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# Infantry Battalion Operations

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**U.S. Marine Corps**

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FOREWORD

Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-10A.1, *Infantry Battalion Operations* is a complete revision of the previous version, last published in 1978, which focuses on capturing best practices from recent operations across the globe. Many of these best practices are reflected in the intelligence, fires, and stability chapters. This publication serves as a starting point for understanding the capabilities of the infantry battalion. It is not intended to cover every situation that may be encountered. It also does not address force structure and weapon system changes currently in progress and anticipated over the next several years unless sufficient experimentation and testing have already been conducted to generate best practices that are ready to be codified here. This publication serves as the basic reference publication for infantry battalion operations and is to be used in conjunction with lower echelon and other Marine Corps doctrinal publications.

This publication is intended for infantry company, battalion, and regimental commanders and their staffs. It is a foundational document that assists in the preparation and execution of battalion-level operations.

Reviewed and approved this date.



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# INFANTRY BATTALION OPERATIONS

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## **To Our Readers**

# CHAPTER 1

## GENERAL

Warfare continues to be characterized by volatility, uncertainty, and complexity. The Marine Corps infantry battalion will continue to conduct expeditionary operations to accomplish specific objectives around the globe. As the National security threats to the United States continue to evolve, the Marine Corps will be ready to deploy infantry battalions that are light enough to leverage various combinations of amphibious shipping, prepositioned equipment and supplies, and inter-theater airlift to quickly arrive in the operational environment.

### COMPETITION CONTINUUM

Marine forces require the capability and flexibility to participate in operations and activities that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and intensity, and that occur across a continuum of competition (see fig. 1-1). Inside this competition continuum, Marines act within three broad categories—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The three states of the competition continuum are not exclusive of each other, but can co-exist at the same point in time within the operational environment. The commander then uses the continuum to help relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose. Regardless of the type of operation being conducted, Marines engage the targets/entities in an operational environment using capabilities that generate both lethal and nonlethal effects. For more information on the competition continuum, see Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*.




Figure 1-1. Operations Across the Competition Continuum.

### Cooperation

Cooperation includes mutually beneficial relationships between actors with similar or compatible interests. Although interests will only rarely be in complete alignment, commanders should cooperate with state and non-state actors to enhance collective security, ensure access, enable burden sharing, and deter conflict. An operation in cooperation is typically an enduring activity

with no discrete start or end point. Marine forces are normally in a supporting role during cooperation and may not even be present in the operational environment.

### **Competition Below Armed Conflict**

Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more actors in the international system have incompatible interests, but neither seeks to escalate the situation to armed conflict. A commander may conduct operations in support of another department of the US Government during competition below armed conflict. A commander should employ all measures short of those that might reasonably lead to armed conflict to attain the desired end state and prevent a competitor from achieving its aims. This may include positioning and employing military forces to pose the threat of armed conflict in support of deterrence. The US forces based in South Korea have supported the Nation's competition below armed conflict with North Korea since the end of armed conflict in 1953.

### **Armed Conflict**

In armed conflict, the use of violence is the primary means by which a state or non-state actor seeks to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict varies in intensity and ranges from limited warfare in crisis response and limited contingency operations to large-scale combat operations.

Commanders must seek to create conditions that impose their will on the enemy and use all available means of National power to attain the desired end state. Armed conflict may include other operations, such as military engagement, occurring simultaneously within the same operational environment. The operational environment may be characterized by large enemy forces that have significant control over the population. The civilian population may be compartmentalized and under the authority of enemy forces. Aside from any multinational force, the friendly actors may be relatively small, with limited capacity.

## **SIMULTANEOUS ACTIVITY**

Marine infantry battalions are capable of effectively executing offensive, defensive, and stability activities. During an operation, commanders combine, sequence, transition, and balance the tasks associated with these three core activities to achieve objectives. For example, an infantry battalion may use elements of the offense and defense, such as raids, patrols, and fixed site defense, to provide security for stabilization efforts.

## **KEY MARINE CORPS TASKS**

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* states that there are five tasks that the Marine Corps must be capable of performing to remain the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness, filling the void between special operations forces (SOF) and heavy ground formations. Marine Corps infantry battalions play a vital role in the accomplishment of these five key tasks:

- Conduct military engagement.
- Respond rapidly to crisis.

- Project power.
- Conduct littoral maneuver.
- Counter irregular threats.

### **Conduct Military Engagement**

Essential to building partner capability and capacity, as well as relationships with the friendly and neutral networks in an operational environment, the infantry battalion participates in military engagement through the deployment of task-organized subordinate elements.

### **Respond Rapidly to Crisis**

Through their expeditionary posture as part of a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU), an air contingency Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), or because of home station readiness, infantry battalions form a key component in crisis response, whether overseas or domestically.

### **Project Power**

As part of a US whole-of-government approach, the infantry battalion is organized, trained, equipped, and sized to participate as part of National “soft power” activities (i.e. persuasive means such as military engagement), “hard power” activities (i.e., the employment or threat of military force), and combinations of the two.

### **Conduct Littoral Maneuver**

As part of an expeditionary force, an infantry battalion maneuvers and operates within the land and maritime domains of the littorals, from which it may conduct expeditionary operations as an integral unit or through the employment of task-organized subordinate elements, such as company landing teams.

### **Counter Irregular Threats**

Countering irregular threats involves the use of military force, in combination with the other elements of power, in the affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory. An infantry battalion is a critical component of this because of its abilities to act decisively across the competition continuum; to employ combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks and transition quickly between them; and to adapt and transition quickly to changing environments.

## **INFANTRY BATTALION EMPLOYMENT**

The mission of the Marine infantry battalion is to defeat the enemy by fire, maneuver, and close combat and to conduct other operations as directed to influence the operational environment across the range of military operations. Depending on the mission at hand, the infantry battalion may serve as any of the following:

- A maneuver element for a regiment.
- A battalion landing team (BLT) for a regiment or MEU.
- An independent task force.
- The ground combat element (GCE) of a MAGTF.

- A force provider, providing task-organized company landing teams or platoons as required.

The battalion employs its organic infantry companies and other assigned resources in any configuration necessary. From splitting the battalion into alpha and bravo commands, to creating independent and semi-independent company landing teams and platoon-sized task organizations, the battalion organizes and transitions itself according to the mission and operational environment. In cases where the most effective configuration is beyond the battalion's organic resources, it requests additional resources and enablers from its higher headquarters (HHQ).

## **Capabilities**

Regardless of the mission, configuration, and means of employment, Marine infantry battalions have the capabilities discussed in the below subordinate sections.

***General Capabilities.*** Its general capabilities include:

- Conducting offensive, defensive, and stability activities in all types of environments and levels of visibility.
- Conducting sustained combined arms operations across the competition continuum.
- Conducting independent, non-contiguous, distributed, and dispersed actions.
- Operating in conjunction with other Service forces, agencies, and SOF.
- Participating in amphibious operations.
- Conducting foot-mobile movement or organizing to conduct motorized, mechanized, or air movement.
- Providing task-organized company landing teams and platoons for employment, to include semi-independent and independent operations.
- Serving as the GCE for a MAGTF.
- Compositing or aggregating with other forces.
- Participating in advanced force and forcible entry operations.
- Conducting military engagement and security cooperation activities with allied and partner nation security forces.
- Conducting crisis response and limited contingency operations.

***Tactical Capabilities.*** Its tactical capabilities include:

- Seizing and holding terrain.
- Exerting its will over the enemy.
- Breaching tactical obstacles and conducting limited gap-crossing, or—when augmented—serving as a breaching task force.
- Conducting feints and demonstrations to deceive the enemy.
- Conducting screen, guard, and—when properly resourced—cover missions.
- Conducting rapid, worldwide deployment.

The range of the battalion's employment is primarily limited by its size, combat power, manner of configuration, resources, assets, and personnel. In its basic foot-mobile configuration, it is limited by its:

- Logistic assets.
- Command and control (C2) assets.
- Mobility assets.
- Vulnerability to armor, artillery, and air threats.
- Vulnerability to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attack and possession of only limited decontamination capabilities.

### **Augmentation**

An infantry battalion often serves as the nucleus of a task force or landing team by attaching additional capabilities. The only limit to the amount of resources that a battalion may attach is its ability to command and control them. Since the list of potential reinforcements, attachments, and enablers is endless, the examples presented in the following subordinate sections represent most likely examples.

***Battalion Landing Team for a Marine Expeditionary Unit.*** Attached or supporting units usually include:

- Artillery battery (reinforced).
- Tank platoon.
- Assault amphibian platoon.
- Light armored reconnaissance (LAR) platoon.
- Combat engineer platoon.
- Combat service support (CSS) augmentation.
- Special intelligence teams.
- Reconnaissance team.

***Ground Combat Element for a MAGTF.*** Attached or supporting units might include:

- Tank platoon.
- Assault amphibian platoon.
- LAR platoon.
- Combat engineer platoon.
- Civil affairs team.
- Military police.
- Reconnaissance team.


***Independent Maneuver Element/Force Provider.*** The battalion may find itself assigned to a special purpose MAGTF that is involved in operations distributed over a large area. In this role, it might employ its infantry companies as semi-independent or independent elements, conducting offensive, defensive, and stability tasks and activities simultaneously. Under these



conditions, it will become necessary for the battalion to plan and organize both organic resources and augments/attachments to have the most positive impact.

## INFANTRY BATTALION ORGANIZATION

Foundationally, three to four infantry battalions serve as the basic maneuver elements of an infantry regiment. The battalion contains four infantry companies and a headquarters and service (H&S) company. The infantry companies consist of three rifle companies and one weapons company, which is also the battalion's fire support element. See figure 1-2 for a depiction.




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**Figure 1-2. Marine Infantry Battalion.**

### Rifle Company

The rifle company, one of the three types of Marine Corps infantry companies, serves as the basic maneuver element of the infantry battalion. When appropriately reinforced, a rifle company may conduct semi-independent and independent operations in support of either the battalion or other organizations. The mission of the Marine infantry company is to defeat the enemy by fire, maneuver, and close combat and to conduct other operations as directed across the range of military operations to defeat the enemy and influence the operational environment. For more information on the rifle company, see Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-10A.2, *Infantry Company Operations*.

A rifle company consists of three rifle platoons, a weapons platoon, and a headquarters platoon (see fig. 1-3). The structure, capabilities, and employment considerations for Marine infantry companies are found in MCRP 3-10A.2.



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**Figure 1-3. Marine Rifle Company.**

## Weapons Company

The infantry battalion possesses one weapons company. The mission of a weapons company is to provide medium mortar support, antiarmor support, heavy machine gun (HMG) support, and fire support coordination to support the infantry battalion's scheme of maneuver. When employed in a non-traditional role; for example, as a fourth maneuver element within the battalion; the weapons company assumes the basic infantry company mission. The weapons company may also form maneuver units by combining its HMG and antiarmor platoons into combined antiarmor teams. As seen in figure 1-4, the weapons company is uniquely equipped with heavy weapons to support the maneuver of the rifle companies and elements within the battalion. The weapons company's heavy weapons, fire control capabilities, and communications assets include a mix that can be tailored to a particular task based on the considerations of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available (METT-T), as well as civil considerations. Details regarding the structure, capabilities, and employment considerations for the weapons company can be found in MCRP 3-10A.2.





Figure 1-4. Marine Weapons Company.

## Headquarters and Service Company

The infantry battalion possesses one H&S company (see fig. 1-5 on page 1-8). The H&S company exists to provide the battalion commander the ability to command and control the battalion and sustain its subordinate elements. The organic H&S company possesses a limited capability to meet the C2 and sustainment needs of the battalion while simultaneously providing slices of C2 and CSS resources to semi-independent or independent company landing teams. Depending on METT-T, the H&S company may require augmentation with external resources and enablers to meet situations in which the battalion is employing the majority of its combat power in widely dispersed roles.



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**Figure 1-5. Headquarters and Service Company.**

## ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PRIMARY STAFF

### Commanding Officer

The battalion commander is responsible for everything the battalion does or fails to do.

Command is the authority that the battalion commander lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the battalion for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

Battalion commanders meet their responsibilities by sound planning, timely decision making, issuing effective orders, assessing their subordinates, and personal supervision and leadership.

Their duties require a thorough understanding of the tactical and technical employment and the capabilities and limitations of their organic units, as well as the units attached to or in support of their battalions. Detailed training management of the entire battalion is required to be successful, which is discussed in detail in appendix A.

***Relations with Staff.*** Battalion commanders use their primary and special staffs to acquire information in support of their decision making. The staff makes recommendations, prepares estimates, creates plans and orders, and implements the commander's decisions. The battalion commander maintains a close relationship with the staff, encourages frank appraisals and the free expression of ideas, and in turn, keeps the staff fully informed.

***Relations with Subordinate Commanders.*** The relationship of battalion commanders with their subordinate unit commanders is direct and personal. Subordinate commanders are encouraged to utilize the battalion staff, but to deal directly with the battalion commander when appropriate. The battalion commander makes inspections and informal visits to subordinate unit commanders and their personnel. These actions promote confidence, respect, loyalty, and understanding while giving the battalion commander first-hand knowledge of the situation and status of the unit.

***The Battalion Commander in Combat.*** The battalion commander uses all available means to accomplish the mission. The guidance, plans, orders, and supervision provided by the battalion commander ensures that the actions of all units contribute effectively toward that end. When additional support and resources are required to accomplish the mission, the commander takes action to obtain them. Battalion commanders place themselves where they can best direct and control the operation while maintaining situational awareness. They may locate themselves at an observation post (OP), with the main effort, at a key leader engagement (KLE), or anywhere else in the area of operations (AO) where they feel their presence and authority are necessary and will have the greatest effect.

### **Executive Officer**

The executive officer (XO) is the battalion commander's principle staff officer and assistant, the second-in-command of the battalion, and the commander's representative in their absence. They are responsible for the organization, training, supervision, and efficient and prompt response of their staffs, and for the coordinated effort of their members. They maintain awareness of their unit's current situation and future plans. They assemble and supervise the staff during the decision-making process and establish liaison with other commands. The staff keeps the XO informed of recommendations and information given directly to the commander, as well as any instructions or guidance they receive from the commander. Executive officers are the overseers of their battalions' information management (IM) plan, and the enforcer of its application and procedures. The XO's specific duties will vary depending on the commander's desires. The XO is normally located with the main headquarters echelon. The XO also assumes staff cognizance over the following special staff members:

- Security manager.
- Information management officer (IMO).
- Headquarters commandant.
- Battalion legal officer.
- Unit liaison officers (LNOs).

## **Sergeant Major**

The battalion sergeant major is the senior staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) within the infantry battalion. A member of the commander's personal staff, the sergeant major advises the commander concerning all matters related to enlisted training, discipline, and troop welfare. The sergeant major works closely with infantry company commanders and first sergeants in the training of SNCOs and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). As the senior enlisted advisor to the battalion commander, the sergeant major should understand the administrative, logistical, and operational functions of the battalion. Additionally, the sergeant major—

- Accompanies the battalion commander on activities, to include command inspections, ceremonies, and battlespace circulation.
- Enforces the battalion's tactical standing operating procedure (TACSOP) and supervises field discipline and hygiene.
- May supervise critical events, such as passage through a breach, leading advanced parties, or coordinating passage of lines.
- Coordinates with the S-1 section in the tracking of casualties, submission of morning reports, and personnel administration.
- Coordinates enlisted training proficiencies with the S-3 section.

## **S-1 (Adjutant)**

The S-1 is the principle staff officer in matters pertaining to personnel management, personnel administration, and headquarters management. The adjutant monitors the administrative chain from company to regiment (or other HHQ) and keeps the commander informed of the battalion's personnel status. Adjutants recommend personnel policy and assist the commander in handling personnel and morale factors that influence the combat effectiveness of the battalion, including supervision of legal matters and disciplinary action. They are responsible for administrative support for casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) and tracking, as well as for civilian internees and detainees. The S-1 works closely with the XO and S-4. Adjutants possess a small staff section headed by a personnel administration chief to assist them in their duties. Duties which are normally the purview of the adjutant and the S-1 section include the following:

- Substance abuse control officer.
- Career retention specialist.
- Battalion legal officer.
- Equal opportunity officer.

## **S-2 (Intelligence Officer)**

The intelligence officer, or S-2, is the principle staff officer for the planning and supervision of intelligence and counterintelligence functions. The battalion intelligence officer is responsible for keeping the battalion commander, primary and special staff, and higher, adjacent, and supporting units fully informed of the current intelligence situation. They make recommendations for the allocation and assignment of intelligence gathering resources, both organic and dedicated (e.g. aerial reconnaissance and scout-sniper teams), and coordinate the intelligence means and activities of other elements of the command. The S-2 has responsibility for the production and dissemination of intelligence, counterintelligence, and graphic intelligence aids. The battalion intelligence officer is responsible for intelligence-related training within the

battalion, including the training of intelligence analysts assigned to infantry companies' company level intelligence cells (CLICs). The intelligence officer conducts authorized and appropriate collection and exploitation of detainee intelligence and coordinates the handling of detainees with the S-1 and S-4. The S-2 supervises counterintelligence efforts in coordination with the operations officer, or S-3. The S-2 possesses a small staff section headed by an intelligence chief to assist them in their duties. The S-2 works closely with the operations officer, fire support coordinator (FSC), civil affairs team (when augmented with one), and information operations (IO) planner in the targeting process.

### **S-3 (Operations Officer)**

The operations officer is the principle staff officer for the battalion's plans, operations, and training. The S-3 is responsible for integrating all of the battalion's warfighting functions and capabilities in support of the commander's plan. The operations officer supervises the organization and functioning of the battalion's combat operations center (COC) to command and control the battalion. They also have a large staff section assisted by an operations chief. The S-3 works closely with the XO, S-2, S-4, and communications system officer, or S-6. The S-3's primary subordinate functions and personnel include:

- Fires.
- Aviation support.
- Operations, training, and education.
- CBRN defense.
- IO.
- Future operations (when necessary).
- Current operations (when necessary).

### **S-4 (Logistics Officer)**

The logistics officer, or S-4, is the principle staff officer for logistics and CSS requirements. Logistics officers coordinate requirements for supply, transportation, health services, maintenance, and food service with HHQ and supporting units. They make recommendations for the allocation of means, prepare detailed requirements, and develop logistical support plans for battalion plans and orders. They constantly monitor the responsiveness of support. The logistics officer supervises the organization and functioning of the battalion's logistics operations center. The S-4 possesses a number of staff assistants for embarkation, supply, motor transport, and maintenance management, and a large staff section headed by a logistics chief. The S-4 works closely with the XO, S-3, and S-6. The S-4's primary subordinate functions and personnel include:

- Armory.
- Battalion aid station.
- Motor transport.
- Supply/fiscal.
- Messing.
- Embarkation.
- Maintenance management.
- Ammunition.

- Ground safety.

### **S-6 (Communications System Officer)**

The communications system officer, or S-6, is the principle staff officer for planning and supervising the installation, operation, resourcing, and maintenance of the battalion's communications and data systems, to include single-channel radio, telecommunications, data networking, and computer support. Communications system officers ensure communications and data planning and training are compatible with the battalion's operational plan and support effective command and control. Communications system officers plan and supervise the integration of the battalion's communication and data systems into the systems of higher, adjacent, supporting, and supported units. They make recommendations for the allocation of means and assets, prepare requirements and employment methods, and assist in the development of plans and orders. They constantly monitor the effectiveness of support. The S-6 directly supports the battalion COC with coordinating the location and conducting the establishment, operation, troubleshooting, and maintenance of all organic communications systems. The S-6 is the communications platoon commander and works closely with the communications chief. The S-6's primary subordinate functions and personnel include:

- Wire communications.
- Radio communications.
- Data communications.
- Maintenance.
- Electronic key management system.

### **S-9 (Civil Affairs Officer)**

Depending on the nature of the mission, and given the necessary resources, the battalion commander may establish a civil affairs staff section, or S-9, within the executive staff. Ideally, a civil affairs team staffs this section, though in some instances the section may be manned by battalion personnel who have received collateral duty civil affairs training. The S-9 is the principle staff officer responsible for planning, coordinating, and supervising civil-military operations (CMO) in support of the battalion's operational plans. Civil affairs officers are responsible to the commander for all matters involving the civilian population present in the AO. They affect liaison with local civilian leaders and with all other civilian organizations present, such as host nation organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that are directly concerned with the civilian populace. The S-9 provides staff supervision over all attached civil affairs units and shares information collected from civilian contacts with the S-2. The civil affairs officer makes recommendations for the allocation of means and assets, prepares requirements and employment methods, and assists in the development of future plans and orders. They constantly monitor the effectiveness of the battalion's CMO effort. A small staff section and a civil affairs chief assist the civil affairs officer. The S-9 works closely with the XO, S-2, S-3, IO planner, and S-4.

## **ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPECIAL STAFF**

### **Battalion Gunner**

The gunner is the battalion commander's advisor on infantry weapons capabilities and employment. While gunners are administratively part of the operations section, commanders utilize and employ their gunners as they see fit. Some of their duties are as follows:

- Function under the cognizance of the S-3.
- Advise the battalion commander, battalion staff, and company commanders on the employment of all organic and threat weapons.
- Advise the battalion operations officer on the development and implementation of the battalion's unit training management (UTM) program.
- Review all live fire-training packages to ensure proper implementation of training and readiness (T&R) manual event components, weapons system employment, and safety procedures.
- Manage the battalion's training and combat ammunition allotment.
- Mentor officers and SNCOs within the battalion.
- Design, develop, and control expeditionary ranges to ensure the best use of available resources and proper live-fire safety while enhancing unit proficiency in all organic weapons.
- Advise the battalion's company commanders in the development of training plans and the employment of supporting arms during combat.
- During combat operations, the gunner may be tasked to inspect fire plans to ensure direct and indirect fires are integrated and mutually supporting.

### **S-3A (Assistant Operations Officer)**

The assistant operations officer assists the operations officer in all duties pertaining to the plans, operations, and training of the battalion. The S-3A may serve as an operational planning team leader. During combat operations, the S-3A may be tasked with supervising the functioning of the COC under the direction of the operations officer.

### **Battalion Operations Chief**

The battalion operations chief is the senior enlisted tactical advisor and infantry subject matter expert (SME) to the operations officer and battalion commander. The operations chief assists in all levels of planning, training, deployment, and employment of the battalion's capabilities, to include the integration and synchronization of the warfighting functions. Some of the operations chief's duties are as follows:

- Advise the operations officer and battalion commander on the employment of battalion capabilities for MAGTF operations.
- Assist in developing detailed plans for combat operations and training.
- Coordinate across the battalion staff sections and with GCE enablers in support of battalion operations.
- Supervise the security, establishment, and displacement of the battalion COC to ensure the continuous command and control of all battalion functions.



## **Air Officer**

The battalion air officer serves as the primary advisor to the battalion commander for the integration of all aviation functions in support of ground combat operations. The battalion air officer is designated by the battalion commander and is usually the senior forward air controller (FAC). As the officer in charge of the battalion tactical air control party (TACP), the air officer establishes liaison with the regimental TACP and supervises the use and training of FACs/joint terminal attack controllers and joint fires observers.

## **Chaplain**

The chaplain has responsibility for matters pertaining to the moral, spiritual, and religious well-being of the command. The chaplain conducts divine services in accordance with the manner and forms of the chaplain's faith group; provides and supervises outreach programs, spiritual growth retreats, and religious education; and facilitates religious ministries for personnel of other faith groups. The chaplain operates under the cognizance of the XO. The chaplain also performs the following duties:

- Assists in determining and improving the state of morale.
- Advises the battalion commander on all matters related to religious ministries.
- Provides pastoral care and pastoral counseling, including visiting the sick, the confined, and detainees.
- Advises the commanding officer (CO) on moral issues and provides input to programs that emphasize Marine Corps core values.
- Assists in the casualty assistance calls program by providing ministry to the next of kin of deceased and seriously ill personnel.
- Provides liaison with local religious groups and NGOs in the United States or foreign countries.

## **Commanders of Attached and Supporting Units**

Commanders of attached and supporting units are advisors to the battalion commander and staff on matters pertaining to the employment of their units. In addition to commanding their units, they are responsible for coordinating their activities with the proper battalion staff sections and those of higher, adjacent, and other supporting units. As such, they function as special staff officers.

## **Headquarters Commandant**

When deployed, the infantry battalion's H&S company commander normally serves as the headquarters commandant. The headquarters commandant has responsibility for the local operational, administrative, and logistic support of the battalion headquarters and attached and supporting units collocated with it. The headquarters commandant operates under the cognizance of the XO and performs the following functions:

- Exercises command over Marines assigned to the headquarters that are not assigned or attached to subordinate commands.
- Provides local headquarters security, including the construction of defensive positions.
- Supervises the operation of supply, maintenance, motor transport, health services, and food service activities serving the headquarters.

- Maintains facilities for the reception and accommodation of visitors and augments.
- Supervises the police and maintenance of headquarters facilities.
- Supervises the billeting plan for headquarters personnel.
- Assists in selecting specific headquarters sites with the S-1, S-3, and S-6.
- Conducts training and morale activities for headquarters personnel.

### **Information Management Officer**

The IMO billet is normally a collateral duty performed by an officer from either the S-6 or the S-3 section. The IMO usually works directly for either the battalion XO or the operations officer; the battalion operations chief assists the IMO with their duties. In some cases when the volume of information is significant, each staff section may assign an IM representative to manage their section's IM responsibilities under the IMO's cognizance. The following additional tasks are performed:

- Advise the commander and battalion staff on IM matters.
- Coordinate IM efforts throughout the battalion and subordinate units.
- Develop and implement the battalion's IM plan in close coordination with the XO, S-3, S-6, and other staff principals.
- Coordinate with the battalion security manager and S-6 in the development and implementation of the battalion's information security procedures.

### **Liaison Officers**

An LNO is the representative of another unit's commander and is attached to the battalion to coordinate and facilitate cooperation and understanding between the two units. An infantry battalion may receive any number of such officers, SNCOs, or NCOs, and may provide any number as well, depending on the situation. The battalion will habitually receive the LNOs discussed in the following subordinate sections.

**Artillery Liaison.** Supporting artillery batteries provide artillery liaison teams consisting of a fire support officer (FSO), a fire support chief, and one or more artillery scouts or observers who serve as radio operators and clerks within the battalion fire support coordination center (FSCC). The artillery liaison section may contain the capability to serve as the IO staff planner.

**Naval Gunfire Liaison.** When naval surface fires are available, the battalion receives a naval gunfire (NGF) liaison team consisting of a naval gunfire liaison officer (NGLO) and one or more Marines to serve as forward observers and spotter/observers for the coordination of naval surface fire support. The NGLO may be tasked to perform other additional duties as deemed necessary by the commander.

### **Medical Officer**

The medical officer, often referred to as the battalion surgeon, serves as the senior medical advisor to the battalion commander and is responsible for medical matters and coordinating medical service support for the command. Medical officers supervise the custody, control, and maintenance of all personnel's medical and dental records. They provide the battalion commander with medical advice and insight in support of post-injury medical care plans, battalion medical and dental readiness, and medical-related service separations. They exercise

staff supervision and technical direction over personal hygiene, environmental sanitation, first aid, sanitary aspects of food service and food procurement, and other preventive medicine activities affecting the health of the command. The medical officer plans and facilitates the training of all corpsmen assigned to the battalion, oversees their employment in support of the battalion's maneuver elements, and participates in their performance reviews and discipline. As part of the planning process, the battalion surgeon advises the staff on the health threats in the intended AO. They also advise on the health service requirements for the command, and—when relevant—the indigenous population within the commander's AO.

### **Motor Transport Officer**

The motor transport officer performs the general duties of a special staff officer, advising the commander on the employment of motor transport assets. The motor transport officer's roles and responsibilities are covered in detail in chapter 12.

### **Communication Strategy and Operations Officer**

The S-1 normally serves as the battalion communication strategy and operations (COMMSTRAT) officer as a collateral duty, though the battalion may have an officer qualified with the COMMSTRAT officer military occupational specialty (MOS) attached to it. The COMMSTRAT officer is responsible for establishing positive relations with local communities and is responsible for informing the general public, the media, and the internal Marine Corps audience about the battalion's activities and operations. In planning and operations, the COMMSTRAT officer works closely with the IO and CMO planners to ensure that efforts to properly inform the public are appropriately deconflicted—and when possible, integrated—with IO efforts to influence specific audiences. The COMMSTRAT officer operates under the staff cognizance of the XO and performs the following functions:

- Advises the commander and staff on the probable public impact of command decisions/policy and, as the command spokesperson, recommends policies and procedures with respect to the release of information to the public and the media.
- Serves as the command's liaison with the media and, in this capacity, answers media queries, coordinates media visits/interviews, and escorts media representatives.
- Supports the internal IM program to inform Marines and their families about Marine Corps and command matters through supervision of such internal news outlets as command newspapers, radio/television facilities, and Web sites and social media.

### **Battalion Legal Officer and Staff Judge Advocate**

The adjutant serves as the battalion legal officer, assisting the commander in the administration of military justice, command investigations, and the processing of other legal matters. However, when operations dictate, the battalion may have a staff judge advocate attached. During combat operations, a staff judge advocate can work closely with the IO planner and FSC in legal matters related to the employment of lethal and nonlethal force and the applicable rules of engagement (ROE). They can also contribute to the coordination of detainee and detention operations with the S-2, S-4, and headquarters commandant, as well as advise and conduct training on the law of war, ROE, host nation laws, and other legal matters as required. When attached to the battalion, a staff judge advocate operates under the staff cognizance of the XO.

## Supply Officer

The supply officer is responsible for all general supply activities within the command. The supply officer's roles and responsibilities are covered in detail in chapter 12.

## HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY

The H&S company is manned, trained, and equipped to provide general and direct support to battalion operations. Through its functional areas, the H&S company supports the battalion and its subordinate elements in the following functional areas:

- Command and control of battalion operations.
- Personnel administration.
- Intelligence/security management.
- Training administration and reporting.
- Organic supply/fiscal management.
- Logistics, maintenance management, and motor transport.
- Communications.

## Mission

The mission of the H&S company is to provide the battalion commander the ability to effectively command and control, sustain, and support the operations and activities of the battalion, its subordinate elements, and attached units. In addition to its primary role in supporting the operations of the battalion, the H&S company oversees all administrative and training requirements for Marines assigned to the battalion headquarters. All personnel in the H&S company, to include the battalion commander, fall under the administrative responsibility of the H&S company. Operationally, however, the battalion executive staff officers and the H&S company commander all report directly to the battalion commander.

## Roles and Support

The key leadership personnel in the H&S company are the company commander, company XO, and company first sergeant.

**Company Commander.** The H&S company commander is normally an infantry officer, and usually serves as the headquarters commandant for the battalion. The H&S company commander is responsible for the installation, movement, and security of the battalion headquarters. These duties are coordinated with the principal staff and include locating maintenance and refueling areas that support the H&S company, locating local security posts and positions, coordinating reaction force actions in support of battalion headquarters security, locating mess and hygiene facilities, and organizing convoy operations for the displacement of the main echelon. The H&S company commander may also lead task-organized maneuver

elements when so assigned or supervise portions of an operation, such as a passage of lines. The duties of the H&S company commander include:

- Responsible for everything the company does and fails to do.
- Responsible for the tactical employment, training, combat efficiency, administration, morale, personnel management, maintenance, and sustainment of the company.
- Understand the capabilities and employment of the company's personnel, weapons, and equipment.
- Know, understand, and develop situational awareness across the company.

**Executive Officer.** The H&S company XO is the second-in-command of the company and the commander's representative in their absence. They are responsible for the organization, training, supervision, and prompt response of their staff sections. The XO's specific duties will vary depending on the desires of the commander. The H&S company XO—

- Is responsible for maintaining situational awareness of the company's tactical situation in combat.
- Serves as the guard officer responsible for the interior guard, including for combat trains, the battalion command post (CP), the H&S company CP, assigned fixed sites, and detainee/enemy prisoner of war holding facilities.
- Plans and supervises the company's logistics planning, requirements, and execution, to include coordination with HHQ or other supporting agencies.
- Supervises company preparations in the execution of training or combat missions in support of the company commander's plans and goals.
- Serves as the company training officer; supervises all aspects of unit training and UTM in support of the company commander's training plan and guidance.
- Is familiar with the capabilities and employment of the company's personnel, weapons, and equipment.

**Company First Sergeant.** The first sergeant is a member of the company commander's personal staff. The first sergeant advises the commander concerning all matters related to enlisted training, discipline, and troop welfare. Additionally, the H&S company first sergeant—

- Is the principal enlisted administrative and technical advisor to the company commander.
- Supervises, inspects, and observes matters designated by the commander.
- Executes and supervises routine operations, to include enforcing the TACSOP; coordinating and reporting personnel and administrative actions; and supervising discipline, field hygiene, and CASEVAC operations.

### **Security and Support Responsibilities**

Headquarters and service company personnel meet the primary security needs for the battalion commander's jump, forward, and main headquarters echelons, the battalion rear area (if applicable), and the security for all battalion combat and field trains. The security force is normally sourced after determining its requirements and coordinating with the principle staff sections to ensure a balance between security and the staffing of C2 and support functions. Security shortfalls must be weighed against the battalion's operational requirements; shortages

may be sourced by pulling combat power from the infantry companies or deciding where to accept risk.

### **Direct Support to Infantry Companies**

The H&S company exists to support the infantry battalion's operational and administrative requirements. When operational requirements necessitate the creation of semi-independent or independent infantry company landing teams and platoons—often separated over significant distances—the H&S company is the primary source for providing the resources required to enable such employment methods. The H&S company commander works with the battalion XO to balance the C2 and support needs of the battalion against the requirements of the subordinate maneuver elements, identify shortfalls, and if necessary, seek external support. Examples of support the H&S company might provide to company landing teams and platoons include providing—

- Additional intelligence support to a CLIC to support collection and analysis requirements.
- Communications personnel to support company COC requirements and the installation, maintenance, and operability of all data and communications equipment.
- Additional medical personnel to support small unit movements and casualty collection, triage, and stabilization requirements.
- Motor transport operators and mechanics to operate and maintain the combat readiness of company vehicles, mine rollers, and other rolling stock.
- Armorers to support the maintenance of company weapons.
- Food service specialists to support field messing.
- Supply clerks to serve as liaisons with the battalion supply section and the logistics operations center for stock level accountability and the request and receipt of supplies.
- Mobility personnel to support movement necessary for aggregation and compositing elsewhere.

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# CHAPTER 2

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is the lawful exercise of authority which a commander exercises by virtue of rank or assignment. Command and control includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. The nature of war and command and control have changed little since the dawn of organized warfare. The combination of authority, leadership, decision making, information, communications, and organization are the essentials that commanders have understood throughout time. Technological advancements have created an environment in which modern commanders must understand and master the enduring elements of command and control if they are to succeed on the modern battlefield.

“Command and control encompasses all military functions and operations, giving them meaning and harmonizing them into a meaningful whole.”  
(MCDP 6, *Command and Control*)

### COMMAND

The battalion commander is responsible for everything the battalion does or fails to do. The commander accomplishes these responsibilities through sound planning, timely decision making, issuing effective orders, and by personal supervision and leadership. The duties require a thorough understanding of the capabilities and limitations of all organic, attached, and supporting units, and of their tactical and technical employment. The battalion commander accomplishes these responsibilities by exercising the three elements of command—authority, leadership, and decision making. For more information, see MCDP 6, *Command and Control*.

#### Authority

The battalion commander exercises command and control through judgment, decision making, direction, and the delegation of authority. The battalion commander delegates authority to subordinate commanders and staff members based on their abilities and judgment. This requires mutual trust both up and down the chain of command and allows the battalion to function in the absence of the commander or specific guidance, trusting that subordinates will be able to carry out assigned tasks with minimal supervision. Legal authority alone will not make the battalion successful. The commander must demonstrate sound leadership and enable subordinates.



## **Leadership**

All commanders must master the art of leadership; however, the infantry battalion commander faces unique challenges. Battalion commanders must be able to effectively and directly inspire and motivate individual members of their staffs, as well as be able to effectively lead through their subordinate unit commanders to achieve broader aims. An important goal of leadership is to build a close-knit sense of teamwork, which is essential to developing trust and understanding and motivating their subordinates to perform to the commander's highest standards. One way the commander accomplishes this is through keeping subordinates informed and ensuring that the commander's intent is clearly understood.

## **Decision Making**

Commanders set their commands up for success or failure through decision making. The commander's ability to make and implement decisions faster than the enemy, even if only marginally, could give the battalion a tremendous advantage. Thus, the ability to make decisions quickly with incomplete information is imperative. Decision making is a key element of command and control. While command and control supports the quality and timeliness of decision making, the tremendous advantages of modern C2 systems are lost to a commander who has not mastered this critical ability. Commanders must master both the art and science of decision making before they master the intricacies of modern C2 systems.

## **Planning**

Planning is an essential element of effective command and control. It involves projecting the battalion commander's thoughts and vision forward in time and space to anticipate and influence events or situations before they occur vice merely reacting to them. Planning should be looked at as a learning process; the battalion commander's knowledge and experience weigh heavily during planning. Both planning and command and control focus on determining what actions need to be accomplished and ensuring the necessary actions take place to achieve the desired end state. The battalion commander guides all planning by issuing commander's planning guidance and providing a clear, concise commander's intent.

Coping with time and uncertainty is a fundamental challenge facing battalion commanders. Given enough time to plan and gather information, the commander can seek to reduce uncertainty. Conversely, given enough certainty, the commander can more efficiently use time during execution. Rarely will situations arise in which the commander possesses the time and certainty they would like. Waiting for certainty will likely result in loss of tempo and initiative; certainty can never be achieved because the enemy is already doing something else. Planning must be the means to balance time and uncertainty by anticipating decisions and actions. Effective planning allows commanders to act decisively in the midst of time and uncertainty.

## **CONTROL**

Within the C2 process, control is the iterative process the commander uses to adjust the guidance and directions given to the staff and the subordinate and supporting unit commanders based on situational awareness and feedback. Situational awareness is knowledge of all aspects of the operational environment, including knowledge of METT-T factors. Maintaining situational

awareness enables the commander to make decisions in a time-constrained and uncertain environment based on personal experience and the foresight to determine the relevance of unfolding events. The three elements that comprise control are people, information, and C2 support structures.

## **PEOPLE**

The battalion commander should generally strive to build unity of effort, reasonable levels of control, cohesive and effective mission teams, and effective information distribution. The commander accomplishes this by placing the right people in the right positions to facilitate the rapid distribution of information and feedback in all directions. The members of the battalion staff and the personnel within a C2 support structure—such as the watch officer, watch standers, clerks, radio operators, and analysts within the battalion COC—are the most important elements of the battalion's C2 structure. Therefore, battalion commanders must make the training of these personnel a top priority.

### **Task Organization**

The battalion commander should take a flexible approach to organization, maintaining the ability to task-organize the battalion to suit the situation. This might include the creation of non-standard and temporary mission-oriented elements or teams. The establishment of these mission-oriented elements requires the commander to account for such considerations as the warfighting functions, assigned tasks, subordinates' capabilities and limitations, and working relationships.

### **Command Relationships**

A significant portion of organizing for combat is determining the relationships between individuals and units. There are two types of relationships for consideration: command relationships and support relationships. Table 2-1 on page 2-4 reflects the command relationships that pertain to military units. Table 2-2 on page 2-4 and table 2-3 on page 2-5 reflect the types of support relationships that can be used when the battalion is supported by external units in the GCE or other elements of the MAGTF. Other than *organic* and *attached*, the command relationships are normally between the MAGTF command element (CE) and its higher and adjacent headquarters. As a subordinate element of the MAGTF, even when serving as its GCE headquarters, an infantry battalion is normally only affected by the support relationships. However, when the battalion serves as the base unit of a task force or as a MAGTF CE, or is task organized as part of an allied, coalition, or multinational command outside of a MAGTF, any of these command relationships can be used, and are critical to the battalion's roles and responsibilities.

**Table 2-1. Command Relationships.**

<b>Type</b>	<b>Description</b>
Organic	Those parts of a unit listed in its table of organization.
Attached	A unit that is bound temporarily to a command other than its organic command.
OPCON	The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
TACON	The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
ADCON	Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support.
Supporting	Support is a command authority; a support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.
DIRLAUTH	That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult, or coordinate an action with, a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.
NATO OPCON	The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign TACON of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
NATO TACON	The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
<b>LEGEND</b>	
ADCON	administrative control
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPCON	operational control
TACON	tactical control

**Table 2-2. Support Relationships.**

<b>Type</b>	<b>Description</b>
DS	A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance.
GS	That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.
GS-R	The artillery mission of supporting the force as a whole and of providing reinforcing fires for other artillery units.
Reinforcing	A support mission in which the supporting unit assists the supported unit's mission. Only like units, such as artillery to artillery, intelligence to intelligence, or armor to armor, can be given a reinforcing/reinforced mission.
<b>LEGEND</b>	
DS	direct support
GS	general support
GS-R	general support-reinforcing

**Table 2-3. Support Relationship Responsibilities.**

	<b>Commanded and Priorities by</b>	<b>Tasked by</b>	<b>Positioned by</b>	<b>Logistics from</b>	<b>Liaison to</b>	<b>Communication with</b>	<b>Priorities Established by</b>
DS	Parent Unit	Supported Unit	Parent Unit	Supported Unit	Parent Unit	Parent and Supported Units	Parent unit
GS	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	As required by Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Parent unit
GS-R	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	As required by Parent Unit	Parent and Reinforced Units	Parent unit
REIN	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Parent Unit	Reinforced Unit	Parent Unit	Parent and Reinforced Units	Parent unit
<b>LEGEND</b>							
DS	direct support						
GS	general support						
GS-R	general support-reinforcing						
REIN	reinforcing						

### Transitions in Command and Control Structures

As situations change, the battalion’s C2 structure may need to change with it to ensure that information continues to be gathered, analyzed, and disseminated. The decision to enact changes or adjustments to the battalion’s C2 structure resides with the battalion commander; this responsibility may be delegated as seen fit. Command and control organizations, processes, and systems can all be adjusted as the battalion transitions between or within dynamic and steady-state operations, shifting focus among offensive, defensive, and stability activities. Indicators that a change to the battalion’s C2 structure may be necessary include the following:

- Changes to mission.
- Changes in threat tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
- Additional functions.
- Changes in the operational environment.
- Change in location or AO.
- Change to task organization.

### INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Information is the product of processed data, which allows the battalion commander to make decisions beyond the purely intuitive. In a situation when the commander must make an instant decision, intuition, experience, and the most current information available will influence it. However, when a commander has the advantage of time before the need for a decision, the C2

architecture should provide relevant and timely information to allow the best decision possible. Today's C2 systems have the ability to overload commanders with information, creating an environment where the most relevant information is difficult to identify. Therefore, information must also be prioritized and organized so that the most time-sensitive and relevant information is available and used.

## **Managing Information**

Battalion commanders require specific quality information to understand situations and events, and to quickly control the challenges that confront them. Managing this information is critical to command and control. According to Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-30B, *Information Management*, "Information management contributes to better formulation and analysis of courses of action, providing both the right information for decision making and execution, as well as feedback/assessment on actions." The goal of IM is simply to enable the commander to leverage information to make decisions faster than the enemy can. However, IM varies in complexity and execution depending on a number of factors, including the echelon of command, the operational environment, the mission, the training of personnel, and the available equipment.

Information management in an infantry battalion revolves around tactical operations and supports how it conducts planning, execution, and assessment. Every plan is generated from and produces critical information which must be managed in a way that increases situational awareness. As a plan is executed, actions occur that produce information the commander receives as a form of feedback through the assessment process, which in turn is used to adjust the plan. Each assessment produces information that serves as feedback for commanders on the effectiveness of their operations, and for use making adjustments to plans and operations. The various information that supports planning, execution, and assessment—and its management—composes the foundation of successful command and control. Everything a unit does has the potential to produce information that, if properly managed, can be leveraged to improve command and control.

There are many tools and techniques that an infantry battalion can use to manage its information. These include various reports, reporting procedures, and reporting formats; the use of tactical control measures and fire support coordination measures (FSCMs); and various types of information briefs and visual displays. The tools a unit uses to manage information for effective command and control should be recorded in its TACSOP. With regards to these tools, there are six questions that can assist the infantry battalion in developing a solid IM plan:

- What tool should we use?
- When should we use the tool?
- Where should we use the tool?
- With whom should we use the tool?
- Why should we use the tool?
- How should we use the tool?

Answering these questions will assist in developing a viable and efficient IM plan that supports the creation of shared awareness and improved command and control.

## **Information Management Techniques and Procedures**

Modern C2 infrastructure has the ability to overwhelm the battalion with a mass of data and information. Through the IM activities of collecting, sorting, storing, analyzing, fusing, and sharing, that mass of data can be turned into useful information to assist the battalion commander in making decisions. The battalion IMO develops the battalion's IM plan, working in concert with the XO, operations officer, and other members of the battalion staff. Since no plan survives contact with a thinking enemy, the procedures and techniques in the IM plan needs to be exercised continuously to ensure the effectiveness and efficiency of the battalion's operations. To assist in processing, managing, and disseminating information into and out of the battalion, the following tools should be utilized:

- Commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).
- Battle rhythm.
- Information displays (e.g., common tactical picture [CTP], maps, and charts).
- Information reports (e.g., situation reports and significant events).
- Briefings and debriefings (e.g., operations and intelligence briefs and battle update briefs).

**Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** The CCIRs are those items of information regarding the enemy or threat, friendly forces, and the operational environment that the battalion commander deems critical to future planning, maintaining situational awareness, and timely decision making. The battalion commander selects and approves CCIRs in an effort to direct the collection and processing of information related to key decisions the commander expects to make.

**Information Displays.** Information must be tailored and displayed so that it meets the battalion commander's requirements. Since studies show that people retain four times more information from graphic presentations as they do from verbal presentations, IM plans should be designed so as much information as possible is provided in the form of maps, overlays, and charts. Such displays can be generated by using either automated (i.e., digital) or manual methods (e.g., charts, boards, and maps). They should employ standard formats, terminology, and symbology to ensure interoperability between units and the accurate interpretation of information. Additionally, operational maps and overlays should contain only the minimum essential information required for the commander to visualize the battlespace. Since excessive detail can be time-consuming and can hinder decision making instead of helping it, units must strike a balance in the amount of information displayed. Whether generated manually or with automated assistance, visual displays should be designed for ease of use, be legible and understandable, contain essential and timely information, and be easy to update quickly.

**Information Reporting.** Information arrives at the battalion in a variety of ways and is channeled through the battalion COC. Regardless of the means by which information arrives, it needs to be tracked, recorded, and routed to the appropriate individual or section in a timely manner. Most information comes in the form of combat reporting from subordinate and supporting units. One of the best techniques to track reporting requirements is to use the battalion battle rhythm or a reports matrix. The matrix organizes required information needed by

subordinate units and the reports that fulfill those requirements. See table 2-4 for an example of a reports matrix. Information reporting should be based on the following:

- Focus on identifying CCIRs.
- Ensure that reports submitted are complete.
- Simplify and streamline reporting procedures.
- Establish realistic deadlines and minimize the number and frequency of reports.
- Ensure a two-way flow of information and establish procedures for reconciliation and validation of information content.
- Ensure the transmission of information (i.e., emissions) accounts for a contested communications environment.

**Table 2-4. Reports Matrix Example.**

Info Needed	Originator	Recipient	Means of Dissemination	Reports Format	Time Required	Remarks
Status Reports	Companies	Bn WO	Bn TAC 1	Voice	1700	
SALT Report	Unit in contact	Bn WO	Bn TAC 1	Voice, Data	As Required	
PERSTAT	Companies Subordinate Units	Bn S-1	Data	Text	1900	Per Bn TACSOP
LOGSTAT	Companies Subordinate Units	Bn S-4	Data	Text	1600	Per Bn TACSOP
Debriefs	Patrols	Bn S-2	Share Point	Text/ Imagery	As Required	
<b>LEGEND</b>						
Bn	battalion					
LOGSTAT	logistics status					
PERSTAT	personnel status					
SALT	size, activity, location, time					
TAC	tactical control net					
WO	watch officer					

**Briefings.** Briefings are designed for the coordination and dissemination of information to a group of people. Both in combat and in garrison, briefings are usually held on a regularly scheduled basis according to the battalion battle rhythm or as the situation dictates. Briefings should follow a formal script, or format, to avoid missing important information and to exclude irrelevant information. Battalion TACSOPs should include the formats of the standard briefs utilized. Some of the more common briefs include the following:

- Situational update briefs.
- Transition of control briefs.
- Operational briefs.
- Mission debriefs.
- After action reports (AARs).

## COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT

A C2 support structure is more than technology and equipment. It is the integrated use of capabilities, procedures, and infrastructure to support decision making and the C2 process. Command and control support structures aid the people who create, disseminate, and use information to achieve effective decisions.

### Command and Control Support Structure

An effective C2 support structure provides the following benefits:

**Labor and Time Efficiency.** Digital C2 systems allow users to perform C2 processes more efficiently than manual methods alone (i.e., sort, process, and disseminate information more quickly). However, they can also be more vulnerable to enemy exploitation than manual methods.

**Dissemination.** Command and control support structures allow the transfer of information to many users simultaneously, even if they are not in the same geographic location.

**Graphics Support.** An effective C2 support structure can take volumes of tabular data and transform it into graphic or visual products that enable personnel to quickly gain meaningful and comprehensive understanding of a situation or event.

### Command Posts and Headquarters Echelons

The CP is the hub of the battalion's C2 facilities, the location where members of the staff supervise operations, obtain information, and make recommendations to the commander so that appropriate and timely decisions can be made. A battalion's C2 entities exist to support commanders wherever they may be on the battlefield. With the S-2, S-3, and FSCC collocated, a COC is established. Battalion headquarters configurations are determined by the mission and must balance capability requirements with the need for tactical mobility and the desire to directly or indirectly influence subordinates. When *command* and *control* are integrated, a headquarters is capable of serving as the CP. When control is present without command authority, the structure is not capable of being a CP. While a battalion headquarters may have multiple echelons, only one can be the CP at a given time to exercise overall command and control for the battalion. Three echelons of CPs can be employed—the forward, main, and rear. While a “jump” can be employed also, it does not have the control capabilities necessary to qualify as a CP. Table 2-5 on page 2-11 lists the capabilities of the headquarters echelons, as well as the jump.

**Jump.** The jump is a small element, task-organized based on METT-T considerations, which can be utilized by commanders to position themselves in the battlespace where they can observe and best influence the actions of their units. A commander may use a jump to conduct battlefield circulation or to travel between headquarters echelons. The jump composition is dependent on the commander; however, regardless of personnel, the composition must allow the commander to communicate with subordinate commanders and the actual CP, maintain security, and have mobility. The jump should be capable of operating for a period of 24 to 48 hours without resupply.



***Forward Headquarters Echelon.*** The forward headquarters echelon is primarily concerned with the command and control of current operations. It is comprised of those personnel, equipment, and C2 systems necessary to have full C2 capability of the tactical situation with the ability to maintain the warfighting functions within the battalion. While the organization of the forward headquarters echelon is flexible and based on the commander's requirements, it is employed separately from or by detaching from the main headquarters echelon. It can be used to move command and control of the battalion as needed for the scheme of maneuver by displacing and shifting command (i.e., status as the CP) between itself and the main headquarters echelon. It is frequently comprised of the following personnel: the battalion commander, sergeant major, S-2, S-3, FSC (with all supporting arms representatives), S-4, and S-6 representatives. This team is commonly referred to as the "alpha" command group.

***Main Headquarters Echelon.*** The main headquarters echelon is the principal headquarters of the commander. The main headquarters echelon has the facilities, equipment, personnel, and communications necessary for the full control and support of the force. It remains fully mission capable even when the forward headquarters echelon is employed apart from it, unless it is displacing. The main headquarters echelon is comprised of the COC, logistics operations center with its compliment of logistics support commodities, and an antenna farm to support communications and C2 systems. The main headquarters echelon can detach the forward headquarters echelon to meet tactical requirements such as displacing and relocating the CP. When the forward headquarters is employed, the main headquarters is usually commanded by the battalion XO. The staff team that operates the main headquarters echelon when the forward echelon is being employed separately is known as the "bravo" command group.

**Table 2-5. Headquarters Echelons and Related Capabilities.**

Type	Capabilities	Limitations
Jump ( <i>not a headquarters echelon</i> )	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Commander can DIRECTLY influence events or gain personal situational awareness through direct observation.</li> <li>- Can readily guard/communicate on tactical nets.</li> <li>- Places the commander at the point of greatest friction to influence the situation.</li> <li>- Small, light, and fast.</li> <li>- Inherent security with tactical unit.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Loss of greater situational awareness both in scope and scale (i.e., depth of understanding).</li> <li>- Cannot readily guard secondary nets.</li> <li>- Cannot make informed decisions beyond the immediate fight.</li> <li>- Cannot directly supervise fire support coordination.</li> <li>- Requires adjusting unit's normal security procedures.</li> </ul>
Forward Headquarters Echelon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Can communicate with higher, adjacent, and supporting commands.</li> <li>- Can communicate with all subordinate commanders.</li> <li>- Can communicate with fire support agencies.</li> <li>- Smaller size than the main headquarters echelon, can be more mobile.</li> <li>- Can utilize limited digital assets to assist in the control of the tactical situation.</li> <li>- Can conduct limited planning in context of coordinating consolidation and immediate follow-on actions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Limited communication with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.</li> <li>- Limited access to data.</li> <li>- Limited ability to conduct planning beyond the immediate fight.</li> <li>- The number of key personnel is limited by the size/space of the facility or vehicles.</li> <li>- Requires external force protection.</li> <li>- Increased logistical requirements.</li> </ul>
Main Headquarters Echelon	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Can communicate with higher, adjacent, and supporting commands.</li> <li>- Can communicate with all subordinate commanders.</li> <li>- Can communicate with fire support agencies.</li> <li>- Can directly supervise fire support coordination.</li> <li>- Can conduct detailed planning.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Time-intensive displacement.</li> <li>- Requires extensive security.</li> <li>- Increased mobile electric power requirements.</li> </ul>

### Location of Command Posts

The CP is located to facilitate the ability to effectively command and control the battalion. Some considerations that influence its location include:

- The disposition of troops.
- Communications requirements.
- The type of operation.
- Space required.
- Cover, concealment, and security.
- Terrain (e.g., prominent terrain features should be avoided).
- The enemy's or adversary's capabilities to locate it in the visual, acoustic, or electromagnetic spectrum and subsequently target it, which may drive the need for frequent displacement.
- The need for and location of a "dummy" CP as part of the tactical deception plan.

In the offense, the initial location should be well forward to negate the need to displace early and to facilitate control. In the defense, it is normally located to the rear of the defensive area to

avoid displacement as a result of enemy attack; it may be located near the reserve for added security. When conducting stability tasks, the CP should be in the best location to allow effective command and control of the AO while maintaining force protection, which can be challenging due to the presence of local civilian inhabitants and infrastructure.

### **Establishment and Interior Arrangement**

The S-3 makes recommendations for the general location of the CP based on METT-T considerations. With this guidance, the headquarters commandant selects the exact location for the CP and the general set-up of its interior. The CP should be established in accordance with the battalion's TACSOP.

### **Command Post Security**

The security of the CP is increasingly more difficult when the companies and subordinate units of the battalion are dispersed over a large area. The CP may be located in the proximity of the reserve to take advantage of the protection afforded by its presence. However, the reserve is not usually assigned the sole mission of protecting the battalion CP unless absolutely necessary. The headquarters commandant is responsible for the security arrangements for the battalion CP.

### **Command Post Displacement**

Situations arise when it becomes necessary to displace the CP. To eliminate or mitigate any interruption to operations, the CP is displaced in two echelons utilizing the alpha and bravo command groups. When displacement is necessary, the S-3 makes a recommendation to the battalion commander on the location and time for the displacement. Once the decision is made to displace, the coordination with the staff is as follows:

- The S-2 determines the enemy situation, anticipated weather conditions and effects, road conditions and trafficability, and any weather effects to air movement in case aircraft are to be utilized.
- The S-3 plans for the disposition of forces, the general location of the new CP, tactical plans, and the estimated time the COC will be operational and ready to assume responsibility as the battalion CP.
- The S-4 will plan and coordinate the transportation of troops and equipment, developing plans and assigning serials based upon priorities.
- Communication requirements will be coordinated with the S-6 for the advance party and for the coordination of the exact site.
- The headquarters commandant coordinates the physical movement of the CP and also arranges for a security detachment, guides, and the movement of the advance party.

A reconnaissance or quartering party consisting of the headquarters commandant and other personnel may precede the advance party to select the exact location for the new CP to be established. This step is expedited if the headquarters commandant has the authority to select the exact location.

The advance party is usually composed of the headquarters commandant, a security element, guides, and communications personnel. After the exact site is selected, guides are posted to lead elements into position as they arrive at the new location.

When the situation permits, the CP is displaced in two echelons. The forward headquarters echelon moves to the new CP location first and prepares for operations. Once the forward headquarters COC is in position and effective communications are established, the main COC is notified, and control is passed from the main to the forward COC. The main headquarters echelon then shuts down and displaces to join the forward headquarters to reestablish the main CP. Once the main headquarters is determined to be fully mission capable and positive communications have been established with higher, adjacent, and supporting units, a message is sent indicating the new position of the CP.

The operation being conducted and the transportation available may require modification to the displacement procedure. Aircraft may be used for rapid displacement of one or both of the headquarters echelons, particularly when large distances need to be traversed and the operational tempo is fast. In some instances, a mobile C2 asset may be utilized that enables sufficient communications while on-the-move to enable the main CP to displace in a single echelon.

Considerations may be made to conduct displacement at night as a passive security measure or for other tactical reasons. An orderly displacement at night is possible, though very difficult. Some of the following measures should be implemented to aid in a night-time displacement:

- Conducting a detailed reconnaissance.
- Preparation of the site, to include black-out screens, infrared chemical lights, marking tape, and control measures.
- Thoroughly briefing guides so that movement into the new site is rapid and orderly.
- The interior layout is well-briefed and understood so that equipment is dispersed and concealed during the hours of darkness.

During amphibious operations, the battalion staff may be located aboard one ship or divided among separate ships. Either way, one command group goes ashore first—usually the alpha command group—while the other stays aboard shipping to monitor and maintain situational awareness. An advance party or reconnaissance/quartering party does not normally precede the battalion's command group ashore. The alpha command group usually lands following the assault companies, before the first elements of the reserve. As soon as the forward headquarters is established ashore, the commander orders the bravo command group and the main headquarters to land and join the alpha command group for possible consolidation.

## **COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESSES**

Command and control processes are the operational rules that govern command and control. Properly-designed C2 processes ensure the accuracy, speed, and thoroughness of the actions taken by personnel in response to repetitive or anticipated C2 events. Other key C2 processes that facilitate accurate, speedy, and thorough command and control—besides the battalion battle rhythm—are COC battle drills.

## **Combat Operations Center**

The COC is the battalion's "nerve center," where the current fight is managed and information is aggregated to provide situational awareness for the commander and staff. The COC provides the commander with the tools to facilitate decision making. The modern COC is increasingly supported by automated tactical information systems and data communications. These systems support the information processing and exchange requirements of the COC, enabling it to monitor and direct an operation.

## **Logistic Operations Center**

The logistic operations center is normally manned 24 hours per day with a minimum of one watch officer and one supply clerk. During normal operating hours or an ongoing operation, it is manned by the S-4 officer, S-4 chief, motor transport officer, and representatives from the appropriate logistics commodities. Personnel to staff the logistics operations center are normally drawn from the battalion S-4 and other logistics commodity elements, though the S-1 section may collocate with the logistic operations center. The logistic operations center monitors all appropriate communications networks, and is normally located near the COC.

## **Combat Operations Center Battle Drills**

Battle drills are designed to assist IM by providing standard procedures during common events. Battle drills assist COC personnel to—

- Accelerate information flow.
- Ensure thorough coordination.
- Enforce the proper sequencing of events.
- Raise situational awareness.
- Preclude necessary actions from being skipped or overlooked.
- Allow less experienced personnel to deal with complex or simultaneous events.
- Maintain and improve COC proficiency.

The three significant battle drills that a COC should be able to execute are synchronization, transition of control, and critical events drills.

