

# Infantry Company Operations

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**U.S. Marine Corps**

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# UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

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## FOREWORD

Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-10A.2, *Infantry Company Operations*, is a revision of the previous version, last published in 2014. The publication focuses on capturing best practices from recent operations. Many of these best practices are captured in the command and control, fires, and information chapters. This publication serves as a starting point for understanding the capabilities of the infantry company. It does not address force structure and weapon system changes that are still being tested. This publication serves as the basic reference for infantry company operations and is to be used in conjunction with other Marine Corps publications.

This publication is intended for the infantry platoon and company commanders and their staffs. It is a foundational document that assists in the planning, execution, and assessment of company level operations.

This publication supersedes Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-11.1, *Infantry Company Operations*, dated 6 October 2014, erratum dated 2 May 2016, erratum dated 22 February 2018, and Change 1 dated 4 April 2018.

Reviewed and approved this date.



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# SUMMARY OF CHANGES

- Chapter 1, General, deletes discussion of the conflict continuum and provides information on—
  - The competition continuum.
- Chapter 3, Command and Control, deletes discussion of information management and provides content on—
  - Signature management.
  - System resiliency.
- Chapter 4, Intelligence, adds discussion on targeting and engagement.
- Chapter 5, Information, adds new chapter on information capabilities.
- Chapter 6, Fires, deletes discussion on information operations and provides content on—
  - Synchronizing fires and information capabilities to generate lethal and nonlethal effects.
- Chapter 7, Offense, deletes fundamentals of offensive operations, helicopterborne operations, and tank/infantry operations and provides information on—
  - Air assault operations.
- Chapter 8, Defense, deletes characteristics of the defense, defensive methods, sequence of the defense, and defensive planning considerations for forward operating bases.
- Chapter 11, Stability, deletes discussion of counterinsurgency.
- Appendices, deletes appendices on training management, foreign weapons capabilities, and rules of engagement and force continuum.

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## **Appendices**

- A      Environments
- B      Tactical Tasks

## **Glossary**

## **References and Related Publications**

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# CHAPTER 1

## GENERAL

This publication sets forth the mission, organization, and doctrine for the employment of the Marine infantry company. It is designed primarily to provide tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to assist the company commander and staff in planning combat and other tactical operations.

### COMPETITION CONTINUUM

Marine Corps operating forces require the capability and flexibility to participate in operations and activities that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and intensity, and that occur across a continuum of competition (see Figure 1-1). Inside this competition continuum, Marines act within three broad categories—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. The three states of the competition continuum are not exclusive of each other but can co-exist at the same point in time within the operational environment. The commander uses the continuum to help relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose. Regardless of the type of operation being conducted, Marines combine and integrate capabilities to generate both lethal and nonlethal effects. For further information on the competition continuum see Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-4, *Competing*.



Figure 1-1. Competition Continuum.

### INFANTRY COMPANY EMPLOYMENT

Marine Corps infantry companies execute operations in any operational environment. Infantry companies operate as task-organized forces capable of executing semi-independent actions over sustained periods. These units disperse and distribute forces throughout the battlespace as required to accomplish the mission. For information on specific environments see Appendix A.

## RIFLE COMPANY EMPLOYMENT

The mission of the Marine infantry company is to defeat the enemy by fire, maneuver, and close combat and to conduct other operations as directed across the competition continuum. The rifle company usually operates as a maneuver element of the infantry battalion; although, when appropriately reinforced and augmented, employment to conduct semi-independent actions for various lengths of time is appropriate. The company is the base unit for creating mission-oriented task elements, which are employable across the competition continuum, through the attachment of command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting (C5ISRT); combat support (CS); and logistics combat elements (LCEs).

While variables, such as a rifle company's leadership, morale, state of readiness, and level of training, carry weight in decisions on how to employ a specific unit at any time, the following capabilities apply to all rifle companies:

- Conduct day and night offensive and defensive operations in all types of environments.
- Conduct combined arms action across the competition continuum.
- Conduct semi-independent, noncontiguous, and distributed actions.
- Conduct small unit operations that integrate maneuver, fires, and information capabilities.
- Operate in conjunction with the joint force, Services, agencies, and special operations forces.
- Participate in expeditionary operations.
- Provide forward C5ISRT and counter-C5ISRT capability.
- Contribute to maritime domain awareness.
- Conduct irregular warfare.

Tasks of the rifle company often include—


- Seize, secure, occupy, and retain key terrain.
- Defeat, destroy, neutralize, suppress, interdict, disrupt, block, canalize, and fix enemy forces.
- Breach enemy obstacles with reinforcements.
- Feint and demonstrate to deceive the enemy.
- Reconnoiter, deny, bypass, clear, contain, and isolate (these tasks may be oriented on both terrain and enemy).
- Screen and guard friendly units.

The rifle company is limited in that it often operates with—

- Austere combat logistic assets.
- Austere C5ISRT assets in a degraded and denied environment.
- Limited vehicle mobility.
- Limited antiarmor capability.

## Rifle Company Organization

The rifle company serves as one of three rifle companies in each infantry battalion. The company is organized in a triangular design around three maneuver elements and one fire support unit. The activities of the subordinate units are controlled and coordinated by a company headquarters (see Figure 1-2).



Legend:

NCO – noncommissioned officer

**Figure 1-2. Baseline Marine Rifle Company.**

Within each rifle company are three rifle platoons. The rifle platoon is the basic maneuver element for the rifle company and its characteristics are essentially the same as the company. The platoon has the same triangular structure built around three squads and each squad is built around three fire teams (see Figure 1-3).



**Figure 1-3. Baseline Marine Rifle Platoon.**

Within each rifle company is one weapons platoon. The weapons platoon is a fire support unit for the rifle company. It provides the company with organic machine gun and mortar capabilities. Its organization and equipment permit maximum flexibility, control, and ease of employment in support of the rifle platoons. Each weapons platoon contains one 60 mm mortar section and one medium machine gun section (see Figure 1-4).




Figure 1-4. Baseline Weapons Platoon.

## **Duties of Key Personnel**

Rifle company key personnel include the company commander, executive officer (XO), first sergeant, gunnery sergeant, fire support team (FST) leader, operations chief, logistic noncommissioned officer (NCO), intelligence specialist, and administrative clerk.

The company commander—

- Is responsible for everything the company does or fails to do.
- Is responsible for the employment, training, combat efficiency, discipline, morale, administration, welfare, maintenance, and sustainment of the company.
- Is responsible for the formal military education and training of every Marine in the unit, which includes advanced military occupational specialty (MOS) schools within the infantry training continuum.
- Is responsible for the integration and synchronization of the warfighting functions across the competition continuum.
- Is responsible for the company's training and provides the training guidance.
- Knows and understands organic and nonorganic capabilities and how to employ them to generate lethal and nonlethal effects that support the commander's desired end state.
- Knows, understands, and develops situational awareness across air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space domains, which includes the electromagnetic environment.

The company XO—

- Serves as the company's second in command and is responsible for maintaining situational awareness of the company's tactical situation during combat.
- Assumes command in the company commander's absence.
- Assumes the duties of the company FST leader when necessary or as directed.
- May be assigned to aid in control of phases of a battle (such as a passage of lines or counterattack) and is prepared to assume tactical duties (such as landing zone [LZ] control officer or detachment or element leader).
- Plans and supervises the company's combat service support (CSS) planning, requirements, and execution to include coordination with higher or other support agencies.
- Supervises company preparations to execute training or combat missions in support of the company commander's plans and goals.
- Supervises all aspects of unit training management (UTM) in support of the company commander's training plan and guidance.
- Knows and understands organic and nonorganic capabilities and how to employ them to generate lethal and nonlethal effects that support the commander's desired end state.
- Is prepared to supervise a combat operations center (COC) to include the management, collation, and processing of information; receipt and forwarding of tactical reports; and communications with higher and adjacent units.



#### The company first sergeant—

- Serves as the senior enlisted Marine in the company and as the principal enlisted administrative advisor to the company commander.
- Supervises, inspects, or observes matters designated by the commander. (i.e., liberty safety brief, ceremonies, garrison inspections, company and administrative boards)
- Executes and supervises routine procedures to include, enforcing the standing operating procedures (SOPs); maintaining accountability of all personnel; coordinating and reporting personnel and administrative actions; and supervising discipline, field hygiene, and medical evacuation operations.

#### The company gunnery sergeant—

- Serves as the senior enlisted technical and tactical advisor to the company commander, platoon commanders, and platoon sergeants.
- Assists the commander in the integration and synchronization of the warfighting functions across the competition continuum.
- Knows, understands, and develops situational awareness across air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space domains, which includes the electromagnetic environment.
- Serves as the company training and education chief.
- Assists in supervising all aspects of UTM in support of the company commander's training plan and guidance.
- Coordinates training, operations, and logistical support requirements for the company.
- Assists the commander in conducting risk management.
- Coordinates and supervises the embarkation and debarkation plans.
- Supervises the setup, function, and displacement of the COC, as well as other functional areas as directed.
- Knows and understands company organic and nonorganic capabilities and how to employ them to generate lethal and nonlethal effects that support the commander's desired end state.
- Supervises the flow of information and dissemination within the COC provided by available C5ISRT systems, to include employment, sustainment, qualification, and licensing.
- Assists the commander in the discipline, appearance, training, control, conduct, and welfare of the company.

#### The FST leader—

- Serves as the company commander's FST leader and fire support coordinator (FSC) when applicable and advises the company commander on the capabilities and limitations of fire support assets.
- Plans and executes the company's fire support plan in support of the company commander's concept of operations (CONOPS) and guidance, coordinates the plan with the battalion FSC, and ensures the proper integration of all available fire support assets.

- Ensures all aspects of essential fire support tasks (EFSTs) are applied during planning and execution.
- Briefs the fire support plan during the operation order (OPORD).
- Integrates platoon targets into the company fire support plan and forwards the plan to battalion.
- Integrates information capabilities into the company OPORD.

The operations chief—

- Assists in the setup, function, and displacement of the COC, as well as other functional areas as directed.
- Manages the flow of information provided by available C5ISRT systems and supervises the control, dissemination, and destruction of classified information within the COC.
- Supervises the company's operations section, logistics NCO, intelligence specialist, and administrative clerk in ensuring all required reports are accurate and submitted in a timely manner.
- Ensures the proficiency of the personnel assigned to the COC and the enforcement of COC standing operating procedures.
- Executes and supervises routine operations to include enforcing the tactical SOPs; maintaining accountability of all personnel; coordinating and reporting personnel and administrative actions; and medical evacuation operations.

The logistics NCO—

- Assists in the development of logistic plans that support the company commander's CONOPS and employment.
- Develops the company embarkation and debarkation plan and supervises during execution.
- Executes tactical logistics for the company to include the coordination of CSS activities necessary for mission accomplishment. These activities include supply and maintenance, coordination of transportation resources and employment, embarkation, general engineering support, and general services support.
- Conducts and executes training on automated information systems that support logistics command and control and in-transit visibility, expeditionary energy systems, and water filtration and purification systems.
- Performs all physical requirements associated with serving in an infantry company.

The intelligence specialist—

- Supervises the company level intelligence cell (CLIC) and assigned personnel and serves as the senior intelligence expert in the company COC.
- Supports the creation of the company's intelligence plan, oversees its execution, and supervises the collection management process and the dissemination of battalion priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and company-specific orders or requests.

- Supports the company's intelligence collection plan by seeking organic and nonorganic support, communicating and coordinating with higher, adjacent, and supporting units, and requesting products and support from the battalion intelligence section.
- Produces and supervises the production of various intelligence products to include briefs, maps, targeting information, and imagery.
- Supervises enemy prisoner of war (EPW) and detainee tracking to process, disseminate, and exploit information gained through tactical questioning, document exploitation, and other means.
- Assists in the enforcement of active and passive operational security measures.
- Supports the company's operational planning.
- Performs all physical requirements associated with serving in an infantry company.

The administrative clerk—

- In conjunction with the company first sergeant, executes all company-related administrative matters to include naval correspondence, administrative action forms, promotion- and pay-related issues, performance evaluations, and re-enlistments.
- Maintains and updates related unit readiness statistics and databases and executes morning report, personnel management, and casualty tracking.
- Serves as company legal representative, executing necessary duties associated with nonjudicial punishment, unit punishment book, and punitive and nonpunitive correspondence.
- Conducts necessary coordination with battalion and other personnel administration centers as required.
- Is prepared to serve in the company COC, conduct headquarters security, and can perform all physical requirements associated with serving in an infantry company.

### **Attachments and Enablers**

The rifle company will usually require attachments from the battalion's weapon company and headquarters and service company to accomplish assigned tasks. Beyond this augmentation, the company commander should expect to incorporate and combine organic skill sets with special enablers from units external to the battalion. The commander must expect to encounter elements beyond their control, such as special operations forces in the battlespace. There are other expectations from the battalion and from outside and within the company.

Expectations from the battalion include—

- An 81 mm mortar forward observer from the weapons company.
- A radio operator from the battalion communications platoon.
- An intelligence specialist from the battalion's intelligence section.
- Corpsmen from the battalion aid station (BAS).
- A tactical air control party from the battalion's operations section.

Expectations from external sources include—

- An artillery observer and scout.
- A naval gunfire liaison team.
- Combat engineers.
- Civil affairs team.
- Tactical psychological operations team.

Expectations from within the company could include—

- Any additional Marines necessary to augment the intelligence specialist in staffing a CLIC.
- Any additional personnel necessary to augment the company headquarters' Marines executing operations and communications functions in the company COC.
- Combat logistic support skills, such as ammunition drivers, armory custodians, and animal packers (e.g., for donkeys, mules, or horses).
- Several Marines per company with appropriate environmental supporting skills, such as mountain or jungle warfare specialists.

## **WEAPONS COMPANY EMPLOYMENT**

The weapons company provides basic, organic fire support and other capabilities for the infantry battalion. The equipment and structure of the company allows infantry battalions additional heavy weapons and firepower, mobility, and augmented communications. Battalions may use these capabilities to provide support for its maneuver elements, may use the weapons company as a foundation for the creation of task-organized elements to accomplish assigned missions, or may use a combination of these methods.

The mission of a weapons company is to provide medium mortar support, antiarmor support, heavy machine gun (HMG) support, and fire support coordination in order to support the infantry battalion's scheme of maneuver. When employed differently, such as a fourth maneuver element within the battalion, the weapons company (an infantry company by basic definition) defers to the infantry company mission. The weapons company is uniquely equipped with heavy weapons to support the maneuver of the rifle companies and task organized elements within the battalion. The heavy weapons, fire control capabilities, and communications assets contained in the weapons company include a mix that can be tailored to the mission based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T) and, when applicable, civilian considerations.

The versatility of the weapons company as part of the infantry battalion also makes it well suited to employ against asymmetrical threats across the competition continuum. During tactical operations, heavy weapons units can suppress, fix, or destroy the enemy at long ranges, allowing other infantry units or combined arms teams to maneuver to a position of advantage.

While variables, such as a weapons company's leadership, morale, state of readiness, and level of training, carry weight in decisions on how to employ a specific unit, the following capabilities and special considerations apply to weapons companies supporting the battalion as designed. Weapons companies employed as maneuver elements or in other combinations should reference rifle company employment, discussed earlier in this chapter, for additional capabilities. The general capabilities of a weapons company are:

- Conduct rapid movement on the battlefield to shift combat power to where it is needed.
- Provide a flexible task-organization and configuration to support battalion operations.
- Support the battalion's scheme of maneuver (SOM) with massed supporting fires.
- Conduct day and night offensive and defensive operations in all types of environments.
- Conduct combined arms operations across the competition continuum.
- Conduct semi-independent, noncontiguous, and distributed actions.
- Operate in conjunction with the joint force, Services, agencies, and special operations forces.
- Participate in expeditionary operations.
- Conduct limited self-sustainment and maintenance.
- Provide forward C5ISRT and counter-C5ISRT capability.
- Contribute to maritime domain awareness.
- Coordinate and synchronize information capabilities.
- Conduct irregular warfare.

The weapons company's tactical capabilities are:


- Destroy enemy armored vehicles and fortifications.
- Suppress or destroy enemy personnel.
- Disrupt, destroy, and suppress enemy positions, units, and air defense.
- Coordinate, mass, and shift long-range direct fires.
- Integrate indirect and aerial fires with the unit's direct fire plan.

The weapons company's limitations include—

- Austere C5ISRT assets in a degraded and denied communications environment.
- Limited antiarmor capability.
- Limited decontamination capabilities.
- Increased logistical fuel and maintenance requirements.


## Weapons Company Organization

The weapons company is the basic, organic direct and indirect fire support for the infantry battalion. The company consists of one 81 mm mortar platoon, one antiarmor platoon, and one HMG platoon. This organization allows for maximum flexibility in providing support to the maneuver units of the battalion or task-organizing the company to accomplish assigned tasks. Depending on employment decisions made by the battalion commander, the weapons company may receive the battalion's sniper platoon or may receive the mission to train them. Usually, the weapons company provides support to the infantry companies according to direction and tasks received from the battalion operations officer via guidance from the battalion commander (see Figure 1-5).




**Figure 1-5. Baseline Weapons Company.**

Within the weapons company is one 81 mm mortar platoon. The 81mm mortar platoon provides the basic, organic indirect fire support for the battalion. The platoon can operate mounted or dismounted, as a massed platoon, or as two independent sections. Regardless of its configuration, the battalion generally employs the platoon vice the platoon's attachment to the rifle companies (see Figure 1-6).



**Figure 1-6. Baseline 81 mm Mortar Platoon.**


Within the weapons company is one HMG platoon. The HMG platoon provides heavy caliber direct and grenade launcher machine gun fire for the battalion. The platoon can operate mounted or dismounted, as a massed platoon, or as independent squads. The battalion's rifle companies may receive portions of the HMG platoon as attachments. The HMG platoon also serves as the base for creating maneuver elements, such as combined antiarmor teams (CAATs) (see Figure 1-7).



**Figure 1-7. Baseline Heavy Machine Gun Platoon.**



Within the weapons company is one antiarmor platoon. The antiarmor platoon provides heavy caliber, long-range, antiarmor fires for the battalion. The platoon can operate mounted or dismounted, as a massed platoon, or as independent sections. The battalion's rifle companies may receive portions of the antiarmor platoon as attachments. The antiarmor platoon may also combine with the HMG platoon to create maneuver elements, such as a CAAT (see Figure 1-8).




**Figure 1-8. Baseline Antiarmor Platoon.**

## Alternate Weapons Company Organization

As a result of battalion problem framing, battalion commanders frequently use the versatility of their weapons companies by making semi-permanent changes to the company organization that best support the most likely method of employment. In general, these methods either create maneuver CAAT platoons that maintain some form of indirect fire capability or they create a pure, fourth maneuver company (mobile assault company).

**Combined Antiarmor Team.** The CAAT platoon is created by combining elements and equipment from the HMG and antiarmor platoons. From the threat analysis, these platoons may have a balance of machine guns and antiarmor weapon systems, may be differently weighted in “heavy” and “light” configurations, or may possess no antiarmor systems whatsoever. Another variation is the weapons mix of machine guns and grenade launchers within each platoon. Decisions reached during problem framing should determine the exact structure of the platoons. Figure 1-9 represents an evenly weighted CAAT platoon.



**Figure 1-9. Baseline Combined Antiarmor Team Platoon.**

## Weapons Company Key Personnel

Weapons company key personnel include the company commander, XO, first sergeant, and operations chief.

The company commander—

- Is responsible for everything the company does or fails to do.
- Serves as the battalion FSC and is responsible for the planning, coordination, and deconfliction of fires in support of the battalion’s scheme of maneuver.

- Is responsible for the employment, training, combat efficiency, discipline, morale, administration, welfare, maintenance, and sustainment of the company.
- Is responsible for the formal military education of every Marine in the unit, which includes advanced MOS schools within the infantry training continuum.
- Is responsible for the integration and synchronization of the warfighting functions across the competition continuum.
- Is responsible for the company's training and provides the training guidance.
- Knows and understands organic and nonorganic capabilities and how to employ them to generate lethal and nonlethal effects that support the commander's desired end state.
- Knows, understands, and develops situational awareness across air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space domains, which includes the electromagnetic environment.
- Is responsible for training company FSTs and their proper integration into battalion fire support SOPs.

#### The XO—

- Serves as the company's second in command and is responsible for maintaining situational awareness of the company's tactical situation during combat.
- Assumes command in the company commander's absence.
- Serves as the battalion assistant FSC responsible for the planning, coordination, and deconfliction of supporting arms in support of the battalion's SOM.
- Plans and supervises the company's CSS planning, requirements, and execution, including coordination with higher or other support agencies.
- Supervises company preparations to execute training or combat missions in support of the company commander's plans and goals.
- Supervises all aspects of UTM in support of the company commander's training plan and guidance.
- Knows and understands organic and nonorganic capabilities and how to employ them to generate lethal and nonlethal effects that support the commander's desired end state.
- Is prepared to supervise a COC to include the management, collation, and processing of information; receipt and forwarding of tactical reports; and maintenance of communications with higher and adjacent units.

#### The first sergeant—

- Serves as the senior enlisted Marine in the company and as the principal enlisted administrative advisor to the company commander.
- Supervises, inspects, or observes matters designated by the commander (i.e., liberty safety brief, ceremonies, garrison inspections, company and administrative boards).
- Executes and supervises routine procedures to include enforcing the SOPs; maintaining accountability of all personnel; coordinating and reporting personnel and administrative actions; and supervising discipline, field hygiene, and medical evacuation operations.

The operations chief—

- Serves as the senior enlisted technical and tactical advisor to the company commander, platoon commanders, and platoon sergeants.
- Assists the commander in the integration and synchronization of the warfighting functions across the competition continuum.
- Knows, understands, and develops situational awareness across air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and space domains, which includes the electromagnetic environment.
- Serves as the company training and education chief.
- Assists in supervising all aspects of UTM in support of the company commander's training plan and guidance.
- Coordinates training, operations, and logistical support requirements for the company.
- Assists the commander in the discipline, appearance, training, control, conduct, and welfare of the company.
- Assists the commander in conducting ORM.
- Coordinates and supervises the setup, function, and displacement of the battalion fire support coordination center (FSCC) as well as other functional areas as directed.
- Supervises the flow of information and dissemination within the FSCC provided by available C5ISRT systems.
- Coordinates and supervises the embarkation and debarkation plans.
- Knows and understands organic and nonorganic capabilities and how to employ them to generate lethal and nonlethal effects that support the commander's desired end state.

# CHAPTER 2

## PLANNING

“Planning involves projecting our thoughts forward in time and space to influence events *before* they occur rather than merely responding to events as they occur. This means contemplating and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance.” (MCDP 5, *Planning*)

### PLANNING FUNDAMENTALS

The key component of company leadership is the ability to make a decision and guide subordinates through the execution of that decision. Planning is simply anticipatory decision making and occurs whether a decision needs to be made in 30 seconds or if considering a unit’s actions six months from now. The planning horizon is how far ahead the planning begins. Different types of problems and different planning horizons often require different planning tools.

Planning serves the commander; the commander isn’t governed by the planning process. With this understanding, company commanders must have the maturity and discipline to modify the planning tools appropriately. Planning processes should neither be abbreviated when thoughtful detail is required, nor rigidly adhered to when expediency is more appropriate.

#### The Value of Planning

The value of planning occurs within the context of two important considerations: first, planning keeps infantry companies oriented on the future instead of remaining reactive; second, by planning in the present, infantry companies can shape a better future. While it is true that extremes exist, such as good planning resulting in failure or no planning at all resulting in success, these extremes are exceptions. Analytical planning today can enable intuitive planning tomorrow. All activities, from the execution of combat operations to the assessment of training, benefit from some planning. Determining the amount of planning necessary—given mission, time, and resources—constitutes the value and art of the planning process.

Planning is often the essential element in seizing the initiative. Planning helps maneuver and supporting elements properly identify opportunity within the context of the overall mission. It does not produce a script that commanders must follow; rather, the process helps commanders anticipate the range of possibilities, prepare for them, and facilitate execution.

Planning decreases the time between decision and action, especially at higher levels of command—the further removed the decision maker is from the battlefield, the longer it takes a decision to result in action. By starting with a shared vision of future actions, possible reactions, and likely risks, the wait time for action is shorter, which keeps friendly tempo faster than that of the enemy.

Planning becomes increasingly critical as situations increase in complexity. The planning required to offload a company on a dock for further actions ashore is radically different from the planning required to land that same company ashore by amphibious assault. Planning builds shared situational awareness among the company's leaders. By synchronizing everyone's view of the problem and the operational environment, subordinates can take greater initiative with an assurance that they are in line with the commander's vision and end state.

## **Decision Making Methods**

There are two main decision-making methods—intuitive and analytical. Racing to out-cycle the enemy or reacting to a developing situation often leads decision makers to favor the intuitive solution. Such solutions can lead to victory or create setbacks, depending on a company commander's level of understanding of the operational environment and the nature of the problem. Intuitive and analytical decision making are necessary and complementary.

**EXAMPLE:** A person driving might intuitively decide to change lanes when someone pulls out in front of them (because they have experience driving). However, intuitive decision making is not sufficient to help plan a trip across the state. Analytical tools would aid in determining such things as route, obstacles to traffic, or the limitations of the vehicle. Once on the road, however, the driver could intuitively change the route to bypass slow traffic because studying the map provided the experience needed to aid that decision.

***Intuitive Decision Making.*** Since intuitive decision making involves the use of experience and instinct to solve a problem, there are few intuitive planning tools. Success with this method relies upon extensive user experience with the problem at hand and the operational environment in which it occurs. Preparation includes actual experience with the conditions and issues as well as training, practice, reading, and discussion. A solid foundation, robust mental model, and intellectual frame of reference are the basics for intuitive decision making.

***Analytical Decision Making.*** Most planning tools are associated with the other method of decision making—an analytical model. These tools artificially design a mental model that leads a decision maker to a solution by creating the necessary understanding of the problem and environment. An analytical model helps manage and organize information when the decision maker faces overwhelming data, is not familiar with the problem, or is trying to synchronize multiple actions and groups.

## **Planning and Command and Control**

Planning is a part of command and control. Both planning and command and control focus on determining what needs to occur and ensuring that the necessary actions happen to attain the desired end state. Further, both begin with a central figure, the commander, with whom the functions of planning and control are inherent responsibilities of command. Through the commanders planning guidance and intent, the commander guides the planning process and supervises the execution.

A fundamental challenge to command and control is coping with time and uncertainty. Given enough time to plan and gather information, commanders can reduce, though never eliminate, uncertainty. Conversely, given enough certainty, commanders can more efficiently use time during execution. However, rare is the situation in which commanders possess the time and


certainty they would like. For company commanders, waiting for certainty results in loss of tempo and initiative. They can never achieve absolute certainty because the enemy is already doing something else. Planning must be the means to balance time and uncertainty by anticipating decisions and actions. Planning builds understanding across the warfighting functions and supports a commander's ability to make effective decision amid uncertainty.

## **MARINE CORPS PLANNING PROCESS AND OTHER PLANNING TOOLS**

The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) supports the decision making of commanders. This flexible process enables units and commands at every level to realize the inherent value of planning, use uniformly understood terms and procedures across the force, convey decisions to subordinates in recognizable and usable formats, and complement joint and crisis action planning. The MCP enables commanders to execute maneuver warfare, gain and maintain the initiative, compress the time between decision and execution, and balance time and uncertainty.

The six-step process begins with problem framing and ends with a transition of the plan from planning to execution. It is a planning process, an approach to decision making. At its most basic level, the MCP determines what must occur to achieve success, why it must occur, and what resources are available; develops potential options; weighs the pros and cons of those options; makes a choice; and enables execution.

While Figure 2-1 indicates a process that commanders and planners can follow sequentially, many of the steps can and should occur simultaneously. For example, although the actual written order for an operation begins with problem framing, it develops continuously throughout the MCP. For more information see Marine Corps warfighting publication (MCWP) 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*.



**Figure 2-1. Marine Corps Planning Process.**

### **Modification of the MCPP**

Company commanders must understand the operational environment and the planning process and have the maturity to make proper decisions about how to use the process. Time is a valuable resource, and the company commander must adjust their use of the MCPP to protect that resource. The MCPP can be detailed or abbreviated as necessary, based upon resources, time, experience, and the situation. It complements both deliberate and crisis action planning. Company commanders must know and understand the basics of the MCPP before omitting, skipping, or otherwise modifying the process.

### **Other Planning Tools**

There are a host of other planning tools available, but some common ones discussed in the Marine Corps are the rapid response planning process, systemic operational design, and the Army's military decision making process. Each has strengths and weaknesses, as does the MCPP, but the MCPP provides a good balance between two elements that often compete—creativity and planning efficiency. Company commanders must decide where to focus the planning effort, and should consider the following:

- Task assigned.
- Time available.
- Experience level with this type of problem.
- Need for creativity.
- Efficiency needed to keep planners and executors on track as the plan is developed, disseminated, and executed.



- Access to resources for planning and execution.
- Familiarity of leaders with the planning tools.

### **Operational Planning Team**

As company commanders work to understand and find solutions to a problem, they can enlist the aid of other members of the company grouped into an operational planning team (OPT). An OPT can consist of a quick, small huddle of the company's XO, first sergeant, company gunnery sergeant, and the commander, or a more deliberate meeting of all of the company's leadership. Much like the other tools used in planning, the commander's determination of the size of the OPT depends on experience and the time available.

## **PLANNING EXECUTION**

### **Problem Framing**

The purpose of problem framing is to enhance understanding of the operational environment and the nature of the problem while identifying what the company must accomplish and when, where, and why it must be done. These basics are required to proceed with planning. The process should surface the best ideas for execution (see Figure 2-2). Problem framing is the most important step of the MCPP because no amount of effort or energy later on will help the infantry company solve a problem improperly understood. Using a design framework established by a company commander's planning guidance, intent, and concept, the company seeks to analyze and answer the following questions:

- What must the company accomplish? When?
- Where? Why?
- What resources does the company need?
- What resources does the company lack?
- What information does the company need to disseminate?

**Injects.** The primary inject for the company is the higher headquarters (HHQ) order. When the infantry company is using a staff planning construct, the next most important inject is the company commander's initial intent and planning guidance. Other injects into problem framing include an initial understanding of the situation as informed by time available, the HHQs intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), status checks of company resources, capabilities and limitations, and any changes to command relationships.

**Activities.** After receiving initial injects, company commanders and the staff begin design activities that are focused on understanding the operational environment and the nature of the problem. These activities include—

- Completing the IPB process (see Chapter 4).
- Developing intelligence requirements (IRs): What bridges can I use? Who is the local leader in the objective area?
- Compiling facts (such as the status of units and enablers available) and requests for information.

- Clarifying assumptions; for example, the river is fordable.
- Understanding the interconnected networks and systems that comprise the area of operations (e.g., human, communications, social).
- Understanding limitations, such as the rules of engagement (ROE), no-fire areas, and the requirement to coordinate with locals.
- Understanding risk to the force and mission, such as enemy indirect fire capability or the inability to clear a support by fire (SBF) position prior to the assault.
- Using red and green cells as able and if appropriate.
- Understanding shortfalls, such as the lack of sufficient assault amphibious vehicles (AAVs) to lift the whole company.
- Analyzing specified, implied, and essential tasks.
- Analyzing centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities.

**Results.** The following five decisions, guidance, and products come from problem framing and they allow planning to continue, subunit planning to commence, and mission preparations to begin:

**Problem Framing Brief.** Company planners present a framing brief to the company commander to ensure shared situational awareness among the staff and to receive the commander's approval of completed products, such as IPB, staff estimates, assumptions, and limitations.


**Restated Company Mission Statement.** A restated company mission statement is based on task and center of gravity and critical vulnerability analysis. This statement also serves as the baseline for development of the warning order (WARNORD), OPOD, and fragmentary order (FRAGOs).

**Commander's Intent and Further Planning Guidance.** Commander's intent is the commander's personal vision of the problem. It must be clear, concise, and easily understood two levels down. It should include an end state or commentary on conditions that, when satisfied, accomplish the purpose. Proper commander's intent enables subordinates to understand the larger context of the commander's actions and guides the subordinates in the absence of orders. It allows company personnel to exercise judgment and initiative in a way that remains consistent with and furthers their commander's mission when the unforeseen occurs. This freedom of action, within the framework of commander's intent, creates tempo during planning and execution. Company commanders approve and disseminate their refined intent for the mission and provide course of action (COA) development and other guidance to the staff for planning. When possible, commanders personally provide this intent and guidance to the entire staff to focus planning efforts.

**Company WARNORD.** Information regarding planning orders can be found in MCWP 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*.

**Intelligence Collection Plan.** The intelligence collection plan seeks to meet the IRs determined during problem framing. A rough collection matrix helps organize this effort, as does prioritization of IRs into commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and PIRs. The

reconnaissance plan is a subset of the overall intelligence collection plan that can involve many different sensor platforms and information sources.



#### Legend

COG center of gravity

CSNE commander's significant notification events

RFI request for information

**Figure 2-2. Problem Framing Process.**

### Course of Action Development

Problem framing answers the questions regarding what must be done, why it must be done, what is the operational environment in which it must be done, and what is available with which to do it; COA development answers questions regarding *how* to do it. The centerpiece of making a decision, COA development occurs when the company commander transitions from understanding the problem to solving the problem (see Figure 2-3). The company commander should develop more than one option for accomplishing the mission during COA development. These do not have to be fully developed COAs if there are severe time constraints, however thinking through multiple options to accomplish the mission will enhance decision making during execution.

**Injects.** Injects for COA development consists of the results of problem framing, products that contribute to the enhanced understanding of the operational environment and the nature of the problem, the restated company mission statement, and the initial array of forces and resources.

**Activities.** Company commanders rely upon their understanding of the operational environment and problem, their training, and their knowledge of the company and the level of threat to develop an idea about how to accomplish the mission. They build the idea into an actual COA that is feasible (can be accomplished by the resources available), complete (makes use of all resources available across all warfighting functions), and acceptable (accomplishes assigned tasks within acceptable risk and minimum expenditure of resources). As they do so, they develop—

- Objectives.
- Task organization, including command relationships.
- Schemes of maneuver, including form of maneuver.
- Tasks and purposes for subordinates and supporting organizations.
- Tactical and fire support coordination measures (FSCMs).
- Timelines.
- Coordinating instructions that synchronize but do not unnecessarily restrict initiative.

**Results.** Upon completing COA development, company planners generate products that narrow the focus of the planning effort, continue to build the OPORD and associated products, allow for resolution of resource shortfalls to begin, and refine the simultaneous preparation and work of subunits and company leadership. These products include a concept of operation, concept of support, synchronization matrix, and fire support execution matrix.

Concept of operation, which includes—

- Updated mission statement.
- Assigned objectives.
- COA graphic.
- COA narrative (translates into the CONOPS portion of the execution paragraph in the OPORD).
- Task organization (including command relationships).
- Tasks to subordinates and supporting organizations.
- Tactical coordination measures and FSCMs.
- Coordinating instructions list, including a timeline or events list.

Concept of support, which includes—


- Command and control (translates into command and signal paragraph in the OPORD).
- Fires (translates into the fire support portion of the execution paragraph in the OPORD).
- Administration (translates into a portion of the administration and logistics paragraph in the OPORD).
- Logistics, including medical plans (translates into a portion of the administration and logistics paragraph in the OPORD).
- Intelligence collections plan (translates into tasks to subordinates and requests to HHQ).
- Information (translates into tasks to subordinates and requests to HHQ).

Synchronization matrix, which includes—

- Displaying all the concepts of support and operations items in an easily understandable format. The matrix helps to ensure that all work is completed in unison.

Fire support execution matrix, which includes—

- Displaying the details of the fire support plan. When possible, fire support tasks are integrated into the synchronization matrix.



#### Legend

COG center of gravity  
 CSNE commander's significant notification events  
 RFI request for information

**Figure 2-3. Course of Action Development Process.**

### Course of Action War Game

After deciding on a COA, the company's leaders need to take a critical look at their understanding of the operational environment and solution to the problem to identify gaps in the plan, discover potentially missed opportunities, and fix synchronization issues among warfighting functions and units involved in the operation. The overall purpose is to remain externally focused, that is, focused on the problem. Additionally, wargaming improves common understanding of the problem and assigned tasks through an interactive refinement process. While battalions and HHQs conduct formal processes to accomplish wargaming, available time and resources make such processes rarely used at the company level. Usually, wargaming at the

company level includes asking “what if” or asking other company and platoon leaders to review and backbrief their understanding of the plan (see Figure 2-4). The COAs, if more than one, are updated and improved by resolving identified discrepancies and issues.

**Injects.** The COA war game activity begins with the concepts of operations and support, the synchronization matrix, and a graphical depiction of the area of operations (AO).

**Activities.** The wargaming activity at the company level is informal and focuses on ensuring that the COAs are understandable and effective, accomplishes the mission, and makes sense. The enemy, mission, branch plans, sequel plans, and friendly ability should be considered.

In COA war game, the key consideration is the enemy’s actions and reactions to the friendly plan. This methodology applies to stability operations as well, during which the actions and reactions of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host nation partners, civilians, weather, and other factors are key considerations to the company plan.

Critically, wargaming verifies which COA solves the problem and accomplishes the mission within HHQ intent and specified limitations. It also verifies which COA makes tactical sense within the principles of war and warfighting functions. Wargaming should also highlight possible impacts of the COAs on HHQ and on adjacent friendly, coalition, and host-nation security forces (HNSF). If enough time is available, wargaming should also provide the foundation for development of branch and sequel plans.


Branch plans refer to possibilities or contingencies that change the mission, scheme of maneuver, or orientation of the company based on events. Since they are preplanned, the company possesses a better chance of success when encountering difficulty executing the CONOPS. For example, if time is available, company planners might fully plan the actions required to use the secondary or even tertiary avenues of approach.

Sequel plans refer to actions that follow the end of the current operation. If time is available, company planners may preplan exploitation and pursuit, or a defense on the objective area.

Wargaming should reveal weaknesses in the internal understanding or the ability to execute the COAs. It should ensure that subordinate units and leadership receive the greatest latitude possible to accomplish their mission. The following questions should be answered:

- Did the company use all elements of available combat power to its best advantage?
- Did the company plan for redundancy of capability or does the success of the plan rest on a single point of failure?
- Is the scheme of maneuver understandable?
- What are likely mistakes that the company might make? Are mitigation measures in place?

**Results.** Course of action war game produces an execution checklist, a decision support matrix, revisions to the CONOPS and support, and revisions to the synchronization and fire support matrices.




### Legend

COG center of gravity  
 DSM decision support matrix  
 DST decision support template  
 RCPA relative combat power assessment

**Figure 2-4. Course of Action War Game Process.**

### Course of Action Comparison and Decision

If the commander developed more than one option, the commander uses COA comparison and decision to select the COA that will be executed (see Figure 2-5). During COA comparison and decision, the company commander reviews the advantages and disadvantages of each COA. The commander decides how to accomplish the mission, either by approving a COA as planned or by combining what has been learned into a new COA that may need further refinement.



### Legend

DSM decision support matrix  
DST decision support template

**Figure 2-5. Course of Action Comparison and Decision Process.**

## Orders Development

The orders development step involves articulating and disseminating the plan so that all units understand the commander's vision and how to achieve it (see Figure 2-6). Using the tools and activities listed previously should result in the order being 80 percent complete as the company leadership reaches this step. Instructions must be communicated in a standard, recognizable, clear, and simple format. Orders production is not for those who *write* them; rather, those who *produce* the orders must condense everything done in planning and convert it into plain language for all to understand. The order is the most widely distributed document in the planning process, so it must be simple and clear. There are many ways to package and distribute a plan, such as through a verbal or written OPORD, a FRAGO, a CONOPS briefing, or matrix orders. The format and dissemination means are determined by—

- Time available.
- Personalities of the company's leaders.
- Experience, training, and knowledge levels of the company's leaders.
- Available resources.
- Complexity of the operation.
- Numbers and types of organizations/units that are being coordinated.

**Injects.** The orders development activity uses the COA wargaming results by incorporating the execution checklist, revised concepts of operations and support, and the revised synchronization and fire support execution matrices into the OPORD.

**Activities.** Company commanders determine the format and method they will use to produce, brief, and disseminate the OPORD. They refine the situational awareness products from problem framing and COA development, ensuring that products and narrative supporting concepts, tasks, and coordination measures are easily understood. They reconcile and crosswalk the order.




Orders reconciliation is a detailed editing process that ensures the validity of information and guidance across the order. If company commanders discover discrepancies between enclosures and the order, gaps in information, directed actions that do not support the mission, and other similar issues, then they make the appropriate changes. In a time constrained environment, commanders ensure that the CONOPS and other supporting concepts (such as maneuver, fires, information) support the commander's intent, mission, and CCIRs. They also ensure that the intelligence collection plan supports PIRs and IRs.

During the orders crosswalk, the commander compares the order with the orders of higher and adjacent commanders to achieve unity of effort and ensure that the higher commander's intent is met. The crosswalk identifies discrepancies or gaps in planning. If discrepancies or gaps are found, the company staff takes corrective action.

**Results.** The result of the orders development activity is an OPORD or FRAGO complete with the following:

- Task organization with command relationships.
- Mission statement.
- CONOPS, including the scheme of maneuver, fire support, and information plans.
- Tasks to subordinates and supporting organizations.
- Tactical control measures and FSCMs.
- Coordinating instructions, including a timeline or events list.
- Intelligence collection plan.
- Administrative support plan.
- Logistical support plan.
- Command and control (C2) plan, including the communications plan.
- Synchronization matrix if used.
- Fire support execution matrix.
- Execution checklist, which may include a decision support matrix.
- Rehearsal and backbrief or confirmation brief plan.



**Figure 2-6. Orders Development Process.**

### Transition (Preparation for Operations)

At the company level, the company commander and company leadership are responsible for both planning and overseeing the execution of the plan although HHQ often transitions a plan from those elements of the staff that developed the plan to those elements of the staff that will oversee its execution (see Figure 2-7). Preparation for operations begins with issuing WARNORDs. After the OPORD reaches subordinates and supporting organizations, the company commander ensures that enough time is allowed for correction of noted discrepancies.

**Injects.** Issuing the FRAGO or OPORD marks the beginning of transition and preparation for operations. All portions of the order directly support the company's preparation to conduct operations.

**Activities.** The transition activity consists of the company commander and company leadership conducting and supervising rehearsals, briefs, precombat inspections (PCIs), and precombat checks (PCCs). After subordinates have the opportunity to understand the order, prepare their own orders, and continue preparations for the operation, "understanding checks" can be accomplished through—


**Rehearsals.** Rehearsals can be very informal radio backbriefs or formal combined arms rehearsals conducted on a large terrain model. Whatever the method, there are few excuses for not conducting a form of rehearsal.

**Backbriefs/Confirmation Briefs.** Backbriefs occur informally and may be more topical, focusing on major movements and tasks. They may take place with the company commander

individually or in a small group of essential leadership. Confirmation briefs are more formal, occur with all leadership or even the entire company present, and cover all the details.

**Precombat Inspections.** During PCIs, company commanders can question individuals on various aspects of the order and plan to ensure that proper dissemination, orders processes, and understanding occurs across the company.

**Results.** The result of the transition phase is the company's ability to execute assigned tasks.



**Figure 2-7. Transition Process.**

## OPERATION ASSESSMENT

An operation assessment plan should determine whether a unit is progressing toward accomplishing the assigned tasks or objectives. The company commander is responsible for the planning-execution-assessment continuum.

Assessment allows company commanders to compare their visions with reality and make informed decisions accordingly. Assessments can be such occurrences as informal conversations and reports from higher, adjacent, supporting, and subordinate headquarters; discussions with company leadership; radio traffic; battlefield circulation; or analysis of collected intelligence. Assessments guide and inform decision making. For more information on operation assessment see Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-10.1, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment*.

### Assessment Planning

Assessment planning should happen during MCPP. Once the desired end state is understood, the OPT should begin to think about the questions that need to be answered and the method of collection for feedback. An example of questions company commanders could ask during assessment planning include the following:

- What will be assessed and to what detail?

- By what criteria will the company assess a particular task or objective?
- How will the company gather feedback information to assess conditions?
- Are the conditions and indicators tied to a decision? Who is making that decision once conditions have been met?

A properly executed assessment plan will generate the below outcomes:

- Depict progress toward accomplishing the desired end state.
- Deepen understanding of the operational environment.
- Inform the commander's decision making.
- Produce actionable recommendations.
- Improve the unit's effectiveness.

Assessments are a vital component of effective decision making, but assessments are usually the most neglected aspect of planning. For decision making to be effective, company commanders must determine where they want to be, where they are, and how they want to get to their objectives.

# CHAPTER 3

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

As stated in MCDP 6, *Command and Control*, “command and control encompass all military functions and operations, giving them meaning and harmonizing them into a meaningful whole.” Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces to attain the desired end state. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander during the planning, execution, and assessment continuum.

### COMMAND

Command is the lawful exercise of a commander’s authority over subordinates. Commanders command by exercising the three separate elements of command—

- Authority.
- Leadership.
- Decision making.

The authority that a company commander lawfully exercises is conferred by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility to effectively use available resources and plan the employment, organization, direction, coordination, and control of military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

All commanders must execute the art of leadership; however, the infantry company commander faces leadership challenges unique to the company level. Routinely, company commanders must exercise both direct and indirect leadership. Company commanders must be able to inspire and motivate individual members of their commands, as well as be able to effectively lead through their subordinate leaders to increase their span of control and to achieve broader aims effectively and directly. At no other echelon of command is this intersection of direct and indirect leadership requirements as prominent as it is at the company level. Skilled company commanders balance the need for easily understood orders with the imperative to maintain the highest degree of initiative and flexibility for their subordinates as dictated by maneuver warfare. This balancing act is the discernment of leadership and tactical art as exercised by the company commander.

It is in the realm of decision making that commanders set their commands up for success or failure. Decision making and command and control exist much as a supported and supporting relationship, with command and control supporting decision making. Effective command and control supports decision making by increasing a commander’s situational awareness and enabling a faster decision-to-execution cycle, which generates the speed and tempo advantages necessary for dominating adversaries in the temporal realm. While the quality and timeliness of

decisions are usually a direct consequence of command and control, the tremendous advantages of modern C2 systems are lost to a commander who has not mastered decision making. Commanders must master both the art and science of decision making before they master the intricacies of modern C2 systems.

## **CONTROL**

Control is the iterative process of adjusting the guidance and directions given to subordinate and supporting units based on situational awareness and feedback. Situational awareness is knowledge of the present environment, including knowledge of METT-T factors. Situational awareness permits the commander to make decisions with incomplete information—a less than perfect understanding—and is a personal perspective or ability to determine the relevance of unfolding events.

Information and skill are the two elements of situational awareness. Higher, adjacent, supporting, and subordinate elements provide quantitative and qualitative information in the form of feedback or assessment to help build the commander's understanding of the situation. The commander must provide the intuitive aspect of situational awareness to understand the situation in the absence of complete information. Skill is a personal element of situational awareness that is based on the commander's experience, education, judgment, and intuition.

For a commander to exercise control in the dynamic environment of military operations, they must have more than a fixed appreciation of the situation. They must have a timely flow of relevant information concerning the situation. Feedback is the information that builds the assessment plan that allows commanders to adjust their perceptions of the situation and modify command actions as needed.

Assessment allows the commander to determine status by comparing established goals with the current situation. Information in the form of feedback may come from anywhere in any form (such as intelligence about enemy actions, reactions, and counteractions; information about the status of subordinate or adjacent units; or revised guidance from HHQ based on developments, or something as subtle as the inflection in a subordinate's voice during a contact report). Assessment is the mechanism that allows commanders to adapt to changing circumstances, exploit fleeting opportunities, respond to developing problems, modify schemes, or redirect efforts. In this way, assessment is what allows a commander the situational awareness to control.

## **HEADQUARTERS ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING**

Commanders execute command and control of their units through their headquarters (HQ) echelons, which enable planning and operations across the warfighting functions. These functions imply maintaining a common tactical picture (CTP). The following considerations apply to the establishment, functioning, and displacement of HQ echelons:

- Headquarters are task-organized, positioned, and echeloned as required based on operational requirements. The positioning of HQ elements is selected with consideration

for communication and force protection requirements. Most units are capable of organically staffing a forward and main HQ.

- Headquarters are augmented and task-organized as required and can change as operational factors change. Care is taken to minimize the size of the HQ to reduce the requirements to secure, transport, and sustain it.
- The HQ (or headquarters and service) company XO and company gunnery sergeant lead the advance party and are responsible for siting the HQ and establishing local security in advance of the HQ arrival.
- The use of advance parties to scout potential sites for the HQ and to assist in the rapid occupation of the main body is a best practice to choose a sound location and to minimize the physical signature of the HQ during occupation.
- Standardizing HQ organization, functions, and layout increases efficiency. Unit SOPs should detail the layouts, responsibilities, battle drills, and reporting procedures.
- Headquarters' SOPs are implemented, rehearsed, and updated as required to enable the staff to effectively execute actions during high-tempo combat operations, enable rapid HQ establishment, and enable rapid HQ displacement.
- The physical locations of personnel within a HQ are arranged to facilitate their functions, as well as communication flow to ensure shared understanding of the battlespace.
- The HQ may be displaced during either offensive or defensive operations, as well as stability activities. A forward echelon is typically displaced beforehand to assume command and control of the unit before a main echelon displaces, though that order may be reversed when deemed appropriate (e.g., during retrograde operations).

### **Headquarters Echelon Organization**

Headquarters should be organized and echeloned to support the desired scheme of maneuver but must be balanced against staffing and force protection requirements. Headquarters may be echeloned in any combination of main, forward, rear, alternate, or battlefield circulation elements—the choices are driven by mission and staffing (augmented or unaugmented)—critically, only one echelon can “own” the battle at any given moment as the command post (CP).

At the company level, commanders only possess the ability to effectively field one HQ echelon without augmentation. This HQ echelon will also serve as the company's COC serves as the CP. The CP must be able to command and control ground combat units across all warfighting functions, even if some of the control is performed through coordination with other echelons, such as reach back. Situations may arise that dictate the company generate a forward echelon to displace beforehand to assume command and control of the unit before a main echelon displaces, though that order may be reversed when deemed appropriate (e.g., during retrograde operations). However, it must be noted that a commander always possesses command, no matter where they are located. However, control, in terms of executing a commander's decisions, can only lie with one HQ echelon at a time.

Mission analysis and planning for the specific mission affects the unit's ultimate task organization, including changes during execution. The critical boundary condition is that however configured, the HQ echelon must possess the people, materiel, and functional ability to conduct effective command and control.

Companies that try to create more than one HQ echelon generate greater survivability to the detriment of actual command and control. Survivability through the reduction of physical signature cannot be the overriding factor in echeloning C2 structure. Rather, units should balance a variety of survivability factors, including both the physical and electromagnetic signature of the CP, with the requirements for a sustainable C2 structure that can be staffed and operated for the necessary duration.

### **Company Command Post**


The company CP is the only HQ echelon at that level and is the principal HQ of the commander, providing the commander all resources necessary for sustained operations, to include planning, executing, and assessing operations across all warfighting functions. It is fully mission capable, even when the commander is conducting battlefield circulation. The company CP is a HQ echelon that possesses the ability to command and control current operations while also having a limited ability to plan for future operations with its organic CLIC. In the absence of the commander, the XO leads the company CP HQ echelon.

Infantry company commanders shape the fight and establish command and control primarily through their organization of forces. Proper task organization aids in maintaining flexibility at each echelon (e.g., a reserve). It establishes the basis for reporting that provides feedback. The company task organization should account for such considerations as the warfighting functions, domains, assigned tasks, and the capabilities/limitations of leaders. Company commanders should consider—

- *Command and control.* Organization of the COC (e.g., personnel, roles, responsibilities, and layout).
- *Maneuver.* Organization of platoons, attachments, and enablers.
- *Fires.* Organization of a weapons platoon and the FST (e.g., to attach or retain sections at company level).
- *Intelligence.* Organization of collection assets and the functioning of the CLIC.
- *Information.* The flow of information and coordination of information capabilities.
- *Logistics.* The interconnected surface line of communications (LOC) and organization of logistics attachments and enablers.
- *Force protection.* Organization of such units as the weapons platoon or engineer attachments.

**Company Forward Command Post.** In its most basic form, the company CP can consist of the company commander, the RO, and the FST. A forward CP sacrifices some capabilities, such as robust communications pathways and the ability to conduct detailed planning, to gain the advantages of mobility, proximity to the fight, and proximity to subordinate leadership. Common forward CP configurations include foot mobile and vehicle mobile. Figures 3-1 and 3-2, offer examples of CP configurations.






### Legend


Arty	artillery	Ldr	leader
BN	battalion	Rep	representative
Cmdr	commander	Sgt	sergeant
CO	company	TAC 1	Primary Tactical Control Net
Intel	intelligence		

**Figure 3-1. Foot Mobile Company Command Post.**



**Figure 3-2. Vehicle Based Company Command Post.**

**Company Main Command Post.** As an operational environment matures or as the mission and factors of METT-T dictate, the infantry company commander can choose to establish a robust CP that leverages the full complement of C2 systems that are available. While the size and capabilities of the CP change depending on C2 requirements, a CP is typically considered a main CP when detailed planning can occur, and all warfighting functions can be fully integrated. An example of a main CP is depicted in Figure 3-3.



### Legend

Cmdr	commander	Ops	operations
Co	company	RO	radio operator
Comm	communications	Rep	representative
Intel	intelligence	Sig	significant
Log	logistics	WO	watch officer

**Figure 3-3. Company Main Command Post.**

Company commanders consider the following factors and principles when establishing a CP:

- Mission.
- Operational environment.
- LOCs and LZs.
- Functions to be controlled in the COC, such as the CTP, intelligence and targeting, fires, logistics, planning, and force protection.
- Security.
- Electricity.
- Sanitation.
- Communications.
- Logistical supportability.
- Signature management (SIGMAN)
- Proximity to higher, adjacent, and supporting units.

**Battlefield Circulation Element.** The commander can conduct battlefield circulation using a small team, task-organized as required by METT-T for mobility, security, communications, and to maintain situational awareness. This element, commonly referred to as a “jump,” is neither a CP nor a HQ echelon, as it does not include the capabilities necessary to command and control the company across all warfighting functions. Instead, commanders use this element to position themselves where necessary to make decisions, gain situational insight, and communicate decisions back through the CP. When the commander wants to combine mobility with full command and control, a mobile forward echelon is employed. At a minimum, the battlefield circulation element consists of the commander's vehicle and necessary security.

Company commanders often desire to project their presence forward of the company CP, forming a battlefield circulation element. The composition of the battlefield circulation element must facilitate command for a limited period but not necessarily full control. Company commanders must consider the effect that forming a battlefield circulation element will have on the ability of the CP to exercise control. In those circumstances when the mission requires the company to establish the capability to form main and/or forward command posts, or alpha and bravo command groups, the company will require personnel and equipment augmentation. Table 3-1 addresses the capabilities and limitations of different COC configurations.

<b>Table 3-1. Capabilities and Limitations of Combat Operations Center Configurations.</b>		
<b>COC Type</b>	<b>Capabilities</b>	<b>Limitations</b>
Battlefield Circulation Element	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Commander can DIRECTLY influence events or gain personal situational awareness.</li> <li>*Can readily guard/communicate on tactical nets.</li> <li>*Commander places their self at the point of greatest friction to influence the situation.</li> <li>*Small, light, fast.</li> <li>*Reactive.</li> <li>*Indirectly control fire support coordination.</li> <li>*Inherent security with tactical unit.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Loss of greater situational awareness both in scope (higher, adjacent, subordinate, support) and scale (depth of understanding).</li> <li>*Cannot readily guard secondary nets.</li> <li>*Cannot make informed decisions beyond the immediate fight.</li> <li>*Cannot directly supervise fire support coordination.</li> <li>*Requires adjusting unit's normal security procedures.</li> </ul>
Forward	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Can communicate with higher and adjacent commands, all subordinate commanders, and fire support assets.</li> <li>*Can be mobile.</li> <li>*Can use limited digital assets to assist in the control of the tactical situation.</li> <li>*Can conduct limited planning in context of coordinating consolidation and immediate follow-on actions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Limited communication with higher, adjacent, and support.</li> <li>*Limited access to data.</li> <li>*Limited ability to conduct planning beyond immediate fight.</li> <li>*Number of key personnel limited by size/space of facility/vehicle.</li> <li>*Requires external security.</li> <li>*Increased power requirements.</li> </ul>
Main	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Can communicate with higher and adjacent commands, all subordinate commanders, and fire support assets.</li> <li>*Can directly supervise fire support coordination and all aspects of command and control.</li> <li>*Can conduct detailed planning.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>*Time intensive displacement.</li> <li>*Requires intense force protection.</li> <li>*Increased power requirements.</li> <li>*Produces a large signature.</li> </ul>

## Command Relationships

A significant portion of organizing for combat is determining the relationships between individuals and units. There are two types of relationships for consideration: command relationships and support relationships. Table 3-2 reflects the types of command relationships as they pertain to military units. While the only command relationships recognized within the Marine Corps are organic and attached, it is important that company commanders understand the types of command relationships used within the joint community and by other Services. External units can support the company without having a command relationship. Table 3-3 reflects this type of support relationships.

<b>Table 3-2. Command Relationships.</b>	
<b>Type</b>	<b>Description</b>
Organic	Those parts of a unit listed in its table of organization.
Attached	A unit that is bound temporarily to a command other than its organic command.
OPCON	The authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission.
TACON	The authority over forces that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
ADCON	Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support.
Supporting	Support is a command authority; a support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force.
DIRLAUTH	That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult, or coordinate an action with, a command or agency within or outside of the granting command.
NATO OPCON	The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign TACON of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.
NATO TACON	The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

### LEGEND

ADCON	administrative control
DIRLAUTH	direct liaison authorized
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPCON	operational control
TACON	tactical control

**Table 3-3. Support Relationships.**

Type	Description
DS	A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance.
GS	That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.
GS-R	The artillery mission of supporting the force as a whole and of providing reinforcing fires for other artillery units.
Reinforcing	A support mission in which the supporting unit assists the supported unit's mission. Only like units, such as artillery to artillery, intelligence to intelligence, or armor to armor, can be given a reinforcing/reinforced mission.

**LEGEND**

DS        direct support  
GS        general support  
GS-R     general support-reinforcing

**Transitions in Command and Control Structures**

As situations change, company leadership transitions the C2 structure to ensure that relevant information continues to be gathered, analyzed, and disseminated. Command and control organizations, processes, and systems will all adjust as the company transitions across the competition continuum. Indicators that a change to the company's C2 structure is necessary include the following:

- *Change to mission.* A change in the company's mission requires evaluation of what C2 functions are necessary to enable the company to change tasks, to move back and forth between static and dynamic operations, and to transition between operational areas.
- *Changes in enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures.* An enemy who is changing the way they fight dictates changes to the information that is critical to company commanders, the decisions that are required of them and when they are needed, and the corresponding changes to the ways in which information is gathered and processed.
- *Additional functions.* The addition or modification of functions required to operate in the battlespace, such as changes in command relationships and information and decision flow paths. Such modifications necessitate changes to C2 structure.
- *Changes in environment.* A change in the company's operational environment (such as a transition to urban, mountain, winter, or summer climates) requires a change in the way the company conducts operations.
- *Change of location.* A new AO requires company commanders to conduct significant problem framing with corresponding changes to C2 structure.
- *Change to task organization.* Any significant change to task organization (such as losses or gains, combat power, enablers, collections, and analysis capability) requires corresponding reevaluation of C2 structure.

**Command and Control Transition Plans**

Responsibility for adjusting C2 structure resides with the company commander but is often delegated to the XO. As the situation changes, a transition plan is developed and can include—

- New functions the C2 system must manage.
- New information requirements and decision points.
- Changes to task organization.
- Changes to command and support relationships.
- Changes to C2 processes, such as battle rhythm, reports, or meetings.
- Changes to C2 systems, such as to increase/reduce the use of various systems.
- Timeline for changes.
- Roles and responsibilities for changes.
- Decision points during the transition.
- COC displacement plan (if required).
- Rehearsal or briefs on changes to relevant organizations/personnel.

### **Roles and Responsibilities**

All members of the company's leadership and headquarters operating the COC and maintaining the CTP have general roles and responsibilities to assist the company commander when determining CP and COC configurations in light of the company's mission and resources.

The company commander has the following responsibilities:

- Approve company COC SOP.
- Provide training guidance to subordinate commanders.
- Develop and implement the company's long-range plan.
- Convene and lead OPTs.
- Provide operational planning recommendations to the battalion operations officer.
- Develop company CCIRs, PIRs, essential elements of friendly information, and friendly force information requirements (FFIRs).
- Develop fire support plan.
- Develop OPORDs.
- Direct company targeting and engagement process.
- Assess operational readiness (e.g., personnel, equipment, logistics).
- Coordinate with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.

The XO has the following responsibilities:

- Perform the duties of the company commander in their absence.
- Establish and supervise the company COC.
- Serve as the company COC's senior watch officer (WO).
- Draft company COC SOPs.
- Develop and enforce battle drills.
- Integrate supporting fires.
- Develop company level attack or engagement guidance matrix.
- Participate in OPTs.
- Administer and supervise training of company COC personnel.
- Develop and oversee execution of local security plan.

