

The fire came as a shock to the 1st ANGLICO teams maneuvering outside the city alongside the Saudis and Qataris, since Colonel Turki and Colonel Admire had agreed that all fire would be coordinated through the supporting arms liaison teams. Lieutenant Colonel William C. Grubb, Jr., 1st ANGLICO commander, went to the 3d Marines combat operations center and fixed the fire support coordination problem, which led to the order that all fire missions be approved by the air-naval gunfire teams. Despite these attempts to avoid firing on Coalition forces, the Qatari's claimed one of their AMX-30s was disabled by Marine artillery fire, although it was not confirmed.¹⁷⁷

Meanwhile, the 7th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade, was preparing another attempt to storm al-

Operating in their doctrinal role as part of the Marine air-ground task force, AV-8B Harriers provided needed close air support during the Battle of al-Khafji.

Khafji and relieve the reconnaissance teams. This time, the attack was more carefully prepared, with artillery support from both Saudi and Marine artillery units and extensive Marine close air support coordinated by the teams working alongside the Saudi Arabian National Guard units. Despite the air and artillery support, the Iraqis still put up a fierce fight, destroying three Saudi V-150 armored cars.¹⁷⁸ "Tank main gun, recoilless rifle, TOW [antitank missile], and small arms fire came thick and furious," 1st ANGLICO later reported. "The Saudis and Qataris charged through the streets firing at everything and anything and in every direction."¹⁷⁹

The battle raged through the southern half of al-Khafji, while Marine AV-8B Harriers and AH-1W Cobras provided direct support to the Saudi and Qatari

troops. Air-naval gunfire teams directed the Cobras in a strafing run against the town's water tower, and Harriers destroyed Iraqi vehicles at the major road intersection in that quarter of the city.¹⁸⁰ The Marine reconnaissance teams took advantage of the confusion of this assault to withdraw safely from al-Khafji, one on foot, the other team in humvees that had sat inside a courtyard, undetected by the Iraqis since the first hours of the battle.¹⁸¹

In the afternoon, the 7th Battalion withdrew to rest and resupply, and the 8th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade, took its place clearing al-Khafji buildings. By this point the Saudis had lost 7 Cadillac Gage V-150 Armored Cars, 18 dead, and 50 wounded. The clearing operation continued throughout the night. "Saudi urban operations were different than what Americans practice," Captain Braden later noted. "Instead of room-by-room clearing, they simply occupy a block and if they take fire they target with TOWs and heavy machine guns until resistance stops and then move to the next building of street. As a result of these techniques there were numerous pockets of Iraqis left in the city that would be killed or captured over the next few days."¹⁸²

In the north, 5th Battalion, 2d Saudi National Guard, and its attached air-naval gunfire teams under Captain Kleinsmith and First Lieutenant Paul B. Deckert stopped Iraqi units trying to reinforce their forces in al-Khafji. At Observation Post 7, a battery of Iraqi self-propelled howitzers had taken up position, supported by infantry and armored personnel carriers. A division of four Cobras destroyed the battery under Captain Kleinsmith's direction, but their arrival coincided with the destruction by enemy fire of two Saudi armored cars and an ambulance. Convinced that they had suffered friendly fire, the Saudis withdrew, leaving Captain Kleinsmith and his team to stabilize the line with air support. When the immediate Iraqi threats were removed, Kleinsmith's team rejoined the 5th Battalion.¹⁸³

As the ground fight for al-Khafji drew to a close, the air effort continued to devastate the Iraqi forces. After a slow start, Coalition air forces claimed hundreds of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery tubes destroyed during the five

History Division Photo



days that al-Khafji remained the main effort. An Air Force post war study highlighted the effect of the air attacks: “pilots described the frantic maneuverings of surviving Iraqi vehicles as visually equivalent to the results of ‘turning on the light in a cockroach-infested apartment.’” The report added: “perhaps the most revealing comment of all came from a member of the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division who had fought in the Iran-Iraq War. This veteran soldier stated that Coalition airpower imposed more damage on his brigade in half an hour than it had sustained in eight years of fighting against the Iranians.”¹⁸⁴

