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From: Commanding General, 4th Force Service Support Group
To: Distribution List

Subj: REAR AREA SECURITY STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS (SHORT TITLE: RAS SOP)

Ref: (a) OH 2-6 (MAGTF Rear Area Security) dtd Aug 89

1. Purpose. To publish policies, procedures and guidance concerning Rear Area Security within the 4th Force Service Support Group.

2. Information. The previous RAS SOP was issued prior to publication of the reference. This SOP complies with guidance provided in the reference and replaces the RAS SOP issued on 7 May 89.

3. Action. This RAS SOP will be used by members of this command as basic guidance for Rear Area Security operations. In essence it is a RAS handbook for CSSE Commanders.

4. Recommendations. Recommendations concerning the RAS SOP are invited and should be submitted to this command (Code G-7) via the appropriate chain of command.

5. Reserve Applicability. This Order is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

6. Certification. Reviewed and approved this date.

H. H. DINKINS
Deputy

DISTRIBUTION: A

LOCATOR SHEET

Subj: REAR AREA SECURITY STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT UNITS (SHORT TITLE: RAS SOP)

Location: _____

(Indicate the location(s) of the copy(ies) of this Manual.)

RECORD OF CHANGES

Log completed change action as indicated.

Change Number	Date of Change	Date Entered	Signature of Person Incorporating Change

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INTRODUCTION

0001. PURPOSE. The Rear Area Security (RAS) Standard Operating Procedures for Combat Service Support units contains guidelines and pertinent information designed to assist Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) Commanders as they integrate RAS into unit training and operations. Rear Area Security can be effective only when Marines are proficient in the basic warfighting skills and in defensive tactics. For this reason, the importance of RAS training cannot be overemphasized. CSSE Commanders should, therefore, stress rigorous RAS training and ensure adherence to the guidance contained herein and in the reference.

0002. CHANGES. Printed changes are posted by following the instructions in this Manual. File changes in the basic manual in consecutive order and complete the Record of Changes page.

CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW

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OVERVIEW

0001 COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY. The area from the Ground Combat Element (GCE) rear boundary to the rear boundary of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) is defined as the rear area. Units located within this area usually include the Combat Service Support Elements (CSSE), Air Combat Element (ACE), and the MAGTF Command Element (CE). Other units which may be located in the rear include Host Units, civilians, etc.

0002 COMMAND AND CONTROL. The MAGTF Commander is responsible for security of the rear area, although he will usually elect to delegate authority to plan and execute the RAS effort to a subordinate element commander located, organized, and equipped to accomplish the RAS mission. This individual will be designated as the Rear Area Security Coordinator (RASC). Based on guidance contained in OH 2-6 (MAGTF Rear Area Security) the CSSE Commander is usually the most logical choice to assume these duties. Therefore, the CSSE commander must be prepared to provide security for his own units plus coordinate security efforts of other units within the rear area. This publication is designed to address these responsibilities as they apply to units of the 4th FSSG.

0003 UNIT RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOCAL SECURITY. To accomplish RAS, all units in the rear area must be prepared to defend against attempts to disrupt operations. All elements must be able to minimize destruction, to reinforce their units and other units within the rear area, and to engage the enemy to either repel or to delay him until reaction forces arrive.

0004 EFFORT PROPORTIONAL TO THE LEVEL OF THREAT. The security effort must be a measured response appropriate to the threat and designed to minimize degradation of combat service support operations. The degree of security must be sufficient to ensure that support activities can continue without undue disruption, but on the other hand the level of personnel assigned to active security at any one time should be no more than necessary to avoid degradation of CSS support. However, if the threat presents a danger to personnel and equipment to the point that units cannot perform their missions, then tactical requirements take precedence until the threat is neutralized.

0005 TASK ORGANIZATION BASED ON METT-T. The CSSE Commander must task - organize his force using the principles of METT-T. The mission and tasks assigned by the MAGTF Commander, the enemy capabilities, terrain in the rear area, and the time required to

react as well as the personnel and fire support available must all be taken into consideration when developing the rear area security plan.

1005 CONTINUOUS, DETAILED PLANNING. RAS planning is a continuous process. It must begin with the receipt of the initiating directive and continue to the completion of the operation. It is necessary that concurrent, parallel, and detailed planning be conducted by all participating units. Unit local security plans must complement the total MAGTF RAS effort.