***Synchronization Drill.*** Synchronization should be part of a daily battle rhythm within the COC. Synchronization can also be an immediate action drill anytime the battalion commander or leadership determines they are losing situational awareness. As part of the watch rotation within the battalion COC, the battalion watch officer should conduct a synchronization drill to ensure that everyone is maintaining situational awareness. The drill should include the following at a minimum:


- Unit locations and actions (i.e., past, present, and future).
- Current battalion mission(s) and assigned tasks.
- Enemy status.
- Significant events or actions.
- Changes to tactical control measures or FSCMs.
- Synopsis of past actions.

- Synopsis of future actions.
- Any incomplete actions from past events requiring requests for information.

**Transition of Control Brief.** A proper transition of control brief, commonly referred to as a watch shift change-over brief, requires a period of overlap between the oncoming and off-going watch personnel within the battalion COC to ensure continuity of situational awareness.

**Critical Events Battle Drills.** Critical events drills are immediate actions taken by the battalion COC watch staff upon enemy, friendly, or environmental actions or changes. An example can be seen in figure 2-1 on page 2-16. The types of critical events drills can include:

- Unit/troops in contact.
- Missing Marine.
- Attack by the enemy.
- Cross-boundary infractions.
- Explosive hazard discoveries.
- Medical evacuation and/or CASEVAC.
- Downed friendly force aircraft.
- Loss of communications with a friendly force unit.
- CBRN attack.
- Fratricide.
- Mass casualties.



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Figure 2-1. Critical Event Battle Drill Example.

## COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS

The success of the infantry battalion in today's operational environment depends heavily on the effective employment of communications and information systems. Communications and information systems can speed up and automate routine functions, freeing battalion commanders to focus on those aspects of command and control that require their experience, judgment, and intuition. Therefore, C2 systems and the personnel who operate and maintain them play a critical role in efficient command and control. It is important to emphasize that C2 systems do not replace the commander's knowledge and proficiency, but are tools to enhance the rapid exchange of reliable information. Command and control systems facilitate the—

- Rapid dissemination of information and decisions.
- Generation of relevant information.
- Identification and prioritization of time-constrained information.
- Efficient information flow up, down, and across the chain of command.

While individual C2 systems change frequently, they are all categorized as voice, text, or graphics based. Each category has advantages and disadvantages that are subject to change as new systems enter and exit the Marine Corps C2 architecture. Battalion leaders must understand systems well enough to make decisions on their use (e.g., timing, volume, and priorities), but must not become over-reliant on any specific system. Changes to the operation and the operational environment increase or decrease the value of individual C2 systems; these values must be considered within the context of the whole C2 plan (e.g., e-mail is a good method of dissemination of information in a static environment, but can often be unreliable or too slow in a dynamic environment).



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# CHAPTER 3

## INTELLIGENCE

The intelligence section in the infantry battalion has two objectives: to support decision making by reducing uncertainty, and to assist in force protections through counterintelligence. The first objective is achieved through collecting, processing, and disseminating intelligence and information about the weather, physical terrain, human factors, and the threat, along with their possible impact to battalion operations. The second objective is achieved by conducting active and passive measures intended to counter terrorism, espionage, sabotage, and subversion. The battalion intelligence section may use information models that have been developed at higher echelon commands, as well as those they develop themselves, to understand the operational environment. Understanding the operational environment requires a high degree of critical thinking by the commander and staff, which is aided by these information models. The following information models help the commander understand the operational environment:

- METT-T.
- Political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII).
- Areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE).

The intelligence section, in collaboration with the other staff sections, should refine these information models to the specific AO. For more information on these models, see MCRP 2-10B.1, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*.

Operations have shown that infantry battalions can frequently encounter multiple threat networks in a single AO. These threat networks interact with friendly and neutral networks that can expand beyond the battalion's specific AO, but have a significant impact on a commander's ability to generate desired effects. Network engagement is a methodology that promotes synchronization and collaboration across the staff to understand the interactions of the multiple friendly, neutral, and threat networks in the AO and to engage with them in ways that support the achievement of objectives. For more information on network engagement, see MCTP 3-02A, *MAGTF Network Engagement Activities*.

### ROLE OF THE BATTALION COMMANDER

Intelligence is an inherent and essential responsibility of command. Though intelligence is a team effort, the overall responsibility is the commander's alone. The battalion commander must be personally involved in the intelligence process, providing guidance, supervision, judgment, and authority. The commander must think of command and intelligence as inseparable. By providing the necessary guidance, including articulating the commander's intent, the commander provides direction and priorities to the intelligence section, defining the scope of the battalion's

intelligence requirements (IRs). Commanders fill their roles in the intelligence process in the following ways:

- Focus the intelligence effort and set priorities.
- Use intelligence in decision making.
- Evaluate the results of intelligence activities.

## **ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BATTALION INTELLIGENCE SECTION**

This section describes the roles and responsibilities of the key billets in the battalion's intelligence section.

### **Intelligence Officer**

The S-2 is an invaluable participant in the commander's decision-making process, ensuring that intelligence is effectively used throughout all phases of mission planning, execution, and assessment. This is accomplished through education and training in regards to intelligence capabilities and limitations, intelligence processes, and making intelligence available to the required consumers. The battalion S-2 also—

- Provides support to stability activities planning through inputs to the Stability Assessment Framework (SAF).
- Provides support to IO planning through inputs to the intelligence preparation of the information environment.
- Provides for the battalion's intelligence training and, when required, the augmentation of intelligence Marines to the CLICs.
- Supports situation development and the commander's estimate of the situation by identifying threat capabilities, strengths, centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities, opportunities, and limitations presented by the environment.
- Identifies the various friendly, neutral, and threat networks within the battlespace.
- Participates in the staff's effort to develop priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), and recommends PIRs to the battalion commander for incorporation into the CCIRs.
- Monitors collections and reporting for PIR triggers and recommends updates to the current PIRs.
- Ensures the staff is aware of the status of all PIRs and other IRs to facilitate further intelligence planning and direction.
- Directs the counterintelligence effort.

See chapter 1 for more information on the battalion S-2.

### **Assistant Intelligence Officer**

The assistant intelligence officer, or S-2A, is the current operations officer for the intelligence section, leading special projects and assisting in the day-to-day functions of the section. They manage the section's time and schedule, ensuring that tasks are completed on time. They are also an external coordinator for the section, and the main points of contact for external

agencies and units. The S-2A is frequently designated as the section's collection manager and targeting officer.

### **Intelligence Chief**

The S-2 chief runs the intelligence operations center (IOC) and ensures that the IOC and battalion COC's intelligence functions are properly staffed and functional. They ensure that outputs from the IOC are integrated into the COC. They manage the logistical and administrative needs of the section, as well as those of assigned intelligence enablers, ensuring their efforts are coordinated. The duties of the S-2A and S-2 chief are largely interchangeable and are dependent on individual personalities, strengths, and the battle rhythm.

### **Scout-Sniper Platoon Commander**

The primary duty of the scout-sniper platoon commander is the management and training of the battalion's scout-sniper platoon. Assisted by the platoon sergeant, the platoon commander advises the battalion staff and infantry company leadership on the employment of the scout-sniper platoon. They operate under the supervision of the S-2 officer.

### **Responsibilities**

The battalion S-2 section provides support to the headquarters and infantry companies, as well as the subordinate and supported units through the planning, collection, exploitation, production, dissemination, and utilization of mission-oriented intelligence products. Information collected during operations that is deemed critical is expeditiously forwarded to HHQ for processing. Higher headquarters passes intelligence to the battalion, which utilizes it and disseminates it to subordinate units through the S-2 section. Some of the intelligence functions performed by the battalion S-2 include the following:

- Providing support during the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process. The S-2 develops and maintains a comprehensive intelligence estimate based on the battalion commander's guidance and requirements, continues to maintain an accurate intelligence picture of the threat and the environment, and assesses its impacts to the battalion's mission through the common intelligence picture. They enhance the command's understanding of the battlespace and the threat through the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination.
- Supporting force protection to guard against the effects of hostile actions and provide early indications and warnings of potential hostile actions, or of situations that may impact the unit's mission.
- Supporting targeting through the identification of potential targets and providing the intelligence for engagement.
- Providing information on the overall effectiveness of forces employed during an operation, to include combat assessment.
- Supporting operation assessment by providing feedback on the effects produced by friendly, neutral, and threat actions within the battalion's AO. This is performed by collecting on and analyzing the indicators that are identified in the assessment plan and included in the intelligence collection plan. The battalion commander may halt, continue, expand, or adjust the plan, execute branch plans or sequels, or take actions to correct current operations based on the effects generated.

- Tailoring analysis and intelligence products from infantry company COCs, subordinate units, attachments, and the battalion S-2 section to direct operations, fulfill unit requirements, and support subordinate units and attachments. The S-2 merges intelligence reporting from HHQ, subordinate units, attachments, and adjacent units.

## **INFANTRY COMPANY SUPPORT**

The S-2 section's support to the infantry companies and other subordinate units is influenced by the battalion's mission. The battalion S-2 should foster an effective working relationship with subordinate units, as they are the main sources of information in support of assessment and answering requests for intelligence, PIRs, and IRs. The key to this is the intelligence function performed by the CLICs.

The intelligence specialists within the infantry CLICs serve as the mechanisms to support the analysis of information collected by small units such as platoons, squads, and fire teams. The intelligence actions of the CLICs are not a substitute for the battalion's intelligence section. Rather, the intelligence functions performed by the CLICs primarily serve to enhance and facilitate intelligence activities at the company level. In situations where one company—or more than one—operate independently or semi-independently (i.e., conducting dispersed or distributed operations in company landing teams), the CLICs may need to be reinforced with additional intelligence personnel and equipment to execute the intelligence cycle continuously over an extended period of time.

The selection of Marines to perform intelligence functions within the CLICs is not the responsibility of the battalion S-2. The S-2's responsibility is to train these Marines in intelligence procedures, since their efforts directly impact the battalion. The battalion S-2 also needs to be involved in the development of the CLICs' intelligence standing operating procedure.

## **INTELLIGENCE ASSETS AND RESOURCES**

The battalion commander should be able to leverage all available collection assets in the battlespace, including assets operating in the battalion's AO that are not under the battalion's control. The S-2 plays an important role in that effort. Some of the assets and resources that can aid intelligence collection support to operational planning, execution, and assessment are included in the following subordinate sections.

### **Collection Assets**

Some of the assets that may be leveraged include the following:

- Battalion-directed and company unit patrolling.
- Scout-snipers.
- Unmanned aircraft.
- Biometric identification and enrollment systems.

- Squad cameras.
- Handheld scanners.
- Tactical site exploitation conducted by subordinate units.

### **Requested or Leveraged Collection Resources**

Some of the resources that may be leveraged include the following:

- Counterintelligence and human intelligence detachment.
- Signals intelligence support teams from the MAGTF's radio battalion, or the element thereof.
- Division or force reconnaissance platoons.
- Marine unmanned aerial vehicle squadron (i.e., VMU).
- Theater collection assets.
- Manned aircraft in non-traditional roles.
- Persistence surveillance.
- Electronic warfare (EW) support team.

### **Non-Dedicated Collectors**

Every entity on the battlefield is a potential source of information. The challenge for the S-2 section is to be aware of which organizations working in the battalion's battlespace may possess information of intelligence value to the command.

### **Non-Traditional Collection Assets**

Regardless of the type or organization, non-traditional assets can be useful to the collection effort. Caution should be used to employ them on a "not-to-interfere basis," as their use may be restricted by HHQ.

### **Reachback and Enabler Support**

Reachback and enabler support can be obtained through various means, including requesting them for attachment to the battalion. An enabler can be a piece of equipment, a person, a capability, or an organization. Intelligence enablers are tailored to the battalion's mission and either fill a capability not resident within the battalion intelligence section or reinforce existing capabilities. Enablers can be located within the battalion IOC, attached to individual companies, or provide reachback support via communications assets from other locations within or outside of the battlespace.

## **BATTALION S-2 INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

### **Intelligence Support to Planning**

Intelligence supports every phase of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP). Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the battlespace and the threat. It assists commanders understanding the situation, alerts them to new opportunities, and helps them assess the effects of actions within their battlespace. The intelligence warfighting function supports and is integrated with the overall operational effort, and must be focused on the commander's IRs.

For more information see, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*.

Much of the intelligence effort is “front-loaded” to support planning; a substantial portion of intelligence development must be completed prior to the *problem framing* step of the planning process. It is critical that the S-2 be given as much time as possible before the beginning of formal planning to develop and tailor intelligence products to support the specific planning requirements. Intelligence provides a comprehensive image of the battlespace and the threat, helping the battalion commander assess battlespace effects, come to an understanding on the general direction of future actions, and anticipate possible threat actions.

The S-2 should actively engage with the battalion staff as much as possible during the IPB process and MCPP for two reasons. First, through continual integration, the S-2 can be more responsive in providing intelligence products to support initial planning. Second, the S-2 can tailor the intelligence products to each staff section’s needs more effectively to make intelligence tactically relevant.

The basics of the battalion S-2’s support to planning do not change. The thoroughness and depth of planning are a function of the time available and the extent the planning process is utilized (i.e., whether hasty or deliberate planning is done). The S-2 builds intelligence products that are specific to the operational environment (e.g., urban, desert, mountain, or jungle). For more information on operations in specific environments, see appendix B.


***Problem Framing and Course of Action Development.*** During problem framing, the battalion S-2 receives the HHQ’s order and related IPB products, the battalion commander’s initial intent and commander’s planning guidance, and other directions as necessary. The S-2 participates fully in the design and problem framing processes through the production of products that help the staff visualize the situation. These products are carried forward into the *course of action (COA) development* step of the MCPP, during which the battalion S-2 continues to update all intelligence products. The S-2 coordinates the staff’s efforts during the IPB process and provides the planning products listed in the following subordinate sections.

***Intelligence Estimate.*** The battalion S-2 provides an intelligence estimate based on the results of problem framing. The battalion S-2 ensures that the intelligence estimate is continually updated as information is gathered and requests for intelligence, PIRs, and IRs are answered. Establishing operation-specific read boards, disseminating updates, and providing regularly scheduled update briefs are some of the ways that the S-2 can help maintain situational awareness among battalion planners and decision makers.

***Battlespace Effects.*** Step two of IPB is used to depict the battlespace effects (i.e., weather, terrain, and civil considerations) on military operations. The staff uses products from this step to predict how the enemy (or adversary) and population will react, to develop friendly COAs, and to plan a scheme of maneuver. These products may include, among others, the weather effects matrix, terrain analysis, modified combined obstacle overlay, population support overlay, social network analysis, and civil considerations analysis.

*Adversary Template.* The adversary template illustrates the deployment pattern and disposition that are common to the threat's normal tactics when not constrained by the effects of the battlespace. The S-2 can construct templates through an analysis of the intelligence database and an evaluation of the threat's past operations. This is most common in traditional warfare; however, even irregular warfare lends itself to graphic depiction. For example, an evaluation of the database might indicate that when robbing banks, an irregular criminal threat's TTP is to send four personnel inside with at least two remaining outside. The four that go inside the bank take up positions at distinct locations. This type of information can easily be converted into a graphic representation, although not in a way that can be overlaid on a standard military map. Adversary templates can also portray the threat's normal organization for combat, including typical supporting elements available from higher echelons of command, frontages, depths, boundaries, engagement areas, objective depths, and other control measures. Whenever possible, these patterns should be converted into graphic representations such as overlays or sketches. An example of such is the adversary template shown in figure 3-1 on page 3-8. The S-2 should create adversary templates for all possible threat COAs, particularly the potential COAs to defend, reinforce, attack, withdraw, and delay (known by the memory aid, "DRAW-D"). The S-2 can then apply common TTP for each possible threat COA to the modified combined obstacle overlay to create situation templates.





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**Figure 3-1. Adversary Template.**

*Situation Template.* A situation template is a graphic depiction of expected enemy or adversary dispositions by timed phase lines if they adopt an anticipated COA. The battalion S-2 should prepare several templates representing different “snapshots in time,” starting with the initial array of the threat force. These templates should be coordinated with the S-3 and CO to identify the critical friction points tied to decisions. When building situation templates, operational terms and graphics should be used to depict threat dispositions and tactical tasks vice using a unit symbol that only depicts disposition or location. The symbols used should be from the MIL-STD-2525, *Department of Defense Interface Standard: Joint Military Symbolology* to

reduce misunderstanding. Situation templates should be used to support the red cell during the *COA war game* step of the MCPP to determine high-value targets (HVTs) and develop the event template. The battalion staff uses the situation templates to start developing COAs and to assist in determining which of the nominated HVTs will become high-payoff targets (HPTs).

**Event Template/Event Matrix.** An event template is a graphic overlay used to confirm or deny enemy COAs. The event template is used as a guide during the COA war game to describe enemy actions throughout the war game and to develop the information collection overlay and the decision support template. The event template is used during execution to aid in determining what COA the enemy is executing. An event template is always accompanied by an event matrix, which contains cross-referenced descriptions of the indicators and activities anticipated to occur at each named area of interest (NAI). While the event template primarily serves as the basis of the collection plan through the development of NAIs, it assists targeting and fire support planners with identifying targets and developing engagement COAs based on priorities. Figure 3-2 and table 3-1, on page 3-10, show examples of an event template and an event matrix, respectively.




Figure 3-2. Event Template Example.

**Table 3-1. Event Matrix.**

Named Area of Interest	No Earlier Than	No Later Than	Event/Indicator
1	H+6	H+12	Battalion sized force moving North.
2	H+6	H+12	Battalion sized forces moving North.
3	H+12	H+24	Orangeland forces enter Blueland. Northern operational group driving on Jesara oil fields.
4	H+14	H+24	Orangeland forces seize junction of highways 7 and 8. Northern operational group turns northwest toward Jesara.
5	H+18	H+24	Orangeland forces enter Tealton. Northern operational group driving on Jesara.
<b>LEGEND</b>			
H H-hour			

**Most Likely and Most Dangerous Courses of Action.** The S-2 should determine which threat COAs are the most likely and most dangerous and should textually and graphically describe and brief them. These threat COAs are typically not created until after a friendly COA has been selected. Each threat COA graphic should contain an event template (i.e., a COA sketch), a COA narrative, a threat center of gravity and critical vulnerability analysis, and the HVTs for the COA. However, the S-2 still creates a situation template for all feasible threat COAs, in addition to making a situation template for the most likely COA and most dangerous COA. During planning, in order for the unit to predict which COA the threat will use, as well as to confirm which COA the threat uses during execution, the S-2 compiles all of the situation templates onto one document called the event template.

**ASCOPE/PMESII Crosswalk.** Civil and operational variables across the battalion's battlespace should be compiled and described as part of step two of the IPB process. The ASCOPE/PMESII crosswalk helps to define the civil/cultural environment and aides in determining the desired effects of friendly actions on the civil populace, as well as the civil populace's impact to friendly operations. When a CMO planner is not available, the battalion S-2 section may be tasked with compiling this product as part of the IPB. For more information, refer to MCWP 3-03, *Stability Operations* and MCTP 3-03A, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations*.

**Course of Action War Game.** The *COA war game* step of the MCPP is conducted to improve on the COAs that are built during the *COA development* step before the commander's evaluation and COA decision. During this step, the staff drills the developed COAs against an opposing will, thinking as the enemy, represented by the red cell. When civil considerations are a significant part of the operation, a green cell is also used to represent the civil populace and civil considerations. The red and green cells are temporarily formed for the duration of the planning process, and are staffed based on the availability of personnel and the appropriate SMEs. The intelligence section may play a prominent role in these cells. During wargaming, the S-2 section should attempt to validate existing PIRs, IRs, and their associated NAIs, and identify or recommend any new ones for each COA. All associated intelligence templates and products continue to be refined and updated.

*Red Cell.* The red cell should be organized to match the threat capabilities and warfighting functions as closely as possible. For example, with a threat that employs improvised explosive devices (IEDs), an explosive ordnance disposal or combat engineer representative should play a prominent role in the red cell, if available. If not, then a Marine with the most expertise should be utilized. The red cell members should use the existing adversary and situation templates to develop detailed, realistic threat COAs that accurately reflect the threat's warfighting functions and known TTP. Using a red cell for this avoids groupthink within the staff and allows the battalion's developed COAs to be measured against an independently-thinking "enemy," particularly if the red cell members are not aware of the battalion's COAs. For this reason, the red cell should be sequestered from the rest of the staff after IPB until COA wargaming begins. A key limitation in employing a red cell is that its members are still US Marines trying to think and plan the way they believe an adversary or enemy would think and act. It is not possible for them to completely cross the cultural barriers, biases, or structured methods of thinking developed through their military training and experience to truly behave as the threat. However, using a red cell properly should still result in the development of more thorough COAs and a better evaluation of them than would happen without using one; this helps maximize the battalion's opportunities for success. Possible red cell members could include the gunner, the battalion operations chief, a senior intelligence analyst, and other experts as needed or available. Red cell products include the following:

- Enemy/adversary mission statement.
- Threat critical factors analysis.
- The enemy's/adversary's critical factors analysis on the friendly force.
- Relative combat power assessment.
- Threat's most likely and most dangerous COA assessment of the friendly force.
- Threat most likely and most dangerous COAs.
- Threat synchronization matrix.
- Threat strengths and weaknesses matrix.

*Green Cell.* The green cell should be comprised of representatives from IO, CMO, and S-2 at a minimum. The green cell S-2 representative should use existing ASCOPE/PMESII information to help the green cell complete its various products. Through the completion and assessment of its products, the green cell can assess the desired effects of friendly actions across the battlespace, determine tasks for shaping the battlespace and executing operations, nominate possible targets for engagement, recommend inputs to the collections plan, and assist in the development of possible measures of effectiveness (MOEs) for the assessment plan. Green cell products include the following:

- ASCOPE/PMESII crosswalk.
- Cultural factors matrix.
- Population support overlay.
- Network map of interrelated networks.
- Civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB).
- Sources of stability and instability.

For more information on the green cell, refer to MCWP 3-03 and MCTP 3-03A.

**Course of Action Comparison and Decision.** During the *COA comparison and decision* step of the MCPP, the S-2 should be prepared to discuss how intelligence can or cannot support each phase of each COA. The S-2 should be prepared to provide the following to support this step:

- Assessment of threat COAs on friendly COAs (this may be done by the red cell).
- Assessment of the battalion's ability to collect information in support of the commander's PIRs.
- Updated IPB products, PIRs, and intelligence estimates.

**Orders Development.** During the *orders development* step of the MCPP, the battalion S-2 produces the intelligence products that support the development of the battalion operation order (OPORD). The products should contain only critical or new information vice routine information developed previously. During orders development, the S-2 is responsible for—

- Contributing to paragraph 1 (situation) of the base order.
- Producing Annex B (Intelligence).
- Conducting an intelligence cross-walk with HHQ (if required).
- Continuing to develop and update intelligence products.

**Transition.** Transition may require a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals for the battalion to make a successful shift from planning to execution. If time and resources allow, a rehearsal of concept drill and confirmation briefs may be conducted. In this case, it may fall upon the S-2 section to assist in the construction of a terrain model. If the battalion is operating with companies dispersed over a large area, it may be necessary for the S-2 section to augment one or more CLICs beginning at transition and continuing through execution. Other tasks that the S-2 may conduct during transition include the following:

- Supplying operational maps.
- Refining intelligence and IPB products, including the collection matrix.

### **Intelligence Support to Execution**

The intelligence effort must be responsive to mission requirements during execution and ensure a continuous flow of intelligence throughout the battalion to maintain a shared picture of the threat in the battlespace and answer new requirements. A major difference between intelligence support to planning and intelligence support to execution is the time available for developing an intelligence product. Often days, weeks, and even months are available to provide intelligence support to planning, but intelligence support to execution must normally be developed in hours, minutes, or even seconds. Success in execution often depends on the ability to provide immediate answers to critical questions concerning enemy force dispositions, actions, and intentions.

Intelligence support during execution focuses on providing the commander with practical knowledge that gives an exploitable advantage over the enemy. Although eliminating uncertainty during execution is impossible, focused intelligence operations can reduce uncertainty by providing situational awareness and identifying opportunities as they present

themselves in the battlespace. Intelligence support to execution provides indications and warnings of new or unexpected enemy activities, enhances efforts to engage the enemy through support to targeting, assists in protecting the force through counterintelligence measures and operations, and supports the planning of future operations by providing timely and accurate battle damage assessment (BDA).

### **Intelligence Support to Assessment**

The S-2 provides support to both combat and operation assessment. The S-2 supports combat assessment through the reporting of BDA. The S-2 section supports operation assessment by collecting on and providing information related to the indicators identified in the assessment plan. These indicators help define the status of the battalion's MOEs across all lines of operations. Battalion leadership may adjust operations based on this information by executing branch plans or sequels, or by taking immediate actions to correct damage resulting from friendly force mistakes.

### **Intelligence Support to Force Protection**

One of the roles of intelligence is support to force protection through counterintelligence operations. For more information, see chapter 11.

### **Intelligence Collection at the Battalion**

The battalion obtains information through the intelligence collection process. While planning to use the battalion's organic assets to meet the most critical IRs, the battalion should not make the mistake of ignoring external assets. The collection matrix is the best tool for displaying the assignment of specific collection assets for collection at specific locations during specific times. Refer to table 3-2 on page 3-14 for an example of a collection matrix. The battalion S-2 considers the following when organizing the collection matrix:

- Which PIRs and IRs need to be answered at which NAIs and target areas of interest.
- Which asset can best obtain the required information.
- From which type of asset (i.e., ground, aerial, or other) can the information best be collected.

**Collection Management.** The S-2 section, working with the battalion staff, works to determine the most effective means of collecting IRs to support the battalion intelligence collection effort. This is referred to as collection management, the process of converting IRs into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and re-tasking as required. Factors that are considered in collections include the collection means, the availability of assets and resources, their capabilities, their sustainability, their vulnerability, and their performance history. Once all considerations have been weighed, then intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planning can begin. For more information on reconnaissance operations, see MCWP 3-01, *Offensive and Defensive Tactics*.

**Table 3-2. Collection Matrix Example.**

Asset	Time						
	0100	0400	0800	1200	1600	2000	2400
Sniper 1			NAI 1				
Sniper 2	NAI 1						
RAVEN	On call						
SCAN Eagle		NAIs 1, 2, 3					
SST					NAI 2		
GSP		NAI 3					
Co A	NAI 2				NAI 2		
Co B		NAI 1			NAI 1		
Weapons Co	NAI 1		NAI 2			NAI 3	
<b>LEGEND</b>							
GSP                      general support platoon							
SST                      signals intelligence support team							

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Plan.** Once the battalion’s IRs are identified, the battalion S-2 works with the operations section to develop the battalion’s ISR plan. The S-2 determines if the battalion can accomplish the plan with its organic ISR assets or must request resources from HHQ. The ISR plan requires its own concept of operations to execute as a separate, supporting mission.

### Intelligence Support to Targeting

At the battalion level and below, the targeting process tends to be reactive, occurs in a short time span with little formality, and focuses on events of an immediate nature. The tactical-level targeting cycle that is focused on the threat is simplified to *decide, detect, deliver, and assess* (D3A). The battalion S-2 plays an integral and important role in the D3A cycle.

**Decide.** The *decide* step is continuous and does not end when the MCPP does. Though initial HPTs are identified and selected for targeting, the battalion’s targeting board continually assesses and updates the initial target lists as operations continue or expand. The battalion targeting board should consist of, at a minimum, members from the FSCC and planners from IO, CMO, intelligence, and operations.

**Detect.** This step is designed to validate known or suspected HPTs based on guidance from the *decide* step, as well as to locate and identify any new targets that meet the battalion’s targeting criteria for HPTs. Because of their importance, HPTs receive priority in the allocation of detection systems. The infantry battalion’s detection systems are most often be supporting or attached LAR units, artillery forward observers, NGF spot teams, scout-snipers, or infantry company patrols. The majority of targets the battalion is concerned with are planned targets and targets of opportunity within the battalion’s AO.

The S-2 coordinates collection efforts with subordinate commanders and integrates any identified requirements into the battalion collection plan. It also coordinates HPT detection using the HPT list, combat information from committed forces, and intelligence received from both the main echelon and higher, adjacent, and supporting units.

**Deliver.** During the *deliver* step, the S-2 may be limited to only receiving information and tracking targets as they are engaged, preparing to task assets to perform assessment functions. For example, during the engagement of selected threat targets, the S-2 watch clerk within the COC, under the direction of the watch officer, may be tasked with positioning available collection assets over the target area. Immediately following the attack on a selected target, the S-2, in coordination with the S-3 and FSC, may conduct a hasty assessment to determine whether the desired effects were generated on the target or whether to reattack.

**Assess.** Determining the effects fires have had on designated targets occurs within the *assess* function of D3A. The requirement for accurate combat assessment is similar to the requirement to assess the effects of an operation. With assessment, the targeting process re-enters the *decide* step, during which decisions about re-engaging targets are made. Assessment is a continuous process related to the individual targets that are prosecuted, not the fire support plan as a whole. The battalion S-2's role is to analyze the information available to provide the battalion commander a clear and accurate picture of the threat. The S-2 utilizes the information reported by collection assets in conducting BDA. This information is then utilized to assess the lethal or nonlethal effects generated on the target.

### **Intelligence Support to Network Engagement**

The three components of network engagement are partnering with friendly networks, engaging neutral networks, and countering threat networks. The network engagement methodology is designed around the following principles:

- Understanding the operational environment.
- Understanding the networks.
- Engaging the networks.
- Assessing the effects on the networks.

Network engagement considerations leverage existing IPB processes and products. A key element of the targeting process is confirming a node—a person, place, or physical thing. Network analysis is the evaluation and interpretation of data to resolve the associations and relationships among individuals, facilities, equipment, locations, and organizations. It assists planning, execution, and assessment by identifying key nodes of the various networks that should be engaged to generate the desired effects. For more information on network engagement, see MCTP 3-02A.

## **3006. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING**

The battalion commander should ensure that intelligence training is provided to all personnel in the command to maximize the battalion's collection efforts. Unlike the infantry companies, the



Marines and Sailors of the H&S company usually have contact with the local population on a more limited basis—mostly by members of the logistic trains, operations section, or intelligence section. Sending these personnel out without a secondary task of intelligence collection is overlooking a possible collection asset. Conversely, sending a convoy or patrol on a mission to satisfy IRs may fail if the personnel on the convoy or patrol do not know what they are looking for, what other things they see that might be of value, and how to collect and record the information correctly; thus, those Marines should receive basic intelligence training. The battalion's intelligence training should be focused on the following:

- Training intelligence specialists within the infantry companies.
- Training Marines with MOSs other than intelligence who are assigned to perform intelligence functions within the infantry companies.
- Training all battalion personnel in the importance of intelligence and how to be collectors (i.e., “every Marine a collector” training).

# CHAPTER 4

## FIRES

Modern combined arms tactics combine the effects of various arms—such as infantry, armor, and information-related capabilities (IRCs)—to create the greatest possible effect on the enemy and influence the operational environment. The strengths of these arms complement and reinforce each other. Simultaneously, the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of each supporting arm are protected by the capabilities of the others. In addition to the effect on the enemy, battalions must consider the impact of fires on the people, culture, political and social organization (both foreign and domestic), as well as any external agencies or organizations that exist within the AO. The battalion is the lowest echelon of maneuver unit with an organic FSCC for the clearance, deconfliction, and synchronization of maneuver and fires in its AO. It establishes its FSCC within the COC, where centralized communications facilities are used by personnel tasked with the coordination and clearance of all forms of fire support. Supporting arms units provide representatives and equipment to the FSCC to conduct coordination, targeting, and communications functions for their respective supporting arms.

It is the primary role of the operations section, along with the FSC or the FSO if the battalion's weapons company is assigned battlespace, to ensure the complimentary use of the modern set of combined arms. The battalion engages friendly and neutral entities to generate nonlethal effects exclusively. Conversely, the battalion engages targets (the term *target* is reserved to describe a person, place, or physical object pertaining to the enemy or threat network) to generate either lethal or nonlethal effects, or a combination of them. A target or entity can be used to describe facilities, organizations, individuals, equipment, or virtual (i.e., non-tangible) things. The important distinction is that the commander generates lethal effects only on targets and not on entities. The command determines and categorizes the networks in the operational environment into friendly, neutral, and threat networks. Information operation engagement plans can be developed after this step that will separate targets from entities and be managed on separate lists.

### FIRES WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

The fires warfighting function integrates and synchronizes a number of processes. The term *fires process* consists of the following:

- Targeting.
- Fire support.
- Counterfire.
- Interdicting adversary capabilities.
- Countering air and missile threats.
- Assessing fires.
- Employing IRCs.

## **Targeting**

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. Targets fall into one of five target types—facility, individual, virtual, equipment, or organization.

## **Fire Support**

Fire support is the process of employing fires that directly support friendly forces to engage enemy forces and facilities in pursuit of mission objectives.

## **Counterfire**

Counterfire is the process of proactively or dynamically employing fires to destroy or neutralize enemy fires systems and weapons.

## **Interdicting Adversary Capabilities**

Interdicting adversary capabilities is the process of diverting, disrupting, delaying, or destroying enemy military surface capabilities before they can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives.

## **Countering Air and Missile Threats**

Countering air and missile threats is the process of integrating offensive and defensive operations and capabilities to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority and force protection.

These operations are designed to destroy or negate adversary aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch.

## **Assessing Fires**

This is the process of assessing the effectiveness and performance of fires and effects in relation to MAGTF objectives. Fires assessment includes, but is not limited to, the metrics to be monitored during execution, the evaluation of fires activities, and recommended adjustments to future activities.

## **Employing Information-Related Capabilities**

Employing IRCs is the process of employing tools, techniques, or activities within the information environment to create effects and operationally desirable conditions, or to achieve objectives. The employment of IRCs is considered an integral MAGTF fires process.

## **ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

### **Battalion Commander**

The commander is responsible for both the approval of fires and for planning the desired effects generated by all capabilities to support the scheme of maneuver within the assigned battlespace. The commander has the inherent ability to delegate this authority to subordinates as necessary; it is typically delegated to the XO and/or operations officer in the commander's absence.

### **Operations Officer**

In addition to frequently being a delegate for fires approval authority, the operations officer is the chief planner for all battalion operations and is primarily responsible for the integration of lethal and nonlethal effects with the scheme of maneuver.

### **Intelligence Officer**

The intelligence officer is the primary developer of the IPB. The S-2 provides links to sources of military intelligence and provides representation to targeting and fires planning working groups.

### **Fire Support Coordinator**

The FSC is responsible for supervising the operation of the FSCC, as well as the activities of the mortar platoon commander, artillery LNO (i.e., FSO), NGLO, and air officer. The FSC is responsible for the training of the rifle company fire support teams, developing fire support plans essential to the battalion's scheme of maneuver, and making recommendations for the prioritization of fire support to subordinate units.

### **Fire Support Officer**

The FSO is the senior artillery officer provided to the battalion by its supporting artillery battery and provides the battalion commander subject matter expertise on artillery support. The FSO is in charge of the artillery forward observers and manages their employment and training. The FSO is responsible for coordinating with the artillery unit for artillery fires in support of battalion operations. As required, the FSO may assume duties as the FSC.

### **Information Operations Planner**

The IO planner is responsible for integrating the execution of IO tasks to support the scheme of maneuver. During planning, the IO planner develops the IO plan and/or IO concept of support to generate the commander's desired effects.

## **FIRE SUPPORT STRUCTURES**

### **Fire Support Coordination Center**

The battalion FSCC performs fire support coordination to closely integrate supporting arms with maneuver. It monitors and receives all fire support requests originating within the battalion. The battalion FSCC ensures that supporting arms are integrated with the scheme of maneuver and that friendly forces are not endangered. It may also coordinate missions for observers to attack targets outside the battalion's zone of action. The battalion FSCC is led by the FSC and is comprised of the sections and elements listed in the following subordinate sections.

**Artillery Liaison Section.** This section is attached to the battalion by the supporting artillery battery; it consists of four officers, a fires chief, four observers, and a compliment of radio operators to support the battalion FSCC. The senior officer is the artillery LNO, or FSO. The remaining Marines are broken into forward observer teams to support the individual infantry companies. The shore fire control party (SFCP) is also provided by the supporting artillery battery. It includes an NGF liaison team, as well as an NGF spot team. The liaison team consists of an NGLO, an NGF chief, and a compliment of three field radio operators. The spot

team consists of an NGF spotter (a Marine lieutenant) and two SFCP spotters with radio operators. The team may be split into two separate elements. For more information on the liaison section, refer to MCRP 3-10F.2, *Supporting Arms Observer, Spotter, and Controller*.

**Fire Support Officer.** Refer to chapter 1.

**Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer.** The NGLO is a Navy officer provided by the supporting artillery battalion to the battalion FSCC. The NGLO provides the battalion commander subject matter expertise on naval surface fire support. The NGLO is responsible for coordinating with the surface ships providing naval surface fire support in support of the battalion on behalf of the FSCC.

**Air Officer.** Refer to chapter 1.

**81mm Mortar Representative.** This Marine monitors the mortar conduct of fire net to clear requests for 81mm mortar fires. They coordinate with the FSC on the movement of the mortar platoon or any of its sections, keeping the FSC informed of the mortar platoon's firing capabilities and ammunition status.

**Watch Officers/Chiefs.** All artillery LNOs and SNCOs assigned to duties in the FSCC must be able to supervise all functions of fire support during normal 24-hour operations. This requires knowledge of the functions of supporting arms and the duties of other supporting arms representatives. It is the responsibility of the FSO and fires chief to employ the Marines and Sailors within their section to satisfy these requirements.

**Other Personnel.** During certain circumstances, it may be necessary for personnel from other staff sections to work closely with the FSCC. These personnel may be SMEs for attached or supporting units such as tanks, LAR, combat engineers, and amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs). It could also be an EW officer or a staff judge advocate. A staff judge advocate is able to give the commander and FSC advice dealing with the legal effects and constraints of fires, such as collateral damage estimates and proportionality.

### **Tactical Air Control Party**

The TACP is organic to the battalion. It consists of three aviators and is augmented with field radio operators from within the battalion. The senior officer acts in a dual capacity as the battalion air officer, working in the FSCC. The other two act as FACs, requesting and providing terminal control of combat aircraft. The TACP provides input to company fire plans.

### **Supporting Arms Coordination Center**

The supporting arms coordination center (SACC) operates aboard amphibious shipping in spaces configured with the communications facilities required to coordinate the employment of mortars, rockets, artillery, aviation, and naval surface fires on shore targets during amphibious operations. The SACC functions under the supervision of the supporting arms coordinator and the authority of the commander, amphibious task force (CATF), and controls all fires during an amphibious operation until control is transitioned to a fires coordination center ashore. It consists of an NGF section, an air support section, and a target information center. Battalion FSCC personnel may

provide representation in the SACC until such time as the battalion FSCC moves ashore. Once passage of control has been conducted, the SACC continues to monitor and is prepared to reassume control if required. For more information, refer to MCWP 3-31, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fires* or JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*.

## **FIRE SUPPORT COMMUNICATIONS**

For the battalion to conduct fire support coordination as efficiently as possible, an effective, suitable, and redundant network must be established utilizing the minimum amount of communications assets. Radio communications allow the monitoring of fires nets by fire support agencies at all echelons. Consideration must be made to facilitate a sufficient number of radio assets, the number of nets required, the number of stations per net, the requirements for data and voice transmission, information flow, and net security. When data communications systems are included, planners must ensure the compatibility of equipment between all supporting agencies at all levels.

The typical radio networks used for fire support coordination at the battalion level include the following:

- Artillery conduct of fire.
- Regimental fire support coordination (i.e., Regt FSC).
- Artillery battalion fire direction (i.e., Arty Bn FD).
- Artillery air spot.
- Naval gunfire fire ground spot (i.e., NGF Spot).
- SFCP Local.
- Naval gunfire air spot (i.e., NGF AS).
- Infantry battalion mortar conduct of fire (i.e., Mortar COF).
- Tactical air request/helicopter request (i.e., TAR/HR).
- Tactical air direction (i.e., TAD).
- TACP Local.

Table 4-1 on page 4-6 highlights the typical communications nets in an artillery regiment.

**Table 4-1. Artillery Regiment Guard Chart.**

Artillery Regiment Nets	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14
	Div CMD	Div TAC	Div Arty Spot	Div FSC 1 Voice	Div FSC 2 Digital	Div Comm Coord	Div Intel	Regt CMD	Regt TAC	Regt FD 1 Digital	Regt FD 2 Voice	Survey/Met	Radar Telling Digital	Regt Comm Coord
Emissions Designators	HF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF	VHF
Restoration Priorities	06	04	14	01	02	12	08	07	05	03	11	09	10	13
Div FSCC	C	C	A	C	C	C	C						X	
Arty Regt FDC	X	X	A	X	X	X	X	C	C	C	C	X	X	C
Arty Regt TPC												C	C	
Arty Regt	X							A	X					
Arty Bn Cdrs								X						
Arty Bn (DS)			W					X	X	X	X		W	X
Arty Bn (GS)			W					X	X	X	X		W	
Arty Bn (GS-R/R)			W					X	X	X	X		W	X
Radar													X	
MDS												X		
MLRS									W					
UAS									W					
Inf Bn FSCC										W	W			

LEGEND			
A-as required Arty-artillery Bn-battalion C-net control CMD-command Cdr-commander Comm-communications	Coord-coordination Div-division DS-direct support FD-fire direction FDC-fire direction center FSC-fire support coordination	GS-general support GS-R/R-general support-reinforcing/reinforcing HF-high frequency Inf-infantry Intel-intelligence Met-meteorological MDS-meteorological data system MLRS-multiple launch rocket system Regt-regiment TAC-tactical	TPC-target processing center UAS-unmanned aircraft system VHF-very high frequency W-when directed X-guard

Table 4-2 highlights the typical communications nets in a direct support artillery battalion.

**Table 4-2. Direct Support Artillery Battalion Guard Chart**

Direct Support Nets	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
	Bn CMD	Bn CO FA	Bn CO FB	Bn CO F1	Bn CO F2	Reg t FSC 1	Reg t FSC 2	Inf Regt CMD	Inf Reg t TAC	Radar Telling	Bn FD 1	Reg t FD 1	Regt FD 2	Art y Reg t TAC	Arty Regt CMD	Div Art y Spot	Bn Com Coord
Emissions Designators	VHF	VHF DIG	VHF DIG	VHF	VHF	HF	VHF DIG	VHF	HF	VHF DIG	VHF	VHF DIG	VHF	VHF	HF	VHF	
Restoration Priorities	06	09	10	01	02	03	11	15	05	12	04	08	14	07	13	16	17
Arty Bn	C	C	C	C	C	X	X		X	C	C	X	X	X	X	W	C
Arty Regt												C	C	C	C	C	
Inf Regt						C	C		C								
Arty Bn Cdr	X													A	X		
Arty Btry Cdr	X																
Battery 1		X		M						A	X						X
Battery 2		X		M						A	X						X
Battery 3			X		M					A	X						X
Battery 4			X		M					A	X						X
Inf Regt FSCC		X		X							M						
FO 1		X		X													X
FO 2		X		X													X
FO 3		X		X													
FO 4		X		X													
FO 5		X		X													
FO 6			X		X												
Radar										X	X						
MET											A		X				
Survey	X																
LNO Btry 1		X		X		X	X				X						
LNO Btry 2		X		X		X	X				X						
LNO Btry 3			X		X	X	X				X						
LNO Btry 4			X		X	X	X				X						

**LEGEND**

<p>A-as required Arty-artillery Bn-battalion Btry-battery C-net control COF-conduct of fire CMD-command</p>	<p>Cdr-commander Comm-communications Coord-coordination DIG-digital FD-fire direction</p>	<p>FO-forward observer FSC-fire support coordination HF-high frequency Inf-infantry LNO-liaison M-monitor</p>	<p>MDS-meteorological data system Regt-regiment TAC-tactical VHF-very high frequency X-guard</p>
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For more information on fire support communication nets, refer to MCTP 3-10F, *Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element*. For more information on fire support digital communications, see MCRP 3-10F.1, *Fire Support Systems for Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Operations*.

## **FIRE SUPPORT AUTOMATED SYSTEMS**

The Marine Corps fire support system automates fire support C2 functions by using digital devices and data communications to collect, process, and distribute information quickly and accurately. It incorporates systems already employed by the Marine Corps and employs their full data communications capabilities. The typical automation systems used for fire support coordination at the battalion level include the following:

- Joint Common Tactical Workstation.
- Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System.
- Effects management tool.
- Fire web portal.
- Target handoff system.
- Target Location Designation and Handoff System.
- Theater Battle Management Core System.

For more information on fire support automated systems, refer to MCRP 3-10F.1.

## **FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING**

The goal of battalion fire support planning is to coordinate and integrate the effects of fires, both lethal and nonlethal, to directly support land and amphibious operations in pursuit of tactical objectives. Fire support planning answers the question, “How will fires support the scheme of maneuver?” The end result of fire support planning must be an effective, integrated, and flexible plan that employs the effects of fires. The considerations in table 4-3 apply during fire support planning for all types of operations.


**Table 4-3. Fire Support Planning Considerations.**

<b>Consideration</b>	<b>Description</b>
Plan early and continuously	To effectively integrate fire support with the scheme of maneuver, planning must begin when the commander states the unit's purpose and provides commander's planning guidance. The FSC should continuously solicit additional guidance from the commander whenever needed throughout planning.
Exploit all available targeting assets	Identify all available target acquisition assets and task each asset in accordance with its capabilities. This should be detailed in the battalion collection plan.
Consider all available fires	Consider all available assets at the battalion level and higher and ensure that if an unplanned asset appears, there is a plan to utilize it, whether it provides lethal or nonlethal effects.
Use the lowest echelon capable of providing adequate support	If the battalion does not possess the adequate asset for the task, resources should be requested from the echelon that controls the required asset.
Use the most effective fire support means	Consideration of the importance and nature of the target, the engagement time window, the availability of attack means, the results desired, and the number and type of asset to create the desired effects should drive what echelon receives the request for fire.
Furnish the type of fire support requested	The FSC weighs requests for fires against the commander's guidance and future needs for fire support. If a request is denied, all parties involved should be alerted, and an alternative means should be provided if available.
Avoid unnecessary duplication	Eliminating unnecessary duplication conserves fire support assets. Use the complementary effects of various assets in coordination with each other to generate the desired effect.
Coordinate airspace	Fire support coordination measures and coordination procedures protect aircraft while incorporating close air support and deep air support with indirect fires in support of close and deep operations.
Provide adequate support	The FSCC must inform the maneuver elements when the battalion does not have the adequate resources to support the plan.
Provide rapid coordination	The FSCC must know the type and capability of available assets, essential fire support tasks, and priority of fires, while maintaining situational awareness, to attack planned targets and targets of opportunity as the battle develops.
Provide safeguards and survivability	Consider both threats from friendly actions (such as battlespace geometry) and possible effects from enemy actions when planning force protection. Close coordination at all levels helps to reduce the possibility of fratricide.
Establish FSCMs	FSCMs facilitate the rapid engagement of targets throughout the battlespace, and at the same time, provide safeguards to friendly forces. Consideration must be given to limit the number of FSCMs employed.
Establish communications support	The timely and efficient exchange of information is a key to successful operations. The physical collocation of coordinating agencies provides the surest form of communication.

## **FIRE SUPPORT AND THE MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS**

Fire support planning is an integral part of the MCPP (see fig. 4-1 on page 4-10). It is begun early and conducted continuously. Therefore, fire support planning never really ends. Even if the unit is accomplishing its mission, planning takes into account potential and likely follow-on missions. Fire support planning applies the MCPP tenets of top-down guidance with bottom-up refinement, the single battle concept, and integrated planning. It helps organize the thought process of a commander and staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It can be as detailed or as abbreviated as time, resources, staff experience, and the tactical

situation permit. The process described is a means to an end and applies in all types of operations. The final output for fire support planning must be an effective, integrated, flexible, and executable fire support plan. For more information, see MCTP 3-10F.



**Figure 4-1. Overview of the Marine Corps Planning Process.**

The battalion conducts planning concurrently with planning at HHQ. While each may be working on different stages of the process, close liaison facilitates concurrent planning. The battalion should focus on how it can best support the infantry companies and subordinate elements to accomplish their missions, focusing on providing close supporting fires and the coordination needed to integrate them with maneuver. Fire support planning at lower echelons seeks to—

- Support forces in contact by providing close supporting fires.
- Support the commander’s scheme of maneuver.
- Integrate lethal and nonlethal effects with maneuver to create combined arms.
- Sustain fire support by judiciously employing limited assets where they will have the greatest effect.

### **Problem Framing**

Because fire support planning is a continuous process, the FSC must continuously update the fire support estimate of supportability. The mission statement, once it is developed and approved, clearly indicates the battalion’s task and purpose. The FSC’s responsibilities during problem framing focus on developing the staff’s situational awareness and gathering the required information to draft the initial fire support plan and estimate of supportability. Table 4-4 lists the injects, activities, and results from problem framing. To facilitate continuous fire support

planning and provide the planners with crucial information and direction, the FSC must understand the following:

- Enemy situation.
- The intent of the HHQ commander.
- Commander’s initial planning guidance.
- Specified, implied, and essential tasks.
- Restraints and constraints.
- Possible resource shortfalls

**Table 4-4. Injects, Activities, and Results for Problem Framing.**

Injects	Activities	Results
<p>Higher Warning Order or OPOD</p> <p>Status of Supporting Arms</p> <p>Information from higher and adjacent FSCCs.</p> <p>IPB Products.</p> <p>Network engagement products.</p> <p>Likely enemy COAs.</p> <p>HVTs and high-value entities by phase or critical event.</p>	<p>Understand HHQ’s maneuver and fire support plans.</p> <p>Organize and analyze facts.</p> <p>Identify specified and implied fire support tasks.</p> <p>Translate status of fire support assets into capabilities.</p> <p>Analyze effects of IPB on fire support.</p> <p>Develop draft essential fire support tasks.</p>	<p>Fire support problem framing brief:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Higher fire support plan.</li> <li>-Fire support status (capabilities and limitations).</li> <li>-Fire support IPB analysis.</li> <li>-Fire support timeline.</li> <li>-Recommended fire support tasks.</li> </ul> <p>Commander approves or modifies fire support tasks and issues additional fire support guidance.</p>

The resulting mission statement, commander’s planning guidance, and commander’s intent drives planning during COA development. The staff may identify issues during problem framing that require additional guidance from the commander.

**Commander’s Initial Planning Guidance.** This provides the commander’s preliminary decisions required to focus the staff’s planning to achieve the commander’s conceptual vision of the operation. The commander’s initial planning guidance focuses the FSC’s attention on what the commander expects fires and engagements to accomplish (i.e., task, purpose, and effects) toward accomplishing the battalion’s mission. The commander’s guidance provides the FSC

with insight to understand how the battalion commander envisions the mission and the resources required to achieve the desired end state.

**Higher Headquarters Order.** Understanding HHQ's plan and how the battalion is nested within it is essential to top-down planning and provides the foundation for bottom-up refinement by the battalion FSC. The FSC must identify what their unit's responsibilities are to the HHQ's fire support plan as well as the fire support capabilities allocated to the battalion. Appendix 19 (Fire Support Plan) to Annex C (Operations) of the HHQ's OPORD can help the FSC obtain the following information:

- The missions of higher and adjacent units.
- The battalion's contingency missions.
- External fire support assets made available.
- FSCMs.
- Fire support coordination procedures.
- Planned fires and IRC engagements.
- Technical advice on fire support.
- Essential field artillery tasks.
- Constraints and restraints.

**Effects of Planning tools on Fire Support.** Intelligence preparation of the battlespace and CPB are the primary analytical methodologies used to produce intelligence in support of decision making. They are systematic, continuous, mission-focused processes for analyzing the threat, information environment, local populace, infrastructure, and environment in the area where the operation is to take place. Along with the traditional understanding of the physical environment, decision makers planning the use of IRCs must also have an understanding of the local economy, social and political structures, and even belief systems. These analyses may identify additional IRs. Utilizing the products from the IPB/CPB and the S-2's analysis of the dynamics in the operational environment facilitates the FSC's and IO planner's development of a fire support plan that meets the commander's stated desired effects. Information from IPB/CPB may include the following:

- Likely enemy COAs.
- Known, suspected, or likely enemy locations.
- Secure points that offer clear observation of the AO.
- Cover and concealment in the AO.
- The location of natural and man-made obstacles in the AO.
- The location of key terrain.
- The weather forecast and its effects on weapons systems, mobility, communications, munitions, aircraft, the identification of targets, and other factors.
- IO/network engagement products—ASCOPE; criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (i.e., CARVER); and the stability/instability factors matrix.
- The five dimensions of operational culture—the physical environment, economy, social structure, political structure, and belief systems.

- When the operation is expected to commence.
- The time available to plan.
- The expected duration of the operation.

**Status of Supporting Arms.** Supporting arms data needs to be translated into meaningful capabilities that the commander and staff can easily understand. The artillery ammunition status should be communicated in a capabilities format vice a number count. Similar analyses can be made for any ships made available for naval surface fire support. Close air support (CAS) sorties allocated by HHQ may be translated into the number of strikes available based on the type of aircraft, time on station, and ordnance load, and number of strikes available. This information is necessary for the FSC to have during the planning process.

**Results of Problem Framing.** Participating in the problem framing step allows the FSC to develop a shared situational awareness with the rest of the staff that helps integrate the fire support plan with other functional plans to support particular COAs developed during the COA development step. At the conclusion of problem framing, the FSC identifies the following:

- Commander's guidance for fires.
- Approved essential fire support tasks (EFSTs).
- Any additional implied or specified tasks.
- Additional constraints/restraints.
- Warning order to subordinate FSCs, observers, or supporting arms representatives.

### **Course of Action Development**

The FSC must conceptualize how to integrate fires, to include IRC engagements, into each developing COA. At a minimum, the concept of fires for each COA should allocate target acquisition assets, attack assets, IRCs, planned target areas, and create the sequence that targets and entities will be engaged in. Fire support planning is an integral portion of the concept of operations, and like other functional plans, shapes the battlespace and sets conditions to facilitate mission accomplishment. The fire support plan cannot be a separate plan developed in a vacuum. Table 4-5 on page 4-14 lists FSC injects, activities, and results for COA development.

**Table 4-5. Injects, Activities, and Results for COA Development.**

Injects	Activities	Results
Fire support problem framing brief.  Approved EFSTs.  Commander’s initial fire support guidance.	Determine where to find and attack the enemy to accomplish the EFST.  Identify HPTs in those formations through target value analysis.  Identify high-payoff entities through network analysis.  Quantify desired effects for EFSTs.  Plan method for EFSTs: -Allocate assets to acquire and attack. -Integrate triggers with maneuver COA.  Use battle calculus.  Assist S-2 in collection plan development to support target acquisition CCIRs.	For each COA developed:  -Concept of fires. -Draft engagement synchronization matrix. -Draft target list worksheet and overlay. -Draft entity list. -Draft attack guidance matrix. -Draft engagement guidance matrix. -Collection plan.

**Targeting.** The targeting process begins during problem framing and provides initial input for fire support and collections planning. After HVTs and high-value entities are identified, the FSC refines the list to identify those targets which the enemy’s loss of may contribute significantly to the success of the proposed COA (i.e., HPTs). High-value entities are also identified and the FSC refines the list to identify those entities whose engagements may also contribute significantly to the success of the COA. These refinements continue during COA wargaming and allows the FSC to develop specific tasks for fire support that affect these targets and entities in the manner required by the scheme of maneuver of each COA. Initial plans may be made for acquiring, tracking, attacking/engaging, and assessing actions taken against HPTs and high-payoff entities.

**Quantify Desired Effects.** Effects should be expressed as a measurable action of combat effectiveness that enables maneuver to accomplish a mission or task. As the staff builds the COA and the FSC determines how to accomplish each EFST, they should try to quantify the desired effects.

**Effects-Focused Fire Support.** Fire support representatives should have a clear understanding of the mission and the commander’s planning guidance. The effects of fires and engagements should be articulated in terms of conditions and MOEs to facilitate assessment, and should be included in the CCIRs.

If the desired effect is not generated, the action may need to be repeated or another method sought. The FSC and the IO planner analyze the enemy’s centers of gravity to determine the weaknesses that are critical vulnerabilities. The FSC and IO planner identify and plan

fires and IRCs against the enemy's critical vulnerabilities to generate the desired effect for the commander.

**Results of COA Development.** The FSC's outputs from this phase should be a tentative fire support plan for each COA that is integrated with and supports the scheme of maneuver. These fire support plans, which are refined further during COA wargaming, should include the following:

- Redundant collection assets plan.
- Concepts of fires and IO (i.e., lethal and nonlethal effects) describing how fires and IRCs will support the scheme of maneuver to accomplish the commander's intent.
- The sequencing of EFSTs.
- Draft target list worksheet and overlay.
- Draft entity list.
- Draft attack guidance matrix for targets (i.e., lethal/nonlethal).
- Draft engagement guidance matrix for entities (i.e., nonlethal only).
- Draft engagement synchronization matrix.

### **Course of Action War Game**

This step matches friendly COAs against the threat COA responses. It allows the staff to adjust identified problems or weaknesses in the friendly COAs. It can be done formally or informally. Whether formal or informal, wargaming relies heavily on tactical judgment and experience. It allows the staff to gain a common vision of the operation and to test the plan against the array of possible enemy and friendly actions. If a red cell was designated during planning, it presents and represents the enemy's actions. If a green cell was designated, it should be involved also to represent actions conducted by—or effects on—the civil populace. Wargaming provides the FSC with the opportunity to validate or refine the fire support plan. The following actions occur during wargaming:

**Continue Targeting.** The refinement of HPTs and high-payoff entities continues; wargaming may identify additional HPTs and high-payoff entities or invalidate previously nominated ones.

**War Game Fire Support Tasks.** This provides a means to test the fire support plan's effectiveness and its integration with the scheme of maneuver. Wargaming can:

- Validate existing fire support tasks.
- Identify additional fire support tasks.
- Refine fire support requirements.
- Adjust fire support allocations.
- Prepare estimates of supportability.

Table 4-6 on page 4-16 lists the FSC's injects, activities, and results for COA war game.



**Table 4-6. Injects, Activities, and Results of COA War Game.**

<b>Injects</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Results</b>
Draft fires paragraph. Draft engagement synchronization matrix. Draft target list worksheet and overlay. Draft entity list. Draft AGM or modified AGM. Draft engagement guidance matrix Collection plan.	Targeting/engagement decisions: finalize HPT list and high-payoff entity list. War game fire support plan against enemy COAs. Test and refine fire support plan. Modify draft fire support plans for each COA.	Final draft for each COA: -Fires paragraph. -Fire support appendix: -Engagement synchronization matrix. -Target list worksheet and overlay. -Entity list. Refined HPT list, high-payoff entity list, AGM, engagement guidance matrix, and target selection standards.
<b>LEGEND</b> AGM      attack guidance matrix		

**Results of Wargaming.** By the conclusion of wargaming, the FSC should have adjusted the fire support plans for each COA. As outputs of this step, the FSC should have final drafts of the fires paragraph and the information required in Appendix 19 (Fire Support Plan) to Annex C (Operations).

**Course of Action Comparison and Decision**

During COA comparison, the staff presents the commander with the findings from the war games and provides their conclusions for the commander’s review and decision. The FSC must be prepared to brief the estimate of supportability for each COA to the commander. The level of detail within the FSC’s brief will vary depending on the commander’s evaluation criteria and the level of participation in the war games. Table 4-7 lists the FSC’s injects, activities, and results of COA comparison and decision.

**Table 4-7. Injects, Activities, and Results from COA Comparison and Decision.**

Injects	Activities	Results
Final draft for each COA of: Fires paragraph	Compare friendly vs. enemy COAs	Commander’s approved COA
Appendix 19 – engagement synchronization matrix, target lists, entity lists.	Compare COA vs commander’s criteria	FSC identifies refinements to templates and tools for selected COA
Refined HPT list, high-payoff entity list, attack guidance matrix, engagement matrix, and target selection standards		Fire support warning order

**Course of Action Evaluation.** The FSC should be prepared to brief the means by which to accomplish each fire support task, along with the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

**Course of Action Comparison.** Each COA is ranked by the FSC and the IO planner as to its supportability in regard to the fires assets and IRCs available.

**Commander’s Decision.** Once the commander decides on the COA, adjustments to the plan regarding the desired effects to be generated by fires and engagements may be made. The FSC and IO planner need to be prepared to incorporate these adjustments.

