CHAPTER 6

Action Along the Matanikau

Retreat of the Kawaguchi Force promised the Marines of the Lunga perimeter another breathing spell from ground attacks, but there was no time for relaxation or relief from concern about the future. Air and naval strikes continued to pound the Henderson Field defenders, and aerial reports of a continued Japanese build-up at Rabaul forecast additional attempts to retake the Guadalcanal area. Patrolling schedules were stepped up; it was disquieting to know that both the Ichiki and Kawaguchi Forces had landed on the island and moved into attack positions without the Marines once being completely sure of their exact locations.

At the conclusion of the Battle of the Ridge on 14 September, the Marines had been ashore for 38 days without receiving either reinforcements or additional ammunition. For most of this period the men could be fed only two meals a day, and part of this food came from captured Japanese supplies. Malaria was beginning to add its toll to battle casualties, and although defensive emplacements were continually improved, the Marine force was wearing itself down while the Japanese ground strength continued to mount in staging areas in the Bismarcks.

In these lean early days in the Pacific, the problem of new strength for the Guadalcanal effort was a thorny one. The Solomon Islands position was merely a salient, and still not a strong one, which made a questionable contribution to the safety of other Allied positions farther to the south. So these areas could not be stripped of defenders, and even if some spare troops could be found there still was another operation slated. From the first, the plan for this initial Allied offensive in the Pacific had included an occupation of Ndeni Island in the Santa Cruz group southeast of the Solomons.

The 2d Marines first had been scheduled for this job, but Vandegrift had been allowed to keep this regiment when the opposition became so bitter on Tulagi. Later the general requested that his division’s third organic infantry regiment, the 7th Marines, come over from its Samoan garrison duty with its supporting artillery, the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. But Admiral Turner demurred; he still saw a need for the Ndeni operation, and the reinforced 7th Marines was the only amphibious force readily available for such an undertaking. On 20 August the admiral published his Ndeni plan, and on 4 September the 7th Marines with its artillery and part of the 5th Defense Battalion sailed from Samoa for Espiritu Santo.¹

¹Turner and Vandegrift often disagreed on conduct of the Guadalcanal operation ashore and on progress of the Solomon Islands action in general. Turner found fault with Vandegrift’s perimeter concept of defense. His idea was to disperse the Marines along the Guadalcanal coast and set them upon the task of mopping up the remaining Japanese.
But by 9 September, with the 7th Marines’ convoy still en route, Turner agreed with Vandegrift’s August request for control of this infantry regiment, and he requested Admiral Ghormley’s permission to divert the regiment from the Ndeni operation. The issue still was not won for the Marine general, however. Turner believed this fresh unit should set up coastal strong points outside the Lunga perimeter, while Vandegrift held that a reinforcement of his perimeter was the more pressing need. Turner relayed this question to Ghormley on 12 September, the same day the 7th Marines arrived in the New Hebrides, and Ghormley next day ordered the reinforced regiment to move as soon as possible to the Guadalcanal perimeter.

After unloading the 5th Defense Battalion units at Espiritu Santo, the ships bearing the infantry regiment and the artillery battalion departed for Guadalcanal on 14 September, the same day that the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines was brought across Sealark Channel from Tulagi. Operating with three cruisers plus the destroyers and mine sweepers of the newly-formed Task Force 65, the transports spent four days at sea skirting enemy naval forces in the Solomons waters. The convoy finally anchored off Kukum early in the morning of 18 September.

The trip cost the Navy dearly. Carriers *Hornet* and *Wasp*, then the only flattops operational in the entire South Pacific (both the *Saratoga* and the *Enterprise* were under repair) ranged southeast of the Solomons with other escort support for the convoy, and the Japanese had just sown the area with a division of submarines. The *Wasp* caught two torpedoes, burned and sank; the battleship North Carolina was damaged as was the destroyer *O'Brien*, which later broke in two and went down while heading back to the U. S. following temporary repairs. But for Henderson Field there was advantage even from such grim disasters as this; pilots and planes that otherwise would have been flying from their carriers could now come up to give the Cactus Force a hand. On 18 September six Navy TBFs arrived in the Lunga area, and on 28 September 10 more planes, some SBD’s and the other TBF’s, flew in. Although enemy raids dropped off somewhat after the defeat of the Kawaguchi Force, operational losses still drained Geiger’s air power, and such reinforcement managed only to keep the Cactus Force at a 50-to-70-plane level, but for this Lunga was most thankful.

September 18th was a red-letter day for the Guadalcanal defenders. While the reinforced 7th Marines unloaded its 4,262 men, three other transports which were not part of TF 65 entered the channel with an emergency shipment of aviation gasoline. In all, this shipping put ashore 3,823 drums of fuel, 147 vehicles, 1,012 tons of rations, 90 per cent of the 7th Marines supplies of engineering equipment, 82.5 per cent of the organizational equipment, and nearly all of the ammunition. Turner’s force then took on board the 1st Parachute Battalion, 162 American wounded, and eight Japanese prisoners and departed for Espiritu Santo at 1800.

After this successful unloading, men on Guadalcanal began to draw more adequate

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1 This was the first ammunition Marines had received since the landing. It included about 10 units of fire with additional hand grenades and 81mm mortar shells. Final Rept, Phase V, Annex Z, 10.
THE PAGODA AT HENDERSON FIELD, headquarters of Cactus Air Force flyers throughout the first months of operations from the captured airfield. (USMC 50921)

CACTUS AIR FORCE spreads in all its variety across Henderson Field during a lull in the battle; in the foreground are Marine scout-bombers. (USMC 108580)
rations, and General Vandegrift was able to adopt new defensive concepts for his force of some 19,200 men now at Lunga. Local air power made a counterlanding less likely, and the attack pattern set by Ichiki and Kawaguchi indicated that more attention should be given to the inland rim of the perimeter. On 19 September, Vandegrift’s Operational Plan 11-42 provided for this new concept by dividing the defenses into new sectors with increased all-around strength.

Relieving special troops such as the engineers and pioneers, infantry battalions filled the yawning gaps that previously had existed south of the airfield and along the southern portions of the new inland sectors. The pioneers, engineers, and the amphibian tractor personnel now were able to perform their normal functions during the daylight hours and at night bolster the beach defenses where fewer men were needed. Each infantry regiment maintained a one-battalion reserve, one or all of which could be made available as a division reserve if necessary.

Gaps still existed in the perimeter. Generally the lines followed the high ground of the ridges, but intervening stretches of low jungle often could not be occupied in mutually supporting positions. Barbed wire had become available in increasing quantity, and in most sectors double apron fences stretched across the ground in front of infantry positions of foxholes and logged and sand-bagged machine-gun emplacements. Colonel Robert H. Pepper’s 3d Defense Battalion, with the 1st Special Weapons Battalion attached, retained responsibility for antiaircraft and beach defense, and Colonel Pedro A. del Valle’s 11th Marines, bolstered by its 1st Battalion, remained in a central position supporting all sectors.

The 1st Marines retained responsibility for the east side of the perimeter, from an area near the mouth of the Ilu River inland to a point beyond the former right flank where McKelvy’s battalion had fought the Japanese across the grassy plain. The fresh troops of the 7th Marines joined the 1st Marines at that point and extended across Edson’s Ridge to the Lunga River. Beyond that river the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines built up a line that tied in on the right to the positions of the 5th Marines, and this latter regiment closed the perimeter with its right flank which connected with the left flank of the 3d Defense Battalion at the beach.

Tentative plans in the reorganization also included extending the perimeter with strong points of one- or two-battalion strength to the mouth of the Matanikau on the west and the Tenaru on the east. Such positions would take advantage of the natural defensive potential of the two rivers and aid the Marines in blocking Japanese movements in strength toward the main battle positions. These strong outposts were not established at this time, however. (See Map 21)

The first order of business seemed to require aggressive attention to the west.
Patrol actions had confirmed intelligence estimates that a strong enemy force was operating from the Matanikau village area on the west bank of the river, but that from the southeast or east there seemed little danger of an attack. With the Henderson Field side of the Lunga perimeter thus reasonably safe from an attack in force, the division planned a series of actions to clear the Matanikau sector. Japanese troops there included elements from the 4th Infantry Regiment of the 2d Division, and other personnel of the Kaguchi Force. The 4th Infantry had been reinforced by new Japanese landings of mid-September.

The first action against this enemy force sent Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Puller’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines into the Mount Austen area on 23 September. The Marines were to cross the Matanikau upstream and patrol between that river and the village of Kokumbona. The action was to be completed by 26 September at which time
the 1st Raider Battalion was to advance along the coast to Kokumbona where a permanent patrol base was to be established.

After passing through the perimeter on 23 September, Puller’s battalion next day surprised a Japanese force bivouacked on the Mount Austen slopes, and scattered the enemy in a brief clash that ended shortly after nightfall. The action cost Puller 7 killed and 25 wounded, and the commander requested air support for a continuation of his attack the next day (25 September) and stretchers for 18 of his wounded men.

Realizing that a prompt evacuation of 18 stretcher cases over the rugged terrain would take at least 100 able-bodied men, General Vandegrift sent Lieutenant Colonel Rosecrans’ 2d Battalion, 5th Marines out to reinforce Puller. With this new strength to back him up, Puller sent a two-company carrying and security force back with the wounded and pushed on toward the Matanikau.

The general’s 24 September communications with Puller also gave the colonel the prerogative of altering the original patrol plan so that he could conform to the termination date of 26 September. Accordingly, when 1/7 and 2/5 reached the Matanikau on 26 September they did not cross but patrolled northward along the east bank toward the coast.

At about 1400 the two battalions reached the mouth of the river and there began to draw fire from strong Japanese positions in ridges on the west bank. Companies E and G of 2/5 attempted to force a crossing but were repulsed, and soon were pinned down by fire from automatic weapons. Puller called in artillery and air, but the enemy positions remained active. By 1600 the combined forces of Puller and Rosecrans had sustained 25 casualties, and the action was broken off while the Marines strengthened their positions for the night.

Meanwhile the raider battalion, on its way to establish the patrol base at Kokumbona, had reached the vicinity of the fire fight, and division directed Griffith to join with 1/7 and 2/5 and to prepare for a renewal of the attack next day. With this large provisional group now formed, Vandegrift sent Colonel Edson up to take command. Puller would act as executive officer. Edson’s plan for the coordinated attack next day (27 September) called for the raiders to move some 2,000 yards inland, cross the Matanikau, and envelop the enemy right and rear while 1/7 supported by fire and 2/5 struck frontally across the river near its mouth.

The attack began early on 27 September, but failed to gain. Marines of 2/5 could not force a crossing, and the raiders’ inland maneuver stopped short when Griffith’s battalion encountered a Japanese force which had crossed the river during the night to set up strong positions on high ground some 1,500 yards south of the beach. First fire from mortars and automatic weapons wounded Griffith and killed his executive officer, Major Kenneth D. Bailey, one of the heroes of the Battle of the Ridge.

A raider message reporting this action unfortunately was confusing, and from it Edson concluded that the battalion had succeeded in gaining the enemy right flank beyond the river and that the fight was in progress there. Thus misinformed, the colonel ordered the raider battalion and
2/5 to resume their attacks at 1330 while the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (less Company C) made an amphibious envelopment west of Point Cruz to strike the Japanese Matanikau line from the rear.

Under the command of Major Otho Rogers, the 1/7 troops left Kukum in landing craft just as a strong bombing raid came over from Rabaul. The division command post took heavy hits which wrecked communications, and the destroyer *Ballard*, supporting the landing, had to slight her mission while taking evasive action. The landing at 1300 was unopposed, however, and the companies pushed rapidly inland toward a high grassy ridge about 500 yards from the beach.

But as the leading elements reached the top of this ridge, they were taken under mortar and small-arms fire. Major Rogers was killed by a mortar round and Captain Zach D. Cox, Company B commander, was wounded. Captain Charles W. Kelly, Jr., acting second in command, took charge of the battalion just as the enemy cut the Marines off from the beach. Kelly found that he could not communicate with the perimeter, and the close-in fight with the surrounding enemy grew rapidly more desperate. The Company D mortar platoon had only one of its weapons and about 50 rounds of ammunition, and to bring this weapon to bear on the pressing Japanese a mortarman had to lie on his back with his feet supporting the nearly-perpendicular tube from the rear while Master Sergeant Roy Fowell called the range down to 200 yards.

Fortunately, Second Lieutenant Dale M. Leslie flew over at about that time in his SBD. As pilot of a plane incapable of dogfighting in the bomber pack, Leslie was hunting likely targets while staying clear of the field and air engagements. As he circled overhead, the Marines below spelled out the word “Help” in white undershirts laid on the hillside, and Leslie managed to make radio contact with Edson at the mouth of the Matanikau and relay this distress signal.

That was summons aplenty for Puller, chafing in Edson’s provisional command post while his battalion went off to battle without him. The combined attack at the river mouth and inland clearly had miscarried, and his men in 1/7 stood exposed to the full wrath of the Japanese west of the river. With characteristic directness, the lieutenant colonel collected the landing craft and churned out to board the *Ballard*. The ship and her skipper, soon under the Puller spell, steamed to the rescue close ashore, the landing craft in the wake ready to be used for a withdrawal.

It was a day for heroic action. When the force trapped ashore saw the ship coming down the coast, Sergeant Robert D. Raysbrook stood out on a hillock of the ridge and semaphored for attention. From the bridge of the *Ballard* Puller ordered his men to pull out to the beach. Raysbrook, still exposed to the enemy fire, flagged back the information that their withdrawal had been cut off. The ship then asked for fire orders, and with Captain Kelly relaying his signals through the sergeant, batteries on the *Ballard* began to blast out a path to the beach.

Supporting fire from the ship was a deciding factor in the action, but the companies still had a fight ahead of them. Japanese artillery began to take casualties as the Marines withdrew fighting through the enemy infantry still pressing from the flanks and rear. Platoon Sergeant An-
Anthony P. Malanowski, Jr. took a Browning automatic rifle from a man dropped in action and covered the withdrawal of Company A until he himself was overrun and killed by the Japanese. But by then his company had reached the beach where it set up a hasty defense into which Company B and elements of Company D drew shortly thereafter.

With the Marines fighting off the enemy at their rear, the landing craft now moved shoreward to begin their evacuation, and thereby exposed themselves to heavy Japanese fire from the high ground above the Marines on the beach and from the projecting terrain of Point Cruz to the east. The Japanese were determined not to allow a thwarting of their trap, and the stiffening crossfire drove the craft back offshore where they bobbed in ground swells and indecision.

This was observed by Lieutenant Leslie, still keeping a watchful eye on the action from his SBD, and he came down again to lend a hand. The pilot strafed the Japanese positions and then turned to make a few swooping passes over the landing craft to herd them on their way. Thus heartened and hurried along, the coxswains went back in to the beach.

The fire from the beach, although dampened by the strafing SBD, still was heavy, but Signalman First Class Douglas A. Munro of the Coast Guard, coxswain of the craft, led the other coxswains through it and maneuvered his Higgins boat to shield the others. The Marines loaded on board with their wounded while Munro covered them with the light machine guns on his boat. He ordered his boat away when the other craft were clear, and still firing, was making his own withdrawal when he was killed by fire from the beach.

The miniature flotilla returned to the perimeter landing site at Kukum by nightfall. The action had cost this battalion 24 killed and 23 wounded. The raiders and 2/5 likewise withdrew after 1/7 got safely clear of the Point Cruz area, and their casualties added another 36 dead and 77 wounded to the tally for the operation.

**ACTION OF 7–9 OCTOBER**

Costly as this action at the Matanikau had been, it confirmed the data being collected by intelligence agencies, and these facts over-all were as important as they were disquieting. Japanese ships still entered Guadalcanal waters nearly every night, barges beached along the coast indicated many new landings, air attacks had picked up again since a comparative lull following the Battle of the Ridge, and now it was clear that the Japanese troops assembling on the island were concentrating just beyond the Matanikau. Another and a stronger Japanese counteroffensive loomed, and although defeat of the Ichiki and Kawaguchi Forces gave the Marines a new confidence in their ability to hold the perimeter, there was yet another factor.

Late in September the Japanese began to land 150mm howitzers, and these weapons would be capable of firing on Henderson Field from the Kokumbona area.

Cactus flyers continued to hold their own against enemy air attacks of the field; Japanese gunfire ships had to come late and leave early to avoid the U.S. planes in daylight encounter, and the frequent night raids of Washing-Machine Charlie were more damned than damaging. But big howitzers were something else. The Marines had no weapon that could reach a 150mm in counterbattery, and they had no sound-flash equipment to locate such firing positions, anyway. If the Japanese could
add the effective fires of these weapons to air raids and naval shelling, it might be just enough tip of balance in their favor to hold down the Cactus fliers while a large force mounted to dislodge the Americans from the Lunga.

Accordingly, an attack was scheduled to trap the enemy force and drive survivors beyond artillery range, and a success in this would be followed by establishment of a permanent patrol base at Kokumbona which could make sure the long-range field pieces stayed out of range. The plan of attack was similar to that of the operation which had just failed, but this new effort would be made in greater strength. The 5th Marines (less one battalion) would engage the enemy at the river mouth while the 7th Marines (also less one battalion) and the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, reinforced by the division scout-sniper detachment, would cross the river inland and then attack north toward Point Cruz and Matanikau Village. (See Map 22)
Colonel William J. Whaling, who commanded 3/2 and the scout-snipers on this special mission, was to lead to envelopment by crossing the Matanikau some 2,000 yards upstream and then attacking north into the village on the first ridge west of the river. Whaling would be followed by the 7th Marines battalions which would also attack north abreast and to the left of the Whaling group.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, with its composite Cactus Force, was to provide planes for infantry liaison, close air support, and artillery spotting. In the artillery plan, 1/11 would support the 7th Marines; 2/11, the 5th Marines; 5/11, the Whaling Group; and 3/11 would be in general support of the Lunga perimeter. If all went well, Whaling's assault of Japanese positions near the coast would be followed by a 5th Marines river crossing, a passage of Whaling's lines, and a pursuit of the enemy toward Point Cruz where the 7th Marines on Whaling's left would close the trap in front to the withdrawing enemy. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines provided the division reserve for the operation, and Vandegrift's command post would coordinate the entire operation. Movements of the forces were to get underway on 7 October, and the coordinated attack would jump off on 8 October.

From recent experience with this growing Japanese force, the Marines expected a stiff fight with all the usual and unusual obstacles encountered in battle. But in this case there was to be one large factor they had no reason to suspect. By an unfortunate coincidence the Japanese also had set 8 October as the date for an attack of their own, and their scheme could hardly have been a better counter against the Marines had they been looking over the shoulders of Vandegrift's staff. Rabaul had ordered Colonel Tadamasu Nakaguma to cross the Matanikau on 8 October with his 4th Infantry and establish artillery positions which could support the new counterattack then in planning. To accomplish this mission, Nakaguma sent an enveloping force inland across the Matanikau on 6 October while he slipped the cautious first echelon of a bridgehead across the river near the coast. There the Japanese forces met the Marines who moved from the Lunga perimeter at 0700 on 7 October.

Whaling's Group scrapped for several hours with the inland Japanese force which confined its opposition to sniping and harassment, but by the middle of the afternoon Whaling decided to bypass the enemy. At nightfall the envelopment force bivouacked on high ground south of the Matanikau's fork, the designated assembly area for the 8 October attack, and the Japanese did not pursue. Meanwhile the 5th Marines met with greater difficulty from Nakaguma's men near the river mouth.
The advance guard of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines came under fire from this enemy at about 1000, and the battalion deployed forward in an attack while the 2d Battalion swung to the left around the action and reached the river without opposition. The Japanese gave ground to previously prepared positions, but 3/5 was unable to push them beyond this line in spite of flanking assistance from 2/5. Vandegrift reinforced Edson with an understrength raider company, but the Japanese continued to hold their confined bridgehead some 400 yards inland from the beach, and the Marines drew up for the night. They held a 1,500-yard front which extended inland from the coast and bowed around the Japanese pocket on the river's east bank. During the night the 5th Marines and some amphibian tractors simulated noisy preparations for a tank-supported river crossing to divert Japanese attention from the Whaling-7th Marines envelopment force.

Heavy rains which began that night, and continued into the 8th, made trails and hills slick, muddy, and treacherous, and grounded the Cactus fliers. The attack had to be postponed, but the 5th Marines and raiders continued to reduce the Japanese positions on the east bank. At about 1830 the Japanese, under pressure all day from the Marines, made a final effort to break out of their nearly surrounded bridgehead and retreat across the river mouth. Running abreast, the enemy troops charged from their foxholes against the thinly-held Marine right flank where the raiders faced them. Front rank attackers engaged the Marines with small-arms fire while succeeding ranks pitched hand grenades into the raider positions. Some hand-to-hand fighting resulted, and casualties were high on both sides. Twelve raiders were killed and 22 wounded, while counted enemy dead numbered 59. Some of the surviving Japanese managed to escape across the river, and the bridgehead was completely reduced.

While the coordinated Marine attack waited out the rain, division was warned by higher intelligence sources that the expected strong Japanese counteroffensive appeared close at hand; aerial observers and coastwatchers to the north reported increased troop activity and a shipping concentration around Rabaul. General Vandegrift accordingly scaled down his planned attack to merely a raid in force so that no major troop strength would be beyond a day's march of the perimeter.

This decision did not alter the basic envelopment maneuver, however, and on 9 October Whaling and the 7th Marines moved across the Matanikau and attacked rapidly northward to raid the Point Cruz and Matanikau village areas. Whaling's Group moved along the first high ground west of the river; Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken's 2/7 moved north on a ridge some 1,000 yards off Whaling's left flank, and Puller with 1/7 attacked along another ridge west of Hanneken.

Whaling and Hanneken reached the coast without serious opposition while 1/7 on the extreme left encountered a strong force of Japanese in a deep ravine about 1,500 yards inland from Point Cruz. Puller brought artillery and mortar fire down on the Japanese, and his men picked off the enemy with rifle and machine-gun fire as they climbed the far side of the ravine to escape the indirect fire. A few enemy escaped up the steep slope, but most of them were either killed by small-arms fire or driven back down the hill into the mortar and artillery concentration.
It was a most effective arrangement for methodical extermination, and Puller and his men kept it up until mortar ammunition ran low. Then they withdrew to join the Whaling Group and Hanneken, and by 1400 the combined raiding force had retired east of the Matanikau through the covering positions of the 5th Marines and the raiders. The three-day operation had cost the Marines 65 dead and 125 wounded. A Japanese diary found later by Marines placed the 4th Infantry losses at 700 men.

Positions at the river mouth were retained to guard against a new Japanese crossing.

Rain and the threat of a new counter-offensive had thwarted the Marines' attack plans, but the action could still go down in the gain column. The raid had tripped up the attack Colonel Nakaguma had planned for the same period, and it had done away with a great number of his men. And in the short time that men of the 7th Marines had been ashore on the island, they had earned a right to identification as veteran troops. So with a completely combat-wise division on hand—and Army reinforcements on the way—Vandegrift and his staff now made plans to meet the strong Japanese attack that was bearing down upon them.
Japanese Counteroffensive

In spite of the miscarriage of Nakaguma’s effort to establish a bridgehead across the Matanikau, the Japanese Seventeenth Army continued preparations for its big push. On 9 October, the same day that Lieutenant Colonel Puller caught a major portion of Nakaguma’s 4th Infantry between the devil of small-arms and the deep sea of artillery and mortar concentrations, Seventeenth Army General Haruyoshi Hyakutake landed on Guadalcanal to take personal charge of the Japanese campaign.

Things were serious but not desperate. Although Ichiki and Kawaguchi had allowed unfounded optimism and overconfidence to swamp their missions against the Marines, Hyakutake still had a strong force and a proud confidence that he could wipe out the Lunga positions in one blow. And with Guadalcanal safely back in Japanese hands, Imperial troops then would retake Tulagi and occupy Rennell and San Cristobal. At the same time Seventeenth Army reserves and the Japanese Navy could renew attacks in New Guinea and take Port Moresby by late November. The Bushido spirit would be back at full strength.

By early October the Japanese had brought troops in from the Philippines, the East Indies, China, and Truk to place within the Seventeenth Army command in Rabaul and the Solomons two divisions, a brigade, and a reinforced battalion. Support forces included six antiaircraft battalions plus one other AAA battery; a heavy regiment and an independent tank company; one regiment and one battalion of mountain artillery; an engineer regiment, and other troops including a mortar battalion and a unit of reconnaissance aircraft. Included in this general listing were the Kawaguchi brigade, the Ichiki reinforced battalion and other battalions of the 4th and 124th Infantry Regiments (Nakaguma) already defeated or weakened by the Lunga defenders.

By reason of the odd impasse in which both the Japanese and the Allied navies chose to avoid decisive battle to conserve their fleets, the Solomons waters changed hands every twelve hours, and thus each side kept an important trickle of aid going to its small combat force which represented the single point of ground contact between the belligerent powers. In daylight when Cactus could fly cover, the Allied ships came in from Espiritu Santo and other southern areas with reinforcements and supplies for the Marines. Barges, landing craft, and YP’s shuttled errands across Sealark Channel. By nightfall the larger ships departed, and most of the others still in the Sealark area withdrew to safety in the Tulagi anchorage. Until dawn the Japanese took over.

The destroyers and cruisers of the Tokyo Express habitually lurked in the Shortlands below Bougainville Island until the afternoon when they would start steaming south to be within 200 miles of
Guadalcanal by about 1800. This was just inside the range of SBD's and TBF's from Henderson Field, but the maneuvering ships made poor targets, and the late hour gave the American planes time for only one crack at them before turning back for Lunga. After that the Express had an open line all the way to Sealark.

While transport destroyers unloaded on either side of the Marine perimeter, Japanese warships stood close in at Lunga and went to work with their guns. Louie the Louse dropped flares to aid the naval gunners, and Washington Machine Charlie lurked overhead to fritter out his bombs during lulls in surface firing. Under such attacks there was little the Marines could do but crouch in their foxholes and pray—or swear. Lunga defenders could estimate 150 new enemy ground soldiers for every destroyer transport—often five or six a night—that made the Express run, and by early October these troops began to land insultingly close, just across the Matanikau eight to ten miles from Henderson Field. The Allied turn to use the waters came at daylight, but U. S. forces did not have the man power to match the Japanese rate of reinforcement.

Fortunately, the Japanese started slowly. Still thinking in terms of their operation against New Guinea, and miscalculating Allied strength in the Solomons, Imperial planners only dribbled reinforcements to Guadalcanal in August when the Marine position was particularly vulnerable. Not until after the Ichiki and Kawaguchi defeats did Japan begin to take serious stock of Vandegrift and his Marines.

But now the Tokyo Express had stepped up its schedule, and by mid-October Hayakutake had landed his 2d Division, two battalions of the 38th Division, one regiment and three batteries of heavy artillery, a battalion and a battery of mountain artillery, a mortar battalion, a tank company, and three rapid-fire gun battalions. Special troops including engineers and medical personnel, and remnants of earlier attacks brought the Japanese force to about 20,000 men.

Facing this mounting Japanese strength was a Marine force of about the same size. Arrival of the 7th Marines and the transfer of other troops from Tulagi bolstered General Vandegrift's Lunga positions, but until 7 October there was little hope that more reinforcements would be forthcoming. Rear areas in the South Pacific had gained little strength since Vandegrift had argued for control of his 7th Marines, and the plan for the occupation of Ndeni still was in the pending basket. Marine strength thus promised to deteriorate while Japanese strength continued to mount. More than 800 Marine battle casualties had been evacuated by early October, and malaria continued to take its toll.

