Last Months in Japan

Americans, uncertain of how the Japanese people would accept the occupation, had their doubts allayed within a short time after the troops had landed and begun fulfilling their missions. Original Japanese qualms about associating with their conquerors were quickly dispelled after the children:

> . . . were the first to lose their fear. These doll-like small fry, most of them wearing uniforms and thoroughly accustomed to saluting, soon began to line the streets and gaze with wide eyes at the Marines and their vehicles. The children's curiosity was soon shared by their elders. Old and young alike seemed especially amazed at the American jeeps and trucks which, regardless of heavy rains and bad roads had the power to travel where their drivers took them. Bulldozers and other earthmoving equipment brought even more amazement. And not the least of the startling sights were the Marines themselves. Men with blue eyes and light hair were astonishing enough, but red-haired Marines were beyond imagination.[1]

Japanese cordiality and hospitality became evident as the Marine occupation forces spread out over the island of Kyushu. Other signs of the presence of American troops were the English language safeguard markers placed on churches, religious shrines, and schools, warning occupation troops away and exempting these places from search and trespass.

Although fraternization with the Japanese was not permitted at first, these restrictions were soon eased and it did not take too long for the Marines to learn more than they had known previously of the Japanese way of life and to appreciate Japanese customs and culture. At the same time, the Japanese were often awestruck by the manner and means by which the Americans could accomplish tasks which the Japanese considered difficult but which the Marines considered normal routine. Japanese standards of living and efficiency were woefully below those of the Western world, and the former enemy nation sadly lacked transportation and construction equipment and tools. Most Japanese primary and secondary industry had been devastated in the air raids. Besides, Japanese industrial facilities had long been geared to the production of war materiel rather than consumer goods, or housing, or any of the other products that the civilian population of the Allies was able to obtain, even in wartime.

Japanese men and women alike labored days to accomplish what the Americans with their heavy equipment and know-how could do in minutes. The backward conditions of the Japanese could be blamed partially on the war, but even more so on a way of life and a social structure that had remained largely unchanged for centuries. Although the opening of Japan by the West

[1] Conner, *5th MarDiv Hist*, p. 138.

in the mid-19th Century caused a severe jolt to Japanese attitudes and sensibilities, it was nothing compared to the changes wrought by the American occupation.

There had indeed been many changes and much accomplished by the end of the first few months of occupation, during which time the occupation forces enforced the surrender terms. The Japanese armed forces had been almost completely demobilized, 90 percent of the military facilities in the Home Islands had been razed, and approximately 20 percent of the ammunition and explosives stored in bunkers all over Japan had been destroyed. Eighty percent of the war materiels and equipment still in usable condition had been turned over to the Japanese Home Ministry for conversion to peacetime use.

In the 5th Division area, the 13th Marines alone had supervised the scuttling at sea or the destruction by other means of 188,000 rounds of artillery and mortar ammunition, 25,000 aerial bombs, 1,800 machine guns, 270 torpedoes, 4,500 mines and depth charges, 83 large guns, 400 tons of aircraft parts, 30 tons of signal equipment, 650 tons of torpedo parts, and 161 miscellaneous types of machines that were geared for the manufacture of war materiel. Other VAC units completed similar demolition missions. Even while they enjoyed their stay in Japan and carried out their occupation duties, " 'Home, when do we go there?' " was the single most important topic of conversation among the Marines in Kyushu.[2]

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 173.

MARINE WITHDRAWAL[3]

By 30 November, only about 10 percent of the Marines in VAC had been returned to the States, although discharge and rotation directives had made more than 15,000 men eligible. Marine divisions were under orders to maintain their strength at 90 percent of T/O, and these restrictions severely curtailed the number of men that could be released. Replacements were almost nonexistent in this period of postwar reduction. Still, the 2d Division, which was to remain in Japan, had 7,653 officers and men who were entitled to return home.[4] To meet this problem, VAC ordered an interchange of personnel between the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions.

High-point men of the 2d Division would be transferred to the 5th Division, and men not yet eligible for discharge or rotation would move from the 5th to the 2d in exchange. Almost half of the 2d Division and 80 percent of the 5th Division, in all about 18,000 Marines and corpsmen, were slated for transfer. At the same time that the personnel exchanges took place, elements of the 2d and 32d Divisions occupied the 5th Division zone of responsibility so that the occupation mission of surveillance, dis-

[3] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *Eighth Army Monograph I;* Occupational Monograph of the Eighth U. S. Army in Japan, v. II, Jan–Aug46, n.d.; I Corps Hist of the Occupation of Japan, Dec45–Jun46; *VAC OpRpt;* VAC WarDs, Nov45–Jan46; 2d MarDiv Occupational Hist-Rpts, 1Mar–15Jun46; *5th MarDiv OpRpt;* 5th MarDiv WarDs, Nov–Dec45; Shaw, *Marine Occupation of Japan.*

[4] *2d MarDiv OpRpt,* Anx B, p. 4.

position of materiel, and repatriation could continue without interruption.

On 24 November, control of Saga and Fukuoka Prefectures passed to the 2d and 32d Divisions respectively. (See Map 29.) In the first of a series of comparable troop movements, 2/6 entrained for Saga to take over the duties and absorb the low-point men of 2/27. The 6th and the 10th Marines occupied the 5th Division zone, relieved units of the 13th, 27th, and 28th Marines, and effected the necessary personnel transfers. The 2d and 8th Marines sent their returnees to Sasebo, the 5th Division port of embarkation, and joined new men from the infantry regiments of the 5th. Separate battalions and headquarters troops of both divisions exchanged men with their opposite numbers.

The 5th Division began loading out as soon as ships were available at Sasebo, and the first transports, carrying men of the 27th Marines, left for the States on 5 December. The 2d Division assumed all of the remaining occupation duties of the 5th on 8 December, and the last elements of the 5th Division departed Sasebo 11 days later.

Beginning on 20 December, with the arrival Stateside of the first troopships of the 27th Marines, a steady stream of officers and enlisted men passed through reassignment and discharge centers at Camp Pendleton. During January, most of the organic elements of the division were skeletonized and then disbanded. On 5 February 1946, the Headquarters Battalion followed suit "and the 5th Marine Division passed into history." [5]

On the same date that the 2d Marine Division took over the duties of the 5th, VAC received a dispatch directive from the Sixth Army stating that the corps would be relieved of occupation responsibilities on 31 December, when the Eighth Army was to assume command of all Allied occupation troops in Japan, and plans were laid to reduce American strength to the point where only those units considered a part of the peacetime Armed Forces would remain. I Corps, with headquarters at Osaka (later Kyoto), would take over the area and troops of VAC.

The VAC spent most of its remaining time in Japan completing its current occupation missions, supervising the transfer of low-point men to the units of the 2d Division, and preparing to turn over the area to I Corps. As had been ordered, the changeover took place on 31 December 1945, and VAC troops began loading out the following day, some units for return to the United States and others for duty with Marine supply activities on Guam. On 8 January, the last elements of VAC, including General Schmidt's headquarters, left Sasebo for San Diego where on 15 February 1946, it was disbanded.[6]

Not long after the departure of VAC from Japan, the 2d Marine Division became responsible for the whole of what had been the corps zone. The 32d Infantry Division, a former Michigan-

[5] Conner, *5th MarDiv Hist*, p. 176. "Exactly one year after the Division had landed on Iwo Jima, Headquarters and the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, arrived at San Diego from Peleliu. Disbandment came quickly for these units. The 1st Battalion completed its mission on Peleliu in March and moved to Guam where it, too, died an honorable death." *Ibid.*

[6] *Muster Rolls*, H&S Bn, VAC, Feb46 (Diary Unit, Files Sec, Pers Dept, HQMC).



MAP 29

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Wisconsin National Guard outfit, was one of the Army units slated for deactivation early in 1946. In preparation for taking over the duties of the 32d Division in Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, and Oita Prefectures, the 2d Division began moving units of the 6th Marines north to the Army zone and increasing the size of the areas assigned to the other regiments. On 31 January, when the 2d Division formally relieved the 32d, the prefectural responsibilities of the major Marine units were: 2d Marines, Oita and Miyazaki; 6th Marines, Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, and Saga; 8th Marines, Kumamoto and Kagoshima; 10th Marines, Nagasaki. (See Map 30.)

At this time, the 2d Division command post was in Sasebo, and the CPs of the regiments were located as follows: 2d Marines, Miyazaki; 6th Marines, Fukuoka; 8th Marines, Kumamoto; and the 10th Marines, Nagasaki. An increase in the size and number of areas assigned to the 2d Division meant that Marine occupation responsibilities were similarly enlarged. The routine of guard, patrol, repatriation, and disposition duties grew apace with the areas in which they were accomplished.

A typical regimental disposition in this phase of the Marine occupation may be seen in the deployment of the 6th Marines on 31 January. (See Map 31.) The regimental headquarters and 1/6 CP were at Fukuoka; the CP of 2/6 was at Saga. The battalion headquarters company and Companies K and L of 3/6 were located at Kokura; Company I was at Senzaki in Yamaguchi Ken. From these widely separated localities, units of the 6th Marines maintained a daily occupation routine that remained largely the same until the entire division departed Japan.

When Major General Roscoe B. Woodruff, commander of I Corps, returned to the United States on temporary assignment on 8 February, Major General LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr., the commander of the 2d Marine Division and senior division commander in the corps, flew to Kyoto and assumed command of the corps, a position he retained until General Woodruff's return on 5 April. The corps zone of responsibility underwent one more change during this period. Advance elements of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) began moving into Hiroshima Prefecture on 4 February and formally took control from the 24th Infantry Division on 7 March. On the 23d, the BCOF formally relieved the 6th Marines in Yamaguchi Prefecture, reducing the 2d Marine Division zone to the island of Kyushu.

By April, it seemed that the constant shifting of units was largely over and that the divisions of I Corps could concentrate mainly on reinstituting regular training schedules. The 2d Marine Division had been pared down to peacetime strength by 11 February, when the third battalion of each infantry regiment and the last lettered battery of each artillery battalion were relieved of occupation duties, assembled at Sasebo, and then sent home for disbandment. Insofar as possible, the remaining units were assembled in battalion-sized camp areas, which served as centers from which surveillance of the local zone of responsibility was maintained. When not undertaking occupation missions, the Marines at-



MAP 30

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tended classes in basic military subjects, fired individual and crew-served infantry weapons, and carried out field exercises in combat tactics. An efficient air courier service of liaison planes and occasionally transports, operating out of the Marine air base at Omura, connected the scattered battalions and enabled the division and regimental commanders to maintain effective control of their units. The Marines had disposed of most of the Japanese war materiel and the tremendous repatriation flow of the first months of the occupation had slowed. The Japanese, as well as their conquerors, had settled into a routine of mutual tolerance, and often a relation much closer and stronger than that.

Soon after General Hunt had returned from Kyoto, he received word from Eighth Army that the 2d Division would be returned to a permanent base in the United States. The 24th Infantry Division would move to Kyushu and take over the Marine zone. Preparations for the movement got underway before the end of April, when reconnaissance parties of the relieving Army regiments arrived to check their future billeting areas.

General Hunt planned to relieve his outlying units first and then gradually to draw in his men upon Sasebo until the last unit had shipped out from the port. Oita and Miyazaki were the first prefectures to be handed over to the Army, and their former garrison, the 2d Marines—whose CP had been moved from Miyazaki to Oita on 18 March—was the first unit to complete loading out. The regiment left Sasebo on 13 June bound for Norfolk, and the 8th Marines followed soon after. General Hunt turned over his zone to the 24th Division on 15 June, and Marine responsibility for the occupation of Kyushu ended.[7] Division headquarters left on 24 June, and with the exception of service troops and rear unit echelons, which remained to load out heavy equipment, the major elements of the 2d Marine Division all had departed by 2 July.[8] General Woodruff attested to the accomplishments of the 2d Marine Division in the following farewell message to General Hunt:

> Today the 2d Marine Division comes to the end of its long trail from Guadalcanal to Japan. Its achievement in battle and in occupation: 'Well Done.' The cooperation and assistance of your splendid Division will be greatly missed. I Corps wishes you bon voyage and continued success in your next assignment. Woodruff.[9]

As a result of the acceptance of defeat by the Japanese, it was never necessary to institute complete military rule. General MacArthur's directives outlining a program of demilitarization and democratization were put into effect by a Japanese Government that disarmed and demobilized its own military forces and revamped its political structure without serious incident.

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[7] On the same date, Marine Air Base, Omura, was deactivated.

[8] Before the 2d Marine Division left Japan, it transferred 2,349 of its men into a China draft, which furnished replacements for the last major Marine unit remaining in the Far East, the 1st Marine Division.

[9] Cited in LtCol Michael S. Currin, "Occupation of Kyushu," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 10 (Oct46), p. 21.



MAP 31

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As MacArthur recalled in his memoirs:

> From the moment of my appointment as supreme commander, I had formulated the policies I intended to follow, implementing them through the Emperor and the machinery of the imperial government . . . the reforms I contemplated were those which would bring Japan abreast of modern progressive thought and action. First destroy the military power. Punish war criminals. Build the structure of representative government. Modernize the constitution. Hold free elections. Enfranchise the women. Release the political prisoners. Liberate the farmers. Establish a free labor movement. Encourage a free economy. Abolish police oppression. Develop a free and responsible press. Liberalize education. Decentralize the political power. Separate church from state.
>
> These tasks were to occupy me for the next five years and more. All were eventually accomplished, some easily, some with difficulty . . . I cautioned our troops from the start that by their conduct our own country would be judged in world opinion . . . Their general conduct was beyond criticism . . . They were truly ambassadors of good will.[10]

The Marines in Kyushu stood by as observers and policemen during many phases of the occupation operation, but were directly concerned with others. They supervised the repatriation of thousands of foreign civilians and prisoners of war and handled the flood of Japanese returning from the defunct overseas empire. Using local labor, the Marines collected, inventoried, and disposed of the vast stockpile of munitions and other military materiel that the Japanese had accumulated on Kyushu in anticipation of Allied invasion. Where necessary, they used their own men and equipment to effect emergency repairs of war damage and to help reestablish the Japanese civilian economy.

Within three months after its landing on Kyushu, the V Amphibious Corps had established effective surveillance over the entire island and its ten million people and had set up smoothly functioning repatriation and disposition procedures. The task was so well along by the end of 1945 that responsibility for the whole island could be turned over to one division. Perhaps the most significant benefit to accrue to the Marine Corps in the Japanese occupation was the variegated experience gained by the small unit leaders in fields widely separated from their normal peacetime routine of training and guard duty. Facing heavy responsibilities, the Marines' ability to adapt themselves to new situations and learn as they went along made the occupation of Kyushu a success.

[10] MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, pp. 282–283. A peace treaty with Japan was signed in San Francisco on 8 September 1951 by the U. S. and 48 other countries.

PART V

North China Marines

Background for Military Assistance

China is a troubled land. In the 20th century its people have known little of peace and much of war and internal strife. By the date of Japan's surrender, China needed a breather—time to recover its strength, to rebuild its economy, and to stabilize its government. Instead, a smoldering civil war flared up with increased intensity.

The mutual distrust and hatred of the Chinese Communists and Nationalists had its foundation in two decades of vicious infighting and campaigns of suppression. In retrospect, it seems that there was no real chance of bringing the two sides together in peace. Yet the United States attempted the impossible role of mediator—impossible because it was not the equal friend of both sides. The presence of American forces in China, particularly North China, can be explained only in terms of the peculiar situation created by the National Government's concurrent fight against the Communists and the Japanese.

HISTORICAL SITUATION REPORT [1]

The first treaty signed by the United States with China in 1844 contained a most favored nation clause which gave to the United States any right given another power by the Chinese Government. The intent of this agreement and others like it negotiated by Western nations was to ensure equality of commercial opportunity; the practical effect was to saddle China with a legacy of foreign extraterritorial rights. The fact that the Manchu Emperor of China did not share the enthusiasm of occidentals for opening his country to trade, or their penchant for seeking converts to Christianity, really made little difference. The major European powers, sparked by Great Britain and France, forced the establishment of foreign concessions ruled by foreign law and police in China's major cities. Although the United States popularly is supposed to have been blameless in this period of unbridled expansion, it nevertheless got a share of many concessions and was not unwilling to use force whenever it appeared necessary.

The first Marines to serve ashore in China, the ship's detachment of the sloop of war *St. Louis,* landed at Canton in 1844 with bluejacket support to protect the American trade station there

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: John King Fairbank, *The United States and China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958, rev. ed.), hereafter Fairbank, *U. S. and China;* Herbert Feis, *The China Tangle* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), hereafter Feis, *China Tangle;* F. F. Liu, *A Military History of Modern China 1924–1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), hereafter Liu, *Military History of China;* U. S. Department of State, *United States Relations with China* (Washington, 1949), hereafter *U. S. Relations with China.*

from mob violence.[2] (See Map 32.) In the years immediately following, ships' landing parties were often in action at trouble spots along the China coast when American businessmen or missionaries required protection. Armed intervention to enforce the terms of treaties and to protect lives and property was the order of the day for every nation strong enough to maintain a share of the Chinese market. Small wars with limited objectives were fought in which the Imperial troops were soundly thrashed by British and French expeditionary forces; and each Western success diminished China's sovereignty as the victors demanded further concessions to enhance their already privileged positions.

Japan bought into the favored nation category by an easy victory in war with China in 1894, and acquired Formosa and the Pescadores as part of its booty. The appalling weakness of the Manchu dynasty, its inability to hold onto its territory or to resist foreign pressures, encouraged the more rapacious powers to improve their own positions by forcing the grant of leaseholds and exclusive spheres of economic influence. To the Chinese, it appeared that "the rest of mankind is the carving knife and dish, while we are the fish and meat." [3] The aptness of this characterization was amply demonstrated in the five years following the end of the Sino-Japanese War.

In North China, Russia acquired the right to build a railroad across Manchuria to its port of Vladivostok, and, after forcing Japan to withdraw its claim, leased the Kwantung Peninsula with its all-weather harbors of Port Arthur and Talienwan (Dairen). To counter the Russian move, Britain developed a naval station at Weihaiwei on Shantung Peninsula directly across the Gulf of Chihli from Kwantung. Germany, moving in all haste to join the land grab, forced the lease of a holding centered on Tsingtao with exploitation rights in Shantung Province. Britain pressured an acknowledgement of its extensive investments and interests in the Yangtze River Valley by obtaining an agreement giving it paramount rights in this area. In South China, the Imperial Government signed a promise to Japan that no other nation would exploit Fukien Province opposite Formosa; Britain acquired Kowloon Peninsula to guard its colony of Hongkong; and France added substantially to the area under its thumb along the borders of its Tongking-Annam protectorate.

By 1899, the United States faced the possibility that it might be squeezed out of an influential position in China and moved to prevent this happening. The American Secretary of State, John Hay, obtained agreement of the other powers to the "Open Door" principle—that in their spheres of influence they would maintain the equality of rights of other foreign nationals. The following year an anti-foreign uprising with open Imperial support, the Boxer Re-

[2] Clyde H. Metcalf, *A History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), pp. 91–92.

[3] Sun Yat-sen, *San Min Chu I—The Three Principles of the People* (Chungking: Ministry of Information of the Republic of China, 1943), p. 12.



MAP 32

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bellion, broke out in North China. By dint of hard fighting, an international relief force which included several battalions of American Marines broke through to the besieged foreign legations at Peking. Secretary Hay acted quickly to forestall a further parceling of China's territory by the victorious powers, and circulated a statement of policy which said that the United States would:

> . . . seek a solution that would bring about permanent safety and peace in China, preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.[4]

The stand of the United States, aided in large part by the wary regard of the interested governments in maintaining a balance of power, won China a respite from dismemberment. Consistently maintained through the 20th century, the American advocacy of China's integrity also won the United States a deserved reputation as a "friend of China." This title came to signify a moral and emotional commitment far more powerful than the original acknowledgement of enlightened self-interest.

By Western standards, the China of the era of foreign intervention was a backward country, a land with little national spirit whose people were wholly concerned with a hand-to-mouth struggle to exist. Most Chinese were provincial in outlook, caring and knowing little of those things outside their immediate experience. Significant geographical barriers had helped foster the development of a number of semi-autonomous regions, each with its own speech, dress, and customs. China was in fact a nation of separate states, but one with no federal tradition. A strong central government was needed to weld together the varying elements, but the Manchu Dynasty had long since ceased to fill that need. The Manchus held power, such as it was, by default.

The opposition to Peking's rule was widespread but ineffectual until the decade following the Boxer uprising when Imperial officials belatedly attempted to institute government reforms. The sands had run out for the Manchus, however, and the try at modernizing the Imperial structure merely gave impetus to those who advocated its overthrow. One man became the symbol of the diverse forces which sought to win control of China—Sun Yat-sen. Under Sun's inspirational leadership, a revolutionary party dedicated to republican principles was formed which drew its strength primarily from the merchants, students, and factory workers of the cities of South China where Western influence had been greatest. Associated with Sun's following were a number of groups whose primary aim was to achieve provincial self-rule, men who did not want a strong government in Peking. After a series of abortive attempts, the Chinese Revolution was successfully launched at Hankow on 10 October 1911. The revolt spread quickly and with little bloodshed; by the year's end the Manchu regent had resigned.

[4] *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 417.

Sun Yat-sen was installed as Provisional President of the Republic of China on 1 January 1912 and an attempt was made to set up a parliamentary democracy. It was soon obvious that a strong man, backed by military power, was needed to force the provinces to adhere to the new government. Sun stepped aside for such a man, Yuan Shih-k'ai, a northern military leader who tried by increasingly undemocratic methods to rule China. When Yuan died in 1916, the Peking government retained only nominal strength. Regional warlords, relying on conscript coolie armies for their power, seized control throughout the country. The experiment in Western-style democracy had failed. The system of government which finally evolved after a decade of turmoil was tailored closer to China's tradition of one-man rule.

During World War I, Japan, taking advantage of the deep involvement of the Western powers in Europe to force compliance with its demands for the privileged foreign position, tried to set up a protectorate over China. Although the United States was instrumental in partially blocking this power grab, the Japanese were able to improve their political and economic hold on Manchuria, a presence which stemmed from their defeat of Russia in 1904-1905. Japan's blatant attempt to subjugate their country aroused in many Chinese a long-dormant spirit of nationalism.

The principal beneficiary of this new awareness was the Kuomintang (National People's Party) whose leader was Sun Yat-sen. Disillusioned in his attempt to establish a republic in the Western pattern, Sun had next tried to work through the warlords to achieve national unity. Turning from this fruitless effort, he devoted himself to the Kuomintang which became the vehicle by which he spread his political philosophy for the new China. Essentially, he wanted to ensure the people an adequate livelihood, to develop nationalism, and to institute a guided democracy compatible with Chinese tradition which in "four thousand years, through periods of order and disorder, [had] been nothing but autocracy." [5] The mission of the Kuomintang was to achieve Sun's goals through a revolutionary process—first would come the unification of China by military power, then a period of political tutelage, and finally a consitutional democracy shaped to Chinese needs.

A disciplined political structure and an efficient and powerful army were elements essential to Kuomintang success. Soviet Russia, realizing the potential for its own ends in Sun's party, began to provide needed organizational and military advisors. Members of the infant Chinese Communist Party, organized in 1921, were encouraged to join the Kuomintang and lend their zeal to the revolutionary movement. A trusted lieutenant of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, was sent to Russia to secure extensive aid and to observe Russian military organization. Early in 1924, at Whampoa outside Canton, a military academy was organized in the Russian pattern with Chiang as superintendent to train and indoctrinate officers for the Revolutionary Army. The Whampoa graduates and cadets, fiercely loyal to China, to the Kuomintang, and to Chiang, were the

[5] Sun Yat-sen, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

men who were to lead the Nationalist forces for the next quarter century.

In 1925 Sun Yat-sen died, leaving two claimants to his political estate, the Communist-dominated faction in the Kuomintang and the anti-leftist majority who looked to Chiang for leadership. The rift between the two factions widened steadily while Chiang led the Revolutionary Army in a successful campaign against the northern warlords in 1926-27. Finally in April 1927, an open break occurred and Chiang began to root the Communists out of the Kuomintang and the army. His purge was bloody and bitterly contested, but successful. By the year's end the militant remnants of the Communist Party had fled for refuge to the mountains of Kiangsi Province. (See Map 32.)

The northern campaign ended in 1928 after the fall of Peking, renamed Peiping (Northern Peace) to celebrate the victory. The new National Government of the Republic of China was established at Nanking, and the various foreign powers, including the U.S.S.R., recognized its legitimacy. Although the government was the strongest that had held sway in China during a century of disorder, the unification of the country was far from complete. Warlord armies had been incorporated in the Nationalist forces for expediency's sake, but their leaders still held tremendous local power and their men were unreliable when compared with the Whampoa-led troops of South China. The Communists holed up in Kiangsi under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung posed a cancerous threat that could not be ignored. And even though the warlords of Manchuria acknowledged the rule of Nanking, the Japanese had their own ambitious plans for that rich territory. Altogether the situation called for strong measures and an authoritative leader not afraid to apply them. Chiang Kai-shek was that man.

Under a variety of titles, Chiang held the real power in the Chinese Government in the 1930s and '40s. He controlled the Kuomintang, and in short order the party apparatus became almost indistinguishable from the government itself. The deep animosity between the Communists and the Kuomintang festered, erupting repeatedly as Chiang strove to wipe out the Kiangsi stronghold. In 1934, under pressure of an annihilation drive against them, the Communists abandoned their mountain fastness and set out on a 6,000-mile trek to a new home at Yenan in north central China. Only the most dedicated Communists survived the hardships and running battles of this legendary "Long March," and these veteran troops formed the hard core around which Mao began to organize a new base of operations. He needed time to develop his position and the Japanese gave it to him.

Japan's steady encroachment on Chinese territory had first call on Chiang's attention. In 1931 Japan established a protectorate over Manchuria and set up a puppet regime despite the protests of the United States and the League of Nations. Undisturbed by vocal opposition, Japan in the next year used its troops to drive the Shanghai garrison from the city after a boycott of Japanese goods led to furious fighting. When the

Japanese withdrew from Shanghai after capturing it, they transferred their attentions to North China and increased economic and military pressure on the border regions. Chiang, who was remodeling the National Army with German assistance and advice, held off from full-scale conflict as long as possible to give his troops training and equipment that would make them a better match for the Japanese. During 1936 an intermittent series of clashes between Chinese Government forces and invading Manchurian puppet troops of Japan's *Kwantung Army* were handily won by the Chinese. A Government spokesman in Nanking promptly warned that "the time has ended when foreign nations could safely nibble away at Chinese territorial fringes." [6]

The stage was set for the full-blown war which broke out on 7 July 1937 when Japanese troops attacked the defenders of Peiping. Almost immediately, leaders of all Chinese military factions, whether Government, warlord, or Communist, aligned themselves behind Chiang Kai-shek's leadership as Generalissimo and pledged resistance to the Japanese invasion. Mao's troops were designated the Eighth Route Army of the Central Government's forces and supposedly came under Chiang's control. Actually, the Communists played their own game, as Chiang had been sure they would when he was forced into a reluctant alliance with them by public and private pressure. During eight years of war with Japan, Nationalist troops bore the brunt of the heavy fighting and suffered by far the greatest proportional casualties as they were committed to defend the prize cities and rice bowl farmlands of South and Central China. In North China, the Communists used the war as a means to increase their strength and expand the area under control of Yenan, the Red capital.

In effect, the Communists gained a standoff by not contesting possession of the important strategic objectives that Japan wanted. Rather than dissipate his strength in set-piece battles for cities, mines, and railroads that he did not need, Mao concentrated on developing his followers into an effective guerrilla force which eventually controlled the countryside around the Japanese positions. The Communists' most effective recruiting aid was their policy of forced land redistribution in favor of the peasantry. The hundreds of thousands of peasants who directly benefited, or who saw at least the possibility of bettering an ageless cycle of impoverished and debt-ridden tenantry, were willing and militant converts to Communism. This ability of Mao's party to effect long-sought economic reforms by fiat was perhaps the greatest factor in its favor in the contest with the Kuomintang.

Reform proposals were sidetracked or given little attention by Chiang's government which was wholly concerned with a desperate struggle to maintain China's identity as a nation. Chinese troops were driven slowly from the important coastal cities and the major

[6] *The Central Daily News* (Nanking), dtd 28Nov36, quoted in Liu, *Military History of China*, p. 114.

communication centers of the interior. The national capital was moved deep inland to Chungking, in the mountains of Szechwan Province on the upper reaches of the Yangtze. A wearying and costly war of attrition was fought during which dogged Chinese resistance and the vast and rugged expanse of China itself combined to limit but not halt Japanese expansion.

During the early years of its fight China received trickles of aid from various foreign powers, notably Germany and the U.S.S.R., until the outbreak of war in Europe shut off help. After 1939, the United States became the principal supporter of China's war effort. Men, trucks, and materiel from the States were furnished to keep open the Burma Road, the sole supply route to Nationalist China after Japan blockaded the coastline. American fighter pilots and ground crewmen, some of them volunteers from the armed forces, were allowed to serve in the Chinese Air Force against Japan. Military and economic missions were sent to Chungking to initiate aid programs, and President Roosevelt made China eligible for Lend-Lease supplies by declaring that "the defense of China was vital to the defense of the United States." [7] All this effort was just getting into full swing when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. One of the priority targets of Japanese troops in Asia was the Burma Road, and with the fall of its southern terminus, China was cut off from all supplies except those brought in by air.

[7] *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 26.

At this juncture, the United States sent a veteran of service in China, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell, to command American troops in the newly created China-Burma-India Theater. He had a parallel duty as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek for a projected joint Allied staff that never materialized and a mission of training and building the Chinese Army into a more effective fighting force with the aid of American equipment and instruction. Stilwell was also made responsible for the effort to reopen overland supply routes to China and to step up the pace of aerial supply. The tasks given the American general were bewildering in their complexity, but he had a single-minded tenacity of purpose which drove him to carry out his orders despite any obstacles. This very drive was his undoing, as he was unable to appreciate Chiang's position as head of state in many military matters. Since Stilwell's actions were characterized by what one Chinese officer called "a monumental lack of tact," [8] friction between the two strong-willed men was inevitable. The Generalissimo forced Stilwell's recall in September 1944.[9] The largest rock on which their stormy relationship foundered was the difference in attitude toward the Chinese Communists whom Stilwell wanted

[8] Liu, *Military History of China*, p. 178.

[9] A lucid and detailed examination of the complex situation which led to Stilwell's recall can be found in the official Army history by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sutherland, *Stilwell's Command Problems—China-Burma-India Theater—United States Army in World War II* (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1956).

to arm, train, and equip to fight against Japan.[10]

To replace Stilwell in China, and to harvest the ripe fruits of his labors in training and logistical fields, President Roosevelt sent Major General Albert C. Wedemeyer to become commanding general of what was now to be the China Theater. In addition to a far-reaching and able military training and advisory organization, Wedemeyer as theater commander had control of the principal American combat unit in China, the Fourteenth Air Force. The Fourteenth was the full-grown child of the early American Volunteer Group of 1941-1942 raised by Major General Claire Chennault, who was still its commander. Where Stilwell had strongly questioned the practicality of Chennault's concept of air war against the Japanese home islands, a concept that found favor with Chiang Kai-shek and President Roosevelt, Wedemeyer had a firm directive to carry out air operations from China.[11] In this respect, as well as others, the personable American leader was armed with instructions that smoothed the way for a restoration of cordial relations in Chungking. At Chiang's invitation, and with JCS approval, Wedemeyer served as his Chief of Staff in directing operations against the Japanese and in coordinating the organization, equipment, and training of Chinese forces during the closing months of the war.[12] Japan's fortunes were on the downgrade in China as well as in the Pacific, and the prospect in spring and early summer of 1945 was for mounting Chinese military success.

WAR'S END IN CHINA[13]

In late May 1945, Japanese *Imperial General Headquarters* issued orders to its area commander in China, General Yasuji Okamura, to contract his battle lines in the southwest and withdraw the main body of his troops to the central and northern provinces. At the same time, Okamura's *China Expeditionary Army* was directed to concert its movements with the *Kwantung Army* in

[10] The commander of the Marine occupation forces in China recalled that at a meeting in September 1945, General Stilwell described the Chinese Communists as being primarily "agrarian reformers." LtGen Keller E. Rockey interviews by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14–15Apr59, 29Apr59, and 9Jul59, hereafter *Rockey interview* with appropriate date. General Wedemeyer commented that the Generalissimo "was confident the Communists would not fight the Japanese but would simply prepare for postwar takeover." Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd 26Aug61.

[11] Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958), p. 271, hereafter Wedemeyer, *Reports.*

[12] Wedemeyer ltr, *op. cit.*

[13] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: MilHistSec, HqAFFE, Japanese Monograph No. 129, ChinaArOpsRec Comd of the China ExpeditionaryA, dtd 13Feb52 (OCMH 8–5.1 AC 121), Japanese Monograph No. 154, Rec of Ops Against Soviet Russia, Eastern Front (Aug45), dtd 6Apr54 (OCMH 8–5.1 AC 179), and Japanese Monograph No. 155, Rec of Ops Against Soviet Russia on Northern and Western fronts of Manchuria and in Northern Korea (Aug45), dtd Sep54 (OCMH 8–5.1 AC 180); Senate Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, *Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 3 May—17 August 1951* (Washington, 1951), hereafter *Military Situation in the Far East; U. S. Relations with China.*

Manchuria and the *Seventeenth Area Army* in Korea. Japanese intelligence predicted that a large-scale American amphibious assault was probable in the Shanghai-Hangchow area, with other possible landings on the Shantung Peninsula and in South Korea. Looming even larger in Japanese defense plans was the clear and ominous threat that the U.S.S.R. would at last enter the war against their country.

The enemy prediction of U. S. landings in China was now incorrect, although such operations had once been planned; the Japanese estimate, however, was based on logical assumptions of American intentions. In the case of Soviet moves, the Japanese were able to read the signs without difficulty and all too correctly. Even before the end of the war in Europe, a buildup of troops in Siberia was evident. Within weeks of Germany's surrender, the border area fairly bristled with Soviet soldiers and their weapons and equipment. Early September was the expected date for an attack, but Soviet armor-led columns cracked the Japanese defenses on 9 August, three days after the dropping of the first atomic bomb. Within a week the war was over.

The *Kwantung Army* which met the Soviet attack was only a shadow of what once was Japan's military showpiece unit. Its first-line divisions had been committed to bolster defenses in Burma, China, and especially in the Pacific islands. In their place, much weaker garrison divisions, largely composed of new conscripts, had been raised. Strong border defenses which barred the avenues of approach from Siberia to the industrial heartland of Eastern Manchuria had been skeletonized to obtain heavy weapons for more active fronts. Significantly, the Japanese themselves rated the effective strength of the ten divisions and one brigade which held Eastern Manchuria at just 2¾ first-line divisions. The combat efficiency of other major *Kwantung* units was equally low.

When the Soviet Far East General Army struck, its tanks and motorized infantry poured over the border on three widely separated fronts. Japanese outpost resistance was brushed aside and stronger defenses were contained or overwhelmed as the multi-pronged attacks converged on the Changchun-Mukden area. Although the *Kwantung Army* reeled back from Soviet blows, most of its units were still intact and it was hardly ready to be counted out of the fight. The Japanese Emperor's Imperial Rescript which ordered his troops to lay down their arms was the only thing which prevented a protracted and costly battle.

Before the end of August the *Kwantung Army* was no more, and Soviet troops controlled most of Manchuria and North Korea. Dispensing with formal surrender ceremonies, the Soviets swiftly disarmed the Japanese, broke up existing military formations, separated officers from enlisted men, and organized hundreds of labor battalions. In short order, a complex military organization was reduced to pieces, its only visible remnants columns of weaponless soldiers trudging north and east to Siberian labor camps.

The asking price of the U.S.S.R.'s entry into the Pacific War was high. At Yalta in February 1945, Marshal Stalin agreed to attack Japan in two to three

month's time after the surrender of Germany. In return for this promise, Stalin wanted all former rights of Imperial Russia in Manchuria, rights which had been lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05. In addition to the virtual control of Manchurian railroads and the Kwantung Peninsula that this demand meant, Stalin insisted that China write off its claim to Outer Mongolia by recognizing the status quo in that Soviet-dominated country. All of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands were to be turned over to the U.S.S.R. as war booty. President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill both agreed "that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan is defeated." [14] Despite its deep concern, China was not a participant in the Yalta Conference nor a signatory power to the Yalta Agreement, because it was believed that the secret of Soviet entry into the war against Japan could not be kept in the lax security situation then prevailing in Chungking.

President Roosevelt undertook the task of persuading Generalissimo Chiang to accept the Yalta terms by signing a treaty of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union. As the one nation, next to China, most deeply involved in fighting Japan, the United States was extremely anxious that the U.S.S.R. add its power to the final battles. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had advised the President before he left for Yalta to insure "Russia's entry at as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations." [15] No Allied leader knew in February or even in the first days of August that the war with Japan would end as suddenly as it did, and that the expected heavy toll of Allied lives would not have to be paid.

The Generalissimo accepted the proffered treaty, despite its unfavorable bent, in hope that the Soviet Union would honor its written guarantee of China's "sovereignty and territorial integrity" and its recognition of "the National Government as the central government of China." [16] Chiang was too much of a realist not to appreciate the fact that Stalin might take all that he wanted without Chinese sanction. If the Soviet Union violated the letter or spirit of its treaty, however, world moral condemnation would become a practical asset to Nationalist China in soliciting aid.

The Chungking Government was sorely in need of any support that it could muster at home or abroad at the war's end. The Kuomintang had been unable to effect significant political or economic reforms during eight years of fighting. Stripped of the shield and purpose of a popular anti-foreign war, it drew the blame for continued poverty, rampant inflation, and corruption. The majority of the Chinese people were war-weary and eager for a better chance in life; as events were to prove, they would not continue to support a government that postponed or was unable to effect necessary reforms.

[14] Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 114.

[15] Quoted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, p. 3332.

[16] Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 586, 587; Chiang Kai-shek, *Soviet Russia in China* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), p. 227, hereafter Chiang, *Soviet Russia*.

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The Chinese Communists, who had none of the obligations and few of the problems of an internationally recognized government emerging from a disastrous war, were able to pursue their end of dominating China with fanatical singleness of purpose. While Chungking had devoted most of its resources to the defeat of Japan, Yenan had expanded its hold on North China and Western Manchuria. The Communists concentrated on economic reforms which would expand their base of popular support. In the summer of 1945, American military intelligence agents could truthfully report:

> . . . since the Chinese Communists provide individuals, especially laborers and peasants, with greater economic opportunity than the Kuomintang Nationalists provide, the Communists enjoy wider popular support in the area held by their own armies than do the Nationalists in their areas of control. This is the Communists' greatest source of strength in China.[17]

Chiang Kai-shek had no intention of letting a rival government exist in China, and Mao Tse-tung showed no signs of turning over the territory he controlled to Chungking. Into this situation of a nation divided, of a civil war ready to flame anew, the United States committed its troops to help repatriate the Japanese and, in a limited manner, to aid the Nationalists in regaining possession of North China. The resultant entanglement with the cause of the National Government was to have an incalculable effect on United States foreign policy for the next decade.

U. S. COMMITMENT [18]

After the publication of the Japanese Imperial Rescript, the *China Expeditionary Army* reversed its wartime role and became a quasi-ally of the National Government. In North China, the Japanese garrison was the only force that could prevent the Communists from seizing the major cities and the communication routes that linked them. The *North China Area Army,* with headquarters in Peiping, complied with a Chungking directive that its troops surrender only to properly designated representatives of Chiang Kai-shek. Although Mao Tse-tung's men were able to pick off outlying Japanese detachments and force the defection of large numbers of puppet troops, the bulk of Japanese soldiers held their discipline and complied with the orders passed to them from above. They continued to mount guard as they had in years past and to fend off Communist attacks, while they waited for relief by Nationalist troops.

The decision to use the Japanese to hold North China was seconded in Washington where President Truman approved plans to use American troops, ships, and planes to aid the Nationalist recovery of the area.[19] Chiang Kai-

[17] MIS, WD, "The Chinese Communist Movement," *ca.* Jul45, in *Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 1st Session* (Washington, 1949), v. 95, pt 15, p. A5501.

[18] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CinCPac-CinCPOA JStfStudy BELEAGUER, dtd 13Aug45; CinCPac WarD, Aug45 (OAB, NHD); *Military Situation in the Far East;* Wedemeyer, *Reports.*

[19] Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope—Memoirs,* v. II (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1956), p. 62.

shek's armies had no organic transportation capable of moving large bodies of men for long distances, and the country's road, rail, and shipping facilities were totally inadequate for the job at hand. Following a JCS directive of 10 August 1945, General Wedemeyer issued orders to the American units under his command to assist the National Government in occupying key areas, in receiving the enemy surrender and repatriating Japanese troops, and in liberating and rehabilitating Allied internees and prisoners of war. While furnishing this assistance, theater forces were admonished to make every effort "to avoid participation in any fratricidal conflict in China." [20] This warning to steer clear of involvement in civil strife followed the consistent pattern of American policy instructions carried through from the earliest days of the Stilwell mission.

Alarmed by the possibility of U.S.S.R. encroachment in North China and Manchuria, General Wedemeyer asked that seven American divisions be sent to his command to create a barrier force which would discourage further Soviet expansion. In reply, the JCS indicated that the absolute priority of occupation operations in the Japanese home islands would use up all immediately available troops and shipping. In furtherance of plans then being laid at Admiral Nimitz' headquarters, however, General Wedemeyer was offered the Marine III Amphibious Corps to assist the National Government in reoccupying North China and repatriating the Japanese.

The preliminary concept of operations involving IIIAC units called for the use of Marine divisions to occupy Shanghai and gain control of the Yangtze's mouth, but the revised CinCPac plan for occupation operations, published on 14 August, covered landings in the Taku-Tientsin and Tsingtao areas instead.[21] (See Map 33.) China Theater had advised that Nationalist troops would be airlifted to Shanghai and Nanking by American planes; the Marines would not be needed there. A considerable time gap would occur, however, before National Government forces in strength could reach North China, and the presence of American occupation forces as stand-ins for the Nationalists would help to stabilize the situation.

On 19 August, at Manila, representatives of CinCPac, Seventh Fleet, and China Theater met to coordinate plans for China operations. The assignment of IIIAC to General Wedemeyer's command was confirmed and 30 September set as the earliest practical date for landing the Marines without undue interference with the occupation of Japan and Korea.

IIIAC PLANS [22]

In order to keep abreast of the rapidly changing situation in the

[20] USForChinaThtr OpDirective No. 25, dtd 20Aug45 (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

[21] CinCPac-CinCPOA OPlan 12-45 (Revised), CAMPUS-BELEAGUER, dtd 14Aug45 (OAB, NHD).

[22] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CinCPac WarD, Aug45; ComSeventhFlt OPlan No. 13-45, dtd 26Aug45, corrected through Change 10, dtd 18Sep45; ComVIIPhibFor OPlan No. A1703-45, dtd 19Sep45, hereafter *VIIPhibFor OPlan 1703-45;* IIIAC WarD, Aug45; IIIAC OPlan No. 26-45, dtd 1Sep45, corrected through Change 4, dtd 27Sep45, hereafter *IIIAC OPlan 26-45.*

Pacific and to have a planning edge for future operations, III Amphibious Corps monitored the radio traffic of higher headquarters. As a result, the corps commander, Major General Keller E. Rockey, and his staff were aware of the impending China commitment of IIIAC several days before any word was received from CinCPac.[23] Even prior to this alert, however, the major units of the corps were readying themselves for occupation duty. The swift mounting out of Task Group Able for the occupation of Japan was sufficient warning of a probable role for other Marine units.[24]

The presence of CinCPac and FMFPac Advance Headquarters on Guam helped speed preparations for the coming operations and allowed changes in plans to be made with a minimum of disruption. Before the switch of targets for IIIAC to the Tsingtao and Tientsin areas was effected, Rear Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, the operations officer for CinCPac, held a briefing on the proposed landing at Shanghai for Generals Geiger and Moore of FMFPac and Rockey and his chief of staff, Brigadier General William A. Worton.[25] By the time the North China objectives were confirmed, with Shanghai as an alternative operation, the coordination of naval plans with those of the landing force at the corps level was well underway. A formal warning order was issued by CinCPac on 21 August; IIIAC alerted its subordinate units the following day.

The Seventh Fleet, under Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, was assigned the mission of conducting naval operations off the coast of China and western Korea in Admiral Nimitz' operation plan of 14 August. On the 26th, Kinkaid published his own plan which covered the landings of the Army XXIV Corps in South Korea and the III Amphibious Corps in North China.

Kinkaid's concept of operations called for a Fast Carrier Force (TF 72) and a task grouping of cruisers, destroyers, minesweepers, and close fire support landing craft, North China Force (TF 71), to arrive in the Yellow Sea prior to Japan's surrender. By means of extensive air and sea sweeps, the U. S. ships and planes would exercise control of the Yellow Sea and the Gulf of Chihli. Simultaneously, other task forces of the fleet would move in on the South and Central China coasts, and, as Nationalist troops advanced to take the ports, set up patrol bases at Canton and Shanghai.

Amphibious operations were to be conducted by Task Force 78, led by Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, Commander, VII Amphibious Force. Barbey's task was to land and establish the XXIV Corps ashore in the Seoul area of Korea, and then to lift and land IIIAC at Tsingtao and at Tientsin's ports, Taku-

[23] MajGen William A. Worton ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 12Jan59 and interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 10Feb59, hereafter *Worton ltr* and *Worton interview*, respectively. General Rockey recalled that Marine officers on the CinCPac staff also had passed the word of the China commitment of IIIAC before the official notification was received. LtGen Keller E. Rockey comments on draft ms, dtd 6Feb62, hereafter *Rockey comments*.

[24] See pt IV, "The Occupation of Japan," *supra*.

[25] *Worton interview*.

Tangku and Chinwangtao. After the initial III Corps landings, some turnaround shipping was scheduled to bring on the follow-up echelons of the corps while other transports moved to South China to pick up Nationalist forces scheduled to relieve the Marines.

In order to facilitate joint planning for the operation, Admiral Barbey sent a liaison party from the VII Amphibious Force to Guam to live and work directly with IIIAC staff officers. The men he picked were empowered to make major decisions without constant referral to the admiral.[26] Although Barbey's operation plan was not issued until 19 September, its essential elements were well known to IIIAC as they developed. The corps itself was able to send out a tentative schedule of operations on 29 August and follow it up three days later with its basic plan.

General Rockey, as Commander, Naval Occupation Forces (TF 79), was assigned his own corps as the China landing force. In addition, the 3d Marine Division on Guam and the 4th Marine Division on Maui reported for planning purposes as CinCPac area reserve. III Corps Artillery was given the role of corps reserve, and was to move from Okinawa to China when and if needed. The heavy artillerymen were ordered to be prepared to operate as infantry.[27] To augment IIIAC ground forces and to give it a substantial air capability, CinCPac added the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to Rockey's command. The fighter groups of the wing were released from operational control of MacArthur's Far East Air Forces on 27 August, shortly after the wing command post had shifted from Bougainville to Zamboanga on Mindanao.[28] The wing's transport group, MAG–25, remained based at Bougainville temporarily, although its planes were continually in the forward area.[29]

In all, with the normal reinforcements for a major amphibious operation, the initial troop list of General Rockey's command included approximately 65,000 men. Many of the units attached for planning were those that would have been needed if extensive combat or base construction activities were expected. But, in North China it appeared that there would be little need for additional Seabee battalions or hospitals. Once General Rockey had a chance to confer with Admiral Kinkaid and with General George C. Stratemeyer, General Wedemeyer's deputy, IIIAC strength was reduced by the deletion of a number of supporting units.[30] The paring process went on as the operation developed, and the peak strength of III Corps in China stayed close to 50,000 men.

As it first evolved, the IIIAC concept of operations included landings about ten days apart at two widely separated objectives. Rockey's headquarters and corps troops would mount out at Guam, move to Okinawa, be joined there by the reinforced 1st Marine Division, and then sail for Tientsin. The 6th Marine Division (less the 4th Marines, which

[26] *Rockey interview*, 14–15Apr59.

[27] III CorpsArty OPlan No. 11–45 (Tentative), dtd 4Sep45, p. 2.

[28] 1st MAW WarD, Aug45.

[29] MAG–25 WarD, Sep45.

[30] *Rockey comments.*

had been committed in the occupation of Japan) would follow from Guam on later shipping and make Tsingtao its destination. Elements of 1st MAW, loading at Mindanao and Bougainville, would move to China as soon as airfields at Tientsin and Tsingtao were ready.

In the main, command relationships for this operation were similar to those for combat landings in the later stages of the war. The transport squadron commanders who moved and landed the two assault echelons were charged with the responsibility for the success of operations ashore until the respective division commanders notified them that they were ready to take over. Admiral Barbey was to continue in command of amphibious forces afloat and ashore until General Rockey had landed and established his headquarters. Once the IIIAC commander was ready to assume control of his forces, he would report to the China Theater commander for operational control.

The nature of the proposed operations at each objective varied so sharply as a result of differing geographical, political, and military factors that in many respects the further history of the Marines in North China became two different accounts. One, told at Tsingtao, has an aura of routine garrison duty through all but the last days of its telling. The other, based on activities along the rail line and roads connecting Peiping, Tientsin, and Chinwangtao, bristles with the constant threat and sometime reality of Communist attacks.

Ashore in North China

TARGET ANALYSIS [1]

The North China plain encompasses most of Hopeh Province and extends two broad valleys through Shantung, one touching the sea near Tsingtao and the other reaching toward Central China. (See Map 33.) Irregular foothills rising into rugged mountain ranges border the plain, infringing on Hopeh's boundaries to the north and west and interrupting the lowland in Shantung in the south and east. The plain has long been the invasion route for armies bent on China's conquest; the Great Wall which separates Hopeh from Manchuria and Mongolia was built to check such incursions. Where the wall touches the sea, a narrow corridor begins which skirts the mountains shadowing the coast until it opens into the Manchurian plain.

In some ways the climate of North China is similar to that in the north central part of the United States. There is a significant range of temperature between the seasons, and the winters are particularly cold, owing to biting winds which whip in from the sea and out of the mountains. Rainfall is light, averaging 20–25 inches the year round, but in North China almost half of that usually falls during two months, July and August. During this rainy season, the many rivers, streams, and canals that lace the plain habitually overflow their banks and flood the countryside. Roads become virtually impassable to any heavy traffic until the end of the rains returns them to their usual dusty state. The frequent dust storms from October through May are a particularly unpleasant feature of the colder weather. There is relatively little snow in winter months.

Any fertile land in the Hopeh-Shantung region is intensely cultivated; fields are terraced high on the hillsides and edge the salt marshes and mud flats that line a good part of the low-lying coast. The staple crops are cereal grains, principally rice and kaoliang,[2] augmented by family garden plots. Thousands of farm villages dot the orderly maze of small fields which give a monotonous sameness to the hinterland. Most of the seventy million people living in the two provinces in 1945 were indebted to absentee landlords and, tied to the land, eked out a marginal

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in section is derived from: MID, OfcCofEngrs, USA, Strategic Engineering Survey No. 150, Hopeh–Shantung Region (China) (Summary) Terrain–Intel, dtd May45; CinCPac–CinCPOA Bul No. 48–45, "The Coast of North China," 2 vols., dtd 1Mar45; *VIIPhibFor OPlan 1703–45;* IIIAC IntelStudy ThtrofOps North China, dtd 29Aug45, hereafter *IIIAC IntelStudy;* IIIAC G–2 PeriodicRpt No. 1–M, Oct45, dtd 3Nov45 in IIIAC WarD, Oct45.

[2] Kaoliang is a grain sorghum which forms much of the diet of eastern Asia. The dry and pithy stalks, which often grow higher than a man's head, serve as fuel and thatch.



MAP 33

T.L. RUSSELL

existence. Many townsmen and city dwellers made their living servicing and exploiting rural market areas. Trade with other parts of China and with foreign lands was funnelled almost entirely through a few large cities which lay along the principal communication routes.

From an economic viewpoint the most important city in North China at the war's end was its commercial hub, Tientsin. Second only to Peiping in size, with a population swollen by refugees to an estimated million and a half, the city dominated an extensive network of railroads and waterways. Since it had grown to importance only during the past half century, Tientsin was quite modern in many respects. Broad, paved streets and substantial masonry buildings of foreign styling characterized the area of the former international concessions which gave the city its pronounced Western cast. Even the predominantly Chinese quarters shared this appearance of openness, especially when contrasted with the jumbled and warren-like aspect of most older cities.

Although it was 36 miles from the Gulf of Chihli, Tientsin was still China's most important port north of Shanghai. The Hai Ho (River) and the railroad which paralleled its course from the sea were the means by which a constant flow of goods had reached and gone out from Tientsin in times of peace. An open roadstead off the entrance to the river gave anchorage over good holding ground to ocean-going vessels. Only lighters and coastal shipping drawing 14 feet or less were able to negotiate the Taku Bar, a barrier of silt across the river mouth that took its name from a nearby village. Seven miles upriver on the north bank was Tangku, a town which served as Tientsin's gateway to the sea and as its railhead for transshipment of cargo. River traffic to Tientsin was extensive but confined to craft less than 300 feet in length which could negotiate the restricted turning basin at the city's wharves.

Tientsin's airport was about seven miles east of its outskirts near the village of Changkeichuang. The field, which was circular in outline, had three intersecting runways only one of which was paved. The comparatively short landing strips, just a bit over 4,000 feet long, and the poor drainage of the surrounding terrain often faced pilots with the prospect of coming down on a short runway that began in mud and ended in mud. Other air facilities at Changkeichuang Field were comparably limited, and the prospects for heavy use were poor without extensive construction.

In contrast to Tientsin's one poor airfield, Peiping had two first class military airdromes, each with considerable hangar, repair, and storage facilities. Lantienchang Field, nine miles northwest of the ancient city, had five runways, all shorter than those at Tientsin but in better operating condition. Eight miles south of the city was Nan Yuan Field which the Japanese had used as a training base. Most of its installations, including four runways and a grass infield suitable for takeoffs and landings, were located within a walled oval nearly two miles long and over a mile wide. Located just outside the enclosure was an airstrip a mile and a quarter long

that could accommodate the heaviest transports and bombers.

The excellent air facilities at Peiping were an indication of its strategic importance. The ancient city, China's capital for nearly 700 years, had a measureless value as a symbol of national power. It was the cultural and educational center of North China as well as its administrative headquarters under both Nationalists and Japanese. More than 1,650,000 people dwelt within its moated walls.

The massive walls of Peiping were the city's most distinctive feature and gave definition to sections within their bounds. The outer walls made of earth and cement faced with brick were 40 feet high, 62 feet broad at the base, and 32 feet across the top. A deep moat, water-filled in most places, extended all around the city. In general outline Peiping resembled a square set beside a rectangle, the square being the Tartar City, the rectangle the Chinese City. The Tartar City was roughly four miles along each side, while the Chinese City was five miles long and two wide. Towering gates in the outer walls and in the interior wall between the two cities opened into broad and straight thoroughfares. Sharp contrast to these main avenues was offered by the many patternless, twisting side streets and alleys which led off them. Most of Peiping's residents lived in family or communal compounds which lined the narrow streets.

Centered in the Tartar City to the east of an extensive system of artificial lakes was the Imperial City. Once the home of court officials and China's leading scholars, the Imperial City completely surrounded the former palace area of the Manchus—the Forbidden City. Within high palace walls were dozens of buildings and courtyards which offered impressive testimony to the richness of a bygone era. The walls of the Imperial City had been razed to make way for roads but its confines were still clearly discernible. In the southeast part of the Tartar City was the walled Legation Quarter, the home and commercial center for a sizeable foreign community. Scattered throughout Peiping were many colorful temples and buildings of the Imperial age which helped make the city an irresistible goal for tourists in peacetime.

Some 475 miles southeast of Peiping was the port of Tsingtao, the smallest of the three North China cities which had populations of over a million. Situated on Kiaochow Bay at the tip of a stout finger of land jutting out from the south shore of Shantung Peninsula, Tsingtao had the best harbor north of Shanghai. Foreign warships, including elements of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet, used its port facilities frequently in prewar years, and American naval officers were impressed with its suitability as a forward area base. Tsingtao was built up around several harbors with most of the large scale commercial activity centered on the mile-square Great Harbor in the northern part of the city where deep draft vessels could dock. Extensive rail yards and an industrial area dominated by textile mills were close to Great Harbor's wharves. Ringing the wide semicircle of shoreline of the Outer Harbor to the south were most of the city's public buildings.

As befitted its origin as a German leasehold, Tsingtao was laid out in orderly fashion with many Teutonic touches. Indeed, to some observers it "looked like a fragment of the Friesland or Westphalia rather than a Chinese port city." [3] Its streets were wide and paved, and its buildings, most of them two- and three-stories high, were modern and Western in appearance. From an incoming ship or plane, the most striking aspect of the city was the almost universal color scheme of red tile roofs and white buildings.

Tsingtao was built on the foothill reaches of an isolated cluster of mountains standing to the east of the city. To the north, well drained flatland provided ample room for airfield construction. The Japanese had established two military airdromes in the area and, in addition, had expanded the facilities of the existing commercial airfield. This field near Tsangkou village about seven miles from the outskirts of the city was perhaps the best in North China. It had two main concrete runways with extensive paved taxiways and aprons and repair shops, storage sheds, and barracks adequate to handle a large volume of air traffic. The terrain in the vicinity provided almost unlimited opportunity for expansion.

No other coastal city in Shantung or Hopeh could rival Tsingtao's natural advantages as a port, but Chefoo, which had the best protected anchorage on Shantung Peninsula's north shore, had comparable strategic significance in the Chinese civil war. Chefoo was 150 miles due south of Dairen and its possession gave the holder easy access to Manchuria across the mouth of the Gulf of Chihli or the capability of choking off such communication. The city had a war-swollen population of about 200,000 whose main concern was the agricultural life in the surrounding countryside. Chefoo had no rail connection with the interior and only a way-station airfield, but the rural roads leading into it were adequate to service a guerrilla army in all months but the rainy season.

The railroad network that traced its way across the North China plain was of paramount importance in determining the course of events in North China. The key line was the Peiping-Mukden Railroad; connecting and subsidiary lines reached south into Central China and north into Siberia from the terminal cities. At Tientsin the Peiping-Mukden connected with a railroad which led to Tsinan, Shantung's capital, and thence eventually to Nanking and Shanghai. Tsinan was linked directly to Tsingtao and the sea by rail.

The prize section of the Peiping-Mukden Railroad ran between Tangku and a small coastal town 150 miles to the north, Chinwangtao. The Kailin Mining Administration (KMA), a British-controlled company, had developed Chinwangtao as a shipping point for its coal mines near Tangshan. Coal was the basic fuel for many public utilities and factories throughout China and the output of the KMA mines figured strongly in any plans for economic recovery. Like the KMA, the Nationalist Government was attracted to Chinwangtao by the fact that its wharves and

[3] 1stLt Alan T. Shilin, "Occupation at Tsing Tao," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 1 (Jan–45), p. 36.

anchorages were never icebound, and it had rerouted the Peiping-Mukden tracks to go through the town. During a hard winter when the Hai River was frozen over, Chinwangtao served in Tangku's stead as Tientsin's port.

The Nationalists, the Communists, and the Japanese were agreed upon the strategic value—and the vulnerability—of the railroads. The Japanese were able to keep in operation only those portions of the rail system that their troops held in strength. Communist guerrillas laid waste unguarded stretches and attacked weak outposts in a ceaseless program of harassment which caused extensive damage to tracks, roadbeds, and rolling stock. The Nationalists moving into North China faced the same problem and planned the same solution as the Japanese. Chiang Kai-shek's forces would be able to use only as much track as they could keep tightly guarded.

Most Japanese troops in North China at the war's end were concentrated in rail junction cities and extended along the tracks between. There were 326,000 regular troops in Hopeh and Shantung and in the provinces immediately inland, Honan and Shansi, all under command of the *North China Area Army* of Lieutenant General Hiroshi Nemoto. Four armies, the *First* in Shansi, the *Twelfth* in Honan, *Forty-third* in Shantung, and the *Mongolian Garrison* in Hopeh had charge of area defense. In addition to the Japanese units, there were 140,000 Chinese in the puppet *North China Pacification Army* and an additional 340,000 village and county local defense troops under Japanese charge.

There was a marked absence of heavy supporting weapons in the Japanese Army organizations, which were composed largely of second-line troops formed from service units turned infantry and filled out with recent conscripts. The *North China Pacification Army* puppet units were even less well trained and equipped and the poorly armed local defense troops were of little military consequence except as manpower reserves.

In the areas where Marines of IIIAC were scheduled to land, approximately 116,000 Japanese regulars were present. In Peiping and its immediate environs were General Nemoto's area army headquarters troops as well as similar elements of the *Mongolian Garrison Army.* At Tientsin, Lieutenant General Ginnosuke Uchida, Commanding General of the *118th Division,* had charge of 50,000 Japanese who defended the city and guarded the rail lines halfway to Peiping, two thirds the distince to Tsinan, and as far north on the Peiping-Mukden as Chinwangtao. The area commander at Tsingtao, Major General Eiji Nagano, had 15,000 troops, including his own *5th Independent Mixed Brigade.*

Communist regular forces in Hopeh and Shantung totaled 170,000 troops with at least that number in addition to partially trained rural militia. Most of the regular units were disposed near the big cities garrisoned by the Japanese, close enough to be troublesome, but far enough out of reach to avoid punitive expeditions. Nationalist strength in the two provinces was negligible, but the influence of Chiang Kai-shek was latent, not absent. Opportunists among local

government officials appointed by the Japanese puppet regime, as well as many puppet troop commanders, saw a more rewarding future in the pay of the Central Government than they did within the austere Communist setup.

The attitude of the puppet soldiers was typical of a traditional and pragmatic approach to warfare in China: "one army is pretty much the same as another." [4] The introduction by the Communists, and to a lesser extent by the Kuomintang, of political indoctrination of the coolie and peasant soldiery brought about a radical change in this feeling. Political propaganda made a potent reinforcement to military power, and its skillful use by the Communists was a significant factor in the course of the civil war. Intelligence officers of III Amphibious Corps, in assessing the difficulties of the task assigned the Marines in North China, concluded that the Communist system:

> . . . permits a policy of expansion and contraction according to need. Their closely-woven network needs neither highways nor railroads owing to Communist independence of the major transportation lines. The process of consolidation in the interim following Japanese capitulation and the arrival of Chungking forces would seem to strengthen their ability to resist the entry of a force to take over from the Japanese. If frustrated in the immediate achievement of their objectives the Communists (unless in the meantime their differences with Chungking are resolved) are prepared to combine political with military warfare for a protracted struggle against any internal or external opponent.[5]

[4] Capt Edward Klein, "Situation in North China," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 4 (Apr46), p. 14.

[5] *IIIAC IntelStudy*, p. 3.

ADVANCE PARTY [6]

While accurate order of battle information on the former enemy forces in North China was available from Japanese sources, details regarding Communist dispositions and intentions were meager. The political situation was unstable, and Chungking was unable to supply reliable intelligence which would give American planners a firm picture of what they might find upon landing. This handicap, however, did not hinder the III Amphibious Corps in compiling a considerable body of geographic information on target areas.

Many officers and senior enlisted men in the IIIAC had served in China in the years of disorder between the world wars.[7] Veterans of the Embassy Guard in Peiping and Tientsin, of the 4th Marines in Shanghai, and of the two expeditionary brigades and numerous ships' detachments landed to protect American lives and property were widely dis-

[6] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: CinCPac WarD, Sep45 (OAB, NHD); *VIIPhibFor OPlan 1703–45; IIIAC OPlan 26–45;* IIIAC WarD, Sep45; *IIIAC IntelStudy; Rockey interview,* 14–15Apr59; *Worton ltr; Worton interview;* MajGen William A. Worton ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2Jan58.

[7] The III Corps was fortunate in having a number of Chinese interpreters available to assist it in the initial months ashore in China. These men, some of whom were Chinese students in the U. S. and others Americans with considerable facility with the language, were recruited by the Marine Corps in 1944 when a landing in South China by the V Amphibious Corps was contemplated. LtCol Sherwood F. Moran ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14Jul59 (Plans & Policies—Interpreters File, HistBr, HQMC).

tributed throughout both air and ground elements. Of the eight general officers in the corps' new task organization, seven had served at least one tour in China.[8] Although the corps commander, General Rockey, had never been assigned China duty, he was fortunate in having a chief of staff, General Worton, who had over 12 years experience in the Orient, most of it spent in North China.

Worton and the Corps G–2, Colonel Charles C. Brown, were both qualified Chinese language interpreters and translators. During 1931–1935 the two officers were assigned to the American Embassy at Peiping as language students. Colonel Brown, moreover, had just returned from duty as Assistant Naval Attache in Chungking before he joined the IIIAC staff. The experience of Worton and Brown was of considerable value in processing intelligence data supplied by CinCPac, and in the planning for the landing, movement when ashore, and billeting of troops.

An up-to-date political-military briefing, even one which was scanty on particulars of the situation in Hopeh and Shantung, was needed. On 22 August a representative of General Wedemeyer's theater staff, Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner, arrived on Guam for conferences with Admiral Nimitz. The Army general had known Worton as a fellow language student in Peiping during the '30s, and he was able to brief the Marine officer on the possible courses of action and the leaders and forces involved in the threatening civil strife. Boatner made a recommendation to CinCPac that the III Corps send an advance party to China to sound out the situation and smooth the way for the projected landings. There was little question that the logical person to lead this party was General Worton, and following Admiral Nimitz' approval of the proposal, General Rockey made a formal request to that effect to General Wedemeyer. The response was favorable, and a tentative date of arrival in China was set for 20 September, 10 days before the Tientsin operation was to get underway.

General Worton named Colonel Brown as his executive in the advance party and added senior representatives of other corps staff sections. The officers chosen continued to take a prominent part in the intricate planning for the Marine landings, becoming familiar with the problems arising from the amount and type of forces and materiel committed. As a necessary precaution, these plans called for the first men ashore to be assault troops, but on the whole the operation contemplated was noncombat in nature. IIIAC units, standing in for Nationalist troops to arrive later, were to take over garrison duties from the Japanese and get the repatriation process started. Under these circumstances, the basic mission of the corps advance party was to contact Japanese commanders and Chinese officials to arrange barracks and storage facilities in areas where the Americans were to operate.

The actual territory to be occupied by Marine forces expanded considerably as plans evolved. In the initial assignment of objectives to IIIAC by Seventh Fleet, landings at Tsingtao and Tientsin

[8] General Officer Biographies (SubjFile, HistBr, HQMC).

(including the Taku-Tangku area) were ordered and the possibility of a landing at Chinwangtao was considered.[9] By 7 September the attraction of Chinwangtao's all-weather port status had brought about its addition to northern sector objectives. Peiping was a probable target in Marine plans from their earliest stages despite its lack of formal assignment by higher authorities. Both Generals Rockey and Worton strongly believed that IIIAC would have to occupy the walled city's airfields in order to ensure the arrival of the Nationalist forces which were to relieve the Marines.

Corps planners were well aware of the threat to peace in North China posed by Communist possession of Chefoo. General Rockey wanted to land a regimental combat team of the 6th Division at the strategically located port to take it over from the Japanese. He proposed this move to General Wedemeyer in mid-September through staff representatives of the China Theater who had visited Guam. On the 16th, theater headquarters radioed that Chiang Kai-shek and Wedemeyer had both approved IIIAC operation plans to include landing an RCT at Chefoo; the new objective was published the following day. In the same message Rockey was given a tentative schedule of arrival of Chinese Nationalist Armies (CNA) in Hopeh and Shantung. He was also informed that all questions relative to the corps move into North China would be covered in discussions after the advance party arrived in Shanghai on 20 September.[10]

On the recommendation of General Geiger, Colonel Karl S. Day, Commanding Officer of MAG–21 at Guam, was assigned as command pilot for the advance party. As finally constituted, Worton's group included a field officer from each of the general staff sections and the corps surgeon as well as several junior officers and a dozen enlisted men from the corps staff. No representatives of the divisions or the wing were included since corps was prepared to handle all arrangements for reception of troops and supplies. As a parting promise to the IIIAC commander, Worton stated that he would meet Rockey's command ship off Taku Bar on 30 September in a KMA tug; if all signs indicated an unopposed landing the tug would be flying a large American flag from its foremast.

Near midnight on 19 September the advance party took off from Guam in three transports, one primarily a fuel carrier. After a stop at Okinawa, the planes flew on to Shanghai, arriving in midafternoon. Worton commandeered a Japanese truck to move the whole party into the city where they put up at hotels. Few American or Nationalist troops were in Shanghai as yet, and the Marines were on their own for the three days they spent there while arrangements were made for the trip north.

On the day after his arrival General Worton reported to the China Theater representative, Major General Douglas

[9] ComSeventh Flt OPlan No. 13–45, dtd 26-Aug45, corrected through Change 10, dtd 18Sep45, p. 14.

[10] ComGenChina msg to CinCPOA AdvHq, dtd 16Sep45, in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, encl (B), p. 4.

L. Weart, for orders, and saw Ambassador Patrick J. Hurley who was on his way back to Washington for a round of conferences. Neither man could give Worton a clear picture of the current situation in North China, since the Nationalists had just begun to take hold in the cities under Japanese control. They did, however, confirm his freedom of action within the broad bounds of the corps mission. The Marine general fully intended to stretch his permissive authority to arrange for the seizure of "areas necessary to facilitate the movement of the troops and supplies in order to support further operations" [11] to include the occupation of Peiping. Even while this discussion was going on, Chungking was approving a revised directive to General Rockey which gave the corps a firmer basis for the Peiping move while still not naming the city as an objective. In the new wording, Rockey could, "for the security of his own forces" and of the major targets assigned to IIIAC, "occupy such intermediate and adjacent areas as he deems necessary." [12]

An Army liaison officer and a State Department advisor had been added to the advance party when it took off for Tientsin on 24 September. Colonel Day led his flight up the coast to Shantung Peninsula, across its mountains and on to the mouth of the Hai River, following its course to Changkeichuang Field outside Tientsin. Almost half of the runway was under water, forcing Day to make a very difficult landing and then act as a landing signal officer to bring in the other planes. This first taste of what had been considered a major airdrome made the possession of Peiping's airfields even more attractive.

The Japanese were waiting for the Marines when they arrived and General Worton was soon set up in temporary headquarters at the Astor House, the city's principal hotel. After a conference with the *North China Area Army's* chief of staff that evening, which indicated that the Japanese were quite ready to comply with any instructions given them, the IIIAC staff officers turned to on the various tasks falling within their areas of responsibility. Arrangements were made with Chinese Nationalist officers to take over Japanese barracks, warehouses, school buildings, and headquarters within the city. Some houses and buildings owned by members of the German community were also requisitioned by the Chinese for American use. Negotiations through consular representatives were made to occupy public buildings in the former foreign concession areas. As a general rule, property of enemy nationals was taken without ceremony, while leases were executed for holdings which were owned by Allied residents or governments. Most of the property selected in the latter category had also been used by the Japanese military forces or civilian community.

General Worton set aside the French Municipal Building, Tientsin's most imposing structure, as IIIAC headquarters. He also laid claim to the French Arsenal, an extensive barracks and storage compound located on the road to the airfield, for wing headquarters. A reluctance to lease the arsenal on the

[11] *IIIAC OPlan 26-45*, p. 3.

[12] ComGenChina msg to ComSeventhFlt, dtd 25Sep45 in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, encl (B), p. 13.

part of local French officials was swiftly overcome when the general used the Japanese radio to contact Chungking and get pressure brought to bear by the senior French representative in the Chinese capital. The Italian Consulate, close to East Station of the Peiping-Mukden line, was chosen as the 1st Marine Division headquarters.

As soon as the billeting and storage program was well underway at Tientsin, General Worton flew on to Peiping where he arranged to take over many of Nan Yuan Field's facilities and to house most of the Marine units within the confines of the Legation Quarter. His State Department advisor was able to smooth the way within the diplomatic corps when any resistance arose to meeting the considerable space requirements of the proposed Marine garrison. As in Tientsin, the property taken over was mainly that seized by the Chinese from Japanese and Germans, or leased from friendly sources in continuation of usage made of it by the enemy. In both cities there were sizeable barracks once used to house troops protecting diplomatic missions following the Boxer Rebellion; these were naturally set aside for troop use.[13]

Few private owners were reluctant to have the Marines hold their property, even though the leases negotiated were not very profitable. Marine billeting officers could promise that property would be adequately repaired and maintained, and in many cases improved upon.[14]

Japanese cooperation with the advance party was exemplary. Sullenness and foot-dragging tactics, which could well have been expected, were absent.[15] General Worton flew to Tsingtao, Tangshan, and Chinwangtao to confer with local Japanese commanders. Arrangements were made in each place in keeping with the procedures used in Tientsin and Peiping for reception and housing of planned IIIAC garrisons. In Tsingtao the general left Colonel William D. Crawford, an Army officer who was serving in the Corps G–1 Section, to lay the groundwork for the 6th Marine Division arrival. Worton also flew to Weihsien in Shantung, the site of Japanese POW and civilian internment camps, to expedite the release and return to Tientsin of foreign railroad and KMA executives. He was convinced that the economic welfare of a large part of China depended upon the KMA mines getting back into full production.

Shortly after General Worton visited Peiping and indicated by his actions that the Marines intended to move troops there, he received a message that "the people opposed to Chiang Kai-shek" [16] would like to talk to him. A meeting was set up that night at Worton's quarters with the full knowledge of Nationalist authorities. The caller who arrived was General Chou En-lai, the top Commu-

[13] These barracks included the famous Marine Barracks at Peiping, which had been occupied from 1905 to 1941 by a crack detachment. When the Marines returned to Peiping, "the traditional spit-and-polish main gate sentry post at the entrance to the old American compound was immediately restored, at the instance of old-timers who remembered the days before the war." Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd 31Aug61.

[14] *Rockey interview*, 9Jul59.

[15] Col William K. Enright interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 10Mar58, p. 2.

[16] *Worton interview.*

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nist representative in wartime truce negotiations between Yenan and Chungking. The substance of Chou's remarks was that Communist forces would fight to prevent the Marines from moving into Peiping. General Worton in reply told the Communist leader that the Marines most certainly would move in, that they would come by rail and road, and just how they intended to do so. Further, the Marine officer pointed out that III Corps was combat experienced and ready, that it would have overwhelming aerial support, and that it was quite capable of driving straight on through any force that the Communists mustered in its path. The stormy hour-long interview ended inconclusively with Chou vowing that he would get the Marines' orders changed; it was a grim warning of the clashes to come.

By the end of the week, the advance party had made all the most urgent arrangements for the reception of the incoming corps. They had deliberately established a pattern of direct handling of all local logistic support problems which was to hold throughout the Marines' stay in North China. There was to be little opportunity for the traditional Chinese "squeeze" that invariably would have marked such operations had they been turned over to middlemen. In this as well as many other respects, the experience of the old China Marines was of incalculable but obvious benefit.

HOPEH LANDINGS [17]

The responsibility for seizing and holding the Tientsin area rested with Major General DeWitt Peck's 1st Marine Division. (See Map 34.) Although Corps planners recognized that the landing would be primarily a logistical problem, provision had to be made for overcoming resistance. The division designated the 7th Marines, organized as CT–7, as its assault troops. The 2d Battalion followed by 3/7 was to make the initial landing at Tangku and secure the town for use as the IIIAC main port of entry for Hopeh operations. The 1st Battalion of the 7th was detailed to take Chinwangtao in a separate landing.

Scheduled to follow the assault troops ashore at Tangku was the Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Louis R. Jones, and his command group plus detachments of the 1st Pioneer Battalion to perform shore party tasks. One battalion of CT–7 would guard the lines of communication between Tangku and Tientsin while the other secured the port area. The regiment was to be prepared to place a garrison in Tangshan on order and assume responsibility for security of the railroad south to Tangku. At the same time, 1/7 at Chinwangtao would take charge of the Peiping-Mukden line north of Tangshan.

[17] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *VIIPhibFor OPlan 1703–45;* VIIPhibFor WarD, 15Aug–31Oct45 (OAB, NHD); ComTransRon 17 AR—Tientsin, China, dtd 1Nov45 (OAB, NHD); *IIIAC OPlan 26–45;* IIIAC WarDs, Sep–Oct45; IIIAC ShoreBrig OPlan No. 1–45, dtd 9Sep45; 1st MarDiv OPlan No. 3–45, dtd 10Sep45; 1st MarDiv WarDs, Sep–Oct45; 1st MAW WarDs, Sep–Oct45; MajGen Keller E. Rockey ltr to Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, dtd 13Oct45 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter *Rockey–Vandegrift ltr, 13Oct45.*


HOPEH DEPLOYMENT
III AMPHIBIOUS CORPS
1 NOVEMBER 1945
CHINWANGTAO
TANGSHAN
TIENTSIN
TAKU
PEIPING
GULF OF CHIHLI
SAND BANKS
= RADIO RELAY
= COAL MINE
T. L. RUSSELL

MAP 34

The 1st Marines Combat Team was assigned the mission of occupying the city of Tientsin and Changkeichuang Field. The 5th Marines Combat Team, moving to the target in a transport division arriving a few days after the main convoy, was slated to secure Peiping and its airfields. Tientsin was the projected base for those units of the 11th Marines and division separate battalions that were not attached to infantry regiments. The greatest part of Corps Troops was also scheduled for garrison duty at Tientsin in support of the 1st Division and 1st Wing.

One corps unit, the 7th Service Regiment, was given far-reaching responsibilities that tended to increase and expand as the occupation wore on. Designated as the functional supply agency for all IIIAC ground and air elements in Hopeh, the regiment's organization was such that it would adapt to rapidly changing conditions of service. Its logistic support companies formed the backbone of the Shore Brigade that corps organized to cope with the formidable problems presented by Tientsin's geographic situation.

The brigade, which was strictly a temporary organization, operated with a tiny headquarters of seven officers and men under Colonel Elmer H. Salzman. Two FMF units attached to IIIAC, the 1st Military Police and 11th Motor Transport Battalions, together with medical and signal detachments from Corps Troops augmented the elements of 7th Service Regiment which were to process all personnel and cargo coming ashore. The first echelon of the Navy advanced base organization, Group Pacific 13 (GroPac–13), which was eventually to operate the port of Tangku, also came under Salzman. As soon as sufficient components of the GroPac arrived in North China, the Shore Brigade would be disbanded. For the first couple of weeks of the operation, however, General Rockey emphasized that the brigade "*must* have full authority over all unloading activities and must coordinate all movement of troops, equipment and supplies in the landing area." [18]

Much of the concern with the logistic aspects of the Tientsin area operations was generated by the fact that all traffic from ship to shore would have to funnel through the narrow seaward channel of the Hai, across the tide-altered depth of the Taku Bar, and up river to the Tangku piers. Although extensive use of ships' boats for unloading was planned, the strong possibility was recognized that only landing craft as large as LCTs would be practical for the long run from transport to pier. Since the condition of the river channel and the cargo handling facilities at Tangku was uncertain, plans for landing procedures were flexible enough to be adapted rapidly to the situation existing on 30 September.

The responsibility for embarking and moving the forward echelons of units headed for the Tientsin area, and for all follow-up echelons regardless of destination rested with Rear Admiral Ingolf N. Kiland, Commander, Amphibious Group 7. Under him, the commander of

[18] IIIAC SO No. 119–45, dtd 23Sep45, in IIIAC WarD, Sep45, App I, p. 1.

Transport Squadron 17 (Transron–17), Commodore Thomas B. Brittain, was ordered to load, lift, and land the 1st Division and Corps Troops and to act as Senior Officer Present Afloat (SOPA) at the objective. General Peck would move to the target in Commodore Brittain's flagship, while General Rockey sailed with Admiral Barbey in the command ship *Catoctin*. Barbey intended to take the *Catoctin* to the Tientsin landing and thereafter to whatever point the progress of the operation demanded.

Corps Troops on Guam began loading supplies and equipment on vessels of their assigned transport division on 11 September. Three APAs and an AKA of the division, plus 15 LSMs for the heaviest vehicles and gear, were needed to move the first echelon; the remaining two transports, a cargo ship, and additional LSMs reported to Okinawa to load out the 7th Service Regiment. On 20 September, the day after the IIIAC advance party took off for China, the corps convoy sailed for Okinawa to rendezvous with ships carrying the 1st Marine Division and Headquarters Squadron of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

Three of the four transport divisions of Commodore Brittain's squadron assigned to lift the 1st Marine Division had returned to Okinawa from Korea and begun loading by 18 September. Bulk cargo of rations and fuel was taken on board off the Hagushi Beaches in the center of the island before the ships moved north to Motobu Peninsula and began loading unit equipment and supplies. Separate dumps were set up for each vessel's load, and ship-to-dump radio contact was maintained to speed cargo handling. Landing craft were used to move light loads on all tides and heavier gear with high water; the amphibious vehicles of 3d DUKW Company, which were not hampered by shoal water, were in use all around the clock. Much division heavy equipment, particularly that of the engineer and pioneer battalions, was loaded directly into beached LSMs which could move up river without unloading at Tangku. The rail and road bridges between Tangku and Tientsin were none too sturdy, intelligence indicated, and the possibility that they could not be used by bulldozers, tanks, and similar vehicles had to be considered.

All units were loaded for minor combat employment after the movement to North China, but in practice there was a significant difference from wartime combat loading procedures. There was little inclination to leave anything behind on Okinawa that might be useful in China. The very uncertainty of what lay ahead prompted unit commanders to fill all available spaces, cutting down on the hold room needed to work combat cargo properly, and leading in some instances to lack of clear understanding of unloading priorities.[19] The hurried acquisition of clothing and materiel to cope with North China's rugged winter continued right up to the time of sailing and further complicated the loading situation. Winter gear, particularly suit-

[19] ComTransDiv 59 (CTU 78.1.12 and 78.1.5) AR—Occupation of Taku, Tangku and Tientsin, China, 30Sep–5Oct45, dtd 11Oct45 (OAB, NHD), p. E–4.

able clothing, was in short supply for some units until late in 1945.[20]

In the original concept of the operation, the movement of a battalion landing team to Chinwangtao was deferred until after the main body of troops left for Tientsin. On 19 September, however, planning for concurrent movement began and an APA was detailed to load out 1/7. An LSM carrying a shore party detachment of the 1st Pioneer Battalion and a destroyer escort were scheduled to join the Chinwangtao landing force off Taku.[21] Loading of the landing team was finished by 25 September, the same date that all elements of IIIAC at Okinawa completed embarkation.

Both the corps convoy from Guam and three LSTs from Zamboanga with the ground echelon of 1st MAW headquarters on board joined Transron–17 on the 24th. The flight echelon of wing headquarters had flown in on the 22d to establish a temporary command post on Okinawa. While the Assistant Wing Commander, Brigadier General Byron F. Johnson, stayed with the CP, the wing commander, Major General Claude A. Larkin, planned to board the 1st Marine Division command ship. General Larkin intended to observe the airfield situation at Tientsin first-hand before calling in planes of his groups. The ground echelons of some wing units were already at sea by 25 September, and most of the squadrons were packed and ready to sail. Flight echelons were prepared to stage through Okinawa and Shanghai as soon as the wing declared North China airfields operational.

On the 26th the III Amphibious Corps, less the 6th Marine Division, left Okinawa bound for the Taku Bar. On board the convoy's ships were nearly 25,000 men, the vanguard of a planned strength of 37,638 scheduled for Hopeh garrisons. Heavy seas and leaden skies attended an otherwise uneventful trip.[22] On 30 September, most ships reached their assigned anchorage off the Hai River's mouth slightly behind the time forecast and Admiral Barbey delayed H-Hour, originally 0900, to 1030. Worried by the rough water and delay in the landing as scheduled, General Rockey considered putting off the landing until the next day, but the arrival of General Worton at the *Catoctin* prompted him to carry through with the original landing plan.[23]

The corps chief of staff had sent out several encouraging situation reports after he arrived in North China, and he was able to keep his promise and meet Rockey in a KMA tug flying an American flag that signified that all was well ashore. Worton brought with him the

[20] The former commanding general of the 1st MAW recalled that "aviation personnel, at least, stood guard until about the 1st of January in khaki when temperatures were below freezing." He credits an inspection trip by Major General James T. Moore, Commanding General, AirFMFPac, with the expediting of delivery of "a great amount of heavy clothing," for use of the division and wing. LtGen Louis E. Woods ltr to CMC, dtd 26Oct61, hereafter *Woods ltr*, 1961.

[21] ComTransDiv 50 AR—The Chinwangtao Landing—19 Sep–4Oct45, dtd 4Oct45 (OAB, NHD).

[22] General Rockey recalled that en route to China, the convoy encountered a number of floating Japanese mines that were the targets of interested gunners. *Rockey comments.*

[23] *Rockey interview*, 14–15Apr59.

mayor of Tientsin who requested that at least a token force of Marines reach the city that day. When he and Worton had started down river very early that morning people were already gathering for a welcoming ceremony; a tumultuous reception was planned. Rockey acceded to the Chinese official's request, which was seconded by Worton, and directed that one battalion of the 7th Marines go straight on through to Tientsin as soon as it landed.

The Navy's river control organization was getting into operation while General Worton was briefing General Rockey. The long run in from the anchorage to Tangku's docks—15 miles minimum—combined with rough water over Taku Bar to rule out the use of ships' landing craft to land troops and supplies. The unloading task was shifted entirely to LSMs, LCIs, such LCTs as could be made available from Korea and Japan, and locally hired Chinese lighters. Control officers in patrol craft were stationed in the rendezvous area off Taku Bar, in the river mouth just over the bar, and at the docks where liaison was maintained with the shore brigade. Loaded craft reported to the rendezvous control, were dispatched to the bar on the approval of the river control at the docks, and assigned to specific docks or beaches by the river mouth control.[24]

General Jones, the ADC of the 1st Division, with some of his staff, arrived at Tangku via a patrol craft at 1030; the two hours it took him to travel from transport to dock was typical of the time lapse involved in reaching shore. It was 1315 before the initial assault battalion of the 7th Marines, 2/7, reached land after transferring to LCIs from its APA. The 2d Battalion spread out through the port town to establish security for the incoming troops and supplies. The 3d Battalion, 7th, with the regimental headquarters attached, landed next and immediately boarded a train at the dock railyard for Tientsin. In late afternoon 3/7, which had been greeted by cheering, flag-waving Chinese all the way up the Hai River to Tangku and all along the rail line to Tientsin, stepped off its cars into the thick of an unbelievably noisy and happy crowd of thousands of people.[25]

The corps advance party had arranged for Japanese trucks to carry the men to their billet, the commandeered racecourse buildings on the western outskirts of the city,[26] but progress through the packed streets of the former concessions was kept to a snail's pace. The utility-clad Marines with full ammunition belts and mammoth transport packs must have looked little like the Marines of prewar years to the Chinese, but their welcome was as fervid as that for a long-lost friend.

Each man in 3/7 had only one day's ration in his pack when he went ashore,

[24] ComTransDiv 59 AR, *op. cit.*

[25] *Rockey comments.*

[26] A Chronological Hist of 3/7, 1st MarDiv Activities in China, 30Sep45–15Apr46, n.d. p. 1. General Worton, who belonged to the Tientsin Race Club, had the unique experience of voting approval of his action in taking over its property. When a sufficient number of members returned from internment camp, a meeting was held and a lease to IIIAC was authorized. Race Club members were accorded the privileges of the Corps Officers' Club which was established at the racecourse. *Worton interview.*

1ST MARINE DIVISION *troops landing at Taku on 30 September 1945. (USN 80–G–417486)*

TIENTSIN CITIZENS *welcome first Marines to return to city since end of war. (USMC 225072)*

since his unit, like all others in the corps, had loaded the remainder of the required five days' rations in organizational vehicles.[27] The trucks that should have stayed with the 3d Battalion according to original plans were left in Tangku when the battalion made its unexpected trip to Tientsin. The lack of food was acutely felt, but members of the advance party were soon able to arrange for locally procured rations.[28]

The mix-up regarding rations was not uncommon during the first three days of the operation while Tangku port facilities were being adapted to handle the flood of heavy military equipment and bulk supplies directed to shore. One of the greatest problems was getting loaded vehicles off landing craft and onto dry land. The mud bank near the pier selected as a vehicle landing would not support the Marine trucks until hundreds of loads of stone ballast and layers of logs had provided a firm ramp. The high gasoline consumption rate of trucks hauling ballast and struggling through mud to shore resulted in unexpected priority requests from Shore Brigade that complicated unloading procedures. By 2 October, LSMs were proceeding upriver to Tientsin with the heaviest equipment and unloading ramp-to-ramp into LCMs that ferried the cargo to shore. Later, a pontoon causeway was towed up to Tientsin and put into use for unloading the LSMs.[29]

Corps planners had allowed for the near-certainty that there would be vexing logistical problems in making the landing at Tangku. After the assault battalions had established themselves ashore, the Shore Brigade was given the time to get itself set up and in efficient operation before calling in additional forces. More troops and supplies could have been landed on 30 September, but to no particular useful purpose. As it was, more than 5,400 men and 442 tons of equipment (including 115 vehicles) came ashore the first day. The total of unloadings increased rapidly as Tangku's piers, its warehouses and dump areas, and its freight yard maintained the driving pace dictated by the need to clear Transron-17 ships for further tasks.

Shortly after the first troops had reached the docks, a flying boat carrying Admiral Kinkaid and Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, who was commanding the China Theater while General Wedemeyer was in Washington with Ambassador Hurley, set down near the *Catoctin*. The two officers immediately were apprised of the favorable situation ashore. In an ensuing conference, the future actions of IIIAC were discussed with Admiral Barbey and General Rockey. A decision made by the Marine commander earlier that day—to proceed immediately with the Chinwangtao landing—was approved; LT 2/7 was underway for its target that evening. The long-planned

[27] IIIAC AdminO No. 8–45, dtd 4Sep45.

[28] MajGen DeWitt Peck interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Jun59, hereafter *Peck interview*. Concerned by the sudden change in IIIAC orders which "had upset the planned schedule of procedure," Generals Peck and Worton had accompanied 3/7 to Tientsin. MajGen DeWitt Peck ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd 3Sep61, hereafter *Peck ltr*.

[29] ComTransDiv 59 AR, *op. cit.*

movement of Marines to Peiping was at last approved officially. In a joint reappraisal of the corps mission, a decision was made to cancel some of the reinforcing naval units assigned to its task organization. Three of six naval construction battalions, a fleet hospital, and some GroPac units were dropped from follow-up echelons of IIIAC. This reduction, though minor in nature, was merely the first whittling down of corps strength; the demobilization rush still to come would pare it to the marrow and eventually force it out of existence.

The sea was too rough for Admiral Kinkaid's seaplane to take off during the first few days of October, and he and General Stratemeyer finally left by land plane from Tientsin on the 3d. By the time of their departure, the operation was progressing smoothly; the reception of the Marines by the Chinese continued to be vocal and enthusiastic. Most of the unloading problems imposed by the lack of adequate facilities at Tangku had been solved. General Peck had landed with his headquarters group and set up the division CP in the ex-Italian Concession of Tientsin. The 1st Marines, charged with the security of the city, had established headquarters at the British Barracks, and sent guard detachments to the French Arsenal and Changkeichuang Field. On 5 October, the 11th Marines took over the arsenal guard when the artillery regiment's CP was opened there. The 7th Marines continued to keep its headquarters and one battalion in Tientsin, but moved from the racecourse to billets in the Japanese School in the ex-Russian Concession on the west side of the Hai River.

The detached 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Gormley, began landing at Chinwangtao at 1010 on 1 October. The troops went ashore in four waves of landing craft but found no opposition; instead, cheering townsmen met them at the beaches. Gormley took command ashore with the landing of his last wave. At 1140 the battalion's transport moved to dockside and began unloading; its holds were cleared by the evening of the next day.[30]

The situation in Chinwangtao was tense. Closely investing the town were regular and guerrilla forces of the Communist Eighth Route Army; exchanges of small arms fire were frequent. About 1,600 Japanese and puppet troops were in Chinwangtao and another 2,000 were at Peitaiho, a one-time summer resort 10 miles south down the coast.[31] The Japanese regulars were ready to leave for Tangshan as soon as 1/7 took over, expecting to surrender there with the main area command. Gormley, however, disarmed the Japanese, pulled the puppet troops off the perimeter defenses where they were constantly harassed by the Communists and replaced them with Marines,[32] and arranged to take the surrender of the garrison. Most of the Japanese troops and civilians were dispatched to Tangshan by rail on 3

[30] ComTransDiv 50 AR, *op. cit.*

[31] A large Japanese hospital at Peitaiho offered barracks space for a considerable number of Marines and the town was therefore soon secured by 1/7 and later used as a regimental command post and billeting area by the 7th Marines.

[32] Col John J. Gormley comments on draft MS, dtd 3Aug61.

October, and the formal surrender took place on the 4th. The Communist leaders in the area sent word that they would be happy to cooperate with the Marines, an attitude of friendliness that had a very short life.

The surrender of all the Japanese forces in the Tientsin area, some 50,000 men, was arranged to take place on the morning of 6 October. The Japanese were directed to turn in their arms, equipment, and ammunition and to keep only such supplies as were needed for health and subsistence. Japanese units were to continue their guard duties until relieved by Marines, and those that did surrender were allowed to keep one rifle with five rounds of ammunition for each ten men to safeguard persons and supplies until these could be placed in physical custody of Marine units. The 1st Marine Division was given the responsibility of collecting the Japanese materiel and controlling the surrendered troops. The attitude of the Japanese officers and men was so universally cooperative that most of the administrative and logistical arrangements for care of former enemy forces were left in the hands of the Japanese themselves.[33] The Japanese civilians in the area, who were also to be repatriated with their military brethren under the terms of the surrender, followed suit and ran their own community in a disciplined manner which created few problems for the Marines.

The surrender ceremony itself, conducted with considerable formality, took place in the plaza in front of the French Municipal Building, now officially IIIAC Headquarters. General Rockey had assumed command ashore, reporting to China Theater for orders, on 5 October. An honor guard of company strength, the band, and the colors of the 1st Marine Division formed a background to the actual signing. Lieutenant General Ginnosuke Uchida, accompanied by a small representative staff, signed for the Japanese; symbolically, these officers laid down their treasured swords. General Rockey acting in the name of Chiang Kai-shek signed for the Allies. Looking on as official guests were the senior officers of the Marine units in China and representatives of the countries and other armed services who had contributed to the victory. Unofficial American observers lined the windows and roof of the corps headquarters, and the adjoining streets were filled with the citizens of Tientsin. Most appropriately, the Japanese surrender party filed off the plaza to the strains of "The Marine's Hymn."

Chinese Nationalist officers, who were beginning to arrive by air in increasing numbers, were quite interested in taking the prestige-laden surrender of the *North China Area Army*. General Rockey, who felt that the Tientsin cere-

[33] The former 1st Division Quartermaster noted that the Japanese "furnished us with what appeared to be a complete and honest inventory of all their stores and the location of each. They even had records of all furniture removed from private houses and where it was located. As a matter of fact, they were a sort of secondary supply depot. Many times when we needed items which were not available in regular supply channels we merely consulted the Jap list, called them on the phone, told them what was wanted, and where to deliver it." Col John Kaluf ltr to Head, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 25Aug61.

mony was a necessary and appropriate tribute to his own men, agreed to support this plan for the surrender at Peiping. The first elements of the 92d CNA to be airlifted to the old capital by American transports arrived on 6 October, and on the following day, a 95-vehicle convoy of the 5th Marines reached the city.

The violent Communist reaction to the Marine move, promised by General Chou En-lai to General Worton, had already made itself evident. Marine reconnaissance parties that went to Peiping in 5 October found a series of roadblocks on the Tientsin-Peiping road that narrowed passage room to jeep width. On the 6th, an engineer group guarded by a rifle platoon of the 1st Marines attempted to remove the roadblocks. They were fired upon by an estimated 40–50 troops at a point 22 miles northwest of Tientsin and withdrew to the city after a short firefight. Three Marines were hit and at least one of the attackers was struck by return fire. The engineers returned to their task the following day escorted by a platoon of tanks, a rifle company of the 1st Marines, and a covering flight of carrier planes.[34] The roadblocks were removed without incident, allowing the 5th Marines' vehicles to reach Peiping safely before nightfall.

The 5th Marines transport division had arrived off Taku on the 2d and begun discharging cargo on the 5th and troops on the 6th.[35] By this time almost all corps and division troops in the forward echelon, except the unit ship platoons left on board to unload cargo, were ashore. The LSTs of the 1st MAW Headquarters Squadron laid alongside the docks at Tangku on the 7th and began unloading.

When the CP of the wing shifted from Okinawa to Tientsin at midnight on 6 October, following the arrival of the first planes from wing and MAG–24 and –25 at Changkeichuang Field,[36] all but one of the major unit headquarters of Expeditionary Troops were ashore and in operation. The convoy carrying the 6th Marine Division was at sea proceeding to its objectives, but the Chinese Communists had already beaten them to one. Rear Admiral Thomas G. W. Settle, commanding a cruiser force which had put into Chefoo harbor, reported that the Japanese had evacuated the city and the Communists had seized it and were ill-disposed to any suggestions that they hand over control to anybody else. Admiral Kinkaid requested General Rockey to proceed to Chefoo with Admiral Barbey and investigate the advisability of landing Marines there in light of the altered situation. Immediately following the surrender ceremony in Tientsin, the two commanders boarded the *Catoctin* and headed for Chefoo. (See Map 33.)

[34] An interesting sidelight to this incident comes from a notebook General Peck kept at the time. He wrote: "7 Oct. Convoy to repair road to Peiping left at 0700. Japs fear yesterday firing on us may have been by Jap troops, so gave Jap officer permission to precede convoy by 1/2 hour in jeep with 2 American officers. (Did not go)." *Peck ltr.*

[35] Com TU 78.1.14 (ComTransDiv 36) AR of (PhibLanOp) in Tientsin–Chinwangtao Area of China, dtd 23Oct45 (OAB, NHD).

[36] MAG–24 WarD, Oct45, and MAG–25 WarD, Oct45.

SHANTUNG LANDING [37]

The *Catoctin* dropped anchor in Chefoo city harbor in midmorning of 7 October under the protective guns of Admiral Settle's flagship, the cruiser *Louisville*. Two days of conferences on ship and ashore took place between the local Communist military and political officials and the senior American officers. Barbey and Rockey saw numerous Communist troops in the port and were told by their leaders that any attempt by the Nationalists to land with or after the Marines would be opposed.[38] The implication was clear that a Marine landing at Chefoo would not mean the liberation of a Japanese-held city but rather a partisan act for the Nationalists in the civil war. Under these circumstances, as the corps commander wrote shortly afterwards to the Commandant of the Marine Corps:

> Admiral Barbey and I both felt that any landing there would be an interference in the internal affairs of China; that it would be bitterly resented by the Communists and that there would probably be serious repercussions. Although the opposition would not have been very serious, there was apt to be some fighting, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Upon our recommendation, the landing was cancelled.[39]

After he received a dispatch recommendation from General Rockey on 8 October, General Stratemeyer conferred with Chiang Kai-shek and then radioed approval.[40] The China Theater deputy commander also suggested that the Chefoo landing force be sent ashore at Tsingtao.[41] Word of the change in operation orders was passed to the 6th Marine Division on the 9th when its convoy was two days out of Tsingtao.

The cancellation of the Chefoo operation was not much of a surprise to Major General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., the 6th Division commander. General Rockey had warned him as early as 4 October that the presence of Communist troops might make it inadvisable to land Marines there. The division billeting plan issued the next day made tentative provision for the accommodation of the Chefoo landing force, the 29th Marines, in buildings in Tsingtao.

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[37] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: ComSeventhFlt WarD, Oct45 (OAB, NHD); VIIPhibFor WarDs, Aug–Oct45; ComTransRon 24 (CTG 78.6) AR, Landing of 6th MarDiv at Tsingtao, China, 23Sep–17Oct45, dtd 27Oct45 (OAB, NHD); IIIAC WarD, Oct45; 6th MarDiv OPlan No. 108–45, dtd 18Sep45; 6th MarDiv WarDs, Sep–Oct45; 1st MAW WarD, Oct45; MAG–32 WarD, Oct45; *Rockey-Vandegrift ltr, 13Oct45;* Gen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 14Jul59, hereafter *Shepherd interview.*

[38] Admiral Barbey recalled that the "Communist commander at Chefoo made it unmistakably clear that any landing of the Marines, with or without Chinese Nationalist troops, would be opposed." VAdm Daniel E. Barbey ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd 8Nov61, hereafter *Barbey ltr.*

[39] *Rockey-Vandegrift ltr, 13Oct45.* Admiral Barbey made the recommendation not to land the Marines in a dispatch to Admiral Kinkaid; General Rockey was present during the drafting of the dispatch and concurred in its recommendations. *Barbey ltr.*

[40] General Rockey recalled that when he saw Chiang Kai-shek in November, the generalissimo was very upset about the elimination of the Chefoo landing and pointed out the proximity of Dairen to the Communist-controlled port. *Rockey comments.*

[41] CGUSForChinaThtr disp to WDCOS, dtd 8Oct45 (Missionary Incoming Book No. 2, Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

Before Chefoo was written off as an objective, the planned Tsingtao ground garrison consisted of the 6th Marine Division, less two of its rifle regiments, with sufficient supporting units to enable General Shepherd to perform his mission of securing the city and Tsangkou Field. Tsangkou, which was projected as the aerial port of entry for North China, was designated the home base of MAG–32 and of Marine Wing Service Squadron 1, which was to operate a processing center for all aviation personnel entering or leaving the area. Operational control of Tsangkou-based squadrons rested with General Larkin as wing commander rather than General Shepherd as area commander.

The 6th Marine Division's mounting out for China was an orderly and uneventful procedure as befitted the veteran status of the troops and naval elements involved. Transport Squadron 24 under Commodore Edwin T. Short assembled at Guam after its transport divisions had helped move occupation forces to Japan. Loading began on 23 September when the IIIAC convoy had cleared the island, and on the 29th the transports carrying the 29th Marines sailed to Saipan to relieve congestion in the loading area. The transron reassembled at sea on 3 October and sailed on past Okinawa for Shantung. On board the ships were 12,834 men of the landing force and 17,038 tons of supplies, including 1,333 vehicles.

Taking advantage of the delay in the Tsingtao operation caused by the shortage of shipping, General Shepherd had sent an advance party led by Colonel William N. Best, the Division Quartermaster, to China with the 1st Marine Division. Best was directed to proceed to Tsingtao and to "take all possible steps to insure orderly and efficient arrival, discharge, and billeting of the division." [42] On 7 October, General Shepherd followed up his advance party and transferred with a small staff to the destroyer escort *Newman* in order to reach Tsingtao a day ahead of Transron 24. The general wanted to check the situation ashore and explore the possibility of cancelling the planned assault phase of the operation and proceeding without delay to general cargo discharge over Tsingtao docks.

A typhoon which struck the Okinawa area on 8 October caught the ships of Transron 24 in its lashing edge. Rough seas slowed the convoy to such an extent that Commodore Short had to delay the landing date 24 hours. Toward the center of the furious storm, waves as high as 40 feet and winds that reached above 100 knots tore at the LSTs carrying the ground echelons of wing units to Tsingtao and Tangku. The turbulence was so great that the main deck of one landing ship split and it had to return to Okinawa for repairs.

The havoc wrought by the typhoon at Okinawa was even greater than it was at sea. Winds with gusts that destroyed measuring instruments swept across Chimu Field where planes and gear of 1st MAW squadrons were parked waiting on clearance for the move to China. The extent of the material damage was hard to believe; every plane in VMSB–244 and VMTB–134 was unflyable when the high winds abated on the 10th. Re-

[42] CG, 6th MarDiv ltr of instruction to Col William N. Best, dtd 20Sep45, in 6th MarDiv WarD, Sep45, encl (L).

supply stores, personal baggage, and unit equipment were scattered and torn apart. The flight echelons of MAG–32 squadrons, working around the clock, performed a miracle of reconstruction on their battered ships. Searching out needed tools and materiel in dumps and storeships throughout the island and its anchorages, improvising and even improving as they made repairs, the pilots, gunners, and ground crews had their planes airborne within a week.[43]

Weather is no respecter of person, and the typhoon that struck Okinawa gave General Shepherd, on board the *Newman*, "his roughest experience at sea." [44] All hands were thankful to see the hills of Tsingtao come up on the horizon on the morning of the 10th, and enjoy the prospect of setting foot on the ground again. Alerted by Colonel Best, the mayor of the city and a delegation of local officials met the general when he landed. Billeting preparations were well in hand, and the cooperation of the Japanese garrison was exemplary. Shepherd decided that there was no need to land assault battalions to secure the wharves prior to the main landing.

Admiral Kinkaid flew in from Shanghai on the 10th, shortly after the *Catoctin* arrived from Chefoo, and broke his flag on board the command ship. Generals Rockey and Shepherd and Admiral Barbey discussed the China situation with the Seventh Fleet commander, and reviewed the difficulties inherent in their instructions to cooperate with the Central Government forces while avoiding any collaboration with the Communists. The schedules for arrival of the rear echelon of IIIAC units and for the initiation of repatriation of Japanese soldiers and civilians came under consideration. Since the JCS had stated that it was U. S. policy to assist the Chinese Government in establishing its troops in the liberated areas, particularly Manchuria, as rapidly as possible,[45] both the movement of follow-up echelons and the progress of repatriation hinged upon the extent to which American vessels were used to move Nationalist armies. Ships of Transron 17 were assigned to transport the 13th CNA from Kowloon to Hulutao and the 8th CNA from Kowloon to Tsingtao; and as soon as Transron–24 cleared its holds, it was to pick up the 52d CNA at Haiphong and take it to Dairen.

Commodore Short brought the 6th Division convoy into Kiaochow Bay on the 11th under a continuous cover of carrier air launched from ships of TF 72 which were keeping station at sea just off the Shantung coast. The standby air and naval gunfire support programmed for both the northern and southern sector landings had not been used, but both objective areas were well accustomed to flights of Navy planes overhead by the time the troops came ashore. The aerial show of force over Tsingtao was but one of a progression that had begun when the Fast Carrier Task Force first sailed into the Yellow Sea in August. Every city and town on the Marine occupation schedule and the countryside for many

[43] VMSB–244 WarD, Oct45; Maj Gerald Fink interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Mar60.

[44] *Shepherd interview.*

[45] JCS msg to CinCPacAdvHq, dtd 19Sep45 in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, encl (B), p. 9. (OAB, NHD).

NAVY CARRIER PLANES *in a "show of force" flight over Peking with the Forbidden City in the background. (USN 80-G-417426)*

REPATRIATED JAPANESE SOLDIERS *salute American flag upon boarding LSTs returning them home to Japan. (USN 80-G-702992)*

miles around had been made aware that the American combat aircraft supported the occupation. A good part of the task of 1st MAW squadrons would be to continue the surveillance and show of force flights started by the Navy carrier planes, which were calculated to impress the Japanese and cause the Communists to take heed.

After he had received the latest hydrographic information and arranged a docking schedule that suited the altered 6th Division landing priorities, Commodore Short brought his first transports into Great Harbor and authorized unloading to begin. The first unit over the side was the 6th Reconnaissance Company which landed at 1430 and boarded Japanese trucks provided by the advance party. These men got the initial taste of Tsingtao's welcome to the division, and found it to be fully as loud, enthusiastic, and memorable as that which had greeted the first Marines to enter Tientsin. The reconnaissance outfit threaded its way through the crowded streets and out past the city outskirts to Tsangkou Field where the Japanese guard was relieved.

Other elements of the division disembarked and moved to their billets on schedule, with the 22d Marines, which had been detailed as assault troops in the original scheme of maneuver, leading the way. The 22d moved into Shantung University Compound, a considerable collection of buildings which was also to house part of the 29th Marines and the 6th Medical Battalion. The Japanese girls' high school set aside as the barracks of the 15th Marines was gutted by fire on the night of the 10th. Subsequent investigation showed this to be an act of arson by the school's caretaker without the sanction or encouragement of Japanese authorities. The Marine artillerymen moved instead into an old set of barracks built by the Germans and into another school. Most of the remainder of the division was billeted in Japanese schools also; the tank battalion occupied Japanese barracks near the tank and vehicle park which was established on open ground near the racecourse. The 6th Marine Division CP opened at the former Japanese Naval Headquarters Building on the shore of the Outer Harbor on the 12th; General Shepherd took command ashore reporting to IIIAC for orders on the 13th. All troops were off their ships by the 16th and the transron sailed the following day.

Admiral Kinkaid had stayed at Tsingtao just long enough to see that the operation was proceeding smoothly and then had flown out. On the 12th, the *Catoctin* followed suit and upped anchor for Chinwangtao with General Rockey still on board. The IIIAC commander and Admiral Barbey wanted to investigate the situation at the KMA port town, particularly with regard to the potential danger posed by the strong Communist forces in the vicinity. Seemingly, after the decision not to land at Chefoo was announced, the Communist leaders ordered a temporary respite in their harassment of the Marines. A Communist general in civilian clothes even called at corps headquarters in Tientsin to apologize for the attack on the road patrol.[46] But the lull was only fleeting

[46] *Rockey-Vandegrift ltr, 13Oct45.*

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while attempts were made to sound out Marine commanders on their attitudes.

General Shepherd was approached by an emissary of the Communist commander in Shantung on 13 October with a letter that offered to assist the Marines in destroying the Japanese and puppet forces and in policing Tsingtao. It called attention to the fact that the Nationalist Army was going to land at the city under the protection of the Marines in a move that was sure to bring open war in Shantung; despite this, the Communist general hoped that his force and the Marines could still cooperate. General Shepherd carefully prepared a point by point reply and dispatched it by the same emissary on the 16th. The Marine commander pointed out that the mission of his division was a peaceful one and that it could not and would not cooperate in any way to destroy Japanese or Chinese forces. The city of Tsingtao was also peaceful, he noted; and should any disorders arise, "my Division of well-trained combat veterans will be entirely capable of coping with the situation." [47] Shepherd then stated that the movement of Nationalist troops into Tsingtao was a factor beyond his control, but that he could promise that the 6th Division would not take the part of either side in armed conflict. In the face of the Marine general's determination to carry out his orders to cooperate with the National Government and to avoid assistance to Yenan's forces, the Communist commander could make no headway.

If there ever was a time when the Communist Eighth Route Army and the Marines could have coexisted peacefully, it was in early October 1945. This chance, however slim, was soon thrown away with the outbreak of a series of harassing attacks against the 1st Marine Division units guarding the communication routes in Hopeh. In the 6th Marine Division zone, the more usual form of harassment became small arms fire against low-flying reconnaissance aircraft.

The first Marine squadron to establish itself at Tsingtao was VMO–6. On 12 October, its 16 light observation aircraft (OYs) flew into Tsangkou Field from the escort carrier *Bougainville* which had transported the squadron from Guam. Although the 1st Wing had administrative responsibility for VMO–6, operational control was assigned by corps to the 6th Division; a similar setup involving the 1st Division and VMO–3 applied in the Tientsin area. While the OYs' principal tasks would be liaison and surveillance flights for ground units, their ability to land and take off from makeshift airstrips also ensured their use for retrieving downed airmen.

The flight echelon of MAG–32 arrived at Tsangkou Airfield on 21 October amidst the preparations of the ground crewmen to get set up for extensive aerial operations. General Shepherd was anxious that regular reconnaissance flights over the interior of Shantung be made to report on the activities of the Japanese and of the Communists. He made an oral request to that effect; and on 26 October, the torpedo and scout bombers of the group began flying over Chefoo and Weihaiwei, the mountains of the Shantung Peninsula, and the

[47] 6th MarDiv WarD, Oct45, encl (B).

railroad leading into Tsinan, headquarters city for the Japanese *Forty-third Army* garrison.

The Japanese troops that were in the immediate Tsingtao vicinity, those controlled by the *5th Independent Mixed Brigade*, were fortunate since their repatriation was assured. Before the other units of the *Forty-third Army*, strung out along the rail line and quartered in the provincial capital, could count on heading home, they would have to wait relief by Nationalist units. Most intelligance sources indicated that the relief could well be a bloody one. Communist troop dispositions along the vital railroad promised a battle to CNA forces attempting to reach Tsinan.

Major General Eiji Nagano, the local Japanese commander in Tsingtao, was directed to surrender his troops to General Shepherd on 25 October. Admiral Barbey, General Rockey, and a gathering of distinguished official guests were invited to witness the ceremony; General Shepherd asked Lieutenant General Chen Pao-tsang, Deputy Commander of the Nationalist Eleventh War Area, to sign as Chiang Kai-shek's personal representative. The entire 6th Marine Division, less the 4th Marines still in Japan, was also a witness. On the morning of the 25th, more than 12,000 men marched on to the oval infield of the Tsingtao racecourse and formed in company and battalion mass columns. To their front, on a raised platform erected for the occasion, General Nagano and the Allied commanders signed the surrender documents. The Japanese general and his staff then laid down their swords, a gesture of defeat of tremendous significance to them. Division military police escorted the former enemies from the field to close the proceedings.[48]

CONSOLIDATION PHASE[49]

The 6th Marine Division settled into a garrison routine with relative ease. The potential for trouble was strong in view of the impoverished thousands of jobless refugees who jammed the poorer sections of the city and overflowed into a miserable collection of shacks and cave hovels on its outskirts. A rash of thievery and mob action broke out from these slums. Directed against German and Japanese households, it occurred within a week of the Marine landing. The local police seemed powerless to prevent the outrages, but squad-sized patrols of the 22d and 29th Marines soon restored order. While the mob violence abruptly ceased with the advent of Marine street patrols, the threat of its renewal remained. General Shepherd's prompt action in bolstering civil authority had its desired effect, however. It dispelled any idea that may have existed in the minds of the people of Tsingtao, or of the watching Communists, that the 6th Marine Division was just a show force.

The division's rear echelon arrived from Guam on 28 October. On the same date naval units needed to operate Tsingtao's port as an advance fuel and supply base for the Seventh Fleet began

[48] Cass, *6th MarDiv Hist*, pp. 206–219.

[49] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: ComSeventhFlt WarD, Oct45; VIIPhibFor WarDs, Aug–Oct45; IIIAC WarD, Oct45; 1st MarDiv WarD, Oct45; 6th MarDiv WarD, Oct45; 1st MAW WarD, Oct45; 7th ServRegt WarD, Oct45.

unloading. By the month's end, the ground portion of the city's American garrison was firmly established.

At Tsangkou, aerial activity was greatly increased over that originally planned by the decision to base MAG–25 as well as MAG–32 at the field. The deficiencies of Changkeichuang Field at Tientsin for extensive use by either fighter or transport aircraft persuaded General Larkin to switch the transport group's home station. The group service squadron was diverted to Tsingtao while it was still at sea en route from Bougainville, and the flight echelon began ferrying men and equipment to Tsangkou on the 22d. From the moment the group's two transport squadrons, VMR–152 and –153, arrived in China they were heavily committed to support the III Corps. Regular passenger and cargo runs to Shanghai, to Peiping, and to Tientsin were scheduled. In addition, special missions were flown as the situation required; in mid-October Marine transports were used to evacuate the Allied internees at Weihsien after Communist troops cut the railroad south to Tsingtao.

The two night fighter squadrons of MAG–24, VMF(N)–533 and –541, set up at Nan Yuan Field outside Peiping without incident. The group's ground echelon, which moved to the target in company with that of MAG–32, had been battered by the typhoon off Okinawa but came out of the storm with no crippling damage.[50] MAG–24's first regular flight operations began on 17 October as the ground echelon was unloading at Tangku.

[50] MAG–24 WarD, Oct45.

The rest of Peiping's complement of Marine planes, the Corsairs of MAG–12, staged through Tsangkou to Lantienchang Field on 25 October. Since the group's ground elements were still at sea at the end of the month, effective operations of its fighter squadrons, VMF–115, –211, and –218, waited upon their landing. For the most part, however, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was ashore and in service by 30 October. On that date, General Larkin, whose failing health would not allow him to remain in China, was detached to return to the States.

The new wing commander, Major General Louis E. Woods, who had led the 2d Wing at Okinawa, arrived at Tientsin on the 30th and assumed command the following day.[51] By this time, his planes had relieved the carrier aircraft of TF 72 of all supporting missions flown for IIIAC. The reconnaissance and surveillance flights requested by ground commanders were now all the responsibility of 1st Wing squadrons. The Marine pilots also inherited the dubious privilege of being fired upon by Communist riflemen and machine gunners who took exception to their presence overhead. No return fire was authorized without permission of higher headquarters, and the sporadic shots went without the repayment that the flyers dearly wished to

[51] General Woods, recalling his introduction to Changkeichuang Field, commented that it had good approaches and that any good pilot should be able to land there without too much trouble, but that he would have to use all the runway. The general remembered a sign had been erected reading: "This is a small field, use all of it." LtGen Louis E. Woods interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 22Jun59, hereafter *Woods interview*.

make.[52] Instead, minimum altitudes at which scouting flights were made were steadily raised to lessen the risk to plane and crew.

The Communist troops who fired at Marine planes seemed equally attracted by Marine-guarded trains. Regularly throughout October, pot shots were taken at trains on the Peiping-Mukden line as they rattled by, and the Marines returned fire if any targets could be seen. On 18 October, six Communist soldiers were killed in the act of firing on a train running between Langfang and Peiping, but for the most part the shooting on both sides was without visible result. Jeep patrols in the vicinity of Marine positions were also fired upon by concealed riflemen and three men were wounded in such incidents through 30 October.

The Tientsin-Peiping road, site of the first clash in China between Communist troops and Marines, broke out in a fresh rash of roadblocks on 15 October and succeeding nights. This activity soon ended, however, when word was passed to farmers along the route that the next ditch dug across the road would be filled in from the nearest field.[53] Patrols of the 5th Marines roamed the road as far south as Ho-Hsi-Wu, the halfway town below which the 1st Marines zone of responsibility began. Along the rail line between the two cities, Langfang was the limiting point and a small detachment of the 5th occupied the station there.

A subordinate command of the 1st Division, Peiping Group, under the ADC, General Jones, was established to control Marine activities in the capital. Only two battalions of the 5th Marines, the 2d and 3d, were part of the Peiping Group. The 1st Battalion was attached to the 11th Marines which had security responsibility for the stretch of road, rail, and river between Tientsin and Tangku. The infantry battalion was assigned to Tangku, guarding the enormous dumps of ammunition and supplies that were building in the area.

Although Tientsin was the supply center for IIIAC units in the northern sector, Tangku was developed as the major storage area to prevent unnecessary transshipment of materiel unloaded at the docks along the river. On 15 October, the Corps Shore Brigade was disbanded and the 7th Service Regiment took over its duties; GroPac–13 and the 1st Pioneer Battalion were placed under its operational control. At Tsingtao, a provisional detachment of 7th Service was activated with the landing of the 6th Division to support Marine activities in the south. The service regiment was officially designated the responsible and accountable supply agency for all organized and attached military and naval units of III Corps in North China on 21 October.

The dispositions of 1st Marine Division troops in the Tientsin area remained throughout October much as they were just after the landing. Most of the division's strength was concentrated in cities and major towns where their presence acted as a strong deterrent to mob action. When raging crowds of Chinese attacked Japanese civilians

[52] At this time, or shortly thereafter, General Woods issued orders that "planes on reconnaissance would no longer be authorized to carry ammunition." *Woods ltr 1961.*

[53] *Peck interview.*

in Tientsin on 13 October, riot squads of the 1st Marines waded into the fighting to rescue the Japanese and quickly quelled the disturbances before serious damage was done. Here, as in Tsingtao, the city's unruly element was given a sharp warning that the Marines would act strongly to prevent disorder whenever local authorities failed to do so.

General Peck was in no hurry to expose his men in small and vulnerable guard detachments along the Peiping-Mukden line.[54] As a consequence, the Japanese continued to outpost the bridges and isolated stretches of track between Chinwangtao and Peiping during October. Disarmament of Japanese troops within the garrison cities occupied by the Marines was effected smoothly with minimum supervision by American forces. The concentration point for the Japanese in the 1st Division zone was their North China Field Warehouse five miles southeast of Tientsin on the Tangku road; the details of feeding, housing, and processing thousands of soldier and civilian repatriates were all handled by Japanese officials acting under the direction of a handful of Marines. The extent of the repatriation problem facing the 6th Division at Tsingtao and the 1st at Tientsin was revealed by *North China Area Army* officers who estimated that there were 326,375 military and 312,774 civilians in North China who would have to be sent home. The first reduction from this vast total was made on 22 October, when 2,924 civilians and 436 military patients boarded a Japanese ship at Tangku and left for Japan.

[54] *Ibid.*

The use of Japanese troops to hold communication routes vital to the Nationalist scheme of control in North China was supposedly a temporary expedient. The airlift of the two Nationalist armies that China Theater Headquarters had scheduled to relieve the Marines and assume responsibility for Japanese repatriation was completed on 29 October. The 30,000-man 92d CNA remained in Peiping as the capital's main garrison, while the 94th CNA, with a strength of 26,000 men, set up its headquarters in Tientsin.[55] The 43d Division of the 94th was dispatched to Chinwangtao, and single regiments of the army were sent to Tangku and the mines near Tangshan for guard duty. The immediate goal of the Nationalist commanders seemed to be the recruitment and reorganization of 60,000 former puppet troops in the area; there was no visible disposition to relieve the Japanese of their rail security task. These Chinese officers were particularly interested in acquiring the Japanese weapons and equipment that had been turned in to the Marines.

Based on his belief that the Nationalist forces would relieve the Marines, and that no American troops should remain in an area of probable civil war,

[55] General Peck has noted: "On arrival of the 94th CNA, I received orders to cooperate with the Chinese in the defense [of Tientsin]. General Mou Ting Fang bore the titles of CG 94th Army and CG Tientsin Garrison Force. In conference between Mou and myself it was agreed that the Chinese would be responsible for the static defense of the city while the Marines would operate as a mobile reserve. This understanding seemed the best answer to the ticklish problems of command which could arise." *Peck ltr.*

General Stratemeyer recommended to Washington that the IIIAC begin pulling out of China on 15 November. Admiral Kinkaid agreed with this proposal in an information copy he sent to CinCPac on 27 October. Both American commanders said that their recommendation held true only if there were no change in the mission of the China Theater or of the Marines.[56] Although the IIIAC commander was not an addressee of Stratemeyer's message, routine monitoring of the communication traffic of higher headquarters soon made him aware of its content. Word of the possible 15 November departure date circulated rapidly through corps headquarters, and for a few days there was a noticeable letdown in the pace of planning for winter operations. Since General Rockey felt that no credence should be given to speculation about an early withdrawal, and in fact that such a move was very unlikely, he actively discouraged any tendency on the part of his staff or unit commanders to let things ride.[57]

Evidence that supported General Rockey's estimate of a long China tour for IIIAC accumulated rapidly during the latter part of October. Soviet foot-dragging tactics in Manchuria made a farce of the Russian treaty promise to recognize Chungking's "full sovereignty" over the area and to give "moral support and aid in military supplies . . . entirely to the National Government as the central government of China." [58] The vast store of captured Japanese munitions collected by the Soviet occupation troops found its way into the hands of the Communist forces that poured into Manchuria with the arrival of the Soviet armies. Hulutao, which the Nationalists planned as their principal port of entry to the Manchurian plain, was seized by the Communists. At Dairen, the local Soviet commander refused to let Nationalist troops land, thus closing the sea gate to the Liaotung Peninsula and eastern Manchuria. At Yingkow, another proposed landing site in Manchuria, the Soviet commander turned over the area to Chinese Communists after Admiral Barbey in the *Cactoctin* arrived to arrange for the landing of Nationalist troops.[59] In all instances where the Communists held sway, they threatened to fight to prevent the landing of CNA troops.

As soon as it became evident that the proposed landings might encounter resistance, Admiral Kinkaid and General Stratemeyer informed Chiang Kai-shek that American ships could not be used to transport Nationalist forces to any area where opposition was expected. Loading of the 52d CNA for Dairen was suspended on 27 October, and the 13th CNA, which was at sea en route to Hulutao, was diverted to Chinwangtao. This action was in keeping with the principles contained in a Seventh Fleet policy guide which Kinkaid published on 21 October. The guide called attention to the U. S. recognition of the Central Government and its strict

[56] CGUSForChina Thtr disp to WDCOS in CincPac WarD, Oct45, encl (B), pp. 19–22 (OAB, NHD).

[57] *Rockey interview*, 9Jul59; *Rockey comments*.

[58] Quoted in *U. S. and China*, p. 587.

[59] *Barbey ltr*.

neutrality in dealing with Communist forces and cautioned:

> (B) All operations shall be carefully planned and executed so as to offer the minimum risk of clashes with Communists or entanglement in possible civil strife in China.
>
> (C) In landing or supporting Central Government troops, areas are chosen where Communist resistance is unlikely. Should a clash or resistance occur between Communist and Central Government forces, fleet units will not take part.[60]

The loss of direct American sealift radically changed Chiang's plans for occupying Manchuria. (See Map 33.) A time-consuming overland advance, probably against Communist opposition, was scheduled to free Hulutao. Hopeh Province was looked upon as a base for operations in Manchuria and the Peiping-Mukden Railroad as the main supply route. The area between Chinwangtao and Shanhaikuan was selected as the assembly and jump-off point.

Since Communist guerrilla forces abounded in the Chinwangtao area, the danger of Marines becoming involved in the fighting was acute. A sample of the trouble that could brew occurred on 30 October, when Communist troops near Peitaiho blew two bridges on the rail line and sent word to the commander of 1/7 that no armed Americans would be allowed to pass through the area without permission. This bit of bravado was reported to the Nationalist Eleventh War Area commander, and on his orders the 43d Division of the 94th CNA conducted a sweep which drove off the Communists.

The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was undoubtedly capable of tangling with these Communists and coming out on top, but it could not do so without contravening its orders not to take offensive action. General Rockey felt that it was "difficult but essential" to comply with the directive not to get involved in the Chinese civil strife and that it accurately reflected majority American opinion at the time.[61] The Commandant of the Marine Corps in discussing the threatening situation facing the Marines, commended General Rockey for his "action at Chefoo and subsequent action at other places [which] has certainly given us every reason to believe that if we do get mixed up [in the fighting] it will have been forced upon us." [62]

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[60] ComSeventhFlt msg to SeventhFlt, dtd 21Oct45 (Missionary Incoming Book No. 5, Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

[61] *Rockey interview*, 14–15Apr59.

[62] Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to MajGen Keller E. Rockey, dtd 31Oct45. (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

An Extended Stay

EXPANDED MISSION [1]

When General Wedemeyer returned from Washington he quickly confirmed General Rockey's judgment that there would be no early withdrawal of the IIIAC. In a conference held on 7 November, Wedemeyer told the corps commander it was imperative that substantial numbers of Marines remain in North China, and that reductions in strength made necessary by the world-wide demobilization rush of American forces be phased over a period of months. Rockey immediately radioed this information to FMFPac in order to maintain the continuity of resupply shipping and to assist General Geiger's staff in the involved planning necessary to provide replacements for the veterans in IIIAC.

The continued requirement for Marines in North China stemmed from two complementary causes. One was the U. S. commitment to assist the National Government in eliminating all Japanese influence from China, and the other was the overriding determination of Chiang Kai-shek to recover control of Manchuria. As a direct result of the obstructionist tactics of Soviet occupation forces, the Nationalist Army was unable to move into Manchuria with either the speed or the limited forces that had once been planned. Instead, the first-line troops which had been scheduled to relieve the Marines of repatriation and guard duties were committed to an overland advance through Shanhaikuan.

In his capacity of chief of staff to Generalissimo Chiang, a wartime role that was dropped before the year's end, General Wedemeyer was sharply aware of the low military potential of the Nationalists. He recommended against the move in strength into Manchuria after Communist opposition developed. Instead, the American commander told Chiang that he should first consolidate his political and military hold on North China as a base of operations. Although the Central Government's armies possessed a three to one superiority in manpower over the Communists, and a considerable edge in weapons and equipment as well, Wedemeyer believed that the Nationalist forces would become overextended and increasingly vulnerable if they attempted to occupy and hold Manchuria.

Despite General Wedemeyer's advice, the recovery of Manchuria became the focus of Chungking's military effort. The Japanese-created industrial complex and the rich agricultural resources of the area made its position seem essential to the economic well-being of postwar China. This argument lost much of its force, however, as a result of the action of the Soviet occupation army

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Eyes Alone Radios Folder (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC); *Rockey interviews*, 14–15Apr59 and 9Jul59; *Worton interview; U. S. Relations with China;* Wedemeyer, *Reports.*

during the fall and winter of 1945. Stripping the best of machinery and equipment from Manchurian factories and power plants under the guise of war reparations, and immobilizing the remainder by this selective robbery, the Soviets effectively converted Manchuria from an economic asset to a liability. Its gutted factory cities added nothing to Nationalist strength when they were taken over, and Communist military action made certain there was no opportunity to rebuild what had been lost.

As the pattern of events in Manchuria began to take shape, the United States anxiously strove to appraise its position in Chinese affairs. General Wedemeyer returned to Chungking from the States with instructions to survey the current situation regarding American forces and future prospects for his country's interests. After visiting Shanghai, Peiping, and Mukden and talking to top American, Chinese, and Soviet commanders, he submitted a detailed report on 20 November. In it he analyzed the relationship of the III Amphibious Corps to the Central Government and its plans, saying:

> The Generalissimo is determined to retain in their present areas the Marines in North China. As a matter of fact he desires the Marines to expose long lines of communications in their occupational area. He visualizes utilizing the Marines as a base of maneuver. The Gimo [Generalissimo] would like to concentrate plans based on conducting a campaign against the Chinese Communists instead of repatriating the Japanese. Such a campaign may require several months or years . . . in the interim the Marines are subject to unavoidable incidents which may involve the United States in very serious commitments and difficulties. Careful consideration has been given to the implications of suggesting that we withdraw all of our American forces including the Marines from China. It is impossible to avoid involvement in political strife or fratricidal warfare under present circumstances, yet I am admonished to do so by my directive. The presence of American troops in the Far East as I view it, is for the expressed purpose of insuring continued peace and accomplishing world order. Under the provisions of the lofty aims of the United Nations Charter, however, I doubt that the American people are prepared to accept the role inherent in world leadership. We can justifiably be accused, by removing our forces at this critical time, of deserting an Ally. It is readily discernible that China is incapable of solving her political and economic problems and also repatriating the millions of enemy troops and civilians within her borders.[2]

President Truman and the Joint Chiefs asked the theater commander to suggest several alternative lines of actions for consideration by policy makers in Washington. Accordingly, Wedemeyer recommended that either all U. S. forces be removed from China as soon as possible, or that American policies under which they were being employed be clarified to justify their use in a situation of imminent danger. He also suggested that American troops might be withdrawn and that economic aid to the Central Government be stepped up, or, in lieu of this course, that a straightforward policy declaration be made affirming U. S. support of the Central Government until it had solved its internal problems and repatriated the Japanese. In an attempt to discover a solution to the ominous Manchurian situation, the general proposed that a four-nation trusteeship (U.S., Great Britain,

[2] Quoted in Wedemeyer, *Reports*, p. 452.

U.S.S.R., and China) be established to control the territory until Chiang's government could demonstrate that it was able to take over. He further suggested that planning already underway for the creation of a Military Advisory Group to handle American aid to the Nationalist army be continued, but that consummation be withheld until military and political stabilization was accomplished to U. S. satisfaction.

Following his report directive, General Wedemeyer did not point out what he considered was the only workable solution to the China problem. In later years he wrote:

> I could do no more than make my views of the situation clear, while refraining from stating definitely that only one course in China would preserve American interests and those of the free world; namely, unequivocable assistance to our ally, the Chinese Nationalist Government.[3]

The senior Marine officers most concerned shared Wedemeyer's belief that the directives under which they had to operate were ill-considered and ambiguous in meaning. The American forces in China, particularly the IIIAC, were placed in an untenable position by instructions that made them at once neutral and partisan in China's civil strife. Some officers felt, as did General Rockey, that U. S. Forces were committed to the extent that American public support would permit. Other officers on the scene, whose view was shared by General Worton, felt that more active backing of the Nationalists could be undertaken without undue risk. The split in opinion between the III Corps commander and his chief of staff was indicative of the split existing throughout the directing bodies of the U. S. Government.[4] Regardless of their personal feelings, however, the Marine generals conscientiously tried to comply with their instructions.

The dominant consideration in determining U. S. policy toward China was a sincere desire for the restoration of peace. Ambassador Hurley had directed a good part of his efforts in Chungking toward ending the civil war and achieving collaboration of both sides in a practical coalition government and army. When he left China in late September, Hurley was convinced that he had made substantial progress toward that goal; some agreements on general principles of settlement had been reached and the ambassador had engineered the convening of a Political Consultative Conference which would consider details of implementation. Then, on 26 November, Hurley announced his resignation as ambassador, on grounds of his lack of confidence in certain officials within the Department of State.

Immediately following Ambassador Hurley's unexpected resignation, the President asked General of the Army George C. Marshall to become his special representative in China. Marshall who had just stepped down as Army Chief of Staff, a position that he held with distinction throughout World War II, returned to duty at the request of his

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 359.

[4] In November seven different joint resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the Marines from China were introduced in Congress. 79th Congress, 2d Session, *Congressional Record* (Washington, 1945), v. 91, pt 8, pp. 11007, 11156.

commander in chief. The stage was set for a renewed effort on the part of the American Government to restore peace in China.

On 15 December, President Truman made a public statement of U. S. policy toward China which was substantially the same as that in his instructions to Marshall. The President believed it essential that a ceasefire be arranged between the Nationalist and Communist armies for the purpose of completing the return of all China to effective governmental control. He stated that a national conference of representatives of major political elements should be arranged to develop an early solution to the civil strife, one which would bring about a unified country and army. At the international level the U. S. would continue to support the Central Government, and within China would concentrate on assisting the Nationalists to disarm and repatriate Japanese forces.

The sense of the President's directive to General Marshall was that the American representative should act as mediator to bring the two sides together, using as his most powerful goad the dispensing or withholding of American economic and military aid. When Marshall arrived in China shortly after the President's statement was released, he immediately began a round of conferences with the Communist emissaries and Nationalist officials in Chungking. General Wedemeyer and Admiral Barbey, who had taken over Seventh Fleet from Admiral Kinkaid on 19 November, briefed Marshall on the American military situation.[5] All were impressed with his obvious determination to carry out his directive and see an end to the fighting.

While General Marshall was still in Washington preparing for his China assignment, he helped draft a set of instructions to General Wedemeyer which would cover American support of Nationalist forces. The theater commander was authorized to step up the program for the evacuation of Japanese repatriates, and to arrange for the transportation of CNA units to Manchurian ports uncovered by the Nationalist overland advance. He was informed that "further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance." [6] Provisional plans for Nationalist troop lifts to North China might be made but would not be put into effect unless General Marshall determined that carrying them out would be consistent with his negotiations.

The temporary halt to the movement of Nationalist soldiers into Hopeh and Shantung emphasized the fact that relief for the Marines was yet to come. In late October the 1st Marine Division had been forced to extend its hold on the Peiping-Mukden line because of the reluctance of Nationalist commanders to outpost the vital railroad in effective strength. A directive from China Theater to General Rockey, which ordered this further exposure of the American troops, declared:

> It is a military necessity that at least 100,000 tons of coal reach Shanghai each

[5] ComSeventhFlt WarDs, Nov–Dec45 (OAB, NHD).

[6] Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 607.

> month. The mines in the Tangshan-Kuyeh area are the only immediately available sources of coal for Shanghai. Action has been initiated to dispatch to Chinwangtao sufficient shipping to move at least 100,000 tons of coal per month to Shanghai. It is understood that the Chinese railway company will endeavor to operate 4 daily coal trains to Chinwangtao by the end of the month provided the III Phib Corps will furnish train guards. It is desired that you take the necessary action to protect the port of Chinwangtao and the rail line and rail traffic to Chinwangtao to the extent necessary to permit the movement to and outloading from Chinwangtao of at least 100,000 tons of coal per month destined for Shanghai.[7]

In short order, Marine rail and bridge guard detachments, most of them taken from the 7th Marines, were spread out along the length of the Peiping-Mukden line from Tangku to Chinwangtao. In many instances the outpost units were little more than squad size and the duty they drew was lonely and dangerous. Their quarters, their clothing, and even their rations were often not suited, at first, for the North China winter. Those Marines whose spell of China duty consisted of rail, coal, and train guard during the winter of 1945–1946 have a far different story to tell than the fortunate majority who were stationed in the cities.[8] The headquarters, support, and combat units that remained in relative comfort in Tientsin, Peiping, and Tsingtao were a stand-by reserve that was never called upon although always ready.

TSINGTAO STAND-BY [9]

China duty for the ground elements of III Corps at Tsingtao often seemed to be divorced from the main current of Marine activities in North China. In contrast to the extended deployment of the 1st Division in Hopeh, the 6th Division had no security responsibility for communication routes in the interior of Shantung. With the exception of the rifle company regularly on guard at Tsangkou Field, no unit of General Shepherd's command held a position exposed to Communist harassing attacks. The Japanese disposition to cooperate in repatriation matters kept the requirement for Marine supervisory and guard personnel low. Once it was well established ashore, the 6th Division met demands that hardly taxed its strength and it could operate at little more than idling speed.

The 6th Marine Division was thus better able than the thinly spread 1st to meet a requirement for reinforcements along the Peiping-Mukden line. On 30 October, the corps ordered General Shepherd to ready a reinforced rifle battalion for transfer to Chinwangtao. The 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, was picked for the task and the division attached to

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[7] Corps SO No. 226–45, dtd 6Dec45, in IIIAC WarD, Dec45.

[8] The 1st Division commander considered rotating troops in outlying positions with those in Tientsin and Peiping, but found the members of his own staff and the unit commanders "were almost all opposed to the rotation idea. Instead, we worked out a liberal recreation schedule which allowed troops on outlying duties to frequently visit Tientsin and Peiping." *Peck ltr.*

[9] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: IIIAC WarDs, Nov–Dec45; 6th MarDiv WarDs, Nov–Dec45; 1st MAW WarDs, Nov–Dec45; MAG–32 WarDs, Nov–Dec45; *Rockey interview*, 14–15Apr59; *Shepherd interview; Woods interview.*

it Battery E of 2/15, platoons from the tank and motor transport battalions, and detachments of engineers and ordnance men. The new rail guard unit left Tsingtao on 6 November and arrived at the coal port the following day, reporting to the 1st Division for orders. On the 9th, when all its supplies and equipment were unloaded, 1/29 moved to Peitaiho to set up its command post. Operationally attached to the 7th Marines, the battalion from Tsingtao was soon deeply involved in the mettlesome routine of guarding the Chinese railway.

General Shepherd realized that one of his major problems in Tsingtao was keeping his men usefully occupied. So long as the Communists posed no serious threat to the city and the repatriation process ran smoothly, there was a good chance that combat troops might lose efficiency. Idleness, even that of a relative nature, can be a curse to a military organization geared to operate at full capacity. In order to maintain unit standards of discipline, appearance, and performance, Shepherd instituted a six-week training program on 12 November which laid emphasis on a review of basic military subjects. The division commander also directed that each unit schedule at least ten classroom hours a week of studying academic and vocational subjects, to be held concurrently with the military training schedule.

Among the officers and men in the wing squadrons at Tsangkou Field there was equal emphasis and interest in an educational improvement program. Work schedules were arranged to encourage study, but heavy flight commitments of MAG–25 and MAG–32 ate into the time available for training not directly connected with operations. By the end of October, Tsangkou had developed into the wing's busiest and most important base in China. Command of the field and its complement rested with General Johnson, the assistant wing commander, who reported to General Woods at Tientsin for orders except where the defense of Tsingtao was concerned. General Rockey had altered the original command setup to give General Shepherd operational control of both ground and air units in a defensive situation.

As a result of the wide separation of major elements of III Corps in North China, Marine transports flew an extensive schedule of personnel and cargo flights connecting Tsingtao, Tientsin, Peiping, and Shanghai. In order to make maximum use of the planes available, MAG–25 operated VMR–152 and –153 as one squadron.[10] The transport pilots and crewmen frequently returned to Pacific island bases, particularly Okinawa, to pick up cargo from the vast supply dumps assembled to support the invasion of Japan. The demand for cold weather gear was constant and pressing, and most of that which found its way to the men manning rail outposts and windswept flight lines arrived at Tsingtao and points north in the transports of Marine Aircraft Group 25.

While most transport flights kept well above the range of Communist small arms, the scout and torpedo bombers of MAG–32 frequently landed with bullet holes in their fuselages. Chance alone prevented some riflemen or machine gunner from bringing down one of the planes; the near misses were frequent.

[10] VMR–152 WarD, Nov45.

The search and reconnaissance missions requested by General Shepherd in October evolved into a daily patrol routine that gave the Marines at Tsingtao an excellent picture of Communist activity in eastern Shantung and kept them informed of the progress of Japanese units moving toward the repatriation port. One search pattern was flown over the mountains of Shantung Peninsula to Chefoo with a return leg that paralleled the northern coast and turned south at Yehhsien to follow the main cross-peninsula road into Tsingtao. (See Map 33.) A second route took the planes up the railroad as far as Changtien before turning south and west through mountain valleys to the road and rail junction at Taian; from Taian pilots followed the tracks through Tsinan and all the way home to Tsangkou. The third route covered by regular aerial patrol ran south to the mountain chain that bordered the coast before turning north through tortuous defiles to Weihsien and the favorite railroad return route.

The importance of the railroads indicated by the attention given them in the MAG–32 patrol schedule was emphasized on 2 November when a semi-weekly rail reconnaissance over the whole length of the Tsingtao-Tsinan-Tientsin rail net was directed. The two-seater bombers returned to Tsangkou Field across the Gulf of Chihli reporting on junk traffic that passed beneath them.

The hazardous nature of winter flying over mountainous terrain was vividly emphasized by an accident that occurred on 8 December. A major portion of each MAG–32 squadron flew to Tientsin that day to take part in an aerial show of strength on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor. The show went off without a hitch, but on the return flight to Tsingtao the planes ran into one of the season's first snow storms over Shantung Peninsula. Each squadron was proceeding independently, and the planes of VMTB–134 and VMSB–244 climbed above the storm to come in. The scout-bombers of VMSB–343, attempting to go under the tempest, were caught up in its blinding snow swirls. Only six pilots managed to bring their planes home safely; six others crashed into the mountain slopes near Pingtu in the center of the peninsula.[11]

As soon as it became evident that the VMSB–343 craft were down, intensive efforts were made to locate them. Virtually every plane in MAG–32 and VMO–6 had a turn at the search, but it was three days before Chinese civilians brought word of the location of the crash and pilots confirmed the fact. Communist villagers had rescued the only two survivors, one of whom was injured. The Communists of Shantung Peninsula also held two other Marine airmen at this time, the crew of a photo reconnaissance plane which crash-landed on 11 December on the shore near Penglai. Leaflets were dropped in both wreck areas offering rewards for the return of the living and the dead.

The photo plane at Penglai was part of a flight of three from VMD–254 on Okinawa which had tried to fly around a heavy weather front and reach Tsangkou Field. All three planes were forced down, one by propeller and engine trouble and the other two by empty fuel

[11] VMSB–343 WarD, Nov45.

tanks.[12] Both crew members of the second plane died in a water landing near Weihaiwei, but the crewmen of the third craft, which went down on the beach near Jungchen, escaped unscratched and were picked up by OYs of VMO–6 on 13 December. On the 15th, the VMD–254 plane crew from the Penglai crash and the uninjured survivor of the mass accident at Pingtu were released by the Communists. Recovery parties of the 6th Division picked up these men, and also drove north on 24 December to accept the remains of the VMSB–343 flyers killed on 8 December. The injured survivor of this crash was returned to Tsingtao on Christmas Day. Though all the negotiations attending the recovery of these Marines, the Communist villagers had been most cooperative, refusing the proffered rewards, and treating well the men they rescued.

By prior arrangement with the Communists, an attempt was made to recover the photo plane down near Jungchen. The 6th Division organized a task force built around Company F of the 29th Marines with appropriate air and ground attachments to handle the job of getting the plane airborne again. Travelling to Jungchen on the 17th on board an LST, the recovery force found the plane could not take off because of soft ground. The aircraft was stripped of usable parts and the carcass burned. The same fate met the wreck of the plane down at Penglai. In both instances, the cooperation of the local villagers was exemplary. For whatever reason, the Communist harassment of the Marines in Shantung faded a bit after the crashes of December. The respite unfortunately proved to be temporary.

The sporadic ground fire that met American air patrols was a severe trial to pilots who had to stand the sniping. General Rockey attempted to establish a set of conditions under which this antiaircraft fire could be returned, and on 6 December he issued combat instructions. The flyers could shoot back if the source was unmistakable, if the fire from the ground was in some volume, if the target was in the open and easily defined, and if innocent people were not endangered. With permission to fire hedged by these qualifications, and the possibility of open warfare always resting on their decision, the Marine pilots remained discreet but frustrated. While in General Wood's opinion the individual pilot should have been given considerably more freedom of action, no Marine in China, regardless of his position, had anything resembling a free hand in conducting operations. The orders from General Rockey were an accurate reflection of the policy directives that reached him from higher headquarters.

Certainly, the directive most difficult to comply with was the admonition to avoid support of the Nationalist armies in the civil war. The very presence of the Marines in North China holding open the major ports of entry, the coal mines, and the railroads was an incalculably strong military asset to the Central Government. And the fact that the U. S. had provided a good part of the arms of the troops scheduled to take

[12] Aircraft Accident Cards of F7F–3Ps Nos. 80381, 80419, and 80423, dtd 11Dec45 (Unit HistReptFile, HistBr, HQMC).

over North China and Manchuria made the situation even more explosive. The supply of ammunition and replacement parts for these weapons, even though they were now used to fight the Communists rather than the Japanese, was a charge upon the American government. On at least one occasion, the Marines at Tsingtao wound up providing this ammunition directly to a Nationalist force hotly engaged with the Communists.

The 8th Chinese Nationalist Army began landing at Tsingtao on 14 November, its mission to accept the surrender of the Japanese *Forty-third Army* at Tsinan. The Nationalist commander moved his troops through the city and encamped between it and Tsangkou while he regrouped for the drive north. The Communist reaction to the landing was immediate and violent. On the night of the 14th, the railroad was effectively knocked out for a distance of 37 miles above Tsangkou by a spread of destructive raids. General Shepherd immediately moved 2/22 reinforced by tanks to the airfield to back up the rifle company already there, withdrawing the battalion as soon as the Nationalists began their advance.

The forward units of the 8th CNA tangled with the Communists soon after clearing Tsangkou's outskirts on 19 November. The prospect of a continuous series of fire fights was most disturbing to the Nationalist commander whose army was quite low on ammunition at the time it debarked from the American transports which carried it to Tsingtao. On 20 November, he made a formal request to General Shepherd for the ammunition he needed. Shepherd forwarded the request to Rockey, who in a meeting with Wedemeyer at Peiping on the 23d received permission to make the transfer. The III Corps commander sent an order to Shepherd authorizing him to turn over to the 8th CNA one unit of fire [13] for the infantry weapons of a Marine division. A hurry-up request to FMFPac asked for immediate replacement of this ammunition.

The majority of Japanese troops to be repatriated through Tsingtao were intended to be released from guard duties by the action of the 8th CNA. Once the Nationalist army had reached Tsinan and disarmed the Japanese there, it was to turn these arms over to puppet troops in the area which had declared for Chiang Kai-shek. The 8th was then to return along the railroad taking over the guard assignment from the Japanese who held it. This plan failed of accomplishment in many respects, but principally because the Nationalist unit, with a strength of less than 30,000 men, just could not handle the job assigned it. At the end of a month of fighting, the 8th CNA had reached a point just below Weihsien and could go no farther. Nationalist authorities changed its mission to one of rail security and pinned their hopes for relief of Tsinan on armies approaching overland from central China. The former puppet troops at Tsinan dug in for a protracted defense of the city,

[13] The unit of fire was a measure of ammunition supply. It represented a specific number of rounds of ammunition per weapon which varied with its type and caliber. The IIIAC took three units of fire to China to cover the possible requirements for ammunition of its ground components.

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while the Japanese *Forty-third Army* set its own schedule for troop movement to Tsingtao.

The actual mechanics of repatriation through Tsingtao were deceptively simple. They represented, however, a wealth of preliminary work at the theater level, principally logistical arrangements,[14] and the ironing out of details at the port of embarkation among Nationalist representatives, Japanese military and civilian leaders, and operations and civil affairs officers of the 6th Marine Division. When the routine of repatriation was settled, only one company of the 29th Marines plus a relatively few liaison officers and interpreters from division headquarters were needed to supervise and control the program.

Basically, the repatriation system at Tsingtao worked in this way. All Japanese civilians and those military units which had not surrendered to the Marines came under control of Nationalist authorities. When the Nationalist 11th War Area representative released the military from guard duties or certified the civilians for return they assembled at a coke factory just north of Tsangkou which was designated as the processing and staging center. Within the center the Japanese handled all the administrative work necessary to set up embarkation rosters within priorities established by the Marines. The housekeeping details of the various billeting areas were also managed by the Japanese. Security details at the coke factory, along the train route to Great Harbor, and at the docks were shared by the Nationalist police and the Marines. In like manner, the inspection of repatriates' baggage for contraband was a joint procedure; the Japanese were allowed to carry away little more than a handbag full of personal effects, a small amount of cash, and a five days' supply of food for the voyage.

Initially, 15 American LSTs were assigned to shuttle between Tsingtao and Japan carrying military repatriates, while the civilians had to wait on Japanese merchant vessels to carry them home. Seventh Fleet, in an effort to speed up the repatriation process, first authorized the use of LSTs by male civilians and later opened their decks and holds to family groups also. Regular repatriation runs from Tsingtao began on 19 November when three landing ships sailed with 2,873 naval base troops and nine civilians on board. Similar shipments of approximately 3,000 men were made on the 21st and 23d. On board each LST, in addition to the repatriates, were six Marine guards and a Japanese interpreter. The first substantial shipment of civilians departed on 5 December when 4,152 left on a Japanese vessel which had brought in 1,961 Chinese from Japan. On ships carrying civilian repatriates, Japanese guards and medical personnel were added to the operating complement.

By the year's end, 33,500 Japanese military and civilians had cleared Tsingtao. The figure could have been much larger but Nationalist reluctance to release rail guards or vital civilian technicians kept the total down. Communist destruction of the tracks, bridges, and roadbed slowed the movement of Japanese from Tsinan, and the

[14] Wedemeyer, *Reports*, pp. 351–352.

43d Army advance units which alternately marched and rode down the railroad had to fight off harassing attacks. There were still 125,000 Japanese scheduled to move home through Tsingtao on 31 December, and most of these people had not as yet begun to move toward the port city.

The main interest of the Nationalist military authorities in the Japanese forces was their weapons, equipment, and ammunition. The considerable stores of munitions that III Corps units had collected in disarming the Japanese were a prize that the Nationalists wanted badly. During October and November, the Marine division commanders had a seldom-exercised authority to make emergency issues from these stocks to Nationalist units. The American feeling was that control of the surrendered military supplies should pass to the Central Government only when full responsibility for the Japanese and their repatriation was assumed. On 13 December, in a move calculated to prod Nationalist authorities, corps withdrew even the limited authorization that had existed to turn over Japanese weapons and ammunition.

In keeping with this decision, General Shepherd turned down a request made by the 8th CNA that it be given the materiel taken from the *5th Independent Mixed Brigade.* The Marine general in reply pointed out that these surrendered Japanese troops were the particular responsibility of the 6th Division. This fact was evident in the voluntary tribute that the *5th Brigade* commander, General Nagano, paid General Shepherd in presenting the Marine with a priceless *Samurai* sword "on behalf of all Japanese soldiers under my command who are moved by your open and honorable conduct toward them." The Japanese officer continued:

> Exemplary conduct and actions on the part of your soldiers inspired our minds with respect and wonder. Personally I like plain speaking. Indeed, it may sound strange for us Japanese soldiers to speak of American soldiers in this strain, but let the fact speak for itself. I feel it is my pleasant duty to report to you that every Japanese in Tsingtao City feels grateful to you for your fair and square dealings. This is the last thing that we expected of your Marines of the Okinawa Battle fame.[15]

The occasion for this presentation was General Shepherd's departure from China; at the same time an heirloom suit of *Samurai* armor was given him in behalf of the Japanese civilian repatriates who praised his Marines for their impartiality and "strict maintenance of military discipline." [16] On 24 December, General Shepherd, who was returning to the States to organize the Troop Training Command, Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet, relinquished command of the division which he had organized and led throughout the Okinawa fighting. In a formal ceremony before the division staff and the regimental and battalion commanders and executive officers, Shepherd turned over his command to Major General Archie F. Howard, who had been Inspector General, FMFPac.

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[15] MajGen Eiji Nagano, IJA, ltr to MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., dtd 15Dec45 filed with *Shepherd interview.*

[16] *Ibid.*

General Howard's assumption of command coincided with the arrival at Tsingtao of a merchant ship loaded with 9,500 tons of coal. Had the vessel come a few days later, only the Marines would have had fuel for heat and light since the stockpile for public purposes was exhausted. In peacetime, coal mines in the Poshan region of Shantung had supplied Tsingtao, but Communist activity had shut off this source. The city had to limp along on a dole reluctantly taken from the supplies intended for Shanghai.

Despite the fact that Tsingtao received only the fuel necessary to power essential public utilities, enough coal somehow found its way into private hands to keep a thriving souvenir industry heated during the winter of 1945–1946. The souvenir shops, like the inevitable honky-tonk district that sprang up almost in the footsteps of the first Marines to land, were attracted by the American dollar. The free-spending habits of the Marines, and of the sailors of Seventh Fleet who often came ashore with several months pay in their pockets, gave Tsingtao a superficial aspect of prosperity that extended only as far as the customary haunts of American servicemen.

Inflation of the local puppet currency was an ill common to all North China when the III Corps arrived. Since the Marines were not an occupying force in the sense that the Allies were in Japan, the steadying influence of a controlled economy in such unsettled conditions was absent. The Nationalists were not strong enough to impose their economic will, and the almost daily upward spiral of the exchange rate precluded payment of Americans in anything but American money. Even the many Chinese employees of the Marines had their wages set in terms of American money with payment at the going rate of exchange.

The fact that most Marine enlisted men could have afforded a personal servant in China, and in fact did share the services of one with his fellows in a ratio set by his commanders, was an attractive feature of China duty. In the city garrisons, each platoon had several houseboys who made up beds, shined shoes, cleaned the quarters, ran errands, and generally made themselves useful. Naturally, the fact that someone else was doing many of the necessary but irksome jobs which fall to the lot of lower ranks in any military organization was universally appreciated by the men who held those ranks.

While only a small portion of the Marines in North China were steadily engaged by occupation tasks, the presence of the remainder as a necessary reserve lent emphasis to the actions of the pilots, the rail guards, and the repatriation details. Unit commanders were particularly concerned that the off-duty hours of men used to having their time and abilities fully occupied be filled in a manner that would maintain morale and discipline. Since the majority of the veterans in III Corps had been in the Pacific islands for a year or more when the North China landings were made, the chance at liberty in Chinese cities was eagerly taken up. The novelty soon wore off, however, as few pocketbooks could stand the strain of constant spending at inflated prices. To meet the problem, General Rockey took steps to set up an

extensive recreational program which would offer the most service at the least cost to his men.

Rockey invited the Red Cross to extend its service club operations to the III Corps area and sent planes of MAG–25 to Shanghai and Kunming to pick up personnel and equipment. The facilities that these people opened in October in Tsingtao, Peiping, and Tientsin were elaborate and luxurious beyond any experience of Marines overseas.[17] To supplement the Red Cross support, Rockey encouraged the formation of unit clubs, particularly at remote stations, to offer varied and inexpensive recreation.

The breakup of Army commands in southwestern China provided the Marines with a radio network. Three surplus 50-watt transmitters with enough broadcasting equipment to set up radio stations at each of the three major IIIAC bases were obtained. The Army-run newspaper at Shanghai, a theater edition of *The Stars and Stripes*, was distributed in North China, but it was overwhelmingly concerned with units and experience of little interest to the Marines. General Rockey felt strongly that the corps should have its own newspaper, and as a result, *The North China Marine* began weekly publication on 10 November. The paper, which took its title from a predecessor put out by the prewar embassy guard, was printed in Tientsin at a local press and distributed free by rail and air to all IIIAC installations.

[17] General Rockey was very complimentary to the Red Cross for its services to IIIAC, citing in particular its club in Peiping, which had luxurious quarters in the rented Italian Embassy. *Rockey comments.*

The Central Government, through its War Area Service Corps (WASC), provided a wealth of educational and cultural opportunities to the Marines. Hostels run by WASC were the principal quarters for transient servicemen from the fleet and from outlying posts who visited the principal cities garrisoned by the corps. Peiping in particular was a mecca for tourists in uniform who flew in or came by rail from all over North China as part of a systematic effort to grant liberty in the ancient city to those not fortunate enough to be stationed there. By the end of December 1945, consistent command effort, ably seconded by the work of the Red Cross and WASC, brought into being a corps-wide recreational program that significantly eased the tension of waiting inherent in the Marines' situation.

LINE OF COMMUNICATION TROOPS [18]

In the northern sector of III Corps responsibility, the processing machinery at the focal point of repatriation ran as smoothly as it did in the south. (See Map 34.) Essentially the process was the same at the Tientsin-Tangku port of embarkation as it was at Tsingtao. The 1st Marine Division had full charge of the program, and the 1st Marines supplied the necessary guards, including 39 six-man details to ride the LSTs carry-

[18] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: IIIAC WarDs, Nov–Dec45; 1st MarDiv WarDs, Nov–Dec45; 1st MAW WarDs, Nov–Dec45; LtCol James D. Hittle, "On the Peiping-Mukden Line," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 31, no. 6 (Jun47); *Rockey interviews*, 14–15Apr59, 29Apr59, and 9Jul59; *Peck interview; Woods interview.*

ing military repatriates. The Japanese through their military command and a civilian liaison committee handled most of the administrative and logistical requirements of selecting, feeding, housing, and moving the thousands who arrived at the assembly area near Changkeichuang Field. The Nationalists provided police protection along the line of march to the railroad station at Tientsin and inspectors for the search of baggage at the docks.

Three Japanese merchant ships were available for civilian repatriation during November, and the 1st Division was able to send home 8,651 people during the month. Five times that number left in December as more ships became available and LST transportation was authorized for nonmilitary repatriates.[19] The feeling of the Japanese civilians toward the Marines of the 1st Division paralleled remarkably the sentiments expressed to General Shepherd regarding the men of the 6th Division. The spokesman for the civilian repatriates wrote to General Peck commending the attitude of the Marines and pointing out that the first repatriates had "kept requesting that the profound gratitude they felt for the kind and understanding treatment accorded them by your men be given expression." [20]

After LSTs became available for military repatriation on 13 November, the 1st Division was able to process and ship out 33,583 men from Tangku by the 30th and an additional 20,450 the following month. The cumulative total for the northern sailings stood at 112,022 on 31 December.

The major factor controlling repatriation totals was the relief of Japanese troops from rail security duties. In Shantung the Central Government forces assigned to this task were unequal to it; in Hopeh there was very little disposition on the part of the Nationalists to make the relief at all. Of necessity, the 1st Marine Division did the job for Chiang Kai-shek's forces by securing the lines of communication between cities where Marines were stationed. Repeated American policy statements pointing to repatriation assistance as the principal reason for the presence of Marines in China made the relief of the Japanese mandatory after the 1st Division extended its hold on the Peiping-Mukden Railroad.

The Nationalist headquarters which was assigned the job of taking over Manchuria, the Northeast China Command of Lieutenant General Tu Li Ming, did not start its troops in motion up the Shanhaikuan corridor until 17 November. In ten days the advance guard had reached Chinchow at the foot of the Manchurian plain without encountering much Communist opposition. Generalissimo Chiang then ordered the Nationalist force to hold up and not press on for Mukden and Changchun; by not proceeding farther, he intended to emphasize the lack of cooperation of the Soviets. The American decision to provide him with troop lift which would expedite his take-over program caused him to revise his strategy. At this point, the Soviet occupation command became much more amenable to Nationalist requests, but the damage both to Manchuria's industrial

[19] IIIAC G–5 PeriodicRpt No. 2, Nov45, dtd 1Dec45 and No. 3, Dec45, dtd 1Jan46.

[20] Mr. H. Imura ltr to MajGen DeWitt Peck, dtd 12Nov45, filed with *Peck interview.*

capacity and to its chances for a peaceful future had already been done.[21]

The movement of Nationalist armies north into Manchuria interfered with the execution of the mission given III Corps to keep coal flowing from the KMA mines near Tangshan and Kuyeh for Shanghai, and, quite naturally, for Peiping and Tientsin, too. Before the advance began, Marine civil affairs officers got word that Northeast China Command intended to take a great deal of rolling stock beyond the Great Wall to support its operations. General Wedemeyer was asked to take steps to prevent this and he, in turn, passed the request on to Chiang Kai-shek. On 30 November, the III Corps was told that only 2 locomotives and 60 cars would be taken permanently. A board was set up with Marine representation to control the allocation of stock on each side of the wall. Before this agreement was made, however, Marine sources estimated that 25 locomotives and 500 coal cars disappeared into Manchuria in the initial stages of the Nationalist advance. In order to prevent this confiscation, Marine guards riding coal trains to Chinwangtao stayed on board during the turn-around period and kept the Nationalists from seizing the engines and cars.[22]

One result of the severe loss to carrying capacity involved in the appropriation of coal cars for troop transports was a disappointingly low total of coal moved from the KMA mines during November. Only 22,000 tons reached Chinwangtao for transshipment, while 37,000 tons were sent to Tientsin. In December the situation improved tremendously, 94,000 tons were shipped to Chinwangtao and 98,000 to Tientsin. A good part of the increase could be traced to a definite slackening of Communist pressure against the rail line after the first part of the month. In Hopeh, as in Shantung where the same thing was happening, the widely publicized peace efforts of General Marshall were the most probable cause of the temporary lull.

The destruction wrought by Communist raiding parties in the first weeks of November was often enough to halt all traffic on the Peiping-Mukden line for a day or more. Chinese track repair gangs, however, profited from the wealth of experience provided them by these attacks and made continuous improvement on the time necessary to restore service. Damage to rolling stock was handled in the large railroad shops at Tangshan whose Japanese technicians were declared essential by the Nationalists and withheld from repatriation.

The OYs of VMO–3 frequently flew along the line to check for damage, since the railroad signal system was almost non-existent. Often the first news that engineers had of a break in the tracks would be their own sighting of twisted or broken rails. Under the circumstances a ride on a train which traveled the well-patched stretch of tracks between Tangku and Chinwangtao was a memorable experience.

Just before noon on 14 November, Communist troops firing from the protection of a village six miles north of Kuyeh stopped a train carrying the 1st Marine Division commander. General

[21] Chiang, *Soviet Russia*, pp. 146–147.

[22] IIIAC G–5 PeriodicRpt No. 2, *op. cit.*

Peck, who was inspecting 7th Marines positions along the railroad, ordered his escort platoon to return fire. Using a radio jeep mounted on a flatcar to contact the nearest Marine garrison at Linsi, he directed that reinforcement be dispatched immediately; at the same time, he radioed General Rockey requesting air support and permission to call down a strike on the village if it should prove necessary.[23] The Communists faded away as soon as Company L from Linsi arrived, set up a mortar, and dropped a few rounds in the area from which the firing had come.[24]

General Peck returned to Tangshan for the night and on the next day started again for Chinwangtao. Just beyond the point at which he had been fired upon the previous day, Peck found the track torn up for several hundred yards. A track gang which was traveling on the train began making repairs while Marines beat down scattered sniper fire which was covering the break. The area proved to be mined and several of the Chinese repair gang were killed or injured when a mine exploded. The extent of the repairs necessary indicated that no trains could get through for two days, so General Peck returned to Tangshan and flew up to Chinwangtao.

In the exchange of messages between Generals Rockey and Wedemeyer which resulted from this incident, the IIIAC commander indicated that he was ready to authorize a strafing mission if fire continued from the offending village. The reply from Wedemeyer is interesting since it vividly demonstrates the difficulties attending Marine combat operations in China:

> If American lives are endangered by small-arms fire received from village about 600 yards north of Loanshien as indicated in your radio CAC 0368, it is desired that you inform the military leader or responsible authority in that village in writing, that fire from that particular village is endangering American lives and that such firing must be stopped. After insuring that your warning to said military leader or responsible authority has been received and understood, should firing that jeopardizes American lives continue, you are authorized to take appropriate action for their protection. Your warning and action should include necessary measures to insure safety of innocent persons.[25]

General Peck, on his arrival at Chinwangtao, was authorized to deal directly with General Tu Li Ming, in order to get the Nationalists to take offensive action against the Communists along the railroad. On the 16th, the generals agreed that if the Marines would mount guard on all railroad bridges over 100 meters in length between Tangku and Chinwangtao, the Nationalists, using the troops thus relieved, would conduct an offensive sweep driving away the Communists. Ten days later, after Marine detachments had taken control of the

[23] General Woods recalled that he received an order specifing that planes loaded with ammunition only be sent to the scene. He protested that bombs should also be carried, but directed that the planes be made ready. Shortly after this, "the original order was cancelled by telephone and no planes were sent." *Woods ltr.* General Peck noted, however, in his contemporary notebook, that some planes did eventually fly over at 1500, but that the pilots reported they did not sight any hostile force. *Peck ltr.*

[24] A Chronological Hist of 3/7, 1st MarDiv Activities in China, 30Sep–15Apr46, n.d., p. 3.

[25] Quoted in IIIAC WarD, Nov45, pp. 4–5.

ARROW, *made of blankets and clothing, directs Corsairs to village from which Chinese Communists fired upon a Marine patrol. (USMC 226788)*



COMMUNIST MINE *damages roadbed of Tientsin-Chinwangtao railroad. Standing figure at left is 1st Division commander, Major General DeWitt Peck. (USMC 226782)*

bridges, Northeast China Command informed the 1st Division that it did not have enough troops available to meet its offensive commitment. Then in early December, as if to clinch the situation, the commanding officer of the 7th Marines was told by the Nationalist 43d Division commander that he had no instructions to relieve the Marines of bridge guard, nor did he have enough men to make the relief if it was ordered.

It is undoubtedly fortunate that the Communist forces harassing the Peiping-Mukden Railroad in Hopeh were unaware of the hedging restrictions on combat use of Marine air in North China. A steady procession of fighter planes was kept aloft over the railroad, seemingly ready at any time to support ground action. Beginning on 1 November, the squadrons of MAG–12 alternated the duty of flying two show-of-strength flights daily to Chinwangtao and return; in December the Corsair units were also assigned a 25-mile radius daily search of the Peiping area.[26] The night fighters of MAG–24 also made a daily flight to Chinwangtao, moving cross country to the coal port from Nan Yuan Field and returning over the railroad.[27] The group's two squadrons flew a daily search pattern in the Tientsin area in December with orders to report any unusual incidents to an air-ground liaison jeep.[28]

On 10 November, a torpedo bomber of MAG–24's Headquarters Squadron was forced down by mechanical failure about 80 miles south of Peiping while on a routine flight to Tientsin. The pilot and five passengers were held by the local Communists, and the plane was camouflaged in an attempt to conceal it from aerial observation. On 15 November, however, a pilot of VMF(N)–541 spotted the aircraft,[29] and negotiations were immediately undertaken to have the men returned. Civilian emissaries who contacted the Communists reported that all the Marines were well and being fairly treated. On 17 December, 38 days after the plane had gone down, Communist troops brought the men to a Nationalist outpost near Tientsin and from there they proceeded to 1st Wing headquarters. The reason for the delay in releasing the men was not explained. The Marines reported that the Communists questioned them repeatedly about American aid to the Nationalists, a sore point that was obviously being emphasized by Yenan's propagandists.

Not all the incidents involving attacks on Marines could be laid clearly at the door of the Communists. Intelligence officers were often forced to put an "unidentified Chinese" label on the assailants. One such case, involving the murder of one Marine and the severe wounding of another, achieved considerable publicity in the States as the result of an inaccurate report of its circumstances.

On 4 December two Marines of 1/29, hunting near their railroad outpost two miles west of Anshan, were shot without warning by two Chinese civilians who approached them. One Marine escaped by feigning death, although

[26] VMF–115 WarD, Nov45; VMF–211 WarDs, Nov–Dec45; VMF–218 WarD, Nov45.

[27] MAG–24 WarD, Nov45.

[28] VMF(N)–533 WarD, Dec45.

[29] *Ibid.*

each man was shot again after he had fallen. The survivor watched the Chinese disappear into a nearby village and then made his way back to his post. Near dusk, the executive officer of 1/29 led a small party to the area, set up a 60mm mortar close to the village, and then entered it with an American interpreter. The Marine told the village headman, who acknowledged the entrance of the gunmen, to surrender the murderers within a half hour. If he failed to do so, the officer promised to shell the village. When the time set elapsed without the terms being met, 24 rounds of high explosive and one of white phosphorus were fired toward the village. The impact area was deliberately kept outside the village walls, and there was little property damage and no injury to any of the inhabitants.[30] The murderers were never apprehended.

The story of the punitive action taken to force the disclosure of the guilty Chinese was garbled in its transmission to 1st Division headquarters. The report received stated that the mortars fired into the village. This was the initial report that General Rockey received from the division, and which he released in response to a directive from theater headquarters. The wire service reporters already had an incorrect version and were prepared to send it out whether or not it was officially released. One reporter in building his highly speculative narrative wrote that "combat men estimated that the village could have been wiped out if all the 60-mm mortar shells scored direct hits." [31]

Building upon the incorrect report of firing into the village and imaginary casualties, some American newspapers blasted the Marines in China. One editorial writer compared the alleged firing on defenseless Chinese villagers to the atrocities committed by the Nazis in Europe and the Japanese in Asia.[32] A board of inquiry which General Rockey immediately convened made a detailed investigation of the events at Anshan and recommended that no disciplinary action be taken against the officer involved, a finding which Rockey strongly approved.[33] As might be expected, the correct version of what happened never received the currency of the original sensational story.

The wide circulation given the false report of the Anshan incident emphasized the heavy responsibility which lay on the shoulders of the Marines who led the men keeping open the Peiping-Mukden line. Should even a bridge guard commander prove too aggressive and exceed his orders to maintain an essentially defensive attitude, the chain reaction to his rashness might well be all-out guerrilla warfare against Marines throughout North China. On the other hand, the same commander by being too circumspect might encourage Communist incursions. It was largely

[30] MajGen Keller E. Rockey ltr to Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, dtd 29Dec45 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

[31] *New York Times*, 9Dec45, p. 23.

[32] "Semper Fidelis," *The Washington Post*, 12Dec45, p. 10, filed with Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to Mr. Eugene Meyer, dtd 13Dec45, published in *The Washington Post*, 15Dec45, p. 16 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

[33] Rockey ltr to Vandegrift, 29Dec45, *op. cit.*

due to the discretion required, expected, and obtained from the "junior officers and senior NCOs who commanded the track detachments along the Peiping-Mukden that the very delicate . . . internationally explosive phase of U. S. foreign policy requiring the protection of the Peiping-Mukden railroad from Tientsin to the Manchurian mountains was accomplished successfully." [34]

The KMA mines and the tracks from Tangshan to Chinwangtao were the focus of Communist harassment. Marine defensive arrangements in this area were kept fluid and changed as the situation required. The regimental headquarters of the 7th Marines moved to Peitaiho in November in order to facilitate control. Three of the four battalions assigned to the 7th's command at this time held the key area, while 3/7 secured the long stretch of track between Tangshan and Tangku. Even though many men were necessarily tied down at fixed posts, bridges and railroad stations, strong mobile reserves were maintained in each battalion sector of responsibility for emergency call.

Common sense on the part of the men concerned and the requirements of their mission helped develop a workable operating procedure for the track guard. A brief consideration of the defensive organization of the 30 miles of track assigned to the center battalion, 2/7, can serve as an example of the general deployment at the turn of the year. (See Map 34.)

The 2d Battalion's sector reached from the walled city of Changli to the bridge across the Luan River at Luanhsien. Seven bridge guard detachments and four station details were mounted, each with a strength based upon the importance of the installation, the capacity of the quarters at hand, the proximity of adjacent detachments, and personnel available. The detachments ranged in size from 1 officer and 18 enlisted men, who held a small bridge only a half mile from the track command post, to a skeleton company of 4 officers and 85-100 men who guarded the bridge over the Luan River. The destruction of this half-mile-long bridge would have effectively cut the railroad to Manchuria for a lengthy period. To supplement individual weapons, the Marine guard at Luanhsien was equipped with two 81mm and two 60mm mortars plus four light and four heavy machine guns.

This concentration of supporting weapons was characteristic of the track outposts where firepower was called upon to make up for manpower shortages. As demobilization had its effect in early 1946, the battalion for a time had to concentrate its training on providing operators to replace fully qualified weapons men on these crew-served pieces. At least one mortar was made a part of detachment armament for night illumination and support. Frequently, unit commanders, who had orders not to "interfere in any engagement or conflict between Communists, Puppets, Nationalists, or any other troops, except as necessary to protect yourself, your own troops, and the installations with which you are charged," [35] shot up flare shells

[34] Hittle, "On the Peiping-Mukden Line," *op. cit.*, p. 20.

[35] 1st MarDiv OPlan No. 5–45, dtd 22Oct45 in 1st MarDiv WarD, Oct45.

when close-lying CNA outposts were attacked. The incidental protection and assistance provided the Nationalists by this natural Marine precaution was undoubtedly interpreted as active support by the Communists.

When the men of the 7th Marines first moved out on bridge guard, they took over existing Japanese troop quarters. Few of these buildings, which were often peasant huts in poor repair, were acceptable billets. As fast as they could be shipped from Okinawa, quonset huts were set out along the railroad to provide suitable accommodations that could be adequately winterized.[36] Although each detachment had a considerable store of rations at its post in case it was cut off, daily hot meals were distributed by track galleys. In 2/7's sector, six of these galley cars were used to service the outposts. All other supplies reaching the men, including mail and special services kits of recreational and educational gear, came by rail also.

Both wire and radio contact with sector headquarters was maintained by each detachment, but the Communist proclivity for cutting the phone lines placed primary reliance on radio. Frequent inspection trips by battalion and company commanders were an established part of the routine of rail guard to ensure that standards of discipline and performance remained high. Marines on outpost were rotated frequently to compensate for the monotony and constant strain of watchfulness of the duties they performed. Regular liberty parties were flown to Peiping from Tangshan with priority of place going to men who had stood the lonely vigil at the bridges of the Peiping-Mukden Railroad. Throughout a period of frequent disruptive personnel changes brought about by demobilization, the morale of the men charged with rail security was excellent. They had a tangible and important job to do, and they did it well.

DEMOBILIZATION AND REPLACEMENT[37]

The Marine Corps demobilization program for its reservists was based on a point discharge system developed by the Army for its non-regular veterans. Those few reservists who were over the upper draft age limit of 36 were also eligible for release regardless of the points they had accumulated.

Marine regulars who had completed their terms of enlistment and those who had served two years or more overseas were also scheduled for return home for discharge or reassignment. Naval personnel serving with the Marines were eligible for discharge under a different schedule of point accumulation which generally paralleled the Army-Marine system. The actual point total for discharge was determined by the service concerned, and most men in the States were separated as

[36] General Woods recalled that many of these quonset huts were Navy ones being sent to house aviation personnel; he gave orders to turn some over to IIIAC to provide suitable accommodations for Marines on bridge guard. *Woods ltr.*

[37] Unless otherwise noted the material in this section is derived from: 6th MarDiv WarDs, Nov–Dec45; CMC ltr to Hon Francis Case, dtd 11Feb46 in 79th Congress, 2d Session, *Congressional Record* (Washington, 1946), v. 92, pt 9, p. A653.

soon as their personal score was reached. Similarly men serving overseas were returned home as their point total neared the discharge level and transportation was available.

Although the Marine Corps had a well organized schedule for demobilization before the end of the war, one which was realistic in terms of occupation commitments, the public pressure to have veterans released from service did not allow its efficient execution.[38] The point score for discharge dropped rapidly in the final months of 1945 with most 50-point men in the States separated by the end of the year; 48,000 more Marines were discharged by 11 January 1946 than had been originally planned. On that date, the occasion of a report by the Commandant to Congress, Marine Corps strength stood at 301,070. Of this total 45,981 Marines were serving in North China, a figure quite close to the original Marine Corps landing strength of III Corps.

Through December, no significant reduction in the size of IIIAC had been effected although changes were in the offiing. High-point Marines in China had to be replaced rather than withdrawn as had once been the plan,[39] and low-point men from the States and from other units of the FMF were sent to North China to release those eligible for separation and rotation. More than 11,000 replacements arrived at Tsingtao and Tangku in December and early January, enough Marines to enable all the 50-point men to be home and discharged by the end of February.

Within two months' time, the III Amphibious Corps lost one quarter of its veterans, and received in their place an equal number of Marines who were short on service and military experience. In the transportation pipeline from the U. S. were even more young Marines, many of them fresh from boot camp, who were scheduled to replace the men with point scores in the 40s and 30s. The problems which arose in assimilating these new men into units disrupted by the loss of key officers and NCOs were formidable. The most characteristic activity of Marine commands during the spring of 1946 was the implementation of a repeated cycle of basic training which enabled them to maintain a satisfactory level of performance.

In view of the rapidly shrinking size of the Marine Corps overall, a reduction in the strength of Marine forces in North China was inevitable. The change in official views regarding the early withdrawal of the IIIAC from China did not alter the plans for the peacetime strength of the FMF to be reached by the summer of 1946.[40] Four of the six Marine divisions activated during the war were scheduled for reduction and disbandment. Plans for the first major step in this program to concern III Corps were issued in December to take effect on order.

The 6th Marine Division was to be reduced to brigade strength with one

[38] CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 13Oct49, Subj: Demobilization Planning (2515–35 File, NavSec, FRC, Alex).

[39] Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to LtGen Holland M. Smith, dtd 30Nov45 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQ–MC).

[40] CominCh disp to CinCPac, dtd 30Sep45 in CinCPac WarD, Sep45, encl (B), p. 7 (OAB, NHD).

infantry regiment, the 4th Marines. At an appropriate time, after necessary reductions and detachments had been made in Japan, a skeleton headquarters group, incorporating the name, the colors, and the traditions of the regiment, would sail for Tsingtao. Once the Chinese base was reached, the regiment would be newly constituted from disbanded infantry units of the division. Supporting elements of the brigade would be activated from units performing similar functions within the division.

The news of the first major reduction of Marine strength in North China emphasized the many such changes pending in 1946. In the coming year, the principal task set IIIAC when it was dispatched to Hopeh and Shantung—the repatriation of the Japanese— was successfully accomplished. A new mission of support of General Marshall's attempt to bring about peace in China made the year chiefly memorable, however, for its wasted effort and endless frustrations.

Abortive Peace Mission

EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS[1]

When General Marshall arrived in China on 20 December, he immediately began a series of informal conferences with Nationalist and Communist leaders. Both sides appeared anxious to bring an end to the fighting and to have Marshall act as the mediator in their discussions. Consequently, the American was asked to be the presiding member of a three-man committee whose task was the development of a workable truce plan. The Nationalist representative was General Chang Chun; speaking for the Communists was General Chou En-lai.

The Committee of Three, as it soon came to be known, first met on 7 January at the American Ambassador's residence in Chungking. The result of six long meetings spaced over the next three days was an agreement which ordered the cessation of all hostilities by 13 January, an end to destruction and interference with lines of communication, a partial suspension of troop movement, and the formation of an Executive Headquarters to police the truce.

The agreement was issued on 10 January over the signatures of the two Chinese members of the Committee of Three and was addressed to "all units, regular, militia, irregular and guerilla, of the National Armies of the Republic of China and of Communist-led troops of the Republic of China." [2] In modification of the ban on troop movement, both forces were allowed to make essential administrative and logistical moves of a local nature. The Nationalists, in addition, won agreement for their continued advance within Manchuria to restore Chinese sovereignty, and acknowledgement of their right to continue troop shifts necessary to complete army reorganization in the area south of the Yangtze River.

The Executive Headquarters provided for in the truce agreement was to be established in Peiping with its actions governed by three commissioners, a Nationalist, a Communist, and an American, with the latter the chairman of the organization. General Marshall appointed U. S. Charge d'Affaires Walter S. Robertson as the American commissioner. His opposite numbers were Major General Cheng Kai Ming of the Nationalist Ministry of Operations and General Yeh-Chien-Ying, the Communist Chief of Staff. Three independent

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: HistRec of the ExecHq, PeipingGruHq, Peiping, China, 10-Jan–31Mar46, n.d. (OCMH), hereafter *ExecHqHist* with the appropriate quarter; SCAP ltr AG 370.05, dtd 17Jan46, Subj: Conf on Repatriation, 15–17Jan46, Tokyo, Japan (Seventh Flt & ComNavWesPac File, FRC, Mech); IIIAC G–5 PeriodicRpts No. 4, Jan46, dtd 1Feb46, No. 5, Feb46, dtd 1Mar46, and No. 6, Mar46, dtd 1Apr46; *U. S. Relations with China.*

[2] Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 609.

signal systems were authorized to enable the commissioners to keep in constant and secret contact with their superiors. The commissioners had the authority to vote and negotiate among themselves, but all orders issued had to have unanimous agreement. The agency through which these orders would reach the field was the Executive Headquarters Operations Section.

The Committee of Three determined that an American officer should be the Director of the Operations Section and that he should have equal numbers of Nationalist and Communist representatives on his staff, as well as enough Americans to carry out the tripartite concept in negotiations. The U. S. Military Attache at Chungking, Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, was selected for the post of director. General Byroade's main concern with the immediate problems involved in maintaining the cease-fire. Field teams, each one a miniature Executive Headquarters in organization, were to be dispatched to areas where fighting continued or broke out anew. The teams were expected to supervise the carrying out of the terms of the truce and to fix responsibility for failure to comply with them.

The initial contingent of officers and enlisted men assigned to Executive Headquarters arrived by air at Peiping on 11 January. A steady procession of Army Air Forces transports, shuttling from fields at Shanghai and Chungking, brought in additional personnel and supplies. Priority in the airlift was given to communications equipment. On the 12th and those days immediately succeeding, radio operators repeatedly sent out the cease-fire order. Byroade's section set up operations in the buildings of the Peiping Union Medical College on 14 January and immediately made preparations to send its first teams into the field to check reports of cease-fire violations.

Support of the Executive Headquarters made heavy demands upon the aircraft availability of the Army's Air Transport Command at Shanghai. On 15 January, a detachment of transports from MAG–25 was temporarily assigned to Peiping to increase the number of planes available to fly truce teams to trouble spots and keep them supplied on a regular schedule. The Marine planes were also used to drop leaflets incorporating the cease-fire message in areas where fighting continued. Fighters of MAG–12 and –24 flew special reconnaissance missions over Jehol Province in Manchuria to report on Communist troop movement for the Executive Headquarters.[3]

The fighting subsided in the first weeks after the publication of the truce agreement. The field teams sent out from Peiping were able to localize clashes between the two sides and to get a start on restoration of normal railroad communications. One result of the operations of Executive Headquarters was an immediate step up in the tempo of Japanese repatriation. The former enemy soldiers and civilians isolated by Communist action in the interior of North China were at last able to march and ride out to the embarkation ports. The continued presence of large numbers of Japanese in the disputed area was a

[3] 1st MAW WarD, Jan46; MAG–25 WarD, Jan46; VMR–152 WarD, Jan46.

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factor which seriously affected the chances for peace, and the truce teams were directed to take an active part in arranging their withdrawal. In coordination with the Central Government and China Theater, Executive Headquarters determined the priority and method of movement of repatriation groups and arranged to feed, house, and transport them.

With the advent of the truce, Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer were able to prod the Central Government into taking over complete responsibility for Japanese repatriation from China. This decision was in keeping with a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which limited future participation in the program by China Theater forces to advisory and liaison duties. All Japanese personnel, supplies, and equipment were to be released to Nationalist control. Word of the impending change was circulated by IIIAC on 3 January, and the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were directed to work out turnover procedures with officials of the Eleventh War Area. The switch began in Shantung on the 14th and in Hopeh on the 18th. Responsibility for the Japanese themselves was assumed immediately and the transfer of property was completed by 9 February.[4]

In the absence of Communist obstruction, an important factor influencing repatriation progress was the availability of shipping. In mid-January, a conference of the Pacific commands most concerned with the repatriation problem was held at Tokyo to determine shipping allocations and scheduling for the overall program. The burden of the transportation task involved in returning the more than 3,000,000 Japanese still overseas had to fall on Japanese-manned ships operated by SCAJAP (Shipping Control Administration, Japan). The requirements of naval demobilization had already made serious inroads in the number of American-manned vessels available, and in immediate prospect was the end to the use of American crews. Several hundred Liberty ships and LSTs were to be turned over to SCAJAP and sailed by Japanese seamen to supplement the captured merchant vessels already in use.

The conference decided that China Theater should have the use of 30 percent of this merchant shipping, and that 100 SCAJAP Libertys and 85 LSTs would be made available in February and March for the China run. By utilizing the crew space in the LSTs for passengers, SCAJAP planned to carry 1,200 repatriates in each vessel rather than the 1,000 lifted in similar American-manned ships. The use of such measures, added to the fact that SCAJAP shipping could not be diverted to transporting Nationalist troops to Manchuria, enabled General Wedemeyer to predict that Japanese repatriation from China would be completed by the end of June.

The scheduling of Korean repatriation, a necessary consideration in those areas where the Japanese had held control, was also taken up at the Tokyo conference. The economic competition of the Koreans overseas, who were mainly laborers and artisans, made them unwelcome to native populations. Most

[4] IIIAC WarDs, Jan–Feb46; 1st MarDiv WarD, Jan46; 6th MarDiv WarD, Jan46.

Koreans clamored to return home, and their agitation posed a particularly difficult problem in Japan proper where their number ran into the hundreds of thousands. Priority of shipping space was assigned to the movement of Koreans from Japan, but enough vessels were diverted to Shanghai, Tsingtao, and Tangku to allow 10,000 of the most destitute Koreans in China to leave during late January and early February.

In January, the last month in which any substantial lift by American vessels was available, 57,719 Japanese and 1,838 Koreans left North China. In the following month, 4,000 more Koreans and 43,635 Japanese were repatriated, most of the latter on SCAJAP LSTs. March saw a significant change, however, when the SCAJAP program got into full swing, and 142,235 Japanese repatriates cleared Tsingtao and Tangku. The encouraging progress confirmed General Wedemeyer's estimate for a June end to the entire program.

During most of the period of Nationalist responsibility for repatriation in North China, American participation in the process went beyond the advice and liaison stage contemplated by the JCS. As soon as the Marines turned over security and inspection duties to Chinese forces, a distinct slackening in the standards of treatment of the Japanese was apparent. China Theater headquarters was deeply concerned by a rash of incidents of unchecked mob violence against the repatriates moving to the coast and of the looting of their meager belongings during the processing at ports of embarkation. After an investigation of the circumstances of these outrages, theater headquarters determined that American supervision of Chinese repatriation procedures was necessary. On 15 February, III Corps was directed to extend supervisory assistance to Nationalist repatriation agencies during staging, movement, and loading of the Japanese. The imposition of partial control by the Marines had the desired effect of stemming further disorder in IIIAC sectors of responsibility.[5]

REDUCTION OF FORCES[6]

Hard on the heels of the assumption of responsibility for repatriation by the Nationalists came a decision by General Marshall to authorize a 20 percent reduction in strength of all Marine units in China.[7] The presidential representative's mission and authority were such that he effectively controlled American forces, although he ordinarily confined his directives to the policy level and did not interfere with operational routine.[8] His decision was welcomed by Headquarters Marine Corps, since the task of maintaining a strength level of 45,000 officers and men in IIIAC seriously threatened the planned demobil-

[5] *ExecHqHist*, 1May–30Jun46, sec VII, pp. 17–18; IIIAC WarD, Feb46.

[6] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Eyes Alone Inactivation Folder (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC); IIIAC WarDs, Jan–Mar46; IIIAC OPlan No. 1–46, dtd 14Feb46; 1st MarDiv WarDs, Jan–Apr46; 6th MarDiv WarDs, Jan–Mar46; 1st MAW WarDs, Jan–Mar46.

[7] Marshall disp to CGChina, dtd 22Jan46 (Eyes Alone Personal Radio Folder, Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

[8] *Rockey interview*, 9Jul59.

ization schedule for the whole Marine Corps.[9]

The strength cut sanctioned by General Marshall gave the Marine Corps an opportunity to revamp its forces in North China in the planned postwar pattern of FMFPac. On 14 February, IIIAC issued its operation plan for the reduction, directing that its major components reorganize according to new peacetime (G-series) tables of organization. Missions were redefined and provision was made for the redeployment necessary to give effect to the plan. Subordinate units had prepared their own plans by the end of February to fit within the framework of action outlined by corps. March was slated to be the period of greatest activity since shipping to take home 12,000 Marines was due to arrive at Tangku and Tsingtao during the month.

Two of the supporting FMF battalions which landed with III Corps were dropped from the troop list under the reduction plan, with the companies of the 1st Military Police to be disbanded in Tientsin and those of the 11th Motor Transport to be returned to the States. The 1st Separate Engineer Battalion lost one of its three engineer companies but remained in China. Corps Troops was reorganized as a Headquarters and Service Battalion (Provisional) with companies replacing the former signal, medical, and headquarters battalions.

The widespread logistics activities of 7th Service Regiment did not permit much paring of its personnel strength, but it was directed to reorganize along lines established by the Service Command, FMFPac. Support functions were consolidated in a smaller and less specialized number of service companies. In a move separate from but complimentary to the corps reorganization plan, the regiment's detachment at Tsingtao was replaced on 19 April by the 12th Service Battalion. The battalion, which came north from Okinawa, reported to 7th Service Regiment for operational control for a short while and then became an integral part of the Marine command at the Shantung port. Stock control remained with the service regiment.[10]

The conversion of the 6th Marine Division to a brigade, anticipated well before the issuance of the corps operation plan, was directed to take effect by 1 April. The reduced regimental headquarters of the 4th Marines which arrived in Tsingtao from Japan on 17 January formed the core of the new unit. A new regimental Headquarters and Service Company was organized and the Weapons Company of the 22d Marines was redesignated the Weapons Company of the 4th. By the same order, 2/29 became 1/4, 2/22 changed to 2/4, and 3/22 was redesignated 3/4. The artillery battalion of the brigade was formed from the 4th Battalion, 15th Marines. The brigade's headquarters battalion was organized from signal, tank, assault signal, medical, and headquarters companies drawn from comparable division units. The service battalion drew its companies from the

[9] CMC memo to CNO, dtd 10Jan46, Subj: Reduction of Marine Forces in China (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex).

[10] 7th ServRegt WarDs, Apr–May46.

division engineer, pioneer, motor transport, and service battalions. The 32d and 96th Naval Construction Battalions which had been attached to the division now became a part of the brigade organization. On 26 March all remaining units of the 6th Marine Division were disbanded, and on 1 April the 3d Marine Brigade came officially into being.

The changes ordered for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were far less sweeping. Flight activities in the Peiping area were consolidated at South Field (Nan Yuan), leaving West Field (Lantienchang) to U. S. Army Air Forces transports supporting Executive Headquarters. The Headquarters and the Service Squadrons of MAG–12 were ordered to the States and with them went VMTB–134 and VMF(N)–541. The fighter squadrons of MAG–12 were transferred to MAG–24. Air unit withdrawals were completed by early April.[11]

The reduction in strength of the 1st Marine Division was accomplished primarily by disbanding the third battalions of each of its infantry regiments and one firing battery from each of the four battalions of the 11th Marines. To facilitate its disbandment, the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, was formally transferred from the 6th to the 1st Division on 15 February and went out of existence at Peitaiho at midnight on 31 March. The other three infantry battalions scheduled for disbandment stayed in being until 15 April when the 1st Division had completed its redeployment.

[11] 1st MAW WarD, Apr46.

The new dispositions of the Marine forces in Hopeh placed a reduced garrison in Peiping under General Jones. The 2d Battalions of the 1st and 11th Marines with supporting division medical and motor transport companies and a small headquarters comprised Peiping Group. A company from 2/1 provided security for MAG–24 installations at South Field, and a battery of 2/11 performed the same function for the Army's 13th Troop Carrier Group at West Field. A radio relay station at Langfang on the boundary of the Peiping Group's sector of responsibility was guarded by an artillery platoon from 2/11.

The 1st Marines was charged with the security of the area between Langfang and Tientsin's East Station which included most of the international concession where corps and division service and support troops were headquartered. The 11th Marines watched the stretch of road, rail, and river between Tientsin and Tangku with a battery of 1/11 furnishing a guard for the 1st Wing facilities at Changkeichuang Field. Tangku and the railroad north to Lei-chuang near the Luan River was the responsibility of the 5th Marines.

Regimental headquarters of the 5th was established at Tangshan with 1/5 in Tangku and 2/5 at Linsi. The 1st Battalion's sector extended north about two-thirds of the way to Tangshan; rifle sections guarded vital bridges and a radio relay at Lutai. A company of the 2/5 was stationed at each of the two major KMA mines in the Kuyeh vicinity with the remainder of the battalion

mounting bridge guard and providing security for the mining area power plant at Linsi.

The dispositions of the 7th Marines remained much as they had been since November, with 2/7 units manning the important bridges and stations from Lei-chuang to Chang-li and 1/7 guarding the remainder of the railroad to and including Chinwangtao. Both the regiment and the 2d Battalion maintained their headquarters in Peitaiho, while the 1st Battalion, reinforced by Battery G of the 11th Marines, garrisoned Chinwangtao.

The effect of the reorganization and the resultant departure of officers and men eligible for discharge or rotation was apparent in the steady fall of III Corps troop strength. At the end of January 1946, the total number of Marines and Navy men in the corps stood at 46,553; three months later the figure was 30,379. The deactivation of the 6th Marine Division dropped the ground strength of the Tsingtao garrison by over 6,000, while the 1st Division lost nearly 4,000 men, and the 1st Wing dipped from 6,175 to 4,200.[12]

Several important command changes took place in this period of reorganization and reduction of Marine forces. On 17 February, Brigadier General Walter G. Farrell from the staff of AirFMFPac replaced General Johnson as Assistant Wing Commander at Tsangkou Field. Farrell, like Johnson, was a veteran of prewar China expeditionary duty. On 1 April, General Howard, who had requested retirement after serving over 30 years as a Marine officer, relinquished command of the Marines in Tsingtao to General Clement.[13] For three weeks during February and March, while General Rockey was on temporary duty in Pearl Harbor at FMFPac headquarters, General Peck commanded III Corps as senior Marine officer in China.

Despite the handicap of constant personnel changes and shifting of units in the first months of 1946, the missions assigned to the Marines were efficiently executed. The repatriation of the Japanese kept pace with the shipping assigned. The output of coal from the KMA mines in the Kuyeh area shipped from Chinwangtao climbed well above the 100,000-ton minimum set by China Theater and stayed there. And the lines of communication between Peiping and Chinwangtao were kept open.

An additional mission not formally laid down in operation orders was given IIIAC in January. General Marshall suggested that the Marines at Tsingtao take an active part in arranging the distribution of UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) supplies in Communist areas of Shantung. The general felt that such action might improve the relations between the Communists and the Marines. Since the United States was by far the heaviest contributor to UNRRA, any help to the United Nations agency's humanitarian and economic relief efforts could be considered

[12] IIIAC G–1 Monthly PeriodicRpts, Jan46, dtd 8Feb46 and Apr46, dtd 6May46.

[13] *Muster Rolls*, 3d MarBrig, Apr46 (Diary Unit, Files Sec, RecBr, PersDept, HQMC).

a furtherance of U. S. policy aims.[14] Using light planes of VMO–6, Marine officers and UNRRA officials flew to Chefoo and Lini in January to coordinate plans for the delivery of food, clothing, and agricultural supplies. Both Generals Howard and Clement made visits to the Communist-controlled cities to assist liaison efforts.

The incidence of firing on Marines, both those on outpost duty and on aerial patrol, fell off appreciably during the months immediately following the signing of the truce. Assistance provided UNRRA in carrying out its relief program in Communist territory seemed to have the good effect desired by General Marshall. The atmosphere was hopeful and the signs at this juncture of Marine activity in North China pointed toward an early withdrawal of American troops.

In Chungking, the Political Consultive Conference which met during January arrived at a basis for organization of a coalition government that seemed to satisfy both sides. The Committee of Three was then able to agree upon a plan for integrating the Communist and Nationalist armies into a single force. The success of this latter scheme, and of the political solution, depended entirely upon the ability of the Executive Headquarters to bring an absolute end to the fighting. The experience of the truce teams proved, however, that the end of the fighting was as far off as it had ever been. Compromise agreements achieved by prolonged negotiation were violated by either side whenever the situation shifted to favor one over the other.

[14] *U. S. Relations with China,* pp. 225–226.

MARINE TRUCE TEAMS [15]

General Marshall believed that Marine participation in the conflict control activities of Executive Headquarters should be restricted. He appeared anxious to avoid any possible misunderstanding arising from their ambiguous role in support of the Nationalist reentry into North China.[16] By early March, however, it became apparent that there were not enough qualified U. S. Army personnel available to form the American contingents of all the needed truce teams. Under the circumstances, General Marshall directed the assignment of a select group of Marines to temporary duty with the Executive Headquarters. The understanding was that they were to be relieved as soon as suitable Army replacements arrived from the States.

On 11 March, III Corps issued a special order directing the formation of six liaison teams for Executive Headquarters, each to be headed by a colonel or lieutenant colonel, with a lieutenant signal officer, a radio mechanic, two radio operators, and a mechanic-driver as team members. The six senior officers chosen were Colonels Theodore

[15] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *ExecHqHist,* 10Jan–31Mar46, 1Apr–30Jun46, and 1Jul–30Sep46; IIIAC WarDs, Mar–Apr46; 1st MarDiv Intel-Memo No. 48, dtd 13Aug46, Subj: Evac of Communist Trps from Bias Bay, South China, in 1st MarDiv WarD, Aug46; Activities of Team 8 in South China in *North China Marine* (Tientsin), 27Jul46, pp. 1, 8.

[16] MajGen Keller E. Rockey ltr to Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, dtd 9Apr46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HQMC).

A. Holdahl and Orin K. Pressley and Lieutenant Colonels Gavin C. Humphrey, Jack F. Warner, Maxwell H. Mizell, and LeRoy P. Hunt, Jr. The need for the Marines was pressing, and the team commanders reported to Peiping on 13 March for briefing from their former posts at Tangshan, Tientsin, and Tsingtao. On the 18th, after joining their Nationalist and Communist members and interpreters assigned by the headquarters, the first Marine-directed teams were sent into the field.

Two of the teams, those led by Mizell and Warner, acted as watchdogs on the railroad lines of communication. The other teams drew assignments in areas of actual or probable conflict where their duties required them to try to keep the peace through negotiation with the contending sides. The effort was taxing, and the round of conferences among the three principals members as well as the discussions with local military leaders were endless. One Marine observer who visited Pressley's team at Chihfeng in Jehol Province commented that this method of operation placed a tremendous burden on the American member:

> Neither the Nationalist nor the Communist representative take the initiative in solving problems which come before the team. Indeed, long hours are spent in discussion of minor points while action on major points is delayed for weeks at a time. Even after action is taken and reports forwarded to Executive Headquarters one member or the other will attempt to void the decision by a new vote. The American representative has displayed more concern and taken more interest in the operation of the team than either of the Chinese representatives.[17]

For more than three months, the Marines with the field teams and a few radio and supply men at Peiping, a group which never exceeded 60 officers and men, played an important part in the American attempt to make the truce work. Life in the field was not easy; the place of duty was usually deep in China's interior, and the only contact with home base was the radio and a weekly Army or Marine transport plane carrying supplies and mail. Being shot at was not at all an unusual experience for men who tried to step between two fighting forces. Still, the reaction of the responsible Americans on the teams to their problems was much the same as General Marshall's. When he visited North China and Manchuria in early March, the general pointed out that "it is not in human nature to expect individuals to forget the events of the past, but there isn't time to cogitate on that now. The rights and wrongs of the past 18 years will probably be debated for 18 years to come. But we have something now that demands that we look entirely in the future." [18] He noted further an attitude toward his task that was shared by many American team members in saying, "I am deeply involved in this matter and I don't like to have anything to do with failure." [19]

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[17] 1stLt Robert E. McKay Rpt of trip to Chihfeng, Jehol Province, 2–8Apr46, in IIIAC IntelMemo No. 37, dtd 15Apr46, in IIIAC WarD, Apr46.

[18] Quoted in *ExecHqHist*, 10Jan–31Mar46, p. 67.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

This determination to get the job done successfully was graphically demonstrated by the work of the few Marines who operated in South China as part of the truce team headquartered at Canton. In the mountains north and east of the city, some 3,000 Communist guerrillas posed a constant threat to lines of communication, and the Nationalists, after trying unsuccessfully to root them out, agreed to allow their evacuation by sea to Chefoo. Six Marines, two officers and three sergeants led by Captain Albin F. Nelson, were assigned by Executive Headquarters to shepherd the evacuation.

On 23 April, Nelson's group flew from Peiping to Canton and, after a month of preparation, went up into the mountains to contact the Communist forces. Three sub-teams, each composed of a Marine officer and an NCO, a Nationalist and a Communist officer, an interpreter, and a small police escort, arranged assembly points and safeguarded the Communists in their travels through Nationalist lines. The tension was high between the bitter enemies and an open fight was never more than a hair's breadth away. Team members handled all arrangements for feeding and housing the evacuees, inoculated them against communicable diseases, and even mustered out those Communists who did not want to make the move. The three columns collected by the sub-teams, which included women and children as well as soldiers, assembled on the beach of Bias Bay 40 miles northwest of Hongkong on 23 June. Typhoons delayed the arrival of LSTs which took the Communists north to Chefoo until late afternoon of the 29th, the last day of the local truce.

The job done by Nelson's sub-teams was unique in concept and execution, but it shared the atmosphere of tension characteristic of most truce team efforts. Although for a time in the first half of 1946 it appeared that the truce might become more than a paper agreement, fighting continued. Because Communist and Nationalist commanders did not enjoy having publicity given to their cease-fire violations, the arena of battle often shifted to areas not policed by Executive Headquarters. The blame for eventual failure of the truce can not be laid solely at the door of either side in the civil war; but as events proved, the Communists benefited from truce negotiations and regarded them strictly as devices to gain time.[20]

THE END OF THE IIIAC[21]

In February, Generals Marshall and Wedemeyer recommended that China Theater be deactivated on 1 May. The move was made in an effort to strengthen Chiang Kai-shek's pressure on Soviet Russia for the removal of its

[20] LtCol Robert B. Rigg, USA, *Red China's Fighting Hordes* (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Company, 1951), p. 229, hereafter Rigg, *Red China's Hordes.*

[21] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Eyes Alone Inactivation and Withdrawal of Marines Folders (Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC); IIIAC WarDs, May–Jun46; 1st MarDiv WarDs, May–Jul46; 1st MAW WarDs, May–Jul46; 3d MarBrig WarDs, Apr–May46; 4th Mar WarDs, Jun–Jul46; Rockey ltr to Vandegrift, dtd 9Apr46, *op. cit.*; Liu, *Military History of China; U. S. Relations with China.*

occupation troops from Manchuria. The residual functions of the theater command were to pass to U. S. Army Forces, China, an administrative and service command, and Seventh Fleet. Operational control of the III Amphibious Corps would be exercised by Commander, Seventh Fleet, Admiral Charles M. Cooke, who had replaced Admiral Barbey.

General Marshall was anxious to reduce Marine forces in China to air transport, housekeeping, and security details whose main purpose would be logistical support of Executive Headquarters. He stated frequently in conversations with General Wedemeyer that the continued presence of the Marines in Nationalist territory was a source of considerable embarrassment to him in his peace negotiations. The crux of the matter lay in Marshall's inability to persuade the Generalissimo to make the long-promised relief of the Marines and to obtain the agreement of the Committee of Three to the movement of Nationalist troops to North China for this purpose.

General Rockey, in conversations with General Wedemeyer on 18–19 March, recommended strongly that the Marines not be relieved until first-line CNA troops were firmly established in their place. The IIIAC commander believed that the Communists were strong enough to disrupt communications completely between Peiping and Chinwangtao, to stop production at the KMA mines, and even to capture Tsingtao in the absence of effective opposition. Wedemeyer agreed to the risk involved in making the relief, but pointed out that the relief must be made even if only Nationalist forces locally available were used. He felt that truce teams judiciously placed in areas of potential trouble might prevent Communist depredations. It appears that both Wedemeyer and Marshall believed that the Nationalists would make no move to provide adequate security forces in North China until it was clear to them that the Marines were going to be pulled out. A tentative target date for the start of the withdrawal of the Marines was set for 15 April, but this, as well as everything else in the concept, depended upon the outcome of truce negotiations.

General Marshall returned to Washington on 12 March for a month of conferences bearing on the China situation. His absence coincided with the stepping-up of the Nationalist drive against the Communists in Manchuria, an operation which made Chungking even less willing than usual to divert good troops to rail and mine security. The Communists, naturally enough, were dead set against any movement of CNA troops into North China which might strengthen the Nationalists hand in Manchuria. Adding further complications to the issue was the belief of theater intelligence officers that the "Marines in China are the anchor on which the Generalissimo's whole Manchurian position is swinging." [22] The effect of the altered situation was to slow the reduction of Marine forces considerably.

The pressure for the relief of the Marines was not all directed at the Nationalists or prompted by General Marshall's desire to get American com-

[22] ComSeventhFlt disp to CNO, dtd 3May46 (Withdrawal of Marines Folder, Wedemeyer File, TAGO, KCRC).

bat troops out of China. In the postwar budget of the Navy Department expenditures for the Marine Corps were calculated on the basis of peacetime strength and organization, and the Commandant was vitally interested in withdrawing or deactivating any units in the field that were not necessary to the accomplishment of the missions assigned IIIAC. He was insistent that changes should be fitted into the organizational framework of the FMF and that the divisional structure be retained.[23]

Before any firm commitment was made to reduce the ground element of IIIAC, a substantial cut in its air strength was ordered. Qualified flying personnel and plane mechanics were in short supply throughout the Marine Corps, and it was no longer possible to maintain all the squadrons in North China in efficient operating status with the replacements available. In early April, plans were laid for the return of MAG–32 to the States during the following month, and the Commanding General, AirFMFPac proposed that MAG–25 also be sent home. General Rockey recommended strongly that at least one transport squadron be retained to support Marine activities and to assist Executive Headquarters in maintaining its truce teams in the field. The recommendation was adopted quickly, and VMR–153 was selected as the unit to stay while its parent group and VMR–152 returned to the west coast of the United States.

In order to determine how Marine ground forces in IIIAC could be reorganized, General Geiger and representatives of his FMFPac staff visited China between 12 and 22 May. Before leaving Pearl Harbor, the FMF staff officers drew up a plan which eliminated III Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops and 3d Brigade Headquarters and Brigade Troops, leaving only the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) in North China. Personnel equal to those eliminated, 391 officers and 5,700 enlisted men, were to be returned to the U. S. This plan formed a working basis for talks with Admiral Cooke and General Rockey. Once Geiger was on the scene in North China, the IIIAC and FMFPac staffs worked out changes that better fitted the situation.

Rockey had no substantial objection to the reductions outlined, but he believed that the 1st Division would need a headquarters augmentation in order to control its scattered components. Similarly, the reduction agreed upon for Tsingtao was much lighter than that originally proposed in view of the separate nature of the command there. At the end of several days of conferences, Geiger and Rockey approved a reorganization that eliminated a number of billets and reduced Marine strength by 125 officers and 1,417 enlisted men. Cooke concurred in this proposal and recommended its acceptance to Marshall, who gave his approval on 24 May.[24]

[23] Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to MajGen Keller E. Rockey, dtd 24Apr46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

[24] LtGen Roy S. Geiger ltr to Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift, *ca.* 25May46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC); ComSeventhFlt disp to CinCPac and CGFMFPac, dtd 24May46, in CinCPac WarD, May 46, dtd 6Jun46, encl (B), (OAB, NHD).

When the reorganization order was published on 4 June, to take effect on the 10th, General Rockey was named Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) and Marine Forces, China, the latter a task force designation for the division. General Worton went from chief of staff of the corps to assistant commander of the division; in general, corps staff officers were assigned the senior positions on the augmented staff. Some 600 officers and men from IIIAC Headquarters and Service Battalion were added to division troops, and the battalion itself was transferred to the division for subsequent return to the U. S. The 1st MAW, consisting of MAG–24 and the squadrons, including VMR–153, assigned to wing headquarters, came under operational control of the division. The 7th Service Regiment and one company of the 1st Separate Engineer Battalion also became part of the reinforced division; the remainder of the engineer unit was returned to the States.

At Tsingtao, the 3d Marine Brigade ended its short existence with most of its units becoming part of the 4th Marines (Reinforced) or Marine Forces, Tsingtao. General Clement was given both commands in keeping with the wishes of General Marshall and Admiral Cooke that a general officer continue to represent the Marines in the port city. Aside from the regiment and its attached units, the task force included VMO–6, the 12th Service Battalion, and 96th Naval Construction Battalion. The total authorized strength of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) was set at 25,252 officers and men with 2,517 of that number naval personnel assigned to port operating, construction, and medical units.

As part of the reorganization of Marine forces, the number of general officer billets in China was cut. In view of the sharply reduced strength of the wing, the rank of the commander was set as brigadier general and the position of assistant wing commander was deleted from the T/O. General Woods was assigned new duties as Commanding General, Marine Air, West Coast and General Farrell returned to AirFMFPac. The new wing commander, Brigadier General Lawson H. M. Sanderson, reported from AirFMFPac and relieved Woods on 25 June. General Peck, who had requested retirement in April after completing more than 30 years of active duty, remained in command of the 1st Division at the Commandant's request [25] until the reorganization was completed. To round out the picture of major command changes, General Jones moved from his Peiping command to duties as President of the Marine Corps Equipment Board at Quantico.[26]

During the many changes in composition of Marine forces in China that took place in the spring of 1946, there was little basic change in assigned missions. Whether the operation orders originated from China Theater or Seventh Fleet, the Marines still were charged with responsibility for seeing that the vital coal supplies from the KMA mines were shipped without interruption and that

[25] Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to MajGen DeWitt Peck, dtd 8May46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

[26] General Officer Biographies (SubjFile, HistBr, HQMC).

the line of communication between Tientsin and Chinwangtao was kept open. They were directed to provide logistical support to Executive Headquarters until the Army was able to relieve them. In furtherance of these tasks, principal garrisons were continued at Peiping, Tientsin, Tangku, Peitaiho, and Chinwangtao with orders to secure only the "actual ground occupied by U. S. installations, property, materiel, personnel, and intervening or surrounding ground necessary for wire and road traffic communications so that the elements of the command are not isolated." [27]

In the south, the same garrison order applied to the Marine force at Tsingtao. The U. S. installations to be guarded were almost exclusively naval in character as the city had become Seventh Fleet headquarters and base of operations by June. A growing shore establishment provided administrative and logistic support to the ships of Admiral Cooke's command. In addition, an American naval training group had been operating at the port since December with a mission of teaching Nationalist crews how to sail and fight the U. S. ships that were transferred to the Central Government under military aid laws.[28]

The most significant change in the tasks set the Marines was the ending of supervisory responsibility for Japanese repatriation. In April, SCAJAP increased its allotment of LSTs to the North China run and 125,872 Japanese were sent home from Tsingtao and Tangku.[29] By the end of May, repatriation was completed except for those persons detained by the Chinese, serving on repatriation staffs, or too ill to be moved; only 15,855 people remained to be returned to Japan.[30] With the sailing of the last scheduled repatriation ship from Tangku on 15 July, even this rearguard was gone; more than 540,000 Japanese had been repatriated from North China under Marine supervision.[31]

When the last SCAJAP LST cleared Tangku, it also marked the end of the entire repatriation program from China proper which saw the return of over 2,200,000 Japanese to their home islands in nine months of dedicated effort. The significance of the American contribution to this remarkable undertaking was summed up well by General Nagano, the former Japanese commander at Tsingtao, on the occasion of his leaving China. The Japanese officer, who had been charged by General Shepherd with the responsibility for seeing the last of his countrymen home from Shantung, wrote in an unofficial report to the Marine general:

> I cannot but be grateful to you and your country. This may sound rather strange from my lips. I like plain speaking. Please do not think that I am making

[27] IIIAC OPlan No. 2–46, dtd 1May46, in IIIAC WarD, Apr46.

[28] Com Tsingtao Unit Final Rpt to Chief, NavAdDiv, JUSMAG, China, dtd 23Jan49, p. 1 (ComNavWesPac A9 File, FRC, Mech), hereafter *Tsingtao NavAdDivRpt.*

[29] IIIAC G–5 PeriodicRpt No. 7, Apr46, dtd 1May46.

[30] IIIAC G–5 PeriodicRpt No. 8, May46, dtd 1Jun46, p. 1.

[31] *Ibid.; ExecHqHist,* 1Jul–30Sep46, sec I, p. 50.

> compliments. If anyone ever tells you that I [am] please tell him to go to Tsingtao and stand in front of the American L. S. T. and see the Japanese soldier as he passes on the ramp salute the Stars and Stripes; no Chinese flag, no Russian flag, no English flag, but the Stars and Stripes, under which they will be able to sail to Japan. Happy they! Just think of those Japanese soldiers and civilians in Manchuria and Siberia. We cannot be too grateful to you.[32]

The early months of 1946, when the mass of Japanese soldiers and civilians moved from the interior of North China to the repatriation ports, was the period of greatest success of the truce. The Communists, by permitting the peaceful withdrawal of the troublesome Japanese, apparently were clearing the deck for action. The number of incidents in which Marine outposts were involved in clashes with Communist troops increased steadily as summer came on. Most of these sudden flare-ups were of a minor nature and American casualties were few. Only one man was killed in the first six months of 1946 in such an affair. He died on 21 May when a small reconnaissance patrol of the 1st Marines were fired upon by 50–75 armed Chinese near a village south of Tientsin. The attacking force slipped away unpunished.

The renewed Communist effort to retain control of North China was particularly marked in Shantung where the pressure on the CNA got so bad in early June that General Clement believed that Tsingtao might be attacked. Twelve Corsairs from VMF–115 at Peiping were stationed at Tsangkou Field from 12–15 June to back up the defenses of the 4th Marines, which held a main line of resistance well inside the positions of the Nationalist garrison. The Communist drive slackened after 15 June while negotiations were being made to bring to an end even more serious fighting in Manchuria.

In many respects, the organized harassment of lines of communication in Hopeh and the bitter struggle in Shantung seemed to have been initiated by the Communists to relieve pressure on their troops north of the Great Wall. The armies of the Central Government won a series of heady victories in Manchuria during an all-out spring offensive, but the defeated Communist forces avoided entrapment. The magnitude of the battles was so great that it threatened the end of all peace efforts. Since both sides claimed at times that the 10 January truce had no effect beyond China proper, General Marshall had to negotiate a separate truce for Manchuria. A temporary halt to the fighting was ordered by the Committee of Three on 6 June and a more permanent truce was signed on the 28th. In short order, this agreement too came to be more honored in the breach than the observance.

At the end of June, General Rockey was able to make a realistic appraisal of the Marine situation in the coming months. He reported to the Commandant that in his opinion:

> . . . conditions will operate to keep Marines in North China for a considerable period, at least during the remainder of this calendar year. Our departure would very materially influence the whole situation in China and General Marshall has apparently reversed his former ideas

[32] MajGen Eiji Nagano ltr to MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., dtd 18May46, filed with *Shepherd interview.*

about our early withdrawal. The CNA is spread thin in Manchuria. They do not appear to have the necessary troops to relieve us. If the Central Government loses the key cities in North China or if the coal fails to move from the KMA mines to Shanghai, Hongkong, Nanking, and elsewhere, the show is over as far as present plans for the unification of China are concerned.[33]

CAPTURE AND AMBUSH [34]

In July, the Communists reorganized their armies, naming the whole, "People's Liberation Army," which agreed with their title for the territory they held as the "liberated areas." In the Communist view, the "liberated area" in Hopeh extended right up to the perimeter defenses of the Marine and Nationalist outposts along the Peiping-Mukden Railroad. Despite its nominal coloring as Nationalist, the countryside over the entire range of land between Chinwangtao and Peiping was alive with Communist guerrilla forces. In their actions they took their cue from Mao Tse-tung, whose pamphlets incorporating hard-earned lessons of guerrilla warfare were primers in Communist military schools. In regard to planning, he said:

> Without planning it is impossible to win victory in a guerrilla war. The idea of fighting a guerrilla war at haphazard means nothing but making a game of it—the idea of an ignoramus in guerrilla warfare. The operations in a guerrilla area as a whole or the operations of a single guerrilla detachment or guerrilla corps must be preceded by the most comprehensive planning possible. . . .[35]

This dictum provides a revealing background for two Communist actions against the Marines which took place in July. One was the first occasion on which Marines other than downed airmen were held prisoner, and the other was a deliberate and well planned ambush. Yenan had evidently decided that the time had come for a major incident involving the Marines, one that could be worked for its full propaganda value. Such an incident would increase pressure in the U. S. for the withdrawal of the Marines because of the danger in which they stood.

On 13 July, the summer afternoon's heat prompted eight men from the bridge guard at Lin-Shou-Ying to head for a nearby village to get ice. This action violated a division directive that guard detachment members would stay within the barbed wire defenses of their posts. Communist soldiers, about 80 strong, surprised and surrounded the Marines at the icehouse. One man escaped unnoticed in the gathering dusk to alert the bridge outpost which radioed

[33] CG 1st MarDiv(Reinf) ltr to CMC, dtd 26Jun46 (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex).

[34] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: ComPhibGru 3 ltr to ComNavWesPac, dtd 30Apr48, Subj: Info and comment concerning incidents involving U. S. persons taken into custody by Chinese Communists (ComNavWesPac A-8 File, FRC, Mech), hereafter *Capture comments;* 1st MarDiv WarD, Jul46; CO 1/11 ltr to CMC, dtd 1Aug46, Subj: SAR of Incident Between CCF and a MarPat on 29Jul46, with five endorsements (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex); Col Wilburt S. Brown ltr to CMC, dtd 20Aug46 (HQMC S&C File, FRC, Alex); LtCol Henry Aplington, II, "North China Patrol," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 33, no. 6 (Jun49); *U. S. Relations with China.*

[35] Mao Tse-tung, *Strategic Problems of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War* (Peiping: Foreign Language Press, 1954), p. 21.

the news to 7th Marines headquarters at Peitaiho, 15 miles to the north. That evening all available men of the 1st Battalion boarded a special train at Chinwangtao and rode to the capture site to begin a dogged pursuit that continued all through a rainy night and on into the next day. No contact was made and it soon became apparent that a long search was in prospect. The Communist troops, armed with a sure knowledge of the countryside and protected by a friendly populace, was able to stay well away from the Marines.

The regimental commander decided to relieve the 1st with the 2d Battalion and withdraw 1/7 to prepare for extensive field operations. A 200-man combat patrol of 2/7 moved out from Changli to continue pursuit on the 16th. Fields of kaoliang higher than a man's head bordered the roads, blocking off all view. The villages along the route were deserted when the Marines first entered and then reoccupied only by women, oldsters, and children; no young men were ever seen. The patrol could easily have been ambushed despite its own precautions and the overhead cover of OYs, as virtually nothing could be seen through the dense cover of ripening crops. When a circuit of the 2/7 sector had been made without result, the patrol returned on 18 July to Changli, secured its base camp, and went back to Peitaiho.

Because none of the Marines taken near Lin-Shou-Ying or their captors could be located by patrols, Executive Headquarters was asked to take a hand in obtaining the release of the men. Before the Communists would permit a truce team to enter their territory to begin negotiations, they required that all Marine units return to the positions held on the 13th. A series of discussions were held after this was done. The Communists demanded that the U. S. recognize the "unlawful" act of entering the "liberated area" and apologize; that there be no repetition of the incidents; and that the Marines captured each make a written statement of their good treatment. The upshot of this was that the seven men each wrote a letter attesting to their good treatment at the hands of the Communists, and U. S. negotiators assured the Communists that additional orders restricting the movement of Marines in the Chinwangtao area would be issued. The men were returned unharmed on 24 July.

No one but the Communists could be pleased by the distasteful but necessary solution to the problem posed by the captured Marines. During all the talks leading to the men's release, Communist officials hammered away at one theme —the Marines were actively aiding the Chinese Nationalist Army. This line of propaganda was to be sounded again and again as long as the Marines were in China, but nowhere in so outrageous and lying a fashion as in the Communist explanation of their ambush at Anping on 29 July. (See Map 35.) According to Yenan, the positions of its Eighth Route Army near Anping on the Peiping-Tientsin road were suddenly attacked on the morning of the 29th and in the battle "more than sixty U. S. soldiers were discovered fighting shoulder to shoulder with eighty-odd Koumintang troops. . . . In the afternoon an American force came as reinforcements from Tientsin. With a view to make the American



MAP 35 T. L. RUSSELL

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troops conscious of what they were doing, units of the Eighth Route Army left the battle at once." [36]

In truth, the Communists laid an ambush at Anping, knowing full well that their prize would be a routine Marine supply convoy. As a matter of policy, no CNA troops accompanied American trucks so there could be no claim of mutual interest or protection. On 29 July, the only Chinese vehicle in the convoy was a truck bearing UNRRA supplies. The presence of Communist troops in strength anywhere along the road to Peiping was completely unexpected, although sniping at individual trucks and jeeps had occurred several times in June. It was as a result of this occasional firing that there was a guard and convoy; the patrols which had searched the road regularly from October 1945 until March 1946 had been discontinued because there seemed to be no need for them.

On the morning of 29 July, the convoy assembled at the 1st Marines compound in Tientsin. The patrol escort, commanded by Second Lieutenant Douglas A. Corwin, consisted of 31 men from 1/11 and a 10-man 60mm mortar section of the 1st Marines. In addition to nine supply trucks for the Peiping Marine garrison and the UNRRA vehicle, there were two Army staff cars with American personnel from Executive Headquarters and three jeeps carrying Marines bound for Peiping. The patrol itself rode in four reconnaissance trucks and four jeeps, two of the latter carrying TCS radios. The TCSs lacked the range to keep in contact all the way to Peiping, so there was a considerable gap between the time the patrol lost touch with 1/11 and the time it was picked up by 2/11's set at South Field. Within that stretch lay the village of Anping.

The convoy started out at 0915 with the patrol protection divided equally between forward and rear points; all vehicles proceeded at 50-yard intervals with 100 yards between elements. Radio contact with 1/11 faded by 1105 and the patrol proceeded normally until about noon when it had reached a point 44 miles from Tientsin. A line of rocks across the road slowed the lead jeeps and as they were threading their way through these obstacles, a new roadblock of ox carts was spotted just ahead. The point stopped and dismounted cautiously. At that moment, about a dozen grenades were thrown from a clump of trees 15 yards to the left of the road block. Lieutenant Corwin was killed immediately and most of the men with him were either killed or wounded in this initial attack. The survivors took cover and returned the Communist fire.

The body of the convoy halted quickly when it in turn came under steady and well-directed rifle fire which originated in a line of trees about 100 yards to the right of the road. Very few of those men riding the supply trucks and passenger vehicles were armed and they took cover as best they could in the ditch to the left of the road. The ambush was complete when the rear point, stalled by the convoy, was sprayed with fire from positions to the right and left rear. The second in command of the patrol, Platoon Sergeant Cecil J. Flanagan, then ranged up and

[36] Statement released by New China News Agency, Yenan, quoted in *The Peiping Chronicle*, 3Aug46, p. 1.

down the long column of vehicles directing return fire. The mortar and machine gun with the rear point were instrumental in stopping Communist attempts to rush. About 1315, during a lull in the attack, three Marines turned one of the jeeps around and made a successful break for help.

The Communists, responding to bugle signals, finally ceased fire about 1530 and began withdrawing. The attacking force, which had an estimated strength of 300 men well armed with rifles and automatic weapons, seemed content to call it a draw with the smaller and weaker defending force. On order of the senior officer in the convoy, an Army major in special services at Executive Headquarters, the American group then gathered up its wounded, and covered by a rear guard of Flanagan's men, continued on for Peiping. Only a few scattered shots greeted the lead vehicles as they left the ambush area; three damaged trucks were abandoned. The convoy and patrol reached the old capitol at about 1745. The Marine casualty list of the afternoon's action reported 3 killed and 1 died of wounds and 10 wounded, all of whom were from 1/11.

The first news of the ambush to reach Tientsin was brought by the Marines who had escaped from the trap early in the fire fight. Their wildly racing jeep overturned on the outskirts of the city, injuring two of the occupants, and delaying their report until a passing vehicle could be commandeered for the rest of the passage to the nearest Marine post. The 11th Marines got word of what had happened at 1630 and a heavily armed combat patrol was immediately ordered to get ready. Air support was requested of the wing, while the regimental executive officer took off in an OY of VMO–3 to scout the scene of action. Flying low over Anping at 1730, he counted 15 bodies in Communist uniform, but saw no sign of the attackers. Five Corsairs of MAG–24 which reached the ambush site at 1917 also failed to spot the Communists,[37] nor was there any longer a sign of the bodies.

The 11th Marines relief force, 400-strong and backed by two 105mm howitzers, cleared the French Arsenal at 1830 driving "at reckless speed, and still only reached the scene of combat at 2045." [38] The Communist force had vanished, taking its dead and wounded with it, and the Marines could only tow in the shot-up trucks that marked the ambush site.

In the wake of the attack, orders were issued that substantially increased the strength of patrols on the Peiping-Tientsin road. Aerial surveillance of the road increased, and fighter aircraft alert time was cut from 2 hours to 15 minutes. More powerful field radios were used to bridge the communication gap between the two cities. No further attack of similar nature occurred during the remaining months the 1st Marine Division was in China.

General Rockey launched a careful investigation of the circumstances of the ambush and the nature of the attacking force. The findings were that a deliberate and unprovoked attack had been made by strong elements of one or more

[37] MAG–24 WarD, Jul46, n.d.

[38] Brown ltr to CMC, *op. cit.*

regular Communist regiments. A similar inquiry of the events at Anping conducted by a special team of Executive Headquarters foundered on Communist obstructions.[39] On General Marshall's order, the American members withdrew from the team and submitted their own report which agreed entirely with that of the 1st Marine Division.

To Marshall, the most disturbing aspect of what he called a deliberately planned and executed stroke at the Marines, was its indication of a hardening in attitude on the part of the Communists. The American representative commented later that prior to 29 July 1946 "there had not been a deliberate break which struck at us specifically, which means that they were taking measures against the Nationalist Government and ourselves all included, which is a very definite departure from what had been the status before." [40] After the Anping incident, the element of risk involved in stationing the Marines on outpost guard increased substantially. As a result, the latter part of 1946 saw a considerable concentration of Marine positions and the foreshadowing of their complete withdrawal from Hopeh.

[39] The Seventh Fleet commander at the time, Admiral Cooke, in reviewing this portion of the manuscript, drew particular attention to the fact that "Communist authorities refused to allow any of their attack commanders to be brought before the investigating body." Adm Charles M. Cooke ltr to ACofS, G-3, dtd 31Oct61, hereafter *Cooke ltr.*

[40] Quoted in *Military Situation in the Far East*, p. 543.

Withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division

CONSOLIDATION OF MARINE POSITIONS [1]

By the summer of 1946, the combat efficiency of the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had dropped far below wartime standards. Neither organization was considered in satisfactory shape to perform its normal function in an amphibious operation. The two units had become, in effect, garrison forces with capabilities geared to the missions which had been theirs since the war's end.

The wing's troubles stemmed from wholesale personnel turnover brought on by rapid demobilization. General Sanderson reported on 15 July: "Only 35% of the present enlisted strength of the entire Wing can be considered to have any qualifications other than basic. . . ." He pointed out further that MAG-24 had less than one experienced mechanic for every four planes, and that it was forced to operate at only 20 percent of aircraft availability. Progress in correcting training deficiencies was hampered by a lack of experienced instructors.[2]

The division shared with the wing the personnel problems brought on by demobilization. An extensive schooling program begun by IIIAC to keep abreast of the loss of specialists was continued and expanded. Ranges were opened near Peiping, Tientsin, Chinwangtao, and Tsingtao to maintain weapons proficiency and to qualify those replacements who had missed range instruction in boot camp. Squads and platoons practiced tactics to the extent that maneuver room was available in the immediate vicinity of Marine posts, but field training by larger formations was not possible. By September, 1st Division units were reporting military efficiency levels of 25–35 percent,[3] barely adequate to do the job at hand and certainly far below acceptable standards for amphibious troops.

Part of the solution to the combat readiness problems of the division and wing lay in a return to more normal rates of personnel attrition. At the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, a target date of 1 October was set for the discharge of all reserves and draftees in the naval establishment, a decision prompted by the limited postwar funds available to operating forces.[4] From North China, all but a

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Aug–Oct46 WarDs of 1st MarDiv and 1st MAW.

[2] CG 1st MAW ltr serial 0052 to CG AirFMFPac, dtd 15Jul46, Subj: Reduced status of 1st MAW AvnUnits (ComSeventhFlt S–A4–1 File, FRC, Mech).

[3] CG, 1st MarDiv (Reinf) SpecRpt of Mil-Efficiency to CG, FMFPac, dtd 24Sep46 (ComSeventhFlt A–9 File, FRC, Mech).

[4] Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to Adm John H. Towers, dtd 9Aug46; Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to LtGen Roy S. Geiger, dtd 22Aug46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

handful of these men were on their way home by mid-September. Replacements scheduled to arrive during the fall months, together with the regulars remaining, promised stability in unit rosters and therefore greater benefit from training programs.

Substantial cuts in the strength of Marine Forces, China, continued during the summer, easing the replacement problem appreciably. As a result of the Communist threat to Tsingtao in June, the Nationalist garrison had been strengthened, and there seemed little reason to station there any more Marines than were necessary for the immediate security and support of Seventh Fleet shore installations. On 1 August, the 1st Division issued an operation order directing the reduction of Marine Forces, Tsingtao, to the strength of a reinforced infantry battalion. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, augmented by detachments from the regiment's supporting units and with operational control of VMO–6, was selected to remain. Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, II, was assigned duty as its commander. The 12th Service Battalion was directed to continue supply functions for Navy and Marine units in the Tsingtao area under operational control of 7th Service Regiment. The air units at Tsangkou Field, except VMO–6, remained under the wing's command.

All regulars in Tsingtao over the number needed for the reinforced 3/4, the 12th Service Battalion, and 1st Wing detachments were transferred to 1st Division units in Hopeh. The reserves and draftees eligible for discharge, over 2,200 men, were transferred to units returning to the United States. In August, 3/12, the 3d Medical Battalion, and headquaters, signal, and service companies of the regimental reinforcing elements sailed for the west coast to form part of a new 3d Marine Brigade organizing at Camp Pendleton. On 3 September, the 4th Marines, less 3/4, embarked and sailed for Norfolk to become a component of the 2d Marine Division at Camp Lejeune. On the departure of the regiment, the command Marine Forces, Tsingtao, ceased to exist, and Colonel Griffith reported to the Commander, Naval Facilities, Tsingtao, for operational control. At the same time, the Marine air base at Tsangkou came under the naval commander. The division and wing retained administrative control of their respective units.

The narrowing of the 1st Division's operational responsibility to Hopeh was made even more significant by a long-sought change in Marine dispositions. Sometime near the beginning of July, General Marshall informed the Central Government that he was going to order the Marines off coal and rail guard duty and bring an end to their exposure to Communist attack. His decision forced the Nationalists to begin relieving the Marines without further delay.[5] In July, eight Marine bridge detachments were replaced by troops of the 94th CNA, which included four first-line divisions equipped with American arms.

On 7 August, as the pace of reliefs was accelerated, General Rockey reported to Admiral Cooke the extent of the Marine commitment along the railroad. Over 4,700 officers and men, a

[5] *Rockey interview*, 14–15Apr59.

third of the actual strength of the 1st Division,[6] were stationed from Tangku to Chinwangtao. Of that number, 873 Marines were on outpost duty, an assignment that included the security of 20 bridges. Sixty men a day were detailed to bridge guard on the coal trains originating at Kuyeh; between 120 and 180 men were constantly employed in this task. The close-in protection of the KMA mines near Linsi was the responsibility of three companies of the 5th Marines. Intelligence indicated that 25,000 Communist troops, both regulars and militia, were located within 15 miles of either side of the railroad in the 1st Division zone of responsibility. Nationalist forces in the same area, all under the 94th CNA with headquarters in Tientsin, totaled 35,898, but many of these soldiers were former puppet troops of dubious military worth.[7]

The Communists did not relax their program of harassment while the Marines were withdrawing from the railroad. On 4 August, a coal train headed for Tientsin was ambushed and derailed near Lutai. The four Marine guards riding the caboose and Chinese railroad police fought off the 50-man ambush party; a relief train from Tangku rescued the men. Sentries on bridge and station outposts were often sniped at, and occasionally a night-long exchange of fire would occupy the Marines and their elusive attackers. Through August and September the number of such incidents declined steadily as the division's units became less vulnerable. The Communists showed no disposition toward attacks on the main Marine positions, but such costly attacks were unnecessary. The same purpose of speeding the decision to withdraw the Marines was accomplished by harrassing actions, and without the risk of all-out retaliation.

In effecting a reorganization of its positions, the division returned the battalions of the 1st and 11th Marines in Peiping to their parent units in Tientsin. The 5th Marines (less 1/5) was reassigned to Peiping and the command, Peiping Marine Group, was dissolved. The 1st Battalion, 5th, continued its year-long association with Tangku and remained responsible for the security of the port and its warehouses and supply dumps. In like manner, after pulling in its outposts, the 7th Marines continued to hold the American installations in Peitaiho and Chinwangtao, a job that had occupied the regiment since the initial landings in China.

The last relief of Marine rail guards by Nationalist troops took place on 30 September. The event also marked the completion of moves which saw the concentration of division units in three main areas—Peiping, Tientsin-Tangku, and Peitaiho-Chinwangtao. With the ending of its responsibility for ensuring coal delivery to Chinwangtao for shipment, Marine Forces, China, had only four residual missions: (1) to protect U. S. property, installations, and personnel; (2) to maintain such detachments in port areas as were necessary for its own support; (3) to guard only those routes and means of communica-

[6] 1st MarDiv G–1 Rpt, Jul46, dtd 5Aug46 in 1st MarDiv WarD, Jul46.

[7] CG, 1st MarDiv ltr to ComSeventhFlt, dtd 7Aug46, Subj: Defense of the RR Line from Tientsin to Chinwangtao (HQMC S&C Files, FRC, Alex).

tion necessary for its own support; and (4) to assist and provide logistical support for U. S. Army activities of Executive Headquarters.

While the ground elements of the division were regrouping, the wing made two changes that reflected the altered nature of Marine operations in China. On 22 September, the wing service squadron, which had acted as a personnel clearing center at Tsangkou Field for almost a year, moved to Changkeichuang Field outside Tientsin to relieve headquarters squadron of maintenance, housekeeping, and transportation details. On 15 October, VMO-6 was detached from 3/4's command and moved to Tientsin to provide additional reconnaissance aircraft to cover supply trains bridging the gaps between Marine garrisons and to scout the immediate vicinity of American defensive positions. Both transfers were made entirely by air.

During this period of change, the last two general officers who had made the original landing completed their China duty. On 26 August, General Worton was relieved as ADC by Brigadier General Alfred H. Noble, and on 18 September, Major General Samuel L. Howard relieved General Rockey in command of the division. Rockey's new post was Commanding General, Department of the Pacific, and Worton took command of Marine Garrison Forces, Pacific, in succession to Noble.[8] Howard, a China-duty veteran who had commanded the 4th Marines in Shanghai in 1941, acted quickly to forestall any thought by the Chinese that a change of command meant a change in Marine purpose. In a public statement addressed to the people of North China, he stated:

> The U. S. Government's announced policy is the promotion of peace and harmony in China. General George C. Marshall and the members of his Executive Headquarters are working toward that end.
>
> The U. S. Marines have no part in the establishment of our nation's policy. We are an organization whose traditional duty is to support and uphold that policy and to protect American lives and property in any part of the globe. We are in China to carry out the directives of our State Department or those of General Marshall. This we propose to do.[9]

The Communist attitude toward the Marines did not soften in any way with the withdrawal of the Americans from railroad and mine outposts. General Howard's assumption of command was greeted with an incident as serious as that at Anping in what it portended—a well planned raid on the Division Ammunition Supply Point at Hsin Ho six miles northwest of Tangku. The supply point was laid out along the edge of a large oval almost two miles across on its long axis and just over a mile wide on the short; the area enclosed was marshy ground. A barbed wire fence, a motor road, and eight sentry towers ringed the oval; the ammunition was disposed in tented piles between the towers. During the summer of 1946, this ammunition supply seemed an irresistible lure to many individuals and small groups which attempted to steal from it. Sentries were frequently fired

[8] General Officer Biographies (SubjFile, HistBr, HQMC).

[9] *North China Marine* (Tientsin), 28Sep46, p. 1.

upon and their return fire drove off several raiding parties bent on getting at the contents of the tents inside the barbed wire. The last such incident happened on 4 September and then a lull occurred which set the stage for a determined effort by the Communists to make a sizeable haul.

At about 2200 on 3 October, a sentry at the ammunition point's Post 3, which was nearly a quarter of a mile from the guard house, discovered a large group of Chinese just outside the perimeter wire. When he approached to investigate, he was fired upon and, after an exchange of shots, ran to the sentry tower to call in an alarm. While he was phoning, a raiding group cut through the wire, entered one of the tents, and began carrying off ammunition boxes. The sentry's rifle fire failed to stop the thieves.

A strong covering party of the raiders, from positions in the fields adjoining the ammunition point, opened a heavy fire on a truck carrying men of the guard to the aid of the sentry. Before the Marines could reach Post 3, they were forced to dismount, take cover, and build up a firing line, while the remainder of the guard, 52 men in all, came up and joined the fight. Gradually the firing from the fields died away and when a reinforcement of 100 men of 1/5 from Tangku arrived at 2300 the Chinese had disappeared. Machine guns and mortars were set up and searching fire by flare light was delivered for several hours to discourage any repetition of the raid. At dawn the nearby fields were thoroughly searched; one dead and one wounded Communist soldier were found and 11 cases of rifle ammunition and grenades were recovered. An inventory showed 32 cases of pistol, carbine, and rifle ammunition were missing. Papers on the dead man and interrogation of the prisoner identified the raiding group as a 200-man company from the Road Protecting Battalion of the 53d Communist Regiment; the unit had come from an area about 35 miles north of Tangku in a day's hard marching.

The Communists withdrew as rapidly and as secretly as they had come. Aerial reconnaissance did not spot them or the donkey carts they had brought with them to carry away the ammunition. The raid was well planned, well executed, and but for the prompt reaction of the Marine guards might have been even more successful. The strengthened security precautions taken at Hsin Ho as a natural result of the raid did not discourage the Communists from attempting further attacks, but they helped delay a return engagement until spring.

WITHDRAWAL FROM HOPEH [10]

Almost as the last shots were dying away at Hsin Ho, General Marshall was reporting to President Truman that he felt he could no longer be useful in China as a mediator. Neither side was willing

[10] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from 1st MarDiv WarDs, Oct46–Jun47; 1st MAW WarDs, Oct46–Jun47; Raid on DivAmmoPt at Hsin Ho, 5Apr47, encl A to 1st MarDiv G–2 PeriodicRpt No. 52, dtd 8Apr47; *U. S. Relations with China; Military Situation in the Far East;* Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope—Memoirs,* v. II (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956).

to honor its truce agreement nor to make any concessions which would materially weaken its position. The fires of hatred fanned by years of bitter civil strife could not be quenched by negotiations. An American reporter categorizing the attitude of the Communists and the Nationalists at this time aptly summed up the situation: "Each side is convinced of the insincerity of the other. Each side is convinced that the enemy aims only at its destruction. And each side is right." [11]

Unwilling to admit failure whenever the barest glimmer of hope for peace remained, Marshall continued to try to bring the two sides together during the remainder of the year. His efforts were fruitless. Finally, on 3 January 1947, President Truman directed Marshall's recall for consultation and on the 7th, as the general was preparing to leave China, announced Marshall's nomination as the next Secretary of State. In evaluating the Marshall mission, the President commented:

> . . . it is important to bear in mind that even before he left for China there already existed a formal agreement in writing between the Central Government and the Communists to work toward national unity. This is the agreement that was brought about previously with the assistance of Ambassador Hurley when he headed our diplomatic mission to China, and had this not already been in existence I would not have sent Marshall to China.[12]

General Marshall issued a strongly worded personal statement as he left China which outlined his views on the reason for failure of the negotiations leading toward peace and coalition government. On the Nationalist side he laid most of the blame on a "dominant group of reactionaries" in the Kuomintang who believed "that cooperation by the Chinese Communist Party in the government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue." [13] While he recognized the existence of an even more powerful and doctrinaire group among the Communist leaders who would not compromise their views, Marshall stated that he considered that there was "a definite liberal group among the Communists, especially of young men who have turned to the Communists in disgust at the corruption evident in the local governments—men who could put the interests of the Chinese people above ruthless measures to establish a Communist idealogy in the immediate future." [14]

The American representative recognized, however, that many knowledgeable people disagreed entirely with his thesis, holding that Communist party discipline was so rigid that it could not condone the existence of divergent viewpoints. Marshall advocated as a solution to the China crisis the assumption of leadership by liberals in the Central Government and in independent minority parties. In the context of his remarks, it is apparent that he had few illusions that what he recommended would occur.

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[11] Harold J. Noble, "Should We Pull Out of China," *The Saturday Evening Post*, v. 205, no. 13 (28Sep46), p. 19.

[12] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

[13] Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 687.

[14] *Ibid.*

While American efforts to bring about peace in China were reaching a final peak of frustration and disappointment, the role of the Marines was undergoing a sharp reappraisal. The mission of assistance and support to American-sponsored activities of Executive Headquarters was the prime reason for the continued presence of the 1st Marine Division in North China. As it became increasingly apparent that a complete collapse of truce negotiations was in the offing, plans were laid for the withdrawal of all Marine units from Hopeh. Guam, which was being developed as the principal forward base of FMFPac, was originally designated the redeployment point for the entire division, but later plans provided for gradual reduction of forces with some outfits slated for Guam, others for the west coast, and a few aviation units headed for Hawaii. The first major move was ordered from Washington and called for the return of the 7th Marines (Reinforced) directly to the States.[15]

A division operation plan incorporating this decision was issued on 2 December. All troops were scheduled to ship out from Chinwangtao. Before the month's end, the 7th Marines was directed to disband the reinforcing companies of the division service and support battalions which had been attached to it during most of the China tour of duty. Those men eligible for return on the basis of their time overseas were incorporated in the regiment's ranks; recent replacements were transferred to units remaining in China. Two artillery battalions, 3/11 and 4/11, and VMO–6 were attached to the regiment for the return voyage. A small rear echelon was charged with the responsibility for disposing of all U. S. property in the Chinwangtao-Peitaiho area. To provide security while American troops and supplies were being shipped from Chinwangtao, a guard detachment of two companies from 1/1 was sent to the KMA port town on 28 December. The 7th Marines embarked and sailed on 5 January, reporting to FMFPac for operational and administrative control.

Sailing with the regiment but bound for Ewa on Oahu was the ground echelon of VMF(N)–533. In December, the flight echelon of the squadron had flown its night fighters to Guam via Shanghai, Okinawa, and Iwo Jima; from Guam the planes were shipped the rest of the way to Ewa. Eleven days after the VMF(N)–533 aircraft staged through Okinawa, the Corsairs of VMF–115 were flown to the island to pick up the carrier *Tarawa* as a transport to Ewa. This cut in MAG–24 strength was ordered on 23 December as a part of a further reduction of Marine Forces, China, which saw the departure of the remaining units of the 11th Marines for Guam.

Heavy icing conditions at Taku Bar and in the Hai River made it necessary to use Chinwangtao as the shipping point for troops ordered out on 23 December also. The 1st Tank Battalion, less Company B which remained attached to the 1st Marines and Company C which had been disbanded by the 7th Marines, left for Guam with the division artillery regiment on 18 January. The

[15] Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to MajGen Samuel L. Howard, dtd 29Nov46 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

ground echelon of VMF–115 sailed at the same time for Ewa.

For a short while in December, Marine combat units were leaving China as Army dependents arrived. General Marshall had approved the sending out of the wives and children of personnel attached to Executive Headquarters before the truce reached its final stages of disintegration. As a result, dependents began arriving at Tangku in August and were escorted to Peiping by Marine train guards and covering flights of OYs. A sizeable shipload arrived on 14 November, but the situation was such that many of these people were sent home on 23 December when another dependent ship arrived. Thereafter the civilian traffic was all one way—homebound. Many dependents bound for Peiping never got off the ships they arrived in.

Some Marine officers and senior NCOs who were normally entitled to have their dependents with them at peacetime overseas stations were quite anxious to have their families join them in China. When the matter was first seriously considered in the summer of 1946 after the Navy had approved the idea in principle,[16] General Rockey recommended strongly against its adoption for forces in Hopeh. Aside from the obvious danger from Communist action, he felt that the personnel and military situation was too fluid, that suitable housing was not available, and that there was a significant danger to the health of women and children exposed to a wealth of strange diseases.[17] Before he left China, however, Rockey endorsed the idea of sending Marine dependents to Tsingtao since its geographic situation permitted quick evacuation and close-in naval support, while the health and housing picture was considerably better than it was in Tientsin and Peiping.[18] On 29 November, the Commandant wrote to General Howard that he was ready to recommend to the Secretary of the Navy that dependents be sent out to China as soon as the troop list was firm.[19] Marine families actually began arriving at Tsingtao in late fall, following by several months the arrival of the first dependents of Navy men stationed at the port.

The Department of State made its formal announcement of the end of American participation in the activities of Executive Headquarters on 29 January. The stay of the 1st Division units in Hopeh was tied to the evacuation of American personnel and property from Peiping. In a new operation order issued on 3 February, the division was directed to provide tactical and logistical support to the Army's Peiping-based forces until their withdrawal was completed and at the same time to finish preparations for its own departure from China. The 1st Marines in Tientsin and the 5th in Peiping and Tangku were ordered to provide train guards, rescue parties, and motor convoys as needed in addition to routine security detachments. One battalion of the 1st Marines was to be ready to fly to Shanghai on six hour's notice, a requirement which reflected the fact

[16] CNO disp to CinCPac, dtd 1Jun45 in CinCPac WarD, Jun46, encl (B) (OAB, NHD).

[17] *Rockey comments.*

[18] *Rockey interview*, 14–15Apr59.

[19] Vandegrift ltr to Howard, dtd 29Nov46, *op. cit.*

that the few Army and Navy units left in the central Chinese city were not organized or equipped to protect American lives and property.

Training was the keynote of China duty for the ground elements of General Howard's command during the waning months of the Marines' stay in Hopeh. Between the fall of 1946 and the spring of 1947, there was a steady but slow rise in the reported combat efficiency of the various elements of the division, but the lack of opportunity for large unit maneuvers and amphibious practice put an effective ceiling on efficiency ratings. By April only the medical and motor transport battalions, whose duties were roughly the same in war and in peace, reported percentages of combat efficiency as high as 75 percent; the remainder of the division hovered around the 50 percent mark and the infantry regiments hung at 40 percent.[20]

The situation in the 1st Wing was somewhat better since the pilots were able to maintain flying proficiency. The requirements for patrol flights were sharply curtailed, however, by the fold-up of Executive Headquarters and the consolidation of Marine positions. In December, VMF-211 got in three weeks of gunnery practice over the sea off Tsingtao while it was temporarily based at Tsangkou Field, but in general fighter pilots had little opportunity for combat training. As far as the crews of VMR-153 were concerned, there was no discernible letup in the heavy schedule of operations that they had met since the transport planes first reached North China. In late February, at Seventh Fleet order, the squadron began dropping UNRRA supplies, mainly clothing and medical items, in Communist territory in western Hopeh.[21] By 27 March when this mission ended, three-quarters of a million pounds of relief supplies had been air dropped.

Marine transports were sent to Tsinan on 3 March to evacuate 17 American and foreign civilians threatened by fighting between CNA and Communist troops. This particular type of rescue mission was to become more and more a part of the VMR-153 routine as its stay in China continued and the civil war situation grew less and less favorable to the Nationalists. The decision as to what aviation units were to remain in China after the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) had been made in Washington by March and the ubiquitous transport squadron headed the slim list of units scheduled to base at Tsangkou where a new command, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific (AirFMFWesPac), was to be organized.

Colonel John N. Hart, the chief of staff of the wing, was assigned duties as commanding officer of the new organization which was to be a part of

[20] CG, 1st MarDiv serial O1A12647 to CG, FMFPac, dtd 5May47, Subj: ReadinessRpt of FMF, (Ground) Units (Unit HistRpt File, HistBr, HQMC).

[21] The Seventh Fleet commander noted that these supplies were arranged for by negotiations at Nanking between Communist, Nationalist, and U. S. representatives. They were intended for "relieving nonmilitary inhabitants, non-Communist inhabitants in dire straits." Admiral Cooke stated that "it was later found that the Chinese Communist Army appropriated and put to its own use all the medical supplies. . . ." *Cooke ltr.*

the over-all Marine command to be activated at Tsingtao—FMFWesPac. The wing issued the operation order for the withdrawal of its units on 25 March as a preliminary part of the 1st Division's similar inclusive plan which was published on 1 April. In addition to VMR–153, one fighter squadron (VMF–211), a headquarters squadron (formed from the wing service squadron), and the air base detachment already at Tsangkou were included in Hart's command. The pilots of VMF–218 began flying their ships to Shanghai via Tsingtao on 26 March and completed a further move to Okinawa by the 30th. From Okinawa the Corsairs picked up a carrier for transport to Guam.

Guam was to be the next base for the wing and for MAG–24, and the planes and men of the headquarters and service squadrons moved to the Marianas in April. The advance CPs of the wing and group opened on Guam on the 24th. The rear echelon of MAG–24 closed out all Marine facilities at South Field by 9 May and headed for Guam; with its departure all scheduled flights to Peiping ceased. While the 1st Marine Division remained in China, a few transports of VMR–153 and six fighters of VMF–211 remained at Changkeichuang Field, which was serviced by an air base detachment. Regular flight operations from the field did not end until 19 June.

The final plan for the withdrawal of the 1st Marine Division ground elements was preceded by several minor moves which anticipated the deployment ordered on 1 April as had the 1st MAW plan. On 10 March, Company B of the 1st Pioneer Battalion was sent to Guam to assist in camp construction activities for the 1st Brigade which was slated to be based on the island. Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, who had relieved General Noble as ADC at the turn of the year, was the commander designate of the new unit.[22] On the 17th, Company E of 2/1 was ordered to Tsingtao to augment 3/4 so that the reinforced battalion could relieve all seamen guards at naval installations. At the same time the 1st Reconnaissance Company was sent to Chinwangtao to relieve the one 1st Marines company still on duty with the guard detachment at the port.

Essentially, the division's withdrawal plan, which was to take effect on the departure of the last elements of the Army's headquarters group from Peiping, divided the division into four detachments. The Marine ground units detailed to FMFWesPac included the 1st Marines, less its Weapons Company and 1/1, and company-sized attachments from the division's headquarters, service, engineer, medical, and motor transport battalions. Similar attachments of division supporting troops were added to the 5th Marines which was scheduled for Guam as the infantry component of the 1st Brigade. The headquarters companies of FMFWesPac and of the 1st Brigade were to be formed by redesignating the Headquarters and Service Companies of the 1st and 5th Marines. A rear echelon consisting of the 7th Service Regiment and 1/1 was directed to dispose of all U. S. property in the area occupied by Marines before withdrawing. All remaining elements of the divi-

[22] Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr to LtGen Allen H. Turnage, dtd 12Feb47 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File, HistBr, HQMC).

sion were ordered to Camp Pendleton to join units then stationed there and to rebuild others to form a new 1st Marine Division.

During this period when the division withdrawal plan was just getting underway, the Communists made their most punishing attack against the Marines. Again the ammunition point at Hsin Ho was the target, and by all indications the raiding force was the same one that had hit the point in October. (See Map 36.) Ironically, the Marine guards were close to the end of their task when the Communists struck. The 7th Service Regiment had nearly finished the process of separating the serviceable ammunition from the stocks and shipping it out of China. Much of what remained was useable but unstable or in poor condition. Although no decision had been made as yet to turn over this ammunition residue to the Nationalists,[23] the prospect that this might be done was obvious and may have triggered the attack.

Following the October raid, the layout of the supply point had been altered from an oval to a more regular triangular shape, with the long axis toward the north. The ammunition was grouped in eight dump areas along the triangle's legs, a pair two miles in length and a shorter side a little over a mile long. At the northern apex, the point most distant from the guardhouse, was a two-man sentry post. Several other fixed posts were placed at strategic points along the perimeter and jeep patrols checked the open stretches between. The security system was adequate to discourage thievery and to hold off the attacks of small raiding groups until reinforcements could arrive from Tangku, but it was not designed to cope with an attack by a force estimated at 350 well-armed men.

At about 0115 on 5 April, a bugle call sounded from the fields adjacent to the northernmost sentry post and a fusilade of rifle and machine gun fire burst out of the night directed at the Marines. The two sentries returned the Communist fire for about 10 minutes before they were killed. Two separate bodies of raiders then penetrated the northern dump, their action evidently a diversion for a stronger and heavier attack which took place farther down the eastern side of the ammunition point. The target of this attack was a dump area containing artillery and mortar ammunition and fuzes. The Communist fire emptied a patrol jeep, killing all three occupants, and drove back the other sentries as well as the men from the main guard coming to their rescue. Eight more Marines were wounded in the exchange of shots.

As soon as word was received in Tangku that the Hsin Ho point was under attack Company C of 1/5 was dispatched to the scene. The Communists were ready for them. At 0200, as the self-propelled 105mm howitzer leading the relief column reached a narrow point in the road near Hsin Ho, it was disabled by a land mine and blocked the way. Immediately, the Marine vehicles following, a jeep and two trucks crowded with men, were subjected to an intense fire coming from an irrigation ditch only 40 yards east of the road. Under cover of

[23] MajGen Samuel L. Howard statement of 30Apr47, in *North China Marine* (Tientsin), 3May47, p. 1.



MAP 36 T. L. RUSSELL

this fire, two waves of Communist soldiers rushed forward and threw grenades at the Marines who had taken cover behind the trucks and were firing back. The Communists, a group of 35–40 men, then pulled back to the ditch and kept up a brisk exchange for another 15 minutes before they were driven off. Eight more Marines were wounded in this well-planned ambush.

By this time the main body of the raiders was withdrawing, leaving behind six dead and taking an estimated 20–30 wounded with them. Tracks showed that six to eight carts and a number of pack animals carried full loads of ammunition out of the dump but no accurate count of what was lost could be taken since the Communists blew up the remnants of the piles they had stolen from. A rear guard composed of the raiders who had hit the northern dump area furnished covering fire until 0300 when the last of the Communists drew off. Again, as in the first Hsin Ho attack, the Communists got away undetected.

Heavy punitive columns from 1/5 and planes from VMO–3 and VMF–211 were on the trail at dawn but the only Communists sighted were those who had died in the attack. The raiders and their booty, ammunition and fuzes which could be made into mines, were able to reach a ferry across the Chin Chung River eight miles north of Hsin Ho and disappear on the other side into a maze of farming villages and fields.

The unsatisfactory ending of the second Hsin Ho attack was a grim reminder of the handicaps under which the Marines operated in North China. The initiative rested with the Communists, who attacked when and where they pleased, secure in the knowledge that once they struck and ran they were safe from effective reprisal hidden among the thousands of villagers within a short distance of any Marine post.

As a matter of expediency, before the month of April was out the ammunition point was being guarded by Nationalist troops. The transfer had little element of formality; "it was more a walking away from the ammunition than a turnover." [24] Only a small detachment from 7th Service Regiment which was cleaning up the last stocks of serviceable ammunition remained at Hsin Ho and these men were withdrawn to Tientsin on 15 May.[25] At virtually the same time in Tsingtao, the Nationalists began acquiring similar stocks of American ammunition declared unserviceable by boards of survey. The ammunition was dumped in small quantities in revetments near Tsangkou Field after the local CNA commander was informed of the intention to do so. Naturally enough, the ammunition quickly disappeared.[26]

Marine activities in Hopeh gradually shut down and centered in Tientsin as the division withdrew on schedule. The last motor convoy carrying 5th Marines gear cleared Peiping on 12 May, and on

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] 7th ServRgt WarD, May47.

[26] ComNavWesPac ltr serial 0002640–07 to CNO, dtd 16Sep47, Subj: Rpt of Ammo dumped by FMFWesPac at Tsingtao, China 19May–13Sep47 (ComNavWesPac File, FRC, Mech). The decision to dump the ammunition in this fashion was recommended by Admiral Cooke, and approved in Washington during a conference in early February 1947, which was attended by Admiral Cooke and Secretary of State Marshall. *Cooke ltr.*

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the same date the regiment (less 1/5) sailed for Guam. On the 20th, the 1st Marines departed for Tsingtao, leaving 1/1 as the guard force for the rear echelon. The port of Tangku's garrison was secured when 7th Service Regiment withdrew its naval detachment, the successor to GroPac-13, to Tientsin, and 1/5 followed the rest of its regiment to Guam on the 24th. For a few days, the only Marines in Hopeh stationed outside of Tientsin were at Chinwangtao, but Communist attacks on the railroad at that port soon prompted their withdrawal.

The Communist drive on Chinwangtao was in sufficient strength to threaten the CNA perimeter positions, and Nationalist gunboats fired over the Marine camp on one occasion to beat back attacks on the railroad.[27] Between 22–24 May, 79 U. S. and European civilians were evacuated from Peitaiho by Marine OYs and Navy landing craft. On the 26th, the Marine guard detachment, the 1st Pioneer Battalion which had taken post in late April to relieve the reconnaissance company, boarded LSMs and left for Tientsin. The Communist attack proved to be only the most serious of a long series of attempts to disrupt rail traffic in the vital corridor to Manchuria, and the Nationalists were able to retain their hold on Chinwangtao.

The remainder of the division shipped out for the States and Guam during the first weeks of June. The only threat to the orderly withdrawal procedure was a report received on the 18th that the Communists intended to attack Tangku. To counter this action, a rifle company at Tsingtao was alerted for airlift to Tientsin to reinforce 1/1. The threat failed to materialize and the division headquarters battalion and attached units sailed for San Diego on 20 June. At midnight on the 19th, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick L. Wieseman, commanding the division rear echelon, reported by dispatch to the Commanding General, FMFWesPac, for operational control.

[27] 1st MarDiv G–2 PeriodicRpt No. 59, dtd 27May47.

FLEET SUPPORT [28]

The troop strength of Fleet Marine Force, Western Pacific, was settled early in 1947 at an interdepartmental conference in Washington in line with the State Department view "that the number of United States armed forces ashore in China should be maintained at the minimum compatible with United States interests." [29] The command drew its name from the altered title of Seventh Fleet which had been redesignated Naval Forces, Western Pacific in January. Named to head FMFWesPac, which was activated on 1 May, was Brigadier General Omar T. Pfeiffer, who had served under Admiral Cooke as Fleet Marine and Planning Officer since January 1946.[30]

The basic organization of General Pfeiffer's command included a force headquarters and service battalion, two infantry battalions, the 12th Service

[28] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: FMFWesPac WarDs, May–Aug47; AirFMFWesPac WarDs, May–Aug47; 7th ServRgt WarDs, May–Sep47; 12th ServBn WarDs, May–Aug47.

[29] SecState ltr to SecNav, dtd 23Jul47 (ComNavWesPac S–A–14 File, FRC, Mech).

[30] MajGen Omar T. Pfeiffer ltr to CMC, dtd 19Oct61.

Battalion, and AirFMFWesPac. Its strength at the end of May after all its elements had joined was 279 officers and 3,747 enlisted men. Administratively, the air elements remained a part of 1st MAW with operational control resting with General Pfeiffer. In the case of the service battalion, the same situation applied although the phrasing vested "military command and coordination control" in FMFWesPac and retained "management and technical control" in Service Command, FMFPac.[31]

In the absence of a regular artillery unit, FMFWesPac was reinforced by enough officers and men to form the nucleus of a provisional artillery organization with two six-gun 105mm howitzer batteries. Five officers and 16 men were added to the force as a tactical headquarters, and one rifle company in each infantry battalion was augmented by 3 officers and 22 artillerymen. These reinforced companies were commanded by artillery majors with infantry captains as executive officers. The battalions were commanded by colonels with lieutenant colonels as executives.[32]

FMFWesPac was ordered to continue the principal mission executed by 3/4 and its predecessors of furnishing security for American naval installations. In alternate months, each of the two infantry battalions was to furnish all the guard details needed for wharfs and warehouses, barracks and headquarters, and ammunition dumps and motor pools. One company, initially E of 2/1, was assigned to the air base guard for several months at a time. The force's lone tank platoon was permanently stationed at the field as part of its defenses.

In addition to its guard duties, FMFWesPac had a mission of providing emergency protection for American lives and property in Tientsin, Nanking, and Shanghai. The three cities contained the majority of Americans in China on government business, aside from the sizeable contingent at Tsingtao. The protective requirement was temporary in nature as far as the 1,900-man division rear echelon at Tientsin was concerned; its planned departure date was set for the end of August. At the Chinese capitol of Nanking, there were 1,240 military and diplomatic personnel and their dependents and at Shanghai were another 1,700. Besides these official representatives, more than 4,500 American nationals were in China on private business and the number was steadily increasing.

Airlift was the means of accomplishing the quick reinforcement intended by FMFWesPac orders. The infantry company at Tsangkou had to have a rifle platoon ready at all times for lift on an hour's notice. One of VMR–153's R5C transports stood by on the same alert. On six hour's warning, all of 2/1 had to be prepared to lift from Tsangkou in the squadron's transports. In surprise practice alerts undertaken during the summer, the ready platoon was aloft in half an hour and seven plane loads of infantrymen were airborne in less than an hour. On the departure of 2/1, 3/4 was to undertake all security commitments, including those at the airfield, assisted by bluejackets trained in interior guard duty by the Marines.

[31] 12th ServBn WarD, May47.

[32] Encl (A) to CMC serial 03A5947, *ca.* 15Apr47 (ComNavWesPac A–1 File, FRC, Mech).

The addition of a second infantry battalion to the units at Tsingtao was made in part so that a realistic program of amphibious training could be scheduled. By alternating months of guard and training, both battalions were able to increase combat efficiency appreciably. All summer long, small unit practice for amphibious exercises planned for the fall was the daily routine of the battalion in training. An important adjunct of this improved program was the instruction given ships' landing forces in the tactics and techniques of land combat. One or two ships of Admiral Cooke's forces were detailed each month for this training which was conducted as a regular activity of FMFWesPac.

No amount of planning or training, however, could overcome Tsingtao's most serious deficiency as a site for amphibious exercises. There was no safe impact area for live firing in support and execution of a landing, and no room for maneuver ashore in the heavily cultivated countryside. Fields used by the Marines in cold weather for extended order training were denied them as soon as the spring thaws allowed crops to be planted. The city's food supply was too critical as a result of the Communist economic blockade to permit the leasing of arable land for troop use.

The problem of a suitable area for training did not plague the fighter squadron at Tsangkou as much as it did the ground units it was to support. In June, 17 pilots of VMF–211 went to Guam for ten days training in naval gunfire spotting techniques. While these men were gone, a like number of VMF–218 pilots from Guam took their place to maintain the state of readiness. The sea off the port of Tsingtao was available as a firing range, and in mid-August VMF–211 was able to practice strafing and dive and glide bombing in attacks on a Japanese destroyer sailed to the area as a target. Later in the month, the squadron flew combat air patrol for fleet units maneuvering off Tsingtao.

Heavy weather dogging these exercises was responsible for the loss of three Corsairs. The pilots of two were recovered quickly, one from the sea and another from a friendly sector of the Tsingtao countryside; the third pilot was taken by the Communists when he landed out of gas on the south shore of Shantung Peninsula. His plane was sighted on 28 August, and a landing party sent ashore to destroy it and find the flyer exchanged fire with local Communists as it withdrew. Fifteen days later the pilot was returned unharmed, but only after lengthy negotiations, the submission of a letter explaining the incident from Admiral Cooke, and the payment of $1,000 plus medical supplies as compensation for damages supposedly sustained by the Communists.[33]

The status of VMR–153 as the odd-job and workhorse squadron of Marine air in China was not in any way changed by its assignment to AirFMFWesPac. Courier flights to Tientsin were made twice weekly after 20 June to expedite the withdrawal of the division rear echelon; Changkeichuang Field was manned by a liaison detail from 7th Service Regiment during landing and takeoff. Nanking and Shanghai were

[33] *Capture comments*, p. 6. Admiral Cooke commented that he directed that "there would be no *ransom* and no apologies" in the negotiations for the release of the flyer. *Cooke ltr.*

stopping points in a regular schedule of transport and cargo flights which maintained physical contact between the major American bases in China. The squadron continued to perform chores outside the common military pattern, and on 28–29 August it flew 218 Germans from Tsingtao, Canton, and Tientsin to Shanghai where they boarded a repatriation ship. The former enemy nationals were not wanted in China by the Central Government, and the U. S. State Department cooperated in arranging their transport.

August was the time of departure. General Pfeiffer completed his tour of overseas duty, having established FMFWesPac as a flourishing command. Brigadier General Gerald C. Thomas, the former Director of Plans and Policies, Headquarters Marine Corps, relieved him.[34] At the same time, Colonel Hart relinquished command of AirFMFWesPac to Colonel Frank H. Lamson-Scribner. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, at Tientsin mounted out for the States on 27 August, its destination Camp Pendleton and the 1st Marine Division. The remainder of the rear echelon, its task completed, boarded ship by 30 August and sailed for Guam. On 12 September, Lieutenant Colonel Wieseman reported with 7th Service Regiment to the 1st Brigade and at the end of the month the regiment was officially disbanded.

The withdrawal of these Marine units from Hopeh marked the end of 25 months of difficult, sometimes hectic service. Tsingtao now became the focus of attention, but duty in the Shantung port continued to have a different aspect than that which prevailed in the north. In many senses, during the remainder of its existence FMFWesPac repeated Marine history. Its actions paralleled those performed by the expeditionary and garrison forces in the China of the prewar era. As an arm of the fleet ashore, it provided security for American nationals in danger when the civil war's tide turned overwhelmingly against the Nationalists.

A LOSING CAUSE [35]

By the summer of 1947, the Communists had their Nationalist opponents dead in their sights. A mounting series of offensives in Manchuria cut off and annihilated or captured CNA outpost garrisons. Lines of communication between major cities were severed and permanently blocked. In less than six months the Nationalists were effectively isolated in several large garrison areas. In order to shake loose from Communist nooses which were slowly tightening, the Nationalists had either to reinforce their armies strongly and take the offensive or to consolidate positions quickly to conserve men. They did neither.

The weak reinforcements sent were dissipated ineffectually, and hundreds of thousands of men were tied to the defenses of cities whose retention added little or nothing to Nationalist military or economic strength. It was evident that few leaders in Nanking appreci-

[34] General Officer Biographies (SubjFile, HistBr, HQMC).

[35] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: *U. S. Relations with China;* Liu, *Military History of China;* Wedemeyer, *Reports;* Rigg, *Red China's Hordes.*

ated the truth of the Communist battle philosophy espoused by one of Mao Tse-tung's commanders: "When you keep men and lose land, the land can be retaken; If you keep land and lose soldiers, you lose both." [36]

Vividly illustrative of the Communist viewpoint was their reaction to a CNA drive to capture the Red capital at Yenan. Rather than tie themselves to position defenses, Mao Tse-tung's forces faded before the advance and let the Nationalists take the remote Shensi city. The victors then were exposed at the end of a long and vulnerable supply line and became besieged instead of besiegers. Similarly, Nationalist advances in Hopeh and Shantung, which included the capture of Chefoo in October, were hollow successes. The attack objectives were cities, not soldiers, and the attacking forces soon settled into a sit-tight defensive pattern to protect their prizes and withered as fighting units.

The deterioration of Nationalist morale was compounded of many factors. American military observers noted a significant loss of popular support for the Nationalists among the war-wearied people, and Chiang's soldiers in return evidenced little regard for the natives of Manchuria and North China. Many of the men in the CNA ranks were from southern and central provinces and had not seen their homes or families for years; there was no rotation plan for veterans. Inflation robbed the soldier's meager pay of any value, and an incredibly inept supply system often left him on short rations, with ailing equipment, and too little ammunition. To top the dismal picture, the military hierarchy in Nanking kept changing senior field commanders; the rate of turnover was high early in 1947 and soared higher as reverses mounted. In all save a few cases, proven combat leadership was subordinated to political considerations in making appointments.

The situation was so black that American leaders were in a quandary as to just what their future policy toward China should be. In May 1946, General Marshall had determined that the Communists and Nationalists were not cooperating to establish peace and a coalition government as they had promised, and he had been instrumental in imposing an embargo on U. S. arms shipments to the Central Government. This cut-off of munitions supply to the Nationalists lasted a year and the results were felt sharply in the fighting in the latter part of 1947. The 6,500 tons of ammunition turned over to the CNA by the Marines at Hsin Ho and Tsingtao between April and September was a helpful measure, but little more than a stopgap. The Communists, aided by the huge quantities of Japanese munitions handed over to them by the Soviets and by their own increasing captures of Nationalist weapons and ammunition, fared better on the arms supply front than their adversaries.

In July, at the request of President Truman and Secretary Marshall, General Wedemeyer headed a special mission to China to investigate and report

[36] Gen Liu Po-cheng, CG, Second Communist FldA, quoted in Rigg, *Red China's Hordes*, p. 31.

on the situation as he found it.[37] He was asked to advise on what aid measures might be taken to bolster the Central Government and what would be the consequences if no assistance was given. For a month members of the mission visited China's major cities and talked with many prominent persons both in and out of Government. The report of the detailed survey and its conclusions were presented to the President on 19 September.

In his report, General Wedemeyer severely criticized the Central Government and its conduct of political, economic, and military affairs. He pointed out, however, that the U. S. had little choice but to support the Nationalists, since the Chinese Communists were furthering the aims of the Soviet Union in the Far East, and these aims were diametrically opposed to those of the United States and jeapordized its strategic security. Although Wedemeyer made a number of specific recommendations designed to remedy the situation, including increased American economic assistance and the institution of a United Nations-sponsored trusteeship of Manchuria, the crux of his feelings was summed up in an extract from the report's conclusions:

> The only working basis on which national Chinese resistance to Soviet aims can be revitalized is through the presently corrupt, reactionary and inefficient Chinese National Government.
>
> The National Government is incapable of supporting an army of the size it now has in the field.
>
> In order to preclude defeat by Communist forces, it is necessary to give the National Government sufficient and prompt military assistance under the supervision of American advisors in specified military fields.
>
> American military aid to China should be moral, material, and advisory. It should be an integrated part of our world wide policy of military assistance to certain nations.[38]

The Wedemeyer report was not made public after its presentation and the tone of urgency its recommendations contained was not translated into immediate action. Although Congress subsequently increased American economic and military aid and the military advisory groups in China were strengthened, the pace of this support did not match that at which the Nationalist fortunes declined.

The confused military picture at this critical point in the civil war was best explained by the man most responsible for its being—Mao Tse-tung. In a speech to his principal subordinates on 25 December 1947, the Communist leader laid out a ten-point path of conquest, a primer for the warfare that had gone before and the battles to come:

> (1). First strike scattered and isolated groups of the enemy, and later strike concentrated, powerful groups.
>
> (2). First take the small and middle-sized towns and cities and the broad countryside, and later take big cities.

[37] When he was in Washington in February 1947, Admiral Cooke, in a meeting with President Truman, had proposed that "a commission composed of emminent members of high prestige, in the political field, the economic field, and the military field, be sent to China in the immediate future, and thoroughly explore the situation and make recommendation to the U. S. Government of what should be done." *Cooke ltr.*

[38] Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, pp. 813–814.

(3). The major objective is the annihilation of the enemy fighting strength, and not the holding or taking of cities and places. The holding or taking of cities and places is the result of the annihilation of the enemies fighting strength, which often has to be repeated many times before they can be finally held or taken.

(4). In every battle, concentrate absolutely superior forces—double, triple, quadruple, and sometimes even five and six times those of the enemy—to encircle the enemy on all sides, and strive for his annihilation, with none escaping from the net. Under specific conditions, adopt the method of dealing the enemy smashing blows, that is, the concentration of all forces to strike the enemy's center and one or both of the enemy's flanks, aiming at the destruction of a part of the enemy and the routing of another part so that our troops can swiftly transfer forces to smash another enemy group. Avoid battle of attrition in which gains are not sufficient to make up for the losses, or in which the gains merely balance the losses. Thus we are inferior taken as a whole—numerically speaking—but our absolute superiority in every section and in every specific campaign guarantees the victory of each campaign. As time goes by we will become superior, taken as a whole, until the enemy is totally destroyed.

(5). Fight no unprepared engagements; fight no engagements in which there is no assurance of victory. Strive for victory in every engagement; be sure of the relative conditions of our forces and those of the enemy.

(6). Promote and exemplify valor in combat; fear no sacrifice or fatigue or continuous action—that is, fighting several engagements in succession within a short period without respite.

(7). Strive to destroy the enemy while in movement. At the same time emphasize the tactics of attacking positions, wrestling strong points and bases from the enemy.

(8). With regard to assaults on cities, resolutely wrest from the enemy all strong points and cities which are weakly defended. At favorable opportunities, wrest all enemy strong points and cities which are defended to a medium degree and where the circumstances permit. Wait until the conditions mature, and then wrest all enemy strong points and cities that are powerfully defended.

(9). Replenish ourselves by the capture of all enemy arms and most of his personnel. The sources of men and material for our army is mainly at the front.

(10). Skillfully utilize the intervals between two campaigns for resting, regrouping and training troops. The period of rest and regrouping should be in general not too long. As far as possible do not let the enemy have breathing space.[39]

The complete Nationalist defeat presaged by Mao's pronouncement was more than a year and a half in the making. During that time, the American private and public stake in mainland China was wiped out, and the principal concern of U. S. officials became the safety of American nationals. The primary mission of Naval Forces, Western Pacific in support of national policy eventually became the evacuation and protection during evacuation of Americans ordered from China.

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[39] Mao Tse-tung, *Turning Point in China* (New York: New Century, 1948), p. 3, quoted in Liu, *Military History of China;* Quoted from the original press release of 1Jan48 in Rigg, *Red China's Hordes*, pp. 180–181. The two translations vary but not significantly; that in Liu has been used.

Withdrawal

STATE OF READINESS [1]

For FMFWesPac, autumn of 1947 brought the harvest of a summer's hard training. On 30 September, BLT 2/1 made a full-scale landing near Tsingtao with simulated naval gunfire support and the overhead cover and dry-run bombing and strafing of VMF–211. In October, a battalion landing team built around 3/4 (newly redesignated the 3d Marines) completed a month-long course of ashore and afloat amphibious exercises with a similar landing. After this final phase of training for 1947 was completed, the Marine garrison settled down to a winter routine of guard duty and a renewal of the familiar pattern of training by progressive stages to maintain the amphibious competence of veterans and replacements.

The new 3d Marines, and its companion, the 1st Marines formed from 2/1, reflected the reorganization of FMFWesPac under new Marine Corps-wide ground tables of organization which eliminated the infantry regimental level in brigade and division and assigned the regimental titles to battalion-sized units. At the same time, the battalion level was done away with in division artillery regiments and batteries were grouped under regiment. The intent of the new setup was to provide the larger FMF commands with a flexible number of hard-hitting units patterned on the battalion landing teams of World War II. The new organizational theory found its principal impetus in the attempts of the Marine Corps to field the most fighting men it could garner despite severe budgetary pruning of its strength.[2]

Within FMFWesPac the number of changes made were relatively few. The artillery augmentation of both the 1st and 3d Marines was withdrawn to pare those organizations to the T/Os common to all FMF infantry battalions. A skeleton artillery headquarters was retained within the force headquarters and service battalion primarily for training purposes. In emergencies, the gunners needed to man the 105mm howitzers which were kept in Tsingtao would have to be flown or shipped in. Most reinforcing units of General Thomas' command were redesignated as elements of parent organizations in the 1st Marine Division, although administrative and operational control remained with FMFWesPac. The 12th Service Battalion was reorganized ac-

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: ComNavWesPac Semiannual Summary of NavForWesPac, 1Apr–30Sep48, dtd 22Oct48 (ComNavWesPac A–9 File, FRC, Mech); FMFWesPac WarDs, Sep47–Feb48; FMFWesPac G–1, G–2, G–3, G–4, and Air S–3 Rpts, Mar48 (S&C Files, HQMC), hereafter *FMFWesPac StfRpts* and following appropriate months, Apr–Jun48; *Capture comments.*

[2] "The New FMF," *Marine Corps Gazette,* v. 31, no. 5 (May47), pp. 10–15.

cording to a new logistical concept that gave units of Service Command, FMFPac, with headquarters in Hawaii, the direct support role once assigned organic service battalions which were dropped from division and brigade organizations.[3]

Emplaced behind a cordon of Nationalist defenses, the Marines in Tsingtao had few contacts with the Communists who held the Shantung countryside. Those that did occur were uniformly unpleasant. Continuing the practice begun in 1945 of holding the men who unwittingly fell into the their hands, the Communists seized five Marines of a hunting party which had blundered through Nationalist lines on Christmas Day in 1947. One Marine died of wounds received in the unprovoked outburst of fire which preceded the capture. For three months the Communists kept moving and interrogating the men, feeding them English language propaganda, and trying unsuccessfully to convince them of American responsibility for the civil war. The Communists finally released the Marines on 1 April, having failed also in their purpose of getting the men to mouth the lie that "high ranking officers sent them into 'liberated areas' to make an incident." [4]

Only four days after these Marines were returned, the four-man crew of an R5D of VMR–153 was taken. The plane's engines failed as it was circling to land at Tsangkou, and it crashed on the mud flats lining the western shore of Kiaochow Bay. Communist troops immediately hustled the crew out of sight, and the first Marine search plane which scouted the wreck was fired upon. For a month the Communists denied knowledge of the whereabouts of the Marines while planes of AirFMFWesPac dropped clothing, food, and medical supplies in Communist territory intended for the captives. When the Communists finally admitted that they held the flyers, they stalled negotiations for their release interminably, and the men were not returned to Tsingtao until 1 July.

The seizure of the hunting party resulted in a firm check on Marine excursions beyond the limits of Tsingtao and the American installations at Tsangkou Field. There was no way, however, of lessening the exposure of Marine flyers to capture so long as there were missions to be flown over Communist territory with the chance of operational failures. The need for such missions continued in 1948, and the land over which the Marine pilots flew increasingly showed the red banners of Mao Tse-tung's armies. In early February, as a result of the imminent capture of Changchun in Manchuria by Communist forces, VMR–153 transports evacuated American and British consular officials, missionaries, and foreign nationals from the city. Later in the month, the Marine planes flew in supplies for the U. S. Consulate in besieged Mukden. This supply lift was repeated in April as a skeleton U. S. consular staff kept a death watch within the Nationalist stronghold.

In view of the worsening civil war situation, the new Commander, Naval

[3] *Ibid.;* 12th ServBn WarD, Oct47.

[4] Interrogation of four Marines, dtd 1Apr48, encl A to CG, FMFWesPac ltr to CNO, dtd 28May48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

Forces, Western Pacific, Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger (who had relieved Admiral Cooke in February) ordered General Thomas to have his command ready to mount out on 30 days' notice. Initially, in a plan published on 3 April, FMFWesPac contemplated leaving a small service contingent to secure and maintain the supplies not loaded in the allotted time. By June, an Inspector General's review of this decision noted that the economic situation of Tsingtao's beleaguered populace was so desperate that "hungry Chinese hordes would sweep over any such remaining force as this. Supplies and installations would melt away instantly." [5] FMFPac added a comment that if redeployment orders were given, the evacuation of men and materiel would be complete, and General Thomas noted that with 30 days' warning, adequate shipping, and Chinese labor, he could clear all Marine supplies and equipment from Tsingtao.[6]

While the alert for possible evacuation existed and plans were made for that eventuality, the Marine garrison life in Tsingtao went on much as usual. To complete the winter's training, all companies of the 1st and 3d Marines were air lifted in practice deployment problems, and in June the battalions each made two landings in conjunction with Admiral Badger's amphibious forces. As Communist troops moved in strength into northern and central provinces in the summer of 1948 the danger to Americans in China increased gravely. The Marines embarked on a new cycle of combat training in July and stood by ready to move as the situation required.

[5] IG memo to CMC, dtd 13Jul48, Subj: Ability of FMFWesPac to carry out assigned mission (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex), p. 4.

[6] *Ibid.*

STATE DEPARTMENT WARNINGS [7]

Admiral Badger assigned General Thomas the responsibility for evacuation of Americans from North China. The FMFWesPac staff prepared plans to cover the withdrawal of their fellow countrymen from Tientsin and Peiping as well as Tsingtao. In the latter city, Thomas was given military command and coordination control of all Navy and Marine shore activities. When the expected official warning to American civilians to get out was issued, the Marines, working closely with local U. S. consulates, were prepared to move swiftly to facilitate the withdrawal. The amount of water lift and naval support necessary to accomplish the evacuation was determined by FMFWesPac and the plans were kept current to match the shifting political and military situation.[8]

In the Yangtze Valley, the only other area of China where large numbers of Americans were present, the overall responsibility for evacuation rested with Rear Admiral Frederick I.

[7] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: U. S. Dept of State record groups on China, Lot F79-830 U. S. Marines 1948 and Lot 55F174, Box 2—300 Evacuation, General (Dept of State RecCen); FMFWesPac StaffRpts, Jul-Dec48; U. S. Department of State Bulletin No. 496, v. 20, no. 1 (2Jan49), pp. 28–29, hereafter *State Bul 496*.

[8] IG memo to CMC, dtd 13Jul48, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–5.

Entwistle, Commander, Amphibious Forces, Western Pacific. Under Entwistle, the Director, Ground Division, Army Advisory Group, Nanking, and the Commander, Naval Port Facilities, Shanghai, were charged with planning and directing evacuation procedures in their respective regions. Missionaries, teachers, and businessmen in outlying sectors who wished to leave would be collected by air or whatever means possible and funnelled through the two cities toward ships bound for safe ports. Principal reliance for security forces under this plan was placed on Marine combat units detailed from Tsingtao or Guam with reinforcements provided by ships' landing parties, many of them trained by FMFWesPac.[9]

Naval authorities realized that the ground forces available to them were not strong enough to protect the widespread properties of Americans during the rioting and disorder that might accompany Communist attacks on major cities. The decision was made early in the summer, and was implicit in all plans prepared after July, that security forces would concentrate on safeguarding the lives of U. S. nationals during evacuation. The possible demands on FMFWesPac to provide troops to assist simultaneous operations in North China and the Yangtze Valley made the reinforcement of General Thomas' command a wise and necessary move.

In order to meet FMFWesPac's most pressing need for combat support, the personnel to man an artillery battery were requested from the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade on Guam. Initially, the artillerymen were held ready for airlift,[10] but in October, Battery D of the 11th Marines shipped out from the island, landed at Tsingtao on the 17th, and moved directly to positions at Tsangkou Field to bolster Marine defenses. The arrival of the battery marked the first increase in the strength of FMFWesPac above the ceiling imposed at its formation by the State Department. Further minor increases in troop strength were authorized but never effected, for the swift march of events caught up with and passed this decision.[11]

Preparations were made to dispatch a battalion landing team to Tsingtao from Guam in mid-October, either by air if an emergency warranted such a move, or by sea if it did not. Actually, the time in transit of the BLT would be less by sea than by air, since with the land transport planes then available the total airlift time would be 15½ days to move the 1,350 Marines and their half million pounds of equipment.[12] A simi-

[9] ComWesPacPhibFor OPlan No. 783, dtd 6Aug48 (OAB, NHD), Anxs A and B. Prior to the commencement of the evacuation, Admiral Entwistle was relieved on 1 December 1948 by Rear Admiral George C. Crawford. Gen Gerald C. Thomas ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 23Aug61.

[10] PlansOff, NavForWesPac ltr to G–3, 1st ProvMarBrig, dtd 5Jul48, Subj: FMFWesPac OPlans (ComNavWesPac S–A16 File, FRC, Mech).

[11] CG, FMFPac speedltr to CG, FMFWesPac, dtd 22Oct48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

[12] Encls (A) and (B) to CinCPac serial 000138 to CNO and ComNavForWesPac, dtd 21Oct48, Subj: Reinforcement of FMFWesPac, Tsingtao with forces presently available to 1st ProvMarBrig, FMF (ComNavForWesPac TS File, FRC, Mech).

lar estimate of lift time made by Fleet Air Wing One on 15 November indicated that use of 24 large seaplanes stationed in the Marianas would only cut the span of time needed by two days.[13] Unless the need for men was imperative enough to warrant piecemeal reinforcement, the best method of moving the BLT to China would be by ship.

The reason for the rush of preparations to bolster FMFWesPac was found in the successes of the Chinese Communists. On 24 September Mao's forces captured Tsinan, Shantung's capitol, and on 15 October the Red armies took Chinchow, the supply center for all CNA forces in Manchuria. In both instances, Nationalist relief columns made feeble attempts to rescue the besieged garrisons and were easily turned back by the triumphant Communists. Under the circumstances, the chance of the Nationalists holding their positions in Manchuria or in North China seemed slim, and Americans in China were advised to "consider the desirability of evacuation while normal transportation facilities were available." [14]

Between the 1st and 15th of November, the American Consulates and the Embassy issued this precautionary warning in all areas of China, and on the 11th, the Consul Generals at Peiping and Tientsin followed up with a statement:

> In as much as later evacuation on an emergency basis may be impossible, American citizens who do not desire to remain in North China should plan to leave at once by United States Naval vessel from Tientsin.[15]

By this time, all Marines had been transferred from Tientsin and Peiping, but a few returned to help process evacuees. A Marine officer with a rifle squad and five communications men flew to Tientsin from Tsingtao on the 14th; another officer and a communication detail reported to Peiping. These Marines assisted consulate personnel in loading out a landing ship and stayed until the 18th when the ship sailed. A similar detachment was sent to Tientsin for two days on the 25th to help evacuate other Americans who availed themselves of the naval lift.

The emergency condition activating plans to evacuate all U. S. nationals who wanted to leave China was set by Admiral Badger on 16 November as Ambassador John Leighton Stuart warned them to "plan at once to move to places of safety." [16] Concurrently, the 1st Brigade on Guam ordered the 9th Marines, suitably reinforced as a BLT, to embark on the APA *Bayfield* for movement to Tsingtao and temporary duty with FMFWesPac. The battalion was directed to be prepared to remain on board ship for an indefinite period in readiness for combat operations ashore.[17] On 28 November, BLT–9 sailed from Guam and reported by dispatch to Admiral Badger and General Thomas for orders.

While the Guam reinforcements were en route, the Marines at Tsingtao

[13] ComFAirWing One OPlan No. 4–48, dtd 15Nov48 (OAB, NHD).

[14] *State Bul 496*, p. 28.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[16] *Ibid.*

[17] 1st ProvMarBrig (Reinf), FMF OpO No. 8–48, dtd 16Nov 48 (ComNavWesPac TS File, FRC, Mech).

moved swiftly to prepare for their own eventual withdrawal. The 2d Provisional Combat Service Group (Light), as 12th Service Battalion had been redesignated in July, began loading out supplies to reduce all force stocks to a 90-day level. Large working parties from the infantry battalion not on guard duty were furnished to expedite this process. Most Navy and Marine dependents left Tsingtao in November in advance of their bulky household effects which were crated for shipment on following cargo vessels. The remaining dependents left in the first days of December. While other American civilians in China could choose to remain or go despite their government's warning, military families had no option; they were ordered to places of safety. In like manner, American women employees of the Embassy and the dependents of diplomatic personnel were directed to leave.

The evacuation plans long in preparation worked smoothly. Some few foreign nationals, mainly dependents of diplomatic officials, were evacuated along with the Americans who were leaving. Between 1 November and 5 December, 1,316 persons left China, 751 by plane, mainly from Shanghai, and 560 by Navy and Army transports. By 20 December the figure had risen to 3,944, of which more than 1,500 were military dependents. In the process, North China had been virtually cleared of American civilians, with only a few businessmen and missionaries remaining as the responsibility of skeleton consulate staffs. Nanking was emptied of its many American military and economic advisory groups by early December, and Shanghai, where approximately 2,500 American civilians remained, became the focal point of evacuation efforts.

Once the exodus from Nanking got underway, with most people leaving by air while a shuttle of Navy landing craft carried away military supplies and household goods, the city was nearly clear of potential evacuees by 17 November.[18] On that date, at the request of Ambassador Stuart, a rifle platoon of the 3d Marines was sent from Tsingtao to the Nationalist capital to provide security for the American Embassy. The platoon travelled by APD, and the high-speed transport stayed at anchor in the Yangtze off Nanking as added insurance for the possible emergency evacuation of the Embassy staff. Stuart believed that the presence of the Marines would prevent lawless mobs from attempting to pillage the Embassy in the interim between Nationalist collapse and Communist takeover. The latter act seemed inevitable by November's end, and the ambassador felt that Chinese police could not be relied upon for adequate protection.

On the arrival of the 9th Marines at Tsingtao, one rifle company (A) and some of the landing team's reinforcing elements went ashore as a reserve while the remainder of the unit stayed on board the *Bayfield* ready for immediate use. On 5 December, Admiral Badger reported to the Chief of Naval Operations that the 9th was ready to move to Shanghai on order. After a discussion

[18] CTF 78 ltr to ComNavWesPac, dtd 6Dec48, Subj: Movement of Evacuees in Yangtze by U. S. Forces (ComNavWesPac A16–3 File, FRC, Mech).

of the situation with the American Consul General, and with Ambassador Stuart's approval, Badger reported:

> Considerable conjecture and talk has already taken place regarding Marines in Shanghai. Their appearance now would cause little additional excitement inasmuch as they are needed to augment naval forces already there. Am ordering *Bayfield* with BLT-9 embarked, minus reserve units, proceed Shanghai ETA 16 Dec. . . .[19]

SHANGHAI STAND BY [20]

The last few weeks of 1948 witnessed the end of effective Nationalist resistance in Hopeh, and in January both Tientsin and Peiping fell easily into Communist hands. The precipitating factor in this defeat was attributed in later years to the arrival of a badly needed but defective shipment of weapons and equipment at Tangku on 29 November. The military gear, American surplus from depots in Japan, had been shipped in unopened crates just as it had been packed at the war's end; at its destination much of the materiel was found to be in poor condition or useless for lack of vital parts. Although immediate steps to correct deficiencies were taken, some American officials felt that the event did lethal damage to the fighting spirit of the already reeling CNA troops.[21]

Regardless of the truth of this supposition, the end result of the civil war was already evident when the shipment arrived. On 15 December, the Director of the Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, Major General David Barr, USA, reported to Washington:

> Only a policy of unlimited United States aid including the immediate employment of United States armed forces to block the southern advance of the Communists, which I emphatically do not recommend, would enable the Nationalist Government to maintain a foothold in southern China against a determined Communist advance. . . . The complete defeat of the Nationalist Army . . . is inevitable.[22]

With a puzzling disregard for the facts of past performance, the officials of a number of major U. S. firms in Shanghai felt that they could do business with the Communists. They feared a probable period of lawlessness at the time of changeover of governments, however, and wanted the Marines to guard their properties, such as the city's power company, from mob damage.[23] The official American policy of using Marines to protect lives only was reiterated, but a consulate spokesman pointed out that the concept was broad enough "so that emergency or tem-

[19] ComNavWesPac disp to CNO, dtd 20Dec48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

[20] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: U. S. Dept of State record group Tsingtao ConGenIntelRpts 1949 (Dept of State RecCen); ComNavWesPac OpO No. 1-49, dtd 24Jan49 (OAB, NHD); *FMFWesPac StaffRpts* Dec48-Jan49; 3d Mar S-1 and S-3 PeriodicRpts, Feb49, dtd 1Mar49 (S&C Files, HQMC), hereafter *3d Mar StfRpts* with appropriate following months; Muster Rolls of the units concerned (Unit Diary Sec, PersDept, HQMC); *U. S. Relations with China.*

[21] Testimony of VAdm Oscar C. Badger and MajGen David Barr in *Military Situation in the Far East*, pp. 2694, 2745-2749.

[22] Quoted in *U. S. Relations with China*, p. 336.

[23] "American Business Request for Marines," *The North China News* (Shanghai), 8Dec48, p. 1.

porary protection might be given to property if necessary to guard Americans living here." [24]

On the arrival of the *Bayfield* in the Whangpoo River off Shanghai, the announcement was made that the 9th Marines would land only if American lives and property were threatened. If the need for emergency evacuation procedures arose, the evacuees would assemble at four major collecting points convenient to the American community where the Marines would furnish necessary protection and cover withdrawal to the U. S. Navy's dock and warehouse area. From the docks, Navy amphibious craft would transfer the evacuees to ships located downriver in the Whangpoo anchorage.[25]

The departure of the 9th Marines for Shanghai lent impetus to the withdrawal preparations at Tsingtao. Communist successes had the effect of completely isolating the city, making it the only Nationalist stronghold left north of the Yangtze. The Central Government, with a target date of 1 February, began withdrawing the men and materiel that made up the thriving naval training center which had grown up at the port following the arrival of the Americans. The fold-up of U. S. naval shore-based facilities kept pace. On 21 January, the Chief of Naval Operations directed Admiral Badger to embark all shore-based units, except for a minimum staff needed to operate recreational facilities for fleet liberty parties and a Marine shore patrol detachment. The ground elements of FMFWesPac, less a reduced 3d Marines BLT and the 9th Marines on stand-by at Shanghai, were to load out for Camp Pendleton and the 1st Marine Division. AirFMFWesPac, less MGCIS-7 which would report to MAG-24 on Guam to continue air control duties, was ordered to move to Cherry Point. The escort carrier *Rendova* would join VMF-211,[26] whose pilots had qualified to operate from its decks in August practice flights.[27]

Part of the movements and transfers directed from Washington were already underway or accomplished by the time the formal directive arrived. The platoon of the 3d Marines on duty at Nanking was relieved in late December by a similar unit of the 9th. On 6 January, Admiral Badger returned the reserve units of the 9th Marines to Guam, and on the 10th, Battery D of the 11th Marines also left Tsingtao for the 1st Brigade. Loading operations to complete the withdrawal of all U.S. supplies and equipment were continued by 2d Combat Service Group and the units concerned.

By 21 January, all VMF-211 pilots had requalified as carrier pilots and the squadron moved on board its new home. The R5Ds of VMR-153 flew out in several echelons before the 29th when the ground personnel and heavy equipment left for the States. Two days later,

[24] United Press disp of 9Dec48 in *North China Marine* (Tsingtao), 11Dec48, p. 1.

[25] AmerConGen Shanghai disp No. 55 to Dept, dtd 3Feb49, Subj: Protection and Evacuation of American Nationals (Lot F79, Box 45, File 300—Evacuation—Emergency Plan, Dept of State RecCen).

[26] CNO disp to ComNavWesPac, dtd 21Jan49 (S&C Files, HQMC).

[27] AirFMFWesPac S-3 PeriodicRpt No. 16, Aug48, dtd 7Sep48 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

Tsangkou Field was closed to all American planes and flight operations ceased as AirFMFWesPac Headquarters Squadron secured and mounted out. On the departure of the last shore-based Marine planes, air transport and liaison for ComNavWesPac was furnished by a seaplane detachment of Fleet Air Wing 1 based on a tender anchored in Tsingtao's harbor. Combat air support, if needed, would be the responsibility of the *Rendova's* air group.

By 3 February, all elements of FMFWesPac were on board ship except Company C, 3d Marines, which was assigned duties as shore patrol to police the limited liberty area kept open for fleet recreation. Another 3d Marines company (B) was transferred to the 1st Marines in keeping with Badger's orders to reduce the strength of the battalion remaining at Tsingtao. The sole reinforcing elements added to the 3d Marines were an engineer platoon and a small detachment, mostly motor transport of 2d Combat Service Group, left to support the final wind up of logistic activities.

On 8 February, when General Thomas and the major portion of his command sailed from Tsingtao, the end of FMFWesPac waited only the disbandment of its Headquarters and Service Battalion in Camp Pendleton and the rejoining of its task force elements to the 1st Marine Division during the following month. For Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Colley and the officers and men of the 3d Marines that he commanded, the remainder of their time at Tsingtao was to be a period of watchful waiting, comparatively uneventful and yet potentially trouble-filled. A trickle of evacuees continued to flow through the beleaguered port, but most Americans who wanted to leave North China had gotten out by February and those few people who left later were generally foreigners or stateless persons certified for evacuation by the consulate.

Tsingtao was kept alive mainly by infusions of American economic aid which provided raw cotton for the city's textile mills and coal, flour, and rice for the refugee population. The role was hardly enough to keep Tsingtao in robust or even passable health, and the days of the port under Nationalist control were obviously numbered. Its capture was easily within the capabilities of Mao Tse-tung's armies, but the drive to cross the Yangtze and destroy the main Nationalist forces had priority in Communist military efforts. The people of Tsingtao no longer considered U. S. naval forces to be an effective shield against the Communists and, according to the American Consul General, were convinced that the Marines and Navy combat ships would take no steps to prevent a Communist entry into the city.

WINDUP ACTIVITIES [28]

By March the Communist armies had reached the Yangtze River on a broad

[28] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: Tsingtao ComGen IntelRpts, *op. cit.; 3d Mar StfRpts*, Feb–Apr-49; 3d Mar S–2 PeriodicRpt, Apr49, dtd 1May-49 (ComNavWesPac A–9 File, FRC, Mech); Muster Rolls of the units concerned (Unit Diary Sec, PersDept, HQMC); *Military Situation in the Far East;* C. E. Lucas Philips, *Escape of the Amethyst* (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1957).

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front and were poised to invade South China. While his forces regrouped for the attack, Mao Tse-tung put pressure on the Nationalist government to cease fighting or else be annihilated. Several weeks of negotiations proved futile for there was no ground for compromise; both sides knew that despite the surface appearance of an agreement, its practical effect was absolute Communist victory.

Under the circumstances, Tsingtao was more than ever a doomed city and held its status as an American naval base on a day-to-day basis. By mid-March, Admiral Badger had decided to move his flagship from the port and to cut further the number of service ships remaining. What was left of the one-time thriving base was either operating from shipboard or was ready to mount out on short notice. There was no longer any need for the 3d Marines to stay at Tsingtao, and Badger ordered the battalion south to relieve the 9th Marines. On 17 March, BLT–3 (less its shore patrol company) sailed for Shanghai in its transport, the APA *Chilton*, and dropped anchor in the Whangpoo the following day.

After a period of familiarization with the evacuation plan and with the city itself, the 3d Marines was ready to take over the watch. In order to reach the strength required for the evacuation procedures which had been worked out, the battalion needed to gain back the rifle company it had lost when FMF-WesPac left Tsingtao. Before its departure on 30 March, the 9th Marines transferred its Company C to the 3d which redesignated the unit Company B. The selection was a natural one since most of the new Company B was already ashore in Shanghai guarding American naval facilities in the dock area and the remaining platoon furnished the embassy guard at Nanking. In addition to these units, the 3d Marines set up a small shore patrol detachment which was quartered on the Shanghai Bund and provided a ship's guard to Admiral Badger's flagship, the AGC *Eldorado*.

The stay of the 3d Marines at Shanghai was a short one. Less than a month after the battalion arrived at the city, an outrageous Communist attack on British naval forces gravely increased the risk of the deep involvement of American ships and men in a similar incident. Admiral Badger made the decision to withdraw on strong evidence that the Communists would no longer recognize the neutrality of American ships in Chinese waters.

So confident were the Communists of their success that they openly announced the date when their ultimatum to the Nationalists would expire and the advance across the Yangtze would begin. In an effort to beat this deadline, the British attempted to relieve the station ship which had been maintained at Nanking for emergency evacuation of Commonwealth nationals. On 20 April, in the narrow reaches of the Yangtze below the capital city, the relief ship, HMS *Amethyst*, was shelled by Communist artillery, forced aground on an island, and raked unmercifully by rifle and machine gun fire.

The Communists' immediate and demonstrably false claim was that the British frigate was operating in conjunction with Nationalist warships.

The Red artillerymen also delivered their fire against HMS *Consort,* the erstwhile station ship which attempted unsuccessfully to rescue the *Amethyst* and she was barely able to limp downriver with heavy structural damage and a long casualty list. A relief force headed by the cruiser *London,* steaming up from Shanghai, was unable to break through the deadly barrier of artillery fire and sustained in its turn considerable casualties and materiel damage. The Communist gunners firing at point-blank range at large targets in restricted waters could hardly miss in this unequal engagement and were able to keep up their attack despite murderous return fire by the British. After these rescue attempts were beaten off, the *Amethyst* stayed stranded in the river for more than three months while the Communists tried to gain maximum propaganda value for their "capture." Finally, in an incredible feat of seamanship and courage, the frigate's crew brought their ship out to safety in a night-long dash through the gantlet of artillery.

Admiral Badger was quick to offer assistance to the British ships damaged in the first few days of the *Amethyst* incident and to provide the means for more effective care of their casualties. The grim lesson of the destructive effect of field artillery fire on naval vessels unable to maneuver freely or reply effectively was a costly one. More than 40 men were killed and 78 wounded aboard three ships. With the help of 3d Marines' corpsmen and stretcher bearers, the wounded men were transferred to the American hospital ship *Repose* which sailed for Hong Kong on 25 April.

The Communist action against the British was followed by threats that similar punitive measures would be taken against any foreign warship which attempted to sail on the river. Since all plans for the evacuation of American civilians had been predicated on free use of the Whangpoo River, Shanghai's access route to the broad mouth of the Yangtze, the altered situation called for a reappraisal of American objectives. If Badger ordered his ships to remain where they could be attacked, he would undoubtedly be forced to use all means at his command, including carrier air and naval gunfire, to retaliate. The Admiral considered that such action would have an adverse effect on the safety of the Americans who desired to stay in China and would certainly involve the U. S. more deeply in the morass of civil war. Consequently, he recommended and had approved a decision to make one last call for Americans to leave and then to withdraw his forces.[29]

The State Department was convinced that most Americans who still remained in China were prepared to stay regardless of the risk. Under the circumstances, the platoon of Marines at Nanking was no longer needed to assist in evacuation, and on 21 April the men flew back to Shanghai leaving behind five NCOs who were transferred to State Department guard duty as a regular detachment. The arrival of the Nanking Marines was followed very

[29] ComNavWesPac disp to CNO and ConGen Shanghai, dtd 22Apr49 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

CHINESE NATIONALIST SENTRIES *relieve Marine bridge guards at Chinwangtao in October 1946. (USMC 228263)*

A PORTION *of the Marines remaining in Tsingtao debark from USS* Chilton, *on which they are billeted, to relieve guard posts throughout the city in March 1949. (USN 80-G-706944)*

shortly by the assembly on board the *Chilton* of the whole BLT–3. Company A remained temporarily on Shanghai's docks to shepherd out the last 119 American civilians who heeded the consul general's final warning to leave. On 28 April, their task finished, the rear echelon of the battalion rode an LSM downstream to their transport, and on the 29th the 3d Marines sailed for Tsingtao.

The purpose of the trip north to the Shantung port was to readjust some of the cargo hastily loaded out at Shanghai and to redistribute naval personnel evacuated from the port facilities there to various fleet units.[30] The *Chilton* sailed for the States on 6 May, leaving behind Company C of the 3d as the sole remnant of an FMF task force that had once topped 50,000 men. The company, which had long had most of its gear loaded on board a cruiser for ready employment as an emergency landing force, shifted its station to shipboard on 3 May, but continued to furnish shore patrol detachments.

Relief for Company C was enroute to Tsingtao when the rest of the 3d Marines sailed for home. Early in April, the 7th Marines at Camp Pendleton had been alerted for movement to join Admiral Badger's command and replace the 3d, and on the 21st the battalion embarked on two cruisers at San Pedro. By the time the ships arrived at Pearl Harbor, the swift march of events in China had caught up with original replacement plans and Badger no longer wanted a battalion. Instead he asked for a rifle platoon to reinforce the regular Marine ships' detachment on two cruisers, plus a headquarters and a third platoon to be stationed on the *Eldorado*.[31] Company C of the 7th Marines was detached for this task at Pearl Harbor on 1 May, and the remainder of the battalion returned to California within a week, completing what was certainly the shortest tour of overseas duty in its history.

The replacement Company C on board the *Manchester* and *St. Paul* arrived at Tsingtao on 14 May; two days later the cruisers which had been relieved on station departed with Company C of the 3d Marines. The stay of new arrivals at Tsingtao was fleeting; almost as soon as the Marines he had asked for had transshipped to the *Eldorado*, Admiral Badger left for Hong Kong and the two cruisers followed in a few days time. The *St. Paul* visited Shanghai just ahead of the Communist forces which captured the city on 25 May, and the *Manchester* left Tsingtao on the 26th when it was clear that the Communists were at last ready to take the city. These two events, the fall of Shanghai and the imminent loss of Tsingtao, had the effect of cancelling the requirement for Marine ship-based reinforcements. There was no longer any opportunity to land in the portions of China held by the Communists without incurring casualties, and the Americans who had unwisely remained to do business as usual could expect no succor from the Navy.

[30] ComNavWesPac disp to CNO, dtd 30Apr49 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

[31] CG, FMFPac msg to CG, 1st MarDiv, dtd 10Apr49; ComNavWesPac disp to CNO, dtd 29Apr49; CNO disp to ComNavWesPac, dtd 29Apr49 (S&C Files, HQMC, FRC, Alex).

The cruisers with the platoons of Company C on board rendezvoused at Okinawa with the *Eldorado* after leaving China. There the company reassembled on the command ship and left with it for the U. S., arriving and disembarking at San Diego on 16 May. The return home of the last element of the FMF to be assigned to Naval Forces, Western Pacific, brought an end to a long and colorful era of Marine History. The swarming Red tide which engulfed mainland China wrought a change that erased forever the way of life which had once made China duty a coveted goal and the China Marine an envied person in the Corps.

CONCLUSION

In the considerable volume of literature that has been written in castigation, explanation, or defense of United States policy in China during the postwar years, there is only passing mention of the part played by the Marines in carrying out this policy. Virtually all memoirs and records concede the enormous difficulty of being at one time an active ally of Nationalist China and at the same time neutral in the civil war it was fighting. Too little recognition is given to the controlled reaction of Americans who were exposed to Communist harassment and attack and who meted out a frustrated limited punishment in return, a retaliatory attitude at odds with all Marine training and conditioning.

The men of III Amphibious Corps and its successor commands had it in their power as individuals and small groups to go beyond the restriction of their orders—to lash back with full fury against their attackers, to hunt them down relentlessly, to shell and strafe the villages and farms that hid them—but instead they gave the disciplined response expected of Marines. The greatest tribute that can be paid these men is that they maintained whatever position their government assigned them and did so in the spirit as well as the letter of the orders under which they served.

The wisdom inspired by hindsight can provide many solutions to the problems that faced the U. S. in China. Interesting though these theories may be, they are academic arguments now. One practical lesson learned, and a costly one, was never to underestimate the strength of Communism or the determination of its adherents. Promises, agreements, and negotiations were all regarded as means to an end by the Chinese Communists, and the Marines ambushed at Anping and those who fought at Hsin Ho received the brunt of this practical education for their fellow Americans.

It was not the Communists but the Japanese who were the expected source of trouble when IIIAC first landed in North China, and one of the marvels of the postwar period is the open cooperation that was received from former bitter enemies. The Marines stepped into a complicated repatriation setup and with the help of the Japanese made its solution seem easy. Where opposition might have been expected, none was received, and a few hundred Marine administrators and guards were able to do a job that could have required thousands of men. Techniques of repatriation worked out at theater level were translated into practice virtually without a

hitch. The impartial justice exercised by the Marines in North China and by all the services throughout the Pacific in seeing defeated soldiers and uprooted civilians home was an incalculable but evident asset in the later relations of the U. S. with Japan.

The mutual trust of the Japanese and the Marines extended to the point where they mounted guard over the railroads of Hopeh together. And the Marines relieved the Japanese when the Nationalists were unable to do so in order that the American pledge to facilitate repatriation could be honored. The mission of keeping open the lines of communication between Peiping and Chinwangtao and the responsibility for seeing that KMA coal reached its destination gave the IIIAC tasks that savored much of the duties which fell to the Marine expeditionary forces in the Caribbean islands in the '20s and '30s. The economic well-being of a large and important part of Nationalist China depended during the winter of 1945–46 on the security measures taken by General Rockey's command.

Important though the humanitarian aspects of Marine missions were, their political repercussions were far greater and longer lasting. The support of the Central Government involved in the act of securing ports of entry into Red-dominated territory ensured the enduring enmity of the Communists. The decision not to follow up this initial support by using all the force necessary to restore order in North China gave immeasurable but certain strength to the Communists, but it was a decision in keeping with the temper of the American people at the time. The Marines by their very presence were a force for stability in China, not because of their own strength, for that was soon whittled away, but because they stood for the power of their country. In effect, American action secured for the Nationalists a base of operations from which they launched their drive to recover Manchuria and North China. Thereafter, the American position was entangled irretrievably with the fortunes of the Central Government's armies.

During the year and a half that a large portion of the FMF was stationed in North China, the Marine Corps underwent a drastic reduction in strength. The men who served so well along the rail lines, at the coal mines, and in the headquarters cities were often fresh from boot camp. There was constant drain of experienced men from corps, division, and wing units that matched or exceeded the ravages of combat, but withal the job set out was done. A determined and continuous effort was made to maintain high standards of discipline and to continue training by whatever means possible. Again, as has been the case many times in the Marine Corps past, commanders were able to count on the fact that their veterans and inexperienced men would coalesce as units because of the tangible pride they had in themselves as Marines. To those who have not experienced this feeling or seen its results, it may seem questionable, but it exists and was in large part responsible for the cohesiveness of Marine units in China at a time when demobilization and demanding commitments might have caused a different result.

Not until the 1st Marine Division pulled out of China and the mission of the remaining units was narrowed to security of American installations at a naval advanced base was there time or opportunity to turn to amphibious training. At Tsingtao in 1947–48, the battalion landing teams of FMFWesPac were able to renew their skills in the complicated business which is the Marine Corps primary mission. When the State Department was convinced that Americans should leave China, these ready battalions were a logical on-the-scene choice to handle the job of emergency evacuation and to provide protection if need be. As it happened, emergency employment of the ship-based Marines was unnecessary, but this fact was in keeping with their selection for the task. Their readiness to land and ability to handle a difficult assignment with dispatch was sufficient insurance that more normal measures could be used.

When the whole of Marine activities in North China in the postwar years is considered, the variety of missions accomplished is considerable and the common factor that threads them all is the adaptability of Marines to the job at hand. Perhaps the most valuable legacy of this tour of China duty is one often taken for granted—the fund of command experience in a variety of situations which was garnered by young officers and NCOs. This reservoir of responsibility well earned has been drawn on repeatedly since in peace and war.

PART VI

Conclusion

Amphibious Doctrine in World War II[1]

THE GENESIS

One would not exaggerate by saying that amphibious warfare was the primary offensive tactic in the American conduct of the Pacific War. Simply defined, an amphibious assault is "an operation involving the coordinated employment of military and naval forces dispatched by sea for an assault on a hostile shore." [2] In his final report of the war to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral King stated:

> The outstanding development of this war, in the field of joint undertakings, was the perfection of amphibious operations, the most difficult of all operations in modern warfare. Our success in all such operations, from Normandy to Okinawa, involved huge quantities of specialized equipment, exhaustive study and planning, and thorough training as well as complete integration of all forces, under unified command.[3]

Marine Corps interest in what is termed amphibious warfare may be said to have begun as early as 1898, when, in the Spanish-American War, Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington's battalion of Marines landed at Guantanamo, Cuba, to seize a major naval base for fleet operations in the blockade of Santiago.[4] In the years following this landing, the advanced base concept envisioned the establishment on a permanent basis of a force capable of seizing and defending advanced bases which a fleet could employ to support its prosecution of naval war in distant waters. According to the theory of how advanced base operations were to be conducted, primary emphasis was on the defense of the base. There was apparently no consideration in the pre-World War I period of the feasibility of large scale landings against heavily defended islands, which, of course, was the nature of much of the amphibious warfare in the Pacific in World War II.

As the international commitments and influence of the United States increased during the early years of the 20th century, the requirements for military and strategic planning grew apace. American interest in Latin America and U. S. participation in World War I accelerated

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal;* Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War;* LtGen Holland M. Smith, "The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the U. S. Navy." in 10 parts, *Marine Corps Gazette,* v. 30, no. 6 (Jun46) through v. 31, no. 3 (Mar47), hereafter Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," *Marine Corps Gazette,* with issue and page numbers; Maj Robert D. Heinl, Jr., "The U. S. Marine Corps: Author of Modern Amphibious War," *USNI Proceedings,* v. 73, no. 11 (Nov47), hereafter Heinl, *The USMC.*

[2] Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," *Marine Corps Gazette,* v. 30, no. 6 (Jun46), p.14.

[3] *War Reports,* p. 658.

[4] For a thorough treatment of Marine participation in the evolution of amphibious warfare, see Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal,* pt I, and Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War,* chaps 1–2.

the need for the preparation of long-range programs, and the Marine Corps was not exempted from having to look to the future. Although expeditionary service in revolt-torn Latin America constituted a heavy and continuing drain on the services of the Marine Corps and forced it to focus attention on that area, a few farsighted military strategists, such as the brilliant Major Earl H. Ellis, directed their thoughts to the Pacific and to the prospect of war between the United States and Japan.

In the general distribution of the spoils following World War I, Japan was given the mandate over former German possessions in the Central Pacific. Thus, the strategic balance in that area was changed drastically in favor of Japan, which now had authority over a deep zone of island outposts guarding its Empire. Once they were fortified and supported by the Japanese fleet, they would provide a formidable threat to the advance of the United States fleet across the Pacific if a war broke out.

Ellis was one of the first to recognize the danger posed by the strategic shift in the Pacific. This awareness influenced him to modify his earlier ideas about the nature of a war with Japan and in 1921 he submitted his new thoughts in the form of Operation Plan 712, "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia." He foresaw operations for the seizure of specific islands in the Marshall, Caroline, and Palau groups, some of which Marines actually assaulted in World War II. His views were generally shared by the Commandant, Major General John A. Lejeune, and other high ranking Marine officers.

The Marine Corps did little in the area of amphibious planning and training during the late 1920s and early 1930s because in those years it was busily engaged in the pacification of Nicaragua, Haiti, and Santo Domingo, and in protecting American lives and interests in the midst of the unrest in China. It was thus precluded from engaging in large-scale amphibious exercises during these years. None could be held in any case because military appropriations were slim. Additionally, the Navy was more interested in preparing for traditional fleet surface actions. Nevertheless, much thought and study was given to amphibious logistic supply in the Navy-Marine Corps maneuvers at Culebra in 1924 and during the joint Army-Navy-Marine Corps maneuvers at Hawaii in 1925. Out of these meager efforts, the genesis of present amphibious doctrine appeared early in the academic year 1930–1931, when the Commandant of the Marine Corps Schools directed a committee of four officers—Majors Charles D. Barrett, Pedro A. del Valle, and Lyle H. Miller, and Lieutenant Walter C. Ansel, USN—to prepare a manual embodying existing knowledge concerning landing operations. Although never published, *Marine Corps Landing Operations*, as it was entitled, comprised the first formal effort to assimilate current amphibious doctrine. As General del Valle recalled:

> . . . the boss man in that show was Charlie Barrett, who was a brilliant officer, and the rest of us were 'makee-learnee' and all that we did was study the meager historic records . . . and semi-historic records that existed. I remember that I had read about the Mesopotamian

> campaign of Sir Charles Townshend, and he gave me some of the principles of a landing attack that we incorporated into this original study. . . .[5]

After Major Barrett, as general chairman of the committee, had blocked out the general form the manual was to take, he was transferred to Headquarters Marine Corps and his place was taken by Major DeWitt Peck, who, in addition, was head of the Tactical Section of the Marine Corps Schools. Major Peck:

> . . . wrote the basic chapter . . . and parcelled out the other chapters to the appropriate school instructors, artillery to the art[illery] instructor, etc. As the chapters were finished [Peck] as editor, coordinated the whole. . . .
>
> Upon approval of the CO of the Schools, the manual was sent to HQMC where it was reviewed, I believe, by Barrett and [Major Alfred H.] Noble. The only important change they made was in the handling of beach and shore parties, reversing the school concept.[6]

The groundwork prepared by these officers at the Marine Corps Schools resulted in further study of the subject at Quantico and elsewhere. Meanwhile, the Fleet Marine Force was established in September 1933, and became increasingly important in Marine Corps training, planning, and thinking.[7] Immediately following the activation of the FMF, it became necessary to prepare a textbook which would incorporate the theory and practice of landing operations for the use of the infant tactical organization. Work on this text began at the Marine Corps Schools in November 1933, when all classes were suspended and both faculty and students were assigned the duty of writing a manual that would present in published form a detailed account of the doctrine and techniques to be employed in training for and conducting amphibious assault operations.

The final result of this crash program appeared in January 1934 under the title *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. The contents and title of the manual were revised several times in the following years, and the Navy accepted it as official doctrine in 1938, when, entitled *Tentative Landing Operations Manual*, the book was reprinted and distributed as *Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP–167)*. Three years later, the War Department recognized the worth and potential of amphibious tactics and published the substance of the work as *Field Manual 31–5*.

Army interest in amphibious assault tactics had resulted earlier in the participation of the 2d Provisional Army Brigade (18th Infantry and two battalions of the 7th Field Artillery) in Fleet Landing Exercise Number (FLEX) 4 in 1938. Not until 1941 did the Army again take part in a FLEX or evince any overt

[5] LtGen Pedro A. del Valle interview by HistBr, dtd 17Nov66 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC).

[6] MajGen DeWitt Peck ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 9May66, hereafter *Peck ltr 1966*.

[7] An example of Marine Corps attitudes concerning the establishment of the Fleet Marine Force may be found in the following comment of the Commandant, Major General Thomas Holcomb, regarding Major General Louis McC. Little: "I have selected General Little for the most important command in the Marine Corps —the FMF." Officer's Personnel Jacket, Louis McC. Little (0562) (GSA, MilPersRecCenter, St. Louis, Mo.).

interest in amphibious warfare. It was in this year that joint amphibious training of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps organizations was first conducted on the east coast. Under the experienced guidance of Major General Holland M. Smith, commander of the Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet, and his staff composed of officers from the three services, the 1st Joint Training Force (1st Marine Division and 1st Infantry Division) conducted maneuvers at Culebra and later at Onslow Beach, North Carolina. Following in 1942, the 9th Infantry Division joined the 1st Marine Division in landing exercises on the east coast. Meanwhile, other Army divisions were similarly involved in the west coast training together with FMF units and learning the fundamentals of amphibious warfare. The results of this training were thoroughly demonstrated throughout the war wherever Army divisions made amphibious assaults.

Lessons learned and gradual advances made in the period 1934–1940, and the refinements that appeared in the fleet landing exercises conducted during the prewar years, placed at the disposal of United States forces at the beginning of World War II a body of tactical principles forming a basic amphibious doctrine. At Guadalcanal, Marines were the first to put to the test of war this doctrine, and found it practicable. General Vandegrift, who commanded the Guadalcanal assault troops, later wrote:

> We were as well trained and as well armed as time and our peacetime experience allowed us to be. We needed combat to tell us how effective our training, our doctrine, and our weapons had been. We tested them against the enemy and found that they worked.[8]

The two key words in General Holland Smith's definition of amphibious tactics noted above are "coordinated" and "assault." In the formal body of amphibious doctrine presented in early 1934, the Marine authors had recognized that an amphibious operation was a joint undertaking of great complexity and that the landing of troops on a hostile shore had to be accomplished as a tactical movement. The steps leading to a successful landing operation included an approach, deployment, and assault by the landing force following an adequate preparatory bombardment and accompanied by the effective supporting fires of surface and air forces. Basically, this is how Allied amphibious operations were conducted in World War II and since.

Also basic to the conduct of an amphibious assault was the organization, founded on well-established concepts, of the amphibious task force and its major elements. Generally, such a force was comprised of the following: a transport group, a fire support group, an air group, a mine group, a salvage group, and a screening group, all naval units; and a landing force, composed of Marine units for the most part. The latter was conceived as a mobile striking force containing self-sufficient combat elements that could be employed with a maximum degree of flexibility.

The nucleus of the landing force was usually the Marine division, which was

[8] Gen Alexander A. Vandegrift ltr, dtd 5 Dec 47, in Maj John L. Zimmerman, *The Guadalcanal Campaign* (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1949), p. v.

often reinforced by corps troops, and sometimes Army units. In the division were three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and division, special, and service troops, the composition, organization, and strength of which underwent several changes in the course of the war. According to established doctrine, the assignment to the Marine landing force of troops and equipment for an amphibious operation was based on the impending mission and the lift capability of the assault transports carrying the troops to the target.

Not all phases of amphibious operations were emphasized during the fleet landing exercises before 1940. Basic logistic planning was relatively simple in this period because there was little equipment to embark and hardly any assault shipping worthy of the name to embark it in, especially when compared to conditions in the war years. One logistics shortcoming which was brought to light following the early assault operations in the Pacific concerned the over-the-beach handling of supplies. While not completely resolved, this problem was considerably eased with each succeeding operation as the planners attempted to correct the mistakes of previous landings.

In reviewing the development of amphibious tactics, General Holland M. Smith, who has been called the "Father of Amphibious Warfare," stated:

> Amphibious preparedness in the two years prior to Guadalcanal consisted on the one hand of full-scale production of the materials which had been found suitable for landing operations in the experimental period before 1940 and on the other of training military and naval personnel to use that materiel in accordance with the tactics and techniques, which had also been developed, in war.[9]

Faced with the imminence of war, Congress made adequate funds available for a speedup of defense preparations. Some of this money was allotted to the Navy and Marine Corps, which then began to eliminate personnel and materiel shortages as rapidly as possible. The most important task facing the Marine Corps as it prepared for the world conflict certain to erupt was to train troops in amphibious tactics utilizing the doctrine, equipment, and materiel then available.

As General Vandegrift commented, Guadalcanal proved Marine tactics were sound. The subsequent development of amphibious tactics following later landings and combat ashore in the Pacific did little to change basic doctrine, but did serve to teach Americans how to land more troops and materiel on the beach in a shorter period of time and at less cost. In the course of the war, existing techniques were perfected and refined at the same time that new solutions (JASCO, air support control, and underwater demolition teams) and the employment of new equipment (radar, landing ships and craft, amphibious command ships, and escort carriers) were developed and integrated with the basic amphibious warfare doctrine to eliminate old problems.[10] It was readily apparent that, no matter how sound Marine tactics were, they were ineffective unless dynamic, intelligent, and well-in-

[9] Smith, "Amphibious Tactics," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 30, no. 10 (Oct46), p. 45.

[10] *Ibid.*, v. 30, no. 11 (Nov46), p. 47.

formed commanders and highly trained and disciplined troops employed them aggressively, vigorously, and resourcefully. The Navy and Marine Corps learned lessons in every assault operation that they conducted during the war; in the final analysis, the experiences gained in one landing helped to achieve the successes in each following one.

The Pacific War may be roughly divided into three periods,[11] during which amphibious tactics were developed and gained optimum results. The first or defensive period began with the attack on Pearl Harbor and lasted until the landings on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The second, a period of limited offensives, began with the Guadalcanal operation; the third was an offensive period heralded by the Tarawa invasion in November 1943. In the opening year of American offensive operations, United States commanders learned that close cooperation between landing force and naval staffs through the planning and training phases for a landing and during its execution was vital to its success.

COMMAND RELATIONS

In World War II "joint forces fought in assault on a scale never before dreamed of. So much combined effort called for the highest possible degree of coordination."[12] For the Marine Corps, the delineation of command responsibilities between the amphibious force commander and the landing force commander was an important factor in the success of the advance across the Pacific.

The chain of command in a force established to conduct an amphibious assault was relatively simple, at least in theory, and Guadalcanal was the testing ground for this facet of amphibious doctrine. According to *FTP–167*:

> d. The attack force commander will usually be the senior naval commander of the units of the fleet comprising the attack force. . . . Provision must be made in advance for continuity of command within the landing area during the course of the operation.[13]

And this was all that *FTP–167* said about command relations. Essentially, the naval amphibious force commander would have the primary authority for decisions affecting either the landing force or the various support groups, each of which would have co-equal command status and parallel command functions under his direction. The pattern was thus set in the Guadalcanal landing for the concept of command relations—worked out in peacetime—to be employed in a combat situation for the first time.

At Guadalcanal, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commanding Gen-

[11] Admiral Spruance set up this arbitrary but practical division in a lecture presented to the Royal United Service Institution in London on 30 October 1946. Adm Raymond A. Spruance, "The Victory in the Pacific," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, v. XCI, no. 564 (Nov46), p. 540, hereafter Spruance, "Lecture."

[12] Adm William H. P. Blandy, "Command Relationships in Amphibious Warfare," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 77, no. 66 (Jun51), p. 572, hereafter Blandy, "Command Relationships."

[13] CNO, ND, *Landing Operations Doctrine, U. S. Navy, 1938 (FTP–167)* (Washington, 1938), p. 29.

eral, 1st Marine Division, and the landing force commander for the operation, was subordinate to Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific (PhibForSoPac), and amphibious force commander for the same operation. A major source of disagreement which rose between Turner and Vandegrift was based on their differing concepts of Vandegrift's command functions and responsibilities once the general had landed and assumed responsibility for the conduct of operations ashore.

Even before the order for the Guadalcanal operation had been distributed, the command relationship between these two leaders derived from the following paragraph of the order which established Turner's command in April 1942:

> IX. *Coordination of Command*
>
> (a) Under the Commander, South Pacific Force, Commander of the South Pacific Amphibious Force will be in command of the naval, ground and air units assigned to the amphibious forces in the South Pacific area.[14]

Further augmenting this relationship was a clause in the JCS Directive of 2 July 1942, setting forth the military aims of the moment for the war against Japan in the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific areas, and which stated:

> Direct command of the tactical operations of the amphibious forces will remain with the Naval Task Force Commander throughout the conduct of all three tasks.[15]

In the planning for and actual conduct of operations at Guadalcanal, Turner's forceful personality and character had an effect on each decision made. General Vandegrift maintained that the commander trained for ground operations should not be subordinate to the local naval amphibious force commander with respect to the conduct of the land battle and the disposition of the main force and reserves given the responsibility to fight it.[16]

Concerning these differences of opinion, Major General DeWitt Peck, who was War Plans Officer for the Commander, South Pacific Force (ComSoPac), wrote: "It might be noted that in questions of command relationship, General Vandegrift's position was supported by ComSoPac. I believe, however, that a definite directive should have been issued when the question first

[14] ComInCh ltr to DistrList, Subj: Basic Plan for the establishment of the South Pacific Amphibious Force (Short title–LONE WOLF), FFL/A3-1/A16-3(5), Ser 00322, dtd 29Apr42 (OAB, NHD), quoted in VAdm George C. Dyer, "The Amphibians Came to Conquer," MS, p. 6–27, hereafter Dyer, "The Amphibians." Currently in preparation, this book is a biography of Admiral Turner.

[15] JCS 00581, dtd 2Jul42, cited in Samuel Eliot Morison, *Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions May 1942–August 1942—History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, v. IV (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1949), p. 261. The three tasks referred to concerned the seizure of: (1) Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacent enemy positions; (2) The remainder of the Solomon Islands and the northeast coast of New Guinea; and (3) Rabaul, and enemy-held New Guinea and New Ireland.

[16] Vandegrift and Asprey, *Once A Marine*, p. 119.

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arose." [17] Continuing, General Peck recalled:

> . . . two points of difference between Vandegrift and Turner in particular. After the successful landing at Guadalcanal and the consolidation, Turner wanted Vandegrift to station marine detachments at several points along the NE and NW shores of the island which were likely landing places for Japanese reinforcements. Vandegrift refused to make this dispersion of his force. At another time Turner wanted Vandegrift to form another Raider Battalion, composed of selected personnel from the Division. Vandegrift refused. It would weaken the Division both in personnel and morale to form an 'elite' organization. In fact there was considerable question in SoPac as to the efficacy and wisdom of having raider battalions.[18]

When the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb visited Guadalcanal in late October 1942 and questioned Vandegrift about the local situation, the 1st Marine Division commander related his problems and said "the quicker we get the Navy and particularly Kelly Turner back to the basic principles of FTP–167 . . . the better off we are going to be." [19]

At the request of Admiral Halsey (ComSoPac) on 23 October, Vandegrift accompanied the Commandant and his party in a flight to Noumea, New Caledonia, for a conference with Halsey and his major commanders concerning Guadalcanal. During this conference Holcomb raised the question of command relationships in the amphibious force and made certain recommendations concerning organizational and command relationship changes in Turner's force. After his retirement, Admiral Turner later told his biographer that he had not been adverse to these changes.[20]

After approval had been given by Halsey, Nimitz, and King, the command structure in Amphibious Force, South Pacific, was changed as follows on 16 November 1942:

a. All Marine units were detached from PhibForSoPac.

b. All Marine Corps organizations in the South Pacific Area, except Marine Corps aviation, regular ships' detachments, and units in the Ellice Islands and the Samoan Defense Group, were assigned to I Marine Amphibious Corps.

c. For coordination of operations, joint planning would be conducted by

[17] *Peck ltr 1966.*

[18] *Ibid.* Commenting on this situation, Major General Omar T. Pfeiffer, Fleet Marine Officer and Assistant War Plans Officer at CinCPac during this period, stated: "I had personal knowledge of the differences between Gen Vandegrift and Adm Turner, as told to me by Gen Vandegrift in Oct '42, when I was at Guadalcanal with Adm Nimitz. I advised Adm Nimitz of these differences." MajGen Omar T. Pfeiffer ltr to CMC, dtd 19Apr66, hereafter *Pfeiffer ltr.* Attempting to put the Vandegrift-Turner command relationship in perspective, General Pfeiffer continued: "It was my privilege to serve intimately with Admirals Nimitz and King and to have almost daily personal contact with Commandants Holcomb and Vandegrift. My experiences, therefore, were with the high command and I have restricted my comments to what I learned on that level. . . . Although command relations with Admiral Turner were not satisfactory, I consider him the exception rather than an example of normal relations." *Ibid.*

[19] Vandegrift and Asprey, *Once A Marine*, p. 183.

[20] Dyer, "The Amphibians," p. 6–30.

CG, IMAC, and ComPhibForSoPac under the control of ComSoPac.[21]

In addition, it was determined that in the future, after the landing force commander had landed, control of the troops ashore would revert to him in his capacity as commander of a task force established in the operation order to conduct the shore phase of the operation. An alternative to this was that Marine Corps units would revert to Marine Corps command when and as directed by ComSoPac or, as the Allies tightened the ring around Japan, by the area commander.

Although the pattern embodied in this directive was the one followed throughout the war in the Pacific with but few modifications, it took a little while before the concept of separate functions prevailed. As Admiral Spruance's former chief of staff recalled:

> The problem of the transfer of responsibility from the Commander Joint Expeditionary Force to the Commander Expeditionary Troops continued to plague Admiral Turner and General [Holland] Smith until an agreement was reached during the planning for 'Galvanic.' [The invasion of Tarawa in November 1943].
>
> I was not a witness to any arguments the two commanders may have had, but each came to me privately and complained about the other. . . . My job was to reassure them, quiet them down, and try to solve their differences. I could get no help from Admiral Spruance. His attitude was 'They both know what I want and they will do it. There is no need of prescribing definitely a solution.' I insisted that it was essential to include in our order a definite statement of the transfer of responsibility, not only to satisfy the two commanders but so that the entire force would understand.
>
> I continued to draft proposed paragraph 5s [pertaining to command] of our operations plan until I finally reached a wording that was satisfactory to both Turner and Smith.
>
> I have not got the plan before me but my notes indicate that para. 5 read in part like this:
>
> 'The Commander Joint Expeditionary Force commands all task organizations employed in the amphibious operations at all objectives through inter-related attack force commanders. The Commanding General Expeditionary Troops will be embarked in the flagship of the Commander Joint Expeditionary Force or stationed ashore when the situation requires, and will command all landing and garrison forces that are ashore.
>
> Landing Forces, after their respective commanders have assumed command on shore, will be under the overall command of the Commanding General Expeditionary Troops.
>
> Commander Joint Expeditionary Force is designated as second in command of this operation.'
>
> There seemed to be no difficulty in accepting the provision that the landing force commanders would inform their respective task group commanders when they assumed command on shore.
>
> Although Turner and Smith disagreed with much ill humor during the planning stages of Galvanic, Flintlock [the Marshalls landings], and Forager [the Marianas campaign], the minute they were embarked together in the flagship of the Comdr. Joint Expeditionary Force, friction disappeared and cooperation and collaboration was excellent.
>
> The command arrangements established for Galvanic set the pattern for Flintlock

[21] ComSoPac msg to TF Commanders SoPac, dtd 16Nov42 (OAB, NHD).

and Forager, and no further problems arose.[22]

LOGISTICS

Another important lesson learned during the first year of the American offensive in the Pacific was that the logistical aspect of an amphibious operation was as vital to the success of a landing as were the assault tactics employed to reach and stay on the shore. Like the negative influence of the Gallipoli debacle on the evolution of so many other facets of amphibious doctrine, the failure of basic logistics planning during this World War I campaign spurred Marine planners on to develop sound logistical theory and techniques. Despite all efforts to the contrary, however, most if not all logistical problems that conceivably could occur during an amphibious operation cropped up in the preparations for and later at Guadalcanal.

The key to amphibious logistics planning developed by the Marine Corps in the prewar period was the "combat unit loading" of transports. This practical process involved the sequential loading of supplies and equipment in order to support the anticipated tactical scheme ashore. Combat loading was finally refined to the point where, if possible, all material belonging to a single organization was stowed in the same part of a ship. Because the tactical requirements for each amphibious assault were different, however, combat loading could not be standardized, and each load had to be planned by someone knowledgeable in logistics and familiar with the scheme of maneuver for the assault phase of the operation.

Trained to cope with the specialized nature of amphibious logistics and versed in all of its myriad details was the Transport Quartermaster (TQM), a Marine officer assigned to duty aboard each amphibious assault ship. He was required to be familiar with not only the weight and dimension of each item of Marine issue that might conceivably be taken into combat, but also every characteristic of the particular ship to which he was assigned. The TQM therefore had to become familiar with the exact location of all holds and storage spaces and their dimensions in cubic and square feet. Because modifications, not shown in ships' plans, had often been made in troop cargo space of the vessel, the TQM was required to obtain an accurate remeasurement of holds, their hatches, and loading spaces.

The Marine Corps had acquired some, but not enough, practical experience in combat loading during fleet landing exercises held between 1935 and 1941. The lack of suitable transports and the uncertainty at times as to ports of embarkation and dates of availability of ships limited the full application of these doctrines in practice and prevented the Marines from gaining a real appreciation of what combat loading would be like under wartime conditions.

This lack was evident during the preparations for Guadalcanal. When the 1st Marine Division left the United States, it was headed for New Zealand, the staging area rather than the target, and most of the ships transporting division units were loaded organization-

[22] RAdm Charles J. Moore ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 2May66.

ally.[23] The reason for this was because General Vandegrift and his planners had been told that the division was to "be the nucleus for the buildup of a force which would be trained for operations which might come late in 1942." [24] When 7 August was announced as the date for the invasion of Guadalcanal, a D-Day that was much earlier than had been expected, the division had to unload its ships at Wellington and immediately reload them for combat. Reloading was expedited and went relatively well for all groups except one, which found the 11-day period required to accomplish this task something akin to a nightmare.[25]

At the objective, the inability of the landing force to relieve the congestion on the beaches, as men and supplies poured ashore, was as great and insoluble a problem during the war as it had been in the prewar landing exercises. Before World War II, no separate shore party organization had been established within the T/O for a Marine infantry division, with the result that labor forces had to be drawn from the tactical units for this purpose. The mission of the latter was thus affected adversely.

In the prewar years, when a simulated enemy was introduced to add realism to a fleet landing exercise, it proved difficult to achieve the requisite order and control of the beaches. In recognition of this problem, early amphibious warfare doctrine provided for the establishment of a beach party, commanded by a naval officer entitled a Beachmaster, and a shore party—a special task organization—commanded by an officer from the landing force. Such primarily naval functions as reconnaissance and marking of beaches, marking hazards to navigation, control of boats, evacuation of casualties from the beach, and the unloading of landing force materiel from the boats were assigned to the beach party. The duties of the shore party encompassed such functions as control of stragglers and prisoners, selection and marking of routes inland, movement of supplies and equipment off the beaches, and assignment of storage and bivouac areas in the vicinity of the beach. The *Tentative Landing Operations Manual* did not stipulate the strength and composition of the shore party, but only stated that it would contain detachments from some or all of the following landing force units: medical, supply, engineer, military police, working details,[26] communications, and chemical warfare. Although the beach and shore parties operated independently, the manual called for their

[23] "I think that this tends to paint a better picture than actually existed. It is my recollection as the logistic staff Marine on Halsey's staff group (Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, ComSoPac at the outset), that we had until about November 1942 for build-up and training in New Zealand and therefore there was *no* combat loading for the 1st Division. All cargo was unloaded at Wellington and reloaded (combat load). The material for which there was no space remained in Wellington for subsequent displacement forward." BGen Joseph H. Fellows ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 25Apr66.

[24] Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, p. 249.

[25] See *ibid.*, pp. 249–250, for the trials and tribulations of this unit.

[26] It is interesting to note that, although incongruous, "working details" is the exact term appearing in the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*.

commanders and personnel to observe the fullest degree of cooperation.

The solution to these deficiencies was found in 1941, when, based on the recommendations of Major General Holland M. Smith, a joint board consisting of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard officers recommended to Rear Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet, that: (1) as a component of the landing force the beach and shore parties be joined together under the title Shore Party; (2) the beach party commander be designated both as the assistant to the shore party commander and as his advisor on naval matters; and (3) the responsibility for unloading boats at the beach be transferred from the naval element to the landing force element of the shore party.[27]

These changes were officially adopted on 1 August 1942 as *Change 2* to *Fleet Training Publication 167*. Earlier that year, the size of the Marine division had been increased by adding a pioneer (shore party) battalion of 34 officers and 669 enlisted Marines. The T/O change was made on 10 January 1942, a date too late for the personnel concerned to acquire practical experience in large-scale exercises, where the techniques of handling vast quantities of supplies and the adequacy and strength of the new organization could have been tested.

At Guadalcanal, where logistical doctrine was put into practice, some glaring deficiencies were uncovered. To begin with, at that critical point in the war, the number of ships available for the operation was limited, necessitating a careful screening of the landing force equipment that was to be carried to the target. No gear that was in excess of tactical requirements could be loaded in assault shipping, nor was there enough hold space for all of the division organic motor transport. Most of the quarter- and one-ton trucks were loaded aboard ships, but 75 percent of the heavier rolling stock was left behind with the rear echelon. When finally embarked, the Marines carried supplies for 60 days, 10 units of fire for all weapons, only enough individual gear to live and fight, and less than half of the vehicles of the division.

The Guadalcanal operation also demonstrated that an increased number of TQMs was needed to supervise all phases of loading and embarkation. In addition, events showed that boat crews well trained in seamanship and small-craft handling were required for the rapid unloading of ships, movement to the beach, and the return to the ships for other loads of cargo. Although this phase of assault landings was improved somewhat during the course of the war, comments concerning the operations of boat crews at Okinawa give rise to the observation that even at the end of the Pacific fighting there was still considerable room for improvement.[28]

A primary source of concern at Guadalcanal on D-Day and after was the slowness with which supplies were moved from the landing craft to the beaches and then to supply dumps inland. Quite simply, General Vandegrift

[27] CG, LantPhibFor PrelimRpt to CinCLant on New River Exercise 4–12Aug41, dtd 27-Aug41.

[28] See pt II, chap 5, p. 159, *supra*.

was faced at this critical point of the operation with a manpower shortage that had been predicted during the planning phases. In view of the uncertainty of the situation on a hostile beach, he believed that he could not spare men from combat units to augment the 500 Marines in the 1st Pioneer Battalion. The mounting stack of supplies on the beaches offered a lucrative target to Rabaul-based Japanese aircraft, but fortunately for the American forces ashore, the enemy concentrated on shipping in the transport area rather than materiel on the beaches. " 'Had the Japanese set fire to the supplies towering high on the Guadalcanal beachhead,' to quote Vandegrift, 'the consequences might well have been incalculable and ruinous.' " [29]

Although enemy threats to the beachhead became negligible as the war progressed—that is, with the exception of the period of the *Kamikazes*—the logistical problems inherent in an amphibious assault landing never completely disappeared. Even under optimum conditions, such as those that existed on L-Day at Okinawa where there was no opposition to the landing, logistics problems continued to crop up from the very inception of an operation and were among the most difficult that the invasion force commanders had to solve. Quick and easy solutions were seldom if ever within grasp, for amphibious logistics has always been an immense and complex factor.

The Guadalcanal landings began the second or limited offensive period of the war in the Pacific. "So limited was it at first, that all of our efforts for several months were exerted primarily to hold what we had taken at Guadalcanal." [30] Operations in this second period were conducted chiefly in the Solomons-New Britain—Eastern New Guinea area and may be said to have lasted until November 1943. As one student of military history has written, the primary lesson of Guadalcanal "was that without the FMF, the operation could never have happened." [31]

The United States entered the offensive period in November 1943 when the Central Pacific campaign opened with the Gilberts operation. This phase of the war was marked by growing American strength as new ships joined the fleet and additional troops became available. In November 1942, there were 69,320 Marine ground troops in the Pacific; this number increased to 100,845 a year later.[32] Marine aviation strength increased proportionately. In this third war period, vast forward area bases were constructed from which these growing forces could mount and stage for future operations.

Although the war in the South Pacific was primarily a holding action, which in the end became fully offensive in character, the Central Pacific campaign was a true offensive from the outset. The terrain of the targets here was entirely different from that experienced in the South Pacific, and the targets themselves were not only a series of "a

[29] Quoted in Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 132.

[30] Spruance, "Lecture," p. 541.

[31] Heinl, "The USMC," p. 1320.

[32] *FMF Grd Status Rpts*, Nov42, Nov43.

tiny, isolated, completely and densely fortified atolls or small islands" [33] but also larger islands such as those found in the Marianas. In the conduct of the fighting in the Central Pacific and in the selection of targets, many of Ellis' prophecies of the 1920s became reality.

It has been accurately stated that:

> If the battles of the South Pacific proved that the Fleet Marine Force was ready for war, those of the Central Pacific demonstrated its grasp and virtuosity in amphibious assault. Except for Okinawa—which was really not a part of either South or Central Pacific campaigns—the entire roll of Central Pacific battles, from Tarawa to Iwo Jima, was by necessity a series of sea-borne assaults against positions fortified and organized with every refinement that Japanese laboriousness and ingenuity could provide. To reduce such strongholds was truly amphibious warfare *a l'outrance* [to the utmost]—the assaults which the Marine Corps had foreseen and planned for during the decades of peace.[34]

Between the invasions of Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 and of Tarawa on 20 November 1943, Marine forces had been involved in assault operations in the Central and Northern Solomons. During the first year of offensive operations, and indeed until the end of the Pacific War, amphibious warfare doctrine was modified without seriously affecting basic principles. Two primary factors generated these modifications—increased American production and refinement of existing techniques in amphibious operations. Each of these factors had far-reaching influence on the reassessment and transformation of the following essentials of an amphibious operation:

1. Preliminary preparation of the target [by air and naval gunfire].
2. [Air bombardment and naval gunfire] in close support of the landing.
3. Logistic support of the landing.
4. Landing craft.
5. Landing force communications.
6. Assault techniques and tactics.[35]

Amphibious assaults were uniformly successful throughout the course of operations in the Pacific because two of the principles of war—surprise and concentration of forces—were generally followed. In the final period of the war, it became not only practicable but possible to subordinate the former to the latter because American naval and air forces had gained control of a vast area above and surrounding the targets. Consequently, objectives were sealed off and the enemy could not reinforce a garrison in the face of an impending American amphibious assault. Therefore, U. S. forces could and did sacrifice surprise without endangering any landings.

LANDING CRAFT

Increased production at home and the resultant flow of new types of weapons and equipment overseas did not materially affect the basic pattern of amphibious operations. The debarkation of Marines into landing craft from amphibious transports, the formation of as-

[33] Heinl, "The USMC," p. 1319.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 1320.

[35] These six arbitrary categories are those noted in *ibid.*, p. 1322.

sault waves, and the trip to the beach itself all remained essentially unchanged. New and improved amphibious vessels and vehicles, however, permitted American forces to conduct landings in a more expeditious manner.

The Fleet Marine Force pioneered in the 1930s the development and testing of landing craft, most notably the shallow-draft *Eureka,* designed by Andrew J. Higgins, a shipbuilder in New Orleans. Despite the fact that the Navy had developed an experimental type of its own, the Higgins boat "gave the greatest promise, for it could push itself aground on the beach and then retract. In fact this boat was the ancestor of the LCVP (Landing Craft Vehicle and Personnel) that played an important part in the amphibious operations of World War II." [36] Because of its rather fragile hull, however, the Higgins boat could not negotiate the reefs offshore of many of the island targets in the Pacific, whereupon another Marine Corps-sponsored and -developed item, the amphibian tractor, orginally conceived for employment in logistical support, was fully utilized as a tactical weapon.

The importance and capabilities of the versatile amtrac as a landing vehicle as well as an assault weapon were fully demonstrated at Tarawa, although they had been employed earlier in the war in the Solomons. On Guadalcanal, the amphibian tractors were used to carry cargo from ship to shore, and once on the island, the artillery employed them in the role of prime movers. "Once in position, however, the gunners found the amphibian was a creature of mixed virtues; tracked vehicles tore up comm wire, creating early the pattern of combat events that became too familiar to plagued wiremen." [37] The amtrac began its career on Guadalcanal in a modest manner, and its "usefulness exceeded all expectations"; [38] nobody, however, envisioned using the weird vehicle in much more than a cargo-carrying capacity.

After Tarawa, however, "Never again in the Pacific War were assault troops to be handicapped by serious shortages of this vital piece of equipment." [39] Amphibian tractors were later armored and armed with guns, howitzers, and flamethrowers, and utilized to carry the assault wave into the beachhead.

Also making its first appearance in a Central Pacific campaign was the DUKW. Developed for the Army to serve as ship-to-shore cargo and troop transfer vehicles where harbor facilities were inadequate, the value of this amphibian truck was initially exhibited at Kwajalein, where it transported supplies and equipment—mainly artillery and ammunition—to the beaches. When ashore, the DUKWs also supplemented the organic motor transport of the land-

[36] King and Whitehill, *King's Naval Record,* p. 320.

[37] Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal,* p. 256.

[38] *Ibid.,* p. 256*n.* Not everybody was enthused about the amtrac, for, according to General Pfeiffer, Admiral Turner ". . . recommended no further amtracs because they rusted on the beach at Guadalcanal. . . ." *Pfeiffer ltr.*

[39] Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War,* p. 583.

ing force in support of the operation.[40] In all Marine operations in the Pacific after Kwajalein, Army DUKW companies, and Marine DUKW companies in the later stages, were attached to the divisions involved.

British developmental experiments with seagoing landing ships furnished the United States with an insight to solving the problem of getting amphibious forces and all of their combat gear ashore in as complete a package as possible. The most important of the larger landing vessels developed in the war was the LST, which quickly attained a reputation for being "the workhorse of the amphibious fleet." [41]

Although hydrographic conditions in the Central Pacific often prevented LSTs from reaching the shore to load or unload their cargoes, these vessels were ideally suited as sea-going transports for DUKWs and amtracs, which could easily offload into the water from the huge LST bow ramp. At the staging area for the Marianas invasions, assault troops and amphibian vehicles were carried to the target on LSTs for the first time in the Central Pacific. This procedure became commonplace in later World War II amphibious assaults in this area.

Depending on how and for what purpose they had been modified, LSTs were employed as offshore radar stations, repair ships, and hospital ships. They were also used as floating platforms from which small spotter planes were launched and recovered by Brodie Gear, which may very roughly be compared to a giant slingshot.

American adoption and further modification of yet another type of landing craft, the LCI, also resulted from earlier British experimentation. Initially employed with ramps on either side of the bow for the rapid offloading of infantry troops at or close to the beach, coral outcroppings fringing the island objectives in the Central Pacific prohibited their employment as originally conceived. The LCIs were then converted to gunboats and rocket and mortar boats, and were assigned to the gunfire support group of the amphibious landing force for the purpose of providing close-in fire support of the landing. They first appeared in this role during the invasion of the Treasury Islands.

Both tactical and logistical requirements gave impetus to the development of a family of various types of landing craft and to the modification and improvement of those already in production and service. The considerations of basic amphibious doctrine were constant factors when the configuration and future uses of new types of landing craft were being determined. Fundamentally, these craft had to give the ship-to-shore movement greater power and flexibility and expedite the landing of the supplies

[40] The DUKW "was valuable only to the extent that nothing else was available to the artillery. It was rated at 5,000 pounds capacity in moderate surf. The 105mm howitzer weighed 5,000 pounds all by itself. Consequently, we had to overload to get a skeleton crew, a limited amount of ammunition, howitzer, and section gear in one DUKW. Until DUKWs were modified to transport the 105, we had to beat out the sides to get the piece aboard. The only reason that artillery used this vehicle was because the amphibian tractors were always assigned to the infantry." LtCol Robert C. Hilliard comments on draft ms, dtd 9Dec65.

[41] Isely and Crowl, *op. cit.*, p. 583.

and equipment belonging to and in support of the landing force.

COMMUNICATIONS

Other technical innovations, which modified but left unchanged amphibious doctrine and helped to improve the control of ship-to-shore movement and operations ashore, appeared in the field of communications. Improved communications procedure and the development of highly sophisticated radio equipment, which was better suited for employment in amphibious operations than that which had been available at the beginning of the war, soon emerged as a result of the lessons learned in battle.

The most critical period of all in an amphibious assault is immediately before and during the ship-to-shore movement. It is at this time that effective command control over scattered subordinate units is difficult to maintain, especially without an optimum communications performance. Many factors led to a communications breakdown at various times at Tarawa. The interrupted contact between the attack force commander's flagship and the forces ashore was one that was fraught with the most dangerous consequences. After Tarawa, few such breakdowns recurred because of the introduction into the Pacific of the amphibious force flagship (AGC, which stands for Auxiliary General Communications).

> That new type of naval auxiliary . . . had been improvised for Admiral Hewitt in the Salerno operation because the network of communications in modern amphibious warfare had become so vast and complicated, and the officers and men necessary to staff amphibious force headquarters so numerous, that no ordinary combatant or auxiliary ship could hold them.[42]

Along with the improved control of operations overall provided by the equipment and facilities of the AGC was an attempt to ensure that no communications gap would again occur in amphibious assault. To gain this assurance control craft bristling with the most modern communications equipment available were stationed at the line of departure. Not only did these craft organize, control, and shepherd to the beachhead the vessels and amphibious vehicles comprising the initial assault wave, but they also coordinated the landing of subsequent waves.

Technical refinements and modern, up-to-date equipment served together to make an amphibious assault a smoothly functioning and relatively simple type of operation. At the end of the war most if not all kinks had been ironed out. By 1945, testing and practice under combat conditions had given American commanders improved and coordinated supporting arms, close air support, and naval gunfire support systems.

SUPPORTING ARMS

Because coordination and control figure so importantly in the conduct of an amphibious operation, every effort was

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[42] Samuel Eliot Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942–April 1944—History of United States Naval Operations in World War II*, v. VII (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960), p. 207, hereafter Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls.*

bent in developing all of the tools and techniques that would make each venture a complete success. Coordination of all three elements of the amphibious force and especially the three supporting arms—air, artillery, and naval gunfire —was vital. The communications failure at Tarawa provided the medium in which the Joint Assault Signal Company was nurtured. The nucleus of Army, Marine, and Navy communications personnel around which the JASCO was formed came from fire support ships, air liaison parties, and shore fire control parties. The JASCO, employed only in the course of amphibious operations, served as a single administrative and housekeeping unit for the naval gunfire teams, air liaison parties, and shore party communication teams required by a division during an assault landing. Just prior to and in the course of operations, all of these teams were parcelled out by attachment to the rifle regiments and battalions of the division. The establishment of the JASCOs resulted in a reduction in personnel and operational requirements of their former parent organizations, because the JASCO required fewer skilled communicators who, by employing uniform techniques and radio procedures, reduced the amount of unnecessary traffic and thus unclogged previously overworked radio circuits.

Complementing the JASCOs and also providing an additional measure of coordination and control to the conduct of the amphibious operation were land-based fire support coordination centers (FSCCs), which appeared for the first time in the war at Iwo Jima.[43] The establishment of the coordination centers ashore simply was an extension to a point closer to the scene of action of the control exercised aboard the AGC by the task force commander, and permitted a more rapid response to the requests of the infantry unit commanders, although it did not always work out that way. At Okinawa, final authority for the allocation and selection of supporting fires was vested in the artillery representative in the Target Information Center, who generally made his decision in accordance with the advice and recommendations of the representatives of air and naval gunfire.

From the Marine Corps point of view, air support of ground troops by Marine pilots flying Marine aircraft never reached a satisfactory level during the Pacific War. In fact, many World War II Marine aviation commanders considered that their squadrons, groups, and wings were never employed to maximum capability with respect to their tactical functions from a time immediately after Guadalcanal until the Philippines and Okinawa campaigns. In late 1943 and the early months of 1944, tedium and boredom were the order for Marine pilots who, day after day, flew the so-called "Bougainville Milk Run," or bombed and rebombed oft-attacked

[43] According to Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., former 3d Marine Division Naval Gunfire Officer, "What we had on Iwo was just a single small-size blackout tent where we kept a modest situation map, a few radio remotes, and our whiskey. The 3d Division was the only unit that did this; neither of the other divisions was that institutionalized." Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., ltr to CMC, dtd 27May66.

atolls and islets that were in the backwash of the war. It may have been good experience for young Marine aviators, but it wasn't the type of combat for which they had been trained.

The situation improved with the assignment of Marine squadrons to the Philippines and Okinawa operations. Attached to MacArthur's forces, the Marines amassed an outstanding record of successful and fruitful close air support missions, and proselytized a number of Army commanders who had not previously been aware of the capabilities of this supporting arm. During Okinawa, close air support was flown for the most part by carrier-based Navy flyers, while Marine pilots of TAF flew combat air patrols and provided the air defense of the island. Although these TAF aviators did the most to blunt the *Kamikaze* threat and downed a creditable if not entirely confirmed number of enemy planes, they still did not fulfill what has come to be recognized as the primary mission of Marine aviation, close air support of Marine ground troops.

The request that Marines support Marines was not based on pride of service alone, as some have suggested—Marine ground commanders were happy to receive air support from any source, provided it came in immediate response to the initial request and did the job for which it had been requested. A less-than-completely satisfactory performance in these two aspects of air support served as the crux of Marine dissatisfaction with the type of support they received until late in the war. This discontent was very strongly voiced in the operations and action reports following the Marianas campaign, where Marine commanders noted that Navy control procedure was relatively inflexible and caused long, needless delays between the request for a mission and its final execution. Another cause for aggravation was that these missions were controlled by naval officers on board ship and out of realistic touch with the situation ashore.

In the Guam campaign, the most critical area of air support operations was communications. Requests for air strikes originated with air liaison parties assigned to each infantry battalion and regiment, and had to be approved up the chain of command and by both division headquarters and the Commander, Support Aircraft, Attack Force. Only one radio circuit, the Support Air Direction net, was made available for these requests, and it was crowded at all times. Additionally, "very few close support strikes were carried out on time or within limits set by requesting agencies" for "the time consumed in request, processing, approval, and final execution was generally 45 minutes to an hour or more." [44] Despite the belief of the Commander, Support Aircraft at Guam that "the time spent [was] justified by the success of the missions, ground units generally asked for more immediate control of planes by air liaison officers and for a method of operations and system of communications that would ensure a faster response to the needs of assault troops." [45]

Concluding that air liaison parties should have more direct contact with supporting planes, the Commander, Support Aircraft, Pacific Fleet, backed

[44] Shaw, Nalty, and Turnbladh, *Central Pacific Drive*, p. 574.

[45] *Ibid.*

the Marines in his comments on air operations in the Marianas.[46] He also called attention to the need for greater understanding "on the one hand by the Ground Forces of the capabilities and limitations of aircraft, and on the other hand by the pilots of what they are supposed to accomplish." [47] The problem of control was eased somewhat at Iwo and Okinawa, where Marine LFASCUs and the ALPs were given greater authority and provided a quicker response to the requests of infantry commanders, but full control remained with the command ship-based Navy CASCUs for the greater portion of these two operations.

One Marine demand that was never completely answered was to have Marine squadrons in support of the infantry from the outset of an amphibious assault. At the end of the war, and then too late for their full employment, some Marine escort carriers appeared in the Pacific. Marine close air support techniques and operations never reached full fruition during the war. Not until Korea, where the experience gained in World War II and in postwar landing exercises was tested in the crucible of combat, did Marines fly close support missions for other Marines for any considerable period.

The operations leading to the capture of Tarawa provided the source of many lessons learned, not the least of which was the importance of the role of naval gunfire in an assault on a strongly defended island. Although this should have been apparent, American commanders learned that in order to soften up the target for a landing, the preliminary bombardment had to be heavier and sustained for a longer period than had been the case in previous operations. More importantly, task force commanders learned that:

> . . . the Japanese shore battery could be attacked at short range with reasonable impunity; ships could 'fight forts,' at least Japanese forts; and no longer would the concept of gunfire support in the Central Pacific require that ships maneuver at high speeds while firing at long range; indeed the opposite was recommended by Admiral Hill when he suggested that destroyers operate close enough to the beach to use their 40mm.[48]

What this meant was that in order to reduce casualties—especially during the assault phase—enemy emplacements would have to be destroyed rather than just neutralized. This concept was a complete reversal of naval gunfire doctrine to that time. Another significant lesson learned about naval gunfire support at Tarawa was "the vital necessity of reducing the time lag between the lifting of fires and the touchdown of the leading wave in order to reduce the opportunity of the defender to recover from the shock of the bombardment. . . ." [49] All in all, "the lessons of Tarawa showed the 'doubting Thomas' that effective gunfire support required a thorough knowledge of the gunnery problem. . . ." [50] Essentially, in view of the nature

[46] ComSptAirPacRpt of Ops in Spt of the Capture of the Marianas, dtd 11Sep44, p. 30 (OAB, NHD).

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[48] Col Donald M. Weller, "Salvo—Splash!" *USNI Proceedings*, v. 80, no. 8 (Aug54), p. 839.

[49] *Ibid.*, p. 849.

[50] *Ibid.*

of Japanese island redoubts in the Central Pacific scheduled for future attack, the performance of naval gunfire support had to improve greatly.

One step taken along these lines was the establishment of a shore bombardment training program at Pearl Harbor in September–October 1943. Kahoolawee Island in the Hawaiian group was utilized as a bombardment range at which both fire support ships and their crews and shore fire control parties practiced naval gunfire support techniques that were to prove successful in subsequent operations. According to one observer, the Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Forces, Pacific Fleet:

> . . . took quite a hard-boiled attitude toward an unsatisfactory performance over this course—and no destroyer went into the forward area without demonstrating proficiency at Kahoolawee.[51]

Marine commanders never disputed the importance of naval gunfire in support of a landing, and acknowledged its dominant position in comparison with the other supporting arms available to ground forces. "This dominance can be measured by various yardsticks such as weight of fire, rapidity of response, all-weather capability, economy, uninterrupted availability, and peak power during the beach assault itself." [52] Once artillery is ashore, however, it becomes the dominant arm. In general, landing force commanders wanted all of the naval gunfire support they could get; three notable occasions when ground commanders were amply supported were the Marshalls, Guam, and Okinawa.

The amount of naval gunfire available for other operations was limited, however, by certain considerations. For example, during the early stages of the war at Guadalcanal, the threat to the landing by the Japanese fleet forced the U. S. task force commander to reduce the strength of the support force by diverting some ships to stem that threat. At Iwo, a portion of the fleet was assigned to cover the carrier strikes on Tokyo in order to reduce the *Kamikaze* menace. These, among others, were the reasons given for the fact that the landing forces could not get all of the NGF support that they wanted and needed.

Finally, naval gunfire preparation of an objective prior to a designated D-Day was necessarily limited early in the war in order to maintain the principle of surprise. American naval superiority in the latter stages of the fighting permitted the sacrifice of surprise without endangering an assault landing. It was not only superior strength that allowed tactical and even strategical surprise to be subordinated to ensure the capture of the beachhead. Improvement in the techniques of employment and delivery of naval gunfire did much to guarantee the success of an operation.

Following Tarawa, naval gunfire doctrine was thoroughly reappraised. As pointed out earlier, one conclusion reached was that while area fire could be employed for neutralization in the prelanding period on the morning of a D-Day, it could not effectively destroy enemy gun positions and well-constructed defenses. In order for NGF to

[51] Weller, *op. cit.*, *USNI Proceedings*, v. 80, no. 9 (Sep54), p. 1017.

[52] Col Robert D. Heinl, Jr., "The Gun Gap and How to Close It," *USNI Proceedings*, v. 91, no. 9 (Sep65), p. 28.

perform its primary task, it was vital that support ships "deliver prolonged deliberate destructive pinpoint fire against known or suspected difficult targets." [53] Accordingly, gunfire support vessels, including battleships, would have to move in close to the beaches. At Kwajalein, NGF was delivered at constantly closing ranges, down to 1,800 yards. Samuel Eliot Morison quotes a conversation that allegedly occurred on the task force flagship bridge after Admiral Turner had given orders for the fire support ships to close the range:

> "C.O. of a battleship: 'I can't take my ship in that close.'
>
> Turner: 'What's your armor for? Get in there!" [54]

A direct result of the lessons learned at Tarawa was the successful and rapid capture of Kwajalein with significantly smaller losses. Subsequent amphibious operations in the Pacific benefitted similarly. The conduct of amphibious assaults in the period following the Gilberts campaign was so vastly improved and the techniques of amphibious warfare refined to such a degree that, in less than a year after Tarawa was secured, Marines landed on Tinian on 24 July 1944 in what Admiral Spruance considered "was, perhaps, the most brilliantly conceived and executed amphibious operation of the War." [55] General Holland M. Smith, commander of the Expeditionary Troops for both Saipan and Tinian, called the latter one of those "enterprises . . . that . . . become models of their kind. . . . If such a tactical superlative can be used to describe a military maneuver, where the result brilliantly consummated the planning and performance, Tinian was the perfect amphibious operation in the Pacific war." [56]

Close on the heels of the end of the Marianas campaign came the bitterly fought battles in the Philippines and on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. The successful amphibious assault at each of these targets was a logical culmination of all lessons learned since Guadalcanal and demonstrated a determination not to repeat earlier mistakes and shortcomings.

Viewing the Pacific War,[57] Admiral Spruance speculated on three factors that stand out in the development of naval warfare. These were the great growth of carrier strength, the improved ability to make amphibious landings against heavy resistance, and the increased capacity for logistical support of the fleet at ever-increasing distances from Pearl Harbor. One can charge the Marines' success in the conduct of amphibious warfare to the same three factors. Vital to all this, however, was the development of new techniques and refinement of the old which neither blindly adhered to basic amphibious warfare doctrine nor completely disregarded it either. This thesis best describes the foundations of the strategy leading to victory.

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[53] Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 587.

[54] Morison, *Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls*, p. 260*n*.

[55] Spruance, "Lecture," p. 550.

[56] Gen Holland M. Smith and Percy Finch, *Coral and Brass* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), p. 181, hereafter Smith and Finch, *Coral and Brass*.

[57] Spruance, "Lecture," pp. 554–555.

THE JAPANESE

But what of the enemy? In the Pacific, the Allies faced a fantastically implacable, determined, and aggressive foe, who had a strong capability for organizing the ground and constructing defensive works of great strength.

As individual soldiers and small unit fighters, the Japanese were probably unsurpassed in courage and tenacity, but these attributes were not complemented by effective tactical direction. Although the Japanese Army had good field artillery, the support of a flexible artillery organization was lacking. After the loss of Guadalcanal, the Japanese ground troops were denied anything that even resembled effective air support and for all practical purposes, the Japanese were unable to maintain an air offensive that was even worthy of the name. By the end of the Gilberts operation, and certainly by the time that Saipan was invaded, the island outposts defending the Empire had been completely isolated and beyond any hope of reinforcement.

American amphibious assaults in the Central Pacific rapidly took on a pattern which seldom varied throughout the rest of the war. This program was set by the generally small size of the objective combined with the high density and great strength of the defense, particularly at the beachhead. The classic example of this, perhaps, is Peleliu. Once American and Japanese forces were in contact, the determination of the enemy to fight until death and the impregnability of his defenses tended to neutralize the overwhelming fire superiority of the Americans. "This forced our riflemen, with some assistance from combat engineers and tanks to assume the cruelly expensive task of literal extermination of all resistance, long after any hope of vital victory remained to the Japanese." [58] This conclusion is particularly valid in relation to Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and certainly the latter, where General Ushijima's *Thirty-second Army* "extracted the maximum cost for our victory." [59] In an attempt to salvage something in the face of impending defeat, the Japanese finally resorted to the program of *Kamikaze* attacks in the hope that resulting American losses would force the United States to tire of the war and end it. Although U. S. casualties mounted as a direct result of these attacks, the war effort was not deterred.

The myth of enemy invincibility, and his reputation for cunning and ruthlessness emerged from the record of the Japanese Army in China in the 1930s, the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, and the relative ease of initial Japanese conquests in Southeast Asia. Marine Corps attitudes towards the enemy were first formed in Shanghai and later tempered in combat at Guadalcanal. The Marine estimate of the opponent basically took two forms. The first was that the Japanese could be defeated by employing their own tactics against them, and by becoming as adept as the enemy in jungle warfare. The Marines were not novices in fighting in the tropics, for many of the regulars had received their baptism of fire in the Banana Wars. The second attitude, one of deep mistrust, was

[58] Col Donald M. Weller, "Firepower and the Amphibious Assault," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 36, no. 3 (Mar52), p. 56.

[59] *Ibid.*

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based on a number of incidents which had occurred in the early days of the war in the Philippines and at Guadalcanal.

One specific episode at the root of this mistrust which strongly affected the Marine temper when it became known was the unfortunate Goettge Patrol on Guadalcanal.[60] As soon as the particulars of what had happened to the patrol reached the rest of the division:

> . . . hatred for the Japanese seared the heart of the Marine Corps. This episode . . . followed by devious trickery, such as playing dead before tossing a grenade, made it difficult to indoctrinate Marines on Guadalcanal and later with the necessity of taking prisoners of war for the purpose of gaining information. Such an attitude, combined with the adamant refusal of most Japanese to surrender under any circumstances, hobbled intelligence work in the field.[61]

Repercussions stemming from the knowledge of this event continued as long as the Pacific War lasted.

With each succeeding Pacific amphibious assault, more chinks and defects in the Japanese military system were exposed and exploited. The step-by-step process by which the enemy was defeated cost the Americans dearly, but in the end, Japanese attrition was the heavier. Perhaps no fighting men in the war suffered so much as those who comprised the pitiful remnants of the once-proud Japanese units that retreated from Guadalcanal, those that withdrew from Cape Gloucester to Rabaul, and others that withered on the vine on the bypassed islands of the Pacific. Once Japanese fortunes waned and the American offensive began to roll, these forces were neither reinforced, replenished, nor succored. Collectively, they were indeed a forlorn hope in the most descriptive sense of this term.

Other factors in addition to the effective application of the doctrine of amphibious warfare and subsequent refinements strongly influenced the Marine Corps role in the Pacific War. Such considerations as the strength and organization of Marine divisions and aircraft wings, combat developments and tactical innovations, and improved and new weaponry together provided the bases leading to a successful conclusion of each campaign to which Marine Corps units were committed.

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[60] See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, p. 281, for the story of this patrol.

[61] Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 138.

A Final Accounting[1]

The intent of the five-volume *History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II*—of which this is the final volume in the series—is the comprehensive presentation of Marine Corps participation in the Pacific War. Because of the emphasis on operations, the administrative aspect of the wartime growth and development of the FMF has received less than full treatment heretofore. It would be difficult and inappropriate to attempt in this one chapter either to depict the many changes in the nature, composition, and mission of Marine Corps units in the war, to describe fully unit activations, deactivations, and consolidations, or to evaluate the causes and effects of changes in amphibious doctrine mentioned briefly in the previous chapter.

These five volumes would be less than complete, however, without some accounting of the role of the Commandant and Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC) in the war effort. Under the provisions of General Order 241—the charter for the Fleet Marine Force—the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) was to maintain the Marine expeditionary force in readiness for operations with the fleet, as the force was to be part of the fleet for "tactical employment." The Commandant also was to designate the units comprising the FMF and which were to be under his command except when embarked with the fleet or when engaged in fleet exercises. At the onset of World War II, therefore, the Commandant did control the FMF, or parts of it. The outbreak of the war changed this command relationship for all practical purposes, primarily because most of the FMF was operating essentially under the tactical direction of fleet commanders. Thereafter, the CMC was responsible only for Marine Corps administration and planning, and had no operational control over FMF units. But the manner in which he provided the FMF with fully trained and equipped Marines and the most modern tools available cannot be overemphasized.

It is possible that many Marines in the islands thought that HQMC operated in a vacuum because Washington was so far away from the combat zone. This view was sometimes believed justified because it seemed to take so long for HQMC to respond to a request or inquiry from the field. The truth is, however, that both Generals Holcomb and Vandegrift kept fully abreast of all developments that concerned their Marines and, depending upon what was required by field units, they responded to those requirements with appropriate

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the material in this chapter is derived from: *CMC Rpts*, 1940–1945; *USMC Admin Hist;* Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, *Marine Corps Training;* Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal;* Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War;* Shaw and Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul.*

and decisive action. CMC decisions could and did involve such varied yet allied matters as personnel, training, and logistics.

Assisting the Commandant was a Headquarters staff, which, like the rest of the Corps, expanded throughout the war. Headquarters Marine Corps had been located in the "New Navy Building," on Constitution Avenue, Washington, D. C., until November 1941, when it moved to the Navy Department Annex in Arlington, Virginia. Built before World War II as an archives storage building and later taken over by the Navy, the Navy Annex overlooks Arlington National Cemetery and commands a fine panoramic view of the skyline of the nation's capital.

At the beginning of the war, the Commandant had a planning staff in the Division of Plans and Policies (irreverently known as "Pots and Pans") and its subordinate sections, and an administrative, technical, supply, and operating staff in the following HQMC staff agencies: Adjutant and Inspector's Department, Quartermaster Department, Paymaster Department, Division of Reserve, Division of Public Relations, Division of Personnel, and Division of Aviation.

Following the outbreak of World War II, the overall growth of Headquarters Marine Corps, together with the initiation of the Women's Reserve program and general wartime requirements, made it necessary to revamp the headquarters structure and bring the Marine personnel under some sort of centralized administrative control. To this end, a Headquarters Battalion, Headquarters Marine Corps, was formed on 1 April 1943. In July, it was redesignated as the 1st Headquarters Battalion, and a 2d Headquarters Battalion was activated. These two units functioned to administer the great number of additional military personnel who had been assigned to HQMC staffs.

Perhaps the most important staff section at HQMC throughout the war was the Division of Plans and Policies, which came into being as a result of the redesignation of the Division of Operations and Training on 21 April 1939. This move was made in preparation for a possible war in view of the deterioration of international relations at this time. To dwell on the importance of this division is not to derogate the equally important role played by other headquarters staff agencies. A brief narration will show how its functions vitally affected almost every facet of other HQMC staff activities and responsibilities.

The Division of Plans and Policies formulated Marine Corps policy and developed plans for personnel, intelligence, operations, supply, equipment, and training, and maintained liaison regarding these and other Marine Corps matters with various government agencies. To facilitate the operations of the division, it had four staff sections of its own: M–1, personnel; M–2, intelligence; M–3, operations; and M–4, supply.[2] A fifth section, M–5, was established on 27 March 1944 to provide more active supervision and coordination of all phases of basic and advanced Marine

[2] On 24 February 1945, the designations M–1, M–2, *etc.*, were changed to the more common G–1, G–2, *etc.*

Corps training, except that conducted by aviation organizations—which came under the Division of Aviation—and that conducted by combat organizations —which remained the exclusive purview of the M–3 Section. Until its disbandment on 6 May 1945, the M–5 Section continued to supervise all Marine Corps training activity within the United States.

Understandably the most important section in "Pots and Pans" was the M–3 Section, which had cognizance over the following matters: war plans, tactical doctrine, FMF organization, aviation planning (with the Division of Aviation), equipment (with M–4 and M–5), FMF personnel allowances and priorities, troop movements, maneuvers (with M–5), chemical warfare doctrine, statistical reporting on location and strength of units, security and passive defense, signal security, assignment of radio frequencies and call signs, codes and ciphers, training of combat organizations, and maintenance of liaison with major agencies of Headquarters Marine Corps and the other Services.

As the war progressed, the ranks of this and other HQMC staffs expanded in pace with the expansion in the number and diversity of FMF units in the field. Many if not most of the staff billets were filled with combat veterans who provided the Commandant and his assistants with valuable knowledge based on their actual experiences in the Pacific. Following each amphibious assault landing in which Marine Corps units participated, a raft of special action reports flowed in to Headquarters Marine Corps to be reviewed, analyzed, and their most important and salient points published and sent to field units for their information and use. In these and other ways, Headquarters Marine Corps played a most vital role in supporting the FMF.

PERSONNEL AND TRAINING

Even before it appeared that a war was imminent, the Marine Corps was fulfilling its mission in national defense. The 1930s saw the development of the doctrine of amphibious warfare and of the tools and techniques to be employed in amphibious assaults. The outbreak of war created an undeniable demand for troops in ever-increasing numbers, an expansion of existing organizations and facilities and the activation of a variety of new ones, and the development of modern weaponry to be employed by Marines in combat. The Marine Corps was as sensitive and responsive as the other Services to these demands, and it was incumbent upon the Commandant to meet them as far as the Corps was concerned.

With the publication of the Presidential declaration of a limited national emergency on 8 September 1939, and of an unlimited national emergency nearly two years later on 27 May 1941, Marine Corps strength was expanded dramatically. The July 1941 strength of the Corps was 53,886; a year later, after the Pearl Harbor attack impelled a flock of volunteers to rush to recruiting stations to enlist, Marine Corps strength had increased to 143,388.

In the months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the Marine Corps processed approximately 2,000 recruits a month; following that date, 20,000 men

were joined each month. By 1 March 1942, recruit depot housing as well as facilities at other major Marine bases were filled to overflowing. At this time, the Marine Corps was forced to reduce its manpower input to approximately 8,000 men monthly until additional land could be acquired and housing built.[3]

To meet training requirements and house the burgeoning ranks of the Marine Corps, the Commandant took steps to purchase additional land on both the east and west coasts of the United States. A divisional training site of 113,000 acres, later to be called Camp Pendleton, was purchased at Oceanside, California. The Marine Corps bought 150,000 acres in the same state at Niland for an artillery firing range, and land for a parachute training site at Santee, near San Diego.

In addition, in mid-1940, Camp Elliott —near San Diego—was activated, ". . . and in operation for a considerable time prior to the acquisition of Camp Pendleton." [4] The following year, this new base housed west coast FMF elements and also serviced as an advanced training base. Until that time, the recruit depot at San Diego had provided room for all of these services besides fulfilling its basic mission of training Marine recruits. Because of the accelerated Marine Corps expansion, San Diego became too crowded and the opening of Elliott fortunately relieved the pressure. Initially, this camp was able to handle the vastly increased advanced training load on the west coast; later, as this load was increased further, the camp was expanded and developed to many times its original size to meet ballooning needs. From the time the 2d Marine Division was activated to the date of its departure to the Pacific, it called Elliott's 29,000 acres home. It also became the base for the first Marine Corps tank training center and the infantry training center for numerous Pacific-bound replacement drafts.

On the east coast, Quantico had assumed an important position in the development of Marine amphibious doctrine and techniques, and in the training of Marine officers and technicians during the period between wars. The advent of the national emergency soon made it apparent that Quantico could not expand physically to continue these activities, all of which were rapidly growing and intensifying in scope, and at the same time serve as home base for east coast FMF activities. This was especially true in view of the fact that operational forces were to reach division size. Parris Island was hard put to maintain its own recruit training program and could do little to relieve the pressure. The only answer to this problem was to construct an entirely new and extensive base for FMF activities on the eastern seaboard. Congressional approval on 15 February 1941 led to the selection of a site in the New River-Neuse River area of North Carolina.

Shortly after its maneuvers in the Caribbean in the summer of 1941, the understrength 1st Marine Division moved into Tent Camp #1, Marine Barracks, New River, N.C. From this base, which was redesignated Camp

[3] *CMC Rpts*, 1941, 1942.

[4] Gen O. P. Smith ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3May66.

Lejeune on 20 December 1942,[5] the division participated in a series of amphibious exercises, one with the Army 1st Infantry Division, the first of four Army divisions to receive such training jointly with Marine units or under the direction of Marine officers.

Like the division, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing soon outgrew its quarters at Quantico, even before it gained full strength. At the same time that the base at New River was being developed, the Marine Corps obtained authorization to construct a new air base nearby. Cunningham Field, Cherry Point, North Carolina, was designated a Marine Corps Air Station for development purposes on 1 December 1941. When it was commissioned on 20 May 1942, it had become a vast new base that was capable of handling the greatest part of a completely built-up Marine aircraft wing.

Similarly on the west coast, burgeoning Marine Corps aviation strength required the facilities to handle the new squadrons and training organizations. Accordingly, the following Marine Corps Air Stations—all in California—were commissioned: Santa Barbara, 4 December 1942; Mojave, 1 January 1943; El Toro, 17 March 1943; and El Centro, 23 July 1943. In addition, a number of satellite air facilities were built on both coasts to handle the overflow as well as to conduct specialized training of squadrons permanently or temporarily based on the larger stations.

Paralleling the acquisition of new training sites and the construction of facilities thereon was the attempt to meet the demand for trained commissioned and enlisted personnel for both general and specialist duties. With the expansion of Marine Corps strength, there was a comparable development in the training program.

By the time that the United States had entered the war, the main patterns of Marine Corps recruit training to be employed for the duration had evolved. The basic principles underlying recruit training in 1939 changed little in the war years, except for the amount of time allotted to the training cycle. Before the national emergency was declared in September 1939, boot camp lasted eight weeks. Following that time, and until the authorized strength figure of 25,000 enlisted Marines had been reached at the end of January 1940, the training period was accelerated and new Marines entering service from September 1939–January 1940 received only four weeks of recruit training.

Beginning in February 1940, with the attainment of the manning level, it was possible to lengthen the training cycle first to six and then to seven weeks. In 1944, the Marine Corps reverted to an eight-week schedule. The program promulgated by Headquarters Marine Corps provided that each recruit spend his first three weeks in the Corps training at the main station of either Parris Island or San Diego, the fourth to sixth weeks on the rifle range, and the last two weeks of boot camp back at the main station. This schedule represented 421 hours of training, broken down as follows: 195 devoted to weapons instruction, 39 to physical training, 89 to garrison subjects, and 98 to field subjects.

[5] *G–3 OpD*, Dec42, p. 36.

In July 1944, the final wartime change was made in training recruits; 36 additional hours of weapons training were included in the eight-week cycle without lengthening it.

From Pearl Harbor to V-J Day, the Marine Corps Recruit Depots at Parris Island and San Diego trained approximately 450,000 new Marines. This is only an approximation because, while there is no actual recruit depot output figure available, all recruits had to go through boot camp before they could be sent to the FMF or other Marine Corps activities, and this number is close to the enlisted strength of the Corps near the end of the war. At the recruit depots, training in the nomenclature, functioning, and handling of weapons, physical conditioning, and instruction in combat field subjects were emphasized. The primary effort of the recruit depots was to transform raw civilians into basically trained Marines, and pass them on to the FMF or to replacement training centers for intensive combat training, or send them to schools for specialized training.

TRAINING REPLACEMENTS

Marine Corps policy in World War II was to replace combat losses on an individual basis. That is, rather than allow committed units to become reduced in size and combat effectiveness because of casualties, it was determined to send replacement battalions of trained Marines to the combat area. Once there, these battalions would be disbanded and individual Marines fed into the units that had been hit hard in the fighting. It was believed that this system would obviate the necessity of withdrawing from combat a unit that had suffered heavy losses. Replacement battalions were also the source of men to fill gaps in deployed units caused by rotation of veterans to the States.

On 22 May 1942, after the 1st and 2d Marine Divisions had been trained and prepared for movement overseas, the Commandant directed that training centers be activated at New River and San Diego. Infantry training of replacements began first on the west coast at Camp Elliott, where the 2d Replacement Battalion was formed on 1 September 1942. This battalion's training was limited to two weeks of physical conditioning only. It should be noted that, from the very beginning of the replacement battalion program to the end of the war, replacement battalions were purely administrative organizations formed to train and expedite the movement of replacements overseas.

Basically, the function of the training centers was to prepare both specialist and infantry replacements to take their places in combat organizations. Accordingly, the training programs at these centers stressed conditioning marches and field exercises, and such subjects as techniques of individual combat, cover and concealment, field fortification, sniper and infiltration tactics and countermeasures, individual and crew-served infantry weapons, jungle warfare, small unit tactics, and amphibious training. In short, the training centers taught FMF-bound Marines all that they should know to enable them to take their places in tactical units in the field.

Although the syllabi of the infantry training centers were designed to reflect the needs of the FMF, and while the programs should have provided the FMF with well-trained infantry replacements, this often was not the case. As late in the war as the Iwo Jima operation, reports from the field indicated that in too many instances, replacements failed to measure up to expected standards in combat. Commenting on the inadequacies of replacements during the battle for Iwo Jima, the commander of the 27th Marines pointed out that "replacements were certainly unsatisfactory. . . . Having had little or no previous combat training, they were more or less bewildered and in many cases were slow in leaving their foxholes." [6]

Replacements failed to meet combat requirements for several reasons. In one instance, the replacement training program was not originally designed to train a man so thoroughly that he could join a strange FMF unit while it was *in combat.* It had been anticipated that replacements would join combat units in rest and rehabilitation areas during the interval between operations. Then they could be integrated under optimum conditions, a prerequisite for reasons of training, morale building, and to imbue them with unit spirit. It was important that replacements and combat veterans alike became acquainted and learned what to expect of each other.

Anticipated heavy losses during the Marianas operations raised the need to replace casualties while units were still fighting. Specifically, after the plans for the invasion of Saipan had been completed and the invasion was underway, the G–1 annex was reconsidered and provisions for the immediate acquisition of replacements inserted.[7]

The heavy losses sustained by the 1st Marines during the first week of the assault on Peleliu served to confirm the necessity for planning for the replacement of casualty losses during a combat situation. Beginning with the Iwo Jima operation, each division was provided initially with two replacement drafts, the personnel of which were to be used first to augment the shore party and then to be released as individual combat replacements when needed. These same provisions were made for the Marine divisions assigned to the invasion of Okinawa.

Had replacements in the States completed the full cycle of the revised training program set forth in a July 1944 directive, it is possible that they might have performed more satisfactorily in combat. So great was the demand from the field for replacements that, by mid-1944, only a few drafts had been able to complete the 12-week cycle.

Other factors diminished the impact of whatever training the replacements did receive. During the early years, the long periods between the departure of replacements from training centers and their assignment to combat units often caused them to forget much of what they had learned in training. Intensive schooling in numerous unfamiliar subjects compressed into a short time was

[6] 5th MarDiv SAR, Iwo Jima Operation, 19Feb–26Mar45, dtd 28Apr45, Anx R (27th Mar).

[7] CTF 56 Rpt on FORAGER, dtd 2Oct44, encl F (G–1).

quickly forgotten during the long voyage on transports and longer periods during which these Marines were performing non-tactical duties in various camps overseas. No adequate training program was provided to keep up their knowledge during this period.[8]

Through no fault of either the personnel or the programs of the training centers, the infantry replacement program overall was less than satisfactory. Replacement training was probably as good as it could have been considering the time limitations. Pressing personnel requirements in the combat zone caused trainees to be shipped out before completion of the training cycle. The training centers were responsible neither for this nor for the training and integration programs established by the receiving organizations. The inherent shortcomings of the replacement system could be cured only by adopting a different method for replacing combat losses, and none had appeared, even by the end of the war.

SPECIALIST TRAINING

Because amphibious warfare became so exactingly complex, to make a successful assault on a heavily defended shore and to support the operations of the attack force demanded a high order of technical skill in a variety of specialties. By 1945, Marine Corps personnel classification employed no fewer than 21 different occupational fields, each field containing a number of individual specialties.

Formal schooling was required for some of the specialties, while on-the-job training sufficed for others. Courses in certain basic occupational fields, such as administration, band, and tank and LVT had been underway before December 1941. By the following April, formal Marine Corps schooling had been expanded to include courses in the following fields: barrage balloon, parachute, chemical warfare, landing boats, and the Japanese language. Some Marines were assigned to courses conducted by the Marine Corps; others attended schools established by the other Services; and still others were trained by civilian facilities, either industrial or academic.

Specialist training at all times reflected the current needs of the Marine Corps. New courses were adopted, others changed, and still others dropped whenever it was required that such action be taken. Parachute and barrage balloon training, for example, was dropped when those units were deactivated.

INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

In an authoritative summary of American participation in the Pacific War, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey stated:

> At the start . . . our strategic intelligence was highly inadequate, and our overall war plans, insofar as they were based on faulty information and faulty interpretation of accurate information, were unrealistic. . . .
>
> In the field of operational intelligence considerable forward strides were made during the Pacific War. . . .[9]

[8] MajGen Oscar R. Cauldwell ltr to CMC, dtd 27Feb56.

[9] USSBS, *Summary Report (Pacific War)* (GPO, 1946), p. 31.

This is true when comparing the status of American intelligence operations at the beginning of the war with those at the end. But judging by the numerous gaps in our knowledge of the enemy existing as late as the time of the planning periods for ICEBERG and OLYMPIC, a great deal had yet to be accomplished in the intelligence program before it could be considered to be operating at an optimum level.

Much has been written in the earlier volumes of this series about poor aerial photographic coverage and subsequent mapping of targets from Guadalcanal on. During the discussion in this work of the planning for Okinawa, it was observed that the same problems existed. Also, American knowledge of Japanese strength and defenses on Okinawa ". . . was minimal, and . . . as late as L minus 1," the G–3 of the 6th Marine Division "was told that the Hagushi beaches were held in great strength." [10] This was, of course, proved incorrect by the uncontested landing on 1 April 1945.

Intelligence problems existed on the division level and below, or perhaps this should be reversed since intelligence production by the G–2 depended upon the timeliness and wealth or paucity of information provided by lower echelons. Throughout the 1930s and well into World War II, American commanders of all Services generally did not understand or appreciate how important it was to staff their intelligence sections properly. Because of this attitude, the people most experienced or knowledgeable in intelligence matters were not very often assigned to work in the G–2 or S–2 sections, and those who were, produced intelligence which commanders usually disregarded.[11] An additional liability accruing from all of this was that intelligence training and an awareness of its importance suffered throughout most commands. In this respect, the Marine Corps was as guilty as the other Services.

At Guadalcanal, the division intelligence section was the weakest component of the 1st Division staff throughout the planning period and into the first weeks of combat. Compounding this weakness, regimental and battalion intelligence teams were not well integrated with either one another or with division. As the campaign progressed, signs appeared that both commanders and subordinates were becoming conscious of the importance of complete, up-to-date information of the enemy and how to acquire it. It was a slow and tedious process, however, to indoctrinate all hands with the importance of saving and

[10] LtGen Victor H. Krulak ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, dtd 4Dec65.

[11] General Omar Bradley spoke of this in *A Soldier's Story* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), p. 33, when he related the intelligence gap to his experiences as an Army officer and said "The American army's long neglect of intelligence training was soon reflected by the ineptness of our initial undertakings . . . Misfits frequently found themselves assigned to intelligence duties. And in some stations G–2 became a dumping ground for officers ill suited to line command . . . Had it not been for the uniquely qualified reservists who so capably filled so many of our intelligence jobs throughout the war, the army would have found itself badly pressed for competent intelligence personnel." In this context, it should be noted that Lieutenant Colonel Edmond J. Buckley, mentioned on page 686, was a Marine Corps reserve officer.

turning in every scrap of material pertaining to the enemy.

On 8 September, the 1st Raider Battalion landed east of Tasimboko on Guadalcanal, the site of a suspected enemy base. Following this raid, Lieutenant Colonel Edmond J. Buckley, division intelligence officer who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge after the latter's death, remarked:

> It did not occur to any of the intelligence personnel present to collect any of the large amount of documentary material that was lying among the rest of the [enemy] supplies . . . a newspaper correspondent on his own initiative, collected a poncho full of maps, diaries, and orders and brought them to me personally.[12]

The intelligence gap existing at the 1st Division level was not solely a result of its own deficiencies, but occurred also because higher headquarters did not supply General Vandegrift with important information made available to other commanders. Until mid-October, the division was not on the distribution list for the daily intelligence report published by Commander, South Pacific, headquarters in Noumea. Vandegrift's G–2 learned of the existence of this report only after the 164th Infantry had landed on Guadalcanal and the regimental intelligence officer informed him of this particular publication.[13]

For the invasion of Cape Gloucester, 1st Division intelligence officers worked hard to assemble information on the objective and the enemy in order to brief assault troops. In addition, they devoted as much attention to the very real problem of acquiring information after the landing. Part of the preinvasion training deliberately and repeatedly stressed the importance of immediately passing along to intelligence agencies any enemy papers or material that were found. Members of the 1st Marine Division were shown through repeated demonstrations and a review of combat experience that a seemingly insignificant enemy document or item of equipment might provide the key that would shorten the battle and save lives. In order to overcome the indifference that most Marines showed toward the taking of prisoners, intelligence staff personnel reminded the New Britain-bound Marines that the ordinary Japanese soldier was willing to cooperate with his captors and provide military information once he had surrendered.

Following these two operations, the attitude of Marines respecting battlefield intelligence and how to acquire it generally improved. This was apparent not only in the 1st Marine Division but also in the Marine divisions which subsequently arrived in the Pacific. Intelligence training paid off at Bougainville, for instance, when a patrol from the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, turned in a sketch

[12] Col Edmond J. Buckley interview by Hist–Div, HQMC, dtd 3Jul47. (Guadalcanal Comment File).

[13] *Ibid.* According to Lieutenant General Louis E. Woods, Cactus Air Force commander after 7 November 1942, Marine aviation on Guadalcanal also suffered an intelligence gap, for "I received very little pertinent intelligence information from the 1st Division Headquarters. However, I did receive the information about the big Japanese invasion force directly from General Vandegrift in time to have some fighter planes flown in prior to the [enemy] November 13–15th landing." LtGen Louis E. Woods ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 18May66, hereafter *Woods ltr 1966*.

of enemy positions found in the map case of a dead Japanese officer. Based on this intelligence, the battalion was able to attack the next day to keep the enemy off balance. This incident of intelligence awareness was not an isolated one, for similar instances appeared in succeeding operations.

Because of Stateside training based on lessons learned in combat, most Marines sent to the Pacific after the campaign for Guadalcanal received a fairly thorough indoctrination in the importance of battlefield intelligence. Other aspects of intelligence besides basic combat intelligence interested the Marine Corps. These ancillary fields encompassed Chinese and Japanese language study and the training of aerial photography interpreters.

By the end of 1944, the Marine Corps had 242 trained Japanese language personnel and 63 enrolled in a study program. At the same time, some 38 Chinese interpreters were available to the Corps.[14] To provide the FMF with officers trained in Order of Battle techniques, commissioned personnel were sent to a course in that subject conducted by the War Department at the Pentagon.[15] Other Marines received specialized training at the Combat Intelligence School, Camp Lejeune, and the Army Military Intelligence Training Center, Camp Ritchie, Maryland. This training, in addition to that conducted in the field, pointed up the increased importance given to intelligence matters in the Marine Corps.

[14] G–2 Sec, Div P&P, OpD, 7Dec41–31Dec44, p. 3.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

UNIT FORMATIONS: CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENTS

With the creation of the FMF, the Marine Corps acquired the tactical structure necessary to carry out its primary wartime mission; namely, to serve the fleet by seizing advance bases for naval operations, and, once captured, to occupy and defend these bases. Accordingly, a tactical organization had to be developed to perform these functions. Although authorization had been granted to form a brigade for the FMF, other Marine Corps commitments prevented the Commandant from assigning the personnel and equipment initially required to bring the FMF up to strength.

In pace with the ever-changing development of amphibious warfare doctrine and techniques were changes in the tactical formations of the units slated to employ these techniques. Additional men and material were needed to beef up the FMF, but the isolationist attitude of the American people was well reflected in congressional reluctance to appropriate any money to any of the Services for any purpose which seemed offensive in character. To obtain the approval of Congress for an increase in Marine Corps strength, following a discussion with Admiral Leahy, the CNO, General Holcomb hit upon the stratagem of making it appear that an increase in Marine Corps manpower would actually constitute an increase in the *defensive* poten-

tial of the United States.[16] In keeping with the defensive aspects of the advance base force, Headquarters Marine Corps planners developed a new unit admirably suited and entitled for this purpose—the defense battalion. Credit for the creation and development of the defense battalion has been attributed to Colonel Charles D. Barrett, the head of the War Plans Section, Division of Plans and Policy, and his artillery assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Pepper.

As it transpired, the defense battalion program, commencing with the activation of the 3d Defense Battalion on 10 October 1939, was one of the major activities of the Marine Corps in the first two years of the war. In that time, the Corps activated a total of 18 defense battalions—numbered in sequence —and two composite defense battalions, the 51st and 52d. These last two units were comprised almost entirely of Negro Marines.

Concerning defense battalions, in his annual report for 1940 to the Secretary of the Navy, General Holcomb said:

> (1) During the fiscal year ending 30 June 1940, the Marine Corps organized and trained four defense battalions for the purpose of providing efficient and readily available organizations for the defense of bases. These battalions are heavily armed and are relatively immobile. The overhead, administration, supply, etc., has been reduced to the minimum. A battle station has been assigned to every man. The defensive fire power of these battalions is very large.
>
> (2) The organization of two additional defense battalions has recently been authorized. The use of all six of these defense battalions can be foreseen in existing plans. In addition, inquiries, preliminary to requesting the service of defense battalions in areas not contemplated in present plans, have recently been made.
>
> (3) These defense battalions and those to be organized will be under the command of the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, and therefore at the disposal of the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet.[17]

The complete development of the defense battalion provided the Marine Corps with a balanced force designed to accomplish the seizure and securing of bases for the Fleet. The advent of the defense battalion liberated infantry and artillery units of the FMF from any inherent responsibility for the protection of bases. As originally conceived and organized, defense battalions consisted of seacoast and antiaircraft artillery batteries, searchlight and sound locator units, and antiaircraft and beach defense machine gun units.

On 2 October 1941, the Commandant approved Defense Battalion Tables of Organization D–155a through D–155d, each T/O representing a defense battalion that was organized differently from the other three. Common to each defense battalion under this T/O were a Headquarters and Service Battery and

[16] Concerning this particular matter, General Thomas recalled that in 1941 General Holcomb told him: "If you said, 'I want an offensive outfit,' the politicians would say, 'No sir, you want to fight a war.' But if you said, 'I want a defensive outfit and I want to defend this country,' you could get men and we got men for defense battalions and we got them just that way because they were going to a defensive outfit and we were going to defend this area." Gen Gerald C. Thomas interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Sep66 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC).

[17] *CMC Rpt*, 1940.

a 90mm or 3-inch AA Group. The addition of two of the following other components would then complete the organization of the battalion: 155mm Artillery Group; Special Weapons Group; 5-inch Artillery Group; Machine Gun Group; or a 7-inch Artillery Group. At this time it was stated that "The particular table which will govern the organization of a defense battalion will depend upon the type of equipment furnished and will be prescribed by the Commandant from time to time." [18]

Approximately seven months later, the defense battalions were reorganized, this time with an increase of strength and the addition of a fifth type of battalion formation, but all still using the components mentioned above. Under this T/O, dated 25 May 1942, the D–155a formation, for instance, consisted of a Headquarters and Service Battery, a 155mm Artillery Group, a 90mm or 3-inch Antiaircraft Group, and a Special Weapons Group. The total strength of this groupment was 1,146 Marines; the D–155d unit was even larger—1,196 Marines. The naval medical component of 25 doctors, dentists, and corpsmen was the same for each groupment. As a matter of comparison, it is interesting to note that the strength of the D-Series T/O infantry battalion was 933, and never during World War II did the strength of the various T/O infantry battalions exceed 996 men.

On 13 May 1942, the CMC approved a recommendation to organize, equip, and train a "colored composite Defense Battalion, the 51st, at Montford Point," in North Carolina.[19] The strength of this unit was 1,085 Marines, and it consisted of a Headquarters and Service Battery (Reinforced), a Machine Gun Group, a 90mm or 3-inch Antiaircraft Group, a 155-mm Artillery Battery, a 75mm Pack Howitzer Battery, and a reinforced Rifle Company.

Officers assigned to defense battalions usually were graduates of the Base Defense Weapons Course, a component of the Marine Corps Schools at Quantico. This course was designed to train company grade officers in the techniques and employment of light field artillery and weapons utilized in the defense of advanced bases. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the 10-month course was fairly evenly balanced between instruction in field artillery and base defense.[20] Mobilization of Marine reservists and general expansion of the Corps necessitated in turn an expansion of the training program and general reduction in the length of most courses. In 1940 the Base Defense Weapons Course was reduced to a period of 16 weeks.

Under the pressures of the short-of-war period, the Base Defense Weapons Class, as it had been retitled, was split into Field Artillery and Base Defense Sections (antiaircraft and coast artillery). Further reductions in the length of the course ensued under the pressure of wartime needs. In January 1943, the Base Defense Section was transferred to Camp Lejeune and redesignated the Officers Base Defense School, which became a part of the Base Artillery Bat-

[18] *G–3 OpD*, Dec41.

[19] *G–3 OpD*, May42.

[20] Condit, Diamond, and Turnbladh, *Marine Corps Training*, p. 88.

talion, which, in turn, was an element of the Training Center, Camp Lejeune. Beginning in March 1944, two separate courses were set up—one designated the Antiaircraft Course dealing with 90mm guns, and the other, which actually began in May, titled the Special Weapons Course to instruct in the employment of 20mm and 40mm guns and .50 caliber machine guns. Beginning in June that year, the emphasis in training began to shift towards instruction in field artillery at the Camp Lejeune school. This change reflected the progress of the Pacific War, for as the offensives in the South and Central Pacific went into high gear, the need for base defense artillery began to pale and the attacks on the strongly fortified Japanese-held islands in the Gilberts, Marshalls, Marianas, and Palaus demonstrated the requirement for more and heavier field artillery.

It was intended that defense battalions would land on an objective after the assault troops had landed, and then assist in the defense of that objective either while the fighting was still going on or after the target had been secured. In practice it did not work out that way, for in many instances, defense battalions landed immediately after the initial assault and began operations soon after. In the case of the defense battalions—or detachments thereof—on Wake, Midway, and certain other Pacific islands, the enemy came to them. At any rate, once the Central Pacific campaign began, the defense battalions in the South Pacific area found themselves in the backwash of the war and, like the aviation activities based in these islands, became beset by doldrums with only the appearance of intermittent enemy air raids to relieve their boredom.

This was the case in late summer 1943, when General Vandegrift—who had recently been appointed as the commander of I Marine Amphibious Corps when General Barrett died suddenly—made an inspection trip in the Solomons in company with his chief of staff, Colonel Gerald C. Thomas. "What interested Vandegrift most were these defense battalions . . . in the Guadalcanal area. . . . The war had gone on beyond them." [21] It was found that each battalion had an excess of five or six majors, "and here these kids were pleading just to get into the war." [22] IMAC then made arrangements with Headquarters Marine Corps to send approximately 35 of these officers back to the States assigned to the Command and Staff Course at Quantico, and then back to the Pacific, "because our crying need at the division and corps level [was] for junior staff officers." [23]

The problem concerning the future of the defense battalions, however, was not solved until 1944, when all of them, with the exception of the 6th Defense Battalion and the two composite units, were first redesignated antiaircraft battalions, and shortly thereafter designated antiaircraft artillery battalions. On 1 November 1944, for the Okinawa operation, four of these AAA battalions —the 2d, 5th, 8th, and 16th—were formed into the 1st Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery Group, which was later placed under the operational control of

[21] Gen Gerald C. Thomas interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Sep66 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC).

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.*

the Army 53d AAA Brigade of the Tenth Army.

Although the defense battalions loomed large in the Marine Corps overall, it appears that "almost until the disaster at Pearl Harbor, there existed in the G–3 [Division of Plans and Policies at HQMC] a divided opinion as to the relative value of 'Defense Battalions' and 'Divisions.' " [24]

According to General del Valle, in 1939 Executive Officer of the Division of Plans and Policies:

> A study of the problem we might encounter in the Pacific, especially the Ellis estimate, inspired me to work with the then Lt. Col. H. D. Harris, our G–2, to make available rough T.Os of various types of divisions. This was done on our own. . . .[25]

Both del Valle and Harris:

> . . . made a study of all the divisions in the civilized world, the composition of the divisions we went into war with, the first World War. . . . And we decided that some time that the Marines may get a division. . . . So, I did it all with Harris. He did the research and I did the pictures, and we made up a division, in fact we made up three type divisions for the Marine Corps. One of them had a battalion of tanks.[26]

One of the protagonists for the defense battalions then told del Valle: "That's all the Marine Corps is going to need, defense battalions." [27] Soon after this, the Head of the Division of Plans and Policies came to the then Colonel del Valle and asked to see the prototype divisions that Harris and del Valle had drawn up; ". . . we produced our crude products, one of which was selected as the basis for the division which we took to Guadalcanal." [28]

THE MARINE DIVISION

During the course of World War II, the organization of the Marine division underwent numerous changes to reflect revisions and new developments in the conduct of amphibious assaults. Although the unit designation was the same, there was considerable difference in the strength and organization of the 1st Marine Division which landed on Guadalcanal in 1942 and the 1st Division which landed on Okinawa three years later. All other Marine divisions activated during the war years were similarly affected by various organizational changes.

General Vandegrift's Guadalcanal division was organized in accordance with Marine Corps T/O D–100, which had been approved on 1 July 1942. The total strength of the D-Series Marine division was 19,514, which was broken down into 865 commissioned and 16,987 enlisted Marines, and 115 commissioned and 1,547 enlisted Navy personnel, who were members of the Medical, Dental, Chaplain, and Civil Engineer Corps.

The organization of this division was as follows:

Special Troops	3,031
Headquarters Battalion	
Headquarters Company	

[24] LtGen Pedro A. del Valle ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 13Apr66, hereafter *del Valle ltr 1966.*

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] LtGen Pedro A. del Valle interview by HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 17Nov66 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC).

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] *del Valle ltr 1966.*

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Signal Company
Military Police Company
Special Weapons Battalion
Headquarters and Service Battery
40mm Antiaircraft Battery
90mm Antiaircraft Battery
3 Antitank Batteries
Parachute Battalion
Headquarters Company
3 Parachute Companies
Tank Battalion (Light)
Headquarters and Service Company
Scout Company
3 Tank Companies

Service Troops 1,946
Service Battalion
Headquarters Company
Service and Supply Company[29]
Ordnance Company
Division Transport Company
3 Regimental Transport Companies
Medical Battalion
Headquarters and Service Company
5 Medical Companies
Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Headquarters and Service Company
3 Amphibian Tractor Companies

Engineer Regiment 2,452
Headquarters and Service Company
Engineer Battalion
Headquarters and Service Company
3 Engineer Companies[30]
Pioneer Battalion
Headquarters Company
3 Pioneer Companies[31]

Naval Construction Battalion
Headquarters Company
3 Construction Companies[32]

Artillery Regiment 2,581
Headquarters and Service Battery
105mm Howitzer Battalion
Headquarters and Service Battery
3 105mm Howitzer Batteries
3 75mm Pack Howitzer Battalions
Headquarters and Service Battery
3 75mm Pack Howitzer Batteries

3 Infantry Regiments 9,504
Headquarters and Service Company
Weapons Company[33]
3 Infantry Battalions
Headquarters Company
Weapons Company[34]
3 Rifle Companies[35]

Throughout the series of wartime T/Os, the Marine division was organized on a triangular basis. This triangular formation was reflected pri-

[29] The Service and Supply Company consisted of a company headquarters and a service platoon. The latter was comprised of a platoon headquarters and service and supply, bakery, commissary, post exchange, chemical services, salvage, and bath sections.

[30] Each company consisted of a company headquarters and an assault and an engineer platoon.

[31] There were a company headquarters and three pioneer platoons in each company.

[32] The versatility of the Seabees is reflected by the composition of each construction company, which had: a maintenance and operations platoon, two construction platoons, a road blasting and excavation platoon, a waterfront platoon, and a tanks, steel, and pipe platoon.

[33] The regimental weapons company consisted of a company headquarters, a 75mm gun platoon, and an antiaircraft and antitank platoon.

[34] The battalion weapons company consisted of a company headquarters, a 20mm antiaircraft and antitank platoon, an 81mm mortar platoon, and three machine gun platoons. The D–Series Tables of Equipment (T/E) specified that when the 20mm dual-purpose gun was not available, the 37mm gun was to be substituted, which was fortunate, for the Marines employed this weapon with good effect throughout the war.

[35] Each rifle company had a company headquarters, a weapons platoon (consisting of a 60mm mortar section and a light machine gun section), and three rifle platoons. The rifle platoon was broken down into a platoon headquarters, a BAR squad, and three rifle squads.

marily in the organization of the three infantry regiments in each division. Within the infantry regiment, groups of three formed the whole: three squads (under the F- and G-Series T/Os, the lowest component was the fire team) comprised a rifle platoon, three platoons a rifle company, three companies an infantry battalion, and three battalions an infantry regiment. Some of the support units organic to the division were likewise triangularly organized in order to give maximum assistance to the infantry elements.

Slightly less than a year after the D-Series T/O for a Marine division had been approved and published, on 15 April 1943 the E-Series T/O appeared.[36] There were certain marked changes in the composition and strength of the new T/O division. Some units were taken away from the division, some were added, and others completely or slightly revamped. The aim of the reorganization was to make the Marine division a more effective and flexible fighting machine.

The E-Series Marine division was stronger than the D-Series by 451 sailors and Marines. Although under the new T/O, the strength of special troops was decreased by 714 men, primarily because of the transfer of the parachute battalion to corps troops, and a reduction in the size of the special weapons, light tank, and service battalions, these losses were overbalanced by the strengthening of certain other division organizations. Among these were: service troops, which was enlarged slightly when the division transport company and the three regimental transport companies were taken from the service battalion and formed into a division motor transport battalion; the engineer and infantry regiments, which were given nearly 100 more men; and the artillery regiment, which was expanded with the addition of a second 105mm howitzer battalion. Along with the formation of the motor transport battalion, which gave the division an increase of 84 personnel in this field, 130 more vehicles were assigned to the division.[37]

The F-Series tables for a Marine division, approved on 5 May 1944, had 2,500 less men than its predecessor. In the 1944 organization, special troops—in essence a command headquarters groupment—was abolished and in its stead a division headquarters battalion, which became a separate battalion within the division, took control of the units formerly under special troops cognizance. The headquarters battalion troop listing was changed somewhat at this time, for the special weapons battalion was disbanded, and the light tank battalion became an independent battalion. It was given a numerical designation which reflected the number of the division to which it belonged, *e.g.*, the 1st Tank Battalion was organic to the 1st Marine Division, *etc.* Division service troops was reduced in strength at this time with the transfer of the amphibian tractor battalion to corps troops.

[36] See App I, "Comparison of Organization, Marine Division," for a tabular representation of the composition of the four World War II T/Os for a Marine infantry division.

[37] See App J, "Comparison of Equipment, Marine Division."

Along with its redesignation, the composition of the tank battalion was also changed. The reduction in battalion strength to 594 men was primarily caused by the loss of the scout company, which was redesignated as the division reconnaissance company (1st Reconnaissance Company, 1st Marine Division, *etc.*) and placed in the division headquarters battalion. Here, the company became the instrument of the division commander. The duties of this company more nearly reflected the amphibious mission of the division, for reconnaissance personnel more often travelled by jeep or on foot on land and in rubber boats over water whenever they were on a reconnaissance mission. The ancestry of the reconnaissance company can be traced to the concept and the needs underlying the formation of Colonel William J. Whaling's scout-sniper group on Guadalcanal.[38] Quite a few Marines who were assigned to the new unit came from the parachute and raider battalions, which were disbanded in 1944.

The engineer regiment, as such, was disbanded when the F-Series T/O was published, and like the headquarters and tank battalions, the engineer and pioneer battalions became separate entities in the division. They, too, were given the numerical designation of their division. The engineer battalion was enlarged somewhat, while the pioneer battalion remained relatively unchanged in size. The naval construction battalions (Seabees) were detached at this time because they were continuously needed elsewhere in the Pacific for airfield construction and it would have been uneconomic to have them remain inactive with their Marine divisions between operations. Despite this T/O change, the Seabees were attached to Marine divisions as a component of the landing force in assault landings.

The only specific change in the artillery regiment in the F-Series tables was that the number of 75mm pack howitzer battalions was reduced from three to two. The Marine artillery regiment now had two 75mm pack howitzer battalions and two 105mm howitzer battalions. In deference to the amphibious character of the Marine division, it contained lighter organic artillery than its Army counterpart, which had three 105mm howitzer battalions and a battalion of 155mm howitzers. During combat operations, however, Marine divisional artillery was usually supported by the 105mm and 155mm howitzers and 155mm guns of corps artillery.

Although the G-Series T/O was not published until 4 September 1945, after the Pacific War had ended, the tables of some division units had been published earlier. For example, the T/O for an infantry regiment is dated 1 May 1945, but this is misleading because many of the changes inherent in the G-Series had been made before this time. A case in point is the fact that the Marine infantry regiments which landed on Okinawa just a month before the T/O publication date were organized in accordance with these tables. Each division of IIIAC was up to or close to T/O strength, 19,176 men—a considerable increase over the previous T/O—plus

[38] See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, p. 319*n*.

an overage which reflected the normal reinforcement given a combat-bound division.

In the 1945 version of the tables of organization, the division had been given an assault signal company, a rocket platoon, and a war dog platoon. Other division units that had been augmented were the service troops, whose motor transport battalion was enlarged from 539 to 906 men (overall transportation in the division was increased from a previous total of 1,548 pieces of rolling stock to 1,918), and a slight expansion of the artillery and infantry regiments. Further indicating that the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions were organized on Okinawa in accordance with the G-Series tables is the fact that the 75mm self-propelled gun platoon had been replaced by the 105mm self-propelled howitzer platoon in the infantry regimental weapons company prior to the landing.

THE MARINE INFANTRY REGIMENT

At first glance, it would appear as though the various wartime T/O regiments differed only slightly in size from one another, and that there had been but few changes in their compositions.[39] Appearances are deceiving, however, for the Marine infantry regiment and its components experienced perhaps the most dramatic revolution of all of the types of Marine Corps units each time new tables of organizations were published. Not only was the composition of the infantry regiment affected by these T/O changes, the types and numbers of the different weapons with which it fought similarly underwent change. Conversely, the development and assignment of new weapons and the augmentation of existing tables of equipment strongly influenced each succeeding infantry regiment T/O change.

The most outstanding changes in the infantry regiment took place on battalion and company levels. Within the regimental headquarters complex, the only element significantly modified during the war was the regimental weapons company, which lost its three antiaircraft/antitank platoons in the E-Series T/O and instead picked up three 37mm gun platoons. These were reduced by one in the G-Series tables. At the same time, the 75mm gun platoon was replaced by a platoon of 105mm self-propelled howitzers. This larger-caliber weapon proved to be of inestimable value in the cave warfare of Okinawa.

With the inception of the F-Series T/O, the battalion weapons company was abolished. Its 81mm mortar platoon was placed in the battalion headquarters company, where it became the infantry battalion commander's artillery, and its three machine gun platoons were parcelled out on the basis of one to each rifle company. The weapons platoon of the rifle company was also disbanded at this time. The 60mm mortar platoon was incorporated with the company headquarters and the light machine gun section became part of the newly established company machine gun platoon.

The size of the rifle company grew with the appearance of each succeeding table of organization. In the D-Series

[39] See App K, pt 1, "World War II Development of the Marine Infantry Regiment."

tables of 1942 company strength was 183; 196 in the E-Series; 235 in the F-Series; and 242 in the G-Series. This growth rate was caused in part by the fact that the machine gun platoon (44 men in 1944, 56 in 1945) was added to the rifle company and offset the loss of the weapons platoon, which was only a paper loss. Actually, when the 60mm mortar section was transferred to the company headquarters, it gained four men, and despite the fact that the light machine gun section was abolished, the loss of its 19 Marines was more than made up for by the addition to the rifle company of the 44-man machine gun platoon.

Another element of the rifle company increased during the war was the rifle platoon, or more importantly, the squads of that platoon. The D-Series rifle platoon had 42 Marines in a platoon headquarters of 7 men, an 8-man automatic rifle (BAR) squad, and three 9-man rifle squads. The BAR squad consisted of a squad leader armed with a submachine gun, two BAR-men, and five riflemen. Although assistant BAR-men were designated as such in subsequent T/Os, they did not appear in the D-Series tables. The rifle squad in this T/O consisted of a squad leader, a BAR-man, six riflemen, and a rifle grenadier, who was armed with the trusty Springfield M1903 .30 caliber rifle and a grenade launcher.

At this juncture, it must be pointed out that, although the D-Series table of equipment for a Marine division [40] listed 5,285 carbines, 7,406 M–1s, and only 456 '03s,[41] this was not, in fact, the case for the 1st Marine Division on Guadalcanal was not so armed. The M–1 rifle was issued to the 1st Division in April 1943, after it had left Guadalcanal, and was in Australia training for the impending New Britain operation. "Nostalgia for the reliable '03 was widespread, but the increased firepower of the M–1 would not be denied." [42] This is not to say that no Marines had M–1s on the 'canal, for some acquired them through a "moonlight requisition" after Army units arrived on the island. Others obtained the new rifle by picking up the dropped weapons of soldiers who had been wounded and evacuated. This last occurred in October 1942, during the time that the 164th Infantry fought alongside of the 7th Marines in stemming Japanese attacks on the perimeter.[43]

Returning to the D-Series rifle squad, it was not particularly suited for operating other than as a whole and, unlike the rifle squads of later T/Os, it was the lowest component of the triangular organization and could not be broken down into a smaller tactical unit. At this point in the development of Marine assault tactics, the chain of command extended down only as far as the squad

[40] See App J.

[41] Apparently only the rifle grenadiers were to be armed with the '03 since the division was equipped with an equal number of grenade launchers in this T/E.

[42] Shaw and Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul*, p. 307.

[43] Mr. George C. MacGillivray comments to HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 7Feb66, hereafter *MacGillivray Comments*. Mr. MacGillivray was a crewman of a 37mm gun team with Weapons Company, 7th Marines, in the operations on Guadalcanal and Cape Gloucester.

level. This was the lowest echelon on which control was maintained and fire supervised. The problem of control in combat has always plagued commanders; and the more difficult the terrain over which a battle was being fought, the more difficult it was to maintain control.

Marine Corps units committed to the jungle war and antibandit activities in Central America during the early 1900s found it necessary to devise methods for achieving better infantry control and accuracy under fire. In face of the hit-and-run tactics and ambuscades of such bandit leaders as Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua, and in areas where mobility was curtailed by the jungle, firepower became the key to success. Additional firepower came from reliance on the assignment of an additional number of automatic weapons to each squad.

> The practical experience gained from using automatic weapons in Nicaragua influenced greatly the development of the fire team. The ratio of automatic weapons in the squad was increased by most leaders from one for every eight men to one for every three or four. Most important was the growth of the automatic rifle as a base of fire and as the nucleus of a small fire group.[44]

A further development leading to a more responsive infantry unit occurred in China in 1938, with the development of a rifle company specially organized to quell street riots. At the heart of this organization were three platoons composed of six fighting teams of four men each.

> Each team was led by a senior private or junior NCO, and could be employed flexibly in independent action as well as in performing its primary mission as an integral part of the riot company as a whole.
>
> The equipment of each man in the 1st and 3d Platoons was a rifle, bayonet, cartridge belt with 100 rounds of ammunition, gas mask, and steel helmet. Two men of the 1st and 6th Teams in the 2d Platoon carried BARs; the other two men in each of these teams were armed with Thompson sub-machine guns.
>
> Marines in the 2d and 5th Teams carried rifles with bayonets fixed, and they too had 100 rounds of ammunition in their cartridge belts. Rifle grenadiers comprised the strength of the 3d and 4th Teams, and they each wore a grenade carrier holding eight tear gas grenades.[45]

The four-man fighting team was the solid foundation on which the riot company was based, for although:

> . . . the company commander and the platoon leaders would retain control for as long as the situation warranted, the fighting team could have been quickly detached on independent assignments such as search missions or the establishment of a strong point at a street intersection. In any case, the team could be detached without destroying the basic riot formation or the unit integrity of the company. The success of the riot company would result from its simple line formations and signals, and more importantly, from the emphasis on the decentralized control of the four-man fighting team.
>
> . . . The decentralization of command and independent coordinated action by small units were as necessary in the

[44] 2dLt Lee M. Holmes, "The Birth of the Fire Team," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 36, no. 11 (Nov52), p. 21, hereafter Holmes, "The Fire Team."

[45] Gen Wallace M. Greene, Jr., "Shanghai 1937," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 49, no. 11 (Nov65), p. 63.

> crowded streets of the International Settlement [of Shanghai] as they were in the jungles of Nicaragua and the Pacific islands. . . .[46]

An answer to some of the problems of rifle squad control appeared in the E-Series T/O. The BAR squad was dropped and replaced by a third rifle squad. The rifle squad was increased in size to 12 men: a squad leader, an assistant squad leader, six riflemen, and two assistant BAR-men, all armed with M-1s, and two BAR-men. Now the squad could be broken down into two six-man units, each containing a total of one automatic and five semiautomatic rifles. While meeting some of the requirements for better control and heavier firepower in jungle fighting, this formation provided only a partial solution. Prior to the adoption of the E-Series T/O, some Marine units, especially the 1st Parachute Battalion—then in training at Camp Lejeune—experimented on their own. Based on the recommendations of the battalion operations officer and because some extra BARs were available to the battalion at the time (1941), the parachutists trained with their rifle squads organized into three three-man teams in which one man was armed with the BAR. Soon other Marine Corps organizations were adopting this formation, if the extra weapons were at hand.

> Liaison between the Parachute and Raider units was very close and ideas on tactics, technique, organization, and equipment were freely exchanged. Both Raider and Parachute units operated with the 3d Marine Division during the Bougainville campaign and the advantages of the fire team organization over the squad were soon noted.[47]

The mission of the Marine raider battalion and the organization of a squad of raiders was described by the commander of the 2d Raider Battalion, Major Evans F. Carlson, in a letter to President Roosevelt, who was told that:

> I designed the organization and equipment with a view to providing a battalion capable of high mobility and possessing the maximum fire power compatible with such mobility . . . The emphasis is on speed of movement on foot, endurance, self-sufficiency and great fire power . . . The squad, consisting of a corporal and nine others, is armed with five Thompson submachine guns, four Garand rifles and one Browning automatic rifle. These nine men operate in three fire groups of three men each. Each group, led by a scout armed with a Garand, is supported by two automatic riflemen . . . The three fire groups, of course, are mutually supporting. A group so armed and so trained can cover a front of from 100 to 300 yards, as against the 50 yard front covered by the orthodox infantry squad of eight men, armed with the 1903 rifle and one BAR.[48]

At Camp Pendleton in July 1943, Company L, 24th Marines, conducted experiments in the problems of controlling infantry units in combat. The basis for this training were the lessons learned by veteran FMF units in the Pacific. The company was organized according to the E-Series tables with

[46] *Ibid.*

[47] Col Robert T. Vance ltr to 2dLt Lee M. Holmes, n.d., cited in Holmes, "The Fire Team," p. 22. It should be noted that the term "fire team" did not officially appear until the F-Series T/O was published in 1944.

[48] Maj Evans F. Carlson ltr to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, dtd 2Mar42 (NARS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.), hereafter *Carlson ltr.*

12-man rifle squads. Heralding the future, an additional man and an extra BAR were added to each squad, which then conducted training with this formation. The results of field tests proved the practicality and ease of control of such an organization, and the officers observing the tests recommended "that the rifle companies of the 24th Marines be organized on the group basis for exhaustive tests of this method with a view to its possible adoption by the Marine Corps." [49] Major General Harry Schmidt, commander of the 4th Marine Division, forwarded this report to the Commandant by way of Major General Clayton B. Vogel, Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, San Diego Area, who further recommended that "experiments be carried out with a company and a battalion organized along these lines, possibly in the school organization at Quantico. . . ." [50]

On 14 October 1943, the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools, was asked to conduct experiments along the lines indicated in the reports which General Holcomb had received from California. A board was convened on 15 December at Quantico; the senior member was Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Griffith, II, a former Marine Raider, and Majors Thomas J. Meyers and Lyman D. Spurlock.[51]

The troops provided the board for these experiments consisted of a rifle platoon furnished by the Training Battalion, Marine Corps Schools. Each squad was organized into four groups of three men each. The platoon was oriented on the purpose of the experiments at a two-hour lecture and blackboard talk conducted by Colonel Griffith's board, and on the following day a number of formations and "plays" were described to the members of the platoon, who then practiced them in the field under the board's observation.

Although the board generally concurred in the findings following the experiment conducted by the 24th Marines, it believed that instead of the four three-man teams recommended by that regiment's board for the rifle squad, the new formation should consist of three groups of four men each. Griffith's board reasoned that in a three-group squad, battle casualties could be absorbed more easily, control would be easier, and the principle of the Marine infantry triangular formation would be preserved. One further point that the board made was that "From the psychological point of view the use of the word 'team' infers a unit of effort and a spiritual cohesiveness that the term 'group' does not." [52] Reinforcing the recommendations of the board, Colonel Griffith included as an enclosure extracts of a letter he had written in September 1943, as 1st Raider Battalion commander, relating the organization of the raider companies to the experi-

[49] LtCols John J. Cosgrove, Aquilla J. Dyess, and Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., ltr to CO, 24th Mar, dtd 2Aug43.

[50] CG, 4th MarDiv ltr to CMC, dtd 23Sep43, and CG, FMF, San Diego Area, 1st End to same, dtd 30Sep43.

[51] CMC ltr to CMCS, dtd 14Oct43, Subj: Employment of the Rifle Squad; CMCS ltr to LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II, dtd 15Dec43, Subj: Board of Officers.

[52] LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II, ltr to CMCS, dtd 7Jan44, Subj: Report of Board of officers relative to experiments conducted with a rifle squad organized into groups.

ences of his battalion in the New Georgia operation.

In preparation for this campaign, in March 1943, the 10-man rifle squads of the 1st Raider Battalion were reorganized into "three groups of three men each, with a corporal squad leader. Each group was designated as a 'fire team' and the senior man was appointed leader of the fire team. Each fire team was equipped with one BAR, one carbine, and one M1." [53] Colonel Griffith continued, "As a result of this combat training experience, the officers and enlisted men of this battalion were of the opinion that the fire team organization was superior to normal organization," and "Our experience in the New Georgia operation confirmed" this opinion.[54]

The findings of the Griffith Board were then sent to Headquarters Marine Corps, where the Division of Plans and Policies noted that a similar plan for the reorganization of the rifle squad had been submitted to FMF field units for comment.[55] Upon receipt of the Griffith Board report at Headquarters, it was routed through the various sections of "Pots and Pans" for comment. Based on his experiences as the commanding officer of the 2d Parachute Battalion, which had conducted the diversionary raid on Choiseul nearly three months earlier, Lieutenant Colonel Victor H. Krulak—now head of the G–4 Section—noted:

> The squad organization recommended by the Marine Corps Schools is believed to be fundamentally sound. All squads in the Battalion which I commanded were organized on a three group system—each group being built around an automatic weapon (in this case the Johnson light machine gun). The organization stood up well in combat.[56]

The reports from the FMF field units indicated that the new formation was satisfactory, and it was adopted and appeared in the new rifle squad T/O published in March 1944.

The F-Series rifle squad was a great improvement over its predecessors and its organization seemed to give the commander the requisite control and additional firepower found to be so necessary in both jungle and island fighting. The 1944 squad was improved in several ways—it had 13 instead of 12 men, it was armed with a third BAR, and was susceptible to greater control over its Marines. Whereas in previous T/Os, the responsibility and authority of command was vested in only one man—the squad leader—four men were given command authority in the F-Series squad. These were the squad leader and his subordinates, three fire team leaders. The new squad consisted of a squad leader armed with a carbine, three fire team leaders and three riflemen armed with M–1s and M–7 grenade launchers, three assistant BAR-men armed with carbines and M–8 grenade launchers, and three BAR-men.[57] The

[53] Extracts of CO, 1st Raider Bn ltr to CO, 1st Mar, dtd 17Sep43, Subj: Organization of Marine Raider Companies, encl (A) to *Ibid.*

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] CMCS ltr to CMC, dtd 10Jan44, Subj: Employment of the Rifle Squad; CMC ltr to CMCS, dtd 17Jan44, Subj: Employment of the Rifle Squad.

[56] LtCol Victor H. Krulak memo AO–644–gg for M–3, dtd 13Jan44.

[57] MCTrngBul No. 101, dtd 29Mar44, Subj: Rifle Squad, T/O F–1, approved 27Mar44.

composition, concept of employment, and combat principles underlying the organization of the fire team were a culmination of Marine Corps tactical experience to that time. By the delegation of command authority to the squad and fire team leaders, it was believed that the principle of military leadership would be more widely disseminated and that the rifle squad would become more aggressive and efficient.

Under the fire team concept, the squad leader was responsible for the training, control, and general conduct of his squad. He was to coordinate the employment of his fire teams in a manner that would accomplish the mission assigned by his platoon commander. He was also responsible for the fire control, fire discipline, and maneuver of his fire teams as units. The fire team leaders were similarly responsible for their fire teams.

As it evolved, the fire team was organized primarily around the base of fire provided by the automatic rifle. Reflecting the uniform organization and balanced equipment of the team, it was capable of operating independently as a reconnaissance, observation, security, or outpost group. Maintenance of the principle of triangular organization in the Marine division beginning at the rifle squad level was apparent with the advent of the fire team. In addition, the establishment of this unit meant that control and coordination of effort under battle conditions in general and in amphibious operations in particular could be sustained. Other benefits accruing from the employment of the fire team were: maintenance of mutual support in the defense; decentralization of fire control; decentralization of command; mobility; flexibility; rapid absorption of replacements during reorganization under combat conditions; and adaptability to special training and the accomplishment of missions involving the employment of special equipment.[58]

Regarding this last factor, the F-Series T/E gave the Marine division a sufficient number of flamethrowers and demolition kits to permit the distribution of one of each per squad when the employment of this equipment was required. The flamethrowers and demolitions were kept in the infantry battalion supply section, and were available when the battalion commander called for them.

In 1st Marine Division preparations for the Peleliu operation, however, there was a shortage of flamethrowers and replacements were late in arriving. Nineteen of these, together with three bazookas and some demolitions, were placed directly under battalion control. To employ these special assault weapons, a battalion weapons platoon composed of 60 men drawn from the rifle companies was, in some cases, organized. These Marines were evidently drawn from the company headquarters, for the

[58] *Ibid.* Apparently the matter of control of troops in a combat situation was uppermost in the minds of Marine planners when they adopted the fire team concept. Regarding this, General Gerald C. Thomas, Director of Plans and Policies at that time, has written: "The fire team leader should not take his place in the firing line, but stay in [the] rear to control his fire team. We went to this squad because a leader could not control seven men in combat, so, we certainly would not expect him to control twelve." Gen Gerald C. Thomas memo to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 26Apr66.

rifle platoons generally were maintained at full strength.[59]

To forestall the necessity of denuding the rifle companies of men in order to form special assault units, the G-Series T/O provided the infantry battalion with a 55-man assault platoon. This organization was composed of a platoon headquarters and three assault sections of two seven-man squads each. Comprising the squad was a squad leader, a flamethrower operator and his assistant, a bazooka operator and his assistant, and two demolitions men. In 1942, the Marine division had 24 not-too-satisfactory flamethrowers, which were carried and employed by the combat engineers. Each infantry battalion supply section in the F-Series T/O had 27 flamethrowers to be put into action on the battalion commander's order. In the G-Series tables, there were only 12 flamethrowers per battalion, but the one advantage in this case was that a trained unit had been established to make optimum use of the weapon.

From 1942 on, many changes were made in the composition of the division —some transitory, some long-lasting, and all reflecting combat lessons learned as well as immediate or future refinements. Many T/O changes resulted from the experimentation of individual units; a new tactical formation or an improved combat tactic often proved successful and was adopted throughout the Marine Corps after official approval had been given. In retrospect, each successive T/O change served to make the World War II Marine division the most effective and deadliest amphibious assault unit in history to that time.

[59] Garand and Strobridge, "Western Pacific Operations," MS, pt III, chap 8, p. 61.

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Some note has been made in preceding paragraphs of the weapons and equipment organic to the Marine division. The point has been emphasized that a division did not always possess the types and amount of equipment specified in a particular T/E. The comments regarding the number of M–1 rifles in the hands of Guadalcanal Marines bear this out. Although the D-Series T/O called for the antiaircraft and antitank platoon of the regimental weapons company to be armed with 20mm guns, they were not in fact so equipped. Organized at Parris Island, the Weapons Company, 7th Marines trained at New River with the old wooden-wheeled, 88-pound, 37mm gun before the division left for the Pacific. The company later received a wholly different 37mm gun, which proved most effective in combat.[60]

Another notable difference between what the D-Series T/E indicated the Marine division should have and what it actually possessed relates to the 75mm self-propelled gun platoon of the regimental weapons company. Officially, each platoon was equipped with two half-track 75s, but in reality, until near the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, the platoon fired 75mm guns which had a modified recoil system on a wholly new carriage with a new sighting, elevating, and training system. The special weapons battalion also had some half-tracks, which were employed in defense of the

[60] *MacGillivray comments.*

1st Division perimeter on the beaches of Guadalcanal.[61]

Marine equipment was continuously repaired (until no longer serviceable), replaced, and replenished throughout the war. Some gear could be refurbished by service units in the division, but more often, combat organizations would have to send damaged items to maintenance and repair facilities in rear areas. Normally, the replacement and replenishment system functioned as well as could be expected under conditions of war, with combat units receiving the supplies they had requisitioned or those which were automatically replenished. As soon as modified or new weapons and vehicles were received, they were sent to the units which would use them.

In May 1943, for instance, the light tanks (M3A1, mounting 37mm guns) of Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, were replaced by 33-ton General Sherman medium tanks (M4A1, mounting 75mm guns). This event is noteworthy because the first 24 mediums to arrive in the SWPA were received by the Army and turned over to the Marine company.[62] When subsequent models of the Sherman (M4A2, M4A3), which were heavier and more fully armored, were shipped to the Pacific, other Marine division tank battalions began using them also. The two later versions of the medium tank were employed on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.[63]

Soon after improved tank models began appearing in the Pacific, armored flamethrowers became available. Much of the successful introduction and employment of this infantry weapon in combat depended upon the rapid development of the portable flamethrower earlier. At the beginning of the war, American troops had only the M1 flamethrower, which had a range of a mere 10-15 yards and frequently misfired. Despite the knowledge that the enemy had no better weapon, it "did not overcome the dislike and distrust the American troops felt for the M1." [64]

Although this model was gradually improved, the basic problem remained, the too-rapid burning of the flamethrower fuel, which in the beginning was gasoline alone. The development of napalm (a three to eight percent mixture of aluminum soap with gasoline) came later after much experimentation. When the correct formula for napalm was achieved, its use as a fuel almost

[61] LtCol George Janiszewski comments to HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Feb66. LtCol Janiszewski served as an enlisted Marine in the 75mm Gun Platoon, Weapons Company, 7th Marines, on Guadalcanal.

[62] LtCol Frank O. Hough and Maj John A. Crown, *The Campaign on New Britain* (Washington: HistBr, HQMC, 1952), p. 22.

[63] The 1st Marine Division's tank battalion on Okinawa, however, retained its M4A2 tanks, which had welded hulls and were equipped with diesel motors. "LtCol [Arthur J.] 'Jeb' Stuart's fight to keep these instead of accepting the gasoline driven ones was carried by me all the way back to Pearl Harbor before the Okinawa landing. In my opinion, considering all factors, this feature helped keep casualties [among tank battalion personnel] to a minimum. The [tanks] were not so easily set on fire and blown up under enemy fire. We salvaged many using a 4.2 mortar smoke barrage and a tow tank under fire." *del Valle ltr 1966.*

[64] 1stLt Lewis Meyers, "Tactical Use of Flame," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 11 (Nov45), p. 20, hereafter Meyers, "Tactical Use of Flame."

doubled the range of the flamethrower and gave greater adhesion of the liquid on the target, it burned for a longer period than earlier fuels, and was much safer for the flamethrower operator to handle. The M1 was modified for use with napalm, and when fully loaded, it weighed 68 pounds—a heavy burden for an infantryman to carry, especially in combat when he was being shot at.[65]

The M2–2 flamethrower was introduced into combat in late 1943 (the E-Series division had 24, the F-Series had 243, and the G-Series had 108), and although it had an improved ignition system and could be maintained better in combat, it had the same 4-gallon capacity and 40-yard range of the earlier model.

By the end of the war, the portable flamethrower had become an important addition to the arsenal of Marine infantry weapons. But in face of the Japanese defenses encountered in the Central Pacific operations, it was found that it could not provide flame in sufficient quantity and that flamethrower operators could not advance through coordinated enemy fires to apply it without tremendous loss of American lives. The two solutions most likely to succeed were to drop some sort of fire bomb on a target and to develop an armored vehicle capable of delivering large amounts of flame for greater periods than heretofore.

The napalm bomb was first employed in support of a combat operation at Tinian, where Army pilots used it on an experimental basis. Various gasoline/napalm mixtures, types of fuses and fuse settings, and methods of delivery were attempted to ascertain what the potentials and limitations of the napalm bomb were. On the basis of reports received from his Navy and Marine Corps observers, the commander of Amphibious Group 2, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, concluded that "the bomb gave great promise of success as an amphibious weapon in future assaults against densely covered islands." [66] This conclusion was verified in later operations as air delivery of napalm was perfected as an offensive weapon.

Fitting LVTs and tanks with flamethrowers gave the infantry a better weapon for the destruction of enemy-held caves, cliffs, and canefields. Appearing in the Pacific in early 1944 was the "Ronson," a Canadian Army-developed, heavy-duty, long-range flamethrower which had a 150-gallon tank. It was initially mounted on an LVT and experimented with in the Hawaiian Islands and later used at Peleliu. In the spring of 1944, the Marines in the Pacific created "Satan," an M3 light tank which had been converted to carry the Ronson and 170 gallons of fuel, and had a range of 60–80 yards. VAC took 24 Satans into the Marianas campaign, where they

[65] Casualties among flamethrower operators were especially high in proportion to their numbers because of the nature of the tactics in which they and their weapons were employed in the assault of fortified positions. Also, the weight of the loaded flamethrower, and its high silhouette combined to make the operator particularly vulnerable to enemy fire.

[66] VAdm Harry W. Hill ltr to Dr. Jeter A. Isely, dtd 15Jun49, cited in Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 364. Commenting on this matter, General Woods has written: "Marine aviation did much experimenting with napalm, mixes, etc., in the Marshall Islands prior to Tinian, and much of it was dropped on Japs in bypassed islands." *Woods ltr 1966.*

were employed with spectacular results.[67] The Satan was improved upon with the appearance of the Army H1 Flamethrowing Tank, which mounted a newer model Ronson on the M4 Sherman. It carried 290 gallons of fuel, had the same range as the Satan, and a firing time of 2½ minutes. This was the weapon employed by Tenth Army troops on Okinawa.

A new type of tracked vehicle making its Marine Corps appearance in combat on Iwo Jima was the "Weasel," a light cargo carrier (M29C) that was capable of hauling a half-ton load. VAC, which received these vehicles in November 1944, distributed them to the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions the same month. While not seaworthy, the Weasel proved of inestimable value on land, where it was fast, maneuverable, and could pull trailers and light artillery pieces over terrain untrafficable for wheeled vehicles.[68]

A recital of the numerous items of new and modified equipment—aviation, ordnance, communications, transportation, armor, *etc.*—assigned to Marine Corps organizations would require more space than is available here. An accounting of their employment is found in the five volumes of this series.

SPECIAL UNITS

Whenever there is a discussion of what special units the Marine Corps had in World War II, the two organizations most readily thought of are the parachute and the raider battalions. There were, however, other specialist-type groups of brief life and briefer memory, and still others which were developed and activated late in the war. Although some of the units to be mentioned in this section were short-lived, the lessons learned from their training and combat experience in many cases proved valuable to other FMF organizations.

Marine parachutists, or Paramarines as they were often called, appeared on the scene in the fall of 1940, when the Commandant solicited requests from Marine volunteers to undergo parachute training. The first group began training at the Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey, on 26 October of that year. As this and succeeding classes became qualified parachutists, they formed the nucleus of the first parachute battalion organized. Company A, 1st Parachute Battalion, was activated at Quantico on 28 May 1941, and the battalion itself some two months later on 15 August. At the same time that this battalion was organizing on the east coast, the 2d Parachute Battalion was being formed at Camp Elliott on the west coast. On 3 September, the 2d Battalion was at full strength.

From Quantico, the 1st Battalion moved to New River for further training. Many World War II Marines will recall seeing the parachute towers at Hadnot Point when they reported to Camp Lejeune for duty. In order to apply Marine Corps concepts of parachute training, parachute training schools were established at Camp Gillespie, San Diego, on 6 May, and at New River on 15 June 1942. In July 1943, the New River complex was closed, and Camp

[67] Meyers, "Tactical Use of Flame," p. 21.

[68] VAC G–4 SAR, Iwo Jima, dtd 30Apr45, p. 45.

Gillespie became the center of Marine Corps parachute training activities.

The 1st Parachute Battalion departed the United States for New Zealand in June 1942. It landed on Gavutu, British Solomon Islands, on the same day that other elements of the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Following its commitment in the heavy fighting on Tulagi and later on Guadalcanal, the battalion was withdrawn from action and sent to Noumea, New Caledonia, where it was joined by the 2d and 3d Parachute Battalions in 1943. On 1 April 1943, the 1st Parachute Regiment was formed of these three battalions. A fourth battalion was activated the next day at San Diego, but never was sent overseas and was disbanded the following January.

Meanwhile, after a lengthy training period, the regiment left Noumea to return to Guadalcanal, arriving there in September 1943. At the end of the month, the entire regiment was transferred to Vella Lavella, New Georgia Group, where it participated in operations against the Japanese. The 2d Parachute Battalion, Reinforced, landed on Choiseul on 27 October in a raid intended to divert Japanese forces from the area of the 1 November target of the 3d Marine Division, Bougainville. The diversionary group withdrew on the 3d.

Before the Bougainville operation was over, most of the 1st Regiment had been committed to action. In December 1943, however, a decision was reached in Washington to disband Marine parachute units. The 1st Regiment, less its air delivery section, was ordered to San Diego, where the Paramarines were used to cadre the newly forming 5th Marine Division. The air delivery section was divided equally, and its elements were redesignated as corps air delivery sections for I Marine Amphibious Corps and V Amphibious Corps. The 1st Parachute Regiment was formally disbanded on 29 February 1944.

In retrospect, the Marine parachute program proved of little value to the Corps in the sense that no Marine combat paradrops were made during the war, although some had been considered. Militating against such action were several cogent factors. First, the Marine Corps did not have an adequate lift capability. At no one time could existing Marine aviation organizations muster more than six transport squadrons for a single operation, which meant that only one reinforced battalion could be lifted to an objective. Moreover, there were no shore-based staging areas within a reasonable distance of proposed targets. Further, the long distances between objectives were prohibitive. Finally, the objectives assigned to the FMF were generally small, densely defended areas, and therefore unsuitable for mass parachute landings. For these reasons, the Marine parachute program passed into history.

Although the Paramarines never made a combat jump, they did fight as ground troops in several actions and fought exceptionally well before the parachute battalions were disbanded. Marine parachute troops had outstanding spirit and, because of the emphasis on physical conditioning and small-unit tactics in their training program, they excelled in these areas. Their combat knowhow and aggressiveness were fully

demonstrated at Iwo Jima, where a large proportion of 5th Division personnel who were awarded Medals of Honor and Navy Crosses had been Paramarines.[69]

Another group of Marines whose members, like the Paramarines, considered theirs an elite organization, were the Raiders. One reason for the formation of several Marine raider battalions was the apparent need for specially trained hit-and-run troops who could harass the enemy based on the long chain of Japanese-captured islands in the Pacific. Presumably, Marine raider battalions were formed because of the notable success of British commando-type organizations at a time when everything else was going badly for the Allies. Although unsubstantiated and undocumented, it has been rumored that not all Marine Corps officers were particularly enthusiastic about the raider concept.[70] In writing to President Roosevelt about his 2d Raider Battalion, Major Carlson said:

> The whole thing is unorthodox, in the military sense, but it will do the job . . . Of course, we are meeting with opposition from the orthodox brass hats. However, General Vogel, the Force commander, and [Major] Generals [Charles F. B.] Price and [Joseph C.] Fegan are sold on the idea and are giving their full support.[71]

One recent critic of special units, who believes that any good organization can be trained for special operations, has written that "Most of the pressure for this organization came from the Navy." [72] This might be rebutted by a comment Admiral Nimitz made in 1957 concerning the assignment of Carlson's 2d Raider Battalion to CinCPac in 1942: "Here I was presented with a unit which I had not requested and which I had not prepared for." [73] A partial explanation for the high level of interest evinced in the Marine raider battalions can possibly be inferred from the following excerpt of President Roosevelt's reply to Carlson's letter:

> I am delighted to have your letter and to know that all goes so well with you.
>
> What you tell me about the new outfit is most interesting and surely there will be a chance to use it.[74]

Regardless of the quarter from which the impetus to organize Marine raider battalions came and despite Marine Corps attitudes pro and con regarding their formation, a program of special raider training began on 6 January

[69] Col Frank C. Caldwell comments to HistBr, dtd 15Feb66. Colonel Caldwell, a former Paramarine, was the commander of Company F, 26th Marines, on Iwo Jima.

[70] "Any such organization, as was the British Commandos, is suitable only for minimal counter-offensive [action] pending the time when the offensive is resumed. Their operational use was limited by their organization and equipment." *del Valle ltr 1966.*

[71] *Carlson ltr.*

[72] LtCol Don P. Wyckoff, "Super Soldiers," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 47, no. 11 (Nov63), p. 24.

[73] FAdm Chester W. Nimitz ltr to ACofS, G–3, dtd 10Mar57. On 28 May 1942, however, Admiral Nimitz proposed to General MacArthur that the 1st Raider Battalion, then at Tutuila, be employed to raid Tulagi, which the Japanese had captured on 3 May.

[74] President Franklin D. Roosevelt ltr to Maj Evans F. Carlson, dtd 12Mar42 (NARS, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.).

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1942. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was redesignated the 1st Separate Battalion and transferred from the 1st Marine Division to Amphibious Forces, Atlantic Fleet. Shortly thereafter, Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson and Major Evans F. Carlson were directed to organize, train, and command the first two Marine raider battalions activated. Both officers had the requisite experience necessary to guide the formation and training for this type of specialized organization. Edson had been a company commander with experience in fighting bandits in Nicaragua, and Carlson had been a military observer with General Chu Teh's Eighth Route Army in North China during the Sino-Japanese War. Carlson's raider concept was based, at least in part, on his analysis and admiration of Mao Tse-tung's guerrilla tactics and operations, about which he wrote in two books published in 1940.[75]

A reason for President Roosevelt's interest in the raiders and Carlson may stem from the fact that before the Marine officer had begun a tour as observer in China (1937–1938), he was the commander of the guard at the "Little White House," Warm Springs, Georgia. Also, while still a company grade officer, Carlson had a number of personal appointments with the President, and "during his tour . . . , he sent the President, at his request, a number of reports dealing with politics, political, diplomatic and military figures, American business policy, and the role of the British and French in China." [76]

Edson's 1st Separate Battalion was redesignated the 1st Raider Battalion on 16 February 1942. The battalion executive officer, Major Samuel B. Griffith, II, joined it after observing commando training in England. On 29 March, the 1st Raiders and 3/7 were sent to the west coast for transfer overseas to Samoa. Arriving at Tutuila on 28 April, Edson's outfit moved once again, this time in July, to Noumea, New Caledonia, where it prepared for the Guadalcanal operation.

The 1st Battalion landed on Tulagi on 7 August together with the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines as part of the 1st Marine Division invasion force, whose other elements landed on Guadalcanal, Gavutu, Tanambogo, and Florida Islands. Although the initial operations on Tulagi were unopposed by the enemy, during the night 7–8 August the raiders repulsed four separately launched Japanese attacks. Organized enemy resistance was eliminated by nightfall of the 8th, and the battalion remained on Tulagi until the end of August.[77]

At this stage in the Guadalcanal campaign, a growing need for more troops led to the move of the battalion across to the bigger island on 31 August to strengthen the 1st Division perimeter. Two raider companies patrolled Savo Island, on 2 September, but found no enemy. Following this, the 1st Raider and 1st Parachute Battalions were consolidated into a provisional battalion and

[75] Evans F. Carlson, *The Chinese Army: Its Organization and Military Efficiency* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940); same author, *Twin Stars of China* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1940).

[76] Dr. Elizabeth B. Drewry, Dir, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y., ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 8Mar66.

[77] 2/5 moved to Guadalcanal on 21 August.

moved into defensive positions on the southern rim of the division perimeter, inland from the airfield.

Here, Edson and his staff planned for an amphibious raid around to the east in the Tasimboko area, where an enemy buildup was reported. The raid was launched on 8 September with a landing just before dawn. Although light at first, enemy resistance became heavier. Upon the arrival of the Paramarines, Edson pushed the attack into the village, where he found that the Japanese had withdrawn, leaving some guns, ammunition, and food.

Despite the disappearance of the enemy forces, intelligence sources indicated that the Japanese were massing for another attack on the Marine defenders. To forestall enemy incursions and to protect the airstrip, General Vandegrift ordered the raiders and parachutists to prepare positions on a long, low ridge extending south of Henderson Field and paralleling the Lunga River. Following sporadic probing attempts on the night 12–13 September, the Japanese launched a full-scale attack the following night and lasting until early the next day. The defenders of Bloody Ridge, or Edson's Ridge as it also became known, turned back a serious threat to their precarious foothold on Guadalcanal in a violent and bloody fight that was crucial to the defense of the perimeter. Edson took over the command of the 5th Marines on 21 September, at which time Griffith, now a lieutenant colonel, relieved him as commander of the raider battalion.

The next action in which the 1st Raider Battalion took part occurred on 26 September, when it was to establish a permanent patrol base on the coast of Guadalcanal at Kokumbona. Meanwhile, at the mouth of the Matanikau River, 1/7 and 2/5 had become involved in a heavy fire fight with a strongly entrenched enemy force and had become pinned down. Griffith's raiders were ordered to join the two battalions and to prepare for a renewal of the attack the next day. It began early on the 27th and the raiders were stopped short when they ran into a Japanese force which had crossed the river during the night to set up strong positions on high ground some 1,500 yards south of the beach. The raiders as well as the other two Marine battalions were hit hard and finally were forced to evacuate from Point Cruz.

The final action on Guadalcanal in which the understrength 1st Raider Battalion participated was the Matanikau offensive on 7–9 October. Because of losses suffered in this fighting, the battalion was no longer an effective unit, and it was withdrawn soon after from Guadalcanal. It was detached from the 1st Marine Division and attached to Corps Troops, I Marine Amphibious Corps. The battalion embarked for Noumea, arriving there on 17 October.

At San Diego, on 19 February the 2d Separate Battalion (formed on the 5th) under the command of Major Carlson was redesignated the 2d Raider Battalion. Carlson's executive officer was Major James Roosevelt. The 2d Battalion (less Companies D and E, which were sent to reinforce the Marine detachment on Midway) departed the west coast for the Hawaiian Islands for training in landing from submarines and rubber boat handling. On the day

after the Guadalcanal landings, Carlson and the remainder of his battalion boarded submarines and sailed from Pearl Harbor for a raid on Makin in the Gilbert Islands, landing there on 17 August.

The purposes of this raid were to destroy enemy installations, gather intelligence data, test raiding tactics, boost morale in America, and perhaps divert some Japanese attention from Guadalcanal. Although the greatest asset of this operation was in relation to its effect on home-front morale, it also gained a modicum of success in its other objectives. The raiders lost 30 of their force in the course of which the battalion destroyed the 85-man Japanese garrison, and the accompanying radio stations, fuel and supply dumps, and other installations before reboarding the submarines for the return to Pearl.[78]

Carlson's battalion next moved to Espiritu Santo, arriving there on 20 September. On 4 November, the 2d Raider Battalion landed at Aola Bay, about 40 miles east of the Lunga River. From this point, Carlson marched his command through the jungle west to Lunga Point to clear the region of the enemy. For 30 days, until 4 December, the 2d Raider Battalion conducted a 150-mile combat and reconnaissance patrol through some of the most difficult terrain on Guadalcanal. In the course of this patrol, the raiders fought more than a dozen actions and killed nearly 500 of the enemy at a loss to themselves of 16 killed and 18 wounded. The battalion left Guadalcanal for Espiritu Santo on 17 December 1942, and moved from there to Wellington, New Zealand the following 4 February for a brief rest period, and then back to Espiritu Santo, where it remained awaiting orders for commitment to further action.

A third raider battalion was formed in the Samoan area on 20 September 1942 of volunteers from various 3d Marine Brigade infantry and defense battalion units. The commanding officer was Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. Liversedge. The 3d Raider Battalion departed Samoa on 15 January 1943 and joined the 2d Battalion at Espiritu Santo. Liversedge's battalion spearheaded the unopposed Army landing in the Russell Islands on 20–21 February 1943, and remained there until it was committed to combat later in the year.

Major James Roosevelt organized the 4th Raider Battalion on the west coast on 23 October 1942. It left the United States in February 1943 and went into camp at Espiritu Santo. On 15 March, the 1st Marine Raider Regiment was activated here and consisted of the four raider battalions organized to date. Liversedge, promoted to colonel earlier, was the first regimental commander. At this time, the raiders were scattered throughout the South Pacific with the regimental headquarters and the 2d and 4th Battalions at Espiritu Santo, the 1st at Noumea, and the 3d in the Russells.

Upon its assignment to the New Georgia operation, the regiment, less the 2d and 3d Battalions, moved to Guadalcanal, arriving there the first

[78] Nine of the Marine casualties were raiders who had been tragically left behind and later captured when the rest of the Carlson force withdrew under most difficult circumstances. See Appendix A, "Marine POWs," *infra.*, for an account of the fate of these men.

week in June, when it became part of the New Georgia Occupation Force. The first element of the regiment committed in this operation was the 4th Raider Battalion (–), now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Michael S. Currin, which landed at Segi Point on New Georgia Island, on 21 June 1943. Before the New Georgia campaign ended four months later, the regimental headquarters, the 1st Battalion, and the remainder of the 4th Battalion, together with Army units, took part in the hard-fought operations leading to the conquest of the New Georgia group. On 29 August, the regiment left Enogai for Guadalcanal, and on 4 September left the Solomons for Noumea.

Here, on 12 September, the 2d Raider Regiment (Provisional), was activated. Consisting of a regimental headquarters and service company, and the 2d and 3d Raider Battalions, Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley's new organization was slated as a reinforcing element of the 3d Marine Division for the Bougainville operation. Prior to the assault landing, the division attached the regimental headquarters and the 2d Battalion to the 3d Marines and the 3d Battalion to the 9th Marines for the campaign.

Both the 1st Raider Regiment on New Georgia and the 2d Regiment on Bougainville fought well during their relatively short spans of life. The same may be said about their battalions which fought as independent units before the regiments were formed. But, by the summer of 1943, the siphoning off of trained men both individually and in battalion-sized organizations, as raider and paramarine battalions were activated, proved to be a severe drain on the Marine Corps as a whole and a luxury which it could not afford. Four Marine divisions (three overseas and one Stateside) were then in existence and the activation of a fifth one was in the offing. The American war effort was in full gear at this time and additional manpower was needed for regular Marine Corps ground formations. The center of the argument here is that the weapons and tactics with which they fought were no different from those employed by regular Marine ground troops. As a matter of fact, a certain cycle is apparent when applied to the history of the formation and disbandment of the raider and parachute battalions: special unit, to groups of special units, and a return to regular infantry formations.

The raiders were too small in organization, too lightly armed (initially, their heaviest weapon was the 60mm mortar), and too specialized in T/O and T/E. Unlike the Paramarines, the raiders did conduct at least one operation of a type for which they had been trained—the raid on Makin. But there was insufficient justification by 1944 for the Marine Corps to maintain special units organized solely to conduct hit-and-run raids. On 26 January, the 2d Raider Regiment (Provisional) was disbanded at Guadalcanal, and the 2d and 3d Raider Battalions were assigned to the 1st Raider Regiment. This unit, in turn, was disbanded on 1 February, when the Headquarters and Service Company and the 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions were designated the regimental headquarters company and the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions of the 4th Marines. The 2d Raider Battalion became the regimental weapons

company. The new regiment was organized to bear the name and honors of the "old 4th," which fought so gallantly in the Philippines in 1942, and was employed first in the Emirau landing and subsequently as a component of the 1st Marine Brigade in the invasion of Guam. Later, at Okinawa, as an element of the 6th Marine Division, the regiment was in the foremost of the fighting.

Two other World War II Marine Corps organizations of passing interest which were abandoned because of general unsuitability were the barrage balloon and glider squadrons. Late in 1941, the Navy had undertaken a barrage balloon program, which was turned over to the Marine Corps for development because those naval bases not defended by the Army came under the cognizance of the FMF. One of the final steps leading to implementation of the Marine program was the recall to active duty of Major Bernard L. Smith as officer-in-charge of barrage balloon development. Major Smith, a reservist, was a pioneer Marine aviator who had served in World War I. On 18 October 1918, he had made the first successful long-distance dirigible flight in the United States, from Akron, Ohio, to Rockaway, New York.

A barrage balloon school was organized at Quantico in April 1941, and later transferred to Parris Island. The long-range goal envisioned a total of 20 balloon squadrons, but in fact by 1943, only five had been organized and sent into the field. The 1st, 3d, 5th, and 6th Barrage Balloon Squadrons were employed at Noumea under the operational control of the Army; the 2d Squadron was at Samoa.

Unfortunately for the time, expense, and effort put into the program, barrage balloons proved to be of little value and hindered rather than supported friendly air operations. In addition, 90mm antiaircraft artillery fire was far more effective in the defense of American installations. On 15 June 1943, in a memorandum to General Marshall, Admiral King stated that a separate Marine Corps barrage balloon program was "an uneconomical use of men and materiel," [79] and recommended that the Army take over the program in order that existing Marine Corps squadrons could be disbanded. General Marshall concurred with the CominCh recommendation, whereupon Admiral King advised the Commandant on 1 July of the decision and directed that all balloon materiel and equipment was to be turned over to the Army.[80]

By the end of 1943, all of the Marine squadrons had been disbanded, their materiel transferred to the Army, and their personnel absorbed by Marine defense battalions. An interesting sidelight to the story of the barrage balloon program is the fact that one of the three original officers in the program at Quantico was Captain Aquilla J. Dyess, who was later posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for heroism while

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[79] CominCh memo for CofS, USA, dtd 15Jun43, FF/1A16-3, Ser: 001187, Subj: Assignment of Barrage Balloon Defense Activities in the Pacific Areas to War Department and Liquidation of the Marine Corps Barrage Balloon Program (OAB, NHD).

[80] Gen George C. Marshall memo for Adm King, dtd 26Jun43, encl A to CominCh ltr to CMC, dtd 1Jul43, FF1/A16-3, Ser: 001318, Subj: Barrage Balloons (OAB, NHD).

leading his infantry battalion at Roi-Namur.

Close upon the heels of the beginning of the balloon program came the inception of the naval aviation troop-carrying glider program, which similarly was to be executed by the Marine Corps. In 1941, President Roosevelt initiated a revision of existing war plans and goals, which, in essence, increased the size of Marine Corps aviation, among other things, and envisioned four glider groups with a lift capacity of 10,000 Marines.[81]

The responsibility for developing the glider program was given to the Division of Aviation, Headquarters Marine Corps, and called for extensive planning in the development of gliders, personnel, and training. On 9 July 1942, CominCh approved a CMC letter which recommended that certain Marine battalions, designated as air infantry, be transported by gliders. The establishment of three glider bases was authorized: Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas; Edenton, North Carolina; and Shawnee, Oklahoma. Personnel to man these bases came from Marine Glider Group 71, consisting of Headquarters Squadron 71, Service Squadron 71, and Marine Glider Squadron 711, which was stationed at Parris Island until 15 November 1942. At that time, the group moved to its permanent station, MCAS, Eagle Mountain Lake; the other two bases were never utilized for glider operations. Glider program training ended in March 1943 and the group was disbanded the following June.[82]

Shortly after the program had begun, the impracticality of Marine Corps employment of gliders was realized. Quite simply, transport-type aircraft were required to haul gliders and the glider-transport combination could not fly in bad weather over long distances, both of which were common in the Pacific. Additionally, as in the case of the Paramarine program, the Marine Corps did not have enough transport planes to support the glider program. These reasons, combined with the island-hopping mission of the Marine Corps in the vast expanses of the Pacific, caused the termination of the glider program after it had reached a strength of 282 Marines and 21 gliders.[83]

Another Marine Corps program, begun in response to a real wartime need, was the training of dogs for use in combat. On 26 November 1942, the Commandant directed the establishment of "a training program for dogs for military employment when personnel and materiel become available." [84] At that time, 20 Marines were being trained by the Army at Fort Robinson, Nebraska, and 4 other Marines were training at Fort Washington, Maryland.

Soon after the War Dog Training Company was organized at New River, the Marine Corps determined that there was little use in tying up the manpower and effort necessary to support the pro-

[81] *DivAvn OpD*, Supplement dtd 1Jun45, p. 4.

[82] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

[83] Maj John H. Johnstone, *United States Marine Corps Parachute Units*—Marine Corps Historical Reference Series No. 32 (Washington: HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1962), p. 8.

[84] CMC ltr to CG, TC, FMF, MarBks, New River, N. C., dtd 26Nov42, cited in "War Dogs in the U. S. Marine Corps," n.d., p. 2 (War Dog Subject File, HistBr, HQMC).

gram unless the use of the dogs contributed directly to killing the enemy and keeping down casualties in units for which the dogs were helping to supply security. Therefore, although at the beginning of the program a certain number of the dogs were trained for guard or sentry duty, as soon as the program was in full operation, the Marine Corps trained only scout and messenger dogs. A 14-week training period was established at Camp Lejeune for both dogs and handlers. Following the completion of each training period, a platoon of 1 officer, 64 Marines, and 36 dogs (18 scout and 18 messenger) was formed. One man was assigned to handle each of the 18 scout dogs, and two handlers were assigned to each of the messenger dogs. Although it was anticipated that a war dog platoon was to be attached to each infantry regiment, in the G–Series T/O the platoon was organic to the division headquarters battalion, from which the dogs and their handlers were to be assigned to front-line units.

The first of its kind to see action in the Marine Corps was the 1st War Dog Platoon, which departed San Diego on 23 June 1943, and landed with the 2d Marine Raider Regiment (Provisional) on Bougainville. War dogs participated in the Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa assaults, and they were employed in mopping up operations on Saipan and in the occupation of Japan. Until 11 August 1945, the Marine Corps procured dogs or accepted offers of donations of dogs for combat training. Approximately six days later, the program ended.

The last special unit which deserves a brief mention here is a rocket platoon, which became organic to the Marine division in the G–Series T/O and was placed in headquarters battalion. Early in the war, purely because the United States was late in beginning the development of the weapon, employment of rocket organizations was strictly on a hit-and-miss basis. An IMAC experimental rocket detachment participated in the Bougainville operation, but its projectiles were highly inaccurate against small area targets and when fired, the rocket launchers revealed Marine positions.

Four provisional rocket platoons were organized by FMFPac during the war. Each detachment had 12 one-ton trucks mounting M7 rocket launchers which fired the Navy 4.5-inch finned barrage rocket. Lighter installations sometimes supplemented this basic armament. The detachments' capabilities were admirably suited for situations where conventional supporting arms could not do the job, and Marine rocket personnel, dubbed "Buck Rogers Men," [85] were often called upon. The sudden and intense concentration of fire from this weapon was ideal for last-minute preparation of an objective, also, and was often used as a signal for the attack to jump off.[86] Ground-fire barrage rockets were effectively employed in this fashion from the invasion of Guam on. Their fires wrought havoc among the enemy both as a destructive and a morale-breaking agent. The appearance

[85] Sgt George Doying, "The Buck Rogers Men," *Leatherneck*, v. 23, no. 4 (Apr45), p. 27.

[86] Bartley, *Iwo Jima*, p. 141*n*.

of rocket launchers at the frontlines generally evoked a hail of Japanese fire, but Marines quickly learned to dig in when the rockets were called up, and by the end of the war, the employment of this weapon in difficult situations was commonplace.

In connection with this discussion of rocketry, their use by Marine aircraft is of interest here. A Marine squadron, VMTB–134, flying TBFs claimed the distinction of having fired the first Navy aircraft rocket at the Japanese:

> That this squadron carried off the pioneering honors was due to their own enterprise and the ingenuity of a service squadron in locating and installing launchers and securing rockets. The rockets reached the squadron on 8 February 1944. On 15 February, with only 3 days training, the squadron took part in a strike on Rabaul. Despite their lack of experience, they used their rockets with considerable success.[87]

One of the rockets developed for air delivery and used extensively by Marine aviation was the 5-inch HVAR (High Velocity Aircraft Rocket), which was 6 feet long, weighed 140 pounds, and had a velocity of 1,375 feet per second. This missile first went into use in July 1944.[88] Marine pilots also employed the "Tiny Tim," the 11.75-inch rocket that was 12 feet long, weighed approximately 1,200 pounds, and carried a punch that equalled the projectile of a 12-inch naval rifle. These were employed with some success by planes from the carrier *Intrepid* at Okinawa, but the results could not be completely assessed because "so many things were being thrown at the Japs on Okinawa that it was impossible to distinguish the wreckage caused by 'Tiny Tim' from the general destruction." [89]

MARINE CORPS AVIATION

Perhaps no other arm of the Services was so profoundly affected by technological advances during the war as aviation, and the air organization of the Marine Corps was no exception. Merely viewing a procession of the types of planes employed by Marine pilots from 7 December to V-E Day supports this statement. The staff agency at Headquarters Marine Corps responsible for supervising the expansion of and supporting the Marine air program throughout World War II was the Division of Aviation.

Previous volumes in this series, especially Volumes II and IV have dealt extensively with Marine Corps air operations in the Pacific fighting. The sections of combat narrative in each of the other three volumes describe in detail the tremendous strides Marine Corps aviation made during the war,

[87] Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy, *U. S. Rocket Ordnance, Development and Use in World War II* (Washington: GPO, 1946), p. 29. The VMTB–134 Hist, dtd Feb44 (OAB, NHD), states that the date of the attack was 17 February 1944. The fact that claims of "firsts" are tenuous is proved by USS *Manila Bay* (CVE–61) AR, ser 014, dtd 18Feb44 (OAB, NHD), which indicates that TBFs of VC–7 employed "air-to-ground rockets in attacking Japanese shore and ship targets in the Kwajalein Atoll area on 31 January and 1 February 1944." Dir, NHD, ltr to Hd, HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, dtd 3Jun66.

[88] Joint Board on Scientific Information Policy, *op. cit.*

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 28.

and the valuable support it provided in most of the operations in the Pacific.

Although the 1st and 2d Marine Aircraft Wings had been established nearly six months before the outbreak of the war, only one group in each wing—MAG–11 at Quantico and MAG–21 at Ewa—were operational. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor destroyed all but one of the planes at Ewa. Just prior to 7 December, half of the combat strength of MAG–21 had been sent westward. Eighteen dive bombers of VMSB–231 being ferried on the carrier *Lexington* to garrison Midway were rerouted to Pearl Harbor, arriving there on 10 December after having been launched from the flattop on the same day. A week later, 17 of the planes made a long over-water flight to their original destination. On Christmas Day, the aircraft complement on Midway was augmented when VMF–221 pilots flew in 14 fighter planes. Throughout the following months, and until the 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942, a greater number of Marine pilots and planes entered the Pacific. But at first, the numbers were all too few.

The importance of the relation of aviation to Marine ground tactics was graphically demonstrated at Guadalcanal, where, despite a severe shortage of planes, fuel, and spare parts, the Cactus Air Force—as the first squadrons to be based on Henderson Field were collectively called—devastated the myth of Japanese superiority in the air. Guadalcanal-based pilots flew cover for Allied shipping coming into and anchored off of the island, and they also went up to intercept Japanese raids coming from the north. A post-Guadalcanal analysis of its operations states, "The Cactus Air Force performed beyond all proportion to its facilities and equipment. . . ." [90]

By 8 February 1943, when Guadalcanal was secured, Marine aviation strength on the island had been built up dramatically. No longer were Allied planes content to play a strictly defensive role; they were carrying the battle to enemy air bases elsewhere in the Solomons, and indeed to the heart of Japanese air operations at Rabaul on New Britain. The plane which was to become the basic weapon of Marine fighter pilots in the war appeared over Guadalcanal on 12 February, when VMF–124 flew its gull-winged F4U–1 Vought-Sikorsky "Corsairs" up from Espiritu Santo. This plane not only could fly faster than any aircraft the Japanese possessed, but it could also climb nearly 3,000 feet a minute and had twice the range of the Grumman Wildcats, the Marine fighter planes flown heretofore. With these and other modern aircraft, Marine squadrons claimed a total of more than 2,344 Japanese planes downed in air combat.

There were 120 Marine aces in the war—that is, pilots who had shot down five or more enemy aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Boyington, a Medal of Honor winner, was the leading Marine ace with 28 planes to his credit; six of these were downed while he was with the Flying Tigers in China before the United States entered the war. Not available for the record is the amount

[90] Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, *Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal*, p. 294. CACTUS was the code name for Guadalcanal.

of damage accomplished by Flying Leathernecks during their support of ground operations.

It was in this area, Marine air support of Marine ground troops, that close coordination between the Marine air and ground components worked so well and laid the basis for the postwar development of the balanced air-ground task force. Close air support techniques were pioneered during World War II as a result of the close working relationship and cooperation between Marine aviation and ground commanders, and a knowledge of what the requirements of each were. Beginning in the Bougainville campaign, and improved upon constantly in each succeeding operation, close air support of ground forces came to be as important as artillery and naval gunfire support, and in many cases was more effective.

The strength and numbers of Marine air organizations, like the ground forces, grew apace with the expanding American war effort. With the capture and occupation of Pacific islands formerly held by the Japanese, Marine squadrons were based on newly built or previously established fields on these islands and became available for a vast number of missions against the enemy. By the war's end, the Marine Corps had activated four aircraft wings in the Pacific, one in the States, a number of training commands, 128 tactical squadrons, and had an aviation strength of 116,628 Marines—of whom 10,049 were pilots.

Because of the nature of Marine Corps aviation activities in the course of the war, it is not possible to trace the development of wing and group T/Os in the same manner that the organization of the Marine division and regiment was traced earlier in this chapter. For one reason, throughout the Pacific War period there was constant development in and manufacture of different types of tactical aircraft, which formed the basis of new tactical squadrons. Therefore, the character and makeup of the wings and groups changed constantly from 1941–1945. The wartime wings were in reality task organizations whose composition depended primarily upon the mission which they had been assigned.

In early 1942, the D-Series T/O for a Marine aircraft wing consisted of a headquarters squadron, an air regulating squadron, an observation-utility group (headquarters squadron, observation squadron, and two utility squadrons), two scout bombing groups (headquarters squadron, service squadron, and four scout bombing squadrons), and two fighter groups (headquarters squadron, service squadron, and four fighter squadrons). A year later, the 1st MAW —with squadrons based on Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, and Efate—consisted of a headquarters squadron, an air depot squadron, an air repair and salvage squadron, an air base squadron, an observation squadron, and four composite aircraft groups in which were fighter, scout bombing, and transport squadrons, as well as the usual headquarters and service squadrons for each of the groups. The makeup of each group was different. And so, throughout the war, the composition and, in fact, the strength of the wings changed in keeping primarily with assigned tactical missions.

Marine air operations in the Pacific War can be divided roughly into sev-

eral phases. Encompassed in the first are the operations following Pearl Harbor and leading to Guadalcanal. Included in the second phase is the advance up the Solomons chain and the complete reduction of enemy air power centered in Rabaul, the story of which is found in Volume II, Part V, "Marine Air Against Rabaul." In a third phase, the role played by Marine pilots during the Central Pacific drive and in the Philippines campaign forms Parts IV and V, "Marines in the Philippines" and "Marine Aviation in the Central Pacific," of Volume IV. Finally, "Marine Carrier Air," leads off Part III of this volume. In these many pages are found the outstanding record of achievement of Marine Corps aviation in World War II.

TACTICAL INNOVATIONS

Paralleling the changes in the composition of the Marine rifle squad was the development of Marine infantry tactics. Some of the senior officers and noncoms landing in the Solomons with the 1st Marine Division had been schooled in jungle fighting during tours of duty in the Caribbean in the 1920s and early 1930s. Most of the rest of the division had participated in one or more of the numerous fleet landing exercises of the prewar era. Prewar concepts and tactics had to be changed, however, when subjected to test in combat.

The combined training and experience of division personnel was sound and proved successful in the initial phases of the Guadalcanal campaign, but more was required of Marines than to defend the division perimeter or to beat off enemy attacks. It would not be enough to patrol the island aggressively in search-and-kill missions. In the final analysis, these were the tactics employed to seize and hold Guadalcanal, but there were other islands to be taken, other Japanese positions to be overcome, and other tactics to be developed.

Japanese bunker defenses encountered on Munda during the New Georgia campaign gave impetus to the development of a new set of ground tactics which emphasized close tank-infantry coordination. In this operation, the Marines provided the tanks, the Army supplied the infantry. At the conclusion of the fighting, Marine and Army commanders submitted a number of recommendations which were aimed at improving tactics, communications, and fire coordination. The experience of New Georgia pointed up the need for the infantry to be supported by heavier tanks and tank-mounted flamethrowers. The light tanks used at that time were not capable of destroying the well-constructed Japanese bunkers.

Training in small-unit tactics against a fortified position paid dividends to the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, on D-Day at Bougainville. The assault wave of the battalion was hit hard by effective fire from an undamaged Japanese 75mm artillery piece, and Marine elements which landed were thoroughly dispersed. Only one infantry company landed on its assigned beach. Rifle groups soon began forming under ranking men, however, and as the fight to extend the beachhead ensued, the Marines became oriented to their location and tactical integrity was restored. The pace of the assault then intensified.

While in New Zealand preparing for Bougainville, 3d Division training had consisted first of small-unit tactics, and then progressed to battalion and regimental combat team rehearsals. On the lower level, all Marines had been thoroughly briefed on the mission of each assaulting element, and each squad, platoon, and company was made familiar with the mission of adjacent organizations. Additionally, each Marine was given a sketch map of the Cape Torokina shoreline. Because of this sound preinvasion indoctrination, and despite the confused situation on the beach on D-Day, control was regained and "bunker after bunker began to fall to the coordinated and well-executed attacks" of the reformed infantry groups.[91]

As the Bougainville campaign progressed and after three major engagements with the enemy, 3d Division Marines became as adept at jungle fighting as the veterans of Guadalcanal. The Marines on the Northern Solomons island learned to take cover quickly and quietly when attacked and learned to employ their supporting arms effectively.

The 3d Division developed a formation it called "contact imminent," which was employed for an approach march through the jungle to enemy positions. This formation, ensuring a steady and controlled advance, had several variations. Basically, it consisted of a march column of units which had flank guards deployed to cover the widest possible front under existing conditions of visual or physical contact. The formation was spearheaded by a security patrol and avoided all trails. Control was maintained by means of telephone wire which was unrolled at the head of the column and reeled in again at the tail. Upon stopping or at the time of contact with the enemy, unit and supporting arms commanders clipped their hand-carried sound-powered telephones into the lines and were in instant communication with the formation commander. The officer at the head of the main body controlled the speed and direction of the column.

Experience at Bougainville demonstrated that a command employing the "contact imminent" formation could expect to move at a rate of 500 yards per hour through swamps—and Bougainville had swamps aplenty inland of the beachhead. It was also discovered that a unit in this formation could fend off small enemy attacks without a delay in forward movement. At the same time, the formation was flexible enough to permit the commander to deploy his troops for immediate combat on the flanks, in the front, or at the rear.

By the end of the Bougainville campaign, 3d Division Marines had amassed a bookful of lessons learned in combat which, together with the experiences gained by others in previous operations, would profit Marines assigned to the Pacific area when they entered combat. Bougainville proved, as did Guadalcanal and New Georgia earlier, that with few exceptions, jungle tactics were based simply on common sense applied to standard tactical principles and methods generally employed in tropical terrain and vegetation. Although it was diffi-

[91] Shaw and Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul*, p. 213.

cult to maintain troop control in the jungle, the "contact imminent" formation proved eminently sound. Another lesson of Bougainville was that, like in the "Banana Wars" of Central America, rapid-fire weapons were most suitable for jungle fighting; the light machine gun was particularly favored because of its rapid rate of fire, mobility, and low silhouette.

Less than two months after the Bougainville D-Day, Major General William H. Rupertus' 1st Marine Division landed on New Britain at Cape Gloucester, which was the last major Marine ground operation in the Southwest Pacific area. The terrain on New Britain for the most part was very similar to that found on Bougainville. Jungle, swamps, and unknown and unforeseen heights abounded. The tactics the Marines employed here, therefore, were the "book" tactics for jungle warfare, with basic techniques refined by these now combat-wise veterans. General Rupertus' men maintained excellent night fire discipline and patrolled aggressively throughout the campaign. In essence, they successfully employed tactics which had once been the exclusive province of the enemy in the Pacific; the tables had been turned. Marines captured enemy weapons and used them expertly against their former owners. Again, as before, small-unit leaders were capable of independent action in "brush-choked terrain, where the bitterest fighting was often done at close range with an unseen enemy." [92]

While fighting on Bougainville was underway and before it had started in New Britain, Marines opened the Central Pacific campaign with the invasion of Tarawa, where Marines met a determined enemy well ensconced in heavily fortified defenses. An overall evaluation of the Tarawa operation called this "a battle where perseverance dominated over adversity, where individual courage and collective knowhow defeated a strong Japanese garrison on its own ground and in its own positions." [93]

A post-operation analysis determined what factors militated for success on Tarawa. In this context, both 2d Division engineers and tankmen praised the preinvasion training they had received in coordinating their employment of demolitions, flamethrowers, and firepower in knocking out the coconut palm log, coral, and concrete bunkers and pillboxes.

Tarawa served as a bloody testing ground where valuable lessons were learned for storming a heavily defended beach. It was found that in their training for future combat commitments, the Marine divisions had to emphasize more thorough coordination of tanks, artillery, flamethrowers, demolitions, and riflemen in isolating and overrunning strong Japanese defenses. A further conclusion based on the Tarawa experience was that all Marines, regardless of their specialties, had to be taught something about the use of demolitions. Up to that point, explosives had been employed almost exclusively by combat engineers.

[92] *Ibid.*, p. 438.

[93] Capt James R. Stockman, *The Battle For Tarawa* (Washington: HistSec, DivPubInfo, HQMC, 1947), p. 65.

The lessons of Tarawa were absorbed at Camp Pendleton by the 4th Marine Division, which was forming and training for its impending assault of the islands of Kwajalein Atoll. Great stress in the training phase was placed on the destruction of pillboxes. To achieve this, the infantry regiments organized two types of assault demolition teams—each numbering about 20 men—for use against these and other fortified positions. Both teams contained demolitions, bazooka, and BAR groups, but the nucleus of the first was a flamethrower, and the second was built around a light machine gun. The 4th Division selected infantrymen from all of the assault units for special demolitions training and to act as demolition men in the above-mentioned teams. They were, in fact, to take the place of combat engineers in this formation and elsewhere, whenever necessary.

The success of this training was emphasized at Roi-Namur and the other islets of Kwajalein. At the end of this operation, the VAC commander, General Holland Smith, made the following comments, which could have applied equally to subsequent campaigns:

> The technique of the infantry-tank teams pushing rapidly forward, closely followed by demolition and flame thrower teams is concurred in by this Headquarters as sound. However, emphasis is placed on the fact that it must be a continuous movement in which light enemy resistance is neutralized and bypassed by the forward elements of the infantry-tank teams, then the supporting elements of the infantry equipped with demolitions and flame throwers reduced these isolated enemy positions before they can recover and fire on the rear of our troops moving forward.
>
> This technique is particularly effective in searching out the real strongpoints and thereby avoiding holding up the attack by weak and scattered resistance. When a strongpoint is encountered, the infantry-tank team and demolition-flame thrower team become integrated and operate together until the strong point is reduced.
>
> In reducing a strong point, emphasis must be also placed upon the value of supporting fires from air, naval gunfire and artillery. Field artillery continues to be the most reliable and effective weapon for neutralization purposes in close support of infantry. Proper use of supporting fires in reducing strong points calls for the artillery-infantry-tank team to be closely coordinated. The greatest neutralization value is gained by the infantry and tanks moving quickly into the neutralized area as artillery fires lift. The closer the advance behind our own neutralization fires the more the benefit derived from the neutralization. Team work, involving firing, must be practiced in training periods to develop thoroughly the use of combined arms.[94]

In a personal letter to the Commandant, General Smith more vividly described the Kwajalein battle:

> The fighting on Namur was fierce. Heavy underbrush filled with Japs throughout the entire back area. The [enemy] had concrete tunnels connecting their pill boxes, and in addition trenches dug at the base of trees running zigzag across the entire island. The 24th [Marines] had to dig them out with hand grenades, flame throwers, and bayonets.[95]

The refinement of existing tactics rather than the development of new ones marked the Saipan operation,

[94] CG, VAC, comments, n.d., in CominCh, Amphibious Operations, The Marshall Islands, Jan–Feb44, dtd 20May44.

[95] MajGen Holland M. Smith ltr to CMC, dtd 4Feb44 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File HistBr, HQMC).

where the technique of tank-infantry coordination was improved. Although artillery served admirably as a supporting arm, the fighting in the Pacific demonstrated the "need for a weapon which could operate closer to the infantry, a weapon which the infantry could direct and control, and from this came the tank-infantry team." [96]

Standard infantry arm and hand signals and radio communication were employed whenever infantry and armor worked together. Neither was a satisfactory link, however, and at Arawe, 1st Tank Battalion personnel installed field telephones at the rear of their light tanks through which the riflemen could contact the tank commanders. "The improvement in tank-infantry cooperation was immediate, and the innovation proved to be sound enough to have a permanent part in armored support tactics." [97]

Tank-infantry cooperation was based on a mutuality of needs. The tanks had the crushing ability and firepower which, under optimum conditions, provided excellent support to the infantry. On the other hand, in the midst of battle, the tank, a large lumbering vehicle, was a target which the enemy could hardly expect to miss, and, in fact, often hit. Under most combat conditions, the tanks were tightly buttoned up and vulnerable because the vision of the tankers inside was restricted to a very great degree. The infantry, therefore, was responsible for protecting the tank from suicide-inclined Japanese who threatened to blow up both tanks and themselves. As the eyes and ears of the tank, the infantry was also responsible for designating suitable targets for the guns of the armored vehicle and directing its fire.

The tank-infantry concept reached full maturity at Saipan. Not only because of earlier experiments but because the terrain here was more suited for armored operations. Infantry-tank coordination was excellent at Tinian. "Indeed, much of the operation took on the properties of a tank-infantry sweep." [98] There were few tank losses here primarily because enemy antitank fire was ineffective, and also because the most dangerous antitank weapon, the magnetic mine, was offset by a Marine technique used first at Roi-Namur, later employed in the Marianas, and nearly perfected at Iwo and Okinawa. This simple field expedient merely consisted of covering the flat areas of the most vulnerable surfaces of the tank with oak planking.[99]

Each infantry regiment on Tinian was assigned one reinforced company of 18 medium tanks plus a platoon of four flamethrower tanks and two light tanks. Throughout this operation, these tank companies supported the same infantry units to which they had originally been assigned. This led to constantly improving tank-infantry tactics.

As at Tarawa, the only infantry tactics feasible at Peleliu were those

[96] Capt Leonard G. Lawton, "Tank-Infantry Team," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 11 (Nov45), p. 30.

[97] Shaw and Kane, *Isolation of Rabaul*, p. 394.

[98] Maj Carl W. Hoffman, *The Seizure of Tinian* (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1951), p. 131.

[99] LtCol Richard K. Schmidt ltr to CMC, dtd 5Dec49, cited in *Ibid.*

employed by determined flamethrower, demolition, and infantry assault teams. The Japanese had fully utilized the terrain on the island to their advantage. It has been said of enemy defenses on Peleliu that "never before in the Pacific War had the Japanese displayed greater resourcefulness or exploited their capabilities more successfully." [100]

To overcome these nearly impregnable defenses, 1st Marine Division troops employed their bazookas, portable flamethrowers, and demolitions with savage expertise. When afforded profitable targets, artillery supported the infantry. Tank-infantry tactics proved satisfactory, but only on level ground where the tanks could maneuver.

General Rupertus, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, noted after Peleliu that portable flamethrowers were not at first employed satisfactorily because the infantry did not receive them until immediately before embarking for the target area. The 1st Division commander commented favorably on the results achieved by the Ronson flamethrower, but added that he believed it should not be mounted on the LVT. Instead Rupertus thought that the General Grant tank would prove a more suitable platform. The Grant mounted a 75mm gun on its right side and in a power turret on top, a 37mm gun and a .30 caliber machine gun. General Rupertus recommended that:

> The 37mm gun . . . could be removed and the Navy flame-thrower installed therein; you would still have the 75mm gun available. . . . If in addition to such installation a bulldozer blade were made a part of the tank, you would have one of the finest weapons possible for this mopping up of caves, pillboxes and blockhouses that you could devise.[101]

For the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, the Marine divisions had dozer and flamethrower tanks.

But these tools of war were not available to Captain George P. Hunt's Company K, 3/1, at Peleliu on D-Day, when it landed on White Beach, the extreme left of the 1st Marine Division beachhead. Hunt's Marines encountered here a classic Japanese defense, set in:

> . . . solid, jagged coral, a rocky mass of sharp pinnacles, deep crevasses, tremendous boulders. Pillboxes, reinforced with steel and concrete, had been dug or blasted in the base of the perpendicular drop to the beach. Others, with coral and concrete piled six feet on top were constructed above, and spider holes were blasted around them for protecting infantry. It surpassed by far anything we had conceived of when we studied the aerial photographs.[102]

It was such a narrow thing that at one stage during the first night, Hunt was holding the point with 18 men and depending heavily on a captured Japanese machine gun to stave off annihilation. Later it proved possible to send in reinforcements and needed supplies by LVTs, and Hunt was able to attack and overcome the enemy position.

After the Peleliu operation, Hunt was returned to Quantico to instruct a course in the rifle company in the attack. With the cooperation of Colonel Lewis

[100] Isely and Crowl, *Marines and Amphibious War*, p. 412.

[101] MajGen William H. Rupertus ltr to CMC, dtd 18Oct44 (Vandegrift Personal Correspondence File).

[102] George P. Hunt, *Coral Comes High* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1946), p. 58.

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W. Walt, "in charge of the attack division" at the Marine Corps Schools, a problem was designed and entitled "Assault of a Fortified Position," based on the experiences of Company K on White Beach, for use in the course of instruction at the Schools. The exact layout and construction of Japanese defenses were reconstituted for this problem. "Later Colonel Walt added the lake and amphibious craft," which gave additional realism to students and visitors alike whenever this particular problem was demonstrated.[103] For a number of years thereafter, "Assault of a Fortified Position" was a highlight and necessary ingredient in the education of young lieutenants at the Basic School.

Iwo Jima confronted invading Marines with defenses and an enemy opposition which were in many ways very much like those encountered in the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Palau Islands. The objective was relatively small in comparison with those in the Marianas. At Iwo, defensive weapons and installations were mutually supporting and thoroughly fortified. Their destruction depended upon closely coordinated teamwork by Marine infantry and supporting arms.

The hard-working infantry, as usual, was called on to perform this mission in the face of murderous enemy fire. Marine tactics generally employed upon meeting a strongpoint were these: a "pin up" team consisting of a bazooka, two BARs, and an M–1 rifle would direct a heavy volume of fire on the target. When the Japanese were subjected to this base of fire, the demolition teams would move in for the kill. One such team might be armed with several sections of bangalore torpedoes, and such other explosives as pole, satchel, and shaped charges.[104] The other team would have two flamethrowers and their operators, which in turn were protected by two riflemen. In the end, the application of these tactics, which were graphically but aptly described at Okinawa as the "corkscrew and blowtorch" method by General Buckner, was enough to destroy

[103] Mr. George P. Hunt ltr to author dtd 17Jun66.

[104] A bangalore torpedo is a long iron pipe filled with an explosive, and fitted with a detonating cap and a long fuse. Several bangalore sections could be fitted together, and after a rounded cap was fastened to the head end, these sections could be pushed forward over most types of terrain and exploded to destroy barbed wire entanglements or to detonate buried mines. The pole charge was simply about 15 pounds of block TNT tied together, capped, fuzed, and mounted at the end of a long pole, ready to be fired. The beauty of the pole charge was that it could be placed in position out of hand-reach. Satchel charges also consisted of about 15 pounds of explosives either taped to a board fitted with a rope or wire loop for carrying, or placed in a haversack for the same purpose. Once the fuze was lit, the satchel could be flung at an enemy fortification or position. A shaped charge was as the name suggests, a charge composed of cast TNT shaped like a cone so that the explosive energy was focused and concentrated to move in one direction. Fastened to a pole and emplaced against a concrete blockhouse, when exploded the shaped charge would blow a small hole on the outside of the position, but once having penetrated the wall, the concentrated energy fanned out with tremendous force, carrying with it concrete and steel fragments and a concussive blast, which in itself was capable of killing all the defenders within the fortification.

even the most steadfastly held Japanese defensive position.

It was tactics such as these which moved Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, who was present and an observer at Iwo Jima, to express great admiration "for the guy who walks up beaches and take enemy positions with a rifle and grenades or his bare hands." [105] Mr. Forrestal gave an exaggerated description, of course, of how Marine infantry overcame General Kuribayashi's island fortress, but the Secretary of the Navy was not far off the mark.

Okinawa was the ultimate amphibious assault landing in the Pacific War, and the ultimate weapon here was the infantryman and his supporting arms. The most complete employment of tank-infantry tactics perhaps best characterizes the nature of the fighting on Okinawa. In the rapid drive north which led to the decisive and successful battle for Motobu Peninsula, 6th Division Marines rode the tanks which later provided fire support in the heavy fighting to rid northern Okinawa of the Japanese. But it was in the southern portion of the island, both on level ground and in cave-studded draws that the development of the tank-infantry team reached a climax.

In both the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions, tanks functioned as a major direct-fire, close-support weapon. At all times, IIIAC tanks operated within the limit of observation and control of the infantry. Generally depending upon the tactical situation, tank-infantry teams were employed in one of two ways on Okinawa. In the first instance, following the neutralization of an objective by supporting fires, the ground troops —preceded by Shermans—advanced to secure the area. This type of attack proved successful only against ground lightly defended by the enemy. In cases where there were heavy and well dug-in Japanese positions, the pre-attack preparation had a temporary effect only, and when American forces were on or near the objective, the enemy would level furious fire on the attackers, pinning them down and prohibiting their movement forwards or backwards.

A second method was widely employed in southern Okinawa. Prior to a general tank-infantry advance, the Shermans—protected by fire teams—delivered close-range direct fire on caves, bunkers, and tomb emplacements in the path of the assault. Tanks and armored flamethrowers ranged out ahead of the front lines to distances up to 800 yards, systematically destroying enemy positions on forward and reverse slopes by putting point-blank 75mm fire and flame right into cave mouths and embrasures. In the fighting for Sugar Loaf, tanks were emplaced in hull defilade firing positions at the front to deliver flat trajectory fire into enemy lines opposite. Of proven worth in the tank-infantry attacks were the M–7s with their 105mm guns. These vehicles served admirably as siege guns and were the most powerful organic weapon in the infantry regiment. Like the tanks, the M–7s could and did roll right up to the face of Japanese emplacements to deliver their fire.

Peculiar to the terrain of Okinawa is a series of sharp, rocky coral ridges

[105] Quoted in *New York Times*, 26Feb45, p. 1, column 6.

which the enemy defended with skill and ferocity against all attackers. These ridges form the precipitous walls of valleys, upon the floors of which were emplaced mutually supported weapons, concealed in caves, and sited for murderous crossfire. The entrances to the valleys were very often mined to discourage tank operations. Usually, the cave positions enfiladed any advance in the open space leading to the valleys. In most cases, the caves were so high on the cliff faces that the infantry was unable to close to assault them.

As demonstrated by the fighting for the Awacha Pocket, and later at both Dakeshi and Wana Ridges, the maneuver of Marine forces was restricted by the funnelling influence of the ever-narrowing cliffs. This, in effect, forced the infantry to mount what generally became a frontal attack, "a slugging match with but temporary and limited opportunity to maneuver." [106]

Born of the necessity for reducing Japanese emplacements in the areas just named, the Marines devised a suitable tactic employing all arms organic and available to the infantry. According to this solution, it was important for attack elements first to take the high ground, from where they could support a methodical cleaning out of the draws and valleys below by tank-infantry-flamethrower-demolitions teams. Once a ridge position had been secured, combat engineers cleared mines from the entrances of the valleys. From the ridgetops, all supporting arms were called upon to place as much fire as possible on the valley walls. Closely following this fire, the tank-infantry teams started into the pocket, working both sides of the valley simultaneously to prevent the numerous enemy positions from supporting each other. "Each cave position is attacked by fire until neutralized, then burned out with flamethrowers, and eventually sealed by demolitions." [107]

It may be clearly seen from this brief exposition on the evolution of Marine infantry tactics in the war that the way of the Marine infantryman in no way became safer, although his path was made easier as new methods and deadlier weapons became his. This in no way mitigates the fact that under any condition infantry combat simply is a dirty and hard business, where training, discipline, and courage earn dividends.

SPIRITUAL AND MEDICAL SERVICES

The most important thing that can be said about chaplains, doctors, and corpsmen in any war is that they were "there," and that they were there with the troops when they were needed. The services performed by these naval personnel in Marine Corps uniforms have been praised by generals and privates alike. The members of the Navy Corps of Chaplains and Medical and Dental Corps ministered to the spiritual and physical needs of all ranks and religions under all conditions. Although unarmed, they were subjected to the same rigors and discomforts in combat as Marine assault troops.

[106] MajGen Pedro A. del Valle, "Cave Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette*, v. 29, no. 7 (Jul45), p. 58.

[107] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Early in World War II, the Navy Chaplains Division established the policy of assigning a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain to each Marine regiment, and six other chaplains to serve the other units in the division. This complement of chaplains in each division came to a total of 16 with the addition of a Division Chaplain and his assistant, a Jewish chaplain who ministered to the Marines of his faith throughout the division.[108]

Like the Marines to whom they had been assigned, Navy chaplains often landed with the assault waves. In the midst of the fighting, they would go from man to man, giving aid and comfort as best they could, and assisting the doctors and corpsmen in treating the wounded. It made no difference what faith a chaplain represented, for he had learned a cardinal rule when first entering the Chaplain's School: "Cooperation with Compromise."[109] Therefore, it was not unusual for a Protestant chaplain to counsel or comfort a serviceman of another religion, or for a fellow chaplain of another persuasion to do the same for a Protestant, a Catholic, or a Jew. As soon as the combat situation permitted, chaplains held divine services, very often within the range of enemy guns. Several times during the war, a major religious holiday occurred after a combat operation had begun. Such was the case at Peleliu, where the Jewish New Year, Rosh Hashonah, fell when the fighting was heaviest. But by Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, which is the holiest of all Jewish religious observances, conditions were fairly secure at the beach area. Of this holiday on Peleliu, Rabbi Edgar E. Siskin, the Jewish chaplain of the 1st Marine Division, wrote afterwards:

> We held services in the morning in the Division CP area. Word had got around somehow and the boys drifted in from all parts of the island. Some had come from lines where fighting was still going on. They straggled in—bearded, dirty, carrying their weapons. The altar rigged by Chaplain Murphy, Division Chaplain, was improvised out of ammunition boxes, and was covered over by a length of captured Japanese silk. Over this we draped our Ten Commandments Banner. The symbolism of this act was not lost to our small congregation.
>
> And there we were—72 men—praying, chanting the old Yom Kippur mode, summoned by a call heard above the tumult of battle. There we were not 200 yards from a ridge still held by the Japs, within range of sniper and mortar fire. And throughout the service the artillery kept up a shattering fire overhead. . . . This Yom Kippur no service anywhere, I dare say, surpassed in the significance ours, for all its makeshift appointments and bedraggled worshippers.[110]

It was commonplace in the experience of all chaplains who served with Marines to have held religious services in a combat area while the guns were still firing. Innumerable Catholic masses and Protestant observances were held on the hood of a jeep, which served as an altar, and many confessions could not be heard over the sound of firing,

[108] Capt Clifford M. Drury (ChC), USN, *The History of the Chaplain Corps, United States Navy, 1939–1949*, v. 2 (Washington: BuPers, ND, 1950), p. 110.

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

[110] Lt Edgar E. Siskin (ChC), USN, "Yom Kippur on Peleliu," *Hebrew Union College Bulletin*, Apr45, pp. 7–8.

although they were being whispered directly into the ears of confessors.

Naval Medical Corps personnel played no less an important role in their support of Marine Corps assault units than the chaplains. Unless one has been in combat and has heard the anguished cry of "Corpsman! Corpsman!" above the din of battle, much of what Navy doctors and hospital corpsmen do in combat is diminished greatly in telling. And unless one has himself been wounded in combat, treated where he has fallen, and evacuated under fire, it is even more difficult to convey the feeling of blessed relief experienced by a casualty who knows the tender care and expert treatment he is soon to receive. It was important for combat troops to know that, if they were unfortunate enough to become wounded in action, they would not have to wait long before they received medical assistance.

With but few variations, the operations of medical units in amphibious assault landings generally remained the same throughout the war. At the time that a division operation plan was prepared, the medical annex to the administrative plan was written and published. In this document were the basic instructions for the employment of medical units in the impending assault. In the ship-to-shore movement, medical personnel landed in approximately the same wave as the headquarters of the unit to which they were attached. Company corpsmen sometimes were assigned to individual rifle platoons. Medical officers were never assigned below the battalion level and remained at their respective aid stations during combat. Shore party medical personnel and the collecting station group landed as soon as possible after the shore party command group. Whenever the tactical situation permitted, the hospital section, medical battalion, and malaria control unit were sent ashore. The normal chain of evacuation of a casualty was through the battalion aid station via the regimental aid station to the beach, and from here to an attack transport, a hospital ship, or the division or corps hospital. "The first link in the elaborate chain of care established by the Medical Department" was formed by the infantry company aid men who landed with and closely followed the assault wave.[111] The respectful disposition of the remains of both friendly and enemy dead was an important element in this chain of care.

Battalion aid stations were set up behind the units they supported at a distance in relation to the size of the beachhead and the depth to which it had been extended. Here, they could give more complete treatment than that available in the midst of the fighting. These aid stations moved forward progressively in pace with the rate of the advance.

The advance element of the medical company, the collecting party, landed soon after the aid station was set up and in operation. With its ambulance jeeps, the collecting parties went forward to the company aid areas to evacuate the wounded to either the battalion aid stations or the beach, where landing craft carried the casualties to transports and

[111] Capts Bennett F. Avery, Louis H. Roddis, and Joseph L. Schwartz (MC), USN, eds., *The History of the Medical Department of the United States Navy in World War II*, v. 1 (Washington: BuMed, ND, 1953), p. 67.

hospital ships offshore. As soon as the airfield on an objective had been seized and put into operation, transport planes flew in to evacuate casualties to hospitals in the rear areas or to the United States. On Okinawa, the artillery spotting planes were pressed into service to fly Marine casualties to field hospitals north of the fighting.

The use of LSTs for casualty handling and evacuation was developed early in the South Pacific campaigns. Designated LST(H)s and staffed with surgical teams from rear echelons for each operation, these vessels became an important link in the chain of evacuation. In the Central Pacific fighting and until the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations, there was a shortage of LSTs for this purpose, but their availability at these later landings proved ideal for giving early care when further evacuation was impossible.

The heroism of medical personnel under fire in combat has been well chronicled in almost every action report submitted during the Pacific fighting. During the early phases of the Saipan assault, for instance, the beach was shelled continuously and had become a scene best described as one of extreme confusion. Into this inferno landed the medical section of the beach parties. "Working for as long as 48 hours at a time without rest . . . , they gave emergency medical treatment and set up casualty evacuation stations in the sand. . . . From these stations, the company aid men went out to administer first aid exposing themselves to enemy fire in order to reach the wounded." [112]

[112] *Ibid.*, p. 83.

These gallant efforts resulted in a high casualty rate amongst hospital corpsmen. Iwo Jima, like other Marine assault operations, was no less costly in the loss of medical personnel. In the 4th Division alone, the casualty rate among corpsmen was 38 percent.[113]

On all combat operations, the work of dental officers and technicians was invaluable. In addition to carrying out their regular duties, dental officers also assisted in the sick bays and operating rooms. They often relieved the medical officers of routine functions, gave anesthesia, and aided in identifying the dead. Dental surgeons were also trained "to work as a team with otorhinolaryngologists in treating gunshot wounds of the jaws and face." [114]

Proof of the devotion to duty and professionalism of Navy Medical Corps personnel is exhibited by the numerous lives they saved, the high proportion of casualties they sustained, and the number of decorations they were awarded. All seven Medals of Honor given to members of the Medical Corps went to company aid men serving with the FMF. In addition, 69 Navy Crosses and 486 Silver Stars, plus numerous lesser combat decorations, were awarded the doctors, dentists, hospital corpsmen, and dental technicians.[115]

TAPS

In the final analysis, battles are not won by machines, but by men filled with the zest of life and imbued with a sense of discipline and a willingness to sacri-

[113] *Ibid.*, p. 95.

[114] *Ibid.*, p. 161.

[115] *Ibid.*, v. 2, pp. 88–111.

fice self for others. The Marine Corps campaigns of the Pacific War came to symbolize the courage and offensive spirit that brought victory to this nation in World War II. In these battles, 80 Marines won the Medal of Honor "For conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity" at the risk of their lives "above and beyond the call of duty"; 48 of these men were given posthumous awards. A total of 957 Navy Crosses were presented other Marines for heroism in the same actions. That these decorations and American victory were not won easily is evident by the following World War II Marine casualty statistics:

Killed in action	15,161
Died of wounds	3,259
Captured and died	268
Missing, presumed dead	795
Prisoner of war, presumed dead	250
Non-battle casualties in a combat zone	4,778
Wounded in action	67,207
Total	91,718[116]

The Tomb of the Unknowns at Arlington Cemetery exemplifies the sacrifice of every American who gave his life in battle for his country. Perhaps no words that have been said here in eulogy to our fallen heroes are as meaningful to the living as those lines written many years ago by the English author John Donne in "For Whom the Bell Tolls":

Any man's death diminishes me,
because I am involved
in mankind . . . .

[116] These figures were collated by the Reports and Statistical Unit, Personnel Services Br, Data Systems Div (APB/5), HQMC, n.d.