



**MCTP 3-03D**

---

# **Security Cooperation**

---



**U.S. Marine Corps**

---

**Limited Dissemination Control: None. Approved for Public Release**

**PCN 147 000087 01**



A no-cost copy of this document is available at:  
<https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPPEL/>

and on the Marine Corps Doctrine library website at:  
[https://usmc.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/MCEN\\_USMCDoctrine/](https://usmc.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/MCEN_USMCDoctrine/) (requires Common Access Card [CAC] to access).

Report urgent changes, routine changes, and administrative discrepancies by letter to the Doctrine Branch at:

Commanding General  
United States Marine Corps  
Training and Education Command  
ATTN: Policy and Standards Division, Doctrine Branch (TECOM PSD)  
2007 Elliot Road  
Quantico, VA 22134-5010

or by email to: [USMC\\_Doctrine@usmc.mil](mailto:USMC_Doctrine@usmc.mil)

Please include the following information in your correspondence:

Location of change, publication number and title, current page number, and, if applicable, paragraph and line number.  
Figure or table number (if applicable).  
Nature of change.  
Text addition or deletion.  
Proposed new text.

### **Copyright Information**

This document is a work of the United States Government and the text is in the public domain in the United States. Subject to the following stipulations, it may be distributed and copied:

- Copyrights to graphics and rights to trademarks or Service marks included in this document are reserved by original copyright or trademark or Service mark holders or their assignees, and are used here under a license to the Government or other permission.
- The use or appearance of United States Marine Corps publications on a non-Federal Government website does not imply or constitute Marine Corps endorsement of the distribution service.

# UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

2 September 2025

## FOREWORD


Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 3-03D, *Security Cooperation*, is designed to assist Marines in prioritizing, planning, executing, and assessing security cooperation engagements with allies and partners in support of U.S. national security objectives. Security cooperation is a vital campaign activity that facilitates access, enhances interoperability with key allies and partners, and contributes to deterrence. Planners must coordinate security cooperation activities across the Marine Corps, joint force, and interagency to achieve the required unity of effort.

This publication outlines Marine Corps security cooperation guidance, concepts, lexicon, and planning considerations, including legal and political issues, available tools and resources, and the Security Cooperation Planning and Execution Cycle. While this publication reflects current best practices, it is neither all-encompassing nor prescriptive.

The Marine Corps is first and foremost a crisis response force. Marines have long engaged with allies and partners to advance U.S. interests. The Marine Corps will continue to conduct security cooperation activities throughout the competition continuum with task-organized forces. The Marine Corps plans, executes, and assesses security cooperation activities at all levels—from the Service headquarters and Marine Corps component commands to mobile training teams and advisor missions at the tactical level. This publication applies to Marines and civilians across the total force.

This publication supersedes MCTP 3-03D, *Security Cooperation*, dated 1 August 2020.

Reviewed and approved this date.



J. C. SHELL  
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps  
International Affairs Branch  
Strategy and Plans Division, Plans, Policies, and Operations  
Headquarters Marine Corps

Publication Control Number: 147 000087 01

Limited Dissemination Control: None. Approved for public release.



# Table of Contents

---

## CHAPTER 1. UNDERSTANDING SECURITY COOPERATION IN A STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Security Cooperation as an Enabler of Strategy .....	1-1
Security Cooperation to Achieve Campaign Objectives .....	1-2
Security Cooperation Guided by National Strategy .....	1-3
Security Cooperation Interrelated Activities .....	1-3
Purposes of Security Cooperation Engagement.....	1-4
Security Cooperation Requires a Whole of Government Approach.....	1-5
Security Cooperation Requires Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation .....	1-7
Marine Corps Approach to Security Cooperation .....	1-7

---

## CHAPTER 2. SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATIONS AND WORKFORCE

Joint, Maritime and Interagency Organizations.....	2-1
Department of State .....	2-1
Country Team .....	2-1
Security Cooperation Organization .....	2-1
Defense Attaché Office.....	2-2
Combatant Commands.....	2-2
Defense Security Cooperation Agency.....	2-2
Defense Security Cooperation University .....	2-3
Institute for Security Governance .....	2-3
Defense Institute of International Legal Studies.....	2-3
Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance .....	2-4
The Navy International Programs Office.....	2-4
State Partnership Program .....	2-4
Marine Corps Security Cooperation Organizations.....	2-5
HQMC, Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations .....	2-5
Training and Education Command .....	2-5
Marine Corps Systems Command .....	2-6
Marine Corps Information Command.....	2-6
Marine Corps Component Commands .....	2-6
Marine Forces Command.....	2-7
Marine Forces Reserve .....	2-7
Marine Corps Security Cooperation Workforce .....	2-7
International Affairs Program Personnel .....	2-8
Marine Corps Security Cooperation Roles .....	2-8

---

## CHAPTER 3. SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING

Security Cooperation Planning at the Combatant and Component Commands .....	3-1
Security Cooperation Planning and Execution Cycle Overview .....	3-2

---

## CHAPTER 4. MARINE CORPS SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION CYCLE

Step 1: Theater Analysis .....	4-1
Lead .....	4-1
Focus .....	4-1
Timeline .....	4-1
Inputs .....	4-1
Process .....	4-4
Outputs .....	4-5
Step 2: Security Role Analysis .....	4-5
Lead .....	4-5
Focus .....	4-5
Timeline .....	4-5
Inputs .....	4-6
Process .....	4-6
Outputs .....	4-11
Step 3: Foreign Security Force Unit-Level Assessment .....	4-11
Lead .....	4-12
Focus .....	4-12
Timeline .....	4-12
Inputs .....	4-12
Process .....	4-12
Outputs .....	4-14
Step 4: Solutions Analysis .....	4-14
Lead .....	4-14
Focus .....	4-14
Timeline .....	4-14
Input .....	4-15
Process .....	4-15
Outputs .....	4-21
Step 5: Resource Analysis .....	4-22
Lead .....	4-22
Focus .....	4-22
Timeline .....	4-22
Inputs .....	4-22
Process .....	4-22

Outputs..... 4-27

Step 6: Execution, Monitoring, and Evaluation..... 4-27

    Lead ..... 4-28

    Focus ..... 4-28

    Timeline ..... 4-28

    Inputs ..... 4-28

    Process ..... 4-28

    Outputs..... 4-31

Planning and Execution Cycle Summary ..... 4-32

---

**CHAPTER 5. MARINE CORPS SECURITY COOPERATION TACTICAL EXECUTION**

Planning ..... 5-1

    Conduct Continuous Higher-Headquarters Coordination..... 5-2

Execution and After Action Reports..... 5-3

---

**Appendices**

- A. Security Cooperation Activities and Additional Considerations
- B. Security Force Assistance
- C. Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation
- D. Foreign Security Force Assessments
- E. Foreign Security Force Training Evaluation

**Glossary**

**References and Related Publications**





# CHAPTER 1.

## UNDERSTANDING SECURITY COOPERATION IN A STRATEGIC CONTEXT

---

### SECURITY COOPERATION AS AN ENABLER OF STRATEGY

The increasingly complex security environment, defined by strategic competition and state and non-state adversaries using indirect, non-attributable and asymmetric means, requires combined operations with allies and partners. Security cooperation (SC) activities enable the joint force to leverage collective strengths and create an asymmetric advantage. The Marine Corps shapes the security environment through SC to expand regional access and increase interoperability with select allies and partners.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, defines SC as—

*Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners.*

Security cooperation supports achievement of military and national defense objectives. It strengthens the US network of allies and partners, improving joint and combined warfighting effectiveness and enabling more effective combined operations.

The Department of Defense (DoD) conducts SC with partners that include alliances, partner nations, and others, such as non-nation actors. In this document, the term “partner nation” refers to the foreign entity DoD interacts with.

When integrated into daily campaign activities, SC helps the Marine Corps shape future battlefields through building relationships that provide maneuver space, shorter crisis response timelines, and positional advantage to Marine forces. Properly planned and executed SC activities can expand commanders’ options, including access and freedom of movement to support operational plans and contingency plans. The Marine Corps is more effective when fighting alongside partner nations employing similar tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment.

## SECURITY COOPERATION TO ACHIEVE CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES

Operating concepts that have emerged from Force Design (i.e., stand-in forces, maritime reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, and expeditionary advanced base operations) require close cooperation with partner nations in littoral regions. Specifically, the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) must gain and maintain access, basing, and overflight permissions in contested areas to deter adversaries and, if necessary, win in conflict.

In today's strategic environment, the combined force is always engaged in some level of competition. As shown in Figure 1-1, SC activities are employed throughout the competition continuum to support multiple campaign objectives and efforts (see JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*).




Figure 1-1. Competition Continuum.

Marine competition mechanisms include attraction and coercion. Security cooperation can be both an enticement method for an ally or partner and a deterrence method against an adversary or enemy. These competition mechanisms support higher, lower, and adjacent missions and objectives as follows:

- Attraction:
  - ♦ Inducement to motivate an actor to take a particular action.
  - ♦ Persuasion is convincing an actor to take an action with evidence.
  - ♦ Enticement is the lure of something of seeing value to an actor, but of negligible value to US or coalition forces.
- Coercion:
  - ♦ Compellence is a threat intended to make an adversary do something or take a specific action.
  - ♦ Deterrence is a threat intended to inhibit an adversary from taking a specific course of action

## SECURITY COOPERATION GUIDED BY NATIONAL STRATEGY

National strategic direction and guidance drive SC. The DoD strategic guidance documents highlight the importance of engaging with allies and partners given the challenging current and future operating environment and finite defense budgets. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and joint staff strategic planning guidance emphasize that empowering our allies and partners to lead efforts is key to setting the theater and directs employment of SC activities as tools to enable operations and execution of plans. Similarly, preemptively countering transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional threats calls for adaptive planning that integrates partner nations as an element of national strategy.

## SECURITY COOPERATION INTERRELATED ACTIVITIES

Security cooperation is the overarching term for DoD engagement with partner-nation security establishments. There are many SC-related joint and interagency terms and definitions that codify how Marines coordinate and operate with the joint force and interagency partners (see Figure 1-2).




Figure 1-2. Security Cooperation Relationships.

As depicted in Figure 1-2, SC is a subset of security sector assistance. Within SC, the DoD engages with both partner-nation defense (e.g., ministries of defense) and non-defense security sectors (e.g., ministries of interior, law enforcement). Within both the defense and non-defense security sectors, the DoD conducts SC activities intended to build partner-nation capability, capacity, and resiliency. These activities consist of security force assistance (SFA), institutional capacity building (ICB), and security assistance. Each has specific goals that enable the Marine Corps to engage with different entities within partner-nation governments. These activities are further defined and explained in Appendix A.

## PURPOSES OF SECURITY COOPERATION ENGAGEMENT

Figure 1-3 depicts the Marine Corps purposes for conducting SC, arranged according to the level of Marine Corps investment of manpower and resources.

More complex SC purposes, such as capability or capacity building, require longer-term and potentially more frequent engagements. Marine Corps planners prioritize SC activities based on the DoD's desired level of investment aligned with defense objectives and Service core competencies.




Figure 1-3. “Security Cooperation Pyramid” Purposes of Marine Corps Engagement.

Figure 1-3 also illustrates the difference between developing a partner nation's capability and developing its capacity. “Capability” is a partner nation's ability to execute a specific task or mission under specified conditions and level of performance while “capacity” is the extent (scale, scope, and duration) to which a task can be performed, including repetition over time.

For example, a Marine Corps mobile training team (MTT) might conduct a series of training activities with a partner nation to build or improve its naval infantry's expeditionary logistics capability. If the partner nation can replicate that capability over time without external support, the partner nation can build an expeditionary logistics capacity. Building capacity requires a partner nation to replicate and sustain organization, training, and equipping forces to conduct a specific mission set. For this reason, building capacity often involves sustained engagement in the governing, executive, generating, or operating (G-EGO) functions of a partner nation at the governmental or Service headquarters level.

The effectiveness of SC activities depends on a partner nation's willingness and absorptive capacity, which is the ability of allies and partners security establishments to manage United States Security Cooperation resources in order to build capability associated with defined roles. Absorptive capacity is influenced by various factors, including operational culture, education levels, and the ability to sustain funding and resources. Willingness must be evaluated across all levels, from political leadership to tactical operators, and includes both intent and motivation to overcome challenges associated with capability development. Establishing strong security relationships with capable partner nations achieves high levels of capability, capacity, self-sustainment, and interoperability, which enables the partner nation to export security aligned to US national security objectives.

---


## **SECURITY COOPERATION REQUIRES A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH**

Security cooperation planning requires a whole-of-government approach that ensures activities and resources are aligned to both national security and foreign policy objectives. The DoD coordinates its SC policies, programs, and activities with DOS and other USG representatives to synchronize actions and messaging. The focus of SC planning and implementation with partner nations is roles-based, to achieve shared security goals. United States departments and agencies plan and execute SC activities based on—

- Continual analyses of the security environment.
- Partner nation's political will and stability.
- Partner nation's willingness and ability to protect sensitive information and technologies.
- Current partner nation ability to sustain new capabilities and increase capacity.
- Partner nation respect for rule of law and human rights.
- US policy and legal constraints.


Except in cases of overriding security considerations, USG departments and agencies can only pursue SC efforts when the partner nation has, or is working toward, capabilities in support of US objectives. Proposed materiel solutions must be integrated with non-materiel solutions to maximize the partner nation's ability and willingness to employ and sustain a capability (e.g., combined exercises, military education and training, ICB).

Building partner-nation capacity or a discrete capability is inherently a joint and combined effort wherein the partner-nation government executes oversight of its military forces. Capacity or capability development requires the basic force development functions required of any military organization (e.g., training and education, facilities, recruiting, doctrine). These include executive functions such as budgeting, acquisition, and policy. One functional construct used to view levels of SC initiatives is through the G-EGO framework (see JP 3-20). Marine Corps planners should evaluate existing SC activities with a given partner nation to ensure future efforts complement ongoing efforts to achieve unity of effort. Figure 1-4 illustrates the G-EGO construct and the requirement for engagements and advisors across multiple echelons.



**Figure 1-4. Governance, Executive, Generating, and Operating Construct.**

Further, Figure 1-5 outlines planning considerations for building partner-nation capabilities based on multiple, mutually enabling lines of effort. A partner-nation capability is based not only on specific material or training solutions, but also on supporting elements that allow a partner nation to effectively integrate, sustain, and employ the desired capability. For example, the “doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, personnel, facilities, and policy” (DOTMLPF-P) framework is a useful planning tool for capability development that can lead to capacity development. Efforts should complement and synchronize in a manner that enables the partner nation to absorb, sustain, and replicate new capabilities and capacities.



**Figure 1-5. Capability Development Considerations.**

As partner nations grow in capability, Marines must consider how to integrate space and cyber effects into SC plans from a combined arms perspective. Such integration requires detailed coordination with Marine Corps, joint, and other interorganizational elements to build an appropriate and effective whole-of-government solution.

---

## **SECURITY COOPERATION REQUIRES ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION**

Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 383 requires the DoD to maintain an Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) program for SC activities to determine and document the return on investment of US resources. The AM&E program allows policymakers to identify and improve or eliminate ineffective SC programs and provides credible information to support new policy and legislation. Marine Corps SC activities contribute to the broader AM&E program. Additional information on AM&E is provided in Appendix C.

---

## **MARINE CORPS APPROACH TO SECURITY COOPERATION**

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (HQMC) conducts and oversees SC activities as part of its Title 10, USC requirement to effectively organize, train, and equip forces to support Secretary of Defense (SecDef), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and combatant commander (CCDR) objectives. Governing policies direct each Military Department to plan and perform functions to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of combatant commands (CCMDs). This includes the requirement for the military departments to provide forces to enhance military engagement, conduct SC, build the security capability and capacity of qualified partner nations, and deter adversaries to prevent conflict.

Global demand for Marine forces and resources consistently exceeds the sustainable supply. Resource constraints require a focused approach to Marine Corps SC. On behalf of the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), the Deputy Commandant (DC) for Plans, Policies, and Operations (PP&O) issues guidance to focus and prioritize Marine Corps SC activities and guide their planning, programming, budgeting, and execution. Specifically, HQMC guidance addresses event and activity design, partner nations with which the Marine Corps should engage, and what force requirements the Marine Corps should endorse. Headquarters, United States Marine Corps communicates this guidance through several documents, typically classified, including: the Force Management Plan, Marine Corps Security Cooperation Guidance, or as standalone products.

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps uses Service-level priorities to develop guidance on issues, such as which—

- Countries are most likely to contribute to projecting power ashore and afloat and accomplish amphibious operational objectives that align with US objectives (see JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*)?
- Military-to-military engagements, including exercises, should be executed?
- Countries should receive priority to send students to Marine Corps schools?

- Countries will the Marine Corps establish, expand, or terminate Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP) agreements and billets?
- Countries should the Marine Corps establish foreign military sales (FMS) cases?
- Countries can the Marine Corps best impact through its language and regionally oriented training and education efforts?
- Countries align with Force Design objectives by enabling stand-in forces, supporting expeditionary advanced base operations, or integrating with emerging naval expeditionary warfare concepts?

Planners at the regional Marine Corps component commands (MCCCs) use this guidance to develop campaign support plans (CSPs), and combatant command campaign plans (CCPs) and for SC activity or exercise design and execution. Components plan, execute, and assess SC in accordance with CCDR and CMC guidance. Per JP 3-20 and JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*, planning for SC is among the component commander's responsibilities. This planning can include allocation, deployment, and employment of Marine forces to support the CCDR's SC efforts. As directed, component commands develop CSPs that nest with CCMD plans and align with CMC priorities. These plans, to include SC plans, will incorporate guidance from the CCDR, component commander, and CMC.

The Marine Corps supports component command execution of SC activities based on available capabilities, resources, and institutional priorities. Guidance from HQMC regarding SC does not supersede CCDR guidance. Marine Corps Service-level objectives align with national strategic guidance and enable more effective allocation of Marine Corps resources in support of strategic priorities. Marine Corps guidance prioritizes specific institutional gaps, challenges, or equities, such as training, equipment, and interoperability issues, which are unique to Marine Corps equities in a region or country. Marine Corps component commands ensure Marine Corps objectives and priorities are considered in the development of campaign plans.

Security cooperation promotes regional stability, fosters trust among partner nations and builds foreign security force (FSF) capability and capacity. As strategic guidance changes, the Marine Corps develops relationships to meet security requirements and maintain enduring relationships with existing strategic partners. The Marine Corps' warfighting culture and legacy combined with these enduring relationships often make the Marine Corps an SC partner of choice. Security cooperation contributes to the operational effectiveness of the Marine Corps when it enhances readiness, positions forces in time and space to respond to crises, and improves interoperability with other Services, allies, and partners.

The Marine Corps leverages forward-deployed task-organized forces, including Marine expeditionary units (MEUs), special-purpose Marine air-ground task forces (SPMAGTFs), and smaller task-organized teams (e.g., detachments from Marine Corps advisor companies [MCACs]) to conduct SC. Marines plan long-term SC engagements using the Security Cooperation Planning and Execution Cycle (SCPEC) (see Chapter 3), primarily with or through the regional component commands. As required, the Marine Corps deploys Marines to conduct advising, training, exercises, MTTs, key leader engagements (KLEs), and other SC activities with partner nations to support achievement of broader US security and foreign policy objectives.



# **CHAPTER 2.**

## **SECURITY COOPERATION**

### **ORGANIZATIONS AND WORKFORCE**

Interorganizational interactions between joint, interagency, and Marine Corps organizations and communities contribute to planning, executing, and assessing Marine Corps SC activities that meet CCDR and CMC objectives.

---

#### **JOINT, MARITIME AND INTERAGENCY ORGANIZATIONS**

##### **Department of State**

The Department of State (DOS) is responsible for US foreign policy and manages and leads security assistance. The DOS maintains bureaus and offices to coordinate effective execution of diplomatic, developmental, and defense aspects of foreign policy. The DOS analyzes and informs the requirements for security-related assistance as part of United States Government (USG) foreign assistance. The DOS also maintains interagency coordination with respective counterparts in the DoD concerning future SC and security assistance activities with partner nations. The Office of State-Defense Integration is the principal link between the DOS and the DoD. Furthermore, the Political-Military Affairs Bureau provides policy direction in the areas of security assistance, export and trade, and programming.

##### **Country Team**

The country team is the senior USG coordinating and supervising body in a foreign country. Headed by the chief of mission, it includes the senior defense official (SDO)/defense attaché (DATT), heads of all U.S. Embassy sections, and the senior members of the other represented USG departments or agencies. Each country team is configured differently based on USG activities and interests in the country. On initiating a bilateral plan with a specific partner nation, the country team draws on guidance from the DOS and the chief of mission to develop an integrated country strategy, which influences the CCDR's development of a country-specific security cooperation section (CSCS) or country plan.

##### **Security Cooperation Organization**

Security cooperation organizations (SCOs) fall under the authority of the chief of mission and SDO in a foreign country and include all DoD elements in a US diplomatic mission with assigned responsibilities for carrying out SC and security assistance management functions. The Marine Corps fills global SCO billets in accordance with DoD requirements. The Marine Corps organizations most likely to be in direct contact with SCOs are the regional component commands and Marine Corps International Programs Office.

The SCOs are referred to as military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, etc., designated to perform SC and security assistance functions. The SCOs are responsible for managing and deconflicting SC programs (including FMS cases), training, and program monitoring. Furthermore, the SCOs are responsible for assessing whether a partner nation can build and sustain capabilities and capacity and have the greatest visibility over the execution of SC activities in that partner nation. The SCO personnel are the foremost points of contact between the partner nation and the USG regarding SC activities.

### **Defense Attaché Office**

The Defense Attaché Office is an organizational element of the US diplomatic mission through which the Defense Attaché System conducts its mission, and to which the SecDef directs the attachment or assignment of other military detachments or elements. The office consists of personnel, material, activities, and facilities where the SDO/DATT has operating responsibilities (see Marine Corps Order [MCO] 3821.2, *The Defense Attaché System*). Within the Defense Attaché Office, the SDO/DATT serves as the diplomatically accredited DATT and chief of the SCO (if a SCO is present). The SDO/DATT, or a designated member of the SCO, is the point of contact for SC planning and developing the country plan with the CCMD planners. Subject to chief of mission approval, the SDO/DATT is the lead integrator for SC activities with the partner nation. The Marine Corps Director of Intelligence is the lead for selecting and sponsoring Marine attachés serving in billets globally.

### **Combatant Commands**

Designated CCMDs maintain responsibility for all SC matters in their assigned areas of responsibility (AORs). The CCDRs plan, execute, and assess SC activities, including AM&E requirements, to achieve US objectives. The CCMDs direct and articulate country-specific objectives through CSCSs, country plans, and CCPs. Throughout the execution of SC and security assistance activities, CCDRs adjust the SC activities based on monitoring of ongoing SC activities. Additionally, the CCDRs task component commands with specific elements of SC activities.

