

attached to the 4th Marines at Chu Lai, with one platoon attached to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Phu Bai. In August, Company B, 1st Tank Battalion arrived at Chu Lai with the 7th Marines and remained in support of that regiment. Four months later Company A, 1st Tank Battalion landed with the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines at Phu Bai.

Lieutenant Colonel Milton L. Raphael, who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Jones on 31 August, explained the complicated command and control problems of the tank battalion:

The battalion commander maintains administrative control of the reinforced battalion and exercises logistic control and/or supervision of all units regardless of location or support status. Tactical control of the gun companies is for the most part in the hands of the supported infantry commander.¹⁹

Raphael related that he, his staff, and company commanders attempted to influence the tactical employment of their tanks by keeping abreast of friendly and enemy situations in all enclaves and then advising the infantry unit commanders on the employment of tanks to enhance the accomplishment of their missions. The battalion commander exercised control, in that:

The four gun companies committed outside of the battalion command post maintain daily contact with the



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In a change of command ceremony on 31 August, Lieutenant Colonel Milton L. Raphael (left) accepts the colors of the 3d Tank Battalion from Lieutenant Colonel States R. Jones. Lieutenant Colonel Jones brought the battalion headquarters into Vietnam the previous month.

battalion. . . . The two companies in the Chu Lai enclave submit a consolidated weekly report of all phases of their operations . . . all company commanders come to the battalion command post to attend the monthly battalion command and staff meeting.²⁰

By December, the III MAF tank force consisted of 65 M-48 tanks and 12 flame tanks deployed at the three Marine enclaves.* In addition to the tanks, there were 65 ONTOS** from both the 1st and 3d Anti-Tank Battalions and 157 amphibian tractors (LVTP-5)*** from the 1st and 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalions attached to Marine infantry units.

Marine Reconnaissance


All Marine units were exposed to severe doctrinal tests in 1965; for the "Recon" Marines the year was one of change and adjustment. The two committed reconnaissance units, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, an integral 3d Marine Division battalion, and the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, a Force Troops unit, both experienced great difficulty in responding to demands imposed by the three growing TAORs at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Hue/Phu Bai. The two ground reconnaissance units were different in many respects, which caused many re-evaluations, as well as revelations, during the opening months of Marine ground action in Vietnam.

Reconnaissance missions were clearly defined by tables of organization. A division reconnaissance battalion, in this case the 3d, was charged with the primary mission of conducting "reconnaissance in support of a Marine Division and its subordinate elements." A force level company, on the other

* The M-48 was armed with a 90mm gun and two machine guns. The flame tank was identical to the M-48, with the exception that the gun tube which housed the flame thrower was shorter and slightly larger in diameter than the 90mm gun tube.

** The ONTOS was a full-tracked, lightly armored, mobile carrier mounting six 106mm recoilless rifles, four .50 caliber spotting rifles, and one .30 caliber machine gun.

*** The Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel (LVTP-5) was an armored amphibian assault, personnel, and cargo carrier. The LVTP-5 was armed with two .30 caliber machine guns. Modifications of the LVTP-5 used in Vietnam included the LVTR, which could be used to retrieve and repair other LVTs, and the LVTE which could be employed to breach minefields and clear obstacles during amphibious operations and river crossings. In addition, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion at Da Nang included a Provisional Armored Amphibian Platoon of six LVTHs. This vehicle was armed with a turret-mounted 105mm howitzer and one .50 caliber and one .30 caliber machine gun.



hand, was to "conduct pre-assault and distant post-assault reconnaissance in support of a landing force."²¹

*1st Force Reconnaissance Company,
The Early Days*

Early beach reconnaissance efforts of Captain David Whittingham's Subunit 1, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company were textbook examples of proper employment of the company. On 23-27 February, Subunit 1, in conjunction with Underwater Demolition Team 12, operating from the USS *Cook* (APD 130), accomplished the reconnaissance of RED Beaches 1 and 2 at Da Nang. As a result, RED Beach 2 was selected as the landing beach for BLT 3/9, the first element of the 9th MEB to land in Vietnam.

The period 15-20 March was devoted to the reconnaissance of the beaches and terrain near Phu Bai. Subunit 1's reports resulted in 3d MEB's decision to send its first BLT to Phu Bai by way of the river approach to Hue and then overland to Phu Bai. The proposed landing beaches were backed by impassable lagoons which made exit almost impossible. For Subunit 1, this was its first real test. The VC were active in the area, but the mission was accomplished without loss and with excellent results.

Eight days later, Subunit 1 undertook the reconnaissance of the beach which was to be the site of the 3d MEB landing, Chu Lai. Its reconnaissance was finished on 30 March, again with excellent results.

On 20 April, 18 days before the Chu Lai landing, the force reconnaissance Marines started a survey of a beach south of the Tra Bong River 10 kilometers southeast of the proposed 3d MEB landing beach. On the 22d the reconnaissance party encountered light resistance. That was not the case the next day. Five Marines on the beach were caught in the crossfire of 25 VC. Corporal Lowell H. Merrell was wounded twice and two sailors in the beach party's LCVP also were hit; all three subsequently died. The 1st Force Reconnaissance Company had lost its first Marine to VC fire. In memory, the new force reconnaissance camp would be named Camp Merrell.

In May, Subunit 1 teams were sent to Special Forces camps to serve as patrol leaders for CIDG patrols. Other teams were assigned to reconnaissance-in-force patrols composed of U.S.- and

Australian-led Nungs* which operated from Da Nang. A third mission was to provide quick response patrols to act as security for downed Marine helicopters. Initially, all force reconnaissance reports and debriefings were coordinated by the III MAF G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Gruenler.

On 10 July, another platoon reinforced Subunit 1, and during July and August the two platoon subunit operated from the 4th Marines' Chu Lai base. Another force platoon was conducting beach surveys for the Commander, Task Force 76; still another platoon was assigned to the SLF; while the rest of the company was still at Camp Pendleton.


On 11 August, Major Malcolm C. Gaffen, the company commander, arrived and relieved Captain Whittingham as subunit commander. During Operation STARLITE, in August, Subunit 1 was attached to the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, and the 3d Platoon, attached to the SLF, landed with BLT 3/7. At the conclusion of STARLITE, Subunit 1 returned to Da Nang.

The company headquarters and a fourth platoon arrived on 24 October while the subunit was participating in Operation RED SNAPPER with the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines north of Da Nang. At the conclusion of RED SNAPPER, the four platoons were reunited at their Camp Merrell base on China Beach south of Da Nang. The China Beach site had been selected because of its ready access to the ocean for amphibious training and because it provided enough room for parachute requalification.

The arrival at Camp Merrell of two-thirds of the company and the fact that the 5th and 6th Platoons had moved west to Okinawa suggested that soon the company would be operating as an independent force unit carrying out the "distant port-assault reconnaissance" specified in the table of organization.

During the summer and fall, company units had experienced a variety of operational difficulties. Communications problems were rampant. The force

* Nungs are ethnic Chinese, residents of Kwangsi Province, but an appreciable number inhabited northern North Vietnam. They are noted for their martial skills. As such, many served, willingly, under the French, and, for this reason, emigrated to South Vietnam in 1954. At one time after the formation of the Republic, the South Vietnamese Army included a division of Nungs, but it was broken up because of its potential threat to the incumbent government. Nungs, hired on as mercenaries, eventually came under the domain of U.S. Special Forces and other agencies involved in unconventional warfare.





USMC Photo A184814

Marines from Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion cross the Nong River near Phu Bai in a rubber raft. The reconnaissance company, attached to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, is supporting a battalion search and clear operation.

platoon with BLT 2/1 during DAGGER THRUST II in September had to be extracted because radio contact could not be established. Another unit was landed from a Coast Guard patrol boat on the relatively secure coast near Hai Van Pass north of Da Nang to test communications and control, and this operation, too, was a "bust." The company's vehicles were "down;" supply problems were legion; and the partially developed MAF staff was not designed to deal with such difficulties.²²

General Walt's solution was to transfer Subunit 1 to the operational control of the 3d Marine Division, which in turn transferred the unit to "opcon" 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. The transfer was effective 30 October; two days later Subunit 1, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company became 1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) with a strength of nine officers and 103 enlisted men.²³

In effect, the force company became a sixth, albeit smaller, company of the reinforced 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Although the "in country" elements of "1st Force" were assembled at last, the assimilation by "division recon" was not an entirely satisfactory solution; some knotty problems arose.

3d Reconnaissance Battalion, Opening Moves

When the 9th MEB landed at Da Nang on 8 March, a platoon from Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion attached to BLT 3/9, became the first division reconnaissance element to be

"resident" in Vietnam. Other platoons arrived as attachments to BLTs, a platoon from Company B with BLT 3/4, a platoon from Company D with BLT 1/3, and a second Company D platoon with BLT 2/3. Platoon attachments lasted until 13 April, at which time the four "in country" reconnaissance platoons were regrouped as a new Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. Captain Patrick G. Collins' Company D operated as the brigade reconnaissance company of the 9th MEB until 7 May, when Lieutenant Colonel Don H. "Doc" Blanchard, his battalion staff, and the rest of the battalion landed at Chu Lai with the 3d MAB. "Doc" Blanchard did not stay at Chu Lai very long; on the 12th, he, his staff, battalion headquarters, and Companies A and C moved to Da Nang where they were reunited with Company D. Company B remained at Chu Lai. In the process, Companies A and B were brought up to strength by integrating the Company D platoons which had arrived with the battalion at Chu Lai; there were no longer two Company D elements. Company C was detached from Da Nang to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Hue/Phu Bai on 26 May.

On 13 September, Company C moved again, returning to Da Nang, leaving its 3d Platoon at Hue/Phu Bai still attached to the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines. Battalion integrity was improved somewhat on 19 September by a directive from General Walt which stated that the reconnaissance battalion should be used in general support of the 3d Marine Division.²⁴ Although this measure simplified command and control, the division was still operating from three separate enclaves, and three separate reconnaissance elements were required. On the 19th, reinforcement of division reconnaissance was accomplished by attaching Company C, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, which had arrived in August as an attachment to the 7th Marines.

The new battalion commander since 1 September, Lieutenant Colonel Roy R. Van Cleve, ordered some adjustments on 20 September in order to comply with III MAF's general support order. The new dispositions were: Headquarters, Companies A, C(-), and D at Da Nang; one Company C platoon at Hue/Phu Bai; and newly designated Reconnaissance Group ALPHA, composed of Company B and attached Company C, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, at Chu Lai.²⁵

During this entire period, the reconnaissance

battalion was faced with the question of "reconnaissance of what." The Hue/Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai enclaves were essentially defensive positions. By virtue of III MAF's mission, all reconnaissance efforts were defensive patrols, but the restrictions imposed by the TAORs limited the patrols to "their own front yard," and there were many people in the "yard."²⁶

Geography solved part of the problem. The physical characteristics of the Hue/Phu Bai lodgment provided the Marines with excellent observation. This had resulted in the reduction of the reconnaissance force there to only one platoon in September.

At the other two enclaves, RAORs (reconnaissance areas of operation) evolved slowly. On 19 June, at the recommendation of Lieutenant Colonel Blanchard, General Walt had approved the formation of a RAOR that extended from 4 to 10 kilometers forward of the Da Nang defensive positions.²⁷ At Chu Lai, the RAORs were as required by the two regiments there, the 4th and 7th Marines. Even with the formation of Reconnaissance Group ALPHA in September, the two Chu Lai-based reconnaissance companies continued to function as direct support companies for the respective regiments.

Another limiting factor which influenced the range and duration of reconnaissance patrols was the radio equipment then in use. The PRC-47 radio was too big and too heavy for small teams, but it did have sufficient range. The smaller, lighter PRC-10 did not have the range for deep patrols. Both sets used up batteries at a high rate, and battery consumption was accelerated by the climate which reduced battery life by more than half. Of all the patrol equipment, only water had a higher priority than batteries, and both were heavy. Patrols were caught up in the simple equation which restricted patrol duration to the number of batteries that could be carried, which, in turn, was reduced still further by the amount of other equipment and supplies which had to be carried.

Radio relay stations helped to solve the radio range problem to some degree, but the arrival, in November, of the PRC-25 radio with its long-life BA 386 battery finally enabled reconnaissance Marines to carry out deeper, long duration patrols. Although communications were vastly improved, reconnaissance units were continually faced with the grim reality of heavier loads for longer patrols.

The size of reconnaissance patrols, especially in




USMC Photo A185990

LtCol Roy R. Van Cleve, commander of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, holds up a Viet Cong flag captured in Operation TRAILBLAZER. The operation took place in a VC-dominated area, 16 miles southwest of Da Nang, nicknamed "Happy Valley."

the Da Nang TAOR, became a matter of great concern. Although the Marines were operating from fixed bases in relatively secure areas, patrols had to be large enough to fight their way out of any entrapment and deal with the possibility of ambush. Sergeant Richard A. Van Deusen of Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion recalled this uneasy situation:

It's very hard in an alien country to hide yourself—I mean, you're going along, and people are all over the place, and they know you're out there, so this right away compromises any chance of "recon." It all depends on the area you're in. Now if you're in the mountains, you can live there for days before they ever realize you're up there. Sometime they never know you're up there. But if you're south—and each treeline has a village on it—the only good chance you have is moving at night.²⁸

By mid-1965, both force and division reconnaissance formations began experiencing utilization problems which ranged from assignments in total disregard of existing doctrine to assignment that had nothing to do with reconnaissance.



Reflecting on this situation, the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Van Cleve, recalled:

They were being used for any mission that might come up. If you didn't have somebody else to do it, why, give it to recon. They ended up on some raider-type missions; they ended up as CP security frequently on operations. As a result of this, General Walt decided that the reconnaissance effort should be controlled at the reconnaissance battalion level, and that any request for reconnaissance type missions would come through the Division staff, the Division reconnaissance officer, G-3/G-2, advising, "Yes, this is a reconnaissance type mission," or "No, this is not a reconnaissance type mission." Division would task reconnaissance battalion to provide to whatever organization was asking for the necessary forces. People were realizing there was a lot of talent in the Recon Battalion that was not being used for strictly recon purposes, and the Divisions and MAF were losing a lot of potentially valuable information.²⁹

Were reconnaissance Marines "fighters" or "finders"? When the first revision of the provisional M-Series table of organization was published on 20 February 1958, it stated that "The [Division] Reconnaissance Battalion may be employed as a unit to screen the advance of the Division or execute counter reconnaissance missions." These were clearly defined fighting missions. The publication of the approved M-1428 (Division Reconnaissance Battalion) Table of Organization, 5 March 1961, reversed this concept stating "The Reconnaissance Battalion . . . will be employed to gain intelligence," and "It is not equipped for decisive or sustained combat It is not capable of screening or counterreconnaissance missions," but, the concept went on to explain, commanders supported by division reconnaissance could, in the event the reconnaissance element was in danger of being "overwhelmed," "reinforce the reconnaissance force, directing that force to destroy the enemy."³⁰

Revision 1 of 23 September 1963, still in effect in 1965, carried the transition a step further by deleting the "destroy the enemy" option, and reiterated the "not equipped for decisive or sustained combat" restriction, but some damage had been done. Misinterpretation of mission and the natural aggressiveness engendered by the demanding physical conditioning program required by reconnaissance units produced a strange amalgam of "fighting" and "finding" reconnaissance Marines.³¹

Many senior Marines had been members of special

units during World War II, notably the raider and parachute battalions, and all Marines were familiar with their legendary exploits. Of the senior commanders in Vietnam in 1965, four were raider battalion veterans: Major General Walt and three of his regimental commanders, Colonels Wheeler, Dupras, and Peatross. There was bound to be some "raider" thinking, but the Commanding General, FMFPac, Lieutenant General Krulak, resolutely insisted that "Combat assault operations, including amphibious raids, are missions to be conducted by rifle companies, rather than reconnaissance units."³² Nevertheless, during the summer and fall of 1964, Company C, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion had actually trained as the battalion's "raid" company.³³ The die was cast.

By 12 March 1965, Company D, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion had been reconstituted in Vietnam. It was the 9th MEB's reconnaissance company, and, as such, in April it claimed more VC "kills" than all of the "in country" infantry units, even through patrolling beyond the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORS was not authorized until 20 April. The company commander, Captain Patrick G. Collins, recalled: ". . . surveillance and observation



USMC Photo A185989

Marines from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion prepare to make camp during Operation TRAILBLAZER in an enemy base area. The VC had used the hut in the background for food storage, class rooms, living area, and as a medical aid station.



USMC Photo A185530

The 3d Reconnaissance Battalion honor guard stands in front of the monument dedicating its base camp to First Lieutenant Frank S. Reasoner, former Company A commander who was killed on 12 July 1965. Lieutenant Reasoner was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during that engagement.

missions quite frequently turned into contact with the Viet Cong and having some quite spirited actions” More specifically, Colonel Frank E. Garetson, the 9th Marines Commander, would tell Captain Collins: “You find [them]; we’ll bail you out.”³⁴

As a result, early reconnaissance patrols were large, usually between 12 and 22 Marines; a number were even larger company-strength patrols. Large patrols did not guarantee absolute safety. On 12 July, an 18-man patrol from Company A operating near Dai Loc 18 kilometers southwest of Da Nang tangled with a VC company. One officer was killed and three men were wounded.

The dead officer, First Lieutenant Frank S. Reasoner, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions on 12 July, the first Marine action in Vietnam to merit the nation’s highest honor. The 3d Reconnaissance Battalion’s camp at Da Nang was named Camp Reasoner, but the lieutenant’s heroic death did little to solve the patrol security dilemma. This enigma was only solved later when the TAORS were enlarged to include the rugged, sparsely inhabited terrain to the west, and when reconnaissance efforts were concentrated on the business of finding the enemy.

The III MAF commander, General Walt, realized that reconnaissance units, properly utilized, were

well equipped to locate an enemy who had already established a reputation for blending into the surroundings, a phantom army which was seldom seen armed and concentrated. Even when VC concentrations were sighted, they were usually on the move, and presented fleeting targets at best. Regular Marine ground formations were too clumsy for this mission; the VC they found generally wanted to be found. General Walt decided that since reconnaissance patrols could find the VC, then the patrols should be provided with a means to destroy the enemy. Accordingly, he allowed patrols to call in air and artillery strikes. Slow clearance procedures hindered this application in the Da Nang TAOR, but the system proved to be successful at Chu Lai. The concept was refined, and in 1966 it was adopted as a standard tactic, then known as STINGRAY.³⁵

Any doubts about the mission of reconnaissance Marines were resolved by General Walt's September directive which restored the division reconnaissance battalion to its general support role. Lieutenant Colonel Van Cleve's appreciation of his mission essentially put an end to the "raider" days, although some experimentation still persisted.

On 18 October, two 3d Reconnaissance Battalion companies hiked into "Happy Valley" for Operation TRAILBLAZER. Their mission was to determine the size of enemy concentrations in the hills west of the Da Nang TAOR. For six days, 18-24 October, the reconnaissance force prowled the hills. Two VC were killed, but five separate enemy base areas were discovered and a vast amount of trail network information was accumulated. TRAILBLAZER was the last of the reconnaissance-in-force operations conducted by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion. A new trend was in motion. By December, the battalion was concentrating on patrolling, sending out more, smaller patrols; a company-size patrol was the exception.

Force and Division Reconnaissance Merged

The force reconnaissance Marines viewed their attachment to division "recon" with trepidation, and the first weeks of the new arrangement were not without some trying moments. During November, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company executed division reconnaissance-type patrols in the Da Nang area, but the III MAF planners had not forgotten the force company's capabilities. As a result, on 27 November the 2d Platoon was returned to III MAF

operational control and sent to Special Forces Camp A-106 at Ba To, 42 kilometers south-southwest of Quang Ngai. On 7 December, III MAF reassigned another force platoon, the 3d, to Camp A-107, Tra Bong, 27 kilometers southwest of Chu Lai, on the upper reaches of the Tra Bong River. Their mission, code named BIRDWATCHER, was "... to test the feasibility of *deep* patrols."³⁶ At last force "recon" was going deep, but the 2d Platoon at Ba To was in for a tough school session.

At 0530, 15 December three reconnaissance teams (20 Marines and CIDG troops), plus a 61-man base defense reaction force, moved out "to determine location, identity, strength, movement, and armament of VC/PAVN units." More than 70 Communists were sighted during the next two days, but the U.S./Vietnamese reconnaissance force had made a serious mistake. The patrol base had not been moved for two nights. The only redeeming feature of this situation was that the base was on a hill, the best defensive terrain in the area.

By 1730 16 December all teams had returned to the patrol base, but the planned move back to Ba To was cancelled when dense fog settled over the camp. The force of 81 Marine, Special Forces, CIDG, and Nung troops was stuck in the same camp site for the third consecutive night.

At 1900 the Viet Cong began walking mortar rounds across the patrol base. The Vietnamese lieutenant in charge of the patrol was mortally wounded and a U.S. Special Forces sergeant was hit. Enemy automatic weapons swept the hill position as the mortar bombardment continued. Then the assault started. Between 150 to 200 Viet Cong attacked. Confusion swept through the mixed force of defenders; they broke up into small groups. The Marines, now led by Gunnery Sergeant Maurice J. Jacques, withdrew into a small perimeter, but of the 13 Marines assigned to the patrol five were already missing. In the perimeter, a Marine was hit, their corpsman was seriously wounded, and a second Marine was killed. Jacques' Marines moved off the hill into the darkness. They hid in a clump of banana trees, formed a defensive perimeter, and waited for the dawn, hoping that aerial observers would spot them in the morning. Of the 13 Marines, 4 were still missing and one was known to be dead.

Dawn came, but the fog persisted. There was no possibility of being seen from the air. The Marines tried to regain the trail back to Ba To, but enemy

troops firing at what were probably other stragglers drove them back into the bush. After moving about four kilometers they found thicker cover and started moving up a ridgeline; they knew the trail to Ba To was on top of the ridge. At this time they were joined by two CIDG survivors, but the two Vietnamese almost were killed in the process. A Vietnamese with the Marines saved them by causing the Marines to hold fire as they came out of the bushes.

The Marines reached the Ba To trail, but again they were faced with a tough decision. It is a bad practice to use trails in enemy territory, but the Marines had to get away quickly and fog still blanketed the area. Fortunately the wind picked up, and it was so loud that it covered any noise the patrol made, so Jacques decided to "head for home." Putting the two Vietnamese stragglers out as the point on the trail, the Marines moved out. They reached Ba To without incident.

An hour after Gunnery Sergeant Jacques' party arrived at the base, another Marine survivor, wounded Lance Corporal Donald M. Woo, was brought in. Determined to survive, Lance Corporal Woo had been captured and escaped twice, and, in turn, captured two NVA soldiers and forced them, at knife point, to carry him to Ba To.

On 21 December the two missing Marines were found, dead. A patrol found 14 bodies: three Marines, the Special Forces sergeant, the Viet-

namese lieutenant patrol leader, and nine CIDG troops.

As a result of the Ba To experience, and some other misadventures, a long standing force reconnaissance operational procedure was suspended. Previous training practices had dictated that when a force reconnaissance patrol was discovered it was to split up, each member evading on his own. After Ba To, force patrols went in together, stayed together, and came out together.

The 2d and 3d Platoons were returned to 3d Reconnaissance Battalion control on 24 December. On the 28th, Captain William C. Shaver relieved now Lieutenant Colonel Gaffen who was transferred upon his promotion.

As the year ended, both force and division reconnaissance units could state that their respective situations were much improved. Although "force" was not pleased with the prospect of remaining under the paternal hand of the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, the force company was, at last, able to conduct deep missions, and the company's supply situation was vastly improved. Division reconnaissance was still spread between three enclaves, but it also had room to maneuver; the threat of compromise was vastly diminished. Coordination, cooperation, and understanding of reconnaissance capabilities and limitations were improving. "Recon" had a clear view of the future.

Logistics and Construction

*The Logistic Situation—III MAF Naval Responsibilities—RED BALL and CRITIPAC—
The Force Logistic Support Group—Engineering and Construction*

The Logistic Situation

When the decision was made in early 1965 to commit major U.S. combat forces in South Vietnam, MACV was prepared to support only the 20,000 U.S. troops already there. General Westmoreland, therefore, requested the commitment of Marines to the I Corps area since the Marine units were the only readily available forces prepared to support themselves over the beaches in an area of few ports and airfields.¹ According to one source:

The Marine Corps equipment posture was at its highest peacetime level of readiness since the Korean War. Modern equipment and ammunition with adequate backup stocks were available to equip and support units required for mobilization, and to improve the combat capability of the Fleet Marine Forces.²

This report overstated the case of Marine logistic preparedness. Logistics for the Marines in Vietnam soon became a major problem, despite the fact that for the first time a combat force had been deployed with a computerized supply system. The computerization broke down “right off the bat . . . when the stock cards began swelling due to the high humidity and the cards wouldn’t fit in the machine.” Record keeping had to be accomplished manually for an extended period, slowing down the entire operation.³

A malfunctioning requisition system compounded supply difficulties. In contrast to the practice in World War II and Korea, the Marine Corps in Vietnam used a “pull” system of resupply rather than forced feeding. Units made requisitions based on predicted usage, but the predictions, even with the incorporation of a “Combat Active Factor,” underestimated the unique demands of the Vietnam situation. Colonel Mauro J. Padalino, the III MAF Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG) commander, later explained:

Those calculations never envisioned either the harsh environment (degraded roads, Chu Lai, etc.) nor the

garrison, war-time 24-hour around-the-clock type operations the Corps experienced. In a free-type battlefield situation where there is constant forward movement with minimal pauses for consolidation, there is less wear and tear on equipment and supplies by comparison, to the in-place situation.⁴

Padalino pointed out that the dirt roads were initially trafficable, but in time “they were reduced to deep powder or mud” resulting in an “astronomical rise in demand for repair parts.” The FLSG commander concluded “the garrison environment imposed a much broader base of demand on the supply system—requisitions for salt and pepper shakers competed with requisitions for combat essentials.”⁵

Many commodities such as fork lifts, barbed wire, and field fortifications were in short supply. One of the most acute shortages was radio batteries, which, since there was no refrigeration, “instead of lasting 25 hours . . . pooped out in four hours.”⁶ For a short period in May, III MAF found it necessary to limit patrol activity because of the lack of batteries for PRC-10 radios. The logistic situation saw some improvement on 5 June, when the Defense Department finally permitted General Greene to release emergency FMFPac mount-out supplies for shipment to Vietnam.

The impact of the release of the mount-out supplies was still modest. One Marine commander later remarked that this action “was akin [to applying] . . . a bandaid to a massive wound.”⁷ By the end of June, the Marine Corps pipeline, designed to support a peacetime consumption rate, was beginning to show the strain. Colonel Nickerson, the III MAF G-4 at the time, commented: “. . . there was no magic solution for the deluge of problems except hard, intelligent work—the use of imagination, ingenuity, and common sense was ever important.”⁸ Nickerson would assign a particular problem to a member of his



Navy Photo K31362

Merchant ships in Da Nang Harbor wait their turn to unload their cargo. At the end of December 1965, 12 ships were in the harbor waiting to be unloaded.

staff and that officer would then become the “duty expert” and action officer for that matter. Colonel Harold A. Hayes, who became the III MAF G-4 on 26 August, recalled the early morning briefings that he held for General Walt and the rest of the III MAF staff where he had to report on the “low, low supply levels at different times in aviation gas, artillery ammunition, and even rations.”⁹

One particularly serious shortage during 1965 was that of aviation ordnance. The data used to forecast aviation ammunition needs in early 1965 failed to reflect the actual combat needs or delivery capabilities of the aircraft deployed to Vietnam.¹⁰ Thus, from the very beginning, the F-4B pilots, and later the A-4 pilots, had to conserve ammunition and to make value judgments on the necessity for firing at assigned targets. No targets were left unhit, but the Marines had to employ their resources sparingly and, on at least one occasion, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing ordered F-4B squadrons not to expend rockets unless they were being used to support Marines.¹¹ According to Colonel Robert F. Conley, who commanded MAG-11 from July to November 1965: “Without the Navy’s strong support in this field, we would not have been able to function.”¹² The aviation ammunition situation, like the rest of the logistic problems that the Marines faced, could not be corrected until a productive pipeline was


established and adequate port and storage facilities were built.*

III MAF Naval Responsibilities

In his role as Naval Component Commander (NCC),** the III MAF commander was in the U.S. Pacific Fleet chain of command rather than that of MACV. In this capacity he was responsible for base construction in I Corps and the operation of all ports, beaches, and depots from Quang Ngai to the DMZ. Colonel Nickerson, in his 16 May concept of logistic support for III MAF, projected a Naval Support Activity under the NCC that would carry out the above assignments, as well as provide common item support for all U.S. forces in I Corps, but the Navy did not have the available manpower for the activation of such a unit. In a message to Admiral

* Colonel Thomas J. O’Connor, 1st MAW chief of staff until August 1965, observed: “We discovered that we had dipped deeply into the national war reserve ammunition supplies in the United States. That’s what happens when you initiate a war, but try to conduct business as usual in the United States as if no war were going on.” Col Thomas J. O’Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

** As NCC, General Walt did not control all U.S. Naval Forces in South Vietnam. The Naval Advisory Group and CTF 115 remained separate entities.



Navy Photo K31382

Stacks of cargo crowd the unloading pier at Da Nang. The overcrowded and undermanned Naval Support Activity at Da Nang was unloading 2,505 measured tons a day by the end of 1965.

Sharp on 28 May, Admiral David L. McDonald, the Chief of Naval Operations, pointed out that a Naval Support Activity could not be formed without the mobilization of certain units of the reserve. McDonald stated that he was asking for more personnel, "but in the meantime, the task will have to be accomplished within our existing resources." On 5 June, nevertheless, Admiral Roy L. Johnson, CinCPacFlt, ordered the NCC to take over common item support in I Corps, stating that he and General Krulak, Commanding General, FMFPac, would provide additional personnel and equipment.¹³

In an evaluation of the NCC responsibility for running the ports and providing logistic support in I Corps, Colonel Nickerson observed on 15 June that "Port operations continue to be conducted by CG III MAF under the cognizance of the NCC staff" and that III MAF would have to continue using its own personnel and equipment for this task until the establishment of a Naval Support Activity.