The next morning, 1 February, Saudi units advanced all the way through al-Khafji, encountering only light resistance. They cleared the city of remaining Iraqi troops, although solitary holdouts would appear to surrender over the next few days, and established a defensive position north of the city. The Battle of al-Khafji had ended.¹⁸⁵

Considerations

Every battle has losses. During the Battle of al-Khafji, 25 Americans lost their lives, 11 Marines and 14 airmen. Three Marines were wounded and two soldiers captured by the enemy. One LAV-25, one LAV-AT, and one AC-130 gunship were destroyed. The Saudis and Qataris suffered 18 killed and 50 wounded. Ten armored cars and two tanks were destroyed. After the war, the Iraqis claimed to have destroyed 4 helicopters, 30 tanks, and 58 armored personnel carriers, as well as capturing 13 prisoners.¹⁸⁶ They listed their losses as 71 dead, 148 wounded, and 702 missing, as well as 186 vehicles destroyed, but their actual losses were likely higher. In the immediate vicinity of al-Khafji alone, 1st ANGLICO reported 90 vehicles destroyed, at least 300 Iraqi soldiers killed, and 680 captured. By most accounts, the 6th Brigade, 3d Armored Division was badly mauled and the 15th, 20th, and 26th Brigades of the 5th Mechanized Division were nearly destroyed.¹⁸⁷

The Battle of al-Khafji had some immediate consequences. The deaths which occurred in the early morning hours of 30 January, when an Air Force A-10 fired the missile into the Marine LAV-25, were one of several similar events during January. As a result, General Boomer ordered an



Photo courtesy of Cpl Charles H. Ingraham III

Cpl Jeffery D. Brown of 3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, stands in one of his team's humvees. The humvee's tires were punctured and its windshield shattered by shrapnel from a Marine artillery barrage called in on Iraqi forces near the reconnaissance teams' positions. Cpl Brown was wounded by the same artillery strike.

investigation to determine what measures could be taken to prevent future casualties. The investigation team's report was completed prior to the invasion of Kuwait and its recommendations implemented.

Otherwise, Marines, Saudis, and Iraqis all took differing views of the battle. Marines generally took away an increased confidence in techniques and doctrines, and a clearer idea of the enemy they would face. Lieutenant Colonel Myers felt that the screening forces along the border had exceeded expectations and the battle “proved the concept, philosophically” of the light armored vehicle.¹⁸⁸ Captain Braden saw al-Khafji as proof of the value and importance of the air-naval gunfire liaison company, and long after the battle ended, he was using al-Khafji as an example to argue against its disbandment: “Without ANGLICO, it is difficult to envision another successful Battle of al-Khafji,” he wrote.¹⁸⁹

Marines gained confidence in their Saudi allies. Colonel Admire, for one, now felt there was “no doubt in the Marine Corps force's mind that when the time would come to in fact attack into

Kuwait, the Saudis and the Qataris and the Coalition forces would be with us. Absolutely no doubt.”¹⁹⁰ Captain Molofsky agreed because “when push came to shove, without any real plan, any real direction, those Saudi soldiers obeyed their orders and went forward. And, they did so courageously.”¹⁹¹

General Boomer saw al-Khafji as further proof that the Iraqi military was a hollow force. “We knew they weren't motivated even by the time al-Khafji occurred, and it confirmed it. We were beginning to pick up POWs who said, ‘I don't want any part of this deal. I am down here getting the heck pounded out of me everyday, food and water are short. Why am I here?’ In essence they were saying, ‘I don't want to die here, in this conflict.’ We were getting enough of that so that I really came to believe that there was a significant morale problem on the other side.”¹⁹² But for Captain Molofsky, the view at the tactical level was somewhat different: “My opinion was that; if that's what it was gonna take to get started in the recovery of a small town like al-Khafji, that we were gonna be involved in



