

FORTITUDINE

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
2013



FORTITUDINE

Bulletin of the Marine Corps Historical Program

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Cover Art: *Guadalcanal* by Sgt Tom Lovell

Marines wade across a river on Guadalcanal during a jungle patrol in World War II. Created for a recruiting poster, 10,000 copies were first printed in 1945. A second and third printing was done in 1952 when approximately 3,500 copies were printed and distributed.

Inside Cover Art: *Marine* by Col Donald L. Dickson

A sketch of a Marine on Guadalcanal in 1942.

Back Cover Art: *Stream Crossing* by Col Donald L. Dickson

A sketch of Marines crossing a stream on Guadalcanal in 1942.

Art on covers from U.S. Marine Corps Art Collection

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They called it “Bloody Ridge”

By Dr. Charles P. Neimeyer
Director, History Division
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About a year ago, upon being named president of the Marine Corps University (MCU) by the Commandant, Brigadier General William F. Mullen III directed the History Division to propose a key historical campaign for the entire university to study and commemorate during the upcoming 2013–14 academic year. Consequently, in collaboration with the director of the National Museum of the Marine Corps, Ms. Lin Ezell, we decided there was no better example than the Guadalcanal campaign. This topic was accepted by the president, and the afternoon and evening of 24 October 2013 set aside for a historical lecture to be held at the university followed by other cele-

bratory events scheduled at the Marine Corps Museum later that same evening. The 24th of October also marks the 71st anniversary of the start of heavy fighting that took place on Guadalcanal against Marines commanded by Colonel Merritt “Red Mike” Edson on a historic piece of ground later known as “Bloody Ridge.”

The “Guadalcanal Day” commemoration will begin with a lecture by acclaimed naval historian, James D. Hornfischer. Mr. Hornfischer recently published a highly regarded book on the Guadalcanal campaign titled *Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal* (Bantam, 2011). It is an outstanding history. However, he notes that, while the combat record

of the U.S. Marine Corps and Army forces on Guadalcanal was superb, the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet bore the brunt of the fighting in a long campaign of attrition that lasted from 7 August 1942 to 9 February 1943. During this time, U.S. naval forces fought five major engagements at sea and another two that involved aircraft carriers. In fact, Hornfischer notes that, during the entire Guadalcanal campaign, for every U.S. combat death that occurred on land another three men were lost at sea.



The raging battle of Edson’s Ridge is depicted in all its fury in this oil painting by the late Col Donald L. Dickson, then-captain and adjutant of the 5th Marines on Guadalcanal.

U.S. Marine Corps Art Collection





U.S. Marine Corps

2dLt Mitchell Paige (third from left) and PltSgt John A. Basilone (far right) received the Medal of Honor at a parade at Camp Balcombe, Australia, on 21 May 1943. MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift (left) received his medal in a White House ceremony the previous 5 February, while Col Merritt A. Edson was decorated 31 December 1943.

So why study Guadalcanal? Why was this battle so significant to the development of the modern day Navy/Marine Corps team? These important questions are answered in *Neptune's Inferno*. While Guadalcanal rightfully evokes the image of the savage fighting that took place between U.S. Marines and Imperial Japanese forces on the island, Hornfischer urges readers to see the campaign in its entirety. First and foremost, Guadalcanal needs to be recognized as both a joint and combined operation that involved not only substantial U.S. Army and Naval forces but also that of allies, such as Australia, New Zealand, and even the tiny island nation of Tonga. He asks us to remember, in context, that Guadalcanal was the first major ground offensive operation of World

War II launched against the empire of Japan. It was also a naval fight for control over the waters that surrounded the island.

As Hornfischer makes clear, the Guadalcanal campaign demanded tight cooperation between land, sea, and air forces—cooperation that was often challenged by interservice rivalry and contentiousness on the part of key military and political leaders. This fight was also about technology, much of which was being used for the very first time. For example, U.S. Navy use of shipboard radar was still in its infancy. Hornfischer noted that when a ship's captain knew how to use this new technology, that ship usually fared well in the campaign.

The Guadalcanal campaign also demonstrated that, although the

Navy and Marine Corps had been working together on a number of crucial aspects related to modern amphibious warfare, much still remained to be learned. For example, a lack of cohesive shore party control and organic stevedore units dedicated to landing critical supplies in a hurry nearly proved fatal to Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift and his 1st Marine Division. Most of Vandegrift's reserve supplies were still on board ship when a Japanese surface force surprised the U.S. Navy covering force off Savo Island the night after the Marines landed on 7 August 1942, and the Japanese sunk one Australian and three heavy U.S. cruisers in a single night. When Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher decided to withdraw his carriers from the vicinity of Guadalcanal, the amphibious

task force commander, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, was forced to also withdraw his transports still laden with precious food, supplies, and much of Vandegrift's reserve infantry. Making do with what he had, including the use of captured Japanese heavy construction equipment and food stocks, the 1st Marine Division quickly captured the nearly completed Japanese airfield at Lunga Point, which the Marines renamed Henderson Field in honor of Major Lofton R. Henderson who had been killed at the Battle of Midway. Henderson Field quickly became an unsinkable aircraft carrier—a factor not immediately understood by U.S. Navy leadership. While Japanese surface naval forces regularly shelled the Marines in and around Henderson Field, it was U.S. Marine aviation that ruled the skies and consequently the sea around Guadalcanal during the daylight hours. As a result, the early fighting on the island revolved around the retention of the airfield by U.S. forces.

Most of the early defense of the airfield was done without much in the way of support from the U.S.

Adm William F. Halsey, illustrated in a Navy recruiting poster during World War II.

U.S. Navy Art Collection



Navy, who had been driven from the area of operations due to the negative results from the engagement off of Savo Island. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy eventually reorganized its forces under a new, more aggressive admiral, William F. “Bull” Halsey. After visiting the Marines on Guadalcanal (something his predecessor, Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley never did), Halsey decided to slug it out with the Japanese. He immediately began a series of sea engagements that, over time, enabled American and allied naval forces to slowly regain control of the seas around Guadalcanal. Once this took place, the Japanese forces on the island were doomed.

Having lost control of the sea to Halsey, the Japanese, after sacrificing a substantial amount of personnel and materiel both at sea and ashore, decided to abandon Guadalcanal. By December 1942, the disease-riddled 1st Marine Division was withdrawn to Australia and replaced by the U.S. XIV Corps. This unit consisted of the 2d Marine Division and U.S. Army 25th (Tropic Lightning) and 23d (Americal) Infantry Divisions. Renewing the offensive in early January 1943, these forces continued operations against what remained of the Japanese on Guadalcanal. Incredibly, using 20 destroyers operating at night, the Japanese extricated nearly 5,000 survivors before the island was declared secure on 9 February 1943.

The aftermath of Guadalcanal was significant in a number of respects. From this point forward, the Japanese ground forces remained largely on the defensive in the Pacific. The U.S. Marines and Army forces on “the Canal” had also subdued the myth of Japanese invincibility. As for the Japanese, they had lost dozens of irreplaceable ships, hundreds of aircraft, and thousands of experienced combat veterans. While the



1st Marine Division insignia art.

United States could and did recover from its losses, the Japanese were extremely hard put to do so after Guadalcanal. The battle for Guadalcanal was also the first prolonged amphibious campaign of the war in the Pacific. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps learned some hard lessons about amphibious warfare especially on issues concerning logistics, sustainability, and command over engaged forces. Following Guadalcanal, there was an urgent need to revisit how amphibious landings were going to occur. More focus was needed on purpose-built amphibious shipping, the use of amphibious Marines to seize objectives as part of a larger naval campaign, and command relationships between the services. This way of fighting was going to become the rule vice the exception—lessons that commanders today should note as the country “pivots” once again toward the Pacific. It is no mistake that the historic “blue diamond” patch of the 1st Marine Division contains the outlines of the Southern Cross (the constellation seen by thousands of Marines who served in the southwest Pacific) with the word “Guadalcanal” written lengthwise down the numeral in the center of the diamond—the only remaining Marine combat division from World War II to commemorate a battle by its name on its shoulder patch. •1775•

On The Front Lines In Afghanistan: **Female Searchers During Operation Mountain Storm**

By Colonel Nathan S. Lowrey
Field Historian
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve

In 1994, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin rescinded the “Risk Rule,” prohibiting women from serving in combat service support units, but stopped short of allowing their assignment to frontline units whose primary mission involved direct combat. Although one reason cited for such caution was a “lack of experience with women in direct ground combat,” Army and Marine experts noted that traditional forward and rear area distinctions were becoming increasingly blurred on post-Cold War battlefields, raising the probability that future combat service support units would find themselves involved in direct combat scenarios. Ten years later, as Coalition forces fought twin insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, that once vague possibility became a bloody reality; of the 280,000 women deployed overseas, 150 were killed in action and another 800 wounded in action. Now, following more than a decade of war, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has announced his intention to remove what barriers remain to women serving in any direct combat role, provided they meet the same qualification standards as their male counterparts. As this long anticipated and hotly debated policy change is implemented, it is important to consider the experience of contemporary women in combat and acknowledge the complex social dynamics occurring on today’s multi-gendered battlefield.

One opportunity to do so is presented by the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (22d MEU), which completed a successful deployment to southern Afghanistan during the spring and summer of 2004. While executing multiple interrelated civil

and military operations designed to pave the way for national elections, they endeavored to avoid alienating the local populace by respecting indigenous cultural values, which included the employment of female Marines and Sailors to search Afghani women. Although this tactic is not unique in and of itself, mission requirements in Afghanistan necessitated the attachment of women to light infantry units operating under austere conditions in a hostile environment for prolonged periods. As then-Captain Maria A. Marte, a prior enlisted combat engineer officer from New York and senior member of the searchers team, expressed during an interview with Marine Corps public affairs, “It’s a first as far as I know. We’ve been out there with the grunts for nearly three weeks straight. We’ve climbed the same hills as the men, searched the same compounds, and gone through everything they have.”