Nickerson concluded that until the matter of the Naval Support Activity was "resolved, Commander Seventh Fleet and the NCC must work together to get the job done."¹⁴

With the complex problems confronting them, the Marines and the Navy attempted to organize their available resources to best carry out the mission of operating port terminals, unloading and moving cargo, and all the other tasks associated with an advance naval base. On 10 July, General Walt formally activated a Provisional Naval Component Support Activity and assigned Colonel Robert W. Boyd as its commander. In effect, Boyd, who had already been acting in this capacity, was the Da Nang port director. On 17 July, the Secretary of the Navy authorized the establishment of a Naval Support Activity, Da Nang and four days later Admiral Johnson promulgated the mission and tasks for the new organization. The Naval Support Activity was to be under the command of Commander, Service

Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, but under the operational control of the NCC. It was not until 15 October, however, that the Naval Support Activity was officially activated and began relieving Marine amphibious forces of this basic Navy mission. Finally, on 24 December, General Walt deactivated the Provisional Naval Component Support Activity and established a permanent Naval Component Command staff, observing that there had been no formal staff distinction between his responsibilities as Commanding General, III MAF and NCC and that "the steady increasing magnitude of the staff requirements" required the separation of the staff functions of the two commands. Colonel Boyd then became Deputy Chief of Staff, Naval Component Command and reported directly to General Walt. At the same time, Marine and Navy senior commanders began discussing whether the entire Naval Component Command responsibility should be assumed by a separate Navy command, rather than remaining under III MAF.¹⁵

The importance of the Naval Support Activity to III MAF was obvious in that all resupply was provided by either sea or air. In July 1965, slippage in air and sea schedule deliveries caused III MAF to reduce its stock level of individual combat rations from a 30-day to a 15-day supply level.¹⁶ The situation gradually improved as additional personnel and equipment arrived to reinforce the Naval Support Activity. From an average daily discharge of only slightly over 1,000 measured tons at the port of Da Nang prior to September, the rate increased to a figure of 2,505 measured tons by the end of the year.¹⁷ There were still problems because of inadequate unloading facilities at the port. At the end of November, 17 ships were in Da Nang harbor unloading or waiting to be unloaded. This figure was reduced to 12 by the end of December, but seven of these ships had been in port longer than two weeks, and four had been in port over a month.¹⁸

At Chu Lai, heavy seas caused by the monsoon season brought about further complications. In October, huge swells damaged the causeway causing the seaward portion to start to sink. This expeditionary dock was inoperative for an extended period since it was not considered practical to restore it until the worst of the monsoon was over. In spite of this frustration, 19 LSTs were unloaded at Chu Lai during October.¹⁹

A much more critical handicap was a leak which

developed in the fuel line of the amphibious assault fuel system (AAFS) at Chu Lai during October. Two amphibious assault fuel systems, one at Da Nang and the other at Chu Lai, were established after the 5 August VC attack on the Esso POL depot at Lien Chieu which destroyed most of the commercial fuel storage in I Corps.* Each of these two systems was capable of holding 300,000 gallons of various types of fuel, resupplied directly from tankers off the coast or in the harbor. When the leak developed in the fuel line at Chu Lai, heavy seas prevented divers from making repairs until December. During the interim, the NSA devised a temporary expedient by installing a buoyant system of 5,000 feet of flexible hose from the AAFS supported by empty 55-gallon drums. Chu Lai depended upon this source for fuel until the bottom-laid line was repaired.²⁰ In December, aviation fuel for MAG-12 at Chu Lai again became critically short for a two-day period because of a break in the offshore lines.^{21**}

RED BALL and CRITIPAC

With the rapid influx of the remainder of the 3d Marine Division, new elements of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and the introduction of units of the 1st Marine Division into the already overcrowded facilities at Da Nang and Chu Lai, logistic problems could be expected. These were reflected in shortages of equipment, fuel, ammunition, and supplies. As already stated, one of the main problems was slow unloading of ships at the undeveloped ports in South Vietnam. Colonel Harold A. Hayes, the III MAF G-4 during the second half of 1965, observed:

The "humor" of having to dump truck loads of canned soft drinks to get in the cargo holds for much needed artillery ammunition (the soft drinks were deck loaded in . . . boxes which disintegrated in the rains); the arrival of soap for the Vietnamese—partially used bars from hotels the Wives' Clubs gathered—which truly lathered on decks, in trucks, and in storage (what a mess); the horror of unloading ammunition in Da Nang Harbor and having

*Lien Chieu is inside the Da Nang Harbor on the south shore of Hai Van Peninsula. At the time of the attack, the area was outside of the Marines' Da Nang TAOR and was guarded by two understrength Regional Force companies. Two JP-4 storage tanks were destroyed and three others damaged resulting in the loss of 1,650,000 gallons of aviation fuel.

**The wing's chronology goes on to state: "In order to conserve fuel available at this airfield and continue to meet operational commitments, A-4 aircraft were launched with light fuel loads, then refueled from KC-130F tankers before and after conducting missions." 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65.

to stack and temporarily store [it] at dock side in the city. One VC could have erased a huge hunk of Da Nang had he gotten in!²²

In I Corps, all shipping was offloaded at Da Nang and then some cargo had to be reloaded on LSTs to support the base at Chu Lai. This created fluctuations in the volume of supplies reaching committed units. The heavy wear and tear on equipment caused by the heat, humidity, and monsoons created additional frustrations.

Solutions had to be found. In August, a logistics assistance team from FMFPac arrived at Da Nang to study the situation there. By the 24th, the team had completed its report and made its recommendations.²³ General Krulak's headquarters instituted two new programs based on the team's findings, the RED BALL and the CRITIPAC systems.

The first of these, the RED BALL Program, which went into effect on 22 September, sought to identify and solve critical supply shortages throughout the Western Pacific. When an important item of supply or equipment was found to be in short supply it was given a RED BALL designation. This meant that as soon as an item was designated RED BALL, all FMFPac supply echelons were alerted and the status of these items was closely monitored by individual action officers at each intermediary headquarters. It was their responsibility to see that the RED BALL item was shipped to Vietnam in the most expeditious manner possible, including specially arranged air shipment.²⁴ For an item to be placed on RED BALL, it had to be combat essential and meet specifications determined by FMFPac, which were refined periodically in the light of experience. For example, the 3d Marine Division reported in December:

During the month . . . the number of RED BALL items increased to such a number that it became necessary to refine the criteria for placing an item on RED BALL. It must be a repair part for equipment, the loss of which would put the unit in . . . Combat Readiness Category 3 or 4. At this time, the number of line items on RED BALL is 80.^{25*}

The second supply innovation, the CRITIPAC Program, was established by FMFPac in November. Under this concept, the Marine Corps Supply Center at Barstow, California automatically furnished, without request, each major Marine unit in Viet-

nam, usually battalion or squadron size, one shipment of critical supplies which were normally required on a routine basis. As a result of the first shipment which arrived in November, the 3d Marine Division indicated that 51 combat essential items were removed from deadline. General Walt recommended that some modifications be made in future shipments to include some items which were essential and to delete others which were not.²⁶ Both new additions to the Marine Corps Supply system, the RED BALL and the CRITIPAC, helped to alleviate the III MAF logistic situation.**

The Force Logistic Support Group

The Force Logistic Support Group under Colonel Padalino had grown from 700 personnel who deployed with the 9th MEB to nearly 3,000 officers and men by the end of the year.*** Under the overall control of the FLSG at Da Nang, two force logistic support units (FLSU) had been established at Chu Lai and Phu Bai. Built on the nucleus of the 3d Service Battalion, the FLSG was reinforced by personnel from the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa and from the 1st Force Service Regiment at Camp Pendleton, California. The FLSG at Da Nang centrally controlled all furnished material, assisted by two data processing platoons. Supplies were provided either from one of the three stock points in I Corps, or the requisition was transmitted electronically to the 3d Force Service Regiment on Okinawa. The FLSG was also responsible for first to third echelon

** The extent of this relief is a matter of some conjecture. According to FMFPac, the RED BALL and CRITIPAC Programs resulted in a decrease in percentage of deadlined equipment from 15 percent in the fall to 12.5 percent by the end of 1965. *FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*, v.1, p. 8-14. MACV on the other hand reported: "Year end deadline rate for III MAF was: overall, 14 percent; electronic, 11 percent; engineer, 32 percent; motor transport 11 percent; and ordnance, 5 percent." *MACV, Comd Hist, 1965*, p. 116. In any event there was no doubt that the supply situation was better than in October 1965, when III MAF reported: "Shortage of spare parts affected readiness to the extent that the operation readiness of several units decreased to the marginally combat ready category." III MAF ComdC, Oct65, p. 7.

*** Colonel Robert J. Oddy commanded the Force Logistic Support Group from 6-29 May 1965. Colonel Oddy also continued to command the 3d Service Battalion which left a rear echelon behind on Okinawa. Col Robert J. Oddy, Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

* Category 3 indicated that a unit was marginally capable for combat while Category 4 shows that a unit is unprepared for combat.

maintenance; fourth echelon maintenance was performed on Okinawa by the 3d Force Service Regiment.*

Some measure of the size of FLSG operations is indicated in the following excerpts from its December report:

- a. Data Processing key punched 66,100 cards, and processed 8,777,700 transactions . . .
- b. Clothing in the amount of \$98,063 was provided . . .
- c. Shipping and Receiving processed 3,688 short tons, 360,900 cubic feet of outgoing material and 2,014 short tons, 225,271 cubic feet of incoming material . . .
- d. 6,469 maintenance work orders were received and 6,250 work orders were completed during the period.²⁷

The FLSG organization had grown to such an extent that in September 1965, General Krulak stated that he had decided to transform the FLSG into a Force Logistic Command (FLC), but this did not happen until 1966.²⁸

Engineering and Construction

A significant construction and engineering effort took place at all three Marine enclaves during 1965. Civilian firms and Seabee units worked on port development, airfield construction, and base development. Marine engineering units not only assisted in these projects when required, but also continued to furnish combat support to III MAF. Colonel William M. Graham, Jr., the III MAF engineering officer, observed: "For my money, Vietnam in 1965 was an engineers' war and not many other units could satisfactorily fulfill their mission without engineer support."²⁹

The 3d Engineer Battalion, like the rest of the 3d Marine Division support units, deployed to Vietnam as attachments to other units. In May, Major Bernard A. Kaasmann established a forward battalion headquarters at Da Nang. Under his control at Da Nang were Companies A from the 3d and C from the 7th Engineer Battalions. Company B, 3d Engineer Battalion was at Chu Lai with one platoon at Phu Bai.

*At that time, all depot or 5th echelon maintenance was performed in the U.S. According to FMFPac, "as the effects of climate and sustained usage amplified maintenance requirements and as forces-in-country steadily grew, this concept became too costly . . ." For example by the end of 1965, 5,500 items had been evacuated from RVN for repair. To alleviate this situation, some fourth echelon maintenance was moved to South Vietnam in 1966. FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*, v. I, p. 8-14.



USMC Photo A184410

Marine engineers from Company C, 7th Engineer Battalion wield a pick and shovel in building a new road up Hill 327 in March 1965. This was one of the first tasks completed by the engineers.

To build the Chu Lai SATS field, the engineers had to send almost all of their earthmoving equipment from Da Nang to Chu Lai. Roads at Da Nang began to deteriorate rapidly and manual labor replaced mechanization. Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas J. Dennis, who had assumed command of the 3d Engineer Battalion on Okinawa in early May and later in the month arrived in Vietnam, recalled that he questioned the necessity for the transfer of equipment between the two enclaves, but that Colonel Graham "easily convinced me that the transfer was ordered."³⁰

Even after the Chu Lai airfield was completed, the tasks facing the engineers were enormous. Major Kaasmann later commented:

To maintain the staggering miles of road network and make repairs on existing and destroyed bridges with



USMC Photo A184985

Marine engineers construct the 3d Marine Division command post bunker. When completed it was estimated that the massive timber and concrete complex would be capable of supporting the weight of three battleships.

construction material available required a great deal of ingenuity and improvisation. . . . Heavy engineer earth-moving equipment and dump trucks were operated from dawn until dusk, seven days a week. Mechanics worked during hours of darkness performing required preventative maintenance and making repairs so equipment and vehicles were ready to roll at first light.³¹

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis, after touring all three enclaves, officially assumed command of the 3d Engineer's forward headquarters at Da Nang on 29 May. He suggested an extensive road improvement program to General Walt, which included building bridges and laying culverts throughout the TAORs to prepare for the forthcoming monsoon season. Dennis also recommended the deployment of the remaining battalion units from Okinawa, Company C, Headquarters and Service Company, and Support Company. By 8 July, the entire 3d Engineer Battalion was in Vietnam.³²

One of the major engineering accomplishments

during this period was the installation of the LAAM battery on Monkey Mountain. According to Colonel O'Connor:

The engineering unit had to move southward along the Monkey Mountain ridge from the Air Force control position through dense jungle. The distance was about three miles to the highest point on the ridge. They constructed a shelf road suitable for military vehicles along the contours of several steep slopes. Upon arrival at the selected peak, they shaved off the top of it to make a flat area for emplacement of a section of a battery. The job took about three weeks and required explosives, bulldozers, and graders to establish cuts and culverts along the way.³³

About the same time, Dennis' battalion completed construction support for the 3d Medical Battalion, which included "air-conditioned operating rooms, strongbacked, screened ward tents, air-conditioned recovery room tents." According to Dennis:

I vividly recall General Walt visiting 'Charlie Med' and directing immediate construction of the above listed



USMC Photo A185678

A Marine stands guard on a newly built 195-foot span near Marble Mountain. The engineers erected the bridge in three days.

facilities. We completed this project . . . [with the cooperation] of many other units . . . including special air shipment from Okinawa of the refrigeration units and lumber.³⁴

Following the 1 July attack on the Da Nang Airfield and the enlargement of the TAOR, General Walt ordered the movement of the 3d Marine Division command posts away from the airfield and the construction of bunkers along the main line of resistance (MLR) in the new areas. According to Dennis, General Walt personally informed him of his construction requirements for the 3d Marine Division CP complex. It was located north of Hill 327 and:

. . . evolved into a monster [bunker] in excess of 300 feet long and 40 to 50 feet deep. It was designed to absorb, without damage, a hit by a 120mm mortar. The columns (12''x12'' timbers) were on 10' centers and in most cases anchored to a 4' cube of concrete . . . The columns supported 12''x12'' caps and roof members consisting of a layer of 8''x8'' timbers, three laminations of 3''x12'' with three feet of earth and six inches of crushed rock as a burster layer. It was air conditioned, lighted and included some private toilet facilities.³⁵

Dennis assembled a force of 60 troops for the construction of troop quarters, the division CP, and

the MLR bunker program which was to consist of 1,098 units. At the same time, other engineering requirements ranged from clearing new areas and building new roads to taking down strong-backed tents, moving them, and then putting them up again. The battalion also kept the roads open, built new bridges, and repaired those that were down.³⁶

On 24 August, the 7th Engineer Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Ermine L. Meeker, joined the 3d Engineers in Vietnam. The 7th Engineers, a Force Troops unit, had a greater heavy construction capability. According to Lieutenant Colonel Dennis, "The 7th Engineers were most welcome. The engineer support tasks were just too massive and overwhelming for a combat engineer unit."³⁷

The 7th Engineers, unlike the 3d, operated directly under III MAF rather than the division.* During its first month in Vietnam, the battalion built

*Company C of the 7th Engineers remained under the operational control of the 3d Engineer Battalion. Company C of the 1st Engineer Battalion arrived with the 7th Marines at Chu Lai. Both engineer companies at Chu Lai were under the administrative control of the 3d Engineer Battalion.



USMC Photo A186354

A member of the 3d Engineer Battalion use a mine detector to sweep a road as South Vietnamese civilians driving oxen veer off to the right. As evidenced by the heavy tire tracks, the road is in great use and an obvious place for the VC to plant their mines.

a large ferry boat to carry supplies between the Da Nang Airbase and Tiensha Peninsula and erected two bridges spanning rivers south of Da Nang. Monsoon weather had caused extensive flooding of many of the main supply routes and storage dumps in the area and better drainage facilities were required. By the end of the month, the battalion could list 16 major projects that it had undertaken in support of the MAF, division, and wing. These ranged from extensive road building to the erection of 33 warehouses for the FLSG.³⁸

During the last quarter of 1965, despite shortages of material and repair parts,* problems with

* Colonel Dennis observed that material requirements "far outstripped our sources of supply, even though we had requisitioned all materials via special channels." The battalion obtained some of its material from cantonment program supplies controlled by the Seabees, some through Marine Corps channels, and some through local purchase. Colonel Dennis remembered: "I kept one SNCO in Da Nang searching for material and a representative in Saigon performing the same task. Without them we would not have accomplished the task. There was a continuous material shortage." Col Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, dtd 3Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

equipment, and washouts and flooding caused by the monsoon, the 3d Engineers was able to provide effective combat and combat service support to the 3d Division. The engineers furnished mine detection and demolition teams in support of infantry operations and made daily sweeps of the main supply routes for mines and booby traps. Lieutenant Colonel Dennis established a mine warfare course, one week for engineer personnel and one day for other troops, at the 3d Engineers' base area. All 3d Marine Division replacements were required to go through the program.

South of Da Nang, the battalion removed 16 kilometers of unused railroad rails and converted the railroad bed into a road to become part of the division's main supply route. By December, Companies A and C were primarily committed to road and bridge construction in the Da Nang TAORs of the 3d and 9th Marines, while Company C, 7th Engineer Battalion was involved in cutting timbers to be used for bunkers along the division's main defensive lines.³⁹

The construction requirements at both Da Nang and Chu Lai were too extensive for Marine Corps

engineering units to undertake by themselves. A civilian construction firm worked on the expansion of the main airfield at Da Nang, while the 30th Naval Construction Regiment, Captain Harold F. Liberty, USN, with four Seabee battalions built helicopter facilities at Marble Mountain and Ky Ha. The Marble Mountain facility construction was approved by CinCPac in July and by 25 August MAG-16 was operating from the base. The Seabees also built a 400-bed hospital just west of the Marble Mountain Air Facility, but construction there was temporarily disrupted by the VC attack on 28 October. At Chu Lai, Seabees, assisted by Major Kennedy's Marine Air Base Squadron 36 and Marine engineers, built a second helicopter air facility on the Ky Ha Peninsula. Colonel Johnson's MAG-36 flew its first missions from the new facility on 12 September.⁴⁰

The experience of the Seabees, who were supported by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson's MABS-12 and Marine engineering units at the Chu Lai SATS field, was typical of the frustration that the construction units faced in South Vietnam. On 3 July, the Seabees finished the last portion of the 8,000-foot runway, but only a few weeks later the northern half of the runway had to be closed because of soil erosion under the matting. No sooner had this project been completed than the Marines discovered that heavy rains and sand erosion had caused the foundation of the southern half of the runway to crumble. The matting became wavy and disjointed, unsafe for jet operations.⁴¹ On 25 September, the Marines closed the southern portion of the runway and the Seabees

applied a soft cement base mixed with sand under the AM-2 matting to try to attain stabilization.⁴² This work was completed on 10 November, but by that time the northern foundation was eroding again. The Seabees made nightly repairs, but by the end of year it was apparent that the northern half would have to be lifted once more and restabilized with the same cement-sand mixture used on the southern portion. This time the sand was packed without using any other material, and then a light layer of asphalt was applied over the sand. Before replacing the aluminum matting, a thin plastic membrane was installed to keep rain from settling in the soil and undermining the runway.⁴³ These efforts proved successful, and the "tinfoil strip", as the runway became nicknamed, was still in use five years after it had been built. Not even the SATS planners at Quantico in 1955 had envisioned that a SATS field could be constructed in such soil conditions and then used in all types of weather for such an extended period.⁴⁴

General Walt expressed his appreciation of the engineering effort in the following terms:

Never have the Marine Engineers and the Navy CB's been faced with more urgent and difficult problems, and never have they responded more positively and effectively than in the Vietnam I Corps area during 1965-66. Their support was magnificent and of the highest professional order. They worked as an integrated team with always the "can do" attitude.⁴⁵

The entire Marine logistics and support effort was perhaps summed up best by General McCutcheon's description of the SATS field: "It worked, but it took some doing."⁴⁶

PART V
OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES

CHAPTER 13

The SLF of the Seventh Fleet

Disbandment of the SLF—A New Mission—The Reestablishment of the SLF—Command and Control Changes—The First DAGGER THRUST Raids—Further Changes in the SLF—The Saigon Conference—The Second Series of DAGGER THRUST Raids—The SLF at the End of the Year

Disbandment of the SLF

The landing of the 9th MEB and the deployment of reinforcing Marine units to Vietnam during the spring of 1965 seriously depleted the Marine forces with the Seventh Fleet. Lieutenant Colonel Edmund G. Darning's BLT 2/9 which had become the Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force (SLF) battalion in late February, was tasked as the floating reserve for the Da Nang landing of 8 March. Darning's attached shore party and the landing craft from the attack transport USS *Bexar* (APA 237) and the landing ship dock USS *Thomaston* (LSD 28) assisted in landing the brigade's supplies and men. In addition, the pilots of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koler, Jr.'s HMM-365, the SLF helicopter squadron on board the amphibious assault ship USS *Princeton* (LPH 5), flew their aircraft from the ship to the Da Nang Airbase. There the 23 UH-34s were turned over to HMM-162 whose personnel arrived by KC-130 from Okinawa. After Koler's pilots returned to the *Princeton*, the ship sailed for Okinawa to take on replacement aircraft. The other ships of the amphibious ready group (ARG) carrying the SLF, *Thomaston* and *Bexar*, recovered their landing craft and reembarked the BLT's shore party on 12 March and steamed northward to rendezvous with the *Princeton*.

After a seven-day port call at Hong Kong, the force returned to Subic Bay for refurbishing of equipment and for training. In mid-April, the SLF was once more off the coast of Vietnam, covering the landings of BLTs 2/3 and 3/4. The group then sailed for Okinawa where both HMM-263 and BLT 2/9 disembarked. At this point, the Seventh Fleet and FMFPac dissolved the SLF, because its amphibious shipping was required for the landing of the 3d Marine Amphibious Brigade at Chu Lai.

The senior Marine and Navy Pacific commanders

recognized that the disbandment of the SLF was a temporary measure. During a visit to Vietnam and Okinawa in May, Lieutenant General Krulak, the FMFPac commander, met with Vice Admiral Paul P. Blackburn, Commander Seventh Fleet; the two agreed that the SLF should be reconstituted when additional amphibious shipping became available. Krulak suggested that this should take place when the first elements of the 7th Marines arrived on Okinawa from California.¹

A New Mission

Throughout the spring, American commanders in the Pacific discussed the possibility of employing the Seventh Fleet's SLF in a series of amphibious raids on VC/NVA infiltration and marshalling points along the coast of South Vietnam. On 14 March, representatives from MACV and the Pacific Fleet reached an agreement in Saigon for a naval coastal surveillance campaign, Operation MARKET TIME. The agreement contained provisions for carrying out amphibious raids using South Vietnamese Marines, U.S. Marine battalions, or combined South Vietnamese and U.S. Marine forces. The MACV and CinCPacFleet staffs were to evaluate available intelligence and agree on suitable target areas for these raids. The first targets were to be in unpopulated areas, which would allow the amphibious forces relative freedom of action. After the two commands had agreed on suitable target areas, the CinCPacFleet staff was to prepare a concept of operations from which the amphibious commander was to make his detailed plans. Completed plans were then to be submitted to ComUSMACV for his concurrence and for South Vietnamese clearance for the raids.²

Both General Westmoreland and Admiral Johnson ratified the results of the Saigon conference. In their transmittal of the agreement to Admiral

Sharp, CinCPac, on 14 May for approval, Westmoreland and Johnson observed that the planning guide for the raids "insofar as possible will be *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (FM 31-11/NWP 22 (A))." The two commanders noted that although the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were to request such raids, "in fact ComUSMACV will stimulate RVNAF requests for operations desired by the U.S."³

Although General Westmoreland was enthusiastic about the prospects of amphibious raids, he wanted them to be conducted solely by South Vietnamese forces.⁴ It soon became obvious that the South Vietnamese Armed Forces were so overextended that they could not carry out these operations alone. On 9 June, General Westmoreland informed Admiral Sharp that U.S. amphibious operations would be welcome and inquired about the status of the 14 March agreement. The CinCPac commander replied that the agreement was still under review, but that U.S. raids could be conducted.⁵ By mid-June, General Krulak radioed General Walt:

We should get the SLF reconstituted as soon as possible, because it is plain that CinCPac and MACV are getting serious about amphibious raids as a part of MARKET TIME. I am asking CinCPacFleet to press 7th Fleet to get the SLF shipping to Okinawa in advance of the currently 1 July date.⁶

The Reestablishment of the SLF

On 19 June, FMFPac reactivated the Marine special landing force for planning purposes. It was to consist of Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Bodley's BLT 3/7, which had arrived on Okinawa from Camp Pendleton, and Lieutenant Colonel Norman G. Ewers' HMM-163, which had arrived on Okinawa from Da Nang. Since Ewers was the senior of the two, he became the SLF commander as well as retaining command of his squadron. On 24 June, the two units embarked in the ships of Task Group 76.5, the Seventh Fleet designation for its amphibious ready group. Commanded by Captain David A. Scott, USN, the task group was composed of the USS *Iwo Jima* (LPH 2), USS *Point Defiance* (LSD 31), and the USS *Talladega* (APA 208). The force sailed from Buckner Bay, Okinawa on 26 June for South Vietnam.

Because of increased enemy activity in II Corps during May and June and the fear of a general Communist offensive there, the first mission of the

SLF was the protection of the U.S. Army's large logistic facilities at Qui Nhon. General Westmoreland had requested the deployment of a Marine battalion to Qui Nhon until U.S. infantry forces arrived. On 1 July, Bodley's BLT 3/7 made an administrative landing at Qui Nhon. The battalion remained ashore for six days until relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter's BLT 2/7. Reembarked, the SLF remained offshore. Ewers' squadron, flying from the *Iwo Jima*, provided helicopter support for Utter's battalion at Qui Nhon. On 20 July, HMM-163 was relieved of this support mission when a 10-plane detachment from HMM-161 arrived at Qui Nhon from Da Nang. The ARG/SLF reverted to its role as the Pacific Fleet's ready reserve and sailed for Subic Bay.

Command and Control Changes

At the time Seventh Fleet and FMFPac reconstituted the SLF, some changes were made in the administrative chain of command of the fleet's amphibious forces. With the deployment of the 3d Marine Division and skeleton III MAF headquarters from Okinawa to Vietnam, General Collins relinquished the designation Commanding General, FMF, Seventh Fleet (CG TF 79). This role was assumed by Brigadier General Melvin D. Henderson, the assistant 3d Marine Division commander, commanding the division's forces remaining on Okinawa.

Admiral Blackburn wanted Henderson's assignment as CG TF 79 to be made a primary duty; General Krulak demurred. He explained that the position had always been an additional duty task, "discharged by the senior officer of those FMFPac Forces assigned to the operational control of Com7thFlt." According to Krulak, that senior officer's primary mission was to the "total command responsibilities related to his force." Specifically referring to General Henderson, Krulak continued:

The obligation implicit in his duties, pivoting as they will upon readying forces for service in Vietnam and supervision of 3d MarDiv (Rear) administrative and logistic matters related to support of our forces engaged in the conflict, mitigate against changing the basic procedure followed in the past. However, am confident that Henderson will be able to fulfill the TF 79 responsibilities to your satisfaction following the past system, and I will ensure that he is provided with proper staff support to do the job.⁷

Krulak ended his message to Blackburn mentioning



Navy Photo 1142349

Ships of the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Group (from left to right) the attack transport USS Bexar (APA 237), the amphibious assault ship USS Princeton (LPH 5), the dock landing ship USS Thomaston (LSD 28), and destroyer escort USS Joseph E. Connelly (DE 450) in formation in the South China Sea with BLT 2/9 and HMM-365 embarked, in March 1965. Helicopters of HMM-365 fly above the ships while the Princeton's crew spell out the groups' designations, TG 76.5 and 79.5, on the flight deck.

that he had discussed the situation with Admiral Johnson and that the latter concurred.

Admiral Blackburn acknowledged that Henderson's primary assignment was as 3d Marine Division assistant division commander, but he still had certain reservations. The Seventh Fleet commander told Krulak that although they both understood the command relationships between CGFMFSeventhFlt, CGFMFPac, and ComSeventhFlt, other might not. To avoid any misunderstanding, Blackburn suggested:

It must be understood by all concerned that CGFMFSeventhFlt as CTF 79 will be immediately responsible to ComSeventhFlt for planning and operations and, in that context, his primary duty is a CGFMFSeventhFlt rather than as Assistant Commander, 3d Marine Division.⁸

At this point, General Krulak replied that he did not believe any further discussion of the topic would prove fruitful. He told Blackburn:

As you say, you and I understand the matter. There are only two other key personages involved, Walt and Henderson. I have ensured that they are both familiar with . . . your order. There is no reason that I can see to fear that Henderson will not carry out his instructions as

stated in your Op Order. Those instructions are clear, and certainly they are binding.⁹

With this reply, General Krulak believed that he had "put the whole affair on ice."¹⁰

Admiral Blackburn, nevertheless, elected, with the concurrence of General Krulak, to activate a second Marine FMF command within the Seventh Fleet. On 28 June, he ordered the establishment of a Ready Afloat Force within the fleet, which included a Ready Afloat Marine Amphibious Brigade (RAMAB) headquarters. This headquarters, which at this juncture consisted of Marine Colonel Horace E. Knapp, Jr. and a small staff, was assigned the Navy designation TF 78. Admiral Blackburn transferred control of the SLF from TF 79 to TF 78, thus resulting in a change of designation for the SLF from TG 79.5 to TG 78.5.

The Marines were not wholly satisfied with the new command arrangements. There were, in effect, two parallel Marine commands within the Seventh Fleet, which blurred command responsibility. General Henderson, as CTF 79 and CGFMFSeventh Fleet, lost direct administrative control of the SLF,

but retained responsibility for the amphibious readiness of the Marine forces on Okinawa. Colonel Knapp, as Commander TF 78, reported operationally to Rear Admiral Don W. Wulzen, TF 76 commander, but administratively to FMFPac. Lieutenant Colonel Ewers as SLF commander retained operational control of both BLT 3/7 and his own helicopter squadron. While afloat, Ewers reported operationally to the ARG commander and administratively to Task Force 78.

Several of the senior Marine commanders believed that the ensuing dilution of Marine authority within the fleet could allow the SLF to be used for non-amphibious purposes, to the detriment of its mission. A case in point took place on 22 July. After the SLF had been released from its reserve role at Qui Nhon, the Navy diverted the ships of the ARG to assist in a salvage mission off Pratas Reef, 200 miles southeast of Hong Kong, where the destroyer USS *Frank Knox* (DD 742) had run aground. Two of the three ARG ships, the *Talladega* and the *Iwo Jima*, remained at the salvage site until 31 July. After a short port visit to Hong Kong, both ships arrived back at Subic Bay on 12 August. In the meantime, a third ARG ship, the LSD *Point Defiance*, had unloaded some of its equipment at Subic Bay to make more deckroom and then returned to the salvage operation where it remained until 19 August. On that date, all three ships were ordered to sail directly to Vietnam so that the SLF could participate in Operation STARLITE. According to the SLF commander, splitting the amphibious ready group resulted in leaving behind some of the amphibious equipment unloaded by the *Port Defiance* at Subic and the incremental arrival of BLT 3/7 in the battle area.¹¹

After Operation STARLITE, General Henderson, as TF 79 commander and senior Marine officer in the Seventh Fleet, expressed his concern to General Krulak about the involuntary diversion of the SLF from training and refitting to salvage operations:

It appears that both the battalion commander and the SLF commander were concerned about the degradation of physical fitness of Marine personnel caused by confinement aboard ship. . . . The SLF commander although concerned, felt that higher authority was directing these movements with full appreciation of effect on integrity and readiness of SLF and refrained from objecting or coming up on the air to set forth his concern.¹²

General Henderson suggested that new liaison arrangements had to be made with both the SLF and

the Seventh Fleet so there would not be a recurrence of similar incidents.

