MCRP 3-03A.2

MAGTF Civil-Military Operations Planning

U.S. Marine Corps

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

21 June 2024

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-03A.2, *Marine Corps Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations Planning*, provides detailed guidance, tools, techniques, and processes necessary to integrate civil considerations into Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) operations to minimize the effect civilians have on MAGTF operations, and MAGTF operations have on the civilians.

This publication's key audience is the MAGTF commander and staff, in particular, the Marine expeditionary force to the Marine expeditionary unit, infantry regiments and battalions, and the influence operations community. This publication describes in detail those activities that provide an operational planning team with the analysis, insight, and planning support products—including Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) of the operation order—related to the civil dimension of the operating environment.

Marine Corps leaders at every level should understand the concepts and employment considerations for civil-military operations and civil affairs described in this publication, and described in Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-03, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, and Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-03A.1, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*.

This publication supersedes MCRP 3-03A.2, *Multi-Service Techniques for Civil Affairs Support to Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, dated February 2013, and the erratum dated 2 May 2016.

Reviewed and approved on this date.

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CHAPTER 1.
MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS FUNDAMENTALS

Throughout the competition continuum, commanders are challenged with preparing the force to operate in a battlespace shared by allies, partners, adversaries and a multitude of military and civilian actors and organizations. The Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) conducts civil-military operations (CMO) to coordinate and deconflict civil and military activities; minimize civil-military friction, reduce threats from the civil component, and maximize civilian support for operations to give the commander the information advantage.

The purpose of planning is to support the commander's decision making. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 5, *Planning*, describes planning as an essential part of the broader field of command and control, which enhances the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. Effective decision making requires both the situational understanding to recognize the essence of a given problem and the creative ability to devise a practical solution. The essential planning functions are: understanding the problem, identifying the difference between existing and desired conditions, and devising ways to achieve the desired end state. Civil-military operations planning is an integrated process within MAGTF planning; CMO planners support the MAGTF operational planning team (OPT) by reaching out to medical officials, engineers, logistics personnel, chaplain and judge advocates, and others when developing options to reinforce mission objectives, improve efficiency and prevent rules of engagement violations. Synchronizing nonlethal and lethal effects enhances operational efficiencies and the commander's ability to achieve desired outcomes; CMO planners routinely coordinate with influence Marines.

The CMO planner is the MAGTF commander's primary resource for meeting the directed obligation to protect civilians in the battlespace while enabling freedom of maneuver and operational tempo. Civil-military operations are typically conducted simultaneously and in the same battlespace as other military operations, including offensive and defensive combat operations. The CMO planner assesses this "civil dimension" of the battlespace for the commander and staff; contributes to the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and identifies potential threats, opportunities, and outcomes during targeting and information activity planning that can degrade or leverage mission success.

This publication describes the supporting legal and doctrinal authorities for integrating civil considerations into the planning process. It details CMO input to the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) and provides a framework for CMO planners or other designated military forces to identify, examine, advise, and assess the effects of relevant factors of the civil dimension of the battlespace and integrate them into planning, conducting, and assessing military operations. Civil-military operations planners are a critical resource for helping the commander understand the civil component of the mission.

Finally, planning is iterative and cyclical and must always support the larger end state. Although mission planning is the basis for mission execution, the post-mission assessment cycle determines whether, how, and why the environment changes during execution, which shapes subsequent mission planning, execution, and assessment.

ROLE OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNER

The CMO planners provide a dedicated planning capability and are nested within the MAGTF tables of organization. The G-9/S-9 (when forward deployed), as a primary staff officer, is responsible for planning and assessing civil considerations and integrating them into the MCPP. The key to successful G-9/S-9 staff support is ensuring the civil component within the operating environment is factored into current and future planning activities and is subsequently captured in branches and sequels based on the anticipated or realized outcomes of current operations. The G-9/S-9 is designated to provide the commander with actionable civil information that can increase the commander's awareness and understanding of the civil component, ensure efficient use of finite resources, and harmonize the efforts of unified action partners, indigenous populations and individuals, and interorganizational partners within the operational environment.

Civil-military operations planners can be requested to supplement Marine staffs to facilitate and manage civil affairs operations (CAO) in support of the commander's CMO concept. In a MAGTF without an assigned G-9/S-9 or at a battalion level with no dedicated S-9 position, the civil affairs detachment commander or team leader might be required to conduct the civil affairs staff officer's duties. It is critical that civil affairs officers and noncommissioned officers understand the MCPP and can incorporate civil data and information into planning processes.

Essential CMO planer's responsibilities include:

- Preparing and updating CMO estimates, civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB), Annex G (Civil-Military Operations), and publishing CMO-related after-action reports for the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3. Civil-military operations planners can contribute to Annex I (Information), Annex P (Host-Nation Support), and Annex V (Interagency Coordination).
- Planning, coordinating, and overseeing CMO and CAO activities within the commander's battlespace to include the following:
  - Ensuring measures are taken to control civilian movement to avoid interference with military operations.
  - Coordinating with adjacent, higher, and non-US military forces and indigenous populations and institutions (IPI) to control civilian activities and resources affecting military operations.
  - Protecting culturally significant sites and critical civil infrastructure; advising on the no-strike list in coordination with either the MAGTF's force fires and effects coordination center or a subordinate unit's fire support coordination center.
  - Coordinating with the United States and other military forces, IPI, and civilian agencies to provide the administration for and the care and relocation of displaced persons and refugees in the battlespace and any associated collection activities.

  - Coordinating with US and other military forces, IPI, and other civilian agencies for evacuating and hospitalizing critically sick, wounded, and injured civilians.
  - Coordinating and overseeing supplies, equipment, and support requested by civilian actors to meet their urgent physical needs in the battlespace.
  - Participating in planning and overseeing noncombatant evacuations, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), populace and resource control (PRC), transitional military authority, support to civil administration and civil affairs supported activities.
- Contributing to the G-3/S-3 common operational picture (COP) and the civil component of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).
- Contributing to the G-2/S-2 IPB and modified combined obstacle overlay with a CPB and civil environment model using areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) and political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) factors analyses, and to support the combined information overlay and the MCPP.
- Contributing to influencing activities and coordinating with additional information capabilities activities regarding civil actors of interest.
- Contributing to civil information management (CIM), information management, and other information fusion processes.

In the absence of a G-9/S-9, the CMO planner also—

- Assesses the requirement for civil affairs force augmentation; oversees civil affairs units and makes recommendations regarding their size and composition.
- Prioritizes and manages funds, projects, and activities supporting CMO and CAO.
- Recommends establishing a civil-military operations center.
- Recommends a CMO watch officer to the fires and effects coordinator (FEC) or fire support coordination center (FSCC) in support of Marine expeditionary force information group and information coordination center operations.
- Advises regarding liaison officer placement in higher headquarters (HHQ)s and select external organizations and agencies to support or represent the MAGTF or the Marine expeditionary force commander as events or missions require.

The CMO planner does not task civil affairs or other forces with CMO or CAO activities. Civil affairs tasks are coordinated with the G-3/S-3 and their supported chain of command. However, the fast paced and nuanced civil environment demands a close, informal working relationship among the G-9/S-9, the G-3/S-3, CMO planners, and the civil affairs forces in the field to achieve and retain the commander's operational tempo.

ORGANIZING FOR CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING

The number of civil affairs personnel available in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) and their experience levels are two factors that determine what CMO capabilities are available for planning and how the CMO staff will organize for the planning effort. Ideally, a staff member with both knowledge and responsibility for the CMO functions is present to support the CMO planner in the

command OPT and oversee the CMO working group and the civil affairs assets that provide input to the planning process. This staff member ultimately becomes the plans executor. An important early step to successful CMO planning is ensuring that all civil affairs personnel and organizations involved understand their part in the overall organization and the roles and responsibilities they have throughout the planning process. The senior CMO planner often develops the CMO concept of operations or concept of support. This is most likely an influence officer, influence chief, or influence specialist; Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-03A.1, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures,* describes the full range and capabilities of influence and civil affairs Marines. The senior CMO planner provides guidance and oversight to the commander during planning by serving as the conduit among the G-3/S-3 or G-9 and the command OPT. The CMO planner should be an active participant in all MAGTF planning efforts and know how to access resources to provide specific expertise regarding (public health, legal and economic systems, civil engineering, etc.) in the operating environment.

Operational Planning Team

Civil-military operation planners integrate into the MAGTF through the OPT, with personnel who have an appropriate level of knowledge and understanding of their respective organization or activity. Civil affairs forces often have useful expertise in junior ranks who should be included. In some cases, the presence of representatives from host-nation government agencies, the host-nation police and military, intelligence community, political representatives, and others might also benefit the OPTs. Humanitarian operations could include representatives from US Government departments and agencies, international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private relief organizations. The key to successful operational planning is to involve the right personnel from the right organizations in the planning process as early as possible to consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information as broadly as possible.

Civil-Military Operations Working Group

The CMO working group plans concurrently with the MAGTF OPT and provides input when needed. The CMO working group's scope and composition varies according to the MAGTF's size and level of interorganizational involvement. The CMO working group is most effective when there is maximum participation and transparency among interorganizational partners. The CMO working group provides input to the CPB, develops the CMO problem statement, creates the CMO concept of support or concept of operations, develops the CMO staff estimate (described in Appendix A), and produces Annex G for the operational order (OPORD).

The CMO working group relies on the CMO planner. The CMO planner—

- Gains understanding and provides insights into the planning the OPT conducts.
- Advises the OPT about civil affairs capabilities, limitations, and the civil environment.

Green Cell

The Green Cell helps the commander and staff understand the civil environment from the civilian perspective. The Green Cell defines and describes the actions of individuals, groups, institutions based on the civilian's perspective of their security, political, social and economic factors with a focus on how, and to what degree these factors induce actions that might affect military operations. The Green Cell is initiated during problem framing, refined in Course of Action (COA) development, and employed during COA wargaming.

Red Cell

The Red Cell is formed to assist the commander and planning group to consider a wider range of perspectives and COAs and to help commanders and staffs avoid complacency when assessing planning against the adversary's capabilities and actions or the environment. Red teams provide the perspectives of partners, competitors, and enemies or adversaries and compare them with perspectives held by US planning organizations and Western military thought in general. People and organizations generally fail in their planning when viewing the adversary according to their own cultures and contexts. As a countermeasure, the Red Cell can help Marines explore alternatives in context from differing perspectives. Like the Green Cell, the Red Cell uncovers civil and adversary motivations and capabilities to influence the populace and degrade or deny US military access and achieve military objectives.

Civil-Military Operations Working Group Subject Matter Experts

When possible, the CMO working group should include civilian subject-matter experts, such as representatives from organizations to include the following:

- United States Agency for International Development's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance.
- Host-nation representation.
- Non-governmental organizations.
- International organizations.
- Department of Agriculture.
- Medical and veterinary organizations.
- Religious organizations.
- Department of State.
- Foreign and regional area specialists.

UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Understanding the operational environment is essential to the planning and decision-making processes, and ultimately, strategic for mission success. Civil-military operations planners identify significant characteristics in the battlespace and their potential effects on friendly operations by analyzing the physical environment, the civil infrastructure, and the civil environment. The civil factor is particularly relevant to creating an environment secure enough for IPI, and international and non-governmental organizations to operate. Civil factors include locally influential individuals and groups; local or regional factors regarding maritime, urban, and rural livelihoods; culture and cultural touchpoints, and local stability and instability dynamics. Information gathered through unclassified and open-source methods are analyzed using the ASCOPE and PMESII matrices. Civil-military operations planners can also include information gathered from staff estimates developed in concurrent planning. Such information includes the IPB, logistics staff estimates, draft intelligence collection plan, medical staff estimate, etc.

THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

Civil-military operations planning supports the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. Civil-military operations planners use the MCPP to promote a common understanding of the operational environment and the problem as a basis for action. The MCPP six-step process is as follows:

Step 1. Problem framing.

Step 2. COA development.

Step 3. COA war game.

Step 4. COA comparison and decision.

Step 5. Orders development.

Step 6. Transition.

The process is guided by three tenets, which direct the commander and staff to plan and direct operations: top-down planning, single-battle construct, and integrated planning. Civil-military operations planners contribute to each step and tenet of the MCPP.

Top-Down Planning

Planning is a fundamental responsibility of command. The commander's involvement throughout the planning process provides the foundation for decentralized execution. Although the commander's guidance and intent drive the process, commanders require support from others. The goal of the CMO planner, like all other staff, operational planning teams, and associated working groups, is to increase the commander's understanding of the environment and the problem and to assist decision making. The CMO planner is the only staff member who is focused on the civil component.

Single-Battle Construct

Conceptually, the battlespace can be divided into three parts: deep, close, and rear. However, operations and events in one part of the battlespace often have profound and unintended effects in other areas and events. Civil-military operations planners develop a concept of support that integrates civil considerations into the MAGTF's scheme of maneuver.

Integrated Planning

Integrated planning is the coordinated action toward a common purpose among all elements of the force. The CMO planner maintains engagement with the commander and staff to share relevant civil component information across warfighting functions in support of current and future operations.

THE SIX STEPS OF THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS

Each step of MCPP is critical to understanding the situation, determining the root cause of the problem, and identifying suitable options for solving the identified problem. Figure 1-1 depicts the MCPP's six steps, which are addressed from a CMO planning perspective in the following paragraphs.

Step 1. Problem Framing

Problem framing is the foundational step of the MCPP. Problem framing uses a design methodology supported by staff actions to determine the nature of the problem through study and analysis of the operational environment. Civil-military operations planners are essential for identifying and describing the relevance of civil, physical, and human factors, particularly the destabilizing factors that adversaries could exploit, degrade or undermine military operations. Problem framing also identifies what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done and, most importantly, why—the operation's purpose.

Step 2. Course of Action Development

During COA development, planners produce options for accomplishing the mission with the commander's operational approach. Civil-military operations planners highlight possible outcomes from the position of the civil component, to include both opportunities and likely friction points.

Step 3. Course of Action War Game

A COA war game involves a detailed assessment, weighing each friendly COA against anticipated reactions of the adversary and the independent will of the population. Civil-military operations planners provide the civil perspective in the absence of a Green Cell and help identify COA strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA. Course of action wargaming also identifies branches and potential sequels that might require additional planning or shaping operations that can affect the civil component.

Step 4. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates friendly COAs against established criteria, compares them against each other, and then decides on a COA that best accomplishes the mission or might need to be further developed and war gamed. Civil-military operations planners provide expertise regarding CMO ability to support COAs and their likely effects on the civil environment.

Step 5. Orders Development

During orders development, the CMO planner, OPT and the commander's staff translate the commander's decision into oral, written, and graphic direction. This direction then facilitates the subordinate units' continued planning, execution, and initiatives.

Step 6. Transition

A transition could involve a range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals by those who will execute the order, to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution. When a Green Cell is not available, CMO planners must be prepared to provide the civilian perspective, likely outcomes, and mitigating actions.



Figure 1-1. The Six Steps of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS AUTHORITIES

Civil-military operations enable commanders to meet their legal and moral obligation to protect the civilian population within their area of operations. Civil-military operations planning is supported and led by many Department of Defense (DoD) authorities, to include the following:

- DoDI 3000.17, C*ivilian Harm Mitigation and Response* directs commanders to protect and do no unnecessary harm to civilians in the battlespace.
- National Security Presidential Directive–44 (NSPD-44), *Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization*. The NPSD states that while the State Department has the lead for stabilization and reconstruction, the DoD has a requirement to support that effort.
- Department of Defense directive (DoDD) 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components* directs the DoD to establish a military government when

occupying enemy territory. Specifically, the Marine Corps conducts security and stabilization activities and assists with the initial establishment of a military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authorities.

- DoDD 2000.13, *Civil Affairs* identifies military government as a directed requirement for CAO until civilian authority can be restored. DoDD 2000.13 also establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for conducting DoD-wide civil affairs activities including the use of military forces to support approved humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations, and disaster relief operations conducted in accordance with DoDD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief* in addition to allowing immediate humanitarian actions to prevent the loss of life, property, and unnecessary human suffering.

Related joint authorities and relevant publications include the following:

- *Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment (JCOIE).*
- *Joint Concept for Human Aspects of Military Operations (JC-HAMO).*
- Joint publication (JP) 3-04, *Information in Joint Operations.*
- JP 3-06, *Joint Urban Operations*.
- JP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*.
- JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*.
- JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting.*
- MCTP 10-10F, *Military Police Operations.*
- AJP 3.19, *NATO Civil-Military Cooperation.*

Domestic Use of Military Forces.

Under extraordinary conditions or events in the continental United States, military forces might be authorized to assist in domestic emergencies to protect property and to provide limited support to domestic civil authorities. Federal military personnel typically provide support to civil authorities in coordination with the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the affected State's National Guard leadership. Applicable DoDDs include the following:

- DoDD 3025.18, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).*
- DoDI 3025.21, *Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.*

CHAPTER 2.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

It is difficult to imagine any scenario where Marines will operate in an environment without the presence of a civilian population and where civil considerations will not affect military actions. The overarching goal of CMO planning is to mitigate the negative effects of military actions on a civilian population and, conversely, prevent the civilian population from interfering with military actions against an enemy or adversary. Therefore, the MAGTF commander and staff must analyze how the civil landscape affects the mission.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY

Conducting military actions requires a careful balance between applying force to accomplish military objectives and meeting the legal and ethical obligations to civilians in the operating environment. Marines achieve this balance by starting with the desired planning end state: a stable, safe, and secure civilian environment. DoDD 3000.05, *Stabilization*, establishes this DoD policy, assigns responsibilities for all Services to conduct stabilization efforts and provides guidance for the planning, training, execution, and oversight of stabilization activities.

The Department of State is the overall lead federal agency for US stabilization efforts; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead implementing agency for non-security US stabilization assistance; the DoD is a supporting element that provides security and reinforces civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities. The stabilization assistance review framework outlines steps by which State, USAID, and DoD organizations work more effectively together and efficiently manage resources to apply lessons learned from past stabilization efforts and ensure unity of effort.

INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES AND CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATION PLANNING

Civil-military operations are a critical capability within influence activities. Influence activities include military information support operations, civil affairs operations, and strategic communications that both target and influence malign adversary behavior while preserving stability and support with neutral and friendly actors. Taken together, influence activities enable information maneuver, which includes activities in the space and cyberspace domains. Maneuver through the information space is integral to prevailing throughout the competition continuum. Civil-military operations planning enables the FMF and MAGTF to focus on maintaining and building positive and constructive relationships with friendly and neutral populations.

The Marine Corps organized the influence occupational field to support activities throughout the competition continuum. This provides increased capability to MAGTF and FMF commanders as well as improved career viability for those Marines with invaluable skillsets in civil affairs and communication strategy. When organizing for CMO planning, consider what type of CMO planner or civil affairs Marine is being employed. MCRP 3-03A.1, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, provides more information on influence and civil affairs military occupational specialties, and MCTP 3-03A, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*, describes how these CMO planners can integrate into functions like the information coordination cell.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS FUNCTIONS AND COMPONENTS

Commanders conduct CMO to achieve unified action between the military and civilian counterparts during operations. Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and integrates joint, Marine Corps, and multinational operations with the activities of other United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, NGOs, international organizations (e.g., the United Nations), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. Unified action is achieved when all partners are integrated into planning and all actions are coordinated and synchronized to achieve the commander's objectives. This applies particularly to partners and activities that are not within the command authority of, or do not have command relationships with, a joint force commander (JFC). Refer to Table 2-1 for a list of CMO components and functions.

Civil-Military Operations Components

The CMO components include civil-military relations, enabling activities, and information management. Each CMO component consists of CMO activities, which support the CMO's goals and objectives through executing assigned missions and tasks.

Civil-Military Operations Functions

Civil-military operations functions are those activities performed by Marines who establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between the MAGTF and IPI. They directly support objectives relating to reestablishing or maintaining stability within a region or a host nation. Civil-military operations are conducted to facilitate unified action in joint operations, and to establish, restore, or maintain a stable operational environment.

Table 2-1. Civil-Military Operations Components and Functions.

Civil-Military Operations		
Civil-Military Relations	**Enabling Operations**	**Information Management**
• Indigenous Populations and Institutions • Interorganizational Cooperation	• Civil Affairs Activities • Medical CMO • Military Government • Military Police Activities • Engineer Activities • Military Information Support Operations • Public Affairs • Cyberspace • Sustainment	• Civil Information Management • Medical Intelligence • Police Intelligence • Geospatial Engineering • Target Audience Analysis

CIVIL AFFAIRS-SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES

In civil affairs-supported activities, which serve a key planning, coordinating, or synchronizing role; civil affairs forces are not the proponent or primary executor. Supported activities include foreign assistance, foreign humanitarian assistance, populace and resources control, and civil-military engagement. Missions are executed through a combination of capabilities provided by elements of the MAGTF or joint force. Civil-military operations planners could be required to plan MAGTF support for one or more of these activities.

Civil-military operations planners should request MOS-qualified civil affairs marines to provide liaison support to civil affairs-supported activities. Civil affairs typically support these operations through planning, integration, and execution of civil affairs operations described in MCRP 3-03A.1. They provide the CMO planner with knowledge and expertise about the civil dimension within the operating environment.

Civil affairs Marines can integrate the IPI and its resources into MAGTF or FMF operations that support foreign assistance, foreign disaster response, population and resource control, and civil-military engagement. They can also coordinate with inter-organizational partners throughout the planning process to facilitate unity of effort between military and civilian organizations. A CMO planner is most effective when they integrate civil affairs Marines into the planning process.

CIVIL INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

The civil information management (CIM) process is an essential activity for civil affairs Marines with unit command staffs (i.e., S-2, S-3 or higher). It should be broadly organized to the supported unit's intelligence and maneuver elements to enhance the common tactical picture or COP and it facilitates the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, IPB, the CPB, or other information-gathering processes. The CIM process is conducted continuously throughout the

competition continuum. Civil-military operations planners provide expertise on data collection and information management related to the civil component of the operational environment and develop timely and accurate civil-component information that is critical to the commander's understanding, planning, and decision-making.

In the CIM process, civil information is gathered, analyzed, and entered into a central database. The information is fused with the supported MAGTF intelligence products and shared with joint intelligence organizations, other USG departments and agencies, interagency partners, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. This ensures the timely availability of information to relevant stakeholders for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of both raw and analyzed civil information to the unified action partners. Civil affairs Marines can refine this information through continued civil reconnaissance and civil engagement.

Civil considerations are developed from data derived from ASCOPE and PMESII within the commander's operational environment. The management of civil information is the fusion of analyzed data into the COP to benefit the supported commander, DoD, interagency, international organization, NGO, and IPI.

Civil information management enhances situational awareness and facilitates understanding for the elements in the operational environment, allowing those elements to achieve decision-making superiority. Although every civil affairs Marine can conduct basic analysis of civil information, trained CMO planners' analyses of that civil information provides an enhanced and actionable situational understanding.

CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

Civil preparation of the battlespace addresses civil considerations throughout the MCPP. It provides information during the IPB process, particularly when identifying distinct differences between information requirements oriented on the threat environment versus the civil dimension. Civil-military operations planners provide civil considerations through the CPB process, developed independently, but in parallel with the IPB.

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is the systematic analysis relating to enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effects on operations. The IPB process allows commanders and staffs to take a holistic approach to analyzing the operational environment by—

- Describing the totality of relevant aspects of the operational environment that could impact friendly, adversary, and neutral forces.
- Accounting for all relevant domains that could impact friendly and adversary operations.
- Allowing commanders to leverage aspects of the operational environment at a time and place most advantageous for mission success with the most accurate information available.
- Identifying windows of opportunity to leverage friendly capabilities against adversary forces.

The IPB most effectively aids the commander's decision making when the intelligence staff integrates the expertise of the other staff sections and supporting elements, including influence Marine expertise, into its analysis. This is particularly true when operating in environments where the effects of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations are complex, multidimensional, and not easily determined. The CBP is a valuable contribution to the IPB.

The CPB specifically analyzes the various civil information aspects and assesses the civil impact of friendly, adversary, and external actors, as well as the local populace, on MAGTF operations and objectives. It is developed through the civil considerations of ASCOPE and the operational variables of PMESII and guided by the commander's desired outcome or end state for the operational environment.

Civil preparation of the battlespace is a four-step iterative process designed to support MAGTF decision makers, staff, and the FMF. It provides insight into many aspects of the civil environment to support planning through the MCPP and operations. The four steps of the CPB are—

Step 1. Define the civil operating environment (collect civil information).

Step 2. Analyze the civil operating environment.

Step 3. Develop a civil environment model.

Step 4. Determine civil actions.

Each step in the process is refined continually to ensure that the CPB products are accurate and relevant in decision making. Civil-military operations planners and civil affairs Marines on staff are typically responsible for developing, refining, and continually updating the CPB throughout the planning process and while conducting CMO operations.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING

Effective CMO planners require not only in-depth understanding of the operational environment at all levels, but also the ability to visualize changes in the operational environment. Civil-military operations planners must also be able to visualize and use military and non-military forces and capabilities to achieve the commander's desired end state. Although a CMO plan does not guarantee mission success, the CMO plan helps the commander and staff forecast most likely negative outcomes and effects of military operations and mitigate them in advance, which can deny the adversary an opportunity to sway the populace and institutions against the United States.

During planning CMO planners interact with the following staff:

- G-9/S-9. The G-9 is typically the senior CMO or civil affairs professional in the command and might serve as an OPT member and CMO working group leader. The G-9/S-9 exercises staff cognizance over all CMOs and CAOs in the commander's battlespace and should review and approve information and products developed by the CMO planner, CMO working group, and Green Cell. In the absence of an assigned G-9/S-9 assigned, the CMO planner assumes these responsibilities.

- A standing working group with input from various staff sections and subject matter experts (SMEs), who, together with the Green Cell, "own the CPB process and inform the OPT or G-9 on civil considerations during planning. The CMO planner is an integral member and might even lead the group, as necessary.
- An ad-hoc working group that assists the commander and the OPT in understanding the effects of the civil environment on both friendly and adversary forces.
  The Green Cell consists of individuals of diverse backgrounds, education, and experiences, who can identify and consider the perspective of the population, civil authorities, and other civilian stakeholders. Like the Red Cell, the Green Cell participates throughout the planning process, but focuses on the effects of the civil environment on friendly and adversary courses of action.

RAPID RESPONSE PLANNING PROCESS

The rapid response planning process (R2P2) is a time-leveraged planning process that enables a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) to begin executing an assigned task within six hours. Critical to R2P2's success is conducting deliberate planning and limited rehearsals, oriented on an anticipated area of responsibility for future MEU operations. In this way, R2P2, when coupled with the extensive use of standing operating procedures (SOPs) and seven-minute battle drills, enables a MEU to focus its execution planning on those aspects of a problem unique to the current situation. The R2P2 is particularly suited for focused operations such as FHA or noncombatant evacuation operations.

The R2P2 steps are the same as those of the MCPP, modified by sharp time constraints. The R2P2 is less formal than the MCPP: wherein, one who knows something informs others who need to know as soon as possible. The planning lead typically establishes a single point of contact to control the information flow and ensures standardized verbiage and graphics are used to focus attention on content and reduce information gaps and redundancies.

Maintaining awareness of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) mitigates information overload and helps the staff to concentrate on the essentials. All participants provide information, knowledge, and basic analysis of their subject areas. The CMO planner's role in the R2P2 includes integrating an up-to-date CPB, staff estimate, and relevant SOP and battle drills, and participating in targeting as or if the situation warrants.

NAVY PLANNING PROCESS

The Navy planning process (NPP) is a six-step, iterative process used to plan operations across all domains: air, land, maritime, space and information, to enable naval operations. Although the planning steps themselves might be similar, execution in each domain is unique. Naval sea power operations planning typically incorporates concepts of both combat and stability missions to gain and maintain sea control. Sea control is not an aspect of peacetime power projection; rather, it is defined by maritime superiority and maritime supremacy, which comprise the necessary actions to

obtain and maintain sea control through combat or the immediate threat of combat to deny adversaries an advantage. Sea power and sea control planning require precise articulation of the specific types of missions to be conducted, their purpose, and their desired outcomes.

The Navy does not have civil affairs-trained forces; however, Navy Seabees conduct small-scale construction projects in areas of interest to build relationships, deter competitors, develop goodwill, and maintain access to the civil dimension, which serves a similar purpose. Civil-military operations planners might contribute to Navy planning with their understanding of relevant civil factors in the maritime and littoral environments, including maritime economies and commerce and regional or local stabilizing and destabilizing factors.

JOINT PLANNING PROCESS

Typically, a joint task force has a J-9, (CMO directorate of a joint staff) as the JFC's lead for planning and incorporating CMO into the joint planning process. Civil-military operations planners at all levels must ensure their input supports the joint force commander's intent and operational concept. The J-9 usually leads the CMO staff element and establishes the objectives, measures of effectiveness (MOE), decisive points, and the desired outcomes of CMO activities in support of JFC operations or campaigns. Civil-military operations planning at this level typically focuses on six overarching lines of effort: governance, economic stability, infrastructure, public health and welfare, public education and information, and rule of law.

Although not all the geographic combatant commands have a J-9 staff section organic to their joint manning document, Marine civil affairs planners can provide planning teams to assist the JFC with deliberate and crisis action planning.

During the joint planning process, just as in the MCPP, CMO planners and civil affairs Marines provide the commander with a real-time analysis of the civil components that shape the operational environment. Civil considerations are analyzed and evaluated for the aspects of the operational environment that directly affect mission accomplishment. Civil-military operations planners further develop and implement their plans with civilian officials from other USG agencies and nonmilitary organizations to synchronize US and multinational efforts. The J-9 responsibilities include the following:

- Advising the JFC and staff on responsibilities as they pertain to the civil component.
- Recommending civil affairs force requirements.
- Participating in the targeting process to identify civil component protected targets.
- Analyzing the effects of civilian populations on military operations.
- Identifying nongovernmental and other independent organizations operating in the area of operation.
- Participating in boards, cells, and working groups to ensure CMO is synchronized as required.

CHAPTER 3.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO PROBLEM FRAMING

The first step of MCPP is problem framing, a commander-driven design methodology supported by staff actions. This step is essential to the entire planning process and helps planners gain understanding of the operational environment and the nature of the problem. This greater understanding leads to the operation's purpose (identifying what must be accomplished and, most importantly, why). Problem framing affects the entire decision-making process. If the problem is insufficiently understood, planning conducted in subsequent steps is unlikely to address its root cause(s).

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Civil-military operations planners must analyze the operational environment and the nature of the problem from the civil perspective. The CPB is key to the overall assessment of the operational environment and the effects adversary, friendly, and other actors could have on the mission. Civil-military operations planners must identify relative CMO assets and capabilities, where those assets are located, and then be able to integrate those assets into planning and executing the concept of support. Civil-military operations planners also begin to develop the CMO staff estimate. The staff estimate provides a timely examination of factors and is the primary means of informing the commander. Once the commander approves a COA, the CMO staff estimate supports the development of Annex G of the OPORD.

INJECTS, ACTIVITIES, AND RESULTS FOR PROBLEM FRAMING

The injects, activities, and results for the problem-framing step are described in detail in Figure 3-1. The diagram is not intended to be used as a checklist, but as a reference to help promote understanding for the entire process. The information shown in bold highlights the commander's personal involvement during each part of this step.



Figure 3-1. Problem Framing Injects, Activities, and Results.

PROBLEM-FRAMING INJECTS

The typical injects to problem framing are the commander's orientation, higher headquarters warning order, OPORD, and the IPB. The CMO planner should provide the operational context from a civil perspective to deepen the commander's understanding of the problem and contribute to design. The commander's orientation demonstrates personal involvement in the planning process and sets the tone for subsequent planning.

Civil preparation of the battlespace enables the commander to gain understanding of the civil dimension of the broader operational environment. Understanding the civil dimension of the operational environment provides background information, facts, status, connections, and other relevant civil factors that give context to the overall picture.

PROBLEM FRAMING ACTIVITIES

Design

The goal of design is to deepen one's understanding through critical thinking and dialogue. Design leads to an actionable operational approach that provides guidance for detailed planning and

execution. A design methodology is central to the problem-framing effort and is conducted throughout the planning-execution-assessment continuum.

The Marine Corps Design Methodology (MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.1) helps planners determine the problem-set and a framework for solving them. This design methodology consists of four distinct actions:

- Describe the current and desired states of the operating environment.
- Define the problem set.
- Produce the operational approach.
- Reframe the design throughout planning and execution.

The commander's operational approach provides context for what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and, most importantly, why (i.e., the purpose of the operation).

Commander's Orientation

The commander's orientation enables the commander and staff to begin framing the problem as a basis for developing possible solutions. It also demonstrates the commander's personal involvement and leadership in the planning process. This activity could be a basic summary of commander's initial thoughts, or a detailed and complex articulation of the commander's experience, insight, and familiarity with the situation. In mature situations with existing HHQ's plans and intent, the commander could suggest possible centers of gravity (COG) and guidance for the subordinate commands. It is not uncommon for the commander and staff to include SMEs who have a deeper understanding of the environment and problem—CMO planners and civil affairs Marines—to be involved in this discussion.

Decision-Making Approaches

Decisions are made through either analytical or intuitive methods. An analytical method is more time-intensive than intuitive and best suited for addressing novel problem sets and planning in larger organizations like a battalion, regiment, or brigade staff. This is the method around which MCPP is primarily designed. This process breaks down complex problem sets into their sub-components, which then provide the staff and planners with a deeper understanding of the environment and mission. An example of a staff action that results from analysis would be a staff estimate-by-function, wherein the logistics staff estimate provides insight into logistics capabilities and limitations, the physical network through which logistics flows, and staff processes that integrate logistics into warfighting functions such as maneuver and fires.

The intuitive decision-making approach is a quicker method that relies on extensive training, education, and experience. Intuitive decision makers have developed heuristics that enable them to gather, process, and quickly make sense of vast amounts of information in a given situation. Intuitive decision makers are acutely aware of the heuristics that they have developed as well as the biases that inhibit their understanding of a situation. Generally, the staff principals are experienced in their respective function, while the MAGTF commander is experienced in integrating those functions in time and space to achieve a desired or directed outcome. For example, a MAGTF commander can read the operational environment, with an understanding

of how each of his staff principals and major subordinate commanders understand that environment and derive an overarching operational approach that drives refinements to design and detailed planning.

Understanding the Environment

Analyzing the environment helps identify and describe current conditions, enabling the development of a comprehensive problem statement. Civil-military operations planners assess their operating environment and then orient to the best possible advantage to carry out feasible actions. In addition to the ASCOPE, PMESII, CPB, and running estimate, CMO planners consider the following:

- Command design, mission, intent, orders, directives, and guidance.
- Intelligence products, to include IPB.
- Area studies and assessments.
- Geography, demographics, and language of the region.
- Civilian population and culture.
- Key influences and relationships.
- Individual identity and group identity.

All individuals are members of multiple, overlapping identity groups. Identity groups form links through affinity and shared understanding. Network analysis involves evaluating, gathering, and interpreting data to discern associations and relationships among individuals, groups, or entities. It considers the context and significance of these relationships to identify opportunities to strengthen or weaken associations. Operational environments invariably comprise interrelated friendly, neutral, and threat networks, all influencing the mission. Analyzing these networks helps commanders identify key nodes or actors for engagement during the targeting process.

Civil Consideration

The primary function of CMO planner is to advise the commander and staff on key aspects of the civil dimension to be considered during the planning process. These civil considerations could be physical, cultural, or relational. Civil considerations focus on the relevant impact the civil population can have on operations, including—

- Civilian perceptions about US forces.
- Civilian capabilities.
- Cultural beliefs and behaviors.
- Seasonal and weather effects.
- Most likely or most disruptive potential civil actions.

Understanding the Problem

The first step in trying to understand the problem is to gather the facts and information relevant to the problem. For CMO planners and staffs, time is usually the most limiting factor. Civil-military operations planners typically begin to draw information from resources that are the most readily available: individual or staff knowledge and experiences and plans and materials from previous or similar missions. However, it is critical that CMO planners do not solely rely on these resources.

Civil-military operations planners must comprehend and incorporate the commander's understanding of the problem to ensure the right information is provided, and to ensure the problem analysis and final COA incorporates relevant civil concerns or characteristics. It is also imperative that the CMO planner understands the process and timelines of the OPT to provide timely input to decision making. Perfect civil information provided too late has little value and can create a gap in the OPT's understanding of the nature of the problem. At a minimum, the CMO planner synthesizes their understanding of the CMO aspect of the problem into a problem statement from the civil perspective and provides input to the OPT.

Although there is no set format for a problem statement, a useful methodology is to start with, "How to…" for example—

- How to support the host-nation's relief effort while minimizing the US military presence in the capital city—
  - Who: the opposing sides—the relationship between competitors or forces.
  - What: the defeat or stability mechanism—the conditions to establish and prevent.
  - When: the time component—the relationship between opponents in time.
  - Where: the center of gravity or decisive point that gives the commander stating the problem a competitive advantage.

Commander's Initial Intent and Planning Guidance

The commander's intent is the commander's personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It also answers the overarching "why," "how," and "to what extent" questions for the operation (purpose, method [if known], and end state). It might include how the commander envisions achieving a decision as well as the end state conditions that, when satisfied, accomplish the purpose.

Staff Actions

The planning process provides venues for interactions among the commander, OPT, staff, and subordinate units. When the staff members or OPT brief the commander, they are providing, in part, the results of their actions. The commander's guidance represents a synthesis of the staff's input, along with other sources of information that manifests as a decision on how to proceed. Once CMO planners have a better understanding of the operational environment and have additional guidance from the OPT, they will conduct a detailed analysis of tasks, assumptions, limitations, shortfalls, and information requirements. The following actions enhance understanding and increase planning effectiveness, primarily through their contribution to the design methodology.

Task Analysis

Civil-military operations planners analyze tasks from the civil-military perspective. They do so through their understanding of the operational environment, friendly capabilities, the nature of the problem, the purpose of the operation, and a description of the desired end state or mission success. The learning and understanding that occurs through task analysis helps enhance the understanding of the problem and contributes to the design effort. Commands rarely receive a mission; generally, they receive tasks that planners analyze as a basis for determining the unit's mission. The principal source for tasks is the HHQ's plan or the OPORD. However, planners

could derive tasks from other sources. In addition to identifying the essential tasks from the HHQs' orders that define their mission, CMO planners will also identify specified and implied tasks.

Specified Tasks. Planners primarily draw specified tasks directly from the execution paragraphs of the higher headquarters OPORD. However, specified tasks can be found elsewhere, such as in the mission statement, coordinating instructions, or annexes and appendices. Civil-military operations planners should identify and record any specified tasks relevant to CMO and civil affairs Marines. The following guidelines assist CMO planners in forming precise specified tasks:

- Identify all specified tasks relevant to CMO and civil affairs Marines.
- Record and reference the source, page, and paragraph number.
- Omit SOP or routine tasks such as "submit daily SITREPS."
- Track all tasks using a spreadsheet or word document.

Implied Tasks. Implied tasks are not specifically stated in the HHQ's order but are necessary to accomplish specified tasks. Implied tasks emerge from analysis using the HHQ order, the threat (as applicable), and from understanding the problem. Routine, inherent, enduring, or SOP activities are not implied tasks, rather—

- Implied tasks should be linked to a specified task.
- Implied tasks should be reviewed to determine necessity, non-routine task.
- CMO planners must review and analyze all specified tasks to identify and draft any CMO implied tasks (see Annex E of the OPORD [Personnel]); for example: specified tasks—support host-nation disaster relief efforts within the MAGTF area of operations.
- Implied tasks are coordinated with civil authorities, IPI, and international organizations for the unified delivery of sourced relief supplies within the MAGTF area of operations.

Essential Tasks. Essential tasks are specified or implied tasks that define mission success and apply to the force as a whole. A task that must be successfully completed for the commander to accomplish the purpose of the mission is an essential task. The OPT develops the mission statement from the essential tasks. Civil-military operations planners should recommend essential tasks, if applicable, for inclusion in the mission statement. They do not develop a separate CMO mission statement.

Centers of Gravity Analysis

The commander's staff conducts a COG analysis on the operational environment to identify and refine adversary and friendly COGs. This analysis also helps determine which friendly and adversary weaknesses are or could develop into critical vulnerabilities and become "aiming points" when applying friendly strengths against adversary weaknesses. Staff planners also identify friendly critical vulnerabilities to protect against the adversary applying their strengths against these perceived weaknesses.

A useful analysis tool for CMO planners is the stability assessment framework (SAF). The SAF is an analytical planning and programming tool designed to support civil-military operations planning, the civil affairs methodology, and nonlethal targeting approaches during MAGTF

operations. The SAF helps Marine and civilian planners identify attributes in the operating environment and integrate multiple perspectives during planning and assessment. The SAF methodology has four basic components nested within the civil affairs methodology (represented by six steps—assess, decide, develop and detect, deliver, evaluate and transition) and the MCPP). The four SAF components in the center (CPB, analysis, design, and execution) complement and enhance existing planning and execution processes (e.g., targeting cycle) used during MAGTF operations. An example of SAF framework is depicted in Figure 3-2.



Figure 3-2. Components of the Stability Assessment Framework.

Develop Assumptions

Assumptions are logical suppositions about the current situation or future events. They are assumed to be true for planning purposes, in the absence of other facts that would prove the assumption otherwise. Assumptions are used to continue planning and allow the commander to decide on a COA and apply it to friendly, adversary, and civil considerations. Civil-military operations planners should determine, record, and validate all assumptions from the civil

perspective prior to execution or build a method into the plan to observe the assumption and have a COA planned when the assumption is validated. If an assumption is tied to mission success, the CMO planner needs to recommend a CCIR be added to the information management plan to monitor this void in information. A valid assumption should answer each of the following:

- Is it logical?
- Is it realistic?
- Is it essential for planning to continue?
- Does it avoid assuming away a friendly or adversary capability or task relevant to CMO?

For example, if the developed assumption is that there will be a significantly reduced international and nongovernmental organization presence and capacity to support host-nation disaster-relief efforts where they cannot operate safely, MAGTF forces might need to move affected civilians somewhere they can receive assistance so the forces can move to the objective.

Determine Limitations

Planning limitations are actions required or prohibited by higher authority that limit the commander's freedom of action or movement (e.g., legal basis and scope of the operation, status-of-forces agreements, civil authorities). Limitations can be grouped into restraints and constraints. Restraints place limits on what a commander can do, while constraints add requirements that might limit a commander's options. Civil-military operations planners must address the identified limitations during COA development and subsequent planning, as they affect how the operations are conducted.

Develop the Mission Statement

The most important decision coming out of problem framing is the mission statement. The mission statement is a solution-based expression of the problem set. The purpose of the operation and the essential tasks, as identified in task analysis, are the foundation for the mission. The commander approves the proposed mission statement, modifies it, or develops a new mission statement before developing the COAs. The approved mission statement (there is only one; staff sections do not have their own) becomes the foundation of an operational plan or OPORD.

Identify Civil-Military Operations Shortfalls

During the initial task analysis, CMO planners should identify personnel, equipment, and resource gaps as early as possible and throughout planning based on the mission and available resources. Civil-military operations planners must identify specific CMO resources needed to accomplish the essential tasks to determine additional support requirements. These resources include civil affairs Marines, communication requirements (tactical or commercial computer assets and phones), and information exchange requirements (command and control systems and applications) such as the Marine Civil Information Management System (referred to as MARCIMS) and briefing software. Civil-military operations shortfalls could also include civilian and local SMEs including interpreters and translators.

Propose Commander's Critical Information Requirements

Commander's critical information requirements are critical pieces of information the commander needs to make decisions. The CCIRs also help the staff prioritize information requirements and resource allocation. Only the commander decides what information is critical, but the CMO

planner or working group should propose CCIRs relevant to the civil environment to the commander. Subcategories of CCIRs are friendly force information requirements (FFIRs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). The FFIRs are information requirements that are related to the disposition of friendly forces. Priority intelligence requirements are information requirements related to the adversary and the environment. The commander and staff might also establish civil CCIRs when pursuing security or stabilization activities that any Marine supporting CMO can observe and can answer.

For example, a proposed CCIR could be, "What are potential impacts to road and bridge infrastructure that can negatively affect local commerce due to MAGTF operations conducted in the area of operations? Can they be mitigated without reducing operational tempo?"

Convene the Green Cell

The Green Cell is formed to assist the commander and planning group in assessing the friendly force's planning from the civil perspective. Although the Green Cell serves a prominent role during the COA development and COA war game steps, the cell forms and begins its work much earlier. Depending on the size of the organization, a Green Cell can range in size from a single officer with CMO experience to a task-organized group of SMEs, including international organizations, NGOs, interagency representatives, political advisors, regional area officers, civil affairs SMEs, and international organizations representatives. The Green Cell typically falls under the staff cognizance of the G-9/G-3 or senior civil affairs officer.

Identify CMO Requests for Information

It is necessary to identify information to remove assumptions, support future plans or conduct current operations. Based on the CPB and information requirements, including CCIRs, the commander and staff identify information and intelligence gaps. Civil-military operations planners forward requests for information (RFIs) in accordance with the information management plan the information management officer establishes. Over time, the volume of RFIs can make tracking them a challenging effort. It is important to have an established management tool and an individual tasked to track RFI submissions and responses to support this effort.

Initial CMO Staff Estimate

The CMO staff estimate provides key information (facts, assumptions, asset locations and availability, forecasted shortages, etc.) and depicts how each COA will be supported from a CMO perspective. This estimate provides a timely examination of factors that support decision making and can affect mission accomplishment. Civil-military operations planners update their staff estimate throughout the planning process. Ultimately, the CMO staff estimate provides the basis for the CMO Annex. An example of a staff estimate can be found in Annex A of the OPORD (Task Organization) or MCWP 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, Appendix G (*Civil-Military Operations*).

Operation Assessment

The essential goal of operation assessment is to enable the commander's vision to achieve a desired end state. Marines use many tools and methods to conduct an assessment. The following describes the steps in the assessment process:

Step 1. Develop an assessment approach.

Step 2. Develop an assessment plan.

Step 3. Collect information and intelligence.

Step 4. Analyze and synthesize the feedback.

Step 5. Communicate the assessment and recommendations.

Step 6. Adapt plan.

Every mission and operational environment has its own set of challenges, and every commander assimilates information differently, making each assessment plan unique. Effective operation assessment—

- Focuses on the commander's objectives, end state, and related information requirements.
- Considers specific indicators in context with other indicators and professional military judgment.
- Incorporates quantitative and qualitative indicators.
- Considers subordinate units' capabilities before assigning assessment related requirements.
- Provides analysis that identifies particular trends and changes in the operational environment, and their potential impacts on operations.
- Incorporates the insights and expertise of various staff sections and stakeholders.
- Leverages objectives, desired effects, and tasks that have effectiveness and performance indicators that forces can observe, measure, refine, and adapt throughout planning and execution.
- Conveys the assessment to the commander in a clear and concise manner.
- Provides analysis and synthesis supported by professional military judgment achieved in part through scrutiny of relevant evidence and logic.
- Provides context, i.e., explains why evidence, arguments, and recommendations matter to the end state.
- Measures progress against objectives.
- Incorporates best practices in assessments, including standards-based assessments, theory of change, and written assessments.

Assessment outcomes—

- Depict progress toward accomplishing the commander's intent.
- Deepen understanding of the operational environment.
- Contribute to the commander's decision making.
- Produce actionable recommendations.
- Make operations more effective.

*I*n design terms, an assessment cell updates its environmental frame through measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness. To explain why a unit is or is not progressing, the assessment cell must observe multiple battle-rhythm events to build a

rational narrative that could include recommendations for change. For more information on assessments, (see MCRP 5-10.1, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment).*

PROBLEM-FRAMING RESULTS

Problem-Framing Brief

The OPT presents a problem-framing brief to the commander to review the completed products and ensure a shared understanding across the staff. When approved by the commander, these products shape COA Ddevelopment. The CMO planner or working group should be prepared to brief the G-9 (or senior civil affairs Marine) on their input to the problem-framing brief, answer any questions regarding the material, and to improve the G-9's understanding of the civil environment prior to briefing the OPT and commander.

Commander's Approval and Guidance

After the problem-framing brief and review of the completed products, the commander should approve the mission statement and provide a vision of the actions necessary to achieve the decisive end state and an operational approach (intent and guidance) to guide COA development. The commander's COA development guidance could be presented in terms of warfighting functions, lines of operation, and forms of maneuver. This visualization assists the staff in determining the battlespace framework, to include the main effort. The CMO planner refines input to problem framing as necessary. The CMO planner could also follow up with individual staff members to further develop CMO's options and contribution to achieving the commander's objectives.

Warning Order

With the above list of specific decisions, approvals, and guidance requested of the commander, the OPT should draft and deliver a warning order to allow subordinate units to begin concurrent planning. Civil-military operations planners should provide input to the warning order, and this information should facilitate concurrent planning. Civil-military operations planners provide information on the civil environment, CMO assumptions, and CMO focused CCIRs.

CHAPTER 4.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

Course of action development creates one or more options by which a unit can accomplish the mission. During COA development, planners use the products carried forward from problem framing to generate options to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's operational approach. The OPT must use its collective experience and judgment to develop potential solutions to an approved mission. For options to be distinguishable, each COA must employ different means or methods that address the essential tasks and incorporate the commander's operational approach. Developed COAs should be "FAS-DC," a mnemonic that means feasible, acceptable, suitable, distinguishable, and complete.

Feasible. Does the COA accomplish the mission within the available time, space, and resources?

Acceptable. Does the COA achieve an advantage that justifies the cost in resources?

Suitable. Does the COA accomplish the purpose and tasks? Does it comply with the commander's operational approach?

Distinguishable. Does the COA differ from other COAs?

Complete. Does the COA address all tasks? Does it address the entire command?

When developing COAs, planners must consider two fundamental questions:

- What needs to be accomplished?
- How should it be done?

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

During COA development, CMO planners are responsible for considering the potential effect the force can have on the civil environment and the effects the civil component can have on military operations. The CMO planner must also be prepared to provide the OPT with a CMO supporting concept tailored for each COA. Civil-military operations planners can use the civil environment model, derived from the CPB, to enhance the OPT's awareness of the civil environment. The civil environment model includes key infrastructure, relevant demographics and their influence, sources of instability and stability, and a civil-oriented modified combined obstacle overlay.

Civil-military operations support for each COA must contain sufficient detail to facilitate wargaming. The CMO planner is likely to be considered the SME for all civil affairs capabilities

and their integration into all operation types throughout the competition continuum. Therefore, CMO planners must be prepared to plan CAO and leverage any civil-military expertise in support of MAGTF operations.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT INJECTS, ACTIVITIES, AND RESULTS

The injects, activities, and results for the COA development step are depicted in Figure 4-1. Each step's results provide injects for the following step. The process as a whole is as much iterative as it is sequential. The information shown in bold highlights the commander's personal involvement during each COA development step.



Figure 4-1. Course of Action Development Injects, Activities, and Results.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT INJECTS

This step begins with addressing any updates to the adversary and civil environment to ensure that the OPT has a common understanding of the operational environment. Essential components of COA development include the mission statement and the commander's operational approach (commander's intent and COA development guidance), which are usually disseminated to the force through a warning order (WARNO). The following paragraphs address staff actions that assist COA development.

Update Products

Staff planners view the battlespace in terms of the adversary and the environment, which helps determine how the adversary and civilian population will likely react to proposed friendly COAs, to include—

- The purpose of adversary actions.
- The most likely and most dangerous adversary COAs.
- The most likely and most disruptive civil actions.
- The type of friendly actions that the terrain, weather, and infrastructure will allow.

The CMO planners must continue to update and refine the CPB to enable deeper understanding of the civil component and to answer the two fundamental questions posed in COA development: What needs to be accomplished, and how should it be done?

Refine Commander's Critical Information Requirements

With approved CCIRs, planners begin to link individual PIRs and FFIRs to specific decisions. The CCIRs are updated and refined throughout planning to help prepare the commander for possible key decisions required during execution and to prepare the staff and units for timely execution of or changes to the plan. Civil-military operations planners review any recommended CCIRs to reflect any change to key information requirements tied to decision points or needed to conduct CMO.

Green Cell

During COA development, the Green Cell aids in building and refining friendly COAs and supports the CMO planner in updating the CPB products for the OPT and COA brief. The Green Cell can also provide considerations for non-DoD entities, such as international organizations or nongovernmental organizations. The most challenging aspect of the process is taking what is known and estimating what, when, and how it will occur in the civil operating environment. The Green Cell should identify the initiatives, events, and important dates for organizations or the population that could affect friendly or adversary operations. The Green Cell should not work in isolation as it provides critical insights regarding the reaction of civilian groups to friendly and adversary actions.

Red Cell

During COA development, the Red Cell builds and refines adversary COAs, using the adversary COAs in the IPB as its starting point. As planning continues, the Red Cell provides updates and findings for IPB refinement. The Red Cell researches the tendencies, biographies, and histories of opposing force commanders and units and refines its plan accordingly. The Red Cell also articulates the adversary commander's anticipated knowledge of friendly intentions and plans. The Red Cell must have adversary COAs completed in sufficient detail for wargaming by the end of COA development.

Update Civil-Military Operations Staff Estimate

The CMO staff estimate supports the COA development process by providing essential civil information, such as a CMO problem statement, assumptions, limitations, resources, key nodes, physical infrastructure, and proposed CCIRs. The staff estimate assists CMO planners during COA development by providing essential information on civil environment, identifying requirements and capabilities, determining shortfalls, and identifying potential solutions to those

shortfalls. Civil-military operations planners should ensure the CMO staff estimate is updated and refined throughout the planning process to deepen the OPT's understanding of the ways the civil environment can affect the mission.

Operation Assessment Planning

Planners, in conjunction with an assessment cell if formed, will further develop the operational assessment framework in accordance with the refined commander's operational approach.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

Planners begin developing options to accomplish the mission, guided primarily by the commander's COA development guidance and planning products created in problem framing. The number of COAs and level of detail depend on the commander's guidance and the time available for planning. Civil-military operations planners might develop one CMO concept of support that can support all developed MAGTF COAs with minor variations or develop a unique concept of support for each COA. There are numerous techniques for developing COAs; regardless of the technique used, planners should consider the factors discussed in the following paragraphs.

Battlespace Framework

This framework describes how the commander can organize the battlespace and forces to accomplish the mission. With this information, CMO planners begin to identify the MAGTF's CMO responsibilities as well as command relationships. The commander can organize the battlespace in various ways, such as spatial, purpose, or along the lines of operations. Friendly forces are usually tasked in accordance with their capabilities and assigned in terms of its effort: main, supporting, reserve, or security.

Spatial Framework. In a conventional operating environment, the battlespace is often described in spatial terms: deep, close, and rear. The CAO could be used to support units operating in any of these areas.

Purpose Framework. Actions in the battlespace can be described in terms of purpose:

- Shaping actions help set conditions for decisive actions.
- Decisive actions is an event or activities critical to mission success.
- Sustaining actions are shaping actions directed at friendly forces.

Line-of-Operation Framework. A line of operations framework is used most often in support of operations in permissive environments (e.g., FHA or humanitarian assistance disaster relief). This method focuses the force's effort on broad mission related objectives designed to achieve specific effects on the adversary or the operating environment. Achieving these effects should lead to objective and mission accomplishment. For example, a civil affairs team could be attached to a maneuver force that has been designated the main effort in a humanitarian assistance disaster relief operation or counterinsurgency environment.

Line-of-Effort Framework. The line-of-effort framework is used at times to organize joint operations and campaigns using a conceptual framework oriented on shared purpose and outcomes. This line-of-effort framework is particularly useful in interorganizational and multinational operations when a unity of command might not be possible, yet multiple USG, international, and host-nation organizations share a common desired outcome. The JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* provides a description of how to design an operational approach using lines of effort.

Identify Shortfalls

Friendly, adversary, and relevant civilian populations should be considered while developing COAs. The OPT should consider MAGTF, adversary, available friendly forces, and interagency or interorganizational capabilities (units, personnel, materiel) to identify shortfalls. Civil-military operations planners should provide alternatives to eliminate or mitigate identified shortfalls for each COA. Shortfalls that carry over into execution create a degree of risk.

Align CMO Tasks and Objectives

The CMO planner aligns CMO tasks and objectives identified in the problem-framing step with the course of action developed by the OPT. This includes those CMO tactical tasks and objectives related to the main and supporting efforts. Additionally, CMO planners leverage interorganizational cooperation mechanisms to engage and influence unified action partners and IPI, achieve with a goal of unified action, or at least to deconflict operations in execution.

Specify Unit Tasks

During rough-cut COA development, the OPT does not identify specific units by name, but rather arranges and aligns units by their capability and the tactical task required. For example, a tactical task to block might require an infantry company, but the specific infantry company does not need to be identified in the rough-cut COA. During COA refinement, the OPT identifies specific units by name to assign a tactical task. For the CMO planner, a requirement for a CA team might be identified in the rough-cut COA, and then specified by name to accomplish a CA or CMO task during COA refinement.

Task Organization

The OPT accounts for all units (organic, attached, supporting, command element) and ensures each unit is constructed, sized, and resourced for success. Task organization includes designating a task organization commander who clarifies command relationships and accounts for span of control. Civil-military operations planners determine the necessary assets required to support the MAGTF's mission requirements and task organization.

Synchronize

Once the OPT has developed a COA, it should determine how to best synchronize the actions of all elements of the force (fires, maneuver, CMO, etc.). Marines use realistic movement rates and base them on actual capabilities relevant to the effects of terrain and weather. Civil-military operations planners should ensure that CMO tasks are properly organized in time, space, and purpose to support each COA. This synchronization of MAGTF tasks provides the initial sequence of actions that make up a rough-cut COA. The planning support tools generally used to help synchronize each COA are the synchronization matrix and the COA graphic and narrative. Civil-military operations planners must ensure that CMO tasks are accurately recorded in both products.

Develop Control Measures

The OPT determines control measures (boundaries, fire support measures, etc.) best suited to command and control the single battle. Control measures are assigned to expedite actions and ensure forces have sufficient battlespace and flexibility to accomplish their assigned tasks while protecting their forces. Civil-military operations planners should consider the civil environment elements that could affect force actions (e.g., key infrastructure, political boundaries, refugee, or displaced persons areas) and determine CMO focused control measures that can be integrated into the MAGTF's overall plan.

Rough-Cut COA Brief

After the OPT has completed the initial COAs, the commander is briefed on each initial COA drafted. This informal, rough-cut COA brief is conducted to ensure the COAs being developed meet the commander's operational approach and allow the commander to make necessary adjustments. Although the planners and staff have been working on the COAs and supporting concepts, the commander continues to refine the operational approach. This is usually accomplished through the commander's dialogue with HHQ, members of the staff, and subordinate commanders. The rough-cut COA brief also helps the commander further review the design and the problem. The commander can eliminate COAs, direct modifications to drafted COAs, or direct the development of additional COAs.

Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

Given additional guidance and direction from the commander, the OPT further develops and refines the COAs to be approved for wargaming. The OPT develops a COA graphic (a map chip) and narrative (description of the key points of the COA) that describes how the mission could be accomplished with the forces and resources available. The narrative describes the MAGTF's concept of operations in appropriate detail, to include the task, method, and end state of each subordinate element. The graphic and narrative enable the commander, staff, and subordinates to understand the MAGTF's organization, focus, priorities, battlespace framework, phasing, sequencing, and integration of the operation. The CMO planner ensures CMO tasks, objectives, organizations, actions, priorities, task organization, and related planning-support activities are included on the graphic and narrative.

Refine Task Organization

After the COAs are refined, the planners review the task organization. If necessary, the task organization is updated to ensure the force is constructed, sized, and resourced for success to be taken forward into COA war game.

Command Relationships

Command relationships must be established and understood before executing a mission to avoid operational friction. Civil-military operations planners should also know the doctrinal support relationships, such as direct support—a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance—and general support—given to the force to better share information and resources.

Synchronization Matrix

The synchronization matrix is a decision-support tool that displays the activities and tasks of the command and subordinate elements for each COA. A synchronization matrix (see Figure 4-2) helps planners and units relate forces to one another in time, space, and purpose. It is the most important planning product created during COA development and provides detailed information required to support wargaming. During orders development, the completed synchronization matrix enables planners to efficiently assign tasks to subordinates. It also provides the basis for resource allocations and the execution checklist of the OPORD (Annex X). Civil-military operations planners must ensure that priority CMO activities are included in the MAGTF synchronization matrix, particularly the CMO tasks identified during problem framing.

Develop Supporting Concept

Supporting concepts can be organized by warfighting functions, as well as selected activities (e.g., fire, information activities) requiring separate consideration. The staff prepares functional and supporting concepts for each COA to coordinate and integrate actions into a single, cohesive plan. Once the commander selects a COA, the supporting concepts help shape the corresponding portions of the OPORD. Civil-military operations planners develop the CMO supporting concept with input from the CMO working group and refines it as necessary during the COA war game.

Civil-Military Operations Supporting Concept Graphic and Narrative

The CMO supporting concept map graphic and narrative depicts how CMO will integrate into the MAGTF concept of operations (CONOPS) for each COA. Usually, the OPT provides a map graphic and the narrative is outlined by task, method, and end state. The graphic depicts how the main and supporting efforts will conduct the CMO activities. The CMO narrative provides the purpose and tasks of the main effort, supporting efforts, and the reserve, as well as the sequencing of the operation. The CMO supporting concept graphic and narrative also supports the development of the OPORD (paragraph 3b and Annex G). Considerations for framework development might be portrayed as follows:

- **TTP.** The CMO supporting concept ensures that CMO action are integrated and synchronized for each COA, generally outlined tasks, purpose, and end state.
- **Task.** MEF CMO will integrate PRC operations to support the movement of our maneuver and fires capabilities to the objective.
- **Purpose.** Conduct PRC operation to minimize civilian interference with MEF movement to the objective.
- **Method.** Assignment of resources, location of CA forces, and priority of CMO.
- **End state.** Conduct repair, refuel, and rearming operation at the objective prior to commencement of Phase XX.

Timeline/Events		Phase XX (Shaping)		Phase XX (Decisive)		Decisive 2B (Phase XX)		Sustaining (Phase XX)	
Adversary Action									
Decision Points									
Intel	NAIs								
	PIRs								
	Assets								
Maneuver	ME/BLT	T:	Defeat adversary reconnaissance south of XX	T:		T:		T:	
		P:	Ensure tactical surprise in Phase XX	P:		P:		P:	
	SE1/CLB	T:		T:	Guard GCE's right (east/southeast) flank	T:		T:	
		P:		P:	Allow exploitation to MEB OBJ X	P:		P:	
	SE2/ACE	T:		T:		T:		T:	
		P:		P:		P:		P:	
	SE3/ACE	T:		T:		T:		T:	
		P:		P:		P:		P:	
Fires	Lethal			Neutralize HPTs					
	FSCMs			Establish FSCMs to support GCE					
	TAIs								
	Arty								
	Air								
	COMCAM	Document (photo/video) MEB Ops							
	MISO	Influence civilian population the AO							
Logistics	Maintenance								
	Supply	Ensure adequate stockage of Class I, III, V		Establish resupply points for Class I, III, V					
	Transportation								
	Health Services								
	Gen Engineering								
	Services								
C2	Main								
	Forward								
	Jump								
	Retrans								
Force Pro									
Information	CA								
	COMMSTRAT								
	PSYOP								

Figure 4-2. Example Synchronization Matrix.

Assessment Planning

The assessment plan enables the MAGTF to determine progress in achieving the desired outcome. Employing an assessment framework during operations is paramount to ensuring the tasks and objectives developed in planning achieve the desired end state during operations. The assessment plan must conform to the operational plan's general structure. The OPT and staff develop MOEs and MOPs, and devises evaluation measures to help the commander understand the relationship between desired effects and task accomplishment. The MOEs are linked to desired effects and

MOPs are linked to tasks. There is no requirement to have an MOE for every MOP or vice versa. The staff devises critical questions and other metrics to observe and empirically evaluate the ever-changing operational environment, to judge progress towards the desired end state, and to provide information toward decision-making process for future actions. The CMO planner should assist in developing the assessment plan and ensure that the CIM plan supports the CIRS outlined in the assessment plan.

COA Development Brief

Planners should brief each COA separately and use a standardized format to help focus the brief and prevent the omission of essential information. Briefs should be tailored to the needs of the commander and the time available. The CMO planner and the Green Cell should collaborate to further develop CMO products (e.g., civil population's most likely and most potentially disruptive actions) for the COA development brief.

COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

A COA must contain sufficient detail to facilitate COA wargaming. Following the COA development brief, planning products, facts, and assumptions are updated in preparation for the war game. Results from COA development includes the commander's designated COAs, wargaming guidance, and evaluation criteria.

Commander's Designated COAs

The commander selects or modifies the COAs to take forward to wargaming. The CMO planner will maintain awareness of those COAs that move to wargaming and coordinate with the Green Cell and CMO working group in preparation of the wargame.

Commander's Wargaming Guidance

Commander's wargaming guidance could include the following:

- Friendly COAs to be war gamed against the specified adversary's most likely or most potentially dangerous COA, as well as the civil population's most likely or most potentially disruptive COA.
- Timelines for the phases or stages of the operation.
- Predicted weather conditions.

Commander's Evaluation Criteria

Before the staff begins the COA war game step, the commander must choose standards the staff and subordinates will use to determine the relative merit of each COA, which could include the following:

- Command and control.
- Logistics supportability.
- Effects of weather.
- Effect on local population and issues.

CHAPTER 5.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME

The COA war game is conducted to improve the COAs and refine as necessary, considering adversary and civil capabilities in addition to the potential actions and reactions unique to the operational environment. Wargaming is a methodical process that helps determine the strengths, weaknesses, associated risks, and resource shortfalls for each COA and synchronizes the warfighting functions throughout the battlespace. A successful war game provides Marines with a better situational understanding, which leads to modified COAs that better reflect the problem CMO planners are attempting to solve. When formally conducted, a well-run COA war game can often be a time-consuming and difficult process, but the intuitive level of understanding that is gained reduces decision-making time in execution. Marine CMO planners war game friendly COAs against selected adversary COAs through an iterative action, reaction, and counteraction process. A Red Cell creates and fights adversary COAs, while a Green Cell develops probable responses and actions of the population and other civilian groups. This form of interaction coupled with feedback loops accounts for the nonlinear nature of military operations.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

During the COA war game step, CMO planners and the CMO working group assist the OPT in identifying most likely and most disruptive civil activities, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA from the civil perspective. The CMO planner should record CMO or civil affairs refinement recommendations and identify possible CMO branches for further planning. During wargaming, the Green Cell provides the civil actions in response to both blue and red actions. The Green Cell emulates the behavior of the population during the war game step to promote a better understanding of the civil environment and the nature of the problem confronting the MAGTF. At a minimum, the Green Cell represents the independent will of the population. The Green Cell could also provide considerations for non-DoD entities, including international organizations (e.g., United Nations, African Union, Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and NGOs. The CMO planner records the results of the war game and updates the CMO staff estimate accordingly. Short of executing the COA, wargaming provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving each COA.

INJECTS, ACTIVITIES, AND RESULTS FOR COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME

The injects, activities, and results for the COA war game step are depicted in Figure 5-1. This step's results provide injects for the COA comparison and decision step. The information shown in bold highlights the commander's involvement during each part of this step.



Figure 5-1. COA War Game Injects, Activities, and Results.

COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME INJECTS

At the end of COA development, the commander translates the following considerations into their COA war game guidance:

- Designated COAs.
- Adversary COAs, usually the most likely and most dangerous.
- War game methods such as avenue, in depth, belt, box, or sequence of critical tasks.
- Evaluation criteria.

The commander's evaluation criteria provide the lens used to analyze and assess COAs, and, at a minimum determine a COA's feasibility, acceptability, suitability, distinguishability (more than one COA), and completeness. The commander voices specific concerns and questions that

must be answered during the wargaming of each COA. Although the commander might have "standing evaluation criteria" (such as limiting friendly casualties or flexibility in the plan) other criteria can be added specific to the situation. Generally, the COA war game step includes the following elements:

War Game Rules

Before executing the war game, the facilitator leads a discussion to ensure the rules are understood to facilitate the war game and to avoid unintended interruptions.

Guidelines

The following guidelines are best practices to gain the most benefit from the war game:

- Use only approved COAs.
- War game each COA independently.
- Stay on timeline.
- Remain objective and unbiased.
- Accept constructive criticism.
- Record war game results by turn.
- Collect COA refinement recommendations.

Preparation

Preparation is critical to the flow and timeliness of the war game. Marines must ensure that there is time allotted for preparation; therefore, planners should post or have readily accessible the following information in addition to the war game injects:

- War game organization.
- Planning support tools.
  - Synchronization matrix (warfighting functions or lines of operations construct).
  - War game worksheet or war game method (used to organize and record friendly, adversary, and civil actions).
- Decision-support template or matrix (depicts decision points and time phase lines associated with movement of adversary and friendly forces).

Organization

In addition to those personnel involved throughout the planning process, a COA war game includes the roles described in the following paragraphs.

Facilitator. Usually the OPT lead, who helps keep the war game process focused and on track, settles disputes, and directs the actions of the group in accordance with the commander's wargaming guidance.

Arbiter. The OPT leader identifies an arbiter from within the OPT or from the staff. The arbiter determines the outcomes of turns, assesses casualties and losses, and adjudicates disagreements.

Recorder. The recorder (OPT members) keeps track of all moves and results from gameplay and records the strengths and weaknesses of each COA. The recorded information assists in developing the necessary templates and matrices to analyze COAs and support decision making.

Red Cell and Green Cell Leads. The Red Cell and Green Cell are used to portray potential adversary and local population reactions to friendly moves using doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures of their most likely, or most potentially dangerous or disruptive COAs. The CMO planner can be intimately involved in the development of Green Cell products but should be coordinating with both the Red Cell and Green Cell to ensure a shared understanding of the operational environment.

Information Manager. Information management might be the greatest challenge and a major time consumer if not organized properly. Having quick access to relevant information and the ability to use force websites is vital, as is keeping them updated to support commands or units with access to current information and plans.

Staff Participants. The OPT leader ensures that the staff representatives are present and on time for the war game. Each staff function should further develop their estimates as the war game progresses.

Subject Matter Experts. Subject matter experts (SMEs) contribute insight. If there is not a core competency on the staff, request one from another command or organization. subject matter experts (e.g., international organizations, cultural, and foreign area officers [FAOs]) can provide both full- and part-time support to the OPT.

Planning Support Tools

There are planning documents and tools required to conduct a COA war game. As lessons are learned and findings are discovered during the war game, the recorder or designated planning team member notes recommended additions, changes, and updates to record, track, and analyze critical-planning information. The documents and tools used to support the war game should include the synchronization matrix and war game worksheet.

Synchronization Matrix. The synchronization matrix is a tool used by the staff to synchronize the COA across time, space, and purpose in relation to an adversary COA. It is organized around the commander's operational approach. The CMO planner will either record CMO tasks and activities across the synchronization matrix or in a dedicated row for CMO or information activities.

War Game Worksheet. The war game worksheet is typically used during the war game to record the friendly action, adversary reaction, and friendly counteraction of each COA (see Figure 5-2). It is also used to capture critical information identified during the war game, such as potential CCIRs, decision points, and named areas of interest. The commander's evaluation criteria and annotated comments should be considered necessary in the remarks section.

OPERATION CMO Planner RESPONSE							
COA 1, Phase II, Stage A Box (War Game Method) MOST LIKELY (Adversary COA)							
Action	**Reaction**	**Counteraction**	**Assets**	**Approx. Time**	**Decision Point**	**CCIR**	**Remarks**
Sequence of critical tasks war game commences with 22d MEU establishing forward COC.	Red - Adversary Reaction to Blue Green - Civil Reaction to both Blue and Red.	Blue counteraction to Red and Green reactions.	List assets in "play" for the turn, e.g., MEU FWD CE, ACE Squadron, GCE Co.	Estimate time of turn, e.g., Est 72-96 hrs.	List DP associated with this turn, e.g., DP 1 reached prior to war game. Decision made for MEU Fwd to establish COC on XX.	Record potential CCIRs, e.g., MEU personnel exhibiting signs of Ebola infection.	List relevant remarks e.g., This stage must be complete prior to D+4.

Figure 5-2. War Game Worksheet Example.

Decision-Support Matrix

The decision support matrix registers and aligns decision points with areas of interests and key indicators or events of friendly and adversary forces based on information requirements. Figure 5-3 provides a roll-up of expected events, decision points, and planned friendly actions in a narrative form. It shows when and where a decision must be made if a specific action(s) is to take place.

Decision Point	Event	No Earlier Than/ No Later Than	NAI	TAI	Friendly Action
1	50% Increase in dislocated civilian population within 48 hrs.	D-1 to D+14	1		Contact US Embassy, coordinate with host nation increase flow of basic needs, and security
2	Dislocated civilian situation critical death rate exceeds 100 per day	D-1 to D+14	2		Prioritize relief supplies and medical support to host nation
3	US Embassy, host nation, international community coordination meeting exceed capability of FCE	D-1 to D+30	3		Send additional personnel to augment FCE at US Embassy
Notes: 1. Best COA is assigned the highest value and the three COAs. 2. Formula to compute value is to multiply weight times ranking (1,2,or 3) for the COA. 3. Highest number is mot likely COA.					

Figure 5-3. Decision-Support Matrix Example.

War Game Methods

The following sections introduce four war game methods described in MCWP 5-10; each technique is suited for a particular situation, considering time or type of command.

Sequence of Critical Tasks Method. Planners sequence critical tasks to determine timing, support requirements, and how critical tasks might predispose mission accomplishment. During a COA war game, the OPT examines the critical tasks' accomplishment and ensures they are listed in the correct sequence. If gaps are identified, re-sequencing critical tasks may be necessary.

Avenue- in-Depth Method. The avenue-in-depth method is used to focus on one avenue of approach at a time, beginning with the main effort. This method is good for offensive COAs or defensive situations when canalizing terrain inhibits mutual support.

Belt Method. The belt method is used to emphasize synchronization of simultaneous events. It divides the terrain into "belts" running the width of the area of operations. The belt technique is most effective when the terrain is divided into well-defined cross compartments; during phased operations; or when the adversary is deployed in clearly defined echelons or belts. A belt typically includes more than one event. When time is limited, the commander can use a modified belt technique, such as noncontiguous belts selected on the basis of anticipated critical events that might or might not occur simultaneously.

Box Method. The box method is used to concentrate on critical events within specific, geographic boundaries. It is most useful when time is limited and to analyze critical events and decision points in a specified area, such as engagement areas or landing zones. The OPT isolates the area and focuses on the critical events within that area.

General Rules

Time is critical to the preparation and flow of the war game. As such, enough time must be allotted for preparation. Therefore, planners should post or have readily accessible the following information:

- War game injects.
- War game organization.
- Planning support tools (i.e., synchronization matrix, war game worksheet, DSM).

COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME ACTIVITIES

Green Cell Brief

The Green Cell portrays the role of a thinking and independent civil population during the war game. It uses historical and operational experience to react to the friendly force and adversary actions. The Green Cell ensures relevant-civil capabilities and vulnerabilities, and these are realistically evaluated against each friendly COA. A Green Cell member should be present throughout the war game, but there should be a distinction between the Green Cell member and the CMO planner. The Green Cell briefs the most likely and most potentially disruptive civil COAs (see Figure 5-4). Civil COAs include:

- CPB key influences.
- Government reactions.
- International or nongovernmental organizations' reactions.
- Host-nation security forces reactions.
- Host-nation civil leadership reactions.
- Population reactions.
- Cultural and civil relationships in the battlespace.

Green Cell Civil Actions Matrix			
Key Influence: Identification of person, place, thing, or intangible factor	**Actions:** A sequence of activities that may follow; concise description	**Objective:** Rationale and purpose of the actions taken	**Comments:**
The Ramtha City Merchants Association	Agrees to cooperate with the coalition project plan in their area due to potential economic benefits and contract awards to local businesses	To encourage continued coalition funding that will benefit the association	
Populace	Will migrate to the nearest displaced civilian camp causing over crowding and disruption in the camp	To flee from violence in local area to security and seek humanitarian assistance	

Figure 5-4. Green Cell Civil Actions Matrix Example.

Red Cell Brief

The Red Cell ensures relevant threat capabilities and vulnerabilities are realistically evaluated against each friendly COA. The Red Cell briefs the adversary's most likely and most potentially dangerous COAs and presents doctrinally based adversary reactions to friendly actions.

CMO Working Group War Game Rehearsal

The CMO working group should conduct its war game rehearsal (Blue, Red, and Green actions) before the OPT's war game. This provides an opportunity for the working group to identify gaps in the CMO's supporting concept prior to these issues being highlighted during the war game. Additionally, the internal war game can identify gaps in the friendly COA that require refinements before the OPT war game. The CMO working group should focus on the following questions:

- Does the COA achieve the intended purpose of the operation?
- Does the COA solve the problem?
- Are there enough resources available to achieve the required CMO actions?
- Does the COA accomplish the mission?

War Game Turn

A turn involves a sequence of moves; a move can be a friendly-force action, adversary or civil reactions, or a friendly force counteraction. A turn is used to examine the COA for any unanticipated adversary or civil actions that would require the friendly force to change its COA or prepare a branch plan and includes:

- Friendly, adversary, and civil actions that are planned to occur during a specific time interval.
- Focus on specific tasks or events that can have an impact or create an opportunity.
- The friendly response (counteraction).
- The first "turn" usually takes twice as long as the subsequent "turns."

Conduct a COA War Game Turn

The COA war game itself consists of one or more turns. In most instances, a turn includes friendly action, anticipated reaction of adversaries, and the local population, and friendly counteraction.

Friendly Action. Friendly force commanders or their representatives during the COA war game describe the operations of all forces involved during this event. They describe the force, its mission, tasks, and the desired outcome. They annotate the force list to account for all forces employed in the event, while moving icons on a map or electronic overlay if physical positioning is applicable.

Adversary Reaction. The Red Cell reacts to friendly actions by briefing the adversary's (or the element that represents a threat to friendly success) actions according to its COA plan, and similarly moving icons. The Red Cell lead describes current adversary activities, followed by the relevant forces outside the immediate area of operations, but within the area of interest they intend to employ during this event. Friendly wargamers can then validate the portion of their plan or higher and adjacent plans that address these additional adversary forces. The Red Cell leader and friendly commanders determine where they will have contact. The Red Cell leader describes the locations and activities of all assets identified as high-value targets (HVTs) and identifies those points in the operation where these capabilities affect the adversary's COA. If these points affect the friendly COA, friendly wargamers identify the HVTs as high-payoff targets (HPTs), making their engagement an integral part of the friendly COA. With this information, planners update the situation and event templates to reflect tactical areas of interest that support the engagement of HPTs.

Civilian Reaction. The Green Cell provides likely civilian responses to friendly and adversary actions, as well as the agenda and objectives of any relevant civilian initiatives. The OPT discusses the impact of the contact on friendly and adversary forces and the population; recording tools capture the discussion. If the OPT members agree on the outcome, the game turn proceeds. If they do not agree, the arbiter determines the outcome and the war game proceeds.

Friendly Counteraction. The counteraction requires some degree of synthesis in order to respond to the adversary and civilian actions. The war game facilitator can use dice or other random answer-generating methods to determine the outcome—whether failure, success, losses, or casualties—as a basis for the next turn. The war game continues until the entire avenue of approach, belt(s), key event, or sequence of essential tasks has been thoroughly war gamed.

War Game Preparation

To examine and test the details of timelines, support requirements, combat power, etc., war games generally depict and exercise units two levels down the table of organization. For example, MEF war gamers might represent the wing and division commanders, including all aircraft groups and infantry regiments on their force list as well as all separate battalions, such as the light armored reconnaissance battalion and ground combat unit. Because commanders frequently task-organize forces, war gamers should also list the number of subordinate units in each element (e.g., one regiment is currently operating with two battalions, another with three).

Facilitators develop a master scenario events list consisting of plausible war-and mission-related events, acts, crises, etc., that could occur during the operation and could be used to test the overall plan. During wargaming turns, the facilitator injects events from the MSEL to further test and examine aspects of the plan and COAs. Master scenario events list items might include the following:

- A mass casualty event to examine the casualty evacuation capabilities and response times.
- Displaced civilians on the MAGTF maneuver to develop branch plans.
- An adversary unit surrender, to evaluate enemy prisoners of war and detainee planning.
- During each COA's war game, planners develop the DSM. The DSM depicts decision points, refined NAIs, target areas of interest (TAIs), time phase lines, and other key information gleaned or validated during COA wargaming and is included in the OPORD. The focus of COA wargaming is on improving the plan, vice the completion of the game. The facilitator is therefore responsible for determining when each turn has met the objectives of the war game, in accordance with wargaming guidance, the established timeline, and the facilitator and lead planner's judgment.

COURSE OF ACTION WAR GAME RESULTS

The result of the war game informs the COA comparison and decision step, in addition to generating an intuitive level of understanding of the problem that accelerates decision-making during execution. Required results from COA war game are the war gamed COA graphic and narrative, approved COAs for the comparison and decision step, and refined planning support products to include—

- IPB.
- CPB.
- COA war game worksheet and the synchronization matrix.
- War game results such as task organization, identification of assets, forces required, and shortfalls; refined CCIRs; and the list of critical events and decision points.
- Refined staff estimates and subordinate estimates of supportability and supporting concepts.

The staff and subordinate commands continue to develop their estimates and supporting concepts. These estimates and supporting concepts are critical to the COA comparison and decision step and eventually become a part of the plan or order. The CMO planner uses the war game results to refine CMO staff estimates, summarizing the civil impact on each COA in preparation for COA comparison and decision step with the commander. The updated CMO estimate becomes the basis for the CMO planner to recommend a COA to the commander that best accomplishes their mission from the civil perspective.

Branches and Sequels for Further Planning

Branch. *The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (hereafter referred to as the *DoD Dictionary*) defines a branch as, "the contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions actions and reactions" (Part 4 of 4).

Sequel. A sequel is the subsequent major operation or phase based on the possible outcomes of the current major operation or phase" (*DoD Dictionary*). A sequel requires its own OPT.

Commander's Comparison and Decision Guidance

The COA war game brief concludes with the commander's approval of the updated COAs, or any recommended changes to the original COAs, before they are compared. The commander also can take this time to provide guidance for the comparison of the COAs, such as the type of COA comparison input expected from the staff.

CHAPTER 6.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO COURSE OF ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

During the COA comparison and decision step, commanders evaluate each friendly COA against established criteria, compare the COAs, and select the COA(s) they believe will best accomplish the mission. This step is commonly referred to as the "commander's step." During this step, the commander leads a discussion with the staff and subordinates about the relative merits of each COA. The CMO planner, as a part of the OPT, is in a supporting role ensuring that the planning guidance is understood. Furthermore, CMO planners provide support products to the commander, staff, and subordinate leadership as early as possible to contribute to a detailed COA comparison and decision discussion. Planners then accurately record the process results and any updates as required.

INJECTS, ACTIVITIES, AND RESULTS FOR COURSE-OF-ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION

The injects, activities, and results for the COA comparison and decision step are depicted in Figure 6-1. The results of this step provide injects for the COA orders development step. The information shown in bold highlights the commander's involvement during each part of this step.



Figure 6-1. COA Comparison: Injects, Activities, and Results.

COURSE-OF-ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION INJECTS

The planners complete the COA evaluation worksheet in preparation for the commander's COA comparison and decision discussion. Planners use the commander's evaluation criteria as well as their own judgment to independently analyze each COA and record the analysis on the worksheet. Once complete, the planners create a draft COA comparison and decision worksheet used to compare COAs against each other and to record the results. Civil-military operations planners should ensure that all planning support products developed during the previous steps are brought forward to support the COA comparison and decision process. A helpful method used to facilitate dialogue during this step is to post various planning support products on the bulkhead. Ideally, this technique would offer multiple perspectives to deepen the group's understanding of the environment and the problem set.

COURSE-OF-ACTION COMPARISON AND DECISION ACTIVITIES

The COA comparison and decision process at lower levels of command might consist of an informal exchange of information between the commander and selected staff members concerning the results of the war game. At higher levels of command, the process is usually a formal sequence of activities. The three major activities conducted during this step are an evaluation, a comparison, and COA selection.

Course-of-Action Evaluation

During the evaluation process, the commander's designated COAs are evaluated against the commander's evaluation criteria. Designated members of the staff identify the advantages, disadvantages, and risks of each COA relative to the commander's evaluation criteria and record their results in the appropriate planning support tool (see Figure 6-2) is an example of a planning support tool.

Commander's Evaluation Criteria	COA 1
Command and control	Requires greater communication and coordination with local leadership
Simplicity	Requires less coordination - US controls support assets and operational oversight
Responsiveness	High probability for the adversary to provide HA support before Host Nation is decisively engaged
Logistical Supportability	Lacks communications to those needing the relief
Fewer dislocated civilians on the MSRs	Host nation and local security forces and police patrol are capable of providing security along the MSRs
Effects of weather	Requires ~ a mile of visibility for the ACE to support relief supply drops
Risk	Convoys bringing in relief supplies within range of adversary rocket launchers

Figure 6-2. COA Evaluation Matrix Example.

Course-of-Action Comparison

During the comparison process, COAs are compared d against one another using the recorded results from the COA evaluation process.

The results from the comparison process shapes the commander's understanding of the relative merit of each COA. A COA comparison and decision matrix is used to aid in the selection process by incorporating a weighted value to each COA (see Figure 6-3).

Commander's Evaluation Criteria	Weight	COA 1		COA 2		COA 3	
Command and Control	3	1	3	2	6	3	9
Logistical Supportability	3	3	9	1	3	2	6
Responsiveness	3	1	3	3	9	2	6
Risk	2	1	2	3	6	2	4
Fewer DCs on MSRs	2	3	6	1	2	2	4
Effects of Weather	1	2	2	1	1	4	3
Gains cooperation of the local populace	1	3	3	2	2	1	1
Total/Weighted Total		**28**		**29**		**33**	

Notes: 1. Best COA is assigned the highest valueof the three COAs.
2. Formula to compute value is to multiply weight times ranking (1,2,or 3) for that COA.
3. Highest number is mot likely COA.

Figure 6-3. COA Comparison and Decision Matrix Example.

Course-of-Action Selection

After completing the comparison process, the staff and subordinate commanders discuss the results of their analysis and provide recommendations to the commander. The commander can—

- Select a COA (without modification).
- Modify a COA (mitigate risk or overcome disadvantages).
- Develop a new COA (combine favorable elements of multiple COAs).
- Discard all COAs (resume problem framing and COA development).

Once a decision is made, the commander should review the approved COA with subordinate commanders. This review is conducted to facilitate detailed planning on a single COA by the entire command.

COURSE-OF-ACTION DECISION RESULTS

Draft the Concept of Operations

The staff prepares a concept of operations, which is integral to the orders development step. The concept of operations is the basis for establishing supporting concepts, such as fires, logistics, and CMO. Included in the concept of operations is a general description of the forces' required and actions in pursuit of mission accomplishment.

Issue the Warning Order

After the staff prepares the concept of operations, the commander could issue a new warning order or update an existing warning order to allow the subordinate commanders to continue concurrent planning.

Refine and Update Planning Support Products

Because the situation in the battlespace is ever evolving, the staff continues to refine and update planning products, such as:

- IPB.
- CPB.
- CCIRs.
- DSM.
- Staff estimates and estimate of supportability.
- Branch plans identified by the commander.

CHAPTER 7.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS SUPPORT TO ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

The MCPP orders development step is designed to communicate the commander's decision in a clear, useful form that those executing the order can easily understand. An order is a written or oral communication that directs actions and focuses subordinates' tasks and activities toward accomplishing the mission. Orders development begins during problem framing and continues throughout the planning process. The order contains critical information and necessary details required for successful execution and assessments by the force.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Civil-military operations planners must be knowledgeable and capable of operationalizing the broader concept of CMO and CAO in support of the commander's directive. Civil-military operations planners must focus on the intended audience (organic units, attachments, augments, sister service supporting elements, coalition forces, etc.) during the orders-development process to ensure that the commander's intent for CMO is met.

INJECTS, ACTIVITIES, AND RESULTS DIAGRAM FOR ORDERS DEVELOPMENT

Figure 7-1 depicts the injects, activities, and results for an orders-development step. The results of this step are incorporated into the final plan. The information shown in bold highlights the commander's involvement during each part of this step.



Figure 7-1. Orders Development: Injects, Activities, and Results.

ORDERS DEVELOPMENT INJECTS

The updated, approved COA (task organization, graphic and narrative, synchronization matrix, and supporting concepts) is the primary input to the orders development process. Other inputs can include the following:

- The revised mission statements.
- The commander's intent and guidance.
- Higher headquarters orders (OPORD, fragmentary order, warning order).
- Updated IPB and CPB Products.
- Updated CCIRs.
- Branches and sequels.
- Operation assessment plan.
- Warning order or planning orders.
- Existing plans and orders.
- Staff estimates.

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- Updated CCIRs.
- Branches and sequels.
- Operation assessment plan.
- Warning order or planning orders.
- Existing plans and orders.
- Staff estimates.

ORDERS DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

The overall concept of operations (CONOPS) is the basis for supporting concepts, planners, and their supporting staff sections to proceed with the functional and detailed planning essential for the development of the order and its implementation during the conduct of operations.

Prepare the Order

Orders development produces an OPORD that expresses the commander's intent and guidance and assigns tasks to subordinates. There are two guiding principles for orders writing are doctrine and usefulness. Orders are written for those who execute them, not the OPT or staff that develop them. An order ensures common understanding across the force. Civil-military operations planners and their respective staffs are responsible for refining CPB products, CMO input to the basic order, completing Annex G, and any associated appendices and tabs. However, when CMO or civil affairs is the primary mission, inputs go into Annex C (Operations).

Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) amplifies and clarifies CMO requirements in the basic OPORD. It provides details pertaining to CMO activities, assessments, or coordination aspect that are too voluminous for the body of the order, or of insufficient general interest, such as, civil environment models, overlays, graphs, or tables. Civil-military operations information relevant to the entire command should be a part of the execution paragraphs (3b, 3c, and 3f) of the order. This might be the only place that other units read activities relating to CMO. Likewise, CMO planners must ensure that the concept of CMO is accurately reflected in paragraph 3b, "Concept of Operations." Civil-military operations tasks identified in the planning process should be included in paragraph 3c and paragraph 3f (of note, for coordinating instructions, include those CMO tasks involving two or more units). To ensure that the order is free of errors, gaps, or omissions, the orders development process includes two essential quality-control techniques, orders reconciliation and orders crosswalk.

Orders Reconciliation

Orders reconciliation is a process internal to the command during which the planners review the entire order in detail to ensure that the basic order and all annexes, appendices, and other attachments are complete and in agreement. The intent is to identify discrepancies or gaps in planning as well as in the written order that could require corrective action. Specifically, the OPT and staff compares the commander's intent, the mission, and the CCIRs against the CONOPS, and the supporting concepts, to ensure that the order captures accurately what was planned.

Orders Crosswalk

Orders crosswalk is an external process in which the planners compare the completed, draft OPORD with the orders of higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders to achieve unity of effort. Additionally, the orders crosswalk ensures the CONOPS aligns, or nests, with the higher commander's intent.

Approve the Order

In the final action in the orders development process, the commander or a designee approves and signs the order.

Orders Development Results

The orders development step results in a signed OPORD (a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation) or plan, complete with necessary annexes, appendices, and tabs. It is not only the responsibility for the CMO planner to write the Annex G, but also provide input to other annexes such as Annex I, Annex V, and Annex P. The format for orders development is contained in MCWP 5-10, Appendix K and CJCSM 3130.03A, *Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance*.

CHAPTER 8.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS
SUPPORT TO TRANSITION

Transition is the final step of the MCPP and CMO operations planning. All transitions carry significant risk: transitions are subject to numerous variables outside MAGTF control, such as mission complexity, environmental constraints, political volatility, resource availability, and most importantly, a limited time "to get it right." Civil-military operations planners develop criteria and plans to terminate or transition civil-military tasks to host-nation authorities, international organizations, NGOs, follow-on civil affairs units, other military units (non-civil affairs), and interagency partners as smoothly and effectively as possible to support the commander's end state.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Transition planning provides an opportunity to discover remaining constraints and facilitate a successful shift from mission planning to mission execution. Transitions must account for the human element: the ability for staffs, leaders, and individuals to understand the mission correctly and perform effectively and efficiently in unfamiliar conditions and surroundings. Likewise, interactions with the populace, host-nation governments, authorities and institutions and civil society requires social, cultural, and military situational awareness to achieve lasting mission success. Adversaries' capabilities and motivations must also be considered.

INJECTS, ACTIVITIES, AND RESULTS FOR TRANSITION

Transition planning facilitates orders development. Injects can include a range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals involving all elements of the force, or primary staff sections. At a minimum, transition includes a transition brief along with a handover and explanation of any execution tools developed during planning such as intelligence and information products, the decision support matrix, and execution checklist. From the CMO perspective, this often involves transitioning planning products and orders to civil affairs tactical leaders and their personnel. Injects to transition are depicted in Figure 8-1.



Figure 8-1. Orders Development Injects, Activities, and Results Example.

The CMO planner and CMO working group are active participants in the transition briefs and drills to ensure that CMO actions, objectives, and capabilities are fully understood and integrated into execution.

The CMO planner typically briefs the CMO concept of support. Key products for the CMO brief include the following:

- Graphic and narrative.
- Task organization.
- Execution checklist.
- Decision support matrix.

Whenever possible, the G-9 should conduct CMO functional transition events such as rehearsal-of-concept (ROC) drills. The ROC drills increase the force's understanding of the commander's approved CMO or CAO activities identified in the order to support military objectives. Civil-military operations ROC drills also provide common understanding of the civil component, promoting unity of effort in execution. Civil-military operations planners can use the ROC drill to provide additional guidance and the "why" and the "so what" to newly designated CMO forces who are unfamiliar with the relevance of civil component. Civil-military operations planners might also discover potential unintended effects, risks, and weaknesses in COAs to be mitigated and opportunities that can be leveraged that had not been evident earlier. Early attention improves the likelihood that the required CMO transition activities conducted within the command are relevant, integrated, resourced, and harmonized into other transition events, and that termination and transition criteria and timelines are met.

TRANSITION INJECTS

Although there are unit-specific digital planning tools available to begin transition operations, the approved order must be published before taking further action. The transition order contains concept matrices and other results of detailed planning, to include the supporting concepts (fires, logistics, etc.) and annexes (CMO, interagency, etc.) necessary to begin transition briefs or drills. In addition to the order, there are other support products produced during planning used to amplify critical and detailed information. These additional resources and inputs include refined IPB and CPB products, staff estimates, estimates of supportability, updated CCIRs, the decision support matrix, and branches for further planning.

TRANSITION ACTIVITIES

Transition Events

Transition events could involve briefings, guided discussions, walk-throughs, or rehearsals to facilitate understanding of the plan throughout each level of the command. Details that are common to transition events include the following:

- OPSEC and security requirements.
- Appropriate location and venue.
- Audio-visual projection.
- Required participants and briefers.
- Terrain model or other visual aid.
- Decision-support tools.
- Execution checklists review.

Formal Transition Brief. Transition occurs at all levels of command. Typically, the higher the level of command, the more formal transition the brief given to subordinate and adjacent commanders and staffs supervising the execution of the order. The commander, deputy commander or executive officer provides transition brief guidance, which can include the number of required briefers and who will brief, briefing content, and briefing order. At lower levels, a transition brief might be less formal. The brief should include the following:

- The situation (adversary and friendly).
- The mission.
- The commander's operational approach.
- Task organization.
- Concept of operations and supporting concepts.
- Assumptions (planning).
- The commander's critical information requirements.

- Operation assessment.
- Execution (including branches and potential sequels).

Transition Drills. Transition drills are used to improve commanders and staff's ability to command and control operations. Commanders can also use transition drills to amplify their design, increase situational awareness among subordinate commanders and their staffs' and to instill confidence in and understanding of the order. Transition drills can include sand table exercises, map exercises, and ROC drills.

The ROC drills are used to review an order or selected aspects of an order. They can be conducted in many ways, but Marines must determine the details in advance, by asking questions like who, what, where, when, and how the order will be carried out.

During a ROC drill, all relevant units and warfighting functions participate in a dry run (rehearsal) to improve their understanding of the plan. A productive ROC drill is characterized by the participants' willingness to recognize and address gaps in the plan. The ROC drill can also serve as a venue for a confirmation brief.

Confirmation Brief. Subordinate commanders conduct a confirmation brief with their higher commander to confirm their understanding of the commander's operational approach, mission, specific tasks and purpose, relationship between units, and the CONOPS. The confirmation brief also provides an opportunity to identify gaps and inconsistencies between the approved concept of operations and supporting plans. It can also refine resource shortfalls, clarify priorities of effort, and enhance integration and coordination mechanisms. A confirmation brief can be executed in conjunction with external drills such as, sand table exercises, map exercises, rehearsals, or briefing slides.

Transition Events versus Time

Deciding on a transition event varies with the complexity of the mission, size of the unit, and time available to plan and conduct the event. Events can range from a transition brief using maps to a full-dress rehearsal with static displays. However, the greater the realism and depth of information to be provided, the more time it requires to prepare and execute, potentially becoming a security risk. At a minimum, conduct a transition or confirmation brief. At lower levels of command, the transition process takes place inherently as the planners are also the executors.

TRANSITION RESULTS

A successful transition is achieved when commanders and staffs are ready to execute the order and if required approved branch plans or sequels. Civil-military operations planners assist by ensuring that CMO tasks are properly understood by those who will execute them. Civil-military operations planning does not end after the order has been transitioned; rather, the planning process continues to develop or plan for the execution of potential contingencies and sequels.

APPENDIX A.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STAFF ESTIMATE

Staff estimates are a primary means of informing the commander for decision-making purposes. Commanders and staffs use estimates as they collect, process, and evaluate information. The staff summarizes significant aspects of the situation that influence the COA, analyzes the impact of the factors on the COA, and evaluates and determines how the resources available can best support each COA. Staff estimates evolve into supporting concepts and support the development of the functional annexes as COAs are developed. Once the commander approves a COA, the staff estimate and supporting concept become the first draft of their respective portion of the order or plan.

The following sections are items designed to stimulate thought and provide some examples of what type of information should be captured in these areas.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STAFF ESTIMATE NUMBER: 00X

References

List relevant documents. Include any maps, charts, documents, regulations, and publications relevant to this estimate.

1**. Higher**

a. Higher authority's mission verbatim

b. Higher authority commander's intent

(1) Purpose

(2) Method

(3) End state Information

(a) Adversary. *Information vital to the entire command, it contains disposition, intent, objectives, vulnerabilities, centers of gravity, and course of action.*

(b) Friendly. *Information on own forces having a bearing on the operation (higher, adjacent, and subordinate).*

(c) Environment. *Information relevant to the civil environment.*

2. **Situation and Civil Considerations**

a. Area of Operations

(1) Weather. *State how weather affects CMO or CAO capabilities.*

(2) Terrain. *State how terrain affects CMO or CAO capabilities.*

(3) Adversary Forces. *Include key CMO or CAO factors from the intelligence estimate and area assessments. Address adversary capabilities by considering sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, noncombatant movement, and noncombatant ability to influence or affect planned military operation and CMO or CAO.*

(4) Friendly Forces. *List current CAO resources in terms of equipment, personnel, and systems. Identify additional resources located at higher, adjacent, or other units or organizations (international organizations, NGO, host-nation, etc.) available to support CMO or CAO.*

b. Civil Planning Consideration. *Using CPB products and results, describe the operational environment and the effects of the civilian population on the military operations, and vice versa.*

(1) Stability and Instability Dynamics. *State the grievances and resiliencies within the society and the key influences that could leverage those grievances and resiliencies Sources of Instability and Sources of Stability matrices*.

(2) Cultural Environment. *The beliefs, economy, political structure, physical structure, practices, customs, and behaviors of the population. Five dimensions of operational culture (Appendix B of Operational Culture for the Warfighter) derived from the operational culture matrix.*

(3) Local Perceptions. *Understanding of the local situation, such as the status and character of the HN government and the attitudes and conditions of the population (supportive, neutral, unsupportive).*

c. CMO Assessment of the Physical Environment. *Key influences and the civil environment model.*

3. Mission

See basic order

a. Commander's planning guidance

b. Task analysis

(1) CMO specified tasks

(a) Implied tasks

(b) Implied tasks

(2) CMO specified tasks

(a) Implied tasks

(b) Implied tasks

c. CMO Problem Statement. *Usually constrained to a single sentence and can oversimplify the challenges within the operating environment from the perspective of executing required CMO.*

d. Recommended Essential Task(s). *The CMO "what" for the mission statement.*

e. CMO Assumptions. *List all assumptions that affect CMO or CAO (assumed to be true to continue planning).*

f. CMO Limitations. *Identify constraints (things that must be done) and restraints (things that cannot be done) that do qualify as specified tasks, while reviewing the appropriate orders and planning products.*

g. CMO Shortfalls. *Compare requirements to current capabilities, and recommend solutions for satisfying discrepancies, be specific.*

h. CMO Requests for Information. *Request for information from higher necessary to remove assumptions, support future plans or conduct current operations.*

i. Recommended CMO CCIRs. *Requirements identified by the commander as essential to the decision-making process from the CMO or CAO perspective.*

j. Course(s) of Action

(1) Commander's COA development guidance

(2) CMO Narrative. *Civil-military operations actions in support of the CMO supporting concept—sequential.*

(a) Phase I

1. Main Effort. *Civil-military operations elements*.

2. Supporting Effort #1

(b) Phase II

4. **Analysis**

Analyze each COA using the commander's evaluation criteria. Review adversary actions that affect CMO as they relate to COAs. Identify disadvantages, issues, and risks these adversary actions can create with respect to CMO.

a. Evaluation Criteria. *Using the evaluation criteria the commander provides during COA development.*

(1) Command and Control. *(e.g., The civil information management plan is overlayed to facilitate decision making. Information requirements are collected at the civil affairs team level in conjunction with international organizations and NGO partners).*

(2) Logistical Supportability. *(e.g., The Class I and VI supplies for initial issue and follow-on missions are on hand in depots. The distribution of these supplies has been requested through the joint task force. The NGOs and international organizations already operating in the Niger Delta region IDP camps own those supplies and are vested in their distribution directly to the populace. The priority choices for movement are tactical air military convoy and local hire).*

b. Comparison. *Compare COAs, rank order COAs for each evaluation criteria (for each COA, evaluate CMO deficiencies, and list the advantages and disadvantages to mission accomplishment). Use the approved matrix to aid the comparison process.*

5. **Recommendation and Conclusions**

a. *Recommend the most supportable COAs from the perspective of executing required CMO.*

b. *List the major CMO deficiencies and risks that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include specific recommendations on how to mitigate any deficiencies and risks.*

APPENDIX B.
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although commanders can delegate authority to accomplish missions, they cannot absolve themselves of the responsibility for these missions. Authority is never absolute; the establishing authority, directives, and the law will specify its extent.

Table B-1 depicts the specific command relationships (combatant command [COCOM], operational control [OPCON], and tactical control [TACON], and support) and defines the level of authority a commander has over assigned or attached forces. A commander can also have authority when the coordinating authority, administrative control (ADCON), and direct liaison authorized relationships have been specified. A common misunderstanding with Marine planners is the term "attached," which is not a command relationship; it describes how one force is coupled with another. The associated command relationship among those forces must still be defined.

A force assigned or attached to a combatant command can be transferred from that command to another combatant commander (CCDR) only when directed by the SecDef and under procedures prescribed by the SecDef and approved by the President. The SecDef specifies the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish). Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs can direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands and delegate the command relationship as appropriate:

- Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship will the gaining commander exercise (and the losing commander relinquish) over those forces must be specified.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders exercise COCOM (command authority) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) exercise OPCON over reassigned forces.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces are attached to the gaining command and JFCs, usually through the Service component commander, to exercise OPCON over the attached forces.
- Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

Table B-1. Command Relationships.

Command Authority	Authority	How and Where Exercised	Restrictions	Remarks
COCOM	(1) Organize and employ forces. (2) Assign tasks. (3) Designate objectives. (4) Operations. (5) Joint training. (6) issue logistics directives.	Normally through subordinate joint force, Service and/or functional component commanders.	Combatant Commanders only; cannot be delegated.	Established by USC, Title 10, section 164; OPCON and TACON are inherent.
OPCON	(1) Organize & employ forces. (2) Assign tasks. (3) Designate objectives. (4) Direct accomplishment of assigned missions. (5) Direct operations and joint training. (6) May be delegated.	At any echelon at or below a combatant command; normally through subordinate commanders.	Does not include admin, logistics, discipline, internal organization or unit training, unless specified.	OPCON is inherent within COCOM. TACON is inherent within OPCON.
TACON	Detailed direction and control of the movements or maneuvers of attached or assigned forces needed to accomplish assigned tasks or missions; may be delegated.	At any echelon at or below a combatant command.	No organizational or ADCON authority.	TACON is inherent within OPCON.
SUPPORT	To aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force as directed by a higher command for a specified mission.	Under a directive issued from a higher command.	As prescribed by the higher command.	This is a command relationship.
ADCON	(1) Organization of Service forces. (2) Control of resources and equipment. (3) Personnel management. (4) Unit & individual training plus readiness. (5) Mobilization & demobilization. (6) Discipline.	Normally by Service or component commanders directly over subordinate or other formations.	Does not include any matters relating to operational missions.	May be modified or restricted by COCOM authority.
Coordinating Authority	Coordinates specific functions or activities involving forces from two or more Services and/or joint force components or two or more elements from the same Service; can require the parties to consult each other.	Normally used in connection with planning rather than operations.	Has no authority to compel agreement; if no agreement is reached, must refer to appointing authority.	Establishes a consulting relationship, not command authority.
DIRLAUTH	Authority granted by a Commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate with a command or agency outside the granting command.	Normally used in connection with planning rather than operations.	Granting Commander must be kept informed.	Coordinating not a command relationship.

COMBATANT COMMAND

The COCOM over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by United States Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, section 164, *Commanders of Combatant Commands: Assignment; Powers and Duties* (or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan) and cannot be delegated or transferred. The COCOM is the authority of a CCDR to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. The COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Typically, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service or functional component commander (FCC) by delegating OPCON or TACON. The COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CCDR considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

OPERATIONAL CONTROL

The command authority that can be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the Secretary of Defense must specify the command relationship the gaining commander exercises (and the losing CDR relinquishes) over these forces. Operational control is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. It should be exercised through the CDRs of subordinate organizations; typically, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service or FCCs. The OPCON usually provides full authority to organize commands and forces and employ those forces as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the CCDR. The OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate JFCs.

TACTICAL CONTROL

The command authority over assigned or attached forces, commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.

SUPPORT

A command authority: a support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Commanders at any echelon can exercise support at or below the combatant command level. This includes the SecDef designating a support relationship between CCDRs as well as within a combatant command. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs that are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the superior CDR) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported commander and supporting commanders understand the degree of authority that the supported commander is granted.

An establishing directive typically is issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It also should include—

- The forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort.
- The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.
- The relative priority of the supporting effort.
- The supporting commander's authority, if any, to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.
- The degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

During the planning process, defining command relationships establishes what a supported unit can do with the supporting force or capability, and what level of administrative and logistical support that unit needs to deliver to the supporting force or capability. Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander has the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

Types of Support

- **General Support.** That support which is given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.
- **Direct Support.** A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance.
- **Mutual Support.** That support which units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.
- **Close Support.** That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL

The direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. The ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in United States Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, section 164. This is the authority necessary to fulfill military department statutory responsibilities for administration and support.

Administrative support can be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a CCDR at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of CCDRs. The ADCON can be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service commands assigned within Service authorities. Service commanders exercising ADCON do not usurp the authorities assigned by a CCDR having COCOM over commanders of assigned Service forces (see Table B-1).

> **NOTE:** Regarding OPCON and ADCON, if the ground combat element OPORD attaches a civil affairs detachment to a subordinate regiment, then the accompanying command relationships need to be outlined in the ground combat element OPORD so that the regiment knows its responsibilities and command authorities. If the civil affairs force is in a support relationship, the planner cannot plan to attach the force to a subordinate command with a higher command relationship such as TACON.

APPENDIX C.
OPERATION ASSESSMENT

Joint doctrine describes three major operational functions: plan, execute, and assess. These operational functions are inseparable; planning is the basis for execution, during which assessments are conducted to determine impact, how, and why MAGTF actions have changed the operational environment. Operation assessment results affect the commander's decision-making and command and control. Therefore, operation assessment must provide a clear intent and purpose to ascertain relevant feedback. Although no assessment process should be viewed as perfect or free of any criticism, assessment is the least-considered operational function and the least understood. For information on operation assessment, see MCRP 5-10.1.

DEFINING OPERATION ASSESSMENT

Operation assessment is a continuous process that supports decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining a desired end state. When conducted properly, operation assessment enables a shared understanding between decision makers and key stakeholders, enabling unity of effort and tempo. Assessment is fundamental to an organization's ability to adapt. Generally, assessments—

- Occur at all echelons and levels of war.
- Focus on commander's objectives and end state.
- Orient on the future.
- Reveal threats and opportunities.
- Provide a basis for adaptation.

Operation assessment is similar to top-down planning; it is a fundamental responsibility of the commander. An effective assessment plan focuses on the commander's objectives, desired end state, and critical information requirements. The commander's intent and guidance are essential to the effort and success of the assessment cell or staff. Operation assessment involves monitoring and analyzing changes in the operational environment, determining the most likely potential causes for those changes, identifying opportunities and risks, and providing recommendations for improving operation or campaign performance to achieve objectives and end states.

ASSESSMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Commanders do not always have the time to form and train their staff prior to an operational commitment. Therefore, it is often essential to direct the employment of staff energy in the early months of an operational commitment to defining necessary roles and developing necessary assessment processes. This investment can pay substantial dividends because operational commitments tend to evolve over time requiring commanders to make increasingly complex decisions. There is no single way to conduct an assessment. Assessment occurs at all echelons and levels of war and applies to all aspects of the operation while considering all elements of the force as well as their warfighting functions (command and control, intelligence, fires, maneuver, logistics, force protection, and information).

Always start with the planning goals and desired outcomes in mind. Outcomes include: an end state, an objective, an effect, a task and purpose, a condition, a description for success and termination criterion; or anything else that specifies the change in the operating environment to be achieved. Sharing information, within disclosure rules, with host nation, interagency, multinational, private sector, and nongovernmental partners provides a more complete understanding of the operational environment in the assessment process. For an outcome to be executable, achievable, and assessable, it must be specific and bounded. One common way to bound outcomes is by unit size, geography, or time. Another way is to make them specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound.

Develop an Assessment Approach

Executing an operation assessment involves developing a plan derived from the logical concept of the operations plan. Through operational design and the MCPP, operations planners compartmentalize the operational environment in purpose, time, and space, which serves as the basis for the cell or staff to identify and develop measures, indicators, and (if meaningful) thresholds of success for each. The assessment plan must conform to the operation plan and adhere to HHQ's reporting and battle rhythm requirements. Operation assessment is intended to answer the following questions:

- What happened?
- Why do we think it happened?
- So, what?
- What are the likely future opportunities and risks?
- What do we need to do?

Staffs and subordinate commands must tailor their support to the commander. They should understand how the commander processes information, and should understand how to best deliver the analyses, assessments, and recommendations as well as become familiar with the approved feedback mechanism for recommending or directing action.

Develop the Assessment Plan

Units must perform assessments within the resources at their disposal. The assessment plan guides the application of the assessment activity to monitor, evaluate, recommend and direct continuously throughout the operations process. As operational plans are iteratively adjusted and improved, the assessment plan must undergo review and revision to ensure alignment with the end state. Assessors must periodically readjust the assessment plan to avoid assessments becoming obsolete as understanding of adaptive and ill-structured systems increases. The assessment cell or staff must have a comprehensive understanding of the commander's goals and objectives, this knowledge aids in the development of the assessment framework.

Basis for Comparison. Before changes in the operational environment can be observed, a baseline or initial an assessment is required. Understanding current and desired conditions and planning goals (commander's desired end state) developed during problem framing forms the basis for assessment plan development.

Analysis Process. The analysis process allows the cell or staff to identify trends and changes that can significantly affect the operational environment and the operation. Analysts seek to identify positive or negative movement toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, or attaining end states in the operational environment over time. Based on their analysis, the cell or staff estimates the effects (impact) of force's activities and resources allocation, determines whether forces have achieved their objectives, or have realized that a decision point has emerged. Using these determinations, the assessors can identify additional opportunities or risks.

Assessment measures generally come in two types as described in Figure C-1. Measures of performance are indications used to assess friendly actions and relate to measuring task accomplishment. They answer general questions, "Are we doing things, right?" and "Was the task completed to standard?" Measures of effectiveness are indications used to help measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time to gauge the achievement of objectives and end states or creation of effects. They help answer the question, "Are we doing the right things to create the effects or desired change in the operational environment?"

	Measure of Performance	Measure of Effectiveness
Quantitative	• Number of schools built • Number of inoculations given • Number of police stations manned • Number of gallons of water delivered	• Literacy Rate (per/1000) • Malaria rate (per/1000) • Crime rate (percentage) • Cases of dehydration and water-borne illness
Qualitative	• Integration with IO and NGO programs • Host nation perception of quality of work	• Sentiment of the host nation population as to health and safety • Police morale

Figure C-1. Qualitative Versus Quantitative Assessment Example.

Developing indicators that reflect the changes in the operational environment over time, that are pertinent to the operation is essential to an effective assessment process. In essence, assessors are asking specific series of questions about the operational environment and about the changes in the operational environment that the force is attempting to create. Indicators must be relevant, observable or collectible, responsive, and resourced. That is, they should answer the correct

questions; collectible at reasonable cost in time, money, or manpower; change perceptively in a time frame relevant to the operation; and have resources available to collect them. Selected indicators must be well-specified such that they answer the information requirements they are designed to answer. Any one indicator can be collected consistently by multiple observers, at different places or over time. Each needs a definition,
a plan for collecting the data (who, what, when, why, and how), and be sensitive to change within an appropriate time frame. This information and guidance should be formalized in the data collection plan.

The process for developing specific, effective, and actionable indicators is fully described in Appendix A of MCRP 5-10.1. This framework describes how to refine questions with enough specificity to link indicators and information requirements to operational outcomes. The purpose of this model is to posit and record the links between an outcome and the indicators used to gauge its achievement. Data collectors rarely have the broader operational context that assessors have, and benefit from specific questions and IRs information requirements derived from this framework when collecting data in support of assessments.

Data Collection

Devising a collection process during assessment planning is the key to its success (see Figure C-2). Collecting and reporting changes in the operational environment are critical components of the assessment plan, not appropriately allocating collection resources places the quality of the assessment at risk. The assessment cell must advise the commander of risks and plausible enhancement measures such as reallocating resources or adjusting information requirements.

Assessment Data Collection Plan			
Objective(s)	**Effect(s)**	**Indicator(s)**	**Source**
Transition to civil governance: Establish civil conditions for the host nation government to control	Protect critical infrastructure or cultural sites	Assessed damage to critical infrastructure or cultural sites per Annex G	Intelligence, civil affairs, ACE, GCE, LCE
	Support Humanitarian assistance operation	Security conditions set to enable other organizations to assist population	GCE
		Effective distribution of aid to designated location in the AO	Intelligence, civil affairs, ACE, LCE
		Number of reports of host nation government and personnel delivering aid	

Figure C-2. Assessment Data Collection Plan Example.

LEGEND

ACE air combat element
GCE ground combat element
LCE logistics combat element

Recommendations

An operation assessment is incomplete without facilitating or recommending future actions. An assessment should diagnose progress and effectiveness, unless it informs decision making, its use to the commander is limited. It is the assessment cell and staff's responsibility to organize the data, concisely communicate the assessment results, and provide recommendations to assist the

commander's or stakeholder's future decisions. Recommendations to the commander can range from continuing the operation as planned, executing a branch plan, making unanticipated operation adjustments, or reprioritizing resources. As with any recommendation, the assessment cell or staff should address any future implications.

Assessment Execution Framework

The assessment model consists of four activities: monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information; submitting the data collection requirements (feedback); evaluating assessment measures (MOEs and MOPs); and recommending and directing action to make operations more effective.

Monitor. Continuously observing conditions relevant to the current operation. Monitoring allows the force to collect necessary information and indicators within the operational environment as it exists to compare those responses with the projected planning goals described in the OPORD. The assessment cell or staff cannot accurately judge the progress or recommend adjustments to the commander without a comprehensive understanding of the current situation and the desired conditions, which serves as a baseline for the analysis process.

Feedback. The clearly established reporting requirements, delivery methods, and the frequency of delivery greatly increases the efficiency of the assessment process and provides the assessors more time to conduct analysis. Feedback comes from various sources and degrees of maturity. The role of the assessment cell and staff is to receive, validate, consolidate, analyze, correlate, synthesize, filter, and present relevant information to the commander.

Evaluate. The assessment cell or staff analyzes specific information the force collects to determine operational progress and likely future outcomes. Analysis is conducted to identify movement toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, or attaining end states. Analysis also identifies trends and changes positive and negative that significantly affect the operational environment and the MAGTF's operation. Assessment measures are used to measure the degree of achievement of the desired end state and to define why a current degree of progress exists, further analysis might be required to determine if corrective action(s) is necessary. The cell or staff estimates the effects of force employment and resource allocation; determines whether they have successfully achieved their objectives; or have realized that a decision point has emerged. Using these determinations, the assessment cell or staff might identify additional opportunities or risks.

Recommendation. The assessment cell or staff work is incomplete without recommending or proposing actions to increase operational effectiveness. In addition to interpreting information into meaningful recommendations, the assessment cell or staff should inform the commander of future opportunities and risks to mission success including their likelihood and effect. The cell constructs possible changes to the plan for the commander's approval and implementation guidance. Proposed recommendations can include update, change, add, or remove critical assumption, such as:

- Transition between phases, stages, parts, steps (as appropriate).
- Execute branches or sequels.
- Change resource allocation or priorities of effort.
- Adjust end states, OPORDs, objectives, and priorities.

Assessment Presentation Product

An assessment product is used to summarize all assessment inputs into a coherent presentation. Techniques for communicating the assessment can vary by the level of command, type of operation, the commander's preference for displaying information or HHQ's mandated reporting formats. An effective assessment product must effectively communicate the assessment findings and recommendations, and their implications on future operations to the commander. Figure C-1 provides an example of an assessment presentation product.

Line of Operation: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance	
Battalion Objective	Potable Water Available
Essential Tasks	1. Drill Well 2. Publicize Coalition Efforts
Desired Effect	Local populace does not support the insurgents.
Progress	Contract signed; locals hired; construction underway
	Locals providing actionable intelligence.
Assessment	Adaptive insurgents continue to leverage unemployed workers in Village X thus threatening the security situation.
Recommendations	Maintain continuous presence in Village X. Pursue additional Essential Services contracts using local labor. Continue periodic operations in conjunction with HN forces to maintain initiative.

Figure C-3. Assessment Presentation Product Example.

COMMANDERS GUIDANCE

After the assessment cell or staff have provided recommendations to the commander, the commander provides additional guidance, including unanticipated operational adjustments, or reprioritizing resources. If necessary, updates or modifications are made to the assessment plan. Then the assessment process begins again based on the new guidance until the desired end state is met.

APPENDIX D.
POPULATION-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS

The MAGTF tactical tasks can be specified, implied, or essential. They define actions commanders might take to accomplish their missions. In special circumstances, commanders could modify tasks to meet mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available requirements. They must clearly state that they are departing from the standard meaning of these tasks. One way this can be done is by prefacing the modified task with the statement, "What I mean by [modified task] is . . ." Tactical tasks are assigned based on capabilities. Civil affairs Marines can execute those tactical tasks deemed essential for influencing the civil environment and supporting civil-military operations.

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on achieving some sort of condition as it relates to the population within the area of operations.

Advise. To improve the individual and unit capabilities and capacities of host nation security forces through the development of personal and professional relationships between United States and host-nation forces.

Assess the Population. To evaluate the nature, situation, and attitudes of a designated population or elements of a population, inhabiting the area of operations.

Assist. To provide designated support or sustainment capabilities to host-nation security forces to enable them to accomplish their objectives.

Build or Restore Infrastructure. To construct, rebuild, or repair local infrastructure to support the host nation and to gain or maintain the cooperation of the local population.

Contain. To prevent or halt elements of a population or designated party from departing or projecting physical influence beyond a defined area. See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks in MCDP 1-0, *Operations*.

Control. To use physical control measures and information-related capabilities to influence elements of a population or designated actors to respond as desired. See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks in MCDP 1-0.

Coordinate with Civil Authorities. To interact with, maintain communication, and harmonize friendly military activities with those of other inter-organizational agencies and coalition partners to achieve unity of effort.

Cordon. To temporarily prevent movement to or from a prescribed area such as a neighborhood, city block, series of buildings, or another feature. See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks in MCDP 1-0.

Enable Civil Authorities. To support or assist the host-nation government and designated interorganizational agencies in providing effective governance.

Exclude. To prevent or halt elements of a population or designated party from entering or projecting physical influence into a defined area.

Influence. To persuade the local population, including potential and known adversaries, within the operational area to support, cooperate with, or at least accept the friendly force presence, and dissuade the local population from interfering with operations. See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks.

Occupy. To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other manmade or natural area without opposition and control the entire area. See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.

Reconnoiter. To obtain, by visual observation or other methods, information about civil considerations. See also enemy- and terrain-oriented tactical tasks.

Secure. To gain possession of a position, terrain feature, piece of infrastructure, or civil asset, with or without force, and prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.

Train. To teach designated skills or behaviors to improve the individual and unit capabilities and capacities of host-nation security forces.

Transition to Civil Control. The handover of civil government and security responsibilities from friendly force military authorities to legitimate civil authorities.

APPENDIX E.
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS PLANNERS PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Plans are based on command decision and generating succeeding decisions at lower levels of command. In each instance, decisions are reached by a commander's estimate of the situation and their ability to develop creative options to solving the problem. Civil-military operations planners advise MAGTF commanders and their staffs on the conduct of CMO and CAO, as well as understanding civil conditions to support operations. Civil-military operations planners must be prepared to contribute to any OPTs as the CMO SME and be thoroughly familiar with the MCPP. Civil-military operations planners must also provide a clear understanding of the possible effects of the MAGTF's actions in the civil operating environment. Most importantly, the CMO planner must consider not only the first-order desired effects of lethal fires, nonlethal fires, and military action, but also possible second- and third-order effects, including undesired ones. The CMO planner must ensure CMO plans are resolute, relevant, and broad enough to allow flexibility in implementation, and must possess sufficient details to increase prospects for a successful mission.

Civil-military operations planners directly support the OPT and aid the commander's decision making by—

- Providing an increased understanding of the civil operational environment and integrating insights from a civil perspective into the planning conducted by the OPT and staff.
- Advises the OPT and staff about civil affairs capabilities, limitations, and shortfalls.
- Participates in the CMO design process dialog and brainstorming, identifying problems, discussing concerns, and thinking beyond a civil affairs detachment level.
- Analyzing the civil operational environment capable of producing a CMO staff estimate.
- Integrating staff requirements, using interpersonal skills to interact with other staff members, and synchronizing efforts with information-related capabilities to leverage capabilities and maximize effects.

Civil-military operations planners participate in, and often lead, the CMO working group. Civil-military operations working groups are standing working groups formed to integrate additional staff members and increase CMO planning effectiveness. Civil-military operations planners must anticipate the needs of the OPT and the tasks within the staff section to provide information and products on time and in the correct format. Additionally, CMO planners must synthesize, when applicable, all input from the CMO working group so the other members of the OPT understand operationally relevant civil information.

Before the OPT convening, CMO planners must be prepared to think at the commander's level. Civil-military operations planners should be informed and aware of the issues that will be of concern at HHQ. Civil-military operations planners should begin with the following areas of study:

- Study pertinent orders, directives, and guidance to increase situational awareness and big-picture understanding.
- Read HHQ orders and annexes, such as Annex A (Organization), Annex D (Logistics), Annex G (Civil-Military Operations), Annex K (Communications), and Annex V (Interagency/Interorganizational Coordination).
- Coordinate with other information-related capability (e.g., military information support operations, communications strategy) to ensure a common set of TTP and to maximize information sharing.
- Research US embassy, security cooperation programs, and provincial reconstruction team plans and guidance, as applicable.
- Identify helpful resources and interagency documents, such as national and regional guidance provided by DOS and USAID.
- Review recent lessons learned and or after-action reports.
- Seek guidance and SME support from the Center for Regional and Security Studies.

Once the OPT is convened, CMO planners must be prepared to provide specific knowledge to the staff, in addition to supporting, adjacent commands, and other governmental agencies. It is essential that CMO planners be properly trained and able to—

- Integrate civil considerations into the planning process, including stabilization planning.
- Develop a CPB and provide civil considerations input to the IPB.
- Participate in and lead the Green Cell to depict population reactions to friendly and adversary actions during wargaming.
- Produce a staff estimate and Annex G.
- Lead a CMO working group.
- Determine whether there is a need to establish a fixed or mobile civil-military operations center, including how many, potential locations, and the communication requirements.
- Determine the CIM system to be used and register information exchange requirements (C2 applications and systems e.g., Marine Corps information management system, administrative software) with the IMO.
- Communicate and coordinate with interagency, host nation, international, nongovernmental personnel.

Moreover, a CMO planner must be able to provide targeted, planned, and coordinated observations and evaluations of specific civil aspects of the operating environment. Civil-military operations planners must be proactive. This typically involves advanced and proper planning and preparation to be ready to act when necessary or most advantageous, and not merely to react to developments. The CMO planner must develop fundamental cognitive competencies such as

framing a problem, mental imaging, critical thinking, analysis, synthesis, reasoning, and problem solving to make effective decisions more quickly in a time-constrained environment despite often having incomplete, inaccurate, or even contradictory information.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CULTURAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The content of the first event in problem framing, the commander's orientation, varies greatly based on mission. The CMO planner should ensure that key information developed in the CPB process is integrated into the orientation, to ensure the commander and staff consider the civil component from the outset of planning. During problem framing, the CMO planner illustrates the possible effects of the following potential causes of conflict:

Civil Conflict

Windows of Vulnerability.

Windows of vulnerability include—

- Elections.
- Legislative changes governing the power of key players or the distribution of resources (e.g., decentralization).
- Economic shocks.
- Natural disasters.
- Rebel incursions, riots, or assassinations.

Institutional Capacity and Response.

Institutional capacity and response considerations include the ability or inability to —

- Address incentives for violence.
- Block access to conflict resources.
- Manage regional and international pressures.
- Constrain opportunistic elite behavior.

Access to Conflict Resources.

Access to conflict resource considerations include—

- Organizational factors that facilitate collective violence (certain spatial distributions of ethnic groups, civil society networks, patronage, or clan networks).
- Financial resources (natural resources, corruption, diaspora communities).
- Human resources (recruits, internal and external).

Reasons for Violence.

Reasons for violence include—

- Ethnic or religious grievance.
- Economic causes (e.g., greed, poverty, stagnant or negative growth).
- Competition over natural resources.
- Destabilizing demographic shifts.
- To maintain political or economic power.

Regional and International Issues.

Regional and International considerations include—

- Globalization and malign influences.
- Erosion of state sovereignty.
- Vulnerability to global market shocks.
- Drug and arms flows.
- Refugee and migrant flows.
- Prostitution and human trafficking.
- Forced trans-border ethnic movements.

Regional and Local Vulnerabilities

Predictable Destabilizers and Events.

Questions to ask regarding predictable destabilizers and events include the following:

- Are major government reforms planned that could result in shifts in political or economic power (e.g., decentralization, anti-corruption, security sector reform)?
- Are contentious elections approaching?

Unpredictable Destabilizers and Events.

Questions to ask regarding unpredictable destabilizers and events include the following:

- Is the country vulnerable to natural disasters?
- Does the government effectively respond to mitigate the damage done by natural disasters?
- Is the economy highly vulnerable to global economic shocks?
- Do government institutions have a history of effectively responding to political and economic crises?
- Do local governments effectively and constructively respond to local instability?
- What is the capacity of the formal and informal economy to absorb new entrants?
- What is the unemployment rate, particularly for young men in urban areas? (There is a strong correlation between unemployed young men, instability and potential for violence).

- Is there a match between the skills of new entrants and the needs of the economy?
- Are these economies heavily dependent on access to global markets? How susceptible are they to economic shocks?

Institutional Capacity and Response

Regime type and legitimacy.

Questions to ask regarding the regime include the following:

- Is the regime democratic, authoritarian, or mixed?
- How long has it existed in its current form?
- Is it in a period of transition or erosion?
- Are there generally accepted rules for political competition?
- What is the overall level of respect for national authorities?

Inclusion or Exclusion.

Questions to ask regarding inclusion or exclusion include the following:

- Do government policies favor one group over another? For example, are government services provided equally across different ethnic or religious groups, are exclusive language policies in place?
- Has the collapse or erosion of state institutions led groups to turn to more immediate forms of identity for survival?
- Are women present and active in professions such as law, journalism, politics, medicine, education, finance, and business?
- Do civil society groups bridge or reinforce cultural or social lines of division?
- How robust are multi-ethnic or multi-religious organizations? Do they have a mass base (e.g., trade unions, business associations), or are they limited to a narrow elite layer?
- How are issues of ethnicity and religion taught in schools?
- Does the press promote ethnic or religious intolerance?

Rule of Law and Provision of Security.

Questions to ask regarding Rule of Law include the following:

- How strong is the judicial system?
- Are civil and political freedoms respected?
- Are other basic human rights respected?
- Does unlawful, state violence exist?
- Does civilian power control the security sector?
- Can the government exercise effective control over its territory?
- Does the security sector (police or justice sector) effectively and impartially settle disputes among groups or is there a bias perception?

- To what extent is the security sector involved in 'shadow,' ‘black market’ or ‘illicit’ economic activity?
- Do government institutions effectively regulate legal-arms trade and prevent illegal-arms trades, or do they participate in it?

Economic Governance.

Questions to ask regarding governance include the following:

- Does economic policy encourage economic growth or impose obstacles?
- Is policy conducive to macro-economic stability?
- How pervasive is corruption in state institutions?
- Do government institutions or civil society groups effectively monitor and enforce financial transparency and accountability?
- Is the government able to exert economic control over the territory of the state or are there large pockets of autonomous economic activity?
- Does government policy encourage a good match between available skills and the demands of the market?
- Do state economic policies favor one group at the expense of another?
- Are local governments able to encourage local economic growth and investment and respond to local economic problems?
- Do grassroots or national institutions constructively engage underrepresented and marginalized groups in economic development activities?
- Do government programs constructively engage potential recruits, such as unemployed youth?

Natural Resource Management.

Questions to ask regarding resources include the following:

- Does government policy seek to improve the sustainable management of natural resources?
- Are there institutions in place that effectively mediate competing claims to natural resources such as land or water?
- Does the local or national elite earn significant off-budget income from the exploitation of natural resources?
- Do government institutions effectively regulate trade in pilferable commodities?
- Are natural resources viewed by the state elite as a useful tool or prize in a larger political competition?
- Are state institutions able to respond to environmental shocks or natural disasters?

Demographic Factors.

Questions to ask regarding demographics include the following:

- Are government policies causing demographic shifts, for example through government-sponsored transmigration or agricultural programs?
- Are government institutions able to respond to new demands created by demographic change? For example, are voting rights tied to place of residence or birth (will uprooted populations be able to voice demands through political channels)?

Regional and International Factors.

Questions to ask regarding predictable destabilizers and events include the following:

- Are ethnic or religious divisions reinforced by parallel relationships in neighboring countries?
- Does environmental degradation have cross-border causes or effects?
- Is economic activity (legal and illegal) closely tied to regional or global dynamics?
- Is the economy highly vulnerable to global economic shocks?
- Are demographic shifts tied to regional events?
- Is mobilization facilitated by support from other governments or ethnic and religious groups outside the country?

Mobilization

Potential for Conflict and Access to Organizational Resources.

Questions to ask regarding conflict potential include the following:

- Do organizational structures bridge or reinforce differences in a society? For example, are civil society groups mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic?
- Are there well-established ethnic or religious associations that could be used to mobilize violence?
- Have these structures stepped in to provide important services, such as access to employment or education, in the context of a weak state?
- How closely do organizational resources (e.g., ethnic groups or patronage networks) align with incentives for violence?
- If incentives and organizations are aligned, can these organizations monitor group behavior and punish "defectors" from group goals?

Financial Resources.

Questions to ask regarding resources include the following:

- Are groups with an incentive to mobilize violence affiliated with foreign support groups (e.g., diaspora, foreign governments, transnational religious or ethnic groups) that could provide funding?
- Can those motivated to engage in violence obtain control of pilferable primary commodities?

- Are resources available through government corruption or patronage networks?
- Can sufficient resources be gained through smuggling, kidnapping, banditry, or other activities on the black or gray market?

Human Resource.

Questions to ask regarding human resources include the following:

- Is there a population of ready recruits (e.g. unemployed young men in urban or semi-urban areas) motivated to engage in violence?
- Can women freely participate in society? If not, what is allowed and what is restricted?
- Women are a component of the population that should be also considered in terms of their ability to safely perform their roles as both participants and caretakers in their society, e.g., when planning for HA/DR response, women require additional resources when conducting activities to care for children, the elderly and other vulnerable populations.
- Increased restrictions and marginalization of women, and the marriage of young girls to older men, are consistent indicators of socio-economic and political breakdown. Observations of degraded freedom of movement of women could indicate the presence or influence of hostile actors.
- New or increased presence of prostitutes is a strong indicator of an expansion of organized crime networks to traffic humans, drugs, and weapons in or through the operational environment. Organized crime is not a military responsibility; however, organized crime's influence can significantly degrade military operations. Are restrictions enforced? What options exist; where?

Other general questions include the following:

- Do groups with incentives for violence have access to all conflict resources—organizational, financial, and human—or only a few?
- What level of resources do groups have and what level do they need to achieve their goals? Is there a match?
- Where do these resources come from (e.g., natural resources, corruption and patronage networks, diasporas, foreign recruits, local and international sources) and what does this imply about ease of access and sustainability?

Incentives for Violence: Grievance and Greed

Grievances and greed are often closely connected; the populace is typically the tool that hostile actors use to gain wealth and political control. Conditions leading to conflict frequently have had elements of one group denying economic or political resources to another group. It is increasingly common for legitimate grievances to be intentionally exaggerated by hostile actors to cause the populace, institutions, and others to economically support their demands, or use threat of violence to politically force governments to further restrict economic or political resources, therefore confirming and exacerbating the grievances. As hostile actors gain wealth and influence, there is decreasing incentive to agree to cooperate with legitimate actors. Civil-military operations planners should be aware that the conditions that led to the present grievance and greed situation are best met by increasing the resiliency of the populace to resist hostile actors and their influence.

Grievance and greed factors include the following:

- Ethnic and religious divisions.
- Is the relationship between ethnic or religious groups characterized by dominance, potential dominance or high levels of fragmentation?
- Where do these groups live and in what numbers? Are they concentrated in regional pockets or dispersed? If they are concentrated, do they form a majority or a minority in the area?
- What is the history of relations between groups? Is there a pattern of systematic
- discrimination or have relationships been relatively peaceful and inclusive?
- Do other divides, for example, political exclusion or economic inequality, reinforce ethnic divisions?
- Are there elites who face an economic or political incentive to mobilize violence along ethnic lines?
- Is extremist ethnic or religious rhetoric increasing? Are elites beginning to create, adopt or promote ethnic myths or rhetoric to dehumanize their adversaries?

Economic Causes.

Questions to ask regarding the economy include the following:

- Is the economy (of the country or region) growing, stagnant, or declining? By what percentage?
- Is the country (or region) low income?
- Are there large socio-economic disparities? Do these occur or reinforce other lines of division, such as ethnicity?
- Is the economy heavily dependent on primary commodities? Are these commodities easily stolen or sold on the black or gray market?
- Is economic power tied to political power? How, and in what way?
- How pervasive is corruption or patronage? Does it flow along ethnic or other lines of division?
- If there is a large informal economy, is it legal or illegal (i.e., based on local farm markets or based on prostitution, or human, drugs, or arms trafficking)? Who benefits?

Environmental Causes.

Questions to ask regarding the environment include the following:

- Are there major resource scarcities?
- What are the primary causes of scarcity?
- Has scarcity led to resource capture?
- Has scarcity led to population transfers?
- Do the effects of scarcity (resource capture, population transfers) reinforce other divides (ethnic, religious, economic) and/or generate competition among groups?

- Do members of the elite compete over the control of valuable natural resources (both renewable and non-renewable), scarce or not?
- Are certain resources (such as land) used as a tool in political competition?

Demographic Trends.

Questions to ask regarding demographics include the following:

- Do population growth rates differ across distinct, adjacent communities?
- Are there other factors (e.g., economic migration) that are tipping the demographic balance toward one group?
- Is the rural population contracting or expanding? If expanding, is there access to land? If contracting, what are the safety valves for population pressures (e.g., migration to other areas, economic opportunity in urban centers)?
- What are rates of urbanization? Is the urban population experiencing a period of economic growth or decline?
- What is the size of the youth cohort relative to the adult population? Do opportunities appear to be the same for young men and young women.
- Are there particular areas (urban centers, distinct regions) where the youth cohort is disproportionately large?
- Are young people radicalizing? If so, around what issues? If not, what is keeping this from happening?
- Are there rapid increases in young, educated professionals who have no opportunities for political or economic advancement?
- Is there an increase in marriages, including marriage of young girls?

Interaction Effects.

Questions to ask regarding interaction include the following:

- Are there many incentives for violence (greed and grievance) or only a few?
- Are they longstanding and chronic or of recent origin?
- Do incentives for violence overlap and reinforce each other or cut across lines of division? For example, does access to economic opportunity overlap with ethnic differences or cut across ethnic differences?
- Is there an alignment between grievance and greed? Are elites with a political or economic incentive to mobilize violence well-positioned to tap into long-standing grievances?

ONGOING MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS ACTIVITIES WITH CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

Civil Preparation of the Battlespace Product Refinement

Similar to the IPB, developing and updating the CPB is a continuous process. As planning progresses and additional information is uncovered and understood about the environment, the adversary, and the friendly force, the CPB should be modified as soon as possible to reflect this. The CMO Planner must ensure that relevant and significant CPB developments are disseminated to the OPT and CMO or civil affairs forces in the field.

Green Cell Activities

Ideally the Green Cell includes members of the CMO working group. The Green Cell continues to develop products and maintain situational awareness of the changing civil dimension throughout the planning process from CPB through COA wargaming.

Red Cell Activities

The Red Cell continues to develop products and maintain situational awareness of the capabilities of friendly forces. The Red Cell also watches the operational environment to uncover fault lines and weaknesses that can be leveraged to degrade or deny achievement of friendly forces mission objectives. The Red and Green Cell are allies in the planning process and should coordinate and share information.

Resource Shortfalls Identification

Throughout the planning process, the commander and staff identify critical resource shortfalls to determine additional support requirements.

Commander's Critical Information Requirements Review and Update

These are information requirements identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely planning and decision-making. There are two categories of CCIR: friendly force information requirements and PIRs. The CCIRs can be updated, modified, dropped, and new CCIRs created as a result of additional information and subsequent questions emerging during COA planning and execution.

Recommended CMO-related CCIRs.

Civil-military operations-related CCIR's include—

- CMO problem statement.
- CMO initial staff estimate.
- Commander's Course of Action Guidance.

At some point following the problem framing brief, the commander provides guidance for developing potential solutions to the problem.

Requests for Information.

Gaps in planning information which cannot be answered by the planning group and readily available sources are usually be recorded and forwarded as requests for information (RFIs) to an appropriate organization for answers.

Define the Problem or the Problem Statement

A problem is defined as the difference between the current state or condition and a desired state or condition. Defining the problem leads to an understanding the difference between existing and desired conditions. Civil-military operations planning is crucial to developing a comprehensive problem statement since civil considerations are inherently germane to any operating environment.

Problem-Framing Brief.

The CMO planner provides input to this brief based on the nature of the mission and the role of CMO in the operation. The CMO inputs to the problem framing brief includes—

- An updated CPB.
- CMO task analysis.
- CMO assumptions.
- CMO limitations.
- CMO shortfalls
- CMO RFIs.

Issue the Warning Order

The CMO planner passes information to CMO assets throughout the force that will be developing supporting plans and have responsibility for executing portions of the plan.

Civil-Military Operations Inputs to Course of Action Development

Course of Action Development is the process of synthesizing and articulating options for solving the identified problem. Civil-military operations planners understand that the nature of the operation defines what the CMO planner and the working group executes in support of the OPT COA Development. For example, in population-centric operations such as in counterinsurgency, stability, or humanitarian assistance operations, the CMO planner and CMO working group can perform COA development activities much like an OPT. In other operations, where CMO does not serve as prominent a role, the CMO staff develops a concept of support for the COA being developed by the OPT.

During COA development, CMO injects, activities, and outputs focus on the following questions:

- What do we want to do?
- How do we want to do it?
- When do we want to do it?
- Where will the actions occur?

To support this, CMO planners and supporting elements attempt to answer civil environment questions, such as—

- How will military actions or operations affect the civilian population?
- How will the civilian population affect friendly forces' military operations?
- As a result of our actions what will happen to, or should be done with, the civilian population (e.g., leave in place, bypass, relocate, etc.)
- How will movements of the civilian population be undertaken (e.g., escorted by local indigenous security force, augment force, etc.)?
- Are adequate resources available to support civil-military tasks and objectives as part of the larger COA? If not, where are adequate resources found?
- Do options address the sources of civil instability or cause of the conflict?

One of the primary products developed during this step is the synchronization matrix. This product is used to synchronize forces and their actions across time, space and purpose in relation to an adversary COA. The CMO planner ensures that CMO tasks and objectives are included in this product; typically, CMO has its own functional row in the synchronization matrix and the row is used to record CMO activities throughout the COA.

Initial Course of Action Development

Initial, or rough-cut COAs are typically options that provide a rough-task organization, scheme of maneuver, and enough information so that the initial COAs can be briefed to the commander to ensure that the options are meeting the intent.

The CMO planners review the CMO portions of the initial COAs with the G-9 to ensure the COA conforms to the commander's COA development planning guidance as well as G-9's guidance. This is the opportunity for the G-9 to make course corrections before the CMO working group conducts detailed CMO support to COA refinement. A CAG commander or civil affairs detachment officer in charge (OIC) could provide an estimate of supportability to the MAGTF based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil considerations analysis and participation in the planning process.

Course of Action Refinement and Completion

After the commander reviews the initial or rough-cut COAs and provides any guidance, the planning group further develops, expands, and refines the COAs to be taken into COA wargaming.

Course of Action Graphic and Narrative and Civil-Military Operations Input

The COA graphic and narrative encapsulates the supporting concepts of a COA by providing a verbal and pictorial representation of the concepts. The CMO planner should ensure that applicable portions of the CMO plan are correctly portrayed in the COA graphic and narrative. The graphic might display civil-military activities, locations of relief organizations, dislocated civilians, key infrastructure, and culturally or historically significant areas. The CMO graphic and narrative, when approved by the G-9 and the commander, forms the basis for applicable input to the OPT COA graphic and narrative, and should be synchronized with information in Annex G, and in the CMO's concept of support in the execution paragraph of the operation plan or OPORD.

The planning group develops a task organization for each COA; in turn, CMO planners develop a civil-affairs- task organization which depicts how the G-9 intends to structure and resource the force with civil affairs capabilities. At this time, command and support relationships can be established. Proper task organization ensures each unit is properly constructed, sized, and resourced to support the commander's planning guidance.

Course of Action Brief

The planning group presents a COA brief to the commander and staff, in which each COA is briefed separately. The commander's wargaming guidance typically includes the COAs to be wargamed, the critical events to be wargamed, and the wargaming methods to be used.

Commander's Evaluation Criteria

The commander typically provides evaluation criteria for COA wargaming. These criteria could be based on principles of war, risk factors, etc. In some cases, such as in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, there could be CMO-specific evaluation criteria. Civil-military operations-related outputs from COA development include—

- Updated CPB.
- Green Cell COAs.
- Planning support tools such as a synchronization matrix.
- CMO graphic and narrative.
- Task organization of civil affairs forces.
- Updated CMO staff estimate.
- CMO assessment plan.
- CMO Concept of Support.

As part of final preparation for the COA war game step, the CMO planner crosswalks the synchronization matrix to the CMO staff estimate and ensures that the CMO options are accurately recorded in the staff estimate. With these tools properly developed and synchronized, the CMO planner should be prepared to participate in the planning group COA wargaming.

Civil-Military Operations Inputs to Course of Action War Game

The purpose of COA war game is to improve the plan. Civil-military operations planners support the COA war game by providing a detailed CMO plan to include a completed synchronization matrix. The Green Cell supports COA war game by representing the civil reactions. Just as with a Red Cell, the Green Cell expands the problem, challenges the planning assumptions, provides a deeper understanding of the adversary and population through their cultural lens, and reveals overlooked opportunities. Civil-military operations inputs to COA wargaming.

Results from Wargaming

An updated COA graphic and narrative with information on the commander's evaluation criteria are the required outputs of the war game. Additional CMO-specific outputs include—

- Updated CPB products.
- A CMO-specific COA wargaming decision support matrix and synchronization matrix.
- Refined or modified planning factors.

- CMO task organization
- Identification of civil affairs assets required and shortfalls.
- Refined CMO-related CCIRs.
- List of critical events and decision points significant from the CMO standpoint.
- Refined CMO staff estimate.

Course of Action War Game Brief

The CMO planner and CMO working group provide input to the OPT for this brief; any input should be reviewed and discussed with the G-3 and G-9 CMO staff to ensure accuracy and understanding. Additional information which should be discussed and that can be used in the war-game brief includes the following:

- Updated CPB products.
- Overview of CMO actions within each COA.
- Significant civil-military events or situations noted during the war game.
- Identification of any additional CMO tasks.
- Revised CMO operational graphic and narrative.
- Revised CMO portion of synchronization matrix.
- CMO resource shortfalls.
- New CMO RFIs.
- Risk assessment of friendly actions and events that negatively affect the civil environment.
- CMO-specific elements related to the commander's evaluation criteria.
- The COA war game brief concludes with the commander's approval of any recommended changes to the COAs.

Civil-Military Operations Inputs to Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During this step, the commander evaluates each friendly COA against established criteria, compares the COAs with each other, and then selects the COA that will best accomplish the mission.

Using the commander's evaluation criteria, the commander or representative leads a discussion about the relative merits of each COA. The senior CMO planner should be an active participant in this discussion and provide a clear and concise evaluation of each COA from a civil-military perspective. This evaluation should be based on experience and judgment, the CMO staff estimate, and the detailed notes recorded by the CMO planner or CMO working group during the COA wargaming step. Functional area representatives and commanders can also provide estimates of supportability for each COA. Once each COA has been individually evaluated, the commander then compares the COAs against one another. It is important to note that the most advantageous COA from a civil perspective might not be the most advantageous COA from another functional area perspective. Depending on the nature of the mission (e.g., humanitarian assistance and disaster relief), the civil perspective can take priority over other functional areas. The commander could use a comparison and decision matrix, as shown in Table 6-3, to help compare one COA against another. The commander selects a COA (which could be a COA as

developed and war gamed, a modification, or a combination of the wargaming COAs) and this approved COA becomes the basis for the CONOPS. Once approved, the CMO supporting concept becomes the basis for CMO concept of support to the approved CONOPS.

Civil-Military Operations Inputs to Orders Development

Orders development is the process of translating the commander's decision into oral, written and/or graphic communications sufficient to guide implementation of the decision and provide initiative by subordinates. The CMO planner is responsible for producing the Annex G. This should be a collaborative process involving all CMO assets that will use this document as the basis for their orders development to ensure CMO unity of purpose and effort. Key planning products used in orders development include the following:

- Civil affairs staff estimate constructed through the planning process.
- CMO graphic and narrative.
- CMO Synchronization Matrix.

Once all staff sections have completed their portions of the order, a detailed internal review of the force order is conducted. This is the orders reconciliation process. The purpose of reconciliation is to ensure the basic order and all annexes, appendices, etc. are complete and in agreement. The CMO planner ensures that Annex G information aligns with CMO-related information in the basic order, Annex I, and the synchronization matrix. After the order has been reconciled internally, the staff conducts an orders crosswalk. The previously reconciled Order order is now compared with higher, adjacent, and subordinate command orders to ensure unity of effort and that the overall commander's intent is met. The CMO planner now ensures that the Annex G is concise, complete, and fully understood by CMO subordinate elements who executes the plan. Civil-Military Operations Inputs to Transition

Transition is the process that shifts the effort from planning to execution. It could consist of a range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals involving all elements of the force. At a minimum, transition includes a transition brief along with a handover and explanation of any execution tools developed during planning (decision support matrix, execution checklist, etc.). The CMO planner and CMO working groups are active participants in force transition briefs and drills to ensure that CMO actions, objectives, etc. are fully understood and integrated into execution. The CMO planner needs to brief the CMO concept of support. Key products for the CMO brief include—

- Graphic and narrative.
- Task organization.
- Execution checklist.
- Decision support matrix.

Whenever possible, the G-9 should also conduct CMO functional transition events. A CMO rehearsal of concept drill will help to ensure CMO unity of effort and success in execution.

GLOSSARY

Section I. Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
CAO	civil affairs operations
CCDR	combatant commander
CIM	civil information management
CMO	civil-military operations
COA	course of action
COCOM	combatant command (command authority)
CONOPS	concept of operations
COP	common operational picture
CPB	civil preparation of the battlespace
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense directive
DoDI	Department of Defense instruction
DSCA	defense support of civil authorities
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FMF	Fleet Marine Forces
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence/intelligence staff section
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations and training/operations and training staff section
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs/civil affairs staff section
HHQ	higher headquarters
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IPI	indigenous populations and institutions
J-9	civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff; civil-military operations staff section
JP	joint publication

MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCDP	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCPP	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEU	Marine expeditionary unit
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
NGO	nongovernmental organization
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
PRC	populace and resources control
R2P2	rapid response planning process
RLT	regimental landing team
ROC	rehearsal of conflict
S-3	operations and training officer/office
SAF	Stability Assessment Framework
US	United States
USC	United States code
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

Section II. Definitions

adversary
A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (DoD Dictionary)

assessment
Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (Part 2 of a 4-part definition.) (DoD Dictionary)

assumption
A specific supposition of the operational environment that is assumed to be true, in the absence of positive proof, essential for the continuation of planning. (DoD Dictionary)

civil administration
An administration established by a foreign government in friendly territory, under an agreement with the government of the area concerned, to exercise certain authority normally the function of the local government or in hostile territory, occupied by United States forces, where a foreign government exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority until an indigenous civil government can be established. (DoD Dictionary)

civil affairs
Designated Active Component and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. See also civil-military operations. (DoD Dictionary)

civil affairs group
A Reserve Component organization supporting the MAGTF commander with specially trained and organized personnel in order to facilitate the planning, coordination and execution of CMO and limited civil affairs operations. Also called **CAG**.

civil affairs operations
Actions planned, coordinated, executed, and assessed to enhance awareness of, and manage the interaction with, the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Also called **CAO**. (DoD Dictionary)

civil information management
(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Process whereby civil information is collected, entered into a central database, and internally fused with the supported element, higher headquarters, other United States Government and Department of Defense agencies, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations. Also called **CIM**. (USMC Dictionary)

civil-military operations
Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO**. See also civil affairs operations. (DoD Dictionary)

civil-military operations center
An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the commander. Also called **CMOC**. See also civil-military operations. (DoD Dictionary)

civil-military operations working group

A task-organized planning entity that supports the G9's (or other staff lead's) or the civil-military operations planner's civil-military operations planning requirements and responsibilities.

civil preparation of the battlespace

An analytical method used to examine civil considerations in support of mission analysis and the overall intelligence preparation of the battlespace process. Also called **CPB**.

civil reconnaissance

A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events Also called **CR.** (DoD Dictionary)

common operational picture

A single, identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called **COP**. (DoD Dictionary)

dislocated civilian

A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Also called **DC**. See also displaced person; evacuee; internally displaced person; Also called **DC**. (DoD Dictionary)

effect

The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. (Part 2 of a 3-part definition) (DoD Dictionary)

end state

The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (DoD Dictionary)

foreign assistance

Support for foreign nations that can be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. See also foreign humanitarian assistance, security assistance. (DoD Dictionary)

foreign humanitarian assistance

Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called **FHA**. See also foreign assistance. (DoD Dictionary)

host nation

A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called **HN**. (DoD Dictionary)

indicator

In the context of assessment, a specific piece of information that infers the condition, state, or existence of something, and provides a reliable means to ascertain performance or effectiveness. (Part 3 of a 3-part definition) (DoD Dictionary)

indigenous populations and institutions

The societal framework of an operational environment including citizens; legal and illegal immigrants; dislocated civilians; and governmental, tribal, ethnic, religious, commercial, and private organizations and entities. Also called **IPI**. (DoD Dictionary)

interagency

Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (DoD Dictionary)

internally displaced person

Any person who has been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations

of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters and who has not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Also called IDP. (DoD Dictionary)

limitation

An action required or prohibited by higher authority, such as a constraint or a restraint, and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, rules of engagement, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host nation issues. (DoD Dictionary)

measure of effectiveness

An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called MOE. (DoD Dictionary)

measure of performance

An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (DoD Dictionary)

nongovernmental organization

A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (DoD Dictionary)

operational approach

An expression of what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources.

operational planning team

A group built around the future operations section that integrates the staff representatives and resources. The operational planning team may have representatives or augmentation from each of the standard staff sections, the seven warfighting functions, staff liaisons, and/or subject matter experts. Also called OPT. (USMC Dictionary)

populace and resources control

Control measures that assist host nation governments or de facto authorities in retaining control over their population centers, thus precluding complicating problems that may hinder joint mission accomplishment. Populace and resources control measures seek to identify, reduce, relocate, or access population resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operation success. Also called PRC. (USMC Dictionary)

private sector

An umbrella term that may be applied to any or all of the nonpublic or commercial individuals and businesses, specified nonprofit organizations, most of academia and other scholastic institutions, and selected nongovernmental organizations. (DoD Dictionary)

resource shortfalls

The lack of forces, equipment, materiel, or capability reflected as the difference between the resources identified as a plan requirement and those quantities identified as apportioned for planning that would adversely affect the command's ability to accomplish its mission. (MCWP 5-0)

rule of law

A principle of governance in which all persons and institutions, public and private, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly announced, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights norms and standards. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform, published 15 March 2016)

security cooperation

Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for

self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. Also called **SC**. See also security assistance. (DoD Dictionary)

support to civil administration

Actions that help continue or stabilize management by a governing body of a foreign nation's civil structure by assisting an established government or by establishing military authority over an occupied population. Support to civil administration consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting with those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports United States and multinational objectives. Also called **SCA**. (USMC Dictionary)

unity of effort

Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action. (DoD Dictionary)

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