Chapter 5. National Security
The magical white monkey Begoman Anoman (right), who fights on the side of the Pandawas, and Kokrosono (left), a young knight who fights for the Kurawas, the Pandawas' cousins and mortal enemies
The armed forces of the republic of Indonesia (ABRI; for this and other acronyms, see table A) play a role in national society that is perhaps unique in the world. The military establishment in the early 1990s was involved in many affairs of state that elsewhere were not normally associated with military forces and was acknowledged as the dominant political institution in the country. Yet, in comparison with countries with a similar background and state of national development, ABRI has been cautious in its exercise of power. Indonesia since the mid-1960s has been truly a nation with military personnel in government, not a nation with a military government. The difference is crucial to understanding the role of the armed forces in Indonesia in the 1990s.

The armed forces establishment, led by the dominant branch, the army, has been the country's premier institution since 1966, when, in its own view, it answered the summons of the people and moved to the center stage of national life. Comprising the three military services and the police, the armed forces operated according to dwifungsi, or dual function, a doctrine of their own evolution, under which they undertook a double role as both defenders of the nation and as a social-political force in national development. In the role of defenders of the nation, the armed forces performed those traditional national defense duties common to most nations. The unique element of dwifungsi is the military's second role as a social-political force. This very broad charter formed the basis by which military personnel were assigned throughout the government to posts traditionally filled in other countries by civil servants or politically appointed civilians. Most prevalent of these assignments for active-duty and retired military officers were as provincial governors, district heads, legislative members, numerous functionaries within civilian governmental departments, and ambassadors abroad.

However, the government cannot properly be characterized as military in nature. Not all top national, provincial, regional, and district jobs were held by the military, and the number of military personnel assigned to dwifungsi civilian positions at all levels of the government was probably fewer than 5,000 officers in 1992 and had declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s. In 1992 approximately half of the country's district heads (bupati) and one-third of the twenty-seven provincial or regional governors were military officers. Still, under the dwifungsi doctrine, legitimizing its performance of both military and nonmilitary missions, ABRI became
a dominant factor in the political life of the country and has acted as a major executive agent of government policies, with which it has been in firm agreement.

The close personal relationship between President Suharto, who served constitutionally as the supreme commander of the armed forces, and ABRI dominated leadership dynamics at the beginning of Suharto's New Order government in 1967. By the 1990s, the personal tie between Suharto and his generals had diminished somewhat as a result of the growing age gap between them and an increasing desire on the part of the new armed forces leadership to resist a personal tie to the presidential office. Nevertheless, the tie between the president and the military leadership remained close in 1992, and the armed forces remained loyal to the institution of the presidency and to Suharto and his policies as he prepared to enter a sixth five-year term of office in 1993.

Since the beginning of Suharto's rise to power in 1965, the armed forces have accepted and supported the foundation of his regime, namely, the belief that economic and social development was the nation's first priority and that social and political stability was absolutely essential if that goal were to be achieved. The primary mission of the armed forces has therefore been to maintain internal stability. They have been eminently successful in this regard, leading the nation out of a period of political and social upheaval in the mid-1960s into a period of relatively long-lasting domestic order and unprecedented economic growth, with an increasingly diversified economy that must maintain a growth rate sufficient to absorb a large annual increase in the work force (estimated in 1992 to be approximately 2.4 million new workers each year) (see Employment and Income, ch. 3).

Because the Suharto government viewed national and regional stability as essential to maintaining the pace of national development, the maintenance of internal security was considered an integral part of national defense itself. Indonesian doctrine considers national defense within the broader context of "national resilience," a concept that stresses the importance of the ideological, political, economic, social, and military strength of the nation. Like dwifungsi, this concept has also legitimized activities of the armed forces in areas not ordinarily considered belonging to the military sphere.

The absence of a perceived external threat in Southeast Asia since the mid-1970s has been widely credited with allowing Indonesia to concentrate on its internal defense and national development priorities. Although the internal security mission has always been paramount, by the late 1970s greater attention began to be paid to development of a credible conventional defense capability against
potential foreign threats. This defense capability had previously been neglected under Suharto for both economic and doctrinal reasons and because the nation had not faced a serious external threat. Neglect of a conventional defense capability resulted in deteriorated equipment throughout the armed forces and raised doubts about the military's capability to confront either a foreign or a severe domestic threat. Under then ABRI Commander General Mohammad Jusuf, the armed forces initiated extensive retraining and reorganization programs that culminated in a major reorganization of the armed forces in 1985. Since then, the armed forces have gradually upgraded their military capability, particularly that of the navy and the air force. Both had been seriously weakened by national spending priorities that—with the full support of the armed forces—continued to stress economic development and relegated defense spending to a much lower priority than found in most developing nations. Although the world's fourth most populous nation, Indonesia in the late 1980s ranked only 48th in total military expenditures and, at about US$8 per capita, 115th in per capita military expenditures. The low priority given to defense spending continued into the early 1990s. In 1991, with its large population, Indonesia fielded only 1.5 military personnel per 1,000 inhabitants, ranking it 122d in the world. For comparison, the United States, at nine military personnel per 1,000, ranked forty-second.

Crime and the administration of criminal justice continued to be important issues as the nation entered the 1990s. Although political offenses had always been viewed as threatening the social order and national stability, for the first time the government also came to view the rising rates of ordinary crime in the same manner. Lack of reliable data made it difficult to determine the actual scope of the problem, but it was taken very seriously in official circles. This concern culminated in a covert military action against ordinary criminals in the early 1980s, an action that was officially disclosed only in Suharto's 1989 autobiography.

A long-promised revision of the law governing criminal procedure was passed after much debate in late 1981. All concerned agreed that it represented a considerable improvement over the old code, which dated from the Dutch colonial era (see European Intrusions, ch. 1). Provisions excluding the law's application to economic and political offenses, however, raised some criticism from those who wished to bring under regular legal constraints the activities of the internal security organization that often dealt with these offenses.
The Pursuit of Public Order

To fully understand the role of the armed forces in contemporary Indonesian society, one must understand the absolute priority the government and the military leadership has placed, from the beginning of the New Order, on the importance of internal security to the achievement of national stability. The New Order government, whose military leaders in 1965 played an important role in crushing what is officially described as a communist coup attempt, has always believed that threats to internal stability were the greatest threats to national security. Having experienced two supposedly communist-inspired attempted coups, a number of regional separatist struggles, and instability created by radical religious movements, the government had little tolerance for public disorder.

The effort to forge a united and coherent nation that could accommodate the natural diversity of peoples in the Indonesian archipelago has always been a central theme in the country's history. The Suharto government, in firm control and without serious challenge since the late 1960s, had achieved this goal, giving the country an unprecedented degree of political stability. In light of the nation's early experiences with regional rebellions and with attempted communist-labelled coups in 1948 and 1965, however, the leadership historically has remained alert to real or potential subversive threats. It has held that unresolved social issues and intemperate criticism of official policies could be used by subversives to create unrest or even social anarchy, while also disrupting the course of national development, to which Suharto's regime is committed.

The government has therefore maintained surveillance and sometimes control over the activities and programs of a wide range of groups and institutions. The largest of these groups included those who were suspected of communist sympathies, jailed in the aftermath of the 1965 attempted coup, and later released during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Another such group, the authors of the Petition of Fifty, included fifty retired generals, politicians, academicians, students, and others who in 1980 advocated, among other things, that Suharto step down, and who encouraged a more effective and prominent role for the House of People's Representatives (DPR) in the national policy-making arena (see Legislative Bodies, ch. 4).

The government has contended, moreover, that political activity should properly be expressed in a harmonious and consensual manner through a government-structured framework that in the early 1990s included two traditional political parties and a state-supported third non-party political organization, a federation of
functional groups called Golkar (see Glossary). The government has been acutely sensitive to any signs of political opposition to its policies. What constituted acceptable criticism or dissent was not always clear, however, and some government critics, including the press, students, ex-military officers, and even some opposition party members of the DPR crossed the line, apparently without intending to do so. The press, political commentators, and social reformers continued to seek the "acceptable" level for criticizing the government and its leadership. In general, the government seemed to label as subversive anything not supportive of the national ideology, the Pancasila (see Glossary; see Pancasila: The State Ideology, ch. 4). Nevertheless, by the late 1980s a call for more openness in government and society as a whole began to be seen as acceptable political activity, and *keterbukaan* (openness) had become the acceptable term to describe an increased level of political commentary and criticism across the spectrum of national politics.

Bodyguards of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, ca. 1902
Courtesy Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress
The Suharto government consistently identified the potential for insurgency and subversion by numerous groups as the most dangerous threats to national security. Most often mentioned in this context were the remnants of the outlawed Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), against which repeated calls for national vigilance were issued (see Political Parties, ch. 4). Law enforcement officials have claimed that former PKI members were sometimes behind apparently ordinary crimes and that the communist ideology presented a special danger to young people who had not lived through the national distress of the 1960s. The government monitored closely the more than 30,000 prisoners taken after the 1965 coup attempt and released in the late 1970s, maintaining that they might be used to resurrect communism in the nation. The mission of monitoring ex-PKI members fell to both the police and the military (see The Coup and Its Aftermath, ch. 1).

Insurgency, however, appeared to present no serious threat to the national security in the early 1990s. The PKI had not mounted any major operations for almost twenty years, and, according to security officials, only a few PKI members were still active. Other very small, armed insurgent movements caused considerable concern in the early 1990s, however. The government as a matter of policy referred to an instance of such activity as a Security Disturbance Movement (GPK). Two of these movements, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin—see Glossary) in Timor Timur Province and the Free Papua Movement (OPM) in Irian Jaya Province, had been reduced to minimal strengths by 1992 and were confined to fairly isolated geographic regions. They had very little in common with any other groups and were unlikely ever to take united action. Nevertheless, political agitation by these groups and their sympathizers continued sporadically.

Groups advocating the establishment of an Islamic state, either over the whole national territory or over discrete areas, claimed to be behind certain violent incidents in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The government took firm action against these movements, taking the position that their goals were contrary to the principles of the Pancasila, which were intended to act as the basis for unifying the nation’s various ethnic and religious groups. By the early 1990s, the Islamic separatist groups that had seriously threatened the national unity in the early independence period, such as the Darul Islam movement, were defunct (see Independence: The First Phases, 1950–65, ch. 1).

Separatists who sought to establish an independent Islamic state in the Special Region of Aceh in northern Sumatra and combined their religious and nationalist appeal with exploitation of social and
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economic pressures and discontent continued to cause unrest in portions of the region. Many Acehnese perceived themselves as disadvantaged by Aceh’s major industrial development projects because income flowed out of the region to the center, and outsiders—especially from Java—were perceived as receiving better employment opportunities and more economic benefits of industrialization than did the resident Acehnese. A criminal element involved in marijuana cultivation and trafficking and other illicit activities was also involved in the unrest. The government treated the drug trafficking as a third GPK to minimize the nationalist appeal of one of the independence movement’s better-known advocates, Hasan di Tiro. However, the occasionally heavy-handed military response was blamed for adding to the problem; the army and police were accused of indiscriminate violence by both domestic and international human rights activists.

The government attributed various acts of terrorism committed during the period from 1975 to 1983 to the Komando Jihad (Holy War Command), which it said was composed of terrorists seeking to establish a new state based on Islamic principles. The group was held responsible for the bombings of churches and theaters in 1976 and 1977, for attacks on police stations in 1980 and 1981, and for the 1981 hijacking to Bangkok of a Garuda Indonesian Airways domestic flight. In the Garuda case, members of an Indonesian antiterrorist squad freed all hostages and killed the hijackers in a successful special forces operation at Bangkok’s Don Muang Airport. Some Indonesian Muslim leaders contended that several disparate groups were responsible for these acts and that the name Komando Jihad was coined by national security authorities and implied a considerable exaggeration of the strength and unity of forces on the Islamic extreme right. However, the past role of radical Islam in destabilizing activities led to intense government scrutiny of any religious movement that gave indications of moving beyond accepted religious tenets.

In 1992 senior armed forces leaders believed that Indonesia’s most serious security threat came not from subversion or armed insurgency, but from domestic unrest brought on by social changes inherent in the rapid development of the national economy. These changes, including improved educational opportunities, rising levels of expectations, industrialization, unemployment, and crowded cities, were blamed for provoking public unrest in the form of urban crime, student and political activism, and labor strikes. The government considered that all such activity posed a potential threat to national security because it could destabilize the nation or could endanger the progress of foreign investment and national development.
Governmental concern reached a peak in the early 1980s, when an alarming rise in violent crime in Jakarta prompted the notorious undercover "Petrus" (penembakan mysterius—mysterious shootings) campaign in which known criminals were killed by handpicked army execution squads and their bodies dumped in public places as warnings.

Lack of reliable data made it difficult to determine the extent of crime or labor unrest in the nation, but demonstrations by students and others, especially in conjunction with elections held in the period from 1977 to 1978 and in 1982, sometimes necessitated the deployment of military units to restore order and led to numerous arrests. Similar deployments became a conventional means of preventive action for major political events. However, the 1992 general election campaign was quiet and without major incidents despite the atmosphere of increased political openness (see Elections, ch. 4).

Violent disputes between ethnic groups have subsided since several serious incidents in the 1970s and early 1980s. Those outbursts against Indonesians of Chinese descent occurred in Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Ujungpandang. The nation's ethnic Chinese minority, estimated at 4 million or more in the early 1990s, has evoked popular resentment since the colonial era when Chinese individuals served as intermediaries between the Dutch elite and the majority of the population (see Ethnic Minorities, ch. 2). In the modern period, resentment has continued over Chinese Indonesian wealth and domination of the economy, including the role of Chinese individuals as intermediaries for foreign investors and as advisers and silent partners for senior armed forces personnel and civilian government leaders active in business.

The government has long believed that China played a major part in encouraging and providing both ideological guidance and financial and logistics support for the 1965 attempted coup by the PKI. For many years, the government refused to normalize relations with China, frozen in 1967, in part because of fears that Chinese Indonesians might provide a conduit for China to again spread communist ideology (see Relations with East Asia, ch. 4). Normalization of diplomatic and economic relations and the reopening of embassies in Beijing and Jakarta in 1990 reflected reduced political and internal ethnic tensions as well as the political and economic realities of the time. However, government efforts to promote non-Chinese enterprises were not completely effective in reducing anti-Chinese sentiments in the general population. Moreover, even though anti-Chinese riots had not recurred in over a decade, Suharto's call in 1990 for increased assistance to non-Chinese
Indonesians (*pribumi*—see Glossary) business efforts resulted in some transfer of Chinese capital to the non-Chinese business sector, and served to remind Chinese Indonesian business leaders that they had an implied obligation to assist the government in its economic reform efforts (see The Politics of Economic Reform, ch. 3).

Many of the thousands of refugees, or “boat people,” who had fled Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos since the mid-1970s were ethnic Chinese. Citing one of the five tenets of the national ideology, Pancasila (just and civilized humanitarianism), Indonesia has maintained one of the largest Indochina refugee processing centers in Asia. It has accepted more than 100,000 refugees in the 1975–91 period, including those “pushed off” from regional neighbors, pending their resettlement in third countries. Refugees and asylum-seekers were housed in a well-maintained camp under United Nations (UN) auspices on Galang Island in the Riau Archipelago near Singapore. As of the early 1990s, none had been accepted for permanent settlement in Indonesia.

In its concern for maintaining public order, the government paid great attention to providing acceptable channels for political participation and expression and to controlling public assemblies and speeches. In exerting its influence over the national press, the government encouraged self-censorship, closed down newspapers and magazines it considered offensive, and set restrictions on news coverage of some events. Such activity became less frequent as the government began to tolerate a greater degree of press freedom and criticism (see The Media, ch. 4). The new *keterbukaan* of the early 1990s allowed the press to print articles critical of government policies and, notably, about the business activities of prominent business personalities close to the president, including his own family, to an extent not possible as recently as the mid-1980s. Travel within the nation was open, and travel restrictions on movement to and within East Timor were lifted in 1988. In 1992, exit visa requirements were simplified and liberalized, but the government admitted the existence of a “blacklist” of several thousand persons who were not permitted to leave the country for one reason or another. The 1992 law also allowed the government to refuse to readmit Indonesian citizens living abroad for a variety of acts deemed contrary to the national interest.

**Historical Background**

The Dutch colonial period (1602–1949), the Japanese occupation (1942–45) during World War II (1939–45), and the National Revolution (1945–49) provided a diversified experience from which the Indonesian armed forces evolved. During the colonial period,
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until the expulsion of the Dutch during the Japanese conquest of Indonesia in 1942, a small number of Indonesians, virtually all in the enlisted ranks, were recruited into the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL). Subsequently, the Japanese occupation forces recruited Indonesians for use as auxiliaries (heiho), supply and support personnel attached to the Japanese army, and frequently sent them to the front in the Pacific, the Philippines, and other war zones. In 1943 the deteriorating military situation led the occupation authorities to organize a native militia, a volunteer army called Defenders of the Fatherland (Peta). Some 37,000 Peta enlisted personnel and officers were given training in combat tactics and, along with the heiho and some KNIL personnel, provided the emergent Indonesian state in 1945 with a ready source of trained military personnel. This force was supplemented by large numbers of youths having experience in various paramilitary youth corps organized by the Japanese to mobilize the population and to provide a recruiting base for Peta.

These elements became the nucleus of the nation’s embryonic military organization, the People’s Security Forces (BKR), which was formed on October 5, 1945, after the proclamation of independence by the government of revolutionary leader Sukarno in August. From the beginning, the Western ideal of a politically neutral military had few proponents. Many of those who joined the new force, renamed the National Army of Indonesia (TNI) in 1947, were nationalists who sought both military victory and political change for their nation. They were aided in the resistance struggle against the Dutch by several locally based, irregular units that were often politically aligned to dissimilar causes or loyal to prominent local figures.

Experiences during the struggle against the Dutch generally strengthened the military’s concern for political involvement. Faced with better trained and better equipped Dutch forces, the Indonesians conducted a guerrilla war in which fighters had to rely heavily on the support of the local population. This tie to the populace formed the basis for the military ideology of perjuangan—the struggle—which stressed that the military must rely on the people for support against both external threats and internal divisiveness, and which is at the core of modern Indonesian military thought.

In many areas, military commanders came to exercise wide powers in both civilian and military affairs. Under these circumstances, many armed forces personnel came to believe that the military had at least as much right as—and perhaps more ability than—the civilian leadership in determining the course of the nation. This experience led directly to the dwifungsi concept of direct involvement
in nominally civilian governmental functions. Many members of the military also felt that civilians had made unnecessary concessions to the Dutch in the negotiations over independence in 1949, and they accepted the authority of the civilian government only reluctantly.

During the war for independence, struggles among national political factions surfaced within the military, influencing the character of the armed forces that emerged from the revolutionary period. Conflict between regular army units and irregular doctrinaire Muslim forces as well as separatist units from the Outer Islands (see Glossary) eventually led to a conscious effort to weed out the more militant followers of Islam and separatists from the armed forces. Doing so left the military relatively free of internal conflict, but keenly attuned to the dangers of such destabilizing influences. An attempt by communists to seize power in East Java in September 1948 resulted in much resentment toward the communists. Political and military leaders charged that the armed rebellion—it came to be called the Madiun Affair—had occurred at a time when the Dutch could have taken military advantage of it and had endangered the existence of the republic. The Madiun Affair has been
widely credited with eliminating most communists from the army and with instilling in many in the armed services a long-lasting anticommunist orientation.

At the end of the war in 1949, the government had as many as 500,000 armed fighters at its disposal. These men served primarily in the TNI—which also included rudimentary air and naval elements—but some were attached to guerrilla bands and irregular forces under the control of local leaders. Widespread demobilization reduced this number to 200,000 by 1950, however, when the armed forces were given their official designation as the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI). A large majority of these personnel were poorly trained and undisciplined. The first priority of the military leadership, therefore, was to form some semblance of a united, structured military out of these disparate elements and to establish central control over them. Progress was made in this direction under the leadership of General Abdul Haris Nasution, army chief of staff. Nasution, a native of Sumatra, had served in KNIL before joining the republican army in 1946. Within two years, Nasution had risen to deputy commander and chief of operations. He was a key person in making plans for "rationalizing" the armed forces, a move to establish better administrative control by confirming the army, the navy, and the air force as separate services. Operational units in all three services were reorganized in accordance with organizational tables borrowed from Western armed forces, and formal training was instituted. Similar changes were made in the structure of the national police.

The efforts of the military leadership under Nasution, who was army chief of staff throughout most of the 1950s, to "reorganize and rationalize" the defense establishment quickly met with resistance, however. Several primarily Peta-trained officers feared that the leadership's plans to centralize command, stress "professionalism," and pare even further the size of the military would downgrade their own status. These officers, who strongly opposed the "professional" faction, wanted to maintain regionally decentralized forces, a revolutionary spirit, and a minimum of hierarchy. In their view, a "professional" military meant one strictly attuned to traditional military missions and skills, formed as a primary arm of a strong central government, and kept separate from involvement in the political development of the country. In what became an intra-army struggle, these officers gained the support of some sympathetic members of parliament who demanded that the central army leadership be dismissed and the defense department reorganized. Nasution and his supporters deeply resented the injection of civilian authority into the military domain. They
considered the legislature to be meddling in purely army affairs. On October 17, 1952, supporters of the military leadership staged demonstrations in Jakarta to support demands that Sukarno dissolve the legislature. When Sukarno, who cared little for Nasution’s scheme, refused to do this and encouraged the faction of the army resisting the reforms, mutinies occurred in several units. By the end of the year, Nasution and several of the most influential members of the “professional” faction were forced to resign.

In the following two years, factionalism in the decentralized army contributed to its increasing politicization. As soon became clear to most officers, factionalism also seriously weakened the military’s position relative to the civilian authority. In early 1955, in what one observer of the Indonesian military has called a “watershed” meeting, officers from both factions resolved to support the unity of the army and to heal its internal rifts. Whereas before 1955, politicians had “intervened” in what the military considered to be its internal affairs, after that meeting the military played an increasingly assertive role in civilian matters. Later in 1955, members of both factions joined to reject the appointment by the cabinet of a relatively junior officer to the position of army commander, an action that led to the resignation of the cabinet and eventually to the reappointment of Nasution as army chief of staff, after a three-year period of inactivity.

After 1955 Nasution initiated a series of personnel transfers and instituted several reforms aimed at establishing the army commander as a real authority over local commanders. The internal military crisis that resulted as the military again broke into factions had profound effects on both the military and the nation. Between 1950 and 1958, several opponents of Nasution’s policies joined local rebellions in the Outer Islands against the central government, creating conditions that threatened the existence of the nation (see Guided Democracy, ch. 1). These disparate movements, such as the Universal Struggle Charter (Permesta) rebellion in central and western Sumatra and Sulawesi, the separatist movement in northern Sulawesi, the Darul Islam rebellion in Sulawesi, and the establishment of the short-lived Republic of South Maluku (RMS) based in Ambon, could have fatally splintered the young republic had they all not failed. As a result of these revolts, the army continued to maintain a disproportionate troop presence in those regions well into the 1980s.

The army’s moves to restore order and to reestablish government control in dissident areas thrust its leadership into successively higher levels of political influence. In March 1957, after the DPR, which had been seated a year earlier, and the cabinet proved
unable to cope with the crisis, Sukarno declared martial law throughout the country, assigning the army wide powers over the national administrative apparatus. In December the army was given the additional task of managing newly nationalized Dutch enterprises and agricultural estates, propelling the military into a position of economic influence.

In the period of Sukarno's Guided Democracy (1959–65), the army's position in the government was institutionalized. Vowing that it would neither be a "dead tool of the government" nor assume total control of the nation, the army took what Nasution referred to as the "middle way," working cooperatively with the civilian leadership through its representation in the cabinet, parliament, and the civil service. It became, along with the PKI, Sukarno's "junior partner" in ruling the nation. Its uniformed personnel held positions throughout the country down to the village level, both in the administration of martial law and management of economic enterprises (mostly nationalized former Dutch properties) and in regionally deployed cadre units assigned to mobilize local resistance in the event of a threat to the national security. During this period, Nasution became minister of defense (1959–66) and chief of staff of ABRI (1962–66).

To support the activist foreign policy of this period, especially with regard to the 1962 campaign against Dutch forces in West New Guinea (also called West Irian or Irian Barat, and renamed Irian Jaya—Victorious Irian—in 1972 by Jakarta), and the 1963–66 policy of armed Confrontation (Konfrontasi—see Glossary) with Malaysia, Sukarno rapidly enlarged the armed forces. The build-up most affected the formerly negligible air force and navy, which were greatly expanded and given advanced arms and equipment acquired through military credits from the Soviet Union and allied East European countries. By the mid-1960s, Indonesia had one of the largest and best equipped armed forces in Southeast Asia.

In the early 1960s, as part of his policy to contain the army's expanding political influence, Sukarno encouraged the air force, navy, and police—the last was designated one of the nation's armed forces in 1960—to act independently of the army. The army leadership viewed the resulting divisions between the services, the growing influence of the PKI in all four, and Sukarno's increasing support for the PKI with considerable alarm. It was also less than sanguine concerning the ability of the country's armed forces to prevail in the Confrontation with Malaysia should Britain intervene on the side of Malaysia and displayed a reluctance to commit troops to the campaign when the domestic situation appeared unstable. Tension among and within the armed forces increased
following proposals by the PKI in early 1965 to place political advisers in each military unit (similar to the Chinese and Soviet systems) and to establish a "fifth force" of armed peasants and workers outside the control of the existing armed services.

The 1965 attempted coup d'État—the September 30 Movement (Gestapu)—by so-called communist sympathizers in the military was the seminal event in the evolution of the modern Indonesian armed forces. The rise to power of General Suharto—to whom Sukarno was obliged to relinquish de facto authority in March 1966 and who was appointed acting president one year later—completed the process of the unification of the armed forces and the centralization of command begun in 1950. Nasution, who had fostered these changes, unlike many of his senior ABRI colleagues, escaped being murdered during the coup. Along with the unrestrained violence and wave of arrests that followed the coup attempt and led to the eradication of the PKI, widespread purges in all services produced a military leadership unified in purpose as never before. The expansionist military doctrine of the Sukarno era was ended, and national expenditures began to be focused exclusively on national economic development.

An army seminar was held in August 1966 to develop and legitimize the role ABRI should play in Suharto's New Order. Its conclusions, which were disseminated throughout all four services in a second seminar held in November, implicitly rejected Nasution's "middle way" concept of sharing national decision making with civilian authorities. ABRI saw itself as a major institution with a role far greater than that of a military organization. It claimed that it must function also as a social force. These two seminars were credited with revitalization of the military's political role in national development and institutionalization of the dwifungsi concept. By 1969 the armed forces had emerged as the nation's dominant political institution. With the end of confrontational actions against the Dutch and Malaysia that dominated the early 1960s, ABRI's primary mission and focus changed to ensuring internal security and political stability so that political and modern economic development could proceed uninterrupted.

By the late 1970s, defense decision makers realized that emphasis on the civic and internal security missions of the armed forces had allowed the nation's defense capability to deteriorate to an unacceptable level. Serious weaknesses in training and discipline of personnel, in logistics and planning capabilities, and in the equipment inventory were reflected in a mediocre performance against Fretilin guerrillas in East Timor (see The New Order under Suharto, ch. 1).
Communist victories in South Vietnam and Cambodia prompted national authorities to reconsider both the external threat the nation faced and how best to meet it. Consequently, the new minister of defense and security, General Mohammad Jusuf, directed a major upgrading of armed forces military capabilities. This upgrade included increased training and procurement of sufficient equipment and personnel to establish a core of some 100 fully ready combat battalions. Successive ABRI commanders stressed military readiness and training even as economic constraints reduced new equipment purchases. The last major acquisition for the ground forces as of 1992, for example, was the 1981 purchase, through the United States Foreign Military Sales program, of new 105mm towed howitzers. Other new equipment purchased during the late 1970s and early 1980s included F-5 and A-4 fighters for the air force and the purchase of used but still serviceable ships for the navy. The purchase of twelve F-16 aircraft, not delivered until 1989, was designed primarily to keep up with rapidly developing defense technology until the armed forces acquired sufficient capital funds to purchase a new generation of fighter-bombers to replace its aging air force fleet.

The Armed Forces in the National Life

Despite its pivotal role in the establishment of the republic, the armed forces did not initially seek to play a dominant political role in the formative years of Indonesian parliamentary democracy. Although it appears that military leaders desired national political power, they seemed to have understood they could not achieve it solely through the exercise of force. It was circumstances rather than deliberate planning that pressed the armed forces to gradually enlarge their role in the nation. As it consolidated each stage of its growing political power, however, the military leadership was reluctant to surrender its gains. By the early 1990s, the inculcation of the Pancasila and the institutionalization of the dwifungsi principle under the laws of the nation, however, have provided the military with an unprecedented degree of legitimacy in Indonesia's political affairs.

In late 1982, the DPR put the dwifungsi principle on firm legal ground when it replaced the old 1954 defense law with a new one expressly stating that ABRI is both a military and a social force. The new law, unlike its predecessor, is based on the principles of the Pancasila and the 1945 constitution, and confers formal legitimacy on the wide-ranging powers exercised by the armed forces in the name of preserving and strengthening national resilience. The government’s sanction of dwifungsi recognized the need for ABRI's
continued influence in the basic national infrastructure so that national development would buttress national defense. ABRI's involvement in the national life included the assignment of both active-duty and retired military personnel to civil administrative and policy positions. Gradually, as stability came to the economic sector, military personnel withdrew from the economic policy-making area, and by 1980 all active-duty personnel had left their positions in non-defense-related economic enterprises, although they remained active in military-owned and -managed businesses. These businesses were primarily in the sectors of plantation agriculture, timber cultivation and harvest, and transportation. Retired military officers continued to run some nationalized firms and military-owned enterprises, although they frequently hired civilian managers.

Political and Administrative Role

ABRI's perception of its political role in the early 1990s was that of a national institution above partisan interests and closely tied to the people, with a duty to foster conditions of order and security in which the habits of a stable and institutionalized political process could develop. Political excesses during the first two decades of the republic had, in ABRI's view, discredited party politics as a proper outlet for grass-roots expression and forced the armed forces to act as the principal guarantor of internal security and political stability. As officially expressed in 1966, the armed forces "have an interest to participate in the efforts to form and manage a government with authority, a strong and progressive government." As a consequence, the armed forces have been intertwined with the civilian side of government at every level. Military officers, active duty and retired, have served in the highest organs of policy and administration since independence (see The Structure of Government, ch. 4). As a major functional group within Golkar, the military was allotted blocs of appointive seats in both the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the DPR (see Legislative Bodies, ch. 4). The provision of appointed military members of the MPR and DPR was also viewed as compensation for the active-duty members of the armed forces being denied the right to vote. However, retired members were permitted to vote, and most of them belonged to an association of retired officers that formed another of the functional groups within Golkar. Military officers served in civilian government posts at the provincial and district levels.

Although ABRI continued to view itself as a guardian of both sociopolitical and defense matters, however, the military of the 1990s was far different from the force that fought for independence and
evolved through the tumultuous political changes of the 1950s and 1960s. As a result of generational changes, a bustling national economy, and its increased self-confidence, ABRI had become a force that studied its roots as history rather than as example (see Transition of Leadership, this ch.).

**Participation in the Economy**

The military has never been as dominant in the economic sphere as it has been in the political. Total military expenditures as a percentage of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) have declined steadily since the 1960s, with the military share of the budget declining from 29 percent in 1970 to less than 4 percent in 1990. Nevertheless, because of historical circumstances, economic necessity, and some doctrinal predisposition, the armed forces retained considerable influence in the workings of the national economy, an influence that some critics charged was too pervasive and sometimes detrimental. By the early 1990s, however, the military had withdrawn from much of the economic policy decision-making arena, leaving that role to an ever-expanding core of Western-trained economists and managers who, the military recognized, were far better educated and able to function in this vital sector.

The armed forces' economic role had its beginnings early on in the National Revolution period (1945-49). That role was stepped up in 1957 when military personnel were assigned managerial or advisory positions in Dutch enterprises and agricultural estates nationalized by the government. This involvement in commercial enterprises projected the military, especially the army, into a new sphere of activity through which it acquired entrepreneurial expertise, a vast patronage, and a source of personal enrichment for many. The military's role in national economic life greatly expanded under conditions of a rapidly deteriorating economy during the Sukarno era in the 1960s, when the services, like many other government departments, were caught in a tightening fiscal squeeze between inflationary costs and depreciating budgets. Nominal military pay, for example, depreciated to a point well below subsistence level for privates and generals alike; commodities and other tangible emoluments were what counted. Left largely to their own devices to find support, local military units secured their needs by operating business enterprises, levying unofficial "taxes," smuggling, and other methods suggested by their own resourcefulness and available opportunities. At the central command level, the preferred procedure was to divert to military use funds from state corporations in which military officers held controlling positions. As military officers were withdrawn from the economic policy and
management sector, however, their ability to directly siphon unbudgeted funds to support military requirements diminished. Nonetheless, this extrabudgetary funding process remained in place, particularly for capital expenditures, even though the transfer of funds from state enterprises was largely a civilian policy arena. In the early 1990s, such extrabudgetary resources apparently still accounted for substantial portions of the annual fiscal needs of the armed forces (see Defense Spending and Defense Industry, this ch.).

The armed forces also influenced the economic policies of the Suharto regime through their ties with its most important economic technocrats. In late 1962, the curriculum at the Army Command and Staff School was broadened to include lectures on a wide range of nonmilitary subjects. In 1965 some of these lectures were presented by a group of economists trained at the University of California at Berkeley (see Role of Government, ch. 3). It was to these technocrats that Suharto turned when seeking economic guidelines for the New Order and when setting up and running his government. The armed forces strongly supported their programs over the years, and these economists continued to play an important educational role at the service staff colleges and the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas). Many believe the military-technocrat alliance provided one foundation of the Suharto regime. By the early 1990s, in fact, the "Berkeley Mafia," continuously augmented as successive generations of bright youths sought training in the
United States, had directed Indonesia’s economy for more than thirty years.

Although not the only state institution to engage in commercial enterprise in order to generate extrabudgetary income, the armed forces certainly were the most energetic and successful. Commercial activities under the various territorial commands commonly included the use of military trucks to transport passengers and freight for hire. Military-owned companies operated in the open market, much as any private company. For example, the Dharma Putra Foundation, a holding company connected with the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), included a film company, an airline, and the Volkswagen assembly franchise. Another company operating under the sponsorship of the Department of Defense and Security (Hankam) controlled affiliates involved in logging, trade, industry, and textiles. In late 1980, a report issued by the provincial assembly in Timor Timur, whose members were appointed by the central government, charged that an enterprise controlled by the local army command had developed a forced monopoly on the province’s main export commodities, coffee and sandalwood, and was reaping profits at the expense of local producers. The army’s umbrella organization, Kartika Eka Bhakti Foundation (YKEB), continued to manage army cooperatives and business concerns into the 1990s.

Another kind of military enterprise was the service-owned factory, which had as its primary purpose the production of ordnance and equipment for the armed forces. By the mid-1980s, however, such major concerns as the navy’s P.T. PAL shipyard in Surabaya (Jawa Timur Province) and the army’s munitions factories had been turned over to the civilian government and were being managed as state enterprises. In a category by itself was the state-owned National Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company (Pertamina) established in 1968 with the union of several state enterprises. Under the managing directorship of army General Ibnu Sutowo from the late 1950s until 1976, when he was eased out of office following the spectacular near-collapse of the company, Pertamina became a commercial colossus and Sutowo himself one of Indonesia’s richest and most powerful men. Since Sutowo departed in 1976, Pertamina has been directed by more professional management and has divested itself of many of its non-petroleum sector enterprises. It still retained its dominant position in the nation’s oil and gas sector in the early 1990s (see Petroleum, Liquefied Natural Gas, and Coal, ch. 3).

Although they could not be singled out from other actors in the national economy, the armed forces of the 1990s continued to face
the problem of coping with a legacy of corruption. The government recognized the special military aspect of this national problem and made repeated calls for military officers to act with special care in their business dealings and to avoid the appearance of nepotism when engaged in civilian duties. The military condemned excessive corruption and retired a number of senior officers for unacceptably blatant corruption. The military in the early 1990s was viewed by Indonesian society as being generally less corrupt than other sectors of the government. Nonetheless, the low salaries of military personnel required "constructive employment" to make ends meet, and there continued to be an acceptance of what Western societies consider corruption, as long as it was within "acceptable limits."

National Defense and Internal Security

Total People's Defense

ABRI's military operations relied on a well-developed doctrine of national defense called Total People's Defense, based on experiences during the struggle for independence. This doctrine proclaimed that Indonesia could neither afford to maintain a large military apparatus nor would it compromise its hard-won independence by sacrificing its nonaligned status and depending on other nations to provide its defense. Instead, the nation would defend itself through a strategy of territorial guerrilla warfare in which the armed forces, deployed throughout the nation, would serve as a cadre force to rally and lead the entire population in a people's war of defense. Military planners envisioned a three-stage war, comprising a short initial period in which an invader would defeat conventional Indonesian resistance and establish its own control, a long period of unconventional, regionally based fighting, and a final phase in which the invaders would eventually be repelled.

The success of this strategy, according to the doctrine, required that a close bond be maintained between citizen and soldier to encourage the support of the entire population and enable the military to manage all war-related resources. In this scenario, the people would provide logistical support, intelligence, and upkeep, and, as resources permitted, some civilians would be organized, trained, and armed to join the guerrilla struggle. In trying to attain these goals, ABRI maintained a territorial organization, run largely by the army, to support public order. This group exercised considerable influence over local decisions regarding such matters as population redistribution, the production of food and strategic materials, and the development of air and sea transportation. Armed forces
personnel also continued to engage in large-scale civic action projects involving community and rural development in order to draw closer to the people, to ensure the continued support of the populace, and to develop among military personnel a detailed knowledge of the region to which they were assigned. The largest of these programs, the Armed Forces Enters the Village (AMD), began in 1983 and was to continue indefinitely. It consisted of nationwide civic action campaigns held roughly three times a year to provide assistance in planning and constructing rural and urban projects selected by local villagers.

The Total People’s Defense strategy did not apply in some of the major actions Indonesia had engaged in since independence. For example, during the Confrontation with Malaysia from 1963 to 1966, ABRI engaged Malaysian forces in guerrilla warfare without the support of the border peoples of Sarawak and Sabah; in the dispute with the Dutch over West New Guinea in the early 1960s, ABRI fought against Dutch troops. These conflicts were fought in territory outside the effective jurisdiction of the national government where the Indonesian armed forces lacked the support of the civilian population and where the concept of Total People’s Defense could not be implemented. However, because the framers of the 1945 constitution had declared these areas as naturally belonging to Indonesia, national authorities declared that these conflicts were anticolonial wars and in fact represented the completion of the war of independence begun in 1945 (see Sukarno’s Foreign Policy, ch. 1; The Constitutional Framework, ch. 4).

**East Timor**

The East Timor conflict that began in the mid-1970s represented a somewhat different case. East Timor—then the colony of Portuguese Timor—was not claimed as a natural part of Indonesia after independence, as Irian Jaya had been. Upon its departure in early December 1975, the Portuguese colonial administration turned over its arms to the leftist, anti-Indonesian Fretilin faction. After fighting had broken out among various political factions in the colony and Fretilin had declared East Timor’s independence, Indonesian military forces, comprising ten battalions, invaded East Timor on December 7. The Indonesian government took the position that because Portugal was unable to reestablish effective control over its colony, it was necessary for Indonesian forces to restore order at the request of local political leaders. A provisional government petitioned Indonesia for incorporation, and East Timor became the nation’s twenty-seventh province—Timor Timur—in July 1976. Thereafter, ABRI’s military campaign against Fretilin
guerrillas in the province was treated as an internal security operation to subdue armed insurgents. It should be noted, however, that many foreign observers believe that the majority of East Timorese did not truly support integration. A succession of United States government administrations have maintained a continuous policy that the United States accepted the integration of East Timor into Indonesia, although not recognizing that the referendum that took place on the issue was legitimate.

By 1988 the situation in East Timor had changed dramatically; the Indonesian government had emphasized rural development, civic action, and improvement of the economic infrastructure. Over half of the military forces in the province were involved in civic action missions, including infrastructure construction, teaching, and agricultural training. Although incidents of unrest sometimes occurred in Dili, they generally reflected economic grievances and social conflict brought about by high expectations for employment and social infrastructures that had not had sufficient time to develop. Ironically, after hundreds of years under a colonial regime that left a legacy of 5 percent literacy, the greatly improved level of education of Timorese youth brought a classic example of unfulfilled rising expectations. Coupled with economic domination by non-Timorese migrants, discontent made exploitation of the situation by the small number of remaining Fretiin supporters inevitable. Periodic heavy-handed army security operations also fueled opposition.

Tragically, a major incident occurred in Dili in November 1991 in which at least 50 and perhaps more than 100 civilians were killed or wounded by army troops reacting to a political demonstration. Unprecedented national and international attention as well as a changing view of ABRI’s role in society prompted Suharto, in his supreme commander’s role, to take the extraordinary step of appointing the first-ever National Investigation Commission to look into the incident, identify those at fault, and take corrective action. In its preliminary report in December 1991, the commission found that the army had overreacted to provocation and had used “excessive force” contrary to established procedures. Based on the findings of a separate Military Honor Council, in February 1992 the army chief of staff directed that five officers be censured, at least eight soldiers and officers be court-martialed for major offenses, and six senior officers in the chain of command be relieved of their posts. To its credit, the army itself reacted with anger and dismay to the incident and supported the subsequent disciplinary actions taken against army personnel. Within six months of the incident, three senior officers were dismissed, two others were relieved from
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active duty, another was suspended, and four junior officers were sentenced to jail terms of between eight and fourteen months.

The army and the government, both subjected to intense international as well as domestic scrutiny (the incident was extensively and openly covered in the press), realized their higher responsibilities and responded in a mature and conciliatory manner to their critics at home and abroad. It may well be that this incident, which provoked the most significant controversy since the 1965 coup attempt, will prove to have been a watershed in the way ABRI viewed its role in society and was in turn viewed by the populace. Suharto’s initiative in directing investigative efforts, which emphasized his role as supreme commander of the armed forces, was a dramatic assertion of his continuing authority over the armed forces leadership, most of whom were twenty years younger than he. His public apologies for the incident also emphasized the embarrassment it had caused Indonesia.

Southeast Asia

In the early 1990s, the defense aspect of the armed forces military mission continued to take second place to that of maintaining internal security. This situation was due primarily to the absence of a credible external threat. The Suharto government maintained close and cordial relations with its nearest neighbors, which, in any case, possessed little offensive military capability. The growth of a series of bilateral military relationships within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—see Glossary) and among such selected non-ASEAN friends as Australia and the United States provided a web of bilateral military ties that strengthened regional stability as well as reduced the external threat to the country.

Attention to potential external threats grew during the 1970s as planners became concerned with the growing military power of the newly unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam and its allies, including the Soviet Union after 1975. Vietnam made claims in the late 1970s over sections of the South China Sea adjacent to the Natuna Islands, considered by Indonesia to be part of its own territory. The possible presence of foreign submarines in national waters and the problems of illegal fishing and smuggling were also accorded increased attention, particularly after Indonesia declared a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone in March 1980 (see National Territory: Rights and Responsibilities, ch. 2). The gradual move toward a forward deployment strategy that began in the late 1970s appeared to be at least partly motivated by these changed perceptions. That strategy entailed the use of paratroopers, long-range transport aircraft, transport and attack helicopters, and attack jets.
National Security

On the one hand, subsequent political developments in Southeast Asia during the late 1980s and early 1990s, including efforts to bring peace to Cambodia—in which Indonesia was intensely involved—the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, and a reduced perceived threat overall from Vietnam relieved tensions. On the other hand, the potential for regional conflict, for example, over territorial claims in the Spratly Islands continued to trouble strategic planners (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). The dramatic end of the Cold War and retrenchment of former Soviet forces in the Pacific brought new strategic thinking on the nature of a potential external threat. In the post-Cold War era, Indonesia quietly continued to support the maintenance of a United States regional security presence to prevent a vacuum that could be filled by potentially less benevolent outsiders.

**Defense Spending and Defense Industry**

Indonesia is unique among developing countries in the relatively low priority given to defense spending. Having fully supported the basic concept of the Suharto regime, namely, that national defense and security depended on the country’s economic development, the armed forces endorsed the principle that scarce domestic resources and foreign aid could not be diverted for military use without slowing the progress of national development. The armed forces accepted their low priority for development funds from the national budget (see Government Finance, ch. 3). Although currency reforms undertaken in the late 1960s and general accounting practices under both Sukarno and Suharto make absolute comparisons impossible, it is evident that military expenditure dropped dramatically during the first two years of the New Order government (1966-67)—perhaps by as much as 75 percent—and that defense spending was held to fairly low levels thereafter. The low level of funding resulted in a rapid decline in inventories of functioning equipment in all services and an overall decrease in armed forces manpower and combat readiness that continued into the 1990s.

By the late 1970s, military hardware, particularly Soviet-bloc systems left over from the Sukarno era, was approaching decrepitude. National and military authorities became convinced that the armed services must be upgraded, although on a gradual basis. During the period between 1977 and 1982, national allocations to Hankam doubled in absolute terms, and modest upgrades were made in all three military services. In the same period, however, the total budget rose at a higher rate, so the military share actually declined each year—from 14 percent of the total in fiscal year
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(FY—see Glossary) 1977 to 12 percent in FY 1982, and down to 4 percent in FY 1991. This period saw such equipment purchases as the F-5 (1978), the A-4 (1981), and the F-16 aircraft (1988), several used frigates and destroyers, as well as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and towed howitzers.

The armed forces budget was divided into two categories of expenditure: one for routine matters, such as pay and allowances, maintenance, and travel, and the other for development of forces and infrastructure, including the purchase of new equipment. Although a more detailed breakdown of the budget was not made public, it can be said that in the early 1990s, routine expenditures accounted for some 70 percent of the total. The balance covered installment payments for several naval vessels and for scheduled payments for the F-5, A-4, and F-16 fighter aircraft.

Historically, the publicly released figures in the budget have not reflected actual military expenditures, since extrabudgetary funds contributed significantly to military expenditures (see Participation in the Economy, this ch.). However, the degree to which actual spending was understated was a matter for conjecture. For example, extrabudgetary funds were used to purchase a squadron of A-4 combat aircraft and four landing ship-tanks (LSTs) in the late 1970s. Moreover, most observers agreed that the portion of the budget devoted to routine matters was insufficient to maintain the armed services at their current subsistence level. The shortfall of funds between actual expenditures and the official budget plus foreign military credits was believed to be made up by the earnings of the military business enterprises and diversion of funds from other state enterprises.

Parliamentary mandate in 1978 encouraged the development of a domestic defense industry to lessen Indonesia’s dependence on foreign manufacturers and to reduce the use of scarce foreign currency reserves on weaponry. In keeping with these guidelines, domestic capacity to maintain, repair, and produce military equipment was improved. Large naval vessels and fighter aircraft still had to be purchased abroad, but the Indonesian aircraft and shipbuilding industries, detached from the armed forces in the early 1980s, had been upgraded by the early 1990s. They produced helicopters, light aircraft, transport aircraft, landing craft, patrol boats, small arms, and a variety of spare parts for these systems, taking advantage of offset production and other licensing agreements with foreign firms. Defense industries attended to a greater amount of routine as well as local-level maintenance, such as installing new engines in helicopters and combat vehicles that had been retired from service because of a shortage of spare parts. Several
electronics firms were established to support defense matériel production. The government continued to seek defense-related technology transfer from the United States, Japan, and several European nations. For example, certification of the P.T. PAL shipyard, starting in 1992, to perform certain types of en route repairs for United States Navy warships on a commercial basis brought a new level of sophistication to that facility.

Despite these efforts, Indonesia was far from self-sufficient in the production of weapons and defense-related matériel. Domestic facilities remained inadequate for the repair of certain complex weapons systems, and equipment inventories often represented considerable overstatements of what was in functioning order. Moreover, although defense guidelines favored the standardization of weaponry and defense matériel, the armed forces still possessed and continued to procure equipment from a number of other countries, presenting serious problems in obtaining and stocking spare parts and training technical maintenance personnel. Progress on regional cooperation in defense maintenance began to show results in the mid-1980s, with cooperative agreements for aircraft and maritime repairs and maintenance established with both Singapore and Malaysia.

Civilian utilization of defense industry plants has benefited the national economic base. The major defense industries were transferred from the armed forces in the 1980s and in 1992 were managed by the minister of state for research and technology. Under a new policy, these plants also produced matériel for the commercial and civilian sectors. The aircraft industry produced parts and equipment for commercial aviation, for example, and the army’s former munitions plants manufactured commercial explosives for the mining and petroleum industries. The P.T. PAL shipyard also manufactured commercial ships and maritime equipment.

**Personnel**

The size of the armed services—approximately 468,000, including the police, in 1992—was small in comparison with other nations of comparable population and with other Asian countries. The army was by far the dominant branch of service, with approximately 217,000 personnel; the navy and marine corps totalled about 44,000, the air force about 27,000, and the police about 180,000. Personnel strength in the army was gradually but steadily reduced over the 1966-82 period, and average annual enlistment in the other services was limited to maintenance of existing force levels (see fig. 11; table 29, Appendix). Two successive five-year plans covering the period through 1997 mandated that there be no increase in the
Figure 11. Armed Forces Personnel Strength, Selected Years, 1966–90

Size of the three military services and limited recruiting to the number needed to maintain current strength to compensate for retirements, deaths, and other separations. Virtually the entire growth of the armed forces took place in the National Police (see The National Police, this ch.).

Under the constitution, every citizen is entitled and obliged to defend the nation. Conscription is provided for by law, but in light of limited civilian-sector employment opportunities, the armed forces have been able to attract sufficient numbers to maintain mandated strength levels without resorting to a draft. As of 1992, almost all service members were volunteers who had met the criteria set for conscription. Officer specialists, such as physicians, however, were occasionally conscripted for short-term service. Most enlisted personnel were recruited in their own regions and generally trained
and served most of their time in units near their homes. Each service had small women's units (see Women in the Armed Forces, this ch.).

The officer corps was estimated to comprise some 53,000 in 1992. Less than 1 percent of these were of general officer rank. Aggressive retirement of officers at or over the usual retirement age of fifty-five during the early 1980s reduced spaces after the reorganization of 1985; continued slow rates of promotion at the highest levels into the early 1990s and the large numbers of officers reaching retirement age in the same period accounted for most of the reductions in total officer numbers since the 1970s. With personnel strength mandated to remain static during the 1990s, a steady balance between new officer accessions and losses (through death, attrition, and retirement) was likely to be maintained in the force structure in the future.

For the first twenty years of independence, entry into the officer corps was very competitive. According to both patriotic and traditional values, a military education and career were regarded as highly desirable. Since the late 1970s, however, the armed forces had experienced difficulty in attracting the best qualified candidates to the Armed Forces Academy of the Republic of Indonesia (Akabri), the national military academy at Magelang, Jawa Tengah Province. Akabri trained most of the military and police officer corps. Throughout the 1980s, as many as 150 spaces a year at the academies went unfilled. Many officers were children of serving or retired armed services personnel. However, the armed services were dissatisfied with the quality of cadets entering the academy system and further blamed the system for not providing officers of sufficiently high caliber. Better jobs in the civilian sector accounted for the fact that the brightest and best-qualified high school graduates preferred to attend civilian degree-granting universities (Akabri did not grant academic degrees as of 1992).

In spite of these problems, in the early 1990s the armed forces, particularly the officer corps, had achieved a cohesive and highly professional esprit de corps. This achievement was even more remarkable in light of the deep-seated and persistent factional strife and interservice rivalry that plagued the defense establishment in the first two decades after independence. Maturation through institutionalization, increased civilian and professional military education, and emphasis on integrated national (not regional) loyalty produced an armed force that was a far cry from the fractionalized and ideologically diverse military that existed at the time of the 1965 coup attempt. Unit ing the individual services under a strong central command structure and a conscious effort to eliminate "warlordism" and regionalism by routine rotational assignments
throughout the officer corps contributed to the new cohesiveness. Purges conducted in the aftermath of the abortive 1965 coup and continuous close examination of personnel's political reliability were also important because they rid the military of those with radical religious or political views. Mandatory retirement for officers at age fifty-five and routine periodic reassignments also ensured that the officer corps was politically reliable.

The officer corps in the early 1990s was composed mainly of ethnic Javanese. In 1992 ethnic Javanese occupied most key command and staff billets. This was especially true of those holding the highest positions in Hankam and in each service. Fifty-three percent of the top eighty-three incumbents of these positions were filled by ethnic Javanese officers; when combined with Sundanese and Madurese also from Java, the total represented 67 percent in 1992 (see table 30, Appendix).

Importantly, however, there was a strong trend toward assignments based on ability rather than ethnic or religious considerations. Since the late 1970s, non-Javanese had risen throughout the general officer leadership ranks in greater numbers, and there was a feeling within the armed forces that ethnic background was not a major factor in promotions. Non-Javanese have held the number-two posts in both Hankam and the army as well as several of the army's ten Military Regional Commands (Kodams). Religious background varied. The minister of defense and security and several other senior officers were Christians; most senior officers were Muslim, and of those most were nominal Muslims (abangan—see Glossary). In light of their experiences in putting down armed challenges to the national leadership by Islamic separatist groups, the armed forces had developed an institutional distrust of orthodox Muslims (santri—see Glossary; Islam, ch. 2).

Leadership Transition

Defense planners have always been concerned with the issue of leadership transition within the armed forces. However, the maturity of the armed forces as an institution was demonstrated in the 1983–84 period, when in less than one year, the entire armed forces leadership structure was turned over without turmoil, from the Generation of 1945—veterans of the war of independence—to a new generation of officers educated in the Indonesian military academy system. Too young to have fought during the independence struggle, these officers, commissioned after 1960, brought a new and more modern perspective to the armed forces.

The Generation of 1945, many of whom were the children of small merchants or minor officials, had been motivated to join the
armed forces by deeply felt ideals of nationalism and patriotism rather than by any desire to pursue a conventional military career. In other circumstances, they might have sought careers in business, politics, or government and so did not constitute a "barracks military." Most were fairly young at the start of the National Revolution; for example, General Sudirman, the revered army commander from 1945 to 1950, was only thirty-two years old in 1945. This generation of officers maintained exclusive control of positions of responsibility well into the late 1970s, often to the frustration of younger officers. Their main concern as they entered retirement was to ensure that their deeply held values were transferred to the new generation, whom they perceived as being less politically attuned and thus less aware of the senior officers' great sacrifices to secure and maintain national independence.

Younger officers had moved into most armed forces leadership positions by 1983. Almost all were graduates of Akabri, which had produced its first full class in 1960. Many of these officers had entered ABRI because they believed that acquiring an academy education and becoming an ABRI officer brought a reasonable living and was one sure way to enter national ruling circles. Most came from middle-class backgrounds, although farmers as well as the wealthy urban class were well represented too. Sons of ABRI personnel made up a large number, but far less than a majority, of Akabri classes. Members of the academy generation had no experience with the struggle for independence and the political turmoil of the early 1950s that had led their elders to distrust civilian politicians. Few, if any, had extensive experience in performing purely nonmilitary tasks, and most had received more professional military training than had their elders.

The character of middle-level and junior officers and the effects of their Akabri education compared with that given more senior officers at Magelang remained unclear in 1992. It appeared, however, that a generational discontinuity had developed between those officers who began training in or after the late 1970s and their predecessors. This generational shift manifested itself primarily in the desire of younger officers to become true military professionals; they viewed some aspects of the dwifungsi doctrine as detracting from that goal. These younger officers, as a result of greater communication and openness in general society, did not share their seniors' inhibitions about seeking training and equipment from friendly foreign countries and favored increased professional military ties with the armed forces of such countries as Australia and the United States.
The armed forces began preparing in the early 1970s for the turnover of leadership from the Generation of 1945 after a survey conducted at the Army Command and Staff School revealed certain differences in motivation and outlook between younger officers attending the school and their superiors. In 1972 high-ranking officers met with representatives of students attending the school to decide which values of the Generation of 1945 should be fostered in order to prevent a discontinuity of leadership when the older officers retired. Those values, which centered on the dual role of ABRI personnel as defenders of the nation and as a force for promoting national development, were raised to the level of ABRI doctrine, then disseminated throughout the services and made the subject of subsequent ABRI curricula. Beginning in 1978, junior officers were required to attend periodic Pancasila indoctrination programs to ensure inculcation of these values (see Pancasila: The State Ideology, ch. 4). Pancasila classes were found throughout both the military and the civilian governmental structure in the early
1990s, with the content differing according to the level of seniority at which the classes were directed.

**Organization and Equipment of the Armed Forces**

**Administrative and Command Structure**

The nation's four armed services, collectively termed ABRI, consisted of the three military services—the army, navy, and air force—and the police. In 1985 a major reorganization separated Hankam from the ABRI headquarters and staff. Hankam was responsible for planning, acquisition, and management tasks but had no command or control of troop units. The ABRI commander in chief retained command and control of all armed forces and continued by tradition to be the senior military officer in the country. The minister of defense and security in 1992 was a retired general, Leonardus B. "Benny" Murdani. Both the minister and the ABRI commander in chief, in 1992 General Try Sutrisno, had cabinet rank and direct access to the president.

Since the separation of the ministry from the armed forces headquarters in 1985, the Hankam staff has been composed largely of retired military personnel. The split provided positions of responsibility for highly qualified but relatively young retired officers of the Generation of 1945 while also opening up high-level billets in ABRI to younger active-duty officers who had been frustrated by slow rates of promotion.

In 1992, the administrative structure of Hankam consisted of a minister, secretary general, inspector general, three directorates general, and a number of functional centers and institutes (see fig. 12). The minister, inspector general, and three directors general were retired senior military officers; the secretary general (who acted as deputy minister) and most functional center chiefs were active-duty military officers.

The role of the separate armed services in 1992 had not changed since 1969, when the heads of the army, navy, and air force were reduced to chiefs of staff. Operational control of almost all their military units was vested in the commander in chief, reducing the headquarters of each military service to the status of administrative organs. Only the police chief continued to exercise operational control over his own personnel.

Largely retained intact when split off from Hankam in 1985, the ABRI staff and its functions remained directly subordinate to the commander in chief, who remained, in turn, directly responsible to the president, also the supreme commander of the armed forces (see fig. 13). Under the commander in chief, there was a
Figure 13. Organization of the Armed Forces, 1992
provision for a deputy, a position that in 1992 was not filled. There were two ABRI chiefs of staff, one for the general staff and one for social-political affairs. The inspector general and the assistant for plans and budget, as well as a number of agencies and institutes, remained directly under the commander in chief. The ABRI chief of general staff directed assistants for communications/electronics, intelligence, logistics, operations, personnel, public security affairs, and territorial affairs; the chief of staff for social-political affairs directed the armed forces' dwifungsi operations in the civilian sector of the government through assistants for nonmilitary workers' affairs and for social-political affairs. The ABRI joint staff supported the headquarters of each of the four services. Staff personnel were drawn from all four services. Police officers served only in positions related to internal security.

The 1985 reorganization also made significant changes in the armed forces chain of command. The four multiservice Regional Defense Commands (Kowilhans) and the National Strategic Command (Kostranas) were eliminated from the defense structure, establishing the Military Regional Command (Kodam), or area command, as the key organization for strategic, tactical, and territorial operations for all services. The chain of command flowed directly from the ABRI commander in chief to the ten Kodam commanders, and then to subordinate army territorial commands. The former territorial commands of the air force and navy were eliminated from the structure altogether, with each of those services represented on the Kodam staff by a senior liaison officer. The navy and air force territorial commands were replaced by operational commands. The air force formed two Operations Commands (Ko-Ops), and the navy had its Eastern Fleet and Western Fleet—Armadas. The air force’s National Air Defense Command (Kohanudna) remained under the ABRI commander in chief. It had an essentially defensive function that included responsibility for the early warning system.

The commander in chief exercised control over most of the combat elements of the army, navy, and air force through the ten army Kodams, the two air force Ko-Ops, and the two navy Armadas. The geographic extent of the army Kodam in the early 1990s was as follows: Kodam I, Special Region of Aceh and Sumatera Utara, Sumatera Barat, and Riau provinces; Kodam II, Jambi, Bengkulu, Sumatera Selatan, and Lampung provinces; Kodam III, Jawa Barat Province; Kodam IV, Jawa Tengah Province and the Special Region of Yogyakarta; Kodam V, Jawa Timur Province; Kodam VI, the four provinces of Kalimantan; Kodam VII, the four provinces of Sulawesi; Kodam VIII, Maluku and Irian Jaya provinces;
Kodam IX, Bali, Nusa Tenggara Timur, Nusa Tenggara Barat, and Timor Timur provinces; and Kodam Jaya Jakarta, the Special Capital City Region of Jakarta (see fig. 14). The air force Ko-Ops and the navy fleets split in approximately the same way: Ko-Ops I and the Western Fleet corresponded to Kodams I through IV and VI; and Ko-Ops II and the Eastern Fleet corresponded to Kodam V and Kodams VII through IX (see fig. 15; fig. 16).

The commander in chief also exercised operational control over two special strike force commands. The first was Kostrad, which had been formed in the early 1960s during the West Irian campaign. It was from his position as Kostrad commander, in fact, that Suharto organized resistance to the 1965 coup. Since then the powerful post has been filled by officers considered particularly loyal to Suharto. By 1992 Kostrad had a strength of some 35,000 to 40,000 army personnel. It consisted of two divisions, each containing airborne and infantry brigades; a separate airborne brigade; one cavalry brigade; two field artillery regiments; and several combat support and service support units.

A second strike force command was the Special Forces Command (Kopassus). This organization, formerly called Kopassandha (which also means Special Forces Command), was reorganized and reduced in size in 1985. In 1992 Kopassus forces numbered some 2,500 army personnel identifiable by their distinctive red berets. Organized into two operational groups and one training group, these special forces were trained in intelligence gathering, a variety of special operations techniques, sabotage, and airborne and seaward landings.

In addition to the regular armed forces, there were militia-style paramilitary formations throughout the country. Estimates of the national strength of these forces ranged between 70,000 and 100,000. These units came under the army territorial hierarchy, which provided them with officers and training. In times of emergency, they came under the command of the army area commander. As of 1992, information regarding military and civilian reserve forces was not available.

**Military Education**

The reorganization retained a central military academy headquarters charged with curriculum standardization, but the four service academies were returned to the control of their respective service chiefs of staff. Cadets continued to begin training at the general academy in Magelang, followed by three-year courses in the specialized branches of Akabri run by each service. The army branch,
Figure 14. Military Regional Commands (Kodams), 1992
also referred to as the Military Academy, was located in Magelang as well. The Air Force Academy was located in Yogyakarta, the National Police Academy in Semarang, and the Naval Academy at Surabaya.

Similarly, the reorganization maintained a joint headquarters for the Armed Forces Command and Staff Schools (Mako Sesko) but returned control of the individual command and staff colleges to the service chiefs of staff. Each service ran its own command and staff college to which officers with the rank of major (or its equivalent) were sent for advanced leadership training. Cohort ties formed at the cadet academy and at the command and staff school were strong unifying elements among officers, and a large portion of the curriculum at this level was devoted to social and ideological issues to prepare officers for assignments in territorial dwifungsii roles. The ABRI command and staff college trained colonels, and the National Defense Institute provided training for senior command and staff officers at the senior colonel and one-star level. The institute also trained senior career civil servants and leaders of the business community.

The Army

The Army of the Republic of Indonesia (ADRI) historically has been the dominant service, with administrative control of the armed forces resting with the army chief of staff, in 1992 a four-star general. His staff included a vice chief of staff, an inspector general, and assistant chiefs of staff for logistics, operations, personnel, planning and budget, security, and territorial affairs. Total army strength, which had not changed substantially during the New Order era, as of 1992 was some 217,000, not including several thousand in nonmilitary positions throughout the government.

The chief of staff was responsible for personnel, training, administration, and logistical support of the army, but he did not exercise direct authority over the ten Kodams, the regional commands of the army that reported directly to the commander in chief. Commanders and staff of each Kodam were responsible for administration, logistics, personnel, training, and the general welfare of assigned and attached combat units. Each Kodam was divided into successively smaller administrative units. These included the Military Resort (Garrison) Command (Korem); Military District Command (Kodim); and Military Subdistrict Command (Koramil). At the bottom of the structure, noncommissioned officers (NCOs) were assigned to every village in the country.

Approximately two-thirds of the army was engaged in the national defense aspect of the armed forces' dwifungsii mission. Operations
were rarely, if ever, conducted in any formation larger than a battalion. Each Korem had control of at least one battalion, and one or more battalions came under the direct control of the Kodam. Army doctrine differentiated between tactical battalions, which were found in Kostrad and at least one quick reaction force battalion for each Kodam; and territorial battalions, which made up the majority of the units assigned to the ten Kodams. Each battalion had a strength of nearly 700 men, and personnel programs within a fixed staffing size called for recruitment of sufficient numbers to bring chronically understrength units up to authorized levels.
Some of these forces were occasionally assigned for temporary missions to Kostrad or Kopassus.

The army had its own small air arm that performed liaison and limited transport duties. It flew one helicopter squadron and one composite squadron composed mostly of light aircraft and small transports, such as the domestically produced CASA 235.

Factionalism within the army leadership, once a severe problem, no longer disrupted operations in the early 1990s. Traditional divisional identification continued to have some significance, however, especially in regard to that developed in the former Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya divisions, which covered western, central, and eastern Java, respectively, during the war of independence and the years immediately thereafter. The detachment of the Jakarta area from the control of the Siliwangi division and the restructuring of the army from a divisional basis to the territorial Kodam system diffused the powers of the divisions and eliminated warlordism.

Most of the army personnel not assigned to combat formations were involved in carrying out the social and developmental portions of the armed forces’ dwifungsi mission. Many were attached to the Kodams as support elements, performing intelligence and internal security functions, and maintaining liaison with local officials charged with implementing the government’s policies. Some military personnel filled civilian government positions from national and province levels down to the district, subdistrict, or village level. A large portion of the army’s territorial forces participated in ABRI civic action projects, such as the nationally directed ABRI Masuk Desa program and locally directed programs at the Kodam level, as part of their mission to promote national development. They constructed roads, bridges, and public buildings, provided medical service in remote areas, and worked to improve rural conditions. The military’s civic action mission received added attention after 1983 as part of a program designed to address the problems of a perceived growing gap between ABRI and the civilian population.

By 1992 virtually all of the army's heavy equipment of Soviet or East European-origin had been eliminated and replaced by equipment produced indigenously or purchased from Western countries. Because of funding constraints, emphasis was placed on maintenance and rehabilitation of older equipment. The mainstay of the armored force was the French-built AMX-13 light tank and AMX-VCI reconditioned armored personnel carriers, mostly acquired in the late 1970s (see table 31, Appendix). The nation's small arms industry supplied nearly all of the army's small arms
requirements, although a substantial number of M-16 rifles purchased from the United States in the 1980s remained in the inventory. Domestically produced arms included FMC rifles, submachine guns, and machine guns made under Belgian-licensed production. Ammunition was in short supply (see Defense Spending and Defense Industry, this ch.).

Although army recruits received their basic training in a central training facility located in each Kodam area, specialist corps training was provided at the appropriate national corps centers. NCOs were required to attend training courses and to pass examinations in their fields prior to promotion.

The Navy

The Navy of the Republic of Indonesia (ALRI) became a separate service in 1946, after the National Revolution began. It was initially stocked primarily with craft once operated by European or the Australian navies. Beginning in 1959, the navy began to acquire a large number of craft from the Soviet Union and East European nations. In the aftermath of the abortive 1965 coup, however, the navy suffered a decline in influence within the armed forces and the nation because of suspected involvement in the coup attempt (particularly by the marine corps) and because of its small size in comparison with the army. A large portion of its vessels of Soviet or East European origin were quickly rendered non-operational owing to a lack of spare parts and maintenance expertise. Until the late 1970s, the only major replacements were four frigates acquired from the United States Navy in 1974.

Since that time, the navy has embarked on an upgrading program designed to develop a balanced fleet suited to operations in archipelagic waters. Over the 1978–92 period, it purchased submarines from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), light frigates from the Netherlands and Britain, and fast attack craft from the Republic of Korea (South Korea). In 1992 the Indonesian government announced plans to acquire thirty-nine used ships of various types from the navy of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The navy produced numerous small coastal craft in national shipyards as well. As of 1992, the fleet was composed of more than sixty ships and numerous smaller vessels (see table 32, Appendix).

The navy's mission was to act as a territorial force responsible for the patrol of Indonesia's immense coastline. The vast majority of operational ships were stationed at the main naval base at Surabaya, Jawa Timur Province. Whereas the 1970s saw an increase in the fleet's ship inventory, the 1980s witnessed a major effort to
Navy personnel on parade in Jakarta
Marines practicing self-defense techniques
Courtesy Indonesian Department of Information
improve the navy’s armament posture through the purchase of the Harpoon weapons system and the MK-46 torpedo. The 1990s were expected to be largely a period of consolidation and training.

Structurally, the navy comprised the headquarters staff at Jakarta under the overall command of the navy chief of staff, two fleet commands (the Eastern Fleet in Surabaya, the Western Fleet in Jakarta), the marine corps, a small air arm, and a military sealift command. There were about 44,000 uniformed personnel serving in the navy in 1992, including about 13,000 marines. The marines were organized into two brigades, one in Jakarta and the other in Surabaya, and were equipped with light tanks, armored personnel carriers, and antiaircraft guns. Some of the marine elements were believed occasionally to be attached to Kostrad in operational missions.

The navy has maintained a small air arm since 1958. Headquartered at Surabaya, its personnel numbered some 1,000 in the early 1990s. It was equipped primarily for naval reconnaissance and coastal patrol duties, flying three squadrons of light airplanes, as well as several transports and helicopters. The military sealift command coordinated the navy’s logistical support systems.

In the early 1990s, naval warships generally were not deployed to a particular region but were grouped in mobile flotillas, to be dispatched where needed. Usually these included eastern, western, and central groups, but activity was most often concentrated in the west in the vicinity of the bases at Belawan in Sumatera Utara Province, Tanjungpinang in Riau Province, near Singapore; and in the east near the base at Manado in Sulawesi Utara Province. This pattern was in keeping with the major missions envisioned for the navy in the 1990s. One mission concerned patrolling the strategic straits through which foreign ships enter and exit the Indian Ocean, particularly the Strait of Malacca. The other mission centered on halting smuggling and illegal fishing, considered to be problems particularly in the areas near the Natuna Islands and in the seas between Kalimantan and Irian Jaya. In support of the second mission, the navy announced plans to construct a number of limited-role bases in isolated areas in the eastern and western sections of the national territory. Patrol activity also increased in connection with the flow of refugees from Southeast Asia, particularly in the area near the Natuna Islands.

The naval shipyard—P.T. PAL—was turned over to the civilian government, but it, along with other facilities in Surabaya, continued to be the navy’s primary training, repair, and industrial center. Since P.T. PAL’s transfer to civilian control and designation as a state enterprise, it has developed and implemented
improvements for a management and technical upgrade of the shipyard to support the Indonesian fleet as well as to conduct commercial repairs for foreign navies. Small craft construction facilities were located at shipyards in Jakarta, Manokwari, Irian Jaya Province; Semarang, Jawa Tengah Province; and Ambon, Maluku Province.

Because of severe budgetary constraints imposed by the national government, no near-term acquisition of major new weapons systems was planned by the navy in the early 1990s. Continual overhaul of foreign-origin ships was perceived as the primary method to retain an operational fleet. Future projects included plans for an Indonesian-designed frigate and construction of a major naval base at Ratai Bay, Lampung Province. The immense costs involved, however, made achievement of these ambitious goals unlikely.

The Air Force

The Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia (AURI), like the navy, was also established as a separate service in 1946 and evolved from the aviation division of the People’s Security Forces (BKR). When it became a separate service, the air force had only a few pilots. Nevertheless, it assumed responsibility for the air defense of the republic and took over all existing Dutch airfields and equipment. Initially, the air force was fairly small and flew mostly United States- and West European-origin aircraft. However, between 1958 and 1964, the force expanded rapidly and switched to Soviet-bloc aircraft, purchasing more than 100 MiG-17 fighters, Il-28 bombers, and other aircraft from Soviet and East European sources. Personnel strength doubled. By the early 1960s, the Indonesian air force was the best equipped air arm in Southeast Asia.

The influence and capability of the air force fell sharply after the 1965 attempted coup. The air force was heavily purged for its role in the events associated with the coup attempt, and the abrupt turn away from the Soviet bloc ended the significant flow of equipment and logistics support that had been the key to expansion during the early 1960s. The air force’s large armada of Soviet aircraft subsequently fell into disuse and disrepair. At the same time, the sharp drop in defense expenditures initiated under Suharto and the anti-communist orientation of the New Order government prevented the purchase of needed spare parts and maintenance assistance and led to the rapid grounding of almost all East European-made equipment. Significant modernization did not get under way until the late 1970s with acquisition of the F-5 and A-4 aircraft from the United States.
In 1992 air force strength was about 27,000. Approximately 4,000 of these personnel formed four battalions of "quick action" paratroopers. The structure of the air force consisted of a headquarters staff in Jakarta supporting the chief of staff, two subordinate commands (Air Matériel Command and Air Training Command), and three operational commands (Ko-Op I, Ko-Op II, and the National Air Defense Command). The Air Matériel Command was headquartered in Bandung, Jawa Barat Province, and the Air Training Command was in Surabaya, Jawa Timur Province. Indonesia's air operations were divided into two area commands, with Jakarta being the east/west dividing point. The largest of the operational commands was Ko-Op II, headquartered in Ujungpandang, Sulawesi Selatan Province, and responsible for all air force operations east of Jakarta (including Kalimantan). Ko-Op I, headquartered in Jakarta, covered air force operations west of Jakarta. The National Air Defense Command, also headquartered in Jakarta, had operational control over all fighter and counterinsurgency aircraft.

Most of the major weapons systems operated by the air force were manufactured in the United States and consisted of the C-130 Hercules, OV-10F Bronco, F-5E Tiger II, and A-4E Skyhawk (see table 33, Appendix). The air force also operated several B-737 aircraft for maritime reconnaissance. In 1990 the air force took delivery of the twelve F-16 Fighting Falcons purchased from the United States, which were based at Iswahyudi Air Base, Jawa Timur Province. During the modernization period of the 1980s, the air force also purchased the Automated Logistics Management System (ALMS) from the United States to upgrade its ability to track and requisition spare parts and materials.

In 1980 the air force enunciated a forward defense strategy that required building or upgrading air bases throughout Indonesia as well as main bases on Java. Most of those upgrades involved civilian airfields also used by the air force. A major upgrade at Ranai Air Base on Natuna Island provided a base for improved surveillance of the South China Sea. Iswahyudi Air Base was upgraded to enable it to handle modern jet fighter aircraft. In 1992, most airfield upgrade programs had been started but most combat aircraft were still based on Java. The exception was one squadron of A-4 aircraft at Pekanbaru Air Base, Riau Province, and another at Hasanuddin Air Base near Ujungpandang.

Pilots generally began flight instruction in propeller-driven T-34 Turbo-Mentors. A squadron of British Aerospace T-53 Hawks was used for advanced training. However, competition with higher paying civilian airlines led to a continuing shortfall of pilots and
 Elite air force paratroopers report to senior military officer. Their Puma military helicopter waits in the background. Courtesy Embassy of Indonesia, Washington

aviation support personnel. To remedy the situation, the air force announced in 1981 that male and female senior high school graduates would be accepted for expense-free training as short-term aviation officers. Graduates of the two-year program would serve ten years in the air force and then be released to find employment in the civilian sphere.

The National Police

Since 1945 Indonesia’s National Police organization has been a national force, financed, directed, and organized by the central government. The strength of the national police force in 1992 was around 180,000. Its main duties were to maintain public order and security. Like the other armed services, the police considered themselves to be a social force active in national development, and therefore they participated in the armed services’ civic missions.

The commander bore the title of police chief and was the highest ranking uniformed police officer in the nation. He was assisted by a deputy police chief. Police headquarters in Jakarta included a staff and several separate administrative bodies that handled specialized police functions. The police had its own territorial organization made up of seventeen jurisdictions, each of which was known
as a Police Regional Command (Polda). Each Polda was administratively subdivided at the district, subdistrict, and village level. Polda Metrojaya, which had responsibility for the metropolitan Jakarta area, was subdivided into precincts, sections, and police posts. It was commonly referred to as the Jakarta Raya Metropolitan Regional Police.

Each Polda had its headquarters in a provincial capital and was assigned police units varying in strength and composition according to the needs dictated by the characteristics of the area. These forces were organized as city police forces or rural units and were under the operational command of the Polda commander, who in turn was directly responsible to national police headquarters. All police elements were charged with supporting the local government in their areas.

Functionally, the police were organized into a number of specialized elements. The largest of these was the uniformed police, which included both the general police, who performed conventional police duties relating to the control and prevention of crime and protection of property, and the traffic police, who patrolled the nation’s roadways and supervised the licensing of drivers and the registration of motor vehicles. Also part of the uniformed force were the women police, who specialized in social matters and the welfare of women and children. Elite units of special police were employed to enforce order in terrorist situations beyond the capability of the regular forces. These units were better armed and more mobile than the general police and lived in separate barracks under more rigid discipline. These police wore the same uniform as other police but were distinguished by special badges.

A small unit of Sea and Air Police patrolled the national waters and airspace, providing tactical aid to other elements by regulating traffic, guarding against smuggling and the theft of fish, and supplying transport. The unit was also active in disaster relief. Its equipment included a few helicopters and light airplanes and various small seacraft.

Plainclothes police were assigned primary responsibility for criminal investigations, especially in complex cases or in cases involving several jurisdictions. They also handled forensics, intelligence, security, and the technical aspects of crime fighting, such as fingerprinting and identification.

One of the oldest National Police units was the Mobile Brigade, formed in late 1945. It was originally assigned the tasks of disarming remnants of the Japanese Imperial Army and protecting the chief of state and the capital city. It fought in the revolution, and its troops took part in the military confrontation with Malaysia in
the early 1960s and in the conflict in East Timor in the mid-1970s.
In 1981 the Mobile Brigade spawned a new unit called the Explo-
sive Ordnance Devices Unit.

In 1992 the Mobile Brigade was essentially a paramilitary organi-
ization trained and organized on military lines. It had a strength
of about 12,000. The brigade was used primarily as an elite corps
for emergencies, aiding in police operations that required units to
take quick action. The unit was employed in domestic security and
defense operations and was issued special riot-control equipment.
Elements of the force were also trained for airborne operations.

Police recruits were volunteers. Applicants were required to have
at least a sixth-grade education and to pass a competitive exami-
nation. Other qualifications included physical fitness and good
moral character. After three years' service as ordinary police, per-
sonnel with junior secondary-school diplomas could enter train-
ing to become NCOs. Those with three years' experience as NCOs
were eligible for further training to enable them to become candi-
date officers and eventually enter the officer corps. Most higher
ranking officers entered the force as graduates of the Police Divi-
sion of Akabri.

Advanced training in vocational and technical subjects was avail-
able for regular police, for NCOs, and for officers. Promotions were
often based on performance in advanced education. The Police
Command and Staff School offered advanced training to police
officers assigned to command units at the subdistrict, district, and
Polda level. Training there focused on administration and logistics.

Conditions of Service

Compensation of all ABRI personnel was on a sliding scale
according to rank and was uniform throughout the country and
among the services. It included, for both officers and enlisted per-
sonnel, housing for married personnel of appropriate rank, sub-
sistence items and rations paid in kind, and a variety of allowances
in addition to base pay.

Compensation for military personnel has increased considera-
bly since the 1970s, both in separate allowances, such as basic food
allowances, and in basic pay. Military compensation, especially
for lower ranking or nontechnically trained personnel, was believed
to compare favorably with compensation in the civilian sector when
extra allotments were figured in. Pay raises for the military
paralleled raises for the entire civil service.

Officers' tours of duty were officially established at three years,
but these limits were not strictly observed. Retirement age was man-
datory for enlisted personnel at age forty-two and for officers at
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fifty-five. However, the president had the authority to grant an unlimited number of extensions on active duty of one year, usually to officers in key posts of the armed forces leadership. Officers were eligible for small pensions at age forty-eight and those failing promotion to lieutenant colonel had to retire at that time. Two years before their retirement, personnel could be placed on preretirement status in which they drew full pay and allowances while they began to develop civilian careers. Higher level retired personnel often worked in the government, in military-owned businesses, and in industry. Many lower ranking members were offered land under the government's Transmigration Program (see Glossary) or were given vocational training (see Migration, ch. 2; Economic Benefits and the Transmigration Program, ch. 3).

Women in the Armed Forces

Each branch of ABRI had a women's component in 1992. There was the Women's Army Corps, the Navy Women's Corps, the Air Force Women's Corps, and the Women's Corps of the Police. According to official publications, women members of the armed forces were "set to work at places and in functions conform[ing] to their feminine disposition." More specifically, women were assigned to administrative work, to teaching English, and to working on improving health and social conditions of armed forces members and their families. The women police were said to "play an important role in solving problems [of] drug addicts and juvenile delinquents."

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

Grade and rank structure was standard throughout the three military services and the police. It corresponded to that common to most military systems, with minor deviations. No formal class of warrant officers existed between the enlisted and commissioned hierarchies. The first and second assistant lieutenants ranks were being gradually phased out, and the two levels of officer candidate—calon perwira—were converted to NCO status. Changes announced in 1991 added two steps to enlisted ranks: chief private and chief corporal (see fig. 17; fig. 18).

One title unique to Indonesia is panglima, a traditional heroic rank revived during the National Revolution. Although panglima is often translated as commander, it carries a higher connotation of honor and power. Its bearers, usually flag officers of various ranks, derive enhanced personal status from serving as panglima. In the 1980s, tradition evolved to limit the title panglima to the
National Security

ABRI commander in chief and the commanders of Kostrad and the ten Kodams.

Uniforms of the four services were distinguished by color and style, with variations in headgear and other details distinguishing some elite troops, who wore various colors of berets. Army working and ceremonial uniforms were olive drab and those of the police, dark brown. Air force and navy uniforms were medium blue and navy blue, respectively. Rank insignia were standardized among the services. In ceremonial and service dress, officers wore rank insignia on the shoulder epaulet. Field uniform insignia were moved in 1991 from the front of the fatigue shirt to the collar tip. Rank insignia were worn on the sleeves for NCOs and enlisted personnel.

Foreign Military Relations

Consistent with its foreign policy of nonalignment, Indonesia maintained no defense pacts with foreign nations. It did, however, have military aid agreements with the United States and various other nations and participated in combined military exercises with several other countries. Over the years, Indonesia also supplied troop contingents—some involving either military or police personnel or both—to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces sent to the Suez Canal-Sinai Peninsula area (1957 and 1973–79), Congo (the former name for Zaire, 1960–64), the Iran-Iraq border (1988–90), Namibia (1989–90), and the Kuwait-Iraq border (1991). In 1991 new UN support missions were sent to Cambodia and Somalia (see Indonesia, ASEAN, and the Third Indochina War, ch. 4).

Indonesia is a member of ASEAN, and although the organization is not a defense alliance, military cooperation existed between Indonesia and its ASEAN partners. This cooperation was conducted on a frequent and bilateral basis and included exchanges of military representatives at national defense institutions, periodic security consultations, and a series of separate bilateral combined military exercises. Following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979, ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Bali pledged their nations' support for the security of each of the other ASEAN nations, but stopped short of discussing the creation of a military alliance. The Cambodian peace accords of 1991 reduced tensions considerably. Moreover, there was a feeling of admiration for Vietnam's armed forces on the part of senior Indonesian military officers, particularly the powerful General Murdani. Murdani and others found much in common between the Vietnamese and Indonesian armed forces. They alone in Southeast Asia had fought against colonial powers for their independence, and both had based much of their
* Marine insignia are same as for navy officers; marine rank titles are same as for army officers.

**Figure 17. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1992**
Figure 18. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1992

* Marine insignia are same as for navy personnel; marine rank titles are same as for army personnel.
military doctrine on the tenets of guerrilla warfare. It was this perceived relationship between Indonesian and Vietnamese military leaders that gave Indonesia the impetus to assume an influential role in the Cambodian peace settlement process. The Indonesian government continued to stress that defense cooperation among ASEAN nations was a function of each nation’s right to protect itself and that bilateral cooperation would not lead to any bilateral or ASEAN-wide defense pact. Indonesia continued to support normalization of Vietnam’s relationship with Western nations, particularly the United States.

Indonesia has also held combined military exercises with non-ASEAN nations, including Australia, Britain, France, India, New Zealand, and the United States. During the 1980s, defense officials suggested that joint border patrols might be set up with Papua New Guinea, and the two countries signed a status-of-forces agreement in January 1992. Indonesian troops sometimes crossed the border from Irian Jaya Province into Papua New Guinea in pursuit of armed insurgents.

Indonesia has maintained military assistance agreements with several countries. It received funded security assistance from the United States every year since 1950 except 1965 and 1966 when relations were at a low ebb. Grant aid of military equipment, which ended in 1978, averaged US$13 million per year and was used mainly for logistics equipment, communications systems, and combat matériel for internal security. The United States also provided grant aid training under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program between 1950 and 1992, when the United States Congress cut the aid as a reaction to the human rights situation in East Timor. In that forty-two-year period, more than 4,000 Indonesian military personnel received IMET training in the United States. United States Foreign Military Sales credits were made available periodically to Indonesia starting in 1974, and have helped defray the expenses of purchases of United States-made military equipment. As of the early 1990s, Indonesia had also received military aid from Australia, Britain, France, the Netherlands, and West Germany, among others. Indonesia also acquired equipment from the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and, although most of it was inoperative by the 1970s, Jakarta continued to make payments to Moscow after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991.

**Security and Intelligence Agencies**

Only very general information has been made public regarding the organization and activities of Indonesia’s intelligence and security bodies. However, a major change in the status of security and
intelligence appeared to have occurred as a result of the 1985 military reorganization. Prior to that time, the foremost intelligence agency was the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib), which focused primarily on mounting internal security operations and collecting intelligence data.

Kopkamtib was established in late 1965 in the wake of the attempted communist coup of that year. Its original function was to purge from the government and the armed forces PKI members and others suspected of complicity with the communists. By the late 1960s, that task had been largely completed. In early 1969, however, Kopkamtib was given new life by a presidential decree that provided it an organizational basis closely interwoven with Hankam. Kopkamtib was assigned a mandate on all matters concerning internal security as defined in its widest sense and quickly began to exercise sweeping powers of supervision over the national political life, using the army's territorial forces as its main operational units. By the early 1970s, Kopkamtib had become a large and powerful body that concerned itself with the activities of every political and social organization in the nation; its powers of interrogation, arrest, and detention were not subject to the regular criminal justice system.

As part of the 1985 armed forces reorganization, Kopkamtib was eliminated and its widespread powers were reorganized into the Coordinating Agency for National Stability (Bakorstanas). Unlike Kopkamtib, the new agency did not have a separate staff, but instead relied upon the operational chain of command for national security matters. The elimination of Kopkamtib reflected both a consolidation of the national security situation and a streamlined intelligence and security apparatus able to operate within the reorganized armed forces structure. The key organizations in the revised Bakorstanas system were the ten army Kodams and the two intelligence agencies, the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Bakin) and the Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency (Bais). Bakorstanas relied on the regular staffs of those organizations for its manpower.

The Bakorstanas system reinforced the power of the ten Kodam commanders, forming a new coordinating body in each of the country's twenty-seven provincial-level jurisdictions. This body was called the Regional Security Council (Muspida). The provincial governor served as chairman of the Muspida within his geographical area, but the Kodam and Korem commanders exerted great influence. Other Muspida members were the provincial or regional chief of police, the provincial assembly chairman, and the senior air force and navy officers in the province or region (if present).
The Muspida system was replicated at the district (kabupaten) and subdistrict (kecamatan) levels, with the army Korem and Kodim commanders serving as lower level Muspida chairmen (see Local Government, ch. 4).

Also eliminated in 1985 was the Special Operations Service (Opsus), which formerly compiled political intelligence and was sometimes used by the president to conduct delicate foreign diplomatic assignments. Opsus was originally a combat intelligence unit set up by Suharto during the Irian Barat campaign of 1963-66. For many years, it was headed by the late Ali Murtopo, a close confidante of the president who also served as the minister of information (see The Political Parties, ch. 4). Ali Murtopo and Opsus were identified with the implementation of the Act of Free Choice, through which the Irian Barat became a province of Indonesia in 1969. Opsus was also involved in negotiations with Portugal regarding East Timor in the mid-1970s (see The New Order Under Suharto, ch. 1).

In 1992 the central intelligence-gathering body was Bakin, which studied both domestic and foreign intelligence gathered by its own personnel as well as by the army and the police. Bakin was directly under the control of the president and maintained its own communications network outside the civilian and military administrations. In 1992 Bakin was headed by an army lieutenant general. Armed forces officers were sometimes seconded to Bakin for special duties. It was probable that Bakin, responsible for intelligence gathering relating to defense matters, was strengthened considerably under the reorganization and operated many of the security and intelligence functions under the Bakorstanas system that were formerly performed by Kopkamtib.

In the early 1990s, Bais was ABRI’s agency for intelligence collection relating to external defense and internal security, processing, and operational functions. After the elimination of Kopkamtib, Bais received a major infusion of personnel, funds, and power. The head of Bais for many years, Murdani, served concurrently through 1983 as head of the Hankam intelligence staff, deputy chief of Bakin, and armed forces commander in chief. Like Ali Murtopo and Suharto himself, Murdani had served as an officer in Kostrad in the 1960s. Only when the minister and commander in chief posts were separated after the 1985 reorganization, with Murdani retaining only the ministerial portfolio, did he give up his Bais and Bakin posts. The reorganization eliminated the chance for one man to hold so many powerful posts at the same time. After the reorganization, the ABRI commander in chief acted as the chief of Bais,
but its day-to-day operations were directed by an army major general in the post of deputy chief.

The Criminal Justice System

The nation's criminal jurisprudence and its institutions of criminal justice derive from Indonesia's experience as an independent state, from the European tradition, and from the Dutch colonial period. The criminal law is one of three systems of law in operation in the nation since the nineteenth century, the other two being a system of European-derived commercial codes and a civil law based on customary law (adat), which included Islamic law (sharia, in Indonesian syaria—see Glossary; see Islam, ch. 2). The criminal law is the only one of these three systems that was essentially codified and applied uniformly throughout the national territory. Criminal justice was administered through a system that included a hierarchy of trial and appellate courts, a prosecutory arm of the national government, and an independent bar.

Several factors limited the actual use of these formal legal channels in dealing with activity defined as criminal. Owing in large part to a general shortage of trained legal personnel, the infrastructure of the criminal justice system was more extensive in urban locales and on Java than in rural or remote areas. In any case, its procedures often did not apply to military, security, and intelligence organizations, which in practice sometimes dealt with both political and ordinary crime. Moreover, Indonesians did not always resort to the formal legal system to resolve their conflicts because many did not share Western views regarding the nature of individual rights and the efficacy of law and procedural justice, but rather preferred to settle disputes by arbitration or accommodation. Retribution and revenge, however, were still popular ways of settling disputes in the early 1990s, especially away from the big cities and towns.

In rural areas, many conflicts, including some (mostly minor) criminal cases, continued to be settled by village chiefs. Even in towns and cities, complaints were not often filed with authorities, and cases were frequently settled out of court in order to save time and money or to avoid attracting public or official attention. In criminal cases, such settlements typically entailed accommodation between the accused and the police or prosecutors, whose roles in the criminal justice system were generally more critical than those of courts or judges. Wealth and status were apt to be important factors in the outcome.
Crime and Political Offenses

Like many countries, Indonesia experienced rising crime as a by-product of increased urbanization and the social and economic dislocations associated with national development. The scope of the crime problem was difficult to gauge, but conditions such as large numbers of unemployed or underemployed in the nation's cities, lack of sufficient jobs for high school and university graduates, and a breakdown in traditional systems of social control were often cited as responsible for the increase in crime. During the 1980s, the government sometimes resorted to extrajudicial means to control a perceived increase in crime, especially in urban areas. The government's clandestine "Petrus" operation in Java in the early 1980s is the best known. Specifically approved by Suharto and directed by the army's special forces, the Petrus campaign was directed at known criminals involved in robbery, rape, murder, and other violence. Public opinion approved of the operation, which was characterized by collection of detailed intelligence on targeted criminals and condoning of nighttime shootings. Public reports lacked details, but few if any innocent bystanders were killed by Petrus. It was thought that a similar operation was conducted against suspected criminals and radical separatists in Aceh in early 1991, but the government refused comment on the operation. By the early 1990s, the actual number of crimes increased only moderately from year to year. Both the authorities and the public, however, were concerned about their increasingly violent nature.

Under Indonesian law, certain categories of crime were handled under special statutes outside the penal code. Offenses such as bribery, the assessment of illegal "levies," and the diversion of public funds for private use by business figures or officials formed a special class of crime usually handled under a 1955 statute on economic crimes and a 1971 statute on corruption. Political offenses and acts that Indonesian authorities regarded as threats to national security were usually prosecuted under Presidential Decree Number 11 of 1963 concerning the eradication of subversive activities. Promulgated as a statute in 1969, it granted far-reaching authority in dealing with almost any act that did not conform to government policy and carried a maximum penalty of death.

The special statutes also contained special procedures that differed in important respects from those in the Criminal Procedures Code. Thus, for example, while the code stated that a suspect could be held only a maximum of 120 days before being brought to trial, the subversion law allowed suspects to be held up to one year.
The most prominent use of the special procedures regarding political offenses involved Kopkamtib's mass arrests and detention of some 200,000 persons in connection with the 1965 coup attempt, most of whom were never charged or tried. These prisoners were classified as group A, B, or C, according to the government's perception of how deeply they had been involved in the events of 1965 or in any of the banned organizations, including the PKI. The last 30,000 of those persons still not brought to trial were released between December 1977 and December 1979. Some PKI members were sentenced to death in the mid-1960s and remained in prison for years while their cases went through the appeals process. Several of these prisoners were executed as late as 1990. Only a handful of those convicted in connection with the coup were still in custody in 1992, although some 36,000 were still barred from voting, and 1.4 million former PKI members were closely monitored by Kopkamtib's successor organization, Bakorstanas.

**Criminal Law**

The Indonesian criminal code in force since independence is basically the Netherlands Indies Criminal Code, which was put into effect in 1918. It incorporates certain amendments promulgated by the revolutionary government in 1946. Since 1958 it has been applied uniformly throughout the national territory.

The Code of Criminal Law is contained in three chapters. Chapter I defines the terms and procedures to be followed in criminal cases and specifies mitigating circumstances that may affect the severity of a sentence. Chapters II and III, respectively, define the categories of felonies and misdemeanors and prescribe the penalties for each type of offense. The distinction between felonies and misdemeanors generally conforms to that in Western countries. As noted above, several other statutes dealing with criminal offenses were also in force, the most significant of which were laws concerning economic offenses, subversive activities, and corruption.

As of 1992, penalties for major offenses included death, imprisonment for periods up to life, local detention, and fines. Total confiscation of property was not permitted. Penalties for minor crimes and misdemeanors included deprivation of specified rights, forfeiture of personal property, and publication of the sentence of the court. Punishments listed in the code were the maximum allowable; judges had discretionary authority to impose lesser punishment. A public drive for the abolition of the death penalty was launched in 1980 following the execution of two persons convicted of murder. In 1992, however, the death penalty remained in force.
Because of widespread complaints about the penal code, which many regarded as a colonial legacy ill-adapted either to Indonesian cultural norms or to modern criminal offenses, a committee began working in the early 1980s on a complete revision. The committee was expected to finish its work in early 1993. The draft would then have to be approved by the minister of justice and submitted to the DPR for passage into law, a process not expected to be completed until mid-1993, assuming no major controversy arose over the draft law.

The proposed new code was likely to eliminate the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors and to pay greater deference to adat in the handling of certain crimes. Although not likely to replace the special subversion law, the proposed code attempted to describe offenses against the state with more specificity. It was also likely to recommend that prisoners who committed crimes because of personal conviction, such as political offenses, be treated differently from common criminals. Whereas two-thirds of the crimes detailed were expected to be the same as in the old code, the new penal code was expected to cover new classes of offenses such as computer crime.

A new Code of Criminal Procedures was promulgated on December 31, 1981. The new code replaced a 1941 revision of an 1848 Dutch colonial regulation that stipulated legal procedures to be used in both criminal and civil cases. Both national jurists and government officials had complained that statutory ambiguity in the old code and certain of its provisions in some cases had led to abuses of authority by law enforcement and judicial officials. Under the old system, several authorities, including the police, the regional military commands, and the public prosecutors, shared powers of arrest, detention, and interrogation—an often confusing situation that sometimes led plaintiffs to file complaints with the particular agency they believed would deal most favorably with their case. Individuals could be arrested and detained on suspicion alone, and there were broad limits on how long a suspect could be held before being charged or brought to trial. Moreover, the accused could request legal counsel only when his case was submitted to a judge and not during any pretrial proceedings.

The new code represents a considerable step forward in the establishment of clear norms of procedural justice. Criminal investigatory powers are vested mainly in the police. A suspect can be held only twenty-four hours before the investigating officials present their charges and obtain a detention order from a judge. Specific limits are established on how long a suspect can be held before a trial. The new code expressly grants the accused the right to learn
the charges against him or her, to be examined immediately by investigating officials, and to have the case referred to a prosecutor, submitted to court, and tried before a judge. The accused also has the right to obtain legal counsel at all levels of the proceedings. Should it turn out that a person has been wrongly charged or detained under the new code, he or she has the right to sue for compensation and for the restoration of rights and status.

In practice, the new criminal procedures code did not always live up to its promise. Prohibitions against mistreatment and arbitrary detention, for example, were sometimes ignored, as were guarantees regarding adequate defense counsel. This was especially true, as noted by outside jurists, in political cases. In addition, the 1981 code was supposed to apply to all criminal cases, with a temporary exception made for special laws on subversion and treason that contain their own procedures for prosecution; these special laws had not been brought under the provisions of the new code as of 1992.

The Administration of Criminal Justice

The prosecutory function rested with the attorney general, who held the position of supreme public prosecutor. The attorney general occupied a cabinet-level post separate from that of the minister of justice, both of whom reported directly to the president. In 1992 the Attorney General’s Office included 27 provincial-level prosecutors’ offices and 296 district prosecutors’ offices.

The public prosecutor’s principal functions were to examine charges of felonious conduct or misdemeanors brought by individuals or other parties, and then either to dismiss a charge or to refer it for trial to the state court having jurisdiction. The prosecutor’s office was also responsible for presenting the case against the accused in court and for executing the sentence of the court.

The matter of control over the conduct of the preliminary investigation has had a history of contention between the prosecuting authorities and the police going back to the late 1940s and early 1950s. Practice under the old code of criminal procedure evidently rested on working agreements between the two services, under which the police, in principle, conducted primary investigations but deferred to the prosecutor whenever the latter asked to undertake the investigation. Under the new code of criminal procedure, a clear division was made between the investigatory function, which was given solely to the police, and the prosecution function, which remained with the prosecutor’s office. The only exception was in the case of "special crimes," a category which was not further defined but which was believed to be reserved for unusually sensitive
Indonesia's penal system was administered by the Department of Corrections within the Department of Justice and included three categories of prisons based mainly on the number of inmates they could hold. The nine largest, or Class I prisons, held prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment or death.

A 1990 study of Indonesian prison conditions conducted by Asia Watch found conditions harsh in most cases. Poor food, unsanitary conditions, and inadequate medical care were common, as were
National Security

mistreatment and corruption. Overcrowding in ancient and inadequate facilities also occurred. The study noted the need for better training of prison personnel and renovation of prison facilities.

Several specialized prisons for women and two for youths were located in Java. Where it was not possible to confine such prisoners in separate institutions, as was usually the case outside of Java, efforts were made to segregate juvenile from adult offenders and females from males in separate sections of the same institution. Ordinarily, prisoners were permitted visits by family members and could receive limited amounts of food and other articles to supplement the minimal supplies they were issued. Under some circumstances, prisoners were permitted to spend their nights at home. Most prisons tried to provide medical service of some kind, although it was generally regarded as inadequate.

Rehabilitation provisions included literacy classes, moral and religious training, and workshops to teach crafts and skills. Some prisons operated small industries or agricultural enterprises that sold their products on the local market. Proceeds were used to pay a small wage to the working inmates, to buy recreational equipment, and to maintain buildings and grounds. In some prisons, inmates worked in fields outside the prison confines.

Although regular prisons often housed both convicted criminals and political prisoners, the latter were kept isolated from other prisoners. Political prisoners were also held in Kodam headquarters and in separate labor camps and detention facilities staffed by military personnel.

Between 1969 and 1979, Kopkamtib ran a separate penal colony on Buru Island for Group B prisoners, who were convicted on charges of indirect involvement in the 1965 attempted coup. In late 1979, following the nationwide release of Group B prisoners, the penal colony on Buru Island was closed and the island was designated a transmigration site.

Many released prisoners faced problems in reintegrating themselves into society because families were often shamed by the prisoner’s incarceration or feared they would be discriminated against by officials or neighbors should they continue association with the released prisoners. In 1981 the nation’s first prisoner’s aid society was privately formed in Jakarta to help released prisoners overcome some of these difficulties and to find employment. Released political prisoners detained in connection with the 1965 attempted coup encountered particular problems upon their return to society. Their identification cards, which all Indonesians carry, had special markings indicating their status. Former political prisoners were denied employment in the civil service, the armed
forces, and in essential industries. They were able to vote but could not hold any elected office. In some parts of the country, they were required to check in regularly with local authorities and to inform them of their movements.

**Narcotics and Counternarcotics Operations**

Although production of narcotics, particularly opiate-derived products from the Golden Triangle in the Thai-Burmese-Lao border area, substantially increased during the late 1980s, Indonesia did not become either a major producer or user of illicit drugs. There was, however, considerable concern on the part of the national leadership and police officials that Indonesia might become an important drug trafficking center as major drug routes in mainland Southeast Asia shifted to take advantage of Indonesia's relatively innocuous reputation. The booming tourist destination of Bali provided a base for individual traffickers and transactions. Although there was no extradition treaty between the United States and Indonesia, Indonesian authorities were cooperative in deporting drug suspects, particularly if the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) was involved. During 1991, for example, a suspected American drug trafficker was deported to the United States with the cooperation of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, the Indonesian National Police, and Interpol. In addition, periodic police campaigns in the Special Region of Aceh and Sumatera Utara Province, which were the country's leading producers of marijuana (much of it used for local cooking and consumption), targeted marijuana fields in joint police/military eradication operations.

The criminal justice system was still evolving in the early 1990s, and was particularly under national and international scrutiny because of intense interest in the prosecution of civilians charged with criminal or subversive actions in the East Timor incident (see National Defense and Internal Security, this ch.). Those trials, which were monitored by the international press and foreign diplomats stationed in Indonesia, were judged to have been smoothly run. The trials illustrated the close relationship in Indonesia between the larger issues of internal security and national defense and Indonesia's criminal justice system.

* * *

Several works treat the development of the Indonesian armed forces before 1970, the most balanced and comprehensive being Ulf Sundhaussen's *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics*
1956-1967. Ernst Utrecht's *The Indonesian Army* offers a very detailed and often critical view from the perspective of a former insider. Ruth T. McVey's two-part "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army" focuses mainly on the military's shortcomings in its early years. *An Indonesian Tragedy* by Brian May and *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* by Harold A. Crouch are more concerned with the causes and effects of the 1965 coup; they also evaluate the armed forces in a somewhat negative light. *The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia*, a collection of essays by ABRI's former official historian, Nugroho Notosusanto, presents the viewpoint of the armed forces and the government regarding ABRI's development, its role, and its doctrine. Several works by Harold W. Maynard provide the most comprehensive look at Indonesian military organization, the dwifungsi concept, and the role of the military in Indonesian society.

Current reportage is available in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* [Hong Kong] and in the periodically updated "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," compiled in Cornell University's journal *Indonesia*. Data on the size and composition of the armed forces are collected by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in its annual publication, *The Military Balance*, and in the annual United States Department of Defense *Congressional Presentation Document*.

Annual reports by Amnesty International and Asia Watch examine the state of human rights practices in Indonesia, as does the annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* prepared for the United States Congress by the Department of State. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
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### Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When you know</th>
<th>Multiply by</th>
<th>To find</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millimeters</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centimeters</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilometers</td>
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<td>miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hectares (10,000 m²)</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square kilometers</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>square miles</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cubic meters</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>cubic feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liters</td>
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<td>gallons</td>
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<td>Kilograms</td>
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<td>pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metric tons</td>
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<td>long tons</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>short tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td>pounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)</td>
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<td>degrees Fahrenheit</td>
</tr>
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<td>(and add 32)</td>
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### Table 2. Climatic Statistics, Selected Stations, 1990

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Precipitation (in millimeters)</th>
<th>Temperature (in degrees Celsius)</th>
<th>Humidity (average relative, in percentages)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banda Aceh</td>
<td>250 *</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banjarmasin</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dili</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jayapura</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mataram</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medan</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>33.6</td>
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<td>Palembang</td>
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<td>23.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
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<td>Semarang</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surabaya</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ujungpandang</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>33.7</td>
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\* 1989 data.

## Table 3. Population Growth and Density, Selected Years, 1920–90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population (in thousands)</th>
<th>Growth Rate (during previous decade)</th>
<th>Density (per square kilometer)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>49,344</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>60,593</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>70,112</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>76,571</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>97,019</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>119,208</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>147,490</td>
<td>2.32</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>179,379</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>93</td>
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n.a.—not available.

Table 4. Area, Population, and Density by Provincial-Level Unit, 1980 and 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial-Level Unit</th>
<th>Area (in square kilometers)</th>
<th>Population (in thousands)</th>
<th>Density (per square kilometer)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>55,392</td>
<td>2,611</td>
<td>3,416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>5,561</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>2,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>21,168</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>1,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya</td>
<td>421,981</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>1,641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>6,503</td>
<td>8,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>44,800</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>2,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawa Barat</td>
<td>46,300</td>
<td>2,470</td>
<td>2,778</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jawa Tengah</td>
<td>34,206</td>
<td>25,373</td>
<td>28,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawa Timur</td>
<td>47,921</td>
<td>29,189</td>
<td>32,504</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Barat</td>
<td>146,760</td>
<td>2,486</td>
<td>3,239</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Selatan</td>
<td>37,660</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>2,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Tengah</td>
<td>152,600</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1,396</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Timur</td>
<td>202,440</td>
<td>1,218</td>
<td>1,877</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>33,307</td>
<td>4,625</td>
<td>6,006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>74,505</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>1,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Barat</td>
<td>20,177</td>
<td>2,725</td>
<td>3,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Timur</td>
<td>47,876</td>
<td>2,737</td>
<td>3,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>94,561</td>
<td>2,169</td>
<td>3,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Selatan</td>
<td>72,781</td>
<td>6,062</td>
<td>6,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Tengah</td>
<td>69,726</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>1,711</td>
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<td>27,686</td>
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<td>1,350</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19,023</td>
<td>2,115</td>
<td>2,479</td>
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<tr>
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<td>49,778</td>
<td>3,407</td>
<td>3,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Selatan</td>
<td>103,688</td>
<td>4,630</td>
<td>6,277</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sumatera Utara</td>
<td>70,787</td>
<td>8,361</td>
<td>10,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Timur</td>
<td>14,874</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>2,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
<td>1,919,317</td>
<td>147,490</td>
<td>179,379</td>
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</table>

### Table 5. Religious Affiliation, 1980 and 1985  
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985 *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1985 was the last year for which total figures on religious affiliation were made available by the Indonesian government.

### Table 6. Religious Affiliation by Provincial-Level Unit, 1991
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial-Level Unit</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
<th>Catholic</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Buddhist</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aceh</td>
<td>97.75</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>93.18</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>97.38</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irian Jaya</td>
<td>14.90</td>
<td>64.30</td>
<td>20.70</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jakarta</td>
<td>84.83</td>
<td>5.94</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>92.16</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawa Barat</td>
<td>97.70</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawa Tengah</td>
<td>95.50</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawa Timur</td>
<td>96.70</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Barat</td>
<td>54.02</td>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>14.87</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Selatan</td>
<td>97.61</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Tengah</td>
<td>67.70</td>
<td>15.40</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>15.80</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Timur</td>
<td>85.68</td>
<td>9.54</td>
<td>4.01</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>94.40</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>54.80</td>
<td>40.90</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Barat</td>
<td>95.90</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Timur</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>27.60</td>
<td>54.20</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>87.30</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Selatan</td>
<td>88.40</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Tengah</td>
<td>76.00</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Tenggara</td>
<td>98.00</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Utara</td>
<td>44.10</td>
<td>49.10</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Barat</td>
<td>97.90</td>
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<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Selatan</td>
<td>94.30</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Utara</td>
<td>63.22</td>
<td>27.96</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor Timur</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>91.40</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogyakarta</td>
<td>91.20</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

— means negligible.

1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. The source of the information used in this table did not provide totals. The last year for which total figures on religious affiliation were made available by the Indonesian government is 1985.

2 No “other” category was reported. The figure represents the estimated difference between the total of the other religions and 100 percent when data provided by the source did not add to 100.

Table 7. Participation in Popular Culture Activities, 1987
(in percentages of population ten years of age and over on weekly basis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Watching television</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Listening to radio</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participating in social organizations</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playing or watching sports</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reading newspapers and magazines</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attending cultural performances</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching motion pictures</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 8. Principal Ethnic Groups by Island, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Island or Island Group *</th>
<th>Island or Region</th>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Sumatra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acehnese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angkola</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gayo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karo</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klucet Alas</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandailing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pak-pak</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simlungeng</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singkil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toba</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Sumatra</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerinci</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melayu</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minangkabau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rejang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sumatra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Komering</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islands southwest of Sumatra</td>
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<td>Simeulue</td>
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<td>Nias</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mentawai</td>
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</table>

### Table 8.—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Island or Island Group *</th>
<th>Major Island or Island Group *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Island or Region</td>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusa Tenggara (continued)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leti</td>
<td>Leti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leti</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lombok</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balinese</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Pantar</td>
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<td>Blagar</td>
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<td>Lama</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nedebang</td>
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<td>Tewa</td>
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<tr>
<td>Roti</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Roti</td>
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<td>Savu</td>
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<td>Kodi</td>
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<td>Laboya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mamboru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanukaka</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weyewa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumbawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bima</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumbawa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atoni</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Galoli</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kemak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makasai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mambai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tukudede</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeastern Kalimantan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apokayan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bajau</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dusun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modang</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murut</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tidung</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Kalimantan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakumpai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biatah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukar Sadong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dohoi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iban</td>
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### Sulawesi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northern Sulawesi</th>
<th>Bintarna</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bola’ang Mongondow</td>
<td>Gorontalo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaidipang</td>
<td>Minahasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongondow</td>
<td>Tombulu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tondano</td>
<td>Tonsawang</td>
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<td>Tonsea</td>
<td>Tontemboan</td>
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### Table 8.—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Island or Island Group *</th>
<th>Major Island or Island Group *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Island or Region</td>
<td>Island or Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
<td>Ethnic Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Sulawesi (continued)**
  - Nuaulu
  - Sepa-Teluti
  - Watubela
  - Wemale
  - Sula
  - Sula
  - Taliabo
  - Taliabo
  - Tanimbar
  - Tanimbar

- **Maluku Islands**
  - Ambon
    - Ambonese
    - Kola
    - Ujir
    - Wokam
  - Aru
    - Kola
    - Ujir
  - Banda
    - Bandanese
    - Biak
    - Biak
    - Biak
    - Wokam
  - Buru
    - Buru
    - Halmahera
      - Galela
      - Kalabra
      - Loloda
      - Modole
      - Pagu
      - Sahu
      - Tehit
      - Tobaru
      - Tobelo
    - Kai
      - Kai
      - Makian
      - Makian
      - Seram
      - Alune
      - Geser
      - Hitu
      - Manusela
  - Irian Jaya
    - Asmat
    - Boazi
    - Dani
    - Dumut
    - Ekagi
    - Kermuk
    - Kilmeri
    - Kwerba
    - Marind
    - Mekwei-Gresi-Kansu
    - Mianmin
    - Moni
    - Ngali
    - Nimboran
    - Ok
    - Papasena
    - Saberi (Isirawa)
    - Sempan
    - Sentani
    - Taikat
    - Tanameerah
    - Tor
    - Uhunduni
    - Waris
    - Wodani
    - Yotafa (Tobati)

* The major islands and island groups in this list are arranged geographically, generally from west to east. The category of Coastal Malays, which includes various groups listed in this table, are people found in northern and southern Sumatra and on the coast of Kalimantan.

Table 9. Enrollment by Level of Education and Sex, 1987 and 1990 (in millions of students)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>1987 Males</th>
<th>1987 Females</th>
<th>1990 Males</th>
<th>1990 Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary school</td>
<td>12.76</td>
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<td>12.82</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior high school</td>
<td>4.72</td>
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<td>4.21</td>
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<td>Senior high school</td>
<td>2.85</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postsecondary institution</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>0.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 10. Enrollment in Private and Semiprivate Schools by Region, Level of Education, and Sex, 1985 (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Primary School Males</th>
<th>Primary School Females</th>
<th>Junior High School Males</th>
<th>Junior High School Females</th>
<th>Senior High School Males</th>
<th>Senior High School Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali and Nusa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenggara</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku and Irian Jaya</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDONESIA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on information from Mayling Oey-Gardiner, “Gender Differences in Schooling in Indonesia,” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, April 1991, 63.
### Table 11. Health Care Use by Level of Education, 1986 (rate per year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Use</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital admissions (per 1,000 persons)</td>
<td>7.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpatient visits (per person)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government hospitals</td>
<td>0.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private hospitals</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health centers</td>
<td>0.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private clinics</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramedics</td>
<td>0.084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 12. Infant Mortality Rates by Level of Education of Mother, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some primary school</td>
<td>82.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary school completed</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary and postsecondary institution</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National average</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 13. Comparative Health Care Expenditure Ratios, ASEAN Countries, Selected Years, 1981–85

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Central Government Expenditure</th>
<th>Percentage of GDP</th>
<th>Per Capita Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>140.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>23.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>6.47</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>3.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>122.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>5.69</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>8.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see Glossary).
2 GDP—gross domestic product (see Glossary).
3 In United States dollars.

### Table 14. Comparative Mortality Projections, ASEAN Countries, 1990-94 and 2000-04

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Infant Mortality (per 1,000 live births)</th>
<th>Life Expectancy at Birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN average</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Southeast Asia average</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see Glossary).
2 Of every 1,000 live births, the number that would die before their first birthday.


### Table 15. Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1982-90

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Merchandise trade</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>-17.9</td>
<td>-15.0</td>
<td>-11.9</td>
<td>-13.8</td>
<td>-16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net services</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net services</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>-3.4</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net factor income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net factor income</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transfers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfers</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current account balance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign direct investment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portfolio investment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portfolio investment</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official borrowings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official borrowings</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other borrowings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other borrowings</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capital account balance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital account balance</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Errors and omissions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Errors and omissions</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterpart items</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart items</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change in reserves (minus means increase)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in reserves</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures may not compute to balances because of rounding.

Table 16. Structure of Gross Domestic Product by Sector at Current Prices, Selected Years, 1967–89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, and fishing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm food crops</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholder plantation crops</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estate plantation crops</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total agriculture, forestry, and fishing</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and LNG</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total mining</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-oil and LNG</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil refinery</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNG</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total manufacturing</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communications</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial services</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration and defense</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(in billions of rupiahs) 4

848 3,672 45,446 89,750 166,324

Private consumption          92.7 77.2 60.5 60.2 53.4
Government consumption       7.4 9.3 10.3 10.2 9.4
Gross investment             8.0 15.8 20.9 26.0 34.7
Net exports                  -8.1 -2.2 8.3 3.5 2.5
Net factor payments          -1.1 -1.8 -4.4 -4.7 -4.9

n.a.—not available.
1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
2 Preliminary.
3 LNG—liquefied natural gas.
4 For value of the rupiah—see Glossary.

### Table 17. Structure of Gross Domestic Product by Sector at Constant Prices, Selected Years, 1967–89
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, forestry, and fishing</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communications</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ⁴</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private consumption</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government consumption</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross investment</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net exports</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-18.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Calculated in 1973 prices.
² Calculated in 1983 prices.
³ Preliminary and calculated in 1983 prices.
⁴ Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Repetia X</th>
<th>Repetia Y, 1989-92</th>
<th>Repetia V, 1990-91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979-83</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1984-88</td>
<td>38.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>29.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>25.2</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>29.7</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>24.9</td>
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</table>

**Table 18. Central Government Budget, Selected Periods, Fiscal Years 1979-92**

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<th>Repetia V, 1990-91</th>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>25.2</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
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**Revenues**

- Domestic revenues
- Oil and gas revenues
- Income tax
- Value-added and sales taxes
- Import duties
- Excise tax
- Export tax
- Land and building tax
- Other taxes
- Nontax revenues
- Total domestic revenues

**Development funds**

- Program aid
- Project aid
- Total development funds

**Total revenues**
Table 18.—Continued

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<td>16.9</td>
<td>16.2 16.1 15.3 16.3</td>
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<td>(Total expenditures as percentage of GDP)</td>
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<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.9 21.7 n.a. n.a.</td>
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</table>

n.a.—not available.
1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
2 Budget, not actual, figures.
3 For definition of value-added tax—see Glossary.
4 Derived from foreign aid and borrowing.
5 For value of the rupiah—see Glossary.
6 GDP—gross domestic product (see Glossary), based on calendar year.

Table 19. Composition of Merchandise Imports, Selected Years, 1982–90
(in percentages)

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(in billions of United States dollars) 10.8 13.9 10.7 13.2 16.4 21.8

* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

### Table 20. Composition of Merchandise Exports, Selected Years, 1982–90 (in percentages)

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</table>

(in billions of United States dollars) 22.3 21.9 14.8 19.2 22.2 25.7

* Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

**Table 21. Merchandise Imports by Country, Selected Years, 1982-90**

(in percentages)

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</table>

— means negligible.

1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
2 ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see Glossary).
3 EEC—European Economic Community.

## Table 22. Merchandise Exports by Country, Selected Years, 1982–90

(in percentages)

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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

— means negligible.

1 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
2 ASEAN—Association of Southeast Asian Nations (see Glossary).
3 EEC—European Economic Community.

Table 23. Production Trends for Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, 1977-79 and 1987-89
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>1977-79 Average</th>
<th>1987-89 Average</th>
<th>Growth Rate</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cassava</td>
<td>13,047</td>
<td>15,272</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloves</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<td>Coconut (copra)</td>
<td>1,558</td>
<td>2,183</td>
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<td>Coffee</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>3,593</td>
<td>6,107</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>37.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish, freshwater</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>5.4</td>
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<td>Fish, saltwater</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk (in millions of liters)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>259</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palm kernels</td>
<td>101</td>
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<td>Palm oil</td>
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<td>Peanuts</td>
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<td>557</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rice, hulled</td>
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<td>28,345</td>
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<td>Rubber</td>
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<td>1,256</td>
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<td>Soybeans</td>
<td>607</td>
<td>1,230</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>2,189</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweet potatoes</td>
<td>2,246</td>
<td>2,082</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tea</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teak (in thousands of cubic meters)</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>737</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other timber (in thousands of cubic meters)</td>
<td>24,714</td>
<td>27,202</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Growth rate calculated as annual rate compounded from 1977-79 to 1987-89 or 1986-88.

Source: Based on information from Indonesia, Department of Finance, Nota keuangan dan rancangan anggaran pendapatan dan belanja negara: tahun, 1990-91 (Financial Note and Estimated National Budget, Fiscal Year 1990-91), Jakarta, 1990, 312-13, 359.
## Table 24. Distribution of Food Crop Production by Region, 1990

(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and Province</th>
<th>Irrigated Rice Paddy</th>
<th>Dryland Rice Paddy</th>
<th>Corn</th>
<th>Cassava</th>
<th>Potatoes</th>
<th>Peanuts</th>
<th>Soybeans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Java barat</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java timur</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Java tengah</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total java</td>
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<td>37.2</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>63.3</td>
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<td>68.0</td>
<td>58.8</td>
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<td>Sumatra</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Sumatera utara</td>
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<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<td>13.0</td>
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<td>Total sumatra</td>
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<td>18.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
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<td>23.7</td>
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<td>8.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nusa tenggara</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timur</td>
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<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total production    |                      |                    |      |         |          |         |          |
| (in millions of tons)| 42.8 \(^2\)           | 2.4 \(^2\)         | 6.7  | 15.8    | 2.0      | 0.6     | 1.5      |
| Total area          | 9.4                  | 1.1                | 3.2  | 1.3     | 0.2      | 0.6     | 1.3      |

1. Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
2. Production measured in dry-stalk paddy.

### Table 25. Production and Exports of Estate Crops, Selected Years, 1978-89
(in thousands of tons)

<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cloves</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconut (copra)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,707</td>
<td>2,054</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government estates</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total coconut (copra)</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>1,718</td>
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<td>2,124</td>
<td>2,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Exports)</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>387</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>206</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private estates</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government estates</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total coffee</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Exports)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>299</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm kernels</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private estates</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government estates</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total palm kernels</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>404</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Exports)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>285</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>496</td>
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<tr>
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<td>599</td>
<td>1,154</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>1,446</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,506</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>1,942</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Exports)</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>853</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pepper</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Exports)</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>41</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>585</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>943</td>
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<td>125</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>200</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>239</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,086</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>2,279</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>195</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>354</td>
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<td>1,619</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>2,279</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Tea</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallholders</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
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<td>26</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>84</td>
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<td><strong>Total tea</strong></td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>155</td>
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<tr>
<td>(Exports)</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td><strong>Tobacco</strong></td>
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<td>116</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total tobacco</strong></td>
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<td>113</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Exports)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

— means negligible.

n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from Indonesia, Department of Finance, Nota keuangan dan rancangan anggaran pendapatan dan belanja negara: tahun, 1990-91 (Financial Note and Estimated National Budget, Fiscal Year 1990-91), Jakarta, 1990, 328-33.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Unit of Measure</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fuels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refined petroleum fuels</td>
<td>millions of barrels</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquefied natural gas</td>
<td>billions of BTUs</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wood products</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plywood</td>
<td>thousands of cubic meters</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>4,715</td>
<td>7,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawn timber</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9,437</td>
<td>10,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chemicals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urea fertilizer</td>
<td>thousands of tons</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>4,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-urea fertilizer</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>1,533</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>3,629</td>
<td>10,027</td>
<td>15,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>1,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Textiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabric</td>
<td>millions of meters</td>
<td>1,576</td>
<td>2,498</td>
<td>4,494</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yarn</td>
<td>thousands of bales</td>
<td>837</td>
<td>1,877</td>
<td>3,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equipment and vehicles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tires, automobile</td>
<td>thousands of units</td>
<td>2,540</td>
<td>4,086</td>
<td>7,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tires, motorcycle</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1,658</td>
<td>2,313</td>
<td>5,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 26.—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Unit of Measure</th>
<th>1978</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycles</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesticide sprayers</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel engines</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplanes</td>
<td>units</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand tractors</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>5,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hullers</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,771</td>
<td>1,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponge iron</td>
<td>thousands of tons</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>1,442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel ingot</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>1,736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other steel products</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>2,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galvanized iron</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheet</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum plate</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel vessels</td>
<td>thousands of BRTs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kretek cigarettes</td>
<td>billions of pieces</td>
<td>43,500</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White cigarettes</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>25,700</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refined coconut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olein</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soap and detergent</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric cords</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cassette players</td>
<td>thousands of units</td>
<td>2,024</td>
<td>2,236</td>
<td>2,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television sets</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refrigerators</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing machines</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Storage batteries</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>5,688</td>
<td>6,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry-cell batteries</td>
<td>millions of units</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>1,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light bulbs</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toothpaste</td>
<td>millions of tubes</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matches</td>
<td>millions of boxes</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>2,837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

— means negligible
n.a.—not available.
1 Preliminary data.
2 Calendar year.
3 BTU—British Thermal Units.
4 Mostly assembly.
5 BRT—Brute Registered Tons.

### Table 27. Production of Major Minerals, Selected Years, 1976–88
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mineral</th>
<th>1976–78 Average</th>
<th>1986–88 * Average</th>
<th>Minimum Production Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Maximum Production Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude oil (in millions of barrels)</td>
<td>591</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas (in millions of standard cubic feet)</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tin ore concentrate</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper concentrate</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nickel ore</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauxite</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>3,645</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>5,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron sands concentrate</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silver (in tons)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold (in kilograms)</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>4,126</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>5,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 28. New Order Election Results, 1971–92

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Golkar ¹</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP ²</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDI ⁴</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ⁵</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Golongan Karya (literally, Functional Groups—see Glossary).
² Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party).
³ Numbers represent the aggregate votes of the parties included in the PPP and PDI since 1973.
⁴ Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party).
⁵ Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

### Table 29. Order of Battle for the Armed Forces, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch and Units</th>
<th>Personnel or Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>217,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division headquarters</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored cavalry brigade</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry brigades</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne brigades</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field artillery regiments</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defense artillery regiment</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat engineer battalions</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regional Commands (Kodams)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry battalions</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry battalions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airborne infantry battalions</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field artillery battalions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defense artillery battalions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction engineer regiments</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer battalions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Command (Kopassus)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces Groups (1 training)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite aviation squadron</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light helicopter squadron</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Navy**         |                    |
| Personnel        |                    |
| Line and staff   | 30,000             |
| Naval aviation   | 1,000              |
| Marines          | 13,000             |
| Total            | 44,000             |
| Fleet Commands (Armadas) | 2 |
| Main naval bases | 6 |
| Military Sea Communications Command | 1 |
| **Marine Corps** |                    |
| Infantry brigades | 2 |
| Battalions | 6 |
| Combat Support Regiment* | 1 |

| **Air force**    |                    |
| Personnel        | 27,000             |
| Paracommando battalions (about 4,000 personnel) | 4 |
| Operations Commands (Ko-Ops) | 2 |
| Tactical fighter squadrons | 2 |
| Counterinsurgency squadron | 1 |
| Fighter-interceptor squadrons | 2 |
| Helicopter squadrons | 3 |
| Transport squadrons | 5 |

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### Table 29. —Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch and Units</th>
<th>Personnel or Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine reconnaissance squadron</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training squadrons</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Matériel Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Training Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Air Defense Command</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>180,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Regional Commands (Poldas)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea and Air Police Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Brigade</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosive Ordinance Devices Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Personnel</strong></td>
<td><strong>468,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Field artillery and air defense artillery.


### Table 30. Ethnic and Religious Diversity of Senior Military Officers, 1992 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island and Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Java</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sundanese</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madurese</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Java</strong></td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatra</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batak</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Sumatra</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balinese</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Bali</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes top officials of Department of Defense and Security (minister through director general of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia—ABRI); army, navy, air force, and national police (chiefs of staffs through principal staff officers); military academy and staff college governors; and all service regional commanders and chiefs of staff.

Source: Based on information from United States Embassy, Jakarta.
### Table 31. Major Army Equipment, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored vehicles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMX-13 light tanks</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-76 light tanks</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saladin scout cars</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferret scout cars</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMX-VCI armored personnel carriers (APCs)</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saracen APCs</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-150 APCs/scout cars</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-40 APCs</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-152 APCs</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-48 76mm towed howitzers</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M101 105mm towed howitzers</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FV Mk61 105mm self-propelled howitzers</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm mortars</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-67 90mm recoilless rocket launchers</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-40 106mm recoilless rifles</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-43 120mm mortars</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm Oerlikon air defense guns</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm Bofors air defense guns</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-60 57mm air defense guns</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapier surface-to-air missile system</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed wing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN-2 Islander</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-47 transports</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC-212 transports</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 185</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 207</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 310</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aero Commander 680</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bo-105</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soloy-Bell 47G (trainers)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 205</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NB 412</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes 300C (trainers)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime ships</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU (300-ton cargo)</td>
<td>various</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCU (transport)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

1 Operational status uncertain.

2 On license with Spain.

3 On license with West Germany.

4 On license with the United States.

### Table 32. Major Naval Equipment, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 209</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whiskey class</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frigates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmad Yani class (Van Speijk), 1 Wasp helicopter, Harpoon surface-to-surface missile</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatahillah class, 1 Wasp helicopter, Exocet surface-to-surface missile</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samadikun class (Claude Jones)</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.K. Tiyahahu class (Tribal), 1 Wasp helicopter</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajar Dewantara (trainer)</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patrol craft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siada class (Attack class)</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabola class (Carpentaria class)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGM 39 class</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarine chaser (Hui class)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missile attack boats (Dagger class)</strong></td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Torpedo boats (Lürssen FPB 57 class)</strong></td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mine warfare ships</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rengat class</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-43 class</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amphibious ships</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teluk Langsa class LST, 200 troops, 16 tanks</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teluk Amboina class LST, 200 troops, 16 tanks</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teluk Semangka class LST, 200 troops, 12 tanks</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Miscellaneous transport/support</strong></td>
<td>various</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed-wing aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASA 212</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aero Commander</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-33 Bonanza (trainers)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA-38 (trainers)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>6</td>
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### Table 32. —Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAS-332B</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasp</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine reconnaissance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-22 Searchmaster B Nomad</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-22 Searchmaster L Nomad</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-76 light tanks</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMX-10 armored infantry fighting vehicles</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMX-10 armored personnel carriers (APCs)</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-50 APCs</td>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-38 122mm towed artillery</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130mm rocket launchers</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

1. Not operational.
2. Operational status uncertain.
3. Possibly were decommissioned in 1988.
4. Operational status varies.
5. On license with France.

### Table 33. Major Air Force Equipment, 1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fighters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4E Skyhawk</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16 Fighting Falcon</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interceptors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5E Tiger II</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5F Tiger II</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterinsurgency aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OV-10F Bronco</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime reconnaissance aircraft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>737-100</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130H-MP</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu-16</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transports</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130 Hercules</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boeing 707</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-47</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 401</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 402</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-27 Friendship</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-28 Friendship</td>
<td>-do-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASA NC-212</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skyvan</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trainers</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AS-202</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-47</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cessna 172</td>
<td>-do-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 207</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna T41D</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beech T34C</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawk T-53</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helicopters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-34T</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 204-B</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bell 206-B</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hughes 500</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAS-332 Super Puma</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAS-330 Puma</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBo-105</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE-316 Alouette III</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 On license with Spain.
2 On license with France.
3 On license with West Germany.

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abangan—Refers to people who are nominally Muslim and who, in fact, are followers of kebatinan (q.v.). The word is derived from the Javanese abang, which means "red."

Asian Development Bank—Established in 1967, the bank assists in economic development and promotes growth and cooperation in developing member countries. The bank is owned by its forty-seven member governments, which include both developed and developing countries in Asia and developed countries in the West.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—Founded in 1967 for the purpose of promoting regional stability, economic development, and cultural exchange. ASEAN’s founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; Brunei joined ASEAN in 1984.

Bahasa Indonesia—The Indonesian national language, also known as Indonesian; an Austronesian language reported to be modelled on Riau Malay and 80 percent cognate with Standard Malay.

Confrontation (Konfrontasi)—Indonesia’s 1963–66 effort to disrupt the new state of Malaysia, which Indonesian leaders regarded as a front for a continued British colonial presence in Southeast Asia.

Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI)—Formed after the March 1992 demise of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI; q.v.). Except for the Netherlands, the membership is the same as IGGI.

fiscal year (FY)—April 1 to March 31.

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)—A United Nations specialized agency established in 1945 to raise living standards and increase the availability of agricultural products.

Fretilin—Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente); a guerrilla movement seeking the independence of East Timor. Fretilin was established in 1974.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—Negotiated in 1947 among twenty-three original signatories who were members of the United Nations Economic and Social Council and went into effect January 1, 1948, as an interim arrangement pending the ratification of the proposed International Trade Organization. GATT functions as a multilateral treaty aimed
at promoting the expansion of international trade on a non-discriminatory basis. As of 1992, 101 nations, including Indonesia, had acceded to the GATT.

Golkar—Golongan Karya (Functional Groups); the de facto ruling political party; a federation of groups within society, such as peasants, workers, and women.

gross domestic product (GDP)—The value of domestic goods and services produced by an economy in a given period, usually a year. Only output of goods for final consumption and investment is included, as the value added by primary or intermediate processing is assumed to be represented in the final prices.

gross national product (GNP)—Gross domestic product (q.v.) plus income from overseas investments and wages minus earnings of foreign investors and foreign workers in the domestic economy.

Group of Fifteen—Group of Third World countries that participated in the Conference on International Economic Co-operation, held in several sessions between December 1975 and June 1977; it has continued to meet and add additional members since 1977. The group in 1992 included nineteen members: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.

Group of Seventy-seven—Established in October 1967 with the aim of promoting economic cooperation among developing countries. Indonesia was among the seventy-seven original members. Despite the name, which persists, by 1992 there were 123 members.

Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI)—An international group of lenders established in 1967 by the Netherlands to coordinate multilateral aid to Indonesia. The other members included the Asian Development Bank, International Monetary Fund (q.v.), United Nations Development Programme, World Bank (q.v.), Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States. In March 1992, Indonesia announced that it was rejecting further IGGI aid as long as the Netherlands chaired the organization. IGGI was replaced by the Consultative Group on Indonesia (q.v.).

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange loans to its members when they experience balance of payments difficulties.
kebatinan—An amalgam of animist, Hindu-Buddhist, and Islamic (especially Sufi) mystical elements that combine to form Javanese mysticism. As a body of belief, kebatinan is officially recognized in the 1945 constitution and is administered by the Department of Education and Culture rather than by the Department of Religious Affairs. Also known as kejawen, agama Jawa, or Javanism.

Nonaligned Movement—Established in September 1961 with the aim of promoting political and military cooperation apart from the traditional East and West blocs. Indonesia was among the original members; as of 1992, there were 101 members, 9 observers, and 12 “guests.” Indonesia was elected to chair the Nonaligned Movement from 1992 to 1995.

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—Founded in Baghdad, Iraq, on September 14, 1960, the organization aims to coordinate petroleum policies of its member countries: Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Indonesia joined OPEC in 1962.

Outer Islands—Term used by some sources to refer to all islands of the Indonesian archipelago other than Java and Madura. Other sources, however, use the term to refer to all islands except Java, Madura, Bali, and Sumatra; still others say except Java and Bali or exclude Java, Madura, and Bali. The term as translated from Dutch—buitengewesten—means outer territories or regions while a similar term from Bahasa Indonesia (q.v.)—tanah seberang—means land (or lands) over there, or across the seas. The term is sometimes considered pejorative by those people living on the islands indicated.

Pancasila—The state philosophy based on five interrelated principles: belief in one supreme God; just and civilized humanitarianism; nationalism as expressed in the unity of Indonesia; popular sovereignty arrived at through deliberation and representation or consultative democracy; and social justice for all the Indonesian people. The Pancasila was announced by Sukarno on June 1, 1945. From Sanskrit: panca (five) and sila (principle).

prabumi—Literally, an indigene, or native. In the colonial era, the great majority of the population of the archipelago came to regard themselves as indigenous, in contrast to the nonindigenous Dutch and Chinese (and, to a degree, Arab) communities. After independence the distinction persisted, expressed as a dichotomy between elements that were pribumi and those that were not. The distinction has had significant implications for economic development policy.
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rupiah (Rp)—Basic unit of currency. The exchange rate was fixed at Rp415 to US$1 from 1971 to 1978, when the rupiah was devalued to Rp625. Thereafter, the rate has floated slightly, although two major devaluations occurred in 1983 and 1986, bringing the exchange rate to Rp1,641 at the end of 1986. A policy of more gradual depreciation at about 5 percent per year has been followed through 1992. In November 1992, the exchange rate was valued at Rp1,881 per US$1, or Rp1 = US$0.00018. The rupiah is made up of 5, 10, 25, 50, and 100 coins and 100, 500, 1,000, 5, 000, and 10,000 notes.

santri—Orthodox Muslims. In the Javanese context, the santri are also sometimes referred to as putihan (white ones), an allusion to their purity, especially as contrasted to abangan (q.v.) Javanese.

sharia (Arabic; syariah in Bahasa Indonesia, q.v.)—Islamic canon law. Among Shia (q.v.) Muslims, the sharia includes the Quran and the authenticated sayings of the Prophet (hadith) and the Twelve Imams.

Shia (or Shiite)—A member of the smaller of two great divisions of Islam. The Shias supported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliphate and leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue they divided from the Sunnis (q.v.) in the first great schism of Islam. Later disagreements have produced further schisms among the Shias. Shias revere the Twelve Imams, most of whom are believed to be hidden from view.

Sufi—Comes from suf, the Arabic word for “wool.” The term derives from the practice of wearing a woolen robe, a sign of dedicating oneself to the mystical life, known in Islam as becoming a Sufi. Sufis, who seek mystical union with God, have been condemned by some Sunni (q.v.) legal schools.

Sunni—Comes from sunna meaning “custom,” giving a connotation of orthodoxy. A member of the two great divisions of Islam, the Sunnis supported the traditional method of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad line. On this issue, they divided from the Shia (q.v.) discipline in the first great schism within Islam.

Transmigration Program—A voluntary rural resettlement plan that seeks to move large numbers of Javanese to Indonesia’s underpopulated Outer Islands (q.v.). Transmigrasi in Bahasa Indonesia (q.v.).
value-added tax—A tax levied on the value added income of a firm, defined as the difference between total sales revenue and costs of intermediate inputs, such as raw materials, used in the production process.

wayang—Literally, "shadow." A dramatic form in several major variations, in which puppets or human performers, and sometimes both, portray gods, heroes, villains, and other characters in literary epics. The wayang kulit is shadow theater using highly decorated flat leather puppets.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans at market-related rates of interest to developing countries at more advanced stages of development. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign investment in developing countries against various non-commercial risks. The president and certain officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (q.v.).
Contributors

William H. Frederick is Associate Professor of History, Department of History, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.

John B. Haseman is a Colonel in the United States Army and the United States Defense Attaché, Jakarta, Indonesia.

Joel C. Kuipers is Associate Professor of Anthropology, Department of Anthropology, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

Kathryn G. Marshall is Assistant Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.

Donald M. Seekins is Associate Professor of Political Science, College of Law and Letters, University of the Ryūkyūs, Senbaru, Nishihara, Okinawa, Japan.

Donald E. Weatherbee is the Donald S. Russell Professor of International Studies, Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina.

Robert L. Worden is Head, Regional Section, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
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