





Live from Baghdad

by Byron Pitts

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A reporter recounts his experience covering the war in Iraq embedded with the U.S. Marine Corps

During my time in Iraq, every night felt like the 4th of July in small-town America: the sound of fire works in the distance, the flash of light from an explosion and, on occasion, the ground shaking when a blast came too close. But in Iraq it was not the celebration of liberty, it was the crackle of gunfire, the rumble of precision bombs striking their targets and the frightening sound of death slamming to Earth like lightning.

By comparison to the epic wars of the past, World War I, World War II, Korea and Vietnam, Gulf War 2, as the troops call it, or “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” as the Bush Administration refers to it, the war in Iraq was, for the most part, “War Lite.” By war’s grotesque standard, the losses were light (at press time, 145 U.S. military casualties) and the fighting brief. It is a standard, of course, that doesn’t mean much if you’re one of the many who lost a parent, sibling, child or friend.

I covered the war for CBS News as an embedded journalist with the First Marine Expeditionary Force. Being “embedded” meant eating, sleeping and traveling with the military, close enough to cover the war firsthand. I was assigned to an air wing, HMLA 169: The Vipers from Camp Pendleton, Calif. They were 363 of the finest men and women I’ve ever met. The Vipers fly Cobra Attack helicopters and Huey helicopters in support of Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT 7), 6,400 Marines who scratched and pushed their way from the Kuwait/Iraq border 300-plus miles to downtown Baghdad. It’s a six-hour drive that took RCT 7 16 days and cost five lives.

Many of the enlisted Marines and certainly most of the officers had trained for this moment for most of their lives. And in many ways so had I. Legendary newsman Edward R. Murrow helped put CBS News on the map with his coverage of World War II. CBS newsmen like Ed Bradley, Dan Rather and Morley Safer built their reputations in Vietnam. In fact, Rather has a saying, “Fish gotta swim, birds gotta fly and reporters gotta go.” I have great respect for what it means to be a “CBS News Correspondent,” so I have always known if a war started I would want to cover it.

There were no official requirements to be an “embed.”

Each news organization submitted names of reporters, producers, photographers and technicians to the Pentagon. At CBS News we were all volunteers. I am certain that is how it worked at the majority of media outlets.

Most news organizations, including CBS, sent employees to a week-long risk management course taught either in the United States or London. Survival training is a growing industry, typically run by former British Royal Marines. Journalists are taught the do's and don'ts of covering a war: how to react to explosions, gunfire, chemical and biological weapons; where to hide; how to run; first aid. Basically it's a How-to-Stay-Alive-and-Cover-the-War class.

In addition to these courses, the Pentagon offered a week-long training course for journalists. I attended their first session months before the war. The training started at the Pentagon, included an overnight stay on an aircraft carrier and ended at the Basic School on the Marine base in Quantico, Va. At 6-foot-1 and 220 pounds, the first lesson I took from this physical training course was to get in better shape. So when I got back home, I hit the gym and the pavement. Five-mile walks with a 30-pound backpack three times a week. I was mistaken for a homeless guy more than once. And, of course, I read all I could on Iraq, Saddam Hussein and the rules of war. I had been to Iraq on assignment in 1998, so that experience would also help.

I arrived in Kuwait City Jan. 11, part of the first wave from CBS to arrive in the region. If you ever need to set up a multimillion dollar business in a day's time, look up two guys named Larry Doyle—he and I spent a harrowing month together in Afghanistan—and Bruce Rheins. They are legendary producers at CBS News. The two hit the ground running, and within 24-hours the CBS News Kuwait Bureau was online and in operation.

We were there when two American businessmen were ambushed in their car not far from the U.S. military base in Kuwait City. One was killed, and the very next day a local newspaper carried a front-page picture of the dead American slumped over the dashboard. Such an image would never appear in a modern-day U.S. newspaper. Many Americans, especially military people, were outraged. I kept a copy in my hotel room taped to my mirror. It was my daily reminder that despite the fine hotel and the hospitality of most Kuwaiti people, I was in the region to do a job. And at times it could be a dangerous job.

For the next several weeks, I filed stories on the slow troop build up to war and the steady stream of American civilians (oil industry workers and their families) leaving Kuwait as the war drew closer.

Finally in late March, I was embedded with my Marine unit. Each journalist received a gas mask, chemical suit and three atropine auto-injectors. The injectors would be our last line of defense in case of a nerve agent attack. To stem the symptoms of a nerve gas attack (drooling, severe headache, difficulty breathing or twitching) we would have to jab ourselves in the leg. The alternative to doing so was certain death. It was the one part of being an embed that scared me the most. Thank God it never came to that. The military also offered each journalist vaccinations for anthrax and smallpox, but I declined both. After a brief crash course on how to use the gear, it was off to my squad. I felt like the new kid on the first day of school.

My team included two other colleagues: CBS cameraman Mark Laganga and Charles (Chuck) Ranney, a freelance engineer. Mark and I had covered Afghanistan, but this was Chuck's first adventure in a combat zone. By the end, Chuck was a proven veteran.

The members of HMLA 169 were all professional and welcoming. Even during the most stressful moments, the Marines I worked with were always focused.

For the first week we had an escort almost every place we went; briefings, chow hall, around the air base. Eventually we were allowed to move around on our own. Both sides quickly realized that in order for us to get the access we needed and report accurately, we had to trust each other. Or as Ronald Reagan once said about the Soviet Union, "trust but verify."

When the war started, I was required to report that I was at a "secret U.S. airbase somewhere in

the region.” That’s how we were instructed by the military to refer to the base. It actually seemed pretty ridiculous to me and most of the Marines we were with, because if every pizza delivery boy in Kuwait knew where we were, then certainly the Iraqis did, too. But those were the rules we agreed to, so we always followed them.

As the days passed, there was no official notice sent around saying, “The war will start at high noon on ‘X’ date.” All of us, both journalists and rank-and-file Marines, found out at the same time when an air raid siren went off Thursday, March 20. It meant the base was under attack, most likely from some sort of Iraqi missiles.

We all feared the bombs might be carrying chemical weapons. That was probably the single most frightening moment for me and my colleagues and, I am sure, for a number of the young Marines. Without warning we were under attack.

Hours earlier, the U.S. had bombed a bunker in Iraq where they thought Saddam Hussein and his two sons were hiding. We were witnessing the Iraqis’ response. Those sirens sent thousands of Marines, sailors and airmen and a few journalists running to cement shelters. There had been drills in days past, but this was the real deal. We had to run about 200 yards to get to our shelter. But before we ran, everyone put on a gas mask. Over and over we had been told that we’d have nine seconds to put it on. In case of a real chemical attack, a person could be dead in 10 seconds.

Once in the shelter, everyone put on their chemical suits: jacket, pants, boots and gloves. Between the gear and the panic, it was hard to breathe. There we sat for nearly an hour. Between the siren blasts, you could hear everyone breathing. Eventually a U.S. built patriot missile destroyed at least one Iraqi rocket. The others missed their target. We were safe. Everyone returned to work. We would repeat that drill about 15 more times in the next 24 hours.

What made that first siren alert most stressful for me was the presence of one journalist in particular: my wife. Lyne Pitts is the executive producer of the CBS *Early Show*. She and one of her anchors, Julie Chen, had come out to the air base for one of their broadcasts. Those first few minutes in the shelter, I sat next to my wife, wondering what our five children would do if we both died? Fortunately that’s one question we never had to answer. Lyne is a tough journalist and a wonderful wife, so she survived the day and ended up staying in the region for about two weeks. That day we hugged and kissed and wished each other well. The experience reminded us both there were real risks involved. But besides loving each other, we respect and trust each other.

And so now the war was really on. The Vipers were flying combat missions. We went along on a number of them. Flying sometimes 50 to 100 feet off the ground in Huey helicopters. We saw the aftermath of battle. The Cobras traveled ahead armed with rockets and bombs. Along with artillery, tanks and troops on the ground, the Cobras destroyed buildings, Iraqi tanks and vehicles. From the air we could not see many dead soldiers, but there were plenty of destroyed vehicles on the ground that no man inside could have survived.

But we didn’t have to wait long to see bodies. Once we joined RCT 7, the ground combat unit, there were plenty of bodies to see. Most were Iraqi soldiers, but there were some civilians. For the next three weeks, the Marines pushed north and we went along for the ride.

Days usually started at 5 a.m. and went until about 9 p.m. We ate what the Marines ate, a selection of MREs, or Meals Ready to Eat. (Marines would trade cigarettes and clean socks to get meal No.8—the hamburger. They’d rather go hungry than eat the pork chops.) For three weeks I didn’t bathe (except for the occasional wet wipe), brush my teeth or comb my hair. It was both awful and liberating. In a war zone, fresh breath doesn’t mean too much. The Marines were, however, concerned about hygiene. U.S. commanders knew the Iraqi military couldn’t defeat them, but disease could stop troops dead in their tracks. So we washed our hands before we ate and carried a shovel and toilet paper when we went to the bathroom in the desert. There are no restrooms—and no shame—on the battlefield.

We’d file a story almost every day: our slice of the war. The embeds provided the slices, and it

was up to New York to serve the pies. From the sandstorm that stopped the troops, to the small battles on the road to Baghdad, those were the stories we told each day. Small is a relative term. Whenever bullets were flying overhead, it seemed for a moment like the world was coming to an end. I heard someone refer to “small arms fire” (AK-47s, etc.) as if the Iraqis were tossing Tic-Tacs at American forces. Small arms still caused big holes.

A Huey pilot told me once, “It’s my job to make sure the Marines on the ground come home, not me.” What an odd thing to say, I thought. That was days before the war started. Weeks later, I better understood what the pilot meant. HMLA 169 lost three men in one crash. It was an apparent accident. Their colleagues cursed and cried, but then went back to work because they had to and because honor required it.

No one suffered more than the families of those men and perhaps their commanding officer. Lt. Col. James Braden is a stocky man, with a stern handshake and gentle eyes. He cried during our interview about the three who died. He talked as if he was discussing his own children. I fear their loss will haunt him the rest of his life. I never saw him smile again. But I also never saw him or the others lose their focus.

Much has been written about the “kids” who go into the U.S. military because they lack options. Let the record show, the young men and women I met represent the very best of America. Many could teach any Ivy League school more about sacrifice, skill, discipline and honor than any of those fine institutions could teach them. The Marines I met did not cut corners. They did not seek the easy solution. They were given an objective and accomplished it, often in short order and always without complaining. Many entered the service just as their father or uncle or other relatives had, others for the adventure and indeed some because it was their best opportunity to better themselves.

The members of HMLA 169 are a bit older than the men and women in most of the ground units. Because the squadron included pilots and highly trained mechanics, the average age is probably about 27. Most are married with children. Besides being skilled, one had to be mature to survive in this squad. There are a few teenagers, but just as many 40-somethings. In many of the frontline combat units, the average age was about 20. Many were just out of high school, but there were no kids. The Marines seemed to do a good job of weeding out the children before the boat ride over.

That’s one myth. Now here’s another. The number of African Americans in the military is high, but the numbers of Blacks on the front lines in Iraq were not as significant as one might think. There were a number of combat units I encountered and did not see a single African American male. The overwhelming majority of frontline combat troops in Iraq were White or Hispanic. That was my personal observation supported by the latest statistics from the Department of Defense. Blacks make up 21 percent of the enlisted force, but account for only 15 percent of “combat arms,” which includes infantry, armor and artillery troops (a rate slightly higher than the overall population of Blacks in the United States—13 percent).

There are many high-ranking African Americans, including Brig. Gen. Vincent Brooks, who was based at Central Command in Doha, Qatar, and served as the military’s spokesman for the war. But the largest single percentage of African Americans in the military (36 percent) serve in support and administrative roles, not on the front lines. This very issue was often the topic of discussion between me and other African American journalists (there were probably about a dozen Black journalists out of the 600 or so embeds) embedded with the troops. Our conversations usually started this way: “So how’re you holding up and where are all the brothers?”

Be clear, African American men and women were on the front lines in Iraq, and a number were killed (at least 23 at press time, putting the Black U.S. casualty rate at about 16 percent thus far—higher than their representation in “combat arms” forces and the general population). But I only saw pockets of Black faces, not the sea of brown some in America have come to believe.

By contrast, consider this statistic from Vietnam: By the end of the war, African Americans had suffered 12.5 percent of the total deaths in Vietnam (58,000 Americans killed). And yet in 1969

African Americans made up only 11 percent of the U.S. population.

One African American woman I met during the war was Capt. Vernice Armour from Memphis. A graduate of Middle Tennessee State University, she was actually promoted from lieutenant to captain in Kuwait. Armour, 29, is the first African American female combat pilot in the history of the United States Marine Corps.

Armour loves to fly. She was a police officer in Arizona and Tennessee before joining the United States Marine Corps. She is a woman accustomed to both adventure and danger. She hoped the Marines would provide both.

"This is not my father's military," she told me. According to Armour, her father was in the service during Vietnam. He pleaded with her not to join the Marine Corps.

"My dad is still bitter about the discrimination he and other Blacks faced in Vietnam," she says. "My experience has had its ups and downs, but overall it's been very positive. The Corps makes an effort to be colorblind."

I had similar conversations with a number of African American servicemen and women, and most told of a similar experience. Race is still an issue, most agreed, but the U.S. military, in their estimation, was far ahead of corporate America and the rest of the country.

Armour talked more about her faith than fighting, more about Jesus than Saddam. She took no joy in the prospect of taking another human being's life, but she would do her job. I walked Armour out to her helicopter for her very first combat mission: We were both nervous. "Please pray for me," she asked with a smile. It was the first of many missions she flew successfully.

Like many of the troops I met during the war, she wore a cross around her neck. "There are no atheists in a foxhole," it has been said. I didn't meet many in Iraq. Most of the young men and women I met believed in God, and came from working-class families with little more than a high school education.

I actually did meet one young soldier who had just graduated from Princeton. "I'm a liberal Democrat from Northeast, so what am I doing here?" he chuckled as he stood next to a tank in downtown Baghdad.

This generation of American warriors are said to be better educated and a bit older than the men and women who served in Vietnam. Unlike Vietnam, this is an all-volunteer fighting force. But like the many before them, they served their country honorably.

During the war, reporters chronicled almost every detail. Here's one I did not report. It is the story we watched every evening when Mark, Chuck and I let Marines use our satellite phone to call home. Most reporters did it. It seemed the least we could do for the front row seat and armed escort to history.

There we'd sit in the back of a delivery truck (our makeshift satellite truck), sunset framed by the corners of the rear door of the truck. It looked like a movie screen with Marines in silhouette calling home.

From the mundane to the romantic to the sad, each told a story of war. There was the Marine who woke his wife up in the middle of the night. We could hear her crying, she was so thrilled to hear his voice. They hadn't spoken in months. Then there was the Marine who called his wife, but she'd changed the number and moved to a new address. Not good. No one asked any questions.

And none of us who were there will ever forget the 19-year-old Marine who got his first letter (it took about three to six weeks for mail to arrive) from home in early March, only to discover his grandmother had died. The woman who raised him and sent him off to war was gone. She was the one person he doted on most as he talked to us and to his friends. We all sat in silence as this young man trembled and cried on the phone, his M-16 slung on his shoulder.

War isn't simply about winning or losing, it is also about sacrifice. Not every American servicemember in Iraq fired their weapon, but they all made some sacrifice for their country.