The Cactus fliers were not doing much more than holding their own, either. By 1 October, Lieutenant Colonel Mangrum's original VMSB-232 and Lieutenant Commander Caldwell's Flight 300 were done for; Army pilots from the 67th Fighter Squadron had only about six or eight of their P-400's in shape to fly, John Smith's VMF-223 had lost an even dozen pilots—six killed and six wounded—and other units, although stronger, still piled up.

1 In October 1,960 malaria patients were hospitalized.
2 Mangrum was the only member of his outfit able to leave Henderson Field under his own power. He was evacuated on 12 October. Caldwell, who arrived at Lunga from the carrier Saratoga as a lieutenant, had been promoted.
their share of losses. On the first day of October General Geiger had 58 planes; two days later the count stood at 49.

If the Japanese had failed to win, place, or show with Ichiki, Kawaguchi, and Nakaguma, the Allies likewise had been unable to improve their odds by any comfortable margin. To General Harmon the situation looked about as grim as it had on 11 August when he expressed doubt that the Marines could hold their perimeter, and on 6 October he wrote to Admiral Ghormley that the Ndeni operation should be quashed until the situation improved. He questioned the logic of holding troops idle for a new operation when things were going so poorly in a battle already joined. He admitted certain factors favoring the Ndeni occupation, but he added that, "...in the final analysis they are individually or cumulatively vital to the success of main offensive operation or . . . maintaining security of South Pacific bases and lines of communications."  

Specifically, Harmon recommended abandoning the Ndeni operation until the Guadalcanal situation improved; reinforcements of Cactus (Guadalcanal) by at least one regimental combat team; the maximum possible intensification of naval surface action in South Solomons waters; and the prompt buildup of airfield facilities and supplies at Henderson Field. Ghormley agreed that Vandegrift needed another regiment and that Henderson Field needed facilities and supplies, but the admiral retained for the time his plan to occupy Ndeni and build an airfield there. For the Guadalcanal reinforcement, Ghormley ordered Harmon to prepare a regiment of the New Caledonia garrison, and on 8 October he ordered Admiral Turner to embark the 164th Infantry of the Americal Division, Harmon's choice for the job, and depart Noumea for Guadalcanal on 9 October.

It was to be a blockade run in force. Transports Zeilin and McCallley, carrying supplies, 210 men of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and 85 Marine casualties as well as the 2,850 men of the Army regiment, sailed under escort of three destroyers and three mine layers while a larger force of four cruisers and five destroyers steamed off the convoy's left flank. These cruisers, San Francisco, Salt Lake City, Helena, and Boise and destroyers Buchanan, Duncan, Farenholt, Laffey, and McCalla were commanded by Rear Admiral Norman Scott. Other U. S. Naval forces in the surrounding waters included Rear Admiral George D. Murray's Hornet carrier group some 180 miles southwest of Guadalcanal, and Rear Admiral Willis Augustus Lee's battleship Washington group about 50 miles east of Miliata. Scott's screening station for the unloading was near Rennell Island.

THE BATTLE OF CAPE ESPERANCE

On 11 October, while the Zeilin and the McCallley made for their 13 October anchorage schedule in Lunga Roads, Admiral Scott learned from aerial observers that two Japanese cruisers and six destroyers were bearing down The Slot. It was the night's Tokyo Express, Scott decided, and at 1600 he started toward Guadalcanal at 29 knots to intercept the run. His orders charged him to protect the transports, and to search for and destroy enemy ships and landing craft; he rushed eagerly to work.
Actually Scott headed to intercept a force stronger than reports had indicated. Observers failed to spot three heavy cruisers, two seaplane carriers, and eight destroyers steaming some distance away outside of The Slot. Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, commander of the Eighth Fleet and the Outer Sea Forces, and Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka, Eleventh Air Fleet commander, had teamed up to strike the strongest blow yet against the bothersome Cactus fliers. In the afternoon of the 11th, Kusaka had 30 fighters and 35 bombers up to occupy Henderson fliers while Mikawa’s bombardment and reinforcing groups steamed south outside the normal Japanese transport route. Heavy cruisers Aoba, Kinugasa, and Fubuki with, destroyers Hatsuyuki and Fubuki made up the bombardment group while the reinforcing fleet included seaplane carriers Chitose and Nisshin, and destroyers Akizuki, Asagumo, Natsugumo, Yamagumo, Murakumo, and Shirayuki.

By about 2200, while Scott maneuvered in the waters of Iron Bottom Sound between Savo Island and Cape Esperance, the Japanese bombardment group came into The Slot and steamed south in a double column at 26 knots. At 2330 a spotting plane from USS San Francisco reported Japanese ships 16 miles from Savo and off Cape Esperance, but Scott’s ships still were unaware of the serious trouble facing them. Gunnery radar failed to pick up the enemy then approximately 35 degrees forward of the port beam, and although the Helena earlier had spotted a Japanese ship bearing 315 degrees and at a distance of 27,700 yards, she didn’t report this contact for 15 minutes.

Flagship San Francisco, with rudimentary radar of that early period, had no contacts, and Scott continued to steam toward Savo with his ships in column. He counted this the best area for intercepting the Express he hoped to derail, and at about 2340 he had reversed course to head back toward the Cape when the Helena, at last confident about the blips from her better radar equipment, announced her fix of a target six miles away. Fortunately, since the U. S. fleet was having "eye" trouble, the Japanese ships were completely blind, and even though certain communications misunderstandings further delayed American fire, first salvos from the Helena at 2346 caught the enemy by complete surprise. Scott’s ships had usurped Tokyo's turn in Sealark Channel.

The Salt Lake City, Boise, and Farenheit quickly added their fire to that of the Helena, and shortly thereafter the U. S. fleet crossed the Japanese "T" (sailed ahead of the Japanese column and at right angles to it) so that a majority of the American guns could bear on each Japanese ship as it came forward. The Japanese destroyer Fubuki sank almost at once, the cruiser Fubuki took such a mauling that she limped away to sink later, and the Aoba caught fire. The only sound survivors, cruiser Kinugasa and destroyer Hatsuyuki, withdrew. On the American side, the Boise, Salt Lake City, Farenheit, and Duncan suffered damage, and the Duncan sank the following day.

*For an account of these misunderstandings and for other descriptions of the Cape Esperance Battle see Struggle for Guadalcanal, Chap VIII.

*Also on 12 October Cactus fliers found the Japanese destroyers Murakumo and Natsugumo north of the Russell Islands, and their attack sank both of these ships.
Scott could count the engagement a victory, but it did not resolve the seesawing for power in the Solomons waters or skies. The Japanese only stepped up their air attacks on Henderson Field and continued preparations for the big push.

PREPARATION FOR BATTLE

Transports McCaveley and Zeilen arrived at Kukum with the Army reinforcements early on 13 October, but this was one of the few bright spots of the day. Both radar and the Northern Solomons coastwatchers missed an air attack that came over at 1202, and the F4Fs couldn't get up in time to hamper the 22 fighter-escorted bombers that rained down their bombs from 30,000 feet. Both Henderson Field and Fighter 1 were damaged, and fires from the attack burned 5,000 gallons of aviation fuel.

Between 1330 and 1400 a second strike of 15 Japanese bombers caught most of the American planes back on their fields refueling. Some planes were damaged, and the strike undid the repair work that had been started by the 6th Seabees following the earlier raid. A few Cactus planes got up to pursue the Japanese, but the only American kill was scored by Captain Joseph J. Foss who had arrived on 9 October with Major Leonard K. Davis' VMF-121 of MAG-14. The field was not completely out of action, but big bombers were advised to avoid it except for emergencies.

In spite of these interruptions, Colonel Bryant E. Moore managed to get his 164th Infantry ashore, along with other men and supplies from the transports, but trouble for the perimeter was not over. As the second bomber strike droned away, the 150mm howitzers near Kokumbona were finally heard from. Safely beyond counterbattery range, these weapons began a slow methodical registration on the field and the perimeter. The fire was a brand of damage and destruction the men at Lunga had to live with, and so to have a pinpoint target for their anger if not their weapons they named this new entrant in their war Pistol Pete.

Pete, as was most often the case with Louie the Louse and Washing-Machine Charlie, was plural. Hyakutake had landed 15 of these howitzers. But for the Marines and soldiers it was difficult to imagine batteries getting that personal, and Pete's particular brand of hell was a most personal and singular thing. So Pete became one enemy, the devil himself—the devil and one big gun acting as Tojo's personal Nimrod.

And after he thumped away at the perimeter all that day, an enemy task force built around battleships Haruna and Kongo came into Sealark Channel after nightfall to launch an 80-minute bombardment. This was the Japanese Combat Division 3, commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, and it also included light cruiser Isuzu and three ships of Destroyer Division 31 as a screen, plus a rear guard of four ships from Destroyer Division 15. The battleships had on board some new bombardment shells which had just arrived from the home islands. These had a greater bursting radius than former Japanese bombardment shells, and there were enough of them for battleships Haruna and Kongo to have 500 each.

This was the first time that battleships had been used to bombard Henderson Field, and the Japanese hoped these big guns and the improved ammunition would

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The unloaded American transports had departed late in the afternoon.
completely knock out the Marine air and clear the way for a coordinated infantry attack. Louie the Louse illuminated the field, and the big guns cut loose. Coconut trees splintered, buildings and huts ripped open and crashed down, fragments and wreckage tore into planes and men, and more gasoline went up in bright fires which helped Japanese gunners stay on target for their systematic coverage of the field with more than 900 rounds of the high explosive shells.

As Admiral Tanaka described it later:

The scene was topped off by flare bombs from our observation planes flying over the field, the whole spectacle making the Ryogoku fireworks display seem like mere child's play. The night's pitch dark was transformed by fire into the brightness of day. Spontaneous cries and shouts of excitement ran throughout our ships.

Then, as the ships became silent and withdrew east of Savo Island, the planes came back. Night bombers continued their strikes intermittently until daybreak, and by dawn of 14 October the Cactus Air Force could fly only 42 of the 90 planes that had been operational 24 hours earlier. Forty-one men had been killed and many more wounded, and the airfield was a complete shambles. Among the dead were Major Gordon A. Bell, whose VMSB-141 had finally built up to 21 planes and fliers on 6 October, and four of his pilots: Captains Edward F. Miller and Robert A. Abbott and Lieutenants Henry F. Chaney, Jr. and George L. Haley.

Operations, sorely restricted by the loss of gasoline in the fire, moved to Fighter 1 which was left in better condition than Henderson; and a few B-17's which had been operating temporarily from Guadalcanal managed to bounce aloft from a 2,000 yard stretch of Henderson that still was usable and fly back to Espiritu Santo. The Japanese “Pagoda,” air headquarters since the early days, had been partially wrecked, and General Geiger had it bulldozed away. It had proved too good a registration point for bombers, anyway.

For the rest of the day the Japanese ships maintained their control of the waters around Guadalcanal, and planes continued to press their advantage in the air. Between the bombings and the shellings, Pistol Pete's effective interdiction prevented repair or use of the main airstrip, and by midafternoon Henderson had to be chalked off as completely unfit for use. By late afternoon fliers of the Army's 67th Fighter Squadron and 13 dive bomber pilots used Fighter 1—and nearly all of Henderson's remaining supply of fuel—to strike back finally at the Japanese by attacking an early run of the Tokyo Express then only 70 miles north of Guadalcanal. One ship was sunk and another damaged, but the Express did not turn back.

That night (14 October) the Japanese cruisers Chokai and Kinugasa moved down the channel to bombard Henderson Field while the express brought the six transports carrying General Maruyama's 2d Division on down to Tassafaronga. The cruisers fired 752 eight-inch shells at the men around Lunga, and by dawn on 15 October five of the enemy transports were clearly visible from the perimeter as they lay off Tassafaronga snugly unloading troops, supplies, and ammunition.

Cactus fliers, smarting from the two-day hammering, drained gasoline from wrecked planes, searched the surrounding jungle for undamaged drums, and finally collected enough aviation fuel to mount an attack with the three SBD's that could still

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4 Tanaka Article, II, 815.
fly. But one of these planes had to be scratched when it tumbled into a crater on the way to the strip, and Lieutenant Robert M. Patterson lost SBD number two when the plane hit a shell hole while he raced for his takeoff. Patterson tried it again with the last dive bomber, and this time he made it. His single-plane attack did not hamper the Japanese much, but while he was flying, the ground crews quickly patched other planes. It resembled an informal neighborhood box-kite club, with members hardly able to wait for work to be completed before they tested their craftsmanship. One at a time the first four planes were taken up to have a chance at the cocky Japanese transports. Two minor hits were scored, but General Geiger stopped the assembly line combat action until he could muster more strength.6

At 1000 Cactus was ready with 12 SBD's, and they went up to drop 500- and 1,000-pound bombs on the transports and then strafe their decks. That attack sank one of the transports. Next came attacks from P–39's and the relic P–400's, and fires broke out on two of the ships. After that, fliers from Espiritu Santo began to show up, and B–17's and SBD's from the south sank another transport. The Tokyo Express was in most serious trouble, in spite of 30 Zeros overhead to provide cover, and General Hyakutake might well have considered that the admirals and senior pilots in Rabaul had been somewhat over-confident in this daring daylight delivery of his reinforcements.

Even General Geiger's own pilot, Major Jack Cram, had his turn during that day of desperation when he made a run on the transports with two torpedoes slung under the wings of the general's Blue Goose, a bulbous and gouty PBY–5A. Cram got the torpedoes off, but then he was chased back to Fighter 1 by a clutch of Zeros, like sparrows around a ponderous hawk, and one determined enemy fighter had to be shot away from the smoking Goose as Cram came in for his landing.

By day's end three bombed transports of 7,000 to 8,000 tons each were beached and burning off Tassafaronga, and the other two had fled back up Sealark Channel and The Slot. But in spite of this, the Japanese had managed to unload 3,000 to 4,000 men of the 230th and 16th Infantry Regiments as well as 80 per cent of the ships' cargo. These troops, the last the Japanese were able to land prior to their concentrated effort against the airfield, brought General Hyakutake's strength on the island to about 20,000 men.

General Vandegrift now had approximately 23,000 men, but the Marine force suffered severely from malnutrition, malaria, the exhaustive defensive actions, patrols, and field engineering work they had accomplished. Most of them were veterans, but in the unhealthy tropics that fact did not necessarily mean an advantage in the long run. Only the 164th Infantry of the American Division contained fresh troops.

With this additional regiment a shores, the division again reorganized the perimeter, this time into five new defensive sectors. Clockwise from the Kukum area they were: Sector One—The 3d Defense

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6 While this action was in progress, Army and Marine C–47's (R4D's) flew in with aviation gasoline, and seaplane tender MacFarland brought in additional supplies of the much-needed fuel. Japanese planes next day (16 October) damaged the tender, but she was repaired by her crew in an inlet of Florida Island.
Battalion with elements of the 1st Special Weapons Battalion, amphibian tractor-men, pioneers, and engineers who held 7,100 yards of beach that straddled the Lunga River. (See Map 23, Map Section)

Sector Two—The 164th Infantry and elements of special weapons units with control of a 6,600-yard line from the beach inland along the Ina River and thence west to a point near the east slope of Bloody Ridge.

Sector Three—The 7th Marines (less 3d Battalion), a 2,500-yard front of inland jungle from Bloody Ridge west to the Lunga River.

Sector Four—The 1st Marines (less 3d Battalion), 3,500 yards of jungle from the Lunga west to the inland flank of the final sector.

Sector Five—The 5th Marines holding the northwest curve of the main perimeter from the flank of the 1st Marines north to the sea and then east along the beach to the west flank of the 3d Defense Battalion.

Since the Japanese attack was expected from the west across the Matanikau, the greatest strength was concentrated on that side of the perimeter. Forward of the 5th Marines’ lines the 3d Battalions of both the 1st and 7th Marines held a strong outpost line from the beach at the mouth of the river inland to Hill 67. This line was supported by a battalion of the 11th Marines and elements of the 1st Special Weapons Battalion. The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines and 1st Tank Battalion units constituted the division reserve, and each regimental sector commander was directed to keep a third of his infantry strength in reserve also.

Against these Marine and Army positions, General Hyakutake prepared to launch his attack for the recapture of the airfield. On 15 October in Kokumbona he issued his attack order to Lieutenant General Masao Maruyama’s 2d Division. Date for the assault was set tentatively for 18 October. The 2d Division would swing far inland to hit the Marines from the south with a night attack in two columns of battalions while the Seventeenth Army artillery commander, General Sumiyoshi, would shell the perimeter and then launch a diversionary strike with infantry units near the mouth of the Matanikau. For this coastal attack Sumiyoshi had a force of some 2,900 men comprising the battalions of the 4th Infantry plus a tank company, seven light field artillery pieces, fifteen of the 150mm howitzers, and three 100mm guns.

For his inland attack, Maruyama had some eight or nine infantry battalions totaling 5,600 men, plus artillery and supporting troops. General Kawaguchi, who had tried his hand in the same area before, would command the right arm of the assault with two battalions of the 230th Infantry, one battalion of the 124th Infantry, and elements of the 3d Light Trench Mortar Battalion, 6th and 7th Independent Rapid Gun Battalions, the 20th Independent Mountain Artillery, engineers, and medical troops. The left attacking column would be under command of Major General Yumio Nasu and would include the 29th Infantry, the remainder of the 3d Light Trench Mortar Battalion, a rapid fire gun battalion, a mountain artillery battalion, and engineers. The 16th Infantry and some engineers—a part of Nasu’s command—would be in reserve behind the 29th Infantry.

General Hyakutake was confident of success. He had left the bulk of his 38th Division at Rabaul. Banzai was to be
Maruyama's signal of victory at the airfield, and his attack from the south was ordered to press unrelenting destruction upon the enemy until General Vandegrift himself came forth to surrender.

Thus charged, General Maruyama struck out through the jungle wilderness on 16 October.

THE GROUND ACTION

Transportation was pedestrian, cargo moved on bended backs, and hand power drove the engineering tools. Thus the column of enveloping Japanese inched single file across the tortuous Guadalcanal back country like a segmented serpent crawling through the perpetual wet shadows of the tropical forest.

The so-called Maruyama Trail, begun by engineers in September, scratched its thin scar along the floor of the jungle southward from Kokumbona, east across the Matanikau and the Lunga inland from Mount Austen, and then north to an assembly area south of Bloody Ridge. Safely beyond range of Marine patrols and hidden from aerial view by the vine-laced tops of giant hardwoods, the Japanese soldier moved with an artillery or mortar shell lashed to his already heavy load of normal equipment, frequently used ropes to scale the rough ridges and steep valleys, and by turns tugged a line or hunched his shoulder to the common effort of manhandling artillery, mortars, and machine guns.

Heavy rain fell almost every day. The van of the single-file advance often had completed its day's march and bivouacked for the night before the rear elements were able to move. Troops weakened on their half ration of rice. Heavy artillery pieces had to be abandoned along the route, and mortars also became too burdensome to manage. Frequently unsure of their exact location in the jungle, the Japanese by 19 October still had not crossed the upper Lunga, and Maruyama postponed his assault until the 22d. Meanwhile General Sumiyoshi's fifteen Pistol Petes pounded the Lunga perimeter, air attacks continued, and Imperial warships steamed brazenly into Sealark Channel nearly every night to shell the airfield, beaches, and Marine positions.

The tempo of action obviously was building up for the counteroffensive, and Marines and soldiers worked constantly to improve their field fortifications and keep up an aggressive patrol schedule. Patrols did not go far enough afield, however, to discover Maruyama's wide-swinging enveloping force, and reconnaissance to the east found no indications of a Japanese build-up on that flank. Thus General Vandegrift and his staff were aware only of Sumiyoshi's threat along the coast from the west.

There the first probe came on 20 October. A Japanese combat patrol, augmented by two tanks, ventured into view on the west bank of the Matanikau but turned back after one tank was knocked out by 37mm fire from the lines of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines. Sporadic artillery fire was the only Japanese answer to this checkmate, and it continued until sunset the next day. Then the artillery fire intensified briefly, and nine infantry-supported tanks debouched from the west bank jungle and drove eastward for the sand spit at the mouth of the river. But again the fire from a 37mm stopped one of the tanks, and the attack turned back without seriously threatening the river-mouth positions of Company I, 3/1. The Marine
FIVE BLASTED JAPANESE TANKS knocked out by Marine 37mm guns during the abortive attempt to force the perimeter along the mouth of the Matanikau. (USMC 54998)

MARINE LIGHT TANKS, mounting machine guns and 37mm cannon, were severely hampered in their operations by the jungle terrain of Guadalcanal. (USN 18525)
battalion had taken a few casualties from artillery and mortar fire, but neither of these first two attacks had posed a serious threat.

At the Matanikau positions on 22 October Sumiyoshi continued firing his mortars and artillery but mounted no new assault. Inland, General Maruyama struggled with the jungle some distance from his lines of departure, and he was forced to postpone his proposed assault to 23 October. But on that day he still was unprepared to attack and again he set back his plans another 24 hours.

At about 1800 on the 23d, however, Sumiyoshi once more intensified his artillery and mortar fire to lay down an orthodox preparation pattern on the Marine east bank positions and along the coastal route from the Lunga Perimeter. Near the end of evening nautical twilight the artillery fire ceased, and a column of nine 18-ton medium tanks churned across the sandspit in an attempt to force a penetration. In assembly areas to the rear infantry troops stood by to assault in the wake of the tanks.

Slim-barreled 37's again blasted at the Japanese tanks while infantry mortars and howitzers of the 11th Marines dumped prearranged concentrations farther west to break up the pending infantry assault. The enemy ground troops never got started, and the tank charge miscarried when eight of the vehicles were hammered to a standstill by the 37's. One tank managed the crossing but staggered out of control when a Marine pitched a grenade in its track as it lumbered by his foxhole. Pursued by a half-track 75, the beset machine wallowed into the surf where it stalled to form a sitting duck target for the tank destroyer.

The other eight hulks remained strewn along the sand bar across the river mouth, and artillery fire knocked out three more tanks that never got to attack. Hundreds of the enemy soldiers who had been waiting to follow the tanks were killed. The action was over by 2200, although at about midnight the Japanese made a half-hearted attempt to cross the river farther upstream. This thrust was turned back with little trouble.

From his study of interrogations of the Japanese generals involved, Dr. John Miller, Jr., sums up:

Sumiyoshi had sent one tank company and one infantry regiment forward to attack a prepared position over an obvious approach route while the Americans were otherwise unengaged. The Maruyama force, still moving inland, had not reached its line of departure. In 1946, the responsible commanders gave different reasons for the lack of co-ordination and blamed each other. According to Hyakutake, this piecemeal attack had been a mistake. The coastal attack was to have been delivered at the same time as Maruyama's forces struck against the southern perimeter line. Maruyama, according to Hyakutake, was to have notified the 4th Infantry when he reached his line of departure on 23 October, and he so notified the 4th Infantry. The regiment then proceeded with its attack.

Maruyama disclaimed responsibility for the blunder, and blamed 17th Army Headquarters. His forces, delayed in their difficult march, had not reached their line of departure on 23 October. The 17th Army, he asserted, overestimated the rate of progress on the south flank and ordered the coast forces to attack on 23 October to guarantee success on the south flank.

Sumiyoshi was vague. He claimed that throughout the counteroffensive he had been so weakened by malaria that he found it difficult to make decisions. Despite an earlier statement that he did not know why the attack of 23 October had been ordered, he declared that he had attacked ahead of Maruyama to divert the Americans. Communication between the two forces, he claimed, had been very poor. Radio sets gave off too much light, and thus had been used only
in daylight hours. Telephone communication had been frequently disrupted. As a result the coast force had been one day behind in its knowledge of Maruyama’s movement.\(^9\)

Meanwhile the Marine division\(^{11}\) had started a shift of manpower within the perimeter. In the face of Sumiyoshi’s attacks, and with no patrol contacts to the south or east, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines on 23 October pulled out of its southern lines east of the Lunga and moved west to relieve the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines at the mouth of the Matanikau. This left the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (Puller) with a responsibility for the defense of all of Sector Five, the 2,500-yard defense line from the inland flank of the 164th Infantry west across the southern slopes of Bloody Ridge to the Lunga River. Puller’s extended lines were thin, but there appeared very little danger from the south.

Hanneken’s 2/7 did not effect its intended relief, however, because of the heavy Japanese artillery fire that engaged 3/1 on the 23d, and on the following day a new assignment was given to the 7th Marines battalion. On the 24th the Marines of 3/7 on Hill 67 south of the Matanikau mouth had spotted a Japanese column, obviously a flanking force,\(^{12}\) moving east across Mount Austen’s foothills. Artillery and air was called in on this enemy movement, but the Japanese disappeared into jungle ravines about 1,000 yards south of Hill 67 before they could be engaged. In the face of this threat apparently headed for the 4,000-yard gap between the Matanikau outpost and the Lunga perimeter, 2/7 was assigned to plug this hole, and the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines retained its positions overlooking the beach and the Matanikau.

Later the same day came other indications that the Sumiyoshi action would not be the only Japanese effort against the perimeter. Late in the afternoon of 24 October an observer in the 1/7 lines south of the airfield saw a Japanese officer studying Bloody Ridge through field glasses, and a scout-sniper patrol reported seeing the smoke from “many rice fires” in the Lunga valley about two miles south of Puller’s positions on the Ridge. By this time twilight was settling over Guadalcanal, and there was little the Marines could do but wait out developments from existing positions. The only troops not in front lines were those in reserve in the various defensive sectors and the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, the division reserve, then bivouacked north of Henderson Field.

The rice fires and the officer with field glasses undoubtedly were signs—and the first the Marines had—of the reinforced 2d Division that finally had negotiated the grueling advance from Kokumbona over the Maruyama Trail. With all his artillery and mortars strewn along the route behind him, Maruyama at last had crossed the Lunga into his assembly areas south of Bloody Ridge. There the force stood at twilight on 24 October ready to attack with only infantry weapons against the dug-in Marines who were backed up by artillery and mortars.

Hoping for bright moonlight to aid coordination (the night actually went black

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\(^{9}\) Miller, Guadalcanal, 157–159, quoted by permission of the author.

\(^{11}\) BrigGen Rupertus, ADC, became acting CG of the 1st MarDiv on 23 October. MajGen Vandegrift left at dawn that day for conferences at Noumea, flying out with LtGen Thomas Holcomb, Marine Corps Commandant, whose Pacific tour had brought him to Guadalcanal on 21 October.

\(^{12}\) This force, never positively identified in reconstructions of battle events, is thought to have been that of Col Oka which appears later in night attacks of 25–26 October. Final Rep, Phase V, 22.
with heavy rain), the Japanese general ordered a narrow attack over the ground Kawaguchi’s force had assaulted in mid-September. The main effort was assigned to the 29th Infantry, with the 16th Infantry in reserve, while farther to the east the Kawaguchi command—now led by Colonel Toshimari Shoji—was to make a parallel assault.

At about 2130 a Japanese unit clashed briefly with a 46-man outpost Puller had stationed forward of his tactical wire, but after a short fire fight the enemy bypassed the position, and the battlefield was quiet. Platoon Sergeant Ralph Briggs, Jr., in charge of the outpost, notified Puller that a large force of Japanese were moving about the outpost hill toward the battalion lines, but Puller ordered his men to hold fire so that Briggs could infiltrate to safety. But the outpost already was flanked by the Japanese moving around the hill, and Briggs led his men to the east while the enemy moved closer to Puller’s battalion and began to cut the tactical wire in front of the 1/7 positions.