The following discussion is divided into two sections. The first describes the tactical employment of female searchers in Afghanistan, while the second presents the searchers’ personal experiences within the various social and environmental contexts that they encountered. By accepting the imperative of necessity acknowledged by the 22d MEU, it becomes possible to go beyond the question of whether or not women should serve in combat to considering the implication of their continued presence on twenty-first century battlefields.

Task Force Linebacker

Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr. commanded the expeditionary unit, otherwise known as Task Force Linebacker. He and approximately 2,200 other Marines and Sailors represented the smallest of the Marine Corps three task-organized expeditionary forces. In addition to his

headquarters element, subordinate units included Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (BLT 1/6), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Asad Khan; Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (HMM-266), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joel R. Powers; and Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 22 (MSSG-22), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin R. Braden.

Approximately 2.5 percent of the Sailors and Marines, serving in the expeditionary unit, were female. Although women were precluded from serving in the infantry battalion, approximately 16 were assigned to each of the expeditionary unit’s command and service support elements, and another 40 were part of the composite aviation squadron. While many of the women were familiar with life in the Marines, the transition could be challenging for others coming from farther afield. Hospital Corpsman 3d Class (Corpsman) Lori F. Butierries, a three-year Navy veteran from Florida who joined the service support group a month before it deployed, reflected on her initiation to the Corps:

I was scared. Basically, I came from a hospital. I was not prepared for all the physical stuff you guys do. I get attached to the MEU [Marine expeditionary unit] . . . and it’s a whole new way of life. The way they talk to you . . . it’s really structured. It’s really intense; never been on ship; never had to go on a hump; never been on a [landing craft]. I didn’t know what was going on; never even held a weapon. It was just nuts. But, it was good times. It was fun learning and everyone helped me along.

After being formed in August

2003, the expeditionary unit completed its customary predeployment training and was deemed special operations capable during January 2004. It embarked upon three amphibious vessels in February, as the Marine's contribution to Expeditionary Strike Group Two. After transiting through the Mediterranean Sea and Suez Canal, the strike group reached U.S. Central Command's area of operations in March. Once in theater, the expeditionary unit's mission quickly changed from acting as the regional commander's mobile reserve to serving as the main effort during the annual spring offensive in southern Afghanistan, code named Operation Mountain Storm.

Senior commanders and their staff soon learned that they were being assigned to Uruzgan Province, a rural mountain region north of Kandahar. Although Hamid Karzai had raised an opposition group there during 2001, the Taliban had a long history in the area, and the rugged landscape had become a haven for insurgents during the two years following the Coalition's initial incursion. The expeditionary unit's mission was threefold: to secure the major population centers, to create a stable environment for voter registration (sponsored by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), and to defeat the anticoalition forces. This was accomplished through a four-phase campaign conducted between 26 March and 10 July, which centered upon familiarizing themselves with their area of operations, establishing a forward operating base and securing the surrounding valleys, and simultaneously engaging the Afghani people and enemy forces in concurrent civil and military operations. While briefing

his troops, Colonel McKenzie put the mission on more personal grounds:

Treat the Afghan people with respect. These people have had a bad deal for a long time. They have a lot of wonderful qualities. We are their only chance. If we can't make a go of it, there is no one else who is going to do it. There are a lot of bad guys there, but there are also a lot of Afghan people who need help. We are going to deal with both of them.

The expeditionary unit's small advanced party reached Kandahar airfield on 13 March. They were followed shortly thereafter by the main body, which flowed from Qatar for two weeks between 24 March and 7 April. Corpsman Lori Butierries commented on her initial reaction to Afghanistan:

When I got to Kandahar, I was relieved. I saw there were grocery facilities. I was like, "this is not going to be that difficult." The only thing that would real-

ly cause any kind of problems was getting adjusted to the heat; it was rather hot. Lots of PT [physical training], that's about it.

Corpsman Jacqueline J. Lee, a five-year Navy veteran from Ohio who had been with the expeditionary unit's surgical support unit for a year, expressed similar sentiments:

Kandahar was funny. We'd never PT'd as an MSSG [Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group]. We never forced marched. We got to Kandahar and they PT'd us seven days a week, and then encouraged us to PT yet another time on our own. That's when we coined the phrase, "We're the BLG" [Battalion Landing Group]. And, it was, "We're in country now, we're supposed to be fighting the good fight, and we're PT'ing seven days a week." It was a source of amusement for us often.

Corpsman Jacqueline J. Lee

U.S. Marine Corps



Phase I, shaping operations, kicked off almost immediately. For a month between 26 March and 26 April, five heavily armed convoys conducted reconnaissance missions along the tortuous 146-kilometer route to the provincial capital at Tarin Kowt. During these missions, code named Ulysses I through V, the expeditionary unit familiarized itself with the operational environment, collected information on road conditions and regional demographics, and introduced itself to the local populace. Meanwhile, unit leaders coordinated with adjacent commands, staff officers refined the operations plan, support personnel assembled the neces-

sary logistical resources, and the troops continued to hone their individual combat skills and conduct physical training.

Phase II was initiated on 25 April. It involved mutually supporting efforts to establish Forward Operating Base Ripley near the village of Tarin Kowt and secure Uruzgan Province. Nearly 3,000 Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines were deployed to the high desert, where they encountered the infamous dry heat and talcum powder-like dust that obliterated visibility and penetrated every crack and crevice of their equipment and person. Through hard work, the barren plain was gradually transformed into an airfield supporting both helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft operations, including bulk fuel, water, ammunition supply areas; command, medical, detainment facilities; and even a chow hall, showers, and tents for personnel.

Operation El Dorado, designed to deter enemy activity throughout the region by denying sanctuary in key towns and villages, was conducted from 25 April to 7 May. This was accomplished through an aggressive campaign of presence patrols, cordon and search missions, and selective combat operations. The battalion landing team led the effort by pushing north from Kandahar to establish its own forward operating base near a key road intersection at Tenachuy. At the same time, two rifle companies were airlifted into remote population centers.

Company A, commanded by Captain Ronald S. Gouker, was inserted into a linear-shaped valley near El Bak, which the Marines unofficially dubbed "Hogan's Alley." It contained six villages, situated along one of two roads linking Kandahar and Tarin Kowt. Company C, commanded by Captain Paul C. Merida, was inserted into the western side of a bowl-shaped depression near Loy Lwargay, in the Sha Wali Kowt valley. Inaccessible except by air, this

remote region contained five villages and was unofficially dubbed "Walton's Mountain." Once established, the operational nodes and operating bases were linked by heavily armed mobile patrols, primarily conducted by the light armored reconnaissance platoon and combined antiarmor teams.

Help Wanted

Doctrinal wisdom warns that, although "searches are an important aspect of populace and resource control" in any counterinsurgent operation, the "misuse of search authority can adversely affect the outcome of operations." As a case in point, during an introductory meeting with Colonel McKenzie in Kabul, the commanding general of Coalition forces in Afghanistan expressed concern over the occasional use of male Soldiers to search Afghani women, because it ignored indigenous mores and alienated the local population whose hearts and minds the Coalition was trying to win. Yet, exempting women from being searched was not possible either, because insurgent forces commonly used them for all sorts of tasks when a threat of being searched was likely.

The obvious answer was for Colonel McKenzie to employ female Marines and Sailors as searchers. This was not a new concept. As part of its special operations training, the expeditionary unit had received instruction in search procedures, during which the instructors had recommended the use of female searchers in Afghanistan and Iraq. Standard doctrinal publications also emphasize the sensitivity of searching indigenous women: "If female searchers cannot be provided, a doctor or aidman should be considered for use in searching female suspects. The search of females is an extremely delicate matter. When male Soldiers search females, every possible measure must be taken to prevent even the slightest inference of sexual molestation or assault."

On the other hand, the need for female searchers is often envisioned as a temporary requirement for operations in relatively permissive urban environments, perhaps at a roadside vehicle checkpoint or a security station during a noncombatant evacuation operation. In this case, women of the expeditionary unit would be with the battalion landing team for an extended period. Besides the customary heat and dust, infantry operations in Afghanistan frequently involved dismounted movement over rugged terrain at high altitudes while carrying heavy loads. If that were not difficult enough, there was also the added danger of sniper fire, ambushes, and improvised explosive devices.

Around 18 April, while working as a watch officer in the expeditionary unit's combat operations center in Kandahar, Captain Marte learned that the battalion landing team was thinking about taking female searchers to the field and volunteered to go with other women from the command group. Similar rumors had surfaced among the service support group, and Chief Petty Officer Dulcie Davis informed Corpsmen Butierries and Lee that either one of them might be pulled from the medical section to serve with the infantry. Three days later, they were each called to a meeting with the rest of the women from the support group, and Lieutenant Colonel Braden announced, "Listen up ladies; this is what we're going to do. The BLTs requested some females to be brought in to help them with searching the villagers and we're adhering to the request . . . trying to keep the peace."

Although Chief Davis remembered that "almost every female jumped at the opportunity to do something that we're not normally allowed to do," Corpsman Lee recalled that "there were a lot of mixed reactions. Half of them were excited. The other half weren't; you were crying and very

upset. It's not what they joined up to do, what they wanted to do." She also noted that "there was no 'who would like to go' or 'who would not like to go,' it was 'you're all going and this is who you're going with.'" Perhaps Lieutenant Melanie J. Stock best captured the reality of the moment by reflecting, "I don't think you do anything in the military that's a voluntary thing, so when they say 'go,' I go."