And in war, mistakes are made. Innocent people die. We went along on one mission when a

Marine company got it right. Lima Company from Twentynine Palms, Calif., had just taken control of the Iraqi Oil Ministry. It was one of the last symbols of Saddam's regime still standing in Baghdad. When 80 or so Marines stormed the building, it was empty except for a few looters. The Marines went in the back door. Outside the front door Iraqi civilians were tearing down a life-size statue of Saddam Hussein. The scene was almost comical. The Marines rolled in looking for a fight and a party broke out. But the party did not last long. Minutes after Saddam's likeness was belly down in street, we all heard the snap of an AK-47 firing in our direction. For the next two hours, that sound grew louder and closer. A snapping sound punctuated every few moments by an exploding RPG (rocket propelled grenade).

During this surprise attack, the Marines were taking fire from three sides. It took a while to determine the source. A young corporal told his commanding officer he had "eyeballed" at least one gunman and he wanted permission to take the shot. Capt. George Schreffler from Harrisburg, Pa., listened, almost politely. It was an odd scene, gunfire crackling just above our heads, and Schreffler sitting with his ankles crossed, patiently listening to his breathless young Marine.

Schreffler asked one question: "Have you positively identified the weapon?" The corporal gave great detail but could not answer the question. So Schreffler ordered him to stand down and said, "Do not take the shot." The corporal was disappointed, to say the least. And truth be told, so was I. We were getting peppered with gunfire, RPGs and falling plaster (as bullets hit the building, pieces of plaster and cement rained down on us), so the desire to shoot something was very high.

Minutes later we all saw the target the young corporal was talking about. Three heads bobbed along behind a wall from the same direction as the shots. Eventually the three heads came into view from behind the wall: a husband, wife and their young daughter. The captain had made the perfect call. The civilians survived, two of the snipers were killed and there were no American casualties. The attack lasted two hours. It felt like two days.

But in war, perfection, like peace, is hard to find. It seems in war, old men start them and young men and women die fighting to end them.

I also met a number of Iraqi civilians during the war. Most welcomed U.S. forces. I often wondered how sincere those welcomes were, however, since the visitors all had guns. But nonetheless, most seemed genuine. During my visit in 1998, people spoke privately about how much they hated Saddam Hussein. So I suspect seeing U.S. troops roll into Baghdad sparked a range of emotions, both relief and sadness.

I am certain the typical Iraqi citizen wants the United States out sooner rather than later. We walked in on one Iraqi family (mom, dad and five children) looting one of Saddam's offices. The father took out a stack of Iraqi money with Saddam's picture, then proceeded to spit and stomp on each bill. "I hate Saddam. I love America," he said. Then he shook my hand, kissed my cheek and finished taking all that he and his family could carry.

For me the war ended in Baghdad April 20 with a helicopter ride out of the city. Shortly before we left, word came that another Marine had just been shot to death at one of the checkpoints. A civilian walked up to him and shot him in the shoulder. The bullet bounced off the Marine's collarbone and went through his heart. Two nights earlier we listened to that every Marine tell his girl back home, "Honey, I'm okay. The worst is over. I'll be home soon."

Now that I am home, I have begun to ponder the questions I ask myself after every "big" story: What have I learned? What do I hope for? Usually I only hope for a little time off to spend with my family and friends to laugh and relax. But this time feels different. This time I still want to see my family and friends, but I also hope to find the courage to cry, a long and cleansing cry. I'm not a crier, so this will be a different journey. And these will be tears not simply of sadness, but tears to relieve a full heart. I'll cry the way parents cry when they watch their children achieve things they once thought impossible. Regardless of how one feels about war and why the United States went after Saddam Hussein, the young men and women who fought in Iraq deserve our gratitude and our respect.

There is one thing I learned in Iraq. In war you never sleep, you only nap. On the battlefield, sleep is reserved for the dead. For those who died in this war, I pray their families will find peace and that each of their lost loved ones now enjoys a sweet sleep, a long good night free from pain and where angels sing.

Part VII **Déjà Vu**





‘Farther and Faster’

by Lieutenant General James T. Conway

U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding, January 2005.

According to the commander of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for 22 months of planning for and fighting in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the war's two segments thus far have proved very different. In 2003, OIF I was comparatively less difficult, with Marines fighting mostly against Shia in the south. . . In OIF II against Sunni tribes in the west, "our vision to win hearts and minds was met squarely with a 300% increase in the number of attacks in our sector," he says, which translated into casualties . . . in "the turbulent city of Fallujah."

Operation Iraqi Freedom unfolded in four distinct phases: a deployment phase, a shaping phase, a decisive operations phase, and a reconstruction phase. During January and February 2003, the Marine Corps flexed its expeditionary muscle, with 60,000 Marines and sailors and their heavy equipment deployed to Kuwait in 45 days. Operation Iraqi Freedom, just as Operation Desert Storm more than a decade before, was a logistical victory. No other nation on earth even could have attempted such a monumental transfer of men and materiel, to a moonscape on exactly the opposite side of the globe, in preparation for an attack.

Our organization for combat remained dynamic throughout phases I and II. The I Marine Expeditionary Force was assigned to the Third Army, where we joined with the V Corps as the ground force. This would be the main attack force in a fast-moving sweep across mainly desert terrain southwest of Baghdad. We would be the supporting attack, crossing rivers and other poorer avenues of approach. Our role was to look like the main attack: pick a fight with anybody who would engage us, and yet keep battlefield geometry so we were abreast or even slightly in advance of V Corps. Both forces were to focus like a laser on Baghdad. When Turkey closed its borders to Coalition forces, the entire British First Armored Division was assigned to the MEF. Marvelous troops and leaders, with first-rate equipment, they swelled our ranks to just short of 90,000 Marines, soldiers, and sailors. I told the colorful British formations that there was a time in our country when the phrase, "The British are coming," was used to scare children. In this instance, however, U.S. Marines in Kuwait were glad to hear it.

The all-volunteer force has provided an amazing quality of Marine and sailor. Bigger, stronger, and faster than their namesake of decades past, they also are more informed, and therefore more opinionated and inquisitive. My commanders and I constantly spoke to the troops in their training bases in Kuwait to provide

information and squelch rumors. Their number-one question was: "Is the country behind us?" They had read or heard about large antiwar demonstrations in the United States and elsewhere and wanted assurances. We told each formation not to worry about it; just do their jobs. American citizens were mature enough in their beliefs that even if they didn't support the war, they would still support the troops.

In what had become a predictable pattern, a U.S. air campaign was planned to precede the ground attack. What had been 40 days was reduced to 16 days, and that was cut in half to an 8-day period of "shock and awe" by the air planners. Increasing reports of explosives being moved into the southern oil fields, however, made it apparent that air attack could be the signal for Iraqi forces to demolish the oil platforms in a calculated act of senseless destruction. Since rapid and intact seizure of the southern oilfield production was a MEF mission, we were early advocates of launching the ground attack before an air campaign. For a time, the best we could do was launch them simultaneously. But there is an old adage, well remembered, that "the enemy gets a vote." Without warning or provocation, on 20 March, Saddam started destruction of the fields. Our attack was moved forward initially 24 hours, then 8 hours more. It's okay to delay an attack, as long as you rest the troops. Moving an attack forward is very much another matter. That said, I could not have been more pleased with the response of my commanders, air and ground, as we thundered across the international border of full 32 hours ahead of plan.

Our intelligence offered different analyses of enemy strength and intentions, and where he would use his chemical weapons. We faced three Iraqi Corps in our sector—two Regular Army and one Republican Guard, consisting of nine total divisions. We were led to believe major portions of some of those divisions would capitulate, the division most likely to collapse being the 11th Infantry division around An Nazariah. We found the opposite to be true. Some intel experts thought Saddam would unleash his chemical weapons as soon as we crossed the Kuwaiti border; others thought it would happen when we crossed the Euphrates River. My own view was, they would hit us with chemicals as we approached the Republican Guard divisions anchored on the Tigris River southeast of Baghdad. Taking no chances, we crossed the line of departure in our bulky chemical suits and stayed in them for two and a half weeks.

The MEF had been honed by our predecessors to be the most efficient killing machine on the battlefield. With integrated ground, air, and logistics elements under a single commander, the force generated a level of speed and momentum that only the enemy could appreciate fully. The MEF had available more than 340 combat aircraft that could generate almost 700 sorties each day against any target we chose. During the Gulf War it took ten bombs to destroy each target. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, a single aircraft could destroy ten targets. It has been said that the Iraqis melted away, but that does not give proper credit to the Iraqi Army. When they amassed, they were blown away by the effects of our deep air attack. A captured Iraqi tank brigade commander told of making an 80-mile forced march to position his tanks east of Baghdad. So he could rest his troops on the first night, he moved his tanks into palm groves. At 0200, during the worst sandstorm in 20 years, under complete cover of darkness and deep in the palm groves, Marine air began the systematic destruction of his tanks. When 30 had been destroyed by pinpoint bombing, his troops then melted away. He told us, "I wanted to order them back but knew that if I did, it meant certain death."

We employed a revitalized concept for reporting the war with multiple media embedded in our formations. The program was without its faults, but on the whole it was a huge success. Members of the media lived the lifestyle of "the grunt" in the cold, the wet, and the biting sandstorms. They saw raw emotions as Marine aggressiveness overcame fog and friction, and, as the exhilaration of battle was tempered by the realities of casualty evacuation. They marveled repeatedly at the professionalism of the 19-year-old lance corporals as they handled all of the above. The stories they filed were 95% positive, and there were more than a few tearful farewells as they left us. Not since the days of Ernie Pyle and World War II had such bonding occurred between the media and the war fighter.

In every war, some things make you smile, and other things make you cry. One such incident occurred as armor columns attacked up Highway 6 southeast of Baghdad. It was difficult to maintain, but we still showed readiness rates of 93% and 94% on tanks and tracks, respectively. As I stood watching the troops move up the highway, I understood why. I saw one amphibious assault vehicle steam past me at 40 miles per hour, towing

another. Atop the second vehicle were three Marine mechanics, with feet and hands into the engine compartment, working on the engine. I said to the division commander standing next to me, "General [Major General James N.] Mattis, that is a safety, violation. God bless 'em!"

Later in the attack on Baghdad, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines got into a serious fight in and around the Imam Ali mosque in the north-central portion of the city. They killed roughly 250 Republican Guards, Baathists, and Sadaam Fedayeen as they took their objectives. First casualty reports coming in on our side were one gunnery sergeant killed and 41 troops wounded. The next day that figure zoomed to 1 killed and 73 wounded. As we asked how that happened, we learned of the lance corporal who came to the battalion aid station weak and with a bloody arm. The corpsman asked him how many times he had changed the bandage, and the Marine told him he had lost count. The doc, as he should, got on the Marine's case. The trooper said, "Doc, I'm not the only guy out there like this." Indeed, he was not. As the company commanders and first sergeants examined their men, they came across the additional casualties. Asked why they didn't turn themselves in to the aid station for treatment and possible, evacuation, they answered, "Sir, I am the only automatic rifleman left in my squad," or "Sir, I thought there might be another big fight today," or just "Sir, I didn't want to leave my buddies." With troops like those, the outcome of Operation Iraqi Freedom was never in doubt.

After securing Baghdad, we then dispatched a light armor column north to take out any remaining resistance around Saddam's birthplace, in the vicinity of Tikrit. The MEF had attacked farther and faster than any unit in U.S. history. Feeling pretty spirited, I announced to my Army boss, Lieutenant General Dave McKiernan, that Marines are assault troops, we don't do nation-building, and we were ready for backload. He said to me, get your butt down south and get started with reconstruction until I can get you relieved. In fact, we spent five and a half months in the southern provinces of Iraq in phase IV operations. We found our 1920s-vintage "small wars manual," written by Marines on duty in Nicaragua and Haiti, to be very applicable to the situations we faced in cities like Najaf, Karbala, and Samawah. One passage captured the essence of our activities: It said, "Conceived in uncertainty, reconstruction operations are often conducted with precarious responsibility, and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders, lacking specific instructions." Our battalion commanders and their company commanders thrived under those conditions and rapidly became effective little potentates until we turned over our sector, and could break them of it, in September 2003.

The MEF had been back at its bases in Southern California for roughly five months when we were unexpectedly ordered back to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom II. We were tasked to replace the 82nd Airborne with a 25,000-Marine air-ground task force in the Al Anbar province during March 2004. On arrival, our numbers grew to 30,000 with the inclusion of a very capable Army brigade combat team. Our responsibilities included the turbulent city of Fallujah and major portions of the Iraq-Syria border. Our new area was about the size of Wyoming and included most of the Sunni Triangle, where Saddam had drawn many of his best officers for the Republican Guard and other elite units.

Returning to western Iraq was very different from our experiences in the south. The tribes were Sunni, not Shia, they were already quite hostile toward Coalition forces, and our ability to employ our proven techniques was much abated. In the Shia provinces, we had been attacked frequently but had not lost a single Marine to enemy fire. After two weeks in the Al Anbar province, by the time of the transfer of authority with the 82nd, we had lost five killed in action. Our vision to win hearts and minds was met squarely with a 300% increase in the number of attacks in our sector.

Initially, we found Iraqi security forces in the region very undependable. Iraqi society is driven by loyalty to the tribal sheiks and religious imams, and this cultural norm frequently made it impossible to rely on the police or national guard units as effective paramilitary forces. Further, they were intimidated by the insurgents and were watching to see which side was going to win. As we built the forces to be more secular, however, and provided them with the weapons and equipment they needed to succeed, they became much more reliable. Indeed, in the fighting in Samarra, Najaf, and the northern Babil province, Army and Marine commanders have given the Iraqi security forces, especially the regular army, a solid grade of "B" for their performances there.

The Coalition forces learned many lessons about information operations (IO) in southwest Asia, and we frankly need to get better in our approach at every level. We tended to treat all media the same, assuming a

level of journalistic integrity and responsible reporting. The Arab media, however, were different. We found right away in Fallujah that Al Jazeera and Al Arabia were bound by no such principles of integrity and routinely provided a shrill and outrageous perspective to an Arab public all too willing to believe such distortions. Eventually, we treated them as enemy combat camera and controlled their access to our actions. Our most consistent and effective IO message to the Iraqis was, "You may not want us here, and we don't particularly want to be here, but we aren't leaving until there is a level of stability and security in Iraq. So help us achieve that end."

An amazing figure accompanied our casualty rates in Iraq. As a result of superb planning and execution at all levels, for every 11 Marines or sailors hit, one would be killed but seven would be returned to duty almost immediately. Never before in combat had such recovery figures been the norm. Our protective gear, the helmets, and SAPI (small arms protection insert) plates worked. Our corpsmen in the line companies were magnificent, as were the medevac pilots and the docs at Alpha and Bravo surgical companies. They were truly the "angels of the battlefield," and when we see each other again, none will ever buy his own drink as long as I am at the bar.

During this deployment, our Commandant won a major victory in Washington, D.C. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had questioned our seven-month rotation policy and initially felt that all services should adhere to the Army's 12 months "boots-on-the-ground" approach. We argued that our overall operational tempo was equal to or greater than any other service. For instance, all the MEF's major headquarters were in Kuwait or Iraq for 17 of the 22 months I was the MEF commander. We argued that six- or seven-month rotations were the norm for the Marine Corps—though not as frequently as we are experiencing now—and that we risked breaking the force if we posed an even more serious burden on our young men and women, especially those with families. The Secretary said to the Commandant "Okay, I've got it." In the Pentagon, you are never sure you have completely won a fight; but we felt much better when Secretary Rumsfeld began asking the Army Chief of Staff to explain why the Army was not doing seven-month rotations.