Marine Corps Art Collection

Marines of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, search al-Khafji for Iraqi stragglers and examine the battle damage as depicted in the painting "Cleaning up Khafji" by Capt Charles G. Grow.

a prolonged and bloody struggle."¹⁹³

The U.S. Air Force saw the Battle of al-Khafji as the proof of air power: "The Battle of Khafji was preeminently an airpower victory." Close air support and battlefield interdiction had isolated the battlefield and inflicted great destruction upon the Iraqis. The result was a "devastating defeat" for the Iraqi military and "airpower was the decisive element."¹⁹⁴

General Khaled bin Sultan explained that while the battle was such an important victory for the Saudis had it gone badly, "the blow to our morale would have been severe. But victory changed the mood of our soldiers to an amazing degree. They had been given a chance to prove themselves and had done so splendidly.... Our forces were now equal partners with our allies, ready to play a full role in any future battle."¹⁹⁵

Perhaps the most surprising conclusion concerning the Battle of al-Khafji came from the Iraqis. Iraqi post-war studies present al-Khafji as a victory whose techniques and procedures should be emulated

to ensure future success. The Iraqis were able to plan and launch a major offensive despite the Coalition's air power advantage. They succeeded in capturing al-Khafji and held it for two days against an enemy superior in technology and numbers.¹⁹⁶ As General Salah Aboud concluded: "The al-Khafji conflict is on the list of the bright conflicts in Iraqi Army history.... one of the thousands recorded in the Iraqi Army history for the new generations."¹⁹⁷

In the end everyone but the dead and wounded won the Battle of al-Khafji. Although the battle did not accomplish any of the Iraqi objectives, it presented enough of an appearance of success that Saddam was able to claim a credible propaganda victory. After the war, the Iraqis were convinced that the battle had somehow influenced the Coalition's decision to end the war after evicting the Iraqis from Kuwait, but before removing Saddam Hussein from power.

The Saudis faced an invasion of their territory and defeated it. Although Coalition air power undoubtedly played a key role in the defeat of the Iraqi offensive, it

was the bravery of the Saudi ground troops, with American advisors, who actually ejected the Iraqis from Saudi soil. Al-Khafji has entered Saudi military history as a great victory.

For the Americans, al-Khafji was won almost by accident. American forces proved so superior that it did not completely register that a major Iraqi offensive had occurred. As a result, U.S. Central Command planners did not expect the Iraqis to collapse as quickly as they did in the February invasion.¹⁹⁸

At al-Khafji, all of the Marine deaths were caused by U.S. fire, but that should not detract from their sacrifice, nor from the bravery of the Marines who survived the battle through luck and training. Endorsing the final report on the Marines killed by the A-10's missile, General Boomer said: "The technological marvels that helped the Coalition forces defeat Iraq sometimes fail, and with disastrous results.... Marines, heroes in my heart, lost their lives while repelling an enemy force. They were good Marines."¹⁹⁹

Al-Khafji Order of Battle

U.S. Marine Forces

I Marine Expeditionary Force

1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intelligence Group
1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer

Colonel Michael V. Brock
Lieutenant Colonel William C. Grubb, Jr.

1st Marine Division

1st Reconnaissance Battalion
1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion (Task Force Shepherd)
1st Battalion, 12th Marines
3d Marines

Major General James M. Myatt

Lieutenant Colonel Michael L. Rapp
Lieutenant Colonel Clifford O. Myers III
Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Rivers
Colonel John H. Admire

2d Marine Division

2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion

Major General William M. Keys

Lieutenant Colonel Keith T. Holcomb

3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 367
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369

Major General Royal N. Moore, Jr.

Lieutenant Colonel Terry J. Frerker
Lieutenant Colonel Michael M. Kurth

Saudi Arabian and Qatari Forces

Joint Forces Command

General Khaled bin Sultan bin Saud

Joint Forces Command East

Major General Sultan 'Adi al-Mutairi

2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade

5th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade
7th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade
8th Battalion, 2d Saudi Arabian National Guard Brigade

Colonel Turki Abdulmohsin al-Firmi

Lieutenant Colonel Naif
Lieutenant Colonel Hamid Matar
Lieutenant Colonel Hamud

Qatari Brigade

Lieutenant Colonel Ali Saeed

Iraqi Forces

III Corps

Major General Salah Aboud Mahmoud

5th Mechanized Division

15th Mechanized Brigade
26th Mechanized Brigade
20th Mechanized Brigade

Brigadier General Flyeh Yaseen

Colonel Khalif Hamid
Colonel Amid Abduljabir
—

3d Armored Division

6th Armored Brigade

Brigadier General Hussan Zedin

Colonel Ibdil Raziq Mahmoud

IV Corps

Major General Yaiyd Khalel Zaki

1st Mechanized Division

Brigadier General Hussen

Notes

¹ This section based on material from LtCol James R. Braden, "The Battle of Khafji: A Coalition Air Ground Task Force Victory" (Paper, USMC Command and Staff College, 1999), p. 11-12, hereafter Braden, "Khafji"; see also Williamson Murray, *Air War in the Persian Gulf* (Baltimore: Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company, 1995), hereafter Murray, *Air War in the Persian Gulf*; Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor and Michael R. Gordon, *The Generals' War* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), hereafter Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*.

² James Titus, "The Battle of Khafji: An Overview and Preliminary Analysis" (Paper, Air University, 1996), p. 7, hereafter Titus, "Khafji."

³ Northrop Grumman Corp., "Joint Stars Data Analysis: The Battle of Khafji" (Paper, USAF Studies and Analysis Agency, 1997), p. 18.

⁴ This section based on material from Kevin M. Woods, et al., *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership* (Joint Center for Operational Analysis, u.d.), hereafter *Iraqi Perspectives*; Captured Iraqi War College Study, Al-Khafji Conflict (ISGQ-2003-00046031), hereafter Iraqi War College Study; Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness 1948-1991* (London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), hereafter Pollack, *Arabs at War*.

⁵ *Iraqi Perspectives*, p. 6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 20.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 96.

¹³ Edgar O'Ballance, *The Gulf War* (New York: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1988), summary of discussion on pp. 94, 143-145, 164-166, 173-174, 194; Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*, p. 268-269; LtCol Peter J. Palmer, "Battle of Khafji: A Gulf State Perspective" (Paper, Marine Corps University, u.d.), hereafter Palmer, "Gulf State."

¹⁴ *How They Fight: Desert Shield Order of Battle Handbook*, AIA-DS-2-90 (1990); DOD, *Iraq Country Handbook*, DOD-2600-642794, (1994).

¹⁵ Iraqi War College Study; Captured Iraqi Training Pamphlet, Battle of al-Khafji (ISGQ-2003-00054592), hereafter Iraqi Training Pamphlet.

¹⁶ Iraqi War College Study, pp. 104-105.

¹⁷ Air War College Study, "EPW Interviews" (Maxwell AFB: Air Force Historical Research Agency); Palmer, "Gulf State."

¹⁸ Iraqi War College Study, p. 101.

¹⁹ Bruce R. Nardulli, "Dance of Swords: U.S. Military Assistance to Saudi Arabia, 1942-1964" (unpublished Phd Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2002).

²⁰ Mohamed Heikal, *Illusions of Triumph* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).

²¹ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Saudi Arabia*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 122, hereafter Cordesman, *Saudi Arabia*; Palmer, "Gulf State."

²² Cordesman, *Saudi Arabia*, p. 137; Palmer, "Gulf State"; Martin Stanton, *Road to Baghdad* (New York, Ballantine Books, 2003), hereafter Stanton, *Road to Baghdad*.

²³ Stanton, *Road to Baghdad*, pp. 14-18; Braden, "Khafji," pp. 5, 23, 29-30; Palmer, "Gulf State."

²⁴ General Khaled bin Sultan, *Desert Warrior* (New York: Harper & Collins Publishers, 1995), hereafter Khaled, *Desert Warrior*.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 379.

²⁶ Col Joseph Molofsky intvw with author, 30Jun06 and 16Aug06 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06 or Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

²⁷ Stanton, *Road to Baghdad*, pp. 23-25.

²⁸ LtCol D. P. Hughes, "Battle for Khafji: 29Jan/1 Feb 1991," *Defense Quarterly*, pp. 15-22; Palmer, "Gulf State."

²⁹ BGen Thomas V. Draude intvw with author and Dr. Fred Allison, 21Jun06 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

³⁰ Col John A. Admire intvw, CD 10234 (Grey Research Center, Quantico, VA), hereafter Admire intvw.

³¹ Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06, 16Aug06; Braden, "Khafji," p. 8

³² Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

³³ Braden, "Khafji," pp. 8-9.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

³⁵ Titus, "Khafji," p. 9; Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*, pp. 268-269.

³⁶ Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.

³⁷ 1st Air-Naval Gunfire Liaison Company/1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group After Action Report for the Battle of Khafji, 29Jan91-1Feb91 (MCHC, Quantico VA), hereafter ANGLICO AAR.

³⁸ LtCol Clifford O. Myers intvw by LtCol Charles H. Cureton, 8Mar91 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Myers intvw, 8Mar91.

³⁹ Khaled, *Desert Warrior*; Braden, pp. 7-8; Palmer, "Gulf State."

⁴⁰ Maj Steven M. Zimmeck, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: Combat Service Support in Desert Shield and Desert Storm*. (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1999), p. 108.

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⁴² Braden, "Khafji," p. 8.

⁴³ Leroy D. Stearns, *U.S. Marines in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991: With the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in Desert Shield and Desert*

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⁴⁴ Iraqi War College Study, p. 97.

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⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁴⁹ Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*, p. 269.

⁵⁰ Iraqi War College Study, pp. 104-107.

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⁵² Braden, "Khafji," p. 13.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

⁵⁶ ANGLICO AAR.

⁵⁷ Braden, "Khafji," pp. 13-14.

⁵⁸ David J. Morris, *Storm on the Horizon* (New York: Free Press, 2004), p. 145, hereafter Morris, *Storm*.

⁵⁹ Iraqi War College Study.

⁶⁰ Morris, *Storm*, p. 145.

⁶¹ Iraqi War College Study, pp. 108-109.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 144-146.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.

⁶⁴ Braden, "Khafji," p. 14.

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⁶⁷ Morris, *Storm*, pp. 31-32.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Ch. 1.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 31-34.

⁷⁰ Morris, *Storm* p. 50; Roger Pollard, "The Battle for Op-4: Start of the Ground War," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Mar92, hereafter Pollard, "Op-4"; Myers intvw, 8Mar91; 1st LAI ComdC, Jan-Feb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

⁷¹ Pollard, "Op-4"; Myers intvw, 8Mar91; 1st LAI ComdC, Jan-Feb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

⁷² Iraqi War College Study, pp. 120-125.

⁷³ Morris, *Storm*, pp. 1-6.

⁷⁴ Pollard, "Op-4"; Myers intvw, 8Mar91.

⁷⁵ Morris, *Storm*, pp. 66-73.

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⁷⁸ Lt David Kendall intvw, 7Feb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).

