

PART VIII
THE SLF, ADVISORS, OTHER
MARINE ACTIVITIES, AND A FINAL
LOOK AT 1966

CHAPTER 19

The SLF of the Seventh Fleet

The SLF, Double Eagle, and Doctrinal Debates—The Okinawa Conference—Changes in Command and Composition—Further Operations and Changes in Commands and Units—The May Conference—The SLF to the End of the Year

The SLF, Double Eagle, and Doctrinal Debates

With the commitment of most Okinawa-based Marine forces to Vietnam by the end of 1965, the Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force (SLF) was the Pacific command's only strategic reserve for all of the Far East.* It consisted of a SLF Marine command and staff, approximating the organization of an infantry regimental staff; a Marine battalion landing team, consisting of a Marine infantry battalion reinforced by artillery and other support elements; and a Marine helicopter squadron. The Marine SLF commander reported directly to the Navy amphibious ready group commander. Although under the overall operational control of the Seventh Fleet, the SLF was readily available to General Westmoreland for specific operations in Vietnam.

At the beginning of 1966, Colonel John R. Burnett was the SLF commander; his headquarters was on board the USS *Valley Forge* (LPH 8). Lieutenant Colonel William K. Horn's BLT 2/3 and Lieutenant Colonel Mervin B. Porter's HMM-261 made up the ground and aviation components. On 5 January, Lieutenant Colonel James Aldworth's HMM-362 replaced HMM-261. Burnett moved his headquarters from the *Valley Forge* to the attack transport *Paul Revere* (APA 248) on the same



Marine Corps Photo A422636
LtCol James Aldworth, Commanding Officer, HMM-362, is seen talking to LtCol Mervin B. Porter, Commanding Officer, HMM-261, on board the USS Valley Forge (LPH 8). HMM-362 relieved HMM-261 as the helicopter squadron of the SLF on 5 January 1966.

date.** From 5-26 January 1966, Burnett's staff was occupied with the planning effort for Operation Double Eagle.

Double Eagle, which began on 28 January and terminated on 1 March 1966, was the largest amphibious operation yet held in the Vietnam war. Task Force Delta, which included the SLF as well as III MAF units, landed first in Quang Ngai Province and then moved into the Que Son Valley further north. Despite extensive preparation and the lengthy duration of Double Eagle, the Marines failed to engage any large NVA or VC main force unit.

Double Eagle brought to a head some of the basic differences between III MAF and the SLF concerning

*Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, who had commanded Amphibious Group 1 in the Far East in 1962, observed that "under Commander Seventh Fleet, the Western Pacific Amphibious Force and, except for units committed to Vietnam, Fleet Marine Force had to be prepared on little or no notice to conduct operations anywhere in the Far East and Western Pacific. This was especially true in the case of the Amphibious Ready Group and Special Landing Force." VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [May78] (Vietnam Comment File).

**The other ships of the amphibious task force were the attack transport ship USS *Montrose* (APA 212) and the landing ship dock USS *Monticello* (LSD 35).

its employment. According to amphibious doctrine, the amphibious task force commander, always a Navy officer, was to have operational control of all forces, including aviation, in the amphibious objective area until the amphibious portion of the operation was over.* He was to exercise control of the ground forces through his deputy, the landing force commander, either a Marine or an Army officer, depending on the composition of the landing force. As the landing force commander for Double Eagle, Colonel Burnett was to turn over command of the ground forces to General Platt, the Task Force Delta commander, once the landing was completed. Since bad weather delayed the completion of the amphibious portion of the operation, an awkward command relationship resulted. According to Colonel Burnett:

The command relationship . . . in effect created a dual command structure for the period D thru D plus 3. Although the Landing Force Commander had responsibility and ostensibly command, this command was diluted When Task Force Delta did not assume OpCon [operation control] of Landing Force elements on D-Day as expected, but rather the Commander Landing Force retained OpCon, Task Force Delta in order to execute its original plan was forced to transmit its desires to the Commander Landing Force.¹

Burnett claimed that "Although this did not adversely affect the operation, it caused some delay and confusion which in other situations . . . might have been disastrous." Furthermore, the SLF commander maintained: "Command and responsibility are inseparable and the person designated as Commander Landing Force with his commensurate responsibilities must have the requisite authority and control of all forces to execute the plan."²

III MAF Marine officers had another perspective of the situation. Although they recognized the SLF commander's desire to maintain autonomous command and control, many members of the III MAF

staff believed that:

. . . once the battalion is committed, let's commit it under the regimental commander who has that sector and the division commander who has that sector . . . terminate the amphibious [portion of the] operation more rapidly than we normally do. In fact, terminate them almost as soon as you get them ashore, so that we can then have one maneuver commander . . . to wit, Platt, [the in-country commander] in Double Eagle.^{3**}

General Krulak's FMFPac Headquarters supported the amphibious commander's point of view. The FMFPac commander was less worried about III MAF commanders assuming control of amphibious forces, than the fact that the Double Eagle example would set a precedent for other corps areas in South Vietnam. General Krulak was also perturbed about the lengthy period that the SLF had been committed to Double Eagle. He did not want the SLF to be considered an "in-country" organization. According to FMFPac, the integrity and independence of the SLF, as distinct from Marine units assigned to III MAF, had to be safeguarded.⁴

It was obvious before the end of Double Eagle that some of these questions had to be resolved. On 15 February, answering a request from Admiral Roy L. Johnson's Pacific Fleet Headquarters for a Seventh Fleet and FMFPac review of the effectiveness of the past amphibious operations, General Krulak proposed that he host a conference at Okinawa later in the month. Admiral Johnson concurred in the recommendation and ordered Krulak to proceed. General Krulak's motives for holding the conference were obvious. As he explained to General McCutcheon, acting CG III MAF at the time, the purpose was "to get everyone talking the same language."⁵ The FMFPac commander wanted to smooth the internal Navy/Marine relationship, cut down planning and reaction time, and make SLF operations more effective.

*Departments of the Navy and the Army, *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* (Washington: July 1962) was published by the Navy as Naval Warfare Publication 22A, by the Marine Corps as Landing Force Manual 01, and by the Army as FM31-11. The Air Force was not a party to any agreement upon amphibious operations at this time.

**Lieutenant General Hugh M. Elwood, who served as both assistant wing commander and III MAF chief of staff in 1966, stated the III MAF point of view as follows: "The basic points were that the SLF was badly needed by CGIIIMAF. Yet under another command, they landed frequently where they weren't really needed, where the enemy mostly wasn't and, on occasion, required the shore-based Marines to move in order to make room for them." LtGen Hugh M. Elwood, Comments on draft MS, dtd 4Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

tive. Colonel Chaisson, the III MAF representative to the Okinawa conference, recalled:

I think we were trying to get our ducks in order with regard to how the SLF would be used in-country . . . [and] what sort of an agreement should be entered into between PacFleet and MACV with regard to the routine employment or the abnormal employment of the SLF.⁶

The Okinawa Conference

The conference was held during the period 25 February - 1 March 1966, attended by representatives from the major Pacific Fleet and Marine commands in the Western Pacific. The conferees were able to resolve most of the differences that had arisen. The representatives reaffirmed the validity of the Navy-Marine amphibious doctrine, as outlined in NWP 22(A), but in their report the conferees noted that in the area of command relationships the fundamental doctrine required detailed exposition "so that all concerned will conduct planning and operations uniformly and in strict conformance"⁷

In its study of command relationships, the conference report observed that there were four types of amphibious situations which the Marines would face in South Vietnam:

1. The landing force is the SLF and the amphibious operation though independent is a supporting operation of a larger operation. [The Dagger Thrust operations of 1965 were cited since they supported the overall MACV campaign].

2. The landing force is the SLF and the amphibious operation is an integral part of "a specific in-country operation in which in-country forces ashore are also employed, but are not embarked. . . ."

3. The landing force is the SLF and in-country forces are usually elements of III MAF.

4. The landing force is composed entirely of III MAF forces.⁸

The Committee on Command Relations, headed by Colonel Chaisson, examined each of the four situations.* It recommended to the conference that

*The other members of this committee were Captain William Stroud, USN, representing Navy Task Force 76; Colonel Joseph E. Loprete, representing the Seventh Fleet; Colonel Robert H. Barrow, representing FMFPac; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Gleason, representing the SLF; and Major Peter L. Hilgartner, representing CinCPacFlt.

whichever commander had the predominance of forces normally should have overall authority. It also reaffirmed the authority of the commander of the landing force, whether he be from III MAF or from the SLF, in the amphibious objective area (AOA) during the amphibious phase of the operation. The conferees emphasized that the amphibious phase should be terminated as "expeditiously as practicable, and the Landing Force passes soonest to the operational control of the commander of the forces ashore."⁹ Even in the AOA, the Chaisson committee recognized that the authority of the landing force commander was limited because of the presence of South Vietnamese forces in the area. The landing force commander had no operational control of allied units although, obviously, he should attempt to secure coordinating authority. In fact, the entire emphasis of the conference report, which incorporated the committee's recommendations, was the necessity of effective liaison and preplanning between the involved command echelons to avoid any possible misunderstanding about command and control.¹⁰

The conference arrived at several broad recommendations for consideration by the senior U.S. commanders in the Pacific. The representatives of the CinCPacFlt components agreed that amphibious operations were a vital element in the war and they emphasized compliance with amphibious doctrine, the acquisition of timely intelligence, early and detailed concurrent planning, and improved reaction time. The conferees proposed bolder exploitation of the helicopter by conducting deeper inland operations. Most importantly, the conference recommended that portions of its report should be developed as "Fleet Policy," to be given wide distribution, most particularly to include CinCPac and ComUSMACV.¹¹

Changes in Command and Composition

At the time the Okinawa conference was ending its deliberations, important changes were occurring in the Marine chain of command relative to the SLF. Until the end of February, the 1st Marine Division Headquarters on Okinawa had administrative control of the SLF. With the pending departure of the division headquarters for Vietnam, a new parent had to be found for Marine forces remaining on Okinawa and afloat with the Seventh Fleet. On 1 March,

General Krulak activated the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade under the command of Colonel Herman Hansen, Jr., a World War II flying ace and holder of the Navy Cross and two Silver Stars. The new command assumed operational control of most Marine units on Okinawa and, as Navy Task Force 79, administrative control of the SLF.*

In early March, the question arose whether the SLF should continue to be embarked at Okinawa or be formed in Vietnam and embarked there. On 4 March, Admiral Sharp, CinCPac, while on an inspection tour of Vietnam, spoke to General McCutcheon, acting CG III MAF, about using III MAF battalions for the SLF and Da Nang and Chu Lai as SLF embarkation ports. McCutcheon answered that although the proposal was feasible, he was under the impression that plans called for Okinawa to serve as the rotation base for Marine units and for the SLF. After Sharp's departure, General McCutcheon reported the details of the conversation to General Krulak. General Krulak agreed with McCutcheon that the SLF battalions should be home-based on Okinawa. The short flurry of concern about SLF basing came to an end in mid-March when General Westmoreland advised Sharp that he supported the Marine position.¹²

By this time, the SLF had a change in composition. After Double Eagle, Lieutenant Colonel Horn's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines reverted to its parent regiment's control at Da Nang. Lieutenant Colonel Harold L. Coffman's BLT 1/5, which had arrived at Subic Bay on 28 February from Camp Pendleton, California, became the new SLF battalion. The battalion had sailed in west-coast-based amphibious shipping which included the USS *Princeton* (LPH 5), USS *Pickaway* (APA 222), and USS *Alamo* (LSD 33). Colonel Burnett, his staff, and Lieutenant Colonel Aldworth's squadron on board the *Valley Forge* joined the amphibious task force in the Philippines. On 5 March, both the SLF headquarters and the squadron transferred from the *Valley Forge* to the *Princeton*. After a short amphibious exercise on the island of Mindoro in the Philippines, the SLF was ready for the next amphibious landing in South Vietnam.

*General Fields established the 1st Marine Division Headquarters at Chu Lai in March. Until 1 March, General Fields had also been Commander, Navy Task Force 79, the naval designation for Marine forces with the Seventh Fleet.

Further Operations and Changes in Commands and Units

The site for the operation was the Rung Sat Special Zone south of Saigon. Taking advantage of the protection of the swampy mangrove jungle of this region, VC gunners fired on ships using the main river channel to the Vietnamese capital. On 27 February, the enemy attacked a Panamanian ship, causing serious damage, and, again on 3 March, a South Vietnamese oil barge. To prevent the interdiction of Saigon's vital waterborne supply route, General Westmoreland requested authority to use the SLF to clear the Rung Sat. The request was granted and the result was Operation Jackstay, lasting from 26 March until 6 April 1966.

Complications concerning command and control arose during the planning phase. After preliminary

Marines of BLT 1/5 hurry to waiting helicopters to begin Operation Jackstay. The operation took place in the Rung Sat sector south of Saigon to prevent the VC from closing the river route to the Vietnamese capital.

Marine Corps Photo A413986



plans had already been completed, the South Vietnamese Government told General Westmoreland that it wanted two battalions of South Vietnamese Marines to participate in Jackstay with the U.S. forces. General Westmoreland agreed to the request, and U.S. and South Vietnamese Marine liaison officers met on board the command ship to assist in developing coordinating instructions. The Vietnamese Marine battalions were not to enter the operation until April and were assigned operational areas in the northwest sector of the Rung Sat, an area distinct and separate from the Marine battalion's operating area. In a sense, Jackstay was a combined operation because the South Vietnamese 4th and 5th Marine Battalions were under the *de facto* operational control of the commander of the amphibious task force.

On 22 March just before Jackstay began, General Westmoreland radioed Vice Admiral John J. Hyland, commander of the Seventh Fleet, indicating that he had reservations about the way in which the

Marine helicopters take off from the deck of the USS Princeton (LPH 5) during Operation Jackstay. With few available helicopter landing zones, the Marines had limited mobility in the swampy mangrove jungles of the Rung Sat, often operating waist-deep in water.

Marine Corps Photo A704376




operation was being organized, and asked Hyland to meet him in Saigon. He told the Seventh Fleet commander that he had promised the South Vietnamese General Staff that he would review and concur in the plan and stated that unless certain modifications were made in it, he would have to ask for a postponement of the operation.¹³

The two commanders met on 26 March. After listening to a briefing on the Jackstay plan, General Westmoreland expressed concern about the fact that he did not have direct control over the operation. He pointed out that a Navy captain, the amphibious task force commander, and a Marine colonel, the landing force commander, not under his command, were going to be conducting an operation for which he personally would be accountable. General Westmoreland suggested that Admiral Ward, the senior MACV naval advisor, be made the commander of the amphibious task force. Admiral Hyland replied that this procedure would not be in accordance with published amphibious doctrine. On the other hand, the Seventh Fleet commander proposed that he assign Rear Admiral Don P. Wulzen, Commander, Task Force 76, as commander of the amphibious task force.* General Westmoreland finally agreed to this arrangement, but only after receiving Admiral Wulzen's assurance that he would be responsive to advice from MACV and that the operation would be terminated whenever MACV desired. The MACV liaison officers on the ships of the amphibious task force were to report directly to Admiral Ward, designated MACV senior liaison officer for the operation.¹⁴ Although the question of command and control had been resolved for the time being, the subject was sure to come up again.

Jackstay was only partially successful in its attempt to eliminate the Viet Cong forces in the Rung Sat. Operating waist-deep in water with few suitable helicopter sites, the Marines would have been literally stuck in the mud, but for the availability of Navy boats and landing craft. The Viet Cong always seemed to be one step ahead and chose not to make a stand. Despite these handicaps, Lieutenant Colonel Coffman's troops did find and destroy enemy

*The amphibious ready group, the Navy task group that carried the Marine SLF, was assigned the Navy designation TG 76.5, and thus was a subordinate command to TF 76 in the Seventh Fleet chain of command.



workshops, bunkers, food stocks, clothing supplies, and weapons. During the course of the operation, the Marines were able to experiment with riverine techniques such as mounting an Ontos on a LCM for fire support. Although the enemy main body of troops withdrew, small groups of Viet Cong remained to provide some resistance to the Marine advance. The SLF claimed to have killed at least 63 of the enemy, while suffering 5 killed, 2 missing in action, and 25 wounded. For the time being, the shipping channel to Saigon was clear.¹⁵

After Jackstay, the commanders and composition of both 9th MAB and the SLF were changed. Colonel Richard A. Brenneman relieved Colonel Burnett as SLF commander on 7 April 1966. Two days later, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel A. Somerville's HMM-364 flew on board the *Princeton* replacing HMM-362. In the meantime, Brigadier General William A. Stiles, the assistant 1st Marine division commander, had arrived on Okinawa from Camp Pendleton and assumed command of the 9th MAB from Colonel Hansen on 20 March. When General Stiles left for Chu Lai, he relinquished command of the MAB to Brigadier General Michael P. Ryan. General Ryan's command included both Colonel Harper's MAG-13 at Iwakuni and Colonel Widdecke's 5th Marines Headquarters and its 3d Battalion on Okinawa.* The newly organized 26th Marines was slated to relieve the 5th Marines as the RLT headquarters for the MAB.

In late April, after the command and unit changes had been accomplished, the SLF conducted an amphibious operation, codenamed Osage, in the Phu Loc District of Thua Thien Province. The Marine BLT was assigned the mission of destroying a VC main force battalion and elements of a NVA regiment reported to be operating in the coastal region. With the exception of delaying and harassing tactics, the enemy again chose not to fight. During Osage, which lasted from 27 April until 2 May, the Marines killed eight enemy while suffering casualties of eight dead and nine wounded.

*The 9th MAB controlled FMFPac's major ground and air components in the Western Pacific outside Vietnam. Exceptions were the 3d Force Service Regiment and Marine Wing Service Group 17. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines sailed from Okinawa for Chu Lai on 7 April.

The May Conference

By this time, both MACV and the Navy desired to reexamine the SLF employment in Vietnam. On 10 May, General Westmoreland radioed Admiral Sharp suggesting that the changing nature of the war in Vietnam made the original SLF mission, conducting amphibious raids to disrupt the buildup of enemy forces in the coastal regions, too narrow in scope. In General Westmoreland's opinion, the growth of U.S. forces in Vietnam and their expanded operations, combined with the Navy's Market Time campaign, had severely restricted enemy sea infiltration and the freedom of movement of Communist main force units. The MACV commander stated that he realized that enemy troop concentrations in coastal areas would continue to occur, but he wanted to develop, in concert with the Seventh Fleet, a more responsive procedure to destroy these forces. Admiral Johnson, CinCPacFlt, who had received an information copy of the MACV message, agreed that a more definite determination had to be made of the role of the SLF. He asked Admiral Sharp for authorization, which he readily obtained, to establish direct liaison with MACV. In a 17 May message to MACV, Admiral Johnson agreed with General Westmoreland that improvement should be made in SLF responsiveness, but pointed out that the basic concept of the SLF, as worked out the previous year, was still valid, but needed some modification. Johnson proposed holding a conference on Okinawa during which the two commands could determine the best means of SLF employment.^{16**}

**Colonel Francis F. Parry, a member of the MACV staff at the time, recalled in 1982 that he had initiated the Westmoreland message. He learned from his immediate superior, Brigadier General William K. Jones, who headed the MACV Combat Operations Center, that General Westmoreland was "grumbling about the Seventh Fleet. . . ." Parry told Jones that he "thought Westy was needlessly concerned. I had known of Johnny [Vice Admiral John J.] Hyland in the Pentagon and he had a reputation for being smart and easy to get along with. I suggested that I could straighten the emerging difficulties out in a hurry if I could deal directly at the staff level. Westy agreed to our proposing a MACV-PacFlt meeting in Okinawa and to my heading the MACV contingent. An Army colonel from FFI [1 Field Force, Vietnam] was included to keep an eye on me." Col Francis F. Parry, Comments on draft MS, dtd 23Feb82 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Parry Comments.

MACV concurred and the conference took place from 25-28 May; officers representing components of both MACV and CinCPacFlt attended. With Captain Herman J. Trum, the senior CinCPacFlt representative as chairman, the conferees were organized into four committees to study the problems and arrive at a new agreement concerning amphibious relations for the signature of both General Westmoreland and Admiral Johnson.

The conference completed its work on 28 May and forwarded its proposed joint agreement to CinCPacFlt and to ComUSMACV. Its main provisions called for the:

1. Proper application of the time-tested Army-Navy-Marine Corps approved doctrine contained in NWP-22(A).
2. Early CinCPac approval for the conduct of these amphibious supporting operations.
3. Early concurrent and parallel planning at the Commander, Amphibious Task Force and Commander, Landing Force level, in accordance with decisions mutually agreed to by ComUSMACV and CinCPacFlt.
4. The acquisition of timely, detailed and accurate intelligence, requiring close coordination between the fleet and in-country intelligence agencies in accordance with procedures agreed upon by ComUSMACV and CinCPacFlt.
5. Improving amphibious reaction by streamlining procedures in order to improve the responsiveness of the ARG/SLF to ComUSMACV operations in RVN.^{17*}

The MACV commander had one major objection to the original draft agreement. He believed that the requirement for CinCPac approval prior to committing the SLF was too restrictive for rapid reaction. This provision was modified, and a few editorial changes were made. The final signed agreement was almost identical to the one concluded by the conferees. General Westmoreland concurred in the joint


agreement on 24 August 1966. Both Admiral Johnson and General Westmoreland had reason to be satisfied. The agreement furnished Westmoreland with more flexibility when calling for the SLF, while Admiral Johnson received assurance that the command relationship contained in NWP-22(A) would pertain to all amphibious operations in Vietnam as much as possible.**

The SLF to the End of the Year

An outgrowth of the May amphibious conference was the decision to initiate a broader type of amphibious operation, codenamed Deckhouse. The Deckhouse operations were designed to complement allied operations against enemy units. The first of the new series, Deckhouse I, took place in II Corps from 18-30 June 1966, in support of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division's operation Nathan Hale. Although the Marines encountered only scattered resistance, Nathan Hale developed into a nine-battalion operation during which the allied forces killed over 400 of the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. Bronars' BLT 3/5, which had replaced BLT 1/5 on 7 May, was the landing force for the operation.

**A revised edition of the *Doctrine for Amphibious Operations* was published in 1967 as NWP-22(B). Most of the modifications from the older version were of a technical nature and beyond the scope of this history. The major importance of the new edition lay in the fact that NWP-22(B) was also published as an Air Force Manual as well as a Marine, Navy, and Army publication. The new NWP did not alter the agreement reached by General Westmoreland and Admiral Johnson, which was approved by CinCPac in November 1966. The issue over control, despite the agreement, remained a sensitive issue between MACV and the Navy. Admiral John J. Hyland, the Seventh Fleet commander, remarked that "the Army never ceased trying to obtain operational control of the SLF and the other assets of the Seventh Fleet which were operating in support of MACV. . . . The Army never liked the concept of the Navy 'operating in support,' because of the fear that the Navy might pull out at any time it felt that a threat outside the MACV area was greater than the threat inside that area. Actually, of course, the Navy would never pull out unless the highest authorities in Washington believed it was needed more in another area." Adm John J. Hyland, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File). For a further discussion of the impact of the Vietnam War on amphibious doctrine, see LtCol Peter L. Hilgartner, "Amphibious Doctrine in Vietnam," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 53, No. 1 (Jan 1969), pp. 28-31.

*Colonel Parry remembered that when he arrived on Okinawa he found the Navy and FMFPac representatives "loaded for bear . . . [and] decided to . . . defuse the situation." He recommended that the conference break into committees to address each of the issues. While he and the senior Fleet and FMFPac representatives "repaired to the Kadena Golf Course . . . the ltcols and majors types worked[ed] things out. I'm sure our hours on the golf course over the next two days did more to ensure the success of the conference than anything else. . . . When we briefed Westy upon return to Saigon I believe he was not a little surprised at the degree of cooperation. Years of Navy-Marine hard-iron teamwork paid off!" Parry Comments



Marine Corps Photo A704379

Two medium landing craft lay-to near the USS Thomaston (LSD 28) during Deckhouse IV. In this operation, the SLF battalion, BLT 1/26, landed near the DMZ and participated in Operation Prairie.

During the two months following Deckhouse I, the SLF once more rotated helicopter and infantry units. On 4 July, Lieutenant Colonel James D. McGough's HMM-363 relieved Lieutenant Colonel Somerville's HMM-364. Both Bronars' battalion and McGough's squadron participated in Deckhouse II during Operation Hastings.* On 4 August, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony A. Monti's BLT 1/26, newly arrived from the United States, became the SLF battalion. After a brief training phase in the Philippines, the newly constituted SLF conducted Deckhouse III on the Vung Tau Peninsula 60 miles southwest of Saigon, in conjunction with the U.S. Army's 173d Airborne Brigade. The results were disappointing; only two enemy were killed at the cost of four Marine dead and 21 wounded.

During the rest of the year, Seventh Fleet SLF forces focused on the northern battle zone. As an adjunct to Operation Prairie, which followed Hastings, the SLF once more landed below the DMZ in Opera-

tion Deckhouse IV.** Although the SLF ended its active participation in Operation Prairie on 24 September, the amphibious forces maintained an anxious eye on the DMZ. From October through November, a Marine BLT remained afloat off the northern coast to reinforce III MAF if the NVA renewed the offensive.

Concern about the DMZ caused a brief period of reinforcement of Seventh Fleet Marine amphibious units. Following Deckhouse IV, Lieutenant Colonel Garland T. Beyerle's BLT 3/26 replaced BLT 1/26 and Lieutenant Colonel Marshall B. Armstrong's HMM-362 relieved HMM-363. The reconstituted SLF was slated for an amphibious exercise in the Philippines. General Westmoreland, fearing that a major enemy thrust could occur in the DMZ during this time, asked Admiral Sharp to provide another contingency force to be stationed off the northern coast of South Vietnam. Approval was granted and

*See Chapter 10 for a detailed description of Deckhouse II.

**See Chapter 11 for a detailed description of Deckhouse IV.



Marine Corps Photo A187883

Marines from BLT 1/26 return to their quarters on board the USS Iwo Jima (LPH 2) after the completion of Deckhouse IV. Although accounting for about 200 of the enemy, the battalion sustained 203 casualties, including 36 killed.

General Ryan's 9th MAB on Okinawa was ordered to provide the force. Colonel John J. Padley, the commanding officer of the 26th Marines, which had arrived on Okinawa in August, embarked his headquarters and assumed the additional designation Commander, Task Group 79.2. The Task Group consisted of BLT 3/3, under Lieutenant Colonel Earl R. "Pappy" Delong, and HMM-163, under Lieutenant Colonel Rocco D. Bianchi. Padley's units remained off northern I Corps until 1 November. At that time, it was relieved by the regular SLF, TG 79.5, now under Colonel Harry D. Wortman. Task Group 79.2 was dissolved on 8 November and two days later TG 79.5 resumed its normal operations. With the easing of the fighting on the northern front, the special alert for the SLF was over.

In December, one more change occurred in SLF

composition when Major James L. Day's BLT 1/9 relieved BLT 3/26 as the landing force battalion. Colonel Wortman and his staff immediately began planning for Deckhouse V which was to take place in the Mekong Delta in early 1967.

With few exceptions, SLF operations, to that point, had little resemblance to classical amphibious warfare. For the most part, Marine amphibious operations in Vietnam were either administrative landings, exploitations of an already existing battle situation, or amphibious raids. Marine landing forces were not assaulting hostile shores; they were landing where large U.S. and allied ground and air forces were already present. Colonel Chaisson later observed that the SLF operations "by and large were sort of contrived. It was almost a concept looking for a home."¹⁸

CHAPTER 20

Other Marine Activities

Staff and Security in Saigon—Marine Advisors to the VNMC—Rung Sat Marines—Marine I Corps Advisors—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison

Staff and Security in Saigon

The composition of the MACV staff reflected the predominance of U.S. Army forces in Vietnam. Despite the fact that over two-thirds of the nearly 3,000 members of the joint MACV staff were Army personnel, General Westmoreland maintained a reputation of impartiality in dealing with the U.S. component commands in Vietnam. Brigadier General William K. Jones, the senior Marine on the MACV staff, observed that the Army officers who filled key staff positions took pains to ascertain the viewpoints of other services and "tried to develop a teamwork that was necessary to run the command."¹

Brigadier General Jones had arrived in December 1965 for the express purpose of organizing the MACV Combat Operations Center. According to Jones, who had held a similar billet as Chief of the General Operations Division in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during 1961-62, "It was a brand new proposition in which I was given plenty of leeway by both General Rosson and General DePuy to set up the overall operation."^{2*}

The MACV Combat Operations Center eventually developed into a smaller version of the National Military Command Center in Washington, performing the same nerve-center function for Westmoreland as the latter did for the Joint Chiefs. The operations center had direct radio and teletype connections with Admiral Sharp's headquarters in Honolulu and the National Military Command



Marine Corps Photo A187971
LtGen Walt, Commanding General, III MAF (left), and BGen Jonas M. Platt, III MAF Chief of Staff (right), pin on the "stars" of newly promoted BGen John R. Chaisson, the III MAF operations officer. As a general officer, Chaisson relieved BGen William K. Jones as Director of the MACV Combat Operations Center.

Center. General Jones remained in command of the center until November 1966, when he was relieved by Marine Brigadier General John R. Chaisson, just promoted to his new rank after completing his tour as III MAF's G-3.*

The number of Marines on the staff at MACV Headquarters in Saigon grew from less than 80 in December 1965 to 185 by the end of 1966. In addition to Generals Jones and Chaisson, Colonel Francis F. "Fox" Parry, Lieutenant Colonel Paul B.

*General Jones had earned the Navy Cross and Silver Star in World War II. His assignment prior to his arrival in Vietnam was Commanding General, Force Troops, FMFPac. Major General William B. Rosson, USA, was the MACV Chief of Staff while Major General William E. DePuy was the MACV J-3. The latter was relieved by Major General John C. Tillson III in March 1966.

*Colonel Francis F. Parry, who was Jones' deputy, recalled that before General DePuy departed, he insisted that the operations center have an Army deputy as well as a Marine. Parry recommended to Generals Jones and Tillson "that the two deputies divide up their duties with the Marine having responsibility for activity in I Corps, II Corps, and air and naval matters; the Army taking III Corps, IV Corps, and Special Forces operations both in and out of country. This retained a Marine hand directly involved in those areas of most interest to us." Parry Comments.

Haigwood, and Lieutenant Colonel Heman J. Redfield III served in the Combat Operations Center. Other Marines were scattered throughout the MACV staff. Administratively, the Marines in Saigon were carried on the rolls of Headquarters Marine Corps in Washington. General Jones later commented that a separate administrative subunit in Saigon should have been established for these Marines declaring "having to go clear to [HQMC] . . . didn't make any damned sense at all."³

The Marine Security Detachment at the American Embassy, which was charged with protecting other U.S. civilian buildings as well as the Embassy, also increased in number during the year because of the proliferation of U.S. Government agencies in the South Vietnamese capital. Reflecting the augmented size and larger security responsibility of the detachment, 1st Lieutenant Phillip E. Tucker assumed command in April from Gunnery Sergeant Jerry N. Lorelli. By the end of 1966, the detachment had reached a strength of 68 Marines.

Marine Advisors to the VNMC

From the beginning of the Vietnamese Marine Corps in 1954, U.S. Marines, starting with Lieutenant Colonel Victor J. Croizat, served as advisors with its units. By January 1966, the U.S. Marine Advisory Unit, headed by Colonel John A. MacNeil, consisted of 25 officers and five enlisted men. The Marine Advisory Unit was part of the U.S. Naval Advisory Group; Colonel MacNeil as the senior advisor reported directly to Rear Admiral Norvell G. Ward, Chief of the U.S. Naval Advisory Group, who, in turn, was responsible to General Westmoreland.

The senior Marine advisor and his staff advised the Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps in all matters pertaining to the organization and employment of the South Vietnamese Marines. Complementary to this function was the senior Marine advisor's responsibility for coordinating the planning for the projected growth of the Vietnamese Marine Corps with Admiral Ward and the South Vietnamese.

Although all of the senior Marine advisors had worked toward the development of a larger independent, self-sufficient Vietnamese Marine Corps, the exigencies of the war forestalled many necessary but


ancillary activities. For example, the continuous need for infantry advisors in late 1965 and early 1966 prevented the assignment of the U.S. Marine operations and training advisor to his primary staff function until March 1966.

In the spring of 1966, Colonel MacNeil undertook a long delayed review of South Vietnamese Marine mission, organization, and objectives. In June, he submitted a Force Structure Plan for the Vietnamese Marine Corps to Admiral Ward. The plan was eventually incorporated into the MACV Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for 1972 (JSOP).^{*} MacNeil visualized the expansion of the Vietnamese Marine Corps from a brigade to a division. Specifically, the plan called for the growth of the Vietnamese Marine Corps from a strength of approximately 7,000 men organized into five infantry battalions and support elements in 1966 to a strength of approximately 11,700 men organized into nine infantry battalions and support units by 1970.

In addition to adding to the number of infantry battalions, the Force Structure Plan restructured the Vietnamese headquarters and support elements. In 1968, a headquarters battalion was to be established containing a brigade/division headquarters, a headquarters and service company, a signal company, a reconnaissance company, and a military police company. The amphibious support battalion, which provided most of these services in 1966, was to be dissolved, while two new support battalions, a service battalion and a medical battalion, were to be established. The artillery battalion was to remain basically the same, with the exception of the addition of a 105mm battery by 1968 or 1969; then Vietnamese Marine artillery would consist of three 105mm batteries and two 75mm pack howitzer batteries.⁴

In 1966, the Vietnamese Marine Corps operated as an element of the general strategic reserve and, in effect, as a sort of "fire brigade" whenever trouble erupted. Its highly respected Commandant, Lieu-

^{*}JSOP is a mid-range objectives plan which translated United States national objectives and policies for the time frame five to eight years into the future, into terms of military objectives and strategic concepts and defined basic undertakings for cold, limited, and general war which might be accomplished with the projected force levels. The MACV JSOP was for five years, thus the fiscal year 1972 JSOP was prepared in 1966.



Marine Corps Photo A186608

South Vietnamese Marines cross a fast-rushing stream in Kontum Province using a make-shift bamboo bridge. The Vietnamese Marines were part of the RVN strategic reserve and used as a "fire brigade" wherever needed.

tenant General Le Nguyen Khang, not only headed the Marine Corps, but was the military governor of Saigon as well. In May, he assumed yet another duty when he became the commanding general of the South Vietnamese III Corps, which included those provinces of South Vietnam in the vicinity of the capital city. Khang's additional assignments caused no diminishment of the effectiveness of the Marine brigade. For the day-to-day administrative duties, he relied heavily upon his efficient and scholarly chief of staff, Colonel Bui The Lan. At least one Marine battalion remained in the Saigon area, while the other battalions, in task force organizations, were deployed throughout Vietnam wherever the need was greatest.

In the spring of 1966, the government sent two battalions of Marines, without their U.S. advisors, to put down the insurrections in Da Nang and Hue.* During the rest of the year, a Vietnamese Marine task force continued to operate in I Corps. During Operation Hastings, two Vietnamese Marine battalions were the I Corps reserve, but were never committed. In August, Vietnamese Marines participated with the 5th Marines during Operation Colorado in the Que Son Valley northwest of Tam Ky and, dur-

*See Chapters 5 and 6. U.S. advisors were excluded for obvious reasons.



Marine Corps Photo A332793 (Col Nels E. Anderson) *Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, LtGen Le Nguyen Khang (right), accompanied by Col Nels E. Anderson, the senior U.S. Marine advisor to the VNMC, reviews his troops. All U.S. Marine advisors to the Vietnamese Marine Corps wore the South Vietnamese Marine uniforms.*

ing Prairie, the Vietnamese Marines supported ARVN 1st Division operations in Quang Tri Province.

The Vietnamese Marines spent nearly 90 percent of the time in the field during 1966. With the activation of a sixth infantry battalion in September, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade's battalion rotation system for refitting and retraining achieved more flexibility. Thereafter, one battalion could be held at its base camp. Despite constant hardships, the Vietnamese Marines maintained a six to one kill ratio over enemy forces. Colonel Nels E. Anderson, Colonel MacNeil's successor, described the readiness and effectiveness of the Vietnamese Marines at the end of the year in the following terms:

At the present time, although the Vietnamese Marine Brigade comprises a little over one percent of the total RVNAF personnel structure, it contributes a great deal more than that in combat against the insurgents. The South Vietnamese Marine Corps at present returns more mileage for the money in the terms of devoted service, combat efficiency, and combat readiness.⁵

Rung Sat Marines

The Naval Advisory Group contained another group of Marine advisors; those operating under the U.S. senior advisor of the Rung Sat Special Zone Advisory Detachment, a Navy commander. The Rung Sat, which literally translated means Forest of Assassins, is a dense mangrove swamp southeast of Saigon in Quang Xuyen and Can Gio Districts of Bien Hoa Province. Roughly circular in shape and about 20 miles in diameter, it covers more than 400 square miles. Its major importance lies in the fact that it encompasses much of the Long Tao River, the main shipping channel from the sea to Saigon. No road net exists in the Rung Sat and most movement was along the streams which are narrow, shallow, and winding. The Vietnamese Navy was responsible for the administration and defense of the Rung Sat. A Vietnamese Army battalion, or occasionally a Vietnamese Marine battalion, normally operated in the Rung Sat area under the operational control of the Navy. The Rung Sat was traditionally a haven for fugitives from the law, and the Viet Cong took advantage of its physical characteristics to elude government forces while harassing shipping. Major McLendon G. Morris, the senior Marine, and two other officers and four enlisted Marines, served as infantry, psychological warfare, and intelligence advisors to the Vietnamese ground units in the Rung Sat. Several years later, Major Morris remembered the frequent Rung Sat search and destroy operations, "conducted in the unforgettable gray mud, up to hip-depth, which sucked one's energy away with every step, especially non-Vietnamese, who tended to sink more deeply with each step than did their counterparts."⁶

Marine I Corps Advisors

The largest number of Marines serving as advisors to the Vietnamese were assigned to the MACV I Corps advisory organization. General Walt, as senior advisor for I Corps, had overall responsibility for the U.S. advisory program in the five northern provinces. The advisory effort was entirely separated from III MAF and, in fact, was administered by the I Corps deputy advisor, an Army colonel. Colonel Howard B. St. Clair, St. Clair served in this capacity until relieved on 1 March 1966 by Colonel Archelaus

L. Hamblen, Jr. During the year, the number of U.S. advisors was reduced for fear that too many advisors could stifle South Vietnamese initiative. The number of I Corps advisors was cut in January 1966 from 700 (65 of whom were Marines) to 630 (49 of whom were Marines) by the end of the year. The spring political crisis hampered the advisory effort to the 1st ARVN Division, but by December, the South Vietnamese unit was well on its way toward regaining its reputation as one of the best divisions of the Vietnamese Army. The 2d Division, which had not participated in the Struggle Movement, continued to improve throughout the year.

Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison

Subunit-1 of the 1st ANGLICO (Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company), Force Troops, FMFPac, although not in the normal III MAF chain of command and small in size, was vital to the successful use of all available supporting arms. The ANGLICO organization is specifically designed to support allied and U.S. Army forces in the employment of Marine close air support and naval gunfire.

Subunit-1, under Major Richard E. Romine, had been in South Vietnam since 1965. By January 1966, Major Romine, headquartered in Saigon, had a force of 55 men divided into 11 teams stationed throughout South Vietnam. In February, Lieutenant Colonel Carrol B. Burch assumed command of the detachment from Major Romine. Although nominally under III MAF, the subunit acted as an independent command under MACV. In September, formal operational control was transferred to General Westmoreland's headquarters. By December, the subunit had grown to a strength of 146 men, divided into 13 detachments. The largest detachment was attached to the Korean Marines at Binh Son, Quang Ngai Province. During the year,



Marine Corps Photo A188080
PFC Bennie C. Belton, a member of Subunit-1, 1st ANGLICO, assists a South Korean officer to call in Marine close air support near Binh Son in Quang Ngai Province. ANGLICO is an acronym standing for Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, a unit made up of Marine and Navy personnel and specifically designed to provide support to U.S. Army and allied forces.

the subunit controlled more than 5,000 naval gunfire missions in support of U.S. and allied forces and was credited with killing 3,000 NVA/VC and destroying over 20,000 enemy structures.*

*Records do not indicate the number of airstrikes controlled by the subunit; only the detachment with the Koreans performed the air-liaison function in Vietnam.

CHAPTER 21

At the End of the Year

Plans for Reinforcing the Marines in I Corps—Planning the Barrier—Conclusion

Plans for Reinforcing the Marines in I Corps

Ironically, just when MACV and the South Vietnamese began emphasizing pacification, the Marines in I Corps found their personnel reserves available for that purpose stretched almost to the breaking point. III MAF was in the difficult position of pursuing an antiguerrilla campaign in its southern TAORs while at the same time containing a North Vietnamese incursion in the north.

The American command could only speculate about the reasons behind the North Vietnamese offensive in the summer of 1966. General Westmoreland expressed the belief that the enemy wanted to divert allied forces from the populated area around Saigon and suspected that the North Vietnamese had hoped to exploit the recent political crisis by establishing a "liberation government" in the northern two provinces.¹ Generals Krulak and Walt thought that the Communist leaders wanted to draw the Marine battalions out of the populated I Corps coastal plain into a campaign of attrition in the almost uninhabited rugged interior of northern Quang Tri Province. Much later, in 1967, General Krulak quoted a leading member of the North Vietnamese Government, Nguyen Van Mai, to support this argument:

The National Liberation Front will entice the Americans close to the North Vietnamese border and will bleed them without mercy. In South Vietnam, the pacification program will be destroyed.²

Whatever their estimates of North Vietnamese reasons for opening the new front, Generals Westmoreland and Walt were in total agreement that the enemy forces had to be thrown back. The MACV commander compared his position to the stance of a boxer, who jabs with his left to keep the enemy off balance, while holding his right to protect

vital areas.³ In a sense, Operations Hastings and, later, Prairie were launched as jabs to counter the enemy offensive. As Prairie continued, the 3d Marine Division was deployed to the two northern provinces and an Army infantry battalion was moved in to reinforce the Marines at Da Nang. The enemy had expanded the war; the allied commands had little choice but to respond.

The realignment of forces was not a spontaneous decision. Early in 1966, the MACV and III MAF staffs prepared contingency plans for countering a North Vietnamese invasion through the Demilitarized Zone. With the beginning of Operation Hastings, the contingency planning effort took on an air of urgency. During a visit to General Walt on 12 July, Westmoreland discussed the long-range implications. The MACV commander believed that the NVA were preparing for a sustained drive in Quang Tri Province and asked Walt to prepare for it. The next day, General Westmoreland ordered III MAF to develop a plan for the employment of a Marine division in northern I Corps, based on two different sets of assumptions. According to the first, labeled Phase I, General Walt was to stop other operations, maintain defense of the base areas, and move a division north to counter the enemy offensive. During this phase, he would not receive reinforcements. Under Phase II assumptions, III MAF was to develop plans for the use of a three-battalion Army brigade to be placed under the operational control of the Marine command. The Army troops were to come from either I Field Force or II Field Force. On 16 July, MACV notified General Larsen, Commanding General, I Field Force, to prepare a plan for the movement of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division to I Corps. The entire contingency planning effort was given the designation South Carolina.⁴

During the summer and fall of 1966, General Westmoreland and his subordinate commanders continued to prepare contingency plans which presumed the reinforcement of III MAF by Army units. By the end of September, the American com-

mand had produced three planning directives which addressed this subject, codenamed South Carolina, North Carolina and Tennessee. All three plans were designed to cope with the manpower drain on III MAF as a result of a North Vietnamese drive in the north. If South Carolina were implemented, the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division in II Corps was to reinforce III MAF in northern I Corps. In the North Carolina plan, the 173d Airborne Brigade in III Corps reinforced Da Nang, while the 3d Marine Division moved north and concentrated in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. According to the Tennessee plan, a brigade from the Army's 1st Cavalry Division was to move from II Corps to Chu Lai if more Marines were required in the northern two provinces.⁵

While this contingency planning was continuing, General Westmoreland was studying other alternatives. On 25 July, he stated that he was considering the establishment of a blocking force to prevent the enemy from moving through the DMZ. Westmoreland believed that there might be some merit in making this an international force, including Korean and Australian troops. Under his concept, observation posts would be established on the hills and mountains just south of the DMZ, while the blocking units would be inserted in the valleys.⁶ At the meeting of the U.S. Mission Council the following week, General Westmoreland brought up the subject again. He stated that:

The organization would be known as the KANZUS Force from its national components: Korean, Australian, New Zealand, and U.S. As presently visualized, the organization would be brigade-size, with two U.S. Marine and one ROK battalion as the combat elements. Individual battalions would retain their national identity. Formation of the command headquarters supporting structure would provide a place for incorporating token remaining national contributions from Australia and New Zealand and others such as the Philippines, should this become suitable. . . . The organization, commanded by a USMC Marine officer, possibly a brigadier general, would operate in the U.S. tactical chain of command in close coordination with and in support of the ARVN.⁷

The proposal received a favorable response from most of the participants at the meeting. Ambassador Lodge notified the State Department that such a force might provide the U.S. with a basis for the eventual creation of an international force under:

UN or Asian regional sponsorship which would inherit the anti-infiltration role of KANZUS. An eventual suc-

cessor would function obviously as a political and psychological cordon sanitaire, and not of course, as a military Maginot Line.⁸

At the same time, General Westmoreland forwarded his concept to the Joint Chiefs through Admiral Sharp's headquarters in Hawaii. According to the MACV historians, the American Ambassadors to Australia, New Zealand, and Korea all thought the idea had merit and concurred in the project.⁹

By 18 August, the MACV staff had completed its planning directive entitled "Operation Short Stop," which outlined the necessary actions to discover and disrupt the infiltration of enemy units through and around the DMZ into northern Quang Tri Province. Operation Short Stop required the improvement of Route 9 to Thon Son Lam and the stationing of the brigade-sized KANZUS force on the Dong Ha-Cam Lo-Thon Son Lam axis. The KANZUS brigade was to have a surveillance reaction mission under the operational control of III MAF. According to the timetable, road work and the positioning of the brigade would have to be accomplished before the onset of the northeast monsoon.¹⁰

Time was of the essence for General Westmoreland. On 21 August, he asked both the State and Defense Departments to furnish approval and guidance for the KANZUS project. He noted that base camps had to be erected, lines of communication opened, and supply points stocked by 1 October, or no sizeable force could operate in northern Quang Tri during the rainy season. The general then stated that there was also a minimum amount of time "for the assembly and shakedown of components of the force."¹¹

In spite of MACV's sense of urgency, the international ramifications of the KANZUS proposal caused Washington authorities to take a long deliberate look at the concept. Several complications arose which had to be solved before troops could be deployed. Some exception even was taken to the designation KANZUS on the grounds that it was too restrictive and precluded additional nations from joining the force. Admiral Sharp noted that the ground rules for operations in the DMZ had to be reconsidered. He recommended that the KANZUS force should have the authority to move into the South Vietnamese portion of the DMZ to prevent the North Vietnamese from using the area as a sanctuary. It was feared that the establishment of KANZUS could pose legal problems with the Interna-

tional Control Commission, which was charged by the 1954 agreements with supervision of the DMZ.¹²

The uppermost question was whether KANZUS would require more manpower. General Westmoreland was able to furnish a breakdown of his estimate of the required force on 19 September. At that time, he told Admiral Sharp that the KANZUS force would consist of two Marine infantry battalions and either a Korean Marine or Army battalion. Supplementing these units would be two firing batteries, one Korean and one New Zealander, and an Australian reconnaissance company. All of these components were then in South Vietnam; no further augmentation was required. The complicating factor was whether the allied nations would release these troops for the DMZ mission; a definite answer to this critical question could not be determined until the KANZUS project was accepted by Washington. As far as U.S. forces were concerned, the only additional reinforcements not yet in Vietnam that were required were a helicopter company or squadron and additional headquarters personnel. The needed additional headquarters personnel included a Marine brigadier general to be the brigade commander and 10 other officers. A Marine regimental headquarters company was to form the nucleus of the brigade staff; the other allied units represented in KANZUS were to provide liaison personnel to the brigade headquarters.¹³

Despite all of the detailed planning, KANZUS became a moot point. It soon was obvious that approval would not come before 1 October, the date that General Westmoreland had set as the deadline for deployment before the monsoon rains. As fighting intensified in late September during Operation Prairie, the question also arose whether a brigade-size force would be adequate to meet the threat in the north. Subsequent events made the implementation of the KANZUS plan impractical.

On 6 October, Generals Westmoreland and Walt activated part of the North Carolina plan. The 3d Marine Division was moved into the two northern provinces, while the 1st Marine Division assumed the responsibility for both the Da Nang and Chu Lai TAORs. General Westmoreland dispatched the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade from Bien Hoa to I Corps, with supporting artillery.

General Westmoreland anticipated that if it were necessary to implement the rest of North Carolina and the other contingency plans, the sequence

would be North Carolina, South Carolina, and then Tennessee, realizing that circumstances could cause change to this order of events. The MACV commander considered the possibility of reinforcing Chu Lai before sending an Army brigade to the DMZ area, or even executing both options simultaneously. Westmoreland also thought that he could integrate RLT 26 into this sequence, either to reinforce the Army troops or even as a reinforcing regiment in lieu of them. All Marine and Army forces that might be introduced into I Corps under these contingencies were to be under III MAF operational control.¹⁴

After action in the DMZ area tapered off and forces were redeployed in early October, the threat of an all-out enemy offensive in the north receded. In November, General Westmoreland ordered the return of the Army infantry battalion to III Corps; it left the next month. During December, the 3d Division pulled the 4th Marines Headquarters away from the border region and reassigned it to Thua Thien Province to conduct Operation Chinook. By the end of the year, General Walt had reduced his DMZ forces to five battalions.

Despite the limited standoff in the northern area at the end of the year, the enemy could still reactivate this front at any time and the American command had to take this fact into consideration. As a countermeasure during December, the MACV and III MAF staffs completed operation plans Georgia I and Georgia II, the deployment of the Army's 9th Division to reinforce the Marines in I Corps. III MAF was extended from Chu Lai to the DMZ, which development had a drastic effect on Marine operations, especially on pacification. There was little doubt that if the enemy renewed the offensive along the northern boundary, U.S. Army units would have to beef up allied strength in I Corps.

Planning the Barrier

Secretary McNamara was interested in an entirely different alternative to meet the DMZ threat. During early 1966, the Defense Department began to look seriously at the possibility of establishing a physical barrier across the DMZ and the Laotian panhandle to stop North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam. In April, the Secretary directed that a special study group composed of leading U.S. scientists examine the technical feasibility of such a



Marine Corps Historical Collection

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara (left) is greeted on one of his early trips to Vietnam by South Vietnamese General Nguyen Huu Co (right) and former U.S. Deputy Ambassador to Vietnam, U. Alexis Johnson (right). Secretary McNamara in 1966 directed that the U.S. study the feasibility of establishing a physical barrier across the DMZ.

barrier. Under the aegis of a private consulting organization, the Institute for Defense Analyses, 67 scholars took part in the study. Reporting on 30 August, the study group concluded that an air-supported barrier, not manned by ground troops, could be operational in approximately one year after the decision was made. The proposed barrier was to consist of two parts, one antipedestrian and the other antivehicular; the foot barrier was to extend along the southern edge of the DMZ into Laos while the antivehicular system would be located further to the west. According to the study, the barrier system was to include a series of minefields positioned at strategic points within the entire barrier region. These minefields were to be augmented by electronic acoustic and seismic sensors which would in-

dicade attempted penetration. Patrolling on a 24-hour basis, U.S. Air Force monitoring aircraft would analyze sensor signals and call in air strikes against any suspicious movement.¹⁵

On 8 September, the Joint Chiefs forwarded the study group's conclusions to Admiral Sharp for his comments. In his reply, one week later, Sharp expressed his doubt about the practicality of the entire venture. He contended:

... that a barrier system must be tended. If not, it could be breached with ease, while the flow of men and material to the VC/NVA continued. An aerial delivered obstacle would not be expected to support the need for soldiers on the ground, and the time, effort, and resources of men and material required to establish a ground barrier would be tremendous.¹⁶

The Joint Chiefs, although concerned that the barrier would require funding from current service resources, agreed with Secretary McNamara that the program should receive further study. On 15 September, the Secretary appointed Lieutenant General Alfred Starbird, USA, to head Joint Task Force 728 within the Department of Defense to determine the feasibility of the barrier. General Starbird asked General Westmoreland to provide him with an estimate of what countermeasures the North Vietnamese might take. While not commenting on the practicality of the concept, General Westmoreland, in his reply, made it clear that any barrier project would present problems. He declared:

... whether the enemy attempted to go over, through, or under the barrier it must be expected that these operations will be accompanied by coordinating harassing and diversionary operations elsewhere. With forces available in NVN and SVN, the enemy will be able to harass a fixed barrier at selected times and places both during and after the construction phase. Work will be hampered by sniper, AW [automatic weapon] and mortar fire and by equipment sabotage. Small units and working parties will be vulnerable to surprise attacks in superior strength. The enemy will make full use of the "bait and trap" technique in attempts to lure friendly elements into prepared ambushes. Extensive harassment, aimed at producing attrition of friendly forces and facilitating infiltration, could be directed not only at the barrier but simultaneously against our lines of communication. . . . Our enemy is self-confident, determined, ingenious and uses terrain and weather to his advantage. His solutions to problems are usually elemental, simple and practical from his view point.¹⁷

Despite his reservations about barriers, on 3 October, General Westmoreland ordered his own staff to prepare a study of the various defensive options in the DMZ area. The MACV planning group briefed the general on its preliminary findings six days later. It suggested the best defense would be a mobile one conducted behind a major barrier system. A 30-kilometer-long linear barrier system could be constructed in the coastal and piedmont regions south of the DMZ, envisioned as 1,000 meters wide and containing barbed wire, a minefield, remote sensor devices, bunkers for outpost forces, watch towers at periodic intervals, and an extensive communications network. A mobile force with good organic firepower, supported by artillery and air, was to conduct screening and delaying actions both in front of and behind the barrier. The planning group

suggested that an ARVN armored cavalry regiment would provide depth to the defense. III MAF would continue normal operations in the northern provinces, but would be prepared to block, counterattack, or eliminate any enemy intrusion.

West of the linear barrier, the MACV planners proposed a strongpoint type of defense. The idea was to establish strongly fortified outposts at strategic positions in the mountainous terrain, forcing the enemy into the narrow defiles. There the enemy would be subjected to allied air and supporting arms. The MACV Staff proposed 20 outposts, extending from the western end of the linear barrier to the Laotian border. To man this strongpoint system, they recommended the deployment of at least an infantry division, possibly Korean, since the terrain in the area resembled that of the Korean Armistice Line. If the frontage to be covered proved too great for a single division, or if enemy deployments in and south of the DMZ or west of the outpost line posed a major threat, the staff suggested that the Koreans could be reinforced with a U.S. Marine regiment.

In its conclusions, the MACV planning group noted that the terrain in the coastal plain and foothills in the eastern DMZ favored the allied defensive measures, but the rugged mountains in the western region provided significant advantages to the infiltration tactics of the North Vietnamese. Considering these two factors, the planners stated that the defensive trace, which they had outlined in the body of the report, was the most advantageous of the various options studied. The group, however, made clear that if a barrier system were to be built, it would be a massive undertaking. In addition to an armored cavalry regiment and a ROK infantry division, the barrier would require a supporting artillery group and the equivalent of an Army aviation battalion for helicopter support. The greatest obstacle would be the building of the barrier itself and the subsidiary tasks of upgrading and constructing roads and logistic facilities to support the barrier and its defending forces. The MACV group finally warned that the North Vietnamese still would have the capability of outflanking the defenses by moving through Laos, posing a major threat to the integrity of the barrier. Despite all of the difficulties, the planning group proposed that its outline concept for the barrier be approved for guidance to MACV staff

agencies in their preparation of detailed supporting plans.¹⁸

After discussing the various barrier projects with General Starbird, General Westmoreland met with Secretary McNamara on 10 October in Vietnam. At this meeting, the MACV commander presented his alternative conventional barrier and strongpoint system for the Secretary's consideration in lieu of the Washington proposal. During his visit, Secretary McNamara flew over the DMZ and apparently was impressed by the difficulties that the northwestern terrain would pose for the construction of a barrier. In any event, he indicated to General Westmoreland that he was receptive to Westmoreland's strongpoint system in this portion of the DMZ area.¹⁹

On his return to Washington, McNamara continued to advocate the building of some sort of barrier in this area of South Vietnam in spite of the difficulties. In a memorandum to President Johnson proposing the installation of the barrier near the 17th Parallel, he stated:

The barrier may not be fully effective at first, but I believe that it can be made effective in time and that even the threat of its becoming effective can substantially change to our advantage the character of the war. It would hinder enemy efforts, would permit more efficient use of the limited number of friendly troops, and would be persuasive evidence both that our sole aim is to protect the South from the North and that we intend to see the job through.²⁰

In his conversation with General Westmoreland the Secretary left no doubt that the MACV planning for the barrier should continue. He also declared that General Starbird's Washington group would continue to function. It would be charged with obtaining and delivering munitions and sensors to support the barrier. At the same time General Westmoreland was to determine his requirements for forces and material to support his concept. The MACV barrier planning effort would be designated Practice Nine.²¹

Shortly after the Secretary's visit, General Westmoreland ordered his subordinate commands to study the concept that his staff had prepared. The Seventh Air Force was tasked with the development of the air barrier, while III MAF, in conjunction with the MACV Combat Operations Center, was to provide the concept for the conduct of a "Mobile Defense/Conventional Barrier."²²

General Walt ordered the 3d Marine Division to

prepare the Marine version. He told General Kyle, the division commander, that a statement should be made at the outset that III MAF disagreed with the barrier concept.²³ In a letter to Walt, General Kyle noted that he, also, had serious reservations about the entire program. He believed that the proposed linear barrier in the east would require at least a division for monitoring and defense, rather than an armored cavalry regiment; this division would be in addition to the 1st ARVN and 3d Marine Divisions. He argued that the MACV proposal to use the latter two units to provide depth to the barrier defense nullified the only possible advantage of the plan. Instead of freeing these two divisions for operations in southern Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces, it would confine them to the border region. General Kyle also objected to positioning a Marine regiment in the western strongpoint area. He reiterated that the barrier defense system "should *free* Marine forces for operations elsewhere — *not freeze* such forces in a barrier watching defensive role."²⁴

General Kyle presented a counterproposal to the MACV plan. He declared that it was obvious that whether there was a defensive barrier or not, at least two divisions would be needed to halt enemy infiltration through the DMZ. The 3d Marine Division commander stated that a two-division mobile defense force could accomplish the same mission as a barrier without tying down more forces to fixed positions, and this course of action would have the additional advantage of requiring a much less extensive engineering effort.²⁵

Nevertheless, General Kyle's mobile two-division defense plan did require a great deal of engineering construction. The general pointed out five tasks which would have to be accomplished, irrespective of which plan was ultimately adopted. They were: (1) the upgrading of Route 9 to a two-lane paved road from Dong Ha to Khe Sanh; (2) widening Route 1 from Phu Bai to the vicinity of Gio Linh; (3) constructing two alternate roads from Route 1 eastward to the Cua Viet, one road emanating from Dong Ha and the other from Quang Tri City; (4) constructing a road from Quang Tri City through the Ba Long Valley to join Route 9 to Ca Lu; and (5) finally, the upgrading of the dock facilities at both Dong Ha and at Cua Viet to the level of a major port. General Kyle reemphasized his contention that this preliminary road construction and port development, combined with the insertion of a mobile two-



Marine Corps Photo A188167

Gen William C. Westmoreland, ComUSMACV (left) is seen on a visit to the 3d Marine Division Headquarters at Phu Bai together with MajGen Wood B. Kyle, Commanding General, 3d Marine Division (right), and LtGen Lewis W. Walt, Commanding General, III MAF (following behind). Generals Kyle and Walt both objected to any linear barrier in the DMZ sector.

division force, were all that was required to secure the northern area.²⁶

Although General Walt agreed with his subordinate commander, neither he nor General Kyle had any choice in the matter. As General Walt later wrote to HQMC, he had commented to MACV that if he had the additional forces projected by the barrier planners, "a far better job of sealing the DMZ could be accomplished without the barrier itself." He also had recommended to MACV that any additional forces for manning the barrier should not come from III MAF; "we are already too short of troops to divert any of them to a function of this nature." Walt observed, however, that his "position has so far not prevailed."²⁷

By the end of the year, the MACV and III MAF planners nearly had completed the first phase of

their barrier planning. MACV had presented its Practice Nine Requirement Plan on 26 November and III MAF submitted its formal operation plan at the end of December. The concept envisioned the completion of the construction and the manning of the eastern portion of the barrier by 1 August 1967. According to the concept of operation, the 3d Marine Division would conduct a series of clearing operations in the vicinity of the strongpoint/barrier locations. Work would also be started on the improvement on the lines of communication in the area to include the dredging of the Cua Viet. On 1 August 1967, a South Korean division would take over responsibility of the western sector, which included all of the area west of Dong Ha Mountain. An ARVN regiment would man the 34 kilometers of the eastern linear barrier extending from Dong Ha Mountain to the South China Sea. The 3d Marine Division would then be free of the immediate responsibility for barrier defense.²⁸

In January 1967, General Westmoreland made some modifications in the barrier plans, but the basic concept remained the same. There were also some changes in semantics. The term "anti-infiltration system" was substituted for "barrier," because the latter word connoted an impregnable defense. More substantially, the deadlines for the building and manning of both the eastern and western defense systems were pushed back. In its Practice Nine Requirements Plan of 26 January 1967, MACV now called for the completion of the eastern portion by 1 November 1967 instead of 1 August. In the western sector, logistic considerations caused the MACV planners to postpone the introduction of large forces in the area until November, although the Marine unit at Khe Sanh was to construct a strongpoint. While the original plan had envisioned the complete installation of the western strongpoint system by November, the new plan only stated that "the remainder of the system in this area will be completed subsequent to 1 November 1967." No provision was made for the construction of a base camp for the Korean division. This version of the barrier concept, according to its originators, reduced the costs by a third and cut down the number of troops required to man the defenses during the initial period. General Westmoreland submitted the new plan to Admiral Sharp and the Joint Chiefs for consideration. The barrier concept, even after the decision was made to

implement part of the MACV plan in March 1967, was to be the subject of a great deal of controversy throughout that year.²⁹

The Marine Corps was consistent in its opposition to the entire concept of a defensive barrier. Colonel Chaisson, the III MAF G-3, represented the feeling of most of his fellow officers when he declared in November 1966:

All of the barrier plans are fantastic, absolutely impractical, and III MAF is opposed to all because of engineer requirements . . . and the installations must tie down troops to protect the barrier.³⁰

General Walt even went further and declared that the entire barrier discussion placed undue emphasis on the infiltration problem. He believed that the primary enemy remained the guerrilla, and that the infiltrator, who came from the north, could only support the local forces, but not replace them. Walt observed:

. . . the mass of infiltrators must be considered as NVA or main force VC types. As the record shows, we beat these units handily each time we encounter them. In my mind, therefore, we should not fall into the trap of expending troops unduly seeking to prevent the entry of individuals and units who pose the lesser threat to our ultimate objective, which remains the people of South Vietnam.³¹

As a 3d Marine Division briefing officer stated in January 1967:

To sum it all up, we're not enthusiastic over any barrier defense approach to the infiltration problem—if there is such a problem in our area. We believe that a mobile defense by an adequate force—say one division give or take a battalion—would be a much more flexible and economical approach to the problem.³²

Conclusion

During 1966, the III Marine Amphibious Force

doubled in size. The 40,000, Marine manpower base in January had been expanded during the year and was rapidly approaching the 70,000 mark by the end of December. At the end of the year, General Walt's command consisted of the reinforced 1st and 3d Marine Divisions, the reinforced 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and the Force Logistic Command.

Despite the rapid buildup of Marine forces, III MAF's high hopes for pacifying and unifying its three enclaves during 1966 had been dashed. The political upheaval caused by the removal of the powerful and popular Nguyen Chanh Thi, the I Corps commander, brought Marine pacification efforts to a complete standstill in the spring. At the same time, Marine units at Phu Bai and Chu Lai found themselves confronted by North Vietnamese and VC main force battalions and regiments in Thua Thien Province and southern I Corps. The North Vietnamese threat grew during the summer when an enemy division crossed into northern I Corps through the DMZ. In October, the 3d Marine Division deployed north of the Hai Van Pass to counter a new NVA offensive, while the 1st Marine Division assumed responsibility for Da Nang and Chu Lai. Although by the end of the year, the Marines had parried successfully the NVA thrust in the north, the pacification effort in the southern enclaves suffered.

At the end of 1966, the two Marine divisions of III MAF were fighting two separate wars: the 3d Marine Division conducting a more or less conventional campaign in northern I Corps, while the 1st Marine Division continued the combination of large unit and counter guerrilla operations south of the Hai Van Pass. Although General Walt wanted to reduce the size of his forces along the DMZ,³³ this pattern of warfare would continue into 1967.

Notes

PART I

The Marine Base Areas in Early 1966

CHAPTER 1

A LARGER FORCE FOR A GROWING WAR III MAF IN JANUARY 1966

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from MilHistBr, Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff MACV, Command History, 1966, hereafter, MACV Comd Hist 1966; HqFMFPac, U.S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67, n.d., 2 vols., hereafter, FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67"; III MAF ComdCs Nov65-Feb66; Vietnam Comment File; Jack Shulimson and Major Charles Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965: The Landing and the Buildup* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, 1978), hereafter Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*; Dep of Defense, *United States Vietnam Relations, 1945-67*, 12 bks (Washington: GPO, 1971), hereafter *Pentagon Papers* with appropriate section title and book, volume or tab, and page numbers; Adm Ulysses S.G. Sharp, USN, CinCPac, and Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, ComUSMACV, *Report on the War in Vietnam* (As of 30 Jun 1968) (Washington: GPO, 1968), hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Gen Louis W. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy, A General's Report on Vietnam* (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1970), hereafter Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1965-66," *Naval Review*, 1968 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 2-35, hereafter Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

III MAF, I Corps, and the Three Marine TAORs

Additional sources for this section are: HqFMFPac, III MAF Operations, Jan 1966, n.d., hereafter III MAF Ops with specific month; III MAF ComdC, Jan66; Biographical Files (Historical Reference Section, History and Museums Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.), hereafter Biog Files (HRS).

1. Gen Lewis W. Walt biographic data in Biog Files (HRS). See also Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 208.

2. See Gen Keith B. McCutcheon biographic data in Biog Files (HRS).

Command Relations

Additional source for this section is MajGen Lewis W. Walt, Address to Staff and Students, Marine Corps Schools, Quantico,

Va, dtd 3Mar66 (No. 6010, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Walt address to MCS, Mar66.

3. Office of Air Force History, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File).

4. Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA, Comments on draft MS, dtd 27May78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Westmoreland Comments, May 78.

5. Lester A. Sobel and Hal Kosut, eds., *South Vietnam: U.S. Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1966-67* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1969), v. 2, p. 211.

6. Walt address to MCS, Mar66.

7. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 15Jan66, encl 17, III MAF ComdC, Jan66.

Planned Deployment of the 1st Marine Division

8. "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-67," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, v. I, p. 25 and FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67," v. I, pp. 7-6, -7, -8.

9. Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, Chap. 8.

10. LtCol Roy E. Moss, Comments on draft MS, Capt Moyers S. Shore III, "Marines in Vietnam," pt III, dtd 10Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File).

The Enemy Buildup

11. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 3.

12. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 100.

The Marine Counter guerrilla War Versus the MACV Perspective

13. See FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. I, p. 9-1, v. 2, p. 97 and III MAF Ops, Jan 66, p. 30.

14. Walt address to MCS, Mar66.

15. Col George W. Carrington, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [May 78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Krulak Comments, May 78.

17. CGFMFPac, "Pacific Operations," Tab F, HQMC, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, pp. F6-F7.

18. Westmoreland Comments, May 78.

19. Ibid.

20. BGen William E. DePuy, ACS J-3, memo to Gen Westmoreland, dtd 15Nov65, Subj: The Situation in I Corps (Gen William E. DePuy Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa.).

21. Gen William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co, Inc., 1976), pp. 165-66, hereafter

Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*.

22. HistDiv, Memo for the Record, dtd 9Mar72, Subj: Conference with BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Director of Marine Corps History and Museums (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Simmons Conference. For a further discussion of the Marine Corps and Army strategy see Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," p. 23 and Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam*, 1965, Chap 8.

23. Krulak Comments, May 78.

24. Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 5 May 78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Greene Comments, May 78.

Marine Mission and Future Plans

25. ComUSMACV ltr to CG III MAF, dtd 21Nov65, Subj: Letter of Instruction (LOI-4), encl 2, III MAF ComdC, Nov65.

26. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 340.

27. HqIIIMAF, G-3 Section, "Presentation for LtGen Krulak," dtd 1Feb66, encl 18, III MAF ComdC, Feb 66, hereafter Krulak Presentation, Feb66.

28. Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

EXPANDING WAR IN SOUTHERN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist 1966; III MAF Ops, Jan-Feb66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Feb66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Feb66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Feb66; Vietnam Comment File; Capt Moyers S. Shore III, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun 1966," pt III of LtCol Ralph F. Moody *et al.*, "Marines in Vietnam," MS (HistDiv, HQMC), hereafter Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III;" Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam*, 1965; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

The Chu Lai TAOR

Additional sources for this section are: 4th Mar ComdC, Jan66; 7th Mar ComdC, Jan66, 1st Mar ComdC, Jan66.

1. 7th Mar ComdC, Jan66.

2. 4th Mar ComdC, Jan66; 1/4 ComdC, Jan66.

3. LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9May78, (Vietnam Comment File).

4. 7th Mar ComdC, Jan66. See 7th Mar FragO 1-66, dtd 18Jan66, encl 3, 7th Mar ComdC, Jan66.

5. 1st Mar ComdC, Jan66; 1/4 ComdC, Jan66.

Operation Double Eagle

Additional sources for this section are: TF Delta AAR Double Eagle I and II, 28Jan-1Mar66, dtd 15Mar66, hereafter TF Delta AAR Double Eagle; MAG-36 AAR Double Eagle I and II, 28Jan-28Feb66, dtd 20Mar66, encl to MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter MAG-36 AAR Double Eagle; III MAF Jnl File, Opn Double Eagle, Dec65-4Feb66, hereafter III MAF Double Eagle Jnl

File; CTF 79.5 AAR, Operation Double Eagle I and II, dtd 17Mar66, Tab F, TG 79.5 ComdC, Jan-May66, hereafter CTF 79.5 AAR Double Eagle.

6. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 359.

7. Col Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 1Dec69, (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Peatross Comments, Shore MS.

8. See Walt address to MCS, Mar66 and MajGen Oscar F. Peatross intvw by Oral HistU, HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 12Apr73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), pp. 38-39, hereafter Peatross Intvw, 73.

9. Walt address to MCS, Mar66.

10. CTF 79.5 AAR Double Eagle; III MAF, Summary of Significant Events in Planning Operation Double Eagle, n.d., encl 8, III MAF ComdC, Jan66, hereafter III MAF Planning Summary, Double Eagle.

11. III MAF, Memo for the Record, dtd 13Jan66, Subj: I Corps/II Corps Conference, I Corps Headquarters, 0930-1130, 13 January 1966, encl 7, III MAF ComdC, Jan66, hereafter, III MAF M/R, I Corps/II Corps Conference.

12. III MAF OpO 307-66, dtd 15Jan66; G-3, HQMC, Point Paper, dtd 19Jan66, Subj: Status Report of all USMC units and replacements now deploying or ordered to deploy (HQMC, G-3 Div, Point Papers-West Pac, Jan-Jun66).

13. See TF Delta, OpO 1-66, dtd 24Jan66; III MAF Planning Summary, Double Eagle; Col William G. Johnson, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 9Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Johnson Comments.

14. See "Concept of Operations," in TF Delta AAR Double Eagle, pp. 10-12 and TF Delta OpO 1-66, Operation Double Eagle, dtd 24Jan66.

15. See 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan 66; 3d MarDiv FragO 359-66, Operation Birdwatcher II, dtd 7Jan66, encl to 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan66; 1st MAW Sit Reps, Jan66; 1st Force Recon Co, OpO 2-66, dtd 12Jan66, encl 64, 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jan66.

16. Hateful Patrol AAR, dtd 23Jan66, encl to 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, 20Jan-Feb66.

17. LtCol Ernest L. Defazio, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," circa 1969 (Vietnam Comment File).

18. Col Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun78] (Vietnam Comment File).

19. CTG 75.5 AAR Double Eagle; Rpt on Double Eagle, D-Day in III MAF Double Eagle Jnl File.

20. Col Robert J. Zitnik, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

21. Ibid.

22. Rept on Double Eagle, D plus 1 in III MAF Double Eagle Jnl File.

23. Col William G. Johnson intvw by FMFPac, dtd 13Sep66 (No. 202, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Johnson Intvw.

24. Johnson Comments.

25. Capt James R. Hardin intvw by HQMC, dtd 17Jan67 (No. 292, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

26. 3dBrig, AirCavDiv, CAAR, Opn Masher/White Wing, dtd 10Mar66 (CMH).

27. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle; BGen Jonas M. Platt intvw by III MAF, dtd 6Dec66 (No. 268, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Platt Intvw.

28. Ibid.

29. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle and MAG-36 AAR Double Eagle.
30. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle.
31. 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, 20Jan-Feb66.
32. SMA, MACV, 2dInfDiv, AAR Lien Ket-22, 29Jan-12Feb66, dtd 16Feb66 (SMA, MACV AARs 1966).
33. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle.
34. Ibid.
35. Maj Alex Lee, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 28Nov69, (Vietnam Comment File).
36. Capt Edwin W. Besch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
37. Col Glen E. Martin, Comments on draft MS, dtd 5Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
38. LtCol Alex Lee, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26May78 (Vietnam Comment File).
39. TF Delta AAR Double Eagle.
40. Platt Intvw.
41. LtGen Victor H. Krulak, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [May78](Vietnam Comment File).
42. 1/4 Sit Rep No. 266, dtd 27Jan66 in 1/4 ComdC, Jan66.
43. 7th Mar ComdC, Feb66.

CHAPTER 3

THE WAR IN CENTRAL I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist 1966; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; Vietnam Comment File; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam 1965-66."

The Da Nang TAOR

Additional sources for this section are: 9th Mar ComdCs, Jan66; 3d Mar ComdC Jan66; MAG-16 ComdC, Jan66; 12th Mar ComdC, Jan66; MajGen Donald M. Weller, Unprocessed Working Papers on Pacification, hereafter, Weller Working Papers; Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*.

1. Reports on Quang Nam Pacification Program, Nov 1965-Feb66 in Weller Working Papers.
2. Ibid. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, Chap 8 and Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," pp. 23 and 25.
3. See Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, pp. 86-88 and Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," p. 31.
4. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, Comments on draft chapter, dtd 27Dec71 (Vietnam Comment File).
5. 3d Mar AAR, Operation Mallard, dtd 6Feb66, encl 41, 3d Mar ComdC, Jan66.
6. *Sea Tiger*, dtd 26Jan66, pp. 1 and 8.
7. III MAF ComdC, Jan66, p. 2.
8. Report on Refugees at Dai Loc District Headquarters Resulting from Operation Mallard, encl 4, 3d Mar AAR, Operation Mallard, dtd 6Feb66. See also 3/7 AAR, Operation Mallard,

dtd 22Jan66 in 3/7 ComdC, Jan 66 for a further description of the operation.

9. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 88.

Honolulu and the Reemphasis on Pacification

Additional sources for this section are: 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66; 3d Mar ComdC, Feb66; MAG-16 ComdC, Feb66; Weller Working Papers; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, 9th Marines Notebook, hereafter 9th Marines Notebook; Pentagon Papers; Lyndon B. Johnson, *The Vantage Point* (New York: Rinehart, Holt & Winston, 1971), hereafter Johnson, *The Vantage Point*.

10. "Re-emphasis on Pacification, 1965-67," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 6, Sec. IV-C-8, p. 27 and MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 504.
11. "Declaration of Honolulu," *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. LIV, no. 1392 (28Feb66), pp. 305-06.
12. Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 243.
13. Westmoreland Comments, May 78. See also Memorandum entitled "1966 Program to Increase the Effectiveness of Military Operations and Anticipated Results thereof," circa 8Feb66, encl, Westmoreland Comments, May 78, and Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, pp. 160-1.
14. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, pp. 504-506.
15. Quang Nam Priority Area in Weller Working Papers.
16. Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam 1965-66," p. 28.
17. 1/9 ComdC, Feb66. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, Chap 8 for the background of the Combined Action Program.
18. Quoted in 9th Marines, Brief Narrative of Activities, Mar65-Jun66, dtd 4Jul66, p. 2. See also 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66; 3/3 ComdC, Feb66; and 9th Mar Sit Reps for 23-25Feb66.
19. Notes for Battalion Commander's Conference, dtd 27Feb66 in 9th Marines Notebook.
20. G-3 Section, Hq, III MAF, Agenda Memo, dtd 19Feb66, Subj: Operation Sparrow Hawk, encl 17, III MAF ComdC, Feb66.
21. 9th Mar Sit Rep No. 56, dtd 25Feb66, 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66.
22. See 9th Marines Casualty Chart in 9th Marines Notebook and 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66.
23. Col Joshua W. Dorsey III, Comments on draft MS, dtd 24Jul78 (Vietnam Comment Files). See also 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66.
24. Col Nicholas J. Dennis, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun78] (Vietnam Comment Files). See also 9th Mar ComdC, Feb66.
25. 3d Mar ComdC, Feb66.

CHAPTER 4

A NEW THREAT IN NORTHERN I CORPS

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Mar66; FMFPac Sit Reps, Jan-Mar66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Feb-Mar66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; DOD, Current News (daily extract of newspaper and magazine clippings as well as TV/Radio news transcripts), hereafter "Current News"; Vietnam Comment File; Gen William

C. Westmoreland Papers (CMH), hereafter Westmoreland Papers (CMH); Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III."

The Buildup at Phu Bai

Additional sources for this section are: HQMC Msg File; 1/1 ComdCs, Feb-Mar66; 2/1 ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; 4/12 ComdCs, Jan-Mar66.

1. 2/1 ComdC, Jan66
2. Krulak Presentation, Feb66.
3. Ibid.
4. 3d Mar ComdC, Feb66.
5. Ibid. See also CGFMFPac Sit Reps for 16-28Feb66.
6. 3d MarDiv OPlan 375-66, dtd 24Feb66, encl 7, and 3d MarDiv OPlan 376-66, dtd 23Feb66, encl 8, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb66.
7. 2/1 msg to 3d MarDiv, dtd 28Feb66, encl 5, 2/1 ComdC, Feb66, hereafter 2/1 msg, 28 Feb66.
8. 2/1 AAR, Opn New York, Pho Lai Village and Phu Thu Peninsula, dtd 6Mar66, encl 4, 2/1 ComdC, Feb66, hereafter 2/1 AAR, Opn New York.
9. Ibid. and Col Edwin M. Rudzis, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26 May78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Rudzis Comments.
10. 2/1 msg, 28Feb66.
11. 2/1 AAR, Opn New York.
12. *Passim.*, III MAF Jnl & Msg File, 28Feb-2Mar66.
13. 1/1 ComdC, Mar66. See also III MAF COC, report of Phone Msg, dtd 2Mar66 and CG3dMarDiv msg to IIIMAFCO, dtd 1Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).
14. 1/1 AAR 4-66, Opn Troy, dtd 21 Mar 66, Tab C, 1/1 ComdC, Mar66.
15. HQMC, G-3 Div, Point Paper, dtd 8Mar66 in G-3 Div, HQMC Point Papers 1966; CGFMFPac Sit Rep No. 340, dtd 5Mar66 (FMFPac Sit Reps 1966); 3dMarDiv SitRep No. 302, dtd 4Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File); 3d Mar msg to TG Foxtrot, dtd 4Mar66, encl 1, 3d Mar ComdC; CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 2Mar66 and 3dMarDiv msg to COC III MAF, dtd 3Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). See also Rudzis Comments.
16. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 4Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).
17. Ibid.
18. ComUSMACV, Memo for the Record, dtd 10Mar66, Subj: MACV Commanders' Conference, 20Feb66 (Westmoreland Papers, CMH).
19. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 4 Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).
20. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 23Feb66 (HQMC Msg File).
21. CGFMFPAC msg to CMC, dtd 9Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).

The Fall of A Shau

Additional sources for this section are: U.S. Army 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) 2-12 Command Reporting Files, 1965-66, Box 14, Accession No. 69A729 (WFRC), hereafter, 5th SFG 2-12, 14 (69A729 WFRC); III MAF, A Shau Incident Jnl, 9-12 Mar66, hereafter III MAF, A Shau Incident; Col Francis J. Kelly *U.S. Army Special Forces—Vietnam Studies* (Washington: Dept of the Army, 1973), hereafter Kelly, *Special Forces*.

22. FMFPac Sit Rep No. 353, dtd 18Mar66 (FMFPac Sit Reps,

1966).

23. III MAF G-2 msg to 3d MarDiv G-2, dtd 5Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). See also A Shau Analysis in 5th Special Forces Miscellaneous Report, 5th SFG 2-12, 14 (69A729 WFRC), hereafter A Shau Analysis.

24. Kelly, *U.S. Army Special Forces*, p. 92. See also Det C-1, 5th SFG, AAR, Battle for A Shau, dtd 28Mar66, 5thSFG 2-12, 14 (69A729 WFRC), hereafter 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau.

25. A Shau Analysis and 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau

26. Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," p. 11-3.

27. Det C-1, 5th SFG, Jnls, 9-12 Mar66 in 5th Special Forces Miscellaneous Report, 5th SFG 2-12, 14 (69A729 WFRC), hereafter 5th SFG, Jnls.

28. III MAF COC, Resume of tele con w/ C/S I Corps, dtd 9Mar66 (III MAF Msg & Jnl File); entry for 9Mar66, 1/1 Jnl, Tab P, 1/1 ComdC, Mar66.

29. BGen Marion E. Carl, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 5Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Carl Comments, 69.

30. LtCol Charles A. House, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun 78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter House Comments.

31. Transcript of MajGen Marion E. Carl intvw by Hist & Mus Div, 1973 (Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), pp. 31-32, hereafter Carl Transcript.

32. IIIMAFCO msg to MACVCOC, dtd 9Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

33. 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau.

34. BGen Leslie E. Brown, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 4Dec69, (Vietnam Comment File).

35. Entries for 10Mar66, 5th SFG, Jnls.

36. MajGen Marion E. Carl, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun 78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Carl Comments, 78. See also Carl Comments, 69.

37. Col Roy C. Gray, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 20Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Gray Comments.

38. 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau.

39. Entries for 10Mar66, 5th SFG, Jnls.

40. Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter O'Connor Comments.

41. "TV Defense Dialogue, Broadcast of 14Mar66," Current News, dtd 15 Mar66, p.4, hereafter "TV Defense Dialogue, 14Mar66." See also 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau and Com-USMACV msg to SecDef, (OASD P/A), dtd 16 Mar66 (III MAF Jul & Msg File), hereafter MACV msg to SecDef, 16 Mar66.

42. 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau and 1st MAW Sit Rep No. 297, dtd 10Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

43. "Radio-TV Defense Dialogue, 14Mar66," Current News.

44. MACV msg to SecDef, 16Mar66.

45. Notes on Personnel Rescued at A Shau, dtd 12Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

46. MACV msg to SecDef, 16Mar66.

47. House Comments. See also MAG-16 ComdC, Mar66.

48. MACVCOC msg to NMCC, dtd 15Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

49. Carl Transcript, p. 31. See also Carl Comments, 78 and House Comments.

50. O'Connor Comments.

51. Gray Comments.

52. 5th SFG, Battle for A Shau, and Notes on Helicopter Sorties, n.d., in III MAF, A Shau Incident.

53. G-3, 3d MarDiv msg to COIIIIMAF, dtd 10Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

54. Passim., III MAF Jnl & Msg File, 10-13Mar66; 1/1 ComdC, Mar66; FMFPac Sit Rep No. 349, dtd 14Mar66 (FMFPac Sit Reps, 1966).

55. CGICorps msg to JGS, dtd 15Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

56. LtCol Raph E. Sullivan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9May78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also MajGen Harold A. Hatch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

57. SA, 1st Inf Div, Hue msg to ComI Corps Adv Gp, Da Nang, dtd 16Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

58. III MAF ComdC, Mar66 and Delta Team Reports, 17-29Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). For organization of Delta Teams, see Kelly, *Special Forces*, passim.

Continuing Reinforcement of Phu Bai and Operation Oregon

Additional sources for this section are: 4th Mar ComdC, Mar66; 1/1 ComdC, Mar66; 2/1 ComdC, Mar66; 1/4 ComdC, 28-31 Mar66; 3/4 ComdC, Mar66; 3/12 ComdC Mar66; 4/12 ComdC, Mar66; TG Foxtrot AAR, Opn Oregon, dtd 10Apr66, hereafter TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon; 1/4 AAR, Opn Oregon, dtd 14 Apr66, encl, 1/4 ComdC, 28-31Mar66, hereafter 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon.

59. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).

60. 4th Mar ComdC, Mar66 and CGFMFPac Sit Rep. No. 352, dtd 17Mar66 (FMFPac Sit Reps, 1966)

61. G-3, III MAF note, Task Group Foxtrot Opn for 19 Mar 66, dtd 19 Mar 66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File). See also III MAF Jnl & Msg File, passim., 19-23Mar66.

62. TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon and 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon.

63. Ibid. and III MAF COC, Opn Oregon Rept, dtd 20Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

64. 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon. See also passim., III MAF Jnl & Msg File, 19-20Mar66.

65. TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon and 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon.

66. Ibid. See also IIIMAFCOG msg to MACV, dtd 21Mar66 (III MAF Jnl & Msg File).

67. 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon and TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon.

68. Rudzis Comments.

69. TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon.

70. 1/4 AAR Opn Oregon and TG Foxtrot AAR Opn Oregon.

71. G-3 Div, HQMC, Point Paper, Subj: Distribution of Personnel in Vietnam as of 28Mar66, dtd 28Mar66 (G-3, HQMC, Point Papers, 1966); 4th Mar ComdC, Mar66; 4/12 ComdC, Mar66; 3/12 ComdC, Mar66; Provisional Recon Group Bravo, 3d Recon Bn ComdC, 28-31Mar66; 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Mar66.

72. 4th Mar ComdC, Mar66 and 1/4 ComdC, 28-31Mar66. See also 3d MarDiv OpO 378-66, dtd 26Mar66, encl 25, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66.

73. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 13Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).

74. MACV, AC/S J-2, report, n.d. [24?Mar66] Subj: The Threat in Northern I Corps (Westmoreland Papers (CMH)).

75. ComUSMACV, Memo for the Record, n.d. [24?Mar66], Subj: Meeting at Chu Lai on 24Mar66 (Westmoreland Papers [CMH]).

PART II

Crisis and War in Central I Corps, Spring 1966

CHAPTER 5

A TROUBLED SPRING

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF Ops, Mar-Jun66; III MAF ComdCs, Mar-Jun66; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam Jan-Jun66, pt III"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

The Beginnings of the Political Crisis

Additional sources for this section are: MCCC, Chronology of Political Unrest in I Corps, 9Mar-23Jun66, covering ltr dtd 24Jun66, hereafter MCCC Chronology of Political Unrest; and Facts on File Inc., *South Vietnam; U.S. Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1966-67* (New York: 1969), v. 2, hereafter Facts on File, *South Vietnam 1966-67*.

1. *Washington Post and Times Herald*, 11Mar66, p.1.

Restructuring the Command

Additional sources for this section are: FMFPac ComdC, Jan-Jun66; 1st MarDiv ComdCs Jan-Jun66; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66; FLC ComdC, Mar66.

2. CinCPacFlt, CinCPacFlt Inst 5440.11, Status, Responsibilities, and Tasks of Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam, n.d. [Mar 66], App 1, U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam, Historical Summary, Apr66 (OAB, NHD).

3. ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd 30Mar66, Subj: Letter of Instruction in MACV Historical Records, 69A702, Box 5, File VA (Marine).

The Beginnings of the Da Nang Offensive

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF Opn Kings Jnl File; 1st MAW ComdC, Mar 66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, MarApr66; 3d Mar ComdC, Mar 66; 9th Mar ComdCs, Mar-Apr66; Col Edwin H. Simmons, Presentation to HQMC, Washington, D.C., Jul66 (Oral Hist Coll, Hist and Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter Simmons Presentation; Simmons, 9th Marines Notebook.

4. 1/3 OpO 302-66, dtd 14Mar66 in 1/3 ComdC, Mar66.

5. 2/3 ComdC, Mar66.

6. Simmons Presentation.

7. Ibid. and Status Rept for LtGen Walt, n.d. (Mar66) in Simmons, 9th Marines Notebook.

8. Col Joshua W. Dorsey III, Comments on draft MS, dtd 24Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Dorsey Comments.

9. 3/9 AAR for 4-5 Mar66, dtd 14Mar66, encl 19, 3/9 ComdC, Mar66.

10. Quoted in 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66, p. 19

11. 3/3 and 3/9 ComdCs, Mar66.

12. 3d MarDiv OpO 382-66, dtd 18Mar66 in III MAF Opn Kings Jnl File.

13. LtCol William F. Donahue, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Donahue Comments. See also Dorsey Comments.

14. 2/9 AAR, Opn Kings, dtd 28Mar66 in 2/9 ComdC, Mar66.

15. 9th Mar ComdC, Mar66, pp. 2-7-2.8

16. Ibid., p. 2-13.

17. 1st MAW Sit Rep 312, dtd 26Mar66 in 1st MAW ComdC, Mar66.

18. 3/3 ComdC, Mar66 and 9th Mar ComdC, Mar66, p. 3-2.

19. Simmons Presentation.

20. 9th Mar ComdC, Mar66, p. 2-9.

21. Ibid., Apr66.

22. Mr. Paul Hare, Summary Notes on Pacification as contained in Regl Dir I Corps USAID, Da Nang memo to Dir USAID/Vietnam, USAID, Saigon, dtd 14Apr66, Subj: Ngu Hanh Son Campaign in Weller Pacification Material.

"Keep Out . . . Da Nang Has Troubles"

23. CO TG Foxtrot msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 26Mar66 (III MAF Jnl Files).

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. MACV msg to NMCC, dtd 27Mar66 (III MAF Jnl Files).

27. Quoted in Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," p. 10-9.

28. Facts on File, *South Vietnam, 1966-67*, pp. 214-216.

29. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 117-19.

30. 9th Mar Sit Rep 99, dtd 9Apr66 in 9th Mar ComdC, Apr66.

31. Chaisson Intvw, Mar69.

32. Donahue Comments.

33. 9th Mar Sit Rep 99, op.cit.

34. MCCC Chronology Of Political Crisis.

35. See various msgs between MACV and III MAF for 15May66 in III MAF Political Crisis Folder.

36. See Col Williams msg to Col Weyl, dtd 15May66 and III MAF C/S msg to Col Laverge, dtd 15May66 in Ibid.

37. Chaisson Intvw, Mar69. See also Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, pp. 125-30.

38. Gen Lewis W. Walt, Comments on draft MS, dtd 13May78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Walt Comments.

39. Chaisson Intvw, Mar69.

40. III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, dtd 18May66 in III MAF Political Crisis Folder.

41. MACV msg to NMCC, dtd 18May66 in Ibid.

42. Walt Comment. See also LtGen Hugh M. Elwood, Comments on draft MS, dtd 4Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

43. Ltcol Paul X. Kelley intvw by HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 16Aug69 (No. 6145, OralHistColl, Hist and MusDiv, HQMC).

44. Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," p.10-13.

45. Copy of Westmoreland msg to Sharp, dtd 27May66 in v. 6 (24Apr-28Apr66), Tab D/25, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

46. Chaisson Intvw, Mar69.

47. Ibid.

CHAPTER 6

THE ADVANCE TO THE KY LAM

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: III MAF Ops, Apr-Jun66; III MAF ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 9th Mar ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; Simmons Presentation; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, 1965-66."

April Actions and Operation Georgia

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF Jnl File, Opn Georgia; 3/9 ComdCs, Apr-May66; 3/9 AAR, Opn Georgia, 20Apr-10May66, dtd 14May66, hereafter 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia.

1. Simmons Presentation.

2. 2/9 AAR for Company H engagement, dtd 16Apr66, encl to 9th Mar Sit Rep 106-66, dtd 16Apr66, Tab B, Sit Reps, 9th Mar ComdC, Apr66.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. See 3d MarDiv OpO 369-66 (Georgia), dtd 1Apr66, encl 3, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr66 and 9th Mar OpO 111-66, dtd 14Apr66, Tab H, 9th Mar ComdC, Apr66.

7. 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia, pp. 2-7-2.8.

8. Artillery Supplement, encl 1, 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia.

9. Reconnaissance Supplement, encl 5, 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia.

10. Col Paul C. Trammell, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

11. Amphibian Howitzer Supplement, encl 4, 3/9 AAR Opn Georgia.

The May Ky Lam Campaign

Additional sources for this section are: 1/9 ComdC, May66; 2/9 ComdC, May66; 2/4 ComdC, May66.

12. 9th Mar ComdC, May66, p. 3-1.

13. 9th Mar OPlan 118-66 Ky Lam, dtd 4May66, Tab H, 9th Mar ComdC, May66.

14. 9th Mar ComdC, May66, p. 3-1.

15. Simmons Presentation.

16. 1/9 AAR for unnamed opn 9-15 May66, dtd 19May66, Tab 4, 1/9 ComdC, May66. The description of the 1/9 action below Dai Loc in the following paragraphs is taken from this account as supplemented by the 9th Mar S-3 Jnl and Sit Reps. All quotations are from the 1/9 AAR.

17. 3d MarDiv ComdC, May66, p. 7.

18. 9th Mar ComdC, May66, p. 2-10.

19. Ibid., p. 3-2. The comparative figures for Marine and VC casualties for the month are found on pp. 1-1 and 2-11 respectively.

Operation Liberty

Additional sources for this section are: 3d Mar ComdC, Jun66; 1st Mar ComdC, Jun66.

20. 9th Mar FragO 153-66, dtd 2Jun66, Tab C, FragOs, 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66.

21. 3d MarDiv OpO 399-66, dtd 5Jun66, encl 4, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

22. See 9th Mar FragO 157A-66, dtd 6Jun66, Tab C, FragOs and 9th Mar OPlan 118A-66 Ky Lam, Jun66, Tab G, 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66.

23. Col Van D. Bell, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File) and III MAF ComdC, Jun66.

24. 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66, p. 9-1

25. 9th Mar Sit Rep 162-66, dtd 11Jun66, Tab B, 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66.

26. 9th Mar ComdC, Jun66, p. 2-4.

PART III

Spring Fighting in Southern I Corps

CHAPTER 7

"THEY'RE NOT SUPERMEN," MEETING THE NVA IN OPERATION UTAH, MARCH 1966

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: III MAF Ops, Mar66; III MAF ComdC, Mar66; III MAF Jnl File, Operation Utah, 4Mar-7Mar66, hereafter Utah Jnl File; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW Sit Reps, Mar66; MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66; TF Delta AAR 3-66, Operation Utah, dtd 7Apr66, encl 6, 7th Mar ComdC, Mar66, hereafter TF Delta AAR Opn Utah; 1/7 AAR Opn Utah, dtd 15Mar66, Tab 9, 1/7 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 1/7 AAR Opn Utah; 2/7 AAR Opn Utah, dtd 12Mar66, App A-1, 2/7 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 2/7 AAR Opn Utah; 2/4 AAR, Opn Utah, dtd 9Mar66, Tab G-1, 2/4 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 2/4 AAR Opn Utah; 3/1 AAR Opn Utah, dtd 11Mar66, encl 3, 3/1 ComdC Mar66, hereafter 3/1 AAR Opn Utah; Vietnam Comment File; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III"; BGen Oscar F. Peatross and Col William G. Johnson, "Operation Utah," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 50, no. 10 (Oct66), pp. 20-27, hereafter Peatross and Johnson, "Operation Utah"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam 1965-66."

First Contact with the NVA

1. Maj Alex Lee, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 28Nov69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Lee Comments. See also Col Robert J. Zitnik, Com-

ments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Zitnik Comments; TF Delta AAR, Opn Utah; Platt Intvw; and Peatross and Johnson, "Operation Utah," pp. 20-21 for further detail concerning the preparation for the operation.

2. MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW Sit Rep No. 291, dtd 4Mar66; Zitnik Comments; LtCol Elmer N. Synder, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 22Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Snyder Comments and Peatross and Johnson, "Operation Utah," p. 22.

3. Johnson Intvw.

4. Peatross Comments, Shore MS; MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File); Zitnik Comments; Snyder Comments.

5. Platt Intvw and LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 20 Nov69 (Vietnam Comment File).

6. Col Leon N. Utter, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 2Mar70 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Utter Comments, Shore MS.

7. 2/7 AAR Opn Utah.

8. LtCol Jerry D. Lindauer, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

9. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

10. Ibid.

11. LtCol Martin E. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 24May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

12. 2/7 AAR Opn Utah.

13. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

14. Copy of Capt Jerry D. Lindauer ltr to LtCol Leon N. Utter, dtd 16Mar66, encl to Maj Jerry D. Lindauer, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 4Dec69 (Vietnam Comment File).

15. Ibid.

16. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

17. Ibid. See also Lee Comments.

18. Utter Comments, Shore MS; 2/7 AAR Opn Utah.

19. Snyder Comments; TF Delta AAR Opn Utah.

20. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

21. Brown Intvw. See also 1st MAW Sit Rep No. 292, dtd 5Mar66.

22. Snyder Comments; 3/11 ComdC, Mar66.

Operation Utah Expands

23. TF Delta AAR Opn Utah; Utah Jnl File.

24. Snyder Comments; MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66.

25. 2/4 AAR Opn Utah.

26. 3/1 AAR Opn Utah. See also MGySgt J. J. McDowell and LtCol Timothy B. Lecky, Comments on draft MS, dtd 23Mar79 (Vietnam Comment File).

27. LtCol Paul X. Kelley, Comments on Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," n.d. (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Kelley Comments; 2/4 AAR Opn Utah.

28. Snyder Comments.

29. Ibid. See also Company B, 1/7 Special CAAR, n.d., encl to 1/7 AAR Opn Utah.

30. TF Delta AAR Opn Utah; 3/1 AAR Opn Utah; 2/7 AAR Opn Utah. See also Utah Jnl File.

31. Utter Comments, Shore MS.

CHAPTER 8

FURTHER FIGHTING AND AN EXPANDING BASE OF OPERATIONS, CHU LAI, MARCH-JUNE 1966

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: III MAF ComdCs, Mar-Jun66; Vietnam Comment File; Shore, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

A Bloody March

Additional sources for this section are: III MAF Jnl File, Opn Texas, hereafter Texas Jnl File; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW Sit Reps, Mar66; TF Delta AAR Opn Texas, dtd 10Apr66, encl 8, 7th Mar ComdC, Mar66, hereafter TF Delta AAR Opn Texas; 7th Mar ComdC, Mar66; MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66; 3/1 AAR Opn Texas, encl 4, 3/1 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 3/1 AAR Opn Texas; 2/4 AAR Opn Texas, dtd 29Mar66, Tab G, 2/4 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 2/4 AAR Opn Texas; 3/7 AAR Opn Texas, dtd 31Mar66, App F, 3/7 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter 3/7 AAR Opn Texas; Artillery AAR Opn Texas, dtd 31Mar66, Tab b, 3/11 ComdC, Mar66, hereafter Arty AAR Opn Texas.

1. MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66; 1st MAW Sit Rep No. 305, dtd 19Mar66; various msgs and entries for 19Mar66 in Texas Jnl File.

2. See Texas Jnl File for 19Mar66 and TF Delta AAR Opn Texas.

3. Kelley Comments.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., and Zitnik Comments.

6. Zitnik Comments.

7. Texas Jnl File for 20-21 Mar66.

8. Kelley Comments.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., and 2/4 AAR Opn Texas.

11. Arty AAR Opn Texas; III MAF COC Spot Report to MACV COC, dtd 21Mar66 in Texas Jnl File; Zitnik Comments.

12. Kelley Comments.

13. CGIIIMAF Operational Summary to CGFMFPac, dtd 21Mar66 in Texas Jnl File, hereafter IIIMAF Op Sum, 21Mar66; 3/7 AAR Opn Texas.

14. Zitnik Comments.

15. TF Delta AAR Opn Texas; 3/1 AAR Opn Texas; MAG-36 ComdC, Mar66.

16. 3/1 AAR Opn Texas and III MAF Op Sum, 21Mar66.

17. For ARVN action see 7th Mar (Fwd) msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 21Mar66 in Texas Jnl File.

18. MajGen Oscar F. Peatross, Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Peatross Comments, Jun78 and III MAF Op Sum, 21Mar66.

19. III MAF Op Sum, 21Mar66.

20. TF Delta AAR Opn Texas.

21. LtCol R. A. Savage, informal rept to CG 1st MAW, dtd 25Mar66, Doc 15, Miscellaneous Documents, Operation Texas, 1st MAW Sit Reps, Mar66. This miscellaneous file will hereafter

be referred to as 1st MAW Sit Rep Miscellaneous File, Opn Texas.

22. 3/7 AAR, Opn Texas.

23. TF Delta AAR Opn Texas and Texas Jnl File.

24. 2/4 AAR Opn Texas.

25. Quoted in CGIIIMAF msg to 3d MarDiv, dtd 25Mar66, Doc No. 12, 1st MAW Sit Rep Miscellaneous File, Opn Texas.

26. For Operation Indiana, see account in III MAF Ops, Mar66 and 7th Mar AAR 1-66, Operation Indiana, dtd 7Apr66, encl 7, 7th Mar ComdC, Mar66.

27. Peatross Comments, Jun78.

Expansion at Chu Lai

Additional sources for this section are 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Mar-Jun66; 1st Mar ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 5th Mar ComdCs, May-Jun66; 7th Mar ComdCs, Apr-Jun66.

28. CGFMFPac msg to CG 1st MarDiv, dtd 26Mar66, encl 14-35, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Mar66.

29. Col Glen E. Martin, Comments on draft MS, dtd 5Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

30. LtGen Lewis J. Fields, Comments on draft MS, dtd 15Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

31. For comparison, see III MAF Ops for Apr and Jun66 respectively.

Operation Kansas

Additional sources for this section are III MAF Jnl File, Opn Kansas, hereafter Kansas Jnl File; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jun66; Task Force X-Ray ComdC, 1-26Jun66, hereafter TF X-Ray ComdC, Jun66; 1st Recon Bn CAAR Opn Kansas, dtd 28Jun66, encl 15, 1st Recon Bn, ComdC, Jun66, hereafter 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas; 11th Mar AAR Opn Kansas, dtd 1Jul66, Tab 8, 11th Mar ComdC, Jun66 hereafter 11th Marines AAR, Opn Kansas; Staff Sergeant Jimmie L. Howard intvws by 1stMarDiv and MCRD, San Diego, dtd 6Feb67 and 24Apr67 (No. 367 and 677, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Howard Tapes; Capt Francis J. West, *Small Unit Action in Vietnam, Summer 1966* (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1967), hereafter West, *Small Unit Action*.

32. Task Force X-Ray ComdC, Jun66: CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 16Jun66 in Kansas Jnl File.

33. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. 1, p. 4-49.

34. Task Force X-Ray ComdC, Jun66; CG1stMarDiv msgs to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13-15Jun66 in Kansas Jnl File.

35. Ibid.

36. CGIIIMAF msg to CMC, dtd 18Jun78 in Kansas Jnl File.

37. The account of Howard's patrol on Nui Vu is drawn from the following sources: West, *Small Unit Action*, pp. 15-30; Howard Tapes; various msgs in Kansas Jnl File; 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas.

38. Quotations are from West, *Small Unit Action*, pp.18-19.

39. Zitnik Comments.

40. Quote is from West, *Small Unit Action*, p. 25. See Also Capt Marshall B. Darling, Comments on Shore, MS, "Marines in Vietnam, Jan-Jun66, pt III," dtd 22Jan70 (Vietnam Comment File).

41. TF X-Ray ComdC, Jun66, and CGIIIMAF msg to MACV, dtd 16Jun66 in Kansas Jnl File.

42. 11th Mar AAR Opn Kansas; 3/1 ComdC Jun66.
43. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 17Jun66 in Opn Kansas Jnl File.
44. 11th Mar AAR Opn Kansas.
45. 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas.
46. TF X-Ray ComdC, Jun66. See also CGIIIMAF msg to MACV, dtd 22Jun66 in Kansas Jnl File.
47. 11th Mar AAR Opn Kansas and 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas.
48. 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Kansas.
49. III MAF Ops, Jun66, p.27.

PART IV

The DMZ War

CHAPTER 9

THE ENEMY BUILDUP IN THE NORTH

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF ComdCs, Apr-Jul66; III MAF Jnl & Msg File, Apr-Jun66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; 4th Mar ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; HQMC Msg Files; Vietnam Comment File; Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

Speculation about the Enemy's Intentions

Additional sources for this section are: Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, and Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*.

1. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 168; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, pp. 115-16; General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, dtd 17Jun66, v. 7, Tab F, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 33.
2. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 168; MACV Comd Hist, 1966, pp 21, 25, 33; Notes on MACV Commanders' Conference, dtd 24Apr66, v. 6, Tab A, encl 2, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); George McGerrigle, "Shift to the North," draft MS (CMH), pp 5, 10; MACV, AC/S J-2 Report, n.d., Subj: The Threat in Northern I Corps, [24?Mar66], v. 5, Tab B, encl 3, Westmoreland Papers (CMH), hereafter, MACV, The Threat in Northern I Corps.
3. III MAF ComdC, Apr66.
4. Col Donald W. Sherman intvw by FMFPac, dtd 6Aug66 (No. 199, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
5. Notes on MACV Commanders' Conference, dtd 24Apr66, loc. cit.
6. Quoted in CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 22Apr66 (HQMC Msg File).
7. Transcript of LtGen John R. Chaisson intvw by Hist&MusDiv, dtd 3Apr72 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), p. 376, hereafter, Chaisson Intvw, 1972.

Reconnaissance at Khe Sanh, Operation Virginia

Additional sources for this section are: HQMC G-3, Point

Papers, 1966; 1/1 ComdC, Apr66; 1/1 CAAR 5-66, Operation Virginia, dtd 5May66, Tab E, 1/1 ComdC, Apr66, hereafter, 1/1 AAR Opn Virginia; Opn Virginia Jnl File in III MAF Jnl & Msg File, hereafter, Virginia Jnl File.

8. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 336.
9. ComUSMACV, Memo for the Record, n.d. [24Mar66], Subj: Meeting at Chu Lai on 24Mar66, v. 5, Tab B, encl 1, Westmoreland Papers (CMH). See also, MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 33; MACV, The Threat in Northern I Corps; Virginia Jnl File, 13-20Mar66.
10. Col Van D. Bell, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, Bell Comments. See also, 3dMarDiv OpO 374-66, dtd 27Mar66, encl 28, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Mar66.
11. 1/1 AAR Opn Virginia; 1/1 OpO 8-66 (Opn Virginia), dtd 3Apr66, Tab C, 1/1 ComdC, Apr66; HQMC G-3, Point Paper, dtd 20Apr66.
12. Col George W. Carrington, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15May78 (Vietnam Comment File).
13. Chaisson Intvw, 1972, p. 371-72.
14. 1/1 AAR Opn Virginia. See also Bell Comments.
15. 1/1 AAR Opn Virginia.

Marine Operations in Thua Thien, April-May 1966

16. Col Francis F. Parry intvw by FMFPac, dtd 15Aug66 (No. 198, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter, Parry Intvw.
17. ComUSMACV, Historical Briefing, dtd 10May66, v. 6, Tab B, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).
18. LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 9May78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 4th Mar ComdC, May66 and III MAF Jnl Files.

Contingency Planning and Reconnaissance at Dong Ha

19. Minutes of MACV Commanders' Conference, dtd 24Apr66, v. 6, Tab A, encl 2, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).
20. Quoted in CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 1Apr66 (HQMC Msg File).
21. Quotes are from CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac and CMC, dtd 22Apr66 (HQMC Msg File). See also Parry Intvw and CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 4Jun66 (HQMC Msg File).
22. III MAF ComdC, May66 and III MAF Jnl and Msg File, 19-22May66.
23. LtGen Krulak msg to Gen Greene, dtd 27May66 (HQMC Msg File); CGIIIMAF msg to CG1stMAW and CG3dMarDiv, dtd 28May66 and ICorps TOC telecon with IIIMAFCO, dtd 29 May66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File); 4th Mar FragO 212-66, Opn Reno, dtd 30May66, encl 7, 4th Mar ComdC, May66; 4th Mar ComdC, May66, p. IV-5.
24. MACV msg to NMCC, dtd 5Jun66 and COC 3dMarDiv msg to COCIIIMAF, dtd 8Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).
25. III MAF ComdCs, May-Jun66.

Politics and War

Additional source for this section is: 4th Mar AAR, Operation Florida, dtd 25Jun66, hereafter, Florida AAR.

26. III MAF ComdCs, May-Jun66; CGIIMAF msg to Com-USMACV, dtd 1Jun66, v. 7, Tab A, encl 10 and MACV msg to NMCC, dtd 2Jun66, v. 7, Tab A, encl 16, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); IIIMAFCOOC msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 3Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

27. III MAF ComdC, Jun66.

28. 4th Mar ComdC, Jun66, p. IV-1; Florida AAR.

29. Col Boston telecon to IIIMAFCOOC, dtd 7Jun66, and 3dMarDiv COC msg to IIIMAFCOOC, dtd 8Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

30. IIIMAFCOOC, Note on Political Situation, dtd 8Jun66, and Col Wegley telecon to Col Quanti, dtd 8Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

31. Florida AAR.

32. Ibid.

33. General Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, dtd 22Jun66, v. 7, Tab C, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

34. DepSAICorps telecon to IIIMAF, dtd 17Jun66; IIIMAFCOOC, Notes, Political Events, dtd 19Jun66; IIIMAFCOOC msg to MACVCOOC, dtd 18Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

35. III MAF ComdC, Jun66 and III MAF Jnl and Msg Files, 20-23Jun66.

Heavy Fighting in Thua Thien Province

Other sources for this section are: 4th Mar AAR, Opn Jay, 25Jun-2Jul66, dtd 19Aug66, 10 encls, hereafter, Jay AAR; Capt Thomas E. Campbell, MAU, NAGMACV, AAR, Ambush of 29Jun66, dtd 19Jul66 (SMA, MACV, AARs, 1966), hereafter, Campbell AAR.

36. III MAF and 4th Mar ComdCs, Jun66.

37. CGIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 1Jun66, encl 2, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

38. Ibid.

39. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIMAF, dtd 10Jun66, encl 10, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jun 66.

40. CG3dMarDiv msg to CO4thMar, dtd 11Jun66, encl 12, and CGIIMAF msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 13Jun66, encl 16, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

41. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGIIMAF, dtd 19Jun66, encl 34, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

42. III MAF and 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jun66.

43. Jay AAR.

44. 4th Mar FragO 4-66, Opn Jay, dtd 24Jun66, Tab 14, 4th Mar ComdC, Jun66.

45. Jay AAR. See also sections on Air Support and Naval Gunfire, encls 1 and 3; 3/12 AAR Opn Jay, dtd 9Jul66, encl 2; 2/1 AAR, Opn Jay, dtd 8Jul66, encl 9; 2/4 AAR Opn Jay, dtd 8Jul66, encl 10, Jay AAR, hereafter, name of unit, Jay AAR.

46. Jay AAR.

47. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

48. 3/12 Jay AAR.

49. Jay AAR.

50. 2/4 Jay AAR.

51. Jay AAR.

52. CG3dMarDiv msg to CO4thMar, dtd 28Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

53. Jay AAR and 3/12 Jay AAR.

54. 3/12 Jay AAR.

55. Jay AAR.

56. Campbell AAR.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid.

59. Jay AAR and 3/12 Jay AAR. See also Campbell AAR; Capt Edwin W. Besch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter, Besch Comments; IIIMAFCOOC msg to MACVCOOC, dtd 29Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File), hereafter, IIIMAFCOOC 29Jun msg.

60. Jay AAR and IIIMAFCOOC 29Jun msg.

61. Besch Comments. See also, Jay AAR and Campbell AAR.

62. Besch Comments; Jay AAR; Campbell AAR; IIIMAFCOOC 29Jun msg; SMA NAG, SitRep, 24-30Jun66, dtd 1Jul66 (SMA, NAG, MACV, SitReps, 1966).

63. Campbell AAR.

64. Jay AAR and ICorps G-2 AdvGp 1st ARVN Div msg to IIIMAFCOOC, dtd 30Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

65. Col Samuel M. Morrow, Comments on draft MS, dtd 23May78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 4th Mar msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 30Jun66, Tab 13, 4th Mar ComdC, Jun66 and III MAF ComdC, Jul66.

Further Reconnaissance in the North

66. III MAF ComdC, Jun66.

67. HqUSMACV, Memo for the Record, dtd 20Jun66, Subj: MACV Commanders' Conference, 5Jun66, v. 7, Tab B, encl 1, Westmoreland Papers (CMH), hereafter, MACV Commanders' Conference 5Jun66.

68. Quoted in Robert Shaplen, *The Road from War, Vietnam, 1965-1970* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 98.

69. MACV Commanders' Conference 5Jun66; 3d MarDiv msg to IIIMAF, dtd 20Jun66, encl 35, and 3d MarDiv FragO 405-66, dtd 20Jun66, encl 36, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jun66.

70. 3d Recon Bn, Prov Group Bravo ComdC, 28Mar-27Apr66; Company B, 3d Recon Bn ComdC, 28Apr-May66; Company B, 3d Recon Bn ComdC, Jun66; 1st Force Recon Co ComdCs, Apr-Jun66; CGIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 8Jun66 (III MAF Jnl and Msg File).

71. 4th Mar ComdC, Jun66, pp. IV-3, IV-4 and Task Unit Charlie OpO 1-66, dtd 23Jun66, encl 12, 1st Force Recon Co ComdC, Jun66.

72. Ibid.

73. LtCol Dwain A. Colby, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

CHAPTER 10

MARINES TURN NORTH, OPERATION HASTINGS

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF ComdC, Jul66; 3dMarDiv ComdC, Jul66; 1st MAW ComdC, Jul66; Task Force Delta AAR Opn Hastings, dtd 17Sep66, hereafter TF Delta AAR; III MAF Jnl File, Opn Hastings, 22Jun-7Aug66, hereafter Hastings Jnl File; MajGen Lowell E. English, Personal Notes, Operation Hastings, n.d., hereafter English Personal Notes; Vietnam Comment File; Westmoreland Papers; Sharp and Westmoreland,

Report on the War; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66"; Robert Shaplen, *The Road from War, Vietnam, 1965-1970* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), hereafter Shaplen, *Road from War*; Robert Shaplen, "A Reporter at Large, Hastings and Prairie," *The New Yorker*, v. XLII, no. 43 (Dec 17, 1966), pp. 129-93, hereafter Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie."

Finding the Enemy

1. LtCol Dwain A. Colby, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File) and 2/1 ComdC, Jul66.

2. Maj Ernest L. DeFazio intvw by MCB, Camp Lejeune, dtd 8Mar67 (No. 466, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

3. TF Delta AAR.

4. Ibid.

5. Transcript of MajGen Wood B. Kyle intvw by HistDiv, dtd 9, 12, and 16Jun69 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), p. 185.

6. TF Delta AAR and 4th Mar msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 11Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).

7. CG3dMarDiv msg to 4th Mar, dtd 11Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).

8. Gen Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, dtd 17Jul66, v. 7, Tab F, Westmoreland Papers (CMH). See also Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 197 and Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 100.

Reactivation of Task Force Delta and Heavy Fighting Along the DMZ, 12-25 July 1966

9. Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 157 and BGen Lowell E. English, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also TF Delta AAR.

10. CGTFDelta FragO 1, dtd 12Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File) and TF Delta AAR. See also Col Sumner A. Vale, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Vale Comments.

11. TF Delta AAR and various msgs in Hastings Jnl File, 12-15Jul66.

12. TF Delta AAR. See BGen Edward J. Doyle, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun 78] (Vietnam Comment File) relating to air-ground coordination.

13. 3/4 AAR Operation Hastings, encl 5, TF Delta AAR, hereafter 3/4 AAR; MAG-16 ComdC, Jul66; Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 104.

14. 3/4 AAR.

15. Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 104.

16. LtCol John J. W. Hilgers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Sep78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hilgers Comments.

17. Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 105. See also TF Delta and 3/4 AARs.

18. Col Arnold E. Bench, Comments on draft MS, dtd 20Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Bench Comments. See also Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 158.

19. TF Delta AAR.

20. Ibid., and 3/4 AAR.

21. Bench Comments.

22. 2/4 AAR, encl 4, TF Delta AAR, hereafter 2/4 AAR.

23. Detailed AAR on 15-18Jul66 by Company Commander, Company K, encl 3, 3/4 AAR, hereafter Company K AAR.

24. III MAF SitRep, Opn Hastings, No. 12, dtd 17Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File). See also III MAF SitRep No. 9, dtd 16Jul66 and COC 3dMarDiv msg to COC III MAF, dtd 16Jul66 (Ibid).

25. English Personal Notes, p. 3. See also III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, dtd 18Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).

26. BLT 3/5 AAR Opn Hastings, encl 6, TF Delta AAR, hereafter BLT 3/5 AAR.

27. Bench Comments and Hilgers Comments. See also 2/4 AAR.

28. Vale Comments.

29. Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 109.

30. Ibid., p. 110.

31. Vale Comments.

32. Company K AAR.

33. III MAF COC msg to MACV COC, dtd 19Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).

34. Quoted in Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 110.

35. TF Delta msg to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 18Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).

36. English Personal Notes. See also 2/4 AAR.

37. Hilgers Comments.

38. BLT 3/5 AAR.

39. 2/1 AAR Opn Hastings, dtd 7Aug66, encl 2, TF Delta AAR.

40. *Washington Post*, 26Jul66, pp. 1 and 3; FMFPacISO msg to IIIMAFISO, dtd 28Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File). See also BLT 3/5 AAR; English Personal Notes; HM2 Victor R. Marget intvw by Hist Sec, III MAF, dtd 22Mar67 (No. 742, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Marget Tape.

41. Marget Tape.

42. BLT 3/5 AAR.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid. and English Personal Notes.

45. FMFPacISO msg op. cit.; see also Marget Tape and BLT 3/5 AAR.

46. BLT 3/5 AAR; Hastings Jnl File; English Personal Notes.

47. CG3dMarDiv msg to TF Delta, dtd 25Jul66 (Hastings Jnl File).

Hastings Comes to an End, 26 July-3 August 1966

48. TF Delta AAR.

49. Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 169. See also Bench Comments and Hilgers Comments.

50. 2/4 AAR.

51. Bench Comments.

52. Hilgers Comments.

53. West, *Small Unit Action*, p. 59.

54. TF Delta AAR; 3/12 AAR Opn Hastings, encl 7, TF Delta AAR; West, *Small Unit Action*, p. 74.

55. Capt Francis J. West, "Sting Ray 70," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 95, no. 11, (Nov69), pp. 26-37.

56. 1st Force Recon Co AAR, Operation Hastings, encl 14, TF Delta AAR.

57. English Personal Notes and TF Delta AAR.

58. MAG-16 ComdC, Jul66; HMM-164 ComdC, Jul66; HMM-165 ComdC, Jul66; English Personal Notes. See Chapter 16 for a further discussion of the CH-46A problem.

59. As quoted in Shaplen, *Road From War*, p. 111.

60. TF Delta AAR.
61. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 141.

CHAPTER 11

THE DMZ WAR CONTINUES, OPERATION PRAIRIE

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jul66-Jan67; III MAF ComdCs, Jul66-Jan67; 3dMarDiv ComdCs, Jul66-Jan67; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jul66-Jan67; III MAF Jnl File, Opn Prairie; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; LtCol Ralph F. Moody and Maj Thomas E. Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars," pt IV of LtCol Ralph F. Moody et. al., "Marines in Vietnam," MS (HistDiv, HQMC), hereafter Moody and Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*; Shaplen, *Road from War*; Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-1966."

Reconnaissance in Force, 3Aug-13Sep66

Additional sources for this section are: CMC WestPac Trip Rpt, Aug66 in Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Personal Official Files, hereafter CMC WestPac Trip, Aug66; CGFMFPac, Rpt of WestPac Trip, 29Aug-7Sep66, n.d., hereafter CGFMFPac Trip Rpt 29Aug66-Sep66; 4th Mar AAR Operation Prairie, 31Aug-30Sep66, n.d., and enclosures, hereafter 4th Mar AAR; Col Alexander D. Cereghino intvw by FMFPac, n.d. (No. 450, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Cereghino Intvw; LtCol Arnold E. Bench et. al. intvw by III MAF, n.d. (No. 1083, OralHistColl), hereafter Bench et. al. Intvw; LtCol Jack Westerman intvw by III MAF, n.d. (No. 269, Oral Hist Coll, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Westerman Intvw.

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2. 2/4 AAR Opn Prairie, dtd 28Sep66, encl 5, 4th Mar AAR, hereafter 2/4 AAR 28Sep66.

3. Bench et. al. Intvw.

4. 2/4 Special Operation Debriefing Rpt, dtd 13Aug66 in 2/4 AAR 28Sep66.

5. Ibid. and Bench et. al. Intvw. See also Col Vincil W. Hazelbaker, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Aug78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hazelbaker Comments.

6. LtCol Howard V. Lee, Comments on draft MS, dtd 14Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

7. Hazelbaker Comments.

8. Bench et. al. Intvw.

9. See Special Operation Debriefing Rpt, op. cit.; Bench et. al. Intvw; Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie"; MAG-16 ComdC, Aug66; VMO-2 ComdC, Aug66 for detailed account of action.

10. Cereghino Intvw.

11. LtCol John J.W. Hilgers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Sep78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hilgers Comments, 6Sep78.

12. 2/4 Special Operation AAR No. 2, dtd 5Oct66 in 2/4AAR, 28Sep66, hereafter 2/4 Special AAR No. 2.

13. Ibid. and Hilgers Comments, 6Sep78.

14. 2/4 Special AAR No. 2 and Capt Edwin W. Besch, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Besch Comments.

15. LtCol John J.W. Hilgers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 2Sep78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Hilgers Comments, 2Sep78.

16. Ibid.

17. Besch Comments.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. 2/4 Special AAR No. 2.

22. Hilgers Comments, 2Sep78 and Col Arnold E. Bench, Comments on draft MS, dtd 20Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File).

23. Hilgers Comments, 2Sep78.

24. 2/4 Special AAR No. 2.

25. Statement of Capt John J.W. Hilgers concerning recommendation for award, case of Second Lieutenant Stephen Snyder, n.d., encl to LtCol John J.W. Hilgers, Comments on draft MS, dtd 14Aug78 (Vietnam Comment File).

26. Besch Comments.

27. LtCol Arnold E. Bench, Comments on draft MS, Moody and Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars," dtd 12Sep69 (Vietnam Comment File); 3/12 AAR, dtd 5Jan67, encl 2, 4th Mar AAR.

28. Westerman Intvw.

29. Col Alexander D. Cereghino, Comments on draft MS, dtd 17Aug78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Cereghino Comments.

30. Ibid.

31. Westerman Intvw.

Assault from the Sea, Deckhouse IV

Additional sources for this section are: CAF Seventh Flt, Hist of Amphib Ops; MCOAG, Study on SLF Opns; 1/26 ComdC, Aug-Sep66; 1/26 AAR Opn Prairie, 19-23Sep66, dtd 16Nov66, hereafter 1/26 AAR; TG79.5 ComdC, Sep66.

32. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 2Sep66, encl 2, 3dMarDiv ComdC, Sep66.

33. MCOAG, Study on SLF Opns, pp. A-21-A-22.

The Continued Fighting for Nui Cay Tre (Mutter) Ridge and the Razorback

Additional sources for this section are: 3dMarDiv AAR Opn Prairie I, Oct66-Jan67, dtd 28Apr67, hereafter 3dMarDiv AAR; 4th Mar AAR; 3/4 AAR Opn Prairie, 17-30Sep66, dtd 7Jan67, encl 6, 4thMar AAR, hereafter 3/4 AAR, Sep66; 3/4 AAR Opn Prairie, 1Oct66-24Dec66, dtd 29Jan67, encl 13, 3dMarDiv AAR.

34. Westerman Intvw.

35. 2/7 AAR, dtd 5Oct66, encl 8, 4th Mar AAR, hereafter 2/7 AAR.

36. 1stLt Robert T. Willis intvw by 1stMarDiv, dtd 16Jun67 (No. 1084, Oral HistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

37. 2/7 AAR.

38. Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 184.

39. Quoted in Ibid.

40. Ibid., pp. 184-5.

41. Ibid.

42. Quoted in Ibid., p. 186.

43. 3/4 AAR, Sep66.

44. Maj Robert G. Handrahan, Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Quoted in Shaplen, "Hastings and Prairie," p. 188.

The Opening of Khe Sanh and the 3d Marine Division Moves North

Additional sources for this section are: 3dMarDiv AAR; 1/3 ComdCs, Sep66-Jan67.

48. CGFMFPac Trip Rpt, 29Aug-7Sep66, p. 5.

49. BGen Lowell E. English intvw by FMFPac, n.d. (No. 402, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

50. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 36.

51. Transcript of intvw with Col John R. Chaisson by FMFPac, dtd Nov66 (No. 327, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), pp. 4-5, hereafter Chaisson Intvw, Nov66.

52. 1/3 AAR, dtd 7Feb67, encl 4, 3dMarDiv AAR.

53. Chaisson Intvw, Nov66, p. 5.

54. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 29 Sep66 in III MAF Jnl File, Opn Prairie.

55. Cereghino Comments.

PART V

The Unrelenting War in Central and Southern I Corps, July-December 1966

CHAPTER 12

THE STRUGGLE FOR AN HOA, OPERATION MACON

Unless otherwise noted the material for this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; 9th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; 3d Mar ComdCs, Jul66; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jul-Oct66; III MAF Opn Macon Jnl File, 5Jul-28Oct66, hereafter Opn Macon Jnl File; HQMC Msg File; Moody and Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars."

The First Clash

1. 9th Mar ComdC, Jul66, p. 2-2.

2. 9th Mar Int Sum No. 182, dtd 2Jul66 in 9th Mar Int Sums, Jul66.

3. Ibid.

4. 1st MAW Op Rep 5-004, dtd 4Jul66 in 1st MAW Daily Op Reps, App 16, 1st MAW ComdC, Jul66; 9th Mar ComdC, Jul66, pp. 2-3; 9th Mar Int Sum No. 185, dtd 5Jul66 in 9th Mar Int Sums, Jul66.

5. 9th Mar Sit Rep No. 186, dtd 5Jul66 in 9th Mar Sit Reps, Jul66.

The Operation Expands

6. IIIMAF msg to MACVCOC, dtd 5Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

7. 3d MarDiv, FragO 408-66, Opn Macon, dtd 5Jul66, encl 10, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.

8. 9th Mar FragO 186-66, Operation Macon, dtd 5Jul66 in 9th Mar FragOs, Jul66.

9. 3d MarDiv FragO, Opn Macon, op.cit.

10. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 6Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

11. 1st MAW Op Rep 5-006, dtd 6Jul66 in 1st MAW Daily OpReps, App 16, 1st MAW ComdC, Jul66; 9th Mar Sit Rep No. 187, dtd 6Jul66 in 9th Mar Sit Reps, Jul66; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66, p. 13.

12. 3/3 AAR, Opn Macon, dtd 19Jul66, encl 88, 3d Mar ComdC, Jul66.

13. See 9th Mar Sit Reps and FragOs for period 6-8Jul66.

14. 9th Mar Special Sit Rep No. 17, Opn Macon, dtd 10Jul66 in 9th Mar Sit Reps, Jul66.

15. 9th Mar FragO 191-66, dtd 10Jul66 in 9th Mar FragOs, Jul66.

16. 1/3 AAR, dtd 24Jul66, encl 1, 1/3 ComdC, Jul66, p. 1.

17. CG3dMarDiv msg to CO9thMar, dtd 13Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

18. 9th Mar, Special Sit Rep No. 32, Opn Macon, dtd 15Jul66 in 9th Mar Sit Reps, Jul66.

Macon Continues

19. IIIMAF msg to MACVCOC, dtd 14Jul66 and CG3dMarDiv msg to CO9thMar, dtd 14Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

20. CG3dMarDiv msg dtd 14Jul66 cited in Opn Macon Jnl File.

21. IIIMAF msg to MACVCOC, dtd 15Jul66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

22. CO9th Mar memo to CG3dMarDiv, dtd 28Jul66, Subj: Visit of General Westmoreland to An Hoa, in Opn Macon Jnl File.

23. 3/9 ComdC, Jul66, p. 2.

24. 3/9 AAR, Opn Swannee, encl 6, 3/9 ComdC, Aug66.

25. LtCol Fred D. MacLean, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 25April78 (Vietnam Comment File). See also 3/9 ComdC, Aug66.

26. 12th Mar S-3 Jnl in 12th Mar ComdC, Sep66.

27. 3d MarDiv Sit Rep No. 245, Opn Macon, dtd 6Sep66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

28. 9th Mar ComdC, Sep66, p. 3-1 and III MAF COC, Record of Telephone Call, dtd 6Sep66 in Opn Macon Jnl File.

29. 9th Mar ComdC, Sep66, p. 2-5.

30. 3/9 ComdC, Sep66, p. 2.

Macon Ends but Little Changes

31. 9th Mar ComdC, Oct66, p. 3-1.

CHAPTER 13

THE CONTINUING WAR

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; III MAF ComdCs, Jul-Dec66; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Dec66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jul-Dec66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jul-Dec66; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jul-Dec66; HQMC Msg File; III MAF Jnl and Msg Files; Moody and Donnelly, "Introduction of North Vietnamese Regulars"; Vietnam Comment File; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-1966."

Operations Washington and Colorado

Additional material for this section include: 1st Recon Bn, AAR, Opn Washington, dtd 23Jul66, encl 19, 1st Recon Bn ComdC, Jul66, hereafter 1st Recon Bn, AAR, Opn Washington; Miscellaneous Messages, Operation Washington, in 1st MAW Daily SitReps, 1st MAW ComdC, Jul66, hereafter Miscellaneous Messages, Opn Washington, III MAF Op Washington Jnl and Msg File, hereafter Washington Jnl File; 5th Mar AAR, Opn Colorado, 6-22Aug66, dtd 5Sep66, hereafter 5th Mar AAR Colorado; SMA, MACV AAR Lien Ket-52, 6-14Aug66, n.d. in SMA, MACV AARs, 1966, hereafter SMA AAR Lien Ket 52; III MAF Opn Colorado Jnl and Msg File, hereafter Colorado Jnl File; West, *Small Unit Action*.

1. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIII MAF, dtd 4Jul66 and CG1stMarDiv OpO 308-66, dtd 4Jul66 in Miscellaneous Messages, Opn Washington.

2. MACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 8Jul66, v. 7, Tab E, encl 1, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

3. 1st Tactical Area msg to III MAF G-3, dtd 6Jul66 in Washington Jnl File.

4. 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Washington and 2/11 ComdC, Jul66.

5. 1st MarDiv PerIntRep No. 2, Anx C, dtd 22Jul66, encl 83, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jul66. See also 1st MarDiv Special SitRep No. 13, dtd 10Jul66 in Washington Jnl File and 1st Recon Bn AAR, Opn Washington.

6. 1st Recon Bn AAR Opn Washington.

7. Minutes of MACV Commanders' Conference, 24Jul66, dtd 17Aug66, v. 8, Tab B, encl 1, Westmoreland Papers (CMH).

8. 1st MarDiv PerIntRep No. 2, dtd 22Jul66 and No. 3, dtd 28Jul66, encl 83 and 101, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.

9. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 18Jul66, encl 75, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.

10. CG 1st MarDiv Planning Directive Opn Colorado, dtd 30Jul66, encl 1, 5th Mar AAR Colorado.

11. See the various messages pertaining to planning and orders in Colorado Jnl File.

12. III MAF msg to MACVCOC, dtd 4Aug66 in Ibid.

13. 1st MAW SitRep No. 444, dtd 6Aug66 in 1st MAW SitReps, App. 9, 1st MAW ComdC, Aug66.

14. See LtCol Alexander S. Ruggiero, USMC, memo to G-3, III MAF, dtd 6Aug66 Subj: Resume of Flight to Tam Ky and Que Son, in Colorado Jnl File and SMA AAR Lien Ket-52, pp. 3-4 for a detailed description of the VNMC action.

15. SMA AAR Lien Ket-52, p. 4.

16. West, *Small Unit Action*, p. 91.

17. Ibid., p. 119.

18. SMA AAR Lien Ket-52, p. 8.

19. Ibid.

20. 2/5 AAR, Opn Colorado, dtd 26Aug66, encl 6, 5th Mar AAR Colorado.

The September Election

Additional material for this section includes: 9th Mar ComdC, Sep66; 3d Mar ComdC, Sep66; Weller Pacification Material; MACV Historical Records, 69A702.

21. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66, p. 18.

22. CGIIIMAF msg to subordinate units, dtd 26Aug66 in Folder No. VA(1)(7), Impact of Political Developments on Operations (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

23. III MAF ComdC, Aug66, p. 11.

24. 9th Mar ComdC, Aug66, p. 2-6.

25. 1st Mar ComdC, Sep66.

26. 9th Mar ComdC, Sep66, p. 2-6.

The Marine TAORs, July-December 1966

Additional material for this section include: TF X-Ray ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 9th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 4th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 5th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 7th Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 1st Mar ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; 4th Mar AAR Opn Chinook I, 25Dec66-20Jan67, dtd 12Mar67, hereafter 4th Mar AAR Opn Chinook; MACV Historical Records 69A702; Weller Pacification Material; CGFMFPac Trip Rept, 29Oct-3Nov66, n.d., hereafter FMFPac Trip Rep, Oct-Nov66; LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr. intvw by Hist Div, HQMC, dtd 10Jan73 (OralHistColl, Hist&Mus Div, HQMC), hereafter Nickerson Intvw; Col Donald L. Evans, Jr. intvw by Hist Div, HQMC, dtd 18Feb72 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Evans Intvw.

27. IIIMAF-COC msg to MACVCOC, dtd 5Sep66 in III MAF Jnl and msg File. The message was drafted by Col Chaisson.

28. LtCol Emerson A. Walker, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun78] (Vietnam Comment File); CO MAG-16 rept to CG 1st MAW, dtd 24Jul66 Subj: Viet Cong Attack on Marble Mountain, 23Jul66, App. B, MAG-16 ComdC, Jul66.

29. III MAF and 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Aug66.

30. Nickerson Intvw.

31. LtCol Warren P. Kitterman, Comments on draft MS, dtd 16Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

32. 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Dec66.

33. Ibid., Dec66 and 3/26 AAR, Opn Chinook I, dtd 26Feb67, encl 2, 4th Mar AAR, Opn Chinook.

34. 4th Mar AAR, Opn Chinook; 3d MarDiv ComdC, Dec66. See also Col Alexander D. Cereghino, Comments on draft MS, dtd 30May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

35. FMFPac Trip Rep, Oct-Nov66, p. D-71.

36. Col Edward L. Bale, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 14Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

37. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 9Oct66 in Folder No. VA(1) Marine (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

38. FMFPac Trip Rep, Oct-Nov66, p. D-71.

39. Evans Intvw.

40. III MAF ComdC, Dec66.

41. Ibid., p. 42. See also III MAF Campaign Plan 1-67, dtd 26Dec66, encl 3, III MAF ComdC, Dec66.

42. BGen Lowell E. English intvw by FMFPac, n.d. (No. 402, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).

PART VI Pacification: The Elusive Goal

CHAPTER 14

MARINE CORPS PACIFICATION

County Fair and Golden Fleece

Additional material for this section is derived from: 9th Marines ComdC, Jan-Apr66; 1st Mar ComdC, Jul66; 3d Marines ComdC, Jul66; 7th Mar ComdC, Sep66; 1/7 AAR Golden Fleece 7-1, 17-27 Sep66, dtd 28Sep66, hereafter 1/7 AAR Golden Fleece 7-1; LtCol Littleton W.T. Waller, II, Comments on Moody and Donnelly draft MS, "Marines in Vietnam," pt IV (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Waller Comments; Simmons, 9th Marines Notebook; U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington: 1940), hereafter *Small Wars Manual*.

1. Walt, *Strange War, Strange Strategy*, p. 29.
2. For a detailed description of the background of the *Small Wars Manual*, see LtCol Kenneth E. Clifford, *Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the U.S. Marine Corps 1900-1970* (Washington, D.C.: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1973), pp. 36-37 and Ronald Schaffer, "The 1940 Small War Manual and the Lessons of History," *Military Affairs*, Apr 72, v. 36, no. 2, pp. 46-51.
3. *Small Wars Manual*, p. II-32.
4. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam*, 1965, pp. 141-142, and Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," pp. 28-29.
5. See 9th Marines OpO 117-66 (County Fair), dtd 4May66 in Folder no. VA (1) Marine, Box 5 (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
6. 9th Marines ComdC and SitReps, April 66.
7. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Apr, May, Jun, Jul 66; Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 121.
8. ComUSMACV ltr to CGIIIMAF, dtd 4Jul66. Subj: Military Support for Revolutionary Development, encl 9, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.
9. Ibid.
10. ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 10Jul66, in Folder No. VA (1) (8) Tactical Innovations, Box 6 (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
11. 1st Marines ComdC, Jul66.
12. 1/3 AAR County Fair 3-14, dtd 30Jul66 in 1/3 ComdC, Jul66.
13. CGFMFPac, WestPac Trip Report, 29Aug-7Sep66, n.d. p. 4.
14. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec 1966, pp. 54-55.
15. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam*, 1965, pp. 138-141.
16. III MAF ComdC, Sep66, p. 30.
17. 1/7 AAR; Waller Comments; 1st MarDiv ComdC, Sep66, pp. 15-16.

18. Waller Comments.

19. 1/7 AAR Operation Golden Fleece 7-1, p. 8.

20. Ibid., p. 8.

21. Ibid., p. 22.

22. Ibid., p. 18.

23. Ibid.

24. Waller Comments.

25. Moody, "Marines in Vietnam," pt V, pp. 13-14—13-25 and Waller Comments.

26. CGFMFPac Trip Rpt, Oct-Nov66, p. 5.

Combined Action

Additional material is derived from: FMFPac, The Marine Combined Action Program, Vietnam, Aug65-Jan67, n.d., hereafter FMFPac, "The Marine Combined Action Program"; Capt John J. Mullen, Jr., "Modification to the III MAF Combined Action Program in the Republic of Vietnam," Student Staff Study, Class 1-69, Amphibious Warfare School, Ed Center, MCDEC, Quantico, hereafter Mullen, "III MAF Combined Action Program"; Francis J. West, Jr., *The Village*; (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1972), hereafter West, *The Village*; Capt Francis J. West, Jr., "Fast Rifles," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 51, no. 10 (Oct67), pp. 38-44, hereafter West, "Fast Rifles"; Capt Francis J. West, Jr., "Something of Significance," unpublished MS (Vietnam Reference Material), hereafter West, "Something of Significance."

27. See Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam*, 1965, pp. 132-138 and Mullen, III MAF "Combined Action Program" for the formation of the Combined Action Program in 1965.

28. FMFPac, "The Marine Combined Action Program," p. 22.

29. Ibid., p. 14.

30. See Mullen, "III MAF Combined Action Program."

31. West, *The Village*, p. 9.

32. Quoted in Ibid., pp. 46-47.

33. See West, "Fast Rifles," p. 40.

34. Ibid., p. 42.

35. West, "Something of Significance," p. 3.

36. HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967, pp. F-18 and F-32.

Personal Response

Additional material for this section is derived from John J. O'Connor, "Cross Cultural Interaction: An Evaluation of some Conceptual Approaches" (Unpublished PhD dissertation, Georgetown University, 1970), hereafter O'Connor, "Cross Cultural Interaction."

37. Quoted in O'Connor, "Cross Cultural Interaction," p. 189. Most of the material in the preceding paragraphs pertaining to Personal Response is derived from the O'Connor dissertation. One should consult this source for the full ramifications of the Personal Response Project and for the sociological implications that cannot be covered in this monograph on Marine operations.

38. CGIIIMAF msg to CG 1st MarDiv, CG 1st MAW, CG 3d MarDiv and CG ForLogCom, dtd 27Nov66 (HQMC Msg File).

Kit Carson

39. BGen Edwin H. Simmons, remarks to Kit Carson Scout Graduation, dtd 21Aug70 (Vietnam Comment File).

40. See Parker, *Civil Affairs*, p. 70 and Nickerson Interview.

41. Parker, *Civil Affairs*, p. 82.

42. 1st MarDiv ComdC, Dec 1966, p. 8. For a detailed history of the Kit Carson Program through February 1967 see "Returnee Exploitation, the Kit Carson Scout Program Development," encl 9, III MAF ComdC, Feb67.

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43. HqIIIMAF, ForceO 5401.2, dtd 5Sep66, Subj: Establishment of the Psychological Operations Section, attached to Anx E, Pt II, Sec IX, III MAF ComdC, Feb67. See also Col Robert R. Read, Comments on draft MS, dtd 7Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Read Comments.

44. Read Comments. See also PsyOps Section ComdC, 1Jul66-31Dec66, Anx E, Pt II, Sec IX, III MAF ComdC, Feb67.

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45. MajGen Jonas M. Platt, "Military Civic Action," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 54, no. 9 (Sep70) pp. 20-26.

46. Ibid.

47. 3d TankBn ComdC, Dec66.

48. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec 1966, pp. 51-52.

49. Lt Marion Lee "Sandy" Kempner, "Letters from Sandy," *American Jewish Archives*, v. 31, no. 1 (Apr79) pp. 7-34, p. 16.

The I Corps Joint Coordinating Council

Additional material for this section is derived from the I Corps Joint Coordinating Council Minutes Folder, 1965-66, hereafter ICJCC Minutes Folder.

50. ICJCC Minutes Folder, 2Aug66.

CHAPTER 15

PACIFICATION, THE LARGER PERSPECTIVE

Unless otherwise noted, material for this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Dec66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MACV Historical Records, 69A702; HQMC Msg File; Weller Pacification Materials; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Walt, *Strange War*, *Strange Strategy*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; *Pentagon Papers*; Parker, *Civil Affairs*; Stolfi, *Marine Corps Civic Action*; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

Pacification Receives Priority

1. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 116.

2. See Parker, *Civil Affairs*, the bottom of pp. 63-64 for the listing of the Honolulu goals.

3. Quoted in "Re-Emphasis on Pacification 1965-67," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 6, sec IV-C-8, p. 80.

4. Ibid., p. 8.

5. See Ibid. pp. 83-87 for detailed analysis of the "Roles and Missions" Report.

6. Tillson Briefing, encl to Minutes of the Mission Council

Meeting of 8 Aug 66, dtd 10 Aug 66 in Mission Council Memo Folder (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

7. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 26Aug66 in Folder VA (1) (1) Guidance from ComUSMACV (MACV Historical Records, 69A703), hereafter ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, 26Aug66. Part of this document is reprinted in "Re-Emphasis on Pacification," op. cit., p. 90.

8. Ibid.

9. Quoted in "Re-Emphasis on Pacification," op. cit., p. 90.

10. See ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd Oct66 in Folder VA (1) (1) Guidance from ComUSMACV, Box 1 (MACV Historical Records, 69A703).

11. See also MACV J-3, Historical Summaries Files, Box 2 (MACV Historical Records, 69A703) and MACV, Combined Campaign Plan (Excerpts) in Weller Working Materials.

Reorganization and Support of Revolutionary Development

12. MACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 18Dec66 in Folder VIIIB Rural Construction, Box 6 (MACV Historical Records, 69A702), hereafter MACV msg to CinCPac, 18Dec66.

13. Ibid.

14. MACV Planning Directive 4-66, dtd 20Jul66, Subj: MACV Planning Cycle in Folder VA (1) (1), Guidance from ComUSMACV, Box 5 (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

15. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, 26Aug66.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 16Sep66 in Folder VA (1) (14) After Action/Lessons Learned, Box 6 (MACV Historical Records 69A702).

19. Minutes of the Mission Council Meeting of 19Sep66, dtd 22Sep66 in Mission Council Memo Folder (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

20. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 13Oct66 in Folder VA (1) (1) Guidance from ComUSMACV, Box 1 (MACV Historical Records, 69A703).

21. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 18Dec66.

22. Quoted in "Re-Emphasis on Pacification," op.cit., p. 91.

23. Ibid., p. 108.

24. For the texts of the conference and the President's speech at Cam Ranh Bay, see: "President Johnson's Trip to Asia: Seven Nations Declare Unity at Manila Conference; President Johnson Visits American Troops at Cam Ranh Bay," *The Department of State Bulletin*, v. LV, no. 1429 (14Nov66), pp. 730-39.

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Additional sources for this section are: Col Albert C. Bole, Jr. (USA) and Col K. Kobata, (USA), "An Evaluation of the Measurements of the Hamlet Evaluation System," MS., Stu Monograph, Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 1975 (Copy in CMH), hereafter Bole and Kobata, "An Evaluation . . . of the Hamlet Evaluation System"; Reporting and Reporting Systems Folder, 1966 (CMH), hereafter CMH Reporting Systems Folder; Evans Interview.

25. Bole and Kobata, "An Evaluation . . . of the Hamlet Evaluation System," pp. 13-18; CMH Reporting Systems Folder; MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 543.

26. For a chart depicting the detailed breakdown of the Marine reporting system, see Stolfi, *Marine Corps Civic Action*, p. 76.

27. Evans Interview; CMH Reporting Systems Folder; MACV Comd Hist, p. 546.

28. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. I, p. 5-36.

29. Hq3dMarDiv, Brochure for Briefing MajGen Robert E. Cushman, 17-22Apr67, encl to 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr67, p. 2-4.

30. Bole and Kobata, "An Evaluation . . . of the Hamlet Evaluation System," pp. x-xi.

31. Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66," p. 34.

32. LtCol Warren P. Kitterman, Comments on draft MS, dtd 23Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

PART VII Supporting the Troops

CHAPTER 16

MARINE AVIATION IN 1966

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: CinCPac Comd Hist 1966; MACV Comd Hist 1966; FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67"; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Dec66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MAG-11 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MAG-12 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MAG-13 ComdCs, Sep-Dec66; MAG-16 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; MAG-36 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; HQMC Msg File; Vietnam Comment File; LtCol Ralph F. Moody, Maj Thomas E. Donnelly, and Capt Moyers S. Shore III, "Backing Up the Troops," pt VIII of Moody et. al., "Marines in Vietnam," hereafter Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops"; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*; Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*; LtCol William R. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters, 1962-1973* (Washington: Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, 1978), hereafter Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*; LtGen Keith B. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation in Vietnam, 1962-70," *Naval Review 1971* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1971), pp. 122-55, hereafter McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation"; Simmons, "Marine Operations, Vietnam, 1965-66."

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2. G-3 Sec, Hq, III MAF memo, dtd 4Jan66, Subj: Fragmentation of Marine Air-Ground Team, encl 12, III MAF ComdC, Jan66.

3. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," p. 133.

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4. FMFPac Trip Rept, Oct-Nov66, p. 6.

5. *Baltimore Sun*, 18Oct66, p. 1.

6. BGen Jonas M. Platt, ACS, G-1, Personnel Presentation,

HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967, Tab G, p. 13.

7. Ibid.

8. MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon, DCS, Air, Aviation Presentation, Ibid., Tab H, p. 13. See also Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 5May78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Greene Comments.

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9. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," p. 134.

10. Fails, *Marines and Helicopters*, pp. 101-102 and FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec66, p. 77.

11. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. I, p. 6-19.

12. LtGen Louis B. Robertshaw, Comments on draft MS, n.d. [Jun78] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Robertshaw Comments, 1978.

13. Col Robert J. Zitnik, Comments on draft MS, dtd 6Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Zitnik Comments.

14. Col Thomas J. O'Connor, Comments on draft MS, dtd 10Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

15. Col George W. Carrington, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 15May78 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. H&MS-16 ComdCs, Sep-Dec66.

17. Zitnik Comments.

Relations with the Seventh Air Force

18. Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, p. 152.

19. McCutcheon, "Marine Aviation," p. 136.

20. Ibid.

21. Greene Comments.

22. LtGen Louis B. Robertshaw, Comments on draft MS, Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops," n.d. (Vietnam Comment File).

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Air Defense

Additional sources for this section are: 1st and 2d LAAM Bns, ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; AAM-6, Point Paper, n.d., Subj: LAAM Posture in RVN, DCS Air, HQMC, Point Papers, 1967, hereafter, "LAAM Posture in RVN."

24. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec66, p. 62 and "LAAM Posture in RVN."

25. 1st and 2d LAAM Bns ComdCs, Jan-Dec66 and "LAAM Posture in RVN."

26. 1st LAAM Bn ComdCs, Aug-Sep66.

27. 2d LAAM Bn ComdC, Dec66.

28. 1st LAAM Bn ComdC, Jun66.

29. Ibid., Dec66.

30. "LAAM Posture in RVN."

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32. Robertshaw Comments, 1978.

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33. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. I, p. 6-20; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Dec66, pp. 65, 67; MCCC, Status of Forces, Dec66.
34. 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Dec66 and MCCC, Status of Forces, Dec66.
35. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 196; Office of Air Force History, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Air Force History Comments.
36. 1st MAW ComdCs, Jan-Mar66.
37. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 24; CinC-Pac Comd Hist, 1966, v. II, pp. 494 and 497; MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 428.
38. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 28Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).
39. CG1stMAW msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 7Apr66 (Ibid.).
40. CGIIIMAF msg to ComUSMACV, dtd 11Apr66 (Ibid.).
41. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 11Jun66 (Ibid.).
42. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports*, p. 196; Gen Westmoreland's Historical Briefing, dtd 24Jul66, v. 8, Tab A, Westmoreland Papers (CMH); Air Force History Comments. For the statistics of Marine jet operations, see 1st MAW ComdCs, Jun-Jul66.
43. 1st MAW ComdCs, Aug-Dec66.
44. LtGen Hugh M. Elwood, Comments on draft MS, dtd 4Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Elwood Comments; VM CJ-1 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66.
45. VMGR-152 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66.
46. CG1stMAW ltr to SecNav, dtd 19Oct66, Subj: Recommendation for Navy Unit Commendation, App A, VMGR-152 ComdC, Jul-Dec66.
47. Elwood Comments.
48. *The Rotor Blade*, dtd 5Aug66, p. 5.
49. *Sea Tiger*, dtd 27Jul66, p. 5. See also Maj. Fritsch's debrief, dtd 15Jul66 in VMFA-323, Debriefing Reports, 6-31Jul66.

CHAPTER 17

ARTILLERY SUPPORT IN 1966

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist 1966; FMFPac "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67;" FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Dec66; III MAF ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 11th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 12th Mar ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st FAG ComdCs, Nov-Dec66; HQMC msg File; Vietnam Comment File; Moody, et. al., "Backing Up the Troops"; MCCC, Status of Forces, Jan-Dec66; Shulimson and Johnson, *U.S. Marines in Vietnam*, 1965.

Organization and Employment, January-June 1966

1. Col Edwin M. Rudzis, Comments on draft MS, dtd 26May78 (Vietnam Comment File).
2. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb66, p. 21.

3. "Commander's Analysis, Techniques Utilized and Lessons Learned, Operation Double Eagle I and II," n.d., encl 32, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Apr66, p. 3.

The Guns Move North and Restructuring the Command, July-December 1966

4. Col Glenn E. Norris, intvw by FMFPac, dtd 3Jul67 (No. 1386 OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
5. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 9Oct66 (HQMC msg File).
6. 1st FAG ComdC, Dec66.
7. Col David G. Jones, Comments on draft MS, dtd 4Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
8. CG1stMarDiv msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 27Nov66, encl 70, 1st MarDiv ComdC, Nov66.
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10. Quoted in Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1966), p. 40.

CHAPTER 18

MEN AND MATERIAL

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Additional material for this section is derived from HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1966; HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967; *Pentagon Papers*.

1. Clipping from *New York Times*, dtd 21Feb66 in Current News, dtd 21Feb66.
2. LtGen Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., "View from the Top—Assistant Commandant's Overview," HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967, Tab B, p. 1, hereafter Chapman, "View from the Top."
3. See entries for Jun, Jul, Aug, 1966 in Hist&MusDiv, HQMC, "Commandant's Chronology, 1954-71," MS.
4. See briefing for CMC in the respective 1st and 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Aug66.
5. Chaisson Intvw, Nov66.
6. FMFPac Trip Rpt, Oct-Nov66, p. C-26.
7. Supplement to General Officers Symposium, dtd 20Jan67, HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1966, p. B-1.
8. BGen Lowell E. English intvw by FMFPac, n.d. (No. 402, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC).
9. Chapman, "View from the Top," p. B-2.

Logistics, Medical Support, and Construction

Additional sources for this section are: FLSG ComdCs, Jan-Mar66; FLC ComdCs, Mar-Dec66; 1st Med Bn ComdCs, Feb-Dec66; 3d Med Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 1st Engr Bn ComdCs, Mar-Dec66; 3d Engr Bn ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; 9th Engr Bn, ComdCs, May-Dec66; 11th Engr Bn, ComdCs, Nov-Dec66; Col George C. Axtell, Jr. intvw by FMFPac, dtd 5Oct66 (No. 219, OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Axtell Intvw; Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*.

10. Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, Ch 12.
11. LtGen Lewis W. Walt, Comments on draft MS, Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops," dtd 19Feb70 (Vietnam Comment File).
12. Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 85.
13. III MAF ComdCs, Jan and Feb66.
14. Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 85.
15. Shulimson and Johnson, *Marines in Vietnam, 1965*, pp. 184-5.
16. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Feb66.
17. III MAF ComdC, Mar66.
18. FMFPac, ComdC, Jan-Jun66, p. 26.
19. Ibid., p. 7, and Col Mauro J. Padalino, Comments on draft MS, Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops," dtd 10 Mar70 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Padalino Comments.
20. III MAF ComdC, Mar66 and III MAF ForceO P40005, dtd 13Mar66, Subj: Standing Operating Procedures for Logistics, encl 8, III MAF ComdC, Mar66.
21. FLC ComdC, Mar66.
22. Padalino Comments.
23. FLC ComdC, Apr66.
24. Ibid., Jun66.
25. 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jul66.
26. CMFMFPac Trip Rpt, 29Aug-Sep66, p. 6.
27. Axtell Intvw.
28. Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 119.
29. See FLC ComdCs, Oct-Dec66.
30. Col Franklin C. Thomas, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 19May78 (Vietnam Comment File).
31. Col James M. Callender, Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
32. Col Edward L. Bale, Jr. Comments on draft MS, dtd 12Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).
33. Axtell Intvw.
34. FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Nov66, p. 51; FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. 1, pp. 8-38—8-39; Hooper, *Mobility, Support, Endurance*, p. 77.
35. *Sea Tiger*, 21Dec66, pp. 1 and 11. See also 3d Med Bn ComdC, Dec66.
36. Moody et. al., "Backing Up the Troops," pp. 22-34—22-35.
37. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar-Sep67, Statistics," v. 2, pp. 87-88.
38. Quoted in *Sea Tiger*, 18Jan67, p. 1.
39. FMFPac, "Marine Forces in Vietnam, Mar65-Sep67," v. 1, pp. 8-23—8-24.
40. 1st MAW G-5 Narrative Summary, App. 5, encl 2, 1st MAW ComdC, Aug66.

PART VIII

The SLF, Advisors, Other Marine Activities,
and a Final Look at 1966

CHAPTER 19

THE SLF OF THE SEVENTH FLEET

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; FMFPac, III MAF Ops, Jan-Dec66; TG 79.5 ComdCs, Jan-Dec66; FMFPac, Report of Amphibious Operations Conference held at direction of CinCPacFlt, 26Feb-1Mar66, n.d., hereafter FMFPac, Amphib Conference Rept; CinCPacFlt, Report of the CinCPacFlt-ComUSMACV Amphibious Conference Report, 25-28 May66, dtd 29Jun66 (OAB, NHD), hereafter CinCPacFlt-ComUSMACV Amphibious Conference Rept; HQMC Msg File; MACV Historical Records 69A702; LtCol Ralph F. Moody and Benis M. Frank, "SLF Operations in Vietnam," MS, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC; Chaisson Intvw, 1972.

The SLF, Double Eagle, and Doctrinal Debates

1. CTF 79.5 AAR Operation Double Eagle I and II, dtd 17Mar66, Tab F, TG 79.5 ComdC, Jan-May66.
2. Ibid.
3. Chaisson Intvw, 1972, pp. 380-81.
4. CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 18Feb66, (HQMC Msg File).
5. Ibid.
6. Chaisson Intvw, 1972, p. 379.

The Okinawa Conference

7. FMFPac, Amphib Conference Rept, p. 1-6.
8. Ibid., pp. 2-1—2-2.
9. Ibid., p. 2-5.
10. Ibid., pp. 2-1—2-10.
11. Ibid., pp. 1-9—1-10.

Changes in Command and Composition

12. CGIIIMAF msg to CGFMFPac, dtd 4Mar66; CGFMFPac msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 6Mar66; AdminOFMFPac to CGFMFPac, dtd 14Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).

Further Operations and Changes in Command and Units

13. ComUSMACV msg to ComSeventhFlt, dtd 22Mar66, File No. VA (1) (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
14. CGFMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 26Mar66 (HQMC Msg File).
15. For a detailed description of Operation Jackstay, see LtCdr Robert E. Mumford, Jr., "Jackstay: New Dimensions in Amphibious Warfare," *Naval Review*, 1968 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 68-87.

The May Conference

16. CinCPacFlt-ComUSMACV Amphibious Conference Rept and MACV Comd Hist, 1966, pp. 416-18.

17. CinCPacFlt-ComUSMACV Amphibious Conference, pp. I-1 and I-3.

The SLF to the End of the Year

18. Chaisson Intvw, 1972, p. 391.

CHAPTER 20

OTHER MARINE ACTIVITIES

Unless otherwise noted the material in this chapter is derived from: MACV Comd Hist 1966 and MACV Strength Reports, 1966.

Staff and Security in Saigon

Additional material from this section is derived from HQMC, Status of Forces, 1966; LtGen William K. Jones intvw by OralHistU, HistDiv, HQMC, dtd 23Apr73 (OralHistColl, Hist&MusDiv, HQMC), hereafter Jones Intvw.

1. Jones Intvw.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.

Marine Advisors to the VNMC

Additional material for this section is derived from MACV, NAG, Joint Tables of Distribution, 1966 (OAB, NHD); Senior Marine Advisor (SMA), NAG, Monthly Historical Summaries, 1966; SMA, NAG, AARs, 1966; SMA, NAG, Ltr to CMC, dtd 13Jul66, Subj: Organization, Employment, and Support of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, (MacNeil Report), hereafter MacNeil Report.

4. Marine Advisory Unit, Naval Advisory Group, MACV, Force Structure Plan for Vietnamese Marine Corps, dtd 4Jun66, encl 1, MacNeil Report.

5. SMA, NAG, Monthly Historical Summary for Dec 1966, dtd 1Jan67.

6. LtCol McClendon G. Morris, Comments on draft MS, dtd 13Jun78 (Vietnam Comment File).

Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison

Additional material for this section is derived from 1st ANGLICO ComdCs, 1966.

CHAPTER 21

AT THE END OF THE YEAR

Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived

from: MACV Comd Hist, 1966; MACV Historical Records, 69A702; III MAF ComdCs, Oct66-Feb67; 3d MarDiv ComdCs, Oct66-Jan67; 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Oct-Dec66; Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*; HQMC, General Officers Symposium, 1967; *Pentagon Papers*.

Plans for Reinforcing the Marines in I Corps

1. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 116.
2. Quoted in HQMC, General Officers Symposium Book, 1967, pp. F-6—F-7.
3. Sharp and Westmoreland, *Report on the War*, p. 190.
4. See ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 12Jul66; ComUSMACV msg to CGIIIMAF, dtd 13Jul66; MACVJO3, Memo for the Record, dtd 13Jul66, Subj: Conference-Situation in I CTZ; CGIForceV msg to CG1stBde, 101st Abn Div, dtd 16Jul66. All four documents are in Box 5, File No. VA(1) Marine (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
5. See MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 367, and planning directives attached to 3d MarDiv and 1st MarDiv ComdCs, Sep-Oct66 for further discussion of these plans.
6. Minutes of the Mission Council Meeting of 25Jul66, dtd 26Jul66, Box 5, Mission Council Action Memo Folder (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
7. Quoted in "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec. IV-C-6, v. I, p. 64.
8. Ibid.
9. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 85.
10. HqUSMACV Planning Directive 6-66, Operation Short Stop, dtd 18Aug66, Box 5, File No. VA (1) Guidance from MACV (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
11. MACV Comd Hist, 1966, p. 85.
12. Ibid.
13. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 10Sep66, Box 5, File No. VA (1) Marine (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).
14. ComUSMACV msg to CinCPac, dtd 30Oct66, Box 5, File No. VA (1) Marine (MACV Historical Records, 69A702).

Planning the Barrier

Additional material for this section are III MAF OPlan 121-66, Practice Nine, dtd 26Dec66, hereafter III MAF OPlan 121-66; Chaisson Intvw, Nov 66; Chaisson Intvw, 1972; BGen Edwin H. Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, 1967," *Naval Review*, 1969 (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1969), pp. 112-141, hereafter Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations, 1967."

15. See "Air War in the North, 1965-1968," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 6, sec. IV-C-7, v. I, pp. 156-59; "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec. IV-C-6, v. I, p. 65; Office of Air Force History, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Jul78 (Vietnam Comment File).

16. Quoted in "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec. IV-C-6, v. I, p. 66.

17. ComUSMACV msg to DCPG Washington, dtd 25Sep66, Box 8, Barrier/Starbird Folder (MACV Historical Records 69A702).

18. The account in the previous three paragraphs is largely based on working papers attached to CG3dMarDiv Ltr to CGIIIMAF, n.d., Subj: ComUSMACV Concept of Defensive Operations in

the Vicinity of the DMZ, encl 2, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct66.

19. Ibid.

20. Quoted in "U.S. Ground Strategy and Force Deployments, 1965-1967," *Pentagon Papers*, bk 5, sec. IV-C-6, v. I, p. 83.

21. MACV Working Paper, dtd 18Oct66, Subj: Barrier Study Conference, attached to encl 2, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Oct66.

22. Ibid.

23. Chaisson Intvw, 1972.

24. CG3dMarDiv ltr to CGIIIMAF, n.d., op. cit.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. LtGen Lewis W. Walt, CGIIIMAF ltr to LtGen H.W. Buse, Jr., Acting Chief of Staff, HQMC, dtd 29Dec66, covering ltr to III MAF OPlan 121-66, hereafter Walt ltr, 29Dec66.

28. See Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirement Plan of

26Nov66, encl 7, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67.

29. See Briefing Paper, Practice Nine Requirement Plan of 26Jan67, encl 6, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67; LtCol Lane Rogers and Major Gary L. Telfer, draft MS, "U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 1967," Ch 9; and Simmons, "Marine Corps Operations; Vietnam, 1966-1967," pp. 133-34.

30. Chaisson Intvw, Nov66.

31. Walt ltr, 29Dec66.

32. 3dMarDiv Practice Nine Briefing for UnderSecNav Baldwin, dtd 12Jan67, encl 3, 3d MarDiv ComdC, Jan67.

Conclusion

33. See Walt ltr, 29Dec66.

Appendix A

Marine Command and Staff List January-December 1966

MARINE COMMAND AND STAFF LIST, 1 January - 31 December 1966*

**Unless otherwise indicated, dates refer to the period a unit was in South Vietnam. With the exception of 3d Marine Division (Fwd) and Task Force X-Ray and Force Logistic Command, Marine organizations of battalion/squadron-size and above are listed below (For a complete listing of location and strength of Marine units in the Western Pacific, see Appendix G.).*

III MAF Headquarters 1Jan-31Dec66

CG MajGen Lewis W. Walt	1Jan-9Feb66
MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon (Acting)	10Feb-8Mar66
LtGen Lewis W. Walt	9Mar-31Dec66
DepCG MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon	1Jan-28Mar66
(Additional Duty)	
MajGen Lewis J. Fields	29Mar-30Sep66
(Additional Duty)	
MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.	1Oct-31Dec66
(Additional Duty)	
C/S Col George C. Axtell, Jr.	1Jan-14Mar66
BGen Jonas M. Platt	15Mar-5Dec66
BGen Hugh M. Elwood	6Dec-31Dec66
G-1 Col Don W. Galbreath	1Jan-7Jun66
Col John L. Mahon	8Jun-31Dec66
G-2 Col Leo J. Dulacki	1-24Jan66
LtCol Joseph T. Odenthal	25-31Jan66
Col John E. Gorman	1Feb-3May66
Col Thell H. Fisher	4May-31Jul66
Col Carl A. Sachs	1Aug-6Sep66
Col Roy H. Thompson	7Sep-31Dec66
G-3 Col Edwin H. Simmons	1Jan-12Feb66
Col John R. Chaisson	13Feb-8Nov66
Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr.	9Nov-31Dec66
G-4 Col Harold A. Hayes, Jr.	1Jan-19Feb66
Col Steve J. Cibik	20Feb-20May66
Col Joseph F. Quilty, Jr.	21May-31Dec66
G-5 Maj Charles J. Keever	1Jan-31Jan66
Col Eric S. Holmgren	1Feb-31Dec66

1st Marine Division*

**The 1st Marine Division was placed under the operational control of III MAF on 29Mar66. Individual units were in Vietnam at that time and many arrived later. The listing below reflects administrative rather than operational organization.*

1st Marine Division Headquarters 29Mar-31Dec66

CGMajGen Lewis J. Fields	29Mar-30Sep66
MajGen Herman Nickerson, Jr.	1Oct-31Dec66
ADC BGen William A. Stiles	29Mar-31Dec66
C/S Col Gordon H. West	29Mar-9Sep66
Col Sidney J. Altman	10Sep-31Dec66
G-1 Col William F. Fry	29Mar-4Aug66
Col Charles C. Crossfield II	5Aug-31Dec66
G-2 Col John J. O'Donnell	29Mar-31Dec66
G-3 Col Louis H. Wilson, Jr.	29Mar-26Jun66
Col Herman Poggemeyer, Jr.	27Jun-31Dec66
G-4 Col William R. Bennett	1Jan-31Aug66
LtCol William E. Bonds	1Sep-1Oct66
Col Edward L. Bale, Jr.	2Oct-31Dec66
G-5 Maj James S. Ready	29Mar-5Apr66
Col Louie N. Casey	6Apr-30Sep66
Col Walter Moore	1Oct-31Dec66

Headquarters Battalion

CO Col James P. Treadwell	29Mar-31Mar66
LtCol Neil Dimond	1Apr-25Jul66
Col Warren A. Leitner	26Jul-31Dec66

Task Force X-Ray 10Oct-31Dec66*

**TF X-Ray was established at Chu Lai on 10Oct66 when the 1st Marine Division Headquarters moved to Da Nang.*

CG BGen William A. Stiles	10Oct-31Dec66
C/S Col Charles F. Widdecke	10Oct-25Dec66
Col Fred E. Haynes, Jr.	26Dec-31Dec66
G-1 LtCol Paul A. Lorentzen	10Oct-6Dec66
LtCol Roland L. McDaniel	7Dec-31Dec66
G-2 Maj Glenn K. Maxwell	10Oct-31Dec66
G-3 LtCol Robert E. Hunter, Jr.	10Oct-15Nov66
LtCol Edward J. Bronars	16Nov-31Dec66
G-4 LtCol William E. Bonds	10Oct-10Dec66
LtCol Louis A. Bonin	11Dec-31Dec66

G-5 Maj James S. Ready	10Oct-8Dec66	Maj Littleton W. T. Waller, II	4Sep-21Oct66
Maj Joseph T. Smith	9Dec-31Dec66	LtCol Basile Lubka	22Oct-31Dec66
1st Marines*		2d Battalion, 7th Marines	
<i>*The headquarters arrived in RVN on 16Jan66.</i>		CO LtCol Leon N. Utter	1Jan-4Jun66
CO Col Bryan B. Mitchell	16Jan-18Aug66	LtCol John J. Roothoff	5Jun-9Oct66
Col Donald L. Mallory	19Aug-31Dec66	Maj Warren P. Kitterman	10Oct-31Dec66
1st Battalion, 1st Marines		3d Battalion, 7th Marines	
CO LtCol Harold A. Hatch	1Jan-31Mar66	CO LtCol Charles H. Bodley	1Jan-28May66
LtCol Van D. Bell, Jr.	1Apr-31Dec66	LtCol Birchard B. Dewitt	29May-31Aug66
2d Battalion, 1st Marines		LtCol Raymond J. O'Leary	1Sep-31Dec66
CO LtCol Robert T. Hanifin, Jr.	1Jan-1Jul66	11th Marines*	
LtCol Jack D. Spaulding	2Jul-9Oct66	<i>*The regimental headquarters arrived in RVN on 16Feb66.</i>	
Maj William F. Hohmann	10Oct-16Oct66	CO Col Peter H. Hahn	16Feb-16Jun66
LtCol Haig Donabedian	17Oct-31Dec66	LtCol John B. Sullivan	17Jun-12Sep66
3d Battalion, 1st Marines*		Col Glenn E. Norris	13Sep-31Dec66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 16Jan66.</i>		1st Field Artillery Group*	
CO LtCol James R. Young	16Jan-10Jun66	<i>*The headquarters arrived in RVN on 30Nov66.</i>	
LtCol Emerson A. Walker	11Jun-25Oct66	CO LtCol Joe B. Stribling	30Nov-31Dec66
LtCol Hillmer F. Deatley	26Oct-31Dec66	1st Battalion, 11th Marines*	
5th Marines*		<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 16Jan66.</i>	
<i>*The regimental headquarters arrived in RVN on 22May66.</i>		CO LtCol Willard C. Olsen	16Jan-29Mar66
<i>With the establishment of TF X-Ray on 10Oct66, the 5th Marines</i>		LtCol James C. Gasser	30Mar-23Jun66
<i>became largely an administrative headquarters.</i>		Maj Lee C. Reece	24Jun-28Dec66
CO Col Charles F. Widdecke	22May-25Dec66	LtCol Mark P. Fennessy	29Dec-31Dec66
Col Fred E. Haynes, Jr.	26Dec-31Dec66	2d Battalion, 11th Marines*	
1st Battalion, 5th Marines*		<i>*The headquarters arrived in RVN on 27May66.</i>	
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 8May66.</i>		CO LtCol Joe B. Stribling	27May-20Aug66
CO LtCol Harold L. Coffman	8May-18Sep66	Maj Ivil L. Carver	21Aug-31Dec66
LtCol Edward R. Watson	19Sep-3Nov66	3d Battalion, 11th Marines	
Maj Peter L. Hilgartner	4Nov-31Dec66	CO LtCol Paul B. Watson, Jr.	1Jan-29Mar66
2d Battalion, 5th Marines*		LtCol John P. O'Connell	30Mar-13Aug66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 5Apr66.</i>		LtCol Robert E. Young	14Aug-21Dec66
CO LtCol Robert H. Uskurait	5Apr-23May66	LtCol Alexander S. Ruggiero	22Dec-31Dec66
LtCol Walter Moore	24May-30Sep66	4th Battalion, 11th Marines*	
Maj Leonard E. Wood	1Oct-2Oct66	<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 23Feb66.</i>	
LtCol William C. Airheart	3Oct-31Dec66	CO LtCol John F. Crowley	23Feb-30Jun66
3d Battalion, 5th Marines*		LtCol George R. Lamb	1Jul-31Dec66
<i>*The battalion was assigned to III MAF on 2Aug66.</i>		1st Reconnaissance Battalion*	
CO LtCol Edward J. Bronars	2Aug-14Nov66	<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 22Mar66.</i>	
Maj Jim T. Elkins	15Nov-22Dec66	CO LtCol Arthur J. Sullivan	22Mar-7Aug66
LtCol Dean E. Esslinger	23Dec-31Dec66	LtCol Donald N. McKeon	8Aug-31Dec66
7th Marines		1st Anti-Tank Battalion*	
CO Col Oscar F. Peatross	1Jan-3Apr66	<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 27Mar66.</i>	
Col Eugene H. Haffey	4Apr-31Jul66	CO LtCol Walter Moore	27Mar-22May66
Col Lawrence F. Snoddy, Jr.	1Aug-31Dec66	Maj Robert E. Harris	23May-9Nov66
1st Battalion, 7th Marines		Maj Martin F. Manning, Jr.	10Nov66
CO LtCol James P. Kelly	1Jan-25Apr66	Maj John J. Keefe	11Nov-31Dec66
LtCol Frederick S. Wood	26Apr-3Sep66		

1st Tank Battalion*		C/S Col Donald W. Sherman	1Jan-23Jan66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 28Mar66.</i>		Col Leo J. Dulacki	24Jan-1May66
CO LtCol Albert W. Snell	28Mar-10Jun66	Col John B. Sweeney	2May-31Dec66
Maj Lowell R. Burnette, Jr.	11Jun-11Jul66	G-1 Col Robert M. Port	1Jan-18May66
Maj Robert E. B. Palmer	12Jul-1Sep66	LtCol Karl T. Keller	19May-28May66
Maj John W. Clayborne	2Sep-31Dec66	Col Glen E. Martin	29May-7Jul66
1st Motor Transport Battalion*		Col John P. Lanigan	8Jul-30Nov66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 1Apr66.</i>		Col Robert M. Jenkins	1Dec-31Dec66
CO LtCol John J. Roothoff	1Apr-3Jun66	G-2 LtCol Richard J. Schriver	1Jan-3Jan66
Maj John H. Doering, Jr.	4Jun-7Sep66	Col George W. Carrington, Jr.	4Jan-30Jun66
Maj Russell E. Johnson	8Sep-22Dec66	Col Thomas M. Horne	1Jul-7Nov66
Maj Jim T. Elkins	23Dec-31Dec66	LtCol Jack L. Miles	8Nov-31Dec66
1st Engineer Battalion*		G-3 Col Don P. Wyckoff	1Jan-20Feb66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 17Jan66.</i>		Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr.	21Feb-19May66
CO LtCol James R. Aichele	17Jan-19Aug66	Col Noble L. Beck	20May-30Jul66
LtCol Charles O. Newton	20Aug-31Dec66	Col William F. Doehler	31Jul-12Dec66
1st Medical Battalion*		Col Edward E. Hammerbeck	13Dec-31Dec66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 20Mar66.</i>		G-4 Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr.	1Jan-6Feb66
CO Cdr Robert H. Mitchell (MC)USN	20Mar-31Dec66	Col James F. McClanahan	7Feb-11Jun66
1st Shore Party Battalion*		LtCol Charles S. Wilder	12Jun-9Jul66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 20Mar66.</i>		Col Robert M. Richards	10Jul-7Oct66
CO LTCol Roma T. Taylor, Jr.	20Mar-4Aug66	Col John F. Mentzer	8Oct-31Dec66
Maj Stanley G. Roberts, Jr.	5Aug-9Sep66	G-5 Maj John Colia	1Jan-28Feb66
LtCol Edward H. Jones	10Sep-31Dec66	LtCol Edward H. Mackel	1Mar-3Aug66
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion		Col Edward R. McCarthy	4Aug-31Dec66
CO LtCol William D. Pomeroy	1Jan-5Aug66	Headquarters Battalion	
Maj Walter W. Damewood, Jr.	6Aug-31Oct66	CO Maj John E. Watson, Jr.	1Jan-2Jan66
Maj Albert R. Bowman, II	1Nov-31Dec66	LtCol Robert J. Perrich	3Jan-4May66
7th Motor Transport Battalion*		Col Edwin G. Winstead	5May-24Jun66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 6Mar66.</i>		Maj Herbert L. Fogarty	25Jun-9Jul66
CO LtCol Louis A. Bonin	6Mar-27Jun66	Col Robert M. Jenkins	10Jul-30Nov66
Maj Arthur C. Stephens, Jr.	28Jun-8Sep66	LtCol Thomas J. Johnston, Jr.	1Dec-31Dec66
Maj Sydney H. Batchelder, Jr.	9Sep-31Dec66	3d Marine Division (Fwd)*	
7th Communications Battalion*		<i>*Established at Dong Ha on 10Oct66.</i>	
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 1Jul66.</i>		CG BGen Lowell E. English	10Oct-31Dec66
CO Maj James H. Bird, Jr.	1Jul-24Nov66	C/S Col Alexander D. Cereghino	10Oct-24Oct66
LtCol William M. Clelland	25Nov-31Dec66	3d Marines	
11th Motor Transport Battalion*		CO Col Thell H. Fisher	1Jan-15Apr66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 29Dec66.</i>		Col Harold A. Hayes, Jr.	16Apr-18Aug66
CO Maj Lee V. Barkley	29Dec-31Dec66	Col Edward E. Hammerbeck	19Aug-12Dec66
3d Marine Division		Col John P. Lanigan	13Dec-31Dec66
3d Marine Division Headquarters 1Jan-31Dec66		1st Battalion, 3d Marines	
CG MajGen Lewis W. Walt	1Jan-9Feb66	CO LtCol Robert R. Dickey III	1Jan-22Sep66
BGen Lowell E. English (Acting)	10Feb-9Mar66	LtCol Peter A. Wickwire	23Sep-31Dec66
LtGen Lewis W. Walt	10Mar-18Mar66	2d Battalion, 3d Marines*	
MajGen Wood B. Kyle	19Mar-31Dec66	<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN from duty as SLF Battalion on 28Feb66.</i>	
ADC BGen Lowell E. English	1Jan-31Dec66	CO LtCol William K. Horn	28Feb-30Jun66
BGen Jonas M. Platt	1Jan-14Mar66	LtCol Fredric A. Green	1Jul-31Jul66
		LtCol Victor Ohanesian	1Aug-31Dec66

3d Battalion, 3d Marines*

**The battalion departed RVN for Okinawa on 30Aug66 and returned to RVN on 29Oct66.*

CO LtCol Joshua W. Dorsey III 1Jan-29Jun66
LtCol Earl R. DeLong 30Jun-31Dec66

4th Marines

CO Col James F. McClanahan 1Jan-23Jan66
Col Donald W. Sherman 24Jan-29Jul66
Col Alexander D. Cereghino 30Jul-31Dec66

1st Battalion, 4th Marines*

**The battalion departed RVN for Okinawa on 16Dec66.*

CO LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan 1Jan-26Jun66
LtCol Jack Westerman 27Jun-16Dec66

2d Battalion, 4th Marines*

**The battalion departed RVN for Okinawa on 5Nov66.*

CO LtCol Rodolfo L. Trevino 1Jan-21Feb66
LtCol Paul X. Kelley 22Feb-6Jul66
LtCol Arnold E. Bench 7Jul-5Nov66

3d Battalion, 4th Marines*

**The battalion arrived in RVN from Okinawa on 18Mar66.*

CO LtCol Sumner A. Vale 18Mar-27Jul66
LtCol William J. Masterpool 28Jul-31Dec66

9th Marines

CO Col John E. Gorman 1Jan-15Feb66
Col Edwin H. Simmons 16Feb-4Jul66
Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr. 5Jul-7Oct66
Col Robert M. Richards 8Oct-31Dec66

1st Battalion, 9th Marines*

**The battalion departed RVN for Okinawa on 29Sep66.*

CO LtCol Verle E. Ludwig 1Jan-5Jan66
LtCol William F. Doehler 6Jan-31May66
LtCol Richard E. Jones 1Jun-25Sep66
Maj James L. Day 26Sep-29Sep66

2d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol William F. Donahue, Jr. 1Jan-23Jun66
LtCol John J. Hess 24Jun-9Nov66
Maj John J. Peeler 10Nov-31Dec66

3d Battalion, 9th Marines

CO LtCol William W. Taylor 1Jan-7May66
LtCol Paul C. Trammell 8May-22Jun66
Maj George H. Grimes 23Jun-31Jul66
Maj Fred D. MacLean, Jr. 1Aug-4Dec66
LtCol Sherwood A. Brunnenmeyer 5Dec-31Dec66

12th Marines

CO Col James M. Callender 1Jan-30Jun66
Col Benjamin S. Read 1Jul-31Dec66

1st Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Warren E. McCain 1Jan-28Feb66
LtCol Adolph J. Honeycutt 1Mar-18Apr66

LtCol Thomas J. Johnston, Jr. 19Apr-4Nov66
LtCol Marshall S. Campbell 5Nov-30Dec66
LtCol Lavern W. Larson 31Dec66

2d Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Eugene O. Speckart 1Jan-28Feb66
LtCol Joris J. Snyder 1Mar-30Jun66
LtCol James R. Gallman, Jr. 1Jul-8Dec66
LtCol Willis L. Gore 9Dec-31Dec66

3d Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Leslie L. Page 1Jan-31May66
Maj Samuel M. Morrow 1Jun-30Aug66
LtCol Charles S. Kirchmann 31Aug-31Dec66

4th Battalion, 12th Marines

CO LtCol Edwin M. Rudzis 1Jan-30Apr66
Maj Paul E. Wilson 1May-31Jul66
LtCol David G. Jones 1Aug-31Dec66

3d Reconnaissance Battalion

CO LtCol Roy R. Van Cleve 1Jan-5May66
Maj Thomas R. Stuart 6May-4Jul66
LtCol Gary Wilder 5Jul-31Dec66

3d Anti-Tank Battalion

CO LtCol Bruce A. Heflin 1Jan-12Jul66
Maj Eddis R. Larson 13Jul-16Aug66
Maj Karl E. Sharff 17Aug66
Maj Donald E. Newton 18Aug-22Oct66
Maj Charles R. Stiffler 23Oct-31Dec66

3d Tank Battalion

CO LtCol Milton L. Raphael 1Jan-2Aug66
Maj James G. Doss, Jr. 3Aug-5Sep66
LtCol William R. Corson 6Sep-31Dec66

3d Motor Transport Battalion

CO Maj Freddie J. Baker 1Jan-5Aug66
LtCol Edwin W. Killian 6Aug-23Aug66
Maj Richard F. Armstrong 24Aug-31Dec66

3d Engineer Battalion

CO LtCol Nicholas J. Dennis 1Jan-31May66
Maj Conway J. Smith 1Jun-1Jul66
Maj Charles D. Wood 2Jul-30Sep66
LtCol Garry M. Pearce, Jr. 1Oct-31Dec66

3d Medical Battalion

CO Cdr Almon C. Wilson, MC, USN 1Jan-31May66
Cdr John T. Vincent, MC, USN 1Jun-31Dec66

3d Shore Party Battalion

CO Maj John M. Dean 1Jan-30Apr66
Maj Thomas W. Jones 1May-30Sep66
LtCol Donald E. Marchette 1Oct-31Dec66

3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion*

**The battalion arrived in RVN on 3Mar66.*

CO LtCol Leroy C. Harris, Jr. 3Mar-28Mar66
LtCol Richard E. Campbell 29Mar-5Jun66

Maj William J. Dinse	6Jun-30Sep66	MWHG-1	
Maj Jack D. Rowley	1Oct-31Dec66	CO Col Edward I. Lupton	1Jan-31May66
9th Motor Transport Battalion		Col William L. Atwater, Jr.	1Jun-31Dec66
CO Maj Joseph F. Jones	1Jan-30Jun66	MAG-11	
Maj Emmett R. Haley	1Jul-25Aug66	CO Col Emmett O. Anglin, Jr.	1Jan-6Jul66
Maj Donald R. Tyer	26Aug-31Dec66	Col Franklin C. Thomas, Jr.	7Jul-31Dec66
11th Engineer Battalion*		MAG-12	
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 30Nov66.</i>		CO Col Leslie E. Brown	1Jan-7Jul66
CO LtCol Ross L. Mulford	30Nov-31Dec66	Col Jay W. Hubbard	8Jul-31Dec66
5th Marine Division Units in RVN		MAG-13*	
1st Battalion, 26th Marines*		<i>*The group arrived in RVN on 25Sep66.</i>	
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN from duty with the SLF on 27Sep66.</i>		CO Col Douglas D. Petty, Jr.	25Sep-31Dec66
CO LtCol Anthony A. Monti	27Sep-23Oct66	MAG-16	
LtCol Donald E. Newton	24Oct-31Dec66	CO Col Thomas J. O'Connor	1Jan-26Mar66
2d Battalion, 26th Marines*		Col Richard M. Hunt	27Mar-15Oct66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN on 27Aug66.</i>		Col Kenneth L. Reusser	16Oct-21Nov66
CO LtCol James J. Wilson	27Aug-14Sep66	Col Frank M. Hepler	22Nov-31Dec66
Maj Walter S. Pullar, Jr.	15Sep-26Sep66	MAG-36	
LtCol James M. Cummings	27Sep-31Dec66	CO Col William G. Johnson	1Jan-23Aug66
3d Battalion, 26th Marines*		Col Victor A. Armstrong	24Aug-31Dec66
<i>*The battalion arrived in RVN from duty with the SLF on 11Dec66.</i>		MWSG-17*	
CO LtCol Garland T. Beyerle	11Dec-31Dec66	<i>*The group arrived in RVN on 12Sep66.</i>	
1st Marine Aircraft Wing		CO Col Orlando S. Tosdal	12Sep-31Dec66
CG MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon	1Jan-15May66	H&HS-1	
MajGen Louis B. Robertshaw	16May-31Dec66	CO Maj Chester A. Liddle, Jr.	1Jan-31Jan66
AWC BGen Marion E. Carl	1Jan-11Apr66	Maj Carl C. Foster	1Feb-31Dec66
BGen Hugh M. Elwood	12Apr-30Nov66	H&MS-11	
BGen Robert G. Owens, Jr.	1Dec-31Dec66	CO LtCol William H. Bortz, Jr.	1Jan-8Apr66
C/S Col Thomas G. Bronleewe, Jr.	1Jan-18Apr66	Maj Don A. Mickle	9Apr-9Jun66
Col Harry W. Taylor	19Apr-31Aug66	LtCol Francis C. Opeka	10Jun-30Nov66
Col Edward J. Doyle	1Sep-31Dec66	LtCol Raymond A. Cameron	1Dec-31Dec66
G-1 Col Wilbur D. Wilcox	1Jan-15Jun66	H&MS-12	
LtCol Robert O. Carlock	16Jun-11Aug66	CO Maj William E. Garman	1Jan-31Mar66
Col Dan H. Johnson	12Aug-31Dec66	Maj Richard E. Hawes, Jr.	1Apr-20Aug66
G-2 LtCol Billy H. Barber	1Jan-1Aug66	LtCol Roger A. Morris	21Aug-5Dec66
Col George H. Dodenhoff	2Aug-31Dec66	LtCol Paul G. McMahon	6Dec-31Dec66
G-3 Col Roy C. Gray, Jr.	1Jan-30Apr66	H&MS-13*	
Col Edward J. Doyle	1May-31Aug66	<i>*The squadron arrived in RVN on 26Sep66.</i>	
Col Arnold A. Lund	1Sep-11Nov66	CO LtCol Walter E. Domina	24Sep-31Dec66
Col Guy M. Cloud	12Nov-31Dec66	H&MS-16	
G-4 Col Robert J. Lynch, Jr.	1Jan-6Jun66	CO LtCol Jerome L. Goebel	1Jan-19Mar66
Col Fred J. Frazer	7Jun-21Aug66	LtCol Leslie L. Darbyshire	20May-14Oct66
Col Herbert H. Long	22Aug-31Dec66	LtCol Manning T. Jannell	15Oct-28Oct66
G-5 LtCol George W. King	1Jan-31Jan66	LtCol Lucius O. Davis	29Oct-31Dec66
Col Fred J. Frazer	1Feb-6Jun66	H&MS-36	
LtCol Ernest J. Berger	7Jun-31Dec66	CO LtCol Thomas G. Mooney	1Jan-5Sep66
		LtCol William C. Carlson	6Sep-31Dec66

HMM-161*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Apr66 and departed 31Oct66.*

CO LtCol William R. Quinn	1Apr-9Aug66
LtCol Samuel F. Martin	10Aug-4Oct66
LtCol Charles E. Wydner, Jr.	5Oct-31Oct66

HMM-163*

**The squadron departed RVN on 1Aug66 and returned to RVN on 1Nov66.*

CO LtCol Charles A. House	1Jan-11Aug66
LtCol Rocco D. Bianchi	12Aug-31Dec66

HMM-164*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 7Mar66.*

CO LtCol Warren C. Watson	7Mar-31Dec66
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HMM-165*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Oct66.*

CO LtCol William W. Eldridge, Jr.	1Oct-31Dec66
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HMM-261*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 6Jan66 and departed RVN on 26May66.*

CO LtCol Mervin B. Porter	6Jan-26May66
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HMM-262*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 4Dec66.*

CO LtCol Ural W. Shadrick	4Dec-31Dec66
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HMM-263*

**The squadron departed RVN on 23May66 and returned to RVN on 1Aug66.*

CO LtCol Truman Clark	1Jan-19Mar66
LtCol Jerome L. Goebel	20Mar-30Sep66
LtCol Manning T. Jannell	1Oct-14Oct66
LtCol Leslie L. Darbyshire	15Oct-31Dec66

HMM-265*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 22May66.*

CO LtCol Herbert E. Mendenhall	22May-27Sep66
Maj Frank B. Ellis	28Sep-31Dec66

HMM-361*

**The squadron departed RVN on 1Apr66 and returned to RVN on 26May66. It departed RVN again on 16Dec66.*

CO LtCol Lloyd F. Childers	1Jan-9May66
LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	10May-15Dec66

HMM-362*

**The squadron departed RVN on 8Jan66 and returned to RVN on 9Apr66. It departed RVN again on 28Sep66.*

CO LtCol James Aldworth	1Jan-22Apr66
LtCol Alfred F. Garrotto	23Apr-31Aug66
LtCol Marshall B. Armstrong	1Sep-27Sep66

HMM-363*

**The squadron departed RVN on 4Jul66 and returned to RVN on 28Sep66.*

CO LtCol George D. Kew	1Jan-16Mar66
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LtCol James D. McGough	17Mar-5Oct66
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LtCol Kenneth E. Huntington	6Oct-31Dec66
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HMM-364*

**The squadron departed RVN on 9Apr66 and returned on 3Jul66. It departed RVN again on 1Nov66.*

CO LtCol William R. Lucas	1Jan-22Mar66
LtCol Daniel A. Somerville	23Mar-31Oct66

MACS-7

CO LtCol Richard R. Miller	1Jan-18Jun66
LtCol Charles E. Showalter	19Jun-22Nov66
Maj Thomas K. Burk, Jr.	23Nov-31Dec66

MASS-2

CO LtCol Ralph L. Cunningham, Jr.	1Jan-10Jan66
LtCol Richard W. Sheppe	11Jan-20May66
LtCol Elwin M. Jones	21May-12Sep66
LtCol Harry Hunter, Jr.	13Sep-31Dec66

MASS-3*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Nov66.*

CO Maj John C. Dixon	1Nov-14Nov66
LtCol Donald L. Fenton	15Nov-31Dec66

MABS-11

CO Maj Douglas A. McCaughey, Jr.	1Jan-30Jun66
Maj Clifton B. Andrews	1Jul-25Jul66
Maj Guy R. Campo	26Jul-31Dec66

MABS-12

CO Maj John W. Parchen	1Jan-28Feb66
LtCol Paul G. McMahon	1Mar-21May66
Maj George M. Lawrence, Jr.	22May-31Aug66
LtCol William G. McCool	1Sep-16Oct66
Maj William W. Campbell	17Oct-1Dec66
LtCol Ralph D. Wallace	2Dec-31Dec66

MABS-13*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 9Sep66.*

CO LtCol Owen L. Owens	9Sep-31Dec66
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MABS-16

CO Maj Lewis I. Zeigler	1Jan-20Apr66
LtCol William J. Webster	21Apr-18Jun66
Maj Lewis I. Zeigler	19Jun-25Jun66
LtCol Rodney D. McKittrick	26Jun-31Dec66

MABS-36

CO Maj Jack A. Kennedy	1Jan-30Mar66
LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	31Mar-9May66
Maj Gordon H. Buckner II	10May-5Jul66
LtCol Edward K. Kirby	6Jul-1Aug66
LtCol William C. Carlson	2Aug-5Sep66
LtCol Joseph A. Nelson	6Sep-31Dec66

VMFA-115*

**The squadron departed RVN on 13Jan66 and returned to RVN on 11Apr66.*

CO LtCol Clyde R. Jarrett	1Jan-23Feb66
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LtCol Dean C. Macho 24Feb-7Aug66
Maj Larry R. Van Deusen 8Aug-31Dec66

VMA-121*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Dec66.*
CO LtCol Donald R. Stiver 1Dec-31Dec66

VMA-211*

**The squadron departed RVN on 14Jul66 and returned to RVN 1Oct66.*

CO LtCol John W. Kirkland 1Jan-29May66
Maj Thomas J. Ayers 30May-16Oct66
LtCol William G. McCool 17Oct-31Dec66

VMA-214*

**The squadron departed RVN on 16Feb66 and returned to RVN on 30Apr66.*

CO LtCol Keith O'Keefe 1Jan-31Mar66
LtCol Dellwyn L. Davis 1Apr-8Jun66
Maj Ralph D. Wallace 9Jun-30Nov66
Maj Richard E. Hemmingway 1Dec-31Dec66

VMA-223*

**The squadron departed RVN on 1Dec66.*

CO LtCol Alexander Wilson 1Jan-1Apr66
LtCol Robert B. Sinclair 2Apr-26Nov66
LtCol Leonard C. Taft 27Nov-30Nov66

VMA-224*

**The squadron departed RVN on 30Apr66 and returned to RVN on 14Jul66. It departed RVN again on 1Nov66.*

CO LtCol Thomas E. Mulvihill 1Jan-31Mar66
LtCol John Browne 1Apr-1Nov66

VMF-(AW)-232*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 15Nov66.*

CO LtCol Nicholas M. Trapnell, Jr. 15Nov-31Dec66

VMF-(AW)-235*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Feb66 and departed RVN on 15Nov66.*

CO LtCol George A. Gibson 1Feb-1Jul66
Maj Don A. Mickle 2Jul-31Oct66
LtCol Edward R. Rogal 1Nov-15Nov66

VMA-(AW)-242*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Nov66.*

CO LtCol Howard Wolf 1Nov-31Dec66

VMA-311*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 15Feb66.*

CO LtCol Jack W. Harris 15Feb-20May66
LtCol Paul G. McMahon 21May-5Dec66
LtCol Roger A. Morris 6Dec-31Dec66

VMF-(AW)-312*

**The squadron departed RVN on 2Feb66.*

CO LtCol Richard B. Newport 1Jan-1Feb66

VMFA-314*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 15Jan66 and departed RVN on 14Apr66. It returned to RVN on 1Aug66.*

CO Maj Charles A. Sewell 15Jan-4May66
LtCol Darrel E. Bjorklund 5May-18Nov66
Maj William H. Heintz 19Nov-31Dec66

VMFA-323*

**The squadron departed RVN on 1Mar66 and returned on 5Jul66.*

CO LtCol Andrew W. O'Donnell 1Jan-20Jul66
LtCol Aubrey W. Talbert, Jr. 21Jul-31Dec66

VMFA-542

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 1Mar66 and departed RVN on 1Aug66. It returned to RVN on 10Oct66.*

CO LtCol Eddie E. Pearcy 1Mar-22May66
Maj Paul S. Frappollo 23May-6Jul66
LtCol Donald L. May 7Jul-31Dec66

VMCJ-1

CO LtCol Francis C. Opeka 1Jan-9Jun66
Maj Robert W. Tucker, Jr. 10Jun-28Oct66
LtCol William B. Fleming 29Oct-31Dec66

VMO-2

CO LtCol George F. Bauman 1Jan-8Apr66
LtCol Arnold W. Barden 9Apr-30Sep66
Maj Robert A. Plamondon 1Oct-30Nov66
LtCol William F. Harrell 1Dec-31Dec66

VMO-3*

**The squadron arrived in RVN on 29Dec66.*

CO Maj Kyle W. Townsend 29Dec-31Dec66

VMO-6

CO LtCol Robert J. Zitnik 1Jan-23Mar66
Maj Robert E. Presson 24Mar-10Jun66
Maj William J. Goodsell 11Jun-16Jun66
Maj Rawley M. Gregory 17Jun-23Jul66
Maj William R. Maloney 23Jul-31Dec66

1st LAAM Bn

CO LtCol Clyde L. Eyer 1Jan-1Oct66
Maj Thomas G. Davis 2Oct-10Dec66
LtCol Merton R. Ives 11Dec-31Dec66

2d LAAM Bn

CO Maj Edward F. Penico 1Jan-30Jul66
LtCol Thomas I. Gunning 31Jul-31Dec66

Force Logistic Command*

**Activated on 15Mar66 from the Force Logistic Support Group (FLSG).*

Force Logistic Command Headquarters

CO Col George C. Axtell, Jr. 15Mar-20Oct66
BGen James E. Herbold, Jr. 30Oct-31Dec66

C/S* Col William H. Cowper 3Oct-31Dec66

**Billet established on 3Oct66.*

G-1 Maj Harold J. Field, Jr. 15Mar-28Sep66

Maj Leonard E. Fuchs 29Sep-10Oct66

Maj Joe B. Noble 11Oct-31Dec66

G-2* LtCol Willard C. Olsen 1Jun-30Jun66

Maj Herbert C. Sanford 1Jul-21Oct66

LtCol Richard M. Taylor 22Oct-31Dec66

**Billet established on 1Jun66.*

G-3 LtCol William L. Nelson 15Mar-31May66

Col William H. Cowper 1Jun-22Jul66

LtCol Raymond E. Roeder, Jr. 23Jul-29Oct66

Col Lyle S. Stephenson 30Oct-31Dec66

G-4 LtCol Richard M. Cook 15Mar-14Jun66

Maj Robert P. Chaney 15Jun-23Jun66

Maj Gilbert C. Hazard 24Jun-31Dec66

G-5* Maj Leonard E. Fuchs 11Oct-31Dec66

**Billet established on 11Oct66.*

Force Logistic Support Group A*

**The Force Logistic Support Group was redesignated FLSG A on 15Mar66.*

CO Col Mauro J. Padalino 1Jan-31May66

Col Robert R. Weir 1Jun-31Dec66

Force Logistic Group B*

**FLSG B was activated on 15Mar66 from the Logistic Support Unit at Chu Lai.*

CO Col Mitchell O. Sadler 15Mar-24Aug66

Col Kermit H. Shelly 25Aug-31Dec66

Force Logistic Support Unit-2*

**FLSU-2 was designated as a major subcommand of the Force Logistic Command on 1Dec66.*

CO LtCol Rollin F. VanCantfort 1Dec-31Dec66

5th Communication Bn*

**The battalion was attached to the Force Logistic Command on 15Nov66 from the administrative control of III MAF.*

CO LtCol Hercules R. Kelly, Jr. 1Jan-30May66

LtCol Joseph Nastasi 31May-30Sep66

LtCol Phillip K. Leeseberg 1Oct-31Dec66

Separate Units under III MAF

1st MP Battalion*

**The battalion arrived in RVN on 17Jun66.*

LtCol Paul G. Stavridis 17Jun-31Dec66

7th Engineer Bn

CO LtCol Ermine L. Meeker 1Jan-31Oct66

LtCol Frank W. Harris III 1Nov-31Dec66

9th Engineer Bn*

**The battalion arrived in RVN on 6Jun66.*

CO LtCol Richard W. Crispen 6Jun-31Dec66

Marine Operating Forces, Western Pacific

1st MAW (Rear)/TG 79.3* 1Jan-14Apr66

**1st MAW (Rear) was the controlling headquarters for most of the wing's units outside Vietnam until 14Apr66.*

CO Col Harry W. Taylor 1Jan-14Apr66

MAG-13 (1Jan-14Feb66)

CO Col Odia E. Howe, Jr. 1Jan-10Apr66

CO Col Edwin A. Harper 11Apr-14Apr66

H&MS-13 (1Jan-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Lytton F. Blass 1Jan-23Mar66

LtCol Kenneth G. Fiegenger 24Mar-14Apr66

MABS-13 (1Jan-14Apr66)

CO Maj William E. Caslin 1Jan-14Apr66

VMA-311 (1Jan-14Feb66)

CO LtCol Jack W. Harris 1Jan-14Apr66

VMFA-314 (1Jan-14Jan66)

CO Maj Charles A. Sewell 1Jan-14Apr66

VMFA-542 (1Jan-28Feb66)

CO LtCol Eddie E. Percy 1Jan-28Feb66

VMFA-115 (15Jan-10Apr66)

CO LtCol Clyde R. Jarrett 15Jan-22Feb66

LtCol Dean C. Macho 23Feb-10Apr66

VMA-214 (16Feb-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Keith O'Keefe 16Feb-31Mar66

LtCol Dellwyn L. Davis 1Apr-14Apr66

VMFA-323 (2Mar-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Andrew W. O'Donnell 2Mar-14Apr66

HMM-161 (4Jan-31Mar66)

Co LtCol Rex C. Denny, Jr. 4Jan-31Mar66

HMM-361 (1Apr-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Lloyd F. Childers 1Apr-14Apr66

VMGR-152 (1Jan-14Apr66)

CO LtCol Dan C. Holland 1Jan-14Apr66

9th MAB/TF 79*

**The 9th MAB was established on 1Mar66 and assumed responsibility for TF 79 from the CG 1st MarDiv on that date. On 15Apr66 the MAB assumed responsibility for most Marine air and ground units in the Western Pacific outside of Vietnam.*

9th MAB Headquarters

CO Col Herman Hansen, Jr	1Mar-29Mar66
BGen William A. Stiles	30Mar-14Apr66
BGen Michael P. Ryan	15Apr-31Dec66
C/S Col Herman Hansen, Jr	30Mar-23Sep66
Col Richard R. Amerine	24Sep-31Dec66
G-1 LtCol James M. Cummings	1Mar-21Sep66
LtCol Edward V. Easter	22Sep-31Dec66
G-2 Maj George J. Kleess	1Mar-14Sep66
Maj John H. Broujos	15Sep-4Oct66
Maj James C. Hitz	5Oct-31Dec66
G-3 Col Arnold L. Emils	1Mar-8Dec66
LtCol James G. Dionisopoulos	9Dec-31Dec66
G-4 Col Oscar B. Johnston	1Mar-3Oct66
Col Elton Mueller	4Oct-31Dec66

SLF 7th Fleet/TF 79.5

CO Col John R. Burnett	1Jan-6Apr66
Col Richard A. Brenneman	7Apr-31Aug66
Col Harry D. Wortman	1Sep-31Dec66

SLF Battalion Landing Teams**BLT 2/3 1Jan-27Feb66**

CO LtCol William K. Horn	1Jan-27Feb66
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BLT 1/5 28Feb-7May66

CO LtCol Harold L. Coffman	28Feb-7May66
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BLT 3/5 14May-1Aug66

CO LtCol Edward J. Bronars	14May-1Aug66
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BLT 1/26 2Aug-26Sep66

CO LtCol Anthony A. Monti	2Aug-26Sep66
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BLT 3/26 4Oct-10Dec66

CO LtCol Garland T. Beyerle	4Oct-10Dec66
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BLT 1/9 3Dec-31Dec66

CO Maj James L. Day	3Dec-31Dec66
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SLF Helicopter Squadrons**HMM-261 1Jan-5Jan66**

CO LtCol Mervin B. Potter	1Jan-5Jan66
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HMM-362 6Jan-8Apr66

CO LtCol James Aldworth	6Jan-8Apr66
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HMM-362 28Sep-31Dec66

CO LtCol Marshall B. Armstrong	28Sep-31Dec66
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RLT 5/79.2 30Mar-4Apr66

CO Col Charles F. Widdecke	30Mar-26May66
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BLT 2/5 30Mar-4Apr66

CO LtCol Robert H. Uskurait	30Mar-4Apr66
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BLT 3/5 7May-13May66

CO LtCol Edward J. Bronars	7May-13May66
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RLT 26 20Aug-31Dec66

CO Col John J. Padley	20Aug-31Dec66
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BLT 3/3 6Sep-29Oct66

CO LtCol Earl R. DeLong	6Sep-29Oct66
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BLT 1/9 5Oct-1Dec66

CO Maj James L. Day	5Oct-1Dec66
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BLT 2/4 8Nov-31Dec66

CO LtCol Arnold E. Bench	8Nov-31Dec66
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BLT 1/4 21Dec-31Dec66

CO LtCol Jack Westerman	21Dec-31Dec66
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1st Battalion, 13th Marines 20Aug-31Dec66

CO LtCol Joseph M. Laney, Jr	20Aug-28Oct66
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LtCol Robert L. Christian, Jr.	29Oct-31Dec66
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TG 79.2 2Oct-7Nov66

CO Col John J. Padley	2Oct-7Nov66
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BLT 3/3 2Oct-28Oct66

CO LtCol Earl R. DeLong	2Oct-28Oct66
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HMM-163 2Oct-28Oct66

CO LtCol Rocco D. Bianchi	2Oct-28Oct66
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MAG-13/TG 79.3* 15Apr-14Aug66

**MAG-13 came under the operational control of the 9th MAB on 15Apr66.*

CO Edwin A. Harper	15Apr-15Aug66
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Col Douglas D. Petty, Jr.	16Aug-24Sep66
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H&MS-13 15Apr-24Sep66

CO LtCol Kenneth G. Fiegenger	15Apr-13Sep66
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LtCol Owen L. Owens	26Aug-8Sep66
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MABS-13 15Apr-9Sep66

CO LtCol William E. Caslin	15Apr-14Aug66
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VMA-214 15Apr-29Apr66

CO LtCol Dellwyn L. Davis	15Apr-29Apr66
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VMFA 323 15Apr-4Jul66

CO LtCol Andrew W. O'Donnell	15Apr-4Jul66
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VMFA-314 15Apr-1Aug66

CO Maj Charles A. Sewell	15Apr-4May66
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LtCol Darrel E. Bjorklund	5May-1Aug66
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VMA-224 1May-6Jul66

CO LtCol John Browne	1May-6Jul66
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VMA-211 14Jul-30Sep66

CO LtCol Thomas J. Ayers	14Jul-30Sep66
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VMFA-542 1Aug-14Aug66

CO LtCol Donald L. May	1Aug-14Aug66
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HMM-361 15Apr-26May66

CO LtCol Lloyd F. Childers	15Apr-9May66
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LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	10May-26May66
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HMM-263 24May-31Jul66		VMF(AW)-232 2Sep-15Nov66	
CO LtCol Jerome L. Goebel	24May-31Jul66	CO LtCol Nicholas M. Trapnell, Jr.	2Sep-15Nov66
HMM-163 1Aug-14Aug66		VMF(AW)-235 16Nov-31Dec66	
CO LtCol Rocco D. Bianchi	1Aug-14Aug66	CO LtCol Edward R. Rogal	16Nov-31Dec66
MACS-6 15Apr-14Aug66		VMA-223 1Dec-31Dec66	
CO Maj Francis L. Delaney	15Apr-14Aug66	CO LtCol Leonard C. Taft	1Dec-31Dec66
VMGR-152 15Apr-14Aug66		VMFA-542 15Aug-9Oct66	
CO LtCol Dan C. Holland	15Apr-19May66	CO LtCol Donald L. May	15Aug-9Oct66
LtCol John Urell	20May-14Aug66	HMM-163 15Aug-31Dec66	
		CO LtCol Rocco D. Bianchi	15Aug-31Oct66
MAG-15/TG 79.3 15Aug-31Dec66		HMM-161 7Nov-17Dec66	
CO Col Charles Kimak	15Aug-31Dec66	CO LtCol Charles E. Wydner, Jr.	7Nov-17Dec66
H&MS-15 15Aug-31Dec66		HMM-361 16Dec-31Dec66	
CO LtCol James McDaniel	15Aug-31Dec66	CO LtCol McDonald D. Tweed	16Dec-31Dec66
MABS-15 15Aug-31Dec66		MACS-6 15Aug-31Dec66	
CO LtCol George H. Albers	15Aug-31Dec66	CO Maj Francis L. Delaney	15Aug-17Oct66
VMA-121 15Aug-30Nov66		Maj Richard L. Hawley	18Oct-1Nov66
CO LtCol Donald R. Stiver	15Aug-30Nov66	Maj William K. Hutchings	2Nov-31Dec66
		VMGR-152 15Aug-31Dec66	
		CO LtCol John Urell	15Aug-31Dec66

Appendix B

Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

- A-1E—Douglas Skyraider, a propeller-driven, single-engine, attack aircraft.
- A-4—Douglas Skyhawk, a single-seat, light-attack jet bomber in service on board carriers of the U.S. Navy and with land-based Marine attack squadrons.
- A-6A—Grumman Intruder, a twin-jet, low-level, attack bomber specifically designed to deliver weapons on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness.
- AAR—After action report.
- AC-47—Douglas C-47 Skytrain, fixed-wing transport modified with 7.62mm miniguns and used as a gunship.
- ADC—Assistant division commander.
- AdminO—Administrative officer.
- Adv—Advanced.
- AGC—Amphibious command ship.
- AK-47—Russian-made Kalashnikov automatic rifle, gas operated, uses 7.62mm ammunition with an effective range of 400 meters. It was the standard rifle of the North Vietnamese Army.
- AKA—Attack cargo ship, a naval ship designed to transport combat-loaded cargo in an assault landing.
- ANGLICO—Air and naval gunfire liaison company, an organization composed of Marine and Navy personnel specially qualified for shore control of naval gunfire and close air support.
- AOA—Amphibious objective area, a defined geographical area within which is located the area or areas to be captured by the amphibious task force.
- APA—Attack transport ship, a naval ship, designed for combat loading a battalion landing team.
- APC—Armored personnel carrier.
- Arc Light—The codename for B-52 bombing missions in South Vietnam.
- ARG—Amphibious ready group.
- Arty—Artillery.
- ARVN—Army of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).
- ASRT—Air support radar team, a subordinate operational component of a tactical air control system which provides ground controlled precision flight path guidance and weapons release.
- B-3 Front—North Vietnamese military command established in the Central Highlands of South Vietnam to control military operations in Kontum, Dar Loc, and Pleiku Provinces.
- B-52—Boeing Stratofortress, U.S. Air Force eight-engine, swept-wing, heavy jet bomber.
- BGen—Brigadier general.
- BLT—Battalion landing team.
- Bn—Battalion.
- Brig—Brigade.
- C-117D—Douglas Skytrain, a twin-engine transport aircraft.
- C-130—Lockheed Hercules, a four-engine turboprop transport aircraft.
- CAAR—Combat after action report.
- Capt—Captain.
- CAS—Close air support.
- CG—Commanding general.
- CH-37—Sikorsky twin-engine, assault, heavy transport helicopter which carries three crew members and 36 passengers.
- CH-46—Boeing Vertol Sea Knight, a twin-turbine, tandem-rotor transport helicopter, designed to carry a four-man crew and 17 combat-loaded troops.
- CH-53—Sikorsky Sea Stallion, a single-rotor, heavy assault transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an average payload of 12,800 pounds. Carries crew of three and 38 combat-loaded troops.
- CIDG—Civilian Irregular Defense Group, South Vietnamese paramilitary force, composed largely of Montagnards, the nomadic tribesmen who populate the South Vietnamese highlands, and advised by U.S. Army Special Forces troops.
- CinCPac—Commander in Chief, Pacific.
- CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.
- Class (I-V)—Categories of military supplies, e.g., Class I, rations; Class III, POL; Class V, Ammunition.
- CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps.
- CMH—Center of Military History, Department of the Army.
- CNO—Chief of Naval Operations.
- CO—Commanding officer.
- Col—Colonel.
- Cdr—Commander.
- Combined action program—A Marine pilot pacification program established at Phu Bai in August 1965 which integrated a Marine infantry squad with a South Vietnamese Popular Forces platoon.
- ComdC—Command chronology.
- ComUSMACV—Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- COSVN—Central Office of South Vietnam, the Communist military and political headquarters in South Vietnam.
- County Fair—A sophisticated cordon and search operation in a particular hamlet or village by South Vietnamese troops, police, local officials, and U.S. Marines in an attempt to screen and register the local inhabitants.
- CP—Command post.
- CRC—Control and reporting center, an element of the U.S. Air Force tactical air control system, subordinate to the Tactical Air Control Center, from which radar and warning operations are conducted.
- CTZ—Corps Tactical Zone.

DASC—Direct air support center—A subordinate operational component of the Marine air control system designed for control and direction of close air support and other direct air support operations.

D-Day—Day scheduled for the beginning of an operation.

DD—Destroyer.

DMZ—Demilitarized Zone separating North and South Vietnam.

DRV—Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

Dtd—Dated.

Div—Division.

DOD—Department of Defense.

EA-6A—The electronic countermeasures version of the A-6A Intruder.

ECM—Electronic countermeasures, a major subdivision of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce the effectiveness of enemy equipment and tactics employing or affected by electromagnetic radiations and to exploit the enemy's use of such radiations.

EF-10B—An ECM modified version of the Navy F-3D Skyknight, a two-engine jet night-fighter.

ELINT—Electronic intelligence, the intelligence information product of activities engaged in the collection and processing, for subsequent intelligence purposes, of foreign, noncommunications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations and radioactive sources.

Engr—Engineer.

F-4B—McDonnell Phantom II, a twin-engined, two-seat, long-range, all-weather jet interceptor and attack bomber.

FAC (A)—Forward air controller (Airborne).

FFV—Field Force, Vietnam I and II, U.S. Army commands in II and III Corps areas of South Vietnam.

FLC—Force Logistic Command.

FLSG—Force logistic support group.

FLSU—Force logistic support unit.

FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

FO—Forward observer.

FSCC—Fire support coordination center, a single location in which were centralized communication facilities and personnel incident to the coordination of all forms of fire support.

FSR—Force service regiment.

Fwd—Forward.

G—Refers to staff positions on a general staff, e. g., G-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; G-2 intelligence; G-3 operations; G-4 logistics, etc.

Gen—General.

Golden Fleece—Marine rice harvest protection operation.

Grenade Launcher, M79—U.S. built, single-shot, break-open, breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire of five-seven rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters.

Gun, 175mm, M107—U.S. built, self-propelled gun which weighs 62,000 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum range of 32,800 meters. Maximum rate of fire is one-half round per minute.

Gun, 155mm, M53—U.S. built, medium, self-propelled gun,

with a 23,300 meter range, and weighing 96,000 pounds. It has a sustained rate of fire of one-half rounds per minute.

GVN—Government of Vietnam (South Vietnam).

H&I fires—Harassing and interdiction fires.

H&S Co—Headquarters and service company.

HAWK—A mobile, surface-to-air, guided missile, designed to defend against enemy aircraft flying at low altitudes and short-range missiles.

HE—High explosive.

H-Hour—In connection with planned operations, it is the specific hour the operation begins.

HistBr, G-3Div, HQMC—Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps.

HLZ—Helicopter landing zone.

HMM—Marine medium helicopter squadron.

Howitzer, 8 inch (M55)—U.S. built, self-propelled heavy-artillery piece with a maximum range of 16,800 meters and a rate of fire of one-half rounds per minute.

Howitzer, 105mm, M101A1—U.S. built, towed, general purpose light artillery piece with a maximum range of 11,000 meters and maximum rate of fire of four rounds per minute.

Howitzer, 155mm, M-114A towed and M-109 self-propelled—U.S. built medium artillery with a maximum range of 15,080 meters and a maximum rate of fire of 3 rounds per minute. Marines employed both models in Vietnam. The newer and heavier self-propelled M109 was largely road bound, while the lighter towed M114A could be moved either by truck or by helicopter.

Howtar—A 4.2-inch (107mm) mortar tube mounted on the frame of a 75mm pack howitzer.

"Huey"—Popular name for UH-1 series of helicopters.

ICC—International Control Commission established by the Geneva Accords of 1954 to supervise the truce ending the First Indochina War between the French and the Viet Minh and resulting in the partition of Vietnam at the 17th Parallel. The members of the Commission were from Canada, India, and Poland.

ICCC—I Corps Coordinating Council, consisting of U.S. and Vietnamese officials in I Corps and coordinated the civilian assistance program in I Corps.

I Corps—The military and administrative subdivision which includes the five northern provinces of South Vietnam.

J—The designations for members of a joint staff which includes members of several services comprising the command, e. g., J-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel; J-2 intelligence; J-3 operations; J-4 logistic etc.

JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.).

JGS—Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese).

JTD—Joint table of distribution.

KANZUS—A proposed international brigade to man defenses along the DMZ; the acronym stands for Korean, Australian, New Zealand, and United States.

KC-130—The in-flight refueling tanker configuration of the C-130 Lockheed Hercules.

KIA—Killed-in-action.

Kit Carson Scout—Viet Cong defectors recruited by Marines to serve as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence agents.

L-Hour—In planned helicopter operations, it is the specific hour the helicopter land in the landing zone.

LAAM Bn—Light antiaircraft missile battalion.

LCM—Landing Craft mechanized, designed to land tanks, trucks, and trailers directly onto the beach.

LCVP—Landing craft vehicle personnel, the principal craft used to transport assault troops to the beach.

LOI—Letter of Instruction.

LPD—Amphibious transport, dock, a ship designed to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked landing craft, amphibious vehicles, and helicopters.

LPH—Amphibious assault ship, a ship designed or modified to transport and land troops, equipment, and supplies by means of embarked helicopters.

LSA—Logistic support area.

LSD—Landing ship, dock, a landing ship designed to combat load, transport, and launch amphibious crafts or vehicles together with crews and embarked personnel, and to provide limited docking and repair services to small ships and crafts.

LST—Landing ship, tank, landing ship designed to transport heavy vehicles and to land them on a beach.

Lt—Lieutenant.

LtCol—Lieutenant colonel.

LtGen—Lieutenant general.

Ltr—letter.

LVTE—Amphibian vehicle, tracked engineer, a lightly armored amphibious vehicle designed for minefield and obstacle clearance.

LVTH—Amphibian vehicle, tracked howitzer, a lightly armored, self-propelled, amphibious 105mm howitzer.

LVTP—Landing vehicle, tracked personnel, an amphibian vehicle used to land and or transport personnel.

LZ—Landing zone.

MAB—Marine Amphibious Brigade.

Machine gun, .50 caliber—U.S. built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters.

Machine gun, M60—U.S. built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 20 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,000 meters.

MACS—Marine air control squadron, provides and operates ground facilities for the detection and interception of hostile aircraft and for the navigational direction of friendly aircraft in the conduct of support operations.

MACV—Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.

MAF—Marine amphibious force.

MAG—Marine aircraft group.

Main Force—Refers to organized Viet Cong battalions and regiments as opposed to local VC guerrilla groups.

Maj—Major.

MajGen—Major general.

MarDiv—Marine division.

—Marines—Designates a Marine regiment, e.g. 3d Marines.

MASS—Marine air support squadron, provides and operates facilities for the control of support aircraft operating in direct support of ground forces.

MAW—Marine aircraft wing.

MCAF—Marine Corps air facility.

MCAS—Marine Corps air station.

MCCC—Marine Corps Command Center.

MCOAG—Marine Corps Operations Analysis Group.

MedCap—Medical civilian assistance program.

MIA—Missing-in-action.

MilHistBr—Military History Branch.

Mortar, 4.2-inch, M30—U.S. built, rifled, muzzle-loaded, drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, base-plate and standard; weapon weighs 330 pounds and has a maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute.

Mortar, 60mm, M19—U.S. built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon, which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.

Mortar, 81mm, M29—U.S. built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon, which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled; it has a sustained rate of fire of two rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,300-3,650 meters, depending upon ammunition used.

Mortar, 82mm, Soviet-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.

Mortar, 120mm—Soviet or Chinese Communist built, smooth bore, drop or trigger fired, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon, which weighs approximately 600 pounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.

MR-5—Military Region 5, a Communist political and military sector in northern South Vietnam, including all of I Corps.

MS—Manuscript.

Msg—Message.

NAG—Naval Advisory Group.

NCC—Naval component commander.

NCO—Non-commissioned officer.

Ngu Hanh Son—The pilot pacification program begun south of Da Nang in 1965 and incorporated into the I Corps National Priority Area in 1966.

NLF—National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist-led insurgency against the South Vietnamese Government.

NMCB—Naval mobile construction battalion (Seabees).

NMCC—National Military Command Center.

NPA—National priority area, designated targeted area for pacification in South Vietnam.

Nui—Vietnamese word for hill or mountain.

Nung—A Vietnamese tribesman, of a separate ethnic group and probably of Chinese origin, trained for special operations and used as separate bodyguards.

NVA—North Vietnamese Army.

O-1B—Cessna, single-engine observation aircraft.

OAB, NHD—Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division.

Ontos—U.S. built, lightly-armored tracked antitank vehicle armed with six coaxially mounted 106mm recoilless rifles.

OpCon—Operational control, the authority granted to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location.

OpO—Operation order, a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.

OPlan—Operation plan, a plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession; it is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders.

OpSum—Operational summary.

OSJS (MACV)—Office of the Secretariat, Joint Staff (Military Assistance Command Vietnam).

PAVN—Peoples Army of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

PF—Popular Force, Vietnamese militia who were usually employed in the defense of their own communities.

POL—Petroleum, oil, and lubricants.

Practice Nine—The codename for the planning of the antiinfiltration barrier across the DMZ.

Project Delta—A special South Vietnamese reconnaissance group consisting of South Vietnamese Special Forces troops and U.S. Army Special Forces advisors.

Recoilless rifle, 106mm, M401A1—U.S. built, single-shot, recoilless, breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained rate of fire of six rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters.

RF—Regional Force, Vietnamese militia who were employed in a specific area.

RF-4B—Photo-reconnaissance model of the F4B Phantom II.

RF-8A—Reconnaissance version of the F-8 Chance Vought Crusader.

Regt—Regiment.

Revolutionary Development—The South Vietnamese pacification program in 1966.

Revolutionary Development Teams—Especially trained Vietnamese political cadre who were assigned to individual hamlets and villages and conducted various pacification and civilian assistance tasks on a local level.

Rifle, M14—Gas-operated, magazine-fed, air-cooled, semi-automatic, 7.62mm caliber shoulder weapon, which weighs 12 pounds with a full 20-round magazine; it has a sustained rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and an effective range of 460 meters.

RLT—Regimental landing team.

ROK—Republic of Korea (South Korea)

Rolling Thunder—Codename for U.S. air operations over North Vietnam.

RRU—Radio Research Unit.

Rural Reconstruction—The predecessor pacification campaign to Revolutionary Development.

RVN—Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam)

RVNAF—Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.

S- —Refers to staff positions on regimental and battalion levels.

S-1 would refer to the staff member responsible for personnel;

S-2 intelligence; S-3, operations; S-4 logistics; etc.

SAR—Search and rescue.

SATS—Short airfield for tactical support, a minimal expeditionary airfield used by Marine Corps aviation elements providing tactical air support for the landing force; characterized by a portable runway surface, aircraft launching and recovery devices, and other essential expeditionary airfield components.

SEATO—Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

2d AD—2d Air Division, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam prior to the establishment of the Seventh Air Force.

SecDef—Secretary of Defense.

SecState—Secretary of State.

Seventh AF—Seventh Air Force, the major U.S. Air Force command in Vietnam.

Seventh Flt—Seventh Fleet, the U.S. fleet assigned to the Pacific.

SitRep—Situation Report.

SLF—Special landing force.

Song—River in Vietnamese.

SOP—Standing operating procedure, set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure.

Sortie—An operational flight by one aircraft.

Steel Tiger—The codename for the air campaign over Laos.

Stingray—Special Marine reconnaissance missions in which small Marine reconnaissance teams call artillery and air attacks on targets of opportunity.

Strike Company—an elite company in a South Vietnamese infantry division, directly under the control of the division commander.

Struggle Forces—the coalition in I Corps which directed the protests against the central government after the removal of the I Corps commander Nguyen Chanh Thi in the spring of 1966. Also known as "Military and Civilian Struggle Committee for I Corps" and "Popular Forces to Struggle for the Revolution."

TAC (A)—Tactical air coordinator (Airborne), an officer, who coordinates from an airplane, the action of aircraft in close support operations.

TACC—Tactical air control center, the principal air operations installation from which all aircraft and air-warning functions of tactical air operations are controlled.

TADC—Tactical air direction center, an air operations installation under the overall control of the tactical air control center, from which is directed aircraft and aircraft warning functions of the tactical air center.

TAOC—Tactical air operations center, a subordinate operational component of the Marine air command and control system designed for direction and control of all en route air traffic and air defense operations.

TAFDS—Tactical airfield fuel dispensing system, the expeditionary storage and dispensing system of aviation fuel at tactical airfields. It uses 10,000 gallon fabric tanks to store the fuel.

Tally Ho—Bombing campaign under ComUSMACV begun in July 1966 of Route Package I in North Vietnam.

Tank, M48—U.S. built 50.7-ton tank with a crew of four; primary armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30 caliber and one .50 caliber machine gun. Maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.

TAOR—Tactical area of responsibility, a defined area of land for which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area as a measure for control of assigned forces and coordination of support.

TE—Task element.

TG—Task Group.

Tiger Hound—Airstrikes in Laos directed by U.S. Air Force small fixed-wing observation aircraft, flying up to 12 miles in southeastern Laos.

TU—Task unit.

UH-1E-Bell "Huey"—A single-engine, light attack/transport helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three with seven combat troops; in its armored configuration it is armed with air-to-ground rocket packs and fuselage-mounted, electrically-fired machine guns.

UH-34D—Sikorsky Sea Horse, a single-engine medium transport helicopter with a crew of three, carries 16-18 combat soldiers.

USA—United States Army.

USAF—United States Air Force.

USAID—United States Agency for International Development.

USMC—United States Marine Corps.

U.S. Mission Council—Council, chaired by the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and included ComUSMACV, which

developed and coordinated U.S. policy within South Vietnam.

USN—United States Navy.

USOM—United States Operations Mission, the United States civilian organization in RVN including the U.S. Embassy, AID, etc.

VC—Viet Cong, a term used to refer to the Communist guerrilla in South Vietnam; a derogatory construction of the Vietnamese phrase meaning "Vietnamese Communists."

Viet Minh—The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups, which actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French in the first Indochina War.

VMA—Marine attack squadron.

VMF (AW)—Marine fighter squadron (all-weather).

VMFA—Marine fighter attack squadron.

VMCJ—Marine composite reconnaissance squadron.

VMGR—Marine refueller transport squadron.

VMO—Marine observation aircraft squadron.

VNAF—Vietnamese Air Force.

VNMB—Vietnamese Marine Brigade.

VNMC—Vietnamese Marine Corps.

VNN—Vietnamese Navy.

VT—Variable timed electronic fuze for an artillery shell which causes airburst over the target area.

WestPac—Western Pacific.

WIA—Wounded-in-action.

WFRC—Washington Federal Records Center.

Appendix C

Chronology of Significant Events

- 4 Jan—The Special Forces camp at Khe Sanh reported 20 rounds of incoming 120mm mortar fire. This was the first confirmed enemy use of 120mm mortars in RVN.
- 18 Jan—The 1st Marines Headquarters arrived at Chu Lai.
- 28 Jan-19 Feb—Operation Double Eagle I was conducted by Task Force Delta in southern Quang Ngai Province.
- 6-8 Feb—President Johnson together with senior military and civilian advisors met with South Vietnamese Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and Head of State Nguyen Van Thieu in Honolulu. The resulting "Declaration of Honolulu" outlined U.S. and South Vietnamese political and military policy.
- 19 Feb-1 Mar—Operation Double Eagle II was conducted 30 miles south of Da Nang.
- 23 Feb—A detachment of the 3d FSR; HQ, 11th Marines; a detachment of HQ Bn, 1st Marine Division; and 4/11 arrived RVN.
- 1 Mar—The 26th Marines was activated at Camp Pendleton, California, initiating the formation of the 5th Marine Division. The 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade was activated on Okinawa.
- 4-7 Mar—Task Force Delta conducted Operation Utah south of Chu Lai.
- 7 Mar—Secretary of Defense McNamara requested authorization for 278,184 Marines on active duty by 30 June 1967. This increase made the Marine Corps the only service to have a strength larger than its peak during the Korean War.
- 9-12 Mar—The *NVA 95th Regiment* overran the A Shau Special Forces Camp in western Thua Thien Province. HMM-163 assisted in the evacuation of the camp.
- 10 Mar—Prime Minister Ky removed LtGen Nguyen Chanh Thi from his position as ARVN commander, I Corps. As a result of this, protest demonstrations and strikes began in the Hue-Da Nang area and slowly spread to Saigon.
- 15 Mar—The Force Logistic Command (FLC) was established at Da Nang. The unit is made up of the 1st and 3d Service Battalions and the in-country elements of the 3d Force Service Regiment (FSR).
- 18 Mar—MajGen Wood B. Kyle assumed command of the 3d Marine Division from General Walt. General Walt continued as CG III MAF.
- 18 Mar—3d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived RVN.
- 20-25 Mar—Operation Texas was conducted south of Chu Lai by Task Force Delta.
- 26 Mar-6 Apr—The SLF Battalion, BLT 1/5, began Operation Jack Stay in the Rung Sat Special Zone about 27 miles SE of Saigon. This was the first operation by American troops in the Saigon River Delta.
- 29 Mar—MajGen Lewis J. Fields established the 1st Marine Division Headquarters at Chu Lai.
- 1 Apr—U. S. Naval Forces, MACV was established in Saigon and assumed control of the Naval Support Activity, Da Nang from III MAF. The 2d Air Division was redesignated the Seventh Air Force.
- 12 Apr—The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines arrived in RVN.
- 7 May—CG FMFPac assumed operational control of RLT-26.
- 8 May—1st Battalion, 5th Marines arrived RVN (formerly SLF).
- 15-31 May—The political unrest in I Corps flared up as Prime Minister Ky sent ARVN units, loyal to the Saigon government, into Da Nang to reestablish his authority. After several days, the "Struggle Forces" in Da Nang backed down but in Hue the situation was out of control until the end of the month.
- 16 May—MajGen Lewis B. Robertshaw relieved MajGen Keith B. McCutcheon as CG 1st MAW.
- 27 May—The 5th Marines Headquarters arrived at Chu Lai from Okinawa.
- 28 May—The 1st Military Police Battalion arrived at Da Nang from ConUS.
- 1-21 Jun—In Hue, militant Buddhist Thich Tri Quang began a hunger strike in protest against the government. The Buddhist leader was subsequently arrested and moved to Saigon where he was imprisoned.
Forces loyal to the South Vietnamese government seized the Buddhist-controlled cities of Hue and Quang Tri and the Buddhist Secular Affairs Institute Headquarters in Saigon.
Ten civilians, representing different religions and political factions, were added to South Vietnam's ruling junta on 6 June. In Saigon, the Unified Buddhist Church issued a manifesto disavowing Communism and recognizing the necessity of the temporary presence of American forces.
- 7 June-30 Jun—The 3d Marine Division conducted Operation Liberty, an extensive pacification sweep and clear operation in the Da Nang TAOR.
- 18-27 Jun—Deckhouse I was the first of a series of SLF amphibious attacks on Viet Cong coastal strongholds. This operation was in Phu Yen Province, 12 miles NW of Tuy Hoa in II CTZ. There were four operations in this series during 1966.
- 7 Jul-2 Aug—Operation Hastings, a search and destroy mission, 55 miles NW of Hue, was conducted under the command of Task Force Delta to counter the movement of the *NVA 324B Division* across the DMZ. In addition BLT 3/5 made an am-

phibious landing and conducted Deckhouse II in conjunction with Hastings.

- 1 Aug—The advance echelon of the 2d Korean Marine Brigade arrived in I Corps approximately three miles south of Chu Lai.
- 3 Aug—The Marines began Operation Prairie in the former Hastings Area of Operations. Prairie, which started as a one-battalion operation, soon expanded into a multi-battalion campaign and continued through the end of the year. The Marines encountered elements of two NVA divisions, the 324B and the 341st.
- 26 Aug—The campaign for election to South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly officially opened with 540 candidates running.
- 28 Aug—BLT 2/26 arrived at Da Nang.
- 11 Sep—Of the 718,024 eligible voters in the I Corps area, 87.4 percent voted in South Vietnam's Constituent Assembly election. Over 80 percent of those registered voted throughout South Vietnam.
- 15-18 Sep—Deckhouse IV amphibious search and destroy operation was conducted in conjunction with Prairie I, eight miles NE of Dong Ha in I CTZ.
- 19 Sep—The 2d Battalion of the 2d Brig, ROKMC arrived at Chu Lai from Cam Ranh Bay.
- 25 Sep—MAG-13 arrived at Chu Lai from Iwakuni.
- 27 Sep—Elements of BLT 3/26 arrived at Okinawa.
- 1 Oct—MajGen Herman Nickerson Jr., relieved MajGen Lewis J. Fields as CG 1st Marine Division.
- 2 Oct—Battery C, 6th Bn (175mm guns), 27th Arty, USA, came under the operational control of Task Force Delta.
- 8 Oct—The 4th Battalion, 503rd Abn Inf, 173rd Abn Brig, USA, arrived at Da Nang.
- 10 Oct—The 3d Marine Division was ordered to displace to Thua Thien and Quang Tri Provinces to conduct offensive operations as directed and continue current offensive operations in the Phu Bai TAOR. Task Force Delta was ordered deactivated and Task Force X-Ray was activated at Chu Lai under the 1st Marine Division. The 1st Division assumed responsibility for all three southern provinces.
- 17-18 Oct—The 1st Bn, 40th Field Arty Regt (105mm How [SP]), USA, arrived at Da Nang and the next day the 2d Bn, 94th Arty Regt (175mm gun), USA, arrived.
- 24-25 Oct—At a conference in Manila, President Johnson met with leaders of six other nations: South Vietnam, New Zealand, Australia, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. The conferees issued a four-point "Declaration of Peace," calling for the peaceful settlement of the Vietnam War.
- 23 Nov—The Office of Civil Operations was established in South Vietnam as a U.S. Embassy activity to direct U.S. civilian support of revolutionary development.
- 29 Nov—Headquarters Btry, 1st Field Arty Grp (FAG), arrived at Chu Lai.
- 3 Dec—The 4thBn, 503d Inf, USA, departed I CTZ for III CTZ. The battalion was relieved by 3/9.
- 6 Dec—The administration disclosed that 9 to 10 billion dollars more is needed to pay for the war in Vietnam in the current fiscal year.
- 31 Dec—III MAF strength at the end of the year was 65,789.

Appendix D

Medal of Honor Citations, 1966

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR posthumously to

STAFF SERGEANT PETER S. CONNOR
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action against enemy Viet Cong forces at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Platoon Sergeant of the Third Platoon, Company F, Second Battalion, Third Marines, First Marine Division (Reinforced), Fleet Marine Force, in Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam on 25 February 1966. Leading his platoon on a search and destroy operation in an area made particularly hazardous by extensive cave and tunnel complexes, Sergeant Connor maneuvered his unit aggressively forward under intermittent enemy small arms fire. Exhibiting particular alertness and keen observation, he spotted an enemy spider hole emplacement approximately fifteen meters to his front. He pulled the pin from a fragmentation grenade intending to charge the hole boldly and drop the missile into its depths. Upon pulling the pin he realized that the firing mechanism was faulty, and that even as he held the safety device firmly in place, the fuze charge was already activated. With only precious seconds to decide, he further realized that he could not cover the distance to the small opening of the spider hole in sufficient time, and that to hurl the deadly bomb in any direction would result in death or injury to some of his comrades tactically deployed near him. Manifesting extraordinary gallantry and with utter disregard for his personal safety, he chose to hold the grenade against his own body in order to absorb the terrific explosion and spare his comrades. His act of extreme valor and selflessness in the face of virtually certain death, although leaving him mortally wounded, spared many of his fellow Marines from death or injury. His gallant action in giving his life in the cause of freedom reflects the highest credit upon the Marine Corps and the Armed Forces of the United States.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

GUNNERY SERGEANT JIMMIE E. HOWARD
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as a Platoon Leader, Company C, First Reconnaissance Battalion, First Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam. Gunnery Sergeant (then Staff Sergeant) Howard and his eighteen-man platoon were occupying an observation post deep within enemy-controlled territory. Shortly after midnight on 16 June 1966, a Viet Cong force of estimated battalion size approached the Marines' position and launched a vicious attack with small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire. Reacting swiftly and fearlessly in the face of the overwhelming odds, Gunnery Sergeant Howard skillfully organized his small but determined force into a tight perimeter defense and calmly moved from position to position to direct his men's fire. Throughout the night, during assault after assault, his courageous example and firm leadership inspired and motivated his men to withstand the unrelenting fury of the hostile fire in the seemingly hopeless situation. He constantly shouted encouragement to his men and exhibited imagination and resourcefulness in directing their return fire. When fragments of an exploding enemy grenade wounded him severely and prevented him from moving his legs, he distributed his ammunition to the remaining members of his platoon and proceeded to maintain radio communications and direct air strikes on the enemy with uncanny accuracy. At dawn, despite the fact that five men were killed and all but one wounded, his beleaguered platoon was still in command of its position. When evacuation helicopters approached his position, Gunnery Sergeant Howard warned them away and called for additional air strikes and directed devastating small arms fire and air strikes against enemy automatic weapons positions in order to make the landing zone as secure as possible. Through his extraordinary courage and resolute fighting spirit, Gunnery Sergeant Howard was largely responsible for preventing the loss of his entire platoon. His valiant leadership and courageous fighting spirit served to inspire the men of his platoon to heroic endeavor in the face of overwhelming odds, and reflect the highest credit upon Gunnery Sergeant Howard, the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

SECOND LIEUTENANT JOHN J. MCGINTY III
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Acting Platoon Leader, First Platoon, Company K, Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam on 18 July 1966, Second Lieutenant (then Staff Sergeant) McGinty's platoon, which was providing rear security to protect the withdrawal of the Battalion from a position which had been under attack for three days, came under heavy small arms, automatic weapons, and mortar fire from an estimated enemy regiment. With each successive human wave which assaulted his thirty-two-man platoon during the four-hour battle, Second Lieutenant McGinty rallied his men to beat off the enemy. In one bitter assault, two of the squads became separated from the remainder of the platoon. With complete disregard for his safety, Second Lieutenant McGinty charged through intense automatic weapons and mortar fire to their position. Finding twenty men wounded and the Medical Corpsman killed, he quickly reloaded ammunition magazines and weapons for the wounded men and directed their fire upon the enemy. Although he was painfully wounded as he moved to care for the disabled men, he continued to shout encouragement to his troops and to direct their fire so effectively that the attacking hordes were beaten off. When the enemy tried to out-flank his position, he killed five of them at point-blank range with his pistol. When they again seemed on the verge of overrunning the small force, he skillfully adjusted artillery and air strikes within fifty yards of his position. This destructive fire power routed the enemy, who left an estimated 500 bodies on the battlefield. Second Lieutenant McGinty's personal heroism, indomitable leadership, selfless devotion to duty, and bold fighting spirit inspired his men to resist the repeated attacks by a fanatical enemy, reflected great credit upon himself, and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

MAJOR ROBERT J. MODRZEJEWSKI
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty while serving as Commanding Officer, Company K, Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division, in the Republic of Vietnam from 15 to 18 July 1966. On 15 July, during Operation Hastings, Company K was landed in an enemy infested jungle area to establish a blocking position at a major enemy trail network. Shortly after landing, the Company encountered a reinforced enemy platoon in a well organized, defensive position. Major (then Captain) Modrzejewski led his men in the successful seizure of the enemy redoubt, which contained large quantities of ammunition and supplies. That evening a numerically superior enemy force counterattacked in an effort to retake the vital supply area, thus setting the pattern of activity for the next two and one-half days. In the first series of attacks, the enemy assaulted repeatedly in overwhelming numbers but each time was repulsed by the gallant Marines. The second night the enemy struck in battalion strength, and Major Modrzejewski was wounded in this intensive action which was fought at close quarters. Although exposed to enemy fire, and despite his painful wounds, he crawled 200 meters to provide critically needed ammunition to an exposed element of his command and was constantly present wherever the fighting was heaviest. Despite numerous casualties, a dwindling supply of ammunition and the knowledge that they were surrounded, he skillfully directed artillery fire to within a few meters of his position and courageously inspired the efforts of his Company in repelling the aggressive enemy attack. On 18 July, Company K was attacked by a regimental size enemy force. Although his unit was vastly outnumbered and weakened by the previous fighting, Major Modrzejewski reorganized his men and calmly moved among them to encourage and direct their efforts to heroic limits as they fought to overcome the vicious enemy onslaught. Again he called in air and artillery strikes at close range with devastating effect on the enemy, which together with the bold and determined fighting of the men of Company K, repulsed the fanatical attack of the larger North Vietnamese force. His unparalleled personal heroism and indomitable leadership inspired his men to a significant victory over the enemy force and reflected great credit upon himself, the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

MAJOR HOWARD V. LEE
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as Commanding Officer, Company E, Fourth Marines, Third Marine Division near Cam Lo, Republic of Vietnam, on 8 and 9 August 1966. A platoon of Major (then Captain) Lee's company, while on an operation deep in enemy territory, was attacked and surrounded by a large Vietnamese force. Realizing that the unit had suffered numerous casualties, depriving it of effective leadership, and fully aware that the platoon was even then under heavy attack by the enemy, Major Lee took seven men and proceeded by helicopter to reinforce the beleaguered platoon. Major Lee disembarked from the helicopter with two of his men and, braving withering enemy fire, led them into the perimeter, where he fearlessly moved from position to position, directing and encouraging the overtaxed troops. The enemy then launched a massive attack with the full might of their forces. Although painfully wounded by fragments from an enemy grenade in several areas of his body, including his eye, Major Lee continued undauntedly throughout the night to direct the defense, coordinate supporting fires, and apprise higher headquarters of the plight of the platoon. The next morning he collapsed from his wounds and was forced to relinquish command. However, the small band of Marines had held their position and repeatedly fought off many vicious enemy attacks for a grueling six hours until their evacuation was effected the following morning. Major Lee's actions saved his men from capture, minimized the loss of lives, and dealt the enemy a severe defeat. His indomitable fighting spirit, superb leadership, and great personal valor in the face of tremendous odds, reflect great credit upon himself and are in keeping with the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

The President of the United States in the name of The Congress takes pride in presenting the MEDAL OF HONOR to

SERGEANT RICHARD A. PITTMAN
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION

For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty as a member of First Platoon, Company I, Third Battalion, Fifth Marines during combat operations near the Demilitarized Zone, Republic of Vietnam. On 24 July 1966, while Company I was conducting an operation along the axis of a narrow jungle trail, the leading company elements suffered numerous casualties when they suddenly came under heavy fire from a well concealed and numerically superior enemy force. Hearing the engaged Marines' calls for more firepower, Sergeant (then Lance Corporal) Pittman quickly exchanged his rifle for a machine gun and several belts of ammunition, left the relative safety of his platoon, and unhesitatingly rushed forward to aid his comrades. Taken under intense enemy small-arms fire at point blank range during his advance, he returned the fire, silencing the enemy positions. As Sergeant Pittman continued to forge forward to aid members of the leading platoon, he again came under heavy fire from two automatic weapons which he promptly destroyed. Learning that there were additional wounded Marines fifty yards further along the trail, he braved a withering hail of enemy mortar and small-arms fire to continue onward. As he reached the position where the leading Marines had fallen, he was suddenly confronted with a bold frontal attack by 30 to 40 enemy. Totally disregarding his own safety, he calmly established a position in the middle of the trail and raked the advancing enemy with devastating machine gun fire. His weapon rendered ineffective, he picked up a submachine gun and, together with a pistol seized from a fallen comrade, continued his lethal fire until the enemy force had withdrawn. Having exhausted his ammunition except for a grenade which he hurled at the enemy, he then rejoined his own platoon. Sergeant Pittman's daring initiative, bold fighting spirit and selfless devotion to duty inflicted many enemy casualties, disrupted the enemy attack and saved the lives of many of his wounded comrades. His personal valor at grave risk to himself reflects the highest credit upon himself, the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

Appendix E

List of Reviewers

Marines

Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr. (Ret)
Gen Lewis W. Walt (Ret)

LtGen Leslie E. Brown (Ret)
LtGen Leo J. Dulacki (Ret)
LtGen Hugh M. Elwood (Ret)
LtGen Lewis J. Fields (Ret)
LtGen Victor H. Krulak (Ret)
LtGen Herman Nickerson, Jr. (Ret)
LtGen Louis B. Robertshaw (Ret)
LtGen Lawrence F. Snowden (Ret)

MajGen Marion E. Carl (Ret)
MajGen Lowell E. English (Ret)
MajGen Harold A. Hatch
MajGen Wood B. Kyle (Ret)
MajGen Oscar F. Peatross (Ret)

BGen Edward J. Doyle (Ret)
BGen Roy E. Moss
BGen Edwin H. Simmons (Ret)
BGen William A. Stiles (Ret)

Col Sidney J. Altman (Ret)
Col Nels E. Anderson (Ret)
Col Emmett O. Anglin, Jr. (Ret)
Col Edward L. Bale, Jr. (Ret)
Col Drew J. Barrett, Jr. (Ret)
Col Noble L. Beck (Ret)
Col Van D. Bell, Jr. (Ret)
Col Arnold E. Bench (Ret)
Col Rocco D. Bianchi (Ret)
Col James M. Callender (Ret)

Col George W. Carrington, Jr. (Ret)
Col Bevan G. Cass (Ret)
Col Alexander D. Cereghino (Ret)
Col Steve J. Cibik (Ret)
Col James M. Cummings (Ret)
Col Clyde D. Dean
Col Earl R. Delong (Ret)

Col Nicholas J. Dennis (Ret)
Col Birchard B. DeWitt (Ret)
Col Haig Donabedian (Ret)

Col Joshua W. Dorsey, III (Ret)
Col Donald L. Evans, Jr. (Ret)
Col Fred J. Frazer (Ret)
Col William F. Fry (Ret)
Col Roy C. Gray, Jr. (Ret)
Col Edward E. Hammerbeck (Ret)
Col Harold A. Hayes, Jr. (Ret)
Col Vincil W. Hazelbaker
Col Peter L. Hilgartner (Ret)
Col William K. Horn (Ret)

Col Thomas M. Horne (Ret)
Col Robert M. Jenkins (Ret)
Col David G. Jones (Ret)
Col Charles J. Keever
Col Karl T. Keller (Ret)
Col James P. Kelly (Ret)
Col John P. Lanigan (Ret)
Col Edward R. McCarthy (Ret)
Col James F. McClanahan (Ret)
Col John L. Mahon (Ret)

Col Glen E. Martin (Ret)
Col William J. Masterpool
Col Herbert E. Mendenhall (Ret)
Col John F. Mentzer (Ret)
Col Anthony A. Monti
Col Samuel M. Morrow
Col Ross L. Mulford (Ret)
Col Michael J. Needham
Col Glenn E. Norris (Ret)
Col Thomas J. O'Connor (Ret)

Col Mauro J. Padalino (Ret)
Col Leslie L. Page (Ret)
Col Francis F. Parry (Ret)
Col Robert M. Port (Ret)
Col Walter S. Pullar, Jr.
Col Robert R. Read (Ret)
Col Edwin M. Rudzis (Ret)

Col Mitchell O. Sadler (Ret)
 Col Richard A. Savage (Ret)
 Col Donald W. Sherman (Ret)
 Col Harry W. Taylor (Ret)
 Col Frank C. Thomas (Ret)
 Col Paul C. Trammell (Ret)
 Col Leon N. Utter (Ret)
 Col Sumner A. Vale (Ret)
 Col Roy R. Van Cleve (Ret)
 Col Paul B. Watson, Jr. (Ret)
 Col E. Robert Watson (Ret)
 Col Gordon H. West (Ret)
 Col Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (Ret)
 Col Paul E. Wilson (Ret)
 Col Robert J. Zitnik (Ret)

LtCol James Aldworth (Ret)
 LtCol Billy H. Barber (Ret)
 LtCol Garland T. Beyerle (Ret)
 LtCol John E. Clements
 LtCol Dwain A. Colby (Ret)
 LtCol Ernest L. De Fazio (Ret)
 LtCol William F. Donahue, Jr. (Ret)
 LtCol Robert J. Driver, Jr.
 LtCol Jim T. Elkins (Ret)
 LtCol Fredric A. Green (Ret)
 LtCol George R. Griggs
 LtCol John J. Hess (Ret)
 LtCol John J. W. Hilgers
 LtCol Charles A. House (Ret)
 LtCol Richard E. Jones (Ret)
 LtCol Warren P. Kitterman (Ret)
 LtCol Timothy B. Lecky
 LtCol Alex Lee
 LtCol Howard V. Lee (Ret)
 LtCol Jerry D. Lindauer (Ret)
 LtCol Fred D. MacLean, Jr. (Ret)
 LtCol Robert J. Modrzejewski

LtCol McLendon G. Morris
 LtCol Martin E. O'Connor
 LtCol Raymond J. O'Leary (Ret)
 LtCol John J. Roothoff (Ret)
 LtCol Conway J. Smith (Ret)
 LtCol Daniel A. Somerville (Ret)
 LtCol Ralph E. Sullivan (Ret)
 LtCol Emerson A. Walker (Ret)

Maj James O. Black (Ret)
 Maj Marshall B. Darling
 Maj Charles L. George
 Maj Robert G. Handrahan
 Maj Richard E. Maresco
 Maj Theard J. Terrebone, Jr.

Capt Edwin W. Besch (Ret)
 Capt James J. Kirschke (Ret)

MGySgt J. J. McDowell

Others

Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff
 Center of Military History, Department of the Army
 Office of Air Force History, Department of the Air Force
 Naval History Division, Department of the Navy
 Adm John J. Hyland, USN (Ret)
 Adm Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, USN (Ret)
 Gen William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret)
 VAdm Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret)
 Capt John H. Craven, USN (Ret)
 Mr. V. Keith Fleming, Jr.
 Mr. Francis J. West, Jr.

Appendix F

Distribution of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific*

UNIT	DA NANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
<i>MAG-11</i>								
H&MS-11	3/UH-34D 4/TF-9J 1/C-117D							
VMCJ-1	9/EF-10B 1/RF-4B 4/EA-6A							
VMFA-115	11/F-4B							
VMF (AW)-232	15/F-8E							
VMA (AW)-242	12/A-6A							
<i>MAG-12</i>								
H&MS-12		1/C-117						
VMA-121		22/A-4E						
VMA-211		22/A-4E						
VMA-214		19/A-4C						
VMA-311		17/A-4E						
<i>MAG-13</i>								
H&MS-13		4/TF-9J 1/C-117						
VMFA-314		15/F-4B						
VMFA-323		13/F-4B						
VMFA-542		14/F-4B						
<i>MAG-15</i>								
H&MS-15					2/C-54 2/TF-9J 1/C-117D			
VMGR-152				12/KC-130F				
VMA-223					19/A-4E			
VMF (AW)-235					10/F-8E			
HMM-361				23/UH-34D				
HMM-362								24/UH-34D**
<i>MAG-16</i>								
H&MS-16	1/C-117D 9/O-1C 4/UH-34D 6/CH-37C							
VMO-2	27/UH-1E							
HMM-163			24/UH-34D					
HMM-164	20/CH-46A							2CH-46A**
HMM-263	22/UH-34D							
HMM-265	22/CH-46A							

UNIT	DA NANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
<i>MW/SG-17</i> H&MS-17	1/UC-45J 4/UH-34D 2/C-117D 2/US-2B							
<i>MAG-36</i> H&MS-36		3/UH-34D 1/C-117D						
VMO-6		21/UH-1E						
HMM-165		23/CH-46A						
HMM-262		24/CH-46A						
HMM-363		23/UH-34D						
<i>MAG-33</i> H&MS-33							3/T-1A 1/C-47H	
VMCJ-3							12/RF-4B 8/EF-10B	
VMF-334							15/F-8C	
VMFA-122							14/F-4B	
<i>MW/SG-37</i> MAMS-37							4/T-1A 3/C-117D 1/C-54Q 1/C-47J	
VMGR-352				4/KC-130F			10/KC-130F	
HMM-364							6/UH-34D	
HMH-463							10/CH-53A	4/CH-53A***
VMO-3								12/UH-1E***
<i>MHTG-30</i> HMMT-301							24/UH-34D	
HMMT-302							16/UH-1E	
VMO-5							16/UH-1E	
<i>1ST MAR</i> <i>BRIG</i> H&MS							4UH-34D 1/VH-34D 1/T-1A	
VMF (AW)-212							14/F-8D	
<i>TOTAL PAC</i> <i>AIRCRAFT</i> Fixed Wing (338)	72	129		16	34	15	72	
Helicopters (364)	108	94	24	23		5	68	42

*From Status of Forces, dated 29 December 1966, with correction of obvious errors in addition

**Aircraft indicated in "Other" column with SLF, Seventh Fleet

***VMO-3(-) and Det, HMH-463, enroute to RVN, 4/UH-1E of number indicated with SLF, Seventh Fleet

Appendix G

Distribution of Personnel Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 22 December 1966

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		DONG HA PHU BAI		OTHER RVN		OKINAWA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		SLF OTHER	
		USMC	USN		USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN
HEADQUARTERS																						
HQ, FMF, PAC																						
H&SBN, FMF, PAC		972	28	3NOV66													972	28				
HQ, FMF, PAC (FWD)																						
SU#2, H&SBN, FMFPAC		47	1	17NOV66									47	1								
HQ, III MAF																						
H&S CO, III MAF		714	18	30NOV66	714	18																
HQ, V MEF	1																					
1ST CIV AFF GP (FMF)	1																					
HQ, 1ST MAR DIV																						
HQ BN, 1ST MAR DIV		1753	31	1DEC66	1183	24	570	7														
HQ, 3D MAR DIV																						
HQ BN, 3D MAR DIV		1570	114	1DEC66					1570	114												
HQ, 5TH MAR DIV	1																					
HQ BN, 5TH MAR DIV	1																					
HQ, FORTPS, FMF PAC																						
HQ CO, FORTPS		394	31	1DEC66															394	31		
HQ, 9TH MAB																						
HQ CO, 9TH MAB		327		30NOV66									327									
HQ, 1ST MAR BRIG																						
HQ CO, 1ST MAR BRIG		314	35	1DEC66													314	35				
INFANTRY																						
1ST MARINES																						
HQ CO, 1ST MAR		257	4	1DEC66	257	4																
1ST BN, 1ST MAR		1048	5	1DEC66	1048	5																
2D BN, 1ST MAR		1071	61	1DEC66	1071	61																
3D BN, 1ST MAR		1040	50	1DEC66	1040	50																
3D MARINES																						
HQ CO, 3D MAR	4	231	8	2DEC66					231	8												
1ST BN, 3D MAR	4	1059	53	1DEC66					1059	53												
2D BN, 3D MAR		1140	62	1DEC66					1140	62												
3D BN, 3D MAR		1068	63	1DEC66					1068	63												
4TH MARINES																						
HQ CO, 4TH MAR	4	253	6	1DEC66					253	6												
1ST BN, 4TH MAR		1032	56	1DEC66									1032	56								
2D BN, 4TH MAR		1132	45	8DEC66									1132	45								
3D BN, 4TH MAR	4	1128	71	8DEC66					1128	71												
5TH MARINES																						
HQ CO, 5TH MAR		229	5	1DEC66					229	5												
1ST BN, 5TH MAR		1025	50	1DEC66					1025	50												
2D BN, 5TH MAR	4	1170	53	1DEC66	1170	53																
3D BN, 5TH MAR		1044	56	8DEC66					1044	56												
7TH MARINES																						
HQ CO, 7TH MAR		258	5	1DEC66					258	5												
1ST BN, 7TH MAR		1077	61	1DEC66					1077	61												
2D BN, 7TH MAR		1096	61	1DEC66					1096	61												
3D BN, 7TH MAR	4	1141	56	1DEC66	1141	56																
9TH MARINES																						
HQ CO, 9TH MAR		195	4	1DEC66	195	4																
1ST BN, 9TH MAR	3	1674	95	2DEC66																	1674	95
2D BN, 9TH MAR		1029	54	11NOV66					1029	54												
3D BN, 9TH MAR		1086	60	8DEC66	1086	60																
26TH MARINES																						
HQ CO, 26TH MAR		400	14	30NOV66											400	14						
1ST BN, 26TH MAR		1035	69	8DEC66	1035	69																
2D BN, 26TH MAR		1037	60	2DEC66					1037	69												
3D BN, 26TH MAR	4	1694	97	24NOV66					1694	97												
27TH MARINES																						
HQ CO, 27TH MAR		70	2	15SEP66															70	2		
1ST BN, 27TH MAR		1156	39	1DEC66											1156	39						
2D BN, 27TH MAR																						
3D BN, 27TH MAR																						

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH	STR RPT DATE	DANANG	CHU LAI	DONG HA PHU BAI	OTHER RVN	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	SLF OTHER
		USMC USN		USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN
28TH MARINES												
HQ CO, 28TH MAR	1											
1ST BN, 28TH MAR	1											
2D BN, 28TH MAR	1											
3D BN, 28TH MAR	1											
ARTILLERY												
11TH MARINES												
HQ BTRY, 11TH MAR		283 8	1DEC66		283 8							
1ST BN, 11TH MAR		537 15	1DEC66	537 15								
2D BN, 11TH MAR		498 15	1DEC66		498 15							
3D BN, 11TH MAR		555 15	10NOV66		555 15							
4TH BN, 11TH MAR		471 10	1DEC66		471 10							
12TH MARINES												
HQ BTRY, 12TH MAR	4	234 8	1DEC66			234 8						
1ST BN, 12TH MAR	4	569 15	10NOV66			569 15						
2D BN, 12TH MAR		515 13	1DEC66	515 13								
3D BN, 12TH MAR		396 15	24NOV66			396 15						
4TH BN, 12TH MAR	4	330 7	2DEC66			330 7						
13TH MARINES												
HQ BTRY, 13TH MAR	2	63 2	15SEP66								63 2	
1ST BN, 13TH MAR		330 9	1DEC66					330 9				
2D BN, 13TH MAR	2	19	15SEP66								19	
3D BN, 13TH MAR	1											
4TH BN, 13TH MAR	2	122 2	15SEP66					122 2				
HQ BTRY, 1ST FAG		143 3	29NOV66		143 3							
HQ BTRY, 3D FAG	1											
1ST 155MM GUN BTRY		118 2	10NOV66			118 2						
3D 155MM GUN BTRY		144 2	17NOV66		144 2							
5TH 155MM GUN BTRY		154 3	1DEC66								154 3	
7TH 155MM GUN BTRY	1											
1ST 8" HOW BTRY		165 2	27OCT66	165 2								
3D 8" HOW BTRY		186 4	10NOV66		186 4							
5TH 8" HOW BTRY	1											
1ST SEARCH LIGHT BTRY	1											
RECONNAISSANCE												
1ST RECON BN		615 38	1DEC66	615 38								
3D RECON BN	4	481 26	27OCT66		336 18	145 8						
5TH RECON BN	2	54	BDEC66					54				
1ST FORCE RECON CO		163 6	17NOV66	163 6								
3D FORCE RECON CO		74 1	1DEC66	15							59 1	
5TH FORCE RECON CO	1											
ANTI-TANK												
1ST AT BN		371 7	1DEC66	371 7								
3D AT BN		297 7	27OCT66	297 7								
5TH AT BN	2	62 1	1DEC66					62 1				
TANK												
1ST TANK BN		568 10	10NOV66	568 10								
3D TANK BN	4	536 10	10NOV66	536 10								
5TH TANK BN	2	93 2	1DEC66					93 2				
AMTRAC												
1ST AMTRAC BN		636 12	11NOV66	636 12								
3D AMTRAC BN		644 12	10NOV66		644 12							
5TH AMTRAC BN	2	159 2	1DEC66					159 2				
1ST ARM AMPHIB CO		274 3	28NOV66	274 3								
ENGINEER												
1ST ENGR BN		571 1	1DEC66		571 1							
3D ENGR BN		690 15	8DEC66	690 15								
5TH ENGR BN	2	85	1DEC66					85				
7TH ENGR BN		916 20	11NOV66	916 20								
9TH ENGR BN		894 15	10NOV66	894 15								
11TH ENGR BN		1059 20	30NOV66			1059 20						
13TH ENGR BN	2	22	15SEP66								22	
1ST BRIDGE CO		139	11NOV66	139								
3D BRIDGE CO		174	11NOV66	174								
5TH BRIDGE CO	1											
MOTOR TRANSPORT												
1ST MT BN		268 7	1DEC66	68	200 8							
3D MT BN		259 7	20OCT66	259 7								
5TH MT BN	2	52 1	8DEC66					52 1				
7TH MT BN		314 8	10NOV66	187 6	147 2							
9TH MT BN	4	304 2	10NOV66			304 9						
11TH MT BN	6	383	1DEC66									383
13TH MT BN	2	21 9	15SEP66								21 9	
COMMUNICATION												
1ST RADIO BN		456 3	1DEC66	171						285 3		
5TH COMM BN		591 7	10NOV66	591 7								
7TH COMM BN		690 12	10NOV66	188 1	455 11	47						
9TH COMM BN	2	183 1	24NOV66					183 1				
1ST ANGLICO	5	254 9	1DEC66				130 6			124 3		
SHORE PARTY												
1ST SP BN		409 23	1DEC66	94 3	315 20							
3D SP BN		429 35	1DEC66	429 35								
5TH SP BN	2	32	5DEC66					32				

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL

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UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED STRENGTH		STR RPT DATE	DANANG	CHU LAI	DONG HA PHU BAI	OTHER RVN	OKINAMA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	SLF OTHER
		USMC	USN		USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN	USMC USN
MILITARY POLICE													
1ST MP BN		747		11NOV66	747								
3D MP BN	2	51		15SEP66								51	
5TH MP BN	1												
SERVICE/SUPPORT													
1ST FSR													
H&S BN		311	50	8DEC66								311	50
SUPPLY BN		298	9	8DEC66								298	9
MAINT BN		491		9DEC66								491	
3D FSR													
H&S BN		950	59	1DEC66					950	59			
SUPPLY BN		1622	40	1DEC66					1622	40			
MAINT BN		1110		1DEC66					1110				
5TH FSR (-)	1												
H&S BN	1												
SUPPLY BN	1												
MAINT BN	1												
HQ, FLC, III MAF		6187	117	17NOV66	6187	117							
H&SCO, VIC													
1ST SERV BN													
3D SERV BN													
PROV SERV BN, 9TH MAB		883	19	24NOV66					883	19			
5TH SERV BN													
7TH SEP BULK FUEL CO	6	360		2DEC66									360
9TH SEP BULK FUEL CO	1												
MEDICAL													
1ST MED BN		127	323	1DEC66		127	323						
3D MED BN		150	327	1DEC66	150	326							
5TH MED BN	2	9	15	1DEC66	9	15							
1ST HOSP CO		31	59	3NOV66		31	59						
5TH HOSP CO	1												
1ST DENT CO		71		1DEC66		71							
3D DENT CO		79		15SEP66	79								
5TH DENT CO	2	2	28	20OCT66							1	12	1
11TH DENT CO		51		1DEC66	51								
13TH DENT CO		33		24NOV66									33
15TH DENT CO	2	10		15SEP66					10				
17TH DENT CO													
GROUND TOTAL		66,409			25,631	11,299	13,411	130	8,715	0	2,852	1,954	2,417
		3,361			1,209	842	681	6	252	0	120	156	95
		69,770			26,840	12,141	14,092	136	8,967	0	2,972	2,110	2,512

AVIATION UNITS

[illegible]

UNIT	NOTE	ASSIGNED	STRENGTH	STR RPT	DATE	DANANG		CHU LAI		DONG HA PHU BAI		OTHER RVN		OKINAMA		JAPAN		HAWAII		EASTPAC		SLF OTHER		
		USMC	USN			USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	USMC	USN	
MAG-15																								
H&MS-15		363			8DEC66											363								
MABS-15		477	20		8DEC66											477	20							
NBC WPNS SEC-1		17			18NOV66									17										
MACS-6		232	3		8DEC66									232	3									
MATCU-60		67			8DEC66									67										
MATCU-66		54			30NOV66									54										
VMOR-152		560	9		1DEC66									467	9		93							
BMH-361		180			30NOV66									180										
VMA-223		183	5		8DEC66											183	5							
VMP(AW)-235		216	1		8DEC66											216	1							
H&MS, PUTERA		232	56		1DEC66											232	56							
H&MS, IWAKUNI		485	298		1DEC66											485	298							
HMM-362	3	220	4		3NOV66																	220	4	
MAG-16																								
H&MS-16		460			1DEC66	460																		
MABS-16		585	14		1DEC66	585	14																	
MATCU-68		72			30NOV66	72																		
VMO-2		182	4		1DEC66	182	4																	
BMH-163		218	4		1DEC66					218	4													
BMH-164		219	5		1DEC66	219	5																	
BMH-263		213	4		1DEC66	213	4																	
BMH-265		218	3		1DEC66	218	3																	
MMSG-17																								
H&MS-17		735	26		17NOV66	735	26																	
WEBS-17																								
MAG-36																								
H&MS-36		333			1DEC66			333																
MABS-36		443	40		17NOV66			443	40															
VMO-6		232	3		8DEC66			232	3															
BMH-165																								
BMH-165		239	1		1DEC66			239	1															
BMH-363		197	1		30NOV66			197	1															
BMH-262		147	2		24NOV66			147	2															
3D MAG																								
MMSG-3																								
H&MS-3		1040	7		8DEC66																1040	7		
NBC WPNS SEC-3		15			15SEP66																15			
5TH LAAN BN		442	12		1DEC66																442	12		
MACS-1		211			8DEC66																211			
MACS-4					8DEC66																			
MATCU-65		250			8DEC66																250			
MABS-5		46			8DEC66																46			
	1	173			8DEC66																173			
MHTG-30																								
H&MS-30		482	3		8DEC66																482	3		
BMHT-301		242	1		8DEC66																242	1		
BMHT-302	2																							
VMO-5																								
MAG-33																								
H&MS-33		499	1		8DEC66																499	1		
MABS-33		487	2		8DEC66																487	2		
VMA-122		313	1		19SEP66																313	1		
VMP-334		174	1		8DEC66																174	1		
VMA-3		223	1		8DEC66																223	1		
MMSG-37																								
H&MS-37		439			8DEC66																439			
MABS-37		702	133		8DEC66																702	133		
MAKS-37		401	1		8DEC66																401	1		
BMH-463		182	1		1DEC66																182	1		
BMH-364																								
BMH-462		8			8DEC66																8			
VMOR-352		362	4		8DEC66																362	4		
VMO-3	6	216	3		1DEC66																		216	3
1ST MAR BRIG AIR																								
H&MS, 1ST MAR BRIG		107			1DEC66																107			
MACS-2		184			8DEC66																184			
MATCU-70		30			18NOV66																30			
VMP(AW)-212		157			8DEC66																157			
USMC 23,943 6,230 6,462 218 1,017 2,049 549 6,982 436																								
USN 893 159 163 4 12 380 0 168 7																								
AVIATION TOTAL 24,836 6,389 6,625 222 1,029 2,429 549 7,150 443																								

RECAPITULATION OF PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION

		ASSIGNED STRENGTH	DANANG	CHU LAI	PHU BAI	OTHER RVN	OKINAWA	JAPAN	HAWAII	EASTPAC	OTHER
GROUND TOTAL	USMC	66,409	25,631	11,299	13,411	130	8,715	0	2,852	1,954	2,417
	USN	3,361	1,209	842	681	6	252	0	120	156	95
AVIATION TOTAL	USMC	23,943	6,230	6,625	218		1,017	2,049	549	6,982	436
	USN	893	159	163	4		12	380	0	168	7
GRAND TOTAL	USMC	90,352	31,861	17,761	13,629	130	9,732	2,049	3,401	8,936	2,853
	USN	4,254	1,368	1,005	685	6	264	380	120	324	102

NOTES:

1. NOT ACTIVATED
2. PARTIALLY ACTIVATED
3. FIGURES IN "OTHER" ASSIGNED TO SLF, TOTAL INCLUDES ALL ATTACHED UNITS
4. UNITS LOCATED AT LONG HA
5. FIGURE IN "OTHER RVN" AT VARIOUS RVN LOCATIONS
6. FIGURES IN "OTHER" ENROUTE TO RVN

UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED, STRENGTHS AND LOCATIONS ARE THOSE REPORTED BY UNIT PERSONNEL STATUS REPORTS AND DO NOT REFLECT DAY-TO-DAY ADJUSTMENTS BETWEEN REPORTING PERIODS.

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