Operation Iraqi Freedom II continues, and Marines from I MEF will continue to be in Iraq until April or May 2005. That said, our view since 28 June and the declaration of national sovereignty is that Iraqi security forces must win against the insurgency in Iraq. We can only set the conditions for success by the host nation. Even then, we must act to ensure an Iraqi lead.

The contrast between the two OIF operations is stark. To begin, they were two very different scenarios: OIF was a classic offensive operation. We never lost the initiative as we put the enemy on his heels from the outset and kept him there until we had secured all objectives. OIF II has evolved into a classic insurgency. Out of necessity to maintain logistical hubs, we operated from fixed sites. But that allowed the enemy to match our freedom to maneuver. Ours was more a defensive role, with emphasis on heavy offensive patrolling and significant civil affairs work. There was a constant effort to hold the initiative, both militarily and psychologically, because as one military dictum says, the commander who maintains the initiative wins.

During OIF II, for reasons still not clear, the media were bent on providing a comparatively more negative slant. Our observations were supported by the reporter who, when asked to come out from Baghdad to cover the opening of a women's hospital, declined, telling our public affairs officer he "wasn't really looking for a good news story." Katie O'Beirne is a political commentator, but she may have offered some insight when she remarked, "You've got to remember, most journalists spent their high school years being stuffed into lockers by the kind of males who are running our military. Now they're determined to get even." My perception since being home is that any bad news coming out of Iraq is not properly balanced with the great things troops from all the nations are doing.

One thing that remained constant during both operations was the magnificent performance of the troops. Whether they were infantrymen running toward enemy fire, mechanics working in 130^o heat, Cobra pilots dueling with heavy-caliber machine guns in support of ground troops, or corpsmen dashing forward to treat a wounded Marine, our young troops were unbelievable in their resolve, discipline, and courage under fire. The older generation worried about this new generation "Y." We saw them as the joy-stick generation and were concerned they might not measure up when the time came. In the hands of these young warriors, our

Corps—indeed, our nation—has absolutely nothing to worry about.

What about the way ahead in Iraq? I believe there will be elections in January, and I suspect very shortly afterward you will start to see a reduction in U.S. forces, not because U.S. planners will seek it, but because the Iraqis will demand it. I used to think that Americans were impatient, but we don't hold a candle to the Iraqis. We are seen as infidels and nonbelievers, and further, most Iraqis now consider us occupiers. They will expect us to provide regional security for a long time because we have destroyed their army. But they will be willing to accept internal security risks in exchange for a reduced Coalition presence.

I think our strategic planners have it right. When the Iraqis establish a free and democratic state, it probably will not be Jeffersonian, but it will put a stake in the very heart of the region producing terrorists. We will not just be killing terrorist. Rather, we will be doing something about the very cause of terrorism. In a region that has made little progress over the centuries, Iraq has the potential to be a prosperous and powerful regional player. Every day we are in Iraq brings us another step closer to Iraqi victory. Iraqi infantry and counterterrorism forces are being stood up at a rate that will field 27 secular battalions, trained and equipped, by March. These battalions are loyal to the central government and have the support of average Iraqi citizens. When they focus their full attention on the insurgents and foreign fighters, they will have little problem gaining actionable intelligence from their countrymen. Will there continue to be bombings and attacks? I fully expect so, because the terrorists recognize the threat to their very existence. I anticipate Iraqis will one day soon make short work of the principal threats to their government.

For the United States and its allies, Iraq and Afghanistan are important battlegrounds in the war on terrorism—not the whole war. Many of the young Arabs we kill are would-be suicide bombers. These are the same fanatical misfits who would otherwise be seeking their way into Los Angeles or Boston. We are engaged in a defense against these people far from our borders and our families. That's okay with our troops; they understand it, and they very much prefer to take care of business in Iraq. Coalition forces will, covertly or overtly, battle terrorists in many other locations across the globe, but history might well show Iraq was our most important fight.

Finally, I ask three things of anyone reading these remarks.

- Don't wait for the historians to put the world we live in today in their context. Think of the nation at war instead of enjoying an interrupted peace and it will shape your outlook.
- Don't lose patience, or more important, your resolve to see the job done. Our enemy knows popular support is the center of gravity for any U.S. government engaged in conflict and he works to disassemble that support every day. You are the ultimate target of the beheadings and bombings. So stay the course.
- Continue to support the troops. Their exterior is hardened and battle-ready. But their psyches are more fragile and susceptible to the convictions of their countrymen. Without your support their will will weaken, their confidence wane, and their morale suffer. With the enthusiastic support of the American people, however, our forces are the most formidable, most responsive, and most disciplined troops on the face of the earth. I can only hope they make you, as they have made me, very proud.

Appendix A

Command List

U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command March–November 2003*

Commanding General: LtGen Earl B. Hailston
Chief of Staff: Col Peter T. Miller
G-1: Col Richard B. Harris
G-2: Col William E. Rizzio
G-3: Col Timothy C. Wells
G-4: Col Philip N. Yff
G-5: Col Timothy L. Hunter
G-6: Col Kevin B. Jordan
SJA: LtCol Robert E. Pinder
Comptroller: Col Robert J. Herkenham

Combined/Joint Task Force-Consequence Management
Commanding General: BGen Cornell A. Wilson

Marine Logistics Command
Commanding General: BGen Michael R. Lehnert

Special Purpose MAGTF
Commanding General: BGen Ronald S. Coleman

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced)

Commanding General: LtGen James T. Conway
Deputy: MajGen Keith J. Stalder
Chief of Staff: Col John C. Coleman
G-1: Col William J. Hartig
G-2: Col Alan R. Baldwin
Col James R. Howcroft
G-3: Col Larry K. Brown
G-4: Col Matthew W. Blackledge
G-5: Col Christopher J. Gunther
Col Anthony L. Jackson
G-6: Col George J. Allen (to 15 June)
Col Marshall I. Considine (after 30 June)
SJA: Col William D. Durrett
Surgeon: Captain Joel A. Lees, USN
Chaplain: Captain John S. Gwudz, USN
I MEF Headquarters Group: Col John T. Cunnings
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)
Commanding Officer: Col Thomas D. Waldhauser

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)
Commanding Officer: Col Richard P. Mills (to 6 June)
Col Ronald J. Johnson (after 6 June)

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Element (-)
Commanding Officer: Col Anthony M. Haslam

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Reinforced)
Commanding General: MajGen James N. Mattis
Assistant Division Commander: BGen John F. Kelly
Chief of Staff: Col Bennett W. Saylor
Col Joseph F. Dunford

1st Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 1)
Commanding Officer: Col Joseph D. Dowdy (to 4 April)
Col John A. Toolan

5th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 5)
Commanding Officer: Col Joseph F. Dunford
(to 23 May)

7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)
Commanding Officer: Col Steven A. Hummer

11th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Michael P. Marletto

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa)
Commanding General: BGen Richard F. Natonski
Chief of Staff: Col James W. Smoot

2d Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 2)
Commanding Officer: Col Ronald L. Bailey

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing
Commanding General: MajGen James F. Amos
Assistant Wing Commander: BGen Terry G. Robling
Chief of Staff: Col Gerald A. Yingling, Jr.

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Randolph D. Alles

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Mark R. Saverese

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Stuart L. Knoll

Marine Aircraft Group 29 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Robert E. Milstead, Jr.

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Michael C. Anderson

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Ronnell R. McFarland

Marine Aircraft Group 39 (-)(Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Richard W. Spender
Col Kenneth P. Gardiner

Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Force Service Support Group
Commanding General: BGen Edward G. Usher III
BGen Richard S. Kramlich

Deputy Commander: Col John L. Sweeney, Jr.
Chief of Staff: Col Darrell L. Moore

Combat Service Support Group 16 (Headquarters Elements)
Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael J. Taylor

Combat Service Support Group 11 (Brigade Service Support Group G 1)
Commanding Officer: Col John J. Pomfret
Col Charles L. Hudson

Combat Service Support Battalion 13 (4th Landing Support Battalion)
Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael D. Malone

Combat Service Support Group 14 (4th Supply Battalion)
Commanding Officer: Col John T. Larson

Combat Service Support Group 15 (1st Supply Battalion)
Commanding Officer: Col Bruce E. Bissett

Transportation Support Group
Commanding Officer: Col David G. Reist

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group
Commanding Officer: RAdm (UH) Charles R. Kubic, USN

United Kingdom Forces

1st Armoured Division (UK) (-)(Reinforced)
Commanding General: MajGen Robin V. Brims
Chief of Staff: Col Patrick Marriott

7th Armored Brigade (British Army)
Commanding Officer: Brig Graham Binns

16th Air Assault Brigade (British Army)
Commanding Officer: Brig Jacko Page

3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines (-)
Commanding Officer: Brig Jim Dutton

*Includes billets in units which served in theater for part but not all of the period covered. Basic sources are MarAdmin 507/03, various versions, Oct-Dec03, with "Modifications to the I MEF Presidential Unit Citation Unit Listing," and unit command chronologies.

Appendix B:

Unit List

U.S. Marines In Operation Iraqi Freedom March-November 2003*

U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command [USMarCent]

Command Element
Combined Joint Task Force-Consequence Management [CJTF-CM]
Marine Corps Logistics Command [MarLogCom]
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force [SPMAGTF]

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced) [I MEF]

Command Element

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [15th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [BLT 2/1]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (Reinforced) [HMM-161]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 15 [MSSG-15]

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [24th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 2d Marines [BLT 2/2]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (Reinforced) [HMM-263]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 24 [MSSG-24]

Task Force Yankee [TF Yankee]

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Element (-) [11th MEU, CmdEle]
2d Battalion, 6th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 6th Mar]
Sensitive Site Team Number 3, U.S. Army [SenSiteTm #3, USA]
75th Exploitation Task Force, U.S. Army [75th ExpTF, USA]
Company C, 478th Engineer Battalion, U.S. Army [Co C, 478th EngrBn, USA]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [I MEF HqGru]

6th Communications Battalion (-) [6th CommBn]
9th Communications Battalion (-) [9th CommBn]
1st Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st RadBn]
1st Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st IntelBn]
1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ForReconCo]
I Marine Expeditionary Force Liaison Element [I MEF LsnEle]
3d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [3d ANGLICO]

4th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [4th ANGLICO]
3d Civil Affairs Group [3d CAG]
4th Civil Affairs Group [4th CAG]

Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Reinforced) [1st MarDiv]

Headquarters Battalion [HqBn]

1st Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 1 [1st Mar/RCT-1]

Headquarters Company [HqCo]
3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]
1st Battalion, 4th Marines [1st Bn, 1st Mar]
2d Battalion, 23d Marines [2d Bn, 23d Mar]
2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [2d LARBn]

5th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 5 [5th Mar/RCT-5]

Headquarters Company [HqCo]
1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]
2d Battalion, 5th Marines [2d Bn, 5th Mar]
3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]
2d Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d TkBn]
1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [1st LARBn]
Company C, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion [Co C, 4th CbtEngrBn]

7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 7 [7th Mar/RCT-7]

Headquarters Company [HqCo]
1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]
1st Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st TkBn]
3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, (-) (Reinforced) [3d LARBn]

11th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [11th Mar]

Headquarters Battery (-) [HqBtry]
Detachment, Headquarters Battery, 10th Marines [Det, HqBtry, 10th Mar]
1st Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [1st Bn, 11th Mar]
2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [2d Bn, 11th Mar]
3d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [3d Bn, 11th Mar]
5th Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [5th Bn, 11th Mar]
1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CbtEngrBn]
2d Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d CbtEngrBn]
1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st ReconBn]
2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d AABn]
3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [3d AABn]

4th Assault Amphibian Battalion [4th AABn]
2d Radio Battalion [2d RadBn]
Military Police Company, 4th Marine Division [MPCo, 4th MarDiv]
Communications Company, 4th Marine Division [CommCo, 4th MarDiv]
Battery I, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry I, 3d Bn, 10th Mar]
Battery R, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry R, 5th Bn, 10th Mar]

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa) [2d MEB TF Tarawa]

Command Element
Detachment, II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [Det, II MEF HqGru]
II Marine Expeditionary Force Liaison Element [II MEF LsnEle]
2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Originally with Task Force Yankee) [2d Bn, 6th Mar]
Company C, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion [Co C, 4th ReconBn]
2d Force Reconnaissance Company [2d ForReconCo]
2d Intelligence Battalion (-) [2d IntelBn]

2d Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 2 [2d Mar/RCT-2]

Headquarters Company [HqCo]
1st Battalion, 2d Marines [1st Bn, 2d Mar]
3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Mar]
2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]
1st Battalion, 10th Marines [1st Bn, 10th Mar]
Battery F, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry F, 2d Bn, 10th Mar]
Company A, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion [Co A, 2d CbtEngrBn]
Company A, 8th Tank Battalion [Co A, 8th TkBn]
Company C, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [Co C, 2d LARBn]
Company A, 2d Assault Amphibious Battalion [Co A, 2d AABn]
Company A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (Reinforced) [Co A, 2d ReconBn]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing [3d MAW]

Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 [MWHS-3]
Detachment, Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 2 [Det, MWHS-2]

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-11]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 11 (-) (Reinforced) [MALS-11]
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14 (-) [MALS-14]
Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 31 [Det, MALS-31]
Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) (Reinforced) [VMGR-352]
Detachment, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 234 [Det, VMGR-234]
Detachment, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 452 [Det, VMGR-452]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 [VMFA-232]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 [VMFA-251]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121 [VMFA(AW)-121]

Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 225 [VMFA(AW)-225]
Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 [VMFA(AW)-533]
Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ:-1]
Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 [VMAQ:-2]

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-13]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 (-) [MALS-13]
Marine Attack Squadron 211 (-) [VMA-211]
Marine Attack Squadron 214 [VMA-214]
Marine Attack Squadron 223 (-) [VMA-223]
Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]
Marine Attack Squadron 542 [VMA-542]

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-16]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (-) [MALS-16]
Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 [Det, MALS-26]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 [HMM-163]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 [HMH-465]

Marine Aircraft Group 29 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-29]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 29 (-) [MALS-29]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 [HMM-162]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (-) [HMM-365]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 [HMH-464]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 [HMLA-269]

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSSG-37]

Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 [MWSS-271]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 [MWSS-272]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 [MWSS-371]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 [MWSS-372]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]
Company C, 1st Battalion, 24th Marines [Co C, 1st Bn, 24th Mar]
Detachment, Military Police, 4th Marine Air Wing [Det, MP, 4th MAW]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced) [MACG-38]

Air Traffic Control Detachment B, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 [ATCDet B, MTACS-2]
Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (Reinforced) [MACS-1]
Detachment, Marine Air Control Squadron 2 [Det, MACS-2]
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28 (-) [MWCS-28]
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 (Reinforced) [MWCS-38]
Detachment, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 28 [Det, MTACS-28]

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 38 (Reinforced) [MTACS-38]
Detachment, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 48 [Det, MTACS-48]
Marine Air Support Squadron 1 [MASS-1]
Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (Reinforced) [MASS-3]
Battery B, 2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [Btry B, 2d LAADBn]
3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [3d LAADBn]
Detachments, Marine Air Support Squadron 6 [CA, MA Dets, MASS-6]
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Aircraft Group 39 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-39]

Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39 (-) [MALS-39]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267 [HMLA-267]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 [HMM-268]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 [HMM-364]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]
Atlantic Ordnance, Command Expeditionary Force [LantOrd, CmdExpedFor]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Corps Air Station,
Miramar [Det, HHS, MCAS Miramar]

Marine Combat Service Support Element

1st Force Service Support Group [1st FSSG]**

Detachment, Headquarters and Service Battalion [Det, H&SBn]

Combat Service Support Group 11 (Brigade Service Support Group 1) [CSSG 11]

Headquarters [Hq]
Combat Service Support Battalion 10 (Combat Service Support Group 1) [CSSB 10]
Combat Service Support Company 111 [CSSC 111]
Combat Service Support Company 115 [CSSC 115]
Combat Service Support Company 117 [CSSC 117]

Combat Service Support Group 13 (4th Landing Support Battalion) [CSSG 13]

Headquarters, 4th Landing Support Battalion [Hq, 4th LdgSptBn]
Combat Service Support Company 133 [CSSC 133]
Combat Service Support Company 134 [CSSC 134]
Combat Service Support Company 135 [CSSC 135]

Combat Service Support Group 14 (4th Supply Battalion) [CSSG 14]
4th Supply Battalion (-) [4th SupBn]

Combat Service Support Group 15 (1st Supply Battalion) [CSSG 15]
1st Supply Battalion (-) [1st SupBn]
Combat Service Support Battalion 12 (1st Maintenance Battalion) [CSSB 12]

Combat Service Support Battalion 18 (Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force Service Support Group) [CSSB 18]
Combat Service Support Battalion 22 [CSSB 22]
Combat Service Support Company 151 [CSSC 151]

Transportation Support Group [TransSuptGru]
1st Transportation Support Battalion (-) [1st TSptBn]
6th Motor Transport Battalion [6th MTBn]

7th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [7th EngrSptBn]
6th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [6th EngrSptBn]
8th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [8th EngrSptBn]
Communications Company, 4th Force Service Support Group [CommCo, 4th FSSG]
Mortuary Affairs Company, 4th Force Service Support Group [MortAffairsCo, 4th FSSG]
Company A, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co A, MP, 4th FSSG]
Company B, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co B, MP, 4th FSSG]
Company C, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co C, MP, 4th FSSG]
Combat Service Support Battalion 16 (Combat Service Support Detachment 16) [CSSB 16]
Combat Service Support Battalion 19 (Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group-11) [CSSB 19]
1st Dental Battalion (-) [1st DentBn]
Fleet Hospital Three, U.S. Navy [FH 3, USN]
Fleet Hospital Fifteen, U.S. Navy [FH 15, USN]
Preventive Medicine Unit, Navy Environmental Health Center [PM-MMART-5]
Preventive Medicine Unit, Navy Environmental Health Center [PM-MMART-2]
Health Services Battalion (1st Medical Battalion) [Health ServBn/1st MedBn]
Company A [Co A]
Company B [Co B]
Company C [Co C]
Company E [Co E]
Company F [Co F]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group [I MEFEngrGru]
Command Element:
30th Naval Construction Regiment [30th NCR]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 [NMCB 5]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 [NMCB 7]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 [NMCB 74]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 [NMCB 133]
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4 [NMCB 4]
Naval Construction Force Support Unit 2 (-) [NCFSU 2]
Air Detachment, Underwater Construction Team 2 [AirDet, UCT 2]

22d Naval Construction Regiment [22d NCR]

Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 15 [AirDet, NMCB 15]
Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 21 [AirDet, NMCB 21]
Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 25 [AirDet, NMCB 25]
Detachment, Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 303 [Det, CBMU 303]

United Kingdom (UK) Forces

1st Armoured Division (UK) (-) (Reinforced) [1st ArmdDiv (UK)]
7th Armoured Brigade (UK) [7th ArmdBde (UK)]
1st Battalion, The Black Watch [1st Bn, BlackWatch]
1st Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers [1st Bn, RoyalFusiliers]
The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards [RoyalScotsDragoons]
2d Royal Tank Regiment [2d Royal TkRegt]
3d Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery [3d Regt, RoyalHorseArty]
32 Engineer Regiment [32 EngrRegt]
16th Air Assault Brigade (UK) [16th AirAsltBde (UK)]
1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment [1st Bn, ParaRegt]
3d Battalion, The Parachute Regiment [3d Bn, ParaRegt]
1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Regiment [1st Bn, RoyalIrishRegt]
7th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (Parachute) [7th Regt, RoyalHorseArty (Para)]
3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines (-) [3 CdoBde, RM]
40 Commando Group [40 Cdo, RM]
42 Commando Group [42 Cdo, RM]
29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery [29 Cdo, RoyalArty]

U.S. Army Reinforcing Units

Detachment, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion [Det, 9th PsyOpsBn]
354th Public Affairs Detachment [354th PADet]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 468th Chemical Battalion
[Det, HHCo, 468th ChemBn]
U.S. Army Space Support Team [USASpaceSptTm]
86th Signal Battalion [86th SigBn]
208th Signal Company [208th SigCo]
Company C, 40th Signal Battalion [Co C, 40th SigBn]
3d Battalion, 27th Field Artillery [3d Bn, 27th FldArty]
1st Field Artillery Detachment [1st FldArtyDet]
498th Medical Company [498th MedCo]
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade [HHBtry,
108th AirDefArtyBde]
2d Battalion, 43rd Air Defense Artillery [2d Bn, 43d AirDefArty]
3d Battalion, 124th Infantry [3d Bn, 124th Inf]
555th Maintenance Company [555th MaintCo]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 378th Support Battalion
[Det, HHCo, 378th SptBn]
777th Maintenance Company [777th MaintCo]
727th Transportation Company [727th TransCo]
319th Transportation Company [319th TransCo]
319th Transportation Detachment [319th TransDet]
299th Engineer Company [299th EngrCo]
459th Engineer Company [459th EngrCo]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Co., 716th Military Police Battalion
[Det, HHCo, 716th MPBn]
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 265th Engineer Group [HHCo, 265th EngrGru]

130th Engineer Battalion [130th EngrBn]
478th Engineer Battalion [478th EngrBn]
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade
[HHCo, 358th CABde]
304th Civil Affairs Brigade [304th CABde]
402d Civil Affairs Brigade [402d CABde]
432d Civil Affairs Battalion [432d CABn]
367th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment [367th MOPADet]
305th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [305th TacPsyOpsCo]
307th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [307th TacPsyOpsCo]
312th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [312th TacPsyOpsCo]
1092d Engineer Battalion [1092d EngrBn]

Marine Follow-on Forces

3d Battalion, 23d Marines [3d Bn, 23d Mar]
4th Combat Engineer Battalion (-) [4th CbtEngrBn]
4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [4th LARBn]
2d Battalion 25th Marines [2d Bn, 25th Mar]
Truck Company, 4th Marine Division [TkCo, 4th MarDiv]

Marine Forces with Fifth and Sixth Fleets

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [26th MEU (SOC)]
Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 8th Marines [BLT 1/8]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 [HMM-264]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 26 [MSSG 26]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (USS *Harry S. Truman* CVN 75) [VMFA-115]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312 (USS *Enterprise* CVN 65) [VMFA-312]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (USS *Constellation* CV 64) [VMFA-323]

*Unit list based on I Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Award Recommendation, 7Aug03; MarAdmin 507/03, various versions, Oct-Dec03; "Modifications to the I MEF Presidential Unit Citation Unit Listing," with additions and/or corrections provided by Ms. Annette Amerman, Historian, Reference Branch; and Col Nicholas E. Reynolds' troop list of Oct04. Unit abbreviations are provided in brackets.

**1st Force Service Support Group reorganized shortly before deployment; previous unit designations are shown in parentheses after the unit's designation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Force Service Support Group's headquarters elements were reorganized into Combat Service Support Group 16 [CSSG 16] in April 2003.

Appendix C

Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

AA–Assault Amphibian
AAA–Antiaircraft Artillery
AAOE–Arrival and Assembly Operations Echelon
AAV–Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ACE–Aviation Combat Element
ADC–Assistant Division Commander
ADOCs–Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
APOD–Air Port of Debarkation
APOE–Air Port of Embarkation
ASLT–Air Support Liaison Team
ASOC–Air Support Operations Center
ASP–Ammunition Supply Point
ATARS–Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System
ATO–Air Tasking Order
BCL–Battlefield Coordination Line
BCT–Brigade Combat Team
BDA–Battle Damage Assessment
BFT–Blue Force Tracker
BSSG–Brigade Service Support Group
C2PC–Command and Control Personal Computer
CBR–Counter Battery Radar
CE–Command Element
CEB–Combat Engineering Battalion
CENTCOM–U.S. Central Command
CFACC–Combined Forces Air Component Commander
CFLCC–Combined Forces Land Component Commander
CG–Commanding General
CGS–Common Ground Station
CIP–Combat Identification Panel
Class II–Batteries
Class VIII–Medical Supplies
Class IX–Repair Parts
CMOC–Civil-Military Operations Center
CPAO–Consolidated Public Affairs Office
CP–Command Post
CPX–Command Post Exercise
CRAF–Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSS–Combat Service Support
CSSB–Combat Service Support Battalion
CSSC–Combat Service Support Company
CONPLAN–Contingency Plan
CONUS–Continental United States

COP–Common Operational Picture
DA–Dispersal Area
DAC–Division Administration Center
DASC–Direct Air Support Center
DIA–Defense Intelligence Agency
DOC–Deployment Operations Center
DS–Direct Support
DSA–Division Support Area
EMCON–Emissions Control
EOD–Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPW–Enemy Prisoner of War
FAC–Forward Air Controller
FAD–Field Artillery Detachment
FARP–Forward Arming and Refueling Point
FOB–Forward Operating Base
FOE–Follow on Echelon
FPOL–Forward Passage of Lines
FRAGO–Fragmented Order
FRSS–Forward Resuscitative Surgery System
FSCC–Fire Support Coordination Center
FSS–Fast Sealift Ships
FSSG–Force Service Support Group
GBS–Global Broadcasting System
GCE–Ground Combat Element
GOSP–Gas-Oil Separation Plant
HDR–Humanitarian Daily Ration
HET–Human Exploitation Team
HF–High Frequency
HHA–Hand Held Assay
HUMINT–Human Intelligence
IC–National Intelligence Community
IMINT–Image Intelligence
IMO–Information Management Officer
IO–Information Officer
IPSA–Intermediate Pumping Stations
JDAM–Joint Direct Attack Munition
JMEM–Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual
JSTARS–Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
KAF–Kuwaiti Armed Forces
KI–Killbox Interdiction
KLF–Kuwaiti Land Forces
KMOD–Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense
LAR–Light Armored Reconnaissance
LASER–Light Amplification through Stimulated Emission of Radiation
LAV–Light Armored Vehicle
LD–Line of Departure
LOC–Line of Communication
LSA–Life Support Area and Logistical Support Area
LTO–Logistics Tasking Order

LZ–Landing Zone
 MACCS–Marine Air Command and Control Squadron
 MAG–Marine Air Group
 MAGTF–Marine Air-Ground Task Force
 MANPAD–Man-Portable Air Defense
 MARCORSYSCOM–Marine Corps Systems Command
 MAW–Marine Aircraft Wing
 MCIA–Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
 MCRE–Marine Corps Readiness Evaluation
 MCWL–Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
 MDACT–Mobile Data Automated Communication Terminal
 MEB–Marine Expeditionary Brigade
 MEF–Marine Expeditionary Force
 MEFEX–Marine Expeditionary Force Exercise
 MEG–MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) Engineer Group
 MEWSS–Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System
 MLC–Marine Logistics Command
 MOD–Ministry of Defense (Kuwait)
 MOI–Ministry of the Interior (Kuwait)
 MOPP–Mission Oriented Protective Posture
 MOS–Military Occupational Specialty
 MOUT–Military Operations on Urban Terrain
 MP–Military Policy
 MPF–Maritime Prepositional Force
 MPSRON–Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron
 MRLS–Multiply Rocket Launcher System
 MSC–Major Subordinate Command
 MSTP–MAGTF Staff Training Program
 MWSG–Marine Wing Support Squadron
 MWSS–Marine Wing Support Squadron
 NBC–Nuclear,Biological, and Chemical
 NBCRS–Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System
 OCD–Obstacle Clearing Detachment
 OMC-K Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait
 OPCON–Operation Control
 OPLAN–Operations Plan
 OPP–Offload Preparation Party
 OPT–Operational Planning Team
 ORCON–Originator Controlled
 OSW–Operation Southern Watch
 PA–Public Affairs
 PALT–Public Affairs Liaison Team
 PIR–Priority Intelligence Requirement
 PLI–Position Location Information
 POL–Passage of Lines
 POW–Prisoner of War
 PRR–Personal Role Radio
 QRF–Quick Reaction Force
 RA–Regular Army

RCT–Regimental Combat Team
RFF–Requested for Forces
RG–Republican Guard
RGFC–Republican Guard Forces Command
RIP–Relief in Place
ROZ–Restrictal Operation Zone
RRP–Refueling and Replenishment Point
RSO&I–Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
RUC–Reporting Unit Code
SAPOE–Sea and Aerial Ports of Embarkation
SAM–Surface-to-Air-Missile
SASO–Security and Stabilization Operations
SIGINT–Signal Intelligence
SIPRNET–Secret Internet Protocol Routed Network
SLTLP–Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party
SMART-T–Secure Mobile Antijam Reliable Tactical Terminal
SOP–Standing Operating Procedure
SRG–Special Republican Guard
SPINS–Special Instructions
SPOD–Sea Port of Debarkation
SPOE–Sea Port of Embarkation
SSE–Sensitive Site Exploitation
SSM–Surface-to-Surface Missile
TAA–Tactical Assembly Areas
TACON–Tactical Control
T/E–Table of Equipment
TEWT–Tactical Exercise Without Troops
TIO–Target Information Officer
TIP–Thermal Identification Officer
T/O Table of Organization
TPC–Target Processing Center
TPFDD–Time-Phased Force Deployment Data

Appendix D

Chronology of Events

2001

11 September Al Qaeda terrorists attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

25 November Marines of Task Force 58 land in Afghanistan as part of operations to deprive Al Qaeda of its base in that country.

2002

January Marine Forces, Pacific, orders I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to focus on preparing for contingencies in the CentCom theater; MEF planners begin more than a year of work on plans to invade Iraq.

2 August MajGen James N. Mattis becomes Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, and puts the division on a virtual war footing.

11 October The Pentagon orders I MEF to deploy its headquarters staff to Kuwait for service with Coalition Forces Combined Land Component (CFLCC) under U.S. Army LtGen David D. McKiernan.

15 November I MEF headquarters deploys to Kuwait; newly appointed I MEF commander LtGen James T. Conway deploys with his headquarters.

16 November 3d Marine Aircraft Wing forward command post, under MajGen James F. Amos, arrives in Kuwait.

18 November 1st Marine Division forward command post arrives in Kuwait.

24 November CFLCC exercise to test command and control links with I MEF and other commands, "Lucky Warrior 03-1," begins.