Since General Henderson, as 3d Marine Division assistant division commander, was about to depart for Da Nang, the responsibility for establishing the new relationships devolved upon his successor as CGFMFSeventhFlt, Major General Lewis J. "Jeff" Fields, the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division. General Fields had assumed command of the 1st Division on 11 August, just before its deployment to the Western Pacific. Accompanied by a small command group, the new division commander left California four days later for Okinawa, stopping en route at FMFPac headquarters in Honolulu. On 24 August, he opened the command post of the 1st Marine Division (Fwd) on Okinawa and at the same time assumed his new command responsibilities in the Seventh Fleet as CG TF 79.

General Fields had his own doubts about command relationships within the Seventh Fleet. He believed that the organization of the SLF at the time "was still a reflection of our peacetime activities in the Western Pacific," and "to think that whoever was senior of the two commanders, helicopter squadron or infantry battalion, would command the SLF as well as his own unit was ridiculous" According to Fields, he decided, after much discussion with his staff, that the next SLF would be provided with an expanded headquarters to command both the helicopter squadron and infantry battalion, "leaving their commanders to carry out the duties for which they had been intended and assigned." By furnishing such a command, Fields thought that he "would have a commander of the force who could properly assist, and respond to the Navy commander's operations and plans."¹³

On 11 September, he incorporated these views in a message to Admiral Blackburn. Fields proposed making the RAMAB/TF 78 commander and his staff the headquarters of the SLF. The Marine general further suggested that, "in order to provide for clearer lines of communication and to accurately portray actual relationships, I shall redesignate TG 78.5 as TG 79.5." He then declared, "my larger TF 79 staff will conduct all required joint planning functions with CTF 76 as well as providing you with advice concerning landing force matters." In effect, Fields was recommending the abolishment of the RAMAB command except as a paper designator until that time an actual MAB was activated.¹⁴

Admiral Blackburn did not concur with the proposed alterations and stated that he would "make all decisions concerning the organization of the Seventh Fleet."¹⁵ According to General Krulak, the Seventh Fleet Commander misunderstood General Fields' intentions and believed that the latter had overreached himself. Krulak explained:

While not Blackburn's idea, the TF 78 and TG 78.5 organization made its advent under his regime, and I'm sure he views its existence with a certain amount of personal pride. Furthermore it has been my experience that whereas the Navy has sometimes abused the SLF they, at the same time, have been sensitive and jealous of the slightest interference with it.¹⁶

General Krulak advised General Fields "to pick up the pieces and try to make something of it." The FMFPac commander observed that he was not interested in "either challenging or assuaging Blackburn, but rather in making things better for our forces afloat." Krulak stated that the SLF had been maltreated and that this concerned him. In his view, the problem stemmed, in part, from the disparity in rank between the Navy and Marine commanders of the amphibious forces "and lack of an appropriate air/ground (SLF) headquarters." Krulak recommended that Fields remind the Seventh Fleet commander that the latter's responsibility did not include the internal organization of the Marine Corps forces, "specifically the assignment of a Marine colonel as SLF commander is outside the authority of the operational commander."¹⁷

General Fields, in his reply to Admiral Blackburn, remarked that he had no intention of usurping any of the prerogatives of the Seventh Fleet commander, but stood his ground on the reorganization of the SLF command. He insisted that as the officer responsible for organizing, equipping, training, and providing forces for the SLF, he was in the best position "to determine who should be placed in direct command of these forces."¹⁸

At this point, the entire question of the organization and control of the SLF was held in abeyance. General Fields stated that for the time being he would hold off the transfer of the commander of the RAMAB to the SLF. On the other hand, Admiral Blackburn, who wanted two SLFs in the Seventh Fleet, which would justify an amphibious brigade headquarters, was denied this request by CinCPacFlt. Admiral Johnson informed Blackburn that with the continuing commitment to Vietnam there were neither enough Marine troops or

helicopters in the Western Pacific to form a second SLF.¹⁹

In the meantime, some changes had occurred in the unit composition of the SLF. After STARLITE and a short refurbishing visit to Subic Bay, BLT 3/7 was unloaded at Chu Lai and was attached to III MAF in early September. The ARG sailed for Okinawa where it embarked Lieutenant Colonel Robert T. Hanifin's BLT 2/1, the new SLF battalion. HMM-163 was retained as the SLF helicopter squadron and Lieutenant Colonel Ewers still kept his "two hats" as commander of the SLF and the squadron. The ARG/SLF returned to Vietnamese waters on 10 September as the covering force for the landing of the U. S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) at Qui Nhon.

The First DAGGER THRUST Raids

While off Qui Nhon, the SLF prepared to carry out the first of the long delayed series of amphibious raids in support of the MARKET TIME anti-infiltration operations. Since June, CinCPac, CinCPacFlt, Seventh Fleet Amphibious Forces, and MACV had worked out the details of the raids, to be known as DAGGER THRUST. In late July, Admiral Sharp approved the outline plans for three DAGGER THRUST raids, as well as the implementation of the 14 March MACV-CinCPacFlt anti-infiltration agreement. In accordance with this agreement, the raids were to be quick thrusts by the SLF into suspected enemy concentration points followed by immediate retraction of the landing force. Established amphibious doctrine dictated that the Navy amphibious commander would retain control of the Marine forces ashore since no permanent beachhead was to be established. Admiral Blackburn designated Rear Admiral Don W. Wulzen, CTF 76, as the amphibious task force commander for the DAGGER THRUST mission. By mid-September, Wulzen had completed his detailed landing plans and, on 21 September, General Westmoreland obtained South Vietnamese clearance for the first raids.

This series of DAGGER THRUST operations was to consist of three raids in rapid succession on widely dispersed coastal objective areas. After carrying out the first raid on the Vung Mu Peninsula, 20 miles south of Qui Nhon, the SLF was to strike a second target 50 miles to the south in the Ben Goi area, 27



Navy Photo K-32579


Marines from BLT 2/1 return to their quarters on board the Iwo Jima (LPH 2) after debarking from HMM-163's helicopters. They have just completed DAGGER THRUST I, the first of a series of amphibious raids against suspected enemy concentration points, which took place in September 1965 on the Vung Mu Peninsula, 20 miles south of Qui Nhon.

miles north of Nha Trang. The third objective was Tam Quan, 30 miles south of Quang Ngai City. All three DAGGER THRUST raids were to take place in as brief a period as circumstances permitted.

On 22 September, the command ship USS *Estes* (AGC 12), Admiral Wulzen's flagship, and the high speed transport USS *Diachenko* (APD 123) rendezvoused with the ships of the ARG off Qui Nhon. Colonel Edwin G. Winstead, who had relieved Colonel Knapp as commander of the RAMAB/TF-78 after STARLITE, had joined Admiral Wulzen on board the USS *Estes* and was the designated commander of the landing force, the Marine counterpart to the amphibious task force commander. The task force then proceeded to Chu Lai where the SLF carried out a dress rehearsal for DAGGER THRUST on the 23d. After reembarkation, the task force was joined by two destroyers, the USS *Mason* (DD 852)

and the USS *Small* (DD 838), and steamed for Vung Mu, the first target.

All three DAGGER THRUST raids were disappointing. During DAGGER THRUST I, the SLF landed over the beach and by helicopter on the morning of 25 September. After searching the peninsula and finding no sign of the enemy battalion that was supposed to be there, the Marines reembarked and sailed for Ben Goi Bay. During DAGGER THRUST II, Lieutenant Colonel Hanifin's BLT did not even land. Three Marine reconnaissance teams from a force reconnaissance detachment, embarked on board the *Iwo Jima*, transferred to the *Diachenko*, and then, accompanied by South Vietnamese UDT personnel, went ashore in small boats on the evening of 27 September. One team lost radio contact, but the helicopters of HMM-163 found it.²⁰ Since none of the teams had reported





Navy Photo 1117017

Marines from BLT 2/1 land near Tam Quan, 30 miles south of Quang Ngai City, during DAGGER THRUST III. The battalion encountered a small VC guerrilla force during the operation.

any enemy and the Marines had lost the element of surprise, Admiral Wulzen decided to cancel the landing. The battalion came ashore at Tam Quan on 1 October for DAGGER THRUST III and met some resistance from local guerrillas. The next day Lieutenant Colonel Hanifin received orders "to break contact and withdraw."²¹ As the Pacific Command's contingency force, Admiral Sharp had ordered the SLF to be reembarked and sail for Indonesian waters where Communist forces had attempted to overthrow the government. The first DAGGER THRUST series was over.

Colonel Ewers observed that although he believed the overall concept was valid, the DAGGER THRUST operations revealed several limitations, especially in planning and command relations. The SLF commander declared that the intelligence was dated and that the SLF/ARG staffs should have been more involved in the planning. He claimed that the detailed scheme of maneuver prepared at the amphibious task force commander's level allowed almost no flexibility on the part of the BLT commander. Ewers concluded:

In amphibious raiding the initiative is ours and there is no compelling reason to rush from target to target. . .BLT planners were harried by changes and the urgent requirements of naval counterparts.²²

Ewers' position was supported by other Marine commanders. In a later report, General Krulak also

maintained that the raid concept was sound, declaring that "raids cause VC in an area to move . . . exhibit a U.S. presence . . . and . . . serve as excellent training for battalions to be committed . . ." Like Ewers, the FMFPac commander was of the opinion that "the full impact of these benefits has not been realized . . . a review of target intelligence and planning procedures would appear prudent."²³

Further Changes in the SLF

Several changes occurred in October following the release of the ARG/SLF from the Indonesian alert. Captain Thomas R. Weschler, USN, relieved Captain Scott as the ARG commander. There was also an exchange of amphibious shipping. The new ARG consisted of the USS *Valley Forge* (LPH 8), USS *Montrose* (APA 212), and USS *Monticello* (LSD 35). At the same time, 11 October, Lieutenant Colonel Mervin B. Porter's HMM-261 replaced HMM-163 as the SLF helicopter squadron and Porter also relieved Ewers as the SLF commander.

The relief of units and shipping was relatively routine and had been planned for some time, but Generals Krulak and Fields took this occasion to institute their long-delayed restructuring of the SLF command and staff. On 17 October, General Krulak notified Headquarters Marine Corps that "due to

accelerated tempo . . . increased complexity of command and control, and for continuity," General Fields was assigning a Marine colonel "with an initial staff of 3 officers and 5 enlisted men" to the SLF.²⁴ General Fields decided to make his TF 79 chief of staff, Colonel John R. Burnett, the new SLF commander, rather than Colonel Winstead, who remained as TF 78 and RAMAB commander. According to General Fields:

It was obvious that the commander of the RAMAB was of little consequence to me at the time and particularly to the operations of the SLF. He, naturally, could advise CTF 76, but he could never command the SLF as such. I decided to let him be and designated my Chief of Staff, Colonel Burnett, who had been a naval aviator and was an excellent solid Marine versed in all aspects of operations in the area, as Commander of the SLF.²⁵

The SLF kept the 78.5 designator, and thus, on paper, remained subordinate to RAMAB. Nevertheless, Krulak and Fields, without directly challenging Admiral Blackburn, not only strengthened the SLF commander's position vis-a-vis his Navy counterpart, but made the RAMAB headquarters obviously superfluous. Colonel Burnett assumed command of the SLF from Lieutenant Colonel Porter on 18 October. With the SLF reconstituted and restructured, American planners began discussing a second series of DAGGER THRUST raids.

The Saigon Conference

The Marines were not the only ones who were unhappy with the command and control of the SLF and the DAGGER THRUST raids. During a discussion with General Walt in July, General Westmoreland indicated his dissatisfaction with the limited authority he enjoyed over the force.²⁶ The MACV commander wanted an arrangement in which it would be unnecessary for him to go to the Seventh Fleet when he wanted the SLF. Furthermore, MACV and CinCPacFlt had debated, since the Chu Lai landing in May, what criteria should be used to establish an amphibious objective area (AOA) during an amphibious landing or raid in Vietnam. According to doctrine, the amphibious task force commander controlled all air, land, and sea forces in the geographical area delineated as the AOA during an amphibious operation. In Vietnam, this raised two specific questions which impinged

upon Westmoreland's authority and South Vietnam's sovereignty "the control of air traffic within the AOA . . . and coordination with friendly ground forces who are conducting operations inland within the perimeter of the AOA."²⁷

After the first DAGGER THRUST raids, on 8 October General Westmoreland proposed a joint MACV-CinCPacFleet conference in Saigon to discuss the raids and to plan future ones. He suggested a 10-point agenda which included critiques of DAGGER THRUST I, II, and III from both Seventh Fleet and MACV perspectives; intelligence for future raids; target acquisitions; and "resolution of amphibious objective area and restricted air space problems for future raids."²⁸ Admiral Johnson agreed to the conference and added some agenda items of his own. The CinCPacFleet Commander, like General Westmoreland, wanted to resolve the AOA problem and was willing to make some concessions. He directed that Navy and FMFPac representatives to the conference hold to a "Navy/Marine position which will allow flexibility within the AOA, but will not weaken the doctrine. . . ."²⁹

The conference took place on 26-28 October 1965 in Saigon. Captain Weschler, the ARG commander, as the senior officer present, served as chairman. There were representatives from the various MACV component commands, including III MAF and 2d Air Division, as well as the amphibious commands under the jurisdiction of CinCPacFleet. During the two-day meeting, the conferees came to several understandings. They agreed on three specific targets for the next series of DAGGER THRUST raids, but at the same time called for a revision of the criteria for establishing targets. They planned for the new series of raids to take place from 25 November through 7 December and allowed that "predicated on the early approval and dissemination of revised target list and success of in-country briefings, the requirement for specific raid notification can be reduced" from 60 to 24 hours. They settled the sensitive issue of command and control of air and ground units in the AOA by simply reducing the AOAs used during the previous DAGGER THRUST raids "to a 10-mile arc inland and a 25-mile arc seaward unless specific target situation dictates an increase." This decision satisfied both sides, for the time being. MACV could work with the restrictions imposed on it by the 10-mile inland

arc, while the reduced AOA still permitted the Navy amphibious task force commander to control naval gunfire and other supporting arms including aviation. The amphibious commander was to reserve a 10-nautical-mile-wide air corridor at an altitude of 7,000 to 10,000 feet for civilian aircraft. This compromise was possible without any violation of amphibious doctrine since the chances of any enemy air opposition were nil and because of the limited range of the VC anti-aircraft weapons.³⁰

The Second Series of DAGGER THRUST Raids

By 10 November both Admiral Johnson and General Westmoreland approved the recommendations of the Saigon conference and the Seventh Fleet amphibious forces began preparing for the next DAGGER THRUSTS. After completion of detailed plans on 26 November, the ARG/SLF, which earlier in the month had been the floating reserve for the BLUE MARLIN operations, sailed for the DAGGER THRUST IV amphibious objective area, Lang Ke Ga, in III Corps. This VC-controlled and suspected infiltration point was on the coast, 90 miles east of Saigon.

For DAGGER THRUST IV, the Marines and Navy had made some more changes in command and control. Although Admiral Wulzen in the USS *Eldorado* (AGC 11) had joined the amphibious task group, Captain Weschler, the ARG commander, retained his position as amphibious task force commander. Colonel Burnett, the SLF commander, was to be the commander of the landing force, unlike the earlier DAGGER THRUST raids when this position was assumed by the TF 78/RAMAB commander. Admiral Blackburn had bowed to the inevitable and, on 24 November, announced his intention to dissolve TF 78. In the interim, he made General Fields commander of both TF 78 and TF 79.³¹

DAGGER THRUST IV followed the same pattern as the earlier DAGGER THRUST raids. On 30 November, the SLF battalion landed as planned at Lang Ke Ga, but, with the exception of scattered tank traps in the beach area and isolated incidents of small arms fire, it encountered no opposition. The next day the battalion reembarked, ending the operation, with no casualties to either side.

The final DAGGER THRUST raid, DAGGER THRUST V began on 5 December near the Phu Thu



Navy Photo 1114070A

Marines of BLT 2/1 run to board HMM-261 helicopters on board the Valley Forge (LPH 8) during Operation DAGGER THRUST V, in December 1965. The white-capped Navy crewman in the left forefront has just led the Marines to their specific helicopter.

village complex, 40 miles north of Qui Nhon. This time the battalion was moderately successful, surprising a small VC force. During the two-day operation, the Marines killed 26 enemy and detained 38 suspects. The Marine battalion sustained casualties of three dead and 10 wounded. In retrospect, the DAGGER THRUST raids failed to achieve their overall objective, the quick exploitation of intelligence and resulting contact with large enemy formations. Admiral Johnson, several years later, observed:

The excessive time involved in planning and coordinating with the MACV levels resulted in completely stale intelligence. Furthermore, by the time MACV had completed his all important coordination and alerting of ARVN forces and Province Chiefs, we had also completely spooked the VC and they had flown the coop.³²

The SLF at the End of the Year

Following the completion of DAGGER THRUST V, Colonel Burnett attended the final III MAF planning briefing for Operation HARVEST MOON on 8 December. General Walt had requested that the SLF be assigned as the reserve force for the multi-battalion U.S. Marine-ARVN operation in the Que Son Valley. The enemy was the old STARLITE foe, the 1st VC Regiment. Both MACV and CinCPacFlt approved the request, and the SLF helicopter squadron was committed to the operation on 9 December. The infantry battalion landed the next day. When the operation ended on 19 December, the SLF reembarked in its shipping. Hanifin's battalion suffered 12 dead and 52 wounded during the extended operation.

After HARVEST MOON, the SLF underwent further changes in unit composition and designation. On 21 December, Hanifin's battalion was unloaded at the mouth of the Hue River and replaced Lieutenant Colonel Sumner A. Vale's 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Phu Bai. The latter battalion embarked on the SLF ships for a return voyage to Okinawa as a unit of the FMFPac intratheater transplacement program. At the same time, Vice Admiral John J. Hyland, who had relieved Admiral Blackburn earlier in the month as Seventh Fleet commander, officially dissolved the RAMAB/TF 78 headquarters. The SLF assumed the fleet designation TG 79.5 and reported administratively to General Fields in his capacity as CG TF 79. On 29 December,

BLT 3/4 landed at Okinawa and on New Year's Eve, BLT 2/3, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William K. Horn, became the new SLF battalion.³³

During the year, the SLF proved its value as a mobile floating reserve. Although the results of the DAGGER THRUST raids were less than expected, the SLF air and ground units played important roles in both STARLITE and HARVEST MOON. The SLF served as a successful contingency force for the Qui Nhon landing in July, and, later in the year, during the Indonesian crisis. By the end of 1965, the organizational problems with the Navy had been resolved and some of the doctrinal debates with MACV had been temporarily put aside. Nevertheless the questions about the extent of the amphibious objective area and command and control of forces in the AOA would continue to arise periodically for the rest of the war.*

* The former Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Roy L. Johnson, remarked: "Command relationships and who exercised operational control over what, where, and when were controversial in varying degrees from the very beginning of active involvement of U. S. forces in N. and S. Vietnam." In reference to the Seventh Fleet amphibious forces, the former CinCPacFlt stated that the "ARG/SLF was kicked around and whipsawed more than any other operational unit that I can think of." Admiral Johnson declared that much of this "had its genesis in the CTF 79/78 arguments." He did not believe that the establishment of TF 78 (RAMAB) was a good solution, but stated that Admiral Blackburn did not have "very many options open to him." Admiral Johnson faulted the Marines for not being willing to appoint a full time CTF 79 (Commanding General, FMF Seventh Fleet), and this failure, the former Pacific Fleet commander claimed, seriously diluted "the command prerogative of Com7thFlt" He also observed that "There were others who had designs on control of the SLF, notably MACV, who did not want to be bothered with going through any [other] command if he wanted to use them in some emergency of his determination." Adm Roy L. Johnson, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File). Admiral John J. Hyland, who relieved Admiral Blackburn as Commander Seventh Fleet in November 1965, commented in the same vein as Admiral Johnson: "The potential problem with the SLF had nothing to do with its performance or its excellence or its utilization. The difficulty was principally a political one between Navy and Army doctrine. . . . Specifically with regard to the SLF the Army wanted operational control. I always felt that once they had been given it they never would have released it, and the SLF would simply become another Army unit ashore. We would never be able to get it back aboard ship for use in some other area which might be more important." Adm John J. Hyland, Comments on draft MS, dtd 3Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File).

Advisors and Other Marine Activities

Marine Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps—Marine Advisors to the Rung Sat Special Zone—U.S. Marines of the I Corps Advisory Group—Marines Serving with MACV Headquarters in Saigon—Company L, Marine Support Battalion—Embassy Marines

Marine Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps

The Marine Corps principal advisory effort outside of I Corps was with the Vietnamese Marine Corps. Headquartered in Saigon and under the operational control of the MACV Naval Advisory Group, the Marine Advisory Unit, commanded by Colonel William P. Nesbit, functioned as the advisory liaison link between the South Vietnamese Marines and the American command. At the beginning of 1965, the Marine Advisory Unit had an authorized strength of 19 officers and one enlisted man. The Marine Advisory Unit consisted of the senior Marine advisor, his deputy, 5 major or captain infantry battalion advisors, 1 captain artillery advisor, and 10 lieutenant advisors, 6 of whom served as assistant advisors to the battalions. The remaining four lieutenants served as motor transport, supply, communications, and engineer advisors. One noncommissioned officer served as the unit's administrative assistant.*

At this time the South Vietnamese Marine Corps consisted of a Marine brigade (VNMB) of five infantry battalions supported by its own artillery and amphibious support battalions. The Commandant, Brigadier General Le Nguyen Khang, who had led the Vietnamese Marines since 1960 except for a short three-month period following the Diem coup, was also the Commander of the Capital Military Region, Saigon and the surrounding area, and reported

directly to the Joint General Staff.** The Vietnamese Marine battalions together with the South Vietnamese airborne brigade made up the nation's strategic reserve, and normally operated as "fire brigade" reinforcements wherever needed in Vietnam. One Marine battalion always remained near Saigon, ostensibly to protect the capital. Although Khang was responsible for administrative and logistic support of his units, he had operational control only over those battalions in the Capital Military Region.

The South Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) had suffered its worst defeat of the war on 31 December 1964, when the *9th VC Division* eliminated the 4th Battalion of the VNMC as an effective fighting force near Binh Gia, a Catholic resettlement village 40 miles east of Saigon.*** Major Lane Rogers, advisor to the 3d VNMC Battalion, who had volunteered on 1 January to go to Binh Gia and assist with the evacuation of the dead and wounded, recalled:

The next three days were spent searching for bodies; we found more than 100 (friendlies) and no VC. . . . The body hunt was a mess. It was stinking hot and you could not get away from the smell. . . . The third day, after finally getting bodybags . . . we bagged up the 4th Battalion bodies.¹

Rogers remembered that Colonel Nguyen Thanh Yen, the Assistant Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, was in charge of the body recovery operation and had issued "vats of local saki" to the

*MACV strength reports of 31 December 1964 listed the actual strength of the Marine Advisory Unit as 22 officers and seven enlisted. Seven of these Marines were performing temporary duty as on-the-job trainees from the 3d Marine Division. This program ended in April 1965.

**On 5 January, the Vietnamese Marine Corps became a separate service from the Vietnamese Navy, although for a two-week period in April General Khang also served as the Navy CNO when the Joint General Staff ousted the then CNO, Rear Admiral Chung Tan Cang.

***See Whitlow, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1954-64*, for a detailed account of the Binh Gia battle.



USMC Photo A186435

Colonel John A. MacNeil, senior Marine advisor, inspects Vietnamese Marines' M-1 rifles. Material readiness was a matter of primary concern for the Marine Advisory Unit in 1965.

working party, all survivors from the 4th Battalion. The American Marine advisor later remarked:

We were all sick . . . (and so you can guess what the "bag detail" was like). That evening we loaded troops and bodies into about ten 6x6s and drove off to Vung Tau. As we made the turn at Ba Ria onto Route 15 . . . one of the body bags rolled off one of the trucks. The messy recovery action drew a crowd and the wailing started. The word was out that the 4th Battalion was wiped out.²

The results of Binh Gia were an ominous portent for 1965. MACV and the South Vietnamese command feared that the Viet Cong Communists might be ready to enter into the final phase of their war to take over the county. At the time, no one knew the exact size of the enemy force that had defeated the government units at Binh Gia. Rumors abounded, including one that the VC had been led by a general riding a white horse. Even discounting such stories, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff knew the enemy force had been larger than any encountered before, although it was not until later that MACV learned that the Communists had formed the *9th VC Division* from two independent regiments. After clearing the Binh Gia battlefield, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff ordered a joint airborne and Marine operation to find and destroy the Communist attacking force. In response to the Joint General Staff order, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade launched Operation NGUYEN VAN NHO, named

after the slain commander of the 4th Battalion. General Khang committed all three of his effective infantry battalions (the 5th Battalion was still being formed) to the operation. He maintained one battalion in reserve near the brigade's headquarters at Vung Tau while establishing a two-battalion task force headquarters under Colonel Yen at Ba Ria (Phouc Le), 14 miles to the north. The two forward battalions then swept a 25-square-mile area extending 10 miles northeast of Ba Ria and including Binh Gia.

The results of the operation, which lasted until 7 February, were disappointing. According to Colonel Nesbit, NGUYEN VAN NHO, under brigade control, revealed the weaknesses of the brigade staff in directing a large force in the field and the "inadequacy of the brigade TO [Table of Organization] for sustained operations." In order to fully man the advisory staff billets for the two headquarters, FMFPac provided eight Marine officers and 11 enlisted men while MACV sent two officers and seven enlisted men. Although this improvised American advisory staff quickly established itself at Vung Tau "and functioned well," Colonel Nesbit described the operation "as one of cautious defense, and therefore not eminently successful in destroying VC."³ Another Marine advisor, Major William G. Leftwich, Jr., called the operation "lethargic" and observed that the task force headquarters played a static role while the "two battalions operated sometimes independently and sometimes in concert."⁴ Even more bluntly, Major Rogers provided the following description of the operation:

[Colonel] Yen was TF Commander at Ba Ria, while General Khang commanded from Vung Tau. . . . I was (briefly, thank God) TF advisor to Yen at Ba Ria and did nothing there, nor did Yen. . . . We found no VC, no caches, no traces, nothing. Reportedly the VC were long gone. I was told the Airborne [operating north of the Marines] did find some rice. As for the "VC general," the "VC Division," the general's "white horse," we never saw a sign.⁵

Following the end of NGUYEN VAN NHO, the Joint General Staff ordered General Khang to send a VNMC task force to II Corps to bolster the ARVN forces holding Binh Dinh Province. Once more Colonel Yen commanded the task force headquarters, now called Task Force ALPHA. Absorbing some of the lessons learned during the NGUYEN VAN NHO campaign, TF ALPHA consisted of a 72-man headquarters and two infantry battalions, the

1st and 3d, and totaled 1,360 men.* The Marine Advisory Unit also beefed up its advisory effort to the task force by providing a two-man headquarters team headed by Major Leftwich in addition to the four-battalion advisors. Arriving at Bong Son, Yen reported to the Commanding General, 22d ARVN Division.

On 9 March, Task Force ALPHA had its first significant encounter with the enemy. Yen's Marines evaded a planned ambush by the *2d VC Regiment*. The VNMC force had been ordered south from Bong Son that day to provide relief for the besieged district town of Hai An. Before leaving Bong Son, Yen learned from intelligence sources that while one VC battalion had entered the town, another had been positioned along the road to ambush any relief column. The Marine force conducted a 10-mile forced march and struck the flank of the VC ambush.

Major Leftwich played a significant role in the action that followed. Before leaving Bong Son, the Marine advisor arranged for tactical air support and when contact was established with the Viet Cong late that afternoon, he moved forward with the assault elements to control air strikes against the enemy positions. As darkness set in, the outmaneuvered enemy disengaged, leaving behind 63 dead. Thus, the Marines had forced the relief of Hai An. Task Force ALPHA casualties were four killed and 11 wounded, including the two headquarters advisors; Major Leftwich was wounded, and his assistant, First Lieutenant Dempsey H. Williams, was killed.**

One month later, the 2d VNMC Battalion tangled with the *2d VC Regiment**** At midnight on 7 April, elements of the *93d*, *95th*, and *97th Viet Cong*

Battalions struck the defensive position of the Vietnamese Marines. The battle raged for five hours during which the Vietnamese Leathernecks repulsed 10 consecutive waves of attackers. As daylight neared, the *2d VC Regiment* withdrew leaving behind 59 dead, 10 wounded, and 71 weapons. Intelligence sources later stated that the Viet Cong had carried away another 70 dead and over 200 wounded. Marine losses were remarkably low considering the ferocity of the action. Four Marines had been killed and 22 wounded. For its heroic stand, the 2d VNMC Battalion was later awarded the U.S. Presidential Unit Citation.⁷

Task Force ALPHA, which remained in II Corps for the balance of 1965, fought one other significant engagement with the enemy. On the 5th of August, the Special Forces camp at Duc Co near the Cambodian border was attacked by a VC regiment. Three days later, Task Force ALPHA and an ARVN armored task force, departed Pleiku to relieve the Duc Co garrison. The next day, they came into heavy contact with a NVA battalion dug in astride Route 19. The South Vietnamese attacked and dislodged the enemy, only to have the rear of the column attacked by another reinforced NVA battalion. Battered by air strikes all night long, the enemy unit, later identified as the *32d NVA Regiment*, launched a final attack at dawn and then withdrew from the battlefield. The next day, the South Vietnamese moved into Duc Co and broke the siege. The South Vietnamese infantry, with the support of U.S. and VNAF air strikes, claimed to have killed over 400 of the enemy and captured 71 weapons. VNMC losses were 28 killed, 60 wounded, and 3 missing. Significantly, the 5th VNMC Battalion, which had become operational on 22 May and then replaced the 2d Battalion two weeks later, had acquitted itself well in this its first major combat action. The battle was the first major contact with North Vietnamese forces operating in South Vietnam.⁸

While two VNMC battalions operated continuously with Task Force ALPHA, the other infantry battalions also saw extensive action. Two were assigned as a major reaction force to be used anywhere in South Vietnam while the remaining one was held near Saigon under the control of General Khang in his capacity as Capital Military Region commander.

Several indications of increased combat effectiveness began to appear after mid-year. In

* Although the authorized strength of the battalions was 931 men each, in 1965 Marine battalions only reached this strength when they returned to their base camps; a field strength of 600 was not uncommon. Each battalion maintained its own base camp and a handful of troops, including wounded, remained behind as guards and logistic and administrative support.

** For their actions, Major Leftwich was awarded the Navy Cross and Lieutenant Williams posthumously awarded the Silver Star Medal. Major Leftwich returned to his duties as Task Force ALPHA senior advisor on 25 March after 17 days hospitalization.

*** The 2d Battalion had replaced the 3d on 9 March. Throughout 1965, the battalions of Task Force ALPHA rotated about every three months between other assignments and II Corps.



USMC Photo A186439

Captain William H. Bond, senior Marine advisor to the 4th Vietnamese Marine Battalion, checks machine gun alignment with Captain Do Dinh Vuong, commander of the battalion's 4th Company. Note the Vietnamese Marine Corps insignia on Captain Do's cap.

November 1965, the two-battalion Task Force ALPHA achieved a casualty ratio of five to one in favor of the Marines. On 10 November, the 3d Battalion participated with the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines in an amphibious landing from Seventh Fleet Ships during Operation BLUE MARLIN. South Vietnamese Marine morale was on the rise, as evidenced by a declining desertion rate in the second half of 1965.

Many problems still remained especially in logistics, administration, delegation of authority, unit training, and assumption of responsibility by junior officers and noncommissioned officers. Both Colonel Nesbit and his successor, Colonel John A. MacNeil, who relieved Nesbit in September, continued to work on correcting shortcomings.⁹

The senior Marine advisors, supported by General Westmoreland, objected to a Joint General Staff mid-year plan to form a sixth Marine battalion in the fall

of 1965. Colonel Nesbit pointed out to General Khang that it would be best to wait until July 1966 "when the present five battalions would be better operationally and some prior planning could be done."¹⁰ Khang accepted the American advice and postponed the formation of the 6th VNMC Battalion until 1966. The South Vietnamese Marine staff and the Marine Advisory Unit, nevertheless, continued to plan for the expansion of the South Vietnamese Marine Corps.

The Marine Advisory Unit also grew in size, corresponding with the expansion and planned expansion of the Vietnamese Marine Brigade. In May, five more billets were added to the advisory unit. These included: an operations officer/task force advisor (major); an amphibious support advisor (major); an administrative specialist (warrant officer); an administrative clerk (corporal); and a supplyman (staff sergeant). In November, MACV authorized two Marine advisors for the planned 6th Vietnamese Marine battalion and a Navy chief hospital corpsman was added as medical advisor. By the end of 1965, the Marine Advisory Unit had an authorized strength of 24 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 4 enlisted men.¹¹

Marine Advisors to the Rung Sat Special Zone

The Rung Sat Special Zone (RSSZ) was an area of about 400 square miles, 85 percent of which is dense mangrove swamp. Literally translated, Rung Sat means "assassins' forest" and was so named because of the bandits and rebels who inhabited its marshlands. It lies along the Long Tao River which connects Saigon with the South China Sea.

On 15 April 1964, responsibility for the Rung Sat was assigned to the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). Lieutenant Commander Nguyen Van Tai, a former VNMC major, was assigned to command the 1,200-man military garrison which consisted of six Regional Force companies, 13 Popular Force platoons, and one river boat company (eight LCVPs).

Since all Rung Sat operations would be amphibious efforts and the VNN had been assigned primary responsibility for the area, the U.S. Naval Advisory Group requested U.S. Marines to advise the Viet-

⁹The MACV history shows the actual strength of the Marine Advisory Unit on 31 December 1965 as 25 officers and five enlisted. *MACV Comd Hist 1965*, p. 90.

namese forces. The advisory staff consisted of a U.S. Marine major as senior military advisor to the Rung Sat Special Zone and a headquarters team of three officers and two enlisted and two subsector teams, each with one officer and three enlisted.¹²

Major Edward J. Bronars, who arrived in Vietnam during the summer of 1964, was the first senior military advisor to the Rung Sat Special Zone. On 30 July 1965, Major Albert C. Smith, Jr., succeeded Bronars as the senior advisor and remained in that position through the end of the year. During this period, the authorized number of U.S. advisors in the Rung Sat was reduced to nine, eight Marines and one Navy corpsman. In addition to the billet of senior advisor, there were two other officer billets, an infantry advisor and an intelligence advisor. The five enlisted billets were operations, intelligence, psychological warfare, communication, and Navy hospital corpsman.^{13*}

Advisor duties encompassed aiding the Vietnamese in planning and executing small amphibious operations to rid the Rung Sat of the Viet Cong hiding in its swamps. Advisors accompanied the Vietnamese troops on all operations. The Marines also arranged for coordinated aerial observation of the Rung Sat, close air support of operations, and naval gunfire spotters and liaison personnel whenever U.S. warships were available for support. Requests for medical evacuation, flare ship support, photo reconnaissance, and command and control helicopter support were also initiated by the advisory staff.¹⁴

U.S. Marines of the I Corps Advisory Group

In September 1964, the Marine Corps agreed to furnish 60 Marines to the I Corps Advisory Group to assist the U.S. Army in advising the 1st and 2d ARVN Divisions. These 24 officer and 36 enlisted billets were intermingled with the Army advisory positions of the 1st through 6th ARVN Regiments and the artillery battalions of both divisional and corps artillery.

General Westmoreland proposed to General Greene, the Marine Corps Commandant, during the

* The MACV Strength Report 1Jan65, dtd 11Jan65, p. 77, indicates that the advisory staff of the Rung Sat Special Zone on 1 January consisted of 13 Marines, seven permanently assigned to fill nine permanent billets and six assigned under long-term temporary duty (in excess of 120 days).



USMC Photo A186444
Communications advisor to the Rung Sat Special Zone, Marine Sergeant Raymond S. Komo, stands guard on the banks of the Long Tao River as a Vietnamese Regional Force mortar team sets up. The Long Tao was the northern tributary feeding into the Rung Sat.

latter's visit to Saigon in April 1965, that the Marine Corps should take over the entire advisory responsibility for ICTZ. This proposal would have raised the number of Marine advisors in I Corps to about 800 men.¹⁵ The plan was never implemented, but on 7 August General Walt assumed the role of senior U.S. advisor to I Corps and became responsible for the U.S. military advisory effort in the five northern provinces. The makeup of the I Corps advisory group remained predominately Army.**

**The exact number of Marines serving as advisors in I Corps is not known. The authors have not been able to uncover any Joint Table of Distribution for the I Corps Advisory Group that would provide this information. Furthermore, all Marine advisors in 1965 administratively were carried on the roles of Headquarters Battalion, HQMC. The unit diary entries for many of these Marines do not indicate the assignment to a specific unit, but simply state "assigned to advisory duty MACV." MACV strength figures show a total of 98 Marines serving in an advisory capacity on 31 December 1965 throughout Vietnam. (MACV Comd Hist, 1965, Table -II-6). A MACV Joint Table of Distribution for the Naval Advisory Group shows 53 Marines authorized to that command including the Marines in the Rung Sat and serving as advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps. (USMACV, US Naval Advisory Group, Joint Table of Distribution, dtd 15Nov65 (OAB, NHD). Presumably 45 Marines were serving as advisors in I Corps.



USMC Photo A183650

Major Charles "Uncle Charles" K. Whitfield, artillery advisor (on the left of the picture), and his assistants, Captain Richard J. Coogan (extreme right) and Staff Sergeant Ronald M. Blakely (third from right) supervise gun laying. During 1965, the Vietnamese Marine artillery battalion was converting from the 75mm pack howitzer to the 105mm howitzer as pictured.

The Marines in the I Corps Advisory Group were assigned to battalion advisory teams consisting of two officers, a noncommissioned officer, and a radioman. Marine captains occupied positions as senior battalion advisors, while lieutenants became assistant battalion advisors. The Marine infantry and artillery noncommissioned officers served as weapons advisors, and the Marine radiomen manned the advisor communications network.

The role of advisor to the Vietnamese Armed Forces during 1965 was a difficult task, but one with many rewards. Major Letwich, after serving with the Marine Advisory Unit, provided the following advice to future Marine advisors, and indeed any advisor:

So much has been written about the advisory business that I felt some sort of mystic aura has grown up around the much overworked subject of "rapport." My modest experience with the Vietnamese, and that of many others,

is that they generally recognize, admire, and respond to the same qualities that we—or any nationality do. There are peculiar customs to be sure, but these are insignificant beside those characteristics that transcend all boundaries of language and nationality. The officer who is knowledgeable in his trade, unafraid of work, well-mannered, and possessed of a sense of humor will succeed here as he does everywhere else. . . . A single American is obviously casting his lot with his counterparts and is generally accepted on this basis, unless he isolates himself by his own misactions.¹⁶

Marines Serving with MACV Headquarters in Saigon

On 1 January 1965, 25 Marines were serving on the MACV staff in Saigon. The senior Marine was General Westmoreland's J-2, Brigadier General Carl A. Youngdale, who had filled the billet of MACV intelligence officer since January 1964. When

General Youngdale completed his overseas tour on 13 July, he was not replaced by another Marine.*

Early in 1965, a discussion took place between the Department of the Army and ComUSMACV over the replacement of Youngdale. Although the joint staff of MACV was already preponderantly Army, U. S. Army authorities thought that the billet should be assigned to an Army brigadier. General Westmoreland explained:

Much of the MACV staff consists of a purely Army advisory effort and results in a staff which appears to be heavily weighted with Army personnel. The RVNAF and Joint General Staff organizations are both predominately Army and demand a large Army contingent in the MACV staff.¹⁷

When the Marine Corps informed General Westmoreland in March that it would not be able to provide an officer of equal rank to replace Youngdale, the matter was settled and the billet was assigned to the Army.

With the rapid influx of American troops into Vietnam, the authorized strength of the MACV staff grew from 1,702 men in January to 2,427 servicemen at the end of 1965. Marine Corps billets on the joint staff correspondingly increased to 131 that year. Because of the time requirements necessary to transfer personnel overseas, only 56 of these positions had been filled by 31 December.

During 1965, 35 Marine officers arrived to fill staff positions. Among these officers were Colonels George L. Hollowell, Chief, Operations Branch, J-3; Webb D. Sawyer, Chief, Plans Branch, J-4; Maxie R. Williams, Chief, US/SEATO Division; and Francis F. Parry, Combat Operations Center.

On 11 November, a MACV steering committee recommended the establishment of a combat operations center within the J-3 Division to provide a centralized MACV agency for the collection and dissemination of information to enhance MACV direction of operations and control of subordinate commands. General Westmoreland approved the recommendation and proposed to Admiral Sharp that the operations center be headed by a Marine Corps

brigadier general. After consulting with General Greene and the other Joint Chiefs, Sharp concurred.¹⁸

When the Combat Operations Center was activated in mid-November, its first director was a Marine, Colonel Parry. Describing his assignment to the MACV staff, Parry stated when he departed for Vietnam the previous month, he was told that he was to be the plans officer for a joint command. Upon arrival, he discovered that MACV had decided not to activate such a command and he was assigned, instead, to the MACV J-3 Division. Colonel Parry remembered that: "After several days in J-3 Operations learning the ropes, Bill DePuy [Brigadier General William E. DePuy (USA), the MACV J-3] called me in and told me that General Westmoreland had decided to organize a Combat Operations Center." According to Parry, General DePuy told him that the "Air Force was holding up the assignment of a Marine BG to MACV because they wanted more general officer slots on the staff. Bill asked me to organize the COC and be its director until such time as the Marine BG arrived."¹⁹ Marine Brigadier General William K. Jones relieved Colonel Parry as director of the Combat Operations Center on 31 December 1965.

Another Marine MACV staff officer, Colonel Webb D. Sawyer, recalled his service as head of MACV J-4 Plans Branch:

From the time of the landing of the Marine Brigade, throughout the buildup of forces within Vietnam, the logistic planners at MACV never came down from the overhead. It was a never ending cycle of short-fuzed studies, high level conferences in Honolulu, SEATO logistic planning meetings in Bangkok, and consultations with ARVN.²⁰

Confronted with this myriad of problems, Sawyer found his job challenging but satisfying. He concluded: "Anyway, all in all, it was a most exciting and interesting year."²¹

Company L, Marine Support Battalion

One small and unheralded Marine unit, Company L, Marine Support Battalion, redesignated on 1 January 1965 from Subunit 1, Company C, Marine Support Battalion, provided a vital intelligence function for MACV during 1965. Headquartered at Phu Bai with the Army's 8th Radio Research Unit, the unit consisted of one officer and 31 enlisted cryptologists. The company was augmented by one

* According to Colonel Webb D. Sawyer, General Westmoreland appointed him "Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Unit, Headquarters, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam," in that he had become the senior Marine on the MACV staff upon the departure of General Youngdale. BGen Webb D. Sawyer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

officer and 10 enlisted men from Naval Communications Station, Philippines. Both contingents formed Detachment ALPHA, NavComSta, Philippines. Captain Donald J. Hatch, the Company L commander, was also the Detachment ALPHA commander. On 21 July, Major William A. Scott, Jr., relieved Captain Hatch. By the end of December, Company L consisted of two officers and 77 enlisted Marine cryptologists. Captain Hatch observed:

The stationing of this unit in Vietnam was an outgrowth of a detachment from the First Composite Radio Company, FMFPac having been in country on a TAD basis for many months. Company L was the first permanent unit assigned.²²

Embassy Marines

The Marine Security Guard, led by Staff Sergeant William D. Kerakos, at the American Embassy in Saigon numbered 30 men. The mission of the Marines was to safeguard classified material and to protect U. S. personnel and property. During the year the detachment established two new watches,

one at the U. S. Information Service Building and the other at the home of the Deputy Ambassador. An individual guard was on post an average of 49 hours a week.

During periods of political unrest, the guards were kept busy preventing Vietnamese street crowds from entering the Embassy. The physical threat against the building became a reality on the morning of 30 March when a bomb, secreted in a car across the street from the Embassy, exploded. The blast killed 11 persons and wounded 163, and did extensive damage to the building. A secretary to the Deputy Ambassador was the only American fatality, but 52 U. S. citizens were injured. The other dead victims were Vietnamese nationals, four policemen, the civilian driver for the Marine guard, and a Viet Cong terrorist. All of the Marines escaped unscathed. Off duty personnel immediately returned to the Embassy. The building was closed, a security check conducted; by mid-afternoon the Embassy was back to normal routine. This incident, more than any other during 1965, demonstrated to the detachment that it too was in the frontlines.

Conclusion

The 10-month period of March to December 1965 was one of expansion and experimentation for Marine forces in Vietnam. During the year, Marine units from California to Okinawa prepared for deployment to Vietnam. General Karch's 9,000 Marines of the 9th MEB were quickly absorbed by the division-wing force, III MAF. By the end of the year, General Walt had over 42,000 men in ICTZ. Since the landing on 8 March, the Marines had extended their influence from eight square miles around the Da Nang Airfield to three coastal enclaves containing over 804 square miles.

As III MAF's TAORs expanded into the densely populated coastal ricelands, the Marines found the Viet Cong intermingled with the local villagers and turned to a variety of pacification experiments to ferret out the Communists and win back the population. They employed counter guerrilla techniques such as combined action companies and civic action projects such as the GOLDEN FLEECE rice harvesting operations. By the end of 1965, the Marines were still unable to measure many real pacification gains.

General Walt's balanced approach for the elimination of the Communist threat initially stressed the establishment of secure beachheads at Da Nang, Chu Lai, and Phu Bai. During the March-June consolidation phase the Marines lost 34 killed and 157 wounded, while killing 270 Viet Cong. By mid-1965 with this phase completed, III MAF began a two-pronged campaign to destroy main force Communist units, and at the same time root out the Viet Cong infrastructure. Operations STARLITE and HARVEST MOON encountered the Viet Cong in regimental strength. During the last six months of

1965 the Marines suffered 420 killed and 1,936 wounded, while killing 2,295 enemy soldiers and capturing more than 700 weapons.¹

There could be no doubt that large-scale, conventional operations were to play a much larger role during the coming year. By the end of 1965, General Westmoreland's intelligence staff estimated that eight regular NVA regiments had arrived in South Vietnam. General Walt had received approval of his request for two full divisions and a reinforced aircraft wing. The 1st Marine Division was scheduled for deployment to I CTZ in early 1966, as were more aircraft squadrons.

Despite the emphasis on troop movement, reinforcement, and engagement of the enemy's larger units, the war was far from conventional. General Krulak cautioned:

The conflict between the North Vietnamese and the hardcore VC on the one hand and the U. S. on the other hand could move to another planet today and we would still not have won the war. On the other hand if the subversion and guerrilla efforts were to disappear, the war would soon collapse as the Viet Cong would be denied food, sanctuary, and intelligence.²

As 1965 drew to a close there was some hope for peace. Both the allies and the Viet Cong agreed to short truces over the Christmas and New Year holidays and President Johnson opened his "peace offensive." He ordered the bombing of North Vietnam suspended for an extended period and dispatched American envoys to visit world capitals in an effort to initiate peace negotiations with the other side. Everyone involved in the war in Vietnam talked of peace, but there was no peace. The prediction of a Vietnamese soothsayer would come true; 1966 would be a year of a "lot of fighting and killing."³

Notes

PART I ESTABLISHING THE ENCLAVES

Introduction

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Chapter 1

The Call for Marines

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, General Staff, Hq, USMACV, Comd Hist, 1965, dtd 20Apr66, hereafter *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*; 9th MEB ComdD Mar65; MAG-16 ComdD 16Jan-Mar65, dtd 8Apr65; HQMC Msg File; CNO, Flag Plot Msg File, Jan-Mar65 (OAB, NHD), hereafter *Flag Plot File*; BGen Frederick J. Karch, intvw by Oral HistU, Hist Div, HQMC, dtd 15Jan72 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter *Karch Intvw*; Vietnam Comment File; Department of Defense, *United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967*, 12 bks (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter *Pentagon Papers* with appropriate section title and book, and section, volume or tab, and page number; LtCol John J. Cahill and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun 65," MS (Hist&Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun 65"; Jack Shulimson, "U. S. Marines in Vietnam, Introduction," MS, pt 1 of LtCol Ralph F. Moody, *et. al.*, "Marines in Vietnam, 1954-May 1968," MS, 8 pts (Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter, Shulimson, "U. S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1."

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Air Retaliation and the Arrival of the HAWKS

3. *Washington Post and Times Herald*, 8Feb65, p. 1.

4. LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Cook Comments*. See also Col George G. Long, Comments on draft MS, dtd 8Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Long Comments*.

5. *Cook Comments*.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Long comments*. See also Capt Ronald G. Richardson, intvw by MCS Quantico, dtd 8Feb66 (No. 50, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

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9. "The Rolling Thunder Program Begins," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-3, pp. xii-xiv, and pp. 27-47. See also JCS Historical Section, Joint Secretariat, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *JCS History Comments*.

Land the Marines

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11. ComUSMACV msg to JCS, dtd 9Feb65 (*Flag Plot File*).

12. JCS Memorandum (JCSM) 100-65, dtd 11Feb65 as cited in "Marine Units Go To Da Nang," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-4, p. ix. See also "The Rolling Thunder Program Begins," *Ibid.*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-3, pp. 31-47 and *JCS History Comments*.

13. General William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (New York, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1976), p. 123, hereafter Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports; MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, p. 30.

14. Quoted in "Marine Units Go to Da Nang," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-c-4, pp. 2-5.

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17. DOD Tlgram 6166, dtd 2Mar65 as cited in "Marine Units Go to Da Nang," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-4, p. 6.

18. CinCPac msg to JCS, dtd 3Mar65, as cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

The Landing

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Chapter 2

The 9th MEB in Vietnam

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*; 9th MEB ComdDs, Mar-Apr65; HQMC Msg File; *Flag Plot File*; Vietnam Comment File; *Karch Intvw*; *Karch Presentation*; *Pentagon Papers*; Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shulimson, "U. S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1"; Jack Shulimson "U. S. Marines in Vietnam, May-December 1965," MS, pt 2 of LtCol Ralph F. Moody *et. al.*, "Marines in Vietnam 1954-May1968," hereafter Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965-66," *Naval Review, 1968* (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 2-35, hereafter Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66."

The First Weeks

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8. *Karch Presentation*.
9. Col Norman G. Ewers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 7Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). See also O'Donnell and staff *Comments*.
10. Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd

27Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter O'Connor *Comments*.

11. 3/9 ComdD, Mar65.
12. FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*, p. 21.
13. *Karch Presentation*.

Estimate of the Situation

Additional sources for this section are: Dept of the Army, SE Asia Msg File (CMH, DA), hereafter *CMH Msg File* and Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*.

14. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 27Mar65 (CMH Msg File). See also Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 126-29.
15. See "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp 56-59 for copies of these earlier recommendations.
16. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 27Mar65 (*CMH Msg File*). This message provides a resume of the 26 March MACV "Estimate of the Situation." See also Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 125.
17. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on Shulimson draft MS. "U. S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1," dtd 11Aug69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Krulak Comments*, 69.
18. NSAM 328, dtd 6Apr65 as reprinted in "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp. 124-26. See also Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 130-31.

More Marines Arrive

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac ComdC, Mar-Dec65; FMFPac Deployment SitReps, 1965; 3d MEB Sit Reps, 5-12Apr65; 3d Marines ComdD, Apr65; MAG-16 ComdD, Apr65.

19. Col Rex C. Denny, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Denny Comments*.
20. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 31Mar65 in FMFPac Deployment SitReps 1965.
21. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 1Apr65 in *Ibid*; Col Richard A. Savage, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
22. *Denny Comments*.
23. ComUSMACV msg to CG9thMEB, dtd 12Apr65 (HQMC Msg File).
24. CG1st MAW msg to CO, VMFA-531, dtd 12Apr65 (*Ibid*).
25. Col Rex C. Denny, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson draft MS. "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd 16Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).
26. Col Otis W. Corman, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Nov 76] (Vietnam Comment File).
27. *Karch Presentation*.

An Expanded Mission

28. *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, p. 40.
29. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Krulak Comments*, 77.

30. 3d Marines ComdD, Apr 65.
31. Capt Gaetano F. Squillace, intvw by MCS, Quantico, dtd 11Jan66 (No. 27, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
32. *Karch Presentation*.
33. *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, 2May65, p. 3.

Chu Lai

Additional sources for this section are: 3d MAB ComdD, Apr-May65; 3d MEB SitReps, 26Apr-12May65.

34. "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, p. 21. See also Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 132.
35. Telephone conversation between FMFPacCC and MCCC, dtd 28Nov67 as cited in Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65," p. 200.
36. *Krulak Comments*, 77.
37. *Denny Comments*.
38. LtCol Charles L. Goode, Comments on draft MS, dtd 7Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Goode Comments*.
39. *O'Connor Comments*.
40. Col Norman R. Nickerson, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Oct76 and 9Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Nickerson Comments*.
41. Col Hardy Hay, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd 5May68 (Vietnam Comment File). Hay in this letter provides a detailed account of the Saigon meeting.
42. Col Hardy Hay, Comments on draft MS, dtd 22Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
43. *O'Connor Comments*.
44. Col Edward Cook, Comments on draft MS, dtd 14Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
45. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to WestPac, 14-21 May 1965, n.d., p. A-8.
46. Col William M. Graham, Comments on draft MS, dtd 18Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

Chapter 3

Formation and Development of III MAF

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist*, 1965; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*; III MAF ComdD, May65; III MAF ComdC, Jun65; 3d MarDiv (Fwd) ComdD, May65; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun65; 1st MAW (Adv) ComdD, May65; 1st MAW (Adv) ComdC, Jun65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 1"; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; *Pentagon Papers*; Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66."

The Birth of III MAF

1. Quoted in CinCPacFlt msg to CGIIIEMEF, dtd 7May65 (HQMC Msg File).
2. Col Victor J. Croizat, Comments on Shulimson draft MS, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 1," dtd 12Aug69 (Vietnam

Comment File); Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 10; Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File).

3. ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIEMEF, dtd 5May65, Subj: Letter of Instruction, encl 11, III MAF ComdC, May 65.
4. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 8May65 (HQMC Msg File).
5. *Ibid*.

The Le My Experiment

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF, Civic Action Report, 8Mar-15Jul65, dtd 18Jul65, hereafter *III MAF Civic Action Report*; 3d Marines ComdD, May 65; 2/3 ComdD, May 65; LtCol David A. Clement, intvw by MCB, Camp Lejeune, dtd 6Aug66 (No. 189, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter *Clement Intvw*; LtCol David A. Clement, "Le My: A Study in Counter-Insurgency," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 95, no. 11 (Nov67), pp. 18-24, hereafter Clement, "Le My."

6. Statement of Capt Nguyen Hoa, dtd 16Jun65, Effect of Marine Corps Operations in Le My Area, encl 5, *III MAF Civic Action Report*.
7. *Clement Intvw*.
8. BGen Marc A. Moore, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Nov 76] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Moore Comments*.
9. Capt Lionel V. Silva, intvw by MSC, Quantico, dtd 2Feb66 (No. 37, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
10. *Moore Comments*.
11. Col David A. Clement, Comments on draft MS, dtd 5Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Clement Comments*.
12. 3d Mar Div (Adv) ComdD, May65.
13. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to WestPac, 14-21 May 1965, n.d., hereafter *CGFMFPac May Trip Summary*.

Building the Chu Lai Airfield

Additional sources for this section are: MABS-12 ComdC, May65; MAG-12 ComdC, Jun65; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-70," *Naval Review 1971* (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1971), pp. 122-55, hereafter McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation"; LtCol Charles L. Goode, Chu Lai Report, encl 2, *Goode Comments*, hereafter *Chu Lai Report*, *Goode Comments*.

14. *Chu Lai Report*, *Goode Comments*.
15. *Ibid*.
16. *Ibid*.
17. *Nickerson Comments*.
18. *Chu Lai Report*, *Goode Comments*.
19. *Ibid*.
20. *Ibid*.
21. *Ibid*.
22. Col John D. Noble, Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
23. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd 24Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).

24. LtCol Robert W. Baker, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

25. Col Hardy Hay, Comments on draft MS, dtd 22Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Hay Comments*.

III MAF in Transition

Additional sources for this section are: FLSG ComdD, May 65; FLSG ComdC, Jun65.

26. Gen Lewis W. Walt, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Walt Comments*.

27. Maj Ruel T. Scyphers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 18Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

28. *CGFMFPac May Trip Summary*.

29. *Hay Comments*.

30. *Nickerson Comments*

31. *Ibid*.

32. See *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, pp. 106-07; LtGen Joseph M. Heiser, Jr., USA, *Vietnam Studies: Logistic Support* (Washington D. C.: Dept of the Army, 1974), pp. 9-11; VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN, *Mobility, Support, Endurance* (Washington: NHD, 1972), p. 72, hereafter Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*.

33. *Nickerson Comments*.

34. AC/S G-4 III MAF memo to CGIIIMAF, dtd 16May65, Subj: Concept of Logistic Support, encl 14, III MAF ComdC, May 1965.

35. *Hay Comments*.

The Seeds of Pacification

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF *Civ. Action Report*; Clement, "Le My"; Capt Russel H. Stolfi, USMCR, *U. S. Marine Corps Civic Action Efforts in Vietnam March 1965-March 1966* (Washington: Hist Br, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1968), hereafter Stolfi, *USMC Civic Action, 65-66*.

36. Quoted in Capt William D. Parker, USMCR, *U. S. Marine Civil Affairs in I Corps, Republic of Vietnam, April 1966-April 1967* (Washington: Hist Div, HQMC, 1970), p. 2.

37. Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., intvw by Hist Div, HQMC, dtd 19 May73 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC).

38. III MAF Force Order 1750.1, dtd 7 Jun 65, encl 7, III MAF *Civ. Action Report*.

39. *Clement Comments*.

40. *Ibid*.

41. *Ibid*.

June Operations in the Three Enclaves

Additional sources for this section are: 3d Marines ComdC, Jun 65; 4th Marines ComdC, Jun 65; 3/4 ComdC, Jun65.

42. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun65.

43. *Ibid*.

44. Col Joseph R. Fisher, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd 14May68 (Vietnam Comment File).

45. LtCol Harold D. Fredericks, Comments on draft MS, dtd 24Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

46. *CGFMFPac May Trip Summary*.

47. Unsigned and undated document entitled "Zone A, Hue/Phu Bai," encl 8, 3d Marines ComdC, Jun65.

Chapter 4

Reinforcement and Expansion

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*; *FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 1st MAW (Adv) ComdC, Jul-Aug65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; Jack Shulimson "U. S. Marine Corps Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, Jul-Dec65," MS (Hist&Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"; *Pentagon Papers*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Gen Lewis W. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy, A General's Report on Vietnam* (New York: Funk&Wagnalls, 1970), hereafter Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66"; Chester L. Cooper, Judith E. Corson, Laurence J. Legere, David E. Lockwood, and Donald M. Weller, *The American Experience with Pacification in Vietnam*, 3 vols. (Washington: Institute for Defense Analysis, Mar 1972), hereafter Cooper *et. al.*, *The American Experience with Pacification*.

The Need for Further Reinforcements

1. *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, pp. 140-41; Cooper *et. al.*, *The American Experience with Pacification*, v. 3, pp. 206-217. The quotes are from Technique of Pacification Operations, Anx E, *Chien Thang Plan*, dtd 22Feb64, as cited in Cooper *et. al.*, *The American Experience with Pacification*, v. 3, p. 207.

2. *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, p. 141; Cooper, *et. al.*, *American Experience with Pacification*, v. 3, p. 228.

3. Cooper, *et. al.*, *The American Experience with Pacification*, v. 1, p. 4.

4. Quoted in Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 15.

5. Quoted in "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, p. 90; *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, pp. 35, 40-41; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 139-40.

6. JCS msg 2400, dtd 22Jun65 as cited in "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, p. 28. See also pp. 25-28, 90-91, 94, and 104; *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, pp. 35, 40-41.

7. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, 139-40. See also *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, p. 41.

8. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 140.

9. Quoted in "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, p. 104.

10. CMH, Comments on draft MS, dtd 15Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

11. ComUSMACV memo to CMC, dtd 28Apr65, Subj: Deployment of an Airmobile Division to the High Plateau. See also ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 13Jun65 as reprinted

in "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, p. 101.

12. Adm Ulysses S. G. Sharp, Comments on draft MS, dtd 8Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File). See also "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp. 26-7; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 144.

The Establishment of the Qui Nhon Enclave

13. Col Charles H. Bodley, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

14. *Ibid.*

15. MACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 2Jul65 (HQMC Msg File).

16. III MAF Op 304-65, dtd 4Jul65, encl 8, III MAF ComdC, Jul65.

The Attack on the Airfield

Additional sources for this section are: 3d Marines ComdC, Jul65; 1/9 ComdC, Jul65; 1/3 ComdC, Jul65; 2/3 ComdC, Jul65; *Karch Intvw.*

17. III MAF Intelligence Rept to ComUSMACV, dtd 3Jul65, Subj: Interrogation of NVA POW.

18. Col Verle E. Ludwig, Comments on draft MS, dtd 8Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Ludwig Comments.*

19. Entry for 1Jul65, 3d MarDiv G-3 Jnl, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul65.

20. *Walt Comments.*

21. *Ibid.*

22. Resume of Activities, Movements and Results, pt II, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul65.

23. *Ludwig Comments.*

24. *Hay Comments.*

25. *Krulak Comments, 77.*

Expansion to the South

Additional sources for this section are: HQMC, Cam Ne Report, Aug-Sep65; 3d Marines ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 9th Marines ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 1/9 ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 2/9 ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 1/9 AAR 1-65, dtd Aug65; LtCol William H. Clark, intvw by MCB, CamPen, circa Feb66 (No. 63, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC).

26. *Walt Comments.*

27. *Krulak Comments, 77; Walt Comments.*

28. BGen Nguyen Chanh Thi ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd 20Jul65, Subj: TAOR of III MAF, encl 3, III MAF ComdC, Jul65.

29. *Ibid.*

30. LtCol William H. Clark memo, dtd 17July65, Subj: Provisional Base Defense Battalion, encl 7, LtCol William H. Clark, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Clark Comments.*

31. *Clark Comments.*

32. CO 2/9 memo to CO 9th Marines, dtd 9Aug65, Subj: Debriefing Rept, 2/9 ComdC, Aug65.

33. Maj John A. Buck, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

34. Statements of LtCol V. E. Ludwig and Capt H. B. West in HQMC, Cam Ne Report, Aug-Sep65.

35. LtCol V. E. Ludwig Statement in *Ibid.*

36. CMC (AH-wwg) memo to Asst SecDef (PA), dtd 9Aug65, Subj: Mr. Morley Safer report of Marine attack on the village of Cam Ne, and Summary of CBS-TV newsbroadcast, evening, 5Aug65 in *Ibid.* For the *Gazette* editorial quote, see "The War in Vietnam: Cam Ne (4)," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 49, no. 10 (Oct 1965), pp. 28-30, p. 30.

37. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 7Aug65 in HQMC, Cam Ne Rept, Aug-Sep65.

Further Reinforcements

38. *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, pp. 40-42. See also "Phase I in the Buildup of U. S. Forces, the Debate," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 4, sec. IV-C-5, pp. 25-31.

PART II

THE BIG BATTLES

Chapter 5

Operation STARLITE: The First Big Battle

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*; HqFMFPac, "U. S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, March 1965-September 1967," n.d., 2 vols., hereafter FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Aug65; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug65; 1st MAW (Adv) ComdC, Jul-Aug65; 7th Marines ComdC, Aug65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"; Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66"; BGen Oscar F. Peatross, "Application of Doctrine: Victory at Van Tuong Village," *Naval Review 1967* (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1967), pp. 2-13, hereafter Peatross, "Victory at Van Tuong"; Col Oscar F. Peatross, intvw by HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 15Jul66 (No. 157, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter *Peatross Intvw, 1966.*

Intelligence and Planning

1. Simmons, "Marines Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 18.

2. MajGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65," dtd 14May71 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Dulacki Comments, 71*; LtGen Leo J. Dulacki, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jul 77] (Vietnam Comment File).

3. Col James F. McClanahan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 18Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 4th Marines ComdC, Aug65.

4. *Dulacki Comments, 71.*

5. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 12Apr73 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC); *Walt Comments.*

6. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65," dtd 7Jun71 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Peatross Comments*, 71.

7. *Peatross Intvw*, 1966.

The Battle

Additional sources for this section are: MAG-16 ComdC, Aug65; MAG-11 ComdC, Aug65; MAG-12 ComdC, Aug65; CTF 79.5 ComdC, 19Jun-10Oct65, dtd 27Oct65; 2/4 ComdC, Aug65; 3/3 ComdC, Aug65; 3/7 ComdC, Jun-Sep65; 1st Lt Richard M. Purnell, intvw by MCB CampPen, dtd 23Feb66 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC); Gy Sgt Jack Marino, Jr, intvw by MCB Camp Lejeune, dtd 25Nov66 (No. 246, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC); "Statement of Major Andrew G. Comer, U. S. Marine Corps, concerning personal observations, impressions and participation in combat operations while serving as Executive Officer of 3d Battalion, 3d Marines during Operation STARLITE, 16August-20August 1965, in the Republic of South Vietnam," n.d., encl to Maj Andrew G. Comer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17 Nov 76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Comer Statement*.

8. Maj Howard B. Henry, intvw by MCAS El Toro, circa Aug66 (No. 188, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

9. Maj Andrew G. Comer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

10. *Comer Statement*

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. Entry for 18Aug65, 7th Marines S-3 Jn1, 7th Marines ComdC, Aug65.

The Aftermath

Additional sources for this section are: 3/12 ComdC, Aug65; 1/7 ComdC, Aug65; 3/7 ComdC Jun-Sep65.

16. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Peatross Comments*, 76.

17. LtGen Leslie E. Brown, transcript of intvw by Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, dtd 14Aug75 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), p. 11.

18. *Walt Comments*.

19. Col Floyd J. Johnson, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 29Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

20. *Peatross Comments*, 71.

21. 1/7 AAR, dtd 22Aug65, 7th Marines ComdC, Aug65, p. 3.

22. *Krulak Comments*, 77.

23. Col Don P. Wyckoff, Comments on draft MS, dtd 16Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

24. *Walt Comments*.

Chapter 6

The Enemy Refuses to Give Battle: September-November Operations

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist*, 1965; *FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*; *FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*; *HqFMFPac, Operations of U. S. Marine Forces Vietnam*, monthly reports, Sep-Nov65, hereafter *FMFPac, III MAF Ops*, with appropriate month; *III MAF ComdCs, Sep-Nov65*; *3d MarDiv ComdCs, Sep-Nov65*; *1st MAW ComdCs, Sep-Nov65*; *TG79.5 ComdCs, Sep-Nov65*; *HQMC Msg File*; *Vietnam Comment File*; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"; Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66."

Operation PIRANHA

Additional sources for this section are: 7th Marines ComdC, Sep65; RLT-7 AAR 2-65, Operation PIRANHA, dtd 25Sep65, hereafter *PIRANHA AAR*; MAG-12 ComdC, Sep65; MAG-11 ComdC, Sep65; MAG-16 ComdC, Sep65; 1/7 ComdC, Sep65; 3/7 ComdC, Sep65; 3/3 ComdC, Sep65.

1. BLT 1/7 OpO 123-65, dtd 4Sep65 in *PIRANHA AAR*.

2. *PIRANHA AAR*.

Much Ado About CS, Operation STOMP

Additional sources for this section are: 2/7 ComdC, Sep65; Col Leon N. Utter, Comments on Shulimson draft MS, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 2," dtd 19Jun70 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Utter Comments*; Maj Alvin Doublet, intvw by MCB, CampPen, dtd 14Jun66 (No. 137, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter *Doublet Intvw*.

3. Quoted in Lester A. Sobel, Editor-in-Chief, *Facts on File Year-book 1965*, v. XXV (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1966), p. 322.

4. *Utter Comments*.

5. LtCol Raymond W. Wilson, Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

6. *New York Times*, 11Sep65, p. 11.

7. *Utter Comments*.

October-November Operations

Additional sources for this section are: MAG-16 ComdCs, Oct-Nov65; MAG-36 ComdCs, Oct-Nov65; 7th Marines ComdC, Nov65; 2/3 ComdC, Oct65; 3/4 ComdC, Oct65; 2/4 ComdC, Oct65; 1/7 ComdC, Nov65; 2/7 ComdC, Nov65; 3/3 ComdC, Nov65.

Chapter 7

The 1st VC Again: Operation HARVEST MOON

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*; *FMFPac, Marine Forces In Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*; *FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Nov-Dec65*; *III MAF ComdCs, Nov-Dec65*; *1st MAF ComdCs, Nov-Dec65*; *3d MarDiv ComdCs, Nov-Dec65*; *TG 79.5 ComdC, Dec65*; *TF DELTA, AAR, Operation HARVEST MOON, dtd 28Dec65, hereafter TF DELTA AAR Opn HARVEST MOON*; *MAG-12 ComdCs, Nov-Dec65*; *12th Marines ComdC, Dec65*; *3/3 ComdC, Dec65*; *2/7 ComdC, Dec65*; *HQMC Msg File*; *Vietnam Comment File*; *Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"*; *Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"*; *Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy*; *Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66."*

The Abandonment of Hiep Duc

1. O'Connor Comments.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.* See also *MAG-16 ComdC, Nov 65, p. 5.*
4. *Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 22.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Nov65, Subj: Letter of Instruction, encl 2, III MAF ComdC, Nov 65.*
7. *CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 22Nov65 (HQMC Msg File).*

Activation of Task Force DELTA and Planning the Operation

8. *Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 26.*

The VC Strike and the Marines are Committed

9. *Washington Post and Times Herald, 9Dec65, p. 3.*
10. *Capt Edward J. Lloyd, intvw by MCRD, San Diego, dtd 26Oct67 (No. 1640, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).*
11. *Col Michael R. Yunck, Comments on draft MS, dtd 22Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File). See also TF DELTA AAR, Opn HARVEST MOON.*

The Search of the Phouc Ha Valley

12. *Hist Div, HQMC, Memo for the Record, dtd 8Jun71, Subj: Phone Con with MajGen Jonas M. Platt (Ret) (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Platt Phone Con, Jun 71.*
13. *Hist Div, HQMC, Memo for the Record, dtd 28Jan70, Subj: Interview with MajGen Jonas M. Platt (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Platt Interview, Jan 70.*

The Fight at Ky Phu

Additional source for this section is *LtCol Leon N. Utter, "Solid Contact for 2/7," Marine Corps Gazette, v. 50, no. 4 (Apr66), pp. 25-30.*

14. *Maj Nicholas H. Grosz, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Dec 76] (Vietnam Comment File).*

15. *Capt Nicholas H. Grosz, intvw by MCRD, Parris Island, S.C., dtd Aug66 (No. 195, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).*

The Wrap-Up

16. *Col Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, dtd 3Nov76, (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dennis Comments, 76.*

17. *MAG-12 AAR, Operation HARVEST MOON, dtd 25Dec65, App 1, MAG-12 ComdC, Dec65.*

18. *CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to WestPac, 3-11 Dec65, dtd 14Dec65, pp. 4-5.*

PART III THE CONTINUING WAR

Chapter 8

Defending and Expanding the Base Areas

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*; *FMFPac, Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*; *FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*; *FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Oct-Dec 65*; *III MAF ComdCs, Aug-Dec65*; *3d MarDiv ComdCs, Aug-Dec65*; *1st MAF ComdCs, Aug-Dec65*; *MAG-11 ComdCs Aug-Dec65*; *MAG-12 ComdCs Aug-Dec65*; *MAG-16 ComdCs Aug-Dec65*; *MAG-36 ComdCs, Sep-Dec65*; *3d Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65*; *4th Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65*; *7th Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65*; *9th Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65*; *3/4 ComdCs, Aug-Dec65*; *HQMC Msg File*; *Vietnam Comment File*; *Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"*; *Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"*; *Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports*; *Walt, Strange War, Strange Strategy*; *Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops 1965-66."*

The Evolution of a Strategy

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2. *ComUSMACV ltr to CG III MAF, dtd 21Nov65, Subj: Letter of Instruction, encl 2, III MAF ComdC, Nov65.*

3. *BGen Fredederick J. Karch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 11Jan77 (Vietnam Comment File); HistDiv, Memo for the Record, dtd 9Mar72, Subj: Conference with BGen Simmons, (Ret), Director of Marine Corps History and Museums (Vietnam Comment File).*

4. *ComUSMACV ltr to CGField Force, Vietnam, dtd 10Dec65, Subj: Tactical Employment of U.S. Forces and Defensive Action (Folder No. VA (1) Guidance from MACV), MACV Historical Records, 1966, NFRC, Washington, (Accession No. 69A702) and Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 165-66.*

5. Copy of LtGen Victor H. Krulak personal ltr to Hon Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, dtd 11Nov65 (LtGen Victor H. Krulak Personal Papers Collection (PC 486) Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

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7. "The Chief of Staff's Overview," Sec. IIB, *1966 General Officer Symposium Book*, p. 3.

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8. CGIIIMAF msg dtd 12Aug65, encl 3, III MAF ComdC, Aug65.

9. I Corps Senior Advisor, I Corps Advisory Group ltr to ComUSMACV, dtd 27Jul65, Subj: I Corps Advisory Group Responsibilities, encl 2, App 1, III MAF ComdC, Aug65.

10. See CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 30Oct65 (HQMC Msg File) and *MACV Comd Hist*, 1965, pp. 97-98.

11. *Wyckoff Intvw*.

12. FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*, p. 14.

Expanding the TAORs

13. CGIIIMAF ltr to CGICorps, dtd 13Sep65, Subj: Expansion of Currently Assigned TAOR at Da Nang, encl 1, III MAF ComdC, Sep65.

14. BGen Nguyen Chanh Thi, CGICorps, ltr to CGIIIMAF, encl 2, III MAF ComdC, Sep65.

15. Col Sumner A. Vale, Comments on draft MS, Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65," dtd 4Jun71 (Vietnam Comment File).

Attacks on the Airfields and Hill 22

Additional material for this section is derived from: CGIIIMAF ltr to CGFMFPac, n.d., Subj: Report of Viet Cong Attack of Marble Mountain Air Facility and Chu Lai Airfield of 28Oct65, encl 6, III MAF ComdC, Oct65, hereafter *Viet Cong Attack Report*; 1/1 ComdC, Oct65; *Brown Intvw*; *Karch Intvw*.

16. *Brown Intvw*, p. 19.

17. *Karch Intvw*.

18. *O'Connor Comments*.

19. *Ibid.*, and *Viet Cong Attack Report*.

20. *Viet Cong Attack Report*.

21. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct65, p. 7.

22. CO 9th Marines ltr to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 30Oct65, Subj: Special Report of Squad-sized Ambush Conducted on 27Oct65, encl 4, 9th Marines ComdC, Oct65.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Viet Cong Attack Report*, p. 9.

25. 1/1 AAR No. 3, dtd 31Oct65, encl 15, 1/1 ComdC, Oct 65.

26. Hist&MusDiv, Memo for the Record, dtd 14 Oct 76, Subj: Oral Comments of MajGen Harold A. Hatch on draft MS (Vietnam Comment File).

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28. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 30Oct65 (HQMC Msg File).

29. 3d Marines ComdC, Oct 65, p. 21.

30. 1/1 ComdC, Nov65, p. 6.

31. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 28Oct65 (HQMC Msg File).

Base Defense

Additional material for this section is derived from: BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Comments on draft MS, Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2," dtd 2Jan70 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Simmons Comments, Jan 70*.

32. Col George W. Carrington, Comments on draft MS, dtd 24Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Carrington Comments*.

33. Briefing for MajGen Larsen, CGUSATFA and MajGen Kinnard, CG1stAirCavDiv, dtd 15Sep65, encl to *Simmons Comments, Jan 70*.

34. III MAF G-3 Section, Agenda Subject, Base Defense Command, dtd 4Oct65, encl, *Simmons Comments, Jan 70*.

35. *Carrington Comments*.

36. *Dennis Comments*, 76.

37. 3/9 OpO 321A-65, dtd 14Sep65, encl 3, 3/9 ComdC, Sep65.

38. 3d MarDiv OpO 327-65, dtd 15Aug65, encl 1, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug65.

39. III MAF G-3 Section, Agenda Subject, War Dog Requirements, dtd 4Jan66, encl 10, III MAF ComdC, Jan66.

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41. LtCol Harold A. Hatch, intvw by MCB, CamPen, dtd 6Jul66 (No. 156, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter *Hatch Intvw*.

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Additional material for this section is derived from 1/7 ComdC, Dec65; 1/9 ComdC, Dec65; LtGen Lewis W. Walt, intvw by III MAF, dtd 30Jan67 (No. 337, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter *Walt Intvw*; *Hatch Intvw*; LtCol James P. Kelly, intvw by MCS, Quantico, dtd 18Oct66 (No. 229, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter *Kelly Intvw*.

42. *Walt Intvw*.

43. 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct and Dec65.

44. *Hatch Intvw*.

45. *Kelly Intvw*.

46. MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dtd 5Dec65.

47. *Kelly Intvw*.

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Chapter 9 Pacification

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist*, 1965; FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops*, Oct-Dec65; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65;" MajGen Donald M. Weller, USMC (Ret), Unprocessed Working Papers on Pacification, hereafter *Weller Working Papers*; Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Stolfi, *Civic Action*; Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, Vietnam 1965-66"; Cooper *et. al.*, *The American Experience with Pacification*.

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Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac, "The Marine Combined Action Program, Vietnam, Aug65-Jan67," n.d., hereafter FMFPac, *Combined Action Program*; 3d Marines ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 4th Marines ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 7th Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65; 9th Marines ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 3/4 ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 1st Lt Paul R. Ek, intvw by MCB, CamPen, dtd 10Feb66 (No. 46, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter *Ek Intvw, Feb66*; Hist Div, HQMC, Memo for the Record, dtd 10Nov72, Subj: Interview with Capt Paul R. Ek, (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Ek MR, 10Nov72*; Capt John J. Mullen, Jr. USMC, Student Staff Study, AWS, Quantico, Va, "Modification to the III MAF Combined Action Program in the Republic of Vietnam," dtd 19Dec68, hereafter *Mullen Study*.

1. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 29.
2. U. S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington: GPO, 1940), p. I-32.
3. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 81.
4. Copy of LtGen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., personal ltr to MajGen Richard G. Weede, USMC, C/S USMACV, dtd 27Feb63 (General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. Personal Papers Collection (PC 511) Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
5. *Ek Intvw, Feb66*.
6. *Ek MR, 10Nov72*.
7. Stolfi, *Civic Action*, p. 1.
8. LtCol Sumner A. Vale, intvw by MCRD, Parris Island, SC, dtd 14Feb67 (No. 372, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
9. 3d Marines ComdC, Dec65, p. 3.
10. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, pp. 105-106.
11. III MAF OpO 305-66, Short Title: Phong Bu, dtd 24Nov65 (III MAF Plans/Orders 1965).
12. These letters are reproduced in FMFPac, *Combined Action Program*, pp. 32-33. See also III MAF G-3 Section, Agenda Subj: RF/PF Status and Improvement, dtd 5Jan66, encl 6, III MAF ComdC, Jan66.

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Additional sources for this section are: 9th Marines ComdCs, Sep-Oct65; 1/9 ComdC, Sep65; 1/1 ComdC, Oct65;

2/3 ComdC, Sep65; 2/4 ComdC, Oct65; LtCol Verle E. Ludwig, intvw by HQMC, dtd 23Jan67 (No. 294, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter *Ludwig Intvw*; Clement, "Le My"; LtCol Verle E. Ludwig, "Bus to Tra Khe," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 50, no. 10 (Oct66), pp. 32-36.

13. *Ludwig Intvw*.
14. 9th Marines ComdC, Sep65, p. 1.
15. *Ludwig Intvw*; 9th Marines FragO 36-65, dtd 9Sep65, encl 2, 9th Marines ComdC, Sep65; *Walt Comments*.
16. *Ludwig Intvw*.
17. Col David A. Clement, Comments on draft MS, Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt. 2," dtd 12Mar70 (Vietnam Comment File).
18. III MAF ComdC, Oct65.
19. III MAF Staff Study, dtd 26Nov65, Subj: Study to determine data on the USMC assisted Summer/Fall 1965 Rice Harvest, encl 7, III MAF ComdC, Nov65.

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Additional sources for this section are: 9th Marines ComdC, Aug-Dec65; 3d Marines ComdCs, Aug-Dec65; *Simmons Comments, Jan70*.

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25. See *ICJCC Minutes*, dtd 6Sep65.
26. *ICJCC Minutes*, dtd 4Oct65.
27. Mr. Marcus J. Gordon, Comments on draft MS, Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2," dtd 10Feb70 (Vietnam Comment File).
28. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct65, p. 25.
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Additional sources for this section are: Reports on Quang Nam Pacification Program, Nov65-Feb66 in *Weller Working Papers*.

30. *MACV Comd Hist*, 1965, p. 233; Cooper *et. al.*, *The American Experience with Pacification*, v. 3, pp. 233-34.
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32. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 18Sep65 (HQMC Msg File).
33. CG 3dMarDiv ltr to COs 3d, 9th, 4th, and 7th Marines, dtd 26Oct65, Subj: Protection of RVN Officials, encl 58, 3d Marines ComdC, Oct65.
34. 1/3 ComdC, Dec65.
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PART IV SUPPORTING THE TROOPS

Chapter 10

Marine Aviation in Vietnam

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*; FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Oct-Dec65*; FMFPac ComdC, Mar-Dec65; III MAF ComdCs, May-Dec65; 1st MAW ComdCs, May-Dec65; HQMC Msg File; *Flag Plot File*; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1"; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt. 2"; LtCol Ralph F. Moody, Maj Thomas E. Donnelly, and Captain Moyers S. Shore, "Backing up The Troops," MS, pt 8 of LtCol Ralph F. Moody *et. al.*, "Marines in Vietnam, 1954-May68," hereafter, Moody *et. al.*, "Backing up the Troops, pt 8"; Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"; Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66"; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-1970," *Naval Review 1971* (Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1971), pp. 122-55, hereafter McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation."

Deployments

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2. Col Richard A. Savage, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).

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4. CinCPac msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 29Mar65 (*Flag Plot File*).
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6. HqUSMACV Directive 95-4, dtd 13Jul65, encl 10, Tab F, G-3 Div, HQMC, Staff Visit West Pac. Nov-Dec65.

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Fixed-Wing Operations

Additional sources for this section are: MAG-11 ComdCs Jul-Dec65; MAG-12 ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; VMF-212 (AW) ComdC, 1965, dtd 10Dec65.

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9. 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65, p. 3-5.
10. 1st MAW ComdC, Jul-Aug65, p. 4.
11. Col Norman G. Ewers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 7Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
12. 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65; MAG-11 ComdC, Dec65; and MAG-12 ComdC, Dec65. See also FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*, v. II, pp. 32-37.
13. 1st MAW ComdC, Nov65, p. 2-4.
14. 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65, p. 2-2.
15. 1st MAW ComdC, Jul-Aug65, p. 2-3.
16. MAG-11 ComdC, Oct65, encl 4, p. 13.
17. MAG-12 ComdC, Dec65, p. 1.
18. FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*, v. II, p. 36.
19. LtCol Harlan P. Chapman, Comments on draft MS, dtd 29Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

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21. *Ibid.*, and BGen Marc A. Moore, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Nov76] (Vietnam Comment File).
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Chapter 11

Fire Support and Reconnaissance

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist*, 1965; FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops*, Oct-Dec65; III MAF ComdCs, May-Dec65; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, May-Dec65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1"; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; Moody *et. al.*, "Backing Up The Troops, pt 8"; Cahill and Shulimson "USMC OPs RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"; Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66."

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2. See for the command changes, 3d MarDiv OpO 327-65, dtd 15Aug65 and 3d MarDiv OpO 329-65, Aug65, encls 1 and 3, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Aug65. See also 12th Marines ComdCs, Aug and Sep65, and 3/12 ComdC, Aug65.
3. 2/12 ComdC, Jul65, p. 3.
4. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Sep65, p. 17.
5. FSCC portions of 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Dec65.
6. 1st MAW ComdC, Jul-Aug65, pt III, sec. 13, pp. 3-4.
7. 12th Marines ComdC, Sep65, p. 5.
8. *Ibid.*, Dec65, p. 5, and Prov Arty Bn AAR, encl 1, TF DELTA AAR, Opn HARVEST MOON, p. 6.
9. 3/12 ComdC, Dec65.

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An additional source for this section is: Naval Gunfire Requirements, CMC File 32, (General Wallace M. Greene, Jr. Personal Papers Collection (PC 511) Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter *Naval Gunfire File (Greene Papers)*.

10. HQMC, AO3H, Talking Paper, dtd 20Jun65, Subj: Naval Gunfire Support, Tab U, *Naval Gunfire File (Greene Papers)*.
11. *MACV Comd Hist*, 1965, p. 176.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 178, and Naval History Division, "History of U.S. Naval Operations in the Vietnam Conflict, 1965-67," MS, Feb71, v. III, pt 2, p. 478 hereafter NHD, "History of U.S. Naval Ops, 1965-67."
13. *MACV Comd Hist* 1965, p. 176.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 178-9.
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17. *Ibid.*, and HqIIIMAF, G-3 Sec, Agenda Subject: Naval Gunfire Support, dtd 4Jan66, encl, III MAF ComdC, Jan 66.
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Marine Reconnaissance

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22. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, intvw by Hist&MusDiv, dtd 26Aug77 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
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25. 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Sep65.
26. *Tiffany Intvw*.
27. 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun65.
28. Quoted in Stubbe, "Paddles, Parachutes, and Patrols," p. 553.
29. *Van Cleve Intvw*.
30. HQMC, Provisional Table of Organization M-1428, Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, dtd 20Feb58; HQMC, Table of Organization M-1428, Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force, dtd 8Mar61.
31. *Rev 1, TO M-1428*.

32. Quoted in Stubbe, "Paddles, Parachutes and Patrols," p. 491.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 448.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 490.
35. Capt Francis J. West Jr., USMCR, "Stingray 70," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 95, no. 11 (Nov69), pp. 26-37.

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Chapter 12

Logistics and Construction

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*; FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Mar-Sep65*; FMFPac, *III MAF Ops, Oct-Dec65*; FMFPac ComdC, Mar-Dec65; III MAF ComdCs, May-Dec65; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, May-Dec65; 1st MAW ComdCs, May-Dec65; FLSG ComdCs, May-Dec65; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1"; Shulimson, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; Moody *et. al.*, "Backing Up The Troops, pt 8"; Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jul-Dec65"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Hooper, *Mobility, Support, and Endurance*; Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66."

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3. *Nickerson Comments*.
4. BGen Mauro J. Padalino, Comments on draft MS, dtd 23Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
5. *Ibid.*
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7. *Dennis Comments, 76*.
8. *Nickerson Comments*.
9. Col Harold A. Hayes, Comments on draft MS, dtd 29Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
10. CGFMFPac msg to CinCPacFlt, dtd 14May65 (HQMC Msg File).
11. Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Opns RVN, Jan-Jun65," p. 189.
12. BGen Robert F. Conley, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

III MAF Naval Responsibilities

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File); AC/S G-4 III MAF Position Paper, dtd 15Jun65, Subj: Operation of Ports, Beaches, and Depots from Chu Lai to DMZ, encl, III MAF ComdC, Jun65, hereafter *III MAF G-4 Position Paper, Jun 65*; Hooper, *Mobility, Support, and Endurance*, pp. 70-71.

14. *III MAF G-4 Position Paper, Jun65*.
15. III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; Force/Naval Component Command Order 5400.1, dtd 24Dec65, encl 4, III MAF ComdC, Dec65; Hooper, *Mobility, Support, and Endurance*, pp. 37-38, 78.
16. III MAF ComdC, Jul65, p. 5.
17. FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*, v. I, p. 8-27.
18. FMFPac, *III MAF Ops*, Dec65, p. 3.
19. III MAF ComdC, Oct65, p. 8.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 7 and FMFPac, *III MAF Ops*, Dec65, pp. 43-44.
21. 1st MAW ComdC, Dec65, p. 2-4.

RED BALL and CRITIPAC

22. Col Harold A. Hayes, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 29Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).
23. III MAF ComdC, Aug65, p. 7.
24. FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*, v. I, p. 8-9.
25. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec65, p. 14.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 15, and FMFPac, *III MAF Ops*, Dec65.

The Force Logistic Support Group

27. FLSG ComdC, Dec65, p. 2.
28. FMFPac ComdC, Mar-Dec65, p. 16.

Engineering and Construction

Additional sources for this section are: 3d Engr Bn ComdCs, Jul-Dec65; 7th Engr Bn ComdCs, Aug-Dec65.

29. Col William M. Graham, Comments on draft MS, dtd 8Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File).
30. Col Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, dtd 18Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File).
31. LtCol Bernard A. Kaasmann, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Opns RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd 24Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).
32. "Background of Deployment to the Republic of Vietnam," n.d., encl 2, *Dennis Comments, 76*, hereafter *Background of Deployment*.
33. *O'Connor Comments*.
34. *Dennis Comments, 76*.
35. *Ibid.*, and *Background of Deployment*.
36. *Dennis Comments 76*.
37. *Ibid.*
38. 7th Engr Bn ComdCs, Sep65 p. 5 and Nov65, p. 3.
39. MACV-4PR Memo for the Record, dtd 23Sep65, Subj: Establishing of Committee to Survey 16 Kms of Railroad Prior to Acquiring for Use by Marine Corps, encl, BGen Webb D. Sawyer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 3Nov76 (Vietnam Comment File); *Dennis Comments, 76*; 3d Engr Bn ComdC, Dec65.
40. MAG-36 ComdC, Sep65, p. 2.

41. 1st MAW ComdC, Sep65, p. 2-4.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 3-10.
43. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," pp. 129-30.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 130.
45. *Walt Comments*.
46. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on Cahill and Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Opns RVN, Jan-Jun65," dtd 24Apr68 (Vietnam Comment File).

PART V OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES

Chapter 13

The SLF of the Seventh Fleet

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*; *FMFPac, III MAF Ops Mar-Sep65*; *FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Oct-Dec65*; *FMFPac, ComdC, Mar-Dec65*; *ComPhibFor, U. S. Seventh Flt, "History of Amphibious Opns in South Vietnam, Mar65-Dec66," n.d.*; *SLF (TG 78.5) ComdC, 19Jun-10Oct65*; *SLF (TG 78.5/79.5) ComdC, 11Oct-31Dec65*; *HQMC Msg File*; Shulimson, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1"; Shulimson, "Marines in Vietnam, pt 2"; Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Ops RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shulimson, "USMC Opns RVN, Jul-Dec65"; LtCol Ralph F. Moody and Benis M. Frank, "SLF Operations in Vietnam," MS (Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

Disbandment of the SLF

Additional sources for this section are: BLT 2/9 ComdD, 23Dec64-7Mar65; BLT 2/9 ComdD, Mar-Apr65.

1. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to West Pac, 14-21 May 1965, n.d., p. 17.

A New Mission

An additional source for this section is CinCPacFlt/ComUSMACV Agreement of 14Mar65, Subj: Anti-Sea Infiltration Operations, encl 2, FMFPac, Provisions of Close Air Support for Seventh Fleet Operations, Operation DECKHOUSE III in Support of ComUSMACV in RVN, dtd 19Aug66, hereafter *CinCPacFlt/ComUSMACV Mar Agreement*.

2. Amphibious Opns on RVN Coastline and Adjacent Islands, Anx B, *CinCPacFlt/ComUSMACV Mar Agreement*.

3. MACV-J3 ltr to CinCPac, dtd [14May65], Subj: Transmittal of Agreement (*CinCPacFlt/ComUSMACV Mar Agreement*).

4. CGFMFPac, Trip Summary, Visit to West Pac, 14-21 May 1965, n.d., p. 13.

5. CinCPac msg to PacFlt, dtd 27Jun65 (GP-5 DAGGER THRUST, *Flag Plot File*).

6. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 12Jun65 (HQMC Msg File).

The Reestablishment of the SLF

The general source for this section is SLF (TG 78.5) ComdC, 19Jun-10Oct65.

Command and Control Changes

7. As quoted in CGFMFPac msg to AdminO 3d MarDiv, dtd 13Jun65 (HQMC Msg File).

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*

11. SLF (TG 78.5) ComdC, 19Jun-10Oct65, p. 5.

12. CTF 79 msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 23Aug65 (HQMC Msg File).

13. LtGen Lewis J. Fields, Comments on draft MS, dtd 21Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Field Comments*.

14. CTF 79 msg to ComSeventhFlt, dtd 11Sep65 (HQMC Msg File).

15. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CTF 79, dtd 15Sep65.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*

18. Quoted in CTF 79 msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 14Sep65 (HQMC Msg File).

19. MCCC, Items of Significant Interest, dtd 14Sep65.

The First DAGGER THRUST Raids

20. *O'Donnell and Staff Comments*.

21. Col Robert T. Hanifin, Comments on Shulimson draft MS, "USMC Opns RVN, Jul-Dec65," dtd 1Jun71 (Vietnam Comment File).

22. CTF 78.5, Post Opns Report for DAGGER THRUST Targets 2, 4, and 11, dtd 5Oct65, encl 9, SLF (TG 78.5) ComdC, 19Jun-10Oct65.

23. FMFPac, *III MAF Ops*, Nov65, p. 7.

Further Changes in the SLF

24. FMFPac msg to CMC, Sit Rep No. 201, dtd 17Oct65 (HQMC Msg File).

25. *Field Comments*.

The Saigon Conference

26. As quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 29Jul65 (HQMC Msg File).

27. CinCPacFlt msg to CGFMFPac and ComPhibPac, dtd 20Oct65 (CinCPacFlt Briefer's File, OAB, NHD).

28. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPacFlt, dtd 8Oct65 in *Ibid.*

29. CinCPacFlt msg, 20Oct65, *op. cit.*

30. CTF 115 msg to CinCPacFlt, dtd 28Oct65 (CinCPacFlt Briefer's File OAB,NHD).

The Second Series of DAGGER THRUST Raids

31. ComSeventhFlt msg to CTF 79, dtd 24Nov65 (GP-5 DAGGER THRUST, *Flag Plot File*).

32. Adm Roy L. Johnson, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Aug77 (Vietnam Comment File).

The SLF at the End of the Year

33. FMFPac ComdC, Mar-Dec65.

Chapter 14**Advisors and Other Marine Activities in Vietnam**

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: *MACV Comd Hist 1965*; Unit Diaries of Casual Company (RUC 54013) and Company B (RUC 54026) HqBn, HQMC; Vietnam Comment File; Shulimson, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, pt 1"; Cahill and Shulimson, "USMC Opns RVN, Jan-Jun65"; Shulimson, "USMC Opns RVN, Jul-Dec65."

Marine Advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps

Additional sources for this section are: MAU, NavAdvGp, MACV, After Tour Reports, hereafter *ATR* with individual name and report date; MAU, After Action Reports (AARs); SMA, MAU, Monthly Evaluation Reports, Jan-Dec65; NavGp, MACV, Monthly Fact Sheets, Jan-Dec65; SMA, NavGp, MACV ltr to CMC, dtd 13Jul66, Subj: Organization, Employment, and Support of the Vietnamese Marine Corps; SMA, MACV, ltr to CMC, dtd 22Mar73, Subj: Vietnamese Marine Corps/Marine Advisory Unit Historical Summary, 1954-73.

1. LtCol Lane Rogers, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jan77] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter *Rogers Comments*.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Col William P. Nesbit, *ATR*, dtd 1Sep65, hereafter *Nesbit ATR*.
4. Maj William G. Leftwich, *ATR*, dtd 10Jan66, hereafter *Leftwich ATR*.
5. *Rogers Comments*.
6. SMA, TF ALFA AAR, 9-13Mar65, dtd 7Jun65.
7. SMA, TF ALFA AAR, 1-26Apr65, dtd 8Jun65.
8. *Leftwich ATR* and Maj William G. Leftwich, "Decision at Duc Co," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 51, no. 2 (Feb66), pp. 34-38.
9. SMA, MAU, Monthly Evaluation Reports, Jan-Dec65.
10. *Nesbit ATR*.
11. USMACV, U.S. Naval Advisory Group, Joint Table of Distribution, dtd 15Nov65 (OAB, NHD), hereafter *MACV JTD, Nov 65*.

Marine Advisors of the Rung Sat Special Zone

Additional material for this section is derived from: Naval Advisory Group, MACV, Monthly Fact Sheets No. 17, Jan-Dec65, Subj: Rung Sat Special Zone, hereafter, *NavGp, RSSZ*;

LtCol Albert C. Smith, Jr., "Rung Sat Special Zone," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, v. 94, no. 4 (Apr 1968), pp. 117-18.

12. *NavGp, RSSZ*, May65, dtd 7May65.
13. *MACV JTD, Nov65*.
14. *NavGp, RSSZ*.

U.S. Marines of the I Corps Advisory Group

15. CMC/CGFMFPac Conference at HqFMFPac, dtd 28Apr65 (No. 6298, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC); CGFMFPac msg to CG 3d MarDiv, dtd 13Apr65 (HQMC Msg File).

16. *Leftwich ATR*.

Marines Serving with MACV Headquarters Saigon

17. *MACV Comd Hist, 1965*, pp. 93-94.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

19. Col Francis F. Parry, Comments on draft MS, dtd 18Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

20. BGen Webb D. Sawyer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 25Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

21. *Ibid.*

Company L, Marine Support Battalion

The material for this section is derived from: Unit Diaries of Company L, Marine Support Battalion (RUC 54101) 1-4Jan65, (RUC 54043) 5Jan-31Dec65; MACV Strength Report, 1Jan65, dtd 11Jan65.

22. LtCol Donald J. Hatch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 22Oct76 (Vietnam Comment File).

Embassy Marines

The material for this section is derived from Marine Security Guard, American Embassy, Saigon, RVN, Quarterly and Special Incident Reports, 1965.

Chapter 15**Conclusion**

1. FMFPac, *Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67*, v. 1, p. 9-14, and v. 2, pp. 86-98.
2. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, and MajGen Lewis W. Walt, intvw by MCDEC, dtd Dec65 (No. 6001, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC).
3. Quoted in Simmons, "Marine Corps Ops, 1965-66," p. 27.

Appendix A

Marine Task Organizations and Command List January—December 1965

Marine Unit Vietnam (CTU 79.3.5) 1Jan-9Mar

Commanding Officer

Col John H. King, Jr. 1Jan-9Mar
 Sub-Unit 2, MABS-16

LtCol Thomas E. Vernon 1Jan-9Mar
 HMM-365

LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr. 1Jan-18Feb
 HMM-163

LtCol Norman G. Ewers 18Feb-9Mar
 1st LAAM Battalion

LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr. 8Feb-9Mar
 Co L, 3/9

Capt John J. Sheridan 1Jan-23Jan
 Co D, 1/3

Capt Terry Turner 23Jan-9Mar
 Co C, 7th Engineer Battalion

Maj William G. Bates 14Feb-9Mar

9th Marine Exeditionary Brigade 8Mar-6May

9th MEB Headquarters
 Commanding General

BGen Frederick J. Karch 8Mar-6May
 Deputy Commander

Col Donald H. Stapp 8Mar-3Apr
 Col Clifford F. Quilici 4Apr-6May
 Chief of Staff

Col Lowell D. Grow 8Mar-3Apr
 Col Donald H. Stapp 4Apr-6May
 G-1

Maj Ruel T. Scyphers 8Mar-13Mar
 Maj Samuel E. Englehart 14Mar-6May
 G-2

Maj Edmund J. Regan, Jr. 8Mar-6May
 G-3

LtCol Joseph E. Muir 8Mar-6May
 G-4

LtCol Joseph G. Cervell 8Mar-16Apr
 LtCol Joseph S. Heitzler 17Apr-6May
 MAG-16

Col John H. King, Jr. 9Mar-6May

H&MS-16

Maj John J. McMasters 14Mar-6May
 HMM-163

LtCol Norman G. Ewers 9Mar-6May
 HMM-162

LtCol Oliver W. Curtis 9Mar-6May
 VMFA-531

LtCol William C. McGraw, Jr. 10Apr-6May
 VM CJ-1

LtCol Otis W. Corman 16Apr-6May
 VMO-2

LtCol George F. Bauman 3May-6May
 Sub-Unit 2, MABS-16

LtCol Thomas E. Vernon 9Mar-6May
 MASS-2

LtCol Paul L. Hitchcock 16Apr-6May
 1st LAAM Battalion

LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr. 9Mar-6May
 3d Marines

Col Edwin B. Wheeler 12Apr-6May
 1/3

LtCol Herbert J. Bain 8Mar-27Apr
 LtCol William H. Lanagan, Jr. 28Apr-6May
 2/3

LtCol David A. Clement 10Apr-6May
 3/9

LtCol Charles E. McPartlin, Jr. 8Mar-6May
 3/4

LtCol Donald R. Jones 14Apr-27Apr
 LtCol William W. Taylor 28Apr-6May
 Brigade Logistic Support Group

LtCol George H. Smith 12Mar-6May
 Brigade Artillery Group

Captain Myron J. Kandra 11Mar-11Apr
 Maj Gilbert W. Ferguson 12Apr-6May
 1/12

Maj Gilbert W. Ferguson 12Apr-6May
 Brigade Engineer Group

Maj William G. Bates 12Mar-6May

III Marine Amphibious Force *

6May-31Dec

**III Marine Expeditionary Force redesignated to III Marine Amphibious Force on 7 May.*

III MAF Headquarters
Commanding General

MajGen William R. Collins 6May-4Jun
MajGen Lewis W. Walt 4Jun-31Dec

Deputy Commanding General

BGen Marion E. Carl 12May-24May
BGen Keith B. McCutcheon 6Jun-31Dec

Chief of Staff

Col Regan Fuller 6May-11Sep
Col George C. Axtell, Jr. 12Sep-31Dec

Deputy Chief of Staff

Col Olin W. Jones, Jr. 15Jun-18Aug
Col Howard E. Wertman 19Aug-31Dec

G-1

Col Frederick C. Dodson 6May-24May
LtCol Donald T. Doxey 25May-7Aug
Col Don W. Galbreath 8Aug-31Dec

G-2

Col Horace E. Knapp, Jr. 6May-10May
LtCol Edward Cook 11May-30Jun
Maj Robert E. Gruenler 1Jul-9Jul
LtCol Dale N. Davis 10Jul-26Jul
Col Leo J. Dulacki 27Jul-31Dec

G-3

Col Hardy Hay 6May-9Jul
LtCol Rex C. Denny, Jr. 10Jul-14Jul
Col Edwin H. Simmons 15Jul-31Dec

G-4

Col Norman R. Nickerson 12May-27Jul
LtCol Joseph S. Heitzler 28Jul-25Aug
Col Harold A. Hayes, Jr. 26Aug-31Dec

G-5*

Col Elmer G. Glidden, Jr. 23Aug-28Oct
Maj Charles J. Keever 29Oct-31Dec

**On 29 October, the G-5 changed from Plans Officer to Civil Affairs/Psychological Warfare Officer and a new billet, G-6 Plans officer, was established.*

G-6

Col Elmer G. Glidden, Jr. 29Oct-31Dec

3d Marine Division *

6May-31Dec

**Until the arrival of the 9th Marines on 6 July, the 3d Marine Division had two command echelons, the 3d Marine Division (Forward) at Da Nang and the 3d Marine Division (Rear) on Okinawa.*

3d Marine Division Headquarters
Commanding General

MajGen William R. Collins 6May-3Jun
MajGen Lewis W. Walt 4Jun-31Dec

Assistant Division Commander, Da Nang

BGen Frederick J. Karch 18Jun-3Aug
BGen Melvin D. Henderson 4Aug-10Dec
BGen Lowell E. English 22Dec-31Dec

Assistant Division Commander, Chu Lai

BGen Frederick J. Karch 5Aug-8Nov
BGen Jonas M. Platt 9Nov-31Dec

Chief of Staff

Col Clifford F. Quilici 6May-14May
Col Andrew I. Lyman 15May-13Aug
Col Donald W. Sherman 14Aug-31Dec

G-1

Col Edward H. Greason 6May-27Jun
Col Robert M. Port 28Jun-31Dec

G-2

Maj Charles T. Williamson 6May-24Aug
LtCol Richard J. Schriver 25Aug-31Dec

G-3

Col Royal E. North 12May-12Aug
Col Don P. Wyckoff 13Aug-31Dec

G-4

LtCol John D. Ross 12May-30Jun
Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. 1Jul-31Dec

G-5 *

Maj John Colia 15Dec-31Dec

**The division established the billet of Civil Affairs Psychological Warfare Officer on 15 December.*

Headquarters Battalion

Maj Charles W. Abbott 6May-18Jul
Maj John E. Watson, Jr. 19Jul-31Dec

3d Marines

Col Edwin B. Wheeler 6May-15Aug
Col Norman R. Nickerson 16Aug-22Nov
Col Thell H. Fisher 23Nov-31Dec

4th Marines

Col Edward P. Dupras, Jr. 7May-24Jul
Col James F. McClanahan 25Jul-31Dec

7th Marines

Col Oscar F. Peatross 15Aug-31Dec

9th Marines

Col Frank E. Garretson 6Jul-11Aug
Col John E. Gorman 12Aug-31Dec

12th Marines

Col William P. Pala 8Jul-14Jul
LtCol Walter E. Stuenkel 15Jul-30Jul
Col James M. Callender 31Jul-31Dec

1/1

LtCol Donald V. McCloskey 28Aug-27Sep
LtCol Harold A. Hatch 28Sep-31Dec

2/1 *

LtCol Robert T. Hanifin, Jr. 23Dec-31Dec
**Part of the SLF 5Sep-22Dec.*

1/3 *

LtCol William H. Lanagan, Jr. 6May-1Sep
LtCol Robert R. Dickey III 19Nov-31Dec

**1/1 relieved 1/3 on 31Aug ending the intertheater battalion transplacement system. 1/1 did not redesignate to 1/3.*

2/3 *

LtCol David A. Clement 6May-10Nov
LtCol William K. Horn 11Nov-19Nov

**2/3 departed Vietnam for Okinawa as the first battalion involved in the newly instituted intra-theater battalion rotation program. The newly formed 1/3 replaced 2/3 at Da Nang.*

3/3
 LtCol William D. Hall 12May-30Jun
 LtCol Joseph E. Muir 1Jul-10Sep
 Maj Andrew G. Comer 11Sep-14Sep
 LtCol William H. Lanagan, Jr. 15Sep-29Nov
 LtCol Joshua W. Dorsey III. 30Nov-31Dec
 1/4
 LtCol Harold D. Fredericks 7May-30May
 LtCol Robert J. Perrich 31May-31Dec
 2/4
 LtCol Joseph R. Fisher 7May-14Oct
 LtCol Rodolfo L. Trevino 15Oct-31Dec
 3/4 *
 LtCol William W. Taylor 6May-30Sep
 LtCol Sumner A. Vale 1Oct-22Dec
**2/1 relieved 3/4 at Phu Bai on 22Dec and the latter unit sailed for Okinawa under the intra-theater battalion rotation system.*
 1/7
 LtCol James P. Kelly 15Aug-31Dec
 2/7 *
 LtCol Leon N. Utter 7Jul-31Dec
**Located at Qui Nhon 7Jul-4Nov. During the period 7Jul-4Aug, III MAF had operational control of 2/7. After that period, the U. S. Army's Task Force Alpha, which became I Field Force, Vietnam in November, had the operational control of the unit.*
 3/7 *
 LtCol Charles H. Bodley 3Sep-31Dec
**Part of the SLF Jun-Sep.*
 1/9
 LtCol Verle E. Ludwig 16Jun-31Dec
 2/9
 LtCol George R. Scharnberg 6Jul-31Aug
 LtCol William F. Donahue, Jr. 1Sep-31Dec
 3/9 *
 LtCol Charles E. McPartlin, Jr. 6May-17Jun
 LtCol Robert J. Tunnell, Jr. 14Aug-30Sep
 LtCol William W. Taylor 1Oct-31Dec
**3/9 departed Vietnam on 17Jun under the battalion intra-theater transplacement system. The newly formed 3/9 returned to Vietnam on 14Aug.*
 3/11
 LtCol William H. Peck 16Aug-29Dec
 LtCol Paul B. Watson, Jr. 30Dec-31Dec
 1/12
 Maj Gilbert W. Ferguson 6May-8Jul
 LtCol Warren E. McCain 9Jul-31Dec
 2/12
 LtCol Jack K. Knocke 7Jul-1Sep
 LtCol Eugene O. Speckart 2Sep-31Dec
 3/12
 Maj Jesse L. Gibney, Jr. 7May-9Jul
 LtCol Leslie L. Page 10Jul-31Dec
 4/12
 LtCol Edwin M. Rudzis 8Jul-31Dec
 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
 LtCol Jack Glenn 21Jul-30Jul
 LtCol William D. Pomeroy 31Jul-31Dec
 3d Anti-Tank Battalion
 Maj Edward E. Brooks 9Jul-15Jul
 LtCol Bruce A. Heflin 16Jul-31Dec

3d Engineer Battalion
 Maj Bernard A. Kaasman 20May-28May
 LtCol Nicholas J. Dennis 29May-31Dec
 3d Medical Battalion
 LCdr John W. Davis, USN 9Jun-20Jul
 Cdr Almon C. Wilson, USN 21Jul-31Dec
 3d Motor Transport Battalion
 LtCol Arthur C. Beverly 16Jun-26Jun
 Capt William D. McGuire 27Jun-3Jul
 Col Edward Cook 4Jul-11Aug
 Maj Freddie J. Baker 12Aug-31Dec
 3d Reconnaissance Battalion
 LtCol Don H. Blanchard 7May-30Aug
 LtCol Roy R. Van Cleve 31Aug-31Dec
 3d Shore Party Battalion
 Maj John M. Dean 1Nov-31Dec
 3d Tank Battalion
 LtCol States R. Jones, Jr. 8Jul-30Aug
 LtCol Milton L. Raphael 31Aug-31Dec
 5th Communication Battalion
 LtCol Hercules R. Kelly, Jr. 12Nov-31Dec
 7th Engineer Battalion
 LtCol Ermine L. Meeker 24Aug-31Dec
 9th Motor Transport Battalion
 Maj Joseph F. Jones 1Nov-31Dec

1st Marine Aircraft Wing
 11May-31Dec*

**Designated 1st MAW (Advance) 11May-31August.*

1st MAW Headquarters
 Commanding General
 MajGen Paul J. Fontana 11May-23May
 BGen Keith B. McCutcheon 24May-31Dec
 Assistant Wing Commander
 BGen Marion E. Carl 1Sep-31Dec
 Chief of Staff
 Col Thomas J. O'Connor 11May-4Aug
 Col Thomas G. Bronleewe, Jr. 5Aug-31Dec
 G-1
 Col Jack W. Morrison 11May-21May
 LtCol Wilbur D. Wilcox 22May-26May
 Maj Roger D. Swanson 27May-14Aug
 Col Wilbur D. Wilcox 15Aug-31Dec
 G-2
 Col Lowell D. Grow 11May-11Jun
 LtCol Jack W. Dindinger 12Jun-16Jul
 LtCol Billy H. Barber 17Jul-31Dec
 G-3
 Col Douglas A. Bangert 11May-21May
 LtCol Robert L. Lamar 22May-1Jul
 Col Leslie E. Brown 2Jul-17Sep
 Col Michael R. Yunch 18Sep-9Dec
 Col Roy C. Gray, Jr. 10Dec-31Dec
 G-4
 Col Martin B. Roush 11May-17Jun
 Col Robert J. Lynch, Jr. 18Jun-31Dec

	G-5 *		HMM-261 *
Col Fred J. Frazer	22Sep-31Dec	LtCol Mervin B. Porter
<i>*Plans officer for Base Development and Military Construction.</i>			<i>*SLF squadron 10Oct-31Dec.</i>
	MWHG-1		HMM-263
Col Albert L. Jones	29Jun-14Jul	LtCol Truman Clark
LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr.	15Jul-1Aug
Col Edward I. Lupton	2Aug-31Dec	HMM-361
	MAG-11		LtCol Lloyd F. Childers
Col Robert F. Conley	7Jul-2Nov
Col Emmett O. Anglin, Jr.	3Nov-31Dec	HMM-362
	MAG-12		LtCol James Aldworth
Col John D. Noble	16May-18Sep
Col Leslie E. Brown	19Sep-31Dec	HMM-363 *
	MAG-16		Maj Willis D. Kellogg
Col John H. King, Jr.	6May-6Aug
Col Thomas J. O'Connor	7Aug-31Dec	LtCol George D. New
	MAG-36	
Col William G. Johnson	1Sep-31Dec	<i>*Located at Qui Nhon 1Sep-31Dec; under operational control of CG, Task Force Alpha (USA).</i>
	H&HS-1		HMM-364
Maj Robert A. Walker	11May-26Jul	LtCol William R. Lucas
Maj Chester A. Liddle, Jr.	27Jul-31Dec
	H&MS-11		HMM-365 *
LtCol Alfred F. McCaleb, Jr.	7Jul-5Aug	LtCol Joseph Koler, Jr.
Capt Albert K. Charlton	6Aug-10Aug
LtCol William H. Bortz, Jr.	11Aug-31Dec	<i>*HMM-365 relieved by HMM-361.</i>
	H&MS-12		VMA-211
LtCol John W. Kirkland	25May-26Dec	LtCol William E. Garman
Maj William E. Garman	27Dec-31Dec
	H&MS-16		VMA-214
Maj John J. McMasters	6May-9Sep	LtCol Keith O'Keefe
LtCol Jerome L. Goebel	10Sep-31Dec
	H&MS-36		VMA-223 *
LtCol Thomas G. Mooney	1Sep-31Dec	LtCol Alexander Wilson
	MABS-11	
LtCol Eddie E. Pearcy	7Jul-9Dec	<i>*VMA-311 relieved by VMA-223 under intra-theater rotation program.</i>
Maj Douglas A. McCaughey, Jr.	10Dec-31Dec	VMA-224 *
	MABS-12		LtCol Thomas E. Mulvihill
LtCol Alexander Wilson	7May-24Sep
LtCol John W. Parchen	25Sep-31Dec	<i>*VMA-224 replaced VMA-225 under intra-theater rotation program.</i>
	MABS-16		VMA-225
LtCol Thomas E. Vernon	6May-31Dec	LtCol Robert W. Baker
	MABS-36	
Maj Jack A. Kennedy	1Sep-31Dec	VMA-311
	MASS-2		LtCol Bernard J. Stender
LtCol Paul L. Hitchcock	6May-26May
LtCol Edward I. Lupton	27May-1Aug	LtCol Jack W. Harris
LtCol Ralph L. Cunningham, Jr.	2Aug-31Dec
	HMM-161		VMCJ-1
LtCol Gene W. Morrison	7May-18Sep	LtCol Otis W. Corman
LtCol Rex C. Denny, Jr.	19Sep-31Dec
	HMM-162 *		LtCol Francis C. Opeka
LtCol Oliver W. Curtis	6May-15May
<i>*Relieved by HMM-365. Unit then returned to Okinawa for rotation to ConUS.</i>			VMFA-115
	HMM-163 *		LtCol Clyde R. Jarrett
LtCol Norman G. Ewers	6May-21Jun
<i>*Relieved by HMM-261; assigned as SLF squadron 27Jun-10Oct when it was relieved by HMM-261.</i>			VMFA-323
			LtCol Andrew W. O'Donnell
		
			VMFA-513 *
			LtCol Walter C. Stewart, Jr.
		
			<i>*VMFA-513 replaced by VMFA-115 under intra-theater rotation program.</i>
			VMFA-531
			LtCol William C. McGraw, Jr.
		
			VMFA-542
			LtCol Richard A. Savage
		
			VMF(AW)-312
			LtCol Richard B. Newport
		
			VMO-2
			LtCol George F. Bauman
		
			VMO-6
			LtCol Robert J. Zitnik
		

1st LAAM Battalion

LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr.6May-14Jul
 Maj George G. Long15Jul-14Nov
 LtCol Clyde L. Eyer15Nov-31Dec

2d LAAM Battalion

LtCol Edward F. Penico10Sep-31Dec

Force Logistic Support Group

Col Robert J. Oddy6May-24May
 Col Mauro J. Padalino25May-31Dec

Force Engineer Group *

Maj William G. Bates6May-12May
 Maj Bernard A. Kaasmann13May-20May

**Force Engineer Group was dissolved on 20 May.*

Naval Construction Regiment-30

Capt Harold F. Liberty, USN19May-31Dec

Naval Construction Battalion-4*

Cdr Worthen A. Walls, USN15Dec-31Dec

**NMCB-4 replaced NMCB-10 at Chu Lai, the latter unit rotating to ConUS.*

Naval Constuction Battalion-5

Cdr William F. Russel,USN26May-31Dec

Naval Constuction Battalion-8

Cdr Pharo A. Phelps, USN26Sep-31Dec

Naval Constuction Battalion-9

Cdr Richard E. Anderson, USN27Jun-31Dec

Naval Constuction Battalion-10

Cdr John M. Bannister, USN7May-15Dec

Appendix B

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

- A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attack aircraft also known as the AD-5
- A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, light-attack jet bomber in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-based Marine attack squadrons.
- AAR—After Action Report
- AdminO—Administrative Officer
- Adv—Advanced
- AGC—Amphibious Command Ship
- AKA—Attack Cargo Ship
- ANGLICO—Air&Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
- AOA—Amphibious Objective Area
- APA—Attack Transport Ship
- APD—High Speed Transport Ship
- ARG—Amphibious Ready Group
- ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam
- ASP—Ammunition Storage Point
- ASRT—Air Support Radar Team
- ArtyGru—Artillery Group
- BGen—Brigadier General
- BDA—Bomb Damage Assessment
- BLSG—Brigade Logistic Support Group
- BLT—Battalion Landing Team
- Bn—Battalion
- C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine, transport aircraft which became operational in the Marine Corps in 1943
- C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine, turboprop transport aircraft
- Capt—Captain
- CAS—Close Air Support
- CG—Commanding General
- CH-37—Sikorsky twin-engine, assault, heavy transport helicopter which carried three crew members and 36 passengers
- Chron—Chronology
- ChronHist—Chronological History
- CinCPac—Commander in Chief Pacific
- CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet
- Class (I-V)—Categories of military supplies, e.g., Class I Rations; Class III - POL; Class V - Ammunitions
- CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps
- CNO—Chief of Naval Operations
- CO—Commanding Officer
- Col—Colonel
- Com—Commander
- ComUSMACV—Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
- ComdC—Command Chronology
- ComdD—Command Diary
- Composite Marine Aircraft Group—An aircraft group consisting of both helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft squadrons
- CP—Command Post
- CPX—Command Post Exercise
- CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone
- DASC—Direct Air Support Center—A subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control and direction of close air support and other direct air support operations
- DD—Destroyer
- DFC—Distinguished Flying Cross
- DIA—Defense Intelligence Agency
- Dtd—Dated
- DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam
- DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam
- ECM—Electronic Counter Measures
- ELINT—Electronic Intelligence
- Engr—Engineer
- F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engine, two-seat, long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber
- F-4C—U.S. Air Force version of the above
- FLSG—Force Logistic Support Group
- FLSU—Force Logistic Support Unit
- FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force Pacific
- Free Strike Area—A zone in which air strikes could be directed without prior RVN clearance
- FSR—Force Service Regiment
- Fwd—Forward
- G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e.g., G-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2 Intelligence; G-3 Operations; G-4 Logistics; etc.
- GCI—Ground-Controlled Intercept
- Gen—General
- GVN—Government of Vietnam
- H-Hour—In connection with planned operations, it is the specific hour the operation begins

- HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air, guided missile designed to defend against enemy aircraft flying at low altitudes and short-range rocket missiles
- HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC—Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
- HistMusDiv, HQMC—History and Museums Division, HQMC. Replaced HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC
- HistOff—Historical Office
- HMM—Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
- J—The designations for members of a joint staff which includes members of several services comprising the command, e.g., J-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; J-2 Intelligence; J-3 Operations; J-4 Logistics; etc.
- JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
- JGS—Joint General Staff (Vietnamese)
- JTD—Joint Table of Distribution
- KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C-130 Lockheed Hercules.
- L-Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour the helicopters land in the landing zone
- LCM—Landing Craft, Mechanized
- LCVP—Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel
- LogSptGru—Logistic Support Group
- LPD—Amphibious Transport Dock
- LPH—Amphibious Assault Ship
- LSD—Dock Landing Ship
- LST—Tank Landing Ship
- LSU—Logistic Support Unit
- Lt—Lieutenant
- LtCol—Lieutenant Colonel
- LtGen—Lieutenant General
- Ltr—Letter
- LVTP—Landing Vehicle Tracked, Personnel
- MAAG—Military Assistance Advisory Group
- MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade
- MABS—Marine Air Base Squadron
- MAC—Marine Amphibious Corps
- MACS—Marine Air Control Squadron
- MACV—Military Assistance Command Vietnam
- MAF—Marine Amphibious Force
- MAG—Marine Aircraft Group
- Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions and regiments as opposed to local VC guerrilla groups
- Maj—Major
- MajGen—Major General
- MarDiv—Marine Division
- Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e.g., 3d Marines
- MASS—Marine Air Support Squadron
- MATCU—Marine Air Traffic Control Unit
- MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing
- MCAF—Marine Corps Air Facility
- MCAS—Marine Corps Air Station
- MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center
- MEB—Marine Expeditionary Brigade
- MEBLEX—MEB Landing Exercise
- MedCap—Medical Civilian Assistance Program
- MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force
- MilHistBr—Military History Branch
- Mogas—Motor gas
- MS—Manuscript
- Msgs—Messages
- MUV—Marine Unit, Vietnam
- MWHQ—Marine Wing Headquarters
- NAG—Naval Advisory Group
- NAS—Naval Air Station
- NIS—National Intelligence Survey
- NLF—National Liberation Front
- NMCB—Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
- NMCC—National Military Command Center
- NWC—National War College
- O-1B—Cessna, single-engine, observation plane, also known as the OE-1
- OAB, NHID—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division
- OpOrder—Operation Order
- OPlan—Operation Plan
- OpSum—Operation Summary
- OSJS(MACV)—Office of the Secretariat, Joint Staff (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam)
- PAR—Progressive Aircraft Rework
- PAT—Political Action Team, the forerunner of the Revolutionary Development Teams. Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned missions of pacification and represented the government of Vietnam in the hamlets of Vietnam
- PF—Popular Force; Vietnamese militia who were usually employed in the defense of their own communities
- POI—Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
- Regt—Regiment
- RF—Regional Force; Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific province
- RF 8A—The reconnaissance version of the F-8 Chance Vought Crusader fighter
- RLT—Regimental Landing Team
- RRU—Radio Research Unit
- ROLLING THUNDER—Code name for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam
- RVN—Republic of Vietnam
- RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
- S—Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels. S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; S-2 Intelligence; S-3 Operations; S-4 Logistics, etc.
- SAM—Surface-to-Air Missile
- SAR—Search and Rescue
- SAR/Maint Team—Search, rescue, and maintenance team
- SEAsia—Southeast Asia
- Seatail—Follow-on shipping
- SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

SecState—Secretary of State
 SHUFLY—The designation for the Marine Aviation Task Unit in RVN until January 1965 when it was redesignated Marine Unit, Vietnam (MUV)
 SitRep - Situation Report
 SLF - Special Landing Force
 Song - Vietnamese word for river
 Sortie - An operational flight by one aircraft
 Sqdrn - Squadron

 TAC(A) - Tactical Air Coordinator (Airborne)
 TAOR - Tactical Area of Responsibility
 TE— Task Element
 TF— Task Force
 TG— Task Group

USMAAG—U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group
 USMACV—U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

 VC—Viet Cong
 VCC- Viet Cong Captured
 VCS- Viet Cong Suspect (captured)
 VMFA-- Marine Fighter Attack Squadron
 VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force
 VNMB-- Vietnamese Marine Brigade
 VNMC— Vietnamese Marine Corps
 VMA - Marine Attack Squadron
 VMGR - Marine Aerial Refueling Squadron
 VMO - Marine Observation Squadron

Appendix C

Chronology of Significant Events

- 1 Jan—TE 79.3.3.6 at Da Nang was designated Marine Unit, Vietnam (MUV), TU 79.3.5, by direction of CG FMFPac. The organization and its operations remained essentially as before.
- 7 Feb—Communist guerrillas attacked a United States compound at Pleiku, and U.S. aircraft retaliated by striking targets in North Vietnam, initiating a new phase of the war. U.S. forces in South Vietnam totaled 23,000. U.S. dependents were ordered evacuated from RVN.
- 8 Feb—Battery A, 1st LAAM Battalion arrived at Da Nang via C-130; it was operational the next day.
- 10 Feb—The Viet Cong blew up a U.S. military billet at the coastal city of Qui Nhon killing 23 soldiers.
- 13 Feb—More elements of the 1st LAAM Battalion (-), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bertram E. Cook, Jr., arrived at Da Nang by sea and air. Two full batteries and supporting elements were 100 percent operational five days later.
- 17 Feb—Company C of the USMC 7th Engineer Battalion began arriving at Da Nang by LST. HMM-163, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Norman G. Ewers, relieved Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koler, Jr.'s HMM-365 as the operating squadron of TU 79.3.5.
- 28 Feb—USMC tactical unit strength in RVN was 1,248, broken down as follows:
- | | |
|--------------------------|-------|
| HMM-163 | 230 |
| Sub-Unit 1 | 203 |
| Security Company (D/1/3) | 260 |
| Total MUV | 693 |
| 1st LAAM Bn (-) | 405 |
| CO C, 7th Engr Bn | 150 |
| Total, New Elements | 555 |
| Total, USMC (Tactical) | 1,248 |
- These figures do not include USMC advisors, Embassy Marines, MACV staff personnel, and various other categories of Marines assigned outside the Da Nang area.
- 8 Mar—The 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) commanded by Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, landed at Da Nang. The MEB included two Marine Battalion Landing Teams (BLTs) — 3/9 (Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. McPartlin, Jr.) which landed over Red Beach 2, and 1/3 (Lieutenant Colonel Herbert J. Bain) which arrived by air from Okinawa. The 9th MEB mission was to defend the Da Nang Airbase. This was the first U.S. ground combat unit to land in RVN.
- 9 Mar—The MUV (TU 79.3.5) was placed under operational control of the 9th MEB and designated MAG-16, commanded by Colonel John H. King, Jr. HMM-163 remained in direct support of ARVN I Corps; other elements of the expanding MAG (Sub-Unit 2, MABS-16) were in direct support of the 9th MEB. The 1st LAAM Battalion was placed under operational control of MAG-16 with a mission to defend Da Nang Airbase from air attack.
- 9 Mar—Lieutenant Colonel Oliver W. Curtiss' HMM-162 arrived at Da Nang.
- 14 Mar—Sub-Unit 2 was redesignated MABS-16; H&MS-16 was activated at Da Nang under the operational control of MAG-16 (-).
- 23 Mar—Current composition of 9th MEB is as follows:
- | | |
|--------------------------------|-------|
| 9th MEB | 4,612 |
| HqCo | 145 |
| BLT 1/3 | 1,124 |
| BLT 3/9 | 1,115 |
| Brigade Logistic Support Group | 583 |
| Brigade Engineer Group | 224 |
| Brigade Artillery Group | 235 |
| MAG-16(-) | |
| H&MS-16(-) | 88 |
| MABS-16(-) | 208 |
| HMM-162 | 233 |
| HMM-163 | 246 |
| 1st LAAM | 411 |
- 2 Apr—The United States announced the intention of sending several thousand more troops to Vietnam.
- 10 Apr—Lieutenant Colonel David A. Clement's BLT 2/3 landed at Da Nang. Task Force Alpha of the BLT was helilifted to the Phu Bai airstrip, 45 miles north of Da Nang near Hue, to assume the defense of that area. Lieutenant Colonel William C. McGraw, Jr.'s F-4B squadron, VMFA-531, arrived at Da Nang.
- 12 Apr—The RLT-3 commander, Colonel Edwin B. Wheeler, and his headquarters arrived; he assumed command of all BLTs ashore.
- 13 Apr—An HMM-162 detachment of 10 UH-34D helicopters was established at Phu Bai. VMFA-531 flew its first combat mission in RVN.
- 14 Apr—Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Jones' BLT 3/4 arrived in Vietnam and moved to Phu Bai where it relieved Task Force Alpha.
- 16 Apr—MASS-2 (Lieutenant Colonel Paul L. Hitchcock) arrived Da Nang and established the DASC west of the runway. Lieutenant Colonel Otis W. Corman's VMCJ-1 arrived at Da Nang, coming under operational control of MAG-16 but remaining under administrative control of MAG-12, which was still located at Iwakuni, Japan.

- 19 Apr—RLT-3 reorganized as 3d Marines (Rein); a larger Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) was established at Da Nang and a TAOR was established at Phu Bai for 3/4.
- 20 Apr—ComUSMACV authorized a change in General Karch's mission for ground forces to include (1) aggressive combat patrolling within TAORs and (2) preparation for conducting offensive operations as a mobile reaction force. High-level Honolulu conference recommended to President Johnson the deployment of III MEF to Da Nang and the landing of a MEB at Chu Lai.
- 20 Apr—The landing of additional Marine Corps units at Da Nang resulted in the following organization:
- 9 MEB
- | | |
|---------------------------------|--------|
| HqCo | 240 |
| 3d Marines (-)(Rein) | 3751 |
| HqCo | (286) |
| 1stBn, 3d Marines | (1099) |
| 2dBn, 3d Marines | (1267) |
| 3dBn, 9th Marines | (1099) |
| Brigade Artillery Group | 548 |
| HqBtry (-), 12th Marines | (26) |
| Btry A, 1stBn, 12th Marines | (120) |
| Btry B, 1stBn, 12th Marines | (119) |
| Btry F, 2dBn, 12th Marines | (120) |
| Btry L, 4thBn, 12th Marines | (112) |
| 1st 8" HowBtry | (51) |
| Brigade Engineer Group | 299 |
| Brigade Logistics Support Group | 656 |
| MAG-16 | 1613 |
| H&MS-16 (-) | (111) |
| MABS-16 (-) | (232) |
| VMFA-531 (-) | (300) |
| HMM-162 | (126) |
| HMM-163 | (233) |
| 1stLAAM Bn | (413) |
| MASS-2 | (100) |
| VMCJ-1 | (98) |
| BLT 3/4 & DetHMM 162 | 1500 |
| Total 9th MEB | 8607 |
- All units were located at Da Nang, except for BLT 3/4 and a detachment of 10 UH-34 helicopters from HMM-162, located at Phu Bai.
- 21 Apr—VMCJ-1 flew its first electronic countermeasures (ECM) missions from Da Nang Airfield and MASS-2 became fully operational.
- 22 Apr—The first real Marine ground action with the Viet Cong occurred—a reconnaissance company on patrol was fired on by an estimated 10 to 150 Viet Cong; VMFA-531 provided air support; one enemy was killed, one Marine was slightly wounded.
- 28 Apr—Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines participated in the first coordinated ground operation with ARVN forces in RVN.
- 3 May—The advance party of the III MEF, including its commander, Major General William R. Collins, arrived at Da Nang.
- 5 May—ComUSMACV promulgated a Letter of Instruction giving the mission of III MEF: "In general render combat support to RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces).

In coordination with CG, I Corps, participate in or provide for the defense of Hue-Phu Bai, Da Nang, and Chu Lai airfields and ancillary facilities. Maintain the capability to conduct, on order, deep patrolling and offensive operations and reserve reaction operations in coordination with CG, I Corps. Be prepared to execute U. S. contingency plans as directed by ComUSMACV."

- 6 May—The III MEF headquarters was established at Da Nang Airbase, commanded by Major General Collins, who was also designated the Naval Component Commander (NCC) for ComUSMACV. The 9th MEB was deactivated as an operating unit and the 3d Marine Division (Forward), also commanded by Major General Collins, was established and assumed command of its assigned units in RVN. With the Chu Lai landings on 7 May, seven of the 3d Division infantry battalions were committed in RVN, supported by most of the 12th Marines and substantial portions of all other elements of the division.
- 7 May—III MEF was redesignated III MAF. 3d MAB, commanded by Brigadier General Marion E. Carl, consisting of RLT-4 (Colonel Edward P. Dupras, Jr.), the advance elements of MAG-12 (Colonel John D. Noble), and Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 10 (Commander John M. Bannister, USN) landed at Chu Lai with the mission of occupying the terrain necessary to construct an expeditionary airfield there. The 173d Airborne Brigade, the U.S. Army's first ground combat unit, arrived in RVN on this date.
- 10 May—The first radar-controlled bomb drops in combat were made by VMFA-531, controlled by MASS-2; 24 MK-81 (260 pound) bombs were expended in "Happy Valley" and the target was reported completely covered.
- 11 May—2d Battalion, 3d Marines cleared the village of Le My, liberating it from over two years of Viet Cong control. The village became a model of the Marine Corps civic action program. The 1st MAW (Adv), commanded by Major General Paul J. Fontana, was established at Da Nang.
- 12 May—Lieutenant Colonel William D. Hall's BLT 3/3 landed at Chu Lai. Brigadier General Carl was designated III MAF deputy commander. RLT-4 was redesignated 4th Marines as the Chu Lai amphibious operation terminated.
- 15 May—HMM-365, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Koler, Jr., relieved Lieutenant Colonel Curtiss' HMM-162 at Da Nang.
- 24 May—Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon arrived and relieved Major General Fontana as CG 1st MAW (Adv).
- 31 May—USMC strengths by area:
- | | |
|----------------|--------|
| Da Nang | 9,224 |
| Chu Lai | 6,599 |
| Hue-Phu Bai | 1,614 |
| TAD in-country | 121 |
| Total | 17,558 |
- 1 Jun—Eight A-4 Skyhawk jet attack aircraft from VMA-225 (Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Baker) and VMA-311 (Lieutenant Colonel Bernard J. Stender) landed at the Chu Lai expeditionary airfield. The first aircraft, piloted by Colonel Noble, the MAG-12 commander, touched down at 0801 to signify the opening of the airfield. (Construction

- had started after the 3d MEB landed on 7 May, 24 days earlier). Only 3,600 feet of the runway was complete on 1 June—therefore, the A-4s used jet-assisted takeoff (JATO) for launching and mobile arresting gear (MOREST) for landing. Four Skyhawks led by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Baker, VMA-225, launched the first Chu Lai-based strike at 1329, flying sorties seven miles southwest of the Chu Lai TAOR in support of ARVN forces.
- 4 Jun—Major General Lewis W. Walt assumed command of III MAF and the 3d MarDiv (Fwd) at 0900, relieving Major General Collins in a formal indoor ceremony.
- 5 Jun—Brigadier General Keith B. McCutcheon relieved Major General Fontana as CG 1st MAW at Iwakuni, Japan. He returned to Da Nang on 7 June.
- 13 Jun—ComUSMACV directed III MAF to prepare an emergency contingency plan for the movement of two infantry battalions to Pleiku in II Corps area. The plan was completed and forwarded to ComUSMACV on 14 June.
- 15 Jun—At Da Nang VMFA-513, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Stewart, Jr., relieved VMFA-531, which chopped to 1st MAW (Rear) marking the first in-country relief of a USMC jet squadron.
- 17 Jun—Lieutenant Colonel Verle E. Ludwig's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines relieved the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines at Da Nang and assumed the responsibility formerly held by 3/9 in the defense of the airbase; 3/9 was the first Marine battalion to be rotated from RVN.
- 18 Jun—Brigadier General Karch returned to Da Nang and assumed duties as Assistant Division Commander (ADC), 3d MarDiv (Fwd).
- 19 Jun—Approximately 350 inhabitants of Pho Nam Thuong and Nam Yen villages moved into the Le My area.
- 21 Jun—Lieutenant Mervin B. Porter's HMM-261 relieved Lieutenant Colonel Ewer's HMM-163 at Da Nang; HMM-163 became the SLF helicopter squadron.
- 27 Jun—Lieutenant Colonel Clement's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines received 12,000 pounds of clothing and food for distribution to the refugees at Le My. Three days later the 4th Marines at Chu Lai distributed over 800 pounds of clothing to local residents who had been relocated to clear real estate for the airfield.
- 30 Jun—III MAF strength in RVN not including Seabees was as follows:
- | | |
|------------------------------------|--------|
| Da Nang | 9,618 |
| Chu Lai | 6,771 |
| Phu Bai | 1,632 |
| Other | 115 |
| Total | 18,156 |
| Total arrived by area during June: | |
| Da Nang | 1,496 |
| Chu Lai | 2,002 |
| Phu Bai | 204 |
| Total | 3,702 |
- 1 Jul—Viet Cong forces conducted a mortar/infantry attack on the Da Nang Airbase under cover of darkness, providing cover for demolition teams that breached the tactical wire surrounding the field and severely damaged six USAF aircraft. The one Viet Cong captured in the attack reported that he was from the *3d Battalion, 18th Regiment, 325th People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) Division* and that the attack force trained and rehearsed for 30 days before

- executing its mission. The SLF, composed of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines (Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Bodley) and HMM-163 (Lieutenant Colonel Norman G. Ewers), landed at Qui Nhon to protect an enclave at the seaward end of Route 19, the main highway from Pleiku.
- 3 Jul—The Chu Lai SATS runway (8,000 feet) and taxiway were completed.
- 6 Jul—RLT-9 (Colonel Frank E. Garretson) with BLT 2/9 (Lieutenant Colonel George R. Scharnberg) landed at Da Nang.
- 8 Jul—Lieutenant Colonel Leon N. Utter's BLT 2/7 relieved the SLF battalion, Bodley's BLT 3/7, which then reembarked in ARG shipping.
- 10 Jul—Lieutenant Colonel Richard A. Savage's F-4B squadron, VMFA-542, arrived at Da Nang and commenced operations.
- 14 Jul—MAG-11 (Colonel Robert F. Conley) assumed operational control of VMFA-542 and VMFA-513 at Da Nang.
- 21 Jul—Written confirmation was received for expansion of the Da Nang TAOR and for the establishment of a reconnaissance zone for the Chu Lai TAOR.
- 29 Jul—Official sources announced plans to increase the U.S. active duty military force by about 300,000 men. The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division arrived in RVN on this date.
- 31 Jul—III MAF strengths in RVN not including Seabees were as follows:
- | | |
|------------------------------------|--------|
| Da Nang | 15,204 |
| Chu Lai | 6,949 |
| Phu Bai | 2,052 |
| Qui Nhon | 1,644 |
| Other | 115 |
| Total | 25,964 |
| Total arrived by area during July: | |
| Da Nang | 5,743 |
| Chu Lai | 395 |
| Phu Bai | 178 |
| Qui Nhon | 1,651 |
| Total | 7,967 |
- 2 Aug—Operation BLAST OUT, a coordinated USMC/ARVN operation involving 1/3 and elements of the 4th ARVN Regiment, was conducted 10 miles southwest of Da Nang.
- 3 Aug—Company D, 1/9 conducted a one day operation in the vicinity of Cam Ne, south of Da Nang. A CBS television crew, accompanying the company, filmed a Marine setting fire to a Vietnamese hut. This film, which was shown on the evening news, led to a debate in the press about U.S. tactics in Vietnamese villages.
- 5 Aug—The Viet Cong attacked the Esso POL storage terminal at Lien Chieu, destroying two JP-4 storage tanks and inflicting extensive damage on three more. Operational control of 2/7 (at Qui Nhon in the II Corps area) passed to U.S. Army Task Force ALFA, the Army field command in RVN.
- 7 Aug—The CG III MAF was designated as the Senior Adviser (SA) for I Corps and assumed operational control of the I Corps Advisory Group.
- 11 Aug—The first tactical delivery of the cluster bomb unit (CBU) by USMC aircraft took place. The addition of this

weapon to the aviation ordnance arsenal broadened the air support capabilities of the 1st MAW.

- 12 Aug—The first all-Marine night helicopter assault took place starting at 2400.
- 14 Aug—The Navy announced four-month involuntary extensions of duty for Navy and Marine Corps enlisted personnel. Coordinating headquarters were established at Chu Lai under the 3d MarDiv ADC, Brigadier General Karch.
- 15 Aug—The Headquarters of the 7th RLT and 1/7 came ashore at Chu Lai. Colonel Oscar F. Peatross commanded the regiment. At Da Nang, elements of 3/9 came ashore making it the first battalion to be re-introduced into RVN (See 8 March and 17 June 1965 entries).
- 16 Aug—3/9 relieved 1/9 as the Base Defense Battalion at Da Nang.
- 17 Aug—2/4 and 3/3 were assigned to the 7th Marines for Operation STARLITE.
- 18-24 Aug—Operation STARLITE. Three Marine battalions—1/7, 2/4, and 3/3—attached to the 7th Marines, and supported by air, artillery, and naval gunfire, conducted an amphibious-heliborne search and destroy operation in the Van Tuong village complex south of Chu Lai. The purpose of the attack was to eliminate an enemy force—the *1st VC Regiment*, reportedly 2,000 strong—which had built up for an attack on Chu Lai. Strong resistance was encountered, requiring the support of BLT 3/7 from the SLF. The USMC units advanced through the objective area in two days, and then were joined for mopping up operations by Vietnamese forces. Casualties were as follows:

	KIA	DOW	WIA
USMC	45	6	203
VC	614	9	

The Viet Cong dead were confirmed by body count. It was estimated that the actual enemy KIA total ran much higher because of the large number of caves and tunnels that were sealed or destroyed. (On 9 September an agent source reported that the VC had suffered 1,430 KIA, in Operation STARLITE).

- 26 Aug—In response to a CG III MAF request made in June, 11 sentry dogs and handlers arrived as the initial element of the 1st Provisional Dog Platoon, which was planned to consist ultimately of two squads, a sentry dog squad and a patrol dog squad.
- 28 Aug—1/1 arrived at Da Nang to relieve 1/3.
- 31 Aug—President Johnson called for “a new and mighty people-to-people program to bring American aid to victims of the war in RVN.” The total III MAF strength in RVN not including Seabees was broken down as follows:
- | | |
|----------|--------|
| Da Nang | 18,063 |
| Chu Lai | 10,277 |
| Phu Bai | 2,114 |
| Qui Nhon | 1,616 |
| Other | 92 |
| Total | 32,162 |
- Total arrived by area during August:
- | | |
|---------------|-------|
| Da Nang | 4,725 |
| Chu Lai | 2,684 |
| Total arrived | 7,409 |

Total departed by area during August:

- | | |
|------------------|----------------------|
| Da Nang | 1,029 (1/3 departed) |
| Phu Bai | 68 |
| Qui Nhon | 35 |
| Total departed | 1,132 |
| Net Gain, August | 6,277 |
- 1 Sep—1/3 departed RVN for Okinawa, where it was relieved by BLT 3/5, and then returned to CONUS. A total of 10,919 personnel of FMFPac remained in Okinawa and Japan.
- 7-10 Sep—Operation PIRANHA. Following the decisive Marine Corps victory over the *1st Viet Cong Regiment* in Operation STARLITE (18-24 August), intelligence information disclosed that other VC forces were building up on the Batangan Peninsula, still farther south of Chu Lai. Operation PIRANHA, another regimental-level amphibious-heliborne attack, was executed to clear the area. It exacted at least 163 Viet Cong killed and served notice once again upon the VC of the hazards of concentrating their forces. Subsequently they reverted to small unit operations in I Corps area.
- 11 Sep—BLT 2/1, which arrived on Okinawa 27 August from CONUS and subsequently embarked as the SLF, assumed a position within six-hours reaction time of Qui Nhon, prepared to land and provide security, if required, for debarkation of the Army's 1st Cavalry Division (Air-mobile).
- 18 Sep—The first elements of the Army's 1st Cavalry (Air-mobile) Division landed at Qui Nhon.
- 23 Sep—The Defense Department said that General Westmoreland had the authority to permit use of tear gas.
- 28 Sep—The total III MAF strength in RVN not including Seabees by area was as follows:
- | | |
|----------|--------|
| Da Nang | 18,641 |
| Chu Lai | 13,601 |
| Phu Bai | 2,172 |
| Qui Nhon | 1,773 |
| Total | 36,187 |
- Total arrived by area during September:
- | | |
|----------|-------|
| Da Nang | 3,222 |
| Chu Lai | 3,384 |
| Qui Nhon | 327 |
| Total | 6,933 |
- Total departed by area during September
- | | |
|------------|-------|
| Phu Bai | 26 |
| Net Change | 6,907 |
- 14 Oct—The CG, I Corps approved extension of the Chu Lai TAOR. A USMC sniper team was formed in the Hue-Phu Bai TAOR. The team used Winchester Model 70 rifles with 8-Unertl telescopic sights and killed two Viet Cong at a range of more than 700 yards in the first exercise of the new tactic. Later, M-1D rifles with telescopic sights were utilized.
- 18 Oct—Operation TRAIL BLAZER, a six-day deep patrol and series of ambushes by the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, began from a patrol base about 15 miles southwest of Da Nang. The purpose of the operation was to determine the extent of VC concentration in the main valleys leading from the mountains into the Da Nang TAOR and to determine the probability of enemy attack from that area.

- Two VC were killed in the operation, and five enemy complexes of training camps, workshops, and bivouac areas were destroyed. Accumulated intelligence was used in developing an aerial target list. Two companies from 3/3 launched Operation TRIPLE PLAY, a two-day search and destroy effort conducted 12 miles north of Chu Lai. The results: 16 VC KIA, 6 VCC, and 18 VCS, with only two Marines wounded.
- 26 Oct—Operation DRUM HEAD, a coordinated two-day sweep effort involving 3/7 and an ARVN platoon, began southwest of Chu Lai. Results: one VC killed and 26 suspects captured; one USMC killed and two wounded.
- 27 Oct—Operation GOLDEN FLEECE (began 8 Sep 65) was terminated. This operation by the 9th Marines was an effort to deny as much rice as possible to the VC during the Summer/Fall 1965 rice harvest. USMC units provided protection for Vietnamese farmers in their fields while the rice crop was harvested. It is estimated that 512,400 lbs. of threshed rice were denied the VC as a result.
- 28 Oct—On the night of 28 October, Viet Cong suicide squads launched simultaneous and coordinated attacks on Marine installations at Marble Mountain near Da Nang and at Chu Lai. Even though most of the attackers were killed, the few who got through used satchel charges to blow up 19 helicopters and damage the hospital at Marble Mountain, while at Chu Lai they destroyed two fixed-wing attack aircraft. Ground actions during the night indicated that other planned attacks were thwarted by Marine patrols.
- 3 Nov—BLACK FERRET, a three-day combined USMC/ARVN search and destroy operation of regimental scope, began in an area 10 miles south of the Chu Lai airstrip, on the north side of the Song Tra Bong. Participating were: two companies from 1/7; two companies from 3/7; 3/11; two platoons from the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion; and two battalions from the 4th Regiment of the 2d ARVN Division. VC forces avoided contact, limiting their resistance to sporadic small arms fire and booby traps. In one instance, a booby-trapped 81mm mortar round wounded six Marines and killed Miss Dickie Chapelle, the war correspondent, who was accompanying USMC units on the maneuver. Numerous fortifications and tunnels were destroyed by attacking forces, and Marine strike aircraft wiped out a number of boats and structures along the Song Tra Bong. Results: 2 VC killed, 20 captured (5 WIA), and 64 suspects apprehended. Eight Marines and one Navy corpsman were wounded. Helicopters returned the Marines to Chu Lai upon conclusion of the operation on 5 November.
- 7 Nov—BLT 2/7 was withdrawn from Qui Nhon (see 10-12 November entry below); HMM-161 remained at Qui Nhon in support of II Corps forces.
- 10-12 Nov—Operation BLUE MARLIN, a combined USMC/VNMC operation between Chu Lai and Tam Ky, 20 miles to the north, took place. On 7 November, BLT 2/7 was lifted in amphibious shipping from its former TAOR at Qui Nhon to Chu Lai, where it was joined by the 600-man 3d Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps. The two units conducted a combined amphibious assault on 10 November across beaches just north of Tam Ky. Four companies of BLT 2/7 in one LVT wave and two LCM waves landed unopposed, followed by the remainder of the BLT and the 3d Battalion, VNMC, in on-call boat serials and helicopters. Surf at the beach was very high, and the anchor chains of the APA *Paul Revere* and the LST *Windham County* parted. After sweeping inland to Route 1, the landing force pivoted southward astride the highway and executed a search and destroy operation to the Chu Lai TAOR. Resistance was light, and casualties were few. A Vietnamese civilian reported that the VC had withdrawn from the objective area two days previously. At the conclusion of the operation, the RVN Marines were returned by helicopter to their base area south of Quang Ngai. 2/7 rejoined its parent regiment at Chu Lai, replacing 3/3, which embarked for Phase II of BLUE MARLIN (see 16-18 November entry) and subsequent operations at Da Nang.
- 16-18 Nov—BLUE MARLIN (Phase II), similar in scope and concept to Phase I (10-12 November), was conducted. At Chu Lai, 3/3 embarked in the same amphibious shipping used in Phase I and landed on 16 November over beaches south of Hoi An, about 22 miles south of Da Nang. The landing was accomplished smoothly, with one wave of LVTs and two of LCMs, followed by artillery and Ontos in on-call serials. Ashore, the landing force was joined by two RVN Ranger battalions and two RVN special companies in a coordinated search and destroy operation north to the Song Cua Dai. Activity was characterized by scattered but sharp contacts as the VC again avoided confrontation with the landing force. Fortifications, tunnels, and man-traps were destroyed in quantity. Combined results were: 25 VC killed, 15 captured, 79 suspects apprehended, and 9 weapons seized. Two ARVN soldiers were KIA, one ARVN was wounded, and three USMC were wounded. At the conclusion of the operation, 3/3 was lifted to the Da Nang area by amphibious shipping and helicopter.
- 17-18 Nov—Marine air elements from III MAF were instrumental in preventing a Viet Cong victory at Hiep Duc, about 25 miles west of Tam Ky. On the 17th, 30 UH-34D helicopters, supported by fixed-wing attack aircraft, lifted 788 ARVN troops to the relief of an invested ARVN garrison at Hiep Duc. In this initial lift, 20 of the 30 transport helicopters were hit by ground fire as they approached the landing zone. Despite marginal flying weather, accompanying attack aircraft and armed helicopters dropped some 14 tons of high explosive bombs and fired 512 rockets, as well as 1,532 rounds of 20mm cannon projectiles, into VC positions near the landing areas. VC losses during the period were a confirmed 38 KIA, with many more probables. The following day, 22 UH-34Ds lifted 463 more ARVN troops to Hiep Duc, making the total lift for two days 1,251. The helilifted troops were successful in defeating the assault on Hiep Duc, but were unable to clear the VC from the critical areas to the northwest. At the request of CG I Corps, 3/7 was alerted to reinforce the ARVN units. Extremely bad weather prevented the helilift of 3/7 into Hiep Duc. While awaiting improved weather, the battalion was diverted to assist an ARVN Ranger battalion under siege at Thach Tru, south of Quang Ngai (see 22-24 November entry).

22-24 Nov—On the late afternoon of 22 November, at the request of CG, I Corps, 3/7 began reinforcing an ARVN Ranger battalion which had come under attack by an estimated VC regiment about 20 miles south of Quang Ngai. At the same time, the Seventh Fleet SLF moved to a position off Quang Ngai, ready to land on two hours notice. Before the Marines arrived, 71 ARVN had been killed, 74 wounded, and 2 were missing. VC losses were 175 KIA by U.S. body count and 225 by ARVN estimate, not including those killed by air or naval gunfire beyond the immediate battle area. Three VC were captured, in addition to 5 recoilless rifles, 9 machine guns, 2 sub-machine guns, and 114 rifles. Six enemy 60mm mortars were destroyed. An undetermined number of enemy dead were credited to Marine strike aircraft, which flew 39 sorties in marginal weather against the initial assaults. When the Marines landed, they secured the landing zones, occupied night defensive positions, and early the next morning cleared the critical terrain, capturing 17 Viet Cong, killing 3, and seizing 2 rifles and 5 carbines. On the morning of the 24th the situation was stabilized and 3/7 returned to Chu Lai by helicopter. Marine losses in the encounter were two killed and one wounded.

23 Nov—By this date there were approximately 20 scout/sniper teams of four men each positioned throughout the III MAF area. On 23 November a team at Phu Bai killed two VC and wounded one at a range of 1,000 meters.

30 Nov-1 Dec—Operation DAGGER THRUST IV. On 30 November the SLF (BLT 2/1 and HMM-261) executed an amphibious raid at Lang Ke Ga, on the coast 17 miles southwest of Phan Thiet and about 70 miles east of Saigon. Immediately prior to the landing, leaflets were dropped along the routes of advance, giving brief warning to the villagers. Contact was negligible.

Nov III MAF summary:

Patrols	3,488
Ambushes	2,576
Sniper posts	175
Total offensive ground operations	6,242
Enemy contacts	226
Enemy KIA	126
Enemy WIA	33
Enemy captured	22
Fixed-wing strike sorties	2,551
Helicopter sorties	23,629
Rainfall	more than 30 inches
Most rain in one day	7.8 inches

30 Nov— The III MAF strength in RVN not including Seabees and Naval Support Activity was as follows:

Da Nang	21,948
Chu Lai	14,452
Phu Bai	2,328
Qui Nhon	254
Other	89
Total	39,071

Personnel strengths fluctuated by area during November due to reassignment between enclaves, replacement, attrition, and movement of battalions. Net strength change for November 422

8-20 Dec—Operation HARVEST MOON was conducted

approximately 25 miles northwest of Chu Lai. Units involved were Task Force DELTA, 2/7, 3/3, 2/1 (from SLF), and 3 ARVN battalions. These units were supported by USMC aircraft and artillery and by four B-52 strikes.

	KIA WIA MIA			
USMC	51	256	1	
	KIA VCC VCS RALLIERS			
VC	407	33	231	3

22 Dec—The U.S. military command in Vietnam ordered a 30-hour Christmas cease-fire. A military spokesman said that similar instructions had been issued by South Vietnamese Government military leaders. No action would be taken by allied or RVNAF forces except in self-defense.

31 Dec—USMACV released the following figures to news media in Saigon:

U.S. Military Strength in RVN	1Jan65	23,000
U.S. Military Strength in RVN	31Dec65	181,000
RVNAF Total Strength	1Jan65	559,500
RVNAF Total Strength	31Dec65	679,000
Enemy Military Strength in RVN	1Jan65	103,000
Enemy Military Strength in RVN	31Dec65	230,000
U.S. losses during the year		1,300
RVNAF losses during the year		11,000
Enemy losses during the year(KIA)		34,000
Enemy losses during the year(captured)		6,000

III MAF total arrived during December:

Da Nang	188
Chu Lai	138
Phu Bai	81
Total	407

III MAF total departed during December

Chu Lai	452
Qui Nhon	25
Total	477

Net Change 70

31 Dec—III MAF strength in RVN not including Seabees and Naval Support Activity was as follows:

Da Nang	22,464
Chu Lai	13,995
Phu Bai	2,354
Qui Nhon	226
1st Anglico	33
Total	39,092

31 Dec—III MAF ground operations for the week ending 31 December were as follows:

Patrols	1,169
Ambushes	633
Platoon Operations	40
Company Operations	6
Battalion Operations	3
VC KIA	81
VC Captured	6

31 Dec—Results of III MAF Operations since 8 March 1965:

	KIA and DOW	WIA	MIA
USMC	342	2,047	18
	KIA	WIA	POW
VC	2,627	314	535
			VCS
			2,827

31 Dec—A total of 14,528 FMFPac personnel remained in Okinawa and Japan.

Appendix D

Medal of Honor Citations, 1965

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

FIRST LIEUTENANT FRANK S. REASONER
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Commanding Officer, Company A, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 3d Marine Division in action against hostile Viet Cong forces near Da Nang, Vietnam on 12 July 1965. The reconnaissance patrol led by Lieutenant Reasoner had deeply penetrated heavily controlled enemy territory when it came under extremely heavy fire from an estimated 50 to 100 Viet Cong insurgents. Accompanying the advance party and the point that consisted of five men, he immediately deployed his men for an assault after the Viet Cong had opened fire from numerous concealed positions. The slashing fury of the Viet Cong machine gun and automatic weapons fire made it impossible for the main body to move forward. Repeatedly exposing himself to the devastating attack he skillfully provided covering fire, killing at least two Viet Cong and effectively silencing an automatic weapons position in a valiant attempt to effect evacuation of a wounded man. As casualties began to mount his radio operator was wounded and Lieutenant Reasoner immediately moved to his side and tended his wounds. When the radio operator was hit a second time while attempting to reach a covered position, Lieutenant Reasoner, courageously running to his aid through the grazing machine gun fire, fell mortally wounded. His indomitable fighting spirit, valiant leadership and unflinching devotion to duty provided the inspiration that was to enable the patrol to complete its mission without further casualties. In the face of almost certain death he gallantly gave his life in the service of his country. His action upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

CORPORAL ROBERT E. O'MALLEY
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action against the communist (Viet Cong) forces at the risk of his own life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Squad Leader in Company 'I', Third Battalion, Third Marines, Third Marine Division (Reinforced), near An Cu'ong 2, South Vietnam, on 18 August 1965. While leading his squad in the assault against a strongly entrenched enemy force, his unit came under intense small arms fire. With complete disregard for his personal safety, Corporal O'Malley raced across an open rice paddy to a trench line where the enemy forces were located. Jumping into the trench, he attacked the Viet Cong with his rifle and grenades, and singly killed eight of the enemy. He then led his squad to the assistance of an adjacent Marine unit which was suffering heavy casualties. Continuing to press forward, he reloaded his weapon and fired with telling effect into the enemy emplacement. He personally assisted in the evacuation of several wounded Marines, and again regrouping the remnants of his squad, he returned to the point of the heaviest fighting. Ordered to an evacuation point by an officer, Corporal O'Malley gathered his besieged and badly wounded squad and boldly led them under fire to a helicopter for withdrawal. Although three times wounded in this encounter, and facing imminent death from a fanatic and determined enemy, he steadfastly refused evacuation and continued to cover his squad's boarding of the helicopters while, from an exposed position, he delivered fire against the enemy until his wounded men were evacuated. Only then, with his last mission accomplished, did he permit himself to be removed from the battlefield. By his valor, leadership, and courageous efforts in behalf of his comrades, he served as an inspiration to all who observed him, and reflected the highest credit upon the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

LANCE CORPORAL JOE C. PAUL
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

Citation:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a Fire Team Leader with Company H, Second Battalion, Fourth Marines, during Operation STARLITE near Chu Lai in the Republic of Vietnam on 18 August 1965. In violent battle, Corporal Paul's platoon sustained five casualties as it was temporarily pinned down by devastating mortar, recoilless rifle, automatic weapons, and rifle fire delivered by insurgent communist (Viet Cong) forces in well-trenched positions. The wounded Marines were unable to move from their perilously exposed positions forward of the remainder of their platoon, and were suddenly subjected to a barrage of white phosphorous rifle grenades. Corporal Paul, fully aware that his tactics would almost certainly result in serious injury or death to himself, chose to disregard his own safety and boldly dashed across the fire-swept rice paddies, placed himself between his wounded comrades and the enemy, and delivered effective suppressive fire with his automatic weapon in order to divert the attack long enough to allow the casualties to be evacuated. Although critically wounded during the course of the battle, he resolutely remained in his exposed position and continued to fire his rifle until he collapsed and was evacuated. By his fortitude and gallant spirit of self-sacrifice in the face of almost certain death, he saved the lives of several of his fellow Marines. His heroic action served to inspire all who observed him and reflect the highest credit upon himself, the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service. He gallantly gave his life in the cause of freedom.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

FIRST LIEUTENANT HARVEY C. BARNUM, JR.
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Forward Observer for Artillery, while attached to Company H, Second Battalion, Ninth Marines, Third Marine Division (Reinforced), in action against communist forces at Ky Phu in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, on 18 December 1965. When the company was suddenly pinned down by a hail of extremely accurate enemy fire and was quickly separated from the remainder of the battalion by over five hundred meters of open and fire-swept ground, and casualties mounted rapidly, Lieutenant Barnum quickly made a hazardous reconnaissance of the area seeking targets for his artillery. Finding the rifle company commander mortally wounded and radio operator killed, he, with complete disregard for his own safety, gave aid to the dying commander, then removed the radio from the dead operator and strapped it to himself. He immediately assumed command of the rifle company, and moving at once into the midst of the heavy fire, rallying and giving encouragement to all units, reorganized them to replace the loss of key personnel and led their attack on enemy positions from which deadly fire continued to come. His sound and swift decisions and his obvious calm served to stabilize the badly decimated units and his gallant example as he stood exposed repeatedly to point out targets served as an inspiration to all. Provided with two armed helicopters, he moved fearlessly through enemy fire to control the air attack against the firmly entrenched enemy while skillfully directing one platoon in a successful counter-attack on the key enemy positions. Having thus cleared a small area, he requested and directed the landing of two transport helicopters for the evacuation of the dead and wounded. He then assisted in the mopping up and final seizure of the battalion's objective. His gallant initiative and heroic conduct reflected great credit upon himself and were in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Appendix E

List of Reviewers

USMC General Officers

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr. (Ret.)
Gen Lewis W. Walt (Ret.)
LtGen Leslie E. Brown
LtGen Leo J. Dulacki (Ret.)
LtGen Lewis J. Fields (Ret.)
LtGen Victor H. Krulak (Ret.)
MajGen Marion E. Carl (Ret.)
MajGen Paul J. Fontana (Ret.)
MajGen Harold A. Hatch
MajGen Joseph Koler, Jr.
MajGen Andrew W. O'Donnell
MajGen Oscar F. Peatross (Ret.)
MajGen Jonas M. Platt (Ret.)
MajGen William R. Quinn (Ret.)
MajGen Donald M. Weller (Ret.)
MajGen Carl A. Youngdale (Ret.)
BGen Robert F. Conley (Ret.)
BGen Frederick J. Karch (Ret.)
BGen Marc A. Moore
BGen Mauro J. Padalino (Ret.)
BGen Webb D. Sawyer (Ret.)
BGen Edwin H. Simmons (Ret.)

USMC Colonels

Col Emmett O. Anglin, Jr. (Ret.)
Col Charles H. Bodley (Ret.)
Col Robert W. Boyd (Ret.)
Col George W. Carrington, Jr. (Ret.)
Col Edward Cook (Ret.)
Col Otis W. Corman (Ret.)
Col Nicholas J. Dennis (Ret.)
Col Rex C. Denny, Jr. (Ret.)
Col Alvin J. Doublet
Col Joshua W. Dorsey III
Col Edward P. Dupras, Jr. (Ret.)
Col Norman G. Ewers (Ret.)
Col Joseph R. Fisher (Ret.)
Col Don W. Galbreath (Ret.)
Col Jesse L. Gibney, Jr.
Col John E. Gorman (Ret.)

Col William M. Graham, Jr. (Ret.)
Col Roy C. Gray, Jr. (Ret.)
Col Edward H. Greason (Ret.)
Col John E. Greenwood
Col Hardy Hay (Ret.)
Col Harold A. Hayes, Jr. (Ret.)
Col George L. Hollowell (Ret.)
Col Floyd J. Johnson, Jr.
Col Charles J. Keever
Col James P. Kelly (Ret.)
Col Horace E. Knapp, Jr. (Ret.)
Col Jack K. Knocke (Ret.)
Col Robert L. La Mar (Ret.)
Col George G. Long (Ret.)
Col Verle E. Ludwig (Ret.)
Col Andrew I. Lyman (Ret.)
Col Robert J. Lynch, Jr. (Ret.)
Col James F. McClanahan (Ret.)
Col William P. Nesbit (Ret.)
Col Norman R. Nickerson (Ret.)
Col John D. Noble (Ret.)
Col Royal E. North (Ret.)
Col Thomas J. O'Connor (Ret.)
Col Robert J. Oddy (Ret.)
Col Keith O'Keefe (Ret.)
Col Leslie L. Page (Ret.)
Col William P. Pala (Ret.)
Col Francis F. Parry (Ret.)
Col Edward F. Penico (Ret.)
Col Robert M. Port (Ret.)
Col Mervin B. Porter (Ret.)
Col Richard A. Savage (Ret.)
Col Richard J. Schriver (Ret.)
Col Donald W. Sherman (Ret.)
Col Donald H. Stapp (Ret.)
Col William W. Taylor (Ret.)
Col Rodolfo L. Trevino (Ret.)
Col Leon N. Utter (Ret.)
Col Sumner A. Vale (Ret.)
Col Roy R. Van Cleve (Ret.)
Col Maxie R. Williams (Ret.)
Col Don P. Wyckoff (Ret.)
Col Michael R. Yunck (Ret.)

USMC Lieutenant Colonels

LtCol Herbert J. Bain (Ret.)
LtCol Robert W. Baker (Ret.)
LtCol Billy H. Barber (Ret.)
LtCol Harlan P. Chapman (Ret.)
LtCol Lloyd F. Childers (Ret.)
LtCol William H. Clark (Ret.)
LtCol Bertram E. Cook, Jr. (Ret.)
LtCol Samuel E. Englehart (Ret.)
LtCol Harold D. Fredericks (Ret.)
LtCol Charles L. Goode (Ret.)
LtCol Donald J. Hatch
LtCol Lane Rogers
LtCol Richard E. Romine (Ret.)
LtCol Walter E. Stuenkel (Ret.)
LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan (Ret.)
LtCol Russell B. Tiffany
LtCol Charles Ward
LtCol Raymond W. Wilson (Ret.)

USMC Majors

Maj John A. Buck (Ret.)
Maj Andrew G. Comer (Ret.)
Maj Paul R. Ek
Maj Nicholas H. Grosz, Jr.
Maj Pat Morgan (Ret.)
Maj John J. Mullen, Jr.
Maj Gary W. Parker
Maj Ruel T. Scyphers (Ret.)

Others

Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Center of Military History, Department of the Army
Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force
Naval History Division, Department of the Navy
Gen William E. DePuy, USA (Ret.)
Adm John J. Hyland, USN (Ret.)
Adm Roy L. Johnson, USN (Ret.)
Adm Ulysses S.G. Sharp, USN (Ret.)
Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret.)
VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.)
RAdm Don W. Wulzen, USN (Ret.)
Mr. Peter Braestrup

Appendix F

Task Organization:

III MAF and Naval Component Command as of 31 Dec 1965

	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
I. Naval Component Command (ICTZ)	9	19	224	4789	5041
A. Headquarters (DA NANG)	6	18	1		25
1. Det, Sub Unit 2, H&SCo HqBn	5	7	1		13
2. Det, 5th Comm Bn		10			10
3. Det, H&HS-1, MWHG, FMAW	1	1			2
B. 30th NCR	3	1	78	2023	2105
1. Hq, 30th NCR (DA NANG)	3	1	6	25	35
2. MCB-4 (CHU LAI)			18	498	516
3. MCB-5 (DA NANG)			17	552	569
4. MCB-8 (DA NANG)			21	397	418
5. MCB-8 (PHU BAI)			1	49	50
6. MCB-9 (DA NANG)			15	502	517
C. Nav Supt Act			145	2766	2911
1. DA NANG (PCS)			101	2281	2382
2. DA NANG (TDY)			15	291	306
3. Station Hospital (DA NANG)			29	184	213
4. CHU LAI Detachment				10	10
II. III Marine Amphibious Force	2429	35869	194	1497	39989
A. HQ III MAF (DA NANG)	97	723	5	11	836
1. Staff	75	120	5	2	202
2. 5th CommBn(-)	18	584		9	611
3. Prov Dog Plt	1	11			12
4. 7th CI Tm (CHU LAI)	3	8			11
B. Base Defense Bn (DA NANG)	32	955	3	51	1041
1. 3d Bn 9th Marines	32	955	3	51	1041
C. 7th Engr Bn (-) (Rein) (DA NANG)	35	998	1	16	1050
1. 7th Engr Bn (- Co C)	29	855	1	16	901
2. 1st Bridge Co (-)	6	143			149
D. 9th MT Bn (-) (Rein) (DA NANG)	18	397	1	9	425
E. Sub Unit -1, 1st ANGLICO	5	42	6		53
1. SAIGON	1	14	1		16
2. BIEN HOA		5	1		6
3. BERIA		3			4
4. DA NANG	1	4	1		5
5. QUANG NGAI	1	3			4
6. QUI NHON	1	2			3
7. PLEIKU		4	1		5
8. NHA TRANG		2	1		3
9. CAN THO	1	5	1		7
F. Det J, 1st Radio Bn FMF	2	65			67
1. HQ & TM 1 (DA NANG)	1	35			36

	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
2. Team 2 (CHU LAI)	1	26			27
3. Team 3 (PHU BAI)		4			4
G. 3d Marine Division (-) (Rein), FMF	1056	21162	106	1045	23369
1. HqBn (-) (DA NANG)	155	1508	13	27	1703
a. HqCo	119	690	13	27	849
b. Comm Co (-)	11	356			367
c. Service Co	15	318			333
d. MP Co (-)	5	111			116
e. 3d CIT	4	16			20
f. Det, 1st ITT	1	17			18
2. 3d Marines (-) (Rein) (DA NANG-PHU BAI)	168	3830	10	174	4182
a. HqCo (Rein) (DA NANG)	17	219	1	5	242
(1) Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv		3			3
b. 1stBn, 1st Marines (DA NANG)	37	983	3	57	1080
c. 1stBn, 3d Marines (DA NANG)	39	1023	3	53	1118
d. 2dBn, 1st Marines (Rein) (PHU BAI)	75	1602	3	59	1739
(1) 2dBn, 1st Marines	40	999	3	50	1092
(2) Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv	1	6			7
(3) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st ATBn (5 M50A1 Ontos)	1	19			20
(4) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st EngrBn	1	44			45
(5) 1st Plt(Rein), Co A, 1st TkBn (5 M48A3 Tanks)	1	27			28
(6) 1st Plt (Rein), Co A, 1st Recon Bn	1	23			24
(7) 4thBn, 12th Marines (-) (Rein) (PHU BAI)	30	484		9	523
(a) HqBtry (-) (Rein) (CMR Team)	14	161		3	178
(b) Btry M, 4thBn (SP) (6-155How)	4	120		2	126
(c) Btry B, 1stBn, 11thMar, (6-105How)	8	124		2	134
(d) 107mm Mortar Btry, 1stBn, 11th Marines (6 Mortars)	4	79		2	85
3. ADC Command Group (CHU LAI)	7	26			33
4. 4th Marines (-) (Rein) (CHU LAI)	107	2654	6	128	2895
a. HqCo	24	268	2	2	296
(1) Det, HqBn, 3d MarDiv	3	16			19
b. 1stBn, 4th Marines	35	968	2	58	1063
c. 2Bn, 4th Marines	34	969	2	58	1063
d. CoB (-) (Rein), 3d ATBn	2	67		2	71
(1) Co B (-)	1	40			41
(2) Det, H & S Co, 3d AT Bn	1	27		2	30
e. CoB (-) (Rein), 3dEngrBn	3	119		2	124
(1) Co B(-)	3	75			78
(2) Det Support Co		44		2	46
f. CoA (-) (Rein), 1st AmTracBn, FMF (34 LVTP-5, 1 LVTC, 1 LVTR-1, 2 LVTE)	5	168		4	177
g. Co C(-) 3d TkBn, FMF (12 M48A3 Tanks)	4	95		2	101
(1) Co C(-)	4	85			89
(2) Det, H&SCo (3 M67A2 Flame Tanks)		10		2	12
5. Artillery Bn Group (CHU LAI)	76	1273	6	24	1379
a. 3dBn (-), 11th Marines	36	593	2	11	642
(1) Hq Btry	11	150	2	3	166
(2) Btry G (6-105 How)	7	118		2	127
(3) Btry H (6-105 How)	8	120		2	130
(4) Btry I (6-105 How)	7	125		2	134
(5) 107mm Mortar Btry (6 Mortars)	3	80		2	85

	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
b. <i>3dBn</i> (-)(Rein), <i>12th Marines</i>	40	680	4	13	737
(1) <i>HqBtry</i> (Rein)	14	164	4	11	193
(a) <i>HqBtry</i>	14	150	4	11	179
(b) Det, CMR <i>HqBtry</i> , <i>12th Marines</i>		14			14
(2) <i>Btry G</i> (6-105How)	8	114			122
(3) <i>Btry H</i> (6-105How)	7	113			120
(4) <i>Btry M</i> , <i>4thBn</i> , <i>11thMar</i> (6-155How)	5	131		2	138
(5) <i>3d 155 Gun Btry</i> (SP) (-) FMF (4-155Guns)	4	113			117
(6) <i>1st Plt</i> , <i>1st 8'' HowBtry</i> (SP) (2-8'' How)	2	45			47
6. <i>7th Marines</i> (Rein) (CHU LAI)	147	3576	11	183	3917
a. <i>HqCo</i> (-)(Rein)	21	281	2	3	307
(1) <i>HqCo</i> (-)	17	224	2	3	246
(2) Det, <i>HqBn</i> , <i>3dMarDiv</i>	4	57			61
b. <i>1st Bn</i> , <i>7th Marines</i>	39	979	3	62	1083
c. <i>2d Bn</i> , <i>7th Marines</i>	38	914	3	55	1010
d. <i>3d Bn</i> , <i>7th Marines</i>	37	942	3	57	1039
e. <i>Co C</i> (Rein), <i>1st AT Bn</i> (15 M50A1 Ontos)	3	85		2	90
(1) <i>Co C</i>	2	59			61
(2) <i>HqCo</i> (-)	1	26		2	29
f. <i>Co C</i> (Rein), <i>1st EngrBn</i>	4	157		1	162
g. <i>Co A</i> (Rein), <i>3d AmTracBn</i>	5	218		3	226
7. <i>9th Marines</i> (DA NANG)	115	3090	10	168	3383
a. <i>HqCo</i>	15	193	2	3	213
b. <i>1st Bn</i> , <i>9th Marines</i>	35	969	3	56	1063
c. <i>2d Bn</i> , <i>9th Marines</i>	36	958	2	54	1050
d. <i>3d Bn</i> , <i>3d Marines</i>	29	970	3	55	1057
8. <i>12th Marines</i> (-)(Rein) (DA NANG)	111	1705	8	36	1860
a. <i>HqBtry</i> (-) (2-CMRS)	22	209	3	4	238
b. <i>1st 8''How Btry</i> (SP) (-) (Rein) (4-8'' How)	7	161		3	171
c. <i>3d Plt</i> , <i>3d 155 Gun Btry</i> (SP), FMF (2-155Guns)	1	35		1	37
d. <i>1st Bn</i> , (-) <i>12th Marines</i>	43	701	2	14	760
(1) <i>HqBtry</i>	14	163	2	4	183
(2) <i>Btry A</i> (6-105How)	7	115		2	124
(3) <i>Btry A</i> , <i>1st Bn</i> , <i>11thMar</i> (6-105How)	8	124		2	134
(4) <i>107mm Mortar Btry</i> (6 Mortars)	3	75		2	80
(5) <i>Btry C</i> , <i>1st Bn</i> , <i>12thMar</i> (6-105How)	8	110		2	120
(6) <i>Btry K</i> ; <i>4thBn</i> , <i>12thMar</i> (6-155 (SP))	3	114		2	119
e. <i>2dBn</i> (-), <i>12th Marines</i>	38	599	3	14	654
(1) <i>HqBtry</i>	14	153	3	5	175
(2) <i>Btry D</i> (6-105How)	7	114		2	123
(3) <i>Btry E</i> (6-105How)	7	109		1	117
(4) <i>Btry F</i> (6-105How)	7	106		3	116
(5) <i>Btry L</i> , <i>4thBn</i> , <i>12thMar</i> (6-155 (SP))	3	117		3	123
9. <i>3d AT Bn</i> (-)(Rein) (DA NANG)	15	305		10	330
a. H&SCo	9	147		7	163
b. <i>Co A</i> (-)(Rein) (10 M50A1 Ontos)	3	63		1	67
c. <i>Co C</i> (Rein) (20 M50A1 Ontos)	3	95		2	100
10. <i>3d EngrBn</i> (-)(Rein) (DA NANG)	28	686	1	13	728
a. H&SCo	10	117	1	13	141
b. Support Co	4	268			272
c. <i>Co A</i> (-)	5	74			79
d. <i>Co C</i>	6	147			153
e. <i>Co C</i> , <i>7th EngrBn</i>	3	80			83
11. <i>3d MedBn</i> (-)(DA NANG)	3	101	27	153	284
a. H&SCo	3	101	8	45	157
b. <i>Co C</i>			18	102	120
c. <i>Co D</i>			1	6	7

	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
12. <i>3d ReconBn</i> (DA NANG)	21	302	1	17	341
a. H&SCo	9	99	1	6	115
b. Co A	4	66		4	74
c. Co C	4	68		3	75
d. Co D	4	69		4	77
13. <i>Recon Group Alpha</i> (CHU LAI)	8	132		5	145
a. Co B (-) (Rein), <i>3d ReconBn</i>	4	63		2	69
(1) H&SCo					
(2) 1st Plt					
(3) 2d Plt					
b. Co C (Rein), <i>1st ReconBn</i>	4	69		3	76
14. <i>1st Force ReconCo</i> (DA NANG)	9	128		5	142
15. <i>3d MT Bn</i> (-) (DA NANG)	10	154		8	172
a. H&SCo	7	84		8	99
b. Co A (-) (15 M-35, 2 1/2-ton trucks)	2	39			41
c. 2d Plt, Co B (15 M-35, 2 1/2 ton trucks)	1	31			32
16. <i>1st Am TracBn</i> (-) (Rein), <i>FMF</i> (DA NANG)	26	639	2	13	680
a. H&SCo (12 LVTP-5, 3 LVTC-1, 1 LVTR-1)	17	319	2	11	349
b. 1st Prov Armored Amphib Plt (6 LVTH-6)	2	74		2	78
c. Co B (Rein) (54 LVTP-5, 4 LVTC-1, 1 LVTR-1)	7	246			253
17. <i>3d TkBn</i> (-) (Rein) (DA NANG)	23	489	1	11	524
a. H&SCo (-) (2 M48A3 Tks)	15	267	1	7	290
b. Co A (-) (Rein) (12 M48A3 Tks and 3 M67A2 Flame Tks)	3	89		2	94
c. Co B (Rein) (17 M48A3 Tks and 3 M67A2 Flame Tks)	5	110		2	117
d. 1st Plt, Co C (5 M48A3 Tks)		23			23
18. <i>3d Shore Party Bn</i> (-) (DA NANG)	22	438	1	25	486
a. H&SCo	12	184	1	10	207
b. Co A	3	86		5	94
c. Co B	4	82		5	91
d. Co C	3	86		5	94
19. <i>Co C, 1st Shore Party Bn</i> (CHU LAI)	5	126	1	10	142
20. <i>3d Dental Co</i> (DA NANG)			8	35	43
H. <i>First Marine Aircraft Wing</i>	1086	8332	40	147	9605
1. <i>MWHG-1</i>	267	2159	12	50	2488
a. H&HS-1 (DA NANG)	141	803	10	28	982
b. MASS-2	19	119			138
(1) Det A (CHU LAI)	4	18			22
(2) Det B (DA NANG)	4	19			23
(3) Det C (CHU LAI)	3	13			16
(4) DASC (DA NANG)	7	19			26
c. MACS-7	23	221		2	246
(1) Det A (PHU BAI)	3	17			20
d. 1st LAAM Bn (DA NANG)	31	481	1	10	523
e. 2d LAAM Bn (CHU LAI)	32	449	1	10	492
2. <i>MAG-11</i> (DA NANG)	178	1817	5	21	2021
a. H&MS-11	34	416			450
b. MABS-11	13	490	3	16	522
c. VMFA-115	41	274	1	2	318
d. VMFA-323	43	278	1	2	324
e. VMCJ-1	29	222			251
f. VMF (AW)-312	18	137		1	156
3. <i>MAG-12</i> (CHU LAI)	166	1654	6	26	1852
a. H&MS-12	41	364			405
b. MABS-12	19	519	3	22	563
c. VMA-211	29	179		2	210
d. VMA-214	24	176	1		201

	USMC		USN		TOTAL
	Off	Enl	Off	Enl	
e. VMA-223	27	178	1	2	208
f. VMA-224	22	176	1		199
g. MATCU-67	4	62			66
4. MAG-16	240	1407	9	21	1677
a. H&MS-16 (DA NANG)	31	281			312
b. MABS-16 (DA NANG)	13	441	5	6	365
c. Det MABS (PHU BAI)		12			12
d. Det MABS (QUANG NGAI)		2			2
e. DET MABS (QUANG TRI)		2			2
f. SU 1, MABS-16 (DA NANG)	10	61		1	72
g. HMM-161 (PHU BAI)	50	178	1	3	232
h. HMM-263 (DA NANG)	46	175	1	3	225
i. HMM-361 (DA NANG)	51	158	1	3	213
j. VMO-2 (DA NANG)	33	136	1	5	175
k. MATCU-68 (DA NANG)	6	61			67
5. MAG-36	235	1295	8	29	1567
a. H&MS-36 (CHU LAI)	34	315			349
b. MABS-36 (CHU LAI)	14	342	4	26	386
c. HMM-362 (CHU LAI)	53	160	1		214
d. HMM-363 (QUI NHON)	54	176	2	3	235
e. HMM-364 (CHU LAI)	54	152	1		207
f. VMO-6 (CHU LAI)	26	150			176
I. Force Logistics Support Group	98	3195	32	218	3543
1. Force Logistics Support Group (DANANG)	52	1649	4	31	1736
a. H&SCo (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn	22	373	3	15	413
b. Supply Co (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn	22	750	1	16	789
c. Maint Co (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn	6	399			405
d. Truck Co (-) (Rein) 3d SvcBn	2	127			129
2. Force Logistic Support Unit-1 (CHU LAI)	38	1308	19	130	1495
a. FLSU Headquarters	24	871		8	903
(1) H&SCo (Provisional)	11	197		8	216
(2) Supply Co (Provisional)	7	326			333
(3) Maint Co (Provisional)	6	348			354
b. Shore Party Group (Provisional)	4	136	1	10	151
(1) Co C, 1st SPBn	4	136	1	10	151
c. MT Group (Provisional)	10	268		4	282
(1) Co A(-), 7th MTBn	3	84		2	89
(2) 2dPlt, Co C, 9th MTBn	1	27			28
(3) Co C(-) 1st MTBn	3	81		1	85
(4) Co C, 3d MTBn	3	76		1	80
d. Co B, 3d MedBn (Rein)		33	18	108	159
3. Force Logistic Support Unit-2 (PHU BAI)	8	238	9	57	312
a. FLSU Headquarters	6	190		4	200
(1) H&SCo (Provisional)	3	40		4	47
(2) Supply Plt		62			62
(3) Maint Plt	3	88			91
b. Co B, 3d MTBn (-)	2	37			39
c. Co A, 3d MedBn		11	9	53	73

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