MAJOR R. C. HALL		133	7	2/106MM RR
2D BN		LTCOL R. R. BURRITT		1003	42	8/106MM RR, 8/81MORT
3D BN		LTCOL R. J. MILLE		1013	42	8/106MM RR, 8/81MORT
11TH MARINES (-) (REIN)		COL E. M. RUDZIS	CAMPEN			
HQ BTRY (-)		MAJOR G. L. YENERALL		222	9	
2D BN (-)		MAJOR C. K. MC AFEE		75		6/M-30 MORT, 6/155 HOW SP, 8/106MM RR
3D BN (REIN)	25	LTCOL B. F. STEWART		494	18	1/M51 VTR, 12/105 HOW TD 6/155 HOW TD
1ST BN (-), 12THMAR (CADRE)		MAJOR L. E. KOLEBER		80	3	
1ST RECON BN (-)		LTCOL B. E. TRAINOR		30		
CO C, (REIN), 3D RECON BN CO D, 1ST RECON BN (CADRE)		CAPT J. W. PARRISH		76	2	
1ST FORCE RECON CO (-) (CADRE)		1STLT A. E. ANDERSON				
CO A (-), 3D RECON BN		1STLT J. G. BAKER III		41	1	
1ST TANK BN	18	1STLT A. W. LAW				
3D AMTRAC BN	19	MAJOR G. E. BERBAUM		502	13	15/M103 TK, 47/M48 TK, 4/M51 VTR, 7/M67 TK 6/LVTE-1, 72/LVTP-5 8/LVTP-5, COMD, 3/LVTR
7TH MT BN (REIN)	13	MAJOR D. W. MAILLER		462	17	
7TH MT BN (REIN)	13	LTCOL J. J. DOWD, JR.		191	4	
CO B (-) (REIN), 3D MT BN		1STLT J. C. HERING		49	1	
CO B (REIN), 9TH MT BN		1STLT R. F. WILLIAMS		75		
1ST MT BN (-)		LTCOL R. B. TALBOTT		77		
CO C, 1ST MT BN		CAPT M. A. SELBY		92	1	
1ST SP BN (-) (REIN) CO B (-) (REIN), 3D SP BN (CADRE)	12	LTCOL T. F. GRAY		246	17	
7TH ENGR BN (-) (REIN)	11	1STLT J. O. ALBER				
1ST BRIDGE CO (CADRE)		LTCOL J. P. KRAYNAK		367	14	
1ST ENGR BN (-)		1STLT D. N. TAYLOR		69		
1ST ENGR BN (-)		LTCOL D. E. BENSTEAD		21		

UNIT	NOTE	UNIT COMMANDER	LOCATION	STRENGTH		MAJOR EQUIPMENT
				USMC	USN	
CO B (-) (REIN), 3D ENGR BN		1STLT L. H. PROSSER		81	2	
1ST SERV BN	10	COL G. K. REID		786	22	
CO C (-) (REIN), 3D MED BN (CADRE)		LT D. B. COLLIDGE (USN)				
CO C, 1ST MED BN (CADRE)		LT(JG) L. A. DAVIS (USN)		23	50	
3D HOSPITAL CO		LT W. L. NICHOLS (USN)		38	34	
1ST DENTAL CO (-)		CAPT J. J. LYONS (USN)		5	43	

7TH SEP BULK FUEL CO (CADRE)						
9TH SEP BULK FUEL CO (CADRE)						
1ST SEARCHLIGHT BTRY (CADRE)						
TOTAL 1ST MARDIV (-) (REIN)				9,380	433	
TOTAL I MAF OTHER EASTPAC				9,380	433	
FORCE TROOPS FMFPAC		BGEN C. W. HOFFMAN	29 PALMS			
H&CO		MAJOR E. L. ROTTSOLK		190	24	
NOP, 1ST FSR		1STLT W. W. STEELE		25		
NOP, 5TH FSR		CAPT T. R. GERIES		21		
9TH COMM BN (-)		LTCOL D. J. GARRETT		360	12	
17TH CIT		CAPT A. G. WILSON		19		
21ST DENTAL CO (-)		CAPT G. W. WALTER (USN)		2	17	
1ST FAG		LTCOL R. O. GILLICK	29 PALMS	19		
HO BTRY		1STLT G. R. MABRY		180	13	
4TH BN, 11TH MAR		LTCOL J. A. HAMILTON		147	2	16/155 HOW SP, 8/105 HOW TD
1ST 8" HOW BTRY SP		MAJ L. J. SZAFRANSKI, JR		107		1/M51 VTR, 4/8" HOW SP
CO A (REIN), 11TH ENGR BN		CAPT P. A. PANKEY		127		
1ST 175MM GUN BTRY SP		1STLT J. P. GROSSCUP		26		1/M51 VTR, 6/175MM GUN
3D 175MM GUN BTRY SP		CAPT D. L. ROSENBERG		56		1/M51 VTR, 6/175MM GUN
TOTAL FORTRPS, FMFPAC				1,279	68	
1ST FSR		COL H. C. REED	CAMPEN			
H&SBN		MAJOR R. E. JOHNSON		346	24	
SUPPLY BN		MAJOR R. J. WEBB		385	18	
MAINT BN		MAJOR A. A. MC VITTY		419		2/LVTR, 2/M51 VTR
TOTAL 1ST FSR				1150	42	
3D MAW		BGEN L. E. BROWN	EL TORO			
M&HG-3		COL G. L. LILLICH				
H&HS-3 (-)		MAJOR P. J. VOGEL		645	115	
6TH CIT		CAPT W. C. HOWEY		16		
4TH SSCT		CAPT H. G. WHITE		8		
M&FS-3		MAJOR J. S. LOOP		113		
M&CS-3		MAJOR G. P. HOWLE		211		
SU 1, H&HS-3		COL L. J. STEIN		8		

UNIT	NOTE	UNIT COMMANDER	LOCATION	STRENGTH		MAJOR EQUIPMENT
				USMC	USN	
MMSG-37		COL R. A. SAVAGE	EL TORO			
H&MS-37 (-)		MAJOR L. K. WARN		472	2	3/C-117D, 1/C-54P, 1/C-54Q
SU 1, H&MS-37		MAJOR H. C. IVY, JR.		51		
WERS-37		LTCOL M. PALLAI		228		
VMGR-352		LTCOL M. P. MANN		282	2	8/KC-130F
MACG-38		LTCOL J. W. DRURY	EL TORO			
H&MS-38 (-)		MAJOR L. O. WAYMIRE		245		
SU 1, H&MS-38		MAJOR S. D. CHANEY		63		
2D LAAM BN	20	MAJOR L. A. SOLLBERGER	29 PALMS	619	7	
1ST REDEYE PLATOON		1STLT K. E. ROWE	EL TORO	36		
3D REDEYE PLATOON		2DLT G. B. DOWLING, JR.		34		
MACS-7		LTCOL J. O. GREGERSON	CAMPEN	228		

MACS-1 (-)		MAJOR W. H. ALLEN	YUMA	210	1	
NWS, SU 1, MACS-1		CAPT R. P. PITTS		70		
DET A, 2D LAAM BN	21	MAJOR A. D. GLAD				
MACS-4 (CAIRE)		MAJOR G. S. PRESCOTT	EL TORO	38		
MAG-13		COL O. R. DAVIS	EL TORO			
H&MS-13		LTCOL C. C. NEWMARK		588	1	23/F-4B, 4/TA-4F, 9/A-6A
MABS-13		MAJOR R. L. BAINBRIDGE		494	2	
VMA-214		LTCOL R. J. REID		155		10/A-4E
VMA-223		LTCOL J. W. LAZZO		121	1	9/A-4F
VMA(AW)-242		LTCOL M. S. NEWBILL		85	1	2/A-6A
VMFA-314		MAJOR A. G. BARTEL		17		
VMFA-323		LTCOL D. L. WALDVOGEL		183		14/F-4B
VMFA-531		LTCOL R. HUTCHINSON		238	1	16/F-4B
VMCJ-3		LTCOL M. W. DINNAGE		265	1	10/RF-4B
MATCU-65		1STLT R. D. ANDERSON		43		
MATCU-67		1STLT J. R. HANCOCK		17		
MATCU-77 (CAIRE)						
13TH FORCE DNETAL CO		CAPT J. R. EVANS (USN)			37	
VMFA-334		MAJOR J. K. KRUTHERS		1		
MAG-56		COL M. B. PORTER	SANTA ANA			
H&MS-56 (-)		LTCOL G. H. DUNN		343		19/CH-53A
SU 1, H&MS-56		MAJOR G. W. LEE	CAMPEN	105		
MABS-56		LTCOL B. G. WILKISON	SANTA ANA	378		
MATCU-74		CAPT G. V. BROWN		38		
MATCU-75		CAPT P. D. HAYNES	CAMPEN	28		
HML-267		LTCOL J. M. MORIARTY		250	4	12/OV-10A, 19/UH-1E
HMM-161		LTCOL B. T. LADD	SANTA ANA	187		22/CH-46D
HMM-163		LTCOL F. A. MATHEWS		205	1	18/CH-46F