### **Defense Security Cooperation Agency**

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) is a separate agency of the DoD under the direction, authority, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)). The DSCA directs, administers, and provides guidance to DoD components for the execution of DoD SC activities. This administration and direction include delegating authority to implement SC programs, as appropriate, to DoD components (e.g., Military Departments, DoD agency, CCMD).

The DSCA primarily—

- Integrates SC activities in support of a whole-of-government approach.
- Represents the interests of the SecDef and USD(P) in SC matters.
- Supports the development of technology security and foreign disclosure and sales policies and procedures for defense information, technology, and systems in coordination with USD(P), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, DOS, and others.

- Approves, in coordination with the CJCS, SCO joint manpower requirements, to include the establishment of new SCOs or changes in manpower authorizations or organizational structure.
- Approves, in coordination with the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), changes to the grade or Military Department affiliation of the SDO/DATT.
- Advises the Defense Technology Security Administration on proposed transfers of significant new technologies or weapons systems. They also help in the determinations of whether significant items or specific sales must be sold to partner nations (exclusively through FMS).

Headquarters Marine Corps and Marine Corps International Programs Office work directly with DSCA regarding SC program planning, implementation, execution, and closure; SC policy and guidance; and SC workforce issues.

The DSCA serves as the resource sponsor for SC databases, such as Socium. Socium is a collaborative tool to track, plan, forecast, monitor, and evaluate SC resources and activities worldwide. Per DoD guidance (i.e., Title 10, USC, Sections 332 and 333), Socium is required to track significant security cooperation initiatives (SSCIs). Marine Corps component commands should follow CCDR guidance to ensure appropriate SC activities are entered into Socium for planning and monitoring. For more information refer to Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5132.14, *Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise*, and Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5132.03, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*.

### **Defense Security Cooperation University**

The Defense Security Cooperation University's (DSCU's) mission is to educate the SC workforce. The DSCU offers resident, mobile, and online courses and learning tools for personnel performing SC functions in the DoD, other USG agencies, the US defense industry, and for partner nations who work with the DoD to procure US defense articles and services. The DSCU is aligned under DSCA per Title 10, USC, Section 384.

### **Institute for Security Governance**

The Institute for Security Governance implements DoD ICB efforts as part of the DSCU. They support the ICB mission through resident, mobile, and virtual activities, as well as resident and non-resident advising. Marines might work alongside personnel from the Institute for Security Governance and Marine Corps SC activities can complement, reinforce, or be synchronized with ICB activities to support the range of executive, generating, and operating forces. Furthermore, because ICB activities are a key component of SSCI-centric planning, Marine activities both shape and are shaped by ongoing ICB activities.

### **Defense Institute of International Legal Studies**

The Defense Institute for Legal Studies is the lead US defense SC resource for professional legal and democratic rule of law education and training for partner nation's military and civilian personnel. It is aligned with DSCU and various activities complement and reinforce building partner capacity (BPC) activities and other US-provided assistance.

### **Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance**

The Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) is a CJCS-controlled activity that reports to the Joint Staff J5 Strategy, Plans, and Policy Division. The JCISFA's mission is to support the integration of SFA capabilities into the current and future joint force to advance joint warfighting capability.

The JCISFA—

- Develops and integrates SFA capabilities into joint doctrine.
- Supports the design and development of joint training and exercises.
- Supports the development of professional military education (PME) curriculum.
- Captures, analyzes, exchanges and archives SFA lessons learned.
- Supports joint concepts with SFA subject matter expertise.

The JCISFA provides SFA doctrine, best practices, and proven tactics, techniques, and procedures to prepare for and conduct SFA missions. These resources are useful guides for Marines who conduct planning, advising, and training missions. For assistance accessing resources, contact the HQMC International Affairs Branch. The JCISFA also contributes information on SC activities to the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned.

### **The Navy International Programs Office**

The Navy International Programs Office (NIPO) manages and implements international SC and security assistance programs, cooperative development programs, and technology security policy. As a reporting unit to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, NIPO supports regional CCDRs and Navy leaderships efforts to build vigorous relationships with maritime security partner nations worldwide. They coordinate with the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard to formulate Department of the Navy SC and security assistance policy, procedures, and priorities. They also team with a wide network of US defense industry and security community product and service providers, program managers, policy makers, and technical and regulatory agencies to support the defense requirements of key partners and allies.

The NIPO facilitates assignments under the Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program for the Marine Corps. This program, which is a Defense Personnel Exchange Program, promotes international cooperation in military research, development, testing and evaluation (RDT&E) communities through the exchange of practical experience of defense engineers and scientists. This program places selected personnel into challenging and productive assignments in technical areas where their professional qualifications and capabilities are used to the fullest. The program is not a training program and is not used for exchanging technical data or software related to the design, development, manufacture, or operation of military systems. A prerequisite for establishing the program is a formal international agreement with each participant partner nation.

### **State Partnership Program**

The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a joint DoD SC program authorized in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 341 and governed by DoDI 5111.20, *State Partnership Program*. The program is managed by the National Guard Bureau, executed by the CCMDs, and sourced by the National Guard of the states and territories. It links a state's National Guard with a partner nation's military, security forces, and disaster response organizations in a cooperative, mutually beneficial

relationship. The SPP is one of the few SC programs authorized to engage across the spectrum of foreign governmental organizations. Marine planners should be aware of ongoing SPP activities to support synchronization and properly deconflict with other Service component commands. Per National Guard Bureau policy, SPP activity is tracked and can be viewed by AOR or country within Socium.

---

## MARINE CORPS SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATIONS

Multiple Marine Corps organizations plan, prioritize, coordinate, execute, and assess SC activities in support of Service and CCMD goals, objectives, and end states. For additional information on Marine Corps SC organizations, reference MCO 5710.6, *Marine Corps Security Cooperation*.

### HQMC, Deputy Commandant, Plans, Policies, and Operations

Headquarters Marine Corps conducts and oversees SC activities as part of its Title 10 requirements to effectively organize, train, and equip forces to support SecDef, CJCS, and CCDR objectives. Under the DC PP&O, Strategy and Plans Division, the International Affairs Branch develops and maintains policy and guidance to the Marine Corps to support the Service's SC activities. The International Affairs Branch coordinates SC governance forums and represents Service interests to the joint force to shape and review SC doctrine, publications, and authorities. It manages partner-nation seats for quota-constrained PME, acts as the Marine Corps lead for SC authoritative databases (e.g., Socium), and coordinates across the other maritime Services to achieve greater integration of maritime SC efforts.

### Training and Education Command

The Security Cooperation Training Detachment is a dedicated SC organization under the Training and Education Command's (TECOM's) Marine Corps Intelligence Schools that executes and enables SC training and education for planners and advisors to support the execution of MCCC lines of operation in coordination with the FMF. The Security Cooperation Training Detachment provides training to Marine Corps forces to advise FSF counterparts and to develop multi-year engagement plans (MYEPs) that align SC activities to Service and national objectives.

The TECOM Security Assistance Branch is the lead for coordinating the delivery of Marine education and training to partner nations. They represent the Marine Corps to CCMDs and SCOs seeking to place partner-nation personnel at Marine Corps schools, including PME, technical- and military occupational specialty-producing, and aviation training. Schoolhouses do not reserve or approve seats for international students. Rather, the TECOM Security Assistance Branch manages international training requirements after the requirements are submitted by the SCO (e.g., through the country's Combined Education and Training Program Plan, at the annual Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Group). The TECOM Security Assistance Branch manages requests through the Marine Corps Training Information Management System.

The TECOM Security Assistance Branch further oversees implementation of the international military student (IMS) officer program across Marine Corps schoolhouses. The IMS officers serve as the primary administrative point of contact for IMSs in Marine Corps schools and are critical facilitators of partner-nation training and education for IMSs attending Marine Corps schools and training facilities. Each schoolhouse is required to have an IMS officer.

### **Marine Corps Systems Command**

Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) is an acquisition command with a dedicated Service-designated SC office (i.e., Marine Corps International Programs Office), which executes and promotes SC programs that foster partner-nation interoperability, capability development, and alliances.

The Marine Corps International Programs Office advises on acquisition related international programs and oversees development and execution of SC programs. These programs include—

- Foreign acquisition of US defense equipment by a foreign customer.
- Assisting the development of cooperative project agreements involving international partners.
- Foreign provision of training, exercises, and technical education services of weapon systems.
- International cooperative research and development.
- Defense service information exchanges, technology transfer policy, weapons systems, subsystems, technologies, and data export policy.

The Marine Corps International Programs Office assists Marine Corps program managers with—

- Development of international business plans, end user certificates (both ground and Marine Corps aviation).
- Acquisition of foreign systems for the Marine Corps.
- Review of contracts for export compliance.
- Reviews Marine Corps weapon systems curriculum.
- Reviews FMF joint exercises with allies and partner nation foreign disclosure spectrum.

### **Marine Corps Information Command**

The Marine Corps Information Command provides space, cyberspace, and influence expertise to Marine Corps SC activities as requested through appropriate feasibility of support (FOS) and global forces management (GFM) processes. The Marine Corps Information Command is the primary integrator of information capabilities including the Marine Corps Information Operations Center. Coordination with relevant Space Force component commands and the Marine Corps Information Command provides CCDRs with more effective and efficient terrestrial and orbital force packages and solutions (including commercial solutions for the combined force). Similarly, the Marine Corps Information Command can support and enable integration of cyberspace capabilities (e.g., enabling partner nations to secure and defend their critical infrastructure or other key terrains) against malicious cyberspace activity.

### **Marine Corps Component Commands**

Regionally and functionally aligned MCCCs provide Marine Corps capabilities to CCDRs and other operational commanders as directed. The MCCCs—

- Advocate for best use of Marine Forces.
- Develop component CSPs to CCPs.
- Develop Marine Corps-specific SC proposals.
- Facilitate the planning, execution, and assessment of Marine Corps SC activities (e.g., FSF assessments, KLEs, exercises).

- Provide subject matter expert (SME) support to CCMD SC priorities (e.g., SSCI development and execution, AM&E activities).
- Facilitate appropriate GFM and Program Objective Memorandum (POM) efforts to inform best use of Marine Forces through both the CCMD and Service.
- Manage SC activities leveraging relevant authoritative data and funding sources.

### **Marine Forces Command**

Marine Forces Command directs Active Component Service retained forces (II MEF) and serves as the transfer-of-command authority of activated Reserve Component forces from the Marine Forces Reserve to the gaining CCMD. Upon receipt of SC-related FOS messages (via the DC PP&O from the MCCCs or allies and partners for Service-retained forces), Marine Forces Command assesses the FOS and provides recommendations and responses.

### **Marine Forces Reserve**

The Marine Forces Reserve provides operational capabilities and strategic depth to the Active Component through participation in exercises, fulfillment of rotational requirements, and support to emergent crisis and contingencies. Marine Forces Reserve augment and reinforce Active Component SC missions across all warfighting functions to include forces within the Reserve Component. Reserve Component-only forces include MCACs, civil affairs groups, a law enforcement battalion, and the SME support necessary to integrate these capabilities into CCMD and component command SC priorities. Statutory authority directs how Reserve Component forces and individuals are to be activated, resourced, and used.

The MCACs (Alpha and Bravo) are Reserve Component O-6 commands with FSF advisors and SC planners trained to be employed in partner-facing SC activities with MCCCs and CCMDs. The MCACs are structured to support both short, intermittent requirements, as well as long-term engagements with task organized advisor teams supporting all warfighting functions. They are designed with capabilities to support FSF staffs at and above the brigade level.

The MCACs support FSF assessments and provide MCCCs the ability to correct or reinforce SC assessment outcomes through advisor support as part of the CCP and component CSPs. The MCACs support short term AM&E requirements and provide persistent engagement through deployed rotational teams.

---

## **MARINE CORPS SECURITY COOPERATION WORKFORCE**

Per Title 10, USC Section 384, the DoD is required to maintain an SC workforce development program to ensure the professionalization and development of SC professionals. Consistent with the law and DoDI 5132.15, *Implementation of the Security Cooperation Workforce Certification Program*, the Marine Corps SC workforce is assigned duties through designated billets. The Marine Corps SCW includes civilians serving in permanent positions, as well as uniformed personnel temporarily assigned to permanent billets. These positions and billets exist within the joint force, MCCCs, supporting establishment, FMF, and interagency (i.e., US Embassies abroad). The International Affairs Branch within HQMC PP&O is the component certification authority for the Marine Corps SC workforce. The SC workforce organizational structure is defined in MCO 5710.6.

## INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS PROGRAM PERSONNEL

Marine Corps Order 1520.11, *International Affairs Program*, establishes and promulgates policy and procedures for programs collectively managed as the Marine Corps International Affairs Program. Marines in the International Affairs Program serve in a range of billets across the Marine Corps, joint force, and interagency. Some of these include billets as foreign area officers, regional affairs officers, foreign area staff on-commissioned officers and MPEP Marines. International Affairs Program personnel employ language, regional, and cultural capabilities in support of Service planning, operational requirements, and MAGTF capabilities beyond baseline skills inherent in the general-purpose force.

## MARINE CORPS SECURITY COOPERATION ROLES

Marines engage frequently with FSFs as part of daily operations and duties during conflict, training, and exercises. Marines interacting with FSF and host-nation personnel must be able to apply interaction skills and cultural awareness. Marine Corps Order 5710.6 outlines DoD and Marine Corps training requirements to support joint and Service SC missions. Specific training requirements are covered within NAVMC 3500.108B, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Planner Training and Readiness Manual*. Marine Corps forces from all MOSs may be assigned to conduct exercise or engagement planning, advising, or training with allies and partners. Table 2-1 provides an overview of Marine Corps SC roles at various levels across the force.

**Table 2-1. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Roles.**

Role	Description
Security Cooperation Planner	Primarily at the regional MCCC level. This position could be called a regional planner, desk officer, or carry another position title, depending on the command.  Planners develop MYEPs in support of overarching global campaign plans, CCPs, and other high-level strategic guidance. They work closely with operational planners to ensure planned engagements enable Marine Corps operations. They have a comprehensive understanding of the Marine Corps Security Cooperation Planning and Execution Cycle.
Engagement Planner	Primarily a member of the MAGTF staff. Planners predominantly use the Marine Corps Planning Process when planning the execution of activities that are performed in support of SC plans developed by the regional MCCC or other higher echelon. They also use or oversee the use of various other planning processes such as Marine Corps Instructional Systems Design and SATE, which uses the ADDIE process to develop partner-nation training.
Advisor	Advisors work alongside designated FSFs so that USG, Service, and FSF objectives can be achieved. They are tasked to advise, liaise, and support an FSF to develop individual or unit security capabilities. Advisor teams are task-organized and enabled for the advisor mission in support of CCDR requirements. Advisors serve as trainers of a specific FSF capability, as well as provide advice on how that capability should be employed.
Trainer	Marines can be assigned to train an FSF on a specific skill set to support pre-planned, short-duration SC activities. Marines in this role are sometimes part of a larger task-organized team on a MEU, SPMAGTF, or advisor team. Other times, these Marines could also be members of a tasked MTT, SMEE, unit deployment program, deployments for training, and CONUS-based military-to-military activities.



# **CHAPTER 3.**

## **SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING**

---

### **SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING AT THE COMBATANT AND COMPONENT COMMANDS**

Effective SC planning ensures activities align with strategic guidance and support end states. The CCMDs, in coordination with SCOs, conduct SC planning and issue tasks to components for execution through various mechanisms including CCPs and country plans. Planning involves the partner nation, SCO, interagency, and component commands. Each CCMD develops objectives with partner nations based on their willingness and ability to enable US national security and CCDR objectives.

Security cooperation is included in campaign and contingency plans through the joint planning process. For example, the USG could desire a partner nation to have the capacity to replicate, sustain, and employ a capability in support of specific combined or coalition efforts. The objective could also be more specific, such as development of partner nation capabilities to deter an emerging or near-peer competitor, support stabilization efforts in failing states, or provide logistics support, intelligence, or access to support US goals and objectives.

Component commanders typically plan and execute SC activities based upon CCMD-assigned tasks. This requires effective planning nested within the CCMD objectives. As such, the component command might develop a MYEP as part of a CSP to provide detailed planning to meet CCMD assigned tasks or objectives, or to propose operations, activities, and investments (OAI)s to the CCMD for approval. An example might be a case where the Marine Corps desires to develop a relationship with a country to facilitate access to training areas in support of readiness. Component command plans must be aligned with CCMD plans and consistent with Service guidance.

The intent of a Marine Corps-developed MYEP is to align Marine Corps OAI)s in support of partner nation capability development requirements to achieve CCMD and Service objectives. Plans should drive the intent, frequency, and duration of SC activities, such as exercises, MTTs, and advise-and-assist missions. Nesting Service-level planning into joint plans helps ensure effective and efficient use of Marine resources and provides the Marine Corps and the CCMD maximum return on investment. These plans must be instituted using all applicable higher-level and interagency guidance. Like the planner at the CCMD, the component command planner must understand the USG's, DOS's, and DoD's security strategies; partner nation goals and objectives; and the desired end state aligned to CCMD objectives.

Security cooperation considerations need ongoing assessment and refinement. Security cooperation planning and execution should not be viewed as an isolated activity or process, but rather strategic in nature and spanning multiple years. It is typically conducted at the Service component command or higher. This does not mean that a MAGTF or MEF could or should not employ the SCPEC, but it is more likely that the MAGTF would be involved in the execution phase versus planning.


---

## **SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION CYCLE OVERVIEW**

The SCPEC is targeted at MCCC planners and provides a framework for planning and executing SC activities with an FSF. It enables the component command planner to—

- Align with higher-level guidance.
- Translate strategic guidance into actionable steps.
- Incorporate objectives and interests of multiple stakeholders, including the partner nation.
- Successfully compete for and efficiently use constrained resources.
- Demonstrate return on investment of committed resources.

Figure 3-1 depicts the six steps of the SCPEC (see Chapter 4 for additional information).



**Figure 3-1. Security Cooperation Planning and Execution Cycle.**

Successful SC planning is based on long-term, continuous planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of SC activities with FSFs to reach the desired end state. Once a MYEP is approved by the CCMD, the Service component resources and requests forces to implement

and execute the plan. In most cases, the Marine Corps will allocate forward deployed or rotational forces to execute SC events. Advisor teams develop a deployment engagement plan to guide implementation of their assigned SC tasks. When interacting with the FSF directly, advisors and trainers develop FSF-specific, standards-based training using the analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate (ADDIE) model, which is the developmental model for the Marine Corps Instructional System Design (also called MCISD) and systems approach to training and education (SATE) process, detailed in NAVMC 1553.1A. The SATE process and ADDIE serve as models for executors of SC to develop effective engagement plans. Table 3-1 depicts the relationship between planning processes and their corresponding echelons of command within the context of SC.

**Table 3-1. Levels of Security Cooperation Planning and Personnel.**

Level	Planning Process	Security Cooperation Personnel
CCMD	JOPP- and SSCI-centric planning	J-5, SCO, SDO/DATT, country team
Marine Corps component command	SCPEC	Desk officers or SC planners (G-3/G-5)
Unit assigned to execute SC activities (e.g., MEF, MCAC)	MCP, SATE, and ADDIE	Engagement planner
		Advisors or team leaders
SC event execution (e.g., MTT, MCAC)	SATE and ADDIE; other tactical planning processes (i.e., begin planning, arrange reconnaissance and coordination, make reconnaissance, complete plan, issue order, supervise)	Advisor
		FSF trainer

The SCPEC is a best practice process in SC activity design, execution, and assessment. However, the full cycle may not be required, applicable, or executable in all instances. Like any doctrinal process, it may be truncated based on constraints in the operational environment that warrant a modified version of the planning process. For SC activities, given that bilateral and multilateral relationships are persistent and dynamic, elements of the SCPEC can take place through comprehensive desk-side studies of an FSF or reviewing assessments of previous SC activities (see Steps 1-3 in Chapter 4).



# CHAPTER 4.

## MARINE CORPS SECURITY COOPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION CYCLE

---

### STEP 1: THEATER ANALYSIS

Theater analysis is a continuous review of stakeholder guidance, available resources, and higher-headquarters tasking, with the intent to build an understanding of the operational environment as well as theater priorities, objectives, limitations, and risks.

#### Lead

Theater analysis is inherently a CCMD function; however, it is conducted as part of the SCPEC by the MCCC planner to confirm and understand CCMD direction and ensure Marine Corps competencies are appropriate for the given mission.

#### Focus

The focus of theater analysis is familiarization with strategic and operational guidance documents and how they apply to a relationship with a designated partner nation.

#### Timeline

This step can take weeks to months, depending on the planner's familiarity with the region and the level of analysis conducted by the CCMD.

#### Inputs

***An Understanding of Unified Action.*** Security cooperation is a joint mission and requires coordination or—at a minimum—situational awareness of subordinate, adjacent, and higher entities' (both internal and external to the DoD) SC-related activities. Strong coordination across staff and with higher headquarters to synchronize and deconflict security cooperation OAs is critical.

***Strategic Guidance.*** Figure 4-1 depicts a hierarchy of strategic guidance and planning documents that shape SC planning and should be included in theater analysis.

***Joint Strategic Campaign Plan.*** The Joint Strategic Campaign Plan is a five-year global strategic plan that operationalizes the national military strategy. It is the CJCS's primary document to guide and direct the preparation and integration of Joint Force campaign and contingency plans. It establishes a common set of processes, products, priorities, roles, and responsibilities to integrate the joint force's global operations, activities, and investments from day-to-day campaigning to contingencies.




Figure 4-1. Security Cooperation Strategic Guidance and Planning Documents.

**Integrated Country Strategy.** An integrated country strategy is a three-year strategy developed by a DOS country team for a particular country. It articulates a common set of USG priorities and goals by setting the mission goals and objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort. It also provides the basis for the development of the annual mission resource requests. The chief of mission leads the development process and has final approval authority.

**Multi-Year Security Cooperation Guidance.** Multi-year SC guidance is released by the USD(P) and covers a five-year span. It provides strategic policy and guidance on the assessment, prioritization, design, planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation of SC programs and activities of the DoD.

*Combatant Command Campaign Plan.* The CCP operationalizes CCMD strategies over a two- to five-year span by organizing and aligning available resources. The CCP consists of all plans contained within the established theater or functional responsibilities, to include contingency plans, subordinate and supporting plans, posture plans, and country-specific SC sections for country plans and operations in execution:

- *Country-Specific Security Cooperation Section and Country Plan.* A section of the CCP, which articulates the CCMD's intent to apply time, money, and effort through SC programs in a specific country to further US defense objectives or set the theater for a potential contingency in their campaign plan. The CSCS serves as the core organizing documents for articulating DoD country-level objectives for the application of SC at the country level and shapes and is shaped by corresponding integrated country strategies. Each CSCS identifies specific lines of effort that represent the SSCIs planned for the country and articulate specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives in support of such initiatives.
- *Campaign Support Plan.* The Service component command CSP identifies CCMD objectives and the supporting Service lines of effort and tasks required, which includes Service-specific equities, to support objectives over a four- to five-year time span. The MCCCs might use various names for the CSP, such as the integrated maritime campaign support plan.