9 December CentCom exercise "Internal Look," based on the current version of the plan for the invasion of Iraq, begins.

2003

January Intense preparations to integrate 1st Armoured Division (UK) into I MEF occur; this division assumes responsibility for securing southeast Iraq.

2 January	Pentagon issues Deployment Order 177A, soon to be followed by 177B, which orders the wholesale deployment of MEF forces to theater.
6 January	Rehearsal of concept (ROC) drill occurs at 3d MAW in Miramar, California; many ROC drills at various levels follow in the coming weeks.
13 January	Gen Michael W. Hagee becomes the 33d Commandant of the Marine Corps.
15 January	Amphibious Task Force (ATF) East departs Morehead City, North Carolina, for Kuwait with 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2dMEB).
17 January	Amphibious Task Force (ATF) West departs San Diego, California, for Kuwait carrying elements of I MEF.
8 February	With MEF, participation, CFLCC exercise "Lucky Warrior 03-2," labeled "a dress rehearsal" for war, begins.
16 February	2d MEB begins to go ashore in Kuwait to reinforce with ATF I MEF; its aviation elements transfer to 3d MAW control and the ground elements are redesignated Task Force Tarawa.
24 February	ATF West begins offloading its West Coast Marine units in Kuwait; most other Marines follow by air.
9 March	First leaflets dropped on Baghdad urging noninterference with coalition operations and soliciting support from Iraqi people.
17 March	President Bush issues an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within 48 hours.
18 March	Operation Southern Watch aircraft conduct air strikes against Iraqi early warning radars and command-and-control capabilities; Marine forces are ordered to staging areas.
Night of 19-20 March	U.S. Air Force aircraft and Navy vessels conduct unplanned attack against Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leadership targets in what becomes popularly known as the "decapitation strike," which does not succeed but does initiate hostilities
20 March	Iraq retaliates by firing surface-to-surface missiles against coalition troops in Kuwait; ground combat operations begin at night; MEF is supporting attack to Army's V Corps; Regimental Combat Team 5 is leading Marine unit.
21 March	Marines capture the Rumaylah oil fields, a key CentCom objective; Marines and British forces secure the port of Umm

	Qasr before moving on the city of Basrah, the most important British objective.
23 March	Task Force Tarawa begins to secure the city of An Nasiriyah and its key bridges over the Euphrates River and the Saddam Canal; heavy fighting ensues; friendly fire incident occurs at bridge over canal; II MEF commander MGen Henry P. Osman deploys to northern Iraq to establish the Military Coordination and Liaison Command (MCLC) under operational control of CentCom in order to maintain political stability.
Night of 24–25 March	“Mother of all sandstorms” begins, slowing operations’ tempo for approximately two days.
24–27 March	1st Marine Division continues to advance up Routes 1 and 7 towards Baghdad.
27 March	“Operational pause” begins to consolidate supply lines and address threats by irregular Iraqi formations on the ground; 3d MAW air offensive continues unimpeded, rendering many Iraqi units combat ineffective.
1 April	1st Marine Division resumes progress towards Baghdad; Force Service Support Group performs Herculean feats of resupply with cooperation of wing and Marine Logistics Command.
3 April	U.S. Army troops move on Saddam International Airport, key terrain outside Baghdad.
5 April	U.S. Army conducts first “Thunder Run,” armored raid, into Baghdad.
6 April	Most of Basrah, Iraq’s “second city,” is in British hands.
7 April	RCT 7 crosses the Diyala River and moves on outskirts of Baghdad from the east; U.S. Army conducts second “Thunder Run” into capital.
9 April	Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, part of RCT 7, assist Iraqi civilians in toppling a large statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square in Marine AO, eastern Baghdad.
10 April	RCT 5 engaged in heavy fighting at Al Azimiyah Palace and Abu Hanifah mosque in Baghdad; looting begins as fighting tapers off; Marines begin post-combat operations.
11–12 April	After the collapse of Iraqi authority in northern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, Kurdish forces fill the resulting power vacuum, followed by U.S. forces over succeeding days, including Marines from 26th MEU (SOC).

- 13-14 April Task Force Tripoli, out of 1st Marine Division, takes control of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's hometown.
- 20 April The relief in place with U.S. Army in eastern Baghdad is complete; I MEF redeploys its forces to the southern third of Iraq; mission is now security, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction; focus of effort is seven infantry battalions from 1st Marine Division in seven governates (or districts).
- 22 April 24th MEU (SOC), which had supported TF Tarawa, begins redeploying to its ships; other Marine units soon follow suit as part of drawn-down to reduced manning levels that are maintained throughout the summer.
- 1 May Under a banner reading "Mission Accomplished," President George W. Bush announces that major combat operations are over; 26th MEU (SOC) departs Mosul and returns to its ships in the Mediterranean.
- 12 May Ambassador L. Paul Bremer takes over as civil administrator in Iraq, replacing Jay M. Garner; Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority soon replaces Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.
- 22 July Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay are killed in firefight with U.S. Army in Mosul.
- 19 August A truck bomb explodes at the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, killing 20 people, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.
- 3 September In Babylon, I MEF conducts a transfer of authority to a Polish-led international coalition force; most remaining Marines return to CONUS.
- 10 November Marines of Special Purpose MAGTF celebrate the Marine Corps birthday in CONUS after completing the work of repatriating all Marine Corps equipment from theater.

Appendix E

Selected Bibliography

Entries in **boldface** type are reprinted in this anthology.

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The authors outline Congressional criticisms of anticipated high budget estimates from the WhiteHouse for the occupation and rebuilding of Iraq. Lawmakers are cited in support of more international economic control of Iraqi reconstruction.

Allison, Maj Fred, H. "Midnight in Baghdad." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Feb02, pp. 32-35.

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Amos, MajGen James F. "3d Marine Aircraft Wing Memorial Remarks." Commanding General's Message to All Hands, 2Dec03.

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Atkeson, MajGen Edward B., USA (Ret). "Iraq Through the Prism of American Experience." *Army*, Dec03, pp. 17-26.

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Bacon, Maj Peter K. "Whatever It Takes: Redlegs and Riflemen." *Army*, Dec03, pp. 10-16.

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The author describes fierce and deadly attacks by Iraqi men, women, and children on U.S. Marines as they secure routes through the city of Nasiriyah, Iraq. Several Marines share their experiences and descriptions of injuries received while facing ambush from locals.

Birch, Douglas. "As Ambushes Continue In Iraq, Some Soldiers Rethink Strategy." *The Baltimore Sun*, 12Jul03.

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Blackledge, Col Matthew W. "Professionals Talk Logistics." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Aug03, pp. 40-43.

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Cobbold, Richard. "War in Iraq, Thoughts From Afar." *RUSI Journal*, Apr03, pp. 4-5.

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Collins, Col John M., USA (Ret). "You Can't Assume Nothin'." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May03, pp. 50-51.

The author identifies and proves or disproves the accuracy of 12 assumptions concerning war with Iraq made by U.S. officials before the start of fighting.

Cone, BGen Robert W., USA, and MajGen Gordon C. Nash. "DOD Briefing on Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned Process." ><http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030603-0243.html>>. 3Jun03.

Transcript of a video-teleconference briefing on Operation Iraqi Freedom lessons learned process between Marine Corps MajGen Gordon C. Nash, commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, and Army BGen Robert W. Cone, director of the Operation Iraqi Freedom Joint Lessons Learned Collection Team.

Coner, Sherri. "Marine Had Close Calls On Patrol to Baghdad." *Daily Journal*, Johnson County, Indiana, 10Jul03.

Marine Cpl Aaron Bousley recalls the fierce ambushes and resistance his Recon unit encountered while on a mission to capture an airfield in Baghdad.

Conlin, Col Christopher C. "What Do You Do For An Encore?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep03, p. 74.

Colonel Conlin outlines the tasks undergone by "First Team" (1st Battalion, 7th Marines) after taking over Baghdad and toppling Saddam Hussein's regime. The battalion task force worked on "Transition Operations" to provide basic utilities and government in the post-war region.

Connell, Rich, and Robert J., Lopez. "A Deadly Day for Charlie Company." *Los Angeles Times*, 26Aug03.

Members of Company C, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, recall an ill-fated mission to capture a bridge in Nasiriyah, Iraq. The company was sent without reinforcements through a dangerous stretch of

highway known as “Ambush Alley,” where they encountered heavy fire from Iraqi army soldiers, Fedayeen Saddam militiamen, Baath Part loyalists, and friendly fire from an Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt. Eighteen men were killed that day and 15 were injured from the company alone.

Connolly, Kate. “We Want to be Feared Not Loved, Say U.S. Marines.”
<[http://dailytelegraph.co.uk/news/2003/06/05/wirq05.xml\\$\\$Sheet=/news](http://dailytelegraph.co.uk/news/2003/06/05/wirq05.xml$$Sheet=/news)>. 6Jun03.

The U.S. military works to create a new credible television news program in the city of Kut. TV Kut has been created in efforts to end years of government propaganda, and to support free press. However, the U.S. military retains strict controls over the stories to be broadcast.

Conway, LtGen James T. “I Marine Expeditionary Force Commander Live Briefing from Iraq.” *DOD Daily News Transcript*, 30May03.

LtGen Conway gives a teleconference from Iraq on the First Marine Expeditionary Forces involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom and stabilization activities in post-war Baghdad.

Conway, LtGen James T. “We’ve Always Done Windows.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Nov03, pp. 32-34.

In an interview with Naval Institute Senior Editor Gordon Keiser, LtGen James T. Conway, commanding general of I Marine Expeditionary Force, discusses many aspects of the Marine Corps’ involvement in Iraq, ranging from intelligence distribution, involvement of coalition and U.S. Special Forces, casualties, media relations, and troop morale.

Conway, LtGen James T. “Briefing on I Marine Expeditionary Force in Iraq.” *DOD Daily News Transcript*, 9Sep03.

LtGen James T. Conway of I Marine Expeditionary Force gives a briefing at the Pentagon and answers questions from the press concerning I MEF’s performance in Iraq and the transfer of authority to the Polish-led Multinational Division.

Conway, LtGen James T. “Farther and Faster.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Jan05, pp. 48-52.

According to LtGen Conway, during the 22 months of planning for and fighting in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the war’s two segments have proved very different. In 2003, OIF I was less difficult, with Marines fighting mostly against Shia in the south. In OIF II against Sunni tribes in the west, as Marines sought to win hearts and minds, attacks increased which translated into casualties.

Cooper, Christopher. “The Marines Raise a Caution Flag Over Use of Embedded Journalists.” *Wall Street Journal*, 16Dec03.

Marines of the 1st Marine Division express concerns over the use of embedded journalists in reporting warfare. They note occasional negative reporting, but express overall support for the embedded journalist program as helpful in relating the events of the war to readers at home.

Copp, LtCol Adam J., and Maj Christian Veeris. "Back to the Basics." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jul03, pp. 29-31.

The authors discuss the roles of 1st Force Reconnaissance Company in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Cramer, Capt Eugene A., and LtCol Alan L. Thomas. "Marine Corps Airfield Damage Repair." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec03, pp. 18-20.

The engineers of the Marine Wing Support Squadron perform many engineering duties. More importantly, they repair damage to airfield surfaces necessary for air-based supply modes.

Crawley, James W. "U.S. Shock-Trauma Platoons Put Emergency Room in Iraq: Units Treat Marines, Civilians, Prisoners." *Union-Tribune*, 17Apr03.

Shock Trauma Platoon 4 sets up makeshift emergency rooms in Iraq to treat Marines, civilians and prisoners. The author describes the stages of treatment: corpsman, aid station, surgical company and fleet hospital.

Dawisha, Adeed I., and Karen Dawisha. "How to Build a Democratic Iraq." *Foreign Affairs*, May-Jun03, pp. 37-50.

The authors map out a blueprint for the institution of democracy in Iraq. They address issues ranging from the structure of government branches, leadership, and preparation of the populace.

De Atkine, Norvell B. "It's An Information War." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Jan04, pp. 64-65.

The author identifies the capture of Saddam Hussein as a psychological victory, but puts it into perspective with threats from other insurgent groups in the continuing war, and cites failures of U.S. policy in Iraq, including loss of the information war.

Disbro, 1stLt Jonathan S. "Expedient Ordnance/Munitions Destruction." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb04, pp. 37-40.

The author outlines several effective methods for use in explosive ordnance disposal.

Dodge, Toby. "U.S. Intervention and Possible Iraqi Futures." *Survival*. Autumn03, pp. 103-122.

Dodge discusses the United States' role in liberating Iraq. He outlines Iraqi political and cultural history in relation to cooperation with American forces. He also warns of the long-term nature of U.S. involvement in the region, that cutting corners to expedite occupation will result in an overall failure to institute change in the region.

Dorsey, Jack. "Bataan Sails Toward Iraq; Strike Force Will Follow." *The Virginian-Pilot*, 20Jan04.

The amphibious assault ship Bataan is deployed from Norfolk, Virginia, to deliver supplies and troops to the Middle East for the fourth time in as many years.

Dowd, Alan W. "Thirteen Years: The Causes and Consequences of the War in Iraq." *Parameters*, Autumn03, pp. 46-60.

The author outlines the history of American foreign relations, particularly concerning Iraq, and stresses the importance of “Three R’s: rebuilding, reviewing, and reforming” in the nation.

Dunfee, CWO3 David R. “Ambush Alley Revisited.” *Marine Corps Gazette*, Mar04, pp. 44-46.

CWO3 David R. Dunfree, of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, discusses inaccuracies of an account of the March 2003 battle in An Nasiriyah’s Ambush Alley as it is portrayed in the book “The March Up.”

Dunn, VAdm Robert, USN (Ret). “Navy Cannot Rest On Its Laurels.” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May03, pp. 53-54.

Task force history undergoes the task of collecting information on the role of the Navy in Operation Iraqi Freedom, an important task in assessing lessons learned and managing peacetime forces and equipment.

Duren, Rod. “Ground Zero for Nation Building.” <http://news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=7576>. May03.

On 1 April 2003, Fleet Hospital Three became the first Navy medical command to establish an Expeditionary Medical Facility in a war zone. FH-3 provided better tactical support and life-saving capabilities.

Eby, CWO3 Jeffrey L. “Rifle Combat Optic.” *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan04, pp. 50-51.

The author discusses the usefulness of rifle combat optics in enhancing Marines’ effectiveness in combat and reducing non-combatant engagements. He suggests a departure from traditional marksman training when faced with non-traditional opposition.

Eby, CWO3 Jeffrey L. “A Marine Gunner’s View.” *Marine Corps Gazette*, Oct03, pp. 30-32.

CWO3 Jeffrey L. Eby discusses his own experiences and observations as a gunner in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Etzioni, Amitai. “Stop Obsessing Over Saddam.” *USA Today*, 12Aug03.

Iraqi’s struggle to govern their country facing foreign occupation. The author stresses that political issues in the country must not be personalized or personified as removing one person will not necessarily bring about change on its own.

Field, LtCol Christopher A., “A Liaison Officer’s Observation and Insights.” *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb04, pp. 32-34.

LtCol Field, a liaison officer with the Australian Defence Force, offers suggestions to enhance the capabilities of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq.

Field, Maj Walker M. “Marine Artillery in the Battle of An Nasiriyah,” *Field Artillery Journal*, Nov-Dec03, pp. 26-30.

The author provides an overview of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, in An Nasiriyah as a military operation in urban terrain. The article discusses specific events and lessons learned.