### **Orders Development**

During orders development, the FSC articulates the commander’s intent, guidance, and decisions into a clear, useful form to facilitate understanding by the subordinate units and supporting arms agencies involved in the execution of the plan. The FSC provides the relevant information pertaining to the fire support plan in Appendix 19 (Fire Support Plan) to Annex C (Operations) of the battalion’s OPORD. Table 4-8 on page 4-18 lists the FSC’s injects, activities, and results during orders development.

**Table 4-8. Injects, Activities, and Results of Orders Development.**

<b>Injects</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Results</b>
Commander's selected COA  Identified refinements to fire support templates and tools for the selected COA.	Refine any changes to the COA made during the decision process  Finalize and reproduce written products  Prepare orders brief	Final fire support plan:  -Fires paragraph  Fire support appendix: -Engagement synchronization matrix -Target list worksheet and overlay, HPT list, high-payoff entity list, attack guidance matrix, engagement matrix, and target selection standards.

During orders development, the FSC also accomplishes the following:

- Finalizes targeting decisions.
- Finalizes EFSTs.
- Finalizes engagement areas.
- Finalizes triggers.
- Effects final coordination between echelons and units.

**Transition**

The transition provides a successful shift from planning to execution. A successful transition ensures that those charged with executing the order have a full understanding of the plan. Transitions may include briefs and rehearsals to increase the situational awareness of the subordinate commanders and the staff and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan.

**Rehearse the Fire Support Plan.** Rehearsals are effective transition drills. A rehearsal is a key evolution to synchronize all warfighting functions with maneuver before execution. Key fire support points that should be highlighted during the rehearsal include the synchronization of the fire support plan with the scheme of maneuver, target execution responsibilities (i.e., primary and alternate observers), artillery and mortar positioning and movement plans, and verification of target acquisition.

**Adjust the Fire Support Plan.** Refinements are crucial in top-down fire support planning. These refinements would include recommended changes based on the subordinate unit's analysis of the terrain and the selected scheme of maneuver. The battalion FSC and IO planner receive inputs and recommended changes and either incorporate or reject them, with the commander's concurrence.

## **NETWORK ENGAGEMENT**


Network engagement is defined as interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels, to help achieve the commander's objectives within an operational area. Marine forces have engaged with friendly, neutral, and threat networks throughout the history of the Marine Corps. The concept of network engagement provides an organizational construct and principles that commanders leverage to create their desired effects in operations spanning the competition continuum. Regardless of whether Marine forces are conducting peace operations or large-scale combat operations, network engagement can be critical to achieving the commander's objectives. Network engagement utilizes a number of methods that support and leverage current enablers to engage networks, including interagency coordination, COMMSTRAT, CMO, cyberspace operations, IO, space operations, MISO, intelligence, MILDEC, OPSEC, electromagnetic spectrum operations, cultural engagements, and KLEs.

Network engagement is performed by the simultaneous and continuous generation of lethal and/or nonlethal effects intended to attain the desired objectives for selected networks. Network analysis products are developed to understand networks as part of the understanding the operational environment. The information from the analysis is used to decide who to engage and how, and continues through assessing the effectiveness of the targeting and engagement efforts.

When commanders decide to generate an effect on a network by engaging specific nodes, the intent may be to shape conditions of a mental or moral nature instead of causing physical damage. The intended result of shaping these conditions supports achieving the commander's objectives. Like IO, network engagement is employed using a combined arms approach and requires synchronization and collaboration across all staff and warfighting functions. The staff must simultaneously partner with friendly networks—while engaging neutral networks—and generating lethal and nonlethal effects to counter the threat networks. All activities conducted with regard to all networks should assist the commander's ability to attain the desired end state. For more information about network engagement, refer to MCTP 3-02A.

## **TARGETING AND ENGAGEMENT**

Information operations, targeting, fires, and the employment of IRCs follow the same commander-driven processes that require the synchronization of all available systems and capabilities to generate lethal and nonlethal effects. The methodology used at the tactical level for targeting and engagement is D3A (refer to fig. 4-2 on page 4-20). It begins with the receipt of the mission and continues through the development of the OPORD, mission execution, and assessment. The D3A cycle seeks to support the commander's objectives by generating the desired lethal and nonlethal effects with the least risk and expenditure of time and resources. To maximize the effects of IO, IRCs and network engagement must be fully integrated into the D3A cycle.



**Figure 4-2. The Joint Targeting Cycle and the Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess Process.**

Historically, targeting and the D3A process have been focused on the threat. However, network engagement leverages the D3A process to engage friendly and neutral networks, as well. Network engagement products should shape the information and intelligence collection efforts and feed the targeting team. The key is creating the commander’s desired effects across the multiple friendly, neutral, and threat networks in the operational environment without unintended consequences. Initial planning provides the commander with the *who*, *what*, and *why* to engage a network. Refined analysis provides the commander with a comprehensive engagement plan for specific nodes, dyads, or other network components.

The D3A cycle is an integral part of MCPP and consists of four phases:

- Decide which targets or entities to engage.
- Detect the targets or entities.
- Deliver the appropriate effects.
- Assess the effects of the engagement

**Decide**

The *decide* phase begins the targeting cycle. This phase translates the commander’s intent into priorities, attack guidance, and engagement guidance. It provides a clear picture of the priorities for the tasking of target acquisition assets, intelligence information processing, selection of attack and engagement means, and damage assessment. The *decide* phase draws heavily on the

staff's knowledge of the operational environment, planning and network analysis products, and continuous assessment of the situation. The results of the information from IPB analysis provides the preliminary information on how IO and the IRCs can support the battalion's mission. The employment and use of IRCs is included within the development of the battalion fire support plan and EFSTs. Possible targets and entities receive task, purpose, method, and effect analysis and development.

A key challenge to the FSC during the *decide* phase is marshalling, requesting, and integrating the many various IRC assets and methods to achieve the assigned purposes. This task becomes increasingly more difficult as the size and complexity of the battalion's operational environment increases. Another challenge is seeking to synchronize IO efforts with the effects of fires. In many instances, it is far easier to designate and prosecute a target with lethal effects than it is to generate nonlethal effects on a target or entity in support of an objective in the information environment. Battalion commanders must guard against any tendencies to disregard IO because it appears too difficult to employ. Decisions made at the beginning of the D3A cycle are critical to the process and form the basis of the D3A methodology.

Targeting and engagement priorities and decisions should be reflected in visual products, such as—

- IPB.
- CPB.
- Intelligence preparation of the information environment.
- Reporting from subordinate, higher, adjacent, and supporting commanders.
- Network analysis products.
- The HPT list, which is a prioritized list of HPTs.
- The engagement guidance matrix, which is a targeting product that addresses *how* and *when* targets and entities are engaged and the desired effects.

Targeting or engaging a network considers the balanced generation of lethal and nonlethal effects on the network's key nodes and interrelated networks. The staff may need to engage nodes across friendly, neutral, and threat networks. The products of the *decide* phase are briefed to the commander. Upon approval, the decisions are translated into the plan.

**Target Value Analysis.** Target value analysis begins when the battalion's red and green cells start preparing for the COA war games. There are almost an endless number of targets and entities to engage in any operational environment. Target value analysis is performed by the FSC and involves a detailed analysis of a targets, entities, doctrine, tactics, equipment, organizations, and the expected behavior of a selected COA. It also provides a ranking of target and entity sets based on the following characteristics:

- Doctrine.
- Tactics.
- Equipment.
- Organizations.
- Expected behavior.

The staff must determine when, where, and how to employ Marine forces to attain the commander's end state. The target value analysis process identifies potential HVTs or high-value entities that could interfere with the friendly COA or that are vital to a network's success.

**High-Payoff Target/High-Payoff Entity Lists.** Prioritized lists of HPTs or high-payoff entities are used as planning tools and to refine the collection plan. For threats, the staff develops target spreadsheets that identify HPTs. The staff develops a separate list that identifies high-payoff entities inside the friendly and neutral networks. The target spreadsheet or entity list should provide detailed targeting or engagement data for each HPT or high-payoff entity. The lists should change from one phase of an operation to the next in concert with the targeting team's war game results.

Considerations for these lists include the following:

- The sequence or order of appearance.
- The ability to detect, identify, classify, locate, and track the target or entity.
- The degree of accuracy available from the acquisition systems.
- The ability to engage the target or entity.
- The ability to create the desired effects on the basis of attack or engagement guidance.

Engagements are prioritized according to the considerations above within specific time windows. The targeting team recommends priorities according to the collective judgment of the group. Target spreadsheets or entity lists give a recommended priority and engagement sequence. The number of priorities should not be excessive. The approved lists are given to the appropriate staff officers and are used as a planning tools to determine attack or engagement guidance and to refine the collection plan. Once the HPT list or high-payoff entity list are approved by the commander, they go back to the targeting team to help them develop the attack guidance matrix or engagement guidance matrix and the collection plan. Table 4-9 is an example of an HPT list.

**Table 4-9. High-Payoff Target List.**

<b>Phase/Event: Security Zone</b>	
<b>PRIORITY</b>	<b>TARGET</b>
1	Mortars
2	Improvised Explosive Device Financier
3	Self-Propelled Artillery
4	Anti-Aircraft Artillery

Table 4-10 is an example of a high-payoff entity list.

**Table 4-10. High-Payoff Entity List.**

Phase/Event: Security Zone	
PRIORITY	ENTITY
1	Humanitarian Operations Chief
2	Host Nation Police Chief

**Engagement Guidance.** The commander, with recommendations from the targeting team, must approve the engagement guidance. This guidance should detail the following:

- Prioritize HPT and high-payoff entities lists.
- The timing, method, and desired effects of engagement.
- Any special instructions.
- Assessment requirements.

Engagement guidance applies to both planned targets and targets of opportunity. Accordingly, engagement guidance may address specific or general target or entity descriptions. This guidance should include expectations for unit tasks, the prioritization criteria for potential engagements, and the general effects desired by engaging those targets. The commander's engagement guidance clearly articulates the desired effect across the friendly, neutral, and threat networks. Guidance is provided to the staff through either the attack guidance matrix or engagement guidance matrix. Network engagement must consider the generation of both lethal and nonlethal effects. First, second, and third-order effects must be considered when engaging targets or entities within a network.

The commander can also provide restrictions as part of their engagement guidance. The targeting restrictions fall into two categories—the no-strike list and the restricted target list.

The no-strike list consists of objects or entities protected by—

- The law of war.
- International laws.
- The ROE.
- Other considerations.

A restricted target list contains valid targets with specific restrictions, such as—

- Limiting collateral damage.
- Preserving select ammunition for final protective fires.
- Do not strike during daytime.
- Strike only with a certain weapon.
- The proximity to protected facilities and locations.



**Attack Guidance Matrix.** The attack guidance matrix provides a consolidated view of the HPTs. Table 4-11 shows an example of an attack guidance matrix.

**Table 4-11. Attack Guidance Matrix.**

HPT	When	How	Effect	Remarks
Mortars	Immediately	Mortars.	Destroy	Destroy as acquired
Self-Propelled Artillery	Immediately	Artillery	Neutralize	Plan as part of initial preparatory fires
Anti-Aircraft Artillery	Planned	Artillery	Suppress	Suppression of enemy air defense artillery in support of close air support
Improvised Explosive Device Financier	As acquired	Artillery	Financier killed	Travels frequently between Village A and B

**Engagement Guidance Matrix.** The engagement guidance matrix provides a consolidated view of high-payoff entities. Table 4-12 shows an example of an engagement guidance matrix.

**Table 4-12. Engagement Guidance Matrix.**

High-Payoff Entity	When	How	Effect		Remarks
			1st Order	2nd Order	
Humanitarian Operation Center Chief	Planned	Key Leader Engagement	Camp manager works with US forces, develops camp management plan	Internally displaced personnel camp run efficiently	Chief is particularly leery of interaction with military
Host Nation Police Chief	Planned	Key Leader Engagement	Police chief improves local police capabilities	Host nation police force more efficient	Police chief loves American music

**Target Selection Standards.** Target selection standards are criteria applied to activities in the operational environment and used in deciding whether the activity is a target. Target selection standards put nominations into two categories—targets and suspected targets. Targets meet accuracy and timeliness requirements for engagement. Suspected targets must be confirmed before any engagement. A target selection standards matrix is used to capture pertinent information on the acquisition and accuracy of a target’s location and is used to decide whether a target meets the engagement criteria established in the engagement guidance matrix. Table 4-13 shows a target selection standards matrix.

**Table 4-13. Target Selection Standards Matrix.**

HPT	TIMELINESS	ACCURACY
Mortars	30 Minutes	150 Meters
Improvised Explosive Device Financier	15 Minutes	150 Meters
Self-Propelled Howitzers	30 Minutes	150 Meters
Anti-Aircraft Artillery	1 Hour	200 Meters

**Engagement Synchronization.** Based on commander's guidance, the staff recommends how each target and entity should be engaged in terms of the effects available to be employed. This information is developed during the planning and targeting processes. Target guidance applies to both planned targets and targets of opportunity. Accordingly, target guidance may address specific or general target descriptions. Targeting efforts can be synchronized with other staff processes via an engagement synchronization matrix.

An engagement synchronization matrix is used to synchronize targeting and engagement by assigning responsibilities to detect, deliver, and assess the engagement of a specific HPT or high-payoff entity. The target or entity can be affiliated to any type of network; both lethal and nonlethal engagements may be included in the same matrix. The targets and entities are listed in priority by category under the *Decide* column. Agencies and assets used to detect, validate, engage, and assess targets are identified in the *Detect*, *Deliver*, and *Assess* columns. As the responsible agencies and assets are designated, it is up to the staff to ensure that those assets are not overtaxed.

The *Assess* column includes additional information that supports collection, BDA, operation assessment, and the assessment of networks. The indicators that can be used to identify targets and entities and assess targeting effects through collections are listed in this column. The first, second, and third-order effects are also listed in the *Assess* column and are useful for planners as they look to attain the commanders desired end state. While there is no standardized format for an engagement synchronization matrix, it generally consists of columns for the following:

- Target or entity category.
- Specific HPT or high-payoff entity.
- Agency (i.e., responsible for coordinating, planning, or directing the identification, engagement, or assessment of a specific target or entity).
- Asset (i.e., used to conduct the identification, engagement, or assessment of a specific target or entity).
- Indicators (i.e., activities that are directly or indirectly observable through collections).
- The desired first, second, and third-order effects being evaluated by each indicator.

An example is provided in table 4-14 on page 4-26.

**Table 4-14. Engagement Synchronization Matrix.**

<b>DECIDE</b>		<b>DETECT</b>		<b>DELIVER</b>	
<b>Target/Entity Category</b>	<b>HPT/High-Payoff Entity</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Asset</b>	<b>Agency</b>	<b>Asset</b>
Fire Support	Mortars	S-2	Unmanned Aircraft System	Fire Support	Mortars
Threat IED Network	IED Financier	S-2	Unmanned Aircraft System	Fire Support	Artillery
Fire Support	Self-Propelled Artillery	S-2	Unmanned Aircraft System	Fire Support	Artillery
Humanitarian Relief Management	Humanitarian Operations Center Chief	S-2	Civil Affairs	G-3/Civil Affairs/IO	Infantry Company KLE
Fire Support	Antiaircraft Artillery	S-2	Aviation	Fire Support	Artillery
Host Nation Police Network	Police Chief	S-2	Human Intelligence	Law Enforcement Detachment	Law Enforcement Company KLE

**Table 4-14. Engagement Synchronization Matrix—continued.**

ASSESS					
Agency	Asset	Indicator(s)	1st Order Effect	2nd Order Effect	3rd Order Effect
S-2	Unmanned Aircraft System	Mortar positions destroyed, rate of mortar fire reduced	Mortars Destroyed	Unable to support enemy maneuver	Enables friendly force freedom of maneuver
S-2	Human Intelligence	Identity of financier confirmed by biometric and forensic data	Financier Killed	Unable to purchase IED material for bomb makers	IED attacks decline in frequency and effect
S-2	Unmanned Aircraft System	Artillery positions destroyed, rate of artillery fire reduced	Artillery pieces neutralized	Unable to support enemy maneuver	Enables friendly force freedom of maneuver
S-3	KLE	Chief attends KLE	Camp manager works with US forces, develops camp management plan	Internally displaced persons camp run efficiently	Local populace supports government
S-2	Aviation	Air crews do not encounter antiaircraft fire	Antiaircraft fire suppressed	Aviation support available to friendly maneuver	Enables friendly force freedom of maneuver
Law Enforcement Detachment	Law Enforcement Detachment	Police chief attends KLE	Police chief improves local police capabilities	Host nation police force more efficient	Security in police district improves

### **Detect**

The *detect* phase is designed to validate the known or suspected targets and entities identified in the *decide* phase and to identify any others for inclusion that meet the criteria for HPTs or high-payoff entities. The operations officer is responsible for directing the effort and must work closely with the rest of the primary staff sections, special staff officers, and network engagement enablers. Targets and entities are detected by maximizing all available collection and acquisition assets. The IPB process is continually updated to confirm enemy, friendly, and neutral actions and projected events using information from organic, supporting, higher, adjacent, and subordinate assets. These changes drive the specific missions that are given to the maneuver elements to confirm or deny them as part of the collection plan. The battalion S-2 coordinates collection efforts with the subordinate commanders for inclusion in the battalion's collection plan. The S-2 locates and tracks targets and entities and makes recommendations for intelligence task organization and for inclusion in the battalion's collection plan. The FSC must closely

work with the IO planner, S-3, and S-2 to ensure that IO tasks are coherent, tracked, and properly detailed.

Detecting targets or entities that support IO objectives can be more difficult than detecting targets for lethal actions due to the requirement to use multiple sensors to develop a picture of the target or entity. Targets and entities are detected through a variety of resources. Network engagement enablers may support target or entity detection with specific resources and techniques. One method is to geospatially associate a network to known locations. Nodal analysis is a network analysis product that can be requested from network engagement enablers and can provide a starting point to support the ultimate detection of a target or entity. Another capability that can be used in detecting a target or entity is biometric information (i.e., identity operations). This information can be used early in the detection process to provide a starting point for locating them.

All available collection assets should be used to detect and track potential targets and entities. These assets include civil affairs Marines and unit patrols that come into contact with the local population. The staff must ensure collection processes are in place to keep up with the pace of data collection. Collection assets at the battalion are limited; therefore, the S-2 should coordinate with HHQ to request intelligence from additional resources when appropriate. Some of these are described in the following subordinate sections.

**Higher Echelon Target Acquisition Assets.** Generally, the battalion FSC and S-2 use the guidance and products from the *decide* phase to request support from target acquisition assets employed in support of the force. The FSC seldom has direct tasking authority over these assets because this authority normally rests with the G-2/S-2 of the regiment, division, or MAGTF. The following assets located within the intelligence battalion of the Marine expeditionary force (MEF) may be available to support a given operation:

- Sensor control and management platoon.
- Radio battalion.
- Topographic platoon.
- Unmanned aircraft squadron.
- Counterintelligence and human intelligence detachment.
- Force imagery interpretation unit.
- Reconnaissance battalion.

**Other Marine Units.** All units within the MAGTF are information collecting agencies and assets. Some examples of agencies that can assist in detecting enemy units and entities include:

- Ground reconnaissance units.
- Electronic warfare squadron (i.e., VMAQ), tactical air controllers (Airborne), and FACs (Airborne).
- Spotters (e.g., joint terminal attack controllers/FACs, forward observers, and SFCPs), OPs, and listening posts (LPs).
- Artillery survey teams and counterbattery radar.

**Detection Procedures.** High-payoff targets or entities must be detected or tracked in a timely and accurate manner. The targeting team should provide guidance to the staff on the type of target or entity and its associated signatures if they are known. Then the most capable collection asset should be directed to detect or track the target or entity.

**Essential Information.** Targets, suspected targets, and entities may be passed to the targeting team by a variety of means. It is important that the essential information be passed for proper analysis and engagement to take place. At a minimum, the report must include the following:

- Reporting agency.
- Date-time group of acquisition by the sensor.
- Description of the activity.
- Other considerations

The staff must develop minimum essential information on the friendly and neutral networks and not focus exclusively on the enemy.

**Target and Entity Development.** Target and entity development are processes used by the staff that ensure that if they engage a specific target or entity, it will be consistent with the commander's desired effect. The process may include research, nomination, deconfliction, target materials production, and collateral damage estimation. Development includes vetting and validation.

**Vetting.** vetting assesses the accuracy of the information and intelligence that has been collected and analyzed for the specific target or entity. The vetting should include target or entity identification, location, and impact on other networks within the operational environment.

**Validation.** Validation is a formal process executed by the staff that ensures the target or entity will meet the commander's guidance and compliance with the law of war and ROE. Validation asks questions such as:

- Does the potential target or entity effectively contribute to achieving one or more of the commander's objectives or supporting sub-tasks?
- Does the potential target or entity effectively support the end state?
- Does the potential target or entity effectively comply with the commander's guidance and intent?
- Is it lawful to engage the target or entity? What are the law of war and ROE issues?
- Will striking/engaging the target/entity arouse political or cultural sensitivities?
- How will striking/engaging the target/entity affect public opinion across the friendly, neutral, and threat networks?
- Are there any target/entity facilities on the no-strike list or restricted target list collocated with the target/entity being validated?
- What is the potential for collateral damage or collateral effects, including casualties?

## Deliver

The objective of the *deliver* phase is the engagement of targets and entities using the products generated in the *decide* phase to prosecute specific targets and entities in support of the commander's plan. The key is well-established procedures for execution, prior coordination, and rehearsals. The *deliver* phase is comprised of a set of tactical and technical engagement decisions. The commander may delegate decision-making authority in attacking targets or engage entities, usually to the battalion XO or operations officer.

The battalion FSC integrates IO with fires and maneuver to generate the commander's desired effects in the AO. The execution of IO, like fires, must occur within the construct of combined arms. Information operations alone will fail unless combined with maneuver. Both fires and IO are essential in creating effects on the battlefield that support the infantry battalion's operations. The information environment is an important and often decisive domain in the battlespace that needs to be understood and positively influenced to achieve success. The employment of IO occurs within the combined arms paradigm, through organic and non-organic capabilities and assets, and as an integrative tool that the battalion commander uses to address information concerns in the operational environment.

Once a target or entity has been detected for attack or engagement, it is up to the commander whether to engage based on the resources available, their capabilities, the effects desired, and the ROE. All available engagement assets should be considered that can create the desired lethal or nonlethal effects. The availability and capability of each resource should be considered using the following criteria:

- Desired effects on the target or entity.
- Degree of risk in employing the asset against the target or entity.
- Impact on friendly forces.
- Impact on other networks.

The *deliver* phase of the targeting process executes the engagement guidance when enough 'actionable' intelligence has been accumulated and supports the commander's battle plan. Tactical patience is the intentional delay of the execution of an operation against a target or entity to allow a fully developed picture of the operational environment or network, or improved engagement conditions, to emerge. The targeting team must select the appropriate delivery system to engage the target, subject to the commander's approval. For planned engagement, this decision is made during the *decide* phase of the targeting process. A check must be made to ensure that the selected delivery system is still available and can conduct the engagement. If not, the targeting team must determine the best delivery system available to engage. Engaging targets should optimize the capabilities of—

- Direct fire weapon systems.
- Indirect fire weapon systems.
- Aviation.
- KLEs.
- IRCs.
- Civil affairs teams.

- US Government aid.
- Other network engagement enablers.

It is important to remember that at the battalion, the actions taken to deliver fires and IRCs have a direct impact on the operational environment of the individual infantry companies and subordinate units within the battalion’s battlespace.

Once detected, analysis produces the following decisions for the *deliver* phase:

- Time of attack/engagement.
- Planned targets/entities.
- Targets/entities of opportunity.
- Time-sensitive targets or entities.

**Time of Attack/Engagement.** The general tactical solutions are either immediate or deferred attack/engagement. The time of attack/engagement is determined according to the type of target/entity and its activity.

**Planned Targets/Entities.** Planned targets and entities are deliberately engaged to create the desired effects to support the commander’s objectives. There are two sub-categories of planned targets/entities list in table 4-15.

**Table 4-15. Planned Targets/Entities.**

Subcategories	Description
Scheduled	Targets/entities on which artillery, IRCs, and other fire support assets deliver their effects in accordance with a pre-established time schedule and sequence.
On-Call	Planned targets/entities engaged in response to a request for engagement rather than in accordance with an established time schedule. It requires less reaction time than a target of opportunity. The degree of pre-arrangement influences the reaction time from request to execution – the greater the pre-arrangement, the faster the reaction time.

**Targets/Entities of Opportunity.** A target/entity of opportunity is identified too late, or not selected for action in time, to be included in deliberate planning, which—when detected or located—meets criteria specific to achieving objectives and is processed using dynamic targeting or engagement. Alternately, it is visible to a surface or air sensor or observer, which is within range of available weapons and against which fire has not been scheduled or requested. See also dynamic targeting; target; unplanned target; and unanticipated target.

**Time-Sensitive Targets/Entities.** A time-sensitive target/entity will normally have intelligence collection and other assets dedicated to it. They should be limited in number and present significant risks to or opportunities for Marine forces. All engagements should be deliberately planned and prepared during the targeting cycle.



## Assess

Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment against specific targets and entities. Due to a lack of organic assets within the infantry battalion to conduct assessments, all attempts should be made to utilize available supporting assets to acquire BDA while they are available. Assessing targeting/engagement efforts is focused on evaluating the lethal or nonlethal effects generated on the target or entity as the result of engagement. The assessment of targeting/engagement efforts nests and supports the overall operation assessments process, and provides the commander with necessary feedback to support decision making. Commanders should use combat assessments in support of targeting/engagement efforts. Combat assessment is comprised of BDA, munitions effects assessment, and recommendations for reattack. The conduct of munitions effects assessment is usually performed at echelons higher than the battalion.

**Battle Damage Assessment.** Battle damage assessment is the timely and accurate estimate of damage or effects resulting from the application of military force, lethal or nonlethal, against a target or entity. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility, but requires extensive coordination with tactical elements to be effective. Table 4-16 list the three elements of BDA.

**Table 4-16. Battle Damage Assessment Elements.**

Elements	Description
<b>Physical Damage</b>	Damage to a target resulting from the application of military force.
<b>Functional Damage</b>	Functional damage is the degradation or destruction of the target's functional or operational capability to perform its intended mission and is a measure of achieving the commander's destruction criteria.
<b>Target System Assessment</b>	This is the broad assessment of the overall impact and effectiveness of the full spectrum of military force applied against the operation of an enemy target system, significant subdivisions of the system, or total combat effectiveness relative to the operational objectives established.

The requirement for BDA on specific planned targets or entities is determined during the *decide* phase of the targeting process; it is an important tool in the targeting process as it allows the battalion staff to determine the effects of its attacks and engagements. The commander and staff must be aware that the resources required for BDA are the same as those used for target or entity development and acquisition. Therefore, an asset utilized for BDA may not be available for target acquisition.

**Recommendations for Reattack/Reengagement.** A recommendation to reattack the same target or reengage the entity may be made if warranted, based on the BDA reported from an earlier attack or engagement. Battle damage assessment results may change future plans and

earlier decisions. The targeting team must periodically update the decisions made during the *decide* phase.

### **Roles and Responsibilities**

A dedicated targeting team may be established for a given mission, based on METT-T, if the commander requests additional personnel from HHQ. If the battalion does not receive additional personnel, the targeting team may be comprised of individuals from within the battalion as an additional duty. The FSC typically chairs the targeting team, which is usually comprised of personnel from the FSCC, S-2, S-3, the IO planner, and a civil affairs officer (if attached). Additional enablers can be added as required, based on external augments. The targeting board uses the D3A methodology during their working groups.

The targeting team has three primary functions in assisting the commander:

- Helps synchronize targeting and engagement activities.
- Recommends targets or entities for engagement. The team also recommends the most efficient and available assets to detect and engage the targets and entities.
- Identifies the level of assessment required.

The targeting team should be established in the battle rhythm of the staff and synchronize the engagement efforts of Marine forces across the multiple friendly, neutral, and threat networks.

## **FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION**

Scheduling the attack of a target is often the most effective way to provide fire support. However, when the time of attack approaches, the FSC must determine whether to engage the target or if the situation warrants a change in the scheduled attack system. Is the target planned or unplanned? Is the target accurately plotted and still visible? Can the target be engaged with available assets? Are priorities in the attack guidance matrix still accurate or have they changed? Will engagement endanger friendly forces or the local populace? The requirement for any additional FSCMs must be determined.

Fire mission clearing procedures specify the communication requirement between the FSCC and the supporting arm before firing a mission. The two options for clearing fires are positive and passive approval.

### **Positive Clearance**

Positive clearance requires a transmission from the battalion FSCC to the firing agency indicating approval or denial of all requests for fire from units operating in the battalion's AO. The firing unit will not fire the mission until the approval is received from the battalion FSCC. This method is used most often because it ensures that all coordination tasks are completed on all missions before they are fired. After a request for fires is transmitted to the firing unit, they may process the request and send the data to the gun crews as a "do not load" status. Once approval is received from the battalion FSCC, the status is changed and the unit fires the mission.

**Passive Clearance**

Passive clearance, commonly known as "silence is consent," does not require a transmission from the battalion FSCC before it is fired by the firing agency. The firing unit conducts basic clearance procedures based on its current status map and fires the mission unless otherwise directed. This method requires the battalion FSCC to quickly determine conflicts that may necessitate canceling the mission and performing required coordination with the firing agency. Passive clearance can only be used with decentralized FSCC message routing.

# CHAPTER 5

## INFORMATION

The Marine Corps established *information* as a warfighting function due to the increasing importance of information in the current and future operating environment. The *Information* warfighting function will integrate and leverage information environment capabilities, resources, and activities across the Marine Corps in support of any operation. It will also leverage the inherent informational aspects of a military operation, from the tactical to the strategic level of war, to support the Nation's defense, increase competitive advantage, and achieve mission objectives. The *Information* warfighting function will be executed at every level of command, down to the small unit level. It encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other warfighting functions to influence relevant actor perceptions, behavior, action or inaction, and support human and automated decision making.

### INFORMATION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

Information operations are the integration, coordination, and synchronization of all actions taken in the information environment to affect a relevant decision maker to create an operational advantage for the commander. The battalion executes IO as an inherent element of all operations to enable and enhance the overall ability to conduct successful military actions. The battalion commander applies IO across the competition continuum by integrating military actions, forces, and capabilities throughout the operational environment. Information operations should be viewed as an element of combat power, focusing on when and where it best supports an operation. Planning guidance from the commander ensures that the tasks and desired effects of IO are incorporated into all steps of the MCPP and that procedures are in place to assess their effects. For further information on IO, refer to JP 3-13, *Information Operations* and MCWP 3-32, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations*.

Although the planning and employment of IO generally follows the same processes as fires planning, the effects of IO are not subject to physical results. Unlike in the application of supporting arms where the intended target is largely subjected to the physical effects of fires without choice, IO are oriented toward the cognitive and informational dimensions. These dimensions make effects more difficult to apply precisely—regardless of the means of delivery. Infantry battalions are not manned with dedicated IO planners unless augmented with them. Most often, the IO planner is a member of the attached artillery liaison team. For this reason, and due to the importance of IO in overall planning, battalion commanders should designate at a minimum one organic officer to be school-trained as an IO planner vice waiting for the attachment of an artillery liaison team.

The commander will seek to generate nonlethal effects exclusively with entities in the friendly and neutral networks of the operational environment. The term *target* is reserved to describe a person, place, or physical object in the threat network (i.e., enemy). The battalion utilizes both lethal and nonlethal effects to engage targets. A target or entity can be used to describe facilities,

organizations, individuals, equipment, or virtual (i.e., non-tangible) things. The important distinction is the commander's decision to generate lethal effects only on targets, and not on friendly or neutral entities. The commander and staff determine and categorize the networks in the operational environment into friendly, neutral, and threat networks. Information operations engagement plans can be developed after this step that will separate targets from entities and be managed on separate lists.

Note: United States citizens should not be placed on any lists.

There are several common issues the battalion commander and staff must understand in planning and employing IO engagement with regard to their intended effects:

- Information must be interpreted by the intended target or entity, which is framed by personal opinions, experiences, and perceptions, as well as social and cognitive filters. Individuals or audiences will not always perceive information the same way.
- The effects created by IO generally take longer to generate.
- Effects generated within the information environment, especially within the cognitive dimension, are often difficult to measure and assess.
- The effects generated by IO can propagate well beyond the intended target, possibly accelerating, gaining strength, changing, or creating unintended consequences (i.e., both favorable and unfavorable).

## **DIMENSIONS OF THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT**

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Therefore, a solid understanding of the information environment must be achieved before any planning can begin. Information operations have the potential to influence the coherence of action and cohesion of relationships on the warfighting capabilities of threat forces and social structures in an AO. To influence a specific target or entity's decision-making process and physical actions, IO are conducted in three areas of the information environment.

- The cognitive dimension.
- The informational dimension.
- The physical dimension

### **The Cognitive Dimension**

The cognitive dimension consists of the beliefs of one or more persons whose decisions can impact the commander's end state; it is the hardest dimension to assess. The key to understanding this dimension is to understand that decisions are made based on culture, life experiences, relationships, outside events, ideology, and the influences of those inside and outside a decision maker's group. Added to these variables are the perceptions that are built on information collected on current events and the plans and beliefs of others. Ultimately, the battalion commander must determine how a targeted or engaged decision maker will act on their beliefs and perceptions and how that action will impact the commander's end state.

## **The Informational Dimension**

The informational dimension consists of the content of information and the way it flows to and from a decision maker to form a message. The content of the message is the idea or thought that is conveyed to key audiences. The message must flow so its intended audience can hear, read, or see it.

## **The Physical Dimension**

The physical dimension consists of both key individuals and networks, as well as a technical and physical infrastructure that supports the information flow to its intended audience:

- Key individuals are those that provide access to audiences of interest, have the ability to influence key audiences, or may be the audience of interest themselves.
- Networks are groups that support the process and dissemination of information to an audience. They can also shape the beliefs of others based on their ideology and goals.
- Technical infrastructure is what is needed to produce, process, receive, send, and store information so that the decision maker can interact with others and make decisions.
- The physical infrastructure supports the flow of information and is what houses the technical infrastructure, as well as key individuals and human networks.

## **INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES**

The use of IRCs in the planning and execution of tactical operations can be likened to using an additional capability in combined arms that can be utilized to generate effects. Although often described as a discrete set of capabilities, IO are much more. The capabilities used for IO should be selected based on mission requirements. Information-related capabilities involve activities that use data, information, or the electromagnetic spectrum to produce lethal or nonlethal effects in the physical or informational dimensions with an expressed intent to cause deliberate effects within the cognitive dimension of the information environment.

Information operations are multidiscipline and include a variety of elements that must be employed together within an integrated strategy. Some of these elements are more offensive, defensive, or informational in nature, but it is their integration into the concept of operations that ensures that the successful employment of IO is an essential part of operations. Some IRCs, such as EW, military information support operations (MISO), and cyberspace operations, require trained specialists and equipment. However, each element of the battalion must be able to employ other capabilities, such as operations security (OPSEC), military deception (MILDEC), KLEs, and spreading the commander's talking points/themes to support its operations.

## **Military Information Support Operations**

Military information support operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. These operations shape attitudes and influence a foreign audience's behavior, and may also support MILDEC. The enemy is likely to employ MISO to

influence the local populace, attempt to weaken the political and military will of US forces, and degrade United States and world community support for military actions. Behavior may generate either negative or positive support from the local population. Both detailed knowledge of the host nation's culture and individual self-discipline are required.

When MISO is used concurrently with other information-related activities, it must be closely integrated with those capabilities to convey selected information in a synchronized way. Information operations personnel will coordinate COMMSTRAT (i.e., the delivery of the truth), OPSEC (i.e., the protection of friendly critical information), MILDEC (i.e., the concealment of friendly intentions and creation of misleading perceptions), and CMO (i.e., the delivery of friendly civil actions) with MISO operations. The overall staff responsibility for the coordination of MISO falls under the S-3. The MISO officer is responsible to the S-3 for MISO planning and oversight.

The Marine Corps has a limited MISO capability that is dedicated to conducting tactical MISO. The US Army has the preponderance of MISO assets within the Department of Defense (DOD). Infantry companies and subordinate units—through their Marines—communicate approved messages or talking points, disseminate MISO products such as posters and handbills, and conduct face-to-face interactions with the populace. For more information about MISO, see MCWP 3-32.

### **Operations Security**

Operations security is the key to information denial. Its goal is to identify, select, and execute measures to eliminate or reduce indications and other sources of information which may be exploited by an enemy. Commanders must ensure that basic measures, such as adherence to communications plans, destruction of classified materials, self-censoring of personal communications (e.g., social media), and varying daily routines and activities, are stressed and become an integral part of each Marine's thought processes. Operations security is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities.

Operations security planning is accomplished through the OPSEC process. The OPSEC process has five distinctive steps that provide a framework for the systematic identification, analysis, and protection of information necessary to maintain essential secrecy. They include:

- Identification of critical information.
- Analysis of threats.
- Analysis of vulnerabilities.
- Assessment of risk.
- Application of appropriate OPSEC measures.

The S-3 has primary responsibility for OPSEC. Normally, an OPSEC officer is appointed and is responsible to the S-3 for OPSEC planning and oversight. For more information about OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, *Operations Security* or MCTP 3-32B, *Operations Security (OPSEC)*.

## **Military Deception**

The purpose of MILDEC is to cause the threat to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force capabilities or intentions by feeding information through their intelligence collection or information assets. It targets their decision makers' intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems and requires a thorough knowledge of the threat and their decision-making processes. The battalion may participate in MILDEC as part of a HHQ's deception plan or conduct tactical deception at their level. Deception operations may comprise of a feint, demonstration, ruse, display, or a combination of all. For more information on MILDEC, see JP 3-13.4, *Military Deception*, or the classified MCRP 3-32.2, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Deception*.

## **Electronic Warfare**

Electronic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the threat. It denies them an advantage in the electromagnetic spectrum and ensures friendly unimpeded access to the electromagnetic spectrum portion of the information environment. Electronic warfare can be applied from air, sea, land, and space by manned and unmanned systems and is employed to support military operations involving various levels of detection, denial, deception, disruption, degradation, protection, and destruction. Contributing to the success of IO, EW uses offensive and defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to shape, disrupt, and exploit the threat's use of the electromagnetic spectrum while protecting friendly freedom of action in that spectrum. Table 5-1 provides descriptions for the three subsets of EW.

**Table 5-1. Electronic Warfare.**

<b>Subset</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Electronic Attack</b>	Electronic attack involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment to degrade, neutralize, or destroy threat capabilities. It is used to generate nonlethal effects.
<b>Electronic Protection</b>	Electronic protection involves actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from effects of friendly or enemy use of the electromagnetic spectrum that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.
<b>Electronic Warfare Support</b>	Electronic warfare support involves actions under the direct control of an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate (or localize) sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting or engagement, planning, and conducting future operations.

Electronic warfare is the responsibility of the S-3. An EW officer is responsible for planning, coordinating, and tasking EW operations and activities. The EW officer coordinates with the S-2 to establish priorities between EW and signals intelligence missions, and also coordinates with the S-6 to facilitate the maximum use of the electromagnetic spectrum through electronic



protection, as well as to minimize interference. For more information on EW, refer to JP 3-13.1, *Electronic Warfare* or MCRP 3-32D.1, *Electronic Warfare*.

### **Civil-Military Operation**

Each military operation has a civil dimension which requires commanders to consider how their actions affect, and are affected by, the presence of noncombatants. Civil-military operations are the activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. It may include military forces performing activities and functions that would normally be the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions.

The activities the commander undertakes to create and foster positive relations between military forces and civilians are included in CMO. Civil-military operations maximize civilian support for the mission and minimize civilian interference with it. It is important for a unit to have an organic trained SME in CMO rather than relying on attachments. Normally, a civil affairs team is attached to a battalion for deployment.

Civil affairs describe designated personnel and distinct units. It is a force that assists in planning, facilitating coordination with civilian organizations, and conducting CMO. Civil-military operations build and use relationships with civilians and other groups to facilitate operational tasks across the competition continuum. They occur throughout the planning and execution of military operations and are not merely an adjunct specialty that occur before or after hostilities. Civil affairs operations are actions planned, coordinated, and executed by civil affairs forces, trained to enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civilian population in an operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. The civil affairs officer normally operates under the S-3.

Civil information management is the process that includes planning, collecting, analyzing, and producing civil information and consolidating it in a central database. Civil affairs teams and the battalion's other subordinate units conduct civil reconnaissance and push/pull civil information such, as ASCOPE and PMESII.

For more information on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations* or MCTP 3-03A.

### **Communication Strategy and Operations**

Communication strategy and operations is the public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward the public, both externally and internally. Communication strategy and operations methods range from direct communications with key public segments or individuals, such as face-to-face engagement or social media outreach, to indirect communications through traditional media channels or other third parties. The Marine Corps COMMSTRAT mission is to communicate and engage; building an understanding, credibility, trust, and mutually beneficial relationships with the domestic and foreign populace on

whom the success or failure of the mission depends. Commanders should use COMMSTRAT to publish accurate information to counter enemy misinformation and disinformation.

While COMMSTRAT and IO are separate functional areas for authoritative and organizational purposes, each directly support military objectives, counter enemy or adversary propaganda and misinformation, and deter enemy or adversary actions. Information operations and COMMSTRAT planners must coordinate their efforts and deconflict activities consistent with DOD principles of information. Along with the IO planner, COMMSTRAT should have pre-planned press releases, statements, and talking points that are nested with the HHQ's and complement all other operations. The unit's COMMSTRAT officer should release nothing until it has been approved by the commander or their delegated representative.

In an expeditionary setting, COMMSTRAT, MISO, and CMO may all disseminate information to the local population. Those planning IO, MISO, CMO, COMMSTRAT, MILDEC, EW, and cyberspace operations must actively coordinate within the IO working cell or coordinate with each other directly to reduce the chance of conflicting messages, referred to as *information fratricide*, that can happen unintentionally and inhibit progress toward objectives in the information environment. The COMMSTRAT officer participates in the MCPP to ensure COMMSTRAT considerations are included in planning. For more information on COMMSTRAT, refer to JP 3-61, *Public Affairs* or MCTP 3-30F, *Marine Corps Public Affairs*.

### **Information Assurance**

Information assurance consists of actions that protect and defend information systems by ensuring availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation; it includes information security, computer security, and communications security. Battalions must ensure that all Marines receive training related to information assurance through annual training, as well as continual reminders of the proper policies and operational procedures. For further information on information assurance, refer to JP 3-13 and MCWP 3-32.

### **Physical Security**

Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. Physical security contributes directly to information protection. Information, information-based processes, and information systems (such as C2 systems, weapon systems, and information infrastructures) are protected relative to the value of information they contain and the risks associate with the compromise or loss of information. The establishment of entry control to the unit's COC and the denial of access to classified systems by unauthorized personnel are types of physical security. For further information on physical assurance, refer to JP 3-13 and MCWP 3-32.

### **Counterintelligence**

Counterintelligence consists of the information gathered and activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, persons or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities. It enhances command security by denying enemies or adversaries information that might be used against friendly forces and

providing protection by identifying and neutralizing espionage, sabotage, subversion, or terrorism organizations or efforts. It provides critical intelligence support to command force protection efforts by helping identify potential threats, enemy or adversary capabilities, and planned intentions to friendly operations while helping deceive the enemy/adversary as to friendly capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. The integration of intelligence, counterintelligence, and operations culminates in a cohesive unit force protection program. For additional information on counterintelligence, refer to JP 2-01.2, *Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations* and MCRP 2-10A.2, *Counterintelligence*.

### **Cyberspace Operations**

Cyberspace operations stem from the increased use of networked computers and support the use of information systems by military and civilian organizations. Cyberspace operations are used, along with EW, to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure. The types of activities they include are defined as offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and DOD information network operations. Due to the continued expansion of wireless networking and the integration of computers and radio communications, some operations and capabilities blur the distinction between cyberspace operations and EW, and may require case-by-case determination when EW and cyberspace operations are assigned separate release authorities. Cyberspace operations encompass a broad range of mutually supporting staff functions. Key staff elements include the S-2, S-6, and S-3. For more information on cyberspace operations, refer to JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*.

## **INFORMATION OPERATIONS EFFECTS**

The commander uses IRCs to create effects that contribute to achieving objectives. Planners use tactical tasks in describing the desired effects of IO. In doing so, planners must understand these tasks may have unique meanings when describing effects. The desired effects depend on the techniques, procedures, and MOEs utilized. Table 5-2 lists a selection of effects that can be generated by the employment of IRCs.

**Table 5-2. Desired Effects of Information-Related Capabilities.**

Advise	Assist	Build	Coordinate	Contain
Control	Compel	Deceive	Defeat	Degrade
Deny	Destroy	Disengage	Dislocate	Disrupt
Divert	Enable	Exploit	Influence	Isolate
Neutralize	Protect	Respond	Restore	Support

For more information on effects, refer to JP 3-13, MCWP 3-32 and MCTP 3-02A.

# CHAPTER 6

## OFFENSE

The offense is the decisive form of warfare. The Marine Corps warfighting philosophy is offensive in nature, focused on the enemy, and uses speed to seize the initiative and degrade the enemy's ability to resist. Offensive operations allow battalion commanders to impose their will upon an enemy by shattering the enemy's moral, mental, and physical cohesion. Offensive action often exposes the attacker, which requires superior combat power at the point of attack to achieve success. Building sufficient combat forces to exploit success requires the commander to accept risk in other areas. Even when in the defense or conducting stability activities, wresting the initiative from the enemy requires offensive action. Offensive action seeks to—

- Destroy enemy forces and equipment.
- Deceive and divert the enemy.
- Deprive the enemy of resources.
- Gain information.
- Fix the enemy in place.
- Seize key terrain.
- Force an enemy decision.
- Disrupt enemy actions or preparations.

### PURPOSE OF THE OFFENSE

#### Characteristics of the Offense

The battalion commander seeks to gain and maintain the initiative and keep constant pressure on the enemy throughout the battalion's AO. To maintain constant pressure, the battalion transitions from one offensive action to another without ceasing. Success in the offense depends on the proper application of its fundamental characteristics—surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity. For additional information, refer to MCWP 3-01.

**Surprise.** Surprise can lead to shock and prevent the enemy from reacting, if only temporarily. It often means adopting a COA that the enemy does not expect. Factors that contribute to surprise include:

- Speed.
- Attacking during periods of limited visibility.
- Use of feints or demonstrations.
- Employment of IRCs.
- Use of ruses and tactical deception.
- Varying routes and patterns.
- Stealth.
- Timely and accurate intelligence.

**Concentration.** The battalion achieves concentration by massing the effects of combat power and resources. Precise timing, accurate maneuver, and speed allow battalion commanders to mass their forces. Battalion commanders balance the need to generate lethal and nonlethal effects by concentrating their forces with the need to disperse their forces to avoid enemy targeting or giving away the element of surprise. At the battalion level, concentration includes the combination of massing organic and supporting fires, massing attached and supporting elements (e.g., tanks, AAVs, and combat engineers), and task-organizing infantry companies. The battalion can achieve concentration through—

- Designating the main effort and allocating resources to support it.
- Careful planning and coordination based on METT-T, combined with accurate, timely ISR.
- Positioning supporting assets within ranges to mass their effects at the decisive point.
- Synchronizing supporting fires (i.e., direct, indirect, and IRCs) with maneuver to mass combat power in support of the main effort.

**Tempo.** Tempo is the ability to adjust the level of activities relative to battle conditions and the enemy's ability to recognize and react. It is the controlled rate of military action. The goal is to maintain pressure on the enemy, whether quickly or slowly. The commander's ability to control and alter tempo promotes surprise, keeps the enemy off balance, denies the enemy freedom of action, and contributes to the security of the battalion. The commander can achieve tempo through—

- Standard staff processes and battle drills.
- Simple and rapid offensive actions.
- Effective use of combined arms.
- Anticipation of culminating points and areas of friction.

**Audacity.** Battalion commanders demonstrate audacity by executing plans in a bold and tenacious manner, taking prudent risks, and being decisive in the implementation of the battalion's actions. The commander understands when and where to take risks, identifies control measures, and executes boldly. The commander dispels uncertainty through action; lack of information is compensated for by seizing the initiative and pressing the fight. Superior C2 systems provide the battalion commander the ability to make quick assessments of the situation, to conduct on-the-spot risk assessments, and to make bold decisions.

### **Fundamentals of the Offense**

While the characteristics of offensive operations are generalities, the fundamentals of offensive operations facilitate forcing an enemy to react and surrender the initiative to the attacking force. These fundamentals are used as references and are applied judiciously by commanders as they assess the battlefield and the mission. The fundamentals do not replace the principles of war, but reflect general truths resulting from the application of the principles to maneuver warfare

doctrine, task organization capabilities, and the competition continuum. The following fundamentals also apply to the lowest level within the infantry battalion:

- Orient on the enemy.
- Gain and maintain contact.
- Develop the situation.
- Concentrate superior firepower at the decisive time and place.
- Achieve surprise.
- Exploit known enemy weaknesses.
- Seize or control key terrain.
- Gain and maintain the initiative.
- Neutralize the enemy's ability to react.
- Advance by fire and maneuver.
- Maintain momentum.
- Act quickly.
- Exploit success.
- Be flexible.
- Be aggressive.
- Provide for the security of the force.

### **Simultaneous Balance**

While one portion of a force conducts an attack, another part of the force may conduct a blocking action, and yet another may assist with displaced civilians. This is the concept of balance and simultaneity, meaning that within almost any given military operation, a combination of offense, defense, and stability activities are conducted. Though a combination of different units and different echelons conduct operations concurrently in the same operation, they may be prioritized and weighted differently depending on METT-T considerations. Therefore, units perform different combinations of offense, defense and stability activities to achieve success. Frequent changes may take place depending on mission, situation, and environment. A good commander chooses the right combination of offense, defense, and stability to place the enemy at the greatest disadvantage. Other tactical operations are conducted to support the execution of offense, defense, and stability tasks and activities. These operations are never decisive in and of themselves; rather, they enable other operations to be decisive.

### **Hasty Versus Deliberate Operations**

How quickly or deliberately a battalion conducts an attack is based upon the amount of planning and preparation time available. The less time available, the hastier the operation; the more time available, the more deliberate it is. A hasty operation is one in which the tactical situation requires the use of immediately available forces and fragmentary orders to perform actions with minimal preparation. A deliberate operation, by contrast, is one in which the tactical situation allows the development and coordination of detailed plans, mission-specific rehearsals, and task-organization of forces through preparation and synchronized shaping and sustaining actions.

## Limited Visibility Operations

Daylight operations are less stressful psychologically and physically on the attacker. However, daylight operations also benefit the defender while failing to take advantage of Marines' generally superior night vision and navigational capabilities. Commanders planning attacks at night—or during inclement weather conditions—must consider their forces' abilities to accomplish the mission based upon their training. Limited visibility conditions complicate the integration of functions, such as intelligence collection, identifying and engaging targets, navigating without detection and many other functions. Table 6-1 outlines the advantages and disadvantages of limited visibility attacks.

**Table 6-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Limited Visibility Operations.**

Advantages of Limited Visibility Operations	Disadvantages of Limited Visibility Operations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Defenses are more susceptible to infiltration.</li> <li>- Darkness can conceal the movement of large forces.</li> <li>- Physical and psychological factors favor the attacker, as shock, disorientation, and isolation are easier to achieve.</li> <li>- Aircraft can operate more safely because air defenders with only optical sights have greater difficulty acquiring targets at night.</li> <li>- The element of surprise may increase because defenders are more susceptible to deception techniques, such as dummy lights, noise, smoke, and fires.</li> <li>- The defender cannot employ reserves as quickly as in daylight conditions.</li> <li>- US forces trained in a limited visibility environment are superior to most potential opponents.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Control of maneuver forces in the absence of night vision devices is more difficult.</li> <li>- A well-rehearsed defender can react more quickly to changing situations than the attacker.</li> <li>- The attacker has difficulty determining the limits of obstacle systems.</li> <li>- Restrictive terrain is more difficult to traverse.</li> <li>- Light, smoke, noise, and fires can deceive the attacker.</li> <li>- The attacker can lose momentum because attacks are conducted at a reduced speed to maintain the coherence of the unit.</li> <li>- Land navigation, without global positioning systems, is more difficult at night; units may become separated, cohesion can be lost, and support elements can move to the wrong positions.</li> <li>- The enemy can reposition or emplace obstacles during darkness without being detected by friendly ISR assets.</li> <li>- Adjusting indirect fire is difficult, even with night vision devices or illumination.</li> <li>- Units require significantly larger quantities of signal ammunition such as smoke, tracers, flares, and illumination rounds.</li> <li>- Units have more difficulty locating and evacuating casualties.</li> <li>- The risk of fratricide may increase.</li> </ul>

The primary planning factors for limited visibility attacks are the capabilities of both the attacker and the defender. Highly trained units equipped with current night vision devices (NVDs) can conduct limited visibility attacks similar to the way they conduct daylight attacks, even against a similarly equipped and trained enemy. Units without extensive NVDs or effective training can still use conditions of limited visibility to conceal movement and close with the enemy, but require more time and control measures to do so.

The presence or lack of illumination influences the conduct of limited visibility attacks. Illuminated attacks are almost like daylight attacks. The commander can also choose to conduct a non-illuminated attack until subordinate forces make contact, at which point the objective can be illuminated. Once illuminated, the attack should continue with illumination. All leaders must understand the time, conditions, and authority required for the employment of illumination. Illumination can also be effective in confusing or deceiving the enemy.

## TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

There are four types of offensive operations—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. These operations may occur in sequence, simultaneously, or independently across the depth of the battlespace. For example, a movement to contact may be so successful that it immediately leads to exploitation or an attack may lead directly to pursuit. An offensive operation may be used to accomplish an enemy-oriented tactical tasks such as destroy or interdict. For a complete list of tactical tasks, see appendix C.

### Movement to Contact

A movement to contact is an offensive operation conducted to develop the situation, establish and regain contact with the enemy utilizing the smallest force possible (e.g., fire team or squad), or to approach an AO. The battalion conducts movement to contact when the tactical situation is not clear or when the enemy has broken contact. Being surprised by inadvertently running into the enemy is always a possibility—but not the preferred tactical option. Advanced ISR technologies provide battalions with enhanced situational awareness; however, these systems do not provide the commander with perfect intelligence which answers all of the unknowns about the enemy force. Battalions conduct movement to contact independently or as part of a larger force—

- To locate and defeat the enemy.
- To develop the situation for HHQ.
- When they lack ISR assets or when operating in an EW-degraded environment.

Reconnaissance, surveillance, and flexibility are essential in gaining and maintaining the initiative. The movement to contact terminates with the occupation of an assigned objective or when enemy resistance requires the battalion to deploy and attack to continue forward movement. A battalion given a movement to contact mission is assigned an axis of advance and an objective at a depth to ensure contact with the enemy. The two techniques of a movement to contact are the *approach march* and the *search and attack*.

**Approach March.** The approach march is a type of movement to contact, or advance, used when direct contact with the enemy is likely or intended. The approach march ends when ground contact with the enemy is made or when the attack position is occupied. Commanders conduct this type of movement when seeking to gain or regain contact with the enemy and to develop specific information on the enemy's disposition. All units from platoon and above can conduct an approach march. An approach march can be conducted by any form of ground movement, and may be along an assigned axis of advance (refer to fig. 6-1 on page 6-7).



Commanders conducting an approach march use the following elements when organizing their forces as depicted in table 6-2.

**Table 6-2. Approach March Elements.**

<b>Element</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Advance Guard</b>	A task-organized company employed forward of the main body to protect against surprise attack, ensure uninterrupted movement, remove obstacles, develop the situation, and cover the deployment of the main body.
<b>Main Body</b>	The element within the approach march that conducts the decisive action. It may travel in one or more separate columns depending on METT-T considerations. Combat elements within the main body need to be prepared for action when security elements make contact with the enemy. Upon contact, elements within the main body deploy to conduct decisive actions against the enemy. The main body is usually comprised of elements of the battalion's heavy mortar section, engineers, and H&S company and/or weapons company.
<b>Flank and Rear Security</b>	These elements are employed when the unit's flanks are not covered by adjacent units and 360-degree security is needed, or when a connecting file to adjacent units is required.

*Planning Considerations.* Planning for an approach march begins with an intelligence estimate of the enemy. The battalion commander's vision of how the approach march is conducted is based on the anticipation of the probable points of enemy contact that may arise, plus the impact of terrain on mobility and mutual support between elements of the battalion. Approach marches are conducted with a specific purpose, which may be one of the following:

- To regain contact with the enemy; the decisive action may be for the main body to deploy in an attack by fire position, freeing other elements to conduct offensive actions.
- As part of an exploitation, the battalion may deploy its main body for a decisive action against any organized resistance of company strength or greater.

The commander plans shaping actions as part of the approach march. Such shaping actions seek to suppress or neutralize enemy reserves, interdict and isolate possible enemy routes into and out of the battlespace, and destroy enemy units that prematurely expose themselves.

*Execution Considerations.* All elements of the battalion must synchronize their actions with adjacent and subordinate units, maintaining contact and mutual support, with the goal of mitigating the chances of enemy infiltration or exploitation of seams between friendly units. The commander seeks to accomplish the following during execution:

- React to enemy contact in accordance with the immediate action drills prescribed in the battalion's TACSOP.
- Make contact with the enemy using the smallest force possible.
- Maintain contact between the main body, advance guard, security elements, and rear guard.
- Ensure that the route or axis of advance traveled by the main body is free of enemy forces.

- Any canalizing terrain being utilized by the main body has been cleared by the advanced guard.
- Proper distance is maintained between the main body and advanced guard to maintain flexibility for maneuver and to increase reaction time.
- Based on METT-T, the battalion may utilize various routes and multiple columns during movement to remain flexible.




Figure 6-1. Force Organization for an Approach March.

**Search and Attack.** The approach march is a relatively direct form of movement to contact. Alternately, the search and attack is used when the location of the enemy cannot be determined to any targetable accuracy other than through a physical search, when the enemy is operating in small elements, when conducting the tactical task of clearing, or when the battalion seeks to further develop the situation within a given area. Some examples of search and attack situations are depicted in table 6-3 on page 6-8.

**Table 6-3. Search and Attack Situations.**

<b>Situation</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Protect the Force</b>	Prevents an enemy from massing for an attack or conducting other operations such as disruption/destruction of friendly military or civilian operations, equipment, property, and key facilities.
<b>Collect Information</b>	Gain information about the enemy, the operational environment, and other intelligence required to support operations.
<b>Destroy the Enemy</b>	Destroy enemy units in the AO.
<b>Deny the Area</b>	Prevents an enemy from operating unhindered in a given area that it might use as a base camp or for logistic support.

*Planning Considerations.* Conducting search and attack operations requires significant detailed planning due to numerous small units moving throughout the battalion’s AO. Key planning considerations are geometries of fire, control measures, intelligence updates, communications, linkup procedures, and logistical support. Creating an environment in which subordinate units safely and efficiently operate with maximum independence and initiative is difficult. An honest assessment of the battalion’s abilities to find, fix, and finish the enemy is required before employing this movement to contact technique.

*Execution Considerations.* The daily actions of a search and attack operation are characterized by stealth, aggressiveness, flexibility, sustainment, rapid decision making, and exploiting opportunities. Commanders must not restrict themselves to certain methods of employment, but rather use good problem framing and design to determine the best way to locate, fix, and eliminate threats and resolve conflict in their AOs.

*Organization.* The commander assumes that contact with an enemy is highly likely. The battalion is task-organized into the elements listed in table 6-4, which are designed to locate and fix the threat and decisively resolve the issue. Mission-related considerations dictate whether the commander tasks subordinate elements with one or all of these various tasks. A robust enemy threat might dictate that one company locates the enemy, another company maneuvers to fix the threat, and a last company provides the decisive element. A lesser enemy threat might dictate that all infantry companies in the battalion deploy organized to carry out all three tasks themselves. Battalions assist subordinate companies by ensuring the availability of supporting fires and other resources.

**Table 6-4. Search and Attack Elements.**

<b>Elements</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Reconnaissance Element</b>	Element tasked with finding the enemy through patrols, OPs, approach march techniques, tracking techniques (which include locating enemies hiding among the population), or a combination of all of these. When the enemy is located or identified, the reconnaissance element reports to the battalion COC, continues to track the threat, and prepares for the arrival of follow-on forces.
<b>Fixing Element</b>	Deploys with enough combat power and resources to prevent the enemy from retrograding or reinforcing, until the arrival of the main effort or finishing element.
<b>Finishing Element</b>	Element tasked with finishing the enemy or resolving a situation (i.e., accomplishing the commander’s desired end state). The finishing element is often designated the main effort.

