MCWP 3-03

Stabilization Activities

U.S. Marine Corps

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

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FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-03, *Stabilization Activities*, codifies the eleven common stabilization missions, the nine associated Marine Corps tasks (MCTs), and the eleven supporting stabilization activities and associated MCTs, in addition to other planning considerations for the Fleet Marine Forces when conducting stabilization activities.

Stabilization activities occur throughout the competition continuum. Whether Marines are conducting foreign humanitarian assistance missions, peace operations, or working concurrently with offensive and defensive operations during an armed conflict, they cannot ignore the presence of the population and its needs.

This publication supersedes MCWP 3-03, *Stability Operations*, dated 16 December 2016; and Change 1, dated 4 April 2018.

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

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CHAPTER 1.
STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

THE MARINE CORPS ROLE IN STABILIZATION

Joint Publication (JP) 3-07, *Joint Stabilization Activities*, describes stabilization activities as the "various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power . . ." These actions are conducted to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment in fragile states of interest to the United States and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief as needed. Joint Publication 3-07 describes stability as the desired end state and stabilization as the aggregation of activities to restore the functions of the legitimate authorities.

Conducting stabilization activities is not a new mission to the Marine Corps. For example, since the late 19th century, beginning with small-scale engagements from South America, often referred to as the Banana Wars, to Asia and continuing into the early 21st century with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Fleet Marine Forces (FMF) have conducted stabilization activities. This includes such locations as Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti, Kosovo, Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia and within the littorals of the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, Adriatic Sea, and Caribbean Sea. Marines participate in stabilization activities because, as Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, *Stabilization*, states, "Fragile and conflict-affected states often serve as breeding grounds for violent extremism; transnational terrorism and organized crime; refugees and internally displaced persons; humanitarian emergencies; the spread of pandemic disease; and mass atrocities. Stabilization can prevent or mitigate these conditions before they impact the security of the United States and its allies and partners." Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 further states that, "Stabilization is an inherently political endeavor that requires aligning US Government (USG) efforts—diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and defense—to create conditions in which locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent violence."

The directive describes five core responsibilities for the execution of stabilization activities by the Department of Defense (DoD) that Marines can use for planning purposes (e.g., to shape prioritization and execution of activities in coordination and collaboration with interagency partners and allies and partners).

Core Responsibility One

The DoD designs, implements, monitors, and evaluates stabilization actions based on conflict assessments, operational requirements, and complementary foreign assistance. For example, Marines would—

- Assess the area of operations and conduct advanced planning, (e.g., to determine immediate tasks for the FMF, such as personnel and logistical requirements to sustain US forces, the host-nation government, and the population).
- Coordinate with the host-nation government, USG interagency partners, and allies and partners to determine capabilities to prevent duplication of effort.
- Prioritize support requirements (e.g., is the immediate need to establish civil security and civil control or is the priority to focus solely on humanitarian assistance?)

Core Responsibility Two

Consistent with available authorities, DoD will prioritize efforts to identify, train, equip, advise, assist, or accompany foreign security forces (FSF) conducting stabilization actions independently or in conjunction with other USG efforts. For example, Marines could—

- Provide security assistance (e.g., training to host-nation security forces [HNSFs] in urban patrols, crowd control techniques, or legal assistance and evidence collection in coordination with judge advocate general [JAG] personnel).
- Coordinate with allies and partners (e.g., French Mobile *Gendarmerie* and Italian *Carabinieri*), to provide security assistance training to HNSFs.
- Conduct security cooperation missions focused on building relationships with HNSFs and developing their capabilities.

Core Responsibility Three

When authorized and directed, DoD will establish secure operating conditions for civilian-led stabilization efforts. For example, activities could include—

- Providing immediate security to prevent societal devolution into chaos and anarchy in the immediate aftermath of an armed conflict or foreign disaster.
- Assisting HNSFs in maintaining basic public order (e.g., to prevent looting or enforce a curfew in the aftermath of an urban battle or a natural disaster).
- Providing for the immediate needs of the population (i.e., distribution of Class I [subsistence] and Class VIII [medical and dental] supplies).
- Assisting the Department of State (DOS) and US Agency for International Development (USAID) in executing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, which could include—
  - Conducting peace operations (peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peace-building activities).
  - Separating warring factions (establishing distinct areas of control that segregate warring factions).
  - Rehabilitating former belligerents into HNSFs or military units.
  - Assisting the DOS and USAID with programs that strengthen governance, such as democratic practices and judicial reform (i.e., the rule of law).
  - Assisting the DOS and USAID with the implementation of economic development programs.

Core Responsibility Four

When required to achieve US stabilization objectives, and consistent with available authorities, DoD supports other USG departments and agencies with logistic support, supplies, and services and other enabling capabilities, such as—

- Providing logistical support with available aircraft and vehicles.
- Providing Class I, Class IV (construction), and Class VIII supplies.

Core Responsibility Five

When required to achieve US stabilization objectives, and to the extent authorized by law, DoD reinforces and complements civilian-led stabilization efforts. Such efforts may include delivering targeted basic services, removing explosive remnants of war, repairing critical infrastructure, and other activities. For example, activities could include—

- Assisting with the repair and restoration of critical infrastructure (e.g., airports, bridges, ports, railroads).
- Assisting with the repair and restoration of life-sustaining essential services (e.g., water and wastewater treatment plants and power generation facilities).

Stabilization activities are, however, distinct from foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and foreign disaster relief (FDR) missions. Marines will likely execute FHA and FDR missions, but DoD humanitarian assistance efforts may complement existing, regional USG stabilization activities. For example, FHA and FDR missions generally set conditions for short-term stability by providing for the population's immediate needs, such as managing the distribution of Class I (subsistence) and Class VIII (medical) supplies to prevent further suffering. A security force assistance (SFA) mission generally involves providing security and maintaining public order in coordination with a host-nation government while simultaneously protecting the interests of the USG. The successful execution of stabilization activities requires a whole-of-government approach, which means it integrates the collaborative efforts of USG agencies to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. Three organizations within the stabilization hierarchy—the lead element, the implementation element, and the supporting element—execute stabilization activities.

- *Lead element*. The DOS is the overall lead federal agency for US stabilization activities. The DOS' responsibilities include oversight of USG foreign policy and programming that may have an impact on the security sector.
- *Implementation element*. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead implementation agency for non-security-related US stabilization assistance. Responsibilities for the USAID include—
  - Support the host-nation government with governance.
  - Assist in conflict mitigation (e.g., reintegration and reconciliation).
  - Assist the host-nation government with implementing the rule of law.
- *Supporting element*. The DoD is a supporting element, providing requisite security and reinforcing civilian efforts where appropriate and consistent with available statutory authorities. The DoD establishes a defense support to the stabilization process to identify

defense stabilization objectives in concert with other USG departments and agencies. For example, when functioning as the support element, stabilization activities could include—

- Supporting host-nation sector security reform (SSR). It is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by the host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice, as well as adhering to the rule of law.
- Assisting the host-nation government in controlling its borders and territory.
- Assisting HNSFs with civil security (i.e., security of the populace, infrastructure, and legislative and judicial institutions).

Table 1-1, Common Stabilization Missions, lists and defines some of the more common stabilization missions that the FMF will likely conduct throughout the competition continuum. Table 1-2, Stabilization Activities and Associated Marine Corps Tasks, and Table 1-3, Supporting Stabilization Activities and Associated Marine Corps Tasks, provide a brief description of stabilization activities and supporting stabilization activities respectively and their associated Marine Corps tasks.

The operational planning team can use the tables as a reference when conducting the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). For example, the stabilization activities and supporting stabilization activities align to a specific Marine Corps task, which itself is taken from a Marine Corps Task List. It is a comprehensive list of Marine Corps tasks, doctrinally based, designed to support current and future mission-essential task list development. The operational planning team would use the definition of the mission type to understand the purpose of the mission, and thereafter, how the stabilization and supporting stabilization activities would align with the associated Marine Corps task (MCT) to achieve mission success. Executing the stabilization or supporting stabilization activities will also require understanding the mission-essential task (also called MET). It is a task a force commander selects from the MCTL that is deemed essential to mission accomplishment. The force commander provides a mission-essential task list, (also called a METL), which is the list of a command's essential tasks with appropriate conditions and performance standards to assure successful mission accomplishment.

The operational planning team war games the mission-essential tasks during the MCPP. In addition, once the operational planning team selects a course of action (COA), the team determines the corresponding measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs). An MOE is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. An MOP is an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. The operational planning team determines how to best use the measurements. The objective is to assess if the COA (stabilization activity) is leading to mission accomplishment and if not, having the operational flexibility to adjust to the realities of the tactical situation.

Table 1-1. Common Stabilization Missions.

Stabilization Mission	Definition or Description
Defense institution building	Defense institution-building activities include episodic, periodic, or one-time visits by DoD personnel participating in defense management exchanges, professional seminars, military-to-military dialogues on defense institution topics, and other events and activities related to a partner nation's defense institution capabilities and capacity.
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration are useful stabilization tools that take different forms depending on the context (e.g., demilitarization of armed groups upon signing a peace agreement, promotion of voluntary defections to degrade the military capabilities of proxy forces or terrorist groups).
Foreign assistance	Support for foreign nations that can be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance.
Foreign disaster relief	Assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities, as well as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter; the furnishing of medical equipment and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services.
Foreign humanitarian assistance	Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. For example, Marines can visualize FHA missions as responding to short-term crises events.
Foreign internal defense	Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host-nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.
Foreign nation support	Civil or military assistance rendered to a nation when operating outside its national boundaries during military operations. This assistance is based on agreements mutually concluded between nations or on behalf of intergovernmental organizations.
Personnel recovery	The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.
Security assistance	A group of programs authorized by federal statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which are considered part of security cooperation.
Security cooperation	Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners.
Security force assistance	The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of FSF and their supporting institutions.

Table 1-2. Stabilization Activities and Associated Marine Corps Tasks.

Stabilization Activity	Marine Corps Task
Conduct Stabilization Activities Stabilization activities are conducted to help establish order that advances US interests and values. Often, the immediate goal is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society. The overarching purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability. Stability activities tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or US civilian professionals, however, US forces should be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Tasks include rebuilding indigenous institutions, including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment; reviving or building the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity, and constructing necessary infrastructure; and developing representative governmental institutions. This task includes prepositioning operations (JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations;* Marine Corps Warfighting Publication [MCWP] 3-01, *Offensive and Defensive Tactics,* and DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.05, *Stabilization*).	MCT 1.14
Restore Essential Services Support stabilization efforts to establish or restore basic civil and essential services: food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. Activities associated with this primary stability task extend beyond simply restoring local civil services and addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. Initial response tasks focus on the immediate needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations including providing or supporting humanitarian assistance, providing shelter and relief for dislocated civilians, and preventing the spread of epidemic disease. Typically, local, and international aid organizations are already providing assistance, although the security situation or obstacles to free movement may limit their access to all populations. By providing a secure environment, military forces enable these organizations to expand their access to the entire populace and ease the overall burden on the force to provide this assistance in isolation (DoDD 3000.05 and *Marine Corps Tactical Publication* [MCTP] 3-03A, *MAGTF Civil-Military Operations*.	MCT 1.14.3
Support to Governance Military support to governance focuses on restoring and stabilizing public administration and resuming public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of legitimate political governance. Governance is the process, systems, institutions, and actors that enable a state to function. The support provided by military forces helps to shape the environment for extended unified action by other partners and enables the host-nation to develop an open political process, a free press, a functioning civil society, and legitimate legal and constitutional frameworks (DoDD 3000.05 and MCTP 3-03A).	MCT 1.14.4
Provide Engineer Support to Stabilization Activities To support stabilization activities by conducting engineer tasks that help establish order and advance US interests and values. The immediate goal is to provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term goal is to help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services. The overarching purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability. The performance of the engineer tasks is shaped by the requirements of the supported commander or agency (DoDD 3000.05; *DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*; Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication [MCDP] 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations*; MCDP 3, *Expeditionary Operations*; and MCWP 3-34, *Engineering Operations*).	MCT 1.14.5

Table 1-2. Stabilization Activities and Associated Marine Corps Tasks. (Continued).

Facilitate Stabilization Activities To plan, advise, coordinate, support, and provide for the safety and security of the population, including protection from internal and external threats as part of a larger MAGTF conducting stabilization activities. Participate in the execution of measures which are normally the responsibility of the indigenous civil government, providing security for the populace, detecting, and reducing the effectiveness of enemy forces, denying human or materiel resources to the enemy, regulating the consumption of materiel resources, and mobilizing human or materiel resources. The immediate goal is often to provide the local populace with security and to meet humanitarian needs. The overarching purpose is to promote and sustain regional and global stability. Tasks may include training, advising, and assisting HNSFs and correctional facilities personnel necessary to secure and stabilize the operational environment; assisting with the restoration of essential services; and support local governance (JP 3.07 and DoDD 3000.05).	MCT 1.14.6
Coordinate Foreign Humanitarian Assistance To plan, advise, coordinate, and support actions, and programs (e.g., foreign disaster relief) to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Example tasks include: monitoring FHA operations for compliance with applicable laws, agreements, treaties, and contracts; identifying host-nation FHA capabilities, establishing contact with, and maintaining working relationships with FHA partners, including the interagency, host nation and foreign military units, NGOs, information activities, and indigenous populations and institutions, as appropriate; establishing CMO, FHA plans and policies; and, assessing, monitoring, and reporting the impact of FHA operations on the affected populace (MCTP 3-03A, and DoDD 5100.46, *Foreign Disaster Relief*).	MCT 1.15.1.2
Coordinate Foreign Assistance To plan, advise, coordinate, and support operations that provide civil or military assistance (other than FHA) to a foreign nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and the host nation. Support the host nation by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term, regional stability. Example tasks include identifying, validating, or evaluating foreign Assistance project nominations; synchronizing foreign assistance projects with other programs; participating in the execution of selected foreign assistance operations as needed or directed; tracking costs associated with execution of foreign assistance projects; identifying, validating, or evaluating security assistance and foreign internal defense programs; and assisting in arbitration of problems arising from the execution of foreign assistance operations (JP 3-57, *Civil-Military Operations*, and MCTP 3-03A).	MCT 1.15.1.3
Conduct Humanitarian Assistance Humanitarian assistance relieves or reduces the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of host-nation civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. The DoD provides assistance when the relief needed is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the normal relief agencies' ability to effectively respond. Humanitarian assistance operation tasks include providing personnel and supplies, and to provide a mobile, flexible, rapidly responsive medical capability for acute medical and surgical care. Humanitarian assistance is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility. This task includes prepositioning operations (JP 1 vol. 1, *Joint Warfighting*; JP 3-0; JP 3-07; JP 3-59, *Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations*; JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*; MCDP 1-0; Naval Doctrinal Publication [NDP] 1, *Naval Warfare*; MCTP 11-10B, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*; NWP 3-02 series; NWP 3-07 series; NWP 4-02 series; and NWP 4-04, *Naval Civil Engineering Operations*).	MCT 1.16
Conduct Interorganizational Cooperation To integrate and operate Marine Corps capabilities and activities with organizations outside the Department of Navy. These organizations may include DoD components; USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; FSF and foreign government agencies; international organizations; non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector (JP 3-05, *Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*; JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation*; JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations;* and MCWP 3-40, *Marine Corps Logistics*).	MCT 5.5.1

Table 1-3. Supporting Stabilization Activities and Associated Marine Corps Tasks.

Supporting Stabilization Activities	Marine Corps Task
Conduct Security Cooperation Activities To conduct security cooperation activities with FSF to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. It includes non-combat activities, activities which may lead to combat operations, and certain combat activities. Foreign security forces are forces—including but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel—that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization's mission (JP 1 vol. 1; JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*; JP 3-20, *Security Cooperation*; DoDD 5132.03, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*; and MCO 5710.6D, *Marine Corps Security Cooperation*).	MCT 1.17
Assess Foreign Security Forces To measure the capabilities of a foreign security force against the United States' desired capabilities and role for that FSF. Assessment provides initial and continuous feedback toward achieving FSF capabilities. It guides the conduct of advising, training, and/or assistance activities. Assessments include training evaluations, the identification of FSF capability gaps, the conduct of after-action reviews, readiness reviews, and other organizational assessments (JP 1 vol. 1; JP 5-0; JP 3-20; and MCO 5710.6D).	MCT 1.17.1
Advise Foreign Security Forces To advise FSF in planning, coordination and execution of operations and exercises in support of US and partner-nation military or political objectives. This includes efforts to enhance foreign security force capabilities to train, organize, equip, employ, and sustain themselves. The focus of advisor efforts is building partner capacity through personal relationships and influence. Training is involved but is not the focus of effort (JP 1 vol. 1; JP 3-20; DODD 5132.03; and MCO 5710.6D).	MCT 1.17.2
Train Foreign Security Forces To teach and instruct FSF in doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and individual or collective skills to foster partner nation security capabilities. This includes training activities at executive, generating, and operating levels of the FSF. Although advising may be involved, it is not the focus of effort (JP 1 vol. 1; JP 3-20; Secretary of the Navy Instruction [SECNAVINST] 4950.4B, *Joint Security Cooperation Education and Training*; DoDD 5132.03; and MCO 5710.6D).	MCT 1.17.3
Assist Foreign Security Forces To provide, coordinate, or facilitate FSF access to US or coalition support in capabilities such as intelligence, fires, logistics, command and control, and force protection. The focus of effort is assistance. Assistance efforts may be conducted in concert with related advising and training efforts to build FSF capacity (JP 1 vol. 1; JP 3-20; and MCO 5710.6D).	MCT 1.17.4
Conduct Network Engagement To conduct and support activities to engage with relevant friendly, neutral, and adversary networks and their supporting systems in a multi-domain environment, in support of tactical, operational, or strategic objectives. This includes establishing and sustaining relationships with regional military and non-military networks, supporting security force assistance to build partner nation capabilities, engaging with local populations, and identifying and countering threat networks (JP 3-25, *Joint Countering Threat Networks* [Publication is CUI]).	MCT 1.21

Table 1-3. Supporting Stabilization Activities and Associated Marine Corps Tasks. (Continued).

Plan and Direct Network Engagement To plan, coordinate, direct, and synchronize engagements with relevant friendly, neutral, and threat networks and their supporting interconnected systems in a multi-domain environment. Actions may include planning activities to sustain and build relationships with regional military and non-military networks, gather, and analyze existing information on relevant friendly, neutral and threat networks, support security force assistance to build partner nation capabilities, engage with populations and institutions, identify and counter threat networks, and assess related effects (JP-3-25).	MCT 5.17
Conduct Security Cooperation To conduct security cooperation including both non-combat activities and activities that may lead to combat operations. Emphasis is to build partner nation capacity, increase understanding, assist in transformation efforts, support greater interoperability with US forces, and accurately communicate US objectives and intent (JP 1 vol. 1; JP 5-0; MCO 5710.6C; and MCO 5710.6D).	MCT 5.5.5
Conduct Security Force Assistance To conduct security force assistance, which is the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. Security force assistance improves the capability and capacity of host-nation or regional security organization's security forces. These forces are collectively referred to as foreign security forces. Foreign security forces are forces—including military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel—that provide security for a host-nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization's mission (JP 1 vol. 1).	MCT 5.5.5.2.1
Conduct Civil-Military Operations Planning Activities To integrate civil military considerations into the MCPP to support execution and accomplishment of MAGTF objectives. Civil-military operations (CMO) may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These actions are executed across the global operating model (formerly Phase 0 through Phase 5). They also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Example tasks include "develop CMO staff estimate" and "develop the Annex G" (JP 3-20; JP 3-57; MCWP 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*; and MCTP 3-03A).	MCT 1.15.2
Conduct Civil Affairs Operations Actions planned, coordinated, executed, to assess the civil component of an operational environment to maximize civilian support and minimize civilian interference to MAGTF objectives. Civil affairs operations gain access to, inform and influence behaviors of the civil component of the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; and/or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government. Example tasks include conducting civil reconnaissance; civil Engagements; and civil information management (JP 3-57 and MCTP 3-03A).	MCT 1.15.4
Conduct Civil Affairs Operation Planning To conduct civil affairs operations (CAO) planning using the MCPP in support of the execution and accomplishment of MAGTF objectives. Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about. Planning CAO is similar to planning other operations and activities but is focused on the actions of civil affairs forces and conducting civil affairs activities (JP 3-57, MCWP 5-10, and MCTP 3-03A).	MCT 1.15.4.3

Stabilization activities are conducted continuously throughout the competition continuum. Marines might take part in anything from a long-term security assistance mission or crisis response mission (FDR or FHA) at one end of the spectrum to offensive or defensive operations during armed conflict on the other. Specific to the latter, Marines plan for stabilization activities, even while engaged in fighting a peer threat, given the reality that civilians will always be present in the operational environment in some form and number. In such a scenario, Marines coordinate with a host-nation government, even the remnants of one, and US allies and partners, as Marines are unlikely to conduct operations unilaterally.

