CHAPTER 6

INTELLIGENCE

CHAPTER 6

INTELLIGENCE

6000. GENERAL. The objective of the intelligence cycle in rear area operations is to locate and identify the enemy, learn the enemy's intentions, and provide timely and accurate information to the commander so that he can take steps to neutralize the threat. The G/S-2 section must be an integral part of security, and keep the entire intelligence staff aware of operational plans and enemy activity.

6001. THREAT LEVELS. OH 2-6 defines the following levels of threats:

1. Level I. Those threats which can be handled by local security efforts. Overreaction to these threats would only succeed in accomplishing the enemy's mission of reducing the effectiveness of combat service support.

2. Level II. Threats beyond the immediate capability of the unit but which can be defeated with reinforcements. The Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) will coordinate requests for reinforcements from other units.

3. Level III. Threats which are beyond the capabilities of the forces located within the rear area. If Level III Threats are encountered, the entire MAGTF is in danger and the MAGTF Commander must be notified immediately in order to redirect GCE efforts.

6002. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. Intelligence sources and processing procedures are covered in detail in the FSSG Intelligence SOP. The following are procedures which are essential to the rear area security effort:

1. Briefing/Debriefing. Personnel leaving their duty area on a mission of any type should receive an intelligence briefing to include the current threat status and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). Immediately upon return from a mission, individuals should be debriefed to determine the nature of intelligence derived.

2. Observation and Reconnaissance. The G/S-2 should work closely with the Tactical Security Officer (TSO) to develop a plan to cover observation or reconnaissance of possible enemy activity and avenues of approach. Resources available include patrols and aerial reconnaissance. The G/S-2 should ensure that pilots are routinely assigned reconnaissance missions within the rear area either as a primary or secondary mission. The G/S-2

should also make use of the Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) when available.

3. Passive Devices. When available, the G/S-2 should ensure that passive collection devices such as Seismic Intrusive Device (SID) systems or Night Observation Devices (NOD) are placed in likely areas of enemy activity and avenues of approach. The G/S-2 should also assist the Tactical Security Officer (TSO) in establishing a deception plan

4. Interrogation. Units should instruct all personnel in the correct handling and processing of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW). In addition, personnel should be instructed to inform the G/S-2 if local nationals are suspected of security breaches and to detain suspected personnel if possible.

5. Internal Security Reporting. Personnel should be encouraged to observe and report any unusual activity by all individuals, including those assigned to work within the immediate area.

6. Password/Countersign. The use of passwords and countersigns is of extreme importance in maintaining internal security. Training should include the proper procedures for using passwords and countersigns and reporting violations of their use. Unit leaders should insure that all personnel receive proper passwords and countersigns on a daily basis.

CHAPTER 7

NBC IN REAR AREA SECURITY

CHAPTER 7

NBC IN REAR AREA SECURITY

SECTION 1: OVERVIEW

7000. NBC DEFENSE RESPONSIBILITY

The Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander is responsible for determining and prescribing the active and passive NBC defense measures required for the MAGTF.

a. Active Defense. In general, the active protective measures which are employed in defense against enemy attack are supplemented for nuclear and chemical defense by plans to:

(1) Employ nuclear and chemical weapons to eliminate the enemy NBC capabilities.

(2) Destroy enemy launching sites.

(3) Warn air and ground reconnaissance.

(4) Increase communications security.

b. Passive Defense. Active protective measures used against other weapons give only partial protection against NBC attack. Provisions must be made for passive defense, such as:

(1) Unit separation, dispersion, and mobility.

(2) Train and indoctrinate personnel.

(3) Detect, identify, and report NBC agents and hazards.

(4) Individual and collective protection.

(5) Decontamination of personnel, equipment, supplies and terrain when directed.

(6) Plans for handling mass casualties, to include medical operations and first aid.

c. TRAINING REQUIREMENTS. In annual training plans, all battalions will include specialized training for decontamination personnel. This training should be set in a tactical situation. In addition, all 0811 and 1171 personnel should be cross trained in operation in the alternate MOS when required.

7002. ALERT CONDITIONS. Alert conditions in the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) will be monitored by the Tactical Security Officer.

1. Subordinate element commanders may establish an increased alert condition based upon the local tactical situation. When an alert condition is established, all subordinate elements will execute the appropriate minimum action identified in this paragraph.

a. Alert Condition YELLOW (Attack Probable).

(1) Distribute NBC first aid medication.

(2) Muster the Monitor and Survey Teams and issue detection equipment.

(3) Ensure supplies are protected.

(4) Test general alarm procedures.

(5) Establish the Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP), risk criteria for operations in an NBC environment.

(6) Turn off all nonessential radio nets and ensure all electronic equipment is properly grounded.

b. Alert Condition RED (Attack Imminent or in Progress).

(1) Alert the Command Element to possible NBC attack. The initial NBC-1 report will have FLASH precedence. Subsequent NBC-1 reports will have PRIORITY precedence.

(2) Cease all nonessential operations until the nature of the warning is determined.

(3) Remain masked until advised of alert condition WHITE.

(4) Conduct monitor and survey operations to determine the nature and extent of actual or suspected contamination.

c. Alert condition WHITE (Attack Not Probable).

