

Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures



U.S. Marine Corps

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PCN 144 000361 00

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
FOREWORD

Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-03A.1, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, provides descriptive guidance for employing Marine civil affairs forces within the Marine air-ground task force and Fleet Marine Forces to conduct civil affairs activities, support military-government operations, and facilitate civil affairs support activities.

This publication's key audience consists of the civil affairs group, Marine expeditionary force information group, and Marine littoral regiment commanders and staffs. Additionally, commanders and staffs of Marine expeditionary forces, Marine expeditionary units, infantry regiments and battalions, and the influence operations community should review and understand the tactics, techniques, and procedures described in this publication.

Marine Corps leaders at every level should understand the concepts and employment considerations for civil affairs operations and civil-military operations described in this publication and in Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-03, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, and Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-03A.2, *Civil-Military Operations Planning*.

Reviewed and approved this date.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. L. Jones', with a stylized, cursive script.

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Publication Control Number: 144 000361 00

Limited Dissemination Control: None. Approved for Public Release.

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CHAPTER 1.

CIVIL AFFAIRS FUNDAMENTALS

Civil affairs Marines are specifically trained, equipped, and organized to support and enable civil-military operations (CMO), influence operations, information maneuver, and Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations. A MAGTF conducts CMO to minimize the effect civilians have on the MAGTF and the MAGTF's effect on civilians in the operational environment. Civil affairs operations (CAOs) and CMO ensure that MAGTF commanders fulfill their responsibilities with regard to the population within their assigned area of operations.

Marine Corps civil affairs began in the central Pacific during War World II when Marine civil affairs specialists assessed local property rights, agricultural needs, and local leaders to plan for the transition of local authority following high-intensity amphibious assaults during Operation ICEBERG (the Battle of Okinawa). Civil affairs Marines provided critical assistance in Okinawa when major combat operations ended in August 1945 and the reconstruction of Japan began. They also proved integral in Korea five years later in sustaining the nation through major aggression from communist forces and subsequent rebuilding. Civil affairs Marines repeated this pattern in Central and South America, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East throughout the Cold War. Civil affairs Marines deployed to the Balkans, Philippines, Africa, and South America after the Soviet Union collapsed. Since 2001, civil affairs Marines have supported the Global War on Terrorism, bringing their skills against irregular enemies and reestablishing basic civic functions in local communities.

Civil-military operations are integral throughout the competition continuum and ensure build awareness of local populations and institutions. Marine civil affairs forces conduct cultural analysis, network analysis, and determine civil actions by conducting civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, civil information management (CIM), military-government operations (MGOs), civil affairs support activities (CASA), and by establishing civil-military operations centers (CMOC). Civil affairs Marines conduct these activities to build and maintain relationships with other organizations, which is essential to success given the need for whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches.

The current strategic environment is characterized by near-peer adversaries trying to avoid confrontation with the US military while pursuing objectives below the level of armed conflict. The joint operational framework describes how joint force commanders approach these challenges. The US joint force competes with adversaries through cooperation, competition, and armed conflict or war. Civil affairs activities are integral to creating desirable effects, particularly in competition and cooperation. The Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) conducts activities that support assurance, deterrence, compellence, and when necessary, force.

During FMF activities, civil affairs minimize the effect on civilian populations and maximize FMF effectiveness. Civil affairs operations indirectly counter near-peer adversaries by developing trust and confidence with local populations and institutions. Marine civil affairs forces are in a unique position to help the Marine Corps achieve its goals by focusing on key contemporary issues and concepts, such as the civilian harm mitigation response and plan, great power competition, campaigning, integrated deterrence, interorganizational cooperation, and gray zone activities. Conventional Marine forces contribute to irregular activities, and civil affairs is a vital irregular warfare capability.

COMPETITION CONTINUUM

The competition continuum is a valuable tool for understanding the interactions among state and non-state actors. The competition continuum describes how state and non-state actors interact in a world with limited access to resources and incompatible security interests. Actions within the competition continuum include cooperation, adversarial competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The competition continuum is a spectrum with cooperation at one end and armed conflict at the other. Several gradations along the spectrum shift to and from cooperation and armed conflict due to actions or perceived actions directly and indirectly between states or other actors. Competition below armed conflict occurs when two entities are neither cooperating nor actively engaged in armed conflict, creating a gray zone. Frequently, irregular approaches are the best options for competition below armed conflict. Unfortunately, placement on the competition continuum is not always clear. For example, two countries can cooperate on some issues while competing on others. Therefore, sharing information and unity of effort is paramount among joint and interagency organizations. Civil affairs Marines operate throughout this joint operational framework as part of either a MAGTF or the FMF. See Table 1-1 for information on how CAO contribute to the continuum.

Table 1-1. Civil Affairs and the Competition Continuum.

	Cooperation		Adversarial Competition Below Armed Conflict	Armed Conflict/War	
Strategic Use of Force	Assure	Deter	Compel	Force	
Civil Affairs Employment	CAO are proactive by performing civil affairs activities (e.g., defense support to civil authorities) to either prevent conflict or set the conditions of the civil dimension for the fight.		Civil affairs Marines provide options (e.g., security cooperation, FHA) to a commander to either de-escalate in a way favorable to FMF objectives or seize the initiative within the civil dimension needed for armed conflict.	Civil affairs Marines might perform to triage (e.g., countering violent extremists, combat operations) the civil dimension and set the necessary conditions for post conflict stabilization.	

Cooperation

Cooperation is when two or more parties work together to achieve a common goal. Cooperation is an enduring activity with a partner that continues into the near future. Civil-military operations are vital to maintaining and building partnerships, particularly in contested regions. The MAGTF serves a significant role in the cooperation space with partners worldwide by conducting CMO to support civic actions, humanitarian relief, capacity building, and combined exercises. Cooperation

activities are deliberately planned and resourced by the MAGTF and FMF to accomplish assigned missions. Sustained cooperation provides the MAGTF with access, basing, overflight, and the relationships with friendly actors necessary to compete, deter, and as required, fight and win against adversaries.

Adversarial competition is a struggle between actors who seek to achieve incompatible strategic objectives while avoiding armed conflict. Competition is more protracted than armed conflict and occurs in a less certain environment than cooperation. Civil-military operations provide critical insight into civil considerations across the operational environment during competition. By identifying and analyzing civil considerations, Marines gain the knowledge and access to maintain influence with friendly and neutral actors and supports governance, infrastructure, perceptions, interagency coordination, and multi-national coordination. Civil-military operations shape the Marine Corps' ability to maneuver through the competition continuum. When engaged in great power competition in a host nation, the cooperation space allows for developing relationships, capacity, and capability with allies and partners.

Armed Conflict

Armed conflict describes a state directing its military forces to take actions against a state or non-state adversary. In the offense, defense, stability construct Marines conduct stabilization activities during armed conflict or war to support offensive and defensive operations. Civil affairs Marines employ civil affairs tactics, techniques, and procedures to support stabilization activities during armed conflict and set conditions for post-conflict actions. The scope and scale of missions assigned to the Marine Corps determine both the size of the MAGTF assigned to a mission, and the scale of Marine civil affairs forces assigned to that MAGTF. During armed conflict, civil affairs Marines work with the MAGTF, joint force, interagency organizations, and interorganizational partners to establish the conditions necessary to maintain essential services and restore stability immediately following armed conflict.

CIVIL AFFAIRS IN STRATEGIC COMPETITION

Understanding the framework for joint operations throughout the competition continuum enables commanders to employ civil affairs forces in support of FMF and joint force missions. The joint force conducts four distinct activities: assurance, deterrence, compellence, and forcible action. These activities arise throughout the competition continuum and are organized to achieve joint force objectives. The relationships between assurance, deterrence, compellence, and forcible action within both the competition continuum and those activities conducted by Marine civil affairs are described in the following sections.

Assurance

Assurance demonstrates commitment and support to US allies and partners through the military instrument of national power. Thus, the United States seeks to maintain current relationships while building new ones. Assuring allies and partners requires regular engagement through military exercises (e.g., Balikatan and African Lion). Civil affairs operations facilitate assurance for the joint force. Assurance activities can include security cooperation, foreign assistance, humanitarian assistance, and providing for the basic human needs of a population in a conflict-affected area or considering human security. Each assurance activity relies on civil affairs forces to engage, assess, and integrate FMF and MAGTF operations within the civil dimension.

Deterrence

Deterrence in an anarchic international system can be difficult given the lack of punishment for wrongful action or the ability of states to bluff. Deterrence prevents an adversary's undesired action by having a clear, credible, and capable military counteraction. Deterrence occurs when the adversary believes the benefit to their action outweighs the cost of our military response. For this reason, many people believed Russia would not cross the border into Ukraine in February 2022 because the international reaction would be too costly for the Russians. The Marine Corps supports deterrence activities by combining forward-based and forward-deployed naval expeditionary forces. Civil affairs Marines enable the FMF to maintain and expand relationships with the civilian population, which is necessary to support deterrence activities.

Compellence

Compellence differs from deterrence in that the adversary has taken an undesirable action, and the threat or use of violent military action is used to change that adversary's behavior. If western actors could have persuaded Russia to withdraw from Ukraine, it would have been an example of compellence. Information maneuver is essential to compellence; Marines conduct influence operations to change undesirable adversary behavior and preserve stability within the civil dimension by maintaining positive relationships with friendly counterparts. Compellence activities are dynamic; they require civil affairs forces to integrate diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. The civil affairs component within influence operations is fundamental to preserving and enhancing friendly and neutral relationships.

Forcible Action

Forcible action is the violent application of military force against an adversary or enemy to eliminate their ability to resist. The Marine Corps supports broader joint force objectives during forcible action to exhaust, erode, or annihilate the enemy. Given the violence involved in this activity, Marine civil affairs forces are vital in assessing the population within a conflict area to ensure commanders meet their responsibilities. Marine civil affairs forces can provide the FMF or MAGTF commander with options on minimizing civilian interference in military operations and set the conditions for a rapid transition to post-conflict stabilization activities.

INFORMATION MANEUVER AND INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES

Civil affairs provides a critical capability within influence activities. Influence activities include military information support operations (MISO), civil affairs, and strategic communications that target and influence malign adversary behavior while preserving stability and support with neutral and friendly actors. Influence activities are the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of all elements of national power and other societal capabilities, individually or collectively, throughout the competition continuum to cause or effect a change to or reinforce attitudes, beliefs, behaviors, or decisions of desired audiences. They enable information maneuver within the influence realm and in the space and cyberspace domains. Maneuver through the information environment is integral to prevailing throughout the competition continuum. Civil affairs Marines focus on maintaining and building positive and constructive relationships with friendly and neutral populations. These actions support broader civil-military and influence activities.

When planning and executing influence activities, it is important to understand the distinctions between CAO and CMO. Civil affairs forces are trained, equipped, and organized to conduct CAO. Conversely, all military forces conduct CMO.

Additionally, there are distinctions between Marine and Army civil affairs. The US Army maintains the largest civil affairs force within the US military. Army civil affairs are functional specialists along one of sixteen functional specialties. These sixteen functional specialties are grouped underneath six functional areas that include security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. Army Field Manual 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*, describes the Army's civil affairs capability in greater detail. Civil affairs soldiers also develop language skills and are trained to operate independently from larger Army formations.

Conversely, civil affairs Marines are generalists, trained in the core civil affairs competencies; however, they do not receive language training and do not operate independently from the MAGTF or FMF. This enables the FMF or MAGTF to effectively employ civil affairs Marines. While civil affairs forces conduct CAO, the MAGTF and FMF conduct CMO, influence Marines must understand the relationship between CAO and CMO when designing and executing operations in support of information maneuver and broader FMF and joint force objectives.

Civil-Military Operations

Civil-military operations are the “activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the re-establishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation” (*DoD Dictionary*). There are three core competencies to CMO:

- Civil-Military Relations. Civil-military relations are the interactions between military forces and civilian populations. They are essential for maintaining a stable operational environment and preventing conflict.
- Enabling Activities. Enabling activities support civil-military relations, such as providing security, transportation, and medical care.
- Information Management. Information management is the collection, processing, and dissemination of information related to CMO, which is essential for making informed decisions and coordinating activities.

Refer to Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-03A, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, for additional information about CMO.

Civil Affairs Operations

Civil affairs Marines plan, coordinate, execute, and assess CAOs to enhance their awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component, identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society, and apply functional skills that are usually the responsibility of civil government.

The three core competencies (see Table 1-2) of CAOs are civil affairs activities, MGO, and CASA. These core competencies provide a conceptual framework for how to design, plan, and employ civil affairs forces in support of MAGTF and FMF operations. Table 1-2 describes the relationship between civil affairs core competencies and functions.

Table 1-2. Civil Affairs Core Competencies and Functions.

	Civil Affairs Activities	MGOs	CASA
Functions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil Engagement • Civil Reconnaissance • CMOC • CIM • CAO Staff Support 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Transitional Military Authority • SCA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Foreign Assistance • FHA • PRC • CME

Civil Affairs Activities. Civil affairs activities are planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces to support the commander by synchronizing, coordinating, and integrating indigenous populations and institutions (IPI), unified action partners (UAPs), and interagency organizations and partners. Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and NGOs, and private sector elements with whom joint forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Civil affairs activities include the following functions:

- Civil reconnaissance is the targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific aspects within the civil dimension of the operational environment.
- Civil engagement is the targeted, planned, and coordinated interaction with IPI, military forces, and UAPS to build working relationships that reduce the effects military operations have on civilians and mitigate the effects civilians have on military operations.
- Civil information management is a process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters (HHQ), other United States Government (USG) and Department of Defense (DoD) agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations.
- A CMOC is an organization, typically composed of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within IPI, private sector, international organizations, NGOs, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander.
- Civil-military operations planning, and civil affairs staff support activities provide analysis, insight, and planning support products—including Annex G (Civil-Military Operations)—related to the civil dimension. Operational planning teams and staffs support the commander's decision-making process. Civil-military operations planning focuses explicitly on the impact of the civil dimension on MAGTF operations and MAGTF operations on the civil dimension within the operational environment.

Military-Government Operations. Military-government operations take place when military forces exercise the supreme authority, by force or agreement, over the lands, property, and IPI of domestic, allied, neutral, or enemy territory; therefore, substituting sovereign authority under the rule of law for the previously established government. Military-government operations include the following functions:

- Transitional military authority exercises the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority.
- Support to civil administration (SCA) is assistance given to a governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government, interim civilian authority, or supporting a reconstructed government.

Civil Affairs Support Activities. Civil affairs support activities are activities wherein civil affairs serves a key planning, coordinating, or synchronizing role, but are not the proponent or primary executor. Civil affairs support activities include the following functions:

- Foreign assistance is civil or military assistance rendered to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment and support for foreign internal defense (FID), to donations of food and medical supplies to aiding survivors of natural and man-made disasters.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) consists of DoD activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.
- Populace and resource control (PRC) provides security for the indigenous populace, mobilizes human resources, denies access to the populace by the enemy, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents.
- Civil-military engagement (CME) is a United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) program of record executed by special operations forces (SOF) to build partner-nation capacity in a preventive, population centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of partnered indigenous governments.

The FMF and joint force typically organize tactical operations around the seven warfighting functions (fires, maneuver, logistics, command and control, intelligence, information, and force protection). A civil affairs activity can be conducted across some or all of the warfighting functions. Conversely, civil affairs Marines must consider the warfighting functions when developing and executing CAOs. Appendix F provides a more detailed breakdown for considering CAO and civil affairs tactical tasks by warfighting function.

CHAPTER 2.

MARINE CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES

MARINE CIVIL AFFAIRS IN CONTESTED ENVIRONMENTS

Joint and naval forces operate in contested regions and littorals. These areas are contested by adversaries that employ malign, irregular tactics that displace traditional joint force power projection capabilities. To persist in contested areas, the naval force conducts expeditionary operations from advanced bases and distributed maritime operations that seek to invert the cost calculations for adversaries. Naval forces operate with allies and partners in these contested areas, requiring Marines to build and maintain relationships with friendly and neutral actors that maintain and expand naval maneuver space in these regions. Success in this environment requires influence activities to maintain positive relationships with friendly and neutral networks and counter malign adversary influence.

Marines will operate in small, lethal, low signature, mobile, simple to maintain and sustain formations designed to persist in contested areas. They must be able to operate across the competition continuum to provide situational awareness to the fleet and joint force, build and maintain relationships with allies and partners, and be ready to detect, deter, and counter malign behavior. Marines able to persist in these contested environments play an instrumental role with allies and partners.

Marine civil affairs forces are trained, equipped, and organized for CAO, they understand this complex, contested, and dynamic environment when designing and executing CAO. During cooperation and competition, CAOs are imperative to prevail against adversaries by preserving relationships with friendly and neutral actors and networks. Civil affairs Marines succeed in this environment by understanding the civil dimension through the civil preparation of the battlespace process.

CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE AND CIVIL AFFAIRS

The civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB) is an analytical method used to examine the civil operational environment to provide a baseline of civil considerations for designing and executing CAO and CMO. Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-03A describes the CPB process. The purpose of CPB is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the civil operational environment and develop a civil environment model that informs decision makers of civil actions that impact MAGTF and FMF operations. They must also consider how CPB drives civil affairs activities as part of an iterative process to continually refine understanding of the civil dimension. It integrates CIM with civil reconnaissance and civil engagement. Incorporating network templating, network analysis, and network engagement into CPB enhances its application for the commander's situational awareness and ability to designate team tasks. It also forms the foundation for planning

and then operating a CMOC. Finally, it becomes the framework from which a civil affairs Marine supports CMO planning. The four-step CPB process is integral to CAO and CMO.

The first step in the CPB process is to define the civil operational environment using the civil considerations of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) and operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, and information (PMESII). The ASCOPE and PMESII matrix (see Table 2-1) becomes an invaluable tool for all the core civil affairs competencies.

Table 2-1. ASCOPE and PMESII Matrix.

	P Political	M Military	E Economic	S Social	I Information	I Infrastructure
A Areas	Areas-Political (District Boundary, Party affiliation areas)	Areas-Military (Coalition, LN bases, historic ambush, improvised explosive sites)	Areas-Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas-Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas-Information (Radio, TV, newspapers, where people gather for word-of-mouth)	Areas-Infrastructure (Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)
S Structures	Structures-Political (town halls, government offices)	Structures-Military and Police (police HQ, Military HHQ locations)	Structures-Economic (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Structures - Social (Churches, restaurants, bars, etc.)	Structures - Information (Cell, Radio, TV towers, print shops)	Structures - Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)
C Capabilities	Capabilities - Political (Dispute resolution, Insurgent capabilities)	Capabilities - Military (security posture, strengths and weaknesses)	Capabilities - Economic (access to banks, ability to withstand natural disasters)	Capabilities - Social (Strength of local & national ties)	Capabilities-Information (Literacy rate, availability of media / phone service)	Capabilities - Infrastructure (Ability to build, maintain roads, walls, dams)
O Organizations	Organizations - Political (Political parties and other power brokers, UN)	Organizations - Military (What units of military, police, insurgent are present)	Organizations - Economic (Banks, large land holders, big businesses)	Organizations - Social (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, NGOs, IOs)	Organizations - Information (News groups, influential people who pass word)	Organizations - Infrastructure (Government ministries, construction companies)
P People	People - Political (Governors, councils, elders)	People - Military (Leaders from coalition, LN and insurgent forces)	People - Economic (Bankers, landholders, merchants)	People - Social (Religious leaders, influential families)	People - Information (Media owners, mullahs, heads of powerful families)	People - Infrastructure Builders, contractors, development councils)
E Events	Events - Political (elections, council meetings)	Events - Military (lethal and nonlethal events, loss of leadership, operations, anniversaries)	Events - Economic (drought, harvest, business open/ close)	Events - Social (holidays, weddings, religious days)	Events - Information (Information activities, campaigns, project openings, CIVCAS events)	Events - Infrastructure (road / bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)
LEGEND CIVCAS civilian casualty HQ headquarters			IO international organization LN local national		TV television UN United Nation	

The second step in CPB uses the ASCOPE and PMESII matrix to build the factors and relevance matrix, stakeholder map, determine key influences, identify cultural factors, and develop stability dynamics. Additionally, civil affairs Marines should conduct network analysis and network engagement once in their area of operation. Network analysis and network development feed each other as Marines verify or refute information that comprises known networks. Marines identify unknown networks that need to be developed in their area of operation. The first two steps of CPB guide the CIM plan and civil information collection priorities, which civil engagement and civil reconnaissance answer. Step 2 in CPB guides Marine CAO and informs broader influence activities.

In step 3 of CPB, planners synthesize information into a civil environment model. This is a graphic and narrative product that describes the characteristics and attributes of the civil dimension necessary to design CAO, CMO, and related influence activities. This step in the CPB process reveals those CAO, CMO, and influence tasks that are linked to the factors from step 2.

In the last step of the CPB process, step 4, planners forecast civil actions based on previous analysis, including civil most likely and civil most disruptive actions. In contrast to military formations, the civilian population operates in a much more dynamic and uncertain manner. Steps 3 and 4 are critical to planning MAGTF and FMF operations, but like the enemy most likely and most dangerous courses of action developed by the intelligence section, the CPB requires continuous refinement in execution.

MARINE CIVIL AFFAIRS ORGANIZATIONS AND FORMATIONS

The Marine Corps maintains ready civil affairs formations in both the Reserve Component and Active Component. Most civil affairs capability resides in the Reserve Component, which is organized around civil affairs groups (CAGs). Within the Active Component, civil affairs capability exists as a billet structure in the—

- Marine littoral regiment (MLR) headquarters.
- Marine expeditionary force information group (MIG).
- Marine expeditionary unit (MEU).
- Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB).
- Marine expeditionary force headquarters.
- Supporting establishment.

The civil affairs team (CAT) is the primary civil affairs capability maintained in the active force and is built around the influence officer and influence specialists military occupational specialties (MOSSs) (see Table 2-2). This CAT is embedded with the MLR headquarters. These Marines conduct CAO and support CMO when assigned to civil affairs billets. They are trained with additional skill sets to support the full range of influence activities.

Within the supporting establishment, several stakeholders support the development and readiness of Marine civil affairs forces. The Deputy Commandant for Information is the Service proponent for civil affairs. The Commanding General, Training and Education Command, provides MOS training to civil affairs via the Marine Corps Civil-Military Operations School.

Table 2-2. Civil Affairs and Influence Operations Occupational Specialties.

Billet	Responsibilities
Influence Officer (AC)	Plan and conduct MISO, CAIS, and CAO. While occupying a civil affairs officer billet, Influence officers assist commanders to plan, coordinate, and conduct CAO.
Influence Chief (AC)	Plan and conduct MISO, CAIS and CAO. While occupying a civil affairs chief billet, the influence chief assists the influence officers in the planning, coordination, and conduct of CAO.
Influence Non-Commissioned Officer (AC)	Plan and execute functions pertaining to MISO, CAIS, and CAO.
Civil Affairs Officer (RC)	Assist commanders in planning, coordinating, and conducting CAO and CMO and function as an interface between the commander and civilian populations, agencies, and organizations.
Civil Affairs Specialist	Perform various duties involving planning, coordinating, and conducting CAO and CMO. They conduct research, analysis, and execution of civil affairs area studies, area assessments, and CMO estimates.
Civil Affairs Non-Commissioned Officer (RC)	Perform various duties involving planning, coordinating, and conducting CAO and CMO. They conduct research, analysis, and execution of civil affairs area studies, area assessments, and CMO estimates.
CMO Staff Planners (Officer)	Support CAO and CMO planning using the MCPP or the JPP for joint operations.
CMO Staff Planners (Enlisted)	Support CAO and CMO planning using the MCPP or the JPP for joint operations.
LEGEND	
AC Active Component	RC Reserve Component

Civil Affairs Group

The senior Marine Corps civil affairs formation is the CAG. There are currently three CAGs assigned to the Marine Forces Reserve. A CAG is commanded by a colonel (O-6) with a headquarters to support both the command and operational functions of a CAG. The CAG can provide a G-9 branch to a MEF headquarters and three civil affairs detachments (CADs). Each detachment has a CIM cell and three CATs.

A CAG's mission is to provide specially trained, organized, and equipped civil affairs personnel to plan, coordinate, and conduct CAO and CMO. The CAG informs, influences, shapes and facilitates access to the civil environment to support the commander's objectives and targeting process or cycle. There are seven mission essential tasks assigned to a CAG as of 2024 that include provide civil affairs forces, conduct CMO, and facilitate PRC, FHA, foreign assistance (formerly nation assistance), CIM, and SCA. In competition the CAG provides Marine civil affairs forces to support joint force missions and MEU deployments. Additionally, the CAG maintains readiness for deployment in support of MEF operations.

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-9 Civil-Military Operations. The CAG is organized to provide an assistant chief of staff for CMO to either the MEF or MEB commander. This typically includes twelve civil affairs Marines and two sailors organized to support current and future operations, as

well as operate a CIM cell. The CAG typically aligns to a MEF by providing a colonel that serves as the G-9 while a CAD is aligned to support the MEB with a lieutenant colonel that serves as the G-9. Each CAG is organized with structure for one G-9 section. The G-9 can be tailored to the needs of the mission, operational environment, and available resources by leveraging the capabilities available within the CAG. A CAT is designed to support a MEU commander and can perform basic CMO and civil affairs staff functions when required. Additionally, the MEU's CAT is trained, equipped, and organized to support influence operations and is staffed with civil affairs officers and specialists (Reserve Component), as well as influence officers, specialists, and chiefs (Active Component).

The G-9's primary responsibility is providing CMO support to the MAGTF and exercising cognizance over civil affairs forces. This is achieved through staff integration procedures across the MAGTF staff and subordinate units. There are several functions that support the integration of civil considerations across the staff, including support to the boards, bureaus, centers, cells, and working groups cycle; support to MAGTF and FMF planning initiatives; developing planning support products and CMO concepts of supports; providing advice to the commander on various considerations within the operational environment; and monitoring current operations and forecasting future operations. Additionally, the G-9 supports the information coordination cell (ICC) and operates a CMOC as directed.

The G-9 serves as the primary interface with both interorganizational partners as well as joint civil affairs and CMO organizations. This requires the G-9 to establish coordination mechanisms with higher and adjacent J-9s and G-9s, and interorganizational partners. Interorganizational partners operate under diverse policies, motivations, and authorities, requiring the G-9 to employ negotiation, mediation, and problem-solving skills. The CMOC can support limited coordination with interorganizational partners; however, the G-9 identifies and engages with key stakeholders across both the joint civil affairs enterprise and the broader interorganizational network. The CIM cell is another resource that can provide situational awareness and understanding of interorganizational partners' activities. For additional guidance on planning and coordination with interorganizational partners, refer to MCTP 3-03A.

Civil Affairs Detachment. A lieutenant colonel usually commands a CAD, aligning with a MEB or infantry regiment. It consists of three CATs, a CIM cell, and a small headquarters staff to support both command and operational functions. Like the CAG, the CAD is integrated into the MAGTF or FMF and leverages MAGTF capabilities to conduct CAO and support CMO. The CAD can provide limited CMO staff planning support to the MEB or regimental headquarters, but it cannot provide both a G-9 branch and an operational CAD.

Civil Affairs Team. The CAT consists of four Marines led by a captain. It is organized to conduct CAO at the tactical level, and it is typically aligned to a MEU headquarters or infantry battalion. The CAT is trained to execute functions of civil affairs activities and support MGO and CASA. Like the CAG and CAD, a CAT leverages the MEU's or battalion's capabilities to conduct CAO and support CMO.

Civil Information Management Cell. A CIM cell can be employed by CAGs and CADs. The CIM cell executes the CIM plan by collecting, consolidating, analyzing, producing, and sharing civil information with stakeholders and decision makers; it also guides the CPB process. A lieutenant

colonel or major leads the CIM cell and tailors those efforts to the mission. Civil information is collected via the Marine civil-information management system (MARCIMS), which is described in the Chapter 6. This civil information flows through a seven-step CIM process and is disseminated to key decision makers. The CIM cell works closely with the information management officer to ensure that processed civil information can be shared with interorganizational partners. The CIM cell must maintain a shared understanding of the civil dimension with stakeholders.

Civil-Military Operations Center

Civil affairs Marines can establish a CMOC, as directed, within the MAGTF's area of operation. The CMOC's purpose is to support and facilitate the coordination of MAGTF or FMF operations with IPIs, international organizations, NGOs, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies. The CMOC aligns with the level of command it supports, ranging from a MEF at one end to an infantry battalion at the other. The CMOC's capabilities are tailored to the mission, operational environment, and resources available. Only one combat operations center exists in a MAGTF's battlespace, where the command makes and implements decisions. Chapter 5 describes how to plan and execute a Marine CMOC and provides baseline templates for consideration when operating a CMOC.

Marine Littoral Regiment Civil Affairs Team

The MLR's CAT is similar in capability to the Reserve Component's CAT assigned to each CAG; however, it is organized with additional skillsets to support all influence activities. The MLR's CAT is led by a captain and staffed with influence specialists. These skill sets provide additional capabilities for the MLR to operate in contested environments. When the MLR's CAT is employed, it is imperative that it is oriented on building and maintaining relationships with friendly and neutral actors. Additionally, the MLR's CAT must be able to balance its available capacity with any additional mission needs to counter an adversary's malign influence.

MIG Civil Affairs and the Information Coordination Cell

The MIG provides a critical function by integrating information activities in support of broader information maneuver within the MEF area of operation. The MIG performs this function through the ICC. The relationship of CMO and CAO to the ICC is described in MCTP 3-03A. It is staffed with a civil affairs officer, influence officer, influence chief, and influence specialist capable of conducting CAO and CMO planning.

Civil Affairs and Influence Operations Occupational Field

The Marine Corps' influence operations occupational field supports operations across the competition continuum by providing increased capabilities in civil affairs and psychological operations occupational fields to MAGTF and FMF commanders and improves career viability for those Marines. When designing and executing CAO, a central consideration is the type of civil affairs Marine employed. The Reserve Component retains Marines designated as a civil affairs officer and civil affairs specialist. Within the Active Component, influence officers and specialists provide additional skill sets to support influence activities. See Table 2-2 for the distinctions between influence and civil affairs Marines.

CHAPTER 3.

CIVIL ENGAGEMENT

Civil engagements are planned and focused activities in which civil affairs Marines deliberately interact with IPI, UAPs, and other civil entities to collect and share civil information. These engagements include deliberate or impromptu meetings with known friendly and neutral civil networks. They are designed to maintain and build relationships with the local population as well as understand how the local population operates. Civil engagements achieve multiple outcomes that include refining the CPB, supporting the CIM process, promoting the legitimacy of US forces, improving cooperation, and gaining an advantage against adversaries. Civil affairs Marines execute civil engagement through patrols, meetings with local leaders, and virtual platforms when conditions require. Civil engagement is critical to fully understanding and interacting with multiple actors, organizations, and leaders in an operational environment.

Civil affairs Marines conduct civil engagements for several reasons, including—

- Building relationships and trusted networks between the military and civil entities.
- Maintaining relationships with friendly actors and expanding relationships with neutral actors.
- Mitigating the impact of military operations on the IPI.
- Leveraging or influencing actions of civil entities.
- Informing or seeking information.
- Collaborating with the civil component.
- Developing civil considerations.
- De-conflicting operations between the civil populace and the military.
- Resolving conflict.

DEVELOPING CIVIL NETWORKS

Civil affairs Marines' ability to characterize civil networks makes them vital to their commander's success. Network engagement includes interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks. Marines simultaneously conduct network engagement at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, and they leverage existing networks within an operational environment. When civil affairs forces conduct network engagement, they examine all relevant networks, such as professional (unions, guilds, associations), functional (logistics, financial, communication), security (military, police, militias), and other related networks. For additional information about networks, refer to MCTP 3-02A, *Network Engagement*.

Civil networks are developed through programs, activities, and operations that either support a friendly, neutral, or unknown network or disrupt a threat network. The goal of developing civil networks is to provide information, capability, resources, and capacity that preserves combat power, consolidates gains, conserves finite resources, provides freedom of maneuver to friendly forces, and denies the enemy freedom of maneuver and influence within the civilian population. Civil affairs Marines develop, build, and evaluate civil networks based on MAGTF and FMF missions and requirements through impromptu and deliberate engagements.

Impromptu Engagements

Impromptu engagements are unplanned or unanticipated encounters. They include dynamic face-to-face conversations with local civilians during dismounted patrols or unsolicited meetings with local leaders. Civil affairs Marines can prepare for impromptu civil engagements through training and understanding the commander's intent, themes, mission narrative, mission statement, and CPB. Although there are many benefits to impromptu civil engagements, they can present risk when civil affairs forces have not planned for civil engagements in an operational environment full of cultural differences and language barriers. Marines must strike a balance between supporting the need for security and presenting a posture that conveys a willingness and openness to engage.

Deliberate Engagements

Deliberate engagements are deliberately planned and executed to generate a specific effect. They are planned events, approached in a detailed manner, which support the overall operational plan and the commander's intent, themes, and desired end state through targeted engagements. Deliberate civil engagements are not an isolated activity; they are integrated with the supported commander's mission and intent. In addition to deliberate engagements conducted by civil affairs forces, they are also conducted by—

- Communication strategy and operations Marines.
- Information maneuver forces.
- Chaplains.
- Health service support and force health protection.
- Legal.
- Law enforcement.
- Military advisors.
- Civil engineers.
- Other specialized engagement teams

Key Leader Engagement. One form of a deliberate civil engagement is the key leader engagement. Civil affairs forces assist Marine Corps leaders in preparing for engagements with important local and regional leaders to affect their attitudes, gain their support, and cultivate them as sources of information. Over time, Marine leaders can conduct engagements with key civilian leaders to maintain and expand friendly networks and to help understand foreign leaders' desires, interactions, and intentions. Key leaders often control civil networks with capabilities and resources that support the commander's operational plan. Leveraging these civil networks preserves combat power by enabling military forces to use civilian resources that otherwise go unnoticed or unused. Through deliberate civil engagements, civil affairs Marines might influence civil networks to mobilize civilian resources to support US military objectives.

The Civil Engagement Process. Deliberate civil engagements employ a seven-step engagement cycle. The seven-step cycle begins by identifying key leaders or entities, reviewing the CPB, identifying desired effects, preparing for the engagement, execution, mission debrief and reporting, and then re-engagement. Additionally, when planning and executing civil engagements, it is important to review the network analysis, intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and network engagement plan. The following sections detail each step in the civil engagement process.

Step 1: Identify Key Leader, Network, or Entity. The first step in the civil engagement process is to identify the key leader, network, or entity based on a review of the CPB, network analysis, IPB, and related planning support products. This review enables Marines to better understand network relationships within the operational environment. Additionally, identifying the key leader, network, or entity ensures that CAO are linked to the commander's desired outcomes.

In step 1, the civil affairs force begins planning by—

- Identifying the intended person, network, or entity to be engaged.
- Determining the target's potential for long-term influence.
- Determining the target's religious, political affiliations, familial or tribal relationships, and economic standing.

Step 2: Review Civil Preparation of the Battlespace. In step 2, Marines review the CPB to plan civil engagements and understand the relationship between the individual, network, or entity within the civil environment. The CPB has various information and data available, ranging from ASCOPE and PMESII to stakeholder analysis, for the civil affairs Marine to review when planning civil engagements. When planning civil engagements, Marines should consider the following:

- Information from all available sources (e.g., CIM, IPB, working groups, open source, and previous engagement reports).
- Commander's intent, themes, and narratives.
- Other ongoing engagements or negotiations.
- Recent significant events in the area of operation and surrounding areas.

Additionally, civil affairs force determines—

- Who might or should be present.
- Which US and friendly personnel are present.
- Other US and friendly personnel with whom they have engaged.
- The key issues for the command.
- The key issues for the local nationals.
- The preliminary conditions required to create the desired effect(s).
- Commitments that can be made, if any.
- The time to prepare.

Step 3: Identify Desired Effects. The commander determines desired outcomes for FMF or MAGTF operations within the operational environment. During step 3 of civil engagements, civil affairs Marines examine and identifies the desired outcomes of the civil engagement and aligns those outcomes with the commander's desired outcomes to ensure a unity of effort within the MAGTF. Civil affairs Marines identify desired outcomes by—

- Determining US desired outcomes.
- Desired outcome of the other party.
- Impact of unintended consequences.

Step 4: Prepare. Once the desired outcomes are identified, the next step is to prepare for the civil engagement. Cross-cultural communications are considered as well as employing an interpreter, negotiation and mediation requirements, and other considerations. Civil affairs Marines prepare for actions on the objective based on analysis from the previous three steps and by considering the following items:

- Structured discussion points.
- Contingencies and counters to unfavorable responses.
- The worst alternative to a negotiated agreement is the course of action (COA) that a party takes if current negotiations fail, and an agreement is not reached.

Additionally, the civil affairs force determines the roles and responsibilities within the engagement team by designating—

- A civil affairs Marine to conduct the engagement.
- A recorder or note-taker (someone not conducting the engagement).
- A security leader.
- An observer or photographer.

When hosting the engagement, civil affairs Marines—

- Select a location to support the tone of the meeting. If the engagement is about a serious matter and important decisions are made, a conference room is appropriate. If the intent of the meeting is to build rapport, select an office or social setting; ensure the setting is considered acceptable according to the cultural standards.
- Select a facility that is professional in appearance.
- Sanitize the engagement location. Ensure no information (e.g., maps, papers, or briefings) that can be useful to a threat is visible.
- Select a location with good security.
- Rehearse picking up the person or people to be engaged at the entrance to the facility.
- Ensure security personnel have situational awareness of the event.
- Consider protocol (e.g., pair people of equal rank or status).
- Provide appropriate hospitality (e.g., social customs and refreshments).
- Rehearse all security procedures.

When civil affairs Marines are not hosting the engagement or using a neutral location, they—

- Perform a reconnaissance of the location using multiple means, if feasible.
- Balance the security posture with consideration for the host. The engagement leader is responsible for security.
- Implement security considerations.
- Establish protocol.
- Design a communications plan.
- Create an exfiltration plan.
- Establish security breach and a mass casualty event plan.

Lastly, the civil affairs Marines rehearse actions with all personnel assigned to the mission in preparation for the civil engagement. Civil affairs Marines discuss the desired effects with the interpreter, recorder, and note-taker. If possible, use interpreters to role-play local national personalities, and practice social nuances.

Civil affairs Marines use a civil engagement plan worksheet (also called a target worksheet) to guide their efforts to plan and conduct engagements supporting the overall unit plan, creating effects throughout their assigned operational area (see Appendix B). This could entail engaging multiple individuals in coordination to achieve the desired effect. Conducting numerous civil engagements without proper coordination risks the opposite effect. Confusing, redundant, or incorrect messages and themes are conveyed, the targets could attempt to manipulate the civil affairs Marines.

The worksheet is prepared before meeting a specific individual. It is the primary responsibility of the civil affairs force conducting the engagement to prepare the worksheet; it should be understood by everyone attending the civil engagement. Unless of course, it contains sensitive information (not necessarily classified) that should not be shared with an interpreter or other foreign national.

Step 5: Execution. Step five in the civil engagement process is mission execution. This step is like many other tactical missions, except that actions on the objective are oriented on engaging with a key leader, network, or entity. As such, the preparation and rehearsals to this point have prepared the CAT for smooth and effective execution. When executing civil engagements, civil affairs Marines should—

- Observe correct social customs, greet in the culturally appropriate way (e.g., greet elders first), allow for culturally appropriate social time prior to the meeting, and present small gifts, if appropriate.
- Position the recorder or note-taker where the person conducting the engagement can see them, and where they are able to observe signals between the leader, interpreter, and recorder. If possible, include a digital recorder for redundancy.
- Only take notes if acceptable and with the individual's permission.

- Position the interpreter behind or to the side of the person conducting the engagement and employ a secondary interpreter to pick up sidebar conversations or conduct multiple, simultaneous engagements.
- Be a patient and active listener; know when to speak, focus on the objective, and give thought to what the individual is saying.
- Do not promise to act. Focus on coordinating as needed and enable local actors.
- Focus on building rapport to develop a relationship. Several meetings might need to be held to build rapport.
- Describe the individual's role and provide a statement to temper expectations and build trust and confidence.
- Practice having a conversation rather than interrogating. Make notes on mentioned topics that require further investigation. Gathering information during a conversation requires adaptability and flexibility.
- Develop an exit strategy should surrounding events or the conversation become hostile.

When ending the meeting, repeat the actionable items, restate understandings, clarify agreements, if needed, establish a follow-up timeline, and give appropriate farewells before arranging the next meeting and departing. Appendix B provides a template for the engagement worksheet.

Step 6: Debrief and Report. During step six, the CAT conducts a debrief, reviews key points from the discussion, and identifies outstanding issues. The CAT then forwards the debrief or report from the engagement to the intelligence and operations staff sections for analysis and dissemination. The CAT then incorporates the civil information that was collected into the CIM plan; records information for continuity per standing operating procedures; and ensures the recorded information contains any available photographs, phone numbers, or emails of key individuals. The CAT conducts a debrief with the interpreter, depending on their clearance level. The debrief should include the “atmospherics” the interpreter observed in either words or body language. There might be many things said by those not directly involved in the meeting that the interpreter overhears. Also, an interpreter who is a native speaker is more attuned to the subtle nuances of phrasing, colloquialisms, tone, facial expressions, etc. Nonverbal cues offer similar insight. The CAT completes the after action report (AAR) following their debrief, ensuring all relevant information for the engagement is included in the report.

Step 7: Re-Engage. Lastly, in step seven, the CAT reengages the key leader, if necessary. Maintaining relationships and providing a method for the key leader to contact the civil affairs Marine between engagements is important. For reengagements, civil affairs Marines conduct an abbreviated engagement cycle. Marines should consider that other actors within the operational environment also talk to that person, including international organizations and NGOs. The CAT should continue the CPB process and ascertain whether others in the area have met with the target and determine the effects of those engagements. Civil affairs Marines will repeat step 7 as deemed necessary.

CHAPTER 4.

CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE

Civil reconnaissance is a tactical, operational, and strategic activity involving the targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment. It emphasizes the civil components, encapsulated by elements represented at the tactical level by collecting and recording data organized through civil areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. Civil reconnaissance ensures acquiring a comprehensive understanding of the civilian population's social, economic, political, and cultural aspects, thereby contributing to the success of the commander's decision making, strategic planning, and mission. Civil reconnaissance drives the civil information collection plan designed to support CAO and CMO.

Civil affairs Marines conduct civil reconnaissance to collect information about the civil component. It begins with an area study followed by a preliminary civil reconnaissance and deliberate civil reconnaissance. Typically, a civil reconnaissance team is organized around civil affairs Marine competencies, which include cultural expertise, MARCIMS proficiency, and previous civil reconnaissance experience. The civil reconnaissance team is familiar with the functional aspects of local sewer, water, academics, trash, medical, safety, and other factors (referred to as SWEAT-MSO). Additionally, the CAT can assess agricultural, local economics, governance, rule of law, civil engineering, and related areas identified in the area study and preliminary civil reconnaissance. A civil reconnaissance team is a critical enabler to civil reconnaissance and CAO.

Civil affairs Marines conduct civil reconnaissance to—

- Locate, identify, survey, observe, and verify or refute ASCOPE information.
- Gain placement and access to the operational environment.
- Detect and monitor changes in the civil environment.
- Identify civil vulnerabilities and root causes of conflict.
- Identify potential key influencers that can be leveraged to achieve US objectives.

Civil affairs forces, across all three core competencies, conduct civil reconnaissance to identify various civil factors. Civil factors are people, places, and objects in the civil environment that affect civil affairs, CMO, and MAGTF operations. These factors are incorporated into assessments, estimates, situational awareness, plans, and orders. Civil factors include the following:

- Security.
- Justice.
- Reconciliation.
- Humanitarian assistance.

- Social well-being.
- Governance and participation.
- Economic stabilization.
- Infrastructure.
- Culture.

The civil information collection plan guides civil reconnaissance by synchronizing civil information collection efforts with other information requirements that support decision making. Civil information should contribute to the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) and answer specific requests for information (RFIs). Civil reconnaissance assessments flow into the CIM's information collection process, which is integrated into the common operating picture (COP).

NETWORK ENGAGEMENT AND CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE

The three tenets of network engagement are partnering with friendly networks, engaging neutral networks, and countering threat networks. The network engagement methodology is designed around the following principles:

- Understanding the operational environment.
- Understanding the networks.
- Engaging the networks.
- Assessing the effects on the networks

Network engagement enablers can support conducting and reviewing CPB during the planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, production, or dissemination stages. The staff uses CPB products and network analysis to inform planning, targeting, and assessments. As these processes unfold, the staff incorporates any additional information requirements into the collection plan.

Network analysis involves evaluating, gathering, and interpreting data to discern associations and relationships among individuals, groups, or entities. Marines conducting network analysis consider the context and significance of these relationships to identify opportunities to strengthen or weaken associations. Operational environments comprise interrelated friendly, neutral, and threat networks, all of which influence the mission. Analyzing these networks helps commanders identify key nodes and actors for engagement during the fires and effects integration process.

Network engagement analysis and activities are derived from civil reconnaissance. As civil affairs forces move throughout a battlespace or among the civil populations, they are interacting and gathering information and discerning key leaders, influencers, and relevant networks for further analysis. The information gathered helps the initial CBP and its refinement.

Categorizing networks is a crucial information management technique Marines employ to grasp the relationship between a network and friendly operational endeavors. Analysts evaluate the network's alignment with friendly efforts and classify it as a friendly, neutral, threat, or unknown network. Although these categories serve as initial guidelines for determining the most suitable category based on the network's capabilities and intentions, they are not rigid constructs.

The Friendly Network

Friendly networks (e.g. US forces, coalition forces, and USG organizations) directly or indirectly support a commander's mission. Depending on the operation, host-nation governments and their forces can be classified as friendly if they are part of the coalition or a partnership. Engaging with friendly networks provides commanders with counter-threat networks, which consist of integrated activities across the DoD and interagency partners to identify, monitor, disrupt, degrade, neutralize, and defeat relevant threat networks.

The Neutral Network

Neutral networks do not actively support or oppose US, coalition, or host-nation interests and are not considered current threats. Engaging neutral actors requires subtlety, sensitivity, and potentially extended periods to establish trust and build relationships. Understanding the factors that unite a neutral network helps commanders assess their capabilities and intentions. Friendly networks can engage with neutral networks to build friendly networks, influence other neutral networks, classify unknown networks, and degrade threat networks. Neutral network examples include IPI, NGOs, domestic and foreign private companies, media organizations, and religious groups.

The Threat Network

Threat networks have goals, objectives, or actions that oppose US, coalition, or host-nation interests and hinder the commander's operational objectives. Although not directly hostile, criminal networks can still negatively impact operational goals. Examples of threat networks include conventional armed forces, insurgent groups, criminal organizations, and geopolitical entities. Engaging with threat networks is essential for commanders to find, disrupt, and defeat threats in the civil component, to enable freedom of movement and maneuver, and leverage available resources in the civil component.

The Unknown Network

Unknown networks are those whose affiliations and intentions that are not readily discernible. The challenge is that they can be a friendly, neutral, or threat network. Understanding and classifying unknown networks is critical for commanders to effectively mitigate potential risks and leverage opportunities.

CONDUCTING CIVIL RECONNAISSANCE

Civil affairs Marines conduct civil reconnaissance at the tactical level to support all other civil affairs activities. There are multiple intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets available to build situational awareness and information environment battlespace awareness. The CAT or civil reconnaissance team can identify and request those capabilities that support their mission planning and help to fill gaps in the information collection plan. Additionally, CATs or civil reconnaissance teams can use ISR or information environment battlespace awareness assets

to assist in their data collection requirement or assessments. Marines can conduct civil reconnaissance in the field or using open-source research and associated software; however, there are data reliability issues that require verification. When using open-source information, it is important to be cognizant that the information being searched could be attributed back to a specific Marine and compromise operations security (OPSEC). For this reason, some personal portable electronic devices are prohibited.

When conducting civil reconnaissance, there are five primary considerations:

- **Security**. The primary objective of all military forces is to accomplish the mission and return to base ready and able to continue follow-on missions. Mission and team security is the primary consideration. In addition to force protection, civil affairs forces conducting civil reconnaissance must exercise OPSEC regarding their presence, profile, and posture. For example, civil affairs Marines should consider whether to have weapons visible or concealed or whether to wear civilian clothes or uniforms. Additionally, they should consider their ingress and egress routes, evasion plan, communications plan, and combat casualty care plan.
- **Required Collection**. The information collected during civil reconnaissance is guided by the civil information collection plan. The civil information collection plan is informed by the CCIR, priority information requirements (PIR), and friendly forces information requirements. Information collected during civil reconnaissance is guided by the commander's direction and influences the commander's decision making.
- **Integration**. Multiple assets within the joint force collect data on various aspects of the operational environment; thus, integration happens when civil reconnaissance is coordinated with the MAGTF staff, supported unit staff, interorganizational partners, and other related stakeholders. To the extent that operational and information security allow, this coordination can include a mission's operational details, information gaps and requirements, deconfliction of resources, security considerations, and how civil reconnaissance supports a shared understanding of the civil dimension.
- **Timeliness**. Civil reconnaissance is subject to the effects of friendly and adversary operations, as well as unforeseeable changes in the environment. Planning civil reconnaissance to meet reporting timelines should consider uncontrolled operational and environmental factors.
- **Opportunity Collection**. Opportunity collection occurs when civil affairs forces moving about the area of operation come upon aspects of the operational environment that are of interest or fulfill intelligence requirements. Civil affairs forces should be prepared to collect civil data when unplanned collection opportunities occur. Pre-mission information searches provide information about the area of operation and its people to guide actions when encountering these situations.

Civil affairs forces establish rapport with the local populace to continuously conduct civil reconnaissance of their area of operation. This enables civil affairs forces to continuously collect on civil information requirements, which are defined in the civil information collection plan. Additionally, civil reconnaissance assists in refining the area study and initial civil reconnaissance, as well as modifying planned missions and operations. Civil affairs assessments are developed by analyzing the data that was collected during civil reconnaissance and making a conclusion about the civil dimension. This ends with a product or a briefing based on information requirements, the mission, and unit-level standing operating procedures.

Civil affairs Marines identify a baseline of the civil component or structure and conduct an initial assessment before executing a deliberate assessment or surveying the population to enhance their conclusion about the population or structure. For example, if CATs identify that a village needs water, they can investigate the village's water source and average consumption requirements to determine whether the village requires additional water sources or if existing sources need repair. Civil affairs Marines should always take appropriate personnel or subject matter experts when executing civil reconnaissance.

Hasty Civil Reconnaissance

A hasty civil reconnaissance is conducted upon entry into the designated area of operation and is the first physical assessment that civil affairs forces conduct. Depending on the situation and timing, the location, group, or individual may have been previously visited or interviewed. The objectives or focus of the initial civil reconnaissance should be broad yet manageable; for example, "assess general conditions of the civil factors within the operational environment." During the initial civil reconnaissance, CATs conduct a hasty survey of the area of operation's conditions as directed by the mission statement. Using the civil affairs methodology principles, they focus civil reconnaissance on locations that best satisfy the supported commander's civil information collection plan. Pertinent information sources include key leaders from the host-nation government, such as public safety and health and important non-government business and community leaders, United Nations, or NGO relief sites.

Deliberate Civil Reconnaissance

Deliberate civil reconnaissance determines the current conditions, capabilities, or attitudes of a population or population center. The objectives or focus of deliberate civil reconnaissance should be well defined and used for emergencies, single issues, or special situations. The CAT can be tasked with answering a CCIR, PIR, or RFI on a specific detail in the civil environment.

Civil affairs forces conduct deliberate civil reconnaissance to help provide critical insights into the conditions and capabilities of the operational environment. Understanding the status of dislocated civilians and their movement routes allows military or civil affairs units to assess the effect of displacement and plan accordingly for humanitarian assistance or resettlement efforts. Similarly, evaluating the capacity of local emergency services following a natural disaster is crucial for gauging the community's resilience and identifying areas where support is needed. Additionally, assessing the status of key infrastructure such as hospitals, dams, railroads, bridges, and cell phone towers provides essential information for prioritizing reconstruction efforts and ensuring the continuity of essential services. Civil reconnaissance teams can contribute to effective decision making and approaches to the complex operational environments by incorporating the civil considerations identified during deliberate civil reconnaissance.

Civil Reconnaissance Surveys

Civil reconnaissance surveys are detailed assessments (ongoing or directed) that examine the objects identified during the initial civil reconnaissance. Civil affairs forces conduct surveys on individuals, facilities, groups, locations, and capabilities within a specific system. Templates and forms for civil reconnaissance are available in the MARCIMS portal. Additionally, CIM forms are found in MCRP 3-34.3, *Engineer Reconnaissance*.

Civil reconnaissance surveys are crucial in military operations. These surveys—

- Are designed to identify patterns, trends, and indicators within the operational environment, providing valuable insights into the dynamics of the civil landscape.
- Facilitate updating requirements for follow-on civil affairs forces, ensuring that subsequent actions are tailored to address evolving needs.
- Help validate or assess the measures of effectiveness (MOEs), enabling commanders to accurately gauge ongoing operations' success.
- Aid in identifying stakeholders and potential factors of stability or instability within the area of operations, which is essential for informed decision making and strategic planning.
- Help identify capabilities and capacities, including any shortfalls or resiliencies of surveyed items, providing a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment, and supporting mission success.

Tactical Conflict Survey. The tactical conflict survey (TCS) identifies potential factors of instability. It asks four broad questions, each followed by “why,” to gather local perceptions or validate the execution of proposed stabilization activities. The TCS is designed to facilitate discussions with locals and to identify root causes of instability during initial civil reconnaissance. Similarly, responses generated can also be used to deduce local resiliencies. The four sample questions are—

- Has the number of people in your town changed recently? Why?
- What is the most important problem facing your town? Why?
- Who do you believe can solve your problem? Why?
- What should be done first to help the town? Why?

Data Analysis

Data analysis encompasses both qualitative and quantitative approaches, each serving distinct purposes in research.

Qualitative data, characterized by its non-statistical nature and open-ended inquiry, delves into the “why” behind phenomena. Through qualitative research, data is generated to fuel theorizations, interpretations, and the development of initial understandings. This form of data analysis is essential in civil reconnaissance as it allows for in-depth exploration of the operational environment, uncovering nuanced insights and facilitating informed decision making.

Quantitative data adopts a more structured and numerical approach, providing concise and conclusive information. Unlike qualitative data, which focuses on exploration, quantitative data answers 'how much' or 'how many' questions. Its statistical nature lends itself well to structured analysis, making it valuable for measuring and quantifying various aspects of the operational environment.

In civil reconnaissance, integrating both qualitative and quantitative data analysis methods ensures Marines have a comprehensive understanding of civil networks, which enables them to effectively plan, integrate fires and effects, and assess mission objectives.

Civil affairs Marines conducting civil reconnaissance should ensure that the ISR is integrated into the collection plan. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance encompasses the coordinated acquisition, processing, and dissemination of timely and accurate information to support commanders' activities. This crucial function uses various platforms across all domains, to include cyberspace, to gather intelligence and provide a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment. By integrating ISR assets, commanders can achieve enhanced clarity and depth of knowledge, enabling effective decision making and operational planning. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, ranging from optical and radar images to electromagnetic signals, offers valuable insights, including early warning of enemy threats and opportunities to enhance coordination and lethality.

Digital Civil Reconnaissance

Civil affairs Marines use digital civil reconnaissance to gather vital information in operational environments by harnessing digital technologies and open-source data. This enables targeted and planned observation of specific civil aspects without a physical presence, making it particularly valuable in denied, politically sensitive, or remote regions where traditional methods are impractical. It relies on open-source information gathered from diverse platforms such as the internet, social media, academic papers, and news articles. This process involves aggregating and analyzing data points related to demographics, social structures, infrastructure, and cultural nuances.

Digital civil reconnaissance employs layered information analysis, categorizing data based on its classification level to facilitate sharing among stakeholders with various security clearances. This approach ensures a comprehensive understanding of the civil landscape, encompassing social, economic, political, and cultural dimensions. In the information environment, it facilitates insights into denied areas by circumventing physical access restrictions, making it indispensable for operations.

Digital civil reconnaissance minimizes risks to Marines by enabling remote information collection, particularly in high-risk or politically sensitive regions where physical presence might not be possible. It is cost-effective and timely, and it aligns with the need for agile and efficient information gathering, ensuring readiness and adaptability.

Stability Assessment Framework

Civil reconnaissance support to planning includes activities that inform planning processes like the Stability Assessment Framework (SAF). The SAF is an analytical, planning, and programming process designed to support CMO planning, the civil affairs methodology, and the fires and effects integration methodology. This framework helps planners determine stability dynamics within the operational environment and to design programs and activities that address sources of instability and reinforce sources of stability and resiliencies, and to measure their effect in fostering stability.

The SAF focuses on the attributes of the operational environment and integrates multiple perspectives during planning and assessment. It has four basic components nested within both the civil affairs methodology and the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPPE). The four SAF components are CPB, analysis, design, and execution. The SAF operates independently and complement existing planning and execution processes (e.g., fires and effects integration methodology) used during operations.

Civil reconnaissance is a component of the design phase in SAF, as well as a vital component to CPB. Step 1 of CPB is to define the civil operational environment. Without the information provided through civil reconnaissance, CPB cannot move forward. The last step of CPB (step 4), is to validate an activity as a viable stability non-lethal target. This validation takes place through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement. Together, civil reconnaissance and civil engagement examine actual local conditions to ensure planning assumptions are not corrupt or misguided. During the last step and prior to the execution phase, activities are validated, prioritized, and synchronized with overall efforts. If the activity is deemed untenable or beyond mission parameters, it is reevaluated through CPB and the entire process cycles again.

CHAPTER 5.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

The CMOC (see Figure 5-1) supports CMO components, including civil-military relations, enabling operations, and information management. The CMOC serves as one of the primary coordination interfaces for US forces with IPI, UAPs, and interagency organizations. The CMOC provides support to the combat operations center by providing liaison and coordination with the civil dimension that includes the IPI, international organizations, and host-nation partners. External organizations cannot be compelled to use the CMOC; however, the CMOC can serve as a liaison and provide liaison support to coordinate with external agencies and organizations to encourage their participation. It can be tailored to the mission and augmented with enabling capabilities such as engineer, medical, or transportation assets, and it serves as the conduit for integrating non-military organizations into a collaborative planning process and subsequent operations. A commander establishes a CMOC to create one or more of the following:

- A meeting place (or UAPs to facilitate coordination, mediation, and consensus building (a coordination center).
- A link to the non-military partners and participants.
- A clearinghouse for information and military support requests from non-military organizations.
- A knowledge and document management center for civil information.
- A central location to capture a record of infrastructure needs.
- A collaborative planning cell for CMO.
- An analysis center for the civil component of the operational environment.

A CMOC is used to analyze, plan, coordinate, monitor, synchronize, and influence the civil component of the MAGTF's operational environment. The CMOC also contributes to actions supporting information activities. Once established, a CMOC is responsible for meeting the following MAGTF objectives:

- Execute the commander's intent and CMO guidance.
- Facilitate CAO.
- Provide input and updates to the COP.
- Conduct CIM.
- Provide liaisons to other departments, agencies, and organizations.
- Provide a forum for organizations that want to discuss CMO issues and raise concerns yet maintain their neutrality. (Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for stakeholder discussions, but not a stakeholder decision-making forum.)
- Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector. (The CMOC then forwards these requests to the supported commander and staff for action.)




Figure 5-1. Notional Functions of a CMOC.

The MAGTF CMOC is a liaison and coordination center established and operated by the battlespace owner to plan, coordinate and facilitate MAGTF and civil affairs activities in the operational environment, monitor, analyze, and disseminate civil information, and provide input to the civil dimension of the COP. However, unlike the Army, which has various CMOCs embedded within their tables of organization, Marine civil affairs forces leverage capabilities within a MAGTF to establish a CMOC. For example, Marine civil affairs units coordinate with the command element to install, operate, and maintain communications services (e.g., email, web browsing, and voice [phone]) at a CMOC.

As stated, there is no established structure for MAGTF CMOCs and no two are identical. Each CMOC is organized to promote information exchange between participating organizations and agencies, including those that do not have a mechanism for coordination and cooperation. Civil affairs Marines in a CMOC are culturally aware, communicate in the local language, and provide a secure environment for all participants.

The CMOC's functions include the following:

- Being scalable and tailored to the given operation.
- Conducting detailed CMO analysis and planning.
- Supporting the activities of civil affairs forces.
- Providing feedback relating to the effects of operations on the civil environment.
- Preparing maneuver units to independently establish a CMOC or mobile CMOC.
- Receiving, analyzing, developing, and managing civil information.
- Disseminating civil information.
- Making recommendations on how to influence the civil component.
- Synchronizing and integrating resources and capabilities.
- Conducting transitional operations

The CMOC has common requirements that should be identified during planning. A CMOC should be given a specific task and purpose, usually found in Annex G of the operation order. Analyzing task and purpose helps the commander determine the structure, equipment, staffing, location, and operational requirements. The following tasks relate to the overall support provided to the CMOC by its headquarters:

- Identify the CMOC's task or purpose.
- Set up and dismantle the CMOC.
- Establish mission dependent CMOC configurations.
- Establish guard, sleep, and shift manning plans.
- Provide command and control (C2) systems and any required communication assets needed.
- Provide life support (food, water, sanitation, medical support, etc.) for CMOC personnel.

To support MAGTF operations, a CMOC is organized and equipped to protect, move, and communicate with its supported command. When the supported force is engaged in decisive action, the CMOC monitors and reports on stability and activities within the operational environment. The CMOC provides actionable civil information in the operational environment. When conducting stabilization activities and FHA, the CMOC can be positioned away from the supported HHQ for greater access to the population.

Operational and mission variables affecting the CMOC can change with each mission. Changes can occur during current operations that affect the CMOC's configuration. The CMOC includes military and civilian components to maximize the efforts of each entity involved; this ensures unity of effort in planning and coordinating CMO activities. Civil liaison teams are organic to a CAG. They are stand-alone teams for the CMOC and act in a similar role as a CAT for a supported infantry battalion. The civil liaison team provides the supported CMOC with civil reconnaissance and civil engagement capabilities for CAO and CMO coordination without interfering with the regular staff functions. They help the CMOC preserve relationships with relevant actors and extend its outreach into multiple areas; however, they provide only a limited civil-military capability.

Augmented with other military forces, IPI, UAPs, NGOs, and interagency capabilities, the CMOC can be optimized to coordinate the CMO activities that a supported commander might need accomplished.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER TASKS

Civil affairs forces supporting combat operations might be simultaneously supporting different operations. A CMOC can support the MAGTF by visualizing the operational environment and promoting unified action through the analysis, monitoring, planning, coordinating, synchronizing, integrating, and influencing of the civil component of an operational environment. The CMOC conducts numerous tasks to achieve its mission during combat operations or in support of defense support of civil authorities. These tasks include—

- Supporting the commander's CMO activities.
- Managing the six-step CIM process.
- Building and preserving relationships with new relevant actors and networks.
- Building relationships and trusted networks between the military and civil entities.
- Leveraging or influencing actions of civil entities.
- Collaborating with the civil component.
- De-conflicting operations between the civil populace and the military.
- Mitigating the effect of military operations on the IPI.
- Disseminating or collecting information.
- Deconflicting potential conflicts
- Conducting MGO activities.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS

During conditions that primarily favor offensive operations, CMOCs at the tactical level remain as mobile as the headquarters element they support. The CMOCs—

- Provide information on resources within an operational environment that can assist the in achieving stated goals and end states, while reducing internal resource consumption.
- Plan populace control measures to increase freedom of maneuver.
- Plan CAO to increase stability in newly liberated areas, and liaises with joint, interagency, and interorganizational partners to prepare for the transition to stabilization activities.
- Generate broad-spectrum information regarding the civil component, which commanders use to develop an understanding of their operational environment.
- Support the commander and associated J-9/G-9/S-9 (CMO) staff sections by enabling consolidation of gains through planning and conducting minimum-essential stabilization activities to establish civil security and provide immediate needs where they exist because of combat operations.

For offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities, a CMOC can be organized so that stakeholders from the host nation, coalition forces, international organizations, NGOs, and civil affairs forces can coordinate. Figure 5-2 below provides a notional layout for a CMOC.




Figure 5-2. Notional Layout for a Tactical CMOC.

During conditions that favor primarily defensive operations, CMOCs become static, much like the units they support. When static, CMOCs—

- Can focus on the civil conditions within a specific area.
- Increase the amount of civil information gleaned from civil network nodes and ground forces operating in the area.
- During mobile defense, work to establish, maintain, or hand off communication with civil entities to ensure the planning for and conduct of minimum-stability tasks.
- Support the commander and associated J-9/G-9/S-9 CMO staff sections by enabling consolidation of gains through planning for and conduct of minimum-essential stabilization tasks to establish civil security and provide immediate needs where they exist because of combat operations.
- Coordinate with entities within the civil component to—
 - ♦ Identify threats to the civil populace.
 - ♦ Execute MGO.
 - ♦ Coordinate civil capabilities and resources to support the commander's mission.

Developed and integrated civil networks allow the commander to maintain influence over areas that might need to be bypassed or vacated during combat operations. The CMOC is also essential to supporting irregular activities by planning and directing essential stabilization activities in support of counterinsurgency or FID. During defense, urgent coordination with civil components—such as IPI, international organizations, NGOs, and the interagency—is essential to defeat lethal threats within the civil component. Additionally, coordinating with civil components enables the CMOC to rapidly and effectively capitalize on gains made to free up resources to prosecute the enemy in other areas of the operational environment.

A CMOC continuously plans for and reinforces stability during operations across the offense, defense, and stability construct. When stabilization activities are the priority for the MAGTF and joint force, CMOCs—

- Use civil affairs units to establish civil networks within the civil component.
- Plan for civil component assessments.
- Recommend initial procedures necessary for commanders to expand beyond the minimum essential stabilization activities.
- Plan for the transition from limited Marine stabilization activities to the Army, other USG agencies, or the host nation to conduct the full range of stabilization tasks.
- Provide greater visualization of the civil component of the operational environment to the commander to enable effective mission planning.

See Table 5-1 for the relationship between a CMOC, humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC), and humanitarian operations center (HOC).

Table 5-1. Relationships among a CMOC, HACC, and HOC.

	Establishing Authority	Function	Composition
HOC	Designated individual of affected country, United Nations, or USG department or agency	Coordinates overall relief strategy at the national (country) level.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Affected country • United Nations • US embassy or consulate • Joint task force • Other non-military agencies • Concerned parties (private sector)
HACC	Combatant commander	Assists with interagency coordination and planning at the strategic level. Typically is disestablished once a HOC or CMOC is established.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Combatant command • NGOs • International organizations • Regional organizations • Concerned parties (private sector)
CMOC	Joint task force or component commander	Assists in the coordination of activities at the operational level and tactical level with military forces, USG departments and agencies, nongovernmental and international organizations, and regional organizations.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint task force • NGOs • International organizations • Regional organizations • USG departments and agencies • Local government (host country) • Multinational forces • Other concerned parties (private sector)

CHAPTER 6.

CIVIL-INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, disseminate, and protect data that is intrinsic to CAO and the operations process. It is the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decision making.

THE SIX-STEP CIM PROCESS

Through a six-step process, CIM supports CAO by extracting relevant data from collected civil information and fusing it with the operations process. The six-steps of the CIM process are plan, collect, consolidate, analyze, produce, and share (see Figure 6-1).




Figure 6-1. Civil Information Management Process.

Step 1: Plan

Planning is the first step in the CIM process and results in civil affairs Marines collecting, consolidating, and sharing information. Planning considerations for CIM are derived from the staff's analysis of DoD-sourced information. Readily available open-source information often provides valuable insight into the civil dimension of the operational environment. Therefore, input

from multiple sources, such as intelligence organizations, interagency partners, the host- or partner- nation, international organizations, and NGOs is essential to developing a better understanding of the civil dimension.

Collaboration increases overall operational efficiency by eliminating redundant collection efforts. This requires a coordinated effort focused on sharing data among civil affairs forces and other staff sections to support the IPB and CPB processes, which results in the initial PIRs and taskings to subordinate units.

Civil affairs force participation in interagency and multinational forums with the command, and other senior agency representatives are important to coordinate activities, particularly in hostile or uncertain environments. Civil affairs forces can provide real-time assessments in governance and FHA issues.



Step 2: Collect

Information collection is the second step of the CIM process. It refers to the collection of civil-related information and relevant data. This step provides information to other related CAO, CMO, and staff planning activities and processes. Civil affairs forces collect civil information through civil reconnaissance, civil engagement, and data mining activities. Often, information is collected in collaboration with IPI, international organizations, and other government agencies.

The civil information collection plan is interdependent, and at times integrated with the ISR plan. The distinction between civil information and intelligence is the orientation on the civil dimension vice the enemy, respectively. International organizations, civil stakeholders, and IPI are often reluctant to engage with and share critical civil information with civil affairs Marines if they believe that information drives intelligence and MAGTF fires and integration processes. Consequently, the ISR plan leverages advanced capabilities to characterize the civil dimension, build situational awareness, and drive decision making that might otherwise be unavailable to the CIM process. It is necessary to apply judgment from experience in determining the best collection methods for civil information.

Civil information must be stored and shared, which requires CIM systems and CIM processes. Table 6-1 describes the relationships between CIM systems and processes. The Marine Corps employs MARCIMS to store and share civil information. Additionally, a MAGTF or FMF staff assigns an information management officer to establish and manage processes that support integrating information across MAGTF and FMF staffs. For more information about information management refer to MCTP 3-30B, *Information Management*.

Table 6-1. CIM Systems and Processes.

CIM Function	Information Flow	CIM Process
Store Information		Plan
		Collect
		Consolidate
Share Information		Analyze
		Produce
		Share

Step 3: Consolidate

Consolidation is the third step in the CIM process. Consolidation is ordering or cataloging the data into groupings, such as staff estimates or databases. The four elements of step 3 are collation, processing, filtering, and creating databases.

Collating and tagging data organizes and standardizes information into relevant groups for easy identification or further processing. A civil-information database can store vast amounts of cataloged data with attached files and photos and rapidly retrieve this data for follow-on processing, analysis, production, and sharing. These database structures typically collate civil information by date, type, location, organization, activity and tag the data according to supported objectives.

Processing is reducing and converting collated data into specific formats. Processing reduces data size by removing obsolete, irrelevant, inaccurate, incomplete, or redundant data.

Having quality information adds value to the decision-making process. Civil affairs forces consider the following seven information quality characteristics:

- Accuracy. Information conveys the objective truth of a situation.
- Relevance. Information applies to the mission, task, or situation.
- Timeliness. Information is available in time to make decisions.
- Usability. Information is in a common, easily understood format.
- Completeness. Information meets all the decision maker's requirements.
- Brevity. Information has only the level of detail required.
- Security. Information has been afforded adequate protections.

Basic filtering criteria should be set by the senior civil affairs Marine, CMO planner, or CIM manager. There are various considerations that can be used to determine filtering criteria (e.g., quality characteristics listed above). Examples of filtering criteria include—

- Subject Matter. Information related to the civil environment, etc.
- Location. Information related to the MAGTF's area of operations.
- Time of Occurrence. Have other reporting and processes already superseded the information?
- Redundancy. Are multiple reports related to the same data or event? Can the information be used to confirm or deny, or does it possess additional significant data?

A CIM database provides insight to past and present conditions within the civil component of the operational environment that are readily available to commanders and staff.

Step 4: Analyze

The analyze phase evaluates and integrates collected information to produce usable products. Civil affairs Marines build situational awareness and understanding by analyzing the nature, functions, and meanings of collected information to identify patterns and indicators. This analysis provides contextual insight into civil behaviors and actions. Analysis is a systemic and deliberate process that feeds into related civil affairs planning activities including CPB and the SAF.

Analysis separates data into the basic components of cause and effect. It is fundamental to decision making, where different analytical methods can result in contradictory understandings. Analysis provides the “so what” to the collected civil information. The analytic process consists of gathering data, organizing the data, making associations among elements within the data, developing hypotheses or assumptions, and verifying or refuting those assumptions. The analyze step ensures that relevant information is presented to the decision-maker. The analyze step of CIM is complementary to step 2 of CPB (analyze the civil environment) and can use several methods to determine relationships. When analyzing civil information, Marines typically use analytical methods, including—

- Civil Considerations Analysis. Civil considerations analysis is the process by which Marines evaluate civil information to determine the effect of the civil component on operations, as well as the effect of operations on the civil component. Civil considerations analysis, which is based on ASCOPE and PMESII data, is critical to mission success.
- Stakeholder Analysis. Stakeholder analysis is the process of assessing a system and potential changes as they relate to relevant and interested parties (i.e., stakeholders). Stakeholder analysis identifies individuals who have a personal stake in the operational environment and examines their needs. It assesses the effects of primary and secondary stakeholders on the operational environment. Primary stakeholders are those who have a direct interest in the operational environment; secondary stakeholders are those who have an indirect interest. Civil affairs Marines can conduct a stakeholder analysis using a stakeholder’s matrix, which helps develop mitigation measures, enhancement measures, and implementation plans.
- Systems Analysis. Systems analysis is a process of collecting and interpreting facts, identifying the problems, and decomposition of a system into its components. Systems analysis identifies civil vulnerabilities within the civil component by determining both the cause and the effect. Based on ASCOPE and focused on PMESII data, systems analysis supports center of gravity (COG) analysis and enhances situational understanding. Civil affairs Marines conduct systems analysis based on operational necessity.
- Root Cause Analysis. Root cause analysis is an empirical-based analytical tool used to review events, issues, problems, and causes. A cause can be a natural or man-made disaster that arises from conflict or changes in the status quo. Root cause analysis can form a critical element of CMO by focusing operations on the causes of instability or on obstacles to mission objectives. Civil affairs forces use the CPB, SAF, and other processes to analyze instability.
- Nodal Analysis. Nodal analysis enables civil affairs Marines to gain a more detailed understanding of a node and its relationships with other nodes in a network. Analyzing the interrelated networks requires clarity on the type and strength of each link connecting a node to others. Understanding the relationships between nodes provides information that supports the entity or target selection process and prioritization. During nodal analysis, the analyst examines the conditions of the relationship (strong or weak, informal or formal), and whether they are formed by familial, social, cultural, political, virtual, professional, or other factors. Analysts use the qualitative data produced by nodal analysis with quantitative data to select specific nodes to engage.
- Link Analysis. Link analysis is the process of identifying and analyzing relationships between personnel, personas, signatures, contacts, associations, events, activities, organizations, and networks to determine key or significant links. Civil affairs forces can use link analysis to

diagram human networks and determine interactions among individuals. Link analysis tools include association matrices, activity matrices, and link diagrams.

- Geospatial Analysis. Geospatial analysis refers to analyzing imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities that are of interest to the supported commander. This analysis is related to, and can be informed by, step 2 of CPB by incorporating the physical environment and infrastructure analysis conducted in that step.

Assessment measures are also developed during the analysis step. Assessments enable commanders to monitor and evaluate trends and changes in the civil dimension of the operational environment in relation to task accomplishment and desired effects. Understanding the relationship between outcomes, effects, and task completion enables civil affairs Marines to promote both a shared understanding within the staff and support the commander's decision making.

Measures of effectiveness are linked to the desired end state of a mission and assess changes in the operational environment towards that end state. Measures of performance (MOPs) are linked to task accomplishment. Typically, the commander has direct authority of task accomplishment; for example, was the school built on time and to standard? However, the commander assesses whether the school project had the desired effect in building legitimacy toward the host-nation government by providing an essential service. Taken together, building a school (MOP) and increasing host-nation legitimacy (MOE) are linked to host-nation capacity building oriented on governance (end state).

Step 5: Produce

The production phase ensures CIM products and services are accurate, timely, and useable for commanders and other senior leaders. Products include—

- Layered geospatial information.
- Civil layers (ASCOPE and PMESII) for the COP.
- COG.
- Association matrix.
- Activities matrix.
- Network diagram.
- Network function template.
- Answers to RFIs.
- Key influences and relevant factors products.
- Civil considerations products.
- Reported priority civil information requirements.
- Updates to ongoing assessments, estimates, and area studies.
- Information papers that might include area studies, executive summaries, AARs, civil engagement reports, talking points, and project closeout reports.

When developing CIM products, analysts should first determine the format they will use to brief the supported commander. Understanding who the product is for, its intended purpose, and when it is needed enables analysts to determine how to develop CIM products and synchronize them with the supported unit's operations process. The products, reports, and graphics should exercise brevity, so as not to saturate the planning staff with too much information that is unnecessary, redundant, or irrelevant to the mission. When producing products, analysts should reduce duplication by synchronizing products with other organizations and agencies.

Step 6: Share

Information sharing is the sixth and last step in the CIM process. Information sharing assists disparate partner agencies and organizations in coordinating actions and involves more than an active pushing of products to specific consumers and the passive posting of products on web portals. Information sharing is a continuous process that ensures all parties involved in establishing an agreed upon end state are working from a shared understanding of the operational variables. The CIM planner works with the staff's information management office to support the integration of CIM products into the staff battle rhythm and processes. The intelligence and operations sections use civil information products. Information sharing includes—

- Integrating partners' input with the COP.
- Establishing civil information repositories and granting access to online databases that include reports, assessments, and area studies.
- Disseminating reports, updating briefs, and developing other civil-information products.
- Integrating with the joint targeting process.
- Integrating with the combatant command (CCDR) campaign plans.

Civil affairs Marines work closely with the MAGTFs information management office and security manager to develop processes, procedures, and controls to share CIM products with allies, partners, the host nation, and other civil stakeholders, while ensuring safeguards remain in place to protect controlled information. Civil affairs Marines determine information sharing requirements and provide disclosure guidance, classifications, and caveats throughout the civil information life cycle. This enables the staff to share data to the maximum extent allowed by US laws and DoD policy. Civil affairs Marines balance the need to protect critical information (i.e., OPSEC) with the imperative to share civil information.

Civil information management builds and maintains the civil component of the commander's COP. Current MAGTF standing operating procedures depict six recognized pictures (air, ground, environmental, logistics, intelligence, and civil) needing to be represented on their COPs. All these pictures are displayed on a unit's Command and Control Personal Computer—Marine Corps battle command system. The civil picture focuses on and depicts PMESII data relevant to ASCOPE in an operational environment. The current MAGTF civil picture contains the following civil information requirements:

- Overall population (number of persons).
- Urban centers.
- Capitals (regional, provincial, district).
- Borders and boundaries (international, regional, provincial, districts, cities).

- Vital infrastructure (food storage depots, water reservoirs, electric power plants, etc.)
- Political and governmental system (authoritarian, democratic, dictator, theocratic, republic, kingdom, etc.)
- Political leadership at the national, district or province level. Events are likely to cause significant loss of confidence in national, district and provincial officials, and events likely to destabilize the district or province. Reports or instances of corruption of national, district, or province level government officials.
- Successful anti-corruption activity by municipal, district, province, or national leadership; and, civil society actions, economic actions against corruption (enemy versus criminal).
- Plans or actions by international organizations to reduce or withdraw their resources from or take actions that affect operations, including the introduction of significant new programs or actors.
- Opponent leadership, insurgent groups, or key leaders expressing willingness to reintegrate with host-nation leadership.
- Economy (general situation, inflation, unemployment, banking system, resources, infrastructure, sectors, industry, trade, labor pool. etc.).
- Agriculture.
- Ethnicities.
- Religion.
- Social (languages, education, emigration, immigration, demographics, human rights, etc.)
- Jurisdiction (legal system, rule of law, etc.).
- Significant changes in any part of the judicial national, district or provincial system.
- Host-nation event likely to attract significant media attention or exploitable for gain.
- Membership to international organizations.
- Diplomatic seats (embassies, consulates).
- Any notable change to foreign diplomatic status or any significant diplomatic event.
- Locations and mission and functions of international organizations, governmental organizations, and NGOs.
- Locations and status of civilian airports and airfields (status and airport facilities and infrastructure: buildings, runways, parking areas).
- Locations and status of civilian ports and harbors (status and port facilities and infrastructure).
- Locations and status of civilian helicopter landing zones.
- Locations and status of civilian communications and information systems infrastructure (availability and status).
- Schools and universities
- Cultural and historical sites.
- Religious sites and shrines.
- Roads (motorways, primary and secondary roads) and road conditions or status (existing, under construction, planned).

- Railroad infrastructure (existing, under construction, planned); railroads and rail heads locations, conditions, and status.
- Inland waterways infrastructure (rivers, canals, locks, etc.).
- Bridges and culverts conditions and status.
- Overall traffic density (land, air, maritime).
- Location of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) capabilities, holdings, projects, etc.
- Displaced persons and refugees and internal displaced persons (camps, movements)
- Humanitarian aid routes.
- Location of vital and essential civilian infrastructure and assets (dams, diamond mines, oil fields and refineries, power plants, etc.).
- Significant related CIMIC events.
- Significant event or change of status involving a private security company.
- Significant issues relating to the military technical agreement.
- Significant status or capability change of key essential services (sewer, water, electric, etc.).
- Host-nation events likely to attract significant media attention or exploitable for international organizations' gain.

The CIM process is designed to turn raw civil data into processed information and knowledge that enhance related processes like IPB. Civil affairs Marines are trained to execute the CIM process and provide tailored products to support CAO and MAGTF operations. Given the complexity of the civil dimension, CIM is critical to evaluating and assessing progress toward mission accomplishment. Finally, CIM products are derived from information provided by civil stakeholders, IPI, and other non-military actors in the operational environment. Civil affairs Marines should synchronize the CIM products with interagency and civil stakeholders in the operational environment.

MARINE CORPS CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The principal knowledge management data repository for civil information is the MARCIMS; it is the program of record for Marines to capture and share civil information. It enables users to collect, organize, analyze, visualize, and share data collected from the field to support CAO and CMO by sharing civil information on an unclassified platform. Additionally, MARCIMS provides a shared understanding of civil information to related staff action, mission planning, and CAO. The key component to MARCIMS is the web portal.

The MARCIMS web portal is an unclassified knowledge-based portal for automated information structuring and management operating on a virtual private cloud. Civil affairs Marines can input civil directly into the MARCIMS portal where users create queries and build pages to visualize results and share information.

CHAPTER 7.

MILITARY-GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

During Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, the Marine Corps supported the Department of State (DOS) in its interagency-led effort to re-establish indigenous governments where US and coalition forces effected regime changes. Military government is the supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and IPI of domestic, allied, neutral, or enemy territory; therefore, substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government. It requires a long-term commitment and applying resources that will support the newly established government long after combat forces are withdrawn from the region. Civil affairs forces should coordinate at the earliest possible moments to transition governance responsibilities to host-nation, joint, or interagency capabilities.

In MGO, civil affairs Marines focus on rapidly establishing governance; assessing the civil needs of the effected population; and setting the conditions for follow-on forces or USG agencies, IPIs, or international organizations. Although the Marine Corps is designed for limited military engagements, they can find themselves liberating populations from their oppressive governments or providing aid to areas affected by man-made or natural disasters where local governance no longer functions. Civil affairs forces' unique combination of civilian oriented skills, ability to understand governance, and deep understanding of the civil component of the operational environment, provides the Marine Corps with a capability to establish effective military government.

Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 2000.13, *Civil Affairs*, outlines the following CAO activities that should be included when supporting MGOs:

- Establish civil security, provide support to governance, provide essential services, support economic development and infrastructure, and establish civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until control can be returned to civilian or non-US military authority.
- Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that civilian authorities are typically responsible for. Civil affairs forces use their expertise to implement DoD policies to advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.
- Establish and conduct a military government until a civilian authority or government can be restored.

When territory is occupied or controlled during military operations, military authority is imposed in accordance with the law of land warfare and international requirements. Military authority is asserted by imposing MGOs, which are designed to enhance, rehabilitate, restore, or establish civilian sector functions. An MGO provides SCA to an established civil authority or asserts transitional military authority until a civilian authority or government can be established. Military

government operations support US instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement abroad) by executing governance tasks mandated by US policy and international law.

Military-government operations are a core competency of civil affairs forces who are trained, educated, and organized to support or execute the functions of a civil administration during SCA or transitional military authority. Civil affairs teams support MGO through assessments and initial identification of civil vulnerabilities. Furthermore, civil affairs functional specialists—or a civil affairs functional specialty cell—who possess expertise in civilian sector functions coordinate MGO activities that are typically the responsibility of civilian authorities.

TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY

Transitional military authority is defined as “a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority” (*USMC Dictionary*). Some civil affairs forces support transitional military authority by executing civil affairs activities and civil affairs supported activities; others are specifically trained and educated to conduct transitional military authority by applying civilian sector expertise to government operations that are typically the responsibility of civilian authorities. Civil affairs forces provide transitional military authority assistance throughout the range of military operations to meet the life sustaining needs of the affected population.

Civil affairs forces might conduct transitional military authority during armed conflict or in the aftermath of a major man-made or natural disaster. Marine Corps establishes and maintains orderly governance in the occupied or controlled territory with a goal of creating a legitimate and effective government. Military leaders can find themselves acting as a military governor under the authorities of a military government ordinance. A military governor is a military commander or other designated person who, in an occupied territory, exercises supreme authority over the civil population. The population is subject to the laws and usages of war and to any directive received from the commander’s government or superior.

A military government ordinance is a transitional military authority, where enactment on the authority of a military governor promulgating laws or rules regulating the occupied territory under such control.

Transitional military authority enables commanders to achieve civil control and stability, and civil security. The DOS is the lead agency on foreign policy and controls many of the resources that can be used under United States Code (USC), Title 22, *Foreign Relation and Intercourse*, and the Foreign Assistance Act. These resources are typically tied to achieving US interests. Once an interim civilian government is established, military resources are exerted to support civil administration.

SUPPORT TO CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Support to civil administration is assistance given to a governing body or civil structure of a foreign country, whether by assisting an established government or interim civilian authority or supporting a reconstructed government. Support to civil administration takes place when military forces support the DOS in the implementation of interim civil authority or US foreign policy in support of a host nation's internal defense and development plan. Civil affairs forces typically participate in developing an internal defense and development for the host nation, which is a requirement to qualify for a US led FID mission.

During competition, SCA supports the diplomatic, information, military, and economic (referred to as DIME) instruments, and financial, intelligence, and law (referred to as FIL) reinforcement elements abroad and can complement, support, enhance, and enable the combatant commander's (CCDR's) campaign plan, integrated deterrence, FID, counterinsurgency, and other irregular warfare activities.

During competition, relationships developed by civil affairs forces significantly contribute to positioning Marine forces in locations of advantage, such as expeditionary operations from advanced bases. Additionally, civil affairs forces can conduct humanitarian assistance disaster relief or foreign disaster relief (FDR) to support relief operations in the wake of natural disasters that cause a crisis for the host nation's government. Civil affairs Marines help the host nation provide governance in the form of organization, planning, and in extreme cases, supplement a host nation's governance responsibilities.

During armed conflict, civil affairs forces implement SCA by conducting stabilization activities to capitalize on gains that are made in offensive operations. During SCA in armed conflict, civil affairs forces are responsible for enabling the commander's operational and support functions with respect to the continuity of government in a host nation. In the close area, civil affairs forces establish contact with existing civil authorities and prioritize SCA efforts. As consolidation areas are established, military forces increase their stabilization activities.

Typical SCA activities during armed conflict include the following:

- Dislocated civilian operations and FHA.
- Re-establishment of local government.
- Provision of emergency supplies.
- Public health and sanitation surveys.
- Organization and training of auxiliary police.
- Issuance of passes for necessary civilian travel.
- Liaison with resistance groups.
- Procurement of civilian labor for government support.
- Assist military forces in improving their relations with the civilian population.

During armed conflict, civil affairs forces might find themselves conducting SCA to support a government in exile. A government in exile is still a USG recognized government that claims to still be a country or semi-sovereign state's legitimate government but is unable to exercise legal power and instead resides in a foreign country. Governments in exile usually plan to return to their native country and regain formal control.

During stabilization or the return to competition, civil affairs forces provide support to civil administration while gradually transitioning control to that civil administration and decreasing SCA activities. When supporting civil administrations, civil affairs forces' responsibilities include—

- Capitalizing on gains made through conducting the minimum, essential stabilization activities needed to establish civil security and provide for the immediate needs of an affected population.
- Identifying, validating, or evaluating host-nation essential service infrastructure.
- Assessing the needs of the IPIs in terms of the civil affairs functional specialty areas.
- Monitoring and anticipating future requirements of the IPI in terms of the civil affairs functional specialty areas.
- Coordinating and synchronizing collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations.
- Engaging and developing civil networks to facilitate MGO requirements.
- Developing civil capacity and identifying resources and capabilities to support the commander's mission.
- Performing liaison functions between military and civilian agencies.
- Assisting in the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations.
- Initiating or refining CIM processes with geospatial projects that depict affected populations and civil vulnerabilities.
- Performing quality control assessments of SCA operations and costs.
- Facilitating the arbitration of problems arising from the execution of SCA operations.
- Coordinating and synchronizing the transition of SCA operations from military to the indigenous government or international transitional government control.
- Mobilizing civil networks to provide civil security and civil control and enhance emergency management plans.
- Restoring pre-conflict conditions.

CHAPTER 8.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Civil affairs support activities are those functions in which civil affairs forces serve a key role in planning, coordinating, or synchronizing; however, they are not the proponent or organization responsible for conducting the activity. Missions associated with CASA are most often considered CMO, or are the activities performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and IPIs. They also directly help achieve objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.

Civil affairs support activities include foreign assistance, FHA, populace and resources control, CME. Legal authorizations used to fund these activities are constrained by the US Congress for specific purposes. Civil affairs forces need to understand these authorities and should provide expert advice to the commander and staff. Often these activities are executed through a combination of capabilities provided by not only Marine civil affairs, but also units from other services within the DoD, or other governmental departments and agencies within the USG. Civil affairs forces provide the knowledge and expertise of the civil component of the operational environment, which commanders need to execute military operations that have minimal impact by or on the civilian populace. Unified action partners, IPI, and interagency provide unique expertise on humanitarian authorities to support the commander's mission. For more information about CASA, refer to JP 3-57, *Joint Civil-Military Operations*.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Foreign assistance is civil or military assistance rendered to a foreign nation through development assistance, humanitarian, and civic assistance, and security assistance programs. The United States provides foreign assistance through security cooperation in conjunction with a geographic CCMD's campaign plan. Security cooperation consists of all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Foreign assistance can also be provided when the US sponsors a FID program or FHA in conjunction with other security cooperation efforts. Foreign assistance operations support a host nation by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.

Department of Defense Directive 5105.65, *Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)*, provides the framework and authorities through which the Defense Security Cooperation Agency operates. This agency is responsible for directing, administering, and providing DoD-wide guidance for the execution of DoD security assistance and security cooperation. Additionally, the Defense Security

Cooperation Agency provides oversight and exercises overall program management responsibility for DoD humanitarian assistance and de-mining activities in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for special operations and low-intensity conflicts.

Civil affairs forces executing foreign assistance, focus on the civil component of the operational environment to provide the commander with viable courses of action to assist in developing stabilization activities. Civil affairs forces are skilled integrators and coordinators for the population and the population's resources. These skills assist the commander in synchronizing efforts and capabilities in the most efficient manner possible. Civil affairs forces coordinate with UAPs, IPIs, and interagency partners to align the usage of resources, infrastructure, and efforts to minimize redundancies and inefficiencies when supporting foreign assistance.

Civil affairs forces have the capabilities to evaluate the civil component of the operational environment through the planning and execution of civil affairs activities in support of foreign assistance. The focus of foreign assistance programs is to legitimize and enhance the stability of a host nation's political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure systems. Civil affairs forces can provide a sociocultural understanding of the operational environment that can help the United States achieve the desired end state. Support to foreign assistance can include technical expertise, advice, and assistance that can exponentially influence the success of other ongoing programs and initiatives. This assistance forms a better foundation on which a nation can build programs to meet the needs of the populace and promote its own sustainable development or growth. Civil affairs forces can assist in the development of these programs and provide assessments to the commander on their effectiveness.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

A principal objective of the foreign policy for the United States is to provide the encouragement and sustained support to people of developing countries to improve the quality of their lives. Development assistance programs are executed by the DOS directly or indirectly. The DOS finances numerous development assistance programs (that civil affairs forces can support, if, or when tasked) to address the following needs:

- Agriculture and nutrition.
- Population control.
- Health.
- Education.
- Energy.
- Environment improvement.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are governed by USC, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 20, Section 401, *Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations*. This assistance can only be provided in conjunction with military operations and exercises and must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief conducted under FHA operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs encompass planned activities (military civic action and civil action program) in the following categories:

- Medical, dental, and veterinary care are provided in rural or underserved areas of a country.
- Construction and repair of basic surface transportation systems.
- Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.
- Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

Marine civil affairs are uniquely capable of supporting humanitarian and civic assistance programs and missions. They support the MAGTF and FMF by providing civil reconnaissance and civil engagement, managing civil information, and developing a shared understanding of the civil dimension.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

United States Code, Title 22, governs security assistance programs, which are a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended), and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (as amended), and other related statutes by which the United States provides foreign military sales, international military education and training, excess defense articles, other defense-related services, and foreign military financing by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Security assistance is an element of security cooperation, funded, authorized, and administered by the State Department through the DoD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Civil affairs forces in support of security assistance programs can—

- Identify host-nation requirements.
- Develop or review the nomination list of programs or projects to support the mission objectives.
- Provide input to the feasibility of each program.
- Provide input to the prioritization of each program to meet the desired end states and goals.

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Foreign humanitarian assistance is, “Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” (*DoD Dictionary*). Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are different from foreign assistance primarily because they have a direct humanitarian need and use specifically appropriated funds for FHA in the form of overseas humanitarian disaster and civic aid. United States military forces conduct FHA operations throughout the range of military operations—from crisis response and limited contingency operations to activities in various steady-state programs as part of the geographic CCMD’s plan or to achieve specific theater campaign plan objectives.

In FHA activities, civil affairs forces assist the commander in planning, advising on the activities, and coordinating with UAPs, IPIs, and the interagency to synchronize efforts. They play a key role in conducting assessments. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are inherently complex and require a significant amount of interagency coordination. Additionally, they are typically directed from the strategic level, coordinated, and managed at the operational level, and conducted at the tactical level. When supporting FHA activities, civil affairs forces—

- Participate in interagency assessment, planning and synchronizing of FHA activities.
- Identify, validate, or evaluate host-nation and international resources available for FHA activities.
- Advise, assist, and plan displaced civilian movement and control.
- Participate in the executing selected FHA activities, as directed.
- Provide liaisons to IPI.
- Assist in coordinating local labor.
- Liaise with staff judge advocates to assist the commander to meet legal and moral obligations.
- Monitor and evaluate FHA.
- Assess requirements and support for the operation of a CMOC.
- Conduct and maintain an assessment of humanitarian issues in designated nations or regions.
- Identify shortfalls in host-nation humanitarian assistance programs and resources.

Civil affairs forces support FHA operations, as necessary, which consist of—

- Peace operations.
- Noncombatant evacuation operations.
- Humanitarian mine action or demining activities.
- Mass atrocity response operations.
- International chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response.

Steady-State Foreign Humanitarian Aid

Steady-state FHA are activities generally planned and conducted as part of the geographic CCDR's theater campaign plan. Steady-state FHA activities assess and increase the affected nation's capacity and capability to respond to disaster. Steady-state FHA is a security cooperation tool that can improve visibility, access, and influence between that nation and US forces. It also fosters interoperability if the United States provides support for FDR. Examples include military exchanges; Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) projects; projects using the CCDR's initiative funds; and distinct assessments.

FOREIGN DISASTER RELIEF

Foreign disaster relief is a limited duration contingency operation where the goal is to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims, including victims of natural disasters and conflicts, internally displaced persons, refugees, stateless persons, and vulnerable migrants. Typically, FDR includes—

- Provisioning basic services and commodities, such as food, water, sanitation, health care, nonfood items (clothing, bedding, etc.), and emergency shelter.
- Supporting critical infrastructure and logistics necessary for delivering essential services and commodities.
- Providing medical equipment, medical and technical personnel, and restoring essential services.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief (FDR)*, guides, frames, and authorizes FDR. Military commanders with forces at or near the location of a foreign disaster shall take actions to save human lives. In cases where this authority is invoked, the commander should obtain the concurrence of the host nation and US chief of mission of the affected country before committing forces. Although US military forces are primarily designed and structured to defend and protect US national interests, they can be adapted to FHA requirements. Military organization, structure, and readiness enable commanders to rapidly and effectively respond.

In addition to, or in lieu of, host-nation efforts, NGOs from around the world respond to disasters to provide FDR in various forms and for varied durations.

For more information on FDR, refer to DoDD 5100.46.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

Populace and resources control operations provide security for the populace, deny personnel and materiel to the enemy, mobilize population and materiel resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. A PRC operations comprises two distinct, yet linked, components: populace control and resources control. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, travel permits, registration cards, and resettlement of civilians. Resource control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints or roadblocks, ration controls, amnesty programs, and inspection of facilities. Most military operations employ some type of

PRC measures. Both components are typically the responsibility of indigenous civil governments; however, during times of civil or military emergency, other proper authorities shall define, enact, and enforce PRC measures.

Military operations are affected by civilian presence or influence. They can be disrupted by actions of the indigenous populace, such as uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians within the operational environment, illegal activities, or any other civil functions. Therefore, commanders consider PRC measures when planning and executing activities.

Although military law enforcement is the primary PRC proponent, civil affairs forces are integral to planning, executing, and assessing military operations concerning PRC measures. However, both are highly attuned to the effects that military operations can have on the civil population, as well as those the civil component has on military operations. Civil affairs forces assist in developing COAs that support the commander's goals, with minimum effect on civil-military relations and current and future operations.

Populace Control

Populace control measures are a key element when executing major combat operations, counterinsurgency, and stabilization activities in the areas of civil security and civil control. International law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the local populace's immediate humanitarian needs. Control measures require a capability to secure borders, protect the population, hold individuals accountable for criminal activities, control the activities of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablish essential civil services, and set conditions in the operational environment that support stability through unity of effort.

A commander's authority to impose populace control measures varies with the mission and operational environment. The civil component of the operational environment includes various intangible factors, such as the culture, perceptions, beliefs, and values of adversary, enemy, neutral, or friendly political and social systems. Civil affairs forces continuously analyze and assess these factors to develop a situational understanding of the environment. Determining whether an environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile will drive critical planning considerations for populace control. These considerations include security requirements, force protection, and related measures that increase for uncertain and hostile environments.

Populace control provides security for the populace, mobilizes human resources, denies enemy access to the population, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include—

- Establishing border security, including customs procedures to prevent trafficking of persons, regulate immigration and emigration, and establish control over major points of entry.
- Establishing identification procedures, including securing documents relating to personal identification, property ownership, court records, voter registries, birth certificates, and driver's licenses.
- Establishing and disseminating rules relevant to movement, including curfews, movement restrictions, and travel permits.
- Instituting policies that regulate air and overland movement.

- Relocating the population as necessary.
- Establishing transitional political authority and interim civil administration.

Civil affairs forces provide the commander and staff with the capability to plan, synchronize, and assist in the execution of populace control. Once the populace control measures are in place, civil affairs forces can assess these measures, provide feedback to the commander on the measures' effectiveness, and provide recommendations to adjust measures, as necessary. Dislocated civilian operations are a special category of populace control that requires extensive planning and coordination among various military and nonmilitary organizations.

Dislocated Civilians Operations. Dislocated civilian operations include actions to keep civilians safe or to safeguard them in the aftermath of a disaster, whether man-made or natural. A dislocated civilian is “a broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person” (*DoD Dictionary*). If dislocated civilians are within their nation's borders, FHA can usually help, whereas refugees fall under the assistance of the DOS' population refugees and migration.

The civil affairs force supporting dislocated civilian operations support the commander's freedom of movement while safeguarding the civilian population. This includes—

- Identifying or evaluating existing host nation and international community dislocated civilian plans and operations.
- Advising on dislocated civilian control measures that would effectively support military operations.
- Advising on how to implement dislocated civilian control measures.
- Publicizing control measures among the IPI.
- Assessing MOEs.
- Participating in dislocated civilian operations as needed or directed and in coordination with the internationally mandated organizations (e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the International Committee of the Red Cross).
- Assisting in arbitration of problems arising from implementation of dislocated civilian control measures.
- Identifying dislocated civilian locations and composition.

During military operations, US forces consider two distinct categories of civilians—those remaining at their homes or places of habitual residence and those dislocating. United States policy dictates that US forces place people in one of these categories, which can conflict with how international organizations, NGOs, and the host nation refer to the people.

The following distinctions exist among the various categories of dislocated civilians:

- Displaced persons.
- Returnees.
- Resettled persons.
- Evacuees.

NOTE: The term evacuee is unique to the DoD and not used by the DOS (except for noncombatant evacuation operations), NGOs, or international organizations.

- Internally displaced persons.
- Migrants.
- Refugees.
- Stateless persons.

While the following are not categories of dislocated civilians, they are categories of civilians that military members might come in contact with while in an operational area and should be part of this discussion for FHA:

- Trafficking victims.
- Vulnerable persons.

For more information on these categories refer to JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarianism Assistance*.

Resources Control

Resource control provides security for a nation-state's natural and man-made materiel, mobilizes economic resources, denies enemy access to resources, and detects and reduces the effectiveness of enemy agents and criminal entities. Resource control includes property control, which is the control of movable and immovable private and public property.

Resource control directly affects the host nation or US governed and occupied territory's economic system. Resource control measures regulate public and private property and the production, movement, or consumption of materiel resources. Controlling a nation's resources is the responsibility of indigenous civil governments. During a civil or military emergency, proper authorities define, enact, and enforce resource control measures to maintain public order and enable the execution of primary stabilization activities in the areas of civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, and support to economic and infrastructure development tasks.

Implementing resource control measures must conform to legal and regulatory policy and be enforced justly and firmly by the governing authority. United States forces do not execute these measures unless the requirements are clearly beyond the capabilities of the host-nation's security forces, the host nation has requested assistance, and appropriate US authorities (to include collections operations management) have granted approval for such assistance. Civil affairs support the host nation by facilitating coordination and security while their civil affairs functional specialist cell provides advice, assistance, and training for host-nation forces.

Resource control measures include—

- Establishing procedures to resolve property rights for land and subterranean resources.
- Implementing mechanisms to prevent unauthorized seizures of land or property.
- Securing existing harvest storage facilities to prevent spoilage and looting of harvested crops.
- Implementing rationing and distribution programs for key commodities (food and fuel).
- Establishing border security and customs procedures to prevent arms smuggling and stop contraband, such as drugs and natural resources.
- Regulating and securing access to valuable natural resources.
- Stopping illicit trade in natural resources and developing governance mechanisms and incentives to bring trade into the market.
- Initiating processes for addressing and resolving resource ownership and access issues.
- Protecting and securing strategically important institutions, such as government buildings, religious sites, courthouses, and communications facilities. This also includes safeguarding arts, monuments, and archives.

Implementing effective resource control measures requires the host-nation government or transitional military authority to inform the populace about the measures and the justification for the action. The message to the population must clearly convey that control measures are necessary for security and the populace' safety. Enforcing the restrictions must be consistent and impartial to ensure the government can establish and maintain legitimacy among the populace. An effective PRC plan limits control measures to the least restrictive measures necessary. Continuously assessing the operational environment enables forces to measure the restrictions' effectiveness, the population's attitude toward the government, and the restrictions' effect on the operational environment. As the security situation improves, restrictions should be modified or rescinded.

CIVIL-MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

Civil-military engagements build partner-nation capacity in a preventive, population centric, and indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of partnered host-nation governments. It is persistent engagement conducted by, with, and through UAPs to shape and influence the IPIs within the operational environment in support of the geographic CCDR's campaign plans, the theater special operations command's (TSOC's) campaign support plan, and in conjunction with US Embassy strategies. The CME program increases the capability of USG supported IPIs, reduces the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and regions, and leverages civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the operational environment.

Marine civil affairs forces are assigned to the conventional force and therefore are not tasked to execute CME. However, because of the placement and access SOF civil affairs forces have gained, they are a valuable resource that Marine civil affairs forces can and should coordinate with. Prior to entering a foreign country, civil affairs forces should coordinate with the US country team and SOF civil affairs forces conducting CME. These forces are often configured as a civil-military support element (CMSE) and work closely with the US country team, other members of the embassy staff, and the host-nation government.

Civil-military engagements enable analysts to identify and address critical civil strengths and vulnerabilities in under-governed and ungoverned areas or high-threat environments where host-nation authorities, the US country team, or foreign assistance programs cannot operate. During CAO, civil affairs forces execute the following key CME program tasks:

- Network Analysis. Regional and theater CMSEs conduct network analysis to identify critical and relevant nodes to partner with friendly networks and to engage neutral ones to counter threats. They conduct network analysis to determine and analyze links between nodes as a means of gaining an understanding of a group, place, physical object, or system.
- Network Engagement. Regional and theater CMSEs conduct network engagement, executed through civil engagement as part of CAO, to engage critical nodes within friendly and neutral networks to counter threats. They continuously and simultaneously conduct network engagement at all levels of warfare.
- Interorganizational Cooperation. Interorganizational cooperation enables unity of effort, common objectives, and a mutual understanding by synchronizing actions. It facilitates cooperation in areas of mutual interest, promotes a COP, and enables the sharing of critical information and resources that contribute to economy of force in accomplishing TSOC objectives.
- Capacity Building. Capacity building develops the capability and capacity within friendly and neutral networks to counter malign actor influence and activities. Capacity building increases host-nation government and military capacity to mitigate the causes of instability to deny malign actor influence.

Practitioners understand the overall preparation of the environment plan and support it by planning and executing targeted CAO, which includes—

- Observing and evaluating specific aspects of the civil environment that fulfill the civil information requirements (i.e., ASCOPE).
- Leveraging interorganizational partners and IPI relationships and resources.
- Helping to shape the operational environment.
- Developing networks for potential use by SOF forces in future operations.

The CME program comprises the following four distinct capabilities based, task-organized units of action:

- CMSE. A CMSE is a task-organized civil affairs force established to plan, facilitate, and execute CAO in support of CME in a specified country, region, or theater. The CMSE is primarily sourced by a SOF CAT and is CME's primary unit of action. It conducts planned and targeted civil reconnaissance and civil engagement, engaging networks to affect the behavior and will of relevant actors, audiences, and adversaries.
- Regional CMSE. The regional CMSE conducts network engagement and analysis within a subordinate command architecture to the TSOC and is primarily sourced by a SOF civil affairs company. The regional CMSE conducts tactical to operational level human network analysis to comprehensively study and understand the relationships of networks to support preparation of the environment. The element is a task-organized unit of action based upon

mission specific requirements with the ability to conduct command and control of multiple CMSEs in an assigned region to achieve desired effects.

- Theater CMSE. The theater CMSE is primarily sourced by elements from a SOF civil affairs battalion HQ and is filled based upon specific mission requirements. It conducts and integrates network analysis into the joint planning process, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, and the joint targeting cycle. This element is co-located with a theater-level special operations mission command node and can command and control multiple CMSEs in theater.
- Trans-Regional CMSE. The trans-regional CMSE is sourced from SOF civil affairs forces assigned to USSOCOM with duty at interorganizational partners in USSOCOM-identified priority locations. This element is tasked with developing and maintaining long-term relationships through an enduring presence with interorganizational partners to enhance trans-regional synchronization and improve inter-organizational cooperation. Trans-regional CMSEs persistently conduct targeted CAO to increase the capability of USG-supported IPIs, reduce the influence of malign actors within targeted countries and regions, and to leverage civil vulnerabilities and resiliencies within the operational environment.

APPENDIX A.

STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

The SAF (Figure A-1) is an analytical, planning, and programming tool designed to support the civil affairs methodology and MAGTF fires and effects integration methodology. Marines use the SAF to identify local grievances and resiliencies and to help design programs or activities that address the source of instability and stability and measure their effect in fostering stability.

Marines focus the SAF on understanding the operational environment and integrating various perspectives into planning and assessment. This methodology has four basic components, nested within both the civil affairs methodology and the MCPP. These components (CPB, stability analysis, design, and execution) complement and enhance existing planning and execution processes that Marines. Analysts should encourage all relevant actors and organizations in the battlespace to participate in the SAF process to create more collaborative and comprehensive efforts while conducting stabilization activities.




Figure A-1. Stability Assessment Framework Methodology.

COMPONENT ONE: CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

Understanding the area of operations requires research on the physical and social characteristics of the MAGTF's battlespace. The CPB process examines the following three variables to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the battlespace:

- Operational environment.
- Cultural environment
- Instability and stability dynamics.

Variable One—Understanding the Operating Environment

Unlike a typical ASCOPE and PMESII research effort, the SAF provides a means to analyze instability or stability factors relevant to local population perceptions and the MAGTF's mission. For example, CMO planners should note whether there is a local government, and whether it is dominated by a certain tribal group who might undermine government legitimacy and resist any foreign intervention. This analytical effort is referred to as the ASCOPE and PMESII analysis method. The ASCOPE and PMESII analysis method facilitates comprehensive research by organizing information into logical categories for CIM and provides a framework for subsequent instability and stability analysis. See Table A-1 for an example of how to annotate relevant instability and stability factors.

Table A-1. Relevant Factors Matrix Example ("A" of ASCOPE).

	Operational Variables	Factors What are the factors in the civil environment that will significantly affect friendly forces (positively and negatively)?	Relevance How will each factor affect the friendly forces?
AREAS	Political	Political boundaries are manipulated	Boundaries are drawn to favor one political faction over another
	Military	Military districts overlap economic regions	Military ownership of industry
	Economic	Economic development areas	Key industries and supply chains are linked through geographic location
	Social	Municipalities, towns, and villages are ethnically homogeneous	Ethnic enclaves are prevalent with little intermingling
	Information	Telecommunication is widespread	Information is easily controlled by the government
	Infrastructure	Investment in infrastructure is disproportionate	Investment favors supporters of the regime

Variable Two—Understanding the Cultural Environment

Marines analyzing cultural information consider Marine Corps operational culture tenets (i.e., physical environment, economy, social structure, political structure, and belief systems) to determine "normal" conditions and to ascertain the potential effects of indigenous culture on MAGTF operations. This analysis is compared against the ASCOPE and PMESII crosswalk and factors matrix to further refine relevant factors to potential sources of instability or resiliencies. Table A-2 illustrates the SAF method of capturing relevant cultural factors.

Table A-2. Operational Cultural Matrix Example.

Physical Environment How do people in the culture use the environment?	Economy What are the economic exchange systems and the formal and informal economies that the culture uses?	Social Structure What is the way people organize themselves and distribute power and status?	Political Structure How do people in the culture determine authority and leadership?	Belief Systems How do cultural beliefs shape people's behavior?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What roles are expected of Marine personnel with respect to water use and provisions? • What kinds of operational considerations are influenced by water, or override cultural aspects of water as a physical resource? • What land in the area of operations is or is not appropriate for certain groups of people to use? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How will Marine operations affect the informal economy and the people in it? • How does the formal economy rely upon the informal economy, and what abuses of the area of operation's population does this cause? • How will Marine expenditure in the local informal economy, or employment of local informal economic actors, influence the socio-economic balance of power in the area of operations? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At what age is someone considered a child or adult? • How should Marines prepare to respond to children that act as soldiers or insurgents, or that participate in violent activities against US forces? • What work, roles, activities, and spaces are assigned to men and women? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How is decision making organized, and who gets to make decisions? • Who do leaders have to consult, and to whom must they answer? • Who are formal leaders and what symbols indicate status? • How will an alliance with one group affect Marine relationships with the other groups? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the pivotal historical stories that all people in the community share? • How are these histories, folktales, and sayings used to support propaganda for or against Marine and US activities in the region? • Are the heroes or villains compared to Marines or Americans?
Cultural Factors Affecting MAGTF Operations				
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activities of life are centered on the seasons (dry and wet). Only life necessities occur during wet season. • Goods and services are not traded across tribal lines. Most activities are informal. • Society dominated by gender (male). • Political power derived by loose confederation of tribal alliances. 				

Variable Three—Understanding Instability and Stability Dynamics

Understanding instability and stability dynamics enables Marines to identify potential instability and stability factors in the local environment. For example, an instability factor might include the local population's grievances; a stability factor might include societal resiliencies (e.g., institutions, mechanisms, personalities) that instill local confidence in the stability of their environment. Of note, events are considered neutral until they are affected by key influences that make events either grievances or resiliencies for the local population. Therefore, population surveys require careful consideration and vigilant planning when operating in remote areas where little or no information exists on the local population's perceptions. In the absence of any formulated survey methodology or information, the civil affairs Marines use the TCS to gather initial local perceptions and validate proposed stabilization activities. The TCS facilitates initial discussions with local populations and gathers local perceptions to analyze root causes of instability and stability. Each situation requires tailored TCS questions to support analysis and design. The four recommended TCS questions asked to the local populations include—

- Has the population in the town changed in the last year?
- What is the most important problem facing the town?

- Who do you believe can solve your problems?
- What should be done first to help the town?

After asking these questions, Marines should ask “why” until they understand the local instability and stability dynamics. This data is compiled and processed for making subsequent targeting decisions; it is also maintained in a CIM data base for subsequent analysis on operational performance and effectiveness. Marines should practice applying the TCS method to ensure that the questions are asked exactly as they are written. Marines should ask the TCS questions in general conversation to ensure the survey is transparent to the audience. Although the questions are simple, they support a scientific research method and can be employed by third parties (i.e., interpreters). The initial TCS effort should be applied quickly and broadly throughout the area of operations to establish a solid baseline of perception data for subsequent SAF analysis and to inform future unit assessment efforts. Because effects of military operations evolve, as do local expectations, Marines can modify subsequent survey questions throughout the operation. Subsequent survey efforts and questions should follow the same model of developing simple and exact questions. Table A-3 illustrates the SAF process in compiling this information for subsequent sources of instability and stability analysis.

Table A-3. Instability and Stability Factors Matrix Example.

Grievances: What are the core grievances and societal vulnerabilities identified in civil considerations (from perception data)?	Events: Potential situations that could contribute to an increase in instability (from ASCOPE and PMESII)?	Key influences—Means and Motivations: What are the influencers, the means and motivations that contribute to an increase of instability (from ASCOPE and PMESII)?
Local people feel neglected	Elections	Lack of representation in government.
Resiliencies: What processes, relationships, or institutions enable society to function normally and peacefully? Are there any previous resiliencies that have been or are being undermined (from perception data)?	Events: What potential or anticipated future situations could create an opening for key influences to further reinforce stability (from ASCOPE and PMESII)?	Key influences—Means and Motivations: What key influences in society preserve and strengthen stability? What means do they possess, what are the motives, and what actions are taken (from ASCOPE and PMESII)?
Strong clan ties	Intermarriage	Elders

COMPONENT TWO: ANALYSIS

After gaining a more complete understanding of the operational environment through CPB, the second component of SAF methodology analyzes gathered information to identify sources of instability and stability and establishes desired objective(s) along with MOEs that define progress toward addressing each source of instability and stability.

Examining the three CPB variables typically results in an extensive list of factors that could be inciting instability or maintaining stability. The primary purpose of analysis is to narrow relevant factors to issues that are indeed actual sources of instability and stability. Analysis also evaluates and

prioritizes the most relevant factors to determine possible MAGTF objectives that have the most potential for effectively creating stability. To begin narrowing down the list of relevant factors, the SAF employs a tactical form of root cause analysis to examine symptom-cause relationships.

Causes of Stability and Instability

Each source of instability and stability is examined through the instability and stability analysis matrix (see Tables A-4 and A-5) and vetted against three criteria to determine effective stabilization activities. An instability or stability factor resulting in affirmative responses (i.e., yes responses) are considered viable issues for designing stabilization activities that address grievances or resiliencies. The relative weight of each response is carefully analyzed for the greatest impact to stability to prioritize efforts later in activity design. The more criteria met, the more likely the issue is creating instability or supporting stability. There are two instability criteria questions:

- Does this issue decrease support for the government or legitimate governance? Legitimate governance institutions refer to governmental and non-governmental entities that help regulate normal functioning societies, such as the judicial system, village elders, or tribal councils. These criteria can often be considered in two parts. First, whether locals are upset about the issue and second, whether their expectations and displeasure are specifically directed toward the government and local leaders.
- Does this issue disrupt the normal functioning of society? The emphasis is on local norms, which are usually based on what community members consider socially acceptable to local customs, quality of life, and acceptable levels of corruption or criminality. For example, if a community never had electricity, the continued lack of electricity can hardly be undermining the normal functioning of their society. If a community is exposed to certain levels of corruption, then it is important to understand the acceptable levels of corruption.

Table A-4. Source of Instability Analysis Matrix Example.

Potential Sources of Instability	Instability Criteria			Source of Instability?	Prioritization
	Does this issue decrease support for the government and legit governance? Explain.	Does this issue increase support for malign actors? Explain.	Does this issue disrupt the normal functioning of society? Explain.	Does the issue meet any instability criteria?	Is the source of instability a Priority Grievance for the local populace?
Government corruption	No. Corruption complaints directed solely at police	No. Malign actors cannot adequately exploit this issue	No. Locals not concerned; within normal bounds	No	No
Insecurity (ineffective police)	Yes. Police ineffectiveness reflect poorly on government	Yes. Malign actors exploit police ineffectiveness	Yes. Insecurity and police problems exceed local norms	Yes	Yes (#1 Grievance)

Table A-5. Source of Stability Analysis Matrix Example.

Potential Sources of Stability	Stability Criteria			Source of Stability	Impact on Mission
	Does this increase support for the government or legitimate governance? Explain.	Does this issue decrease support for malign actors? Explain.	Does this issue increase societal and institutional capacity and capabilities? Explain.	Does the issue meet any stability criteria?	Do we need to support this source of stability?
Religious leader	No. Practices faith without political motivations	No. Neither for nor against malign actors	Yes. Positive influence on societal stability	No	No
Local government arbitrator	Yes. Locals accept the arbitrator's decisions	Yes. Malign actors want the arbitrator marginalized	Yes. An arbitrator is an accepted form of local governance	Yes	Yes (#1 Resiliency)

For stability, the following questions should be considered:

- Does this issue increase support for the government or legitimate governance? The population's acceptance and reliance on governmental and nongovernmental entities to maintain a stable social environment is a key factor. This does not solely equate to providing services, but rather, speaks more to the population's confidence in entities protecting their equities and way of life.
- Does this issue decrease support for malign actors? This usually occurs when malign actors are exploiting the population beyond acceptable levels, which equates to seizing opportunities for reducing levels of violence, crime, or subjugation.
- Does this issue increase societal and institutional capacity and capabilities? This equates to improving conditions beyond what currently exists without creating artificial systems or processes that are unnatural to the environment or local customs.

Marines should then prioritize the identified sources of instability and stability using local perception data. Information is available through the TCS, independent surveys, polling data, information shared with intergovernmental and nongovernmental representatives, host-nation officials, etc. At this stage of SAF, CMO planners make assumptions as to whether the source of instability is a priority grievance for the population. The planners should seek to validate any assumptions at the earliest opportunity through civil reconnaissance. A priority grievance is an issue a significant percentage of the local population identifies as a priority for their community. During the design process, activities are developed to mitigate sources of instability or protect sources of stability.

Civil-military operations planners should recognize that not every source of instability can be mitigated, nor can sources of stability be protected through MAGTF organic capabilities or nonlethal means. Although certain sources of instability can be mitigated, others are protected. Protection may include referrals to intergovernmental and nongovernmental-sponsored programs, host-nation actions, or in some cases, referred for prosecution by MAGTF or joint targeting approaches. When these types of issues arise, CMO planners need to share the results of sources

of instability and stability analysis with other MAGTF entities. Additionally, they should be prepared to collaborate in separate activities that are not related to SAF methodology but are still important to achieving overall MAGTF objectives.

The final steps in stability analysis are conducting root cause analysis, establishing an objective, and identifying MOEs and MOE data sources to complete the instability and stability matrix part 1 (see Table A-6).

Table A-6. Instability and Stability Matrix Part 1 Template.

Analysis						Design		
Source of Instability or Stability	Cause (Perception)	Cause (Systemic)	Objective	MOE Indicators	MOE Data Sources	Activity	MOP Indicators	MOP Data Sources
Taken from the source of instability or stability analysis	Population's perception	Root cause	Objective statement	Indicators reflecting measurable change as objective is achieved	Information sources that allow tracking of indicators			

Root Cause Analysis

Root cause analysis seeks to identify and remedy root causes. Repeatedly asking why is used to conduct root cause analysis because it does not require data segmentation, hypothesis testing, regression, or other advanced statistical tools, and in many cases can be completed without a data collection plan. Repeatedly asking why helps determine symptoms, which can lead to the root cause of a problem. Very often the apparent reason for a problem results in asking another question. Although this technique is called “5 Whys,” a question can be asked fewer or more than five times to find the issue related to a problem.

Objectives

Establishing objectives uses the same processes and principles used in the MCPP; CMO planners should collaborate with other MAGTF entities while developing COAs and employing SAF methodology.

Measures of Effectiveness

Establishing MOEs helps CMO planners measure progress toward achieving the stated objective. Measures of effectiveness measure effects on the environment. Careful analysis is placed on deriving MOEs because it truly underpins achievement of objectives in a manner related to addressing root causes of instability or stability. Measure of effectiveness data sources are identified after MOE indicators are established. These MOE data sources provide accurate information to monitor MOE indicators based on simplicity, practicality, and affordability to maintain an enduring and consistent monitoring and evaluation process throughout operations. Table A-6 provides an instability and stability matrix template for the design phase.

COMPONENT THREE: DESIGN

In the design component of SAF, CMO planners design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities using an activity design worksheet (see Table A-7) and complete the design section of the instability and stability matrix part 2 (see Table A-8). This process begins by identifying potential activities specifically related to issues captured during previous source of instability and stability analysis. Potential activities are then screened and refined using three stability criteria.

Table A-7. Activity Design Worksheet Template.

Brainstorm Possible Activities	Stability Criteria			Considerations								Resources			Select	
	Does the activity increase support for government or governance? Explain.	Does the activity decrease support for malign actors? Explain.	Does the activity increase institutional and societal capacity and capability? Explain.	Sustainability	Local Ownership	Short-Term vs. Long-Term Results	Leverage Support from other Organization	Culturally & Politically Appropriate	Accountability & Transparency	Leverage Existing Resiliencies	Flexibility	Money	Personnel	Expertise	Time	Is activity realistic or should it be done?
Generate a list of potential activities that will address the systemic cause and contribute to achieving the objective for a given source of instability or stability	Explain how the activity will increase support for the government and/or legitimate governance institutions.	Explain how the activity will decrease support for malign actors.	Explain how the activity will increase institutional and societal capacity and capability.	For each potential activity that meets at least 2 of 3 stability criteria, refine the proposed activity to meet as many considerations as possible.								Do planners have the resources to support successful execution of the activity?			Based on the stability criteria, design principles, and resource availability, should the activity be implemented?	

The activity design worksheet facilitates designing stabilization activities predicated on previous source of instability and stability analysis. The source of instability or stability is captured in the header of the first column to ensure traceability. The proposed activity is entered into the first column. Subsequent rows, associated with each activity, are developed across the template addressing items identified in column headers. Explanation for the stability criteria questions remains the same. However, the opportunity exists to reexamine data while fully explaining responses to stability criteria and exploring relative importance for prioritization. Proposed activities that meet any stability criteria are refined using the following eight design principles:

- Can the local government or society sustain activity?
- Does activity maximize local involvement and create local ownership?
- Does the activity minimize the trade-off between short-term positive effects and potential long-term negative impacts (i.e., unintended consequences)?

- Does activity leverage or support programs of other government agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and the host-nation government?
- Is activity appropriate to local political and cultural context?
- Does activity strengthen government accountability and transparency?
- Does activity leverage and build upon existing societal resiliencies?
- Is activity flexible enough to adapt to change in circumstances?

Activity design does not have to meet all design principles but the probability of executing a successful activity increases significantly when all design principles are met.

The next step is to screen each proposed activity against available resources (i.e., money, personnel, expertise, time) to validate whether the activity is realistic or even meets the parameters of the MAGTF's mission. If the activity is deemed appropriate and feasible, then MOPs are determined. Measures of performance are quantitative measurements that only track output in the form of task accomplishment. For example, if the security task is to conduct patrols, then the MOP is the number of patrols performed. However, the number of patrols conducted does not necessarily equate to improving the security environment. Measure of performance data sources are identified after MOP indicators are established. These MOP data sources provide accurate information to monitor MOP indicators based on specific tasks that are monitored and evaluated throughout operations.

If the activity meets acceptable parameters for final consideration, then part 2 of the instability and stability matrix (design) is completed and processed for final validation as a legitimate nonlethal stability engagement package (see Table A-8).

Table A-8. Instability and Stability Matrix Part 2 Template.

Analysis						Design		
Source of Instability or Stability	Cause (Perception)	Cause (Systemic)	Objective	MOE Indicators	MOE Data Sources	Activity	MOP Indicators	MOP Data Sources
Taken from the source of instability or stability analysis	Population's perception	Root cause	Objective statement	Indicators reflecting measurable change as objective is achieved	Information sources that allow tracking of indicators	Activity to achieve objective	Indicators that measure progress toward activity completion	Information sources that track activity completion

The last step in design is to validate the activity identified in the completed instability and stability matrix part 2 as a viable stability nonlethal target. Validation is done through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement. Civil reconnaissance and civil engagement examine actual local conditions to ensure planning assumptions were not corrupt or misguided. It is critical to implement stability nonlethal engagement efforts predicated on a thorough understanding of local conditions, grievances, and norms—not outsider assumptions. This understanding can be gained through civil reconnaissance or other mechanisms including population surveys, focus groups, civil engagements, input from local NGOs, etc.

During the last step, prior to the execution phase, activities are validated, prioritized, and synchronized with overall MAGTF efforts. If an activity is not validated through civil reconnaissance or any other circumstances, then the activity is deemed untenable and revalidated through CPB and the entire process begins again. If an activity is validated, the information in the instability and stability matrix is forwarded through the operations department as a nonlethal engagement package and the initial transition criteria are established until they are further refined during monitoring and evaluation (M&E) efforts in the execution phase.

COMPONENT FOUR: EXECUTION

The execution phase consists of delivering a nonlethal engagement package (i.e., instability and stability matrix) to the operations department, M&E on an approved nonlethal engagement package, and conducting transition to competent authorities (event driven) or conducting closing actions at the conclusion of operations (time driven).

The first step of this phase is nominating the nonlethal target package so that it becomes part of the overall MAGTF operational effort. If approved and implemented, activities are resourced and executed in accordance with MAGTF policies and procedures.

Next and most significant, is establishing an iterative cycle of examination that eventually leads to accomplishing the objective or results in activity termination because of failure to achieve desired effect. Most activities are seldom designed perfectly during initial planning and seldom require little or no adjustment during extended operations. Therefore, M&E are the mechanism to ensure success and the key to mitigating unintended negative consequences. Monitoring and evaluation are conducted on the following three levels: MOPs, MOEs, and overall stability.

Measures of performance track implementation of an activity. They answer the question, “Is the activity progressing?” and “Is the activity complete?” Examples might include the number of miles of road paved or number of police trained. Measures of performance are monitored during the implementation of an activity until it is completed.

Measures of effectiveness measure an activity’s effect. Examples might be decreased travel time (for a road project) or decreased criminal activity (for a police training activity). They are a combination of qualitative and quantitative data points that are assessed together to provide a more comprehensive understanding of effectiveness.

Overall stability measures the effect of individual activities, it considers the effect of all the activities conducted over a longer period, as well as the influence of external factors. It asks, “Is stability increasing or decreasing?” Key to measuring overall stability is identifying good indicators, creating a baseline, and then tracking the indicators at regular intervals, starting as early as possible. The best overall stability indicators reflect local perceptions. They are based on the question, “What will local people do or say differently if they believe the environment is becoming more stable?” Examples of overall stability measures include—

- Local government recognition (e.g., locals take their problems to local government officials for resolution) reflects trust and confidence.
- Local-on-local violence—a direct measure of insecurity.
- Population freedom of movement—reflects security conditions.

A single indicator is incapable of measuring overall stability. Stability indicators usually aggregate to build a complete sight picture. Therefore, stability planners establish and track metrics methodically to inform progress but also to maintain an iterative process of stability activity refinement. The M&E matrix provides a mechanism and tool for capturing progress and evaluating overall stability (see Table A-9).

Table A-9. Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix Example.

Source of Instability	Objective	Activity	MOP	Status	Baseline	Change	MOE
Lack of legitimate conflict resolution mechanism	Population supports conflict resolution mechanisms linked to government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical training for justice officials • Police establishes secure meeting environment for conflict resolution 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of officials trained • Police provides security at meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Course approved • Force protection unit established 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20 percent officials trained • 50 percent meetings unsecured 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 60 percent officials trained • 10 percent meetings unsecured 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • People accept adjudication • Judges held in esteem • No violent incidents • Increased willingness to participate • Increased confidence in police

TRANSITION

The last step of the entire SAF process is to transition operations to the host nation and to redeploy MAGTF assets to other contingencies or back to the continental United States. When activities are submitted for implementation, the commander established initial transition criteria; however, more definitive transition criteria are established as operations progress and the M&E process determines most realistic circumstances based on progress and overall MAGTF transition criteria.

APPENDIX B.

CIVIL ENGAGEMENT TEMPLATES

The following templates provide a standardized format to plan, execute, and record information from civil engagements and are critical to developing civil networks. The civil engagement target plan provides an overall framework to approach civil engagements. It also provides a journal or log to track civil engagements. The civil engagement worksheet is developed when planning civil engagements and provides structure to each engagement. Finally, the civil engagement notes record information from the civil engagement. Each of these templates are linked, and can be provided as input into the CIM process.

CIVIL ENGAGEMENT TARGET PLAN #1								
PREPARED BY: Capt Black MEU IO Plan		APPROVED BY: LtCol Brown, XX th MEU OpsO				UNIT: XX th MEU		DATE XX/XX/XXXX SUBMITTED:
TARGET	ENGA #	DTG	LOCATION (STRUCTURE)	ORGANIZATION (NETWORKS)	OTHER INFO (ETHNICITY, TRIBE, RELIGION, INTERESTS)	PURPOSE: (THEMES/SUB- THEMES)	IRC COOD	
Jean Lindo Alu-Layag Primary Health Care Clinic Public Health Care Administrator	1-1	041600XAPRXX	Parang, Municipality	KAABAY, PI NGO	Catholic, but KAABAY support the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao's Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD-ARMM) and Department of Health (DOH- ARMM) on several health programs and activities	-Continue to foster our partnership with the GRP military and build rapport w/local civilian leaders. -US forces here at the request of the PI Gov to conduct BALIKATAMN, annual partner training, with the Philippine Military.	MEU MISO Det. COMMSTART (COMCAM)	

COMMAND MESSAGE: American forces are here at the invitation of the Philippine Government, conducting the annual bilateral exercise BALIKATAN, with the Philippine military. American forces have built a solid partnership with the Philippine military and are honored to be their guest for this invaluable training which ensures the security of the Philippine people.

Figure B-1. Civil Engagement Plan Template Example.


TARGET TITLE & NAME: CONTACT INFO: <i>For the target</i>	ENGA #: DTG: LOCATION:	AGE: SEX: ETHNICITY: RELIGION:	
TARGET INTERESTS/ISSUES: <i>Interests the target has in the civil environment based on the CPB and network analysis.</i>		TARGET BACKGROUND/IMPORTANT INFORMATION: <i>Write all relevant information about the target—their network connections, influence, job, connection to the civil environment, anything that could give you or the team insight to the target.</i>	
PREVIOUS ENGAGEMENT RESULTS: <i>Relevant information from previous engagements.</i> BY WHO: <i>What unit and which person conducted the previous engagements?</i> CONTACT INFO: <i>For the previous unit or person who conducted previous engagements.</i>			
PURPOSE OF ENGAGEMENT: <i>Describe the reason for the engagement</i>			
TALKING POINTS: <i>List relevant talking points for the engagement. What are some key items that you want to get covered? Is there something you need to bring up from previous meetings, such as a promise or agreement?</i>			
COMMAND MESSAGE: <i>Record the command message word-for-word here.</i>			
ISSUES FOR COMMAND: <i>List concerns the command has within the AO. Example: Criminal organizations are operating freely within the AO and are considered a part of the economy by the population. Command is concerned with the security of CA teams operating in the AO because these criminal organizations have a tendency to kidnap Americans for ransom.</i>			
IO THEMES: <i>What are the information themes or active messaging campaigns within the AO?</i>			
DESIRED ENDSTATE: <i>Record the desired results of the engagement. What do you hope to gain from the engagement?</i>			
IRC TASK: PURPOSE:		IRC COORDINATION:	
INTERPRETER: RECORDER: PHOTOGRAPHER: SECURITY:		WHO ELSE WILL BE PRESENT: <i>Record who else will be at the engagement.</i>	

Figure B-2. Civil Engagement Plan Worksheet.

TARGET NAME: Jean Lindo OCCUPATION: Public Health Administrator, employed by Kalusugan Alangsa Bayan (KAABAY) AGE: 44	TARGET CONTACT INFO: 20 Vargas Street Barangay Alu Layag-Layag Parang Municipality	DTG: 041600XAPRXX ENGA #: 1-1
NOTES: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Born in 1975 in Davao City, Mindanao • Lower-middle class Catholic Filipino family • Attended the U of Manila • Unmarried, made decision at young age to care for others in need • Degree in Public Health Administration • Speaks Tausug, Tagalog, and English (very well); happy to talk to Marines in English • Started working for KAABAY in 2004, working at the Alu Layag Primary Health Center for the past three years • Clinic has 10 beds • Outpatient capability of 25 people/day • Clinic staff: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♦ 1 part-time doctor ♦ 4 nurses ♦ 1 secretary, processes patients • Clinic services: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♦ Internal medicine ♦ Basic pediatrics ♦ Basic obstetrics ♦ X-ray (machines has been down for 2mos.) ♦ Pharm (low on most meds, to include basic anti-biotics) ♦ Family med ♦ Dermatology (limited) • Greatest need at moment is clean water; at least 100cases of dysentery as a result of non-potable water; local water plan has no engineer to fix broken pump • Observed several cases of leishmaniasis on adolescent children • Serious health conditions go to Parang District Hospital (~6 km southeast in Barangay Lungan Gitong) <p>Atmospherics: Very receptive to US presence here, looks forward to meeting with US health officials each year during BK, and would love to establish greater year-round dialogue so that she can have patients lined up and prioritized based on medical urgency before we arrive in order to be more efficient and better allocate resources/personnel/time; seems very proactive, earnest to set populace on path to better living/health conditions through preventive measures/education first; recognized long-term solution is not increased dependence on other nations, seek her out to get best results in forwarding medical efforts.</p>		

Figure B-3. Civil Engagement Notes Example.

APPENDIX C.

CIVIL AFFAIRS AUTHORITIES

UNITED STATES CODE

Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 6

Section 164. Section 164, *Commanders of COCOMS: Assignment, Powers, and Duties*, outlines the relationship, roles, and responsibilities of a CCDR with higher and subordinate organizations. The commander of a CCMD is responsible to the President and to the SecDef for the performance of missions assigned to that command by the President or by the SecDef with the approval of the President. Combatant commands produce plans for the employment of the armed forces to execute national defense strategies and respond to significant military contingencies. The armed forces may take actions, as necessary, to deter conflict.

Section 167. Section 167, *Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces*, designates civil affairs as a special operations activity. The SecDef memorandum dated April 2009, affirmed the CDR, USSOCOM as the civil affairs joint proponent. Civil affairs is one of two Marine Corps capabilities with a special operations joint proponent (MISO being the other). This makes civil affairs unique within the Marine Corps because joint proponenty affects doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy. Execution authorities to conduct CAO in a specific theater are often held at the CCDR level and integrated into their campaign plans, theater security cooperation plans, or other operational plans or programs. Included in section 167, civil affairs forces will support other USG led activities by planning, executing, and evaluating CAO within the specific authorities of those agencies.

Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 16

Section 321. Under section 321, *Training with Friendly Foreign Countries: Payment of Training and Exercise Expenses*, funding of incremental expenses (including small scale construction) of foreign partners from developing countries is limited to military forces.

Section 333. Under section 333, *Foreign Security Forces; Authority to Build Capacity*, the SecDef authorizes the training and equipment of national security forces to build partner capacity utilizing DoD centrally managed sole source funds. Annual guidance is produced and provided by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

Unique SOF lines of funding include USC Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 3, sections 127e, *Support of special operations to combat terrorism*, and 127f, *Expenditure of funds for clandestine activities that support operational preparation of the environment and non-conventional assisted recovery capabilities*, and Part II, Chapter 61, section 1202, *Regulars and members on active duty for more than 30 days: temporary disability retired list*.

Title 10, Subtitle A, Part IV, Chapter 152

Section 2557. According to section 2557, *Humanitarian assistance program excess property*, the SecDef can make available for humanitarian relief purposes, any nonlethal excess supplies of the DoD. In addition, the SecDef can make nonlethal excess supplies of the DoD available to support domestic emergency assistance activities. Excess supplies made available for humanitarian relief purposes under this section shall be transferred to the Secretary of State, who shall be responsible for the distribution of such supplies. This section does not constitute authority to conduct any activity, which, if carried out as an intelligence activity by the DoD, require a notice to the intelligence committees under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC. 3091 et seq.).

Title 22, Chapter 32, Subchapter I

Part I, Section 2151. Section 2151, *Congressional Findings and Declaration of Policy*, is the DOS controlled Foreign Assistance Act, which is a civil affairs supported activity. This act is designed to focus on developing countries by supporting military assistance programs, foreign military financing programs, and international military education training programs. The Foreign Assistance Act also supports economic support funds; peacekeeping operations; international narcotics control and law enforcement programs; and nonproliferation, antiterrorism, de-mining, and related programs. The act contains provisions to assist foreign countries in fighting internal and external aggression by providing various forms of military assistance upon request (contingent upon Congressional approval). This act also mandates close coordination and cooperation between the DoD and US civilian agencies at all levels.

Part IX, Sections 2292, 2292a, and 2292b. Sections 2292, *General Provisions*; 2292a, *Authorization of Appropriations*; and 2292b, *Disaster Assistance Coordination through a Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance*; *Presidential appointment and duties*, address the international disaster assistance funds. These sections assert, Congress, and the President, with concurrence of the DOS (except in emergencies), provides the authorization for the United States to aid certain countries during man-made or natural disasters. Foreign humanitarian assistance operations are also a civil affairs supported activity.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ISSUANCES

Department of Defense Directives

Department of Defense Directive 2000.13. DoDD 2000.13 establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for conducting DoD-wide civil affairs activities. The DoD maintains a capability to conduct a broad range of CAO necessary to support DoD missions and to meet DoD component responsibilities to the civilian sector in the operational environment across the range of military operations. Civil affairs operations include DoD actions that—

- Coordinate military activities with other USG departments and agencies, civilian agencies of other governments, host-nation military or paramilitary elements, and NGOs.
- Support stabilization activities that establish civil security, provide support to governance, provide essential services, support economic development and infrastructure, and establish

civil control for civilian populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-US military authority.

- Provide assistance outside the range of military operations to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population, when directed.
- Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that are generally the responsibility of civilian authorities. That expertise is applied to implement DoD policies that advise or assist in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.
- Establish and conduct a military government until civilian authority or government can be restored.

DoDD 2000.13 derives its statutory authority from USC, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I—

- Chapter 6 section 167.
- Chapter 16, Subchapter II, section 322, *Special operations forces: training with friendly foreign forces*.
- Chapter 20, sections 401, *Humanitarian and civil assistance provided in conjunction with military operations*, and 404, *Foreign disasters assistance*.

It includes the use of military forces to support approved humanitarian and civic assistance and is provided in conjunction with military operations, and disaster relief operations. These operations, which are conducted in accordance with DoDD 5100.4, allow immediate humanitarian actions to prevent the loss of life, property, and unnecessary human suffering. Civil affairs operations include DoD actions that—

- Coordinate military activities with other USG departments and agencies, civilian agencies of other governments, host-nation military or paramilitary elements, and NGOs.
- Support stability operations and activities that establish civil security, provide support to governance, provide essential services, support economic development and infrastructure, and establish civil control for populations in occupied or liberated areas until such control can be returned to civilian or non-US military authority.
- Provide assistance outside the range of military operations to meet the life-sustaining needs of the civilian population, when directed.
- Provide expertise in civilian sector functions that are generally the responsibility of civilian authorities. Expertise is applied to implement DoD policies for advising or assisting in rehabilitating or restoring civilian sector functions.
- Establish and conduct a military government until civilian authority can be restored.

Department of Defense Directive 3000.07. DoDD 3000.07, *Irregular Warfare*, establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DoD conduct of irregular warfare and development of capabilities to address irregular challenges or threats to national security in accordance with DoDD 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*.

Irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare, and DoD must be equally capable in both. Many of the capabilities and skills required for irregular warfare are applicable to traditional warfare, but their role can be proportionally greater.

Irregular warfare can include any relevant DoD activity and operation such as counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, FID, counterinsurgency, and stability operations that, in the context of Irregular warfare, involve establishing or re-establishing order in a fragile state or territory.

While irregular warfare activities, whether undertaken in sequence, parallel, or in blended form, occur across the full range of military operations, the balance or primary focus of operations give a campaign its predominant character.

Before, during, and after irregular and traditional warfare, various programs, missions, and activities can occur that shape the environment and serve to deter or prevent war. These include military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence activities, cyberspace operations, MISO, strategic communication, and CMO.

Department of Defense Directive 5100.01. DoDD 5100.01 provides overarching authority and guidance for the DoD to develop concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, and organize, train, equip, and provide forces with expeditionary and campaign qualities. It directs the Marine Corps to conduct security and stability operations and assist with the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to another authority. Security and stability operations include the following:

- Organize, train, and equip forces to conduct support to civil authorities in the United States and abroad, which includes support for disaster relief, consequence management, mass migration, disease eradication, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, critical infrastructure protection, and response to terrorist attacks. The Marine Corps executes these in coordination with the other military Services, CCMDs, the National Guard, and USG departments and agencies.
- Conduct CAO.
- Occupy territories abroad and provide for the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

Department of Defense Instruction

Department of Defense Instruction 3000.17. The purpose of Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3000.17, *Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response*, is to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures for civilian harm mitigation and response. Additionally, DoDI 3000.17 directs commanders to do no unnecessary harm to civilians in the battlespace. The National Security Presidential Directive–44, *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*, while the State Department has the lead for stabilization and reconstruction, the DoD has a requirement to support that effort.”

DOMESTIC USE OF MILITARY FORCES

Civil affairs forces can be authorized to assist in domestic emergencies and provide support to domestic civil authorities. All Federal personnel, including civil affairs, are subordinate to the State's military leadership, usually the Army National Guard (USC, Title 32, *National Guard*),

under the executive direction of the Department of Homeland Security (United States Code, Title 6, *Domestic Security*). Refer to the following DoDDs for more information on domestic use of military force:

- DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- DoDD 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances*.

Other statutory authorities that can apply, or fiscal authorities that civil affairs routinely use include:

- DoDD 3000.05, *Stabilization*. The stabilization directive establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities for stabilization efforts and provides guidance for planning, training, execution, and oversight of stabilization.
- DOS and DoD. Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning USG efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence. The DOS is the overall lead federal agency for US stabilization efforts. The DoD is a supporting element, including providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities. Stabilization is incorporated into planning across all lines of effort for military operations, as early as possible, to shape operational design and strategic decisions.

Because drivers of instability vary widely and are based on the unique political landscape of the host nation, stabilization requires—

- Thorough cultural understanding and conflict assessment, that includes intelligence collection and related activities to improve understanding of and ability to influence stability.
- A strategy to cooperate, coerce, or defeat determined destabilizing actors, and a strategy to support key actors that enable stabilization.
- An integrated interagency and international unity of purpose with common objectives.
- A sustained commitment and sufficient support to mitigate destabilizing elements reinforcing stabilizing elements.

To the extent authorized by law, DoD plans and conducts stabilization in support of mission partners across the range of military operations to counter subversion; prevent and mitigate conflict; and consolidate military gains to achieve strategic success. The DoD emphasizes small-footprint, partner-focused stabilization that works by, with, and through indigenous and other external partners to achieve strategic objectives. The DoD's core responsibility during stabilization is to support and reinforce the civilian efforts of the USG lead agencies consistent with available statutory authorities, primarily by providing security, maintaining basic public order, and providing for the immediate needs of the population.

OVERSEAS HUMANITARIAN, DISASTER, AND CIVIC AID

The OHDACA draws authorities from United States Code, Title 10, Subtitle A—

- Part I, Chapter 20, sections 402; 404; and 407, *Humanitarian demining assistance and stockpiled conventional munitions: authority; limitations.*
- Part IV, Chapter 152, sections 2557 and 2561, *Humanitarian Assistance.*

Funds for OHDACA are prioritized by DOS and appropriated to DoD humanitarian assistance activities that build the capacity of a partner nation government to provide essential humanitarian services to the civilian population and supports partner nation efforts to reduce the risk of, prepare for, and respond to humanitarian disasters; thereby, reducing reliance on international disaster relief assistance. The OHDACA-funded programs offer a unique security cooperation tool for CCMDs to gain access, visibility, and influence within their regions and achieve theater and US national security objectives.

APPENDIX D.

JOINT CIVIL AFFAIRS ENTERPRISE

The Army provides the bulk of CAO capabilities, which comprises four, one star civil affairs commands (CACOMs), 10 colonel-commanded civil affairs brigades with 39 lieutenant colonel-commanded civil affairs battalions, and two separate civil affairs training battalions assigned to training commands. Additionally, the Army possesses CAO advocacy for its civil affairs forces through the two star commander of the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) and the two star commander of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (Airborne).

As noted in the SecDef's April 2009 memorandum, USSOCOM is the joint civil affairs proponent but does not have any support capabilities organic to its headquarters beyond the J-39 civil affairs proponent office. They do however, have mission command of the only SOF designated civil affairs force—the Army's 95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) and their HHQ, and the Army's 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne). These forces provide intelligence, regional analysis, and cultural expertise reach-back capability. The rest of the DoD's CAO capabilities reside in the conventional force.

A key distinction between Army and Marine civil affairs is that Marine civil affairs are generalists; Army civil affairs are specialists. Army civil affairs forces are regionally aligned or even assigned to specific geographic CCMDs where Marine civil affairs forces are affiliated with the three Active Component MEFs but are assigned to Marine Forces Reserve and are globally available for Global Force Management Implementation Guidance purposes. Additionally, there are Active Component civil affairs Marines assigned to the MLRs and MIGs.

JOINT CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS TASK FORCE

A joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) is created when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond what an organic J-9/G-9 (CMO) staff or established CMOC could accomplish. Independent from, but in coordination with the J-9/G-9 or established CMOC, the JCMOTF plans, prepares, executes, and continually assesses CMO in a theater of operations or joint operations area (JOA). It is a special-purpose task force comprising units from two or more Services and can include both assigned or attached conventional forces and SOF units. Based on mission requirements, the JCMOTF is flexible in size and composition. Generally organized under a one star general or a colonel CACOM and staff, which a CAG can provide, it is not strictly a civil affairs organization. It also likely has engineering, transportation, and law enforcement units as subordinate elements.

A JCMOTF can—

- Be a stand-alone JTF or a subordinate unit in a JTF.
- Assist JTF unit commanders when their organic abilities cannot meet the CMO needs of their JOA.
- Advise the JTF commander on policy; funding; multinational, foreign, or host-nation sensitivities; and their effect on theater strategy and/or campaign and operational missions.
- Provide command and control or direction of military host-nation advisory, assessment, planning, and other assistance activities by joint US forces.
- Assist in establishing US or multinational and military-to-civilian links for greater efficiency of cooperative assistance arrangements.
- Perform essential coordination or liaison with host-nation agencies; US country teams; UN agencies; and deployed US multinational, host-nation military forces, and their supporting logistics organizations.
- Assist in the planning and conduct of civil information programs to—
 - ♦ Publicize positive results and objectives of military assistance projects.
 - ♦ Build civil acceptance and support of US operations.
 - ♦ Promote local capabilities contributing to recovery and economic-social development.
- Plan and conduct joint and combined CMO training.
- Advise and assist in strengthening or stabilizing civil infrastructures and services.
- Assess or identify host-nation support, or relief capabilities and funding requirements.
- Facilitate transition to peacekeeping or consolidation operations and associated hand-off to other government agencies, international organizations, or IPIs.

A JCMOTF should not—

- Be the CMO staff augmentation for a JTF.
- Have the forces responsible for accomplishing all CMO in JOA when subordinate to a JTF.
- Eliminate the need for commanders to plan and conduct CMO.

Both Marine and Army civil affairs force structures contain civil sector expertise in their functional specialty cells aligned to the six (or five for Army, interagency, and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]) functional specialty areas. The Army also has military government specialists within each of the sixteen functional specialty areas (sub-functions). Marine civil affairs functional specialty cell members can reach-back to Army CACOM functional specialty cells for virtual support and preparation for the transitioning of governance support responsibilities from the Marines to the Army. The following paragraphs illustrate the Army's military government specialist's eighteen skill identifiers and eight associated capabilities Marine civil affairs forces can access through reach-back.

If not available, civil affairs forces can reach back to the cultural intelligence elements resident within several of the Army's 1st Special Forces Command's formations. The Army maintains regionally aligned cultural intelligence support capabilities that civil affairs forces can access.

Although JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, acknowledges six general civil affairs functional areas, the Army, interagency, and NATO have recognized only five—security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. They have recognized sixteen sub-nested functional specialty (sub-functions) areas. The five USG stability sector functional areas were derived from the US Institute of Peace and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s publication, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. Some functional areas were renamed by the military for defense purposes (e.g., rule of law became justice and reconciliation). Each stability sector has several sub-nested functional specialty areas that require unique expertise.

NATO CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

Civil-Military cooperation is a function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of civil-military interaction with diverse non-military actors. The aim of CIMIC is to support the mission objectives by establishing and maintaining cooperation with non-military actors within the area of operations. Ideally all actors work towards a common goal. However, when this is not possible, interactions ensure that activities are harmonized as much as possible to avoid negative impacts on military and non-military operations and the civil environment. This minimizes interference or unintended conflict between different actors.

Civil-military cooperation has the following core functions:

- Civil-military liaison.
- Support to the force.
- Support to non-military actors and the civil environment.

Civil-Military Liaison

Using a comprehensive approach, NATO has instituted broader coordination with non-military actors. NATO liaison includes military to military, as well as civil-military interactions, with CIMIC focusing on the latter. The aim of civil-military liaison is to establish and maintain liaison with non-military actors at appropriate levels. It facilitates interaction, harmonizes information sharing, and supports concerted or integrated planning and conduct of operations. Early liaison is fundamental to the planning and development process of the core CIMIC functions.

Civil-military liaison includes—

- Identifying relevant non-military actors in a timely manner.
- Developing a liaison structure that includes a notification mechanism.
- Coordinating internal and external CIMIC information management.

Support to the Force

Commanders might require non-military support from within their joint area of operations as well as coordination of efforts to minimize disruption to military operations. The force is partially dependent on civilian resources and information from civilian sources. For that reason, CIMIC serves a proactive role by contributing to planning and conduct of operations. In cooperation with other military functions, this includes—

- Gathering, assessing, and reporting information regarding the civil environment.
- Identifying and assessing key civil indicators and sensitive factors that critically effect on the planning and conduct of operations.
- Identifying and assessing the effects of the military operation on the civil environment.
- Recommending how to mitigate the negative consequences or exploit the opportunities of military operations in respect to cross-cutting topics.
- Identifying and assessing the effect of non-military activities influencing joint operations.
- Promoting force acceptance and transparency.
- Contributing to information that is provided to the civil society in the mission area in line with the communication effort led by strategic communications.
- Facilitating access to non-military resources when needed.

Support to Non-Military Actors and the Civil Environment

Within a comprehensive approach, military support to non-military actors and the civil environment is only conducted to create conditions that accomplish a military mission. It includes a wide spectrum of resources such as information, personnel, materiel, communications facilities, specialist expertise or training. Facilitating military support towards non-military actors is a task of CIMIC. The support itself can be provided by all elements of the military. A staggered approach should—

- Support by means of capacity and information sharing.
- Enable support by means of capacity building.
- Support by military means (only as a last resort).

Civil-military cooperation is applicable to all NATO operations. Commanders are required to assess and analyze the civil environment and apply cross-cutting topics perspectives in all scenarios when planning and conducting military operations. This includes considering that there are numerous non-military actors present in the area operations. Applying CIMIC depends on the operation, the civil environment, and the relationship with non-military actors.

The CIMIC principles guide commanders, staff, and forces in planning and conducting operations. These principles contribute to the implementing a comprehensive approach with CIMIC as the facilitator of civil-military interaction. The six CIMIC principles are as follows:

- Understand the Civil Environment. Understanding the civil environment is crucial for mission success and conflict resolution. The commander requires a comprehensive picture of the civil environment for mission planning and execution because, for example, even an unintended violation of the local traditions and customs can lead to a loss of support by the

population and the trust of non-military actors. In turn, this can lead to the military forces losing their legitimacy, which would seriously undermine the mission.

- Understand the Aims and Objectives of All Non-Military Actors. Commanders and staff fully understand the mandate, aims and objectives, role, structure, methods, and principles of non-military actors. Establishing and maintaining strong relationships prior to and during operations ensures mutual understanding. Non-military actors can also use these relationships to develop an understanding of how liaison with the military can benefit their objectives.
- Respect Civilian Primacy. Governments, and in some cases non-military actors, are and should remain responsible for the provision of basic needs and services. The military's priority is to accomplish its mission. The military should only give additional support to non-military actors if it is required to accomplish the mission. Any support to non-military actors should be given as quickly and efficiently as possible to not detract from the military's focus.
- Act with Integrity. When interacting with non-military actors it is crucial to demonstrate openness, competence, capability and resolve to gain respect, trust and confidence between all actors and so engender successful relationships. A high degree of transparency, balanced by the needs of OPSEC, helps civil affairs forces avoid misunderstanding and mitigate the risk of the military force losing legitimacy. The military should manage expectations and communicate in advance what realistically can be achieved.
- Integrate Planning with Non-Military Actors. By engaging non-military actors, commanders can encourage collaborative analysis, integrated planning, and interaction in the JOA, thereby supporting unity of purpose and effort. Civil-military cooperation enhances the ability to integrate civil-military planning and develop a process and structure for effective coordination and cooperation with non-military actors.
- Establish Relationships and Communication with Non-Military Actors. Commanders and their staff should develop personal relationships with non-military actors, using civil-military liaison, and make decisions on the degree of reliance on those actors for critical tasks. Establishing relationships with non-military actors requires planning, establishment, and reinforcement. The relationship can be used to ensure that all communication is conducted in line with the communication strategy.

APPENDIX E.

CIVIL AFFAIRS AND

THE WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS

See Table E-1 for civil affairs activities categorized by warfighting function.

Table E-1. Civil Affairs Activities Categorized by Warfighting Function.

	Civil Affairs Activities
Command and Control	<p><u>CMOC</u>: Integration cell with all stakeholders that serves as a coordination and liaison element back to the MAGTF to synchronize effects and resources.</p> <p><u>CIM</u>: Provides valuable information that informs commanders and their decision-making cycles with relevant civil considerations, impacts on the operational environment, and risk.</p> <p><u>CMO Planning</u>: Integration of CAO and civil considerations into MAGTF's plan across all phases of operations.</p>
Maneuver	<p><u>Civil Engagement</u>: Engagement with local populations that inform both cognitive and physical maneuver considerations ensuring the civil population does not interfere with military operations (civil isolation).</p>
Fires	<p><u>Civil Reconnaissance</u>: Understand critical infrastructure in the battlespace and its relation to civil and social needs and wants.</p> <p><u>Civil Engagement</u>: Understand civil, societal actors, and norms in the battlespace informing the MAGTF fires and effects integration methodology and restricted strike list.</p> <p><u>CIM</u>: Repository of gathered information from CAO operations informing the MAGTF fires and effects integration process, battle damage assessments, and effects.</p>
Protection	<p><u>Civil Reconnaissance</u>: Identifies critical infrastructure and cultural, economic, and socially relevant structures that could adversely impact operations (critical vulnerabilities to local stabilization).</p> <p><u>Civil Engagement</u>: Identifies key influencers and networks for targeting effects and supports the larger network analysis and engagement process for a unit commander.</p> <p><u>CIM</u>: Data aggregation that illuminates critical social and cultural grievances that could impose risk to mission and to the force.</p>
Information	<p><u>Civil Engagement</u>: Identifies key influencers and networks for targeting effects and supports the larger network analysis and engagement process for a unit commander.</p> <p><u>Civil Reconnaissance</u>: Supports the concept of information and analysis on information infrastructure of a given geographic location.</p> <p><u>CIM</u>: Data aggregation that supports assessment frameworks, informs critical operational environment impacts on a commander's decision-making cycle, IEBA, and provides relevant data to all information forces to construct effects.</p>
Sustainment	<p><u>Civil Reconnaissance</u>: Critical infrastructure assessments on airfields, ports, railways, electricity, water, etc. to understand their importance, relation to civil society, and potential use for US forces.</p> <p><u>Civil Engagement</u>: Identifies local sources of supply, vendors, and capabilities that can be tied to building redundancies and use through operational contract support or FOO/PA teams.</p> <p><u>CIM</u>: Data aggregation that supports RFIs, PNA, and information in construction concepts of logistics and support.</p>
Intelligence	<p><u>Civil Reconnaissance</u>: Critical infrastructure assessments on airfields, ports, railways, electricity, water, etc. to understand their importance, relation to civil society, and potential use for US forces. Support to collecting information in support of a commander's PIRs and RFIs.</p> <p><u>Civil Engagement</u>: Analyzes relationships, actors, functions, and tensions within the battlespace's civil society.</p> <p><u>CIM</u>: Support to collecting information in support of a commander's PIRs and RFIs.</p>

APPENDIX F.

CIVIL AFFAIRS

TACTICAL TASKS AND FUNCTIONS

A task is “a clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned by an appropriate authority to an individual or organization, or derived during mission analysis, that must be accomplished” (*DoD Dictionary*). Tasks include the following:

- Observe. The visual, audible, mechanical, electrical, and/or photographic monitoring of activities.
- Locate. To search or examine an area to find a specified entity known to be present in the area, but whose specific location is unknown.
- Detect. To discover or discern the existence or presence of civil activity.
- Determine. To decide or settle conclusively. This task applies to missions in which much information is known about the civil environment. However, some questions still exist about the exact disposition, location, or attitude(s).
- Identify. To positively recognize a friendly or hostile character of an unknown detected contact or to differentiate between recognizable objects as being friendly or adversary, or the name that belongs to the object as a member of a class.
- Evaluate. To examine, judge, and place value or worth on the condition and state of specified structures or capabilities.
- Confirm. To support or establish certainty or validity.
- Deny. To prove untrue or invalid.
- Report. To communicate collected information accurately and in a timely manner.
- Mark. To designate a target by marking devices.
- Measure. To estimate by comparing distances, areas, or volumes.
- Disrupt. To interrupt (an event, activity, or process) by causing a disturbance or problem and/or to integrate direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an adversary's formation or tempo, interrupt their timetable, or cause their forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion.
- Reconnaissance Operation Area. Describes and gives boundaries of the reconnaissance operations area. If it describes a route reconnaissance, it provides a general description of the routes to be taken.
- Insertion and Extraction. Provides details required for team insertion and extraction, including means, date, time, and place. Alternate means are also provided.
- Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape, and Recovery. Lists long and short-range evasion means and how recovery is undertaken.

- Detailed Patrol Plan. The patrol plan includes designation of patrol members; the specific area of operation; patrol routes; schedule of events for landing, reports, and withdrawal; landing and recovery methods; specific communications procedures; equipment requirements; and alternate procedures.
- Coordinating Instructions. Describes any coordinating instructions required to support the specific mission, including integration with other unit intelligence and reconnaissance operations, intelligence reporting criteria, reporting formats, briefing times and places, debriefings, no communication plans, and abort authority.
- Surveillance. The systematic observation of airspace or surface area by visual, aural (hearing), electronic, photographic, or other means.
- Reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. civil affairs Marines would focus on civil aspects (i.e., ASCOPE) of the operational area.
- Target Acquisition. The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to permit the effective employment of capabilities that create the required effects.
- Target Interdiction. Any action taken to divert, disrupt, delay, or defeat the adversary's military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

GLOSSARY

Section I. Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
CAO	civil affairs operations
CACOM	civil affairs command
CAT	civil affairs team
CCDM	combatant command
CCDR	combatant commander
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CIM	civil information management
CME	civil-military engagement
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CMSE	civil-military support element
COA	course of action
COP	common operational picture
CPB	civil preparation of the battlespace
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense directive
DOS	Department of State
FDR	foreign disaster relief
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
FMF	Fleet Marine Forces
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs/civil affairs staff section
HHQ	higher headquarters
ICC	information coordination cell
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace

IPI	indigenous populations and institutions
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance
J-9	civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force
JOA	Joint operations area
JP	joint publication
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCPP	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCTP	Marine Corps tactical publication
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MEB	Marine expeditionary brigade
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MISO	military information support operations
MIG	Marine expeditionary force information group
MLR	Marine littoral regiment
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MOS	military occupational specialty
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OPSEC	operations security
OHDAAC	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
PRC	populace and resources control
RFI	request for information
S-9	civil affairs officer/office
SAF	Stability Assessment Framework
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SCA	support to civil administration
SOF	special operations forces
TSOC	theater special operations command

UN	United Nations
US	United States
USC	United States Code
USG	United States Government
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command

The following acronyms are specific to this publication.

CAD	civil affairs detachment
CASA	civil affairs support activities
MARCIMS	Marine civil-information management system
MGO	military government operations
TCS	tactical conflict survey
UAP	unified action partners

Section II. Terms and Definitions

area of operations

An operational area defined by a commander for the land or maritime force commander to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called **AO**. (DoD Dictionary)

assessment

1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or “agents.” (DoD Dictionary)

chief of mission

The principal officer in charge of a diplomatic facility of the United States, including any individual temporarily assigned to be in charge of such a facility. Also called **COM**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil administration

An administration established by a foreign government in friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government or hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (DoD Dictionary)

civil affairs

Designated Active Component and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA See also civil-military operations. (DoD Dictionary)

civil affairs operations

Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called **CAO**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil information management

(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows). Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government and Department of Defense agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called **CIM**. (USMC Dictionary)

civil-military operations

Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO**. See also **civil affairs**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil-military operations center

An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan, and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander. Also called **CMOC**. See also **civil-military operations**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil reconnaissance

A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. (DoD Dictionary)

combatant command

A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called **CCMD**. (DoD Dictionary)

combatant commander

A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called **CCDR**. See also **combatant command**. (DoD Dictionary)

commander's critical information requirement

(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decision-making. The two subcategories are priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements. Also called **CCIRs**. (USMC Dictionary)

countering threat networks

Integrated activities across the Department of Defense and interagency partners to identify, monitor, disrupt, degrade, neutralize, and defeat relevant threat networks. Also called **CTN**. (DoD Dictionary)

effect

1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (DoD Dictionary)

force protection

(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. Force protection is one of the six warfighting functions. Also called **FP**. (USMC Dictionary)

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called **FHA**. (DoD Dictionary)

foreign internal defense

(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Participation by civilian, military, and law enforcement agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **FID**. (USMC Dictionary)

host nation

A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (DoD Dictionary)

indigenous populations and institutions

The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens; legal and illegal immigrants; dislocated civilians; and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called **IPI**. (DoD Dictionary)

information management

The function of managing an organization's information resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations. Also called **IM**. (DoD Dictionary)

intelligence preparation of the battlespace

The systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called **IPB**. (USMC Dictionary)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

1. An integrated operations and intelligence activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors; assets; and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. 2. The organizations or assets conducting such activities. Also called **ISR**. (DoD Dictionary)

interagency

Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (DoD Dictionary)

interagency coordination

The planning and synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies. (DoD Dictionary)

internal defense and development

The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **IDAD**. See also foreign internal defense. (DoD Dictionary)

internally displaced person

Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who has not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Also called **IDP**. (DoD Dictionary)

Interorganizational cooperation

The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government department and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military

forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (DoD Dictionary)

irregular warfare

A form of warfare where states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities. Also called **IW**. (DoD Dictionary)

Marine air-ground task force

The Marine Corps' principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations, composed of forces task-organized under a single commander capable of responding rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world. The types of forces in the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four core elements: a command element, an aviation combat element, a ground combat element, and a logistics combat element. The four core elements are categories of forces, not formal commands. The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies, though the number, size, and type of Marine Corps units comprising each of its four elements will always be mission dependent. The flexibility of the organizational structure allows for one or more subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. In a joint or multinational environment, other Service or multinational forces may be assigned or attached. Also called **MAGTF**. (USMC Dictionary)

Marine Corps Planning Process

A six-step methodology that helps organize the thought processes of the commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on the mission and the threat and is based on the Marine Corps philosophy of maneuver warfare. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of command and supports the establishment and maintenance of tempo. The six steps consist of problem framing, course of action development, course of action war game, course of action comparison and decision, orders development, and transition. Also called **MCPP**. (*Note: Tenets of the MCPP include top-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planning.*) (USMC Dictionary)

Marine expeditionary brigade

A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around an infantry regiment reinforced, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a combat logistics regiment. The Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force, or alone. It varies in size and composition and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a Marine expeditionary force. The MEB is capable of conducting missions across the range of military operations. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. Also called **MEB**. (USMC Dictionary)

Marine expeditionary force

The largest Marine air-ground task force and the Marine Corps' principal warfighting organization, particularly for larger crises or contingencies. It is task-organized around a permanent command element and normally contains one or more Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings, and Marine logistics groups. The Marine expeditionary force is capable of missions across a range of military operations, including amphibious assault and sustained operations ashore in any environment. It can operate from a sea base, a land base, or both. In a joint or multinational environment, it may also contain other Service or multinational forces assigned or attached to the Marine air-ground task force. Also called **MEF**. (USMC Dictionary)

measure of effectiveness

An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called **MOE**. (DoD Dictionary)

measure of performance

An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called **MOP**. (DoD Dictionary)

multinational force

A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for a specific purpose. (DoD Dictionary)

nongovernmental organization

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (DoD Dictionary)

populace and resources control

Control measures that assist host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success. Also called **PRC**. (USMC Dictionary)

priority intelligence requirement

(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) An intelligence requirement associated with a decision that will critically affect the overall success of the command's mission. Also called **PIR**. (USMC Dictionary)

private sector

An umbrella term that can be applied to any or all the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (DoD Dictionary)

security assistance

A group of programs authorized by federal statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which are considered part of security cooperation. Also called **SA**. (DoD Dictionary)

security cooperation

Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. Also called **SC**. See also **security assistance**. (DoD Dictionary)

stabilization activities

Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (DoD Dictionary)

support to civil administration

Actions that help continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a foreign nation's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports United States and multinational objectives. Also called **SCA**. (USMC Dictionary)

unity of effort

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (DoD Dictionary)

The following definitions are specific to this publication.

Civil affairs activities

Activities specifically planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs forces that support the commander to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate indigenous populations and institutions, unified action partners, and interagency organizations/partners.

civil affairs group

A Reserve Component organization supporting the MAGTF commander with specially trained and organized personnel to facilitate the planning, coordination, and execution of CMO and limited civil affairs operations.

civil engagement

A deliberate or impromptu activity or interaction six between Marine forces and nonmilitary individuals or entities, designed to build relationships; reduce or eliminate civil interference and causes of instability; gather, confirm, or deny information; foster legitimacy, or promote cooperation and unified action.

civil preparation of the battlespace

An analytical method used to examine civil considerations in support of mission analysis and the overall IPB process. Civil preparation of the battlespace is conducted through the framework of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations to focus on civil aspects as it relates to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. Civil preparation of the battlespace uses myriad methods to specifically analyze distinct aspects of civil information and assess the civil impact of friendly, adversary, external actors, as well as the local populace, on MAGTF operations and the achievement of objectives.

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