Planning for and conducting stabilization activities helps Marines achieve the desired end state. Achieving stability, fundamentally, is not a single operation or isolated mission, but involves a collection of participating entities to include—

- USG departments and agencies.
- Host-nation government departments and agencies at all levels—state, territorial, local, and tribal.
- HNSFs.
- Foreign military forces (e.g., US allies and partners).
- International organizations such as the United Nations.
- Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
- Private sector entities, such as international corporations or local businesses.

For example, successful stabilization activities often requires an understanding of the interorganizational dynamics of NGOs, (i.e., their priorities and capabilities) and recognizing whether those align with the planned efforts of US forces, which requires advanced coordination, and, when authorized, collaboration.

GOAL OF STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

Stabilization activities support the strategic goals of the United States and its allies and partners throughout the competition continuum, which could include countering subversion, preventing and mitigating conflict, and consolidating military gains to achieve strategic success. To ensure a stable and lasting peace, stabilization activities require coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among US military, USG departments and agencies, US allies and partners, and NGOs. These complementary civil-military efforts strive to strengthen legitimate governance, restore, or maintain rule of law, support economic and infrastructure development, and foster a sense of national unity. The goal of this unity of effort is to reform institutions to achieve sustainable peace and security as well as create conditions for transitioning control to legitimate civil authorities.

An overarching goal of stabilization activities is to create the foundational conditions that can assist a legitimate host-nation government and its security forces to peaceably manage conflict. This could include managing civil disturbances—using methods that do not further exacerbate the

conditions that led to the civil disturbance in the first place, preventing looting during an FHA mission or in the aftermath of armed conflict or alleviating the conditions that underscore an active insurgency. Table 1-4 lists the foundational conditions or end states that can promote stability.

Table 1-4. Stabilization Activities—Foundational Conditions and End States.

Foundational Condition	Description
Rule of Law	• Setting conditions for public order in accordance with established rules of engagement (see JP 3-07 and Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3000.17, Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response). Activities could include— ◆ Conflict resolution and peace implementation. ◆ Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs. ◆ Reconciliation and reintegration efforts. ◆ Security sector reform. • Helping the host-nation government to objectively apply the rule of law with support from civil affairs groups (CAGs), JAG personnel, and subject matter experts from US allies and partners and NGOs. Rule of law activities could include— ◆ Assisting in establishing a host-nation legal framework and judicial system. ◆ Establishing accountability, oversight, and anti-corruption programs. ◆ Establishing a host-nation security architecture (i.e., law enforcement and corrections training, border security, and countering transnational crime). ◆ Synchronizing communication and perception management.
Safe and Secure Environment	• Helping HNSFs prevent extra-judicial killings, criminal and gang violence, and eliminating remnants of insurgent groups or proxy forces. • Conducting security cooperation missions with HNSFs. (e.g., patrols within urban areas or along borders to maintain territorial integrity). • Ensuring the safety, security and protection of women and girls.
Stable Governance	• Providing basic life sustaining goods and services, such as electricity, water and wastewater treatment, and fuel for cooking and heating. • Providing engineering support to restore critical infrastructure facilities. • Providing security to enable host-nation businesses or available NGOs to execute restoration activities. • Ensuring political moderation in which the legislative process remains open and fair with limited corruption, and minority parties do not incur political persecution. • Ensuring opposing political parties do not use political processes and the judiciary against each other to damage or delegitimize them, what is commonly referred to as “lawfare.” • Preventing extra-judicial violence or killings against political party leaders, to include judges and other legal personnel, such as district attorneys and law enforcement personnel.
Sustainable Economy	• Assisting the host-nation government to set the conditions to re-establish commerce and longer-term, sustainable, economic practices (i.e., after Marines and other organizations depart the area of operations).

THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. The operational environment in which Marines conduct stabilization activities varies, but the factor that remains constant, albeit in different forms, is the human construct of societies. Societies are a collection of interconnected systems that evolve rapidly or over time to meet the needs of the population. These systems consist of both formal and informal institutions and organizations. At a

minimum, a political, economic, civil security, and judicial system form the foundation of all societies, whether tribal or modern. The most modern societies, however, have multiple layers of systems and subsystems. For example, the USG identifies sixteen critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks are considered vital to maintaining a functioning and productive society (see Presidential Policy Directive 21).

Advancements in communications technologies (such as computer processing power and data collection capabilities), combined with the ability to rapidly transfer information through social media, contributes to the interconnected nature of societies. Information travels faster, than ever before. In addition, advancements in communications technology involves more than just communications itself and includes life-sustaining infrastructure and manufacturing facilities. For example, manufacturers, medical facilities, and power-generation facilities use interconnected communications control architecture (referred to as SCADA, or supervisory control and data acquisition). This control architecture consists of networked computers and data communications systems. These are often referred to as smart, meaning they have the ability to function independently, aided or even controlled by artificial intelligence, with limited—managed from a computer screen—or no human intervention. Accidental or intentional interruptions to supervisory control and data acquisition systems can result in societal interruptions involving life-sustaining services, to include power generation facilities, manufacturing processes, medical centers, and the supply chain. A thorough analysis of the civil considerations, areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE), and operational variables, political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII), can help Marines determine whether a society relies on such systems or not, and what does or does not contribute to the resiliency of a specific operational environment. Marines must understand this prior to conducting stabilization activities.

Stability in a society occurs when interconnected systems are in harmony. This can be true for both totalitarian and republican forms of government. The former, however, relies on coercion, which means the political system is not truly in harmony, risking collapse over time, primarily due to intolerable levels of corruption. Three main components support harmony in any given society: adequate resources and services to meet the needs of a population, a sense of purpose or conviction from the population about the worthiness of the society, and the free flow of information within that society. The need for resources drives these systems, and although there is always competition for resources, when they are available and equitably distributed, stability ensues. For example, having food and energy production supported by a functional supply system, combined with good governance and the availability of services contributes to stability. In addition, any willing participant of a society must have an overarching conviction that their society will endure and is worthy of their support.

When a catastrophic event, terrorist attack, or deliberate targeting, such as indirect fires during an armed conflict occurs, the systems that sustain a society can become strained or even collapse. Instability and increased competition for obtaining, controlling, and distributing life-sustaining goods and services often results. How a society reacts reflects its inherent resiliency, itself a reflection of culture, values, and capabilities. Having an understanding of a society's norms and a host nation's capabilities to respond enables Marines to provide the appropriate level of assistance. Planning considerations become critical when attempting to restore a society to a level of stability. Some examples include—

- Assessing immediate societal needs in coordination with the host-nation government, supporting US allies and partners, and NGOs.
- Planning logistical requirements and ensuring for their equitable distribution.
- Determining immediate restoration priorities (e.g., repairing life-sustaining infrastructure, such as power generation facilities).
- Executing the information warfighting function (e.g., ensuring the dissemination of information to keep the population informed of the activities of Marines and where and when the population can receive support, all in coordination with the host-nation government).

Understanding the interconnectedness of the systems that sustain a society and the relevance of those systems during stabilization activities is vital to planning. For example, multiple, system-related first-, second-, and third-order effects could become destabilizing and negatively affect the conduct of military operations. An additional example involves the local population. If it perceives a host-nation government or HNSF act as unjust, the population might, whether organized or spontaneous, decide to protest the perceived injustice. This could ignite destructive and deadly riots, which terrorist or proxy forces could attempt to leverage, resulting in the loss of host-nation government control. An event of this magnitude could cause the destruction of government facilities, culturally significant museums, or monuments in addition to life-sustaining infrastructure (e.g., transportation systems, power generation facilities) which would have an immediate and longer-term impact on stabilization activities (e.g., increasing personnel and logistical requirements).

STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE COMPETITION CONTINUUM

Stabilization activities occur throughout the competition continuum. Marines conduct operations varying in size, purpose, and combat intensity that involves some form of stabilization activities. For example, Marines may participate in security assistance programs or security cooperation missions, from deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations, to an armed conflict, (i.e., major combat operations and campaigns). The nature of the area of operations may also require Marines to conduct several tasks simultaneously. Whether the prevailing context for a military operation is irregular warfare or conventional warfare (armed conflict), combat and stabilization activities are not sequential activities, and they take place concurrently. Marines must identify, integrate, and synchronize stabilization activities with offensive and defensive operations as the population is always present within the operational environment.

Security Cooperation

Security cooperation includes DoD's interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. (Note: contingency access could include airports, ports, railhead, warehouses, inland waterways, etc.). Security cooperation activities take place throughout the competition continuum and missions could involve building professional relationships to enable access for future military operations, developing HNSF capabilities to

address shared threats (i.e., to understand, align, and improve tactics, techniques, and procedures of both the HNSFs and US forces), and conducting other activities that promote the interests of the United States and its allies and partners. The area of emphasis, however, depends on the level of cooperation and competition between the United States and other regional or global powers, in addition to the geopolitical status and military capabilities of a particular ally or partner. During an armed conflict, security cooperation would support the military objectives of the United States through an integrated country strategy and other deterrence activities. For example, stabilization activities in the aftermath of an armed conflict could require establishing a military government or transitional military authority, or providing overarching support to a civil administration.

When providing military support to stabilization activities during competition, security cooperation builds relationships through routine contact and military presence. These actions enable and encourage a host-nation, allies, and partners to support the United States. Support could come in the form of access (e.g., to bases with airfields or deep-water ports), capabilities to address shared threats, whether current or future, intelligence involving insurgents, terrorists, criminal organizations, proxy forces and peer competitors. In addition, a host government could provide HNSFs that can augment the efforts of Marines, which can include situational awareness involving effective tactics, techniques, and procedures, and enable the execution of other activities that promote US interests (see JP 3-20).

Competition And Stabilization Activities

Stabilization activities are conducted continuously throughout the competition continuum. The balance of stabilization activities and combat operations varies widely below the threshold of armed conflict. For example, many crisis response and limited contingency operations do not involve direct combat, but some FDR and FHA missions might require Marines to assist a host-nation government by using force to stop looting or manage challenges resulting from an insurgency, terrorist, criminal or gang activity, or proxy forces. A joint force commander (JFC) might also task Marines with conducting strikes and raids, either independently or in coordination with a host-nation government. This may not require stabilization activities but must incorporate stabilization planning considerations, such as an ASCOPE and PMESII analysis. For example, how will the population perceive a strike or raid, and will such an action create challenges for the host-nation government? Additional types of operations during competition but below armed conflict require planning for stabilization activities, such as protracted counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, which require a delicate balance of offense, defense, and stabilization activities. (See Chapter 2, which address several stabilization activities that are conducted during competition below armed conflict.)

Armed Conflict

Stabilization activities are not sequential or alternative activities when conducting offensive or defensive operations during an armed conflict. One reason is that elements of the population typically remain within the operational environment. Planners must integrate and synchronize stabilization activities with offensive and defensive activities within each phase of any operation to achieve military objectives and mission success. Ignoring this requirement could interfere with the execution of operations, create significant logistical constraints, endanger engagements and rapport built by civil affairs teams, or create narrative challenges for the commander’s

communication strategy and operations (COMMSTRAT) requirements, or challenges for information maneuver teams, conducting military information support operations (MISO) within the area of operations. Additional planning considerations include—

- *Managing the movement of people*. How would planners manage the movement of an armored column headed to the forward line of own troops when a main route becomes overwhelmed with refugees, rendering both vulnerable to enemy fires? The obvious answer is to understand and select alternative routes, but these risk use by refugees as well. Engagement with the population, and local leaders, may prove the most useful to coordinate the movement of refugees or enforce a shelter in place order. Regardless, this requires advanced planning to include input from intelligence, surveillance reconnaissance assets, and input from civil reconnaissance.
- *Logistical considerations*. What are the logistics requirements to meet the needs of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDP) who seek shelter, food, and medical care from US forces? This requires advanced planning to identify the capabilities of US forces to support IDPs, advance coordination with interagency partners and NGOs, and establishment of temporary refugee camps. Marine planners should also consider specific logistics consideration and security requirements for women and girls, as discussed in Chapter 3.
- *Information: dissemination*. How would Marines coordinate the dissemination of information to the population regarding the movement of Marines without compromising operational security? This requires engaging the population, specifically identifying and coordinating with key leaders (e.g., issuing a shelter-in-place order with the goal to prevent movement of refugees when US forces require freedom of movement within the operational environment to effectively engage the enemy). The goal is to adequately inform the population without inadvertently outlining the intent of friendly forces to the enemy.
- *Information: images*. How will Marines manage the inevitable images of human suffering with the movement of thousands of IDPs within the operational environment? For example, adversarial operations, particularly when targeting urban areas with indirect fires such as saturation fires, can result in destruction, depopulation, and forced migration. Marines can demonstrate to the world that they are providing adequate care, to include food, medicine, and shelter, by using appropriate images while also demonstrating, with images, how adversarial operations led to the humanitarian crisis in the first place. This is not an easy feat, particularly when conducting operations against a sophisticated adversary who would actively and aggressively seek to counter Marine Corps messaging, even using artificial intelligence to create false images and false messages.

  NOTE: This is commonly referred to as the battle of the narratives.

- *Operations security*. This is a process that identifies and safeguards critical information and indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities. Marines must ensure that stabilization activities do not inadvertently reveal capabilities, intentions, or plans. When coordinating with the host-nation government, HNSFs, US allies and partners, and NGOs inherent risks to critical information exists and requires safeguarding. Marines must strike a balance between sharing and protecting information.
- *Population management*. Marines must understand the dynamics of all segments of a population, to include IDPs, during an armed conflict. Understanding the various segments of

the population can help Marines prevent or halt the further deterioration of security and political systems while Marines continue to execute offensive or defensive operations. The goal is to create enough stability within the operational environment so that the host nation, USG departments and agencies, US allies, partners, foreign militaries, NGOs, or the private sector, can assume greater responsibility for managing the population.

The preconditions for a establishing a secure environment in the immediate aftermath of an armed conflict varies, but generally require providing support to civil administration, establishing military authority over an occupied population to prevent lawlessness, helping a host-nation government restore its civil structure, and restoring life-sustaining critical infrastructure services. Achieving some form of initial stabilization can help Marines consolidate immediate gains in addition to operational and strategic objectives, mitigate further harm to the population, and prevent future conflict.

FUNDAMENTALS OF STABILIZATION

When executed early enough and in support of broader national policy goals and interests, stabilization activities can effectively reduce the risk of a partner nation(s) or occupied territories descending into politically motivated violence by addressing the sources of instability. For example, in a post-conflict operational environment or during an FHA mission, effectively executing stabilization activities can mitigate the risk of the need for a lengthy military peacetime engagement. Marines can set the conditions to create long-term stability within an operational environment by addressing the fundamentals of stabilization activities. These include:

- *Conflict transformation*. Marines can help the host-nation government address the root cause or causes of a conflict or prevent further instability during an FHA mission.
- *Unity of effort*. Ensure unity of effort between and among Marines, USG departments and agencies, US allies and partners, foreign militaries, NGOs, the private sector, and the host-nation government to appropriately assist the population and prevent duplication of effort.
- *Host-nation ownership*. Marines can assist the host-nation government and security entities by providing training that enables the host nation to take the lead during stabilization activities as the host nation is in the best position to manage local and national challenges long-term and long after Marines redeploy.
- *Network engagement*. Network engagement includes the interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Marines can use products derived from network engagement to better understand societal challenges and resiliencies, key people, places, and things—the nodes that form a network's structures and resources. Having an understanding of societal challenges and resiliencies enables Marines to reduce the former and harness the latter while conducting stabilization activities (see MCTP 3-02A, *Network Engagement: Targeting and Engaging Networks*.)
- *Building host-nation government capabilities* (i.e., building partnership capacity). Examples include legal training, security training, and assisting with the restoration of infrastructure.

Conflict Transformation

Conflict transformation is a process that addresses the underlying causes of violent conflict while developing viable, peaceful alternatives for warring factions and the population to meet their needs and pursue their political and socioeconomic aspirations. When Marines understand the underlying causes for violence within the operational environment, they can better formulate their approach to operations and network engagement. For example, combining a civil preparation of the battlespace (CPB), an ASCOPE analysis, a PMESII analysis, and a cultural analysis can provide informed input regarding the potential means to resolve a conflict and separate warring factions, enabling a society to transition from violence to peace.

Conflict transformation often takes place when countries seek to transition from war to peace because warring factions are exhausted or pressured because external nation states will no longer provide funds or supplies. A temporary halt to hostilities could allow a host-nation government to address challenges involving property damage, atrocities, trauma, and injustice. Developing approaches for effective conflict transformation requires building relationships between the host-nation government and population—to include its marginalized groups. A successful conflict transformation requires consensus-building mechanisms involving all parties (e.g., the host-nation government, the population, insurgents, and criminal groups). Conflict transformation mechanisms a host-nation government can apply include—

- *Checks and balances on power*. Examples include free and fair elections, adhering to a rules-based legislative process, accountability of public officials, implementation of legislative measures to limit corruption within government and industry.
- *Transparency measures*. Marines could assist the host-nation government with the equitable distribution of goods and services, such as relief supplies and life sustaining services, and by restoring critical infrastructure. An additional transparency measure could include assisting the host-nation government with communication and perception management (i.e., information flow). For example, sending messages via social media describing the ongoing actions of the host-nation government that have an immediate and positive impact on the population.
- *Applying the rule of law*. The host-nation government must objectively and fairly apply the rule of law, in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, are held accountable to the laws publicly promulgated; these laws must be equally enforced without favoritism to any one group, whether in the minority or majority (see JP 3-07 and the *Handbook for Military Support to Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform*). Civil affairs groups and JAG personnel could provide training and legal advice to assist the host-nation government in re-establishing the rule of law.
- *Reducing sources of instability*. The host-nation government must effectively demonstrate the ability to address the economic and social challenges that led to destabilization. The host-nation government must also develop measures acceptable to the population that allow for former insurgents or rebels to re-assimilate into society and limit the risk of extralegal, retributive actions.
- *Strengthening resiliency*. The host-nation government demonstrates an ability to respond to a complex catastrophe, whether natural or man-made. This could include the organizational and logistical means to respond independently without external support (e.g., stockpiling supplies to respond to an emergency and equitably distributing those supplies when an emergency occurs). In addition, the host-nation government can effectively respond to a

terrorist attack and limit the inevitable destabilization that occurs in the aftermath of such an incident while also applying the appropriate and necessary legal measures to hold such perpetrators accountable.

- *Building host-nation capacity to manage security risks*. A legitimate host-nation government and its security forces demonstrate an ability to manage threats to itself and the population with appropriate force if or when necessary.