- Establish and supervise the reconnaissance or quartering parties.

The company first sergeant has the following responsibilities:

- Maintain personnel status board to include direct preparation of the morning report.
- Track casualties and oversee maintenance of the casualty tracking board in the COC.
- Supervise the handling and tracking of EPWs and detainees.

The company gunnery sergeant has the following responsibilities:

- Assist the XO in establishing and supervising the operation of the company COC.
- Draft company COC SOPs.
- Supervise the management and employment of company C5ISRT assets.
- Supervise the COC in tracking logistic operations and reporting.
- Assist XO in establishing and supervising a leader's reconnaissance of COC site selection.
- Participate as the senior enlisted technical and tactical planner to all company OPTs.
- Plan and supervise casualty evacuation (CASEVAC).
- Supervise C5ISRT representatives that operate company level C5ISRT platforms, such as unmanned ground vehicles, remote cameras, and unmanned aircraft.
- Supervise accountability of company equipment.
- Supervise and enforce rest plan for all COC personnel.

The WO/watch chief has the following responsibilities:

- Supervise all personnel in the company COC to include battle handover.
- Supervise current operations and initiate appropriate action as the commander's senior representative.
- Ensure all missions are briefed and debriefed.
- Conduct cross-boundary coordination.
- Provide situational updates and briefings for key personnel.
- Control entry and exit of friendly lines.
- Obtain situational updates from company COC personnel.
- Maintain situational awareness on all friendly and enemy activity.
- Obtain information from the appropriate subordinate and supporting units.
- Disseminate information to the appropriate subordinate and supporting units.
- Notify the commander of any CCIR event.
- Ensure all status boards in the company COC are current.
- Commit the company reserve in accordance with unit SOP.
- Coordinate and clear supporting arms in accordance with appropriate documentation.
- Adjust and disseminate FSCMs based on the tactical situation.
- Coordinate the movement of ground-based fire support.



The company's intelligence specialist has the following responsibilities:

- Link between the company COC and the battalion intelligence section as well as nonorganic intelligence assets being employed in the company AO.
- Conduct IPB, submit daily intelligence reports, and develop the company commander's intelligence briefs.
- Coordinate intelligence activities in the AO with nonorganic intelligence assets and HN forces.
- Recommend PIRs and develop a company intelligence collection plan.
- Operate COC systems.
- Analyze enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- Provide indications and warnings of enemy attacks in the AO.
- Support the targeting and engagement process through intelligence support.
- Conduct friendly pattern analysis.
- Process unit geospatial intelligence support requests and other intelligence requests for information to HHQ.
- Monitor enemy activity throughout the AO and the area of interest (AOI).
- Provide guidance and supervision on intelligence-related matters to the infantry Marines serving in the company COC.
- Produce local area maps and imagery.

If using a CLIC, Marines assigned to support the intelligence specialist by assisting in analysis, briefing, and debrief functions have the following responsibilities:

- Focus on the current enemy threat, conduct appropriate mission briefs, and provide indications and warnings of enemy attacks in the AO.
- Brief all outgoing patrols.
- Assist the intelligence specialist and operations NCO in the production of the company commander's intelligence briefs and daily intelligence reports for submission to supported and supporting units.
- Provide updates to the intelligence specialist and operations NCO for the CTP.
- Update specific information requirements, high-value target (HVT) lists, and BOLO [be on the lookout] lists.
- Produce and maintain company storyboards.
- Alert the company COC upon receipt of CCIRs and PIRs.
- Operate COC systems.
- Monitor intelligence-related digital systems.
- Track detainees for further exploitation.
- Assist collections Marine in battle damage assessment (BDA).

If using a CLIC, Marines assigned to support the intelligence specialist by assisting in data collections have the following responsibilities:

- Provide input to the company intelligence collection plan.
- Conduct mission debriefs to support the collection effort.

- Input collected intelligence information into the appropriate system for analysis, production, and dissemination.
- Assist in the production of daily intelligence reports for submission to higher, adjacent, and supporting units.
- Alert the company COC upon receipt of any CCIR.
- Give situation briefings/updates to key personnel.
- Process information gathered from tactical site exploitation, tactical questioning, document exploitation, detainee interrogations, and other sources.
- Monitor any company organic or assigned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, such as ground sensors or unmanned aircraft.
- Operate, process, and conduct training on digital camera and video assets.
- Operate COC, biometric collections, and similar systems.
- Maintain and disseminate a record of targets fired on, BDA, and targets not engaged.
- Forward the SHELREPs [shelling reports] and enemy order of battle overlays to counterfire headquarters to develop counterbattery and countermortar fire data.

The MOS 06XX communications Marine has the following responsibilities:

- Provide guidance on communications, install and maintain voice and data communications, and maintain communications equipment.
- Maintain all required communication records, such as accountability, circuit logs, and record jackets.
- Conduct over-the-air rekey.
- Employ communications security measures.
- Coordinate communications operations with the battalion communications section.

The radio operator has the following responsibilities:

- Assist the communications Marine with installing and maintaining voice and data communications nets and equipment.
- Operate voice and data communications nets within the company COC.
- Maintain communications and position report status boards.
- Record and disseminate all message traffic.
- Employ communications security measures.
- Maintain situational awareness of the CTP.
- Alert the company COC upon receipt of any CCIR.

Additionally, the following company COC members have specific functions:

- The C5ISRT representative operates company level C5ISRT platforms, such as unmanned ground vehicles, remote cameras, and unmanned aircraft.
- The fires representative plans fire support and conducts fire support coordination in conjunction with the FST and HHQ FSOC.
- The information representative plans and coordinates with civil affairs, military information support operations (MISO), and other information elements.

## Command and Control Processes

Command and control processes govern C2 for the company. Properly designed C2 processes ensure the accuracy, speed, and thoroughness of repetitive or anticipated C2 events. The company commander must be deliberate in the design of C2 processes and leverage information management, battle rhythm, and battle drills. See Chapter 5 for more details on information management.

**Battle Rhythm.** A planned, rehearsed, and executed battle rhythm is essential to sustained combat operations. It should encompass the event timing, purpose of the event, participants, and lead action officer/individual. Battle rhythms can change as operational factors change to support differences in information requirements. For example, transitioning from offense to defense may necessitate a change to reporting and battle rhythm events.

There is too much information flowing during an operation to process it all at once. To enable an orderly information flow that supports decision making, the information management plan must determine when and how company leadership receives information and disseminates decisions. This management of information flow is a battle rhythm. It is a collection of recurring or singular command and staff actions. These actions include reports, meetings, inspections, rehearsals, planning events, and briefings. Command and staff actions requiring input, output, or participation by HHQ and those of specified interest to the company leadership become part of the battle rhythm. The intended objectives of the battle rhythm are to—

- Provide an opportunity for the company staff to synchronize its efforts.
- Enforce standardized information reporting, briefing, and orders formats.
- Enable timely communication.
- Generate tempo and unity of effort.
- Lower friction through shared situational awareness.
- Facilitate the flow of information.
- Facilitate effective time management in a chaotic environment.

While the company commander is responsible for an effective company battle rhythm, the company XO usually supervises its functioning and continually evaluates it for efficiency. Battle rhythms exist across several time horizons, such as daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annually; events occurring in one can have a cascading effect on subsequent events across all. Table 3-4 is an example of a daily company battle rhythm.

Table 3-4. Daily Company Battle Rhythm Example.	
Time	Activity
2345	Watch officer changeover
2345	Radio operator changeover
0000	Concept of operations report due to higher headquarters
0530	Platoon position reports due to company
0545	Operations and intelligence NCO changeover
0600	Platoon personnel updates due to company
0630	Platoon logistic status due to company
0745	Watch officer changeover
0745	Radio operator changeover
0800	Concept of operations report due to higher headquarters
0900	Company targeting board
1200	Intentions message due to higher headquarters
1345	Operations and intelligence NCO changeover
1545	Watch officer changeover
1545	Radio operator changeover
1700	Commander's update brief
2030	Company position reports due to higher headquarters

**Battle Drills.** Just as squads and platoons need to execute many repetitions of battle drills to achieve proficiency, the company HQ must train and rehearse their capabilities. Training should be progressive, include the entire task-organized HQ with all enablers and attachments, and address the following considerations:

- What functions do we need to address in the HQ?
- Have we task-organized the HQ to support 24-hour operations?
- Do we have personnel assigned to set-up the CP?
- Are we staffed, trained, and equipped to guard the required nets and systems?
- Have Marines received the appropriate individual training?
- Have we conducted battle staff training?
- Have we received the appropriate collective HQ staff training?
- Have we established an information management process and battle rhythm that supports the commander's ability to make decisions?

Battle drills assist with information management and decision making in COCs. Done correctly, battle drills accomplish the following:

- Accelerate information flow.
- Ensure thorough coordination.
- Enforce proper sequencing of actions.
- Raise situational awareness.
- Preclude actions from being skipped or overlooked.
- Allow less experienced personnel to deal with complex or simultaneous events.
- Maintain and improve COC proficiency.

Three significant battle drills are synchronization, transition of control, and critical events. Synchronization must be part of a daily battle rhythm and an immediate action drill when company commanders determine they and the company staff have lost situational awareness. Within the normal battle rhythm, the battle update or operations and intelligence brief accomplishes the synchronization function. The transition of control battle drill occurs when control of the current fight shifts from one person to another or from one CP to another; examples include the watch section change over and the CP transition checklist.

***Synchronization.*** The commander should adjust the format and content as the phases or demands of the mission shift; however, the following items are typically briefed:

- Unit locations and actions (past/present/future).
- Current company mission and assigned tasks.
- Enemy status.
- Environmental status, such as weather, terrain, and LOCs.
- Personnel status, such as changes to leadership.
- Significant events.
- Tactical and FSCMs.
- Summary of past actions.
- Overview of planned future actions.

***Transition of Control Brief.*** A proper transition change requires a period of overlap between the oncoming and off going watchstander and COC to ensure continuity of situational awareness. It is a deliberate brief that is tied to the battle rhythm. The following items are typically briefed:

- Unit locations and actions (past/present/future).
- Current company mission and assigned tasks.
- Enemy status.
- Environmental status, such as weather, terrain, and LOCs.
- Personnel status, such as changes to leadership.
- Significant events.
- Tactical and FSCMs.
- Summary of past actions.
- Overview of planned future actions.

***Critical Events Drills.*** Critical events drills are immediate actions taken by the staff upon enemy, friendly, or environmental actions or changes. They can include—

- Unit in contact.
- Missing Marine.
- Attacks by the enemy.
- Cross-boundary coordination, such as fires and maneuver.
- Improvised explosive device (IED) discoveries.
- Cache discoveries.
- CASEVACs.

- Intelligence alerts.
- Downed aircraft or vehicle.
- Chemical attack.
- Loss of communications with a unit.
- Friendly fire incidents.

## **Command and Control Systems**

The specific technical solutions which enable information exchange and general command and control are constantly evolving, but there are four general capabilities or functions which are required to maximize efficiencies for any C2 node. In general, these items are distributed via a chat platform, a CTP, a fires adjudication capability, and voice services.

**Chat.** With the use of chat services, information can be exchanged simultaneously amongst many users without the bottleneck of a single radio net or phone line. Conversations and information can also be quickly and accurately logged and forwarded as necessary for further rapid dissemination. Although very useful for collaboration to multiple users simultaneously, there are downfalls. One downfall is that users can get tunnel vision or fixated on the computer, which reduces collaboration amongst the staff. Another downfall is the rate that information is exchanged and the potential of things getting missed during high-traffic events.

Information management procedures should be rehearsed to account for the high flow of information and staff primaries should develop SOPs for when and how watch standers alert them to critical information as it arrives.

**Common Tactical Picture.** An accurate CTP is a critical component of the commander's and staff's decision-making process. A fully realized digital CTP can allow for automated and almost real-time updates of the tactical situation. Digital CTP information can also be networked to allow a standardized picture across all command echelons. Due to concerns about signatures, a commander may choose to avoid the use of a digital CTP in their CP. This increases the requirement for consistent battle tracking and updating manual maps and tracking boards. It can also lead to confusion when these products are not up to date with current reporting, and especially when the common intelligence picture and CTP do not match. Rehearsing and refining the placement and updating of the CTP to support shared awareness across the company staff and to enable the commander to visualize the battlespace is essential.

**Fires.** The adjudication and coordination of fires can occur using several different methods. The primary means to plan for is the implementation of an Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) network run at the battalion level and above. At the company level, this is not possible due to equipment constraints, then alternate means such as chat or voice (e.g., radio or phone) services can be used as a substitute.

**Voice.** There are several practical and psychological reasons where voice communications among commanders, staff, and tactical operators is the most appropriate means of information exchange. Voice communications allow for detailed coordination with aircraft, despite the challenges of detecting ultrahigh frequency communications, and the routine use of uncovered tactical air direction (TAD) nets. Additionally, voice provides a more effective medium to

convey context and nuanced information. Voice communications for commander-to-commander conversations and for synchronization meetings of multiple echelons bring increased risk of detection but can allow for more meaningful interaction when used appropriately. Communication windows are effective in some cases, particularly at a low operational tempo, but as the pace of activity increases, staffs may struggle to filter and disseminate critical information in a timely manner, which could result in missed opportunities.

### **Signature Management**

Near-peer adversaries could take advantage of the US military's reliance on the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) for contemporary operations. The diversity of signals emanating from a single tactical location typically indicates that the area is a C2 node. Risk discussions need to be held between a commander and their staff to balance the right amount of resiliency, survivability, and SIGMAN posture based on the threat environment.

### **System Resiliency**

Information exchange and functional capabilities need to have some level of resiliency and redundancy built in during the planning process. The typical framework used is known as the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan. Each element of the PACE plan must be distinguishable with differing systems, such as frequency bands and physical methods. The PACE plan must also be feasible for each element that is instructed to execute it. A fundamental understanding of information exchange requirements, equipment limitations, system capabilities, and the threat environment are critical during the creation of a unit's PACE plan.

# **CHAPTER 4**

## **INTELLIGENCE**

The requirement for intelligence is driven by the mission. Even in the most conventional methods of company employment, there are often other intelligence assets operating in the company commander's battlespace. The company commander should never assume that because the company does not control these intelligence assets, they will not impact the company's mission. Rather, the company commander should plan for and coordinate the use of these intelligence assets. Often, when an opportunity to use a nonorganic asset occurs, the individual who possesses a plan ready to execute will be able to seize the opportunity.

### **COMPANY COMMANDER'S ROLE**

Intelligence is an inherent responsibility of command, and the commander must remain closely involved in daily intelligence activities. While the company's intelligence specialist supports this command function, it is not their responsibility. It is the responsibility of the commander and company leadership.

### **Evaluating Intelligence**

The commander should evaluate intelligence from both the COC and HHQ. A unit should not act on intelligence from HHQ without determining if it makes sense based on the commander's assessment of the battlespace. To improve the quality of intelligence that commanders receive, they need to regularly coordinate with and provide feedback to the intelligence specialist, COC Marines, and the battalion intelligence officer.

### **Establishing Priority Intelligence Requirements**

In addition to those received from HHQ, company commanders need to designate their own PIRs. Company commanders should not simply restate HHQ PIRs; rather, they should determine what local PIRs best enable them to support their portion of the mission—both horizontally with adjacent units and vertically with senior and subordinate commands.

A company's PIRs are specific to its AO, aid the commander in making decisions, and should be adjusted and updated as the situation changes. Priority intelligence requirements allow the company commander to provide focus and direction to the company's limited collection assets. In the same manner that specified and implied tasks in problem framing are not automatically essential tasks, not every intelligence requirement will be designated as a PIR.

While there is not a limit to the number of PIRs a company commander can designate, it is not possible for everything to be a priority. Company commanders should designate information requirements, and then refine to prioritize PIRs that will be most impactful to the mission. This methodology, coupled with associating locations and times with PIRs, will enable the COC and subordinate elements to focus their efforts.



## **Integrating Intelligence Assets**

Company commanders need to integrate and coordinate the activities of all of the intelligence assets operating in their battlespace. Many of these will not work directly for the company; however, these assets still need to be aware of the company's scheme of maneuver. The commander needs to develop an appreciation for the capabilities and limitations of these assets to employ them properly.

## **Staffing the Combat Operations Center**

An extremely important decision a commander will make is the selection of Marines needed to augment the COC when necessary. The company commander should not plan on external personnel augmentation but will pick Marines from within the company. The value the company gets out of the COC depends upon the Marines who serve there.

## **COMPANY LEVEL INTELLIGENCE CELL**

The CLIC supports analyzing and utilizing information collected at the company level and below. The CLIC provides accurate, relevant, and timely information and intelligence about the threat, relevant populations, and the operational environment. It also disseminates battalion and higher level intelligence products to the company. For more information on the CLIC, see MCRP 2-10B.7, *Company-Level Intelligence Cell*.

## **INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE**

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace begins during problem framing and is a systematic and continuous process. By assisting the infantry company commander in understanding the nature of the problem, the operational environment, and the threat, IPB provides a starting point for further functional and detailed planning. The company's intelligence specialist assists in developing and updating IPB products. Company commanders should use the mission variables of METT-T, the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII), and the civil considerations of areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) to develop IPB products. The commander may also choose to use such tools as key terrain, observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, and avenues of approach (KOCO) to express the results of the company IPB process to subordinate units. Before beginning the IPB process, company commanders determine the time available for planning and tailor their IPB priorities and guidance accordingly. Network analysis can also be integrated in the development of IPB products through network engagement activities. For more information on network engagement activities, see Marine Corps Tactical publication (MCTP) 3-02A, *Network Engagement: Targeting and Engaging*. There are four steps of IPB:


1. Define the operational environment.
2. Describe the effects on operations.
3. Evaluate the adversary.
4. Determine adversary courses of actions.

Note: A threat includes an enemy and adversary.

For more information on IPB, see MCRP 2-10B.1, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace* and MCRP 2-10B.7, *Company-Level Intelligence Cell*.

### Step 1: Define the Operational Environment

The company commander usually receives an assigned AO from HHQ. The assigned AO is used as a starting point leading into IPB. Step one of the IPB process focuses the company commander's efforts on defining the conditions, circumstances, and influences of the operational environment that affect the employment of capabilities and decisions of the commander. The commander must determine the relationship between the areas of operations, influence, and interest, which is depicted in Figure 4-1.



**Figure 4-1. Area of Operations, Area of Influence, and Area of Interest.**

**Area of Operations.** It is the responsibility of the company commander to determine if the AO that has been assigned is large enough to accomplish the mission tasked. The operations of the company commander will physically take place within the AO. It is the responsibility of the commander to request changes to the AO if deemed necessary for mission success.

**Area of Influence.** Company commanders must then determine their area of influence (AI). The AI is the geographical area that the commander can affect with maneuver and fire support systems usually organic to the company. This area can be determined simply by overlaying range rings for all organic weapon systems. It is possible that the AI and AO are the same. Conversely, the AI may geographically extend beyond the commander's defined AO. The AI is important to

company commanders, as what occurs in areas around them will usually influence the way they execute their missions.

**EXAMPLE:** A company commander is defending a battle position as the battalion's main effort. Within the range of the company commander's 60 mm mortars is an adjacent company's battle position. The nearby company is a supporting effort assigned to protect the main effort's flank. During planning, the commander should consider the ability to influence this fight through disruptive or delaying fire from the company's 60 mm mortars if the supporting effort was to fail. During execution of operations, the company commander should be interested in the success of this supporting effort and should have assigned, event-driven decision points regarding when and if to shift mortar fires outside of the company's battlespace to a portion of the area of influence.

**Area of Interest.** To focus intelligence support on threats that can influence the AO, the AOI is determined. This area includes the AO, the AOI, and all other areas from which threats may originate that would affect current or planned operations. Geography, time, event, or various combinations of these may orient potential threats. Determining the appropriate size for the AOI is critical; too small of an AOI results in missed reporting on threats outside of the AO and too large of an AOI results in information overload due to excess reporting.

Step one of the IPB process defines the significant characteristics of the operational environment that may influence friendly COA development and decision making.

### **Step 2: Describe the Effects on Operations**

During step two of IPB, the staff describes how characteristics of the operational environment affect friendly operations. This includes describing the effects of the adversary, weather, and terrain, at a minimum. The company commander may prescribe additional considerations.

**Adversary.** The evaluation focuses on the general capabilities of adversary forces that may influence company operations. These forces can include state and nonstate actors.


**Weather.** While HHQ provides weather forecasts, companies are responsible for determining their own assessments of how weather impacts friendly and enemy operations. Figure 4-2 provides an example of graphical depictions of weather effects on operations.

5-Day Forecast Valid 0700 HRS Local 15 Jan 2013					
Forecast	Mon 14 Jan	Tues 15 Jan	Wed 16 Jan	Thur 17 Jan	Fri 18 Jan
TEMPS	LO: 21F / -6C HI: 46F / 8C	LO: 25F / -4C HI: 48F / 9C	LO: 25F / -4C HI: 48F / 9C	LO: 27F / -3C HI: 54F / 12C	LO: 28F / -2C HI: 55F / 13C
Winds Sky/Visibility Flight Conditions	00-12 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 16 gusts 26 knots Clear  12-00 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 20 gusts 32 knots Clear	00-12 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 18 gusts 26 knots Clear  12-00 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 20 gusts 32 knots Clear	00-12 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 14 gusts 26 knots Clear  12-00 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 20 gusts 32 knots Clear	00-12 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 18 gusts 25 knots Clear  12-00 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 15 gusts 30 knots Clear	00-12 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 10 gusts 22 knots Clear  12-00 HRS: 7MI / No Ceiling 14 gusts 25 knots Clear
Solar Data	BMNT: 0556 SR: 0665 MR: 0400 EENT: 1756 SS: 1657 MS: 1329	BMNT: 0556 SR: 0665 MR: 0530 EENT: 1756 SS: 1659 MS: 1429	BMNT: 0556 SR: 0654 MR: 0600 EENT: 1756 SS: 1700 MS: 1529	BMNT: 0555 SR: 0654 MR: 0659 EENT: 1756 SS: 1700 MS: 1529	BMNT: 0555 SR: 0654 MR: 0735 EENT: 1800 SS: 1701 MS: 1749
Lunar Data	Illuminationn 15% Elevation 21°	Illuminationn 8% Elevation 11°	Illuminationn 3% Elevation 6°	Illuminationn 0% Elevation 0°	Illuminationn 0% Elevation 8°
Illumination					
Personnel					
MVMT/MNVR					
HELO/OPS					
CAS					
UAS					
Airborne					
Time	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18 00

moderate impact    no impact    severe impact

**Figure 4-2. Weather Forecast Chart.**

**Terrain.** The terrain evaluation conducted by HHQ directly affects the placement and assigned mission of the company. The company commander is responsible for continuing terrain evaluation at the company level. General considerations of physical terrain (such as slope, surface configuration, vegetation, hydrology, soil types, LOCs, and urban areas) help define avenues of approach and obstacles in all types of operations. Figure 4-3 shows the flow of weather and terrain analysis and the products generated by that analysis.



**Figure 4-3. Weather and Terrain Analysis Flowchart.**

### Step 3: Evaluate the Adversary

Proper evaluation of the enemy allows the company commander to begin predicting likely enemy actions. Following the IPB process automatically produces adversary threat models with greater and greater detail, which is important to company commanders because planning time is always at a premium and it is impossible to plan for every contingency. If done correctly, company commanders can walk away from the planning process at a moment's notice with one or more predictions of enemy action around which they can plan. These models depict who, where, when, why, and how the adversary is likely to fight.


Over time, adversaries develop patterns that can be studied through their written doctrine and publications and observed in their military exercises and battlefield actions. Graphical depictions of these operational patterns are adversary templates. These baseline enemy threat models depict enemy actions without the constraints of terrain and weather. As its name implies, the adversary template is a depiction of what the enemy would do if they followed their doctrine perfectly, such as where they would place artillery, where they would place logistic trains, and how they would organize the forward battlespace. Higher headquarters usually disseminates adversary templates to infantry companies. When the enemy does not consist of conventional military forces, observed enemy actions generate adversary templates that usually originate at the company level.

The company's intelligence specialist collects data from enemy activities, assesses trends and patterns, and creates a common profile. The profile serves as the adversary template for these types of threats while identifying any gaps in current information that need to be satisfied through collection efforts.

#### Step 4: Determine Adversary Courses of Action

Combining adversary templates with the effects of terrain and weather produces situation templates. Situation templates predict what the enemy would do if they applied their doctrine to their current place and situation. Applying enemy threat models to the actual situation to produce situation templates requires company commanders to make informed and reasonable decisions. The thought process behind these decisions is what allows the company commander to determine the enemy's most probable and dangerous COAs (see Figure 4-4). Company commanders must ask themselves the following questions:

- What will terrain and weather force the enemy to do?
- Does terrain exist that would allow the enemy to do what they would most like to do? If so, where is that terrain?




**Figure 4-4. Creation of Enemy Situation Template.**

Through the process of creating the situation template and determining enemy courses of action (ECOA), company commanders must also determine how they think operations will unfold. If the situation template represents the initial array of threat forces in the battlespace, the event template seeks to predict movement and countermovement across time. From this analysis, company commanders can begin to determine what events, indications, and decisions are required at what times and in what places. Company commanders should draw annotations of



time on the template to show what the enemy will be doing and where they will be doing it at a specific time. The longer and more detailed the operation, the greater the requirement for multiple event templates. Total time depicted on event templates should at a minimum cover the duration of the company operation. Figure 4-5 is an example of an event template.



**Figure 4-5. Event Template Example.**

**Event Matrix.** To depict phases of the event template, an event matrix that shows individual components in chronological order is used. When faced with an unconventional threat, the event matrix is more useful than an attempt to template the profile. Like the event template that it may augment, the individual components of the event matrix aid the infantry company commander in determining when and where to assign collection assets in support of critical decisions and events that will occur during the operation. Table 4-1 is an example of an event matrix. It does not correspond to the Event Template Example in Figure 4-5.

Table 4-1. Event Matrix Example.			
NAI #	No Earlier Than	No Later Than	Indicator
1	H-7 h	H-2 h	Engineer preparation of artillery positions
1	H-2 h	H-30 min	Artillery occupies firing positions
1	H-1 h	H-15 min	Artillery commences preparatory fires
2	H-2 h	H-1.5 h	Route reconnaissance patrol
2	H-1.5 h	H-30 min	Rifle company in march formation

**Legend**

h hour  
min minutes

**Named Area of Interest.** Named area of interest (NAIs) focus collection assets on spots where they can best serve a company commander's decision making. During a specific operation, NAIs may aid the company commander by validating or invalidating assumptions

made during the generation of situational and event templates, such as determining if the battalion's artillery was successful in destroying the enemy mortars or if the enemy is massing for a counterattack. During operations, NAIs help prioritize collection assets against satisfaction of IRs and PIRs. While there are no limits on the numbers of NAIs a company commander can designate, there are limited resources upon which the company commander can draw to collect information on all NAIs.

## **INTELLIGENCE CYCLE**

The intelligence cycle describes the general sequence of activities involved in developing information into intelligence. The cycle does not prescribe a procedure to follow but describes a process that generally occurs. The cycle has the following six phases:

- Planning and direction.
- Collection.
- Processing and exploitation.
- Production.
- Dissemination.
- Utilization.

### **Planning and Direction**

The company commander's IRs are critical portions of design and are a primary driver for the planning process. Company commanders need to ensure that all available intelligence assets and all attachments to the company, such as civil affairs and engineer attachments, are integrated into the process to ensure the right information is being pursued by the right assets. They might ask what the engineers need to know for a successful breaching effort or which intelligence assets are best used to get that information. Marine Corps Intelligence Activity Publication 1540-002-95, *Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH)*, contains lists of IRs by mission profile and can provide significant assistance to the company commander.

Upon receipt of planning guidance and direction from the company commander, the intelligence specialist and CLIC monitor and execute the overall intelligence effort for the company. Intelligence planning and direction is a continuous function and a command responsibility. Company commanders must ensure they provide coherent and actionable guidance and direction to the CLIC, as required.

### **Collection**

Friendly forces obtain information through the collection process. Company patrols are organic intelligence assets the company commander possesses, so tasking patrols with valid and specific orders or requests to help answer priority PIRs and IRs is critical. While planning to use their own patrols to meet the most critical IRs, company commanders should not make the mistake of ignoring external assets. These assets may not belong to or be in direct support of the company, but they are often available if requested. The assets can provide redundant collection for important IRs and fill gaps in the company's collection plan. Accessing these assets requires that the company intelligence specialist produce well written, thought out, valid requests. A well organized, efficient IPB process at the company level plays a vital role in providing the company



commander the information needed to secure external intelligence support. The intelligence specialist and CLIC uses various tools, such as the collection matrix seen in Table 4-2 to organize collection assets against NAIs. Geospatial intelligence, SIGINT, human intelligence (HUMINT), counterintelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, open-source intelligence, and technical intelligence disciplines can also support company operations.

Table 4-2. Collection Matrix Example.							
UNIT	TIME						
	0001	0400	0800	1200	1600	2000	2400
1 <sup>st</sup> Plt 1 <sup>st</sup> Sq	NAI 2 – UAS						
1 <sup>st</sup> Plt 2 <sup>nd</sup> Sq					NAI 2 – UAS		
1 <sup>st</sup> Plt 3 <sup>rd</sup> Sq	NAI 3 – Observation Post						
3 <sup>rd</sup> Plt 1 <sup>st</sup> Sq	NAI 1 – Sniper Team						
3 <sup>rd</sup> Plt 2 <sup>nd</sup> Sq					NAI 1 – Sniper Team		
3 <sup>rd</sup> Plt 3 <sup>rd</sup> Sq					NAI 3 – Observation Post		
2 <sup>nd</sup> Plt	Reserve						

**Legend**

UAS unmanned aircraft system

**Geospatial Intelligence.** Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery and geospatial information. It derives the information from multiple collection platforms of diverse capabilities, such as maps, patrol debriefs, or images from theater and national assets. An example of company-generated geospatial intelligence is when pictures are taken on a patrol and are turned into the CLIC during the patrol debrief.

**Signals Intelligence.** Signals intelligence is derived from the interception, processing, and analysis of foreign communications. Signals intelligence can provide timely and accurate data on enemy forces that may include details on enemy composition, identification, and location. Companies can expect to work with detachments from the radio battalion in the form of SIGINT support teams or radio reconnaissance teams. The company commander must discuss and understand the capabilities and limitations of these SIGINT teams to properly support and employ them in the company's intelligence collection effort. The SIGINT support teams and radio reconnaissance teams collocated with companies will usually have significant security clearance, physical security, and access control requirements.

**Human Intelligence.** Human intelligence is information coming from human sources. Several entities provide a company's HUMINT, from attached counterintelligence (CI)/HUMINT exploitation teams to national agency reporting. If a company commander fails to integrate CI/HUMINT teams operating in the company's AO with the intelligence collection effort and scheme of maneuver, the teams will default to HHQ reporting requirements. Careful evaluation of HUMINT is required to determine the accuracy and reliability of the information provided. It is important to recognize that, while any Marine can conduct tactical questioning, only CI/HUMINT team Marines may task and run sources. Company commanders should recognize

the requirement to provide CI/HUMINT teams with appropriate security and that CI/HUMINT teams cannot operate on their own without support from the company.

**Counterintelligence.** Counterintelligence is similar to and often confused with HUMINT, as CI uses many of the same techniques for information collection. In addition, CI/HUMINT teams serve as the primary source for CI functions in the Marine Corps. Counterintelligence obtains information by or through the functions of CI operations, investigations, collection and reporting, analysis, production, dissemination, and functional services. Among its functions, CI supports FP during military operations; detection, identification, and neutralization of espionage; antiterrorism; and enemy threat assessments.

**Measurement and Signature Intelligence.** Measurement and signature intelligence is information gathered by technical instruments, such as radar systems, passive electro-optical sensors, radiation detectors, and remote ground sensors. Examples that a company commander would likely encounter are ground sensor platoons and biometric automated tool sets.

**Open-Source Intelligence.** Open-source intelligence is information of potential intelligence value that is available to the public, including periodicals, posters, radio and television broadcasts, and unclassified internet networks (blogs and chat rooms). Open-source intelligence can provide a good baseline for local population and societal trends, attitudes, and demeanor. However, careful evaluation of open-source intelligence sources is necessary to determine the accuracy and reliability of the information provided.

**Technical Intelligence.** Technical intelligence is derived from the exploitation of foreign materiel and scientific information. Technical intelligence begins with the acquisition of a foreign piece of equipment or foreign scientific/technological information. Specialized, multi-Service collection and analysis teams then exploit the item or information. These technical intelligence teams assess the capabilities and vulnerabilities of captured military materiel and provide detailed assessments of foreign technological threat capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities. Technical intelligence is useful at the tactical level to see how the adversary is using technology. While most technical intelligence will be provided by multi-Service level teams, rudimentary technical intelligence at the company level can often come from battalion gunners or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units.

## **Processing and Exploitation**

Information is assembled through processing and exploitation. With the potential for vast amounts of information coming in to the CLIC, it is essential that information is catalogued, organized, assessed, and prioritized. Such processes allow relevant information to receive the focus of the intelligence specialist and CLIC, potentially relevant information to be coherently stored for later retrieval, and irrelevant information to be discarded. Proper organizing of information can also create turnover products for follow-on units. Examples of the processing of information include the translation of documents or of foreign writing on pictures obtained during a patrol or the retrieval of sensitive information from a seized computer or hard drive. Much obtained information requires exploitation at higher levels of command that possess the necessary resources and assets. Companies should track the results of this exploitation. Since the exploitation of much of the gathered information is beyond the capabilities of the company

intelligence specialist, but perhaps very important and relevant to the company in the form of intelligence, it is essential that the intelligence specialist establish effective means of tracking the progress and receiving the results of exploited information. The company intelligence specialist is responsible for ensuring that information delivered to HHQ for exploitation possesses the appropriate amplification and guidance to ensure that critical information is extracted and disseminated first.

## **Production**

Production is the process of converting information into intelligence and assessing the value of the intelligence. Raw information can assist with intuitive decisions, but information produced into intelligence can assist with analytical decisions. Production asks, “So what?” and “What does this information mean to the company and its mission?” During this step, information is—

- Evaluated to determine pertinence, reliability, and accuracy.
- Analyzed to isolate the significant elements.
- Integrated with other relevant information and previously developed intelligence.
- Interpreted to form logical conclusions that bear on the situation and support the commander’s decision-making process.
- Placed into the product format that will be most useful to the eventual user.

## **Dissemination**

Dissemination is the process by which intelligence is provided to decision makers throughout the chain of command, both vertically and horizontally. Dissemination must be timely, it must be in the appropriate format, and it must reach the right people. The infantry company commander must ensure that the processes with which the CLIC disseminates intelligence are effective. The company intelligence specialist and CLIC face two concerns—the methods available to pass intelligence and the intelligence requiring dissemination. Disseminating relevant and timely intelligence is more important than its format. Notifying a platoon outpost by radio that they will likely experience a small arms attack in the coming 12 hours is far more effective than delaying notification while attempting to send or deliver a large graphics file with supporting documentation. The CLIC uses a combination of supply-push and demand-pull methods as appropriate to the importance of the intelligence and the methods of dissemination available.

## **Utilization**

Utilization is the process by which intelligence helps to make decisions. Commanders may provide direction on their IRs, information might be collected and converted into intelligence, and the intelligence may be disseminated. However, unless that intelligence is exploited through decision and action, all the effort serves no purpose. Intelligence has no value for its own sake. Its value lies in action. Taking action based on intelligence begins the whole cycle again by generating future IRs, which require the company commander to provide planning and direction guidance.

## TARGETING AND ENGAGEMENT

Intelligence drives the targeting and engagement processes. The company commander will seek to generate nonlethal effects exclusively with entities in the friendly and neutral networks of the operational environment. The term *target* is reserved to describe a person, place, or physical object in the threat network (i.e., enemy). A target or entity can be used to describe facilities, organizations, individuals, equipment, or virtual (i.e., non-tangible) things. The important distinction is the commander's decision to generate lethal effects only on targets, and not on friendly or neutral entities. The commander and staff determine and categorize the networks in the operational environment into friendly, neutral, and threat networks. The commander integrates fires and information capabilities through the targeting and engagement processes. The term engagement will be used throughout this publication to indicate the integration and synchronization of capabilities to generate a specific effect on a particular entity or target. For more information on targeting and engaging, see Chapter 6 Fires.

## ASSESSMENT

Assessment and feedback occur continuously in operations— during execution, current operations, and future operations planning. The company intelligence specialist looks for feedback and intelligence that assess the effects friendly operations produce across all aspects of the environment. Company leadership adjusts operations based on the effects produced and may expand the operation, continue it as is, halt it, execute a branch or sequel, or take steps to correct damage caused by a mistake. While traditional, battle damage assessment metrics include destruction and neutralization criteria, nonlethal assessment metrics include changes in the following:

- Local attitudes.
- Public perceptions.
- Quality and quantity of information provided by locals.
- Economic or political situation.

For more information on battle damage assessment, see Chapter 6.

For more information on operation assessment, see MCRP 5-10.1, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment*.


# CHAPTER 5

## INFORMATION

In the current operational environment, Marines operate within a highly interconnected and dynamic information environment. The information environment is characterized not only by the information itself but by an intricate web of social, cultural, linguistic, psychological, technical, and physical factors. These elements collectively influence how information is perceived, acted upon, and utilized by both human actors and automated systems. The information environment also includes the various entities—individuals, organizations, and technological systems—that create, process, and disseminate information. As a competitive domain that spans all areas of operation, the information environment is perpetually active and frequently contested, presenting ongoing challenges and opportunities for achieving military advantages. For more information see MCWP 8-10, *Information in Marine Corps Operations*.

### INFORMATION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

The Marine Corps information warfighting function is a framework used to support planning, executing, and assessing operations that leverage information for advantage. Just as Marines conduct fires, maneuver, or logistics, Marines conduct four information function activities: generate, preserve, deny, and project information. See Figure 5-1.



**Figure 5-1. Information Warfighting Function Doctrine Logic.**

The doctrine logic provides a practical framework that any Marine can apply. All Marine Corps units can generate, preserve, deny, and project information. The goal is to do these four functions deliberately to create and exploit information advantages that achieve mission objectives.

### Functions of Information

The functions of information are integral to any operation conducted by Marine infantry units. Each function plays a crucial role in how information is managed to enhance operational effectiveness and generate the desired effects.

**Generate Information.** Generating information is the act of creating or obtaining the information needed to understand the situation, make decisions, direct actions, and conduct

assessments. Marine units generate large amounts of information, including intelligence information to perform their missions. Information generation includes any process or capability involved in collecting, gathering, accessing, combining, processing, storing, or displaying the information needed to plan and conduct operations, support decision making, or perform any mission, task, or support activity.

Information generation activities include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Collect data and information to feed the intelligence cycle (e.g., reconnaissance).
- Develop intelligence products.
- Provide situational awareness (multi-domain), to include information environment and EMS awareness.
- Gain and maintain physical or virtual access to information, systems, and networks.
- Access, gather, and process friendly force reporting and status information.
- Develop plans, orders, tasks, and instruction.
- Conduct analysis and develop assessments, estimates, reports, and briefs.
- Acquire or create visual information.

***Preserve Information.*** Preserving information is the act of preventing the loss, corruption, or destruction of friendly force information against external and internal threats. This requires constant vigilance by maintaining, protecting, defending, and securing the systems, software, and networks that store, process, or communicate information needed to plan, conduct, and coordinate operations. The infantry company has a role in preserving the information generated in support of planning and operations.

Information preservation tasks include but are not limited to the following:

- Assure C2 and critical systems.
- Conduct fires or other offensive actions to counter enemy attacks targeting friendly information, communications, or intelligence.
- Conduct physical security and implement redundant and distributed data storage.
- Exercise information discipline and effective cyberspace hygiene.
- Routinely practice continuity of operations.

***Deny Information.*** Marines engage opponents to deny their ability to gather, fuse, process, display, understand, or use the information needed to make decisions, generate effects, or act in a coordinated fashion. This includes concealing, misrepresenting, or altering information; or disrupting, destroying, or preventing the acquisition of information the enemy or adversary needs to function, understand the situation, and make decisions. Information denial activities can involve a range of actions from across Marine Corps warfighting functions, such as employing fires to destroy enemy collection or C2 capabilities. Information denial activities can also be used to support maneuver through operations security (OPSEC) or concealment. The infantry company supports information denial activities.

The following are examples of denying information:

- Conduct OPSEC and SIGMAN.
- Conducting tactical deception (TAC-D).
- Practice information discipline in public spaces and social media.
- Counter enemy propaganda through informing and influencing activities.

**Project Information.** Projecting information is the act of communicating, transmitting, or delivering information of any type to inform, influence, or deceive an observer or targeted system. Information projection activities range from using official communication to informing allies and the US population of Marine Corps activities to using TAC-D in support of ground force maneuver.

Typical information projection tasks include but are not limited to the following:

- Conduct military exercises with allies and partners.
- Conduct humanitarian assistance distribution.
- Conduct civil-military operations (CMO) and key leader engagements (KLEs).
- Conduct shows of force, military demonstrations, or freedom of navigation operations.
- Conduct public affairs activities to inform domestic and international audiences.
- Publish command activities to communicate a command narrative.
- Conduct MISO.
- Conduct deception activities to affect enemy and adversary decision makers' perception and behavior.

## Information Advantage

An information advantage is an exploitable condition that results when one side can generate, preserve, deny, or project information more effectively than the other. By applying the functions of information in combination with other warfighting functions during operations, Marines can generate effects that result in information advantages. Marines must understand that an information advantage is not an end state or objective unto itself. Instead, like other advantages (e.g., air superiority), information advantages are often temporary conditions exploited to achieve or pursue other objectives. Using the air superiority example, Marines exploit this advantage in the air domain to conduct other missions and achieve objectives—most often in other domains—such as when providing close air support for troops in contact. There are three primary types of information advantages that define a minimum set, or grouping of advantages that Marines should consider in planning and aim to achieve. The three basic types of information advantage are: *systems overmatch*, *prevailing narrative*, and *force resiliency*.

**Systems Overmatch.** Systems overmatch refers to the technical advantage one opponent has over another. The warfighting functions and systems used to perform these tasks depend on assured access to trusted information, whether that information is accessed through distant remote servers or retained locally. By denying, degrading, manipulating, or destroying the information flowing to or within an enemy's systems (e.g., weapons systems, intelligence, C2 systems) Marines can sow doubt or confusion, or disrupt the enemy's ability to function in a cohesive way. Disrupting, manipulating, or destroying information or information-dependent

systems involve ongoing offensive and defensive actions in the battle for systems overmatch. These actions, combined with influence activities, deception, and supporting actions, can result in significant military advantages.

***Prevailing Narrative.*** A prevailing narrative is a critical type of information advantage that Marines seek to create and exploit. Narratives are essential underpinnings to every operation and activity because they give meaning to a set of interpreted facts. The crafter's goal is to achieve a prevailing narrative that results in a public opinion or perception advantage by eliciting trust, establishing credibility, and fostering belief in the friendly force's presence, mission, and objectives.

***Force Resiliency.*** From an information perspective, resiliency embodies a Marine or a unit's ability to resist, counter, and prevail against enemy and adversary efforts, technical disruptions, and foreign malign influences, such as misinformation and disinformation. In short, Marines resist, counter, and prevail against any threat that targets their systems and psyche.

## **INFORMATION CAPABILITIES**

Information capabilities are not discrete, standalone capabilities. They should be integrated and coordinated with both organic and nonorganic assets, to influence adversaries and enemies thereby creating an operational advantage. The focus of information capabilities is on integrating with fires and maneuver capabilities in a way that supports the commander's decision making, the actions of subordinates, and mission accomplishment.

### **Military Information Support Operations**

Military information support operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. Company tactical operations, such as patrols, often provide MISO to influence and persuade relevant audience's attitude and behavior. On patrol, a company's Marines communicate approved messages (or talking points); disseminate MISO products, such as leaflets, posters, or handbills; and conduct face-to-face interaction with the populace. Tactical psychological operation teams occasionally augment rifle companies, but company commanders and their FSTs should expect to request these types of assets specifically when needed.

### **Operations Security**

Operations security is the continuous action of analyzing friendly information and actions, determining how the enemy may exploit vulnerabilities, and mitigating friendly activities accordingly. From personnel releasing inappropriate information in e-mails to patrols establishing predictable patterns, good OPSEC at the company level seeks to reduce the enemy's ability to harm friendly forces by identifying friendly weaknesses early. The root of good OPSEC is discipline and avoidance of complacency. Company commanders must ensure that basic measures, such as adhering to communications plans, varying patrol routes and departure times, and self-censoring personal communications, become an integral part of the company's thought patterns to avoid offering the enemy an easy target. Companies should ensure that their



internal OPSEC nests properly with the HHQ OPSEC plan, to include close coordination with deception operations, to ensure their success.

### **Signature Management**

Marines use SIGMAN to understand friendly force signatures and indicators, identify adversarial methods and capabilities to collect and analyze those signatures, develop and implement countermeasures to mask those signatures, and when necessary, develop and implement methods to project false signatures which protect friendly forces from adversarial exploitation, or to draw the enemy or adversary toward a specific COA or position of disadvantage. Signature management is an operational fusion of aspects that combines traditional methods of intelligence (e.g., adversary conduit and friendly force signature), counterintelligence, OPSEC, MILDEC and fires into a single process that enables a commander to achieve surprise and outmaneuver the enemy or adversary at the decisive moment.

### **Military Deception**

Military deception is highly sensitive in nature and executed via specific authorities, usually residing at the general officer level. Tactical deception can occur at any level, to include the company and below. Deception requires careful planning and integration with OPSEC and detailed coordination with HHQ military deception (MILDEC) plans to produce the desired effect. Tactical deception plants seeds of doubt, disrupting the enemy's decision-making process and misleading the enemy regarding friendly intentions. Objectives of the company's deception plan can be to cause the enemy to draw false assumptions regarding force disposition, time and location of attack, or focus of the main effort.

### **Electromagnetic Warfare**

Dedicated EW platforms within the EW community generally execute offensive and defensive activities. The EW community also provides varying levels of support to other commands. The three types of EW are electromagnetic attack, electromagnetic protection, and EW support. Electromagnetic attack can support company operations by conducting tactical jamming to deny or degrade enemy communication capabilities and can help isolate company objectives. Certain electromagnetic attack capabilities and operations can also support static and mobile force protection (FP) missions.

Electromagnetic protection addresses countermeasures and other procedures that ensure continued company use of the EMS despite enemy EW activities. The company commander must give special attention to the types of electromagnetic countermeasures employed by the company in relation to those employed by other Services and coalition partners operating in the company's battlespace to ensure deconfliction. The FST should coordinate frequency and spectrum deconfliction with HHQ's EW officer.

Infantry companies usually interface with EW support in the intelligence collection capacity. Electromagnetic warfare units, such as the radio battalion or other joint SIGINT collection assets, can provide support to company operations with an ability to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentionally and unintentionally radiated electromagnetic energy, such as cell phones or wireless command detonation devices. This capability enables the company to conduct immediate enemy threat recognition, targeting, and

planning as well as to provide intelligence input into future operations. For more information see MCRP 3-32D.1, *Electronic Warfare*.

### **Civil-Military Operations**

Civil-military operations refer to all interactions between military members and members of civil society, to include government activities, cultural and social groups, and any other non-military groups in the operational environment. Every Marine can be expected to participate in CMO. Civil-military operations, by their nature, usually affect public perceptions in their immediate locale. Using civil affairs Marines to disseminate information about CMO efforts and results can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals. Company commanders should take an active interest in ensuring relevant audiences receive constant information on the activities, efforts, and positive actions of the company or company-supported operations. For more information see MCTP 3-03A, *MAGTF Civil Military Operations*.

### **Communication Strategy and Operations**

Communication strategy and operations (COMMSTRAT) is the public information, command information, and community engagement activities directed toward the public, both externally and internally. Communication strategy and operations methods range from direct communications with key public segments or individuals, such as face-to-face engagement or social media outreach, to indirect communications through traditional media channels or other third parties. The Marine Corps COMMSTRAT mission is to communicate and engage; building an understanding, credibility, trust, and mutually beneficial relationships with the domestic and foreign populace on whom the success or failure of the mission depends. Company commanders should use COMMSTRAT to publish accurate information to counter enemy misinformation and disinformation. Preplanned press releases, statements, and talking points should complement all operations. For more information on COMMSTRAT, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-61, *Public Affairs* or MCTP 3-30F, *Marine Corps Public Affairs*.

### **Cyberspace Operations**

Cyberspace operations stem from the increased use of networked computers and support the use of information systems by military and civilian organizations. Cyberspace operations are used, along with EW, to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend the information environment. The types of activities they include are defined as offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and DoD information network operations. Due to the continued expansion of wireless networking and the integration of computers and radio communications, some operations and capabilities blur the distinction between cyberspace operations and EW and may require case-by-case determination when EW and cyberspace operations are assigned separate release authorities. For more information on cyberspace operations, refer to JP 3-12, *Cyberspace Operations*.

### **Space Operations**

Space is of vital interest and integral to national security. Space superiority enables the Marine Corps, as part of the joint force, to rapidly transition from competition to conflict and prevail in a global, multi-domain fight. Space-based capabilities provide a combat advantage by effectively extending the line of sight from a ground-based user to sensor or communication payload. Space

operations seek to achieve superiority in the space domain and its corresponding environment. Space-based capabilities are critical for successful land, air, and maritime domain operations. Both the FMF and joint force are highly reliant on space-based communications, navigation and ISR capabilities. For more information on space operations, see JP 3-14, *Space Operations*.

## **INFORMATION CAPABILITY EMPLOYMENT**

Information capability employment at the company level primarily focuses on influencing and informing local relevant audiences, including adversary decision makers. The ability of the infantry company to conduct daily personal interaction with the relevant audiences in their AO is often the company's greatest contribution to information. Company commanders should ensure that all Marines not only receive necessary training and messages to support the company's information plan, but also understand that operations occur under the constant scrutiny of a global media. The PCCs and PCIs should include current information messages. What the individual Marine does or fails to do, good and bad, directly impacts information in Marine Corps operations. Planning of information follows the top-down planning, bottom-up refinement philosophy. Accordingly, the FST assists company commanders in developing and employing bottom-up information refinement that reflect local conditions nested within top-down national and regional messages.

The company FST integrates information capabilities with fires and maneuver to generate effects in their AO. Execution of information capabilities must occur within the construct of combined arms. Information capability efforts alone will fail unless combined with maneuver and fires. Along with the numerous nonorganic assets that may be available, the platoons and squads of the infantry company represent the single best agents of cognitive information effects because of their daily, face-to-face contact with the local populace. Combining fires, maneuver, and information capabilities are essential in creating lethal and nonlethal effects in the battlespace that will support the infantry company's scheme of maneuver. The information environment is an important and often decisive portion of the battlespace that needs to be understood and positively influenced to achieve success. Employment of information capabilities occurs within the combined arms paradigm, through organic and nonorganic capabilities and assets, and is an integral tool that the company commander uses in any operational environment.

### **Influence of the Individual**

All actions can have information implications. Every action or inaction can be broadcasted immediately and have immediate strategic impact. Individual company personnel possess a face-to-face level of access that senior personnel do not have; the actions of junior Marines who are in contact with the local populace will usually have more of an impact in shaping the attitude of the local populace toward friendly forces than information messages developed by HHQ. Whether it is a conversation with the locals or a firefight with the enemy, individual Marines manage perceptions and can be the best weapons or the worst liabilities. The company must ensure that company personnel understand the messages (talking points) associated with every operation: Who is the relevant audience? What are the effects friendly forces are trying to generate? How are those effects assessed? The company commander needs to consider the message, the messenger, and the medium used to deliver that message.

## **Nesting Command Messages**

In the same way that proper planning effectively nests both task and purpose horizontally (adjacent units) and vertically (higher to subordinates), the company ensures that their messages are appropriately nested. When seeking to add specificity to HHQ messages for the local environment, the company commander and FST need to understand the amount of latitude they may or may not have and the request process required to modify messages originating from HHQ. Further, companies must coordinate messages (and modifications) with adjacent units, especially when friendly units share population groups.

## **INFORMATION FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Information allows commanders to make decisions beyond those that are purely intuitive. In a situation when a commander must make an instant decision, intuition and information previously received will form that decision. In a situation when a commander has the advantage of time between present demands and the need for a decision, the C2 architecture should provide relevant and timely information. Modern C2 systems can overload company commanders with information, which creates an atmosphere in which the most relevant information is difficult to identify. Therefore, information must also be prioritized and organized so that the most important information is not overlooked or lost. Awareness and understanding of the operational environment allow the company commander to anticipate future conditions, formulate CONOPSS, analyze the COA, and accurately assess risks. This awareness and understanding can be obtained only through collecting, processing, analyzing, and assessing information. Information is, in a sense, the raw material that fuels the entire C2 process. The ability of commanders to exercise command and control depends on employing effective processes to manage information.

### **Classes of Information**

Information is the facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form and the meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. Information is what allows a commander to make decisions; however, it typically exists as a form of data before it is usable in decision making. Data can lead to information, but the two are very different. Data usually passes through four classes of development before commanders use it to make decisions—raw data, processed data, knowledge, and understanding. As information moves through the information hierarchy, it becomes more valuable to the decision maker.

Raw data are the facts and individual pieces of information (data) that are the building blocks of processed information. Processed data comes from organizing, correlating, comparing, processing, and filtering raw data and making it readily understandable to the potential user. Knowledge is the result of analyzing, integrating, and interpreting processed data, which brings meaning and value to a situation or event. Simply put, knowledge is a representation of *what* is happening. Finally, understanding is the highest level of information and the most valuable; it is an appreciation for *why* things are happening. Understanding results when personnel synthesize bodies of knowledge and then apply their experience, judgment, and intuition to reduce gaps generated by uncertainty to arrive at a complete mental image of the situation.

## **Information Characteristics**

Commanders must consider the quality of the information upon which they are acting. Information is susceptible to distortion, both by the enemy (intended) and by friendly sources (unintended). All information must be evaluated to determine the quality of the data: unevaluated information from an unknown or potentially unreliable source can lead to unforeseen consequences, while quality information adds value to the decision-making process. Considerations for attributes of quality information may include the following:

- Accuracy: information must be as accurate as possible.
- Relevance: information must apply to the mission, task, or situation.
- Timeliness: information must be available at the appropriate time and place to be useful.
- Completeness: reports should paint as full a picture as time permits.
- Usability: the display or presentation of information to the user must be understandable and formatted to support decision making.
- Brevity: information is distilled to match time constraints.
- Security: adequate protections must be in place to guard the integrity of information; however, the level of information safeguards employed must balance with the need to share information in a timely manner with those who require it.


## **Managing Information**

Information management is the function of managing an organization's information resources. This includes the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes access.

The goal of information management is to get the right information to the right person at the right time to make the right decision faster than the enemy can. Infantry company commanders require quality information to understand situations and events and to quickly control the challenges that confront them. Management of this information is critical. The contemporary operational environment and the emerging concepts of tomorrow require force mobility, unit dispersion, and tactical agility. The future operational environment requires the infantry company to simultaneously share useful information with personnel at distant locations as well as support C2 processes that satisfy decisions made throughout the force. These requirements contribute to the growing information challenge facing the infantry company. Fortunately, effective information management can deliver critical information in a timely manner to those who need it in a form they quickly understand.

## **Information Management Actions**

Information management actions are those steps that increase the value and availability of information. They are the methods by which information matures from raw data to understanding (see Figure 5-2).



**Figure 5-2. Information Management Actions and Achieving Understanding.**

### Information Management Techniques and Procedures


Information management techniques and procedures should facilitate a rapid, unconstrained flow of useful information throughout an organization. As with any tactical process, information management requires codified and rehearsed techniques and procedures to achieve efficiency and effectiveness. Some common items that need to be tracked and managed include—

- Tactical and FSCMs, such as boundaries, checkpoints, and restrictive fire areas (RFAs).
- Command and support relationships.
- Troop to task, including purposes.
- Unit positions/actions, including nonorganic units with which the company may interact or from which the company may request support.
- Event tracking (friendly, enemy, other).
- Intelligence analysis.
- Unit status information, such as logistics, administration, training, or skills.
- Battle rhythm (meetings and reports).
- IRs and FFIRs.

The following important techniques and procedures help deal with the flow of this information:

- CCIRs.
- Information flow.
- Information display.
- Information reporting.
- Briefings.

**Commander's Critical Information Requirements.** The CCIRs are information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decision making. The two subcategories are PIRs and FFIRs. Only a fraction of the information that is theoretically available can be collected and processed rapidly enough to support combat decision making. The commander, therefore, identifies CCIRs to focus and direct the collection and processing of information. Commander's critical information requirements are always associated with key decisions the commander expects to make to achieve desired results. Clearly defining these information requirements is one of the most difficult and important tasks of command. They not only influence the quantity and quality of information, but also have a direct impact on the workload of the staff and subordinate units (see Figure 5-3).



**Figure 5-3. Information Requirements Display Example.**

Examples of PIRs include the following:

- Indications and warning (I&W) that enemy forces reinforce.
- Indications and warning that enemy commits reserve; identification of enemy counterattack routes.
- Indications and warning of enemy indirect fire positions.
- Composition/disposition of enemy forces.

- Location of enemy C2 nodes.
- Indications and warning of employment of weapons of mass destruction (chemical/biological) within the AO.
- Location, composition, and size of enemy obstacles.
- Enemy prisoner of war size that is greater than a squad.
- Severe weather warning or significant weather change that poses a threat to personnel or could have high impact on operations.
- Location of CBRN delivery systems, munitions, and facilities.

Examples of FFIRs include the following:

- Significant loss in friendly combat power (squad size or greater).
- Loss of a piece of artillery; aircraft; light armored vehicle; tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-command link guided missile (TOW); or breaching asset.
- Total loss of communications for 30 minutes to any unit.
- Loss of a sensitive item (such as a weapon or a pair of night vision goggles).
- Logistics/personnel problem that significantly affects operations.
- Serious injury/illness of Marine/Sailor or other attached Service members.
- Critical Red Cross message that requires immediate extraction of personnel.
- Any spillage of petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) or other hazardous materials.

**Information Flow.** Command relationships, task organization, and the need for information, influence the flow of information. Company leadership must decide what it needs to know and how information must flow as a precursor to developing the proper mix of personnel, equipment, training, procedures, and infrastructure. The following principles can aid the commander in mapping the flow of information:


- Tailor information for the commander.
- Locate information in predictable locations.
- Disseminate accurate and relevant information.
- Determine what information needs to be “pushed” and what information should be “pulled.”
- Balance the use of multiple sources of information.
- Ensure information flow protocols function in dynamic and steady-state operational environments.
- Create flexible and redundant procedures and plans.

**Information Display.** Information must be tailored and displayed so that it fits the personality of the commander. Since people retain information learned in graphic presentations at a rate four times greater than verbal presentations, information should be provided in the form of maps, overlays, and charts whenever possible (see Figure 5-4). Color-coded charts may reflect the status of a unit or system. Such displays may be generated by using either automated or manual means and should employ standard formats, terminology, and symbology in accordance with Department of Defense Interface Standard, *Joint Military Symbology*. Additionally, operations maps and overlays should contain only the minimum information required for the commander to



visualize the battlespace. Detail is time consuming and often hinders vice helps decision making. Whether generated manually or with automated assistance, visual displays should do the following:

- Display essential information.
- Display information clearly and understandably.
- Display information accurately, reliably, and in a timely manner.
- Be designed for ease of update.



#### Legend

comm	communications	log	logistics
Intel	intelligence	sig	significant
KLE	key leader engagement	TCM	tactical control measures

**Figure 5-4. Displaying Information Example.**

**Information Reporting.** Collection of information occurs in a variety of ways; however, most information comes in reports from subordinate units. One of the best techniques to track reporting requirements is a reports matrix (see Table 5-1). The matrix organizes required information needed by commanders and the reports that fulfill those requirements. It also helps manage reporting requirements by identifying reports not linked to commander-designated needs. Reporting requirements should—

- Focus on collecting information identified as critical.
- Ensure that information collected is not redundant and that information of marginal utility is not collected.

- Appreciate the impact of reporting requirements on subordinate units.
- Simplify and streamline reporting procedures.
- Establish realistic deadlines and minimize the number and frequency of reports.
- Ensure a two-way flow of information and establish procedures for reconciliation and validation of information content.