## **Attack**

An attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. When the commander decides to attack or the opportunity to attack occurs during combat operations, the execution of that attack must mass the effects of overwhelming combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo and intensity that cannot be matched by the enemy. The resulting combat should not be a contest between near equals. Attackers must be determined to seek decision on the ground of their choosing through the deliberate synchronization and employment of the combined arms team.

The commander maneuvers to avoid enemy strengths and to create opportunities to increase the effects of friendly fires. The commander secures surprise by making unexpected maneuvers, rapidly changing the tempo of operations, avoiding observation, and using deception techniques and procedures. The commander seeks to overwhelm the enemy with one or more unexpected blows before the enemy has time to react in an organized fashion. This occurs when the attacking force is able to engage the defending enemy force from positions that place the attacking force in a position of advantage with respect to the defending enemy force, such as engaging the enemy from a flanking position. Echelon security forces prevent the enemy from discovering friendly dispositions, capabilities, and intentions, or interfering with the preparations for the attack. Finally, the commander maneuvers to close with and destroy the enemy by close combat and shock effect. Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces or seizes and retains ground. Close combat encompasses all actions that place friendly forces in immediate contact with the enemy where the commander uses direct fire and movement in combination to defeat or destroy enemy forces or seize and retain ground.

A commander can overwhelm an enemy by the early seizing and retaining of key and decisive terrain that provides dominating observation, cover and concealment, and better fields of fire to facilitate the maneuver of friendly forces. If decisive terrain is present, the commander designates it to communicate its importance in the commander's concept of operations, first to the staff and later to subordinate commanders. The friendly force must control decisive terrain to successfully accomplish its mission.

***Special Purpose Attacks.*** Commanders may execute an attack for any number of reasons, to include the other types of attack—

- Spoiling attack.
- Counterattack.
- Feint.
- Demonstration.
- Reconnaissance in force.
- Raid.
- Ambush.

***Spoiling Attack.*** A spoiling attack is a deliberate attack to seriously impair a hostile attack while the enemy is still forming or assembling for it (e.g., with an armed ISR asset). It is killing the enemy as the unit deems that it is justified by the current ROE. The enemy forces may be

transporting weapons, staging for an attack, or preparing an IED, for example. There are two conditions that must be met to conduct a successful and survivable spoiling attack:

- The objective must be obtainable prior to the enemy being able to respond to the attack in a synchronized and coordinated manner.
- The commander must ensure that the force conducting the spoiling attack does not become decisively engaged or vulnerable to destruction.

*Counterattack.* The counterattack is an attack conducted by a defending force against an attacking force to regain lost ground, cut off or destroy enemy advance units, or deny the enemy the purpose of attack. Similar to the use of a reserve, pre-planned counterattacks integrated into the defensive plan are preferred over improvised counterattacks that risk reinforcing failure. Commanders conduct counterattacks either with a reserve or with their least committed maneuver elements. Execution of the counterattack occurs after the enemy launches its attack, reveals its main effort, or creates an assailable flank. Combat power and mobility issues are common when attempting to employ a counterattack as the decisive action.

*Feint.* Feints are limited scope attacks with extremely specific objectives intended to cause the enemy to either react in a particular way or to delay or disrupt reaction, such as repositioning forces, committing reserves, or shifting fires. The battalion is unlikely to assign a subordinate unit to conduct a feint, but might be given the mission to conduct a full-scale attack on a limited objective as the feint of a larger force. A feint is most effective when—

- It is integrated with IO.
- It reinforces enemy expectations.
- It appears as a definite threat.
- The enemy commits a large reserve early.
- The attacker faces several feasible courses of action.

A feint follows the same sequence as other offensive operations and seeks to—

- Force the enemy into improper deployment or use of its reserves.
- Attract enemy supporting fires away from the friendly main effort.
- Force the enemy to reveal its defensive fires and measures.
- Accustom the enemy to expecting shallow, limited attacks, and therefore gain surprise for a deep attack.

*Demonstration.* Similar to a feint, a demonstration is an attack designed to deceive the enemy about the location of the main attack; however, the friendly force does not make contact with the enemy. A demonstration may be an economy of force measure and must be incorporated with IO. The battalion is likely to participate in a demonstration as part of a larger force. However, in certain circumstances and based on METT-T considerations, the battalion may be able to conduct a demonstration on its own. Table 6-5 lists considerations when participating in a demonstration as part of a larger force.

**Table 6-5. Demonstration Considerations.**

Consideration	Description
Limit of Advance	The limit of advance is a control measure that ensures the enemy can see the demonstration force, but cannot effectively engage it with direct fires.
Security Measures	Security measures, such as robust local security or a counter-reconnaissance plan, prevent engagement by the enemy.
Contingency Plans	The demonstration force must be prepared to respond effectively to enemy direct or indirect fires while avoiding decisive engagement.
Follow-on Orders	Clear and specific follow-on orders must ensure that the demonstration force is prepared to exploit the success of the main attack if necessary.

*Reconnaissance in Force.* The reconnaissance in force is a type of attack made to obtain information and to locate and test enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions. It is used when knowledge of the enemy is vague and there is insufficient time or resources to develop the situation. Deciding whether to reconnoiter in force, the battalion commander considers—

- Current known information on the enemy.
- The efficiency and speed of other intelligence collection assets.
- The extent to which the intent of future plans may be divulged by the reconnaissance in force.
- The possibility that the reconnaissance in force may lead to decisive engagement or an unexpected opportunity.

When conducting reconnaissance in force, a force must be large enough to cause the enemy to—

- Disclose their positions.
- Disclose their dispositions and strength.
- Disclose planned fires.
- Disclose planned use of their reserve.


*Raid.* A raid is a limited objective attack involving a swift penetration into a hostile area and a planned withdrawal upon completion. The planned withdrawal separates raids from other types of attack. Raids may be conducted in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments. They can be conducted in daylight or limited visibility, and both within or beyond the scope of supporting friendly units or supporting arms. When a raid is conducted beyond the reasonable support of a parent unit, the raid force is an independent unit for the duration of the raid and should be task-organized (i.e., weighted) with resources accordingly. Raids are conducted for one of the following purposes:

- Psychological effects.
- The destruction of enemy personnel or equipment.
- Harassment.
- To obtain information.
- Evacuation and recovery of friendly forces or equipment.
- Diversion and deception.

*Ambush.* An ambush is a surprise attack by fire from concealed positions designed to reduce the overall combat effectiveness of an enemy force, capture or harass a threat, and to destroy or capture equipment or supplies, maximizing the use of surprise. Ambushes may be hasty or deliberate depending on the time available and the enemy situation. The actual method used to conduct the ambush varies by the level of threat, the terrain, and the skill of the ambush force. The two general types of ambushes are *point* and *area*. See table 6-6 for their descriptions. Figures 6-2 and 6-3, on page 6-14, show examples of linear and L-shaped ambush formations. Figure 6-4 on page 6-14 shows an area ambush.

**Table 6-6. Ambush Types.**

<b>Ambush</b>	<b>Description</b>
<b>Point</b>	A point ambush is characterized by the ambush force deploying to attack the enemy in a single kill zone. Though the battalion can conduct a point ambush, normally they are conducted by the infantry companies or other subordinate units of the battalion. Point ambushes are typically conducted using either a linear or L-shaped formation.
<b>Area</b>	An area ambush is characterized by the ambush force deploying to conduct several point ambushes throughout an area. Area ambushes are usually not conducted by a force smaller than platoon strength.



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Figure 6-2. Linear Ambush.






Figure 6-3. L-shaped Ambush.




Figure 6-4. Example of an Area Ambush.

### Exploitation

The ability to exploit success for further gain is why the offense is the form of decision on the battlefield. By disorganizing the enemy in depth following a successful offensive action,

exploitation multiplies the initial success by destroying vulnerable assets and resources, preventing the enemy from successfully disengaging and re-establishing other means of resistance, and maintaining dominant tempo by exposing further opportunities for exploitation. Battalions must plan to exploit every offensive action. Initiative, boldness, and the unhesitating employment of uncommitted forces characterize exploitation, which can occur physically or through measures such as IO. The commander designs the exploitation for the following reasons:

- To maintain pressure on the enemy.
- To compound and take advantage of the enemy's disorganization.
- To shatter the enemy's will to resist.
- To seize decisive or key terrain.

During a hasty attack, the force in contact normally continues the attack, transitioning to exploitation. In the deliberate attack, the commander's principal tool for exploitation is normally the reserve, appropriately constituted to execute the decisive action of the mission (such as combat forces, engineering assets, CMO, IO, or various combinations thereof).

### **Pursuit**

Friendly forces shift to pursuit once the enemy's will to resist is broken. The difference between exploitation and a pursuit is the condition of the enemy. The object of a pursuit is to destroy the enemy force or the ability of the enemy to affect security of the local populace. Like exploitation, pursuit requires broad, decentralized control and rapid movement. The commander may use the battalion's organic assets or external resources to maintain observation on the enemy. Maximum use of C2 and ISR assets aids momentum. The pursuit may be conducted using direct pressure or a combination.

**Direct Pressure.** This is conducted when the commander tasks only a single force, most likely a company, to maintain pressure on the retrograding enemy by conducting offensive action along the same routes used by the enemy.

**Combination.** The commander designates a force to maintain direct pressure on the enemy's main body, denying the enemy the ability to disengage or reconstitute a defense. The commander also designates an encircling force that maneuvers to the enemy's flanks or rear to block the escape.

## **ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFENSE**

### **Organization of the Battlespace**

During problem framing for offensive operations, the battalion commander must visualize and describe the battlespace. There are two methods to do this—using spatially or purpose-based battlespace frameworks. There is no requirement to use the same method as the HHQ plan. The commander may utilize a combination of both, or use them simultaneously within the battlespace. For example, a division or MEF may frame the battlespace spatially while a regiment and one of its battalions frame the battlespace with the purpose-based method.

***Spatial-Based Battlespace Framework.*** Spatially-based battlespace frameworks focus on arranging operations and forces in terms of time, space, and geography. They are most often associated with traditional warfare (i.e., as opposed to irregular warfare), where friendly forces occupy a contiguous operational area. Spatially-based battlespace frameworks consist of deep, close, and rear operations.

***Deep.*** Deep operations are conducted by units charged with security and reconnaissance tasks to locate enemy forces. Commanders can seize initiative, create windows of opportunity, restrict the enemy's freedom of action, and disrupt the cohesion and tempo of enemy operations by employing deep operations.

***Close.*** Close operations are directed against the main enemy force in the immediate area of the friendly main force. In close operations, fires and maneuver are combined to destroy the enemy.

***Rear.*** Sustainment and security are normally the dominant rear area activities to ensure the force's freedom of action and continuity of operations, logistics, and command and control.

***Purpose-Based Battlespace Framework.*** The purpose-based method breaks down the battlespace into shaping, decisive, and sustaining actions. The focus is on arranging operations, forces, and resources in terms of time, conditions, and effects. The purpose-based method is most often associated with irregular warfare. When using the purpose-based method to frame the battlespace, commanders should identify their vision of the decisive point.


A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack. The decisive point is the place where the commander applies decisive action against the enemy's critical vulnerability to achieve success. The decisive point can be focused against the enemy, terrain, friendly forces, or the environment; it does not have to be achieved by lethal means. For example, in a stability mission, the decisive point may be the support of the local population, the establishment of legitimate governance, or the protection of certain populations. In more lethal operations, it could be the seizure of footholds in the enemy's defense, the destruction of the enemy's center of gravity, or the seizure of key avenues of approach.

***Shaping Actions.*** Shaping actions create and set the conditions for the success of the decisive action. Shaping actions establish conditions for decisive actions through the generation of lethal and nonlethal effects on friendly, neutral, and threat entities. Shaping actions may occur throughout a unit's AO, usually by reconnaissance and security forces, but may involve any combination of forces and capabilities. Shaping actions may occur before, during, or after the decisive actions begin.

***Decisive Actions.*** Decisive actions are normally accomplished by the designated main effort. They determine the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive action is the focal point around which commanders design the entire operation. Multiple units may be engaged in the same decisive action.

**Sustaining Actions.** Sustaining actions occur throughout the battalion's AO and enable the success of decisive and shaping actions by sustaining and maintaining combat power. Sustaining actions differ from decisive and shaping actions in that they are focused on friendly forces rather than externally on the enemy or environment. They typically address important sustainment and protection actions that are essential to the overall success of the mission.

**Contiguous and Non-Contiguous.** The battalion commander may choose to organize the AO by assigning company or other subordinate unit commanders AOs that may be contiguous, non-contiguous, or a combination of both. Areas of operation can use both spatial and purpose-based battlespace frameworks. The establishment of contiguous or noncontiguous AOs is determined on mission factors and METT-T considerations (refer to fig. 6-5).



**Figure 6-5. Contiguous and Non-Contiguous Areas of Operation.**

**Contiguous Area of Operation.** With a contiguous AO, all of a commander's subordinate forces' AOs share one or more common boundary. They maintain distinctive forward, lateral, and rear boundaries. Units occupying contiguous AOs are normally within supporting distance of one another. The commander may establish contiguous AOs for the following reasons:

- The AO is of limited size to accommodate the force.
- Political boundaries or the enemy disposition require the concentration of force.
- When there is a risk of being defeated in detail by enemy forces, the enemy situation is not clear, or when the friendly force is significantly outnumbered.

- The concentration of combat power along a single axis of advance, movement corridor, or avenue of approach is required.

**Non-Contiguous Area of Operation.** With a non-contiguous AO, one or more of the commander's subordinate forces' AOs do not share a common boundary. The areas lying between the subordinate units remains the responsibility of the battalion. Noncontiguous AOs do not possess distinctive forward, lateral, or rear boundaries. The AO consists of a boundary which encompasses the whole unit. Noncontiguous AOs may be utilized by elements of the battalion employed as company landing teams or platoons conducting distributed operations. Some reasons why the commander may establish noncontiguous AOs are:

- Limited friendly forces must occupy or control key terrain that is widely separated. Key terrain is any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.
- Subordinate units do not need to provide mutual support.
- Dispersed enemy or population centers throughout the AO require a corresponding dispersal of friendly units.
- Operations in areas not included in assigned noncontiguous AOs are the responsibility of the common higher commander.

The use of noncontiguous AOs presents the commander with the difficult task of conducting sustainment and resupply. The utmost use of innovative means of logistics operations is required. The commander is confronted with a decision regarding the establishment of lines of communication (LOCs) with subordinate units. General options include:

- Assigning route security for each main supply route established.
- Assume risk by having CSS elements conduct convoys, relying only on their organic self-defense capabilities for protection, with augmentation from quick reaction forces when within range.
- Assign subordinate units the mission of providing convoy security for each convoy.

### **Organization of the Force**

Once the commander has determined the battlespace framework, the main effort, supporting efforts, and reserve are determined.

**Main Effort.** The main effort is the element that achieves the battalion's decisive action; it is the designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. Battalion commanders weight the main effort with the appropriate resources to ensure success at the decisive point. This often means the main effort has the greatest concentration of combat power. As the element that achieves the battalion's mission, the mission of the main effort, in terms of task and purpose, should nest directly with the battalion's task and purpose.

**Supporting Effort.** Supporting efforts provide support to the main effort, allowing it to achieve success at the decisive point. The mission assigned to supporting efforts must directly support the main effort's purpose. Such nesting allows supporting efforts to exercise initiative to

react on the battlefield in ways to ensure the main effort's success, including being prepared to assume the main effort's mission. Supporting efforts receive the combat power, attachments, and any other enablers needed to accomplish their mission in support of the main effort.

**Reserve.** The reserve is that portion of the force which is withheld from action at the beginning of an engagement to be available for a decisive action. The commander determines the size of the reserve based on how much is known about the enemy and the enemy's most likely COA. The reserve is not a committed force and thus does not normally have a full suite of combat multipliers available to it until its commitment. The primary tasks for a reserve are to—

- Retain the initiative.
- Conduct the decisive action.
- Exploit success.
- Relieve depleted units and provide for continued operations.
- React to threats against the battalion's rear area.
- Cover a retrograde movement.
- Counter tactical setbacks (e.g., enemy counterattacks, penetrations, envelopments).

A commander should always attempt to retain a reserve, reconstituting a reserve force whenever possible upon the commitment of the primary reserve. In extreme circumstances where the commander is faced with limited forces, the commander may designate a "least engaged" subordinate unit as the reserve.

### **Nesting of Purpose**

Throughout the MAGTF, units' actions must be nested to achieve decisive action. The battalion's task and purpose are usually informed by direction from its HHQ; the commander develops methods, tasks, and purposes for subordinate elements through the use of the MCPP.

**Purpose.** The purpose of the main effort achieves the decisive action. All supporting efforts' purposes should either directly support or set conditions to achieve the decisive action.

**Tasks.** Subordinate elements' tasks are directed to achieve the purposes. Subordinate commanders may deviate from their tasks if the situation permits, as long as it achieves their purpose.

**Method.** Commanders may dictate which method a subordinate unit uses to achieve its task. This is optional and more restrictive; but may be required to synchronize forces, efforts, and battlefield geometry.


## **OFFENSIVE MANEUVER**

### **Forms of Offensive Maneuver**

The six forms of offensive maneuver—frontal attack, flanking attack, envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, and penetration—are the basic techniques a force can use to conduct offensive operations to gain advantage over the enemy. Each form of maneuver has a specific

purpose relative to the enemy. The battalion commander chooses the form of maneuver that best accomplishes the mission. The major difference between the flanking attack, envelopment, and turning movement is the depth of attack.


**Frontal Attack.** A frontal attack is a form of maneuver in which the main action is directed against the front of the enemy forces. Commanders use a frontal attack when they seek to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force as a shaping action to allow offensive actions elsewhere. It is generally the least desirable form of maneuver because it exposes the attacker to the concentrated fire of the defender and limits the effectiveness of the attacker's own fires. When conducting a frontal attack, the commander should maximize combined arms assets to mitigate the vulnerability of the force. The frontal attack is often the best form of maneuver for an attack in which speed and simplicity are key elements; it is useful in overwhelming weak defenses, securing outposts, or disorganizing enemy forces. Refer to figure 6-6 for an example of a frontal attack.



**Figure 6-6. Frontal Attack.**

**Flanking Attack.** A flank is the right or left side of any military formation. The flanks are generally weaker in terms of combat power than the front of the formation. Therefore, a flanking attack is a form of offensive maneuver directed at either flank of an enemy force. Exposed enemy flanks may be created by the attacker using fires or by a successful penetration. Flanking attacks are normally conducted by supporting efforts that fix the enemy's front while the friendly

main effort attacks the enemy's flank. Due to their simplicity, flanking attacks often serve as the form of maneuver favored for hasty attacks or immediate action drills during which speed and simplicity are paramount to maintaining battle tempo, and ultimately the initiative. Refer to figure 6-7 for an example of a flanking attack.



**Figure 6-7. Flanking Attack.**

**Envelopment.** The envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy's rear or flank to destroy them in their current positions. Unlike the frontal attack, the envelopment directs its attack beyond the flank and toward the enemy's rear. The envelopment is the preferred form of maneuver because the attacking force tends to suffer fewer casualties while having the most opportunities to destroy the enemy. Refer to figures 6-8 and 6-9 on page 6-22 for examples of a single and double envelopment.

A battalion normally employs an envelopment utilizing all of its maneuver elements in coordination with one another. When planning an envelopment, the commander must ensure that the enveloping force does not go beyond the battalion's supporting distance that is normally based on the position of the fixing force. The commander should also ensure that the enveloping force possesses the ability to sustain itself for a short duration of time until the battalion can open a LOC between the two elements.






Figure 6-8. Single Envelopment.





Figure 6-9. Double Envelopment.

**Turning Movement.** A turning movement is a variation of the envelopment in which the attacking force passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives deep in the enemy's rear area. The goal of a turning movement is to force the enemy to abandon a position or reposition major forces to meet the attacking force. Once "turned," the enemy loses the advantage of fighting from prepared positions on ground of their choosing. The turning force (i.e., the main effort) executes the turning movement as the enemy is fixed in position by the fixing force (i.e., a supporting effort). A turning movement differs from an envelopment in that the turning force usually operates at such distances from the fixing force that mutual support is unlikely, and that the attacker seeks to cause the enemy to reposition forces. The turning force must be able to operate independently and must possess the appropriate resources for sustainment, relative mobility, and survivability. Figure 6-10 shows an example of a turning movement, with the turning force conducting the decisive action.

An infantry battalion has insufficient strength to conduct a turning movement as its own scheme of maneuver, but it may serve as an element of a larger friendly force that executes one. The force ratio of friendly to enemy should be at least three to one for a turning movement.



**Figure 6-10. Turning Movement.**

**Infiltration.** An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy's rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires. Refer to figure 6-11 on page 6-24 for an example. Moving and assembling forces covertly through enemy positions takes a considerable amount of time, and a battalion normally does not

infiltrate units larger than companies or smaller than platoons. A successful infiltration reaches the enemy's rear without fighting through prepared positions. An infiltration is normally conducted as a supporting effort to another form of maneuver such as a flanking attack or envelopment. An infiltration may be conducted to—

- Attack an enemy position from an unsuspected direction.
- Occupy a support by fire position to support an attack.
- Secure key terrain.
- Conduct ambushes and raids.
- Conduct a covert breach of an obstacle.




Figure 6-11. Infiltration.

**Penetration.** A penetration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to create assailable flanks and access the enemy's rear. A penetration may be conducted when the enemy flanks are unassailable, when enemy forces are overextended, when weak spots in the enemy defense are identified, or when time does not permit some other form of maneuver. Refer to figure 6-12 for an example of a penetration. A battalion may also use a penetration to secure a foothold within an urban area. The commander should seek to have a minimum advantage in combat forces of three-to-one over the enemy

defenders at the point of penetration. It is imperative that overwhelming combat power is directed at the point of penetration. A penetration normally consists of the following three steps:

- Breach the enemy's main defensive positions.
- Widen the gap to secure the flanks by enveloping one or both of the enemy's newly exposed flanks, allowing follow-on forces to exploit the enemy's rear areas.
- Seize the objective deep in the enemy's rear.




Figure 6-12. Penetration.

## Phases of the Offense

Once the commander decides to conduct an offensive operation, it is executed using the following five steps:

- Gain and maintain contact.
- Disrupt the enemy.
- Fix the enemy.
- Maneuver.
- Follow through.

Normally the first three steps of the process are conducted in the form of shaping actions; with the fourth step, *maneuver*, being the decisive action. *Follow through* may be in the form of a branch plan or sequel, transitioning from offense to limited defensive operations or stability activities. See MCWP 3-01 for more information on the phases of the offense.

## Combat Formations

A combat formation is an orderly arrangement of forces for a specific purpose; it describes the general configuration of a unit on the ground. A commander can use seven different combat formations, depending on the mission variables and METT-T considerations—column, line, echelon (left or right), box, diamond, wedge, and vee. The terrain's characteristics and visibility determine the actual arrangement and location of the unit's personnel or vehicles within a given formation. See table 6-7 for a description of combat formations.

A unit may employ a series of combat formations during the course of an attack. When determining the appropriate formation for a given situation, the commander considers the advantages and disadvantages of each in the areas of command and control, maintenance, firepower orientation, ability to mass fires, and flexibility. The commander's use of standard formations allows the unit to rapidly shift from one formation to another. By designating the combat formation for use, the commander—

- Establishes the geographic relationship between units.
- Indicates probable reactions once the enemy makes contact with the formation.
- Indicates the level of security desired.
- Establishes the predominant orientation of subordinate weapon systems.
- Postures friendly forces for the attack.

The number of maneuver units available makes some formations, such as the box and the diamond, impractical for modular heavy forces and infantry BLTs, unless they are task-organized with additional mobility assets.


**Table 6-7. Combat Formations.**

<b>Formation</b>	<b>Description</b>
Column	Elements move one behind the other.
Line	Elements move abreast of one another.
Echelon	Elements arranged on an angle left or right of the direction of attack.
Box	Elements arranged in a box or square (requires the use of four maneuver elements).
Diamond	Variation of the box formation, with one element to the front, units on the flanks, and the remainder in the rear.
Wedge	A lead element in front with left and right elements slightly behind; maximizes combat power to the front and flanks.
Vee	Places two units in front with the remainder trailing.

### **Follow and Support**

Follow and support is a tactical task in which a second committed force follows and supports a lead force in conducting its mission (e.g., the battalion may be assigned a follow and support mission as part of a regiment, or an infantry company may be assigned a follow and support task to support the battalion's main body in an attack). The follow and support force is not a reserve, but is a supporting effort force committed to supporting the lead unit, acting to create conditions that allow the lead unit to continue its success. Refer to figure 6-13 on page 6-28 for an example of follow and support. The follow and support force may—

- Be prepared to assume the lead element's mission.
- Engage enemy forces that the lead element bypasses.
- Block movements of enemy reinforcements.
- Clear obstacles and secure key terrain.
- Control dislocated civilians.



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**Figure 6-13. Follow and Support Tactical Task.**

### **Follow and Assume**

Follow and assume is a tactical task in which a second committed force follows in trace of a lead force (see fig. 6-14) and is prepared to assume the lead force's mission if it becomes fixed, halted, or unable to continue. The follow and assume force must be prepared to conduct a passage of lines or passage around a flank with the lead force when necessary. The follow and assume force is not a reserve, but is a supporting effort that is prepared to execute all missions

assigned to the lead force. The following actions are crucial to support the commitment of the follow and assume force:

- Maintaining the most current information on the enemy and friendly situations.
- Ensuring terrain is allocated for rapid movement while maintaining force protection.
- Shifting observers and reconnaissance assets as required.
- Establishing FSCMs and direct-fire control measures (e.g., restrictive fire lines).
- Being prepared for the shift in priority of support.




Figure 6-14. Follow and Assume Tactical Task.



## Transitions

A transition occurs when predominantly offensive operations pause or end, and the force's activities become primarily focused on defensive or stability activities.

***Transition to Defense.*** The battalion may transition from the offense to the defense because it is ordered to do so, has planned to do so after some phase is completed or objective is met, or is forced to do so by an enemy action or because a culminating point is reached. Commanders seek to anticipate likely culmination points so they have the freedom to choose when and where to halt the attack with the ability to plan a defense, minimize their vulnerability to attack, and facilitate a return to offensive operations. Commanders should employ these techniques when transitioning from the offense to the defense:

- Maintain contact with and surveillance on the enemy.
- Establish a security area, security forces, and local security measures.
- Redeploy artillery assets to ensure the support of security forces.
- Redeploy forces to support future offensive actions.
- Maintain or regain contact with adjacent units in a contiguous AO, or ensure that units remain capable of mutual support in a non-contiguous AO.
- Transition the engineering effort by shifting the priority of work from mobility to countermobility and survivability.
- Consolidate, reorganize, and request logistic support for defensive operations, and seek to maximize opportunities for reconstitution of the force.
- Explain the rationale for transitioning from the offense to the unit's personnel.

A commander can utilize two basic techniques when transitioning to defensive operations, regardless of the type of defense (i.e., area, mobile, or retrograde). The first technique is to deploy forces to occupy enough ground to establish a security area anchored on defensible terrain. The main force then moves to occupy the terrain utilizing hasty defensive actions that evolve into a more deliberate posture as time and resources permit. The second technique is to establish a defense in the general area of the unit's current positions, moving the main body rearward to more defensible terrain. The security force thins out and the remaining force deploys to organize the defense.

Civil considerations are inherent to all operations, and a transition from the offense to the defense often requires an increased focus on stability activities. Commanders must anticipate how to minimize the disruptive effects on the unit's operations that may be created by the civilian populace during this transition—people seeking aid, fleeing the area, or hostile activities, whether passive or active.

***Transition to Stability.*** Units change their focus of effort from offensive operations to stability operations due to a change in mission or the cessation of hostilities. Stability activities cannot be an afterthought; ideally, all the unit's efforts to date have been oriented on setting the

conditions to successfully transition to stability activities and eventual withdrawal. As the unit transitions from traditional offensive operations to stability activities, the commander—

- Maintains contact with and surveillance on any remaining enemy or hostile elements.
- Maintains the combat power necessary to conduct security operations.
- Establishes AOs, either contiguous or non-contiguous, for subordinate forces.
- Prepares to transition some or all combat support units to other roles such as provisional infantry, mobility operations, or critical infrastructure reconstruction.
- Conducts command and control and task reorganization to support stability functions, to include adding and integrating new functions and enablers.
- Seeks to integrate operations with proper civil authority, whether an occupational government, international governmental organization, or host nation authority.
- Consolidates, reorganizes, and requests logistics support for stability activities, and seeks to maximize opportunities to reconstitute the force.
- Readdresses risk assessment assumptions and the ROE.
- Conducts necessary training and reorientation of the unit's personnel both to combat complacency and reinforce the shift in emphasis from the offense to stability.

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# CHAPTER 7

## DEFENSE

A military unit conducts defensive operations to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, or economize forces. The goal of a successful defense is to expose a weakness that can be attacked and exploited, allowing friendly forces to transition to the offense. While the defense can deny success to the enemy, rarely does it result in total victory. The essence of defensive tactics is to place the enemy into a position that permits defeat through the intelligent use of terrain and firepower, thereby creating a favorable situation for counterattack.

### **PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE**

An effective defense is never passive; defenders should take advantage of any lulls to continuously construct and improve their positions or repair combat damage. The commander should seek to place the enemy in a disadvantageous position and relentlessly attack the enemy using a combination of maneuver, combined arms, and IO. Since mobility is imperative, one of the commander's key goals should be to possess greater mobility than the enemy, whether through organic assets or enablers. The organization of the reserve is a significant part of this consideration. Commanders at all levels must be offensively aggressive, using all means available to locate, attack, and weaken the enemy at the earliest possible time to wrest the initiative from the attacker and set conditions to transition to the offense.

### **Offensive Tasks in the Defense**

Commanders must identify opportunities to transition to offensive action. When in the defense, leaders must be wary of adopting a "hunker down" mindset instead of conducting aggressive offensive actions. Leaders cannot simply construct defensive positions and wait for the enemy to attack; they must have an offensive mindset as well. Offensive actions employed in the defense to attack the enemy's combat forces and sustainment in depth are part of the commander's shaping actions. The commander seeks to reveal an enemy weakness that may be exploited, such as an exposed flank that may be open to counterattack, allowing the commander to transition to the offense.

### **Characteristics of the Defense**

The principal characteristics of the defense include maneuver, preparation, mass and concentration, flexibility, use of terrain, mutual support, defense in depth, surprise, knowledge of the enemy, and local security.

***Maneuver.*** Maneuver is as important in the defense as it is in the offense. A cohesive defensive plan includes the integration of ambushes, patrolling, and depth to disrupt the enemy. While steadfastness and tenaciously holding key terrain are tactical advantages in the defense, the defender must not become immobile. Defenders must maintain the freedom of maneuver to generate the offensive power that is fundamental to a successful defense. Maneuver is vital to security operations, operations within the main battle area, and rear operations. Units of all sizes seek to maneuver in depth, taking advantage of terrain and tactical developments to concentrate, disperse, and occupy positions from which they can bring effective and devastating fire to bear on the enemy. Maneuver, through movement in combination with shaping actions, allows the defender to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy to deliver decisive actions.

***Preparation.*** A battalion organizes the defense on ground of the commander's choosing. While the attacker can choose the specific time and point of attack, the commander can canalize the enemy's attack into terrain that is advantageous through the proper selection of terrain and tactical obstacles. Once identified, the terrain is organized and assigned to the companies to occupy and defend. Based on METT-T considerations, including the time available and the proximity of the enemy, the battalion prepares a hasty or deliberate defense.

***Hasty Defense.*** A hasty defense is normally organized when in contact with the enemy, when contact is imminent, the time available for organization of the ground is limited, or the defender possesses a stronger force. The commander may not have adequate time to conduct a leader's reconnaissance prior to assigning subordinates a mission. The battalion's security forces may need to engage the enemy to buy time to seize ground suitable for defensive operations or to retrograde to better terrain. A hasty defense should be constructed in accordance with the battalion's TACSOP; all tasks and immediate action drills need to be understood by all so that no time is wasted. Fighting positions should be improved continuously as time permits. The majority of the force may initially conduct security missions to buy time until the ground is organized to the minimum degree required for self-defense.

***Deliberate Defense.*** A deliberate defense is normally organized when not in contact with the enemy, or when contact with the enemy is remote and sufficient time to organize and prepare is available. A deliberate defense normally includes fortifications, extensive use of obstacles, and fully integrated fires. The commander is normally free to conduct a thorough reconnaissance and select the terrain on which to defend, and the best tactical deployment of forces. Upon completion of planning, the battalion should conduct extensive rehearsals to be prepared for all anticipated enemy actions. Special attention should be given to rehearsals to employ the reserve, and counterattacks in particular.

**Mass and Concentration.** A battalion cannot defend everywhere in strength. The commander must concentrate forces and fires at the decisive place while exercising economy of force in less critical areas. This is driven by the commander's understanding of the enemy's strengths and weaknesses from the METT-T analysis. The commander designates the decisive action based on the anticipation of the enemy's most likely COA. The defender masses fires and concentrates combat power to defeat and wrest the initiative from the attacker. This is achieved by concentrating fires on the enemy in designated engagement areas where they will have the most destructive effects. During dispersed or distributed operations, it becomes increasingly difficult to mass or concentrate resources over vast distances. In such instances, the battalion must rely on maneuver, indirect fires, and aviation fires to create mutually supporting elements.

**Flexibility.** While the commander makes every effort to determine the enemy's intentions in advance, the plan must be flexible enough to deal with different enemy COAs. During the course of battle, commanders must be flexible enough to shift from the initial plan when an opportunity for decisive action appears unexpectedly. Commanders must also be able to quickly shift focus from the main battle area during the course of the battle, with corresponding shifts in support and supporting efforts. Potential shifts should be addressed in branch or sequel plans and be rehearsed. Well-developed contingency plans permit flexibility, as does the use of the reserve. This requires that the commander "see" the battlefield to detect the enemy's scheme of maneuver early. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace helps to predetermine likely enemy actions. These assumptions can be verified by security elements, reconnaissance, and intelligence collection assets.

**Use of Terrain.** The battalion commander must exploit every aspect of terrain and weather for advantage. Terrain is only valuable if a force gains advantage from its possession or control. The defender seeks to defend on terrain that maximizes the effects of weapons, cover, concealment, movement, and surprise. The commander seeks to select terrain that possesses good defensive qualities without being obvious to the attacker. Natural obstacles are exploited and reinforced with man-made obstacles as part of an integrated obstacle plan that supports the overall defensive plan.

**Mutual Support.** Mutual support is support that units render to each other; it strengthens the defense through the ability to mass firepower and create a dilemma for the enemy. As the enemy concentrates forces upon a specific position, the enemy is engaged from multiple directions by two or more mutually supporting positions. This forces the enemy to divide their forces, making them less effective. The degree of mutual support can be influenced by terrain, the range of weapons, and visibility. Mutual support is essential at all levels. The possession of a reserve with greater mobility than the enemy can enhance the effective range of mutual support.

**Defense in Depth.** Defense in depth is the emplacement of mutually supporting defensive positions throughout the battalion's AO to absorb and progressively attrite and weaken the attacker, thereby preventing the enemy from gaining momentum. Aggressive and simultaneous

offensive operations throughout the depth of the defender's AO can disrupt and confuse an enemy attacker. Defense in depth is achieved by—

- Engaging the enemy at the earliest opportunity with security forces.
- Employing weapons at their maximum effective ranges.
- Using blocking positions, obstacles, and supplementary positions.
- Positioning and maneuvering reserves and fire support units.
- Maximizing mutually supported positions.

**Surprise.** The defender seeks to achieve surprise against the attacking enemy, who has the initiative. The physical layout of the defense must not be apparent to the attacker. The battalion must employ every means to deceive the enemy about the true location of its positions and the strength of its defense to preserve combat power. Fire discipline must be used to defeat the enemy's reconnaissance, so that the battalion does not disclose the defensive scheme of maneuver. Keys to surprise are camouflage, concealment, deception, counter-reconnaissance, OPSEC, defensive mobility, and the ability to strike during inclement weather and periods of reduced visibility.

**Knowledge of the Enemy.** The defense is largely reactive by nature in that the battalion commander's options are dictated in large measure by what the attacker does. Therefore, thorough knowledge of the enemy's capabilities, tactics, and habits are essential to a successful defense. Changes to these enemy factors must be anticipated, especially after prolonged combat or dealing the enemy a tactical setback. The battalion commander needs to know how the enemy units are organized and how they deploy in the attack, and have an understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the enemy's weapons and equipment.

**Local Security.** Local security (i.e., not to be confused with security operations) deceives the threat as to the location of the friendly positions and their strength or weakness by inhibiting or defeating enemy reconnaissance activities. Security also provides early warning and strives to disrupt enemy attacks early. Both passive and active local security measures should be employed. For more information on security operations, see MCWP 3-01.

**Passive Security.** All units employ passive security measures to reduce exposure to the enemy. These include ground and aerial observation, electromagnetic signature management, and fires. Communications procedures, camouflage, movement control, and individual continuing actions must be strictly enforced.

**Active Security.** Active security measures include combat patrols, sensors, surveillance, and employment of false visual and electronic signatures. In addition, the capability sets of certain units enhance the unit's security posture. For example, combat engineers contribute to survivability, mobility, and countermobility, all of which contribute to the unit's security.

For more information on characteristics of the defense, see MCWP 3-01.

## TYPES OF DEFENSE

There are three basic types of defense—mobile, area, and retrograde. The type that the commander chooses depends on the METT-T estimate of the situation.

### Mobile

The mobile defense is usually conducted by units of regimental size and greater. While a battalion may be an element of a larger mobile defense coordinated by its HHQ, it is unlikely to use a mobile defense as its own scheme of maneuver. However, a limited-capacity mobile defense might be appropriate for a battalion in some situations. For instance, during operations where a battalion's companies are geographically dispersed, a reserve with mobility enablers is formed, or the enemy has limited mechanized forces. In this situation, the commander could react to an attack or threat with a mobile reserve to conduct one or more counterattacks throughout the battalion's battlespace. In a mobile defense, the battalion commander—

- Commits minimum forces to fixed positions.
- Seeks to gain superior mobility over enemy forces.
- Positions maximum combat power to counterattack the enemy.
- Takes advantage of obstacles and terrain in depth, while employing firepower and maneuver to wrest the initiative from the attacker.
- Employs a strong counterattack force to strike the enemy when the enemy is most vulnerable.
- Uses ISR assets to track the enemy, identifying critical nodes such as command and control, radars, logistics trains, and indirect fire support elements.

### Area

The goal of an area defense is to deny the enemy access to critical terrain or facilities for a specified period of time. This usually means the retention of terrain or facilities vice the outright destruction of the enemy force. The area defense is the type of defense which an infantry battalion is most likely to utilize. A battalion may employ this by positioning forces in mutually supporting positions to control the terrain between the positions. The distance between positions may be based on the battalion's mobility relative to the enemy, the ability of units to mutually support by direct or indirect fire, and the terrain. The mechanisms of defeating the enemy are the concentration of fires into engagement areas, utilizing the reserve to reinforce fires, employing depth, blocking penetrations, restoring positions, and counterattacking. See figure 7-1 on page 7-7 for an example of an area defense. Area defense is used when—

- Certain terrain or facilities must be held for a specified time.
- Sufficient time remains to organize the position.
- The battalion has less mobility than the enemy.
- The terrain limits counterattacks to a few probable employment options.
- The terrain affords natural lines of resistance, limiting the enemy to a few well-defined avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemy's maneuver.

There are two forms of area defense which are explained in the following subordinate sections—the defense in depth and the forward defense.




**Defense in Depth.** A defense in depth is usually the commander's preferred option. It may require significant combat engineering resources dedicated to both countermobility and survivability (for more information, refer to MCTP 3-34B, *Combined Arms Countermobility Operations* and MCTP 3-34C, *Survivability Operations*). In this form of defense, the defender absorbs the brunt of the enemy's attack by forcing the enemy to launch a series of attacks through mutually supporting positions arrayed in depth. In addition to the considerations for using the area defense, the commander selects the defense in depth when—

- The mission does not restrict the commander from fighting throughout the depth of the battlefield.
- The terrain does not favor a defense well forward, and there is better defensive terrain deeper within the AO.
- There is substantial depth available in the AO compared to the width.
- Cover and concealment near the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) is limited.
- The enemy possesses considerably more combat power than the defender.
- The enemy possesses precision munitions or has the capability of deploying weapons of mass destruction.

**Forward Defense.** When utilizing the forward defense, the commander concentrates substantial portions of combat power into engagement areas along the FEBA with the intent to deny major enemy penetrations into the defensive area. The commander seeks to retain these positions along the FEBA and violently attacks all penetrations. The commander executes a forward defense when key terrain must be retained. Along with the general considerations for an area defense, the following considerations also apply when employing a forward defense:

- Defensive positions are located along the FEBA.
- Strong natural obstacles are located along the FEBA.
- Natural engagement areas exist near the FEBA.
- Cover and concealment in the rear of the AO are limited.



**Figure 7-1. Area Defense.**

### **Retrograde**

A retrograde is a movement to the rear or away from the enemy, either a planned movement or one forced by enemy action. There are three methods of retrograde—delay, withdrawal, and retirement. There are also two unique, associated retrograde situations—denial measures and stay-behind force operations. If it is to succeed, a retrograde must be well organized, rehearsed, and well executed in accordance with the battalion’s TACSOP. All retrograde operations are executed to improve the battalion’s tactical situation. Timely and accurate intelligence is vital; the battalion commander must rely heavily on HHQ intelligence assets. The battalion or its subordinate units may conduct retrograde operations to—

- Preserve combat power by gaining time.
- Avoid combat under unfavorable conditions.
- Reposition forces to eliminate exposed flanks or shorten LOCs.
- Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.
- Harass, exhaust, resist, delay, and damage the enemy.

Deception helps degrade the enemy's ability to detect a retrograde; it provides surprise, causes indecision, and delays enemy actions. The battalion commander conducts the retrograde by one of the following methods: delay, withdrawal, or retirement. These methods may be combined depending on METT-T considerations.

**Delay.** A delay is an operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage without becoming decisively engaged. Delaying operations require sufficient depth. Delaying forces must maintain continuous contact with enemy forces to ensure the enemy experiences continuous pressure and cannot bypass delaying units. Mobility is critical in minimizing the possibility of delaying forces becoming decisively engaged with enemy forces. See figure 7-2 for an example of a delay.


Delays are conducted—

- When friendly forces lack the strength to sufficiently defend or attack.
- To reduce the enemy's offensive capability by inflicting casualties.
- To gain time by forcing the enemy to deploy.
- To determine the strength and location of the enemy's main effort.
- When the enemy's intent is not clear and the commander desires intelligence.
- To protect and provide early warning for the main battle area forces.
- To allow time to re-establish the defense.

**Withdrawal.** A withdrawal is a planned action in which a force in contact with the enemy disengages and moves in a direction away from the enemy force. Ideally, a withdrawal occurs without the enemy's knowledge or before the enemy can prevent or disrupt it; it is conducted either under or without enemy pressure. A commander should seek to conduct a withdrawal without enemy pressure. A battalion would normally conduct a withdrawal as an element of a larger force, moving to an assembly area or to occupy new positions to conduct follow-on activities. The battalion would normally execute delaying actions to cover its withdrawal. The withdrawing unit is typically organized into a security force, a main body, and a reserve. Depending on the situation, a stay-behind force may be designated to conduct further actions.

The security force maintains contact with the enemy, simulating the actions of the main body while the main body withdraws. For a battalion, this might be a company reinforced with enablers to increase its combat power. The security force may leave small detachments in contact with the enemy to deceive the enemy into thinking that the main body of the battalion is still in its positions. Additional security forces may be established to guard or screen the flanks of the main body.

A battalion conducting a withdrawal, especially under pressure, will find it increasingly hard to reconstitute a reserve, although all efforts must be made to do so. The reserve affords the battalion commander the ability to respond to unforeseen enemy actions, assist heavily engaged friendly forces, extricate elements before they become encircled, and take advantage of enemy mistakes.



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**Figure 7-2. Delay.**

**Retirement.** Retirement involves forces out of contact moving away from the enemy. A retiring unit does not anticipate contact with enemy ground forces. Examples include a unit that has just completed a withdrawal, or a unit being provided security by another unit. Commanders must still plan for enemy actions and organize the unit to fight in self-defense. Speed, control, and security are the most important considerations. A battalion usually conducts a retirement as part of a larger force.

For more information on the types of defense, see MCWP 3-01.

## ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE

As in the offense, the commander must consider both the organization of the battlespace and the forces available for the defense.


### **Organization of the Battlespace**

The commander organizes the battlespace into three areas—deep, close and rear—in which forces conduct specific functions. Refer to figure 7-3 for a diagram. Though normally portrayed as boxes on a map, these areas are determined by function and are based on METT-T considerations; they must provide the space required to conduct appropriate operations in support of the overall mission.

**Security Area.** The security area contains deep operations normally conducted through shaping actions by security forces. Security forces are used to locate and engage the enemy at the earliest time to disrupt their unity, either by interdicting enemy supply lines or by isolating and degrading enemy forces. Deep operations may require coordination with National-level assets, joint forces, or SOF. The battalion's security area includes all of its battlespace not directly assigned to subordinate units. The battalion headquarters is responsible for all operations in the deep area.

**Main Battle Area.** The main battle area is where close operations are conducted and where decisive action normally occurs. The battalion's role in the main battle area is to monitor, facilitate, and support company operations, primarily through resource allocation. The battalion commander positions forces in the main battle area to defeat, destroy, or contain enemy assaults. Reserve or counterattack forces may also be employed in the main battle area to destroy enemy forces, reduce penetrations or re-gain lost terrain, execute a counterattack, or exploit a weakness in the enemy's attack. The battalion commander must articulate who can commit the reserve.

**Rear Area.** The battalion's rear area extends forward from the command's rear boundary to the rear of the main battle area assigned to the command's subordinate units. Rear area operations are comprised of those sustainment and security operations that ensure the continuity of the force's operations. Rear area operations protect the sustainment effort and deny the enemy use of the rear area. The rear area may not always be tied in with the main battle area, as is the case with dispersed operations.



**Figure 7-3. Organization of the Battlespace.**

### **Organization of the Force**

Conducting defensive action normally imposes multiple requirements on the commander. Such requirements may be phases, conditions, or elements that are particular to a type or method of defense. These requirements directly affect the manner in which the battalion commander organizes available combat power and resources. The organization of forces for the conduct of the defense is built around the commander's organization of the battlespace.

**Main Battle Area Forces.** Main battle area forces consist of the main effort and those supporting efforts necessary to execute the close defensive scheme of maneuver in the main battle area—halting and defeating or destroying the enemy. Main battle area forces normally accomplish or support the decisive action.

**Security Forces.** Security forces are a supporting effort. They are employed forward of the main battle area to delay, disrupt, and provide early warning of the enemy's activities through counter-reconnaissance activities, and to deceive the enemy as to the actual location of the main battle area. They can be tasked with screen, guard, or cover missions. Security operations must be an integral part of defensive planning. Based on METT-T considerations, the battalion commander may task the rifle companies or attachments, such as LAR, tanks, and reconnaissance assets to conduct the required security activities. For more information on security operations, see MCWP 3-01.

**Reserve.** The reserve is not a committed force and thus does not normally have a full suite of combat multipliers available to it until its commitment; it normally becomes the battalion's main effort once it is committed. The commander bases the desired size of the reserve on the level of uncertainty and risk in the tactical situation. The location occupied by the reserve depends on its most likely mission upon commitment. The commander can assign the reserve a wide variety of tasks to perform on commitment; they depend heavily on the amount of mobility that the reserve force possesses.

## **DEFENSIVE MANEUVER**

The battalion commander chooses the type of defense that provides the best chance of success and allows the greatest flexibility in the ability to position and maneuver forces. This allows the commander to attain positional advantage over the enemy once weaknesses or vulnerabilities are exposed, thus creating an opportunity for offensive action and a decisive engagement.

### **Defensive Methods**

The employment and arrangement of forces to solve the tactical problem in the defense is, as in all operations, up to the commander. The defensive methods provide the commander with tools to execute an area, mobile, or retrograde type of defense. Each method has its own purpose and unique considerations. The following paragraphs discuss the purposes and considerations associated with the battle position, strong point, perimeter, linear, reverse slope, and sector defensive methods.

**Battle Position.** A battle position is a position which may be used alone, or in combination with other defensive methods, from which the commander may array forces in relation to the terrain for the purpose of delaying or denying the enemy the use of terrain or avenues of approach. Battle positions are both a defensive method and an intent graphic, giving the location and general orientation of the defending force assigned. Units of platoon to battalion size may be assigned a battle position. Battle positions should not normally be held at all costs. The commander should give precise instructions regarding occupation and displacement criteria. Local security should operate outside the battle position for early detection of the enemy and security. Battle positions may be occupied hastily and may be held only temporarily, but are improved continuously while occupied. The battle position is not an AO; the entire unit need not be located within its boundaries. Normally, a unit assigned to defend from a battle position is also assigned a sector in which the battle position is located for the exercise of other defensive functions. There are five kinds of battle positions: primary, alternate, supplementary, subsequent, and strong point. The use of *on order* battle positions with associated tasks of *prepare* or *reconnoiter* adds flexibility and depth to the defensive plan. Refer to figure 7-4 for a physical depiction of a battalion battle position with subordinate company battle positions.





Figure 7-4. Battle Position.




**Strong Point.** A strong point is a key point in a defensive position around which other positions are grouped to protect it. Usually heavily fortified and protected by automatic weapons, a strong point is designed to deny the enemy specific terrain and/or an avenue of approach. It is established on critical terrain and must be held in order for the defense to succeed. It differs from a battle position in that it is designed to be occupied for an extended period of time. This defensive method is employed by commanders whose missions require the retention of terrain indefinitely and when it is possible that the defending force may be isolated for periods of time by enemy action. A strong point requires 360-degree defense and should have sufficient supplies, especially ammunition, to continue to fight if surrounded or cut off from resupply. Strong points require considerable time and support to build and occupy, especially combat engineer support. Figure 7-5 shows an example of a strong point.



**Figure 7-5. Strong Point Defense.**


**Perimeter.** A perimeter defense orients in all directions and applies to situations when a unit must hold critical terrain, such as a combat outpost, bridge, mountain pass, or airfield. Patrolling and security operations are usually prerequisites for a successful perimeter defense. A commander may also employ a hasty defensive perimeter when the unit has been bypassed and isolated by the enemy or when pausing to rearm or refuel during offensive operations. Figure 7-6 depicts an example of a perimeter defense.



**Figure 7-6. Perimeter Defense.**

**Linear.** Commanders employ the linear defense method in conjunction with an appropriate linear terrain feature such as a river, ridgeline, or valley, with or without augmentation by man-made obstacles. The linear defense is normally associated with an area defense because the commander accepts less risk by not allowing the enemy to cross the linear obstacle. The commander deploys forces either along or behind the linear terrain feature, depending on METT-T considerations and the HHQ overall scheme of maneuver. Because of the possibility of enemy penetrations, defense in depth, mutual support, and a mobile reserve are usually imperative. Positive communications throughout the defense in depth and between mutually supporting positions and the reserve are necessary, as well as detailed rehearsals. When conducted against a conventional enemy, this defense depends on surprise, offensive action, and the initiative of small unit leaders.

**Reverse Slope.** A reverse slope defense is organized in a single direction behind terrain with a topographical crest where the commander wants to conceal the main defensive positions from the enemy. It is usually conducted when the enemy possesses a considerable advantage in forces and combat power over friendly forces, making a defense on the forward slope untenable. The defender seeks to deliver surprise fires on the enemy that crosses the crest of the forward slope or when significant enemy forces are fully exposed on the reverse slope; however, the defender may not be able to cover obstacles on the forward slope by direct fires effectively if the enemy gains control of the crest. The defender should emplace OP/LPs on the forward slope to call for indirect fires on the enemy approach. These OP/LPs should be prepared to be bypassed during enemy attacks to maintain “eyes on” the enemy and report enemy activity to the battalion. Figure 7-7 on page 7-16 shows an example of a reverse slope defense.



**Figure 7-7. Organization of Forces for a Reverse Slope Defense.**

**Sector.** A commander may assign the companies defensive sectors to provide them maximum latitude to accomplish assigned tasks. The extent of the assigned sector is dependent on METT-T considerations, but as a general rule, it should be no larger than can be influenced by the unit. A sector does not infer the same responsibilities as being assigned an AO. Defensive sectors are normally assigned to the companies or smaller elements.

### **Sequence of the Defense**

As part of a larger element, an infantry battalion conducts defensive operations in a sequence of integrated and overlapping steps. Many of these steps, such as using a security force to

counteract enemy reconnaissance attempts, apply to any enemy in any particular tactical environment. Regardless of what defense the battalion commander chooses to employ, the execution of that defense may be divided into five steps. These steps may occur sequentially or simultaneously. The first three of these steps are usually shaping actions, while the last two may be the commander's decisive action. The steps are as follows:

- Gain and maintain enemy contact.
- Disrupt the enemy.
- Fix the enemy.
- Maneuver.
- Follow through/counterattack.

***Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact.*** Depending on METT-T and other planning considerations, the commander may or may not assign the security force both reconnaissance and security tasks. Regardless, as operations begin, the initial focus of friendly forces in the security area is to win the reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance fight. This fight begins immediately, even during planning; the battalion must utilize ISR assets to gain and maintain observation of the enemy as soon as possible. Once security forces have made contact with enemy forces, they must maintain that contact while attempting to disrupt, confuse, and deceive the enemy.

***Disrupt the Enemy.*** The commander begins disrupting the enemy as soon as possible after gaining and maintaining contact. This is an ongoing activity that occurs throughout planning and into execution. At a minimum, the defending forces employ supporting arms and IRCs against enemy critical vulnerabilities. As the enemy's attack enters the security area, the security force executes operations designed to gain information, disrupt the enemy's tempo and formations, limit options, and ideally compel them to conduct a movement to contact against a prepared defense. Employing fire support and IRCs, the security force disrupts the enemy's decision making and ability to coordinate and synchronize actions. Except in the case of unexpected success in the security area, when the security force accomplishes its mission or reaches its displacement criteria, the security forces conduct a rearward passage of lines and battle handover with the main battle area forces.

***Fix the Enemy.*** The battalion commander attempts to fix the enemy by initiating shaping actions that delay, disrupt, and attrite the main enemy force, isolate it from enemy support, and disrupt follow-on forces. The commander completes fixing the enemy by the use of obstacles and defensive positions in the main battle area that canalize the enemy in one or more engagement areas for destruction. The battalion's main effort defeats the enemy in these engagement areas either by fires, counterattack, or both.

**Maneuver.** As the enemy attack approaches the main battle area, friendly forces prepare to execute the decisive action, which is normally the massing of combat power in an engagement area against the enemy main body. The defender uses the strength of prepared mutually supporting positions, camouflage, concealment, and defensive mobility to offset the attacker's attempts to suppress and neutralize friendly positions. The battalion's main effort uses a combination of obstacles and massed fires to defeat the enemy while supporting efforts in both the main battle area and security areas continue to attack and disrupt enemy follow-on forces, command and control, and logistics.

**Follow Through/Counterattack.** If the defense is successful, the commander counterattacks with the reserve and/or other available forces to maximize the damage inflicted by either attacking the remaining enemy in the main battle area or pursuing a retreating enemy. Depending on METT-T considerations, the commander uses this counterattack to restore the defense or to transition the force to offensive operations.

# CHAPTER 8

## STABILITY


Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of National power. Stability actions are often an integral part of theater campaign plans and integrated country strategies, and can be conducted in any phase of an operation. Stability actions assist states or regions entering, enduring, or recovering from crisis and aid in the transformation from actual or potential violent conflict toward a sustainable political settlement. Stability activities involve identifying and reducing the sources of instability at all levels while strengthening and mitigating factors across political, security, rule of law, economic, and social spheres in collaboration with legitimate actors in the host nation and region. As one of the basic blocks of employment, an infantry battalion executes stability activities with the same competence and ability with which it participates in offensive and defensive activities. A battalion's ability to solve various tactical problems by utilizing, combining, and transitioning between the various offense, defense, and stability tasks is part of the Marine Corps' historical legacy as an expeditionary force.

### THE STABILIZATION FRAMEWORK

The stabilization framework is a construct to help the commander visualize the operational environment. The framework assists the commander with training and organizing the battalion prior to employment in a specific operational environment. Stabilization activities can be required in any operation across the competition continuum. The three broad categories of the stabilization framework are *initial response*, *transformation*, and *fostering sustainability* (see fig. 8-1 on page 8-2). For more information on the stabilization framework, see JP 3-07, *Stability*.

#### Initial Response

This stage encompasses tasks performed to stabilize the operational environment in a crisis, including providing a safe, secure environment, and attending to the immediate essential service requirements of the local population. Initial response tasks are common in crisis response and limited contingency operations, and are the stage most suited to how the Marine Corps is manned, trained, and equipped. Initial response tasks may be performed in response to a crisis, or immediately after the cessation of hostilities in combat operations against an enemy. The battalion focuses on its initial arrival, preventing the problem from worsening, and setting the conditions necessary for transition to follow-on forces or transformation activities.



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**Figure 8-1. The Stabilization Framework.**

### **Transformation**

This stage includes a broad range of reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity-building activities. An infantry battalion supports the MAGTF in developing enduring capability and capacity in the host nation's governing institutions and security forces. The battalion can expect to have many civilian agencies and organizations in the same AO, which may even be co-located with the battalion.

### **Fostering Sustainability**

This stage encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to establish conditions enabling sustainable development. This stage terminates with the transition of all stability functions to the host nation.

## **TENETS OF STABILITY ACTIVITIES**

When developing COAs that require the execution of stability tasks, the battalion considers the seven stability tenets. For more information on stability activities, see MCWP 3-03.

### **Host Nation Involvement**

The host nation should be integrated to the maximum extent possible in planning and execution.

### **Joint Operations**

Many different resource requirements are met through unified action.

**Assessment**

The efficiency and effectiveness of execution and results should be continuously assessed.

**Comprehensive Approach**

Operations should incorporate a whole-of-government approach.

**Magnitude and Duration May Vary**

Conditions-based (i.e., vice time-based) criteria should be used to define success and mission accomplishment.

**Security**

Establishing a safe and secure environment in the operational environment is a necessary precursor to many stability activities.

**Transition Lead Responsibility**

While the military may initially lead in stability activities, it seeks to transition to proper civil authority as soon as practicable.

**STABILITY FUNCTIONS AND TASKS**

As illustrated in table 8-1 on page 8-4, the stability functions associated with a joint campaign plan are nested down to population-oriented tactical tasks. When conducting stability activities, an infantry battalion normally executes the stability tasks by assigning population-oriented tactical tasks to subordinate units. For more information on population-oriented tactical task, see MCDP 1-0.

An infantry battalion may lead or support the execution of these tactical tasks, all of which are interrelated and possess an inherent security component. Each of the stability tasks possess a set of activities that can be performed individually or in combination with other activities. For example, to conduct the stability task *establish civil security*, a battalion may execute border control activities, protect key personnel and facilities, and carry out raids on HVTs.

Infantry battalions normally provide the command and control and security infrastructure necessary for many of the tasks, sub-tasks, and related activities to be conducted, rather than executing them themselves with its organic forces. If the mission requires a battalion to conduct tasks beyond its command and control and security components, it would benefit from extensive augmentation with resources, assets, and enablers.