*Marine Corps Security Cooperation Guidance.* Service-level guidance is provided to deputy commandants and FMF commanders to shape international engagement planning and execution. It guides the Marine Corps total force in recommending the types of activities and recognizing opportunities that are best suited for Marine Corps engagement.

***Significant Security Cooperation Initiative.*** Significant security cooperation initiatives are identified and generally led by CCMDs, in coordination with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and involve applying multiple SC authorities and programs to build a full-spectrum capability in partner nations to perform roles that support US national security objectives. These initiatives are overseen and managed by various DoD components and the DOS over multiple years to realize a country or region-specific objective or functional objective and involve several interagency actors. Typically, a specific line of effort in the CSCS of a CCP articulates the SSCI.

Significant security cooperation initiatives include the following resources that can be used for theater analysis:

- Initial assessments.
- Initiative design documents (IDDs).
- Performance monitoring plan (PMP).
- Performance monitoring report (PMR).
- Objective trees.
- Five-year plans.

The SSCI process and its relation to the Marine Corps SCPEC is discussed further in Appendix C.

## **Process**

**Build Situational Awareness.** Review relevant documents at all levels, to include those from the partner nation. Ensure that the CCMD has provided any organizational, operational, institutional, and environmental assessments conducted by joint planners. The following questions can help determine Marine Corps equity in working with a specific FSF:

- Why is a given country important to US national security?
- How can a partner nation's current or planned capabilities contribute to US national security?
- What OAs in support of partner nation development can achieve CCMD objectives?
- How are the partner nation operational needs relevant to the Marine Corps?
- How does Marine Corps tactical activity in a given country serve Marine Corps priorities?
- How do the factors captured in the CCMD environmental assessment affect the Service component commands SC task or effort?

**Make a Level of Interoperability Recommendation.** If theater analysis yields a requirement for a partner nation to be interoperable with the Marine Corps, then the component command planner will make a recommendation to the component commander regarding the level of interoperability with a partner nation. Interoperability must be appropriately scoped based on specific, desired effects and partner nation capabilities. The Marine Corps compartmentalizes partner nation interoperability into the following three categories:

- Integrated. Forces can merge seamlessly and are interchangeable. Other Services will take the lead for their respective warfighting domains to develop integrated interoperability with potential coalition forces. Marine Corps SC should include the export of unique and core Marine Corps warfighting competencies to a small number of allies and partners that are anticipated to contribute coalition forces to operate throughout the competition continuum. Integrated interoperability is typically resource-intensive and a long-term commitment spanning multiple years within the same domain.
- Compatible. Forces can interact with each other in the same geographic battlespace pursuing common goals. The Marine Corps should seek to develop compatible interoperability with partner nations with like-minded objectives and complementary capabilities.
- Deconflicted. Multinational forces can coexist but not interact operationally with each other. Interact implies a combat relationship between forces, not routine interaction required for coordination or deconfliction. Deconflicted interoperability focuses on ensuring synchronized transit, storage, logistics, and other non-combat functions.

**Make a Marine Corps-Specific Applicability Recommendation.** Not all higher-level guidance is applicable to Marine Corps SC objectives. The planner advises the Marine Corps component commander on whether the Marine Corps is the best partner for a particular FSF to achieve the desired access, capability, or level of interoperability.

Marine Corps-specific considerations include—

- Expeditionary Expertise. The planner should highlight where the SC objective aligns with the Marine Corps' expeditionary capabilities, such as—
  - ♦ Amphibious Operations. What amphibious ability does the partner nation possess and how relevant is it to the Marine Corps?



- Littoral Operations in Contested Environments. Does the security environment require operating in highly contested maritime spaces?
- Crisis Response and Security Force Assistance. Does the objective involve training partner forces for rapid response or counterterrorism operations?
- Force Design Implications. The planner should assess whether the SC objective supports—
  - Force Design. Does the engagement enhance the Marine Corps' ability to operate in distributed maritime environments or support the Stand-in Force concept?
  - Developing Key Capabilities. Does the engagement provide opportunities to train and refine capabilities prioritized by Force Design, such as long-range precision fires, unmanned systems, or information warfare?
- Relationship with CCMD. This includes—
  - Supporting CCMD Priorities. The planner should determine whether the SC objective directly supports the priorities of the relevant CCMD in the region.
  - Leveraging Existing Engagements. Can the SC objective be integrated with existing Marine Corps deployments or exercises in the region for greater efficiency and impact?

By considering Marine Corps-specific factors, planners can provide more tailored and relevant recommendations to component commanders, ensuring that SC efforts are effectively aligned with service priorities and contribute to overall national security objectives.

## Outputs

The outputs of Step 1, Theater Analysis, include—

- A thorough understanding of guidance documents, stakeholder objectives, priorities, and current operational environment conditions.
- Authority and Service concurrence to commit personnel and resources to follow-on SC assessments and analysis.

---

## STEP 2: SECURITY ROLE ANALYSIS

During the security role analysis step, the planner analyzes stakeholder objectives identified in theater analysis and determines common objectives that will help define a desired security role (DSR).

### Lead

Step 2 is typically led by MCCC planners, in coordination with relevant stakeholders (e.g., CCMD, country teams, partner nation representatives).

### Focus

Identify a DSR that can be developed to support mutual objectives for the Marine Corps and a specific FSF from the designated partner nation.

### Timeline

Depending on inputs and assessments already conducted from the CCMD, or from previous interaction with the FSF, this step can take several weeks to complete.

## Inputs

The input to this step is the information attained during Step 1, Theater Analysis.

## Process

**Conduct Component-Level Assessment.** Component-level assessments are typically conducted by the Service component command as required but might also be executed by the CCMD or other stakeholders (e.g., MCACs). These assessments focus on the component level of the FSF, or on informing the component command's broader understanding of the work required in a given country to meet CCMD objectives. Component-level assessments are compared to the strategic analysis contained in initial assessments, which is the CCMD's responsibility as part of SSCIs.

The component-level assessment validates partner nation and FSF goals, willingness, absorptive capacity, operational culture, current regional dynamics, and how they support US objectives. It identifies current state partner nation or FSF component-level capabilities to help determine a desired future state in security role analysis (e.g., DSR linked to SSCI or country plan objective). For additional details on conducting a component-level assessment refer to Appendix D.

**Conduct Stakeholder Common Objectives Analysis.** The planner must work with stakeholders to identify and align partner nation objectives to reveal common purpose. Figure 4-2 highlights some of the key guidance documents from which the planner derives various stakeholders' objectives and goals with a partner nation or FSF. The partner nation objectives vary and come from a range of sources. The planner should collaborate with the US Embassy Team regarding the partner nation's desired objectives.





Figure 4-2. Source Documents for Common Objectives Analysis.

**Draft Desired Security Role.** Using a common objectives analysis, the planner drafts a DSR statement for the FSF. This is the desired end state of a partner-nation relationship. This analysis should focus on determining which of the shared objectives is most suitable for the Marine Corps. The DSRs should be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timebound [SMART]. There could be objectives that are not appropriate as a Marine Corps-facilitated DSR, such as developing FSF capability in a skillset the Marine Corps does not train to. Planners should seek commander's approval for the proposed DSR to ensure it meets the commander's intent. In some cases, the DSR might be provided to the component command by the CCMD. Figure 4-3 shows an example of a common objectives analysis used to develop a DSR.



**Figure 4-3. Common Objectives Analyzed to Develop a DSR.**

Some countries might require multiple DSRs due to the complexities of requirements to meet objectives. Desired security roles come in many forms, depending on the future end state defined in terms of the SC purposes (access, capability, and capacity).

**Access.** A DSR for access defines the type of access required (e.g., basing, overflight, port access, littorals access), such as in support of an operational or contingency plan. To assure access, activities must be conducted to foster a partner nation relationship strong enough to facilitate an access agreement.

**Capability.** Building partner nation capability focuses on all warfighting domains and functions. Capability is the ability of a partner nation to complete a task under specified conditions, standards and levels of performance. These efforts require the partner nation to perform the basic force development functions required of any military organization.

**Capacity.** Building capacity is focused on how the partner nation can generate, replicate, and sustain its capabilities. A DSR focused on capacity should consider key aspects, such as budgeting, acquisitions, policy, training and education, facilities, recruiting, and doctrine. This requires efforts at multiple echelons and across many force development disciplines.

A DSR is directly linked to US guidance and the role we need the partner nation to fill but must also be shaped by the operational environment of the partner nation. The DSR must support US objectives; however, partner-nation buy-in to the DSR is critical as well. Planners must consider partner-nation priorities, restrictions, absorptive capacity, and the likelihood a partner nation can sustain a capability once developed. Ultimately, the DSR is shaped by and nested under the CCP (including specific SSCI objectives as appropriate) and the MCCC CSP and associated plans and guidance. For examples of DSRs refer to Table 4-1.

**Table 4-1. Examples of Desired Security Roles.**


Purpose	DSR Statement	Activities (not exhaustive)	Desired Outcome (aligns with DoD)
Access	Country X provides overflight ISO operational or contingency plan within 2 years.	Port visit, KLE, training.	Access required ISO operational or contingency plan.
Capability	Country X naval infantry Bn conducts VBSS within sovereign waters to protect maritime fisheries zone within 2.5 years.	MTT, SMEEs, exercises, FMS.	Capability required in support of plan, or regional stability. May be a capability CCMD requires for limited time.
Capacity	Country X naval infantry conducts offensive and defensive operations to defend against or deter country Y aggression within 3 years.	Advisor teams, ICB, FMS, IMET, KLE, staff talks.	CCMD requires country X ISO operational or contingency plan.
<b>LEGEND</b> Bn      battalion ISO     in support of VBSS   visit, board, search, seizure			

**Develop Military and Security Tasks.** The planner should identify which military/security tasks (MSTs) the FSF must execute to achieve the DSR:

- **Military.** FSF military forces, such as land, marine, naval, or air forces.
- **Security.** FSF policing agencies (i.e., border patrol, police agencies, coast guard) performing internal security tasks.

The planner uses the Marine Corps Task List or an FSF equivalent, if applicable, to find relevant tasks that support the DSR. The Marine Corps Task List contains Marine Corps tasks that include capability statements and measures of readiness. The planner adjusts task descriptions based on the DSR, the partner nation, and the absorptive capacity of the FSF.

Military/security tasks are chained directly to the DSR (see Figure 4-4), and the subordinate capability sets support the MSTs. The planner should request relevant documentation from the FSF to align with their standards and doctrine. However, in the absence of partner-nation equivalent T&R standards to create capabilities, sub-capabilities, and skills, planners can use the Marine Corps Task List and Marine Corps T&R standards while adhering to foreign disclosure requirements.



**Figure 4-4. Aligning Military/Security Tasks to a DSR.**

In developing a military/security task list (MSTL) for an FSF unit, Marines use a logical progression of task chaining and linking. The MSTs that comprise an MSTL offer a standards-based approach to assessing the FSF that closely mirrors the SATE and ADDIE process. The SATE process and use of Marine Corps T&R standards must be carefully adjusted to the local partner nation military's current capability, social and cultural conditions, and absorptive capacity.

The MST/MSTL construct differs from the Marine Corps' mission-essential task (MET) and mission-essential task list (METL) construct in that tasks are tailored to the FSF and e-coded (i.e., evaluation-coded training) events are tailored to the DSR.

Table 4-2 provides a comparative example of the Marine Corps MET and METL construct (left) and the MST/MSTL construct (right) used for FSFs.

Collective and individual training standards in support of MSTs are e-coded; failure to perform the event to standard results in failure to accomplish the MST and by extension the DSR. Thus, the MST/MSTL construct used by the Marine Corps planner nests within Marine Corps unit training management (UTM) because all MSTs are mission focused. Narrowing the focus from a relatively broad Marine Corps MET to MSTs tailored to an FSF organization allows the SC planner and advisor teams to maximize training and allows assessors to focus on crucial elements of DSR accomplishment.


Another difference in the MST/MSTL and MET and METL constructs is the level at which events can be e-coded. In Marine Corps T&R manuals, events below the 7000 (battalion) level are rarely e-coded. Most Marine Corps SC activities with FSFs take place at the 6000 (company), 5000 (platoon) and 4000 (squad) level. Allowing the planner to e-code events independently of the MET and METL construct allows them to effectively prioritize training events and standards to be assessed.

The planner uses MSTs and continues chaining and linking to determine the capability requirements the FSF must be able to execute to achieve the DSR (see Figure 4-5).

Table 4-2. Marine Corps and FSF Chaining and Linking Comparison.

Marine Corps Task Level	METL Example of Chained Events to a MCT	FSF Task Level	DSR: Conduct of Offensive Ops ISO a Combined Force
MCT/MET	MCT 1.6.1 Conduct offensive operations.	Military/security task	MST 1 Conduct offensive operations.
8000-6000	INF-MAN-8001 Conduct offensive operations. INF-C2-8004 Conduct combat operations center operations. INF-C2-8005 Conduct Planning.	Capability set	1.1 Conduct Bn-level command and control. 1.2 Establish a fire support coordination center. 1.3 Plan and conduct intelligence operations.
7000-3000	INF-MAN-7001: Conduct a ground attack. INF-MAN-6001: Conduct a ground attack. INF-MAN-5001: Conduct a ground attack. INF-MAN-4001: Conduct a ground attack. INF-MAN-3001: Conduct fire and movement.	Sub-capability set*	1.1.1 Operate a combat operations center. 1.2.1 Conduct fire support coordination. 1.2.2 Establish a company-level intel cell.
2000-1000	0300-ISUL-2501 Lead a squad. 0300-OFF-1001 Perform actions in a hasty firing position. 0300-PAT-1008 Perform individual actions in a patrol. 0300-M16-1005 Zero a rifle combat optic to a service rifle.	Individual skills	1.1.1.1. Operate a radio. 1.2.1.1. Occupy a mortar firing position. 1.2.1.2. Conduct a tactical site exploitation.
This represents an METL required to conduct 1.6.1 offensive operations. Only one MCT (reference MCO 3500 series, depending on FSF capability).		*Units, advisors, SC teams, SMEEs, etc., use judgment to develop a chained, linked FSF MSTL commensurate with FSF capability to be built (e.g., Bn., company, platoon).	
<b>LEGEND</b>			
Bn	battalion	ISUL	infantry small-unit leader
C2	command and control	MAN	maneuver
INF	infantry	MCT	Marine Corps task
ISO	in support of	PAT	patrol

The MST/MSTL is a vital part of AM&E within the SCPEC. Initially, the MST/MSTL provides a basis for the FSF unit-level assessment and assists planners with identifying gaps in an FSF's ability to perform the DSR. Subsequently, the capabilities, sub-capabilities, and skills, aggregated under MSTs, create lines of efforts within the MYEP, which are monitored through the engagement plan tracker and evaluated using interim progress reports (IPRs). For DSRs nested under SSCIs, this is a mechanism of feedback to inform CCMD PMRs. Lastly, the MYEP close-out report focuses on the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR through the framework of the MST/MSTL.

**NOTE**

Notional depiction of chaining and linking of tasks in support of desired security role, Military/Security task, and capabilities.

**Figure 4-5. Chaining and Linking to Capability Requirements.**

For a DSR related to access there may be no need for a capability-based MSTL. The assessor would instead focus on the suitability of an airfield, or the compatibility of a port with US shipping, depending on the type of access needed. If the MSTL is associated with an access DSR, it should be tailored to the specific DSR. In many cases, tactical activity is required to achieve the DSR (e.g., platoon exchange for access). In these cases, the MSTL's focus would still be on DSR achievement—not the tactical proficiency of the FSF.

### Outputs

**Component-Level Assessment Findings.** Findings from the component-level assessments should demonstrate the objectives sought after through engagement with the partner nation (e.g., access, minimizing partner nation capability gaps). A component-level assessment's findings become the basis for the stakeholder analysis and DSR development.

**Approved Desired Security Role.** The approved DSR defines the role the partner nation must fill to achieve US objectives.

**Foreign Security Forces Military/Security Tasks and Capability Requirements.** The FSF capability requirements are derived from the MSTs it must achieve, improve, or sustain to effectively execute the DSR.

## STEP 3: FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE UNIT-LEVEL ASSESSMENT

During Step 3 the planner assesses the FSF's ability to perform the required capabilities to achieve the approved DSR.

**Lead**

The MCCC planner is responsible for the FSF unit-level assessment but will delegate the assessment as appropriate.

**Focus**

The focus of Step 3 is assessment of the designated FSF.

**Timeline**

The timeline for this step varies but can take up to 6 months.

**Inputs**

**Approved Desired Security Role.** The approved DSR defines MSTs and the capability requirements used to measure the FSF's performance.

**Military/Security Task List and Capability Requirements.** The planner uses the MSTL and capability requirements to formulate the standards used to measure the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR.

**Marine Corps Training and Readiness Manual.** The MCO 3500 series (T&R manuals) contain events that guide force generation, training, and education. This system of progressive and ordered events minimizes duplications, ensures training effectiveness, standardizes capability development, and generates FSF capabilities. The T&R manual is a guide for shaping assessment criteria. For additional information refer to Appendix E.

**Process**

**Assess Need for Unit-Level Assessment.** To determine the necessity for an FSF unit-level assessment, consider the following:

- If the DSR for a country is only access, a unit-level assessment is not necessary; the planner will skip Step 3 and jump to Step 4. Access requirements in support of operational and contingency plans are a CCMD responsibility. However, the Marine Corps might identify requirements in support of Marine Corps capabilities and make recommendations to the CCMD.
- For capability DSRs, a unit-level assessment is necessary, and is conducted to measure the FSF's ability to execute those MSTs and capability requirements required to achieve the DSR, validate any assumptions made about the FSF during the SCPEC Steps 1 and 2, identify capability gaps, and validate the willingness of the FSF to act in a capacity commensurate with the DSR. An FSF unit-level assessment considers all factors that influence an FSF organization and is designed to provide stakeholders with as much information as possible to determine whether to move forward with a MYEP.
- FSF unit-level assessments can be built into existing exercises and training planning cycles.

**Establish FSF Unit-Level Assessment Criteria.** The planner uses the DSR and previously identified capability requirements to determine the scope (e.g., logistics vs. infantry skills, general vs. technical skills) and scale (e.g., platoon vs. battalion) of the FSF unit-level assessment.

**Source Assessment Team.** The component command might source assigned forces or organic personnel to conduct an FSF unit-level assessment, or request forces or support from the MCACs, MEFs, or other supporting establishment forces through the GFM process.



**Gather Input for an FSF Unit-Level Assessment.** The planner and the assessment team should review all pertinent documents, trip reports, after action reports (AARs), FSF briefs, etc., of previous activities and engagements with a given FSF or FSF unit. If possible, they should also conduct interviews of current advisors or personnel in-country or who have returned, and research SC databases (e.g., Socium). Finally, the planner should inform or receive input from other agencies that conduct assessments, such as the Center for Naval Analysis, SPP activities, other component command assessments, and any CCMD-level assessments.

**Develop Unit-Level Assessment Performance Evaluation Checklists.** The planner will need to develop performance evaluation checklists (PECLs) to measure the FSF's current state and ability to perform the DSR. A PECL consists of collective standards, required to conduct the MSTL, and is based on Marine Corps equivalent standards. The PECLs will be used to evaluate the FSF's proficiency level during the FSF unit-level assessment. Much of the required information necessary to inform the scoping of the FSF unit-level assessment can be found in previously conducted assessments, to include the initial assessment and component-level assessment. See Appendix E for notional PECLs.

If the FSF has their own T&R-like reference(s) the planner should develop PECLs according to the FSF's existing standards. Some partner nations participate in international collective security agreements, such as NATO. In these cases, the planner should use NATO training standards to develop PECLs. Regardless, the planner develops PECLs in conjunction with the stakeholders (e.g., SC teams, exercise forces), and should review these standards in comparison to the requirements of the MSTL and capability requirements developed to satisfy the DSR. This ensures the FSF trains to standards and tasks associated with the DSR.

Some FSFs do not have established T&R reference(s). In these cases, the planner needs to reference Marine Corps T&R standards, establish appropriate FSF standards, develop PECLs, and coordinate with the stakeholders of the SC activity on which events the FSF will be graded against.

Security cooperation practitioners and planners should not expect FSFs to meet Marine Corps T&R standards. While Marine Corps T&R standards may be used as a reference, planners must develop standards according to the DSR, FSF absorptive capacity, and available resources.

**Conduct FSF Unit-Level Assessment.** An FSF unit-level assessment generally focuses on operational analysis, described in Appendix D, and consists of the following actions:

- Measure FSF's Ability to Perform the DSR. In most cases the assessment team travels to the partner nation and evaluates the FSF in their own facilities and training locations. The FSF elements can be brought to other locations for this step.
- Validate Assumptions About FSF. The assessment team will confirm or deny assumptions made during SCPEC Steps 1 and 2 regarding the FSF's ability to perform the DSR. They should also determine the absorptive capacity of the FSF, to include the partner nation's ability to sustain and replicate the forces required to achieve the DSR.
- Validate FSF's Willingness to Execute DSR. During the assessment, through interaction with the FSF and its leadership, the assessment team confirms the FSF's willingness to perform the DSR.

**Conduct Capabilities Gap Analysis.** The planner compares the results of the FSF unit-level assessment against the MSTL derived during Step 2, Security Role Analysis. This comparison will provide a list of capability gaps that must be addressed to achieve the DSR. In some situations, the planner will need to refine the MSTs based on assessment findings. The capabilities gap analysis allows planners to make risk decisions in the context of overall USG engagement in country and theater. The planner also uses this information for the continuation of chaining and linking of MSTs and capability requirements into sub-capabilities and individual skills requirements later in Step 4, Solutions Analysis.

**Develop FSF Unit-Level Assessment Report.** The planner compiles and summarizes the research completed during all previous assessments (e.g., initial assessment, component-level assessment) and provides a recommendation with justification to proceed or not proceed with developing an FSF along the identified capability gaps. The assessment report should examine risk considerations, such as US and partner nation commitment and the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR. Finally, the planner provides an estimate of the resources (forces and funding) and time required to achieve the DSR.

### **Outputs**

**FSF Unit-Level Assessment Report.** The FSF unit-level assessment report provides a list of gaps in the FSF's current capability to perform the DSR. This report details the assessment process and results and provides a recommendation for continuation of the MYEP.

---

## **STEP 4: SOLUTIONS ANALYSIS**

During this step the planner determines solutions to the gaps in an FSF's ability to achieve a DSR through the development of resource-informed mitigations (i.e., SC activities). The end state of solutions analysis is to develop a MYEP. The MYEP and associated activities support and nest within higher strategic guidance. The plan, which can be shaped by strategic guidance, can shape country plans, SSCIs, CCPs, CSCSs, etc.

### **Lead**

The MCCC planner is responsible for solutions analysis and works with relevant staff and SMEs.

### **Focus**

Focus entails coordination across the command's staff and the larger Marine Corps with support from SMEs in relevant warfighting functions, UTM, fiscal, legal, and force management.

### **Timeline**

The time required for this step depends on the size of the initiative and its requirements. Security cooperation activities requiring congressional notification and approval can take more than twelve months to obtain approval and funding for program execution. Exercise-related authorities should be identified at the earliest part of the Joint Exercise Life Cycle. Longer-timeline authorities are not intended for emergent requirements.

## Input

**FSF Unit-Level Assessment Report.** The FSF unit-level assessment report supplies a list of capability gaps in relation to the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR. This list is the starting point for conducting solutions analysis.

## Process

**Prioritize Gaps Identified in FSF Unit-Level Assessment Report.** The planner prioritizes the identified capability gaps, in accordance with applicable guidance, to achieve the DSR.

**Solutions to Capability Gaps.** Solutions to address capability gaps should be practical, able to be absorbed and sustained by the partner nations, and financially viable. Solutions (i.e., events and activities) can take many forms (e.g., FMS, international military education and training [IMET], KLEs, subject matter expert exchanges [SMEEs], exercises). A MYEP can include a varying number of events, depending on available resources and guidance. Training events should be organized from basic to advanced or individual to collective skills. Solutions should be prioritized based on a risk assessment for achieving the DSR. Planners must recognize differences in willingness, capacity, and resources, and tailor expectations and solutions accordingly. A general lack of absorptive capacity might require rethinking task design. For example, a partner nation may require secure communications to conduct operations against an opposing force. While encrypted radios might be the ideal solution, previous engagements could reveal that partner nation personnel lack the training to program or sustain them, reverting instead to unsecured cell phones. A more viable alternative, such as cell phones with simplified encryption, can align better with the partner nation's existing practices while still achieving the desired operational effect.

Figure 4-6 shows examples of possible solutions for each tier of the SC pyramid, which was previously discussed in Chapter 1.




Figure 4-6. "Security Cooperation Pyramid" Possible Solutions to Capability Gaps.

**Coordinate Across the Staff.** The planner should coordinate with legal, finance, and other staff sections, as appropriate. Coordination is required for identifying the appropriate processes, justifications, and authorities. The planner must also coordinate with intelligence, foreign disclosure, operations cell to coordinate GFM and request for forces [RFF] or capabilities (e.g., logistics planners, and others that can amplify the MYEP and establish unity of effort to achieve appropriate outcomes).

**Define Measures of Performance and Effectiveness.** A DSR defines the desired end state of a specific FSF. To measure progress towards this goal, the planner must define specific indicators. Measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are quantitative and qualitative indicators used for this purpose.

**Measures of Performance.** A MOP is an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Measures of performance are commonly addressed in task execution matrices and confirm or deny proper task performance. For example, they help answer the questions, “Are we doing things right?” or “Was the action taken?” or “Was the task completed to standard?”

**Measures of Effectiveness.** A MOE is an indicator used to measure a current system state with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Measures of effectiveness help answer the question, “Are we doing the right things to create the effects of changes in the conditions of the operational environment that we desire?”

Data to support the MOP and MOE can be collected using various methods (e.g., research, observation, conversation). They can be conducted in a formal or informal setting (e.g., during a large-scale exercise or in a phone conversation with a unit representative).

Additionally, MOPs and MOEs can be conducted by various individuals or teams (e.g., assessment team, advisor team, MTT). Figure 4-7 contains MOP and MOE examples related to desired partner nation FSF capabilities.

**Establish Milestones.** Milestones are scheduled events that indicate the completion of a major program task. They are observable and enable the measurement of the program’s progress. When met, specific FSF achievements result in proficient performance ratings that link to the FSF’s ability to perform the related DSR. How these events are organized is determined by the planner and based on the resource picture and priority of that FSF’s development in comparison to other commander priorities. The MOPs and MOEs are used to determine whether the FSF unit has achieved a specified milestone. Assessing achievements can require detailed planning efforts to build an assessment team and associated criteria.




Figure 4-7. "Security Cooperation Pyramid" MOP and MOE Examples.

**Identify Decision Points.** Decision points are a point in space and time when the commander or staff anticipates making a key decision concerning a specific course of action. Planners need to identify known decision points, which allow commanders the opportunity to look for alternatives and minimize risk. For example, if the FSF fails to achieve a milestone, a decision must be made to adjust the plan or discontinue working with a given FSF. Planners should be prepared for ad-hoc decision points that might occur, such as a change in a partner nation's willingness to support a DSR, shifts in USG or DoD priority, leadership changes, or a sudden change in available resources.

**Security Cooperation Concept of Engagement.** An SC concept of engagement is a synchronized graphical representation used to organize and depict initial conditions and the FSF unit's desired end state (i.e., DSR), chronologically ordered SC events and milestones, and sourcing considerations and solutions overlaid on a timeline. It provides a graphical representation of primary activities across the MYEP.

Figure 4-8 depicts an example SC concept of engagement. It provides different activities over multiple years, using a SPMAGTF as the primary sourcing effort. The example is not representative of the full measure of efforts required to fulfill a DSR. However, it does illustrate how SC planning must be comprehensive, strategic in nature, requires a multi-year effort, and contributes to and draws from DOS, DoD, and Marine Corps planning and resourcing processes. Many administrative software tools can be used to develop and monitor a security cooperation concept of engagement.





Figure 4-8. Marine Corps Security Cooperation Concept of Engagement.

**Solutions Analysis: Chaining and Linking Tasks to DSR.** To best understand how to chronologically align specific solutions to address capability gaps, planners should chain and link tasks from MSTs to individual skills to aid the progression of the FSF toward DSR achievement in a defined and measurable manner. Figure 4-9 depicts the standards-based approach of chaining the DSR to MSTs, based on capability gaps identified in the FSF unit-level assessment. Figure 4-9 also demonstrates the further chaining of the individual skills required to perform the subordinate capabilities. Assigned units or teams can be given the responsibility to link the individual skills required of the FSF to accomplish a subordinate capability. In the example below, the assigned executing unit creates the associated training package to achieve a sub-capability using the Marine Corps SATE and ADDIE process.

**Event Performance Evaluation Checklists.** A PECL is developed for each sub-capability of a capability set associated with each MST supporting a DSR. Event PECLs should be created from previous FSF unit-level assessments; however, only a portion of the PECLs might be relevant to a single event. The group of PECLs provided to a unit executing an event should be scoped accordingly. It might be necessary to refine PECLs. In such cases, planners should seek SME input. These PECLs become the standard for FSF evaluation used throughout the lifecycle of the MYEP (two-five years) and ensures the FSF's performance is appropriately measured against the same baseline. This provides the planner with the quantitative data to accurately assess, monitor, evaluate and report the progress of the FSF against established standards, which move toward DSR achievement.

**NOTE**

Notional depiction of chaining and linking of tasks in support of desired security role, military/security task, and capabilities.

**Figure 4-9. Chaining and Linking to Individual Skill Sets.**

**Event Cards.** Planners use event cards to guide activity design and sequencing to ensure activities are cumulative and progress the FSF over time. Event cards are specific to each event reflected in a MYEP. The primary purpose of an event card is to scope an executing unit's mission (e.g., advise, train, assist, assess) for a singular event. Once an executing unit for a specific event is identified, the associated event card should be provided to them as a guide for follow-on detailed planning. Depending on the scope of the event, a single event could include all capabilities and sub-capabilities associated with an MST or it could be very narrowly focused on a particular technical sub-capability; each event card should reflect accordingly. Planners also develop event cards for activities, such as exercises, KLEs, and SMEEs. These event cards can support justification for obtaining appropriate resources to achieve the MYEP objectives. An example of an SC event card is shown in Figure 4-10.

LOO # 1: Maneuver									
Milestone #1: Military/Security Task 1: Conduct amphibious assaults and raids									
Capability set 1.2: Light infantry operations									
Event Number	Sub-capability	Recommended Audience	Engagement Category	Sub-activity	Organization	Planner	Location Base/ City/Country	Estimated Cost	
1.1.2.1	Machine gunnery	FSF HQ	Supply	TBD	TBD	TBD	TBD	Number of Personnel:	
	Purpose: to train the FSF in basic machine gunnery (to include live-fire evaluation).							Number of Days:	
	Description: Advisor team develops training package to provide basic machine gunnery skills to the FSF. Training should be standards based and train competency up to platoon level and culminate with a live-fire evaluation that will use Marine Corps standard T&R PECLS.							Travel:	
	Additional comments: The FSF must submit a formal letter of request to the SCO to obtain associated Marine Corps publications. See publication list associated with this event. Evaluations Standards will be agreed upon with stakeholders of the multi-year engagement plan (SCO, MARFOR, and CCMD Staff).							Per Diem:	
	Countries involved: United States and FSF							Event Cost:	
	Event linkages: This event may be combined with other light infantry events.								

**LEGEND**  
TBD to be determined

**Figure 4-10. Security Cooperation Event Card.**

**Engagement Plan Tracker.** Creating an engagement plan tracker is a best practice that can be used by SC planners to administratively organize events, track assessment data, and capture progress of an FSF's organization over the span of multiple years. Using a series of spreadsheets, planners can track progress of the FSF. For example, from attaining a single sub-capability skill, to the entire capability set, to the associated MST, to all MSTs, and to ultimately enabling the FSF to perform the DSR. Figure 4-11 provides an example of an engagement plan tracker and represents how the logical progression of linked capabilities development can be used to track FSF progression.

Completed Events			Partially Complete Events			Cancelled/Problem Events		
Milestone 1								
Military/Security Task 1: Conduct amphibious assaults and raids								
Capability Set 1.1: Ship to shore movement				Capability Set 1.2: Light infantry operations			Capability Set:	
Sub-capabilities				Sub-capabilities			Sub-capabilities	
1.1.1.1	1.1.1.2	1.1.1.3	1.1.1.4	1.1.2.1	1.1.2.2	1.1.2.3		
Military/Security Task 2: Conduct maritime/small boat security operations								
Capability Set 2.1				Capability Set 2.2			Capability Set 2.3	
Sub-capabilities				Sub-capabilities			Sub-capabilities	
1.2.1.1	1.2.1.2	1.2.1.3		1.2.2.1	1.2.2.2	1.2.2.3	1.2.2.4	1.2.2.5
Milestone								
Military/Security Task:								
Capability Set				Capability Set			Capability Set:	
Sub-capabilities				Sub-capabilities			Sub-capabilities	
Milestone								
Military/Security Task:								
Capability Set				Capability Set			Capability Set:	
Sub-capabilities				Sub-capabilities			Sub-capabilities	

**Figure 4-11. Engagement Plan Tracker.**



**Multi-Year Engagement Plan.** The components described below comprise the Marine Corps' definition of a MYEP. A MYEP is a resource-derived, comprehensive plan that incorporates strategy, methodology, and timeline to conduct activities that close capability gaps and enable the FSF to fulfill a DSR. It is a "living" plan that must remain flexible based on priorities, resource availability, and changing conditions in the operational environment. At a minimum, the MYEP should include:

- Background. An scene-setting document that provides context for the plan.
- Executive Summary. A succinct summary of the key points of the plan.
- Security Cooperation Concept of Engagement. A synchronized graphical representation used to organize and depict the initial conditions and an FSF unit's desired end state (i.e., DSR), chronologically ordered SC events and milestones, sourcing considerations and solutions overlaid on a timeline.
- Security Cooperation Event Cards. A security cooperation event scoping and reporting tool. They contain a summary of the training, logistics, and funding requirements associated with an SC event. The cards are provided to an executing unit to enable follow-on planning.
- Engagement Plan Tracker. A series of spreadsheets used to administratively organize events, track assessment data, and capture FSF progress.
  - ♦ Training Evaluation Matrix. A part of the engagement plan tracker used during FSF training evaluations to produce overall training readiness grades for the training unit (see Appendix E).
- Enclosures. Enclosures include the CCP, CSSC and country plan, CSP, SSCI documents (if the MYEP is nested under an SSCI), and any supporting assessment summaries from the CCMD, component-level assessment report, FSF unit-level assessment report, higher-level supporting guidance, and any other documents as necessary.

The planner should leverage the appropriate information management structure to ensure centralized access to the MYEP.

## Outputs

The outputs of Step 4, Solutions Analysis, include—

- A planned and approved, but not yet resourced, MYEP.
- Authority to proceed with coordinating the commitment of personnel and resources in support of MYEP execution.
- Service concurrence to coordinate and commit personnel and resources in support of MYEP execution.

---

## **STEP 5: RESOURCE ANALYSIS**

Once the CCMD approves a MYEP and the Service concurs, the planner must identify resources required to effectively execute it. Resources include all required forces, funding, materiel, and training necessary across the lifecycle of the plan. Accordingly, resource analysis is a recurring step over the course of a plan's lifecycle, due to evolving fiscal and manpower prioritization and conditions in the operational environment.

### **Lead**

The planner leads resource analysis in collaboration with other staff members, internal and external, who are SMEs in disciplines, such as fiscal, force management, legal, and operations.

### **Focus**

Focus requires staff coordination across the command and the larger Marine Corps with respect to relevant process and cycle timelines (e.g., POM, GFM) and key events (e.g., Force Synchronization).

### **Timeline**

Sourcing and resourcing require broad consideration of Marine Corps institutional priorities and objectives approximately 18-24 months in advance, with an increased level of commitment as the execution of distinct events and activities nears.

### **Inputs**


Inputs to Step 5, Resource Analysis, include—

- An approved MYEP.
- Sourcing and resourcing guiding documents and processes (e.g., GFM, POM, MCO 5710.6, MCBul 3120, MCO 3120.12A, *Marine Corps GFM and Force Synchronization*).

### **Process**

**Determine Applicable Authorities.** A significant consideration for SC planning involves gaining the funding (appropriation) and authority to execute SC activities. Statutory authorities to conduct SC include multiple titles across USC (primarily Title 10 and Title 22), as well as temporary authorities in public law. Policies (e.g., DoD directives, DoD instructions, CJCS instructions, Navy manuals, MCOs) and execution authorities (executive orders, planning orders) complement and further refine the processes, procedures, and guidelines for implementing authorities that govern the execution of SC activities.

Funding sources for SC vary and could include appropriations from Congress to DoD for specific programs; USG agency appropriations, such as DOS appropriations; or Service operations and maintenance funding streams. Some SC programs, such as FMS and education and training, are paid for by partner nations and can be dual-funded or completely US-funded. Figure 4-12 is an example of programs under both Title 10 (DoD) and Title 22 (DOS) and shows how they overlap when DOS appropriations are implemented by DoD.



**Figure 4-12. Title 10 and Title 22 Program Comparison.**

The DSCA maintains the electronic Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), which contains the most up-to-date listing of approved authorities, programs, and guidance (<https://samm.dsca.mil/listing/esamm>). Refer to Appendix A for commonly used SC activities and their governing authorities and resources.

**Identify Available Resources.** The planner must identify, plan for, and begin acquiring resources (forces, funds, authorities, training, and material) required to execute the MYEP plan.

Potential challenges include the following:

- Obligating funds within the fiscal year of availability.
- Limited Service capacity for specific capability sets.
- Limited availability of desired material.
- Implementation.
- Political-military changes.
- Limited available funding.
- Partner nation (e.g., funding, timelines, capacity to adapt, or legal statutes).
- DoD policy restrictions (e.g., boots on the ground).

Innovative, low-footprint approaches using already allocated forces and available funding within congressionally mandated authorities can be sufficient in some circumstances. Some significant processes and considerations are described in the following sections.

*Program Objective Memorandum.* A POM is the final product of the programming process within the DoD. A component's POM displays the resource allocation decisions of the military departments in response to and in accordance with the Force Management Plan and Defense Planning Guidance. The POM cycle is planned two years in advance and shows programmed needs for five years. Accordingly, a planner must both be aware of the timelines and how to compete with other activities within the Marine Corps POM cycle, making appropriate recommendations supporting approved MYEPs.

*Security Cooperation Proposals.* Many SC-specific authorities require the development and submission of proposals for authorities and funding authorizations. Some of these authorities include congressionally appropriated funds whereas others authorize the expenditure of Service operation and maintenance funds. Most proposals must be routed through and approved by the CCMD prior to submission to OSD or the joint staff. Due to the long timelines associated with approval, advanced planning on the part of the planner is required to develop a proposal, submit it to the CCMD, and receive approval. At a minimum, a twelve-month lead time is required for most BPC authorities.

*Global Force Management.* The GFM process enables the SecDef to make proactive, risk-informed decisions to align forces against known CCDR requirements in advance of planning and deployment preparation timelines. Global force management serves a large role in plan execution; therefore, it is vital that planners understand the DoD process to request appropriate forces to meet CCDR requirements. If able, Service component commands should execute engagements with their own assigned and rotationally allocated forces. For those that do not have assigned forces, or when requirements exceed the component's capacity to source, the component command should use the existing GFM RFF processes.

The Marine Corps GFM and force synchronization process drives the synchronization of force generation, sustainment planning, and execution. Under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, the CMC nominates available Marine Corps units, personnel, equipment, and other resources for employment via respective CCDRs. The CMC also approves the allocation of Marine Corps forces in support of Title 10 and other institutional responsibilities (e.g., training, exercises, and experimentation).

*Force Synchronization Systems and Tools.* In executing the aforementioned responsibilities, the CMC directs and employs Marine Corps force synchronization conferences and force operations summits to develop informed force allocation decisions and recommendations. The Force Synchronization process facilitates Service-wide coordination and alignment of force generation actions in support of Title 10 responsibilities, resulting in proper manning, training, and equipping of nominated forces and units for forward deployment and employment. The output from these forums is the release of the MCBul 3120. For further guidance, reference MCO 3120.12A. Table 4-3 provides a list of additional force synchronization systems and tools.

Table 4-3. Force Synchronization Systems and Tools.

System	SIPR/NIPR	Principal Users	Purpose
JCRM/ LOGBOOK	SIPR	CCDRs, JS, PP&O	Used to register and track CCDR operations (force) requirements.
JOPEs	SIPR	JS, PP&O, component commands, MEFs, SE	Used to plan, assign, and track lift requirements through planning, sourcing, and execution of force deployment and redeployment.
JTIMS	SIPR	CCDRs, JS, component commands	Used to register CCDR and joint exercise requirements and associated sourcing solutions.
JNTC Agreements List	SIPR	JS, J7, Services, US Special Operations Command	Used to register and track the JNTC exercise force requests.
JMAPS	SIPR	CCDRs, JS, M&RA, component commands	Used to register JMD/JIA requirements.
Marine Corps Force Management Tool	SIPR	Marine Corps-wide	Used to track all Marine Corps requirements and associated sourcing solutions.
JIA Playbook	SIPR	M&RA, PP&O	Used to track Marine Corps JMD/JIA requirements and associated sourcing solutions.
Slider	SIPR	Marine Corps-wide	Graphical presentation of employment decisions and effects.
MCMPs MRTM	NIPR	M&RA, PP&O	Tracks Marine Corps individual augment requirements and sourcing.
MCTIMS	NIPR	Marine Corps-wide	Used to develop the units' training plans, training schedules, and record training achievement.
<b>LEGEND</b> JMAPS    Joint Manpower and Personnel System JIA        joint individual augmentee JNTC      Joint National Training Capability JOPEs    Joint Operational Planning and Execution System JS         Joint Staff M&RA     Manpower and Reserve Affairs MCMPs    Marine Corps Mobilization Processing System MCTIMS   Marine Corps Training Information Management System MRTM     Manpower Requirements Tracking Module NIPR      Nonclassified Internet Protocol Router SE         Supporting Establishment SIPR      Secret Internet Protocol Router			

**Consider Timelines.** The planner must consider timelines to register requirements using appropriate venues or systems (e.g., POM, GFM, Joint Training Information Management System [JTIMS], Joint Capabilities Resource Manager [JCRM]). Requested resources must be confirmed prior to the execution of any activity in support of a MYEP. As such, the planner should account for resources that can be acquired in the current and subsequent fiscal year, as well as projections that will require POM and GFM submissions. Resourcing is driven by distinct battle rhythms for

sourcing and resourcing, in addition to the execution of individual activities. Generally, Reserve Component-sourced requirements should be identified approximately 12-months prior to the activation date.

Short notice SC activities often generate emergent requirements that CCDRs cannot effectively staff and source through the annual GFM process. In these instances, the emergent RFF process is used to pursue sourcing for requirements within the annual cycle. Manning should first be sourced through FOS and Service-retained force allocations. As per MCO 3120.12A, RFFs should only be used when these mechanisms cannot meet operational demands and must be validated by Joint Staff before execution. The Service will only entertain emergent requirements after they have been validated by the Joint Staff and sent down to the Marine Corps for feasibility and risk assessment. This does not alleviate MCCC's responsibility for registering the requirements in JCRM. The planner must follow through to ensure all aspects of the event are properly tracked and completed.

**Conduct Staff Coordination.** Once applicable authorities and available resources are identified, the **actions in the list below** are required to resource a MYEP. The planner is likely not the SME on these matters but must be proficient enough to coordinate the completion of these tasks by appropriate personnel (i.e., other staff sections, unit and team assigned to execute a security cooperation event).

The required actions are as follows:

- Continue coordinating MYEP execution preparations with other stakeholders (e.g., SCO/ DATT, CCMD Staff).
- Complete force management requirements.
- Identify mitigation options and provide alternate recommendations (e.g., available resources from other DoD entities, the DOS, nongovernmental organizations) in the event requested resources are denied or unavailable.
- Enter planned events into the appropriate SC database (e.g., Socium) for all events involving Marine Corps personnel.
- Conduct detailed coordination with the country team.
- Facilitate the required training, equipping, and preparation of a unit and team assigned to execute an SC event. For example, proper command relationships and associated operational and tactical command and control are identified and communicated; acquiring the necessary travel documentation such as visas and passports, immunizations; proper uniforms for geography, weather, and activity; government charge card authorizations; and proper travel authorities (verification of status protection, country, theater entry approval, and isolated personnel report).
- Provide foreign disclosure guidance and facilitate requests between units and teams (once assigned) and foreign disclosure officers (FDOs).
- Assist in the facilitation of the translation of training materials to be used by units and teams.

**Force Management Requirements.** Per MCO 5710.6, when MCCC's use forces for SC events, requirements should be relayed through JCRM, JMPAS, JTIMS, or the MRTM to DC PP&O for registration in the appropriate Global Force Management system. The planner may be required to

make entries in additional systems or send official correspondence to units and agencies including entry of specific events and activities into JTIMS, submission of FOS or RFF correspondence for requested resources, etc.

Two key Force Management Requirements are—

- **Feasibility of Support.** A FOS request is a joint or Marine Corps request to determine the availability, readiness, and commitment of specified forces or capabilities. The query is used throughout force synchronization and supports capability identification, force analysis, and sourcing solution development. The FOS query can be generated by any Marine Corps command and serves to gather information but is not directive. Responses, agreements, or information exchanged during FOS staffing actions must be codified through formal submissions to the Joint Staff. Potential force providers will provide risk-to-force assessments in response to assigned FOS requests. This risk assessment provides valuable insights on the available inventory of forces and the potential adverse effects on future force readiness and impacts to GFM requirements.
- **Request for Forces and Request for Capabilities.** An RFF and request for capabilities (RFC) is originated by a CCDR or force provider for units or capabilities to address requirements that cannot be sourced by the requesting headquarters. The request is generated because either the unit or capability is not resident in existing assigned or allocated forces or the unit or capability is not available due to current force commitments with other ongoing requirements in the CCDR's AOR. RFFs are not used to request forces for exercises or individual requirements. Further details regarding FOS queries and RFF and RFCs can be found in MCO 3120.12A.