Stabilization activities that support conflict transformation can include DDR, population and resource control (PRC), foreign internal defense (FID), and COIN. If the host-nation government determines the need to employ disarmament activities, doing so requires a thorough understanding of the dynamics of the population and the risk that a return to violence could increase exponentially (see JP 3-07 and JP 3-25).

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Example Planning Questions. Marines can use the following list as a starting point when conducting stabilization activities involving DDR. An ideal scenario to form planning questions would include a collaborative effort involving the host-nation government, HNSFs, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs. Their insight into the operational environment, such as population dynamics and any warring factions, etc., and input for a cultural analysis, can help develop and crosswalk an ASCOPE and PMESII, *The Marine Corps Planning Process*, and course of action development to determine what is or is not realistic for execution. In addition, the operational planning team can obtain a better understanding of the capabilities and subject matter expertise of participating entities. Finally, the operational planning team can use the same collaborative approach when conducting PRC and FID activities or during a COIN mission. This list of questions is not exhaustive, and the operational environment and the immediate tactical situation will heavily influence requirements:

- Would any attempt at disarming the population result in immediate and significant destabilizing security challenges for the host-nation and US forces? For example, the population may consider individual ownership of weapons a natural right and any attempt to disarm the population would prove counterproductive to stabilization activities conducted by the host-nation government and Marines.
- Would disarming one group or faction within a population versus another create security challenges for US forces? Marines must understand the dynamics between the host-nation government, warring factions, and the population before Marines help a host-nation government conduct disarmament activities.
- Would disarmament of one group render that group defenseless and vulnerable to retaliatory, retributive attacks, such as extra-judicial killings? The host-nation government and Marines should consider and assess the risk that a previously warring faction that refused to disarm might now attack a warring faction that disarmed.
- Would disarming existing police or other security forces create immediate security and policing challenges for US forces? Marines should consider the potential immediate and long-term consequence of disarmament activities involving existing HNSFs, such as the need for additional Marines to conduct security operations. Security operations create vulnerabilities involving other operational requirements, to include personnel, equipment, and time limitations.

Unified Action and Unity of Effort

Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization that is the product of successful unified action. The successful execution of stabilization activities requires sustained civilian and military integration at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to achieve both unified action and unity of effort. Marines coordinate their stabilization activities with various actors—such as USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, NGOs, and foreign governments—that either have an established presence within the operational environment or are planning to execute stabilization activities. Uniting these diverse capabilities and activities requires understanding, collaboration, cooperation, and coordination with a focus toward a common goal. Where military operations typically demonstrate unity of command, stabilization activities often challenge military and civilian leaders by forging a unity of effort or unity of purpose—a more collaborative environment versus directive to create unified action. Achieving both—unity of action and unity of effort—requires a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach.

A Whole-of-Government Approach. The US whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of relevant stabilization partners to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal, such as when participating USG agencies and US forces collaborate effectively to achieve economy-of-force through the balancing of resources, capabilities, and activities. Civilians and Marines must plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively to make this work. Because of differing organizational capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decision-making processes, USG departments and agencies and Marines often encounter challenges during a whole-of-government approach. Regardless, Marines will coordinate efforts with USG interagency partners and the host-nation government to mitigate these challenges. Information sharing—timely and continuous—is critical. In practice, USG
civil-military interaction is often not as robust as desired. Establishing a civil-military operations center (CMOC) encourages collaboration and helps to coordinate the myriad stabilization activities between and among Marines, the host-nation government, HNSFs, USG departments and agencies, US allies and partners, foreign militaries, NGOs, and the private sector (see MCTP 3-03A, *Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil Military Operations* for more information on CMOCs.)

An additional planning consideration for Marines is that USG civilian agencies and other stabilization partners may not be able to fully operate until the operational environment is permissive, a minimum level of restoration of essential services occurs, and resources become available. For example, inadequate (i.e., poorly maintained) or destroyed infrastructure can result in logistical constraints, while insufficient port capacity can hamper port operations (i.e., delivery of cargo, commodities, equipment, fuel, and personnel). Marines may need to support or temporarily assume responsibility for tasks outside those typically associated with military stabilization activities, requiring Marines to incorporate engineering and logistical requirements into their planning considerations. The JFC collaborates with the chief of mission, DOS, and other USG entities to integrate CMO with the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power to ensure for both unified action and unity of effort. The objective is to establish

the foundational conditions to enable other USG departments and agencies to continue stabilization activities long after the Marines' departure. (For more information on the whole-of-government approach see JP 3-07 and JP 3-08.)

A Comprehensive Approach. A comprehensive approach integrates the cooperative efforts of USG departments and agencies and, to the extent possible, the host nation, HNSFs, US allies and partners, foreign militaries, NGOs, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort resulting in unified action to accomplish a shared goal. A comprehensive approach builds from the cooperative spirit of unity of effort. It is vital to recognize that stabilization partners present in the operational environment likely have different priorities, objectives, and authorities. Establishing a CMOC enables Marines to share information, increase integration and collaboration, and prevent duplication of effort. Upon arrival, Marines may find that stabilization partners are already well established within the operational environment and conducting activities.

The importance for Marines to work with such entities cannot be overstated as many have significant crisis and disaster response expertise (e.g., helping host-nation governments with conflict transformation), and, most importantly, an established relationship with a host-nation government. In addition, stabilization partners can have useful insight and critical information involving population dynamics (i.e., the civil network or warring factions, such as insurgent groups, proxy forces, and criminal organizations or local gangs). Whenever possible, Marines should seek such information during the planning phase and prior to execution of military operations. When doing so, the objective is to leverage the capabilities of such organizations, augmenting them whenever appropriate and always in coordination with the host-nation government. In addition, NGOs and US allies and partners, can often contribute valuable intelligence and information—if authorized and they are willing to share—that, when given to Marines could save critical time and potentially lives.)

Marines can forge a comprehensive approach and leverage the capabilities of relevant stabilization partners to achieve broad conflict transformation goals and attain a sustainable peace. Marines can support the activities and goals of others by sharing resources and information when practical and authorized. In a comprehensive approach, however, compelling participants to work together is not always the best approach; instead, the objective is for them to participate out of a shared understanding and appreciation for the goal of sustained stability within the operational environment.

Challenges with the execution of a comprehensive approach, however, can occur. For example, some groups, to include many NGOs, must retain independence of action, while other humanitarian actors might not actively cooperate or coordinate with US forces, USG departments or agencies, US allies or partners, and in some instances, even the host-nation government and its security forces. This does not suggest that civilian organizations are unappreciative of the efforts of Marines, but rather, the foundational charters of such organizations restrict them from working with any military organizations. In addition, in some scenarios, humanitarian actors (i.e., international donor organizations, NGOs) not working with US forces may have authorization to work with other NGOs or USG departments and agencies, such as USAID.

An inability to coordinate directly with some nongovernmental organizations may prove challenging at times, but recognizing that the principles of impartiality, neutrality, and independence that guide such groups can assist Marines in establishing a working relationship over time. For example, some NGOs and other humanitarian actions may not want to collaborate due to the desire to remain neutral to ensure the safety and security of their staff and to effectively engage some segments of the population. Marines, in some scenarios, might also want to maintain neutrality when establishing cooperative professional relationships. For example, avoiding the perception by the population that NGOs are an extension of Marine intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance efforts. One method to overcome collaboration challenges is to determine whether NGOs and other humanitarian actors have a liaison officer assigned to work with military organizations.

Regardless of whether NGOs and other humanitarian actors are willing to assist Marines and the host-nation government, Marines must plan for a comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort whenever possible, and this requires extensive cooperation and coordination. A comprehensive approach may prove difficult to initiate and to sustain but it is critical to successfully execute stabilization activities during an operation with a wide representation of contributing civilian and military entities.

Network Engagement

Network engagement includes the interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. A network is composed of interconnected nodes and links representing relationships or associations. Below is a description of a node and link (see MCTP 3-02A for additional information).

- *Node*. A node is a person, place, or physical entity within a network or system. Nodes represent tangible elements within a network that can be engaged for action. A node that is a person can also be referred to as an actor, key actor, or relevant actor.
- *Link*. A link represents a behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. These relationships could be connections, associations, or other types of involvement that serve as conduits for information sharing or interaction between nodes. Some types of relationships can be characterized as familial, proximal, virtual, or specialized.

Networks can have social or functional purposes. For example, networks can consist of communications networks (i.e., computer and cyber networks, human networks, and functional [logistical, training] networks). The purpose of network engagement is to help Marines identify and understand how complex networks impact the operational environment. When conducting stabilization activities, Marines can visualize network engagement as their interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks. These engagements, or interactions transpire continuously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

The results either aid the successful execution of stabilization activities or function as impediments to mission success. The operational environment, however, is not linear, and it encompasses the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains. Conducting an operation effectively in these complex domains requires synchronization and collaboration across the

warfighting functions and the recognition that the operational environment includes social and functional networks. These networks, whether friendly, neutral, or threat, consist of people, places, and physical entities.

Marines can consider and analyze, through network engagement, all types of networks (e.g., criminal, computer, financial, logistical), the supply chain, terrorist organizations, and other areas. The actions of a network can either influence or have a direct impact on the operational environment. Human aspects—arguably the most complex—of military operations support network engagement by impacting the will and influencing the decision making of relevant actors. Understanding the human aspects of an operational environment is a critical function for Marines. Network engagement activities provide a methodology that Marines can leverage to create the desired effects throughout the competition continuum. There are four principles of the network engagement methodology in addition to several questions that the operational planning team can use to inform the MCPP and COA development (see MCTP 3-02A):

- *Understanding the operational environment*. This principle requires a CPB, an intelligence preparation of the battlespace, an ASCOPE and PMESII analysis, a cultural analysis, and coordination with subject matter experts from USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs.
- *Understanding the networks*. How would stabilization activities impact friendly, neutral, and threat networks? For example, what networks would likely assist HNSFs and US forces, what networks would remain indifferent and not interfere, and what networks would likely interfere?
- *Engaging the networks*. What are the best methods of engaging networks? Is it direct contact between the networks and Marines or should Marines engage networks through the host-nation government, HNSFs, US allies and partners, or even through NGOs? These entities would likely offer a nuanced understanding of the culture within the operational environment and its networks, which Marines should leverage whenever possible.
- *Assessing the effects on the networks*. What are the immediate and potential long-term impacts stabilization activities might have on the networks? What is the risk that executing stabilization activities could change the categorization of the various networks within the operational environment? If the network categorization changes, how would that affect the immediate tactical situation and the operational environment as a whole?

Figure 1-1 demonstrates the three pillars of network engagement.

A friendly network(s) could consist of a partnership between and among the joint force, NGOs, and the host-nation government who share the common objective of establishing a stable operational environment, and it can include both state and non-state networks. Building and facilitating a shared understanding is key to enabling unified action with partners in friendly networks. Unified action provides the opportunity for the commander to create friendly networks with far-reaching capabilities to engage neutral networks and counter threat networks.



Figure 1-1. The Three Pillars of Network Engagement.

Neutral networks may include those individuals, groups, or organizations that could enable or contribute to drivers of instability or could mitigate them. Engaging neutral networks often involves applying incentives and deterrence (i.e., clarity regarding the severity of consequences of moving from a neutral network to a threat network). The goal is to either maintain the status of a neutral network as neutral or to turn neutral networks away from supporting threat networks, and when assessed as useful, toward supporting friendly networks.

Threat networks could consist of criminal entities (i.e., local gangs or transnational criminal syndicates, insurgents, terrorist groups, or proxy forces). In many cases, such entities interfere with the execution of stabilization activities. Local gangs, terrorist organizations, or tribal entities have and often attempt to steal relief supplies. In doing so, such entities can control distribution, which provides power over a population in need, further their black market activities, or even support members of their organization.

United Nations Operations in Somalia

During the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I/II—1992-1993) known as Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, various warlords—Somalia was a clan or tribal culture—stole relief supplies. The theft supported their clans, black market activity, and interrupted international efforts to stop starvation and the spread of disease. In addition to their thievery, the various clans resisted the overall peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts of the United Nations, eventually targeting the soldiers from participating nations, resulting in an inglorious withdrawal of all United Nations forces. The result has been long lasting, and Somalia remains a failed state into the Twenty-first Century.

In most cases, the primary orientation of stabilization activities is toward partnering with friendly networks and engaging neutral networks. If, however, threat networks are or become a source of instability, countering those in coordination with the host-nation government becomes a necessity. Methods to address threat networks when conducting stabilization activities include—

- Developing the capabilities of HNSFs, from law enforcement to COIN activities.
- Conducting foreign internal defense activities in coordination with HNSFs.
- Conducting counterterrorism activities independently or in coordination with HNSFs.
- Conducting irregular activities in coordination with HNSFs.
- Ensuring synchronized communication (i.e., messaging to the population). Marines should align their actions to COMMSTRAT messaging and support information maneuver teams conducting MISO.
- Providing logistical and law enforcement support, to include subject matter expertise from CAGs and JAG personnel while executing counterdrug operations.

Network engagement provides planning tools and products that can maximize effectiveness within the operational environment throughout the competition continuum. Network analysis can help Marines understand the relationships and interdependencies between neutral and threat networks and among the actors that comprise them. This can also contribute to conflict analysis and overall mission planning. (For more information on network engagement see JP 3-25, MCWP 5-10, and MCTP 3-02A.)

BUILDING HOST-NATION GOVERNMENT CAPACITY AND CAPABILITY

A primary and often immediate role for Marines during stabilization activities includes security cooperation missions. Security cooperation missions are those Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. Some examples of immediate security cooperation activities Marines might conduct in coordination with a host-nation government include—

- *Conducting CMO and stabilization activities during an armed conflict*. Marines must plan to conduct CMO and stabilization activities concurrent with offensive and defensive operations during and in the immediate aftermath of an armed conflict. This could include providing support to a civil administration in coordination with USG interagency partners, USG allies and partners, any remnants of a host-nation government, and NGOs.
- *Deploying as part of a multinational peacekeeping force*. Activities could include joint patrols to prevent lawlessness (e.g., looting and riots), guard and distribute relief supplies, protect host-nation government buildings, protect major cultural monuments and museums, and protect critical infrastructure (e.g., power generation facilities and major transportation nodes).
- *Building counterterrorism capacity*. Marines might assist HNSFs in countering local and transnational terrorist networks while simultaneously building HNSF capabilities and capacity to assume the long-term role of preventing terrorist attacks. Another objective could

include helping HNSFs establish investigative capabilities to prevent or bring to justice those that commit terrorist acts.

NOTE: Marines should coordinate with available US allies and partners that have extensive counterterrorism operational experience, such as the French Mobile *Gendarmerie* or Italian *Carabinieri*.) The operational environment will determine the immediate and longer-term objectives, but counterterrorism investigations must occur through the objective application of the rule of law to limit extra-judicial killings.

- *Conduct personnel recovery or an FDR mission*. Marines are often the first to respond to a complex catastrophe, such as a man-made or natural disaster, which requires coordination for specific skill sets and classes of supply, specifically Class I and Class VIII. A priority planning consideration for such missions, particularly within urban areas, is to prepare Marines to respond should they or the population be exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear and toxic industrial materials.
- *Counter the activity of transnational criminal organizations*. The immediate objective for Marines in the aftermath of a complex catastrophe is to help the host-nation government prevent lawlessness and wanton criminal activity by transnational criminal organizations likely to take advantage of a chaotic operational environment. An immediate activity for Marines could include patrolling, which ideally would provide space and time for the HNSFs to develop capacity, from recruitment and training to the development of capabilities, such as conducting independent patrols, independent investigations, etc.
- *Enhance interoperability*. An immediate objective of increasing interoperability could include aligning or sharing operational approaches. A longer-term focus could include pursuing mutually beneficial objectives to the host-nation government and the USG, such as enhancing their ability to counter criminal and terrorist organizations.

A secondary role for Marines during stabilization activities is building partnership capacity (BPC). Marine CAGs typically participate in BPC efforts with USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, NGOs, foreign militaries, and the private sector. An overarching goal of BPC is to help the host-nation government execute critical government functions. For example, BPC could include helping the host-nation government establish emergency services capabilities, such as fire, police, and medical, in addition to helping establish an impartial judicial system—the rule of law and political moderation. Marine CAGs would participate in BPC activities within established policy and legal frameworks. Building partnership capability is often a long-term process in which USG departments and agencies, US allies and partners, foreign militaries, the United Nations, NGOs, and the private sector assume leading roles to enhance a host-nation government's human, technological, organizational, institutional, and resource capabilities. Depending on the USG and host-nation government relationship, BPC can range from education and training to ballistic missile defense. Success, however, requires a long-term mutual commitment to improve capabilities and interoperability, and for the United States, that supports its strategic objectives.

Host-Nation Ownership and Legitimacy

All external stabilization efforts and activities fail without host-nation ownership and dedication to achieving its own long-term stabilization. Marines must understand that the host nation has its own perceptions and interpretations regarding stabilization solutions. Where existing host-nation

social, political, economic, police, judicial, and security systems remain viable and legitimate in the eyes of the host-nation population, stabilization activities should allow them to function, rather than circumventing or reinventing them. Legitimacy builds trust and confidence in the host-nation government among its people. Commitment and constructive participation by the host nation's political, civic, cultural, economic, religious leaders, and representatives of marginalized populations enhances stabilization efforts.

When conducting stabilization activities, host-nation ownership of stabilization processes is the immediate goal, as it leads to legitimacy. For example, when the host-nation government is in the lead and taking effective action, whether distributing relief supplies or ensuring law and order equity, much of the population likely perceives such actions as legitimate and necessary. Long term success, however, requires that Marines distinguish between genuine host-nation ownership and mere acquiescence to an externally imposed solution that is not likely to work after the departure of US forces. For example, some host-nation government entities could gain undue status and influence if given money or when meeting with US forces. In addition, the risk for corruption is an ever-present reality, underscoring the importance of an accurate ASCOPE and PMESII analysis. For example, ensuring the true motives of some host-nation entities can always be a challenge for Marines in foreign societies where the nuances of local customs are unknown or somewhat puzzling. The use of knowledgeable advisors from CAGs, US allies and partners, or USG departments and agencies, e.g., those with the language training and cultural expertise serve as force multiplier during the execution stabilization activities.

UNDERSTANDING STABILIZATION—CAUSES OF INSTABILITY

Marines are likely to have a role in addressing fundamental causes of a potential conflict, particularly during security cooperation events with host-nation governments. To understand the operational environment, Marines must identify and understand both underlying causes and immediate drivers of instability. Fundamental causes refer to the features of the host-nation that contribute to its vulnerability or resiliency in the face of internal and external stresses. These features often include a mix of cultural, demographic, sociological, economic, geographic, and political factors. They can also include friction between formal and informal male and female roles.

Fundamental causes can produce grievances that on their own would not result in instability, but various groups (e.g., criminal organizations, insurgents, proxy forces or political factions), can exploit these underlying challenges to mobilize portions of the population to violence. In addition, fundamental causes typically require long-term efforts to resolve; addressing these efforts can typically take place only once some level of stabilization has occurred within the operational environment. However, when Marines assess that known causes, (i.e., the fundamental or root cause of instability within the operational environment) continue to increase in severity, a potential solution could include focusing stabilization activities on the known immediate drivers. The goal is to resolve the fundamental causes, avert a political crisis that could destabilize the host-nation government, and create an opportunity for longer-term processes that the host-nation government can utilize to effectively address the challenges impacting the population.

Sources of instability within a country reflect its broader socio-economic conditions, and these are likely to manifest themselves locally within the operational environment. Instability can result from catastrophic events, such as a humanitarian crisis, foreign power-instigated violence (e.g., proxy forces) an active insurgency, or domestic unrest (such as large-scale, destabilizing protests, or civil war). Prolonged instability, particularly in countries already weakened by corruption and distrust, can set the economic, political, and military conditions that foster development of an insurgency or an increase in operations by proxy forces. For example, a country may experience instability stemming from decreased support for the government, based on what locals might perceive as unmet economic and political expectations, negating government claims of legitimacy.

