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Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations

SEMPER FIDELIS

US Marine Corps

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FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.1, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, is designed to assist Marines, whether serving in civil-military operations (CMO) billets or in other capacities, to incorporate CMO across the range of military operations throughout each phase of an operation or campaign. Civil-military operations are difficult to understand and execute effectively without adequate doctrine, expertise, and training. This publication provides a starting point for CMO planners as they plan and fight in today's complex operational environments.

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.1 provides a doctrinal foundation of Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) CMO and serves as a guide for the commander and his staff, as well as for Marine Corps active duty and Selected Marine Corps Reserve civil affairs units. The intent of this publication is to supplement joint doctrine by describing how and why the MAGTF uniquely incorporates CMO into its expeditionary mission. This publication is a result of current lessons learned, after action reports and subject matter expert collaboration of the joint Services and select Government agencies.

For additional information about Joint and other Service CA organizations and CMO doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, refer to Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*; Field Manual 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations; and Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-33.1A, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*. These publications provide a wealth of information on civil affairs and CMO doctrine, history, organization, capabilities and methodology, and should be included in the libraries of Marine Corps civil affairs units and personnel.

This publication supercedes MCWP 3-33.1, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, dated 7 April 2003.

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BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Civil Dimension of Military Operations

Historical Background 1-1
Fundamentals 1-3
Civil-Military Operations in the Range of Military Operations 1-4
Phase 0: Shape (prevent, prepare) 1-4
Phase I: Deter (crisis defined). 1-5
Phase II: Seize Initiative (assure friendly freedom of action, assess theater infrastructure). 1-5
Phase III: Dominate (establish dominant force capabilities, achieve full-spectrum superiority) 1-5
Phase IV: Stabilize (establish security, restore services) 1-5
Phase V: Enable Civil Authority (transfer to civil authority, redeploy) 1-6
Forms of Military Operations 1-6
Types of Civil-Military Operations 1-6
Populace and Resources Control 1-7
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 1-8
Nation Assistance 1-9
Support to Civil Administration 1-9
Civil Information 1-9
Civil Support Operations 1-10
Funding Authorities 1-10
METT-T, Civil Considerations, and Funding 1-10
Department of Defense Funding Authorities Available Under United States Code, Title 10. 1-11
Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 1-11
Humanitarians Assistance. 1-11
Humanitarian Assistance–Excess Property 1-11
Humanitarian Assistance–Other 1-12
Humanitarian Mine Action Program 1-12
Foreign Disaster Relief Initiative 1-12
The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program 1-13
The Denton Program 1-13
The Funded Transportation Program 1-13
Security and Stabilization Assistance. 1-13
Department of State Funding Authorities Available Under United States Code, Title 22. 1-13
Civil-Military Operations in the Long War 1-14
Act in the National Interest. 1-14
Serve in Expeditionary Environments 1-14
Partners Outside of the MAGTF 1-15
Watched by the World 1-15

Tactical Actions May Have Strategic Implications 1-15
Importance of Civilian Population 1-15
Operate in Uncertainty 1-15
MAGTF Civil-Military Operations in an Expeditionary Environment 1-15
Task Organization 1-15
Serving as an Initial Entry Force 1-16
Fighting From the Sea 1-16
Seabasing 1-16
Interfacing with Civilians 1-16
Operational Support 1-16
Minimize Civilian Interference, Maximize Civilian Support 1-16
Meet Legal and Moral Obligations 1-17
Gain Situational Awareness 1-17
Enhance Freedom of Action 1-17
Isolate the Enemy 1-17
Support the Force 1-18
Win the Perception Battle 1-18

Chapter 2. MAGTF Civil Affairs Forces and Concept of Employment

Personnel and Units 2-1
Civil Affairs Group 2-1
Civil Affairs Detachments 2-2
Civil Affairs Teams 2-2
Command and Control 2-4
MAGTF G-9/S-9 Staff 2-4
Reserve Component Civil Affairs Forces 2-5
Preplanned Support 2-5
Contingency Support 2-6
Concept of Employment for Civil Affairs Forces 2-6
Phase 0: Shape (prevent, prepare) 2-7
Phase I: Deter (crisis defined) 2-8
Phase II: Seize Initiative (assure friendly freedom of action, assess theater infrastructure) 2-8
Phase III: Dominate (establish dominant force capabilities, achieve full-spectrum superiority) 2-8
Phase IV: Stabilize (establish security, restore services) 2-9
Phase V: Enable Civil Authority (transfer to civil authority, redeploy) 2-9
Other MAGTF Capabilities in Support of Civil-Military Operations 2-9

Chapter 3. Civil-Military Operations Planning

Civil Affairs Methodology 3-1
Assess 3-1
Decide 3-2

Develop/Detect 3-3
Deliver 3-3
Evaluate 3-3
Transition 3-4
Civil Reconnaissance 3-4
Civil Information Management 3-4
The Marine Corps Planning Process 3-5
Tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process 3-6
Integrated Planning 3-7
Continuous and Concurrent Planning 3-8
Civil-Military Operations Problem Framing 3-8
Understanding the Environment 3-9
Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace 3-9
Understanding Our Capabilities 3-11
Understanding the Problem 3-11
Understanding the Purpose 3-12
Commander's Initial Intent and Guidance 3-12
Civil-Military Operations Staff Action 3-12
Green Cell 3-14
Red Cell 3-14
Civil-Military Operations Course of Action Development 3-14
Apply Inputs From Problem Framing 3-14
Develop Initial Courses of Action 3-14
Identify Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations 3-15
Update Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Products 3-15
Determine Battlefield Framework 3-16
Establish Priorities and Objectives 3-16
Determine Tasks 3-16
Determine Requirements 3-16
Assign Required Course of Action Capabilities 3-16
Assign Purpose Then Tasks 3-16
Determine Command Relationships 3-16
Synchronize 3-16
Determine Control Measures 3-16
Obtain G-9 Input 3-17
Conduct Course of Action Refinement 3-17
Prepare Civil-Military Briefing 3-17
Publish Commander's Wargaming Guidance and Evaluation Criteria 3-17
Civil-Military Operations Course of Action War Game 3-18
Establish War Game Rules 3-19
Conduct War Game Preparation 3-19
Conduct the War Game Turn 3-20
War Game Brief 3-22
Course of Action Comparison and Decision 3-22
Evaluate Courses of Action 3-22

Compare Courses of Action 3-23
Establish Commander's Decision 3-23
Prepare the Commander's Concept of Operations 3-25
Update the Warning Order 3-25
Orders Development 3-25
Preparation of an Order 3-25
Orders Reconciliation 3-25
Orders Crosswalk 3-26
Commander Approves Order or Plan 3-26
Development of the Operations Order and Civil-Military Operations 3-26
Transition 3-27
Transition Brief 3-28
Transition Drills 3-29
Confirmation Brief 3-29

Chapter 4. Coordination

Civil-Military Operations Center 4-1
Interagency, Nongovernmental, and Intergovernmental Organizations 4-2
US Government Coordination and the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization 4-3
US Government Interagency Partners 4-4
Nongovernmental Organizations and Intergovernmental Organizations 4-5
Facilitation of Effort 4-6
Information Component 4-7
Civil Support Operations 4-7
MAGTF Coordination in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 4-7
Lessons Learned 4-8
The Operational Environment 4-9
The Relief System 4-10
The Military Role 4-10
The Humanitarian Community 4-11
United States Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 4-12
Sphere Project 4-13

Appendices

A Combat Standing Operating Procedure A-1
B Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance B-1
C District Stability Framework Quick Reference C-1

D Sample Civil-Military Operations Reports D-1
E Examples of Annex Gs for Conducting Stability Operations. E-1

Glossary

References and Related Publications

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CHAPTER 1
CIVIL DIMENSION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Gradually there must be instilled in the inhabitants' mind the leading ideas of civilization, the security and sanctity of life and property, and individual liberty. In doing so, one should endeavor to make self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these matters. With all this accomplished, one should be able to leave the country with the lasting friendship and respect of the native population.

—Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-15, *Small Wars Manual*

Historical Background

When the *Small Wars Manual* was originally published in 1940, the Marine Corps had already amassed a wealth of experience in conducting what is known today as stability operations. In 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD), recognizing the importance of this trend, published Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, *Stability Operations*, which stated that stability operations were to be a core US military mission and that its Armed Forces were to be prepared to conduct these types of operations with a level of proficiency equivalent to combat operations. Although stability operations were often relegated to the background during the Cold War, they have been conducted with increasing frequency during the past 20 years in such places as Panama, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, the Philippines, and Afghanistan. Furthermore, this DODI directed that the Armed Services should be prepared to conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations. Although no longer relegated to peacekeeping operations or short-term contingency operations, DODI 3000.05 states "stability operations missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration." Inherent to stability operations is the need to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance (HA). All of these tasks fall within the purview of civil-military operations (CMO), and today's Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) must be prepared to carry out this type of mission whether it has civil affairs (CA) forces assigned or not.

In any type of environment and across the range of military operations, Marine Corps commanders must determine how best to engage the civilian populace to accomplish their missions. This publication provides a framework from which to understand, plan, and execute CMO for the MAGTF. The Marine Corps has been engaged in CMO since its inception, in places as diverse as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In some of these operations, civil-military considerations were paramount and their effective incorporation into planning often determined an operation's success or failure, such as the operations in the Caribbean and Central America that were also known as the "Banana Wars," which were fought during the 1920s and 30s. To capture these hard-learned lessons, the Marine Corps first published the *Small Wars Manual* in 1940, it was later republished in 1990 as FMFRP 12-15, *Small Wars Manual.*

Though portions of the *Small Wars Manual* are now outdated, it still contains many enduring truths, particularly concerning CMO, that are as

valid today as they were in 1940. For example, chapter 4's discussions on civil-military relationships with host nation (HN) officials, indigenous law enforcement, and the civil population still stands the test of time. One quote, perhaps, sums it up best, "Poor judgment on the part of subordinates in the handling of situations involving the local civil authorities and the local inhabitants is certain to involve the commander of the force in unnecessary military difficulties and cause publicity adverse to the public interests of the United States."

During World War II, the Marine Corps established a limited number of CA officer billets in the Fleet Marine Forces manned by subject matter experts (SMEs) directly commissioned from academia. While working with their Navy CA counterparts, the officers conducted planning for the military government of occupied Japanese islands such as Bougainville, the Gilberts, the Marshalls, Saipan, and Okinawa. During the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the Marine Corps established CA staff elements at the division and Marine expeditionary force (MEF) levels, known as the G-5, which focused on CMO planning. A noteworthy development during the Vietnam War was the Marine Corps' establishment of the combined action platoon concept, which involved embedding small teams of Marines in remote villages as part of the overall pacification program. The combined action platoons lived with and shared the same food as the villagers. The platoons assisted the villages with rural development by earning the trust of the villagers and by deterring the attempts that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces made to separate the villages from the central government. Though successful, the combined action platoon concept was not expanded during the war and many of their lessons learned were forgotten when the war ended.

To address the shortfall of CA expertise within the Marine Corps, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) directed the establishment of the 4th Civil Affairs Group (CAG) in 1966, followed by the 3d CAG in 1985. Both CAGs, composed of Marines from the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, are assigned to United States Marine Corps Forces Reserve (MARFORRES), but upon mobilization, support the MEFs with civil affairs teams (CATs) and detachments. During the Cold War and Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, these forces were deemed sufficient to fulfill the CA support requirement of a MAGTF and support planning for the numerous HA/disaster relief (DR) operations that frequently occur throughout the world.

In 2001, the Marine Corps, and the rest of the US Armed Forces, found themselves facing a new series of CMO intensive challenges—first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq—that exceeded 3d and 4th CAG's ability to adequately address. This led, in 2004, to the creation of the first provisional CAG, the 5th CAG, followed by the 6th CAG, both formed from MARFORRES units.

In order to keep the reserve CAGs within their 5 to 1 dwell ratio limits, 5th Battalion, 10th Marine Artillery Regiment was designated as a CMO force task-organized to provide CA support to II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (MEF [Fwd]) during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 2006–2008. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marine Artillery Regiment was designated a Provisional CAG, which means that it is not the unit's primary mission, however; it is a mission assigned to them due to a lack of available forces. The 2d Battalion, 11th Marine Artillery Regiment replaced 5th Battalion, 10th Marine Artillery Regiment in support of II MEF (Fwd) during OIF 2007–2009.

In January 2007, the President of the United States, on the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, announced that the Marine Corps would increase its end strength from approximately 180,000 to 202,000 by 2011. As part of the force structure increase, Headquarters, Marine Corps, authorized the creation of 173 additional active

duty CA billets during fiscal year (FY) 2008. Based on guidance from CMC and the Marine Corps Requirements Oversight Council, the establishment of these billets would provide qualified CMO plans and operations personnel to commanders of the ground combat and command elements in the three MEFs, including all active duty infantry and artillery regiments as well as the Marine expeditionary units (MEUs). The force structure increase included three, active duty, 51-man CA detachments allocated to the 10th and 11th Marines as well as III MEF.

Fundamentals

Civil-military operations apply at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Marines deploy across the globe to support regional engagement strategies and further national goals through the forward presence of expeditionary units. Marines are involved in multinational training activities and exercises that contribute to international cooperation and stability. Marines respond to complex emergencies, such as natural disasters that overwhelm civil authorities. Marines also contribute to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions and they are prepared to use force or the threat of force to deter conflict. If efforts to preserve peace fail, focused military capability is carefully employed to accomplish national objectives swiftly and with as little loss of life as possible. Once hostilities conclude, military forces contribute to stabilization, recovery, and the peaceful transition of control back to civil authorities. Therefore, military operations are more than the simple application of forces, arms, and equipment. Each operation has a civil dimension. The civil dimension requires that commanders consider how their actions affect, and are affected by, noncombatants.

A CMO may require military forces to perform activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Designated CA units, other military forces, or a combination of CA and other forces may perform CMO. Therefore, a MAGTF will need to carefully develop, nurture, and maintain positive relations between themselves and the indigenous people, governments, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in their area of operations (AO). Effective CMO assists military commanders in meeting their international obligations to civilians and achieve objectives.

Per Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, the purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations, and to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives, through the integration of civil and military actions while conducting support to civil administration (SCA), populace and resources control (PRC), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), nation assistance (NA) (JP 3-57), and civil information management (CIM). The civil aspect of the operational environment, by its very nature, changes rapidly, though certain things remain constant, such as the need to thoroughly integrate CMO into MAGTF operations. Therefore, an understanding of CMO terminology is critical to mission success:

- *Civil-military operations* are activities that a commander utilizes to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, and consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Although CA Marines or other military forces may become designated to perform CMO, the commander is ultimately responsible.
- *Civil affairs* personnel are those designated AC and RC Marines and units organized, trained,

and equipped specifically to conduct CA operations and to support CMO. Since this term applies to people, it is incorrect to say that one would conduct CA. Marines conduct CMO, not CA.

- *Civil affairs* operations are those military operations conducted by CA forces that—
  - Enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present.
  - Require coordination with other interagency organizations, IGOs, NGOs, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector.
  - Involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government in order to enhance the conduct of CMO.

JP 3-57 also identifies six CA functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. While CA forces assigned to the US Army Reserve possess the personnel and capability to address all six of these functional areas, the majority of CA forces in the AC of the Army and Marine Corps are considered CA generalists. The CAGs from MARFORRES are manned, trained, and equipped to perform two of the six functional specialty areas—public health and welfare and rule of law—because judge advocates and public health specialists are authorized within their tables of organization. If a CAG is attached to a MAGTF, it provides the MAGTF with the capability of conducting limited CA operations.

Civil-Military Operations in the Range of Military Operations

JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, recognizes that military operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity within a range of military operations that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, major operations and campaigns as depicted in figure 1-1. A MAGTF may be called upon to simultaneously execute a variety of missions across the range of military operations, and Marines might be required to conduct major operations or campaigns in a third world country or region; therefore, the MAGTF must be prepared to conduct CMO across the full range of military operations anywhere in the world.

JP 3-0 also introduces an expanded six-phase model (shape, deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority) for conducting major operations and campaigns that also provides a flexible arrangement for smaller, related operations as shown in figure 1-2 on page 1-5 (see chap. 2 for additional information).

Phase 0: Shape (prevent, prepare)

During this phase, CMO that are carried out as part of NA are designed to support a commander's security cooperation activities that develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, improve



Figure 1-1. Range of Military Operations



Figure 1-2. Phasing Model.

information exchange and intelligence sharing, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access. Civil-military operations (e.g., medical, veterinary, and engineering) are conducted in conjunction with many security cooperation exercises and events that MAGTF forces are engaged in around the world, such as Cobra Gold, African Lion, and New Horizons.

Phase I:
Deter (crisis defined)

During this phase, MAGTF CMO planners and liaison teams coordinate with interagency partners, IGOs, and, occasionally, NGOs who work together to set conditions for the execution of subsequent phases of the campaign. Many actions in the deter phase build on activities from the previous phase. During a build up of forces, the CMO task of PRC, such as publicizing curfew information among indigenous populations and institutions and planning to establish control of dislocated civilians (DCs) to preclude interference and facilitate tactical movement of forces and logistical support within the AO, becomes necessary.

Phase II:
Seize Initiative (assure friendly freedom of action, assess theater infrastructure)

During this phase, the MAGTF, either separately or as part of a joint force, establishes conditions for stability by providing immediate assistance to relieve conditions that precipitated the crisis. The MAGTF forces must ensure that CMO remain continuous as the US Government (USG) works to resolve the crisis at the earliest opportunity.

Phase III:
Dominate (establish dominant force capabilities, achieve full-spectrum superiority)

Even though the emphasis during this phase is on defeating the enemy, CMO and stability tasks are conducted as needed to facilitate military operations and to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase. The CMO tasks of PRC and CIM predominate, especially with regard to civilians on the battlefield and the prevention or possible payment for collateral damage during operations. As the situation develops, CA planners, as part of integrated operational planning teams (OPTs) or working groups, should attempt to validate or identify new potential sources of conflict within the population to minimize future instability.

Phase IV:
Stabilize (establish security, restore services)

During this phase, the MAGTF may be required to perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, interagency, IGO, or NGO participants until legitimate local entities are functioning.

This includes providing or assisting in the provision of basic services to the population. The stabilize phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations to stability operations. All CMO tasks occur in this phase, but NA tasks dominate as CMO facilitate humanitarian relief and restoration of civil order and services as the fighting subsides and emphasis shifts from relief to reconstruction.

Phase V: Enable Civil Authority (transfer to civil authority, redeploy)

During this phase of a campaign, the MAGTF will act in a supporting role to the lawful civil authority in the region throughout the enable civil authority phase. The MAGTF forces should work to transition all civil sector functions to legitimate authorities as soon as practical. All CMO tasks are performed, including NA.

Forms of Military Operations

In today's operating environment, Marines have to be ready to both fight and build, depending on the security situation and a variety of other factors. The four forms of military operations that the Marine Corps and Army are expected to be able to carry out are offensive operations, defensive operations, stability operations, and civil support operations. For a description of primary tasks and purposes of each of these forms of operations, see figure 1-3.

Each of the three forms of military operations depicted in figure 1-3 (less civil support operations) may be carried out in foreign countries to a greater or lesser degree. The exact mix of offensive, defensive, or stability tasks varies depending on the situation and the mission. Commanders weigh each operation based on their assessment of the operation or campaign phase and the situation in their AO. They shift the weight among the tasks of the different operations as necessary to address situations in different parts of the AO while continuing to pursue their overall objectives.

During stability operations, CMO comes to the forefront. The CMO planners and CA units will assist the MAGTF in planning and conducting support to civil security and civil control, restoring essential services, supporting governance, and providing support to economic and infrastructure development, all of which contribute to providing a stable and secure environment. The MAGTF CMO staff section (G-9/S-9), in coordination with the operations staff section (G-3/S-3), is well suited to take lead in the planning and coordination of CMO intensive stability tasks such as restoring essential services, supporting governance, and providing support to economic and infrastructure development.

Marine Corps CA forces are required to perform some or all of their CMO tasks in every form of operation. Figure 1-4, on page 1-8, depicts how CMO tasks, which fall under stability operations, vary according to the overall nature of the operation underway.

For example, during phases 0, the emphasis may be on stability operations, with less emphasis on offensive and defensive operations. During phases I and II, the emphasis will be on defensive operations. In phase III, offensive operations will dominate. As the operation or campaign transitions from phase III to phase IV and from phase IV to phase V, once again, stability operations will become dominant, as fewer offensive and defensive operations may be required as the country returns to its preconflict state.

Types of Civil-Military Operations

Performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government may be included in CMO. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of

Offensive Operations	Defensive Operations
Primary • Movement to contact • Attack • Exploitation • Pursuit **Purposes** • Dislocate, isolate disrupt, and destroy enemy forces • Seize key terrain • Deprive the enemy of resources • Develop intelligence • Deceive and divert the enemy • Create a secure environment for stability operations	**Primary Tasks** • Mobile defense • Area defense • Retrogate **Purposes** • Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations • Gain time • Achieve economy of force • Retain key terrain • Protect the populace, critical assets, and infrastructure • Develop intelligence
Stability Operations	**Civil Support Operations**
Primary Tasks • Civil security • Civil control • Restore essential services • Support to governance • Support to economic and infastructure development **Purposes** • Provide a secure environment • Secure land areas • Meet the critical needs of the populace • Gain support for HN government • Shape the environment for interagency and HN success	**Primary Tasks** • Provide support in response to disaster or terrorist attack • Support civil law enforcement • Provide other support as required **Purposes** • Saves lives • Restore essential services • Maintain or restore law and order • Protect infastructure and property • Maintain or restore local government • Shape the environment for interagency success

Figure 1-3. Forms of Military Operations.

other military operations. Designated CA may perform CMO, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces.

The core CMO mission essential tasks (METs) are those primary tasks that Marine Corps forces must be fully capable of planning, supporting, executing, or transitioning through, with, or by outside factors to mitigate or defeat civil threats. The mission essential CMO tasks are facilitate PRC, facilitate foreign HA, facilitate NA, manage civil information, and facilitate SCA (*Marine Corps Task List*).

Populace and Resources Control

The PRC assists HN governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder mission accomplishment. Populace and resource control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten success. Populace and resource control measures can be applied across the range of military operations. The MAGTF CMO planners develop and coordinate PRC in conjunction with HN and NGO resources, to include DC evacuation and camps.



Figure 1-4. Operation or Campaign Phases.

For more details regarding PRC tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), refer to Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-33.1A *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.*

Populace control provides for security of the populace, mobilization of human resources, denial of personnel availability to the enemy, and detection and reduced effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures also include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, identification and registration cards, and voluntary resettlement. The DC operations involve populace control that requires extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

Resources control regulates the movement or consumption of materiel resources, mobilizes materiel resources, and denies materiel to the enemy. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, and checkpoints, (e.g., roadblocks), ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. (JP 3-57)

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

The FHA consists of DOD activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or Department of State (DOS), conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Foreign humanitarian assistance can relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or endemic conditions that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies

that have primary responsibility for providing assistance (see JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, for additional information). A MAGTF participating in FHA will often take the form of a MEU, which is already at sea, and be tasked to provide HA in a natural or manmade disaster event. For more details regarding FHA TTP, refer to MCRP 3-33.1A.

Nation Assistance

Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the US and that nation. (JP 3-57) Nation assistance operations support a HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. Nation assistance programs often include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, and humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA). All NA actions are integrated through the US ambassador's mission strategic plan. (JP 3-57) Commonly, NA performed by MAGTF forces takes the form of US military to foreign military training and HCA events, such as medical, dental, or engineering-related projects in conjunction with military operations and exercises. For more details regarding NA TTP, refer to MCRP 3-33.1A.

Support to Civil Administration

The SCA helps continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a foreign nation's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives. (JP 3-57) Support to civil administration occurs most often during stability operations. During counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, SCA is often managed utilizing lines of operations (LOOs), such as civil security, essential services, support to governance, and support to economic and infrastructure development. For more details regarding SCA TTP, refer to MCRP 3-33.1A.

Civil Information

Civil information pertains to civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) within the civil component of the operational environment, which can be fused or processed to increase situational awareness, situational understanding, or situational dominance. The process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused within the supported unit; higher headquarters (HHQ); and other USG and DOD agencies, IGOs and NGOs is called CIM. The CIM process ensures the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the AO. Examples of CIM tasks include the following:

- Conducting civil reconnaissance (CR) to find, analyze, and report civil information and coordinating with non-CA assets to achieve a coherent reconnaissance and execution plan.
- Synchronizing the collection and consolidation of civil information.
- Developing the civil components of the common operational picture (COP).
- Increasing the supported commander's environmental awareness.
- Assisting in the development of the supported commander's COP and conducting interagency, IGO, NGO, and indigenous population and institutions (IPI) coordination.

For more information concerning integration of civil information during the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP), refer to chapter 3.

Civil Support Operations

Although civil support operations are not a mission essential or core task for Marine Corps CA forces, it is included due to the similarities between civil support operations and NA. Civil support is the overarching term for DOD's SCA. The DOD's role in the civil support mission consists of support to the Department of Homeland Security or other agencies for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement activities. Civil support capabilities are derived from DOD warfighting capabilities that could be applied to foreign/domestic assistance or law enforcement support missions. Additionally, civil support operations incorporate CMO tasks performed inside the United States—similar to CMO tasks conducted as part of stability operations on foreign soil. Marines may participate in civil support operations when requested, such as in the 1992 Los Angeles riots, California wildfires, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. For additional information on civil support operations, see JP 3-28, *Civil Support*.

Funding Authorities

Money in CMO is often the commander's most effective weapon. Like all weapons, however, a thorough knowledge of the weapon's capabilities and limitations is imperative to its effective employment. Funding authorities are normally found in the DOD Appropriations Act. In recent COIN operations, Congress appropriated additional funds to commanders for the specific purpose of dealing with COIN. Recent examples include the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, Iraq Freedom Fund, and Commander's Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program Funds. Both the DOS and the USAID are appropriated funds by the US Congress for foreign assistance under legal authorities in United States Code, Title 22, *Foreign Relations and Intercourse*. These funds are not expendable by commanders, though they fund programs administered by USAID. Marines responsible for funding CMO activities in close proximity to the activities of other government agencies (OGAs), such as USAID, need to be aware of the funding authorities available as well as how those funding authorities can be employed. Many adjacent funding authorities exist; for example, the Iraqi Security Forces Fund, which exists to provide support to all Iraqi Security Forces. Projects under this fund could include building construction, provision of essential services, and immediate response to emergency situations. Though projects may look similar, the desired effect varies significantly.

METT-T, Civil Considerations, and Funding

A thorough civil considerations analysis and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available (METT-T) analysis of the AO is critical to identifying the funding programs that will best meet the commander's desired end state. Many funding programs exist; some provide immediate response to a HA/DR mission (such as Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid [OHDACA] funds), while others are more suited to satisfy an immediate requirement for an essential service, such as water purification CERP. Funding authorities can be identified to support the commander's desired end state once the mission has been identified and a civil assessment has been conducted. In addition, funding authorities are amended routinely, and some funding programs are temporary in nature so maintaining currency of the funding programs available to an operational environment is critical to effective CMO.

Department of Defense Funding Authorities Available Under United States Code, Title 10

The CERP enables local commanders in any operation to respond with a nonlethal weapon to urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects and services that immediately assist the indigenous population and that the local population or government can sustain. The DOD defines urgent as any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or service that in the judgment of the local commander calls for immediate action. Prior coordination with community leaders increases goodwill. Standing operating procedures governing the authorities and submission guidelines for CERP are contained within United States Code, Title 10, and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2006, extended by United States Code, Title 10, and the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008. The Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook 09-24, *Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System*, provides the full scope of capabilities and limitations for this program in its tactical application.

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid

A program administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency that includes three segments: the Humanitarian Assistance Program, the Humanitarian Mine Action Program, and Foreign Disaster Relief Initiative. In broad terms, OHDACA programs support US military forces in meeting two key requirements. The first is to maintain a robust overseas presence aimed at shaping the international security environment in a manner that deters aggressors, strengthens friends and allies, and promotes peace and stability in regions of tension. The second requirement is for US forces to respond effectively when called upon to assist the victims of storms, earthquakes, and other natural or manmade disasters. Funding authority provided by United States Code, Title 10.

Humanitarian Assistance

Established in 1986, this program is designed to assure friendly nations and allies of our support and provide basic humanitarian aid and services to populations in need. The DOD and geographic combatant commanders seek to help avert political and humanitarian crises, promote democratic development and regional stability, and enable countries to begin to recover from conflicts. The HA projects and activities accomplish these objectives in several ways: they support the donation of excess nonlethal DOD property and they also support the provision of on-the-ground activities carried out by US military personnel aimed at assuring friendly nations of our support by improving US military presence in countries. Such activities include assessment of needs; rudimentary construction of clinics, schools, and roads; and medical, technical, and logistical assistance.

Humanitarian Assistance–Excess Property

United States Code, Title 10 authorizes DOD to provide nonlethal, DOD excess supplies to foreign governments and civilian organizations (orphanages, schools, clinics) for humanitarian relief purposes when requested by the local US embassy. The DOD processes, refurbishes, stores, and transports the property, and the DOS (or US embassy in HN) distributes the property to the intended recipients for humanitarian purposes. Examples of property available through this program include medical equipment and supplies, construction equipment, trucks and other vehicles, generators and other electrical equipment, school supplies, tools, furniture, tents, blankets, and clothing. Item availability is not guaranteed and depends on a variety of factors. Property must primarily benefit the recipient country civilians, is donated with no warranties or guarantees

and no post donation support, cannot be sold by the recipient government, and can be donated to the military only if used for civilian purposes.

Humanitarian Assistance–Other

United States Code, Title 10 provides authority to carry out humanitarian projects, other than Humanitarian Assistance–Excess Property projects, that support the national security and foreign policy goals of the United States. These projects typically include construction or refurbishment of local infrastructure facilities, disaster preparedness or refugee repatriation training, exercises or seminars, assessment visits, and technical and logistic assistance for foreign recipients. Humanitarian construction projects are generally limited to $500,000. Proposed projects costing more than $500,000 require special justification and review by Defense Security Cooperation Agency and DOD policy. The OHDACA funds may occasionally be used to deploy US military teams or DOD-related personnel to carry out diverse humanitarian projects worldwide.

Humanitarian Mine Action Program

The Humanitarian Mine Action Program is a major component of the USG program and supports DOD's security cooperation strategy. Explosive remnants of war, which include landmines, unexploded ordnance, and small arms ammunitions, are the residues of civil wars and internal conflicts on virtually every continent. Increasingly in these conflicts, these explosive remnants of war deny civilian populations their livelihoods, uproot them from their lands, and promote political instability. Today, explosive remnants of war kill or maim at least 1,000 people every month—most of them innocent civilians. US military or civilian personnel do not enter active minefields or remove emplaced landmines. The Humanitarian Mine Action Program, executed by the geographic combatant commanders, provides significant training and readiness-enhancing benefits to US forces while contributing to alleviating a highly visible, worldwide problem. The program aids in the development of leadership and organizational skills for host country personnel to sustain their mine action programs after US military trainers have redeployed.

Foreign Disaster Relief Initiative

In times of severe natural and manmade disasters, such as the Pacific Tsunami (2005), Pakistan earthquake (2006), the Burma Cyclone (2007), and the Georgia Conflict (2008), the US military has been and will continue to be called upon to provide aid and assistance because of our unique assets and capabilities. The OHDACA funding allows the geographic combatant commanders to provide immediate life-saving assistance to countries in their regions.

The DOD plays a key role by providing effective response when asked by the DOS and the USAID. The US military offers exceptional operational reach and can be immediately deployed as a stop gap measure to limit the extent of emergencies. The DOD's ability to respond rapidly assists in the containment of crises and limits threats to regional stability by donating and/or transporting relief aid within hours or a few days of a disaster. The DOD's capabilities for command and control, logistics, transportation, communications, and cargo transport cannot be matched by other agencies or countries.

Emergency response, in the form of both supplies and services, encompasses transportation, logistical support, provisions of humanitarian daily rations to maintain the health of moderately malnourished recipients until conventional relief programs or targeted feeding can be resumed, search and rescue, medical evacuation, and assistance to internally displaced persons and refugees. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency comptroller's office provides further details and guidance on the specific focus of these programs and budget authorizations for current and future FYs.

The Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program

United States Code, Title 10 permits US military forces to carry out HCA projects and activities in conjunction with military operations overseas. The DODI 2205.2, *Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities*, establishes policy and assigns responsibilities of DOD components. Military deployments for exercises and training are an integral part of maintaining a forward US military presence, ensuring operational readiness to respond to crises, and preparing US RCs for wartime missions. Activities must be conducted in conjunction with authorized military operations by—

- Promoting the security interests of both the United States and foreign country.
- Promoting operational readiness skills of the US forces.
- Complementing but not duplicating any other US assistance.
- Serving the basic economic and social needs of the country's people.
- Not being used by any individual, group, or organization engaged in military or paramilitary activity.
- Being approved by the DOS and funded with funds specifically provided for such purpose.

Military deployment operations and maintenance funds are authorized for incidental costs of carrying out this assistance by annual defense appropriations acts (see United States Code, Title 10).

The Denton Program

The Denton Program permits DOD to provide transportation of privately-donated HA cargo to foreign countries using military transportation on a space available basis. The program is authorized under the Jeremiah Denton Amendment to United States Code, Title 10. There are no fees due to the donating agency or organization for USG transportation-related costs.

The Funded Transportation Program

Conducted under the authority available for HA, United States Code, Title 10, the Funded Transportation Program permits transportation of cargo and DOD nonlethal excess property worldwide for NGOs and IGOs. This authority provides for the actual cost of transportation and payment of any associated administrative costs incurred.

Security and Stabilization Assistance

United States Code, Title 10 and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 provides authority for the DOD to transfer to the DOS up to $100 million per FY in defense articles, services, training, or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries.

Department of State Funding Authorities Available Under United States Code, Title 22

The DOS executes its funding authorities under United States Code, Title 22. Unlike the DOD funding authorities, DOS funds under United States Code, Title 22 are generally designed to implement long-term, regional stability by addressing essential needs. The MAGTF commander does not have direct authority to expend United States Code, Title 22 funds, however, these funds will be present within a MAGTF commander's AO and can supplement his/her civil-military concept of operations. This requires coordination via the interagency process with the US embassy's country team or appropriate DOS representative. In addition, MAGTF commanders will often find themselves working closely with provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), Advance Civilian Teams (ACTs), or field advanced civilian team (FACTs), USAID disaster assessment and response teams, and other interagency players identified during the METT-T and civil

considerations analysis of the operational environment. An example of Title 22 funds that are being executed within a MAGTF operational environment is the Afghanistan Agricultural Rapid Response Program under the cognizance of USAID via regional PRTs within Helmand Province. This program focuses on a region's long-term agricultural development by means of competitive investment in locally identified industries. The desired effects from this program may not be visible to the MAGTF that witnessed its inception, though it will become apparent in subsequent rotations. It is imperative that a MAGTF commander understands these programs and knows how to incorporate them into the overall MAGTF concept of operations.

Civil-Military Operations in the Long War

In *The Long War: Send in the Marines*, the CMC highlights the importance of building partner capacity and how doing so, including performing CMO, decisively contributes towards shaping the operational environment.

> The secondary military effort of [building partner capacity] seeks to relieve some of the conditions that contribute to instability. Civil-military operations (CMO) constitute the Marine Corps' efforts to promote positive interaction between governments and citizens. Activities within this effort include the provision of infrastructure improvements, humanitarian civil assistance, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and strategic communication. Marines will conduct civil-military operations alongside and in support of host nation military forces and government entities as a means of strengthening their commitment and the impact of their efforts. Advancement of these efforts leads to increased regional security and stability as individuals are empowered and governments are emboldened to eliminate systematic oppression, injustice, and corruption. In some cases, activities performed by Marines will be designed to increase the legitimacy and reach of weak governments. . . these activities can serve as a catalyst to cause modification in the behavior of corrupt governments or governments that are unresponsive to the needs of their people.
>
> In every effort, the ties between populaces and responsive governments will be strengthened as progress compels citizens to take an increased role in the advancement of their community's security, stability, and prosperity. These efforts not only help moderate the effects of unstable environments, they build goodwill toward our country.

Commanders must ensure that they integrate CMO tasks into predeployment training programs that include individual, MAGTF component, and MAGTF collective training tasks, especially in support of regionally focused special purpose MAGTFs. In support of the long war, Marines must understand that many of their actions could have much larger, global implications, and, as such, must keep in mind some key tenets.

Act in the National Interest

Whether demonstrating national commitment through forward presence, exercising with allies and strategic partners, engaging in armed combat or providing relief to victims of a natural catastrophe, all MAGTF operations are designed to support national objectives and policies.

Serve in Expeditionary Environments

The MAGTF usually operates far from home. The requirements of a major theater war, a smaller-scale contingency, or an important theater engagement mission may demand that the MAGTF operate in varied locations that may not be accustomed or adapted to a US military presence.

Partners Outside of the MAGTF

The MAGTF will have many partners and many of them will not wear uniforms. The MAGTF will work with other Services and AC, RC, and National Guard members. The MAGTF will work increasingly with representatives of various USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs who bring capabilities and expertise not usually found in the MAGTF. Many of these organizations may not have worked together before and will not be subordinate to a military commander. They will understand problems from their perspective and seek to resolve them often without any obligation to accept military direction. Therefore, in accordance with their organizations guidelines, extraordinary effort and flexibility will be required to establish a unified effort among partners.

Watched by the World

The efforts of the MAGTF will be observed, commented upon, and selectively portrayed to the world and perceived differently by many viewers, some of who will not necessarily be unbiased. The perceptions created by MAGTF operations may result in changes to political realities that may, in turn, affect the mission. Therefore, CMO has a powerful, complementary information operations (IO) component. Not only do MAGTF actions matter, but the perceptions they create do as well.

Tactical Actions May Have Strategic Implications

Small, apparently local actions may have strategic consequences. An event at a single checkpoint may change the relationship between the MAGTF and local residents, allied partners, and NGOs, and may affect public opinion. Marines must be aware of the potential for their actions to create undesirable strategic implications.

Importance of Civilian Population

Civilians are more than just a part of the battlefield. Their presence, infrastructure, resources, and moral and physical support will almost always have military significance. In a COIN operation, the civilian population is at the center of a struggle for legitimacy between the insurgent and the counterinsurgent; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate. The adversary may also deliberately target civilians to promote or accelerate instability or civil war.

Operate in Uncertainty

All military operations occur in an inherently uncertain and chaotic environment that is shaped by continuous human interaction. Civilian populations, organizations, and leaders will cause much of this uncertainty. The commander must shape events within this context of unpredictability. Civil-military operations help the commander assess the civil situation and focus MAGTF efforts and those of other organizations. Although the MAGTF may not directly control the efforts of others, interaction, coordination, and cooperation with agencies external to the MAGTF may be critical to mission success.

MAGTF Civil-Military Operations in an Expeditionary Environment

Task Organization

The Marine Corps operates as a MAGTF: integrated, combined arms forces that include a command element, aviation combat element (ACE), ground combat element (GCE), and logistics combat element under a single commander. The MAGTF is task-organized to accomplish a specific mission. The MAGTF commander task-organizes his organic and assigned CA forces to his major subordinate commands (MSCs) to where they can best plan, coordinate, and assist in the execution of CMO in support of the concept of operations. Task organization permits a single commander to guide the civil-military interactions of the entire force and to integrate CMO into his concept of a “single battle.”

Serving as an Initial Entry Force

Marines are prepared to operate anywhere, providing a joint force enabler in three dimensions—air, land, and sea. The MAGTF CMO helps shape the civil dimension of the AO for current and future MAGTF, joint, or international efforts. The perception the MAGTF creates, as the first US force deployed to an operation will set the stage for the remainder of the effort. The MAGTF CMO planner must create an operational architecture and CIM system that supports the follow-on deployment of CA elements. The MAGTF CMO cannot be conducted independent of the wide variety of other governmental and relief agencies that may already be present in the AO.

Fighting From the Sea

The Navy–Marine Corps team will continue to provide a timely, worldwide response to unforeseen and rapidly unfolding natural disasters and manmade crises. Our forward forces will be first on scene in an emerging crisis and will provide key enabling capabilities for OGAs, private organizations, and the introduction of follow-on forces and resources. They may also assume or facilitate joint or combined task force command responsibilities, as demonstrated by the command element of III MEF following the tsunami in Southeast Asia in late 2004.

Seabasing

The ability to provide a sustainable logistic base safely at sea allows the MAGTF to operate from international waters. The global fleet station is a seabasing concept from which to coordinate and employ adaptive force packages within a regional area of interest. Focusing primarily on Phase 0 (shaping) operations or campaigns, theater support command, global maritime awareness, and tasks associated specifically with the war on terrorism, the global fleet station offers a means to increase regional maritime security through the cooperative efforts of joint, interagency, and multinational partners, as well as NGOs.

Interfacing with Civilians

The MAGTF will need to interact and attempt to influence a wide variety of nonmilitary populations, organizations, and leaders, and their response will affect the manner in which operations are planned and executed. Cooperation with civilians, with an understanding of their needs, can mitigate potential frictions and can help keep MAGTF resources focused on operational objectives. Key leader engagements will become a primary tool of the MAGTF commander in order to influence events and the various subgroups among the population. The MAGTF CMO planners must consider the following questions about civilian populations, organizations, and leaders:

- What will they do?
- What does the MAGTF want them to do?
- How can the MAGTF make that happen?
- What does the MAGTF need to know to make that happen?

Operational Support

All MAGTF operations receive CMO support. Where possible CMO synchronizes and integrates US interagency, IGO, NGO, indigenous populations, institutions, and private sector activities with MAGTF operations.

Minimize Civilian Interference, Maximize Civilian Support

The MAGTF must assume that civilians will interfere with operations, generally unintentionally. Planning and execution must account for this interference by avoiding actions and locations that are likely to attract disruptive civilians and the potential obstructions they cause.

The MAGTF must actively seek to use civilian physical and human resources to operational advantage. Civilian supplies and logistic resources, appropriately and legally acquired, can reduce logistic requirements. Equally important, by

effective interaction among the MAGTF and civilian populations and organizations, the MAGTF gains access to capabilities and information it may lack. This might include language, cultural, tribal, social, geographic, or economic information. Collection of information from civilian sources in support of force protection, operational planning, and intelligence is facilitated by CMO. Whenever possible, the MAGTF hopes to gain trust and inject confidence with friends and allies while avoiding the creation of grievances.

During COIN operations, support from the populace is critical in obtaining information regarding insurgents and insurgent activities. As the HN government increases its legitimacy, the populace will begin to assist it more actively. Eventually, the people will marginalize and stigmatize insurgents to the point that the insurgent's claim to legitimacy is destroyed.

Meet Legal and Moral Obligations

Under international law and US policy, the MAGTF commander has responsibilities to the civilian populace in his AO. Adhering to these responsibilities has a positive effect on the relationship between the MAGTF and civilians. Meeting our moral and legal obligations enhances the legitimacy of the MAGTF in the eyes of the HN populace and the wider international audience.

Gain Situational Awareness

Civil information is gained during CMO in support of the commander's decision-making process and helps to identify opportunities and enemy vulnerabilities and centers of gravity, particularly during COIN operations. Civil affairs specialists and other members of the MAGTF conducting CMO must share information they obtain with the G-9/S-9 and G-2/S-2 through effective CIM. The CIM provides a methodology to understanding the population in order to begin to design effective operations to gain control of the environment in order to defeat insurgents. If the center of gravity is the population for the insurgent and counterinsurgent, understanding the population is the first step in defeating the enemy in a COIN environment.

Enhance Freedom of Action

Effective CMO influences the employment of forces and helps the commander take maximum advantage of the AO. Civil-military operations help to extend operations to the fullest breadth feasible by minimizing political and logistic constraints. Civil-military operations help the commander to shape the AO. To counter CMO, the enemy may be required to disperse forces over a broad area, resulting in gaps that the MAGTF can exploit. For example, civil facilities and assets may allow the ACE to be forward-based, minimizing flight time to targets, increasing time available to support ground maneuver, or enabling attacks on deep targets. During CMO, logistic lines of communications, airfields, and seaports can be made available to the MAGTF, enhancing support to the force. Finally, by developing effective links to local governments and communities, CMO remove these stresses from subordinate commanders, freeing them to focus on mission accomplishment.

Isolate the Enemy

Civil-military operations can limit the enemy commander's freedom of action, denying civilian support to the forces. These civilians might be within the AO, in neighboring countries, or elsewhere within the region. Enemy forces may attempt to gain logistical support, information for use as intelligence, and economic or political support. Conducting CMO minimize the support given to the enemy by solving civil problems, arbitrating grievances, and persuading the populace of the legitimacy of US operations. Aggressive CMO deny the enemy a support base and an operational environment by providing the populace a more attractive alternative than that offered by the enemy.

Support the Force

Effective CMO will bring additional capabilities to the MAGTF, including support provided by HN, other USG agencies, and occasionally NGOs. Support sustainment and access to logistic and support capabilities external to the MAGTF are provided by CMO. Supplementing MAGTF resources allows military capabilities to remain dedicated to supporting the force. By minimizing the logistic footprint, CMO reduce force vulnerabilities. However, integration of external resources may present new force protection and security challenges.

Win the Perception Battle

Information shapes and influences the operating environment. Crisis, amplified by the connectivity of global communications, will ignite passions; spark reaction; crystallize beliefs; and compel people, nations, and organizations to think and act in accordance with their worldview and in reaction to the media. As a related capability to IO, CMO demonstrates in practical ways the MAGTF's message and counters disinformation and propaganda.

CHAPTER 2
MAGTF CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES AND CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

Personnel and Units

As CMO planners, special staff members, or as members of a CAT or civil affairs detachment, CA Marines are the commander's principal advisors on CMO. They support the MAGTF commander's need to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO across the full range of military operations and throughout the conflict continuum. They assist the commander in understanding and visualizing the civil component of the operating environment. The Marine Corps CA force consists of designated AC and RC forces and personnel organized, trained, and equipped specifically to provide CMO support to the MAGTF and to perform limited civil affairs operations (CAOs). Although CA is neither a mission nor an objective, it is the name for designated personnel and units.

Marine CA personnel are planners and executors. As CMO planners, they consider the impact the civil component has on military operations and vice versa. They ensure that the MAGTF staff integrates CMO throughout the MCPP as part of the MAGTF single-battle concept. As executors, they conduct assessments and gather information in the field, manage reconstruction (in some cases developmental) projects, coordinate with a wide variety of civil and military organizations, engage key leaders, and provide advice to subordinate military commanders or civilian authorities. Throughout the AO, they coordinate local labor efforts, locate and manage civilian resources, gather and manage critical civil information, identify key facilities and protected targets, disseminate information to the civil population, and assist in the MAGTF's conduct of PRC.

The Marine Corps CA force currently consists of three active duty CA detachments, assigned to 10th Marines, 11th Marines, III MEF command element, and two RC CAGs. A CA operations officer (military occupational specialty [MOS] 0530) and CA chief (MOS 0531) are assigned to each AC infantry regiment. Additionally, each MEU has a CMO planner (MOS 0530) and CMO chief (MOS 0531) as shown in figure 2-1.

If no AC or RC CA forces are available, any Marine unit may be temporarily designated as a provisional or in lieu of CA force.

Civil Affairs Group

The mission of the CAG is to support the MAGTF commander with specially trained and organized personnel in order to facilitate the planning, coordination, and execution of CMO and to conduct limited CAO.

Two CAGs are part of MARFORRES. Located at Camp Pendleton, CA, the 3d CAG normally supports I and III MEF. The 4th CAG is located at Anacostia, Washington, DC, and normally supports II MEF.

The CAG is organized with a group HQ and four CA detachments. The group HQ is organized into a command section; staff sections; and communications, motor transport, and public health sections. The group HQ provides the nucleus of CA staff support to the MEF command element and command and control of subordinate CA elements not attached to subordinate MEF elements.



Figure 2-1. Civil-Military Operations Planners.

Civil Affairs Detachments

There are currently two types of CA detachments, each with their own structure: RC CA detachments organic to a CAG and AC CA detachments at 10th Marines, 11th Marines, and III MEF.

An RC CA detachment assigned to a CAG usually supports the MSC of the MAGTF, such as a regimental landing team or regimental combat team (RCT). Normally, such CA detachments are attached to the supported unit to ensure unity of effort, but remain under the administrative control of the CAG. The RC CA detachment consists of a HQ and three general purpose CATs of five Marines each as depicted in figure 2-2. While all CA elements can assist the MAGTF in planning, coordinating, and executing CMO, the RC CA detachment is the smallest element that can plan and conduct limited CAO, specifically public health and welfare and rule of law. If not resident within the MAGTF, functional specialty expertise in the other four joint CA functional specialties (economic stability, infrastructure, governance, and public education) may also be sourced from elements of forces afloat, other Services, USG interagency partners, IGOs, NGOs, HN organizations or private contractors.

In 2008, three AC CA detachments were added to the Marine Corps structure. Currently, one CA detachment is organic to the regimental HQ battery of both 10th and 11th Marines. The third detachment is assigned to the III MEF command element. Each AC CA detachment consists of up to 51 Marines, with 6 CATs and a detachment HQ for 1st and 2d Marine Divisions of I MEF and II MEF, as shown in figure 2-3. The AC CA detachments do not have functional specialists and cannot conduct CAO without augmentation.

Civil Affairs Teams

A CAT is the smallest operational CA element. It provides CMO expertise and planning capability



Figure 2-2. United States Marine Corps Forces Reserve Civil Affairs Group



CA Section:		Det HQ:		CA Team:		RC Breakdown:			
1 Capt	0530	1 Maj	0530	1 Maj	0530	1 LtCol	0530	1 GySgt	0531
2 SSgt	0531	1 GySgt	0531	1 GySgt	0531	2 Capt	0530	2 Sgt	0531
1 Cpl	0531	1 SSgt	0531	1 SSgt or 1 Sgt	0531	1 Capt	4402	1 Cpl	0531
1 LCpl	3034	1 Sgt	0531	1 Sgt	0531	1 USN LT	2300	1 LCpl	0151
				1 Cpl	0531				

Legend

Capt	captain	**LT**	lieutenant	**Sgt**	sergeant
Cpl	corporal	**Maj**	major	**SSgt**	staff sergeant
DET	detachment	**mapped**	position filled by reservist	**USN**	US Navy
GySgt	gunnery sergeant	**ME**	Marine enlisted	**NO**	Navy officer
LCpl	lance corporal	**MO**	Marine officer		
LtCol	lieutenant colonel	**RC**	Reserve Component		

Note: III MEF Civil Affairs Det structured the same, except no Det HQ or CAG Marines.

Figure 2-3. Active Component Civil Affairs Detachment.

to infantry battalions, MEUs, or other major subordinate elements of the MAGTF as required. A CAT helps the MAGTF plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO, but has no capability to conduct CAO. Both AC and RC CATs have the capability to establish and operate a CMOC. The AC CAT

typically consists of seven CA Marines, organized as follows:

- CAT leader (major, MOS 0530).
- CAT chief staff noncommissioned officer (NCO) (gunnery sergeant, MOS 0531).
- CA cultural specialist (staff sergeant or sergeant, MOS 0531).
- CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531).
- CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531).
- CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531).
- CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531).

The RC CAT consists of five CA Marines, organized as follows:

- CAT leader (major, MOS 0530).
- Assistant CAT assistant team leader (captain, MOS 0530).
- CAT chief (staff sergeant, MOS 0531).
- CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531).
- CA NCO (corporal, MOS 0531).

The RC CATs may require significant augmentation with additional transportation and communications assets as well as additional security elements before conducting independent operations in an uncertain or hostile operational environment.

Command and Control

The commander's principal staff officers comprise the general staff in units commanded by a general officer and the executive staff for all other units. Principal staff assistants are responsible to the commanding general (CG) and/or commanding officer and are coordinated and directed by the chief of staff and/or executive officer. General and/or executive staff officers are responsible for a broad functional area and help the commander coordinate and supervise the execution of plans, operations, and activities in that area. A commander may elect to modify staff organization based on the situation, perhaps by creating additional staff sections and designating a special staff officer as a member of the staff. When CMO are of increased importance, the MAGTF commander may augment his organic CMO cell within the G-3 and establish a G-9/S-9. See appendix A.

MAGTF G-9/S-9 Staff

Once established, the G-9/S-9 conducts an initial assessment to determine the CA force augmentation requirements for the MAGTF. The section will coordinate with other staff sections of the MAGTF by participating at various boards, working groups, and the OPT as required. Typically, at the MEF level, a G-9 watch officer will be established within the combat operations center. The G-9/S-9 will send liaison officers (LNOs) to higher commands and external organizations.

The G-9/S-9 considers the impact of operations on public order and safety, the potential for HA and DR requirements, support for civil authorities, and protection of culturally significant sites and critical infrastructure. It ensures that civil considerations are effectively integrated into each course of action (COA) considered by the commander. The MAGTF G-9/S-9 has staff planning and oversight of the following:

- Assigned and attached Marine Corps and Army CA forces.
- All aspects of the relationship between the MAGTF and external nonmilitary agencies that may be operating within the AO (NGOs, IGOs, USG agencies, and foreign government agencies).
- Preparation of Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) to the operation order (OPORD).
- Coordination, synchronization, and integration of civil-military plans, programs, and policies with national and combatant command strategic objectives.
- Prioritization and management of projects supporting CMO.

- Key leader engagements.
- Implementation of PRC measures.
- Coordination of CMO with higher and adjacent commands, as well as major subordinate elements of the MEF.

The MAGTF G-9 plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO through direct coordination with the supported unit's operations officer. The supported unit's operations officer plans and oversees the execution of the overall operations effort.

At the MEU, special purpose MAGTF, or major subordinate element, future planning is the responsibility of the S-3. At the MEF and Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), the G-5, future operations staff element, should include a CMO planner. As a planner and advisor, the CMO planner must ensure that the CMO staff element participates in the MAGTF planning effort. Duties include the following:

- Serve as a member of the staff.
- Advise the commander on the potential impact of military operations on civilian populations.
- Assist the commander in meeting his legal and moral obligations to civilian populations under his control.
- Advise the commander of changes in the political environment that may change the military situation.
- Advise the commander on employment of other military units and US assets that can perform or assist CMO.
- Serve as the commander's principal interface with external nonmilitary agencies that may be operating within the AO; for example, the US interagency, NGOs, IGOs, and HN civil agencies.
- Recommend priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to the S-2/G-2.
- Ensure the CMO effort is synchronized and coordinated with other related staff functions such as IO, public affairs (PA), and military information support operations (MISO).
- Coordinate preparation of annex G, to the OPORD.

Reserve Component Civil Affairs Forces

Preplanned Support

While MARFORRES CA forces provide significant CMO capability, their utilization will require that a MEF prepare supporting plans in advance in order to mobilize and integrate them into a MAGTF operation. As a RC, the CAGs provide continuous and worldwide support to the operating forces, with much of this support being provided prior to CAG unit activation. Preplanned events and contingencies are usually supported in an incremental fashion.

Preplanned events support theater engagement strategies and Service or joint exercises. The CAGs also support deliberate planning efforts for standing operational plans and deployments and review the development of doctrine and training.

Many orders and authorization processes are used for preplanned support. Occasionally, inactive duty for training periods, usually called drills, can be devoted to types of CA support. With sufficient advance notice, annual training periods, generally 2 weeks, can be scheduled to provide appropriate support. When support is required for longer periods, a number of overlapping annual training increments can be planned, providing continuous support to the commander. Specific missions also may be authorized with Active duty for operational support orders, which are generally limited to 179 days in a FY but may be much shorter in duration. Active duty for operational support orders are especially useful for regular commitments, such as billets continuously involved in theater engagement.

Schedules and locations for exercises and operations often change. This can jeopardize preplanned CA deployments and may result in degraded support. Civil affairs group personnel are reservists and may have a limited ability to respond quickly to schedule changes. Coordination

for funding and the generation of individual orders are required to prevent delays.