While Puller’s men strained to hear the approaching enemy above the sound of drumming rain which lashed the night, the Japanese prepared their routes through the Marine barbed wire and formed up for their attack. Then at 0030 on 25 October, Nasu’s men came out of the jungle screaming their banzais, throwing grenades, and firing rifles and machine guns to strike the left center of 1/7’s line with an assault in depth on a narrow front. Puller called in mortar and artillery concentrations, his riflemen took up a steady fire, and the machine guns rattled almost endless bursts down their final protective lines.

From Puller’s left, troops of the 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry added their fire to that of the Marines, but still the Japanese assaulted, trying to rush across the fields of fire toward the Ridge. The attack kept up for 10 or 15 minutes, but finally ground itself to a halt against the combined arms of the U.S. force. Then there was a lull while the Japanese regrouped and came back again, trying to clear a penetration with their grenades and small arms. The Marine commander assessed correctly that his men were standing off the main attack of Rabaul’s big counteroffensive, and that the force in the jungle to his front obviously was strong enough to keep such attacks going most of the night. He called for reinforcements, and division headquarters ordered Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. Hall to take his 3d Battalion of the 164th Infantry down the Ridge to bolster Puller’s thin line.

But the reinforcements had a mile of muddy ridge to cover before they could be of any help, and in the meantime the Japanese continued to assault out of the jungle and up the slopes. A small group forced a salient in the Marine line to fall upon a mortar position, and farther to the front Nasu’s soldiers worked close to a water-cooled machine gun and knocked out all but two of its crew. Marines near
the mortar position won back the tube from the enemy, and in the machine-gun section Sergeant John Basilone took rescue matters into his own hands. For this action and later heroism in braving Japanese fire to bring up ammunition, Basilone became the first enlisted Marine of World War II to win the Medal of Honor. 15

As these attacks continued, Colonel Hall's soldiers began to arrive in small detachments. Puller made no attempt to give this battalion a line of its own on his threatened front, but instead had his men lead these fresh troops into his line where they were most needed at the moment. The fighting was too brisk and the night too rainy for any major reshuffling of lines. By 0330 the reinforcement was complete, and the Japanese attacks were becoming less intense. Infantry and supporting fires had cut down the Nasu force so that each new assault was made with fewer and fewer men.

Fortunately, all had not gone well for the Japanese plans. Nasu bore the brunt of the effort without assistance to his right where the second assaulting column was to have struck. Colonel Shoji, with Kawaguchi's former command, had strayed out of position in the difficult terrain and poor weather and got in behind General Nasu's 29th Infantry. Shoji was unable to correct this error in time for his battalions to participate in the action.

But Maruyama was true to his orders to press unrelenting attacks upon the Americans. With characteristic resolution, the Japanese struck at the Marines again and again throughout the night. The Bushido spirit was unswerving, but the flesh could not endure the concentrated fire from the combined U. S. infantry battalions, the artillery, and 37mm's from the neighboring 2d Battalion, 164th infantry. By dawn Maruyama called back his men to re-group for later attacks, and Puller and Hall began to reorganize their intermingled battalions and readjust their lines. The first strong effort of the counteroffensive had been turned back, but the remainder of 25 October, Sunday in the Solomons, was not a restful day.

Heavy rains on the 23d and 24th had turned Fighter 1 into a mud bog, and at 0800 Pistol Pete opened up again on Henderson to fire at ten-minute intervals until 1100. With Cactus fliers thus effectively grounded, enemy planes from Rabaul took advantage of this, and the first fair weather in three days, by attempting to give the Japanese counteroffensive some semblance of the coordination that Generals Sumiyoshi and Maruyama had muffed. Likewise strong enemy naval forces, to be engaged next day in the Battle of Santa Cruz, were known to be approaching, and early in the morning three Japanese destroyers, as bold as the Zeros overhead, cavorted into Sealark Channel to chase off two American destroyer-transports, sink a tug, set fire to two harbor patrol craft, and harass the beach positions of the 3d Defense Battalion. Finally venturing too close to shore, one of the enemy destroyers was chastised by three hits from 5-inch guns of the defense battalion, and the Japanese ships then withdrew. In all, the day earned its name of "Dugout Sunday."

But the name "was a misnomer in a sense." 16 Although the lurking Zeros kept "Condition Red" alerts in effect most of the day, bombing raids came over only

15 Basilone was killed in 1945 during the Marine assault of Iwo Jima.

16 The Island, 178.
twice," and Lunga defenders not connected with Cactus operations climbed out of their foxholes to watch the dogfights which began after Fighter 1 dried enough to support takeoffs. These American planes were able to go up at 1430 to meet a 16-bomber strike from Rabaul and hamper this attack; and a nine-plane bombing raid at 1500 dumped its explosives on General Geiger’s boneyard of discarded wrecks. It was 1730 before Condition Red lifted, but after getting airborne the Cactus fliers had given a good account of themselves.

For the second time in three days Captain Foss shot down four Japanese fighters, and all other members of the Guadalcanal flying force worked so well to make up for time lost during the wet morning that 22 enemy planes had been downed by late afternoon. Three American planes, but no fliers, were lost in the actions. And while the F4F’s were battling the Zeros, SBD’s and P-39’s went off to the north to attack a lurking Japanese naval force. They sank a destroyer and put a cruiser out of action.

Meanwhile, in the reorganization of lines south of Bloody Ridge, Lieutenant Colonel Puller’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines held ground from the Lunga east across the southern slopes of the ridge, and Lieutenant Colonel Hall’s 3/164 tied in at that point around four 37mm guns and extended across low jungle country to the right flank of the 2d Battalion, 164th. In the sector west of the Lunga the 5th Marines swung a line into the jungle about a half mile in from the beach and made visual contact with the left (east) flank of Colonel Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines which extended from 3/7’s dangling flank near the Matanikau back toward the Lunga perimeter. It was clear that Maruyama waited in the jungle to launch another attack in the big counteroffensive, and the Lunga defenders were determined to have stronger positions ready to meet him this time.

In spite of his losses the previous night, Maruyama still had manpower sufficient to build a better attack against the Marines and soldiers, but he somehow gained some faulty intelligence which kept the Shoji (Kawaguchi) Force idle for a second night. The intelligence caused Maruyama to expect a U. S. counterattack on his right (east) flank, and he sent Shoji, who had gotten lost in the wet darkness of the first assault, to screen the flank while Nasu’s 29th Infantry and the 16th Infantry (previously the Maruyama reserve) made ready to carry the new assault.

After dark (on 25 October), the Japanese repeated the pattern of attack used the previous night. With only machine guns to augment their hand-carried weapons, groups of from 20 to 200 soldiers shouted out of the darkness to assault the entire length of the Puller-Hall line. The strongest of these attacks sent two machine-gun companies with supporting riflemen against the junction of the Marine and Army battalions where a jungle trail led north to the airfield. Artillery, mortars, small arms, and the four canister-firing 37’s cut down the repeated Japanese assaults. A company from the 1st Marine Division reserve, as well as an Army platoon, came forward to reinforce, and the lines held.

Taking staggering losses, the Japanese continued hammering against the Ameri-
American lines throughout the night while farther to the west Colonel Oka (whose troops probably had been those spotted on Mount Austen's slopes on 23 October) sent his force against the thin line of 2/7. This Marine battalion had been under artillery fire (from the Kokumbomba area) throughout the day, snipers also had scored some American casualties, and now from 2130 to 2300 it was jarred by three strong attacks which Oka made in battalion strength. The weight of the attacks fell mostly heavily on Company F on the left flank of Hanneken's line.

Until midnight these thrusts were thrown back, but at 0300 an assault swept over the Marine company. Enfilading fire from nearby foxholes of Company G failed to dislodge the Japanese, and they took over Company F's high ground. In the haze of morning some 150 Japanese could be observed in F/2/7 foxholes firing American machine guns at adjacent Marine emplacements.

Major Odell M. Conoley, 2/7 executive officer, led a jury-rigged counterattack force of headquarters troops against these Japanese, and he was joined by a platoon from Company C, 5th Marines and by personnel from the 7th Marines regimental CP. Surprising the Japanese, this force killed and drove off the enemy penetration, while a mortar barrage prevented Oka's soldiers from reinforcing.

This was the end of the Japanese October counteroffensive. The Marines, this time with the valuable assistance of the Army regiment, had driven off the 17th Army's strongest attempt to recapture the Henderson Field area. And again part of the Japanese failure could be laid to faulty intelligence, combined with an over-optimistic evaluation of their own capabilities, and a contemptuous evaluation of the American fighting man. Had the enveloping Japanese successfully negotiated the Maruyama Trail with their mortars and artillery, and had the Japanese managed over-all coordination, the battle might well have had a different outcome. At least the Japanese would have taken a heavier toll of Americans and might well have effected serious penetration of the perimeter. But these errors formed the foundation of a grisly monument of failure: some 3,500 Japanese soldiers dead, including General Nasu and his regimental commanders—Colonel Furumiya (29th Infantry) and Colonel Hiroyasu (16th Infantry). It was a beaten and disorganized Japanese force which began withdrawing inland during the morning of 26 October. 38

By contrast, although records are sketchy or nonexistent, American losses were far less: probably around 300 dead and wounded, including those hit by shelling and bombing. The 164th Infantry sustained 26 killed and 52 wounded (during all of October), and the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines lost 30 dead in its action against Oka's Japanese. No figures are available on losses of 1/7, but evidence indicates that these probably did not much exceed 100 dead and wounded. 39

THE BATTLE OF SANTA CRUZ

As Maruyama's assaults were weakening on the south slopes of Bloody Ridge...
JAPANESE TORPEDO PLANE ignores two American cruisers as it heads for the crippled carrier Hornet which was sunk during the Battle of Santa Cruz. (USN 20447)

NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT for the Army-Marine advance up the north coast of Guadalcanal is provided by the 5-inch guns of an American destroyer. (USN53439)
and while Colonel Oka’s brief penetration of 2/7’s line still was two hours away, an American patrol plane southeast of Guadalcanal reported sighting elements of a large Japanese fleet in the waters near the Santa Cruz Islands. These ships comprised another part of the “coordinated” Japanese counteroffensive. Admiral Kondo of the Second Fleet and Admiral Nagumo of the Third Fleet had teamed up with four carriers and four battleships, eight cruisers, 28 destroyers, and supporting vessels; and they were standing by to steam into Sealark Channel when they got the “Banzai” signal that Henderson Field had been recaptured. Meanwhile they guarded against American reinforcements or countermeasures from the south.

Rear Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, then northeast of the New Hebrides with the Enterprise and Hornet carrier groups, moved to attack. At 0650 on 26 October two more observation planes spotted Japanese carriers 200 miles northeast of the American force at about the same time Japanese planes were sighting the U. S. ships.

Air action began almost at once. Japanese carrier Zuiho was hit in her stern by two of the scouting U. S. dive bombers. A hole in Zuiho’s flight deck prevented flight operations, but the undamaged carriers Junyo, Shokaku, and Zuikaku mounted air strikes against the American ships.

Twenty minutes later the Hornet sent up 15 SBD’s, six Avenger torpedo planes, and eight Wildcats, and a short time after that the Enterprise got her first 19 planes into the air. By 0830, 73 American planes were airborne to meet the approximately 125 Japanese aircraft. Other flights followed from both forces.

Like some of the previous Pacific naval battles, it was an air-air and air-surface affair. The opposing ships did not close for surface fighting. Twenty U. S. planes were lost to enemy action and 54 to other causes. The Japanese lost 100 planes.

The fate of USS Hornet is an example of the desperate fighting which took place during the Santa Cruz battle. Lamed by a starboard bomb hit, the carrier next caught a spectacular suicide crash as the Japanese squadron leader’s wounded plane glanced off her stack and burst through the flight deck where two of the plane’s bombs exploded. Japanese “Kates” then bore in on the carrier to launch their torpedoes from low astern. Two exploded in engineering spaces, and the ship, clouded by thick smoke and steam, lurched to starboard. Dead in the water, she then took three more bomb hits. One exploded on the flight deck, another at the fourth deck, and the third below the fourth deck in a forward messing compartment.

As if that were not enough, a blazing “Kate” deliberately crashed through the port forward gun gallery and exploded near the forward elevator shaft. Salvage and towing operations got underway almost at once and continued, amid repeated Japanese attacks, until dark when the ship was abandoned and later sunk. The Hornet lost 111 killed and another 108 wounded.

Meanwhile the destroyer Porter had sustained fatal damage, and the Enterprise, South Dakota, light antiaircraft cruiser San Juan, and destroyer Smith were damaged but not sunk. The Japanese lost no ships, but three carriers and two destroyers were damaged. One carrier, the Shokaku,
was so badly mauled that she saw no more action for nine months.

Not defeated, but hearing of the Army's failure on Guadalcanal, the Japanese naval force withdrew at the end of the day. Although control of South Pacific waters still had not been resolved, the loss of planes was a serious blow to Japan, and one that was to aid the Allied fleet within a few weeks. A bigger naval battle was brewing.
Critical November

If Tokyo by now realized that one of her long tentacles of conquest had been all but permanently pinched off unless the Solomons invaders were at last taken in all seriousness, the critical Guadalcanal situation likewise was getting more active attention in Washington. On 18 October Admiral Ghormley had been relieved of South Pacific Area command by the aggressive Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., and almost immediately the new commander was allotted more fighting muscle to back his aggressiveness.¹

Ten days after Halsey assumed his new command, the Marine Corps established a supra-echelon staff for coordination of all Fleet Marine Force units in the South Pacific. Major General Clayton B. Vogel headed this newly organized I Marine Amphibious Corps with headquarters at Noumea. He exercised no tactical control over the Guadalcanal operation; his staff was concerned only with administrative matters. And it would not be until later that the amphibious corps would have many troops with which to augment divisions for landing operations.

At a Noumea conference on 23–25 October, General Vandegrift assured Admiral Halsey that Guadalcanal could be held if reinforcements and support were stepped up. Some thought also had to be given to relief of the reinforced 1st Marine Division, weakened by strenuous combat and the unhealthy tropics. Halsey promised Vandegrift all the support he could muster in his area, and the admiral also requested additional help from Nimitz and from Washington.

 Shortly after this conference the Marine Commandant, General Holcomb, who had concluded his observations of the Marine units in action on Guadalcanal, sought to clear up the command controversy between General Vandegrift and Admiral Turner. Holcomb prepared for Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations, a dispatch in which he set forth the principle that the landing force commander should be on the same command level as the naval task force commander and should have unrestricted authority over operations ashore. Holcomb then used his good offices to get Admiral Halsey to sign this dispatch. The Marine Commandant then started back to the States, and at Nimitz’ office in Pearl Harbor he again crossed the path of the dispatch he had prepared for Halsey’s signature. Holcomb assured Nimitz that he concurred with this message, and the admiral endorsed it on its way to King. It was waiting when Holcomb returned to Washington, and King asked the Commandant whether he agreed with this suggestion for clearing up the question of how a landing operation should be commanded. Holcomb said he did agree with it, and this led eventually to the establishment of firm lines of command for future operations in the Pacific. Holcomb had

¹ For a discussion of this command change see Struggle For Guadalcanal, 182–183.
shepherded Marine Corps thinking on this important matter across the Pacific to its first serious consideration by the top military hierarchy.\(^2\)

Aside from the general policy that directed America's major war effort toward Nazi Germany during this period, the South Pacific was not intentionally slighted. But as Rear Admiral Samuel E. Morison points out, Washington at this time had its hands full:

Our predicament in the Solomons was more than matched by that caused by the German submarines, which, during the month of October, sank 88 ships and 585,510 tons in the Atlantic. The North African venture was already at sea: British forces in Egypt still had to be supplied by the Cape of Good Hope and Suez route. Guadalcanal had to be fitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff into a worldwide strategic panorama, but Guadalcanal could be reinforced only by drawing on forces originally committed to the build-up in the United Kingdom (Operation "Bolero") for a cross-channel operation in 1943. General Arnold wished to concentrate air forces in Europe for the strategic bombing of Germany; Admiral King and General MacArthur argued against risking disaster in the Solomons and New Guinea in order to provide for the eventuality of a future operation in Europe. President Roosevelt broke the deadlock on 24 October by sending a strong message to each member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, insisting that Guadalcanal must be reinforced, and quickly.\(^3\)

Immediate results of the Roosevelt order were particularly cheering to Halsey and Vandegrift. Admiral Nimitz ordered the new battleship *Indiana* and her task group to the South Pacific; the 25th Army Division in the Hawaiian area was alerted for a move south; the repaired USS *Enterprise*, damaged in the August Battle of the Eastern Solomons, headed back into the fighting. The Xdeni operation, much dog-eared from perpetual shuffling in the pending file, finally was scrapped by Halsey, and the 1st Battalion, 147th Infantry, the latest outfit to start the Xdeni job, was called off its course to the Santa Cruz Islands and diverted to Guadalcanal. Other battalions of the 147th regiment followed.

Also scheduled to reinforce the general Guadalcanal effort were Colonel Richard H. Jeschke's 8th Marines from American Samoa, two companies (C and E) of Colonel Evans F. Carlson's 2d Raider Battalion,\(^4\) a detachment of the 5th Defense Battalion, Provisional Battery K (with British 25-pounders) of the Americal Division's 246th Field Artillery Battalion, 500 Seabees, two batteries of 155mm guns, additional Army artillery units, and detachments of the 9th Defense Battalion. The old Guadalcanal shoestring from which the operation had dangled for three critical months was being braided into a strong cord.

The two 155mm gun batteries—one Marine and the other Army—landed in the Lunga perimeter on 2 November to provide the first effective weapons for answering the Japanese 130mm howitzers. On 4 and 5 November the 8th Marines landed with its supporting 1st Battalion of the 10th Marines (75mm pack howitzers), but the other reinforcements commenced a distinctly separate operation on the island. These units included the 1st Battalion of the 147th Infantry, Carlson's Raiders, the 246th Field Artillery's Provisional Battery K, and the Seabees. Joined under

\(^2\) LtCol R. D. Heini, Jr., interview with Gen. T. Holcomb, 12 Apr 49.

\(^3\) *Struggle for Guadalcanal*, 184–185.

\(^4\) Elements of this battalion conducted the Makin Island raid.

\(^5\) Btry A of the Marine 5th DefBn and Btry F of the Army 24th CA Bn.
the command of Colonel W. B. Tuttle, commander of the 147th Infantry, this force landed on 4 November at Aola Bay about 40 miles east of the Lunga. There, over the objections of Vandegrift and others, Tuttle's command was to construct a new airfield.  

Geiger's Cactus Air Force also grew while Vandegrift added to his man power on the ground. Japanese pounding under the October counteroffensive had all but put the Guadalcanal fliers out of action; on 26 October, after Dugout Sunday, Cactus had only 30 planes capable of getting into the air.  

But in the lull of action following the defeat of General Hyakutake and the withdrawal of the Japanese naval force from the Battle of Santa Cruz, Cactus ground crews had a chance to do some repairs, and more planes began to arrive at Henderson Field.  

Lieutenant Colonel William O. Brice brought his MAG-11 to New Caledonia on 30 October, and in the next two days parts of Major Joseph Sailer, Jr.'s. VMSB-132 and Major Paul Fontana's VMF-211 reported up to Guadalcanal. On 7 November Brigadier General Louis E. Woods assumed command at Cactus, and General Geiger went down to his wing headquarters at Espiritu Santo. By 12 November MAG-11 completed a move to Espiritu Santo where it would be close to Henderson, and more of the units were able to operate from the Solomons field.  

November there were 1,748 men in Guadalcanal’s aviation units, 1,557 of them Marines.”

As these fresh troops and fliers came ashore, the veterans of Guadalcanal’s dark early days were off on an expedition to the west. With the Japanese reeling back from their defeat of late October, the Marines sought to dislodge the enemy completely from the Kokumbona-Poha River area some five and a half miles west of the Matanikau. Once cleared from this area, where the island’s north coast bends sharply northwest toward Cape Esperance, the Japanese Pistol Petes would be beyond range of Henderson Field, and the Marines and soldiers could possibly meet Japanese reinforcements from the Tokyo Express before another buildup could muster strength for a new major effort against the perimeter. Under Colonel Edson, the force on this operation included the colonel’s 5th Marines, the 2d Marines (less 3/2), and a new Whaling Group consisting of the scout-snipers and the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. The 11th Marines and Army artillery battalions, Cactus fliers, engineers, and bombardment ships were in support. (See Map 24)  

The plan: At 0630 on 1 November attack west across the Matanikau on engineer footbridges; move on a 1,500-yard front along the coast behind supporting artillery and naval shelling; assault the Japanese with the 5th Marines in the van, the 2d Marines in reserve, and with the Whaling Group screening the inland flank. By 31 October preliminary deployment had taken place. The 5th Marines had relieved battalions of the 7th west of the Lunga; the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Ma-

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6 Vandegrift’s objection to the Aola Bay airfield harked back to the old dispute between him and Adm Turner. Turner continually wanted to spread out along the Guadalcanal coast; Vandegrift objected to the establishment of additional perimeters before the first one became strong.

7 These included 12 F4F’s, 11 SBD’s, 3 P-400’s, 3 P-39’s, and one F4F-7 photographic plane.
PUSH TOWARD KOKUMBONA
1-4 November 1942

AXIS OF ATTACK, 1 NOVEMBER
5TH MARINE POSITIONS, 2 NOVEMBER
POSITIONS REACHED 4 NOVEMBER
JAPANESE POCKET

500 YARDS MAP 24

rines had come across from Tulagi; and the engineers were ready with their fuel-drum floats and other bridging material for the crossing sites.

Companies A, C, and D of the 1st Engineer Battalion constructed the bridges during the night of 31 October, and by dawn of 1 November, Company E of 2/5 had crossed the river in rubber boats to cover the crossing of the other units on the bridges. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 5th Marines reached their assembly areas on the Matanikau’s west bank by 0700 and moved out in the attack with 1/5 on the right along the coast and 2/5 on high ground farther inland. The 3d Battalion was Edson’s regimental reserve, and battalions of the 2d Marines followed as force reserve. The area around Point Cruz was shell ed by cruisers San Francisco and Helena and destroyer Sterrett while P-39’s and SBD’s from Henderson Field and B-17’s from Espiritu Santo strafed and bombed Japanese positions around Kokumbona.

Marines of 2/5 advanced against little opposition along the high ground to reach their first phase line by 1000 and their second phase line by 1440. But near the coast 1/5 met strong resistance, and as it held up to attack Japanese dug in along a deep ravine near the base of Point Cruz, the two 5th Marines battalions lost contact. Farther inland, Whaling screened the flank with no significant enemy contacts. It seemed clear that 1/5 had located the major Japanese force in the area.

While Companies A and C of 1/5 (Major William K. Enright) engaged the enemy, Company B was ordered up to fill

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*The 3d Bn, 2d Mar, long the division’s mobile reserve, was sent to rest on Tulagi.
a gap which opened between these attacking companies. The opposition held firm, however, and Company C, hardest hit in the first clash with the entrenched Japanese, had to withdraw. The Company B commander, trying to flank positions which had plagued the withdrawn unit, led a 10-man patrol in an enveloping maneuver which skirted behind Company C, but this patrol also suffered heavy casualties and it, too, was forced to withdraw. Edson then committed his reserve, and Companies I and K of 3/5 (Major Robert O. Bowen) came up to the base of Point Cruz on a line between 1/5 and the coast. This put a Marine front to the east and south of the Japanese pocket; but the enemy held, and the Marines halted for the night.

Next morning (2 November) Edson’s 2d Battalion (Major Lewis W. Walt) came to the assistance of the regiment’s other two battalions, and the enemy was thus backed to the beach just west of Point Cruz and engaged on the east, west, and south. The Marines pounded the Japanese with a heavy artillery and mortar preparation, and late in the afternoon launched an attack to compress the enemy pocket. Companies I and K stopped short against an isolated enemy force distinct from the main Japanese position, but this resistance broke up under the campaign’s only authenticated bayonet charge, an assault led by Captain Erskine Wells, Company I commander.

Elsewhere the going also was slow, and advances less spectacular. A Marine attempt to use 75mm half-tracks failed when rough terrain stopped the vehicles. The 3/5 attack gained approximately 1,500 yards but the main pocket of resistance held, and the regiment halted for another night.

Final reduction of the Japanese stronghold began at 0800 on 3 November. Companies E and G of 2/5 first assaulted to compress the enemy into the northeast corner of the pocket, and this attack was followed by advances of Company F of 2/5 and Companies I and K of 3/5. Japanese resistance ended shortly after noon. At least 300 enemy were killed; 12 antitank 37mm’s, a field piece, and 34 machine guns were captured.

It seemed that this success should at last help pave the way for pushing on to Kokumbona, the constant thorn in the side of Lunga defenders and long a military objective of the perimeter-restricted Marines. From there the enemy would be driven across the Pola River, Henderson Field would be beyond reach of Pistol Pete, and the Japanese would have one less weapon able to bear on their efforts to ground the Cactus fliers. But the frustrating Tokyo Express again quashed Marine ambitions. The Express had shifted its terminal back to the east of the perimeter, and another buildup was taking place around Koli Point.

The 8th Marines was not due in Sealark Channel until the next day (and there was always a chance that Japanese surface action would delay this arrival) so Vandegrift again pulled in his western attack to keep the perimeter strong. Division decided to hold its gain, however, and it left Colonel Arthur’s 2d Marines (less 3d Battalion) and the 1st Battalion, 164th Infantry on the defense near Point Cruz while Edson and Whaling led their forces back to Lunga.

**ACTION AT KOLI POINT**

With their October counteroffensive completely wrecked, the Japanese faced an
important decision, and on 26 October Captain Toshikazu Ohmae, Chief of Staff of the Southeastern Fleet, came down to Guadalcanal from Rabaul to see what General Hyakutake proposed to do about it. And while Hyakutake had been proud and confident when he reached Guadalcanal on 9 October, Ohmae reflected Rabaul's current mood which had been much dampened during the month. The counteroffensive failed, Ohmae believed, because Hyakutake bungled by not carrying out attacks according to schedule and because the Army did not understand problems facing the fleet. "The Navy lost ships, airplanes and pilots while trying to give support to the land assault which was continually delayed," Ohmae said later in response to interrogations.

On 9 October Hyakutake's appetite had been set for Port Moresby; Guadalcanal was but a bothersome bit of foliage to be brushed aside along the way, and the general had the bulk of his 38th Division and other reserves, plus quantities of supplies, in Rabaul and the Shorthands ready to plunge south when the airfield at Lunga was plucked from the Solomons vine like a ripe grape. But now "the situation was becoming very serious," Ohmae was here to point out, and either Guadalcanal or Port Moresby had to be scratched off the conquest list, at least temporarily. In the conference with the naval captain, Hyakutake agreed that the U. S. advance in the Solomons was more serious than the one through New Guinea, and he agreed to divert his reserves to a new assault against Vandegrift and the Henderson fliers on the banks of the Lunga.

This time, though, things would be conducted differently. Rather than lurking in wait of successes ashore, the Imperial Fleet would run the show. Ohmae's chief, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of the Combined Fleet, wanted Hyakutake's uncommitted troops of the 38th Division to land at Koli Point so the Americans would be worried and split by forces on both sides of them. High-speed army vessels would transport these Japanese troops down The Slot under escort of the Tokyo Express. Then Yamamoto's bombardment ships and Japanese fliers would knock out Henderson Field once and for all, and Hyakutake could land more troops and finish off a battered defensive garrison which would have no air support.

It was a bold plan, but there were some Japanese officers who thought that it was not particularly wise. Admiral Tanaka, that veteran of many distressing hours in The Slot, was one of these. He had suggested after the October defeat that defenses should be pulled back closer to Rabaul so that they would have a better chance to stand off the Allies while Japan gained more strength in the Solomons. "To our regret," he reported later, "the Supreme Command stuck persistently to reinforcing Guadalcanal and never modified this goal until the time came when the island had to be abandoned."
Colonel Shoji already was at Koli Point with his veterans of the October assault against Bloody Ridge, and other Japanese troops now made ready to join him there. Hyakutake planned to build an airfield there so Japanese planes could be more effective during the November attacks. But while Edson and Whaling fought their action to the west around Point Cruz, a Marine battalion marched out to the east and stepped into the middle of Hyakutake’s plans there.

On 1 November, the same day Edson and Whaling crossed their foot bridges westward over the Matanikau, division sent Lieutenant Colonel Herman H. Hanneken’s 2d Battalion, 7th Marines out to investigate reports of Japanese activities to the east. Hanneken trucked his men to the Tenaru River that day, and on 2 November the battalion made a forced march across the base of Koli Point to the Metapona River, about 13 miles east of the perimeter. Intelligence had it that the Japanese had not yet been able to build up much strength here, and Hanneken’s mission was to keep things that way. On the night of 2 November he deployed his battalion along the coast east of the Metapona and dug in for the night. (See Map 25, Map Section)

While 2/7 Marines strained to see and hear into the black rainy night, six Japanese ships came down Sealark Channel, lay to offshore about a mile east of the American battalion, and began to unload troops. This force was made up of about 1,500 men from the 230th Infantry,\(^5\) and they were carrying out initial plans of the Imperial Army and Navy for the buildup to the east.

Rain had put Colonel Hanneken’s radio out of commission, and he could not contact division with information of this landing. The Marines held their positions that night but moved to attack next morning after an eight-man Japanese patrol approached their line by the Metapona. Marines killed four members of this patrol, and the battalion then moved up to fire 81mm mortars into the enemy’s landing site. This brought no immediate response, but as Hanneken’s infantrymen prepared to follow this mortar preparation a large force of Imperial soldiers maneuvered to flank the Marines who began also to draw mortar and artillery fire. In the face of this coordinated attack by the Japanese, 2/7 withdrew, fighting a rear guard action as it pulled back to take up stronger positions on the west bank of the Nalimbiu River, some 5,000 yards west of the Metapona.

During the withdrawal, Hanneken managed to make radio contact with the CP at Lunga. He reported his situation, and called for air attacks against the enemy and for landing craft to meet him at Koli Point and evacuate his wounded. This message reached division at 1445, and Vandegrift immediately dispatched the requested air support and also relayed the situation to gunfire ships which had supported the Koli Point operation.

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\(^5\) CG 1st MarDiv msg to ComSoPac, 17Nov42, in SoPac War Diary (located at NHDC). Another source says no Japanese troops landed that night; only supplies were put ashore, and the force Hanneken’s battalion met next day was only Shoji and his veterans of the October counteroffensive. Miller, Guadalcanal, citing interrogation of MajGen Takeo Ito, former CG of the 38th Division, 196a. Dr. Miller’s text recognizes the landing, however, and lists the above message from the SoPac War Diary as the source. Ibid., 196.
Cruisers San Francisco and Helena and destroyers Sterrett and Lansdowne shelled likely target areas east of the Marine battalion, and planes ranged overhead in vain searches for signs of the enemy. Communications still were none too good, however, and elements of 2/7 were accidentally strafed and bombed by some of the first planes that came out from Cactus.

Meanwhile, division had made the decision to concentrate more force against the evident buildup to the east. The western attack then in progress would be called back while General Rupertus, due to come across Sealark Channel from Tulagi, went to Koli Point with Colonel Sims of the 7th Marines, and Sims’ 1st Battalion (Puller). And to the efforts of this regiment (less its 3d Battalion), Vandegrift added the 164th Infantry (less 1st Battalion) which would march overland to envelop the Koli Point enemy from the south. Artillery batteries of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines would be in general support.

By dusk of 3 November the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines reached the west bank of the Nalimbiu River near the beach at Koli Point, and there General Rupertus met Hanneken next morning with Colonel Sims and Puller’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines. At 0600 on 4 November Brigadier General Edmund B. Sebree, Americal Division ADC who had just arrived on the island to prepare for the arrival of other Americal troops (which included the 132d and 182d Infantry regiments, in addition to the 164th Infantry already in the Solomons action), marched out of the perimeter in command of the 164th Infantry. Thus General Vandegrift, with two field forces commanded by general officers, operated his CP like a small corps head-

quarters. And to add even more troops to this concentration of effort to the east, Vandegrift obtained release of Carlson’s 2d Raider Battalion from Colonel Tuttle’s command at Aola Bay, and ordered it to march overland toward Koli Point and cut off any Japanese who might flee east from the envelopment of the 7th Marines and the 164th Infantry.

On 4 November the Japanese on the east bank of the Nalimbiu did not seriously threaten the Marines on the west, but General Rupertus held defensive positions while awaiting the arrival of the 164th Infantry. The soldiers, weighted down by their heavy packs, weapons, and ammunition, reached their first assembly area on the west bank of the Nalimbiu inland at about noon. There the regimental CP bivouacked for the night with the 3d Battalion, the 2d Battalion pushed on some 2,000 yards downstream toward Koli Point.

Next day the 3d Battalion, 164th crossed the river about 3,500 yards upstream and advanced along the east bank toward the Japanese. The 2d Battalion likewise crossed the river and followed its sister battalion to cover the right rear of the advance. As the soldiers neared the Japanese force they began to draw scattered small-arms fire, and two platoons of Company G were halted temporarily by automatic weapons fire. This opposition was silenced by U. S. artillery and mortars, however, and when the Army units halted for the night there still was no firm contact with the enemy.

*On 4 Nov the Lunga perimeter had been reorganized, this time in two sectors. Gen Rupertus took the sector east of the Lunga, Gen Sebree the sector west of the river.*
Action on 6 November likewise failed to fix the Japanese in solid opposition, although the 7th Marines crossed the Nalimbiu and moved eastward along the coast, and the 164th Infantry found an abandoned enemy bivouac farther inland. Meanwhile, Company B of the 8th Marines, just ashore on the island, moved east to join the attacking forces as did regimental headquarters and the Antitank and C Companies of the 164th Infantry. The combined force then advanced to positions a mile west of the Metapona River and there dug in for the night, the Marines near the beach to guard against an expected Japanese landing that did not materialize.

Unknown to Marines and Army commanders, the situation was shifting because of new changes in the Japanese plans. During the night of 5–6 November the enemy began to retire eastward from positions facing the Marines across the Nalimbiu, and when the U. S. force stopped west of the Metapona River the Japanese were east of the river preparing rear guard defensive positions that would aid a general withdrawal. General Hyakutake and Admiral Yamamoto on 3 or 4 November had changed their plans about hitting the Lunga perimeter from two sides, and the idea of an airfield at Koli Point was abandoned. Shoji was to return overland to Kokumbona where he would join the main elements of the Seventeenth Army's buildup on the west.17

After remaining in positions to guard against the expected landing throughout 7 November, the U. S. forces under Generals Rupertus and Sebree advanced eastward again on the 8th. Patrols had located the Japanese near the coast just east of Gavaga Creek, a stream some 2,000 yards east of the Metapona River. The 2d Battalion, 164th Infantry was attached to the 7th Marines as regimental reserve, and the combined forces moved rapidly to surround the Japanese. During the advance General Rupertus retired from the action with an attack of dengue fever, and Vandegrift placed General Sebree in command of the entire operation. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines met stiff resistance, and four Marines were killed while 31, including Lieutenant Colonel Puller, were wounded. Major John E. Weber next day succeeded to command of this battalion.

Hanneken's 2/7 moved around the Japanese to take up positions east of the creek with its right flank on the beach. The 2d Battalion of the 164th Infantry, committed from reserve, tied in on 2/7's left (inland) flank, straddled Gavaga Creek south of the Japanese, and tied in with the right flank of the 1st Battalion 7th Marines. From this point 1/7 extended north to the beach along the west side of the Japanese positions, and the ring was closed on the enemy. With this action to the east thus stabilized, division called for the return of the 164th Infantry (less 2d Battalion) and Company B of the 8th Marines. Vandegrift planned to resume the western action toward Kokumbona.

On 9 November the 7th Marines and 2/164 began attacks to reduce the Gavaga Creek pocket. Supported by 155mm guns, two pack howitzer batteries, and aircraft, the two Marine battalions closed in from east and west while the soldiers of the Army battalion moved north to compress the Japanese into the beach area. The Japanese fought bitterly to break out of the trap, especially to the south through a gap where Companies E (on the right)
and F of the 164th Infantry were unable to make contact across the swampy creek. This action continued through 10 November, with repeated orders by General Sebree for 2/164 to close the gap across the creek. This was not done, however, and the commander of 2/164 was relieved on 10 November.

During the night of 11–12 November most of the enemy escaped along the creek to the south. On 12 November the three battalions swept through the area where the Japanese had been trapped, met little opposition, and withdrew that afternoon across the Metapona River. Marines estimated that the action had cost the enemy approximately 450 dead. About 40 Americans were killed and 120 wounded.

Meanwhile, Colonel Carlson and his raiders, traveling cross-country to Koli Point, encountered the rear elements of the retiring Japanese. Joint by his Companies B and F, as well as elements of Company D, Carlson concentrated his battalion inland near the native village of Binu and patrolled the surrounding area. During the afternoon of 12 November the raiders beat off five attacks by two Japanese companies. Scattered actions took place for the next five days, and on 17 November the main Japanese force began withdrawing into the inland hills to skirt south of Henderson Field to Kokumbona. Carlson pursued, was augmented by the arrival of his Company A and by native bearers, and remained in the jungle and ridges until 4 December. His combat and reconnaissance patrol covered 150 miles, fought more than a dozen actions and killed nearly 500 enemy soldiers. Raiders lost 16 killed and 18 wounded.

Admiral Tanaka had now been placed in charge of a larger Japanese reinforcement fleet, and Admiral Mikawa of the Eighth Fleet had stepped up his plans for the buildup on the west side of the Marine perimeter. On the night of 7 November Tanaka sent Captain Toraji Sato and his Destroyer Division 15 down The Slot with an advance unit of some 1,300 troops. After evading a U. S. bomber attack in the afternoon, these ships landed the troops at Tassafaronga shortly after midnight and then sped back north to the safety of the Shortlands. While these ships came north, the second shuttle went south from Rabaul to the Shortlands with the main body of the 38th Division. Two days later (on 10 November) 600 of these troops under Lieutenant General Tadayoshi Sano made the move from the Shortlands to Guadalcanal. The convoy was heckled by U. S. planes and PT boats, but the troops were landed safely, and the ships made it back to the Shortlands on 11 November.18

BRIEF RENEWAL OF WESTERN ATTACK

Meanwhile Colonel Arthur’s 2d Marines (less 3/2), augmented by the 8th Marines and the 164th Infantry (less 2/164), pushed west from Point Cruz toward Kokumbona on 10 November. The force advanced against ragged opposition from infantry weapons and by 11 November had regained most of the ground that had been given up when Vandegrift shifted his attacks to the east earlier in the month.

General Hyakutake, to thwart this thrust at his Guadalcanal command post, assigned Major General Takeo Ito (formerly CO of the 228th Infantry and now infantry group commander of the 38th

18 Tanaka Article, II, 820.
Division) to maneuver inland and flank the American advance.

But before Ito could strike—and before the Americans were aware of his threat—General Vandegrift again had to call off the western attack. On 11 November the troops pulled back across the Matanikau, destroyed their bridges, and resumed positions around the Lunga perimeter. Intelligence sources had become aware of the plans of Hyakutake and Yamamoto to mount another strong counteroffensive, and Vandegrift wanted all hands available.

DECISION AT SEA

It did indeed appear that the Lunga perimeter would need all the strength it could muster. Rabaul was nearly ready for a showdown, winner take all, and the time was now or never. The Japanese were losing their best pilots in this Solomons action, and shipping casualties likewise were beginning to tell. At the same time Allied strength in the South Pacific was slowly growing. It was becoming an awkward battle, and Japan was spending altogether too much time and material on this minor outpost which never had borne much intrinsic value. This needless loss had to be stopped, and Admiral Yamamoto was determined that the new counteroffensive would not be botched.

At 1800 on 12 November Admiral Tanaka's flagship, the destroyer Hayashio, headed out of the Shortlands leading the convoy which carried the main body of the 38th Division. Elsewhere in these Solomons waters two Japanese bombardment forces also made for Guadalcanal. Admiral Yamamoto had ordered them to hammer Henderson Field while Tanaka landed the soldiers. Yet a third Japanese flotilla ranged the Solomons in general support. Nothing was to prevent the 38th Division from landing with its heavy equipment and weapons. The troops would be put ashore between Cape Esperance and Tassafaronga.

On 23 November the 8th Marines passed through the 164th Infantry to attack the Japanese positions steadily throughout the day. Again there was no gain, and the American force dug in to hold the line confronting the strong Japanese positions. There the action halted for the time with the forces facing each other at close quarters. The 1st Marine Division was due for relief from the Guadalcanal area, and more troops could not be allotted for the western action.

On 29 November Admiral King approved the relief of Vandegrift's division by the 25th Infantry Division then en route from Hawaii to Australia. This division was to be short-stopped at Guadalcanal and the Marines would go to Australia.

During the period that preceded the withdrawal of the 1st Division, the last naval action of the campaign was fought off Tassafaronga. Shortly after midnight of 29 November the Japanese attempted to supply their troops in that area, and an American task force of five cruisers and six destroyers moved to block the attempt.

The American force, under the command of Rear Admiral Carlton H. Wright, surprised the Japanese force of eight destroyers, but the enemy ships loosed a spread of torpedoes before retiring. One Japanese destroyer was sunk,
pearl harbor to guadalcanal

but the U.S. lost the cruiser Northampton, and three others, the Minneapolis, New Orleans, and Pensacola, were seriously damaged.

But Japan’s day of smooth sailing in The Slot was over. With a reinforced submarine fleet of 24 boats, Admiral Halsey’s command had been prowling the route of the Tokyo Express to destroy or damage several enemy transports. The Japanese edge in fighting ships also was becoming less impressive. In addition to the carrier Enterprise, Halsey had available two battleships, three heavy and one light cruisers, a light antiaircraft cruiser, and 22 destroyers organized in two task forces.

The strength of the Lunga perimeter was likewise much improved since the Japanese attacks of late October. Arrival of fresh troops enabled an extension of defensive positions west to the Matanikau and the establishment of a stronger line along the southern (inland) portions of the infantry ring around Henderson Field. These new positions plus the shooting by the 155mm guns kept Pistol Pete from carefree hammering at the airfield and beach areas.

And the perimeter was to grow even stronger. More planes were becoming available to Henderson fliers, bombers from the south were able to provide more support for the Solomons area, and another regiment from the Americal Division was ready to move in from New Caledonia. Colonel Daniel W. Hogan’s 182d Infantry (less 3d Battalion) sailed from Noumea in the afternoon of 8 November on board Admiral Turner’s four transports. Admiral Kinkaid with the Enterprise, two battleships, two cruisers, and eight destroyers would cover the troop movement. A day later (9 November) Admiral Scott sailed from Espiritu Santo with a supply run for Guadalcanal, and a day after that Admiral Callaghan followed with his five cruisers and ten destroyers.

Early on 11 November (the day Vandegrift called off his western advance) Scott’s transports arrived off Lunga Road to begin unloading. Enemy bombers twice interrupted the operations, and damaged the Betelgeuse, Libra, and Zeilin. Damage to the latter ship was serious, and she was mothered back to Espiritu Santo by a destroyer. The other two transports retired at 1800 to Indispensable Strait between Guadalcanal and Malaita, and later joined Turner’s transports. During the night Admiral Callaghan patrolled the waters of Sealark Channel.

Turner’s transports with the 182d Infantry arrived at dawn on 12 November to begin unloading troops and cargo. During the morning the Betelgeuse and Libra drew fire from near Kokumbona. The two ships escaped damage, however, and American counterbattery and naval gunfire silenced the Japanese. Unloading ceased in the afternoon, and the ships were flushed into dispersion by an attack of about 31 torpedo bombers. The transports escaped unscathed, but Callaghan’s flagship San Francisco and the destroyer Buchanan were damaged. Only one Japanese bomber survived the American antiaircraft fire and air action, and unloading resumed two hours later.

Meanwhile, intelligence reports plotted the Japanese fleet closing in on the Guadalcanal area. During the morning American patrol planes north of Malaita had spotted a Japanese force of two battleships, one cruiser, and six destroyers. Later five destroyers were observed 200
miles north-northwest. By midafternoon another sighting placed two carriers and a brace of destroyers some 250 miles to the west.\textsuperscript{21} Coastwatchers in the upper Solomons logged other sightings. Turner appraised the various reports at two battleships, two to four heavy cruisers, and ten to twelve destroyers. Callaghan was heavily outweighed. But Halsey's orders were to get the naval support of Guadalcanal out of the dark back alleys of the South Pacific; and after he shepherded the unloaded transports south to open water, Callaghan turned back to engage the enemy.

Japanese battleships \textit{Hiei} and \textit{Kirisshima}, light cruiser \textit{Nagara}, and 15 destroyers steamed south to deliver Admiral Yamamoto's first blow of the new counteroffensive. This bombardment group was to enter Sealark Channel and hammer Henderson Field and the fighter strip to uselessness so that Cactus air could not bother General Hyakutake's reinforcements on route. This Japanese mission gave Callaghan one slight advantage. For shore bombardment, the Imperial battleships carried high explosive projectiles for their 14-inch guns, not armor-piercing shells which would have been much more effective against the hulls of U. S. cruisers.

Near Savo Island at 0124 on 13 November, cruiser \textit{Helena} raised the Japanese in radar blips at a range of 27,000 yards, and she warned the flagship that the enemy was approaching between Savo and Cape Esperance. But radar on the \textit{San Francisco} was inadequate, and Callaghan could not determine the exact positions of his own or the enemy ships. The admiral therefore delayed action until he was sure of the situation. By that time the range had closed to about 2,500 yards, and the van destroyer of the American force was nearly within the Japanese formation. When they maneuvered to launch torpedoes, the American ships disorganized their formation, and they took up independent firing. Some swerved off course to avoid collision, and in the melee both American and Japanese ships fired at their sister craft.

The \textit{San Francisco} caught 15 solid hits from big Japanese guns and was forced to withdraw with Admiral Callaghan killed and others, including Captain Cassin Young, her skipper, dead or fatally wounded. A cruiser hit on the \textit{Atlanta} killed Admiral Scott and set fire to the ship. But the small American force held in spite of heavy losses, and by 0300 the Japanese group retired without being able to attempt its bombardment mission. The Imperial bombardment force had lost two destroyers and four others were damaged. The battleship \textit{Hiei} limped away damaged by more than 80 American hits.

For the American ships it was a costly victory. Henderson Field had been protected, but the antiaircraft cruisers \textit{Atlanta} and \textit{Juneau} sank in the channel along with destroyers \textit{Barton}, \textit{Cushing}, \textit{Monsen}, and \textit{Laffey}. In addition to Callaghan's flagship, heavy cruiser \textit{Portland} also was seriously damaged as were destroyers \textit{Sterrett} and \textit{Aaron Ward}. Destroyer \textit{O'Bannon} sustained minor concussion to her sound gear. These ships struggled back to the New Hebrides after daybreak on 13 November. Of the 13 American ships in the action only destroyer \textit{Fletcher} escaped damage.

Planes from Henderson Field took off at first light on 13 November to nip the
heels of the retiring Japanese ships. They found the crippled battleship Hiei afire near Savo, and bombed and strafed her throughout the day. The Japanese fought a losing battle to salvage their hapless ship, but they had to scuttle her next day (14 November).

During the night battle off Guadalcanal, Admiral Tanaka had been ordered to lead his convoy back to the Shortlands. He headed south again from there during the afternoon of 13 November at about the same time that Admiral Halsey ordered Kinkaid to withdraw the carrier Enterprise south with the remnants of Callaghan's force. Halsey wanted this carrier—the South Pacific's sole operational flattop—safely out of Japanese aircraft range. To guard Henderson Field, Admiral Lee would steam on north with his battleships Washington and South Dakota and four destroyers from Kinkaid's task force. The distance was too great for Lee to make that night, however, and only the Tulagi PT boats were available to protect Sealark Channel. Shortly after midnight Japanese cruisers and destroyers entered the channel and shelled the Cactus airfield for about half an hour. There was no serious damage, however.

At dawn on 14 November the Henderson fliers found their field still operational. Early search flights found Admiral Tanaka's convoy heading down The Slot some 150 miles away and the bombardment cruisers and destroyers retiring north. In spite of the fact that the shelling of Henderson Field had been ineffective, Tanaka was coming on down to Guadalcanal with the 10,000 troops of the 38th Division's 229th and 230th Regiments, artillery personnel, engineers, other replacements, and some 10,000 tons of supplies.

First Cactus attacks struck the retiring warships which had shelled Henderson during the night. Ground crews on the field hand-loaded their planes and visiting craft from the Enterprise with fuel and ordnance, and the planes mounted from the muddy runways in attack. They damaged Japanese heavy cruiser Kinugasa and the light Isuzu. Planes still on the Enterprise, now 200 miles southeast of Guadalcanal, also attacked the Japanese warships. They added to the troubles of the Kinugasa and Isuzu, and also damaged heavy cruisers Chokai and Maya and destroyer Michishio.

Meanwhile, the 11 troop transports steamed on down The Slot until by about 1130 they were north of the Russells and near Savo. A previous light attack by Enterprise fliers had inflicted little damage to this convoy, but at 1150 seven torpedo bombers and 18 dive bombers from Henderson were refueled, rearmed, and boring in for an attack. This strike hulled several of the transports. About an hour later 17 fighter-escorted dive bombers delivered the second concentrated American attack on the transports and sank one of them. Next turn went to 15 B-17's that had left Espiritu Santo at 1018. They struck at 1430 from an altitude of 16,000 feet and scored one hit and several near misses with their 15 tons of explosives.

These attacks continued all day as the Henderson fliers scurried back and forth from their field. Nine transports were hit, and seven of them sunk. But from these sinking ships, some 5,000 men were rescued by destroyers. As Admiral Tanaka described the day:

The toll of my force was extremely heavy. Steaming at high speed the destroyers had laid smoke screens almost continuously and delivered
a tremendous volume of antiaircraft fire. Crews were near exhaustion. The remaining transports had spent most of the day in evasive action, zigzagging at high speed, and were now scattered in all directions.

In detail the picture is now vague, but the general effect is indelible in my mind of bombs wobbling down from high-flying B-17's, of carrier bombers roaring toward targets as though to plunge full into the water, releasing bombs and pulling out barely in time; each miss sending up towering columns of mist and spray; every hit raising clouds of smoke and fire as transports burst into flame and take the sickening list that spells their doom. Attacks depart, smoke screens lift and reveal the tragic scene of men jumping overboard from burning, sinking ships. Ships regrouped each time the enemy withdrew, but precious time was wasted and the advance delayed.23

In spite of this disastrous day, Tanaka steamed on south in his flagship, doggedly leading transports Kinugawa Maru, Yamatsuki Maru, Hirokawa Maru, and Yamoura Maru on toward Guadalcanal. These ships and three destroyers from Destroyer Division 15 which continued to escort him were the only sound vessels Tanaka had at sundown that day—"... a sorry remnant of the force that had sortied from Shortland," 23 But what was worse, Tanaka then got the word that a strong U. S. task force appeared to be waiting for him at Guadalcanal. This was Admiral Lee's force, then some 100 miles southwest of Guadalcanal, but Japanese intelligence reported these ships to Tanaka as four cruisers and four destroyers. To counter this threat, headquarters at Rabaul ordered Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondo to hurry down and run interference for Tanaka with a fighting force which included the battleship Kiri-shima, heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, light cruisers Sendai and Nagara, and an entire destroyer squadron. Kondo was to complete the Henderson Field knockout which Admiral Callaghan's force had thwarted two nights earlier.

Throughout the day Admiral Lee likewise sifted intelligence reports which funneled into his flagship, the battleship Washington. Then he moved against this powerful Tokyo Express which was headed his way.23 Lee entered Sealark Channel at about 2100 on 14 November and patrolled the waters around Savo. An hour before midnight, radar indicated a Japanese ship (the cruiser Sendai) nine miles to the north. About 12 minutes later the target was visible by main battery director telescopes and Lee ordered captains of the Washington and the South Dakota to fire when ready. Their first salvos prompted the Sendai to turn out of range.

Shortly before this Admiral Tanaka, still leading his four transports south toward Guadalcanal, had been much relieved to see Admiral Kondo's Second Fleet in front of him in The Slot. But when the cruiser Sendai scurried back from this first brief brush with the American ships, the Japanese officers found that for the first time in the Pacific war they were up against U. S. battleships, and not just cruisers as they had expected.

Tanaka immediately ordered his three escorting destroyers—the Destroyer Division 15 ships commanded by Captain

23 Tanaka Article, II, 822.
24 Ibid.
Torajiro Sato—into the fight, and the admiral then turned his transports north and shepherded them beyond range of the impending action. Meanwhile Admiral Kondo’s fleet closed for the fight, and soon the American destroyers leading Admiral Lee’s formation came within visual range of some of these ships. The U. S. destroyers got the worst of the bargain. By 2330 all four of them were out of action: the Walke afire and sinking, the Benham limping away, the Preston gutted by fire that caused her abandonment later, and the Guin damaged by a shell in her engine room. Only one Japanese destroyer, the Ayarami, had been damaged.

The two U. S. battleships continued northwest between Savo and Cape Esperance. The South Dakota, turning to avoid the burning destroyer Preston, came within range of the Japanese ships which had just scuffled with the American destroyers, and the word passed by these Japanese ships brought their “big brothers” out from the shelter of Savo’s northwest coast.

Admiral Kondo steamed into the fight with destroyers Asagumo and Teruzuki in the van followed by heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, and the battleship Kirishima in the wake.

The South Dakota, partially blind because of a power failure that hampered her radar, soon came within 5,000 yards of the Japanese who illuminated her with their searchlights and opened fire. Almost at once the Washington blasted her 16-inch main batteries at the enemy battleship about 8,000 yards away.

The Kirishima took nine 16-inch hits and nearly half a hundred 5-inch wounds in less than ten minutes, and she staggered away in flames. Japanese cruisers Atago and Takao, revealed by their own searchlights, also were damaged. But the original Japanese onslaught had caused enough serious damage to the South Dakota to force her to retire, also.

Admiral Lee continued on a northwesterly course to divert the Japanese, then bore away to the southwest near the Russells, and finally retired from the area when he noted the Japanese likewise withdrawing. The enemy battleship Kirishima was abandoned as was the destroyer Ayanami. American destroyer Benham likewise had to be abandoned later.

With his escorting destroyers dispersed by this battle and its aftermath, Admiral Tanaka now was alone in his flagship Hayashio with the four transports. He made full speed for Tassafaronga, but it was clear to him that the transports would not be able to unload before daylight. After that the U. S. planes would attack them like they had those six transports which tried to unload during daylight in October. But these men were critically needed on Guadalcanal, Tanaka knew. He sent a message to Admiral Mikawa at Eighth Fleet headquarters and asked if he could run the transports aground on the beach to insure prompt unloading. Admiral Mikawa said “No.” But Admiral Kondo, disengaging his Second Fleet from the battle with Lee’s battleships, contacted Tanaka and told him to go ahead with this plan.

By now the early light of dawn was turning Sealark Channel a slick gray, and Tanaka followed Admiral Kondo’s message of approval. He ordered the four transports to run aground off the landing beaches, and after he watched them head for shore the admiral turned
north, gathered up his destroyers again and sailed through the waters east of Savo Island."\(^24\)

The admiral wrote later:

Daylight brought the expected aerial assaults on our grounded transports which were soon in flames from direct bomb hits. I later learned that all troops, light arms, ammunition, and part of the provisions were landed successfully.\(^25\)

Two guns of the 244th Coast Artillery Battalion and the 5-inch guns of the 3d Defense Battalion also contributed to the damage of the grounded transports. This fire hit two of the ships, and then the American destroyer Meade came over from Tulagi to enter the fight. Planes from Henderson Field and Espiritu Santo soon joined this grisly "Buzzard Patrol," and the Japanese transports were reduced to useless hulks engulfed in flames. Japanese plans for a big November counteroffensive had met disaster, and Imperial headquarters now began to think seriously about the more cautious plan to pull the line back closer to Rabaul. There now were some 10,000 new Japanese troops on Guadalcanal, but these recent sea and air actions made it clear to the Japanese that these troops could not be supplied or reinforced on a regular basis. The shipping score against the Japanese scratched two battleships, a cruiser, three destroyers, and 11 transports. Nine other ships had been damaged.

American losses numbered one light cruiser, two light antiaircraft cruisers, and seven destroyers. Seven other U. S. ships were damaged. But the Tokyo Express had been derailed. Never again was Japan able to reinforce significantly with night runs from Rabaul. From this point the Imperial force on the island began to dwindle\(^26\) while the American command continued to grow. Critical November had turned into decisive November, in the Pacific War as well as the Guadalcanal Battle. The Japanese never again advanced and the Allies never stopped.

Admiral Tanaka, whose skillful conduct of the convoy and aggressiveness in throwing his four escorting destroyers into the battle against Admiral Lee's force near Savo had contributed most to what limited success the Japanese had had during this harrowing month, summed it up this way:

The last large-scale effort to reinforce Guadalcanal had ended. My concern and trepidation about the entire venture had been proven well founded. As convoy commander I felt a heavy responsibility.\(^27\)

**BACK TOWARD KOKUMBONA**

With this Japanese attempt to reinforce General Hyakutake decisively stopped, the American ground advance to the west was resumed. General Sebree, western sector commander, would be in command. With the troops of his sector—the 164th Infantry, the 8th Marines, and two battalions of the 182d Infantry—the general planned to secure a line of departure extending from Point Cruz inland for about 1,700 yards. From this line the attack would press on to Kokumbona and the Poha River where the main Japanese force was concentrated.

\(^{24}\) Tanaka Article, II, 823–824.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 824.

\(^{26}\) Capt Ohmae said later: "Following the [naval] battle, it was decided to do as much as we could by reinforcing the Guadalcanal Garrison by destroyers, while a sufficient supporting force of aircraft was built up in Rabaul. This plan was not too successful." Ohmae Interrogation, 471.

\(^{27}\) Tanaka Article, II, 824.
The 2d Battalion of the 182d Infantry crossed the Matanikau on 18 November and took up positions on the south (inland) flank of the proposed line of departure. On the following day the 1st Battalion of the same regiment moved west to take up the right flank position at the base of Point Cruz. Company B of the 8th Marines screened the left flank of 1/182’s advance, and these two units met sporadic infantry opposition. About noon the Army battalion halted, dug in, and refused its inland flank. The screening Marine company withdrew to rejoin its regiment east of the Matanikau. A gap of more than 1,000 yards separated the two battalions of the 182d Infantry.

Meanwhile, the Japanese deployed for a local offensive action of their own. With the 38th Division troops who had been on the island, plus those few brought ashore from the ill-fated transports, the Japanese moved east to force a Matanikau bridgehead from which a new attack at the Lunga perimeter could be launched. Other elements of the 38th Division moved inland to occupy the Mount Austen area. Remnants of the battered 2d Division were held in Kokumbona.

On the night of 19–20 November, the Japanese took up positions facing the two Army battalions west of the river and engaged the Americans with artillery and mortar fire. At dawn (20 November) the Japanese struck the inland flank of 1/182. The Army troops gave ground for approximately 400 yards, but this was regained later in the morning with air and artillery support. This U.S. attack continued to the beach just west of Point Cruz, but halted there in the face of increased enemy artillery and mortar fire.

During the night the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 164th Infantry moved into the gap between the two battalions of the 182d, and a general American attack jumped off on the morning of 21 November. Strong Japanese positions fronting the 164th held the attempt to no gain, however, and a second attack on the morning of 22 November likewise was halted.
CHAPTER 9

Final Period, 9 December 1942 to 9 February 1943

CHANGE OF COMMAND

At the Noumea conference with Admiral Halsey in October, General Vandegrift stressed the need for getting the 1st Marine Division to a healthier climate. But at that time the Japanese counteroffensive was underway, and another enemy effort against the Lunga perimeter began shortly after this October attack was turned back. Troops could not be spared from Guadalcanal during that period, and sea lanes to the area were too hazardous for a rapid buildup of the island garrison. It was not until after the important naval actions of November that sufficient reinforcements could be brought in to relieve the 1st Marine Division. By that time it was clear to all that these veterans needed to be taken out of the jungle.

Compared to later actions in the Pacific, casualties in the division had not been excessive. From the landing early in August 1942 until relief in December, the division lost 605 officers and men killed in action, 45 who died of wounds, 31 listed as missing and presumed dead, and 1,278 wounded in action. But unhealthy conditions in the jungle were, statistically, a greater hazard than the enemy. While 1,959 Marines of the division became casualties to enemy action, 8,580 fell prey at one time or another to malaria and other tropical diseases.

Records make it impossible to separate these two totals. Many men with malaria were hospitalized more than once and thus added to the total as cases rather than as individuals. Some of these later were killed or wounded in action. But on the other hand many suffered from a milder form of malaria or other illness and did not turn in at the hospital at all. It became a rule of thumb in front-line units that unless one had a temperature of more than 103 degrees there would be no light duty or excuse from a patrol mission. The tropics weakened nearly everyone. Food had been in short supply during the early weeks of the campaign, much of the fare had been substandard, and most of the long-time veterans of the fighting suffered some form of malnutrition.

On 7 and 8 December, men in one of the division’s regiments were examined by Navy doctors who thus sought to assess the physical condition of the division. The doctors concluded that 34 per cent of the regiment was unfit for any duty which might involve combat. This percentage would have been higher but for the recent inclusion within the regiment of 400 replacements.

Plans for the operation called for the Marines to be relieved early and reorganized for a new assault mission else-

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1 These figures refer to organic units only; such reinforcing attachments as the 3DefBn, 1st RdrBn, and the 1st PrchBn are not included in these statistics.
where. This could not be, however, and the Marines who held out in the Lunga perimeter during the dark early days deserved a break. They had taken America's first offensive step against long odds, and they had held out against strong Japanese attacks when Guadalcanal was all but cut off from Allied support. For this they were awarded a Presidential Unit Citation and—what was to be immediately more satisfying to the survivors—a rehabilitation and training period in Australia. The 2d Marines, also on hand for the original landing, was to be sent to New Zealand.

On 9 December 1942, command of the troops ashore on Guadalcanal passed from General Vandegrift to Major General Alexander M. Patch, commanding general of the Americal Division and senior Army officer present. On the same day the 1st Marine Division began to embark for Australia. The 5th Marines sailed that day, followed at intervals of a few days by division headquarters personnel, the 1st Marines and, after a longer interval, by the 7th Marines. The command of General Patch included Henderson Field, the fighter strip, the Tulagi area and seaplane base there, as well as the Guadalcanal perimeter. Although withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division meant that strong actions against the Japanese had to be temporarily suspended, reinforcements began to arrive concurrently with the departure of the Marines.

The third infantry regiment of General Patch's division, the 132d Regimental Combat Team (less 1st Battalion and Battery A, 247th Field Artillery Battalion) arrived on 8 December. 2 With this arrival the Army division numbered 13,169 men—more than 3,000 short of full strength. The 164th Infantry, in action since the October fighting on Bloody Ridge, was in little better shape than the 1st Marine Division regiments. Both this regiment and the 182d Infantry were each understrength by about 860 men.

Major General J. Lawton Collins' 25th Division, bound from Hawaii to New Caledonia, was diverted directly to Guadalcanal where its 35th Infantry Regiment landed on 17 December, the 27th Infantry on 1 January, and the 161st Infantry on 4 January. Also on 4 January, the 6th Marines (Colonel Gilder T. Jackson) and division headquarters of the 2d Marine Division landed from New Zealand to join their other regiments, the 2d and 8th Marines. Brigadier General Alphonse De Carre, the ADC, acted as division commander while this division was on Guadalcanal, and also served as commander of all other Marine ground units. Major General John Marston, commanding general of the 2d Marine Division, remained in New Zealand because he was senior to General Patch, the Army officer who now was in command at Guadalcanal. 3

2 This division's other infantry regiments, the 164th and the 182d, already were on Guadalcanal.

3 LtGen Holcomb, Marine Commandant, later expressed the opinion that Marston should have had the opportunity to command his division in spite of his seniority over Patch. CMC ltr to MajGen C. R. Vogel, 12Feb43. Marston said he was never apprised of the Commandant's attitude, however. MajGen J. Marston ltr to CMC, 30Dec48.
37mm guns of American Division antitank units are landed on the beach at Guadalcanal as Army troops arrive to relieve 1st Division Marines. (SC 164902)

Shoving off as relieving troops arrive, weary men of the 1st Marine Division file on board landing craft and leave the Guadalcanal battle behind. (USMC 52978)
By 7 January arrival of additional replacements had placed Guadalcanal's combined air, ground, and naval forces at about 50,000. The 2d Marine Division now had a strength of 14,733; the American Division, 16,000; the 25th Division, 12,629. This was a manpower level beyond even the dreams of the early Lunga defenders, and, with the South Pacific air and naval power also growing, the Allies at last were able to lay plans for attacks that would defeat the Japanese on the island and keep reinforcement landings to a minimum.

With Guadalcanal clearly out of the shoestring category at last, General Harmon on 2 January designated the Guadalcanal-Tulagi command as XIV Corps. General Patch became corps commander and General Sebree, former American ADC, assumed command of that division.4

A month and a half earlier than this, on 15 November, installations of the Cactus Air Force also had gained a more dignified title. On that date Rear Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, who had relieved Admiral McCain as ComAirSoPac, designated Henderson Field and Fighter 1 a Marine Corps Air Base, and Colonel William J. Fox became base commander. On 1 December and 30 January two new engineering units came in to improve the air facilities on Guadalcanal. On the earlier date, Major Thomas F. Riley's 1st Marine Aviation Engineer Battalion relieved the 6th Seabees, and on the January date Major Chester Clark's 2d Marine Aviation Engineer Battalion arrived. These were the only units of their kind within the Marine Corps, and, together with the remaining Seabees plus the organic engineer battalions of the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions, they kept the airfields in shape.

Part of this work included construction of a new strip, Fighter 2, closer to the beach near Kukum. Fighter 1, always unusually slow to dry adequately after tropical rains, was abandoned when this new strip became operational, about the middle of December. Both Henderson and Fighter 2 then were built up with coral for better drainage, and steel Marston mats, now becoming available, also were laid on the runways. Tools still were scarce, however, and the old Japanese road rollers, for example, continued to be used.

Brigadier General Louis E. Woods, who had relieved General Geiger at Cactus on 7 November so the wing commander could return to his headquarters at Espiritu Santo, stayed on as Commander Aircraft, Cactus Air Force until 26 December when he in turn was relieved by Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy, commanding general of the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. Colonel William O. Brice succeeded Colonel Albert D. Cooley as strike commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Samuel S. Jack became fighter commander after Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Bauer was lost to enemy action on 15 November.

By 20 November there were 100 planes on the Guadalcanal fields. This figure included 35 F4F-4's, 24 SBD's, 17 P-38's, 16 P-39's, 8 TBF's, and one lone and battle-scarred P-400. At about this time also, B-17's from two merged Army Air Force

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4 "The XIV Corps's staff section chiefs assumed their duties on 5 January 1943, but most of the posts at XIV Corps headquarters were manned by American Division staff officers . . . [who] . . . acted simultaneously . . . as assistant staff section chiefs for the Corps. As late as 1 February 1943 XIV Corps headquarters consisted of only eleven officers and two enlisted men." Miller, Guadalcanal, 218–219.
Bomber Groups (the 11th and the 5th) began to operate through Guadalcanal on long-range reconnaissance missions. On 23 November six OS2U’s came in to run antisubmarine patrols; on 26 November the 3d Reconnaissance Squadron of the Royal New Zealand Air Force arrived with its Lockheed Hudsons, and during the period 15 to 25 December night patrolling PBY’s of VP–12 arrived. Also during December the Army sent in the 12th, 68th, and 70th Fighter Squadrons and the 69th Bombardment Squadron of B–26’s.

This additional air strength enabled the Allies to maintain the upper hand they had gained over the Tokyo Express and Rabaul fliers. Japanese commanders pointed up their loss of pilots as the most serious trouble resulting from the fighting around Guadalcanal, and several Japanese officers, including Captain Ohmae, list this loss as the turning point at Guadalcanal and therefore the turning point in the Pacific war. Ohmae said later:

We were able to land a number of troops and supplies [on Guadalcanal], but our air losses were too great. Almost all of the Navy’s first class pilots and a few of the Army’s were lost in the Solomon Operations. The greatest portion of these were lost against Guadalcanal. At one time, we had three or four squadrons at Rabaul, but they were sent down one at a time. The constant attrition was very expensive. The 21st, 24th, 25th and 26th Air Groups were lost. This loss was keenly felt in the defense of the empire during the Marshall-Gilbert campaign.

In 1943, our training program began to be restricted, so we were never able to replace these losses, although we still had a number of carriers. In January 1943, due to your increased strength and our difficulty in supplying Guadalcanal, it was necessary for us to withdraw.

**GENERAL SITUATION**

The U. S. forces had not been idle during December. The perimeter now extended west along the beach to Point Cruz, south to Hill 66 (nearly 2,000 yards inland from the beach at Point Cruz) where it was refused east to the Matanikau to join the former Lunga perimeter outpost line east of that river. There was little expansion to the east, but a separate American force held Koli Point outside the main perimeter.

The Aola Bay force, finally giving up airfield construction there because of swampy, unsuitable terrain, moved early in December to Koli Point where a field later was built. This force, still under the command of Colonel Tuttle, now included the colonel’s 147th Infantry, the 9th Marine Defense Battalion, the 18th Naval Construction Battalion (Seabees), and elements of the 246th Field Artillery Battalion.

The limited offensive toward Kokumbona was halted late in November when the Japanese tried to mount a second strong counteroffensive against the perimeter, and at that time a Japanese movement to build up forces in the Mount Austen area was noted. Now, early in December, it seemed advisable to concentrate on this important piece of terrain as a prelude to a general corps offensive which would be launched when more troops became available. The high ground just to

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3 Ohmae Interrogation, 471.
4 Ibid.
the south above Henderson Field had to be cleared before many troops went west along the north coast to drive the Japanese beyond Kokumbona. The enemy line from Point Cruz inland was dug in for a determined stand, and Japanese strength was again mounting in the Bismarcks.

On 2 December, General Hitoshi Imamura, commander of the Japanese Eighth Area Army, arrived in Rabaul to assume command of the enemy’s South Pacific area and what was left of General Hyakutake’s Seventeenth Army. Imamura had been ordered down from Japan to retake Guadalcanal, and for this job he brought along 50,000 men for his Eighth Area Army. Hyakutake remained on Guadalcanal where his troops were disposed generally from Point Cruz inland to Mount Austen, facing the American line west of the Matanikau. The rear areas, and the bulk of Hyakutake’s support troops, extended from the Point Cruz line west to Cape Esperance. This Japanese force included remnants of the 2d Division (General Maruyama), 38th Division (General Sano), and the Kawaguchi and Ichicki Forces. (See Map 26, Map Section)

Confronting the Americans on his left flank from Point Cruz inland to Hill 66, General Hyakutake had troops of Maruyama’s 2d Division composed of the 4th, 16th, and 29th Regiments. From this division’s right (inland) flank were the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 228th Infantry on high ground west of the Matanikau. The 124th Infantry and other units extended from the Matanikau to Mount Austen. Remaining elements of the 38th Division (including the 230th, 228th, and 229th Regiments) plus detachments of the 124th Infantry were deployed in the Mount Austen area.

At this time the total Japanese strength on the island stood at about 25,000 men. But they were incapable of concentrated offensive action, and they had dug in for a defensive stand while awaiting General Imamura’s Eighth Area Army reinforcements. Rations were low, malaria now was more prevalent in Japanese ranks than in American, ammunition stocks were nearly exhausted, preventive and corrective medical capabilities were practically nonexistent, and the Tokyo Express was hard pressed to maintain even a starvation-level of supplies. Admiral Tanaka still was in charge of this supply operation down The Slot, and the measures now being taken were desperate ones. Destroyers tried to supply these Imperial troops by making high-speed runs to Guadalcanal and dropping off strings of lashed-together drums into which supplies had been sealed. Barges from the island then were to tow these drums ashore. This procedure was not too successful, however, and the troops managed to retrieve only about 30 per cent of these supplies that Tanaka’s destroyers cast upon the water.

Tanaka’s first run with the drums occurred on the night of 29 November, and his force was the one engaged by American ships in the Battle of Tassafaronga. With the same sort of aggressive naval action which had characterized the sending of his four destroyers into the fight against Admiral Lee’s battleship force earlier in the month, Admiral Tanaka made a creditable show in this action. But this did not get the troops supplied, and that was still the big problem.

With new action shaping up, the Japanese attempts to supply their force by floating drums continued. The force dug
in to face the Americans could not even hold defensive positions unless they could be fed and cared for. Tanaka's destroyers raced down The Slot on 3 December and dropped strings of 1,500 drums. But the island troops managed to haul in only about 300 of these from the waters off Tassafaronga and Segilau. "Our troubles," Tanaka said, "were still with us."  

On 7 December Captain Sato led 10 destroyers to Guadalcanal for the third Japanese attempt to supply the troops. Fourteen U. S. bomber and fighter planes located this force in The Slot at about nightfall, however, and one Japanese ship was hit and had to start back north under tow by another destroyer. Two other ships escorted this aided cripple. Admiral Tanaka went south to the scene in his new flagship, the newly-built destroyer Teruzuki, an improved 2,500-ton model capable of 39 knots. The other destroyers which had been on the drum run went on south toward Guadalcanal but had to turn back when they encountered PT boats and U. S. planes. Thus the third supply run failed completely.

The fourth of these supply runs came on 11 December, and Tanaka himself led this one in his speedy Teruzuki. A flight of 21 U. S. bombers attacked these ships at about sunset but scored no hits. Tanaka’s destroyers managed to shoot down two of six fighters which were covering for the bombers, and the Japanese steamed on south. The Teruzuki patrolled beyond Savo Island while the other destroyers dropped some 1,200 drums of supplies off Cape Esperance and then headed north again. Admiral Tanaka sighted some U. S. PT boats, and his new destroyer went to the attack. The Japanese ship chased the PT boats away but in the process got hit in its port side aft by a torpedo. The ship caught fire and became unnavigable almost at once, and the destroyer Nagamachi hurried alongside to rescue survivors. Tanaka, who had been wounded and knocked unconscious, plus others from the officers and crew were transferred to this other destroyer, and the destroyer Arashi also came up to help. But the heartened U. S. PT boats chased these sound ships away from the sinking Teruzuki, and the Japanese could only drop life rafts to crew members who were still in the water. Some of the drums were recovered by the troops ashore, but with the loss of such ships as the Teruzuki, this sort of supply operation was becoming very costly. And now the moon was entering a phase which caused other such attempts to be temporarily postponed. Japanese defenses had received very little help for the actions which now shaped up against them.

The 132d Infantry of the Americal Division began the offensive against Mount Austen on 17 December, and by early January troops of this regiment had the major Japanese force in the area surrounded in a strong point called the Gifu. Although this pocket was not completely reduced until 23 January, the enemy was sufficiently restricted to preclude any threat to the perimeter or the rear of the general corps attack.

Meanwhile, in other preliminaries of the corps offensive, the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines had taken Hills 54 and 55 west of the Matanikau, and the Americal Division Reconnaissance Squadron had seized Hill 56. These positions which were southeast of the southern anchor of the line extend-

*Tanaka Article, II, 828.
ing inland from Point Cruz served to extend the American positions farther into Japanese territory west of Mount Austen. (See Map 27, Map Section)

THE CORPS OFFENSIVE

With the Japanese in the Mount Austen area localized in the Gifu, the drive to the west could get underway. General Patch planned to extend his Point Cruz-Hill 66 line farther inland and then to push west, destroying the Japanese or driving them from the island. General Collins’ 25th Division (with 3/182, Marines of 1/2 and the American Reconnaissance Squadron attached) would advance west of Mount Austen on the extended flank inland, and at the same time assume responsibility for the Gifu Pocket which now would be behind the XIV Corps line. (See Map 27, Map Section).

The 2d Marine Division (less 1/2) would provide the corps’ right element from the 25th Division’s north flank to the beach. The Americal Division (minus the 182d Infantry, division artillery, and 2/132) would hold the main perimeter.

Since the 25th Division apparently would have some fighting to do before it could come abreast of the Point Cruz-Hill 66 line, its phase of the offensive was the first ordered into action. Colonel Robert B. McClure’s 35th Infantry, with the Division Reconnaissance Troop and 3/182 attached, was ordered to relieve the 132d Infantry at the Gifu and then advance to the west on the division’s inland flank. The 27th Infantry (Colonel William A. McCulloch) would capture the high ground south of Hill 66 between the northwest and southwest forks of the Matanikau. The 161st Infantry (Colonel Clarence A. Orndorff) would be the division reserve.

The ground thus assigned to the 27th Infantry consisted of a jumble of hills (dubbed the Galloping Horse because of their appearance on aerial photographs) which lie some 1,500 yards south of Hill 66. Army units began their attacks against this terrain on 10 January, and, during the final actions here three days later, Marines on the right flank of the corps line began their forward movement.

Launching its attack with the 8th Marines on the right and the 2d on the left, the 2d Division immediately encountered a series of cross compartments in which the Japanese had established very effective defensive positions. Using a minimum of men and weapons, the enemy fired down the long axis of these valleys which were perpendicular to the Marine advance, and thus engaged the attackers in a cross fire in each terrain compartment.

Enemy positions of this type held up the 8th Marines throughout the day, but two battalions of the 2d Marines advanced about 1,000 yards on the inland flank. The 6th Marines then moved up to relieve the 2d Marines which was long overdue for withdrawal from the Guadalcanal area. Lines were adjusted at this time. The 8th Marines now was on the left and the 6th along the coast. This relief was completed by 15 January, and the 2d Marines sailed for New Zealand.

The 8th Marines hammered at the ravine defenses of the Japanese, and operations along the coast during this phase of the campaign as well as during actions later in January provided the first opportunity for Marines to test, in a rudimentary way, their principles of naval gunfire in support of a continuing attack.
against an enemy. The four destroyers in action fired only deep support missions in this phase of the advance, however, and close-in fighting of the Japanese held the 8th Marines to insignificant gains until the afternoon of 15 January when flame throwers were put in action for the first time on this front. Three Japanese emplacements were burned out that day, and the attack, supported by tanks, began to move forward. By the end of 17 January the 8th Marines had advanced to positions abreast the 6th Marines.

The naval gunfire during this period indicated that both Marines and ships had much to learn. The Navy’s peacetime training had not stressed this type of support, and likewise the Marine division had no naval gunfire organization or practice. There was no JASCO (Joint Assault Signal Company) such as appeared later, and no organic shore fire control parties or naval gunfire liaison teams in the infantry battalions and regiments.

But here along Guadalcanal’s coast, Marines and ships took advantage of their new freedom from air and surface attacks to develop some gunfire procedures. Each direct support artillery battalion had two naval officers trained in naval gunfire principles, and these officers were sent out with FO (forward observer) teams to train them in shore fire control party (SFCP) duties. And while the naval officers ashore schooled Marine forward observers, artillery officers from the division went on board the support ships to inform commanders and gunnery officers of the missions desired by the division.

In addition to establishing some sound naval gunfire practices which would be most helpful in later Pacific assaults, the Marine action since 13 January had gained approximately 1,500 yards, killed over 600 Japanese, and captured two prisoners and a variety of enemy weapons and ammunition.

While the Marines fought along the coast, the 35th Infantry (reinforced) battled about 3,000 yards through the twisted ridges of an area southeast of the 25th Division’s inland flank to take the Sea Horse complex (so called because it looked like one on an aerial photograph), and finally cleared Colonel Oka’s defenders out of the Gifu Pocket.

The western line of XIV Corps now extended from Hill 53, the head of the Galloping Horse, north to a coastal flank some 1,500 yards west to Point Cruz. With elements of the 35th Infantry south of the Galloping Horse to guard against a flanking attack from that direction, the Americans at last were poised on a line of departure from which an attack could be launched to Kokumbona and beyond.

**DRIVE TO THE WEST**

Hoping to trap the Japanese at Kokumbona, General Patch in early January had sent a reinforced company (I) of the 147th Infantry around Cape Esperance in LCT’s to Beaufort Bay on the island’s southwest coast, and from there the force advanced up the overland trail toward Kokumbona to block the mountain passes against a possible Japanese escape to the

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8 Although the 1st MarDiv landing was supported by naval gunfire, subsequent support fire from ships had been infrequent and on a catch-as-catch-can basis. Col F. P. Henderson, “Naval Gunfire in the Solomons—Part I: Guadalcanal,” *MC Gazette*, March 1956, 44-51.

9 Ibid.
With this unit in place, the XIV Corps attack jumped off with the 25th Division on the left to envelop the enemy south flank, and the CAM Division (Composite Army-Marine) to advance west along the coast. The CAM Division consisted of the 6th Marines, the 182d and 147th Infantry regiments, and artillery of the Americal and 2d Marine Division. (See Map 28, Map Section)

The 25th Division began its flanking movement on 20 January, swinging toward Kokumbona and taking Hills 90 and 98 by 21 January. This high ground, immediately south of Kokumbona, was in front of the CAM Division and dominated the coastal area around the Japanese base. The enemy troops facing the CAM Division thus were outflanked and partially surrounded by the two forces. The attack continued on 23 January when the 27th Infantry occupied Kokumbona, but by this time most of the enemy already had slipped away along the coast.

Meanwhile, the CAM Division on 22 January had opened a full-scale attack with the 6th Marines on the right by the beach, the 147th Infantry in the center, and the 182d Infantry on the left. Again the Marines had called on naval gunfire, and this time four destroyers provided close support to CAM troops who faced more cross compartments forward of Kokumbona.

A radio spotting frequency was assigned the four SFCPs serving with the assault battalions of the 6th Marines and the 182d Infantry, and on this frequency the shore spotters called in fire missions from the destroyers. Another frequency was established between the Division Naval Gunfire Officer (NGFO) and all four of the destroyers, and forward spotters also could use this net if the need arose.

In this phase of the corps advance, Marines in the CAM Division ran into the strongest opposition, and they were stopped the first day by about 200 Japanese in a ravine west of Hill 94. With the help of the close-in naval gunfire adding its weight to artillery, air, and infantry weapons, this opposition was overcome by noon of 24 January when the CAM Division made contact with the 25th Division on the high ground above Kokumbona. Although some of the fighting had been most difficult, the Japanese were pulling back slowly. It appeared that they would probably establish strong defenses farther west.

Actually there would be more stiff fighting on the island, but no all-out stand of Japanese on a strong line of defense, and no more Japanese reinforcements to face. Tokyo and Rabaul had called new signals, and General Hyakutake was withdrawing his troops. The situation now was reversing itself. The U. S. operation, starting as a shoestring, had slowly added other cords in a warp and woof of fabric with a definite pattern. But the Japanese conquest string had ended in the Solomons and New Guinea, and never had a firm knot tied in the end of it.

Affairs in New Guinea suffered when Hyakutake's reserves were diverted from a planned reinforcement there to the No-
November attempt to retake Guadalcanal. Now a small force of Japanese had met with disaster trying to recapture Port Moresby from across the Owen Stanley Mountains, and the 50,000 troops General Imamura brought down from Java to reinforce Hyakutake would have to be used in New Guinea. Around 15 December the Japanese decided to evacuate Guadalcanal and build up new defenses farther north in the Solomon chain. The starving troops on the island would fight delaying actions toward Cape Esperance, and they would be evacuated in detachments from that point by fast destroyers. Commanding these destroyers would be Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi, former chief of staff of the Second Fleet. He had replaced the wounded and exhausted Admiral Tanaka, who now was on his way to the home islands where he would serve on the Naval General Staff.

XIV Corps maintained the momentum of its western advance by resupplying its attacking divisions over the beach at Kokumbona, where the Tokyo Express had often unloaded, and ordering the attack to push on toward the Poha River, a stream some 2,500 yards beyond Hyakutake's former headquarters village. The 2d Battalion, 27th Infantry met opposition in the high ground south and west of Kokumbona, but this was overcome in attacks of 24 and 25 January, and units of the regiment reached the Poha before dark on the 25th. (See Map 28, Map Section)

**FINAL PURSUIT**

After the corps advance reached the Poha River, intelligence sources began reporting a new buildup of Japanese ships at Rabaul and in the Shortlands, and the Allied command concluded that the enemy was ready for still another attempt to retake Guadalcanal. Admiral Halsey deployed six task forces south of Guadalcanal, and General Patch recalled the 25th Division from the western advance to bolster the perimeter. It was the same problem General Vandegrift had faced so many times in the past, but now there were more troops and the western attack did not have to be completely stopped. Pursuit of the Japanese was assigned to the CAM Division.

This estimate of Japanese intentions slowed pursuit of the enemy and probably aided their escape, but the mistake was an honest one. Actually the Japanese strength at Rabaul had been mounting, and the basic intelligence was good. But this time the activity in the Bismarcks and the Shortlands was the result of Japanese plans to complete the evacuation of Guadalcanal and to start new defensive installations closer to Rabaul.

By this time the Japanese had nearly completed their withdrawal to evacuation areas around Cape Esperance, and when regiments of the CAM Division launched their new attacks early on 26 January they advanced rapidly along the narrow coastal corridor against slight opposition. Naval gunfire again was employed, but once more it fired in deep support at targets of opportunity and to interdict the coastal trail forward of the advancing troops. (See Map 29)

The Marines and soldiers gained 1,000 yards the first day and 2,000 yards the second. Opposition now was such that General Patch on 29 January brought the 182d Infantry back to the perimeter and ordered the 147th Infantry to continue the pursuit while the 6th Marines covered the rear of the Army regiment. The advance
JAPANESE EVACUATION NIGHTS 1/2, 4/5 AND 7/8 JANUARY – 9 FEBRUARY 1943

FINAL PHASE
26 January - 9 February 1943

MAP 29

PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL
resumed on 30 January, and the soldiers ran into resistance near the mouth of the Bonegi River about 2,000 yards northwest of the Poha. There the units fought until 2 February when the Japanese withdrew. The U. S. force advanced again next day, and on 5 February the 147th held up 1,000 yards short of the Umasami River, a stream some 2,500 yards northwest of Tassafaronga Point.

Meanwhile, to form a new trap for the retreating Japanese, General Patch on 31 January dispatched the reinforced 2d Battalion, 132d Infantry around Cape Esperance to land near the western tip of the island. From that point the battalion was to advance to Cape Esperance and cut off the Japanese line of retreat. After landing early on 1 February at Verahue, the force advanced to the village of Titi, nearly a third of the way to the cape. By 7 February this force was ready to push on from that village, and the north coast attack was prepared to advance beyond the Umasami River.

By this time the 147th Infantry had been relieved at the Umasami by the 161st Infantry of the 25th Division, and on 8 February this regiment reached Doma Cove some eight miles from Esperance. On the same date 2/132 arrived at Kamimbo Bay a short distance from the tip of the island, and on 9 February the two units met at the village of Tenaru on the coast below the high ground of the cape. Only token resistance had been met in these final days. Evacuation of the Japanese from the island had been completed on the night of 7–8 February.

The Guadalcanal campaign was over. When the two units met at Tenaru village, General Patch sent to Admiral Halsey a message announcing “Total and complete defeat of Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. . . .” From a hazardous early step up the long island path toward Tokyo, the Allies had gained a solid footing which would become an all-important base until after the mounting of the final offensive against Okinawa two years later.

Happy to hear the news that Guadalcanal was at last secured—but hardly disappointed that they had not been there for the final chase—were the veterans of the 1st Marine Division in Australia, the 2d and 8th Marines in New Zealand, and the 1st Raider and 1st Parachute Battalions in New Caledonia. These old island hands were resting, fighting off recurring attacks of malaria, getting the jungle out of their blood, and already training for their next campaign.

**EPILOGUE**

Guadalcanal was the primer of ocean and jungle war. It was everything the United States could do at that moment against everything the Japanese could manage at that place. From this the Americans learned that they could beat the enemy, and they never stopped doing it. The headlines from Guadalcanal did more for home front morale than did the fast carrier raids of 1942’s winter and early spring, for at last Americans had come to grips with the enemy; and the outcome of this fighting added in the bargain a boost to the spirit of the Pacific fighting man. The benefits from official

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and unofficial circulation of lessons learned there by the Army, Navy, and Marines were many and far-reaching.

Veterans of all ranks from all branches of the service came home to teach and spread the word while many more stayed on to temper the replacements coming out to the war. Barracks bull sessions and bivouac yarns added color and not a little weight to the formal periods of instruction. Thus was the myth that the Japanese were supermen shattered, and the bits of combat lore or the legendary tall tales and true which begin, “Now, on the ‘Canal . . .” still have not entirely disappeared from the Marine repertoire.

General Vandegrift summed it up in a special introduction to The Guadalcanal Campaign, the historical monograph which contains the Marine Corps' first study of the operation:

We struck at Guadalcanal to halt the advance of the Japanese. We did not know how strong he was, nor did we know his plans. We knew only that he was moving down the island chain and that he had to be stopped.

We were as well trained and as well armed as time and our peacetime experience allowed us to be. We needed combat to tell us how effective our training, our doctrines, and our weapons had been.

We tested them against the enemy, and we found that they worked. From that moment in 1942, the tide turned, and the Japanese never again advanced.

Likewise, Guadalcanal was more than just another battle for the Japanese, but the lesson they learned there was a bitter one. The occupation which they started almost on a whim had ended in disaster, and from this they never quite recovered. Captain Ohmae summed it up:

... when the war started, it was not planned to take the Solomons. However, the early actions were so easy that it was decided to increase the perimeter defense line and to gain a position which would control American traffic to Australia. Expansion into the Solomons from Rabaul was then carried out. Unfortunately, we also carried out the expansion at the same time instead of consolidating our holdings in that area. After you captured Guadalcanal, we still thought that we would be able to retake it and use it as an outpost for the defense of the empire. This effort was very costly, both at the time and in later operations, because we were never able to recover from the ship and pilot losses received in that area.12

Unfortunately for the Japanese there were very few lessons from Guadalcanal that they could put to effective use. In a sense this was phase one of their final examination, the beginning of a series of tests for the military force which had conquered the Oriental side of the Pacific, and they failed it. After this there was neither time nor means for another semester of study and preparation. Admiral Tanaka had this to say about the operation and its significance:

Operations to reinforce Guadalcanal extended over a period of more than five months. They amounted to a losing war of attrition in which Japan suffered heavily in and around that island . . . There is no question that Japan's doom was sealed with the closing of the struggle for Guadalcanal. Just as it betokened the military character and strength of her opponent, so it presaged Japan's weakness and lack of planning that would spell her defeat.13

The Allies entered this first lesson with sound textbooks. In the field of amphibious warfare, Marine doctrine hammered out in the peacetime laboratory now could be polished and improved in practice and supported by a rapidly mobilizing industrial front at home. Modern equipment which everybody knew was needed began to flow out to the test of combat. There

12 Ohmae Interrogation, 474.
13 Tanaka Article, II, 831.
it took on refinements and practical modifications, as doctrines and techniques improved. New models continued to arrive and were quickly put to use in the hands of now-skilled fighting men.

For example, landing craft which went into mass production aided the tactical aspects of amphibious assaults and also lessened the logistical problems at the beachhead. Improved communications equipment made it possible for the Marine Corps to improve and make more effective many of the special organizations and operational techniques which previously had been little more than carefully-sketched theory. Air and naval gunfire liaison parties experimented with on Guadalcanal later became the efficient tools of integrated warfare that Marines had been confident they could become. Improved equipment brought improved technique, and thus began a continuous cycle of increasing efficiency which made the final amphibious assaults by cooperating U. S. forces at Iwo Jima and Okinawa remarkable models of military precision.

This strength of new equipment and ability enabled the Allies to take command of the strategy in a contest in which the enemy had been able to set his men for a checkmate before the contest began. The psychology of total war found expression for the front-line Marine in his observation that “the only good Jap is a dead one.” But an even better one was the one bypassed and left to ineffective existence on an island in the rear areas: he cost the Allies less. Strength gave the Allies this capability to bypass many garrisons.

Likewise Guadalcanal proved that it often was cheaper and easier to build a new airfield than to capture and then improve one the Japanese had built or were building. This coincided well with the basic amphibious doctrine long agreed upon: never hit a defended beach if the objective can be reached over an undefended one. Together these principles sometimes made it possible for the Allies to land on an enemy island and build an airfield some distance from the hostile garrison. This the Marines did in November 1943, at Bougainville. A perimeter was established around the airfield, and there defenders sat waiting for the Japanese to do the hard work of marching over difficult terrain to present themselves for a battle if they so desired. It was a premeditated repeat of the Guadalcanal tactic, and when the Japanese obliged by so accepting it, they were defeated.

All services, units and men in the Pacific, or slated to go there, were eager to learn the valuable lessons of early combat and to put them into practice. For the Marine Corps, an important factor in the continuing success of the advance across the Pacific was the delineation of command responsibilities between the naval task force commander and the amphibious troop commander.

Late in this first offensive General Vandegrift was able to initiate an important change in naval thinking concerning the command of amphibious operations. The general and Admiral Turner had often disagreed on the conduct of activities ashore on Guadalcanal, and Vandegrift had maintained that the commander trained for ground operations should not be a subordinate of the local naval amphibious force commander. His theory prevailed, and in the future the amphibious troops commander, once established ashore, would be on the same command
level as the naval task force commander. Both of them would be responsible to a common superior.

With this point cleared, and with the valuable lessons of Guadalcanal combat a part of his personal experience and knowledge, Vandegrift as a lieutenant general became commander of the I Marine Amphibious Corps in the fall of 1943 and was able to guide an ever-expanding fighting force already involved in new actions in the Solomons. Later, on 10 November 1943, he left the Pacific to become the eighteenth Commandant of the Marine Corps.

The cost of Guadalcanal was not as great as some later operations. Total Army and Marine casualties within the ground forces amounted to 1,598 men and officers killed and 4,709 wounded. Marines of the ground forces killed or dead from wounds numbered 1,152; and 2,799 were wounded and 55 listed as missing. In addition 55 individuals from Marine aviation units were killed or died of wounds while 127 were wounded and 85 missing.\textsuperscript{13} Defeat for the Japanese was more costly. Although some 13,000 enemy soldiers were evacuated from Guadalcanal for new defensive positions farther north, more personnel than this had lost their lives on the island. Japanese sources list approximately 14,800 killed or missing in action while 9,000 died of wounds and disease. Some 1,000 enemy troops were taken prisoner. More than 600 enemy planes and pilots also were lost.

Combat shipping losses were about even for the two opponents. The Allies and the Japanese each lost 24 fighting ships, with the loss amounting to 126,240 tons for the Allies and 134,839 tons for the Japanese.

There would be bigger battles later. There would be tiny atolls for which the Japanese would demand higher prices on shorter terms. And far away to the north a dead volcano waited to be the backdrop of a photograph which would become the symbol of the entire island war ahead. But nothing could take from Guadalcanal its unique spot in history. The first step, however short and faltering, is always the most important.

\textsuperscript{13} A tabulation of Marine casualties appears in Appendix D.
APPENDIX A

Bibliographical Notes

This history is based principally on official Marine Corps records: the reports, diaries, orders, etc., of the units or activities involved in the specific operations described. Records of the other armed services have been consulted where pertinent. On matters pertaining to operations at high strategic level, the authors have drawn on the records of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Because this volume spans a considerable period of time and deals with a wide variety of activities, the same records seldom overlap from one part of the book to another. These are fully cited in the text and will be discussed separately as applicable to specific parts. Except as otherwise noted such records are on file at, or obtainable through, the Records and Research Section, Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.

There are, however, a number of published works of general interest more widely cited throughout this volume. The more important of these are listed below.

Books

Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. This deals with the evolution of amphibious doctrines, tactics, and materiel and their application in the Pacific. This excellent study was undertaken by the history faculty of Princeton University at the behest of the Marine Corps. In no sense an official history, the conclusions it contains were arrived at independently by the authors and researchers who compiled it.

Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volumes III, IV, V. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1948, 1949, 1950. The volumes cited bear the individual titles: The Rising Sun in the Pacific; Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions; and The Struggle for Guadalcanal. Although he disclaims his work as official, Rear Admiral Morison (USNR, Retired) undertook the monumental project on naval order and has carried it through with all possible support of the Navy. The author ranks as one of our leading writers and historians, and the whole series is highly readable and reliable. A few minor errors of fact that crept into the first editions are being corrected in subsequent printings.

Robert Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II. Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1952. This is another unofficial history undertaken at the request, and with the support, of the Marine Corps. The title is self-explanatory, but the author gives some account of the earlier days of Marine Corps Aviation. It is by far the most comprehensive treatment of this subject now in existence.

E. B. Potter (Editor), The United States and World Sea Power. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955. This large (963 pages) single-volume history is the work of twelve faculty members of the Department of English, History and Government, U. S. Naval Academy. It is extremely comprehensive in scope, covering naval history from ancient operations to today. As a result comparatively few of its chapters are applicable to Marine Corps operations in World War II. It furnished the authors of this book, however, much valuable background.

Ernst J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1952. This somewhat heavy-handed tome sheds many interesting sidelights on high-level decisions and how they were arrived at.


Masuo Kate, The Lost War. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1946. Kate, a Japanese news corre-
spondent in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor, was interned and then repatriated in the civilian exchange ship. He understands thoroughly both Japanese and U. S. points of view. His "inside story" presents vividly political, military, and civilian conditions in Japan as the war developed and sheds much light on why they developed as they did on the enemy's side.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946. This is a report of USSBS (Pacific) Naval Analysis Division. It attempts to present the broad picture of the war through brief descriptions of the various campaigns, but unfortunately was prepared too soon after the event to gain deep perspective. The text contains many factual inaccuracies. This book is of great value, however, in presenting translations of many enemy documents that reveal Japanese wartime thinking.


PART I

INTRODUCTION TO THE MARINE CORPS

Official Documents

Annual Reports of the Commandant of the Marine Corps constitute the basic primary source relied upon in tracing the growth and development of the Marine Corps throughout the period under consideration. These are supplemented by pertinent reports at lower levels, as indicated in the text. More detailed breakdown of personnel statistics derives from study of contemporary muster rolls.

In dealing with the evolution of amphibious doctrine Marine Corps and Navy manuals pertaining to landing operations, issued during the period under discussion, are the principal sources. Files of Headquarters Marine Corps have been consulted in tracing the origin and development of the Fleet Marine Force. These files, together with those of the Navy Depart-
Corps Gazette, June-October 1948. General Smith probably contributed more than any single individual to the developments which he discusses in this authoritative five-part article.

John H. Russell, Jr., "Birth of the Fleet Marine Force," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1946. As Assistant Commandant, General Russell conceived the FMF essentially as it exists today; as Commandant, he guided it through its early formative years.

Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, Coral and Brass. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949. In this autobiographical volume, General Smith touches again on the early struggles dealt with in his Gazette series and carries the story through the Pacific war.

Major General John A. Lejeune, "The United States Marine Corps," Marine Corps Gazette, December 1923. In this article, General Lejeune, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, expresses the prevailing Marine Corps thought on advance base operations.

Brigadier General Dion Williams, "Blue Marine Corps Expeditionary Force," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1925. In this article, General Williams discusses the Army-Navy amphibious maneuver held in Hawaiian waters in 1925.


Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, "The Framework of Hemisphere Defense," MS of a forthcoming volume in the series, United States Army in World War II, has been most useful in presenting the Army's viewpoint of the problems presented by the Iceland operation. Dr. Fairchild also made available the final draft manuscripts of several chapters he wrote for a further OCMH volume on Army operations in the Eastern Atlantic (as yet untitled) which detail the progress of the occupation and examine Iceland's peculiar command situation.

PART II

WAR COMES

Official Documents

Reports of the units involved, as cited in the text, form the basis of the narrative of Marine garrison activities in Samoa and the 14th Naval District. All Marine records on Guam were either destroyed or captured and the reconstruction of the action on 8–10 December is largely taken from the post-captivity report of the island's governor.

The primary source of information on the actions of the United States and Japan in the period immediately before, during, and just after the Japanese raid on Pearl is Senate Document No. 244, 79th Congress, Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. In addition to the basic report of the findings of the committee, there are 39 volumes of hearings, testimony, and exhibits which touch on every facet of the story. The record of the hearings and the appended documents constitute a unique 10,000,000-word examination of a military disaster.

Unofficial Documents

Unofficial reports, personal letters, notes and interviews of numerous individuals, and on occasion unpublished manuscripts, have been drawn upon to supplement official material where pertinent. An especially valuable source of information has been the comments of key participants in the actions described who reviewed draft manuscripts of this history as well as drafts of previous campaign monographs. Unofficial comment of this type, as cited in the text, has been especially helpful in developing a fuller story of the initial action at Midway.

Books and Periodicals

In dealing with the broader aspects of the war and decisions and events on a high strategic plane, two volumes of the Army's official history United States Army in World War II have been most useful. They present a lucid account of thought and planning at Chief of Staff level with very detailed citation of sources consulted:

Mark S. Watson, Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950.


Major O. R. Lodge, The Recapture of Guam. Washington: Historical Branch, G–3 Division,
Headquarters Marine Corps, 1954. While this monograph is primarily concerned with the operations on Guam in the summer of 1944, it does include a narrative of the Japanese capture of the island which is the basis for this volume's story.

Thomas Wilds, "The Japanese Seizure of Guam," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1955. This article by an accomplished Japanese translator is the only published narrative taken from enemy sources of the capture of the island and is essential to a clear picture of the operation.

PART III
DEFENSE OF WAKE

Official Documents

Official records pertaining to the defense of Wake ceased to exist with the atoll's capture by the Japanese, save for the dispatches which got through to Pearl Harbor and the reports carried out by Major Bayler several days prior to the final struggle, as related in the narrative.

Upon his return after release from Japanese prison camp, Colonel Devereux requested each of his surviving officers to submit to him an informal report concerning his part in the operation. From study of the material thus obtained and the promptings of his own memory, Devereux then prepared his official report for submission to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Colonel Paul A. Putnam submitted a similar report as CO of VMF-211. These comprise the basic sources from which the version of the operation contained herein derives.

Unofficial Documents

Eighteen officers submitted informal reports to Colonel Devereux, and six of these later filled out a special questionnaire prepared by the Historical Branch. These papers, together with copies of pertinent correspondence and notes and transcriptions of interviews with individuals, are on file in Marine Corps Archives.

Books and Periodicals

The defense of Wake figures more or less incidentally in all of the works of general interest previously described. But comparatively little has been published about the details of the operation itself. Since it was so narrowly a Marine action, the other services have shown little interest in studying it, and within the Corps few remain who know much about it. The following works, however, are deemed worthy of mention:

Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., The Defense of Wake. Washington: Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1947. This is the official Marine Corps historical monograph from which the version in this book has been adapted.

James P. S. Devereux, The Story of Wake Island. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1947. This work prepared by the commander of the Wake defense with some professional literary assistance does not pretend to be a history, but it does contain a number of human interest sidelights not found elsewhere.

Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. J. Bayler, Last Man of Wake Island. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1943. This book was rushed to publication to shed timely light on an event currently before the public eye. Memories of the events during his stay on Wake were still fresh in Colonel Bayler's mind at the time of writing; but, of course, he did not see the final battle.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., "We're Headed for Wake," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1946. Lieutenant Colonel Heinl, then a first lieutenant, was a member of the abortive relief expedition and here gives a full account of that little understood event from the point of view of those engaged in it.

PART IV
MARINES IN THE PHILIPPINES

Official Documents

Just before the fall of Corregidor an American submarine took off a load of escapees and a scant haul of the records of units that had fought the Japanese on Luzon. Fortunately, these records included the daily journals of the 4th Marines operations and intelligence sections plus a very few other papers and reports, mostly interleaved in the journal copy books. For some reason, not now known, this contemporary material has been ignored until the writing of this volume. In the
few previous accounts which mention Marine action in the Philippines, there are a number of direct contradictions to the entries in these journals. None of these errors are particularly serious, however, and where it was possible they have been corrected in this version of the action.

A number of the official reports cited, including that of the 4th Marines, were drawn up long after the events they describe by participants who survived captivity. The details of these reports are somewhat suspect since the accounts are distillations of memory, carefully hidden notes, and those few official papers of the period that were available when the reports were prepared. It is not difficult to find minor errors in these reports, but on the whole they are quite valuable.

The cited narratives compiled by Admirals Hart and Rockwell, together with their supplementary postwar comments on naval activities in Asiatic waters, have been very helpful in establishing the background of the Navy and Marine Corps contribution to the defense of the Philippines.

Unofficial Documents

A number of undated informal reports submitted by survivors of the 4th Marines, presumably written right after the war, form the largest body of information about the Marine part in the Philippines operation. These reports are frequently cited in the text. Of almost equal importance are the letters of comment received from over 25 survivors who read the preliminary draft of this part. These men were able to clear up many puzzling matters of command relationship and small unit action that were left unanswered in official documents and the personal accounts mentioned above. The narrative of the fighting in the East Sector on Corregidor is drawn in large part from these letters and unofficial reports.

A Marine reserve officer, Captain Grant J. Berry, has compiled an interesting story of the 4th Marines in the Philippines, much of it based upon correspondence with survivors. He used this material to write his master’s thesis at the University of California in 1951. A copy of the thesis and a portion of his correspondence with former members of the 4th Marines is on file in the Marine Corps Archives.

Japanese Sources

Following the close of the war, the U. S. Army’s Historical Section, G-2, General Headquarters, Far East Command, sponsored and directed the preparation of a series of monographs entitled Japanese Studies in World War II. These were prepared by Japanese commanders and staff officers who had participated in the various Pacific campaigns; and they were compiled from reports, notes, and consultation with key survivors. These translated studies have been checked carefully against all other available sources and found to be remarkably accurate. In the case of the early Philippines campaign several of these monographs have been consulted and the two-volume study of Fourteenth Army operations has been used frequently to give the enemy viewpoint. This particular monograph is very uneven in quality but it includes a wealth of information available nowhere else.

Books and Periodicals

Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953. Dr. Morton’s book is another of the volumes of the United States Army in World War II series. It presents what is easily the most comprehensive and thorough treatment of this subject yet to appear in print.

Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (Editors), Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942—The Army Air Forces in World War II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. This is the first of a series of official histories, subsequent volumes of which will be cited throughout this history when Army air operations have a bearing on the narrative of Marine action.

General Jonathan C. Wainwright, General Wainwright’s Story, Robert Considine (Editor). Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1946. Although much of this book is devoted to General Wainwright’s experiences as a Japanese prisoner, the early portions shed some interesting first-hand sidelights on the fighting on Bataan and Corregidor.

Kazumaro Uno, Corregidor: Isle of Delusion, Shanghai: Press Bureau of the Imperial Japanese Army Headquarters in China, 1942. This
propaganda booklet, printed in English, contains a number of second-hand accounts of enemy experiences in the seizure of Corregidor. The book has been used principally to give personality to the enemy side of the action. A photostatic copy of this book is held by the Office of the Chief of Military History.

Hanson W. Baldwin, “The 4th Marines at Corregidor,” Marine Corps Gazette, November 1946-February 1947. One of today’s leading analysts and writers on military subjects carefully combed the 4th Marines’ report, the personal narratives of survivors mentioned above, and consulted numerous individual participants in compiling his detailed four-part article on the stand of the regiment on Corregidor. The primary fault of the study is that it failed to utilize the existing 4th Marine journals and therefore has perpetuated a number of minor errors regarding the combat organization and strength of the regiment.

First Lieutenant William F. Hogaboom, “Action Report—Bataan,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 1946. Lieutenant Hogaboom died while he was a prisoner of war but his narrative, secretly compiled during captivity, survived him and was published under this title. Hogaboom participated in both of the major Marine actions in the Philippines, Longoskawayan Point and Corregidor’s defense.

Lieutenant Colonel William F. Prickett, “Naval Battalion at Mariveles,” Marine Corps Gazette, June 1950. This article by a survivor of 3/4 who talked to many participants in the Longoskawayan action disagrees in some few respects with the official version of this action given in Commander Bridget’s report. Prickett’s story is in much more detail, however, than any official history, and well worth reading.

PART V
DECISION AT MIDWAY

Official Documents

In course of preparation of the historical monograph on which this account is mainly based, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., carried on extensive correspondence with individuals who held key positions on Midway before and during the attack. Many of these he interviewed personally. Some of this documentation is cited in the text; much more, of incidental interest, is on file in Marine Corps Archives.

Books and Periodicals

As with preceding descriptions of naval operations, the previously cited sources have been relied on. In addition, the following works have been extensively consulted and used for this part:

Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Marines at Midway. Washington: Historical Section, Division of Public Information, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1948. This is the historical monograph which, much-edited and re-worked, forms the foundation for the present account.

M. Fuchida and M. Okumiya, Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan. Annapolis: U. S. Naval Institute, 1955. This is an excellent account of the battle from the Japanese side of the action.

Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, IJN, “Action Report by C-in-C of the First Air Fleet,” ONI Review, May 1947. This article is simply a translation of what must stand as one of the most revealing documents obtained from the Japanese following the war. It is Admiral Nagumo’s official report of the debacle in which he played the leading part. It is frank and factual to a surprising degree, and detailed to the extent of including charts showing the exact location of each bomb hit on each of the four carriers destroyed. It also includes a chronological log of all messages sent and received during the entire period of the approach, action, and withdrawal.

PART VI
GUADALCANAL

Official Documents

In coverage of the strategic planning for Guadalcanal this text cites much official corre-
spondence and planning at top level. The correspondence between Admiral King and General Marshall was obtained from the Naval History Division; material pertaining to the Joint Chiefs of Staff was furnished by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army.

As in all operations discussed in this history, those in Part VI are based on the reports of the units concerned. These include action reports, war diaries, etc., of tactical units, and the journals of the various staff sections. At this stage of the war, however, Marines were less experienced in preparing reports than they became later. Command and staff personnel believed fighting to be more important than writing. Thus the documentation on many phases of early operations is fragmentary and incomplete. The 1st Marine Division’s “Final Report on the Guadalcanal Operation” was not compiled until several months after the campaign, although much of the material it contains was prepared on the scene.

The Army and Navy were little better than the Marine Corps in this respect; their official documentation also leaves much to be desired. Generally speaking, the records of reporting units are in the custody of the service to which they belong.

Unofficial Documents

In the course of preparing the Marine Corps preliminary monograph on Guadalcanal, Major John L. Zimmerman circulated copies of his preliminary draft among many individuals who participated in that operation. These elicited many factual corrections and cogent comments which are included in the text. He also interviewed some of these officers. Notes or transcriptions of these interviews, together with all pertinent correspondence, are available through Marine Corps Archives.

Books and Periodicals

As the first protracted ground operation of the war, Guadalcanal elicited a spate of published material. Much of this was journalistic in nature; but in addition to these works of general interest, the following apply more narrowly to the historical examination of the campaign:

Major John L. Zimmerman, The Guadalcanal Campaign. Washington: Historical Division, Headquarters Marine Corps, 1949. This is the Marine Corps’ preliminary study which serves as the groundwork for the present, completely revised and much more complete, account of the battle.

John Miller, Jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive. Washington: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1949. This excellent volume is one in the series United States Army in World War II, and it has been relied on for much of the interpretation of material pertaining to Army command and operations of Army units.

Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (Editors), The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950. Volume IV of the series The Army Air Forces in World War II, this deals in greater detail with aviation operations than is practical in a general history of the campaign.


Eric A. Feldt, The Coastricators. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946. Commander Feldt, RAN, organized and commanded that hardy band of rugged individualists who lurked in the jungle behind the Japanese lines and radioed out invaluable information to the Allied forces. Here he tells for the first time the story which was top secret during the war.

Many articles in periodicals were likewise journalistic in nature. They provide valuable sources for information which helps fill the gaps of the official accounts, however, and they have been cited where used in the text. One article bears special mention:

Vice Admiral R. Tanaka with R. Pineau, “Japan’s Losing Struggle for Guadalcanal,” two parts, U.S.N. Proceedings, July and August 1956. This excellent article sheds much light on the Japanese side of the Guadalcanal operation, particularly on the dramatic comings and goings of the Tokyo Express, those determined destroyers and cruisers which guarded the convoys shuttling supplies and reinforcements from Rabaul and the Shortlands to Guadalcanal. With the kind permission of the Proceedings, this volume quotes many passages from this article.
Chronology

The following listing of events is limited to those coming within the scope of this book, and those forecasting events to be treated in the volumes to follow.

10 November 1775 . . Continental Congress authorizes raising of two battalions of Marines.

11 July 1798 . . . Congress reactivates Marine Corps.

10 June 1898 . . . Battalion of Marines seizes Guantanamo Bay; pre-
liminary thinking on Advanced Base concept begins.

10 December 1898 . . Spain cedes Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico to U. S.


25 April 1915 . . First modern amphibious assault; British land on Gallipoli.

27 April 1917 . . . First Marine aviation unit formed: “Marine Aeronautic Company, Advanced Base Force.”


7 December 1933 . . Fleet Marine Force established.


1 September 1939 . . Germans invade Poland; World War II begins.

1940

7 May . . . Pacific Fleet ordered by President to remain indefinitely in Hawaiian waters.

5 July . . . Export Control Act invoked against Japan to prohibit exportation of strategic materials and equipment.

19 July . . . President signs Naval Expansion Act containing provisions for “Two Ocean Navy.”

29 September . . Midway Detachment, FMF arrives at Midway.

8 October . . U. S. advises its citizens to leave Far East.

1941

12 May . . . Ambassador Nomura of Japan presents Secretary of State Cordell Hull with Japanese proposal for a “just peace in the Pacific.”

27 May . . . President declares a state of unlimited emergency; he announces that the Atlantic Neutrality Patrol is extended and that Pacific Fleet units have been transferred to the Atlantic.

12 June . . . All Naval Reserve personnel not in deferred status are called to active duty.

22 June . . . Germany, Italy, and Romania declare war on Russia and invade along a front from the Arctic to the Black Sea.
7 July . . . . . . . 1st Marine Brigade lands in Iceland. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing forms at Quantico, Va.
10 July . . . . . . 2d Marine Aircraft Wing forms at San Diego, Calif.
15 August . . . Naval Air Station, Palmyra Island, and Naval Air Facility, Johnston Island, established.
11 September . . . President orders Navy to attack any vessel threatening U. S. shipping.
14 November . . . Marines are ordered to leave Shanghai, Peiping, and Tientsin, China.
20 November . . . Ambassador Nomura presents Japan’s “final proposal” to keep peace in the Pacific.
26 November . . . Secretary of State submits final proposals for adjustment of U. S.-Japanese relations.
27 November . . . Adm Stark, CNO, sends war warning to commanders of the Pacific and Asiatic Fleets.
7 December . . . Japanese attack Pearl Harbor.
10 December . . . Guam surrenders to Japanese landing force.
20 December . . . Adm E. J. King becomes Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
21 December . . . Naval defense forces in Philippine Islands move headquarters to Corregidor.
22 December . . . Japanese land at Lingayen Gulf, P. I.
23 December . . . Wake Island surrenders to Japanese.
25 December . . . British surrender Hong Kong.
26 December . . . Manila, P. I., declared an open city.
31 December . . . Adm C. W. Nimitz assumes command of Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

1942

2 January . . . . Manila and Cavite, P. I., fall to Japanese.
22 January . . . . Allied forces evacuate Lae and Salamaua, New Guinea.
6 February .......... U. S. and Britain establish Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS).
8 February .......... Japanese land at Gasmata, New Britain.
15 February .......... Singapore surrenders.
27 February .......... Battle of Java Sea.
1 March .......... Battle of Sunda Strait.
9 March .......... Java surrenders to Japanese, ending conquest of Netherlands East Indies.
11 March .......... Gen MacArthur leaves Philippines for Australia.
12 March .......... U. S. forces arrive in New Caledonia.
26 March .......... Adm King relieves Adm Stark as Chief of Naval Operations.
29 March .......... Marines arrive at Efate, New Hebrides.
30 March .......... Pacific Ocean divided into Pacific Ocean Areas under Adm Nimitz, and Southwest Pacific Area under Gen MacArthur.
1 April .......... Japanese occupy Buka Island, Solomons.
5 April .......... Manus Island, Admiralties, occupied by Japanese.
9 April .......... Bataan falls to Japanese.
18 April .......... Doolittle raid strikes Tokyo, Yokosuka, Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagoya.
2 May .......... Japanese land on Florida Island, Solomons.
4–8 May .......... Battle of the Coral Sea.
6 May .......... Corregidor and Manila Bay forts surrender.
3 June .......... Japanese bomb Dutch Harbor; land on Kiska and Attu, Western Aleutians.
4–6 June .......... Battle of Midway.
14 June .......... First echelon of 1st MarDiv arrives at Wellington, New Zealand.
19 June .......... VAdm Ghormley assumes command of South Pacific Area and South Pacific Forces.
25 June .......... President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill conclude conference in Washington; decision reached for combined efforts to develop atomic bomb.
18 July .......... Amphibious Force, South Pacific Area, is established under command of RAdm Turner.
7 August .......... 1st MarDiv lands on Florida Island, Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and Guadalcanal in Southern Solomons to launch the first U. S. offensive of the war.
8 August .......... 1st MarDiv wins control of Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo and captures airfield on Guadalcanal.
9 August .......... Battle of Savo Island forces U. S. ships to retire from Guadalcanal area, leaving control of waters temporarily to Japanese.
17 August .......... 2d Raider Battalion (Carlson's Raiders) land from submarines at Makin Island in the Gilberts. Raid is completed following day.
CHRONOLOGY

20 August. First fighter aircraft arrive on Henderson Field, Guadalcanal.
21 August. Marines turn back first major Japanese attack on Guadalcanal in Battle of the Tenaru.
24-25 August. Naval Battle of Eastern Solomons.
13 September. Marines repulse second major Japanese ground attack at Guadalcanal in the Battle of the Ridge.
18 September. 7th Marines arrive on Guadalcanal.
11-12 October. Naval Battle of Cape Esperance. U. S. forces under Adm Spruance engage Japanese ships of the “Tokyo Express.”
13 October. 164th Infantry Regiment of Americal Division arrives to reinforce 1st MarDiv.
18 October. VAdm Halsey relieves VAdm Ghormley as Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force.
15 November. RAdm Lee with two battleships and four destroyers turns back large Japanese naval group to end naval Battle of Guadalcanal.
9 December. MajGen A. A. Vandegrift, CG 1st MarDiv, is relieved by MajGen A. M. Patch, CG Americal Division, as commanding general of Guadalcanal. 1st MarDiv makes preparations to retire from combat zone to rehabilitate and retrain.
17 December. U. S. Army forces begin attacks against Japanese in the Mount Austen area.

1943

10 January. Gen Patch's XIV Corps offensive to the west.
23 January. XIV Corps' westward advance captures Kokumbona on Guadalcanal coast.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 February</td>
<td>Japanese begin to evacuate troops from Guadalcanal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February</td>
<td>Evacuation of some 11,000 Japanese troops from Guadalcanal is completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 February</td>
<td>Gen Patch's Cape Esperance envelopment force joins with western advance and Guadalcanal is declared secure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

Marine Task Organization
and Command List

A. WAKE ATOLL (7–23 December 1941)

MARINE DETACHMENT, WAKE

CO.----------------- Maj James P. S. Devereux

1st Defense Battalion Detachment

CO.----------------- Maj James P. S. Devereux

5-Inch Artillery Group

CO.----------------- Maj George H. Potter
Btry A.---------- lstLt Clarence A. Barninger
Btry B.---------- lstLt Woodrow W. Kessler
Btry L.---------- 2dLt John A. McAlister

3-Inch Antiaircraft Group

CO.----------------- Capt Bryghte D. Godbold
Btry D.---------- Capt Bryghte D. Godbold
Btry E.---------- lstLt William W. Lewis
Btry F (Prov).---- MG Clarence B. McKinstry

Separate Batteries

Btry G.---------- Capt Wesley McC. Platt
Btry H.---------- 2dLt Robert M. Hanna
Btry I.---------- 2dLt Arthur A. Poindexter

Marine Fighter Squadron 211

CO.----------------- Maj Paul A. Putnam

B. PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (7 December 1941–6 May 1942)

4th Marines (Reinforced)

CO.----------------- Col Samuel L. Howard
ExO.----------------- Col Donald Curtis
R-1.----------------- Capt Robert B. Moore
R-2.----------------- lstLt Robert F. Ruge (To 24Dec)
LtCol George D. Hamilton (From 25Dec)
R-3.----------------- Maj Frank P. Pyziek
R-4.----------------- Maj Reginald H. Ridgely, Jr. (To 3Jan)
Maj Carl W. Meigs (From 4Jan)

HqCo.----------------- Capt Robert Chambers, Jr.
SerCo.----------------- Maj Max W. Schaeffer (WIA 6May)

1st Battalion, 4th Marines

CO.----------------- LtCol Curtis T. Beecher
ExO.----------------- LtCol Samuel W. Freeny (WIA 29Apr)
Bn-1.----------------- Capt Golland L. Clark, Jr.
Bn-2.----------------- Capt Golland L. Clark, Jr.
Bn-3.----------------- LtCol Samuel W. Freeny (WIA 29Apr)
Bn-4.----------------- lstLt Ralph R. Penick
HqCo.----------------- lstLt Golland L. Clark, Jr. (To 25Dec)
Capt Lewis H. Pickup (From 26Dec)

A Co.----------------- Maj Harry C. Lang (KIA 5May)
Capt Lewis H. Pickup (From 5May)

1 Unless otherwise noted, names, positions held, organization titles, and periods of service were taken from the muster rolls of the units concerned held in the Diary Unit, FilesSec, RecsBr, PersDept. HQMC. Officers are shown in the highest rank held during the period that they were assigned to the positions indicated.

2 Because of the incomplete nature of the muster rolls of the Wake Detachment, reference has been made to research conducted by LtCol R. D. Heinl for The Defense of Wake (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947) in order to complete this listing.

3 After 28Feb42, no muster rolls reached HQMC from the 4th Mar and information presented after that period was taken from the comments of survivors on draft listings and the few existing records of the regiment's actions on Corregidor.
PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

2nd Battalion, 4th Marines

CO................ LtCol Herman R. Anderson
ExO................ Maj John J. Heil
Bn-1................ 1stLt Hugh R. Nutter (To 28Dec)
                    Capt Lloyd E. Wagner
                    (From 29Dec)
Bn-2................ 1stLt Hugh R. Nutter (To 28Dec)
                    Capt Lloyd E. Wagner
                    (29Dec-6Jan)
                    1stLt Sidney F. Jenkins
                    (From 7Jan)
Bn-3................ Maj John J. Heil
Bn-4................ Capt Austin C. Shofner
HqCo................ 1stLt Austin C. Shofner
                    (to 4Jan)
                    Capt Lloyd E. Wagner
                    (From 5Jan)
E Co................ Maj James V. Bradley, Jr.
F Co................ Capt Lloyd E. Wagner (To 28Dec)
                    Capt Clyde R. Huddleson
                    (From 29Dec)
HCo................ Capt Benjamin L. McMakin
                    (WIA 26Mar)
BnResCo............ Capt Austin C. Shofner

3d Battalion, 4th Marines

CO................ LtCol John P. Adams
ExO................ Maj Andrew J. Mathiesen
Bn-1................ Capt George R. Weeks (To 31Dec)
                    Capt John W. Clark (From 1Jan)
Bn-2................ Capt William F. Prickett
Bn-3................ Maj Andrew J. Mathiesen
Bn-4................ Maj Carl W. Mcigs (To 4Jan)
                    Capt Roy L. Robinton
                    (From 5Jan)
HqCo................ Capt George R. Weeks (To 31Dec)
                    Capt John W. Clark (From 1Jan)

I Co................ Maj Max Clark (WIA 24Apr, 29Apr)
K Co................ Capt John W. Clark (To 31Dec)
                    Maj George R. Weeks (From 1Jan)
L Co................ 2dLt Willard D. Holdredge
                    (To 23Dec)
                    1stLt Howard L. Davis
                    (24-31Dec)
                    Capt Willis T. Geisman
                    (From 1Jan, WIA 20Apr)
M Co................ Capt Ted E. Pulos
BnResCo............ 1stLt Clarence E. Van Ray

4th Battalion (Provisional), 4th Marines

CO................ Maj Francis H. Williams
                    (WIA 29Apr, 6May)
Bn-1................ Capt Calvin E. Chunn, USA
                    (WIA 6May)
Bn-2................ Capt Calvin E. Chunn, USA
                    (WIA 6May)
Bn-3................ 1stLt Otis E. Saalman, USA
Bn-4................ Ens John McClure, USN
                    (WIA 6May)
Q Co................ Capt Paul E. Moore, USA
R Co................ Capt Harold E. Dalness, USA
S Co................ Lt Edward N. Little, USN
                    (WIA 6May)
                    1stLt Otis E. Saalman, USA
                    (From 6May)
T Co................ Lt Bethel B. Otter, USN
                    (KIA 6May)
                    Capt Calvin E. Chunn, USA
                    (From 6May, WIA 6May)

Regimental Reserve

CO................ Maj Stuart W. King (To 17Feb)
                    Maj Max W. Schaeffer
                    (From 18Feb, WIA 6May)
O Co................ Capt Robert Chambers, Jr.
                    (WIA 6May)
P Co................ 1stLt William F. Hogaboom
C. MIDWAY ISLANDS (4-5 June 1942)

6th Defense Battalion (Reinforced)

CO................ Col Harold D. Shannon
H&S Btry............ Capt William P. Spenser
### Marine Task Organization and Command List

#### 22d Prov MarCo
- 1st Lt George E. Metzenthin

#### 23d Prov MarCo
- Capt Boyd O. Whitney

### 5-Inch Artillery Group

| CO | LtCol Lewis A. Hohn |
| H&S Btry | LtCol Lewis A. Hohn |
| Btry A | Maj Loren S. Fraser |
| Btry B | Capt Rodney M. Handley |
| Btry C | Capt Donald N. Otis |
| 7" Btry | Capt Ralph A. Collins, Jr. |
| 7" Btry | Capt Harold R. Warner, Jr. |
| 3"/50 Btry | Capt Jay H. Augustin |
| 3"/50 Btry | Capt William R. Dorr, Jr. |

### 3-Inch Antiaircraft Group

| CO | Maj Charles T. Tingle |
| H&S Btry | MG Maurice C. Pulliam |
| Btry D | Capt Jean H. Buckner |
| Btry E | Maj Hoyt McMillan |
| Btry F | Capt David W. Silvey |
| Btry G (S/L) | Capt Alfred L. Booth |

### Machine-Gun Group

| CO | Maj Robert E. Hommel |
| H&S Btry | 2dLt George K. Acker |
| .50 Cal Btry | Maj William E. Boles |
| .30 Cal Btry | Capt Edwin A. Law |

### 3-Inch Antiaircraft Group, 3d Defense Battalion

| CO | Maj Chandler W. Johnson |
| H&S Btry | Maj Chandler W. Johnson |
| Btry D | Maj William S. McCormick |
| Btry E | Maj James S. O'Halloran |
| Btry F | Capt Arnold D. Swartz |
| Btry K (37mm) | Capt Ronald K. Miller |
| Btry L (20mm) | Capt Charles J. Seibert, II |

### 2d Raider Battalion Detachment

| CO | Capt Donald H. Hastie |
| Co C | Capt Donald H. Hastie |
| Co D | 1st Lt John Apergis |

### Marine Aircraft Group 22

| CO | LtCol Ira L. Kimes |
| H&S Sqn | 1stLt Charles F. Hurlbut |
| VMF-221 | Maj Floyd B. Parks (MIA 4Jun) |
|         | Capt Kirk Armistead (From 4Jun) |
| VMSB-241 | Maj Lofton R. Henderson (MIA 4Jun) |
|         | Maj Benjamin W. Norris (MIA 4Jun) |
|         | Capt Marshall A. Tyler (From 4Jun) |

### D. Guadalcanal (7 August 1942-8 February 1943)

**First Marine Division (Reinforced)**

- **Division Headquarters**
  - (7 Aug 42-8 Dec 42)
  - CG: MajGen Alexander A. Vandegrift
  - ADC: BrigGen William H. Rupertus
  - CO of S: Col William C. James (To 21Sep)
  - Col Gerald C. Thomas (From 21Sep)
  - D-1: Col Robert C. Kilmartin, Jr. (To 21Sep)
  - Maj James C. Murray, Jr. (From 22 Sep)
  - D-2: LtCol Frank B. Goettge (MIA 12Aug)
  - LtCol Edmund J. Buckley (From 14Aug)
  - D-3: LtCol Gerald C. Thomas (To 20Sep)
  - LtCol Merrill B. Twining (From 21Sep)
  - D-4: LtCol Randolph McC. Pate (To 21Oct)
  - LtCol Raymond P. Coffman (21Oct-25Nov)
  - LtCol William S. Fellers (From 26Nov)

- **Hq Bn (Orgd 2d)**: LtCol Edwin J. Farrell

- **1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion**
  - (7 Aug 42-22 Dec 42)
  - CO: LtCol Walter W. Barr

- **1st Aviation Engineer Battalion**
  - (18 Sep 42-8 Feb 43)
  - CO: Maj Thomas F. Riley

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*Unit commanders are listed only for those periods when their units are entitled to battle participation credit as indicated by the dates below unit designations. In the case of Marine air units, many of which participated in the battle as flight or advance echelons only, the unit commander who was actually in the Guadalcanal area is shown where muster rolls reveal this information.*
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1st Engineer Battalion
(7Aug42–22Dec42)
CO............ Maj James G. Frazer (To 24Oct)
           Maj Henry H. Crockett
           (From 25Oct)

1st Medical Battalion
(7Aug42–22Dec42)
CO............ Cdr Don S. Knowlton, MC
           (To 14Dec)
           LCdr Everett B. Keck, MC
           (From 15Dec)

1st Parachute Battalion
(7Aug42–18Sep42)
CO............ Maj Robert H. Williams
           (WIA 7Aug)
           Maj Charles A. Miller
           (8Aug–5Sep)
           Capt Harry L. Torgerson
           (6–8Sep)
           Maj Charles A. Miller
           (9–17Sep)
           Capt Harry L. Torgerson
           (From 18Sep)

1st Pioneer Battalion
(7Aug42–22Dec42)
CO............ Col George R. Rowan (To 19Sep)
           Maj Robert G. Ballance
           (From 20Sep)

1st Raider Battalion
(7Aug42–16Oct42)
CO............ LtCol Merritt A. Edson (To 20Sep)
           LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II
           (From 22Sep, WIA 27Sep)
           Capt Ira J. Irwin (From 27Sep)

1st Service Battalion
(7Aug42–22Dec42)
CO............ LtCol Hawley C. Waterman

1st Special Weapons Battalion
(7Aug42–22Dec42)
CO............ LtCol Robert B. Luckey (To 15Oct)
           Maj Richard W. Wallace
           (From 16Oct)

PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

Forward Echelon, 1st Tank Battalion
(7Aug42–22Dec42)
CO............ Maj Harvey S. Walseth

1st Marines
(7Aug42–22Dec42)
CO............ Col Clifton B. Cates
1st Bn........ LtCol Lenard B. Cresswell
2d Bn........ LtCol Edwin A. Pollock (To 22Sep)
           LtCol William W. Stickney
           (From 24Sep)
3d Bn........ LtCol William N. McKelvey, Jr.

5th Marines
(7Aug42–9Dec42)
CO............ Col Leroy P. Hunt (To 19Sep)
           Col Merritt A. Edson (From 21Sep)
1st Bn......... LtCol William E. Maxwell
           (To 28Aug)
           Maj Donald W. Fuller (30 Aug–11Oct)
           Maj William P. Thyson, Jr.
           (12Oct)
           Maj William K. Enright
           (13–23Oct)
           Maj William P. Thyson, Jr.
           (24–30Oct)
           Maj William K. Enright
           (From 31Oct)
2d Bn........ LtCol Harold E. Rosecrans
           (WIA 11Sep)
           Capt Joseph J. Dudkowski
           (11–17Sep)
           LtCol Walker A. Reves (18–24Sep)
           Capt Joseph J. Dudkowski
           (25–30Sep)
           Maj David S. McDougal
           (From 10Oct, WIA 8Oct)
           Maj William J. Piper, Jr.
           (8–11Oct)
           Maj Lewis W. Walt (From 12Oct)
3d Bn........ LtCol Frederick C. Biebush
           (To 21Sep)
           Maj Robert O. Bowen (From 22Sep)
### 7th Marines
(18Sep42–5Jan43)

**CO**
- Col James C. Webb (To 19Sep)
- Col Amor LeR. Sims (From 20Sep)

**1st Bn**
- LtCol Lewis B. Puller (WIA 8Nov)
- Maj John E. Weber (9–17Nov)
- LtCol Lewis B. Puller (From 18Nov)

**2d Bn**
- LtCol Herman H. Hanneken (To 17Nov)
- Maj Odell M. Conoley (18–28Nov)
- LtCol Herman H. Hanneken (From 29Nov)

**3d Bn**
- LtCol Edwin J. Farrell (To 21Sep)
- LtCol William R. Williams (From 24Sep)

### 11th Marines
(7Aug42–22Dec42)

**CO**
- BriGen Pedro A. del Valle

**1st Bn**
- LtCol Joseph R. Knowlan (To 18Oct)
- LtCol Manly L. Curry (18Oct–27Nov)
- LtCol Donovan D. Sult (28Nov–20Dec)
- Maj Lewis J. Fields (From 21Dec)

**2d Bn**
- LtCol Edward J. Hagen (To 19Oct)
- Maj Forest C. Thompson (20–30Oct)
- Maj Lewis A. Ennis (1–5Nov)
- Maj Forest C. Thompson (6–11Nov)
- Maj Lewis A. Ennis (12–30Nov)
- Maj Forest C. Thompson (From 1Dec)

**3d Bn**
- LtCol James J. Keating

**4th Bn**
- LtCol Melvin E. Fuller (To 26Oct)
- Maj Carl G. F. Korn (27–31Oct)
- Capt Albert H. Potter (From 1Nov)

### 5th Bn
- LtCol Eugene H. Price (To 30Oct)
- Maj Noah P. Wood, Jr. (From 1Nov)

### 2d Raider Battalion
(4Nov42–17Dec42)

**CO**
- LtCol Evans F. Carlson

### 3d Barrage Balloon Squadron
(8Sep42–8Feb43)

**CO**
- Capt Robert C. McDermont

### 3d Defense Battalion
(7Aug42–8Feb43)

**CO**
- Col Robert H. Pepper (To 28Nov)
- LtCol Harold C. Roberts (29Nov–11Jan)
- LtCol Samuel G. Taxis (From 12Jan)

#### Detachment A, 5th Defense Battalion
*Redesignated 14th Defense Battalion, 15Jan43*
(8Sep42–8Feb43)

**CO**
- LtCol William F. Parks (To 5Dec)
- Col Galen M. Sturgis (From 5Dec)

### 9th Defense Battalion
(30Nov42–8Feb43)

**CO**
- Col David R. Nimmer (To 2Feb)
- LtCol William J. Scheyer (From 3Feb)

### Second Marine Division

#### Advance Echelon, Division Headquarters
(4Jan43–8Feb43)

- **CG**
  - BriGen Alphonse De Carre
- **Cols**
  - Col George F. Stockes
- **D–1**
  - Maj Lawrence C. Hays, Jr. (To 5Feb)
- **D–2**
  - Maj Thomas J. Colley
- **D–3**
  - LtCol John H. Coffman (To 21Jan)
- **D–4**
  - LtCol Jesse S. Cook, Jr. (From 21Jan)
- **D–5**
  - Maj Daniel H. Lattimer
PEarl harbor to guadalcanal

2nd Special Weapons Battalion  
(7Aug42-8Feb43)
CO. LtCol Paul D. Sherman (To 8Jan)  
  Maj Guy E. Tannyhill (9–12Jan)  
  LtCol Paul D. Sherman (From 13Jan)

2nd Marines  
(7Aug42-31Jan43)
CO. Col John M. Arthur  
1st Bn. LtCol Robert E. Hill (WIA 11Nov)  
  Maj Wood B. Kyle (From 11Nov)  
2d Bn. LtCol Orin K. Pressley (To 14Dec)  
  Maj Ewart S. Laue (From 14Dec)  
3d Bn. LtCol Robert G. Hunt

6th Marines  
(4Jan43–8Feb43)
CO. Col Gilder D. Jackson, Jr.  
1st Bn. LtCol Russell Lloyd  
2d Bn. Maj Raymond L. Murray  
3d Bn. Maj William A. Kengla

8th Marines  
(2Nov42–8Feb43)
CO. Col Richard H. Jeschke  
1st Bn. LtCol Miles S. Newton (To 22Nov)  
  LtCol Joseph P. McCaffery (From 23Nov)  
2d Bn. LtCol John H. Cook, Jr.  
3d Bn. LtCol Augustus H. Fricke

1st Battalion, 10th Marines  
(4Nov42–8Feb43)
CO. LtCol Presley M. Rixey

2nd Battalion, 10th Marines  
(4Jan43–8Feb43)
CO. Maj George R. E. Shell

3rd Battalion, 10th Marines  
(7Aug42–8Feb43)
CO. LtCol Manly L. Curry (To 17Oct)  
  LtCol Donovan D. Sull (10Oct–27Nov)  
  LtCol Manly L. Curry (From 28Nov)

2nd Aviation Engineer Battalion  
(30Jan43–8Feb43)
CO. Maj Charles O. Clark

11th Defense Battalion  
(17Jan43–8Feb43)
CO. Col Charles N. Muldrow

Marine Air Units

Headquarters Detachment, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing  
(3Sep42–8Feb43)
CG. MajGen Roy S. Geiger  
CofS. BriGen Louis B. Woods  
W-1. LtCol Perry O. Parmelee (To 20Nov)  
  Capt James G. Hopper (21Nov–20Dec)  
  LtCol Thomas G. Ennis (From 21Dec)  
W-2. LtCol John C. Munn  
W-3. Col Lawson H. M. Sanders (To 31Dec)  
  Col Christian F. Schilt (From 1Jan)  
W-4. Col Christian F. Schilt (To 31Dec)  
  LtCol Albert D. Cooley (From 1Jan)  
HqSq-1. Capt Herman J. Jesse

Forward Echelon, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing  
(26Dec42–8Feb43)
CG. BriGen Francis P. Mulcahy  
CofS. Col Walter G. Farrell  
W-1. 2dLt Robert E. Cuddington  
W-2. LtCol Elmer H. Salzman
MARINE TASK ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND LIST

W–3.----------------- LtCol Joe A. Smoak
       (To 29Jan)
       LtCol William C. Lemly
       (From 30Jan)

W–4.----------------- LtCol Franklin G. Cowie
       HqSq–2.-------- Maj William K. Snyder

Marine Aircraft Group 14
       (16Oct42–8Feb43)

CO.----------------- LtCol Albert D. Cooley
       Col William O. Brice
       (From 19Dec)

HqSq–14.-------- Capt Claude J. Carlson, Jr.
       Capt Stanley M. Adams
       (From 18Nov)

SMS–14.-------- Maj Arthur R. Stacey

Marine Aircraft Group 23
       (20Aug42–4Nov42)

CO.----------------- Col William J. Wallace
       MG Harland W. Bond
       (To 24Oct)
       LtCol Charles L. Fike
       (From 25Oct)

SMS–23.-------- 2dLt Joseph A. Pawloski

Advance Detachments, Marine Aircraft Group 25
       (3Sep42–8Feb43)

CO.----------------- LtCol Perry K. Smith
       Maj Leonard W. Ashwell
       (To 17Nov)
       Capt Dave J. Woodward, Jr.
       (From 18Nov)

SMS–25.-------- Maj Leonard W. Ashwell
       (To 23Dec)
       Capt Ralph R. Yeaman
       (From 24Dec)

Marine Fighter Squadron 112
       (2Nov42–8Feb43)

CO.----------------- Maj Paul J. Fontana
       (To 31Dec)
       2dLt Alexander A. Case
       (1–6Jan)
       Maj Paul J. Fontana
       (From 7Jan)

Marine Fighter Squadron 121
       (2Oct42–28Jan43)

CO.----------------- Maj Leonard K. Davis
       (WIA 11Nov, To 16Dec)
       MG William F. Wilson
       (17–31Dec)
       Maj Donald K. Yost
       (From 1Jan)

Marine Fighter Squadron 122
       (12Nov42–8Feb43)

CO.----------------- Capt Nathan T. Post, Jr.
       (To 21Nov)
       Capt James R. Anderson
       (22Nov–10Dec)
       2dLt John F. Tenvole
       (11–23Dec)
       Maj Elmer E. Brackett, Jr.
       (24–29Dec)
       Capt Nathan T. Post, Jr.
       (30Dec–11Jan)
       Maj Elmer E. Brackett, Jr.
       (From 12Jan)

Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 123
       (3Feb43–8Feb43)

CO.----------------- Maj Edward W. Johnston

Flight Echelon, Marine Fighter Squadron 124
       (3Feb43–8Feb43)

CO.----------------- Maj William E. Gise

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 131
       (11Nov42–8Feb43)

CO.----------------- LtCol Paul Moret
       (To 20Nov)
       Capt Jens C. Aggerbeck, Jr.
       (From 21Nov)

Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 132
       (1Nov42–19Jan43)

CO.----------------- Maj Joseph Sailer, Jr. (KIA 7Dec)
       Maj Louis B. Robertshaw
       (From 7Dec)
**PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL**

*Flight Echelon, Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 231*

(30Aug42-14Nov42)

CO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Leo R. Smith (To 18Sep)
Capt Ruben Iden (From 19Sep, KIA 20Sep)
Capt Elmer G. Glidden, Jr. (From 20Sep)

*Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 232*

(20Aug42-2Nov42)

CO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LtCol Richard C. Mangrum

*Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 233*

(25Dec42-8Feb43)

CO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Clyde T. Mattison (To 19Jan)
Capt Elmer L. Gilbert (From 20Jan)

*Flight Echelon, Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron 234*

(28Jan43-8Feb43)

CO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj William D. Roberson

*Marine Observation Squadron 251*

(19Aug42-8Feb43)

CO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . LtCol John N. Hart (To 29Oct)
LtCol Charles H. Hayes (30Oct-30Nov)
Capt Ralph R. Yeaman (1-7Dec)
Maj William R. Campbell (8-10Dec)
Maj Joseph N. Renner (From 11Dec)

*Marine Utility Squadron 253*

(3Sep42-8Feb43)

CO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maj Harold A. Johnson (To 11Oct)
Maj Henry C. Lane (From 12Oct)
Marine Casualties

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<td>Guadalcanal (7 Aug 42-8 Feb 43)</td>
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Naval Medical Personnel Organic to Marine Units

| Philippines (7 Dec 41-6 May 42) | 2 | 2          | 3           | 25           | 5            | 25           |                |                |                |                |              |                |
| Guadalcanal (7 Aug 42-8 Feb 43) | 8 | 23         | 1           | 4            | 15           | 86           | 24            | 113            |                |                |              |                |

1 These final Marine casualty figures were compiled from records furnished by Statistics Unit, PersAcctSec, (RecsBr, PERSDept, HQMS. They are audited to include 26 Aug 52. Naval casualties were taken from Nation Printing Office, 1943), II. 1-84. The key to the abbreviations used at the head of columns in the table follows: KIA, Killed in Action; DOW, Died of Wounds; WIA, Wounded in Action; MIAPD, Missing in Action, Presumed Dead; KDPOW, Killed or Died while a Prisoner of War. Because of the method used in reporting casualties during World War II a substantial number of DOW figures are also included in the WIA column.
APPENDIX E

First Marine Division
Operation Order—Guadalcanal

FIRST MARINE DIVISION
FLEET MARINE FORCE
Wellington, N. Z.
[20 July 1942] ¹

OPERATION ORDER
No. 7-42

Maps: H. O. CHART #2896 (Solomon Islands) reproduced by D-2 Section.
D-2 Section Map North Coast Guadalcanal Island—Lunga Point to Aola, 9 Sections, 15
July, 1942, RF 1/24,000.
D-2 Section Map Tulagi and adjacent islands, 7/14/42, (4 sheets) c RF 1/12,000.
D-2 Section—Special map Tulagi—1/12,000, 15 July, 1942.

TASK ORGANIZATION
(a) COMBAT GROUP A [5th Mar, Reinf] (less Combat Team #2 (less Btry E 11th Marines))
(b) COMBAT GROUP B [1st Mar, Reinf]
(c) TULAGI GROUP
   1st Raider Bn
   Combat Team #2 (less Btry E 11th Marines)
(d) GAVUTU GROUP
   First Parachute Battalion
(e) SUPPORT GROUP
   1st Eng Bn (less Cos A, B, & C)
   11th Marines (less 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th Bns)
   1st Spl Wpns Bn (less 1st & 3d Pl Btry A)
   1st Pion Bn (less Cos A & B)
(f) DIVISION RESERVE
   2d Marines (Reinforced) (less Combat Team A)
(g) FLORIDA GROUP
   Combat Team A.
(h) THIRD DEFENSE BATTALION

1. See Annex A Intelligence

Naval Attack Force will furnish naval gunfire and air support (see Annexes B and C gunfire and
air support plans respectively). Minesweepers will cover landing of FLORIDA GROUP by con-
centrations on BUNGAANA ISLAND [south of Halavo Peninsula] and GAVUTU.

¹ With the exception of the information in brackets which was added to assist the reader, this operation
order is an exact transcription of a copy of the original order contained in Final/Rept, Phase I, Annex F.
Map Nos. 13, 14, and 15 of this volume should be used as references with the order.

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2. This Division will attack and destroy the hostile garrisons of TULAGI, GUADALCANAL, GAVUTU, and MAKAMBO by simultaneous landings on D day. It will then organize and defend those islands. For Transport Area, Line of Departure, beaches, objectives, Boundaries see Operation Overlay Annex D.

3. (a) Land on Beach RED at Zero Hour with 2 CTS in assault on a front of 1600 yards seize beachhead (see operation overlay). When passed through by Combat Group B, Combat Group A (less CTS #2 & 3) attack toward LUNGA with its right resting on the shore line. Seize the line of the TENARU RIVER. Combat Team #3 attack and seize line of woods running southeast from TENAVATU [eastern flank of Red Beach] (see operation overlay). Hold that line until relieved by Support Group. Then operate as directed by Task Organization Commander.

(b) Land on Beach RED at Zero Hour plus 50 minutes (see operation overlay) pass through right of Combat Group A and attack on magnetic azimuth 260°. Seize grassy knoll 4 miles south of LUNGA POINT. Be prepared for further advance. Formation—Column of battalions echeloned to the left rear. Maintain contact with Combat Group A on right.

(c) Land on front of 500 yards on Beach BLUE at H hour, and seize that portion of TULAGI ISLAND lying northwest of line A (see D-2 Section Special Map TULAGI 1/12,000, 15 July 1942). Fire GREEN STAR CLUSTER to call for five minutes air and naval bombardment of TULAGI southeast of line A, after H plus 1 hour. Upon completion of bombing and lifting of naval gunfire, attack and seize the remainder of TULAGI ISLAND. Upon completion seizure of TULAGI ISLAND 1st Raider Bn reembark at Beach Blue and report completion of reembarkation to Division Headquarters, prepared for further landings. Upon seizure of TULAGI, control passes to Commander Combat Team #2. Combat Team #2 then reembark sufficient troops and seize MAKAMBO ISLAND, then organize and defend those islands, Following seizure of TULAGI and MAKAMBO, and of GAVUTU and TANAMBOGO by 1st Parachute Battalion, relieve 1st Parachute Battalion with one rifle company plus one machine gun platoon.

(d) Land on east coast of GAVUTU ISLAND at H plus 4 hours, and seize that island, then seize TANAMBOGO. Fire GREEN STAR CLUSTER to call for five minutes naval gunfire on TANAMBOGO ISLAND. Reembark upon relief prepared for employment elsewhere.

(e) Land on Beach RED on order, assume control of 2d and 3d Battalions 11th Marines, provide artillery support for the attack, and coordinate AA and close in ground defense of Beachhead area.

(f) Be prepared to land Combat Team B less all reinforcing units on GAVUTU ISLAND at H plus 4 hours. Be prepared to attach Combat Team C less all reinforcing units to the TULAGI GROUP.

(g) Land 1st Battalion 2d Marines (less one rifle company and one machine gun platoon) on promontory at x3022 [Halavo Peninsula] at H hour plus 30 minutes and seize village of Halavo. Then support by fire the attack of the 1st Parachute Bn on GAVUTU. Land one (1) rifle company reinforced by one machine gun platoon at H minus 20 minutes in cove at W738 [Haleta] and seize and hold point to southeast thereof.

(h) Execute following on order:

(1) Land Battalion less 1/3 AA elements on Beach RED. These pass to CO Support Group on landing. Assist in AA defense of beach area.

(2) Land 1/3 AA elements on TULAGI and GAVUTU, and provide AA defense that area.
(x) 1. Land tanks with combat groups and move to cover near east boundary of beachhead. Tanks not to be committed except on division order.

2. Land 1st and 3d Platoons Battery A Special Weapons Battalion on flanks of beach and furnish AA defense beach area, 1st Platoon to right, 3d Platoon to left. These revert to battalion control upon landing of Headquarters 1st Special Weapons Battalion.

3. Scout cars will not land.

4. All artillery of combat troops will be landed with those groups and pass to control 11th Marines upon landing 11th Marines Headquarters.

5. Assistant Division Commander will command operations in TULAGI-GAVUTU-FLORIDA Area.

4. See Administrative Order.

5. (a) See Annex E, Signal Communication.

(b) Command Posts afloat:

1st Mar Div  
Combat Group A  
Combat Group B  
TULAGI Group  
GAVUTU Group  
Support Group  
Division Reserve  
FLORIDA Group  
3d Defense Bn  

MC CAWLEY (AP10)  
AMERICAN LEGION (AP35)  
BARNETT (AP11)  
APD  
HEYWOOD (AP12)  
HUNTER LIGGETT (AP27)  
CRESSENT CITY (AP40)  
PRESIDENT JACKSON (AP37)  
ZEILIN (AP9)

(c) Axis of Signal Communication all units:

CP afloat—locations ashore to be reported.

(d) Use local time, zone minus eleven (zone suffix letter Love), in all communications with Division.

BY COMMAND OF MAJOR GENERAL VANDEGRIFT

W. C. JAMES,  
Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps,  
Chief of Staff.
## Military Map Symbols

### SIZE SYMBOLS
- **●** Squad
- **• •** Section
- **• • •** Platoon
- **I** Company or Battery
- **II** Battalion or Squadron
- **III** Regiment or Air Group
- **x** Brigade
- **xx** Division or Wing

### UNIT SYMBOLS
- **P** Pioneer
- **Rdr** Raider
- **Tank**
- **Command Post**
- **Observation Post**
- **Boundary (battalion)**
- **Aid Station (battalion)**

### MISCELLANEOUS SYMBOLS
- **Basic Unit**
- **Air**
- **Amphibian Tractor**
- **Antiaircraft**
- **Defense Battalion**
- **Engineer**
- **Field Artillery**
- **Infantry**
- **Parachute**
- **Parachute**

### EXAMPLES
- **1st Sec, L Btry, 1st Def Bn**
- **CoB, 5th Mar Regt**
- **1st Rdr Bn**
- **11th Mar Regt**
- **OP, 2d Bn, 7th Mar Regt**
- **CP, 1st Mar Div**
Guide to Abbreviations

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<td>Miles per hour</td>
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<tr>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Manuscript</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSgt</td>
<td>Master Sergeant</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTB</td>
<td>Motor Torpedo Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAD</td>
<td>Naval Ammunition Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAS</td>
<td>Naval Air Station</td>
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<td>Nav</td>
<td>Navy; Naval</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>Navy Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>NHD</td>
<td>Naval History Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGF</td>
<td>Naval Gunfire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOB</td>
<td>Navy Operating Base</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRMC</td>
<td>Naval Records Management Center (Alexandria, Va.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSD</td>
<td>Naval Supply Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCMH</td>
<td>Office of the Chief of Military History, U. S. Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONI</td>
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<td>OP</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPlan</td>
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<td>P&amp;P</td>
<td>Plans and Policies Division, Headquarters Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pac</td>
<td>Pacific (Fleet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Para</td>
<td>Parachute</td>
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<td>Pat</td>
<td>Patrol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBY</td>
<td>”Catalina” patrol bomber made by Consolidated-Vultee</td>
</tr>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>Patrol Craft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pers</td>
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<td>Amphibious</td>
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<td>Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prov</td>
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<tr>
<td>POA</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Report</td>
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<td>RF</td>
<td>Representative Fraction (Map Scale)</td>
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<td>Regimental Landing Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Royal Marine(s)</td>
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<td>RMA</td>
<td>Royal Marine Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>Royal Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SBD#</td>
<td>”Dauntless” scout-bomber made by Douglas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB2U#</td>
<td>”Vindicator” scout-bomber made by Vought-Sikorsky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander Allied Powers</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Searchlight</td>
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<td>Special Manual</td>
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<td>SMS</td>
<td>Marine Service Squadron</td>
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<td>SNLF</td>
<td>Japanese Special Naval Landing Force</td>
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<td>South</td>
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<td>Spl</td>
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<td>TAGO</td>
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<td>TBD#</td>
<td>“Devastator” torpedo-bomber made by Douglas</td>
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<tr>
<td>TBF#</td>
<td>“Avenger” torpedo-bomber made by Grumman</td>
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<td>TF</td>
<td>Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TG</td>
<td>Task Group</td>
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<td>Training</td>
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<td>Table of Organization</td>
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<td>TQM</td>
<td>Transport Quartermaster</td>
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<td>Trans</td>
<td>Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSgt</td>
<td>Technical Sergeant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U/F</td>
<td>Unit of fire, a unit of measurement for ammunition supply. It represents a specific number of rounds of ammunition per weapon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (Fleet)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFFE</td>
<td>United States Army Forces in the Far East</td>
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<tr>
<td>USFIP</td>
<td>United States Forces in the Philippines</td>
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<td>United States Navy</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>USNI</td>
<td>United States Naval Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
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<td>United States Strategic Bombing Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAdm</td>
<td>Vice Admiral</td>
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<tr>
<td>VF</td>
<td>Navy Fighter Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Vindicator&quot;</td>
<td>SB2U–#, scout-bomber made by Vought-Sikorsky</td>
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<td>Marine Fighter Squadron</td>
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<td>Marine Scout-Bomber Squadron</td>
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<td>Navy Patrol Squadron</td>
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<td>Watchtower</td>
<td>Code name for the Guadalcanal-Tulagi Operation</td>
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<td>War Department</td>
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<td>War Documents Center</td>
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<td>Wes</td>
<td>West</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Wildcat&quot;</td>
<td>F4F–#, fighter made by Grumman</td>
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<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>Warrant Officer</td>
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<td>WPL</td>
<td>War Plan</td>
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<td>Wpons</td>
<td>Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>WW</td>
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<tr>
<td>YP</td>
<td>Small Patrol Craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Zero&quot;</td>
<td>Japanese fighter</td>
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</table>
Unit Commendations

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Citation by
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
of
The Wake detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion, U. S. Marine Corps, under command of
Major James P. S. Devereux, U. S. Marines
and
Marine Fighting Squadron 211 of Marine Aircraft Group 21, under command of
Major Paul A. Putnam, U. S. Marines
and
Army and Navy personnel present

“The courageous conduct of the officers and men who defended Wake Island against
an overwhelming superiority of enemy air, sea, and land attacks from December 8 to 22,
1941, has been noted with admiration by their fellow countrymen and the civilized world,
and will not be forgotten so long as gallantry and heroism are respected and honored. They
are commended for their devotion to duty and splendid conduct at their battle stations
under most adverse conditions. With limited defensive means against attacks in great
force, they manned their shore installations and flew their aircraft so well that five enemy
warships were either sunk or severely damaged, many hostile planes shot down, and an
unknown number of land troops destroyed.”

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.
Citation of units in the United State Forces in the Philippines.—As authorized by Executive Order 9075 (sec. II, Bull. 11, W. D., 1942), a citation in the name of the President of the United States, as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction, is awarded to the following-named units. The citation reads as follows:

The Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays and Naval and Marine Corps units serving therein, United States Forces in the Philippines, are cited for outstanding performance of duty in action, during the period from March 14 to April 9, 1942, inclusive.

Although subjected repeatedly to intense and prolonged artillery bombardment by concealed hostile batteries in Cavite Province and to heavy enemy aerial attacks, during the period above-mentioned, and despite numerous casualties and extensive damage inflicted on defensive installations and utilities, the morale, ingenuity, and combat efficiency of the entire command have remained at the high standard which has impressed fighting men the world over.

On March 15, approximately 1,000 240-mm projectiles were fired at Forts Frank and Drum, and large numbers of lesser caliber projectiles struck Forts Hughes and Mills. Again on March 20, over 400 240-mm shells were fired at Fort Frank and a lesser number at Fort Drum, while enemy air echelons made a total of 50 attacks on Fort Mills with heavy aerial bombs.

During the entire period all units maintained their armament at a high degree of efficiency, while seaward defense elements executed effective counter battery action. Antiaircraft batteries firing at extreme ranges exacted a heavy toll of hostile attacking planes, and Naval and Marine units from exposed stations assured the defense of the beaches and approaches to the fortified islands. By unceasing labor and regardless of enemy activity, essential utilities were restored and the striking power of the command maintained unimpaired.

As a result of their splendid combined efforts, ruggedness, and devotion to duty the various units and services comprising the Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays frustrated a major hostile attempt to reduce the efficiency of the fortified islands.

Units included in above citation: 59th Coast Artillery, 60th Coast Artillery (AA), 91st Coast Artillery (PS), 92d Coast Artillery (PS), Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Harbor Defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, Medical Detachment, Ordnance Detachment, Quartermaster Detachments (American and Philippine Scouts), Finance Detachment, 1st Coast Artillery (PA) (less 2d Battalion), Company A, 803d Engineer Battalion (Aviation) (Separate), detachments DS Army Mine Planter Harrison (American and Philippine Scouts), 4th U. S. Marines, U. S. Navy Inshore Patrol, Manila Bay area, Naval Force District Headquarters Fort Mills, Naval Forces Mariveles Area Philippine Islands, Battery D, 2d Coast Artillery (PA), 1st Platoon Battery F, 2d Coast Artillery (AA), 2d Platoon Battery F, 2d Coast Artillery (AA), (PA).

(A. G. 201.54 (4-12-42)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULIO
Major General
The Adjutant General
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, April 30, 1942

Citation of units of both military and naval forces of the United States and Philippine Governments.—As authorized by Executive Order 9075 (sec. II, Bull. 11, W. D., 1942), a citation in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction, is awarded to all units of both military and naval forces of the United States and Philippine Governments engaged in the defense of the Philippines since December 7, 1941 to 10 May 1942.

A. G. 210.54 (4–12–42). (Closing date auth. by W. D. G. O. #46 of 1948)

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

J. A. Ulio
Major General
The Adjutant General
UNIT COMMENDATIONS

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-TWO

for service as set forth in the following

CITATION:

“For conspicuous courage and heroism in combat at Midway Island during June, 1942. Outnumbered five to one, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-TWO boldly intercepted a heavily escorted enemy bombing force, disrupting their attack and preventing serious damage to island installations. Operating with half of their dive-bombers obsolete and in poor mechanical condition which necessitated vulnerable glide bombing tactics, they succeeded in inflicting heavy damage on Japanese surface units of a large enemy task force. The skill and gallant perseverance of flight and ground personnel of MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-TWO, fighting under tremendously adverse and dangerous conditions, were essential factors in the unyielding defense of Midway.”

For the President.

FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington.
The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

SIXTH DEFENSE BATTALION, FLEET MARINE FORCE, REINFORCED,
for service as follows:

"For outstanding heroism in support of military operations prior to and during the
Battle of Midway, June 1942. Assuming a tremendous operational and service load in pre-
paring defenses of Midway against anticipated Japanese attack, the officers and men of the
SIXTH Defense Battalion carried on intensive night battle training, completed and installed
underwater obstacles, unloaded and distributed supplies, emplaced guns and constructed
facilities for stowing ammunition and for protecting personnel. Alert and ready for combat
when enemy planes came in to launch high and dive-bombing attacks and low-level strafing
attacks on June 4, they promptly opened and maintained fire against the hostile targets,
downing 10 planes during the furious 17-minute action which resulted in the destruction of
the Marine galley and mess-hall, equipment, supplies and communication facilities. Work-
ing as an effective team for long periods without relief, this Battalion cleared the debris
from the bomb-wrecked galley, reestablished disrupted communications, and serviced planes,
thereby contributing greatly to the success of operations conducted from this base. The
high standards of courage and service maintained by the SIXTH Defense Battalion reflect
the highest credit upon the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the SIXTH Defense Battalion, Fleet Marine Force,
Reinforced, consisting of the SIXTH Defense Battalion, attached personnel of the Third Defense
Battalion, 22nd and 23rd Provisional Marine Companies and "C" and "D" Companies of the Second
Raider Battalion are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JOHN L. SULLIVAN,
Secretary of the Navy.
UNIT COMMENDATIONS

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

4 FEBRUARY 1943.

Cited in the Name of
The President of the United States
THE FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED
Under command of
Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, U. S. M. C.

CITATION:
"The officers and enlisted men of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, on August 7 to 9, 1942, demonstrated outstanding gallantry and determination in successfully executing forced landing assaults against a number of strongly defended Japanese positions on Tulagi, Gavutu, Tanambogo, Florida and Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands, completely routing all the enemy forces and seizing a most valuable base and airfield within the enemy zone of operations in the South Pacific Ocean. From the above period until 9 December, 1942, this Reinforced Division not only held their important strategic positions despite determined and repeated Japanese naval, air and land attacks, but by a series of offensive operations against strong enemy resistance drove the Japanese from the proximity of the airfield and inflicted great losses on them by land and air attacks. The courage and determination displayed in these operations were of an inspiring order."

FRANK KNOX,
Secretary of the Navy.
PEARL HARBOR TO GUADALCANAL

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY,
Washington.

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

NINTH MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION

for service as follows:

"For outstanding heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces at Guadalcanal, November 30, 1942, to May 20, 1943; Rendova-New Georgia Area, June 30 to November 7, 1943; and at Guam, Marianas, July 21 to August 20, 1944. One of the first units of its kind to operate in the South Pacific Area, the NINTH Defense Battalion established strong seacoast and beach positions which destroyed 12 hostile planes attempting to bomb Guadalcanal, and further engaged in extensive patrolling activities. In a 21-day-and-night training period prior to the Rendova-New Georgia assault, this group calibrated and learned to handle new weapons and readily effected the conversion from a seacoast unit to a unit capable of executing field artillery missions. Joining Army Artillery units, special groups of this battalion aided in launching an attack which drove the enemy from the beaches, downed 13 of a 16-bomber plane formation during the first night ashore and denied the use of the Munda airfield to the Japanese. The NINTH Defense Battalion aided in spearheading the attack of the Army Corps operating on New Georgia and, despite heavy losses, remained in action until the enemy was routed from the island. Elements of the Battalion landed at Guam under intense fire, established beach defenses, installed antiaircraft guns and later contributed to the rescue of civilians and to the capture or destruction of thousands of Japanese. By their skill, courage and aggressive fighting spirit, the officers and men of the NINTH Defense Battalion upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the NINTH Defense Battalion during the above mentioned periods are authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

JOHN L. SULLIVAN,
Secretary of the Navy.
The Secretary of the Navy, Washington.

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

FIRST SEPARATE ENGINEER BATTALION

for service as follows:

"For exceptionally meritorious service in support of military operations on Guadalcanal, December 10, 1942, to February 27, 1943; Tinian from August 20, 1944, to March 24, 1945; and Okinawa from April 14 to September 2, 1945. Faced with numerous and difficult problems in engineering throughout two major campaigns, the First Separate Engineer Battalion initiated new techniques and procedures in construction, repair and maintenance, executing its missions under adverse conditions of weather and terrain and in spite of Japanese shellings, artillery fire, bombing raids, sickness and tropical storms. Technically skilled, aggressive and unmindful of great personal danger, the officers and men of this gallant Battalion constructed, developed and maintained vital routes of communication, airfields and camp facilities; they served as combat engineer units in performing demolitions, mine detection and disposal and bomb disposal tasks in support of various units of the Fleet Marine Force; and they built bridges and repaired air-bombed air strips toward the uninterrupted operations of Allied ground and aerial forces. Undeterred by both mechanical and natural limitations, the First Separate Engineer Battalion completed with dispatch and effectiveness assigned and unanticipated duties which contributed immeasurably to the ultimate defeat of Japan and upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to the First Separate Engineer Battalion during any of the above mentioned periods are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION Ribbon.

James Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.
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