Unmet expectations could also create an alternate condition of instability, in which local support for anti-government actors (e.g., criminal organizations, insurgents, or terrorists) increases. This can occur when the local population perceives that those anti-government actors can solve their grievances, whereas the government either cannot or will not, either for legitimate reasons, such as the lack of capability, or a worst-case scenario, unmitigated corruption. Instability can also result when significant friction points exist within a society. Friction points will vary, and can range from existing ethnic, religious, or tribal animosities fueled by historical grievances or perceived injustices by a host-nation government, or extreme events, such as mass migration. The latter can result from regional conflict, failed national or regional economies, or environmental disasters. Another friction point can include extreme lawlessness, such as unmitigated gang or tribal violence, resulting in indiscriminate killings or genocide. Normal functioning—the systems that sustain a society—will often strain and then begin to collapse during such scenarios. This can further exasperate existing economic and political challenges within a host nation, at which time a host-nation government might overreact with disproportionate violence to quell dissent or protests, further delegitimizing the political system and alienating the population.

THE FRAGILE STATES FRAMEWORK

The term fragile states describes a broad range of failing, failed, and recovering states in which legitimate and representative government struggles or fails to manage social, security, economic, and political pressures. Fragile states fall along a spectrum from weakness to collapse, and conflict may or may not be a salient factor. A state is considered fragile when the government can no longer fulfill its prime function, often described as a social contract between the government and population. Democratic societies describe the social contract as the ability of the government to protect its citizens though the rule of law, which broadly includes—

- Providing a secure environment in which citizens can conduct economic activities.
- Preventing cross-border invasions, infiltrations, and loss of territory.
- Eliminating domestic threats to or attacks on the national order and social structure.
- Preventing crime and any related dangers to domestic and economic security.
- Enabling citizens to legally resolve disputes without experiencing violence and intimidation in response.

A fragile state is in danger of losing its capacity to govern. Fragile and conflict-affected states often serve as recruiting grounds for violent extremism, terrorism, and organized crime. These groups often conduct targeted killings of government, civic, and religious leaders, extra-judicial killings, random acts of violence, or organized mass atrocities. In addition, humanitarian disasters such as earthquakes or typhoons can overwhelm a fragile state's capacity to respond (e.g., urban search and rescue) and to present the spread of disease. These man-made and natural challenges, referred to as complex catastrophes, often result in internally displaced persons and refugees. Complex catastrophes strain the political system of a fragile state to the point where it becomes ineffective, leading to a failed state. Some of the circumstances that can cause a fragile state to transition to a failed state include—

- *Weak governance*. Weak governance occurs when a government collapses outright and its remnants are so weak and ineffectual that chaos results. The population then loses faith in the government. The government then loses legitimacy. A lack of legitimacy can create the conditions for exclusion and discrimination as the population competes for scarce resources or corruption takes hold of the remnants of any existing government institutions. Corruption can lead to denial of resources, food, goods and services, or denial of participation in the political process. All are key drivers and causes of instability.
- *Stagnant economic conditions*. Weak governance often leads to chaotic conditions in which legitimate businesses can no longer function, manufacturing facilities can no longer produce finished products, international investors withdraw funds, inflation dramatically increases (the currency becoming worthless), and financial institutions collapse.
- *Collapsed social conditions*. Social conditions can deteriorate exponentially as various groups such as gangs, insurgents, tribal entities, political organizations, or proxy forces, compete or seek to control either limited or lucrative resources.
- *Violent extremism*. Extremism often thrives in failed states due to weak governance, stagnated or collapsed economic systems, and in the aftermath of an armed conflict or civil war. Warring factions often seek to amplify such conditions, leveraging the chaos to their advantage for political or economic gain or both.
- *Failed borders*. A failed state cannot control its borders. Insurgents, terrorists, trans-national criminal organizations, and proxy forces leverage open borders to sustain their activities (e.g., logistical resupply and movement of personnel and weapons) in a country with impunity.
- *Civil unrest*. Weak governance, and stagnated or collapsed economic conditions, combined with the legacy of an armed conflict or civil war, can produce or exacerbate historical grievances, that on their own would not necessarily result in instability. However, various groups or political factions can exploit such conditions to mobilize portions of the population to violence.
- *Information*. Multiple groups and political factions might inundate fragile states with competing messages in what is often described as the battle of the narratives between elements of the government, warring political factions, and even external actors. The latter can include Nation states providing financial support to a specific political faction or supporting proxy forces within a fragile state or geographic region. Marines must be aware of competing messages, understand what resonates with the population, and understand the best method(s) of dissemination.
- *Corruption*. Unmitigated corruption—particularly that caused by a failed or failing state experiencing endemic institutional weaknesses from lack of managerial expertise,

engineering capabilities, financial resources—can threaten the legitimacy and the stability of a government at national, state, and local levels. If corruption is a primary challenge, it requires identification prior to conducting stabilization activities, or the contributions of responding organizations likely results in only short-term impacts. The inherent risk of such a scenario is a host-nation government reverting to its previous condition after the departure of Marines and others. Planning considerations to help a host-nation government manage corruption during stabilization activities might involve strengthening national institutions; monitoring elections; promoting human rights; and fostering security.

Stabilization activities can prevent or mitigate these conditions before they have a regional impact or affect the interests and security of the United States and its allies and partners. The Fragile States Framework categorizes the conditions described above into four categories: failing, failed, recovering, and stable. Although the distinction or exact transition between categories are not definitive, Marines conduct missions under all four conditions. For example, instability could result from a collapse of the government in the aftermath of an armed conflict, from ongoing systemic issues involving economics or governance further exacerbated by corruption, or a complex catastrophe involving a natural or man-made disaster.

A failing or failed state often results from the inability of the government to effectively respond, whether to conditions over time or to a complex catastrophe. The former strains the government functionality over months or years and the latter can result in an immediate collapse. Understanding how a stable state collapsed prior to conducting stabilization activities sets the conditions for their success. If the context is unclear however, stabilization activities are likely to prove ineffective at best, or at worst, could exacerbate existing challenges. Marines should leverage input from host-nation governments, HNSFs, CAGs, US allies and partners, foreign militaries, NGOs, and the private sector to develop an informed ASCOPE and PMESII analysis.

A common theme regarding failing and failed states is that the legitimate and representative government continues to struggle or cannot manage PMESII challenges. Regardless of the exact conditions within the operational environment, experience has demonstrated that forging stabilization in the aftermath of conflict or conflict transformation requires more than purely diplomatic and military action. A need exists for unity of effort through integrated peace-building efforts, to include the host-nation government, HNSFs, US forces, US allies and partners, foreign militaries, NGOs, and the private sector. Marines should leverage the expertise and capabilities of these entities to address the various factors that have caused or are threatening a resurgence of conflict.

Marines should be able to recognize the difference between a failing state, a failed state, a recovering state, and a stable state. With this understanding, Marines can develop their planning processes, to include requests for information, to develop an accurate ASCOPE and PMESII analysis.

Failing State

The failing state is still viable, but it has a reduced capability and capacity to protect and govern the population. Based on the situation and level of stabilization, a failing state may be moving toward becoming a stable state or a failed state. Failing states range along a spectrum from weakness to collapse; conflict may or may not be a prominent issue.

Failed State

A failed state is deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions. A failed state could have only remnants of a government due to collapse or regime change, or it could have a government that exerts weak governance in all or large portions of its territory. A failed state is unable to protect and govern the population effectively. A failed state generally experiences an absolute breakdown in political power and law enforcement capabilities and cannot execute its basic domestic and international functions. Listed below are several overarching characteristics of a failed state but these vary based on the operational environment.

- *Political*. The government of a failed state often collapses. This can result from political corruption, internal pressure resulting from general political violence or a coup, and external pressure involving a nation state(s) encouraging or financing regime change. An additional factor undermining state sovereignty is violence—from criminal organizations, gangs, insurgents, proxy forces, and terrorists. As a result, the sovereign government can no longer execute its law enforcement responsibilities or govern all or large portions of its national territory. In addition, a failed state can no longer provide basic government services such as fire, police, medical, and education.
- *Military*. A failed state can no longer defend its borders from external threats. This includes border guards' inability to secure the nation's borders, prevent criminals, terrorists, or proxy forces from entering or stemming the flow of excessive numbers of refugees (a significant destabilizing factor contributing to a failed state).
- *Economic*. A failed state may have experienced several years of economic decline further exacerbated by corruption. Opportunities for economic advancement could prove limited, complicated by extreme disparities in education and high rates of illiteracy, great disparities in wealth and extreme poverty, and the population assigning a lower or illegitimate status to women.
- *Social*. Demographic pressures—whether from a natural increase in population, an influx of millions of refugees, or a combination—can overwhelm a government, leaving it unable to provide basic life-sustaining services or control its own borders. This can lead to political instability, social unrest, and demands for services that the government can no longer meet due to a lack of capability, corruption, or both. Criminal organizations, insurgent groups, and proxy forces can leverage social unrest to further destabilize the government.
- *Information*. A failed state may experience significant external pressure from a deliberate information campaign by a nation state (e.g., support to proxy forces) or an insurgent group that seeks to undermine the sovereign government by leveraging the grievances of the population or a specific segment within that population. This can result in destabilizing the government when information received, regardless of the means (e.g., internet, leaflets, radio, or social media) radicalizes the population and opportunities to reach political compromise or equitable solutions no longer exist.
- *Infrastructure*. A failed state can no longer maintain existing infrastructure or invest in new infrastructure projects. This can lead to disruptions in the delivery of goods and services and life-sustaining resources such as electricity; energy for cooling, heating, and cooking; and water and wastewater services.

The factors listed above can lead to a state of near anarchy in which the government is unable to govern or protect the population, resulting in a complete loss of population's loyalty and trust. A failed state is a worse-case scenario in which Marines might be conducting stabilization activities. If this occurs, and remnants of a national government are ineffectual, the intervening authority, whether the United States, US allies and partners, or international organizations such as the United Nations, can legally direct Marines to install a transitional military authority.

Recovering State

The recovering state is moving toward stability but may still experience varying levels of instability. This state has the capability to protect and govern its population to some degree. A key consideration is whether the population considers the level of protection and governance acceptable and normal. Based on the situation and level of stability, a recovering state may be progressing to being a stable state or regressing to a failed state. The latter can occur due to renewed pressure from resurgent insurgent groups, criminal organizations, gangs, proxy forces, or terrorists.

Stable State

A stable state is able to protect and govern its population to some degree. The population considers the level of protection and governance acceptable and normal. Characteristics of a stable state include such perceptions of government as the legitimate authority with a monopoly on the use of violence, the ability to resolve disputes, the ability to provide for essential services for the people (i.e., security food, water, energy, shelter, medical, and waste disposal), the ability to influence key regional and international leaders in positive ways, and finally, the government is able to secure the future of the population.

The distinction among failing, failed, and recovering states is not always clear in practice. For example, such labels may mask subnational and regional conditions. These could include ongoing insurgencies, activities by international criminal syndicates, activities by proxy forces, etc., within the operational environment that are more informative and relevant. Marines should understand the extent and pace a country is progressing toward stabilization (or instability) and distinguish between fragile states that are vulnerable to failure and those already in crisis.

Vulnerable nation states are unable or unwilling to meet the expectations or demands of significant portions of their populations, thereby weakening the perceived legitimacy of the government. These states are not in crisis and may even be moving toward stabilization, but their vulnerability to failure remains an important consideration for the host-nation government, USG decision makers, and for Marines wargaming courses of action for the execution of stabilization activities. Crisis-state governments cannot exert effective control over their sovereign territory or are unable or unwilling to provide essential services to significant parts of their territory. In addition, crisis states would generally be experiencing significant levels of failure (e.g., lack of governance and rule of law, economic and social inequality, crumbling infrastructure), which can quickly create the conditions that spiral into a violent conflict. (For more information on the fragile states framework see JP 3-07.)

Elements of a Stable State. Recognizing the elements of a stable state provides a baseline for contextualization. Marines can use this to assess planning considerations and to understand their role in different domains if called upon to conduct stabilization activities as a state moves from

failed to stable. Human security, economic development, infrastructure development, stable governance, and rule of law provide the underpinning of stabilization development in a post conflict (conflict transformation) environment. In a stable state, the social, cultural, and ideological factors that bind society are broadly consistent with the way state institutions discharge their responsibilities and gain consent from the population. The context, however, is also determined by host-nation government officials (e.g., political and security) and the foundational social relationships between the government and the population. The effective execution of stabilization activities further supports a stable state, but effectiveness requires unity of effort among Marines, other USG entities, and the host-nation government. Success also requires active engagement with local leaders. This engagement should always be multidimensional in nature, that is, Marines would engage the host-nation government and local leaders, to include women (if not represented in formal leadership roles, USG interagency partners, and, when appropriate, non-governmental entities such as NGOs). This ideally results in consolidation and coordination of effort. Because stabilization activities occur across the competition continuum, they are integral to military operations.

The fragile states framework and the elements of a stable state are tools to help understand how stabilization occurs. For example, capacity building, such as education and training provided to a host-nation government, could involve instruction in best practices for governance or for providing and managing life-sustaining basic services. Capacity building has a crucial role at the national level, but societal strength and long-term stability are ultimately rooted at the community or local level. This means, as a governing philosophy, resolutions should be made at the lowest levels of government possible. The host-nation government, however, might not have the capacity or the capabilities to meet the expectations of local communities. When this occurs, Marines typically need to provide resolution of challenges at the local level that require a local solution. This approach builds self-reliance and innovation. Marines can focus on critical tasks at local levels throughout the course of a military operation, with stabilization activities continuing until the transition is made to appropriate civilian authorities.

HUMAN SECURITY

A fundamental requirement for the success of stabilization activities is that the host-nation government be able to provide for human security, which encompasses civil security, personal security, and physiological needs. Human security also requires the objective application of the rule of law. The government might also function within limited levels of corruption, or at least at levels acceptable to the population. Human security exists when the population lives and works freely and without fear of their own government or of criminal organizations, gangs, insurgents, proxy forces committing unmitigated acts of crime and violence.

A government's ability to provide for human security underscores the legitimacy of its authority and, ultimately, the longer-term security of the state. In essence, when a government can protect and defend the population from external and internal threats, the population generally perceives the government as legitimate. Protection from external threats requires secure borders and a professional, well trained, and well-supplied border force, in addition to HNSFs that serve as a deterrence but can also defend a nation from invasion by other nation states. Internal protection

includes protecting individuals from persecution, intimidation, reprisals, and other forms of systemic violence, such as extra judicial killings. In essence, the government can objectively fulfill its law enforcement and judicial responsibilities for all segments of the population. Having human security also implies a government can either manage or provide for physiological needs or life-sustaining good and services, such as food, fuels for cooking, electricity, and heating, and water and wastewater services.

When a government lacks the capability or will to meet security needs, the population tends to transfer its loyalty to any group that promises to meet those needs, to include anti-government factions, whether criminal organizations, gangs, insurgents, or proxy forces. These groups can exploit an ineffective government by serving as a substitute authority by meeting the physiological needs of the population. In some instances, when such groups demonstrate a level of competence greater than the government, such entities can begin to serve in a judiciary role, however extrajudicial in its execution, further delegitimizing the government. In addition, such groups can exploit segments of the population that may be disenfranchised, or those with historical grievances, using them to commit violent acts against the government or disseminate anti-government messages via social media, the internet, etc.

ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

Coupled with rule of law, the development of a sustainable, economy, is one of the central components for a state because it creates opportunities for prosperity and employment opportunities for a nation's citizenry. Developing the host-nation's economy generally entails instituting legal reforms that limit corruption and provide incentives for domestic and foreign investment. These factors, when applied appropriately, reduce the drivers of conflict and instability, and can prevent a downward spiral from vulnerability to crisis and state failure. The priority, however, is to re-establish a stable and trustworthy host-nation government, and an economy that reflects pre-crisis economic standards acceptable to the population. That is, the immediate goal not always to establish a market-based economy. It is the ideal, and a longer-term goal, coordinated by USG agencies, but criminal organizations and in some operational environments, tribal warlords, are often the first to recognize the benefits of a market-based economy, where none existed before, allowing them to rapidly monopolize goods and services—critical to the well-being of the population—through threats and violence. If such nefarious actors become ingrained in a host-nation government or positions of authority (e.g., within HNSFs) such entities become nearly impossible to eliminate. In addition to understanding the economic conditions of a host nation, stabilization activities typically include assessing the status of critical infrastructure. For example, during an FHA mission, Marines should assess damage incurred, or assessment of damage or destruction resulting from actions taken during an armed conflict.

Marines can conduct an ASCOPE and PMESII analysis to help them make accurate assessments of the operational environment. An accurate assessment also determines what engineering assets and personnel are required to help the host-nation government restore critical infrastructure. This would include units from supporting US forces, the host nation, and most importantly, those civilians with the subject matter expertise who operate the host nation's critical infrastructure facilities daily. The immediate objective is sustainment, that is, returning critical infrastructure

systems to operation. A secondary objective is infrastructure development, which requires the host nation to take a leading role and can include the involvement of NGOs and other stability partners. It could include new construction or modernization of critical infrastructure facilities and systems.

STABLE GOVERNANCE

Stable governance maintains a sustainable political structure that permits the peaceful transition of power and resolves internal policy disputes and grievances in a way that reasonably satisfies the expectations of the population. Long-term stable governance can occur when effective influence is exercised over a population and territory by methods viewed as broadly legitimate by the majority of the governed. While the government can maintain stability through brutality, oppression, and intimidation, such methods are brittle and can cause a rapid collapse of the government if effectively challenged. The actions of a brutal and overly corrupt government can result in a resurgence of insurgent activity or attempts by proxy forces to further establish themselves, both attempting to undermine the government while appealing for support from the population.

An immediate and long-term goal of stabilization activities is to achieve stable governance. It is an end state in which the government has a sustainable political and legal structure. This includes the peaceful transfer of power, free and transparent elections, and achieving the ability to resolve internal policy disputes through a legislative process without resorting to violence. A stable government includes political and legal institutions that hold government officials accountable, and in which the judiciary fairly and equitably applies the rule of law, meaning, two-tiers of justice for one group or another do not exist. In addition, a stable government can provide basic security, maintains the rule of law, and effectively conducts economic governance (i.e., ensuring fair transactions without allowing undue regulatory burdens). A stable state can also manage or provide basic life-sustaining essential services without discrimination, and without significant assistance from the international community. Finally, when a stable-government exists, the population has equitable access to and can participate freely in the political process, to include participating in civil society organizations, such as independent media, political parties, etc., without fear of reprisal from government institutions (i.e., a dominant political party).

A good metric Marines can use for planning purposes to assess whether a government is stable or not is to assess the population's perspective. A government is stable when much of a population perceives the governing methods as legitimate and grievance resolution systems reasonably satisfy the expectations of the general population. A stable state can also successfully execute conflict transformation measures. This could include addressing legitimate grievances of the population and reintegrating insurgents or others without extrajudicial actions, while effectively addressing underlying causes of instability.

Rule of Law

Rule of law is a principle of governance in which the state itself; all persons; and institutions and entities, public and private, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated and which are consistent with international human-rights norms and standards. It requires taking measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of

the law, separation of powers, participation in decision making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and procedural and legal transparency (see JP 3-07, and the *Handbook for Military Support to the Rule of Law*).

Rule of law is the fabric that binds all systems of society. It is a social contract between the government and the citizenry, typically expressed in a written constitution, guaranteeing basic rights, and holding all accountable to the law. Legislative bodies of government—national, state, and local—enact laws after due process, which establish legal frameworks, maintenance of public order, accountability to the law, and equal access to justice. Over the long term, adherence to the rule of law prevents the government from abusing the citizenry and fosters predictability and safety.

Equitable treatment under the law, safety, and access to essential services create strong bonds of government legitimacy, fostering resiliency of both the government and the population during natural or man-made complex catastrophes. Establishing the institutional mechanism for establishing the rule of law takes time; however, in the short term, access to justice provides immediate accountability through transitional justice mechanisms, promotes economic legal reform, institutionalizes political and economic reform, and nurtures justice and reconciliation (i.e., conflict transformation) efforts. Establishing rule of law encourages a society to seek legal remedies to disputes rather than resorting to violence.

Irregular Activities in Support of Stabilization

Joint Publication 1, Volume 1, *Joint Warfighting*, defines irregular warfare as a form of warfare in which states and non-state actors campaign to assure or coerce states or other groups through indirect, non-attributable, or asymmetric activities. The Marine Corps contributes to joint irregular warfare missions by conducting irregular activities. These consist of actions with, through, or against threat non-state actors throughout the competition continuum. During such missions, Marines might also need to support friendly networks. One example would be a requirement to help the host-nation government engage the population while also supporting its institutions in their efforts to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment. This could include helping the host-nation government provide essential governmental services, execute emergency infrastructure reconstruction projects, or provide humanitarian relief.

Irregular activities that can support these stabilization goals can occur during an FHA mission, counterdrug operations, maritime interdiction operations, counterthreat finance operations, CMO, CAO, countering transnational organized crime, MISO, security cooperation missions, and network engagement. These types of missions are, by default, irregular in nature, as they engage non-state elements within a population, deny adversary legitimacy, and resolve conflict without use of conventional forces, weapons, or tactics, techniques, and procedures. An example would be re-establishing a safe and secure environment during competition, based on the needs of difference sectors of the population. This could be part of coercive measures or a deterrence strategy against non-state threat networks, such as insurgents or proxy forces. These entities simultaneously implement strategies of subversion—fear, intimidation, or coercion—of their own against the host-nation government and the population. The objective for HNSFs and supporting Marines is often to influence the behavior and decision of the non-state actor(s) or threat networks through the proactive and positive execution of irregular activities (see MCDP 1-4, *Competing,* for more information on attraction and coercion strategies).

Additional irregular activities focused on stabilization activities are conducted throughout the competition continuum. The emphasis for such missions generally focuses on helping a host-nation government and its HNSFs manage conflict and prevent the escalation of violence. The types of irregular activities that can contribute to established stabilization goals could include:

- *COIN*. Marines would help the host-nation government defeat insurgent groups and proxy forces, in addition to providing capabilities and guidance to the host-nation government to address core grievances of the population.
- *FID*. The objective with FID is to support HNSFs in protecting the host-nation government from subversion, lawlessness, terrorism, criminal activity, (e.g., international criminal syndicates, particularly those with connections to terrorist organizations), and information campaigns managed by proxy forces and adversarial nations.
- *DDR*. Disarm and demobilize warring factions (criminal organizations, gangs, insurgents, proxy forces, and terrorists) with the goal of attaining societal reintegration without extrajudicial retribution.
- *PRC*. Help the host-nation government establish populace and resource control measures, such as providing security control, to enable HNSF freedom of movement and network engagement. The goal is to understand the actual and potential interconnections and resiliencies of friendly, neutral, and threat networks and how that can inform irregular activities to prevent escalation and further violence.

An overarching objective for Marines when conducting irregular activities involving stabilization activities is to be proactive. This requires the deliberate execution of well-thought-out courses of action (COA) wargamed through the MCPP. Selecting war game COAs requires input from the host-nation government and when appropriate, other stabilization partners. The results of informed and appropriately executed (i.e., not alienating the population) irregular activities enables dominance of the commander's narratives and strategic messaging within the host nation and abroad. For example, the effective execution of irregular activities throughout the competition continuum could create dilemmas, deny access, or thwart adversarial subversion attempts against legitimate host-nation governments. The successful execution of stabilization actions through other irregular activities could also improve existing HNSF capabilities, improve relationships between the host-nation government and the population, create new regional partners, and potentially check the expansion of state or non-state threats from gaining a foothold in a vulnerable operational environment.

Defeat Mechanisms and Stability Mechanisms

The Marine Corps defines defeat as the ability to disrupt or nullify the enemy commander's plan and overcome the will to fight, making the enemy commander unwilling or unable to pursue the adopted course of action. The enemy commander will then yield to the friendly commander's will. Defeat mechanisms present options a commander can use to create the conditions for success by asking what process, system, or phenomenon would give the commander's tactical actions and effects meaning? Defeat mechanisms address the mental, moral, and physical dimensions identified during wargaming and encourage commanders to think critically about their concept of operations: How will executing the concept of operations defeat the enemy? What is the best means to combine nonlethal and lethal effects to defeat the enemy?

Regardless of the defeat mechanism employed, its successful execution results in achieving the friendly commander's will over the enemy. This occurs through combined arms leading to the destruction and dislocation of the enemy, shattering their plans and dispositions, and preventing them from adapting, recovering, and reconstituting. In essence, breaking the enemy's will for organized resistance.

Commanders and staffs determine the appropriate combination of the four stability mechanisms (compel, control, influence, and support) and the four defeat mechanisms (destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, isolate) to achieve desired results. Commanders use the four stability mechanisms to visualize how to simultaneously conduct stabilization activities with offensive and defensive operations, whether conducting irregular warfare missions against insurgents or during an armed conflict. When Marines intervene in an unstable situation, they use defeat mechanisms to alter conditions enough to protect the population.

> NOTE: Marines would ideally not conduct such operations in isolation and would leverage existing capabilities from the Army, Navy, Coast Guard, US allies and partners, and HNSFs.

Stability mechanisms help commanders visualize how to employ their units to conduct stabilization activities. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which Marines help civilians attain conditions that can lead to lasting, stable peace. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help shape the human dimension of the operational environment more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. Stability mechanisms leverage the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power.

The conditions of the operational environment ultimately determine the appropriate approach and mix of defeat and stability mechanisms required. Missions throughout the competition continuum typically require Marines to intervene in unstable situations when violent threats emerge and destabilize an area, at which time units can use defeat mechanisms to alter conditions sufficiently to protect the population. In a relatively benign environment where military forces primarily assist or facilitate civil efforts (e.g., host-nation government, NGOs, the United Nations, etc.) stability mechanisms dominate. Stability and defeat mechanisms complement planning by providing focus in framing complex problems and by providing the conceptual means to solve them. By combining the mechanisms, Marines can effectively address the human dimension of the problem while acting to reduce the security threat. Combining mechanisms can inhibit threats to stability, create an environment where people can live in some sort of normalcy (i.e., pre-crisis living conditions), and set conditions for military forces to appropriately transition stabilization activities from the joint force to the host nation government, HNSFs, or other partners, such as contributing allies and partners or NGOs.

THE STABILIZATION FRAMEWORK

The stabilization framework is a tool for understanding and prioritizing a range of stabilization activities that embody unity of effort in an operational environment. The stabilization framework is created to encompass all the tasks performed by military and civilian actors throughout the competition continuum. The framework guides understanding of the effort involved in executing stabilization activities and the commitment necessary to shape military engagement activities

during peacetime to prevent conflict and to rebuild a nation torn by conflict or disaster. The missions, tasks, and activities that make up these actions fall into three broad sequential categories (see Figure 1-2):

- Initial response.
- Transformation.
- Sustainability.

These categories collectively represent the missions, tasks, and activities of area security and stabilization activities necessary to achieve a lasting peace. The stabilization framework is not intended to be all-inclusive, as no two situations are the same, but the development of a stabilization plan provides a means to adapt to the specific conditions of an operational environment. A detailed assessment and thorough analysis of needs and assets provides the foundation upon which to build a stabilization plan. An effective plan underpins conflict transformation efforts, addressing the root causes of conflict and leveraging local assets while building host-nation ownership and institutional capacity to sustain effective governance, economic development, and the rule of law (see JP 3-07 for more information on the stabilization framework.)

Initial Response

Initial response generally reflects tasks executed to stabilize an operational environment in a crisis state (e.g., natural disasters or acts of war or terrorism) wherein the host nation and Marines must address time-sensitive issues to prevent additional crises or escalation of conflict. The focus of



Figure 1-2. Stabilization Framework.

these early, urgently needed activities are often related to establishing security, providing the critical needs of the population, and restoring key infrastructure. These needs can be determined by gender analysis as described in Chapter 3. During the initial response phase, Marines stop unnecessary suffering and lawlessness within the operational environment by executing initial stabilization activities, thereby setting conditions for subsequent phases of treatment. The duration of an initial response phase varies. It may be relatively brief in the aftermath of a complex catastrophe or longer following major combat operations. The goal during this initial phase is to provide a safe, secure environment. Military forces support efforts to reduce the level of violence and human suffering while creating conditions that enable other actors to safely participate in ongoing efforts to stabilize an operational environment.

Transformation

Transformation is the consolidation of gains. Military forces perform transformation tasks under conditions relatively free from most wide-scale violence, often to support broader civilian efforts. This phase represents a range of reconstruction, stabilization, and capacity-building activities. It may or may not be associated with post-conflict operations and may take place in either failed or failing states. Marines often perform transformation tasks in either vulnerable or crisis states. The objective during transformation is to develop and build enduring capability and capacity in the host-nation government and its HNSFs.

As civil security improves, the focus expands to developing legitimate governance, providing essential services, and stimulating economic development. As a result of this expanded focus, stabilization activities have the potential to strengthen positive and lasting relationships among the host nation, the population, and the United States. Transformation in a stabilization context involves transitions, which occur individually and concurrently over time.

Sustainability

Fostering sustainability encompasses long-term efforts that capitalize on capacity building and reconstruction activities (from earlier phases) to establish conditions that enable sustainable development and enduring security. This phase transitions responsibility to the host-nation government and HNSFs. Fostering sustainability efforts implements long-term programs that commit to the viability of the institutions and economy of the host nation.

CHAPTER 2.
AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO STABILIZATION

LINKING MILITARY AND CIVILIAN EFFORTS

When executing stabilization activities, Marines link their military efforts with civilian efforts to achieve unified action, and through unified action, achieve unity of effort (as opposed to duplication of effort). Integrating military and non-military organizational effort involves the joint force, USG entities, the host nation, contributing allies and partners, and, when appropriate, NGOs. This produces a more comprehensive approach by enabling continuous coordination, collaboration, and cooperation. A unified approach also helps Marines mitigate discord among participating entities, whether government or civilian; address inadequate bureaucratic procedures or personnel limitations; and prioritize stabilization activities (e.g., infrastructure restoration and prioritization of logistical requirements). Marines can achieve unity of effort by focusing all activities on a common set of objectives and a shared understanding of the desired effects.

Understanding and communicating the strategic and operational effects that the execution of stabilization activities would likely have on the population can help Marines achieve unity of effort with civilian entities. Some concepts for general consideration to include—

- Sharing an understanding of defined authorities and responsibilities, such as the host-nation government, the USG, the United Nations, and NGOs. Marines could consider authorities and responsibilities a form of constraints and restraints on stabilization activities, and consider their impact on mission requirements.
- Assessing the capacities and capabilities of internal organizations, such as the host-nation, and external organizations, such as NGOs. When considering the former, what is the availability of personnel and their level of training? Specific to the latter, are they willing to work with US forces? What is the potential impact on stabilization activities? Understanding assigned lead and support roles and relationships, such as when should US forces to take the lead, or an NGO, or the host-nation government, and does the latter have the capability and personnel?
- Participating foreign militaries and NGOs conducting collaborative planning (e.g., leveraging the expertise and capabilities) when appropriate.
- Understanding structure and which processes or organizational mechanisms enable effective execution.

STABILITY SECTORS

The USG broadly categorizes stability activities into five stability sectors to focus civil and military efforts. The five stability sectors include the—

- *Security sector*. It includes programs and policies that focus on developing legitimate institutions and infrastructure to maintain stability.
- *Justice and reconciliation sector*. Its focus is for ensuring that host -nation government provide fair, impartial, and an accountable justice system, while ensuring for an equitable means to reconcile past crimes and abuse from a conflict or disaster.
- *Humanitarian assistance and social well-being sector*. It emphasizes the need to alleviate immediate suffering involving any intervention effort. This includes providing for the immediate need for water, food, shelter, emergency health care, and sanitation.
- *Governance and participation sector*. It addresses the need to establish effective, legitimate political and administrative institutions and infrastructure at the national and subnational levels.
- *Economic stabilization and infrastructure sector*. Its emphasis is at the local level, with modest, carefully targeted economic and governance programs.

The stability sectors are similar in purpose and application to lines of effort. They help focus and unify reconstruction and stabilization activities within specific functional areas of society. The stability sectors form a framework for executing stabilization activities. Individually, the stability sectors encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute reform activities in a functional sector.

Collectively, the stability sectors form a base on which the host-nation government frames the possible reconstruction activities required, such as implementing conflict transformation methods or addressing a man-made or natural disaster. Marines, in coordination with the host-nation government and other stability partners, can execute some tasks sequentially, but success generally necessitates simultaneous actions across the operational environment. Given the inextricable link between military and civilian stability efforts, positive results in one stability sector often depends on the successful integration and synchronization of stability efforts across other stability sectors (see JP 3-07).

JOINT STABILITY FUNCTIONS

The six joint stability functions provide a framework for identifying the stabilization tasks that exert the greatest influence within an operational environment (see JP 3-07). The framework also provides a means for Marines to visualize the scope of stabilization efforts within a joint operation; to assign and prioritize stability tasks, which reflects mission requirements; and the conditions of the operational environment. Coordination with the DoS is a priority planning requirement, as it is the lead USG interagency partner for stabilization activities. Planning and

execution of the six joint stability functions does not occur in isolation, but with the host nation, HNSFs, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs. The six joint stability functions include—

- Security.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Economic stabilization and infrastructure.
- Rule of law.
- Governance and participation.
- Security cooperation.

The six stability functions and associated tasks are inextricably linked. For example, a positive result in the execution of one stability function typically depends upon the successful integration and synchronization of all stability functions throughout the operational environment. Marines can execute the six stability functions and their associated tasks sequentially, but success often necessitates an integrated approach. It must focus on synchronized actions throughout the operational environment. In addition, the joint task force commander, informed by the political strategy and in coordination with the DoS, executes the six stability functions through the establishment of lines of effort, which guide unity of effort. Department of State requirements, the commander's intent, and the MCPP, in addition to the realities of the operational environment, determine whether the most appropriate approach is sequential or integrated.

Marines, however, need to be aware that a sequential approach, either by design or default, which focuses solely on the security function would likely fail, as such a COA ignores the other five stability functions and their associated tasks. This would prove counterproductive given that the successful execution of all six stability functions contributes to a secure operational environment. The ideal scenario is to conduct the six stability functions concurrently through an integrated approach, while setting the conductions for long-term stability after the Marines depart. Prioritized stabilization activities should reflect the needs of the operational environment and DoS requirements but could include providing legal advice and training or economic advice. Marines would not do this independently, but in coordination USG interagency partners, US allies and partners and subject-matter experts from NGOs. Regardless of the approach, the overarching objective is to enable the host nation to reestablish itself and execute its daily activities.

MARINE CORPS TASKS

The tasks assigned to the FMF during stabilization activities varies depending on three primary considerations:

- Operational environment.
- Authorities and responsibilities of the host nation, its HNSFs, and supporting Marines.
- Presence and capabilities of USG entities, US allies and partners, and international organizations such as the United Nations, and NGOs.

In some cases, USG entities, US allies and partners, and others are often well established long before Marines arrive. In others, Marines have to operate before other actors have a significant presence and could, in some cases, be expected to lead non-security efforts until other more appropriate organizations take responsibility for the task, such as gendarmerie forces from participating US allies and partners. Marine Corps support to stabilization activities can also take the form of individual augmentation or logistics support, such as engineer, medical, and communications personnel, in addition to CAGs and JAG personnel or participating US allies and partners. As with all support-related tasks, the establishing authority must specify the type of support and the degree of support by the supporting and supported commanders. The Marine Corps recognizes seven core stability tasks:

- Conduct network engagement.
- Establish civil security.
- Provide FHA.
- Support economic and infrastructure development.
- Support establishment of civil control.
- Support to governance.
- Security cooperation.

These stability tasks assigned to the Marine Corps are nested within the DoD's stability end states and the joint stability functions. The seven core Marine Corps tasks are linked to a cause of instability and are executed through the population-oriented tactical tasks (see Table 2-1). The seven core stability tasks and their numerous subtasks focus the efforts of Marines toward desired conditions. For example, Marines conducting stabilization activities could, in the initial phase, focus on achieving security with the goal to enable a host-nation government or other participating foreign or USG agencies to perform their established role(s) safely and independently. In other cases, such as a failed state, Marines may need to participate in a broader range of tasks and participate before or beyond the initial phase.

The seven core stability tasks are interconnected. To achieve a specific objective or establish specific conditions often requires performing a combination of multiple tasks. For example, the tasks required to provide a safe, secure environment for the local populace may first require FMF to participate in ending hostilities—isolating belligerents and criminal elements, demobilizing armed groups, eliminating explosives and other hazards, and providing public order and safety.

The size of the force and combination of tasks necessary to stabilize conditions depend on the immediate situation within the operational environment. For example, when a functional host-nation government exists, the size of the supporting force and the scope of the mission is likely more limited. In this operational environment, Marines might assume a more advisory role and conduct all stabilization activities with authorization from and coordination with the host-nation government, most likely the local civil authorities. The immediate objective might include providing guidance to the host-nation government and its HNSFs as they work to reform the judicial and law enforcement institutions, and thereby ensure the objective application of the rule of law, address issues of sexually based violence, or the targeted exploitation of women and girls. In these examples, whenever possible, HNSFs should take the lead.

Table 2-1. Connecting Stability Sectors, Functions, and Tasks.

Connecting	
United States Government Five Stability Sectors— • Security. • Foreign humanitarian assistance and social well-being. • Economic stabilization and infrastructure. • Justice and reconciliation. • Governance and participation.	
Through	
Six Joint Stability Functions— • Security. • Foreign humanitarian assistance. • Economic stabilization and infrastructure. • Rule of law. • Governance and participation. • Security cooperation.	
By Means Of	
Seven Marine Corps Core Stability Tasks— • Conduct Network Engagement. (MCT 1.21) • Establish civil security. (MCT 1.14.1) • Provide foreign humanitarian assistance. (MCT 1.15.1.2) • Support economic and infrastructure development. (MCT 1.14) • Support establishment of civil control. (MCT 1.14.2) • Support to governance. (MCT 1.14) • Security cooperation. (MCT 5.5.5)	
As a Result Of	
Population-Oriented Tactical Tasks • Advise • Assess the population • Assist • Build and restore infrastructure • Contain • Control • Coordinate with civil authorities. • Cordon	 • Enable civil authorities • Exclude • Influence • Occupy • Reconnoiter • Secure • Train • Transition to civil control

During a worst-case scenario, a chaotic security environment in which the host-nation government is in a state of crisis or has failed altogether, Marines would likely operate independently, at least initially. In such a scenario, Marines, in coordination with other available forces—participating allies and partners or functioning remnants of HNSFs—focus on the core stability tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace.

Regardless of the scenario, Marines are often the first response force on the scene and support the host nation's efforts to restore security and provide humanitarian assistance. Marines can broadly categorize initial support requirements into four subtasks:

- Providing local security.
- Distributing relief supplies.
- Supporting dislocated civilians.
- Supporting the effort to restore essential services.

These four subtasks require coordination with the host-nation government, USG interagency partners, NGOs, and the logistics combat element (for the movement and distribution of relief supplies). They also coordinate available engineering units to restore essential services, such as power generation facilities and transmission lines and transportation systems, to include airports, bridges, roads, ports, etc.

ESTABLISH CIVIL SECURITY

Establishing civil security provides for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. Establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment helps set conditions for enduring stability. As soon as the HNSF can perform this task, Marines can usually transition civil security responsibilities to them. Within the security functional area, transformation tasks focus on developing legitimate, sustainable, and stable security institutions. A USG means to establish and support civil security is through SSR. It is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Without a reasonable level of civil security, other stabilization activities are not effective. A safe and secure environment requires four conditions:

- Cessation of Large-Scale Violence.
  - Large-scale armed conflict has come to a halt.
  - Warring parties are separated and monitored.
  - A peace agreement or cease-fire has been implemented.
  - Violent spoilers are managed.
- Public Order.
  - Laws are enforced equitably.
  - The lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected.
  - Criminal and politically motivated violence have been reduced to a minimum.
  - Criminal elements (e.g., local criminal elements such as gangs, international criminal syndicates in the operational environment, looters, rioters) are pursued, arrested, and detained.
  - Legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence.
  - Significant illegal armed groups have been identified, disarmed, and demobilized.
  - The defense and police forces have been vetted and retrained.
  - HNSF (local, regional, and national) operate lawfully under a legitimate governing authority.
- Physical Security.
  - Political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population are free of fear from grave threats to physical safety.
  - Refugees and IDPs can return home without fear of retributive violence.
  - Women, children, and the elderly are protected from undue violence.
  - Key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure are protected from attack.
- Territorial Security.

- People can move themselves and goods freely throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm to life and limb.
- The country is protected from invasion.
- Borders are reasonably well-secured from infiltration by insurgent, terrorist, and criminal elements.

Marine Corps units help establish civil security by performing a diverse set of activities. During the initial response phase, FMF might execute the tasks on their own because the host nation lacks capability or the security situation prevents their involvement. In the transformation phase and fostering sustainability phase, FMF transition to building partner-capacity missions that improve the capability and capacity of HNSFs.

Civil security is resource intensive; it is advantageous to have a comprehensive plan that creates acceptance from, and an understanding of, the local population. For example, the legacies of violence (i.e., historical memory) and potential mistrust among different segments of the population could prevent the implementation of a seemingly logical security measure. The local population could perceive such a measure as unfair or callous, creating a grievance. such as the treatment of women in many Muslim countries, which prompted the decision to employ female Marines to interact with local women.

In addition, the local population may perceive the presence of US forces and their bases as intrusive. The population may also be repulsed when those advocating a need for such bases claim it as part of a security plan that is managed by disreputable officials. Another potential challenge could occur when the population perceives the deployment of certain HNSF units with trepidation and despair, as some may have committed human rights abuses, did not adhere to the rule of law, or were corrupt. Marines can account for population perceptions through an ASCOPE and PMESII analysis informed by an accurate cultural analysis. Marines should also seek input from US allies and partners (e.g., French Mobile *Gendarmerie* or Italian *Carabinieri*) who might have experience in the operational environment, providing insight into the capacity and capabilities of HNSFs, but most importantly, their character.

The objective during stabilization activities is not the complete absence of violence, but its reduction to tolerable levels for host nation-government administration and an accepted status quo for the local society. The host nation or other legitimate authority may consider security activities successful when they have functional control over host-nation territory (i.e., established borders) and civil violence is reduced to a manageable level.

> **NOTE:** The latter often occur with the assistance of HNSFs and international law enforcement entities.

These efforts align with two broad priorities: securing the host-nation territory and providing civil security.

Ensuring that multinational forces and HNSFs gain control of the host-nation borders and territory is critical to establishing a safe and secure environment. Effective control of host-nation territory eliminates internal safe havens for insurgents, criminals, or terrorists; prevents illicit economic activities; enables the freedom of movement for commerce and trade; and fosters security for the

population. As with all security concerns, territorial security must balance restrictive security requirements with the political and economic provisions for openness. Activities that Marines might conduct to establish and ensure territorial security include:

- Establish border control measures.
- Ensure freedom of movement.
- Support identity activities.
- Support countering transnational organized crime.

The security of the local population and institutions is central to the success of stabilization activities. Whenever it has functional control over all or a part of host-nation territory, the Marine Corps assumes legal obligations to ensure the security of the civilian population. The nature of the operational environment could require various missions be simultaneously conducted throughout the competition continuum. Accordingly, commanders combine and sequence offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities to achieve objectives, to include taking measures to protect the population from internal and external threats. Activities that Marines conduct to establish and ensure civil security include:

- Protecting civilians. For example, executing law enforcement and security cooperation activities in coordination with HNSFs that limits collateral damage and collateral effects.
- Policing in coordination with HNSFs, whenever possible.
- Clearing explosive ordnance and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards.
- Separating warring factions.
- Helping the host-nation form the disposition and constitution of national armed and intelligence services.
- Supporting DDR activities.
- Protecting indigenous infrastructure.

PROVIDE FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Foreign humanitarian assistance encompasses those DoD activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. The overarching goal of an FHA mission is to meet the immediate basic human needs of the population. This typically involves addressing shortages of potable water, food, shelter, clothing, bedding, and medical aid. Civilian development agencies generally divide an FHA mission into three categories: emergency humanitarian and disaster assistance, shorter-term transition initiatives, and longer-term development assistance. These generally parallel the military approach of initial response activities, transformational activities, and activities that foster sustainability.

A host-nation government, USG agencies, international organizations and governments, or NGOs are likely to request DoD capabilities when a disaster or security situation becomes so severe, they no longer have the ability to respond effectively (e.g., logistics, security personal, transportation capabilities, etc.). Regardless of the scenario involving an FHA mission, the assistance the Marine

Corps provides complements the efforts of the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities, USG departments and agencies, various international organizations, and NGOs that may have the primary responsibility for coordination with the host-nation government in providing assistance. In most cases, however, Marines provide military support during an FHA mission only at the request of civilian agencies. In addition, Marines generally limit their activities to those lines of effort within which the Marine Corps has a unique capability (e.g., heavy lift and transportation, distribution of aid, providing personnel for security) that would otherwise be unavailable.

Foreign assistance includes support for foreign nations that can be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. Marines are likely to be involved in foreign assistance activities throughout the competition continuum.

> **NOTE:** An FHA mission and foreign disaster relief activities are generally responses to a specific event, such as an immediate emergency that overwhelms a host-nation government and other non-military organizations, whereas foreign assistance occurs over time.

Marines provide foreign assistance and humanitarian assistance during major operations and campaigns that also involve sustained combat operations. For example, operations during an armed conflict will inevitably impact the population and will likely result in a humanitarian crisis with thousands of internally displaced persons fleeing areas of combat. This could result in the need for Marines to take immediate action to conduct humanitarian assistance to save lives, reduce suffering, and establish the conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance by civilian agencies and organizations. Regardless of the scenario, Marines are often the first response force in a specific combatant command (CCMD) and in support of host-nation efforts to provide humanitarian assistance. Planning considerations for providing humanitarian assistance include four subtasks:

- Providing local security.
- Distributing relief supplies.
- Supporting dislocated civilians.
- Supporting the effort to restore essential services.

Subtask One—Provide Local Security

Transnational and local organized crime networks can hamper humanitarian assistance efforts. The lawlessness caused by these criminal elements can severely strain local efforts to provide needed aid and assistance in the aftermath of a catastrophic event. Although the goal is always to have the host-nation government and its HNSFs take the lead and provide local security, Marines can provide local security to humanitarian relief efforts—which often require the need to protect relief supplies from criminal elements (i.e., gangs and looters), protect the affected population, and relieve personnel.

Subtask Two—Distribute Relief Supplies

In most cases, the largest contribution that the Marine Corps provides is maritime, air, and ground transportation of relief supplies to distributing organizations in the affected area. In some cases, engineering assets may be necessary to facilitate the transportation and distribution of supplies. It

is important to note that US forces should only deliver supplies directly to the population when directed. Otherwise, they should deliver relief supplies to the host nation, indigenous populations, and institutions, such as USAID, NGOs, or other sanctioned entities.

Subtask Three—Support Dislocated Civilians

"Dislocated civilian" is a broad term primarily used by the DoD to reference a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. Dislocated civilians are particularly vulnerable to starvation, dehydration, disease, or acts of violence, particularly in the immediate aftermath of a man-made or natural complex catastrophe. The presence of dislocated civilians can complicate relief efforts (e.g., increase logistical demands and security challenges, particularly if tens of thousands either exist or are entering into an operational environment). The United Nations, other international organizations, and NGOs typically build and administer camps when needed and provide basic assistance and services to the population within a permissive environment. Marines support such efforts through camp organization, to include basic construction (Class IV) and administration, provision of care (Classes I, II, VIII, and X), and placement, such as movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations. Marines might also conduct identity operations in support of reunification of displaced and dislocated civilians (see JP 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*).

Forced Migration and Deliberate Targeting (Lethal Effects) of Civilians.

Adversaries of the United States and its allies and partners have demonstrated a willingness to target (lethal effects) civilian populations, particularly in urban areas. The deliberate destruction of dwellings results in depopulation, forced migration—involving tens-of-thousands and often millions of displaced persons—and a humanitarian crisis event(s) that can overwhelm a host nation. Marines should plan for such an eventuality and manage the humanitarian crisis throughout the competition continuum, whether during an FHA or FDR mission, or during an armed conflict. Regardless of the scenario, such masses of humanity will block primary and secondary roads, interfere with the movement of both combat service support (CSS) units and the ground combat element (GCE), and increase the need for accuracy when delivering fires (lethal effects). Finally, the need to conduct stabilization activities, to prevent ethnic cleansing, genocide, or to assist displaced persons, cannot be ignored. The challenge will not resolve itself and Marines will need to assess requirements for stabilization activities during the Marine Corps Planning Process to include—

- *Managing the humanitarian crisis throughout the competition continuum.*
- *Managing challenges specific to the information warfighting function. Adversaries seek to leverage the suffering of displaced persons, attempting to portray US forces and its allies and partners as being indifferent or ignoring the crisis.*
- *Remaining engaged with the enemy while still managing the humanitarian crisis. For example, during an armed conflict, Marines can use the mission, enemy, terrain and weather (METT-T) and civilian considerations framework as a means to assess the best method(s) of addressing the humanitarian crisis while maintaining operational tempo.*

Subtask Four—Help Restore Essential Services

Efforts to restore essential services ultimately contributes to achieving a stable democracy, a sustainable economy, and the social well-being of the population. In failing or failed states or in the aftermath of an armed conflict and other catastrophic events, Marines' support efforts might include establishing or restoring the systems that sustain a society (e.g., critical infrastructure) until local governments and civil services can assume responsibility. The immediate humanitarian needs and security for local populace are always a foremost priority.

The host-nation government or civilian relief agencies work to restore and develop essential services. Local, international, and US civilian agencies or organizations often arrive in a country long before US forces. However, if civilian relief agencies, have yet to arrive and establish themselves, or they lack capabilities and capacity, Marines can provide immediate and limited support. This generally continues until the host-nation government or civilian organizations become fully established.

The USG defines sixteen critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks provide life-sustaining goods and services within a society. The incapacitation or destruction of these sectors could severely complicate stabilization activities. The sixteen critical infrastructure sectors Marines can use to inform their ASCOPE and PMESII planning considerations involving a specific operational environment are—

- Chemical sector. The chemical sector converts raw materials into basic chemicals (e.g., bleach or chlorine), specialty chemicals for manufacturing processes, agricultural chemicals (e.g., ammonium nitrate used to create fertilizer for crops), and consumer products. In addition, the healthcare and public health sector (i.e., hospitals) require certain chemicals to maintain operations. When conducting stabilization activities, particularly involving urban operations Marines must incorporate chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear planning into the MCPP to manage potential challenges involving chemicals or toxic industrial materials. These are dual use chemicals that criminals, insurgents, terrorists, or proxy forces could use to construct and deploy improvised explosive devices.
- *Commercial facilities sector*. The commercial facilities sector includes public assembly areas such as stadiums, lodging facilities, to include hotels, motels, conference centers, and parks. Marines can coordinate with the owners or operators of such facilities to use them as staging grounds for logistic supplies or to establish temporary shelters for IDPs.
- *Communications sector*. The communications sector provides an "enabling function" that is the interconnected information exchange (e.g., terrestrial, satellite, and wireless) across all sixteen sectors. Regardless of the mission, Marines must secure communications sector transmission facilities, such as mobile (cell) phone towers. Marines should visual such towers as a form of "high ground" which function as a force multiplier to assist Marines in messaging. This includes providing lifesaving information to the population, but also countering adversarial messaging efforts within the "battle of the narratives."
- *Critical manufacturing sector*. The critical manufacturing sector includes iron and steel mills, facilities that manufacture machinery (e.g., parts for power generation facilities), heavy equipment, (e.g., earth moving equipment, transportation equipment, such as locomotives, trucks). Marines must determine, in coordination with the host-nation government, what is "critical" manufacturing capability within a specific society. Determining this in advance helps prioritize economic restoration activities within the host nation.

- *Dams sector*. Use of dams provide critical water retention and control (i.e., prevent flooding and provide water to the population) and generate power (i.e., hydroelectric power generation). Marines, in coordination with available HNSFs, must immediately secure such power generation facilities and provide any available engineering restoration support as required.
- *Defense industrial base sector*. The significance of this sector reflects the inherent engineering capabilities of a specific society and its ability to manufacture and maintain military weapon systems. Regardless, certain geographical regions of the world either have the raw materials or the specific subject matter expertise that contributes to USG defense industrial base sector requirements and therefore requires identification and incorporation into security cooperation missions between Marines and available HNSFs.
- *Emergency services sector*. The emergency services sector becomes a priority sector for restoration during stabilization activities and it includes:
  - *Law enforcement*. Law enforcement includes HNSFs and other host-nation police elements who (ideally) conduct joint operations with Marines (e.g., during the immediate response within an FHA mission) and available gendarmerie forces provided by US allies and partners or available US Army military police units.
  - *Fire and rescue services*. Fire and rescue services includes firefighting capabilities in addition to specialized units, such as hazardous material response teams, and particularly important during an FHA mission or in the aftermath of urban combat, search and rescue teams in addition to canine units.
  - *Emergency medical services*. Emergency medical services includes ambulatory capabilities that provide immediate, emergency medical care to the population prior to transportation to a hospital. Marines must assess the capabilities of host-nation emergency medical services prior to conducting stabilization activities particularly those involving a foreign disaster response.
  - *Emergency management*. Emergency management includes the organizational capabilities of a host-nation government to manage a disaster, e.g., effectively responding with emergency medical and fires and rescue services.
  - *Public works*. Public works includes local host-nation government departments that maintain and repair roads and help restore utility (e.g., electricity, natural gas, water, wastewater) services to the population, remove debris, etc., which becomes critical during a complex catastrophe.
- *Energy sector*. The energy sector broadly includes three segments: electricity, oil, and natural gas. All sectors have some need for the continuous availability of energy to maintain daily operations, but the population also requires energy to maintain life, such as fuel for cooking and heating and the uninterrupted transmission of electricity. Marines must plan security cooperation missions in coordination with available HNSFs and participating US allies and partners to secure power generation and refinement facilities. This may be a priority task during the initial phases of an FHA mission or in the immediate aftermath of an armed conflict.
- *Financial services sector*. The financial services sector continues to increase in importance given the ongoing digitalization of financial assets and usage (e.g., credit and debit cards). Having the ability to re-establish financial services through local community banks and credit unions can aid restoration activities and re-establishing the economic activity at the local level.

- *Food and agriculture sector*. This includes farms, food manufacturing and storage, and this sector has critical dependencies with water and wastewater systems, transportation systems sector, energy, and chemical sectors. The ASCOPE and PMESII analysis should include the capabilities of a host nation to provide for the consumption needs of a population (e.g. in the immediate aftermath a natural disaster or an urban battle). Planning considerations should assess the host nation's needs in returning to self-sufficiency while also identifying NGOs who can take the lead in restoring food and agriculture sector to pre-crisis event effectiveness.
- *Government facilities sector*. The government facilities sector includes host-nation government buildings that coordinate the daily activities of host-nation government business and administrative services to the population. Marines may need to assist the host-nation government in securing such buildings during stabilization activities as many have historical, symbolic meaning to a population.
- *Healthcare and public health sector*. Healthcare and public health includes education and research facilities but most importantly, healthcare coalitions that can organize emergency services and other capabilities to respond to a complex catastrophe. Marines should leverage the expertise of such organization, many of which include valuable input and capabilities from NGOs, to manage crisis response efforts. An example would be the number of nearby hospitals and their capability levels, or those nursing homes that might require evacuation.
- *Information technology sector*. The information technology sector includes the manufacturing capabilities to provide the hardware, software, and other technology that enables a modern, information-orientated society to function.
- *Nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector*. If a host nation has a nuclear power generation facility, Marines could be asked to help HNSFs secure this and other facilities that have radiological material in the immediate aftermath of a complex catastrophe or armed conflict. The objective is to prevent nuclear material from entering the hands of criminal, insurgent, or proxy forces who could use it to create a radiological dispersal device or some other chemical or biological agent—often referred to as dirty bombs—targeting the population, host-nation emergency services personnel, and Marines.
- *Transportation systems sector*. The transportation sector (i.e., airports, highways, ports), moves people and goods throughout a host nation, enabling economic activity through the transport of manufactured products and life sustaining services. Marines would coordinate the protection of transportation assets (e.g., critical transportation nodes such as a major bridge into a city), with HNSFs, supporting US allies and partners or provide any available engineering resources to assist a host-nation government with immediate restoration.
- *Water and wastewater systems sector*. It sustains public health by providing clean water (i.e., potable water), and by properly treating wastewater which is vital to prevent disease and protect the environment, both imperative planning considerations during stabilization activities involving urban operations. For example, the ability for a host-nation government to quickly restore damaged or destroyed water and wastewater systems can protect the population from disease transmission but also protect Marines.

Commanders must be prepared to coordinate with civilian entities to ensure progression in or restoration of essential services. Civil affairs teams are ideal for this coordination and can support the staff in planning activities that support restoration. In some cases, Marine Corps combat

engineers, in coordination with local public works personnel, can undertake projects that temporarily provide services to the local population until appropriate host-nation government entities or NGOs can take over.

SUPPORT ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

When conducting stabilization activities, Marines should leverage the existing capabilities of the host-nation government to support economic and infrastructure development. This could include local businesses that can provide construction capabilities and logistical support, such as heavy equipment transportation, fuel and food hauling and distribution, etc. Marines should also determine what capabilities participating US allies and partners can provide and should not ignore, but also leverage, NGO capabilities within the operational environment. These entities have specific skillsets and subject matter expertise to support the initiation and sustainment of economic and infrastructure development.

Ideally, the host-nation government has the qualifications to re-establish economic activity and lead infrastructure restoration efforts. Regardless of host-nation capabilities, the overarching goal for Marines is to help the host nation establish conditions so that it can manage its own infrastructure projects and generate its own revenues and not rely solely upon outside aid.

The goal is to set the conditions that ensure the host nation does not become overly dependent on external entities. Such a dependency would increase the risk for immediate economic collapse and could halt infrastructure development upon the departure of Marines and any supporting US allies and partners. The danger in such a scenario is that it creates an opportunity for threat networks to leverage, and thereby undermine the progress of recent stabilization activities.

When planning to support economic and infrastructure development projects, Marines should consider the host-nation government's ability to sustain the effort independently. Sustainability involves the local ability to maintain a project and the capability to use it after an operation. Developing new local capacities can be substantially more complex than simply restoring capabilities that existed before a conflict. Existing capabilities, though perhaps not as effective as new capabilities, may have more support from local means. Synchronizing reform efforts among the economic, governance, and security sectors decreases the chance of continued or renewed conflict. Developing the economic sector hinges on these necessary conditions:

- Employment generated at the local level.
- Price and currency stabilized, also referred to as macroeconomic stabilization.
- Economic sustainability.
- Eradicated illicit economy, or at the very least, controlled to a manageable level, while also addressing any other forms of economic-based threats to peace.
- Individual economic security.

Depending on the situation, economic and infrastructure development may include—

- Protecting natural resources and environment.
- Generating economic, enterprise, and employment opportunities.

- Establishing agricultural development programs.
- Assisting in the immediate restoration of infrastructure. This could include the energy sector, such as power plans and fuel distribution, and the transportation sectors, such as bridges, major primary and secondary highways, etc., and establishing a general infrastructure reconstruction program for longer-term development.
- Infusing monetary resources into the local economy to stimulate economic activity.
- Fostering private sector development.

An overarching planning consideration for supporting economic and infrastructure development requires an assessment of how to avoid unintended disruptions to local markets by suddenly stimulating the economy. For example, if Marines were to agree to pay prices significantly above the market rate, this could cause prices to spike, that is, inflation, within local markets, and make products cost-prohibitive for the population. A price spike can cause resentment and undermine broader stabilization activities, potentially leading to market collapse upon the inevitable departure of the Marines.

SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CIVIL CONTROL

Civil control is the local leadership's ability to manage the disputes and conflicts within the population effectively and foster the rule of law. The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions, and entities (public, private, and state) are accountable to laws that publicly promulgated through the legislative process, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. Civil control ensures that citizens live in a safe society in which individuals and groups adhere to the rule of law. The rule of law provides equal access to a justice system that is consistent with international human rights standards. This is a long-term process developed by civilian entities.

Marine CAGs, in coordination with contributing US allies and partners (e.g., those with significant gendarmerie experience), generally takes the lead for helping the host-nation government establish civil control. However, Marine units can also provide security cooperation assistance training and support to HNSFs. The focus is to implement temporary or interim capabilities to lay the foundation for host-nation government or interorganizational development of this sector. Depending on the situation, establishing security for host-nation civil control could require that Marines assist—based on available capabilities and personnel—the host-nation government, USG agencies, and participating US allies and partners with six general support requirements, described below.

General Support Requirement One—Public Order and Safety

Public order is a condition in which a government equitably enforces laws. For example, a government can protect the lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals, can manage criminal and politically motivated violence, preventing it or keeping it at a minimal, and can effectively pursue, arrest, and detain criminal elements (e.g., members of gangs, looters, rioters, or leaders of organized crime networks). Public safety permits people to conduct their daily lives

without fear of systematic or large-scale violence or extra-judicial killings or vigilante justice. Long-term sustainability of reforms depends on the achievement of public order and safety, which Marines can help accomplish in the area of establishing security.

General Support Requirement Two—Law Enforcement and Police Reform

Law enforcement and police reform comprise an essential component of civil control. During stabilization activities, the ideal scenario is for civil agencies, such as USG agencies or participating US allies and partners with the requisite law enforcement and legal expertise, to provide support for law enforcement and police reform efforts. Sometimes, however, host-nation civilian police forces or HNSFs succumb to corruption and locals distrust them. As a result, Marines can temporarily fill a security void that could include conducting urban patrols to prevent lawlessness, looting, or riots, or providing security at host-nation government buildings, HNSF or police training facilities, and critical infrastructure nodes. Marines may conduct such activities until they are replaced by a suitable alternative.

Determining a suitable alternative requires planning prior to conducting stabilization activities. Many foreign governments who are regional partners of the United States and US allies and partners have significant military policing experience overseas. These entities train specifically for overseas operations requiring military policing capabilities, such as the French Mobile *Gendarmerie* and the Italian *Carabinieri*, a gendarmerie-style force. Both have participated in numerous peacekeeping operations, from the Balkans to Afghanistan and Iraq. Marines should also plan to incorporate US Army units with military policing capabilities, which would enable Marines to focus primarily on security requirements. In addition, Marines may detain looters or rioters when involved in an FDR or FHA mission. The primary objective for Marines generally requires helping to provide security and prevent extra-judicial killings.

General Support Requirement Three—Justice System Reform

Stabilization requires the populace to perceive their nation's justice system as legitimate, fair, and effective. Justice system reform activities aim to achieve broad institutional reform by updating legal statutes and reorganizing fundamental justice system structures to ensure basic fairness and protect human rights. While civilian agencies typically lead such reform efforts, military forces sometimes establish and maintain the security necessary to facilitate future host-nation government efforts. Marine CAGs and JAG personnel usually provide this type of support in coordination with contributing USG agencies and US allies, and partners.

General Support Requirement Four—Corrections Reform

Corrections reform is an integral part of a broader SSR. Corrections reform includes building host-nation penal system capacity by restoring institutional infrastructure, providing oversight of the incarceration process, and training host-nation personnel to internationally accepted standards. Tasks also include instituting a comprehensive assessment of the prison population, determining the status of prisoners, and establishing procedures to help reintegrate political prisoners and others unjustly detained or held without due process into society. Security missions could also require Marines to detain criminals, insurgents, terrorists, or even members of proxy forces. Specific instruction involving corrections reform, however, generally includes contributions from the Marine law enforcement battalion, CAGs, JAG personnel, USG agencies, and contributing US allies and partners.

General Support Requirement Five—War Crimes Courts and Tribunals

The international community oversees the conduct of war crimes courts and tribunals. Marines may need to provide security in support of host-nation government and HNSFs investigative activities, some supported by USG agencies and participating allies and partners. Examples of supporting corrections reform could include protecting witnesses; identifying, securing, and preserving evidence for courts and tribunals of war crimes and crimes against humanity; supporting investigations (e.g., with Marine CAG or JAG personnel); and providing security for HNSFs when they conduct an arrest or transfer war criminals. In addition, Marines will likely need to coordinate security efforts with other agencies and organizations, and US allies and partners (e.g., the French Mobile *Gendarmerie* or Italian *Carabinieri*).

General Support Requirement Six—Public Outreach and Community Rebuilding Programs

The reconciliation process entails public outreach and community rebuilding while promoting public respect for the rule of law. Activities performed by Marines, specifically CAGs, could include training, advising, and helping host-nation agencies develop public access to information and assess the needs of vulnerable populations (e.g. women, children, elderly). Any outreach effort Marines assess they need to conduct requires coordination with COMMSTRAT to ensure alignment with previously issued public affairs guidance. This coordination is imperative, as mixed messing creates significant challenges for Marines regarding the "battle of the narratives" with the inevitable need to counter adversarial messaging that will attempt to undermine the stabilization activities of the USG and its allies and partners.

SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

Stabilization activities, ultimately, strive to leave a host-nation government and its HNSFs capable of protecting the civilian populace (i.e., the rule of law), contributing to and sustaining internal and regional security, (i.e., effectively limiting the influence and activities of criminal entities, insurgents, or proxy forces), and maintaining sustainability (i.e., effective governance) without undue external support (e.g., from the United States, its allies and partners, or NGOs). These objectives, or even their achievement, however, do not necessarily result in democratization—particularly when interpreted to mean direct elections—despite democratization often being an end-state condition in planning or directed by mandate. For example, in societies already divided along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, elections may further polarize factions. Regardless, representative institutions, generally—and there can be an array of representative structures depending on local context—offer the best means of reconstituting a government acceptable to most of the citizens. This is the broad intent of developing host-nation governance and a significant planning consideration to successfully execute stabilization activities.

When a legitimate and functional host-nation government exists, military forces (i.e., Marines and forces from supporting allies and partners) operating to support the state have a limited role. If the host-nation government, however, cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions, for whatever reason, some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. A state's legitimacy among its people is related to its perceived ability to govern fairly (i.e., the objective application of the rule of law) and provide essential services. In extreme cases, where the civil government of a nation state becomes completely dysfunctional or absent altogether, international law requires military forces to provide the basic civil administration functions of the host-nation

government under the control of a transitional military authority. Figure 2-1 is graphic representation of how Marines can align lines of effort during stabilization activities involving a failed nation state.

Governance is the state's ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which a population's interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society, including the representative participatory decision-making processes typically guaranteed under inclusive, constitutional authority. Effective and legitimate governance ensures these activities are transparent and accountable, often involving public participation. Participation is a process by which the citizenry confers authority on rulers, accepts the rules of governance, and is attentive to the enforcement and modification of these rules. Participation also refers to programs designed to help the people share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation. Legitimacy is predicated on predictable and transparent rules and processes.



Figure 2-1. Sample Lines of Effort.

Marines, either directly or in coordination with US allies and partners, and in some instances NGOs, can help a host-nation through initiatives that build progress towards achieving effective, legitimate, government institutions. Support to governance focuses on restoring public administration and resuming public services while fostering long-term efforts to establish a functional, effective system of political governance. The support provided by Marines helps to shape the environment for extended unified action by other partners. These efforts can eventually enable the host nation to develop an open political process, a free press, a functioning civil society, and legitimate legal and constitutional frameworks. Good governance addresses—

- Provision of essential services.
- Stewardship of state resources.
- Political moderation and accountability.
- Civic participation and empowerment.

Marines typically conduct stabilization activities in failed or fragile state situations or when the host-nation government has difficulty resolving stabilization and reconstruction challenges. In some cases, host-nation governments can function and exercise their sovereign responsibility. In these cases, international actors, including FMF, support host-nation government authorities. If the host-nation government, however, is dysfunctional or absent, military forces could provide interim governance as a transitional military authority until the host nation establishes a responsible civilian authority. When assisting an interim government or transitional military authority, activities Marines might conduct include—

- Supporting a national constitutional process.
- Supporting a transitional governance.
- Conducting a transitional military authority or governance.
- Supporting development of local governance.
- Supporting anticorruption initiatives.
- Supporting free and fair elections.

SECURITY COOPERATION

Security cooperation involves those DoD interactions with foreign security establishments to build relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and partner military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partners. Establishing or reestablishing competent HNSFs is fundamental for conducting security and for it to succeed. Marines can broadly define success as the ability of HNSFs to independently provide safety and security for the host-nation government and its population (i.e., with increasingly limited need for external support.

Having capable host-nation security forces is integral to the successful execution of stabilization activities. Marines can conduct security coordination through various ways (activities) and means (authorities) that support the development of HNSFs. Security cooperation can directly support immediate goals such as stopping lawlessness and protecting women and girls from gender-based violence or exploitation. Security cooperation can also have longer-term goals, such as countering

threats from criminal groups, insurgents, and proxy forces, or obtaining access to bases and overflight authorization. Conducting security coordination missions almost always involve multiple stakeholders, from the host nation itself, US forces, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and international organizations, such as the United Nations.

Security coordination begins at the country level by the country team. It is the senior, in-country, United States coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented United States department or agency, as desired by the chief of the United States diplomatic mission. The country team initiates security coordination and coordinates with the CCMD, which includes all DoD administered programs. Marine planners would align their security coordination activities with the goals and objectives as articulated by the country team and CCMD, but such activities usually hinge on accomplishing five outcomes:

- *Promote stability*. Security cooperation activities promote stability by increasing HNSF capabilities, enabling them to effectively manage internal and external threats and manage national borders.
- *Develop alliances*. Marines can build professional military relationships during security coordination activities, which can become vital during a complex catastrophe, provide direct contacts in addition to an understanding of how a host-nation government and its HNSFs respond (e.g., capabilities and capacity and insight into political dynamics).
- *Gain and maintain access*. The goal is operational access, which includes the host nation's bases, major ports of significant economic and military value, inland waterways, and overflight authorization within the host nation.
- *Develop HNSF relationships*. This could include bilateral exercises between Marines and HNSFs or multinational exercises that also include allies and partners of the United States. Objectives include improving interoperability between the host nation and US forces (e.g., familiarity with the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the HNSFs and Marines), establish and improve training requirements and determine logistical requirements for future operations.
- *Manage regional threats*. Marines typically conduct security activities that could help HNSFs manage regional state or non-state threats impacting the host nation (see JP 3-20 and MCTP 3-03D).

CHAPTER 3.
PLANNING AND STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

Stabilization activities present many challenges for military planners. By their nature, stabilization activities are complex and typically require a long-term view or approach. At their essence, stabilization activities are political and employ all instruments of national power available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives, whether diplomatic, economic, informational, military, or a combination thereof. Marines should also examine interagency capabilities within finance, intelligence, and law enforcement. Understanding the operational environment requires an inclusive approach that extends beyond the joint community and into the interagency, multinational, and NGOs. Early collaboration with interagency partners is a critical component to reduce risk and help ensure success. When operating in these environments, Marines must understand these partner capabilities and limitations and integrate them into all actions from the early planning phase through execution and transition.

Cooperative Planning

One of the defining features of stabilization activities is the array of participants present in the theater of operations. The range of external stakeholders could include various USG departments and agencies, allies (who themselves often have a multi-agency presence), NGOs, and private sector interests, such as large corporations. Despite the differing organizational cultures, experiences, and timelines that inevitably exist among stakeholders, it is imperative that there is a shared understanding of the international objectives and the operational environment. Conducting cooperative planning and assessments and coordinated, integrated (when appropriate) actions and activities results in cohesion and unified action.

If Marines engage in a larger USG stabilization mission, planning should occur with joint and USG interagency partners as early as possible. When multiple entities and capabilities are in the operational environment, unity of effort and unified actions are essential to ensure coordinated, synchronized, and synergistic actions. The alternative can lead to duplication of effort with well-intentioned activities that unintentionally exacerbate grievances or create opportunities for manipulation by corrupt host-nation officials or even create other counterproductive consequences, such as providing exploitation opportunities for criminal groups, insurgents, proxy forces, or terrorists. The operational approach to enable unified action and unity of effort requires:

- A common or shared understanding of the situation.
- A common vision or goals for the mission.
- Elimination of duplicate efforts or resources.
- Coordination of efforts to ensure continued coherency.

- Common measures of progress and the ability to change course, if necessary.
- Integrated interagency decision making in the planning and assessment processes.
- Engagement with the host nation and other joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners.

When working with other entities in support of stabilization efforts, it is essential to identify common objectives early in the planning process. This facilitates unity of effort, leading to a collective focus on (and resourcing to enable) achieving common goals. At the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the responsibility is with military leadership and their civilian counterparts to achieve and maintain unity of effort through consistent cooperation, and where appropriate, integration and collaboration.

While the presence of these other entities may complicate planning and increase the complexity of the operational environment, they can also serve as a force multiplier. For example, these entities have resources and expertise that Marines can leverage in support of common stability objectives. The key is to understand that each organization comes with its own mandates, capabilities, authorities, and objectives. Understanding their respective parameters and resources enables the execution of a coherent, integrated plan that uses multiple organizations' capabilities to achieve common goals. Some groups, such as NGOs, and humanitarian actors must retain independence of action, and do not actively cooperate or coordinate with the USG or military. Nevertheless, military planners need to understand these organizations' roles, actions, and constraints regarding stabilization efforts.

In many crisis environments, organizations within the United Nations or an NGO take the lead in addressing a specific aspect of the emergency response; this is known as the cluster-based approach. Clusters are essentially problem sets for which an organization or group of organizations coordinates the planning, delivery, and impact assessment of humanitarian assistance. See Figure 3-1 for a description of the standing global clusters and the agencies that lead them.

Military representation in cluster working groups may be appropriate if there are shared objectives and unique capabilities that military units can bring to the effort. Marines should coordinate participation with the cluster lead ahead of time. Also, Marines should take special care to avoid actions that put other participants at risk or leave cluster members with the perception that the unit is using the working group to collect intelligence.

Plan for Transition from the Start

Marines will need to conduct stabilization activities throughout the competition continuum and regardless of the mission type. As such, stabilization activities are an inherent planning requirement during the MCCP. Marines must plan for transition (e.g., stabilization activities) from the start, meaning once they receive a warning order. The ideal scenario is for a specific transition period, when stabilization activities become the priority mission, whether during an FHA or FDA mission, or during an armed conflict. This ideal scenario, however, will rarely occur, but must be planned for regardless. Success requires a thorough transition plan. Marines can adopt this transition plan to the needs of the operational environment.

Transition, during the aftermath of an FHA or an armed conflict—two extreme examples within the competition continuum—is the act of turning over the supervision of the identified problem set to a competent authority e.g., host-nation government, HNSFs, or participating allies and



NOTE
The cluster system does not apply in refugee situations where United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees is the lead for all sectors.

Figure 3-1. Global Security Clusters.

partners, NGO). In most cases, before transitioning responsibilities, Marines should have established a baseline of stability. This level of stability, often agreed to with multiple, participants, to include the host-nation government, ensures that the new authority can sustain and improve upon the progress achieved. All desired end states should drive toward transition. There are two aspects to transitions:

- Plan with and for an early transition of the USG lead agency (usually DOS) upon achieving an adequate level of security. Coordination with USG agencies requires advanced planning and continuous collaboration (e.g., to determine the timing of transition based on the reality of the operational environment to a specific USG agency or other authority).

- Reinforce the host-nation government's capability and capacity to exercise their authority and fulfill their responsibilities (e.g., providing goods and services to the population, protecting the population from threat networks, securing the country's borders against external threats).

Transitions can occur due to—

- Changes to mission.
- Changes in threat actions.
- Additional functions.
- Changes in environment.
- Changes in location.
- Changes to task organization.

Marines must plan transitions. Consider Marines engaged in an FHA mission. The transition challenge revolves around the limited resources and capabilities of most aid providers and the restrictions in US Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, for funding these non-military functions. In planning the transitions for FHA, the JFC must coordinate closely with the country team and geographical combatant commander to establish timelines and public information related to the transition of maritime support to FHA activities.

When transition is a consideration from the start of an operation, certain factors in the operational environment might take on special tactical relevance. For example, understanding that key linkages between the community's critical infrastructure and its economic productivity, requires that Marines consider the first-, second-, and third-order effects of target selection (i.e., lethal and nonlethal effects) against a determined enemy. The goal is to avoid unnecessary destruction and collateral damage, which may save time, resources, and earn good will from the population. For example, the need to avoid unnecessary collateral damage during military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) when conducting stabilization activities becomes a paramount planning consideration. During MOUT, adversaries, and in some instances, hostile media organization to the United States and its allies and partners, will have greater access to urban areas or the urban battlespace, using images and videos for information activities. Adversaries will report any transgressions, any mistakes, real or contrived (i.e., image manipulation and false narratives) instantly to the world. The consequences could prove extremely damaging to establishing a rapport with the population, complicating and possible preventing the successful execution of stabilization activities.

In some cases, a transitional military authority is required in an ungoverned area, occupied territory, or an allied or neutral territory liberated from enemy forces. A transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. It exercises temporary executive, legislative, and judicial authority in a foreign territory. The authority to establish military governance by US military personnel resides with the President of the United States and US forces will only assume control as prescribed in directives to the JFC.

Understand the Population

The population influences the Marines' ability to conduct operations. The reason is straightforward: the population is always present within the operational environment. When using the MCPP, civil considerations are an essential planning focus. Marines who ignore this risk jeopardize mission success. An assessment of civilians within the operational environment always presents complications, given that a population is not a homogenous, singular entity, but consists of myriad groups or social networks, each with their own interests and potential to disrupt or contribute to mission success. Marines should not adopt an adversarial mentality toward the population. Civilians and their actions present operational challenges that can influence a commander's decisions and force specific actions. During an FHA mission, planning considerations could include how to deliver humanitarian assistance. During an armed conflict, a planning consideration might include the need to account for IDP movement, often in the tens of thousands, on major roads and how the movement of the population in such numbers could impact the movement of the ground combat element.

Methods to understand and engage the population include—

- Employing MISO.
- Developing human intelligence sources.
- Planning for CMO.
- Planning for CAO.
- Planning for the use of COMMSTRAT. The operational planning team should note that narrative determination is a COMMSTRAT responsibility, which COMMSTRAT disseminates in their public affairs guidance or PAG, or within the operation plan or operation order.
- Using population resource-control measures.
- Conducting network analysis and network engagement (to determine the most relevant networks that could impact tactical operations.)
- Planning to execute the information warfighting function.