**Table 8-1. Stability Functions and Tasks.**

<p>Stability End States</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Safe and secure environment</li> <li>• Social well-being</li> <li>• Sustainable economy</li> <li>• Rule of law</li> <li>• Stable governance</li> </ul>
<i>Through</i>
<p>Stability Functions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Security</li> <li>• Foreign Humanitarian assistance</li> <li>• Economic stabilization and infrastructure</li> <li>• Rule of law</li> <li>• Governance and participation</li> </ul>
<i>By Means Of</i>
<p>Stability Tasks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establish civil security</li> <li>• Provide foreign humanitarian assistance</li> <li>• Support and/or provide restoration of essential services</li> <li>• Support establishment of civil control</li> <li>• Support economic and infrastructure development</li> <li>• Support to governance</li> </ul>
<i>As a Result Of</i>
<p>Population-Oriented Tactical Task</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advise</li> <li>• Assess the population</li> <li>• Assist</li> <li>• Build/restore infrastructure</li> <li>• Contain</li> <li>• Control</li> <li>• Coordinate with civil authorities</li> <li>• Cordon</li> <li>• Enable civil authorities</li> <li>• Exclude</li> <li>• Influence</li> <li>• Occupy</li> <li>• Reconnoiter</li> <li>• Secure</li> <li>• Train</li> <li>• Transition to civil control</li> </ul>

**Establish Civil Security**

Establishing civil security involves providing security for state entities, indigenous populations, and institutions, including protection from internal and external threats. It is a fundamental activity to the success of the other stability functions and the most likely stability task for an infantry battalion. Sub-tasks include the following:

- Enforce the cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Determine the disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services.
- Support disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

- Conduct border control and boundary security, and ensure freedom of movement.
- Support identification programs.
- Protect key personnel and facilities.
- Clear explosive ordnance.

### **Provide Foreign Humanitarian Assistance**

Conflict and natural disasters often result in acute shortages of water, food, shelter, clothing, and medical aid. An infantry battalion and its companies are often the first response forces on scene; therefore, they support efforts to provide humanitarian assistance with command and control, personnel, and security. For more information on foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), refer to JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*. Depending on the situation, providing FHA may include three sub-tasks:

- Provide local security.
- Distribute relief supplies.
- Support dislocated civilians.

### **Support and/or Provide Restoration of Essential Services**

Restoring essential services to local expectations of normalcy allows a population to return to its routine daily activities and prevents further destabilization. This task is most often associated with the *transformation* and *fostering sustainability* categories of stability operations. Infantry battalions lack the organic capability to execute this task on their own, and most often contribute security, command and control, and personnel to related activities. If it is assigned this task as part of its mission, it may require significant augmentation with enablers and CSS. There are no sub-tasks for this core task.

### **Support Establishment of Civil Control**

Civil control fosters the rule of law by enabling legitimate, local leadership to effectively manage disputes and conflicts within the population according to accepted local conflict resolution mechanisms. Infantry battalions contribute to this task by providing the command and control and security framework to enable civil control activities to be performed, and in some cases by supporting the training of host nation law enforcement. Establishing civil control includes six sub-tasks:

- Support the establishment of public order and safety.
- Support law enforcement and police reform.
- Support justice system reform.
- Support corrections reform.
- Support war crimes courts and tribunals.
- Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

### **Support Economic and Infrastructure Development**

Long-term peace and stability require a well-developed and sustainable economy and physical infrastructure development. Infantry battalions contribute to this task by providing the command and control and security framework necessary for related activities to be performed and by

preserving important assets such as production facilities, hospitals, universities, commercial enterprises, and markets. This core task includes five sub-tasks:

- Support the protection of natural resources and the environment.
- Support economic generation and enterprise creation.
- Support agricultural development programs.
- Support the restoration of transportation infrastructure.
- Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.

### **Support to Governance**

Governance is the state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive constitutional authority (refer to JP 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*). Governance is the set of activities conducted by a government to maintain societal order and enforce rights and obligations. When confronted with a dysfunctional or absent government, international law obligates military forces to provide military governance until a transition to civil authority can occur. Most often, the military conducts stability tasks that support the efforts of other agencies to assist the host nation in building capability and capacity. Infantry battalions most often provides the security and C2 framework necessary for governance activities to occur. Support to governance includes three sub-tasks:

- Support transitional administrations.
- Support the development of local governance.
- Support elections.

## **CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS**

Civil-military operations are the activities performed by military forces to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions. Civil-military operations support US objectives for host nation and regional stability. They may include activities and functions normally performed by the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur in the absence of other military activities.

Civil-military operations are the activities through which stability activities are executed. Initial CMO during stabilization efforts will likely secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish civil law and order, protect and repair critical infrastructure, and restore public services. A commander should be prepared to accomplish these tasks when indigenous civil, multinational, or international capacity cannot. When an infantry battalion executes stability tasks, it does so by generating civil effects with military activities. The responsibility of conducting CMO lies with the battalion commander.

## **Staffing Considerations**


Civil-military operations should not be separated from common staff functions, processes, and procedures—it is not a parallel activity, but must be fully integrated. At the very least, CMO responsibilities reside within the S-3 either as a function, an assigned individual, or a cell to ensure the proper planning, execution, and assessment of stability tasks.

When a battalion's mission requires it to focus heavily on stability tasks and activities, the battalion commander may decide to establish an S-9 civil affairs staff section. If this is done, it is essential that the battalion either request augmentation by a civil affairs team or seek the training necessary to create a provisional civil affairs staff section. A civil affairs team normally consists of a civil affairs officer (MOS 0530) with additional MOS 0535 (CMO Planner), CMO chief (MOS 0539), and other civil affairs SNCOs and NCOs (MOSs 0531 and 0532).

While they may support operations in the field or provide advice to the companies, the civil affairs team's purpose is to be the battalion commander's principal advisors on CMO, supporting the battalion's need to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO as part of its stabilization efforts. If the battalion's employment of its companies requires greater CMO expertise at that level or below, then the battalion must either seek additional external resources or provide civil affairs training to designated company personnel.

**Civil Affairs Operations.** Civil affairs operations, as seen in figure 8-2 on page 8-8, are actions planned, coordinated, and executed by civil affairs unit, assessed to enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Civil affairs personnel inform, influence, shape and gain access to the cognitive civil environment through targeted and integrated civil reconnaissance and civil engagements to achieve the commander's objectives.

For more information on CMO and civil affairs, refer to JP 3-57 and MCTP 3-03A.



**Figure 8-2. Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Relationship.**

**Enablers.** While infantry battalions must be prepared to execute CMO in support of stability efforts on their own, the more complex the requirements of stabilization are, the more critical the enablers listed below are to their success. For example, there is a significant difference between controlling refugee traffic during urban operations and replicating tasks and functions normally conducted by a civil government. Battalion commanders must conduct design and problem framing with this in mind and seek external expertise when necessary. In addition to civil affairs Marines, the battalion may receive augmentation and assistance from enablers such as—


- COMMSTRAT.
- Engineers.
- Health service support.
- SOF.
- Transportation units.
- Military police.
- MISO.
- Cultural advisors.

## Execution of Civil-Military Operations

As the action arm through which battalions execute stability activities, the functions and tasks of civil affairs align closely with the stability tasks. It is worth noting that while CMO rely upon security, security is not a function of CMO itself. This underscores the need for infantry battalions to closely integrate their CMO efforts with security and combat operations when the mission requires it. Ultimately, a lack of security can undermine all CMO efforts and result in continued or even increased instability.

## Civil-Military Operations Center

The infantry battalion can utilize a civil-military operations center (CMOC) as its primary means of coordinating its activities with those of other US Governmental organizations, NGOs, private volunteer organizations, and the civilian population. There is no standardized organization for a CMOC. Rather, each CMOC is task-organized—its size and composition being a function of the mission. Refer to figure 8-3 for an example of a CMOC layout. For more information on CMOCs, see MCTP 3-03A.




**Figure 8-3. Example of a Civil Military Operations Center.**

Since external organizations such as NGOs and the host nation government cannot be compelled to use the CMOC, it must be seen as something that serves a useful purpose to encourage their participation. The CMOC must be easily accessible and may be placed either outside or inside a perimeter security, depending on the security situation.

The CMOC must be organized to promote information exchange between participating civilian host nation agencies and organizations, including those that otherwise might not have a mechanism for coordination and cooperation. They must be culturally sensitive, host nation language capable, and able to provide a secure environment for all. When possible, the CMOC can help identify civilian capabilities that can satisfy civilian requirements, entirely avoiding the use of battalion resources. The functions of a CMOC include the following:

- Act as a clearinghouse for all civilian support requests and other US military forces. The CMO staff element attempts to meet civilian requirements with civilian capabilities via coordination at the CMOC before passing validated support requests to the battalion (see fig. 8-4).
- Provide US Government interagency partners and NGOs with a single, accessible point of contact for the battalion’s CMO and stability efforts.
- Facilitate collaborative civil-military efforts with joint and coalition forces and United Nations, host nation, and other non-military agencies.
- Assist in the transition of operations from the battalion to proper civil authority.
- Provide agency points of contact, agency capability lists, daily information summaries, population density, demographic, and dislocated civilian overlays, which might be posted on a public information board.



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**Figure 8-4. Civilian Support Request Flow.**

## STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

The SAF is an analytical, planning, activity design, and measurement tool for conducting operations with a stability focus. The SAF methodology enables the analysis of civil factors, improves accuracy in problem framing, and supports the development and evaluation of stability activities that help to enable stable end states. Specifically, SAF helps Marine and civilian practitioners identify grievances and resiliencies and design programs or activities that address sources of instability and stability and measure the activities' effects in fostering sustainability.

The SAF consists of four sequential components that support MCPP; each component builds on information collected and analyzed in the previous steps. The first two components are essential for accurate problem framing if the operation occurs in a populated area. The four SAF components are listed in table 8-2.

**Table 8-2. Stability Assessment Framework Components.**

Components	
One	Civil Preparation of the Battlespace
Two	Analysis
Three	Design
Four	Execution

Worked in sequence, the components and their associated steps enable the identification of key information, such as—

- The most relevant civil considerations (i.e., ASCOPE) and operational variables (i.e., PMESII).
- Aspects of the culture most relevant to operations.
- Societal vulnerabilities, grievances, and resiliencies.
- Key influences with means and motivations to stabilize or destabilize.
- Windows of opportunity for key influences to exploit/leverage.
- Sources of instability or stability.

### **Civil Preparation of the Battlespace**

Civil preparation of the battlespace is the first component of the SAF process. It enables a heightened understanding of the battlespace, which is why it is critical for problem framing. The outputs of the CPB steps should be integrated into step two of IPB. There are three CPB variables:

- The operational environment.
- The cultural environment.
- Instability/stability dynamics.



**Variable 1—Understanding the Operational Environment.** The first step in gaining an understanding of the operational environment is enabled through cross-referencing civil considerations (i.e., ASCOPE) against operational variables (i.e., PMESII).

The resulting crosswalk in table 8-3 yields multiple data points that require further analysis to determine their relevance to the mission. For example, the staff should not simply note that there is a government in power; they should note that it is dominated by a certain tribe, clan, or family which has a vested interest in the status quo and will resist foreign intervention.

The SAF utilizes a factors-relevant worksheet, table 8-4 on page 8-14, that serves as a filter to assess how a given factor matters—to the population, the threat, and the battalion’s mission. The task is to extract key factors from the crosswalk product and ask the relevance questions.

**Table 8-3. ASCOPE/PMESII Crosswalk.**

	<b>P Political</b>	<b>M Military/Police</b>	<b>E Economic</b>	<b>S Social</b>	<b>I Infrastructure</b>	<b>I Information</b>
<b>A Areas</b>	Political Areas (district boundary, party affiliation areas)	Military Areas (coalition/local national bases, historic ambush sites)	Economic Areas (bazaars, shops, markets)	Social Areas (parks and other meeting areas)	Irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage	Radio/TV/newspapers (where people gather for word-of-mouth)
<b>S Structures</b>	Political Structures (town halls, government offices)	Military/Police Buildings (police HQ, military HHQ locations)	Economic Structures (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Social Structures (churches, restaurants, bars, etc.)	Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)	Information Structures (cell/radio/TV towers, print shops)
<b>C Capabilities</b>	Political Capabilities (dispute resolution, insurgent capabilities)	Military Capabilities (security posture, strengths and weaknesses)	Economic Capabilities (access to banks, ability to withstand natural disasters)	Social Capabilities (strength of local & national ties)	Infrastructure Capabilities (ability to build/maintain roads, walls, dams)	Information Capabilities (literacy rate, availability of media/phone service)
<b>O Organizations</b>	Political Organizations (political parties and other power brokers)	Military Organizations (what units of military police, insurgents are present)	Economic Organizations (banks, large land holders, big businesses)	Social Organizations (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, international organizations)	Infrastructure Organizations (government ministries, construction companies)	Information Organizations (News groups, influential people who pass word)
<b>P People</b>	Political People (governors, councils, elders)	Military People (leaders from coalition, local national, and insurgent forces)	Economic People (bankers, landholders, merchants)	Social People (religious leaders, influential families)	Infrastructure People (builders, contractors, development councils)	Information People (media owners, mullahs, heads of powerful families)
<b>E Events</b>	Political Events (elections, council meetings)	Military Events (kinetic events, loss of leadership operations)	Economic Events (drought, harvest, business open/close)	Social Events (holidays, weddings, religious days)	Infrastructure Events (road/bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)	Information Events (campaigns, projects openings, civilian casualties)

**Table 8-4. Factors-Relevance Worksheet.**

Civil Considerations	Operational Variables	Key Factors	Relevance to Mission
Areas Structures Capabilities People Events	Political		How is the factor relevant to the population, the threat, and the end state?
	Military		
	Economic		
	Social		
	Information		
	Infrastructure		

**Variable 2—Understanding the Cultural Environment.** The task in this step is to apply cultural considerations to the most relevant ASCOPE/PMESII factors derived from the factors relevance step just completed. There are five dimensions of operational culture—the *physical environment, economy, social structure, political structure, and belief systems*. In table 8-5, each dimension is presented with a broad question to help define each of the operational culture dimensions. This allows the staff to examine the implications of each cultural dimension for an operation in a specific AO.

**Table 8-5. Operational Culture Matrix.**

<b>Physical Environment</b>	<b>Economy</b>	<b>Social Structure</b>	<b>Political Structure</b>	<b>Belief Systems</b>
<b>How do people in the culture use the environment?</b>	<b>What are the economic exchange systems and the formal and informal economies that the culture uses?</b>	<b>What is the way people organize themselves and distribute power and status?</b>	<b>How do people in the culture determine authority and leadership?</b>	<b>How do cultural beliefs shape people's behavior?</b>
<i>What would be expected of a unit with regards to water use and provision?</i>	<i>How will a Marine presence affect the formal and informal economy and the people in it?</i>	<i>At what age is someone considered an adult?</i>	<i>How will an alliance with one group affect Marine relationships with another?</i>	<i>What are the pivotal points in history or important stories that all people in the area share?</i>
<i>What kinds of operational variables are influenced by water?</i>	<i>How will an operation affect the informal economy and the people who depend on it?</i>	<i>Who has influence in families?</i>	<i>How is decision making organized?</i>	<i>How are these histories and stories used to support propaganda for or against the US?</i>
<i>What priorities would override a relationship with water as a resource?</i>	<i>How does the formal economy depend on the informal one?</i>	<i>How should a unit respond to children who are involved in armed conflict?</i>	<i>Who gets to make decisions?</i>	<i>Are the heroes or villains in the area compared to Americans?</i>
<i>What land is/is not appropriate for certain people to use?</i>	<i>How will a Marine presence influence the socio-economic balance of power in the area?</i>	<i>What work, roles, activities, and spaces are assigned to men and women?</i>	<i>Who are the formal leaders? How are they selected?</i>	<i>Do groups see themselves as victims of outside powers or as recipients of assistance?</i>
<b>Which cultural factors affect the battalion's operation?</b> <b>Which cultural factors might be exploited by the threat?</b> <b>Which cultural factors present an opportunity for friendly forces?</b>				

Because the SAF emphasizes the mission relevance of civil factors, the final step of using the operational culture matrix involves asking three questions to further refine the number of issues units need to address:


- Which cultural factors affect the battalion's operation?
- Which cultural factors might be exploited by the threat?
- Which cultural factors present an opportunity for friendly forces?

Looking at the operational environment through the lens of operational culture assists planners to determine what “normal” looks like, and in so doing, how the culture will impact a battalion’s operations.

**Variable 3—Instability and Stability Dynamics.** As the result of work on the previous steps, the staff has sufficient information to begin developing a picture of the factors that are causing instability and that could promote stability.

Understanding the relationship between the people, societal grievances, resiliencies, events, and key influences is fundamental to effective operations in populated environments. This step of CPB involves the analysis of grievances, societal vulnerabilities, and resiliencies.

The SAF uses the concept of a scale to depict the dynamics of stability and instability (see fig. 8-5). The scale balances resiliencies and grievances in combination with specific key influences and events. An abundance of resiliencies or grievances can tip the scale toward stability or instability.



**Figure 8-5. Stability/Instability Dynamics.**

Instability results when the factors fostering instability overwhelm the ability of the host nation to mitigate them. On the other side of the scale are the stabilizing factors, also called resiliencies (i.e., institutions, processes, and relationships) that help society function peacefully. For resiliencies or grievances to affect stability, key influences and events (i.e., “windows of opportunity”) must be present simultaneously. The next step of the SAF requires identifying all these factors and determining potential linkages between them.

Stable institutions, processes, people, and relationships help societies rebound from shocks and function peacefully. Resiliencies can be enhanced or damaged by military operations. Examples

“The existence of grievances does not automatically cause instability: poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, inadequate essential services, political marginalization, and repression are unfortunately commonplace, and exist in many places that are reasonably stable. It takes leaders to build a compelling narrative that links grievances to a political agenda.” (JP 3-07, *Stability*)

of resiliencies include host nation government capacity, the provision of essential services, the rule of law, freedom of speech, conflict resolution mechanisms, leaders who support unity, and social cohesion. Grievances can undermine the friendly mission, while some resiliencies can be used to advance toward the desired end state. Determining which are mission-relevant requires further analysis.

The SAF utilizes a stability/instability factors matrix, table 8-6, to help planners analyze the connections between the factors derived in the previous steps and identify linkages between them.

**Table 8-6. Stability/Instability Factors Matrix.**

<b>Instability Factors</b>		
<b>Grievances</b>	<b>Events</b>	<b>Key Influences—Means and Motivations</b>
<i>What are the core grievances and societal vulnerabilities identified?</i>	<i>What potential situations could contribute to an increase in instability?</i>	<i>What are the influences, means, and motivations that contribute to an increase in instability?</i>
<b>Stability Factors</b>		
<b>Resiliencies</b>	<b>Events</b>	<b>Key Influences—Means and Motivations</b>
<i>What processes, relationships, or institutions enable the society to function normally and peacefully?</i>	<i>What potential situations could contribute to an increase in stability?</i>	<i>What key influences in the society preserve and strengthen stability? What means and motivations contribute to an increase in stability?</i>

The primary grievances and resiliencies identified in the previous steps are listed in the first column. Known and anticipated events that could affect the stability situation, such as floods, draughts, religious holidays, military operations, and elections are listed in the *events* column. The key influences in the operational environment with the means and motivation to cause instability or leverage resiliencies should be listed in the third column.

Another way to think of *events* is that they are instances (whether spontaneous or scheduled) that present a window of opportunity for motivated influences to exploit grievances or leverage resiliencies. In and of themselves, these events are often neutral (e.g., an election, a harvest, a religious holiday, a sporting event, or a parade). Even an event that appears negative (e.g., civilian casualties or a bombing at a busy marketplace) can be leveraged by positive actors to reinforce resiliencies.

Once populated with factors, the matrix should be examined row by row to determine if linkages can be made between grievances and influences, an event, or both. If a linkage can be made, it represents a potential source of instability to be further analyzed in the next step. If a reasonable connection cannot be made, the grievance/vulnerability for now is simply a data point that should not be dealt with for the time being—all societies have grievances, but this one is not likely mission-relevant. Likewise, the resiliencies should be examined for linkages with events or key influences. If a relationship exists, a potential source of stability may need to be protected, reinforced, or leveraged.

The CPB steps conducted up to this point are about how the operational environment is interrelated. The ASCOPE/PMESII crosswalk relevance, operational culture, and factors matrix inherently involve the civilians in the battlespace—and how they relate to factors like the environment, political structure, economy, culture, and the conflict at hand.

## **Analysis**

The second component of the SAF process is analysis. At this point in the SAF, planners need a way of assessing whether the identified sources of instability or sources of stability require additional resources to mitigate them or protect them. The specific tasks in this component—

- Apply stability/instability criteria to potential sources as identified in CPB.
- Determine the population's view on the causes of the sources of stability and instability.
- Determine the root causes of the stability/instability.
- Use data related to people's perceptions and mission relevance to prioritize the sources of stability and instability.

Each potential source of stability/instability is examined using the stability/instability analysis matrix and vetted against three stability/instability criteria to ascertain its potential for generating instability or fostering stability. A potential source resulting in affirmative responses to any of the criteria is considered a viable issue for engagement via stability activities.

The relative weight of each response must be carefully analyzed for the greatest potential impact toward the desired end state to prioritize efforts and resources at the activity design phase. Generally, the more criteria that are met, the more likely that the issue is creating instability or

supporting stability. The instability and stability criteria are provided through a series of questions. The answers to these questions must be based on the population’s definitions of “normal”—not those of outsiders.

**Source of Instability Criteria.** The SAF utilizes the source of instability analysis matrix in table 8-7 to help catalogue analysis. The instability analysis matrix includes columns for the potential sources of instability, the three criteria questions, and their prioritization.

**Table 8-7. Source of Instability Analysis Matrix.**

Potential Sources of Instability	Instability Criteria			Source of Instability	Prioritization
	Does this issue decrease support for legitimate governance? Explain.	Does this issue increase support for malign actors? Explain.	Does this issue disrupt the normal functioning of society? Explain.	Does the issue meet 1 of 3 instability criteria?	Are the sources of instability a priority grievance for the populace?

A “priority grievance” is an issue that a significant percentage of the population identifies as a priority for their community. Answers to the following questions will help reveal the extent to which the source of instability poses risk to the desired end state and may need to be prioritized:

- Is the blame or anger over this issue directed toward any particular group?
- Is this issue increasing public support for violent/destabilizing groups or actions?
- Is the issue worsening?

It is important to note that at this stage of the SAF, planners may have to make assumptions as to whether or not a source of instability is a priority grievance for the population, and should seek to validate this assumption at the earliest opportunity through civil reconnaissance.

**Source of Stability Criteria.** To determine whether a potential source of stability may require battalion resources, the SAF utilizes the following three criteria, also shown in table 8-8 on page 8-20:

- **Does this issue increase support for legitimate governance?** The population’s acceptance and reliance on governmental and/or nongovernmental entities to maintain a stable social environment is a key factor. This does not solely equate to providing services; rather, it speaks more to the population’s confidence in entities protecting their equities and ways of life.
- **Does this issue decrease support for malign actors?** This usually occurs when malign actors are exploiting the population beyond acceptable levels. Normally, this equates to seizing opportunities for reducing levels of violence, crime, or subjugation.



- **Does this issue increase societal and institutional capacity and capabilities?** This equates to improving conditions beyond what currently exist without creating artificial systems or processes that are unnatural to the environment or customs.

**Table 8-8. Source of Stability Analysis Matrix.**

Potential Sources of Stability	Stability Criteria			Source of Stability	Prioritization
	Does this issue increase support for legitimate governance? Explain.	Does this issue decrease support for malign actors? Explain.	Does this issue increase societal capacity and capability? Explain.	Does the issue meet 1 of 3 stability criteria?	Will reinforcing the sources of stability help enable the desired end state?

Prioritizing sources of stability refers to the degree to which actively supporting the sources will advance the desired end state. If the following criteria for sources of stability are met, the following questions will help planners determine if they have mission relevance:

- If the resiliency did not exist, would instability increase?
- If the resiliency was interfered with, would instability increase?
- Does the population rely on this factor for a stable environment?
- Will the commander’s end state be more readily accomplished if friendly forces supported or reinforced the resiliency?

**Tactical Stability Matrix.** To organize analysis at this stage, the staff should build a tactical stability matrix, as depicted in table 8-9. A tactical stability matrix should be built for each instability and stability source. This tool is used to organize analysis of the causes and to help design the stability activities that will address them. Notice that the emphasis is placed on analysis prior to activity design; this is because the SAF is ultimately about accurate engagement and the smart use of time and resources. As a result, it is front-loaded with understanding the problem before acting upon it.

**Table 8-9. Tactical Stability Matrix.**

Source of Stability/Instability	Analysis					Design		
	Cause (Perception)	Cause (Systemic)	Objective	MOE Indicators	MOE Data Sources	Activity	MOP Indicators	MOP Data Sources

The sources of stability and stability (derived from the previous step) populate the first column, but their causes have yet to be determined. The SAF distinguishes between “perceived causes”—what people say and think about the source of the issue—and the root or systemic causes. Effecting change in both are key to success.

*Perceived Causes.* Data on people’s perceptions is key to understanding the sources of stability and instability. It is important to note that collecting data on people’s perceptions is an iterative effort. Information revealing perceptions about key issues may be available through surveys, polling data, traditional and social media, KLEs, intergovernmental organizations, or host nation officials. Another way to think of “perceived causes” is like “symptoms”—all these examples are likely symptomatic of the root cause, rather than being the root cause themselves.

For example, in a hypothetical scenario, the source of instability is “ineffective and corrupt police.” Some perceived causes of this in the scenario could include:

- Shakedowns at checkpoints.
- Overly aggressive tactics with minorities.
- Police do not show up to work.

*Root/Systemic Causes.* Root cause analysis tells planners not just what happens, but also why. The SAF seeks to identify and correct root causes, rather than to simply address their symptoms. Root cause analysis is a requirement if the staff is to provide the commander a thorough understanding of the problem.

The “five W’s” technique is used to conduct a root cause analysis because it does not require advanced statistical tools, and in many cases can be completed without a data collection plan. By asking a series of questions (five is a good rule of thumb), planners get to the root cause of the problem. Some planners find that simply asking, “why” (why the source of instability exists) five times works well. Others utilize a series of more specific questions for the root cause analysis:

- What circumstances led to the perception?
- Why does this problem continue?
- Who benefits from the continuing problem?
- What should have fixed the problem?
- Why hasn’t it fixed the problem?


Root cause analysis requires critical thinking and an acceptance of the need to make educated guesses based on available information. Root causes identified through this questioning process will inherently involve some assumptions which will need to be verified through an appropriate collection plan once the staff has access to more information.

In the corrupt police example, using this series of questions for root cause analysis, could lead to answers like the following:

- What circumstances led to the perception?
  - Shakedowns at checkpoints.
  - Overly aggressive tactics with minorities.
  - They do not show up when called.
- Why does this problem continue?
  - Poorly trained.
  - Irregular pay.
  - Little to no oversight.
- Who benefits from the continuing problem?
  - Police leadership, because they have no oversight.
  - Anti-government actors who exploit population grievances.
- What should have fixed the problem?
  - Communication from police to higher levels.
  - Management intervention to address training and timely pay.
- Why hasn't it fixed the problem?
  - Disconnect between provincial and national police.
  - Culture does not allow people to challenge authority.

Based on these answers, a staff could feel reasonably comfortable concluding for now that the root cause is associated with a lack of oversight and a fundamental disconnect between higher levels of command and the police.

*Perception Data.* Perception data is key to understanding sources of stability and instability. It is important to note that collecting data on perceptions is a repetitive process. Perceptions are reality to the population. Perception data is extremely useful as depicted in figure 8-6.



**Figure 8-6. Perception Data.**

*Determine the Objective.* After the priority sources of stability/instability have been identified, the next step involves defining an objective—the condition that the unit wants to achieve with respect to these sources of stability/instability.

In the SAF, objectives are NOT actions to execute or activities to implement. They are conditions that stability actors want to generate through their activities. Put another way, the objective is a short statement of what the operational environment will look like when the source of instability has been diminished or the source of stability has been reinforced.

Stability Assessment Framework objective statements can often simply be a statement of the opposite condition. For example, if the source of instability is “ineffective police,” the objective statement could be, “Police capable of providing effective, consistent security.”

Objective statements for a source of stability will typically be a short sentence of what it would look like if the resiliency was reinforced. For example, if the source of stability is, “Effective water treatment system,” the objective statement could be, “Protection of water treatment facility.”

*Selecting Measures of Effectiveness.* Measures of effectiveness need to be observable and measurable signs that the activity is having an effect. They are the changes in the operational environment that show progress toward meeting the objective. Identifying good MOEs requires careful analysis and thought; extra care should be taken at this step because MOEs underpin the achievement of stability objectives in the AO. The SAF links back to the collection plan to gather data for MOEs.

*Data Sources.* Marines collecting information on the impact of operations require sources that can be obtained with relative ease. Indicators should be derived from data sources that are simple, practical, and affordable for those collecting on them to access. Possible data sources include open source intelligence, civil reconnaissance reports, police records, media reports, and KLEs.

## **Design**

The third component of the SAF is design. When the duration of the mission extends to a point such that Marines can utilize their SAF analysis to inform and implement stability activities, SAF provides guidance about activity design, as well as monitoring and evaluation of those activities to ensure they generate the desired effects.

The collective result of design is a nonlethal engagement package. It is a collection of activities that aim to promote stability, and the data points for collection that units can use to measure progress toward the objectives. The tactical stability matrix is the focal point of the SAF during design. This process is about efficient use of limited battalion resources. Planners must understand the problem to be solved before the allocation of resources.

At this point, a priority source of instability and its likely causes has been analyzed, along with the associated changes (i.e., effects) the unit believes should be generated in the AO and where

the staff would look to detect those changes (i.e., indicators). The tactical stability matrix should now be populated with indicators and data sources to evaluate the MOEs.

The first step of the *design* component of the SAF involves brainstorming stability activities specifically associated with the sources of stability and instability analysis from the previous steps that could make progress toward the unit's objectives. The following questions assist in generating ideas:

- What activities address root causes?
- What activities would enable an objective?

The perspectives from the tactical stability matrix should be considered, along with—when appropriate—the resources of external parties that have an interest in this process. Civil organizations often have significant familiarity with the operational environment and the population's likely responses to potential COAs; they may also have resources and expertise that can be leveraged in support of common stability objectives.

**Three Stability Criteria.** The proposed activities are then screened and refined using the three stability criteria. The criteria serve as a filter to ensure that an activity will contribute to achieving the objective and ultimately help enable the commander's desired end state (i.e., will increase stability). Specifically, the staff should be able to explain how the suggested activity will—

- Increase support for the government and/or legitimate governance institutions.
- Decrease support for malign actors.
- Increase institutional and societal capacity and capability.

Each proposed activity needs to address at least two of the three stability criteria. If one or more do not, the activity needs to be refined, or another more viable option should be vetted and selected for further development.

**Design Principles.** The next step is to refine the proposed activity so that it meets as many of the following eight principles of design as possible. The design principles are the result of lessons learned and best practices utilized in the field. They are not a go/no-go list, but a tool to help shape the activity for optimal effect. The principles include:

- Sustainability.
- Ownership.
- Short-term versus long-term results.
- Leverage/support from external organizations.
- Cultural and political acceptability.
- Government accountability and transparency.
- Leverage or reinforce existing social resiliencies.
- Flexibility.

*Sustainability.* The activity can be sustained by nongovernmental and governmental organizations, social groups and leaders, or other entities.

*Ownership.* The activity maximizes the population's involvement to ensure they have a stake in its success.

*Short-Term versus Long-Term Results.* The activity minimizes the trade-offs between positive short-term effects and any potentially negative long-term effects (i.e., unintended consequences).

*Leverage/Support from External Organizations.* The activity leverages or supports the programs of other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and/or the host nation government.

*Cultural and political acceptability.* The activity is appropriate in the political and cultural context.

*Government Accountability and Transparency.* The activity strengthens governmental accountability and transparency.

*Leverage or Reinforce Existing Societal Resiliencies.* The activity leverages and builds upon existing societal resiliencies.

*Flexibility.* The activity includes the flexibility to adapt if circumstances change.

The next step is to screen each proposed activity against the available resources (e.g., money, personnel, expertise, and time) to validate whether they are realistic or meet the parameters of the battalion's mission. Non-military resources should be leveraged from organizations that also have a stake in stability, some of which should ideally be involved in the SAF process.

If the activity is deemed appropriate and feasible, then measures of performance (MOPs) are developed. A MOP should provide quantitative measurements related to task accomplishment. For example, if a security task is to conduct patrols, then the MOP is simply the number of patrols performed. The number of patrols conducted does not equate to the degree the security environment is improved, but it may be an important criterion in the operation assessment plan for evaluating stabilization efforts.

The activity design worksheet in table 8-10 on page 8-26 supports the design, prioritization, and synchronization of stability activities. The sources of stability/instability are captured in the header of the first column to ensure traceability. The proposed activity is entered into the first column. Subsequent rows associated with each possible activity are developed across the template, addressing the sources of stability/instability identified in the headers.

**Table 8-10. Activity Design Worksheet.**

Identify Possible Activities (Objectives)	Stability Criteria			Design Principles								Resources				Select
	Does the activity increase support for governance? Explain.	Does the activity decrease support for hostile actors? Explain.	Does the activity increase institutional and societal capability? Explain.	Sustainability	Local Ownership	Short-term vs Long-term Results	Culturally/Politically Acceptable	Accountability & Transparency	Leverage Existing Resiliencies	Flexibility	Leverages Support from Other Organizations	Money	Personnel	Expertise	Time	Is the activity realistic and should it be done?
List potential activities that contribute to achieving objectives. Input each proposed activity separately in this column.	Explain how the activity will increase support for legitimate governance.	Explain how the activity will decrease support for hostile actors.	Explain how the activity will increase institutional and societal capability.	Refine the proposed activity to make it meet as many of the design principles as possible.								Determine resource requirements				Should the activity be executed ?

The activity design worksheet can serve as both an activity refinement tool and a justification to support making recommendations to the commander. Specifically, the staff can use the worksheet to explain how a proposed activity will meet the stability criteria, how it will meet as many of the design principles as possible, and what resources it will require.

**Validate Engagement Package.** At this point, the tactical stability matrix is complete for the priority sources of stability/instability. The final step is to validate this product as a legitimate engagement package. Validation occurs through civil reconnaissance and civil engagement; both are needed to re-examine the conditions related to the sources of stability/instability and ensure the planning assumptions are accurate. At this juncture, it is especially important to vet the analysis and activity design to ensure they are based on reality (i.e., the “ground truth”) rather than outsiders’ assumptions. Based on the population’s perspectives (to include SMEs who may be more familiar with the AO), the following questions should be asked:

- Does the proposed activity have a reasonable chance of meeting the stability objective?
- Does civil reconnaissance confirm a solid link between the objective and the root cause?
- Is there buy-in for the activity and its associated objective?

If units find that planning assumptions were wrong or that an activity is otherwise invalidated, the activity is deemed untenable and must be reevaluated though the entire process again.

**Execution**

The fourth and final SAF component is execution. It consists of—

- Delivering the validated nonlethal engagement package.
- Monitoring and evaluating approved nonlethal engagement packages.

- Planning for and conducting transition to competent authorities when appropriate (i.e., time or event-driven transition).

The first step of execution is to finalize the nonlethal engagement package so the battalion executes it. The product delivered is one tactical stability matrix for each source of stability/instability that is being engaged, with an objective and associated activities.

The second step, monitoring and evaluation, establishes a cycle of examination that recognizes progress toward the accomplishment of objectives or the lack thereof, facilitating the termination of activities that fail to generate the desired effects. Through monitoring and evaluation, units are able to assess activities for progress and effects. Some of the data collected on the stability activities may rise to the level of a PIR or CCIR. For example, if indicators showed that a source of instability worsened despite the stability activity designed to address it, the commander will want to know to reassess the activity. Monitoring and evaluation are conducted using MOPs, MOEs, and commanders' overall intuitive impressions of stability. A single indicator is incapable of measuring stability. Stability-related indicators normally aggregate to build a comprehensive picture. This means that stability planners must establish and track metrics methodically to inform progress, as well as refine activities when necessary.

The MOPs selected track the accomplishment of an activity. They answer the question, "Is the activity being performed and making progress?" and in the long run, "Is the activity complete?" Examples might include the number of miles of road paved, or the number of police officers trained. The selected MOPs are monitored during the implementation of an activity until it is complete.

The selected MOEs measure an activity's impact. Examples might include decreased travel time (i.e., for a road construction/repair project) or decreased criminal activity (i.e., for a police training activity). They are generally evaluated after an activity has progressed to a point of having some impact in the AO. A key point is to monitor for unintended positive effects that can be reinforced, as well as unintended negative effects that should be mitigated.

Consideration of the overall intuitive impression of stability is the last part of monitoring and evaluation. Rather than measuring the effect of individual activities, this considers the effect of all the activities conducted over a longer period of time, as well as the influence of external factors. It asks, "Is stability increasing or decreasing?" Key to measuring overall stability is identifying good indicators, creating a baseline, and then tracking the indicators at regular intervals, starting as early as possible. Stability indicators should reflect the population's perceptions of stability, not perceptions or assumptions held by outsiders. They are based on the question, "What will people do or say differently if they believe the environment is getting more stable?" Examples include the following:

- The population takes their problems to the district government for resolution, which reflects trust and confidence.
- The level of violence is a direct measure of insecurity.
- The population's freedom of movement reflects security conditions.



The monitoring and evaluation matrix is a tool for capturing progress toward activity completion and generating stability. Table 8-11 provides an example of a monitoring and evaluation matrix.

**Table 8-11. Monitoring and Evaluation Matrix.**

Source of Instability	Objectives	Activity	Measure of Performance	Status	Baseline	Change	Measure of Effectiveness
Lack of legitimate conflict resolution mechanisms		Establish mobile dispute resolution unit	Number of cases heard by mobile dispute resolution unit	(Status of activity completion)	Average of 14 legal cases per month resolved by malign actors	(Change from baseline)	
Disaffected, unemployed young adults aligning with violent non-state actors	Youth employed through government-linked programs	Rehabilitate destroyed structures to serve as government-run community centers for job training	Structure rehabilitated  Number of trainings conducted		80% unemployment rate among young adults		Increase in pro-government social media content by youth  Decrease in unemployment

The *status* column refers to a given activity’s stage of completion. An example of a description could be “funded,” or “approved,” or “80% constructed.” The *baseline* column should reflect the status of a key indicator or data point before the activity was initiated. An example of a baseline could be the number of known legal cases resolved by malign actors before the government’s mobile dispute resolution team started hearing cases. The *change* column refers to the departure from a given indicator’s baseline since the activity started.

# CHAPTER 9

## AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

An amphibious operation is a military operation that is launched from the sea by an amphibious force embarked aboard ships or craft with the primary purpose of conducting landing force operations within the littorals. The littorals include those land areas and their adjacent sea and associated air space that are predominantly susceptible to engagement and influence from the sea.

The amphibious operation integrates naval, air, and land forces in a concerted military effort. The mobility and flexibility of this balanced force render it capable of striking with great force at a selected site or sites within an adversary's defensive system. The threat posed by the existence of an appreciable amphibious capability induces an adversary to disperse forces and to make expensive and often wasteful efforts to defend the littoral area.

An amphibious operation includes planning, the embarkation of troops and equipment, rehearsals, movement to the objective area, final preparation of the objective, the landing of troops and accompanying supplies and equipment, and support of the landing force until termination of the amphibious operation. For more information on amphibious operations, refer to JP 3-02 and JP 3-02.1, *Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation*.

### PURPOSE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

The purpose of an amphibious operation is to transition ready-to-fight combat forces from the sea to the shore, within the littorals, with or without diplomatic clearance or host nation support, to conduct landing force operations. In non-combat situations, the amphibious force projects appropriate forces and resources ashore to provide the most timely and effective response to the situation.

### Role of the Infantry Battalion in Amphibious Operations

The infantry battalion is organized into a BLT for amphibious operations, either as part of a regimental landing team or as the GCE of a MEU. The BLT consists of the infantry battalion and such other combat, combat support, and CSS units that are required to accomplish a mission or operation ashore. Since the BLT is task-organized for a specific mission, there is no standard organization. The primary consideration for organizing a BLT is the determination of support requirements to accomplish specific amphibious operations.

Operations may vary from those in which a BLT operates under the close supervision of a HHQ to independent operations where the BLT commander is also the commander, landing force (CLF). As stated previously, the BLT should be prepared to operate in a disaggregated manner over great distances between task-organized maneuver elements. For example, one company team may conduct theater security cooperation in one country, while another provides FHA, and yet a third participates in maritime interdiction operation as part of a joint task force.

## **Characteristics of Amphibious Operations**

Regardless of the type of amphibious operation, the characteristics discussed in the following subordinate sections apply to all.

***Integration of the Amphibious Task Force and Landing Force.*** Close coordination between the amphibious task force (ATF) and landing force is a key characteristic of amphibious operations. Shared planning responsibilities and the mutual reliance of both forces during execution are hallmarks of an amphibious operation. The integration required to conduct separate and distinct tasks with a common unified purpose requires trust between the commanders and their staffs.

***Gaining and Maintaining Access.*** Access is critical to the success of an amphibious operation. Access may be granted by a nation as a result of previous military engagements or diplomatic actions. In other cases, access may need to be gained by shaping the operational area. Finally, some amphibious operations are characterized as forcible entry operations against a hostile force. Integration with other service components and SOF enables complementary supporting operations. An amphibious force, in conjunction with other joint assets, must have the capacity to continuously support forces ashore during all phases of an amphibious operation.

***Task-Organized Forces.*** Battalions routinely deploy with similar task organizations to meet anticipated operational requirements. However, no standard organization is applicable to all situations. It is important that the BLT possess a wide range of skill sets and capabilities to be prepared for the accomplishment of multiple and diverse missions and possible integration with joint and multinational forces.

***Unity of Effort.*** Due to the complexities associated with amphibious operations, coordination and cooperation towards a common goal must take place. This includes between units and organizations not necessarily part of the same command, which is the product of successful unified action. This is critical because of the BLT's reliance on higher, adjacent, and supporting units for intelligence, understanding the operational environment, and establishing open communications between staffs. This unity of effort is critical to achieving success in all five types of amphibious operations.

## **Types of Amphibious Operations**

There are five types of amphibious operations, following in the order of likelihood: amphibious support to other operations, amphibious raid, amphibious assault, amphibious withdrawal, and amphibious demonstration.

***Amphibious Support to Other Operations.*** This type of operation focuses on providing a rapid response to crisis, supporting deterrence, resolving conflict, promoting peace, or supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crises. Amphibious forces routinely conduct support to operations such as security cooperation, FHA, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace support operations, recovery operations, or protection of US personnel and facilities abroad. A BLT may find itself conducting two or more of these operations simultaneously while distributed over vast distances.

***Amphibious Raid.*** An amphibious raid is an operation involving a swift incursion into or the temporary occupation of an objective to accomplish an assigned mission, followed by a planned withdrawal. An amphibious raid may be conducted for a variety of reasons, including to temporarily seize an area to secure information, to confuse an adversary, to capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability.

***Amphibious Assault.*** An amphibious assault involves the establishment of a landing force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore, which requires a swift buildup of combat power ashore. Utilizing fire support, seabasing, and logistics functions, amphibious forces can gain a foothold on a hostile shore by forcible entry. For example, during the Korean War, amphibious forces conducted a turning movement against North Korean forces by establishing a landing force at the port of Inchon, deep behind the enemy's lead elements.

***Amphibious Withdrawal.*** Amphibious withdrawals are conducted to extract forces in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore. They may be conducted under enemy pressure or under operational urgency in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments to obtain forces needed elsewhere or to remove forces whose mission is completed. For example, after 1st Marine Division conducted its tactical withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir, it executed an amphibious withdrawal from the port of Hungnam, North Korea.

***Amphibious Demonstration.*** An amphibious demonstration is a show of force intended to influence or deter an enemy's decision. The intent of an amphibious demonstration is to deceive the enemy, causing the enemy to select an unfavorable COA. For example, during Operation Desert Storm, amphibious forces composed of 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and ships of an amphibious strike group conducted raids, fire missions, feints, mine and lane clearance, and beach reconnaissance to convince Iraqi commanders that the main attack would come from the sea. This caused the enemy to shift forces from the southern flank to reinforce Kuwait City, thereby weakening the defenses where the true coalition main effort came from.

## **AMPHIBIOUS MANEUVER**

### **Amphibious Operations Command Relationships**

The commander, amphibious force (CAF) is the officer in overall command of an amphibious operation. The CLF and CATF are subordinate commanders to the CAF. The CATF is the Navy officer designated in the CAF's initiating directive as the commander of the ATF. The CLF is the officer designated in the CAF's initiating directive as the commander of the landing force for an amphibious operation. During operations, amphibious commanders may be referred to by either their operational command titles or by their assigned task force designators.

The command relationships established between the CATF, CLF, and other designated commanders are critical decisions. The relationships chosen for the CATF, CLF, and other designated commanders by their common superior, the CAF (i.e., the establishing authority), should be based on the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, operational environment, and recommendations from subordinate commanders.

Command relationships during multinational operations are based on international standardization agreements or on bilateral agreements between nations and are defined in the initiating directive. For more information on multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*.

The CATF and CLF identify the events and conditions for any shifts of the support relationship throughout the operation, ideally during the planning phase, and forward them to the establishing authority for approval. See figure 9-1 for examples of when the relationship might shift between commanders. Situations may arise when the amphibious force is conducting distributed operations, and either the BLT commander or one of their subordinate commanders may be designated as the supported commander for a particular phase or stage of an operation, for a particular function, or for a combination of phases, stages, events, and functions.

Examples of Shifts in the Support Relationship	
Mission	Supported Commander
Assault	CATF, then CLF
Raid with Coastal threat	CATF, then CLF, then CATF
Inland raid with no coastal threat	CLF
Demonstration	CATF
Withdrawal	CLF, then CATF
Foreign humanitarian assistance	CATF or CLF

**LEGEND:**  
 CATF commander, amphibious task force                      CLF commander, landing force

**Figure 9-1. Examples of Shifts in the Support Relationship.**

### Phases of an Amphibious Operation

Planning for an amphibious operation generally follows a distinct and well-defined pattern. This pattern includes a sequence of events and activities which occur during landing operations, and—to a lesser degree—all other amphibious operations. The sequence most commonly utilized is *planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and action* (PERMA). The sequence may vary when amphibious forces are already forward-deployed, or when they are subsequently tasked following the termination of a prior amphibious operation. The PERMA sequence is used to facilitate timely offload in support of the mission. It is normally utilized by forces that are not already forward deployed aboard naval shipping upon receipt of their tasking. The sequence may be adjusted, with embarkation being the first phase to make best use of available space on shipping without a specific mission in mind. Table 9-1 shows the sequence of events for PERMA in detail. For more information on PERMA, see JP 3-02.

**Table 9-1. Phases of an Amphibious Operation.**

<b>Phase</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Battalion Level Perspective</b>
Planning	<p>Continuous concurrent process involving bottom-up refinement.</p> <p>Begins at the receipt of initiating directive and terminates with the completion of operational objectives.</p> <p>Products that emerge from the planning phase are the landing force concept of operations ashore, landing plan, loading plan, and amphibious force tasking order.</p>	<p>Predeployment training.</p> <p>Allocation of assault shipping to units/elements.</p> <p>Identify embarkation/cube requirements.</p> <p>Generation of deliverables for use in constructing the landing plan.</p> <p>Generation of TACSOPs/briefing shells.</p>
Embarkation	Embarkation to landing force personnel and equipment aboard amphibious shipping.	<p>Cargo and equipment echeloning/staging load plan.</p> <p>Inspections of vehicles and containers.</p> <p>Identification of troop spaces.</p> <p>Loading of personnel and equipment</p> <p>Stowage of equipment.</p>
Rehearsal	Conducted prior to and during movement (transit) to ensure the feasibility, adequacy, and timing of the landing plan, the readiness of the landing force, to test communications, and to validate procedures/assumptions.	<p>Shipboard training.</p> <p>Serial call-aways.</p> <p>Shipboard safety drills.</p> <p>Rehearsal drills.</p> <p>Confirmation briefs.</p> <p>Planning refinements.</p>
Movement	Amphibious force departs port of embarkation and proceeds to the AOA.	<p>Troop regulations.</p> <p>Shipboard life.</p> <p>Maintenance of weapons and equipment.</p> <p>Mission-related training.</p>
Action	<p>Amphibious force is in position to initiate ship-to-shore movement and terminates upon completion of mission objectives.</p> <p>This phase includes supporting arms, ship-to-shore movement/ship-to-objective maneuver (via surface, air, or a combination of both).</p>	<p>Assault support/landing craft considerations.</p> <p>Establishment of beachhead/landing zones.</p> <p>Rearm/refit/refuel/resupply.</p>

### **Termination of Amphibious Operations**

The criteria for how and when to terminate amphibious operations are discussed during operational design. The termination of the amphibious operation is predicated on the accomplishment of the mission per the specific conditions contained in the initiating directive.

### **PLANNING**

Planning for an amphibious operation differs from planning for land warfare in the manner in which it is conducted and in the degree of detail involved. The attacker must fully exploit the means available to ensure success (e.g., aviation support, supporting weapons, and CSS). A BLT

is provided the necessary troops, equipment, and support to accomplish its mission. Normally, the BLT commander is not told how or in what manner to accomplish the mission. However, during planning for an amphibious operation, higher echelons may make certain decisions that would ordinarily be left to the battalion commander. The BLT commander is further dependent upon higher echelons for information and intelligence during the amphibious planning phase.

Amphibious planning must be coordinated between ATF and landing force units at all levels of command. Although planning is a continuing and cyclic process from the inception of the amphibious operation, it takes on formal shape with the preparation of the operation plan or order.

Planning for amphibious operations is conducted in reverse order. That is, the first step in amphibious planning is to determine what physical objectives must be taken to accomplish the mission. Next, a scheme of maneuver is developed that will seize these objectives. That scheme determines the plan for landing, which in turn determines the plan for debarkation. Finally, the plan for debarkation is used to determine the embarkation plan.

### **Fundamentals of Amphibious Planning**

Amphibious planning is concurrent, parallel, and detailed. These factors are emphasized more in the amphibious planning process than in planning for land warfare. The differences arise from the complex nature of an amphibious operation and the integration of forces from two or more Services, and possibly even coalition or allied forces.

**Concurrent Planning.** Concurrent planning is conducted at all echelons of the same command and by corresponding echelons of different commands. Concurrent planning not only saves time, it also permits the early detection of problems at all echelons so that they may be resolved quickly and allow the orderly continuation of the planning process. The battalion commander ensures that tentative decisions, plans, and other information are made available to the staff and subordinate units. The battalion commander determines what reinforcements are required to accomplish the mission. Those requirements are coordinated, consolidated, and forwarded to the HHQ. It is through this planning process that the CATF can determine the landing force's overall needs. The non-availability of certain requirements, such as shipping space, may cause modifications to the requirements or changes to the concept of operations.

**Parallel Planning.** The close and continuous coordination necessary between corresponding ATF and landing force echelons is termed parallel planning. The necessity for parallel planning arises from the need to coordinate two or more Services in a common effort. At the BLT level, such planning cannot begin until certain basic decisions have been announced by HHQ echelons. A higher echelon commander, in conjunction with the CATF, usually decides upon the time and place at which the BLT and the ATF counterpart may begin parallel planning. To expedite parallel planning, the BLT commander communicates directly with their ATF counterpart to determine general agenda items and which key personnel will attend the initial planning. The selection of a general agenda and personnel attending are prerequisites for a well-organized and efficient meeting. Circumstances permitting, all essential staff personnel should attend the initial planning meeting. It is most advantageous for the initial planning meeting to be held aboard ship or at a site in proximity to the amphibious shipping assigned to the BLT. This affords an

opportunity for the mobility officers and other staff members to visit assigned ships and to effect direct liaison with the ships' officers, especially the combat cargo officers (CCOs). The BLT's mobility officer and the ship's CCO effect positive liaison, which is continued throughout the planning and embarkation phases. Parallel planning can best be accomplished when the corresponding commanders and their respective staffs are in close proximity to one another.

**Detailed Planning.** When the CATF determines that the ATF can support the concept of operations ashore, detailed planning commences. The CLF and subordinate commanders plan the details of their schemes of maneuver ashore, their fires support plans, and their movements from ship-to-shore (i.e., landing plans) which will establish forces ashore in the combat postures dictated by their maneuver and fire support requirements. Final detailed plans should be completed and disseminated prior to embarkation to ensure that the embarkation plan supports the landing plan and subsequent phases.

### **Amphibious Planning Sequence within the Marine Corps Planning Process**

Following receipt of the initiating directive, which may come in the form of a warning order, the BLT commander may formulate a planning sequence prior to announcing the commander's planning guidance. The order should contain at a minimum—

- The tentative mission and objectives specified by the next HHQ.
- The HHQ commander's concept of operations.
- The tentative assignment of landing means (i.e., rotary wing and tilt-rotor aircraft, landing craft, and AAVs).
- The tentative mission timeline expressed in D-Day, H-Hour, or L-Hour.
- The tentative assignment of supporting and attached units.
- The tentative shipping allocation.
- The tentative landing zones (LZs) and beach landing sites.
- The tentative air and NGF support.
- The deadlines for the completion of planning and submission of requirements.
- Logistic and administrative information, such as restrictions on vehicle loads, medical requirements (e.g., special equipment and immunizations), and tentative logistical procedures.

As stated previously, once the commander's guidance is received, the BLT begins detailed planning using the reverse planning method from the scheme of maneuver, plan of supporting fires, and the landing plan. It is imperative that as much detailed planning as is feasible be conducted regarding the personnel and equipment needed to accomplish the BLT's mission, as this has a drastic impact on the load plan for embarkation and the identification of resource shortfalls.

### **Employment of Supporting Units**

The type and amount of combat support and CSS provided to the battalion is based primarily on the concept of operations ashore. The required task organization for the BLT evolves by considering the proposed concept of operations ashore in light of the enemy situation, the terrain, the mission of the BLT, and the availability of support forces. Initially, the assignment of reinforcements to the BLT may be directed by the next HHQ. Often, as a result of staff estimates



and detailed planning, it will be evident that the BLT requires additional reinforcements. Additional requirements are determined at the earliest time possible and submitted to the next HHQ for a resourcing decision.

### **Amphibious Task Force Planning**

The ATF's planning is focused on ship-to-shore movement, the availability of landing craft, the hydrography, control of the seaward/beach approaches, and the geography of beaches being considered for use by the landing force.

### **Battalion Landing Team Planning**

As discussed earlier, the BLT's plan for an amphibious operation consists of the scheme of maneuver, the landing plan, and the plan of supporting fires. These three elements of the plan are interdependent and require simultaneous consideration and preparation. The plan must be capable of being supported tactically and logistically from the sea. Although expressed in detail, the plan must stress simplicity and flexibility. Prior to preparing the detailed plan, the BLT commander and staff must continuously examine and analyze the terrain, weather, and enemy situation.

***Scheme of Maneuver.*** The scheme of maneuver for an amphibious operation is essentially the same as for offensive operations ashore; the fundamentals apply equally in both cases. The major difference is the requirement in an amphibious operation to build up combat power ashore from zero initially. When determining the scheme of maneuver, the BLT commander and staff must consider the following:

- Seizure of objectives that support the rapid buildup of forces and supplies ashore.
- The scheme of maneuver can be supported by NGF, missiles, and tactical air support until artillery and other fire support means are established ashore.
- Individual assault companies are capable of being independently successful and logistically self-sufficient initially, without dependence on other assault units.
- Early seizure of key terrain overlooking the landing beaches and LZs, as well as other key terrain that is not seized, are neutralized by the effects of fires.
- Early seizure of key terrain features beyond the LZ or inland from the beach landing sites to expedite the advance to and seizure of the assigned BLT objectives.
- The timely landing of reserve forces by the early seizure and control of sufficient land area to support dispersion and space to maneuver, when the reserve is committed. The use of air assault as a means of employment gives the BLT commander more flexibility in committing the reserve.

In order for the BLT commander to approve a scheme of maneuver, it needs to be logistically supportable from the moment the landing force is committed until the termination of the amphibious operation or subsequent operations ashore. The commander must consider the following:

- Based on the commander's concept of operation, the overall logistics requirements for each phase of the operation are estimated.

- The identified requirements are refined and presented to HHQ as specific logistical support requirements. These are detailed statements of what is required and by what means the requirements are to be met. They include mount-out supplies, assault shipping, resupply (both surface and aerial), and CSS.
- The assignment of logistics support assets to subordinate units in the BLT and specific logistics responsibilities.

**Landing Plan.** The landing plan is the commander's plan for landing units in appropriate formations, with the necessary equipment and supplies, over assigned beaches or in assigned LZs, at the times required by the scheme of maneuver to initiate combat ashore. The plan must support the scheme of maneuver ashore, but is subject to the associated consideration of the capabilities of the landing means available. The primary concerns in formulating the landing plan include:

- The formation required for the initiation of combat ashore.
- The mobility of air assault and waterborne forces.
- Air and NGF support for the ship-to-shore movement.
- Rapid buildup of combat power ashore.
- Flexibility in landing supporting arms and reserves.

**Plan of Supporting Fires.** Before detailed planning can commence, the battalion's supporting arms representatives must be made aware, in general terms, of the battalion commander's requirements and intentions for the desired effects of fires. They must know what is required, where, and when, to plan the details on how they will accomplish the commander's guidance. The plan of supporting fires should provide guidance in the following areas:

- The tentative fire support means and assets known to be available.
- Targets or areas of particular importance, which must be engaged by a particular supporting arm or organic weapons.
- Maneuver units that will have the priority of fires during specific phases of the operation.
- Whether or not shaping fires are to be fired, and if so, their approximate duration, location, and timing.
- The extent of planning required for the employment of IRCs (e.g., EW and MISO), to include the effects desired.
- General guidance relating to restrictions on the use of fire support (e.g., restricted targets and conservation of ammunition).
- For organic fire support assets (e.g., artillery, tanks, light armored vehicles), the general time and place that they will be landed.

## **Logistics Planning**

It is the responsibility of HHQ to provide the required logistics support to the BLT and its subordinate units. Once ashore, planning for logistics will be similar to how the BLT would be supplied during land warfare. The development of the BLT logistics support plan is based on the commander's planning guidance, operation planning, directives issued by HHQ, experience

factors, tables of allowances, and individual unit requirements. The BLT's logistics planning for amphibious operations must provide for accomplishment of the following objectives:

- The orderly assembly and movement of the BLT's personnel, supplies, and equipment.
- The establishment and maintenance of a support system in the objective area which provides responsive and adequate logistics and administrative support to the BLT.

Considerable consideration must be given to how the BLT will be initially supplied once committed ashore, and how the BLT will be supplied during sustained operations.

***Initial Supply.*** This consists of the supplies needed to support the assault landing and initial operations ashore. The BLT can provide this support by doing some of the following:

- All assault companies should carry enough supplies to sustain themselves until they can be resupplied based on initial estimates (e.g., 72 hours of supplies).
- Supplies to be landed with the landing force can be assembled to facilitate issuing them before and during debarkation.
- Pre-staged air-lifted supplies can be established.
- Supplies can be landed selectively in accordance with the landing plan.
- Logistics or staging points ashore can be planned (if required), as well as the onward distribution of those supplies to forward units.

***Sustained Operations.*** Sustained tactical operations ashore require logistics support to be transported to the amphibious objective area (AOA) in follow-on shipping and/or aircraft.

## **EMBARKATION**

Embarkation involves all measures necessary to ensure the timely and effective loading and unloading of the amphibious force. Embarkation planning must begin early, continue constantly, and be coordinated with other planning, and it must provide enough flexibility to support changes to the original plan. It is coordinated between all forces and requires a detailed knowledge of the capabilities, characteristics, and limitations of all ships, troops, supplies, and equipment to be embarked. Three principles drive embarkation planning: support the tactical plan, provide for unit self-sufficiency, and provide for dispersion.

Once embarkation planning is complete, the BLT should issue an embarkation order to the companies and subordinate units specifying the time, dates, routes, loading diagrams, echeloning of equipment, and methods of movement to points of embarkation for their troops and equipment. For more information on embarkation, see JP 3-02.1.

### **Key Personnel**

The embarkation and landing personnel consist of the CCO, team embarkation officer (TEO), landing force air officer, and assault amphibian officer. The CCO is a Marine Corps mobility officer permanently assigned to the ship's company. The CCO is often assisted in their duties by one or more permanently assigned SNCOs, depending on the type of ship, who serve as combat

cargo assistants. The CCO is directly responsible to the ship's CO for all issues pertaining to the embarkation of landing force personnel, supplies, and equipment. The CCO advises both the ship's CO and the embarked commanding officer of troops (COT) on plans for loading and offloading troop cargo, storage, communications requirements, and for the billeting and messing of troops. The CCO oversees the work of the TEOs. The CCO provides direction and guidance regarding the ship's loading characteristics, embarked troop regulations, cargo capacities and inventories, and management of the landing force operational reserve materiel. In conjunction with the ship's first lieutenant, CCOs and their assigned personnel directly supervise the embarkation and debarkation of landing force personnel, supplies, and equipment. The BLT and other units embarked on a ship augment the ship's CCO with a detachment of Marines and sailors that make up the combat cargo platoon, which performs tasks associated with the landing force's equipment aboard amphibious shipping on behalf of the ship's CO.

An embarkation team is a temporary administrative group of personnel, supplies, and equipment either embarked or to be embarked. The COT appoints a TEO to handle all matters pertaining to cargo loading/offloading. The demands of the TEO are such that it should be the primary duty of the officer assigned. The TEO's duties include the preparation of load plans for assigned shipping, coordination and execution of the load plan, and assistance in offload planning. The TEO must be familiar with the ship's loading characteristics, troop regulations, and the contents of the landing force's embarked material.

When embarked, the senior assault amphibian unit leader also serves as a special staff officer, who provides SME advice to both the ship's company and embarked personnel on all matters pertaining to AAVs. In this role, the assault amphibian officer's duties include providing supported commanders with estimates of supportability, coordinating launch and recovery operations with applicable Navy personnel, overseeing safety considerations and emergency procedures, developing AAV-specific communication plans, and assisting in the planning of subsequent operations ashore.

### **Loading Plan**

The mission ashore drives all planning. Without a valid concept of operations, it is impossible to determine resource requirements such as amphibious ships, landing craft, and aircraft. This is precisely why amphibious embarkation planning begins at the earliest possible stage—to identify possible limitations and to determine what personnel and equipment are essential and where they will be assigned and loaded. This allows them to be echeloned ashore in the proper sequence to support the concept of operations (i.e., the landing plan).

All BLT embarkation and operational planners must familiarize themselves with a host of factors, including the capabilities and limitations of the ships, aircraft, and landing craft available, their Navy counterparts, and the personnel, supplies, and equipment to be embarked aboard amphibious shipping. Close, continuous coordination throughout planning and execution is required between operational planners and those responsible for the embarkation and offloading of personnel and materiel. For more information on air and surface load planning considerations, refer to JP 3-02.1; MCTP 13-10B, *Combat Cargo Operations Handbook*; and MCTP 13-10C, *Unit Embarkation Handbook*.

The BLT commander should be familiar with the loading characteristics of the ships upon which the BLT will embark. They must ensure that TEOs visit their ships regularly, attend all embarkation conferences, and regularly brief embarkation team commanders. Planning for embarkation requires the submission of deck diagrams from the TEOs to their COTs for approval, then to the ship's CO via the CCO. As with any other amphibious planning, the load plan must be cross-walked through the ship's department heads for supportability and concurrence. Once a load plan has been approved, it can only be changed with the approval of both the ship's CO and the COT.

## **REHEARSAL**

The rehearsal phase tests the feasibility of the landing plan, the adequacy of command and control and communications, and the integration and combat readiness of participating forces, and familiarizes all units with the plan. Rehearsals can be limited to squads or include entire MAGTFs and associated Navy elements. The BLT should make maximum use of time to conduct full-scale rehearsals with the units and elements conducting the mission, prior to embarkation whenever feasible, to approximate the conditions anticipated in the objective area as much as possible. Once embarked and underway, the BLT competes for limited space and resources with other embarked units to conduct training and rehearsals.

### **Types of Rehearsals**

The types of rehearsals are based on the individual needs of the landing force. Rehearsals are not simply unit-level training; rather, they exercise the amphibious force's ability to execute the plan for the specific mission. The types of rehearsals the BLT can expect to conduct or participate in include staff rehearsals, integrated rehearsals, and separate unit rehearsals.

**Staff Rehearsal.** The BLT staff can expect to participate—along with the staffs from the other units conducting operations ashore—in a series of landing force rehearsals prior to any integrated rehearsals with the ATF's staffs. These rehearsals should take place in the same spaces and use the same C2 equipment to be used for the actual landing to validate their effectiveness. These rehearsals can be conducted utilizing CP exercises, tabletop exercises, or any combination.

**Integrated Rehearsal.** Integrated rehearsals are conducted jointly between the ATF and landing force staffs, units, and elements. They can range in size from large numbers of participants to a select few. The full spectrum of C2 capabilities should be rehearsed. The BLT should expect to participate in the integrated rehearsals by validating its role in the ship-to-shore movement and debarkation timeline through conducting call-away drills. The call-away refers to the calls made over the ship's public address system for designated serials to move to their mustering locations and debarkation stations on the ship. The general steps in the call-away and debarkation are the serial announcement; confirmation of manifests; equipment, weapons, and ammunition issue; test fire; and movement to the assault or landing craft. The process involving hundreds of personnel and is both time consuming and difficult; therefore, it requires as much rehearsal as possible.

**Ship Rehearsals and Drills.** Navy personnel conduct continuous training and drills across all watches while underway. Some drills necessitate embarked unit participation, while others require non-engaged personnel to stand clear. Ships and major amphibious elements publish specific TACSOPs regarding how different types of drills occur. Some of the major rehearsals and drills that affect embarked units are general quarters, man overboard, and abandon ship.

### **Rehearsal Planning**

Just as the mission has an operational plan, the rehearsals should have rehearsal plans. These plans should be thoroughly understood by all personnel. A rehearsal plan should contain specific instructions detailing the who, what, where, when, and why for each planned rehearsal.

Immediately following each rehearsal, an evaluation should take place to identify any flaws in the operational plan that were discovered during it and recommendations for corrective actions to be taken. Primary considerations should be given to command and control, communications, TTP, and TACSOPs.

## **MOVEMENT**

The movement phase commences upon departure from the port of embarkation and concludes when the ships reach the AOA. Depending on the timeline, which may be influenced by both military and political factors, movement may be made directly to the AOA, or it may be interrupted to conduct rehearsals en route or to make adjustments to the load plan. During transit to the AOA, the BLT should develop a plan to prepare the Marines and Sailors for combat operations ashore. Since the operation may begin after several weeks aboard ship, it is essential that the BLT's organization and routine be efficient. Some of these continuing actions include the following routines:

- The BLT should develop a training plan that takes into account the limited space and facilities aboard ship. Training coordination and deconfliction needs to be conducted continuously between the COT and ship's operations to minimize possible points of friction. The battalion gunner should usually allow for a shipping container consisting of materials and equipment for establishing live-fire ranges, both aboard ship and ashore. Live-fire training requires a detailed brief to the ship's CO detailing how all phases will be conducted, to include a thorough operational risk management (ORM) analysis, communications plan, safety plan, and ricochet abatement.
- Most physical conditioning occurs at the individual, fire team, squad, and platoon level due to the lack of space and facilities. The ship may develop a battle rhythm that includes when the flight deck is open for physical training, the establishment of "green" and "blue" hours in the gym, and set forth the standing operating procedure for physical training for all embarked troops.
- Embarked equipment is subject to dampness and salt water, requiring routine cleaning and maintenance for weapons, communications equipment, vehicles, and supplies. Maintenance of equipment, especially if stored in the areas near the well deck, often needs to be coordinated with ship's operations. The BLT TEO should coordinate this access through HHQ and/or the ship's CCO. Emphasis should be placed on vehicle maintenance, including engine star-up at times designated by ship's operations.

## **Command Relationships while Underway**

It is important that all embarked BLT personnel understand that the highest authority aboard ship is the CO of the vessel. Regardless of Service, all personnel aboard ship are subject to the authority of its CO. While the BLT is embarked aboard shipping, it is the COT's responsibility to ensure that the discipline of embarked troops is maintained. The importance of maintaining a good working relationship with the ship's personnel cannot be stressed enough.

## **Underway Tasks for Embarked Forces**

The ship's CO and COT work closely together to combine the ship and embarked troops into one fighting unit. As part of this team, embarked units take part in certain labor-intensive functions that serve the welfare of the entire ship. The duration and requirements differ depending on the task, such as augmenting the ship's security or self-defense detail during port visits or transiting specific areas. Other than landing force troops required to augment combat cargo personnel, who are generally attached for the duration of the deployment, personnel return to landing force units after a period of time or for operations ashore.

## **ACTION**

The action phase of the amphibious operation consists of the ship-to-shore movement, landings (i.e., which may include assault landings), movement to the objective areas, and seizure of the objectives or otherwise accomplishing the mission. It is the culminating point of all the predeployment training, planning, embarkation, rehearsals, and movement to the AOA.

## **Characteristics of Ship-to-Shore Movement**

The ship-to-shore movement is that portion of the action phase that involves the movement of the force from its assigned shipping to the designated landing areas. It is designed to land troops, equipment, and supplies at the prescribed times and places and in the formations required in the landing force concept of operations. The action may be executed by waterborne/surface means (i.e., landing craft, AAVs, or other connectors), air assault, or a combination of the two. The most significant factor that influences the conduct of ship-to-shore movement is whether the landing is in a permissive or hostile environment. The requirement for forcible entry has a dramatic effect upon the employment of supporting fires and IRCs. In either scenario, the conduct of the ship-to-shore movement follows the same sequence. For more information on ship-to-shore movement, see MCTP 13-10E, *Ship-to-Shore Movement*.

## **Organization**

Regardless of whether the BLT is configured for surface assault, air assault, or a combination, it can expect to have units attached or in direct support that are necessary for the initial assault. These may include shore party units, helicopter support teams, liaison elements, and personnel from HHQ, for example. The BLT commander or COT of other ships assigns "boat spaces" on landing craft or aircraft to these elements.

If the BLT is employed as the reserve force, it is organized in the same manner as the assault BLTs. Though not organized for the assault of a specific beach landing area or LZ, the BLT needs to be prepared to land as an assault unit.

**Waterborne (Surface).** Those elements of the BLT conducting waterborne movement by landing craft, AAVs, or other surface means are formed into boat teams, boat waves, boat groups, and boat flotillas. The integrity of the infantry companies should be maintained within their groups and teams as much as possible. These organizations are described in the following sections.

**Boat Team.** A boat team consists of troops and their equipment loaded onto one landing craft or AAV.

**Boat Wave.** A boat wave refers to the landing craft or AAVs within a boat group that require simultaneous landing.

**Boat Group.** The boat group is the basic organization of landing craft. One boat group usually consists of the BLT or a similar organization (e.g., an infantry company).

**Boat Flotillas.** A boat flotilla consists of two or more boat groups. A consideration in planning is the type of landing craft being utilized by elements within the BLT and how that could affect both timing and unit integrity. For example, the speed and subsequent cycle time for a round trip of a landing craft, air cushion is much quicker than a landing craft, utility or AAV.

**Landing Documents for Waterborne Assault.** The landing documents that are prepared by the BLT for a waterborne assault vary in accordance with the operation. When the BLT will land independently, where command and control from its HHQ may be difficult, it prepares certain documents that would be published by HHQ under different circumstances.

**Landing Diagram.** The landing diagram depicts the tactical deployment of boat teams in scheduled waves for the ship-to-shore movement. It provides the wave composition that allows AAVs, landing craft, and boat teams, as well as touch-down times for landing beaches and cushion landing zones. This diagram is prepared by a GCE representative. The landing diagram, table 9-2 on page 9-16, is promulgated concurrently with the landing craft and amphibious vehicle assignment table, and is distributed to commanders within the ATF.



**Table 9-2. Example Landing Diagram.**

<b>Beach Red One H-Hour 0530</b>								
<b>Scheduled Waves</b>	<b>Wave Composition</b>							
Wave 1 H-Hour	Assault Platoons, Co A and Co B							
	1-1 (X)	1-2 X	1-3 X	1-4 X	1-5 X	1-6 X	1-7 X	1-8 X
Wave 2 H+3 min	Co A (-) and Co B (-)							
	2-1 (X)	2-2 X	2-3 X	2-4 X	2-5 X	2-6 X	2-7 X	2-8 X
Wave 3 H+6 min	Leading Platoons, Co C and 81mm Mortar Platoon							
	3-1 (X)	3-2 X	3-3 X	3-4 X	3-5 X	3-6 X	3-7 X	3-8 X
Wave 4 H+9 min	Co C (-)							
	4-1 (X)	4-2 X	4-3 X	4-4 X	4-5 X	4-6 X	4-7 X	4-8 X
Wave 5 H+16 min	Weapons Company							
		5-1 (U)	5-2 U	5-3 U	5-4 U	5-5 U	5-6 U	
Note: Prepared concurrently with the landing craft and amphibious vehicle assignment table.								
<b>Key</b> X – AAV U – LCU ( ) – Wave Commander								

The landing plan is prepared in the following manner:

- Waves are numbered from front to rear.
- The time of each wave's landing is indicated on the diagram relative to H-hour.
- Each landing craft is assigned a boat number corresponding to the number of the embarked boat team. The wave is numbered from the center outward, with even numbers to the left and odd numbers to the right.
- Amphibious assault vehicles are numbered from right to left in each wave within the boat group. For example, a vehicle numbered 2-3 would be the third vehicle from the left in the second wave.

**Approach Schedule.** The approach schedule is prepared by the primary control officer (PCO)—the Navy officer responsible to the CATF for all ship-to-shore movement across a specific beach—and submitted via the CCO to the ATF and landing force commanders for consolidation and coordination with the overall landing plan. The approach schedule shows the scheduled time of H-hour; the beaches; the wave numbers; the courses the landing craft will follow; the names of boat group commanders, assistant boat group commanders, and PCOs; the

number of the vehicle in which the PCO is embarked; and other necessary information. Table 9-3 is an example of an approach schedule.

**Table 9-3. Approach Schedule Example.**

<b>Beach Red One</b>			
<b>H-Hour 0530</b>			
<b>Wave</b>	<b>Launch Area</b>	<b>Cross Line of Departure</b>	<b>Land</b>
1	H-23 min	H-20 min	H-Hour
2	H-20 min	H-17 min	H-3 min
3	H-17 min	H-14 min	H-6 min
4	H-14 min	H-11 min	H-9 min
5	H-2 min	H-5 min	H-16 min
Courses:	a. Launch area to LD:	140° True North, 144° Magnetic	
	b. LD to Land:	174° True North, 178° Magnetic	
Primary Control Officer:		CAPT D. M. Jones, USN	
LCAC Group Commander:		LT O. P. Hatch, USN	
Notes:			
1. Wave composition is shown in Landing Diagram (Table 8-2).			
2. Distances used to compute times shown:			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AAVs are launched 300 yards seaward of the line of departure.</li> <li>• Launch area to the line of departure is 1,000 yards.</li> <li>• The line of departure to the beach is 4,000 yards.</li> </ul>			

**Serial Assignment Table.** The serial assignment table lists the identifying serial numbers for all units to be landed prior to general unloading. The list is prepared in the numerical order of the serial numbers allocated to the BLT from HHQ earlier in the planning, providing a ready reference for information about the composition and landing requirements of each unit which a number is assigned to. The BLT completes the serial assignment table and submits it to HHQ for incorporation into the overall GCE and landing force serial assignment tables. Table 9-4 on page 9-18 gives an example of a landing force serial assignment table.

**Table 9-4. Landing Force Serial Assignment Table Example.**

Serial No.	Unit	Personnel	Material Equipment Vehicles	Number of Craft and Type	Parent Ship	Remarks
1401	Assault Platoon, Co A (rein)	98	Normal Combat	4 AAVs	LPD 14	1st Wave Beach Red One
1402	Co A (-)(rein)	91	Normal Combat	4 AAVs	LPD 14	2nd Wave Beach Red One
1403	Assault Platoon, Co B (rein)	96	Normal Combat	4 AAVs	LPD 14	1st Wave Beach Red One
1500	Assault Platoon, Co D	15	Normal Combat	1 CH46	LHA 1	1st Wave LZ Hawk
2101	1st Platoon, Co A 1st Tank Battalion	12	3 M1A1 Tanks	1 LCU	LHD 1	3rd Wave Beach Red One
2251	B Battery	34	2 M198 2 M923	1 LCU	LHD 1	On-Call Beach Red one

*Landing Sequence Table.* Though the final document is not normally generated by the BLT, the landing sequence table contains information pertinent to the BLT's ship-to-shore movement. The landing sequence table includes information about the estimated landing sequence of the landing force's nonscheduled units, including combat support, CSS, and aviation units. It is the principal document used by control agencies directing the ship-to-shore movement of these units. This table is the basis for developing the embarkation and loading plans for nonscheduled units. Table 9-5 gives an example of a landing sequence table.

**Table 9-5. Landing Sequence Table Example.**

Unit	Element	Serial No.	Carrier No. and Type	Ship	Beach
1st and 2d Platoon, Co A		905	3 LCUs	LPD	Red
1st Bn, 10th Marines	A/B/C Battery	1013 1014 1015	7 LCUs	LHA	Red

*Assault Schedule.* The assault schedule in table 9-6 lists the beach, hour, and priorities for landing the assault units. It is a tool to coordinate the movement of landing craft from amphibious shipping to designated beaches. The BLT commander determines the composition and formations of the BLT's assault waves and forwards this information to HHQ for consolidation, inclusion, and publication in the overall assault schedule.

**Table 9-6. Assault Schedule Example.**

Wave	Time	Beach			
		Red		Blue	
		1	2	1	2
		Craft/VEH Unit Serial	Craft/VEH Unit Serial	Craft/VEH Unit Serial	Craft/VEH Unit Serial
1	H-hour	8 AAVs Assault Platoons BLT 2/6 604/704	8 AAVs Assault Platoons BLT 1/6 203/303	8 AAVs Assault Platoons BLT 2/2 606/706	8 AAVs Assault Platoons BLT 1/2 1801/1802
2	H+3 min	6 AAVs Co E 605/705	6 AAVs Co A 204/304	6 AAVs Co F 607/707	6 AAVs Co B 1802/1803
3	H+7 min	4 AAVs Co C 803	4 AAVs Co C 405	4 AAVs Co C 804	4 AAVs Co C 406

**Air Assault.** Forces conducting ship-to-shore movement by air assault are organized into flights, waves, and teams.

**Team.** A team refers to the predetermined number of passengers loaded aboard an individual aircraft.

**Flight.** A flight refers to an individual aircraft by type (e.g., CH-53, MV-22).

**Wave.** A wave is a group of aircraft consisting of multiple flights.

**Ship-to-shore movement.** Regardless of the method of debarkation, the initiation of an element's movement is the same. Once the directive is issued by the CATF to land the landing force, the BLT is called away by serial number to their debarkation stations aboard the various ships. Due to the tedious and time-consuming work involved in the loading of personnel, equipment, and supplies for the scheduled waves, it is imperative that the BLT conducts rehearsals before-hand to assist in making this evolution as seamless as possible. The goal of the ship-to-shore movement is to maintain the planned timeline. The ship-to-shore movement, regardless of method, includes three categories—scheduled waves, on-call waves, and nonscheduled waves.

**Scheduled Waves.** A scheduled wave is launched immediately and landed according to plan.

**On-Call Waves.** The landing of on-call waves is initiated when called for by the landing force, and continues until these units are ashore.

**Nonscheduled Waves.** These are nonscheduled units that are not a high priority. The landing of these units may be interrupted if assets are needed elsewhere.

## **Control Organizations**

During the ship-to-shore movement, the CATF—in concert with the CLF—is in overall command of all landing force movements, both surface and air. There are a number of C2 organizations that assist the CATF. It is important for the BLT to have LNOs within these organizations to maintain situational awareness until such time as command and control is transitioned ashore. Many of the LNOs may come from the BLT's bravo command group.

***Navy Control Group.*** The Navy control group includes the CCO and the PCOs, who keep the CATF, CLF, and other designated commanders informed of the progress of the surface movements, including the landing of waves and overall progress of operations ashore.

***Navy Tactical Air Control Center.*** The CATF's tactical air control center controls and coordinates all aerial ship-to-shore movement through the tactical air officer.

***Tactical Logistics Group.*** The tactical-logistics group (i.e., TACLOG) is a temporary agency composed of landing force personnel, usually from echelons above the battalion level, which advises the Navy control organization of the landing force's requirements during ship-to-shore movement and assists in expediting the movement of the landing force ashore. It is the primary source of information for the CLF regarding the status of landing force units.

***Landing Force Operations Center.*** The landing force operations center (LFOC) is used by the landing force headquarters, and is normally organized to support the MAGTF CE. Ordinarily, the battalion has LNOs posted in the LFOC when it is deployed as the GCE of a MEU to assist and monitor operations. In this situation, the battalion commander maintains voice connectivity with the LFOC during the initial stages of an amphibious operation, usually by phone through the battalion's LNOs. Once established ashore, the battalion command group maintains connectivity with subordinate units and HHQ through tactical communications and the control ship assigned to coordinate the BLT's landing.

***Amphibious Air Traffic Control Center.*** The amphibious air traffic control center is the primary control agency for the CATF and is normally located on the flagship. If air traffic control is passed to an agency based ashore, the amphibious air traffic control center assists the direct air support center in controlling air assault aircraft between ships and shore and is prepared to assume control, as required.

***Supporting Arms Coordination Center.*** The SACC is supervised by the supporting arms coordinator, who is the direct representative of the Navy commander charged with supporting arms coordination. The BLT may provide representatives to the SACC, including the air officer, NGLO, and target information officer. Requests for fire support from the BLT's units are coordinated by landing force representatives with the SACC to ensure continuity of support.

## **Supporting, Advance Forces, and Pre-Action Operations**

Prior to the action phase of an amphibious operation, the CAF seeks to shape the operational environment. Although these operations are usually referred to in the context of an amphibious assault or amphibious raid, they may be used to support other types of amphibious operations, such as a noncombatant evacuation operation or FHA mission. Supporting operations are

directed by the CAF or designated commander and are, to a large degree, based on requests for certain actions from the CATF and CLF.

Due to the proliferation of anti-access/area denial weapons in the world today and the anticipated threat they may pose to the amphibious force, the CLF may designate an advance force landing group, which may be comprised in part or entirely of elements from the BLT. Some of the missions that may be conducted by an advance force include raids on possible anti-access/area denial weapon sites or command facilities, attacking land-based targets, providing the cordon or quick reaction force for a SOF mission, providing a tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel force, conducting deception operations, a combination of these, or yet others.

### **Final Preparations for Landing**

The BLT may need to cross-deck personnel to other ships prior to the ship-to-shore movement commencing. Pre-combat checks and pre-combat inspections of all embarked troops, equipment, and supplies going ashore must be completed. Any adjustments to previous plans need to be disseminated. The commencement of debarkation and the timing of the ship-to-shore movement depend on the designated H-hour; all elements of the BLT must be prepared to modify plans on short notice to conform to changes in H-hour.

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# CHAPTER 10

## OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS

Infantry battalions conduct other tactical operations to assist in the execution of offense, defense, or stability activities. Other tactical operations are usually not decisive actions; rather, they enable decisive actions to be taken. Planning and preparing for other tactical operations presents the battalion commander and staff with the same challenges and requirements as all tactical operations. An infantry battalion can conduct other tactical operations in mounted or dismounted roles, with or without enablers, during contiguous or noncontiguous employment, as well as in a joint or coalition environment. For more information other tactical operations, see MCWP 3-01.

### TROOP MOVEMENT

Troop movement is simply the movement of troops from one place to another by any available means. The battalion commander's ability to employ forces throughout the battlespace depends on the ability to move that force. Successful movement places the battalion in the right place, at the right time, with the right forces.

#### Methods of Troop Movement

Troop movements are conducted while dismounted or mounted using a combination of assets. The battalion commander may use ground vehicles, rail, aircraft, or surface vessels to move forces. There are six basic troop movement methods: dismounted march, mounted march, air movement, rail and water movement, forced march, and administrative movement.

***Dismounted March.*** An infantry battalion usually conducts a dismounted march (i.e., foot march) when moving as a consolidated unit with limited organic support, when stealth is required, the distance to cover is short, motor transport support or fuel is limited, or the tactical situation prohibits using a large numbers of vehicles. Dismounted marches can increase the commander's maneuver options. Though foot marches present limitations due to slow rates of march and can cause fatigue to heavily laden troops over long distances and varying terrain, they offer the following positive characteristics:

- Increased combat readiness; personnel may immediately react to enemy contact without the need to dismount.
- Provide ease of control.
- Can quickly adapt to varying terrain.
- Independence from existing road networks.

***Mounted March.*** A mounted march is the movement of troops and equipment by combat and tactical vehicles. An infantry battalion relies on considerable support from CSS units or other



elements to conduct mounted marches. Considerations for mounted marches over extended distances include—

- The ability of the route network to support the numbers, sizes, and weights of the tactical and combat vehicles making the movement.
- Available refueling and maintenance sites and crew rest areas.
- The need for recovery and evacuation assets.

**Air Movement.** Air movement is a continuous, progressive operation to transport successive elements of a battalion. The commander conducts air movements to rapidly move troops and equipment, to emplace systems, and to transport ammunition, fuel, and other high-value supplies. Because air movement is generally a faster form of movement than ground tactical movements, it may be preferred, depending on the situation. The same general considerations for air assaults apply to air movements.

**Rail and Water Movement.** A battalion may find itself conducting operations within an area that facilitates the use of either rail or water movement (in this case, water refers to inland waterway, bays, lakes, and estuaries vice amphibious movement). Their use may require a mixture of military and commercial assets. Battalions request the use of railroads and waterways through their HHQ logistics section.

**Forced March.** In cases of tactical necessity, a battalion can accelerate its rate of movement by conducting a forced march, whether mounted or dismounted. The conduct of a forced march requires speed, exertion, and an increase in the normal hours marched or traveled by motorized means than the normal standard. The commander must realize that at the end of a forced march, both vehicles and personnel will experience a significant temporary deficiency in their physical abilities and readiness. The combat effectiveness and cohesion may also be temporarily affected.

**Administrative Movement.** Administrative movements may be conducted when there is no expectation of enemy contact; they are typically used only in secure areas and can utilize military and commercial assets. Since the movements are usually classified as non-tactical, a battalion's S-4 coordinates the required support.

### **Tactical Road March**

Infantry battalions conduct tactical road marches to relocate units within the combat zone. The primary consideration is not the method of movement, but the relative speed of movement required. Battalions execute the tactical road march with the expectation that contact with the enemy is unlikely; however, local security measures are taken to be prepared for immediate action in the event of enemy air or ground attack. When contact with the enemy is expected, battalions use a combination of combat formations and movement techniques.

**Organization.** Tactical road march forces are organized into march columns, serials, and units. The march column consists of all the units in the battalion, including attachments and subordinate elements, that are utilizing the same routes of march under the command of one commander (usually the battalion commander). The march column is further organized into four elements: reconnaissance, advance party, main body, and trail party. Figure 10-1 shows a

graphical depiction. The march serial is a subdivision of the march column organized under one commander (e.g., a company commander). The march unit is the smallest sub-element of the march column under the command of a single commander (e.g., a rifle platoon commander).





Figure 10-1. Organization of a Tactical Road March.

**Forms of Tactical Road Marches.** Tactical road marches are conducted using three different forms: open column, close column, and infiltration. Each utilizes frequent halts to maintain control and sustain the conduct of the march. During the march, whether mounted or dismounted, battalion leadership needs to be aware of situations that can cause undesirable accordion-like effects, especially during periods of limited visibility. The commander needs to ensure that the order of march, rates of march, intervals, and time gaps between units, column gaps, catch-up speeds, and unit location reporting are specified.


**Movement Techniques.** Commanders combine combat formations and movement techniques when conducting tactical road marches when the emphasis is on readiness and contact. The three movement techniques are traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch. Figure 10-2 on page 10-4 illustrates when a commander might utilize each technique.



**Figure 10-2. Movement Technique Usage Considerations.**


Commanders select the movement technique based on the likelihood of enemy contact. When on the move, available terrain is used in conjunction with movement techniques to provide cover and concealment from enemy fire and observation.

*Traveling.* The traveling movement technique is utilized when speed is necessary and contact with the enemy is not likely. All elements adopt appropriate combat formations suitable for the terrain and visibility, and move simultaneously. Figure 10-3 shows an example of the traveling technique. Unit leaders locate themselves where they can best control the situation. The traveling movement technique is similar to a tactical road march, but not the same.




**Figure 10-3. Traveling.**

*Traveling Overwatch.* The commander uses the traveling overwatch movement technique when contact with enemy forces is possible, but speed is important. The lead trailing elements maintain short dispersion relative to the terrain. The trailing element moves at variable speeds, pausing for short periods when necessary to overwatch the lead element. It keys its movement to the terrain and the lead element, conducting overwatch from a distance that, should the enemy engage the lead element, will not prevent the trailing element from firing or moving to support the lead element. Figure 10-4 on page 10-6 shows an example of the traveling overwatch technique. Due to the need for speed and mobility by overwatch elements, especially when dismounted, care must be taken to ensure that overwatch elements are not overburdened with extraneous gear or equipment.




**Figure 10-4. Traveling Overwatch.**

**Bounding Overwatch.** Bounding overwatch is used when contact with enemy forces is expected. The unit moves by bounds; one element is always halted in position to overwatch another element while it moves. The overwatch elements of the battalion are positioned to support the movement of the main body by fire or fire and movement. Bounding overwatch is performed using two techniques: alternate bounding (see fig. 10-5) and successive bounding (see fig. 10-6).



**Figure 10-5. Bounding Overwatch Using Alternate Bounds.**



**Figure 10-6. Bounding Overwatch Using Successive Bounds.**

### **Movement Planning**

The goal of all movements is for the unit to arrive at its destination ready to accomplish its mission. The goal of movement planning is to ensure it occurs through a combination of discipline and flexibility. The commander ensures discipline in the conduct of movement through the battalion's TACSOP, rehearsals, and coordination measures. The following considerations apply for movement planning:

- Destination, routes (i.e., primary and alternate), orders of march, rates of march, start times for each serial, and the location of contact teams.
- Route reconnaissance and route clearance support.
- Communications plan.
- Use of strip maps.
- Immediate actions upon enemy contact.
- Cross-boundary coordination for movement outside the battalion's AO.
- Linkup plan, if required.
- CSS from HHQ or logistics combat element (LCE) units, if required.
- Location of the commander.

### **RELIEF IN PLACE**

The battalion conducts a relief in place (RIP) when it is ordered by HHQ to either assume another unit's battlespace or turn over its battlespace to a relieving unit. The RIP only occurs when the battalion—or the infantry companies—are conducting traditional combat operations. A battle handover occurs between the units in conjunction with the RIP. If the battalion or its subordinate units are conducting crisis response or stability activities, a transfer of authority (TOA) may accompany the physical RIP vice a battle handover. The general planning,

preparation, and execution considerations of a RIP apply to the TOA as well. For a battalion, this normally means a series of simultaneous RIPs involving the infantry companies. Normally the relieved unit is in a defensive posture during the relief, even if the purpose of the relief is to resume offensive operations. A relief may also serve to free the relieved unit for other tasks, such as reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance, or specialized training. For more information on RIP methods, see MCWP 3-01. There are three methods of conducting a RIP:

- **Sequentially.** Each element within the relieved unit is relieved in succession, from right to left or left to right, depending on how it is deployed.
- **Simultaneously.** All elements are relieved at the same time.
- **Staggered.** The commander relieves each element in a sequence determined by the tactical situation, not by its geographical orientation.

### **Critical Tasks**

The primary issues during the RIP are control and authority. The clear understanding of who is exercising command and control of the RIP at any given time is crucial. Consequently, it is critical that units do the following during the RIP:

- Develop a liaison plan.
- Maintain the plan of action and milestones.
- Monitor the progress of subordinate units.
- Account for all equipment through verification of supply accounts.
- Establish assembly areas for outgoing units to maintain control of movement.
- Notify HHQ upon completion of the RIP or the TOA.

### **Planning Checklist**

Upon receipt of orders to conduct a RIP, a battalion should begin developing its planning checklist based off all information available. The checklist should consider the following: the liaison plan, command relationships, CPs, fire support, and control measures.

***Liaison Plan.*** Upon notification that the battalion will conduct a RIP, the battalion commander should contact the commander of the force being relieved and establish communications. A plan should be developed where the battalion sends an advance party that is able to address all the warfighting functions for the battalion staff, as well as representatives from the infantry companies. The timing should be such that these liaisons have enough time to familiarize themselves with the tactical situation, conduct necessary reconnaissance, and conduct planning for the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of the incoming unit.

***Command Relationships.*** When the battalion begins moving from its current location to assembly areas in the outgoing unit's AO, it comes under the tactical control of the unit being relieved until the RIP is complete. Before beginning the RIP, the commanders of both units make a determination when TOA can occur, based off of HHQ's requirement. Battle handover checklists are developed and distributed. The unit conducting the relief generally defers to the recommendations of the unit being relieved in these and similar matters because the outgoing unit possesses the best understanding and knowledge of the AO and threat.

**Command Posts.** The first event to occur prior to any movement of subordinate elements is the collocation of the incoming and outgoing CPs. These are normally the elements of the battalion and company forward headquarters echelons. When required, the battalion commander may attach additional LNOs to other units as necessary to ensure a smooth transition of command, control, and coordination.

**Fire Support.** The authority for the control of fire support, including indirect, direct, and IRCs, rests with the outgoing unit until the transfer of control for all sectors is passed to the battalion. Some considerations for control are:

- The ROE pertaining to the use of indirect fires and IRCs.
- Airspace C2 information.
- Locations of HHQ firing units' support assets.
- Availability of assets at HHQ to employ IRCs.

### **Schedule and Control Measures**

Depending on the timeline set forth in the HHQ order, the timeline for a RIP is based on either its commencement or on reverse planning from the “no later than” date. Regardless of which course of planning is selected, the time for the actual transfer of command and control between units resides with the two commanders, based on when they determine their units are ready, and with concurrence from HHQ. During a RIP, the relieving battalion should adopt and assume all boundaries, control points, battle positions, FSCMs, release points, start points, and routes from the unit being relieved until after the RIP is complete to prevent fratricide, even if changes are inevitable.

### **Executing the Relief in Place**

The unit being relieved is the lead unit until battle handover or TOA, since it is more familiar with the AO or operational environment. Whether the battalion is conducting a RIP during offensive, defensive, or stability actions, the sequencing is generally the same; only the variables of time and unit locations may influence execution. During the initial stage of the RIP, individual elements of the battalion move forward and linkup with their counterparts from the outgoing unit. Because of possible limitations on space for personnel, elements of the incoming unit should be sequenced in as elements of the outgoing unit move out. This sequencing should be performed as quickly as possible to avoid becoming vulnerable to enemy action and as the progress of the RIP allows.

Elements of the battalion move into “seats” next to their counterparts from the outgoing unit. For the battalion COC, this may be one of the watch rotations paired with a watch rotation of the outgoing unit, or it may be the vehicle commanders of the battalion logistics trains riding with the vehicle commanders of the outgoing unit. The battalion should defer to the tactical arrangements of the outgoing unit, operating under their call signs, learning their TTP, and becoming familiar with all aspects of the operational environment, while the outgoing unit exercises command and control over the combined mission.

Once battalion elements become familiar with the procedures and the operational environment, the relieving unit begins conducting operations while the outgoing unit observes, unless



extraordinary circumstances arise. The battalion can make changes to the TACSOP as it sees fit upon completion of the RIP, but until then it needs to learn all it can from the outgoing unit. Once both commanders are satisfied that the execution of the RIP is successful, they notify HHQ of a change of call signs and that the RIP is complete. The relieving battalion commander should insist that the outgoing unit's leadership be the last to depart to answer any last-minute questions and to account for its personnel. For more information on RIP, see MCWP 3-01.

## **PASSAGE OF LINES**

When a battalion wants to maintain tempo and pressure in the offense by pushing fresh units forward, it performs a passage of lines. The passage of lines can be either forward or rearward, depending upon the situation. When the battalion is the headquarters directing the passage of lines, its main role should be to plan, coordinate, and task the units involved in conducting the passage, establish the time and place of the passage, and disseminate information down to the lowest levels of those organizations. For more on conducting a passage of lines, see MCWP 3-01. Battalions may also conduct a passage of lines to accomplish the following:

- Free a unit for another mission or task.
- Pass counterattack forces forward.
- Retrograde main battle area or security area forces.
- Maintain an effective defense by passing the battle from one element to another.

### **Types**

There are two types of passages: forward passage (shown in fig. 10-7) and rearward passage (shown in fig. 10-8 on page 10-12). Regardless of whether the battalion is conducting a forward or rearward passage of lines, the characteristics and sequencing are very similar. One unit is usually stationary, while the other unit conducts the movement (i.e., passage). Momentum should be maintained, and the passage should not interfere with the stationary unit's current operations. The passage may be hasty or deliberate, depending on METT-T considerations; the preferred method is to utilize deliberate planning.





Figure 10-7. Forward Passage of Lines.



**Figure 10-8. Rearward Passage of Lines.**

### Planning Considerations

Regardless of whether a battalion is conducting a forward or rearward passage of lines, it should consider the following during planning:

- Contact with the enemy should be maintained to prevent interference.
- The current scheme of maneuver, fires, IO plans, and their impact on battlespace geometries.
- The location to conduct the passage (e.g., unoccupied area or flank of stationary unit).
- The time and conditions for the battle handover.
- Establishing a battle handover checklist.
- Designating, establishing, and clearing lanes, the use of guides, routes, assembly areas, passage points, release points, start points, and any other required control measures.
- Collocating the units' CPs during execution.

- The most current picture of the enemy situation.
- Security and risk mitigation of possible CRBN attack.
- The stationary unit's ability to provide logistical support to the passing unit (e.g., fuel, maintenance, or medical support).
- The use of deception.

## **VERTICAL ENVELOPMENT**

Marine Corps forces conduct vertical envelopment via air assault. A battalion commander may utilize vertical envelopment through insertion by air assault to accomplish the following:

- Threaten enemy rear areas, causing the enemy to divert combat elements to protect vital installations and hold key terrain.
- Overcome distances quickly and bypass enemy barriers and defenses.
- Extend the area over which the commander can exert influence.
- Disperse reserve forces widely for survivability while maintaining their capability to effectively and rapidly respond.
- Exploit combat power by increasing tactical mobility.

Factors common to vertical envelopment are the use of the reverse planning process, condition setting, and the impact of meteorological conditions. For more detailed information on air assault, see MCTP 3-01B, *Air Assault Operations*.

Planning for vertical envelopment uses the reverse planning sequence in the same way as planning for an amphibious operation does. Vertical envelopment planning consists of the five following plans:

- Ground tactical plan.
- Landing plan.
- Air movement plan.
- Loading plan.
- Staging plan.

During planning, the battalion staff should consider the following:

- Are there enough aircraft to put the right force in the right place at the right time?
- What is the size and mobility capability of the enemy in the objective area?
- What are friendly forces' sustained logistics requirements, and what external capabilities are required to support them?
- What is the long-term weather forecast and its effect on departure sites, pickup zones, LZs, along approach routes, and in the objective area?

As with other operational planning, intelligence regarding the enemy, terrain, and the objective area are vital to the planning effort. All plans within the sequence should be developed and

coordinated concurrently by the battalion staff and the supporting aviation combat element (ACE) counterparts. For more information on planning for and defense against vertical envelopments, see MCTP 3-01B.

## **ENCIRCLEMENT**

An encirclement is the loss of freedom of maneuver resulting from the opposing force controlling all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement. An infantry battalion can conduct or participate in an offensive encirclement to isolate an enemy force or threat, or conduct defensive operations as a result of the unit's isolation by enemy encirclement. Encirclements can occur across the competition continuum because modern operations often require a battalion to be dispersed across large areas relative to its force density. For more on encirclement, see MCWP 3-01.

### **Offensive Encirclement**

The primary goal of an offensive encirclement is to isolate and capture or destroy an enemy force. Battalions typically conduct an offensive encirclement as part of a larger ongoing operation, as part of a planned sequel, or as a result of an unforeseen opportunity. Normally, the encirclement is conducted through the linkup of two enveloping forces or by a single force utilizing impassable natural obstacles (e.g., a river).

**Planning Considerations.** The conditions to initiate planning for an encirclement rely on the overall conduct of the larger ongoing operation. The battalion organizes itself based on what it wants to accomplish relative to the enemy after the encirclement is complete (e.g., fix and contain, or clear and destroy). If fixing and containing, the commander task-organizes to establish a perimeter and prepare for defensive operations. If clearing and destroying, the commander task-organizes for offensive combat.

**Fix and Contain.** The following considerations apply to the fix and contain task:

- An assessment of the enemy's ability to reinforce from outside or counterattack from within the encirclement is needed.
- An assessment of the enemy's ability to be isolated from receiving intelligence, CSS, and fire support from outside the encirclement is needed.
- The mobility of friendly forces compared to the enemy.
- The force must mitigate the dangers of possible fratricide through the control of battlespace geometry.

**Clear and Destroy.** The following considerations apply to the clear and destroy task:

- An assessment of the enemy's current level of supply is needed.
- The force must maintain contact with the enemy and develop an aggressive intelligence collection plan to monitor enemy reactions, determine enemy intentions, identify enemy positions, and seek weaknesses to exploit.

- The force must control battlespace geometry to allow maneuver against the enemy while mitigating the increased dangers of fratricide.
- The force must maintain constant pressure to prevent the enemy from consolidating positions, reorganizing, and executing breakouts.

### **Defensive Encirclement**

A friendly unit is encircled when it is surrounded by an enemy force which has cut all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement. Instances may arise where a battalion or elements of the battalion become encircled. The battalion commander should plan to resist encirclement, but may have to accept it in accomplishing the mission based on HHQ direction. When the mission requires, the battalion breaks out of the encirclement, either alone or with the assistance of a linkup force. When appropriate, an encircled battalion may be withdrawn by aircraft. Once the battalion or its elements become encircled, they have four options: defend, breakout, exfiltrate, or attack deeper into enemy-controlled territory. The choice depends on the mission of the HHQ, METT-T, the defensive situation of the encircled force prior to encirclement (e.g., a strongpoint defense), the ability to maintain continuous resupply and CASEVAC, unity of command, and a high standard of morale and discipline.

Unity of command is a basic requirement for an encircled force. Enemy attacks are normally directed against identified tactically weak areas in the defender's position. Therefore, when encircled forces consist of two or more units, unified command is established early and the defense is coordinated.

It is more likely that one of the battalion's subordinate units become encircled (e.g., an infantry company or platoon), rather than a whole battalion. In this case, the battalion will support the encircled force, and must consider the following when providing support:

- Maintaining command and control and communications capability with the encircled force.
- Employing ISR to support the defensive scheme.
- Utilization of all fire support and IRCs to mass on enemy forces.
- Formulating a plan utilizing all means for logistical resupply.
- A countermobility plan to support the unit's defense.

### **Breakout from Encirclement**

A breakout is an operation conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of movement or contact with friendly units. It differs from other attacks only in that a simultaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter must be maintained. A breakout contains elements of both the offense and the defense. An encircled force normally attempts to conduct a breakout when one of the following four conditions exists:

- The commander directs the breakout or the breakout falls within the intent of a higher echelon commander.
- The encircled force does not have sufficient relative combat power to defend itself against enemy forces attempting to clear the encirclement.
- The encircled force does not have adequate terrain available to conduct its defense.

- The encircled force cannot sustain itself long enough to be relieved by forces outside the encirclement.

The planning of a breakout is similar to that of other types of offensive operations. The battalion may conduct hasty planning when deciding to conduct a breakout to take advantage of the enemy being disorganized, if not part of a larger planned breakout operation. Hasty planning is supported by incorporating ISR assets to quickly locate any possible gaps that may be exploited by the encircled force. Conversely, the battalion may use deliberate planning when the breakout is part of a much larger operation involving a stronger and larger relief force. In this instance, the employment of ISR is vital in maintaining the commander's situational awareness of the enemy's tactical laydown, capabilities, and possible intentions. Other considerations to consider during planning include:

- Use of the pull method of reconnaissance to guide planning and execution.
- Looking for any routes or terrain the enemy is unlikely to defend or is not expected to use.
- Whether the breakout is to be executed during periods of limited visibility.
- The effective employment of IO during the conduct of the breakout.
- Using military and tactical deception.
- The employment of other IRCs to cause delay or hesitation by enemy forces.
- The employment of shaping actions, such as diversionary attacks, prior to execution.
- The availability of CSS and combat support assets for mobility.
- Engineering assets available for possible destruction of friendly equipment, munitions, vehicles, or supplies.

## **Linkup**


A linkup is an operation that entails the meeting of friendly ground or air assault forces. Battalions normally conduct linkup activities semi-independently or as part of a larger force. When conducting a linkup, both units may be moving or one may be stationary. If both are moving, one must occupy one or more temporary stationary positions to conduct the linkup. Refer to figure 10-9 for a visual depiction. If the battalion is the HHQ directing the linkup of its subordinate units, the battalion commander establishes—

- Command relationships and the responsibilities of each force before, during, and after linkup.
- The coordination of fires and IO support before, during, and after linkup, including control measures.
- Recognition signals and communication procedures (including pyrotechnics) for daytime and limited visibility linkup.
- Possible operations to conduct following the linkup.

One or more of the infantry companies may lead the linkup force for a battalion-level linkup. The major differences between linkups at the various echelons (e.g., platoon, company, battalion, and regiment) are in the complexity of the details in planning. Regardless of size or echelon, all linkups require communication, coordination, and planning. They begin with contact at the

smallest unit levels (e.g., two patrols making contact at a linkup point). Linkups are usually performed when one of the following occurs:

- Units are conducting a passage of lines.
- A unit moves to assist an encircled force.
- A unit moves forward to conduct a follow and assist or follow and assume mission.
- Units conduct coordination for a RIP.
- Advancing units move forward to occupy an objective that was seized by air assault or infiltrating forces.



**Figure 10-9. Linkup of a Moving and Stationary Force.**

**Planning considerations.** Regardless of the size of the unit conducting a linkup, the battalion should consider the following during planning:

- Primary and alternate linkup sites should be selected that can be identified during daytime and limited visibility, provide both access and escape routes, are defensible, provide cover and concealment, and are away from natural lines of drift.
- Provide both elements with task, purpose, coordination, and subsequent tasks to take during and after the linkup.



- Provide a detailed fire support plan for all direct and indirect fire weapons, as well as IRCs.
- Provide units with recognition signals (i.e., primary, alternate, and tertiary means) from the battalion TACSOP, relying on visual and voice rather than radio communications.
- Provide contingency plans in case of enemy attack or unforeseen occurrences, usually from the battalion TACSOP.

## **Cordon**

A cordon is a temporary enabling operation that isolates a target area of some size to conduct further operations within the cordon (e.g., encirclement). Such operations usually occur during raids or searches for weapons, munitions, HVTs, or some combination of these. These operations are referred to as *cordon and search*. Battalions frequently task a subordinate unit to conduct a cordon as part of one of the operations discussed earlier. The cordon can be executed either hastily or deliberately, depending on the situation and time available. Regardless of the method, execution follows the same sequence:

- Approach the objective area.
- Cordon (usually inner and outer).
- Actions on the objective.
- Retrograde.

As stated previously, the mission most likely to utilize the cordon is a cordon and search. During the cordon and search, the force is organized in much the same manner as a raid force. For more information on cordon and search, see MCWP 3-01. The cordon and search force is comprised of—

- The security element (i.e., cordon).
- The CE.
- The support element.
- The search and assault element.

A battalion may frequently be the HHQ for a subordinate unit mission involving a cordon, providing command and control during the operation. In such instances, the battalion may provide the following:

- Execution checklist for the mission.
- Attachments or enablers such as explosive ordnance disposal or civil affairs.
- Additional intelligence assets to conduct biometrics or tactical site exploitation on the objective.
- Continuous ISR support for the duration of the mission.
- Detainee teams.
- Breaching or demolition teams.
- A quick reaction force—either ground, air, or both.

# CHAPTER 11

## FORCE PROTECTION

The purpose of the battalion commander's leadership is mission accomplishment and troop welfare. While mission accomplishment takes priority, without effective and capable Marines, there can be no mission accomplishment. The complexity of the battalion's operational environment encompassing offensive, defensive, and stability activities make force protection a daunting task. Force protection is taking reasonable measures to ensure that the infantry battalion retains enough capability to accomplish the mission assigned.

### FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection is not intended to be a prescription for paralysis or non-action; it is meant to ensure that the battalion commander can deploy the right forces, at the right time, and in the right place, ready to fight. While the semantics, processes, and procedures may be modern, the concept of force protection is as old as warfare itself. When determining, implementing, and executing force protection measures, infantry battalion commanders face the same task that their predecessors faced. Force protection should be applied both inward and outward; while the internal application helps to protect the force from its own actions, the external application protects the force from outside threats.

### OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT

Operational risk management is a five-step process that helps identify and control internal and external hazards to protect the force. Operational risk management serves to help identify and control risk, but not to eliminate it. It is a decision-making tool that assists the battalion commander and subordinate unit leaders to identify hazards and develop controls to mitigate them. Figure 11-1 on page 11-2 shows the ORM worksheet format that is commonly used to work through and document the ORM process in the Marine Corps. For more information on ORM, see Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3500.27\_, *Risk Management*. The basic principles of ORM underline its importance as a tool and thought process, rather than an outcome-generating methodology:

- Accept risk when the benefits outweigh the cost.
- Accept no unnecessary risks.
- Anticipate and manage risk by planning.
- Make risk decisions at the right level.

The five steps in the ORM process are applied to each identified hazard, whether internal or external. The five steps of ORM are:

- Identify the hazard to the force.
- Assess the potential impact of the hazard.
- Develop controls and make a risk decision.
- Implement controls.
- Supervise and evaluate.

<b>Mission/Task:</b>			<b>DTG Begin:</b>	<b>Date Prepared:</b>		
			<b>DTG End:</b>	<b>Prepared by:</b>		
				<b>Position:</b>		
<b>Phase of Mission or Task:</b>						
Step 1: Identify Hazards	Step 2: Assess Hazards (Initial RAC)	Step 3: Develop Controls	Step 3B: Residual Risk (Residual RAC)	Step 4: How to Implement	Step 5: Supervise	Step 5B: Evaluate
Overall Risk Level After Control(s) Implemented: (Circle One)			Accept Risks: YES or NO Comm with Higher: YES or NO		Risk Decision Authority:  Signature/Rank/Name/Position	
Low – Moderate – High – Extremely High						
Legend: DTG – Date time group RAC – Residual assessment code						

**Figure 11-1. Example Operational Risk Management Worksheet.**

### Step 1—Identify Hazards

Hazards can be faced during combat operations, stability operations, and garrison activities, including training. Each presents its own unique hazards to the battalion. It is important that battalion leaders at all levels are able to identify hazards. Leaders must realize that complacency itself is a major hazard that needs to be controlled. The following should be done to assist in identifying hazards:

- Conduct an operational analysis, listing major steps/phases of the operation.
- Conduct preliminary hazard analysis, including:
  - List the hazards associated with the steps/phases.
  - List the possible causes of the hazards.

## Step 2—Assess Hazards

The degree of risk for each hazard is determined in terms of severity and probability. Using a matrix provides a consistent framework for the evaluation, shows the relative hazards, and prioritizes which hazard to control first. See tables 11-1 through 11-4 on this page and page 11-4 for common matrix examples.

**Table 11-1. Hazard Probability.**

<b>Degree of Probability</b>	<b>Description</b>
Likely (A)	Likely to occur or within a short period of time. Expected to occur frequently to an individual item or person, or continuously to a fleet, inventory, or group.
Probably (B)	Probably will occur in time. Expected to occur several times to an individual item or person, or frequently to a fleet, inventory, or group.
May (C)	May occur in time. Can reasonably be expected to occur sometime to an individual item or person, or several times to a fleet, inventory, or group.
Unlikely (D)	Unlikely to occur.

**Table 11-2. Degree of Severity.**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Degree of Severity</b>
Category I	The hazard may cause death, loss of facility/asset, or result in grave damage to National interests.
Category II	The hazard may cause severe injury, illness, property damage, damage to National or Service interests, or degradation to the efficient use of assets.
Category III	The hazard may cause minor injury; illness; property damage; damage to National, Service, or command interests; or degradation to the efficient use of assets.
Category IV	The hazard presents a minimal threat to personnel safety or health; property; National, Service, or command interests; or the efficient use of assets.

**Table 11-3. Risk Assessment Matrix.**

Risk Assessment Matrix					
		Probability			
S E V E R E I T Y	Category	A	B	C	D
	I	1	1	2	3
	II	1	2	3	4
	III	2	3	4	5
	IV	3	4	5	5

**Table 11-4. Risk Assessment Code.**

Risk Assessment Code (RAC)	
Number	Corresponding Level of Risk
1	Critical
2	Serious
3	Moderate
4	Minor
5	Negligible

**Step 3—Develop Controls/Residual Risk**

Controls are developed for each hazard to eliminate or reduce the risk until the benefit is greater than the risk. Next, the residual risk is determined (i.e., each hazard’s risk from step two is assessed again with the controls in place to determine the residual risk). The unit should communicate with higher authority if the risk is still greater than the benefit, the risk exceeds the commander’s stated intent, or help is needed to implement controls.

**Step 4—How to Implement**

Selected controls should be incorporated into TACSOPs, letters of instruction, orders, briefs, training, and rehearsals. The selected controls should be communicated to higher, adjacent, and subordinate units, and those executing the mission.

## Step 5—Supervise/Evaluate

Standards and controls must be enforced (i.e., ensure personnel are performing tasks to standard, the controls are in place, and are having the desired effects). Leaders should remain alert for changes and expected developments that require time-critical or deliberate ORM. Corrective action must be taken when necessary. Following missions, leaders should evaluate how well the risk management process was executed and solicit feedback on whether controls were effective or ineffective.

## EXTERNAL FORCE PROTECTION

Externally-oriented force protection measures are steps or control mechanisms put in place to mitigate potential threats to friendly forces, and possibly threats to civilian populations. Battalion commanders should view these external threats through the lens of ORM, asking the following questions:

- What must the battalion, infantry companies, and other subordinate units do?
- What are the risks entailed in executing the mission?
- What is the battalion doing to mitigate or eliminate those risks?

Many of the controls put in place to mitigate threats from the enemy are tactical in nature. The use of roadblocks and entry control points are controls that can mitigate the threat to friendly forces by possible suicide bombers. While a commander may not choose to use ORM as a tool in decision making, they are still required and expected to find ways to mitigate hazards.

### Operations Security

Operations security consists of controls and processes put in place to thwart the enemy or adversary from collecting information on friendly forces, whether that collection is through the observation of friendly activities, actions, or movements, or through the gathering of data, documents, or electronic means. This requires the use of passive and active OPSEC measures. Operations security is a five-step process that begins with mission planning. The five steps of OPSEC are: identification of critical information, analysis of threats, analysis of vulnerabilities, assessment of risk, and application of OPSEC measures. For more on OPSEC, see MCO 3070.2\_, *The Marine Corps Operations Security (OPSEC) Program*.

**Critical Information.** The battalion staff identifies critical information during the planning process and makes every attempt to control access to this information. All information should be designated with an appropriate classification to control its access by only those with a need to know.

**Threat Analysis.** The enemy's or adversary's perceived collection capabilities should directly influence the initial countermeasures that the battalion initially implements. These capabilities enable the battalion and companies to look at themselves from the enemy's point of view and adjust accordingly.

**Analysis of Vulnerabilities.** Constant supervision at all levels of leadership in the battalion is needed to identify and analyze vulnerabilities, as well as to enforce control measures. Some considerations regarding vulnerabilities include:

- What information personnel are sending home.
- What information is being posted to social media or sent through the internet.
- How sensitive information is disposed of.
- Whether units are establishing recognizable patterns in their daily operations.

**Risk Assessment.** There are two steps to risk assessment for OPSEC. In the first step, the staff attempts to identify all possible vulnerabilities. In the second step, the staff identifies all possible OPSEC measures that might eliminate or mitigate those vulnerabilities. The following is an example of this process:

*Step 1.* Vulnerability: the ability of troops to post sensitive information about operations to social media.

*Step 2.* Operations security measure: deny troops access to social media until completion of a specific operation.

Specific OPSEC measures are selected for implementation based on the risk assessment that the battalion conducts. Risk assessment involves comparing the estimated cost (i.e., time, effort, resource allocation, and money) of implementing an OPSEC measure to the overall potential effects on mission accomplishment resulting from an enemy exploiting a particular vulnerability. Multiple OPSEC measures may be identified for each vulnerability.


**Application of Operations Security Measures.** The unit implements the OPSEC measures from the risk assessment step. Incorporating the OPSEC measures into the operations plan is critical to ensure that the right measure is applied at the right time in the right place.

Operations security measures should be monitored and assessed for effectiveness. It is imperative that feedback be sent and received from the combat units, intelligence collectors, and other IRC elements based on the reporting requirements set forth in the operation plan.

## **Combating Terrorism**

Terrorism is the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to instill fear, intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Adversaries which cannot stand up to conventional US forces usually turn to terrorism as a means of resistance. Terrorist attacks have a disparate effect on even the most capable conventional forces, and can be an IO boost for the adversary. Infantry battalions must take efforts to defeat these attacks through offensive steps to counter terrorism and through antiterrorism, utilizing defensive measures to deter or defeat terrorist attacks.

Figure 11-2 shows the elements of combating terrorism.



**Figure 11-2. Elements of Combating Terrorism.**

**Counterterrorism.** Counterterrorism measures are offensive actions taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism, usually conducted by SOF units. Although infantry battalions may not conduct counterterrorism operations, they may conduct conventional operations in support of SOF units conducting counterterrorism operations, such as raids and strikes.

**Antiterrorism.** Antiterrorism is comprised of defensive measures taken to protect personnel and facilities from terrorist attacks, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. As part of force protection, the battalion—as well as the infantry companies if conducting independent or semi-independent operations—must always consider antiterrorism measures when conducting offensive, defensive, or stability actions. Figure 11-3 on page 11-8 illustrates the relationship between antiterrorism and force protection. An infantry battalion may be a high priority target for terrorists due to the high profile and notoriety that is sure to follow all terrorist attacks on friendly targets. Battalion commanders must make every effort to protect their battalions from terrorism. Typical defensive antiterrorism actions include:

- Coordination with local law enforcement.
- Determining the location of and hardening facilities.
- Physical security measures designed to prevent unauthorized access or approach to facilities.
- Physical security measures that prevent the theft of weapons, munitions, equipment, identification cards, and other materials.



- Policies regarding travel, the size of convoys, interaction with host nation personnel, breaking routines, and off-duty restrictions.
- Protection from weapons of mass destruction.

Battalions should also conduct active defensive measures in the form of offensive actions to prevent or deter terrorist activities in the AO. These actions may include:

- Mounted and dismounted patrols.
- Cordons and searches.
- Roadblocks and control points.



**Figure 11-3. Antiterrorism Relationship to Force Protection.**

The DOD has identified and standardized the force protection conditions and threat levels depicted in figure 11-4. Commanders may adopt higher force protection condition measures than ordered by their HHQ if conditions in the operational environment warrant. For additional information on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*.




Figure 11-4. DOD Threat Level and Force Protection Conditions.

### Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense

The introduction of CBRN weapons into the battlespace during an operation results in an integrated battlefield, which infantry battalions must be prepared to operate in. Infantry battalions fight the same on an integrated battlefield as on a traditional battlefield; however, in a CBRN environment, they must be ready and able to implement protective measures to increase their survivability. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense measures are conducted as a response to battlefield conditions resulting from the enemy's employment of one or more of those types of weapons. Battalions should adhere to the three principles of CBRN defense: avoidance, protection, and decontamination. They must also provide timely reporting and warning about possible contaminants to aid in protecting the battalion and other units. For further information, refer to MCTP 10-10E, *MAGTF Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations* and MCRP 10-10E.3, *Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations*.

**Avoidance.** Avoiding CBRN attacks and hazards is the key to CBRN defense. Avoidance involves both active and passive measures. Passive measures include individual protection measures, training, camouflage, concealment, hardening positions, and dispersion. Active measures, by contrast, include detection, CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, alarms and

signals, warning and reporting, marking, and contamination control. Infantry battalions receive the majority of their intelligence regarding CBRN threats from HHQ.

**Protection.** Protection from CBRN hazards is an integral part of operations. Techniques that work for avoidance also work for protection, such as shielding personnel and units and shaping the battlefield. Protection activities include sealing or hardening positions, protecting personnel, assuming the proper mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP), reacting to attack, and using collective protection based on actual or pending threat conditions. Table 11-5 displays the CBRN threat conditions, indicators, and minimum protective actions.

**Table 11-5. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threat Conditions.**

<b>Threat Condition</b>	<b>Attack Probability</b>	<b>Enemy Indicators</b>	<b>Civil Indicators</b>	<b>Minimum Protective Actions</b>
White: Zero Probability (Serial 1)	Negligible	No CBRN offensive capability in the AOI.	No known industrial hazards or nuclear reactors in the AOI.	Verify CBRN equip. Conduct routine maintenance.
Green: Low Probability (Serial 2)	Possible	Offensive CBRN capability.  No indicators of potential employment in the next 24 hours.	Confirmed presence of hazardous industrial materials or nuclear reactors in the AOI.	Take all of the above actions Conduct CBRN training and rehearsals. Conduct CBRN equip. PMCS, to include vehicle and shelter filters. Establish shelter/overhead cover plan. Review MOPP considerations.
Amber: Medium probability (Serial 3)	Probable	Enemy moving, dispersing or positioning CBRN munitions forward or near delivery systems.  Enemy wearing protective gear or moving/dispersing decontamination systems.  Increased OPSEC of delivery systems.	Hazardous industrial practices reported.  Hazardous conditions in storage facilities detected.  Combat operations being conducted near sites with confirmed hazards.	Take all of the above actions.  Emplace alarms.  Cover equipment/supplies.  Verify alarms/warnings.  Brief CBRN teams.  Verify mask seals/MOPP.  Prepare decontamination sites.  Erect collective shelters.  Issue medical countermeasures.  Conduct reconnaissance.
Red: High probability (Serial 4)	Imminent	Enemy ready/certain to employ CBRN munitions.  CBRN munitions used in AOI, no local contamination hazard present.	Localized spill or accident confirmed.  Host nation authorities direct limited precautionary evacuation or declare hazard area.	Take all the above actions.  Implement MOPP considerations based on METT-T.  Monitor continuously.  Use vehicle overpressure. Conduct reconnaissance overwatch of NAIs.
Black	Attack occurred	CBRN contamination present in AO.  Germs/toxins detected in AO.	Major industrial accident/incident.	Take all above actions.  Mark contaminated areas.  Find clear routes.  Resupply CBRN equipment.
<b>LEGEND</b> AOI     area of influence PMCS   preventive maintenance checks and services				

Mission-oriented protective posture levels are a flexible system of protection against CBRN contamination in which personnel are required to wear only that protective clothing and equipment appropriate to the threat level, work rate imposed by the mission, temperature, and humidity. Table 11-6 displays the MOPP levels and the protective steps associated with them. Like other similar orders and directions, company commanders may not reduce a minimal MOPP level dictated by HHQ, but may adopt a higher protective posture if necessary. In general, when addressing MOPP levels, commanders take into account the mission, level of threat, environment, temperature/humidity, work/rest rate, performance degradation, and physical conditioning of battalion personnel by considering the following:

- What is the mission? Is it offensive or defensive?
- What is the likelihood of enemy CBRN employment?
- What is the expected warning time?
- How physically and mentally demanding is the work to be performed?
- What is the expected duration of the mission?
- What is the weather, terrain, and time of day?
- Has the unit accounted for degraded performance of even simple tasks? Are work and rest cycles planned?

**Table 11-6. Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Levels.**

MOPP Equipment	MOPP Levels						
	MOPP Ready	MOPP O	MOPP 1	MOPP 2	MOPP 3	MOPP 4	Mask Only
Mask	Carried	Carried	Carried	Carried	Worn	Worn	Worn
Overgarment	Ready (2)	Available (3)	Worn (1)	Worn (1)	Worn (1)	Worn	
Boots	Ready (2)	Available (3)	Available (3)	Worn	Worn	Worn	
Gloves	Ready (2)	Available (3)	Available (3)	Available (3)	Available (3)	Worn	
Notes							
1- In hot weather, coat or hood can be left open for ventilation.							
2- Must be available within two hours. A second set is available within 6 hours.							
3- Must be within arm's reach.							

**Decontamination.** Decontamination prevents the erosion of combat power and reduces possible casualties that can result from inadvertent exposure or failure of protection. Decontamination allows commanders to sustain combat operations. Decontamination principles involve conducting decontamination as quickly as possible and decontaminating only what is necessary. There are three types of decontamination—immediate, operational, and thorough. Immediate decontamination of individuals' protective equipment is done to minimize casualties and mitigate the possible spread of contaminants, keeping the maximum amount of combat power engaged in operations. Operational and thorough decontamination is normally coordinated by the battalion or its HHQ. They involve assembling decontamination teams and establishing decontamination stations for vehicles and heavy equipment.

A battalion's CBRN officer and SNCO advise the commander on all CBRN matters. The CBRN officer is responsible for collecting, consolidating, and distributing all CBRN reports from subordinate, adjacent, and higher units. Battalion CBRN personnel inspect equipment and train subordinate units on CBRN defensive tasks. As a member of the S-3 section, the battalion CBRN officer is normally found in the main headquarters. The CBRN officer acts as the liaison with any attached CBRN elements. They are required to coordinate closely with the S-2 on the current and updated CBRN threat. Together, they develop CBRN-related NAIs. The CBRN officer also coordinates with the S-4 on logistics matters, such as MOPP suit inventories, protective mask filters, distribution plans, fog oil, and water supplies for decontamination, and identifies "clean" and "dirty" routes and contaminated casualty collection points.

***Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warning and Reporting.*** The primary means of warning units of an actual or predicted CBRN hazard is the CBRN warning and reporting system. Higher headquarters normally transmits CBRN warnings or alarms in the form of CBRN-3 reports and CBRN-5 reports. A battalion reports CBRN information to HHQ utilizing a specific report format. If the situation arises where a battalion receives multiple reports, the information is consolidated into a single report for submission. Higher headquarters directs what MOPP level units use based on their analysis. For more information, see MCRP 10-10E.5, *Multi-Service Reference for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction Procedures*.

## **INTERNAL FORCE PROTECTION**

Internal force protection measures refer to protection from such things as fratricide, negligent discharges, equipment or communication failures, and other items within the battalion's control that can negatively affect mission accomplishment and troop welfare. Battalion commanders and leadership should view these internal issues as they do external issues, through the lens of ORM, by asking the following questions:

- What must the battalion do to accomplish the mission?
- What are the risks entailed in conducting the mission in terms of internal failures?
- What controls can the battalion implement to mitigate or eliminate those risks?

### **Overwatch**

Overwatch is a tactical movement technique in which one element is positioned to support the movement of another element with immediate fire, or the tactical role of an element positioned to support the movement of another element with immediate fire. Every battalion evolution or activity should employ an overwatch element, whether it is annual training on a live-fire range, a change of command ceremony, or the battalion commander conducting a KLE with village elders. The need for overwatch cannot be dismissed. The size of an overwatch element can range from two Marines to the employment of a platoon or more, based on METT-T

considerations. They may be armed or unarmed, depending on the situation. The following guidelines should apply to overwatch employment:

- Personnel and equipment remain tactically alert to provide security, protection, and early warning.
- Overwatch elements should be given guidance and training regarding the use of deadly force, local ROE, and escalation of force continuum procedures.
- Overwatch elements rehearse the immediate actions required of them.
- Units must employ the appropriate communications to ensure that overwatch elements can provide proper early warning of a threat.
- Overwatch elements remain vigilant and alert to potentially hostile activities and actions near their units.
- Overwatch elements should be rotated to maintain the highest levels of awareness.
- Overwatch elements should be employed at all unit evolutions, regardless of size or operational environment.

### **Fratricide Avoidance**

The modern battlefield is more lethal than any in history. The tempo of operations is rapid, and the nonlinear nature of the battlefield creates C2 challenges for battalion leadership. The increased accuracy and lethality of modern weapons and munitions, coupled with the ability to acquire and engage targets at extended ranges with more sophisticated sighting devices in both day and night conditions, increases the use of longer-range fires. The ability to acquire and positively identify targets at extended ranges (i.e., beyond 1000 meters) through other than visual means alone is crucial, especially during periods of limited visibility. However, while tactically useful, longer-range fires may also increase the chance of fratricide occurring if situational awareness is inadequate.

An accurate CTP is essential and must be maintained throughout all operations. Software platforms to maintain and share the CTP, along with other C2 systems, enable commanders to have better situational awareness throughout their commands. However, risk identification and mitigation still play a vital and preventive role in fratricide avoidance.

Reduction of fratricide risks begins during the planning phase of an operation and continues through preparation and execution. Battalion leadership consciously identifies specific fratricide risks for all operations. By utilizing this structured approach, infantry battalion and company commanders can predict the most likely causes of fratricide and take actions to protect their forces. Whether used for an actual combat operation or a training event, this thought process complements the troop-leading steps and analysis of METT-T factors in planning.

The ORM worksheet can be utilized when identifying and assessing risks associated with fratricide. Risk identification must be conducted at all levels during each step of the process. All results should be communicated up and down the chain of command throughout the battalion so risk assessment can begin. The following sections contains considerations influencing risk identification and focus on actions battalion leadership can take to make the process more effective and help prevent fratricide from occurring.

**Planning Phase.** Clearly communicating a well-developed and detailed plan so that it is completely understood helps to minimize fratricide risk. The following components affect the potential for fratricide in a given operation:

- Clarity of the enemy situation.
- Clarity of the friendly situation.
- Clarity of the commander's intent.
- Complexity of the operation.
- Planning time available at each level.

The use of graphics can help to reduce incidents of fratricide, whether through clarifying commander's intent, adding accuracy to the concept of operations, or communicating the battalion plan. For this reason, the definitions and purposes of operational terms and graphics must be understood by all battalion leadership.

**Preparation Phase.** Confirmation briefs and rehearsals are the primary tools that should be utilized during the preparation phase to help reduce the chances of fratricide by identifying risks and developing controls. The following are considerations for their use:

- Confirmation briefs and rehearsals ensure subordinates know where fratricide risks exist and what to do to reduce or eliminate them.
- Brief-backs ensure subordinates understand the commander's intent. They often highlight areas of confusion, complexity, or planning errors.
- The type of rehearsal conducted determines the types of risks identified.
- Rehearsals should extend to all levels of command and involve all key players.

The following factors may expose fratricide risks during rehearsals:

- The number and type of rehearsals.
- The training and proficiency levels of units and individuals.
- The habitual relationships between units conducting the operation.
- The physical readiness (i.e., endurance) of the troops conducting the operation.

**Execution Phase.** During execution, in-stride risk assessment and reaction can assist in overcoming unanticipated fratricide risks. The following are factors to consider when assessing fratricide risks:

- Intervisibility between adjacent units.
- The amount of battlefield obscuration.
- The ability or inability to identify targets positively.
- Similarities and differences in equipment, vehicles, and uniforms between friendly and enemy forces.
- Vehicle density on the battlefield.
- The tempo of the battle.



- Civilians on the battlefield.
- The ROE.

As stated previously, maintaining and observing an accurate CTP at all times is another key measure in reducing the chances of fratricide from occurring as the operation progresses. Battalions must develop and employ effective techniques and TACSOPs to assist leaders and personnel in this process, to include:

- Monitoring the next HHQ's communications nets.
- Cross-talk between units.
- Timely and accurate COP updates.
- Accurate position reporting and navigation.
- Training, use, and exchange of LNOs.

### **Battlespace Geometry**

Battlespace geometry requires awareness of eight elements of information on the combined arms battlefield. While every individual in the battalion cannot track all elements of battlespace geometry, they can be trained for awareness. If individual members of the battalion understand how battlespace geometry works for small arms, indirect fires, and aviation fires, and if they understand how the different combined arms platforms—such as CAS or artillery—operate, they are much more likely to recognize unsafe situations and act accordingly. As a backstop for the maneuver units, the battalion COC acts as an “extra set of eyes” by maintaining awareness of unit positions and an awareness of unit intentions, intervening when possible fratricide appears likely. The eight elements of battlespace are:

- Friendly positions and associated surface danger zones.
- Enemy positions.
- Enemy threat rings.
- Ordnance minimum safe distances (i.e., in training) or risk estimate distance (i.e., in combat).
- Artillery gun-target lines.
- Mortar gun-target lines.
- Fixed-wing CAS attack cones.
- Rotary-wing CAS battle positions.

### **Body Armor Protective Levels**

In many cases, battalion commanders can expect guidance regarding body armor protective level (APL) posture from HHQ. This direction usually aligns APLs with general enemy threat conditions or activities, while providing guidance on the battalion commander's authority for modification and waiver authority and procedures. When determining APL requirements, commanders must balance mission accomplishment against troop welfare, as with all force

protection considerations. Commanders may choose to exercise their authority in protection using the following considerations:

- Whether personnel are mounted or dismounted.
- The effects of terrain and weather on troops' endurance.
- The threat from IEDs.
- Whether personnel are conducting offensive, defensive, or stability activities.

The current Marine Corps family of personal protective equipment is deliberately scalable to allow commanders flexibility in APL posture. Table 11-7 describes the APL requirement for individual levels.

**Table 11-7. Armor Protective Levels.**

<b>APL</b>	<b>Description</b>
Level 0	No body armor worn
Level 1	Vest/plate carrier with soft armor only
Level 2	Vest/plate carrier with front and back hard armor plates
Level 3	Vest/plate carrier with front, back, and side hard armor plates

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# CHAPTER 12

## LOGISTICS

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. Logistics provides the resources which support combat power, positions those resources on the battlefield, and sustains them throughout the execution of operations. As stated in MCWP 3-40, *Logistic Operations*, “Marine Corps logistics missions, at all command and support levels, is to generate MAGTFs that are rapidly deployable, self-reliant, self-sustaining and flexible, and that can rapidly reconstitute.” The relationship between logistics and operations can therefore be stated as, “logistics facilitates what is operationally possible.” Since logistics enable operations, it follows that one of our key objectives must be to ensure that the limits imposed by logistics do not inhibit effective operations. For more information, see MCDP 4, *Logistics* and MCTP 3-40B, *Tactical-Level Logistics*.

### LOGISTICS

Battalion commanders ensure logistics are integral to the planning process and the allocation of resources. Effective logistic operations are the result of a thorough analysis and framing of the problem to identify the capabilities required to accomplish the mission. Logistics planning is an ongoing iterative process from the receipt of the mission until all forces are returned to home station.

Non-organic logistics support is coordinated through the S-4. The S-4 must have a keen awareness of command relationships external to the battalion. For example, if the S-4 must sustain dispersed operations to support disaggregated battalion elements, the most effective and efficient method to do so may require coordination with operational and strategic-level enablers within the theater-specific Service component command and/or the geographic combatant command. The battalion logistics section provides the linkage with external organizations in support of operational requirements.

### Principles of Combat Service Support

Combat service support consists of the capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of the battalion. These functions include, but are not limited to, providing supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other services required to permit supported units to accomplish their missions. The principles in the following subordinate sections guide the planning, organization, management, and execution of CSS based on METT-T.

**Responsiveness.** Responsiveness is providing the right support at the right time and in the right place. Among the principles of CSS, the principle of responsiveness is the most critical.

**Simplicity.** The avoidance of complexity fosters efficiency in both the planning and execution of CSS operations. Mission-type orders and standardized procedures contribute to simplicity.

**Flexibility.** This refers to the ability to adapt CSS structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and concepts of operations.

**Economy.** The provision of support at the least cost in resources necessary to accomplish the mission.

**Attainability.** This refers to the ability to provide the essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations.

**Sustainability.** This is the ability to maintain support throughout the operation. Sustainability is an element of military capability.

**Survivability.** This refers to the inherent capacity of the organization and its capabilities to prevail in the face of potential destruction.

### **Balance and Simultaneous Activity Across the Competition Continuum**

The ability to operate in an expeditionary environment is an essential tenet of the Marine Corps ethos. A battalion that excels in the ability to conduct combat operations but cannot deploy is failing to fulfill its primary role as an expeditionary force. The force deployment process includes the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies from home stations to a theater of operations. Upon arrival in the assigned AO, those designated personnel, equipment and supplies are consolidated into a fully mission capable force. Commanders must ensure that their staffs and subordinate units are familiar with their roles in the force deployment process and the roles of external organizations in supporting force deployment. The following subordinate sections contain CSS considerations.

**Logistics Considerations in the Offense.** The purpose of logistics in support of offensive operations is to foster tempo, extend operational reach, and increase the endurance of the force with a logistics system optimized for maintaining operations. Logistics support must be integrated and synchronized with maneuver so the force's tempo does not cause lead elements to reach a culminating point and outrun the battalion's logistical support. Culminating points must be anticipated and planned for. Securing open LOCs is also critical to logistical sustainment (e.g., a critical bridge on the main supply route may be essential to the logistics network; ensuring that it is protected would be crucial). For this reason, maneuver elements must carry enough supplies to sustain themselves should LOCs become interdicted by the enemy. Commanders and logisticians must anticipate these considerations and ensure they are included in their planning. During offensive planning, logistical considerations include:

- Positioning essential classes of supply, such as food; water; ammunition; and petroleum, oil, and lubricants to best support the scheme of maneuver.
- Anticipating requirements based on historical unit data to push logistical services forward and developing pre-configured push packages of essential items.
- Designing and establishing a reliable and redundant distribution network.
- Attaching tactical logistics elements to supported maneuver units.
- Identifying resource shortfalls and requesting augmentation from external units for requirements beyond organic capability and capacity.

- Developing self-securing and self-recovering capability sets.
- Echelonning support forward and initiating operations at the new site before ceasing operations at the old site.
- When applicable, incorporating captured enemy supplies and equipment in support of operations.
- Establishing adequate command, control, and communications between maneuver and tactical logistics elements.
- Preparing for increased casualties and additional medical requirements (i.e., friendly, enemy, and civilian).
- Ensuring preparations for operations do not give away tactical plans.

***Logistics Considerations in the Defense.*** Tactical logistics activities in the defense support defensive battles and facilitate rapid transition to the offense. Defensive operations take many forms ranging from strictly positional to wholly mobile defenses. The S-4 must be involved early in defensive planning. This allows them to plan support for the defense and to anticipate changing priorities. During defensive planning, CSS considerations include:

- Consideration to stockpile limited amounts of ammunition and fuel in centrally located battle positions in the main battle area that are likely to be occupied.
- Ensuring the rear echelon monitors and tracks the ongoing battle to anticipate CSS requirements.
- Pushing forward tailored packages of support on a scheduled basis. These regular shipments of ammunition, fuel, and previously requested repair parts to the combat trains helps eliminate the need to call for supplies repeatedly, reducing the chance that a lapse in communications will interrupt supply. Resupply continues until the receiving unit issues instructions to the contrary.
- Conducting resupply during periods of reduced visibility to reduce enemy interference.
- Dispatching maintenance support teams forward to reduce the need to evacuate equipment.
- Consideration to provide security forces with prepositioned stocks of critical supplies in subsequent defensive positions throughout the security force area.
- Planning for increased demand of decontaminants and MOPP equipment.
- Planning for high expenditures of ammunition.
- Planning for decreased vehicle maintenance.
- Planning for increased demand for barrier and fortification materials.
- Coordinating with civil affairs personnel concerning refugee control and logistics requirements.
- Establishing linkages to operational level logistics enablers in the AO when operating in remote locations far removed from rear echelon or HHQ.

***Logistics Considerations During Stability Activities.*** Logistics activities have an impact on and are impacted by the populations they interact with and the terrain they traverse in support of operations. Careful consideration must be given to the timing of logistic movements and the impacts they have on local national activities and infrastructure. Cultural considerations such as

holidays, market days, and traffic patterns may directly impact operations. Logistics elements must be mindful of the local population as they move about the operational environment.

Local national logistics organizations can offer significant resources to logisticians. Careful consideration must be given to which organizations to use, as there can be significant impacts to ongoing stability efforts. Close coordination with CMO is important so as not to use a local vendor that could create a disturbance amongst the populace, thereby possibly setting back the attainment of goals.

During FHA missions, LCE personnel may have a more prominent role in the conduct of operations and more direct contact with the local population, placing one or more infantry battalions in a supporting role of planning, providing personnel, and providing security. As such, the battalion's logistic personnel need to be given adequate training on how to interact with the local population and current IO messaging; they also need to be resourced with appropriate translator and contractor support as the mission requires.

Interagency and joint considerations must be included in every aspect of operations. Effective interagency logistics planning is essential to effective stability operations; interagency and joint personnel must be an integral part of all planning efforts.

The construction or demilitarization of semi-permanent expeditionary bases requires engineer support external to the battalion, which requires more deliberate planning and longer lead times than organic assets. When a battalion conducts operations from dispersed locations, the battalion may have to establish a prioritized engineering projects list based on the assets and resources available (e.g., force protection vice building a training range). This dispersion also puts a larger burden upon the battalion's logistics to push support to these dispersed locations with limited assets. The need to coordinate additional resources through HHQ may be a necessity.

## **Roles and Responsibilities**

This section discusses the roles and responsibilities of key personnel in the S-4 section of an infantry battalion.

**Logistics Officer.** The logistics officer's roles and responsibilities include the following:

- Determining the logistical support requirements to support the battalion's mission, focusing on the six functions of logistics: supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and services.
- Designating lines of movement and locations for the battalion's organic logistics assets.
- Preparing and developing logistics plans in concert with the current tactical plan and anticipating future logistical needs.
- Responsible for the preparation and distribution of logistical support plans and orders when they are published separately.

- Supervising the supply, maintenance management, motor transport, food service, mobility, armory, and arms, ammunition and explosives sections.
- Ensuring that the S-4 watch in the logistics operations center monitors appropriate communication networks and the locations and status of combat trains, and consolidates all logistics requests.

**Supply Officer.** The supply officer's roles and responsibilities include the following:

- Supervising the execution of policies and procedures pertaining to procurement, receipt, accounting, repair, storage, issue, disposal, computation, and maintenance of stock levels.
- Supervising the transportation of supplies and equipment and the collection, safeguarding, and transmittal of public funds. Participating in the budget process and the administration and expenditure of allocated funds.
- Supervising the maintenance of subsistence, clothing, ammunition, and property accounts.
- Coordinating supply support to the battalion's scheme of maneuver.
- Issuing garrison and deployed supply accounts to designated responsible officers, and ensuring periodic inventories are conducted on all supply account items.
- Establishing turnover procedures for equipment, ensuring joint limited technical inspections are completed, and that accountability is established prior to any turnover.
- During maritime prepositioning force (MPF) operations, receiving and issues the battalion's maritime prepositioned equipment and supplies.
- Coordinating with the LCE to requisition and distribute secondary reparable items from the reparable issue point.
- Serve as the fiscal officer for the battalion and provide recommendations and advice regarding all fiscal, budgetary, contracting, and expenditure decisions.

**Motor Transport Officer.** The motor transport officer's roles and responsibilities include the following:

- Oversees all aspects of motor transport related duties and training, to include operator certification and licensing.
- Supervises the execution of motor transport maintenance, to include record-keeping, parts requisition, reports, and inventory.
- Provides estimates of motor transport supportability in support of operational planning.
- Maintains liaison with higher, adjacent, and supporting commands pertaining to motor transport support.
- Analyzes and evaluates motor transport capabilities throughout the command.
- Advises the battalion commander on the deployment and employment of battalion motor transport assets.
- Overseeing the maintenance of motor transport equipment by establishing preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, quality control, and effective training programs to ensure the efficient performance of vehicles under all operational readiness conditions.
- Employing maintenance contact teams to support the maneuver companies' vehicle sustainability.



**Armory Staff Noncommissioned Officer in Charge.** The armory SNCO in charge's roles and responsibilities include the following:

- Performing, training, and supervising various duties incident to the inspection, maintenance, and repair of all small arms, heavy weapons, and mortars, including vehicle-mounted small arms.
- Preparing, maintaining, and supervising a shop maintenance and management program, and coordinating the maintenance and repair of small arms according to the proper maintenance level and technical manual. Ensuring that all weapons and optics have received limited technical inspections and pre-fire inspections before issue for live-fire operations.

**Food Service Officer.** The food service officer's roles and responsibilities include the following:

- Developing and supervising the planning, procurement, and distribution of food service equipment, combat rations, and contractual services related to any food service functions.
- Administering the nutrition awareness program and menu development.
- Coordinating with the LCE to ensure the battalion has sufficient field rations for all field operations and combat operations.

**Ammunition Technician.** The ammunition technician's roles and responsibilities include the following:

- Serving as primary advisor to the logistics officer on the battalion's arms, ammunition, and explosives program.
- Responsible for managing the battalion's ammunition allocation, coordinating closely with the operations section to identify operational, contingency and training ammunition requirements. This function is closely monitored by the battalion gunner.
- Overseeing the requisition, distribution, and accounting of the battalion's ammunition allocation.

**Mobility Officer.** The mobility officer's roles and responsibilities include the following:

- Serving as principle advisor to the battalion operations officer and logistics officer on requirements for force deployment planning and execution in support of operations and training.
- Responsible for training unit embarkation representatives on preparing personnel, equipment, and supplies for deployment.

**Maintenance Management Officer.** The maintenance management officer's roles and responsibilities include the following:

- Serving as special staff advisor to the commander on the readiness posture of the battalion's equipment.

- Coordinating with supply to validate requisitions in support of the battalion maintenance effort.
- Maintaining visibility on equipment evacuated to higher echelons of maintenance.
- Identifying requirements for maintenance contact teams and overflow maintenance.
- Coordinating with the LCE for contractor and field service representative maintenance support necessary for the battalion's equipment.
- Overseeing the maintenance management training of the battalion's maintenance personnel.

## **Functions of Logistics**

The following sections describe the functions of logistics.

**Supply.** Supply is a cyclic process of acquiring, receiving, and issuing materiel to supported units. This materiel consists of consumable and durable materiel, components, and primary end items. The battalion S-4 consolidates the requirements for the various classes of supply based on input from the companies and sections. The battalion commander must make the decision on the type of distribution to use. It is made based on an analysis of METT-T and recommendations from the S-3, S-4, and subordinate commanders.

**Maintenance.** Maintenance includes supply and repair actions taken to ensure that a unit is capable of carrying out its assigned mission. These include inspections, testing, servicing, repair/maintenance, and reclamation. There are two types of maintenance—preventive and corrective, and it has three levels—organizational, intermediate, and depot. For further information, refer to MCTP 3-40E, *Maintenance Operations*.

**Repair and Recovery.** Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forward as possible at the lowest capable echelon. The battalion maintenance section is task-organized to best support the mission. During dispersed operations, the S-4 should develop a plan to best handle equipment maintenance and repair problems as they arise.

**Transportation.** Transportation is the movement from one location to another by means of railways, highways, waterways, pipelines, oceans, and airways; it includes movement by military and/or commercial assets. Throughput is the measurement of the transportation and distribution systems, while sustainment is the product of the throughput system. Transportation facilitates the integration of the other functions of logistics. For further information, refer to MCTP 3-40F, *Transportation Operations*.

**Health Services.** Health service support consists of all services performed, provided, or arranged to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel, which include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat and operational stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services. The objective of the battalion's health services system is to preserve and restore the health of battalion personnel, and—when required—those

of enemy combatants and affected civilians. This has two subordinate objectives: to return ill or injured personnel to duty as soon as possible, and to reduce mortality and disability. When conducting dispersed operations, commanders must consider and weigh the possible risks of where to position the battalion's limited medical assets to be most effective. For further information, refer to JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services* and MCTP 3-40A, *Health Service Support Operations*.

**Services.** Services support the commander's decision-making process, the conduct of operations, and the morale of battalion personnel. Services include disbursing, postal service, exchange services, legal services, and—when required—personnel recovery and preparation. These services are provided by the LCE. For further information, refer to MCTP 3-40G, *Services in an Expeditionary Environment*.

**General Engineering.** General engineering is considered a tactical logistics function, while combat engineering is considered a combat support function. Infantry battalions may receive limited general engineering support from the element of the combat engineer battalion attached or in direct support of them (usually a reinforced platoon), the majority of general engineering support is provided by the engineer support battalion in the LCE. General engineering that directly supports aviation operations in a battalion's AO may be provided by a Marine wing support squadron. Construction requirements may be filled by joint engineers, including Seabees, which may be task-organized within the MAGTF or serving as the joint task force's theater engineers. When a combat engineer platoon is attached or in direct support, the platoon commander serves a dual role as the battalion engineer under the S-3, and is the link to requesting external engineer resources. The battalion commander, with input from the S-3, S-4, and engineer, determine where to employ engineering capabilities and develop priorities of work. For more information, see JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations* or MCWP 3-34, *Engineering Operations*.

### **Logistics Preparation and Planning**

The S-4 is responsible for planning logistical support for the battalion. The S-4's concept of support must be coordinated and integrated with the S-3's concept of operations. The concept of support, in fact, legitimizes the concept of operations. Throughout the planning for and execution of the operation, the S-4 must constantly reevaluate support requirements and unit capabilities. To provide responsive and sustained support, the S-4 must anticipate requirements which exceed organic capabilities, such as:

- The maintenance and repair of generators not organic to the battalion.
- Requirements and requests for earthmoving and other heavy equipment support.
- Requirements for plumbing, electrical, and other deliberate engineering support.

Battalion S-4s advise their commanders and S-3s on the readiness status of major equipment and weapon systems. They must keep abreast of the operational plans which their S-3s formulate. The availability and future employment of organic CSS assets influence their planning and requirements determination. In view of infantry battalions' limited organic CSS capabilities, early and continuous liaison and coordination is required. S-4s must constantly coordinate with their HHQ and supporting LCE units.

**Employment of Logistics Assets/Capabilities.** A battalion commander, through the coordinated efforts of the S-3 and S-4, initiates detailed planning for CSS assets for the unit. Combat service support planning by subordinate companies begins with a determination of requirements and assignment of internal priorities. The battalion commander determines and identifies those CSS requirements beyond the organic capabilities necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. The battalion commander establishes and assigns priorities associated with the execution of the concept of operations and scheme of maneuver. This assignment of priorities, in turn, significantly affects the concept of support for CSS developed by the regiment and the LCE. Battalion commanders must concern themselves with the tactical timing of CSS and the availability of required support in time to support the scheme of maneuver.

**Repair and Recovery.** Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forward as possible at the lowest capable echelon. The battalion maintenance section is task-organized to best support the mission. During dispersed operations, the S-4 should develop a plan to best handle equipment maintenance and repair problems as they arise.

**Logistics Command and Control.** Logistics actions need to be synchronized with other battalion operations. For instance, resupply convoys require the same level of planning and coordination as any other operation. Logistics are planned in the logistics operations center and movements are coordinated through the unit movement coordination center, in close coordination with the operations section.

The S-4 must ensure that section personnel are properly trained in C2 and other automated information systems. Automated information systems may include Marine Corps, joint, coalition, or interagency systems. Logistics planning must include the identification of and the requirement for adequate C2 support for the battalion's logistics efforts and the associated communications architecture associated with operating those systems.

**Sustainment.** When considering the seven principles of logistics (i.e., responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, survivability, and sustainability), the most critical is sustainability, or the ability to maintain logistics support to all users throughout the AO for the duration of the operation. Throughout planning and execution, the six functional areas of tactical logistics must be considered to ensure the sustainability of the battalion. The battalion commander must determine the logistical priorities associated with the scheme of maneuver in constructing and sustaining the force. The requirements to support the prolonged activities of a protracted campaign must be determined, as well as the allocation of resources and the tactical timing to execute decisive action in response to the enemy's anticipated COA.

**Reporting.** Subordinate companies and units should submit logistics-related reports (e.g., logistics status reports, munitions reports, and readiness reports) as detailed in the battalion's battle rhythm to ensure that the commander and logistics personnel are kept abreast of the battalion's current logistics readiness. Accurate reporting aids the S-4 in anticipating logistics requirements and coordinating timely logistical support. Logistics reports are also monitored by LCE personnel, who use that information to forecast support requirements and assign resources.

**Replenishment Methods.** There are various methods by which the battalion and subordinate companies are resupplied. The tactical situation and operational necessity determine which method or combination of methods is used.

**Service Station.** The service station method of supply distribution involves vehicles leaving their tactical positions and entering an established resupply area. The resupply area is designated as a series of resupply points for vehicles; traffic flow through the re-supply area is one way to enhance efficiency.

**Tailgate Issue.** This method is normally utilized in an assembly area and involves resupply while combatants remain in their covered positions. Vehicles stocked with petroleum, oils, and lubricants and ammunition stop at each individual vehicle position to conduct resupply services. This method places the resupply vehicles at greater risk, but maintains tactical positioning and reduces traffic flow. If the tailgate issue method is used in forward positions, then resupply must be masked by the terrain.

**Combat Trains.** Combat trains consist of the battalion's organic logistics elements; they are task organized and tailored to provide critical logistics support to the companies and other subordinate elements. These trains have the capability to transport maintenance contact teams, medical support, passengers, rations, fuel, ammunition, critical repair parts, and any other required logistical materiel. They operate in close proximity to the companies to provide immediate recovery, resupply, medical aid, and maintenance.

**Logistic (Field) Trains.** Field trains consist of the remaining organic CSS elements that are not needed by the combat elements or other critical support; they are usually co-located with the main CP. The battalion commander controls the field trains. Commanders use field trains to improve responsiveness and flexibility; field trains may carry the battalion aid station, the mess section, and the supply section. This option is preferable when the unit is in the offense, as all the battalion's assets can be consolidated and follow in trace of forward elements, ready to provide needed support.

### **Other Logistics Matters within the Battalion**

**Contracting.** Contracting is conducted at the division or MAGTF level and above. Once a contract has been awarded to a vendor by a contracting officer to support a battalion's requirements, a contracting officer representative must be assigned at the battalion level to oversee the execution of the contract.

**Financial Management.** The Marine Corps founded its philosophy of financial management on the principal that financial management is inseparable from command. Financial management in the operating forces is broken down into four functional areas: budgeting, accounting, disbursing, and auditing. Of these four functional areas, budgeting is the only one conducted at an infantry battalion. The battalion commander normally assigns the duty of fiscal officer to one of the special staff officers (e.g., the supply officer). The assigned officer acts as the commander's financial management SME.

**Facilities.** The logistics officer is responsible for overseeing the maintenance and use of all facilities assigned to the battalion, both in garrison and when deployed. Battalion facilities include all structures assigned to and signed for by the battalion, including workspaces, living quarters, barracks, and warehouses, among others.

**Environmental Compliance.** If not overseen by the S-4 directly, environmental compliance will frequently fall under the cognizance of the headquarters company commander. The proper identification, preparation, use, storage, embarkation, and disposal of hazardous materials (HAZMATs) are critical logistics responsibilities. The battalion assigns an individual to oversee the HAZMAT program, primarily to ensure battalion personnel and equipment are protected, to make sure the battalion is trained on the proper procedures for using HAZMAT, and to ensure compliance with applicable HAZMAT laws.

**Safety.** Safety is the responsibility of every Marine and Sailor within the command and is a critical component of the battalion's force preservation program. The battalion logistics section represents the commander in enforcing safety programs and standards across the battalion. Safety programs may include fire, ORM, weapons safety, motorcycle operation, and hearing protection. A commander should ensure proper reporting of mishaps to HHQ.

## **DEPLOYMENT, REDEPLOYMENT, AND REGENERATION**

The following sections describe efforts to deploy and redeploy an infantry battalion, and to regenerate its combat capability when it is diminished.

### **Deployment**

The S-3 and S-4 work closely with their HHQ during the force deployment planning and execution process to ensure the battalion is deployed in accordance with the commander's intent and that provisions are made to deploy the sustainment necessary to maintain that force. These planning efforts are translated into time-phased force deployment data and are subsequently mapped to strategic and operational lift assets. Deployments typically involve a change of operational control between geographic combatant commanders and their subordinate sub-unified commanders as units move from home stations to the theater of operations. For instance, a battalion based at Marine Corps Base, Hawaii under the Marine Corps Forces, Pacific command structure in the US Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility which is transiting to the US Central Command area of responsibility changes control to Marine Corps Forces, Central. Logistics and deployment activities must be coordinated through the assistant chief of staff for logistics (i.e., AC/S G-4) for each geographic Marine Corps Service component command. This coordination is performed by HHQ with the battalion's input, unless the battalion is serving as a MAGTF CE.

### **Redeployment**

Planning for redeployment begins prior to the actual deployment and continues throughout the operation. A simple approach to redeployment is to execute the deployment in reverse. While this approach has some merit, it is essential that the battalion plans the right flow of personnel and equipment upon the completion of operations.

## **Regeneration**

Regeneration is the process of resetting the battalion's equipment back to an operational state. Battalions should plan to regenerate forces in anticipation of possible follow-on operations in another AO, based on instructions from HHQ.

## **PREPOSITIONING AND SEABASING OPERATIONS**

### **Prepositioning Operations**

Battalion logistics personnel need to be familiar with the unique requirements and organizations associated with MPF and land-based prepositioning operations. The MPF concept significantly reduces the strategic lift requirements associated with an operation, and is a key component in strategic and operational planning for force employment. Prepositioning a unit requires several temporary organizations to be established, such as the offload preparation party and the GCE's arrival and assembly operations element. Some of these require personnel from the infantry battalion. Battalions must ensure that they staff these organizations with the correct personnel who have the requisite training and maturity to be able to operate within these transitory organizations. Prepositioning operations are logistically intensive, and the flow of equipment directly impacts force closure, which in turn impacts combat readiness. There are significant supply actions inherent to MPF and land-based prepositioning operations associated with the receipt and issuance of equipment. Battalion supply and logistics personnel must be familiar with these unique requirements and trained accordingly. For more information on prepositioning, see MCTP 13-10D, *Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations*.

### **Seabasing**

The Seabasing concept envisions arrival and assembly operations and logistics functions occurring over the horizon from the shore to reduce the logistics footprint ashore and limit the risk to the seabased force. The battalion logistics section must be familiar with the capabilities and limitations of this concept to ensure that they balance their logistics resources accordingly, based on the specific requirements of the mission. For more information, see MCWP 13-10, *Seabasing*.

# APPENDIX A

## TRAINING MANAGEMENT

Training consists of learning, and from an instructional perspective, teaching a skill or skills. The use of the word “training” over other terms for learning generally denotes the involvement of practical experience or application. The practice of training management at the battalion level consists of coherently and efficiently determining the battalion’s training requirements, meeting those requirements through the correct application of time and resources, and maintaining proficiency in those requirements.

### UNIT TRAINING MANAGEMENT

Training management is defined as the use of the *systems approach to training* and the Marine Corps training principles in a manner that ensures commanders make the most efficient use of limited training time and resources by focusing training priorities on skills required to accomplish the unit’s wartime mission. Done correctly, training management balances time, resources, and mission requirements to produce the most efficient results possible within local limitations. Done improperly, poor training management results in the loss of time, the squandering of resources, and a failure to produce a mission capable infantry battalion. Proper training management requires energy, focus, and discipline from the battalion commander, who sets the tone for the battalion’s success or failure.

Commanders must ensure that they do not confuse efforts with results. While the combination of hard work and failure produces learning among the staff, consistently ineffective training will result in mission failure. The training management methodology allows the commander to measure the effectiveness of training and prevent poor training.

Training management allows commanders to confront the fact that there will never be enough time or resources to train to perfection, or even to train in all events that they would hope to. Training management allows commanders to determine training priorities and place time and resources against them to produce a unit capable of accomplishing the tasks assigned to it. For example, a commander facing deployment to a peacekeeping environment would be more likely to spend precious training time and resources on tactical road marches and fixed site security than on attacking a strong point or conducting an explosive breach.

By maintaining a positive training management environment, commanders create multi-echelon training opportunities and develop subordinates. In such an environment, an event as simple as a combat pistol course can encompass opportunities to practice COC procedures, conduct tactical road marches, and meet ancillary training requirements during down-time. Subordinates receive valuable lessons on leadership, resource management, risk mitigation and consequence management, and the training management process by planning, preparing, executing, supervising, and assessing the training event at all levels of responsibility.



## **MARINE CORPS TRAINING PRINCIPLES**

Marine Corps Tactical Publication 8-10A, *Unit Training Management Guide* lists nine training principles for a battalion commander's purpose, which are described below.

### **Train as You Fight**

This principle undergirds all others, as it strikes at the heart of the reason for the Marine Corps' existence—to fight the country's battles. This applies to matching a unit physical training program to the types of tasks expected of it in combat, to individuals wearing the actual combat load required of a training skill in combat conditions, to ensuring that the combat engineers with which a battalion will deploy are present for battalion training exercises. Depending on the skill set, the training environment may be an important portion of this principle, though commanders must understand that the training environment does not necessarily equal good training. Commanders at all levels must also remember that they themselves sometimes constitute the training audience and ought not to remove themselves from these opportunities.

### **Commanders are Responsible for Training**

Commanders are ultimately responsible for the training of their units. This responsibility includes not only the internal training the commander can directly affect, but also ensuring that the battalion takes proper advantage of those opportunities afforded by various courses and exercises sponsored by higher and service headquarters. The failure of a battalion commander to ensure all battalion personnel qualify on their personal weapons is just as egregious as failing to ensure the battalion sends the right personnel to foreign language courses, or is prepared to take advantage of training exercises.

### **Standards-Based Training**

Training to standards represents one of the largest challenges for battalion commanders as the demands of time, resources, and understanding tempt many to either ignore standards or modify them inappropriately. Good organizations train to standards, not time. Battalion commanders must understand the requirements for standards and how the development of standards occurs. Such understanding not only ensures their units can actually perform the skills to which they train, but allows battalion commanders to develop their own training standards when necessary, such as training personnel to execute a unique set of ROE in their deployment theater. Training standards provide measurements for performance, foster flexibility by reducing the need for complex orders, and teach Marines to respond to changes in combat reflexively and automatically.

### **Performance-Oriented Training**

Quite simply, battalion commanders make certain that the training conducted by the battalion is of quality. Performance-oriented training refers to the proper selection and prioritization of training tasks within the battalion training plan and ensuring those tasks are oriented on mission accomplishment. Performance-oriented training refers to conducting quality training which is properly resourced, led, supervised, and produces the results desired.

### **Mission-Oriented Training**

One of the initial challenges facing the battalion commander is balancing the time available, the battalion personnel available, and the many training requirements necessitated by appropriate orders and HHQ policy with the requirements demanded for successful mission accomplishment. Prioritization is not enough. Only through a well thought out training management system can battalion commanders meet external requirements and those internal training requirements necessary for the battalion to perform the most likely missions required of it. Battalion commanders understand that their focus is training for the mission essential tasks (METs), not trying to execute the exhaustive list of battalion tasks listed in the T&R manual. At the most basic level, this means ensuring that all training is prioritized to support the unit's mission essential task list (METL) and accurately reflects the operational environment the unit will operate in once deployed.

### **Train the MAGTF to Fight as a Combined Arms Team**

The combined arms team is the cornerstone of the way the Marine Corps fights. At the infantry battalion, combined arms training focuses on gaining and retaining those skills that integrate combat logistics support, aviation, and other elements with the battalion's weapons and maneuver capabilities. Battalion commanders work diligently to exercise these capabilities whenever possible, develop the skill sets within the battalion to integrate them, and work directly with the units that provide them.

### **Train the MAGTF to Fight as a part of a Joint Force**

The infantry battalion needs to prepare for the possibility of operating with forces from other services, allowing for the incorporation of capabilities to be complimentary. The ability to partner with other forces, especially SOF, may be essential to the battalion during future deployments, allowing better situational awareness and allowing for better integration during theater security cooperation activities, training exercises, and possible future stability operations. Learning and understanding how governmental agencies, regional partners, and other services operate and conduct command and control could pay huge dividends in the event the battalion conducts crisis response operations.

### **Train to Sustain Proficiency**

Good training management ensures that both learning and retention occur. Battalion commanders make certain that their training plans provide for remediation and sustainment. A variety of factors such as stand-alone events, multi-echelon training, exercises, or a combination of all of these may meet remediation and sustainment requirements. While the battalion headquarters may practice setting up the COC on its own initially, by requiring a functioning COC at every training event in which the battalion participates, to include ranges, the battalion commander ensures that the headquarters personnel become and remain proficient in setting up, operating, and redeploying the COC and its systems.

### **Train to Challenge**

Good training challenges and inspires battalion personnel by building upon current skills, increasing the complexity of training problems, and demanding progressively greater levels of performance. This is not a prescription for automatically moving forward on a training schedule regardless of past performance, it is a caution against unnecessary repetition, failure to apply


standards as measures of success, unimaginative static and lecture-based instruction, and ill-prepared training. Members of any unit instinctively recognize wasted time the same way that they reflexively flourish when challenged to excel.

### **Integrate Values Based Training and Leadership**

The commander implements values-based training and leadership to provide the unit with a set of values and principles meant to guide the behavior and conduct of Marines. Values-based training and leadership begins at recruit training, the School of Infantry, The Basic School, and other entry level supporting establishments. Leaders at all levels should ensure that values-based training and leadership is incorporated in training.

### **UNIT READINESS PLANNING**

The policy for the implementation of unit readiness planning (URP) throughout the Marine Corps is provided in MCO 1553.3\_, *Unit Training Management (UTM) Program*. The URP process, shown in figure A-1, includes all tasks previously associated with UTM, but expands them to provide linkages between training proficiency and operational mission requirements in accordance with Navy and Marine Corps Departmental Publication (NAVMC) 1553.1A, *Marine Corps Instructional Systems Design/Systems Approach to Training and Education Handbook*. While UTM was designed to govern the peacetime training activities of the Marine Corps, sustained operations in an adaptive environment demand a more responsive approach to achieving readiness. Although equipment and personnel readiness are critical components of the overall readiness of a unit, the primary objective of URP at the unit level is to aid commanders in the development of training plans that will ensure all Marines and units attain and sustain combat readiness.



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**Figure A-1. Unit Readiness Planning Process.**

## MISSION ESSENTIAL TASK LIST

The METL is a list of mission tasks deemed essential to mission accomplishment. It is the commander's tool for maintaining focus on mission accomplishment and forms the foundation upon which readiness reporting is made.

Training management is designed around the infantry battalion's METL. Unlike companies, which typically focus on individual events, battalions must plan training to achieve proficiency in all METs.

The METL is developed in support of a commander's assigned mission. Through careful analysis of the assigned mission, the commander arrives at a set of mission-based requirements. These requirements are then expressed in terms of the METs to be performed, the conditions under which they will be performed, and the standards to which they must be performed. Each unit's training program must ensure members train as they are going to fight; this is accomplished by focusing training proficiency on accomplishment of METs. A combat focus is critical throughout the training process, as it provides priority to training for combat roles vice peacetime routines. By prioritizing training to meet METs, the commander can allocate the proper resources to training priorities. The following six steps should be followed when establishing a METL.

### **Step 1—Review the Unit's Table of Organization Mission Statement**

After commanders have reviewed the HHQ's METL and other guidance, and they understand which tasks are pertinent to their units, they should review their unit mission statement on the table of organization, or in NAVMC 3500.44\_, *Infantry Training and Readiness Manual*.

### **Step 2—List Core Mission Essential Tasks**

A unit's core METs justify why it exists, and what it must be able to perform. The core METs, selected from the Marine Corps Task List (MCTL), are defined as the expected capabilities and essential tasks a unit must be able to perform during normal operations. Core METs are standardized for all units of the same type and are used to develop a community's T&R manual.

### **Step 3—Include other Additional or Assigned Mission Essential Tasks**

The commander takes into consideration other inputs when developing the METL, such as the HHQ's METL and guidance. The commander also needs to identify any named operation METs the unit has been tasked with and METs from any operation or contingency plans the unit is required to participate in.

**Higher headquarters' METL and Guidance.** A subordinate unit's METL must be linked to and support the HHQ's METL. A key component of the senior commander's METL approval is to determine if subordinate units have coordinated their METLs and established them to support their own METL.

**Named Operation METs.** These are assigned when the unit must prepare to participate in an operation (i.e., Operation Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom). Named operation METs may be similar to the core METs. However, it is possible the named operation has tasks not normally

expected of the unit type. In this case, the unit tasked with the named operation must train to METs for the named operation that are not currently on its own METL.

**Operation Plan/Contingency Plan METs.** Operational plans and contingency plans assign joint task execution to elements of a joint force. Commanders of Marine Corps component commands, using the MCTL, define and develop the METs for the expected capabilities units will execute for specific operational plans and contingency plans.

#### **Step 4—Tie Mission Essential Tasks to the Marine Corps Task List**

All Marine Corps METs are derived from the MCTL or the Universal Joint Task List. This step ensures accurate reporting against the correct METs within the Defense Readiness Reporting System—Marine Corps (DRRS-MC).

#### **Step 5—Revise the Unit’s Mission**

Once the commander has tied the MCTL task identification to every MET in the unit’s METL, the commander revises the unit’s mission statement. On certain occasions, the unit’s mission needs to be revised to incorporate METs from an operation or contingency plan. While the mission statement must be revised, the revision is up to the commander’s discretion.

#### **Step 6—Submit to Next Senior Commander for Approval**

The commander must submit the METL to the next higher commander for approval.

### **DEVELOP THE COMMANDER’S TRAINING ASSESSMENT**

The purpose of training assessment is to determine a unit’s proficiency in the METL. The desired level is defined in training standards within NAVMC 3500.44. Assessment is a continuous process and is integral to training management. It is conducted by leaders at every level and during all phases of planning and conducting training. For example, when a commander assumes command of a unit, they begin the assessment to see where the battalion stands and how prepared it is for combat. Assessment is a continuous process used to identify unit strengths and weaknesses.

The commander will find that they have many resources to utilize when conducting an assessment. For example, commanders rely on their professional observations as well as evaluation input and feedback from the following sources:

- Subordinate commanders.
- Enlisted leadership.
- Current reported DRRS-MC readiness levels.
- Table of organization and table of equipment levels.
- Evaluations, AARs, combat reports, etc.
- Roles and responsibilities.

## DEVELOP A TRAINING STRATEGY

The commander uses an eight-step process to develop a proper strategy. This process lays out the foundation for developing the *commander's training guidance* letter and is a source for developing long-range, mid-range, and short-range training plans. The document developed during this process is for the commander only, and not an official document.

- List the mission and METL.
- Specify training proficiency levels.
- Specify evaluation-coded (i.e., E-coded) T&R events that support the METL.
- Sequence training events and objectives with a crawl-walk-run method.
- Identify major training events and mission readiness exercises.
- Specify the frequency for executing specific training events and exercises.
- Plan for remediating tasks not performed to standard.
- Identify and allocate resources such as:
  - Time.
  - Training areas.
  - Fuel.
  - Ranges and ammunition.
  - Weapon qualifications and gunnery.
  - Simulations and support exercises.
  - Opposing forces and evaluators to support training events/exercises.

Overall, the training strategy should:

- Logically link objectives, events, and resources with METL training proficiency.
- Outline a means by which to achieve and sustain METL proficiency.

## COMMANDERS TRAINING GUIDANCE

Command training guidance is published at all command levels to provide a focus to the organization's long-range training plan. It must be read and understood by all members of the command. It is used as a reference for the planning, execution, and assessment of training throughout the planning process. The commander's training guidance should include and describe the following:

- Commander's training philosophy.
- The METL.
- Combined arms training.
- Major training events.
- Leader training.
- Individual training.
- Mandatory training.
- New equipment training.

- Resource allocation guidance.
- Training management.

### **Training Philosophy**

The commander's training philosophy is a statement telling subordinate leaders what is important to the commander, what is expected of subordinate leaders, and expectations of what Marines should be capable of doing.

### **Commander's Assessment of METL Proficiency**

The commander's assessment provides perspective on how the commander perceives the abilities and current capabilities of the unit. This assists in identifying unit strengths and weaknesses. This focuses attention on those things the unit does well and on skills that need more training. It is important to remember to keep this assessment general. Detailed assessments are reserved for the unit's readiness report in DRRS-MC and are classified.

### **Combined Arms Training**

The cornerstone of today's MAGTF is the combined arms team. Combined arms proficiency is developed only when teams train together on a regular basis. The cross-attachment of units and the routine employment of the full spectrum of combat, combat support, and CSS functions must be practiced regularly.

### **Major Training Events & Exercises with Associated Training Standards**

These are any major training activity/event that the commander decides is important. (e.g., the battalion commander may deem the following exercises as major training events in preparation for the unit's next deployment: integrated training exercise, combined arms exercise, mountain warfare training, field training exercises, sand table exercises, and live-fire exercises).

### **Leader Training**

Leader training is individual training that equips leaders to perform leadership tasks associated with the unit's operational mission. It prepares a leader to lead a unit, make decisions, and develop tactical and technical proficiency. Professional military education, mentoring, case studies, tactical exercises without troops, practical applications, role playing, and managed on-the-job training are effective methods for conducting leader development training. Other methods that can be used for leader training include:

- Unit physical training.
- Conducting inspections (i.e., uniform, equipment, vehicle).
- Training drills.
- Coaching and critiquing on the job performance.
- Presenting classroom instruction.
- Conducting objective AARs.
- Pursuing independent study.

### **Individual Training Requirements**

In addition to mission-oriented training, all Marines must also complete their individual training. This training includes marksmanship, the physical fitness test and combat fitness test, combat

water survival, and CBRN training (i.e., gas chamber). Some other examples include suicide awareness, Navy Relief, equal opportunity and Semper Fit.

### **Formal Training Requirements**

Lifelong study of the foundations of the military profession, or professional military education, is designed to equip Marines with the skills, confidence, understanding, and vision to exercise sound military judgment and decision making in combat situations. Each rank and MOS have professional military education requirements that must be completed before a Marine is eligible for promotion.

### **Standardization**

All Marines in a unit must be trained to a certain standard. These are derived from Marine Corps doctrine, technical manuals, orders, directives, and accepted procedures.

## **COMBAT READINESS**

### **Training Evaluation and Feedback**

Commands establish programs to evaluate combat readiness within their units. Evaluation programs must address more than just instructor techniques and management procedures. They must address the full spectrum of leadership tasks, drills, teamwork, and individual and collective skills performed within the framework of the mission or task. Every command has several evaluation programs. They monitor a variety of activities such as maintenance, supply, training, and administration.

Commanders can coordinate these different programs by:

- Designating specific tasks to be evaluated.
- Determining if existing evaluations produce adequate information.
- Reducing redundancy between existing evaluations.
- Ensuring that command evaluations complement unit activities.
- Ensuring that feedback from subordinates is obtained.

The evaluation process is only as effective as the feedback it gains, and its subsequent employment toward improving training proficiency.

### **Preparation of Trainers and Evaluators**

The commander must designate the personnel who evaluate training performance and ensure the evaluators are familiar with the standards established for the training. The commander may designate how training feedback is reported. Additionally, the commander must ensure that the evaluators have the required logistical support. Commanders and their unit training managers stage the resources and personnel and conduct the planned training. It is imperative that both the trainers and Marines being trained have a clear understanding of the training objectives and standards. Combat training takes many forms, but as long as it is clearly linked back to the unit's METL, the goal of the instruction, demonstration, or practical application will never be lost.



## **Equipment and Training**

The commander must set forth guidelines on equipment training and readiness, particularly for new equipment. Preventive maintenance on vehicles, communications equipment, and weapons needs to be addressed.

## **Resource Allocation and Guidance**

The commander uses METL assessment to determine resource priorities for training. During long-range planning, constrained resources may require deletion of low-priority training requirements, substitution of less costly training alternatives, or requests to HHQ for additional resources. If possible, commanders should ensure resources are available before publishing training plans. As was explained in the previous section, some resources include:

- Command operating budget.
- Ammunition allocation.
- Fuel allocations.
- HHQ training plans.
- Local directives on training areas and facilities.

## **Risk Management**

Uncertainty and risk are inherent in the nature of military action. The success of the Marine Corps is based upon a willingness to balance risk with opportunity in taking the bold and decisive action necessary to triumph in battle. At the same time, commanders have a fundamental responsibility to safeguard highly valued personnel and material resources, and to accept only the minimal level of risk necessary to accomplish an assigned mission. Historically, the greater percentages of losses during combat operations have been due to mishaps. Unnecessary losses, either in battle or in training, are detrimental to operational capability.

## **Values-Based Training and Leadership Training**

Values-based training should be implemented that focuses on honor, courage, commitment, selflessness, and taking care of fellow Marines. Training should emphasize the expectation of honorable service to the Nation and reinforce core values.

# **TRAINING PLANS**

## **Long Range Training Plan**

The long-range training plan at the regimental level normally covers a period of 12 to 24 months, and is updated annually. The plan at the MEF level and above can cover between five to 10 years. The purpose of a long-range training plan is—

- To identify missions and assign priorities.
- To develop command goals, to develop a strategy for accomplishing the training program, and to ensure resources are available to implement training.

## **Mid-Range Training Plan**

The mid-range training plan covers a period of four to 12 months, depending on the level of the unit (i.e., battalion, regiment, or division), and is updated quarterly. The purpose of the mid-range training plan is to convert the long-range training plan into a series of training activities and events. This is the primary training plan for a battalion.

## **Short-Range Training Plan**

The short-range training plan usually covers one to four months. The purpose of the short-range training plan is to specify and schedule the individual training events that comprise the mid-range training plan and link them to individual and collective training events.

## **Review Current Unit Proficiency, Resources, and Training Environment**

This step answers two of the questions previously addressed during analysis:

- What must the unit be able to do?
- What can the unit do now?

## **Seven Critical Components of a Training Plan**

**Commander's Training Guidance.** The commander's training guidance is published at all levels of command to provide focus for the organization's training plans. It must be read and understood by all commanders, staff officers, SNCOs, and NCOs. It is used as a reference for the planning, execution, and assessment of training throughout the planning process.

**Mission Essential Task List.** The METL is a complete list of the command's METs that are needed to successfully meet the organization's assigned mission.

**Training, Exercise, and Employment Plan.** The training, exercise, and employment plan (TEEP) displays the schedule of events throughout the timeframe of the plan, which includes "white space," major activities and events, and recurring events.

**Major Training Events and Exercises.** By developing and coordinating training events, the organization brings together training areas and facilities, opposing forces, controllers, evaluators, and other training resources that create the most realistic and combat-focused training. Major training events are the common building blocks that support an integrated set of METL-related training requirements.

**Available White Space.** White space on the TEEP consists of dates that are available for lower-level units to conduct training or open training dates. For example, a company commander may schedule a field exercise to conduct platoon offensive operations during available white space that is not already scheduled for major events or exercises on the battalion calendar. This training must support the unit's METL. It is important to remember that subordinate units utilize the battalion's plan to identify available white space for their training. To facilitate this, it is best to employ the one-thirds/two-thirds rule—using one-third of available white space for training and trying to leave two-thirds for subordinate unit training and individual training requirements.

**Predeployment Training Plan.** The predeployment training plan consists of blocks of training available on the TEEP to complete all four blocks of predeployment training. These four blocks of the predeployment training plan are mandated by Headquarters, Marine Corps and are required to be reported to the unit's HHQ upon completion.

**Formal and Ancillary Training Requirements.** Formal training, such as rifle and pistol qualification and the physical fitness test, is directive in nature. It should be prioritized below mission-oriented training requirements. Ancillary training is also directive in nature, and includes such training as sexual harassment, service member's group life insurance, and fraternization. Ancillary training should be prioritized below mission-oriented training and formal training.

### **Extracting Critical Information**

After a review of all of the seven critical components of the HHQ's training plan, the training plan is ready to be written. By extracting the critical components, all of the HHQ's training goals and directives are present in the training plan.

## **TRAINING REFERENCE TOOLS**

Commanders and trainers have a large number of references at their disposal to address all of the training requirements demanded of them. Many of the following references also possess the required information for the creation of nonstandard and mission-specific training requirements not addressed in the Marine Corps' T&R Manual system.

### **Unit Training Management Specific Publications**

The core publications for conducting training and training management in the Marine Corps are MTP 8-10A, *Unit Training Management Guide* and MCTP 8-10B, *How to Conduct Training*. They are replete with examples and specific, systematic instructions.

### **Training and Readiness Manuals**

The Marine Corps develops T&R manuals for most skill sets found in the Marine Corps. Just because a particular skill set does not exist in the infantry manual, does not mean it does not exist elsewhere. For example, an infantry battalion deploying to conduct crisis response and limited contingency operations might find many appropriate standards within NAVMC 3500.10\_, *Military Police and Corrections Training and Readiness Manual*.

### **Technical Manuals**

Marine Corps technical manuals provide ready sources for performance steps and standards on equipment-related training needs.

### **Marine Corps Publications**

While some publications may lack the weight of doctrine, they contain significant practical resources on how to conduct tasks, from managing training to conducting mechanical breaching. These publications can serve as ready source material for classes and training, provide insight into performance steps and evaluations, and act as the basis for nonstandard training standards.

### **Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned**

The center deploys representatives to all major commands, bases, training organizations, and forward deployed operating forces. The sole purpose of the organization is to collect, consolidate, and publish lessons learned across the six warfighting functions. Their publications and website provide a means of maintaining currency of instruction and training for specific theaters.

### **Other Service Publications**

The Marine Corps shares many publications and documents with the US Army, and actively endorses and uses joint publications. For commanders operating with other services or conducting missions not normally associated with the Marine Corps, joint and other service manuals prove invaluable. Examples of some such manuals are:

- Field manuals and Army tactics, techniques, and procedures publications are the Army's family of publications. They are similar to, and are often shared as, the Marine Corps warfighting and reference publications.
- Air Land Sea Application Center is an organization that sponsors multi-service doctrinal publications.
- Joint publications are joint doctrinal publications that serve as foundational documents for the services.
- The Center for Army Lessons Learned is similar to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned and provides an extensive list of documents, pamphlets, and web-based information.

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# APPENDIX B

## OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

Infantry battalions are deployable worldwide; therefore, commanders expect the requirement to operate in “every clime and place.” The general classifications of environments are rural, urban, jungle, mountain, and desert settings and conditions. To operate in these various conditions, the Marine Corps produces a host of warfighting publications addressing each one. This appendix covers the most common environments. Finally, infantry battalions must train and plan for the environments they are most likely to encounter. At a minimum, battalion commanders should seek to ensure that their companies:

- Possess cadres of personnel with specialized skills sets, such as assault climbers, jungle leaders, and urban warfare specialists.
- Conduct environmentally appropriate survival and medical training, such as how to recognize and treat altitude sickness, various jungle diseases, and parasites.
- Possess a fundamental understanding of unique equipment requirements, such as assault ladders, cold weather, and appropriate jungle clothing.

### URBAN OPERATIONS

Urban areas have traditionally held enemy centers of gravity, such as government, concentrations of the population, and infrastructure. The worldwide trend is toward increased urbanization, especially in the littorals. Infantry battalions must be ready to operate in urban environments.

The urban environment is complex and challenging, combining manmade features with the terrain and climate. The concentration of structures, facilities, and populations make the urban environment unique. Commanders use METT-T and civil considerations when making considerations for urban environments. For further information on urban operations, refer to MCTP 12-10B, *Urban Operations*.

#### Urban Considerations

The following considerations make the urban environment unique.

**Mission.** The battalion’s mission, along with the higher commander’s intent and end state, are critical starting points for urban mission planning. Planners must determine specific aspects of the mission, such as whether the tactical task *clear* will mean every building along a route or key terrain only, or whether the battalion will need to leave behind security elements along a route. The battalion commander must consider adaptability, command and control, and movement.

**Adaptability.** The battalion must be flexible and adaptable in the urban environment. Missions that begin against prepared enemy positions, requiring repetitive explosive breaching against barricaded rooms, can quickly demand precision engagement due to the unexpected presence of civilians on the battlefield. Forces must possess the necessary equipment to move from

permissive searching of a city block to high-intensity operations. Key considerations include fratricide avoidance and battlespace geometry.

**Command and Control.** Command and control is made increasingly difficult due to the dispersed nature of urban operations. Radio and verbal communications, line of sight, and various pyrotechnic signals are made more complicated, making reliance on a combination of mission tactics and top-down planning vital to the exercise of effective command and control. Extensive use of tactical control measures (i.e., boundaries, phase lines, and checkpoints) and event-driven execution checklists help build and maintain situational awareness across the force.

**Movement.** Due to the heightened three-dimensional nature of the urban environment, the danger of movement in the open becomes ever greater in proportion to the level of the threat. Terrain study is the first critical step in determining what movement is necessary and where and which structures require such actions as occupation, overwatch, suppression, or obscuration to provide an advantage. Commanders allow subordinate elements to take maximum advantage of covered and concealed routes within the urban area. If mounted, infantry uses tanks or other armored vehicles to assist its movement through their firepower and armor protection.

**Enemy.** Key factors that affect the battalion's problem framing are the type of enemy force expected in the urban area, the enemy's probable COAs, and the ROE. Rules of engagement that are more restrictive work to a defender's advantage; conversely, less restrictive ROE work to an attacker's advantage. An enemy working in a permissive or uncertain environment directly influences the battalion commander's choices on force protection and the use of firepower; such choices would change in a hostile environment.

**Terrain.** The urban environment is characterized by layers of manmade structures both above and below ground. Commanders and subordinate leaders must consider all aspects of terrain, environment, and climate when conducting urban operations across the competition continuum.

Maps may not provide enough detail for urban terrain analysis or reflect significant infrastructure, such as sewer, water, gas systems, subways, railroads, and electrical and communications infrastructure. For all types of operations, satellite and grid reference graphic imagery is preferred.

Key terrain may consist of buildings, high ground, and other features that provide security, overwatch, fields of fire, and enable safer movement. Decisive terrain may refer to controlling a local market that is surrounded by high buildings and is extremely vulnerable to multiple avenues of approach.

In addition to major routes of movement within the urban area, battalions must gain awareness and (when possible) intimate knowledge of alleys, throughways, footpaths, and other covered and concealed routes within the built-up area. Intentional or unintentional demolition of structures by friendly or enemy forces is another route consideration.

**Troops and Fire Support Available.** In large-scale traditional operations in urban environments, infantry battalions generally require augmentation with combat engineers, medical

capabilities, translators, tanks, and even direct fire artillery, on rare occasions. Commanders should seek necessary support beyond the battalion.

Urban environments demand more troops than other environments. In the offense, this need is particularly acute to meet relative combat power requirements and to accomplish the number of other tasks required, such as clearing buildings, providing security, controlling civilians, evacuating casualties, and conducting resupply.

Due to the complexities of employing supporting arms within the urban environment, fire support coordination tends to occur at HHQ levels where such issues as collateral damage, weaponeering, and airspace coordination are more easily resolved. Collateral damage estimates in the urban environment take into account the difficulty of tracking friendly unit location. Weaponeering issues consider not only collateral damage estimates, but also penetration, building composition, and changes to airspace controls due to high-trajectory artillery fires. The fire support team is an integral component in planning.

Regardless of the type of operation, armor often proves a valuable tool due to its firepower, ability to shield dismounted infantry, psychological effect, and lift capability. The basics of armor and infantry coordination apply in the urban environment as well. Commanders and staffs should work closely with attached armor to ensure that tanks bring the right ammunition mix into the urban environment.

***Time Available.*** Despite the deceptive presence of roads and the traditional fast pace of life associated with urban areas, combat operations in built-up areas have a slower pace and operating tempo than those in other environments. Clearing and searching multiple buildings, rooms, garages, yards, or alleys is slow even without the presence of a defending enemy. Commanders must plan accordingly to mitigate these factors and to maintain relative momentum and speed over the enemy, who must also deal with the same problems. Loss of tempo is mitigated by keeping plans simple, preplanning resupply, rotating the main effort frequently, and maintaining and using a reserve.

***Civil Considerations.*** When conducting operations in urban environments, contact with some portion of the populace should be expected. In higher intensity conflict, contact with the population is likely to come in the form of displaced persons or refugees. A civilian population may behave in a friendly, neutral, or threat manner towards the infantry battalion. Commanders must plan to encounter civilians on the battlefield and remain flexible, using combat power accordingly. Commanders must provide a plan and specific guidance regarding civilians.

### **Offensive Considerations**

Maneuver warfare is applicable in the urban environment, where limited resources coupled with unit isolation place a premium on leadership and commander's intent. Regardless of where they find themselves along the competition continuum, commanders can generally expect to execute the following missions: isolation of an urban objective, attack of an enemy outpost, attack of a block or group of buildings, assault of a building, movement to contact, seizure of key urban terrain, and raids.



**Isolation of an Urban Objective.** Unlike a cordon, which is used in a permissive or uncertain environment, isolation of an urban objective more closely resembles the isolation requirements for attacking a strong point. The purpose of isolation is to limit the enemy's options on the objective by cutting off escape or reinforcement. Commanders remain mindful of how they move to and occupy assigned positions to preserve surprise and avoid the risk of moving in open areas.

**Attack of an Enemy Outpost.** Forces may encounter enemy outposts, checkpoints, or strong points in their advance. The battalion may task a rifle company to conduct hasty attacks against substantially weaker enemy forces, bypass an outpost, or attack and reduce an outpost using classic strong point reduction tactics— isolate, suppress, breach, and assault.

**Attack of a Block or Group of Buildings.** A battalion may attack a block or group of buildings. The size of the block or group of buildings determines how the battalion employs its companies to execute the mission.

**Assault of a Building.** A battalion may task the assault of a building to a company when the building is too large for a platoon to assault and clear (vice search).

**Movement to Contact.** One of the principal considerations with a movement to contact for the commander is command and control and the nature of the enemy threat. Using search and attack methodology in an urban environment presents significant command and control issues.

**Seizure of Key Urban Terrain.** Battalions may seize key terrain to provide an advantage to friendly forces. Key terrain may include overpasses, building complexes, traffic circles, surrounding natural terrain, bridges, or transmitters.

**Raids.** Raids in urban terrain are planned similarly to raids on other terrain. Objectives may be located in built-up areas, necessitating that raid forces move through urban and other terrain to arrive at them.

### **Defensive Considerations**

Considerations for establishing a defense in an urban environment are no different from those covered in chapter 7. The urban environment greatly favors the defender, especially a defender who possesses the time to prepare and who intimately knows the terrain they are defending. The reasons an infantry battalion may defend in an urban environment are:

- Tactical advantage.
- Deny the enemy an important strategic or political objective.
- Retain economic capacity.
- Economy of force.
- Logistics.

### **Patrol Considerations**

Whether conducting patrols in a peacekeeping operation or conducting a reconnaissance on a prepared enemy position, patrol planning in the urban environment faces the same challenges

present in all urban operations—command and control and movement. Commanders should consider increased contact with the populace, use of the reserve, and communications.

**Increased Contact with the Populace.** Regardless of the level of conflict, patrols are likely to encounter the local population. It is important that patrols have detailed, specific instructions on how to deal with friendly, neutral, and threat populations.

**Use of the Reserve.** Commanders make difficult patrol plan decisions about how, when, and if to support patrols with the use of a reserve or a quick reaction force. In stability operations, counterinsurgency, and similar environments, committing a reserve to take advantage of a contact or discovery made by a patrol, or to extricate a patrol from an enemy threat beyond its ability, is a matter of course.

**Communications.** The urban environment already challenges radio communications. This problem increases considerably with the use of dismounted patrols moving any appreciable distance from the battalion's lines. Commanders must consider the ways in which they can establish continuous communications coverage, such as by conducting a communications survey as part of the C2 infrastructure planning, requesting additional communication resources when necessary.

## **MOUNTAIN WARFARE**

Major mountain ranges are found across the world in desert, jungle, and cold climate areas. Traditional operations in the mountains focus on controlling heights and passes, since mountains normally present an obstacle to mobility and are not objectives themselves. Commanders operating in mountainous environments must expect significant limitations on operations, including the impact of severe environmental conditions on the battalion and its equipment and the extraordinary challenges they present to ground mobility. For information about mountain warfare, refer to MCTP 12-10A, *Mountain Warfare Operations*.

### **Mountain Considerations**

The complex, compartmentalized nature of mountainous terrain changes the fundamental nature of techniques across all six of the warfighting functions. Units and personnel may require specialized training in skills such as military mountaineering, snow mobility, and appropriate fieldcraft. Mountain considerations can also be thought of in terms of METT-T and its effects on civilians.

**Mission.** When conducting problem framing, commanders must remember that the mountain environment not only slows movement, but also increases the difficulty of providing normal levels of support and conducting simple tasks. Patrolling becomes more support intensive. The nature of the terrain significantly influences patrol route selection and effectiveness; altitude and the nature of airflow in the mountains may preclude air support. Due to the limits on mobility and canalization caused by terrain, such items as avenues of approach and key terrain become easier to analyze. Since terrain may limit very high frequency communications, reliance on high

frequency and satellite communication assets drive a training requirement for the battalion commander's consideration.

The amount of time to prepare for mountain operations is an important planning consideration. Commanders tailor operational expectations accordingly. An infantry battalion deploying directly into a high-altitude environment, for example, will suffer from failing to conduct the preferred methods of gradual high-altitude acclimatization. Commanders should modify their operational expectations due to their forces' reduced effectiveness from oxygen depletion and potential altitude sicknesses.

**Enemy.** The enemy faces the same issues when operating in mountainous environments. They are just as likely to seek the easiest paths of movement and to balk at and require technical resources to climb cliff faces. In determining likely enemy COAs, the commander takes into account the enemy's effectiveness and capabilities in dealing with mountainous environments. Commanders strive to be more effective at these same tasks than the enemy so as to seize or maintain the initiative and dictate the tempo of operations.

**Terrain and Weather.** Units operating in the mountains should be prepared for increased casualties. Complex terrain always generates additional casualties, especially lower-body musculoskeletal injuries. At altitudes above 8,000 feet, commanders can expect some altitude-related illnesses among the battalion's personnel. If not considered during planning, the combination of these factors plus combat casualties can rapidly overwhelm medical response and CASEVAC capacity, especially when the mountains reduce the effectiveness of that capacity to begin with. Training, clothing, and proper resources can mitigate these terrain and climate-related issues.

**Troops and Support Available.** Commanders who may operate in the mountains seek specialized and general training for their battalions and additional equipment and personnel resources.

Task organization remains largely unchanged; however, commanders consider the employment of critical skills and enablers. Commanders should ensure that all company sub-elements include trained mountain leaders and that company commanders task-organize skill specialties (e.g., animal packers or assault climbers) to support specific functions.

The terrain and a relatively small force-to-space ratio dictates decentralized fire support techniques. Battalion personnel must train to develop the ability to control both indirect and direct fires in terrain where the firing agency, target, and observer are at different altitudes. Due to the nature of mountainous terrains, a relatively small area can contain numerous population groups who require specifically tailored IO themes.

Motor vehicles can operate in mountainous environments, normally restricted to specific areas and routes. Vehicles operating at the extremes of their operating parameters are more likely to break down, requiring greater preventive maintenance and increased resources.

The higher the altitude, the greater the limitations on some aviation support; specifically, the lift capacity and capabilities of rotary-wing aircraft. The ability of fixed-wing aircraft to work at high altitudes helps offset this loss; commanders need to consider and request the extra personnel and training resources needed to make effective use of fixed-wing support for aerial delivery.

A dismounted force operating in the mountains automatically consumes greater quantities of such expendables as food, water, and medical supplies. Adding to the burden of logistics in mountainous environments are terrain and altitude-imposed restrictions on the means of resupply and movement. Commanders mitigate these issues through prepositioning and stockpiling supplies, as well as methodical and well-planned operations.

***Time Available.*** Overcoming the many obstacles and challenges in a mountain environment demands increased planning time. A key planning assumption is that movement will be slow. Even if portions of a movement are mounted, commanders must make accurate time-distance planning assessments when determining their own movement rates and those of the enemy.

***Civil Considerations.*** The complex and compartmentalized terrain of the mountains often results in large numbers of diverse groups of people in a relatively small, two-dimensional area. Population groups in the mountains can be lumped into large ethnic, tribal, or language groups. Commanders should not assume that these groups are therefore heterogeneous. They possess extensive knowledge of the local terrain, including routes that might not appear on maps. Civilians living in the mountains tend to cluster in valleys, near arable land and along mobility corridors.

### **Offense Considerations**

In a mountainous environment, commanders generally execute attacks and movements to contact because exploitation and pursuit remain exceptionally difficult due to terrain and altitude restrictions on movement, resupply, and command and control. Offensive operations avoid frontal attacks; they seek surprise, try to place friendly forces on the flank or rear of enemy positions, and attempt whenever possible to attack downward from heights. Due to the methodical nature of operations dictated by mountain restrictions, commanders tend to seek objectives that are important for setting successful conditions for the next step of the battle. Other considerations include the following:

- Conduct operations in limited visibility to maximize surprise.
- Focus on mobility and survivability, both in the assault and during consolidation and reorganization.
- Maintain friendly LOC while destroying those of the enemy.
- Maintain a robust reconnaissance and security posture throughout the offensive action to protect friendly actions from discovery.
- Mitigate difficulties in concentrating combat power through centralized planning and decentralized small unit actions.
- Seek to mitigate such issues as supply and environmental force protection by executing operations of short duration and violent execution.

## **Defense Considerations**

While an attacker seeks key and decisive terrain important to the next phase of the battle, the defender seeks to retain that terrain to deny it to the enemy and preserve it for use in taking the offense—the decisive method of war. Observation, fields of fire, the ability to fortify, the opportunity to stockpile supplies, and preparation of internal routes for the quick movement of troops within the defense all work to the defender's advantage. In the defense, commanders also consider the following:

- Using camouflage and concealment extensively to retain surprise.
- Conducting a careful analysis of the terrain to determine avenues of approach and guard against enemy use of impossible or unlikely routes.
- Conducting an aggressive reconnaissance effort to prevent surprise while denying the enemy the ability to discover the nature, location, and strengths of the friendly defense.
- Determining the requirement for perimeter defenses to defend against an assault from any direction.
- Using delaying tactics to disrupt the attacker, as delaying tactics are particularly effective in complex terrain.

## **Patrol Considerations**

When conducting stability or defensive operations, it is likely that commanders will make increased use of OP/LPs or mountain pickets to overwatch avenues of approach, dead space, and critical pieces of terrain within the defense. The patrolling and reconnaissance plan should integrate these types of positions to shorten the length and ease the difficulty of patrol routes, to provide overwatch of patrols, and to provide temporary patrol bases for force protection, supply, and emergencies.

## **DESERT WARFARE**

Deserts or arid environments make up a larger portion of the world's climates than any other, making it very likely for Marines to deploy into desert environments. As the term *arid* suggests, deserts are defined by their lack of water and moisture, not by their temperatures, which can vary (sometimes within a matter of hours) from extreme cold to extreme heat. Commanders expecting to operate in the desert must plan and train for the impact of dry, arid, rugged, and dusty conditions on personnel, equipment, and vehicles. For further information on desert warfare, refer to MCTP 12-10D, *Desert Operations*.

## **Desert Considerations**

From the sweeping operations of Bedouin tribesman in World War I to the North African tank battles of World War II and the modern mechanized warfare of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, the open terrain of the desert is ideal for mobile maneuver warfare between opposing conventional forces. Any force capable and confident enough to journey into the desert effectively either forces battle or drives smaller enemy threats into the population centers to seek shelter there. Commanders must consider METT-T and civil considerations when planning desert operations.

**Mission.** Battalions participate in major offensive and defensive operations as maneuver elements. In stability operations, battalions frequently act semi-independently. When conducting problem framing, infantry commanders must first consider mobility issues. First, the types of vehicles provided to units influence the capabilities and survivability tactics the commander can choose. Second, both the types of vehicles and the nature of trafficability in the desert affect mobility. Deserts can contain wadis, deep sand, salt marshes, and similar features that can quickly bog down both wheeled and tracked vehicles

The relatively open nature of the desert, the advantages provided by vehicular and aerial mobility, and the ability to employ weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges offer opportunities and challenges for defender and attacker alike. Commanders operating in the desert must ensure that subordinates are thoroughly capable of conducting both aided and unaided land navigation across large and featureless areas. Formations for movement stress flexibility and the ability to rapidly respond to contact to the front and flanks.

Reconnaissance remains important to the commander in the desert. However, without dominating terrain features from which to achieve observation points, commanders must use aggressive patrolling for both reconnaissance and security purposes, as well as aerial platforms and imagery to see the enemy in depth.

Given the chaos possible with multiple maneuvering units, the dust and obscurity associated with desert movement, and the lack of intervening terrain that might limit the effects of weapons, fratricide is of even greater concern on the desert battlefield

**Enemy.** An enemy capable of matching the technical and tactical prowess in the open desert is a dangerous foe. Frequent displacement of friendly artillery enables commanders to maintain friendly fire support. The enemy will seek to mass unexpectedly to achieve local combat superiority, create decisive effects, and disperse using the relatively unobservable tracts of desert as a form of concealment.

**Terrain and Weather.** Heat and arid environments can adversely affect all sorts of equipment, but communications and computer equipment are particularly vulnerable. Commanders must consider both the natural and manmade features of the desert.

Natural desert features can make visibility and determining distance challenging. Distances in the desert are deceptive due to the lack of terrain features available to provide scale, which affects combat reporting and control of supporting arms. Commanders must appreciate that desert distances and openness enable the employment of weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges.

Night movement, while providing concealment, carries its own risks, such as the separation of vehicles due to darkness and dust. Desert features such as wadis, oases, sand dunes, salt marshes, rocks, and flooding during rainy seasons all impact operations. Many of these features shift based on weather patterns and do not appear on maps. Commanders should not discount the presence of micro-terrain. While a ten-foot sand dune does not appear on a map and may not be visible at a distance, it can conceal a friendly or enemy vehicle.

**Troops and Support Available.** When conducting desert operations that favor mobile operations, commanders do not discount the requirement for dismounted infantry. Dismounted infantry, when properly supported by antiarmor weapons, survivable fortifications, obstacles, and fire support, are the force of choice for strong point operations and the defense of logistical nodes or fixed sites. Dismounted infantry is critical to armor survivability in the close assault; the need for combat engineer support is greater in desert operations also, due to heavy demands for mobility, countermobility, and survivability.

Supporting arms in the desert greatly assists infantry battalions in creating the suppressive effects necessary to safely enter and transit through areas within the effects of enemy weapons. Commanders must plan their operations carefully to avoid outrunning indirect fires.

Aviation greatly aids reconnaissance efforts and fire plans. Due to the ineffectiveness of ground-based observers without key terrain, aviation assets aid reconnaissance, and—with the use of FAC (airborne) capabilities—can enhance the effectiveness of fire plans. Close air support, in its different roles, can aid fire support gaps created by displacing artillery or mortar assets. With the ability to lift troops, light vehicles, and even artillery, assault support can insert friendly forces into the rear area of the enemy to create significant blocking positions.

Commanders must confront the much greater logistical requirements associated with mobile warfare and maintaining forces in the desert. Ground movement is always vulnerable to enemy attack, especially in counterinsurgency or “behind the lines” operations.

**Time Available.** Commanders carefully consider time and speed in the desert, especially as they relate to supporting arms. In the attack, commanders must consider the speed of maneuver elements to avoid driving into supporting fires or lifting supporting fires too soon. In the defense, the use of natural target reference points helps to time supporting arms so that they fall onto moving enemy targets instead of ahead of or behind them. The mobile nature of desert warfare generally leads to a significantly higher operating tempo than that found in other environments. Commanders must consider rest plans, incorporating them into operations in the same manner as actions such as refueling, resupply, and security halts.

**Civil Considerations.** While the desert is not empty of population, those peoples who live in the desert tend to be nomadic. Permanent populations tend to cluster around terrain favorable to life, such as oases, trade routes, seasonal water sources, or narrow agricultural strips on rivers. Battalions should expect to encounter civilians across all types of operations.

### **Offense Considerations**

Commanders in the offense must plan to avoid their culmination points, maintain mobility, maintain suppression, and maintain the defense.

**Avoid the Culmination Point.** As the attack progresses, friendly forces become further and further removed from their supply bases and, therefore, vulnerable to enemy counterattacks and actions against friendly supply lines. When planning offensive actions as part of a battalion or when conducting semi-independent operations, company commanders must plan on how to overcome an early culmination point in the attack.

**Maintain Mobility.** Commanders maintain mobility in two ways—through the maintenance and supply of their vehicles, and through a robust breaching capability to maintain mobility against fortified enemy positions.

**Maintain Suppression.** Because of the open nature of desert terrain and the ability for weapon systems to engage at their maximum ranges, suppression of enemy defenses is critical as friendly maneuver units close on them. The fire support plan must take into account suppression, destruction criteria, and similar considerations that allow the battalion to maneuver in relative safety to the objective and assault it successfully.

**Maintain the Defense.** Defensive tasks are inherent in the offense. Battalions in a mobile desert fight need to consider flank security when engaging an enemy likely to defend in depth and to maintain a counterattack capability. Commanders consider posting flank security when the enemy position is penetrated.

### **Defense Considerations**

Defense seeks to deny terrain that furthers the opponent's operations by retaining them. In the defense, the battalion commander considers assembling a mobile defense in depth.

When assigned missions not associated with terrain or fixed sites, the commander makes maximum use of depth and mobility to attrite, disrupt, and draw the enemy deep into the defensive sector before executing decisive offensive actions, such as counterattacks, to destroy the enemy.

### **Patrol Considerations**

Commanders must plan their reconnaissance efforts based on their own patrol assets. Since the desert can lack terrain from which to observe the enemy, friendly patrolling should be aggressive. Patrols may often combine mounted and dismounted methods to get close enough to enemy positions to conduct reconnaissance without risking the destruction of friendly forces and assets.

## **JUNGLE WARFARE**

The jungle environment is common on or near the equator. Large swaths of this environment lie in the littorals and support large populations throughout Africa, Central and South America, Indonesia and northern Australia, and in southern and Southeast Asia. Because of their locations along the littorals and near very large population centers, jungles remain likely environments in which Marine Corps forces continue to operate. For more information on jungle warfare, refer to MCTP 12-10C, *Jungle Operations*.

### **Jungle Considerations**

Jungles are generally characterized by thick foliage and persistent heat. All jungles receive significant rainfall, but it varies by location. Jungles along the equator experience rainfall throughout the year; whereas, jungles further from the equator, such as those in Southeast Asia,



have distinct monsoon and dry seasons. The jungle's limitations on maneuver, speed, and visibility significantly influence combat in this environment.

**Mission.** Most jungle operations occur without physically tying into units on the flanks or to the rear, due to the nature of the jungle environment. Regardless of employment methodology, the primary issue facing the infantry commander in the jungle is either finding the enemy or avoiding being found by the enemy.

Because of the limited visibility and restrictive terrain, most jungle fighting takes place at close range. Whether defending or attacking when facing a conventional, insurgent, or asymmetrical foe, finding the enemy is often the task and purpose of the infantry. Actual movement is slow and units disperse to find the enemy. Because the jungle limits the use of vehicles and the effectiveness of heavy weapons, the tactical face of the infantry often comes to resemble that of the enemy—light infantry relying on small arms, mortars, and artillery. Commanders can use rotary-wing CAS to ease fire support limitations and assault support aircraft to significantly increase mobility.

Commanders should develop jungle and field craft skills within a select cadre of personnel in case preparation time before deployment is short. When possible, commanders should seek to acclimatize battalions to the new environment before committing them to operations.

**Enemy.** Most potential enemies in the jungle, regardless of organization, purpose, and equipment, consist of light infantry augmented with mortars, and perhaps artillery. They seek to camouflage their activities and use infiltration and breaching operations in the attack.

**Terrain and Weather.** The jungle environment includes many different types of landscapes, including dense forests, swamps, savannahs, bamboo thickets, plantations, and other forms of vegetation. Other considerations of the jungle terrain and weather are key terrain, observation, moisture, disease, and navigation.

Traditional definitions of key terrain, such as high ground, do not possess the same importance in the jungle due to the thick vegetation, which precludes observation and fires. Features that support mobility and resupply, such as roads, rivers, streams, LZs, and fording sites, are key terrain in the jungle fight.

Line of sight and observation distances are minimal in the jungle. Nights in jungle regions are roughly 12 hours long. Commanders should plan to use NVDs to take advantage of this darkness.

Jungle climates are characterized by high temperatures, high humidity, and the potential for heavy rain throughout the year. All three seriously affect battalion personnel, equipment, weapons, vehicles, maintenance, and tactics. Since much of the technology that increases the lethality of the infantry is vulnerable to moisture, battalions should prepare and train to operate without them.

Jungles contain wildlife that can be harmful to battalion personnel; however, the chances of being injured are remote, especially if the battalion is trained on and remains disciplined about basic fieldcraft and precautions. These include looking before sitting or checking boots before donning, for example. Preventive medicine, field craft discipline, supervised use of prophylactics, and the availability of potable water demand the attention of unit leadership at all levels when conducting operations.

Navigating through the jungle environment is challenging even for the most proficient land navigator, and frequently requires advanced techniques (i.e. offsets, terrain association in limited visibility, and “hand-railing” ridgelines and contours). The ability to use electronic assistance, such as GPS [global positioning system], is frequently limited or blocked altogether by thick jungle canopy that prevents satellite reception.

**Troops and Support Available.** Artillery can be difficult to employ effectively in the jungle environment, and while rotary-wing aviation assets can be of great assistance, their survivability to enemy small arms is an important consideration.

Commanders should consider organizing personnel who normally employ heavy weapons, such as antitank missiles or HMGs (largely ineffective in the close jungle fight), as additional infantry maneuver elements. All movement techniques must consider the following:

- Centralized control of direction.
- Ability to rapidly deploy to maneuver or reinforce.
- Ease of movement by dispersing along different parallel routes.
- Maintenance of 360-degree security during movement and at halts.
- Multiple and redundant navigational aids.
- Ability to transition between different formations at danger areas.

Depending on the nature of the jungle, the ability to fire through the canopy can make indirect fire support questionable. Mortars must possess overhead clearance in all probable firing directions. Friendly defensive positions must also be survivable and have overhead cover.

The flexibility, responsiveness, loiter time, and ability to more easily identify friendly positions and signals makes rotary-wing aviation an ideal asset to make up for fire support gaps and the lack of infantry heavy weapons. Furthermore, the ability for rotary-wing gunships to rapidly identify enemy firing positions and destroy them should not be discounted. In addition to rotary-wing CAS, assault support often plays an integral role in troop lift and resupply, both of which can add significant mobility to friendly forces. Aerial resupply is the major way of supplying infantry battalions and conducting CASEVAC in the jungle environment.

Most radios, computers, and similar data systems are extremely vulnerable to the moisture prevalent in the jungle environment. Battalion personnel must consider ways to protect these assets and be prepared to fight without them.

**Time Available.** Jungle movement, even if aided by aerial troop lift, is slow. When planning on how to use available time, commanders must make considerable allowances for movement and security.

**Civil Considerations.** As with other challenging environments, infantry battalions are not likely to encounter civilians deep in the primary jungle. They may encounter plantations and agricultural cultivation as they approach population centers or the coast.

### **Offense Considerations**

While the added mobility and firepower of rotary-wing CAS and assault support can dramatically increase the overall tempo of jungle operations.

**Reconnaissance.** The difficulties of locating the enemy in the jungle should not be underestimated, even a heavily armed conventional enemy. Even if the general location of the enemy is known, such as a sanctuary in a valley, the nature of jungle terrain and vegetation tend to foil aerial imagery and direct observation, and can result in the details of the location remaining hidden until contact is made. Commanders must make every effort to discover the nature and depth of enemy positions prior to the assault.

**Meeting Engagements.** Successful attacks in the jungle combine surprise, dispersion, and the ability to rapidly concentrate when contact occurs. Therefore, even when reconnaissance reveals the enemy's position in some detail, prudence still dictates that the battalion consider the dispersed approach march and expect that the opening moments of contact will resemble a meeting engagement.

Since jungle warfare is largely a light infantry fight, infantry battalions should actively employ the classic tactics available in restricted terrain—infiltration, rear area harassment, ambushes, aggressive use of surprise, and periods of limited visibility.

### **Defense Considerations**

When in the defense in a jungle environment, the infantry uses extensive camouflage of its positions, designs its positions to trap the enemy in prepared fields of fire, and conducts aggressive security operations to disrupt and delay the enemy's attack.

**Defensive Maneuver.** Since uncertainty and surprise are an attacker's greatest asset in the jungle, commanders plan their defenses to decrease these factors. Within the defensive position, routes take advantage of cover and concealment, while resupply, preparations, and other tasks are handled during periods of limited visibility. A centrally located reserve enables commanders to react to penetrations of the defense or counterattack opportunities.

**Patrolling.** The infantry patrols aggressively in the defense. While the attacker patrols to find the battalion's defense, the companies aggressively patrol to foil this effort, to disrupt and delay the attacker's movements, and to defeat attempts at infiltration. Commanders make appropriate use of OP/LPs to augment their patrolling effort and to provide advanced warning of enemy attacks.

**Visibility and Camouflage.** Regardless of the operational environment, camouflage, deception, and the concealment of friendly positions, intentions, and movements always play an important role in the defense. However, camouflage at the individual, position, and unit level are even more paramount in the jungle than in other environments.

### **Patrol Considerations**

Expertise in field craft characterizes successful patrolling in the jungle. Most combat in the jungle is short, intense, unexpected, and conducted by opposing small units who actively move through the environment seeking to do harm while avoiding harm. Commanders must prepare their battalions to be that force.

**Route Planning.** Many factors come into consideration for route planning. Some of these include the slow and often exhausting demands of jungle movement, the ability to support units requiring resupply, assistance or extraction, and the ability of the units to maintain communication. Others include providing units with enough combat power and logistical resources to support themselves temporarily, while still being able to take advantage of stealth and concealment.

**Communications.** Communications are difficult in the jungle environment, where heat, obstructions, and foliage can derail communication assets. Communication is critical so units can contact supporting arms or conduct a CASEVAC. Commanders should consider measures to assist in communications, such as emplacing retransmission sites and using OP/LPs. Other measures might be maneuver based, such as sending out elements that are large enough to set up temporary patrol bases.

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# APPENDIX C

## TACTICAL TASKS

The MAGTF tactical tasks, listed in table C-1 on page C-2 and described in the rest of this appendix, may be specified, implied, or essential. They define actions commanders may take to accomplish their missions. In special circumstances, commanders may modify tasks to meet METT-T requirements. They must clearly state that they are departing from the standard meaning of these tasks. One way this can be done is by prefacing the modified task with the statement, “What I mean by [modified task] is . . . .”

Tactical tasks are assigned based on capabilities. The GCE can execute all of the MAGTF’s tactical tasks. The LCE can execute those tactical tasks essential for it to provide sustainment to the MAGTF. The ACE can execute many of the MAGTF’s tactical tasks, but it cannot secure, seize, retain, or occupy terrain without augmentation by the GCE. Weather and task duration may significantly affect the ACE’s ability to execute assigned tactical tasks.

The descriptions of tactical tasks that follow are for guided discussion only and are not official definitions of the terms in most cases. For the definitions, as applicable, see the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* and MCRP 1-10.2, *Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

**Table C-1. Tactical Tasks.**

Enemy-Oriented Tactical Tasks	Terrain-Oriented Tactical Tasks	Friendly-Oriented Tactical Tasks
ambush attack by fire block breach* bypass canalize contain* corrupt deceive defeat degrade deny destroy disrupt exploit feint fix influence* interdict isolate neutralize penetrate reconnoiter* support by fire suppress	breach* clear control* cordon* occupy* reconnoiter* retain secure* seize	cover disengage displace exfiltrate follow and assume follow and support guard protect screen
	<b>Population-Oriented Tactical Tasks</b>	
	advise assess the population assist build/restore infrastructure contain* control* coordinate with civil authorities cordon*	enable civil authorities exclude influence* occupy* reconnoiter* secure* train transition to civil control
* Tactical tasks with multiple classifications and applications.		

### **Enemy-Oriented Tactical Tasks**

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on generating effects against enemy forces.

#### **Ambush**

A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy.

Note: An ambush is fundamentally a type of attack, enemy-oriented, and is planned and executed accordingly.

#### **Attack by Fire**

Fires (direct and indirect) in the physical domains and/or through the information environment to engage the enemy from a distance to destroy, fix, neutralize, or suppress.

Note: Within the physical domains, an attack by fire closely resembles the task of support by fire. The chief difference is that one unit conducts the support by fire task to support another unit so it can maneuver against the enemy.

### **Block**

As a tactical task, a block denies the enemy access to an area or prevents the enemy's advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. It may be for a specified time. As an obstacle effect, a block integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or to prevent the enemy from passing through an engagement area.

Note: Block differs from the tactical task fix because a blocked enemy force can still move in another direction, it just cannot advance. A fixed enemy force cannot move.

### **Breach**

To break through or secure a passage through an obstacle. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

### **Bypass**

To maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force.

### **Canalize**

To restrict enemy movement to a narrow zone by the use of existing or reinforcing obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver.

### **Contain**

To stop, hold, or surround the enemy forces or causes the enemy to center activity on a given front and prevents the withdrawal of any part of the enemy's forces for use elsewhere. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

Note: Whereas the tactical task fix prevents enemy movement, the tactical task contain allows for some enemy movement within the designated area.

### **Corrupt**

To change, debase, or otherwise alter information from its original or correct form or version by intentionally introducing errors or alterations, thereby rendering it useless.

### **Deceive**

To manipulate an enemy into believing and acting upon something that is not true for a selected period of time and/or at a particular location to create a friendly advantage.



**Defeat**

To disrupt or nullify the enemy commander's plan and overcomes their will to fight, thus making the enemy commander unwilling or unable to pursue the adopted course of action and yield to the friendly commander's will.

**Degrade**

To diminish the effectiveness or efficiency of an enemy's C2 systems, communications systems, and/or information collection efforts or means; lower the morale of an enemy unit; reduce a target's worth or value; and/or impair an enemy's decision-making capability.

**Deny**

To hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, facilities, and/or specific capabilities.

**Destroy**

To physically render an enemy force combat ineffective unless it can be reconstituted or render a target or capability so damaged that it can neither function as intended nor be restored to a useable condition.

Note: Defeat and destroy are not the same. Destruction of the enemy force normally leads to their defeat, but defeat does not necessarily require destruction.

**Disrupt**

A task or effect that employs or integrates fires and obstacles to break apart an enemy's formation and tempo, interrupts the enemy's timetable, or causes premature commitment or the piecemealing of forces. In information warfare, disrupt also entails preventing efficient interaction of enemy combat and combat support systems by inflicting damage over the short term to specific facets of the system's operation.

**Exploit**

To employ to the greatest possible advantage the success achieved in a military operation or enemy information that has come into friendly hands.

Note: Exploitation is an offensive operation following a successful attack that is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. It extends the initial success of the attack by preventing the enemy from disengaging, withdrawing, and reestablishing an effective defense.

**Feint**

Contact with the enemy to deceive them about the location or time of the actual main offensive action.

Note: Feint is the counterpart to the type of attack.

**Fix**

As a tactical task, to prevent the enemy from moving any part of their forces, either from a specific location or for a specific period of time, by holding or surrounding them to prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere. As a tactical obstacle effect, fix integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker within a specified area—normally an engagement area.

Note: Fixing an enemy force does not mean destroying it. However, the friendly force has to prevent the enemy from moving in any direction, which can be resource intensive.

**Influence**

To cause the enemy to behave in a manner favorable to friendly forces. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Interdict**

To divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

**Isolate**

To seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent that enemy force from having contact with other enemy forces.

**Neutralize**

As a task, to render the enemy or the enemy's resources ineffective or unusable. As an effect of fires delivered, neutralize renders a target ineffective or unusable, which degrades the enemy's capability of accomplishing its mission.

**Penetrate**

To break through the enemy's defense and disrupt their defensive system.

Note: The tactical task penetrate is the counterpart to the form of offensive maneuver that is known as penetrate.

**Reconnoiter**

To obtain, by visual observation or other methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary. *See also terrain- and population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Support by Fire**

Movement to a position where the maneuver force can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force.

Note: Support by fire closely resembles the task of attack by fire. The difference is a unit conducting attack by fire only uses direct and indirect fires. A unit conducting support by fire uses direct and indirect fires to support the maneuver of another friendly force.

**Suppress**

The transient or temporary degradation of an opposing force or the performance of a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives.

**Terrain-Oriented Tactical Tasks**

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on achieving some sort of condition as it relates to terrain.

**Breach**

To break through or secure a passage through an obstacle. *See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Clear**

To remove enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with the unit's ability to accomplish its mission.

**Control**

To maintain physical influence by occupation or range of weapon systems over the activities or access in a defined area. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

Note: Control differs from the tactical task secure in that control prevents the movement of enemy ground forces through an area, but does not require the complete clearance of enemy forces or the prevention of enemy fires into the specified area.

**Cordon**

To prevent an enemy unit's withdrawal from or reinforcement to a position. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Occupy**

To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other manmade or natural area without opposition and control the entire area. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Reconnoiter**

To secure data, by visual observation or other methods, about the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. *See also enemy- and population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Retain**

To occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure it is free of enemy occupation or use.

**Secure**

To gain possession of a position, terrain feature, piece of infrastructure, or civil asset, with or without force, and prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. The attacking force may or may not have to physically occupy the area. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Seize**

To clear a designated area and gains control of it.

Note: The tactical task seize differs from occupy in that seizure occurs in the face of enemy opposition.

**Friendly-Oriented Tactical Tasks**

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on supporting the actions of other friendly forces.

**Cover**

To conduct offensive and defensive actions independent of the main body to protect the covered force and develop the situation.

Note: It is the tactical task associated with the security operation cover.

**Disengage**

To break contact with the enemy and move to a point where the enemy cannot observe nor engage the unit by direct fire.

**Displace**

To leave one position to take another while remaining in contact with the enemy.

Note: Displace differs from the tactical task disengage in that units disengage to break contact with the enemy, while units displace to continue the mission or execute alternate missions.

**Exfiltrate**

To remove personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth.

**Follow and Assume**

A task in which a second committed force follows a force conducting an offensive operation and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attrited, or unable to continue.

Note: The follow-and-assume force is not a reserve but is prepared to execute all missions of the followed unit.

**Follow and Support**

A task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation.

Note: The follow-and-support force is not a reserve but is a force committed to supporting the followed unit. The difference between follow and assume and follow and support is: the follow and assume force is

prepared to take over the lead element's mission whereas the follow and support force acts to create the conditions necessary to allow the lead element to continue its success (such as destroying bypassed elements, blocking enemy movement of reinforcements, clearing obstacles, or controlling dislocated civilians).

**Guard**

To protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information.

Note: It is the tactical task associated with the security operation guard.

**Protect**

To prevent observation by, engagement with, or interference from an adversarial or enemy force, system, capability, or location.

**Screen**

To observe, identify, and report information, and only fight in self-protection.

Note: It is the tactical task associated with the security operation screen.

**Population-Oriented Tactical Tasks**

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on achieving some sort of condition as it relates to the population within the area of operations.

**Advise**

To improve the individual and unit capabilities and capacities of host nation security forces through the development of personal and professional relationships between United States and host nation forces.

**Assess the Population**

To evaluate the nature, situation, and attitudes of a designated population or elements of a population, inhabiting the area of operations.

**Assist**

To provide designated support or sustainment capabilities to host nation security forces to enable them to accomplish their objectives.

**Build/Restore Infrastructure**

To construct, rebuild, or repair local infrastructure to support the host nation and gain or maintain the cooperation of the local population.

**Contain**

To prevent or halt elements of a population or designated party from departing or projecting physical influence beyond a defined area. *See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Control**

To use physical control measures and information-related capabilities to influence elements of a population or designated actors to respond as desired. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Coordinate With Civil Authorities**

To interact with, maintain communication, and harmonize friendly military activities with those of other interorganizational agencies and coalition partners to achieve unity of effort.

**Cordon**

To temporarily prevent movement to or from a prescribed area such as a neighborhood, city block, series of buildings, or other feature. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Enable Civil Authorities**

To support or assist the host nation government and designated interorganizational agencies in providing effective governance.

**Exclude**

To prevent or halt elements of a population or designated party from entering or projecting physical influence into a defined area.

**Influence**

To persuade the local population, including potential and known adversaries, within the operational area to support, cooperate with, or at least accept the friendly force presence, and dissuade the local population from interfering with operations. *See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Occupy**

To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other manmade or natural area without opposition and control the entire area. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Reconnoiter**

To obtain, by visual observation or other methods, information about civil considerations. *See also enemy- and terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Secure**

To gain possession of a position, terrain feature, piece of infrastructure, or civil asset, with or without force, and prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Train**

To teach designated skills or behaviors to improve the individual and unit capabilities and capacities of host nation security forces.

**Transition to Civil Control**

The handover of civil government and security responsibilities from friendly force military authorities to legitimate civil authorities.

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# GLOSSARY

## Section I: Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAR.....	after action report
AAV.....	amphibious assault vehicle
ACE.....	aviation combat element
AO.....	area of operations
AOA.....	amphibious objective area
APL.....	armor protective level
ASCOPE.....	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATF.....	amphibious task force
BDA.....	battle damage assessment
BLT.....	battalion landing team
C2.....	command and control
CAF.....	commander, amphibious force
CAS.....	close air support
CASEVAC.....	casualty evacuation
CATF.....	commander, amphibious task force
CBRN.....	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR.....	commander's critical information requirement
CCO.....	combat cargo officer
CE.....	command element
CLF.....	commander, landing force
CLIC.....	company level intelligence cell
CMO.....	civil-military operations
CMOC.....	civil-military operations center
CO.....	commanding officer
COA.....	course of action
COC.....	combat operations center
COMMSTRAT.....	communication strategy and operations
COT.....	commanding officer of troops
CP.....	command post
CPB*.....	civil preparation of the battlespace
<i>*proposed for inclusion in next revision of MCRP 1-10.2</i>	
CSS.....	combat service support
CTP.....	common tactical picture
D3A.....	decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DOD.....	Department of Defense
DRRS-MC.....	Defense Readiness Reporting System—Marine Corps
EFST.....	essential fire support task



EW.....electronic warfare

FAC.....forward air controller

FEBA.....forward edge of the battle area

FHA.....foreign humanitarian assistance

FSC.....fire support coordinator

FSCC.....fire support coordination center

FSCM.....fire support coordination measure

FSO.....fire support officer

G-2.....assistant chief of staff, intelligence/intelligence staff section

G-4.....assistant chief of staff, logistics/logistics staff section

GCE.....ground combat element

H&S.....headquarters and service

HAZMAT.....hazardous material

HHQ.....higher headquarters

HMG.....heavy machine gun

HPT.....high-payoff target

HVT.....high-value target

IED.....improvised explosive device

IM.....information management

IMO.....information management officer

IO.....information operations

IOC.....intelligence operations center

IPB.....intelligence preparation of the battlespace

IR.....intelligence requirement

IRC.....information-related capability

ISR.....intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

JP.....joint publication

KLE.....key leader engagement

LAR.....light armored reconnaissance

LCE.....logistics combat element

LFOC.....landing force operations center

LNO.....liaison officer

LOC.....line of communication

LP.....listening post

LZ.....landing zone

MAGTF.....Marine air-ground task force

MCDP.....Marine Corps doctrinal publication

MCO.....Marine Corps order

MCPP.....Marine Corps Planning Process  
 MCRP.....Marine Corps reference publication  
 MCTL.....Marine Corps Task List  
 MCTP.....Marine Corps tactical publication  
 MCWP.....Marine Corps warfighting publication  
 MEF.....Marine expeditionary force  
 MET.....mission essential task  
 METL.....mission essential task list  
 METT-T.....mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available  
 MEU.....Marine expeditionary unit  
 MILDEC.....military deception  
 MISO.....military information support operations  
 MOE.....measure of effectiveness  
 MOP.....measure of performance  
 MOPP.....mission-oriented protective posture  
 MOS.....military occupational specialty  
 MPF.....maritime prepositioning force

NAI.....named area of interest  
 NAVMC.....Navy and Marine Corps departmental publication  
 NCO.....noncommissioned officer  
 NGF.....naval gunfire  
 NGO.....nongovernmental organization  
 NGLO.....naval gunfire liaison officer  
 NVD.....night vision device

OP.....observation post  
 OPOD.....operation order  
 OPSEC.....operations security  
 ORM.....operational risk management

PCO.....primary control officer  
 PERMA.....planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and action  
 PIR.....priority intelligence requirement  
 PMESII.....political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure

RIP.....relief in place  
 ROE.....rules of engagement

S-1.....personnel officer/personnel office  
 S-2.....intelligence officer/intelligence office  
 S-3.....operations officer/operations office  
 S-4.....logistics officer/logistics office  
 S-6.....communications system officer/communications staff office  
 S-9.....civil affairs officer/civil affairs staff section  
 SACC.....supporting arms coordination center

SAF.....Stability Assessment Framework  
SFCP.....shore fire control party  
SME.....subject matter expert  
SNCO.....staff noncommissioned officer  
SOF.....special operations forces

T&R.....training and readiness  
TACP.....tactical air control party  
TACSOP.....tactical standing operating procedure  
TEEP.....training, exercise, and employment plan  
TEO.....team embarkation officer  
TOA.....transfer of authority  
TTP.....tactics, techniques, and procedures

URP.....unit readiness planning  
US.....United States  
UTM.....unit training management

XO.....executive officer

## Section II: Terms and Definitions

**advance guard**—Detachment sent ahead of the main force to ensure its uninterrupted advance; to protect the main body against surprise; to facilitate the advance by removing obstacles and repairing roads and bridges; and to cover the deployment of the main body if it is committed to action. (DOD Dictionary)

**air assault**—Operations in which air assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support), using the firepower, mobility, and total integration of assault support assets in their ground or air roles, maneuver on the battlefield under the control of the mission commander to provide mobility and firepower of the assigned mission. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**ambush**—A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**approach march**—Advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the enemy is imminent. Troops are fully or partially deployed. The approach march ends when ground contact with the enemy is made or when the attack position is occupied. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**attack**—An offensive action characterized by coordinated movement, supported by fire, conducted to defeat, destroy, or capture the enemy or seize and/or secure key terrain. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**battalion landing team**—In an amphibious operation, an infantry battalion normally reinforced by necessary combat and service elements. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) Also called **BLT**. (DOD Dictionary)

**battle damage assessment**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. Battle damage assessment estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**battle position**—In ground operations, a defensive location oriented on an enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**block**—To deny the enemy access to an area or prevent enemy advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. It may be for a specified time. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (MCRP 1-10.2)

**bounding overwatch**—A movement technique used when contact with enemy forces is expected. The unit moves by bounds. One element is always halted in position to overwatch another element while it moves. The overwatching element is positioned to support the moving unit by fire or fire and movement. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**breach**—To break through or secure a passage through an obstacle. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**breakout**—An operation conducted by an encircled force to regain freedom of movement or contact with friendly units. It differs from other attacks only in that a simultaneous defense in other areas of the perimeter must be maintained. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**bypass**—To maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of advance. Previously unreported obstacles and bypassed enemy forces are reported to higher headquarters. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (MCRP 1-10.2)

**canalize**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) To restrict enemy movement to a narrow zone by the use of existing or reinforcing obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**civil-military operations**—Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO**. (DOD Dictionary)

**clear**—To remove enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**close operations**—Military actions conducted to project power decisively against enemy forces that pose an immediate or near-term threat to the success of current battles or engagements. These military actions are conducted by committed forces and their readily available tactical reserves, using maneuver and combined arms. See also **deep operations**; **rear operations**. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**combat engineering**—Engineering capabilities and activities that directly support the maneuver of land combat forces that require close and integrated support. (DOD Dictionary)

**combat formation**—An ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and describes the general configuration of a unit on the ground. (Proposed for inclusion in MCRP 1-10.2)

**combat service support**—The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of warfare. Also called **CSS**. (DOD Dictionary)

**command and control**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Command and control is one of the six warfighting functions. Also called **C2**. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**commander's critical information requirements**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities

and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decision making. The two subcategories are priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**contain**—To stop, hold, or surround the enemy forces or to cause the enemy to center activity on a given front and to prevent the withdrawal of any part of the enemy's forces for use elsewhere. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**control**—To maintain physical influence by occupation or range of weapon systems over the activities or access in a defined area. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**control point**—A position along a route of march at which men are stationed to give information and instructions for the regulation of supply or traffic. (DOD Dictionary)

**cordon**—To prevent withdrawal from or reinforcement to a position. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**counterattack**—Attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy's purpose in attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**counterintelligence**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**countermobility operations**—The construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy by reinforcement of the terrain. (DOD Dictionary)

**course of action**—A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. (Part 2 of a 3-part definition.) Also called **COA**. (DOD Dictionary)

**cover**—A form of security operation whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (Part 2 of a 4-part definition.) (MCRP 1-10.2)

**decisive action**—Any action the commander deems fundamental to achieving mission success. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**deep operations**—Military actions conducted against enemy capabilities that pose a potential threat to friendly forces. These military actions are designed to isolate, shape, and dominate the battlespace and influence future operations. See also **close operations**; **rear operations**. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**defeat**—To disrupt or nullify the enemy commander’s plan and overcome the will to fight, thus making the enemy commander unwilling or unable to pursue the adopted course of action and yield to the friendly commander’s will. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**defensive operations**—Operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable to offensive and stability operations. The three types of defensive operations are area, mobile, and retrograde. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**delaying operation**—An operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged. (DOD Dictionary)

**demonstration**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Operation designed to divert enemy attention, allowing the forces of a Marine air-ground task force to execute decisive action elsewhere. It is a show of force that threatens an attack at another location but does not make contact with the enemy. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**destroy**—To physically render an enemy force combat ineffective unless it can be reconstituted. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (MCRP 1-10.2)

**direct support**—A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. (DOD Dictionary)

**disengage**—To break contact with the enemy and move to a point where the enemy cannot observe nor engage the unit by direct fire. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**displace**—To leave one position and take another. Forces may be displaced laterally to concentrate combat power in threatened areas. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**disrupt**—To integrate fires and obstacles to break apart an enemy’s formation and tempo, interrupt the enemy’s timetable, or cause premature commitment or the piecemealing of enemy forces. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (MCRP 1-10.2)

**electronic warfare**—Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called **EW**. (DOD Dictionary)

**encirclement**—The loss of freedom of maneuver resulting from enemy control of all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**envelopment**—An offensive maneuver in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy’s rear. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (MCRP 1-10.2)

**exfiltration**—The removal of personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means. (DOD Dictionary)

**feint**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) An offensive action involving contact with the enemy to deceive the enemies about the location or time of the actual main offensive action. Feints are used to cause the enemy to react in three predictable ways: to employ reserves improperly, to shift supporting fires, or to reveal defensive fires. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**fix**—To prevent the enemy from moving any part of the enemy's forces, either from a specific location or for a specific period of time, by holding or surrounding them to prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (MCRP 1-10.2)

**flanking attack**—An offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an enemy. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**frontal attack**—An offensive maneuver in which the main action is directed against the front of the enemy forces. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**guard**—To protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**information management**—The function of managing an organization's information resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that data or a right to that information. Also called **IM** (DOD Dictionary)

**information operations**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The integration, coordination, and synchronization of actions taken to affect a relevant decision maker in order to create an operational advantage for the commander. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**interdict**—To divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**limit of advance**—An easily recognized terrain feature beyond which attacking elements will not advance. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**linkup**—An operation wherein two friendly ground forces join together in a hostile area. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**local security**—Those security elements established in the proximity of a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**main body**—The principal part of a tactical command or formation. It does not include detached elements of the command, such as advance guards, flank guards, and covering forces. (MCRP 1-10.2)



**main effort**—The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power and is directed against a center of gravity through a critical vulnerability. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**maneuver**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy. Maneuver is one of the six warfighting functions. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**measure of effectiveness**—An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called **MOE**. See also **combat assessment; mission**. (DOD Dictionary)

**military deception**—Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called **MILDEC**. (DOD Dictionary)

**military information support operations**—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **MISO**. (DOD Dictionary)

**mobile defense**—Defense of an area or position in which maneuver is used with organization of fire and utilization of terrain to seize the initiative from the enemy. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**noncontiguous area of operations**—An area of operations where one or more of the commander's subordinate forces' area of operations do not share a common boundary. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**occupy**—To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other man-made or natural terrain area without opposition and control the entire area. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**penetrate**—To break through the enemy's defense and disrupt the enemy's defensive system. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**penetration**—A form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**protect**—To prevent observation, engagement, or interference with a force or location. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**pursuit**—An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**raid**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) An attack, usually small scale, involving a penetration of hostile territory for a specific purpose other than

seizing and holding terrain. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**rear area**—That area extending forward from a command's rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the command's subordinate units. This area is provided primarily for the performance of combat service support functions. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**rear operations**—Military actions conducted to support and permit force sustainment and to provide security for such actions. See also **close operations; deep operations**. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**retain**—To occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure it is free of enemy occupation or use. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**retirement**—An operation in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**retrograde**—Any movement or maneuver of a command to the rear, or away from the enemy. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**screen**—A form of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (Part 2 of a 2-part definition.) (MCRP 1-10.2)

**secure**—To gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. The attacking force may or may not have to physically occupy the area. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**seize**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) To clear, occupy, and control a designated area. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**simultaneous activities**—The continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authorities as appropriate to a given mission. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**spoiling attack**—A tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile attack while the enemy is in the process of forming or assembling for an attack. A spoiling attack is usually an offensive action conducted in the defense. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**support by fire**—To engage the enemy by direct fire to support a maneuvering force using overwatch or by establishing a base of fire. The supporting force does not capture enemy forces or terrain. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**supporting effort**—Designated subordinate unit(s) whose mission is designed to directly contribute to the success of the main effort. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**survivability**—(See DOD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The degree to which a system is able to avoid or withstand a manmade hostile environment

without suffering an abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**sustaining actions**—Activities conducted to prepare and support friendly forces (e.g., planning, logistics, force protection) that promote unity of effort and extend operational reach. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**time of attack**—The hour at which the attack is to be launched. If a line of departure is prescribed, it is the hour at which the line is to be crossed by the leading elements of the attack. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**traveling overwatch**—A movement technique used when contact with enemy forces is possible. The lead element and trailing element are separated by a short distance which varies with the terrain. The trailing element moves at variable speeds and may pause for short periods to overwatch the lead element. It keys its movement to terrain and the lead element. The trailing element overwatches at such a distance that, should the enemy engage the lead element, it will not prevent the trailing element from firing or moving to support the lead element. (MCRP 1-10.2)

**turning movement**—A variation of the envelopment in which the attacking force passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives deep in the enemy's rear to force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the threat. (DOD Dictionary)

# REFERENCES

## Department of Defense Publications

MIL-STD-2525\_ Department of Defense Interface Standard: Joint Military Symbology

## Joint Publications (JPs)

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

1	Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
2-01.2	Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in Joint Operations
3-02	Amphibious Operations
3-02.1	Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation
3-07	Stability
3-07.2	Antiterrorism
3-12	Cyberspace Operations
3-13	Information Operations
3-13.1	Electronic Warfare
3-13.3	Operations Security
3-13.4	Military Deception
3-16	Multinational Operations
3-24	Counterinsurgency
3-29	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
3-34	Joint Engineer Operations
3-57	Civil-Military Operations
3-61	Public Affairs
4-02	Joint Health Services

## Navy and Marine Corps Departmental Publications (NAVMCs)

1553.1A	Marine Corps Instructional Systems Design/Systems Approach to Training and Education Handbook
3500.10_	Military Police and Corrections Training and Readiness Manual
3500.44_	Infantry Training and Readiness Manual

## Marine Corps Publications

### Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1-0	Marine Corps Operations
4	Logistics
6	Command and Control

### Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

3-01	Offensive and Defensive Tactics
3-03	Stability Operations
3-31	Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fires
3-32	Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations

3-34	Engineering Operations
3-40	Logistic Operations
5-10	Marine Corps Planning Process
13-10	Seabasing

#### Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs)

3-01B	Air Assault Operations
3-02A	MAGTF Network Engagement Activities
3-03A	Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations
3-10F	Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element
3-30B	Information Management
3-30F	Marine Corps Public Affairs
3-32B	Operations Security (OPSEC)
3-34B	Combined Arms Countermobility Operations
3-34C	Survivability Operations
3-40A	Health Service Support Operations
3-40B	Tactical-Level Logistics
3-40E	Maintenance Operations
3-40F	Transportation Operations
3-40G	Services in an Expeditionary Environment
8-10A	Unit Training Management Guide
8-10B	How to Conduct Training
10-10E	MAGTF Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations
12-10A	Mountain Warfare Operations
12-10B	Urban Operations
12-10C	Jungle Operations
12-10D	Desert Operations
13-10B	Combat Cargo Operations Handbook
13-10C	Unit Embarkation Handbook
13-10D	Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations
13-10E	Ship-to-Shore Movement

#### Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

1-10.2	Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
2-10A.2	Counterintelligence
2-10B.1	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
3-10A.2	Infantry Company Operations
3-10F.1	Fire Support Systems for Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Operations
3-10F.2	Supporting Arms Observer, Spotter, and Controller
3-32.2	Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Military Deception
3-32D.1	Electronic Warfare
10-10E.3	Multi-Service Doctrine for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations

10-10E.5 Multi-Service Reference for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warning and Reporting and Hazard Prediction Procedures

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)

1553.3\_ Unit Training Management (UTM) Program  
3070.2\_ The Marine Corps Operations Security (OPSEC) Program  
3500.27\_ Risk Management

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