## Outputs

The outputs of Step 5, Resource Analysis, include—

- Submitted POM or SC authority proposal in support of SC events from an approved MYEP.
- Submitted Force Management Tool or FOS message traffic in support of SC events from an approved MYEP.
- Generated RFF and RFC message traffic in support of SC events from an approved MYEP.
- Identified resourcing gaps with recommended mitigations and alternate solutions.
- Resourced (fully or partially) MYEP.

---

## STEP 6: EXECUTION, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION

Step 6 is a feedback loop of execution, monitoring, and evaluation, concluding with close-out actions. The planner must effectively manage and coordinate MYEP activities with stakeholders (e.g., CCMD, SCO, HQMC) and force providers, as well as maintain lines of communication with stakeholders, force providers, assigned units and teams, and FSF leadership.

**Lead**

The MCCC planner is responsible for the overall execution of the MYEP, ensuring long-term support from stakeholders, coordinating across the command and higher headquarters staff(s), and ensuring the teams assigned to execute the events are adequately informed, resourced, conducting activities in the proper sequence, and providing meaningful feedback.

**Focus**

The focus of Step 6 is on the progress of the MYEP and the progression of the FSF towards the DSR.

**Timeline**

A MYEP is generally designed to span two-five years; the duration of the execution step should correspond accordingly, but is subject to political-military changes, funding availability, policy restrictions, etc.

**Inputs**

The inputs for Step 6, Execution, Monitoring, and Evaluation, include—

- A resourced (fully or partially) MYEP.
- CCMD authority and Service concurrence to execute the approved MYEP.

**Process**

**Conduct Stakeholder Coordination.** Multi-year engagement plan execution requires continual monitoring of stakeholder objectives because a change in stakeholders' position can influence the plan. The planner should be aware of all SC activities conducted with the FSF (i.e., SPP engagements) to ensure appropriate deconfliction, coordination, and synchronization of efforts and outcomes. Coordination with other Marine Corps entities (e.g., supporting establishment or other Marine forces), maritime component staff, defense agencies, DOS, adjacent joint, interagency, and partner nation units that are engaging with the same FSF is critical to ensure all activities are aligned and synchronized to avoid duplication of effort with the same FSF. Duplication of effort could disproportionately burden the FSF, create information gaps or over-saturation, and waste resources.

The planner must also recognize that the operational environment can rapidly change due to multiple factors, such as the political climate, US objectives, etc. Changes in the operational environment can affect the plan, its execution, and possibly the desired capability and capacity of the FSF.

Further operational limitations arise when the MYEP, or discrete SC events, receive partial resources, requiring continuous monitoring to modify, postpone, or cancel execution of ongoing activities. Modifications could involve combining activities, reducing the scale or scope, or working with other components or CCMD personnel to complement or conduct the activities.

As appropriate, the planner should incorporate activities conducted by other stakeholders into the MYEP to support MOP and MOE collection, provide additional indicators and milestones, and to achieve unity of effort. In some cases, given the level of engagement from other stakeholders, it might be necessary to adjust and refine the MYEP in both scale and scope.



If additional FSF or partner nation activities are conducted by another Marine Corps entity, such as a KLE or exercise, the planner should provide inputs for those events to ensure unity of effort. The planner can provide subject matter expertise on what types of activities support the DSR and will be supportable and sustainable for a given FSF.

**Conduct Staff Coordination.** The planner of the MYEP is responsible for facilitating the development of the FSF to meet a DSR to satisfy CCMD and Service objectives. The planner should continue all actions detailed in Step 5 when conducting staff coordination and conduct the following:

- Maintain electronic and administrative correspondence with all involved units and agencies, adjusting and tracking throughout the lifecycle of the plan.
- Record events, activities, progress, and feedback in JTIMS and SC databases such as Socium, as appropriate.
- Track FOS and RFF resource requests.
- Record plan adjustments as support and SME requirements change (e.g., the FSF has progressed from needing training in rifle marksmanship to requiring capacity to develop a marksmanship schoolhouse).
- Monitor and report progress of the FSF's ability to achieve the DSR and be prepared to recommend and seek approval from the commander for any significant changes to the MYEP based on analysis of FSF progress, changes in stakeholder objectives, or other operational environment changes. Socialize these approved modifications among all stakeholders.

**Conduct Unit and Team-Level Coordination.** The planner provides continuity as rotational units and teams execute one or more SC events on a given MYEP. However, because the planner might not necessarily be in-country during all SC events, awareness must be maintained via a robust relationship and a strong two-way feedback loop between the planner and the assigned units and teams. Coordination with assigned units and teams is described in more detail in Chapter 4.

**Monitor and Evaluate Progress.** Adaptive execution of SC activities depends upon continuous operation assessment. Monitoring and evaluation are two distinct tasks that are conducted as part of operation assessment. Both take place during execution, although evaluation can also take place after an activity is complete. Monitoring tracks mission progress against established indicators, (i.e., MOEs and MOPs) to establish progress toward objectives using the engagement plan tracker. Monitoring mission progress is a regular part of operations but also should be scheduled for review as part of the battle rhythm of the executing unit. Planners should attempt to re-scope any objectives that are not making progress over time. Evaluating assesses progress toward desired conditions to ascertain what is working, what did not work, why, and how, to inform decision making at appropriate levels. Interim progress reports are a key part of evaluating to assess progress.

**Develop Interim Progress Reports.** Planners develop IPRs to—

- Evaluate and provide feedback on the progress of the MYEP to SC planners at the Service component command.
- Determine whether programmatic milestones for FSF progression to the DSR are being achieved within anticipated time-frames and budgets.

Interim progress reports are critical during execution to monitor FSF progress, inform stakeholders, and recommend potential course adjustments. They also ensure planned activities are synchronized and that the plan still supports accomplishing US or Service objectives. The IPR informs higher-headquarters assessment and monitoring activities (e.g., as part of overall AM&E efforts and support of SSCIs and campaign assessment activities).

Considerations regarding IPRs include the following:

- The IPR informs decision makers, particularly with regard to resource allocation or re-allocation as required to adjust planned activities, and the composition and frequency of SC activities.
- Planners are responsible for scheduling IPRs throughout the lifecycle of a MYEP. The IPRs are intended to inform commanders, the US Embassy Team, CCMD staff, HQMC, and other stakeholders.
- The IPRs should take place yearly, or as required by the CCMD or Service component commander. In some cases, an IPR is conducted to collect information to inform lawmakers of expenditures incurred against FSF progress. The IPRs are critical to the success of a MYEP and are programmed into the plan during SCPEC, Steps 2-4.
- Marine attachés can be a useful resource for current FSF capabilities. Planners should interface regularly with available attachés for countries with MYEPs. However, there is no command relationship between attachés and planners. Attachés, while creating intelligence reports, generate information that could inform the planner. Additionally, a planner should inform the attaché on ongoing MYEP status.
- The IPR should be focused specifically on the event that has led to the planned IPR (typically a milestone) and that event's impact on accomplishment of the partner nation's DSR. In other words, if a DSR's end state is access to an area or the building of a relationship with a partner nation the IPR should be specifically focused on that milestone.

At a minimum, an IPR should contain the following:

- Executive summary.
- Significant milestone achievements.
- Status of MYEP progression (both schedule and resources) to include—
  - ♦ Factors contributing to on-track or accelerated MYEP progression.
  - ♦ Factors and challenges contributing to schedule delays or resource shortfalls.
- Conclusions and status of FSF or partner nation progression toward the DSR to include—
  - ♦ Recommendations for adjustments (if any).
  - ♦ IPR conclusions, which could provide a decision point for a commander to proceed as planned or adjust course.

The planner should leverage the appropriate information management structure to ensure centralized access to IPRs. The IPR should be formatted and written with the understanding that the information or IPR can be shared with relevant stakeholders, including the DOS and partner nation. The planner can request support from the SC workforce when conducting an IPR.

**Develop a Close-Out Report.** A close-out report, developed by the Service component command planner, is a comprehensive report of all activities conducted in support of the MYEP, FSF assessments, and all monitoring and evaluation activities. A close-out report is required once the FSF achieves the DSR or when it's deemed necessary to curtail engagements with an FSF unit. A close-out report should encapsulate the cumulative actions and funding to build FSF capability. The component command can use this report to keep the CCMD, HQMC, and other stakeholders informed, as appropriate. Because the planner is not on the ground advising or training the FSF daily, accurate input from assigned units and teams executing SC events is critical.

At a minimum, a close-out report contains the following:

- Executive Summary. A short, succinct summary (1-2 pages) of all actions executed.
- Background. A detailed explanation of all actions taken throughout the MYEP.
- Milestone Achievements. A listing and explanations of all designated milestones and what was or was not accomplished and why.
- Resource Management. This includes—
  - ♦ How Forces Were Used. A summary of the number of rotations, force type (MTT, MCAC, MAGTF, MEU), force strength (numbers), and structure (ranks).
  - ♦ Equipment Delivered. FMS, direct commercial sales, excess defense articles, etc.
  - ♦ Programs Used. IMET, MPEP, USC Title 10 Section 333, etc.
  - ♦ Fiscal Accounting. A complete listing of the cost of all resources expended; estimated cost versus actual cost must be represented.
- Close-Out Status. An explanation of the current status of the FSF and how the development and employment of the capability transitioned from the US to the FSF. This section should include the capability developed, the degree to which it was developed, and the projected ability of the FSF to sustain the capability. Security cooperation planners should be prepared to make recommendations regarding follow-on SC activities or involvement with the partner nation.
- Enclosures. The initial CCMD assessment summary, the component-level assessment, the unit-level FSF assessment, higher-level supporting guidance, all components of the MYEP, all FSF evaluations, IPRs, and rotational unit AARs.

A close-out report may include a final assessment of a milestone event that is tactically evaluated as a final measure of DSR achievement. Outputs from the tactical evaluation are used in the close-out report. If a tactical evaluation is not necessary (e.g., a capability was not built) a close-out report would instead be a compilation of previously conducted activities. The planner should leverage the appropriate information or knowledge management structure to ensure centralized access to the close-out report.

## Outputs

The output of Step 6 is a complete and approved close-out report.

## PLANNING AND EXECUTION CYCLE SUMMARY

Figure 4-13 depicts the entire SCPEC, as detailed in this chapter. Security cooperation planning and execution is dynamic and nonlinear; a MYEP must be continuously reviewed and modified as conditions change. The SCPEC ensures the Marine Corps can identify and articulate how Marine Corps SC activities are contributing to US objectives advancement by developing FSF capabilities to achieve a DSR.




Figure 4-13. Detailed Security Cooperation Planning and Execution Cycle.

# **CHAPTER 5.**

## **MARINE CORPS SECURITY**

### **COOPERATION TACTICAL EXECUTION**

Security cooperation events are often executed by commanders and small-unit leaders from the MEFs, MEUs, battalions, squadrons, and MCACs from throughout the FMFs. Assigned units can deploy in total or task-organize into advisor and trainer teams, tailored to the mission requirement. Care should be taken before breaking up units as this impacts their readiness. Deployed Marine expeditionary brigades and MEUs operate under the operational control of the Navy components and fleet commanders; therefore, who support for Marine SC activities must be coordinated by the component command and approved by the Navy component and fleet commander.

---

#### **PLANNING**

In the execution of the MYEP, tactical executors of SC (i.e., those in the FMF) must maintain close coordination and communication with the component command planners. They also need to work with the SCO in-country during planning, execution, and post-engagement AAR coordination. The SCO will be the point of contact for coordinating with FSF representatives until direct coordination is approved for the executors to engage with relevant FSF event participants.

When assigned to execute an SC event, executors should be instructed to report to and engage the appropriate headquarters—typically a geographic MCCC, MEF, or MEU, to facilitate planning. The component command planner should provide the executors an orientation of the FSF and the intended strategic, operational, and tactical outcomes. This also includes DSRs identified in the MYEPs and the specific event card that will provide a summary of the training, logistics, and funding requirements associated with an event to enable follow-on planning by the executing unit. The planner should provide a general concept of operations and define any associated constraints (“must do”) and restraints (“cannot do”). While the executors must understand the strategic and operational objectives, their tasking and focus will be more tactical.

Informed by the MYEP and SC event cards, SC executors should develop a deployment or event-specific engagement plan to guide implementation of their assigned tasks. When interacting with the FSF directly, advisors and trainers develop FSF-specific, standards-based training using the ADDIE model in accordance with the SATE process. All actions support the execution of the SC plan, which is directly linked to CCMD and MCCC objectives.

**Conduct Continuous Higher-Headquarters Coordination**

Rotational units and teams that execute one or more SC events on a given MYEP should be in close coordination with higher headquarters. Because the planner might not necessarily be in-country during all SC events, a robust relationship and strong two-way feedback loop is essential. To this end, the MCCC planner and executing unit leadership should—

- Ensure that all materials to be shared with an FSF during SC execution have undergone foreign disclosure and technology transfer reviews.
- Ensure that the executing unit understands that they must avoid false impressions of US readiness to make available classified military materiel, technology, or information, and to avoid proliferation of requests for classified military information or controlled unclassified information that are not releasable to the requestor.
- Obtain and review all MYEP, theater, and FMF requirements well in advance of programmed deployments to facilitate staffing, pre-deployment planning, administration, logistics, and training. This includes acquiring the necessary travel documentation, such as visas and passports, immunizations, and proper travel authorities (verification of status protection, country and theater entry approval).
- Ensure executors understand the current progress of the FSF toward the desired end state.
- Use SC event cards to define mission requirements, specify intended outcomes, and guide detailed event planning.
- Contribute information about the operational and information environment toward developing a plan to help an FSF achieve its DSR. The information environment, as a subset of the operational environment, must be included in any overview.
- Ensure units and teams are aware of existing MOPs and MOEs and are provided pre- and post-event assessment criteria. For example, approved PECLs should be provided to units and teams in accordance with the focus of the assigned SC event. Event PECLs should be derived from the PECLs already refined following the FSF unit-level assessment. The group of PECLs provided to an executing unit and team should be scoped to their event.

Table 5-1 describes what the FMF executors should expect from component command planners, and what the FMF executors should provide back.

**Table 5-1. Planner and Executor Feedback.**

<b>Marine Corps Component Command to Fleet Marine Force</b>	<b>Fleet Marine Force to Marine Corps Component Command</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• DSR event cards (mission) access to all assessments.</li><li>• Access to previous assessments and evaluations.</li><li>• Resources.</li><li>• Reach-back support.</li><li>• Ability to talk to outgoing team pre-deployment site survey.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Assignment of the right people to advise a pre-deployment training program for advisors, trainers, and those who support or interact with FSF.</li><li>• Proficiency in the SATE and ADDIE processes and how to apply them to FSF.</li><li>• Provide accurate evaluations and assessment to MARFOR AAR with mission details including administrative issues and FSF assessment based on training evaluations.</li></ul>

Unit leaders must work in tandem with higher-headquarters and MCCC planners to facilitate the required training, equipping, and preparation of a unit and team assigned to execute an SC event. For example, proper command relationships are identified and communicated for acquiring the necessary travel documentation and immunizations; proper uniforms; government charge card authorizations and policies; and proper travel authorities. Further, executors and planners must work together to provide pre-execution foreign disclosure guidance and facilitate requests between units and teams (once assigned) and FDOs.

---

## **EXECUTION AND AFTER ACTION REPORTS**

During execution, Marines leverage basic engagement skills to “do no harm” and aid the unit’s ability to achieve assigned operational objectives. The ADDIE process can be used to guide standards-based training and education to plan effective FSF engagements that address specific tasks, conditions, and standards linked to the SC event card, MYEP, and DSR. Marines use their training plan to not only help plan and enable event execution but also to enable standards-based assessment to create effective AARs.

Executing unit and teams are responsible for gathering meaningful quantitative and qualitative data to provide to the component command planners. Without this data, FSF progression cannot be measured effectively. Each rotation of Marine forces will provide evaluations of the FSF and a summary assessment. These summary assessments, or AARs, should be honest and candid in terms of the FSF’s willingness to perform the DSR, particularly throughout the competition continuum, including in crisis and conflict.

The outputs from the unit and team includes completed PECLs, AARs, etc. This enables assigned units and teams to provide substantive feedback that facilitates the modification of existing or development of new follow-on SC events through adjustments to the MYEP. Marine Corps component command planners should maintain awareness of FSF training packages and AARs to ensure completion.





# **APPENDIX A.**

## **SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES AND ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS**

This section outlines various SC activities (e.g., authorities, programs, funding streams) available to the DoD and Marine Corps to help achieve US objectives, as well as additional planning considerations.

---

### **SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES**

Types of SC activities include—

- Multilateral exercises.
- Combat advising (advise and assist teams).
- Mobile training teams.
- Information and intelligence sharing.
- Foreign military sales.
- International military students attending Marine Corps courses.
- BPC programs.
- PEPs.
- KLEs.
- International armaments cooperation.

This list is not exhaustive but rather demonstrates the depth and breadth of the types of activities that fall under or relate to SC.

#### **Military-to-Military Activities**

Military-to-military activities are a group of activities primarily conducted under the authorization of Title 10, USC, Chapter 16. These programs vary greatly in terms of the agency or DoD entity responsible and the way they are planned for and funded. Table A-1 outlines some key military-to-military activities conducted by the Marine Corps.

**Table A-1. Military-to-Military Activities.**

<b>Military-to-Military Activity</b>	<b>Guidance</b>
<b>Staff Talks</b>	The senior engagement forum for discussing Marine Corps USC, Title 10 responsibilities. Participants discuss shared interests in weapons systems, training, personnel, interoperability, information, and strategy. Staff talks serve as venues to improve interoperability and operational effectiveness with key allies and partners. The level of participation depends on the partner nation. Service-level staff talks are led by the DC PP&O (International Affairs Branch) with participation from other HQ elements, supporting establishment, and FMF. Marine Corps component commands can also conduct staff talks but are not authorized to commit the resources of the Marine Corps, conclude international agreements, or advocate on behalf of Service programs.
<b>Senior Leader Visits</b>	Provide the Service's executive leadership (O-7 level and higher), with the opportunity to engage with and impact the attitudes of key foreign military or security leaders. Conducting senior leader visits builds relationships over time with enough strength and depth such that partners and allies can then support Marine Corps interests during crises. A deliberate approach to planning and assessment is necessary to ensure that whenever the Service's executive leaders meet with foreign counterparts, they are delivering an effective, consistent message that supports the organization's goals. Senior leader visits take place throughout the Service, to include HQMC, supporting establishment, and FMF, and can be requested by the partner nation or the Marine Corps.
<b>Other Staff Visits</b>	Afford supporting staff sections and organizations the opportunity to engage with foreign counterparts to build relationships that advance Marine Corps interests. These visits are often narrower in scope and focused on specific institutional, operational, or technical issues. They serve to strengthen the Marine Corps overall relationship with a given partner nation or provide a forum to collaborate on potential future mil-to-mil engagements. These visits can achieve strategic effects by demonstrating professionally trained and led military forces. Staff visits can be requested by the partner nation or the Marine Corps and take place throughout the Service, typically at the O-6 level and below.
<b>Official CMC Counterpart Visits</b>	Specifically authorized in USC, Title 10, to support international relations and maintain the standing and prestige of the United States. Official counterpart visits establish or enhance relationships between senior leaders to positively influence key foreign counterparts in support of the DoD and Marine Corps objectives, such as— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Visits are initiated with a formal invitation from the CMC to a counterpart leader of a partner nation Service. The invitation is for the counterpart and may also include the counterpart's spouse and up to two aides or staff members.</li> <li>• Marine Corps pays all costs for the visit, except transportation to and from CONUS.</li> <li>• The lead for these visits is the Commandant's Special Projects Directorate, with support from DC PP&amp;O (International Affairs Branch), CMC protocol, Marine Barracks Washington, and Marine Corps organizations and installations visited.</li> </ul> <p>There is approximately one visit per quarter. The partner nations are selected by CMC, based on current international engagement priorities and recommendations compiled by the International Affairs Branch.</p>
<b>Payment of (partner) Personnel Expenses for Theater Security Cooperation</b>	USC, Title 10, Section 312, authorizes payment of travel, subsistence, and similar personnel expenses for defense personnel of friendly foreign governments in furtherance of SC objectives. Section 312 may not be used to fund education and training or representational activities. Payment is limited to "developing countries" absent a waiver from the Secretary of Defense. Funds can be requested through CCMDs or HQMC (DC PP&O, International Affairs Branch). The International Affairs Branch uses Socium to track HQMC-funded 312 activities.
<b>Personnel Exchanges</b>	Personnel exchanges are authorized in Title 10, USC, Section 311, and include numerous agreements with allies and partners that allow for the exchange or assignment of foreign personnel in US defense establishments and for the corresponding exchange or assignment of US personnel in foreign defense establishments. The defense PEP is an umbrella term that includes exchange programs, to include the MPEP and Engineer and Scientist Exchange Program.

### Combined Exercises and Training

Combined exercises and training include bilateral or multilateral exercises or training of US forces in tandem with partner nation forces. Combined exercises and training should focus on enhancing or maintaining Marine Corps readiness against Marine Corps unit mission essential tasks and is an opportunity to measure an FSF unit's current capabilities and progress toward a stated objective. The DoD has specific authorities to conduct combined exercises and training established in Title 10, USC (e.g., Sections 321, 322) and through the NDAA. This is often the primary security cooperation tool the Marine Corps employs.

### Providing Defense Articles, Training, and Services

The DoD has many authorities and appropriations to deliver defense articles, services, and training to partner nations. This category also includes security assistance programs. Table A-2 describes a few security assistance programs in detail.

**Table A-2. Provide Defense Articles, Training, and Services Activities.**

Train-and-Equip Activity	Description
<b>Building Partner Capacity</b>	Building partner capacity (also referred to as “train and equip”) programs enable the training, equipping, and associated design and construction services funded with USG appropriations. These programs enable the DoD to train and equip partners for the purpose of building the FSF's capabilities to conduct counterterrorism, counter drug, counter-weapons of mass destruction, air domain awareness, counter-transnational organized crime, maritime and border security, and military intelligence operations, or to support operations that contribute to an international coalition, among other capability areas. These activities use the authorities provided to the DoD under Title 10 (e.g., Section 333), or via the annual NDAA (e.g., Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative). The DoD leverages the FMS process, to include initiating letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs) to track the procurement of defense articles and services to build the capabilities of partner nations under specific authorities. The pseudo-LOA itemizes the defense articles and services included in the letter of request from the CCMD or SCO. The pseudo-LOA is not signed by the partner nation, except for transfers under the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 607.
<b>Security Force Assistance</b>	Security force assistance includes DoD activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of an FSF and their supporting institutions”. The DoD uses SFA activities to shape the operational environment or to assist a partner nation in defending against internal and transnational threats to security or stability. Security Force Assistance also contributes to DoD's role in unified USG efforts to support partner nation security sector reform, whether through routine security cooperation activities or in support of a foreign internal defense operation or program. For additional information, reference Appendix B of this publication.
<b>Institutional Capacity Building</b>	Institutional capacity building encompasses all SC activities that support a partner nation's effort to develop institutions and processes to generate and sustain forces and capabilities, effectively employ security sector governance and management, and oversee activities of their security forces to achieve shared security objectives. The ICB activities are primarily conducted by DoD civilians and field-grade officers and senior enlisted uniformed members; In some cases, Marines may be requested through individual augment requests to support ICB activities. However, Marines are not generally involved in ICB activities but should be aware of ongoing ICB activities in various countries, particularly as security cooperation planning and execution align with ongoing ICB events. In general, ICB activities should complement other strategic as well as operational and tactical security cooperation activities. Some authorities (e.g., Section 333) require complementary ICB programs to sustain other operational or tactical capabilities the United States has provided to a partner nation. The DSCU through the Institute for Security Governance manages ICB programs, to include those that leverage civilian and contracted expertise to engage with partner nations' defense and security institutions (e.g., Ministry of Defense Advisor Program, Defense Institute for Legal Studies). For additional information on ICB, reference JP 3-20 and DoDD 5205.82, <i>Defense Institution Building</i> .

### Operational Support

Operational support enables the DoD to assist partner nations in the context of specifically designated operations, which could include—

- Logistical support, supplies, and services.
- Equipment loans to enhance capabilities and interoperability.
- Specialized training.
- Small-scale construction to enable countries to participate or continue participating in designated operations.

### Education

Educational opportunities enable partner nations to attend and participate in US PME institutions, Service academies, special programs (e.g., the Air Force’s Aviation Leadership Program), and targeted education programs at public and private universities. Table A-3 details two key SC education activities.

### International Armaments Cooperation

International Armaments Cooperation represents defense-related international research, development, production, and support SC activities. It involves cooperation between the USG and the governments, industries, and academic institutions of highly capable partner nations to directly support warfighting capability requirements for existing coalitions (e.g., NATO). International Armaments Cooperation programs, further described in Table A-4, are focused on joint production, procurement of foreign technology, and research, development, testing, and evaluation in support of priority capability gaps.

**Table A-3. Education Activities.**

Activity	Guidance
<b>International Military Education and Training</b>	Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a non-reimbursable (grant) basis by the USG or contractors includes correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. Funding for IMET is Congressionally appropriated, based on requested DOS allocations, by country. The DSCA manages and issues the IMET funds to the military departments who then disperse the funds to individual countries or courses on behalf of the Services. Education and training are typically provided in US military schools or aboard US installations. However, education and training may include deployed training assistance (e.g., MTTs or mobile education teams), but is subject to appropriate waiver approval. The Marine Corps lead for coordinating education and training of international students under IMET is the TECOM Security Assistance Branch.
<b>Regional Centers for Security Studies</b>	<p>The DSCA oversees six regional centers for security studies that offer multilateral training, education, seminars, and networking discussions. Typically, the curriculum is focused at the executive level, with discussions on security issues inherent to a particular region. The following regional centers are authorized under Title 10, USC, Section 342:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies; Garmisch, Germany.</li> <li>• Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies; Honolulu, Hawaii.</li> <li>• William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies; Washington, D.C.</li> <li>• Africa Center for Strategic Studies; Washington, D.C.</li> <li>• Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies; Washington, D.C.</li> <li>• Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies, Anchorage, AK.</li> </ul>

Table A-4. Armaments Cooperation.

International Armaments Cooperation Activity	Guidance
<b>Foreign Comparative Testing</b>	<p>The foreign comparative testing program is an acquisition program authorized in Title 10, USC, Section 2350a(g). The purpose of the foreign comparative testing program is to test and evaluate foreign non-developmental defense equipment to determine whether such equipment can satisfy the Services' requirements. After successful comparative testing, the Services can procure the foreign materiel. The Marine Corps Systems Command International Programs Office manages the foreign comparative testing program for the Marine Corps.</p>
<b>Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements (ACSA)</b>	<p>ACSAs enable the DoD to acquire logistics support, supplies, and services directly from a partner nation or international organization. They also enable the United States to provide support to a partner nation or international organization (e.g., support of operations, combined exercises, training, deployments, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, and certain peace operations under the Charter of the United Nations). These agreements are primarily exercised by the CCMDs or component commands and serve as an important tool to facilitate logistics support and services.</p> <p>The DC, Installations and Logistics is responsible for establishing Marine Corps-level policy for the use of ACSAs and provides guidance to the MCCCs and MEFs. Usually, there must be a cross-servicing agreement and implementing arrangements, negotiated in accordance with DoD Directive 2010.09, <i>Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements</i>. ACSAs must primarily benefit the interest of DoD forward-deployed forces; they are not a grant program. Acquisitions or transfers must be either in cash, replacement-in-kind, or exchange of supplies or services of equal value in support of the operational needs of US forces. The ACSAs should not be used to increase inventories, nor can the DoD use them when the desired materiel or service is reasonably available from US commercial sources. Most importantly, DoD acquisition personnel must ensure ACSAs are not used as a routine source of supply for a partner nation. DoDD 2010.09 and CJCSI 2120.01D, <i>Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements</i>, provide complete details on responsibilities and procedures for acquiring and transferring logistics support, supplies, and services under the authority of Sections 2341 and 2342 of Title 10, USC. ACSAs are executed by the authorized points of contacts contained in the individual cross-servicing agreements with a partner nation. Personnel authorized to request services and execute ACSAs must be trained and authorized by letter.</p>
<b>Cooperative Research</b>	<p>Cooperative agreements facilitate research and development of technologies with partner nations to support interoperability and leverage shared resources. DoDD 5000.01, <i>The Defense Acquisition System</i> and DoDI 5000.02, <i>Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework</i>, highlight that a cooperative development program with one or more partner nations is preferred over a new, unique joint or agency development program. The NIPO is responsible for negotiating international agreements to facilitate cooperative RDT&amp;E.</p>
<b>Information and Data Exchanges</b>	<p>The DoD RDT&amp;E Information Exchange Program (IEP) is the primary, but not exclusive, means for DoD RDT&amp;E information exchange taking place under bilateral and multilateral international agreements. This program is governed by DoDI 2015.4, <i>Defense RDT&amp;E IEP</i>. The United States and its allies and partners conduct RDT&amp;E information exchange through IEP annexes and agreements. The RDT&amp;E IEP primary goals include facilitating closer alliances, integrating US and partner nation technological capabilities, and improving interoperability and standardization across multinational forces.</p> <p>The NIPO is responsible for negotiating IEP annexes to facilitate the exchange of RDT&amp;E information, including classified military information, in a specific technology or scientific area with partner nations. In general, these annexes are valid for a period of five years and are renewable.</p>

### Security Cooperation Support to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief

There are multiple programs and authorizations enabling the DoD to provide overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid, primarily to provide for transportation, supplies, training, education, equipping, and limited construction. These actions enable partner nations to deliver humanitarian assistance and essential services to their civilian populations (e.g., irrigation and agriculture, medical and hospitals, schools, roads). In general, the DSCA oversees and manages these funds and programs, which are funded through the overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid appropriation. Marine Corps planners should consider the Marine Corps civil affairs capabilities when recommending best use of Marine forces to support humanitarian assistance funded initiatives.

### Security Assistance

This section outlines security assistance activities that the Marine Corps can leverage to achieve DoD objectives (see Table A-5). As a subset of SC, security assistance includes programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and other related statutes by which the USG provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Additionally, programs funded and authorized through the DOS and administered by DoD and DSCA are considered part of SC. These programs enable, enhance, and complement other SC activities, multinational interoperability, and support SFA, because they allow the DoD to provide and sell FSFs training, defense articles, and defense services.

**Table A-5. Security Assistance Activities.**

Activity	Guidance
<b>Foreign Military Sales</b>	<p>Foreign military sales programs require agreements or contracts between the USG and an authorized recipient government or international organization. The FMS program provides the recipient current stocks or new procurements under DoD managed contracts, regardless of the source of financing. The program is non-appropriated, and is authorized by the Arms Export Control Act, through which eligible foreign governments purchase defense articles, services, education, and training from the USG. The purchasing government pays all costs associated with a sale. An FMS is conducted based on a signed government-to-government agreement between the United States and a foreign government, known as a LOA. Each LOA is commonly referred to as a “case” and is assigned a unique case identifier for accounting and reporting purposes. The FMS program builds military-to-military relationships, promotes coalition building, enables interoperability, increases the number of systems and parts being produced to drive down DoD costs, and benefits US industry.</p> <p>Training provided under FMS can include education or training in US formal schools (PME and technical skills training), contractor-provided training, or deployed training assistance (e.g., MTTs). The Marine Corps lead for coordinating formal schoolhouse training and education for international students under FMS is the TECOM Security Assistance Branch.</p> <p>The Marine Corps Systems Command International Programs Office is the Marine Corps lead for the sale, lease, or transfer of ground defense articles, information technology systems and associated support. This office develops FMS cases following the DoD policy for a “total package approach,” which includes all needed support items, training, technical assistance, initial support, ammunition, and any follow-on support from USG or USG contractors required to introduce and operationally sustain major items of equipment or systems.</p>

**Table A-5. Security Assistance Activities. (Continued).**

Activity	Guidance
<b>Foreign Military Financing Program</b>	Through grants or loans, foreign military financing provides USG financing to friendly foreign countries or international organizations for the purchase of defense articles, services, and training either through FMS or direct commercial sales. The Arms Export Control Act governs the program. A combination of FMS and foreign military financing program funding can be used to execute a transfer of Marine Corps-managed defense equipment and services using the security assistance infrastructure.
<b>Excess Defense Articles</b>	Defense articles no longer needed by a DoD agency or the United States Coast Guard are declared excess. This excess equipment may be offered at a reduced cost, or at no cost, to eligible foreign recipients on an "as is, where is" basis. Excess defense articles can also be sold under the normal FMS process. The Excess Defense Articles Program provides a means by which the United States can transfer major weapons systems to partner nations.
<b>Leases</b>	Defense articles can be leased to eligible foreign countries or international organizations for a minimum of one month and up to five years due to compelling foreign policy or national security reasons. Authorized in Section 2796 of Title 22, USC, this non-appropriated program is administered by DSCA and uses the FMS process to develop lease agreements. The law stipulates that the cost of the lease, with some exceptions, must be borne by the recipient. For the recipient country, leases could be less expensive than purchasing the article outright and leases provide a convenient way to obtain defense articles for temporary use. Leases are executed through a lease agreement with an associated FMS case to cover repair, training, supply support or transportation, if required.
<b>Loans</b>	Loans of defense materiel, supplies, or equipment are authorized under the Arms Export Control Act, Section 65 (Title 22, USC, 2796d), in support of RDT&E programs and efforts. The intent of these loans is to strengthen the security of the United States and its allies and partners by promoting standardization, interchangeability, and interoperability of equipment.

### Women, Peace, and Security

In support of the US Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act of 2017, WPS can be a strategic enabler that yields substantive operational and SC benefits. As outlined in the WPS Framework within JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*, Appendix D, WPS should be integrated into SC planning and considered for SC activities with allies and partners, as appropriate.

Women, peace, and security should be used as a tool to help encourage and enable partner nations to act in support of US strategic objectives and values and enhance the US reputation when contrasted with its competitors.

Integration of WPS into SC planning follows the normal planning process as described in Chapter 4. When conducting a common objectives analysis to determine the DSR with a partner nation, planners can leverage an ally or partner nation WPS National Action Plan to identify SC engagement opportunities related to WPS.

### Environmental Resilience

Marine Corps SC efforts can address challenges related to weather and the environment, and that also impact issues like maritime security. For example, planners can collaborate with partner nations on SC activities that counter illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing; support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; enable operations in extreme environments; and support civil infrastructure projects. By working alongside partner nations to mitigate weather-related risks, the Marine Corps can improve environmental resilience and ensure that the Marine Corps and its FSF counterparts remain mission capable.

### **Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response**

The civilian harm mitigation and response (CHMR) program includes actions to reduce the risk and severity of civilian harm and to respond to incidents of civilians harmed (see DoDI 3000.17, *Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response*). The DoD issued the CHMR Action Plan, which requires CHMR considerations in SC programs, including tailored conditions to promote and enable FSF efforts to mitigate civilian harm. Planners should incorporate civilian harm risk assessment and mitigation methods in SC programs that improve or enable partner nation ability to reduce the risk of civilian harm from their operations. The policy and national security objectives of the US are best advanced by facilitating arms transfers and building capabilities for trusted actors who will use such capabilities responsibly.

The CHMR components of SC programs might include—

- Reviewing and contributing to CHMR baselines of allies and partner nations to shape SC program design and adjust SC programs based on FSF CHMR outcomes. Marine Corps component command planners can leverage information available in CHMR baselines and ensure that combined planning efforts enable a shared understanding of the civilian environment and processes for assessing and responding to civilian harm.
- Force development efforts that enhance the ability of FSFs to mitigate civilian harm.
- Enabling actions taken when planning and conducting military operations, such as assessing and analyzing the operational environment, including the presence of civilians and civilian objects that may be at risk, and corresponding measures when planning and conducting operations to address identified risks to civilians.
- Facilitating efforts to analyze and learn from military operations to improve the operational and institutional ability to mitigate and respond to civilian harm.

---

## **ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS**

In addition to the specific SC activities that Marine Corps forces conduct, there are numerous planning considerations, restraints, constraints, and underlying agreements that ensure the Marine Corps conducts SC activities legally, effectively, and efficiently with minimal risk to Marine Corps forces, mission, and institution.

### **Foreign Disclosure and Technology Transfer**

Foreign disclosure is conveying information, in any manner, to an authorized representative of a foreign government or international organization. Materials in any form, including verbal, that can be used as part of an SC event must be approved by an FDO.

Details about the foreign disclosure request process are provided in MCO 5510.20C, *Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments and Interests*. Personnel should coordinate with the applicable, local FDO to submit requests as soon as a requirement is identified.

Per National Disclosure Policy (NDP-1), “It is the policy of the United States to avoid creating false impressions of its readiness to make available classified military materiel, technology, or information. Therefore, initial planning with foreign governments and international organizations



concerning programs which might involve the eventual disclosure of classified military information may be conducted only if it is explicitly understood and acknowledged that no US commitment to furnish such classified information or materiel is intended or implied until disclosure has been approved.”

A false impression often results in negative consequences when expectations are not moderated. Best practices to ensure compliance with the False Impressions Policy and foreign disclosure policies include—

- Involving an FDO in the planning process for all combined exercises and operations and divulging all possible activities to preemptively determine what can legally be discussed with a foreign government or international organization.
- Never agreeing outright to any disclosure of controlled unclassified information or classified military information without the express approval of an FDO.
- Engaging FDOs early and often during all steps of engagements.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 5230.01A, *Joint Staff Foreign Disclosure and Foreign Visits Program*, provides useful guidance when operating in a joint or multinational environment.

### **International Agreements**

International agreements, governed by DoDI 5530.03, *International Agreements*, and SECNAVINST 5710.32, *International Agreements and Arrangements*, support many SC activities, to include: personnel exchanges; operational support; international armaments cooperation; exchange of supplies or goods; sale of defense articles, services, and training; and information and intelligence sharing. International agreements can include those established for the status of forces, access, basing, facilities, prepositioned equipment, international acquisition, communications, and health and medical agreements.

Department of Defense personnel can only conclude international agreements that are specifically authorized in DoDI 5530.03 and SECNAVINST 5710.32. The CMC is the Marine Corps approving authority for the establishment of an international agreement. Acquisition-related international agreements are the purview of OSD and, in some cases, NIPO. By policy, CCDRs are authorized to negotiate and conclude international agreements in specific circumstances.

In the absence of a binding international agreement between the DoD and an FSF organization, or the USG and partner nation government, the SC planner should explore establishing a non-binding memorandum of agreement (MOA) and memorandum of understanding (MOU), to set forth concepts and terms under which planning and execution of SC activities take place. Non-binding MOUs or MOAs are not international agreements.

There are specific international agreements between the USG and partner nations that facilitate information and intelligence sharing. An important component in planning is to consider and identify specific intelligence or information-sharing requirements and collaboration that are mutually beneficial in support of SC or operational activities with partner nations.

The following two types of information sharing agreements facilitate disclosure or release of certain US information and technology:

- Overview Security of Military Information Agreement. This is a legally binding international agreement that establishes terms for the protection and handling of classified military information provided by either partner nation to the other.
- Communications and Information Security MOA. A formal document that establishes terms for secure communications interoperability and security between the USG (through the DSCA) and the partner nation.

### **Export Control**

Export control regulates the shipment or transfer, by whatever means, of controlled items, software, technology, or services out of the United States. Marine Corps SC handles export control duties for Marine Corps ground equipment, while DC Aviation handles the same requirements for aviation equipment. These duties include serving as the Marine Corps focal point for export license requests, end-user certificates, and interfacing with government agencies, such as the DOS, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, and the Defense Technology Security Administration to address and resolve import and export issues. Export control duties also include the processing of international traffic in arms regulations exemptions.

### **Human Rights Vetting (Leahy Amendment)**

The Leahy Amendment refers to a vetting process through which the USG validates that US assistance and DoD training programs are provided only to FSF units that have not committed gross violations of human rights. The DOS, through the SCO, is responsible to conduct vetting in advance of training a partner nation. The DOS uses the international vetting and security tracking system to facilitate the vetting process. The statutory requirements for human rights vetting are contained both within Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and under a recurring provision in the DoD annual appropriations bill. If Marine units have reasonable information that would identify an FSF organization committed gross violations of human rights, it must be reported to the U.S. Embassy and SCO.

# **APPENDIX B.**

## **SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE**

The Marine Corps uses SFA activities to shape the operational environment, assist FSFs in defending against internal and external threats, and to build capability or capacity in a partner nation that supports US national security interests. Security force assistance activities contribute to combined, multinational operations and help develop or reform a country's security forces and supporting institutions. The Marine Corps plans and conducts SFA at all levels, from ministerial to tactical, with FSFs that provide security for a partner nation and its population or support a regional security organization's mission (e.g., paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel). The following sections provide a brief overview of SFA within the Marine Corps. For additional details, refer to JP 3-20 and MCRP 3-03D.1, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces*.

---

### **SECURITY FORCES GENERIC FUNCTIONS**

Security forces perform four generic functions: governance, executive, generating, and operating. The Marine Corps typically works with marine or naval infantry forces that are part of the partner nation's navy. Therefore, the Marine Corps generally advises at the tactical, operational, and generating levels of an FSF unit. Although the Marine Corps has the capability to advise at these levels, due to its size and mission, it primarily uses its forces to conduct SC activities at the operating level of the FSF. Marines may be requested through the provision of individual augments at the ministerial or executive level.

The planners of SFA missions require knowledge of how their organization distributes the four functions, as well as how the FSF implements them into their system to identify the SFA developmental tasks that will support the FSF's model. Specific generating and operating functions will likely have some overlap of requirements and responsibilities. In some FSFs, a single organization might perform all four functions. Following the functions construct ensures SC planners consider the various functions the FSF must perform to sustain a force over time. The SC planner must consider all levels of the FSF when developing an SC plan to determine at what level the Marine Corps should engage with the FSF and the capability sets the FSF must perform to fulfill a DSR.

---

## **FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES DEVELOPMENTAL TASKS**

The Marine Corps applies the organize, train, equip, build, and advise developmental task framework to advance the effectiveness of an FSF to address common security issues and to guide its SFA activities. These tasks can occur as stand-alone or in combination with one another.

### **Organize**

Organize includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management. This can include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and manning functions. An SFA can also be used to develop and improve an FSF's organizational processes in force development, force integration, capabilities development and integration, budgeting, and personnel management.

### **Train**

Train includes all activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, leader, collective, and staff levels (i.e., across the executive, generating, and operating functions). This can include doctrine development, unit or organization design, command and staff processes, and recruiting and manning functions. An SFA's training efforts should consider the unique character and personnel requirements of an FSF and consider the FSF's own doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy [DOTMLPF-P] system versus creating an unfamiliar and potentially unsustainable US model. As the capability and capacity of an FSF increases, SFA forces conduct combined training and may focus on interoperability across multiple domains to support multinational or combined force objectives.

### **Equip**

Equip includes all activities to design, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment, procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life cycle management. This could also include fielding of new equipment, operational readiness process, repair, and recapitalization.

### **Build and Rebuild**

Build and rebuild includes all activities to create, improve, and integrate facilities. This may also include physical infrastructures such as bases and stations, lines of communication, ranges and training complexes, and administrative structures. Build and rebuild activities vary according to the mission's goals, objectives, and desired end state. Because build and rebuild activities often involve physical construction and protection of facilities, the effectiveness of SFA activities depends on the availability and allocation of adequate resources by the FSF.

### **Advise**

Advise includes all activities to provide subject matter expertise, guidance, advice, and counsel to FSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or organization. Advising can be done under combat or administrative conditions, at operating through executive levels, and in support of individuals or groups. Advising establishes personal and professional rapport where trust and confidence define how effectively the advisor will be able to influence the FSF counterpart(s).

### Other Required Tasks

The organize, train, equip, build, and advise construct does not fully capture all the types of actions required to ensure FSF success in reaching a DSR. At times the Marine Corps might have to fill specific capability gaps until the FSF can conduct an activity or operation without direct US assistance or action. Additionally, the Marine Corps should be continuously assessing the capabilities of the FSF at all stages, steps, events, or actions.

**Assist.** The Marine Corps provides partner nation assistance to provide, coordinate, or facilitate FSF access to US or coalition support in capabilities, such as intelligence, fires, logistics, command and control, and force protection. The focus of effort is assistance and can be conducted in concert with related advising and training efforts to build FSF capacity.

**Assess.** The Marine Corps conducts assessments to measure the FSF unit's capabilities against the US desired capabilities and role for that FSF. Assessment provides initial and continuous feedback toward achieving FSF capabilities. Assessments guide the conduct of advising, training, or assistance activities. Assessments include training evaluations, the identification of FSF capability gaps, AARs, readiness reviews, and other organizational assessments.

**Foreign Internal Defense.** The participation by civilian and military agencies of the USG in any of the action programs taken by another government, or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. A CCDR can use SC, with particular emphasis on developmental activities, to generate FSF internal defense capabilities. Foreign internal defense supports a partner nation's internal defense and development plan, sponsored by DOS, and often enables specified capabilities of extant or developing FSF. For additional information, see JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense*.

---

## MARINE CORPS APPROACH TO SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE

The Marine Corps advises, trains, equips, and assists FSFs worldwide in support of its efforts to increase its own readiness, improve a partner nation capability, and strengthen partner nation capacity. Additionally, SFA activities can range from small-scale, short-term engagements to large-scale, long-term OAs. Consequently, the SC planner should determine the most effective level of engagement, and whether that level is the best use of Marine resources. For example, if an FSF DSR can only be achieved at the executive level of the FSF, this might not be the most effective use of Marine Corps resources.

Smaller-scale SFA activities can include a short-term rotation of a MCAC to support a time-bound SFA mission (e.g., in support of a BPC program). On a larger scale in Australia, the Marine Corps uses the Marine Rotational Forces Darwin program to develop Marine Corps readiness while simultaneously developing United States and Australia interoperability. The Marine Rotational Forces–Southeast Asia, which is forward deployed in Southeast Asia, provides the Marine Corps with a regionally-aligned forward presence that is able to conduct combined exercise and training events to promote Marine Corps readiness and port and littoral access and build partner nation capabilities.



# APPENDIX C.

## ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION

### DoD ASSESSMENT, MONITORING, AND EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

Title 10, USC, Section 383 requires the DoD to maintain an AM&E program of SC activities, intended to articulate the return on investment of US resources. The AM&E program is codified in DoDI 5132.14, which outlines the DoD AM&E framework for SC programs intended to foster accurate and transparent reporting to key stakeholders on the outcomes and sustainability of SC. Table C-1 details a comparative view of definitions of assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

If quality work goes into AM&E activities over the lifecycle of a MYEP, decision makers (e.g., component commanders, CCDRs) will be well-informed and able to make appropriate risk decisions regarding SC in support of a given partner nation. Therefore, the SC planner must consistently monitor MYEP activities, assess the effectiveness of MYEP execution, and evaluate and report progress of both the MYEP (administratively) and the FSF (operationally). The MYEP should be adjusted annually based on ongoing in-stride monitoring and evaluation results.

**Table C-1. Definitions of Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation.**

Definitions of Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation	
<i>In the context of the DoD SC AM&amp;E program (DoDI 5132.14)</i>	<i>In the context of planning and operations (JP 3-20)</i>
<b>Assessment.</b> Systematic analysis to provide an understanding of the context, conditions, partner capabilities, and requirements to inform SC planning and implementation. Assessments are generally conducted in advance of SC activities but may be repeated to update analysis and identify mid-course corrections of SC activities.	<b>Operation Assessment.</b> 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations to achieve stated objectives. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective.
<b>Monitoring.</b> A continuous process designed to provide regular feedback on the extent to which expected outputs and outcomes are being achieved to inform decisions or corrective actions. In general, results measured in monitoring are the direct and near-term consequences of initiative activities that provide opportunities to validate the theory of change throughout implementation and an early indication of the likelihood that expected results will be attained.	<b>Monitoring.</b> Monitoring is observing and analyzing established indicators, including MOEs and MOPs, as well as the conditions in the operational environment that affect those indicators, to establish progress toward objectives. SC monitoring is a continual process of collecting data to provide regular feedback on the extent to which expected outputs and outcomes are being achieved.
<b>Evaluation.</b> A systematic collection and analysis of information and evidence about the characteristics and outcomes of an ongoing or completed initiative, and its design, implementation, and results. Evaluations determine relevance, value, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact as a basis for improving effectiveness and to inform decision makers regarding future plans, programs, and activities.	<b>Evaluating.</b> Evaluating operations is principally a CCDR function but can happen at any level. However, evaluating SC activities and initiatives is a core component of the overall AM&E policy for the SC enterprise. Informed by monitoring, evaluations seek to ascertain what is working, what did not work, why, and how, to inform decision making at appropriate levels.

The Marine Corps conducts AM&E throughout the SCPEC in the context of the continuous operation assessment. These activities contribute to the AM&E within the context of the DoD SC AM&E program.

Figure C-1 depicts the relationship between the AM&E activity conducted by CCMDs throughout the SSCI planning process and the AM&E activity conducted by MCCCs in the SCPEC.




Figure C-1. Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Activities.



---

## CCMD AM&E RESPONSIBILITIES

### Initial Assessment

The DoD SC AM&E policy requires CCMDs to conduct an initial assessment for all new SSCIs. Initial assessments are defined as, “information collected before or at the start of an initiative that provides a basis for planning, monitoring, or evaluating subsequent progress or impact” (DoDI 5132.14). Although conducted by the CCMD, they may be tasked to another force provider or require SME augments from component commands. A CCMD might assign an initial assessment to an MCCC, depending on the specific capabilities requiring assessment.

The purpose of an initial assessment is to conduct an initial needs assessment and gap analysis of the partner nation security forces’ capabilities and capacities to perform a specific role in pursuit of US strategic objectives. It provides in-depth analysis, recommendations, and other SC data for CCMDs to build their SC programming, and shapes the IDD, objective tree, and strategic and feasibility review for an SSCI.

### Initiative Design Document

An IDD is a comprehensive document embedded in Socium that specifies the specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound objectives, theory of change, and PMP for an SC initiative. The “theory of change” incorporated in the IDD is a planning and evaluation method that relies on a clear end state as well as measurable indicators for success. It ensures activities are linked to a thorough understanding of how change happens and how the phasing of activities themselves achieves intended results.

### Performance Monitoring Plan

The CCMDs must submit a PMP for all approved and funded SSCIs and are required to implement the PMP during the execution of approved and funded SSCIs. A PMP is a roadmap for how monitoring is conducted for a program or initiative.

### Performance Monitoring Report

A PMR is submitted annually for continuing SSCIs. It summarizes and analyzes data collected through implementing the PMP, outlines where progress against objectives has and has not taken place, and identifies risks and mitigations. This is then used by OSD and DSCA to SSCI refinement and prioritization.

---

## MARINE CORPS AM&E RESPONSIBILITIES

Within the context of the DoD SC AM&E program, the Marine Corps is primarily responsible for providing insight, analysis, and documentation (e.g., assessment and training evaluation reports, AARs and trip reports, IPRs, close-out reports) in support of CCMDs. Marine Corps SC planners must also consider the principles of AM&E (e.g., specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-bound [referred to as SMART] objectives, MOPs and MOEs, theory of change) when developing MYEPs aligned to CCMD objectives. The Marine Corps might also be tasked with providing SMEs to support CCMDs in SSCI development and execution.

### **Marine Corps Approach to Assessment**

Although Service component commands might be tasked by the CCMD to support, conduct, or augment an initial assessment, the Marine Corps has two formal up-front assessment frameworks that are integral to the SCPEC:

- Component-Level Assessment. Component-level assessments are conducted in Step 2 of the SCPEC by the MCCC as required, but can also be supported by the CCMD or other stakeholders (e.g., MCACs). These assessments focus on the component level of the FSF or the component command's broader understanding of the work required in a given country to meet CCMD objectives. These assessments are compared to strategic analysis contained in initial assessments (a CCMD responsibility) and unit-specific detail is provided during follow-on unit-level assessments.
- Unit-Level Assessment. Unit-level assessments are conducted in Step 3 of the SCPEC and assess the FSF's ability to perform the required capabilities to achieve the approved DSR. The component command SC planner is responsible for the unit-level assessment but can delegate the assessment to a team of SMEs.

While designed as up-front assessments to facilitate MYEP development, component and unit-level assessments can be performed at any point in the SCPEC, as required. Results should be shared back with the CCMD and the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. Additional details on assessments is provided in Appendix D.

### **Marine Corps Approach to Monitoring**

During Step 6 of the SCPEC, planners maintain awareness of ongoing activities being conducted by executors (e.g., advisors, trainers, MEUs). Planners should work with the executors to collect, review, and analyze completed PECLs, AARs, etc., developed by the assigned unit or team for consideration for future SC activities and investments. Training evaluation results are a key aspect of monitoring progress using the engagement plan tracker. The analysis of ongoing activities should include adjustments required to the MYEP and future SC solutions.

### **Marine Corps Approach to Evaluation**

Interim progress reports are programmed into the MYEP as a mechanism to assess FSF progress, inform stakeholders, and recommend potential course adjustments. A mechanism of evaluation within the continuous operation assessment, IPRs shape the CCMD assessment and monitoring activities as part of the overall AM&E efforts in support of SSCIs and campaign assessment activities.

Although it is not a formal element of the joint evaluation process, Service component command planners develop a close-out report to inform Marine Corps leaders within in the context of both monitoring and evaluation. The close-out report summarizes all activities conducted in support of the MYEP and can inform lessons learned, which should be documented in the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned.

# **APPENDIX D.**

## **FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE ASSESSMENTS**

The MCCC FSF assessments are nested within the SCPEC and should be shaped by CCMD assessments. This appendix highlights planning considerations to conduct an institutional analysis for the component-level assessment in Step 2 of the SCPEC, and an operational analysis for the unit-level assessment in Step 3 of the SCPEC.

---

### **TYPES OF ANALYSIS**

#### **Institutional Analysis (DOTMLPF-P)**

Does the FSF and partner nation have the institutional systems and processes to generate and replicate forces? What institutional challenges pose a risk to shared security and defense objectives? The component-level assessment in Step 2 analyzes the capability of the parent organization to generate, staff, train, equip, and sustain the designated unit.

#### **Operational Analysis (Warfighting Functions)**

Does the FSF unit have the skill set necessary to accomplish the DSR? Is it properly organized to perform the DSR? The unit-level assessment in Step 3 investigates the capability of a unit along the warfighting functions.

The purpose of both assessments is to identify gaps in capability of the unit and the capacity of the parent organization to sustain that unit. These assessments should use available CCMD assessment material, in particular CCMD environmental assessments (PMESII) can provide significant information on the partner nation. Environmental assessments seek to answer the question, “is the partner nation’s operational environment conducive to accomplishing a desired US objective?”

---

### **INPUTS**

The primary inputs to FSF assessments include the following:

- The theater analysis conducted in SCPEC, Step 1.
- CCMD SSCI documents (i.e., initial assessment, IDD, PMP, PMR).
- Security cooperation strategic guidance documents (refer to Figure 4-1 in Chapter 4 for an overview of SC strategic guidance documents).

---

## **PROCESS**

### **Institutional Analysis (FSF Component-Level Assessment-SCPEC Step 2)**

Depending on the size of the FSF organization, the words “component” and “service” might be interchangeable.

This analysis follows a systematic approach to analyze the FSF component’s capability to fulfill their strategic mission. Although the FSF could have the capacity to conduct certain missions as defined by the partner nation, the institutional analysis should provide the narrative of institutional memory or history, and thus provide context to the force’s current capability and capacity.

The institutional analysis helps determine the effectiveness of an FSF institution’s ability to perform common force development functions required to generate, sustain, and replicate forces. It analyzes how the FSF trains, organizes, and equips its forces by identifying the capabilities and capacities of the force structure and the component’s supporting institutions. This analysis helps stakeholders determine which future SC activities would meet strategic end states established by the CCMD.

The following are sample questions to build a component-level assessment report:

- Doctrine:
  - ♦ Does the FSF have its own doctrine?
  - ♦ Can the FSF write and sustain doctrine?
  - ♦ Is there Marine Corps doctrine that can be used to assist the FSF component?
- Organization:
  - ♦ What is the organizational structure?
  - ♦ Who are the key players in the institutional structure?
  - ♦ Are there friction points in the FSF component, supporting institutions, or organizations?
- Training:
  - ♦ What kind of training venues and ranges does the FSF have?
  - ♦ What does the FSF ELT pipeline look like?
  - ♦ Do they have a pre-deployment training program or similar training?
  - ♦ How much training do members of the FSF unit receive at recruit or entry level training?
  - ♦ Is the training effective? Is it retained? Is it compatible with Marine Corps TTP?
- Materiel:
  - ♦ Does the FSF have materiel and equipment required to perform tasks in support of a DSR?
  - ♦ Does the FSF have the ability to sustain materiel (maintenance, parts, etc.)?
  - ♦ Does the FSF have a planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process to sustain materiel and equipment required to perform tasks in support of the DSR?

- Leadership:
  - ♦ Who are the key leaders?
  - ♦ How do FSF service members progress in rank? Responsibility?
  - ♦ Do they use non-commissioned officers? How?
- Personnel:
  - ♦ How do they recruit?
  - ♦ What is the basic education level of new recruits?
  - ♦ How do they retain personnel?
  - ♦ What is the breakdown of men and women in the FSF?
  - ♦ How are women employed in the FSF?
- Facilities:
  - ♦ What is the functionality and status of their facilities (living, training, etc.)?
  - ♦ What is the status of training areas and live fire ranges?
- Policy:
  - ♦ Do they have institutional policies?
  - ♦ What agency creates policy?

Institutional analysis is the primary method of analysis to determine gaps in force generation, sustainability, and replication. Component-level assessors and senior-level advisors will identify primary gaps in capacity and capability to perform essential force development functions required of any military force. Therefore, it is the primary mechanism to inform the joint force of governance, executive, and generating advisor requirements.

### **Operational Analysis (FSF Unit-Level assessment-SCPEC Step 3)**

Operational analysis assesses the strengths and gaps in the FSF's ability to perform its assigned missions, roles, and functions across the warfighting framework (command and control, movement and maneuver, information, intelligence, fires, logistics, and force protection).

The purpose of the analysis is to ensure that decision makers consider the operational capabilities of the FSF when deciding whether to proceed with an SC activity that moves the FSF from the current capability state to a desired future capability state.

The following sample questions are a framework to build on—

- Command and Control:
  - ♦ How does the FSF component exercise command and control of its forces?
    - Is it a centralized or decentralized command structure?
  - ♦ What does the command structure look like?
  - ♦ How well does the FSF unit prepare and disseminate plans and orders?
    - Are orders understood and acted on by subordinate elements within the unit?
    - How does the FSF unit coordinate and control the employment of external support?
    - Does the FSF unit maintain a common operational picture within its unit and with higher headquarters?

- Maneuver:
  - ♦ How does the FSF unit conduct—
    - Offensive maneuver?
    - Defensive maneuver?
    - Amphibious maneuver?
    - Stabilization activities?
  - ♦ How does the FSF unit conduct joint and combined operations?
  - ♦ Is the FSF unit capable of interoperability with the United States? If so, to what scale? And at what level?
    - Integrated?
    - Compatible?
    - Deconflicted?
  - ♦ How does the FSF unit establish and conduct operations in a combat operations center?
- Fires:
  - ♦ Does the FSF unit execute combined arms?
  - ♦ How well does the FSF component coordinate organic and inorganic assets and agencies?
    - Close air support?
    - Indirect fire support agencies?
    - Naval gunfire?
  - ♦ How does the FSF unit conduct targeting?
- Logistics:
  - ♦ What are the current logistical systems and processes, and do they operate efficiently?
    - Supply?
    - Maintenance?
    - Transportation?
    - Services?
    - Overview engineering?
    - Health services?
    - Deployment distribution?
- Information:
  - ♦ Does the FSF unit conduct or contribute to operations in the information environment?
    - What actions does it take to operate and defend networks, systems, and information to enable command and control and the assured operation of critical systems?
    - What actions does it take to characterize the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment to identify challenges, opportunities, and comparative advantages for the operational commander?
    - What actions does it take to exploit or attack adversary networks, systems, signatures, individuals, and information to create advantages for the operational commander?

- What actions does it take to influence domestic and international audiences to build understanding and support for operational and institutional objectives?
- What actions does it take to influence select foreign audiences and affect their decision making and behaviors to create conditions favorable to operational objectives?
- What actions does it take to induce ambiguity, misunderstanding, resource misallocation and delayed actions to deliberately mislead adversary decision makers, cause them to reveal strengths, dispositions, and future intentions while protecting the operational unit's true capabilities, readiness, posture, and intent?
- What actions does it take to provide the commander with the ability to exercise command and control and integrate resourced information assets and enhance the operational unit's ability to operate in the information environment?
- ♦ What level of interoperability does the FSF share with US forces to conduct operations in the information environment?
- Intelligence:
  - ♦ Does the FSF unit conduct intelligence operations?
  - ♦ Does the FSF component organize its forces to disseminate intelligence in actionable time frames?
- Force Protection:
  - ♦ Does the FSF component evaluate and institute—
    - Active defensive measures?
    - Active safety measures?
    - Passive defensive measures?
  - ♦ Are there field health and sanitation measures and standards?

This operational analysis is conducted in Step 3 of the SCPEC as part of the baseline FSF unit-level assessment.





# **APPENDIX E.**

## **FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE TRAINING EVALUATION**

The FSF training evaluation is the process of determining whether the unit can accomplish the training objectives related to a specific training event by comparing actual performance to the standards listed for that task. The drills and training exercises for a squad or crew are aimed at accomplishing the collective task(s) practiced in that drill or exercise.

A training evaluation is a crucial tool in informing an assessor (and by extension the SC planner) of an FSF's operational capability to accomplish warfighting functions at the tactical level. The relationship can be best surmised, "Because of this evaluation, I assess that..." A training evaluation can be used for all unit-level assessments to provide quantitative and qualitative information regarding tactical proficiency, provide feedback for milestones reached using IPRs, or to validate accomplishment of a DSR as part of a MYEP close-out.

A training evaluation is conducted by the component command or the advisor team, potentially with external support (e.g., through an RFF from the appropriate Marine Corps unit) and should be properly scoped by the SC planner prior to execution of the evaluation.

---

### **ADVISOR TEAM**

The SCPEC is designed to provide the ability to apply rotational forces to achieve objectives with partner nations and FSFs (access, capability, or capacity). When a DSR requires a capability or capacity build, as part of the monitoring process, an advisor team compares the FSF unit's current level of proficiency with the desired level of proficiency, linked to an event card.

Advisors determine current training proficiency levels by reviewing all available training evaluations. Each evaluation applies only to a portion of an organization's total proficiency at a specific time. Therefore, advisors must use all available evaluation data to develop an assessment of the organization's overall capability to accomplish each task in the MSTL. In addition to past tactical evaluations, future events could influence the assessment. For example, the projected personnel turnover rate or the fielding of new equipment could significantly affect the advisor's assessment of the proficiency status during the upcoming training period. Leaders update the assessment at the beginning of each rotation, after major training events (e.g., a milestone), and at the conclusion of their rotation.

Service component commands must provide guidance to rotational forces based on the current status of the FSF to help the advisor team develop indicators to measure the current status of the FSF in comparison to the future status, the DSR. Typically, this is accomplished through the mission event card of the SC team, advisor team, SMEE, or other activity. Roles and responsibilities differ at each level. The following construct adheres to the Marine Corps Force Generation process of Commander's Certification, and SATE and ADDIE. The officer-in-charge (OIC), staff non-commissioned officer-in-charge (SNCOIC), or team leader—

- Conducts an event that confirms previous rotations progress with the FSF.
- Conducts the advising roles (advise, support, liaison, assist) required of the MYEP for the event(s) assigned.

- Monitors and assesses advisor training with the FSF (e.g., training products and class delivery).
- Oversees PECL development for training and exercises conducted with the FSF in coordination with the SC planner, ensuring that any T&R standards are carefully adjusted to the local partner nation military's current capability, social and cultural conditions, and capacity to adapt while also taking foreign disclosure into consideration.
- Compiles the quantitative and qualitative results generated by advisor PECLs.
- Writes an AAR that captures overall assessment of the team's progress with the FSF.
- Coordinates with Service component command and partner nation FSF to develop additional tasks specific to the FSF's mission (e.g., T&R-like tasks).

The advisor or trainer—

- Develops standards-based training in accordance with the Marine Corps UTM process that matches the chaining and linking of required FSF events (tasks) to accomplish the DSR (as assigned in event card).
- Develops, executes, and compiles PECLs for every training event (task) conducted in coordination with the OIC and SNCOIC.

---

## **TRAINING EVALUATION MATRIX**

The training evaluation matrix is a component of the engagement plan tracker that records and analyzes the quantitative evaluation data captured by the PECLs to produce overall training readiness grades for the training unit and its subordinate units. The training evaluation matrix consists of four components:

- Performance evaluation checklist:
  - ♦ Based on event components specified in T&R manuals.
  - ♦ Provides assessors with a structured mechanism to evaluate, record notes, and debrief training.
- PECL summary tab within excel:
  - ♦ Records grading data from PECLs.
  - ♦ Enables assessor to summarize unit performance and view trends across units.
- MSTL by function tab within excel, which consolidates all data by warfighting function.
- MSTL summary tab within excel:
  - ♦ Consolidates grading data.
  - ♦ Computes unit performance averages and combat readiness percentages (CRPs).

### **Performance Evaluation Checklist**

There is a PECL (see Figure E-1) for each event listed in the evaluation. The purpose of the PECL is twofold; it enables an evaluator to conduct a standardized evaluation of a training unit using Marine Corps training standards and it assists the evaluator with providing structured qualitative feedback to the training unit based on the specific steps the unit succeeded or failed to perform. The evaluation team leader is responsible for the compilation of PECLs and must use them as a

basis for opinions and recommendations expressed in the unit-level assessment report. The PECLs generated using the Marine Corps Training Management System T&R Manual module are subject to the distribution statement of the T&R manual for which it is being derived from.

UNIT: _____		<b>INF-CSS-6002 Process casualties</b>		E-Coded: NO
ASSESSOR: _____		<small>D-Live training Enablers may be used to augment live training</small>		
	<b>Notes</b>	<b>Proficiency</b>		
1. If able, casualty applies self-aid.				
2. If in direct contact with the enemy, utilize suppression and smoke to allow for movement to the casualty.				
3. Marines apply buddy aid to the injured.				
4. Evacuate friendly and enemy wounded in action (WIA) and killed in action (KIA) to Casualty Collection Point (CCP), while taking reasonable measures to safeguard casualties.				
5. Weapons, serialized gear, and Personnel Protection Equipment (PPE) are handle and accounted for in accordance with unit Standard Operation Procedures (SOP).				
6. Wounded enemy combatants are safeguarded/escorted as required.				
7. Unit corpsmen conduct triage at CCP, and advise company leadership on evacuation priorities and numbers.				
8. Conduct coordination with higher headquarters for evacuation.				

**Figure E-1. Performance Evaluation Checklist.**

The PECL contains the following elements:

- **Evaluation Information.** This section contains space to annotate the unit being trained, the name of the evaluator, and the date of the training evaluation.
- **Event Information.** This section describes the event being trained, the conditions under which the event must be conducted, and the trained standards to be met. This section also annotates whether the event is coded for formal evaluation (e-coded).
- **Evaluation Section.** This section contains a table with the following three columns:
  - ♦ **Performance Steps.** Lists all the individual events or steps the training unit must conduct to complete the training event.
  - ♦ **Notes.** Provides a space for the evaluator to record notes on the training unit for each performance step.
  - ♦ **Proficiency.** Provides space for the assessor to assign the unit a grade for each performance step. Evaluators assign a quantitative score to event components on the PECL. Grades are assigned according to the following scale and can be color coded. Figure E-2 below provides an example of color-coding associated to scoring categories:
    - **Untrained (Grade=0).** The training unit did not adequately perform the performance step. If the evaluator observes that the training unit did not execute the performance step, a grade of (0) is assigned.
    - **Partially Trained (Grade=1).** The training unit conducted the performance step with difficulty.

- Trained (Grade=2). The training unit demonstrated mastery of the performance step.
- Not Observed (N/O). The assessor did not observe performance of the event. Non-observed performance steps are left blank and the evaluation matrix is coded in such a way that they do not affect the MSTL's cumulative average.

<b>0</b> <b>Untrained:</b> Unit did not demonstrate mastery of task	<b>1</b> <b>Partially Trained:</b> Unit completed task with some difficulty	<b>2</b> <b>Trained:</b> Unit demonstrated mastery of task	<b>N/O</b> Not observed
------------------------------------------------------------------------	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------	----------------------------

Figure E-2. Evaluation Grading Criteria.

### Performance Evaluation Checklist Summary Tab

The PECL summary (Figure E-3) tabulates scores for all performance steps of a task. It then averages the performance steps and provides a score. The table is coded to ignore non-observed task components. The scores for each performance step are drawn directly from the PECL on-hand at the evaluation. The PECL summary is divided by level (e.g., 9000, 8000, 7000, 6000).

INF-MAN-7006: Conduct a Helicopter/tilt-rotor assault	
	Battalion
1. Conduct integrated planning.	2.00
2. Conduct IPB.	1.00
3. Conduct fire support planning.	1.00
4. Conduct fire support coordination.	1.00
5. Task organize forces.	2.00
6. Conduct ISR.	2.00
7. Establish Go/No Criteria.	2.00
8. Designate TRAP force.	
9. Conduct Command and Control.	2.00
10. Treat and process casualties.	1.00
11. Process detainees.	1.00
12. Conduct Combat Service Support.	
13. Send and receive required reports.	1.00
14. Transition to follow on operations, as required.	
<b>INF-MAN-7006</b>	<b>1.45</b>

Figure E-3. Performance Evaluation Checklist Summary.

### Military/Security Task List by Function Tab

The MSTL by Function tab compiles scores from all tasks (by level and by unit [e.g., a company]) across an MSTL and are displayed by warfighting function. This serves as a data visualization tool for the analysis of FSF performance trends. The information generated through this is used to produce the qualitative narrative of the assessment report, in addition to identifying trends by functional area. Figure E-4 illustrates a sample MSTL by Function tab.

Battalion MSTs					
Function	Code	Task	E-Coded	Supporting Events	Battalion Assessment
Commanding and Control	INF-C2-7001	Employ a command and control (C2) system		INF-C2-6001	1.80
	INF-C2-7003	Establish a command post (CP)	Yes	INF-C2-6002	1.70
	INF-C2-7004	Conduct combat operations center (COC) operations	Yes	INF-C2-6002	1.71
	INF-C2-7005	Conduct planning	Yes	INF-C2-6003	1.64
	INF-C2-7006	Conduct assessment	Yes	INF-C2-6004	0.75
	INF-C2-7007	Conduct information management (IM)		INF-C2-6005	1.10
	INF-C2-7009	Integrate enabler support		INF-C2-6006	1.50
	INF-C2-7010	Execute a command and control (C2) process	Yes	INF-C2-6007	1.44
	INF-C2-7011	Coordinate force deployment planning and execution (FDP&E)		INF-C2-6003	
	INF-C2-7013	Integrate Marine Air Command and Control System support (MACCS)			
	INF-C2-7014	Displace the command post (CP)		INF-C2-6002	
Cond.	INF-COND-7001	Conduct a forced march	Yes		
Logistics	INF-CSS-7001	Conduct logistics planning		INF-CSS-6001	
	INF-CSS-7002	Conduct combat service support (CCS)	Yes	INF-CSS-6001	1.71
	INF-CSS-7003	Process casualties		INF-CSS-6002	1.60
	INF-CSS-7004	Conduct detainee operations		INF-CSS-6003	1.50
Force Protection	INF-FP-7001	Conduct force protection	Yes	INF-FP-6001	1.67
	INF-FP-7002	Employ Operational Security (OPSEC) measures		INF-FP-6002	
	INF-FP-7004	Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) operations		INF-FP-6004	
	SQDR-OPS-7005	Establish base/airfield security operations	Yes	HQCO-ABGD-6001	2.00
Fires	INF-FSPT-7001	Conduct fire support planning	Yes	INF-FSPT-6001	1.20
	INF-FSPT-7002	Conduct fire support coordination	Yes	INF-FSPT-6002	1.13
	INF-FSPT-7003	Conduct decide, detect, deliver, assess (D3A) targeting		INF-FSPT-6003	
	INF-FSPT-7004	Conduct information operations		INF-FSPT-6004	
	INF-FSPT-7005	Integrate electronic warfare		INF-FSPT-6005	
Intelligence	INF-INT-7001	Conduct intelligence operations	Yes	INF-INT-6001	1.43
	INF-INT-7002	Direct reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) operations		INF-MAN-6217	
Maneuver	INF-MAN-7001	Conduct a ground attack	Yes	INF-MAN-6001	1.53
	INF-MAN-7002	Conduct a movement to contact		INF-MAN-6002	
	INF-MAN-7003	Conduct a pursuit		INF-MAN-6001	
	INF-MAN-7004	Conduct exploitation		INF-MAN-6001	
	INF-MAN-7005	Conduct an armored/infantry operation		INF-MAN-6005	
	INF-MAN-7006	Conduct a helicopter/tilt-rotor assault	Yes	INF-MAN-6003	1.45
	INF-MAN-7007	Conduct a bypass operation		INF-MAN-6205	
	INF-MAN-7101	Conduct an area defense	Yes	INF-MAN-6101	1.71
	INF-MAN-7102	Conduct a mobile defense		INF-MAN-6102	
	INF-MAN-7103	Conduct retrograde		INF-MAN-6103	
	INF-MAN-7104	Conduct security operations	Yes	INF-MAN-6212	1.67
	INF-MAN-7202	Conduct mounted operations		INF-MAN-6212	1.64
	INF-MAN-7203	Occupy an assembly area		INF-MAN-6203	
	INF-MAN-7204	Conduct a relief in place (RIP)		INF-MAN-6204	
	INF-MAN-7205	Conduct a gap crossing		INF-MAN-6205	
	INF-MAN-7206	Conduct passage of lines		INF-MAN-6206	
	INF-MAN-7207	Conduct a linkup		INF-MAN-6207	
	INF-MAN-7208	Conduct obstacle breaching		INF-MAN-6208	
	INF-MAN-7210	Conduct reserve operations		INF-MAN-6210	
	INF-MAN-7211	Conduct rear area operations		INF-C2-6007	1.73
	INF-MAN-7212	Conduct route reconnaissance operations		INF-C2-6009	1.25
	INF-MAN-7214	Employ scout snipers		INF-MAN-6217	
	INF-MAN-7215	Control an area		INF-MAN-6215	
	INF-MAN-7301	Conduct an amphibious assault		INF-MAN-6301	
	INF-MAN-7302	Develop a landing plan		INF-C2-6003	
	INF-MAN-7303	Conduct an amphibious withdrawal		INF-MAN-6103	
	INF-MAN-7304	Conduct an amphibious raid		INF-MAN-6004	
	INF-MAN-7305	Conduct noncombatant evacuation operations	Yes		
	INF-MAN-7306	Conduct an amphibious landing	Yes	INF-MAN-6301	
	INF-MAN-7401	Conduct civil military operations (CMO)	Yes	INF-MAN-6401	1.67
	INF-MAN-7402	Restore civil security		INF-MAN-6406	
	INF-MAN-7403	Support the establishment of civil control		INF-MAN-6402	
	INF-MAN-7404	Support the restoration of essential services		INF-MAN-6403	1.71
	INF-MAN-7405	Support local governance		INF-MAN-6404	1.75
	INF-MAN-7406	Support economic development		INF-MAN-6405	
	INF-MAN-7408	Train and mentor foreign security forces		INF-MAN-6407	
Training	INF-TRNG-7001	Manage unit training and readiness		INF-TRNG-6001	
Average Performance (on ALL events)					1.54
Adjusted CRP (% of ALL events scored 1.00 or above)					39%
Number of E-coded events			19		
Average Performance (on E-coded events)					1.53
CRP (% of E-coded events scored 1.00 or above)					79%

Figure E-4. Military/Security Task List by Function.

### Military/Security Task List Summary Tab

The MSTL Summary tab provides performance scores on designated e-coded events, overall performance of tasks, and a CRP of e-coded events, if required. The information generated from the MSTL Tracker is used to produce the qualitative narrative of the assessment report. It also serves as a data visualization tool for the analysis of performance trends of the FSF.

The MSTL Summary tab contains the MSTL summary and the MST summary. The MSTL summary shows the FSF unit's overall performance and CRP at a glance. The MST summary displays all the events and their scores that generated an MST's score and CRP.

The CRP is calculated by adding the percentage of each completed and current (within sustainment interval) e-coded training event. The percentage for each MST is calculated the same way and all are added together and divided by the number of MSTs to determine unit CRP. For ease of calculation, we will say that each MST has four e-coded events, each contributing 25 percent toward the completion of the MST. If the unit has completed and is current on three of the four e-coded events for a given MST, then they have completed 75 percent of the MST. The CRP for each MST is added together and divided by the number of MSTs to get unit CRP; unit CRP is the average of MST CRP. Figure E-5 is an example of an MSTL Summary. Figure E-6 is an example MST Summary.

MSTL SUMMARY			
Code	Task	Score	CRP
MST 1	Deploy forces/conduct maneuver	1.44	90%
MST 2	Conduct offensive operations	1.49	100%
MST 3	Conduct base defense	1.66	100%
MST 4	Conduct military operations in urbanized terrain (MOUT)	1.18	100%
MST 5	Conduct route clearance operations	1.64	100%
MST 6	Conduct stability operations	1.67	100%
MST 7	Integrate and operate with joint/combined forces	1.13	100%
MSTL CRP		1.46	100%

Figure E-5. Military/Security Task List Summary.

MST 2: Conduct Offensive Operations				
Code	Task	Score	Override	Final Score
INF-MAN-7001	Conduct a ground attack	1.53		1.53
INF-MAN-7006	Conduct a helicopter/tilt rotor-borne assault	1.45		1.45
Average Performance		1.49		1.49
CRP (% of E-coded events scored 1.00 or above)		100%		100%

Figure E-6. Military/Security Task Summary.

---

## FOREIGN SECURITY FORCE TACTICAL EVALUATION REPORT

A tactical evaluation report should be thoughtful, well-researched, well-organized, and should objectively evaluate FSF performance. The report should contain the following:

- Executive Summary. A one- to two-page overview of the background, evaluation purpose, objectives, assessment method, conclusions, and recommendations.
- Operational Assessment of MSTL. Address all T&R standards assessed in the conduct of the exercise.
- Methods. Explain assessment methodology in detail and disclose assessment limitations.
- Conclusion. Present findings as analyzed facts, evidence and data supported by strong quantitative or qualitative evidence and not anecdotes, hearsay, or opinion.
- Recommendations. Support recommendations with specific findings and provide recommendations that are action oriented, practical, specific, and define who is responsible for action.
- Annexes. Include a full description of evaluation methodology and a list of all references (e.g., T&R manuals).

---

## TRAINING EVALUATION INPUTS INTO FSF ASSESSMENTS

The training evaluation is by design quantitative and qualitative in nature and therefore can be applied to each part of a unit-level FSF assessment (FSF baseline assessment in Step 3, an IPR, and an advisor team's assessments) by providing objective data identifying capabilities and capability gaps.

The training evaluation should at minimum provide an objective percentage or number value that highlights the performance of assigned tasks defined in an engagement plan. It should be accompanied by a qualitative report that provides an objective explanation of the quantitative rating and recommendations for areas that the FSF should sustain or improve to achieve their mission objectives and objective data to support the later solution analysis planning step.





# GLOSSARY

## Section I. Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AAR</b>	after action report
<b>AM&amp;E</b>	assessment, monitoring, and evaluation
<b>BPC</b>	building partner capacity
<b>C2</b>	command and control
<b>CDDR</b>	combatant commander
<b>CCMD</b>	combatant command
<b>CCP</b>	combatant command campaign plan
<b>CHMR</b>	civilian harm mitigation and response
<b>CJCS</b>	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
<b>CMC</b>	Commandant of the Marine Corps
<b>DATT</b>	defense attaché
<b>DC</b>	deputy commandant
<b>DoD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DoDD</b>	Department of Defense directive
<b>DoDI</b>	Department of Defense instruction
<b>DOS</b>	Department of State
<b>DOTMLPF-P</b>	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
<b>DSCA</b>	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
<b>DSCU</b>	Defense Security Cooperation University
<b>DSR</b>	desired security role
<b>FDO</b>	foreign disclosure officer
<b>FMS</b>	foreign military sales
<b>FOS</b>	feasibility of support
<b>FSF</b>	foreign security forces
<b>GFM</b>	global force management
<b>ICB</b>	institutional capacity building
<b>IDD</b>	initiative design document

<b>IEP</b>	Information Exchange Program
<b>IMET</b>	international military education and training
<b>IPR</b>	interim progress report
<b>JP</b>	Joint Publication
<b>JTIMS</b>	Joint Training Information Management System
<b>KLE</b>	key leader engagement
<b>MAGTF</b>	Marine Air-ground task force
<b>MCAC</b>	Marine Corps Advisor Company
<b>MCBul</b>	Marine Corps bulletin
<b>MCCC</b>	Marine Corps component command
<b>MCO</b>	Marine Corps order
<b>MCRP</b>	Marine Corps reference publication
<b>MARCORSYSCOM</b>	Marine Corps Systems Command
<b>MCTL</b>	Marine Corps task list
<b>MCTP</b>	Marine Corps tactical publication
<b>MCWP</b>	Marine Corps warfighting publication
<b>MEF</b>	Marine expeditionary force
<b>MET</b>	mission-essential task
<b>METL</b>	mission-essential task list
<b>MEU</b>	Marine expeditionary unit
<b>MOE</b>	measure of effectiveness
<b>MOP</b>	measure of performance
<b>MST</b>	military/security task
<b>MSTL</b>	military/security task list
<b>MTT</b>	mobile training team
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NAVMC</b>	Navy/Marine Corps departmental publication
<b>NDAA</b>	National Defense Authorization Act
<b>NDP</b>	national disclosure policy
<b>OSD</b>	Office of the Secretary of Defense
<b>PECL</b>	performance evaluation checklist
<b>PEP</b>	personnel exchange program
<b>PME</b>	professional military education

<b>PP&amp;O</b>	Plans, Policies, and Operations (HQMC)
<b>RFC</b>	request for capabilities
<b>RFF</b>	request for forces
<b>SECNAVINST</b>	Secretary of the Navy Instruction
<b>SC</b>	security cooperation
<b>SCO</b>	security cooperation organization
<b>SDO</b>	senior defense official
<b>SecDef</b>	Secretary of Defense
<b>SFA</b>	security force assistance
<b>SME</b>	subject matter expert
<b>SMEE</b>	subject matter expert exchange
<b>SPMAGTF</b>	special-purpose Marine air-ground task force
<b>SSCI</b>	significant security cooperation initiative
<b>T&amp;R</b>	training and readiness
<b>TECOM</b>	Training and Education Command
<b>USD(P)</b>	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
<b>USG</b>	United States Government
<b>UTM</b>	unit training management

The following acronyms pertain specifically to this publication.

<b>ADDIE</b>	analyze, design, develop, implement, and evaluate
<b>IMS</b>	international military student
<b>LOA</b>	letter of offer and acceptance
<b>OAI</b>	operations, activities, and investment
<b>PMP</b>	performance monitoring plan
<b>PMR</b>	performance monitoring report
<b>SATE</b>	systems approach to training and education

## Section II. Terms and Definitions

### **assessment**

1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (DoD Dictionary) (Additional considerations around AM&E terms and definitions are contained in appendix C.)

### **capability**

The ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance. (DoDD 5132.03)

### **capacity**

The ability of a foreign security forces organization or partner nation to replicate and self-sustain a given capability over time or to export a given capability in support of regional or global interests. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

### **close-out report**

A final report that addresses all actions and activities executed in support of a security cooperation plan, which provides an accounting of all resources expended and analysis/assessments of the effectiveness of the plan. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

### **component-level assessment**

Identifies current state partner nation or foreign security forces component-level capabilities to help determine a desired future state in security role analysis. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

### **desired security role**

The role assigned to a foreign security forces organization after analyzing the common objectives of all stakeholders and to meet security cooperation purposes (relationship, access, capability, capacity). Also called **DSR**. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

### **foreign internal defense**

(See DoD Dictionary for core definition. Marine Corps amplification follows.) Participation by civilian, military, and law enforcement agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **FID**. (USMC Dictionary)

### **foreign military sales**

A process through which eligible foreign governments and international organizations may purchase defense articles, services, and training from the United States Government Also called **FMS**. (JP 3-20)

### **foreign security forces**

Defense and security establishments, or forces, of a foreign state, including military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces, and the military and civilian agencies that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions in a foreign state. Also called **FSF**. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

### **foreign security force assessment**

A tailored analysis of foreign security forces based on mission and tasks conducted at various levels of command that validates capability standards, identifies gaps, determines operational risks associated with the gaps, and provides recommendations to address the gaps. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

**foreign security force training evaluation**

The process of determining whether the unit can accomplish the training objectives related to a specific training event by comparing actual performance to the standards listed for that task. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

**initial assessment**

Information collected before or at the start of a significant security cooperation initiative, program, activity, etc. that provides a basis for planning, monitoring, or evaluating subsequent progress or impact. (DoDI 5132.14)

**institutional capacity building**

Security cooperation activities that support partner efforts to establish or improve enduring policies and processes to plan, develop, resource, acquire, staff, employ, and sustain capabilities of mutual benefit to respond to shared challenges. Also called **ICB**. (JP 3-20)

**interagency coordination**

The planning and synchronization of efforts that occur between elements of Department of Defense and participating United States Government departments and agencies. (JP 3-0)

**interim progress report**

Assesses the progress of the MYEP to determine whether programmatic milestones for the foreign security forces have been achieved within anticipated timeframes and budgets. Also called **IPR**. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

**interorganizational**

Elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (MCWP 3-03 Stabilization Activities)

**materiel**

All items necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (DoD Dictionary)

**measure of effectiveness**

An indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called **MOE**. (JP 5-0)

**measure of performance**

An indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called **MOP**. (JP 5-0)

**military/security task**

Collective foreign security forces unit-level responsibility that comprises capability sets and associated sub-capabilities. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

**mission-essential task**

A task, selected by a force commander from the Marine Corps Task List, deemed essential to mission accomplishment. Also called **MET**. (USMC Dictionary)

**mission-essential task list**

The list of a command's essential tasks with appropriate conditions and performance standards to assure successful mission accomplishment. Also called **METL**. (USMC Dictionary)

**multi-year engagement plan**

A comprehensive but flexible plan that combines methodology, strategy, assessments and monitoring across a timeline to conduct security cooperation activities with a PN, helping them meet the requirements to fill a desired security role. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

**security assistance**

A group of programs authorized by federal statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which are considered part of security cooperation. Also called **SA**. See also security cooperation. (JP 3-20)

**security cooperation organization**

A Department of Defense element in a diplomatic mission assigned to carry out security assistance and cooperation management functions. Also called **SCO**. (JP 3-20)

**Security Cooperation Planning and Execution Cycle**

The Marine Corps' six-step process to plan, assess, execute, monitor, and evaluate security cooperation activities and processes with foreign security forces to accomplish mutual objectives of the United States Government and partner nations. Also called **SCPEC**. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

**security force assistance**

The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called **SFA**. (JP 3-20)

**security role analysis**

The examination of the common security objectives among United States and partner nation stakeholders for the purpose of defining which security cooperation activities to conduct with a partner nation to attain a desired security role. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

**solutions analysis**

The data-based development of proposed MYEP activities designed to address gaps and risks in foreign security forces capabilities as identified during a foreign security forces assessment. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

**theater analysis**

A continuous analytical review of stakeholder guidance and available resources to build an understanding of theater priorities, objectives, constraints and restraints. (As contained in this glossary, this term and its definition are applicable to this publication only.)

# REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

## Federal Issuances

### United States Code

Title 10        Armed Forces  
Title 22        Foreign Relations and Intercourse

### Federal Law

Arms Export Control Act of 1976  
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended  
Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017

### Executive Branch

The National Security Strategy of the United States  
National Disclosure Policy-1

## Department of Defense Issuances

### Department of Defense Directives (DoDDs)

2010.09        Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements  
5000.01        The Defense Acquisition System  
5100.01        Functions of the DoD and Its Major Components  
5105.65        Defense Security Cooperation Agency  
5132.03        Security Cooperation  
5205.82        Defense Institution Building  
5230.11        Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and  
                 International Organizations

### Department of Defense Instructions (DoDIs)

2015.4        Defense Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Information  
                 Exchange Program (IEP)  
3000.17        Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response  
5000.02        Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework  
5111.20        State Partnership Program (SPP)  
5132.14        Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security  
                 Cooperation Enterprise  
5132.15        Implementation of the Security Cooperation Workforce Certification Program  
5530.03        International Agreements

Miscellaneous

Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP)

Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual

Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)

**Office of the Secretary of Defense**

The National Defense Strategy of the United States

**Department of State**

Functional Bureau Strategy

Integrated Country Strategy

Joint Regional Strategy

**Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI)

2120.01\_ Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements

Miscellaneous

Joint Strategic Campaign Plan

Guidance for Employment of the Force

The National Military Strategy of the United States

**Joint Issuances**

Joint Publications (JPs)

3-0 Joint Campaigns and Operations

3-02 Amphibious Operations

3-16 Multinational Operations

3-20 Security Cooperation

3-22 Foreign Internal Defense

5-0 Joint Planning

Miscellaneous

Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 Competition Continuum



## Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST)

5710.32      International Agreements and Arrangements

## Navy/Marine Corps Departmental Publications (NAVMC)

1553.1A      Marine Corps Instructional Systems Design/Systems Approach to Training and Education Handbook  
1553.3      Marine Corps Training Input Plan Program Guidance  
3500.108\_      MAGTF Planner T&R Manual

## United States Navy

### Miscellaneous

Tri-Service Maritime Strategy: Advantage at Sea

## United States Marine Corps

### Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1      Warfighting  
1-0      Marine Corps Operations  
1-2      Campaigning  
1-4      Competing  
5      Planning  
6      Command and Control

### Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

3-02      Insurgencies and Countering Insurgency  
3-03      Stabilization Activities  
5-10      Marine Corps Planning Process

### Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP)

7-20A      Unit Training Guide

### Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

1-10.1      Organization of the United States Marine Corps  
3-03D.1      Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)

P3500.72\_ Marine Corps Ground Training and Readiness Program  
1520.11 International Affairs Program  
3120.12\_ Marine Corps Global Force Management (GFM) and Force Synchronization  
3821.2 The Defense Attaché System  
5510.20\_ Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Governments and Interests  
5710.6\_ Marine Corps Security Cooperation

Marine Corps Bulletins (MCBul)

3120 Force Synchronization (This document is located on SIPR; title is unclassified)

Miscellaneous

Marine Corps Supplement to the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms  
A Concept for Stand-In Forces  
A Functional Concept for Maritime Reconnaissance and Counter-reconnaissance  
Concept for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations  
Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment