Chapter 4. Dominican Republic: Government and Politics
View of the Alcázar de Colón, the home of Spanish governor Diego Columbus
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC in the late 1990s could be considered a political democracy, albeit one that remained fragile and uninstitutionalized. This chapter focuses on contemporary issues and patterns in the country's government and politics. It briefly reviews the emergence of democratic politics in the country, examines the country's system of government and political institutions, analyzes the major political and socioeconomic actors, and discusses major issues in foreign relations.

Three major themes are underscored. First, the discussion notes that various historical, socioeconomic, and international factors have been unfavorable to the development of democracy in the country, although dramatic changes have taken place over the past several decades. Second, this historical experience is crucial to understanding how the country's system of government comprises both formal rules (such as the constitution and elections) and informal norms often at variance with the formal rules. The formal rules have frequently been ignored, manipulated, or changed by political actors as part of the struggle for power. Informal norms regarding both the use of the state for personal power and accumulation of wealth and the invocation of formal rules have often been more important. Following Max Weber, we may say that these norms reflect patrimonial politics, where a ruler governs a country as if it were simply an extension of his household, thus blurring public purposes and private interests. Typically, this type of ruler seeks to reduce the autonomy of his followers through complex ties of dependence and loyalty commonly involving patronage and clientelist ties. The third theme is that, as a consequence, the struggle for political democracy in the country has been a struggle not only for greater respect for civil liberties and political rights of the population as a whole, but also for the construction of a more coherent and accountable set of state and political institutions, with greater respect for a democratic rule of law.

**Historical Legacies of Authoritarian Rule**

The Dominican Republic has had a tragic history particularly inimical to the development of democratic politics. This fact is evident in the country's Spanish colonial experience,
which was followed in the nineteenth century by foreign invasion and occupation by neighboring Haiti, a brief reoccupation by Spain, numerous civil wars, and economic ruin. These factors inhibited the possibility of national integration or the construction of a viable central state. As a result, the country experienced considerable political instability even as all early efforts to extend liberal rule in the country failed. According to Dominican historian Mu-Kien Sang, between 1840 and 1900 the Dominican Republic had fifty-six governments, of which only four comprised administrations that were able to complete their constitutional period; furthermore, seventeen individuals governed for less than a year, and 271 rebellions or armed uprisings occurred. The country ended the nineteenth century with the increasingly despotic seventeen-year rule of Ulises Heureaux (1882-99); his assassination, in turn, led to a renewed period of tremendous upheaval, aggravating the country's debt problems. Into the twentieth century, the country was marked by a weak church, insecure economic elites, and the absence of an effective national military institution, as well as by high levels of poverty and low levels of social or political organization.

The turn of the century was also marked by increasing dependence on the United States, which ultimately led to the United States occupation of 1916-24. This occupation in turn, through its establishment of a constabulary force with Rafael Trujillo Molina at its head and its improvements in the country's transportation and communications infrastructure, helped set the stage for the rise and the consolidation in power of Trujillo in 1930 (see The Trujillo Era, 1930-61, ch. 1). Trujillo governed the country from 1930 to 1961; during that time, he built a state and constructed a nation, although his methods were brutal and his discourse racist. Under Trujillo, there was seemingly complete respect for the forms of democracy. The country had a congress, a judiciary, regular elections, and the formal passage of laws, but these institutions were a meaningless charade carefully manipulated by Trujillo. His massive economic holdings, which became state patrimony upon his death, evolved into major economic liabilities for the country. In addition, Trujillo's political style of centralization of power, cynical manipulation of individuals, and constitutional hypocrisy had a profoundly negative impact on the country's political culture.
A successful transition to democracy following the death of Trujillo in 1961 faced numerous obstacles given the extent and nature of Trujillo's domination of the island republic. The military was essentially Trujillo's personal instrument, no independent societal organizations existed (with the partial exception of the Roman Catholic Church), and no political opposition was countenanced. Furthermore, the country was relatively poor, rural, and isolated. Yet, in part because of the involvement of the United States, democracy advanced further in the nation at this time than might have been expected based on the country's history and the legacies of the Trujillo era. In the period before and after Trujillo's assassination, the United States once again became deeply enmeshed in Dominican internal affairs, motivated both by anticommunist objectives (which remained central) and a desire to promote democracy. An initial result was a surprisingly successful democratic election in 1962, with the victory of Juan Bosch Gaviño and his Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano—PRD). However, Bosch was overthrown after only seven months in office by a coalition of conservative social and political forces and the military; because of Cold War fears about communism and concerns about the nature of Bosch's leadership (including the belief that Bosch himself was not sufficiently anticommunist), the United States did not forthrightly defend his government.

Following Bosch's overthrow, the country entered a deeply tumultuous period, marked in 1965 by a brief civil war and United States intervention that originated in an exaggerated fear of a "second Cuba" in the Western Hemisphere. The United States arranged the formation of a provisional government and the holding of elections in 1966. These elections were won by Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo, a prominent figure from the Trujillo era, and his Reformist Party (Partido Reformista—PR). Balaguer handily defeated a dejected Bosch, who ran a desultory campaign. Balaguer was to become the dominant figure of Dominican politics for the next three decades, serving as president from 1966 to 1978 and again from 1986 to 1996.

Under Balaguer, patrimonial politics emerged once more, although Balaguer never sought or achieved the degree of personal control that Trujillo had attained. Balaguer was an astute politician with an astounding drive for power. He was willing to be ruthless if necessary, but not over-eager to employ repres-
sion and violence. He emphasized themes of order and stability, and he continued to link Dominican nationalism to what he viewed as its Hispanic, Roman Catholic essence and to anti-Haitian themes. He was both a realist about power politics and a conservative nationalist; he recognized the overwhelming reality of the United States presence, but retained a certain disdain for that country and its leaders. Although he was willing to take United States aid, Balaguer had conservative instincts and a nationalist interpretation of Dominican history that led him generally to be, like Trujillo, a fiscal conservative.

During the period from 1966 to 1978, Balaguer governed in an authoritarian fashion. In both 1970 and 1974, in the face of open military harassment, most opposition forces opted to abstain from participation in elections. In 1973 Bosch—skeptical about liberal democracy and critical of the United States—left the PRD to found the more radical cadre-oriented Party of Dominican Liberation (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana—PLD). In 1976, however, in the face of growing United States pressure, mounting economic problems, and increasing domestic discontent, Balaguer began a process of political liberalization. Meanwhile, the PRD sought to moderate its image within the country, build support across all social sectors, and strengthen its international ties. All this set the stage for Balaguer's electoral defeat in 1978 and a transition to democracy.

The Contemporary Struggle for Democracy

The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) came into office in 1978 as a party committed to strengthening democracy and fostering reform. However, the party's eight years in office were ultimately to be a disappointment. The PRD's most significant achievement was that one major threat to democracy, that of military incursion into politics, receded considerably, beginning in 1978 when President Silvestre Antonio Guzmán Fernández forcibly removed high military officers favorable to Balaguer. Even when Balaguer returned to power in 1986, the military never regained the level of importance or of influence it had had during his first twelve years in office.

In other respects, however, PRD administrations were not as successful. The Guzmán administration (1978–82) was limited in its reform agenda because it faced a Senate controlled by Balaguer's party and then experienced growing intraparty rivalry in the PRD. Initial hopes that the administration of Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982–86) could be an important example
of a less personalist, more institutional, reformist presidency fell short as well under the impact of the country's economic crisis. The situation was a result of the world oil crisis, executive-congressional deadlock now driven by intraparty factionalism, and the reassertion of patrimonialism from the presidency.

By the end of Jorge Blanco's term, the PRD was a factionalized organization that had been forced to oversee a brutal economic adjustment and that was facing widespread accusations of corruption and mismanagement. Although civil liberties had generally been respected, there were no significant advances in democratic institutionalization or participation nor were there reforms of a social or economic nature during the PRD years. Rather than leaving a legacy of lasting political and economic changes implemented by a social-democratic party, the PRD rule had continued patronage politics. Jorge Blanco's government faced wrenching economic problems, and its attempt to stabilize the economy involved extensive negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) and other international creditors. The situation led to bitter party wrangling and the eventual division of the PRD.
Economic decline and divisions within the PRD paved the way for the unexpected presidential comeback of Joaquín Balaguer in 1986. A loyal electorate, especially older, less educated, rural, and female voters, and splits within and between the opposition parties permitted Balaguer to win the 1986 elections. Aided, it was charged, by electoral fraud, Balaguer was able to eke out narrow victories in 1990 and 1994 as well.

The 1990 elections were marred by irregularities and charges of fraud, as the eighty-three-year-old incumbent Balaguer edged out his eighty-year-old opponent, Juan Bosch, by a mere 24,470 votes. With the PRD still recovering from its factional strife, José Francisco Peña Gómez came in a surprisingly strong third place. The 1994 elections were even more crisis-ridden than those of 1990 because of an extremely tense and bitter campaign between Balaguer and Peña Gómez. When thousands of voters were prevented from voting because their names did not appear on electoral rolls, domestic protest and international pressure led to a drawn-out crisis. Between 1994 and 1996, the political efforts of opposition parties, Dominican civil society (including substantial elements of the business community), and the international community (the United States in particular) focused on how to secure the holding of fair elections in 1996 and how to block any effort by Balaguer to extend his term in office, either unconstitutionally or by modifying the constitution. The crisis was finally resolved when Balaguer agreed to reduce his term to two years and accept a number of constitutional reforms, including a prohibition on immediate presidential reelection. As a consequence, the eighty-eight-year-old Balaguer finally left the presidency in 1996, handing power over to the PLD’s Leonel Fernández Reyna, whom Balaguer had tacitly supported and then openly endorsed (age and illness had led to Bosch’s retirement in 1994).

The 1996 elections proceeded according to strict guidelines. In 1996, unlike the previous two elections, presidential reelection was not an issue, and the Central Electoral Board was staffed by professional nonpartisans. Furthermore, in addition to the oversight provided by several high-profile missions of international observers, civil society mobilized far more extensively in support of free and fair elections than it had done in the past.

The 1996 elections were held under new rules requiring a second-round election if no candidate received more than 50
percent of the votes in the first round. With a renewed PRD under his tight leadership, Peña Gómez performed well. However, he only gained 45.9 percent of the vote. He was followed by Leonel Fernández of the PLD with 38.9 percent, and Jacinto Peynado of the Reformist Social Christian Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano—PRSC) with 15 percent. Balaguer did not endorse his party’s candidate (indeed, he did not even vote in the first round), instead providing his implicit support to Fernández during the first round. For the second round, Balaguer and the PRSC officially endorsed the candidacy of Leonel Fernández in a "Patriotic Pact" calling for the preservation of national sovereignty and Dominicanness, against the candidacy of Peña Gómez. Fernández defeated Peña Gómez in the second round.

Fernández obtained the presidency, but his party had a very small representation in Congress as a result of its poor performance in the 1994 elections. The new electoral calendar established by the 1994 reform meant that congressional elections would now be held at the midpoint of the presidential term. And, soon after Fernández’s electoral victory, the PRSC negotiated a pact with the PRD to secure leadership positions in Congress.

Without congressional support, the Fernández administration has faced serious difficulties in obtaining the passage of a number of desired reforms, although some progress has been made on a number of important fronts. The legislative attempt to reform the economy in late 1996 failed when Congress refused to agree on a set of policy proposals to liberalize the economy, including lower tariffs and a higher value-added tax. Congressional deadlock prevented an agreement over the national budget for 1997, which led President Fernández to withdraw the budget bill from Congress and use the 1996 budget agreement to apply in 1997, as stipulated by the constitution when no agreement is reached between the executive and the legislative branches over revenues and expenditures.

Yet, Fernández has governed in a more democratic and institutional fashion than Balaguer, without renouncing the use of patronage or clientelist mechanisms. Some important legislative measures also have been approved to which he can point. Furthermore, the country has been able to maintain high rates of economic growth with moderate inflation, and the state has modestly expanded its investments in education, health, and housing.
With regard to greater respect for democratic institutions, several important successes occurred during Fernández's first three years in office. One has to do with improvements in the judicial branch. A crucial step was the appointment of a new Supreme Court composed of distinguished jurists in a much more open process through a Council of the Magistrature established by the constitutional reform of 1994. This Supreme Court has sought to review and improve the qualifications of judges throughout the country. In August 1998, Congress also approved a law establishing a judicial career service; the implementation of such a career service is expected to further professionalize and improve the judiciary. Another success was the fact that the congressional and municipal elections held on May 16, 1998, were viewed as free and fair, although the results were disappointing for Fernández. The death of PRD leader Peña Gómez a week before the elections probably helped the PRD win by an even wider margin than expected; with 51.4 percent of the vote, the PRD gained twenty-four of thirty Senate seats, and eighty-three of 149 Chamber of Deputies' seats. The PLD won 30.4 percent of the vote, winning only four Senate seats and forty-nine Chamber seats (sufficient to permit it to uphold a presidential veto). The PRSC, in turn, continued its decline, winning only 16.8 percent of the vote, and electing two senators and seventeen representatives.

As a result of the election, President Fernández was completing his term with continued strong opposition in Congress. In the course of 1999, both the PRD and the PLD were able to choose presidential candidates without causing party splits, even as the PRSC remained beholden to its now nonagenarian leader, Joaquín Balaguer. As of November 1999, the May 2000 presidential elections appeared to be polarized between Hipólito Mejía, the candidate of the PRD, and Danilo Medina, the candidate of the PLD. As neither appeared able to attain a majority in the first round, both were courting Balaguer and the PRSC for potential support in the second round. Thus, the state of the country's political parties (especially the PRSC) and the party system remained in flux as the country prepared for the challenges of the next century.

System of Government

Especially in the period since 1978, the Dominican Republic has had important experiences with democratic politics. At the same time, democracy has been marred by the weakness of
institutions and formal rules, including flawed and sometimes fraudulent elections. Democratization also has been hindered by the lack of sustained progress in strengthening a more democratic and plural civil society, democratizing political institutions, and making state institutions more coherent and more accountable.

To understand the system of government in the Dominican Republic, as well as some of the major challenges political democracy confronts, it is crucial to understand the formal rules as defined by the constitution and electoral and other key laws. It is equally important to understand the informal norms, legacies of patrimonial politics, and strong-man rule under which politics has operated. Laws and legal procedures have often been ignored, manipulated, or changed in the pursuit of power and of policy, including in negotiations to facilitate political transitions or to control the military.

This tension between the formal rules and the informal norms of politics was especially evident during the presidential periods of Balaguer, even when he governed in a somewhat more democratic fashion during the 1986–96 period. Over time, there has been a growing demand from the institutional voices of business and from elements of civil society, particularly those representing middle-sector groups, for a change in this political style. Such elements seek a greater respect for institutionality and the rule of law, both within the state and within political parties. Dominican business people and civil society in general have increasingly recognized that effective citizenship requires reductions in severe poverty and marked inequality as well as improvements in education and health.

Yet, for various reasons, movement away from the informal norms of patrimonial, clientelist politics has been difficult, and much remains to be done. Even presidents who may not have entered office intending to foster these norms have often employed or succumbed to them. Many politicians across all the major parties have continued to pursue political office as much for personal or narrow parochial gain as for the pursuit of ideological or policy goals. Given high levels of poverty, weak societal organizations, and the country's historical patterns, many of the politicians' followers expect them to satisfy demands in a personalist, clientelist fashion, rather than in an institutional, impersonal one. Even as business organizations encourage reform and many companies largely respect the rules, other firms have grown accustomed to operating in an
informal environment and deriving profit from it. And, many groups in civil society have also responded more to clientelist modes of politics than to more participatory, democratic ones.

The Evolution of Constitutional Doctrine

Liberal ideas did not penetrate deeply into the country in the nineteenth century. Constitutions and formal legal institutions were often either ignored or given ex post facto rationalizations; such documents and institutions kept liberal doctrines alive but at the cost of hypocrisy and cynicism. The Dominican Republic appears to fit the general pattern in Latin America in that the number of constitutions correlates inversely with a country’s democratic experience. Having had practically no democratic history until well into the second half of the twentieth century, the country has, nevertheless, experienced a substantial number of new constitutions and other modifications. As was the case in other authoritarian countries, in the Dominican Republic the adoption of a new constitution, especially in the late nineteenth century, often reflected an authoritarian leader’s effort to legitimize or extend his rule. This pattern was to continue well into the twentieth century. However, at times, as elsewhere on the continent, new constitutions in the Dominican Republic also were generated during democratic "turning points," although these tended to be short-lived. Thus, for nearly all of Dominican history, unconstitutional regimes have used constitutionalism to augment their claims to legitimacy rather than employing them to establish general "rules of the game" to which they or other major power holders in the society would commit themselves. At the same time, reformers and democratic leaders sought to generate liberal constitutional texts and to live by them.

The country's first constitution in 1844 was a remarkably liberal document. It was influenced directly by the Haitian constitution of 1843 and indirectly by the United States Constitution of 1789, the liberal 1812 Cadiz Constitution of Spain, and the French constitutions of 1799 and 1804. Because of these influences, the 1844 constitution called for presidentialism, separation of powers, and extensive "checks and balances." But its liberal nature was to be short-lived. General Pedro Santana, claiming that the legislative restrictions on the executive were excessive in a period of war, forced the Constitutional Assembly to add an article granting the president extraordinary powers. Also, although the constitution did not permit immediate pres-
idential reelection, the Assembly elected Santana to two consecutive terms. These actions initiated a pattern in which a strong executive imposed constitutional hypocrisy; careful attention to form went hand in hand with violation of the substance of democratic process and rights.

Genuine efforts to put in place more liberal constitutions that restricted centralized, authoritarian power continued, however. Thus, an even more liberal constitution was prepared in 1854. It, too, was almost immediately modified to vitiate it of an effective legislative check on executive authority: all control over the armed forces was placed directly in the hands of the president. Later in 1854, an essentially authoritarian constitutional text was enacted because Santana, eager to ensure himself even more constitutional authority, successfully pressured the Congress for the change. The change reduced Congress from two chambers to a single, seven-member Senate that was to meet only three months a year; moreover, the president could suspend civil and political rights if deemed necessary. Meanwhile, the country soon descended into a lengthy civil war in which figures from the Cibao region emerged victorious. In 1858 in Moca, an even more liberal and democratic constitutional text was enacted, although, as in 1854, it was never implemented. For the first time in the country's history, however, the constitution called for direct elections for major elected posts; it also prohibited presidential reelection, decentralized authority, and prohibited the death penalty for political crimes.

From the enactment of a Dominican constitution in 1865, following the forced departure of the Spanish, until the United States military entered the country in 1916, sixteen additional constitutional changes took place. Most of these were associated with a change in leadership or with an effort by a leader to provide a legal cover for the extension of his term in office. Yet, they also represented a struggle between the two different constitutional traditions represented by the constitutions of 1854 and 1858. Thus, when Buenaventura Báez Méndez and the Red Party (Partido Rojo) took power in 1865, they forced the Congress to enact a more authoritarian text, in imitation of that of 1854; when Báez was overthrown a year later, a more liberal text was decreed. In turn, when Báez resumed the presidency in 1868, a constitutional shift again occurred. Constitutional changes occurred each year from 1874 to 1879 reflecting the revolts and changes in government that took place. The pat-
tern continued in the next decade, when the leader of the Blue Party (Partido Azul), Gregorio Luperón, called for a National Convention to enact a new liberal constitution. The new constitution was enacted in 1880. This text, in turn, was reformed three more times before the end of the century (in 1881, 1887, and 1897). In 1907 and 1908, political changes were once again associated with constitutional modifications. By 1880, however, the liberal constitutional doctrine, although not the practice, had emerged triumphant.

Constitutional manipulation and hypocrisy continued in the twentieth century, particularly during Trujillo's period in power, when seven constitutional reforms occurred. There was formal obedience to constitutional and electoral requirements, although neither Congress nor the courts were autonomous, the population had no basic rights, and election results were carefully orchestrated. For example, in response to international pressure for democratization following the end of World War II, Trujillo permitted two regime-sponsored opposition parties to run in the 1947 elections; each officially received a similar vote of just under 4 percent of the total, which was carefully distributed so that each could win exactly one deputy seat.

In 1963, following his decisive victory in the presidential elections and his comfortable majority in Congress, Bosch decided to proceed with a significant revision of the country's constitution. The new constitution was promulgated in May 1963. In many ways, the constitution, which included prohibition of presidential reelection, was a model democratic text. However, it drew sharp attacks from conservative and business forces because it curtailed some of the traditional rights of the church and foresaw the possibility of expropriation of property and control of foreign investment. One of the first actions by the military that overthrew Bosch was to declare the new constitution "nonexistent." In turn, over the next several years Bosch sought to "return to constitutional power without elections," ultimately setting the stage for the 1965 conflict between "constitutionalist" and "loyalist" forces that led to the United States intervention.

Following his inauguration as president, Balaguer proceeded to enact a new constitution through Congress. The November 1966 constitution (with important modifications made in 1994) is the text under which the country's democracy currently operates. The new text enhanced presidential powers and permitted unlimited presidential reelection (until 1994),
while removing material objectionable to church and business interests.

The Executive

Within the Dominican Republic, the 1966 constitution is widely viewed as giving the president extraordinary powers (see fig. 5). Although the formal powers of the president are fairly extensive, in fact they are more limited than in several other Latin American countries, given the absence of extensive decree powers, constitutional budgetary powers, a partial veto, and the ability to force referenda.

The president has often been perceived as having near-dictatorial powers because of the willingness of some incumbents, particularly Balaguer, to abuse the powers of their office in the absence of effective checks from the legislature or the judiciary. In doing so, such incumbents built upon historical patterns of patrimonialism and strong-man rule that had gained a degree of support in society. Thus, Balaguer and, to a much lesser extent, other presidents during this period assumed vast informal (and sometimes unconstitutional) powers to create taxes, set budgets by decree, spend money, and ignore numerous laws. In contrast, when presidents have sought to govern in a fashion that is more democratic and more respectful of the other branches of government, such as is largely the case with Leonel Fernández Reyna, who has governed with only minority support in Congress and with a more independent judiciary, their power has appeared more limited and constrained.

The constitution vests executive power in a president who is elected by direct popular vote and whose term of office is four years. Until 1994 nothing in the constitution prohibited a president from seeking reelection. Balaguer was reelected in 1970 and in 1974; following defeats in 1978 and 1982, he was elected again to the presidency in 1986. He was reelected in 1990 and again in 1994. Well-documented allegations of fraud, however, led to international pressure and an internal political crisis that was finally resolved by negotiation and constitutional reform: Balaguer’s presidential term was shortened to two years, and the constitution was amended to prohibit immediate presidential reelection. The 1994 reform also introduced a mandatory second round among the top two vote getters in presidential elections if no candidate received a majority of the votes cast in the first round.
Figure 5. Dominican Republic: Structure of the Government, 1999
The constitution requires that presidential candidates be Dominican citizens by birth or origin, at least thirty years old, and in possession of all political and civil rights. A candidate cannot have been a member of the military or the police for at least one year prior to election. Vice presidential candidates must meet the same qualifications. The vice president may assume the office of president when the chief executive is ill, outside the country, or otherwise unable to perform the duties of the office. If the president dies or becomes permanently unable to carry out the functions of the office, the vice president serves until the next scheduled election. If the vice president is also unable to fill the office, the president of the Supreme Court serves temporarily. Within fifteen days, the president of the Supreme Court must convene the National Assembly (which consists of both houses of the Congress), which must then select a substitute to fill out the term.

The Dominican constitution takes twenty-seven paragraphs in Article 55 to spell out the president's extensive powers. Among the most important are those that grant the president authority over almost all appointments and removals of public officials and that empower him to promulgate the laws passed by Congress; to engage in diplomatic relations; to command, deploy, and make appointments in the armed forces; and to extend pardons. The president also has the right to declare a state of siege or a state of national emergency when Congress is not in session, and to assume special emergency powers against unions and strikes in the face of threats to public order or state security. Historically, the exercise of these emergency powers usually has been the prelude to dictatorship. The few limitations the constitution places on presidential authority focus primarily on the requirement that the president obtain congressional consent to certain appointments, treaty negotiations, and the exercise of emergency powers. In recent years, perhaps the most important constraint on the executive has been the constitutional provision that certain contracts, including foreign assistance loans from international financial institutions, require congressional approval.

The constitution of 1966 provides for cabinet secretaries of state and subcabinet secretaries of state to assist in public administration. These officials must be Dominican citizens, at least twenty-five years of age, with full civil and political rights. The powers of these officials are determined by law and are not set forth in the constitution. However, the president is constitu-
tionally responsible for the actions of such officials. Secretaries of state serve at the president’s discretion, can be removed by the president, and function both as administrators of their secretariats and as agents of presidential authority.

The extent to which presidents have sought to employ the cabinet as a functioning executive body to organize and implement policy has varied considerably. Balaguer rotated individuals in and out of such cabinet positions with great frequency and sometimes appointed people with little relevant background; he also granted the rank of secretary of state to large numbers of individuals other than cabinet ministers. Thus, alongside the formal bureaucratic structure of the state and cabinet with its constant rotation of office-holders, there were the informal cliques of Balaguer’s true confidants. The governments of the PRD and of the PLD differed from this pattern, while still retaining a high degree of personalism, and, in the case of Silvestre Antonio Guzmán Fernández, nepotism.

The Legislature

The 1966 constitution confers all legislative powers on the Congress of the Republic, which consists of a Senate and a Chamber of Deputies. The election of senators and deputies is by direct vote every four years. Until 1994 congressional terms were coterminous with presidential terms. This fact greatly increased the possibility that the president's party would enjoy a majority in the legislature, particularly in the Senate. As a consequence of the 1994 constitutional reform that called for new presidential elections—but not congressional or local ones—in 1996, the electoral calendar now separates presidential elections by two years from elections for congressional and local-level positions. This nonconcurrent timing decreases the likelihood that a president will have majority support in Congress. Under Balaguer the possession of such majorities, at least in the Senate, permitted not only the use but also the abuse of presidential power. However, as a result of the 1994 reform, the country faces the opposing risk of potential deadlock and ungovernability because of executive-legislative confrontation between a minority administration and a Congress dominated by opposition parties.

One senator is elected from each of the country's provinces and from the National District (Santo Domingo); in 1998 the Dominican Senate had thirty members (see fig. 2). This electoral rule provides for significant rural overrepresentation in
the Senate. Deputies also represent provinces, but their seats are appointed on the basis of population. According to the constitution, there should be one deputy for each 50,000 inhabitants in a province, with no fewer than two per province; in reality, adjustments based on census figures have often been delayed. Nevertheless, the more populous provinces and the National District do have larger delegations. In 1998 there were 149 representatives in the Chamber of Deputies, forty-four of whom came from the National District of Santo Domingo. An electoral law approved in 1997 (Law 275–97) calls for the creation of single-member electoral districts in the larger provinces of between 25,001 and 50,000 inhabitants, beginning with the elections of 2002.

Deputies and senators must be Dominican citizens, at least twenty-five years old, with full civil and political rights. They must be natives or residents for at least five years of the province they wish to represent. Naturalized citizens are eligible to run for Congress if they have been Dominican citizens for ten years. Senators and deputies are not allowed to hold another public office concurrently.

The Senate and Chamber of Deputies may meet together as the National Assembly on certain specific occasions cited by the constitution—for example, when both the president and vice president are unable to complete their terms of office and a successor must be designated, or in order to amend the constitution itself. By a three-fourths vote, the Chamber of Deputies may bring accusations against public officials before the Senate, but it has no other exclusive powers. In contrast, the Senate has several exclusive powers. These currently include: choosing the president and members of the Central Electoral Board, electing the members of the Controller’s Office, approving diplomatic appointments made by the president, and hearing cases of public misconduct brought before it by the Chamber of Deputies, with removal possible with a three-fourths vote. As a result of the 1994 constitutional reform, the Senate lost an important prerogative it previously had had, the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court (see The Judiciary, this ch.).

The Congress has broad powers to levy taxes, change the country’s political subdivisions, declare a state of emergency, regulate immigration, approve or reject extraordinary expenditures requested by the executive, legislate on all matters concerning the public debt, examine annually all the acts of the
executive, interrogate members of the cabinet, and legislate on all matters not within the constitutional mandate of other branches of government or contrary to the constitution. By a two-thirds vote of the full membership in each chamber, the Congress can also override a presidential veto of a law previously approved by simple majority.

Historically, the Dominican Congress has been a weak, submissive branch. Its facilities, staffing, offices, and library have been woefully inadequate; in addition, the Court of Accounts, which examines the country’s finances and reports to the Congress, has not provided complete or timely information. In the past several years, some modest steps toward improvement have been taken. Because the selection of candidates to the party lists has been determined by party leaders, legislators have tended to be more responsive to these leaders than to voters. Turnover has been extremely high: from 1970 to 1998, only 18 percent of incumbent senators and only 17 percent of incumbent deputies were reelected to a subsequent term. The turnover has further encouraged legislative weakness and executive predominance. Many legislators have seen their position in Congress as temporarily providing them with an opportunity to focus on issues of personal and parochial gain, rather than on broader ideological or policy issues. The high turnover has also tended to discourage emphasis on building up the institution of the Congress itself. Finally, because the judicial branch until very recently has also tended to be extremely submissive to the executive branch, there has been little the legislature could actually do to prevent abuse of power by the president. This was especially the case with Balaguer, who governed the country with considerable discretion and little effective congressional oversight.

Congress showed more independence during the PRD governments of Antonio Guzmán and Salvador Jorge Blanco between 1978 and 1986, and again under the PLD government of Leónel Fernández (1996–2000). In addition, during his 1986–96 period in office, Balaguer was more limited in his ability to ignore or sidestep Congress than he had been during the 1966–78 period when he had comfortable majorities in both chambers. Even the earlier Balaguer administrations occasionally confronted an obstructionist Congress, however. Indeed, the major power of Congress has been to obstruct and to delay—whether in the pursuit of personal or parochial gain, responding to the wishes of interest groups or other societal
allies, or as a result of genuine policy or ideological differences. The PRD governments were especially frustrated by factions within their own parties, although they also faced opposition from the PRSC and PLD representatives. President Fernández, in turn, has been confronted particularly with opposition from the PRD, especially after it gained congressional seats in the 1998 election.

The Judiciary

Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice and by other courts created by the constitution and by law. The country has general courts, which consider civil, criminal, commercial, and labor issues (except for labor matters in the major urban areas of Santo Domingo, Santiago, San Francisco de Macorís, and San Pedro de Macorís), and certain specialized courts, namely land courts, labor courts (in the country’s four major urban areas), tax courts, and new children’s courts that were mandated by a 1994 law. The country also has other courts or offices with judicial functions, which do not form a part of the judicial branch. These include the Police Tribunal, the Military Tribunal, and the Central Electoral Board, which administers elections and is the unappealable arbiter of all disputes related to elections, with complaints being heard in the first instance by municipal electoral boards.