UNIT	NOTE	UNIT COMMANDER	LOCATION	STRENGTH		MAJOR EQUIPMENT
				USMC	USN	
HMH-361		LTCOL E. W. RAWLINS		196		10/CH-53A
HMH-363		LTCOL A. F. RIBBECK, JR.		187		14/CH-53A
VMO-2 (-)			ENROUTE CONUS			
MHTG-30		COL A. F. GAROTTO	SANTA ANA			
H&MS-30		MAJOR D. G. DUNLAP		250	1	9/CH-46F, 4/CH-53A
HMHT-301		MAJOR D. A. DALRYMPLE		112	1	8/CH-53A
HMHT-302		LTCOL P. L. MOREAU		156	1	13/CH-46F
MCCRTG-10		COL R. B. SINCLAIR	YUMA			
H&MS-10		MAJOR G. R. CALLISON		446	5	
VMFAT-101		LTCOL T. R. MOORE		411	1	18/F-4B
VMAT-102		LTCOL R. D. REID		292		29/A-4E
VMT-103		MAJOR B. H. FREEMAN		233	2	20/TA-4F
DET, H&MS-11 (-)			ENROUTE CONUS			
DET, H&MS-13 (-)						
TOTAL 3D MAW				9601	187	
TOTAL OTHER EASTPAC				12,030	297	
TOTAL EASTPAC				21,410	730	

MIDPAC						
1ST MARINE BRIGADE						
		BGEN V. A. ARMSTRONG	KANEOHE			
H&SCO		MAJOR R. F. HALLETT		274	17	
1ST IIT		CAPT T. E. NADOLSKI		16		
DET 1, 21ST DENTAL CO		CDR J. D. CRAWFORD (USN)			14	
1ST BN (REIN), 3D MAR	22	LTCOL H. W. WAHFELD		656	54	6/105 HOW TD, 8/106MM RR, 8/81 MORT
CO A, 9TH ENGR BN		CAPT R. I. EDWARDS		121		
CO A (REIN), 1ST AMTRAC BN		CAPT K. R. BURNS		193		44/LVTP-5, 3/LVTP-5 COMD, 1/LVTR
PROV SERV BN		LTCOL R. E. NICHOLSON		234		
BTRY "A", 1STBN, 12TH MAR	14					
MAG-24						
		COL R. E. CAREY	KANEOHE			
H&MS-24		LTCOL C. L. PHILLIPS		457		5/CH-46A, 2/TA-4F, 1/C-117D
MAHS-24		LTCOL W. R. LEDBETTER, JR		381	29	
MATCU-70		CAPT O. F. GOUR, JR.		51		
VMFA-122		LTCOL L. FURSTENBERG		154		15/F-4B
VMFA-212		LTCOL J. W. MOORE		216		17/F-4J
VMFA-235		LTCOL F. L. FARRELL, JR.		225		16/F-4J
MACS-2		LTCOL P. L. ELLIOTT		200		
TOTAL 1ST MARINE BRIGADE				3178	114	
TOTAL FMFPAC				65,105	2535	

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