**Table 5-1. Reports Matrix Example.**

Information Needed	Originator	Recipient	Means of Dissemination	Report Format	Time Required	Remarks
<b>Readiness Status</b>	Platoons	Watch Officer	Co TAC 2	Voice	H-30	
<b>SALT Report</b>	Unit in contact	Watch Officer	Any	Any	within 5 minutes of contact	
<b>PERSTAT</b>	Platoon	1stSgt	Chat	Text	0600	Per format
<b>LOGSTAT</b>	Platoon	Co GySgt	Chat	Text	2000	Per format
<b>Debrief</b>	Patrols	Intel	Chat	Voice/Text	within 2 hours after patrol	Per format
<b>After Action Review</b>	Patrols	Watch Officer	Chat	Text	Within 24 hours after patrol	Per format

**Legend**

Co                company  
1stSgt          first sergeant  
GySgt          gunnery sergeant  
LOGSTAT      logistics status report  
PERSTAT      personnel status report  
SALT          size, activity, location, time  
TAC 1          primary tactical control net

**Briefings.** Briefings are designed for the rapid dissemination of information to a group of people. In garrison, briefings usually occur regularly—often weekly. In combat, briefings occur as frequently as required by the situation. Briefings should follow a formal script or format to avoid omitting important information and/or including irrelevant information. Company tactical SOPs should include formats of the common briefs. Common briefs are—

- Situational update briefs, such as battle update briefs or operations/intelligence briefs.
- Transition of control brief, such as watch change over briefs or COC transition briefs.
- OPOD issuance.
- Backbriefs/rehearsal of concept briefs.
- Patrol/event debriefs, which are focused on identifying information on the enemy and the environment.
- After action briefs, which are focused on identifying friendly actions that need improvement.

# CHAPTER 6

## FIRES

The infantry company serves as the primary executor of maneuver and fires in its battlespace. The FST plans and executes the company's fire support tasks based on guidance and direction from the company commander and coordinates with HHQ fire support agencies. The FST will coordinate, plan, and control organic and nonorganic fire support assets to the company. While the FST may often reside with the company COC, it may just as likely deploy elsewhere within the battlespace to execute the company commander's intent. The FST is responsible for integrating the fires and information warfighting functions at the company level to generate the desired lethal and nonlethal effects for the commander.

### ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

#### Company Commander

Employment and coordination of fires in support of the company's mission is an inherent responsibility of the company commander. The company commander must know and understand the roles, duties, functions, and capabilities of their FST and the fire support systems available to the company. Company commanders are also responsible for ensuring their FSTs are properly trained.

The company commander must provide coherent, concise, and clear guidance to the FST on the intent for fires and desired lethal and nonlethal effects to support the company mission. This guidance usually is in the form of one or more EFSTs but must at least include the scheme of maneuver, effects desired, and restrictions. For more information on EFSTs, see MCTP 3-10F, *Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element*.

It is essential that the company commander ensures synchronization and integration of the fire support plan with the scheme of maneuver. The commander is also responsible for proper integration of the company's fire support plan with that of the HHQ's plan. Company commanders must ensure they fully understand the requirements from HHQ regarding engagement and the planning considerations and execution of fires in support of the company. Using the company commander's fires and information engagement guidance, the FST is the primary action element for coordination with the battalion. The FST submits lists of targets/entities, requests engagement assets, and refines targets/entities in support of the company's engagement plan and scheme of maneuver. The FST integrates battalion-directed limitations into the company's plans. The company commander must supervise this process and remain actively aware of potential changes to the fires and information engagement plan.

#### Fire Support Team

At a minimum, the FST will consist of a leader, a fire support Marine, a radio operator, and a terminal controller. Depending on the mission and the fire support systems allotted, a naval gunfire spotter and information representatives may assist the FST or company commander.

The FST leader is usually the company's weapons platoon commander. Fire support team leaders coordinate with the FSC of HHQ for fires planning and to ensure support of the company commander's intent for fires. Fire support team leaders use the specialized experts within the FST to accomplish the mission. The FST leader—

- Is responsible to the company commander for the proper planning and execution of fires in accordance with the company commander's intent, guidance, desired effects, and direction in support of the company's maneuver.
- Advises the company commander on the capabilities and limitations of fire support systems and assets.
- Supervises the FST in planning and execution of dynamic and deliberate fires to create desired effects. Actions include targeting, product and orders development and dissemination, rehearsals, coordination with HHQ, friendly fire avoidance, and effects assessment.
- Organizes and integrates FST functions into the company COC to include serving as the infantry company COC's primary means of conducting fires communications with subordinate, adjacent, and higher commands.
- Ensures integration of all fires and information capabilities with the intelligence collection effort and the scheme of maneuver to generate lethal and nonlethal effects.
- Approves, coordinates, and disseminates targeting products and priorities, FSCMs, and other appropriate documents.
- Is prepared, if tasked, to control fires in the company's battlespace through approval, modification, and denial.
- Is responsible for recommending FST augmentation requirements to the company commander.
- Is responsible to the company commander for fires training of organic company fire support personnel.
- Ensures assigned targets are refined, observed, rehearsed, and fired according to the scheme of fires.
- Directs FST members in the execution of fires in support of the company to include managing battlespace geometry, tracking and updating friendly and enemy situations, and preventing friendly fire.

The fire support Marine is responsible for:

- Requesting and controlling artillery fires.
- Providing the company commander and the FST leader with recommendations regarding employment of field artillery.
- Assisting the company commander and FST leader with fire support planning and artillery support.
- Maintaining verbal and digital communications on artillery fire and coordination nets.
- Performing duties of the FST leader as directed.

The joint terminal attack controller/forward air controller (JTAC/FAC) is responsible for:

- Providing terminal control of aircraft.
- Orienting aircraft to the enemy situation and disposition of friendly forces.
- Providing the company commander and the FST leader with recommendations regarding employment of aviation assets.
- Providing the FST the capability to locate and engage targets using aviation assets.
- Maintaining communications on aviation control and coordination nets.
- Assisting the company commander and FST leader in fire support planning, submitting aviation requests, and maintaining situational awareness of special instructions (SPINS) and the air tasking order flow.

The shore fire control party has the following responsibilities:

- Controlling naval surface fire support (NSFS).
- Providing the company commander and the FST leader with recommendations regarding the employment of NSFS assets.
- Maintaining communications on NSFS control and coordination nets.
- Assisting the company commander and FST leader in fire support planning and NSFS requests.

The mortar FO has the following responsibilities:

- Controlling 81 mm mortar fires.
- Providing the company commander and the FST leader with recommendations regarding the employment of mortars.
- Maintaining communications on mortar control and coordination nets.
- Assisting the company commander and FST leader in fire support planning and mortar requests.

***Enablers for Fire Support.*** Some enablers for company fire support are the joint fires observer, the information representative, and the CMO representative. In the case of information and CMO, the company should seek formally trained personnel for these billets. If trained personnel are not available, the company should seek to train personnel from within the company.

The joint fires observer is any Marine in the company who has completed the Joint Fires Observer Course. Personnel with this training can control fires within certain restrictions. This capability adds to the company's flexibility in employing supporting arms by reducing the demand on the FST and increasing the number of observers and potential controllers throughout the company, its platoons, and squads. The joint fires observer—

- Requests, adjusts, and controls surface-to-surface fires.
- Provides targeting information in support of Type 2 and Type 3 CAS terminal attack controls.

- Maintains communication with appropriate support and supporting agencies, such as FST, artillery, mortars, JTAC/FAC, and FSCC.

The information representative is responsible to the FST for all company information plans and has the following responsibilities—

- Advise the company commander on information planning considerations.
- Ensure that company information plans are coordinated with the HHQ information plan.
- Coordinate all information matters with higher, adjacent, and subordinate units.
- Recommend information priorities and target/entity nominations.
- Coordinate intelligence support to all information in Marine Corps operations.
- Prepare and coordinate command information messages with HHQ.
- Coordinate talking points with higher and disseminate to subordinate elements.
- Manage company broadcast system programs.
- Compile subordinate unit reporting to provide information assessment/population atmospherics.

The CMO representative has the following responsibilities:

- Advise the company commander on CMO planning considerations.
- Ensure that company CMO plans are coordinated with HHQ CMO plans.
- Ensure the civil information gathered by company personnel and any associated civil affairs personnel are incorporated into the overall company intelligence collections plan for analysis and dissemination to HHQ.
- Advise the company commander on project nominations and supporting project submission packages.
- Track all company level projects and coordinate all projects in the company AO initiated by HHQ.
- Advise the company commander on all interagency, NGOs, and international organizations operating in the company AO.
- Coordinate activities of civil affairs team members.

## **FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING**

The goal of fire support planning is coordinating and integrating engagements from armed aircraft, land-based and maritime-based indirect fire systems, and EW systems that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operation forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. The fires and information capabilities need to be combined to create a dilemma for the enemy and gain/maintain OPTEMPO, support engagement of friendly, neutral, and threat entities that will create the desired lethal and nonlethal effects for the commander's scheme of maneuver.

The FST's leader and its members will execute most of the detailed work required to create a fire support plan; however, it is essential that the company commander devote appropriate energy to overseeing the process because the fire support plan is critical to the company's mission success.

For more information on creating a company fire support plan, see MCTP 3-10F, *Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element*.

Engagement planning at the company level may use the troop leading steps commonly referred to as BAMCIS [begin planning, arrange for reconnaissance, make reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order, supervise] (see Table 6-1). Actions may occur in sequence or simultaneously. The FST leader must organize the efforts of the FST to meet all these requirements in a time-constrained environment. Two questions should focus the efforts of the FST:

- Are the fires and information support plan fully integrated with operations?
- How will fires and information capabilities support operations?

**Table 6-1. Fire Support Actions in BAMCIS Format.**

<b>Troop Leading Steps</b>	<b>Fire Support Actions</b>
<b>Begin planning</b>	Update friendly and enemy situations. Determine assets available, allocations, and control measures. Obtain HHQ target/entity list worksheet and attack guidance. Understand HHQ fire support plan. Identify fire support tasks. Identify information supports tasks. Receive the commander's mission statement. Receive the commander's fire and information support guidance. Provide input to warning order. Issue warning order to fire support personnel.
<b>Arrange for reconnaissance</b>	Conduct map analysis. Plot obstacles and known enemy locations. Plot relevant HHQ targets. List fire support tasks. List information support tasks. Identify resource limitations. Refine target/entity list and request additional assets as required. Determine if HHQ targets support the commander's guidance. Determine purpose, engagement criteria, trigger points. Determine primary and alternate executors. Develop target/entity list worksheet. Develop fire support execution matrix. Brief commander on initial fire support plan.
<b>Make reconnaissance</b>	Ensure battlespace observation is maintained. Accompany maneuver leaders on reconnaissance. Confirm or modify plan. Verify target location, trigger points, and observation plan (primary and alternate).
<b>Complete the plan</b>	Modify the plan as necessary after reconnaissance.

	Brief commander on the scheme of fires. Emphasize observer movement, OP requirements, and triggers. Receive approval for fire and information support plan. Provide fire and information support plan to HHQ. Brief fire and information support plan to personnel.
<b>Issue the order</b>	Participate in company orders brief. Ensure fire support personnel attend orders brief.
<b>Supervise</b>	Conduct rehearsals. Conduct inspections as required. Continuously update and coordinate the plan as necessary.

## Begin Planning

During this phase, FST leaders participate in the company's problem framing and design processes. Company commanders provide the FST with the intent for engagements and their desired lethal and nonlethal effects to support maneuver. The FST leader works closely with the company intelligence specialist to understand the friendly, neutral, and threat situations in the AO (see Chapter 4). The FST will begin coordination with HHQ and will work continually to refine the fire support plan throughout the planning process. As problem framing moves forward toward COA development, the FST leader should be able to provide the company commander an initial concept of fires—at least task and purpose—for inclusion in the commander's WARNORD. The FST leader considers the mission, coordination with and refinement of the HHQ fire support plan, the fire support resources available, and initial targeting.

**Mission.** The FST should ensure that the fire support planning is not too complex. As products are briefed and disseminated, the FST leader should use the task-purpose-method-effect format to ensure the company understands the fire support plan and its requirements. Regarding the company's specific mission, the FST leader should consider the following:

- What is the mission?
- How much time is available?
- What is the enemy situation and capabilities?
- What are the friendly and neutral entities situation and capabilities?
- What is the scheme of maneuver?
- What are the results of the IPB?
- What are the desired lethal and nonlethal effects and what criteria defines success?
- What maneuver TCMs and FSCMs exist?

For more information on the task-purpose-method-effect format, see MCTP 3-10F, *Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element*.

**Higher Headquarters Coordination.** The company commander and FST must properly understand the HHQ fire support plan, guidance for fires, and the effects of fires on the company's scheme of maneuver. This allows the FST to produce a valid company level fire support plan. Initial answers to the following important questions exist within the HHQ plan:



- What is the HHQ fires and information plan and what are the permissions and authorities for the capabilities?
- Does the HHQ plan adequately support the company scheme of maneuver?
- Which of the battalion's subordinate units is the main effort?
- Who has priority of fires and when?
- Who has priority for information capabilities and when?
- Will priority of fires or priority targets shift? If so, what is the trigger and what is the signal?
- Are there limitations on supported arms in terms of ROE, collateral damage, battlespace geometry, undesired effects and friendly fire mitigation? If so, what FSCMs are needed and do they support the scheme of maneuver and desired effects?
- What is the approval process for fires and information capabilities?

**Available Resources.** A key factor in beginning the planning is determining what actual fire support systems and information capabilities are available to the company. Products, such as FSCMs, the fire support execution matrix, and the target/entity list, will provide guidance and direction on what and when a company can expect to use various types of fire support systems, to include information capabilities and assets. When addressing available resources, company commanders and their FST leaders consider the following questions:

- Does the FST have the required personnel and equipment (e.g., JTACs, joint fires observers, FOs, information representatives, laser designators, and appropriate communication platforms)?
- What are the allocated fire support and information assets?
- What are the allocated air assets (e.g., rotary-wing and fixed-wing CAS, assault support, and EW)?
- What assets can acquire and track the targets/entities?

**Initial Targeting and Engagement.** The FST uses the decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) methodology for targeting and engagement (discussed later in this chapter). The IPB and initial intelligence estimate process will provide the FST leader with the preliminary information on how fires can support the company's mission. The HHQ fire support plan will provide initial direction and guidance on targets and entities. The FST combines these sources of information with the company commander's guidance to begin the company D3A methodology, nominating targets and entities when necessary and refining HHQ targets and entities as required. A coherent D3A methodology allows the development of the company's EFSTs and effective input into the intelligence collection plan. As initial targeting and engagement proceeds, the FST leader considers the following questions:

- What is the HHQ D3A methodology?
- What is the air tasking order cycle?
- What are the most likely enemy avenues of approach?
- What types of targets need to be attacked and when?
- What types of entities need to be influenced and when?
- What are the priority targets/entities?

- What airspace coordination areas will affect the fire plan?
- Are there any unique C2 or communications requirements?
- How can targets/entities locations be continuously refined?

### **Arrange for Reconnaissance**

Within the planning process, the FST continues to participate in problem framing and supports the transition to COA development. With the company commander's intent and planning guidance for fires and information, the FST leader must focus efforts on developing the details necessary to produce the initial fire support plan for use during COA development. Further, in cooperation with the company intelligence specialist, the FST integrates ISR requirements into the initial fire support plan, including scout snipers, the collection and reconnaissance plans, observer requirements, and aerial reconnaissance. Of note, the process of arranging for reconnaissance includes analyzing maps, developing the initial fire support plan, and continuing coordination with HHQ.

**Conduct Map Analysis.** The FST should plot all known elements of battlespace geometry, to include battalion targets, obstacles, friendly, relevant neutral entities, and enemy locations. The FST coordinates this information with the company intelligence specialist and CLIC along with requests for information, target/entity location refinement, and similar issues for inclusion in IPB development and the intelligence collection plan. The FST should also plot additional targets necessary to support the company commander's guidance within target/entity allocation from higher.

**Develop the Initial Fire Support Plan.** With the results of problem framing and in conjunction with the company commander's scheme of maneuver, the FST leader should continue the D3A methodology and analyze EFSTs. If necessary, EFSTs should be refined and, if resource gaps appear, the FST should request necessary additional assets. At this point in planning, the FST leader should advise the company commander on the ability or inability to meet the commander's intent for fires given available assets and allocations. Identifying issues early in the process enables the company commander to advocate for more resources to support the company's scheme of maneuver. In addition, the FST should—

- Determine purpose, engagement criteria, trigger points, and primary and alternate executors of fires and information capabilities.
- Refine targeting decide and detect measures.
- Develop initial fire support plan products, such as the target/entity list worksheet, company fire support execution matrix, and any preplanned fire actions.
- Brief commander on initial fire support plan.

**Continue Higher Headquarters Coordination.** As the initial fire support plan is completed, it is critical that all elements of the FST continue to coordinate with HHQ and designated supporting agencies. As with intelligence, logistic, and other support plans, the fire support plan will continue to undergo changes and modifications as battlespace requirements change and organizations external to the company complete their planning. With an initial fire support plan completed, the FST must be sensitive to changes that could alter the ability to execute the plan, such as the following considerations:

- What is the ammunition status of fire support agencies?
- What is the planned ordnance load for aviation assets?
- Is there a need for special munitions, such as smoke, illumination, or improved conventional munitions?
- What special considerations for fuze or shell combinations apply in this situation?
- Is there a requirement to register fire support assets?
- What is the guidance on counterfire?
- What is the guidance on suppression of enemy air defenses?
- What is the nature of future plans or on order missions?
- What is the availability and reaction time of information capabilities?
- What active MISO series are in effect?
- What is the status of EMS restrictions?
- What authorities or permissions does the company have and what will be requested?

### **Make Reconnaissance**

During this phase, the company commander and FST leader should confirm the desired lethal and nonlethal effects of the fire support plan. For lethal effects, the FST leader should ensure that battlefield observation is continuous for those who will be controlling fires and assessing their effects. The FST should confirm or deny the requirements of the intelligence collection plan and prepare to support the plan with fires as necessary. At a minimum, if they cannot attend themselves, FST leaders should ensure that personnel who will control fires and information capabilities accompany the appropriate maneuver leaders when those individuals make their reconnaissance. Across the FST, target or entity locations, trigger points, and the observation plan (primary and alternate observers) should be refined and confirmed through personal reconnaissance, intelligence feedback, and close coordination with company commanders and their subordinate maneuver element commanders.

### **Complete the Plan**

The next step after completing the reconnaissance steps will be to apply any modifications discovered or identified to the initial fire support plan. As the plan is completed, the company commander's concern transitions from planning to execution. Accordingly, within the fire support plan, the FST needs to pay close attention to observer movement, OP requirements (placement and security), and triggers. With the approval of the company commander, the fire support plan is submitted to HHQ for final approval. After approval, the fire support plan must be distributed to any supporting arms units.

### **Issue the Order**


During the company OPORD brief, the FST leader presents the fire support and information plan. The FST ensures that all available fire support and information representatives attend the orders brief.

## Supervise

The FST leader should be prepared to conduct the combined arms rehearsal at the company level. If a formal combined arms rehearsal cannot occur, the company commander must ensure that some form of rehearsal takes place, even if it consists of radio backbriefs from maneuver commanders and their assigned organizations, such as FOs, joint fires observers, or FACs. Within the FST, the FST leader conducts necessary inspections and backbriefs. Refinement of targets/entities and triggers is continuous. The fire support and information plan are continuously updated and used for coordination.

## TARGETING AND ENGAGING

The primary purpose of targeting and engaging is to support the company commander's intent for fires and information. Fires and information capabilities generate desired effects by determining what people, equipment, infrastructure, or other things require acquisition and attack or influence. The following subparagraphs discuss using the D3A methodology at the company level (see Figure 6-1). There are possible scenarios in which the company deploys into a larger and more dispersed battlespace than usual with accompanying expanded targeting and engaging responsibilities. In these cases, a larger and more complicated engagement picture emerges that may require expansion and augmentation of the FST. The company commander and FST must address the proper employment of more and varied resources against the appropriate targets/entities with the correct method of engagement and assessment. They must also address increased staffing of the FST, CLIC, and company COC as well as that within subordinate maneuver elements so that the expanded fire support and information planning receives adequate support.



**Figure 6-1. Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess Methodology.**

## **Decide**

The FST leader supervises the decide function. This function provides the overall focus for the methodology and sets priorities for intelligence collection and engagement planning. It initially begins in problem framing and in conjunction with IPB with the establishment of enemy and friendly situation estimates; the development of event and decision support templates; and the identification of NAIs, target areas of interest, decision points, HVTs, high value entities and associated high-payoff targets (HPTs) and high-payoff entities. When executing the decide function, the company commander and FST leader consider the following questions:

- What targets/entities should be acquired and attacked or influenced?
- When and where will targets/entities likely be found and who will locate them?
- How should the targets be attacked (e.g., artillery, precision munitions)?
- How should entities be engaged using a KLE?
- What lethal or nonlethal effects need to be generated on the target (e.g., suppress, neutralize, destroy)?
- What nonlethal effects need generating on the entity?
- Is BDA required? For example, is a destroy effect required before another phase of an operation begins?

The company commander must take an active interest in supervising the coordination of the fire support, intelligence, and operational plans. The company intelligence specialist's development of the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs drive identification of HVTs and appropriate HPTs. In turn, targeting directly affects the company intelligence specialist and the CLIC's creation of the intelligence collection plan. Positioning the FST within the company COC best achieves this interaction and is the preferred method when the company executes its wide scope of responsibilities.

## **Detect**

During the decide function, the FST and company intelligence specialist work together to determine targets/entities, and then refine those results into HVTs and high value entities. The detect function consists of execution of the intelligence collection plan and integration of the results into the methodology with a focus on NAIs and target areas of interest (TAIs). During continuous operations, the FST makes immediate determinations regarding what actions to take on refinement of existing targets/entities or engagement of newly identified targets/entities.

***Intelligence Collection.*** Part of the intelligence collection process entails tasking sensors to detect, find, and track targets and entities designated during the decide function. There are many different means of target/entity detection, consisting of a host of organic, nonorganic, joint, Service, and national level assets. While the company commander does not possess ready access to most of these, a properly trained and coordinated CLIC can use the request process to gain information from many of them. As discussed in Chapter 4, clearly articulated, properly identified requirements provide the best opportunity for leveraging intelligence assets outside of the company. Intelligence assets and their functions include the following:

- Communications and direction-finding assets (such as radio battalion, counterbattery radar, and aviation EW assets) help locate enemy C2 nodes, their indirect fire assets, and their various communications nets.
- Visual reconnaissance assets (such as company patrols, ground reconnaissance units, and light armored reconnaissance) help locate enemy maneuver elements and direct fire assets.
- Multi-sensor and aerial imagery assets such as aviation platforms, satellites, and unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) help locate enemy C2 nodes, logistic functions, and fire support systems.
- Ground remote sensors help track enemy movement.
- HUMINT assets (such as CI/HUMINT teams) help locate targets (such as enemy maneuver elements).

***Essential Reporting Information.*** When integrating the results of the intelligence collection plan with the D3A methodology, certain essential reporting requirements exist regardless of the method or asset used to gather intelligence. From a fire support standpoint, failure to capture these requirements may render the intelligence useless. Essential information includes the following:

- Reporting agency.
- Date-time group of acquisition by the sensor.
- Description of the activity.
- Size of the target.
- Target location, altitude, and target location error.
- Entity location.
- Status (stationary or moving).

## **Deliver**

The keys to success within the deliver function are well-established procedures for execution, coordination, and rehearsals within the FST and company COC. A perfect fire support plan that never leaves the FST or company COC is the same as not having a fire support plan at all. Effective deliverance of fires relies upon all persons and agencies involved in the process having knowledge and understanding of the plan. It is an integral part of the FST's responsibilities to ensure that such understanding occurs. The execution of fires should follow the attack guidance created in support of the company commander's plan, which consists of the following information:

- Time of attack.
- Desired effect.
- Attack system.
- Number and types of munitions.
- Response time.

## **Assess**

Determination of the effects on designated targets or entities occurs within the assess function of D3A. The requirement for accurate assessment is similar to the requirement to assess the effects of all operations. The assess function of D3A is a continuous process related to individual targets or entities, not the fire support and information plans.

The formal method used is combat assessment for targets, which measures effectiveness of force employment during military operations. It is composed of three elements: BDA, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendations.

**Battle Damage Assessment.** Battle damage assessment gives a timely and accurate picture of the effects generated on the enemy and aids in determining if a reattack is necessary. The requirement for a reattack is determined during the decide phase. While BDA is primarily an intelligence responsibility, it requires coordination with maneuver and operational elements to be effective. To be effective, there are three considerations for BDA:

- The assessment must be important to the commander's desired effect, not just easily measurable.
- The assessment must be objective.
- Ideally, the assessment consists of information from more than one collection asset.

Battle damage assessment consists of three aspects to the target:

- Physical damage inflicted by such effects as blast, fragmentation, or fire.
- Functional damage, which is the attempt to determine if and to what extent the target can still operate.
- Assessment of the target system as a whole.

Battle damage assessment is not conducted on friendly and neutral entities.

**Munitions Effectiveness Assessment.** The second of the three components that make up combat assessment is munitions effectiveness assessment. As the name suggests, it is simply an assessment of how well the designated munitions performed against the target engaged. This FFIR is fed into the intelligence community as a means of determining how well a given weapon system performed. It drives modifications or evolution of such things as weapon methodology, tactics, and employment parameters. While the company commander ensures that the FST records and forwards this portion of combat assessment, it is not necessarily a portion of the fight at hand.

**Reattack Recommendation.** The reattack recommendation provides direct feedback into the D3A methodology. Using BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment, the CLIC and FST determine whether fires created the desired effects. The recommendation should address the target's critical elements, the target system, and enemy force strengths. This recommendation feeds the decide portion of the D3A methodology during which the commander makes the final decision regarding effects produced and whether a reattack is necessary.

## **FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATION**

### **Fire Support Coordination at the Company Level**

The ability for the infantry company to operate across a broad range of operations often includes the requirement to operate semi-independently with augmentation. In these circumstances or in situations specifically designated by HHQ, the infantry company may control and coordinate fires. This level of responsibility often entails personnel and equipment augmentation to the infantry company.

One of the immediate demands on the infantry company employed in this manner is the requirement of the FST to always maintain situational awareness through direct integration with the company COC watch process. The FST must be aware of and track the following:

- The position of all friendly units to include those transiting through or operating in the company's battlespace; this includes aviation.
- Battlespace geometry for all friendly units across the AO.
- The location and status of all fire and information support assets.
- Theater-specific issues, such as ROE, collateral damage estimate, aviation SPINS and routing, and all fire support products from HHQ that affect the company battlespace.

If the infantry company is operating an FSCC, it must do more than safely deconflict fires. In addition to its normal role, it now must monitor, manage, use, and provide input into the following:

- The fires plan of the HHQ, company, platoon, and others.
- Attack guidance matrices.
- Fire support coordination measures.
- Management and utilization of the air tasking cycle to include airspace control order, air task order, and SPINS.
- Collateral damage estimate determination and management to include ROE use.
- Management of the location and status of all fire support assets to ensure continuous coverage of the battlespace to include such things as ammunition and fire capability status.

### **Clearing Fires at the Company Level**

Fires clearance procedures at all levels follow the same principles. The following subparagraphs briefly describe the process of clearing fires and emphasize the need for company commanders to consider clearly and carefully who within the company leadership is authorized to clear fires and under what circumstances they are authorized to do so. For more information on clearing fires, see MCTP 3-10F.

***Plot the Target Location.*** The FST must determine how the fires will affect such things as friendly units, FSCMs, airspace coordinating measures, or collateral damage concerns. The effects of fires are based on considerations that include target location error, weapons effects radius, estimated miss distances, and probability of incapacitation radius.



**Consult the Attack Guidance.** The FST consults the attack guidance to ensure that the correct fire support platforms engage the correct types of targets. Clearance personnel must understand the attack guidance and the methodology and assumptions used to create the document.

**Conduct Necessary Coordination.** The FST coordinates with lower, adjacent, higher, host nation, or other agencies, depending on the asset used and the mission's specific requirements. Only a complete understanding of the operational environment will ensure that the FST contacts the correct agencies through the correct channels with the correct information.

**Clear Fires.** Decisions to approve, modify, or deny fires involve numerous considerations. Only upon completion of all other steps and an analysis of the decision does the approving authority make its decision to approve, modify, or deny.

**Complete the Mission.** Fires clearance is not complete merely upon delivery of the first rounds on target. Refinements of fires, friendly maneuver, enemy action, and unexpected movements of civilians are actions that may cause any given mission to be denied or modified at any point during execution. Indeed, previously denied fire missions might receive approval depending on changing battlefield conditions, such as evacuation of civilians near the engagement. Approval authority must continue to monitor execution, record BDA, and disseminate information as appropriate to maintain control of fires.

**Conduct Counterfire Procedures.** Because of the automation of both incoming and outgoing fires detection, counterbattery fires present unique considerations. These considerations do not supersede standard fires clearance procedures. In operations or theaters with significant ROE and collateral damage estimate limitations, the chief consideration will be clearing the enemy's point of origin—normally not under friendly observation. The company commander dictates the level of risk that is acceptable in conducting counterbattery fire and includes proper guidance in the instructions to the company COC and FST. For more information on counterfire/counterbattery procedures see MCTP 3-10F.

# CHAPTER 7

## OFFENSE


This chapter discusses the basic principles employed at the company level to gain contact with and attack the enemy. It includes the tactics and techniques used by the company commander when applying the principles of offensive combat. Various other publications, located in the references of this publication, offer guidance on the special considerations applying to warfare in specific environments, which this chapter does not address. For more information on offensive tactics see MCWP 3-01, *Offensive and Defensive Tactics*.

### PURPOSE OF THE OFFENSE

Offensive operations seize the initiative and dictate tempo. They provide freedom of maneuver and action while massing fires to achieve goals. Offensive operations focus on the enemy, the situation, and the problem, but not seizure of terrain, occupation of facilities, or distribution of resources. The spirit of the offense demands that company commanders take every opportunity to dictate the terms of engagement by seizing the initiative through offensive action. In sum, the offense allows company commanders to impose their will upon the enemy, the situation, and the problem.

### TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS


There are four general types of offensive operations—movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. Though described in a logical sequence, these operations may occur in any order or simultaneously throughout the AO (see Figure 7-1). A movement to contact may be so successful that it immediately leads to exploitation, or an attack may lead directly to pursuit.



**Figure 7-1. Types of Offensive Operations.**

## **Movement to Contact**

Movement to contact is an offensive operation conducted to develop the situation and to gain or maintain contact. A properly executed movement to contact allows the commander to make initial contact with minimum forces and to expedite the employment and concentration of the force and resources. It also creates favorable conditions for subsequent actions. Companies executing this task use the smallest force possible to make contact and develop the situation. On contact, company commanders have five options: take offensive action, take defensive action, bypass, delay, or withdraw. They may use any means of transportation, but generally adopt some form of march column formation and organization (see Figure 7-2). Planning a march requires significant preparations and attention to detail to ensure the movement takes place with minimum confusion and delay.



**Figure 7-2. Movement to Contact.**

At a minimum, a movement to contact consists of a security element (advance and rear guard) and the main body. Depending on METT-T, company commanders may place additional security with each column or element and may use flank and rear security to screen the main body. For example, the commander of the main body element may choose to put a small “point element” forward to provide additional security for the main body and serve as a connecting file with the advance guard.

In planning movements to contact, the company commander should consider—

- Rapid movement.
- All-around security.
- Multi-domain environment awareness.
- Ease of control.
- Direct control of the main body, which usually is the decisive element.
- Possibility of multiple teams finding the enemy.
- Decision points and criteria for committing the main body.

Within the overall OPORD addressing the task and purpose of the movement to contact, company commanders devote substantial effort to such things as the way the movement will occur, the relationships between elements, and movement contingencies. The march order should consist of detailed instructions regarding route, destination, schedule, rate of march, formation, and other control measures not covered by the unit's SOP. When possible, these instructions are augmented with overlays, maps, march tables, and similar products. Movements to contact occur as either approach marches or search and attacks.

***Approach March.*** Company commanders choose the approach march method of conducting a movement to contact when the location of the threat, situation, or other conflict is roughly known. Companies using an approach march do not wander around the battlespace; rather, they move forward aggressively along a route to the place of most likely contact.

The company commander assumes that contact with an enemy is imminent. Units in the main body are task-organized and tactically grouped for immediate deployment from the march column. Mission-related considerations outweigh other concerns and company commanders may choose to deploy the company into formations less efficient to movement than a tactical column. Similar to other types of marches, the approach march is generally organized into an advance guard that provides forward security and reconnaissance as it seeks out the enemy or moves into an uncertain or chaotic situation, a main body from which decisive action maneuver and action originates, and a rear guard that provides security to the rear.

The advance guard, which is usually a rifle platoon for a company-sized movement, is a security detachment that precedes the main body to provide forward security and reconnaissance. Divided into a point element, an advance party, and a support element, the advance guard must possess enough combat power not only to seek out the enemy, but also to prevent an enemy or chaotic situation from engaging or involving the main body until the company commander wishes to commit the decisive element.

The main body is the decisive element in the approach march. When encountering an enemy or reaching the destination for further operations, the advance guard deploys, reports, and develops the situation. The company commander forms and decides upon a COA and then uses the main body to execute that plan. The main body contains the bulk of the company's combat power and resources. From those resources, the main effort and any other supporting efforts are drawn. During movement, the main body groups itself tactically along the assigned route, generally forming a tactical column. The main body provides its own flank security.

The rear guard is a security detachment that follows the main body to protect the rear of the movement. Usually consisting of a single squad, the rear guard is organized and tasked similarly to the advance guard. A fire team-sized rear point provides security and early warning of enemy threats. The rest of its parent squad forms the rear party that supports the rear point if necessary and delays enemy attacks until support from the main body arrives. The rear guard provides its own flank security.

While conducting the approach march, the nature of the mission dictates speed, formation, and other variables. While the purpose of the operation is to gain and maintain contact, company commanders should not let caution slow the approach march to the point that the enemy can avoid contact, dictate contact, or allow unstable situations to worsen significantly. Similarly, company commanders should not move so fast that their movement loses cohesion, blunders into unexpected threat situations, or becomes unable to mass fires at the point of decision. As expected from offensive action, the ideal solution is to move aggressively, relying on good security and reconnaissance, and to find the enemy or determine the threat situation first, thereby allowing the company to deploy as it pleases on ground of its choosing to resolve the problem when desired.

Each major subdivision of the march column establishes security detachments that protect the flanks of the unit while on the march. Flank guards engage the enemy as required to prevent exposure of the company.

The use of security elements and temporary OPs/listening posts (LPs) ensures security of the main body during halts. Flank guards occupy blocking positions located on key terrain. Contact between the various elements of the tactical march column is the responsibility of the senior unit. The main body is responsible for maintaining contact with the advance guard and rear guard in the same way that the support element of the advance guard is responsible for maintaining contact with the advance party.

A battalion-sized movement to contact may use a rifle company employed as the advance guard or as part of the main body. Regardless, the general considerations and missions of the elements remain the same and company commanders plan accordingly.

**Search and Attack.** While the approach march is a relatively direct method of movement to contact, infantry companies employ the search and attack method when the location of the threat, situation, or source of conflict is in an unknown within a general area. A company commander employs this form of movement to contact when the enemy is operating as small, dispersed elements, when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to operate in the battlespace, or when the company seeks to further develop the situation within a given area. Some examples of search and attack situations are—

- *Protect the force.* The enemy is prevented from massing for an attack or other operations, such as disruption or destruction of friendly military or civilian operations, equipment, property, and key facilities.
- *Collect information.* Information is collected about the operational environment to support operations.

- *Destroy the enemy.*
- *Deny the area.* The enemy is prevented from operating unhindered in a given area that it might use as a base camp or for logistic support.

The company commander assumes that contact with an enemy is highly likely. Units of the company are task-organized into elements—reconnaissance elements, maneuver elements, and support by fire elements—designed to locate and fix the enemy and decisively resolve the issue. Mission related considerations dictate whether the company commander tasks subordinate elements with one or all these various tasks. A robust enemy threat might dictate that one platoon locates the enemy, another platoon supports by fire to fix the enemy, and a last platoon maneuvers to decisively finish the enemy. A lesser enemy threat might dictate that all rifle platoons in the company deploy organized to carry out all three tasks themselves. Companies may employ subelements built around the rifle platoons to conduct a search and attack or they themselves may serve as elements of a battalion-sized search and attack operation. Battalions assist subordinate companies by ensuring the availability of supporting fires and other resources.

Elements tasked with finding the enemy do so through patrols, OPs, tracking techniques that include locating enemies hiding among the population, approach march techniques, or a combination of all of these. When the enemy is located or identified, the reconnaissance element reports to company headquarters, continues to track the enemy or situation, and prepares for the arrival of follow-on forces or resources tied to fixing and finishing the situation. Based on likely locations as determined by IPB, elements of the company conducting reconnaissance functions receive specific guidance on zones of operation, routes, actions on contact, and/or engagement and disengagement criteria.

When the reconnaissance element locates the enemy, the fix element deploys with enough combat power and resources to prevent the enemy from retrograding or reinforcing or to prevent chaotic situations from further degrading or spreading until the main effort or finish element arrives.

Elements tasked with finishing the enemy or resolving a situation serve as the main effort tasked with accomplishing the company commander's desired end state. After the other elements locate and fix the enemy, the assault element deploys to accomplish the mission.

The company must enter the designated battlespace to begin operations. In planning, the intelligence estimate will define the battlespace in such terms as areas of interest and influence. Using this estimate, the security threat, and the mission, the company commander enters the battlespace with the company either en masse or by infiltration:

- *En masse.* Company commanders may choose en masse occupation in the face of significant enemy threats, when forceful occupation of the battlespace is part of establishing dominance over the enemy or population, or when speed and simplicity are required.
- *Infiltration.* Company commanders may choose infiltration when the level of enemy threat is low and does not immediately threaten the survivability of any part of the

company, when surprise or stealth are desired, when avoiding intimidation or alarm of the populace, and when time is not necessarily a factor in the speed of occupation.

Stealth, aggressiveness, flexibility, sustainment, rapidity of decision making, and exploitation of opportunities characterize the daily actions of a search and attack operation. Company commanders must not restrict themselves to certain methods of employment; rather, they must use good problem framing and design to determine the best way to locate, fix, and eliminate enemy threats and resolve conflict in their AOs. They must also task-organize combat power and establish employment techniques accordingly.

Conducting search and attack operations requires a significant amount of detailed planning. Key planning considerations are battlespace geometry, control measures, intelligence update/dissemination, communications, linkup procedures, and logistical support. Creating an environment in which subordinate units safely and efficiently operate with maximum independence and initiative is difficult. An assessment of the company's abilities is required before employing this movement to contact technique and should include the following points:

- HHQ desired end state.
- ROE.
- Succinct mission statements for subelements.
- Engagement criteria and triggers.
- Size of force required based on intelligence estimates.
- Logistical support considerations based on mission duration and requirements.
- Control measures.
- Rehearsals.
- FP.

## **Attack**

Infantry companies attack known enemy threats and specific enemies, their positions, their means of support, and other pressure points associated with their will to resist. Attacks are offensive operations of coordinated movement that are supported by fire and are conducted to seize or secure terrain or to defeat, destroy, or capture the enemy. While the offense is inherent in all operations across a broad range of military operations and company commanders must always consider environment, ROE, and the presence of noncombatants on the battlefield, the attack remains an aggressive, offensive action during which violence is limited only by the enemy's level of resistance and the law of war. There are seven types of special purpose attacks—spoiling, counterattack, feint, demonstration, reconnaissance in force, raid, and ambush. An attack may be executed as either a hasty or deliberate operation. The main difference is the time available for the commander to prepare the unit to execute. For example, a unit that has proper training and has executed numerous deliberate spoiling attacks may be able to quickly execute a hasty spoiling attack.

**Special Purpose Attacks.** Commanders may execute an attack for any number of reasons, to include other types of attack—

**Spoiling Attack.** Spoiling attacks are limited objective attacks used to delay, disrupt, or destroy the enemy's ability to attack. Spoiling attacks usually occur within the defense, though they may also occur to stop the enemy's offensive action prior to launching a larger friendly attack. Company commanders produce these effects by striking the enemy during vulnerable moments in their preparations, such as in their assembly areas (AAs) or attack positions or while they are on the move. Spoiling attacks may be either hasty or deliberate and their conduct is similar to other types of attacks.

**Counterattack.** A counterattack is an offensive action conducted by the defense to regain the initiative or to deny success of an enemy attack. Similar to the use of a reserve, preplanned counterattacks integrated into the defensive plan are preferred to hasty counterattacks that risk reinforcing failure. Commanders conduct counterattacks either with a reserve or with lightly committed forward elements. Execution of the counterattack occurs after the enemy launches its attack, reveals its main effort, or creates an assailable flank.

Planning and rehearsing counterattacks is similar to that of all other types of attacks: combat power, tasks, supporting fires, routes, triggers, and similar measures are determined and assigned; moreover, counterattacks planned as part of the defensive scheme of maneuver receive greater planning emphasis than those planned as contingencies. Well-planned counterattacks are likely to succeed given the defender's superior knowledge of the terrain, the ability of the defender to generate parity between forces at the point of attack, and the inevitable degradation of cohesion experienced by attackers as they penetrate an objective.

**Feint.** Feints are limited scope attacks with an extremely specific objective intended to cause the enemy to either react in a particular way or delay or disrupt reaction, such as by repositioning forces, committing reserves, or shifting fires. An infantry company is unlikely to conduct a feint internal to its own operations, but it is more likely to conduct an actual, full-scale attack on a limited objective that delivers a feint effect determinable by HHQ.

The following are planning considerations for the company commander:

- The higher commander's intent regarding force preservation.
- Disengagement criteria and plans.
- Assignment of limited depth and attainable objectives.
- Clear follow-on orders that ensure the feinting force is prepared to exploit the success of the main attack, if necessary.
- Permissions required for use of information capabilities.

Feints are successful only if the enemy believes that a full-scale attack is underway; therefore, it is essential that the feints occur with the same level of precision and violence as any attack. Higher headquarters must issue a clear task and purpose, including identification of the specific enemy action(s) the feint must trigger (or deny). Feints are most effective under the following conditions:

- When they reinforce the enemy's expectations.
- When the attack appears to present a definite threat to the enemy.



- When the enemy demonstrates consistent early committal of their reserve.
- When the attacker has several feasible COAs, any of which the enemy could confuse for the main effort.

**Demonstration.** Similar to a feint, the demonstration is an attack designed to deceive the enemy about the location of the main attack; however, the friendly force does not make contact with the enemy. Demonstrations may be an economy of force measure. The company commander, when participating in a demonstration as part of a larger force, should consider the following:

- *Limit of advance.* The limit of advance is a control measure that ensures the enemy can see the demonstration force but cannot effectively engage it with direct fires.
- *Security measures.* Security measures, such as robust local security or a counterreconnaissance plan to prevent engagement by the enemy.
- *Contingency plans.* The demonstration force must be prepared to respond effectively to enemy direct or indirect fires while avoiding decisive engagement.
- *Follow-on orders.* Clear, specific follow-on orders must ensure that the demonstration force is prepared to exploit the success of the main attack if necessary.
- *Conditioning.* The enemy needs to believe the demonstration is real. The demonstration must be conducted in a way that matches what the enemy has come to expect from friendly forces.

**Reconnaissance in Force.** The infantry company is unlikely to conduct a reconnaissance in force attack on its own but may participate in a reconnaissance in force conducted at the battalion level or above. A reconnaissance in force is an attack designed to gain information and to locate and test enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions. While it may share some similarities to a movement to contact, which is designed to leave a commander maximum latitude for final disposition (transitioning to the offense or defense or avoiding decisive engagement), the reconnaissance in force is an offensive action that seeks specific information and enemy reactions.

While lacking the subtlety of other methods, a reconnaissance in force tends to develop information more rapidly and, in more detail, than other types of reconnaissance. An infantry company participating in a reconnaissance in force may be tasked to conduct limited objective assaults that are designed to determine the enemy's situation and maintain pressure on them by uncovering their weaknesses or forcing them to commit planned fires and use of their reserve. Since the situation is unknown, the infantry company can expect to be part of a task-organized, combined arms force that can deal with a variety of situations.

**Raid.** A raid is a limited objective attack involving swift penetration into a hostile area and a planned withdrawal upon completion of the mission; the planned withdrawal separates raids from other types of attack. Raids may occur in permissive and uncertain/hostile environments. Infantry companies can conduct company-level raids or be task-organized to participate in them as an element of a larger force. Raids occur in daylight or in darkness and both within or beyond the scope of supporting friendly units or supporting arms. When a raid occurs beyond the reasonable support of a parent unit, the raid force is an independent unit for the duration of the

raid and receives resources accordingly. Raid forces receive specific objectives to focus their efforts and assist in decision criteria. The primary differences between the raid as a type of attack and as a type of patrol are size and scope. The raid force should withdraw using a different route from that used to approach the objective.

The company conducts raids to accomplish the following missions:

- Capturing personnel.
- Capturing or destroying C2 locations.
- Destroying logistics, caches, and other means of support.
- Obtaining information concerning enemy locations, dispositions, strength, intentions, and methods of operation.
- Confusing the enemy and disrupting their plans.

The raid force is usually task-organized into command, support, assault, and security elements but may also contain reconnaissance and reserve elements. Specialized attachments usually move with the assault force. There are five phases to a raid—

- Movement to the objective area.
- Isolation of the objective.
- Assault on the raid objective.
- Actions on the objective.
- Withdrawal from the objective area.

When planning a raid, the company commander makes the following considerations:

- Deception.
- Selection of routes to and from the objective.
- Integration of capabilities that generate lethal and nonlethal effects.
- Specialized assets appropriate to the mission, such as demolitions or site exploitation.
- Method and resources to isolate the objective.
- Emergency extraction or reinforcement plans.
- CASEVAC plan.
- Detainee processing plan.
- Signal plan.

**Ambush.** An ambush is a surprise attack from concealed positions designed to reduce the overall combat effectiveness of an enemy force, capture or harass a threat, and to destroy or capture equipment or supplies. Imagination, need, and the infantry company's abilities and capabilities are the only limitations on the types, methods, and purposes of ambushes.

Control, coordinated fires, and surprise characterize an ambush. Company commanders usually employ ambushes within the context of a larger task and purpose. Ingress and egress routes, mounted or dismounted movement, survivability of the ambush force, and a host of other factors affect how ambushes aid accomplishment of the mission.

While the actual method used to conduct the ambush varies by the level of threat, the terrain, and the skill of the ambush force, there are two general types of ambush:

- Point ambush, when the ambush force deploys to attack the enemy in a single kill zone.
- Area ambush, when the ambush force deploys to conduct several point ambushes throughout an area.

The ambush force is usually task-organized into assault, support, and security elements. The assault element executes the ambush. The support element fixes the enemy with direct fires; provides additional personnel for tasks, such as litter bearers and detainee handlers; and may be responsible for controlling supporting arms. The security element secures the objective rally point, provides protection and early warning to the assault element, and isolates the ambush site.

For more information on special purpose attacks, see MCWP 3-01, *Offensive and Defensive Tactics*.

## **Exploitation**

The ability to exploit success for further gain is why the offense continues to be the form of decision on the battlefield. Exploitation is an offensive action applicable across a range of military operations. Once the enemy is disorganized in depth following a successful offensive action, exploitation multiplies the initial success by destroying vulnerable assets and resources, preventing the enemy from successfully disengaging and re-establishing other means of resistance. Exploitation helps to maintain dominance of tempo by exposing further opportunities for exploitation. Initiative, boldness, and the unhesitating employment of uncommitted forces characterize exploitation. Company commanders ensure that exploitation is a part of the planning process because the triggers for transition to exploitation require considerable judgment, intuition, and situational awareness.

Premature transition to exploitation can result in unnecessary risk of failure or casualties, if the enemy's ability to resist or avoid engagement remains effective. Delayed transition to exploitation can result in lost opportunities or unnecessary risk and casualties, by allowing the enemy time to reconstitute or escape and evade.

In a hasty attack, the force in contact usually continues the attack, transitioning to exploitation. In the deliberate attack, the commander's principal tool for exploitation is usually the reserve, appropriately constituted to execute the decisive action of the mission.

**Use of the Reserve.** Company commanders retain only those reserves necessary to ensure flexibility, continue momentum, and react to likely enemy responses to the exploitation. The reserve is positioned where it can exploit the success of the main or supporting effort(s). Exploitation forces execute bold, aggressive, and rapid operations using the commander's intent and mission tactics.

**Use of Information Capabilities.** Company commanders employ information capabilities to increase the effectiveness of an exploitation. Certain capabilities, such as MISO and EW are used

directly by friendly forces to demoralize the enemy or to further disrupt/degrade their C2. Cyber and COMMSTRAT are used by HHQs to enhance the operation and effect of the exploitation.

### **Pursuit**

When the enemy's ability to resist is broken and they attempt to escape, friendly forces shift to the pursuit. The infantry company is unlikely to conduct its own pursuit but will likely participate in a pursuit as a component of a larger force. The difference between exploitation and a pursuit is the condition of the enemy. The object of a pursuit is to destroy the enemy force or the ability of the enemy to effectively operate in the area. Like exploitation, pursuit requires broad, decentralized control and rapid movement. Commanders may use organic and nonorganic assets to maintain observation on the enemy. Maximum use of C2 and observation assets maintains momentum.

Friendly forces task-organize themselves into a direct pressure force and an encircling force. When necessary, a direct pressure force alone can conduct a pursuit, but the preferred method is to apply both direct pressure and encirclement to ensure defeat of the enemy.

Whether through application of combat power or use of security measures, the application of direct pressure seeks to prevent the enemy from reorganizing or taking any effective action to survive. Encirclement seeks to ensure the destruction of the enemy by preventing escape or reinforcement. The encircling force must have greater mobility than the enemy.

## **ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFENSE**

### **Organization of the Battlespace**

The infantry company can expect to operate as part of a larger force and will likely receive an AO, axis of advance, route of attack, or similar control measure with which to define the company's portion of the battlespace. The Marine Corps uses two battlespace frameworks: spatial-based and purpose-based.

A battlespace framework assists commanders in understanding and organizing their battlespace so they can relate their forces to one another in time, space, event, and purpose. Battlespace frameworks provide commanders and their staffs with a means to ensure they consider all essential elements of military operations while in the planning and execution phases. Frameworks are situation and mission dependent and may vary between units within the same operation. Battlespace frameworks are not methods or means of tasking units or resources.

Spatial-based battlespace frameworks consist of deep, close, and rear areas of operation. This framework focuses on arranging operations and forces in terms of time, space, and geography. Purpose-based battlespace frameworks consist of shaping, decisive, and sustaining actions. This framework focuses on arranging operations, forces, and resources in terms of time, conditions, and effects.

Regardless of the battlespace framework selected by the commander, the operational environment is an interconnected collection of networks and systems across all domains (i.e., air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace).

## Organization of the Force

Conducting offensive action usually imposes multiple tasks on the commander. Such tasks may come in the form of phases, conditions, or elements that are particular to any form of offensive maneuver. These requirements directly affect the way the commander divides the available combat power and resources in organizing for the offense. The company's combat power is usually organized into the main and supporting efforts and the reserve.

Company commanders weight the main effort to ensure success at the decisive point, which often means that the main effort contains the greatest concentration of combat power. The purpose of the main effort is to accomplish the company's mission; the designation of a main effort allows the company to focus all its energies, actions, and resources toward enabling the main effort to achieve success. As the element that achieves the company's mission, the task and purpose of the main effort should nest directly with the company's task and purpose. For example, in conducting an attack on a strong point, a company commander is likely to task the company's main effort with the duties associated with the assault element.

Supporting efforts enable the main effort to achieve success at the decisive point. For example, in conducting an attack on a strong point, a company commander may task one of the company's supporting efforts with the duties associated with the breach element. The mission assigned to supporting efforts must directly support the main effort's purpose. Such nesting allows supporting efforts to exercise initiative to react in the battlespace in ways that would ensure the main effort's success, including being prepared to assume the main effort's mission. Supporting efforts receive the combat power, attachments, and any other enablers needed to accomplish their mission in support of the main effort. Supporting efforts may use suppressive fires, secondary attacks, deception, obstacle reduction, or other tactics to accomplish the following:

- Allow the main effort to maneuver to the decisive point.
- Prevent the enemy from reacting to the assault.
- Cause the enemy to dissipate their fire support or prematurely commit their reserves.
- Prevent the enemy from surprising the main effort.

The primary mission of the reserve is to conduct decisive movement, take advantage of sudden opportunities, and reinforce and exploit main effort success. Employment of the reserve at the decisive point is the commanders' principal means to influence the action. A reserve does not reinforce failure. The reserve must be large enough to exploit success, yet its size should not materially weaken the main effort. The reserve might constitute a small part of the company in the case of a deliberate assault. In a movement to contact, the reserve may constitute the bulk of command that is ready for commitment as a main effort upon locating the enemy. Company commanders base their determination of the reserve's size on the following:

- Contemplated missions of the reserve.
- Forces available.
- Type of maneuver planned.
- Terrain over which the reserve must travel.
- Possible hostile reactions.
- Clarity of the situation.

## **Nesting of Purpose**

Throughout the ground combat element (GCE), units' actions must be nested to achieve decisive action. The company's task and purpose are usually informed by direction from its HHQ. The commander develops methods, tasks, and purposes for subordinate elements through the planning process.

**Purpose.** The purpose of the main effort achieves the decisive action. All supporting efforts' purposes should either directly support or set conditions to achieve the decisive action.

**Tasks.** Subordinate elements' tasks are directed to achieve the purpose. Subordinate commanders may deviate from their tasks if the situation permits, as long as it achieves their purpose.


**Method.** Commanders may dictate which method a subordinate unit uses to achieve its task. This is optional and more restrictive; but may be required to synchronize forces, efforts, and battlespace geometry.

## **OFFENSIVE MANEUVER**

### **Forms of Offensive Maneuver**

For the infantry company in the offense, there are six forms of maneuver—frontal attack, flanking attack, envelopment, turning movement, infiltration, and penetration.


**Frontal Attack.** Frontal attack (see Figure 7-3) is a form of offensive maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force along a broad front by the most direct route. It is generally the least desirable form of maneuver because it exposes the attacker to the concentrated fire of the defender and limits the effectiveness of the attacker's own fires. When conducting a frontal attack, the company commander must maximize the use of combined arms to mitigate the vulnerability of the force. The frontal attack is often the best form of maneuver for an attack in which speed and simplicity are key; it is useful in overwhelming weak defenses, securing outposts, or disorganizing enemy forces.



**Legend**  
 ENY enemy

**Figure 7-3. Frontal Attack.**


**Flanking Attack.** A flank is the right or left side of any military formation and is generally weaker in terms of combat power than the front of the formation. Therefore, a flanking attack (see Figure 7-4) is a form of offensive maneuver directed at either flank of an enemy force. It is different from envelopment in that envelopment directs its attack beyond the flank and toward the rear of the enemy. Moreover, both flanking attacks and envelopments are different from a turning movement in that, while a turning movement seeks to force the enemy to move, flanking attacks and envelopments seek to engage the enemy in their current position. Exposed enemy flanks may be created by the attacker using fires or by a successful penetration. Flanking attacks are usually conducted by supporting efforts that fix the enemy's front while the friendly main effort attacks the enemy's flank. Due to their simplicity, flanking attacks often serve as the form of maneuver favored by hasty attacks or immediate action drills during which speed and simplicity are paramount to maintaining battle tempo and initiative.



**Legend**  
 ENY enemy

**Figure 7-4. Flanking Attack.**

**Envelopment.** Companies will usually participate in envelopment as part of a larger force. Envelopment is a form of offensive maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy's rear or flank to destroy them in their current position (see Figure 7-5).




**Legend**  
 ENY enemy

**Figure 7-5. Envelopment.**



A successful envelopment requires discovery or creation of an assailable flank. The envelopment is the preferred form of maneuver because the attacking force tends to suffer fewer casualties while having the most opportunities to destroy the enemy. Envelopments focus on seizing key terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes.


**Turning Movement.** A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the enemy's rear (see Figure 7-6). This tactic causes enemy forces to move out of their current positions (as opposed to flank attacks and envelopments, during which the friendly forces seek to engage the enemy in their current location) or to divert major forces to meet the enemy. For a turning movement to be successful, the unit trying to turn the enemy must attack something that the enemy will fight to save, such as a supply route, artillery emplacement, or a headquarters. In addition to attacking such a target, the attacking unit should be strong enough to pose a real threat to the enemy. Attackers seek to secure key terrain deep in the enemy's rear and along their LOCs. Faced with a major threat to their rear, the enemy is "turned" out of their defensive positions and forced to attack rearward. The company will likely conduct a turning movement as part of a larger force.



**Figure 7-6. Turning Movement.**

**Infiltration.** Infiltration is a form of offensive maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy's rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (see Figure 7-7). Moving and assembling forces covertly through enemy positions takes a considerable amount of time. A successful infiltration reaches the enemy's rear without fighting through prepared positions. An infiltration usually occurs in conjunction with and in support of another form of maneuver. A company may conduct an infiltration (dismounted or mounted) as part of a larger unit's attack with the battalion employing another form of maneuver. Company commanders also may employ maneuver by infiltration to move their platoons to locations to support the battalion's attack. A company may conduct an infiltration to—

- Attack an enemy-held position from an unsuspected direction.
- Occupy a SBF position to support an attack.
- Secure key terrain.
- Conduct ambushes and raids.
- Conduct a covert breach of an obstacle.




**Legend**  
ENY enemy  
OBJ objective

**Figure 7-7. Infiltration.**

**Penetration.** Penetration is a form of offensive maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to create both assailable flanks and access to the enemy's rear (see Figure 7-8). Penetration occurs when enemy flanks are not assailable, when enemy forces are overextended, when weak spots in the enemy defense are identified, and when time does not permit some other form of maneuver. As part of a larger force penetration, the company will usually isolate, suppress, fix, or destroy enemy forces; breach tactical or protective obstacles in the enemy's main defense; secure the flanks of the penetration; or seize key terrain. A battalion may also use the penetration to secure a foothold within a large built-up area. A penetration usually consists of the following three steps:

1. Breach the enemy's main defensive positions.
2. Widen the gap created to secure flanks by enveloping one or both of the newly exposed flanks.
3. Seize the objective.



**Legend**  
ENY enemy  
OBJ objective

**Figure 7-8. Penetration.**

## **ATTACK CONSIDERATIONS**

Elements of the attack are fire, maneuver, and close combat. The following subparagraphs provide company commanders and their subordinate commanders with guidance in planning for, executing, and controlling the fire, maneuver, and close combat inherent in the attack of infantry units. The commander must be prepared to establish a detainee/EPW collection plan, a casualty collection plan, and a logistic support plan.

### **Planning Considerations**

The battalion commander assigns missions to the infantry company, usually expressed in terms of terrain objectives to seize, control measures to follow, and designation of attached/supporting units. The infantry company may be the main effort, supporting effort or the reserve of the infantry battalion. It may be foot mobile, mounted, or aircraft transported in the attack. When it is a reserve element of the battalion, it may use any form of mobility.

The AA is an area in which a unit gathers and organizes to prepare for further action. In assessing potential AAs, company commanders make the following considerations:


- Cover and concealment.
- Adequate space for the dispersion of troops, equipment, and vehicles.
- Ease of access and egress.
- Adaptability to defensible position.
- Location, preferably beyond the effective range of enemy mortar and light artillery fires.

In the AA, preparations for combat are finalized. They are as complete and detailed as the available time and the situation permit. Preparations include the following:

- Conduct personnel, weapons, and equipment PCCs and PCIs.
- Conduct final resupply of fuel, water, rations, and ammunition.
- Stage equipment and personal effects not required for the operation.
- Issue mission-specific special equipment for the operation.
- Conduct a rest plan consistent with security and preparations for the attack.
- Continue planning and intelligence updates.
- Designated attachments join the command.
- Conduct specialized training and rehearsals.

### **Tactical Control Measures**

Infantry battalion, infantry company, and rifle platoon commanders control the maneuver elements of their respective units in the attack by using required control measures. To give subordinate echelons maximum freedom of action, only the minimum control measures necessary to ensure that the attack progresses in the desired manner are used. See Figure 7-9.



### Legend

ASLT	assault	PD	point of departure
FCL	final coordination line	PL	phase line
LD/LC	line of departure is the line of contact	PSN	position
OBJ	objective	RP	release point

**Figure 7-9. Tactical Control Measures.**

### Maneuver

Maneuver is the use of movement in combination with fires employed to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy to facilitate the accomplishment of the mission. When possible, the commander employs those techniques that avoid the enemy's strength and conceal the company's true intentions. Company commanders maneuver their platoons to close with the enemy, to gain positional advantage over them, and ultimately to destroy them or force them to withdraw or capitulate. Within the actual mechanics of conducting maneuver, there are two elements:

- *Base of fire element.* The combination of fire and movement first requires a base of fire in which some elements of the company remain stationary and provide protection for the maneuvering forces by preventing the enemy from reacting to the movement.
- *Maneuver element.* Under the protective overwatch or effective suppressive fires of the base of fire element, the maneuver element moves to a position advantage using whatever techniques and formations appropriate to the situation in terms of such factors as risk, speed, terrain, weather, and conditioning.

## **Fires**

In the attack, fires primarily occur when fixing or suppressing the enemy, when maneuvering against and assaulting them, and when exploiting success. When planning fires, the company commander uses the following method: task, purpose, method, effect for constructing, and determining the validity of a fire support plan. Fire support team leaders use a briefing tool—purpose, location, observation, triggers, communications, and remarks—when preparing the fire support plan and order. While the FST executes the fire support plan, the company commander supervises that execution to ensure successful and appropriate prosecution of targets and the effectiveness of the created effects.