Filkins, Dexter. "Chaos and Calm are 2 Realities for U.S. After the War: The Reconstruction" *The New York Times*, 24Aug03.

Regions of Iraq stand divided between those in the south such as Diwaniya where Iraqis cooperate with and display appreciation toward American Marines, and cities in the north such as Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah in which former Ba'athist loyalists continue to fight U.S. troops.

Ford, Col W.G. "Embedded Media in OIF" *Leatherneck*, Jun03, p. 40.

Embedded journalists proved themselves competent and ultimately essential in their coverage of Iraq alongside U.S. Marines. They reported accurately and effectively and prevented disinformation to connect Americans at home with the soldiers abroad.

Franks, Gen Tommy R. "Briefing on Military Operations in Iraq."
<<http://www.centcom.mil/CENTCOMNews/Transcripts/20030322.htm>>. 22Mar03.

Gen Franks in this press conference discusses the objectives and current status of military operations in Iraq.

Freeman, Maj Lloyd D. "Winning Future Battles: Why the Infantry Must Change." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Apr03, pp. 54-58.

The author raises questions about the success of small unit combat in conjunction with massive air support, and whether conditions in Afghanistan can be used to predict the nature of future warfare. He is particularly concerned over whether this new warfare will require restructuring of many aspects of Marine Corps infantry training.

Friedman, Norman. "Both Gulf Wars Offer Lessons." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May03, pp. 60-62.

Friedman compares and contrasts both gulf wars to prove that past lessons are still present today. He explains that while U.S. objectives in 1991 and 2003 are similar, different tactics are required to meet them.

Friedman, Thomas L. "Bad Planning." *The New York Times*, 25Jun03.

Friedman sites several examples in which he claims that the United States and the Pentagon were poorly prepared for postwar Iraq.

Friedman, Thomas L. "Starting From Scratch." *The New York Times*, 27Aug03.

Friedman claims that for success in Iraq, the United States must reinvent the country under the control of Iraqis to create a sense of responsibility and ownership of the government.

Friedman, Thomas L. "Presidents Remade by War." *The New York Times*, 7Dec03.

The author discusses changes in President Bush as a result of the war with Iraq, citing a shift in purpose of the war from finding weapons of mass destruction to installing democracy in the Middle East. He compares this shift to those made by Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War and Woodrow Wilson in World War I.

Friedman, Thomas L. "It's No Vietnam." *The New York Times*, 3Oct03.

Friedman cites the source of insurgency in Iraq to be former Saddam loyalists who fear loss of power under a new more democratic society.

Garden, Timothy. "Iraq: The Military Campaign." *International Affairs* 79, 4, Jul03. pp. 701-717.

The author records the sequence of events in Iraq as they pertain to military operations. He attempts to draw conclusions based on the fact that Operation Iraqi Freedom was comparatively short to other operations, and that the full impact of the war had not yet manifested.

Gordon, Michael R. "The Capture of Hussein: The Insurgency; for U.S. Foes, a Major Blow: Fighters Now Lack a Symbol." *The New York Times*, 15Dec03.

Gordon explains how the capture of Saddam Hussein was an important turning point in the war with Iraq. He points out that the Iraqi insurgents no longer have a unifying symbol to rally behind and the capture has given U.S. forces an important military and political boost in the eyes of America and the rest of the world.

Gordon, Michael R. "Marines Plan to Use Velvet Glove More Than Iron Fist in Iraqi." *The New York Times*, 12Dec03.

LtGen James T. Conway discusses the more precise methods adopted by U.S. Marines in Iraq for facing insurgency. These tactics include lessening use of artillery, engaging more of the Iraqi populace in policing efforts, and learning to accommodate to Iraqi culture.

Gourley, Scott R. "The Arsenal of the Ground War." *Army*, May03, pp. 37-44.

The author provides photos and explanations of a sample of ground and attached air equipment that played major roles in combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He also provides photos and explanations of the relatively inferior equipment employed by the opposing forces.

Graham, Bradley. "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces." *The Washington Post*, 24Nov03.

Graham reports on the idea posed by the Pentagon that would create military forces specifically designed for peacekeeping and recovery operations. The Army believes that combat troops can act as peacekeepers, but the advantages of having a specially trained division are profound.

Gramuglia, LtCol Patrick A. and Maj Richard L. Phillips. "Aviation Integration in Operation Iraqi Freedom I: A Division Air Officer's Perspective." *Marine Corps Gazette*, May04, pp. 28-32.

The authors discuss Marine aviation's flexibility and responsiveness as a major contributor to 1st Marine Division's success in OIF.

Gregson, LtGen Wallace C. "Asia, Now: Winning the War of Ideas." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*. Feb04, p. 36.

LtGen Gregson differentiates between terrorism of the past and terrorism of the present. This shift poses real threats to the United States and its allies. He gives two responses to resist the new forms of terrorism—improve ability to counter conventional threats and to carry these methods over to the roots of terrorism and their forces and resources.

Groen, LtCol Michael S. "Blue Diamond Intelligence: Division-Level Intelligence Operations During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM," *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb04, pp. 22-25.

The author focuses on supportive intelligence during operations in Iraq. He details tactics that worked both well and not so well. Overall, the author concludes that Marine intelligence was a success due to the efforts of multiple organizations and Marine intelligence professionals.

Grossman, Elaine M. "Marine General: Iraq War Pause 'Could Not Have Come at Worse Time.'" <http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/grossman_itp_mattis.htm>. 2Oct03.

Grossman describes the five-day pause outside of Baghdad before U.S. forces went in to capture the city. She focuses on the views and remarks of Marine Major General James Mattis, who was opposed to the pause.

Gugliotta, Guy. "Iraq Museum is Slowly Recovering Artifacts." *The Washington Post*, 15Sep03.

Marine Col Matthew Bogdanos, investigating the theft of artifacts from Iraq's National Museum, reports on a few particular artifacts and tries to give estimates as to the numerous pieces still missing. The museum houses artifacts from Mesopotamia—the area in which the first human civilizations are known to have existed.

Hart, Capt David E., and LtCol Vernon C. Prevatt. "No More Brownouts: Dust Abatement in Support of Tactical Helicopter Operations." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec03, pp. 29-30.

The author explains and tracks solutions to the problem of brownouts in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The brownout conditions reduce pilot visibility to zero, potentially resulting in the loss of aircraft and life.

Hawkins, Maj Donald S. "Close Air Support in the U.S. Marine Corps: A FAC's Perspective." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep03, pp. 48-52.

The author discusses the glitches in the application of close air support in combat missions. He reviews the systems, policies, doctrine, and procedures related to Marine Corps CAS.

Henderson, Kristen. "Maneuvers." *The Washington Post*, 5Oct03.

A Marine chaplain's wife recounts the deployments and homecomings she has been through. She sheds light on what the families of soldiers go through when they are away, and the unpredictability of their homecoming.

Hess, Pamela. "Raid in Iraq's Indian Country." *United Press International*, 6Aug03.

Hess discusses the experiences of Task Force Scorpion from its squalid living conditions to hunting down the enemy one by one in northern Babil, Iraq.

Hessman, James D. "Homeland Defense Strategists Have Much To Learn From Afghan, Iraq Operations." *Sea Power*, Jun03, pp. 21-22.

Hessman explains how the qualities of speed, agility, and flexibility contributed to the U.S./coalition forces success in Iraq. The Department of Homeland Security should take these strategies used by the Department of Defense and apply them when dealing with terrorist incidents at home.

Hodierne, Robert. "Moving Those Beans and Bullets: Asset Visibility Keeps Supplies Moving to Troop in Iraq." *Armed Forces Journal*, May03, p. 16.

During the first Gulf War, there were tie-ups in supply lines that led to thousands of unused supplies at war's end. This time around, better technology and integrated information systems, including a Joint Logistics Warfighting Initiative, are in place to make sure supplies are identified and sent to where they need to go on a more accurate basis.

Hogberg, LtCol James A. "Disbursing Goes to War." *Marine Corps Gazette*. <<http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/04hogberg.html>>. Jan04.

The author outlines the activities performed by disbursing services in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Disbursing agents were able to provide Marines in the field with pay and supplies, and many even took part in fighting and earned combat action ribbons.

Holt, CWO2 C.L., Capt D.S. Morrison, and Capt P.J. Nash. "Selected Services in Postwar Iraq During Phase IV Operations." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Mar04, pp. 46-47.

The authors provide enlightenment on areas not often given a lot of thought in combat operations such as civil affairs, mortuary affairs, and post exchange.

Jaffe, Greg, and Christopher Cooper. "U.S. Intelligence in Iraq Comes Under Fire From Army, Marines." *Wall Street Journal*, 8Dec03.

The author assesses the current status of intelligence in the military and its shortcomings in the war with Iraq.

Johnson, Scott, and Thomas Evan. "Still Fighting Saddam." *Newsweek*, 21Jul03, p. 22.

The authors assess the current status of intelligence in the military and its shortcomings in the war with Iraq guerrillas, revealed to be Saddam's tactic of resistance. The author explains that although the president has been deposed, there is still considerable fighting going on in Iraq, and this affects both the military and political sides of the War.

Judah, Tim. "In Iraqi Kurdistan." *Survival*, Winter02-03, pp. 39-51.

The author assesses the status of the Kurdish population of Iraq. Judah details a history of this group, and establishes their relationship with the United States. He focuses on the question of whether the Kurds will fight with coalition forces to reach their objectives, or if they will continue to lay quiet.

Kahn, Operation Specialist 2d Class Wendy. "Medical Warriors: Navy Reserve Surgeons Care for Combat Wounded," <http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=7360>. May03.

The author describes the mission of three orthopedic surgeons and how they contributed to Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom.

Keene, R.R. "Appointment in Samarra." *Leatherneck*, Jun03, pp. 16-20.

Keene follows the incidents that led up to the disposition of Saddam Hussein, and relates Saddam's life to a man trying to cheat death—it is only a matter of time before Saddam meets his fate.

Keene, R.R., ed. "In Every Clime and Place." *Leatherneck*, Jul03, pp. 22-23.

Although Marines have a different mission in Iraq now that Baghdad has been taken, they still have a job to do to secure and protect civilians.

Keene, R.R., comp. "It's War! Five Days on the Road to Baghdad." *Leatherneck*, May03, pp. 20-25.

Keene follows Marine units through the first five days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He provides information and knowledge of what is happening from the perspective of an embedded journalist, reporting from one battlefield to the next.

Kelly, BGen John F. "Tikrit, South to Babylon." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb04, pp. 16-19.

The first in a series of articles by BGen John F. Kelly on Phase IV, security and stabilization, operations of the 1st Marine Division. He assesses the movements of the division leading up to the security operations.

Kelly, BGen John F. "Part II: Tikrit, South to Babylon." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Mar04, pp. 42-46.

The second in the series of articles following the movements of the 1st Marine Division and their eventual switch from combat operations to security and stability operations.

Kelly, BGen John F. "Part III: Tikrit, South to Babylon." *Marine Corps Gazette* Apr04, pp. 43-47.

The third and last installment in the series of articles on security and stabilization operations of the 1st Marine Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Kibler, LtCol Michael J. "A Different Air War: Marine Air Control in Operation Iraqi Freedom." History Division. 2004.

Report summarizes the activity of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and includes lists of supporting active and reserve units.

Kifner, John. "May25-31: Iraq: More Evidence of a Troubled Situation." *The New York Times*, 1Jun03.

The author describes the troubles in the aftermath of the war. There are still many obstacles to be overcome in Iraq, especially concerning peacekeeping missions and the Iraqi civilians.

Klocek, Maj Joseph J., and LtCol Niel E. Nelson. "8th Engineer Support Battalion's Support of Operation IRAQ I FREEDOM." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec03, pp. 38-44.

Klocek documents the reforming of 8th Engineer Support Battalion, engaged in engineering projects, into a bridge battalion. The ESB overcame many obstacles to achieve its goals in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Koopman, John. "McCoy's Marines: Darkside Toward Baghdad Chapter 1." *San Francisco Chronicle*, 10Nov03.

In a series of chapters, John Koopman, embedded with the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, follows LtCol Bryan P. McCoy and his unit through the hours and days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Koopman provides historical perspective and interesting facts about the unit and the Marines in general. This chapter covers units wait for battle in Kuwait.

Koopman, John "McCoy's Marines: Darkside Toward Baghdad, Chapter 2." *San Francisco Chronicle*, 11Nov03.

In this second chapter, Koopman recounts the first hours of war with the unit.

Koopman, John. "McCoy's Marines: Darkside Toward Baghdad, Chapter 3." *San Francisco Chronicle*, 12Nov03.

Marines cope with sandstorms, seesaw temperatures, and long periods of waiting and training in this third chapter of McCoy's Marines.

Koopman, John. "McCoy's Marines: Darkside Toward Baghdad, Chapter 4." *San Francisco Chronicle*, 13Nov03.

Koopman recounts the first major combat engagement the Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Koopman, John. "McCoy's Marines: Darkside Toward Baghdad, Chapter 5." *San Francisco Chronicle*, 14Nov03.

The Marines reach the outskirts of Baghdad and take one of the eastern bridges that led into the city in this fifth installment.

Koopman, John. "McCoy's Marines: Darkside Toward Baghdad, Chapter 6." *San Francisco Chronicle*, 15Nov03.

McCoy's Marines finally enter Baghdad. Koopman gives an account of the dismantling of Saddam Hussein's statue. He then goes on to describe the homecoming of the Marine unit to Twentynine Palms, California.

Kreisher, Otto. "Marines to Come Home Soon But Might Have to Go Back." *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 10Sep03.

LtGen James Conway says that Marine forces will soon be out of Iraq. They have relinquished most of the provinces that were occupied, but remain in the holy city of Najaf to promote stability and security.

Kurtz, Howard. "Embedded Reporter's Role in Army Units Action Questioned by Military." *The Washington Post*, 25Jun03.

Embedded reporter Judith Miller is said to have taken aggressive actions leading to the capture of Saddam Hussein's two sons. She is said to have exercised influence over Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi National Congress leader. The newspaper denies that she did anything out of her sphere as a reporter with the Army Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha. The military says that she did play a considerable role and are critical of her actions.

Lacy, Col Warren S. "Operation Iraqi Freedom War in Iraq is Seen As a Fight for Strategic Security in the New Age." *Military Officer*, May03, p. 8.

Lacy, editor of the *Military Officer* magazine, expresses the challenges of publishing a monthly magazine and how to cover breaking news and changing situations. The author suggests a bigger approach and focusing on the big picture and not so much on fine details. The United States role in strategic security is one of these larger issues in modern military operations.

Landers, Jim. "Alone and Unafraid." *The Dallas Morning News*, 18May03.

Landers, embedded with the 2d Tank Battalion, describes the swiftness and deftness of the unit in its fight into Baghdad. The Marines agree that it was the quickness and overwhelming fire-power of the U.S. military that prevented the Iraqi's from waging tank and aerial war, and forced them to hide in buildings and use guns and rocket-propelled grenades to counter the U.S. forces.

Layton, Capt Peter, RAAF. "The New Arab Way of War." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Mar03, pp. 62-65.

The author describes the 'new Arab way of war' as a combination of education in bomb making and holy-war doctrine. This new way of war is asymmetrical and does not have a front or rear, or even a land base. This new war power seems to lie in people and groups rather than in countries and states.

Lehnert, BGen Michael R. and Col John E., Wissler. "MLC: Sustaining Tempo on the 21st Century Battlefield." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Aug03, pp. 30-33.

The Marine logistics command commenced itself as a necessary component in support of I Marine Expeditionary Force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The MLC supported all Marine forces in Kuwait and Iraq, and linked tactical and strategic logistics.

Lethin, LtCol Clarke R. "1st Marine Division and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb04, pp. 2-20.

Lethin discusses the issues of planning, speed, and commander intent used by the 1st Marine Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The author says that it is these areas that led to the success of the operation.

Love, Col Robert E. "Operation IRAQI FREEDOM-Marine Corps Logistics at Its Best?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan04, pp. 48-50.

Love explores the role of Marine Corps logistics in OIF. He criticizes 'modern' logistics support as being outdated and that there is room for improvement of this system.

Ma, Jason. "Marines Assess Force Structure, Civil Affairs, Police Functions." *Inside the Navy*, 22Dec03, p. 3.

LtGen Jan Huly offers commentary on the strength of the Marine Corps. As Marines prepare to deploy for peacekeeping missions in Iraq, troop rotations and unit activation become critical issues needing to be addressed.

Maass, Peter. "Good Kills." *The New York Times Magazine*, 20Apr03.

Peter Maass gives an account of the battle for Diyala bridge during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Col McCoy of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, talks about war casualties and how they are tragic but unavoidable. As the unit's commander, McCoy knows it is his job to break through enemy lines to reach military objectives, and that the cost will be in blood. Maass goes on to talk about Iraqi civilian losses and what the unit thinks of killing.

Maass, Peter. "Professor Nagl's War." *The New York Times Magazine*, 11Jan04.

A graduate of West Point who specializes in counterinsurgency, Maj John Nagl, gets hands-on experience in Iraq where he is third in command of Task Force 1/34, part of the 1st Infantry Division. In Iraq, Nagl experiences attacks by insurgents on American forces and those domestic forces cooperating with the Americans. Nagl finds it one thing to study counterinsurgency and another to experience it and help with operations against insurgents.

McCaffrey, Gen Barry R., USA (Ret). "We Need More Troops." *Wall Street Journal*, 29Jul03.

Gen McCaffrey stresses the importance of having adequate military personnel. The success of U.S. combat forces has made the United States more secure, but in the process troops have been stretched too thin. To finish the War on Terror and operations in Iraq, more combat forces need to be on active duty.

McCartney, Capt Stephen F., MC, USNR. "Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Surgeon's Perspective." *Navy Medicine*, Mar-Apr04, pp. 6-9.

The author recalls his experiences with Alpha Surgical Company, 1st Medical Battalion in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He relates how hectic battle is, and the fact that both Americans and Iraqis were treated for wounds.

McEntree, Marni. "Marines Adjust With Time." *European and Pacific Stars and Stripes*, 6Jun03.

As major combat operations come to a close, Marines adjust themselves to peacekeeping and rebuilding of the war zone in Babylon, Iraq.

MacFarquhar, Neil. "Occupation: Marines Turn Over a South-Central Area of Iraq to a Polish-Led International Force." *The New York Times*, 4Sep03.

The United States hands over command of an area in south-central Iraq to Polish forces. Poland became the third nation to become an official occupying power. The transfer signifies the change of power from occupying forces to the new Iraqi government.

MacFarquhar, Neil. "In Najaf, Justice Can Be Blind but Not Female." *The New York Times*, 31Jul03.

LtCol Christopher C. Conlin postpones a decision to swear in Najaf, Iraq's first female judge. An Islamic group protests that it is against Islamic law for a woman to take the position.

MacFarquhar, Neil, "Iraq Shiites Protest in Formerly Calm Najaf." *The New York Times*, 20Jul03.

Demonstrators of the Shiite majority rally around Moktada al-Sadr, a cleric and supporter of theocracy, to oppose the American presence in their city.

McSweeney, Capt Dan. "CLOWNS to the Left of Me." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Nov03, pp. 46-48.

Capt McSweeney describes military-media relations during the war in Iraq. This is a short personal account of embedded reporters and the military each trying to do their job and not step on each other's toes.

Maples, MajGen Michael D., USA. "Fires in Operation Iraqi Freedom." *Field Artillery Journal*, May-Jun03, p. 1.

MajGen Maples discusses field artillery in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He discusses the fielding and employment of new systems such as integration of new technology and strategy. History in the making is stressed as an important tactic to see what works and what does not.

"Marines Work to Restore Ancient Hammurabi." *The New York Times*, 27Jul03.

U.S. Marines repair damage to museums in the ancient city of Babylon, Iraq. The museums were vandalized and robbed following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, contained significant archaeological artifacts from the 4,300- year old city.

Mater, Journalist Seamen Erica, USNS. "Comfort Faces Different War."
<http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=7213>. 2May03.

The author compares the contributions of the Comfort and her crew made during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm with those made during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.

Matthews, William. "The High Cost of Peace: Postwar Iraq Will Drain Federal Coffers, Army Ranks." *Armed Forces Journal*, May03, pp. 11-12.

William Matthews assesses post-war Iraq. He discusses the differing opinions and estimates made by officials on topics such as the cost of peacekeeping forces and the cost to America in the long run.

Mattis, MajGen James N. "The Professional Edge." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb04, pp. 19-20.

MajGen Mattis discusses the importance of reading and studying the experience of leadership and the nature of war throughout history. These experiences of those that have fought, conquered, discovered and theorized should be applied to modern day warfare and tactics. By doing this, modern-day warriors can be better prepared to make judgments and decisions in critical situations.

Mattis, MajGen James N. "1st Marine Division (Rein): Commanding General's Message to All Hands," Mar03.

MajGen Mattis addresses the Marine warriors on Operation Iraqi Freedom. It is a motivational document with a prescription for war etiquette.

Mazzetti, Mark. "Fighting Words: A Marine Commander Readies his Troops for Combat." <<http://www.usnews.com/usnews/new/iraq/articles.marines030317.html>>. 17Mar03.

LtGen James Conway, commanding officer of I Marine Expeditionary Force, gives a motivational speech to assembled Marines concerning the impending war with Iraq.

Melillo, LtCol Michael R. "Cannon Cockers at War: The 11th Marines in Operation Iraqi Freedom." *Field Artillery Journal*, Sep-Oct 03, pp. 28-32.

This article recounts the 11th Marines' importance role in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Topics covered are training, task organization, various battle engagements, artillery adaptability, and security. The 11th Marines was the only regiment to engage the enemy in every battle campaign during Iraqi Freedom.

Mercer, 1stLt Christopher. "Charlie Company Leads BLT into Northern Iraq." 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit Public Affairs Office. <<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/928060/posts>>. Jun03.

The author describes Charlie Company's first mission into northern Iraq to secure the Al'Mosul airport, and their defense of the airport as more troops arrived.

Micucci, LtCol Michael A. "Combining 1st and 2d Combat Engineer Battalions: Should We Do It Again?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec03, pp. 21-24.

LtCol Micucci explores the pros and cons of combining Combat Engineer Battalions during Operation Iraqi Freedom and if this strategy would work in other cases as well.

Moore, Capt Dan, USN. "Penetrate-Isolate-Subvert-Reorient-Reharmonize." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May03, pp. 51-52.

Moore defines the strategy PISRR: penetrate-isolate-subvert-reorient-reharmonize and its' role in defeating the Iraqi regime.

Mortenson, Darrin. "Marines Prepare for Guerrilla War." *North County Times*, 5Dec03.

Marines of the I Marine Expeditionary Force train in preparation of replacing Army soldiers in Iraq. Mortenson notes that most of the Marines in training sessions are not used to combat because of their respective positions in logistics and administration, but in Iraq everyone is a foot soldier.

Mortenson, Darrin. "'Good Intel' Key to Marines' Iraq Mission." *North County Times*, 17Feb04.

Marine officers read and study about the culture and society of Iraq, as preparation for U.S. occupancy. This form of intelligence is different from tactical intelligence, but just as important and necessary.

Mroue, Bassem. "Southern Iraqi Cities Mostly Peaceful Since End of War." *Southeast Missourian*, 15Jul03.

Marine officers read and study about the culture and society of Iraq, as preparation for U.S. occupancy. This form of intelligence is different from tactical intelligence, but just as important and necessary.

Mundy III, LtCol Carl E. "Spare the Rod, Save the Nation." *The New York Times*, 30Dec03.

MajGen James Mattis took a "do no harm" approach as military operations came to a close in Iraq. Soldiers tried to win over the people and be aware of Iraqi sensitivity because this tactic worked better than being tough.

Myrick, Amy. "Marine Sergeant Wins Honors In Iraq." *East Bay Newspapers*, 5Jun03.

Amy Myrick follows the career of Marine Corps Sgt Calise, from his enlistment to the various missions. These missions have earned Sgt Calise meritorious honors.

Nakash, Yitzhak. "The Shi'ites and the Future of Iraq." *Foreign Affairs*, Jul-Aug03, pp. 17-26.

Yitzhak Nakash offers a history of the Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims in relation to Operation Iraqi Freedom. The history of these people reveals insights into the decisions that the groups would most likely make in terms of government, ruler-ship, and the future of Iraq.

O'Brien, Dennis. "Former Navy Secretary Blasts Bush on Iraq." *The Virginian-Pilot*, 30Aug03.

James Webb, former Secretary of the Navy under George Bush senior, gives his opinion on what the current Bush administration should do regarding the occupation of Iraq. He believes that the United Nations should be involved as quickly as possible, and emphasizes a quick exit by the U.S.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Public Affairs Guidance (PAG) on Embedding Media During Possible Future Operations/Deployments in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). <<http://defenseink.mil/news/Feb2003/d20030228pag.pdf>>. 10Feb03.

Document providing guidance, policies, and procedures on embedding news media during possible future operations or deployments in the U.S. Central Commands Area of Responsibility.

Oppel, Richard A., Jr. "U.S. Troops Delay Exit From Najaf." *The New York Times*, 1Sep03.

American troops in Najaf, Iraq hold of replacement by the Polish troops due to a bombing at the holiest Shiite temple in the area. This sort of violence had not been seen before in Najaf, and Americans insist on staying to help out.

Osman, LtGen H.P. "Recent Successes Have Been A Team Effort." *Jacksonville Daily News*, 5Aug03.

LtGen Henry Osman credits recent successes in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa to the team of people who make up II Marine Expeditionary Force. He not only gives credit to the Marines and Sailors who make up the Force, both in the theater and abroad, but also to the civilian employees at home base and the families of the Marines.

Packer, George. "Letter From Baghdad: War After the War, What Washington Doesn't See in Iraq." *The New Yorker*, 24Nov03, pp. 59-85.

George Packer reviews the violence, crime, and politics during the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom. He proves a point that although the Baathist regime is gone, Iraq is still a long way from the objectives of freedom and democracy that President Bush laid out.

Phillips, Michael M. "For Some Marines, The Next Battlefield Is An Emotional On-Hoping to Fend Off Trauma, They Share War Horrors; 'Life Flowed Right Out'" *Wall Street Journal*, (Eastern edition), 11Apr03.

After arriving in Iraq, Marines of Lt Isaac Moore's 2d Platoon experienced combat for the first time. Individual soldiers reveal their encounter with the hard realities of war, and the emotional trauma that results from battle.

Phillips, Michael M. "Job for a Marine: Taking First Breath After a Gas Attack-In Kuwait Drills, Someone Must Test the 'All Clear'; Sending in the Chickens." *Wall Street Journal*, (Eastern edition), 20Feb03.

The author describes Marine training for chemical and biological attack. The 7th Marines in Kuwait demonstrate 'selective unmasking,' where one unlucky Marine takes his gas mask off to see if it is safe to breath.

Phillips, Michael M. "Marines Do It All in Iraq City, But Now They're Going Home." *Wall Street Journal*, 22Aug03.

Basic security operations run by the Americans are handed off to the Bulgarians. However, Col Panayot Panayotov is unsure that his force will be able to do all that the Marines were doing before such as painting schools and training the local police force.

Pitts, Byron. "Live From Baghdad." *The Crisis*, May-Jun03, pp. 31-35.

Reporter Byron Pitts from CBS News recounts his experience as an embedded reporter during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Byron was with HMLA-169, which provided aerial support for Regimental Combat Team 7.

Plenzler, Capt Joseph M. "Conducting Expeditionary Public Affairs." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb04, pp. 26-29.

The internal workings of the Public Affairs team in the 1st Marine Division are detailed. The successful embedding of reporters into the unit was based on the cooperation between the soldiers and the reporters.

Pollack, Kenneth M. "Securing the Gulf." *Foreign Affairs*, Jul-Aug03, pp. 2-16.

Since the United State's victory in Iraq the problems have become more challenging as opposed to easier to deal with. The problem of Persian Gulf security is the main focus of military missions in the Middle East. There are three issues that the United State's must deal with to achieve the end of a more stable Persian Gulf. These issues are the reconstruction of Iraq, Iran's nuclear weapons program, and unrest in the countries comprising the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Powell, Maj Douglas M. "The Military-Media Relationship: From Bull Run to Baghdad." *21st Century Defense: U.S. Joint Operations*, pp. 84-89

The author discusses the history of the embedded journalist program, and the importance of embedded reporters in Operation Iraqi Freedom in relating the war to those at home.

Prine, Carl. "Reflections on a Firefight." *Pittsburgh Tribune-Review*, 11May03.

Embedded reporter Carl Prine gives a moving account of what it is like to be caught in a firefight.

Pugh, Willie B. "Braving My Little Sister's Call to War." *The Crisis*, May-Jun03, p. 54.

LCpl Devan S. Pugh's experience in Kuwait as seen through the eyes of her brother, Willie B. Pugh, is discussed. He recounts her history and dedication to the Marine Corps in the midst of battle.

Quigley, 1stLt Brendan F. "Combined Arms: Losing the Effects?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Feb04, pp. 30-32.

The author posits that current combined arms training tactics are unrealistic, ineffective, and inefficient. He suggests more realism and imagination in the training.

Rabassi, 1stLt Christopher E. "What Happened to Class IX in Iraq?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep 03, pp. 54-56.

Lt Rabassi concludes that Class IX, consumable parts and secondary reparable, did not support sustained combat operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He therefore outlines three areas critical to the management of Class IX items: information management, transportation, and distribution control.

Reed, LCdr Meg, USN. "MEF Engineer Group Seabees Helping to Rebuild Iraq." *Navy Newsstand*, 30May03.

The I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group Seabees still have a major role to play in the Middle East even though Marines and soldiers are packing up to go home. The Seabees are responsible for the rebuilding projects in Iraq.

Reid, Chip. "Recalling Life as an Embedded Reporter: Digging Ditches to Sleep in, Dodging Gunfire – A long Way From D.C." <<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4400708>>.15Mar04.

Chip Reid recalls his life as an embedded reporter with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. He describes ground warfare, the uncertainty in war, and the difficulty he had maintaining an objective viewpoint.

Richardson, Herb, ed. "We—the Marines." *Leatherneck*, Jun03, pp. 44-47.

A series of short articles on different topics concerning Marines. Some topics covered the Marine Band, Marine memorial services, and various individual's personal achievements.

Richey, Warren. "War Reporter in Limbo." *The Christian Science Monitor*, 12Jun03.