Predeployment exercises, such as MEU special operations capable workups and Mojave Viper, are prioritized for support. Supporting CA elements sharpen staff integration by participating in predeployment exercises with the deploying MAGTF. Preplanned exercises, such as MEF exercises or mission rehearsal exercises, serve as rehearsals and facilitate contingency support.

Contingency Support

When activated, CAGs are prepared to provide a level of immediate support to MAGTFs engaged in contingency operations. Civil affairs support is provided by echelon. Each CAG maintains a list of CA personnel ready to support time-sensitive contingency operations. The CAG supports the deployed echelon by reachback, using stateside assets to support forward-deployed elements. Support might include cultural, economic, or political research and/or authorized coordination with US-based organizations. Follow-on increments of the CAG might be subject to involuntary activation such as Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up authority. Finally, the entire CAG may be mobilized in support of a MEF. The CATs and detachments will often deploy prior to full mobilization of other RC forces.

Concept of Employment for Civil Affairs Forces

Marines within the MAGTF must be prepared to conduct CMO. Marine Corps CA forces are well positioned to provide CMO expertise to the MAGTF throughout the range of military operations. The AC CA detachments and CMO planners provide a full-time CMO planning and support capability to all standing MAGTFs and AC infantry regiments. This AC CA structure is augmented by the RC CAGs as required.

Marine Corps CA is designed to support operational- or tactical-level MAGTFs throughout each phase of a large-scale contingency or major theater war:

- MEU or battalion = CAT
  The MEU or battalion is supported by one CAT.
- MEB or RCT = CA detachment
  The MEB or RCT is supported by one CA detachment, with one CAT per battalion-sized major subordinate element and a CA detachment HQ augmenting the GCE RCT S-3 CMO staff element and MEB G-9 COM staff element.
- MEF = CAG
  The MEF is supported by one CAG, with one CA detachment per RCT and other MSCs (as required), with CA augments to MEF G-9 CMO element.

During phases 0 and 1, the CA support requirement for a MEF and its MSCs is generally small enough to be met by organic CMO planners and AC CA detachment. As the contingency progresses, the MEF CA support requirement also increases. This increased CA support requirement is best met by the mobilization of a RC CAG. Once mobilized, the CAG typically will be employed as follows:

- HQ detachment will augment the MEF G-9, G-3, and G-5 staff sections and provide LNOs to higher and adjacent commands, the US interagency, and HN entities.
- CA detachments (up to four) provide support to the subordinate maneuver elements of the MEF. The detachment HQ will augment the RCT CA operations officer under the S-3, with the CA teams being assigned to subordinate maneuver elements.

The CA support requirement for the GCE division is provided by the AC CA detachment HQ for I MEF and II MEF (from 10th and 11th Marines, respectively) and directly from the CE of III MEF.



Figure 2-4. Civil-Military Operations Level of Effort.

A CAG may provide additional CA support to the division as required as well as support to US Army brigade combat teams.

To better illustrate CA concept of employment, the following subparagraphs discuss CMO tasks that may be performed and the level of CA forces required by phase for a major theater campaign conducted by a MAGTF consisting of a division-sized GCE, an ACE, and logistics combat element.

Figure 2-4 illustrates the level of commitment of MAGTF CMO forces and the types of CMO tasks they perform throughout each phase of a large-scale contingency or major theater war, ranging from phase 0 (shaping) to phase V (enable civil authority).

Phase 0:
Shape (prevent, prepare)

During the shape, also referred to as steady-state, phase of an operation or campaign, CA forces, both AC and RC, will be involved in a variety of peacetime related operations, training exercises, and military-to-military exchanges. Examples of CMO tasks that might occur during this stage include NA and FHA operations. These might occur during the course of a MEU's response to a humanitarian crisis, such as an earthquake in the Pacific, or participation in a joint training exercise such as Cobra Gold. Civil information management is conducted throughout the phase in order to systematically collect, process, and forward civil information to the intelligence cell for use by the MAGTF commander in his decision-making process.

Phase requirement:

Number of Marine Corps CA forces required: One or more CA team(s), up to and including a CA detachment (from either the active duty detachment or the CAG), depending on the length and duration of the mission. Generally, one CAT (AC or RC) is sufficient to support a MEU during operations conducted during this phase.

Phase I:
Deter (crisis defined)

During the deter phase of a major operation or campaign, Marine Corps CA forces may continue any ongoing phase 0 activities, scale them up or ramp them down, help in the planning and conduct of a noncombatant evacuation operation; begin planning for the movement and reception of follow-on CA forces; and begin planning for phases II, III, and IV. The MAGTF may establish a CMOC to coordinate CMO between the MAGTF and other partners.

Phase requirement:

Number of Marine Corps CA forces required: One or more CA detachments, giving the MAGTF three to six CA teams, depending on the mission. During phase I, active duty CA teams from the CA detachment assigned to the 10th and 11th Marines or III MEF command element may be deployed in support of a MEU or MEB. Should the CA support requirement exceed the capability of the active duty CA detachment, RC CAT detachments or an entire CAG may be mobilized by MARFORRES to support the MAGTF.

Phase II:
Seize Initiative (assure friendly freedom of action, assess theater infrastructure)

During the seize the initiative phase of an operation or campaign, CA forces may continue ongoing phase 0–I activities (FHA, NA, and CIM) and assist the MAGTF in the planning and conduct of PRC measures to be taken during phase III in order to prevent the civilian population from interfering with offensive operations. In the MAGTF CMOC, coordination with other USG agencies, such as USAID and DOS, as well as international and multinational partners, if not already begun, will focus on actions to be taken during both phase III and IV. Support to civil administration may be initiated; CIM will be continuous, as the amount of data that must be collected, sorted, and interpreted will increase.

Phase requirement:

Number of Marine Corps CA forces required: During phase II, a MAGTF will normally be formed by a MEF composed of a division-sized GCE, a Marine aircraft wing, and a Marine logistics group (MLG). This will exceed the actve duty CA detachment's capability to provide teams and planners to support a CMO staff section at all echelons of command within the MAGTF and will require mobilization of RC CA forces. A Marine division constituting the MEF GCE will typically require as many as four CA detachments, including one attached to each RCT or other maneuver element. Therefore, during this phase the MAGTF may require as many as five CA detachments.

Phase III:
Dominate (establish dominant force capabilities, achieve full-spectrum superiority)

During the dominate phase, AC and RC civil affairs forces, now at full strength, primarily conduct and support PRC in addition to other ongoing CMO, such as FHA, NA and CIM. The primary emphasis during this phase is ensuring the MAGTF commander's freedom of action. Battle damage and solatia payments may be a significant task. Civil affairs forces are planning and supporting the execution of CMO at the battalion, RCT, division, and MEF level. Multiple CMOCs are in operation and CA LNOs

have linked up with higher, lower, and/or adjacent joint/coalition/multinational partners. Planning for post-phase III operations will be continuously refined through the OPT.

> **Phase requirement:**
>
> Number of Marine Corps CA forces required: As during phase II, as many as five CA detachments (4 RC and 1 AC) possibly augmented by additional CA detachments (providing between 18 and 24 CATs.

Phase IV: Stabilize (establish security, restore services)

During the stabilize phase, Marine Corps and joint CA forces will be in greatest demand. They will be required to support MAGTF CMO planning and coordination along the various LOOs; man and operate CMOCs; carry out key leader engagement; conduct CMO assessments; work with DCs (to include possibly operating DC camps); determine requirements to repair infrastructure; and work with USG interagency partners, NGOs/IGOs, the HN, as well as other multinational partners.

> **Phase requirement:**
>
> Number of Marine Corps CA forces required: During phase IV CMO requirements may require the mobilization of the second CAG as well as the inclusion of the other two AC CA detachments. As many as six CA detachments, with up to 24 or more CATs may be required to address all of the requirements that the MAGTF may encounter. These teams may require robust security, transportation, and communications augmentation.

Phase V: Enable Civil Authority (transfer to civil authority, redeploy)

At the beginning of the enable civil authority phase, MAGTF CA forces will continue CMO tasks begun in phases 0–IV, but will begin to transition responsibility to other organizations, such as other USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and the HN government. The main focus during this phase will be on SCA, as the MAGTF assists the HN government in a building and/or rebuilding capacity.

> **Phase requirement:**
>
> Number of Marine Corps CA forces required: Inititally, it would be the same as during phase IV, but the number would decrease as benchmarks are completed. Eventually, CA forces would once again reach phase 0 shaping levels, as they redeploy or demobilize.

Other MAGTF Capabilities in Support of Civil-Military Operations

The MAGTF has capabilities that may be used to assist in the conduct of CMO, particularly during stability or COIN operations, such as medical, transportation, water purification, construction, and communications. However, it assumes civil sector responsibilities such as public works and utilities only as a last resort if no other agency is present and will transition those responsibilities to the joint force or civilian authorities as rapidly as possible. For example, in the case of DC operations, the MAGTF uses its own assets to perform the following:

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing DC activities, including locations and movement within the MAGTF AO.

- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, caring for, controlling, processing, and repatriating DCs, including the planning and operation of DC camps.
- Plan movement control measures, emergency care, and evacuation of DCs. Coordinate provision of transportation, military police support, military intelligence screening/interrogation, and medical services as required.
- Advise the commander, through the staff judge advocate (SJA), on legal and moral responsibilities with respect to DCs in accordance with US policy and international law.

CHAPTER 3
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING

"It used to be that the CAG headquarters would put their detachments in direct support of the RCTs, but they did not 'own' them, and so the CAG headquarters was technically still responsible for the accomplishment of those tasks in that regimental commander's AO. The technique that we employed gave the regimental commander complete responsibility for all those tasks. So all the CA tasks in AO Raleigh were the responsibility of RCT-6, and then we resourced them by giving him a CA detachment to accomplish those things. . . . By giving him all the tasks and all the tools and allowing him to execute it, he was better able to manage and quickly respond to things that occurred in his AO, and I think that this was a critical aspect of the regiments' . . . and the BCT's successes, . . . was their ability to have complete responsibility but also have the resources and tools to execute those missions."

–5/10 MCCLL 12 Nov 2008

Civil Affairs Methodology

Civil affairs methodology is a process used by CA trained Marines to plan, execute, and assess CMO tasks assigned to tactical CA elements. The CA methodology is similar to the more familiar troop leading steps (begin the plan, arrange for reconnaissance, make reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order, supervise) used by Marine leaders at the company level and below. Using CA methodology, CA elements incorporate the elements of the civil environment as they plan and execute the CMO task. The six steps in CA methodology are as follows:

- Assess.
- Decide.
- Develop/Detect.
- Deliver.
- Evaluate.
- Transition.

The first two steps pertain to planning. The next three steps pertain to execution. The last step addresses transfer of a CMO task to another unit or entity that will assume responsibility for the uncompleted CMO task.

Civil affairs methodology is a circular process. By incorporating an evaluation step, recommendations can be made to change how tasks are being executed and/or change the actual CMO tasks. These recommendations then force a return to the first step of the process, creating a circular evaluation process.

Assess

Assess step begins with the receipt of the mission. Marines must review all mission-related material, to include operation plans (OPLANs), intelligence summaries, fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), the commander's intent, and joint common plans. From these sources, CMO planners must collect all relevant information, to include IGO, NGO, and IPI points of contact. Planners consider ASCOPE as depicted in table 3-1, on page 3-2, and it is used primarily as a development tool to understand the civil dimension as follows:

- Areas.
- Structures.
- Capabilities.
- Organizations.
- People.
- Events.

Table 3-1. Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events Planning.

Areas	Structures	Capabilities	Organizations	People	Events
Tribe	Religious shrines	Water	Family/clan	Speeches	Birthdays
Ethnicity	Houses of worship	Electrical	Religious	Face-to-face	Religious gatherings
Religion	Bars/teas shops	Academic	Ethnic	Media/radio	Major religious events
Economic districts	Social gathering places	Trash	US/coalition	Media/TV	Major religious events
Smuggling routes	Print shops	Medical	Governmental agencies	Media/print (newspaper)	Anniversaries of wars or battles
National	Internet cafes	Security	Farmers or unions	Visual (graffiti, signs)	Holidays
Social classes	Television	Market (use and goods)	Community	Visual (videos, DVDs)	Harvests
Political districts	Radio station	Employment and commerce	Military or militia units	Audio (pirated or illegal radio)	Reconstruction openings
Military districts	Hospitals	Crime and justice	Illicit organizations	Rallies or demonstrations	Town or council meetings
School districts	Banks	Basic needs	Insurgent groups	Restaurants	Elections
Road system	Dams	Public health	Gangs	Door-to-door	Sports events
Water sources	Bridges	Economic (jobs)	Businesses organizations	Internet	
Water coverage	Police stations	Religion	Police	Markets	
Water districts	Gas stations	Displaced persons and refugees	Nomads	Sports	
Construction sites	Military barracks	Political voice	Displaced persons and refugees	Religious gatherings	
Gang territory	Jails	Civil rights, individual rights	Volunteer groups	Parks	
Safe area/sanctuary	Water pumping stations		IGOs	Family gatherings	
Trade routes	Oil/gas pipelines		Political	Gas lines	
Power grids	Water lines		Contractors	Bars/tea shops	
	Power lines		NGOs	Food lines	
	Storage facilities		Labor unions	Job lines	

While Marines are familiar with METT-T, CA Marines must also address civil considerations, which include civilians, their environment, and their capacity; hence, the term ASCOPE. Civil considerations are just as important as METT-T and must be incorporated when planning CMO. Civil considerations and METT-T are applicable throughout the range of military operations (offense, defense, or stability). Both METT-T and ASCOPE serve as a mental filter that enables Marines to quickly assess and report the situation from the CMO perspective.

Decide

This step is characterized by developing how the CMO task is going to be executed. Depending on the time available, the CA planner may choose to develop more than one option on how to execute the assigned CMO task. The CA planner will also

develop the measure of effectiveness (MOE) and the measure of performance (MOP) for the assigned CMO task. For further information on MOEs and MOPs, see appendix B. These options need to be tested against the operational environment, need to meet the unit commander's intent and guidance outlined in the order, and need to support other CMO related directives for the AO.

Develop/Detect

This begins the execution step of the CMO task. Marines conducting CMO must establish relationships and build rapport with key leaders, IGOs, NGOs, and IPI representatives. Marines will continue deliberate assessments in order to confirm the plan and assumptions made during the assess step.

Marine forces engaged in CMO use the District Stability Framework (DSF) as a tool to detect potential sources of conflict. Understanding these factors supports the commander and gives him an understanding of the AO. For more information on DSF, see appendix C.

Deliver

In this step, properly executed CMO will mitigate or reduce the need for contingency/crisis action operations, particularly in its early stages before armed conflict has occurred. The deliver step may consist of full-scale projects managed by NGOs, or simply encouraging the local population to do it themselves, or doing everything in between. The complexities of the reconstruction and development effort and the capabilities of the HN will determine how a plan will be executed. Monitoring must be continuous until the task has been completed. Course corrections may be required along the way until the task has been completed.

A set of targeted reconstruction and development efforts that lead to greater stability will be the end result. The process of collecting, analyzing, planning, and executing targeted reconstruction and development efforts is continuous. As conditions change, planners must be able to reassess and shift efforts accordingly. Over time, data will indicate whether stabilization objectives are being met. Activities during this step include the following:

- Projects/programs (CERP, IO).
- Enhanced interagency efforts.
- Execution of CMO in support of RCTs/battalions.
- Support to local government/tribal key leader engagement.
- Collection and consolidation of raw civilian information.

All of these activities must be linked to the supported commander's intent. The duration of this phase is dependent on achieving the end state. For TTP concerning project management, refer to MCRP 3-33.1A.

Evaluate

The evaluation step includes detailed analysis of civil information using established metrics such as MOEs and MOPs to provide the commander and the staff an evaluation of the progress of CMO. Planners use this crucial step of the methodology to determine the following:

- Adjustments to the plan.
- New plans or operations, if needed.
- Mitigation of unforeseen/unintended consequences.
- Decision point for termination/transition of operations.

The outputs of this step include the following:

- CMO briefings and reports.
- After action reports.
- Additional project nominations.
- Recommendations for new CMO tasks.
- Finalized transition plan.
- Termination, transition, or transfer timelines.

For more information on MOEs and MOPs, see appendix B.

Transition

This final step is the transition of civil-military tasks to follow-on forces, OGAs, or the local government. Chapter 6 of MCRP 3-33.1A offers more information on transition. Follow on forces or organizations can be, but are not limited to, the following:

- United Nations (UN) mandated peacekeeping force or entity.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
- European Union.
- African Union.
- USG interagency.
- IGOs.
- NGOs.
- HN government and/or private contractors.

Civil Reconnaissance

Daily interaction between Marine forces is critical to the commander's understanding of the operational environment. Every civilian in the AO is a potential source of civil information. The CMO planners, in coordination with the CA detachments, integrate CR into the overall supported commander's concept of operations (CONOPs) enhancing the development of the COP. Effective CIM practices are vital for capturing data and information. Potential sources of civil information from a coordinated CR plan include the following:

- Observations made by combat elements supported by CA detachments and teams in the normal day-to-day conduct of operations.
- Results of DSF questionnaires (see app. C).
- Debriefings of Marines involved in various civic action projects, such as medical civic action programs or veterinary civic action programs, regarding local perceptions.
- Ongoing ASCOPE assessments of the AO that may identify trends.
- Interaction with CA forces and IPI spheres of influence, including HN government officials, religious, tribal, and clan leaders.
- Gathering, providing, and sharing civil information using the appropriate databases such as Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), Asymmetric Software Kit, Marine Link, and geospacial assessment tool for engineering reachback [GATER].
- Marine Corps Intelligence Agency country studies.
- Department of State background notes found at http://www.state.gov.
- Contact with nonmilitary organizations and agencies.
- Nontraditional sources.
- Reachback support by SMEs; such as Center for Advanced Operational and Cultural Learning, CMO branch, Security Cooperation Education and Training Center.

In order to maintain situational awareness, CR must be conducted continuously to fulfill the requirement of updating the CMO assessments as conditions change. For detailed CR TTP, refer to MCRP 3-33.1A.

Civil Information Management

The goal of CIM is to create a collaborative information environment that consists of individuals, organizations, systems, infrastructure, and processes to create and share the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess CMO. It will enable CA Marines to make more informed recommendations to the supported commander. As a component of the Global Information Grid, CIM enhances CA capabilities for the explicit purpose of information and knowledge collaboration. It offers commanders and their staffs the ability to create a shared situational awareness so they can plan and operate with an

enhanced unity of effort. The CIM seeks to provide the right information to the right people at the right time in an understandable and actionable format or display. Civil information is generated through collection, collation, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination. The effective management of the CIM benefits the supported commander.

Anticipating and satisfying civil information needs for the supported commander are tasks for the CA planners. The CA planner has the lead in providing the key civil considerations that should support the commander's intent in order to perform the following:

- Conduct CR to find, analyze, and report civil information.
- Coordinate with non-CA assets to achieve a coherent reconnaissance and execution plan.
- Synchronize the collection and consolidation of civil information.
- Develop the civil components of the COP.
- Increase the supported commander's environmental awareness.
- Assist in the development of the supported commander's COP.
- Conduct USG interagency, IPI, IGO, and NGO coordination.
- Develop protocols for the storage, maintenance, access, and referral of civil information.

For more details regarding CIM TTP, refer to MCRP 3-33.1A and the *Joint Civil Information Management Handbook*. Examples of sample reports are found in appendix D.

The Marine Corps Planning Process

The Marine Corps doctrinal philosophy of maneuver warfare describes planning as an essential part of command and control. The aim of command and control is to enhance the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. Effective decisionmaking requires both the situational awareness to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. An essential function of planning is to promote understanding of the problem, to define the difference between current and desired conditions, and then to devise ways to solve the problem.

The commander plays a central and essential role in the MCPP. Civil-military operations planners aid the commander's decision-making ability by providing a civil perspective. Civil-military operations planners conduct integrated planning with the MAGTF staff throughout the planning process and are responsible for preparing the CMO staff estimate and annex G.

Planning should never be viewed as an isolated activity or process. Rather, it should be viewed as a part of a continuum in which planning, execution, and assessment are continuous activities. Environmental factors, enemy action, civil considerations, updated intelligence, changing resources, revised guidance from HHQ, and input provided as a result of operations all contribute to making planning endeavors highly complex and nonlinear. It must be recognized that planning rarely occurs in the same straightforward manner. Knowledge of the planning hierarchy is therefore essential to the effective application of the MCPP.

As described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, *Planning*, conceptual planning is the highest level of the planning hierarchy. Conceptual planning establishes aims, objectives, and intentions and involves developing broad concepts for action.

At the lowest level of the planning hierarchy is detailed planning. Detailed planning is concerned with translating broad concepts into a complete and executable plan. Detailed planning generally corresponds to the science of war and is an analytic process of decomposing the concept into executable tasks. Detailed planning works out scheduling, coordination, or technical issues involved with moving, sustaining, administering

and directing military forces. Detailed planning identifies the actions necessary to accomplish the objectives defined during conceptual planning.

Between the highest and lowest levels of the planning hierarchy is functional planning, which involves elements of both conceptual and detailed planning. Functional planning is concerned with designing supporting plans for discrete functional activities like maneuver, CMO, lethal and nonlethal fires, logistics, intelligence, and force protection.

In general, conceptual planning provides the basis for all subsequent planning. Planning should generally progress from the general to the specific. However, conceptual planning must also be responsive to the outputs of functional and detailed planning. For example, the realities of deployment schedules (a functional concern) can dictate employment schemes (a conceptual concern). Functional planning must in turn be responsive to the detailed requirements of execution. Conceptual, functional, and detailed planning are seldom conducted sequentially because the situation and available information are continually evolving.

Design is a continuous activity and must never be viewed as an isolated event occurring only during problem framing. It occurs throughout the planning-decision-execution-assessment continuum. Continuous learning is one of the most important aspects of design. As the problem evolves, the commander's understanding of the problem and how the command will conduct operations to achieve the desired end state must also evolve. Design, formulated by the commander, informs and is informed by planning and execution, making design a basis for assessment. The purpose of design is to achieve a greater understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem in order to identify an appropriate solution. Design provides a means to learn and adapt. It is a way of organizing conceptual work within an organization to assist commanders in understanding, visualizing, and describing the operational environment and to develop approaches to solving problems. Because the environment is dynamic, problems evolve as we interact with them. As a result, design occurs throughout planning, execution, and assessment. See MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, for detailed information on design.

Tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Process

The tenets of the MCPP—top down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning—are derived from the doctrine of maneuver warfare. These tenets guide the commander's use of his staff to plan and execute military operations.

Top-Down Planning

Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The commander must not merely participate in planning, he must drive the process. His personal involvement and guidance are keys to planning. The commander uses planning to increase his understanding of the environment and the problem to support his decisionmaking.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Civil Military Operations (G-9) provides guidance to both the G-9 working group and the G-9 CMO planner. The G-9's personal involvement and understanding of the commander's guidance are important to CMO planning.

Single-Battle Concept

Operations or events in one part of the battlespace often have profound and unintended effects on other areas and events; therefore, a commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity. Commanders set the stage for a single-battle effort during planning, primarily through their intent. Intent allows subordinates to understand the problem while guiding and empowering them to take action as the situation dictates, particularly when the unforeseen occurs, while remaining consistent with larger

aims. The G-9 supports the MAGTF single battle concept by ensuring that all CMO actions help to accomplish the mission and the desired end state.

Integrated Planning

Integrated planning is conducted to coordinate action toward a common purpose by all elements of the force. Integrated planning is facilitated by assigning personnel to the OPT who have an appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of their respective organization or activity. In conventional operations, representatives from each of the warfighting functions such as fires, maneuver, intelligence, logistics, force protection, and command and control may be sufficient. In stability operations and CMO, representatives from government agencies, the HN police and military, intelligence community, political representatives, and others may be required. Similarly, humanitarian operations may involve representatives from OGAs, NGAs, and private relief organizations. The key to integrated planning is to involve the right personnel from the right organizations in the planning process as early as possible to consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information as broadly as possible.

Integrated Planning

The MCPP promotes understanding between the commander and his staff regarding the nature of a given problem and the options for solving it; therefore, CMO planners must analyze the civil dimension of the operating environment, which will assist with the commander's decision-making process.

The CMO planners are an integral part of the planning process. The civil dimension of the operating environment must be considered and integrated into all MAGTF operations. The CMO planners are expected to be SMEs on the civil dimension of the operating environment and should be active participants in all MAGTF planning efforts. The CMO planners are the conduit between the G-9 principal staff officer and the MAGTF OPT as shown in figure 3-1. Staff personnel and SMEs within the G-9, also known as the G-9 working group, support the G-9 CMO planners. The G-9 working group plans concurrent with the MAGTF OPT and provides input as required. The G-9 working group will develop a CMO problem statement, conduct civil intelligence preparation of the battlefield (CIPB), create the CMO concept of support, develop the CMO staff estimate, and write annex G.



Legend

FOPs future operations

Figure 3-1. Integrated Planning.

Continuous and Concurrent Planning

A commander may initiate planning on his own initiative, based on indications and warnings, or on guidance and direction from HHQ. The planning process is designed to promote understanding between the commander and his staff regarding the nature of a given problem and the options for solving it. The plans that result may be considered hypotheses, which will be tested and refined as a result of execution and assessment as shown in figure 3-2. Planning and COA development and evaluation are continuous activities and are not isolated events that occur only once. They occur throughout the planning–decision–execution–assessment continuum.

Six steps of the planning process are as follows:

- Problem framing.
- COA development.
- COA war game.
- COA comparison and decision.
- Orders development.
- Transition.

These steps are discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

Civil-Military Operations Problem Framing

Problem framing is the first step in the MCPP. The purpose of problem framing is to gain an enhanced understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. This understanding allows the commander to visualize the operation and describe his conceptual approach, providing context for the examination of what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be accomplished, and most importantly, the nature of the problem and the purpose of the operation. (See fig. 3-3)

During problem framing, CMO planners are responsible for conducting problem framing from the CA perspective. The CMO planners analyze the operational environment by looking at civil considerations such as ASCOPE analysis,



Figure 3-2. Concurrent Planning.



Note: The information shown in bold is meant to highlight the personal involvement of the commander for this part of each step.

Figure 3-3. Problem Framing.

determining civil capabilities (CA, IGO, NGO, interagency), defining the nature of the problem from the CMO perspective, and supporting development of the commander's mission and intent to ensure they adequately reflect the civil perspective. The CMO planners will also determine CMO tasks, assumptions, limitations, and information requirements. Furthermore, CMO planners will begin to develop the initial CMO staff estimate shown in figure 3-4 on page 3-10.

Understanding the Environment

Understanding the environment is an important aspect of design. The essential activities in understanding the environment include critical thinking and an open and frank discussion by all participants, including the commander, to help expose a broad range of ideas to be considered. The CMO planners must consider, but are limited to, the following:

- Existing HHQ design.
- HHQ mission, intent, orders, directives, and guidance.
- Intelligence products to include intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB).
- Area studies/assessments.
- ASCOPE analysis.
- Key actors/relationships.
- Population/culture/language.
- Geography/demographics.

Civil Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

To gain a greater appreciation for the operational environment, CMO planners should conduct

1. Mission. Mission statement results from problem framing.

2. Situation and Considerations

a. Characteristics of the Area of Operation

(1) Weather. How will different military aspects of weather affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?

(2) Terrain. How will aspects of terrain affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?

(3) Other Pertinent Facts. Analyze political, economic, sociological, and psychological factors and infrastructure as they relate to the area.

b. Adversary Forces. Adversary disposition, composition, strength, capabilities, and COA(s) as they affect specific staff areas of concern.

c. Friendly Forces

(1) Friendly COA(s).

(2) Current status of resources.

(3) Current status of other resources.

(4) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions.

(5) Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.

d. Assumptions

3. Analysis. Analyze each COA using key considerations (evaluation criteria) to determine advantages and disadvantages.

4. Comparison. Compare COA(s) using key considerations (evaluation criteria). Rank order COA(s) for each key consideration. Visually support each comparison with a decision matrix.

5. Recommendations and Conclusions

a. Recommended COA based on the comparison (most supportable from specific staff perspective).

b. Issues, deficiencies, and risks with impact mitigations.

Figure 3-4. Civil-Military Operations Staff Estimate.