(1) Unmasking is permitted for units not affected. Advise the Command Element of changes in MOPP level.

(2) Determine decontamination requirements for personnel, equipment, and terrain.

(3) Muster the NBC defense teams necessary to decontaminate the mission essential equipment, personnel, and terrain.

(4) Provide medical aid as needed to the units affected by the attack.

(5) Mark areas and routes necessary for the safe conduct of operations.

7003. PROTECTION. Protection includes measures taken by individuals and units that reduce the harmful effects of an NBC attack.

1. Individual protective actions are to be taken before, during, and after attack. Actions include donning protective clothing, preparing protective positions, and protecting individual food, water, and material.

a. All Marines are to have, when directed, the individual protective clothing and equipment listed below. These items may be issued to the individual or prepared for embarkation by the unit based upon the situation and guidance. Ensure filter elements for the mask are serviceable.

(1) Chemical protective overgarment.

(2) Protective mask with a hood attached.

(3) Chemical protective glove set.

(4) Chemical protective footwear cover.

(5) One waterproof protective bag.

(6) One skin decontamination kit (M258A1).

(7) Chemical detection paper (M8 or M9).

b. Individual fighting positions are to be constructed as deep as possible with overhead cover (3ft) when possible. This will provide protection against nuclear weapons. Protective clothing affords good protection from the effects of chemical and biological attack.

c. Food, water, and material require protection to ensure that personnel can safely consume and use them after the attack. Food and water are to remain inside the original or airtight containers until consumed. Prior to use, the monitor and survey teams are to periodically check them for

contamination. Weapons and other equipment are to be covered and placed inside the protective positions.

2. Unit protective actions are taken before, during, and after attack. They include the construction of protective shelters and tactical measures necessary to reduce the vulnerability of the unit.

a. Protective shelters provide safety for personnel and ensure the continued operation of vital functions within the unit. Shelters will be constructed to take the full advantage of terrain shielding.

b. Maintain sufficient additional NBC defense equipment to ensure the survival of all Marines. One additional set of combat filters, protective gloves, and protective boots will provide minimum protection.

c. Ensure heavy construction materials (class IV) are available.

7004. DECONTAMINATION. The requirement to decontaminate is based upon an evaluation of the tactical situation by the element commander. Normally, only persistent chemical agents and nuclear fallout will be decontaminated. There are three types of decontamination:

1. Basic skills (decontamination procedures that are simple measures taken to ensure the survival of the individual Marine).

a. Individual decontamination (conducted by all contaminated Marines within the first minute after attack using the Skin Decontamination Kit).

b. Crew decontamination (conducted by all contaminated Marines within 15 minutes after attack with the M-11 and M-13 Decontamination Apparatus. This allows safe equipment operation until hasty decontamination is conducted).

2. Hasty decontamination (conducted within six hours after attack by the unit NBC Defense Teams).

a. Unit MOPP gear exchange (supervised by the unit NBC Defense Teams for groups of 10 personnel or less. This provides short breaks from MOPP-4).

b. Vehicle washdown (conducted by the unit NBC Defense Teams from hastily prepared locations to remove gross amounts of contamination from vehicles).

NOTE: No more than five minutes and 200 gallons of water per vehicle are required for vehicle washdown.

3. Deliberate decontamination (conducted by the CSSE with augmentation from the unit being supported).

a. Deliberate personnel decontamination is to be done in the following manner:

Step 1: Individual equipment decontamination and drop.

Step 2: Decontamination of overboots and hoods.

Step 3: Remove the overgarment.

Step 4: Remove the overboots and gloves.

Step 5: Monitor body for contamination.

Step 6: Remove the protective mask.

Step 7: Mask decontamination.

Step 8: Reissue individual equipment.

b. Detailed equipment decontamination is to be done in the following manner:

Step 1: Primary vehicle washdown.

Step 2: Decontamination Solution 2 (DS-2) application and interior decontamination.

Step 3: Decontamination reaction time.

Step 4: DS-2 rinse.

Step 5: Monitor equipment to ensure compliance with decontamination criteria.

c. Priority and Criteria for decontamination.

(1) In a nuclear environment, efforts to decontaminate personnel are to receive first priority. Efforts are to continue until monitoring instruments measure no more than .03 centigray per hour (cGy/hr). Mission essential equipment is to have second priority and contamination is to be reduced to a point where monitoring devices measure .5 cGy/hr. All other equipment is to be decontaminated to .5 cGy/hr.

(2) In a chemical environment personnel have first priority for decontamination. Mission essential equipment has second, and all other equipment is to be decontaminated to a point where no detectable trace of contamination can be found with M-8 chemical detection paper.

(3) There are two techniques for conducting deliberate decontamination of NBC contamination:

7005. SUPPLY. Procedures for transporting, issuing and maintaining supplies in an NBC environment are outlined as follows:

1. The movement of all classes of supplies, whether by wheeled, tracked vehicle, or aircraft, is to follow routes that avoid known or suspected areas of contamination, if possible. In the event that vehicles and supplies become contaminated, a decontamination site is to be established/designated for decontamination of the convoy.

2. All supplies are to be monitored by the receiving unit's Monitor and Survey Teams for possible contamination prior to issue. If supplies are contaminated, every effort is to be made by the receiving unit to decontaminate the supplies. If efforts are unsuccessful, the items are to be destroyed and buried. Do not burn contaminated material because toxic vapors are released.

3. Maintenance of NBC defense equipment is performed by the Maintenance Management Officer and the Supply Officer. Serviceability standards for each chemical defense item is covered in Technical Instruction (TI) 10010-15/1B.

4. The separate elements in the CSSE are responsible for the embarkation of NBC defense equipment. Ensure lot numbers of clothing (Chemical Protective) and filter elements are available prior to embarkation.

5. Supply officers are responsible for ensuring that two sets of chemical protective equipment are available for issue in the event of a chemical and biological attack.

CHAPTER 1

NBC IN REAR AREA SECURITY

SECTION 2: NBC TEAMS

7006. GENERAL. The ability of units to survive NBC attacks will depend on the proper organization of well trained NBC teams and individuals. NBC defense teams are organized to provide capabilities for the control of information and operations, the detection of hazards and decontamination of unit equipment.

7007. NBC TEAM ASSIGNMENTS. All units within the CSSE will organize, train and operationally equip unit NBC teams to effectively meet NBC contingencies. NBC SOP's will make provisions for detached units, attached units and the organization and assignment of NBC defense teams.

1. Control Center Teams. Control center teams will be organized at the following levels:

a. RAOC.

b. Separate elements.

2. Monitor/Survey Teams. Monitor/Survey teams are organized and assigned at all levels based on mission oriented protective posture (MOPP), and unit T/E for RADIAC equipment and chemical agent detector kits.

3. Decontamination Teams. Decontamination teams are organized and assigned at all levels based on (MOPP).

a. Personnel decontamination.

b. Equipment decontamination.

7008. MONITOR/SURVEY TEAMS. Selected individuals will be given specialized training in radiological monitoring and survey techniques. Radiological monitoring is the general act of detecting the presence of radiation and measuring it with radiac instruments. Radiological survey is the direct effort to determine the extent and dose rates of radiation in an area. All personnel should be familiar with the basic capabilities and characteristics of authorized radiac instruments. Members of both the monitor and survey teams are trained in the use of all instruments.

1. Monitor/Teams. Each element maintains the capability of utilizing at least two AN/PDR-27J for monitor. This calls for

at least two monitors with backup personnel. Preferably platoon size units should be able to use the AN/PDR-27J or equivalent monitoring device.

2. Survey Teams. One survey team, consisting of two IM-174/PD monitors and necessary support and security personnel, is organized on each company size unit.3. Capabilities. All monitor/survey personnel should have the following capabilities:

a. Conducting field biological sampling and chemical agent detection.

b. Operating both monitor and survey radiac instruments as well as T/E communication equipment.

c. Working in contaminated areas with appropriate protective clothing.

d. Marking known or suspected contaminated area with standard triangular markers.

e. Types of monitoring.

(1) Periodic Monitoring. Periodic monitoring is the periodic check of the units area of radiation.

(2) Continuous Monitoring. Continuous monitoring requires constant surveillance for radiation in the unit area of operations or along a route of march.

7009. DECONTAMINATION TEAMS. Each element should organize and train unit decontamination teams consisting of one school trained NCO and a minimum of six team members. This team will be capable of performing first and second echelon decontamination, utilizing T/E radiac equipment and chemical agent detector kits and establishing a personnel decontamination station appropriate to unit level. In the event of large scale decontamination operations, augmentation personnel must be organized and available.

CHAPTER 7

NBC IN REAR AREA SECURITY

SECTION 3: NBC REPORTS

7010. GENERAL. U.S. forces use the standardized formats which are prescribed in NATO STANAG 2103. These formats provide a rapid means of disseminating information, but do not have inherent security. Speed is more essential than security in reporting NBC attacks.

7011. NBC REPORTS. The report of unidentified nuclear, biological or chemical attack and the resulting hazardous areas are made according to the provisions of STANAG 2103. The expected chemical and radiological hazard areas resulting from nuclear and chemical weapon employment by friendly forces are also reported.

1. NBC 1: Report used by the observing unit to report initial and subsequent data of a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. (See figure 7-1).

2. NBC 2: Report used for passing evaluated data of an NBC attack. (See figure 7-2).

3. NBC 3: Report used for immediate warning of expected NBC contamination. (See figure 7-3)

4. NBC 4: Report used for radiation dose rate measurements. (See figure 7-4).

5. NBC 5: Report used to locate the area of radiological, biological, and chemical contamination or hazard. (See figure 7-5).

6. NBC 6: Report used to locate the area of radiological, biological attacks. (See figure 7-6).

7012. REPORT OF FIRST USE. The report of unidentified nuclear, biological, or chemical attack and the resulting hazardous areas are made according to the provisions of STANAG 2103. The expected chemical and radiological hazard areas resulting from nuclear and chemical weapon employment by friendly forces are also reported.

7013. NBC INFORMATION SOURCES. The NBC information source may be a unit under attack or a unit observing an attack. The source submits NBC reports through the chain of command by the fastest means possible.