Chief Davis later acknowledged her concern for the women's welfare; the same concern she felt for any corpsman deploying forward. She explained that they did not know how the Taliban were going to respond at the time, and they had initially expected large numbers of casualties. Although Chief Davis had offered to take their place if they really did not want to go, the corpsmen were honored that the battalion landing team would ask for them, and each went to the field. Corpsman Butierries explained, "I really wanted to go out. I was so scared and I was so nervous, because I wasn't sure if I could cut it or not . . . but . . . I wanted to try it. I wanted to see if I could cut it; and I did. And, I surprised myself and I surprised who was with me."

Colonel McKenzie and his subordinate commanders ultimately chose 12 women to serve as searchers with the battalion landing team. All were junior personnel, professionally capable, and in top physical condition. Otherwise, beyond the fact that they each possessed "two x chromosomes," as Lieutenant Stock noted with a hint of humor and sarcasm, the group was extremely diverse in its composition. Two were officers and eight were enlisted, three were Sailors and nine were Marines, four



U.S. Marine Corps

Chief Petty Officer Dulcie Davis

came from the command element, and eight came from the service support group. Together, they represented at least five occupational fields: administration, engineering, communications, medicine, and religious programs. The searchers were subsequently divided into two teams of six. Captain Marte led one group attached to Company A, while Lieutenant Stock led the other group attached to Company C. Except for the training that they underwent during predeployment, the only specialized instruction the searchers received was from a U.S. Army military police unit that taught them how to force a woman to the ground, secure her hands, and then conduct a search without lifting her up, just in case she was concealing explosives.

Cordon-and-Search Operations

Within days of the commander's meeting, both rifle companies had deployed to remote river valleys to begin cordon-and-search operations

among the rural farming villages. Lieutenant Stock's team departed for Walton's Mountain on 25 April with Company C, while Captain Marte's team departed for Hogan's Alley on 26 April with Company A. The extra training day afforded Captain Marte's team a brief opportunity to assimilate into their new unit. They were briefed on Company A's mission, its area of responsibility, and taught how to enter and exit helicopters while under fire.

On the day of the insertion, Captain Marte looked upon the rest of the assault force from the rear of her helicopter and thought to herself, "Wow, this is a force to be reckoned with and I [am] part of it."

Corpsman Lee recalled that she was unexpectedly bumped from the first to the second wave of troops being flown into El Bak. At first she figured this was just luck, assuming that any fighting would have taken place by the time she arrived, but her anxiety grew when one of the helicopters from the initial flight failed to return to base. Unaware that the aircraft had been damaged during a hard landing, those getting ready for the 25-minute flight into harm's way imagined that their shipmates might have been brought down by enemy antiaircraft fire and anxiously realized they were heading to the same location.

After consolidating near their respective landing zones, each of the rifle companies began its arduous cross-country movement, interspersed with repetitive cordon-and-search missions. Under normal circumstances, reconnaissance teams began to observe the target location two days in advance, while the infantry moved into an assembly

area, conducted a leader's reconnaissance of the objective area, and then stepped off three to six hours before sunrise to establish a cordon around the village. The cordon element was usually comprised of one or two rifle platoons, depending on the size of the community. It would set up on high ground that provided good observation and fields of fire, so it could cover the search element and stop any residents who attempted to flee.

The search element, including one or two additional platoons and the company headquarters, would then move in and take up positions near the end or center of the village. The goal was to set up without being observed and before the villagers left for their fields in the morning. Sergeant Joshua C. Sheppard, a squad leader in Company B, recalled, "You can tell what the village is going to be like by the people walking around. If you see kids running around and women, it's going to be an easy day. If you don't see any at all or one or two guys and they are of fighting age, you don't know what you're going to find."

Unless there was a perceived threat, which might direct their attention toward a specific individual or location, the search element would attempt to make contact with the village elder and explain their intent to search the buildings, compounds, and fields for weapons. Most of the villagers were cooperative, although some ethnic groups were friendlier than others and, in cases where the villages had already been searched several times, the residents might be frustrated by the prospect of repeating the process. However, if the general area inspection proved uneventful, the Marines might only conduct an abbreviated search of some males. If the presence of contraband was initially denied and subsequently discovered, it was more likely that they would search everyone in the village. The prospect

of having everyone searched was a major concern to the village. Captain Gouker noted that upon meeting the elders, one of their first comments to the Marines was that "we have women and children." In this regard, Captain Merida added:

We usually didn't search the females, unless there was some reason to. We tried to pay particular attention on how we treated the females in the villages. That was definitely a concern that was raised before we crossed the line of departure. Their females in Afghanistan don't even leave the compound and so . . . They're pretty protective about their females and who interacts with them and how they're interacted with, so we tried to respect that as much as possible, and it usually paid off pretty well. People were usually pretty appreciative, even if they didn't want us there, that, you know, we weren't man-handling their women.

In Company C, the assignment of female searchers varied in accordance with the unit's daily mission. If enemy threat was high or the likelihood of encountering women was remote, such as during mountain patrols, the searchers would likely as not remain behind with the headquarters element. On the other hand, if the company intended to enter a village that was known to contain women, then a team of searchers would accompany the infantry. In Company A, the women usually broke into two groups, three going with the company first sergeant on the left side of the village and three going with the company commander on the right side of the village. Halting outside each walled household compound, a plan of action would be diagramed in the dirt and then the Marines would proceed to clear one building after the other.

The searchers usually entered the household compounds after they had

been cleared, and the Afghan women and children had been segregated from the men. This undercut the tendency for the women to be intimidated by male members of the household or seek their guidance while answering the searcher's questions, which had been loosely coordinated with intelligence personnel beforehand. As Lieutenant Stock described, "Before each village that we would go into, they'd be like, 'Well, this is sort of the line of questioning that I'm going to ask . . .' [and] you kind of adapt it towards the women."

Grooming standards were relaxed in both companies so the searchers could wear their hair down in braids or ponytails to emphasize their sex among the Afghani people. Although this occasionally elicited laughter from the surprised locals, Captain Marte noted that their presence eased tensions and "allowed the engineers and grunts to go ahead with their search." For example, in one humorous anecdote, she described being herded into a room by curious Afghani women who wanted to pat her down and "see what was underneath [her] garment."

Frequently outnumbered by as many as 10 to 1, the searchers might speak with the Afghani women in isolated groups of three or four. This not only helped the searchers maintain control of the discussion, which could easily devolve into open debate between the Afghans, it also provided for better information. As a general observation, Lieutenant Stock noted that while the Afghani women may "claim to not know anything and just be interested in what the household is, a lot of times they do know more than what's going on, but they don't want to tell you." She described the initial portion of the search procedure:

And then we would go into the room, and we would search the females utilizing the interpreter. Most of the interpreters were

male, so they would stay kind of in a hidden area, but so the women could hear them, and then we would search them, obviously having them take off their burqas. And this was so that we were respecting their cultural issues, because for men to see their faces is not acceptable.

As Corpsman Butierries described, the searchers encountered various personalities among the Afghani women. Some were afraid to talk, others could be coaxed through conversation, and “some of the women, regardless of what you did, were feisty, and they didn’t want you touching them, and they didn’t want you talking to them. And so, they fight against you when you try to search them.” Although Corpsman Butierries had not been personally confronted by a hostile female in Afghanistan, she told of other searchers who had been and in one case several AK-47 rifles had been recovered. In these situations, particularly at the beginning of the deployment, the searchers were told:

“Hey, if they fight against you, just take them down. Don’t ask questions. Just take them down and search them, and then you can have the interpreter come in and talk with them about what happened because your safety comes first and those of the Marines around you.”

As the searchers gained in both situational experience and cultural awareness, their initial apprehension over the potential threat from the Afghani women lessened, and they realized that many were bewildered by the presence of Americans searching for weapons in their village. Lieutenant Stock remarked:

And as you search more and more females, then you found that they had

little idea of what was going on politically, and pretty much were kept in the dark; that they wouldn’t have the motive to be a suicide bomber, not to mention that it was against their religious beliefs. And then you could kind of tailor your searches, so they weren’t so invasive, because it was . . . for most of these women it was a traumatic experience to be touched and to be searched in the manner that we were taught.

Sometimes they would be angry, but that was very rare. It usually was if there was a matriarch who was an older woman. Generally, the older women who had lost their husbands and became the head of the household did have more of a global knowledge of what was going on, and sometimes would be resentful. Those women like to speak on behalf of everyone, so it was very difficult, because sometimes you had to isolate them and talk to

Corpsman Lori F. Butierries

U.S. Marine Corps



them one on one, because you could get more useful information that way, because, believe it or not, they do see things. They have eyes. They know what’s going on.

Chief Davis, who saw more than a thousand patients during her assignments at medical clinics in Afghanistan, observed that the Afghani women are “treated like second class citizens.” In a cross-cultural anecdote told to emphasize the point, she first explained that Afghani girls are often auctioned (married) off at the age of 12, and then told how a male patient had asked to keep her for the purpose of producing light-eyed offspring. Afghans “look at women completely different” than Americans, she continued. “You get very used to seeing them crouched down, very shy, around the men . . . but when they’re outside their men, they are just like women in America . . . chattering little Cathys . . . and they can be just as aggressive as the men.” “From the feminist point of view,” Chief Davis reflected, “I can be

upset, because I think they treat them horribly . . . And that’s hard to grasp for me, because I’m used to having a little girl. But that’s all they know; that’s honestly all they know.” The challenging work could also be frustratingly difficult. Butierries reflected:

It wasn’t always that fun. I mean the people resented your presence and your abilities, and you get frustrated when you get some questions and you’re trying to help them and you’re really trying to do something for them, but they don’t want your help, and they lie to you. Then they get mad at you when they lie and you have to search them . . . It was hard sometimes; sometimes

you had . . . to go find a reason to laugh.

The rifle companies returned to their operating bases after approximately two weeks in the field. During Operation El Dorado, the team members conducted 63 patrols and 29 cordon-and-search missions; the expeditionary unit discovered 30 weapons caches and detained 16 individuals for further questioning. Yet, rumors began to surface, suggesting that the female searchers had been treated improperly during their stay with the infantry and that they would be returning to the primary billets. This incensed Captain Marte, who spoke with the expeditionary unit's sergeant major and commanding officer. She explained that the searchers had been treated with nothing but respect and that both the company commanders wanted them to stay in the field. She also asked for an opportunity to fix the problem and learn from the mistake, and recommended letting those who wanted to return to the field go back. Colonel McKenzie agreed. As Corpsman Butierries described:

So, all the females got taken to FOB [Forward Operating Base] Payne and were asked, "Hey, are you being abused? Are you not getting the supplies that you need? Are they making you do stuff you shouldn't be doing?" And, we said, "No." Well, Colonel McKenzie was just, he was like, "Hey, check it out; I'm not going to make you stay out there. So, those who don't want to stay out there can go back to the rear. Those who do want to stay can stay."

Once the assignments became voluntary, Captain Marte told the women that she did not want to pressure anyone into doing something that was physically demanding, and they were worried about, emphasizing that it was not their primary job, and no one would look at them differently if they chose to stay behind. Half of the original searchers, includ-

ing Captain Marte, Lieutenant Stock, and Corpsman Butierries, chose to stay with the battalion. The other half, including Corpsman Lee, decided to return to their previous jobs. Corpsman Lee acknowledged that it was a difficult decision, which she discussed with her supervisors. Although the field assignment had definitely been an adventure that she would never forget, she was a trained corpsman, she felt responsible for supporting the medical section, and she wanted the professional experience of participating in the civil action clinics.

For those who decided to remain with the infantry, the intensity of operations continued to rise. Operation Rio Bravo began on 12 May. Returning to Hogan's Alley, Companies A and C resumed cordon-and-search operations while moving toward each other from opposite ends of the valley. To counter occasional incidents of unnecessary roughness that had surfaced toward the end of El Dorado, Colonel McKenzie reemphasized the civil nature of the mission by modifying the tactics from "cordon and search" to "cordon and knock."

Lieutenant Stock described her time as more focused on locating weapons in surrounding areas than on the villages and residents. The tempo was also much quicker than before, with Company C clearing as many as six villages in a day and covering 11 kilometers in two weeks. While personal safety was not jeopardized, individual search procedures were necessarily modified to accommodate the faster pace. By the end of Rio Bravo on 21 May, the expeditionary unit not only destroyed 9 more weapons caches, detained 27 additional individuals, and driven the enemy from the De Chenartu Tangay area, they also secured the main supply routes, initiated 30 civil affairs projects, and enabled voter registration to commence.

The expeditionary unit encoun-

tered its heaviest fighting during Operation Asbury Park, conducted between 1 and 17 June 2004. Lieutenant Colonel Khan led a heavily armed mobile reconnaissance patrol deep into Deh Chopan District, an enemy stronghold located east of Tarin Kowt. Moving slowly along winding mountain paths, leapfrogging cautiously from one village to the next, Task Force Genghis repeatedly provoked the enemy into fighting, so it could be destroyed by maneuvering ground forces and close air support. By the end of Operation Asbury Park, Marines killed or wounded approximately 100 insurgents and significantly disrupted the enemy's command and control network.

Given the expeditionary unit's stunning success, it was given an additional battalion from the Army's 5th Infantry Regiment and assigned a larger area of operation. While this battalion returned to the Deh Chopan area during Asbury Park II, conducted from 23 June to 8 July, the Marine battalion headed west toward Deh Rawood and the Cenar Cineh Valley during Operation Thunder Road, conducted from 27 June to 10 July. Although Captain Marte and Lieutenant Stock had to return to their primary jobs before the operation began, two former searchers were ordered back to the field because of their proven ability to hike.

The Soldiers and Marines made contact with small groups of insurgents on several occasions, but the enemy now realized the folly of meeting the Marines head on and remained elusive. After the expeditionary unit ceased combat operations on 10 July, the commander of Coalition forces in Afghanistan remarked: "Never in the story of Operation Enduring Freedom has there been an offensive operation like the one the 22d MEU conducted. Never have we been this successful. You have made history here." In recognition of their accomplishments, the expeditionary unit was awarded a Navy Unit Citation.

Observations

I learned that anything's possible. That you . . . never really know what you're made out of until you're tested. (Corpsman Lori Butierries)

While reflecting on his experience after the deployment, Lieutenant Colonel Braden admitted to harboring some paternalistic apprehension about sending women to the field for extended periods. He remarked lightheartedly, "[My] initial thoughts [were], 'Well, women Marines don't go on patrols, they don't go into direct combat, how are they going to be out there for 10 to 15 days at time, [living] out of the pack?' They have special hygiene needs." He also had concerns about the nature of their involvement with the male Marines; "I'm saying, 'Holy smokes, we've got to put them in pairs.' There's no privacy out there, with a bunch of young grunts and some good looking gals and you're in the field." Although Braden was correct in concluding that the search operations turned out to be a resounding success, he was also right that integrating female attachments into male infantry units would require compromise on several levels.

The Environment

And, these men have some mighty endurance. I'll tell you that. They accomplish so much in a day. It's just unbelievable. I would've never believed the stories and the stuff that they do, *if I hadn't experienced it myself* [emphasis added]. It's just amazing. (Corpsman Lori Butierries)

Although Captain Marte had commanded a combat engineer platoon, the other female Marines were less familiar with operating in a field environment. For the Sailors, it was essentially a new experience. Corpsman Lee remarked that duty with the Marines was "a completely different way of life" and "more difficult" than

she had imagined. Her experience resulted in a new found respect for the infantrymen's minimalist lifestyle: "They live with what they have to survive. I've seen them get packages from home and burn most of it, because they knew if they kept it they'd have to carry it." Corpsman Butierries echoed that she also "gained a lot of respect for the men," citing tattered uniforms, blistered feet, cellulite, malnutrition, and exhaustion. "They could still find a reason every day to smile or make a joke," she continued, "and I loved that; I totally respected that."

It was unavoidable that the female searchers who stayed in the field would eventually adapt to the infantry routine. They experimented with ways to cool drinking water, learned to combine the prepackaged rations into a more palatable fare, realized they were too tired to worry about sleeping on the ground, and found ways to keep clean. Corpsman Butierries told how the Marines had taught her to use empty ammunition cans or a waterproof bag to wash her clothes, and described how she and the others would occasionally bathe in nearby streams: "I had no shame . . . I ran down there with my bar of soap, and we all stripped down to our skivvies, and we were in the water. I did not care; green slime and all, we were getting clean somehow. We'd fill up water bottles and we'd wash our hair . . . We'd go find a secluded area to do that kind of stuff." Summing up the situation, as well as the infantry ethos, she concluded, "We did the best we could with what little we had."

Corpsman Lee admitted that the lack of privacy while going to the "bathroom . . . in the middle of God's country with everybody and their brother watching" was an issue for her. Being shy and somewhat introverted, she scheduled her daily routine to urinate once in the morning and once at night. Although there was a Marine with a rifle standing five feet away, she explained, the darkness

provided a semblance of being alone. Captain Marte also informed the other women that night vision goggles do not work as effectively at dawn or dusk.

Menstruation was another specifically feminine hygiene issue that had to be considered in the field because unsanitary conditions could lead to vaginal and urinary tract infections. While some of the women like Corpsmen Lee and Butierries decided to apply birth control patches to regulate their monthly periods, others like Captain Marte chose to maintain their normal cycle and used tampons to stem the flow of bodily fluids. The disadvantage of the second strategy became apparent when Operation El Dorado was unexpectedly extended, causing several women to run short. Corpsman Butierries laughed while recalling a humorous incident in which Captain Merida and First Sergeant Ernest K. Hoopii debated who would radio in the historic resupply request for tampons for a Marine rifle company. In the meantime, a temporary solution was to use tampons that some corpsmen carried to plug bullet holes and, when these were gone, to use paper napkins from the field rations. Captain Marte related a similar experience with Captain Gouker in Company A, laughing that the resupply arrived in a huge box with enough tampons for 50 women. The best part of their shipment, she added, were small paper bags that enabled the women to burn the soiled tampons.

The Infantry

Although welcomed by both rifle companies, as the searchers changed assignments while transitioning from one operation to another, they soon realized that each unit possessed its own unique personality. The differences reflected the dispositions of their commanders, the type of relationships that they established with subordinate units, and the attachment's tactical awareness. Captain Marte described Captain

Merida as being charismatic, outgoing, and aggressive; exploiting an intuitive sense of what needed to be done that had been developed in his Marines. In tactical situations where the searcher's presence might have been overlooked, she suggested ways in which they could be employed and quickly established a collaborative rapport with the company commander. Conversely, when supporting one of the rifle squads during a search, she intentionally subordinated herself to its leader and emphasized that her rank was not an issue: "You tell me where you need me to be."

Corpsman Butierries fondly described Company C as a band of protective big brothers: "The first day they were kind of standoffish, they're feeling us out, we're feeling them out, and then we just kind of clicked . . . They took us underneath their wings and we were going everywhere with them . . . The guys had great personalities. The whole company was awesome. They rocked!" Corpsman Butierries reveals the nature of that relationship in an anecdote describing how the women in Company C got their radio call sign:

After the first night we were there, First Sergeant Hoopii comes up to us. We're all laying on our pack—it's hot outside . . . And, he says, "All right ladies, we figured out a call name for you." I'm like, "Aww, First Sergeant, don't call me Minnie Mouse or something retarded like that." He's like, "No, you're Charlie Company, what do you think it is?" I was like, 'Humph, Charlie's Angels?' He was like, "Yeah." So, that's where we got our nickname, that we were Charlie's Angels. We all wrote like, you know, Angel Number One on our helmet, or Angel Number Two, Angel Number Three, and walked around like that.

Captain Marte described Captain Gouker as a "very proficient" and

detailed planner who "valued your opinion" and "incorporated everybody . . . into his team." The two corpsmen agreed that Company A had been a "lot . . . different" than Company C, noting that it was "really strict" (disciplined). Corpsman Butierries stated, "I had to prove myself to these men, because they didn't know who I was and they didn't trust me, and it was just uncomfortable. But, I went out there and I proved myself. I'd go on patrols with them, and go bathe in the streams with them, do whatever I could to just hang out." Corpsman Butierries described the incident that led to her eventual acceptance:

We were at [Forward Operating Base] Payne and we were just sitting there and they had to go on patrol, and they asked some of the male corpsman to go. We [needed] male corpsman with us, and all the guys were like, "Hmmm." Acted like they didn't hear him or they were just waiting to be picked. They're just ignoring him, and I'm like—that is horrible. That's embarrassing. I was like, "I'll do it." They're like, "You?" I'm like, "Yeah, me!" It's like, "I can do it, it's not that hard." They're like, "All right."

Oh my God! That was horrible. But, I hung in there. I refused to fall behind. It was so hard. By the fifth mountain that we were climbing, and the very last one, I was on my hands and knees crawling up that bad boy. I was grunting and groaning and I was scowling. One of the guys was like, "Doc, you're hard. That's right, yeah. Get some. That's right." I'm crawling. I'm doing it. And, one of the guys was like, "Doc, give me your stuff. I'll carry it." I said, "No. You know what, I got it. Get up there. I'll meet you at the top." About ten minutes later, I made it to the top. But, I did it.

The Men

The searchers also had to interact with the male Marines on an interpersonal level. Captain Marte reflected, "I don't know if the Marines ever felt uncomfortable; I don't think so from the way they treated me or the way they incorporated me into their plans and talked to me." At a different level, after tactfully observing that the men were "definitely not used to working with women" and perhaps "a little nervous at first," Lieutenant Stock admitted that the "gentlemen were . . . resentful" of the "outsiders" presence. Corpsman Butierries was more to the point, stating that "nobody knew what to do with each other." The infantry had never been "infiltrated" by women and was not sure how to treat the search team; she continued, "the guys were afraid that we were going to come there and act like we were all like G.I. Jane and were just . . . one of the dudes."

At the same time, the women were not sure what was expected of them or if the infantry would tire of their presence, so they initially maintained a low profile. In Corpsman Butierries' case, the situation was resolved by negotiating her role and status; while acknowledging that she was not a rifleman, she emphasized that she knew her job as a corpsman and was there to help the grunts, by serving as a female searcher whenever needed. Over time, Lieutenant Stock explained, the men realized that the women were self-reliant, that they had something to offer the infantry, and that they were not "that much different than . . . their own male-oriented group." After that initial readjustment, she said, the women "became an integral part of what they were trying to accomplish" and "everything worked pretty smoothly." Corpsman Lee summed up the situation from her perspective:

The Marines will watch your back, but you have to carry your stuff. You have to prove that you are not some little

female trying to make a statement, because that's not what you're out there for . . . You're out there to do your job and take care of yourself. And, if they need you, you're there for them. That's your job . . . You're not a bra-burner out there; you're not a 1970s little rebel trying to say women should be involved in combat. You're there because you were asked to go—or I guess “volun-told”—and doing your job. That's what you are out there for; you are not there to find a date for the Marine Corps Ball.

Infantry reports, from battalion commander to fire team leader, stated unanimously that the female searchers had performed well and facilitated interaction with the local populace. Yet, it was also apparent that the searcher's role was, like that of any other supporting agency, subsidiary to the primary mission of defeating the enemy and pacifying the region. For example, Captain Merida downplayed the significance of working with the female searchers by emphasizing their temporary status as attachments:

It really wasn't that big of a deal. I mean there was a couple, obviously considerations that had to be made, but it wasn't really that big of a deal. The Marines understood why they were there; they obviously understood why they were there. It was kind of a thing that took place on a limited basis, so we really didn't have any serious issues . . . There was a female officer there and she always took charge of the female Marines . . . I didn't have any problem with them being



U.S. Marine Corps
Lieutenant Melanie J. Stock (shown here as a captain).

there. I mean, they were attachments, we knew they were attachments, they knew they were attachments. I think you would see problems if they were permanently part of a unit. That's when you would see the problems with males and females interacting in the same unit.

Sergeant Sheppard, a squad leader in Company B, responded similarly, but also explained his reluctance to rely upon untrained strangers in a combat environment. His team leader, Sergeant Brian T. French, concurred.

They understood they weren't infantry, so when we were doing our stuff I would like tell them, “My guys are going to make entry here, going to do this and that. If I need you, I'll yank you, but if I don't, just stay right here and everything will be all right.” I didn't want to incorporate them into my squad because—in some peo-

ple's eyes it was a little chauvinistic that I didn't want to incorporate them into my squad when we were clearing—but these guys did a whole workup together. These guys were used to being there. Even if they were trained at doing the same thing, it's different when you get a group of people like that. When Sergeant French and me enter a room, I know which way he likes to go, I know how he does certain things, so without even looking at Sergeant French I know he is going to hook left and he's going to cross over like this. If he sees something, this is what he's

going to call out. I just know he's going to do that and I am used to that, and I am very comfortable with that.

What bugged me was if they wanted them to come with us, I would have really enjoyed training with them. If they were going to come clearing with me, they should have been out at the [military operations in urban terrain] facility with my teams, with my squad, clearing with us if they wanted to be more engaged with it.

Although Captain Marte had applied infantry tactics in training, most of the other female Marines possessed only a rudimentary knowledge of the subject, and it was an entirely new experience for the Sailors. Lieutenant Stock, who preferred to characterize her leadership role as a “mini-platoon commander” rather than a detachment officer-in-charge, concurred with Sergeant French that the women's lack of tactical training limited integration. Yet, it is also true that the female searchers

did benefit from on-the-job-training and were occasionally employed outside their narrow occupational sphere when mission requirements demanded flexibility. In addition to Corpsman Butierries' service as a field corpsman, for example, she also described searching for weapons caches and hauling out stores of ammunition when they were discovered. Captain Marte told of standing watch, walking the battalion's lines, and actually maneuvering against the enemy with a rifle squad. Sergeant Sheppard even admitted to employing female searchers to clear rooms when he had run out of male Marines, adding that "they weren't happy, but they went and did it."

The Enemy

Most of the female searchers came under hostile fire while serving in Afghanistan, principally during Operation Asbury Park, and 10 were recommended for the Combat Action

Ribbon. Although Captain Marte exchanged her pistol for a rifle and, at one point, joined in the pursuit of insurgents fleeing through a mountain pass, actually locating a wounded insurgent hiding in a rock crevasse, most of the incidents involved vehicular ambushes and subsequent immediate action drills to drive the enemy off. In the account presented below, Captain Marte describes being caught in an ambush and maneuvering against the enemy early in Asbury Park:

We were coming up to this village and all of the sudden we start getting shot at with AK-47s. And, I'm like, "Are they retarded?" And, it was kind of like a comic scene, because at one point we pulled up and we all jump out of the HMMWV . . . and we're getting shot from that side, so what do we do, we all take off and run to the other

side. "Oh, crap. We're getting shot at from that side too. Oh, crap, jump into the vehicle" So, we all jump in the back of the vehicle so we could move up and get past the kill zone, and . . . I'm, basically, like second one in, and all the guys are piling on top of me. They were trying to apologize. I was like, "What the hell do I care. Cover me, cover me! Just roll." We were hitting the back of the vehicle, like "Hey, hey, we're all in. Go, go, go!"

So, we got closer to the hill . . . where the incoming was coming [from] and we all get out of the vehicle and . . . we start doing movement of contact . . . I leave [Butierries] at the rocks with the one squad, and I grabbed this one guy, I was like, 'You better not leave her. She's attached to you. She goes wherever you go.' So, then I run and

Captain Maria A. Marte

U.S. Marine Corps



haul butt over to try and get to the next squad, so that they have a female searcher. And now I'm in an orchard, and I'm tied in with the headquarters of the BLT . . . and I'm online with a couple of the guys near a tree.

All of a sudden they take off and I'm like, "What the hell?" And Colonel Kahn's just cursing at these enemy: "You mother—I dare you to come down here." So, he was just yelling. So, everyone yelling, they're like "Jump, jump!" and I'm like, "Who are they yelling at?" So, I looked to my left, all of the sudden I see these rounds hitting the dirt, like that burst of dirt coming closer and closer. And it never even dawned on me, "They're shooting at me." So, "Oh, me jump!" So, I finally jump and I go into the culvert there, and it was just—it just all happened so fast. You're like, "holy crap."

Now, I maneuvered to the back of the vehicles . . . and they finally controlled one area where the rounds were coming from, and now the guys started maneuvering to go on top of the hill. So, they called in air and eventually we backed off the hill, and we didn't find anything after the air was done. So, we left that site, go back, loaded onto the vehicles and maneuvered on to the next site.

Corpsman Butierries described the first of several encounters she had with enemy fire, which also occurred during Operation Asbury Park:

The first conflict we had gotten into, we hit [the] compound running, and we get there and, I mean, bullets flying everywhere and First Sergeant, he's like, "Doc, get right there, stay right there" . . . So, he put me right next to the building and all the guys were yelling and scream-

ing, "Yeah, get 'em." Their shooting up at the crown . . . and it was so exciting. Adrenaline's pumping. And, First Sergeant Hoopii . . . says, "Hey, Doc, you want to get some of this?" He's up on [the machine gun]. He's like, "Doc, you want to get some?" "You know, honey. I'm gonna have to pass." These bullets [are] hitting right in front of me, like hitting the wall right next to me; [I] did not appreciate that. So, after that calmed down, we had the helos come in and drop bombs all over this mountain top. We have to go up these mountains to go look for bodies now. I was like, well, they didn't tell me I couldn't go. So, I started going with them. And they all looked back like, "What is she doing? Who's going to—Anybody say anything to her?" Nobody said anything to me, so I was going with them . . . We had so much fun.

She also reflected on her overall combat experience:

When we came into contact, initially, I was kind of excited about it, like, "Finally, yes! We're doing what we signed up to do." But after like, the fifth or sixth attack, you're kind of like, "Okay, this isn't fun anymore." Even though others had been hit, there are rounds hitting the vehicle that you're in, they're hitting right in front of your feet, going by your head. It's . . . so scary just how close it's coming, you're so close to going home again.

But, it was scary. I wasn't sure how'd I react when we got into conflict. Like, you see it in the movies and you hear other people telling stories about it, but how are you . . . going to handle it? And I was calm and I was surprised. But, I was happy that I didn't return into [inaudible] . . .

The only time that I actually was scared I could handle it.

Conclusion

This is a once-in-a-lifetime experience. This is an adventure. I'm never going to get a chance to do this again, more than likely. (Corpsman Lori Butierries)

The status of women serving in the military has evolved steadily since World War II. In 1948, they were incorporated into the military as permanent personnel and, during 1968, the two percent numerical limit on female representation was lifted. In 1973, following America's withdrawal from Vietnam and inception of the all-volunteer military, women began a gradual transition to noncombatant roles within the operating forces. The range of potential assignments was expanded again during 1993-94, as prohibitions against women flying combat aircraft and serving in combat service support roles were rescinded following the conclusions of the Cold and Gulf Wars. Women were subsequently provided ample opportunity to exercise their new opportunities during the second half of the 1990s, as a shrinking military confronted rising operational tempos around the globe.

During the Global War on Terrorism [also known as the Long War], America (and its allies) fought asymmetrical campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq with an all-volunteer force that was much smaller than originally conceived in 1973. The amorphous frontlines in these twin counterinsurgencies were ambiguous and shifting and, as predicted, combat service support personnel frequently found themselves in direct combat with an unpredictable enemy. Women, who represented approximately 15 percent of the active duty military and 6 percent of the Marine Corps, were part of that force. In many regards, the political debate over whether or not women

should serve in combat was overcome by events, recasting the issue in terms of mission requirements, available resources, and task assignments.

The women who volunteered to serve as searchers in Afghanistan are an example of those changing times. As might be expected, their assimilation into the infantry did not occur without some difficulty, highlighting three points about the process of integration. First, this is not simply a question of combining men and women, but bringing together a wide range of gendered personalities: men and women; Marines and Sailors; officers and enlisted personnel; and members of the support, combat support, and combat arms occupational fields. Second, differences between these groups can be de-emphasized through cross-training that enhances individual skills and broadens group perspectives. Third,

the key to success remains individual professionalism. In this case, a group of determined young women did what needed to be done to accomplish their mission and, in doing so, positively influenced both the Marines and Afghani citizens with whom they served.

As Lieutenant Colonel Khan remarked following the deployment that “the women Marines did a phenomenal job in combat. I mean, they did awesome, I couldn’t be prouder of them.” In his battalion’s official after action report, he recommended that female searchers be incorporated into the expeditionary unit’s task organization.

Captain Michael Johnson, who commanded Company A after Captain Gouker advanced to Weapons Company, echoed Lieutenant Colonel Khan’s sentiments while responding to the interviewer’s question, “Are there any particular memo-

ries that when you go home you are going to carry with you? When you think of Afghanistan 10 years from now you will remember?” He stated:

I think meeting with General Zia will be one of those . . . He came over personally and thanked . . . the two female searchers we had brought with us because one, they were females and as Americans we respected their customs, which he was very pleased about, and he said he’d like to see more women in a more active role, because he said these two could serve as role models for other young ladies of Afghani descent.

When the interviewer posed the same question to Captain Marte, she replied: “The relationship and camaraderie that I experienced while I was out there, and being part of the team.” •1775•

Marines assigned to Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit, Special Operations Capable, engage in a firefight with Taliban snipers on a mountain range near the village of Siah Chub Kalay, Afghanistan, during Operation Asbury Park.

U.S. Marine Corps



Picture This: WORLD WAR I WOMEN MARINES

By Kara R. Newcomer
Historian, History Division
Marine Corps University



U.S. Marine Corps
Private Lela E. Leibrand, the first woman Marine to fly in a Marine Corps aircraft, is helped down by the pilot after her flight at Quantico.



U.S. Marine Corps
Unidentified woman Marine with a swagger stick.



U.S. Marine Corps
A newly arrived woman Marine waves goodbye to the Marine she released for overseas duty, depicted by Marine Corps artist Morgan Dennis.



U.S. Marine Corps
In New York City, women Marines assist in recruiting men for the Marine Corps by putting up posters.



U.S. Marine Corps
A male and female Marine inspects the secondary battery guns on board the USS Arizona, in the North River, New York.



U.S. Marine Corps
(L-R) PFC Mary Kelly, PFC May O'Keefe, and PFC Ruth Spike.

(Below) Seven women Marines are sworn in to the Marine Corps Reserves, 17 August 1918.

U.S. Marine Corps



In Memoriam:

Lieutenant General Keith A. Smith

By Fred H. Allison, PhD
Oral Historian, History Division
Marine Corps University

Lieutenant General Keith A. Smith, a distinguished Marine aviator and decorated combat leader, passed away 7 September 2012 at the age of 83. General Smith served at the helm of Marine aviation as Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps, from 1984 to 1988.

General Smith grew up on a dairy farm near Cheney, Washington. He attended Washington State University (then college) and enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserve in 1951. He attended the Platoon Leaders Course and was commissioned in 1952. Although serving on active duty for over 35 years, Smith remained a reservist his entire career. After attending the Basic School and before commencing flight school, he married Shirley Lee of Hoquiam, Washington. Entering Navy flight school in 1953, he recalled that on his first training flight he was “hooked, it was a natural take.” He became a naval aviator on 12 May 1954 and started flying jets.

His first tactical squadron was Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513, flying the Douglas F3D-2 Skyknight, a night fighter aircraft. The Korean War had just ended, and the squadron at that time was flying from Pyeongtaek, South Korea. These pioneering days of jet night-tactical flying were difficult and perilous.

After a tour as an air liaison officer with the 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company, he returned to civilian life in 1957. He continued to fly, however, with VMF-216 and VMF-541, both Washington State-based reserve squadrons. In 1960,

he returned to active duty, and two years later was assigned as officer-in-charge of a cadre of Marine aviators who formed the first East Coast McDonnell Douglas F-4B Phantom squadron, Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 531. Smith was the first amongst them to fly the new, state-of-the-art fighter that could reach speeds twice the speed of sound. Smith remained with this squadron and, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Foxworth, deployed in November 1962 to Key West, Florida, where they flew missions monitoring Communist aircraft operations over the Florida Straits on the heels of the Cuban missile crisis. In 1965, Smith deployed with Marine All Weather Fighter Squadron 531 to Da Nang, South Vietnam, the first F-4 Phantom squadron to operate from South Vietnam. The Phantom was the best fighter of the day, and Marines ensured that it also became an excellent fighter/bomber. It became a workhorse for close air support in the Vietnam War. During this combat deployment, Smith flew 156 combat missions, mostly close-air-support missions, in support of Marine ground units. Smith returned to South Vietnam in 1970, this time in command of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 542. During this tour, he flew 389 combat missions and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Upon return to the United States, Smith took command of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323. In 1980, he was promoted to major general and appointed Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs. Subsequently, Smith served as Commanding General, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. While commanding 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, Smith initiated a wing-wide family-



U.S. Marine Corps

Lieutenant General Keith A. Smith

support program that later became the model for a Marine Corps-wide family readiness program that came later. Smith, late in life, attested that this was “his greatest accomplishment” as a Marine officer. After this tour, he was assigned Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation at Headquarters Marine Corps from 1984 to 1988 in the midst of a decade of transformation that laid the foundation for modern Marine aviation. Programs and policies that effectively modernized Marine aviation continued under Smith. These included development of the MV-22 Osprey, which Smith characterized as the “single biggest advance in aviation since the introduction of the jet engine.” Lieutenant General Smith retired from the Marine Corps in 1988.

Lieutenant General Smith and his wife, Shirley, are the parents of Kelly, Timothy, Holly, Cynthia, Lynn, Thad, Tadgh, and Tara Rose. Their oldest son Vincent, a Marine captain, was killed in action in Beirut, Lebanon, on 23 October 1983. •1775•

BOOK REVIEW

The Making of the Modern Marine Corps

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Review of *Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps*, by Aaron B. O'Connell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

At what moment in history was the “modern” U.S. Marine Corps born? Was it during the Spanish-American War, when, for the first time, Marines carried out amphibious landings using battalion-size formations? Was it in 1918, when the 4th Brigade bludgeoned the German defenders of Belleau Wood, demonstrating that Marines were capable of defeating a modern army on the field of battle? Or was it between 1941 and 1945, as the Fleet Marine Force helped to spearhead the American drive across the Pacific toward the Japanese islands?


Such arguments are largely pedantic, as the term “modern” is so broad that one could pin almost any number of dates in the last century as the birth of the “modern Marine Corps.” Nevertheless, Aaron O'Connell's, *Underdogs: The Making of the Modern Marine Corps*, makes a strong argument that the critical two decades between the end of World War II and the beginning of large-scale U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was a period of significant transformation for the U.S. Marine Corps. In this well-written and thought-provoking book, the author presents a fresh critical eye to some of the best known Marine Corps shibboleths. He recounts how a range of factors came

together during the immediate post-war era to create what the American public today commonly recognizes as the U.S. Marine Corps: an elite general-purpose amphibious force-in-readiness grounded in a uniquely strong sense of identity that was based on toughness, sacrifice, and an esprit de corps valuing the collective over the individual.

O'Connell argues that the key to this transformation was the institutional culture of the Marine Corps. This allowed the Corps to remain unified in its singular purpose and enabled the mobilization of a coherent narrative about what the Marine Corps was, what it did, and why it was an important player in maintaining America's security. The core of this

culture was an inherent belief in the Corps' exceptionalism. It was, O'Connell writes, “an ideology that made them feel separate from and superior to everyone else, both soldiers and civilians.” This belief that Marines thought and acted differently from the members of other armed services only grew greater during World War II and ultimately had a substantial impact on the Marine Corps, American society, and national security. To create and disseminate this culture, the Corps worked to recruit and deploy combat correspondents, provided support to Hollywood films, such as *The Sands of Iwo Jima* and *The D.I.*, built pro-Marine coalitions in Congress to protect it against potentially harmful legislation, initiated public affairs programs, such as Toys-for-Tots, and developed a range of doctrinal innovations that gave the executive branch a flexible air-ground contingency force capable of conducting operations short of general (i.e., nuclear) war.

As successful as this service culture was in protecting the Marine Corps and increasing its stature, O'Connell sees a number of troubling drawbacks and consequences. First, O'Connell takes on one of the most commonly accepted accounts of the Corps' history: its struggle to prevent dissolution during the defense unification debates of 1946–47. For most Marines, Lieutenant General Victor H. Krulak's account from his memoirs *First to Fight* (Naval Institute Press, 1999) remains the standard narrative: An aggressive Army hostile to the Marine Corps attempted to run roughshod over Congress in an effort to unify the armed-ser-



vices and dissolve the Corps. They were aided in these efforts by an unfriendly president and a Navy that was indifferent to the Corps' fate. In response, the Marine Corps launched a counterattack that protected America's national security interests in the face of short-sighted service parochialism and defended the prerogatives of the legislative branch.

As O'Connell demonstrates, however, unofficial lobbying organizations, such as the "Chowder Society," might have done more harm than good. In their zeal to protect the Corps, the society leaked classified documents and committed acts of insubordination that could have warranted a court-martial and actually led to the end of one Marine's illustrious career, that of Lieutenant General Merritt A. Edson. The society also caricatured the Army's defense plans as an attempt to create an all-powerful Prussian general staff, a particularly odious assertion considering the emotions and anger such a mischaracterization was bound to spark following World War II. Furthermore, in gaining statutory protection for the Corps' size and mission, the society successfully undermined the commander-in-chief's constitutional authority to determine the force structure, missions, and roles of the United States armed forces. Thus, far from being a period of constant siege, the 1950s was one in which the Marine Corps made significant gains in terms of status, roles, and public support.

More controversial is O'Connell's analysis of the harmful effects of the Corps culture upon its members. O'Connell contends that the Marine Corps culture of violence and praise of suffering created a service philosophy that denigrated showing any sign of weakness, consequently robbing Marines of the psychological tools needed to confront their own fears, anxieties, and terror in combat. This hindered many Marines' ability to reintegrate into civilian life and led to a higher incidence of alcoholism,

domestic abuse, and post-traumatic stress disorder in the Marine Corps than in the other armed services. O'Connell's assessment of the 1956 Ribbon Creek incident, during which a drill instructor's punitive march led to the drowning death of six recruits, thus diverges from that of other Marine historians, such as Allan Millett. That author has consistently criticized Marine Commandant Randolph M. Pate's decision to characterize the incident as indicative of a widespread problem of recruit abuse within the Corps. The episode, Millett contends, was an isolated one. O'Connell takes the opposite position, arguing that it was indicative of a culture of brutality that permeated the Marine Corps.

O'Connell's arguments are bold and thoughtful. However, there are two points of concern. First, some of the author's assertions regarding incidences of violence in the Marine Corps need to be substantiated by a more thorough reading of the evidence. For example, his claims that there was a higher incidence of alcoholism in the Marine Corps during the 1950s compared to the other services are based largely on surveys taken since the 1970s. To be sure, O'Connell acknowledges this source problem, noting that participation in Vietnam certainly had a significant impact. But I feel his claim that "trauma, tradition, and the competitive elements of the military fraternity were equally present among World War II and Korean War veterans" diminishes the dramatic and significant differences between the pre-Vietnam and post-Vietnam Marine Corps. At some points, I also wonder if the data asserting that Marines were more violent than American society is as conclusive as the author argues. For example, O'Connell shows that the average suicide rate in the Corps during the 1950s was 11.5 per 100,000 while death by assault was 5.2 per 100,000. In comparison, the Navy's numbers were 8.3 and 2.5, respective-

ly. This is a dramatic divergence, but then O'Connell also notes that the civilian rates were 10.3 and 4.7, respectively. In other words, during the 1950s, a Marine was only slightly more likely to commit suicide and be killed as the result of an assault than a civilian.

A second point of concern is O'Connell's comparative approach. How much is the distinction between Marine Corps and Army culture a result of a conscious decision to become more martial on the Corps' part and how much is it a consequence of different combat responsibilities? Of the three services, the Marine Corps was the most unitary not only in its identity but also in terms of the types of units it fielded and its mission—ship-to-shore operations. There was a far greater assortment of mission types given to the Army, necessitating a greater variety of personnel with different backgrounds, skills, and educations. I feel a more apt comparison would have been to compare units with similar missions and force structures from each service, such as the 1st Marine Division, and an Army unit, such as the 1st Infantry Division. Both units participated in numerous, hard-fought amphibious assaults throughout World War II, both were built around cadres of interwar veterans, and both developed an elite status and culture during and after the war. A comparison along these lines would better strengthen O'Connell's central argument about what made the Corps so unique.

Despite these minor points, *Underdogs* is a valuable addition to the scholarly literature on the history of the Marine Corps and the history of the U.S. military during the Cold War. It asks big questions, provides provocative answers, and sheds new light on many issues in Marine Corps history and its place within U.S. society. *Underdogs* also explores a period in the Corps history that has been largely overlooked in both scholarship and official histories. •1775•

Marines in the Revolution

“First to Write” highlights previously published books from the Marine Corps University, History Division. The excerpt that starts at “Ashore at Last” is drawn from Charles R. Smith, *Marines in the Revolution* (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, History Division, 1975, pp. 50-52), which can be downloaded for free as a PDF from the History Division website (<http://www.history.usmc.mil>) under publications.

On 3 March 1776, Captain Samuel Nicholas led a battalion of Continental Marines and Sailors ashore on New Providence Island in the Bahamas, conducting the first amphibious landing of the Continental Marines. During the American Revolution, Continental Marines served many functions: conducting amphibious landings, acting as sharpshooters during naval engagements, forming boarding parties, supplementing the Continental Army in battles ashore, and generally serving as the seagoing Soldiers of the Continental Navy. All of these were necessary functions during the Revolution, but amphibious warfare has remained as the Marine Corps primary purpose.

Ashore at Last

A short time after noon the Marines and sailors splashed ashore at “the Creek,” two miles east of Fort Montagu. Nearby was the small village of New Guinea, inhabited by the free slaves and mulattoes of New Providence. At first they thought the invading Americans to be Spaniards and became alarmed, doubtlessly conjuring up pictures of being taken prisoner and again sold into slavery. They soon discovered otherwise. By two o’clock all the Marines and seamen had landed and formed marching ranks.



U.S. Marine Corps Art Collection

This painting depicts the moment Continental Marines stepped ashore from ships of the Continental Fleet, commanded by Commodore Esek Hopkins, and led by Captain Samuel Nicholas.

The original force of 30 militiamen under Lieutenant Pratt sent to Fort Montagu earlier that Sunday morning was reinforced about ten o’clock by another detachment of equal size commanded by Lieutenant Burke, as enemy ships were sighted in the distance. Soon after the second detachment arrived at the fort, the whaleboats carrying American Marines and sailors were seen approaching the beaches two miles to the east. Immediately Lieutenant Pratt formed half his force into a scouting party under Lieutenants Burke and Judkin and ordered it down the beach “to reconnoitre and if possible prevent their landing.” But by the time the party reached the enemy beachhead there was little that could be done. The size of the assembled American force left only one alternative—gather whatever intelligence possible and then retreat. Therefore, a man was sent under a flag of truce to inquire as to the identity of the invaders and their purpose. On his return the mili-

tiaman informed Lieutenant Burke that “they were sent by the Congress of the United Colonies in order to possess themselves of the Powder and Stores belonging to His Majesty.” Seeing that he could not possibly forestall the Americans, Lieutenant Burke ordered an immediate withdrawal in the direction of Fort Montagu without firing a single shot.

Meanwhile, word of the American landing was brought by courier to Fort Nassau, but Governor Browne still had not returned. In his absence, the council ordered Major Robert Sterling to march the main body of the militia (approximately 80 men) to Fort Montagu and if possible prevent the enemy from landing. As the militia was being formed into ranks the governor arrived, presumably now dressed, and apologized for his tardiness saying that he had been detained by “a violent fit of Cholick.” After learning of the situation, he then took charge of the militia and set out to reinforce Fort Montagu.

Following his arrival at the eastern fort, Browne ordered a detachment of 40 men under the command of Captain-Lieutenant Walker and an ensign to advance toward the enemy beachhead and reinforce Burke and Judkin. As the second group advanced down the beach they met the first in retreat, and both returned to the fort. With the Americans advancing toward Fort Montagu and with his militia in full retreat, Browne realized that his situation was precarious. If he did not act quickly there was a possibility that he would be outflanked and cut off from the town. If on the other hand he stood his ground, all that protected the town was a fort garrisoned by two old men and a few militiamen. As the remainder of his retreating forces entered the fort, the governor looked around and withdrew several nails from his pocket. A local gentleman standing nearby asked him what the nails were to be used for. "For spiking up the guns of Fort Montague," Browne replied. "God," said the gentleman who asked the question, "if that is to be the Case I don't know what business we had here." The governor then ordered an immediate evacuation of the fort, and all the cannon spiked with the exception of three which he instructed to be fired in the direction of the approaching Marines. Leaving two men to man the three guns, Browne mounted the only saddled horse and beat a hasty retreat to Government House where he remained for the next several hours.

As Captain Nicholas and his force of 284 Marines and sailors moved along the cove trail, a "prodigious thicket on one side and the water on the other," the three guns at Fort Montagu were fired. Many Bahamians later claimed that at this point Governor Browne lost his best opportunity for halting the American invaders. As one of the governor's severest critics, Merchant William Taylor, recalled, the coastal path "was the very place where our forces

should have opposed them." Not only did the militiamen have adequate cover, a small sturdy fort, and sufficient "men to have Cut off a Thousand of them," but they were confronted with a poorly equipped and undisciplined enemy. In a letter to the American Secretary, Lord George Germain, Taylor paints a highly uncomplimentary picture of the American force:

My Lord if you had seen the miserable figure the Enemies did Cut . . . for they had not so much as one field Piece, let alone Battering Cannon, nor a scaling Ladder, nor so much as an Ax to have made a gap in our Pallisades in order to have got under our great Guns, not one armed vessel had they steering along shore to cover them, and to seal the Woods in Case We had fired upon them, nor had they so much as Boats rowing along shoar to take them off if routed, tho' the path was not above a Stones throw from the sea side all the way they had to March, indeed they came more like Sheep to the Slaughter than men to fight.

Continuing, Taylor noted that "several of the Enemy declared afterwards that if they had met with a warm reception in the Wood, they would have surrendered." Whether

Captain Samuel Nicholas
U.S. Marine Corps Art Collection



these observations were correct or not, he and others were at a loss to understand why Browne chose not to either organize Captain-Lieutenant Walker's or Lieutenant Burke's detachments into an ambush, or build defensive earthworks along the coastal trail.

The suggestions that an ambush or breastworks be established along the trail were simple solutions to a more complex problem. Faced with a *fait accompli*, there was little the governor could do at Fort Montagu, since the possibility existed that the Americans would by-pass the fort and assault the town. Browne had lost the initiative when he failed to organize a strong and immediate response; neither an ambush nor the erection of defensive works at this late hour could regain it. Therefore, the only course of action open was to retreat.

Whether the governor's decision to retire to Fort Nassau was wise or not, the immediate results were disastrous. Each man in the militia must have realized that with the evacuation of the eastern garrison and the forces in retreat, the town was open to the ravages of the enemy. Therefore, his first thoughts were for the security of his family and possessions. Yet it was remarkable that after making sure their families were safe, over half of the militia reassembled at Fort Nassau.

By three o'clock the governor had recovered enough to return to Fort Nassau and resume command. The militia was then put to work building defensive positions and assembling provisions for the expected battle. Still short of the required men needed to garrison the fort, Browne ordered that the drums again be sounded and a pistol be offered to any able-bodied Black who would join him in the fort. The plea had little effect. Although his forces were depleted by desertions, and few were willing to volunteer, the governor's most pressing need was for information as to the disposition and plans of the American Marines. •1775•



National Museum of the Marine Corps

Frank B. Goettge:

THE DUAL HERO


By Alfred V. Houde Jr.
Senior Ordnance Curator
The National Museum of the Marine Corps

America has always held a fascination for sports and its athletes, and a deep respect for its servicemen. Frank B. Goettge (1895–1942) was legendary in both worlds.

Goettge was born and raised in Canton, Ohio. He was an imposing figure of a man who attended Ohio University for only one year, but during his time at the university, he made headlines across the country as a talented freshman football player. With America's entry into World War I, Goettge decided to leave school and answer his nation's call, which put his education and promising gridiron career on hold. He enlisted in the Marine Corps on 22 May 1917. He initially trained in Philadelphia and was assigned to the Marine detachment on board the Connecticut-class battleship USS *Vermont* (BB 20). He rose quickly through the enlisted ranks, no doubt as a result of his education and leadership skills, and attained the rank of first sergeant. By March 1918, he was the senior enlisted Marine on board the battleship.

A little more than a year into his enlistment, Goettge was ordered to Quantico, Virginia, for officer training. Commissioned a second lieutenant in July 1918, he attended additional staff training before shipping out to France. He was soon promoted to first lieutenant and participated in the final stages of the Meuse-Argonne offensive with the 5th Marines until the armistice on 11 November 1918.

With the end of the Great War, his regiment was assigned to be part of the Army of Occupation in Germany. During this period, he began his impressive military sports career. He excelled as a fullback on the 2d Division's football team and played for its baseball team as well. While participating in sporting activities, Goettge suffered an injury severe enough to be ordered back to the United States. He arrived in New York in



U.S. Marine Corps

Goettge at Butler Stadium, Quantico, ca. 1920s.

September 1919 and continued his Marine career at various posts in both the United States and overseas. At one point, he applied for aviation training but was rejected in 1921.

As it happens in life, one door closes and another opens—while enrolled in the Marine Corps Schools, he played for the football team at Quantico. He made an immediate impact on the football field and gained the name of “The Great Goettge.” His dominant playing style for the Quantico Marines earned him national recognition. Several professional teams, most notably the New York Football Giants, offered him a contract to play. He

Mameluke Sword Owned by Frank B. Goettge

chose to stay in the Marine Corps and served in various positions at Quantico from 1921–24, all the while helping the football team to 38 wins in 42 games. The Quantico Marines played football against the other services and universities. In one game, Goettge led his team to a 20-0 victory over the 3d Army Corps team, coached by Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, a talented, former football player himself. Over the course of three seasons, Goettge's team beat the Army team of hand-picked West Point stars notwithstanding the constant Army chant of "Stop Goettge! Stop Goettge!" Sports writer Walter Camp called him "easily the greatest football player of the present day, the nearest approach to Jim Thorpe of all time"—quite a compliment for a part-time player. As a coach, Goettge led the all-Marine football team to the President's Cup in 1926.

He departed Quantico in 1927 to continue his service both overseas and stateside in many duties of increasing responsibility to include being assigned as an aide to both President Herbert Hoover and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major General Ben H. Fuller. Goettge advanced through the officer ranks to lieutenant colonel by August 1940. In July

1941, he was ordered to the 1st Marine Division. Goettge was assigned as the division's intelligence officer and landed on Guadalcanal with the 1st Marine Division in August 1942. Much has already been written regarding the ill-fated patrol that Goettge led to make contact with what were believed to be sick and malnourished Japanese soldiers possibly willing to surrender. On the contrary, the Japanese were not planning to surrender and quickly engaged the Marines. Goettge and most of the patrol were killed during this engagement. His remains were never recovered. Although no real intelligence was gained from this mission, it did teach the Marines an important lesson about underestimating the mindset of the Japanese.

Goettge gave his life for his country when he could have easily left the Marine Corps and achieved greater fame in the sports world. When one thinks of the phrase "not for self, but country," Goettge comes to mind. In 2001,



U.S. Marine Corps Art Collection

Marines searching the jungles of Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, during World War II to flush out the foe.

Frank B. Goettge received recognition as an exceptional Marine athlete when he was enshrined in the inaugural class of the Marine Corps Sports Hall of Fame.

This traditional Mameluke Marine officer's sword and scabbard belonged to and is engraved with the name of Frank B. Goettge. The sword dates from World War I and is held by the National Museum of the Marine Corps. In honor of Goettge's service to his country and achievement in sports, the sword and scabbard will be placed on display in the Marine Corps Sports Hall of Fame gallery when it will be constructed in the National Museum of the Marine Corps. •1775•

Mameluke sword of Frank B. Goettge.

Alfred V. Houde Jr.





Jackson

Stream Crossing