Planning of fires occurs within the construct of top-down planning, bottom-up refinement, and single battle concept. Accordingly, company commanders refine the fire plan that was initially published by HHQ to ensure that the relevant portion meets company requirements. Additionally, company commanders ensure development of an appropriate intelligence collection and observation plan that supports triggers, decision points, and controls for initiating and shifting fires. In general, company fire support plans should—

- Suppress enemy weapon systems that inhibit movement.
- Fix or neutralize bypassed enemy elements.
- Obscure enemy observation or screen friendly maneuver.
- Support breaching operations.
- Illuminate enemy positions.
- Conduct suppression of enemy air defenses.
- Disrupt/degrade local C2.

## **LIMITED VISIBILITY CONSIDERATIONS**

Successful attacks during limited visibility depend on leadership, reconnaissance, training, planning, and surprise. While these fundamentals apply to daylight attacks, attacks during limited visibility require viewing these fundamentals with a greater emphasis on control. In this case, limited visibility does not mean a temporary state of reduced observation as might apply to heavy rain, snow, or battlefield obscuration; rather, it refers to a severely degraded state of visibility throughout the conduct of operation, such as darkness or dense, persistent fog. Such reduced visibility usually applies to night operations, but the term limited visibility is used because many of the issues discussed in the following subparagraphs may apply to those occasional circumstances when company commanders find themselves operating in environments of sustained, limited visibility.

Units equipped with night vision devices (NVDs) may conduct limited visibility attacks much like daylight attacks. The fundamentals for a daylight attack still apply for nighttime attacks. Conducting attacks in this manner requires the following criteria:

- Personnel must be proficient in limited visibility attacks and the use of NVDs.
- Enough ambient light is available to employ the unit's NVDs.
- A successful reconnaissance of the objective area has been made.

- Additional control measures and techniques are considered.

### **Planning Considerations**

Because of the increased complexity and greater risk in conducting limited visibility attacks, company commanders should make the following considerations when planning them:

- Feints and other types of military deception may be more effective.
- Infiltration techniques require smaller units than normally employed. This requirement places greater responsibility and reliance upon the training and ability of junior leadership.
- The control of mounted and dismounted formations (to include navigation) requires decreased dispersion.
- Illumination support and/or employment of NVDs must be planned.
- Observing and controlling fires is more difficult.
- Rest plans must be implemented in conjunction with night operations to mitigate effects of fatigue and other human factors.
- Identification, friend or foe procedures, are even more critical.
- Negative communications are possible due to the limited visibility conditions, especially high frequency radios.
- All CSS functions, to include locating, treating, and evacuating casualties, require more time than usual.
- Linkups and passages of lines require increased planning and control measures.
- Degraded visibility increases the difficulty of bypassing or breaching enemy obstacles.
- Fire control techniques must be clearly established and easily understood.

### **Illumination and Fires**

Company commanders always plan for illumination methods and make them available in case the enemy either illuminates the battlefield or possesses a night vision capability. The use of illumination is also effective during consolidation and reorganization, particularly for CASEVAC. Illumination is available from artillery, mortars, grenade launchers, and hand-fired and aircraft flares. Illumination placed beyond the objective assists assaulting unit visibility by backlighting the enemy during their defense. Marines must be prepared to rapidly transition from conducting illuminated to nonilluminated operations and vice versa. In the orders process, company commanders issue specific guidance and criteria on the employment of illumination.

Given the visibility available by illumination, illuminated supported attacks are almost identical to daylight attacks. These may be most effective when speed is essential, when there is limited time for reconnaissance, or when the enemy is weak or disorganized. The commander must plan illumination time requirements and request sufficient ammunition to support the attack through its duration. Any break in illumination may reduce the effectiveness of suppressive fire when the attackers need it most.

In circumstances during which the enemy is likely to use illumination or possesses a night vision capability, company commanders should consider using smoke to obscure the enemy in the same manner as a daylight attack. As with normal obscuration fires, smoke effects are close to or on

enemy positions to avoid restricting friendly movement, with a particular emphasis placed on wind direction.

Shifting fires requires greater planning due to observer limitations but has the potential for greater shock effect on the enemy in conjunction with ground maneuver. Strict adherence to methods of synchronizing fires, such as time on targets or series timelines, is critical for both the main effort and supporting arms.

Deconfliction of CAS is significantly more difficult under limited visibility conditions and illumination can disrupt a pilot's ability to accurately deliver munitions. Company commanders must ensure the company's reporting discipline is good enough to allow the FST to deliver accurate identification of friendly locations to CAS platforms.

Limited visibility conditions hinder target designation for CAS and other supporting arms. In the company's fires plan, the FST reinforces methods of positive identification and includes redundant means for target designation should primary means fail or prove unable to see the target.

### **Reconnaissance and Rehearsals**

Reconnaissance is critical in every attack, but more so for attacks during limited visibility. The reconnaissance plan should include leaders down to the lowest level possible. While balancing the need for detailed information against the risk of deception and surprise, company commanders ensure that reconnaissance, route rehearsal, placement of guides, and other similar control measures occur during daylight, twilight, and times of limited visibility when possible. The intelligence collection plan should establish continuous surveillance of the objective in case the enemy repositions units and weapons or prepares additional obstacles. On those occasions when reconnaissance proves unsuccessful, company commanders should request a delay in the attack time to allow for further reconnaissance. If a delay is not possible, they should consider an illuminated or supported attack. Subordinate units rehearse all phases of the attack, paying particular attention to movement, position occupation, battlespace geometry considerations, and other control measures.

### **Simplicity**

The success of limited visibility attacks relies more on simplicity than on complex maneuvers. Attacks during periods of limited visibility do more than risk failure if compromised during the approach: a competent enemy taking advantage of such a vulnerable time will inflict considerable damage on such an exposed unit. Limiting the potential of mistakes is a function of limiting the complexity of the attack—commanders should keep their plans simple. Accordingly, company commanders should try to use small and easily identified objectives that are approached by simple, well-marked and guided routes and are driven by a well-defined decisive point upon which the combat power of the company focuses. The company uses a simple, explicit signal plan that incorporates event driven methodology and includes controlling direct and indirect fires.



## **Consolidation and Reorganization**

Consolidation and reorganization are the same as for a daylight attack with the following exceptions:

- Designating guides to lead elements forward to their positions.
- Changes to task organization are avoided to keep the consolidation plan simple.
- Locating and evacuating casualties and EPWs takes longer.
- Unit positions should be closer together to ease control and improve mutual support. Adjustment to positions occurs as visibility improves.

## **AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS**

Air assault operations are tactical movements by assault support aircraft that support a ground tactical plan. Air assault operations are deliberate, precise combat operations designed to allow the rifle company to strike over extended distances (regardless of terrain and without dependence on ground LOCs) and to attack the enemy when and where they are most vulnerable. Raids and assaults are the two primary missions for air assault forces. For more information on air assault operations, see MCTP 3-01B, *Air Assault Operations*.

The use of air assault operations occurs in situations that are limited in duration, require superior mobility or the ability to influence in depth, and are typically against undefended or lightly defended objectives. Due to the relative lack of tactical mobility once on the ground, ground forces usually land on or near the objective, may or may not operate in conjunction with other ground forces, and rely on planning and rehearsals to overcome initial disorganization after debarkation. The enemy threat determines wave composition, to include the size and makeup of the initial wave, follow-on waves, and preplanned contingency and logistical support waves.

Air assault operations provide a range of methods to exercise TAC-D, from the threat posed by the very existence of the capability to such overt methods as demonstration landing. Regardless of the mission and purpose, the planning of air assault operations is a unique process that requires the development of five basic plans with a reverse planning sequence:

- Ground tactical plan.
- Landing plan.
- Air movement plan.
- Loading plan.
- Staging plan.

## Planning Considerations

Because of the complexity of these operations and the vulnerability of air assault forces to ground fire and other aircraft, functional and detailed planning are centralized. The synchronization of maneuver and fires is essential.

**Task Organization.** The battalion is the lowest level unit staffed with sufficient personnel to plan, coordinate, and control air assault operations. Therefore, when company-sized air assault operations occur, most planning occurs at the battalion level. When the battalion conducts air assault operations, it becomes a task-organized force called an air assault task force. This task organization combines ground and aviation assets to accomplish the ground tactical plan.

**Enemy Threat.** The composition of the enemy threat, to include mobility and air defenses, determines the size and composition of the initial assault wave, the likelihood of an active enemy defense of the LZ, and the fire support and aviation escorts required to mitigate the threat.

**GO/NO GO Criteria.** During planning, mission *GO* and *NO-GO* criteria must be set. *GO* criteria are the prerequisites that need to be met, either equipment, personnel, or conditions prior to mission commencement based on friendly disposition. For example, the minimum number of Marines the GCE requires on the deck to defend against an enemy threat for a specified period of time. Conversely, *NO GO* criteria are the prerequisites that need to be met—equipment, personnel, or conditions—prior to mission commencement based on enemy disposition and weather. All elements of the air assault task force must make sure they have input to the overall mission *GO/NO GO* criteria.

Example items that may be included in the *GO* criteria for an air assault operation may be the minimum passengers for a mission from the GCE and, from the aviation combat element (ACE), the confirmed establishment of forward arming and refueling points.

Examples of items that may be included in the *NO GO* criteria for an air assault operation may be the presence of enemy armor on the objective from the GCE and the presence of effective enemy radar weapons systems in the objective area from the ACE. The ACE will also be required to set the weather conditions that preclude mission commencement from an aviation standpoint.

**Alternate Landing Zones.** When possible, commanders should select other LZs that will still allow mission accomplishment. The use of alternate LZs usually requires building contingency plans since the alternate LZ characteristics often change such things as the number of airframes that can land at any one time or the routes of the ground force.

**Re-embarkation.** Re-embarkation plans occur in two ways. The first applies to a planned withdrawal as in a raid. The second applies to unforeseen contingencies and, like all withdrawals, may or may not occur under enemy pressure. Immediate extract missions refer to re-embarkation occurring under enemy pressure. Even in those cases when the ground force expects to link up with another ground force, planners still create re-embarkation contingency plans.

**Casualty Evacuation Plan.** The CASEVAC plan conducted by the ground force is noticeably different from plans the force might usually conduct on its own. First, the limited tactical mobility of the ground force complicates movement of casualties over any appreciable distance. Second, the proximity of the enemy, the nature of the terrain, and other factors usually necessitate movement of casualties to some point where aircraft will be less vulnerable during extraction. Lastly, both factors indicate that CASEVAC might be delayed until medical augmentation of the ground force arrives.

**Immediate Action Plan.** Immediate action plans usually apply to the ground force and constitute actions that can range from reacting to unexpected contact with the enemy to actions on the objective. As such, they may or may not include the participation of the aviation element.

**Fire Plan for Assault.** In addition to the overall fire support plan for the ground tactical plan, the most complicated portion are those fires occurring before and during the landing phase. These fires may come from indirect ground and aviation assets. They may necessitate the insertion of ground observers sometime prior, the use of airborne observers, or both. They may occur along the aircraft ingress and egress routes. The success of these fires may directly affect the GO/NO GO criteria.

**Bump Plan.** Proper problem framing and solid GO/NO GO criteria determine the parameters of the bump plan. This plan determines the priority of the passengers remaining within the wave in the event of mechanical failure. If done correctly, when reduced to the absolute minimum number of aircraft for mission success, the assault force will still consist of the right number of the right skill sets to accomplish the mission. For more information on bump plans, see MCTP 3-01B, *Air Assault Operations*.

**Ground Force Situational Awareness.** Stick leaders and ground force leadership within the assault waves should take advantage of such things as jump seats and extra aircraft helmets with intercoms to maintain situational awareness of the operation and orientation of their aircraft especially when landing.

### **Key Billets and Duties**

There are six key leaders for air assault operations—mission commander, air mission commander, assault force commander, assault flight leader, escort flight leader, and marshalling area control officer (MACO).

The mission commander is the senior ground force commander responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing the operation. If a company acts as the ground force, the battalion commander is usually the mission commander. Whenever possible, the mission commander will be airborne to maintain communications with the air assault forces, supporting arms, and their headquarters.

The air mission commander is the Marine aviator designated by the commander of the aviation unit tasked to support the air assault operation. The air mission commander is responsible to the mission commander that all aircraft and support operations are conducted according to the needs

of the ground tactical plan. They are also responsible for establishing and executing the air movement plan.

The air assault force commander is the commander of the ground force. Their unit makes up the air assault force and they are responsible for the accomplishment of the ground tactical plan.

The assault flight leader is an experienced aviator in command of the assault support flight. The assault flight leader reports to the air mission commander and assists in the planning of flight routes, LZs, and all other facets of the air assault mission that directly involve assault support aircraft.

The escort flight leader is an experienced aviator in command of the escort flight. The escort flight leader reports to the air mission commander and assists in the planning of LZ preparation, fire support planning, threat mitigation, and all other facets of the air assault mission that directly involve attack aircraft.

At the company level, the MACO is usually the company first sergeant. During the planning phase, MACOs develop and coordinate the manifest and air assault team wave and serial assignment table. During the extraction phase of the operation, they ensure the accountability of each wave and establish “the gate” (a control point). The MACO collocates with the terminal controller within the extract LZ and ensures full stick accountability prior to initiation of extract. Once extract begins, the MACO will coordinate the departure of various sticks through a control point. The MACO is the last to depart.

### **Assault Support Serial Assignment Table**

Building and maintaining the assault support serial assignment table and manifest is one of the most demanding and tedious procedures in the planning process due to variations in aircraft availability and the METT-T impact on personnel requirements. In general, as time passes, fewer aircraft and more ground force personnel become available. Air assault forces should prepare to land in two or more waves and create linkup plans accordingly. The command element and FST should land in the initial wave to take control of the fire plan. There are two types of manifest building procedures: deliberate and hasty. The load plan should—

- Maintain unit integrity as much as possible.
- Spread load crew-served weapons (CSWs).
- Spread load the command element.
- Spread load information capabilities and key enablers.

### **Supporting Fires**

Initial fires may begin as early as the loading phase to shape the battlespace, such as by destroying or suppressing enemy air defenses. They may continue during the air movement phase in support of the movement itself, while continuing in the objective and landing areas. During the landing phase, fires address the areas immediately around each LZ and any threats that might influence the arrival and departure of aircraft from those LZs. Fire plans address the entire landing phase (multiple waves), the execution of the ground tactical plan, planned re-

embarkation, and any contingency plans, such as immediate extract. Fire support plans developed to support the landing plan must address the following:

- Will fires support a deception plan?
- Will the air assault task force use surprise fires or is the enemy threat robust enough to dictate a more deliberate approach?

The fires plan addresses proper weaponeering to avoid creating obstacles to landing and maneuver through collateral damage to the LZ, such as undesirable cratering, knocked down trees, and obscuration. During planning, evaluation of the fires plan against the elements of battlespace geometry is continuous to ensure uninterrupted suppression during insertion of friendly forces.

Fires planning includes avoiding task saturation of escort aircraft or determining a requirement for more escorts. Common tasks for escort aircraft are employment during air movement, fires in support of LZ preparation, and the possibility of use as CAS for the ground tactical plan. Escorts that must conduct engagements during air movement and LZ preparation may not have enough ordnance left to support the ground force.

Fires planning also includes battle handover drills and rehearsals between various observers throughout execution of the plan. Someone forward, such as a FAC (airborne) or qualified ground-based observer, conducts initial shaping fires in the battlespace, to include such things as refinement and BDA. Soon after the arrival of the initial wave, the air assault force commander will take charge of the fires plan from that forward positioned observer. During extract, this process is reversed.

### **Landing Zones/Pickup Zones**

Landing zones and pickup zones (PZs) share many characteristics. The definitions indicate that an LZ is any designated zone in which an aircraft lands; whereas a PZ is a place where troops or equipment are picked up. A PZ may consist of one or more LZs.

***Landing Zone Considerations.*** The ground force provides security to LZs until abandoned. Preplanned landing patterns should support the mission commander's designated scheme of maneuver and possess easily identifiable and accessible staging points. If required, LZ selection should include suitability for establishing CSS functions, defensive positions, and similar ground requirements. Control of the LZ and PZ occurs over primary and secondary frequencies.

***Pickup Zone Considerations.*** The ground force provides security to PZs until abandoned. Planning of PZs is critical, to include the location of AAs and easily identifiable and accessible staging points. The MACO establishes PZs as planned, aided by a PZ control party that—

- Prepares, maintains, and marks landing sites and removes or marks obstacles.
- Is prepared, trained, and equipped to mark and provide initial terminal guidance at night, which includes proper selection of marking material for pilots with NVDs.
- Is prepared, trained, and equipped to direct and control air assault operations within the PZ and support air assault units landing in the zone.

## **MOUNTED OPERATIONS**

Marine infantry companies are foot mobile by design. When required, task-organized infantry companies may execute mounted operations in vehicles that are wheeled or tracked, armored or unarmored, or some combination thereof. Mission requirements, length of an operation, logistical support, and other considerations drive the methods by which infantry companies receive vehicular support. Such support can be internal, external, or by cross-attachment. For more information on armor integration with infantry, see Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.1, *Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team*.

When employing the internal support method, the infantry company physically possesses a suite of vehicles that may or may not be suitable to mount the entire company simultaneously. Internal support usually requires the infantry company to train and provide its own drivers; conduct its own basic maintenance; and conduct other logistical operations, such as fueling, maintenance tracking, and accountability.

When employing the external support method, a vehicular unit, such as a truck or assault amphibian platoon, supports the infantry company. In general, enough vehicles arrive with the supporting unit to accommodate the entire company. The support unit may be attached depending on the length of the operation. While the vehicular unit provides the personnel, vehicles, and maintenance needs for the vehicles, the infantry company can expect such increased logistical requirements as life support and fuel. Regardless of the length of the operation or the command relationship between the vehicular unit and the company, it is critical that the company commander set an appropriate tone and take positive action to develop teamwork between both units.

### **Planning Considerations**

Planning mounted operations requires more energy and diligence than planning for other operations due to the likelihood of multiple attachments and differing command relationships. There is also the possibility of company ownership of vehicles, increased complexity of fire support planning, impact of logistical limitations, and employment considerations of a wide variety of weapon and vehicle systems. The following factors should be considered when planning mounted operations:

- Vehicle maintenance responsibilities to include the assignment or allocation of maintenance personnel.
- Employment of combat engineers.
- Communication planning with multiple internal vehicle, subunit, and command nets.
- ROE limitations on weapon, ammunition, and pyrotechnic employment.
- Use of tactical control measures and coordination to enable decentralized control over greater distances.
- Reserve decisions to include establishment, combat power, employment triggers, and reconstitution planning.
- Personnel training requirements, such as communications, vehicle drivers, CSWs, and mounted land navigation.
- Terrain and weather limitations.

- Development of mounted operations SOP.
- Logistic planning for increased petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) use and maintenance requirements to include organic refueling capability.

The capabilities of mounted units include the following:

- Speed/mobility.
- Increased firepower.
- Increased C2 capabilities.
- Enhanced force protection.
- Increased lift capacity for self-sustainment.

The limitations of mounted units include the following:

- Dependency on fuel.
- Vehicle mishaps and recovery.
- Vehicle maintenance.
- Requirement for trained drivers.
- Decreased number of dismounts available.
- Limited mobility in restricted terrain.

### **Mounted Immediate Action and Battle Drills**

Like all immediate action drills, mounted immediate action drills allow units to make effective, immediate responses to enemy contact without hesitation. They are simple, well-rehearsed, usually event driven, and backed up by a simple signal plan that uses brevity codes. Immediate action drills are not set rules or maxims and company commanders can modify basic drills according to environment, formations, terrain, enemy threat, and company capabilities. Immediate action drills do not exist to win the encounter, though poorly executed drills can certainly lose the encounter. Rather, immediate action drills exist to provide the opportunity for unit leadership to execute the basic steps in addressing any chance contact or meeting engagement, to deploy and report, to develop the situation, to determine a COA, and to execute the COA. Battle drills exist at the vehicle and crew level, and represent those basic actions needed for the vehicle to perform as an effective part of the unit.

Immediate action drills include the following:

- Actions upon contact.
- Antitank guided missile (ATGM) drill.
- Incoming artillery drill.
- Air attack.
- IED or possible IED.

Battle drills include the following:

- Dismount drill (normal and rapid).

- Disabled vehicle or roll over.
- Disabled weapon and reload drills.
- Incapacitated driver.
- Hasty roadblock set up.
- Destruction plan.
- Vehicle recovery plan.



# CHAPTER 8

## DEFENSE

This chapter discusses the functional and detailed planning, preparation, and execution of defensive operations. These operations are temporary measures conducted to identify or create enemy weaknesses, protect the force, and create the opportunity to go on the offense. While properly conducted defensive operations can defeat numerically superior forces, the offense remains the form of decisive action. Infantry forces in the defense rely on terrain and surprise to support their defensive form of maneuver. They maintain an offensive focus and seek to avoid static defenses that surrender the initiative. For more information on defensive tactics see MCWP 3-01, *Offensive and Defensive Tactics*.

### PURPOSE OF THE DEFENSE

The purpose of the defense is to defeat an enemy attack, protect the force, stabilize a situation, gain time, economize forces and resources, and gain the initiative for offensive operations. The defense and defensive functions are inherent parts of all operations across the competition continuum. While the defense may sometimes be stronger than the offense and it may sometimes prevent enemy victory, it rarely delivers victory on its own—the offense provides the decisive form of action.

In offensive operations, a portion of the force may defend an exposed flank to allow the main effort to continue to pursue an enemy. The defense denies key or vital terrain and infrastructure to a threat while retaining similar critical elements for friendly use. Defense operations seek to shape the situation for offensive action and victory either by attriting, canalizing, or fixing enemy forces, or by harboring resources, guarding the populace, and providing security. The defense demands that company commanders demonstrate flexibility, adaptability, and agility since the end state is always to regain the initiative. In conducting the defense, company commanders protect vital forces and assets, disrupt the threat, and generate the effects necessary to set the conditions for successful offensive action.

### TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

In general, the infantry company, as part of any defense, may defend, disrupt, delay, withdraw, counterattack, or conduct any other defensive method as part of a larger type of defense. Indeed, company commanders may combine or phase between different types of a defense as part of their overall plan for mission accomplishment. Within these options, there are three broad types of defensive efforts—area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde.

#### Area Defense

Area defense concentrates on defeating the enemy by denying them access to designated terrain or infrastructure for a specified time. The infantry company may use any number of defensive methods to accomplish its mission.

### **Mobile Defense**

Mobile defense orients on the destruction of the enemy by allowing them to become vulnerable in their attack and then defeating them through decisive offensive action by a striking force. The infantry company may use any number of defensive methods to set the conditions necessary for the success of the offense.

### **Retrograde**

Retrograde involves organized movement away from the enemy. A transitional operation, the retrograde defense occurs within a larger scheme designed to regain the initiative from the enemy. There are five forms of retrograde—delay, withdrawal, retirement, denial, and stay-behind.

## **ORGANIZATION OF THE BATTLESPACE**

The defensive sector in depth consists of three areas: the security area, main battle area (MBA), and rear area (see Figure 8-1). These areas are equally applicable to any operational environment.

For any echelon of command, the security area is forward of the forward edge of the battle area assigned to the security forces. It is where security forces execute assigned tasks. The commander adds depth to the defense by extending the security area as far forward as is tactically feasible, which allows security forces to inflict the greatest possible damage and disruption to the enemy attack by the time the enemy reaches the MBA.



The rear area extends forward from a command's rear boundary to the rear boundary of the MBA. This area exists primarily for CSS functions. Rear operations include those functions of security and sustainment required to maintain continuity of operations by the force as a whole.

## **ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE**

In a similar manner to other functions across a range of military operations, conducting defensive action usually imposes multiple tasks on the commander. Such tasks may be phases, conditions, or elements that are particular to any type of defense or form of defensive maneuver. These requirements directly affect the way the commander divides the available combat power and resources in organizing for the defense. The conduct of the defense is built around the concept of security, MBA, and rear area forces.

### **Main Effort**

Company commanders weight the main effort to ensure success at the decisive point. In the defense, this role often lies with the tasks associated with the MBA force. This often means that the main effort contains the greatest concentration of combat power, but not always. The purpose of the main effort is to accomplish the company's mission, and the designation of a main effort allows the company to focus all its energies, actions, and resources toward enabling the main effort to achieve success. As the element that achieves the company's mission, the main effort's task and purpose should nest directly with that of the company. For example, when conducting a sector defense, a company commander is likely to charge the company's main effort with tasks that will result in the achievement of decisive effects in the primary engagement area. This could include designating priority of fires and attaching various enablers to the main effort.

### **Supporting Efforts**

Supporting efforts enable the main effort to achieve success at the decisive point. The completion of tasks associated with security and rear area forces most often involve one or more supporting efforts. For example, in conducting a sector defense, a company commander may task one of the company's supporting efforts with disrupting the enemy in the security area to allow the main effort to achieve success in an engagement area in the MBA. The mission assigned to supporting efforts must directly support the main effort's purpose. Such nesting allows supporting efforts to exercise initiative to react on the battlefield in ways to ensure the main effort's success, including being prepared to assume the main effort's mission. Supporting efforts receive the combat power, attachments, and any other enablers needed to accomplish their mission in support of the main effort. Across all types of the defense, supporting efforts may use BPs or successive BPs, delay and disruption, deception, lane closures, suppressive fires, or other tactics to—

- Allow the main effort to maneuver to the decisive point.
- Prevent the enemy from reacting to the defense.
- Cause the enemy to dissipate their fire support, lose their formation cohesion, or prematurely commit their reserves.
- Prevent the enemy from surprising the main effort.

## **Reserve**

The primary mission of the reserve is to conduct decisive action, take advantage of sudden opportunities, reinforce main effort success, and exploit main effort success. The reserve is usually associated with the MBA forces and its employment at the decisive moment is the commanders' principal means to influence the action. A reserve does not reinforce failure. The reserve must be large enough to exploit success, yet its size should not materially weaken the main effort. In a deliberate defense, the reserve might be a very small part of the company, whereas, in a mobile defense, the reserve may constitute the bulk of the company, ready for commitment as the main effort's counterattack. Company commanders consider the size of the reserve depending on the following:

- Contemplated missions of the reserve.
- Forces available.
- Type of maneuver planned.
- Terrain over which the reserve must travel.
- Possible hostile reactions.

## **ENGAGEMENT AREA DEVELOPMENT**

The engagement area is where the company commander intends to contain and finish the enemy force using the massed fires of all available weapons. Depending on the size of the enemy force, company commanders may reasonably expect to destroy the entire enemy force in their engagement area. If the likely size of the enemy force is greater than the company can reasonably expect to finish, then the company must either receive additional resources or the company commanders must construct a defensive scheme of maneuver that allows for attrition of the enemy prior to their arrival in the engagement area. The success of finishing effects depends on how effectively the commander can integrate the obstacle plan, indirect fire plan, direct fire plan, and the terrain within the engagement area to achieve the company's tactical purpose. Beginning with evaluation of METT-T and continuing throughout the IPB process, engagement area development follows these steps, which are amplified in the subsequent paragraphs:


- Identify all likely enemy avenues of approach.
- Determine likely enemy schemes of maneuver.
- Determine where to destroy the enemy.
- Emplace weapon systems.
- Plan and integrate obstacles.
- Plan and integrate indirect fires (organic/nonorganic).
- Rehearse execution of operation in the engagement area.

### **Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of Approach**

The following procedures and considerations apply when identifying the enemy's likely avenues of approach (see Figure 8-2)—

- *Conduct initial reconnaissance.* If possible, this should be done from the enemy's perspective along each avenue of approach into the sector or engagement area.

- *Identify key and decisive terrain.* This includes locations that afford positions of advantage over the enemy; positions the enemy may use to establish overwatch, base of fire, and OPs in support of their attack; and natural obstacles and chokepoints that restrict forward movement.
- *Determine cover and concealment.* Determine which avenues of approach will provide cover and concealment for the enemy while allowing them to maintain their tempo. Determine what terrain the enemy is likely to use to support each avenue.
- *Evaluate lateral routes.* Evaluate lateral routes adjoining each avenue of approach that the enemy may use to enhance their flexibility.



### Legend

K key terrain

Km kilometer

MRB motorized rifle battalion


**Figure 8-2. Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of Approach.**

### Determine Enemy Scheme of Maneuver

When continuing IPB within COA development to determine relative combat power analysis and to develop most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs (see Figure 8-3), the company commander must—

- Determine how the enemy will structure the attack in terms of speed, formations, sequencing, and placement of combat multipliers, such as engineering assets.
- Determine how the enemy will use its reconnaissance assets to include infiltration efforts and OPs for supporting arms.
- Determine where and when the enemy will change formations and establish SBF positions.
- Determine where, when, and how the enemy will conduct their assault and breaching operations.

- Determine where and when the enemy will commit follow-on forces and reserves.
- Determine likely enemy reactions to friendly counteractions.



#### Legend

AA avenue of approach

K key terrain


**Figure 8-3. Determine Enemy Scheme of Maneuver.**

#### Determine Where to Destroy the Enemy

After determining the enemy's most likely COA, company commanders determine the place where the company's combat power has the greatest opportunity to finish the enemy (see Figure 8-4) and accomplish the following:

- Identify and mark where the company will mass its fires on the enemy.

- Identify target reference points (TRPs) that match the place where the company seeks to create the desired effect through the massing of fires.
- Identify secondary TRPs to allow the company to rapidly mass fires elsewhere in the engagement area should the enemy seek to maneuver in a different manner than expected.
- Record the name and location of all TRPs.
- Determine how many weapon systems must focus fires on each TRP to generate the desired effects.
- Determine which platoons will mass fires on each TRP.
- Develop the direct fire planning and control measures necessary to focus fires on each TRP.



**Figure 8-4. Determine Where to Destroy the Enemy.**


### **Emplace Weapon Systems**

After determining where to destroy the enemy, planners address weapon system placement to enhance weapon strengths while minimizing weaknesses. Long-range antitank missile systems might seek positions at a distance from and on the enemy's flank. Friendly positions are built around the placement of weapons. The following steps apply in selecting and improving BPs and emplacing CSW systems and infantry positions (see Figure 8-5):

- Select tentative weapon positions with regard to the enemy's most likely COA, the intent of the company commander to destroy the enemy, and the terrain available.
- Select subunit BPs to support weapon emplacement.
- Conduct a leader's reconnaissance of the tentative BPs.
- Traverse the engagement area to confirm that selected positions are tactically advantageous.
- Confirm and mark the selected BPs.



- Conduct battlespace geometry analysis to ensure that BPs and their fires do not conflict with those of adjacent units and that positions are mutually supportive.
- Select primary, alternate, and supplementary fighting positions to generate the desired effect for each TRP.
- Ensure that platoon commanders, platoon sergeants, and squad leaders position weapon systems so that the required number of weapons and platoons effectively covers each TRP.



**Legend**  
FSV fire support vehicle

**Figure 8-5. Emplace Weapon Systems.**

When creating the direct fire plan, company commanders consider the following questions:


- Which enemy weapon system should be engaged first?
- How will the company initiate fires?
- Which company weapon systems will fire first?
- What are the target priorities for the various company weapon systems?
- What is the desired effect of fires from each platoon (platoon missions)?
- How will the company distribute the fires of platoons to engage the enemy laterally and in depth?
- On what will platoons focus their fires? How will platoons know where to engage? Will they be able to see and understand the control measures?
- How will the company mass fires to deal with multiple enemy threats and generate the desired volume of fire?

- How will company commanders position themselves to effectively control fires?
- How will the company shift fires when necessary? How will the company focus fires on new targets?
- How will the company address likely enemy reactions to company fires?
- How will the company administer weapons control statuses?
- Is each company weapon system employed to maximize effectiveness?

### **Plan and Integrate Obstacles**

The purpose of obstacle planning within the engagement area is to support the commander's intent through obstacle emplacement and integration with fires to finish the enemy (see Figure 8-6). Obstacles must allow the enemy into the engagement area and then contain them there. The focus at the battalion level and below is the integration of fires and obstacles. At the battalion level, obstacle planning is very directive and detailed and it centers on obstacle groups. At the company level, obstacle planning deals with the actual sighting and emplacement of individual obstacles within the groups. The following steps apply in planning and integrating obstacles in the company defense:

- Site and mark individual obstacle locations in coordination with the engineers.
- Provide security for the engineering effort, which first marks the trace of the obstacles and then begins emplacement at points closest to the enemy first.
- Verify that the marked trace of the obstacles meets the commander's intent and is covered by fire.
- Create and mark fire control measures, such as TRPs, in the engagement area.
- Refine direct and indirect fire control measures.
- Identify lanes and gaps.
- Report obstacle locations and gaps to HHQ.




**Figure 8-6. Plan and Integrate Obstacles.**

### **Plan and Integrate Indirect Fires**

While fires planning is integral to development of the defensive scheme of maneuver, fires planning is proofed and refined within engagement area development (see Figure 8-7). The following steps apply in planning and integrating indirect fires:

- Determine the purpose of fires throughout the battle, from initial actions in the security area to destruction of the enemy at the point of decision in the engagement area.
- Develop EFSTs that support the purpose of fires.
- Determine the places to accomplish the EFSTs.
- Establish the observation plan with observer redundancy for each target.
- Establish triggers and assessment criteria.
- Obtain accurate target location and conduct refinement by fire if possible.
- Plan final protective fires.
- Establish fire support coordination measures, such as RFAs and no-fire areas.



#### Legend

FSV fire support vehicle  
MGS machine gun system

**Figure 8-7. Plan and Integrate Indirect Fires.**

### Rehearse Execution of Operation in Engagement Area

The purpose of an execution rehearsal is to ensure all company personnel understand the plan and all elements are prepared to cover their assigned areas with direct and indirect fires. The rehearsal should cover the following actions:

- Involvement of key leaders and attached units.
- Rearward passage of security forces (as required).
- Closure of lanes (as required).
- Movement from hide positions to the BP.
- Use of fire commands, triggers, and maximum engagement lines to initiate direct and indirect fires.
- Shifting of fires to refocus and redistribute fire effects.
- Triggers for emplacement of scatterable mine systems.
- Preparation and transmission of critical reports.
- Assessment of the effects of enemy weapon systems.
- Displacement to alternate, supplementary, or subsequent BPs.
- Cross-leveling or resupply of ammunition.
- Evacuation of casualties.

## **ADJACENT UNIT COORDINATION**

The purpose of adjacent unit coordination is to ensure unity of effort across the companies so that the battalion accomplishes its mission. Items that adjacent units must coordinate include the following:

- Unit positions, including locations of C2 nodes.
- Locations of OPs and patrols.
- Overlapping fires to ensure that direct fire responsibility is clearly defined.
- TRPs.
- Alternate, supplementary, and subsequent BPs.
- Indirect fire information.
- Location and type of obstacles.
- Air and missile defense considerations, if applicable.
- Signature management considerations.
- UAS and counter-UAS considerations.
- Routes to be used during occupation and repositioning.
- Sustainment considerations.

## **MOUNTED OPERATIONS**

Chapter 7 discussed offensive considerations, planning, and employment of Marine infantry with various types of tracked and wheeled vehicles. Here, the focus is narrowed to address only the unique considerations when conducting mounted operations in the defense.

When integrating mounted infantry into a defensive plan, company commanders seek to maintain the advantage of vehicle mobility and their mounted weapon systems. Just as in the offense, vehicles and infantry work together. Infantry accompanies vehicles conducting offensive operations as part of the defense and infantry occupies defensive positions to both receive the protection of and provide survivability to vehicles.

Company commanders strive to maintain one of the primary advantages of vehicles on the battlefield—mobility. Even within strong point or BP defenses, providing a vehicle with a hide position and two or three firing positions allows that vehicle to respond flexibly throughout the defensive position in a manner that both supports the company commander and enhances vehicle survivability. In a similar manner, tracked or wheeled vehicles, can conduct multiple missions within a defense based upon their mobility. These vehicles can assist the security force forward, conduct a rearward passage of lines and occupy positions to support an engagement area, and conduct multiple displacements within the company's battlespace as needed. While there are always instances that could require vehicles to occupy fixed positions in a defense, these should constitute exceptions vice the rule.

With few exceptions, vehicle mounted weapon systems represent significant combat power additions to what is usually available to the infantry company. Depending on the enemy threat and the defensive scheme of maneuver, company commanders seek to position these weapon

systems in such a manner that they cover suspected enemy avenues of approach, are able to deliver decisive effects in an engagement area, and play to the strengths of that particular weapon system (such as flank shots for antiarmor weapon systems).

Vehicles are not invincible. Company commanders maintain vehicle survivability by assigning reasonable missions, enabling mobility within the defense to allow vehicle displacement, creating survivable positions from which vehicles and their crews fight, and ensuring adequate dismounted infantry support.

### **Planning Considerations**

When planning a mounted infantry defense, company commanders consider the same organization issues that face them during the offense. Company commanders may receive vehicles that they need to operate and maintain; they may receive units in DS, such as a truck or an AAV platoon, with their own organic personnel structure that requires integration into the company. Some additional considerations include the following:

- Increased use of tactical control measures and enhanced planning and coordination to enable decentralized control over greater distances.
- Reserve decisions to include establishment, combat power, employment triggers, and reconstitution planning.
- Terrain and weather limitations, which affect vehicle operations and task organization of subunits for assigned defensive tasks.
- Defensive task priorities for limited amounts of dismounted infantry to include retention of key terrain, protection of vehicles in restricted terrain, personnel for defensive labor tasks, and the counterreconnaissance effort.
- Plans for and rehearsals of communications between dismounted infantry and vehicles and signaling methods in the defense to include such items as target designation and displacement.
- Conduct of logistical functions and movement, to include engineering, within a company's defensive battlespace about which the enemy is actively seeking information and the opportunity to employ indirect fires.
- Establishment of plans and triggers for rearward passage of lines to include vehicle mishap and recovery criteria.

### **Task Organization**

As in the offense, there are some general principles that company commanders consider when using the infantry and vehicle team in the defense. Regardless of the manner in which the infantry company is mounted, company commanders work to create company teams that are flexible, self-sufficient, and maintain the unity of command.

Company commanders ensure that their company and platoons maintain similar degrees of mobility and that their task organization supports the defensive scheme of maneuver. In the defense, the less movement the enemy can observe, the better the chances of maintaining surprise. Company commanders seek to answer the greater logistical demand of their vehicles in the following ways:

- By providing self-sufficiency through a combination of prepositioning and assignment of logistical assets, such as refuelers, to subunits.
- By masking movement by route and time.
- By conducting resupply during times of limited visibility.

As in the offense, mounted forces may conduct defensive schemes of maneuver that require subunits to operate at distances and at tempos that preclude centralized control. Company commanders assign and equip subordinate units accordingly. Antiarmor forces, which operate in the security area to attrit an advancing enemy before they reach the MBA, may work for one platoon commander who possesses an FO and JTAC to prosecute the fire plan. This unity of command provides the company commander with the ability to affect the fight while allowing the units in the security area the flexibility needed to accomplish their missions.

### **Combat Support**

Company commanders will most likely receive many of the same combat assets when conducting the defense with mounted infantry as they do when conducting offensive operations, such as assault amphibian platoon, CAAT, supporting arms, security, and combat engineers.

***Assault Amphibian Platoon.*** Infantry company commanders remain aware that assault amphibian platoons usually work for the company commander in a direct support relationship and that they possess their own internal organization that must be integrated into the company. In the defense, AAVs offer the company increased HMG firepower and offer significant increases in communication flexibility by using the multiple radios on each vehicle. Because of the light armor of the AAV and the lack of a stabilized gun system, company commanders weigh AAV employment and survivability against the priority of work in the defense. Employment of AAV firepower requires static firing positions, which may need to be dug before firing positions of more survivable armor.

***Combined Antiarmor Team.*** Mounted antiarmor assets, such as antiarmor and HMGs, often arrive as part of a CAAT that combines ATGM systems with mounted HMGs. As part of CAATs, vehicle mounted TOW or Javelin missiles assist the mobile defense and offer company commanders further flexibility since their long ranges help to maintain surprise. Mounted ATGM systems can fight throughout the defensive battlefield to accomplish multiple missions and tactical tasks. Survivability of both the weapons and the light armored vehicles that mount them remains a concern. Though these systems are ideal for moving around the battlefield, dismounting or placing these systems in defensive positions requires the same attention to survivability and the priority of work as applies to AAVs. In engagement areas, company commanders integrate the effects of these weapon systems with the rest of the antiarmor assets available to them.

The HMGs provide the CAAT increased flexibility to engage different types of targets while providing security for the ATGMs. With ranges of both HMGs and ATGMs in excess of 1,500 meters, CAATs may attrit enemy forces in the security area, create effects in engagement areas, cover displacement, and screen flanks.

**Supporting Arms.** Supporting arms are critical to such functions as destroying the enemy where designated by the company commander, delaying and disrupting the enemy, screening friendly displacements, and providing aerial reconnaissance and observation. When planning the defensive fight, the company commander ensures that qualified controllers of air, artillery, and UAS assets are positioned to conduct the company's fire plan. Company commanders must properly plan and phase defensive fires against a mobile and moving enemy. Since artillery cannot "chase" a moving target, the company commander ensures that proper triggers are a part of the fires plan and that the FST remains disciplined in staying ahead of the enemy.

In the defense, fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft CAS remain important combat multipliers for the company commander. As in the offense, vehicle marking, and friendly unit location information is critical for combat identification by friendly forces to reduce potential for friendly fire. The company FST, to include attached FACs, travel forward in the formation to gain and maintain the situational awareness of the company fire requirements and maneuver locations.

**Security.** The requirement for an aggressive security effort forward is the same for mounted or dismounted operations—just the methods differ. Depending on the terrain and enemy threat, the security fight may consist of mounted operations, dismounted operations, or a combination of both. The company commander ensures that the leadership designated to conduct security operations possesses the maturity and judgment to operate alone. The company commander ensures that the security effort can sustain itself, control the fires of supporting arms, and support the overall defensive scheme of maneuver. Company commanders do not limit themselves to organic ground reconnaissance assets but seek additional sensor support and integrate into HHQ security efforts as required.

**Combat Engineers.** In mounted operations, engineers perform their traditional mobility, countermobility, and survival roles through obstacle emplacement, lane closing, route improvement, and survivability measures. Determining the engineer priority of work in the defense begins with a decision whether the company will conduct a hasty or deliberate defense; however, regardless of the type of defense, the company commander will face a time constraint that will dictate prioritization of the engineer effort. In the defense, general guidance is not enough. While some tasks in execution can rely on company SOP, most guidance must be passed in some detail by the company commander.

## **EXPEDITIONARY OUTPOSTS**

A combat outpost (COP) is a reinforced OP that can conduct limited offensive, stability, or other operations. A COP provides security to its immediate area and enables direct contact with the local populace. These benefits are unavailable from remote bases. The strategy carries with it potential downsides, such as increased FP concerns and decreased operational flexibility; however, these weaknesses are acceptable considering the significant increases in population contact and security. Emplacing a company or platoon COP in sector is a deliberate operation that requires detailed problem framing, site selection, and the expectation of requirements for additional logistical support.



Outposts may be employed to—

- Secure key terrain, LOCs, weapon systems, sensors, or infrastructure.
- Provide force protection and survivability of the unit.
- Gather intelligence.

### **Priorities of Work**

Since COPs, by the nature of their presence among enemy threat elements, face increased risk, consideration of placement, timing, and security throughout planning, construction, and occupation is critical. The following are some considerations:

- Ensure the position is free of noncombatants. Avoid displacing people when possible and, if unavoidable, ensure that they receive timely and proper restitution. If necessary, place appropriate signage in local language to direct, redirect, warn, and provide any other guidance necessary.
- Emplace key weapon systems. Select key weapon and CSW positions covering likely mounted and dismounted avenues of approach.
- Create and support a direct fire plan. Company personnel clear fields of fire by removing obstacles and creating loopholes and similar measures while preparing fire control measures, such as range cards, aiming stakes, sector stakes, and TRPs.
- Construct positions with overhead cover and use camouflage to break up outlines. Make target acquisition harder and counter sniper threats.
- Identify and secure surface and subsurface avenues of approach, such as rooftops, sewers, basements, and stairwells.
- Construct barriers and emplace obstacles to deny the enemy any access to streets, underground passages, and buildings that provide an advantage over the COP. Obstacles should delay and disrupt enemy threat attempts to approach the COP.
- Integrate barriers and obstacles with key weapons.
- Improve and mark internal movement routes between positions as well as alternate and supplementary positions.
- Stockpile ammunition, food, firefighting equipment, and drinking water.

### **Counterinfiltration and Early Warning**

The key to any defense is detecting a threat before it becomes a danger. Effective COP defense lies in identifying threats—the most dangerous threat is infiltration. The best defense against these threats is the population that surrounds the COP. Internally displaced people, merchants, or shopkeepers are potential sources of intelligence about enemy attacks on bases. One of the purposes of a COP is to place the company in direct contact with the populace. Company personnel must take advantage of such proximity and talk with their neighbors.

### **Combat Outpost Construction Considerations**

Building a COP is a complex task that must be well thought out, with a clear vision from the beginning for expansion and development. The commander should integrate trained engineers, either military or civilian to assist in constructing the base. If the threat environment supports it, use of local companies and population is preferred. The following subparagraphs discuss critical considerations.

**Force Protection.** All elements of COP construction, whether occupying and modifying an existing structure or building a new position, take into account enemy threat capabilities and internal security considerations.

**Enemy.** Construction, modification, and renovation ensure the following:

- Adequate coverage of dead spaces.
- Creation of a safety zone to mitigate the effects of enemy rocket attacks.
- All around observation.
- Countermeasures for vehicleborne threats.
- Ability to deliver direct and indirect fires effectively.

**Security.** Security measures augment survivability and FP and disrupt threat capabilities. Security measures include the following:

- Concrete walls, prefabricated barriers, and earthen berms for perimeter protection.
- Concertina wire, both within the position (similar to strong points) and outside the position, for canalization and disruption of dismounts.
- At least two entry control points with signage and kits for such actions as enforcing traffic patterns, conducting escalation of force continuum procedures, and searching vehicles.
- Guard towers at each corner that are reinforced with sandbags, ballistic glass, and sniper screens.
- Ground sensors and surveillance systems.
- Chain link screens to protect positions from rocket-propelled grenades and hand grenades.
- Counterbattery and countermortar radar.

**Equipment.** Combat outpost equipment considerations are METT-T dependent but may include the following:

- Kitchen sets.
- Motor pool assets.
- First and second echelon maintenance enablers and parts.
- Power generators.
- Earth-moving equipment.
- Refrigeration equipment.
- Communication equipment.
- Morale, welfare, and recreation equipment.
- Air conditioner and heater units.
- Prefabricated barriers.
- Barriers.
- Bulletproof glass.
- Kevlar blankets.
- Entry control point kits.

- Pest and rodent control.
- Burn barrels.
- Building material and tools.
- Camouflage netting.
- Maintenance tools.
- Firefighting equipment.
- Sound or alert system (indirect fire).
- Clearing barrels.
- Signs.

**Storage.** Storage space is created by building appropriate structures, such as prefabricated storage containers. Despite operating in a tactical environment, commanders may not ignore the rules and regulations governing storage of ammunition, hazardous waste, and other items. Storage considerations include the following:

- Waste storage.
- Armory.
- Ammunition.
- Fuel.
- Chow.
- Water.
- Supply.
- Unexploded ordnance.
- Valuables.

**Electrical.** When developing the plan to power a COP, planners rely first on local power (main), second on generators (backup), and third on power converters off vehicles (tertiary backup). Poor electrical planning and shoddy wiring present a substantial risk to FP due to fires and electrocution. Electrical considerations include the following:

- Use trained and certified electricians.
- Envision the proper wiring and layout of zone power grids.
- Use generators for backup and ensure they are safely and properly linked into the power grid.
- Create a proactive sustainment and maintenance process.

**Plumbing.** Improper field sanitation presents a substantial risk to FP due to the risk of disease. Plumbing considerations include the following:

- Use trained and certified plumbers.
- Bulk water from locally drilled wells is typically the main source of water.
- Proper cleaning and maintenance of portable toilets and disposal of waste bags.
- Proper cleaning and maintenance of shower trailers and laundry facilities.
- The creation of an effective sustainment and maintenance process.

**Fuel.** Proper storage of fuel and protection of fuel assets against enemy action mitigate both operational and FP risk. An additional consideration is fuel handling—the transfer of fuel from its storage container to the container or vehicle for use. Fuel considerations include the following:

- Elevated fuel tanks for gravity-fed fueling.
- Fuel pumps (manual or electric).
- Fuel filters.
- Hoses.
- Required lubricants (e.g., transmission, steering, brake, and coolant).
- Fuel cans.
- Fire suppression assets.
- Room to provide for separation of living and working spaces from fuel storage locations.

# **CHAPTER 9**

## **PATROLLING**

This chapter discusses aspects of patrolling as they pertain to infantry company tactics and employment. It further describes the characteristics of patrolling across the competition continuum and establishes guidance for the effective use of patrolling as an integral component of offense, defense, and stability operations. This chapter provides guidance and addresses certain patrolling characteristics; roles and responsibilities; as well as considerations for the planning, preparation, and conduct of a patrol and post-patrol actions at the company level. For more information on patrolling, see MCTP 3-01A, *Scouting and Patrolling*.

### **PURPOSE OF PATROLLING**

A patrol is a detachment sent out to gather information and carry out a destructive, harassing, or security mission. The purpose of a patrol is to provide a commander the organic means of managing the battlespace and gathering information. Commanders create patrolling plans to meet their requirements and they are limited only by the ingenuity with which they employ their patrols and the skill and aggressiveness of patrol members. Purpose and mission requirements dictate patrol techniques, not vice versa. Patrols may be mounted, dismounted, or both. Though they may serve defensive purposes by using offensive techniques and may possess the means for violence, they provide stability in a peacekeeping environment. Patrols may employ any number of techniques and variations of techniques, from police-like community action to ambushing enemy units, to meet their assigned purpose. They may seek to fulfill reporting requirements or none; they may require extensive additional skill sets and enablers or none. Managing their battlespace and gathering information remains the main purpose of commanders' patrolling plans.

### **TENETS OF PATROLLING**

Patrols fall into categories defined by objective and method of conduct. All patrols must have clearly defined objectives and with each objective comes a specific focus. Patrols may focus on the enemy, the security of the unit, or on the security of the population. Regardless of the objective and focus of individual patrols, the tenets of successful patrolling endure and apply across the competition continuum. Company leadership at all levels must conduct focused training, inspect preparations, judge operational effectiveness, and base corrections on the tenets of successful patrolling. The tenets of patrolling are:

- Detailed planning.
- Rehearsals.
- Thorough reconnaissance.
- Positive control.
- All-around security.
- Every Marine a collector.

## PATROL TYPES

Although mission requirements determine the type of patrol conducted, every patrol has the secondary mission of collecting information about the enemy, the operational environment, and physical terrain. The two main types of patrols are combat and reconnaissance. The purpose of combat patrols may include: raid, contact, ambush, and security. There are three reconnaissance missions that reconnaissance patrols support: route, zone, and area. The patrolling unit requires a clear task and purpose, and the patrol's mission must support the overall company patrol plan.

## PATROL PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Company commanders use a company patrol plan, driven by the requirements and results of problem framing, as the primary tool to enable successful patrol planning and execution. The design and problem framing processes determine patrolling priorities within the commander's battlespace. Information requirements and the resulting intelligence collection plan, the intelligence collection requirements of HHQ, and the company's targeting requirements focus patrolling priorities on specific areas. Operations and security requirements determine the number, routes, and frequency of security patrols. After establishing the size and scope of the patrol requirements, company commanders then balance those requirements against the resources available.

### Developing a Company Patrol Plan

The company patrol plan begins with determining the nature of the problem and understanding the environment and the corresponding intelligence collection requirements and operational necessities to realize the patrol's goals.

**Problem Framing.** The task and purpose of the company provide the foundation for all other planning. An analysis of friendly and enemy centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities helps determine what patrols should look for and what patrols should guard against. Problem framing allows commanders to establish priorities for the patrolling effort—What must be known first? What must be guarded against immediately to avoid loss of focus in the patrol plan?

**Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.** The IPB process helps commanders to accomplish the following:

- Identify and prioritize PIRs and associated NAIs for inclusion in the intelligence collection plan.
- Identify resource shortfalls and seek augmentation or support from other intelligence collection platforms to cover gaps in the collection plan.
- Integrate and reinforce external intelligence collection resources in the patrol and operation plans.
- Conduct continuous pattern analysis of the friendly, neutral, and threat networks in the operational environment.
- Locate and plot the proximity of indigenous boundaries to the patrol, such as tribal, ethnic, religious, and HNSF.
- Determine initial civil considerations and critical infrastructure status.

**Developing the Patrol Plan.** The following are considerations regarding the patrol plan:

- Balance the patrol plan against other operational priorities and resource demands, such as construction of the defense.
- Determine patrol limitations in terms of size, frequency, duration, and range based on the company's maneuver, fires, information, and logistic capabilities.
- Conduct a risk assessment based on the company's ability to accomplish such tasks as maintain a reserve, conduct CASEVAC and vehicle recovery, and maintain communications.
- Conduct a time-space analysis to support risk assessment and determine patrol limitations.
- Identify and prioritize gaps in personnel and material assets.

**Fires Planning.** Fire support for patrols includes creating lethal and nonlethal effects. Chapter 5 contains more information on fire support planning. The following are considerations for fire support planning in preparation for a patrol:

- Determine fires limitations in the battlespace, including ROE, risk estimate distances, collateral damage estimate methodology, and the impact of physical terrain.
- Determine potential fire support gaps in patrol coverage by analyzing and assessing current fires support in the battlespace in terms of organic fire support range fans, external fire support range fans if available, fire support procedures, and FSCMs.
- Plan fires to cover movement along the entire patrol route.
- Determine, establish, and rehearse fire control procedures, including which units may clear and deny fires within the patrol area.
- Ensure individual patrols can direct and control fires in terms of both communications and the presence of enablers, such as air and artillery observers.

**Information Planning.** Information planning for patrols includes creating nonlethal effects. Chapter 5 contains details on information planning. The following are considerations for information planning in preparation for a patrol:

- Determine information messaging requirements for the patrol.
- Project information into the AO that will facilitate generating the desired nonlethal effects for the company.
- Determine what, if any, information enablers will accompany the patrol and their requirements.
- Develop civil information collection and civil reconnaissance requirements.
- Ensure EMS is deconflicted with company plan and approved operating frequencies for EW equipment.

**Maneuver Planning.** The actual execution of the patrol, both during movement and in the accomplishment of its task and purpose, requires some thought regarding what steps and resources better enable its success. The following are considerations in maneuver planning:

- Depending on task and purpose, request additional personnel and enabler support, such as engineers, military working dog teams, and a CI/HUMINT team.
- Depending on task and purpose, request additional resources and equipment, such as troop lift, biometric systems, communications platforms, and emergency aerial resupply or extract capabilities.
- Consider adjacent and higher unit coordination requirements for patrols in contact with or in proximity to other friendly, partnered nation, and coalition units.
- Consider EPW and detainee handling and evacuation plans and procedures.
- Establish pre-departure requirements, such as rehearsals and backbriefs, overlays and patrol plans, manifests, and equipment density lists, PCCs, and PCIs.
- Establish post patrol requirements, such as debriefs and AARs, PCCs and PCIs, and reconstitution.

### **Contingency Plan Considerations**

Planning for contingencies is critical to patrol planning. Identifying and rehearsing actions from individual patrols through company headquarters during contingencies will highlight critical gaps and friction points in both the patrol's plan of action and the ability of the company to effectively support patrol actions. Effective planning for contingencies also enables the company commander to identify risk and apply deliberate mitigation measures. Underlying the effectiveness of reactions to contingencies is effective communications and accurate and timely reporting. Planning for contingencies should include individual patrol actions and company COC actions.

**Patrol Actions.** Patrols establish and rehearse immediate action drills for unit responses (e.g., a reaction to a far ambush) and battle drills for internal actions (e.g., vehicle recovery and CASEVAC).

**Company Combat Operations Center Actions.** The company COC anticipates contingencies and remains prepared to effectively deal with them by maintaining communication and enforcing reporting discipline among patrols; by accurately tracking patrol location and information requirements; and by coordinating with higher, adjacent, and supporting units to reduce response time.

**Additional Considerations.** The company COC cannot allow itself to be overcome by any single event or contingency. Rehearsals and well-understood procedures allow the company COC to handle contingencies effectively while continuing to manage the rest of the battlespace. The existence of tools, such as priorities, reserve committal and reconstitution criteria, information requirements, and resource triggers, allow the company COC to make sound and mature decisions about the priority of effort required by any contingency considering the company's other operations.



## **CONSIDERATIONS FOR MOUNTED PATROLS**

Vehicle considerations within mounted patrols are like those considerations that apply to all mounted infantry operations. Company commanders consider METT-T, mobility versus survivability, task organization and load planning, communications, logistics, and maintenance.

### **Patrol Purpose**

When conducting problem framing, company commanders balance the advantages available when mounting infantry, such as speed, mobility, and survivability, with the patrol's purpose. Proper understanding of the environment and problem reveals that missions may support mounted patrols, dismounted patrols, or both. Mounted patrols provide the increased flexibility, speed, and mobility that are appropriate for long distances; multiply the effects of a small force; and occur in terrain that supports vehicle operations. Dismounted patrols enable stealth, are more capable of providing detail on specific areas and routes, operate effectively in complex terrain, and provide superior contact with the local population. Combining mounted and dismounted methods within a patrol is appropriate in instances when vehicles serve an approach march function that enables dismounted operations at the objective—whether the objective is an ambush, a meeting, or an area reconnaissance. Company commanders are careful to avoid allowing their companies to fall into the worst habits associated with vehicular movement, such as disinclination to dismount, tactical discipline laziness, and tendency to leave mission critical gear on vehicles when dismounting. Mission accomplishment takes precedence over troop comfort and welfare.

### **Armor and Force Protection Versus Maneuverability**

A key factor when considering armor versus maneuverability is that the increase in FP available through armor naturally affects some of the infantry's basic strengths, such as all-around observation and the ability to maneuver through restrictive and complex terrain. Balancing considerations for the protection of vehicles and crews, observation, the employment of weapons, and maneuverability is critical. Usually, heavily armored vehicles, especially wheeled vehicles with extra mine-resistant armor, can limit crew and passenger observation in complex terrain. Reduced observation can also limit weapons employment at close ranges. Both rocket-propelled grenades and IEDs can defeat many armored vehicles and may defeat any wheeled vehicle, with or without an armor package, at the point of detonation. Enemy forces often target vehicles with poor security because these vehicles can appear easier to destroy and less likely to respond effectively. Commanders must analyze mission demands, enemy trends, and recent events in their AOs before deciding on an appropriate level of armor protection. Depending on the threat, heavier armor protection can provide for enhanced crew and vehicle survivability. Lighter armor protection can often provide more vehicular speed and mobility resulting in greater offensive capability. In some situations, speed and mobility can offer a degree of protection itself. Other considerations include the following:

- Providing security for vehicle crew and passengers.
- Providing security for the vehicle when Marines dismount.
- Ability to quickly and safely mount or dismount, to include under fire.
- Providing force protection for the gunner of a turret-mounted weapon system.
- Ensuring adequate observation for gunner of a turret-mounted weapon system.

- Assessing force protection from enemy weapon systems.

### **Task Organization and Vehicle Load Planning**

Even though mounted, patrols must still have the ability to accomplish all the internal and external tasks associated with reconnaissance and combat patrols. Many of these tasks, such as security, are more difficult due to the larger number of patrol personnel tied to the vehicles as crew. When planning to conduct mounted operations, planners apply considerable effort to manifesting and troop to task. The ground tactical plan serves as a starting point in determining the number of personnel required, which indicates the number, type, and organization of the vehicles required. Further modification occurs as vehicles available, element integrity, bump plans, and cross-leveling of personnel and equipment are integrated into the plan. In all cases, commanders must balance vehicle and crew survivability, vehicle weight and payload, the offensive capabilities of the crew and passengers, and their ability to mount and dismount the vehicle quickly and efficiently. The development and use of company SOPs aid this process. The company commander modifies these basic operating procedures as necessary to accomplish specific patrol missions. Additional considerations for task organization and vehicle load planning follow:

- What types and numbers of vehicles are available?
- Are vehicle capabilities and limitations appropriate to the mission?
- Will the vehicles have organic crews, or will the infantry platoon or company provide drivers and crews?
- What types of weapons will the vehicles mount? Are outside resources, such as HMGs required?
- Does the commander anticipate dismounting the crew-served or automatic weapons from the vehicles at the objective or if in contact?
- Will the unit maintain team and squad integrity within vehicles and vehicle sections?
- Is the mission a mounted patrol in which dismounting is a battle drill or is the mission a mounted approach march supporting dismounted operations, such as a search?
- Does the commander anticipate using the vehicles' CSWs as a base of fire or as an SBF element?
- Do the vehicle recovery and emergency maintenance battle drills support the mission driven bump plan priorities?
- Does the load plan for personnel and equipment, especially mission-specific special equipment, use spread load and redundancy methodologies?
- Can information systems (e.g., EW, MISO) be employed while on the move?