1. Nuclear Attack Report. The information source, normally artillery units, air defense units, the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) submits:

a. An initial NBC 1 report to its next higher headquarters and adjacent units with a FLASH message precedence, and other reports with an immediate precedence.

b. Subsequent NBC 1 nuclear reports to its next higher headquarters and adjacent units with an IMMEDIATE message precedence giving follow-up data.

2. Chemical and biological attack report. The information source, normally the company level, submits:

a. An initial NBC 1 chemical or biological report to its Command Element and adjacent units with a FLASH message precedence. The next Command Element forwards the initial NBC 1 report to the TSCC.

b. Subsequent NBC 1 follow-up reports to its Command Element with an IMMEDIATE message precedence giving follow-up data.

LINE	NUCLEAR	CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL	REMARKS
Bravo	position of observer	position of observer	use grid coordinates (or place)
Charley	dir of attack from observer	dir of attack from observer	direction measured clockwise from grid north or magnetic north (state which) in degrees or mils (state which)
Delta	date-time group of direction	date-time group for start of attack	zulu time
Echo	illumination time	date time group end of attack	zulu time
Foxtrot	location of area attacked	location of area attacked	use grid coordinates actual or estimated
Golf	means of delivery	kind of attack	artillery, mortars missiles, bombs or spray
Hotel	type of burst	type of agent/ height of burst	air, ground or sub-surface for nuc, air or ground est height for air chemical
Juliet	flash to bang time		use seconds
Lima	clouds with at H&S		degree or mils (state which)

NOTE: Lines B, D, H, and either C or F would always be reported. Other items may be used if the information is known.

Figure 7-1. --NBC-1 Report.

Purpose. Report used for passing evaluated data.

Notes:

a. This report is based on two or more NBC-1 Reports. It includes an estimated GZ and in the case of nuclear detonation, an evaluated yield.

b. Refer to the chemical downwind message to determine cloud cover, significant weather phenomena, and air stability.

c. Users of NBC-2 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples. Other letter items may be added at the user's discretion.

d. Letters stand for the same data as on NBC-1 reports.

EXAMPLES

Nuclear

PRIORITY
001420Z
UNCLASSIFIED
COMBAT SIX
CONTROL
NBC-2 NUCLEAR
A. 024
D. 0014058Z
F. LB 187675
G. AIRCRAFT
H. SURFACE
N. 50 KT.

Chemical & Biological

PRIORITY
001316Z
UNCLASSIFIED
BORON SEVEN
CONTROL
NBC-2 TOXIC
A. C016
D. 000945Z
F. LB 126346 ACT
G. AIRCRAFT
H. NERVE

Letter items "G" should be included if known.

Figure 7-2. --NBC-2 Report.

Purpose: To issue immediate warning of expected contamination.

Note: a. This message must be delivered by telephone or radio.

b. Users of NBC-3 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples. Other letter items may be added at the user's discretion.

EXAMPLES

Nuclear

A. A024
D. 201405Z
F. LB187486 EST
N. 50 KT
Y. 02720312 DEG
Z. 01902505
ZI. 010,0017,0028,007

Chemical/Biological

A. B002
D. 201415Z
F. LB560750 ACT
H. NERVE, V. AIR BUST
PA. LB556751
LB 559754
LB 632774
LB 610794
LB 558747
PB. 2-4 DAYS ATTACK AREA
1-2 DAYS HAZARD AREA
Y. 0270 DEG. 015 KMPH
ZA. 518640

Note: 1. The digits in letter item Z are not normally separated, but are separated here to show the proper number of digits for each group.

2. If the effective wind speed is less than 8 kmph, line 2 of the NBC-3 (NUC) consists of 3 digits for the radius of zone 1.

3. If the wind speed is less than 10 kmph, line PA of the NBC-3 (CHEM) is 010, which is the radius of the hazard area.

4. Line ZI is used only for NUCWARN reports. When line ZI is used, line 2 is not used.

Figure 7-3. --NBC-3 Report.

Purpose: To report reconnaissance, monitoring and survey results.

Note:

a. Letter items H, Q, R, and S may be repeated as often as necessary.

b. Nuclear radiation dose rates are measured in the open, one meter above the ground. Other conditions will be specified in the message.

c. Users of NBC-4 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the example. Other letter items may be added at the user's discretion.

d. In line R descriptive word such as initial peak increasing, decreasing, special, series, verification, or summary may be added.

e. If readings are taken inside a vehicle or shelter, also give the transmission factor.

EXAMPLE

PRIORITY
001520Z
UNCLASSIFIED
COBALT EIGHT
MADHOUSE CONTROL
NBC04
A. A024
R. 1.5 INCREASING
S. 001500Z
Q. 782354
R. 6 INCREASING
S. 001500Z
Q. 645407
R. 15 PEAK, NONSTANDARD DECAY RATE
S. 001500Z

Note: Letter item "S" is not normalized to H+1 hour.

Figure 7-4. --NBC-4 Report.

Purpose: (Area of Actual Contamination)

EXAMPLES.

NUCLEAR

PRIORITY
001420Z
UNCLASSIFIED
TABUN
MADHOUSE
NBC-5
A. A024
V. ND 651455
V. ND 815010
V. ND 821459
V. ND 651422
W. ND 604718
W. ND 991686
W. ND 114420

TOXIC

PRIORITY
001420Z
UNCLASSIFIED
COBALT SIX
MADHOUSE
NBC-5
CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL
A. B002
D. 201415Z
H. NERVE V, AIR BURST
S. 201630Z
T. 201645Z
X. 760323 CHEM
X. 771325 CHEM
X. 802472 CHEM

Note: This report is best sent as an overlay if time and the tactical situation permit.

Figure 7-5. --NBC-5 Report.

Purpose: Detailed information on chemical/biological attacks.

EXAMPLE

NUCLEAR

n/a

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL

A - B002
D - 201415Z
E - 201427Z
F - LB 560750 act
G - aircraft
H - nerve, V, airburst
I - 20 rounds
K - mostly small houses and barns
M - enemy by passed on right flank
Q - liquid ground sample from attack area
S - 201005Z
T - 201110Z
X - as per overlay
Y - downwind dir 0090 deg, windspeed 010 kmph
ZB - this is the only chem attack in our area to date

Note: 1. This report is only submitted when requested.

2. This report is completed by NBC unit personnel. It provides as much narrative information as possible for each item.

Figure 7-6. --NBC-6 Report.

CHAPTER 8

LOCAL DEFENSIVE TACTICS

CHAPTER 8

LOCAL DEFENSIVE TACTICS

8000. GENERAL. A successful defensive plan must ensure that all avenues of approach are covered by fire, provide for early detection of enemy activities, and maintain the capability to concentrate ever increasing volumes of fire as the enemy approaches the perimeter. The RAS TSO will accomplish this mission for the rear area as a whole while local TSO's will do this for each TAOR.

8001. DEFENSIVE PLANNING. Defensive planning begins with the targets which can be observed within the effective ranges of available supporting arms. If assets are available, long range air support targets should be planned first, followed by naval gunfire, artillery, 81mm Mortars, 60mm Mortars, close and close-in air support, and small arms fires.

8002. PERIMETER DEFENSE. In planning the perimeter defense, the perimeter will be divided into sectors and units within the CSSE's perimeter will be assigned specific sectors. The local Tactical Security Officer (TSO) will ensure that crew-served weapons (TOW's, Dragons, machine guns, etc.) receive priority in placement. He will assign alternate positions and see that all units have supplemental positions and that all units interlock their fires.

8003. OBSERVATION AND LISTENING POSTS. The tactical situation will dictate the number of personnel to be assigned to observation and listening posts.

8004. BARRIER PLAN. Engineer assets are to be utilized to construct barriers over likely avenues of approach. Obstacles will be covered by fire and routes will be planned to and from observation/listening posts. Mines and wire barriers are useful defensive barriers.

8005. PATROLS. Patrolling will be conducted based upon the tactical situation with primary emphasis on reconnaissance rather than combat patrols.

8006. ROUTE SECURITY. The local TSO along with the Roadmaster will see that Main Supply Routes (MSR's) remain clear for traffic in the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) assigned to the CSSE. Military Police (MP's) will normally provide continuous roving patrols to ensure routes remain clear. In addition, the local TSO may task individual units to clear enemy ambushes or establish ambushes in areas of known enemy activity

within the TAOR. In addition, the RAS TSO may task the local TSO to provide security outside of the unit's TAOR.

8007. FIRE PLAN. All units should submit fire plans through the chain of command to the TSO. These plans should include sectors of fire, placement of crew served weapons, obstacles, and requests for supporting arms targets. The local TSO will consolidate fire plans, coordinate pre-planned fires and forward them to the RAS Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC), which coordinates fire support for all units within the rear area. All calls for fire will be on the conduct of fire net and controlled by the RAS FSCC. SILENCE IS NOT CONSENT.

8008. CONVOY OPERATIONS. Convoys are essential to the missions of the CSSE; therefore, particular emphasis should be placed on convoy operations and security. The following are some key considerations:

1. Organization. A typical convoy organization is composed of the following:

a. Transport Element. This element will, in essence, be the main body. It will contain the vehicles transporting the needed items to the requesting unit, such as ammunition, MREs, etc.

b. Escort or Security Elements. Depending on the size of the convoy and the specific mission, either an escort or security element will be required. As a minimum, organic M-2 .50 cal and/or MK - 19 will be ring mounted on every other truck of a convoy. The .50 cal. machine guns should be on lead and rear trucks for air security and MK - 19's in the center for ambush protection. In addition, external assets will be utilized to provide security during movement. These external assets include pre-planned supporting arms targets, aerial reconnaissance, helicopter gunship escorts, etc.

c. Support Element. This element will provide the convoy the capability to move with minimum interference. A support element includes personnel and equipment such as engineer obstacle and mine clearing teams, refueling equipment and personnel food service support. It may provide support at selected sites such as medical support, translator/interpreter support, and maintenance/vehicle recovery support. Certain items of support may be established at predetermined sites enroute as well.

d. Command and Control Element. The convoy commander is the direct representative of the commander and responsible for the safety, security and overall accomplishment of the convoy's mission. To carry out his responsibilities, the convoy

Commander develops a command and control element. This includes the vehicles, communications equipment, and personnel necessary for the convoy commander to direct, control and coordinate the convoy's operation and necessary external support as required.