CIPB. The CMO planners conduct CIPB to assess the impact of friendly, adversary, and other actors, as well as the local populace, on the CONOPS and end state. The CIPB helps planners to understand relationships within interrelated political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems relevant to MAGTF operations. The CMO planners conduct CIPB in a similar manner that intelligence personnel conduct IPB. First, planners evaluate the operational environment's effects on friendly and adversary operations by conducting a detailed ASCOPE analysis of a unit's AO. Once a detailed ASCOPE analysis has been conducted for the unit's AO,

planners then determine possible civil reactions to the MAGTF's concept of operations. Once possible civil reactions are determined, planners will identify key civil assets and personnel, and their likely location, for each COA. To conduct CIPB, CMO planners analyze the following:

- HHQ intelligence and IPB products.
- HHQ civil considerations analysis ASCOPE.
- G-4 physical network analysis, which provides insights into infrastructure, roads, bridges, airfields, and ports.
- Area studies and assessments.
- Terrain as it relates to CMO such as indigenous population centers and likely movement corridors for DCs.
- Weather such as seasonal events that may affect mobility or agricultural production.
- The enemy (from the viewpoint of how the enemy can affect the civil component). Considerations include, but are not limited to, the following:
  - Capabilities to conduct sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism.
  - The ability to affect planned operations.

For more information on civil and cultural considerations, refer to Drs. Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Holmes-Eber's book, *Operational Culture for the Warfighter*.

Understanding Our Capabilities

Understanding our capabilities is critical to all planning efforts. The CMO planners must identify assets that can be used in a CMO role, where those assets are located, and then be able to integrate those assets into the overall plan for CMO. The CMO planners also need to identify anticipated CMO support requirements during problem framing. Once those capabilities are identified, CMO planners must compare capabilities versus requirements and provide solutions/recommendations to mitigate any identified CMO shortfalls.

Understanding the Problem

Armed with an appreciation of both the environment and of friendly CA capabilities, the planning effort focuses on understanding the problem. The essential activities in understanding the problem are critical thinking and an open and frank discussion to help reveal the underlying nature of the problem. A problem is defined as the difference between the current state or condition and a desired state or condition. Another way to describe a problem is to view it as the difference between the state of affairs as it is now and the state of affairs as it ought to be. Defining the problem leads to an understanding of the difference between existing and desired conditions. The CMO planners should synthesize their understanding of the nature of the problem into a problem statement.

There is no set format for a problem statement. Problem statements normally start with "How to" (what it is you wish to accomplish) and may include the following:

- What: The defeat/stability mechanism or the conditions to establish and prevent.
- Who: The opposing sides or the relationship between competitors or forces.
- When: The time component or the relationship between opponents in time.
- Where: The center of gravity or decisive point that gives the commander stating the problem a competitive advantage.

The purpose of the operation is not expressed in the problem statement. The following are two examples of potential problem statements:

- How to employ coalition capabilities to support an enduring capacity of local and provincial governance in the 202,000 square kilometers of the I MEF AO before anti-governmental forces consolidate in the region.
- How to provide a secure environment for people without insurgent influence, while legitimizing the government and improving economic conditions throughout the AO.

Understanding the Purpose

The commander, in the form of his commander's intent, will convey the purpose of the operation. The commander's intent is the commander's personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It may also include how the commander envisions achieving a decision as well as the end state or conditions that, when satisfied, accomplish the purpose. It may be derived from the purpose or the "in order to" portion of the HHQ mission statement or commander's intent of the OPLAN or OPORD.

Commander's Initial Intent and Guidance

The commander's initial guidance can be as detailed or as broad as the commander desires. There is no prescribed format for the commander's initial guidance. At a minimum, the commander should provide his understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. This guidance may also include his thoughts on the operational environment, friendly and enemy centers of gravity, information requirements, and his initial commander's intent. Once the commander has established his initial guidance, the G-9 should also provide the commander's guidance to the G-9 working group. The G-9 should articulate the commander's understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem from the CMO perspective.

Civil-Military Operations Staff Action

Having a better understanding of the operational environment and additional guidance from the G-9, CMO planners can conduct a detailed analysis of tasks, assumptions, limitations, shortfalls, and information requirements. Much of the information available to the commander comes from staff actions, primarily in the form of analysis.

The staff actions by the MAGTF OPT and the CMO working group are complementary activities. The planning process provides venues for interactions among the commander and the staff, the OPT, and/or subordinate units. When the staff or OPT briefs the commander, they are representing the collective planning efforts of the MAGTF, to include the CMO planning conducted by the G-9 working group.

Conduct Task Analysis

Commands rarely receive a mission. By understanding the nature of the problem, including the purpose of the operation, CMO planners can conduct task analysis. Normally, commands receive tasks that planners analyze as a basis for determining the unit's mission. The principal source for tasks is the HHQ plan or order, but there may be other sources from which to derive tasks. Additionally, as the problem and purpose are understood and a design conceptualized, the command develops tasks based on this understanding. Using the commander's initial guidance and HHQ orders and annexes, the CMO working group identifies specified and implied CMO tasks. These tasks become the basis for a unit's mission and can be applicable to the force as a whole. Tasks can be specified, implied, or essential:

- Specified tasks derive primarily from the execution paragraphs of the HHQ OPORD, but they may be found elsewhere, such as in the mission statement, coordinating instructions, or annexes such as Annex D (Logistics) and annex G. Any specified task that is germane to CMO should be identified and recorded.
- Implied tasks are not specifically stated in the HHQ order, but they are necessary to accomplish specified tasks. Implied tasks emerge from analysis of the HHQ order, the threat, and our understanding of the problem. Routine, inherent, enduring, or standing operating procedure activities are not implied tasks.
- Essential tasks are specified or implied tasks that define mission success and apply to the force as a whole. If a task must be successfully completed for the commander to accomplish his purpose, it is an essential task. The MAGTF OPT develops the mission statement from the essential tasks. The CMO planners should recommend essential tasks, if applicable, for inclusion into the MAGTF mission statement.

Note: The CMO planners do not develop a CMO mission statement.

Determine Civil-Military Operations Assumptions

The CMO assumptions are suppositions about the current CMO situation or about future events assumed to be true in the absence of facts in order to continue planning and allow the commander to make a decision concerning a COA. They apply to friendly, adversary, and environmental considerations. A valid assumption should answer all of the following:

- Is it logical?
- Is it realistic?
- Is it essential for planning to continue?
- Does it avoid assuming away a threat capability?

As planning continues, additional CMO assumptions may be needed and previous CMO assumptions may be deleted. A record of CMO assumptions is maintained in order to track and validate them as they are confirmed or disapproved. Assumptions are contained in OPLANs, but are not included in OPORDs. If the OPLAN contains assumptions that are not validated before execution, the assumptions become part of the inherent risks of the operation.

If possible, all assumptions are forwarded to HHQ for validation. This ensures that the HHQ commander understands the potential risks that a subordinate command is accepting. It may prompt the HHQ to pursue facts that support the assumption or to request additional information.

Determine Civil-Military Operations Limitations

Restraints (things you cannot do) and constraints (things you must do) that do not qualify as specified tasks are collectively referred to as limitations. Limitations are carried forward into COA development and subsequent planning as they can affect how operations will be conducted.

Identify Civil-Military Operations Resource Shortfalls

Based on the mission and available resources, the CMO working group identifies critical resource shortfalls in order to determine additional support requirements. Shortfalls can include a need for SMEs.

Recommend Commander's Critical Information Requirements

Only the commander decides what information is critical, but the G-9 staff may propose commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) to the commander. The CCIRs are reviewed and updated as required. The two subcategories of CCIRs are friendly force information requirements and PIRs. Initially, CCIRs may reflect the nature of planning and identify intelligence or information requirements to assist with the planning and decision process. When answered, CCIRs may often serve to inform the ongoing design and provide information proving or disproving the hypothesis. As the planning moves forward and execution is imminent, the CCIRs will normally change in nature to reflect key information/intelligence requirements tied to decision points or needed for execution.

Identify Civil-Military Operations Requests for Information

The CMO planners identify information necessary to remove assumptions, support future plans, or conduct current operations. Based on the civil IPB and information requirements, including CCIRs, the commander and staff identify gaps in information and intelligence. The CMO planners forward requests for information (RFIs) to the appropriate staff section or to HHQ for answers. Over time, the number of RFIs can make the tracking effort very difficult. A software-based RFI management tool and an individual tasked to track RFI submission and response can help accomplish this task.

Develop Initial Civil-Military Operations Staff Estimate

The G-9 staff gathers and refines information in support of the CMO staff estimate. This estimate provides a timely examination of factors that support decisionmaking and can affect mission accomplishment. Depending on the level of command and the time available, the estimates could be a formal, detailed written document or an informal verbal briefing. See figure 3-4.

Green Cell

The purpose of the green cell is to assist the commander in assessing COAs from the civil perspective. Depending on the size of the organization, a green cell can range in size from an officer with CMO experience to a task-organized group of SMEs such as IGOs, NGOs, interagency representatives, political advisors, regional area officers, CA SMEs, or PA and IOs representatives. The green cell falls under the staff cognizance of the G-9 and conducts a detailed analysis of the civil component. While the green cell's principal duties center on CMO COA development and CMO war game, it should also support the commander's understanding of the situation from the civil perspective.

Red Cell

The purpose of a red cell is to assist the commander in assessing COAs against a thinking enemy. Depending on the size of the organization, a red cell can range in size from an intelligence officer to a task-organized group of SMEs. While a red cell's principal duties center on COA development and the COA war game, it could also support the commander's understanding of the situation and problem during the initial stages of design as well as participate in the analysis of enemy centers of gravity.

The red cell falls under the staff cognizance of the G-2 and is typically led by someone whose expertise most closely reflects that of the adversary. The red cell should inform both the MAGTF OPT and the CMO planning efforts. The G-9 should consider sending representation to the red cell to help ensure information fusion between the G-2 and the G-9.

Civil-Military Operations Course of Action Development

A COA, as shown in figure 3-5, is a potential solution to an approved mission. The COA development step is designed to generate options for follow-on wargaming and comparison and decision that satisfy the mission, commander's intent, and the commander's COA development guidance. The CMO planner's develop CMO COAs and CMO concepts of support that are integrated into the options being developed by MAGTF planners.

To be distinguishable, each COA must employ different means or methods that address the essential tasks and incorporate the commander's intent and guidance. During COA development, the OPT concentrates on two questions: What do we want to do? How do we want to do it?

Apply Inputs From Problem Framing

The inputs to CMO COA development are primarily the results of CMO problem framing. The CMO planners must continually review and update the results of CMO problem framing, particularly in a dynamic environment. At a minimum, CMO COA development requires the problem statement, mission statement, intent, and COA development planning guidance that is provided and approved by the commander during problem framing.

Develop Initial Courses of Action

Once CMO planners have updated their products from CMO problem framing, to include updating friendly and enemy force locations, they are ready to develop the initial CMO COA. Typically, CMO planners will develop only one CMO



Note: The information shown in bold is meant to highlight the personal involvement of the commander for this part of each step.

Figure 3-5. Civil-Military Operations Course of Action Development.

COA that is capable of supporting all of the MAGTF COAs. The CMO planners, as part of an integrated planning effort with the MAGTF staff, will develop the CMO COA using the commander's planning guidance and vision of shaping and decisive actions.

Identify Civil-Military Operations Planning Considerations

The cooperative inclusion of local organizations and authorities can strengthen the MAGTF's overall concept of operations. For example, military police are more effective when teamed with HN police forces. Operational planners should attempt to consult with local authorities in order to more thoroughly inform the decision-making process. Actions that are informed by and executed with HN forces enhance legitimacy of MAGTF operations and aid mission accomplishment.

Update Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Products

Planners are able to view the battlespace in terms of the adversary and the environment by using IPB. Planners can determine how the adversary will react to proposed friendly COAs, the purpose of adversary actions, the most likely and most dangerous adversary COAs, and the type of friendly operations that the terrain and infrastructure will allow. It is critical that planners continue to update and refine IPB to deepen their understanding of the situation and to answer the two fundamental questions posed in COA development: What do we want to do? How do we want to do it?

Determine Battlefield Framework

The battlefield framework is a technique of breaking the battlespace down into manageable aspects. The battlefield framework describes how the commander will organize his battlespace and forces to achieve a decision. The commander organizes the battlespace in one of three ways:

- Spatially: deep, close, and rear.
- Functionally: decisive, shaping, and sustaining actions.
- LOO.

This technique allows planners to operate within the single battle by translating the commander's vision of decisive action into a framework with which to develop initial COAs.

Establish Priorities and Objectives

The CMO planners must establish priorities and objectives for CMO. Establishing clear priorities and measurable objectives will lead to greater unity of effort and assist in promoting the MAGTF's single battle. Initial measures of performance should also be developed in order to support each CMO objective.

Determine Tasks

Once CMO planners have established priorities and clear CMO objectives, they should determine the tasks that are necessary to accomplish established CMO objectives.

Determine Requirements

Identify resources that are required to achieve established objectives, accomplish specified/implied tasks, and support the MAGTF scheme of maneuver. During this portion of planning, identify CA requirements and the type of capability or resource required to fulfill each requirement. Civil affairs planners do not assign specific units but they assign generic capabilities, which will assist MAGTF planners in identifying resource shortfalls.

Assign Required Course of Action Capabilities

After mapping together known CA, HN, IGO, and NGO locations and capabilities, CMO planners can identify the capabilities available to meet the supported unit's projected requirements. The CMO planners will begin by assigning CA forces to the MAGTF beginning with the main effort and then each supporting effort, and then the reserve. Those requirements that have not been fulfilled by a specific CA capability are considered CA shortfalls.

Assign Purpose Then Tasks

Once CA forces have been arrayed, assign a purpose and then tasks to each of the MAGTF's subordinate commands. Begin with the main effort and then each supporting effort, and then the reserve. Each MAGTF element should be properly resourced with CA assets in order to accomplish the assigned CMO intensive tasks.

Determine Command Relationships

Civil military operations planners must determine the appropriate command relationships between CA forces and the MAGTF unit that they are assigned to once CA forces have been assigned and tasked. Refer to JP 3-0 for a detailed description of command relationships.

Synchronize

Once CMO planners have developed the CMO COA, they should synchronize CMO efforts, arranging in terms of time, space, and purpose with the MAGTF COA. The CMO planners record their efforts in the synchronization matrix and then depict the synchronization of CMO actions in time and space in the CMO COA graphic and narrative.

Determine Control Measures

The CMO planners determine any necessary CMO control measures, such as DC assembly

areas, DC campsites, and DC routes that will need to be integrated into the overall MAGTF plan for control measures.

Obtain G-9 Input

The CMO planners review the initial CMO COA with the G-9 to ensure the COA conforms to current guidance and also to the COA development planning guidance provided by the commander. This is the opportunity for the G-9 to make course corrections before the CMO working group conducts detailed CMO COA development and refinement.

Conduct Course of Action Refinement

Refinement of CMO COA consists of developing and refining information organized into three basic products: CMO COA graphic and narrative, CA force assignments and command relationships, and the CMO synchronization matrix.

Civil-Military Operations Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

The CMO COA graphic and narrative each portrays how CMO will be integrated in the MAGTF COAs. Together, they identify who (notional task organization), what (tasks), when, where, how, and why (intent). The CMO COA graphic and narrative are essential and inseparable from each other. Together, they help the commander and the staff to understand the method by which the organization will conduct CMO. The graphic portrays the CMO activities to be conducted by the main effort and supporting efforts. The CMO narrative provides the purpose and tasks of the main and supporting efforts, the reserve, and the sequencing of the operation. The graphic may display civil-military activities, locations of relief organizations and DCs, key infrastructure, and culturally or historically significant areas.

The CMO COA graphic and narrative, when approved by the G-9 and the commander, form the basis for annex G and for the CMO concept of support in the execution paragraph of the OPLAN or OPORD.

Force Assignments and Command Relationships

Force assignments and command relationships capture how the G-9 intends to structure and resource the force with CA resources. It can also establish command and support relationships. Proper task organization ensures each unit is properly constructed, sized, and resourced to support the commander's concept of operation.

Synchronization Matrix

The synchronization matrix is a working document showing the activities of the command and subordinate elements over time. The matrix can display how units and tasks interrelate, providing additional details that complement and amplify the CMO COA graphic and narrative. The synchronization matrix is not used as a script or playbook for execution, but serves as a way to provide structure for the war game.

Prepare Civil-Military Briefing

The finalized products from CMO COA refinement such as the CMO COA graphic and narrative; CA force assignments and command relationships; the CMO synchronization matrix; the CMO concept of support; and any updated facts, assumptions, limitations, and shortfalls are briefed to the G-9.

Publish Commander's Wargaming Guidance and Evaluation Criteria

Following the COA development brief, the commander will select or modify the COAs and suggest additional COAs for wargaming. The commander will also provide wargaming guidance and evaluation criteria.

Commander's Wargaming Guidance

The commander's wargaming guidance may include a list of friendly COAs to be wargamed

against specific enemy COAs such as, COA 1 against the enemy's most likely, most dangerous, or most advantageous COA. It may also include a timeline for the phase or stage of the operation and a list of critical events, such as shifting the main effort.

Commander's Evaluation Criteria

Before the staff can begin the COA war game, the commander must choose the evaluation criteria to be used to select the COA that will become his concept of operations. The commander establishes evaluation criteria based on METT-T, judgment, personal experience, and his overall design for the operation. Commanders may choose an evaluation criterion that is related to the principles of war, such as mass or surprise. These evaluation criteria help focus the wargaming effort and provide the framework for data collection by the staff. The commander will apply the data collected during the war game to the COA comparison and decision step.

Civil-Military Operations Course of Action War Game

The COA war game depicted in figure 3-6 examines and refines the broad option(s) in light of enemy capabilities and potential actions or reactions as well as the characteristics peculiar to the operational environment. Planners war game friendly COAs against selected threat COAs through an interactive action-reaction-counteraction process. A free thinking red cell builds and fights the threat COAs.



Note: The information shown in bold is meant to highlight the personal involvement of the commander for this part of each step.

Figure 3-6. Civil-Military Operations Course of Action War Game.

The COA war game leads to a greater understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem, identification of potential branches and sequels, the sequence and timing of major events, and recognition of required modifications to each COA. The COA war game will:

- Enable the commander and this staff to gain a common understanding of friendly and possible enemy COAs. This understanding will allow them to determine the advantages and disadvantages of each COA and forms the basis for COA comparison and decision.
- Involve a detailed assessment of each COA, to include staff estimates, as it relates to the enemy and the battlespace. Each friendly COA is wargamed against selected threat COAs.
- Assist planners in identifying strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA.
- Identify branches and sequels that require additional planning.

Prior to wargaming, the commander designates the COAs for examination and provides wargaming guidance and evaluation criteria. Short of actually executing a COA, wargaming provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving COAs. Inputs to the CMO COA war game are as follows:

- Updated commander's design.
- Updated civil IPB products.
- Planning support tools including the CMO COA graphic and narrative and synchronization matrix.
- CMO staff estimate.
- CMO concept of support.

Establish War Game Rules

Wargame rules can include, but are not limited to, the following:

- War game CMO COAs independently.
- Do not compare one COA with another during the war game.
- Use approved enemy and civil COAs.
- Remain unbiased and avoid premature conclusions.
- Keep to the established timeline for the CMO COA war game.
  - Continually assess how feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete each CMO COA is.
  - Record war game results by war game turn, including the advantages and disadvantages of each CMO COA.
  - Collect CMO COA refinement recommendations and identify possible branches and sequels for further planning.

Conduct War Game Preparation

War game preparation can include, but is not limited to the following:

- Determine war game organization.
- Gather the tools.
  - War game injects.
  - Planning support tools.
  - Synchronization matrix
  - War game worksheet.
  - Decision support template/matrix.
- Determine the MAGTF COA(s) to be wargamed.
- Determine which enemy COA will be used.
- Determine which civil COA will be used.
- Select a war game method:
  - Box: Used when the war game is time-constrained. The box method allows planners to focus on specific areas such as colored beach, raid objectives, urban areas, and critical events and decision point analysis.
  - Belt: Used for terrain divided into well-defined cross-compartments, phased operations, and when the enemy deploys in clearly defined echelons or belts.
  - Sequence of critical tasks: Allows for sequential war game of major operational movements and enables evaluation of critical tasks and reordering if necessary.

- Avenue in depth: Focus on one avenue of approach at a time such as in offensive COAs and in defensive situations where canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support.
- Any other aspects of the operation that the commander wants to analyze in more detail.

Red Cell Brief

A red cell representative will brief an overview of the enemy's concept of operations including a detailed discussion of the most likely and most dangerous COAs. The red cell brief should include a description of the enemy's doctrine-based capabilities and not embellish the enemy to unachievable capabilities.

Green Cell Brief

The green cell should provide their overview of the civil situation to include a detailed discussion of the most likely and most dangerous civil COAs. The green cell should provide a brief on the current civil situation to include internal and external influences on the populace. It is critical that the green cell ensure civil actions are realistic.

Conduct the War Game Turn

A CMO COA war game turn covers all friendly and enemy actions during a specific time interval. Each war game turn consists of three moves: one friendly (action), one enemy (reaction), and one friendly (counteraction). The CMO planners may conduct wargaming using the enemy's most likely or most dangerous COA. The commander will approve which enemy COA is wargamed by the MAGTF OPT. This is the same enemy COA that CMO planners should war game. The CMO planners must also take into consideration the input received from the green cell.

Provided with the commander's wargaming guidance, war game evaluation criteria, the MAGTF and CMO synchronization matrix, decision support products, updated civil IPB, and red cell products the CMO working group organizes and prepares to conduct the war game.

The steps involved in a CMO war game turn are as follows:

- Describe friendly action using brief MAGTF actions from the OPT synchronization matrix.
- Describe CMO actions associated with friendly action using brief CMO actions from the CMO synchronization matrix.
- Determine enemy reaction based on most likely or most dangerous COAs.
- Consult green cell in order to obtain most likely or most dangerous civil reaction in response to both friendly and adversary actions.
- Determine MAGTF CMO counteraction. Upon completion of the red cell and green cell reaction, the G-9 working group determines CMO counteractions and identifies recommendations for MAGTF counteractions.
- Refine planning tools.
- Evaluate outcome on CMO COAs.
- Refine CMO COA.
- Record results on the CMO COA war game worksheet and the CMO synchronization matrix.
- Record recommendations for modifications to the CMO COA and potential branches and sequels.
- Record pros and cons of each CMO COA based on commander's and G-9's evaluation criteria.

Table 3-1 is an example of CMO input to the COA synchronization matrix. The matrix is a planning support tool designed to integrate the efforts of the force across the warfighting functions and to record the results of the COA war game. The matrix depicts, over time, the diverse actions of the entire force that are necessary to execute the COA.

Table 3-2, on page 3-22, is an example of a COA war game worksheet that is used during the war game to record friendly actions, enemy reactions, and friendly counteractions that are involved in each COA. The COA war game worksheet captures critical information identified during the war game, such as potential CCIRs, decision points, and named areas of interest.

Table 3-1. Sample CMO COA Synchronization Matrix.

Time/Event		Pre D-Day	D-Day – D+20	D+21 – D-60	D+61 – +80
CMO	CA Forces	Attach Det to (ME) RCT 4 CAT DS 2 CAT GS			
	Rule of Law	Analyze, prioritize assessments	1 CAT supports local PTT/engineer assessment for Al Jaffar prison improvement project		
	Economy	Analyze, prioritize assessments	2 CAT conducts assessment of local industry and market capacity/productivity vic Al Jaffar	1 CAT to assist local economic development roundtable vic Al Jaffar with HN and local officials/businessmen	1 CAT to monitor local economic conditions identify trade bottlenecks in Ar Sufka and Al Jaffar
	Public Health	Analyze, prioritize assessments	1 CAT supports local FSSG for Al Jaffar hospital repairs		
	Infrastructure	Analyze, prioritize assessments	1 GS CAT to manage bridge repair project vic Al Jaffar and Ar Sufka	CATS in support of ME Man Bn assist HN in renovation of water treatment plant at Ar Sufka	2 GS CAT to support USAID effort in Ar Sufka wheat field irrigation project
	Governance	Analyze, prioritize assessments	Helicopter governance 1 GS CAT supports HN gov local government assessments	HN transition 1 GS CAT provides assistance to Ar Sufka water minister ISO HN renovation project	HN control 2 GS CAT with PRT supports USAID and HN wheat field irrigation project vice Ar Sufka
	Public Education	Analyze, prioritize assessments	1 CAT (SE) Man Bn manages college and high school repairs vic Al Jaffar		

Det	detachment	Man Bn	maneuver battalion
DS	direct support	ME	main effort
FSSG	force service support group	PTT	police transition team
Gov	government	SE	secondary effort
GS	general support	vic	vicinity
ISO	in support of		

Table 3-2. Sample COA War Game Worksheet.

COA Stage A Most Dangerous							
Action	Reaction	Counteraction	Assets	Approx. Time	Dec Point	CCIR	Remarks
1CAT manages FSSG project for Al Jaffar hospital repairs and resupply	Local businessmen want contract HN money and supply delays Hospital theft occurs Hospital staff threatened by insurgents many of the staff leave	Conduct assessment of source of instability in alternative area Determine alt methods of funding contract payments Utilize local officials to provide supplies Provide PTT and local police force security to hospital	1 CAT Eng Plt 20 LN police security force	D+10	DP1	Hospital ceases operation	

Approx	approx	FSSG	force service support group
DP	decision point	LN	local national
Dec	decision	PTT	police transition team
Eng Plt	engineer platoon	Tm	team

War Game Brief

The CMO COA war game brief includes the advantages and disadvantages of each CMO COA and suggested modifications. It may also include the following:

- Updated CIPB products.
- CMO problem framing and CMO COA development products:
  - Higher, supporting, supported, and adjacent commanders' mission statements (two levels up).
  - Tasks and intent provided by HHQ.
  - Commander's intent for subordinate units.
  - Overview of CMO COA.
  - War game technique used.
- COA war game products and results:
  - COA war game worksheet.
  - Identification of any additional CMO tasks.
  - Revised CMO COA graphic and narrative.
  - CMO synchronization matrix.
  - Recommended branches and potential sequels.
  - CMO resource shortfalls.
  - New CMO requests for information.
  - Estimated time required for the operation.
  - Risk assessment.
- Recommended changes to the commander's evaluation criteria.

Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During COA comparison and decision, shown in figure 3-7, the commander evaluates each friendly COA against established criteria, compares them against each other, and selects the COA he believes will best accomplish the mission.

Evaluate Courses of Action

Using his evaluation criteria, the commander or his representative (deputy commander, chief of staff, or operations officer) will lead a discussion



Note: The information shown in bold is meant to highlight the personal involvement of the commander for this part of each step.

Figure 3-7. Course of Action Comparison and Decision.

about the relative merits of each COA. The staff will record the advantages and disadvantages for each. To the extent that operations allow, subordinate commanders, staffs, and planners should participate and provide input based on their estimates of supportability as shown in table 3-3 on page 3-24.

Compare Courses of Action

Course of action comparison provides the commander with an understanding of the relative merit of each COA and aids in his decisionmaking. The commander compares the COAs against one another using the results of the COA evaluation. The commander may use a comparison and decision matrix, shown in table 3-4 on page 3-24, to help him compare one COA against another.

Establish Commander's Decision

The commander will select a COA. In making a decision, the commander may—

- Select a COA without modification.
- Modify a COA.
- Develop a new COA by combining favorable elements of multiple COAs.
- Discard all COAs and resume problem framing or COA development, as required.

Once the commander has made a decision, he should review the approved COA with subordinate commanders. With a decision, detailed planning can accelerate once the entire command's focus is on a single COA. To facilitate detailed planning, the staff uses the approved COA as the basis for the concept of operations.

Table 3-3. Sample CMO Evaluation Matrix.

Commander's Evaluation Criteria	COM COA1	CMO COA2	CMO COA3
Force Protection		Potential riots due to lack of HN support	
Tempo, Surprise	More methodical, better stability over long term, lower short term improvements		
Shapes the Battlespace		Supports DSF assessment as primary source of conflict	
Asymmetrical Operations			
Maneuver	Economy of force, unity of effort	Teams not able to support each other	
Decisive Actions			
Simplicity		Command relationships not clear, may cause confusion	Demanding CIM requirements

Table 3-4. Sample Comparison and Decision Matrix.

Criteria	Weight	COA#1	COA#2	COA#3
Fewer DCs on MSRs (faster movement)	4	3 / 12	2 / 8	1 / 4
Avoids collateral damage	2	2 / 4	2 / 4	3 / 6
Engages key leaders	1	2 / 2	1 / 1	3 / 3
Gains cooperation of civilian populace	1	2 / 2	1 / 1	3 / 3
Preserves key infrastructures	2	3 / 6	2 / 4	1 / 2
Amount of HA likely to be needed	2	1 / 2	2 / 4	3 / 6
TOTALS		28	22	24

Notes: 1. Best COA is assigned the highest numerical value of the three COAs.
2. Formula to compute value is to multiply weight times ranking (1, 2, or 3) for that COA.
3. Highest number is most suitable COA.

Legend

MSR main supply route

Prepare the Commander's Concept of Operations

The staff expands on the approved COA to develop the CONOPS, which is the basis for (or could include) supporting concepts such as the concept of CMO. Within the context of military operations, concepts are a vision of actions. A CONOPS is a general description of actions to be taken in pursuit of mission accomplishment. Embedded in the CONOPS is a complete description of the COA with graphics and narrative. Provided with the CONOPS and the concept of CMO, CMO planners can proceed with functional and detailed planning that is essential for the development of the annex G.

Update the Warning Order

With the preparation of the CONOPS, the commander will update his warning order or issue a planning order to inform subordinate commanders' concurrent planning.

At the completion of this process, the MAGTF should have the commander's decision as to which COA will be finalized and executed to satisfy the unit's mission. At this point, the staffs will consolidate the planning products to date and begin the process of orders development.

Orders Development

The purpose of orders development is to translate the commander's decision into oral, written, and/or graphic communication sufficient to guide implementation and promote initiative by subordinates. Orders development is a form of detailed planning. When completed, the order becomes the principal means by which the commander expresses decision, intent, and guidance.

The orders development step in the MCPP communicates the commander's decision in a clear, useful form that can be understood by those executing the order. An order is a written or oral communication that directs actions and focuses a subordinate's tasks and activities toward accomplishing the mission. Various portions of the order, such as the mission statement and staff estimates, have been prepared during previous steps of the MCPP. The development of the order begins during problem framing and continues throughout the process as shown in figure 3-8 on page 3-26.

The chief of staff or the executive officer, as appropriate, directs orders development. The chief of staff or executive officer dictates the format for the order, sets and enforces the time limits and development sequence, and determines which annexes are published by which staff section.

Preparation of an Order

Orders appear in a variety of forms ranging from detailed, written documents with numerous annexes to simple verbal commands. Their form depends on time available, complexity of the operation, and levels of command involved. Staff estimates, subordinate commanders' estimates of supportability, and other planning documents form a plan or order's annexes and appendices.

The order, in narrative form with graphics and a range of supporting documents, serves to focus the command during transition. The order is the vehicle by which the commander expresses his intent and assigns tasks to subordinates. The order ensures common understanding and serves to put every staff section and subordinate unit at the same place, pointed at the same objective.

If a basic order has been published, a FRAGO may be issued to subordinate commanders. Whatever the format, orders must be clear, concise, timely, and useful. Orders development also includes two essential quality control techniques: orders reconciliation and orders crosswalk.

Orders Reconciliation

Orders reconciliation is an internal process in which the staff conducts a detailed review of the entire order. The purpose of reconciliation is to ensure the basic order and all the annexes,



Note: The information shown in bold is meant to highlight the personal involvement of the commander for this part of each step.

Figure 3-8. Orders Development.

appendixes, etc., are complete and in agreement. It identifies discrepancies or gaps in the planning that will require corrective action. Specifically, the staff compares the commander's intent, the mission, and the CCIRs against the concept of operations and the supporting concepts such as maneuver, fires, and support. Priority intelligence requirements and the intelligence collection plan must support the CCIRs.

Orders Crosswalk

Orders crosswalk is an external process in which the staff compares its order with the orders of higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure the superior commander's intent is met. Similarly, confirmation briefs and rehearsal of concept (ROC) drills can assist a commander in ensuring the subordinate units understand the order. For additional information regarding orders preparation, see MAGTF Staff Training Program Pamphlet 5-0.2, *Operational Planning Team Leader's Guide.*

Commander Approves Order or Plan

The final action in orders development is the approval of the order or plan by the commander. While the commander does not have to sign every annex or appendix, it is important that he reviews and signs the basic order or plan.

Development of the Operations Order and Civil-Military Operations

The G-9 is responsible for producing annex G. Civil-military operations products that were

created during the previous steps of the planning process, such as the CMO staff estimate, CMO COA graphic and narrative, and the CMO synchronization matrix, all support the orders development process. Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the OPORD should include the CMO concept of support, CMO tasks, and any CMO coordinating instructions. Further guidance for CMO is captured in the annex G. Other annexes that the G-9 may be responsible for are Annex V (Interagency Coordination) and Annex P (Host Nation Support). (See app. E for a sample annex G.)

Orders development considerations:

- Only units have mission statements. Staff sections should not create their own mission and intent. Annexes should refer the reader to the basic order when discussing the mission or the commander's intent.
- When writing plans or orders, words matter. Writers must remain consistent in their use of approved terminology, particularly tactical tasks. For example, there is a significant difference between defeat and destroy.
- Updated standard operating procedures (SOPs) are critical to producing a concise order. The SOPs need to be current, widely disseminated, and used if the order will reference the SOPs.
- The entire staff develops the order. Planners develop and refine functional concepts throughout the process (concept of CMO and concept of fires). The staff principals and their respective sections are responsible for completing the annexes.
- The staff should ensure all tasks are either in the basic order or no lower than an appendix. Tasks that appear in tabs, exhibits, or attachments often lose visibility by the subordinate units and may not be accounted for and accomplished.

Transition

The purpose of transition is to provide a successful shift from planning to execution. It enhances the situational understanding of those who will execute the order, maintains the intent of the concept of operations, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo.

Transition may involve a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals necessary to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution, subject to the variables of echelon of command, mission complexity, and, most importantly, time. At a minimum, the transition step includes a concept of operations brief along with the handover and explanation of any execution tools developed during planning such as a decision support matrix or execution checklist. If time and resources allow, the transition step may include ROC drills and confirmation briefs by subordinate units.

Transition is a continuous process that requires a free flow of information between commanders and staffs by all available means. At higher echelons where the planners may not be executors, the commander may designate a representative as a proponent for the order or plan. After orders development, the proponent takes the approved order or plan forward to the staff charged with supervising execution. As a full participant in the development of the plan, the proponent is able to answer questions, aid in the use of the planning support tools, and assist during execution in determining necessary adjustments to the order or plan.

Transition occurs at all levels of command. A formal transition normally occurs on staffs with separate planning and execution teams. Planning time and personnel may be limited at lower echelons of command, such as regiment and aircraft group or below; therefore, transition may take place intuitively because the planners are also the executors. For transition to occur, an approved order must exist. The approved order, along with the products of continuing staff actions, forms the input for transition. These inputs may include the following:

- Refined intelligence and IPB products.
- Planning support tools.
- Outline FRAGOs for branches.

- Information on possible future missions (sequels).
- Any outstanding issues.

Regardless of the level of command, a successful transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander's intent, the concept of operations, and MCPP tools. Transition, as depicted in figure 3-9, may be internal where as the transition occurs between future plans or future and current operations or external where the transition occurs between the commander and his subordinate commanders. Transition may come in the form of briefs or drills and relocating a planner to current operations for execution.

Transition Brief

At the higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition brief to subordinate or adjacent commanders and to the staff supervising execution of the order. At lower levels, it might be less formal. The transition brief provides an overview of the mission, commander's intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly situation. The commander, deputy commander, or chief of staff provides transition brief guidance, which may prescribe who will give the brief, the content of the brief, the sequence of the briefing, and who is required to attend. Time available may dictate the level of detail in the transition brief. Orders and supporting materials should be transmitted as early as possible before the transition brief. The brief may include items from the order or plan such as the following:

- HHQ mission (tasks and intent).
- Mission.
- Commander's intent.
- CCIRs.



Note: The information shown in bold is meant to highlight the personal involvement of the commander for this part of each step.

Figure 3-9. Transition.

- Task organization.
- Situation (friendly and enemy).
- Concept of operations.
- Execution (including branches and potential sequels).
- Planning support tools.

Transition Drills

A transition drill is a series of briefings, guided discussions, walk-throughs, or rehearsals used to facilitate understanding of the plan throughout all levels of the command. The commander and his subordinate commanders conduct transition drills along with the staff that is tasked with execution of the plan or order. Typically, a transition drill is the only drill used at lower levels of command, where the staff both develops and executes the plan. Transition drills are important techniques during transition that will ensure the greatest possible understanding of the order by those who must execute it. Transition drills improve the ability of the commander and staff to command and control operations. Transition drills also allow the commander to express his thoughts on design, thereby increasing the situational awareness of the subordinate commanders and the staff and instilling confidence and familiarity with the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, and rehearsals are examples of transition drills.

Transition drills, such as ROC drills, include a large-scale terrain map. The terrain map should be large enough for all participants to view the ROC drill, such as a gym floor or parking lot. During a ROC drill, staffs and commanders will literally walk through the concept of operations to ensure all participants have a clear understanding of the plan. While time and resource intensive, the ROC drill provides key visual reinforcement and allows for better retention of the information.

Confirmation Brief

Subordinate commanders conduct a confirmation brief with their higher commander to confirm their understanding of commander's intent, their specific task and purpose, and the relationship between their unit's mission and the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher commander to identify gaps in his plan, identify discrepancies between his and the subordinate commanders' plans, and learn how subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their mission.

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CHAPTER 4
COORDINATION

"We are in fact minimizing the loss of life and mitigating the incredible human suffering that we see across the region. [Operation Unified Assistance] has been a unique military operation from that perspective, in that we have been planning, assessing, deploying, and executing concurrently. It would be like . . . taking a family vacation and you were trying to pack the car and decide where you were going while you were driving down the road."

—LtGen Robert R. Blackman, USMC Commander, Combined Support Force 536 (www.defense.gov)

Civil-Military Operations Center

The MAGTF may establish a task-organized CMOC to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces with other USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, local governmental leaders, or civilian populations. Civilian agencies recognize that the MAGTF's resources and capabilities may greatly enhance their ability to respond to domestic shortfalls; however, in accordance with United States Code, Title 10, MAGTF resources must only be used as a last resort. Each MAGTF may have more than one CMOC. There is no established structure and no two CMOCs are identical. Its size and composition are situation dependent. This concept differs from that employed by US Army CA forces, which have CMOCs of various sizes and structures embedded in their tables of organization.

Since external organizations, such as NGOs/IGOs and the HN, cannot be compelled to use the CMOC, it must be seen as something that serves a useful purpose to them in order to encourage their participation. The CMOC must be easily accessible and may be placed beyond perimeter security. However, if the security situation dictates, the CMOC may be inside the perimeter.

The CMOC's location must be known throughout the MAGTF. With their specialized training and focus, CA personnel generally direct CMOC operations under the guidance of the MAGTF CMO officer. Depending on the situation, MAGTF subordinate elements may establish a local CMOC. Figure 4-1, on page 4-2, is an example of a CMOC layout.

The CMOC must be organized to promote information exchange between participating civilian or HN agencies and organizations, including those that otherwise will not have a mechanism for coordination and cooperation. They must be culturally sensitive, HN-language capable, and able to provide a secure environment for all. When possible, the CMOC can help identify civilian capabilities that can satisfy civilian requirements, entirely avoiding the use of MAGTF resources. Major CMOC functions include the following:

- Provide USG interagency partners, IGOs, and NGOs with a single, accessible POC for CMO.
- Facilitate collaborative civil-military efforts with joint and coalition forces and UN, HN, and other nonmilitary agencies.
- Assist in the transfer of authority and/or transition of operations from the MAGTF to DOS, UN, NATO, HN, or other nonmilitary agency control.



Legend
ePRT embedded provencial reconstruction team

Figure 4-1. Example of a Regimental Combat Team/Battalion Civil-Military Operations Center.

- Act as a clearinghouse for all civilian support requests, from the MAGTF and other US military forces. The CMO staff element attempts to meet civilian requirements with civilian capabilities via coordination at the CMOC before passing validated support request to the MAGTF. See figure 4-2.
- Provide agency points of contact (POCs), agency capability lists, daily information summaries, population density, demographic, and DC overlays, which might be posted on a public information board.

Interagency, Nongovernmental, and Intergovernmental Organizations

The MAGTF operations are likely to be conducted in an interagency environment. Other governmental agencies, such as IGOs and NGOs, will often be involved in a crisis before the arrival of the MAGTF. Interagency coordination forges a vital link between the military and the economic, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and informational entities of the USG, the HN, and NGOs. Effective communication and cooperation enables access to capabilities and resources not typically under MAGTF control. Synchronization of efforts leads to synergy with the application of each capability adding to the effectiveness of the others. See appendix F.

Across the full range of military operations, any MAGTF effort is likely to be an interagency operation conducted in support of US national interests referred to as a whole of government approach and could involve NGOs, IGOs, and HN partners. The relationship between military and civil authorities must be based on mutual trust and confidence. Strong and effective communication is often the difference between success and failure. The MAGTF may find itself in a situation where OGAs may be operating parallel to the MAGTF rather than subordinate to it. If this is the case, then the exchange of LNOs to the major civilian groups from the G-9 or other available staff would gain and maintain situational awareness and smooth communications.

The MAGTF may also perform the following:

- Identify all agencies and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation.
- Identify the resources of each participant to reduce duplication of effort and increase coherence in the collective effort.



Figure 4-2. Civilian Support Request Flow.

- Determine mutually supportable objectives for the operation.
- Define the desired end state and exit criteria.
- Define the types of information that can and cannot be exchanged.
- Establish agreed upon formats for data and develop means to share useful information.
- Plan for the transition of responsibilities to agencies with long-term duties and interests.
- Establish an interagency hierarchy when possible.
- Solicit from each agency, department, or organization a clear understanding of the role that each plays. Memoranda of agreement may be required to formalize agreements.
- Define COAs for both military operations and agency activities.
- Identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities.
- Maximize the mission's assets to support the long-term goals of the enterprise.
- Establish interagency assessment teams.

US Government Coordination and the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization

President George W. Bush signed National Security Presidential Directive 44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, on 7 December 2005. This mandated that the Secretary of State lead all USG efforts to plan for and conduct reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) efforts. This was preceded by the creation of the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in July 2004. Pursuant to its mandate, S/CRS published the *Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization* in March 2007 to provide the USG with an integrated, whole government approach to R&S efforts. The CMO and the missions they support are complex and may require the effective coordination of many USG agencies. Detailed coordination develops and maintains a common framework for planning and an understanding of common purpose. Many agencies have unique skills, resources, and experience. Cooperation and coordination based on respect and moral purpose can unify the effort. To

facilitate coordination, a clear chain of command among USG participants including the MAGTF should be defined. For a detailed description of interagency coordination, see appendix E.

The Interagency Management System for R&S provides coordinated, interagency policy and program management for highly complex crises and operations that—

- Are national security priorities.
- Involve widespread instability.
- May require military operations.
- Will engage multiple US agencies in the policy and programmatic response.

The Interagency Management System for R&S may also be used in engagements that do not require military participation. It is not intended to respond to the political and humanitarian crises that are regularly and effectively handled by existing government systems. It will assist chiefs of missions (COMs) at embassies, policy makers in Washington, DC, and military commanders with managing complex R&S efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

The Interagency Management System for R&S consists of the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), integration planning cell, and the ACTs, which may be augmented by FACTs if necessary.

The CRSG consists of a Washington-based interagency decision-making body, supported by a full-time interagency secretariat, that performs planning and operations functions and mobilizes resources. The DOS regional assistant secretary, S/CRS coordinator, and the National Security Council (NSC) director co-chair the CRSG.

The integration planning cell consists of interagency planners and regional experts that deploy to the relevant combatant command or to a multinational HQ. Its role is to assist in harmonizing ongoing planning and operations between military and civilian agencies and/or the USG and multinational HQ. Its members will be representative of all relevant USG agencies, to include DOD.

To supplement an existing USG presence or to establish a new presence, the CRSG may recommend, with the COM's concurrence, that the Secretary of State deploy an ACT. The ACT provides a skills-specific team with surge capacity that supports the ambassador in the development, execution, and monitoring of R&S plans for a specific contingency. It provides interagency field management, deployment, and logistical capabilities and may develop and implement activities through regional field teams as necessary. The ACT can operate with or without US military involvement, but in cases where the military is involved, it can integrate with the joint task force (JTF) and embassy operations. In all circumstances, the COM bears ultimate responsibility for the execution of the R&S plan.

A FACT, responsible to the COM through the ACT, coordinates USG efforts in an affected district. Similar in principle to PRTs in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, it will be comprised of civilians and the military, plus support staff, and may be integrated with military (US or non-US) units as directed by the COM and JTF commander. With the ability to work in uncertain or hostile environments, it may advise MAGTF personnel on political/civil factors in an AO. If acting as an "embassy forward," or temporarily fulfilling the functions of a US embassy, it may also assist American citizens, perform PA officer functions, perform negotiations and support local governance, and function as the ACT's assessment tool to determine when and how to implement USG R&S plans. Figure 4-3 is an example of how the Interagency Management System for R&S may work in a contingency operation.

US Government Interagency Partners

Many agencies and organizations in the USG are structured and equipped to apply resources to resolve crisis, including diplomatic, economic, and informational. Careful communication and coordination are required to ensure mutual support

between the MAGTF and these agencies. Examples of common partners are as follows:

- USAID.
- DOS – S/CRS.
- Department of Justice.
- USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in a humanitarian crisis.
- Department of Agriculture.

Whenever participation by other US Government agencies in an operation is expected, MAGTF planners may write annex V, as part of the operations order. Formats for annex V can be found in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.030C, *Joint Operations Planning and Execution Systems (JOPES), Vol. II (Planning Formats).*

Nongovernmental Organizations and Intergovernmental Organizations

The NGOs and IGOs are likely to be already working wherever the MAGTF operates. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs and IGOs are frequently on the scene long before US forces arrive. They are often willing to operate in high-risk areas and will likely remain after military forces have departed. Generally, these organizations are guided by three principles: humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. The NGOs and IGOs are flexible, focused, and involved in many diverse activities such as education, public health, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. They often refer to their efforts in a crisis as a response. The military refers to them as an operation. The MAGTF may not be able to share information, especially about future plans or operations. However, cooperation that identifies common objectives and establishes a clear understanding of what information can and cannot be shared is beneficial to all parties.

These relief organizations may have substantial resources and can respond quickly and effectively to crises. They can assist in limiting the resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Their extensive and long-term involvement, local contacts, and experience in various nations also make these organizations



Figure 4-3. Notional Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization in a Contingency Operation.

valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward the operation. The large number of lives they affect and the resources they provide make them key centers for communication and coordination. The relief organizations must be factored into the CMO assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the MAGTF concept of operations.

The NGOs are voluntary organizations that write their own charter and missions and are legally different from governmental and international agencies. Private donors, IGOs, and governments fund them. While not answerable to profit-making institutions, they are accountable to their various donors for their resources. The NGOs vary from long-standing organizations with substantial staffs and budgets, to charities operated by local community organizations or individuals. Properly conducted, the relationship between military forces and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting, but rather an associate or partnership relationship.

Inherent differences between the cultures and organization of military forces and NGOs present challenges to successful cooperation. To protect their freedom to operate, NGOs are likely to be hesitant to identify too closely with the MAGTF. Collaboration or perceived collaboration with military forces may endanger both the missions of NGOs and the lives of their field staff, especially when a particular response or operation has strong political or military implications. These organizations often operate without detailed planning, a by-product of their small staffs; however, they can also reorient their efforts and assets with great agility.

Common examples of NGOs are as follows:

- International Medical Corps.
- CARE (an organization that provides humanitarian assistance to fight poverty).
- Amnesty International.
- Doctors Without Borders.

The IGOs generally refer to international governmental organizations or organizations with a universal membership of sovereign states; the most notable IGO is the UN. They are subject to international law and are capable of entering into agreements amongst themselves or with other member states. When there is a UN presence in a country affected by a humanitarian disaster, the United Nation Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) will facilitate civilian-military coordination before, during, and after the crisis. While IGOs conduct operations very much like NGOs, their support may be detailed to a designated civilian agency. Common agencies found in areas where the MAGTF may operate include the following:

- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
- UN Children's Fund.
- World Food Programme.
- World Health Organization.
- UN Development Programme.
- World Bank.
- International Committee of the Red Cross.
- International Monetary Fund.
- International Organization for Migration.

Facilitation of Effort

The MAGTF CMO is more effective when facilitating the efforts of other organizations, such as a requirement to feed a group of DCs. It is not likely that the MAGTF will directly feed the people themselves, but they would facilitate logistical support for other agencies to ensure that the food arrives at the appropriate place. The MAGTF may also provide security for the food convoy or for other nearby organizations in a destabilized environment. By coordinating their activities, and by providing enabling capabilities such as security, communications, and air or seaport access, the MAGTF and other USG agencies accomplish the mission without unnecessary use of military resources. By developing and

advertising simple procedures and POCs, the MAGTF enables other agencies, many with substantial resources, to meet requirements with minimum use of MAGTF resources. Whenever possible, CMO seek synergy—the combination of efforts and resources, which has a combined effect greater than those same resources if left to work in isolation.

Information Component

At the ground level, the actions between the MAGTF and civilian organizations put deeds into words, providing positive, tangible examples of US intentions. Conversely, an adversary can portray MAGTF interactions with civilians in a negative light. The information component of CMO must not merely be anticipated, it must be aggressively exploited. It will help win public support, solidify coalitions, support diplomacy, and isolate the enemy. Popular support contributes to the success of CMO. The importance of coordinating CMO with PA and IO cannot be overstressed. Information released through any one of these channels potentially affects all audiences; therefore, good CIM practices are essential.

Civil Support Operations

Military operations inside the United States and its territories are limited by United States Code, Title 18, *Crimes and Criminal Procedure*, and military regulations. However, military assistance may be requested when situations require resources beyond civil capabilities. Guidance and direction for the command and control of these operations vary depending on the mission and support to be provided, but generally follow a similar pattern. The Federal Response Plan outlines how federal agencies, including the DOD, assist state and local agencies that request assistance when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively. Additional DOD directives, memoranda of understanding, and agreements provide details for military response for particular missions such as DOD Directive 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*; Marine Corps Order 3440.7A, *Marine Corps Support to Civil Authorities*; and JP 3-28.

Depending on the type of emergency, a civil command and control focal point for federal response will be established. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has primary responsibility for coordinating federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster assistance functions. Acting for the President, FEMA will appoint a federal coordinating officer who is responsible for coordinating federal disaster assistance to states and territories. Plans for other emergencies designate a distinct lead federal agency, (for example, the attorney general is responsible for the management of the federal response to civil disturbance). Once a federal manager is selected, he may request military resources from the DOD.

The Secretary of Defense retains approval authority for military involvement in civil support operations. Typically, a military official will be specifically designated as the defense coordinating officer to orchestrate DOD support on scene. Upon assignment, military forces will usually be formed into a JTF. This JTF is typically placed in support of the federal coordinating officer or the lead federal agency.

MAGTF Coordination in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

The time available to plan for a real-time emergency is short, particularly in the case of disasters requiring an FHA response from a MEU. In a matter of days, the supported geographic combatant commander, joint force commanders, and MEU planners must develop and approve a feasible COA that ensures sufficient support, sustainment, and redeployment of US military forces responding to a disaster.

Relief planners in the affected HN and various humanitarian agencies that work within that country will immediately conduct a needs

assessment. Outstanding needs and requirements that cannot be met internally are then converted to appeals to the international community. The US military may then receive a request for assistance to provide immediate lifesaving supplies, transportation, or security.

Lessons Learned

Lessons learned during previous FHA operations can provide valuable insight for commanders and staffs preparing for a similar operation. The following factors include some of the key lessons from FHA operations and highlight areas that FHA forces have found to be extremely important:

- Is the mission stated in terms of working towards restoration to pre-emergency status?
- Is mission success stated in terms not strictly defined by US or western standards?
- Is the situation at end state sustainable by the affected country and organizations remaining in the operational area?
- What is the legal authority for the operation?
- Do plans include SJA personnel and assets?
- What is the legal and fiscal authority to conduct civil action projects?
- Is there a status-of-forces agreement in effect? If not, should a status-of-forces agreement or some other type of international agreement be negotiated or implemented?
- What coordination and collaboration is required with the supported combatant commander, supporting combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commands, COM and country team, multinational partners, NGOs, IGOs, and OGAs?
- What are the command, coordination, and collaboration relationships?
- Have civilian agencies involved in the operation been encouraged to contribute their valuable expertise and assistance?
- Have US forces recognized these agencies for their efforts in this regard?
- What restrictions exist regarding the sharing of information (sensitive or otherwise) with other agencies and organizations?
- What are the liaison requirements?
- Are LNOs positioned in both higher and subordinate HQs as well as OGAs, medical facilities, NGOs, and IGOs, as required?
- Is seaport and aerial port infrastructure, to include road and rail access to the ports, in place before forces begin to arrive?
- Has United States Transportation Command been consulted as to transportation feasibility? Has the use of ports been deconflicted with HN, NGOs, and IGOs?
- Are interpreters available for the JTF, geographic combatant commander, and other US agencies?
- Is adequate communications equipment available for essential basic services?
- Is additional equipment or connectivity reconfiguration needed to provide direct communications routing to principal destinations?
- What is the communications plan for communicating with NGOs, IGOs, and multinational forces? Do these entities require equipment augmentation?
- Are briefing formats appropriate for use in CMO? Do they emphasize conditions, activities, and population support requirements? Are other participants in the FHA effort (interagency, NGOs, and IGOs) included in the briefings?
- What are the information gathering and dissemination requirements? Has MISO been brought into the planning process?
- During the planning process, has the joint force surgeon identified the CCIR, PIRs, and named areas of interest pertaining to the health threat in the operational area and submitted requirements to the supporting intelligence element?
- Have supplemental measures to the standing rules of engagement (ROE) been identified, approved, and published prior to deployment?
- Do multinational forces understand the ROE? Are they using the same or compatible ROE?

- Are planned actions within the budgetary limitations of the operation?
- Has a finance officer been identified and deployed early in the operation?
- Have Service-contracting teams been identified and deployed early in the operation?
- What logistic requirements are needed to support the operation, and what mechanism is in place to continually monitor logistic resources to ensure that urgent needs are met?
- Has a PA officer and necessary staff been identified and deployed early in the operation?
- Has PA guidance been developed and passed to all members of the joint force?
- Has a joint information bureau been established to support the media?
- What means are available to provide information to the affected population about FHA operations?

The Operational Environment

Before responding to a request for FHA, MAGTF planners, working closely with their CMO planner, must understand their operational environment. Important elements of the operational environment to consider when executing an FHA mission include the type of disaster involved, underlying causes, the security environment, and the system of international relief already at work in the affected nation. There are three categories of disasters: slow onset, rapid onset, and complex onset.

- *Slow onset*. These emergencies are characterized by the gradual decay of order over relatively long periods of time. They might be caused by events such as crop failure due to drought, the spread of agricultural diseases, or a deteriorating political situation that leads to conflict.
- *Rapid onset*. These emergencies are the usually the result from a sudden natural event such as a windstorm, hurricane, typhoon, flood, tsunami, wild fires, landslides, avalanches, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. They may also be caused by accidental or human-caused catastrophes such as civil conflict, acts of terrorism, sabotage, or industrial accidents.
- *Complex onset*. The UN defines a complex emergency as a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program.

The USAID defines a complex emergency as a natural or manmade disaster with economic, social, and political dimensions. It is a profound social crisis in which a large number of people die and suffer from war, disease, hunger, and displacement owing to manmade or natural disasters, while others may benefit from it. Four factors can be measured: the fatalities from violence, the mortality of children less than 5 years of age, the percentage of underweight children under 5, and the number of external refugees and internally displaced persons. Common characteristics include the following:

- Many civilian casualties and populations besieged or displaced.
- Serious political- or conflict-related impediments to delivery of assistance.
- Inability of people to pursue normal social, political, or economic activities.
- High security risks for relief workers.
- International and cross-border operations affected by political differences.

Operational environment can be characterized by the degree of control HN entities have to support and assist in the operation. Forces conducting FHA will find one of the following environments: permissive, uncertain, or hostile. Regardless of the operational environment, force protection will remain the MAGTF's paramount concern.

- *Permissive*. The HN military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the

intent and capability to assist FHA operations. This is most likely to be found in more developed countries following rapid onset disasters.

- *Uncertain*. The HN government, whether opposed or receptive to FHA operations, does not have very effective control of the territory and population in the intended AO. This is most likely to be found in less developed countries that have lost government control of an area following a disaster or in areas that traditionally harbor insurgents or terrorist elements that may oppose US presence regardless of the humanitarian mission.
- *Hostile*. Hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the FHA operations a unit intends to conduct with violence or banditry. This environment is mostly likely to be found during complex disasters or following a complete breakdown of infrastructure, which can severely impair the mission.

The Relief System

An assessment of the situation should include a description of the relief organizations such as NGOs, IGOs, indigenous populations and institutions, foreign governments and military forces, UN agencies, or any other pertinent element involved in the FHA effort. Descriptions should include the relationships among the various agencies and their effectiveness. United States Agency for International Development will be critical in identifying key players in multiple organizations. The range of civilian actors in a response is mostly determined by the permissiveness of the environment. For example, the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies typically work in permissive environments; e.g., a natural disaster, while the International Committee of the Red Cross works in uncertain or hostile environments. Sources of information on the relief situation and organizations are as follows:

- US country team assessments.
- Combatant commander country books.
- Recent situation reports (SITREPS) from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).
- UN secretariat assessments.

The Military Role

The USG participated in the development of the UN-sponsored Oslo Guidelines, which is a basic framework for formalizing and improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in international DR operations. While the USG endorses their use, the Oslo Guidelines are not binding, but do outline the process for making military or civil-military requests through UNOCHA. Partners such as NATO may be requested to assist in DR in accordance with the Oslo Guidelines as well.

The Oslo Guidelines provide that foreign military assets should be requested only as a last resort—when the use of military assets can meet a critical humanitarian need. The military asset, therefore, must be unique in capability and availability and be used to fill a specific humanitarian need as requested by the HN. The military can deliver three categories of assistance:

- *Direct assistance*. The face-to-face distribution of goods and services.
- *Indirect assistance*. At least one-step removed from the population; involves such activities as transporting relief goods or personnel.
- *Infrastructure support*. Providing general services such as road repair, airspace management, and power generation that facilitates relief, but may not be necessarily visible to or solely for the affected population.

To accomplish whatever type of assistance the MAGTF may give, the commander must develop an FHA mission statement. As with any other mission statement, it must provide specific direction for achieving the desired end state via a clear and sustainable objective. The following sample mission statement was used by United States Pacific Command, Operation Unified Assistance (2004–2005).

"United States Pacific Command provides assistance to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and other affected nations to mitigate the effects of the recent earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean. Conduct of operation is in support of the USG lead agency, and in coordination with international organizations, NGOs, and partner nations."

There are a variety of responding organizations that require careful and continuous liaison in order to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure that MAGTF can quickly transition its support activities to civilian agencies.

The Humanitarian Community

By nature, responses to humanitarian emergencies are difficult to manage, with coordination of NGOS, IGOs, and other actors creating a daunting challenge. The UN is the primary provider and coordinator of HA around the world. By following the principles of HA (neutrality, impartiality, and humanity), the UN seeks to advocate on behalf of disaster-struck people to the assistance community worldwide, and its major response agencies and a brief description of their capabilities follow.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

The mission of UNOCHA is to mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies, advocate for the rights of people in need, promote preparedness and prevention, and facilitate sustainable solutions. Its civil military coordination section ensures the effective use of military and civil defense assets in DR and HA operations.

United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team

As part of UNOCHA, this standby team of disaster management professionals deploys rapidly to carry out an assessment of a disaster-stricken country to support national authorities and the UN resident coordinator and to coordinate international relief on-site. Frequently, the UN disaster assessment and coordination will establish an on-site operations coordination center that provides a platform for coordination among the disaster response parties. A virtual on-site operations coordination center, maintained in Geneva, but available through the Internet, monitors HA efforts worldwide.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

The UNHCR is mandated to lead and coordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide.

World Food Programme

The primary task of the World Food Programme is to furnish food in support of economic and social development projects in developing countries, but it also provides substantial resources in emergencies on behalf of donor governments, UNOCHA, or the affected countries. Because of its substantial resources, it can be regarded as the de facto logistic arm of the UN in disaster situations.

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement

The movement is made up of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the 185 individual national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.

The mission of The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement is to—

- Prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found.
- Protect life and health and ensure respect for the human being in times of armed conflict and other emergencies.

- Work for the prevention of disease and for the promotion of health and social welfare.
- Encourage voluntary service and a constant readiness to give help by the members of the movement.
- Provide a universal sense of solidarity toward all those in need of its protection and assistance.

In addition to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality, the movement adds independence (critical for its access to enemy prisoners of war), voluntary service, unity, and universality. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Cresent Societies has its own emergency response teams that assess and coordinate international appeals to aid the affected population in a disaster.

The International Committee of the Red Cross has the exclusively humanitarian mission of protecting the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence, specifically by visits to prisoners of war, search for missing persons, transmission of messages between family members, provision of basic health services, and meeting other urgent humanitarian needs.

The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

During wartime, national societies assist the affected civilian population and support military medical services where appropriate. The National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies acts as an auxiliary to the public authorities in their own countries, offering services such as DR, health, and social programs. The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent serves as a spokesman for the individual national societies, provides them capacity-building mechanisms, and coordinates humanitarian aid globally in permissive environments.

The International Organization for Migration

In FHA scenarios, the International Organization for Migration assists in the search for practical solutions to migration problems and provides HA to migrants in need, to include refugees, displaced persons, or other uprooted people. The International Organization for Migration is the principle IGO in the field of migration.

The American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction)

The American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction) is the largest coalition of US-based international NGOs focused on the world's poorest and most vulnerable populations. It exercises leadership in conflict prevention, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and peace building initiatives in post-conflict situations. Additionally, through its more than 165 members posted in every developing nation, The American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction) responds to natural disasters worldwide.

United States Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

The USAID's OFDA is the USG's lead federal agency for international HA and DR. Its mission is to save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the economic and social impact of disasters. With approximately 250 personnel worldwide, they respond to an average of 70 disasters per year using a variety of methods. If the situation warrants, they will deploy a disaster assistance response team that will coordinate the assistance mission for OFDA. These teams often contain technical experts in water and sanitation, health, shelter, structural engineering, and protection and work through grants with partners such as the UN, IGOs, and NGOs. Since they will already be on the ground when the MAGTF arrives, a rapid link-up and exchange of LNOs will enhance cooperation and coordination in any FHA mission where both the MAGTF and OFDA are operating.

Sphere Project

When planning any sort of humanitarian assistance or disasater relief operation, one area that has proved a challenge is where to obtain accurate data for determining logistical requirements to feed, house, clothe, and care for thousands of victims for short or sustained periods. For example, where do you turn when you need information regarding the amount of water you need, bulk food, or tentage to house thousands of people? One of the best and most preferred sources for this information is the handbook produced by the Sphere Project. The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 to develop a set of minimum standards in core areas of humanitarian assistance. The aim of the project is to improve the quality of assistance provided to people affected by disasters and to enhance the accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster response. The objective of the Sphere Project was to develop a humanitarian charter and associated set of minimum standards in collaboration with leading NGOs, interested donor governments, and UN agencies to both disseminate the resultant products widely within the international humanitarian system and to encourage their formal adoption and practice by relief agencies and their donors.

One of the major results of the project has been the publication of the handbook, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*. This handbook is designed for use in disaster response. While not a policy document, it is applicable in a range of situations where relief is required, including natural disasters as well as armed conflict. The handbook is designed for use in both slow- and rapid-onset situations, in both rural and urban environments, and in developing and developed countries anywhere in the world. The handbook emphasizes meeting the urgent survival needs of people affected by disaster, while asserting their basic human right to life with dignity. The information contained in the handbook is not prescriptive. Minimum standards and key indicators have been developed using broad networks of practitioners in each of the sectors. Most of the standards, and the indicators that accompany them, are not new, but consolidate and adapt existing knowledge and practice. Another source of information is the *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessments and Response*, more commonly known as the FOG handbook, produced by USAID. While not as inclusive as the Sphere handbook, the USAID handbook follows the standards as laid down by the Sphere Project and is more user friendly.

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APPENDIX A
COMBAT STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE

The following is a generic, combat SOP for a MEF-sized MAGTF with a G-9 CMO staff operating within the framework of a combined joint task force (CJTF) conducting stability operations in a friendly country recovering from the aftereffects of a protracted insurgency.

Functions

The MEF G-9, when established, directs and coordinates CMO within the MAGTF as well as with the CJTF and adjacent units. The MEF G-9 includes an executive section, a fiscal or budget section, an administrative section, a liaison section that may include interagency representation, a support section, an operations or plans section and an engagement section as depicted in figure A-1. The staff works, in support of the FACT, to develop and assess local HN civil capacity. Three major components of this capacity are local and provincial level government agencies and actors, the private sector, and civil society organizations. The MEF G-9 works across all six logical LOOs: governance, economic development, rule of law, infrastructure, public health and welfare, and public education and information.

G-9 Section Duties and Responsibilities

G-9 Executive Section

- Provides CMO subject matter expertise and advice to the CG in support of MEF operations.
- Ensures that CMO support of the MEF operation or campaign plan is linked to MEF logical LOOs and achieves the commander's desired end states.
- Develops and recommends for approval the CMO priority of support and effort. Once approved by the CG, ensures that MEF CMO is executed in the appropriate priority.
- Directs CMO programs to achieve maximum effectiveness given limited manpower, money, and time and prevents duplication of effort with HN-led initiatives.



Figure A-1. Example Marine Expeditionary Force G-9 Staff.

- Serves as the deputy for the MEF resource allocation and assessment board, which is chaired by the deputy commanding general (DCG).
- Coordinates actions of the various CMO LNOs.
- Plans, coordinates, and conducts MAGTF stability operations in its AO.
- Develops and communicates an understanding of the scope and scale of the CMO challenge within the MEF AO.
- Identifies and obtains the resources (SMEs, equipment, funding, and ideas) required to conduct effective CMO.
- Integrates CMO with the actions of the other elements of the MAGTF staff and ensures CMO is fully synchronized with other lethal and nonlethal MAGTF operations.
- Orchestrates CMO programs across the six LOOs.
- Trains, educates, equips, and deploys a functional staff section capable of planning and executing full spectrum CMO.

G-9 Operations/Plans Section

- Coordinates MAGTF stability operations with HN officials at the provincial and national level, DOS FACT, CJTF, the US embassy, and NGO/IGO.
- Coordinates the G-9 staff section's interaction with other MEF primary and special staff.
- Coordinates staff actions and support with the CMO LNOs.
- Ensures orders from HHQ and this command are properly drafted, staffed, promulgated and executed. Coordinates responses to requests for information from HHQ and requests for support from MSCs.
- Ensures air and ground transportation requirements are sourced and executed in accordance with CMO requirements.
- Ensures daily CMO SITREPs and staff summaries and monthly command chronologies are submitted.
- Plans and coordinates routine and special CMO training as required.
- Plans and integrates MEF support for and participation in DOS FACT programs and initiatives.
- Coordinates and facilitates CMO planning conferences to include identifying conference objectives, logistics, and budget and administrative support.
- Represents MEF interests and capabilities to FACTs, USAID, and US embassy.
- Provides a CMO SME as a member of the targeting board, G-3 future operations OPTs, and other planning teams and working groups.
- Provides a central POC for reconciliation and engagement with HHQ, coordinating responses to requests for information, draft FRAGOs, and compliance with directives from the CJTF.

G-9 Support Section

- Ensures distribution of computer assets within the G-9.
- Coordinates with the MEF G-6 regarding all changes in requirements and/or computer, printer, or video teleconferencing maintenance.
- Coordinates data equipment support, migration, and maintenance issues for all G-9 computer users. This includes NIPR [Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router], SIPR [SECRET Internet Protocol Router], DSN [Defense Switched Network], sVOIP [secure voice over internet protocol] lines, and video teleconferencing capabilities.
- Publishes defense message system messages for country clearance requests required by traveling G-9 personnel.
- Processes all travel vouchers (DD [Department of Defense] Form 1351-2, *Travel Voucher or Subvoucher*) for Marines returning from temporary additional duty.
- Coordinates all conference scheduling and special events and meetings requiring video teleconferencing support.

- Provides all general administrative requirements; including the tracking of awards, letters, order writing for temporary additional duty trips, and other correspondence required of G-9 personnel.
- Coordinates with MEF contracting office for all open purchase supply needs utilizing the warfighter open purchase request router system. Ensure that all supply requests are processed and delivered through the MAGTF distribution center.
- Arranges payment for all nontactical vehicles and armored nontactical vehicles contracts existing within the G-9 scope of responsibility.
- Maintains, tracks, and supervises all operation and support section equipment to include the G-9 consolidated memorandum receipts and theater provided equipment accounts.
- Manages all bilingual, bicultural advisors/SMEs through the contracting company and ensures payments are made for those assigned to the MEF G-9.
- Coordinates transportation for all flights and ground transportation for those assigned to or in support of personnel within the MEF G-9.
- Coordinates the logistic and administrative requirements for entry aboard the military installation of HN civilians, HN government officials, and HN military personnel based on the requirements of the G-9. This includes meetings and engagements in support of the mission of the personnel assigned to the G-9.
- Coordinates logistical support for engagements aboard military installations to include conferences, meetings, and engagements.
- Ensures coordination is maintained for life support needs aboard the base for billeting and workspace requirements and maintenance.

G-9 Engagement Section

- Advises the MEF CG and DCG on matters concerning HN government and tribal relations.
- Manages the MEF key leader engagement plan for interactions with governmental, religious, tribal, and other provincial notables.
- Provides SMEs on tribal affairs.
- Tracks status of legislation emanating from the HN council of representatives and provincial council.
- Provides lead elections planner for military support to HN provincial elections.
- Assists and advises in the development of provincial economic/health/education/rule of law/infrastructure plans by providing input on governance-related considerations.
- Conducts regular engagements with identified notables in support of MEF operations and in furtherance of the CG's engagement priorities.

G-9 Budget Section

- Conducts weekly resource allocation and working group meeting to determine if projects are eligible for CERP funding.
- Conducts weekly resource allocation and assessment board to present CERP recommended projects to the DCG for decision.
- Promulgates MEF CERP guidance based on congressional, combatant command, and CJTF published guidance.
- Coordinates daily with RCTs to provide CERP guidance for developing RCT/unit weekly project submissions.
- Drafts CERP waiver letters to CJTF for all projects greater than $500,000.
- Provides updated CERP slides for the monthly trends brief by the third of the following month.
- Provides updated CERP slides for the weekly DCG/embassy/HN funding brief by close of business each Saturday.
- Provides updated CERP slide for the weekly operations/intelligence brief.
- Provides updated CERP slides for the HN reconstruction management system/program review board on the first Saturday of each month.
- Provides updated CERP slides for the G-9 CMO command brief as required.
- Completes CERP quarterly report by the first day of the following quarter, based on FY.

- Completes CERP monthly report by the fifteenth of the following month.
- Completes CERP quarterly report by 15 April, 15 July, 15 October, and 15 January.

G-9 Liaison Section

LNO to CJTF CJ-9:

- Ensures CJTF commander's mission sets and operational priorities are clearly known and understood by the MEF G-9 CMO staff.
- Ensures MEF G-9 planning considerations are incorporated in the CJTF CJ-9 (CMO) plans and orders.
- Coordinates with CJTF CJ-9 and US embassy for the rotation and sustainment of DOS FACTs in the MEF AO.
- Coordinates with CJTF CJ-9 and task force business stability operations assessment visits and monitors progress of state-owned enterprise redevelopment in the MEF AO.
- Prepares and briefs CJTF CJ-9 staff daily on MEF economic and governance assessments progress.
- Maintains continuous engagement with CJTF CJ-9 and CJTF strategic effects board in regard to status of CMO activities in the MEF AO.
- Coordinates with UN assistance mission to facilitate UNHCR visits to refugee camps in the MEF AO and monitors UNHCR plans for relocation of refugees.
- Facilitates and assists US embassy planning for the resettlement of refugees.
- Participates in infrastructure security working group, internally displaced persons working group, reconciliation and engagement cell, energy fusion cell, and elections working group.
- Facilitates HN transportation network initiatives and participated in transportation network OPT.
- Engages HN transition assistance office in regards to electricity, oil, and rail. Enhances working relationship with USG agencies and interagency.
- Reviews and comments on CJTF CJ-9 draft plans and FRAGOs.
- Coordinates with the CJTF combined future operations staff section (C-35) nonlethal targeting working group and the CJTF action group on development of HN key leader engagements.

LNO to the HN governor:

- Maintains close and continuous liaison with CJTF, the MEF's operational HQ; a US Army brigade combat team (BCT) (tactical control [TACON] to the MEF); DOS officials; and HN governmental officials at the district, provincial, and central government levels.
- Provides mentorship and advice to HN provincial governor.
- Coordinates appointments with HN government officials, local leaders, and dignitaries.
- Is responsible for and coordinates congressional delegations who wish to visit the provincial governor.
- Provides information to the MAGTF CG and DCG on provincial affairs from the governor.
- Is responsible for the personal security for the provincial governor.

LNO to the US Embassy:

- Coordinates and attends meetings between MAGTF personnel and embassy, CJTF, and HN officials and is the primary POC for all MAGTF personnel visiting the HN capital city.
- Develops working relationships with the following:
  - US embassy sections.
  - Political.
  - Military.
  - Economics.
  - Rule of law coordinator.
  - US Department of Justice attaché.
  - US Department of Treasury attaché.
  - US Department of Agriculture attaché.
  - Office of legislative affairs.
  - CJTF CJ-3 operations.

  - CJTF CJ-5 plans and assessments.
  - CJTF CJ-9 strategic effects.
  - CJTF SJA.
  - HN deputy prime minister.
  - HN national security advisor.
  - HN minister of planning.
  - HN minister of finance.
  - HN minister of industry and minerals.
  - HN minister for women's affairs.
- Arranges logistic support for MAGTF key leader engagement, to include the following:
  - Hotel, transportation, engagement sites, airport assistance, and visas.
  - Processing of country clearances (7 days requested).
- Coordinates border issues for MAGTF with US embassy:
  - Retrograde of MAGTF equipment to port of entry.
  - Inbound MAGTF fuel, and food supplies.
- Facilitates information flow:
  - Between the MAGTF contracting office and HN businessmen in order to understand process and maintain transparency by the coalition forces.
  - Among the DCG, FACT economics and governance sections, G-9 engagement section, and HN expatriate businessmen.
- Participates in development of economic forums such as—
  - International, national, and regional outreach conferences.
  - Business education and professional development seminars.
- Conducts liaison with former HN military officers to facilitate reconciliation and engage with force strategic engagement cell to arrange meetings and provide translation support as needed.
- Conducts liaison with local tribal key leaders to ensure tribal relationship with the MEF is maintained.
- Coordinates US embassy support to bilateral and multilateral exercises as well as distinguished guest visits.
- Drafts weekly SITREPs for both MEF DCG and CMO economics section.
- Briefs US ambassador on MAGTF activities as required.
- Interacts with security personnel in Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Force Protection and Intelligence Section based on need for security or sharing of information.
- Develops and maintains database of all business contacts.

FACT augmentation section

FACT operations/plans:

- Lead planning teams and working groups with FACT members to develop work plans.
- Lead joint and interagency planning teams to revise the joint common plan.
- Integrate FACT section operations.
- Integration FACT operations with MEF, CJTF, and other agencies as required.
- Support the quarterly development of the HN economic development maturity model.
- Coordinate the FACT knowledge management process with that of the G-9.
- Coordinate movement support for the FACT members.
- Coordinate logistic support for the FACT members.

Staff judge advocate:

- Develop rule of law work plans and assessments.
- Conduct engagements with and mentorship for members of the provincial judiciary.
- Coordinate the activities of RCT and FACT rule of law team members.

Public education advisor:

- Develop public education work plans and assessments.
- Conduct engagements with and mentorship for provincial educators and ministry of education leaders.
- Coordinate the activities of RCT and FACT education team members.

- Advise the CG and MEF staff on all issues related to the local education system to include primary, secondary, and university education and adult literacy and vocational technical training.
- Research education projects for possible Quick Reaction Funds proposals, write project proposals and present to the Quick Reaction Funds Board for approval. Implement project based on the outcome of the Quick Reaction Funds Board.
- Interacts with, as the primary engager, the HN provincial council education committee.
- Identify CA education issues and implement CA concepts in a tactical environment.
- Provide a central POC for HHQ concerning educational issues, formal requests for information, FRAGOs, and compliance with directives from CJTF.

Medical planner:

- Develop public health work plans and assessments.
- Conduct engagements with and mentorship for provincial health directorate leaders.
- Coordinate activities of RCT and FACT public health team members.

Public information officer:

- Develop public information work plans and assessments.
- Assist other FACT sections in development of public information plans.
- Coordinate activities of RCT and FACT public information team members.

Agriculture advisor:

- Develop agriculture work plans and assessments.
- Conduct engagements with and mentorship for provincial agriculture leaders.
- Coordinate activities of RCT and FACT agriculture team members.

Daily/Weekly/Monthly Reporting Requirements

Daily CMO reports due to G-9 not later than 1800Z. Weekly CMO reports due each Sunday not later than 2200Z. Monthly CMO reports are due two days before the end the month not later than 2200Z. For more information, see appendix D.

APPENDIX B
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

The MOE focus on end state attainment by demonstrating the impact that completed actions have had in shaping the desired adversary behaviors. The MOP focuses on task accomplishment and confirms or denies that actions have been conducted correctly. The following are questions that are answered by MOE:

- Was the right thing done?
- Are additional or alternate actions required?

There are differences between accomplishing a task and creating an effect that is important. Measures of effectiveness measure changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that are tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect, and whether they are conforming to the commander's intent. Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness are used collectively to provide an evaluation, identifying trends that can affect future operations. When CR is used, through the CIM process, it assists the CMO planner conduct evaluations that form the basis for a continuing review of the operation, campaign plan, existing orders, and supporting activities. The CMO planner will be able to determine if operations should continue as planned or be adapted to achieve the commander's specified effects. Just as full integration of all actions is essential to building an effective plan, integration of these actions in the evaluation step is essential to evaluate how programs are progressing toward their objectives.

The primary purpose of evaluation is to identify progress of operations toward the achieving objectives at any point in time, which provides the basis for plan adjustment. Through the effective use of CR and CIM processes, MOPs and MOEs are used to develop combat assessments. Together, MOPs and MOEs support an overall assessment of objective achievement.

An MOE spreadsheet shown in figure B-1 provides criteria to measure a program or initiative's success that directly supports the commander's objective. Identified in a quantifiable format, the

MOE Spreadsheet			
Objective 1: Gain public support for US/coalition military forces and interim Iraqi government			
Effect A: General populace supports US/coalition efforts.			
Measures	**Oct**	**Nov**	**Dec**
Number of offensive gestures directed at US/coalition patrols by Iraqi civilians.	**10**	**12**	**9**
Number of instances involving anti-US/coalition graffiti.	**9**	**11**	**8**
Number of anti-US/coalition demonstrations.	**12**	**11**	**5**
Number of pure Iraq events US/coalition representatives are invited to attend.	**4**	**3**	**5**
Effect B: Civil leadership at district and local levels supports US/coalition efforts.			
Measures	**Oct**	**Nov**	**Dec**
Number of civil or religious leaders actively supporting US/coalition initiatives.	**20**	**20**	**25**
Number of civil or religious activities US/coalition representatives are invited to attend.	**8**	**10**	**12**

Legend

- **Baseline**
- **Positive**
- **Neutral**
- **Negative**

Figure B-1. Example of a Measure of Effectiveness Spreadsheet.

collection of MOE provides trends to determine positive progress toward a stated objective or desired effect. The MOE spreadsheet allows the force to track, by operational area and key terrain, where indicators are occurring to show whether the unit is having success or failure with a particular effect.

NOTE: In operations that involve many nonmilitary factors, the US Army uses the term "lines of effort," that it has found to be a tool, similar to LOOs, which allows the planner to link tasks, effects, conditions, and the desired end state.

The process of determining CMO MOE begins when CMO planners develop the civil-military LOOs or lines of effort. These LOOs roughly correspond with the five technical sectors of the DOS's S/CRS, which includes security, governance and participation, HA and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. The CMO planner then determines CMO MOE to evaluate the effectiveness of those outcomes:

- *Appropriate*. Measures of effectiveness should correlate to the audience objectives. If the objective is to present information to those outside the command, MOE should be general and few in number. If the objective is to assist on-scene commanders, then the MOE should be more specific and detailed.
- *Mission-related*. Measures of effectiveness must correlate to the mission. If the mission is relief, MOEs should help the commander evaluate improvements in living standards, mortality rates, and other related areas. If the mission expands, so should the MOE. Planners should tailor the MOE to address strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
- *Measurable*. Quantitative MOEs reflect reality more accurately than qualitative or subjective MOEs, and, hence, are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use. When using a qualitative or subjective MOE, clear measurement criteria should be established and disseminated to prevent mismeasurement or misinterpretation.
- *Numerically reasonable*. Measures of effectiveness should be limited to the minimum required to effectively portray the relief environment. Planners should avoid establishing excessive MOEs because they can become unmanageable or collection efforts outweigh the value.
- *Sensitive*. Measures of effectiveness should be sensitive to force performance and accurately reflect changes related to joint force actions. Extraneous factors should not greatly affect an established MOE.
- *Useful*. Measures of effectiveness should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to immediately and effectively respond.

For additional information, see *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)*.

APPENDIX C
DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK QUICK REFERENCE

The district stability framework (DSF) is a field-level analysis, planning, and programming tool specifically created to guide and support stabilization efforts. The DSF helps users to identify local sources of instability (SOIs) and design programs and activities to address them. It reflects stability operations, COIN, and international development best practices by emphasizing the local population's perspectives and development principles and measuring impact, not just output.

The DSF process has four basic steps, shown in figure C-1. To maximize effectiveness, all relevant actors and organizations in the area should ideally be involved in the entire process, participating in an inclusive stability working group.

Situational Awareness

The DSF uses four lenses to achieve a population-centric and stability-oriented understanding of the local environment: operating environment, cultural environment, local perceptions, and instability/stability dynamics.

Operating Environment

The operating environment refers to the physical or tangible characteristics of the local area. The DSF uses PMESII [political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure] and ASCOPE (see table C-1) to help identify this information. Significantly, DSF does not simply generate a list of facts about the operating environment, but also the relevance of those factors to the local population and the practitioners' stabilization mission. For example, don't just identify that the local government is dominated by one tribal group, but also that this inequity undermines the legitimacy and support for the government among other tribes.

Cultural Environment

The cultural matrix, shown in table C-2, identifies who the major cultural groups are, what they care about and will potentially fight over, and how they normally regulate society and solve disputes. The cultural matrix also identifies who the traditional authorities are; disruptions to traditional



Figure C-1. District Stability Framework Process.

mechanisms/authorities; and how enemy, friendly, and other actors take advantage of these factors.

Local Perceptions

To be effective, stabilization efforts must be based on a deep understanding of local conditions, local grievances, and local norms, rather than outsider assumptions. This understanding can be gained through several possible mechanisms, including population surveys, focus groups, key leader engagements, and polling conducted by external organizations.

One of the most rigorous methods for collecting local perceptions is the tactical conflict survey,

Table C-1. Operating Environment Matrix.

Description		Factors	Relevance
Political: Political actors, agendas, government capability and capacity	A S C O P E	Key elements of the formal, informal, and shadow systems of government that significantly influence the local population	Why is a factor relevent to the local population? How does it affect stability?
Military: Capabilities in the AO (equipment, mission, resource constraints)		Key elements that could influence the security situation	Why is a factor relevent to the local population? How does it affect stability?
Economic: Trade, development, finance, institutional, capabilities, geography, and regulation		Key elements that influence economic activity in the area	Why is a factor relevent to the local population? How does it affect stability?
Social: Demographics, migration trends, urbanization living standards, literacy/ education level, etc.		Key elements that describe or could influence traditional social dynamics in an area	Why is a factor relevent to the local population? How does it affect stability?
Infrastructure: Basic facilities, services and installations		Effects on the physical infrastructure: sewage, water, electricity, educational facilities, health, facilities, and transportation	Why is a factor relevent to the local population? How does it affect stability?
Information: Means of communication, media, telecommunications, word of mouth		Key elements that facilitate the transfer of information to and among the local population	Why is a factor relevent to the local population? How does it affect stability?

Table C-2. Cultural Matrix.

1) Major Cultural Groups	2) Their Interests	3) Cultural Codes, Traditions, and Values	4) Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
Identify the major cultural and/or tribal groups in your AO	Identify the things these groups care about or consider to be valuable—both material and intangible	Identify cultural codes, traditions, and values that the major cultural groups live by	Identify how conflicts between individuals and groups have traditionally been resolved

5) Traditional Authorities	6) Disruptions to These Mechanisms/Authorities	7) How Malign Actors/Stabilizing Forces Leverage These Factors
Identify the traditional authorities to whom the locals respect and/or normally turn to for assistance	Describe what new actors or conditions may have disrupted the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and/or undermined the influence of traditional authorities	Describe how malign actors leverage and/or exploit these cultural factors to their advantage Consider how stabilizing forces leverage these factors

which is a simple, four-question survey that can be used by military units on patrol, civilian agency implementing partners, and HN government and security forces. Each question is followed up by asking the question "why" to ensure full understanding of the interviewee's response and perspective. The four questions are:

- Has the number of people in the village changed in the last year? Why?
- What are the most important problems facing the village? Why?
- Who do you believe can solve your problems? Why?
- What should be done first to help the village? Why?

The responses to this survey can then be aggregated and represented graphically, allowing for a quick visual understanding of local perspectives, whether represented as a snapshot in time or as change over time (see fig. C-2).

Instability/Stability Dynamics

Finally, DSF identifies potential instability and stability factors in the local environment. Factors of instability include grievances of the local population (taken from various local perceptions data sources), events that create a window of vulnerability in which stability may be undermined, and key individuals who are fomenting instability. On the other side of the equation are factors of stability such as resiliencies in the society (institutions and mechanisms that help the society function peacefully), events that present a window of opportunity to enhance stability, and key individuals who are helping to enhance stability. Events are usually the same in both matrices; whether they end up reinforcing stability or instability depends mainly on how they play out (see table C-3 on page C-4).

Analysis

After gaining situational awareness, DSF provides tools to analyze and identify potential sources of instability, their causes, the desired objective(s), and the impact indicators that will measure progress in addressing each SOI.

The four situational analysis lenses typically result in a long list of problems, needs, and grievances that could be driving instability. A primary

What is the most important problem facing the village?



Sample local perception quotes:

"Taliban justice is swift."
"Nobody is safe here."
"Elders can't solve our problems anymore."
"Police take our money."
"Judges support those who pay them."
"Government doesn't help the jirgas."
"Coalition forces endanger us."
"We have no doctor or clinic."
"The government should do more to protect us."
"Police are not competent to solve or prevent crimes."
"We avoid the police; they only help themselves."
"The only Islamic schools are in Pakistan."

Figure C-2. Example of Tactical Conflict Survey Data.

Table C-3. Factors Matrices.

Factors of Instability		
Grievances	**Events**	**Key Actors: Means, Motives, and Actions**
What issues or problems are the local populace concerned or upset about? Whom do they blame for these conditions, and how severe are they?	What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key actors and their followers to further undermine stability?	Which individuals or institutions are leveraging popular grievances and events to create instability? What means do they possess, what are their motives, and what actions are they taking?
	Factors of Stability	
Resiliencies	**Events**	**Key Actors: Means, Motives, and Actions**
What processess, relationships, or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any previous resiliencies that have been or are being undermined?	What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key actors and their followers to further reinforce stability?	Which individuals or institutions in the society are attempting to preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess, what are their motives, and what actions are they taking?

purpose of analysis is to narrow this list down to a much smaller number of issues that are actually SOIs. To begin narrowing down the list, DSF will group together issues that are closely related or logically connected in a symptom-cause relationship. For example, the problems of poor border control, police corruption, and violent crime might all be grouped together under the heading of physical insecurity. If physical insecurity is an SOI, the DSF process will break these issues apart again later to address them in detail. Next, each problem or group of related problems is entered in the SOI analysis matrix, shown in table C-4, and vetted against the three instability criteria. These criteria ask the questions, does this problem—

- Decrease support for the government or legitimate governance institutions? Support for the government must be based on what locals actually expect of their government—not what outsiders might expect of their own government back home. Legitimate governance institutions refers to NGOs that help the society regulate itself, such as a tribal council.
- Increase support for malign actors? This usually occurs when the malign actors are either: 1) directly helping to solve the problem, such as, providing security to a community that the police never visit; or 2) successfully leveraging the issue in their propaganda, such as, if we were in charge we would reform and expand the police.
- Undermine the normal functioning of society? The emphasis here must be on local norms. For example, if people have never had electricity, the continued lack of electricity can hardly be undermining the normal functioning of society.

The final step on the SOI analysis matrix is to prioritize the identified SOIs using local perceptions. Practitioners should normally focus first on SOIs that are a priority grievance for the local population. Otherwise, locals may perceive the stabilization efforts as being disconnected from reality and focusing on problems that don't really matter to them.

Table C-4. SOI Analysis Matrix.

Instability Criteria				SOI	Prioritization
Potential Sources of Instability	**Does this issue decrease support for the govt/legit governance? Explain**	**Does this issue increase support for malign actors? Explain**	**Does this issue disrupt the normal functioning of society? Explain**	**Does the issue meet 2 of the 3 instability criteria?**	**Is the SOI a priority grievance for the local populace?**
Justice/Conflict resolution (include land disputes)	Yes. Formal and traditional mechanisms seen as ineffective	Yes. Taliban increase their reputation by solving disputes	Yes. Traditionally solved by shuras, now a source of violence	Yes	Yes (#1)
Barakzai dominate govt	Yes. Undermines Noorzai support, increases resentment	No. Taliban not taking advantage	No. Barakzai have dominated for several decades	No	No
Lack of healthcare	Probably. Provincial govt healthcare excludes Nawa	No. Taliban does not provide healthcare	No. Nawa has never had healthcare	No	Yes (#3)
Poor road infrastructure	No. Governor is actually working to build a new road	No. Taliban are not building roads	No. Road network has always been rudimentary at best	No	No
Civilian govt corruption	No. Corruption complaints directed solely at police	No. No evidence that Taliban exploits this issue	No. Locals not concerned; apparently within normal bounds	No	No
Insecurity (include police and civcas)	Yes. civcas, insecurity, police ineffectiveness reflect poorly on govt	No. Taliban are also blamed for civcas, not providing security either	Yes. Insecurity and police problems exceed local norms	Yes	Yes (#2)
Lack of education (include radical mullahs)	No. Despite limitations, people are grateful for education improvements	No. Taliban use this to promote radical madrassas in Pakistan	No. Despite low levels, education has actually improved since 2001	No	Yes (#4)

Legend

civ/cas civilian casualties
govt government

After identifying and prioritizing a discrete number of SOIs, practitioners fill out a tactical stability matrix (TSM) for each one (see table C-5 on page C-6). The TSM helps further analyze and design activities to address each SOI. The TSM consists of nine colums: the first six columns support the analysis process, while the final three support the design phase. The columns in the TSM are filled out by identifying the following:

- The targeted SOI.
- Perceived Causes—how locals perceive this situation and why they think it exists. Usually presented as representative quotes from the local populace.
- Systemic Causes—the root causes of the SOI or the underlying conditions that led to the problem and allow it to continue.
- Objective—a succinct statement of the goal or endstate that will address the SOI. Often simply the reverse of the SOI.
- Impact Indicators (also MOEs)—changes in the environment that would indicate progress toward reducing the systemic causes and achieving the objective.
- Impact Indicator Data Sources—where the information to track the impact indicators can be obtained.

Table C-5. Tactical Stability Matrix.

Analysis						Design		
Source of Instability	**Causes (Perception)**	**Causes (Systemic)**	**Objective**	**Impact Indicators**	**Impact Indicators Data Sources**	**Activities**	**Output Indicators**	**Output Indicator Data Sources**
Lack of govt/ traditional conflict resolution mechanism	Taliban provides swift justice Judges support those who pay them the most The elders can't solve our problems Govt doesn't help the jirgas	Formal justice system is slow, inefficient, hard to access Justice officials are not paid in full/on time Traditional conflict resolution structures are undermined Govt officials focused on formal justice system	Foster conflict resolution mechanisms linked to govt	Increased number of disputes resolved by govt-recognized entities Decreased number of disputes resolved by Taliban Decreased violence linked to land disputes Increased number of land deeds registered	Tactical conflict surveys Govt records Public surveys Patrol reports Interviews Assessments	Support training for justice officials Facilitate judicial pay system reform Establish a mobile Govt dispute resolution unit Facilitate jirgas Link jirgas to govt IO campaign	Number of justice officials trained Pay reforms enacted Mobile dispute unit estimate Number of jirgas held Number of jirgas with govt involvment Number of IO radio spots	Govt financial records Interviews Assessments Tactical conflict surveys Patrol reports Radio

Legend
govt government

- Activities—things you will do to mitigate the systemic causes and achieve the objective. Taken from activity design worksheet.
- Output Indicators (also MOPs)—metrics that indicate progress toward the completion of an activity. Ask yourself; how can I confirm that the activity is progressing or has been completed?
- Output Indicator Data Sources—where the information to track the output indicators can be obtained.

DESIGN

In the design phase of DSF, practitioners design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities. This process starts by brainstorming potential activities that will address each of the systemic causes of the SOI. These ideas are then screened and refined using the three stability criteria, the seven design principles, and resource availability. The activity design worksheet helps to guide this process as depicted in table C-6.

The stability criteria are essentially the mirror image of the instability criteria. Any proposed activity that does not meet at least two of these criteria should be eliminated.

Proposed activities that meet the stability criteria should then be refined using the seven design principles. To the extent possible, practitioners should design or modify each activity so that it will—

- Be sustained by the local government or society.
- Maximize local involvement to create local ownership.

Table C-6. Activity Design Worksheet.

Brainstorm Possible Activities	Stability Criteria (must meet 2 of 3)			Design Priciples							Resources				Select
	Does the activity increase support for govt/legit governance? Explain.	Does the activity decrease support for malign actors? Explain.	Does the activity increase institutional and societal capacity and capability? Explain.	Sustainability	Local Ownership	Short Term vs Long Term Results	Leverage Support From Other Org.	Culturally/Politically Appropriate	Accountability/Transparency	Flexibility	Money	Personnel	Expertise	Time	Is Activity Realistic?
Generate a list of potential activities that will address the systemic causes and contribute to achieving the objective for a given SOI.	Explain how the activity will increase support for the govt and/or legitimate governance institutions.	Explain how the activity will decrease support for malign actors.	Explain how the activity will increase institutional and societal capacity and capability.	For each potential activity that meets at least 2 of the 3 stability criteria, refine the proposed activity to make it meet as many as possible of the 7 design principles.							Do you, or your partners, have the resources to complete the activity? If not, eliminate the proposed activity.				Based on the stability criteria, design principles, and resource availability, should the activity be implemented?

Legend

govt government
Org. organization

- Minimize the tradeoffs between short-term positive effects and any potentially negative long-term impacts; such as, unintended consequences.
- Leverage or support the programs of OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, and the HN government.
- Be appropriate to the local political and cultural context.
- Strengthen governmental accountability and transparency.
- Include the flexibility to adapt if circumstances change.

Next, practitioners screen each proposed activity against their available resources, time, money, personnel, and appropriate expertise. Those activities, for which the necessary resources exist, are entered into the activities column of the TSM. Practitioners then complete the TSM by identifying output indicators and output indicator data sources that will enable them to determine whether each activity is proceeding as planned and, ultimately, when it has been completed.

In the final steps of the design process, the selected activities are prioritized and synchronized. They should be prioritized based on their anticipated impact on the SOI. They should also be synchronized in time and space to build upon and reinforce other activities and operations conducted by stability working group members. A synchronization matrix shown in table C-7, on page C-8, can help stability working group members accomplish this.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The monitoring and evaluation matrix shown in table C-8, on page C-8, is a program management tool to help track the output and impact of individual activities and takes place during and after the implementation of stabilization activities. Most of the information comes directly from the TSM, with additional columns added to establish a baseline for the impact indicators and to measure change against this baseline. Monitoring and evaluation is conducted on three levels: output indicators, impact indicators, and overall stability.

Table C-7. Synchronization Matrix.

SOI #1: List Source of Instability Being Targeted																									
Timeframe		January				February				March				April				May				June			
		Wk 1	Wk 2	Wk 3	Wk 4	Wk 1	Wk 2	Wk 3	Wk 4	Wk 1	Wk 2	Wk 3	Wk 4	Wk 1	Wk 2	Wk 3	Wk 4	Wk 1	Wk 2	Wk 3	Wk 4	Wk 1	Wk 2	Wk 3	Wk 4
Operations		Shaping Ops (list specific)								Clearing Ops (list specific)						Holding Ops (list specific)		Building Ops (list specific)							
Key Events		List Specific Events					List Specific Events				List Specific Events					List Specific Events						List Specific Events			
List Systemic Cause #1	Example: USAID	List Activity #1					List Activity #2					List Activity #3						List Activity #4					List Activity #5		
	Example: DOS	List Activity #1				List Activity #2					List Activity #3							List Activity #4				List Activity #5			
	Example: Military	List Activity #1				List Activity #2				List Activity #3				List Activity #4											
	Example: USDA		List Activity #1							List Activity #2									List Activity #3						
List Systemic Cause #2	Actor #1																								
	Actor #2																								
	Actor #3																								
	Actor #4																								

Legend

Ops Operations
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
wk week

Table C-8. Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix.

SOI	Activity	Measure of Performance			Measure of Effect			Objective
		Output Indicator Data	**Output Data Sources**	**Impact Indicator**	**Baseline**	**Change**	**Impact Data Sources**	
Taken from the TSM	Taken from the TSM	Data for output indicators identified on the TSM	Taken from the TSM	Taken from the TSM	Baseline data for Impact Indicator identified on the TSM	Change in baseline data	Taken from the TSM	Taken from the TSM

As practitioners track these three levels of monitoring and evaluation, they should identify lessons about what worked, what didn't, and what could be done to improve their stabilization efforts as they repeat the DSF process in the future.

Output Indicators

Output indicators are monitored during the implementation of an activity, until it is completed. Implementation of an activity is tracked by MOP. They answer the question, "Is the activity progressing?" and, in the long run, "Is the activity complete?" Examples might include the number of miles of road paved or number of police trained.

Impact Indicators

The effect that an activity has achieved is measured by MOE. They are generally evaluated only after an activity is completed. Examples might be decreased travel time for a road project or decreased criminal activity for a police training activity.

Overall Stability

Rather than measuring the impact of individual activities, overall stability takes into account the stabilizing impact of all activities conducted over a longer period of time, as well as the influence of external factors. It simply asks, "Is stability increasing or decreasing?" The key to measuring overall stability is establishing good indicators and tracking them at repeated intervals, starting as early as possible.

The best overall stability indicators reflect the local population's perceptions of stability, not the perceptions or assumptions held by outsiders. They are based on the question, "What will local people do or say differently if they feel the environment is getting more stable?" The following are examples of suggested indicators of overall stability within Eastern Afghanistan (see fig. C-3 on page C-10):

- District government recognition: how many locals take their problems to the district government for resolution? (reflects trust and confidence).
- Local-on-local violence: a direct measure of insecurity.
- Bazaar activity: reflects freedom of movement and investor confidence.
- Host nation security force presence: reflects security force confidence to range farther and more frequently into insecure areas.
- Population freedom of movement: reflects security conditions.
- Local perceptions of their government: direct measure of public confidence in government's competence, transparency, and relevance.
- Local perceptions of security conditions: direct measure of perceived safety.



Figure C-3. Example of an Overall Stability Index.

APPENDIX D
SAMPLE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS REPORTS

Normally, each MAGTF will require the CMO staff element to submit a daily, weekly, or monthly CMO report. This report provides a timely summary of significant CMO in the AO. This report is usually unclassified. Formats vary and are based on the SOP of each MEF or subordinate element of the MAGTF. Reports may be submitted electronically or in hard copy. Using possible logical LOOs as an organizing construct, the following reports are examples of CMO reports.

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Daily MAGTF G9

CLASSIFICATION

Copy no. ____ of ____ copies
ISSUING HEADQUARTERS
PLACE OF ISSUE (may be in code)
Date-time group

PERIOD COVERED: from DTG to DTG

(U) REFERENCES: List maps (serial number, sheets, edition, scale) or charts

1. (U) Activities of the Last 24 Hours

a. (U) Civil Affairs Situation at End of Period. Location of CA units and major activities of each and any important changes in CA operational zones or areas, principal incidents, and events since last report. Indicated on map or overlay annex whenever possible.

b. (U) Governance. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Civil administration.

(2) (U) Labor.

(3) (U) Civil defense.

c. (U) Economic Stability. Use annexes as necessary and practicable.

(1) (U) Economics and commerce.

(2) (U) Food and agriculture.

(3) (U) Property control.

(4) (U) Civilian supply

(5) (U) Public finance.

d. (U) Infrastructure. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Public works and utilities.

(2) (U) Public transportation.

(3) (U) Public communications.

Page number

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e. (U) Rule of Law. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Legal.

(2) (U) Public safety.

(3) (U) Courts and detention facilities.

f. (U) Public Health and Welfare. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Public health.

(2) (U) Public welfare.

g. (U) Public Education and Information. Use annexes as necessary.

(1) (U) Public information.

(2) (U) Public education.

h. (U) Other (as needed).

(1) (U) Dislocated civilians.

(2) (U) Arts, monuments, and archives.

(3) (U) Cultural affairs.

i. (U) Miscellaneous. Indicate any special recommendations and requests, such as special CA personnel problems existing or anticipated, requests for additional forces, recommendations for lifting of PRCs and restrictions, recommendations for troop indoctrination, and other matters not properly covered in the paragraphs above.

2. (U) Activities Planned Next 24 to 48 Hours

3. (U) G-9 Comments (as needed)

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name
Rank and
Service
Title

Authentication:
Annexes:
Distribution:

Page number

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CIVIL AFFAIRS DETACHMENT 1: DAILY SITREP

Period Begins: 051700ZAUG09 Period Ends: 061659ZAUG09
POC: Capt. B. US Marine

ATMOSPHERICS:

Kandahar: Nothing significant to report.

Baghran: On 5 Aug 09 atmospherics were positive.

Lashkar Gah: Nothing significant to report.

Garmser: On 6 Aug 09 atmospherics were negative. The local population avoided contact with patrols and failed to respond to friendly gestures.

DETACHMENT ACTIONS LAST 24 HOURS:

Det HQ: Nothing significant to report.

Kandahar: On 5 Aug 09 CA Team 1 met with project contractors.

Baghran: On 6 Aug 09 CA Team 2 attended mayor's meeting and visited projects for assessment.

Lashkar Gah: Nothing significant to report.

Garmser: On 6 Aug 09 CA Team 4 attended the education and fuel committee meeting.

NEXT 24 to 72 HOURS:

Det HQ: Det CO and 1stSgt will travel to CMOC in Musa Qala for battlefield circulation. Will remain overnight and return to base on 7 Aug 09.

Kandahar: On 7 Aug 09 CA Team 1 will attend city council meeting.

Baghran: On 7 and 8 Aug 09, CA Team 2 will hold meetings with key managers of the flour mill in Baghran. On 9 Aug 09, the team with inspect progress on all pending projects in the Kajaki area.

Lashkar Gah: On 7 Aug 09, CA Team 3 will conduct an inspection of the Boys High School. On 8 Aug, the team will conduct a 24-hour administrative standdown.

Garmser: On 7 Aug 09, CA Team 4 will conduct a meeting with the mayor of Garmser.

Detachment Commander's Comments:

Nothing significant to report

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DAILY CIVIL AFFAIRS TEAM REPORT

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1. PRECEDENCE: URGENT/PRIORITY/ROUTINE

2. FROM:
   DTG:
   LOCATION:
   PERIOD COVERED (from -- to):

3. TO:

4. INFO:

5. SUBJECT: CMO SITREP #

   LINE 1: CA TEAM STATUS (include personnel, equipment status, and current team locations):

   LINE 2: DC INFORMATION: DC Camp #1:

   (a) Number of DCs that arrived at camp last 24 hours.

   (b) Where they came from?

   (c) Why they left previous location (did they know MISO themes? If "stay put," why did they leave?)?

   (d) Number of DCs who departed camp last 24 hours.

   (e) Reason for departure.

   (f) Current camp population.

   (g) Population numbers by type.

Age	# Males	# Females
50 years or more		
16 to 49 years		
15 years or less		

Page number

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(h) Status of DC camp administration.

(i) Status of logistical support available.

(j) Critical current/future needs.

LINE 3: STATUS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THEIR ABILITY TO SUPPORT/CONTROL THE LOCAL POPULACE:

GREEN—*GO*; fully functional.
AMBER—Meets most of population needs.
RED—Only emergency needs met.
BLACK—*NO GO*; nonfunctional.

(a) Population center and estimated population:

(1) Security: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(2) Health/Medical: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(3) Food/Water: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(4) Shelter: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(5) Utilities/Services: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(b) Population center and estimated population:

(1) Security: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(2) Health/Medical: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(3) Food/Water: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(4) Shelter: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

(5) Utilities/Services: Green/Amber/Red/Black.

LINE 4: STATUS OF RELIEF SUPPLIES:

(a) Provided by NGO/IGO.

(b) Provided by US agencies.

(c) Provided by US military.

(d) Assessment of current and future supplies to meet needs.

Page number

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LINE 5: STATUS OF HOST NATION/FOREIGN NATION/INDIGENOUS NATION SUPPORT:

(a) Support currently provided.

(b) Unused capability available for US/allied forces.

(c) Assessment of ability to meet future needs.

LINE 6: FRIENDLY MISO (effectiveness):

(a) Theme 1 (effectiveness/recommendations).

(b) Theme 2 (effectiveness/recommendations).

(c) Theme 3 (effectiveness/recommendations).

LINE 7: NARRATIVE:

(a) Significant actions, events, or incidents.

(1) Point #1.

(2) Point #2.

(3) Point #3.

(b) Summary of significant meetings.

(1) List of attendees (name of officials/organization and title/position).

(2) Location of meeting and time.

(3) Issues (resolved/unresolved).

(4) Future actions, meetings, and recommendations.

(c) Assessment of current CMO (including effectiveness of PRC measures, if any).

(1) Point #1.

(2) Point #2.

(3) Point #3.

LINE 8: FUTURE OPERATIONS: (narrative, include unsourced needs):

6. DISTRIBUTION:

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7. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

8. DRAFTER:

9. RELEASER:

CLASSIFICATION

PERIODIC/WEEKLY CMO REPORT NO. _____

(Omit nonapplicable paragraphs and subparagraphs)

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1. FROM (issuing unit):
   DTG:
   LOCATION:
   PERIOD COVERED (from -- to):

2. CMO SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD (Location of CA teams/units and major activities of each; any important changes in CA operational zones/areas; major incidents and events, including meetings, since last report; use map or overlay where possible):

3. CMO COLOR CODE ASSESSMENT (see color code legend below):

GREEN—(GRN) *GO*; fully functional
AMBER—(AMB) Meets most of population needs
RED—(RED) Only emergency needs met
BLACK—(BLK) *NO GO*; nonfunctional

Page number

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GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS	GRN	AMB	RED	BLK	REMARKS
Public administration					
Legal					
Public safety					
Public health					
Public welfare					
Public education					
Labor					
Public finance					
Civil defense					
ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS					
Economics and commerce					
Food and agriculture					
Property control					
Civilian supply					
PUBLIC FACILITIES					
Public works and utilities					
Public transportation					
Public communications					
SPECIAL FUNCTIONS					
Civil information					
Dislocated civilians					
Arts monuments and cultural affairs					

4. SIGNIFICANT CONCLUSIONS ON CURRENT CMO STATUS AND FUTURE PLANS (include identification of resources or decisions needed to implement future plans):

5. DRAFTER:

6. RELEASER:

APPENDIX E
EXAMPLES OF ANNEX GS
FOR CONDUCTING STABILITY OPERATIONS

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CAMP ROBERTSON, MINDANAO
26 Sep 09

ANNEX G (CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS) TO III MEF OPERATIONS ORDER 01-09 (Operation ZAMBOANGA DAWN) (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) (U) Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*

(b) (U) Department of the Army FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*

(c) (U) MCRP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*

(d) (U) DOS *Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization*, 29 March 2007

(e) (U) Commander JTF Philippines Joint Campaign Plan (JCAP), 17 Aug 2009

(f) (U) Commander JTF Philippines OPORD Operation Zamboanga Dawn (OZD), 12 Sept 2009

(g) (U) Memorandum of Understanding with US Department of State, 21 Aug 2009

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General. This annex provides guidance and tasks for planning and executing III MEF CMO in support of III MEF OPORD 01-09.

b. (U) III MEF CMO. III MEF. Conducts CMO that require coordinated actions by all its subordinate elements. The CA forces execute tasks in support of MAGTF CMO at both the tactical and operational level. The following describes the method of employment for III MEF CA forces.

(1) (U) Civil Affairs Planners. The CA planners and SMEs augment the G-9 staff in order to plan, task, and coordinate III CMO efforts in Mindanao.

(2) (U) Civil Affairs Detachments. 1 x CA detachment is attached to each RCT/ BCT in order to execute CMO tasks in the commander's AO. The CA detachment conducts CMO planning; engages key leaders; and initiates, tracks, and reports on CMO projects. Each detachment operates with multiple CA teams that support maneuver battalion CMO tasks/initiatives. The CA teams are staffed and trained to conduct tactical level CMO; provide self-sufficient convoy/fixed-site security; conduct local leader engagement; and assess, initiate, and track projects.

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(3) (U) CA Liaison Officers. Liaison officers work with numerous external organizations in order to facilitate CMO in the III MEF AO. Organizations can include, but are not limited to: Joint Task Force-Philippines (JTF-PI) J-9, US DOS, USAID, and the HN. III MEF G-9 coordinates/directs the efforts of the all CA LNOs.

(4) (U) US Army CA Company. JTF-PI will augment III MEF CA forces with an Army general-purpose CA company in order to accomplish CMO tasks. The CA companies deploy with extensive planning capabilities civil affairs planning team-alpha [CAPT-A] that add weight to CA force efforts at the MEF, RCT/BCT and team level.

c. (U) Enemy. See Annex B (Intelligence).

d. (U) Friendly. III MEF remains committed to coordination and cooperation with the various commands, agencies, IGOs/NGOs, and HN ministries operating within Mindanao.

2. (U) Mission. See OPORD.

3. (U) Execution

a. (U) Commander's Intent. See OPORD.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. CMO follow and support III MEF concept of operations. III MEF forces conduct CMO to reinforce the security and transition LOOs by improving the governance, economic, development, and rule of law abilities of the provincial and municipal governments in order to set the conditions for restoration of HN control and foster general stability.

c. (U) Lines of Operations. Based on the memorandum of understanding between JTF-PI and the DOS dated 21 August 2009, III MEF will follow five LOOs to coordinate the activities of all military and nonmilitary participants in order to ensure a whole of government approach towards the stabilization within the JTF-PI AO. For further discussion of the LOOs, refer to the OPORD.

(1) (U) Rule of law.

(2) (U) Economic development.

(3) (U) Security.

(4) (U) Infrastructure (including sewage, water, electrification, and trash removal).

(5) (U) Public health.

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d. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) 3d CAG Reinforced (Rein)

(a) (U) Provide support to DOS ACT and FACTs pursuant to memorandum of understanding with DOS.

(b) (U) Provide support to CA organizations that are operational control/ TACON to III MEF or operating in the III MEF AO.

(c) (U) Attach one CA detachment to each RCT/BCT.

(2) (U) Commanding Officers, GCEs

(a) (U) Responsible for the security LOO. Provide continuous CMO support to the municipal governments in order to strengthen the security, set the conditions for HN control, and foster general stability.

(b) (U) Provide logistical and administrative support to ACT and FACTs pursuant to memorandum of understanding with DOS.

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) Inform III MEF G-9 of significant mission-limiting CMO constraints and deficiencies beyond MSC capability to correct.

(2) (U) RCTs/BCT and G-9 are responsible for appropriate CMO and effects assessments, project nominations, oversight of CMO projects, and project management.

(3) (U) RCT/BCTs, G-9, and III MEF comptroller are responsible for funding certification.

(4) (U) RCT/BCTs and G-9 catalog and report ongoing and planned CMO projects and reconstruction assessment.

(5) (U) RCT/BCTs, G-3, IO staff, and G-9 synchronize III MEF-approved information operation themes with CMO actions.

(6) (U) The G-9 will collect all Infrastructure Reconstruction Coordinating Board outputs and is responsible for the submission of all CMO-related reports to JTF-PI J-9.

f. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. See OPORD.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

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a. (U) Military Resource Requirements. See Annex D (Logistics/Combat Service Support).

b. (U) Civilian Personnel. See Annex E (Personnel).

c. (U) Civilian Facilities and Supplies. See Annex D.

5. (U) Command and Signal. See Annex A (Task Organization) and Annex J (Command Relationships).

a. (U) Command

(1) (U) III MEF exercises command over all assigned forces in its AO. The HN government maintains authority over its municipal governments in accordance with the Republic of the Philippines Constitution.

(2) (U) The G-9 conducts long-range CMO planning and is responsible for the following:

(a) (U) Proponent for the infrastructure, economic development, public health, and rule of law LOOs to include the prioritization of economic reconstruction and development projects.

(b) (U) Proponent for DOS ACT and FACT programs in the Mindanao Province.

(c) (U) III MEF staff lead for long range CMO planning and policy development, political-military interactions, and integration of governance, economic development, public health, and rule of law LOOs with MSCs, COM US Embassy Manila, and USAID.

(d) (U) Integrates and facilitates III MEF infrastructure, economic development, public health, and rule of law LOOs to support activities with US Embassy Manila through operational channels.

(e) (U) Provides support to the ACT/FACTs by—

1 (U) Developing strategies to stimulate sustainable economic growth and generate local employment.

2 (U) Engaging and facilitating IGO/NGO actions and involvement throughout the III MEF AO.

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3 (U) Facilitating MSC resolution of US COM and coalition force issues arising from ACT and FACT deliberations to the JTF-PI J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff through operational channels. In coordination with the III MEF comptroller, develop III MEF CERP policy and allocation guidance to improve reconstruction priorities in the provinces.

b. (U) Signal. MSCs submit CMO reports in accordance with Annex R (Reports).

APPENDICES: (Omitted).

1-Population and Resource Control
2-Dislocated Civilian Operations
3- CMO Resource Management
4- Duty to Care for Dislocated Civilians
5-Humanitarian Assistance Program Effects Coordination
6-Economics Plan

OFFICIAL:

C. A. Marine
Colonel, USMC
AC/S G-9
Conventional Ops

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INDOLAYSIA (CTF-IL)
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1 Feb 2009

ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER (001-1) (Operation AUTUMN FORGE) (U)
MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS DURING PHASES II AND III OF A JOINT CAMPAIGN (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) Planning Order, DTG 200830Z Jan 12

(b) USPACOM OPORD, DTG 261805Z Jan 12

(c) Annex P to CTF-IL OPLAN (AUTUMN FORGE) Foreign Nation Support, (Feb 12)

(d) Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*

(e) FM 3-05.40, *Civil Affairs Operations*

(f) FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*

(g) FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare*

(h) Joint Publication 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. I*

(i) *UN High Commissioner for Refugees Handbook for Emergencies* (Dec 82)

(j) USAID *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response* (Jun 94)

(k) Sphere Project *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Response Handbook*, 2004

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General

(1) (U) References (d) through (g) provide the legal foundation and expected scope of CA activities and CMO.

(2) (U) This annex provides guidance concerning relationships between military forces, civil authorities, US agencies, UN agencies, international volunteer agencies, and civilians in the AO.

(3) (U) The III MEF AO, from the Republic of Northern Indolaysia (RNI) border to the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, is a densely populated tropical region with concentrations of villages and towns in the low-lying areas and the coastline, encompassing approximately 22 million people (2000 Census).

(a) (U) III MEF can expect to encounter significant numbers of DCs as it moves deeper into the southern Malay Peninsula. III MEF resources to support DC operations will be austere. To coordinate the overall CMO effort in the III MEF rear area, III MEF will activate a CMOC.

(b) (U) During phases I through III, due to the success of the theater-wide "stay put" policy for civilians in zone, we expect no more than 5,000 DCs a day in our AO. Any DCs requiring transfer to DC camp facilities will be moved through the III MEF zone to RNI, where they will come under the jurisdiction of local authorities.

(c) (U) As III MEF advances down the peninsula from the north during stage III, parts A and B, it will not encounter any large urban area before it reaches the city-state of Singapore. However, nearly all villages or towns of 5,000 people or larger are located along major supply routes or avenues of approach.

(d) (U) CTF-IL expects that no more than 20,000 people will become DCs, with an average number of 5,000 appearing each day within their zone. Included in this number are third country nationals and released Singaporean hostages.

(e) (U) Although I Corps will bear the significant burden of the largest population center, Kuala Lumpur, III MEF must maintain the ability to handle DCs.

(f) (U) All III MEF personnel must show appropriate respect for the Islamic beliefs of both RNI and Indolaysian citizens and must be sensitive of cultural differences.

(4) (U) Indolaysian Civilian Population

(a) (U) Within the Malay Peninsula, up to 70 percent of the Indolaysian civilian population will be ethnic Malayan Muslims. The remainder will be Javanese, Hindus, ethnic Chinese, third country nationals, and other ethnic groups. We estimate that most of the population to be neutral to the III MEF presence, though there will be pockets in zone that we expect to be hostile towards III MEF forces. Within this population, we expect to encounter several

insurgent groups hostile to III MEF, Indolaysian special purpose forces, Indolaysian village militias, and Indolaysian intelligence agents who will remain behind after their forces have withdrawn.

(b) (U) CMO will initially be met with minimal cooperation from any remaining Indolaysian government officials. In addition, the effects of long-lasting sanctions, eroded public services, a limited food supply, and fear will affect Indolaysian civilian attitudes toward III MEF forces. III MEF forward elements may encounter visible signs of suffering, hunger, and disease. Collateral damage will be exploited by Indolaysia to gain international sympathy. Damage to Islamic shrines, other protected targets, and civilian casualties could turn civilian population against III MEF forces. Indolaysia could possibly delay evacuations of populated areas in the immediate path of our advancing forces until the last moment to cause DC traffic to spill onto main supply routes in the path of III MEF forward elements.

(c) (U) Expect some civilians to attempt to interfere with friendly operations with and without malicious intent. Civilian actions that hamper friendly forces could possibly be aided or encouraged by Indolaysia military, special forces, or local militias.

(d) (U) We expect that many DCs will be either wounded or injured. Units should expect significant portions of the population to be undernourished with the elderly and infants in the worst condition. Significant public health problems relating to water supply, medical care, pollution, and public sanitation also afflict the populace. III MEF may also experience a flow of DCs out of the west from the Army forces zone in the vicinity of Kuala Lumpur. Many Indolaysian government officials will flee advancing US forces, leading to breakdown of some public services (see annex B of OPORD for enemy forces).

b. (U) Enemy

(1) (U) See annex B.

(2) (U) We expect that some Indolaysian military forces will attempt to disguise themselves as civilians, either as DC or as members of the local populace in urban areas in order to blend in to avoid capture or to form the basis of insurgent groups loyal to the government.

(a) (U) Indolaysian military forces may use civilians as human shields and hide amongst civilians in order to approach III MEF forces and carry out attacks.

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(b) (U) The enemy may integrate DCs into their scheme of defense by interjecting them onto high-speed avenues of approach to blunt friendly attacks and disrupt logistic efforts.

(c) (U) They may conduct operations such as laying improvised explosive devices on main supply routes and alternate supply routes, gathering and reporting intelligence, etc.

c. (U) Friendly

(1) (U) CTF-IL Commanders CMO Guidance.

(a) (U) CTF-IL, through Commander, 351st Civil Affairs Command, will serve as the theater executive agent for CA in the joint operations area. Initially, the hosting foreign nation RNI will operate and secure DC camps. Elements of the RNI marine brigade will be available to secure DC camps in the CTF-IL rear area and perform static guard duties. There will be no movement of HN support beyond RNI border without coordination through C-9.

(b) (U) Foreign Nation Support (FNS). CTF-IL has concluded a number of FNS agreements with RNI representatives that include transportation, fuel, water, engineer, security, medical, and military police support. These assets will be available upon request. Units that require FNS will contact III MEF CA officer, who coordinates its release with CTF-IL C-9 rear through 377th Theater Support Command. A list of apportioned FNS assets that can be released by CTF-IL.

(2) (U) Senior operational commander's structure guiding CMO.

(3) (U) Other US Government agency battlespace plans and activities (See annex V).

d. (U) Assumptions. See annex B.

2. (U) Mission. See OPORD.

3. (U) Execution. III MEF will conduct CMO in its AO to reduce civilian interference with operations and to lessen the impact of operations on the civilian population. CA units will assist in identification and acquisition of foreign nation resources and services and ensure that commanders are kept advised of their moral and legal responsibilities toward the civilian population. All elements of III MEF must be prepared to assist the conduct of HA/DR efforts in the AO, including Singapore. CMO is a function of command and will be performed by all components of III MEF and integrated into each stage of the operation. CMO planning for the III MEF main battle area will be conducted by the

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4th Civil Affairs Group (4th CAG) commanding officer, acting as the III MEF assistant chief of staff (AC/S), G-9.

a. (U) Concept of the Operations (phase III stages, A and B). Annex G provides guidance and defines responsibilities for the conduct of CA and CMO in support of operations to liberate Singapore and to defeat Indolaysian forces in the III MEF AO. CMO priorities of effort for the operation are to conduct DC operations, maximize use of the FNS, limit the diversion of III MEF resources to support DC operations, and respond to HA needs of the Indolaysia population. The conduct of HA and DR within the RNI are the responsibility of the HN's civil defense organization, which will provide weapons of mass destruction protective equipment such as masks, protective suits, and decontamination for its own people. All III MEF personnel will maintain favorable relations with the RNI population and their representatives and NGOs/IGO.

b. (U) CMO Actions by Stages and Parts

(1) (U) Stage A, Part 1 (Shape/Deceive) and Stage A. Part 2 (Feint/Air Assault). During these parts, the III MEF will shape and secure key terrain to prepare for main effort offensive operations in our area to begin phase III (dominate). III MEF expects to encounter few, if any, DCs during this stage. CA and CMO tasks for this stage include the following:

(a) (U) Maximize FNS to meet III MEF's logistical requirements.

(b) (U) Minimize diversion of III MEF's resources to support DC requirements.

(c) (U) 4th CAG will be prepared to establish the III MEF CMOC collocated with the III MEF rear command post.

(d) (U) Incorporate no-fire areas/protected targets into their planning for locations that contain arts, monuments, archives, or other culturally/religiously significant items. Refer to appendix 4 of this annex for currently known no-fire area/protected targets.

(2) (U) Stage A, Part 3 (Amphibious Assault/Secure MEF Objectives A/B/C, Stryker Brigade Combat Team Maneuver Route 3). During this part, III MEF's main offensive operations begin. No large urban population areas will be affected during this stage. CA and CMO tasks during this stage include the following:

(a) (U) Continuing of stage A, parts 1 and 2 tasks.

(b) (U) Conducting CMO assessments in AO.

(c) (U) Handling DCs per instructions founds in paragraph 3.c of this annex. For locations of dislocated civilian collection points (DCCPs), dislocated

civilian assembly areas (DCAAs), DC evacuation routes, and DC camps, see appendix 2 of this annex.

(3) (U) Stage B, Parts 1 (Defeat IL in Zone/Secure Objective D) and Stage B, Part 2 (Consolidation). During this stage, III MEF will defeat Indolaysian military forces in zone. CA and CMO tasks during this stage include the following:

(a) (U) Continue of stage A, parts 1, 2, and 3 tasks.

(b) (U) Initiate PRC in areas under III MEF control as required.

(c) (U) Initiate contact with remaining Indolaysian government officials.

(d) (U) Be prepared to establish DCAAs.

(e) (U) Be prepared to conduct HA and DR operations within AO.

c. (U) DC Operations. This paragraph provides guidance concerning the handling of DCs.

(1) (U) Units in contact with DCs will report their location to their chain of command, protect them if possible from the effects of hostile or friendly fire, render first aid if necessary, and ensure that they have been screened for weapons. Units will attempt to redirect DCs to their homes; however, those who cannot return home will be directed to the nearest DCCP.

(2) (U) Priority of Handling DCs. At DCCPs, units will again attempt to direct DCs back to their homes. Should this not be possible, DCs will then be moved to a DCAA located in division or corps/MEF rear areas. DCs will be then directed to neighboring towns where they have extended family or tribal/cultural relationships. The last resort will be to move them to designated DC camps. If the population of a DCAA exceeds 4,000 or if DCs have been in the DCAA for over 72 hours, they will be moved or directed to DC camps.

(3) (U) To arrange movement of DCs from DCAAs to DC camps in the CTF-IL rear area, units will coordinate transportation with their MEF transportation officer. Ensure that DCs are searched for weapons and screened by counterintelligence personnel before they are allowed to enter a DCAA. The DCs with obvious signs of disease should be evaluated immediately by medical personnel and segregated from the rest of the population. Backhaul of DC to the rear should be used as much as possible.

d. (U) CA Assessments. Units will conduct assessments of all population centers containing 5,000 or more people in the III MEF AO and report status to 4th CAG commanding officer within 24 hours. Units will task-organize CA teams that will conduct

assessments of urban areas. As a minimum, these teams will consist of a CA team A or CA detachment from the units supporting CA battalion or CAG, CA specialty teams, and security elements.

e. (U) CMO Crises/Emergencies. Units that encounter situations involving mass civilian casualties, food and water supply contamination, use of weapons of mass destruction against civilians, incidents of media interests, or epidemics in zone will immediately report to 4th CAG commanding officer. Units will task-organize an assessment team with appropriate expertise in order to take action or make recommendations. Additional requirements will be identified and coordinated by III MEF CMOC.

f. (U) Population and Resource Control Measures. The PRC will be conducted in accordance with references (e) and (g). Commanders at division level are authorized to implement PRC within their AO inside Indolaysia. III MEF units will refrain from taking control over populated areas unless absolutely necessary for mission accomplishment and will relinquish control to civil authorities at the earliest opportunity once the area is evaluated to be stable and secure.

g. (U) Requisitioning. Inside Indolaysia, requisitioning is authorized in accordance with procedures outlined in references (e) and (g).

h. (U) Tasks

(1) (U) Logistics combat element (3d MLG) (-)

(a) (U) You are the main effort for CMO.

(b) (U) Receive TACON of 118th Military Police Battalion.

(c) (U) Be prepared to establish, operate, and sustain DCCPs, DCAAs, DC routes, and emergency DC rest areas in zone per III MEF DC operations overlay.

(d) (U) In coordination with USG interagency ACT and FACT, conduct assessments of Singapore and Indolaysia population centers in MEF AO in order to determine HA/DR requirements needed to maintain life.

(2) (U) GCE (3d Marine Division [-] [Rein], 172d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, and United Kingdom 3d Commando Brigade, Royal Marines)

(a) (U) Conduct CMO in AO.

(b) (U) Be prepared to establish hasty DC operations until quick turnover to 3d MLG.

CLASSIFICATION

(3) (U) Aviation Combat Element (1st Marine Aircraft Wing [Rein])

(a) (U) In coordination with USG interagency team and NGO/IGO, be prepared to load and deliver HA/DR supplies to affected areas as necessary.

(b) (U) Conduct aerial assessments of any actual or suspected DC camps or large groupings (500 people or more) of civilians in rural or remote areas of Malayan Peninsula.

(4) (U) 3d Intelligence Battalion

(a) (U) Identify indigenous Indolaysian leadership who may harbor positive feelings towards III MEF presence and who may be willing to cooperate with the coalition in order to promote a stable and secure environment.

(b) (U) Identify and locate any Indolaysian internment facilities holding Singaporean leaders and their families in the southern Malayan Peninsula.

(5) (U) 12th PSYOP Battalion (-) (Rein)

(a) (U) Support CMO in III MEF AO with MISO products (radio and television broadcasts, leaflets, and loudspeaker broadcasts) stressing the “stay put” policy as specified in Tab D (Psychological Operations) to Appendix 3, (Information Operations) to Annex C (Operations) to CTF-IL OPORD 01-10 (AUTUMN FORGE) beginning H-hour.

(b) (U) Support III MEF and USG interagency stabilization and transition operations with public information broadcasts and printed products.

(6) (U) 4th Civil Affairs Group

(a) (U) Establish III MEF AC/S G-9 staff element.

(b) (U) Establish an III MEF CMOC collocated with III MEF rear area.

(c) (U) Provide CA detachments to 3d MLG as required.

(d) (U) Support requests for Army specialty team to conduct CA assessments of occupied urban areas in Indolaysia.

(e) (U) Assist/advise Commander, III MEF on DC operations.

(f) (U) Synchronize activities of USG interagency ACT, FACTs, and NGO/IGO to support III MEF CMO through CMOC. Conduct a daily 1100 hours CMOC meeting at III MEF command post (see coordinating instructions of this annex).

i. (U) Coordinating Instructions

(1) (U) Each subordinate HQ will conduct daily CMO estimates and submit daily reports or requests for FNS. III MEF subordinate units will submit their reports to 4th CAG commanding officer.

(2) (U) Units evacuating DCs through their zone into DCAAs in the III MEF rear area will coordinate the movement in advance with the III MEF CMOC and the G-4 transportation officer to insure that the hand-off of responsibility is properly executed.

(a) (U) DCs will not be abandoned or allowed to remain at any location for longer than 4 hours without food and water by US personnel.

(b) (U) Positive control of DCs is the key to success during DC operations. Units must develop and maintain rosters of DCs while they are in our care and ensure the rosters accompany the DCs when transferred to other locations.

(3) (U) III MEF CMOC will hold meetings at 1000 hours daily via III MEF rear command post. Representatives from III MEF medical, military police, engineer, 3d MLG, IO, military intelligence, G-4, and judge advocate general, as well as the USG interagency ACT, are required to attend. Representatives from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and select NGO and/or IGO will be invited.

(4) (U) Supported commands are responsible for providing administrative/logistic support to attached or operationally controlled CA units and contracted FNS.

4. (U) Administrative and Logistics

a. (U) See OPORD and appendix 3 of this annex for FNS.

b. (U) To compute daily HA/DR logistical requirements for DCCP and DCCA, as well as affected civilian populations in the CTF-IL AO, see references (i) and (j).

5. (U) Command and Signal

a. (U) Command

(1) (U) Command and control of CMO in the III MEF rear area will be exercised by 3d MLG.

(2) (U) All CA units within III MEF AO will be under TACON of 4th CAG.

b. (U) Signal. See OPORD.

APPENDICES: (Omitted).

1-Area Study
2-DC Operations Overlay
3-Foreign Nation Support
4-No-Fire Area List
5-Civil-Military Operations Priority Information Requirements
6-Nongovernmental/Intergovernment Organizations Present in Zone

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GLOSSARY
SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AC . . . . . Active Component
ACE . . . . . aviation combat element
AC/S . . . . . .assistant chief of staff
ACT . . . . . Advanced Civilian Team
ALMAR . . . . . All Marines
AO. . . . . .area of operations
ASCOPE . . . . . .areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events

BCT. . . . . brigade combat team

C-9 . . . . . combined civil-military operations staff section
C-35 . . . . . combined future operations staff section
CA. . . . . civil affairs
CAG . . . . . .civil affairs group
CAO . . . . . civil affairs operations
CAT . . . . . civil affairs team
CCIR . . . . . commander's critical information requirement
CERP . . . . . .Commander's Emergency Response Program
CG. . . . . commanding general
CIDNE . . . . . .Combined Information Data Network Exchange
CIM. . . . . civil information management
CIPB . . . . . .civil intelligence preparation of the battlefield
CJ-3. . . . . combined joint staff for operations
CJ-5. . . . . combined joint staff for plans
CJ-9. . . . . combined joint staff for civil-military cooperation
CJTF . . . . . .combined joint task force
CMC . . . . . .Commandant of the Marine Corps
CMO . . . . . .civil-military operations
CMOC. . . . . civil-military operations center
COA . . . . . course of action
COIN. . . . . counterinsurgency
COM . . . . . chief of mission
CONOPS. . . . . .concept of operations
COP. . . . . common operational picture
CR . . . . . civil reconnaissance
CRSG . . . . . Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
CTF-IL . . . . . Combined Task Force-Indolaysia

DC. . . . . dislocated civilian
DCAA . . . . . .dislocated civilian assembly area
DCCP . . . . . dislocated civilian collection point
DCG . . . . . deputy commanding general
DOD . . . . . Department of Defense
DODI . . . . . Department of Defense instruction
DOS . . . . . Department of State
DR. . . . . disaster relief
DSF . . . . . district stability framework

FACT . . . . . field advanced civilian team
FEMA . . . . . Federal Emergency Management Agency
FHA . . . . . .foreign humanitarian assistance
FM. . . . . field manual
FMFRP . . . . . .Fleet Marine Force reference publication
FNS . . . . . foreign nation support
FRAGO. . . . . .fragmentary order
FY . . . . . .fiscal year

G-2 . . . . . brigade or higher intelligence staff office
G-3 . . . . . brigade or higher operations staff office
G-4 . . . . . brigade or higher logistics staff office
G-5 . . . . . brigade or higher civil affairs staff office
G-6 . . . . . brigade or higher communications system staff office
G-9 . . . . . brigade or higher civil-military operations staff office
GCE . . . . . ground combat element

HA. . . . . humanitarian assistance
HCA . . . . . humanitarian and civic assistance
HHQ . . . . . higher headquarters
HQ. . . . . headquarters
HN. . . . . host nation

IGO . . . . . intergovernmental organization
IO . . . . . information operations
IPB . . .intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IPI . . . . . .indigenous populations and institutions

J-3 . . . . . operations staff section
JP. . . . . joint publication
JTF . . . . . joint task force
JTF-PI . . . . . Joint Task Force-Philippines

LNO . . . . . liaison officer
LOO . . . . . line of operations

MAGTF . . . . . Marine air-ground task force
MARFORRES . . . . . United States Marine Corps Forces Reserve
MCDP . . . . . Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCPP . . . . . .Marine Corps Planning Process
MCRP . . . . . .Marine Corps reference publication
MEB . . . . . Marine expeditionary brigade
MEF . . . . . Marine expeditionary force
MEF (Fwd) . . . . . Marine expeditionary force (forward)
MET . . . . . .mission essential task
METT-T . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available
MEU . . . . . Marine expeditionary unit
MISO . . . military information support operation
MLG . . . . . Marine logistics group
MOE . . . . . measure of effectiveness
MOP . . . . . .measure of performance
MOS . . . . . military occupational specialty
MSC . . . . . major subordinate command

NA. . . . . .nation assistance
NATO . . . . . North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO . . . . . .noncommissioned officer
NGO . . . . . .nongovernmental organization
NSC. . . . . National Security Council

OFDA . . . . Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGA . . . . . .other government agency
OHDACA . . . . . Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
OIF . . . . . Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPLAN . . . . . .operation plan
OPORD. . . . . operation order
OPT. . . . . operational planning team

PA . . . . . public affairs
PIR . . . . . priority intelligence requirement
POC. . . . . point of contact
PRC. . . . . populace and resources control
PRT . . . . . .provincial reconstruction team

R&S . . . . . reconstruction and stabilization
RC. . . . . Reserve Component
RCT. . . . . .regimental combat team
Rein. . . . . reinforced
RFI . . . . . request for information
RNI . . . . . Republic of Northern Indolaysia
ROC . . . . . rehearsal of concept
ROE . . . . . rules of engagement

S-2. . . . battalion or regiment intelligence section
S-3. . . . . battalion or regiment operations section
S-9. . . . . battalion or regiment civil-military operations section
SCA. . . . . support to civil administration
S/CRS . . . . . Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SITREP . . . . . situation report
SJA . . . . . staff judge advocate
SME . . . . . subject matter expert
SOI . . . . . source of instability
SOP . . . . . .standing operating procedure

TACON. . . . . tactical control
TSM . . . . . .tactical security matrix
TTP . . . . . tactics, techniques, and procedures

UN. . . . . United Nations
UNHCR . . . . . United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOCHA . . . . . .United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
US . . . . . United States
USAID . . . . . .United States Agency for International Development
USG . . . . . United States Government
USPACOM . . . . United States Pacific Command

ZULU . . . . . time indicator for Universal Time

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

civil administration—An administration established by a foreign government in (1) friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government; or (2) hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs operations—Those military operations conducted by civil affairs forces that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present; (2) require coordination with other interagency organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector; and (3) involve application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations. Also called **CAO**. (JP 1-02)

civil information management—Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other US Government and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called **CIM**. (MCRP 5-12A)

civil-military operations—The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operation may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called **CMO**. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center—An organization normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States with indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called **CMOC**. (JP 1-02)

civil support—Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (JP 1-02)

civil support operations—The overarching term for the Department of Defense's support to civilian authorities. Civil support operations are divided into three broad categories of domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other activities, based on the civil support definition. These categories, in many cases, can overlap or be in effect simultaneously,

depending on the particular circumstances of the incident. (Excerpt from JP 3-28)

combatant command—A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander—A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. (JP 1-02)

country team—The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian—A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an expellee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called **DC**. (JP 1-02)

force protection—Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance—Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called **FHA**. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense—Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. (JP 1-02)

host nation—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance—Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, Section 401 and funded under separate authorities. Also called **HCA**. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian assistance—Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. Also called **HA**. (JP 1-02)

indigenous populations and institutions—A generic term used to describe the civilian construct of an operational area to include its populations (legal citizens, legal and illegal immigrants, and all categories of dislocated civilians), governmental, tribal, commercial, and private organizations and entities. (JP 1-02)

interagency—United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination—Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)

intergovernmental organization—An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called **IGO**. (JP 1-02)

internally displaced person—Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (JP 1-02)

joint force—A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

joint task force—A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called **JTF**. (JP 1-02)

migrant—A person who (1) belongs to a normally migratory culture who may cross national boundaries, or (2) has fled his or her native country for economic reasons rather than fear of political or ethnic persecution. (JP 1-02)

multinational force—A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. (JP 1-02)

nation assistance—Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other Title 10, US Code programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations. Also called **NA**. (JP 1-02)

natural disaster—An emergency situation posting significant danger to life and property that results from a natural cause. (JP 1-02)

nongovernmental organization—A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (JP 1-02)

operational control—Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of

administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. (JP 1-02)

populace and resources control—Control measures that assist host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success. Also called **PRC**.

provincial reconstruction team—An interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of a host nation local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens and delivering essential government services. Also called **PRT**. (JP 1-02)

solatium payment—A monetary compensation given to indigenous personnel to alleviate grief, suffering, and anxiety resulting from injuries and property or personal loss due directly or indirectly to US Government/military actions. A solatium payment is nominal in amount and is not an admission of liability by the US Government.

refugee—A person who owning to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. (JP 1-02)

stability operations—An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement—An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. (JP 1-02)

support to civil administration—Actions that helps continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a foreign nation's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives. Also called **SCA**.

unity of effort—Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. (JP 1-02)

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2205.2	Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA) Activities

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