### **Communications**

Vehicle crew communication is paramount to smooth vehicle operation. Commanders must consider how dismounts will communicate with the mounted or dismounted crew. Drivers and troop commanders can usually communicate by voice in most wheeled vehicles but might not be able to do so if in contact. Passengers and gunners have a difficult time communicating with the driver/troop commander under normal operating conditions and most likely cannot do so during contact. Once passengers' dismount voice communications are nearly impossible. Commanders should consider the following:

- If intercom systems are not available, equip the driver, troop commander, and gunner (if applicable) with headset radios for internal and external vehicle communication.
- Use redundant hand and arm signals, flags, and pyrotechnics for basic critical signals, such as mount, dismount, shift and cease fire, and target designation.

## CONSIDERATIONS FOR PATROL BASES

A patrol base is a temporary position set up when the patrol unit halts for a period longer than a security halt, but shorter than what is necessary for a permanent position such as a COP or forward operating base (FOB). The patrol base is a defensive position and, as such, the fundamentals of perimeter defenses apply (see Chapter 8). When the unit must halt for a long time in a place not protected by friendly troops, active and passive security measures are required. Mission and enemy capabilities determine whether a patrol base is overt or covert. Covert patrol bases are occupied in stealth and are located in areas that are difficult to access, provide no tactical value to the enemy, are easily defendable, and from which hasty egress can occur if compromised. Conversely, overt patrol bases are readily visible. Their visibility is often a portion of their mission, such as an overt patrol base among the population. Patrol bases are occupied only as long as necessary, but not for more than 24 hours— except in an emergency. The unit should not use the same patrol base more than once.

## KEY LEADER RESPONSIBILITIES

The company commander, XO, gunnery sergeant, fire support team leader, and WO each have specific responsibilities regarding patrol planning and conduct.

### Company Commander

Company commanders might be involved in patrolling in one of three ways: they might lead a company-sized patrol; they might provide small patrols from their company as directed by battalion; or they might send out patrols on their own initiative as a component of the overall company patrolling effort. Regardless of the type of involvement company commanders have in individual patrols, the priority of their efforts are dedicated to setting the right conditions for success through detailed planning, coordination, rehearsals, and supervision. When company commanders plan to use a patrol to support a company operation, they identify its mission, organization, key times and places for departure and return, and possibly its routes. Depending on the mission, commanders may assign the task, give their intent, and allow the platoon leader to plan the patrol. The company commander and members of the company headquarters assists in planning fire support, logistic support, and communications. Commander-specific responsibilities include, but are not limited to, conducting problem framing, conducting IPB, and developing the patrol plan.

**Conducting Problem Framing.** The company commander conducts problem framing, which serves as the foundation for developing a patrol plan. The company operational planning team determines mission, end state, and essential tasks of the patrolling effort; assesses and mitigates operational risk; and identifies personnel and resource limitations.

**Conducting Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.** The company commander uses the company intelligence specialist to assist in the development of PIRs, an intelligence collection plan, and in obtaining intelligence support for the conduct of patrols. Commanders supervise and approve the development of company essential elements of information and CCIRs, the synchronization of patrolling requirements with the intelligence collection plan, and the prioritization of patrolling efforts in conjunction with the intelligence collection plan and operational requirements.

**Developing the Patrol Plan.** Company commanders may use planning support from within the company leadership and the company COC, but they remain responsible for creating a patrol plan that meets their intelligence collection and operational requirements. The commander also has the following associated responsibilities:

- Develops company patrol plan and associated OPORDs.
- Issues WARNORDs to the designated patrol unit.
- Initiates appropriate troop leading procedures.
- Coordinates and assists in the development of detailed individual patrol plans.
- Ensures the tasked element prepares, properly organizes, and equips itself for the mission.
- Ensures critical contingency plans are thoroughly planned, briefed, and rehearsed from the patrol through the company COC.
- Assists the patrol leader with preparations, coordination, and final inspections before the patrol departs.
- Assesses operational readiness (i.e., personnel, equipment, logistics).
- Coordinates with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.
- Maintains and updates the CTP throughout the course of the patrol.
- Ensures patrol reports are properly received, recorded, and routed.
- Supervises the coordination and execution of contingency plans.
- Coordinates supporting arms in accordance with mission requirements.
- Ensures that the appropriate PCCs and PCIs have been conducted prior to patrol departure.
- Ensures that patrol debriefs occur upon the return of the patrol and information gleaned from patrols is properly integrated into the overall intelligence effort and disseminated internally to higher, adjacent, and supporting units as required.

### **Executive Officer**

The XO possesses the authority to act on behalf of the company commander and is frequently expected to exercise that authority during the development, execution, and support of the company's patrol plan. The XO has the following duties:

- Executes designated patrol-related duties as assigned by the company commander.
- Develops and oversees execution of the local security plan.
- Develops and enforces battle drills and battle rhythm.
- Participates in planning efforts.

- Supervises the company COC's timely and accurate updates of friendly and enemy situations.

### **Company Gunnery Sergeant**

The company gunnery sergeant oversees patrol preparation, logistical support, and efficient company COC operations. The company gunnery sergeant responsibilities follow:

- Oversees company COC operations to include management of company C5ISRT assets.
- Supervises patrol preparation to include rehearsals and PCC/PCIs.
- Directs supply and resupply.
- Supervises and manages the local force protection plan.
- Supervises the operations chief and WO in tracking logistic operations and reporting.
- Coordinates company reserve support requirements.
- Plans, coordinates, and supervises CASEVAC.
- Plans, coordinates, and supervises EPW and detainee handling.

### **Fire Support Team Leader**

The FST leader assists patrol leaders in fire support planning, integrates patrol fires with the company fires plan, and conducts coordination with organic and nonorganic fire support agencies. The FST leader responsibilities follow:

- Develops targets and FSCMs that support the patrolling effort.
- Integrates patrols into the company fire support plan and information plan.
- Coordinates and clears supporting arms in accordance with mission requirements.

### **Watch Officer**

The WO is the senior Marine in the company COC and maintains awareness of all activity taking place in the company battlespace to include AIs and AOIs. The WO must be prepared to update the company leadership at any time. Some of the WO's responsibilities specific to patrolling follow:

- Ensures all patrol missions are briefed and debriefed.
- Conducts cross-boundary coordination for patrol.
- Controls entry and exit of friendly lines for patrols.
- Commits the company reserve to reinforce or support a patrol in accordance with unit SOP.
- Coordinates and clears supporting arms for patrols in accordance with fire support plan.
- Updates the situation map regarding friendly patrols and enemy activity during the last 48 hours.

## **POST-PATROL ACTIONS**

After the patrol has been completed, leadership must account for all personnel and equipment, debrief patrol members, and conduct an AAR.

## **Accountability**

Accountability is an important component of FP. Leadership at all levels must know the location and status of their personnel and equipment. Accountability also enforces discipline within a unit. Upon returning from a patrol, the element does not return to its billeting or similar facilities. Accountability, post combat care of personnel and equipment, and debriefs occur prior to releasing the patrol members.

The commander verifies the location and status of all patrol members, attachments, EPWs, and detainees. The patrol leader verifies accountability of all weapons, ammunition, munitions, and equipment. In the case of missing personnel, the company immediately institutes its missing Marine procedures. In the case of lost or missing equipment, reports and appropriate investigations occur in a timely manner.

## **Debriefs**

A Marine patrol supports shared situational awareness, providing that all relevant and significant information from the patrol is captured during a debrief. The commander must conduct a thorough debrief with all members of the patrol. Checklists of the material to be covered in debriefs are important and should align with the patrol brief and assigned IR/PIRs. To conduct a meaningful and detailed debrief, commanders should ensure the following:

- Establish debriefing procedures in company SOPs and update as needed.
- Isolate the patrol from distraction so members can be debriefed without interruption.
- Establish a “no rank” debrief atmosphere and avoid discouraging patrol member input.
- Ensure that all relevant billet holders, such as the platoon commander, platoon sergeant, platoon/squad intelligence representative, element leaders, and recorder, are present.
- Ensure that all items of interest collected by the patrol are present and displayed, such as pictures, recordings, sketches, and map improvements.
- Avoid a “story telling” atmosphere (objective versus subjective) and maintain the focus on drawing information from the individual or group being debriefed. Focus on the information requirements that formed the patrol’s tasking.
- Avoid asking leading questions, searching for preconceived answers, or trying to confirm prior assumptions.
- Ask questions that require a detailed response and do not accept simple “yes” or “no” answers.
- Track all “atmospheric” changes in the AO, such as new construction, new signs, things no longer present, and population traffic pattern changes.
- Record and track civil information in accordance with SOP.
- Save after action comments (e.g., critiques of the patrol) for the AAR.

## **After Action Reviews**

An important component of post-patrol actions is a meaningful AAR, especially after patrols involving contact or other significant events. The AAR usually occurs after completion of formal post-patrol requirements, such as debriefs, but before patrol members become absorbed in post combat checks and equipment maintenance. Unit leadership should supervise AARs to ensure that appropriate information is incorporated into SOPs, lessons learned, and sustainment training plans. The company commander is responsible for the technical and tactical proficiency of the

company and takes appropriate personal interest in the validity of the AAR process within the company. Company commanders have a responsibility to ensure they accomplish the following:

- Establish AAR procedures in company SOPs and update as needed.
- Isolate the patrol from distraction so members can conduct the AAR without interruption.
- Establish a “no rank” atmosphere and avoid discouraging patrol member input.
- Ensure that all relevant billet holders, such as platoon commander, platoon sergeant, and element leaders, are present.
- Avoid a “story telling” atmosphere (objective versus subjective) and maintain the focus on an item-discussion-recommendation format.
- Record any debrief comments that might occur during the AAR and forward to the company commander for appropriate inclusion into the intelligence collection plan.

# CHAPTER 10

## AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

This chapter provides a basic orientation for the infantry company that is conducting an amphibious operation or deployment. An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force (AF), embarked in ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force (LF) ashore to accomplish the assigned mission. Since the introduction of watercraft onto the sea there has always been competition in the littorals and maritime LOCs. The United States remains a maritime nation and needs an AF projection capability.

There are unique considerations for an infantry company involved in an amphibious operation such as command relationships, embarkation, debarkation, and phasing. The fundamental principles and guidance on the planning and execution of amphibious operations are contained in JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*.

In addition to JP 3-02, the following references complete the essential compendium of amphibious operations-related doctrine: MCTP 13-10C, *Unit Embarkation*; and MCTP 13-10B, *Combat Cargo Operations*.

For ship-to-shore movement planning refer to MCTP 13-10E, *Ship-to-Shore Movement*.

The phases of amphibious operations—planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and action (PERMA)—are not necessarily successive, they always occur. For example, forward deployed AFs, such as amphibious ready groups, use the following sequence: embarkation, movement, planning, rehearsal, and action. Table 10-1 shows the various phases of an amphibious operation, a description of each, and considerations for the infantry company.

Table 10-1. Phases of an Amphibious Operation.		
Phase	Description	Company Level Perspective
<b>Planning</b>	Products that are generated from the planning phase are the landing force CONOPS, landing plan, loading plan, and amphibious force tasking order.	Predeployment training Identify load out/cube requirements Generation of deliverables for use in constructing the landing plan Generation of SOPs
<b>Embarkation</b>	Embarkation of landing force troops and equipment aboard amphibious ready group shipping.	Inspection of vehicles and containers Identification of troop spaces Loading of troops and equipment Stowage of equipment
<b>Rehearsal</b>	Conducted during movement to ensure feasibility, adequacy, and timing of the landing plan and readiness of the amphibious force; test communications; and validate procedures/assumptions.	Shipboard training Call aways Shipboard safety drills Rehearsal of concept Confirmation briefs
<b>Movement</b>	Amphibious force departs port of embarkation and proceeds to the amphibious objective area.	Troop regulations Shipboard life Inspections of troop spaces



		Maintenance Training
<b>Action</b>	Amphibious force is in position to initiate ship-to-shore movement and terminates upon completion of mission objectives.	Assault support/landing craft considerations Establishment of beachhead/landing zones Rearm/refit/refuel

## TYPES OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Amphibious operations include assaults, withdrawals, demonstrations, raids, and amphibious support to other operations. Amphibious assaults involve introducing a LF on a hostile or uncertain shore. Using seabasing, fire support, and logistic functions, AFs can gain a foothold on a hostile or uncertain shore by forcible entry. For example, when conducting Operation CHROMITE during the Korean War, sea-based mobility was used to execute a turning movement against North Korean forces and establish a LF at Inchon, deep behind the North Korean lead elements.

An amphibious withdrawal is the extraction of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore. For example, during the Korean War, after the 1st Marine Division successfully extracted itself from a Chinese counterattack at the Chosin Reservoir, it executed an amphibious withdrawal from the port of Hung-Nam.

An amphibious demonstration is a show of force conducted to deceive with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a COA unfavorable to it. As a form of MILDEC, it uses the threat posed by an AF to accomplish this purpose. During Operation Desert Storm, the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and ships of an amphibious strike group conducted such measures as raids, fire missions, mine and lane clearance, and beach reconnaissance to successfully convince Iraqi commanders that the coalition's main effort would be an amphibious assault against Kuwait City. This decision resulted in the Iraqis weakening their southern defenses to reinforce the seaward defenses of Kuwait City, making them vulnerable to the true, land-based coalition main effort.

An amphibious raid is a type of amphibious operation involving the swift incursion into or temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. Sea-based landing craft and aircraft execute the surface and air movement necessary to support this and the other types of amphibious operations.

Amphibious support to other amphibious operations contributes to conflict prevention or crisis mitigation. Amphibious forces routinely conduct amphibious support to other operations, such as security cooperation, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), civil support, noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace operations, or recovery operations. Examples include the Liberia NEO and the foreign disaster relief effort in Bangladesh.

## CHARACTERISTICS OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Regardless of the type of amphibious operation, the characteristics discussed in the following subparagraphs apply to all.

## **Integration Between Naval and Landing Forces**

Close coordination is required among naval forces, the LF, and other supporting forces. This coordination is critical because of the host of special skills and equipment associated with the complex nature of amphibious operations. If the forces involved in the amphibious operation do not synchronize their efforts and understand each other's contributions, then the risk of failure increases for the AF.

## **Rapid Buildup of Combat Power from Sea to Shore**

Gaining and maintaining access is key, particularly in the conduct of amphibious raids and/or amphibious assault forcible entry operations. Continuous support to the LF ashore is critical for mission accomplishment. For example, during the World War II invasion of Guadalcanal, the decision for naval shipping to retire in the face of an enemy naval threat led to insufficient logistical support and NSFS, stranding the LF for a long period of time.

## **Task-Organized Forces**

Amphibious forces task-organize based on a specific mission or, in the case of forward deployed AFs, a series of most-likely contingencies. The inherent restricted lift capacity of amphibious shipping precludes carrying equipment and personnel for every conceivable mission. For example, during an amphibious-based FHA to typhoon ravaged Indonesia and Thailand, the AF task-organized to address the requirements of ship-to-shore (STS) movement in a disaster area, specific humanitarian-related classes of supply, medical capabilities, and LCE forces.

## **Unity of Effort and Operational Coherence**

Closely related to the need to integrate naval and LFs is the need for all components to fully understand their roles within the larger task and purpose of the AF. The naval force cannot be concerned only with transporting the LF just as the LF cannot *only* focus on operations ashore. The two components must operate as one whole—success during all PERMA phases is important to both components and requires mutual support.

## **Readiness**

Readiness is determined by the maintenance level of the skills and equipment necessary for successful amphibious operations and by the status of forward deployed AFs that maintain a constant state of preparedness for employment. The first requires continual coordination between the Marine Corps and Navy to maintain joint training standards. The second recognizes that reaction times to crises are measured in hours and days not weeks. The requirement for a NEO can come suddenly, as can a natural disaster, and fully prepared AFs can react immediately.

## **Flexibility**

Amphibious forces are inherently flexible due to their ability to reconfigure and reposition. Given that much of the world's population, political power, and critical infrastructure lie within 100 kilometers of the oceans, the AFs are ideal response platforms that possess significant capability to loiter. From forcible entry to show of force operations, AFs provide national leadership with a scalable force capable of a wide array of military operations across the competition continuum.

## **Self-Sustainment**

Due to the ability of the AF to conduct underway and on-station replenishment of personnel and certain supplies and equipment, they are less reliant on land-based logistical infrastructure. Amphibious forces also possess the organic capability to project forward logistic capabilities ashore, facilitating throughput for follow-on operations.

## **Mobility**

The ability to conduct mobility allows AFs to position themselves to overwatch rapidly degrading situations and respond swiftly to contingencies when called upon.

## **ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND RELATIONSHIPS**

Amphibious operations include the marriage of naval and ground forces to achieve a military objective. Orders to conduct amphibious operations will establish commanders and command relationships, while identifying available forces and tasks. The following subparagraphs will provide information about those Navy and LF personnel with whom company personnel will interact aboard ship. More detailed information may be found in MCTP 13-10B, *Combat Cargo Operations* and MCTP 13-10C, *Unit Embarkation*.

### **Shipboard Command Structure**

The command structure consists of those key individuals aboard ship—CO, commanding officer of troops (COT), XO, and ship's operations officer—who either exercise command authority or directly assist in its implementation within the ship's company and embarked forces.

The CO is a ship's highest authority, responsible for the portion of the LF embarked aboard the ship. Both the ship's company and embarked personnel are subject to the CO's authority. The CO's orders to embarked personnel are transmitted via the COT.

The highest-ranking officer of embarked LF personnel assumes the additional role of COT. On smaller amphibious ships, this individual could be a company commander. The key task of the COT is to facilitate integration of the LF into the ship's functions and routines. Such integration includes coordinating embark and landing plans; assigning LF personnel to secondary duties, such as messing and laundry; and assisting the efficiency of shipboard life. The COT works closely with the CO to build the ship and LF into a cohesive military team through the following methods:

- Using internal ship's communications systems to promulgate briefings and all hands messages.
- Integrating LF personnel into the ship's workforce, to include fire fighters, damage control, flight deck crew, combat cargo, messing, maintenance, and underway replenishment.
- Integrating LF units into shipboard routines through such actions as joint berthing inspection processes, training meetings, reporting processes, and published plans.
- Integrating LF units into the social cohesion of the ship through such activities as recreation and competition.

- Developing and implementing LF internal approval and control processes for operations and training so that the LF can speak effectively with one voice with naval counterparts.

The second in command of the ship—the XO—is the direct representative of the CO for daily operations aboard the ship. The XO is specifically concerned with the organization, health and sanitation, discipline, employment, and efficiency of the crew and LF. Commanders of troops ensure that all troop spaces inspections, such as armory, berthing, offices, staterooms, and washrooms, are coordinated with the XO. If possible, COTs should use their XOs to serve as XOs of troops who can work directly with the ship's XO. On smaller amphibious ships, the XO may also serve as the debarkation control officer during offload operations.

The ship's operations officer is responsible for plans regarding the employment of the ship both externally and internally. The operations officer is responsible to the CO for developing plans relating to maneuvering and positioning the ship and landing and recovery operations. The operations officer is also responsible to the XO for the coordination, deconfliction, and publishing of the ship's daily, weekly, and long-range schedules for both the ship's company and LF. The COT implements an internal approval process for all LF training and operations requirements to preclude the ship's operations officer having to assume LF deconfliction duties.

### **Other Shipboard Personnel**

The chief engineer, ship's first lieutenant, air boss, combat systems officer, and supply officer are other key shipboard leaders.

The chief engineer is the naval officer who heads the engineering department. The chief engineer and the engineer department exercise responsibility for all matters pertaining to propulsion, auxiliary/ancillary ship systems, and damage control. The COT engages with the chief engineer in two ways: identifying embarked personnel requirements for support of repair and damage control parties and coordinating work requests for berthing spaces and heads.

The ship's first lieutenant is a traditional title that applies in modern practice to the officer in charge of the deck department. The deck department exercises responsibility for all activities and maintenance involving cargo, cargo spaces, deck seamanship, the ship's exterior, and ship's boats. For embarked troops, the deck department and the first lieutenant are the primary points of contact for such activities as starting and moving vehicles, accessing embarked cargo, and all embarkation and debarkation requirements.

The ship's air officer, or air boss, is responsible to the ship's CO for the safe conduct of air operations, specifically launching and recovery, servicing, and handling of all aircraft and UAS. The air boss is assisted by the flight deck officer, hangar deck officer, aviation fuels officer, aircraft handling officer, and aircraft ordnance officer.

The combat systems officer is responsible to the ship's CO for the supervision, direction, and training of shipboard weapon systems. The combat systems officer's duties include operation, care, maintenance, and training of personnel on the ship's weapon systems and all matters pertaining to the stowage and inspection of ordnance. The combat systems officer often serves as the embarked unit's point of contact for use of flight decks for live fire training. In addition,

many ships expect to or can use embarked Marines and CSW systems for ship defense. The combat systems officer integrates these Marines into the ship's defensive plans.

The supply officer is responsible to the ship's CO for the procurement, receiving, stowage, and issuance of ship's stores. These duties encompass the wardroom, general mess, barbershop, ship's store, disbursing, and post office. Embarked units coordinate with the supply officer for such things as special meals, personal demand items, and embarked personnel support to the barbershop.

### **Embarkation and Landing Personnel**

The embarkation and landing personnel consists of the combat cargo officer (CCO), team embarkation officer (TEO), LF air officer, and assault amphibian officer.

The CCO is a Marine Corps officer or chief warrant officer permanently assigned to the ship's company. The CCO is often assisted by a permanently assigned Marine who serves as the assistant CCO. The CCO is directly responsible to the ship's CO for all issues pertaining to the embarkation of personnel, LF supplies, and equipment. The CCO advises the CO and COT on plans for loading and offloading of troop cargo, embarkation, communications requirements, and the billeting and messing of troops. The CCO oversees the work of the TEOs. The CCO provides direction and guidance regarding the ships loading characteristics, embarked troop regulations, cargo capacities and inventories, and management of the LF operational reserve material. In conjunction with the ship's first lieutenant, CCOs and their assigned personnel directly supervise the onload and offload of LF personnel, supplies, and equipment.

An embarkation team is a temporary, administrative term that refers to a group of personnel, supplies, and equipment either embarked or to be embarked. The COT appoints a TEO to handle all matters pertaining to cargo loading and offloading. The demands of the TEO are such that it should constitute the primary duty of the officer assigned. The TEO's duties include preparation of load plans for assigned shipping, coordination and execution of the load plan, and assistance in offload planning. The TEO must be familiar with the ship's loading characteristics, troop regulations, and the contents of the LF's embarked material.

The LF air officer is a Marine Corps officer attached to the ship's company and responsible for overseeing the coordination of naval air operations. When addressing air-related matters, the first point of contact for embarked units is the LF air officer.

When embarked, the senior assault amphibious unit leader also serves as a special staff officer who provides subject matter advice to both the ships company and embarked personnel on all matters pertaining to AAVs. In this role, the assault amphibian officer's duties include providing supported commanders with estimates of supportability, coordinating launch and recovery operations with applicable naval personnel, overseeing safety considerations and emergency procedures, developing AAV-specific communication plans, and assisting in the planning of subsequent operations ashore.

## PLANNING

Amphibious operations require detailed planning—from the approval of the CONOPS ashore to mission execution. The length and requirements of the planning process relate directly to the nature of the AF. A forward deployed Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) that has mastered the basics of amphibious operations may more easily focus planning on a specific mission. A Marine expeditionary force preparing for an amphibious operation would need to devote considerable planning time to actual training and embarkation in addition to planning for actions ashore.

### Load Plan

The mission ashore drives all planning. Without a valid CONOPS, it is impossible to determine resource requirements such as amphibious ships, landing craft, and aircraft. This is precisely why amphibious embarkation planning begins in the first planning stage to identify possible limitations and to begin making determinations of what and where personnel, vehicles, and equipment will be loaded, so that they can be transported ashore in the proper sequence to support the CONOPS (i.e., the landing plan).

Embarkation planners must familiarize themselves with a host of issues—the capabilities and limitations of ships, aircraft, and seaborne craft; their naval counterparts; and the personnel, supplies, and equipment to be embarked aboard naval shipping. Close, continuous coordination throughout planning and execution is required between operational planners and those responsible for the embarkation and offloading of personnel and materiel.

Infantry company commanders should familiarize themselves with the loading characteristics of the ships upon which they will be embarking. They should ensure that TEOs visit the ships regularly, attend all embarkation conferences, and regularly brief embarkation team commanders. Planning for embarkation requires the submission of deck diagrams from the TEO to the COT for approval, then to the ship's CO via the CCO. As with any other amphibious planning, the load plan must be cross walked through the ship's department heads, such as the first lieutenant or the chief engineer, prior to submission to the ship's CO for final approval.

### Landing Plan

The landing plan addresses the organization and sequence of placing the LF ashore based on commander's guidance and assigned tactical tasks. The landing plan integrates naval and LF surface and airborne STS movement and platforms for two purposes—rapidly building up LF assets ashore and conducting necessary logistical sustainment of forces ashore.

**Naval Planning.** Naval planning for STS movement focuses on availability of landing craft, hydrography, control of seaward/beach approaches, and the geography of beaches being considered for use by the LF.

**Landing Force Planning.** Landing force planning for STS movement begins with receiving key outputs from the naval planning process, such as landing craft availability, and then focuses on sequencing and organizing assets to buildup of combat power ashore. In STS movement, the landing plan is composed of certain specific documents that detail the numbers of landing craft, aircraft, and other surface craft available for use and the exact personnel and equipment that will

be loaded on each, along with embarkation and landing times. Some of these documents are applicable to amphibious operations of any size. Table 10-2 lists landing plan documents and responsibilities. While several of the documents listed in Table 10-2 are more applicable to Marine expeditionary brigade-sized amphibious operations, all are valuable tools for any size mission. The creation of and details in these documents depend on the landing plans, CONOPS ashore, and the guidance provided by the amphibious task force and LF commanders.

<b>Table 10-2. Landing Plan Documents.</b>	
<b>Commander Amphibious Task Force (Naval Landing Plan)</b>	<b>Commander Landing Force (Landing Force Landing Plan)</b>
Debarkation Schedule	Amphibious Vehicle Availability Table
Unloading Plan -Landing Craft Availability Plan -Landing Craft Employment Plan	Landing Craft and Amphibious Vehicle Assignment Table
	Landing Diagram
	Landing Force Serial Assignment Table
Approach Schedule	Landing Priority Table
Assault Wave Schedule	Landing Force Sequence Table
Landing Area Diagram	Assault Schedule
Sea Echelon Plan	Amphibious Vehicle Employment Plan
Causeway Plan	Assault Support Availability Table
Medical Regulating Plan	Assault Support Serial Assignment Table
Amphibious Bulk Liquid Transfer System Plan	Assault Support Aircraft Enplaning Schedule
	Landing Zone Diagram
	Assault Support Landing Table
	Ground Combat Element Landing Plan
	Consolidated Landing and Approach Plan
	Landing Force Aviation Landing Plan

Detailed information about development of a landing plan, including serials and landing priorities, along with all the form, diagrams, and tables (with examples) depicted in Table 10-2 can be found in MCTP 13-10E, *Ship-to-Shore Movement*.

## **Risk Management**

In addition to the purpose, means, and methods of RM (discussed in Chapter 13), company commanders must be aware of specific hazards associated with shipboard life and amphibious operations. Many of these matters are addressed in the troop regulations issued by the CCO, which are often ship specific with respect to restricted spaces, activities, and safety requirements.

***Shipboard Safety Considerations.*** Living and working aboard ship is similar to living and working on a factory floor. Unlike on cruise ships, utilities, pipes, control boxes, and a host of other systems are exposed for ready access by the crew. Therefore, in addition to expected controls on, for example, restricted or smoking spaces, company commanders and COTs can expect shipboard safety considerations to focus on electrical and deck safety.

**Electrical Safety.** Electrical safety will restrict what types of electrical items the embarked troops can use, how many they can use at any one time, and where they can use them. Rigorous inspections and controls are a part of most shipboard electrical safety programs.

**Deck Safety.** As naval ships are designed for utility and fighting first and creature comforts second, the areas in which crew and embarked units' function, eat, and sleep are characterized by hard surfaces and steep angles. In addition to expected slip and fall hazards, company commanders should ensure that all company personnel understand the safety issues surrounding the following:

- Moving on wet decks.
- Moving heavy equipment through ship's spaces.
- Operating around vehicles and heavy equipment on well decks.
- The extra hazards associated with "wet well" operations, such as moving around the well deck during times of embarkation and debarkation.

**Waterborne Safety Considerations.** Basic safety measures, such as proper manifesting, that apply to all types of movement and conveyances from busses to aircraft also apply on the water. Landing craft of various types possess their own sets of safety considerations, such as briefs regarding emergency procedures, use of life jackets, use of scuttles and escape hatches, and Marine overboard drills. When conducting an amphibious operation, members of the LF should also know "down boat" procedures and signals, the location and methods of rescue and casualty collection boats, and the location of safety and recovery boats along approach lanes.

## **EMBARKATION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

The success of the amphibious operation depends upon the manner in which troops, supplies, and equipment are loaded aboard ships. Embarkation plans begin at the battalion or higher level but require bottom-up input and refinement from the infantry company. Company commanders ensure that the battalion embarkation plan provides for the rapid and orderly buildup of forces ashore in support of the landing plan and scheme of maneuver. Successful integration of the company's priorities for embarkation requires the constant involvement of the company gunnery sergeant with the battalion S-4; shipboard combat cargo personnel; and, when appropriate, the supporting combat logistic battalion.

It is essential that the infantry company's embarkation process be organized and smooth. This occurs through proper coordination with appropriate agencies in a timely and organized manner and a rigorous pre-embarkation inspection process at the company, battalion, and higher levels. Maintaining embarkation readiness in garrison is foundational to embarkation planning.

### **Storage and Shipping Containers**

Often called QUADCONs [quadruple containers] and PALCONs [palletized containers], the infantry company will receive an allocation of standardized embarkation containers from the battalion, which directly affects what the company will bring and how it will organize and conduct business aboard ship. What is in these containers and how it is safely stored are initial concerns. If properly planned, many of these containers can serve as shipboard storage and



workspaces. For example, upon approval, an infantry company might choose to use some of its storage containers as armory spaces. In addition to storing armory gear, the infantry company will seek to have these containers embarked in such a manner that they are easily accessible as workspaces.

**Packing Lists and Labeling.** Proper packing and labeling of all embarked containers ensures accountability, assists in inspections, aids in embarkation, and ensures proper access upon stowage. The battalion S-4 distributes packing guidance and formats as part of the pre-embarkation process.

**Security.** It is normal for the ship to require and the COT to mount an internal guard force on LF cargo. The size of guard force depends largely on the nature of the cargo being stored.

**Weatherproofing.** An amphibious environment is, by nature, a wet environment. Containers stored on exposed decks will be subject to sun and water and infantry companies need to carefully select what is stored and how it is stored accordingly. Containers on well decks are exposed to the water and spray generated by “wet well” operations in the well decks. Containers in “dry” areas may be temporarily stored elsewhere as cargo is moved around the ship. In sum, the infantry company should never assume that cargo will remain dry because it is in a container.

**Hazardous Materials.** Appropriately, ship crews ruthlessly address anything that poses a significant fire hazard to their ship and this scrutiny applies as much to hazardous materials as to electricity and other matters. During embarkation planning, infantry companies must identify hazardous materials to the S-4 and follow their guidance, in coordination with the CCO, on where and how to store such materials. Use of hazardous materials aboard ship, such as those used for vehicle maintenance, is also a source of concern and requires coordination with the ship’s crew.

## **Armory**

One of the first questions requiring an answer during pre-embarkation is the method the infantry company will use to store and access weapons. There are two concerns: first, CSWs, armory gear, tools, and parts; second, personal weapons. If a ship’s armory spaces prove unsuitable for storage requirements, companies must plan for alternatives, to include procuring and bringing along such items as padlocks, using seals on certain armory spaces, and establishing an interior guard.

## **Communications Equipment**

Communications equipment storage requires its own unique considerations that are similar to those experienced ashore: climate-appropriate storage spaces, security of sensitive communications equipment, and hazardous material handling in the form of batteries. More than many other types of equipment, communications gear requires cool and dry storage. This necessity is complicated because most amphibious ships do not have designed spaces set aside for this purpose. Like armory storage, communications storage needs to be weatherproof, secure, and easily accessible. An obvious technique is to combine armory and communications storage.

## **Vehicles**

The number and type of vehicles potentially assigned to a company vary widely depending on the mission and their most likely means of employment. Vehicles represent one of the major items the company possesses that will end up going ashore as a stand-alone asset. The storage container holding the company's weapons may be buried deep within the ship because the container is not going ashore in an assault wave, but the radios are. On the other hand, company vehicles will be stowed in a manner that allows them to be placed upon appropriate landing craft per the landing plan. Consequently, the infantry company embarkation personnel must pay particular attention to the storage of company vehicles to ensure that such storage meets the access requirements mandated in the landing plan.

Because of their unique place in the load and landing plans, vehicles are often among some of the last items embarked. Company gunnery sergeants, in their embarkation roles, closely supervise the preparation, preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), labeling, and staging of the company's vehicles. Infantry companies should expect that the movement, staging, and loading of embarked unit vehicles present a significant endeavor. Since the standard is that each vehicle is ready to move at any time in the embarkation process, each company vehicle must have its own driver and assistant driver who must remain with the vehicle until embarkation is complete. Depending on the load and landing plans, vehicles are stowed in the well decks, vehicle turning areas, or are sometimes "preboated" aboard landing craft.

## **Maintenance Assets**

Companies do not normally possess the authority or resources to conduct their own maintenance. However, when required to do so, the infantry company must consider the needs and requirements applicable to their parts, tools, and the conduct of maintenance while embarked. A company tasked with maintaining a small boat capability represents the requirement to store parts and tools while conducting repairs and maintenance throughout embarkation. Properly planned and coordinated, storage containers can be used to embark maintenance assets and then become stand-alone workshops once underway.

## **Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Embarkation**

Infantry companies tasked with maintaining a small boat capability must pack and maintain their own form of transportation. The small boat company must work diligently with embarkation personnel from the battalion and the ship to ensure that space assigned for maintenance and storage of parts, combat rubber raiding craft (CRRC), and engines facilitate the requirements to build and inflate, stage, launch, recover, maintain, tear down, and stow small boats. As indicated, the small boat company possesses a significantly greater load plan footprint than any other infantry units do. It is important that the company clearly articulate and document its requirements to ensure they are met. The company must understand that, given the specialized nature of its equipment, the procurement of repair parts through the normal supply system is difficult at best and can be impossible while underway. Much of what a company anticipates needing must be embarked. Failure to do so could rapidly degrade the small boat capability to the point of mission failure.

## REHEARSALS

The rehearsal phase tests the feasibility of the landing plan, timing and sequencing of various operations, communications, and generally the combat readiness of participating forces. Rehearsals can be limited to squads or include the entire LF.

### Operational Rehearsals

Since most amphibious operations preclude full scale rehearsals, company commanders can expect to participate in multiple rehearsals at the battalion level and higher, which sometimes require “cross-decking” to other ships. In the same manner, company commanders must make maximum use of available planning spaces to conduct such activities as rehearsals of concept or mock-up exercises without troops. There is no excuse to not adequately rehearse impending missions and there are numerous effective rehearsal techniques that companies can use aboard amphibious shipping.

### Call Away Rehearsals

The primary way the infantry company tests and refines its portion of the landing plan and debarkation timeline is to practice the call away. The call away refers to the calls made over the ship’s public address system for designated serials to move to their designated mustering location/debarkation stations on the ship. The general steps the companies rehearse are the serial announcement, confirmation of manifests, equipment, weapons, and ammunition issue and test fire, and movement to the assault or landing craft. The process, involving hundreds of personnel is time consuming and difficult and requires as much rehearsal as possible.

***Serial Announcement.*** When serials are announced over the ship’s public address system, company personnel muster by serial with all gear and equipment at prearranged locations/debarkation stations, such as the hanger deck or ramp to the flight deck. The company should establish primary and alternate routes from berthing areas to the armory, muster point, and other destinations. Weapons and gear are issued prior to call away and the company must possess an adequate understanding of how long these processes take and plan and rehearse them accordingly.

***Confirmation of Manifests.*** Upon arriving at the mustering area, combat cargo personnel organize and segregate the company by serial, verifying manifests in the process. Rehearsal of these processes will greatly accelerate and smooth execution. The company should already know which personnel belong to which serials and should organize in manifest order to ease accountability procedures.

***Ammunition Issue and Test Fire.*** After confirming manifests, the serials receive their ammunition. Combat cargo personnel guide company personnel by serial to the test fire area of the ship. Test firing is abbreviated and generally consist of one or two rounds before serials are led back to their mustering areas.

## **MOVEMENT TO ASSAULT AND LANDING CRAFT**

In accordance with commands from the ship and the debarkation schedule, combat cargo personnel lead serials from debarkation stations to the appropriate positions, which is usually the flight or well deck, to board their assigned aviation asset, assault, or landing craft.

## **MOVEMENT TO THE OBJECTIVE AREA**

For the LF, the movement phase of amphibious operations is characterized by maintaining not only the combat readiness of vehicles, weapons, optics, and gear, but by also ensuring that Marines and Sailors remain proficient in their skills and competencies. Continuing actions during movement to the objective area are vital to the infantry company's combat effectiveness once ashore. Despite possible training and operating limitations placed upon the company while underway, company commanders still have a responsibility to ensure their company personnel, weapon systems, and equipment are ready and prepared for combat operations ashore.

### **Training**

Commanders establish a training battle rhythm that uses the limited space aboard the ship and prevents complacency. The commander must ensure the company training plan is thoroughly coordinated with the ship's crew to reduce friction and enable successful training to occur as scheduled. Training schedule coordination and deconfliction occurs through the COT and ship's operations officer.

### **Underway Vehicle Procedures**

Vehicles will be stowed per the discussion earlier in this chapter. Moving vehicles is a time consuming and labor-intensive process while the ship is underway. The TEO coordinates weekly maintenance periods, vehicle startups, and fueling. Adequate company representation must be present for these scheduled periods, since it will be unlikely that they will be repeated for individual units. If a company misses one of these regularly scheduled periods, it will generally need to wait for the next.

### **Shipboard Life Considerations**

Life aboard amphibious shipping can be a very different experience from what Marines are traditionally accustomed. The Navy can drive daily routine to a large degree, and it is essential for personnel to quickly assimilate to a new environment. Company personnel require a basic understanding of this environment and its associated requirements in which they will often be living and operating for considerable periods.

## **ACTION**

The following subparagraphs provide information on the various assault craft the infantry company may encounter and deck cycles for aircraft that inform the development of the landing plan.

### **Landing Craft, Air Cushioned**

The landing craft, air cushioned (LCAC) is a high speed, non-displacement landing craft well suited for use in conjunction with assault support aircraft for over-the-horizon movement. It can operate through surf zones and deliver its cargo well above the high-water mark. Being designed to carry heavy loads, it is lightly armored and armed and is not planned for use with the initial assault waves. For more information on the LCAC see MCTP 13-10A, *Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC)*.

The LCAC is not constrained by most tidal conditions and hydrographic features, which makes it an ideal complement to other surface and air landing means. Although limited in the number of personnel it can carry without a passenger transport module on board, it complements the displacement landing craft utility well in transporting heavy loads ashore. Because the LCAC produces large volumes of sea spray, waterproofing of vehicles, mounted weapons systems, and mobile loads is vital.

### **Landing Craft, Utility**

The landing craft, utility (LCU) is a versatile displacement craft that can move more personnel, vehicles, and cargo in one STS movement than the LCAC. The LCU is considered the “work horse” of the AF. Although much slower than the LCAC, the LCUs ability to loiter, execute ship-to-ship, and open ocean shore-to-shore transits, makes it an asset for use across the competition continuum.

Sea states and accurate hydrographical information about potential landing sites are critical to its employment. Although it possesses no offensive combat capability, it has a high bow ramp, and its steel construct provides a measure of protection against small arms fire. For more information on the LCU, see MCTP 13-10C.

### **Assault Amphibious Vehicles**

The AAV moves the elements of the LF from amphibious shipping to the designated landing site. Possessing both offensive and defensive combat capabilities, having significant range, and being armored, it can conduct mechanized operations well inland once it gets ashore. The AAV’s tracks enable it to navigate most tidal, hydrographic, and surf conditions. The AAV’s slow rate of movement in the water coupled with the negative effects of sea state on crew and passengers makes them ill-suited for prolonged STS movements.

### **Air Assault Considerations**

Air assaults along with the types of operations that the infantry company may conduct using this method of movement are addressed in Chapter 7. The following subparagraphs focus on unique considerations that accompany the infantry company when it is using assault support aircraft to conduct an amphibious operation from naval shipping.

**Deck Cycle.** The deck cycle is the time it takes to move, spot, load, launch, and recover aircraft on the flight deck. The biggest influences on deck cycle time are the number of deck spots and the type, model, series, and ranges of the aircraft. An infantry company lift, and the aircraft required to lift it, attack, escort, and bump aircraft is too large to enable simultaneous

staging and launching. Company commanders must consider their ship's deck cycle when developing their schemes of maneuver ashore.

### ***Mustering and Staging***


Combat cargo personnel control the debarkation of all landing serials, regardless of debarkation means. For airborne landing serials transiting from their designated mustering locations/debarkations to a crowded and seemingly chaotic flight deck, accountability, and immediate and complete compliance to orders from combat cargo personnel is critical. Unlike at an LZ, the infantry company will not control its own movement from the debarkation station.

### ***Concurrent Air and Surface Operations***

Company commanders should realize that during the creation of the landing plan, naval planners consider concurrent use of the flight deck and the well deck. Activities on one or both can impair the ability to function at peak performance. Sea state, wind direction, and safety all play a role. Waiting will be the most likely effect on the infantry company. The company may launch in surface craft early to allow for unrestricted flight operations later or vice versa.

### ***Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Considerations***

When an infantry company plans to use CRRCs to conduct the action phase of an amphibious operation, the primary concern is preparing, loading, and launching the craft in conjunction with all other activities taking place aboard the ship. The earlier boats can be prepared and staged the better. Most small boat operations occur in such a manner that operational requirements, such as a night insertion, functionally deconflict the CRRC launch from other amphibious activities. In those rare cases when this is not the case, company commanders must ensure that planners fully understand the length of time required to prepare and launch the boats. Figure 10-1 demonstrates the ideal staging and launching method of an empty well deck. In practice, small boat companies may have to stack and build boats around other vehicles and landing craft.



**Figure 10-1. Combat Rubber Raiding Craft Staging.**

# **CHAPTER 11**

## **STABILITY**

Stability operations is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment. This chapter discusses the infantry company's roles and responsibilities in conducting stability operations. The infantry company will conduct stability operations in terms of ongoing activities, such as addressing the civil considerations inherent to METT-T. The company will also conduct specific, stability-type operations, such as FHA. Stability operations may be short-term responses to crisis or, occasionally, long-term developmental assistance. They may be permissive and nonviolent (such as supporting the Japanese tsunami disaster relief in 2011) or they may be nonpermissive and require significant combat (such as the Iraq invasion and counterinsurgency from 2003 to 2011).

The action arm for stability operations is CMO. The company conducts CMO with and through the interorganizational agencies. Whether conducting specific stability-type operations (such as training HN security forces) or stability activities (such as executing a refugee plan), the military end state for stability operations is a transition to civil authority. The infantry company's main contribution to stability operations is security.

### **GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

Experience in such operations as small wars, interventions, counterinsurgencies, and disaster relief has allowed Marines to identify the following imperatives that apply to stability operations and activities across the competition continuum:

- Manage information and expectations.
- Use the appropriate level of force.
- Learn and adapt.
- Empower the lowest levels.
- Support the host nation.

The infantry company conducts stability operations in a complex operational environment. For example, within a company battlespace, one platoon may be providing fixed-base security, one platoon may be executing a security patrol to conduct civil engagements, and another platoon may be conducting a cordon and search with HNSF. With many competing tasks and requirements, company commanders must remain focused on their main effort. More than any other type of mission, stability operations tend to drive a diffusion of effort.

Stability operations require versatile, well-trained units and adaptive commanders. The infantry company must be able to operate as part of a joint or multinational force, interacting continuously toward defined goals with partners, interagency and NGO representatives, contractors, and the host nation. The company may often interact semi-independently, requiring

a well-executed analysis of METT-T, PMESII, and ASCOPE to allow the company commander to build a coherent framework with which to execute the tasks assigned.

The end state for all stability activities is a level of order that enables a transition to civil authority. The infantry company most often provides security with a larger, more comprehensive approach to build a foundation for transitioning power to civilian control. When tasked and resourced to do so, the infantry company may support other agencies and organizations by performing specific tasks that support other functions, such as rule of law or governance and participation.

### **Categories of Stability Action**

Regardless of whether a stability operation is short or long term, it falls within three broad categories, which may or may not occur as sequential phases. The infantry company may find itself participating in only one aspect, such as initial response, before transitioning to civil authorities. The categories are—

- *Initial response.* First responders provide a safe, secure environment and attend to the immediate essential service needs of the local population.
- *Transformation.* Longer term efforts develop or re-establish enduring capability and capacity in the HN government.
- *Fostering stability.* Long-term efforts capitalize on capacity-building and reconstruction activities to enable sustainable development.

## **STABILITY ACTIVITIES**

The primary objective of any stability activity is stabilization of an unstable environment. The infantry company participates in the missions, tasks, and activities conducted to create that stability. It does so as part of a larger effort that usually provides or executes security-related tasks. The end state of any stability operation is to transition the military role to civil authority. For more information on stability, see MCWP 3-03, *Stability Operations*.

### **Stability Functions**

According to MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*, the Marine Corps participates in stability operations through the execution of five stability functions. These functions serve as a framework for HHQ to visualize the conduct of the stability actions in any operation, sequence the necessary activities within that operation, and develop appropriate priorities for those activities and resource allocation. The GCE and, in turn, the infantry company possess only a limited ability to conduct many of the stability functions on its own without significant augmentation. The five stability functions are:

- Security.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Economic stabilization and infrastructure.
- Rule of law.
- Governance and participation.



## **Stability Tasks**

Tactical units receive tasks. The execution of the five stability functions depends on units executing tasks that enable those functions to occur. There are six stability tasks that enable the stability functions (see Table 11-1). In the same manner that the stability functions relate to each other, so do the stability tasks. For example, it is difficult to establish the rule of law without security, but security is also dependent upon the rule of law. Actions pursuant to any one task inevitably create related effects in another; planned and executed appropriately, carefully sequenced activities complement and reinforce these effects. For example, a company will not focus most of its assets or time on supporting economic and infrastructure development if it faces a highly lethal insurgency; rather, it will direct efforts and time toward establishing civil security (maintaining security at an acceptable level). These tasks apply across the competition continuum and could as easily be executed by the infantry company in a conventional conflict as they could be in a natural disaster. The six stability tasks are:

- Enable civil security.
- Enable civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support governance.
- Support economic and infrastructure development.
- Conduct humanitarian assistance.

<b>Table 11-1. Stability End States to Population-Oriented Tactical Tasks</b>	
<b>Stability End States</b>	
	Safe and secure environment Rule of law Stable governance Social well-being Sustainable economy
<b>Through</b>	
<b>Stability Functions</b>	
	Security Foreign humanitarian assistance Economic stabilization and infrastructure Rule of law Governance and participation
<b>By Means of</b>	
<b>Stability Tasks</b>	
	Enable civil security Enable civil control Restore essential services Support governance Support economic and infrastructure development Conduct humanitarian assistance
<b>As a Result of</b>	
<b>Population-Oriented Tactical Tasks</b>	
	Advise Assess the population Assist Build/restore infrastructure Contain* Control* Coordinate with civil authorities Enable civil authorities Exclude Influence* Occupy* Reconnoiter* Secure* Train
<i>*Population-oriented tactical tasks with multiple applications.</i>	

**Enable Civil Security.** Enabling civil security involves providing or assisting in the provision of a safe and secure environment for the HN and its population from internal and external threats. Enabling civil security can apply to a diverse set of activities that range from enforcing

peace agreements to conducting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Such activities include providing security through transition and developing a HNSF. Enabling civil security is resource intense, requiring extensive amounts of personnel and material. Civil security is a necessary precursor to success in achieving other stability tasks. Infantry companies can specifically expect the civil security mission to include the following actions:


- Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Advise, mentor, and train HNSF.
- Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
- Conduct border control, provide boundary security, and monitor freedom of movement.
- Establish and support identification programs.
- Protect key personnel and facilities.
- Clear explosive and CBRN hazards.

**Enable Civil Control.** Enabling civil control supports the rule of law and civil security by providing or supporting the provision of effective judiciary, police, and corrective systems. It encompasses the key institutions necessary for a functioning justice system, which include police, investigative services, the prosecutorial arm, and public defense. This task targets internal threats that manifest as insurgencies, subversive elements within the population, organized crime, or general lawlessness. The infantry company must be ready to execute the following activities, which are associated with enabling civil control:

- Establish public order and safety.
- Support the establishment an interim criminal justice system.
- Support law enforcement and police reform.
- Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

**Restore Essential Services.** Restoring essential services consists of immediate efforts focused on protecting and supporting the establishment or restoration of basic civil services—food, water, shelter, and medical—until a transition to civil authority occurs. In the aftermath of major armed conflicts and disasters and during many stability operations, military forces support efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services to sustain the population until local civil services are restored (see Figure 11-1). These efforts typically include providing or supporting HA, providing shelter and relief for dislocated civilians, and preventing the spread of epidemic disease. Unless they receive specific skill set augmentation, infantry companies usually support these efforts with labor, security, local coordination, and civil engagement. A company commander can expect to support the following activities:

- Provision of essential civil services.
- Assistance to dislocated civilians.
- Famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
- Nonfood relief programs.
- Human rights initiatives.
- Public health programs.
- Education programs.



**Figure 11-1. Essential Services Lines of Effort.**

**Support Governance.** Military forces support governance by helping to shape the environment necessary to restore public administration and public services through a legitimate, functional, effective system of political governance. The support provided by military forces in the areas of civil control and civil security enables other partners to develop an open political process, a free press, a functioning civil society, and legitimate legal and constitutional frameworks. An infantry company must be ready to execute the following actions, which are associated with supporting governance:

- Support transitional administrations.
- Support development of local governance.
- Support anticorruption initiatives.
- Support elections.

**Support Economic and Infrastructure Development.** Economic and infrastructure development consists of military support of mid- and long-term construction and engineering efforts focused on transportation, telecommunications, energy, and other public services. This level of effort is different from that required to restore essential services, which is an immediate

and short-term endeavor and requires some basic level of security and rule of law. The infantry company supports economic and infrastructure development in four ways:

- Enables civil security and civil control through active participation in operations and/or by supporting the HNSF.
- Serves as a sensor in providing data to determine economic and infrastructure development needs in the AO.
- Serves as a collector for assessments regarding the effectiveness of economic and infrastructure projects.
- Possesses a limited capability to employ funds and resources in support of HHQ declared economic and infrastructure goals.

**Conduct Humanitarian Assistance.** Military forces conduct HA in short-term emergency crises, during other operations, or in long-term development assistance by providing or supporting the provision of access and delivery of basic needs—water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services. The task is deliberately broad as delivering HA is one of the most common stability tasks that occur across the competition continuum, whether conducting a stability-type operation (disaster relief) or responding to an earthquake during conventional operations. The infantry company supports this task in the following ways:

- Providing security.
- Providing manpower.
- Assisting in determining needs and assessments.

### **Population-Oriented Tactical Tasks**

The population-oriented tactical tasks enable the execution of the stability tasks. The company may receive these tactical tasks from HHQ or, more likely, it will choose to use these tactical tasks to enable its platoons and squads to execute actions and activities that fulfill the company's larger mission. The fourteen population-oriented tactical tasks are:

- Advise.
- Assess the population.
- Assist.
- Build and restore infrastructure.
- Contain.
- Control.
- Coordinate with civil authorities.
- Enable civil authorities.
- Exclude.
- Influence.
- Occupy.
- Reconnoiter.
- Secure.
- Train.

For more information on the population-oriented tactical tasks, see Appendix B.

## **CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS**

Civil-military operations are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or threat operational area to support achieving operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions usually the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs personnel, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces.

Civil-military operations is the action arm of stability operations. For stability functions and tasks to occur, the infantry company conducts CMO. The company will often engage and coordinate with civic, government, and religious leadership as well as with the populace itself. Civil-military operations build and use relationships with people, governments, and NGOs to facilitate tactical tasks and military objectives and enhance the effective and thoughtful use of combat power. Civil-military operations are not the realm of civil affairs personnel alone. Civil affairs personnel may support infantry companies but will most likely work at the battalion level and above. Therefore, CMO remains a commander's responsibility. Civilian populations, organizations, and leadership add considerable variables to an already chaotic and uncertain battlespace. Since the actions of many of these elements can only be influenced rather than controlled, company commanders seek to mitigate this unpredictability through well-thought-out CMO plans. When planning CMO actions, company commanders should consider the following:

- Actions that generate and further stability.
- Actions that minimize population interference with company operations while enhancing the legitimacy of friendly forces.
- Actions that isolate the enemy from the population and put additional pressure on their operations.
- Actions that identify and coordinate acquisition of local resources.
- Actions that assist the company in meeting legal obligations to the local population.
- Actions that analyze the CMO aspects and implications of current or planned operations.
- Actions that gain and maintain situational awareness of the civil environment.
- Establishing a civil-military operations center (CMOC).

### **Civil-Military Operations Center**

A CMOC is an ad hoc organization established by military commanders to assist in the coordination of activities of military forces and US Government agencies, NGOs, host nation government, and the local civilian population. A CMOC may be a permanent or temporary organization. It can be used for functions, such as the following:

- Providing services to the local population, including adjudication of claims, project and contractor meetings, and issuance of identification documents and cards.

- Providing a venue for meetings between local government and military personnel.
- Enhancing and encouraging the coordination of activities among military personnel, NGOs, host nation government, and US Government agencies.

## **STABILITY ACTIVITY PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

Stability operations at the infantry company level require specific considerations for planning, organizing, and training before and during combat operations. Extensive planning will occur at levels above the company, but company commanders are responsible for detailed planning in their areas of operations. Training before deployment will still focus on small unit tactics and individual skills; however, Marines must also train to understand, consider, and execute CMO in support of stability.

### **Task Organization**

Stability operations often require significant dispersion of the infantry company. Company commanders should include a relative combat power analysis as part of problem framing and COA development—troop to task is part of this process. In doing so, the company commander seeks to develop an understanding of what capabilities the rifle platoons need for effectiveness. Company commanders may find that the requirement to increase the lethality, flexibility, and self-sufficiency of the rifle platoons dictates weapons platoon employment. Company commanders may have to weigh risk: Does the benefit of additional maneuver elements outweigh the threat posed by having less than desired combat power in each of those elements or vice versa?

Company commanders can therefore employ the weapons platoon as a maneuver element, disperse it across the rifle platoons, or retain the capabilities at the company level, weighting company operations with weapons platoon assets as needed. If conducting a relief in place (RIP) during an ongoing operation, commanders consider how the currently engaged company is employing its weapon platoon. The company commander should also seek to understand the reasoning behind the current method of employment before considering changing or adopting it.

### **Planning Horizons**

The company must integrate the planning horizons of the battalion into their own long- and short-range plans. More so than in the offense and defense, the company can envision the desired stability end state some weeks or months in the future. This planning horizon allows the company commander to assess operations and modify them so that progress continues. Failure to establish a long-range plan within which short-term planning occurs will leave the company constantly reacting to events and failing to achieve stability.

### **Unity of Effort**

As planning begins, engaging and using host nation and US civilian partners and stakeholders are critical to ensuring a unified plan with support and agreement from all partners.

### **Secure Critical Infrastructure**

Regardless of the level of conflict in which the infantry company finds itself, planning includes securing and endeavoring to retain the functionality of critical infrastructure, such as basic

utilities. Critical civilian infrastructure also includes governmental, societal, and culturally sensitive sites.

## **Interconnected Systems**

When company commanders analyze the battlespace in terms of civilian considerations, they must appreciate the interactions and reactions within the whole. Certainly, infantry companies approach the enemy holistically as well: the enemy's operation; their systems, capabilities, and resources; and their vulnerabilities. Commanders must understand how complex civil societies can stimulate encouraging the company to analyze the interconnected systems of the battlespace carefully and to consider possible second and third order effects when planning operations.

## **Civil Considerations**

The elements of the infantry company leverage their ability to interact with the local population when conducting such activities as patrols, census operations, checkpoints, key leadership engagements, or interaction. During all such activities, the infantry company can gain information through active and passive means, determine the tenor of the community (atmospherics), identify key leaders and trusted agents, and collect data that supports the planning process for future operations. The mnemonic ASCOPE provides a tool for the company to assess the civil environment in terms of its capacity and means to help, hinder, or affect military operations. It also provides insight into the effect of military operations on civil considerations in the following ways:

- *Areas.* The analysis of areas refers to key localities or aspects of the terrain within a battlespace that are not usually considered militarily significant, such as locations of government centers; political boundaries; social, religious, or criminal enclaves; agricultural and mining regions; and traditional trade routes.
- *Structures.* Studying structures includes an analysis of the location, function, capability, and application of existing civil structures, such as warehouses, schools, irrigation pump stations, mass media stations, utilities, and cultural sites.
- *Capabilities.* The study of capabilities investigates what exists or is required to sustain the populace and infrastructure, including public administration, public safety, emergency services, or food distribution, and resources and services that can be used or contracted to support the military mission. Such support may include interpreters, construction materials, and heavy or transport equipment.
- *Organizations.* The company should identify organized groups that may or may not be affiliated with government agencies. Examples include religious, fraternal, nationalistic, and political entities; community watch groups; and NGOs.
- *People.* The study of people includes all civilians that the infantry company can expect to encounter in the AO as well as those outside the AO but in the AOI, whose actions, opinions, or political influence can affect military operations. Examples include all local nationals, civil authorities, key leaders, expatriates, contractors and foreign employees, and the media.
- *Events.* The company must consider all civilian events that may affect military operations. Examples include religious/national holidays, harvests, elections, and recent conflict.



## ASSESSMENT OF STABILITY TASKS

Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness and progress of any effort, endeavor, and operation against the desired end state of the company commander. In short, assessment answers basic questions regarding whether the company's efforts are making progress toward mission accomplishment. If it is not making progress, why not, and what must be done differently? As with all other operations, the infantry company constantly assesses progress with stability tasks and activities. The types, methodology, and processes of conducting assessment at the company level are discussed thoroughly in Chapter 2. The following are examples of useful indicators that may be integrated into a company level assessment plan:

- *Acts of violence.* Numbers of enemy attacks, friendly/HN casualties.
- *Dislocated civilians.* Dislocated civilian is a broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. The number, population, and demographics of dislocated civilian camps or the lack thereof are an indicator of overall security and stability. A drop in the number of people in the camps indicates an increasing return to normalcy. People and families exiled from or fleeing their homes and property and people returning to them are measurable and revealing.
- *Human movement and religious attendance.* In societies where the culture is dominated by religion, activities related to the predominant faith may indicate the ease of movement and confidence in security, people's use of free will and volition, and the presence of freedom of religion. Possible indicators include the following:
  - Flow of religious pilgrims or lack thereof.
  - Development and active use of places of worship.
  - Number of temples and churches closed by a government.
- *Presence and activity of small and medium sized businesses.* When danger or insecure conditions exist, these businesses close. Patrols can report on the number of businesses that are open and how many customers they have. Tax collections may indicate the overall amount of sales activity.
- *Level of agricultural activity.* Answers to the following questions are indicators:
  - Is a region or nation self-sustaining or must life-support type foodstuffs be imported?
  - How many acres are in cultivation? Are the fields well maintained and watered?
  - Are agricultural goods getting to market? Has the annual need increased or decreased?
- *Presence or absence of associations.* The formation and presence of multiple political parties indicates more involvement of the people in government. Meetings of independent professional associations demonstrate the viability of the middle class and professions. Trade union activity indicates worker involvement in the economy and politics.
- *Participation in elections.* Such participation is an indicator of progress, especially when insurgents publicly threaten violence against participants.
- *Government services available.* Examples include the following:
  - Police stations operational and police officers present throughout the area.
  - Clinics and hospitals in full operation and whether new facilities sponsored by the private sector are open and operational.
  - Schools and universities open and functioning.

- *Freedom of movement of people, goods, and communications.* This is a classic measure to determine if nonstate actors are interdicting or denying access to goods and services.
- *Tax revenue.* If people are paying taxes, this can be an indicator of host nation government influence and subsequent civil stability.
- *Other indicators.* Other indicators include industry exports, employment/unemployment rate, availability of electricity, and specific attacks on infrastructure.

## CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The ability of the United States to respond to crises around the world promotes regional security. Crisis response and limited contingency operations may arise during or because of other operations. Military units may respond unilaterally or as part of a larger interagency or multinational effort. Many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as disaster relief and FHA operations, do not necessarily require combat but may require basic security and FP measures. However, these types of events might occur during offense, defense, or stability operations as well, requiring a balance of combat preparedness and humanitarian response. Still, some operations, such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and require a significant effort to protect friendly forces while accomplishing the mission; therefore, infantry companies must be prepared to conduct the full range of military operations in support of crisis response scenarios.

### Types of Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

There are eight types of crisis response and limited contingency operations in which the infantry company may participate: disaster relief, FHA, NEO, strikes and raids, embassy defense, recovery operations, defense support of civil authorities, and peace operations.

**Disaster Relief.** Disaster relief operations are actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Disaster relief resulting in employment of the infantry company can occur both domestically or in foreign countries and either unilaterally or as part of a much larger multiagency and multinational effort. Military units executing disaster relief will usually serve as a supporting force for civilian-directed responses.

**EXAMPLE:** Following Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992, the Special Purpose MAGTF established and maintained a temporary city for 2,500 displaced civilians, distributed supplies, and helped restore power to Dade County. Marines also supported relief efforts after Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana in 2005 and are called out almost yearly to fight wildfires in California.

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.** The purpose of FHA is to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions that pose a serious threat to life (disease, starvation) or property. The US military typically supplements HN authorities along with US Government agencies, NGOs, and unaffiliated individuals. Most FHA operations resemble disaster relief operations.

**EXAMPLE:** In 1991, 24th MEU (Special Operations Capable) provided security, shelter, food, and water to the dissident Kurdish minority in northern Iraq. The 5th Marine Expeditionary

Brigade, during Operation SEA ANGEL in 1991, assisted Bangladesh in the aftermath of a devastating tropical cyclone by distributing food and medical supplies and repairing the country's transportation infrastructure. In late 2004 and early 2005, III Marine Expeditionary Force units assisted Indonesia and neighboring areas following an earthquake and subsequent tsunami.

***Noncombatant Evacuation.*** A NEO is a Department of State-run operation that serves primarily to evacuate US citizens whose lives are in danger. It can also evacuate natives and third-world country nationals when directed to do so. The military supports the Department of State through swift insertion of forces and the temporary occupation of an objective, followed by a planned withdrawal. An infantry company participating in a NEO may task-organize to provide security, organizational and logistical support, detainee handling, or evacuation assistance. The company uses only the force needed to protect evacuees and defend itself.

**EXAMPLE:** On 12 July 2006, Hezbollah conducted a rocket attack on northern Israel. The American embassy (Department of State) requested Department of Defense support on 14 July for a NEO of American citizens, resulting in a US Central Command executive order issued on 15 July. The order resulted in the following mission statement for 24th MEU: "On order, 24th MEU (Special Operations Capable) conducts the evacuation of approximately 25 American citizens from the US Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, to Cyprus in order to support Department of State authorized departures. Be prepared to support follow-on evacuation operations of designated personnel."

***Strikes and Raids.*** A strike is an attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. Raids are a type of attack that include a planned withdrawal. Forward deployed forces, of which the infantry company may be a part, most often conduct strikes and raids. Infantry companies may participate directly or may provide direct and indirect support.

**EXAMPLE:** In 1988, elements of a special purpose MAGTF destroyed two oil platforms in the Persian Gulf being used by Iran as staging platforms for attacks on merchant shipping.

***Embassy Defense.*** When periods of civil unrest, revolution, and lawlessness exceed the HN's abilities to contain, Marine Corps forces have often been called upon to defend US diplomatic posts and personnel against external danger (the Marine Corps Embassy Security Group provides internal security services). Embassy defense operations are frequently conducted in conjunction with NEOs.

**EXAMPLE:** In 1996, elements of the 22nd MEU (Special Operations Capable) simultaneously reinforced the American Embassies in Monrovia, Liberia (Operation ASSURED RESPONSE) and Bangui, Central African Republic (Operation QUICK RESPONSE), providing security for some months and eventually evacuating 2,444 and 448 people respectively.

***Recovery Operations.*** The Marine Corps maintains the ability to execute recovery of personnel, aircraft, and equipment. Often, particularly with personnel, these operations occur within the context of the Department of Defense Personnel Recovery System. The Marine Corps expects that personnel and aircraft recovery plans are inherent within the conduct of all

operations from patrols through amphibious landings, which is why commanders at all levels plan drills and procedures, such as break contact, missing person, or escape and evasion. Due to its expeditionary nature, the Marine Corps is unique in having developed a specific operation—tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP)—to execute recovery tasks. The MAGTF usually designates a TRAP force, even if that force exists only on a contingency basis. The TRAP force consists of specially trained and briefed aircrews with a task-organized ground force. The infantry company or elements of the company form the basis of the ground force. The company focuses on the following:

- Enemy threat.
- Location of personnel, aircraft, and equipment to be recovered.
- Composition of personnel, aircraft, and equipment to be recovered.
- Troop to task, to include special skills or equipment of the TRAP force for the mission.
- Insertion and extraction means, to include secondary and tertiary assets and locations.
- Expected time on the ground.
- GO and NO-GO criteria.
- Verification of SPINS.
- Constitution of a reserve.

The actual execution of a TRAP mission includes five phases—report, locate, support, recover, and reintegrate. The infantry company commander can expect that information from the report and locate phases will drive the company’s TRAP participation in the support and recover phases. The reintegrate phase is beyond the scope of the company.

**EXAMPLE:** On 3 September 1992, United Nations’ relief flight 2117, an Italian G-222 transport aircraft, crashed near Sarajevo airport from suspected hostile fire in the former country of Yugoslavia. The 26th MEU, operating aboard the helicopter carrier USS *Iwo Jima* in the Adriatic Sea, received a TRAP mission task to rescue or assist any survivors of the Italian G-222.

**Defense Support of Civil Authorities.** When permitted by law (Posse Comitatus Act) and when events overcome the ability of local authorities to respond, domestic civil authorities may receive temporary military support. Infantry companies tasked to provide this type of support may respond to a range of activities, such as augmenting forest firefighting efforts, providing humanitarian relief to hurricane victims, and assisting in the restoration of law and order during periods of civil disturbance. It is critical that the company leadership understand the differences between conducting operations inside and outside of the United States. While the military may serve as the lead agency outside of the United States, it will never do so within the United States. Both Active and Reserve components of the Marine Corps are not legally the same as civilian agencies or the National Guard. From the ground, guarding a motor pool and handing out food in a foreign country appears very much like guarding a motor pool and handing out food in a US city, but they are not the same. It is important that the company understands the legal differences between the two operational environments.

**EXAMPLE:** In 1992, Marine Corps forces formed as a special purpose MAGTF to provide security and assistance to local law enforcement in response to riots in the city of Los Angeles.

**Peace Operations.** Peace operations is a general term that applies to all manner of international and military missions seeking to contain conflict, restore peace, create and sustain an environment of reconciliation and rebuilding, and facilitate transitions to legitimate governance. It encompasses three general areas: operations in support of diplomatic efforts, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The infantry company may participate in peacekeeping or peace enforcement but is unlikely to participate in operations supporting diplomatic efforts unless part of a larger force. Peace operations may occur under the auspices of the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations, within a mission-specific coalition of nations, or unilaterally.

**EXAMPLE:** In concert with the US Government's ongoing commitment to East Timor, 11th MEU/Boxer Amphibious Ready Group deployed more than 500 Marines and Sailors daily 9-11 April 2002, from the USS *Boxer*, USS *Harpers Ferry*, and USS *Cleveland* to several locations in East Timor to conduct medical and dental assistance, airlift and sealift of humanitarian supplies, and assistance in community relations projects around the island.

### **Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations Planning Considerations**

Company commanders must expect an uncertain, fluid, and chaotic operational environment when conducting crisis response and limited contingency operations. Gaining and maintaining an understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem is critical and leaders must stay flexible and understand their roles within the operation. The following are some planning considerations for the infantry company:

- Communicating the chain of command.
- Developing an initial employment plan, which includes site reconnaissance and site security, for potential company operating bases.
- Ensuring that civilian agencies and counterparts understand the capabilities and limitations of an infantry company.
- Possessing a clear understanding of the ROE and escalation of force continuum and its implications on mission accomplishment.
- Establishing communications and liaison with local authorities, such as government officials, law enforcement agencies, and public works officials.
- Determining processes and procedures necessary to coordinate, support, and get support from local authorities and agencies.
- Identifying key equipment, logistical, personnel, and external augmentation requirements.
- Ensuring the company's IPB process clearly takes into account information and civil considerations.
- Planning and synchronizing a robust information plan.
- Establishing CCIRs and PIRs that allow the infantry company to assess, validate, and determine the requirements of the local populace.
- Establishing an assessment plan with valid indicators.

# CHAPTER 12

## OTHER TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This chapter discusses other operations that enable actions across the range of offense, defense, and stability operations. Like all tactical operations, they may be main or supporting efforts. Other operations include engineering, RIP, passage of lines, linkup, reconnaissance, convoy, deliberate and hasty checkpoints, and the handling of detainees and captured personnel. Planning and preparing for other operations presents the same challenges and requirements as for any type. Other operations executed by the infantry company can occur in mounted or dismounted roles, with or without enablers, and in a joint or coalition environment.

### ENGINEERING OPERATIONS

Engineers conduct four primary missions: mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering. The following subparagraphs expand upon discussions of mobility and countermobility in this publication.

An obstacle is an obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of an opposing force while imposing additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on them. Obstacles can be natural, manmade, or a combination of both. Mobility operations seek to reduce obstacles to maintain freedom of movement for maneuver units, weapon systems, and critical supplies. Countermobility operations endeavor to construct obstacles to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy to slow or divert them; increase time for target acquisition; and increase friendly weapon effectiveness.

#### Mobility

Mobility applies to all engineering activities that enhance the ability of friendly forces to maneuver. Engineers conduct mobility operations across a range of operations and, regardless of operational environment, the infantry company faces increasing numbers of widely varying types of obstacles from tank ditches to IEDs. Company commanders plan, organize, and prepare their companies to perform mounted and dismounted mobility tasks using the full range of organic and nonorganic mobility assets available.

**Obstacle Crossing.** Obstacle crossing applies to those tasks associated with traditional breaching and the crossing of all obstacles, such as rivers. Obstacle crossing can occur at the division level, such as the reduction of a complex obstacle belt during Operation DESERT STORM, or at the squad level by breaching protective wire to enter an enemy position or getting over a deep ravine. Obstacle crossing is a task that occurs often during offensive operations and entails the employment of a combination of techniques, procedures, and equipment to project combat power to the far side of an obstacle. Company commanders must understand the challenges presented by various types of obstacles and the capabilities and limitations of the assets the company can employ to defeat them. They must further understand the basic tenets of obstacle crossing, obstacle breaching, and the types of breaches the company may conduct on its own or as part of a larger force.

**Breaching.** In the planning and execution of a breaching operation, the company commander applies the five tenets of breaching:

- Intelligence.
- Breaching fundamentals.
- Breaching organization.
- Mass.
- Synchronization.

When confronting simple or lightly defended obstacles, well-rehearsed battle drills, tactical SOPs, and breaching asset redundancy can offset a lack of obstacle intelligence; however, detailed obstacle intelligence is imperative for a successful breach of a complex obstacle. Company commanders must remember that the purpose of the enemy obstacle is to disrupt, turn, fix, or block the company. If the company lacks intelligence on how to defeat the obstacle and associated defenses, it is performing in the manner the enemy desires and faces disastrous consequences. At a minimum, effective obstacle IRs for breach and maneuver planning should identify the following:

- *Bypasses and gaps.* The requirement for a breaching operation depends on the existence of adequate bypasses. Existing gaps may influence the type of breach used.
- *Obstacle location and orientation.* These factors affect the approach to the breach and the scheme of maneuver that supports the breach.
- *Obstacle composition and depth.* These factors determine required breaching resources; how long the breach will take; the amount of exposure friendly forces will experience while passing through the breach; and the combat power required to emplace, maintain, and exploit the breach. Further considerations include the location of enemy direct fire weapons and the topography and soil composition.

There are five basic steps that form a part of every breaching operation—suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault (SOSRA):

- *Suppress.* A company's failure at this step ensures the failure of the rest. The infantry company uses all available organic and nonorganic combat power to deny the enemy the ability to place effective fires on the breach and assault forces for the duration of the breaching operation.
- *Obscure.* The infantry company employs screening or obscuring smoke to prevent or disrupt enemy acquisition of friendly elements. Plans must be made to ensure the obscuration lasts for as long as it is needed.
- *Secure.* Under the cover of suppression and obscuration, the infantry company secures the breach site to prevent enemy interference with obstacle reduction or the movement of friendly forces through the cleared lanes. When conducting task organization, assigning combat power, and creating the scheme of maneuver, the company commander must ensure that security at the breach site can defeat all types of enemy actions, such as counterattack forces, that could threaten the breach.

- *Reduce.* With the risk of enemy action mitigated by the previous first three steps, the breaching force physically reduces the obstacle, creates lanes for movement, and guides friendly forces through the breach.
- *Assault.* During the assault phase, the infantry company exploits the breach by passing through combat power that assaults the objective, destroys enemy forces capable of bringing direct or indirect fires on the breach, and sets the conditions for further exploitation and pursuit.

To conduct a breach, the infantry company must perform three functions—support, breach, and assault—and generally organizes itself in that manner. The task organization of available combat power is not as important as effectively accomplishing the three functions:


- *Support force.* The support force establishes necessary SBF and observation positions to suppress the enemy with direct and indirect fires to prevent effective fires against friendly forces. It employs obscuration to screen breach and assault forces.
- *Breach force.* The breach force searches for bypasses, establishes breach site security on both sides of the obstacle as required, reduces the obstacle, and proofs and marks lanes or bypasses.
- *Assault force.* The assault force exploits the breach to assault the objective and set conditions for follow-on actions. It is prepared to assist the support force in suppressing the enemy, assist the breach force in securing the far side of the breach site, and conduct assault breaches of protective obstacles.

The infantry company masses combat power at the breach site by focusing all resources and assets on isolating and fixing the enemy in position. The company commander should plan for at least a 50 percent redundancy in obstacle breaching assets.

The company commander synchronizes complex breaching operations through detailed reverse planning, clear instructions to subordinate elements, effective command and control, and extensive rehearsals (see Figure 12-1). Basing planning around SOSRA and using reverse planning methodology, company planners consider—

- *Actions on the objective.* The planned actions on the objective influence the size and composition of the assault force and the number and location of lanes required of the breach element.
- *Breach requirements.* Lane requirements, topography, and the types of obstacles determine the type and number of reduction assets required by the breach force.
- *Breach site security.* The ability of the enemy to interfere with the breach determines whether fires, force, or both secure the breach site.
- *Suppression requirements.* The enemy's ability to mass fires at the breach site dictates the nature of the required suppressive fires, including the composition of the support force and the type, amount, and duration of supporting fires. In planning this step, company commanders develop assessment criteria to determine when to commit the breach force.
- *Support positions.* The location of the enemy and the availability of clear fields of fire determine the location of the support force and its SBF position.





### Legend

LD/LC line of departure is the line of contact  
 OBJ objective

**Figure 12-1. Reverse Planning—Breaching.**

Though there are two types of breaches at the company level and above—hasty and deliberate—the bypass method is the first thing a commander should consider before committing to an actual breaching operation. At this level of operation, the company will often (but not always) serve as a support, breach, or assault force for the parent battalion.

**Bypass.** When a unit bypasses an obstacle, it physically changes direction and moves along a route that avoids the obstacle. While the desire to maintain momentum encourages bypassing obstacles whenever possible, company commanders must ensure that bypassing an obstacle provides a tactical advantage without exposing the unit to unnecessary danger. A reconnaissance should allow commanders to consider the following:

- The limits of the obstacle.
- Physical aspects of the bypass route, including location, availability of cover and concealment, and key terrain influencing the route.
- Confirmation that the bypass route takes the company where it needs to go, but not where the enemy wants it to go, such as into possible ambush sites or kill zones.

**Hasty Breach.** Companies and battalions employ the combined arms hasty breaching technique to overcome unexpected or lightly defended obstacles quickly; they may also use the technique when the obstacle or enemy situation is unclear. Company commanders and battalion commanders prepare their units for a combined arms hasty breach by task-organizing subordinate battalions or companies (as applicable) with the additional forces necessary to conduct the operation. As with the combined arms deliberate breach, the battalion commander may direct the company, probably task-organized with one or more attached engineer platoons, to conduct the combined arms hasty breach on its own. The company commander assumes responsibility for designating support, breach, and assault forces and for synchronizing SOSRA actions.

**Deliberate Breach.** When confronting known, complex, or heavily defended obstacles and when no other reasonable tactical alternatives exist, the combined arms deliberate breach is conducted. The combined arms deliberate breach is a standalone operation specifically designed to reduce an obstacle, allowing the unit to continue the mission. Thorough reconnaissance, detailed planning, and extensive preparation and rehearsals characterize the deliberate breach. Subordinate elements are tasked to perform the roles of support, breach, and assault forces.

**River Crossing.** Unfordable rivers exert considerable impact on operations by imposing restrictions on movement and maneuver. The wider, deeper, and swifter the current of any given river, the stronger that river is as an obstacle. Infantry companies will most likely participate in river crossings as part of a larger force that conducts a centrally planned and controlled offensive operation. River crossings are resource intensive, usually requiring external means of crossing. The operation itself concentrates on successfully crossing the gap, establishing a beachhead, rapidly building up combat power on the far side of the river, and then sustaining further combat operations. A hasty river crossing will use the means at hand and seek to ford the obstacle by seizing an intact crossing site, such as a bridge or ferry. As the name suggests, a deliberate river crossing requires extensive planning and detailed preparations.

**Role of Engineers in Mobility Operations.** Engineers reduce obstacles as part of company breaching operations and must be prepared to perform mounted and dismounted reduction tasks using manual, mechanical, and explosive reduction means. Through reverse breach planning, the supporting engineer identifies critical mobility tasks, allocates reduction assets, and recommends a breaching task organization to the company commander. Keys to allocating reduction assets include identifying all reduction tasks within the zone or axis, matching specific reduction assets to each task, and planning redundancy for each task. Since the breach force must have the capability to secure the breach site locally, engineers must receive adequate maneuver combat power to destroy or suppress enemy forces in the immediate vicinity of the breach site. Other mobility tasks are route clearance operations and mobility planning.

**Route Clearance Operations.** Regardless of employment or operational environment, the infantry company can expect to conduct routine route clearance. Companies may conduct route clearance as part of normal operations, such as natural debris removal, or the company may receive a specific route clearance mission. The latter form of route clearance is a combined arms operation usually assigned to an infantry battalion or company that is task organized with combat engineers and LCE assets as required. As such, it requires the detailed integration and synchronization found in typical breaching operations.

**Mobility Planning in the Defense.** Mobility operations in the defense enhance the ability of the infantry company to reposition forces, conduct delays, and launch counterattacks. Mobility planning is a key component of any defensive scheme of maneuver. The company commander determines mobility requirements as the defensive scheme of maneuver evolves. Critical considerations may include the following:

- Lanes and gaps in the defensive obstacle plan.
- Lane closure plan and subunit responsibility.
- Route reconnaissance, improvement, and maintenance.


### **Countermobility**

While mobility seeks to enhance the ability of friendly forces to maneuver, countermobility seeks to degrade and deny the enemy maneuver. As mobility operations assist a company defense, countermobility can assist in protecting the flanks of an attacking force. In the same manner, as countermobility may canalize civilian traffic patterns into controlled areas in stability operations, mobility may allow for successful emplacement of a bridge in a contested river crossing.

Given the complex nature of planning, siting, synchronizing, and emplacing obstacles, combat engineers perform significant obstacle planning and provide detailed integration and resourcing information to the supported commanders. Combat engineers assist commanders by using obstacles to develop EAs, protect friendly vulnerabilities, and counteract enemy reactions to friendly maneuver. Obstacle plans must support the scheme of maneuver, maximize subordinate flexibility, and facilitate future operations.

The advent of scatterable, remotely delivered minefield systems eased labor and time demands on countermobility obstacle emplacement while increasing a commander's flexibility. While use of mines may still apply to high intensity conflict, most operational environments preclude such use of minefields. Further, the United States does not employ nonself-destruction antipersonnel land mines. Consequently, time continues to remain the single biggest consideration in developing and implementing countermobility plans.

**Obstacle Groups, Belts, and Zones.** Figure 12-2 demonstrates the interaction among obstacle groups, belts, and zones. All seek to create specific effects on the enemy, whether to disrupt, fix, block, or turn. Beginning at the company and battalion level, one or more individual obstacles are integrated with direct and indirect fires to create an obstacle group with a specific effect. Groups combine their individual effects to create a specific effect at the regimental level and above.



**Figure 12-2. Obstacle Groups, Belts, and Zones.**


**Obstacle Intent.** Chapter 8 addresses engagement area and defensive scheme of maneuver development. When integrating barriers, obstacles, and mines into the defensive scheme of maneuver, company commanders constantly consider the advantages and disadvantages of their employment. When determining the intent of any obstacle or set of obstacles, commanders consider the following:

- Creating uncertainty in the enemy.
- Using obstacles to free friendly combat power for other tasks.
- Exploiting geographic features.
- Inflicting significant personnel, equipment, and psychological damage on the enemy with minimal risk to friendly forces.
- The enemy's ability to bypass, breach, or clear friendly obstacles.
- Amount of friendly time and resources available to create obstacle effects.
- The effects on potential friendly maneuver, such as a counterattack and pursuit.
- How obstacles will be removed or made safe after use.

Using commander's intent for obstacles provides a simple framework to issue countermobility guidance and facilitates common understanding and coordination between maneuver and engineer forces. This method is applicable across offensive, defensive, and stability operations. It applies whether the enemy is a conventional mechanized infantry battalion or a nonstate actor network working within the population. The intent for obstacles is the foundation of the obstacle integration process that includes target, obstacle effect, and relative location. The target is that

portion of the enemy that the commander wants to affect with fires and tactical obstacles. The commander identifies the target in terms of size, type, echelon, avenue of approach, or any combination of these.

The obstacle effect portion of the intent describes how the commander wants to attack enemy maneuver with obstacles and fires. Tactical obstacles block, turn, fix, or disrupt the enemy. See Figures 12-3 through 12-6. The obstacle effect drives integration by focusing on the relationship between obstacles and both direct and indirect fires.



**Figure 12-3. Turn Effect.**




Figure 12-4. Fix Effect.





Figure 12-5. Disrupt Effect.



**Figure 12-6. Block Effect.**

The relative location is where the commander wants the obstacle effect generated against the targeted enemy force. Whenever possible, the commander identifies the location relative to the terrain and maneuver or fire control measures to initiate the obstacle integration process.

**Obstacle Planning Process.** The obstacle planning process is an integral part of employing countermobility effects. It correlates directly with subunit maneuver and positioning, engagement area development, and enemy actions. It includes the following key components:


- Direct and indirect fires analysis.
- Obstacle intent integration (target, effect, relative location).
- Method of emplacement (conventional or scatterable).
- Obstacle effect priority.
- Mobility requirements.
- Obstacle design and resourcing.
- Marking and reporting obstacle locations.

Figure 12-7 demonstrates proper planning and integration of obstacles into an engagement area. It shows the following information:

- Obstacle gaps exist to allow egress from forward positions.
- Turning obstacles on both flanks tie into terrain features, receive reinforcement by direct and indirect fires, and force the enemy into the company fires.

A fix effect obstacle reinforces the company's main effort by enhancing the effects of destructive direct and indirect fires.





#### Legend

EA engagement area

TRP target reference point

**Figure 12-7. Obstacle Planning and Integration.**

## MINE DUMP OPERATIONS

Mine dumps usually contain resources for a single obstacle group but may contain only the resources for individual obstacles if the distances between obstacles in a group are excessive. The company commander, in coordination with the supporting engineer, locates mine dumps where they support obstacle construction within the AO. If a company is assigned more than one obstacle group, it may have more than one mine dump. The company commander must provide leadership and personnel to operate the mine dump, allowing engineers to construct other tactical obstacles for integration into the defensive scheme of maneuver.

## CORDON OPERATIONS

A cordon is a temporary, enabling operation that isolates a target area of some size to conduct further operations within the cordon. Such operations could consist of raids, searches, visits, meetings, or some combination of all of these. Once operations within the cordon are complete, it collapses. Company commanders can extrapolate the guidance on cordon and search to cordons in general and any other operations that may occur within the cordon.



## CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATIONS

Cordon and search operations are one of the most likely a company may conduct. They isolate a target area and search suspected buildings and areas to capture or destroy a threat. They may be conducted in any type of environment and the principles remain the same whether in a jungle or in a city. Cordon and search operations are by no means limited to, but often are associated with, clear-in-zone actions. Depending on the threat and the accuracy of intelligence leading to the operation, a cordon and search may appear similar to a movement to contact, raid, deliberate attack, or area reconnaissance. Regardless of appearances and similarities, the cordon and search orients on finding the threat and their caches. Cordons may involve mounted or dismounted troops or a combination of both.

### Organization

Four elements perform the major tasks of a cordon and search: command, security, support, and search and assault. In general, the headquarters element provides command and control, the security element sets up inner and outer cordons, the support element acts as reserve and overwatch, and the search and assault element acts as the main effort for actions within the cordon.

**Command Element.** The command element provides command and control and generally collocates with either the support or search and assault elements where it can provide oversight to the entire operation. The composition of the command element may be as small as the commander and an RO or may include other enablers. The command element remains mobile so it can quickly displace as necessary. Depending on the size of the operation, the command element may provide direct oversight of integration with other security forces, detainee handling, tactical questioning, evidence handling, and damage claims.

**Security Element.** Using inner and outer cordons, the security element isolates the target area through both containment and interdiction, which limits or prevents threat or civilian influence from outside of the cordon and prevents targets from escaping the cordon. Such security usually entails decentralized employment to cover multiple avenues of approach, blocking positions, and OPs. The security element may employ local patrols to cover gaps and requires enough combat power and logistical resources to accomplish its mission.

**Support Element.** The support element serves as a reserve, prepared to augment, or assume the missions of any of the other elements. The support element requires identification and prioritization of potential tasks for purposes of planning and preparation. Such tasks could include reinforcing the cordons; clearing and searching buildings; conducting CASEVAC; and securing and safeguarding civilians, detainees, and captured material or equipment.

**Search and Assault Element.** The search and assault element serves as the main effort for the cordon and search. It accomplishes the purpose of the operation by securing, clearing, and conducting site exploitation of the target. The element usually organizes itself internally into assault, search, security, and support teams to facilitate its SBF, security, breaching, searching, and other similar tasks. The search and assault element must possess explosive and nonexplosive breach capabilities and, regardless of whether there is resistance, enough combat power to clear

target structures using standard entry and building clearing battle drills. The search and assault element may create the following specific teams:


- Detainee team (support team), consisting of at least two personnel.
- Field interview team (support team), a CI/HUMINT team with interpreter.
- Documentation team (search team), a team large enough to take pictures of structures and rooms, evidence and contraband, and detainees; determine resident status and occupancy; and handle and document evidence.
- Mine detection/demolition team (search team), the search team lead that looks for mines, IEDs, and other potential threats to the security and assault element.
- Breach and demolition team (assault team), a team capable of conducting explosive and nonexplosive breaches as well as providing the assault element with a mine detection capability.
- Tunnel reconnaissance team (assault team), a team capable of investigating such confined spaces as tunnels and subbasements.
- Civil engagement team (support team), civil affairs, or MISO personnel with interpreter and equipment.
- Military information support operations dissemination team (support team) and MISO personnel with required equipment to disseminate MISO products to a relevant audience.

## **Execution**

The cordon and search consist of five phases: planning and reconnaissance, movement to the objective area, cordon, actions on the objective, and withdrawal.


***Planning and Reconnaissance.*** During the planning and reconnaissance phase, the mission is received or initiated, and problem framing begins to develop the task and purpose of the cordon and search. Initial friendly forces and support, possible enemy threats, and the nature of the target and objective areas are identified. A tentative scheme of maneuver is established, WARNORDs are issued, and generic rehearsals begin. Planning and reconnaissance generally occur simultaneously as they depend and build upon each other. Planning serves to focus reconnaissance collection efforts by identifying what to look for and where to look for it, while reconnaissance helps refine the plan by providing current and detailed information. The planning and reconnaissance phase ends with the issuance of a complete order, conduct of final rehearsals, and completion of PCCs and PCIs.

***Movement to the Objective Area.*** The movement to the objective area phase begins with departure from the AA. The infantry company may use multiple AAs or routes depending upon the scheme of maneuver. There are two methods of moving to the objective area: single point and multidirectional ingress. The single point of ingress method of approach to the target area facilitates command and control, timing, and deconfliction of fires (see Figure 12-8). However, it produces a larger movement signature, is a slower method of establishing a cordon, and makes the entire force vulnerable to enemy threat actions.



**Figure 12-8. Single Point of Ingress Method of Approach.**

The preferred method of approaching the objective area is from multiple directions, which provides a lower movement signature while allowing for almost immediate emplacement of the cordon (see Figure 12-9). However, multidirectional ingress approaches make command and control more difficult, increases the risk of friendly fire in the event of contact, and increases the risk to temporarily isolated units.




**Figure 12-9. Multidirectional Ingress Method of Approach.**

All operations should include MILDEC—any technique that makes the cordon and search force appear to have a different mission or objective will aid in success. Commanders are limited only by their imagination and practicality. Possible techniques include infiltrating elements into the area under the guise of local security patrols, increasing operating tempo in the area a few days prior to the actual operation, and masking movement by following a regularly scheduled convoy.

**Cordon.** The movement to the objective area phase should transition smoothly into the cordon phase. Depending on the method of approach, the transition is either sequential (single point) or nearly simultaneous (multidirectional). While the cordon itself is an enabling operation, it is important that leadership effectively integrate the cordon technique within the larger operation to maintain momentum and focus. It is also important that FP measures be considered and implemented as cordon forces are generally static for the duration of the operation, which increases their chances of being targeted by such threats as snipers or suicide bombers. There are two portions to the cordon. The outer cordon that generally focuses on external influences and


threats and the inner cordon that generally focuses on preventing escape from the target area. Proper coordination between the two should be a central focus of the security element.

**Outer Cordon.** The outer cordon isolates the objective area through containment and interdiction to prevent threat or civilian influence in the objective area (see Figure 12-10). It is usually in place prior to the inner cordon. The outer cordon is likely to focus on terrain in terms of controlling avenues of approach and egress. It establishes control using hasty traffic control points, blocking positions, OPs, sniper employment, FP measures, local patrols and screens. The outer cordon deconflicts battlespace geometry with other elements and makes use of any aviation assets that are available. The keys to success for the outer cordon are detailed reconnaissance, terrain study, planning, rehearsals, and vigilance.




**Figure 12-10. Outer Cordon.**

**Inner Cordon.** The inner cordon prevents escape from the target area and provides security and overwatch to the search and assault element (see Figure 12-11). If opposed by a hostile force, the inner cordon provides supporting fires to the search and assault elements as they maneuver. Portions of the security element that establish the inner cordon do so by setting up mutually supporting positions that isolate the target area through overlapping sectors of fire and observation. Given the often compressed nature of the target area, battlespace geometry and deconfliction is critical. Force protection considerations and measures for the inner cordon are similar to those for the outer cordon. The success of the inner cordon also depends on detailed reconnaissance, terrain study, planning, rehearsals, and vigilance.



**Figure 12-11. Inner Cordon.**

***Actions on the Objective.*** The search and assault element initiates actions on the objective once the outer and inner cordons are in place. If the target area is large or the objective area contains multiple target areas, the support element may provide additional overwatch and security to the search and assault element and its subteams. The search and assault element accomplishes its mission by gaining a foothold on or in the target area to clear all threat and noncombatant personnel. It then conducts a systematic search of the target. These areas may be searched selectively (only specific rooms, buildings, or blocks) or systematically (everything within a given area). The search and assault and support elements resolve the disposition of captured and detained material and personnel. For example, a large cache of explosives may be destroyed on site after documentation or it might be removed for further exploitation. Members of the search and assault elements must be extremely judicious in their use of force due to the proximity of noncombatants and friendly forces (see Figure 12-12).



**Figure 12-12. Actions on the Objective.**

**Withdrawal.** When actions on the objective are complete, the cordon and search force withdraws in reverse order: the search and assault element, support element, and command element pull off the objective followed by the collapse of the inner and outer cordons. The key to the retrograde is the assessment criteria for the operation established by the commander. The operation could be over in a matter of hours or, if sizable caches are discovered, security may need to remain on the site for some days. Commanders plan for all eventualities prior to committing the force.

## RELIEF IN PLACE

A RIP is an operation directed by HHQ that tasks one unit to partially or completely relieve or replace another unit in an assigned area. The relief can take place at once or over some period, ideally during periods of reduced visibility or at night, and in such a phased manner as to maintain tactical security throughout. Depending on the nature of the relief, commanders may also execute a transfer of authority. Transfers of authority tend to occur during stability operations or crisis response and limited contingency operations, during which units accumulate significant resources, logistic tails, and responsibilities. Throughout the operation, reconnaissance, liaison, coordination, and cooperation are essential as is a clear definition of command relationships and passage of control.



## Critical Tasks

Control and authority are the primary issues during a RIP. Defensive positions and the ability of subordinate units to defend them are relatively simple matters; however, understanding who is exercising command and control of the whole at any given time is the crucial matter.

Consequently, during a RIP, it is critical that units—

- Develop a liaison plan.
- Maintain the time schedule.
- Monitor progress of subordinate units.
- Notify HHQ upon relief.
- Establish AAs for the outgoing unit to maintain control of movement.
- Report new position of outgoing unit to HHQ.
- Maintain accountability of personnel and equipment.

## Planning Checklist

When planning a RIP, planners should consider the liaison plan, command relationships, CPs, fire support, and control measures.

***Liaison Plan.*** Once HHQ orders a RIP, the incoming unit sends liaison parties capable of addressing all the warfighting functions to the outgoing unit. These liaisons familiarize themselves with the tactical situation, conduct necessary reconnaissance, act as guides for the rest of the incoming unit, and brief the incoming unit on the tactical situation.

***Command Relationships.*** When the relieving unit arrives at the start point, it comes under the tactical control of the unit being relieved until C2 transfer. Before beginning the RIP, the commanders of both units determine when the relieving unit takes control and maintains this arrangement, even if contact occurs during the relief. Battle handover checklists are developed and distributed. The unit conducting the relief generally defers to the recommendations of the unit being relieved in these and similar matters because the outgoing unit possesses the best understanding of the area and the enemy.

***Command Posts.*** One of the first events to occur during a RIP, before the movement of any subordinate units, is the collocation of the unit CPs to better facilitate command, control, and coordination.

***Fire Support.*** The authority for control of fire support is with the outgoing unit until control of the sector is passed to the incoming unit. Then, the incoming unit assumes responsibility for control of fire support.

***Schedule and Control Measures.*** Depending on the nature of the HHQ order, planning either begins with a time to commence the relief or occurs in reverse from the time the relief must be complete. Plans, such as routes, march control measures, priority of movement, AAs, and contact points, are developed to ensure smooth movement both in and out of the battlespace. Depending on the enemy situation, units should consider transferring mortar base plates, machine gun tripods, field phones, antennas, or even entire weapon systems. Mortar base plates



already sunk, machine gun tripods already set according to range cards, already functioning field phones, and similar measures can be valuable in the face of an aggressive enemy.

### **Execution Checklist**

When executing a RIP, planners should consider the outgoing and incoming units. As the unit most familiar with the area and the enemy, the outgoing unit should drive the relief process. Commanders and their senior staff members should be the last to leave so they can ensure accountability of their unit and provide guidance or advice until the last moment. The outgoing commander considerations:

- Contacts the incoming unit commander.
- Reconnoiters and validates the terrain and routes for use during the relief.
- Briefs the incoming unit on the existing defensive plan, including fire support, barriers, counterattack plans, and friendly and enemy activities.
- Plans the relief to take place at periods of reduced visibility, to include the possible use of obscuration.
- Establishes the time or circumstances when command passes to the incoming commander.
- Maintains radio listening silence of the relieving unit while the relieved unit continues normal traffic.
- Employs indirect fires to cover the sound of vehicles if necessary.
- Limits the size and composition of reconnaissance parties.
- Plans and employs fire support, if necessary, during the relief.
- Completes relief rapidly to reduce enemy detection and reaction time.
- Meets incoming element at designated point.
- Guides incoming element to new position in the determined sequence of relief.
- Affects transfer of equipment as required.
- Remains in charge until RIP is complete and incoming element is in place and is prepared to assume the mission.
- Plans transfer of excess ammunition, wire lines, POL, and other materials to the incoming unit.
- Reports completion of relief.
- Reports outgoing unit is clear of old area of operations.

The incoming unit generally defers to the tactical arrangements of its predecessor unless extraordinary circumstances dictate otherwise. The incoming unit can make changes as it sees fit upon the completion of the RIP but must learn as much as it can from the outgoing unit before its departure. The incoming unit's commander has the following responsibilities:

- Begins operation under radio listening silence.
- Receives guides from the outgoing unit to lead the incoming unit to its new positions.
- Positions unit CP next to outgoing unit's CP for training purposes.
- Ensures the outgoing unit commander remains in place until relieved of responsibility by incoming commander.

- Once in position, breaks radio listening silence and transmits appropriate traffic to maintain the pattern of the outgoing unit's communications.
- Reports change of call signs and completion of RIP.
- Ensures movement is rapid, orderly, and completed on schedule without detection by the enemy.


## PASSAGE OF LINES

When a moving unit cannot bypass the positions of another friendly unit, it moves through it by conducting a passage of lines. The movement may be forward to continue the assault or rearward. A passage of lines is not merely an administrative movement between two units. It is an operation that involves units moving and transferring responsibility for the battle. The HHQ of the involved units plans, coordinates, and tasks the passage of lines. The commanders of the two units conduct detailed planning, liaison, and coordination. The essential element of a passage of lines is maintaining the momentum of the moving element.

### Types

Although not a separate type, passage of lines planning methodology is applicable to the movement of units within each other's battlespace in stability operations. When a company or battalion is passing through the battlespace of another similarly sized unit, the units should coordinate routes, guides, engagement criteria, and control of fires. Simple answers, such as the stationary unit escorting the moving unit, may resolve many issues. However, if operating tempo precludes such involvement, the units should approach the problem using the passage of lines operation as a guideline.

**Forward Passage of Lines.** In a forward passage of lines, the passing unit occupies its AA first and conducts passage of lines coordination as part of its preparation for the attack. Such coordination usually entails stationing liaison personnel with the stationary unit CP, establishing a battle handover checklist, receiving current intelligence on the enemy, and conducting reconnaissance. At the designated time, the moving unit departs the AA and moves tactically through designated passage lanes. Movement occurs expediently with the moving unit seeking to reduce its vulnerability in the passage lanes to a minimum. The moving unit holds its fire until forward of the battle handover line (BHL). Once forward of passage lane restrictions, the moving unit deploys as necessary and conducts its designated mission (see Figure 12-13).




#### Legend

- PP passage point
- RP release point
- SP start point

**Figure 12-13. Forward Passage of Lines.**

**Rearward Passage of Lines.** During a rearward passage of lines, the moving unit may or may not be under enemy pressure. Further, the moving unit may be conducting a planned movement as part of the defensive scheme of maneuver or is conducting an unplanned or earlier than expected movement. The conditions of the movement affect the amount of planning time available and the risk of friendly fire, which is always significantly higher in a rearward passage of lines. The passing unit contacts the stationary unit while it is still beyond direct fire range and conducts coordination, liaison, and reconnaissance. It creates the battle handover checklist. Coordination emphasizes far and near recognition signals as well as the location of the BHL, which is usually established at the limit of the stationary unit's direct fire capabilities. The units use additional control measures, such as RFAs or restrictive fire lines, as necessary to further minimize the risk of friendly fire. Following coordination, the passing unit continues tactical movement toward the passage lanes. Weapons remain oriented in the direction of the enemy and the passing unit is responsible for its own security until it passes the BHL. The passing unit minimizes vulnerability in the passage lanes by moving quickly through them toward some designated location well to the rear of the stationary unit (see Figure 12-14).



#### Legend

- FEBA forward edge of battle area
- PP passage point
- RP release point
- SP start point

**Figure 12-14. Rearward Passage of Lines.**

#### Planning Considerations

In planning the passage of lines, infantry companies remain mindful of the purpose of the passage of lines. They focus their planning efforts on two crucial keys to success: passing responsibility for the battle from one unit to another and maintaining the momentum of the moving unit.

**Battle Handover.** Regardless of the direction of the movement, the responsibility for fighting the battle transfers from one unit to another. In the case of a forward passage of lines, the stationary unit passes control to the advancing unit. In the case of a rearward passage of lines, the retrograding unit passes control to the stationary unit. Both units rely upon clearly defined battle handover criteria and procedures from HHQ, to include the roles of both the passing unit and the stationary unit and the use of direct and indirect fires. If necessary, HHQ specifies a BHL, usually the line of departure for a forward passage of lines and the limit of the stationary unit's direct fire weapons for a rearward passage of lines. A forward passage of lines is complete when the passing unit deploys and crosses the BHL. A rearward passage of lines is generally complete when the passing unit is clear and the stationary unit is ready to engage the enemy.

**Passage Lanes.** The passage should facilitate transition to follow-on missions using multiple lanes or lanes wide enough to support formations for the passing units. The stationary unit marks passage lanes and provides guides, to include briefing and coordinating obstacles. Units should coordinate passage times, number of elements, and number of troops and vehicles per element. These are especially critical for rearward passage of lines where accountability of friendly forces is essential to avoid friendly fire or enemy infiltration.

**Intelligence.** Planners and liaison officers should ensure that intelligence on the enemy situation is part of the battle handover checklist. In a forward passage of lines, the stationary unit enhances the advancing unit's chances of success by providing continuous updates on the enemy situation to their front. The moving unit should provide similar updates on the enemy situation as it retrogrades and passes control of the battle to the stationary unit. In all cases, units should closely monitor HHQ command frequencies to track the progress of the battle.

**Use of Deception.** Units use military deception to enhance the success of the passage of lines. Stationary units can create multiple lanes, to include dummy lanes, and conduct increased internal troop and vehicle traffic to mask the movement of an advancing unit. A retrograding unit seeks to mask the location of the stationary unit's positions through delay and disrupt techniques. All may make use of smoke, obscuration, and masking terrain to create uncertainty for enemy forces.

**Air Defense.** In those environments that possess an air threat, whether in the form of attack or mere observation, the passage of lines represents a vulnerable and valuable chokepoint. Usually, the stationary unit is responsible for providing air defense, allowing the passing unit's air defense assets to move with it.

**Logistics.** Since both units already possess necessary logistical support, the logistical coordination required in a passage of lines applies to vehicle recovery and CASEVAC in the passage lane. An advancing unit will usually handle these issues because the passage lanes quickly become a rear area for it. Conversely, when conducting a retrograde, the stationary unit will likely assist or execute evacuation actions to enable it to quickly clear and close the lanes in preparation for conducting the defense.

## LINKUP OPERATIONS

Linkup is an operation that entails the meeting of friendly forces. The infantry company conducts linkup activities semi-independently or as part of a larger force. When conducting a linkup, one of the units must be stationary. If both are moving, one must occupy temporary positions to conduct the linkup. The HHQ directing the linkup will dictate command relationships. Within a larger unit, the company may lead the linkup force. Regardless of the size of the units conducting a linkup, whether divisions or squads, all require communication, coordination, and planning. They begin with contact at the smallest unit levels—two patrols making contact at a linkup point. Linkup operations usually occur when the following occurs:

- Advancing forces reach an objective area previously secured by air assault or infiltrating forces.
- Units conduct coordination for a RIP.
- Cross-attached units move to join their new organization.
- A unit moves forward to conduct a follow and support or follow and assume mission.
- A unit moves to assist an encircled force.
- Units converge on the same objective during an attack.
- Units conduct a passage of lines.

### Execution

As an operation, the linkup generally consists of an approach, the preliminary linkup of the units, and the transition to subsequent operations. The linkup procedure begins as the stationary unit halts, unless already in position. At a designated time, the stationary unit sends an element to occupy the linkup point. The moving unit halts at a predetermined spot, sufficiently far enough away to allow it to defend itself without risking friendly fire with the stationary unit. Once halted, the moving unit sends an element to affect a linkup at the linkup point. The linkup elements conduct standard small unit near and far recognition procedures. Once both elements make physical contact, the units rapidly execute those planned actions, such as confirming positions, deconflicting battlespace, exchanging liaison officers and guides, conducting joint reconnaissance, and fulfilling other requirements to transition to subsequent operations.

### Linkup Planning

Linkups occur for many reasons and under many different conditions. The indirect fire control planning required by two units approaching each other from different directions is entirely different from any that might need consideration during a RIP. Planners should review the conditions in the following subparagraphs when conducting planning.

**Follow-On Actions.** Since linkups are seldom an end, the HHQ ordering the linkup should provide both units the task, purpose, coordination, and subsequent actions of the operation. While devoting significant effort to the mechanics of approaching and linking up, planners cannot forget to adequately plan for follow-on actions. For example, if two battalions are conducting a linkup as part of a double envelopment, then both battalions will have follow-on missions that require them to coordinate actions to prevent enemy efforts at breaking out or relieving the encirclement. To maintain momentum, the battalions cannot wait until the linkup occurs to plan their follow-on missions.

**Site Selection.** Site selection refers to picking the linkup point (a primary and alternate site) where elements of the linkup units will conduct initial contact. Linkup sites should be easy to find at night, have cover and concealment, and be off natural lines of drift. They must be defensible and offer both access and escape routes.

**Recognition Signals.** Units use near and far recognition signals to prevent friendly fire. Depending on the tactical situation, units conducting the linkup should avoid radio communications as a means of recognition due to the threat of compromise. Instead, visual and voice recognition signals should be planned.

**Direct and Indirect Fires.** Direct and indirect fires must be planned in detail before a linkup. Lack of planning could lead to friendly fire or hesitation in the face of enemy action resulting in casualties. The stationary unit controls fires near the linkup point. While the moving unit does not give up control of fires in its battlespace, it does near the linkup point and stationary unit. Both units use RFAs, restrictive fire lines, and phase lines to shift and control fires as the moving unit approaches the stationary unit.

**Contingency Plans.** Unit tactical SOPs, or the linkup annex of OPORDs, should address what to do if enemy contact occurs before, during, or after the linkup. They should also determine actions if units fail to linkup and alternate linkup and rally points.

## RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

Successful reconnaissance is a focused collection effort that is aimed at gathering timely, accurate information about the enemy and the terrain in the AO. As stated in MCDP 1-0:

*Reconnaissance is a mission—aerial, ground or amphibious—undertaken to obtain, by visual or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of the enemy or to secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, electromagnetic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. More simply, reconnaissance obtains information about the characteristics of a particular area and any known or potential enemy within it.*

In many ways, reconnaissance is a continuous effort. It is the responsibility of every infantry company commander to ensure such reconnaissance occurs to gain the information needed to ensure the success of the company. This effort, combined with IPB and other collaborative efforts, yield greater situational understanding of the operation or area. The infantry company may conduct reconnaissance as ordered by HHQ.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the mere act of executing operations, such as patrols and convoys, serves a secondary purpose of reconnaissance. Accordingly, the company commander should emphasize a reconnaissance mindset for every Marine. At a larger level, a company movement to contact is a reconnaissance operation that seeks to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. The company may participate in a battalion reconnaissance in force to gain information and exploit enemy weaknesses. These operations demonstrate that passive reconnaissance through aerial or ground surveillance or even aggressive patrolling may not provide the information necessary for a commander to defeat the enemy. It is sometimes necessary to move against the

enemy with a robust, highly flexible force that makes the enemy react in a manner that reveals key command and control and weapon systems. Even in stability operations, such actions as shows of force or area sweeps are reconnaissance activities that seek the threat and attempt to force an enemy reaction.

Regardless of methodology, all reconnaissance falls into one of four types: route, area, zone, and force-oriented missions. Within these types, reconnaissance orients either on the enemy or on the terrain as its primary purpose.

A route reconnaissance focuses on gathering detailed information about a specific route as well as on all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. Route reconnaissance may be oriented on a specific area of movement, such as a road or trail, or on a more general area, such as an axis of advance.

Area reconnaissance focuses on gathering detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within a specific prescribed area vice a zone. The area can be any location that is critical to the unit's operations, such as a town (large area), a ridgeline (medium area), or a bridge (single point).

A zone reconnaissance focuses on gathering detailed information concerning all routes, terrain, enemy forces, and obstacles within a defined zone. Zone reconnaissance is used most often when the enemy situation is vague or when the company requires information concerning cross-country mobility.

Force-oriented reconnaissance focuses on gathering detailed information on a specific enemy asset and also conducting surveillance on that asset. Reconnaissance assets focus on the target; they move when required to maintain observation on the target and report the elements of information tasked.

## **COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS**

The counterreconnaissance effort seeks to destroy, suppress, deceive, disrupt, or influence the enemy's reconnaissance efforts. These efforts seek to prevent enemy observation of friendly units, areas, specific locations, intentions, or activities. Counterreconnaissance is active and not passive actions taken by a commander. Counterreconnaissance tasks require the commander to understand how the enemy conducts its reconnaissance and the ability to find those enemy reconnaissance assets. These efforts allow the commander to target or engage enemy reconnaissance assets, which is a continuous process throughout all phases of an operation.

## **CONTROL POINTS**

Control points are defined as positions along a route at which Marines are stationed to give information and instructions for the regulation of supply or traffic. More specific to the infantry company, a traffic control point (TCP) is a designated spot on the ground, road, or trail network used to control and influence the flow of pedestrian, vehicular, or boat traffic to support tactical tasks and their effects. Traffic control points can be hasty or deliberate in nature and can be




friendly, terrain, enemy, or environmentally oriented. The purpose of TCPs can be further delineated with prefixes, such as entry, vehicle, or pedestrian. The infantry company enforces circulation control measures, laws, orders, and regulations on vehicle and pedestrian traffic by using hasty and deliberate TCPs.

The TCP is critical for planning because it determines combat power and resources assigned to the task. A series of hasty, temporary TCPs designed to disrupt the enemy require little material as opposed to a terrain-oriented TCP that seeks to strictly regulate movement into a given area. Friendly-oriented TCPs serve such purposes as controlling friendly movement and conducting FP through inspections of vehicles. Terrain and environmentally-oriented TCPs serve such purposes as restricting movement into certain areas, demonstrating the presence of peace forces, or enforcing the terms of peace agreements. Enemy oriented TCPs serve such purposes as disruption and interdiction of movement, prevention of smuggling, and interference with communication.

Control point layout, construction, and staffing should reflect METT-T factors, including the purpose and amount of time available for emplacement. The following considerations for control points require the greatest amount of planning, logistics, and combat power (see Figure 12-15):

- *Positioning.* Infantry companies position TCPs where they are visible and where traffic cannot turn back, get off the road, or bypass the control point without observation.
- *Establish control.* In designing the TCP, the infantry company should endeavor to create an environment that deters resistance. Such deterrence is best achieved through overmatching combat power, such as with visible CSWs or armored vehicles, which are not merely displayed, but are woven into the overall scheme of the control point.
- *Obstacles.* Obstacles are placed in the road to slow and canalize traffic into search areas and bypass lanes as appropriate.
- *Communications.* The TCP should rely on wire as its primary means of communications.
- *Search areas.* Search areas should be below ground or heavily fortified to keep the effects of blasts or small arms internal to the search area. The design of search areas allows for general searching areas; facilities appropriate for more detailed searches that require privacy; and, as appropriate, search areas segregated by gender. They should also afford some means of FP for the personnel conducting searches.
- *Enablers.* Control points should receive special skill sets appropriate to their missions, such as interpreters, HN liaisons, or military working dog teams.



**KEY**



concertina wire



speed bump



lane barriers



gate

**Figure 12-15. Traffic Control Point.**

# **CHAPTER 13**

## **FORCE PROTECTION**

The purpose of Marine Corps leadership is mission accomplishment and troop welfare. While mission accomplishment takes priority, troop welfare has always been included because, without effective, capable troops at the point of decision, there can be no mission accomplishment. Force protection is not a directive or prescription for paralysis or inaction—the warfighting and maneuver warfare tenets of Marine Corps doctrine demand otherwise. Force protection is taking reasonable measures to ensure that the infantry company retains enough capability to accomplish the mission assigned. This chapter discusses RM and external and internal FP measures from the infantry company commander’s perspective.

Force protection are the preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against personnel, resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Commanders ensure they possess the troops, equipment, and facilities necessary to accomplish the mission through the application of force protection.

Force protection applies inwardly and outwardly: while internal protection measures protect the force against its own actions, external protection measures protect it from the enemy. Examples of these types of measures include antiterrorism barriers, engineering survivability measures, and body armor. Examples of internal FP include weapons safety, proper battlespace geometry, proper clothing for the environment, rest plans, and unit hygiene.

### **RISK MANAGEMENT**

Risk management processes and methods provide tools to help commanders balance the demands of mission accomplishment against the risk they can accept in terms of combat power. The Marine Corps uses RM, a process that applies to any mission or environment, for this purpose. Risk management is a five-step process that helps identify and control hazards to protect the force. It serves to help identify and control risk, not necessarily eliminate risk. While eliminating risk is always preferred, when possible, it cannot be a goal since the only way to truly eliminate risk is to take no action at all. Company commanders use RM as a tool to assist them in balancing risk, not as a lock-step process that dictates COAs. Similarly, the Marine Corps expects its company commanders to possess the maturity and judgment to understand the importance of risk management in mission accomplishment.

The basic principles of RM underline its importance as a tool and thought process, rather than an outcome-generating methodology:

- Accept risk when benefits outweigh the cost.
- Accept no unnecessary risks.
- Anticipate and manage risk by planning.
- Make risk decisions at the right level.

The critical input necessary for the RM process is identification of hazards. The company identifies hazards through guidance from the company commander, during the planning process, and during execution. The METT-T with civilian considerations methodology helps to identify hazards in any operational environment:

- *Mission*: specified, implied, essential, and subtasks determine what the company must do and how it may do it.
- *Enemy*: how and what the enemy can do to affect the force directly impacts FP.
- *Terrain and weather*: the terrain and environment in which the company must operate will dictate hazards that must be mitigated to operate effectively.
- *Troops and support available*: the condition, training, experience, and readiness of troops and equipment affect the risk of certain COAs.
- *Time available*: the amount of time available to plan, rehearse, and execute a mission impacts the amount of risk a company commander might accept.
- *Civilian considerations (as appropriate)*: the effects of the company's actions and combat power on noncombatants is often a critical hazard for which company commanders seek mitigation.

The five steps of RM in Table 13-1 apply to each identified hazard individually:

<b>Table 13-1. Five Steps of Risk Management.</b>	
<b>1</b>	Identify the hazards.
<b>2</b>	Assess the hazards.
<b>3</b>	Make risk decisions.
<b>4</b>	Implement controls.
<b>5</b>	Supervise.

For more information on risk management see, Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3500.27C, *Risk Management*.

## **EXTERNAL FORCE PROTECTION**

External FP refers to outside challenges to the balancing of mission and troop welfare. Company commanders view these external threats through the lens of RM, by asking the following questions:

- What must the company do?
- What are the risks entailed in executing the mission?
- What is the company doing to mitigate or eliminate those risks?

During the conduct of the planning process, COA development and wargaming provide critical inputs into RM in terms of hazards to the force. Many hazard controls that apply to the enemy are tactical in nature. For example, the use of a SBF position is a hazard control that mitigates enemy risk to the assault element. Similarly, the creation of both branch and sequel plans are hazard control measures that mitigate the risk of the enemy taking different actions than those most likely. While company commanders might not choose to use a formal RM tool for mitigating the enemy threat, they are still required and expected to seek ways to mitigate enemy hazards.

## **Antiterrorism**

Antiterrorism is an official security program used by the Marine Corps across a broad range of operations both at home and abroad. While most commonly associated with the security of facilities and infrastructure with regard to terrorist threats, the tenets of antiterrorism apply beyond terrorism and mere fixed site security. These tenets represent a security mindset that seeks to make “hard targets” of all activities.

**Considerations.** In conducting antiterrorism assessments, company commanders consider the nature and degree of possible threats by geographic location, criticality and vulnerability of the target, and level of hostile intent. In most cases, company commanders can expect to receive significant antiterrorism assessment support from HHQ. Such support does not alleviate company commanders from considering their own local vulnerability or from conducting antiterrorism assessments when executing semi-independent operations.

**Collect and Analyze.** Using a combination of information sources, including HHQ, turnover with previous units, law enforcement, local threat assessments, and inspections, company commanders make a risk assessment of the likelihood and type of possible threat actions against their companies. Just like planning for any operation, company commanders then consider the best friendly responses to threat actions. Using antiterrorism methodologies, company commanders assess the vulnerability of their company personnel and positions in terms of physical security, personal protection, threat capabilities, and OPSEC.

**Plan and Prepare.** Based on the antiterrorism collection and analysis results, company commanders develop countermeasures and controls to mitigate or eliminate risks of terrorism or similar threat actions. During planning, the company determines resource shortfalls and seeks augmentation as necessary. During preparation, company personnel receive training on new procedures and processes, the company implements education campaigns if required, and engineers conduct surveys and draw up plans for physical security augmentation.

**Implement.** The company commander either includes FP measures within the OPORD or prepares an antiterrorism-specific order in cases involving significant and detailed antiterrorism processes, procedures, and countermeasures. In addition to various procedures, an antiterrorism order contains guidance for operating within the context of larger operations, such as the requirements of HHQ, emergency response actions and reporting, and a threat and vulnerability assessment. The issuing of the order marks the start of implementation to include the introduction of physical security measures and facility hardening if needed.

**Threat Metrics.** There are a wide variety of terrorist threat levels, security conditions, and other assessment metrics used by different US Government entities. While all seek to classify terrorists, threats, and expected friendly actions, many are subject to change, revision, or elimination. The following three subparagraphs address those threat conditions company commanders most likely will encounter.

**Department of Defense Force Protection Conditions.** The Department of Defense has identified and standardized the FP conditions in Table 13-3. Commanders may adopt higher FP condition measures than ordered by the chain of command if local conditions warrant greater security measures.

<b>Table 13-3. Department of Defense Force Protection Conditions.</b>	
<b>NORMAL</b>	General threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only routine security.
<b>ALPHA</b>	General threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and installations; nature is unpredictable.
<b>BRAVO</b>	Increased/more predictable threat activity exists; must be able to be maintained for weeks without undue hardship.
<b>CHARLIE</b>	An incident occurs or intelligence indicates terrorist action is imminent.
<b>DELTA</b>	Terrorist attack has occurred in the area or intelligence indicates attack is likely.

**Antiterrorism Security Conditions.** Commands use the following metrics to report antiterrorism security conditions and postures:

- Condition Red: Denotes the actual in progress or identified imminent threats to force personnel. All force personnel are alerted and must stand to. All access points to areas of operations are closed.
- Condition Yellow: Indicates probable hostile actions or unidentified activity that warrants investigative actions by security personnel. All security personnel are alerted.
- Condition Green: Activity is normal. No actions are required.

**Rear Area Security Threat Response Levels.** Infantry company commanders may encounter the metric outlined in Table 13-4 in relation to a threat assessment conducted by rear area security personnel.

<b>Table 13-4. Rear Area Security Threat Assessment Levels.</b>	
<b>Level I</b>	Those threats that can be defeated by local defenses.
<b>Level II</b>	Those threats that are beyond the capabilities of local defenses, but that can be defeated by reaction forces. Local defenses must be able to contain Level II threats until the arrival of reaction forces.

<b>Level III</b>	Those threats that require the commander to employ combat units to defeat them, which is normally a tactical combat force.
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**Company Commander Responsibilities.** Company commanders execute the requirements mandated in the latest version of the antiterrorism order. In general, they can expect to—

- Act in accordance with HHQ antiterrorism direction.
- Institute and maintain antiterrorism threat assessments, plans, orders, and control measures.
- Incorporate antiterrorism countermeasures and risk assessments into physical and fixed site security, training plans, OPORDs, and company planning and execution methodology.
- Coordinate and synchronize antiterrorism, OPSEC, and information security requirements.
- Appoint a company FP officer in accordance with the latest version of the antiterrorism order to manage antiterrorism programs within the company.
- Ensure that the company and its personnel meet current antiterrorism individual and unit training requirements per the latest version of the antiterrorism order.
- Ensure that the company determines the nature of and conducts any additional antiterrorism training required for deployment to specific areas as defined both geographically and by threat condition.

### **Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear**

For infantry companies operating in a CBRN hazard environment or CBRN threat environment, the most important consideration is maintaining the force for further operations. Company commanders meet FP requirements in this challenging environment primarily through contamination avoidance to include timely warning and reporting, effective individual protection measures, well-trained CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, and decontamination teams. These teams are usually managed at the battalion level.

**Threat Analysis.** Infantry companies receive information regarding the potential for operating in a CBRN environment from HHQ, whether that environment results from terrorist action or from the introduction of CBRN warfare into the operational environment. Depending on the threat, HHQ may—

- Issue additional equipment such as individual protective, decontamination, and detection equipment.
- Test CBRN warning and reporting system by sending and receiving CBRN reports.
- Conduct additional training for reconnaissance and surveillance teams and decontamination teams.
- Establish control measures and resources, such as separate routes for contaminated and decontaminated units, or primary and alternate decontamination sites.
- Modify operational timelines to account for slower tempo in a CBRN environment.

**Threat Conditions.** The CBRN threat conditions listed in Table 13-5 are used to quickly provide information about current threat and protective measures to be taken.

<b>Table 13-5. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Threat Conditions.</b>				
<b>Threat Condition</b>	<b>Attack Probability</b>	<b>Enemy Indicators</b>	<b>Civil Indicators</b>	<b>Minimum Protective Actions</b>
White: Zero probability (serial 1)	Negligible	No CBRN offensive capability in the AOI	No known industrial hazards or nuclear reactors in the AOI	Verify CBRN equipment Conduct routine maintenance
Green: Low probability (serial 2)	Possible	Offensive CBRN capability  No indicators of potential employment in the next 24 hours	Confirmed presence of hazardous industrial materials or nuclear reactors in the AOI	Take all of the above actions  Conduct CBRN training and rehearsals  Conduct CBRN equipment PMCS, to include vehicle and shelter filters  Establish shelter/overhead cover plan  Review MOPP considerations
Amber: Medium probability (serial 3)	Probable	Enemy moving, dispersing, or prepositioning CBRN munitions forward or near delivery systems  Enemy wearing protective gear or moving/dispersing decontamination systems  Increased OPSEC of delivery means	Hazardous industrial practices reported  Hazardous conditions in storage facilities detected  Combat operations being conducted near sites with confirmed hazards	Take all of the above actions  Emplace alarms  Cover equipment/supplies  Verify alarms/warnings  Brief CBRN teams  Verify mask seals/MOPP  Prepare decontamination site  Erect collective shelters  Issue medical countermeasures  Conduct reconnaissance
Red: High probability (serial 4)	Imminent	Enemy ready/certain to employ CBRN munitions  CBRN munitions used in AOI; no local contamination hazard present	Localized spill or accident confirmed  HN authorities direct limited precautionary evacuation or declare hazard area	Take all of the above actions  Implement MOPP considerations based on METT-T  Monitor continuously  Use vehicle overpressure  Conduct reconnaissance overwatch of NAI
Black	Attack occurred	CBRN contamination present in AO  Germs/toxins detected in AO	Major industrial accident/incident	Take all of the above actions  Mark contaminated areas  Find clear routes  Resupply CBRN equipment



NOTE: The CBRN threat levels and serial numbers used for assessment purposes are according to NATO Standardization Agreement 2984, 1995 Graduated Levels of Nuclear Biological Threat and Associated Protection.

**Company Actions.** Infantry companies ensure mission accomplishment in a CBRN environment by conducting contamination avoidance. After a CBRN incident, Marines continue accomplishing the mission through effective use of individual survival measures. Companies coordinate reconnaissance and surveillance and decontamination operations with HHQ. Since companies do not have CBRN defense officers or CBRN defense specialists, the CBRN subject expertise available to the infantry company resides at the regiment and battalion level.

**Mission-Oriented Protective Posture.** Like other similar orders and directions, company commanders may not lessen a minimal mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) level dictated by HHQ, but may adopt a more protective posture if necessary. In general, when addressing MOPP levels, commanders take into account the mission, level of threat, environment, temperature, work/rest rate, performance degradation, and physical conditioning of the company's personnel (see Table 13-6) by considering the following:

- What is the mission? Is it offensive or defensive?
- What is the likelihood of employment?
- What is the expected warning time?
- How physically and mentally demanding is the work to be performed?
- What is the expected duration of the mission?
- What is the weather, terrain, and time of day?
- Has the company accounted for degraded performance of even simple tasks? Are work and rest cycles planned?

**Table 13-6. Mission-Oriented Protective Posture Levels.**

MOPP Equipment	MOPP Levels						
	MOPP Ready	MOPP 0	MOPP 1	MOPP 2	MOPP 3	MOPP 4	Mask Only
Mask	Carried	Carried	Carried	Carried	Worn <sup>1</sup>	Worn	Worn
Overgarment	Ready <sup>2</sup>	Available <sup>3</sup>	Worn <sup>1</sup>	Worn <sup>1</sup>	Worn <sup>1</sup>	Worn	
Boots	Ready <sup>2</sup>	Available <sup>3</sup>	Available <sup>3</sup>	Worn	Worn	Worn	
Gloves	Ready <sup>2</sup>	Available <sup>3</sup>	Available <sup>3</sup>	Available <sup>3</sup>	Available <sup>3</sup>	Worn	
Notes							
1-In hot weather, coat or hood can be left open for ventilation.							
2-Must be available within two hours. Second set available in 6 hours.							
3-Within arm's reach.							

**Reconnaissance and Surveillance Teams.** The infantry company does have Marines trained in CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, but such Marines are typically trained as teams at the battalion level. Companies will be directed by HHQ to execute reconnaissance and surveillance team operations. The CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance operations locate, identify, and track CBRN hazards.

**Decontamination Teams.** The infantry company has Marines trained in decontamination; however, they are typically trained/organized as teams at the battalion level. Companies will support HHQ decontamination efforts with Marines that have been designated as decontamination team members.

**Decontamination Operations.** There are three types of decontamination: immediate, operational, and thorough. Individuals, as the situation allows, perform immediate decontamination of themselves and their personal equipment to minimize casualties, prevent the spread of contamination, and keep the maximum amount of combat power engaged in operations. A company must be able to perform immediate decontamination, MOPP gear exchange, and MOPP gear drop. Thorough and operational decontamination are organized by HHQ.

**Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Warning and Reporting.** The primary means of warning units of an actual or predicted CBRN hazard is the CBRN Warning and Reporting System. Higher headquarters usually transmits CBRN warnings or alarms in the form of CBRN 3 reports and CBRN 5 reports. Higher headquarters will direct what MOPP level a company will use based on analysis performed. Companies will generally only send CBRN 1 observers reports to HHQ. See MCRP 10-10E.8, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense*, for more information regarding CBRN.

## INTERNAL FORCE PROTECTION

Internal FP measures refers to such things as friendly fire, negligent discharges, equipment or communications failure, and other items within the company's control that can negatively affect troop welfare and mission accomplishment. Company commanders view these internal issues just as external issues—through the lens of ORM—asking the following questions:

- What must the company do to accomplish the mission?
- What are the risks entailed in conducting the mission in terms of internal failures?
- What is the company doing to mitigate or eliminate those risks?

### Guardian Angel

The guardian angel method uses the overwatch concept to provide continuous security for a unit, function, activity, or facility. When conducting a security halt, a squad leader may place a pair of Marines on the roof of a nearby building to provide overwatch for the patrol. Guardian angels are mature, alert, and trusted individuals who use an ambush mentality to watch over a unit's security. Whether armed or unarmed, they must have the means to convey a threat (sound the alarm). Guidelines for employment of guardian angels are:

- Personnel and equipment remain tactically alert to ensure security, protection, and early warning until a trained guardian angel is emplaced.
- Guardian angels will be given guidance and training regarding the use of deadly force and local ROE and escalation of force continuum procedures. Guardian angels rehearse the immediate actions required of them.

- Units will employ the appropriate communications gear to ensure that guardian angels can provide proper early warning of a threat.
- Guardian angels remain vigilant and alert to potentially hostile activities and actions near their units.
- Guardian angels should be rotated to maintain the highest levels of awareness.
- Guardian angels are employed at all unit evolutions, regardless of size or operational environment.

### **Friendly Fire Prevention and Battlespace Geometry**

Friendly fire represents a real threat to FP and mission accomplishment. Friendly fire happens when friendly weapons and munitions are used to destroy the enemy, but the effects of those weapons and munitions impact other friendly forces instead. While some definitions of friendly fire include such words as unintentional and unforeseen, most friendly fire incidents result from human error or loss of situational awareness. Company commanders can implement substantial controls to significantly reduce the risk of friendly fire. The basis of such controls are schemes of maneuver and tactical control measures that mitigate the chance of friendly fire; maintain situational awareness across the company; and train company personnel to understand their weapons, the effects of their weapons, and the principles of battlespace geometry.


***Tactical Control Measures.*** Control measures deconflict fire and maneuver, assign responsibilities, and control combat operations. They may apply to the scheme of maneuver or they may apply to internal procedures. They may be verbal, graphic, or both. Tactical control measures reinforce the company commander's scheme of maneuver, help prevent friendly fire, are easily understood, and are tied to readily recognizable terrain features as appropriate. Examples of tactical control measures are—

- Maneuver, such as axis or direction of attack, EAs or BPs, and attack and SBF positions.
- Command and control, such as contact and control points, boundaries and phase lines, rally and passage points, and limit of advance.
- Internal control measures, such as day and night visual markings, challenge and passwords, and brevity codes.

***Battlespace Geometry.*** As seen in Figure 13-1, on the combined arms battlefield, battlespace geometry requires awareness of critical elements of information. While every individual in the company cannot track all elements of battlespace geometry, they can be trained for awareness. If individual members of the company understand how combined arms works to integrate various weapon platforms, such as CAS or artillery, then they are much more likely to recognize unsafe situations and act accordingly. The critical elements of battlespace geometry are—

- Friendly positions and associated surface danger zones.
- Enemy positions.
- Enemy threat ring.
- Ordnance minimum safe distances (training) or risk estimate distance (combat).
- Artillery gun-target lines.
- Mortar gun-target lines.

- Fixed-wing CAS attack cones.
- Rotary-wing CAS BPs.



**Figure 13-1. Battlespace Geometry (Training Distances) Example.**

**Weapons Safety.** The ability for company personnel to understand the functioning, employment, and effects of their weapons is crucial to avoiding friendly fire. A good understanding of battlespace geometry helps prevent poor employment of a weapon system, but Marines must also understand the effects of their weapons in terms of maximum range, penetration depth, beaten zone, and blast effects to avoid engaging the enemy in such a manner as to endanger friendly troops. Further, understanding the functioning of a weapon and engaged leadership prevents friendly fire resulting from negligent discharges. Most negligent discharges do not happen in combat, but happen during training, weapons clearing and cleaning, or because of horseplay. The Marine Corps uses the following five safety rules in Table 13-7 as the basis for weapons safety:

<b>Table 13-7. Five Weapons Safety Rules.</b>	
<b>1</b>	Treat every weapon as if it were loaded.
<b>2</b>	Never point a weapon at anything you do not intend to shoot.
<b>3</b>	Keep your finger straight and off the trigger until you intend to fire.
<b>4</b>	Keep your weapon on safe until you are ready to fire.
<b>5</b>	Know your target and what lies beyond it.

### **Combat Checks and Inspections**

A unit that has a well-established system of checks and inspections will more consistently perform to standard (see Table 13-8). The company commander establishes checks and inspections that support the unit's operational tasks. Once established, the company commander must ensure that the checks and inspections happen before and after combat operations. Checks and inspections fall into the following categories: PCCs, PCIs, postcombat checks, and postcombat inspections.

<b>Table 13-8. Sample Precombat Inspection Checklist.</b>	
Vehicle preparations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Loaded according to the load plan</li> <li>• Vehicle refueled</li> <li>• Water cans full, Class I stowed</li> <li>• Equipment cleaned and stowed</li> <li>• First aid kit/combat-lifesaver bag complete and stowed</li> <li>• Vehicle dispatched, technical manual present, vehicle tool kit stowed</li> <li>• Basic load of ammunition stowed</li> </ul>
Communications equipment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Radios operational, mounted, and secured</li> <li>• Connections and receptacles cleaned and frequencies set</li> <li>• Antenna matching unit(s) operational</li> <li>• Communications security equipment operational</li> <li>• All required nets entered and monitored</li> </ul>
CBRN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CBRN equipment accounted for and serviceable</li> <li>• CBRN equipment stored/employed as appropriate</li> <li>• Individual CBRN equipment is issued as appropriate</li> </ul>
Optics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NVDs and binoculars cleaned, operational, and stowed</li> </ul>

Maintenance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PMCS conducted on all equipment</li> <li>• Equipment inspection and maintenance worksheet completed on all equipment</li> </ul>
Armaments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All weapons cleaned and test fired</li> </ul>

**Precombat Checks.** Precombat checks help the leader to prepare the unit for combat and include checks for individuals, vehicles, weapons, and equipment. While these checklists are generic, they can be easily tailored to fit a unit's specific needs. Leaders at all levels use these checklists to plan and prepare instructions to their subordinate leaders.

**Precombat Inspections.** Precombat inspections validate that the PCCs occurred. They are a leader's primary means of ensuring that essential equipment is present and ready and that subordinates understand the order and the mission. Leaders must plan their time and that of the unit to ensure that inspections happen. Time must also be available for corrective actions should an individual or item fail the inspection. Leaders cannot delegate this responsibility; they must be the inspectors. This demands that they be competent in the maintenance and care of the unit's equipment. The standards a commander sets and inspects will determine the unit's ability to perform.

**Postcombat Checks.** Postcombat checks are identical in form to PCCs but differ in substance. Individuals, vehicles, weapons, and equipment checks still occur; however, the focus changes to repairing and refitting these items to be reusable. Expendable items may need replenishing and lost items require replacing. Units replace their basic load items and ensure that equipment has its full complement of POL. Damaged and nonoperational equipment is evacuated for repair.

**Postcombat Inspections.** In the same way that PCIs require unit leaders to verify PCCs, postcombat inspections require leadership to inspect postcombat checks. Since postcombat operations are maintenance oriented, unit leaders should employ inspection teams consisting of vehicle, communication, supply, and other appropriate personnel to assist them. As well as helping with the inspection, these personnel can also make on-the-spot corrections. Inspections must focus on serviceability. Sufficient time is necessary to perform these inspections to accommodate the required attention to detail.

### **Body Armor Protective Level**

In many cases, company commanders can expect some sort of guidance regarding body armor protective level posture from HHQ. This direction usually aligns armor protective levels with general enemy threat conditions or activities, while providing guidance on company commander authority for modification, waiver authority, or waiver procedures.

### **Environment Risk Mitigation**

Since the Marine Corps continues to operate in "every clime and place," the effects of various environments on the personnel and equipment of the infantry company remain a key component of FP. When determining how to mitigate those effects, company commanders consider preventing, mitigating, and recovering from the effects. Environmental effects are hot or cold, dry or wet, high or low, and many combinations thereof. Using this methodology, some of the

mountains in Indonesia would be considered hot, wet, and high, whereas the Gobi Desert would be considered cold, dry, and high.

**Hot or Cold.** The temperature of the body is regulated within very narrow limits: overheating can cause heat exhaustion and heat stroke; overcooling can cause hypothermia. Both conditions can occur in either hot or cold environments. Rather than approach the environment in terms of its temperature range, company commanders enact FP measures by approaching the environment in terms of the temperature of the company's personnel and equipment. For example, disciplined use of layering garments prevents heat exhaustion when conducting physical exertion in the cold in the same manner as it prevents hypothermia in the desert at night when at rest. While acclimatization assists the company when operating in extreme temperature environments, it is not a cure all. Measures, such as work rotation to manage physical exertion in both hot and cold, shelter availability (whether sunshade or a heating tent), hydration and diet regardless of temperature, and proper equipment maintenance, are appropriate considerations for the company commander.

**Wet or Dry.** While not readily apparent, the presence or lack of moisture in an environment can have just as many effects on personnel and equipment as temperature. Rather than approach the environment in terms of its humidity, rainfall, or aridness, company commanders enact FP measures by approaching the environment in terms of the humidity required by personnel and equipment. In wet environments, companies focus on keeping personnel as dry as possible to avoid fungal infections and disease, while keeping equipment lubricated to prevent rust. Companies may accomplish this through simple measures, such as dry socks, personnel shelters above the ground, and air conditioners to protect sensitive electronic equipment from moisture. While high humidity and the presence of large amounts of water present the greatest problems to the infantry company, overly dry environments can also cause issues that company commanders seek to mitigate through hydration of personnel and lubrication and maintenance of equipment.

**High or Low.** Altitude presents significantly greater concerns than other environments due to its immediate effects on the human body. Low altitudes present little or no problems for the infantry company; however, as companies begin to operate in elevations over 6,500 feet, the effects of elevation on company personnel become an increasing challenge. Above 8,000 feet, companies can expect cases of altitude-related illness, which can result in death if left untreated. While gradual acclimatization to slowly increasing altitudes is a viable method for preventing altitude-related illnesses, companies may not have that luxury. In addition to deploying healthy and fit Marines, companies deploying into elevations above 6,500 feet should expect to have altitude-related casualties and conduct appropriate medical training for all company personnel.

# **CHAPTER 14**

## **LOGISTICS**

The company commander is responsible for logistics, its associated functions, and the proper use and disposition of supplies and equipment. The relationship between logistics and military operations is that logistics sets the outward limit on what is operationally possible. If logistics sets the limits, it follows that one of the key objectives must be to ensure that limits imposed by logistics do not inhibit effective operations. As a result, this chapter provides commanders considerations in the development of logistic plans and the allocation of resources.

In the austere logistic environment of the Marine infantry company, sustaining the company in combat provides company commanders with one of their greatest challenges and operational limits. Company commanders must be innovative and resource conscious in adopting company processes and techniques for supply, maintenance, and casualty treatment and evacuation. Supervision and key leadership engagement at all levels is critical. Company commanders who supervise and ensure the proper task organization and division of labor of the company staff will enable the company's success.

### **LOGISTICS FUNCTIONAL AREAS**

Tactical logistics consists of six functional areas: supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and services. Table 14-1 provides detailed information on the six functions of CSS and their associated subfunctions.



<b>Table 14-1. Functional Areas of Logistics.</b>		
<b>Supply</b>	<b>Maintenance</b>	<b>Transportation</b>
Determination of requirements	Inspection and classification	Embarkation
Procurement	Service, adjustment, and turning	Landing support
Storage	Testing and calibration	Port and terminal operations
Distribution	Repair	Motor transport
Salvage	Modification	Air delivery
Disposal	Rebuilding and overhaul	Freight transportation
	Reclamation	Passenger transportation
	Recovery and evacuation	Materials handling equipment
<b>General Engineering</b>	<b>Health Services</b>	<b>Services</b>
Engineer reconnaissance	Health maintenance	Command services
Horizontal/vertical construction	Casualty collection	Personal administration
Facilities maintenance	Casualty treatment	Religious ministries support
Demolition and obstacle removal	Temporary casualty holding	Financial management
Explosive ordnance disposal	Casualty evacuation	Communications
Bridging		Billeting
		Messing
		Band
		Morale, welfare, and recreation
		CSS services
		Disbursing
		Postal services
		Exchange services
		Legal services support
		Graves registration

For more information on the six logistics functional areas, see MCTP 3-40B, *Tactical-Level Logistics*.

## LOGISTIC PREPARATION AND PLANNING

Infantry companies engage with all six functions of CSS in the execution of their missions. The following subparagraphs highlight logistic considerations that a company commander and staff consider during planning. When conducting logistical planning, companies always adhere to the seven principles of CSS:

- *Flexibility*: the ability to tailor and rapidly change how logistic structure is set up to meet new missions, situations, and operations.
- *Simplicity*: the ability to foster efficiency in both planning and execution through mission type orders and standardized procedures.
- *Attainability*: the ability to meet the basic and essential logistic requirements needed to conduct combat operations.
- *Sustainability*: the ability to maintain adequate and effective logistic support for all parties throughout the AO.

- *Economy*: stewarding resources to enable mission accomplishment through the most effective logistic support at the least cost.
- *Responsiveness*: ensuring the correct support arrives at the right time in the right place.
- *Survivability*: using various measures, from dispersion to fortification, to safeguard and protect logistical assets and resources.


## **General Considerations**

The battalion usually accounts for the baseline CSS requirements of the companies. The basic planning unit is the combat day. From this baseline, the infantry company determines other CSS requirements and uses the battalion's request process for submission. Company commanders and their staffs must include CSS requirements and a support plan as part of problem framing and COA development by considering the following factors:

- *Mission*. The mission will dictate special equipment requirements, possible transportation needs, and CASEVAC augments.
- *Enemy*. The enemy's most likely COA, disposition, and other characteristics will dictate ammunition requirements, breaching requirements, and EPW considerations.
- *Terrain*. Terrain not only dictates mobility requirements, but also has immediate impacts on the means and ability to conduct all CSS functions.
- *Weather*. Weather directly affects the CSS plan through impacts on mobility, visibility, and possible degradation of equipment and weapons capabilities.
- *Transportation*. The movement of personnel and all classes of supply must be integrated into the company plan. All surface and air transportation means should be considered for movement.
- *Ease of resupply*. Ease of resupply requires the company commander to consider all factors that influence the sustainment of the company and the direct effect on operations. The effect of distance and time may limit how far the company can travel in its battlespace without additional assets.

## **Supply**

Through problem framing and COA development, the company commander determines and prescribes the supply load for the company and requisitions supplies accordingly. The prescribed load is not a fixed quantity and may change to meet new tactical and logistic conditions. When planning the prescribed load, company commanders and their staffs analyze the means of transportation. Companies should optimize the basic load for all supplies, including Class IX repair parts. The unit's load should not exceed the commander's anticipated requirements, even if additional quantities could be carried. When considering supply, company commanders always remember the big three—subsistence, fuel, and ammunition (see Figure 14-1).



**Figure 14-1. The Big Three.**

**Class I (Subsistence).** Company planners must consider the amount of water and food the company will consume during operations, how to transport these items, and the methods of resupply. Higher headquarters often provides the means and guidance for infantry companies to meet their Class I needs, leaving infantry companies to plan only “by exception.” However, when company commanders employ their companies semi-independently and distributed, company planners take an active role in Class I management.

**Water.** When developing load plans for personnel and vehicles, planners should expect each Marine to carry no more than a one-day supply of water—less in some situations. Planners use averages (see Table 14-2) in their calculations.

<b>Table 14-2. Average Water Planning Rates Per Marine Per Day in Gallons.</b>		
<b>Function</b>	<b>Sustaining</b>	<b>Minimum</b>
Drinking	2.0	1.5
Hygiene	1.5	.5
Feeding	.8	.3
Waste	.4	.2
<b>Totals</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>2.5</b>

**Food.** Infantry companies must consider the length of an operation and a feed plan to determine food consumption requirements. A feed plan is a prediction of what types of meals personnel will consume and when. In a limited duration tactical environment, the company might use combat rationing consisting of three meals, ready to eat per day—two per day in extreme situations. In a more permanent FOB, the company might plan for hot meals in the morning and evening and a meal, ready to eat for lunch. Infantry companies should limit combat rationing to only those situations that truly require it. Whenever possible, companies should provide unitized

group rations to offer personnel a diet variety. The types of unitized group rations are A, B, and “heat and serve/tray rations.” Unitized group ration B and tray rations are well suited for expeditionary and austere environments but require some preparation by trained food service personnel. The battalion S-4 can provide this type of support; one trained cook augmented with company mess staff can meet an infantry company’s needs.

***Class II (Clothing, Individual Equipment).*** The infantry company identifies all requirements and submits requests for delivery through HHQ. In the case of specialized, newly identified items, such as gloves, pads, or some other specific piece of gear for which the company commander determines a requirement, the infantry company will need to submit a justification to HHQ in addition to the request itself. Uniform items, clothing, and individual equipment are the Class II items of most interest to the infantry company, though a company possessing a substantial vehicle fleet may also require tool kits depending on the level of maintenance authorized.

***Class III (Petroleum, Oils, Lubricants).*** Infantry companies usually serve as customers for HHQ Class III use and distribution plans. The fundamental basis for an infantry company’s Class III needs is the consumption rate of equipment and vehicles assigned, attached, or in DS of the company. If employed semi-independently, company staff work closely with HHQ logistic staffs in determining Class III requirements, including storage and distribution. In such cases, the company commander can assume a need for such augmentation to the company as personnel (such as bulk fuel personnel), technical manuals, tools, and repair parts. In cases when the infantry company must store its own POL resources, HHQ and companies determine storage capacity by multiplying daily usage by days between resupply.

***Class IV (Construction Material).*** The method of an infantry company’s employment dictates if and how Class IV supply issues will affect company planning. Initial planning guidance originates from the battalion operations and logistic sections, while engineers provide expert advice.

***Survivability.*** The mission and enemy threat determine the company’s requirements to build and maintain positions. A company conducting a search and attack may carry only a few sandbags per Marine for basic night defense. A company tasked with building and securing a strong point may have sandbags, timber, prefabricated barriers, concertina wire, and many other Class IV requirements.

***Counter mobility.*** During problem framing and COA development, company commanders determine the number, depth, and complexity of obstacles needed to generate the effect required.

***Habitability.*** The more significant and permanent the position, the more equipment needed for life support. Fixed positions often generate continuous life support development, which then creates a greater CSS requirement. Company commanders should guard against “CSS creep,” which can often change a company’s operations if left unchecked. For example, austere outposts that gain greater creature comforts require more resupply and maintenance, which diverts more company combat power from other missions to support convoys, contractors, and other sustainment activities.

**Storage.** Company planners understand that the more developed the position, the greater the maintenance requirements and the need to preposition Class IV supplies. This requirement applies as equally to a strong point exposed to frequent enemy indirect fire impact as to mature FOBs.

**Class V (Ammunition).** Ammunition planning factors for each weapon system is in the most recent version of Marine Corps Order 8010.1\_, *Class V(W) Planning Factors for Fleet Marine Force Combat Operations*. When planning for ammunition consumption, usage, or storage, company commanders need to ensure that they have coordinated with the battalion gunner and battalion ammunition chief. The ammunition chief will help infantry companies comply with storage, transport, and handling regulations of specific ammunition types as moisture and other environmental conditions can have an adverse effect on the performance of certain ammunition items. Follow-on considerations for Class V are lift and handling requirements and ammunition driver training qualifications.

**Class VI (Personal Demand Items).** Infantry companies route all Class VI requirements and requests through HHQ. Items of interest to a company commander in this category include sundry packs, post exchange items, and waste bags for field sanitation use.

**Class VII (Major End Items).** An infantry company manages all Class VII issues with HHQ, whether replacing company equipment from the table of equipment or equipment density list or identifying a need for a major end item not normally assigned to the company.

**Class VIII (Medical Materials).** Medical personnel assigned to the infantry company possess complete medical and first aid kits. The company's senior corpsman coordinates Class VIII resupply through the BAS. The senior corpsman also serves as the company commander's senior medical representative for medically related planning. The primary Class VIII planning consideration for the company is the replenishment of high demand items in the individual first aid kit. The company should ensure that it possesses enough litters to provide one per squad or section.

**Class IX (Repair Parts).** The infantry company does not normally stock Class IX repair parts but may if separated from HHQ. Regardless of the method of employment, companies will usually seek to possess small amounts of pre-expended bin items, which are low cost/high use parts for armory, communications, and motor transport assets. The infantry company requisitions all required Class IX items through battalion supply. The greater the amount of logistic support pushed to the infantry company, the greater the need for the infantry company to possess appropriate personnel augmentation. Company commanders and their planners may request the assistance of subject matter experts, such as motor transport or communications personnel, at the company level.

## **Maintenance**

With the increase in weapon and vehicle density within an infantry company, the importance of conducting and tracking maintenance becomes vital to mission accomplishment. The more austere the environment, the more important PMCS becomes to an operation. At a minimum, a company must conduct periodic and scheduled PMCS on its equipment and vehicles in addition

to maintaining appropriate logs and records. The company commander should consider assigning a Marine to the XO to serve as a liaison with the battalion's logistic section and track company maintenance requirements and activities. Finally, infantry companies will frequently receive equipment under warranty or with contracted maintenance support. A focused maintenance effort within the company will ensure that company personnel receive appropriate training on all equipment and that unauthorized maintenance does not occur.

### **General Engineering**

Since an infantry company does not have organic engineering assets, most engineering tasks require external support. An important planning step for a company is to identify its engineering requirements. Doing so may require subject matter experts from supporting engineer units, to include EOD. In the realm of general engineering, the infantry company faces its greatest challenges in terms of resources, resource management, and personnel augmentation when tasked with building and managing FOBs, COPs, expeditionary patrol bases, and other similar fixed sites. The company considers a variety of general engineering issues when dealing with these types of facilities.

***Vertical and Horizontal Construction (Camp Commandant Functions).*** When building, maintaining, or overseeing new construction, the relationship of buildings and functions to each other and to living spaces is critical. Ammunition, for example, needs a berm and access control features, standoff (depending on net explosive weight), and protection from the weather. Table 14-3 lists similar considerations for other functions.

<b>Table 14-3. Facility and Function Standoff Distances.</b>		
<b>Keep These</b>	<b>This Far</b>	<b>From These</b>
Food waste	30m	Food preparation area Water source
Portable toilets, burn latrines	30m and downwind	Water sources Billeting
Portable toilets, burn latrines	100m and downwind	Food preparation area
Garbage collection	100m and downwind	Food service area
Garbage pit/landfill	Safe distance and downwind	Water sources
POL	Safe distance and downhill	Food preparation area Water source
Laundry soakage pit/ shower area	100m	Food preparation area
Laundry soakage pit/ shower area	30m	Water sources Billeting
Hazardous materials collection	100m	Food preparation area Water source

**Legend:**

m – meters


POL – petroleum, oils, lubricants

**Vehicle Staging Area.** In addition to considerations listed in Table 14-3, company planners also consider vehicle maintenance functions, such as location and protection from the weather, ease and safe movement of vehicles in the maintenance area, and the ability to effectively conduct maintenance in the space. Other considerations include hazardous material and POL storage and spill containment.

**Field Mess.** Location of the field mess includes being separate from but practically accessible to berthing areas. The company should require a trained electrician to conduct a survey of power requirements and a regularly scheduled review of power usage. The field mess should not only have protection from the elements, but also overhead cover if possible. If storing perishables, refrigeration requirements are identified as well as the maintenance of these assets.

**Hygiene Facility.** While obviously kept separated from berthing and messing, hygiene facilities receive the same consideration in terms of power and protection. Further, company planners consider water requirements, how water is delivered, and how wastewater is removed. Hygiene facilities might require placement such that heavy trucks can access them regularly.

**Forward Collecting Point.** Forward collecting points must meet certain standards for treatment of detainees and EPWs. These standards include protection from the effects of combat (such as indirect fire), reasonable protection from the elements, clean water sources, and adequate hygiene facilities. These requirements occur within the context of proper security and separation from friendly berthing, C2, medical, and other sensitive areas. Figure 14-2 provides an example of a hasty forward collecting point.



**Figure 14-2. Forward Collecting Point.**

**Weapons Storage.** The infantry company can approach weapons storage in two ways. The first is the system and procedures by which individuals secure their personal weapons. Depending on the operational and threat environment, individuals may carry their weapons. Similar to shipboard berthing, individuals may have their weapons stored and secured in living areas. Finally, it is possible that individuals will store their weapons in an armory. The armory is the second approach to weapons storage. Regardless of how the infantry company handles individual weapons storage, there will always be some requirement for an armory to store weapons for maintenance or evacuation and to hold extra weapons. The armory should be close to C2 areas and be securable.

**Force Protection.** Chapter 13 discusses FP issues in depth. For general engineering planning purposes, however, infantry companies consider a number of survivability issues. Most survivability issues at positions similar to a FOB require heavy equipment and engineers for such items as prefabricated barriers; defensive barriers; guard tower vertical construction; and semi-permanent facilities, such as field messes. In addition to these items, the company must conduct position improvement as a continuing action. Position improvement and maintenance includes filling sandbags, maintaining sandbag positions, and establishing concertina wire fences and maintaining that wire.

**Infrastructure.** Infrastructure applies to the systems with which a facility operates. Water is such a system, as are power and communications. After water, the infantry company's next



major concern is power. While host nation power may be available as a convenient option, it is often unreliable, so it becomes critical to maintain a tactical backup in the event of a power failure. Also, most countries operate on a different voltage and phase power than the United States, which requires transformers to avoid destroying assets.

***Environmental Controls.*** The infantry company first determines power requirements and then fulfills those requirements by means of prioritization. Communications and command and control represent priorities ahead of secondary requirements, such as billeting.

***Generators.*** Generators affect the logistic systems through POL and maintenance requirements. The number of generators needed for a company position is greater than that determined purely by electrical needs. Planners consider fueling schedules, power loading, and maintenance rotation to ensure that the necessary number of generators always run. Other generator concerns are spill containment, noise shielding, cable protection, and protection from the elements.

***Communications.*** Communications is a major infrastructure concern. In addition to power requirements, company planners consider the requirements to keep key systems cool, to store and recharge batteries, and to properly locate antenna farms.

## **Transportation**

Commanders should use organic capability before soliciting additional support or resources for transportation. As a rule, when requesting external transportation assets, infantry companies provide what and who needs movement when, while the logistic experts determine the means of movement. Company commanders work closely with their logistic support in those other cases when operational concerns may influence transportation requests. For example, FP requirements might dictate the use of hardened vehicles. The mission may include GO/NO GO criteria that dictate the dedication of extra transportation assets for a “bump” capability. When requesting transportation, company planners consider the following:

- Cube, weight, and types of cargo, such as hazardous materials, explosives, and compatibility.
- Number of passengers and their combat equipment.
- Infantry companies normally receive light or medium lift assets.
- Close coordination with transportation units to account for altitude, lift capabilities, and off-road lift limitations.

The unit movement control center controls movement through a battalion or HHQ AO. Because of the nature of its work, the center is generally located within or near the COC though it is staffed by the S-4. The unit movement control center is the battalion’s single point for movement coordination with HHQ. It manages and coordinates logistical movements within the battalion AO and tracks logistical movements coming into the AO from other units. Nonorganic units moving through the infantry company’s zone or sector should coordinate their movement (start point, route, and release point) with the company operations center and the battalion unit movement control center.

The embarkation section of the battalion S-4 will create and manage the battalion's embarkation scheme of maneuver (transportation of people and things). Company planners contribute to the battalion's embarkation plan by providing an accurate and validated equipment density list. The company commander's consolidated memorandum of receipt is a baseline from which to build the equipment density list. The company appoints one of its personnel to serve as the company embarkation representative who coordinates directly with the battalion embarkation chief and company XO.

## **Services**

The company commander requests most supporting services needed by the company through the battalion S-4. The battalion makes decisions on how to meet these requests and, in some cases, may use contracted services to support the company. In these cases, it may be necessary to appoint and certify a contracting officer's representative to oversee completion and execution of contracts. The appointment and training of this individual is coordinated with the battalion S-4. Services tend to be critical low-density capabilities that are often not readily available in an austere environment or early on in certain operations.

## **Health Services**

Fielding healthy Marines directly affects the company's ability to conduct operations. While CASEVAC often receives the most attention, preventive medicine and health services do not. Health services consist of everything from avoiding immersion foot or malaria in a jungle environment to maintaining a rudimentary aid station and monitoring water quality in a FOB. The senior corpsman in the company, in addition to other duties, serves as the company's "special staff officer" for health services and is tasked and positioned accordingly. The ability to exercise health services within a company depends primarily on coordination with the battalion logistic section and BAS. As always, the first line of health services is always the individual Marine, followed immediately by the vigilance of small unit leaders. Companies should ensure that their personnel receive the training and opportunity to practice self-aid and buddy aid skills.

As briefly discussed in this chapter, the company's senior line corpsman will be the company's interface with the BAS. The abilities of this individual can directly affect the company and should receive appropriate supervision. Specifically, the senior corpsman—

- Acts as the company commander's "special staff officer" for medical care.
- Works with the BAS to coordinate the replenishment of medical supplies and consumables.
- Coordinates the evacuation of routine and nonemergency cases to higher levels of care.
- Maintains company medical and dental records and coordinates for routine care, such as dental exams, medical exams, and vaccination updates.
- Conducts preventive medicine inspections.

**Health Maintenance.** Proper execution of health maintenance ensures the company and its personnel are medically prepared for combat operations. It begins at home station with maintenance of such records as dental health, immunizations, and scheduled physicals and continues while deployed through identification of hazards and mitigation, regular health inspections, and immunization maintenance. The company develops a regular health inspection

plan of the company's positions by the battalion's preventive medicine technician. If deployed semi independently, company commanders should seek augmentation of their staff with a preventive medicine technician or seek additional training for corpsmen assigned to the company.

**Casualty Collection.** Casualty collection is the assembly of casualties at a designated point and treatment site. Casualty collection points should—

- Be in an area far enough from combat operations that the casualties are not in danger of being further injured.
- Provide a higher level of care than what is immediately available at the combat site.
- Prepare casualties for evacuation to higher levels of care.
- Provide protection to the casualties with available forces to prevent overrun and capture.

**Casualty Treatment.** Casualty treatment includes triage and all levels of care from self-aid to buddy aid to resuscitative care. It begins at the point of injury and continues until the injured individual leaves the company's control by CASEVAC. Triage and classification of casualties begins with the first corpsmen on site and is a continual process. The levels of triage are—

- Routine (evacuation typically within 24 hours).
- Priority (evacuation typically within 6 hours).
- Urgent (immediate evacuation; "golden hour" requirement).

**Casualty Evacuation.** The evacuation of casualties is the movement of sick, wounded, or injured personnel from the point of injury or onset of disease to BAS or medical treatment facility (MTF). It also includes the movement of personnel between MTFs. The parent battalion or HHQ provides the infantry company with direction and guidance regarding CASEVAC procedures. All units have an organic means to evacuate casualties.

**Golden Hour.** When addressing CASEVAC means and limitations, it is imperative to understand the "golden hour" requirement for urgent casualties. The golden hour begins at the point of injury and does not end until the arrival of the casualty at an MTF with a surgical capability (Level II or Role II North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]). While HHQ will provide the infantry company guidance on CASEVAC procedures and requirements, company commanders must understand how their operations add or subtract from the golden hour and plan accordingly when they are operating semi-independently. The company commander should not let the golden hour restrict operations; rather, they should seek augmentation of personnel or assets to mitigate it. A company commander might request forward deployment of CASEVAC assets to cover a critical period of an operation when the assets normally available would fail to meet the golden hour. Shock trauma assets normally do not have a surgical capability and are Level I. Additional augmentation with assets, such as armored ambulances to get casualties safely to a designated LZ or ambulance exchange point, can also contribute to meeting golden hour requirements.

**Vehicles.** Any vehicle can serve as a means for evacuating casualties. A medical ambulance is the preferred surface means of transportation for casualties and transfer to that type of vehicle

should occur as soon as practical in a ground based CASEVAC plan. The battalion designates casualty and ambulance exchange points for removing casualties from company care and quickly returning ground CASEVAC assets to company control.

***Air Casualty Evacuation.*** The use of aerial assets to conduct CASEVAC is a function of the enemy's air defense threat. Often, ground CASEVAC removes casualties to areas where aircraft can safely extract wounded personnel. For planning, aeromedical evacuation should replace surface means as soon as practical—especially for priority and urgent casualties.

***Temporary Hospitalization.*** Temporary hospitalization refers to an MTF that hold sick, wounded, and injured Marines for a limited time, usually not more than 96 hours. While at the MTF, patients are either released or are prepared for further evacuation to treatment centers. In combat, surgical companies or fleet hospitals often serve as centers for temporary hospitalization.

## **Load Planning**

Company commanders may increase or decrease individual loads based on the specifics of the mission, the requirements of environment, the duration of the operation, and the timing and means of resupply. The basic rule for individual load planning is to carry only those things necessary to accomplish the mission; the company neither has enough time to plan for every contingency, nor can it carry everything it could conceivably need.

## **UNIT SUSTAINMENT**

The following subparagraphs cover various logistic actions taken by the infantry company during sustained operations, including those relating to reporting, distribution, convoys, and command and control.

### **Reporting**

During operations, a company will be required to submit various reports. These reports provide the battalion and HHQ with information needed to make logistical and operational decisions. In a high operating tempo environment, accurate reporting is even more critical due to potential resource constraints. The risk in taking shortcuts in reporting is that a company will not get the support that it requires in a suitable timeframe. The adage “garbage in, garbage out” applies to reporting. Especially as reporting becomes increasingly digital, accurate reporting allows the company commander to more easily use historical data to plan and predict future requirements.

The logistics status report (LOGSTAT) provides the battalion a picture of the infantry company's overall logistic status. It includes personnel and key equipment availability as well as food, water, fuel, and ammunition levels. This report provides a snapshot of the overall readiness of the company. It also allows the battalion to plan and act proactively to resupply a company. Submitting the LOGSTAT can occur via C2 systems, e-mail, courier, or radio and is typically done daily. Other supporting reports or supplements to a LOGSTAT include the ammunition expenditure report and the rapid request.

The ammunition expenditure report provides the Marine Corps a detailed list of ammunition issued, expended, and turned in. This report is submitted through electronic, or paper means with appropriate signatures required. During combat operations, this report becomes supplemental to the LOGSTAT that includes overall levels of ammunition. Regardless, certain items, such as Category I ammunition (rockets), are closely tracked by serial number, even in combat. Serial numbers of expended rockets must be provided either in the ammunition expenditure report or in the ammunition portion of the LOGSTAT.

A rapid request is an infantry company's method of requesting supplies and logistic services from the battalion or DS element of the LCE. Submission of the rapid request can occur through various computer-based applications. The LCE will provide the formats for rapid requests.

### **Distribution Methods**

There are various methods to resupply a company and for a company to resupply platoons during operations. Most often, a company receives its resupply from the battalion combat trains. Other means of resupply, such as air, combat logistic convoys, or vertical replenishment, depend upon the proximity of a company to the battalion, the terrain, and the enemy situation.


***Battalion Combat Train.*** The push method of resupply consists of the supporting element automatically sending supplies to a supported element based on LOGSTATs and other reporting. A "push" is generally a predetermined amount of supplies based upon historical data or prior requests. The pull method of resupply involves the supported element requesting specific items from the supporting element. In the pull method, requested items are either delivered to or picked up by the supported element. Most often, battalions use a combination of push and pull resupply to support the infantry companies. The method of resupply used depends upon a variety of factors, such as transportation assets available, the nature of the supplies provided, and the nature of the operation.

***Company Resupply.*** The infantry company must closely supervise its supply status in light of current and future operations. If future operations necessitate movement, then the company must plan to avoid having surplus quantities beyond the company's ability to lift. Conversely, future operations dictate the types and quantities of supplies needed, so the company must possess those before the operation begins.

***Platoon Resupply.*** In general, the infantry company holds all assets at its position until a platoon requests them using the pull resupply method; however, modification can occur in instances of distributed operations, but platoons usually have less ability to accumulate, move, and handle supplies in quantity than do companies. In some cases, a company may have its own organic combat train, which can consist of several light and medium lift assets with trailers.


***Repair and Replenishment Point.*** There will be times when a company may resupply itself from a repair and replenishment point (RRP). The company may provide its own security and move the supplies in organic transportation or have the supporting unit drop supplies at company and platoon positions. There are two standard configurations for an RRP: tailgate and service station. Both methods apply whether the infantry company is mounted, dismounted, or both.

**Tailgate Method.** A company using the tailgate method deploys its elements and vehicles into a perimeter defensive posture. The logistic element conducting the resupply then moves around the interior of the perimeter delivering all supplies to the “tailgates” of each vehicle and element. This method is typically less effective and more time consuming but may be more prudent due to the security situation on the ground. A commander would typically prefer this method during the consolidation phase of a battle when elements cannot leave their respective positions due to security concerns (see Figure 14-3).



**Figure 14-3. Tailgate Resupply Method.**

**Service Station Method.** A company using the service station method of resupply approaches the RRP as a column of vehicles and elements. Within the RRP, the logistic element establishes separate areas for each class of supply. As the company’s elements and vehicles move through the RRP, they stop at each area to pick up requested supplies or receive maintenance support. This resupply method is usually preferred as it is more efficient and quicker than the tailgate method. The service station method becomes especially useful when the company is pressed for time and needs to get supplies and maintenance in the most expedient manner possible. It is also an opportunity to take advantage of backhauling. Backhauling returns supplies, equipment, or trash to the rear for disposition (see Figure 14-4).



**Figure 14-4. Service Station Resupply Method.**

**Air Delivery.** In remote and inaccessible areas, due to terrain or enemy situation, there are times when resupply via airdrop is the only solution. Airdrops need to be coordinated with the battalion S-4 section. Additionally, a suitable drop zone will need to be established and secured. Typical container delivery systems are GPS guided and have low cost parachute systems. Local policies and procedures will determine if the infantry company must recover any portions of the container delivery system. Depending on the size of the cargo dropped, companies may need materials handling equipment augmentation, such as cranes or forklifts, to move the cargo. Emergency air delivery is reserved for extraordinary situations. As a rule, normal air delivery missions typically take several days for planning and preparation.

**Vertical Replenishment or Assault Support Teams Missions.** Resupply may occur via assault support aircraft that carry equipment and supplies either internally or externally. Such support requires prior coordination and external support from a DS LCE with trained landing support personnel. Companies will need the augmentation of LCE personnel or choose members of the company for appropriate training. These personnel will assist in receiving the supplies safely and recovering slings and cargo nets used to carry external cargo. This method of resupply can be used in emergencies as long as the anti-air threat is not too high.

**Emergency Resupply.** Commanders will encounter situations in combat when supplies run out faster than anticipated for various reasons, some which are beyond anyone's control. Emergency resupply usually focuses on the "Big Three"—food, fuel, and ammunition.

Commanders should push these requests up through appropriate C2 means for immediate action by the S-4. Situations will dictate whether the resupply comes by air, ground, or a combination of the two. Emergency resupply focuses on items that, if not received, will adversely affect the company's ability to conduct its assigned mission. Sometimes a technique called cross-leveling will be required as an interim solution.

Cross-leveling is a redistribution of supplies throughout the unit. Usually done automatically between fire teams and squads after every engagement, the company may cross-level supplies among platoons when resupply cannot occur. In some instances, supplies may be weighted vice evenly redistributed. For example, during preparation for an assault of an enemy trench system, the platoon with the task of SBF may be required to give its hand grenades to the platoon with the task of clearing the trench.

### **Convoys**

Convoys differ from mounted movement or motorized patrols based on size and purpose. A convoy is a large, orderly, movement of vehicles for a logistical or administrative purpose. Convoys may operate in permissive or uncertain environments. Convoys are not designed for combat operations but may conduct combat operations as a function of accomplishing their larger purpose and mission. The infantry company may receive the mission to provide the combat power to a convoy through an escort mission.

### **Logistic Command and Control**

The requirements associated with distributed company operations dictate a more robust C2 capability for the company commander. This capability plus the increased responsibility for CSS that exists at the company when conducting semi-independent operations result in the company exercising logistical functions usually associated with the battalion and above. The use of computer-based logistic systems requires the same attention to detail and accurate reporting needed by radio and paper-based systems.

**Planning.** The existence of logistic C2 systems and the capability to use them do not automatically translate into the ability to do so. As the communications plan is developed during problem framing and COA development, company leadership must ensure the battalion communications section is aware of the company's requirements. The battalion's communications plan must account for the additional computer assets, additional software and network requirements.

**In-Transit Visibility Systems.** In-transit visibility systems allow a user to track the actual location of supplies and equipment while they are shipped. The system allows for tracking items embarked on ship, located in staging areas, and moved across the AO. Additionally, by tracking the location of specific items, the company can track the location of the assets carrying them, such as the location of the company's trains or other logistic vehicles transiting the company's battlespace. As with any similar system, the quality of the information input into the system affects the quality of the information from the system. In this case, a key component to the system is radio frequency identification tags assigned to items; poor or nonexistent labeling results in poor or nonexistent information.



***Request Management Systems.*** Request management systems allow for the organized, automated management and tracking of a company's CSS-related requests across supporting agencies and functions. The company may track the progress of a request through its lifecycle without the need to call or radio back to the supporting element. It allows the company to view where the request is in its cycle, follow up if nothing has happened, view who has acted on it, and provide historical data after an operation. This, of course, is only possible with the appropriate level of automated equipment and connectivity.

## **CONSOLIDATION AND TRANSITION**

The following subparagraphs address logistic considerations that accompany consolidation on the objective, transition to follow-on operations, and transition to redeployment.

### **Battle Damage Repair**

After an operation, the company commander must conduct an immediate assessment of the company's equipment and supply. The battalion logistic section must receive a rapid report on equipment damaged beyond the company's ability to immediately repair and place it back into service. Timely reporting leads to more effective repair and replacement of damaged equipment, but it also allows for dropping equipment deemed a "combat loss," such as captured, destroyed, abandoned, or lost equipment, from the company's property records. In many cases, the loss or degradation of certain pieces of equipment is one of the battalion CCIRs, which also dictates timely and accurate reporting. Accurate documentation and follow-up with the battalion supply officer is sometimes necessary to ensure that lost assets are properly removed from a company commander's property records, such as the consolidated memorandum of receipt, prior to the next reconciliation or turnover to a relieving unit.

### **Equipment Accountability and Turnover**

Company commanders are responsible to their battalion commanders for accurate accounting and maintenance of company equipment. While company commanders and their staffs frequently work with the battalion's logistic, maintenance, and supply officers for technical and procedural issues related to company equipment records and files, those officers work on behalf of the battalion commander who will hold company commanders responsible for success or failure in this regard.

***Relief In Place Equipment Turnover.*** By their expeditionary natures, infantry companies often deploy and fall in on equipment already forward deployed, whether in peacetime or in combat. Sometimes this equipment might originate from a maritime prepositioning ship or because of a turnover with a unit in place. There is a good chance that company commanders might turn over substantial amounts of equipment and supplies, such as Class I or Class V, to a unit relieving them. Reliefs in place are difficult operations, made more so when the relieved unit is in contact with the enemy. It is undesirable to complicate the operational situation with distracting logistical issues. Having accurate property records and knowing the status and location of all the company's equipment and supplies prior to the RIP is essential to a successful turnover. Critical items that can cause delays and even disciplinary action include the following:

- Serialized small arms accountability. Ensure records are accurate and that the serial numbers on the weapons match them. Regular inspections, combat loss reporting, and other measures ensure accuracy.
- Electronic key management system equipment accountability.
- Serialized ammunition accountability. Keep detailed inventory records of all rockets and missiles and track their expenditure by serial number.

**Equipment Record Jackets.** In addition to the actual equipment, companies must ensure the turnover of all relevant record jackets, PMCS records, pending maintenance, and supply transactions/requests to the relieving unit. This precludes the follow-on force from having to recreate historical data.

### **Redeployment Operations**

Most of the factors already discussed in previous paragraphs apply to companies preparing to redeploy; however, redeployment does offer several other unique factors to consider, such as environmental washdown, ordnance removal, and maintenance.

On those occasions when a company is redeploying with its equipment, a washdown of that equipment is required, regardless of whether embarked aboard naval ships, commercial lift, strategic lift, or maritime prepositioning force assets. While the battalion logistic section will usually coordinate these actions, company commanders can expect to provide the manpower and supervision to conduct the washdown.

Through proper leadership, company commanders create an environment in their companies that encourages proper storage, handling, and accountability of ammunition and ordnance. In addition, a rigorous and thorough inspection must occur to ensure that all ammunition and ordnance is removed from equipment prior to redeployment and embarkation. As practical, commanders should identify and mitigate all equipment maintenance issues prior to embarkation. Broken equipment, equipment leaks, and other issues may result in embarkation delay.

## **ORDERS PROCESS AND LOGISTICS**

Commanders can enhance the quality of the support they receive by working closely with unit logisticians and providing requirements for support, but not necessarily requesting specific assets. Additionally, regularly referencing unit SOPs and thoroughly reading OPORDs, will provide logistical situational awareness.

Logistics is a commander's responsibility that impacts operational limits. The logistic concept of support should read similarly to an operational concept of support and should address logistic issues before, during, and after the mission. It should describe how the infantry company will be supported, the relationship between the LCE and the infantry company, the use of organic assets (if any), and days of supply issues. In addition, company commanders offer guidance on the following:

- Sustainment priorities and resources.
- Priority and movement of major logistic items for each phase.

- HN, joint, and coalition support as applicable.
- Location and priority of main resupply points.
- Transportation policies, guidance, and procedures.
- Detailed planning requirements and subordinate unit tasking.

In addition to the logistic concept of support, company commanders add the following guidance:

- Prescribed load.
- Planned resupply.
- CASEVAC procedures and control points.
- Repair and recovery procedures.
- EPW handling and collection points.
- Mortuary affairs guidance.
- CSS request methods.

## **CAPTURED PERSONNEL**

Captured personnel are EPWs and detainees. The two groups are legally different categories, though both groups are treated in accordance with the law of war and the Geneva Conventions. Enemy prisoners of war, detainees, and captured enemy equipment and materiel often provide combat information. This information is of tactical value only if the infantry company processes and evacuates captured personnel and materiel to the rear quickly. The infantry company can expect detailed and specific guidance from HHQ on handling captured personnel and material.

All persons captured, detained, or retained by the infantry company during military operations are considered “detained” persons until their status is determined by higher military and civilian authorities. Higher echelons of command possess military police units to take control and evacuate detainees; however, for practical purposes, the infantry company must provide professional initial processing and handling of captured personnel and equipment. Detainee handling is a resource intensive and politically sensitive operation that requires detailed training, guidance, and supervision.

# APPENDIX A

## ENVIRONMENTS

The infantry company is deployable worldwide and, therefore, company commanders expect the requirement to operate in “every clime and place.” The globe is comprised of environments that are hot or cold, wet or dry, and high or low in altitude. Within these general classifications are rural, urban, jungle, mountain, or desert settings and conditions. This appendix covers the most common environments. Companies must train and plan as able for the environments they are likely to encounter. At a minimum, company commanders should seek to ensure that their companies—

- Possess cadres of personnel with specialized skills sets, such as assault climbers, jungle leaders, and urban warfare specialists.
- Conduct environmentally appropriate medical training, such as how to recognize and treat altitude sickness, various jungle diseases, and parasites.
- Possess a fundamental understanding of unique equipment requirements, such as assault ladders, cold weather clothing, and jungle appropriate footwear.

### URBAN WARFARE

Urban areas are complex and provide the enemy with a multitude of ways to hide. Heavy concentrations of people, buildings, roadways, and railways increase the difficulty for a commander to impose their will onto an enemy.

#### Urban Considerations

The urban environment is complex and challenging, combining manmade features with the terrain and climate of nature. In general, the concentration of structures, facilities, and populations make an environment urban. Population centers, such as villages, towns, and cities, are all urban environments. Commanders use METT-T and civil considerations when planning for urban environments.

**Mission.** As expected, the company’s mission, along with HHQ intent and end state, is a critical starting point for urban mission planning. Planners must determine specific aspects of the mission, such as whether the tactical task “clear” means every building along a route or just key terrain, or whether the company needs to leave behind security detachments along a route.

Missions that begin against prepared enemy positions, requiring repetitive explosive breaching against barricaded rooms, can quickly demand precision engagement due to the unexpected presence of civilians on the battlefield. Similarly, Marines must possess the necessary equipment to move from permissive searching of a city block to high intensity operations if, for example, they discover an enemy safe house.

Due to the dispersed nature of urban operations, command and control is difficult and radio and verbal communications, line of sight, and various pyrotechnic signals are made more

complicated. Extensive use of tactical control measures, such as boundaries, phase lines, checkpoints, and event-driven brevity codes, help build situational awareness across the force. In addition to operation-specific rehearsals, a well-rehearsed company SOP (that addresses such routine activities as contact drills, building entry and clearing, linkup procedures, CASEVAC, and resupply) simplifies operations, builds confidence, and avoids adding further confusion to the urban environment.

Due to the heightened three-dimensional nature of the urban environment, the danger of movement in the open becomes ever greater in proportion to the level of threat. Terrain study is the first critical step in determining what movement is necessary and where and which structures require such actions as occupation, overwatch, suppression, or obscuration to provide an advantage to the infantry company. Company commanders allow subordinate elements to take maximum advantage of covered and concealed routes within the urban area.

**Enemy.** Key factors that affect the company commander's problem framing are the type of enemy force expected in the urban area, the enemy's probable COAs, and the ROE. Rules of engagement that are more restrictive work to a defender's advantage; conversely, less restrictive ROE work to an attacker's advantage. An enemy working in a permissive or uncertain environment directly influences the company commander's choices on movement techniques, FP, and use of firepower; such choices would change in a hostile environment. The urban environment often enhances the inherent advantages of the tactical defense: if the infantry company is defending, it benefits; if company commanders are executing offensive or other tactical operations, they must acknowledge the defender's advantage and plan accordingly.

**Terrain and Weather.** The urban environment consists not only of the natural terrain upon which it is built—hills, valleys, flat land—but also layers of manmade infrastructure both above and below ground. Commanders and subordinate leaders must consider all aspects of terrain, environment, and climate when conducting urban operations.

Maps may neither provide enough detail for urban terrain analysis nor reflect significant infrastructure, such as sewer, water, and gas systems; subways; railroads; and electrical and communication infrastructure. For all types of operations, satellite and grid reference graphic imagery is preferred. When available, commanders should use such aids as building or city plans, engineering prints, aerial photographs, or tourist maps that may assist them in their analysis of the terrain.

Key and decisive terrain are not always the same. Key terrain may consist of buildings, high ground, and other aspects that provide security, overwatch, and fields of fire; it enables safer movement. Decisive terrain may refer to control of a local market that is surrounded by high buildings and is extremely vulnerable to multiple avenues of approach. Control of decisive terrain may require identification and control of the key terrain that affects it. The urban environment should be viewed as an interconnected system. Control of the interconnected system will facilitate the ability to deny freedom of movement to the enemy.

In addition to major routes of movement within the urban area, infantry companies must gain awareness and, when possible, intimate knowledge of alleys, thoroughways, footpaths, and other

covered and concealed routes within the built-up area. Intentional blocking of routes is another consideration.

Flooding or severe storms can significantly affect operations in an urban environment. Commanders should not assume that a structure is not vulnerable to flooding or wind damage that could significantly damage equipment and create non-battle casualties.

***Troops and Support Available.*** In large scale, conventional operations in urban areas, infantry companies conduct offensive and defensive tasks within the context of battalion operations. For most other situations, companies work semi-independently and the company commander assesses the company's relative combat power in the same manner as for other operations. Working in urban environments generally requires company augmentation from various enablers. The urban environment is complex and the hazards, such as electricity, gas leaks, water, and weakened structures, are greater than merely the enemy. Company commanders seek necessary support from attachments and enablers to create the desired effects.

The urban environment demands more troops than other environments do. In the offense, this need is particularly acute to meet relative combat power requirements and to accomplish the number of other tasks required, such as clearing buildings, providing security, controlling civilians, evacuating casualties, and conducting resupply.

Due to the complexities of employing supporting arms within the urban environment, fire support coordination tends to occur at HHQ levels where such issues as collateral damage, weaponeering, and airspace coordination are more easily resolved. Collateral damage estimates in the urban environment consider the difficulty of tracking friendly unit location, ROE and the presence of civilians, and the general desire not to rubble the urban environment (from both the standpoint of future use and the desire not to aid enemy defensive efforts). Weaponeering issues to consider are not only collateral damage estimates, but also penetration, building composition, and changes to airspace controls due to high trajectory artillery fires. The FST is an integral component in planning offensive, defensive, and on-call fires and their associated communication, target identification, and control issues.

***Time.*** Despite the deceptive presence of roads and the traditional fast pace of life associated with urban areas, combat operations in built-up areas have a slower pace and operating tempo than those in other environments. As the level of threat increases, so does the need for security, which slows down movement; bounding overwatch is inherently slower than traveling overwatch. Clearing and searching multiple buildings, rooms, garages, yards, or alleys is slow even without the presence of a defending enemy. The mere physical exertion and stress associated with urban combat quickly fatigues and slows company personnel. Commanders must plan accordingly to mitigate these factors and to maintain relative momentum and speed over the enemy, who must also deal with the same problems. Slowdowns are mitigated by keeping plans simple: preplanning resupply, rotating the main effort frequently, and maintaining and using a reserve.

***Civil Considerations.*** When conducting operations in urban environments, contact with some portion of the populace will occur. In stability and similar operations, contact with the

populace is desired and sought. In these operations, civilian considerations, such as legitimate governance or quality of life, become part of the commander's mission. In conflicts of higher intensity, contact with the population is likely to come in the form of displaced persons or refugees. Populations may be friendly, neutral, or threat. The population's attitude toward the company may change from day to day or hour to hour based on conditions. Local conditions trump higher level conditions, especially with relation to threat of violence and status of critical infrastructure. Infantry company commanders must plan to encounter civilians on the battlefield and remain flexible, using combat power accordingly. Commanders must provide a plan and specific guidance to company personnel regarding civilians.

### **Offense Considerations**

In the attack, the company commander focuses planning on how to get the main effort to the decisive point. Actions on the objective often splinter into small unit engagements when intent and purpose provide the uniformity needed for what becomes a squad fight. The urban environment is no different. Committing to offensive operations in an urban environment result from situations in which the area offers the following:

- *Tactical advantage.* Road, railway, seaport, and airport infrastructure increases friendly mobility and the opportunity to deny freedom of movement to the enemy.
- *Political advantage.* The possession of the urban area itself represents an information victory or might increase the legitimacy of the HN government.
- *Economic advantage.* Perhaps the designated urban area contains an important banking center or a key industry that, if denied to the enemy, directly impacts their ability to wage war.
- *Potential threat to further operations.* A potential threat, such as the enemy presence in the urban area, represents too great a threat to bypass.

Maneuver warfare finds some of its greatest applicability in the urban environment when limited resources coupled with unit isolation place a premium on leadership, task and purpose, and commander's intent. The use of attachments and enablers, such as combat engineers, medical augmentation, and translators, are critical.

### **Defense Considerations**

The general considerations for establishing the defense in an urban environment are no different from those covered in Chapter 8. The urban environment favors the defender, especially a defender who possesses the time to prepare and intimately knows the terrain being defended. The reasons an infantry company may defend in an urban environment are—

- *Tactical advantage.* Retaining an urban area may allow friendly forces to control key avenues of approach, block movement, or threaten the enemy's flank or rear if bypassed. Further, continuing to hold the interconnected systems that comprise an urban area with important rail and road networks increases friendly mobility and the opportunity to deny the enemy's freedom of movement.
- *Deny the enemy an important strategic or political objective.* Even though any urban area may lack tactical importance, it may possess important political, psychological, cultural,

and national morale factors that are worth denying the enemy or retaining for friendly purposes.

- *Retain economic capacity.* An urban area may possess key industry, port, finance, and other wealth-related capacity that is important to retain and ensure is interconnected via surface LOCs to other urban areas.
- *Economy of force.* Since the urban area favors the defender who can effectively engage a numerically superior attacker, a defense in an urban environment can free friendly forces for offensive action elsewhere. Similarly, by forcing the enemy to commit large amounts of resources to an assault in an urban environment, the enemy must weaken forces elsewhere, creating opportunities for friendly action.
- *Logistics.* Cities often form logistical hubs due to the presence of seaport, rail, and air facilities. These hubs must be interconnected via spokes to other logistical hubs to ensure the ability of the population to sustain standards above poverty levels. If the population can sustain themselves through normal economic activity, it reduces requirements for HA missions by friendly forces.
- *Population and Resource Control.* A unit will find itself overwhelmed quickly while trying to defend an urban location with an unmanaged population. Commanders must plan to keep civilians out of danger without threatening their way of life or livelihood.

### **Patrol Considerations**

Patrolling in the urban environment accomplishes all the tasks discussed in Chapter 9 in addition to supporting the intelligence collection plan. Whether conducting patrols in a peacekeeping operation or conducting a reconnaissance on a prepared enemy position, the company's patrol plan in the urban environment faces the same challenges present in all urban operations—command and control and movement. In the case of patrolling, company commanders must determine how the company maintains communications with its dismounted or mounted patrols and how it moves to support those patrols in both routine and quick reaction force situations.

Regardless of the level of conflict in which the company is participating, patrols are likely to encounter the local population. In many operations, the entire purpose of the patrol is to make such contact. It is important that patrols leave with detailed, specific instructions on how to deal with friendly, neutral, and threat networks. A patrol may not have trained civil affairs Marines attached to conduct civil engagements with the population. The commander develops a civil engagement plan that is followed by all patrols. The civil engagement plan reduces friction with the population and ensures Marines do not make promises they cannot keep. All engagements with the population and observations of the civil environment are monitored and recorded through the civil information management procedures.

Company commanders make difficult patrol plan decisions about how, when, and if to support patrols with the use of a reserve. In stability operations, and similar environments, committing a reserve to take advantage of a contact or discovery made by a patrol or to extricate a patrol from an enemy threat beyond its ability is a matter of course. However, at the higher end of armed conflict, that may not always be the case. Regardless, if committing the reserve in support of patrols is part of the patrol plan, then such issues as urban movement, command and control, CASEVAC, and linkup procedures must receive the attention of the company planners.



The urban environment already challenges radio communications within the company. This problem increases considerably with the use of dismounted patrols moving any appreciable distance from the company AO. Company commanders must consider the ways in which they can establish continuous communications coverage, such as by conducting a communications survey as part of patrol route planning, requesting additional communication assets, or bulking up patrols with additional personnel to establish retransmission points.

## **MOUNTAIN WARFARE**

Major mountain ranges are found across the world in desert, jungle, and cold climate areas. Traditional offensive and defensive operations in the mountains focus on controlling heights and passes, since mountains present an obstacle to mobility. Even when conducting other tactical operations, the focus on control of local heights and passes does not change significantly. Infantry company commanders operating in mountainous environments must expect significant limitations on operations; specifically, the impact on the company and its equipment of severe environmental conditions and the extraordinary challenges to ground mobility.

### **Mountain Considerations**

The complex, compartmentalized nature of mountainous terrain changes the fundamental nature of tasks, techniques, and procedures across all seven of the warfighting functions. Units and personnel may require specialized training in such skills as military mountaineering, snow mobility, and appropriate field craft. Mountain considerations can also be thought of in terms of METT-T and civil considerations.

***Mission.*** When conducting problem framing, infantry company commanders must remember that the mountain environment not only slows movement, but also increases the difficulty of providing normal levels of support and conducting simple tasks: patrolling becomes more support intensive; the nature of the terrain significantly influences patrol route selection and effectiveness; and the altitude and the nature of airflow in the mountains may preclude UAS support. On the other hand, due to limits on mobility and canalization caused by terrain, such items as avenues of approach and key terrain become easier to analyze than in environments that are more open.

Since terrain limits VHF [very high frequency] communications, infantry companies will rely on HF [high frequency] and satellite communications assets that drive a training requirement for the company commander's consideration. Increased use of retransmission sites, HF, and satellite communications will mitigate communication difficulties, but will also drive greater force protection requirements and create a need for more communication resources.

Movement becomes more difficult in a mountainous environment, but it does not become impossible. Similar to other complex terrain, mountain movement is methodical, well thought out in advance, well supported, and slower. Since the mountains penalize all movement equally, infantry company commanders can maintain tempo and momentum dominance over the enemy but must adjust their timeline expectations and fully appreciate the support in terms of resources now associated with even simple movements. Due to limited mobility corridors and canalization,

company commanders consider the ability of units to mass combat power if they are widely spread out.

The amount of time the company must prepare for mountain operations is an important planning consideration. Company commanders tailor operational expectations accordingly. An infantry company deploying directly into a high-altitude environment, for example, will suffer from failing to conduct the preferred methods of gradual high-altitude acclimatization. In such a case, company commanders would modify their operational expectations because company personnel would initially be ineffective due to oxygen depletion and potential altitude sicknesses.

**Enemy.** The enemy faces the same issues as the infantry company when operating in mountainous environments. Regardless of whether enemies are natural mountain warriors or not, they must resolve and mitigate the limitations of mountain warfare in the same manner as the infantry company. They are just as likely to seek the easiest paths of movement and to balk at and require technical resources to climb cliff faces. In determining likely enemy COAs, the company commander considers the enemy's effectiveness in dealing with mountainous environments and their capabilities, such as training and equipment necessary for cliff assaults. As in all operations, the company commander strives to be more effective at these same tasks than the enemy to seize or maintain the initiative and dictate tempo.

**Terrain and Weather.** Infantry companies operating in the mountains prepare for increased casualties. Complex terrain always generates additional casualties, especially lower-body musculoskeletal injuries. At altitudes above 8,000 feet, company commanders can expect some altitude-related illnesses among the company's personnel. If not considered in planning, the combination of these factors plus casualties occurring as part of combat operations can rapidly overwhelm medical response and CASEVAC capacity, especially when the mountain environment already reduces the effectiveness of that capacity. Training, clothing, and proper resources can mitigate these terrain and climate-related issues.

**Troops and Support Available.** Company commanders who operate in mountain environments seek specialized and general training for their company and additional equipment and personnel resources. Though task organization of the company remains largely unchanged, commanders consider the employment of critical skills and enablers. For example, company commanders should ensure that all company subelements include trained mountain leaders and skill specialties, such as pack animals (e.g., donkeys) or assault climbers, to support specific company functions.


The terrain, a relatively small force-to-space ratio, and generally uninhabited nature of the mountainous environment dictates decentralized fire support techniques. Companies must train to develop the ability to control both indirect and direct fires in terrain where the firing agency, target, and observer are at different altitudes. Decentralization applies to capabilities that generate nonlethal effects in the same manner. Due to the nature of mountainous terrain, a relatively small area can contain numerous population groups who require specifically tailored information messages.

Motor vehicles can operate in mountainous environments but are usually restricted to specific areas and routes. Even specialized vehicles, such as off-road vehicles, experience such terrain limitations as slope and snow composition. Vehicles operating at the extremes of their operating parameters are more likely to break down, requiring greater preventive maintenance and increased resources.

The higher the altitude at which the infantry company operates, the greater the limitations on some forms of aviation support, specifically assault support in terms of lift capacity and access. The ability of fixed-wing aircraft to work at high altitudes helps offset this loss, but company commanders need to consider and request the extra personnel and training resources needed to make effective use of fixed-wing support as aerial delivery.

A dismounted infantry company operating in the mountains will automatically consume greater quantities of such expendables as food, water, and medical supplies. Adding to the burden of logistics in mountainous environments are restrictions imposed by the terrain and altitude that affect the means of resupply and movement. Company commanders mitigate these issues through prepositioning and stockpiling supplies; methodical and well-thought-out operations; use of pack animals (i.e., donkeys), porters, and other means of supply movement; and increased resources in terms of personnel, such as corpsmen and mechanics, to achieve higher levels of self-sufficiency.

**Time.** Overcoming the many obstacles and challenges in a mountain environment demands increased planning time. Moving troops and supplies, prestaging caches, and preparing routes all demand increased preparation time for any type of operation. When conducting movement, the planning assumption is that movement will be slow. Even if the company's inclusion of trained assault climbers opens mobility "possibilities," the existence of a new way to approach the enemy does not negate the slow, methodical nature of conducting that approach. Company commanders must, even if portions of the movement occur mounted, make accurate time-distance planning assessments when determining their own movement rates and those of the enemy (see Figure A-1).



**LEGEND**  
 Kph Kilometers per hour  
 TDF time-distance formula

**Figure A-1. Mountain Time-Distance Formula Chart.**

**Civil Considerations.** The complex and compartmentalized terrain of the mountains often results in numerous cultures grouped in a relatively small area. Since easy mobility

between the different groups is limited, populations tend to develop in different ways, particular to the land they occupy. Even when population groups in the mountains can be lumped into large population, tribal, or language groups, company commanders should not assume that these groups are therefore homogeneous. They possess extensive knowledge of local terrain, including routes that might not appear on maps. Civilians living in the mountains tend to cluster in valleys, near any arable land, and along mobility corridors. Civil information management procedures assist commanders in differentiating between various groups and capturing local knowledge.

### **Offense Considerations**

In a mountainous environment, the infantry company generally executes attacks and movements to contact because exploitation and pursuit remain exceptionally difficult due to terrain and altitude impacts on operations. Offensive operations avoid frontal attacks, seek surprise, try to place friendly forces on the flank or rear of enemy positions; they attempt, whenever possible, to attack downward from heights. Mountain warfare tends to center on terrain that supports mobility, such as passes and LOCs, and the terrain that controls that mobility, such as ridges, chokepoints, and high ground. Due to the methodical nature of operations dictated by mountain restrictions, infantry company commanders tend to seek objectives that are important for setting successful conditions for the next step of the battle. Other considerations include the following:

- Conduct operations in limited visibility to maximize surprise.
- Focus on mobility and survivability both in the assault and during consolidation and reorganization.
- Maintain friendly LOCs while denying freedom of movement to the enemy.
- Maintain a robust reconnaissance and security posture throughout the offensive action to protect friendly actions from discovery.
- Mitigate difficulties in concentrating combat power through centralized planning and decentralized small unit actions.

### **Defense Considerations**

Complex terrain favors the defender and the same applies in the mountainous environment. While an attacker seeks key and decisive terrain important to the next phase of the battle, the defender seeks to retain that terrain to deny it to the enemy and preserve it for use in taking the offense—the decisive method of war. Observation, fields of fire, ability to fortify, opportunity to stockpile supplies, and preparation of internal routes for the quick movement of troops within the defense all work to the defender's advantage. In the defense, infantry company commanders also consider the following:

- Using camouflage and concealment extensively to retain surprise.
- Conducting a careful analysis of the terrain to determine avenues of approach and guard against enemy use of impossible or unlikely routes.
- Conducting reconnaissance to prevent surprise while denying the enemy the ability to discover the nature, location, and strengths of the friendly defense.
- Determining the requirement for perimeter defenses to defend against an assault from any direction.
- Using delaying tactics to disrupt the attacker.
- Developing and utilizing routes, rehearsals, and mobility resources.

## **Patrol Considerations**

While the formations and fundamentals of patrolling do not significantly change in a mountainous environment, additional planning and supervision by company commanders will ensure that the task and purpose of the patrolling plan is met while the effects of terrain, weather, and altitude are mitigated. When conducting stability or defensive operations, it is likely that company commanders will make increased use of OP/LP or mountain pickets to overwatch avenues of approach, dead space, and critical pieces of terrain within the defense. The patrolling and reconnaissance plan should integrate these types of positions to shorten the length and ease the difficulty of patrol routes; to provide overwatch of patrols; and to provide temporary patrol bases for FP, supply, and emergencies. In addition, leaders must make the following considerations:

- Due to the inherent risks of inclement weather, it is necessary that the commander possesses both a meticulously planned extract and an alternative sustainment plan, such as identifying food and water sources along patrol routes.
- The company's patrol plan includes detailed, rehearsed, and properly resourced secondary and tertiary communications plans to mitigate the effects that mountainous terrain will have on all communications assets.
- Patrols receive necessary fire control augmentation in the form of equipment and personnel to allow fire control at the lowest level possible.

## **DESERT WARFARE**

Deserts or arid environments make up a larger portion of the world's various climates than any other, making it very likely that infantry companies will deploy into desert environments. As the term arid suggests, deserts are defined by their lack of water and moisture and not by their temperatures, which can vary (sometimes within a matter of hours) from extreme cold to extreme heat. Deserts are generally open, sometimes rugged, terrain that demands mobility. From the beginning of warfare, the lack of restricted terrain in the desert has favored horse mounted over foot soldiers and armor over infantry. Infantry company commanders expecting to operate in the desert must plan and train for the impact of dry, arid, rugged, and dusty conditions on personnel, equipment, and vehicles.

### **Desert Considerations**

From the sweeping operations of Bedouin tribesman in World War I to the North African tank battles of World War II and the modern mechanized warfare of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, the open terrain of the desert is ideal for mobile maneuver warfare between opposing conventional forces. It is far less suitable for irregular warfare, as it offers no real permanent sanctuary. The successes that desert-based insurgencies have achieved have been against static enemies who, for a variety of reasons, largely ceded the desert terrain to the insurgents. Any force capable and confident enough to journey into the desert effectively either forces battle or drives smaller enemy threats into the population centers to seek shelter there. Commanders must consider METT-T and civil considerations when planning desert operations.

**Mission.** Infantry companies participate in major offensive and defensive operations as a maneuver element for the parent battalion. In irregular warfare, companies will more frequently

act semi-independently. When conducting problem framing, infantry company commanders must first consider mobility issues. First, the type of vehicles provided to companies influence the capabilities and survivability tactics the company commander can choose. Second, the type of vehicle and the nature of the desert environment affects mobility. Deserts can contain wadis, deep sand, salt marshes, and similar features that can quickly bog down wheeled and tracked vehicles. When addressing various mission profiles in offensive, defensive, and stability operations, company commanders next consider environmental force protection for the company's personnel (e.g., water, food, and shade) and maintenance support for vehicles (e.g., as parts, fuel, and recovery).

The relatively open nature of the desert, the advantages provided by vehicular and aerial mobility, and the ability to employ weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges offer opportunities and challenges for defender and attacker alike. Attackers possess superior initiative while defenders benefit from a mobile defense with its inherent chances for offensive action. Company commanders operating in the desert must ensure that subordinates are thoroughly capable of conducting both aided and unaided land navigation across large and featureless areas. Formations for movement require flexibility and the ability to rapidly respond to contact to the front and flanks.

The more static the operational stance of the infantry company, the easier the support considerations. Stability operations with significant, complex, and mature logistical nets ease the company commander's burdens though such infrastructure carries the risk of self-imposed paralysis and lack of aggression. Conversely, the infantry company in the attack in the deep desert must bring its support with it, often over considerable distances. In desert warfare, the defender tends to fall back on supply sources while the attacker continues to move away from them. While vehicles increase the number of resources the company can haul, there is a limit to their haul capacity. Also, the mere presence of vehicles adds considerable limitations in terms of maintenance and fuel.

Reconnaissance remains important to the company commander in the desert as elsewhere. However, without dominating terrain features from which to achieve observation points, company commanders must use aggressive patrolling for both reconnaissance and security purposes as well as aerial platforms and imagery to see the enemy in depth.

Given the chaos possible with multiple maneuvering units, the dust and obscurity associated with desert movement, and the lack of intervening terrain that might limit the effects of weapons, friendly fire is of even greater concern on the desert battlefield. Accurate location reporting, schemes of maneuver that limit the chances of friendly fire, and effective methods of identifying friendly vehicles and troops are important.

**Enemy.** An enemy capable of matching the technical and tactical prowess of the infantry company in the open desert is a dangerous foe. Such an enemy is likely to make extensive use of antitank weapons, obstacles, and fire support in conjunction with maneuver. They are likely to possess counterbattery fire capabilities that will require not only frequent displacement of friendly artillery, but also more detailed planning and coordination to maintain friendly fire support during displacement. Less robust enemy forces will likely use the desert as a mobility

corridor and temporary sanctuary. They will seek to mass unexpectedly to achieve local combat superiority, create decisive effects, and disperse using their relatively unobservable routes as a form of concealment.

***Terrain and Weather.*** Heat and arid environments can adversely affect all sorts of equipment, but communications and computer equipment are particularly vulnerable and must be guarded and maintained accordingly. While the desert is generally open terrain, it is rarely as trackless and featureless as it appears. Company commanders must consider the natural and manmade features of the desert.

Natural desert features can make visibility and determining distance challenging. Distances in the desert are deceptive due to the lack of terrain features available to provide scale, which affects combat reporting and control of supporting arms. Company commanders must consider distance in terms of how far they can travel from reliable combat logistic support. Finally, infantry companies must appreciate that desert distances and openness enable the employment of weapon systems at their maximum effective ranges.

Dust clouds, the reflection of sunlight off vehicles, and daylight use of headlights can make friendly forces visible for vast distances. Night movement, though concealing, carries with it its own risks, such as separated vehicles due to darkness and dust.

Such desert features as wadis, oases, sand dunes, salt marshes, rocks, and flooding during rainy seasons all impact desert operations. All can contain considerable tactical value, such as an oasis as a population center and water source or a flooded salt marsh protecting a flank. Many of these features shift based on weather patterns and do not appear on maps. Company commanders should not discount the presence of microterrain. While not on a map and maybe not visible at a distance, the presence of a ten-foot sand dune can conceal a friendly or an enemy vehicle.

Manmade terrain features in the desert consist of improved water sources, such as canals or wells, roads, airfields, or population centers that create tactical and support considerations in what might have otherwise been open desert.

***Troops and Support Available.*** When conducting desert operations that favor mobility, company commanders do not discount the requirement for dismounted infantry. Dismounted infantry, when properly supported by antiarmor weapons, survivable fortifications, obstacles, and fire support, are the force of choice for strong point operations and the defense of logistical nodes or fixed sites. In the offense, dismounted infantry is critical to armor survivability in the close assault and can often precede armor to infiltrate and weaken enemy defenses. Company teams also receive greater combat engineer support as the need is greater in desert operations due to heavy demands for mobility, countermobility, and survivability.

Supporting arms in the desert greatly assist the infantry company in creating the suppressive effects necessary to safely enter and transit through enemy weapon system threat rings that, in the open desert, can reach into the thousands of meters. Company commanders plan their operations carefully to avoid outrunning indirect fires.



Aviation in the desert environment greatly aids company reconnaissance efforts and fire plans. Due to the inability of ground-based observers to see into the depth of enemy positions, aviation assets aid reconnaissance and, with the use of FAC (airborne) capabilities, infantry companies can enhance the effectiveness of their company fire plans. Close air support in its different roles can aid fire support gaps created by displacing artillery or mortar assets. Used creatively, assault support assets can add flexibility and depth to friendly plans. They can conduct limited emergency resupplies and create supply caches in support of offensive operations. With the ability to lift troops, light vehicles, and even artillery, assault support can insert friendly forces into the rear area of the enemy to create significant blocking positions.

**Time.** Company commanders carefully consider time and speed in the desert, especially as they relate to supporting arms. In the attack, the company commander must consider the speed of maneuver elements to avoid driving into supporting fires or lifting supporting fires too soon. The mobile nature of desert warfare generally leads to a significantly higher operating tempo than that found in other environments. The result is the risk of fatigue in both personnel and vehicles. Limited only by supply and enemy action, units can conduct continuous operations. Company commanders must consider rest plans, incorporating them into operations in the same manner as such actions as refueling, resupply, and security halts.

**Civil Considerations.** While the desert is not empty of population, those peoples who live in the desert tend to be nomadic. Like mountain environments, permanent populations tend to cluster around terrain favorable to life, such as oases, trade routes, seasonal water sources, or narrow agricultural strips on rivers. Since the nature of desert warfare often lends tactical value to population centers and their associated terrain, such as airfields or roads, infantry companies should expect to encounter civilians across all types of operations.

### **Offense Considerations**

The focus of offensive action, like other environments, is the destruction of the enemy or the bending of their will. As is the case in many harsh environments where support is a constant issue, the goal of the infantry company in offensive combat frequently centers on seizing objectives that enable further offensive action, such as airfields, communication and logistical nodes, and water sources.

During an offensive operation in the desert, friendly forces become further and further removed from their supply bases and, therefore, vulnerable to enemy counterattacks and actions against friendly supply lines. When planning offensive actions as part of a battalion or when conducting semi-independent operations, company commanders must plan to overcome an early culmination point in the attack.

The company must be able to conduct local breaches of protective obstacles down to the platoon level. In addition, the company may serve as the battalion's breaching element, providing security for an obstacle-clearing detachment that is creating a breach in the enemy's defense.

Because of the open nature of desert terrain and the ability for weapon systems to engage at their maximum ranges, suppression of enemy defenses as friendly maneuver closes in on them is critical. Establishing direct fire suppression alone risks a survivability fight in which friendly

forces opposing dug-in, well-equipped enemy forces are likely to lose. The fire support plan for the company must consider suppression, destruction criteria, and similar considerations that allow the infantry company to maneuver in relative safety to the objective and assault it.

### **Defense Considerations**

When assigned a defensive mission not associated with terrain or fixed sites, the company commander makes maximum use of depth and mobility to attrit, disrupt, and draw the enemy deep into their sector before executing decisive offensive actions, such as counterattacks, to destroy them. When assigned defensive tasks that orient on terrain or if in a dismounted role, company commanders rely on extensive use of such tactics as obstacles, fire support, and antitank weapons to disrupt the enemy in the security area and destroy them in a series of EAs. Whether part of a battalion defense or conducting their own operations, company commanders make maximum use of obstacles and any existing terrain to limit the maneuver options of the enemy.

### **Patrol Considerations**

Though UAS may be available, company commanders should continue to plan much of their reconnaissance efforts based on their own, organic patrol capability. Since the desert lacks terrain from which to observe the enemy, friendly patrolling is aggressive. Patrols may often combine mounted and dismounted methods to get close enough to enemy positions to conduct reconnaissance without risking the destruction of friendly vehicles. Due to the same survivability concerns, company commanders should consider patrolling at night and in conditions of limited visibility.

## **JUNGLE WARFARE**

The jungle environment occurs on or near the equator. Large swaths of this environment lie in the littorals and support large populations throughout Africa, Central and South America, Indonesia, and northern Australia, and in southern and southeast Asia. Because of their location along the littorals and near very large population centers, jungles remain very likely environments in which Marine Corps forces will continue to operate.

### **Jungle Considerations**

Jungles generally consist of thick foliage and persistent heat and, though varying by location, all jungles receive significant rainfall. Jungles along the equator experience rainfall throughout the year; whereas, jungles further from the equator, such as those in southeast Asia, have distinct monsoon and dry seasons. Combat in the jungle consists of long periods of looking for the enemy followed by short periods of violent, close combat. The jungle's limitations on maneuver, speed, and visibility significantly influence combat in this environment. Infantry companies find themselves in jungles when—

- Protecting important economic, political, and psychological assets requires engaging a jungle based enemy force.
- Denying the jungle as an enemy sanctuary or means of cover and concealed movement.
- Using the jungle as a concealed route to approach and engage an enemy force.

Commanders must consider METT-T and civil considerations when planning jungle operations.

**Mission.** Whether operating semi-independently or in conjunction with a parent battalion, most company operations occur without physically tying into units on the flanks or to the rear due to the nature of the jungle environment. Regardless of employment methodology, the primary issue facing the infantry company commander in the jungle is either finding the enemy or avoiding being found by the enemy.

Because of the limited visibility and restrictive terrain, most jungle fighting takes place at close range. Whether defending or attacking when facing a conventional, insurgent, or asymmetrical foe, finding the enemy is often the task and purpose of the infantry company. Actual movement is slow and units disperse to find the enemy. Mission type orders, immediate action drills, and “marching to the sound of the guns” allow units to rapidly concentrate when contact occurs. Because the jungle limits the use of vehicles and the effectiveness of heavy weapons, the tactical face of the infantry company often comes to resemble that of the enemy—light infantry relying on small arms, mortars, and artillery. The infantry company commander can use CAS to ease fire support limitations and assault support aircraft to add significant mobility.

As in all preparations for environments containing climatic extremes, healthy and fit company personnel provide a baseline for deployment to the jungle—such fitness includes swimming skills. Company commanders should develop jungle and field craft skills within a select cadre of personnel in case preparation time for the company is short. When possible, company commanders seek to acclimatize the company to the new environment before committing them to operations. The keys to preparation for the jungle environment remain the same as elsewhere: develop aggressive patrolling and field craft skills; individual and unit discipline; solid SOPs continually adapted and improved upon; and tough, focused leadership.

**Enemy.** Most potential enemies in the jungle, regardless of organization, purpose, and equipment, consist of light infantry augmented with mortars and, perhaps, artillery. The enemy operating in the jungle faces the same challenges as friendly forces do. They seek to camouflage their activities and use infiltration and breaching operations in the attack.

The enemy will exploit close jungle contact due to limited visibility to mitigate the effects of US supporting arms. By remaining within hand grenade range of friendly forces, the enemy seeks to create a situation in which the use of supporting arms will likely endanger Marine Corps forces as well. Regardless of the enemy’s combat power, they will make every effort to use the jungle to their advantage, to include infiltration vice attacking into possible friendly strengths. Enemy forces will use surprise, especially those enemy forces for whom meeting the infantry company on equal terms is not possible. Enemy forces will choose to remain dispersed, mass to conduct raids or ambushes as it suits them, and then disperse again.

**Terrain and Weather.** The jungle environment contains many different types of landscapes, including dense forest, swamps, savannahs, bamboo thickets, plantations, and other forms of vegetation. Other considerations of the jungle terrain and weather are observation, moisture, disease, and navigation.

Traditional definitions of key terrain, such as high ground, do not possess the same importance in the jungle due to thick vegetation precluding observation and fire. Terrain features that support mobility and resupply, such as roads, rivers and streams, LZs, clear firing positions, and fording sites, are likely key terrain in the jungle fight.

Line of sight and observation distances are minimal in the jungle. Regarding visibility, night in jungle regions is roughly 12 hours long. Coupled with the density of jungle canopies in primary jungle, nights are extremely dark. Company commanders integrate NVD use to take advantage of limited visibility.

Jungle climates are characterized by high temperatures, high humidity, and the potential for heavy rain throughout the year. All three seriously affect company personnel, equipment, weapons, vehicles, maintenance, and tactics. Company commanders must plan methods to keep personnel, weapons, and equipment dry, such as frequent changes in clothing and construction of survivable shelters above ground. Since much of the technology, such as radios and individual laser sights, that increase the lethality of the infantry company are vulnerable to moisture, the company prepares and trains to operate without them.

Jungles contain various wildlife that may be harmful to company personnel; however, the chances of being injured are remote, especially if the company is trained on and remains disciplined about basic field craft and precautions, such as looking before sitting or checking boots before wearing. A larger and more significant menace to the company is insect-carried, waterborne, and fungal diseases as well as the threat of heat-related illnesses. Preventive medicine, field craft discipline, and the availability of potable water demand the attention of company leadership when conducting operations.

Navigating through the jungle environment is challenging even for the most proficient land navigator and frequently requires advanced techniques, such as offsets, terrain association in limited visibility, and “hand-railing” ridgelines and contours. The ability to use electronic assistance, such as GPS, is frequently limited or blocked altogether by the thick jungle canopy that prevents satellite reception.

***Troops and Support Available.*** The primary jungle weapons of the infantry company are their small arms and mortars, since artillery can be difficult to employ effectively in the jungle environment. There may be an insufficient number of clearings available to position artillery units and the jungle canopy provides natural cover for enemy forces, diminishing the effectiveness of artillery fires. Assault support aircraft assets can be of assistance in positioning and resupplying indirect fire assets and can provide observation of fires. However, the jungle can provide covered avenues of approach for the enemy to attack indirect firing positions with small arms, which is why commanders use electromagnetic support assets to detect and find enemy elements in jungle environments.

The company commander considers organizing personnel who usually employ heavy weapons, such as antitank missiles or HMGs (largely ineffective in the close jungle fight), as additional infantry maneuver elements. Since the techniques by which an infantry company organizes itself and conducts movement in the jungle environment can mean the difference between success and

failure, commanders must consider the following when planning to use any movement technique:

- Centralized control of direction and task.
- Ability to rapidly deploy to maneuver or reinforce.
- Ability to ease movement by dispersing along different, if parallel routes.
- Maintaining 360-degree security during movement and halts.
- Multiple and redundant navigational aids.
- Ability to transition between different formations at danger areas.

Due to limited visibility and tricks of sound in foliage, fire support is difficult to observe and adjust. Depending on the nature of the jungle, the ability to fire through the canopy can make indirect fire support questionable. Company mortars must possess overhead clearance, in all probable firing directions. Given the propensity of the enemy to attempt to get close enough to friendly positions to render fires ineffective, fires must be accurate and adjusted out and then toward friendly positions. Friendly defensive positions must also be survivable with overhead cover.

The flexibility, responsiveness, loiter time, and ability to identify friendly positions and signals, makes assault support aircraft an ideal asset to make up for fire support gaps and lack of infantry heavy weapons. These benefits to the company commander's combat power must be weighed against the survivability of these aircraft against enemy small arms. Assault support aircraft play an integral role in troop lift and resupply, both of which can add significant mobility to friendly forces.

Aerial resupply is the major way of supplying infantry companies and conducting CASEVACs in the jungle environment, even when operating in relatively proximity to a battalion HQ. While operating in a light infantry environment in some ways eases the resupply burden, the lack of an extensive all-weather transportation network in many jungle areas makes the logistic mission more difficult.

Most radios, computers, and similar data systems are extremely vulnerable to the moisture prevalent in a jungle environment. Companies must consider ways to protect these assets and be prepared to fight without them. In jungle environments, weapons will quickly rust. In addition, optical, sensor, laser sighting systems, and other weapon augmentation will be vulnerable to the continuous wet environment to which they are exposed. Maintenance on these systems is continuous and the company must be prepared to fight without them.

**Time.** Jungle movement, even if aided by aerial troop lift, is slow. When planning on how to use available time, company commanders must make considerable allowances for movement and security. This may leave less time for planning and preparation.

**Civil Considerations.** As with other challenging environments, infantry companies are not likely to encounter civilians deep in the primary jungle. They may encounter plantations and agricultural cultivation as they approach population centers. If the population is the company's center of gravity, then the company's operations in the jungle will be a function of the

requirement to protect the population by challenging the enemy's ability to move and seek sanctuary in the jungle.

### **Offense Considerations**

While the added mobility and firepower of CAS and assault support can dramatically increase the overall tempo of jungle operations—the requirement to find the enemy as a precursor to attacking them remains. When fighting in the jungle, orientation is on the enemy rather than on terrain. Reconnaissance remains paramount. Once the enemy is found, they must be destroyed or they will have to be found again.

The difficulties of locating the enemy, even a heavily armed conventional enemy, in the jungle should not be underestimated. Even if the general location of the enemy is known, such as a sanctuary in a valley, the nature of jungle terrain and vegetation foil aerial imagery and direct observation and can result in the details of the location remaining hidden until contact is made.

Successful attacks in the jungle combine surprise, dispersion, and the ability to rapidly concentrate when contact occurs. Because seeing and engaging the enemy at distances more than 50 meters away are rare, usual tactics, such as emplacing SBF positions or using refined artillery preparations, are ineffective. So, even when reconnaissance reveals the position of the enemy and uncovers some detail about their position, prudence still dictates that the company conduct a dispersed approach march and expect that the opening moments of contact will resemble a meeting engagement. Once contact is made, the company closes from different directions, massing combat power while offering mutual support among the different elements.

Since the jungle is largely a light infantry fight, infantry companies should actively employ the classic tactics available to the rifleman in restricted terrain—infiltration, rear area harassment, ambushes, aggressive use of surprise, and periods of limited visibility.

### **Defense Considerations**

The infantry company in the defense uses extensive camouflage of its positions, designs its positions to trap the enemy in prepared fields of fire, and conducts aggressive security operations to disrupt and delay the enemy's attack.

Since uncertainty and surprise are an attacker's greatest enemies in the jungle, company commanders plan their defenses to increase those factors. Simultaneously, since the jungle limits friendly observation while providing the attacker many different avenues of approach, the infantry company plans for all-around defense, even when defending as part of a larger battalion position. Within the defensive position, routes take advantage of cover and concealment, while resupply, preparations, and other housekeeping chores take place during periods of limited visibility. A small, centrally located reserve enables the company commander to react to penetrations of the defense or counterattack opportunities. The reserve must rehearse day and night movement throughout the defensive position.

The jungle's requirements for individual position and unit camouflage are paramount. Since most engagements are at close range and relatively unexpected, good use of camouflage provides the company a critical advantage in the opening moments of contact with the attacker. Bunkers

and positions are built low to the ground to make them difficult to see and decrease the ability of the attacker to engage them effectively. Vegetation may be cleared below the waist to provide fields of fire for small arms and principal directions of fire for machine guns, while hiding those measures from a standing enemy.

### **Patrol Considerations**

Expertise in field craft characterizes patrolling in the jungle. Most combat in the jungle is short, intense, and unexpected. The force that wins the jungle fight possesses the discipline to move without being seen; detect without being detected; react without causing a reaction; and, when necessary, act swiftly and violently at a place of its choosing. Infantry company commanders must prepare their companies to be that force.

In planning patrol routes, company commanders consider the slow and often exhausting demands of jungle movement, the ability to support patrols requiring assistance or extraction, and the ability of the patrols to maintain communication. As in other demanding environments, depending on the enemy situation and company resources, patrols might need to receive the task organization to self-extract. Different kinds of patrol techniques, such as satellite patrols from a central patrol base, offer a classic way of providing patrols with enough combat power and logistical resources to support themselves temporarily, while still being able to take advantage of small unit stealth and concealment.

Communications is difficult in the jungle environment, where heat, obstructions, and foliage can derail VHF assets and preclude radios that require clear lines of sight. Communication is critical so the patrol can contact supporting arms or conduct a CASEVAC. Company commanders consider measures, such as emplacing retransmission sites and using OP/LPs to assist in communications. Other measures might be maneuver based, such as sending out patrols that are large enough to set up temporary patrol bases. These bases maintain overall communications with the company while sending out smaller satellite patrols that only need to communicate with the patrol base.

# APPENDIX B

## TACTICAL TASKS

The MAGTF tactical tasks may be specified, implied, or essential (see Table B-1). They define actions commanders may take to accomplish their missions. In special circumstances, commanders may modify tasks to meet METT-T requirements. They must clearly state that they are departing from the standard meaning of these tasks. One way this can be done is by prefacing the modified task with the statement, “What I mean by [modified task] is . . .”

Tactical tasks are assigned based on capabilities. The GCE can execute all the MAGTF’s tactical tasks. The LCE can execute those tactical tasks essential for it to provide sustainment to the MAGTF. The ACE can execute many of the MAGTF’s tactical tasks, but it cannot secure, seize, retain, or occupy terrain without augmentation by the GCE. Weather and task duration may significantly affect the ACE’s ability to execute assigned tactical tasks.

The descriptions of tactical tasks that follow are for guided discussion only and are not official definitions of the terms in most cases. For the definitions, as applicable, see the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* and *USMC Dictionary*.

Table B-1. Tactical Tasks.		
Enemy-Oriented Tactical Tasks	Terrain-Oriented Tactical Tasks	Friendly-Oriented Tactical Tasks
ambush attack by fire block breach* bypass canalize contain* corrupt deceive defeat degrade deny destroy disrupt exploit feint fix influence* interdict isolate neutralize penetrate reconnoiter* support by fire suppress	breach* clear control* cordon* occupy* reconnoiter* retain secure* seize	Cover Disengage Displace Exfiltrate follow and assume follow and support Guard Protect Screen
	Population-Oriented Tactical Tasks	
	advise assess the population assist build/restore infrastructure contain* control* coordinate with civil authorities cordon*	enable civil authorities Exclude influence* occupy* reconnoiter* secure* Train transition to civil control
* Tactical tasks with multiple classifications and applications.		



## **ENEMY-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS**

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on generating effects against enemy forces.

### **Ambush**

A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy.

Note: An ambush is fundamentally a type of attack, enemy-oriented, and is planned and executed accordingly.

### **Attack by Fire**

Fires (direct and indirect) in the physical domains and/or through the information environment to engage the enemy from a distance to destroy, fix, neutralize, or suppress.

Note: Within the physical domains, an attack by fire closely resembles the task of support by fire. The chief difference is that one unit conducts the support by fire task to support another unit so it can maneuver against the enemy.

### **Block**

As a tactical task, a block denies the enemy access to an area or prevents the enemy's advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. It may be for a specified time. As an obstacle effect, a block integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or to prevent the enemy from passing through an engagement area.

Note: Block differs from the tactical task fix because a blocked enemy force can still move in another direction, it just cannot advance. A fixed enemy force cannot move.

### **Breach**

To break through or secure a passage through an obstacle. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

### **Bypass**

To maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force.

### **Canalize**

To restrict enemy movement to a narrow zone by the use of existing or reinforcing obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver.

**Contain**

To stop, hold, or surround the enemy forces or causes the enemy to center activity on a given front and prevents the withdrawal of any part of the enemy's forces for use elsewhere. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

Note: Whereas the tactical task fix prevents enemy movement, the tactical task contain allows for some enemy movement within the designated area.

**Corrupt**

To change, debase, or otherwise alter information from its original or correct form or version by intentionally introducing errors or alterations, thereby rendering it useless.

**Deceive**

To manipulate an enemy into believing and acting upon something that is not true for a selected period of time and/or at a particular location to create a friendly advantage.

**Defeat**

To disrupt or nullify the enemy commander's plan and overcomes their will to fight, thus making the enemy commander unwilling or unable to pursue the adopted course of action and yield to the friendly commander's will.

**Degrade**

To diminish the effectiveness or efficiency of an enemy's C2 systems, communications systems, and/or information collection efforts or means; lower the morale of an enemy unit; reduce a target's worth or value; and/or impair an enemy's decision-making capability.

**Deny**

To hinder or prevent the enemy from using terrain, space, personnel, supplies, facilities, and/or specific capabilities.

**Destroy**

To physically render an enemy force combat ineffective unless it can be reconstituted or render a target or capability so damaged that it can neither function as intended nor be restored to a useable condition.

Note: Defeat and destroy are not the same. Destruction of the enemy force usually leads to their defeat, but defeat does not necessarily require destruction.

**Disrupt**

A task or effect that employs or integrates fires and obstacles to break apart an enemy's formation and tempo, interrupts the enemy's timetable, or causes premature commitment or the piecemealing of enemy forces. In information, disrupt also entails preventing efficient interaction of enemy combat and combat support systems by inflicting damage over the short term to specific facets of the system's operation.

**Exploit**

To employ to the greatest possible advantage the success achieved in a military operation or enemy information that has come into friendly hands.

Note: Exploitation is an offensive operation following a successful attack that is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. It extends the initial success of the attack by preventing the enemy from disengaging, withdrawing, and reestablishing an effective defense.

**Feint**

Contact with the enemy to deceive them about the location or time of the actual main offensive action.

Note: Feint is the counterpart to the type of attack.

**Fix**

As a tactical task, to prevent the enemy from moving any part of their forces, either from a specific location or for a specific period of time, by holding or surrounding them to prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere. As a tactical obstacle effect, fix integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker within a specified area—normally an engagement area.

Note: Fixing an enemy force does not mean destroying it. However, the friendly force has to prevent the enemy from moving in any direction, which can be resource intensive.

**Influence**

To cause the enemy to behave in a manner favorable to friendly forces. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Interdict**

To divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.

**Isolate**

To seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent that enemy force from having contact with other enemy forces.

**Neutralize**

As a task, to render the enemy or the enemy's resources ineffective or unusable. As an effect of fires delivered, neutralize renders a target ineffective or unusable, which degrades the enemy's capability of accomplishing its mission.

**Penetrate**

To break through the enemy's defense and disrupt their defensive system.

Note: The tactical task penetrate is the counterpart to the form of offensive maneuver that is known as penetrate.

**Reconnoiter**

To obtain, by visual observation or other methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary. *See also terrain- and population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Support by Fire**

Movement to a position where the maneuver force can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force.

Note: Support by fire closely resembles the task of attack by fire. The difference is a unit conducting attack by fire only uses direct and indirect fires. A unit conducting support by fire uses direct and indirect fires to support the maneuver of another friendly force.

**Suppress**

The transient or temporary degradation of an opposing force or the performance of a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives.

**TERRAIN-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS**

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on achieving some sort of condition as it relates to terrain.

**Breach**

To break through or secure a passage through an obstacle. *See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Clear**

To remove enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with the unit's ability to accomplish its mission.

**Control**

To maintain physical influence by occupation or range of weapon systems over the activities or access in a defined area. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

Note: Control differs from the tactical task secure in that control prevents the movement of enemy ground forces through an area but does not require the complete clearance of enemy forces or the prevention of enemy fires into the specified area.

**Cordon**

To prevent an enemy unit's withdrawal from or reinforcement to a position. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Occupy**

To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other manmade or natural area without opposition and control the entire area. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Reconnoiter**

To secure data, by visual observation or other methods, about the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. *See also enemy- and population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Retain**

To occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure it is free of enemy occupation or use.

**Secure**

To gain possession of a position, terrain feature, piece of infrastructure, or civil asset, with or without force, and prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. The attacking force may or may not have to physically occupy the area. *See also population-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Seize**

To clear a designated area and gain control of it.

Note: The tactical task seize differs from occupy in that seizure occurs in the face of enemy opposition.

**FRIENDLY-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS**

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on supporting the actions of other friendly forces.

**Cover**

To conduct offensive and defensive actions independent of the main body to protect the covered force and develop the situation.

Note: It is the tactical task associated with the security operation cover.

**Disengage**

To break contact with the enemy and move to a point where the enemy cannot observe nor engage the unit by direct fire.

**Displace**

To leave one position to take another while remaining in contact with the enemy.

Note: Displace differs from the tactical task disengage in that units disengage to break contact with the enemy, while units displace to continue the mission or execute alternate missions.

**Exfiltrate**

To remove personnel or units from areas under enemy control by stealth.

**Follow and Assume**

A task in which a second committed force follows a force conducting an offensive operation and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attrited, or unable to continue.

Note: The follow-and-assume force is not a reserve but is prepared to execute all missions of the followed unit.

### **Follow and Support**

A task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation.

Note: The follow-and-support force is not a reserve but is a force committed to supporting the followed unit. The difference between follow and assume and follow and support is: the follow and assume force is prepared to take over the lead element's mission whereas the follow and support force acts to create the conditions necessary to allow the lead element to continue its success (such as destroying bypassed elements, blocking enemy movement of reinforcements, clearing obstacles, or controlling dislocated civilians).

### **Guard**

To protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information.

Note: It is the tactical task associated with the security operation guard.

### **Protect**

To prevent observation by, engagement with, or interference from an adversarial or enemy force, system, capability, or location.

### **Screen**

To observe, identify, and report information, and only fight in self-protection.

Note: It is the tactical task associated with the security operation screen.

## **POPULATION-ORIENTED TACTICAL TASKS**

The following tactical tasks focus friendly efforts on achieving some sort of condition as it relates to the population within the AO.

### **Advise**

To improve the individual and unit capabilities and capacities of host nation security forces through the development of personal and professional relationships between United States and host nation forces.

### **Assess the Population**

To evaluate the nature, situation, and attitudes of a designated population or elements of a population, inhabiting the area of operations.

**Assist**

To provide designated support or sustainment capabilities to host nation security forces to enable them to accomplish their objectives.

**Build/Restore Infrastructure**

To construct, rebuild, or repair local infrastructure to support the host nation and gain or maintain the cooperation of the local population.

**Contain**

To prevent or halt elements of a population or designated party from departing or projecting physical influence beyond a defined area. *See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Control**

To use physical control measures and information-related capabilities to influence elements of a population or designated actors to respond as desired. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Coordinate with Civil Authorities**

To interact with, maintain communication, and harmonize friendly military activities with those of other interorganizational agencies and coalition partners to achieve unity of effort.

**Cordon**

To temporarily prevent movement to or from a prescribed area such as a neighborhood, city block, series of buildings, or other feature. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Enable Civil Authorities**

To support or assist the host nation government and designated interorganizational agencies in providing effective governance.

**Exclude**

To prevent or halt elements of a population or designated party from entering or projecting physical influence into a defined area.

**Influence**

To persuade the local population, including potential and known adversaries, within the operational area to support, cooperate with, or at least accept the friendly force presence, and dissuade the local population from interfering with operations. *See also enemy-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Occupy**

To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other manmade or natural area without opposition and control the entire area. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Reconnoiter**

To obtain, by visual observation or other methods, information about civil considerations. *See also enemy- and terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Secure**

To gain possession of a position, terrain feature, piece of infrastructure, or civil asset, with or without force, and prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. *See also terrain-oriented tactical tasks.*

**Train**

To teach designated skills or behaviors to improve the individual and unit capabilities and capacities of host nation security forces.

**Transition to Civil Control**

The handover of civil government and security responsibilities from friendly force military authorities to legitimate civil authorities.



# GLOSSARY

## Section I. Acronyms and Abbreviations

AA	assembly area
AAR	after action review
AAV	assault amphibious vehicle
ACE	aviation combat element
AF	amphibious force
AFATDS	Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System
AI	area of influence
AO	area of operations
AOI	area of interest
ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
ATF	amphibious task force
ATGM	antitank guided missile
BAS	battalion aid station
BDA	battle damage assessment
BP	battle position
BHL	battle handover line
C2	command and control
C5ISRT	command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, targeting
CAAT	combined antiarmor team
CAS	close air support
CASEVAC	casualty evacuation
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
CCO	combat cargo officer
CI	counterintelligence
CLIC	company level intelligence cell
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
CO	commanding officer
COA	course of action
COC	combat operations center
COMMSTRAT	communication strategy and operations
CONOPS	concept of operations
COP	combat outpost
COT	commanding officer of troops
CP	command post
CRRC	combat rubber raiding craft

CS.....	combat support
CSS .....	combat service support
CSW .....	crew-served weapon
CTP .....	common tactical picture
D3A.....	decide, detect, deliver, and assess
DoD.....	Department of Defense
EA .....	engagement area
ECOA.....	enemy course of action
EFST .....	essential fire support task
EMS .....	electromagnetic spectrum
EOD .....	explosive ordnance disposal
EPW .....	enemy prisoner of war
EW .....	electromagnetic warfare
FAC.....	forward air controller
FFIR.....	friendly force information requirement
FHA.....	foreign humanitarian assistance
FO .....	forward observer
FOB.....	forward operating base
FP .....	force protection
FRAGO .....	fragmentary order
FSC .....	fire support coordinator
FSCC.....	fire support coordination center
FSCM.....	fire support coordination measure
FST.....	fire support team
GCE.....	ground combat element
HHQ.....	higher headquarters
HMG .....	heavy machine gun
HN.....	host nation
HNSF .....	host-nation security forces
HPT .....	high-payoff target
HQ.....	headquarters
HUMINT.....	human intelligence
HVT .....	high-value target
I&W .....	indications and warning
IED.....	improvised explosive device
IPB .....	intelligence preparation of the battlespace
IR.....	intelligence requirement
ISR .....	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JP.....	joint publication

JTAC .....	joint terminal air controller
KLE .....	key leader engagement
KOCSA .....	key terrain, observation, fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, and avenues of approach
LCAC .....	landing craft, air cushioned
LCE .....	logistics combat element
LCU .....	landing craft, utility
LOC .....	line of communication
LOGSTAT .....	logistics status report
LP .....	listening post
LZ .....	landing zone
MACO .....	marshalling area control officer
MAGTF .....	Marine air-ground task force
MBA .....	main battle area
MCDP .....	Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCPP .....	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCRP .....	Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP .....	Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP .....	Marine Corps warfighting publication
METT-T .....	mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available
MEU .....	Marine expeditionary unit
MILDEC .....	military deception
MISO .....	military information support operations
MOPP .....	mission-oriented protective posture
MOS .....	military occupational specialty
MTF .....	medical treatment facility
NAI .....	named area of interest
NCO .....	noncommissioned officer
NEO .....	noncombatant evacuation operations
NGO .....	nongovernmental organization
NSFS .....	naval surface fire support
NVD .....	night vision device
OPORD .....	operation order
OPSEC .....	operations security
OPT .....	operational planning team
PACE .....	primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency
PCC .....	precombat check
PCI .....	precombat inspection
PERMA .....	planning, embarkation, rehearsal, movement, and action
PIR .....	priority intelligence requirement

PMCS.....preventive maintenance checks and services  
 PMESII .....political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure  
 POL .....petroleum, oils, and lubricants  
 PZ.....pickup zone  
  
 RFA.....restrictive fire area  
 RIP .....relief in place  
 RM .....risk management  
 RO.....radio operator  
 ROE.....rules of engagement  
 RRP.....repair and replenishment point  
  
 SBF .....support by fire  
 SIGINT .....signals intelligence  
 SOM.....scheme of maneuver  
 SOP .....standing operating procedure  
 SOSRA.....suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, and assault  
 SPINS.....special instructions  
 STS.....ship-to-shore  
  
 TAD .....tactical air direction  
 TAI.....target area of interest  
 TCP .....traffic control point  
 TEO.....team embarkation officer  
 TOW ..... tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-command link guided missile  
 TRAP .....tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel  
 TRP .....target reference point  
 TTP .....tactics, techniques, and procedures  
  
 UAS.....unmanned aircraft system  
 UTM.....unit training management  
  
 WARNO .....warning order  
 WO.....watch officer  
  
 XO.....executive officer

# GLOSSARY

## Section II. Terms and Definitions

**assessment**—A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. (Part 1 of a 4-part definition.) (DoD Dictionary)

**advance guard**—Detachment sent ahead of the main force to ensure its uninterrupted advance; to protect the main body against surprise; to facilitate the advance by removing obstacles and repairing roads and bridges; and to cover the deployment of the main body if it is committed to action. (DoD Dictionary)

**air assault**—Operations in which air assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support), using the firepower, mobility, and total integration of assault support assets in their ground or air roles, maneuver on the battlefield under the control of the mission commander to provide mobility and firepower of the assigned mission. (USMC Dictionary)

**ambush**—A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. (USMC Dictionary)

**approach march**—Advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the enemy is imminent. Troops are fully or partially deployed. The approach march ends when ground contact with the enemy is made or when the attack position is occupied. (USMC Dictionary)

**attack**—An offensive action characterized by coordinated movement, supported by fire, conducted to defeat, destroy, or capture the enemy or seize and/or secure key terrain. (USMC Dictionary)

**battle damage assessment**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. Battle damage assessment estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations. (USMC Dictionary)

**battle position**—In ground operations, a defensive location oriented on an enemy avenue of approach from which a unit may defend. (USMC Dictionary)

**block**—To deny the enemy access to an area or prevent enemy advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach. It may be for a specified time. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (USMC Dictionary)

**bounding overwatch**—A movement technique used when contact with enemy forces is expected. The unit moves by bounds. One element is always halted in position to overwatch another element while it moves. The overwatching element is positioned to support the moving unit by fire or fire and movement. (USMC Dictionary)

**breach**—To break through or secure a passage through an obstacle. (USMC Dictionary)

**bypass**—To maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of advance. Previously unreported obstacles and bypassed enemy forces are reported to higher headquarters. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (USMC Dictionary)

**canalize**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) To restrict enemy movement to a narrow zone by the use of existing or reinforcing obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver. (USMC Dictionary)

**civil-military operations**—Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO**. (DoD Dictionary)

**clear**—To remove enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned zone, area, or location by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of enemy forces that could interfere with the unit's ability to accomplish its mission. (USMC Dictionary)

**combat service support**—The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of warfare. Also called **CSS**. (DoD Dictionary)

**command and control**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Command and control is one of the six warfighting functions. Also called **C2**. (USMC Dictionary)

**commander's critical information requirements**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Information regarding the enemy and friendly activities and the environment identified by the commander as critical to maintaining situational awareness, planning future activities, and facilitating timely decision making. The two subcategories are priority intelligence requirements and friendly force information requirements. Also called **CCIR**. (USMC Dictionary)

**contain**—To stop, hold, or surround the enemy forces or to cause the enemy to center activity on a given front and to prevent the withdrawal of any part of the enemy's forces for use elsewhere. (USMC Dictionary)

**control**—To maintain physical influence by occupation or range of weapon systems over the activities or access in a defined area. (USMC Dictionary)

**control point**—A position along a route of march at which men are stationed to give information and instructions for the regulation of supply or traffic. (DoD Dictionary)

**cordon**—To prevent withdrawal from or reinforcement to a position. (USMC Dictionary)

**counterattack**—Attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of the enemy's purpose in attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives. (USMC Dictionary)

**counterintelligence**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. (USMC Dictionary)

**countermobility operations**—The construction of obstacles and emplacement of minefields to delay, disrupt, and destroy the enemy by reinforcement of the terrain. (DoD Dictionary)

**course of action**—A scheme developed to accomplish a mission. (Part 2 of a 3-part definition.) Also called **COA**. (DoD Dictionary)

**cover**—A form of security operation whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. (Part 2 of a 4-part definition.) (USMC Dictionary)

**decisive action**—Any action the commander deems fundamental to achieving mission success. (USMC Dictionary)

**defeat**—To disrupt or nullify the enemy commander's plan and overcome the will to fight, thus making the enemy commander unwilling or unable to pursue the adopted course of action and yield to the friendly commander's will. (USMC Dictionary)

**defensive operations**—Operations conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable to offensive and stability operations. The three types of defensive operations are area, mobile, and retrograde. (USMC Dictionary)

**delaying operation**—An operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged. (DoD Dictionary)

**demonstration**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Operation designed to divert enemy attention, allowing the forces of a Marine air-ground task force to execute decisive action elsewhere. It is a show of force that threatens an attack at another location but does not make contact with the enemy. (USMC Dictionary)

**destroy**—To physically render an enemy force combat ineffective unless it can be reconstituted. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (USMC Dictionary)

**direct support**—A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force's request for assistance. (DoD Dictionary)

**disengage**—To break contact with the enemy and move to a point where the enemy cannot observe nor engage the unit by direct fire. (USMC Dictionary)

**displace**—To leave one position and take another. Forces may be displaced laterally to concentrate combat power in threatened areas. (USMC Dictionary)

**disrupt**—To integrate fires and obstacles to break apart an enemy's formation and tempo, interrupt the enemy's timetable, or cause premature commitment or the piecemealing of enemy forces. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (USMC Dictionary)

**electromagnetic warfare**—Military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called **EW**. (DoD Dictionary)

**encirclement**—The loss of freedom of maneuver resulting from enemy control of all ground routes of evacuation and reinforcement. (USMC Dictionary)

**envelopment**—An offensive maneuver in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy's rear. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (USMC Dictionary)

**feint**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) An offensive action involving contact with the enemy to deceive the enemies about the location or time of the actual main offensive action. Feints are used to cause the enemy to react in three predictable ways: to employ reserves improperly, to shift supporting fires, or to reveal defensive fires. (USMC Dictionary)

**fix**—To prevent the enemy from moving any part of the enemy's forces, either from a specific location or for a specific period of time, by holding or surrounding them to prevent their withdrawal for use elsewhere. (Part 1 of a 2-part definition.) (USMC Dictionary)

**flanking attack**—An offensive maneuver directed at the flank of an enemy. (USMC Dictionary)

**frontal attack**—An offensive maneuver in which the main action is directed against the front of the enemy forces. (USMC Dictionary)

**guard**—To protect the main force by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information. (USMC Dictionary)

**information management**—The function of managing an organization's information resources for the handling of data and information acquired by one or many different systems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that data or a right to that information. Also called **IM** (DoD Dictionary)



**interdict**—To divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (USMC Dictionary)

**limit of advance**—An easily recognized terrain feature beyond which attacking elements will not advance. (USMC Dictionary)

**linkup**—An operation wherein two friendly ground forces join together in a hostile area. (USMC Dictionary)

**local security**—Those security elements established in the proximity of a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy. (USMC Dictionary)

**main body**—The principal part of a tactical command or formation. It does not include detached elements of the command, such as advance guards, flank guards, and covering forces. (USMC Dictionary)

**main effort**—The designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power and is directed against a center of gravity through a critical vulnerability. (USMC Dictionary)

**maneuver**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy. Maneuver is one of the seven warfighting functions. (USMC Dictionary)

**military deception**—Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called **MILDEC**. (DoD Dictionary)

**military information support operations**—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called **MISO**. (DoD Dictionary)

**mobile defense**—Defense of an area or position in which maneuver is used with organization of fire and utilization of terrain to seize the initiative from the enemy. (USMC Dictionary)

**occupy**—To move onto an objective, key terrain, or other man-made or natural terrain area without opposition and control the entire area. (USMC Dictionary)

**penetrate**—To break through the enemy’s defense and disrupt the enemy’s defensive system. (USMC Dictionary)

**penetration**—A form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. (USMC Dictionary)

**protect**—To prevent observation, engagement, or interference with a force or location. (USMC Dictionary)

**pursuit**—An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. (USMC Dictionary)

**raid**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) An attack, usually small scale, involving a penetration of hostile territory for a specific purpose other than seizing and holding terrain. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (USMC Dictionary)

**retain**—To occupy and hold a terrain feature to ensure it is free of enemy occupation or use. (USMC Dictionary)

**retirement**—An operation in which a force out of contact moves away from the enemy. (USMC Dictionary)

**retrograde**—Any movement or maneuver of a command to the rear, or away from the enemy. (USMC Dictionary)

**screen**—A form of security operation that primarily provides early warning to the protected force. (Part 2 of a 2-part definition.) (USMC Dictionary)

**secure**—To gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to prevent its destruction or loss by enemy action. The attacking force may or may not have to physically occupy the area. (USMC Dictionary)

**seize**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) To clear, occupy, and control a designated area. (USMC Dictionary)

**spoiling attack**—A tactical maneuver employed to seriously impair a hostile attack while the enemy is in the process of forming or assembling for an attack. A spoiling attack is usually an offensive action conducted in the defense. (USMC Dictionary)

**support by fire**—To engage the enemy by direct fire to support a maneuvering force using overwatch or by establishing a base of fire. The supporting force does not capture enemy forces or terrain. (USMC Dictionary)

**supporting effort**—Designated subordinate unit(s) whose mission is designed to directly contribute to the success of the main effort. (USMC Dictionary)

**survivability**—(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) The degree to which a system is able to avoid or withstand a manmade hostile environment without suffering an abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. (USMC Dictionary)

**traveling overwatch**—A movement technique used when contact with enemy forces is possible. The lead element and trailing element are separated by a short distance which varies with the terrain. The trailing element moves at variable speeds and may pause for short periods to overwatch the lead element. It keys its movement to terrain and the lead element. The trailing element overwatches at such a distance that, should the enemy engage the lead element, it will not prevent the trailing element from firing or moving to support the lead element. (USMC Dictionary)

**turning movement**—A variation of the envelopment in which the attacking force passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives deep in the enemy's rear to force the enemy to abandon the position or divert major forces to meet the threat. (DoD Dictionary)

# REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

## Department of Defense Publications

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

MIL-STD-2525\_ Department of Defense Interface Standard: Joint Military Symbology

## Joint Publication (JPs)

3-02	Amphibious Operations
3-12	Cyberspace Operations
3-14	Space Operations
3-61	Public Affairs

## Army Publications

### Army Techniques Publication (ATP)

3-90.1	Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team
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## Marine Corps Publications

### Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1-0	Marine Corps Operations
1-4	Competing
5	Planning
6	Command and Control

### Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

3-01	Offensive and Defensive Tactics
3-03	Stability Operations
5-10	Marine Corps Planning Process

### Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs)

3-01A	Scouting and Patrolling
3-01B	Air Assault Operations
3-02A	Network Engagement: Targeting and Engaging
3-03A	MAGTF Civil Military Operations
3-10F	Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element
3-30F	Marine Corps Public Affairs
3-40B	Tactical-Level Logistics
13-10A	Employment of Landing Craft Air Cushion
13-10B	Combat Cargo Operations
13-10C	Unit Embarkation
13-10E	Ship-To-Shore Movement

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

2-10B.1	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
2-10B.7	Company-Level Intelligence Cell
3-32D.1	Electronic Warfare
3-40A.6	Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation
5-10.1	Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Operation Assessment
10-10E.8	Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CBRN Passive Defense

Marine Corps Order (MCO)

3500.27C	Risk Management
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Miscellaneous

Marine Corps Supplement to the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms