



Photo by Sgt Jack T. McKirk, National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC354464
MajGen Almond, left, always generous with medals and commendations, on 11 December congratulates bareheaded BGen Armistead D. Mead, commander of Task Force Dog, on keeping the MSR open from Chinhung-ni to Hambung. Few Marines were aware of this Army contribution to their march back from Chosin.

Sicily on 7 December.) The rest had been by the shore-based squadrons at Wonsan and Yonpo. The first Marine jet squadron to arrive in Korea, VMF-311, with McDonnell F9F Panther jets, Lieutenant Colonel Neil R. McIntyre commanding, had arrived at Yonpo on 10 December and managed to fly four days of interdiction missions before moving back to Pusan to aid the Fifth Air Force in its support of the Eighth Army.

Flight conditions both ashore at Yonpo and afloat in the carriers were hellish—in the air, poor charts, minimal navigational aids, and capricious radios; at Yonpo, primitive conditions and icy runways; and, afloat, ice-glazed decks and tumultuous seas for the carrier-based aircraft. The *Badoeng Strait* reported scraping off three

inches of ice and snow from the flight deck. The *Sicily* at one point had to stop flight operations for VMF-214's Blacksheep in the face of heavy seas and 68-knot winds. Planes were lost. Three night fighters went down. There were other crashes. It was estimated that a pilot who had to ditch at sea in the arctic waters had only 20 minutes before fatal hypothermia. Two VMF-212 pilots from Yonpo, out of gas, managed to save themselves and their planes by landing on the *Badoeng Strait*. By strenuous effort on the part of all hands, aircraft availability at Yonpo hovered around 67 percent and a remarkable 90 percent on board the carriers. About half the missions flown were not for the Marines but for someone else. Statistics kept by the wing reported a total of 3,703 sorties in 1,053 missions controlled by tactical air control parties being flown between 26 October and 11 December. Of these missions, 599 were close support—468 for the 1st Marine Division, 67 for the

Gen MacArthur made one of his quick trips to Korea on 11 December, this time to Yonpo Airfield to meet with MajGen Almond and approve the X Corps evacuation plan. MacArthur is in his trademark peaked cap and Almond is in a bombardier's leather jacket. No one would mistake the accompanying staff officers, with their well-fed jowls, for combat soldiers.

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC3544110





Photo by SSgt Ed Barnum, Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130426

Marine crewmen check the loading of rockets on the rails of an F-4U Corsair flying from Yonpo Airfield early in December. Despite minimum facilities and terrible weather, the hard-working crews maintained an availability rate of 67 percent for aircraft flying from Yonpo.

ROKs, 56 for the 7th Infantry Division, and 8 for the 3d Infantry Division. Eight Marine pilots were killed or died of wounds, three were wounded, and four were missing in action.

Marine transports—twin-engine R4Ds and four-engine R5Ds from VMR-152, commanded by 44-year-old Colonel Deane C. Roberts—supplemented General Tunner’s Combat Cargo Command in its aerial resupply and casualty evacuation from Hagaru-ri.

The squadron that the 1st Marine Division considered its own private air force, Major Gottschalk’s VMO-6, with 10 light fixed-wing aircraft and nine helicopters, racked up 1,544 flights between 28 October and 15 December. Of these 457 had been reconnaissance, 220 casualty evacuation, and 11 search-and-rescue.

Time To Leave

Wonsan closed as a port on Sunday, 10 December. Outloading for the evacuation, conducted from 2 to 10 December, was under Lieutenant Colonel Henry “Jim” Crowe with muscle provided by his 1st Shore Party Battalion. The attached Company A, 1st Amphibian Truck Battalion, found employment for its DUKWs (amphibian

trucks) in shuttling back and forth between docks and ships. In the nine-day period, 3,834 troops (mostly Army), 7,009 Korean civilians, 1,146 vehicles, and 10,013 tons of bulk cargo were evacuated. Defense of the immediate harbor area was shared with two battalions of South Korean Marines and a battalion from the 3d Infantry Division.

General Craig, Smith’s sorely missed assistant division commander, returned from emergency

Nerve center for the tactical air support of X Corps was the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’s Tactical Air Control Center at Hambung. After the last of the Marine squadrons departed Yonpo on 14 December, control of air operations passed to Navy air controllers on the command ship Mount McKinley (AGC 7).

Photo by SSgt Ed Barnum, National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A130453



leave on the 11th. Marines were left to wonder what his tactical role might have been if he had come back earlier. Smith sent him south to Pusan to arrange for the division’s arrival. “I took 35 people of various categories with me and left for Masan,” said Craig years later. “[I] conferred with the Army commander there about replacement of enormous losses of equipment of various kinds. He assured me that he would open his storerooms to us and give us anything we required that was in his stock. And this he did.”

On Tuesday evening, 12 December, General Almond called his generals together for a conference and a dinner at X Corps headquarters. The division commanders—Smith, Barr, and Soule—listened without comment to a briefing on the evacuation plan. They then learned that the true purpose of the dinner was Almond’s 58th birthday. General Ruffner, Almond’s chief of staff, eulogized his commander, saying, in effect, that never in the history



National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-422892

Wings folded, Marine F-4U Corsairs wait on the ice-glazed deck of the escort carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116). As much as three inches of ice had to be scraped from the flight deck. A remarkable aircraft availability rate of 90 percent

was maintained on board the carriers. Only half the missions were in support of the Marines. The rest went to the Army and South Koreans.

of the U.S. Army had a corps in such a short time done so much. General Almond replied and General Shepherd added a few complimentary remarks. Earlier Almond had asked Smith if he thought it feasible to disinter the dead buried at Hungnam. Smith did not think it feasible.

Interdiction fires by Army artillery, deep support by naval gunfire, and air interdiction bombing by Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft provided a thunderous background of noise for the loading operations. By 13 December the 5th and 7th Marines were loaded and ready to sail. At 1500, General Smith closed his division command post ashore and moved it to the *Bayfield* (APA 33). Before departing Hungnam, Smith paused at the cemetery to join a memorial service for the dead. Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish chaplains officiated. Volleys were fired and taps sounded. Meanwhile, the 3d

and 7th Infantry Divisions had nothing to report except light probing of their lines and minor patrol actions.

The loading of the Marines and attached Army elements was completed on the 14th. That day saw the last of the Marine land-based fighter-bombers depart Yonpo for Japan. Shortly after midnight the air defense section of MTACS-2 passed control of all air to the Navy's Tactical Air Control Squadron One on board the *Mount McKinley*, but, just to be sure, a standby Marine tactical air control center was set up on an LST and maintained until the day before Christmas.

The *Bayfield*, an attack transport and the veteran of many landings, with General Smith embarked, lifted her hook and sailed at 1030 on 15 December. The ship had been experimenting with C-rations, but with the embarkation of the Marines she

In a landing exercise in reverse, Marines in an LCM landing craft head for a transport waiting for them in Hungnam harbor. The docks could only berth seven ships at a time, so most soldier and Marines had to load out in the stream. Collecting enough ships, both U.S. Navy and Merchant Marine, for the evacuation was a monumental effort.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-424506





Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC355243
These members of the 5th Marines move by way of a cargo net from an LCM landing craft into a side hatch of the transport that would take them to the southern tip of the Korean peninsula. Loading out of the regiment was essentially accomplished in one day, 12 December. Destination was the "Bean Patch" at Masan.

returned to a more appetizing Navy diet. A total of 22,215 Marines had boarded an assemblage of 4 transports, 16 landing ships, an assault cargo ship, and 7 merchant ships. General Shepherd, with his Marines safely embarked, left Hungnam the same day for Hawaii by way of Tokyo. Just before leaving Hungnam he attended a ceremony at which General Almond presented a Distinguished Service Cross to General Barr.

A day's steaming on board the jam-packed ships took the Marines to Pusan. They landed at Pusan and motor-marched to the "bean patch" at Masan where a tent camp was being set up. Smith moved into a Japanese-style house. "The toilet works, but the radiators are not yet in operation," he noted.

The Commandant reported to the Secretary of the Navy 4,418

Marine casualties for the period 26 October to 15 December. Of these, 718 were killed or died of wounds, 3,508 wounded, and 192 missing in action. In addition, there were 7,313 non-battle casualties, mostly frostbite. Roughly speaking, these non-battle casualties added up to a third of the strength of the division. (From 26 November until 11 December, Commander Howard A. Johnson's 1st Medical Battalion had treated 7,350 casualties of all categories.) The three infantry regiments had absorbed the lion's share of the casualties and arrived at the Bean Patch at about 50 percent strength. Some rifle companies had as little as 25 or 30 percent of their authorized allowance.

Chinese Casualties


Captured documents and prisoner interrogations confirmed that the Marines had fought at least nine and possibly all 12 CCF divisions. These divisions can be assumed to have each entered combat at an effective strength of about 7,500—perhaps 90,000 men in all. Other estimates of Chinese strength go as high as 100,000 or

more. Peng's chief of staff said, it will be remembered, that the *Ninth Army Group* had started across the Yalu with 150,000 troops, but not all of these had come against the 1st Marine Division. The Marines could only guess at the casualties they had inflicted. The estimates came in at 15,000 killed and 7,500 wounded by the ground forces and an additional 10,000 killed and 5,000 wounded by Marine air.

Still waiting in the surrounding hills above Hamhung, Sung Shilun's *Ninth Army Group*—assuming non-combat casualties at least equal to battle casualties—probably had at most no more than 35,000 combat effectives. Almond's X Corps had three times that number. Rank-and-file Marines who grumbled, "Why in the hell are we bugging out? Why don't we stay here until spring and then counterattack?" may have had it right.

Last Days of the Evacuation

The light carrier *Bataan* (CVL 29) joined Task Force 77 on 16 December, too late to help the





MajGen Smith, a deeply religious man, paid a last visit to the division's Hungnam cemetery before boarding the Bayfield (APA 33) on 13 December. A memorial service with chaplains of three faiths, Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, was

held. Volleys were fired and taps sounded. During the course of the Chosin Reservoir campaign, 714 Marines were killed or died of wounds.

Marines, but in time for the last stages of the Hungnam evacuation. Airlift from Yonpo continued until 17 December after which that field was closed and a temporary field, able to handle two-engine transports, opened in the harbor area. The only Marine units still ashore were an ANGLICO (Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company) group, a reinforced shore party company, and one-and-a-half companies of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion manning 88 amphibian tractors. These Marines had been left behind to assist in the outload-

ing of the remainder of X Corps. General Smith had resisted this detachment, and General Shepherd, before departing, had advised Smith to stress to X Corps the irreplaceable character of the tractors. Admiral Doyle, as a safeguard, had earmarked several LSDs (landing ship, docks) to lift off the tractor companies and their vehicles.

The last of the ROK Army units sailed away on the 18th. General Almond closed his command post ashore on 19 December and joined Admiral Doyle in the *Mount*

McKinley. Doyle reminded Almond that, in accordance with amphibious doctrine, all troops still ashore were now under his command as amphibious task force commander. By the 20th all of the 7th Infantry Division was embarked. On the morning of 24 December the 3d Infantry did its amphibious landing in reverse, coming off seven beaches into landing ships in smart style marred only by the premature explosion of an ammunition dump, set off by an Army captain, that killed a Marine lieutenant and a Navy sea-



Department of Defense Photo (USN) 424527

Marines, probably members of the division headquarters, board the Bayfield by way of the gangway ladder. With MajGen Smith and his command group embarked, the Bayfield lifted her hook and sailed before noon on 15 December. A day's steaming would take the ship to Pusan.

man and wounded 34 others. Three Marine amphibian tractors were lost in the explosion.

Totting up the statistics: 105,000 U.S. and ROK service men, 91,000 Korean refugees, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 measurement tons had gone out in 193 shiploads in 109 ships—some ships made two or even three trips.

The carrier *Valley Forge* came on station on 23 December, in time for the final curtain. By mid-afternoon on the 24th, all beaches

were clear and the planned pyrotechnic display of demolitions and final naval gunfire began. The whole waterfront seemed to explode as prepared explosive charges went off, sending skyward such ammunition, POL, and other stores as could not be lifted off. On board the *Mount McKinley* the embarked brass enjoyed the show and then the command ship sailed away.

More naval shells were used at Hungnam than at Inchon. Navy

records show that during the period 7 to 24 December the expenditure, headed off by 162 sixteen-inch rounds from the battleship *Missouri* (BB 63), included 2,932 eight-inch, 18,637 five-inch, and 71 three-inch shells plus 1,462 five-inch rockets. The Chinese did not choose to test seriously the Hamhung-Hungnam perimeter defenses. Not a man was lost to enemy action.

After the short run south, General Almond went ashore from the *Mount McKinley* at Ulsan at mid-afternoon with Admiral Doyle to inspect unloading areas. Late in the evening they returned in the admiral's barge to the flagship and then went ashore again for Christmas dinner, Doyle explaining to Almond that no alcoholic drinks could be served on board ship.

Chairman Mao Is Pleased

On 17 December the Chinese occupied Hamhung. On the 27th they moved into Hungnam. Chairman Mao sent the *Ninth Army Group* a citation: "You completed a great strategic task under extremely difficult conditions."

But the costs had been high. The assaults against Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri had almost destroyed the *20th* and *27th CCF Armies*. From Koto-ri on most of the Chinese fight was taken up by the *26th CCF Army*.

Zhang Renchu, commander of the *26th CCF Army* lamented in his report:

A shortage of transportation and escort personnel makes it impossible to accomplish the mission of supplying the troops. As a result, our soldiers frequently starve. From now on, the organization of our rear ser-



Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC355244

Vehicles of LtCol Youngdale's 11th Marines are swung up on board a merchant ship at a Hungnam dock on 14 December. Some ships had to make two or even three round trips before the evacuation was completed. About 1,400 vehicles had been brought down to Hungnam by the division. Most would go out by LSTs (tank landing ships).

vice units should be improved.

The troops were hungry. They ate cold food, and some had only a few potatoes in two days. They were unable to maintain the physical strength for combat; the wounded personnel could not be evacuated. . . . The fire power of our entire army was basically inadequate. When we used our guns there were no shells and sometimes the shells were duds.

Zhang Yixiang, commander of the 20th CCF Army, equally bitter, recognized that communications limitations had caused a tactical rigidity:

Our signal communication was not up to standard. For example, it took more than two days to receive instruc-

tions from higher level units. Rapid changes of the enemy's situation and the slow motion of our signal communications caused us to lose our opportunities in combat and made the instructions of the high level units ineffective.

We succeeded in the separation and encirclement of the enemy, but we failed to annihilate the enemy one by one. For example, the failure to annihilate the enemy at Yudam-ni made it impossible to annihilate the enemy at Hagaru-ri.

Zhang Yixiang reported 100 deaths from tetanus due to poor medical care. Hundreds more were sick or dead from typhus or malnutrition to say nothing of losses from frostbite. The 26th CCF Army reported 90 percent of the command suffering from frostbite.

An Army band greets Col Litzenberg's 7th Marines on arrival at Pusan. From here the regiment moved by motor march to Masan where an advance party had the beginnings of a tent camp ready for them. After a pause for Christmas, the rebuilding of the 1st Marine Division began in earnest.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5704






Photo by David Douglas Duncan

The 1st Marine Division was only a fraction of the total evacuation from Hungnam. In all, along with 105,000 U.S. and South Korean servicemen, 91,000 civilian refugees were evacuated. In materiel, 17,500 vehicles and 350,000

tons of all classes of equipment and supplies were taken out in 193 shiploads in 109 ships. "We never, never contemplated a Dunkirk," Admiral C. Turner Joy later said.

MajGen Robert H. "Shorty" Soule, USA, supervises the loading-out of the last elements of his 3d Infantry Division at Hungnam on 24 December. By then, MajGen Almond, the X Corps commander, considered the 3d Infantry Division, which had not been involved in heavy fighting, his most combat-effective division.

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC355587



Peng Deqing, commander of the 27th CCF Army, reported 10,000 non-combat casualties in his four divisions:

The troops did not have enough food. They did not have enough houses to live in. They could not stand the bitter cold, which was the reason for the excessive non-combat reduction in personnel. The weapons were not used effectively. When the fighters bivouacked in snow-covered ground during combat, their feet, socks, and hands were frozen together in one ice ball. They could not unscrew the caps on the hand grenades. The fuses would not ignite. The hands were not supple. The mortar tubes shrank on account of the cold; 70 percent of the

shells failed to detonate. Skin from the hands was stuck on the shells and the mortar tubes.

In best Communist tradition of self-criticism, Peng Deqing deplored his heavy casualties as caused by tactical errors:

We underestimated the enemy so we distributed the strength, and consequently the higher echelons were over-dispersed while the lower echelon units were over-concentrated. During one movement, the distance between the three leading divisions was very long, while the formations of the battalions, companies, and units of lower levels were too close, and the troops were unable to deploy. Further-



Department of Defense Photo (USN) 424093

North Korean refugees wait apprehensively to board U.S. Navy LST 845. Some 91,000 civilians were evacuated from Hungnam. This does not count the thousands of others who fled Hungnam and other North Korean ports in fishing boats and other coastal vessels. Family separations occurred that in future years would never be mended.

more, reconnaissance was not conducted strictly; we walked into the enemy fire net and suffered heavy casualties.

Zhang Renchu, commander of the 26th CCF Army found reason to admire the fire support coordination of the Marines:

The coordination between the enemy infantry, tanks, artillery, and airplanes is surprisingly close. Besides using heavy weapons for the depth, the enemy carries with him automatic light firearms which, coordinated with rockets, launchers, and recoilless guns are disposed at the front line. The characteristic of their employment is to stay quietly under cover and open fire suddenly when we come to between 70 and 100

meters from them, making it difficult for our troops to deploy and thus inflicting casualties upon us.

In a 17 December message to Peng Dehuai, Mao acknowledged that as many as 40,000 men had perished due to cold weather, lack of supplies, and the fierce fighting. "The Central Committee cherishes the memory of those lost." Peng asked for 60,000 replacements; it would be April before the *Ninth Army Group* again went into combat.


Christmas at Masan

At Masan on Christmas Eve, Olin Beall, the mustang commander of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion, wrote a letter to his old commanding officer, General Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith, now retired and living in La Jolla, California:

An enormous stockpile of equipment and supplies, including rations, fuel, and ammunition had been built up at Hungnam. Much was evacuated, but even more would have to be destroyed. A detachment of Marines was left behind to help in the destruction. A Marine lieutenant was killed on 24 December in a premature explosion, probably the last Marine casualty of the campaign.

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC 355021





Department of Defense Photo (USN) 424297

The Begor (APD 127), a high-speed amphibious transport, lends its weight to the pyrotechnic display ashore on 24 December. In a final farewell to the stricken port there was a crescendo of planned demolitions and naval gunfire. RAdm Doyle and MajGen Almond watched the spectacle from the bridge of the Mount McKinley.

I just thought that you might like to have a few words on first hand information from an ole friend and an ole timer. . . . I've seen some brave men along that road and in these hills, men with feet frozen, men with hands frozen still helping their buddies, men riding

trucks with frozen feet but fighting from the trucks. . . . I think the fight of our 5th and 7th Regts, from Yudam-ni in to Hagaru-ri was a thing that will never be equaled. . . . Litzenberg [7th] and Murray [5th] showed real command ability and at no time did any of us doubt their judgment.

The night we came out of Koto-ri the temperature was 27 below zero and still we fought. Men froze to their socks, blood froze in wounds almost instantaneously, ones fingers were numb inside heavy mittens. Still men took them off to give to a wounded buddy. . . . We are now in



Department of Defense Photo (USA) 426954

More naval shells were shot at Hungnam than at Inchon. Here the battleship Missouri (BB 63) bangs away with its 16-inch guns. Altogether the Navy fired more than 162 sixteen-inch, 2,932 eight-inch, and 18,637 five-inch shells plus 1,462 five-inch rockets during the period 7 to 24 December.

Masan in South Korea reout-fitting, training and getting some new equipment. I'm very, very proud to be able to say that in all our operation my Bn [1st Motor Transport Battalion] has lost only 27 trucks and every one of these was an actual battle casualty, so I think my boys did pretty good. . . . Oliver P. Smith and Craig make a fine team and we'd stand by them thru hell and high water.

An epidemic of flu and bronchitis swept through the tent camp at Masan. The Marines were treated

with an early antibiotic, Aureomycin, in capsules to be swallowed the size of the first joint of a man's finger. The division rebuilt itself rapidly. Replacements—men and materiel—arrived. Some units found themselves with an "average" of vehicles and weapons that had to be returned to the Army.

A refrigerator ship brought into Masan a planned double ration of Christmas turkey. Through some mix-up a second shipment of turkey and accessories arrived so that there were four days of holiday menu for the Marines. Working parties pretending to be patrols went up into the surrounding hills

to cut pine trees to line the company streets of the tent camp. Cration cans and crinkled tinfoil from cigarette packages made do for ornaments. Choirs were formed to sing Christmas carols. Various delegations of South Koreans, civilian and military, arrived at the camp with gifts and musical shows.

On Christmas Day, General Smith was pleased to note that attendance at church services was excellent. Afterward he held open house at his Japanese-style house for officers of sufficient rank—his special staff, general staff, and more senior unit commanders. First Lieutenant James B. Soper, serving at Sasebo, Japan, had sent the commanding general's mess a case of Old Grand-Dad bourbon. Mixed with powered milk, sugar, and Korean eggs it made a passable eggnog.

The irrepressible LtCol Olin L. Beall in a photo taken at Camp Pendleton in May 1951. Beall's exploits as commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion, which lost nothing in his own telling, delighted MajGen Smith, himself a reserved and rather humorless individual.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A215229





National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A5848

On Christmas Day, MajGen Smith held open house for his senior officers and immediate staff at his Japanese-style quarters in Masan. Not all can be readily identified, but easily recognizable on the General's right are Cols Puller, McAlister, and Bowser. On Smith's immediate left, with pipe, is BGen Craig. In the middle of the kneeling row is LtCol Beall.

Drysdale's 41 Commando also held an open house. The British embassy in Tokyo had sent over a supply of Scotch whisky and mincemeat pies. Most of the guests were officers of the 1st and 5th Marines.

On 27 December, for the benefit of his log, General Smith added up his division's losses since the Inchon landing on 15 September:

Killed in action	969
Died of wounds	163
Missing in action	199
Wounded in action	5,517
Total	6,848
Non-battle casualties	8,900
Prisoners of war taken	7,916

On the 28th of December the division was placed once again under the operational control of X Corps, still commanded by Almond who would soon be promoted to lieutenant general. X Corps was

now part of the Eighth Army, which had a new commander. General Walker had been killed when this jeep collided with a South Korean weapons carrier north of Seoul on 23 December. Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, known to the Marines as a fighting paratrooper in World War II, took his place. General Smith met him for the first time at a conference at X Corps headquarters on 30 December. Ridgway told his listeners that he wanted less looking backward toward the MSR, saying that when parachutists landed their MSR was always cut. Smith, not sure if this was praise or criticism, was nevertheless cautiously impressed by the new commanding general.

By the first of the year the 1st Marine Division would be ready to return to combat. There would be new battles to be fought—and won.

Dressed for the occasion of MajGen Smith's Christmas party, LtCol Murray is wearing an Army winter trench coat and Col Puller a brand-new M1943 field jacket. Both wear the highly prized cuffed Army boots, but O. P. Smith, his inseparable pipe clutched in his left hand, is wearing, as always, regulation leggings with his high-top "boondockers."

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A5850



What Happened to Them?

CHARLES L. "GUS" BANKS, commander of the 1st Service Battalion, received a Navy Cross for his actions at Hagaru-ri. He retired in 1959 with a promotion to brigadier general in recognition of his combat decorations and died in 1988.

BOEKER C. BATTERTON, commanding officer of MAG-12, retired in 1958 with a promotion to brigadier general in recognition of his combat decorations. He died in 1987.

OLIN L. BEALL, commanding officer of the 1st Motor Transport Battalion, retired as a colonel, with both a Navy Cross and a Distinguished Service Cross for his actions at Chosin Reservoir. He died in 1977.

ALPHA L. BOWSER, JR., the division's G-3 or operations officer, retired in 1967 as a lieutenant general and presently lives in Hawaii.

JAMES H. BROWER, commander of the 11th Marines, the artillery regiment, retired as a colonel in 1960 and died in 1984.

J. FRANK COLE, commanding officer of VMF-312, retired as a colonel in 1965 and died in 1969.

HENRY P. "JIM" CROWE, commanding officer of 1st Shore Battalion, retired in 1960 as a colonel, became chief of police in Portsmouth, Virginia, and died in 1991.

RAYMOND G. DAVIS, commander of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, went on to command the 3d Marine Division in Vietnam and was a four-star general and Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps before retiring in 1972. He now lives near Atlanta, Georgia.

FREDERICK R. DOWSETT, the executive officer of the 7th Marines, retired as a colonel and died in 1986.

VINCENT J. GOTTSCHALK, commanding officer of VMO-6, received a Silver Star for his service in Korea. He retired as a colonel in 1968 and died in 2000.

FIELD HARRIS, commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, retired in 1953 and was advanced to lieutenant general because of his combat decorations. He died in 1967 at age 72.

WILLIAM F. HARRIS, commander of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, was listed as missing in action. No trace of him was ever found and he was eventually presumed dead. He received a posthumous Navy Cross.

BANKSON T. HOLCOMB, JR., the division's G-2 or intelligence officer, retired as a brigadier general in

1959. An expatriate, he lived for many years in Inverness, Scotland, where he died in 2000 at the age of 92.

MILTON A. HULL, company commander, Company D, 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, twice wounded, received both a Silver Star and Navy Cross for his actions. He retired as a colonel in 1969 and died in 1984.

ROBERT P. KELLER, commander of the "Blacksheep Squadron" and air liaison officer to Fifth Air Force, retired in 1974 as a lieutenant general. He lives in Pensacola, Florida.

RANDOLPH S. D. LOCKWOOD, commander of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, was not evacuated after being relieved but continued to move with the 7th Marines. On arrival at Masan he was sent to an Army hospital for psychiatric observation. The Army psychiatrist concluded he had suffered a situational neurosis, which disappeared after the evacuation. Lockwood returned briefly to the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, but was soon transferred to administrative duties. He retired as a lieutenant colonel in 1960 and resides in Texas.

JAMES F. LAWRENCE, JR., who assumed command of 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, after Lockwood's relief, received a Navy Cross for his actions at the reservoir. After distinguished service as a Marine Corps lawyer, he retired in 1972 as a brigadier general. He lives in northern Virginia.

HOMER L. LITZENBERG, JR., commanding officer of the 7th Marines, rapidly ascended in grade to major general and as such in 1957 served as the senior member of the United Nations component negotiating the peace talks at Panmunjom. He retired in 1959, was elevated to lieutenant general because of his combat decorations, and died in 1963 at age 68.

FRANCIS M. MCALISTER, the division's G-4 or logistics officer, succeeded Puller as the commander, 1st Marines, a position he held until wounded in May 1951. He retired as a major general in 1960 and died in 1965.

JOHN N. McLAUGHLIN, survived his captivity and went on to become a lieutenant general and chief of staff at Headquarters Marine Corps. He retired in 1977 and lives in Savannah, Georgia.

RAYMOND L. MURRAY, commander of the 5th Marines, rose to the grade of major general before retiring in 1968. He lives in Southern California.

REGINALD R. MYERS, Executive Officer, 3d Battalion,

1st Marines, received a Medal of Honor for his actions on East Hill. He retired as a colonel in 1967 and now lives in Florida.

GEORGE R. NEWTON, commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, received a Silver Star for his service in Korea and retired as a colonel in 1964. He died in 1993.

FRANCIS F. "FOX" PARRY, commander of 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, retired as a colonel in 1967. He published his memoir, *Three War Marine*, in 1987. He lives in Flourtown, Pennsylvania.

JOHN H. PARTRIDGE, the division engineer, retired as a colonel in 1965 and died in 1987.

LEWIS B. "CHESTY" PULLER, the 1st Marines' commanding officer, was promoted to brigadier general and became the division's assistant commander in February 1951. He received his fifth Navy Cross for his performance at the Chosin Reservoir and rose to the grade of major general on active service and to lieutenant general on the retired list when he retired in 1955. He died in 1971 at the age of 73.

J. ROBERT REINBURG, commander of VMF(N)-513, retired as a colonel in 1978 and died in 1997.

THOMAS L. RIDGE, Commanding Officer, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, received a Silver Star for his defense of Hagaru. He retired as a colonel in 1964 and died in 1999.

MAURICE E. ROACH, Litzenberg's jack-of-all-trades, commander of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, retired as a colonel in 1962 and died in 1988.

DEANE C. ROBERTS, commander of VMR-152, retired as a colonel in 1957 and died in 1985.

HAROLD S. ROISE, commander of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, received two Navy Crosses for his heroic actions. He retired as a colonel in 1965 and died in 1991.

WEBB D. "BUZZ" SAWYER, Litzenberg's roving battalion commander, received two Silver Stars for his actions at Chosin Reservoir and a Navy Cross for later heroics during the Chinese spring counteroffensive in April 1951. He retired as a brigadier general in 1968 and died in 1995.

HENRY W. "POP" SEELEY, JR., retired as a colonel in 1963 with his last years of active duty as a highly regarded logistics officer. He lives in Florida.

DONALD M. "BUCK" SCHMUCK, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was later advanced to executive officer of the regiment. He retired in 1959 and because of his combat decorations was advanced in grade to brigadier general. He lives in Wyoming and Hawaii.

CARL L. SITTER, company commander, Company G, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, recipient of a Medal of Honor, retired as colonel in 1970. He was a long-time resident of Richmond, Virginia, until his death in 2000.

OLIVER P. SMITH, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, was promoted to lieutenant general in 1953 and given command of Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. He retired in 1955 and for his many combat awards was raised in grade to four-star general. He died on Christmas Day, 1977, at his home in Los Altos Hills, California, at age 81.

EDWARD W. SNEDEKER, the division's deputy chief of staff, retired as a lieutenant general in 1963. In retirement he was known as a world-class stamp collector. He died in 1995.

EDWARD P. STAMFORD, the Marine tactical air controller with Task Force Faith, retired as a major in 1961 and lives in Southern California.

ALLAN SUTTER, commander of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, retired as a colonel in 1964 and died in Orange, Virginia, in 1988.

ROBERT D. TAPLETT, commander of 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, received a Navy Cross for his heroic actions and retired as a colonel in 1960. He published his memoir, *Dark Horse Six*, in 2003.

MAX J. VOLCANSEK, JR., commander of VMF(N)-542, retired in 1956 and was advanced in grade to brigadier general because of his combat decorations. He died in 1995.

HARVEY S. WALSETH, the division's G-1 or personnel officer, after recovering from his wounds, returned to the division to serve as deputy chief of staff and commanding officer, rear echelon. He retired in 1960 as a colonel and resides in Santa Barbara, California.

ERWIN F. WANN, JR., commander of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, retired as a colonel in 1965 and died in 1997.

GREGON A. WILLIAMS, the division's chief of staff, retired as a major general in 1954 and died in 1968.

DAVID C. WOLFE, successor to Reinburg as Commanding Officer, VMF(N)-513, served as the head of the U.S. military mission in the Dominican Republic before retiring as a colonel in 1965. He died in 1992.

CARL A. YOUNGDALE, who relieved Brower as Commanding Officer, 11th Marines, went on to command the 1st Marine Division in Vietnam and retired as a major general in 1972. He died in 1993.

About the Author

Edwin Howard Simmons, a retired Marine brigadier general, was, as a major, the commanding officer of Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, throughout the Chosin Reservoir campaign. His active Marine Corps service spanned 30 years—1942 to 1972—during which, as he likes to boast, successively in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam he had command or acting command in combat of every size unit from platoon to division. A writer and historian all his adult life, he was the Director of Marine Corps History and Museums from 1972 until 1996 and is now the Director Emeritus.

Born in 1921 in Billingsport, New Jersey, the site of a Revolutionary War battle, he received his

commission in the Marine Corps in 1942 through the Army ROTC at Lehigh University. He also holds a master's degree from Ohio State University and is a graduate of the National War College. A one-time managing editor of the *Marine Corps Gazette* (1945-1949), he has been widely published, including more than 300 articles and essays. His most recent books are *The United States Marine: A History* (1998), *The Marines* (1998), and a Korean War novel, *Dog Company Six*. He is the author of an earlier pamphlet in this series, *Over the Seawall: U.S. Marines at Inchon*.

He is married, has four grown children, and lives with his wife, Frances, at their residence, "Dunmarchin," two miles up the Potomac from Mount Vernon.

Sources

The official history, *The Chosin Reservoir Campaign* by Lynn Montross and Capt Nicholas A. Canzona, volume three in the five-volume series *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953*, provided a starting place for this account. However, in the near half-century since this volume was published in 1957, there has been a great deal of new scholarship as well as release of classified records, particularly with respect to Chinese forces. This pamphlet attempts to benefit from these later sources.

With respect to Chinese forces, *The Dragon Strikes* by Maj Patrick C. Roe has been especially useful as have various articles by both Chinese and Western scholars that have appeared in academic journals. *The Changjin Journal*, the electronic newsletter edited by Col George A. Rasula, USA (Ret), has provided thought-provoking detail on the role of U.S. Army forces, particularly RCT-31, at the reservoir. The as-yet uncompleted work on the Hungnam evacuation by Professor Donald Chisholm has yielded new insights on that critical culminating event.

Books, some new, some old, that have been most useful include—listed alphabetically and not necessarily by worth, which varies widely—Roy E. Appleman, *East of Chosin* and

South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu; Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War*; Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea*; T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War*; Andrew Geer, *The New Breed*; D. M. Giangreco, *War in Korea, 1950-1953*; Richard P. Hallion, *The Naval Air War in Korea*; Max Hastings, *The Korean War*; Robert Leckie, *The March to Glory*; Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*; Francis Fox Parry, *Three War Marine*; Russell Spurr, *Enter the Dragon*; Shelby L. Stanton, *America's Tenth Legion*; John Toland, *In Mortal Combat: Korea 1950-1953*; Rudy Tomedi, *No Bugles, No Drums*; and Harry Truman, *Memoirs*.

The official reports that proved most helpful were the Far East Command's *Command Report, December 1950*; the 1st Marine Division's *Historical Diary for November 1950*; the Commander, Task Force 90's *Hungnam Redeployment, 9-25 December 1950*; and the Headquarters, X Corps, *Special Report on Chosin Reservoir, 17 November to 10 December 1950*.

Oral histories, diaries, memoirs (published and unpublished), and personal correspondence were extremely useful, especially those papers originating with Generals Almond, Bowser, Craig, Litzenberg, Murray, Shepherd, and Smith.

Resort was made to scores of bio-

graphical and subject files held by the Reference Section of the Marine Corps Historical Center.

The author also unabashedly put to use his own recollections of events and recycled materials that he had first developed on Chosin Reservoir in various essays, articles, and lectures during the past half-century.

As is invariably the case, the author had the unstinting and enthusiastic support and cooperation of the staff at the Marine Corps Historical Center.

The text has benefited greatly from the critical reviews by the editorial ladder within the Marine Corps Historical Center—Mr. Charles R. "Rich" Smith, Mr. Charles D. Melson, LtCol Jon Hoffman—and externally by Col Joseph Alexander, Col Thomas G. Ferguson, USA (Ret), BGen James F. Lawrence, Col Allan R. Millett, Mr. J. Robert Moskin, Col George A. Rasula, USA (Ret), and Maj Patrick C. Roe. The author, of course, remains responsible for any defects remaining in the book.

A fully annotated draft manuscript is on deposit at the Marine Corps Historical Center. Virtually all of the reference materials published and unpublished, used can be found at the Marine Corps Historical Center in Washington, D.C., or at the Marine Corps Research Center at Quantico, Virginia.



COUNTEROFFENSIVE

U.S. Marines from Pohang to No Name Line

by Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR (Ret)



At Hungnam, the 1st Marine Division, following the withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir, embarked all of its equipment and personnel in record time and sailed for Pusan. The trip south for the half-starved, half-frozen Marines was uneventful except for the never-closed chow lines, salt-water showers, a complete change of clothes, and a widespread outbreak of colds or mild cases of pneumonia. "For the first time in weeks we felt clean," wrote one Marine, "and our lice were gone forever—washed down a drain-hole into the cold Sea of Japan." In addition to a scrub down and new dungarees, there was a good deal of conjecture and discussion on the possible employment of the division; many hoped that instead of landing at Pusan, the convoy would proceed directly to Japan or the United States and relief by the 2d Marine Division. Both officers and enlisted men alike held that it was impossible to visualize the employment of the division in the near future and that rest, reorganization, and rehabilitation was an absolute necessity. Then, too, there were those who had fought

around the Pusan Perimeter and were "not too happy or not too eager to see the dreadful country they had fought over." Regardless of the speculation, the convoy steamed on, and on 16 December arrived at Pusan. Although several tank landing ships sailed past Pusan and put in at Masan, a majority of the division's Marines traveled by rail and road from Pusan 40 miles west to their new area outside the small seaport untouched by war.

In an area previously occupied by the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, a tent city quickly sprang up—pyramidal tents for all members of the command and squad tents for each battalion. Hospital tents and mess halls were erected and with the help of Korean laborers mess tables and other improvements soon began to appear. A large barracks in the outskirts of Masan served as the administrative headquarters for the regiments, while the division's service and support units occupied areas near the docks and south of town. The men observed the division's first Christmas in Korea with a memorable display of holiday spirit despite a chilling drizzle. A choir from the 5th Marines serenaded the division headquarters with carols, many attended a series of shows put on by troupes of U.S. Army and Korean entertainers, and the U.S. Navy sent Christmas trees and decorations. It was not only a time to be thankful, but also a period of rapid recuperation from fatigue and nervous tension.


As 1950 drew to a close the military situation in Korea was so bleak American policy makers were seriously contemplating the evacuation of U.S. forces from that embattled country, and American military leaders had already formulated secret contingency plans to do so. The Korean Conflict had been raging for six months during which time the fighting seesawed up and down the 600-mile length of the mountainous peninsula with

Gen Douglas MacArthur, America's longest-serving soldier, was Commander in Chief, Far East, and also commanded the multinational United Nations forces in Korea. Although the situation appeared ominous in early 1951, MacArthur later said he never contemplated withdrawal and "made no plans to that effect."

Department of Defense Photo (USA) SC362863



AT LEFT: *Marine riflemen hug the ground as they advance under fire during Operation Ripper.* National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6862



Matthew B. Ridgway, USA, to rally his troops just as the outlook was darkest. This fortuitous event began a dramatic reversal of fortunes, a turnaround so startling that within six months it was the Communists who were on the ropes.

The combined NKPA and CCF armies had more than a half million men inside Korea while the United Nations Command numbered only about two-thirds that many. The U.N. commander was American General of the Army Douglas MacArthur who was concurrently Commander in Chief, Far East. The major Service components of the Far East Command were the Eighth Army, the Fifth Air Force, and elements of the Seventh Fleet. Recently appointed Lieutenant General Ridgway commanded the Eighth Army; Major General Earl E. Partridge, USAF, the Fifth Air Force; and Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, USN, the Seventh Fleet. Major General Oliver P. "O. P." Smith's 1st Marine Division and Major General Field Harris' 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were the two major Marine units in Korea. Unlike today's expeditionary force structure, at that time there was no Marine component headquarters so the non-Marine theater commander was the only common superior officer for both the division and aircraft wing in Korea. The nearest senior Marine was Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in Hawaii, who was responsible for the logistical support of both the division and wing. Despite the fact that no official direct command link existed between Marine air and ground units in Korea, the respective Marine commanders maintained close liaison and carefully coordinated their actions.

Several important new com-

first one side and then the other alternately holding the upper hand. With 1951 only a few days away the Communist forces—consisting of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) reinforced by "volunteers" from the People's Republic of China, known as the Communist Chinese Forces (CCF)—appeared on the verge of victory. In a series of stunning

blows that began the previous November, the United States-led United Nations Command had been pushed back from the Yalu River at the North Korean-Chinese border all the way south of the 38th Parallel, which divided North and South Korea. A momentary lull in the action, however, allowed the energetic new United Nations field commander, Lieutenant General



Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A6087

The general staff of the 1st Marine Division assembled for an informal photograph shortly after the New Year. Pictured from left are: Capt Eugene R. Hering, USN, Division Surgeon; Col Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., G-3; Col Bankston T. Holcomb, Jr., G-2; MajGen Oliver P. Smith, Commanding

General; Maj Donald W. Sherman, Assistant G-1; BGen Edward A. Craig, Assistant Division Commander; Col Edward W. Snedeker, Chief of Staff; and Col Francis M. McAlister, G-4.

mand relationships developed after the Marines' fighting withdrawal from the Chosin (Changjin) Reservoir. Marine aircraft, which had provided superb close air support for Marine ground units for the previous five months, would no longer be on direct call. Instead, the potent Marine air-ground team was broken up so land-based aircraft of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing could be incorporated into the Fifth Air Force. The U.N. ground command also underwent some changes. The 1st Marine Division passed from X Corps to Eighth Army control in mid-December 1950, just about a

week before the tough and energetic Army paratrooper, General Ridgway, was named Eighth Army commander after his predecessor, Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA, was killed in a traffic accident.

The Masan Bean Patch

After the ordeal at the Chosin Reservoir, the 1st Marine Division moved to Masan in southern Korea where it became part of Eighth Army reserve. Concurrently, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was flying from aircraft carriers and airfields in Korea but was about to tem-

porarily deploy to Japan. On the home front, three replacement drafts (the 3d, 4th, and 5th) were either already enroute or were preparing to ship out. Hopefully, their arrival would bring the depleted Marine ranks in Korea back up to strength before the next round of combat began.

The battered 1st Marine Division spent two weeks licking its wounds in a rest area known as the "Bean Patch" about 200 miles south of the main line of resistance. Its three rifle regiments, each of which was led by a future lieutenant general, occupied the agricultural flat lands on the north-