RAS SOP

CHAPTER 2

RAS FUNDAMENTALS

CHAPTER 2

RAS FUNDAMENTALS

2000. GENERAL. RAS is a MAGTF responsibility. However, the MAGTF commander may delegate authority to coordinate the RAS mission to the CSSE commander or the ACE commander, or both. Aside from this possibility, the CSSE commander remains responsible for RAS for his command.

2001. UNIT RESPONSIBILITY. As the CSSE commander has RAS responsibility for his entire element, each unit that comprises that CSSE also has unit as well as element responsibility for the RAS mission. Unit security is an inherent responsibility for any commander. The fact that a higher commander establishes security measures does not relieve a unit commander of this responsibility. In addition to providing its own local security, each rear area unit must plan for and be able to execute active and passive security measures.

1. Active measures:

a. Training Marines in basic infantry skills to include anti-armor and air defense.

b. Organizing units for defensive operations.

c. Equipping support elements with weapons and munitions required for local defense.

d. Patrolling, establishing observation/listening posts, and using other local security techniques.

e. Providing security to convoys.

f. Positioning low altitude air defense (LAAD) units in depth within the objective area.

g. Establishing liaison with fire support organizations, establishing preplanned target lists, and training individuals in call-for-fire procedures.

h. Establishing and coordinating security and security reaction forces both within units and within geographical areas.

i. Training individuals in the employment of close air support (CAS) and close-in fire support (CIFS).

j. Establishing defensive plans and positions to include local barriers and obstacles.

2. Passive Measures:

a. Using camouflage, dispersion, and natural cover.

b. Hardening installations.

c. Establishing deception measures such as mock installations and positions.

d. Positioning rear area units to be mutually supporting defensively.

e. Establishing redundant facilities to preclude CSSE support capabilities from being rendered ineffective should the primary facility be destroyed.

3. The RAS effort places minimum reliance on the GCE. GCE assets should be tasked with security missions in the MAGTF rear area only in emergencies, and only to the minimum extent necessary. This allows the GCE commander to focus on the main battle. GCE units should be diverted to RAS missions only when large enemy ground formations are attacking support and aviation elements, and the accomplishment of the MAGTF mission has become jeopardized. When such major penetrations occur in the rear area, the problem becomes more than just RAS, and therefore requires a realignment of the main battle.

4. The RAS effort is proportionate to the threat. RAS must be a phased response in direct proportion to threat capabilities. This requires accurate threat assessment. The degree of security provided must be sufficient to ensure that rear area operations continue with minimum disruption. The RAS plan must not be so demanding or restrictive on rear area units that it renders their functioning ineffective. When the rear area threat is low, local active and passive security measures should suffice. When the threat increases, RAS may require reinforcement and reorganization of rear area units to include task-organized reaction forces. In a high threat situation, the MAGTF commander may direct the GCE commander to increase the size of reserve forces to provide adequate response to counter the threat.

2002. RAS PLANNING. Efficient RAS planning and execution require effective and timely command and control. Coordination for fire support, air defense, close air support, close-in fire support, and use of intelligence assets must be established. Prior coordination with the ACE and GCE will facilitate implementation of air and fire support missions. The keys to credible RAS are sound planning, early warning, continuous operational security (OPSEC), tactical deception, proper

dispersion, cover and concealment, and rapid deployment of sufficient forces and resources to counter the threat. In planning for RAS, CSSE units must make provisions for equipping, staffing, and training to ensure that both active and passive security measures can be implemented in a timely manner.

2003. RAS COMMAND AND CONTROL. The CSSE Commander exercises command and control through two operations centers staffed and equipped to handle the separate functions of CSS operations and Rear Area Security.

1. The CSSE Commander monitors the day to day operation of the CSSE through the CSS operations center (CSSOC). The G/S-3 is responsible for the operation of the CSSOC. The CSSOC is functional twenty-four hours a day during combat operations, and continually monitors and records the status of CSS operations. The CSSOC is staffed by the CSSE's operations and communications personnel. Local SOPs govern the size and composition of the CSSOC.