2. Movement. Convoys should, if possible, move at night under strict blackout conditions to provide maximum protection/defense against attack. If a night convoy is not possible, movement during inclement weather is a second option. During decreased visibility, drivers may be able to see no more than 2 vehicles ahead. Visual contact between vehicles is essential. During daylight, however, travel should allow for 80 - 100 meters spacing between vehicles. If contact is lost, all remaining vehicles in the convoy should flash their headlights until the convoy is halted. It is essential that drivers maintain visual contact with vehicles behind them at all times. Daylight travel on unpaved secondary roads requires reduced speed to minimize the dust signature. Travel in open country should be scheduled when the sun is high to reduce the size of vehicle shadows. All vehicles should be camouflaged with the appropriate paint pattern, and glossy surfaces such as window glass should be covered or dulled wherever possible. Larger units should be divided into smaller units, for smaller convoys provide increased control and target dilution.

3. Actions on Contact. All personnel should be thoroughly briefed on Immediate Action Drills (IAD) and IAD'S should be practiced on a regular basis. In the event of contact, the following actions should be taken:

a. In an air attack, vehicles will alternately pull off to the left and right sides of the road and engage aircraft with all available weapons.

b. In the event of an ambush, return fire, maintain vehicle distance, and continue to move, if possible. Disabled vehicles should be steered off the road to allow passage of other vehicles. Convoy vehicles should avoid entering a kill zone. Personnel aboard a disabled vehicle in a kill zone should mount a passing vehicle. Flanking fire should be returned from vehicles outside the kill zone. The convoy's security element should deploy upon command and fight as a team. When contact is broken, the enemy should be pursued by fire only. Convoy elements should then reorganize and leave the area to avoid enemy supporting fires.

4. Convoy Operation Order. The convoy operation order contains the instructions necessary for the orderly conduct of the planned movement. The following are essential elements of the order:

a. Current situation

b. Fire Support Plan.

c. Mission/Purpose.

d. Concept of operations for the movement.

e. Responsibilities for administration and logistics.

f. Command and control.

g. Communications/radio frequencies.

8009. AIR DEFENSE. The enemy can be expected to utilize slow moving aircraft in basically the same way as friendly forces by either flying low to take advantage of terrain features, or by firing in a standoff mode on personnel and vehicles. In either case, enemy aircraft will be vulnerable to small arms, antiaircraft fires, and attack aircraft.

1. A standard tactic for Soviet trained pilots in high speed aircraft is to make an initial pass over a target, execute a half-loop, and return for a finishing attack. While the first attack may create considerable casualties, all personnel should prepare for a second attack by taking cover and preparing to take the aircraft under fire with small arms and antiaircraft weapons.

2. In addition to antiaircraft weapons utilized within the perimeter, vehicles with ring mounted machine-guns should also be incorporated into the perimeter defense. Specific individuals should be assigned to man these guns and all individuals should be trained in procedures for engaging aircraft with small arms.

8010. REINFORCE/ASSAULT TEAMS. Each unit within the CSSE will organize work assignments so that an adequate number of personnel is available to conduct security missions (patrols, convoy security, etc.) within the Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR). Ideally, units should keep a second group of personnel available in a standby status to provide tactical reinforcement if needed. These Reinforce/Assault Teams (RATS) should also be prepared to reinforce units outside the CSSE TAOR and consequently the RAS TSO will coordinate reinforcement drills among units on a frequent basis.

8011. CONSOLIDATION OF FORCES. The CSSE will continue to provide logistical support to the fullest extent possible. However, should the threat situation dictate, it may become necessary to discontinue combat service support operations and

require units within the CSSE to relocate to supplemental positions where they will form new defensive perimeters. Unit Commanders must predesignate equipment to be taken, left, and/or destroyed. The destruction plan must designate equipment along with procedures and personnel responsible for destruction. This action is intended to deny the enemy additional equipment or support.

CHAPTER 9

DISPLACEMENT

CHAPTER 9

DISPLACEMENT

9000. GENERAL. Due to the size and dispersion of personnel and equipment, displacement within the CSSE is usually kept to a minimum. Efficiency is reduced with frequent displacement since units are unable to perform their primary missions at their full capacity while moving. However, with an enemy intent upon disrupting efforts of support combat elements, it will become increasingly important for CSSEs to be more mobile. There are basically two types of displacements, deliberate and hasty. The tactical situation affects the type of displacement, and the planning and execution of each displacement is unique.

1. Deliberate Displacement. Deliberate displacements are displacements which allow time for planning and organization. This type of displacement may be to avoid enemy detection or once detected, to avoid hostile fires. Deliberate displacements could also be initiated in order for units to accomplish their missions more efficiently by reducing the distance from supported units, or to move within range of supporting arms fires.

2. Hasty Displacement. When a unit's position becomes untenable due to enemy attack, the unit commander must make an immediate decision to displace. During a hasty displacement time is the most critical factor, so commanders should include plans for a hasty displacement, including a destruction plan, when they develop their defensive plans. This type of forethought is essential in RAS planning.

9001. DELIBERATE DISPLACEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES. The G/S-3 has the staff responsibility for initiating recommendations as to the time of displacement and general locations. These recommendations are based upon study of maps and input from the G/S-2. Before making his recommendation, he consults other members of the staff, in particular the Communications Officer, Tactical Security Officer, and any others who might encounter specific problems in moving or in performing their functions at the new location. The G/S-1 has primary responsibility for planning and supervising displacement of the CP under the supervision of G/S-3. He is assisted by the Headquarters Commandant, G/S-2, and Communications Officer. Other members of the staff provide such information and assistance as the G/S-1 and the Headquarters Commandant may request during displacement.

9002. COORDINATION REQUIREMENTS. In developing plans for the actual displacement of the CP, the G/S-1 coordinates with the other members of the staff as follows:

1. With the G/S-2, to determine the weather forecast, road conditions and trafficability, and the location of enemy activity in the vicinity.

2. With G/S-4, to determine road priority and availability of surface transport when the move is to be made entirely or partially by ground vehicles.

3. With the Air Liaison Officer, when the move is to be made by helicopters or fixed wing aircraft, and to provide security enroute when the move is by land.

4. With Tactical Security Officer for convoy security.

5. With G/S-2, Communications Officer and Headquarters Commandant, to provide details of the contemplated displacement and instructions concerning advance party activities in order to ensure uninterrupted communications during displacement.

9003. DETAILED PROCEDURES. While these procedures pertain to the normal method of command post displacement, they can be modified for use when displacing by another method.

1. The Headquarters Commandant will inform all staff sections of the impending move, and will meet with representatives of each section to promulgate the following:

a. Time of departure for the advance party (and reconnaissance party when constituted).

b. Anticipated time of departure of the CSSE Commander's Echelon.

c. Establishing signals for departure of the advance party and CSSE Commander's Echelon.

d. Assignment of duties in accordance with this SOP.

e. Informing the G/S-4 of nonorganic transportation required and the allocation of that transportation.

f. Time and location for reporting of working parties.

2. Security. Convoy security as described earlier in this SOP should be adhered to at all times during displacement and coordinated by the TSO.

3. Reconnaissance Party. Normally, the advance party will include command post reconnaissance as part of its duties, however, there may be situations when, an additional reconnaissance group is required. In this case the G/S-2, TSO, and Communications Officer or their representatives will

form a reconnaissance party and select several probable CP sites for recommendation to the Commander. Adequate security and transportation appropriate to the terrain to be covered will be attached for any reconnaissance mission. Normally, the advance party will include command post reconnaissance as part of its duties.

4. Advance Party

a. OIC is the S-2.

b. Selects the specific site.

c. Headquarters Commandant and TSO establish positions within the perimeter.

d. Plans interior arrangement.

e. Installs communications nets.

f. TSO establishes local security.

g. Establishes forward CSSOC and RAOC.

h. Notifies Executive Officer or the G/S-3 when the new site is ready to assume operational control.

i. Sends guides back to old command post.

j. Supervises the movement of personnel and equipment of the CSSE Commander's Echelon into the new CP.

5. CSSE Commander's Echelon

a. The CSSE Commander's Echelon will begin preparations to move when the advance party is sent forward to reconnoiter the new CP site.

b. The G/S-1 will be responsible for assembling the CSSE Commander's Echelon for movement to the new CP.

c. Staff sections will notify the G/S-1 when they are ready to commence the movement.

d. The CSSE Commander's Echelon normally will move after receiving information that the Advance Party has established essential communications.

e. All tents should be dismantled when the advance party departs. However, in extreme weather conditions, the CSSOC, RAOC, and other selected tents, may have to remain standing until weather conditions improve. As sections complete

dismantling. Personnel not actually on watch should be provided to the G/S-4 to aid in closing the CP and holding police calls. All key personnel of the CSSE Commander's Echelon report to the G/S-1 when they are prepared to move.

f. Upon arrival at the new site, the CSSE Commander will resume control, and the echelon will accomplish further preparation of the CP site. This preparation will include:

(1) Establishment of an operations CSSOC/RAOC.

(2) Improvement of perimeter security.

(3) Provision for readiness of G/S-1 and G/S-4 tents.

(4) Provision for wire and radio communications.

g. The G/S-3 will notify higher, adjacent and subordinate headquarters informing them of the closing of the old and the opening of the new CPs.

6. Sergeant Major. The sergeant major will be responsible for supervising preparations to move the Commanding Officer's Echelon to the new location. He will keep the G/S-3 informed at all times of the progress being made and the time remaining until all units of the Commanding Officer's Echelon are prepared to move.

7. Communications Circuit Priorities During Displacement Although priorities of communication circuits may vary due to equipment availability, terrain and distance, the advance party should have reliable voice communications with higher, adjacent and subordinate headquarters before calling for the CSSE Commander's Echelon.

8. Displacement of Communications. Displacement of communications even under ideal conditions is difficult. With considerations of terrain, distance, number of personnel available, enemy situation, amount of equipment to be moved, weather and time available, it is essential that as much advance notice of a pending displacement be given the Communications Officer as possible. Preparation during daylight hours will help prevent equipment from being damaged, lost, or misplaced.

9. Displacement by Motor Vehicle. To properly organize, load, and promptly displace the advance party, the Communications Officer should, if possible, load and stage the communications equipment and vehicles the day preceding the displacement. Due to the type of equipment involved, physical security must be maintained. Normally it will be best to stage pre-loaded

vehicles and trailers in close proximity to the Communications Center.

a. As a minimum, the following circuits must be established:

(1) CSSE command Net.

(2) Conduct of Fire Net/DASC.

(3) CSSE Security Net.

b. If so equipped, multi-channel teletype and administrative/logistic nets should be in the process of being established when the CSSE Commander's Echelon is called. However, assumption of command at the new site should not be contingent upon communications being passed over these circuits.

10. Rear Party

a. OIC is the G/S-4.

b. The Rear Party will check the old CP site to ensure that nothing has been left behind and the area has been well policed.

9004. HASTY DISPLACEMENT. When enemy attack or natural catastrophe make a position untenable, the commander of the unit must make a decision to displace immediately without the benefit of an Advance Party. The signal for hasty displacement should be included in the unit's SOP and in the commander's defense order. Hasty displacements should become another immediate action drill which is practiced each time the unit goes to the field.

1. Supplementary Positions. Part of the Commander's defensive planning should be a reconnaissance of several potential supplemental positions. Based upon this reconnaissance, he should select a primary and several possible alternative relocation positions, and the best routes to reach these positions. However, he should normally allow his Security Force the opportunity to secure the position prior to moving into the new location.

2. Fire Support Plan. Included in the commander's defense should be a Fire Support Plan to cover a hasty displacement. Targets should be located within the old and new locations and at key positions enroute.

3. Destruction Plan. Also included in the Commander's planning should be the designation of specific equipment to be taken during a hasty displacement, equipment which should be left

behind and equipment which should be destroyed. The destruction plan should further designate who should destroy the equipment and how destruction should be accomplished. A specific destruction plan should be included in the unit's RAS SOP.

4. Consolidation. Upon reaching the new position, units must immediately establish local security and communications. As soon as possible, units should also report all casualties and missing personnel to the G/S-1. They should also report to the G/S-4 the status of ammunition on hand and the status of all equipment including equipment left behind or destroyed.

CHAPTER 10

TRAINING

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10000. GENERAL. Rear area security will be effective only when individuals are proficient in the basic warfighting skills and adequately trained in defensive tactics. All units should include not less than one subject dealing with rear area security in each month's training plan.

10001. INDIVIDUAL TRAINING. Individuals should be encouraged to enroll in MCI courses involving tactics. Lance Corporals and above should be encouraged to complete training equivalent in content to the MCI course entitled "Infantry Squad Leader: Weapons and Fire Support". The following are examples of topics to be incorporated into unit training schedules:

1. Handling of POW's.
2. Field firing of individual weapons, both day and night.
3. Hand grenades.
4. Familiarization with M60, M2, MK-19, and SAW.
5. Individual camouflage and concealment.
6. Camouflage and concealment of vehicles.
7. Construction of fighting holes.
8. Individual movement.
9. Patrolling.
10. Land navigation.
11. Operations security.
12. Care & cleaning of individual weapons.
13. Identification of enemy vehicles and equipment.
14. NBC.
15. Air defense drills.
16. Demolitions.

17. Noise discipline.

18. Call for and adjustment of indirect fires.

10002. UNIT TRAINING. In addition to individual training, there are several areas of training that should be accomplished as a group or unit. The following are examples:

1. Convoy security.

2. Immediate Action Drills (IAD) for ambushes/air attack.

3. Crew served weapons.

4. Fire plan sketches/PDF and zones of action.

5. Barrier plans.

6. Air defense tactics.

10003. LEADERSHIP TRAINING. Along with the above mentioned topics, NCO's should be well trained in the following:

1. Defensive tactics.

2. Fire support planning.

3. Call for the adjustment of indirect fires.

4. Communication procedures.

5. Construction of a barrier plan.

6. Placement of crew served weapons.

7. Antiair tactics.

CHAPTER 11

SUMMARY

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SUMMARY

11000. GENERAL. CSSE Commanders can assure continuous and effective combat service support for MAGTF operations by carefully planning and organizing to provide adequate rear area security. The RAS effort must be a measured response, using the appropriate resources to counter the enemy threat to the rear area. While the term "Rear Area Security" is of relatively recent vintage, it has evolved from the traditional concept of defensive tactics in the Marine Corps. Therefore, CSSE Commanders must base their RAS training on the sound principles of defensive tactics, supported by the RAS guidance provided in this document and OH 2-6. Every commander must continue to improve RAS training, select a Tactical Security Officer (TSO), conduct displacements, and define unit and element sectors of defense. In short, CSSE's must be capable of self-defense and commanders must accomplish this task with the existing assets and personnel found within their units.