Under the Supreme Court there are nine Courts of Appeals, which hear appeals of decisions from Courts of First Instance. There are eighty-three of these Courts of First Instance, which, unlike the Supreme Court or the Appeals Courts, are presided over by only one judge. There are also 214 justices of the peace, who hear cases of small claims or minor crimes. In addition, there are also four Labor Courts of Appeal, and single Courts of Appeal for tax and for land issues; under these are the respective specialized courts of first instance.

Centralized and hierarchical, the Dominican legal system is patterned after the French system; its basic codes for criminal and civil procedure date back to 1884. The legal system has employed a code-law legal system rather than a common law system such as the one used in the United States. Detailed and comprehensive, the codes leave little room for United States-style judicial activism or citation of precedent. Legal reasoning is deductive (from the codes), rather than inductive or based on past cases.
Until a 1994 constitutional reform enacted substantial changes to the 1966 constitution, the judiciary was particularly dependent upon the other branches of government. Prior to the reform, judges were chosen by the Senate, not by the president, ostensibly to limit executive power. The Senate also selected judges for the lower courts. Because judges were not named for any specific term of office, the result was a highly politicized process of nomination and rotation in office. Furthermore, the president could name all public employees in the judicial branch, as well as temporarily name judges if vacancies occurred. Other problems cited as affecting the judiciary have included low pay, poor working conditions, staff shortages, and allegations of corruption and influence-peddling.

The 1994 constitutional reform was intended to enhance the independence and autonomy of the judiciary. It called for the establishment of a Council of the Magistrature (Consejo de la Magistratura) whose sole purpose is to name the judges of the Supreme Court. The Council consists of the president, the president of the Senate, a senator chosen by the Senate from a political party different from the president of the Senate, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, a representative chosen by the Chamber from a party different from the president of the Chamber, the president of the Supreme Court, and another judge from the Supreme Court, chosen by the Court. The reform gave the Supreme Court the power to select judges for all the courts under it, as well as to name administrative personnel for the judicial branch. Furthermore, it called for the establishment of a judicial career (judicial civil service), and for life tenure for judges in the context of this judicial civil service. And, it enabled the president, the president of the Senate or the Chamber, or any interested party to appeal to the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of a law. After the new court was installed, it held public hearings to evaluate all sitting judges and replaced about two-thirds of them.

Requirements for appointment as a Supreme Court justice and other powers of the Court remain as established by the 1966 constitution. Supreme Court justices must be Dominican citizens by birth or origin, at least thirty-five years old, with full political and civil rights. They are required to have a law degree and to have practiced law or held judicial office for at least twelve years. These requirements become progressively less strict for lower-court justices. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to assume jurisdiction in matters affecting the
president and other high officials, act as a court of cassation, serve as a court of last instance in matters forwarded from appellate courts, exercise final disciplinary action over other members of the judiciary, and transfer justices from one jurisdiction to another.

Implementation of the 1994 constitutional reforms has been slow but significant. The Council of the Magistrature was formed in late 1996, and in August 1997 new members of the Supreme Court were named. This new Supreme Court is widely viewed as professional and nonpartisan, and for the first time in the country's history, business, professional, and middle-sector groups from civil society played an active role in the nomination and screening process. Critical judicial reforms have also made gradual progress. The Supreme Court evaluated and replaced many of the country's judges, leading to improvements in the system's efficiency and effectiveness. A law establishing a judicial career service was promulgated in August 1998, and in August 1999 a National School for the Judiciary was established to improve the training and the quality of the country's judges. With these changes, the quality of the country's judiciary and the historical subservience of the courts to the government in power appears to be changing slowly.

Public Administration

Historically, the Dominican Republic has been marked by a public administration dominated by patronage and clientelist relations, with nepotism, corruption, and inefficiency as common features. Although initial civil service legislation was passed under the United States military occupation of 1916–24, and changed several times thereafter, the legislation was never truly implemented. Indeed, the legislation was actually abolished in 1951 by President Trujillo. Under Trujillo, the state was largely an instrument for the benefit of the dictator; this meant there was little localized or decentralized corruption not countenanced by Trujillo or his closest cronies.

Following the fall of Trujillo, no ruler retained as full a personalist control over the state and its personnel as he had experienced. Balaguer (1966–78; 1986–96) came closest, especially in his first twelve years in office. Under Balaguer's administration, the executive centralized expenditures and power through contracts and patronage networks, and widely ignored administrative regulations and bureaucratic norms. Although
the governments of Guzmán (1978–82) and Jorge Blanco (1982–86) did not attain as extreme a level of centralization, their administrations were marked by clientelist favoritism, nepotism, and corruption. Fernández's government has sought to initiate significant state reforms, while not totally ignoring clientelist uses of the state; one of its first measures was to increase the salary offered for high posts in government from the extremely low levels to which they had fallen under Balaguer.

In addition to receiving low salaries, Dominican public officials historically had little protection in their jobs. A civil service law was approved in 1991 and finally implemented by the executive in 1994. However, at that time only an extremely limited number of employees, primarily those working in fields related to insurance and banking services, were allowed to seek incorporation into the civil service. Under the Fernández administration, the civil service was expanded to include employees in several secretariats of state, including the Technical Secretariat of the Presidency, Labor, Foreign Affairs, and the Attorney General's office. Indeed, without further restructuring that set guidelines for determining professionalism, qualifications, and salary rates in other areas of the public sector, such a law could conceivably complicate public-sector efficiency rather than improve it.

From the cabinet level to the lowest ranks, traditionally almost all civil servants have been appointed, served, and could be removed largely at the will of the president. The result was a patronage-dominated system in which public-sector jobs were given out in return for loyalty and service. Hence merit, achievement, and competence were not always the main criteria guiding government appointments. The public bureaucracy was often characterized by incompetence even at the highest levels. Nepotism and corruption—a favor in return for a favor, the granting of special governmental privileges to favored persons, private enrichment stemming from public service, outright bribery—were also widespread. Those who tried to be honest were scorned and considered foolish by their colleagues. Indeed, for some, government service was thought of not so much as an honored career but as a brief opportunity to indulge oneself at the public trough. The frequent failure of government programs could often be attributed directly to the corruption and incompetence of the bureaucracy. And, just as the use and abuse of state funds were common at election time,
a public-sector worker was often expected to do political work for his or her patron.

The abuse of the public sector and of public administration was particularly evident during Balaguer's governments. Although he insisted that corruption stopped "at the door of his office," he openly acknowledged the legitimacy of what he politely termed "commissions," allowing his family members to accept ostensible donations and gifts by favored contractors. Balaguer rarely called cabinet meetings, although he named dozens of people as secretaries of state without portfolio. Around election time, in particular, he openly countenanced corruption and the abuse of state resources. Balaguer's policy of rotating individuals in and out of government positions extended to the appointment of governors of the Central Bank; indeed, in a sample of fifty-eight countries over the past several decades, the Dominican Republic had the second lowest average tenure, around twenty-one months, for a Central Bank governor (only Argentina was lower). The PRD administrations, particularly that of Jorge Blanco, were not free of these problems, although they tended to be more rational in their naming of cabinet officials.

Under President Fernández, until August 1999 there were fifteen secretaries of state: an administrative secretary of state for the presidency, a technical secretary of state for the presidency, and twelve additional secretaries of state administering various secretariats. In August 1999, Congress approved the establishment of a new secretary of state for women. In addition, as of year-end 1999, the Central Bank governor named by Balaguer in 1994 had retained his position.

In addition to the cabinet secretaries of state, in 1999 the country had some two dozen autonomous and semiautonomous agencies. The autonomous and semiautonomous agencies were established in the early 1960s to administer new public programs as well as the vast properties and enterprises inherited by the state after the death of Trujillo. These agencies administer an array of programs and enterprises, ranging from farm loans to cooperatives to vast sugar lands. The largest of these is the State Sugar Council (Consejo Estatal del Azúcar—CEA), which at one time had 85,000 employees, making it the largest employer in the country and its most important exporter. Among the others are the Dominican State Enterprises Corporation (Corporación Dominicana de Empresas Estatales—Corde), in which twenty-three state-owned enter-
prises that had belonged to Trujillo were consolidated, and the Dominican Electricity Corporation (Corporación Dominicana de Electricidad—CDE) (see Industry, ch. 3).

These agencies traditionally have been dominated by patronage considerations, plagued by corruption and inefficiency, and sometimes plundered for electoral purposes. By the end of Balaguer's last term in office in 1996, even enterprises that once had been profitable were plagued with deficits. The government was being forced to subsidize the CEA, which had once provided the government with a steady stream of revenue. In addition, the CDE confronted a situation in which more than half of the electricity that it sold was either lost in transmission or distribution or not paid for, even as the country was plagued with frequent outages.

Under President Fernández, some steps toward rationalization of some public enterprises and the privatization of others were initiated during his first three years in office, following passage of the Public Enterprise Reform Law of 1997. However, in the face of protests from nationalists and workers at the firms, as well as resistance from opposition parties that feared the administration might use funds received from privatization for partisan political purposes, the government was proceeding slowly. By the end of 1999, steps had been taken to privatize the distribution of energy; to further privatize some of the production of electricity; to allow private investments in some CEA lands, with the expectation that many of the state's sugar mills would be leased to the private sector; and to permit greater private-sector involvement in areas such as the management of the country's seaports and airports.

Local Government

The Dominican system of local government, like the Dominican legal system, has been based on the French system of top-down rule and strong central authority. In late 1999, the country was divided into twenty-nine provinces plus the National District (Santo Domingo). The provinces in turn were subdivided into a total of 108 municipalities. Each province is administered by a civil governor appointed by the president. A governor must be a Dominican citizen, at least twenty-five years old, and in full possession of civil and political rights. The powers and duties of governors are set by law. The constitution establishes the structure of local government; its specific functions are enumerated in the municipal code.
The municipalities and the National District are governed by mayors (called sindicos) and municipal councils, both popularly elected to four-year terms. The size of the council depends on the size of the municipality, but each is required to have at least five members. The qualifications of local officials as well as the powers and duties of mayors and councils are set by law. Naturalized citizens can hold municipal office provided they have lived in the community at least ten years.

Neither provinces nor municipalities have any significant independent power to levy taxes. As a result, historically few services have been initiated at the local level. There are no local police departments, only a single national force. Policy and programs relating to education, social services, roads, electricity, and public works likewise are administered at the national level, rather than at the provincial or municipal level. Local government, therefore, has been weak and ineffective, not only because it has lacked taxing authority, but also because in the Dominican system the central government sets almost all policy.

Starting in the early 1960s, the Bosch government made various efforts to strengthen Dominican local government. A new Dominican Municipal League came into existence in 1962, and
efforts were made to develop community spirit, local initiative, and self-help projects. These projects were not wholly successful, in large part because of the traditional arrangement under which almost all power flowed downward from the central government. A small step was taken with the passage of a law in 1983 that mandated that a percentage of the country's taxes be distributed to municipalities. Enforcement of the law, particularly under President Balaguer, was uneven, however.

In the 1990s, as a consequence of the focus of international aid agencies on decentralization, the emergence of groups in Dominican civil society pressuring for change, and the desire of some opposition political parties to coordinate local development efforts, additional pressure for change emerged. An important potential advance took place with the passage of a January 1997 law providing that 4 percent of the central government's national budget be transferred to municipal governments. The law did not clearly specify the functions or responsibilities of a municipality, however.

Decentralization efforts under President Fernández, however, became mired in partisan politics. Following the 1998 local elections, which led to PRD plurality victories in more than half of the country's municipalities, the PRD expected to retain control of the secretary generalship of the Dominican Municipal League and thus of the enhanced resources provided for under the new law, which promised to be a key source of patronage. However, the PRD publicly accused the Fernández administration of attempting to bribe electors in order to take control of the League by supporting a candidate from the PRSC. In January 1999, following several tense incidents between riot police and PRD party members, two parallel assemblies elected two different persons as secretary general to head the League, through which would flow approximately US$400 million. The candidate of the PRSC supported by the PLD ultimately gained control of the League offices. In February 1999, President Fernández proposed a political dialogue in order to resolve several critical issues including this one, others such as the composition of the Central Electoral Board leading up to the 2000 elections, and various key administrative bills stalemated in Congress (see Electoral System, this ch.). With regard to the Dominican Municipal League, an ad-hoc committee of notables was formed to help determine how funds should be disbursed.
Electoral System

Voting is free, secret, and obligatory for both men and women. Suffrage is available to anyone eighteen years old or older, or any married person regardless of age. Members of the police or armed forces are ineligible to vote, as are those who have lost their political and civil rights, for example, incarcerated criminals. Polls are open from 6 am to 6 pm on the day of elections, which is not a working day. The method of voting has frequently been changed. In the 1996 and 1998 elections, women have voted in the morning and men in the afternoon. The process was as follows: on election day voters went to their voting station to register; once registration closed, voting began. This process (known as colegios cerrados) was mandated by a 1994 constitutional reform, and was intended to prevent the possibility of double voting. And, on the basis of a 1997 law, for the first time in 1998, political parties received public funding. For other provisions of the 1997 law, see below.

Elections in the Dominican Republic historically have been highly problematic and crisis-ridden. Opposition parties have usually questioned the use and abuse of state resources by the governing party, and the campaign period leading up to election day has often been marked by widespread distrust, allegations of fraud, and violence associated with campaign events. In recent years, as a consequence of fraud and protest, particularly in the 1990 and 1994 elections, important modifications in the electoral law have been made.

At the center of the problem with elections has been doubts about the objectivity, capability, and autonomy of the country’s Central Electoral Board (Junta Central Electoral—JCE), which, along with its subsidiary municipal boards, is responsible for overseeing elections. These agencies combine administrative, regulatory, and judicial functions. The JCE is responsible for managing the voter registry list, regulating the campaign and administering the elections; it is also the unappealable arbiter of all disputes related to elections, with complaints being heard in the first instance by municipal electoral boards. The autonomy and credibility of the JCE have been affected by a number of factors. Its judges are named by the Senate (or by the president if the Senate is not in session and does not subsequently act) for terms that can be coterminous with each electoral period; partisan political criteria often have been uppermost. In a number of elections, an imperfect alternative to a strong
JCE was the use of ad-hoc mediating and support commissions or international observers or mediators.

As a consequence of the 1990 electoral crisis, an electoral law was passed in 1992 that instituted a number of reforms. This law provided the JCE with greater legal budgetary independence. It also provided that henceforth Dominican citizens would receive a single card that would serve both as an identity card and an electoral card; prior to this law, the JCE shared responsibility with the executive branch for the management of the offices that provided the personal identification cards that citizens had to present along with electoral cards distributed by the JCE in order to vote. Naturally, this enhanced fears by opposition parties that the emission of identity cards could be manipulated to favor the government party. Like much of the rest of the state, the JCE has also paid woefully low salaries, a situation that has improved somewhat since 1996.

As a consequence of the 1992 law, building up to the 1994 elections the JCE leadership was expanded from three to five judges—three chosen by the governing PRSC party and two by opposition parties. The JCE also issued a new national and electoral identity card and prepared a new electoral roll, which ended up being flawed and at the center of significant fraud in the elections carried out that year. Thus, the JCE remained an institutionally weak, politicized institution.

For the 1996 elections, rather than choosing JCE judges with partisan criteria paramount, independent figures were named, who remained in place for the 1998 elections. Both these elections were relatively trouble free. However, partisan criteria again played a hand when JCE judges were chosen to oversee the presidential election of the year 2000. In August 1998, the PRD-dominated Senate named all five of the JCE judges without consultation with the opposition parties. This action once again made the composition of the JCE an issue of serious contention among the country's major political parties. Finally, after extensive negotiations, in June 1999 the Senate named two additional JCE judges, one identified with the PLD and the other with the PRSC.

The electoral law of 1997 (Law 275–97) mandated a number of important changes in electoral procedures. In addition to requiring public funding of political parties, the law instituted a 25 percent quota for female candidates. The requirement helped improve female representation in the Chamber of Deputies, which went from 8.6 percent female representation in
1994 to 16.1 percent in 1998, and in the municipal councils, which went from 14.7 percent female representation in 1994 to 26.5 percent in 1998. The law also called for the creation of electoral subdistricts of three to four representatives each in large multimember provinces such as Santo Domingo and Santiago, to begin in 2002. Furthermore, the 1997 law permits Dominicans abroad to vote in presidential elections, beginning in the year 2000.

**Political Parties**

For a country with relatively limited experience with political democracy, the Dominican Republic has a surprisingly strong set of political parties. However, the party system is currently in a state of flux as the parties confront the risks of potential fragmentation over leadership succession issues. Since the 1960s, the country has had two important political parties: the Reformist Party (Partido Reformista—PR), now the Reformist Social Christian Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano—PRSC), and the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano—PRD). A third party, the Party of Dominican Liberation (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana—PLD), was formed in 1973 and gradually became electorally important in the course of the 1980s. In addition to these three parties, numerous other minor parties have occasionally garnered support.

Prior to the Trujillo period (1930–61), parties were weakly organized, had insubstantial leadership, were neither very ideological nor programmatic, and were generally based on personalist followings rather than concrete programs. Trujillo organized the Dominican Party (Partido Dominicano) to provide himself with support, even though elections were fraudulent. Following Trujillo's assassination and the forced exile of his brothers and then of Balaguer, the party was officially banned.

When Balaguer returned from exile to campaign for the presidency in 1966, he recaptured central elements of the conservative constituency that had formed the bulwark of Trujillo's support among rural, less-educated, older, and female voters. He further sustained their loyalty and support by employing the power of the presidency and state resources on their behalf. During the 1966–78 period when he was president, several high-level military figures also played a prominent role in the party. Moreover, military pressure eased Balaguer's reelec-
tion in 1970 and 1974; nearly all of the opposition ultimately refrained from participating. Balaguer also consistently retained the support of the conservative Roman Catholic hierarchy within the country. The PR was Balaguer’s personal machine, largely ignored when he was in office, except at election time. As such, it lacked a clear-cut program or coherent ideology, although Balaguer continued to reiterate themes of order, nationalism, religiosity, and anti-Haitianism.

In 1986 Balaguer supported the merging of his party with existing minor Christian Democratic parties, opening the way for the integration of his newly named PRSC (the former PR party) into the Christian Democratic Union. As with the much longer lasting and more deeply rooted link between the PRD and the Socialist International, this association brought the PRSC international visibility, financial and technical assistance, and the promise, never realized, of an ideological basis for the party. Although the merger did assist Balaguer in his electoral comeback that year, from 1978 to 1994, electoral support for the PR (or PRSC since 1986) oscillated fairly narrowly between around 35 percent and 42 percent of the vote. The party won elections for the most part because of divisions in the opposition and some use of fraud.

Throughout his political career, Balaguer has consistently retained absolute control over the PRSC, forcing out or weakening potential adversaries within the party. In 1996, when he was constitutionally barred from running for the presidency again, he refused to campaign for or ultimately vote for his own party’s candidate in the first round of the presidential ballot; instead, he first quietly supported Leonel Fernández of the PLD, and then openly endorsed him for the second-round ballot. In 1996 support for the party dropped precipitously to only 15 percent in the first-round presidential election, and it has remained at that low level. Although Balaguer turned ninety-two in 1999, he retains control of the PRSC. There are serious questions about the future of the party once Balaguer dies.

Another major party is the PRD, which was founded in 1939 by exiles from the Trujillo dictatorship, including Juan Bosch. It functioned as an exile organization for twenty-two years before returning to the Dominican Republic in 1961 after Trujillo’s assassination. The PRD was able to win an impressive victory in the 1962 elections, through extensive organizational work and a campaign that focused on helping the poor. This electoral victory led to the ephemeral government of Juan
Bosch, which was overthrown after only seven months in office. Yet, the PRD as a strong party was ultimately forged through this initial victory and overthrow, and the further heroics of civil war, foreign intervention, and subsequent repression under Balaguer. The struggle for democracy during the 1970s under these conditions and the hard bureaucratic work associated with it helped to build a strong organization led by José Francisco Peña Gómez, who often served as the party's secretary general. The party continued to prosper in spite of Bosch's departure in 1973 in order to create a new party. Bosch, who had become radicalized as a consequence of the 1965 United States intervention, was promoting the notion of "dictatorship with popular support."

Following Bosch's departure, the PRD pursued a three-pronged strategy to assume power in 1978. It continued its extensive organizational work, particularly in the country's major urban areas where the bulk of its supporters were found. The party also moderated its nationalist, statist, and reformist program and purposely named a very moderate figure, Guzmán, as its presidential candidate. In addition, it assiduously strengthened its international contacts, both with the Socialist International and with liberal politicians in the United States. As a consequence, when the Dominican military sought to block the vote count and prevent a PRD victory in 1978, the party was able to draw upon support from the United States and other international allies, as well as from a variety of domestic groups and to secure the presidency. In 1982, with Jorge Blanco as its presidential candidate, the PRD was once again able to win the country's national elections.

The eight-year period during which the PRD held the presidency turned out to be an acute disappointment for the country and for the party, however. The party was forced to oversee a difficult period of economic stabilization as a result of the debt crisis. At the same time, each of the presidencies became marked by bitter intraparty division as the party increasingly lost its ideological moorings and its factions fought for power and spoils. The first term was marked by the tragic suicide of Guzmán near the end of his term. Guzmán had bitterly opposed Jorge Blanco's nomination as the party's candidate for president, and as he became increasingly isolated within the party, he feared retribution and corruption charges against family members by the incoming administration. The term presided over by Jorge Blanco saw an increase in levels of corrup-
tion, clientelist practices, and infighting by PRD leaders. Combined with the country's economic decline, these practices helped lead to the electoral comeback of Balaguer in 1986. The prosecution and conviction of Jorge Blanco on corruption charges by Balaguer (a case still under appeal as of year-end 1999), further weakened the party. Factional divisions finally led to a formal party split in the period leading up to the 1990 elections. Peña Gómez retained the party name and symbols, while the party's 1986 candidate, Jacobo Majluta Azar, formed the Independent Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Independiente—PRI). The latter party received only 7.0 percent of the vote in the 1990 elections and subsequently declined further.

During the 1990s, Peña Gómez gradually supplanted formal notions of internal party democracy and assumed the role of uncontested leader within the PRD. He failed to attain the presidency, however. In 1994 it is likely that fraud robbed him of the margin of victory. In 1996 the introduction of a second-round presidential election—held because no party had received a majority in the first round—and an effective alliance between the PLD and the PRSC in the second round prevented him from winning. Peña Gómez's death just a week before the 1998 congressional and local elections helped the PRD to gain 51.4 percent of the vote, which translated into twenty-four of the country's thirty Senate seats and eighty-three representatives in the Chamber of Deputies. The party also won majorities in many municipalities. The PRD then successfully limited factional infighting and maintained organizational coherence while selecting its presidential nominee for the May 2000 elections, something it had not been able to do leading up to the elections of 1986 and 1990. Hipólito Mejía handily won a presidential primary the party held in June 1999, and successfully incorporated the two major losing candidates, Rafael Suberví and Hatuey DeCamps, into high-level positions within the party.

Remarkably, Juan Bosch is the founder of two of the country's three major parties. In 1973 he left the PRD to found the PLD, positioning it as a more radical, cadre-oriented, ideologically coherent, and organizationally solid party. Its major initial strength was among educated, nationalist, radicalized urban middle-sector and labor groups. Gradually, as the country's economic situation declined during the 1980s and the PRD was weakened by internecine struggles, Bosch and the PLD reen-
tered the electoral arena. From a mere 1.1 percent of the vote in 1978, the PLD’s support grew to 9.9 percent in 1982 and 18.4 percent in 1986. In 1990 a much more moderate PLD campaigned on promises of honesty, efficient government, and gradual reform. It gained 33.9 percent of the vote, losing the presidency to Balaguer by a very slim margin, which many Dominicans are convinced was the result of fraud. Although the PLD continued to retain a more complex organizational structure and a greater respect for internal party norms than did Balaguer’s PRSC, Bosch remained its unquestioned leader; individuals perceived as potential threats were occasionally forced out of the party.

During the 1990s, the PLD continued to moderate its ideological position. Retaining a modest nationalism and focus on good governance, as well as a strong organizational structure, the party sought to reach out more effectively to broader sectors of Dominican society. In 1994 an aging and ailing Bosch was able to capture only 13.1 percent of the vote. As a result of the agreement following that election, Balaguer’s term was shortened by two years, and he agreed not to seek reelection. Because of his age and poor health, Bosch agreed to step down as leader and presidential candidate for the PLD and endorsed the party’s nominee, Leonel Fernández. With Fernández’s victory in the 1996 presidential elections, the PLD reached the country’s highest office; ironically, however, the once radical party did so by defeating the PRD through a coalition with the conservative Balaguer. The PLD, however, has been stymied by its lack of support in Congress. In the 1998 elections, it received 30.4 percent of the vote, slightly increasing its presence in Congress, especially in the Chamber of Deputies where it was able to elect forty-nine representatives, just enough to uphold a presidential veto. Nevertheless, President Fernández has remained a generally popular figure. And, his favored candidate within the PLD, his close adviser and Secretary of the Presidency Danilo Medina, won the party’s nomination through a closed party primary in June 1999 to be the PLD candidate for the May 2000 elections. The major future challenges for the PLD are consolidating its support among the parts of the electorate it won over from the PRSC and winning over new voters, while preventing factional strife and division.

In addition to these major parties, the PRSC, the PLD, and the PRD, the Dominican Republic has had multiple minor parties. Some of these have been little more than personalist vehi-
cles that have permitted their leaders to maintain a certain presence in the national arena, sometimes by establishing alliances with one of the major parties. Others have been created by leaders who have lost factional struggles within one of the major parties. Extreme-left and communist parties have never had much of a popular following in the country, and they have often been consumed by internecine conflicts and by bitter attacks against the PRD and then the PLD. Following the end of the Cold War, these parties declined even further as electoral vehicles, when some of their leaders joined the PRD or the PLD, and others focused more of their attention on social movements.

As the Dominican Republic enters the new century, each of its major parties confronts challenges that could lead to significant changes in the party system. And, as elsewhere on the continent and, indeed, in the world, political parties in the country confront high levels of skepticism within an electorate that often perceives them as inefficient, self-serving organizations rather than as effective means of representing their interests. The PRD remains the party with the strongest membership and following, but it knows it risks a repeat of factional division or loss of support because of poor performance in government. The PRSC has experienced sharply declining electoral support as its aging leader was forced from the presidency, yet Balaguer retains a firm grip on the party. It is unlikely that any other leader will be able to retain the loyalty of this electorate to the degree that Balaguer did, and the fate of the party is very much in question once he dies. Meanwhile, as its relatively lackluster performance in the 1998 congressional elections indicates, the PLD has not yet consolidated support among the voters who gave it a presidential victory in 1996.

**Interest Groups and Social Actors**

In the Dominican Republic, numerous factors have militated against the establishment and maintenance of a dynamic civil society characterized by a multiplicity of interest groups and associations. Historically, the most important factors that explain this lack include poverty and low rates of education, high levels of inequality, repressive governments such as that of Trujillo (1930–61), which quashed any independent organizations, and the reliance of political actors on clientelism and patronage. Since 1961, and especially since the early 1980s, socioeconomic changes and international influences have had
contradictory consequences regarding the development of civil society. Urbanization, education, economic growth, the growth of middle-sector groups, some return migration, and support from international aid and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have all helped the development of civil society. At the same time, economic crisis and wrenching economic changes have helped weaken labor and popular-sector organizations, and large-scale migration has also involved a significant "brain drain" of many talented Dominicans.

Overall, this sector remains quite weak, with business and middle-sector groups overrepresented. Yet, during the past several decades, more interest groups and a more self-consciously identified civil society have emerged. This civil society has played an important role in seeking to strengthen Dominican democracy, both in terms of political rights and a greater respect for institutionality and the rule of law. Its influence has been apparent in efforts to generate national agendas for reform and in more specific areas such as electoral reform (including the pursuit of gender equality through measures such as quotas for women on electoral lists), electoral observation, and judicial reform. At the same time, the role of two traditionally powerful actors, the Roman Catholic Church and the armed forces, has also evolved during the past several decades. The church has moderated its position and seen some of its influence wane in the face of the growth of Protestantism and secularization, and the role of the military in domestic affairs has declined although institutionalized, democratic, civilian control over the military yet remains to be achieved.

**Economic Elites**

The Dominican Republic's economy has undergone a major transformation, especially in the period since the mid-1980s. Until the 1970s, the country's economy was fundamentally based on the export of selected agricultural crops such as sugar, tobacco, coffee, and cocoa, and of minerals such as ferronickel. A set of industrialists who produced goods for a heavily protected domestic market also existed. However, during the 1980s, as sugar exports declined drastically, dramatic growth occurred in light industry for export in free-trade zones and in tourism. As a consequence, the once important Association of Landowners and Agriculturists (Asociación de Hacendados y Agricultores) was gradually overshadowed in importance by associations related to industry, finance, real
estate, telecommunications, tourism, and free-trade zones; importers and commercial interests continued to retain powerful organizations, however. Behind the array of seemingly formal organizational structures lies the reality that many sectors of the economy are dominated by a few large firms that often form part of family conglomerates that sometimes have complex histories of collaboration and rivalry.

Efforts to construct a powerful, united umbrella organization of private-sector interests has had mixed results. The closest approximation is the National Council of Private Enterprise (Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Privada—Conep), which, however, has seen defections during the 1990s as a result of tensions over the nature and pace of the opening up of the economy. Such tensions have divided local industrialists from importers.

**Middle Class**

By the 1990s, Dominican society no longer consisted of a small landed elite at the top and a huge mass of peasants at the bottom, with almost no one in between. In large part as a result of the economic development and modernization that had occurred since the end of the Great Depression, a sizable, heterogeneous middle class had emerged that comprised 30 to 35 percent of the population (see Urban Society, ch. 2).

The middle class consists of shopkeepers, government officials, clerks, military personnel, white-collar workers of all kinds, teachers, professionals, and the better-paid members of the working class. Most of the middle class resides in Santo Domingo, but secondary cities like Santiago, Barahona, Monte Cristi, La Romana, San Francisco de Macorís, and San Pedro de Macorís have also developed sizable middle-class populations.

The middle class has come to predominate within the country's major political institutions: the Roman Catholic Church, the military officer corps, government service, political parties, interest groups, and even trade union leadership. It also has provided important leadership for civil society organizations committed to good governance and clean government, and has supported women's and environmental issues and community development. Yet, many in the middle class remain quite conservative, reflecting the fact that this social group has often been divided on social and political issues. Generally, its members advocate peace, order, stability, and economic progress,

196
although increasingly many also want democracy and respect for institutions and the rule of law.

During the late 1960s and early 1970s, many middle-class elements supported Balaguer because he was thought to stand for those things they wanted; later, chafing under Balaguer's personalism and economic decline, they supported the PRD governments of Guzmán and Jorge Blanco. As a result of the failure of these governments to reform conditions in the country, which led thousands in the middle class to migrate, they turned away from the PRD, toward either the PRSC or the PLD. Partly, their turn from the PRD came because many held anti-Haitian sentiments and thus did not wish to support the PRD's Peña Gómez. In 1996 many supported the PLD.

**Trade Unions and Popular Organizations**

Organized labor in the Dominican Republic has always been weak (see Labor, ch. 3). Labor was repressed under Trujillo, who passed very restrictive legislation in 1951; labor also experienced severe restrictions under Balaguer in the 1966-78 period. Although a labor code passed in May 1992 established new rights for workers and unions, organized labor remains weak and politically divided in three larger and several smaller labor confederations that represent 12 percent of the work force. Even following passage of the 1992 labor code, many employers replace workers who try to organize. They can do so because the country has high rates of unemployment and underemployment and a surplus of unskilled labor. The practice of replacing workers is especially prevalent in the country's export-oriented free-trade zones, where unionization and collective bargaining are largely absent. Some of the strongest unions are found among middle-sector professionals employed by the public sector, such as medical personnel and teachers; such professionals often obtain salary increases only after threatened or actual work stoppages.

Trade union organizations have often been closely allied with individual political parties; in recent years, however, identification of the major confederations with individual political parties has declined. Rivalry across trade union federations has often been intense, and most of the union organizations have suffered from weak funding and limited staff. In recent years, support from international labor federations and NGOs has supplemented more modest domestic revenue sources. Sometimes employers have engaged in what could be described as...
union-breaking activities, including the summoning of police to put down union activities. These and other conditions have both weakened and politicized the labor movement. Because collective bargaining is limited to only a few of the larger firms, political action, such as street demonstrations, marches to the National Palace, and general strikes, is a widely used tactic. These tactics are meant to put pressure on the government to side with the workers in labor disputes.

During the 1980s, a number of important urban, neighborhood-based protest organizations emerged. Their emergence was facilitated by greater democratic freedoms under PRD governments, and sometimes by the assistance of local church and other activists as well as by international aid. The activism of these groups was enhanced by the country's growing economic crisis. Typically, they focused on local-level demands such as salary increases, price reductions for basic products, and improvements in public transportation, water, and electricity services. Despite various efforts by the organizations during the 1980s and 1990s to move toward more effective, centralized, unified action, such efforts largely failed. Tensions within the organizations and between them and the already divided labor movement were also sometimes exploited by the government, particularly under Balaguer, who was a master at employing patronage and clientelism to coopt leaders and divide and weaken popular movements.

Similarly, independent peasant groups have been limited, weak, and often politically fragmented. Balaguer excelled at such political fragmentation. He retained loyal support among many in the rural sector through his appeals for a conservative, Roman Catholic nationalism and for order and stability. He also occasionally distributed land titles and other personalist benefits, even as the urban bias of many government policies led to massive rural to urban migration as well as emigration overseas. Furthermore, trade union and peasant organizations have rarely succeeded in forming a workable joint organization composed of Dominicans and Haitian migrants. Indeed, during 1999, the Dominican government took steps to try to limit the influx of Haitians and to repatriate some it considered to be in the country illegally. The increased presence of Haitians, in part because of the deteriorating situation in that country, once again became a sensitive issue domestically.
Dominican Republic: Government and Politics

Mass Media

Starting in the early 1960s, the Dominican Republic experienced a communications revolution. The spread of radio, television, and newspapers awakened the previously isolated countryside, stimulated rapid urbanization, and led to the political mobilization of millions of persons who had never participated in politics before. In addition, since Trujillo's death in 1961, the Dominican media have been among the freest in Latin America.

In the 1990s, Dominicans have access to a multiplicity of radio and television stations domestically, including several that are state-owned and managed; many Dominicans also have access to major United States, Spanish, and Latin American networks through various satellite cable companies. All radio and television stations are government-licensed, a situation that has sometimes led to charges of undue pressure and manipulation. Furthermore, at election time, the state-owned media have usually been blatantly partisan in favor of the incumbent administration's candidates. As ownership of television units has grown, television has become the major medium through which the public receives its news. Those who cannot afford a set of their own often watch at neighbors' houses or in public places such as bars or shops.

The country's major newspaper is the Listín Diario, founded in 1889 and revived in 1964. Santo Domingo boasts a number of other significant dailies as well, including Hoy, El Siglo, El Caribe, El Nacional, and Última Hora. These newspapers circulate nationally, although other cities also have smaller papers. Ownership of newspapers tends to be concentrated in family-held conglomerates, which sometimes use their control of the press to advance the interests of their firms or to attack those of their rivals. Journalists are not always well paid and sometimes accept additional remuneration from government offices, political parties, or firms. Not surprisingly, objectivity in reporting sometimes suffers. At the same time, investigative reporting of alleged corruption, abuse, and negligence by government and by private-sector firms, previously almost unknown, has gained impetus over the past decade in these daily newspapers and also in the weekly newsmagazine, Rumbo.

Roman Catholic Church

The Dominican Republic remains about 80 percent Roman
Catholic despite major gains by Protestant groups, especially evangelical, charismatic, and spiritualist sects (see Religion, ch. 2). The Dominican Roman Catholic Church historically has been conservative and traditionalist, generally supporting the status quo and the existing power structure. But the Roman Catholic Church also has been weak institutionally, with few priests (fewer than 200 in the entire country), little land, few educational or social institutions, and little influence over the daily lives of most Dominicans.

Since the 1960s, the Roman Catholic Church has ceased to identify wholly with the status quo. Rather, it has tended to advocate moderate change. It has organized mainstream Catholic political parties, trade unions, student groups, peasant leagues, and businessmen's associations.

Liberation theology has made few inroads in the Dominican Republic. A few priests espouse liberationist ideas, but they are not considered to be in the mainstream of the clergy. Nor have there been calls by church officials for an alliance with Marxist groups, let alone calls for guerrilla struggles or other militant action against the system. During the 1980s and 1990s, the church often played a mediating role in political and social conflicts, particularly through Monsignor Agripino Núñez Collado, rector of the Pontifical Catholic University Mother and Teacher.

As the Dominican Republic has modernized and secularized, the church has lost some of its influence. The country legalized divorce in 1963 and instituted government-sponsored family planning in 1967, two measures that the church had opposed. The church seldom has succeeded in mobilizing voters in support of its favored programs. With only some 10 percent of the population engaged as active, practicing Catholics, and with Protestant groups continuing to grow rapidly, church influence has continued to decline during the 1990s. While Balaguer was in office, there was a particularly strong link between his government and the conservative cardinal and Archbishop of Santo Domingo Nicolás de Jesús López Rodríguez. However, increasingly the importance of Protestant voices within organized religion is recognized, and secular influences in culture and education continue to grow.

**Armed Forces**

One of the most significant changes in the Dominican Republic during the past several decades has been the lessen-
ing of the threat of military incursion into politics. Trujillo assumed power in 1930 as head of the country's military; during the thirty-one years he controlled the country, he vastly expanded the budget of the armed forces, while manipulating the military to his advantage. Following his assassination, the military retained considerable influence, and during the 1960s became deeply enmeshed in civil-military plots. Under the Balaguer presidency during the 1966–78 period, the military remained a powerful support group of the government and occasionally a potential threat to Balaguer. Numerous generals were forced to resign under PRD governments (1978–86), however.

In the 1990s, as a result of the successive changes, the Dominican military combined patrimonial elements, partisan balance, and financial constraints. The military was not the professional, partially insulated, democratically controlled armed forces that reformers had sought to develop. Different administrations also carried out their relations with the military ignoring established legal norms. The PRD administrations managed to weaken the institution of the military and to promote individuals loyal to the president to high posts. Following this pattern, Balaguer brought back to active service officers who had been loyal to him. However, during the ten years of his presidency (1986–96), the armed forces increasingly became a weak, underpaid, top-heavy, and largely unprofessional institution.

The first dramatic change to the military came on the day of Guzmán's inauguration in 1978 when he forced the resignation of several generals who could have proved a threat to his regime (see The PRD in Power and Balaguer, Again, ch. 1). During the next two years, more than thirty generals either were retired, demoted, or sent abroad. In addition to taking additional steps to remove the military from partisan politics, Guzmán also instituted a more concerted policy of rotating officers to break up regional pockets of civilian-military alliances that had become established under Balaguer. Guzmán earned the trust of the remaining military both through his conservative views and anticommmunist policies and his endorsement of Balaguer's last-minute generous salary increases for the military, as well as additional modest budget increases. By the end of his administration, Guzmán could number several military among his closest and most loyal associates.
Jorge Blanco (1982–86) transformed the armed forces even more, while also establishing close relations with certain top officers. He weakened the military structure by accelerating a pattern of massive retirements, typically after first rapidly promoting officers. To outside observers, the logic was not always clear because some of those retired appeared to be professional, well-trained individuals; the United States, for example, complained that its military training funds were being wasted as careers were cut short. In addition to further limiting the ability of the military to participate in politics, Jorge Blanco’s actions constrained the maneuvering room of any incoming administration regarding promotions. The result was a military force that was institutionally weak and no longer a direct political threat. And, as all the major political parties moderated their policy positions, the support for military intervention declined throughout all groups in society.

In the same way, however, that Balaguer’s maneuvers in 1978 largely did not prevent Guzmán from taking steps against certain officers, so Jorge Blanco’s actions ultimately did not limit Balaguer’s options in 1986. Balaguer, also, had little interest in unduly strengthening the military. By the time he returned to power in 1986, he was prepared to accept his inability to retain power either by overt military pressure or through a coup, given United States pressure and the extent of organized domestic opposition. What Balaguer wanted was a military that was loyal to him. Thus, when he resumed the presidency in 1986 and in subsequent years, he simply brought a number of officers who had been close to him back into active service. Because many of these previously retired officers continued to age while ostensibly on active duty, Balaguer’s strategy became known as abuelismo (from the word for "grandfather"). Although recalling previously retired officers was in open violation of the Organic Law of the Armed Forces, as many of Guzmán’s actions had been, no effective judicial challenge could be mounted given Balaguer’s sway over the judiciary and possible alternative interpretations of presidential constitutional powers.

During the 1986–96 period, the military receded further as important political, strategic, or economic players, especially in contrast to the role they had played during Balaguer’s first twelve years in power. The contexts were substantially different. In 1966 Balaguer took office shortly after a civil war that had provoked serious intramilitary rifts and left a legacy of polariza-
tion and continued commitment to violence among some. In 1986 there were no active political forces committed to the use of violence. As in his first period as president, Balaguer sought to place officers he trusted in key places, occasionally rotating them to keep them off balance. However, far more than in the 1960s and 1970s, he now made a mockery of any sense of military professionalism or career path. Balaguer also permitted the budget to decline; paid the military appallingly low salaries, thus inviting corruption; allowed the armed forces to become one of the most top heavy on the continent; and made generals out of individuals such as his personal chauffeur.

The decline in military professionalism continued to deteriorate the longer Balaguer remained in office. Not surprisingly, given the low salaries and lack of official functions for many officers, corruption was alleged to be rampant. For example, because of their presence along the Haitian border, the Dominican military played an important role in acquiring Haitian labor for state sugar mills, for which bribery was often involved, and also in "facilitating" contraband trade between the two countries (especially during the period of the international embargo of Haiti in 1993 and 1994).

Balaguer's policies helped provoke unhappiness within the ranks of the military, especially among frustrated individuals in the lower ranks who perceived their chance of advancement as blocked by individuals who had been brought back from retirement and remained in place. Although some military might have been willing to support Balaguer by force of arms if called to do so, during the 1990s it appears that the Dominican armed forces were becoming increasingly divided in their political loyalties. In both the 1994 and 1996 elections, all the major presidential candidates and parties possessed the support of at least some military officers. Opposition parties did not complain of centralized military harassment against them, although evidence of local-level military bias was present.

In sum, as a result of the actions of the PRD and the more cautious and cynical steps subsequently by Balaguer, the Dominican armed forces were largely not a political threat to democracy. Yet, occasionally, firm action was still required by the president: soon after assuming the presidency in August 1996, President Fernández was forced to dismiss the head of the air force, General Juan Bautista Rojas Tabar, when the general challenged the president's political authority. President Fernández has been seeking to improve the degree of profes-
sionalism of the armed forces. Yet, the military institution (or parts of it) remains a potential instrument of the president in power because it has not yet developed into a professional, well-organized semiautonomous but democratically accountable state institution. Furthermore, in the absence of a professional, apolitical ethos, it is also possible for politically ambitious individuals within the military to rise through the ranks and represent a potential threat to civilian authority.

Foreign Relations

The Dominican Republic is a relatively small and weak country, heavily dependent on the outside world economically and strategically, and located in the center of what was an important area for Cold War conflict in the world—the volatile Caribbean. Because of these factors, various outside actors have long exercised a significant degree of influence in the island nation's internal politics.

In the early nineteenth century, the principal outside actors were Spain, France, and Britain; toward the end of the century, Germany and the United States had also become involved in Dominican affairs. The United States has remained a central actor in Dominican affairs ever since. Because the Dominican Republic shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti, and because Haiti represented a constant threat to the Dominican Republic both before and after the Haitian occupation of 1822–44, Haiti also has exerted significant influence (see The Struggle for Formal Sovereignty and Ambivalent Sovereignty, Caudillo Rule, and Political Instability, ch. 1). In recent years, the economic importance of Europe has grown for the country, particularly because of increased European aid flows and the large number of Europeans who vacation in the country.

Various transnational actors have played a significant role in Dominican politics. These include private economic actors such as multinational corporations, and financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank (see Glossary), and the Inter-American Development Bank. They also include other international political or state actors such as the Socialist International (the international grouping of social democratic parties, which was highly involved in Dominican affairs during the 1970s and 1980s), the international Christian Democratic Union, the Vatican, and European assistance organized through the Lomé Convention (see Glossary). In recent years, they have included NGOs, principally from Europe and
from the United States, including such organizations as the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and Human Rights Watch, which played an important role in applying pressure for passage of the 1992 Labor Code in the Dominican Republic. In addition, overseas Dominicans must now be considered as important actors within the Dominican Republic because their remittances are a crucial source of foreign exchange and because Dominican political parties avidly seek their funding. The Dominican diaspora has also recently been given the right to vote in Dominican presidential elections, even as the diaspora also is beginning to have more of a presence in local politics in New York City and elsewhere where its numbers are concentrated.

With regard to relations between the United States and the Dominican Republic, in the past issues that were central focused primarily on security concerns, protection of United States private economic actors, and expectations of political solidarity. Such issues are being increasingly superseded by new issues related to market-oriented reforms, democracy and human rights, drug trafficking, and migration. From the perspective of the Dominican Republic, Dominican policy makers worry that the country is marginal to the concerns of United States policy makers; they also are concerned about unilateralism and potential pressure by the United States, no longer because of anticommunism, but as a consequence of issues such as narcotics, democracy, and human rights. Finally, the Fernández government is putting forth efforts to enhance hemispheric cooperation around such issues as trade and respect for democracy.

As a small, economically vulnerable country, the Dominican Republic has continually been forced to adapt to sudden changes in the world economy. Globalization has had contradictory effects on the country. On the one hand, it has generated sometimes wrenching economic changes, weakening previously strong popular-sector organizations and stimulating further inequality, at least in the short term. The dramatic shift away from sugar exports toward tourism and free-trade zones is one example, as is the significant increase in emigration that was spurred in the 1980s and continues to this day. On the other hand, globalization has deepened the country's links to the outside world, providing external support for organizations committed to building or strengthening democratic accountability within the country. This effect has been seen in the
international support for electoral observers and for NGOs in areas such as labor, women's rights, and environmental issues.

The country's major trade relations are with the United States, its primary partner, and with Japan, Venezuela, Mexico, and the European Union. In addition to sustaining diplomatic relations with these countries, the Dominican Republic maintains embassies throughout the Western Hemisphere and in selected other countries, including the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Israel.

The Dominican Republic is a signatory to the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), the Pact of Bogotá, and all major inter-American conventions. Historically, its ties to and involvement in the OAS were stronger than its relations with the United Nations (UN), although under President Fernández this is changing.

The Dominican Republic is a member of the UN and its Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the International Court of Justice. It subscribes to the IMF, the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation (IFC—see Glossary), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Development Association (IDA—see Glossary), and the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat). It is also a participant in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Universal Postal Union (UPU), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Dominican Republic faces significant foreign policy challenges. Under President Balaguer, the country had a low international profile and increasingly tense relations with the United States. Because of his age and his health, President Balaguer traveled abroad very little. A conservative nationalist, President Balaguer accepted the fact that the Dominican Republic was in the sphere of influence of the United States, yet he also resented its presence and its influence. Relations became especially tense around questions of democratic elections and also with regard to Haiti, particularly when the United States was seeking to force the Haitian military to leave
in order for the deposed Jean-Bertrand Aristide to return to office.

The country's international profile and its relations with the United States have changed considerably since President Fernández assumed office in August 1996. In his first two years in office, President Fernández has made foreign policy and international relations an important priority. He has worked to strengthen the country's Secretariat of State for Foreign Relations and its diplomatic capabilities in terms of personnel and equipment. He has reached out to the country's Caribbean and Central American neighbors, seeking to have the Dominican Republic serve as a bridge between the two areas. He has reestablished diplomatic relations with Cuba. He has also worked with his Caribbean and Central American neighbors to find common ground on issues that affect their relations with each other and with the United States, such as drug trafficking, economic integration, improved access to United States markets, and the treatment of their emigrants in the United States, including concerns about the forced repatriation of convicted criminals to their country of origin.

The growing international profile of President Fernández and of the Dominican Republic is demonstrated by the fact that the country now presides over the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group of nations (under the Lomé Convention that obtains aid for these countries from the European Union). Furthermore, the second summit meeting of heads of state of these nations was held in Santo Domingo in November 1999. In addition, the Dominican Republic presented the requests of this group to the meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, which began in late November 1999.

One of the most challenging relationships has been with Haiti. Although in general President Fernández has sought to improve relations with Haiti, he has also responded to domestic fears and pressures revolving around the growing presence of Haitian migrants in the country. As Haiti's economic situation has continued to deteriorate and Haitians have found it increasingly difficult to migrate to the United States, they increasingly attempt to enter the Dominican Republic. Large-scale deportations of Haitians during 1998 and 1999 met with protests; many deportees complained that they were not allowed to demonstrate that they were legally resident in the Dominican Republic and criticized their treatment while being transported out of the country.
Beginning with President Fernández, awareness has grown in the Dominican Republic that maintaining an informed role in world affairs is crucial to helping the country confront the challenges it faces in an increasingly globalized world. The Dominican Republic’s global outlook is facilitated by the extent of contact that broader elements of the Dominican population have with that world through family members who have emigrated abroad, tourism, the media, and travel.

* * *

Many useful books are available on the government and politics of the Dominican Republic. On the formative Trujillo era, see Jesús Galíndez’s *The Era of Trujillo*, the excellent biography by Robert Crassweller entitled *Trujillo*, and Howard J. Wiarda’s *Dictatorship and Development: The Methods of Control in Trujillo’s Dominican Republic*. Post-Trujillo developments are treated in detail in John Bartlow Martin’s *Overtaken by Events*, and Howard J. Wiarda's three-volume *Dictatorship, Development, and Disintegration: Politics and Social Change in the Dominican Republic*. The 1965 revolution and intervention are well covered in Piero Gleijeses’s *The Dominican Crisis*, Dan Kurzman’s *Santo Domingo: Revolt of the Damned*, Abraham Lowenthal’s *The Dominican Intervention*, and Jerome Slater’s *Intervention and Negotiation: The United States and the Dominican Republic*.

For the Balaguer era of the 1960s and 1970s, see G. Pope Atkins's *Arms and Politics in the Dominican Republic*, Ian Bell’s *The Dominican Republic*, Rosario Espinal’s "An Interpretation of the Democratic Transition in the Dominican Republic," and Howard J. Wiarda and Michael J. Kryzanek’s *The Dominican Republic: A Caribbean Crucible*. More recent developments are analyzed in Jan Knippers Black's *The Dominican Republic: Politics and Development in an Unsovereign State*, James Ferguson’s *The Dominican Republic: Beyond the Lighthouse*, a special issue of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) Report on the Americas entitled "The Dominican Republic After the Caudillos," Jonathan Hartlyn's *The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic*, and Rosario Espinal and Jonathan Hartlyn's "The Dominican Republic: The Long and Difficult Struggle for Democracy." (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Chapter 5. Dominican Republic: National Security
The Torre del Homenaje, Santo Domingo
BY TRADITION, THE DOMINICAN Republic's armed forces have been active in the competition for national political power and have often functioned as a praetorian guard for the government holding power. The turbulent period of the early 1960s led to three coups against the civilian government by the military leadership. Violence between reformist and conservative military elements brought the country close to civil war in 1965, and intervention by the United States was required to restore order. However, it appeared that during the 1970s and the 1980s, successive governments were able to reduce the military's former role in national political life as self-appointed final arbiter of public policy.

By the late 1980s, the stature of the armed forces had been reduced to that of an important interest group competing with other such groups for power and influence within the nation's increasingly pluralistic political system. It would be premature, however, to conclude that the goal of developing an institutionalized and apolitical military establishment had been completely realized by 1999. Individual military officers continued to exert considerable political influence, and armed forces units continued to be employed overtly during political campaigns. Nevertheless, the military's explicit support of civilian governments during the 1980s, and particularly of Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo, who served as president between 1986 and 1996, suggested that the armed forces had accepted the principle of civilian control. The military leadership benefited financially during Balaguer's rule, but could not act independently of the president. Balaguer's successor, Leonel Fernández Reyna, began his term by dismissing or retiring many generals in what was seen as part of an effort to restore higher standards to a military institution whose standards had slackened under Balaguer.

The armed forces have as their primary mission the defense of the nation's territorial integrity. However, as of 1999, the country faced no credible external threat, and the military served more as an internal security force, working with the National Police and the narcotics police to maintain domestic order, to combat the increasingly serious problem of narcotics trafficking, and to control contraband and illegal immigration from Haiti.
Although the Dominican Republic no longer faces a domestic insurgency threat, popular economic discontent has resulted in frequent protests and strikes that occasionally have become violent, resulting in injuries and some deaths. Soldiers are routinely assigned to help the police and have sometimes been accused of excessive force in clashes with demonstrators. Most of these disturbances are rooted in despair over the constant deterioration of living conditions for ordinary citizens as well as a decline in the level and quality of public services.

The country's security forces often have been called upon to prevent violence and disturbances in connection with political campaigns and elections by measures that included detentions of antigovernment figures. In 1996, however, presidential power was transferred peacefully and smoothly after elections described as the cleanest in the country's history.

Defense budgets since the early 1980s have shown little change except for measurable increases between 1993 and 1996. Weapons replacement and modernization have been almost abandoned as spending constraints preclude outlays much beyond pay and benefits. As a consequence, the readiness of the armed forces to deal with any threat from abroad is severely limited. They are capable of carrying out most internal security functions, but lack the resources to adequately patrol the country's borders against the flow of illicit drugs.

The armed forces in 1999 consisted of about 24,300 active-duty personnel. The army has seven brigades, most organized along constabulary or tactical infantry lines. The air force operates three flying squadrons, only one of which is armed, and the navy maintains twelve armed patrol vessels. The Dominican military is second in size to Cuba's military in the Caribbean.

The National Police, the National Department of Investigations, and the National Drug Control Directorate also share responsibility for security matters. The latter two groups, which draw personnel from both the military and the police, report directly to the president.

The criminal justice system comes under the jurisdiction of the national government. The system, according to its critics, has many shortcomings, including interference by political authorities, judicial corruption, maladministration of the courts, and scandalously poor prison conditions. Much police misconduct goes unpunished. In addition, the Dominican Republic has become a primary way station in the transport of narcotics between Colombia and the United States. Dominican
nationals are leading figures in drug distribution and delivery in New York and throughout the northeastern United States. Rarely do narcotics-related crimes result in prison sentences in the Dominican Republic.

The presidential administration that took office in 1996 had drug corruption and judicial and prison reform on its agenda. Measures have been introduced to make the criminal justice system more humane and effective and independent of politics. As the head of a minority party, the president nevertheless faces an uphill battle in cleansing the bureaucracy, the military, and justice and law enforcement agencies of the influence of the well-entrenched drug interests.

**History and Development of the Armed Forces**

Spanish colonial militias were the first organized military forces in what is now the Dominican Republic. These forces maintained law and order over the entire island of Hispaniola, which from 1496 was ruled from Santo Domingo, the center of Spanish colonial administration in the New World (see The First Colony, ch. 1). By the mid-1500s, when Spain's interests shifted to the richer colonies of Mexico and Peru, the Dominican colony had a well-established hierarchical social system that was based on authoritarian rule by a small white elite. The colony also included a large black slave population (see Ethnic Heritage, ch. 2).

The shift in Spain's colonial interests and the consequent withdrawal of most of Spain's military from the Dominican colony was followed by a long period of economic and political decay, during which domestic order deteriorated. The colony was threatened by pirates along the coast as well as by periodic encroachment by the forces of France and England, which were competing with each other and with Spain for territory and power in the New World.

As a result of this competition, Spain was forced in 1697 to cede the western third of Hispaniola to France. Nevertheless, border disputes continued, and by 1797 France had prevailed on Spain to cede the rest of the island.

Before French rule became established in the Dominican colony, however, a slave revolt broke out in the western portion of the island, which came to be known as Haiti. In what proved to be the first in a series of Haitian incursions into Dominican territory, the rebellious Haitians invaded the poor and less populous eastern side of the island in 1801. Haitian forces were
repelled, but the rebellion within Haiti continued, and the French were forced to withdraw from the island by 1804. In 1809, helped by Britain, Spain regained control of the Dominican portion of the island. Spain ruled only until 1821, however, when the Dominican colonists revolted. Independence lasted just a few weeks before Haiti invaded in 1822. The Dominicans were not able to expel the Haitian forces until 1844 (see The Struggle for Formal Sovereignty, ch. 1).

The long-delayed achievement of independence did not bring peace to the new Dominican Republic, nor did it improve public order. Political power was extremely decentralized, and competition among factions of the landowning white elite produced a level of national disunity that had disastrous effects on public safety. Although the central government had established a national army, this force essentially consisted of a small group of officers who were interested chiefly in personal enrichment and whose duties were largely ceremonial. The national army was far outnumbered by armed militias that were organized and maintained by local caudillos, who had set themselves up as provincial governors. Using these militias, the caudillos waged bloody civil wars as they contended for regional and national power. National political life was characterized by repeated coups and military uprisings against whichever caudillo—usually self-promoted to general-officer status—had gathered enough power to seize the presidency.

The continuous civil war, political upheaval, and misrule that characterized the republic's early years were punctuated by repeated Haitian attempts to invade. During such periods of danger, forces larger than the small national army were needed to defend the country. These forces, hastily raised and poorly equipped, were essentially conglomerations of regional militias that had been filled out by poor farmers or landless plantation workers who had been pressed into service. Once the threat had subsided and Haitian forces had been repelled, the militias would return to advancing the cause of particular regional leaders. The impressed troops would return home, where some would contribute to the general state of disorder by taking up banditry.

During its first thirty years of independence, the Dominican Republic was run directly, or indirectly, by General Pedro Santana Familias and General Buenaventura Báez Méndez, whose bitter rivalry was played out in civil wars that resulted in alternating Santana and Báez regimes (see Ambivalent Sovereignty,
Caudillo Rule, and Political Instability, ch. 1). Each of the two generals used his position to enrich himself, his relatives, and his followers at public expense. To deal with the national bankruptcy caused by civil war, corruption, and mismanagement, Santana called on Spain in 1861 to restore colonial rule. The Dominicans soon had enough of Spanish control, and in 1865 Spain was again forced out. As a result of army restructuring after the restoration, existing military tendencies in Dominican society became more pronounced.

General Ulises Heureaux became president in 1882. During his brutal, dictatorial rule, factionalism was repressed, and the nation enjoyed relative internal peace. The army emerged as a standing organization for the first time, based on a system of conscription that affected mainly peasants. The number of officers increased sharply, and military expenditures dominated the state budget. By 1897 Heureaux was able to boast of a disciplined army with 14,000 Remington rifles and six artillery batteries. With the country's newly built rail lines and a modest navy, the force had considerable mobility.

After Heureaux was assassinated in 1899, political factions again contested for power and for access to the national treasury. By 1904 the economy was in shambles, and foreign gov-
ernments were threatening to use force to collect defaulted loans. Citing the need to avert European intervention, the United States assumed control of Dominican customs receipts in 1905. Amid continuing disorder, a force of 750 United States Marines landed in 1912, and in 1916 they were authorized by President Woodrow Wilson to take full control of the Dominican government (see From the United States Occupation (1916–24) to the Emergence of Trujillo (1930), ch. 1).

The marines disbanded the regional militias and ruled the nation directly for eight years, acting as police in cities and in rural areas. As part of its effort to build effective institutions of government in the Dominican Republic, the United States formed a new Dominican Constabulary Guard of about 2,000 officers and men to replace the old national army. Up to this time, both the civilian and the military elites had been drawn from the same wealthy landowning class. Intense resentment among the elites against the United States presence, however, made it impossible to find recruits for the new constabulary among the landowning class. The ranks became filled by the lower strata of Dominican society and, as a result, the new force had neither ties nor debts to the traditional elite. The most notable representative of the new military leadership was Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina, who entered the Dominican Constabulary Guard in 1919 as a second lieutenant. By curtail­ing the power of regional caudillos, the constabulary gave the country a sense of political unity and provided the structure for the emergence of a new elite that would eventually control political life.

In 1924, after the Dominican Republic had adopted a new constitution and had elected a civilian president, the United States forces withdrew. The same year, the constabulary was renamed the Dominican National Police, a somewhat misleading title for what had become more a military entity than a law enforcement organization. By that time, Trujillo had risen to the rank of major and had assumed one of the nation's two field commands. He had also emerged as one of the most influential voices within the force, increasingly able to mold its development to suit his personal ambitions. In 1928 when the National Police was renamed the National Army (Ejército Nacional), Trujillo became a lieutenant colonel and army chief of staff. In this role, Trujillo was the most powerful individual in the nation even before his election to the presidency in 1930 (see The Trujillo Era, 1930–61, ch. 1)
By the 1930s, the new Dominican military establishment had developed into a centrally controlled and well-disciplined force that was both larger and far better equipped than any previous Dominican army. New rifles and machine guns were purchased, and an artillery element was fashioned by combining Krupp 77mm guns from the old Dominican army with newer 37mm and 77mm guns. The unified, apolitical, and professional force that had been envisioned by the United States military government had not been realized, however. Instead, traditional Dominican patterns of military service persisted, including factionalism, politicization, and the perception that position entitled one to personal enrichment. Trujillo encouraged and strengthened these patterns, and used them both to retain the support of the armed forces and to control them. Military officers became an elite class, gaining wealth, favors, prestige and power, and developing an esprit de corps that Trujillo carefully nurtured. Under these conditions, a career in the military came to be esteemed as an avenue of upward mobility. The services themselves were built up, large quantities of arms were imported, and a defense industry was established. The country was divided into three military zones, each garrisoned by a two-battalion brigade.

Trujillo rationalized maintenance of a large military by citing the purported need for vigilance against Haiti and, particularly after the Cuban Revolution of 1959, against communism. For the most part, however, Trujillo used the large and powerful military establishment to maintain internal control over the nation. The army and the navy intelligence services were among the numerous agencies Trujillo employed to maintain close surveillance and rigid control over the population. In 1957 the intelligence and secret police organizations were unified into the State Security Secretariat. With a personnel strength of 5,000, this new organization was larger than either the regular National Police, the air force, or the navy.

The military establishment claimed an increasingly greater share of the national budget. Part of the military costs were offset by basing privileges granted to the United States during World War II. The basing agreement enabled the Dominican Republic to qualify for Lend-Lease aid. However, only limited equipment transfers took place, mostly light weapons and lightly armored vehicles. After the war ended, the country acquired larger quantities of surplus stocks, including 105mm howitzers, light tanks, and half-track armored personnel carri-
ers. Sweden and Brazil became important suppliers of matériel; combat, training, and transport aircraft were acquired from Britain and the United States.

Trujillo did not rely solely on rewards to keep control over the military. He maintained personal command of all aspects of military organization, including promotions, logistics, assignments, and discipline. He constantly shuffled personnel from assignment to assignment to prevent any potential rival from gaining an independent power base. Trujillo also used the tactic of frequent inspections, sometimes in person and sometimes by undercover operatives, to keep tabs on both men and operations. In addition, he brought many of his relatives and supporters into the armed forces, promoting them rapidly as a reward for loyalty.

As part of his effort to maintain control over the armed forces, Trujillo built up the air force as a political counterbalance to the army, and he encouraged factionalism in all the services. A full armored battalion was formed at San Isidro Air Base outside Santo Domingo. This battalion, which was directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, essentially constituted a fourth armed force, further splintering power within the military. The total complement of 10,000 men was supplemented by a call-up of reservists after Fidel Castro Ruz established his communist dictatorship in Cuba in 1959. The government acquired many additional weapons from a variety of sources, notably 106mm recoilless rifles from the United States and AMX–13 tanks from France. The Dominican army easily crushed an invasion from Cuba of anti-Trujillo Dominicans in July 1959.

After Trujillo was assassinated in 1961, the military, as the nation's most powerful and best-organized interest group, claimed a major role in the political competition that followed. It soon became clear, however, that the factionalism encouraged by Trujillo prevented the military from acting as a unified institution. Instead, elements of the armed services allied with various civilian politicians. After Juan Bosch Gavino of the center-left won the presidential election in 1962, portions of the military became alarmed over his reforms and his tolerance of leftists and legal communist parties. In 1963 armed forces officers, led by Elías Wessin y Wessin (a colonel at the time), overthrew Bosch and replaced him with a civilian junta. Another faction of officers calling themselves Constitutionalists favored the return of Bosch. In 1965 this faction overthrew the civilian
Dominican Republic: National Security

junta. In the following days, civil war erupted as the armed forces split into warring camps. The majority within the armed forces united behind Wessin y Wessin (by this time a general) and attacked the new government with armored and air support. The Constitutionalists armed their civilian supporters in order to defend the capital (see Democratic Struggles and Failures, ch. 1).

United States intervention in the conflict halted the fighting, but subsequent efforts to reunify the armed forces were only partly successful. The agreement to reintegrate those officers who had supported Bosch was never fully implemented, and only a few gained readmission. Politically, the outlook of the officer corps remained right of center after the civil war.

Although the armed forces continued to be a significant factor, their influence on national political life steadily declined. This decline began during the administration of Joaquín Balaguer Ricardo (1966–78; 1986–96), who made effective use of some of the same tactics employed by Trujillo to maintain control over the military, including the encouragement and manipulation of factionalism within the officer corps and the frequent shuffling of top assignments. He also increased the number of general officers from six in 1966 to forty-eight by 1978. At the same time, Balaguer gave senior officers a stake in his regime by appointing many to positions in government and in state-run enterprises. He also extended valuable sugar-growing concessions for government mills.

The process of reining in the military advanced significantly during the terms of Balaguer’s successors, Silvestre Antonio Guzmán Fernández (1978–82) and Salvador Jorge Blanco (1982–86), each of whom made an effort to institutionalize the armed forces and to remove the powerful group of officers who had supported Trujillo and Balaguer. The partial success of their efforts was demonstrated in the period from 1984 to 1985, when the armed forces leadership repeatedly and publicly supported Jorge Blanco’s government in the face of social unrest provoked by adverse economic conditions. Although Jorge Blanco had not been the military’s preferred candidate in the 1982 elections, the leadership chose to support him as constitutional head of state rather than to take power itself.

Military capability in the years after the 1965 civil war declined to an even greater extent than did the armed forces’ national political role. After that time, each administration
faced increasing national economic constraints that forced stringent limits on defense spending. Although force levels and personnel budgets were generally left untouched, aging equipment was not replaced. As a result, as of 1999 equipment in all three services was outmoded, in short supply, and of doubtful operational utility.

**Role of the Military in Public Life**

The 1966 constitution describes the armed forces as "essentially obedient and apolitical and without the right to deliberate. The purpose of their creation is to defend the independence and integrity of the republic, to maintain public order, and to uphold the Constitution and the laws." By law, members of the armed forces are denied the right to vote and the right to participate in the activities of political parties and organized labor.

Since the early 1960s, the political influence of the military has declined. And military officers have largely accepted their status as defenders of national sovereignty and their subservience to the civilian government hierarchy. During Balaguer's first two terms (1966–78), the president reinforced his control by accommodating high officers, helping them to become landowners, merchants, and industrialists, positions they could not have attained had they remained in the purely military sphere. When Balaguer left office in 1978, the officers were reluctant to see power handed over to Antonio Guzmán, fearing a threat to their profitable positions. Their fears were justified. Guzmán retired some forty pro-Balaguer generals and introduced a period of military professionalization. When Balaguer resumed power in 1986, however, the retired generals were reintegrated into the military and offered a financial stake in the regime. Although friendly to the military establishment, Balaguer's authoritarian style enabled him to keep it on a tight leash (see Interest Groups and Social Actors, ch. 4).

After disputed elections marred by fraud in 1994 between José Francisco Peña Gómez of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano—PRD) and Balaguer of the Reformist Social Christian Party (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano—PRSC), the Dominican military openly supported the election board's declaration of Balaguer's victory. (Balaguer had won elections in 1966, 1970, and 1974; was voted out of office in 1978; and was reelected in 1986 and 1990.) An official communique warned against attempts to
undo the decision, saying that the armed forces "would not omit efforts to guarantee public peace and the tranquillity and serenity that the Dominican family enjoys."

A post-election agreement in 1994 limited Balaguer's term to two years, and lawyer Leonel Fernández Reyna, new head of the PRD, won in a run-off election. Soon after taking office in 1996, President Fernández undertook efforts to reprofessionalize the military leadership, which had become preoccupied with its own enrichment under Balaguer's policy of granting economic and commercial privileges. He retired twenty-four of the country's seventy generals, most of whom were considered allies of Balaguer. The president also replaced the head of the navy, the head of the air force, the head of the state intelligence service, and the commander of the second brigade. Admiral Rubén Paulino Álvarez continued as secretary of state for the armed forces. Although Fernández faces opposition from pro-Balaguer factions in the officer corps, he may be able to count on a more liberal group of officers to support him in the transition to a more democratic style of government.
Missions

No valid purpose exists for armed forces structured to defend the Dominican Republic's security because the country faces no foreseeable external military threat. The principal justification for the military establishment is the containment of possible civil unrest. The military is thus largely organized as an internal security force. The armed forces also constitute a principal line of defense against international drug trafficking. However, in spite of help from the United States, the flow of narcotics has not been stemmed because of equipment and budget limitations as well as insufficiently motivated personnel.

The Dominican Republic has a tradition of enmity toward Haiti although the military officers of the two countries have maintained friendly relations. On a personal level, President Balaguer had little incentive to enforce the United Nations (UN) embargo against the Haitian military regime in 1994 because it was intended to help restore the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, whom Balaguer personally disliked. The unhindered movement of goods, particularly gasoline, across the lightly patrolled border with Haiti undercut the effectiveness of the embargo. Only after coming under heavy international pressure did Balaguer agree to seal the border by replacing corrupt border guards with 10,000 or more troops. The United States provided radios and night vision equipment, and a UN observer force was dispatched to help stiffen the Dominican effort. The Dominican army cut down embargo violations by day but was unable to prevent activity at night. It was also alleged that many of the border troops were less interested in interdicting gasoline than in ensuring their share of the bribe money changing hands.

After the return of the Aristide government in 1994, several of the more notorious of the Haitian military coup leaders took refuge in the Dominican Republic, where their presence became a source of tension between the two governments. In 1996, however, they were deported by the Dominican authorities and left for Central America.

Dominican army troops and observation posts are thinly located along the length of the 388-kilometer frontier. Border forces are principally concerned with illegal border crossings and contraband, especially narcotics. Haitian military capability has been clearly unequal to that of Dominican forces, and incursions in whatever form could be handled. Any latent Haitian threat became even more improbable after the Haitian
armed forces were abolished in 1995. The renewal of upheaval in Haiti would present a danger of large-scale refugee movements, however. The several hundred thousand legal and illegal Haitian immigrants who work in the nation as agricultural laborers are already a recurring source of tension, and the Dominicans would face increasing difficulty in controlling border movement if the economic situation in Haiti caused more Haitians to flee conditions in their own country (see Foreign Relations, ch. 4).

After Castro's assumption of power in 1959, the Dominican Republic saw Cuba as a potential external threat. This view, which was rooted in the anticommunist sentiments espoused by Trujillo, is still held by most military officers. It also has a basis in the 1959 Cuban-based invasion attempt by anti-Trujillo Dominicans. Cuba itself, however, has never taken overt military action against the nation. Critics have charged the armed forces with justifying attacks on leftist political groups and on political and labor activists by falsely accusing them of having ties with Cuba.

Until the mid-1970s, the military occasionally conducted operations against limited insurgencies, but by the late 1970s the country was relatively free of insurgent groups. In 1990 eight terrorist attacks, mainly bomb explosions, were directed against United States targets in the Dominican Republic. None of the attacks resulted in the death of a United States citizen. Some were linked to the United States military action against Panama. A group calling itself the Revolutionary Army of the People claimed responsibility for several of the attacks. The government blamed the National Union of Revolutionary Students and other communist organizations for attempting to organize a campaign of terror and subversion.

As part of its mission to assist the police in maintaining public order, the military keeps watch on political groups deemed to be possible sources of instability, including opposition parties of the far left that have little following but operate freely.

Interdiction of illegal immigration is another mission of the armed forces. The country has become an important way station for would-be immigrants to the United States who attempt to cross the 175-kilometer-wide Mona Passage to Puerto Rico. Refugees from many corners of the world congregate on the country's northern coast to make contact with boat captains. Local officials are often bribed to overlook the activity. Although the armed forces cooperate with the United States in
intercepting the refugees, the navy’s tight budget hampers its interdiction efforts.

Article 93 of the constitution states that an objective of the armed forces is the pursuit of civic-action programs and, at the direction of the executive branch, participation in projects that promote national, social, and economic development. The armed forces hence conduct civic-action activities in the form of well-digging; road, home, and school construction; and the provision of sports and educational equipment to rural schools. The military also runs the most important vocational school system in the nation. Navy schools train diesel mechanics, for example, and the army is largely responsible for forest conservation. In addition, military medical and dental teams pay visits to remote areas, and the air force has transported medicine, doctors, and supplies to areas damaged by hurricanes and other natural disasters. The navy also plays a role in transporting fuel oil.

**Armed Forces Organization, Training, and Equipment**

Under the constitution, the president of the republic is the commander in chief of the armed forces. The chain of command extends from the president to the secretary of state for the armed forces and then to deputy secretaries of state for the army, navy, and air force (see fig. 6). The secretary and the three deputies are all military personnel. In the past, the secretary has usually been an army lieutenant general although an admiral held the post in 1998 and the incumbent in 1999 was a major general, Manuel de Jesús Florentino. The secretary is appointed by the president and also serves as chief of the armed forces general staff. The deputies, normally holding the rank of major general or rear admiral, are appointed by the secretary with the approval of the president.

Each deputy controls his service through a chief of staff and a general staff that consists of five principal sections: personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, and public affairs. In addition, an administrative judge advocate section for each service handles military legal matters. Except in emergencies, the chiefs of staff exercise operational control over the three services of the armed forces.

The army is responsible for the nation’s land territory and for the border with Haiti. The navy is responsible for coastal
waters, port areas, dams, rivers, and lakes. The air force is responsible for the operation and security of international airports, local airports, and landing strips.

The Secretariat of State for the Armed Forces operates several schools, including the three military academies. It also runs the General Juan Pablo Duarte Military Institute of Advanced Studies located in Santo Domingo, which operates a one-year command and staff program for senior officers and a six-month course of advanced strategic studies. The institute also offers fourteen specialized courses, including military intelligence, foreign languages, and military law. Another school at the same location, the General Directorate for Military Training, gives a specialized course for captains and first lieutenants, with a branch for noncommissioned officers. It has introduced courses on human rights, environmental protection, and forestry.

The secretariat also administers the Vocational School of the Armed Forces and Police, which is headquartered in Santo Domingo and has twenty-three branches throughout the country. With a student body primarily composed of civilians, its offerings include courses in carpentry, electricity, auto mechanics, industrial mechanics, plumbing, and leather and metal working. Some courses are also taught in prisons. The school operates a job placement program for its graduates.

The armed forces maintain an integrated judicial system for courts-martial for officers, and each branch conducts courts for minor offenses. All persons subject to military jurisdiction who commit a crime or misdemeanor while on military duty are accountable to military authorities. Those not on military duty are liable to prosecution by civilian authorities.

Army

As of 1999, the Dominican army had a strength of approximately 15,000, about twice the size of the navy and air force combined. The army is organized into seven brigades composed of battalions that fall into one of two categories—administrative, which perform constabulary functions, and tactical, which are organized as combat units. Purely tactical brigades are generally composed of three battalions, while administrative brigades have no fixed number of battalions and may have as many as five or six.

The first brigade, headquartered in the capital, is a combat brigade with two battalions in the capital and one at San
Figure 6. Dominican Republic: Organization of the Armed Forces, 1999
Cristóbal nearby (see fig. 7). The second brigade, with headquarters in Santiago, has three administrative and two tactical battalions, the first in Santiago and the second, a Special Force, in the central mountains at Constanza. The third brigade is an administrative brigade at San Juan in the west. One of its battalions patrols the frontier with Haiti. The fourth brigade has its headquarters in Valverde. One of its two battalions patrols the northern part of the border with Haiti. The fifth brigade has headquarters at Barahona, with one tactical and two administrative battalions scattered in the southwest. The sixth brigade is designated as combat support. It has five battalions—artillery, armor, medical, engineering, and transportation—and quartermaster services. The seventh brigade is designated as a training brigade.

One independent battalion, headquartered at San Pedro de Macoris, has four companies stationed at provincial capitals at the eastern end of the island. A mixed tactical battalion of army, navy, and air force infantry units headquartered in Santo Domingo reports directly to the secretary of state for the armed forces. It includes a mixed Special Forces unit trained in antiterrorism.

The army's principal small arm is the German G3 7.62mm rifle. Its armored assets include twelve French AMX-13 tanks and twelve American M-41A1 light tanks, all mounting 76mm guns. Eight Cadillac Gage V-150 Commando armored vehicles and twenty half-tracks serve as armored personnel carriers. The artillery units maintain twenty-two 105mm towed howitzers and are also equipped with 81mm and 120mm mortars (see table 12, Appendix). Most of the foregoing weapons date from the post-World War II period, and their present operational utility is considered doubtful.

Army enlisted personnel receive basic training at the Armed Forces Training Center near San Isidro, ten kilometers east of the capital. Advanced and specialized training is also provided to relevant units. Officer candidates are required to be high-school graduates and to meet strict physical requirements. Officer cadets attend the four-year Military Academy at San Isidro. A six-month course for infantry captains and lieutenants is conducted to prepare young officers to function as company commanders. Senior officers attend the Armed Forces Staff College in Santo Domingo to prepare for battalion-level and higher commands.
Navy

A Dominican navy was first established in 1873, when the country acquired a gunboat built in Scotland. By the time the navy was disbanded in 1916 during the United States Marine occupation, the fleet had acquired only two more gunboats and four armed launches. Several elements of the navy were incorporated into the Dominican Constabulary Guard in 1917 to function as a small coast guard. The navy remained an element of the National Army until 1943, when the Dominican National Navy was formally established as a separate service. During the next year, the navy began activities at the naval base at Las Calderas; in 1948 a separate naval school opened there.

The navy received a number of coast guard cutters from the United States just before the outbreak of World War II. Three additional cutters were transferred after the transport Presidente Trujillo was sunk by a German submarine in 1942. The Dominican Republic was not actively involved in the war although it made base facilities available to the United States. As a consequence of the purchase of numerous war-surplus vessels as part of a postwar expansion program, the Dominican navy became the most powerful in the Caribbean, with personnel numbering 3,000, including one marine battalion. Naval strength had leveled off by the time of the 1965 civil war when naval units participated in the shelling of宪制主义ist positions in Santo Domingo. After 1965, aging vessels were not replaced, and the naval inventory steadily declined.

As of 1999, the active naval complement was 3,800 officers and men, a reduction of 25 percent from ten years earlier. Navy headquarters are located at the 27 de Febrero Naval Base in Santo Domingo. The other principal base is at Las Calderas. The navy also has facilities at the ports of Barahona, Haina, La Romana, Monte Cristi, Pedernales, Puerto Plata, Samaná, and San Pedro de Macorís.

The navy chief of staff supervises the operations of the regional commands. The Santo Domingo Naval Zone includes the naval headquarters and the various naval organizations located in the capital. The headquarters of the Northern Naval Zone, at Puerto Plata, are responsible for the Atlantic coast from the northern border with Haiti to the Mona Passage. The Southern Naval Zone, headquartered at Barahona, covers the southwest coastal area to the Haitian border. The Eastern Naval Zone, with headquarters at La Romana, covers the eastern end of the island.
By 1999 national economic constraints had reduced the Dominican fleet to twelve armed patrol vessels and thirteen support ships, tugboats, and sail training ships. Most of the armed vessels are World War-II vintage craft of United States origin. The largest is a 1,000-ton (fully loaded) patrol vessel of the Balsam class, formerly a United States Coast Guard cutter transferred to the Dominican Republic in 1995 for antinarcotics patrols. Only limited use has been made of the new vessel because of insufficient fuel supplies. The most heavily armed are two 855-ton corvettes sold to the Dominican Republic in 1976. Each mounts two 76mm guns. An Admiral-class gunship of 905 tons, a former United States minesweeper, and a Satoyo-class vessel of 860 tons are each mounted with a single 76mm gun. Smaller patrol craft are fitted with Bofors 40mm
machine guns and Oerlikon 20mm machine guns (see table 13, Appendix). The navy has at its disposal two Alouette III helicopters and five Cessna T-41D aircraft for inshore coastal reconnaissance. Naval aircraft are operated by air force liaison personnel. A battalion-sized naval infantry unit is headquar­tered at Santo Domingo.

The Dominican Navy undertook a concerted effort in 1999, in cooperation with the United States Coast Guard, to intercept illegal shipments to Puerto Rico of persons, weapons, and drugs. In addition, the navy created a motorized company to interdict illegal crossings. The company consists primarily of fifty-five naval officers who patrol the coasts on all-terrain motorbikes, equipped with night vision and communications gear.

Naval enlisted personnel receive instruction at the training center at Las Calderas. The Naval Academy at Las Calderas offers a four-year course to officer cadets.

Air Force

The air force traces its origins to 1928, when the government, inspired by the use of air power in World War I, au­thorized the creation of an aviation school. The first military aviation element was formed in 1932 as an arm of the National Army. The air force became an independent service in 1948. After several name changes, it has been officially designated as the Dominican Air Force since 1962.

Beginning in 1942, with the grant of base facilities to the United States, the Dominican Republic received shipments of aircraft under the Lend-Lease program, mostly light trainers. Later, after the signing of the Rio Treaty in 1947, the United States provided twenty-five F-47 fighter-bombers, plus C-46 and C-47 transports and additional trainers. Trujillo later pur­chased two B-17 and two B-25 bombers from commercial sources. In 1952 he made a large purchase of jet fighter-bom­bers from Sweden and F-51Ds from the United States. By the mid-1950s, the air force had some 240 aircraft and some 3,500 uniformed personnel. After Trujillo's assassination, however, funds were not forthcoming for the replacement of aging air­craft, and the air force's capabilities dwindled rapidly.

Air force headquarters are located at San Isidro Air Base near Santo Domingo. Most aircraft are based at San Isidro as well. The second large base is La Unión at Puerto Plata on the north coast. Smaller bases are at Barahona, La Romana, and
Pedernales, with airstrips at Constanza in the central mountainous area and Dajabón, on the Haitian border. The air force administers the general military medical center located in San Isidro. The air force also runs the nation's Civil Aeronautics Directorate, and air force officers oversee the operation of the nation's airports.

The air force, numbering some 5,500 personnel in 1998, is organized into three flying squadrons. The counterinsurgency squadron is equipped with eight Cessna A-37B Dragonflies. The A-37B, developed from the T-37 jet trainer, can land on short, unimproved airstrips. It is armed with a machine gun and can carry a light load of bombs or other munitions. The transport squadron uses three C-47 Douglas Dakotas and one Commander 680, and the helicopter squadron has as its principal units eight Bell 205s for search-and-air rescue and transport. Various small aircraft are used for liaison and training purposes (see table 14, Appendix). The air force carries out routine antidrug reconnaissance patrols, but is often grounded because of lack of fuel and spare parts.

The Base Defense Command provides security for all bases and aircraft. It includes an airborne Special Forces unit and an air police unit, both of approximately battalion size, and an antiaircraft battalion equipped with four 20mm guns. The Maintenance Command is responsible for maintenance and repair. The Combat Support Command supplies all base services. Air force cadets attend the Army Military Academy at San Isidro for three years, then spend their fourth year at the Frank Feliz Miranda Aviation School, also at San Isidro.

Manpower

The combined strength of the three armed services in 1998 was 24,300. This figure represents a ratio of 2.8 military personnel for every 1,000 citizens, which conforms to the average for all Latin American states. The armed forces had expanded about 10 percent over the previous decade.

The armed forces no longer have the strength and the military potential they enjoyed under Trujillo, but the military continues to be a popular career. The constitution provides for compulsory military service for all males between the ages of eighteen and fifty-four. However, the ranks are easily filled by volunteers, and the military does not impose a strain on national manpower. Officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and many enlisted personnel, as well, look on the mil-
military as a long-term career. As a result, all three services consist largely of experienced and well-trained professionals.

Entry into the officer corps is competitive, and most entrants are drawn from the middle and the lower-middle classes. Most enlisted personnel come from rural areas. The military has a very small number of females; most serve in positions traditionally reserved for women, such as nursing. Women first gained admittance to positions traditionally held only by men in 1981, when a few female personnel were commissioned as medical officers.

Pay and conditions of service compare well with opportunities available in civilian occupations. Larger installations maintain a number of commissaries and exchanges, and each of the three services operates officer and enlisted clubs. Military personnel also benefit from free medical service. Under the armed forces' generous retirement program, all members who have served thirty years are entitled to receive a pension based on 75 percent of their active-duty pay at the time of retirement. Certain officers, such as pilots and naval engineers, may apply for a full pension after twenty years of service.

Defense Spending

Estimated defense expenditures for 1998 were US$180 million, representing 1.1 percent of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary), according to the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The levels of spending reported by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, presumably calculated on a different basis, were significantly lower, averaging US$109 million annually for the years 1994–96 and US$120 million in 1997. Military expenditures averaged about 7 percent of central government expenditures during the decade 1986–95 and were slightly in excess of 1 percent of GNP in most years of that decade.

The level of military spending measured in Dominican currency rose steadily during the late 1970s, remained at relatively constant amounts during the early 1980s, then tended to be somewhat higher from 1992 onward. When adjusted for inflation, however, there was no real increase in military outlays until 1993. The sharp decline in the value of the peso in the mid-1980s weakened the nation's ability to finance the arms imports necessary for modernization, not to mention replacements and spare parts for existing equipment.
The problem was made even more acute by the fact that the military budget is preponderantly allocated to current operations. Capital expenditures are believed to account for well under 10 percent of total military spending. The low proportion of the budget devoted to funding capital improvements is illustrated by the fact that reported arms and related imports during the 1986–95 period totaled only about US$40 million, constituting 0.35 percent of the nation’s total imports. The United States has been the most important source of military equipment although, during the 1982–87 period, the nation’s principal arms supplier was France.

Trujillo established the nation’s defense industry just after World War II. By the late 1950s, the Dominican Republic had the capacity to be nearly self-sufficient in small weapons. Although that capability has deteriorated, the nation still has a modest arms-manufacturing capacity. The arsenal at San Cristóbal, twenty-four kilometers west of Santo Domingo, produces small arms ammunition and can repair heavier weapons and vehicles. Smaller wooden-hulled craft have in the past been produced by domestic shipbuilders for the navy.

Between fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1950 and FY 1996, United States grant military assistance to the Dominican Republic totaled US$36.5 million. No grant assistance has been provided in recent years except for the transfer to the Dominican Republic in 1995 of a United States Coast Guard cutter to assist the antinarcotics effort. Training for the Dominican military in the United States or elsewhere in Latin America under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program is provided at a cost of about US$35,000 annually. Financing of Dominican purchases under the Foreign Military Sales Program totaled US$34.5 million between FY 1950 and FY 1996. The Dominican Republic used this credit program for only US$441,000 worth of matériel in FY 1996.

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia

The rank structure of the armed forces follows traditional lines and largely conforms to the pattern of the United States services, with minor variations reflecting the disparity in force levels. The army has eight enlisted grades, six company and field-grade ranks, and three ranks for general officers (see figs. 8 and 9). The air force has seven enlisted grades; its officer ranks are identical to those of the army. Naval personnel are separated into six enlisted grades, six ranks for officers, and
three ranks for flag-rank officers (admirals). The highest rank attainable is lieutenant general (army and air force) or admiral in the navy (comparable to vice admiral in the United States Navy).

Uniforms resemble those of United States counterparts in cut, design, and material. The ground forces wear olive green uniforms; the air force, blue; and the navy either navy blue or white. Enlisted personnel in all three services also have khaki uniforms. The three categories of uniform include full dress, dress, and daily. The dress uniform is worn off-duty as well as on semiformal occasions. The basic uniform for officers consists of a short-sleeve or long-sleeve shirt, tie, trousers, belt, and black shoes. The basic uniform for army and air force enlisted personnel is an olive green fatigue uniform with combat boots. Navy enlisted personnel wear denim shirts and dungarees for work and middy blouse and trousers when off duty.

Army and air force company-grade officers wear one, two, or three silver laurel leaves as their insignia of rank. For field-grade officers, rank insignia consist of one to three gold stars. Brigadier, major, and lieutenant generals wear one, two, and three silver stars, respectively. Naval officer ranks are indicated by gold stripes worn on the lower sleeve of the uniform jacket. Army and air force enlisted personnel wear green chevrons on the upper sleeve; navy enlisted personnel wear red chevrons.

Internal Security and Public Order

The Dominican Republic historically has depended on the export of its sugar and other agricultural products. By the late 1970s, however, markets for these crops had plummeted, and the consequent agricultural crisis forced thousands of farmers to migrate to the cities. Although some employment was created by setting up industrial trade zones and promoting tourist trade, sufficient jobs did not materialize, and workers, peasants, and even middle-income families expanded the ranks of the unemployed. Many of the unemployed emigrated to the United States, mainly during the late 1970s and the 1980s.

The Dominican population has traditionally turned to the state to relieve social distress. In the past, political parties distributed contracts and found jobs for their followers, but in the late 1990s the government had only a limited capacity to deal with the wider needs of material relief. About half the people live below the poverty line. Access to potable water and sewerage is limited, and electric power outages are common. The
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank Title</th>
<th>Army Rank</th>
<th>Air Force Rank</th>
<th>Navy Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teniente General</td>
<td>Teniente General</td>
<td>Teniente General</td>
<td>Teniente General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor General</td>
<td>Mayor General</td>
<td>Mayor General</td>
<td>Mayor General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General de Brigada</td>
<td>General de Brigada</td>
<td>General de Brigada</td>
<td>General de Brigada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coronel</td>
<td>Coronel</td>
<td>Coronel</td>
<td>Coronel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teniente Coronel</td>
<td>Teniente Coronel</td>
<td>Teniente Coronel</td>
<td>Teniente Coronel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capitan</td>
<td>Capitan</td>
<td>Capitan</td>
<td>Capitan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primero Teniente</td>
<td>Primero Teniente</td>
<td>Primero Teniente</td>
<td>Primero Teniente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segundo Teniente</td>
<td>Segundo Teniente</td>
<td>Segundo Teniente</td>
<td>Segundo Teniente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8. Dominican Republic: Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1999*
### Dominican Republic: National Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RANK</th>
<th>RASO</th>
<th>RASO DE 1a CLASE</th>
<th>CABO</th>
<th>CABO DE 1a CLASE</th>
<th>SARGENTO</th>
<th>SARGENTO DE 2a CLASE</th>
<th>SARGENTO PRIMERO</th>
<th>SARGENTO MAYOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
<td><strong>NO INSIGNIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. RANK TITLES</strong></td>
<td>BASIC PRIVATE</td>
<td>PRIVATE</td>
<td>PRIVATE 1ST CLASS</td>
<td>CORPORAL</td>
<td>SERGEANT</td>
<td>STAFF SERGEANT</td>
<td>SERGEANT 1ST CLASS</td>
<td>MASTER SERGEANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RANK</strong></td>
<td>RASO</td>
<td>RASO DE PRIMERA CLASE</td>
<td>CABO</td>
<td>SARGENTO</td>
<td>SARGENTO A/C</td>
<td>SARGENTO PRIMERO</td>
<td>SARGENTO MAYOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
<td><strong>NO INSIGNIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. RANK TITLES</strong></td>
<td>AIRMAN BASIC</td>
<td>AIRMAN</td>
<td>AIRMAN 1ST CLASS</td>
<td>SERGEANT</td>
<td>STAFF SERGEANT</td>
<td>TECHNICAL SERGEANT</td>
<td>MASTER SERGEANT</td>
<td>SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RANK</strong></td>
<td>GRUMETE</td>
<td>MARINERO</td>
<td>CABO</td>
<td>SARGENTO</td>
<td>SARGENTO PRIMERO</td>
<td>SARGENTO MAYOR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
<td><strong>NO INSIGNIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S. RANK TITLES</strong></td>
<td>SEAMAN RECRUIT</td>
<td>SEAMAN</td>
<td>SEAMAN</td>
<td>PETTY OFFICER 30 CLASS</td>
<td>PETTY OFFICER 20 CLASS</td>
<td>PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS</td>
<td>CHIEF PETTY OFFICER</td>
<td>SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 9. Dominican Republic: Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1999*
resulting social discontent has brought periodic outbreaks of turmoil and violence. In addition, grassroots groups have shown an increasing ability to organize major protest actions that can lead to conflict and threaten the internal order.

In July 1997, a general strike was called in the northeast to demand infrastructure improvements that had been promised in the presidential campaign of the previous year. Power cuts resulting from delays in building new generating units were a particular source of resentment. The rising prices of staples like rice and chicken were also at issue. Hundreds of soldiers, as well as air force airborne units, were dispatched to reinforce the police. Some injuries occurred as strikers set off explosives and exchanged fire with police. Although the strike ended after its leaders had met with a team of high government officials, the president charged that the strikes were being led by "remnants of the left."

Protests continued in the fall of 1997, with numerous violent street demonstrations taking place in the suburbs of Santo Domingo. These demonstrations culminated in a national general strike in November 1997 to protest failure of the national power grid, which had led to power outages and rising prices. The strike was led by the Coordination of Popular, Peasant, and Union Organizations. The demonstrators accused the government of aiming for high growth rates at the expense of public services and controls on the prices of fuel and food staples. The series of local and national disturbances prompted the government to deploy thousands of police, reinforced by soldiers, to the poor neighborhoods of the main cities, which were described as under a virtual state of siege. Although ten civilians and police officers had been killed during earlier clashes, the two-day general strike was peaceful. The security forces demonstrated restraint although they detained many persons on suspicion of vandalism and violence. In July 1998, the police used live fire in an attempt to disperse a demonstration, killing one law student. Police officers detained in the incident were arrested and faced trial.

Dominican Marxist parties, illegal under Trujillo, emerged from the underground after his death. During the civil war, they supported Bosch and the Constitutionalists. Since then, most of these groups have operated as legal political parties. Although they have contested elections, they are small and weak and have failed to win seats in the legislature. The Dominican Communist Party, which has had a legal existence since
1977, was one of fifty-three political organizations and trade unions that formed the Dominican Leftist Front in 1983 but which still retain their individual structures. The government has often detained members of organizations and populist groups thought to be preparing public disturbances, especially during election campaigns. For example, the authorities detained hundreds of opposition party figures, members of other antigovernment groups, and journalists, ostensibly to foil possible violence, following the disputed 1994 elections.

The presence of Haitians living illegally in the Dominican Republic has been a source of recurrent disturbances. Large numbers of Haitians come to the country, some legally but most undocumented, searching for economic opportunity. Security forces, particularly the army, round up and repatriate thousands of these Haitians each year. Persons with legal residence and those of Haitian ancestry with possible claims to Dominican citizenship have complained of being included in the expulsions without being given a chance to prove their status. Ill-treatment of Haitian sugarcane cutters working under contract has also been a source of resentment and violence. Forced recruitment of Haitians to work on the sugar plantations has been reported. After as many as 25,000 Haitians were deported in early 1997, the presidents of the two countries met to set up a mechanism for the repatriations to be carried out under humane conditions.

National Police

The nation's security forces consist of the National Police, the National Department of Investigations (Departamento Nacional de Investigaciones—DNI), the National Drug Control Directorate (Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas—DNCD), and the armed forces. The National Police is under the secretary of state for interior and police, the military is under the secretary of state for the armed forces, and the DNI and DNCD report directly to the president.

The country's first police organization was a municipal force set up in 1844 in Santo Domingo. Beginning in 1847, other towns formed similar organizations. Eventually, every province had independent police forces. The national executive branch had only nominal influence over these forces, which were largely controlled by local caudillos. The local forces were disbanded in 1916 during the United States occupation; at that time, the United States Marines, and later members of the
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies

Dominican Constabulary Guard, assumed police duties. The National Police was created in 1936. Since then, police activities in the nation have been completely centralized, and no independent provincial or municipal forces have existed.

In 1998 the National Police numbered some 15,000. The force's current strength reflects an enlargement by 50 percent in less than a decade. A further 2,000 personnel from the military were reportedly transferred to the police in September 1997 to help deal with civil disturbances. The director general of the National Police is a police major general, who is directly subordinate to the secretary of state for interior and police (see fig. 10). The police maintain a close relationship with the armed forces, and, until the 1980s, the chief of the National Police was often a senior officer from one of the armed services. The director general is assisted by a deputy director general and directly supervises two sections: Internal Affairs and Planning, and Special Operations. Three other sections, Administration and Support, Police Operations, and Territorial Zones, are headed by the deputy director general.

The deputy director general of police has overall responsibility for territorial police operations. He supervises five regional directors, usually police brigadier generals, who are responsible for five zones: the Northeastern Zone (headquartered at San Francisco de Macorís), the Northern Zone (Santiago), the Southern Zone (Barahona), the Central Zone (San Cristóbal), and the Eastern Zone (San Pedro de Macorís). The police zones each cover several provinces; forces within the zones are broken down into provincial sections, companies, detachments, and local police posts.

An assistant director general under the director heads the Special Operations Section, which is responsible for the administration of the secret service, generally headed by a police brigadier general. The secret service performs undercover surveillance of domestic political groups and foreigners suspected of espionage or of inciting political or economic disorder. In October 1997, Special Operations took more than 500 persons into custody because it was believed they might incite violence during the planned general strike. The secret service coordinates its efforts with the DNI, which reports to the president. Created in 1962, the DNI is authorized to "investigate any act committed by persons, groups, or associations that conflict with the constitution, laws, or state institutions, or that attempt to establish any totalitarian form of government." The DNI is
an investigative body and, unlike the police, generally does not have arrest authority. The functions of the DNI are closely coordinated with those of the armed forces intelligence units, as well as with the functions of the police. The DNI is often commanded by a retired military general.

Approximately half of all police personnel are stationed in the capital area, both because Santo Domingo is by far the nation's largest city and because police headquarters, as well as several special police units, are located there. Among the special units garrisoned in the capital is a paramilitary Special Operations battalion with some 1,000 personnel armed with teargas and shotguns. The unit is used for riot control in Santo Domingo, although elements also can be deployed rapidly to any section of the country. Other specialized police units include a special Bank Guard Corps and a Sappers Corps that performs firefighting and civil defense duties.

The public image of the police has improved since the 1970s, but excesses on the part of police personnel, including beatings of suspects, continue to spark controversy. The government has adopted several measures to monitor police behavior and has taken corrective steps, but complaints about such abuses continue to surface (see Respect for Human Rights, this ch.).

**Criminal Justice System**

The Dominican criminal justice system is basically an inquisitorial arrangement in which a court and its staff take general charge of a criminal case, and the judge gathers evidence to supplement that produced by the prosecution and the defense. Evidence is largely committed to writing, and the final stage of the proceedings consists of the judge's examining all the combined written material and then deciding whether he or she is convinced, beyond doubt, of the guilt of the accused. The criminal courts do not, therefore, operate under a system of trial by jury.

The 1966 constitution guarantees several basic legal rights to all citizens. These include the rights of due process, public trial, and habeas corpus protection. An accused person is also guaranteed protection against double jeopardy and self-incrimination. A written order from a competent judicial authority is required if any person is to be detained more than forty-eight hours or if an individual's home or property is to be searched. Security forces have frequently violated these provisions by
Figure 10. Dominican Republic: Organization of Internal Security Agencies, 1999
Dominican Republic: National Security

...detaining suspects for "investigation" or "interrogation." It has been customary for the police to detain both suspects and witnesses in a crime, deciding only after investigation which merit release and which should be held further. Since the new government took office in 1996, an effort has been made to reduce abuses of the forty-eight-hour rule by placing lawyers from the prosecutor's office in police stations.

During the closed pretrial investigative phase of the criminal justice process, the state does not provide counsel to indigent prisoners. A small public defender organization was introduced in 1998 to assist indigent defendants in the Santo Domingo area. Other indigent cases are assigned to part-time, private attorneys. The courts rarely appoint defense lawyers in misdemeanor cases.

Defendants awarded bail rarely face an actual trial. Those denied bail may serve their entire sentences while awaiting trial. Accordingly, the decision to grant bail often determines whether an accused person will ever serve a prison sentence.

The justice system suffers seriously from chronic delays. Many suspects undergo a long period of pretrial detention that sometimes exceeds the maximum possible criminal sentence. In 1998 the proportion of the prison population awaiting trial was more than 75 percent. In the Santo Domingo National District, which accounts for approximately 45 percent of all criminal cases, the average pretrial detention declined from 13.8 months in 1996 to 6.5 months in 1998. However, the rest of the country did not experience corresponding improvement.

In addition to the Supreme Court of Justice, the constitution established three basic types of courts: courts of appeal, courts of first instance, and justice of the peace courts. There are special courts for labor, traffic, administrative, and land matters. Most misdemeanor offenses are tried by the justice of the peace courts, of which there is one in each municipality or township. The courts of first instance have original jurisdiction for criminal felony cases. There are twenty-nine of these, one for each province. Decisions may be, and regularly are, appealed to one of the nation's seven courts of appeal. These courts also have original jurisdiction over cases against judges of courts of first instance, government attorneys, provincial governors, and other specified officials.

Military and police courts have jurisdiction over members of the security forces, but a military or police board frequently remands cases involving capital crimes to civil courts. In 1996...
police referred two cases of extrajudicial killings to civilian criminal courts.

The constitution stipulates an independent judiciary, but in the past interference from other entities, including the executive branch, has undermined judicial independence. The Senate previously appointed all justices by majority vote for four-year terms, except members of the Supreme Court. This procedure subjected judges to undue political influence and often resulted in a wholesale turnover of judicial personnel when control of the Senate changed hands. The result was a highly politicized process, sometimes bringing incompetent jurists to the bench who could not be supervised effectively by the executive authorities.

Under a constitutional reform enacted in 1994, the judiciary was granted a fixed percentage of the national budget, thus weakening legislative control. A Council of the Magistrature was created to appoint justices of the Supreme Court (see The Judiciary, ch. 4).

The constitution requires all judges to have law degrees, and judges at each level of the judiciary are required to have practiced law for a specified number of years. Supreme Court justices, for instance, must have a minimum of twelve years of experience, and judges of the courts of first instance must have two years of experience. Justices of the peace are also required to have a law degree; exceptions are permitted, however, in rural areas where it might be impossible to appoint a trained lawyer.

Respect for Human Rights

The government observes the protections guaranteed to citizens under the constitution. It grants individuals and groups of all political points of view the freedom to speak, respects the constitutional right of peaceful assembly and association, normally grants permits for public marches and meetings, and imposes no restrictions on domestic or international travel. The government also adheres to the constitutional protections against invasion of the home, and conducts wire tapping and other forms of surveillance under provisions provided by law.

Dominican internal security forces are generally responsive to the authority of the civilian executive branch, but frequent instances of human rights abuse have occurred. Misuse of the police for political motives is relatively rare, however. There are no political prisoners, and deliberate political murders have
not occurred in recent years. However, the 1994 disappearance of university professor Narciso González, a prominent critic of the government of President Balaguer, has been a source of discord in the country, with suspicion falling on senior military officers. After President Fernández took office in 1996, he reopened the investigation of the case.

In 1997 President Fernández dismissed the heads of the National Police and the DNCD after both officers had been criticized by the attorney general for use of torture in criminal investigations and excessive force in attempting to control crime. Extrajudicial executions, described as "exchanges of fire," were said to have occurred. In addition, valuable assets seized in drug cases—cars, planes, and boats—were said to have disappeared.

Numerous deaths have resulted from police use of excessive force on persons in custody, during civil disturbances, or in pursuing suspects. In 1995 eighty-five such cases were reported; in 1998 seventy-five extrajudicial killings were ascribed to the police or the DNCD, a sharp increase over the previous year. Police personnel involved in such incidents may be tried by police courts or remanded to civilian courts. During 1998 police courts convicted and sentenced fifty members of the police for serious crimes. Numerous other officers were dismissed and their cases remanded to the civilian court system. As a rule, sentences in serious cases of abuse have ranged from a one-month suspension to six months' incarceration. In 1997 the narcotics police of the DNCD were accused of numerous cases of torture. The DNCD initially failed to cooperate with efforts to impose civilian supervision over the investigative process; the monitoring program resumed when the DNCD director was removed. When soldiers were transferred to the National Police in 1997, the human rights issue was high profile enough that the government mandated that those transferred receive several weeks of human rights training.

The National Police and narcotics police are reported to engage in the practice of rounding people up indiscriminately in poorer neighborhoods; most detainees are released after several hours. The security authorities continue to detain relatives and friends of suspected criminals to coerce a suspect into surrendering. Detentions of hundreds of persons occurred in 1994 and in earlier years at election time, ostensibly to prevent violent demonstrations. The individuals involved were released within the legal forty-eight-hour period.
Penal System

With a countrywide prison population of about 14,814 in 1997, the largest penal facility is the national penitentiary, La Victoria, in Santo Domingo. All individuals sentenced to more than two years of imprisonment serve their sentences there. A warden is supposed to run each prison and report to the attorney general through the Directorate of Prisons. In practice, however, the police or military colonel assigned to each prison to provide security is in charge of the prison and neither the wardens nor the Directorate of Prisons has much power.

The corrections system has received inadequate financing and suffers from unsanitary conditions and gross overcrowding. Medical supplies and services of physicians are deficient. Most prisoners find it necessary to supplement the prison diet with food supplied by relatives or purchased. Rioting to protest overcrowding and food shortages is an almost annual occurrence, often accompanied by loss of life. Gangs operating inside the prisons supply drugs and run prostitution rings. Prison officers reportedly engage in extortion and other forms of corruption.

Under the Fernández government, which took office in 1996, some reforms have been instituted. The government instituted a census of all prisons, and the attorney general's office began a case-by-case review of prisoners. Minors, the mentally ill, and the infirm were also segregated from other prisoners. In addition, a renovation program has begun at La Victoria and several other prisons to supply improved sanitation and more comfortable quarters, medical teams have been sent to each prison, and telephone access and recreation programs have been instituted.

As of the end of 1997, the number of inmates at La Victoria penitentiary had been reduced to 2,100 from a peak of 3,500. However, as a result of a crackdown against crime, the prison's population had risen to 3,300 by the end of 1998. Najayo, the second largest prison, built in 1994 to house 700 inmates, had a population of 2,290. Some 300 juveniles found by investigators to be incarcerated in La Victoria were removed in 1997. An inspection by a government reform commission continued to find many incidents of violations in other prisons, including 156 juveniles jailed with adults at Najayo. Females are held in separate prison wings under conditions that are, in general, superior to those found in the male wings; few abuses by guards have been reported.
Narcotics Trafficking

The Dominican Republic is a major transshipment country for cocaine from Colombia destined for the United States and Puerto Rico. The country's long, underpatrolled border with Haiti and its poorly paid and ill-equipped police and armed services make it an ideal linkage point for drug deliveries. Although the Dominican Republic is not a drug-producing country, the profits of drug trafficking support a significant part of the construction and business sectors, and are responsible for much of the personal spending on luxuries.

Dominican citizens are heavily involved in the street narcotics networks in New York and other cities of the Northeast and Miami. They are believed to be responsible for one-third of the 300 tons of cocaine reaching United States markets each year—a share that has doubled since the early 1990s. Loads of drugs from Colombia are delivered by ships and planes, often offshore air drops for pickup by small Dominican vessels. The drugs are then transferred directly to Puerto Rico by specially designed speedy small craft and yachts, or to the mainland United States hidden in legitimate cargoes. Aircraft are used for flights to the Bahamian islands. Profits from drug transactions are sent back to the Dominican Republic by bulk transfers of cash concealed in commercial shipments and camouflaged as remittances from Dominican workers in the United States.

The Dominican Republic has demonstrated considerable determination in the conduct of its counternarcotics effort. Senior officials engage in neither drug trafficking nor money laundering. The counternarcotics effort is normally in the hands of the DNCD and the military. Composed of more than 800 officials from the police, the three armed services, and the civilian sector, the rapidly growing DNCD has done an excellent job of battling drug trafficking along the southwest and east coasts and in the Santo Domingo area. However, lack of experience among operational-level personnel and low salaries hamper its overall effectiveness. The DNCD is aided by Special Investigative Teams of the DNCD, trained and equipped by the United States; these teams supply valuable intelligence on major international narcotics operations. A Financial Investigative Unit was formed in 1997 to uncover money laundering. The two other mechanisms for controlling drug trafficking are not as effective. Neither the police nor the military are sufficiently motivated or equipped to impose consistently effective controls. The army has had little success in interdicting ship-
ments along the porous border with Haiti, across which thousands of kilograms of cocaine are smuggled annually. In 1998, however, a new border check station was established on the easiest route for smuggling drugs for transshipment to the United States, and two more stations were planned to be opened in 1999. The navy and air force, however, lack sufficient resources to give full support to the DNCD, and patrol planes obtained from the United States can perform only limited coastal reconnaissance because of fuel and parts shortages.

The United States is engaged in a program to furnish equipment and training in support of the Dominican counternarcotics effort. Under the terms of a bilateral agreement concluded in 1988, the United States has supplied US$4,200,000 in counternarcotics assistance. In 1998 US$300,000 was provided, including support for a canine detection program and the Haitian border initiative. A United States policy of linking denial of visas with drug-related corruption has also proven effective in thwarting corruption.

Although the DNCD is said to be relatively untainted, the United States Department of State reported in 1998 that corruption continued to be widespread among lower-level law enforcement officials; bribery of immigration officers and airline personnel by drug dealers is also common. Of 10,000 drug cases over a seven-year period, only 100 ended in jail sentences. Rumor had it that family ties between Dominican officials and narcotic traffickers have led to delayed arrests, early release, and loss of evidence to prevent conviction.

Charges of corruption have arisen in the DNCD over the disposition of confiscated assets of drug traffickers. Numerous incidents of torture of prisoners by the DNCD have also been alleged, in some cases with leaders of the DNCD present. After the rear admiral heading the DNCD was dismissed in 1997, a new agency was formed to take charge of seized assets and placed under the direct control of the governmental coordinating body, the National Drug Council (Consejo Nacional de Drogas) rather than the DNCD.

As regards criminal cases, 1,942 Dominicans were deported from the United States as criminals in 1997. More than 100 Dominican nationals wanted in the United States are believed to have taken refuge in their homeland. In 1998 the Dominican Republic enacted legislation repealing the prohibition on the extradition of Dominican nationals and subsequently extradited three Dominicans, in one case for narcotics-related racke-
teering. In 1999 the Dominican government had yet to act on a number of other extradition requests from the United States. Dominican gang members in the United States have been considered notoriously violent, confident they could escape punishment by fleeing to their homeland.

Since taking office in 1996, President Fernández has made strenuous efforts to reduce narcotics-related corruption among the judiciary and the police, military, and customs services. Nevertheless, his party is weak in Congress, and the political opposition has become increasingly dependent on funds from major drug dealers. Drug money infiltrates into legitimate business enterprises, casinos, banking, and the media, thereby turning illicit profits into legitimate assets. The influence of the traffickers grows as more and more of the economy becomes dependent on them.

Fernández has made a promising beginning by introducing partial reforms to the criminal justice system and attempting to motivate the military and the police to join more wholeheartedly in the struggle against narcotics. While improving cooperation with the United States on this issue, his political priorities oblige him to turn first to the reduction of social tensions induced by poverty and breakdowns in public services, matters of primary importance to the Dominican electorate.

* * *

No recent studies that deal comprehensively with national security in the Dominican Republic are available. Two works published in 1983–84 survey the history and development of the armed forces until that period. One is Adrian English’s *Armed Forces of Latin America*, and the other is the section on the Dominican Republic in John Keegan's *World Armies* (second edition). A recent study of the institutional evolution of the armed forces is *Las fuerzas militares en la República Dominicana desde la Primera República hasta los comienzos de la Cuarta República* by Jose Miguel Soto Jimenez.

Current order of battle data are available in *The Military Balance* published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London and in Jane's *Fighting Ships*. The conduct of the internal security forces, the reform of the judicial system, and problems of human rights and public order are reviewed in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, a report submitted annually by the United States Department of State to the
United States Congress. The Department of State's *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report* provides an annual appraisal of the Dominican effort to curtail drug trafficking. Mention of other matters pertaining to the military and internal security can often be found in *Caribbean Insight* and *Latin American Regional Reports: Caribbean and Central America Report*. Both of these periodicals are published in London. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Haiti: Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Haiti.
Short Form: Haiti.
Term for Citizens: Haitians.
Capital: Port-au-Prince.

Geography

Size: Approximately 27,750 square kilometers.
**Topography:** Five mountain ranges divide country into three regions: northern, central, and southern. Highest peak, Morne de la Selle, located in south, reaches an altitude of 2,715 meters. No navigable rivers. Largest lake is Étang Saumâtre, brackish body in southern region.

**Climate:** Tropical climate influenced by northeast trade winds. Wet season generally lasts from March through May, dry season from December through February. Rainfall irregular because of mountainous topography. Temperature in lowland area 15°C to 25°C in winter, 25°C to 35°C in summer.

**Society**


**Language:** 1987 constitution recognizes both French and Creole as official languages. Languages linguistically distinct, not mutually comprehensible. Creole spoken by vast majority, but facility with French connotes higher social status.

**Ethnic Groups:** Population almost entirely black and mulatto as result of historical origin as slaveholding agricultural colony. Economic and political elite mainly mulatto. Only ethnic minority "Arabs"—Syrian, Lebanese, and Palestinian immigrants—most of whom work in export-import sector.

**Education and Literacy:** In academic year 1996–97, enrollment rate 64 percent for six- to twelve-year-olds and 15 percent for twelve- to eighteen-year-olds. Private schools attended by 75 percent of school enrollment. Ninety percent of urban children but only 23 percent of rural children attend school. University of Haiti major institution of higher learning. National literacy estimates range from 20 to 53 percent.

**Health:** Children twelve to twenty-four months old at high risk for malnutrition. Infant mortality high at seventy-two per 1,000 live births in 1996, a decline since mid-1980s. Principal causes of death for children one to five years old diarrheal illnesses (37 percent), malnutrition (32 percent), and respiratory illness (25 percent). Common causes of adult deaths malaria, tuberculosis, parasitic diseases, and typhoid fever. National incidence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) projected at 5.4 to 7.7 percent for 2000; rate of males to females with...
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) one to one.

**Religion:** Roman Catholicism official religion according to 1860 concordat with Vatican. Voodoo more widely practiced than Catholicism, could be considered national religion. Much overlap of believers, with most voodooists considering themselves Roman Catholics. Although church joined in several antivoodoo campaigns in course of Haiti's history, its opposition to folk religion more sporadic and ambivalent than that of Protestant missionaries, who condemn voodoo as diabolical. Rapid growth of Protestantism since 1950; some estimates 25 percent of population Protestant in late 1990s.

**Economy**


**Agriculture:** Employed 66 percent of total workforce of almost 3 million in 1990s and accounted for some 25 to 30 percent of GDP and less than 10 percent of exports. In late 1990s, agriculture sector produced only 20 percent of Haiti's domestic food requirements. Constantly deteriorating rural infrastructure, primitive farming techniques, migration out of rural areas, deforestation, and natural disasters, including Hurricane Georges in September 1998, have taken a toll.

**Industry:** Manufacturing 14 percent of GDP in 1991, suffered following Jean-Bertrand Aristide's overthrow and ensuing embargo imposed by United Nations (UN) and Organization of American States (OAS). Of 180 companies operating in four free zones (more than 150 of these, mostly United States-controlled, engaged in assembly production), 130 closed factories after 1991 coup. Some thirty plants reopened after reestablishment of constitutional government in October 1994. Plants generated about 60,000 jobs producing processed foods, electrical and electronic equipment, textiles, clothing, toys, sporting goods, and handicrafts. Assembly industry prospects hampered by underdeveloped infrastructure, illiterate workforce, scarce managerial personnel, and highest utility costs in Caribbean. Chronic political instability prompted many firms to relocate to more stable Caribbean areas, mostly to free zone in neighboring Dominican Republic. By late
1990s, Haiti's assembly sector operating at fraction of capacity. In mid-1999 Prime Minister Alexis decided to resume privatization process of various enterprises after a two-year hiatus.

**Currency:** Gourde (G). Official exchange rate originally set at G5 to US$1 in 1919. Black market trading began in early 1980s in response to high inflation and fiscal shortfalls. Political crises of early 1990s, international embargo, and sharp drop in government revenues reduced value of gourde by about 80 percent by 1994. Although the Central Bank pumped more than US$37 million into foreign exchange market in 1996, gourde continued to fall to G16.9 = US$1 in August 1997. In 1999 gourde fluctuated between 17.5 and 18.3 to US$1.

**Imports:** Primarily food, tobacco, chemicals, machinery, and transportation equipment; fell from US$449 million in 1991 to US$141 million in 1994.

**Exports:** Mainly coffee and manufactured goods from assembly plants; declined from US$202 million in 1991 to US$57 million in 1994.

**Balance of Payments:** Since mid-1960s and continuing into late 1990s, Haiti has incurred substantial trade deficits. Deficits partially offset by remittances from Haitians working abroad and official aid. During 1992–94 international trade embargo, public deficit financed mainly by Central Bank credit and accumulation of arrears. External current account deficit, estimated at 19 percent of GDP in FY 1994–95, projected to drop gradually to 10 percent of GDP by FY 1999–2000.

**Fiscal Year (FY):** October 1 through September 30.

**Fiscal Policy:** Effects of gourde depreciation, together with rising food prices, raised inflation rate from 15.6 percent in December 1996 to 17.2 percent in July 1997. To protect gourde stability, government adopted stringent fiscal policy and aggressive tax collection program. New legislation broadened base of sales tax and unified its rates, reduced tax evasion among larger companies, and minimized number of tax and customs exemptions.

**Transportation and Communications**

**Roads:** Of 1999 total of 4,050 kilometers of roads, 950 kilometers are paved, another 950 kilometers are gravel or
otherwise improved, and 2,150 kilometers are unimproved and almost impassable during rainy season. Two paved highways link northern and southern regions.

**Ports:** Port-au-Prince is major port, with container facilities and berths for large liners. Remaining thirteen ports, largely provincial and small, centers of imported contraband in 1990s.

**Airports:** Haiti's main international airport is located ten kilometers north of Port-au-Prince. Some ten other airfields are operational but are only grass strips.

**Railroads:** One rail line, used for transporting sugarcane. No passenger rail service.

**Telecommunications:** With a ratio of six telephones per 1,000 inhabitants in 1998, Haiti ranks below some poorer African nations (eight telephones per 1,000 people). The 39,000 telephone lines of the 1980s increased to 64,000 in late 1990s, with 80 percent concentrated in capital area, where only 25 percent of population live. Subscribers with international service can dial directly to United States and Europe via satellite station at Sabourin. Telephone service in rural areas so poor that many resort to two-way radios.

**Government and Politics**

OPL. In June 1997, Smarth resigned. In December 1998, deeply divided parliament confirmed Jacques Édouard Alexis as prime minister. In January 1999, Préval initiated rule by decree, dismissing parliament and appointing municipal officials "interim executive agents" of Ministry of Interior. In March, following successful negotiations between Préval and a coalition of political organizations that did not include FL or OPL, Prime Minister Alexis formed interim government and Préval named a Provisional Electoral Council with mandate to organize overdue parliamentary and municipal elections by late 1999. Elections held in May 2000, with Aristide's Lavalas Family party gaining victory. OAS Election Observation Mission questioned validity of Senate elections, and United States, Canada, and European Union threatened to withhold aid if results not revised. As of August 2000, Haitian government has refused to accept OAS recommendations.

**Politics:** Tentative progress toward pluralistic democratic government after long history of rule by military leaders and dictators. Tradition of political movements or upheavals and strong presidency inhibit development of political parties and of power sharing among executive, legislature, and judiciary. Late 1980s Lavalas movement of Aristide promoted a participatory and decentralized democracy as opposed to more urban-centered, representative forms of democratic governance. Movement splintered several times since gaining power in 1990 elections. National political institutions and organizations decimated during three years of de facto military rule (1991–94). Political void following 1995 dismantling of Haitian army filled by OPL. Emergence in 1997 of Aristide's FL shattered OPL, creating bitter rivalry between country's two dominant political groups. Other political parties small and weak. Adherents of authoritarian rule abound, but lack stable institutions and popular support. Church, business, and civil society lack formal political institutions, but often have been influential political actors. Charismatic leadership, currently in person of Aristide, remains dominant political trait in Haiti.

**International Relations:** Focused mainly on United States, country's leading trade partner and major source of foreign aid, and on neighboring Dominican Republic. Haiti's longstanding regional and international isolation diminished following greater involvement by Caribbean Community and Common Market (Caricom), OAS, and UN beginning with 1990 elections and increasing following international

International Agreements and Memberships: Member of UN, OAS, Caribbean Community, Association of Caribbean States, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and Lomé Convention.

National Security

Armed Forces: Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armées d'Haiti—FAd'H) disbanded January 1995, after return of President Aristide from exile. Strength of armed forces including police elements 8,000 before Aristide's return.

Police: Haitian National Police (Police Nationale d'Haïti—PNH) with approximately 6,000 members only functioning security force in late 1999.

Police Organization: Main components Administrative Police, Judicial Police, and Office of Inspector General. Specialized units include presidential and ministerial guards, crowd control unit, Coast Guard, and Counternarcotics Unit. Nine departmental directorates supervise city and rural divisions. UN-sponsored police trainers helped form PNH in 1995; about 280 trainers from eleven countries as of late 1999.

Police Equipment: Ordinary police carry sidearms. Special units have shotguns, semiautomatic rifles, and submachine guns. Some riot equipment, vans, and radio equipment.
Figure 11. Haiti: Administrative Divisions, 1999
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1492</td>
<td>Columbus lands at present-day Môle Saint-Nicolas, Haiti; establishes first permanent Spanish New World settlement at site of Santo Domingo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1492–1697</td>
<td>Spain colonizes Hispaniola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1503</td>
<td>Nicolás de Ovando named governor and supreme justice; institutes <em>encomienda</em> system. Importation of African slaves begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1697</td>
<td>Treaty of Ryswick: Spain cedes western part of Hispaniola, known as Saint-Domingue, to France following War of the Grand Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791–1803</td>
<td>Slave rebellion in Saint-Domingue leads to revolution under Toussaint Louverture against French expeditionary force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1804 January 1</td>
<td>Haiti becomes independent, with Jean-Jacques Dessalines as president and, subsequently, emperor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1804</td>
<td>Dessalines assassinated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>Haiti partitioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>Alexandre Pétion president in the south.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818–43</td>
<td>Jean-Pierre Boyer presidency; Boyer reunites Haiti 1820, invades and occupies Santo Domingo 1822; abolishes slavery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1843–1915</td>
<td>Period of political instability in Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>Concordat restores relations between the Vatican and Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1862</td>
<td>United States recognizes Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915–34</td>
<td>United States marines occupy Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915–34</td>
<td>Dominican military kills 5,000–12,000 Haitians along Haitian-Dominican border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941–42</td>
<td>Roman Catholic Church organizes anti-superstition campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946–50</td>
<td>Dumarsais Estimé presidency; new 1946 constitution and reforms launched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950 May 10</td>
<td>Military coup overthrows regime of Dumarsais Estimé and leads to period of instability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957–71</td>
<td>François Duvalier presidency/dictatorship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Revision of concordat between the Vatican and Haiti allows François Duvalier to nationalize the Roman Catholic Church.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–86</td>
<td>Jean-Claude Duvalier presidency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Pope John Paul II visits Haiti; advocates justice, more egalitarian society.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985–86</td>
<td>Haitians demonstrate against Jean-Claude Duvalier.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 January</td>
<td>United States withholds recertification of Haiti for foreign assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 February 7</td>
<td>Jean-Claude Duvalier leaves Haiti.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 December</td>
<td>Free parliamentary and presidential elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 February 7</td>
<td>Jean-Bertrand Aristide assumes presidency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 25</td>
<td>Aristide addresses United Nations General Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 31</td>
<td>Haitian military overthrows Aristide; he leaves for Venezuela, later goes to United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991–94</td>
<td>Raoul Cédras military regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>July 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>April 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 16–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>June 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>February 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6. Haiti: Historical Setting
Figure from a painting by Prosper Pierrelouis
AFRICAN SLAVES IN THE French colony of Saint-Domingue rebelled against their French masters, defeated a powerful Napoleonic military force, and founded the independent nation of Haiti in January 1804. This overthrow of a government by slaves is the only such revolution in history. It also made Haiti the second oldest independent nation in the Western Hemisphere, after the United States. However, since this auspicious beginning, Haitian history has seen perennial political, economic, and racial problems.

Haitian rulers have emulated the French colonial system. They have exploited racial, religious, and class differences, and retained armies and personal security forces to control the population and remain in power. At various times they have favored either blacks or light-skinned Haitians (mulattoes), Roman Catholics or voodooists, the elite or the masses, each at the expense of the other.

As a consequence of the French colonial legacy, Haiti has had a history of dictatorial leaders who have defied constitutions, ruled through reliance on their military and security forces, and often come into power or left it through violent means. Of the few presidents who were popularly elected, such as Dumarsais Estimé (1946–50), François Duvalier (1957–71), and Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1991–95), only the last named left office voluntarily after completing his term of office. The popular revolt that deposed President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971–86), the military coup that deposed President Aristide in 1991, and the United States/United Nations actions that reinstated Aristide in 1994 suggest that violence continues to be the usual route to change.

Spanish Discovery and Colonization, 1492–1697

The island of Hispaniola (La Isla Española), which today is occupied by the nations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, is located about eighty kilometers from Cuba, 200 kilometers from Jamaica, and 1,120 kilometers from the United States. Haiti has an area of about 27,750 square kilometers, comparable in size to the state of Maryland. Evidence exists of human habitation in Haiti as early as the fourth millennium B.C. by people of Central American origin. The Taino emerged as an
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies

ethnic group in Hispaniola around A.D. 1200, and the Caribs arrived just before the Spanish landed at Môle Saint-Nicolas in 1492.

Christopher Columbus received a friendly reception from the Indians when he disembarked on Hispaniola in what is today Haiti, near Cap-Haïtien. However, when Columbus returned on his second voyage in 1493, he found that his first settlement, Navidad, had been destroyed and its inhabitants slain. Undeterred, Columbus established a second settlement, Isabela, farther to the east, and continued his mission to spread Roman Catholicism, claim new lands for Spain, and discover gold.

Hispaniola, or Santo Domingo, as it became known under Spanish dominion, became the first outpost of the Spanish Empire. When the quest for gold failed, the island became important as a seat of colonial administration and a starting point for other conquests. It was in Santo Domingo that the system of allotments of land (repartimiento) was introduced, whereby Spanish-born persons residing in the New World (peninsulares) received large grants of land and the right to compel labor from the Indians who lived there.

Christopher Columbus was the first administrator of Santo Domingo. He and his brother, Bartolomé Columbus, fell out of favor with the settlers and the Indians as a result of their harsh demands and discipline. They also lost favor with the crown for failure to maintain control of the colony, bring gold back to Spain, or discover a new route to Asia. Both brothers were briefly held in a Spanish prison. The colony's new governor, Nicolás de Ovando, laid the groundwork for the island's development. During his tenure, the repartimiento system gave way to a system in which all the land was considered to be the property of the crown (encomienda). This new system granted stewardship of land to the crown's agents (encomenderos), who were entitled to employ (or, in practice, to enslave) Indian labor.

The Indians were the first and greatest victims of colonial rule. Although the exact size of the indigenous population of the time is not known, contemporary observers have estimated it to be between several thousand and several million. By most accounts, however, there were between 60,000 and 600,000 Indians on the island. Within fifty years, almost all had been killed outright, died as a result of overwork in the mines, or succumbed to diseases to which they were not immune.
Several years before the Indians were decimated, Santo Domingo had lost its position as the preeminent Spanish colony in the New World. Its lack of mineral riches caused it to be neglected by the mother country, especially after the conquest of New Spain (Mexico). In 1535 Santo Domingo was incorporated into the Viceroyalty of New Spain, which included Mexico and the Central American isthmus; its status dwindled further after the conquest of the rich kingdom of the Incas in Peru. Agriculture became the mainstay of the island's economy, although the colony did not reach the high level of productivity that was subsequently to characterize it under French rule.

Although Hispaniola never realized its economic potential under Spanish rule, it remained strategically important as a gateway to the Caribbean. The Caribbean provided the opportunity for pirates from England, France, and the Netherlands to impede Spanish shipping, waylay galleons filled with gold, and establish a foothold in the hemisphere, which had been divided by papal decree between Spain and Portugal. This competition for spoils occurred throughout the Caribbean, but nowhere as intensively as on Hispaniola.

England's Sir Francis Drake led one of the most famous forays against the port of Santo Domingo in 1586, just two years before he played a key role in the English navy's defeat of the Spanish Armada. Drake failed to secure the island, but his raid, followed by the arrival of corsairs and freebooters who established scattered settlements, was part of a pattern of encroachment that gradually diluted Spanish dominance.

Beginning in the 1620s, Frenchmen, reportedly expelled by the Spanish from Saint Christopher (Saint Kitts), began to use Tortuga Island (Île de la Tortue), located off the northwest coast of Hispaniola, as a base to attack English and Spanish shipping. They came to be called buccaneers, a term derived from the Indian word, boucan, meaning spit, on which they cooked their meat. Skirmishes with Spanish and English forces were common. As the maintenance of the empire drained the energies of a declining Spain, the buccaneers' intervention became more effective on behalf of France. The first permanent settlement on Tortuga was established in 1659 under the commission of King Louis XIV of France. The subsequent establishment of the French West India Company to direct the expected commerce between the colony on Tortuga and France underscored the seriousness of the enterprise.
Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies

In time, the buccaneers began to cross to the western side of Hispaniola to hunt for cattle and wild boar, and some settled there, assuming they would be safe because of the area's relative remoteness from the Spanish capital city of Santo Domingo. By 1670 the buccaneers had established a permanent settlement at Cap-François, now Cap-Haïtien (see fig. 11). At that time, the western third of the island was commonly referred to as Saint-Domingue, the name it bore officially after Spain relinquished sovereignty over the area to France following the War of the Grand Alliance, which officially ended with the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697.

French Colony of Saint-Domingue, 1697–1803

More French citizens arrived in Saint-Domingue in the 1720s. They hoped to get rich by farming indigo, coffee, or sugar and then to return to France. Many succeeded in their goal. By the mid-eighteenth century, this territory, largely neglected under Spanish rule, had become the richest and most coveted colony in the Western Hemisphere. Between 1783 and 1789, agricultural production on the island almost doubled, creating more wealth than the rest of the West Indies combined, and more than the United States. Sugar was the principal source of its wealth. Saint-Domingue produced 40 percent of the sugar imported by France. The colony played a pivotal role in the French economy, accounting for almost two-thirds of French commercial interests abroad and 40 percent of foreign trade.

This flourishing economy was based on slavery. The first African slaves were brought from Portugal and Spain, but by 1513, shipping lines had been established exclusively for slaving, and its victims were imported directly from Africa. Although most of the slaves came from West Africa, their origins were diverse, representing at least thirty-eight regions in Africa and 100 tribes. With time, Saint-Domingue became the principal slave-importing island in the West Indies. According to historian Moreau de St. Méry, who wrote in 1797, based on census figures there were 452,000 slaves in Saint-Domingue in 1789 out of a total population of 520,00—the remainder consisted of 40,000 whites and 28,000 affranchis (free men and women of color) or descendants of affranchis. Between 1764 and 1771, 10,000 to 15,000 new slaves arrived in Saint-Domingue annually, while countless others died at sea en route. Most who survived the crossing subsequently perished in
Haiti: Historical Setting

Saint-Domingue, some because of the island's tropical heat, humidity, and diseases, and others as the result of brutal treatment by plantation owners. Statistics show that there was a complete turnover of slaves every twenty years. In 1789 two-thirds of all the slaves in the colony had been born in Africa.

The colony was hierarchically structured, based on color, class, and wealth. At the bottom of the social ladder were the slaves who had just arrived in Saint-Domingue and spoke only African languages. As field laborers, they had the hardest work and were despised by everyone else. On the next rung were the Creole slaves, Africans whose source of pride was that they had been born in the New World. Above them came the mulatto slaves, who often worked in the plantation house and viewed themselves as superior to the freed black slaves because of their indoor work and lighter skin color. At the top were the affranchis, usually mulattoes, or people of color (gens de couleur), neither whites nor slaves. Whites were on a separate social ladder; at the bottom were the shopkeepers, referred to as the small whites (petits blancs). At the top were the plantation owners, wealthy merchants, and high officials, who were known as the big whites (grands blancs).

Social and racial dissatisfaction and tensions among planters, free blacks, and slaves became widespread in Saint-Domingue in the last years of the colony. In addition, the planters chafed at regulations imposed by the mother country. France appointed the colonial governors, quartered militia in the colony, and required that all cargo travel on French ships.

The free blacks protested their second-class status. Beginning in the 1770s, the white colonists imposed laws that precluded blacks from being called "mister," from wearing certain clothes, or from sitting wherever they liked in churches and theaters. The free blacks wanted equal rights with whites, and most of all the right to hold citizenship and to own slaves.

The slaves on Saint-Domingue, who were badly mistreated by the planters, became increasingly restive, spurred on by the French Revolution, with its endorsement of freedom and equality and by campaigns by British and French anti-slavery organizations. Violent conflicts between white colonists and black slaves were common in Saint-Domingue. Bands of runaway slaves, known as maroons (marrons), entrenched themselves in bastions in the colony's mountains and forests, from which they harried white-owned plantations, both to obtain provisions and weaponry and to avenge themselves against the
inhabitants. As their numbers grew, these bands, sometimes consisting of thousands of people, began to carry out hit-and-run attacks throughout the colony. This guerrilla warfare, however, lacked centralized organization and leadership. The most famous maroon leader was François Macandal, whose six-year rebellion (1751–57) left an estimated 6,000 dead. Reportedly a boko, or voodoo sorcerer, Macandal drew from African traditions and religions to motivate his followers. Only one instance is known of an organized plan to free slaves during the 100 years prior to 1791. The instigator was Macandal. His attempt failed before it got started, but as the number of slaves, free blacks, and escaped slaves increased, so, too, did the potential for insurrection.

In 1790 the National Assembly in Paris required that the white Colonial Assembly grant suffrage to landed and tax-paying free blacks; the planters' refusal to comply led to the first rebellion in Saint-Domingue. A white militia, reinforced by a corps of black volunteers, contributed to the racial tensions by brutally putting down the revolt, which was led by Vincent Ogé.

**Fight for Independence, 1791–1803**

The slave rebellion that finally toppled the French colony began with a voodoo ceremony. It was organized by Boukman, a maroon voodoo priest (houngan), on August 14, 1791, at the Turpin plantation near Bois Cayman. Among those who participated in that ceremony and later became leaders of the revolution and new nation were Toussaint Louverture (also seen as L'Ouverture), Georges Biassou, and Jean-François.

The slave rebellion began little more than a week after the voodoo ceremony. The slaves slaughtered whites and torched property, fields, and factories in northern settlements, including Acul, Limbé, and Flaville. When news of the uprising reached Cap-Français (formerly Cap-François), whites retaliated at random against non-whites. In response, they were attacked by thousands of blacks. The rebellion ended with an estimated 10,000 slaves and 1,000 whites dead, and 1,200 coffee estates and 200 sugar plantations ruined.

The attack on Cap-Français failed, but elsewhere the planters were unable to regain control. Mulatto forces under André Rigaud, Alexandre Pétion, and others, reinforced by black slaves, continued to clash with white militia in the west and south. The rebellion set in motion events that culminated in the Haitian Revolution.
After the French National Assembly declared in favor of enfranchisement of free blacks and enforcement of equal rights, commissioners were dispatched to Saint-Domingue to implement the policy. Whites in Saint-Domingue, who had had little respect for royal governance in the past, now rallied behind the Bourbons and rejected the radical egalitarian notions of the French revolutionaries. A convoluted situation developed in different regions of the colony, which resulted in divisions within the white, mulatto, and black communities as well as among the various groups. Black slaves battled white colonists while blacks who supported the French king, known as black royalists, fought white and mulatto French republicans, and still other mulattoes struggled against white troops. The Spanish and British took advantage of the instability, and their intervention became another chapter in the revolution.

The leader of the slave rebellion in Saint-Domingue was Toussaint Louverture. Toussaint was born between 1743 and 1746 on the Bréda plantation in northern Saint-Domingue, one of a small number of slaves who were well treated and allowed to become literate. Toussaint served on the Bréda plantation as a steward; when the rebellion began, he arranged safe conduct for his master’s family out of the colony and joined the army. He soon emerged as the preeminent military strategist, reportedly in part because of his reading of works by Julius Caesar and others, and in part because of his innate leadership ability.

In April 1793, Cap-Français fell to the French republican forces, who were reinforced by thousands of blacks who had joined them against the French royalists on the promise of freedom. In August Commissioner Léger-Félicité Sonthonax abolished slavery in the colony.

Two black generals refused to commit their forces to France. Instead, Jean-François and Georges Biassou accepted commissions from Spain and, in coordination with Spanish forces, sought to take the north of Saint-Domingue. Toussaint joined the Spanish in February 1793. Commanding his own forces, he cut a swath through the north, swung south to Gonaives, and by the end of the year had taken control of north-central Saint-Domingue. At this point, Toussaint changed his surname to Louverture meaning "opening," perhaps a commentary on his ability to find openings on the battlefield, or an allusion to his role in creating an opening for slaves.
Some historians believe that Spain and Britain may have reached an informal arrangement to divide the French colony between them—with Britain taking the south and Spain the north. British forces landed in Jérémie and Môle Saint-Nicolas, besieged what is now Port-au-Prince, and took it in June 1794. Meanwhile, the Spanish launched an offensive from the east. The French forces checked Spanish progress toward Port-au-Prince in the south, but the Spanish pushed rapidly through the northern part of the country, occupying most of it by 1794. Spain and Britain appeared poised to seize Saint-Domingue but were foiled by epidemics of tropical diseases.

Toussaint’s centrally located forces became the key to victory. After three years of service with Biassou and Jean-François, Toussaint joined forces with France on June 25, 1794, presumably because the French National Assembly had decided on February 4, 1794, to abolish slavery whereas Spain showed no sign of keeping its promise to end slavery in territories it controlled, and Britain had reinstated slavery in places it had occupied. Toussaint took the Artibonite region following a number of raids against his former allies. André Rigaud’s mulatto forces had some successes in the south, and the tide turned toward the French republicans. On July 22, 1794, a peace agreement was signed between the principal contenders, France and Spain; Britain was not involved, having no legitimate claim to Hispaniola. Although not implemented until the next year, the Treaty of Basel directed Spain to cede its holdings on Hispaniola to France. The Spanish forces were left without supplies, funding, or avenues of retreat. The armies of Jean-François and Biassou disbanded, and many of their forces joined Toussaint.

In March 1796, Toussaint rescued the French commander, General Étienne-Maynard Laveaux, from a mulatto-led effort to depose him as the primary colonial authority, and the grateful Laveaux appointed Toussaint lieutenant governor of Saint-Domingue. Subsequent French governors made Toussaint commander in chief of all French forces on the island. From this position, Toussaint attempted to create an autonomous state under black rule by getting rid of the French and the mulattoes. He expelled Sonthonax, the French commissioner, and defeated Rigaud’s forces in the so-called War of the Castes (1799–1800).

After capturing the port of Santo Domingo in May 1800, Toussaint controlled all of Hispaniola. Then, he turned his
attention to domestic issues. In 1800 the plantations were operating at only two-thirds of their former productivity. Toussaint sought to maintain an export economy by putting his generals in charge of the plantations. He reinstated forced labor, *fermage*, in order to grow sugar, coffee, and other crops; made Roman Catholicism the official religion; and outlawed voodoo, the religion of most of the population. Toussaint also declared divorce illegal and demanded monogamy and marital fidelity of his subjects, although he himself kept mistresses.

According to a constitution approved by the Colonial Assembly in 1801, Toussaint was made governor general for life and given the authority to choose his successor. This did not please slave-holding countries, such as the United States and Britain, and threatened French ambitions for a western empire. With the French victorious in Europe, on October 23, 1801, Napoleon ordered his brother-in-law, General Charles Victor Emmanuel Leclerc, to retake the colony and restore slavery.

A 20,000-man French-led expeditionary force, which included Polish, German, Dutch, and Swiss mercenaries and was joined by white colonists and mulatto forces under Pétion and others, landed on the north coast of Saint-Domingue in January 1802. Their numbers were later doubled. Toussaint held out for several months, but two of his chief lieutenants, Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Henry Christophe, held separate talks with the French and went over to their side. On May 6, 1802, Toussaint surrendered, perhaps believing that blacks would be allowed to retain their freedom or that tropical diseases would work their earlier magic and allow him to regain control. However, despite French assurances of his safety, Toussaint was arrested in June 1802 and sent to the Fort de Joux prison in the Jura mountains of France, where he died on April 7, 1803.

Following Toussaint's betrayal, Dessalines, Christophe, and Pétion regrouped to oppose Leclerc and his diseased army. Leclerc requested reinforcement but died of yellow fever two months later, in November 1802. Once his replacement, General Donatien Rochambeau, arrived, fierce fighting continued for another year, during which 55,000 more people were killed, including most of the remaining whites. Many plantations and villages were also destroyed. By September 1803, Rochambeau wrote to Napoleon Bonaparte advising him that the only way for France to win would be to kill everyone over twelve in Saint-Domingue. Meanwhile, more than 20,000 of his own forces
were dead. War had resumed in Europe, and consequently Rochambeau was never adequately supported. Following the French defeat at Vertières, Rochambeau fled to Jamaica in November 1803, where he surrendered to the British, ending French colonial rule in Saint-Domingue. After a decade of violence, 300 years of foreign domination had come to an end.

**Early Years of Independence, 1804–43**

On January 1, 1804, Jean-Jacques Dessalines proclaimed the birth of a new nation. Its name would be Haiti, taken from an Arawak word for "mountainous," and its flag would be red and blue like the French tricolor, but minus the white stripe.

The new nation faced major challenges. Its black and mulatto population of 480,000 in 1789 had been reduced to 250,000 by 1804. Its plantation-based economy was in shreds, and few of the 170,000 who could still do agricultural work wanted to return to the plantations, the symbol of slavery. Even if a supply of labor were found, credit would be required, and it would not be obtainable from the hostile, slave-owning surrounding states. The population was uneducated and largely unskilled, and commerce was almost nonexistent.

Dessalines, the first leader of Haiti, was born in the north, on the Corers plantation, where he served as a field hand prior to being sold to a freeman. Both his masters were brutal, and Dessalines developed a hatred for whites, mulattoes, and authority. When the revolt began, he joined forces with Toussaint Louverture, and proved to be a successful and ruthless leader in battle. As the leader of Haiti, Dessalines governed with a firm hand just as Toussaint had done and, like Toussaint, reimposed the plantation system and used the military to ensure that laborers stayed on the plantations and worked. The quality of life for blacks did not improve much during Dessalines's rule. His extensive use of the military set a pattern that lasted until the army was disbanded in 1995.

In 1803 Dessalines became governor general for life, and, in 1804, he crowned himself Emperor Jacques I. Dissatisfaction with his rule increased and became widespread. Cultured Haitians objected to his ignorance and illiteracy, the mulattoes felt threatened by his racism, and most Haitians objected to his corruption and poor economic judgment.

Dessalines was assassinated on October 17, 1806. En route to Port-au-Prince with a column of troops to crush a mulatto-led rebellion, Dessalines was ambushed, shot, and hacked to pieces.
by people probably hired by mulatto opponents. The perpetra-
tors were never apprehended. His assassination contributed to
a legacy of racial friction, and led to a popular connection
between Dessalines and black power. It was the first in a long
series of violent deaths of Haitian heads of state.

Although Dessalines had not designated a successor prior to
his murder, a number of candidates presented themselves after
his death. The leading contender from the north was Henry
Christophe, but he was not popular enough in the south to off-
set the desire there for a mulatto leader. Consequently, the
Constituent Assembly worked out an arrangement that created
a weak presidency and a strong legislature. Christophe would
be president, and Alexandre Pétion would head the legislature,
thus beginning a tradition of "politics by understudies" (poli-
tique de doublure), where, typically, a black president would be
manipulated from behind the scenes by a mulatto. However,
this arrangement failed because Christophe was not content to
be a figurehead president.

Partition of Haiti, 1811–20

After military attacks to displace Pétion failed, the country
split into two parts. Christophe ruled the north from Cap-Haïtien, while Pétion governed the south and west. In 1811 Christophe crowned himself King Henry I of Haiti, and the northern dominion became a kingdom. He installed a nobility of mainly black supporters, who assumed titles of earl, count, and baron.

Christophe, who was born a slave in Grenada and served masters at sea, in Georgia, and in Saint-Domingue, remained a life-long anglophile. He spelled his first name, Henry, with the English orthography. As president, he hired English teachers to establish national schools, and encouraged British investment in Haiti.

Christophe's career was also influenced by his association with Toussaint Louverture. During the Haitian Revolution, Christophe had become a protégé of Toussaint and helped develop the fermage program that returned Haitians to the plantations as paid laborers. When Christophe became president, he also attempted to restore the sugar plantations, using workers who were bound to the land.

Christophe sought to open up international trade, but he was afraid such trade would encourage foreign invasions. He brought 4,000 warriors from Dahomey in West Africa, the Royal Dahomets, as a security force to protect himself and Haiti and to encourage honesty and morality among his subjects. Christophe remains conspicuous among Haitian leaders for his emphasis on public and personal morality.

Meanwhile, in the south and west, Alexandre Pétion was head of a military oligarchy. He ruled under two constitutions. Under the first, he was president of the republic from 1807 to 1816, and under the second, he became president for life.

An important difference between the northern kingdom and the southern republic was the treatment of land ownership. Christophe gave the bulk of the land to the state and leased large tracts to estate managers. Pétion distributed state-owned land to individuals in small parcels. He began distributing land to his soldiers in 1809, and later extended the land grant plan to other beneficiaries, lowering the selling price to a level that almost anyone could afford. Pétion's motivation was to reward people for the travails of slavery. A legacy of this well-intentioned program has been to create a region of family-owned farms, which have become increasingly unproductive through subdivision according to inheritance laws.
To Christophe's chagrin, his subjects continued to defect from the harsh conditions in the north to the more benevolent situation in the south. In 1818, when Pétion, known to his citizens as Father Good Heart (Papa Bon Coeur), died without naming a successor, the Senate selected General Jean-Pierre Boyer to fill his post. Boyer was a mulatto, who had been born in Port-au-Prince and joined the revolutionary forces with Toussaint. After independence, he served Pétion as secretary and commander of the Presidential Guard.

After Pétion's death in 1818, Christophe sought to reunite Haiti, but the south rejected the prospect of domination by a black leader. In October 1820, following a stroke that had caused him to lose control of the army, his principal power base, Christophe committed suicide. Boyer immediately took advantage of the situation, and on October 26, he entered Cap-Haïtien with 20,000 troops and reunited the country.

Jean-Pierre Boyer Reunites Haiti, 1820–43

Boyer inherited a country with diminishing agricultural production caused by Pétion's policy of land distribution. He tried to revive the plantation system through the enactment of the Rural Code (Code Rural). Its regulations included forced labor to produce export crops and the use of rural police to restrict the movement of peasants and make them work. However, government laxity and lack of cooperation from plantation owners caused the system to fail and led to the ultimate demise of the plantation economy. Sugar production continued to decline as a result of the move toward small subsistence farms. Throughout the nineteenth century, coffee remained the principal export, while food crops were raised for local consumption.

Like previous Haitian rulers, Boyer feared another invasion of Haiti. To eliminate foreign presence on the island, he seized the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo in 1822. This ended slavery in Hispaniola but created a legacy of poor relations between the French and Spanish-speaking sides of the island.

Three years later, Boyer undertook another measure intended to remove the threat of foreign invasion and open Haiti to international commerce. He agreed to compensate France for its losses during the revolution. In return for a 150-million-franc indemnity and halving customs charges for French trade, Haiti received diplomatic recognition from France. Britain recognized Haiti the following year. This act ended Haiti's diplomatic isolation, but did not preclude inter-
vention. Although the indemnity was reduced in 1838 to 60 million francs, the payments had a disastrous effect on the Haitian economy and led to years of French domination of Haiti's finances.

Social and class divisions based on color and property ownership hardened during Boyer's rule. Despite his efforts to appoint blacks to responsible positions, his government increasingly fell into the hands of the mulatto elite. Uneducated rural blacks found few opportunities in the bureaucracy and turned to the army.

Nevertheless, the immediate threat to Boyer came from mulattoes opposed to the political and social status quo. In the late 1830s, Hérard Dumesle, a mulatto member of Congress, founded the Organization for the Social Rights of Man and Citizen, which was critical of the economy, corruption, and nepotism and called for an end to Boyer's rule. Although Dumesle and his congressional sympathizers were expelled from the legislature, dissatisfaction with the government continued. On January 27, 1843, Charles Rivière-Hérard, a cousin of Dumesle, overthrew Boyer in what is referred to as the Revolution of 1843. Boyer sailed to Jamaica, the destination of other displaced Haitian rulers in the nineteenth century. The Dominicans took this opportunity to declare their independence.

Boyer's presidency was remarkable for its length, the longest in Haitian history, and for its relative placidity. During his rule, the nation was reunited internally and internationally. However, Boyer's presidency also saw a hardening of class and social divisions based on skin color and property ownership. Blacks, who had been excluded from power under Boyer, reasserted themselves after his overthrow. The subsequent struggle for power led to a succession of short-lived governments.

**Increasing Instability, 1843–1915**

The period between 1843 and 1915 was marked by a pattern of political instability and struggle in which a succession of incompetent or brutal leaders came and went rapidly and violently. Of the twenty-two heads of state between 1843 and 1915, only one served out his prescribed term of office. Three died while serving. One was blown up in the palace, one was poisoned, one was hacked to pieces by a mob, one resigned, and fourteen others were deposed by coups.

This was also a period of economic stagnation. Revenues from agriculture declined as the ill-tended and subdivided land
yielded less and less. Payments to France emptied the federal reserves, and the national treasury was chronically in default. Presidents appealed to foreign countries for loans and help to stay in power. A new and lucrative business emerged: coup-making. German merchants funded rebellions on speculation, and Haitian mercenaries, known as cacos, carried out the coups.

Interspersed among these short-lived presidencies were a few longer-lasting dictatorships in which black leaders were manipulated by elite mulatto politicians or merchants. Another phenomenon was a growing rivalry between Liberal (mulatto) and National (black) parties.

The life of most Haitians was dismal. As late as 1915, more than 90 percent of the population was illiterate. The average annual income was only US$20. Not only were people poor, but tropical diseases such as malaria, hookworm, yaws, and intestinal infections were endemic, leading to high mortality rates.

The presidency of Charles Rivière-Hérard (1843–44) was cut short because of international and domestic difficulties. In March 1844, Hérard returned from a failed effort to take Santo Domingo to diminished support. Two months later, bands of peasants called piquets (a term derived from the stakes they carried as weapons) overthrew Hérard at the behest of an army officer, Louis Jean-Jacques Acaau, who demanded an end to mulatto rule.

As property values declined, politics became more lucrative. Between 1844 and 1849, mulattoes in the Senate, including Beaubrun Ardouin and his brothers, ruled behind the scenes, installing a series of black leaders and taking the profit. The first was the eighty-seven-year-old Philippe Guerrier (1844–45), who had been a member of the peerage under Christophe. In short order, he was succeeded by Jean-Louis Pierrot (1845–46) and Jean-Baptiste Riché (1846–47).

The fourth mulatto presidential choice, Faustin Soulouque (1847–59), was a little-known black from the Presidential Guard, whom the Ardouin brothers had selected. Soulouque was ambitious and ruthless. After arresting, exiling, and killing his sponsors, he established a secret police force, the zingtins, to terrorize adversaries; he used piquets to frighten the merchants of Port-au-Prince and then executed the piquet leader, who had become too powerful.

A year after taking office, Soulouque crowned himself Emperor Faustin I. Perhaps fear of foreigners prompted his
renewed attacks on the Dominican Republic. Both of his incursions were defeated, however, and they contributed to his overthrow by General Nicholas Geffrard. Soulouque was the last Haitian leader to have been a slave.

Geffrard, a dark-skinned mulatto, restored the old order of elite rule. His relatively long rule (1859–67) was peaceful and progressive, in contrast to that of his predecessor. He is credited with a number of accomplishments: he produced a new constitution based on Pétion’s 1816 document, promoted education and organized a medical school, cut the army by half, and tried to improve the quality of cotton production. He also signed a concordat with the Vatican in 1860 that ended a sixty-year schism with Rome, led to ablest clergy, and gave Roman Catholicism a privileged position among religions in Haiti. Geffrard also won recognition for Haiti from the United States in 1862.

The 1860s were a difficult decade for Haiti politically and economically. Geffrard was harassed by the elites and the piquets throughout his rule. Under siege in Cap-Haïtien, Geffrard called in the British for support. He was the first Haitian president to stay in power with foreign support, but not the last. In 1867 General Sylvain Salnave, a light-skinned mulatto populist with support from northern blacks and the poor in Port-au-Prince, forced Geffrard to leave the country for Jamaica.

Salnave, however, lacked the support of the cacos. After waging several unsuccessful battles against them, he was pursued to the Dominican border, captured, tried, and executed on January 15, 1870.

After setting up an interim provisional government, the National Assembly selected Nissage Saget as president. Saget completed his term of office (1870–74) and stepped down voluntarily. His successor, President Boisrond Canal, resigned in 1879 in the absence of legislative cooperation. All of the subsequent presidencies until 1915 began and ended with force or the threat of it.

Rebellion, intrigue, and conspiracy continued to be commonplace even under the rule of Louis Lysius Félicité Salomon (1879–88), the most notable and effective president in the late nineteenth century. From a political southern black family, he was well educated, well traveled, and politically experienced. After living in France following his expulsion by Hérard, he
had returned to Haiti and served as minister of finance under Soulouque.

President Salomon was a populist. He established a national bank, brought some order to public administration, revived agriculture to an extent, linked Haiti to the outside world through the telegraph, opened rural schools, and imported French teachers. Salomon also paid off the indemnity to France. Although known as a nationalist, Salomon encouraged investment by permitting foreign companies to own Haitian land.

Salomon's support of the rural masses and efforts to contain elite-instigated plots kept him in power longer than the strongmen who preceded and followed him; however, when he tried to stay in office beyond his term, Salomon was evicted by Liberal Party forces and other opponents.

The final exception to the short-lived presidencies of the late 1800s was that of Florvil Hyppolite (1889–96). Hyppolite is remembered for his Ministry of Public Works, which built bridges, docks, iron markets, and public buildings throughout Haiti and installed telephone and telegraph lines. After Hyppolite, Haitian politics became even more unstable and the governments particularly short-lived. This was the case until the United States occupation in 1915.

**United States Involvement in Haiti, 1915–34**

The turn of the century was a period of expansion for the United States. It was becoming an extraterritorial economic and military power, accumulating possessions in the Caribbean and Central America that included Cuba, Puerto Rico, and parts of Panama. The Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the Roosevelt Corollary in 1904, the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, the beginning of World War I, and Admiral Alfred Mahan's doctrines concerning the strategic importance of sea-lanes of communications all contributed to a growing view that the Caribbean was an American lake in the United States' own backyard.

One of the Caribbean countries where the United States had interests was Haiti. By 1915 the United States controlled Haiti's banking and railroads and accounted for most of the country's imports. Only Germany, which had considerable business and strategic interests in the area, provided real competition. Germany was rumored to be interested in acquiring Môle Saint-Nicolas as a refueling station, a prospect that concerned the
United States because it would place a potential European enemy in relative proximity.

Between 1849 and 1915, the United States Navy sent warships to Haiti on twenty-six occasions to extract debt payments from reluctant Haitian governments and to prevent the British, French, and Germans from gaining a greater foothold. After the fall of President Antoine Simon in 1910, six Haitian leaders seized power during the next four years, four of whom were killed in office. In December 1914, following news of additional caco revolts, a United States ship entered Port-au-Prince, removed US$500,000 from the Haitian Bank, a sum that the United States claimed it was due, and deposited it in the National City Bank of New York. This action was regarded as a significant affront by Haitians.

The event that caused the United States Marines to invade Haiti occurred on July 27, 1915. Seeing that his downfall was imminent, President Vilbrun Guillaume Sam ordered the killing of 167 political prisoners in the national penitentiary and then sought refuge in the French embassy. However, an irate crowd stormed the embassy, dragged Guillaume Sam out, pulled him apart, and then paraded parts of him through the streets. The next day, the United States deployed 330 marines aboard the USS Washington to protect its citizens, stabilize the Haitian government, and secure United States financial interests. The United States Marines remained in Haiti for the next nineteen years.

The marines took rapid control of Haiti. They imposed martial law, disbanded the Haitian army, installed Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave, a mulatto from an elite family, in the presidency, and then appointed lesser officials.

On September 15, 1915, the marines announced complete political and administrative control of Haiti. A treaty, the Haitian-American Convention, decreed that United States citizens would collect customs and oversee all government outlays, approve all debt requests, advise the treasury, direct public works and health programs, and launch an agricultural training campaign. Article 10 decreed that the United States would create and head a new constabulary. Not surprisingly, Haitians resented this treaty, which was originally to be in force for ten years but which, in March 1917, was extended for another ten years.

The marines also changed the Haitian constitution. After the Haitian congress refused the first draft proposed, the
marines dissolved congress and resubmitted the draft to a closely monitored national plebiscite, which accepted it almost unanimously. The authorship of this constitution is still debated. Some argue that the author was the young assistant secretary of the navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

The 1918 constitution included a novel provision for Haiti—white foreigners would be permitted to own land. Many North American companies took advantage of this opportunity to lease large tracts of Haitian land.

During the nineteen-year occupation, the marines undertook numerous initiatives under the presidencies of Philippe Sudre Dartiguenave (1915–22) and Louis Borno (1922–30). They attempted to improve the country's infrastructure by building roads, bridges, wharves, lighthouses, and irrigation systems. They tried to improve health conditions by upgrading the sanitation system and providing clean water. They brought in United States physicians to create a public health program that included the establishment of hospitals, clinics, and training schools for doctors and nurses and mounted campaigns
against syphilis, yaws, malaria, and hookworm. They tried to modernize agriculture by creating an agricultural-technical system, the Service Technique, with the help of United States agricultural experts. They sought to professionalize the security forces by replacing the constabulary, or gendarmerie, with a National Guard. They attempted to stabilize the Haitian currency, the gourde, by linking it to the dollar.

Whatever initial Haitian enthusiasm existed for the United States invasion dimmed quickly. Haitians increasingly disliked the marine presence and governance. They resented the legalization of land ownership by foreigners and the forced drafts of peasants for road building, known as corvée.

A particular problem was the racial prejudice of the United States Marines. The marines favored the predominantly light-skinned mulatto elite and installed a series of mulatto presidents that lasted through Sténio Vincent (1930–41).

The marines were charged with promoting stability. As part of this mission, they created and trained a gendarmerie, which came to be called the Garde d’Haïti, and was a precursor to the Haitian army. The Garde was increasingly employed to hunt down and kill Haitians who opposed the occupation and may ultimately have killed as many as 6,000 and put another 5,500 into labor camps. The intolerance of North American whites of the occupying force caused indignation, resentment, and eventually a racial pride that was reflected in the work of a new generation of Haitian historians, ethnologists, writers, artists, and others, many of whom later became active in politics and government.

In 1918 Charlemagne Péralte, a former military officer from a rural, middle-class family, proclaimed himself leader of the cacos (mercenary bands) and announced that he was determined "to drive the invaders into the sea and free Haiti." Péralte attacked outlying military establishments and then, on October 7, 1919, Port-au-Prince itself. Péralte became a national hero, but, shortly afterward, he was betrayed, ambushed at gunpoint, killed, and then publicly displayed as a warning to other rebels. Benoit Batraville took his place, but after his murder in 1920, armed resistance to the occupation ended.

The marine occupation continued after World War I, although it was an embarrassment to President Woodrow Wilson at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, where national self-determination was a major topic. It was not until 1929,
after many Haitians were killed and wounded in student uprisings and a strike at Les Cayes, that the United States Congress demanded an inquiry into the occupation.

President Herbert Hoover appointed W. Cameron Forbes, a former governor general of the Philippines, to head an investigatory commission. The commission found that although the marines had made material improvements, they had excluded Haitians from a real role in government and from the Garde d'Haïti. The commission concluded that "the social forces that created [instability] remained—poverty, ignorance, and a lack of a tradition or desire for orderly free government." The commission recommended withdrawal of the occupation forces, and United States withdrawal was underway by 1932, when Franklin D. Roosevelt became president. The last contingent of marines departed in August 1934, after a formal transfer of authority to the Garde; a financial mission remained until 1941 to safeguard United States holdings. The departure was welcomed by Haitians of all colors, classes, and sectors of society.

Although the United States occupation was intended to bring political and financial stability to Haiti, dictatorships soon returned, and the improvements to the country's infrastructure made by the marines were allowed to deteriorate.

Racial prejudice in Haiti dates from the colonial experience, but the Revolution of 1946, which brought black leaders to power, was a direct reaction to the United States occupation. Historically, educated Haitians had taken pride in their familiarity with France, ability to speak French, and their Roman Catholicism. After the occupation, increasingly, Haitians came to reject anything to do with whites and the West. They began to explore and take pride in their African roots and in Haitian history, and openly to practice voodoo, the religion of most Haitians. In 1957 François Duvalier played on these anti-white, anti-Western, pro-black and pro-voodoo sentiments to gain the presidency and hold power.

The occupation led to another unforeseen and tragic result. In October 1937, some 5,000 to 12,000 Haitians were killed by the Dominican military on orders from dictator Rafael Leónidas Trujillo. These Haitians were living in an area on the Haitian-Dominican border that the United States Marines had incorporated into Haïti during the occupation. Historically difficult relations between Haïti and the Dominican Republic worsened because of the killings and because of Dominican resentment of previous Haitian control.
From the End of the United States Occupation to Duvalier, 1934–57

The 1930 presidential election was the first since the occupation began in which the marines did not interfere. The winner was Sténi Vincent, a former senator with populist tendencies. A charismatic speaker, Vincent was the first Haitian head of state to make official speeches in Creole rather than French.

Beyond efforts to remove the marines from Haiti and improve infrastructure and services, President Vincent increasingly used his office and the Garde to increase his own power and wealth. In 1935 he forced a new constitution through Congress that allowed him sweeping powers to dissolve the legislature, reorganize the judiciary, appoint ten out of twenty-one senators, and rule when the legislature was not in session. Then, he held a plebiscite that transferred economic matters from the legislature to the executive. Vincent repressed opposition and censored the press, but when he sought to remain in office for a third term, the United States objected. He relinquished the presidency to Élie Lescot in 1941.

Élie Lescot was a light-skinned mulatto like his three predecessors. His previous experience as ambassador to the Dominican Republic and in other government jobs seemed promising. However, Lescot exacerbated racial sensitivities by placing light-skinned people at all levels of the government irrespective of their competence. He exacerbated religious sensitivities by facilitating an anti-superstition campaign (1941–42) that the Roman Catholic Church organized against voodoo. Lescot also became increasingly authoritarian. He declared himself commander in chief of the military, repressed the people, censored the press, and compelled Congress to grant him extensive powers to handle the budget and fill legislative vacancies without elections.

Lescot's declining popularity sank further when correspondence was made public that revealed that he had been under the influence and pay of Dominican President Trujillo when he was ambassador to the Dominican Republic, and that Trujillo's money might have helped get him elected. After Lescot jailed the Marxist editors of a journal called La Ruche (The Beehive) in early January, students took to the streets to protest and demand more civil liberties. Then, on January 11, 1945, army officers, led by Major Paul E. Magloire, forced Lescot to resign, and the Garde took power. The Garde acted
in a singular fashion, on behalf of the nation rather than an individual. Further, it pledged to hold free elections and did.

The Revolution of 1946, as the elections were called, was the result of incompetent, dishonest, and repressive governance and exasperation at mulatto domination. The spectacle of mulattoes everywhere in the administration turned many blacks into pro-black activists, or noiristes. A contemporary writer, Roger Dorsainville, described the popular mood, saying, "I was a noiriste. And I will add that anyone in my social class in Haiti, after Lescot, under Lescot, whoever was not a noiriste would have been scum . . . ."

In May 1946, Haitians elected a National Assembly whose purpose was to select a president on August 16, 1946. The three major candidates were black. The leading candidate, Dumarsais Estimé, was from a modest black family in Verrettes. He had been a school teacher, assembly member, and minister of education under Vincent. Félix d'Orléans Juste Constant was leader of the Communist Party of Haiti (Parti Communiste d'Haiti—PCH). Démosthènes Calixte was a former Garde commander and a stand-in for Daniel Fignolé, head of the progressive coalition that included the Worker Peasant Movement (Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan—MOP); Fignolé was too young to run himself.

Dumarsais Estimé was anti-elitist and therefore regarded as anti-mulatto. His base of support came from blacks, particularly from the emerging middle class and the north. Although Estimé was a civilian, he had the blessings of the Garde d'Haiti and won easily on the second round of polling.

Dumarsais Estimé enjoyed broad support in the early years of his presidency. Under a new constitution in November 1946, he launched a series of reforms intended to improve the condition of life in the cities and countryside. He brought more middle-class and lower-class blacks into the public sector, increased the daily minimum wage, raised salaries of civil servants, and proposed the nation's first social security laws. He expanded the school system, encouraged rural cooperatives, sent agronomists to Puerto Rico to study farming techniques, and encouraged the United States and the Export-Import Bank to invest in a Haitian Tennessee Valley Authority for the Artibonite River.

However, President Estimé made enemies, who finally contributed to his overthrow. He alienated the elites by purging mulatto officials from his administration and pursuing an agenda that encouraged labor unions and forced people to pay
income tax for the first time. Although Estimé was a practicing Roman Catholic, he disturbed Catholics and the church with his endorsement of voodoo. Finally, even some blacks deserted him, characterizing the regime as ineffectual.

President Estimé had sought the support of the Garde by turning it into the Haitian army, but when he attempted to amend the constitution in 1950 to prolong his presidency, the new army, under Colonel Paul Magloire, sent him to exile in Jamaica, with the tacit support of the elite and little public opposition. The people who had ensured the transfer of power from Lescot to Estimé called for new elections.

Colonel Magloire resigned from the junta to run for president. With the blessings of the military and the elite and the absence of electoral opposition, he won a term in the first elections in Haiti in which all men over twenty-one could vote.

President Magloire was an appealing figure who managed to captivate blacks while restoring the elites to prominence. Under his presidency, the business community and government benefited briefly from favorable economic conditions, as did the country's infrastructure, agricultural sector, and school and health systems, all with the help of foreign loans.

By Haitian presidential standards, Magloire was firm but not harsh. He jailed political opponents, prohibited labor strikes, and periodically shut down printing presses. On the other hand, he allowed unions and sometimes the presses to function.

However, Magloire's increasing corruption disillusioned many Haitians. He controlled the sisal, cement, and soap monopolies and built mansions for himself. Then, after Hurricane Hazel devastated Haiti in 1954, Magloire appropriated relief funds that had been earmarked for recovery. In May 1956, after an attempt to prolong his stay in office, protesters demanded that he step down. In December 1956, after strikes shut down Port-au-Prince, Paul Magloire fled to Jamaica.

The period between the ouster of Magloire in December 1956 and the election of François Duvalier in September 1957 was marked by political instability. During that interval, there were three provisional presidents, one of whom resigned, and two others who were ousted by the army.

François Duvalier, 1957–71

François Duvalier came from a modest but upwardly mobile black family in Port-au-Prince. He attended the Lycée Pétion, a
good state school, with other children of academically ambitious parents of limited means. After graduation, Duvalier studied medicine in Haiti. Then, he took an internship at Saint François de Sales Hospital near the capital. Afterward, he took a post that attempted to eradicate yaws and became director of a clinic. In August 1944, Duvalier briefly attended Michigan State University to study public health, but before completing the program returned to Haiti to continue his work against yaws.

François Duvalier's interest in literature, ethnography, and politics led him to start the Haitian negritude movement in 1929 with Lorimer Denis, a black lawyer, nationalist, and mystic. He founded a pro-voodoo, African-focused organization, Les Griots (a Guinean term meaning The Bards) in the late 1930s. Then he helped Dr. Price Mars form the Bureau of Ethnology, an organization dedicated to the study and propagation of indigenous Haitian customs and values.

François Duvalier's first overtly political act was to become general secretary of Daniel Fignolé's party of young professionals, the MOP. In 1946 he became a protégé of Dumarsais Estimé, then the MOP candidate. When Estimé was elected president, Duvalier entered the cabinet as minister of labor. When Estimé was ousted from office in 1950, Duvalier also lost his job. In September 1956, François Duvalier entered the race for president as the heir to Dumarsais Estimé.

Although François Duvalier was not everyone's favorite candidate, he had broad support. His proponents saw him as educated, mild mannered, lacking in undue political ambition, and having good international connections. He had worked with poor and sick Haitians, he was a pro-black nationalist, and he cared about voodoo and ethnicity. This father-figure demeanor and manner caused him to be referred to as "Papa Doc." Finally, he had the support of the Haitian army.

The election was historic. All Haitians over the age of twenty-one were eligible to vote for a president. However, whether the peoples' will was done is debatable. There were no official election observers, the army disqualified the most popular candidate, Fignolé, and there were claims of fraud. In any case, François Duvalier claimed a decisive victory, and his followers captured two-thirds of the legislature's lower house and all the seats in the Senate. In September 1957, François Duvalier was installed as president.
In his first speech on October 22, 1957, President Duvalier promised government unity, reconciliation, and financial redistribution. However, within weeks, he began to destroy all past or potential opposition in order to centralize power in himself and remain in power.

Duvalier's apparent lack of political ambition was a sham. In October 1961, he extended his presidency another six years and replaced the bicameral legislature with a unicameral body. In June 1964, unwary voters in a plebiscite discovered that they had approved a constitutional change making François Duvalier president for life.

President Duvalier reigned supreme for fourteen years. Even in Haiti, where dictators had been the norm, François Duvalier gave new meaning to the term. Duvalier and his henchmen killed between 30,000 and 60,000 Haitians. The victims were not only political opponents, but women, whole families, whole towns. Duvalier also used other techniques to eliminate opposition, including imprisonment, intimidation, and exile. Many left in what became the first wave of Haitian emigration.

To protect himself against the military, Duvalier repeatedly reshuffled the high command and promoted junior black officers. In July 1958, when a coup attempt occurred, Duvalier created a separate Presidential Guard within the army for one purpose only, to enable him to remain in power. In 1959 Duvalier created the Voluntaires for National Security (Volontaires de la Sécurité Nationale—VSN), or makout, as they were dubbed, in reference to mythical Haitian bogeymen who carry off sleeping children in sacks. The VSN was a secret, private, armed paramilitary group reporting directly to the palace, whose members used terror and blackmail to get patronage for the regime and themselves (see The Duvalier Era, 1957-86, ch. 10). Duvalier used religion as a form of control. He co-opted voodoo priests as spies in the countryside, and for added protection, he himself dressed as a well-known voodoo figure. Finally, the president created a new elite, who owed its wealth and status to him.

President Duvalier weathered a series of foreign political crises early in his tenure, which enhanced his power and contributed to his view of himself as the "personification of the Haitian fatherland." By 1961 Duvalier had received US$40.4 million in foreign assistance, mainly as gifts from the United States. However, in mid-1962, President John F. Kennedy cut aid to Haiti after Duvalier arrogantly refused to account for its disburse-
ment. Even so, Duvalier continued to receive funds secretly. After Kennedy's death, Duvalier again received aid openly. In return, he remained outside the communist camp and voted with the United States to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS).

In April 1963, when an army officer suspected of trying to kidnap two of Duvalier's children took refuge in the Dominican chancery, Duvalier ordered the Presidential Guard to occupy the building. The Dominicans were incensed; President Juan Bosch Gaviño ordered troops to the border and threatened to invade. However, the Dominican commanders were reluctant to enter Haiti, and Bosch was obliged to turn to the OAS to settle the matter.

After the government, the military and the Roman Catholic Church were the two most powerful institutions in Haiti, and President Duvalier sought to weaken both. Although he was less violent with the church, he employed similar techniques with both institutions. Duvalier co-opted clergy, arrested those who opposed him, exiled several bishops, a papal nuncio, and numerous clergy, and confiscated church property. Despite such actions, on October 25, 1966, he succeeded in having the Vatican sign an accord that allowed him to nationalize the church, effectively putting himself at the head of the church in Haiti. The most significant change in the concordat was that the president was given the power to name archbishops and bishops, with the approval of the Holy See. Duvalier nominated five bishops, four of whom, including the archbishop, were black. According to the president, the new church would promote Haitian unity. The church would no longer be a white, largely French, institution with foreign loyalties. For the remainder of his presidency, Duvalier continued to control the church and expel those, such as the Holy Ghost Fathers, whom he accused of being antigovernment. With regard to the army, Duvalier exiled or eliminated officers who opposed him, closed the Military Academy because he considered it a potential source of opposition, and expelled the United States mission in 1963, fearing its influence (see The Duvalier Era, 1957–86, ch. 10).

The social and economic liabilities of the François Duvalier government far outweighed its marginal benefits. The attrition of the population through exile and murder was a terrible blow to the country's economic and political development and to its image in the world. Religious and racial tensions increased as a
result of Duvalier's endorsement of voodoo and his support for the black urban middle class at the expense of the mulatto elite. Despite substantial multilateral and bilateral economic support, the economy stagnated as a result of neglect and the diversion of as much as 10 million dollars a year from the treasury. Among the few positive things that can be said about his presidency is that François Duvalier provided some new opportunities for the black urban middle class. Before his presidency, the army command had been a bastion of the mulatto elite. Duvalier turned it into a medium for black upward mobility. Another progressive aspect of his presidency was the Haitianizing of the Catholic hierarchy, which acted as a stimulus to Haitianize the rest of the church.

Jean-Claude Duvalier, 1971–86

Only nineteen years old in 1971, when his father died peacefully in his sleep, Jean-Claude Duvalier (referred to as "Baby Doc") protested that he was too young and inexperienced to be president. Although it is unclear whether he was in fact mentally prepared to be president, there is near unanimity that he was ill-suited for it. For the first few years, Jean-Claude's politically ambitious mother, Simone Ovide, ran the government, while he lived the life of a playboy.

For many Haitians and foreign observers, Jean-Claude's youth, approachability, and his political promises were encouraging. The United States was heartened when the new president announced that "his father had accomplished the political revolution, and his administration would realize the economic revolution."

There were initial signs of political openings that included more freedom of the press and respect for human rights. By neglecting his role in government, however, Jean-Claude squandered a considerable amount of domestic and foreign goodwill and facilitated the dominance of Haitian affairs by a clique of hard-line Duvalierist cronies, who later became known as dinosaurs.

On May 27, 1980, Jean-Claude Duvalier married Michèle Bennett. The wedding made the Guinness World Book of Records for lavishness and highlighted for most Haitians the disparities between their lives and that of the Duvaliers. Everything about the wedding was contentious. Although the bride was a divorcée, the couple was married in the Port-au-Prince cathedral by an archbishop. In addition, she was a light-skinned
Jean-Claude Duvalier (third from right) with wife Michèle and others at a military ceremony

mulatto, whose former husband was the son of a man who had attempted a coup against François Duvalier. Michèle’s father, Ernest Bennett, had a reputation for shady business deals, including narcotics trafficking.

The marriage alienated many Haitians, particularly blacks and Duvalierists, the very people François Duvalier had cultivated. Increased political repression added to the volatility of the situation, which continued until 1986.

Jean-Claude’s personal interest in government was extrac­tive. His principal source of revenue was the Tobacco and Matches Administration (Régie du Tabac et des Allumettes), established by President Estimé as a tobacco monopoly. Jean-Claude expanded the monopoly to include profits from other state-owned industries. Over the years, he drew hundreds of millions of dollars from this “nonfiscal account.” An additional source of income for the first family was the business community, which Jean-Claude’s wife, Michèle Bennett, canvassed and from which donations were extorted.

Corruption and intimidation extended well beyond the first family. The makout and section chiefs, or chefs de section (the paramilitary rural constabulary), also used a method of extor­tion called "squeeze and suck" (peze souse) referring to the way
Haitian popsicles are eaten by squeezing the bottom and sucking from the top).

At the beginning of the 1980s, a period of economic decline and stagnation set in. Based on all the economic indicators, Haiti fell to the bottom of the group of least-developed nations. Bad governance, combined with a series of natural disasters, increased discontent and misery. By 1986 nearly half of all Haitians were unemployed, and many more were underemployed. Many people were not getting enough to eat and were dying of treatable illnesses.

In the first half of the 1980s, Haiti's problems intensified. In 1982 Hurricane Allen destroyed plantations growing coffee, one of Haiti's principal agricultural products. In 1982 and 1983, droughts further devastated agricultural production. In 1983 Reynolds Aluminum, which mined bauxite in Haiti, left. The same year, the worldwide economic crisis hit Haiti. Then, acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) became associated with Haiti, causing tourism to plummet and some foreign-owned assembly plants to leave. To avoid the spread of African swine fever, Haitian black pigs were all eradicated by 1984. These pigs had been the major protein source for Haitians and, in effect, their savings account (see Livestock and Fishing, ch. 8). In addition, high population growth caused the subdivision of land into plots too small to support a family. Overcultivated and deforested terrain was causing soil erosion and depletion of charcoal, the major energy source.

Dissatisfaction with Jean-Claude increased following a one-day visit by Pope John Paul II on March 9, 1983. The government encouraged the visit, hoping it would revive the president's declining reputation. The president, his ministers, and a crowd estimated at 200,000 met the pontiff at the airport. Jean-Claude spoke first, conceding his concordatory right to name the church hierarchy. Then the pope spoke. He recalled that Haiti was the first Latin American country to proclaim liberty and added how important it was to have liberty. The Eucharistic and Marial Congress he had come to attend reminded him that the meaning of the Eucharist was service and love, and the Haitian church needed to serve everyone, especially the poorest. The slogan of the Congress was "something has to change here," and the pope agreed. He continued, saying that there was a "deep need for justice, a better distribution of goods, more equitable organization of society and more participation. There was a legitimate desire for freedom of expression, access
to food, care, schools, literacy, honest and dignified work, social security, and the fundamental rights of man." All of this had to be done "without violence . . . out of respect and love of liberty." Many Haitians were deeply moved by the papal visit. The government was not. The papal message seemed to provide permission to the clergy and laity to pressure the government for reform, and ultimately, if it could not change, for Jean-Claude Duvalier to leave office.

Subsequently, the popular church, or small church (ti-legliz), and the Catholic radio station, Radio Soleil, sought to make Haitians aware of the role that government should have and to urge people to protest when anyone's rights were usurped. The response of the government to increased public discontent and demands for openness was more repression. Demonstrators were shot. Meetings and church services were invaded. Newspaper publishers and owners of radio stations, including Radio Soleil, which became the symbol of anti-Duvalierist resistance, were killed or deported, and their newspapers were closed.

In early 1985, the government passed legislation that would allow political parties, and it released some political prisoners. That July the government held a referendum on the presidency, but the patently sham ballot did not fool Haitians, and these staged events, including the October firing of Roger Lafontant, the brutal minister of interior, served only to reconfirm opinion that the government was beyond repair.

On November 26, 1985, the commemoration of a 1980 government crackdown turned the next day into a demonstration for "an end to misery, the Constitution, and the Duvalier government." On November 28, troops intervened in Gonaïves and randomly opened fire, killing three previously uninvolved students. The government announced the formation of a commission to investigate the events at Gonaïves but closed Radio Soleil to prevent its broadcasts. These events convinced Haitians that Duvalier had to go. Antigovernment protests, marches, and school and university strikes spread to other cities.

In last-ditch efforts to save his presidency, Duvalier revamped his cabinet, lowered the cost of cooking oil and several other basic consumer items, invited the church for talks, announced a military reform and the dissolution of the political police, and promised to bring to trial those presumed responsible for the killings in Gonaïves. The public was neither
appeased nor intimidated. Demonstrations spread, paralyzing the whole country.

In January 1986, the Reagan administration began to pressure Duvalier to leave Haiti, as did Congressman Walter Fauntroy, chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, who had been interested in Haiti since 1979. The United States refused a request to provide asylum for Duvalier, but offered to assist with the dictator's departure. Duvalier had initially accepted the offer on January 30, but then changed his mind.

On January 31, the United States prematurely announced Duvalier's departure, and Haitians were overjoyed. Jean-Claude responded to the demonstration by declaring a state of siege, dispatching the makout and the army. Despite these threats, Haitians continued to demonstrate all over the country. On that same day, the United States Department of State reduced its US$56 million aid package to Haiti. This action distanced Washington from the Duvalier regime and denied the regime a significant source of income. At this point, two leading officers who had devised a plot to remove the Duvaliers, army chief of staff Lieutenant General Henri Namphy and Military Academy head Colonel Williams Regala, confronted the Duvaliers and demanded their departure. Left with no bases of support, Jean-Claude agreed.

After hastily naming a National Council of Government (Conseil National de Gouvernement—CNG), made up of Namphy, Regala, and three civilians, Jean-Claude and his family, his entourage, and a caravan of trucks loaded with possessions departed Haiti on the night of February 7, 1986, aboard a C-141 transport provided by the United States. Spontaneous street demonstrations and church masses were held all over Haiti to celebrate. People felt free. A popular slogan was "the muzzle is off." Graffiti on walls thanked Radio Soleil, and many Haitians wore a teeshirt emblazoned on the front with the newly restored Haitian red and blue flag and the words "Liberation of Haiti, February 7, 1986", and on the back, "operation to uproot evil accomplished."

**Post-Duvalier Era, 1986–90**

The widespread joy and expectations for a new Haiti soon dimmed. Haitians had hoped to rid the country of Duvalierists and makout and bring to trial those who had committed crimes. Instead, a number of high-ranking officers, including the head of the makout and the former army intelligence chief, managed
to slip out of the country. Others known to have committed crimes were freed after army courts found insufficient evidence to convict them. Some Duvalierists remained in high positions. Haitians described the situation they were experiencing as "Duvalierism without Duvalier." As a result, some took the law into their own hands. In the weeks after Duvalier fled, mobs killed a number of known makout. Crowds looted the home of former secret police chief Luc Désir and prevented him from leaving the country. A Creole term for this vigilante justice was dechoukaj, "uprooting evil." Dechoukaj was particularly focused on makout and voodoo priests and priestesses, houngans and mambos, who were presumed to have been associated with the makout or Duvaliers. The spokesperson for the national voodoo organization, however, blamed the Roman Catholic Church, accusing it of inciting a new anti-superstition campaign.

Haitians were also concerned about the composition and agenda of the CNG, which was charged with preparing the way for elections. The interim government was led by Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, army chief of staff. The group consisted of four other Duvalierists: three military officers (colonnels Prosper Avril, Williams Regala, and Max Valles), and one civilian (Alex Cinéas, former minister of public works under Duvalier). In addition, the CNG had two civilians known for their opposition to Duvalier: Gérard Gourgue, an educator, lawyer, and president of the Haitian League for Human Rights; and Rosney Desroches, a well-known and respected educator. These last two members had short-lived tenures in office, however. Gourgue resigned after two months to protest army repression, and Desroches was removed a year later, when the CNG abandoned its reformist facade and moved sharply to the right. Before long, the CNG became a military junta composed of Duvalierists.

Initially, the CNG dismantled some of the unpopular vestiges of the Duvalier era. It rescinded the 1983 constitution providing for a presidency for life, disbanded the VSN, restored the original red and blue flag of 1804 that François Duvalier had replaced by a red and black banner, replaced the Duvalierist National Assembly with a new thirteen-member ministerial cabinet, nationalized properties belonging to the Duvaliers, freed political prisoners, permitted political organizations to exist and political exiles to return to Haiti, and pledged to respect human rights and freedom of the press. However, the CNG did not attempt to uproot Duvalierism, as the public demanded,
because the army was still full of Duvalierists; and by disman-
tling the VSN, the CNG restored the army to its dominant posi-
tion in Haiti.

Within months, the CNG embarked on a policy of repres-
sion. On April 26, 1986, police shot into a peaceful crowd led
by Jean-Bertrand Aristide, gathered to commemorate prisoners
killed and incarcerated at Fort Dimanche, Haiti's most infa-
mous Duvalier prison. In November, police disrupted a demon-
stration protesting the abduction and murder of two literacy
workers. By the end of its first year in office, the CNG was
responsible for the deaths of more civilians than in fifteen years
of Jean-Claude Duvalier's government.

Hopes for greater freedom revived briefly in March, when a
CNG working committee produced a new constitution that
Haitians readily approved by referendum on March 29, 1987. It
put planning and execution of presidential elections in the
hands of a Provisional Electoral Council (Conseil Électoral Pro-
visoire—CEP), to be composed of civilians. It reduced the pow-
ers of the presidency, and Article 291 prohibited the
participation in government for ten years of anyone who had
been "an architect of dictatorship and its maintenance during
the past twenty-nine years."

However, the CNG, the military, and Duvalierists were not
happy with the new constitution and prospective presidential
elections, seeing them as a challenge to their continued politi-
cal dominance. Soon afterward the CNG announced that it
would dissolve the CEP and take over its functions. Although
Haitians were outraged, military strength triumphed.

The political environment was gloomy. However, on election
day, November 29, 1987, prospects of a new constitution and
president combined with a sense of security offered by the pres-
ence of international observer teams and reporters, brought
people to the polls. When they opened that morning, Duva-
lierist thugs and soldiers shot openly at the lines of waiting vot-
ers, killing between 22 and 200 and seriously wounding many
others. The CNG immediately canceled the elections and dis-
banded the CEP. According to Namphy, this action was to pre-
vent the CEP from handing the presidency to a leftist,
insinuating that Gourgue of the National Cooperative Front
(Front National de Concertation—FNC) was a leftist and
would have won, although an August opinion poll indicated
that World Bank (see Glossary) economist Marc Bazin was the
leading candidate.
As a consequence of what came to be called the "election-day massacre," the four principal candidates condemned the CNG, called for the restoration of an independent CEP, and agreed to abstain from any new elections organized by the CNG. Responding to domestic and international pressure, the CNG agreed to hold new elections in January, under an electoral council of its choosing.

The candidate preferred by the military and the United States in the rescheduled presidential elections was Leslie François Manigat. The military anticipated that he would be malleable, and the United States viewed the Haitian academic and anti-communist, who had left the country a generation earlier and had ties to the United States and the Caribbean, as more qualified than the other candidates. When the CNG-orchestrated elections took place on January 17, 1988, the major candidates and most Haitians boycotted them; less than 10 percent of those eligible voted. Manigat was declared the winner of elections marked by fraud and abstention.

Leslie Manigat held office for five months, during which he made some powerful enemies, including the Roman Catholic Church, drug traffickers, and the military. After the church had boycotted the presidential elections, Manigat did not invite the bishops to his inauguration. Wearing a Masonic sash, he had a voodoo priest give the blessings. Several months later, Manigat informed the church that he was going to change the concordat, implying a reduction in its power.

President Manigat's initially cordial relations with the military soon soured. Unable to obtain foreign military and economic assistance, as he had promised, Manigat attempted to find other sources of income. He initiated legal mechanisms to recover hundreds of millions of dollars allegedly stolen by Jean-Claude Duvalier. Haiti had become a major transshipment point for drugs en route to the United States from Latin America. Manigat tried to stop the corrupting flow. Both of these actions threatened vested interests within the armed forces. On June 20, 1988, when President Manigat attempted to gain civilian control over the military and remove top army officers, he was removed from office by noncommissioned officers, and General Namphy took control. On the same day, General Namphy dissolved the National Assembly, suspended the 1987 constitution, placed the country under strict military control, and, because he felt the country was not ready for elections or democracy, declared himself president.
Namphy was supported by the army as president of the new military government, but divisions existed in the army command, and each faction vied for control of the presidency. As a consequence of his lack of support within the military hierarchy, Namphy sought additional support outside, from henchmen of the Duvalier regime and former makout. To intimidate civilian resistance, Namphy unleashed a campaign of terror. Victims included Lafontant Joseph, a distinguished lawyer and human rights advocate, and members of the activist sector of the church. In one week, three churches were stormed. The first assault was particularly vicious. Armed men burst into St. Jean Bosco on September 11, killing eleven worshipers and wounding seventy others in an unsuccessful attempt to reach Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the officiating priest.

On September 17, 1988, noncommissioned officers ousted General Namphy in a coup, dispatched him to the Dominican Republic, and took charge—arresting and demoting officers with Duvalierist connections. Hope grew, and talk about housecleaning to complete efforts begun in February 1986 unleashed new efforts to uproot makout all over Haiti.

This coup was different from previous ones. The noncommissioned officers had more in common with most Haitians than their officers. Excluded from perquisites and poorly paid, they issued a list of demands that called for restoration of the 1987 constitution, legislative and presidential elections, respect for human rights, removal of makout from the army, the disarming of paramilitary gangs, separation of the army from the police, and an end to political brutality.

Inexplicably, the noncommissioned officers turned over control of the government to Brigadier General Prosper Avril. Within a short time, he accused them of planning a coup against him and arrested fifteen of the leaders. By December 1988, President Avril, who had been installed by the army in September 1988, was in full control of the government.

President Avril was an astute politician and tactician, skills he had learned from service to the Duvaliers. Prior to becoming a member of the CNG, the general had commanded Duvalier's Presidential Guard, been financial manager for the Duvalier family, and served as a personal aide to Jean-Claude Duvalier.

Avril cultivated loyalty by giving a share of the goods that Haiti imported to his friends for resale, a practice that contributed to a US$60 million increase in the budget deficit. He also co-opted potential enemies by including various sectors of soci-
ety in his cabinet. However, Avril, who used spies to create an atmosphere of fear in the country, increasingly used force to remain in power, initiating a wave of assassinations, arrests, torture, and deportations that led to growing opposition to his rule. Twenty-five political organizations formed a common Front Against Repression (Front Contre la Répression) and six political parties called for Avril’s departure and a transfer of power to the Supreme Court. Haitians were outraged when three political activists were arrested, tortured, and publicly displayed on Halloween 1989. When the army attacked an anti-Avril demonstration in Petit Goâve, resulting in the death of an eleven-year-old girl on March 5, 1990, Haitians demonstrated throughout the country. To avoid further bloodshed, United States ambassador Alvin Adams encouraged Avril to leave office. On March 12, Avril resigned and was flown to Florida by the United States.

Following Avril’s departure, the 1987 constitution was restored and used as a basis for a transition government. The constitution called for the appointment of an interim president from the Supreme Court, and Ertha Pascal Trouillot, whose political leanings were relatively unknown, was selected. It also called for a ministerial cabinet and a Council of State (Conseil d'État) consisting of representatives of the political parties to oversee the government.

Although Trouillot was obliged to cooperate with the Council of State, she began to act unilaterally in selecting members of the cabinet, including choosing a Duvalierist to be minister of finance, and allowing some notorious Duvalierists to return to Haiti. These included General Williams Regala, who was accused of complicity in the November 1987 election massacre, and Roger Lafontant, head of the makout accused of torturing prisoners while he was minister of interior. When Lafontant formed a political party, the Union for National Reconciliation, and announced his candidacy for president, outraged Haitians went on strike and called for his arrest. After the government had issued an arrest warrant for him and the military police had refused to execute it, Trouillot dropped the matter. Her action, showing lack of democratic resolve, led the council to say it could no longer work with her and to demand her resignation.

The Council of State turned to the 1987 constitution for guidance in preparing for elections. Using Article 191, it created an independent Permanent Electoral Council (Conseil
Électoral Permanent) to develop electoral laws and organize and support elections. Under Article 291, which prohibited close collaborators of the former government from holding public office for a decade, it barred Roger Lafontant's candidacy. Then, the Permanent Electoral Council announced the parliamentary and presidential elections for December 16, 1990. Prospects for successful elections looked poor, given a new wave of violence that included the murder of a council member and associate, and a record since 1986 of delayed, canceled, or rigged elections.


The two leading presidential candidates were Marc Bazin and Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Bazin, a former World Bank economist and right of center candidate of his party, the Movement for the Installation of Democracy in Haiti (Mouvement pour l'Instauration de la Démocratie en Haïti—MIDH), was referred to as the "American candidate" because he was seen as being the choice of the United States, where he had lived for many years. By contrast, Aristide was an outspoken anti-Duvalierist and a priest who entered the race at the last minute with tangential links to the National Front for Change and Democracy (Front National pour le Changement et la Démocratie—FNCD).

The campaign was punctuated by violence and derogatory rhetoric directed at Aristide—one rally was interrupted by a grenade explosion that killed seven and wounded fifty others. However, the December 16, 1990, elections went smoothly and were judged to be honest. For both reasons, they were unprecedented in Haitian election history. The elections were monitored by international observer teams from the United States led by Jimmy Carter, the OAS, and the UN. Aristide, or "Titid," as he was affectionately called by his supporters, won a landslide victory. Seventy-five percent of the eligible voters had gone to the polls, and 66.48 percent had voted for him while 14.22 percent voted for Bazin. Having condemned makoutism, Duvalierism, the excesses of the elite, and conservatism of the church, Aristide had won a clear mandate to create a more just, equal, and democratic Haiti.

Although most Haitians were jubilant, there were efforts to sabotage Aristide even before he took office. On January 1,
1991, Archbishop François Wolff Ligondé gave a homily in the Port-au-Prince Cathedral in which he called the president-elect a "socio Bolshevik," and wondered whether this was the beginning of a dictatorship. But he urged his parishioners not to be afraid, saying "this, too, shall pass." On January 6, Roger Lafontant attempted a coup. He arrested President Trouillot, forcing her to resign, then went on television saying he had the support of the army. Infuriated Haitians took to the streets in two days of clashes with the police and army, and violence against church property before the military arrested Lafontant and restored President Trouillot to office. On January 27, Haitians stifled the threat of a coup involving the imprisoned Lafontant. On February 3, someone fire-bombed Aristide's orphanage, Family Is Life (Lafanmi Selavi), killing four children. In the seven weeks prior to the inauguration on February 7, 125 people died of street violence and clashes with the army and police.

The transfer of power on February 7, 1991, from President Trouillot to an elected president, was unexpected and unprecedented. Few people expected that Aristide would be allowed to take office or that his presidency would last. They were half-right.

Jean-Bertrand Aristide was born in 1953 to a property-owning peasant family from Port-Salut in southern Haiti. He was sent to Port-au-Prince to be educated by the Salesian Order; then, in 1966, to a seminary in Cap-Haïtien. Thereafter he became a novice in the Dominican Republic. Before ordination in 1982, Aristide studied in Canada, Israel, Greece, and Italy. Returning to Haiti in 1985, Father Aristide helped oust Jean-Claude Duvalier and, subsequently, worked to eliminate residual traces of Duvalierism.

Aristide's efforts created enemies. In 1986 his march to commemorate victims of the notorious prison, Fort Dimanche, was interrupted by bullets intended for him. In 1987 his jeep ride to Jean Rabel to commemorate the peasants murdered by the military almost cost him his life. In 1988 his mass at St. Jean Bosco was halted by the military and by thugs who killed thirteen, wounded seventeen others, and burned the church. In 1988 the Salesians removed him from their order for "incitement of hatred and violence, glorifying class struggle, and profanation of the liturgy." Aristide emerged stronger from each of these confrontations. His popularity was reflected at the
polls, and witnessed to by the huge crowd outside the palace on inauguration day.

Aristide's skilled use of language and symbolism was evident at his inauguration. A peasant woman helped put on the presidential sash, and most of the speech was in Creole, the only language of most Haitians. In his speech, Aristide noted that there were people under the table and on top of it but that everyone should be at the table together (the next morning, he served breakfast to hundreds of homeless people and street children at the palace). He called for a marriage between the army and people to oppose the *makout* and anti-democrats, and said that since marriages require sacrifices, he would retire the high command, reassign several top-ranking officers, and promote and commission others. Among the promoted was Colonel Raoul Cédras, who would lead the coup against him seven months later. Because no party had won a majority in the National Assembly, President Aristide selected a friend, René Garcia Préval, as prime minister and minister of interior and national defense. For the cabinet, he chose friends and allies—mostly university educated and progressive technocrats.

In lieu of a political party, President Aristide formed an organization called Lavalas, a Creole phrase meaning 'cleansing flood' (Organisation Politique Lavalas—OPL), which drew support from the masses, including the rural and urban poor. OPL produced the Lavalas Development Model, which contained Aristide's goals. The goals included "transition from misery to poverty with dignity" and promotion of social democracy in Haiti based on the European model. After the inauguration, Aristide announced his priorities. They included addressing poverty and corruption, improving the infrastructure, decentralizing the role of Port-au-Prince, achieving food self-sufficiency, bringing criminals to justice, collecting taxes, and instituting essential public spending programs.

During his first seven months, President Aristide made progress against military-related corruption, drug trafficking, and human rights abuses. He dismantled the section chief system found in rural areas (see Role of the Army in Law Enforcement Prior to 1995, ch. 10) and closed Fort Dimanche. He created a human rights commission and commissions to investigate and bring to justice those accused of crimes between 1986 and 1990. He curbed waste and corruption by closing offices and agencies and reducing budgets and salaries, including his own.
President Aristide achieved a positive balance in the treasury for the first time in years through the collection of taxes and arrears; invitations to the "10th Department," as he called the Haitian diaspora, to invest in Haiti; and foreign assistance. By July 1991, he had accumulated US$511 million in grants and concessionary loans and by September, a US$48 million appropriation in standby loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary).

Aristide and his achievements did not meet with everyone's approval. The military feared reduction of its budget, demobilization of its infamous Leopard Corps, establishment of a separate presidential security force, interruption of its lucrative drug trade, and investigations into its involvement in the election day and Jean Rabel massacres and the destruction of St. Jean Bosco. The rich were afraid of the empowerment of the social classes they had historically dominated and the prospect of paying taxes and obeying laws. The Roman Catholic Church hierarchy was apprehensive about the ti-legliz movement and its loss of influence in a more egalitarian institution. The United States had misgivings about Aristide because he had been critical of "the frigid north."

Opposition to Aristide and his government became increasingly evident. Several plots were devised by former or current makout and former military officers. Civilians and soldiers attempted to assassinate or overthrow him. On April 16, makout burned the Hyppolite Public Market in Port-au-Prince while former supporters complained that the effort to curb the makout and lower the cost of living was too slow.

On September 26, 1991, Aristide learned that a coup was planned for his return from the UN, where he had just proclaimed that "democracy (in Haiti) has won out for good." In Haiti the next day, Aristide addressed the nation, denouncing the makout and elites. He urged the people to give the elites what they deserved, a burning tire around their necks, or "necklace" (père lebrun), and extolled the device, "What a beautiful tool! It has a good smell." Such statements alarmed civil libertarians as examples of presidential intimidation of the legislature and courts and abuse of presidential power.

**Military Coup Overthrows Aristide, September 30, 1991–October 1994**

The coup began on September 29, 1991, when soldiers...
attacked Aristide's residence. Although Aristide escaped, on September 30 he was captured at the palace, delivered to Brigadier General Cédras, flown to Venezuela, and soon thereafter was in Washington. Violence and terror spread across the country as soldiers hunted down Aristide supporters. One victim was Silvio Claude, the ardent anti-Duvalierist and perennial Protestant presidential candidate, who was "necklaced." Approximately 1,500 people were killed in the first few days after the coup.

On October 3, 1991, the military held a news conference. According to Cédras, head of the junta, the coup was justified because Aristide had abused power by undermining the constitution, preaching class warfare, and encouraging violence and mob rule. Yet, opposition to the coup continued, and the army responded with more violence. Amnesty International reported murders, arrests, torture, disappearances, and attacks against community and church organizations.

The junta reversed Aristide's reforms. It restored the section chiefs, fired Aristide-appointed prosecutors and judicial officers, and released prisoners convicted of human rights violations. It created a civilian government, appointing an eighty-year-old Supreme Court justice, Joseph Nérette, president and former Duvalier minister of tourism Jean-Jacques Honorat as prime minister.

Foreign reaction was swift and negative. United States Secretary of State James Baker condemned the coup leaders and informed them that "this coup will not stand." Then the United States imposed a series of penalties on the regime. The OAS also condemned the coup. It called for Aristide's reinstatement, attempted to have a dialogue and hold meetings with the junta, and imposed hemispheric trade sanctions on Haiti. Additionally, the UN Security Council condemned the coup, refused to recognize its leaders, and issued a statement of moral support for President Aristide's return.

The junta thwarted efforts to negotiate and countered with an attack on Aristide, quoting statements by him that endorsed "necklacing." The Haitian bishops then weighed in. They favored a state of law and a democratic society in Haiti but denied that restoring Aristide would result in a return to democracy. This propaganda had an effect. Initial enthusiasm for returning the president diminished as these critical reports about him began to circulate.
Haitians, meanwhile, were suffering from the brutality of the junta and the effects of sanctions and embargoes. There were food shortages, 65,000 Haitians lost jobs, fuel shortages paralyzed public services, and unprecedented numbers of Haitians tried to leave Haiti—crossing the border to the Dominican Republic or attempting to go by boat to the United States, which turned back most of them.

On June 23, 1993, frustrated by failed diplomatic initiatives, the UN Security Council imposed a worldwide fuel and arms embargo on Haiti; this action succeeded in bringing the junta to the negotiating table. On July 3, Aristide and Cédras signed an accord at Governors Island, New York, that provided for Aristide’s return, suspension of the embargo, installation of a new prime minister and government, separation of the army and police, the presence of a UN force in Haiti, and amnesty for the military high command on its resignation.

Once the embargo was lifted, violence recurred against partisans of democracy. Five men were gunned down outside city hall as they waited to welcome the new prime minister. Antoine Izméry, an associate of Aristide, was pulled out of church and shot in the street in front of an international team. A new organization, the Revolutionary Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (Front Révolutionnaire pour l’Avancement et le Progrès d’Haiti—FRAPH), composed of armed civilian supporters of the junta, took credit for some of the violence.

On October 11, 1993, the USS Harlan County was prevented by armed thugs from docking in Port-au-Prince. It had been transporting a lightly armed contingent of United States and Canadian troops, the vanguard of the UN force, to oversee the return of democracy to Haiti. The incident ended the Governors Island Accord and led to resumption of economic sanctions. The junta displayed its contempt for the forces attempting to restore democracy by gunning down François Guy Malary, Aristide’s minister of justice, along with his driver and bodyguard, and allowing some of the worst Duvalierist torturers to return to Haiti.

In the United States, President Aristide, President William J. Clinton, and Congress differed on what to do. The situation was compounded after Aristide called for a total embargo on Haiti. Some called Aristide callous. The New York Times implied that he had brought the coup on himself by forcing out newly elected officials who had opposed Duvalierism. Moreover, a leaked Central Intelligence Agency report described Aristide as
mentally unstable, which contributed to the clamor against him in Washington and beyond.

Initiatives by a few individuals forced the United States and the UN into action. On April 22, 1994, six congressmen, five of them members of the Congressional Black Caucus, demonstrated in front of the White House to protest United States policy toward Haiti and were arrested. On April 12, Randall Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica, a lobbying organization on Africa and the Caribbean, began a hunger strike that he announced would last until the administration fired special envoy to Haiti Larry Pezzullo and changed its policies toward the Haitian military and the refugees. Twenty-seven days later, Pezzullo was fired, and the hospitalized Robinson received assurances that his other demands would be met. Robinson then ended his strike.

The Department of State named a new special envoy to Haiti and promised asylum hearings for Haitian refugees aboard United States ships. President Clinton took new steps to cut off the junta from oil supplies and their foreign bank accounts. On April 28, President Clinton gave the junta an ultimatum: a global trade embargo or resignation within fifteen days. On May 6, the UN Security Council approved a near total trade embargo on Haiti along with restrictions on the junta, with a deadline of May 12.

The junta demonstrated that it had no intention of relinquishing power. On May 11, it installed Émile Jonaissant, an eighty-one-year-old Duvalierist Supreme Court justice, as provisional president; he selected his own prime minister and cabinet. When President Clinton applied additional pressure, ending United States-Haitian commercial flights and urging United States citizens to leave the country, the junta attempted to provoke nationalist and anti-United States sentiments by airing television films of the 1915 invasion. The situation led President Jonaissant to declare a state of emergency and impose a curfew. Infantrymen paraded through the streets.

In response, the United States asked the UN to endorse a United States-led military intervention in Haiti, and on July 31, 1994, the UN Security Council passed a resolution (S/Res/940) approving a plan to raise a Multinational Force, Operation Uphold Democracy, which would "use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military dictatorship."
Preparations for both forcible and permissive entries proceeded. The United States, Canada, France, and Venezuela (referred to as the Friends of Haiti) played a key role. Ten countries ultimately agreed to participate, and the United States deployed a battleship, the USS Eisenhower to the Caribbean, increasing pressure on General Cédras.

On September 15, President Clinton addressed the United States public, justifying the need for an invasion by citing the terrorism of the military regime. The next day, Clinton made a final effort to avoid a military invasion of Haiti by sending former president Jimmy Carter, former chair of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia to Haiti to arrange a peaceful departure of the junta. On September 18, with airplanes headed toward Haiti, Carter phoned Clinton to say that the junta would step down in return for an amnesty for themselves and the Haitian military. President Aristide gave his approval.

On September 19, 1994, United States troops entered Haiti peacefully and unopposed. Haitians greeted the United States forces warmly but cautiously, fearing reprisals from the Haitian military. However, as the people became more festive, Haitian police killed two people while United States forces watched, unsure of their mandate. Other incidents occurred in Cap-Haitien and Gonaïves.

The junta left Haiti within a month. On October 4, former police chief Joseph Michel François fled to the Dominican Republic. On October 10, General Cédras resigned in a brief ceremony in which he had to be protected from jeering crowds, and on October 13, generals Cédras and Biamby left for exile in Panama.

**Democracy Restored, 1994–96**

President Aristide made a triumphal return to Haiti on October 15, 1994. For the first time, an exiled Haitian president was restored to office. A jubilant crowd, estimated at 10,000, gathered in front of the presidential palace to see and hear him. President Aristide spoke to them about reconciliation and justice, repeating the phrase, "No to violence, no to vengeance, yes to reconciliation." The next day, October 16, the UN Security Council lifted all economic sanctions against Haiti.

A sense of disillusionment soon set in among many of Aristide's followers, however. Their champion of social justice
entertained the wealthy, contemplated privatization of state industries, and selected a businessman as prime minister. His obvious wealth, his move to a mansion, marriage and subsequent fatherhood were disturbing changes in the former priest.

Haitians had also changed. Most were much worse off than before 1991. The economy had been destroyed by sanctions; the departure of the pivotal assembly industry left 70 to 80 percent of Port-au-Prince unemployed; and the infrastructure and agricultural sectors had collapsed. Many educated, technically skilled, and formerly politically involved Haitians had left, and 3,000 to 4,000 others had been killed.

President Aristide faced multiple challenges on his return to Haiti, not the least of which were the high expectations of his supporters and a mere fifteen months left of his term. He announced a detailed economic recovery program designed to streamline the bloated and corrupt public sector and renew private-sector job creation. In response, the international community pledged a major emergency economic aid package of US$1.2 billion. Aristide used this assistance to support the government, and create temporary public works jobs for the immediate alleviation of poverty, avoiding unpopular and controversial measures. In view of the magnitude of Haiti's economic problems, the reforms needed time to succeed.

President Aristide took bold action in dealing with the issue of domestic security. In early 1995, he disbanded the military and paramilitary organizations that had tyrannized Haitians and prevented a society based on laws. A new Haitian National Police under the Ministry of Justice and Public Security superseded the armed forces as the agency dealing with the nation's serious problem of maintaining law and order. Meanwhile, the international force, which consisted in large measure of United States troops, remained to guarantee basic security and assist in training the Haitian National Police. A beginning was made on the reform of the judicial system by weeding out corrupt and incompetent judges, and measures were taken to improve prison conditions (see Justice System, ch. 10). As one of his first actions, Aristide created a National Commission of Truth and Justice to investigate and write a report on some of the worst crimes committed between 1991 and 1994. The commission finished its investigation and presented its findings to the Ministry of Justice in January 1997; no further action has been
Haiti: Historical Setting

reported. In the area of social reform, President Aristide created a National Secretariat for Literacy and began land reform.

The June 25, 1995, municipal and parliamentary elections were contentious. The elections were delayed twice, and the Provisional Electoral Council reviewed candidates and printed ballots up to the last minute, leading to a boycott by three political parties, and a low turnout. Despite UN monitoring, some fraud occurred, necessitating a rerun on August 13. Except for Lavalas, which did well, nearly all of the other political parties called for an annulment.

Presidential elections followed in November. Aristide campaigned for René Préval, his prime minister and friend, until the last moment, when Aristide himself appeared to consider staying in office. Thereafter, neither Aristide nor his disappointed supporters, who had hoped that Aristide would run again, showed much enthusiasm for Préval. Only 30 percent of the eligible voters went to the polls, and 80 percent of those who did voted for Préval on the OPL ticket. Regardless of the turnout, the election was unprecedented. When Préval took office on February 7, 1996, for the first time in Haitian history power was transferred from one democratically elected president to another.

President Préval (1996– ) is an agronomist, who was a baker in Port-au-Prince before Jean-Bertrand Aristide selected him to be prime minister. Viewed as a hard worker, his main appeal came from his association with Aristide. Over time, however, the relationship became strained, and Préval's popularity decreased.

President Préval inherited a daunting array of problems. As of early 1996, the depressed economy continued to decline while the astronomical unemployment rate continued to climb. Inflation had already reached 30 percent and was expected to increase. In response to these indicators and because of the new openness and availability of weapons, common crime was increasing, straining the capabilities of the new National Police. Foreign assistance had declined drastically—from US$230 million in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1995 to US$90 million in FY 1996, depriving President Préval of an external cushion.

Although Haitians carried out an historic transition from one democratically elected president to another, the future of democracy in Haiti remained uncertain. Upcoming congressional elections would give Haitians the opportunity to correct
the marred 1995 congressional elections and create a permanent electoral council. Although President Préval seemed committed to the privatization of state-owned industries, as of early 1996 it remained to be seen whether he would be able to overcome congressional and public opposition. To date, Haiti had not begun the process of economic recovery nor reached a consensus on how it might be achieved.

* * *

Historical works on Haiti traditionally have focused on the leaders of the war of independence, the early heads of state, François Duvalier, and voodoo. Recently, however, a number of comprehensive studies on Haiti have appeared. Among these are David Nicholls' *From Dessalines to Duvalier*, Robert and Nancy Heinl's *Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492–1995*, James Leyburn's *The Haitian People*, Selden Rodman's *Haiti: The Black Republic*, and Robert Rotberg and Christopher Clague's *Haiti: The Politics of Squalor*. For precolonial and colonial history, see M.L.E. Moreau de Saint-Méry, *A Civilization that Perished*. For the revolution, consult C.L.R. James, *The Black Jacobins, Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*. The United States occupation of Haiti is chronicled in Hans Schmidt's *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934*. For more about François Duvalier, see Bernard Diederich and Al Burt's *Papa Doc et les Tontons Macoutes*. For the Duvalier dynasty, consult Elizabeth Abbott's *Haiti: The Duvaliers and Their Legacy*. For a chronology of efforts to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power, see *Haitian Democracy Restored: 1991–1995* by Roland I. Perusse. For the role of religions in Haiti, look at Anne Greene's *The Catholic Church in Haiti: Political and Social Change* and for voodoo, consult *Voodoo and Politics in Haiti, Voodoo Heritage*, and *Études sur le vodou haïtien* by Michel S. Laguerre. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)