2. The CSSE Commander in his role as the Rear Area Security Coordinator (RASC) will establish the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) in or near the CSSOC. The RAOC is tasked-organized to direct and control the RAS effort and is supervised by the G/S-7 or tactical security officer. Depending upon the assets available and the tactical situation, the TSO or his assistant may also function as the fire support coordinator, air liaison officer, and/or NBC representative.

CHAPTER 3

DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA

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DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA

3000. GENERAL. Defense of the Rear Area necessitates extensive coordination among the various elements within the Rear Area. Coordination is further complicated by extensive Main Supply Routes (MSR) and Lines of Communication (LOC), geographical isolation, and demanding operational requirements. In order to buy time for the commander to counter the threat, the priority must be placed on point defense and provisional security forces capable of reacting to the threat. In addition to local security and reaction forces, the RAOC should have access to the same supporting forces, and supporting arms systems available to the GCE. Artillery, mortars, naval gunfire, attack helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and various host nation assets are important force assets which must be considered and incorporated into the RAS defensive effort.

3001. DEFENSE OF THE REAR AREA. The unit commander is responsible for the defense of his unit's facility. A Level I response can normally be defeated by the unit's security force and capability. As the threat increases resulting in a Level II response, military police and provisional security forces are required to terminate the enemy's attempt to disrupt operations. Missions of the military police and provisional security forces are coordinated through the RAS RAOC. When the rear area threat begins to exceed the capabilities of the military police and provisional security forces, the RAS TSO will notify the RASC. The RASC makes the decision to request GCE assistance from the MAGTF commander. Should the threat necessitate a Level III response and the employment of GCE units, coordination will be effected between the RAOC and GCE's Combat Operations Center (COC).

1. Fire support in defense of the rear area will be coordinated through the RAOC Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC). It is imperative that requests for supporting arms be controlled through the RAS RAOC to avoid duplication of effort and potential fire support coordination problems.

2. The primary RAS mission of the military police is MSR/LOC security. MPs continuously move throughout the rear area conducting foot and motor patrols thereby ensuring the safe passage of personnel and supplies. MPs can conduct hasty reconnaissance, seek new or alternate routes, and serve as an important intelligence gathering source. The military police will coordinate all RAS missions through the RAOC/TSO. (See FMFM/OH 3-5, FMF Military Police Operations.)

3. The provisional security forces provide additional sources for MSR/LOC security. They can be attached to the military police or remain under the operational control of the RAS TSO.

3002. AIR DEFENSE. Air defense is defined as all defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the earth's envelope of atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack (JCS Pub 1-02). Air defense is divided into active and passive tasks and coordinated by the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) in the RAOC. Active tasks include surveillance, weapons control and management, and weapons employment. Passive measures include cover, concealment, camouflage, and deception. (See FMFM/OH 5-5, Antiair Warfare, and FMFM 5-54, Small Arms Defense Against Air Attack, for a comprehensive discussion of air defense.)

3003. PROVISIONAL SECURITY FORCE. The Provisional Security Force will be task organized, but will follow the general organizational structure outlined in Chapter 3 of OH 2-6. The size of the security force will vary in accordance with the size of the CSSE. For example, a BSSG should include two heliborne platoons and one mobile platoon reinforced with either a second infantry squad or a second weapons squad while a MSSG should have one mobile platoon plus a heliborne platoon.

3004. GCE EMPLOYMENT IN RAS. Units from the GCE should be assigned a RAS mission only in emergency situations. The MAGTF commander can task GCE units, including his reserve, to participate in the RAS defense should the threat rise to a Level III.

1. When GCE units are assigned a RAS mission, they will be placed under the operational control of the RASC. Upon arrival in the rear area, the GCE unit leader will coordinate with the TSO located in the RAOC to receive mission assignment/ clarification, operation and intelligence updates, and other necessary coordinating instructions. All requests for operational/logistical support will be coordinated through the RAOC. When the GCE unit is no longer required to perform the RAS mission, it will normally revert to its parent command.

2. When the RAS requirement necessitates a large scale commitment of GCE forces, the MAGTF commander may assume direct control of RAS activities or pass control to the GCE commander as the situation dictates.

CHAPTER 4

REAR AREA OPERATIONS CENTER

CHAPTER 4

REAR AREA OPERATIONS CENTER

4000. GENERAL. The Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) is a tactical coordination center located adjacent to the CSSOC. It will be the focal point for the RAS effort and will plan, coordinate, and direct the execution of the rear security. It is under the operational control of the RASC/TSO and will perform a function similar to that which the combat operations center (COC) performs for the GCE. Specific responsibilities include:

1. Coordination of the rear area security plan with other plans.

2. Determination and establishment of special passive and active security measures.

3. Determination of special personnel and equipment requirements.

4. Assignment of subordinate unit responsibilities.

5. Assistance in the positioning of units.

6. Designation of boundaries and other control measures which affect security operations.

7. Collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence information pertinent to RAS.

8. Establishment of a redundant tactical communication system within the CSSE and/or the rear area.

9. Monitoring all activities within the rear area.

10. Monitoring actions of the GCE.

11. Establishing and maintaining liaison with the GCE.

12. Monitor the Intelligence Net.

13. The development and implementation of a deception plan.

4001. FUNCTIONS. The following apply to the RASC/TSO.

1. Fire Support Coordination. Fire support coordination for the rear area is a major RAOC function. The RAOC must

coordinate fire support plans, compile the list of targets for submission to the senior FSCC, and effect coordination with the applicable fire support agencies. Normal coordination of artillery and close air support can be accomplished on the existing nets. However, the RAOC should maintain frequent liaison with fire support units to ensure that these units are aware of RAS fire support requirements as the tactical situation changes.

2. Movement Control. The RAOC must coordinate all logistical and tactical movement during a high threat period within the rear area. Units will constantly be moving in the rear area because of mission requirements. Moving units, to include units passing through the rear area, must coordinate with the RAOC. The RAOC can provide timely rear area intelligence concerning the routes to be used and specific unit location. The moving unit will retain its responsibility for self-defense but may request support from the RAOC.

3. Communication

a. The RAOC is responsible for establishing tactical communications plans for the RAS effort. The RAOC will coordinate with GCE, ACE and other units within the rear area to ensure viable communications are established.

b. All tactical messages should be routed immediately to the RAOC Watch Officer who may route copies to the TSO, if applicable.

c. Primary communications should be by wire whenever possible.

d. Radio traffic should be kept to a minimum and messengers utilized as runners as the alternate form of communication.

4002. STAFFING. The following personnel are required to perform RAOC operations:

1. Rear Area Security Coordinator (RASC). Designated by the MAGTF Commander and responsible for RAS planning and coordination. This officer will be the ultimate source of coordination for the RAS mission for all elements of the MAGTF.

2. Tactical Security Officer (TSO). Has the responsibility for supervision of RAOC functions. He reports directly to the RASC.

3. Tactical Security Chief (TSC). Assists the TSO in performance of his duties.

4. Intelligence Officer. Has responsibilities for gathering, integrating, and disseminating all intelligence data in the rear area.

5. Intelligence Chief. Assists Intelligence Officer in performance of his duties.

6. Radio Operators. Based upon the tactical situation, the TSO will determine the actual number of operators required to man these nets. Radio operators are required for no less than the following nets:

a. RAS TAC.

b. Conduct of Fire/TAR.

c. Intelligence.

7. Recorders. The TSO and Intelligence Officer should keep separate maps to record current operational and intelligence situations. Recorders should also keep separate log/flip charts to maintain historical records of intelligence and tactical events.

4003. SUPPORTING ARMS. The tactical situation and availability of assets will dictate when supporting arms liaison representatives are assigned to the RAOC and these assignments can vary on a daily basis. The TSO must be prepared to perform supporting arms functions even in the absence of liaison personnel.

4004. PHYSICAL ORGANIZATION. In order to function at maximum efficiency, the RAOC should be in close proximity to the Combat Service Support Operation Center (CSSOC). The number of personnel in the RAOC should be kept to a minimum. The physical layout of the RAOC will vary depending upon the situation and space available. On the following page is an example of a plan designed to maximize coordination:

SAMPLE RAOC ORGANIZATION

INTEL MAP	RAS MAP	RAS FLIP CHART
	TSC & RECORDERS	
INTEL OFF/CHIEF	TSO/WATCH OFF	RAS TAC TAR & COF NETS
INTEL NET		NBC OFF/CHIEF
INTEL FLIP CHART		RASC
		RUNNER/MESSENGER

CHAPTER 5

FIRE SUPPORT FOR REAR AREA SECURITY

CHAPTER 5

FIRE SUPPORT FOR RAS

5000. GENERAL. There will rarely be sufficient MAGTF fire support assets to simultaneously support the main battle and the RAS effort. Seldom, if ever, will fire support assets have the primary mission of supporting RAS operations. However, the availability and timely use of fire support is critical to RAS and the unemployed provision of CSS and other rear area functions.

1. Most fires in support of RAS should be observed fires on targets of opportunity. Unobserved fires will rarely, if ever, be used in RAS operations. The possible intermingling of combatants and civilians in the rear area could result in collateral damage and casualties. The RAOC FSCC's primary mission is to clear fire missions where SILENCE IS NOT CONSENT. Positive clearance of fire missions in support of RAS is imperative.

5001. FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS

1. Artillery. Artillery is highly responsive, accurate, and capable of delivering a wide range of munitions. When the situation dictates, artillery in support of RAS can be arranged by providing special instructions and modifying some of the inherent responsibilities in an artillery battalion's tactical mission. Another advantage of artillery in support of RAS is that the artillery battalion fire direction center (FDC) is more capable of finding a unit available to fire and passing a fire order to that unit, even during periods of high activity, than is a mortar FDC or a naval gunfire support ship. This is the case because artillery is the only supporting arm with a headquarters organization capable of immediately controlling multiple firing units. One limitation of artillery is that support of RAS is not likely to be a primary mission and as such could be detrimental to the responsiveness required for RAS. In addition, artillery is subject to some of the same limitations as Naval Gunfire.

2. Mortars. Mortars are the most rapidly responsive of the supporting arms. Although limited in the choice of munitions, mortars are an excellent antipersonnel weapon, making them suitable for most RAS targets. A disadvantage of mortars is that their fires are difficult to sustain because of their rapid expenditure of ammunition and limited resupply capability. They also have the most limited range of the supporting arms discussed herein. These disadvantages can be overcome by

prepositioning mortar sites and stockpiling ammunition at those sites.

3. Naval Gunfire (NGF). NGF can deliver high volumes of fire very quickly and has about the same variety of munitions as does artillery. Although NGF spot teams are normally assigned to the GCE, they can be dispatched to the rear area when the GCE is no longer within range of the NGF support ship(s). The greatest disadvantage of NGF is that its high range of probable error reduces its effectiveness for close-in support when units in contact are on the gun-target line. This can be a major problem in RAS operations where pinpoint accuracy may be required and collateral damage must be minimized. Another disadvantage of NGF is that it is not easy to obtain without a trained and equipped NGF spot team.

4. Close Air Support. Immediate close air support (CAS) against targets of opportunity is the most likely RAS mission for fixed-wing attack aircraft. Air-delivered ordnance is generally the most lethal of the supporting arms, and attack aircraft can be rapidly concentrated at the target to achieve surprise. However, CAS requires a trained observer to control the aircraft. Therefore, unless the target warrants the use of air, such as the case of large troop concentrations, CAS would usually be less suitable than surface-fired supporting arms and is unlikely to play a major role as a supporting arm in most RAS scenarios. However, fixed-wing aircraft can be a very valuable reconnaissance asset.

5. Close-in Fire Support. Close-in Fire support from attack helicopters and slower fixed wing aircraft has considerable potential in an RAS (CIFS) role because these aircraft are responsive assets which require no supplementary observers, possess a significant loiter time in the target area, and have the capability to destroy almost any target. Controlling CIFS is considerably easier than controlling CAS for a unit without a FAC. Although these aircraft are vulnerable to ground air-defense weapons, including small arms, this danger should be considerably more in the main battle area than in the rear area.

5002. RAS PLANNING. Efficient RAS planning and execution require effective and timely coordination with supporting arms. Level II and Level III responses against sizeable enemy forces are more appropriate for use of indirect fire means. The RAOC FSCC has to determine the best fire support asset to engage probable and actual targets.

1. Responsiveness of the RAOC FSCC available weapon system. When time is a critical factor the FSCC will obviously want the weapon system which can most quickly and effectively respond to the situation. At times, the FSCC may have to settle for the

weapon system that is available to fire, even though it may not be the most appropriate.

2. Precision and collateral damage effect of the weapon systems. The rear area may be interspersed with civilian population centers, key facilities, and host nation historic monuments or buildings in which precision must be maximized and collateral damage minimized in the use of indirect fire assets.

3. Availability of observers to identify targets and adjust fires. Use of supporting arms coordinators must be maximized in RAS operation. The same air control assets used to control aerial reconnaissance/surveillance and aircraft engaged in close air/close-in fire support can also provide an artillery/NGF spotting capability. Assets available for this mission are located in the Marine Observation Squadron (VMO). In the rear area, the availability of trained ground observers to identify and adjust fires will be extremely limited thus, dictating the need for positive clearance of all fire missions.

5003. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AND CLOSE-IN FIRE SUPPORT IN RAS

1. Close Air Support

a. In general, there is a low probability of enemy air-to-air interference and enemy surface-to-air threats in RAS operations, but the probability does exist, especially during a Level III Threat. Although close air support (CAS) is not appropriate for a Level I and II response, and may be used infrequently in RAS operations, it may be critical to the initial stages of a Level III response. The TSO/RASC should consider use of CAS against:

(1) Level III-type forces.

(2) Larger formations of Level II-type forces when they can be found, fixed, and identified to CAS aircraft.

(3) Those Level I-and II-type threats against high priority targets, where other fire support assets are not available and the critical need outweighs the possibility of collateral damage and low probability of effectiveness.

(4) Penetration of enemy forces before friendly maneuver forces can engage.

(5) Antiarmor

b. An emphasis should be placed upon the use of a FAC(A) in RAS CAS since CAS-delivered munitions are dependent upon visual

means for delivery and tactical air control parties are usually located with the GCE who is not immediately available to the TSO.

2. Close-In Fire Support

a. Close-in fire support (CIFS) is defined as air action unique to attack helicopters against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces (FMFM 5-4A, Close Air Support and Close-In Fire Support). When not employed in aerial or ground escort operation, attack helicopters and slow moving fixed wing aircraft may:

(1) provide CIFS.

(2) provide fire support coordination.

(3) act as a FAC(A).

(4) assist in the suppression of enemy air defenses (EAD).

b. Under certain conditions such as poor weather or intensive jamming, CIFS aircraft may be the only feasible means of aerial fire support available to the rear area. Because the nature of CIFS aircraft allows for multiple runs, easy target identification, an accurate weapons platform, and the capability to destroy almost any target, they can respond to any level of threat to the rear area.

5004. FIRE SUPPORT

1. Requests for fire support in the MAGTF rear area can originate from units, bases, facilities, aerial observers, military police, or provisional mobile security forces. The RAOC FSCC will act as both the approving authority and coordinator for fire support requests between requesting units and fire support assets.

2. Fire support coordination in RAS operations will be controlled by the FSCC located in the RAOC. The FSCC duties will differ from standard operations of the Fire Support Coordinator. The FSCC will positively clear all fire missions in the rear area; SILENCE IS NOT CONSENT.

3. Fire support coordination measures in RAS operations will be similar to those used forward of the GCE rear boundary. The FSCC will have the authority to establish the needed fire support coordination measures within the rear area. These measures can include:

a. Restricted Fire Areas (RFAs). Usually established around bases. Unless fires are requested by the base itself, the fires are not permitted in the restricted areas.

b. No Fires Areas (NFAs). - Usually established around host nation population centers and key civilian/military facilities. Fires into these areas are prohibited unless authorized by the establishing authority, or in cases involving immediate self-defense. Coordination with the host nation is essential.

c. Free Fire Areas (FFAs). - Usually established around known enemy forces or planned around possible LZs/DZs allowing an expedited response to any enemy action. Because of the nature of FFAs, the RASC must coordinate with the host nation, if applicable, and abide by all host nation agreements/ conditions.

5005. RAS FIRE SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS

1. Requests for fire support from the units within the rear area will be cleared through the RAOC FSCC which will approve requests forwarded to the GCE FSCC or directly to the supporting unit depending upon the situation.

2. Requests for air support from units will be approved by the TSO/ALO in the RAOC as they are conveyed to the direct air support center (DASC). The TSO/FSCC must therefore have the capability to communicate on the GCE fire support coordination net, and the tactical air request (TAR) net. This gives the TSO/FSCC redundancy in communication and the ability to access any fire support asset available.