Warren Richey flies to Kuwait and spends 17 days waiting to be embedded with the U.S. military to cover the war on Iraq. Finally embedded, Richey expresses what it was like to be in a group of soldiers anticipating battle.

Ricks, Thomas E. "Marines to Offer New Tactics In Iraq: Reduced Use of Force Planned After Takeover from Army." *The Washington Post*, 7Jan04.

Based on an internal Marine document and interviews, the Marine Corps has come up with alternative tactics for use in Iraq. The U.S. Army, which will be replaced by some Marine Corps units, feels that the document is critical of the job they did in Iraq. However, the Marine Corps and Army officials do not see it that way, and are focused on achieving the same goals as the Army—peace and stability in the Sunni Triangle.

Roberts, LtCol Lawrence R., and Maj John P. Farnam. "Airborne Recon Supported Marines' Advances in Iraq." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Jun04, pp. 40-43.

Close coordination among Marine air controllers, strike and reconnaissance aircrews, and their joint and coalition partners enabled decisive realization of Marine Air Group 11's objectives in Operation Iraqi Freedom—which included knocking out Iraqi artillery batteries capable of firing at long ranges.

Rodriguez, LCdr Cindy, USN, Maj Michael Manzer, Jr., Cdr Shawn Lobree, USN, and Cdr Jon Dachos, USN. "Harrier Carriers Perform in Iraqi Freedom." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Feb04, pp. 32-35.

New "Harrier carrier" ships are being used to multiply the force power of naval expertise and Marine air power to achieve more effective operations. The details of the Harrier carriers' advantages are investigated.

Rolfson, Bruce. "Air Power Unleashed: Lessons from Iraq." *Armed Forces Journal*, Jun03, pp. 30-33.

Rolfson discusses air power in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He compares it with Operation Desert Storm to show the differences. He describes aircraft and weapons in detail that played a particularly large role in the effectiveness and speed of missions.

Roos, John G. "What Has U.S. Learned?" *Armed Forces Journal*, May03, pp. 24-30.

John Roos covers some of the important lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom. He discusses the war in terms of the media and politics, enemy encounters, tactics, and older concerns

such as friendly fire. Ross also stresses the importance of capitalizing on these lessons to enhance effectiveness of war and strategy.

Ross, Kirk. "Marine Engineer Group: A Force for the Future." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Jul03, pp. 84-86.

The Marine Engineer Group is described as an evolutionary group, capable of supporting varying efforts and missions. The MEG's primary missions involve construction, repair, supply, and support. MEG has three task forces, Mike (for mobility), Charlie (for construction), and Echo (for endurance), each of which has capabilities that are unique and shared.

Rude, Maj David J., USA, and LtCol Daniel E., Williams, USA. "The 'Warfighter Mindset' and the War in Iraq." *Army*, Jul03, pp. 35-40.

AH-64D Longbow Apache helicopters were for the first time employed in combat missions during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Apache's attributes, comparisons to other roles the helicopter has filled, and the future of the aircraft is covered in detail.

Rumsfeld, Donald H. "Help Iraq to Help Itself." *Wall Street Journal*, (Eastern edition), 29Sep03.

The media reports on the war in Iraq do not reveal the whole picture of what is actually occurring. The media focuses on the security situation in Iraq, but there is much more than this going on. Rumsfeld attempts to set the record straight by listing and defining the good things that are happening such as reopening of bridges, schools, and businesses, and the formation of the Iraqi Governing Council.

Ryan, RAdm Paul, J., USN. "Mine Countermeasures a Success." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May03, pp. 52-53.

Mine warfare and countermeasures operations in Iraq have contributed greatly to the overall effectiveness of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The missions and accomplishments of this type of warfare are detailed.

Sambrook, Richard. "Military and the Media." *RUSI Journal*, Aug03, pp. 40-45.

The relationship between the military and the media is a tedious one, especially during war coverage. Operation Iraqi Freedom is an example of the divergent goals of the two groups. Sambrook says the military want to win and the media want the truth. Sambrook gives an account of military-media relations in recent history.

Schmidt, Col John W. "The Principles of War and Iraqi Freedom." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Jun03, pp. 70-71.

Schmidt offers a new perspective on Operation Iraqi Freedom. He puts the operation in the context of the principles of war and concludes that the war did follow the principles, and was thus successful.

Schreiber, LtCol Paul, Cdr Brian Kelley, USCG, LtCol Gary Holland, USAF, and Cdr Stephen Davis, USN. "Iraq After Saddam." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Apr03, pp. 32-35.

Schreiber analyzes the post war conditions in Iraq and evaluates what still needs to be done to make the country stable. He focuses on security issues as a multi-faceted issue concerning both civilian and military spheres.

Seamon, LtCol Richard. "Military Not Complaining About Coverage." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, May03, p. 56.

Embedded journalists are reporting their individual experiences and opinions as well as the truth of the war as it progresses. Although there are problems with this type of coverage, the military does not seem to condemn the news, but to condone it.

Sedge, Michael H. "Not-so-Friendly Fire: War in Iraq Shows Fratricide Remains an Enduring Problem." *Armed Forces Journal*, May03, p. 18.

Despite technology and detailed systems that are in place, fratricide, or friendly fire, still remains a problem to be overcome by U.S. military forces. Specific examples are given from Operation Iraqi Freedom, showing that there are still breakdowns in the system.

Shachtman, Noah. "Tough Talking for Marines in Iraq." <http://www.wired.com/news/technology/10,1282,59106,00.html>. 7Jun03.

The array of equipment Marines have to use to communicate with each other during combat missions is overwhelming. Radios, speakers, laptops, and other equipment overload the limited space convoys have. Solutions are in the making, but until then Marines have to cope.

Shadid, Anthony. "Marines Put Militias on Deadline in Najaf." *The Washington Post*, 10Sep03.

Iraqi militiamen deployed in Najaf, Iraq, to help improve the security situation and avert violence. However, U.S. military officials told that the religious factions removed the armed followers because of a decision to only let the police force carry weapons.

Shelato, Sgt M.P. "Marine Corps CH-46's Vital to CasEvac Mission in Iraq." <http://www.usmc.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf>. 30Jul03.

This account differentiates between CasEvac and MedEvac flights, describes the composition of the crew and their procedures, and emphasizes the dangers inherent to flying in bad weather during combat conditions.

Simpson, Ross W. "Battle for Baghdad." *Leatherneck*, Oct03, pp. 14-18.

Simpson describes the Battle for Baghdad from the viewpoint of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. Although it took 21 days to liberate Baghdad, the fighting is far from over.

Simpson, Ross W. "Marine Close Air Support: Never More Important." *Leatherneck*, May03, pp. 16-18.

Marines of the 1st Marine Division rely on the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing for support. Marines support their own units before any others. Simpson interviews members of the 3d MAW to gain perspective on their mission in the Persian Gulf.

Simpson, Ross W. "Training the Media for War," *Leatherneck*, Jun03, pp. 38-41.

Prior to the deployment of embedded journalist to the hot areas of the Persian Gulf, the journalists underwent training exercises to prepare them for the harsh conditions of battle. The author describes the "prep school" these journalists attended, courtesy of the Department of Defense.

Simpson, Ross W., "Going to War." *Leatherneck*, Jul03, pp. 30-35.

Embedded reporter Ross Simpson describes what it was like going to war with the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. The author focuses on day-to-day activities, training, and preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Sinnreich, Richard Hart. "Iraqi Freedom Confirms Some Familiar Lessons." *Army*, Jun03, p. 7-8.

The author concludes that although Operation Iraqi Freedom presents new challenges in warfare, the familiar lessons of past wars are confirmed in this war. Despite such aspects as combined arms operations, training and self-discipline of the troops, swift operations and adaptability, and the role of air and sea power, the war must still be won on the ground.

Sisto, Cpl Jeff. "Experience and Adaptability Ensure Success for 24th MEU (SOC) in Iraq." <<http://www.Marines.mil/marinelink/mcn2000.nsf/lookupstoryref/200351228360>>. May03.

The author discusses the skills and training that allowed for the successes of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit in the challenging missions they faced in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Smith, MajGen Ray L., and F. J. West. Implications from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM for the Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Gazette*, Nov03, pp. 40-46.

The authors investigate the implications of Iraqi Freedom as they pertain to the Marine Corps. West and Smith focus on how the Operation was a military victory. Speed, logistics, deterrence, planning, and maneuver warfare are some of the aspects the authors use to prove U.S. military power.

Sousa, 1stLt Anthony G. "FiST Up! Task Organizing Fire Support Teams for Maximum Flexibility in Mechanized Operations." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Jan 04, pp. 42-43.

The author emphasizes the importance of fire support teams (FiST) and the placement of these teams in a company. FiST give battlefield commanders supporting fires, but their place in task organization can make a significant difference in the effectiveness of the FiST.

Staff and Commanders, 1st and 2d Combat Engineer Battalions. "Combat Engineer Battalion in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM." *Marine Corps Gazette*, Dec03, pp. 18-21.

Operation Iraqi Freedom proved once again that there are never enough combat engineers on the battlefield and why both 1st and 2d Combat Engineer Battalions were needed.

Steel, Dennis. "Baghdad: Aftermath and Prelude." *Army*, Jul03, pp. 26-34.

Steele documents the transfer from combat operations to security and reconstructive operations in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad.

Steinkopff, Eric. "2d MEB Commander Describes the Differences with Deployment in Iraq." *Jacksonville Daily News*, 29Jun03.

The 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade commander, Brigadier General Richard Natonski, describes the challenges and uncertainties of combat.

Sweet, Sgt Mike, USA. "New Council, Mayor Mark New Iraqi Government." *Marine Corps News*, 15Jul03.

A new government council will help to establish democracy in the holy city of Najaf. Although Marines still patrol the area, Najaf is stated to be a safe and secure environment.

Sweet, Sgt Mike, USA. "Marines Open Last Legacy School before Shipping Home." *Marine Corps News*, 18Aug03.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, opens the Al Gary Secondary School for Girls after renovation. The Marines strive to leave behind a legacy of freedom, not of war.

Tomkins, Richard. "War Diary: Tales From the Front." *United Press International*, 22Apr03.

Tomkins records his observations and reflections on being embedded with Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, and the push into Baghdad.

Tomkins, Richard. "War Reflection: With the Marines in Iraq." *Washington Times*, 21Apr03.

Tomkins again recounts the time spent embedded with Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. As a reporter, he remembers the individuals of the company and how they were like family to him.

Torriero, E.A. "GIs Doubt Foreign Troops' Readiness." *Chicago Tribune*, 7Sep03.

Torriero reports on the readiness of foreign troops deployed to replace Marine and Army units in the Persian Gulf. The integrated units must overcome complications such as language barriers and training and readiness differences in order to work with each other.

Tripp, Charles. "After Saddam." *Survival*, Winter02-03, pp. 23-37.

The author provides a speculative view on Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. He discusses the hypothetical overthrow of the dictator, reconstruction, and the staying power of the United States in the region as well as the reactions of the surrounding countries.

Truscott IV, Lucian K. "A Million Miles from the Green Zone to the Front Lines." *The New York Times*, 7Dec03.

Truscott tells of the hardships Company B, 101st Airborne Division, must endure while trying to make Mosul, Iraq, a livable place. Although its missions were nonmilitary, there was no one else to do them and the company does them well.

Tyler, Patrick E. "There's a New Enemy in Iraq: The Nasty Surprise," *The New York Times*, 1Jun03.

After the fall of Saddam, it was expected that troops would withdraw and democracy would prevail in Iraq. Tyler makes the point that expectations are not working out on either side. Misunderstandings could provoke aggression by Iraqis and more unorganized combat.

Tyler, Patrick E., and Amy Waldman. "After the War: Combat; G.I. Is Killed in Grenade Attack on Convoy; Another Blast Starts Fire on Oil Pipeline." *The New York Times*, 23Jun03.

The author recounts the violence and small-scale assaults on American troops. Once such assault led to the death of an American soldier, the 14th in a series of attacks in the past month.

Warner, Margaret. "A Marine's View." *Jim Lehrer Transcript*, 26Sep03.

Margaret Warner interviews MajGen James Mattis. As commander of the 1st Marine Division, Mattis recounts his experience in combat, including the Battle for Baghdad, and running the occupation in Iraq.

West, F.J. "Bing." "Maneuver Warfare: It Worked in Iraq." *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Feb04, pp. 36-38.

West says that maneuver warfare techniques, not network-centric warfare concepts, were what won the war in Iraq.

West, F.J. "Bing" "Quagmire?" *Wall Street Journal*, (Eastern edition), 23Jul03.

The author compares what the media presents to the public with what the military and government see as the truth. He especially refers to the casualties of the war—in this conflict, America as a nation has lost relatively few men, but each loss is an individual tragedy.

White House. "President Bush Addresses the Nation." <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html>>. 19Mar03.

President George W. Bush addresses the nation regarding Operation Iraqi Freedom. He gives the causes for going to war, the objectives, and coalition support that America has for the operation.

Wilson, George C., "Bottom Up." *Government Executive Magazine*, 26Apr03.

It is the author's conclusion, after being embedded with Marines in Iraq, that the top commanding officers do not understand what the embedded reporters job is in the war. He says that the reporters are there to win the propaganda war in Iraq, but that the officers are not conducive to this mandate.

Wong, Edward. "Iraq's 'Faceless Enemy': Rebels Without a Cause or a Web Site." *The New York Times*, 7Dec03.

Edward Wong investigates the "faceless enemy" who attack American forces in Iraq. He compares them with guerrilla fighters of past wars, but concludes that they are indeed a new kind of enemy.

Woolley, Wayne. "Reservists' Last Convoy a Joyful One." *The Star-Ledger*, 14Jul03.

The author follows the 6th Motor Transport Battalion as it heads home from Iraq. The Marines are happy they are going home; confident they have completed their mission; did what they were sent to Iraq to do, and come home with everyone they started out with.

Wright G., Andrew. "Navy, Marine Engineers Battle to Win Iraqi Hearts and Minds." *Construction*, 14Apr03.

While other coalition forces are still securing Baghdad, Rear Admiral Chuck Kubic and his unit are concentrating on winning the battle for support by Iraqi residents of Umm Qasr

Wright, Evan. "The Killer Elite: The True Story of Bullets, Bombs and a Marine Platoon at War in Iraq." *Rolling Stone*, 26Jun03.

Writer-photographer Evan Wright risked his life to get this story—a rollicking, profane, brutal look at the Marines of Company B, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, who led the charge into Iraq. In the course of myriad firefights, mortar attacks and ambushes on their way to Baghdad, Wright won the trust of his subjects, but he remained clear-eyed, depicting the soldier's cold-bloodedness as well as their humanity. For the three part series, Wright received the 2004 National Magazine Award for Excellence in reporting.

Wright, Evan. "The Killer Elite, Part Two: From Hell to Baghdad." *Rolling Stone*, 10Jul03.

Wright, Evan. "The Killer Elite, Part Three: The Battle for Baghdad." *Rolling Stone*, 24Jul03.

"Young Shiites Make Power Play, But Their Ambitions Cause Friction." <http://www.charleston.et/stories/072703/ter_27younshi.shtml>. Jul03.

A group of young Shiite Muslim clerics, the al-Sadr, organize a religious army in the city of Najaf, to protest American occupation of the country.

Back Cover: The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, the device has continued on Marine Corps buttons to the present day.