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
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- ¹⁰⁵ Palmer, "Gulf State."
- ¹⁰⁶ Titus, "Khafji," p. 13; Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*, pp. 279-286; Khaled, *Desert Warrior*, pp. 381-387; Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), pp. 208-213, hereafter Atkinson, *Crusade*.
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- ¹⁰⁸ ANGLICO AAR.
- ¹⁰⁹ Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.
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- ¹¹⁴ Titus, "Khafji," p. 11.
- ¹¹⁵ Titus, "Khafji," p. 11; Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*, pp. 273, 278.
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- ¹²¹ ANGLICO AAR; Braden, "Khafji," p. 15.
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- ¹²⁹ Morris, *Storm*, pp. 166-169.
- ¹³⁰ 1st Recon ComdC, Jan-Mar91 and 3d Recon ComdC, Jan-Feb91, (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).
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- ¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 376.
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- ¹⁷² Titus, "Khafji," pp. 13-14.
- ¹⁷³ Titus, "Khafji," pp. 17-20; Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*, p. 284. The most detailed secondary account of the shoot down is in Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1993), p. 210.
- ¹⁷⁴ Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*, pp. 283, 285-287.
- ¹⁷⁵ Morris, *Storm*, p. 253; ANGLICO AAR.
- ¹⁷⁶ 1/12 ComdC, Jan-Feb91 (Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA).
- ¹⁷⁷ Morris, *Storm*, pp. 253-258.
- ¹⁷⁸ ANGLICO AAR; Braden, "Khafji," p. 17.
- ¹⁷⁹ Braden, "Khafji," pp. 22-23.
- ¹⁸⁰ ANGLICO AAR.
- ¹⁸¹ Ibid.
- ¹⁸² Morris, *Storm*, pp. 258-266.
- ¹⁸³ Braden, "Khafji," p. 23-24.
- ¹⁸⁴ ANGLICO AAR.
- ¹⁸⁵ Titus, "Khafji," pp. 17-20; General Mahmoud's comments and the references to Iraqi radio communications are taken from Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*, pp. 283, 285-87; the "cockroach" analogy appears in H. Norman Schwarzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Linda Grey, Bantam, 1992), p. 429.
- ¹⁸⁶ ANGLICO AAR.
- ¹⁸⁷ Iraqi Training Pamphlet.
- ¹⁸⁸ ANGLICO AAR.
- ¹⁸⁹ Myers intvw, 8Mar91.
- ¹⁹⁰ Braden, "Khafji," p. 32.
- ¹⁹¹ Admire intvw.
- ¹⁹² Molofsky intvw, 30Jun06.
- ¹⁹³ Boomer intvw, 27Jul06 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
- ¹⁹⁴ Molofsky intvw, 16Aug06.
- ¹⁹⁵ Titus, "Khafji"; Barry D. Watts, et al., "Effects and Effectiveness," *The Gulf War Air Power Survey Volume II*, Eliot A. Cohen, et al. 6 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 240.
- ¹⁹⁶ Khaled, *Desert Warrior*, p. 390.
- ¹⁹⁷ Iraqi War College Study, p. 97.
- ¹⁹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹⁹ Gordon and Trainor, *Generals' War*, p. 288.
- ²⁰⁰ Fratricide - Investigation into USAF Attack on Marine LAV, SWA-0062, Seq. No. 01980 (MCLLS, Quantico, VA).



About the Author And Acknowledgements

Paul W. Westermeyer received a Master of Arts degree in history from the Ohio State University in 1996, and is pursuing a doctorate in history from the same institution. He joined the staff of the History Division in 2005. The Iraqi documents used as sources for this project were translated by Ali al Saadee; the project could not have been completed without his excellent work. The finished manuscript also benefited from the aid and advice of David J. Morris, Dr. Kevin Osterloh, and Dr. Amin Tarzi. History Division interns Alexander N. Hinman, Nicholas J. Ross, Evan Sills, and Paul R. Zimmerman provided invaluable research assistance.

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Background Photo: For wounds suffered during the Battle of al-Khafji, Cpl Jeffery D. Brown of 3d Platoon, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, receives the Purple Heart at Manifa Bay, Saudi Arabia, following the war.

Photo courtesy of Cpl Charles H. Ingraham III

Back Cover: The logotype reproduced on the back cover has as its major element the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, the device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.