View the Local Society as a System

A complex system is a functionally-related group of elements composed of multiple parts, each of which could act individually according to its own circumstances and change the circumstances affecting some or all other parts or elements. Visualizing a society, a city, or a local community as a complex system with characteristics similar to that of a living organism can aid in understanding the dependency and interconnectivity of that entity's individual components. This is particularly important during urban operations, as heavily populated urban areas are inherently complex and dynamic, with various interrelated structures, processes, and functions. How these interact, as part of a broader system impacts operational planning.

The actions of Marines in one area of an urban environment affect one element of the city or system and can have repercussions on other elements. This could include a positive or negative interaction with the population. For example, the effective distribution of supplies would ideally create a positive reaction from the population, but collateral damage, such as the destruction of a bridge that sustains delivery of goods and services to a city or local community, could create a negative reaction. Military operations, however, invariably cause damage and destruction, even

during stabilization activities (e.g., heavy trucks or tracked vehicles can damage roads or even collapse bridges and the movement of Marines can disrupt daily, civilian activities). When deciding on a course of action, the stabilization or destabilization effects on the civil environment of those actions should be a planning consideration. Marines must consider the first-, second-, and third-order effects of their actions. The goal is to understand and predict which parts of the system are essential to its continued viability and functioning so that—

- Units are not surprised by the population's reaction to (or the enemy's exploitation of) damaged or destroyed elements of the system. This could include critical infrastructure such as power generation facilities, bridges, roads, railhead, and ports, (i.e., the transportation system), host-nation government buildings, religious buildings (e.g., churches, mosques, synagogues) and significant cultural monuments.
- Units can dedicate resources to mitigation or reconstruction actions, e.g., determining what is the priority action for a specific area of operations that can expedite restoration of the system.
- Units can use network analysis or engagement, conduct a network-criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability (N-CARVER) assessment, in addition to ASCOPE and PMESSI assessments to shape their assessment of the operational environment, how it functions as a system, and thereafter determine the most appropriate planning input and course of action. (For more information on N-CARVER, see JP 3-25.)

When military operations disrupt or destroy parts of the system that are essential to the predictability of essential services, governance, and the pre-crisis pattern of life, stabilization activities can mitigate the damage and help the host-nation government return system functionality to pre-crisis levels.

Build on Existing Capacity and Norms

Stabilization activities should build on the foundations of existing capacity, however insubstantial they are, and whether formal or informal. Capacity, in this context, refers to the capabilities, institutions, and processes within the society that enable it to function. Capacity always exists in some degree; friendly capacity building activities should build, nurture, empower, and mobilize pre-existing capacity. By identifying existing capacities on which to build, governance capacity building is more likely to develop approaches that are both desirable and culturally feasible. Some capacities may be self-evident, while others will need to be carefully explored, often for the first time.

Before implementing any activities, Marines should assess the current conditions (e.g., per the ASCOPE and PMESII constructs). This assessment should be based on the local norms—not standards common within the United States—and should identify and prioritize the sources of instability that threaten effective governance and economic development. An ASCOPE and PMESII analysis, often underscores the need for security, and generally becomes the primary role of military forces in building host-nation government capacity and developing its HNSFs. Units, however, may also have a role supporting the efforts of other USG agencies to enhance the host-nation government's capabilities for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions (e.g., disaster preparedness).

UNDERSTANDING STABILITY DYNAMICS

The following terms and descriptions are instrumental to understanding the dynamics of stabilization activities within an area of operations:

- *Grievances*. The perception by various groups in a society that other groups, social institutions, or the government are a threat to their values, well-being, and even existence.
- *Resiliencies*. Community networks, communication, health, governance, resources, and economic investment that help it to function peacefully and to rebound from crisis.
- *Key influencers*. Persons or groups with the means and motivation to foster stability or to create instability.
- *Events*. Incidents that provide a window of opportunity for key influencers to create effects in the environment (e.g., to exploit grievances or promote resiliencies).

The existence of grievances does not automatically cause instability; poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, inadequate essential services, political marginalization, and repression are common and can exist in many places that are reasonably stable. Stability is challenged when an actor exploits the operational environment for violence. Key influencers use events as opportunities to exploit known grievances through a narrative to generate a destabilizing effect. Marines need to know the key influencers in their area of operations and the potential events that could provide venues for destabilizing actions.

Instability occurs when the destabilizing factors overwhelm the authorities' ability to respond to or mitigate them. Military operations can destabilize an environment already in crisis (or may be the initial cause of a crisis). Stability tasks could involve helping the host nation or local government mitigate these destabilizing forces through support to public information campaigns or other activities.

Resiliency is a system's (society's) ability to recover from some type of external event (e.g., an invasion) or internal event or shock (e.g., a disaster). Understanding a population's dynamics and host-nation capabilities to respond to such events is a significant planning consideration prior to conducting stabilization activities. This shapes the initial logistical and engineering requirements. Being aware of the resiliencies in the operational environment and the stability-reinforcing key influencers within it (as part of understanding the civil environment and framing the problem) increases operational effectiveness and helps mitigate the destabilizing effects of military operations. Examples of resiliencies include government capabilities, the provision of essential services, the rule of law, a free media environment (i.e., not state-run), leaders (key influencers) who support unity, and civil organizations. Marines should strive to understand the situation and perspective of relevant actors, including the elements shaping human behavior, before they can use force, the threat of force, or other activities to assure, deter, coerce, or compel relevant actors in the operational environment. Understanding the root causes of instability and conflict—not just an awareness of the symptoms—is critical. Marines may even identify some host-nation resiliencies they want to proactively leverage or protect in support of the desired end state.

CULTURAL ANALYSIS

Marines must understand and respect the reasons a host nation selects the course of action it deems the most viable solution during the execution of stabilization activities. This is referred to as a cultural analysis and includes the actions taken to understand and integrate relevant cultural factors into the MCPP. Effective cultural analysis occurs through open dialogue with the host nation and helps Marines understand its beliefs, values, current behaviors, cultural norms, and attitudes. One of the goals is for the planning staff to broaden their collective understanding of socio-cultural dynamics through a cultural analysis to generate hypotheses or planning assumptions about the population that are relevant. For example, because it is important to understand how the population would react to the actions of friendly forces, a cultural analysis would help the planning staff develop a shared understanding of the operational environment that shapes COA development, COA wargaming, and an operations assessment.

Network engagement aids cultural analysis through providing an understanding of civil considerations that impact the operational environment. The planning staff integrates language, regional expertise, and cultural knowledge by conducting an analysis of the five dimensions of the operational culture which are—

- Physical environment.
- Economy.
- Social structure.
- Political structure.
- Belief systems.

Understanding these five dimensions can help planners better understand the operational environment, predict reactions to military operations, and develop more effective COAs. A successful cultural analysis prevents the implementation of a planning bias based on a false assumption(s) of the operational environment. The goal is to prevent mirror imaging through a false cultural interpretation of the operational environment, while simultaneously assisting planners in considering mission-relevant cultural factors. Planners can ask the questions in Table 3-1 to help them assess what each of these dimensions mean and how they are relevant to operations (see MCTP 3-02A).

Women, Peace, and Security

The DoD Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) strategic framework and implementation plan provides a framework for Marine WPS-related tasks while conducting stabilization activities with DOS, USAID, and other US interagency oversea efforts. The DoD strategic framework and implementation plan tasks Marines to increase inclusion and protection of women and girls at all levels during the execution of stabilization activities. The framework provides a means to ensure women are involved in decision making in peace and security matters during a complex catastrophe or in the aftermath of an armed conflict.

Table 3-1. Five Dimensions of Operational Culture.

Dimensions	Questions to Ask to Assess the Operational Culture for Planning and Mission Execution
Physical Environment	What roles are expected of Marines regarding the use and provision of water? How do the littorals or island waterways influence planning considerations for operations? What operational priorities would override relationship with water as a resource? What land is (or is not) appropriate for certain people to use?
Economy	How will operations affect the informal economy and the people who depend on it? How does the formal economy depend on the informal one? How will Marine expenditures influence the socio-economic balance of power in the area of operations?
Social Structure	At what age is someone considered an adult? Who has influence in families? How should Marines respond to children who participate in armed conflict (i.e., child soldiers)? What work, roles, activities, and spaces do men and women traditionally perform?
Political Structure	How is decision making organized? Who makes decisions? Who are the formal leaders? Who are the informal leaders? How are they selected? What symbols reveal a person's status as having influence? How will Marines' alliance with one group affect relationships with other groups?
Belief Systems	What are the pivotal points in history or important stories that all people living in the area of operations share? How are historical events interpreted? How does collective historical memory influence the population in addition to political decisions? How is historical memory manipulated by insurgent groups or proxy forces to further destabilize the population? How are these histories and stories used to support propaganda for or against US forces? Are there heroes or villains in the area of operations? How are these heroes or villains compared to US forces? Do groups see themselves as victims of outside powers or as recipients of assistance?

Department of Defense and Marine Corps equities mirror United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, which identifies the critical role women can have in initiating and sustaining peacebuilding efforts and how that can help the United States secure more effective and lasting gains when conducting stabilization activities. Marine Corps WPS efforts during stabilization ensures military actions uphold human rights and mitigates harm against the civilian population. Women, Peace, and Security actions can be nested in ongoing efforts with HNSFs and aligned with the host nation's goals and objectives. In addition, Marine Corps WPS efforts during stabilization activities include four lines of effort:

- *Participation*. Include women in peace negotiations and peace operations as representatives.
- *Protection*. Protect women and girls from violence and sexual violence.
- *Prevention*. Improve intervention strategies that prevent violence targeting women and girls.
- *Relief and Recovery*. Consider the needs for women and girls within refugee camps.

These lines of effort shape planning considerations that affect women and girls during stabilization activities. Adversarial nations and warring factions often ignore the law of armed conflict, and any subsequent inadvertent or deliberate collateral effects. The result is that violence often disproportionately affects women and girls. Adversarial nations and warring factions may deliberately target women and girls (i.e., kill them or use sexual and gender-based violence like rape) as a deliberate strategy to destabilize communities. Additional planning considerations include the need to recognize the occurrence of sexual exploitation and abuse and human trafficking (see JP 3-07). This is true whether such violence occurs during or in the aftermath of an armed conflict, or occurs during peace enforcement operations, or even during an FDR or FHA mission. Regardless of the scenario, criminals often target women and girls in refugee camps, whether stealing relief supplies, committing acts of sexual violence, or engaging in human and sex trafficking.

Preventing criminal activity targeting women and girls requires close coordination with HNSFs, which might require increasing awareness and training standards, coordination with allies and partners and participating NGOs. Many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners have very capable military police units or gendarmerie forces such as the French Mobile *Gendarmerie* and Italian *Carabinieri* who may have experience in conducting operations in an unstable operational environment during or post-conflict or in the aftermath of a complex catastrophe. Marines should seek to leverage such expertise during stabilization activities.

Gender Analysis

A gender analysis is an examination of the relationships and interactions between men and women, their access to and control of resources, the constraints they face relative to each other, and related sociocultural power structures. Marine planners, in coordination with interagency partners, conduct a gender analysis to assess the impact of, or the potential for, sexual and gender-based violence within the operational environment. A gender analysis would help Marine planners identify indicators of instability, such as gender-based vulnerabilities, prior to the execution of stabilization activities (see JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*).

Marine planners should note that when conducting a gender analysis, sexual and gender-based violence is a broad, descriptive term for any harmful threat or act directed at an individual or group based on gender or sex. This includes the use or threat of physical, psychological, sexual, economic, legal, political, social, and other forms of control or abuse. Marine planners should note that gender-based violence is not synonymous with sexual violence. Sexual violence is a specific type of gender-based violence. In addition, gender-based violence is not just about violence against women and girls, but men and boys can also be victims, as can others, for their gender identity, non-conformity, or sexuality (see JP 3-20). Marine planners should also be aware that sexual and gender-based violence is not limited to warring factions but can include military forces, private military contractors or the local population. Some examples of sexual and gender-based violence include—

- Forced prostitution and other forms of sexual exploitation.
- Forced labor or services.
- Slavery or practices similar to slavery or servitude
- Removal of organs, or illicit organ harvesting with the person's consent.
- Trafficking in person, to include holding or obtaining a person in compelled service through force, fraud, or coercion. The three most common forms of trafficking in persons include—

- Sex trafficking.
- Labor trafficking.
- Child soldiering.

Marines can expect to encounter such illegal activities during stabilization activities. Countering them, or combating trafficking in persons (CTIP), requires coordination with USG interagency partners, the host nation, its HNSFs, and US allies and partners. Its successful execution, as combined with other stabilization activities, directly aids re-establishing a stable state.

Societal Roles of Women

The societal roles of women—social, economic, and political—vary from formal to informal in any given area of operations. Cultural awareness and an understanding of the types of roles women and girls traditionally have within a society greatly aids in implementing the lines of effort established within the WPS strategy. For example, it is imperative for planners to know when it is best to expedite inclusion of women during stabilization activities and when a more methodological approach would better serve mission needs. Determining this is not always straight forward, but some general questions to consider when assessing women's roles in a specific society include—

- Are women included or excluded within the political system? Do women have the right to vote? Are women encouraged or discouraged to participate in the political process?
- What local, regional, or national groups exist, particularly women's groups in which engagement could support the mission requirements?
- How can the greater inclusion of women, women's groups, and female political actors provide support for more effective military operations and help attain objectives?
- Are women and girls disproportionately vulnerable within the operational environment? If so, how can US forces, in cooperation with HNSFs, address this challenge?
- Are women key actors—direct or indirect—during an armed conflict, insurgency, a terrorist organization, or a proxy force?
- Are women planning adversarial operations and engaging in combat?
- Are women providing material, situational, informational (intelligence), and emotional support to insurgents, terrorists, or proxy forces?
- Are women encouraging the cessation or continuation of hostilities?

Marines' cognizance of women's roles in a specific society increases situational awareness in an area of operations and helps determine the best means to approach WPS issues during stabilization activities.

INFORMATION WARFIGHTING FUNCTION

The free flow of information and effectively communicating messages are critical to the success of stabilization activities. If the local population does not understand the intent of a stabilization activity, then often the efforts and resources spent are for nothing. When conducting stabilization activities, it is important to deliver a clear and concise unified message to obtain support from the

population. When the population perceives that the messaging and actions of the host nation and supporting US forces are well-intentioned and generating successful outcomes, their cooperation will be more likely. From the perception of the population Marines are considered legitimate when their actions align with their words. Physical actions and messaging must complement each other to positively influence a population's thoughts, perceptions, attitudes, and ultimately, their behavior.

Planning considerations for executing the information warfighting function include the four information function activities: generate, preserve, deny, and project (see MCWP 8-10, *Information in Marine Corps Operations* for an in-depth doctrinal description of the information warfighting function). Effective implementation of the four information function activities helps friendly forces gain an information advantage. Two methods to achieve are public-facing messaging and engagement and influence activities. The Marine Corps broadly categorizes four influence activities to include—

- *Civil-military operations*. Civil-military operations (CMO) are activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation.
- *Military information support operations*. Military information support operations (MISO) are planned operations designed to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives. Information maneuver teams conduct MISO.
- *Military deception*. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that contribute to accomplishing the friendly mission.
- *Operations security*. A capability that identifies and controls critical information and indicators of friendly force actions attendant to military operations and incorporates countermeasures to reduce the risk of an adversary exploiting vulnerabilities.

Commanders at the operational and tactical levels would adapt and align the execution of the information warfighting function within their area of operations with the narratives as established at the national-strategic level. Effective narratives and messaging, however, requires an informed understanding of the population through a cultural analysis, in addition to the best methods for communication, whether social media, the Internet, podcasts, radio, newspapers and journals, or word of mouth. These considerations help ensure that the intended audience receives the message and that the message has the desired effect.

Population Perception, Stability, and the Battle of the Narratives

Population perception is a key factor to achieving stability. One way to achieve this is through the alignment of actions and words or messaging. Messaging is often referred to as the battle of the narratives. It is just as much an engagement as the actions that occur during offensive or defensive operations. When MISO is conducted, it does not occur in isolation, but rather is in constant

competition with adversarial messaging. Marines also need to recognize that even before entering an area of operations, the population or human networks use stories to make sense of the events around them, to include the meaning of the arrival of Marines.

A cultural analysis assesses the best methods of information dissemination, or storytelling. For example, a population use stories or narratives to understand the current situation, to disseminate information, and to assess the legitimacy of Marine stabilization activities in support of the host nation. The stories or narratives shape the population's perception of reality, that is, how the population understands and interprets an event.

Adversarial messaging can influence the stories or narratives, what is or is not told, and what the population believes or does not believe, even before Marines arrive. Adversarial messaging works to counter friendly messaging in attempt to counter the physical successes of Marines. The adversary's goal is to influence the population to ignore or reject friendly messaging or physical successes while simultaneously attempting to convince the population to reject the overarching mission. Marines should be aware that adversarial messaging remains constant and continuously seeks gaps to exploit. Marines should also be aware that adversary efforts to counter friendly messaging could require application of electromagnetic support capabilities, to search for, intercept, and locate adversarial transmissions. Finally, any messaging effort must be prepared for the adversary to use artificial intelligence to create what is referred to as "deepfakes," which produce false images—both photos and videos—false audio, and false articles. These are then distributed electronically via the internet or social media. The impact to stabilization activities can prove immediate and extremely difficult to counter.

Developing an effective narrative requires a cultural analysis and CPB. These are shaped by the requirement to conduct civil reconnaissance, which is a targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events. Civil affairs Marines can conduct a civil reconnaissance of the operational environment. One method is to interact with the local population to gain first-hand information to understand why a specific perception exists. Interaction with the population can also help Marines identify key leaders and influencers and the means by which they disseminate information, whether through word of mouth, social media, podcasts, radio, newspapers, and even graffiti. Marines maintain their understanding of current narratives by monitoring identified information dissemination methods, but the most important is their own interactions with the population. In addition, Marines would also leverage available intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets within the area of operations to monitor messaging produced by state and non-state threat networks.

Successful messaging, or the battle of the narratives, requires each Marine to recognize their own role in gaining an understanding of the operational environment, the population, and message. They should ask how their individual action and the collective action of their platoon, company, battalion, etc., might affect the narrative positively or negatively. This is imperative, as interactions with the population and host-nation officials occur and, whether positive or negative, shape the population's perception of events, that is, reality versus perceived reality. Marines should recognize this as an opportunity to understand what influences that perception. It could include historical grievances, some legitimate or contrived, key leaders, and other influencers, such as those on social media. The outcome enable Marines to develop a compelling message or narrative to influence the population and to counter adversarial messaging.

Marines must also recognize the power of individuals, often referred to as influencers, with the monetary means and messaging capability, whether via the internet, social media, podcasts, radio, etc., and the motives—ideological, political, religious, or motivated by real or perceived historical grievances—to disseminate a compelling narrative that moves a population to react. For example, in fragile, unstable environments, influencers often use a narrative to explain who is to blame for their grievances, the root cause, and how the population could or should address the real or perceived grievance(s).

The success of a narrative is based not only on the substance of its promises and threats, but its acceptance by the relevant audience. Successful narratives typically frame grievances in terms of an ethnic, religious, political, class, or geographic identity, such as emphasizing the way the host-nation government or other authority has marginalized a specific group within the population. In addition, any individual observing US forces with a mobile communications device or cell phone with internet access can post information and images that have the potential to reach millions of people. The impact is often immediate, influencing regional or global perceptions about the purpose and legitimacy of US military operations and the methods used to conduct them. Marines should always prepare to conduct operations in which their every movement, particularly in an urban environment, is filmed.

Effective stabilization activities require understanding the population or social environment and its networks—friendly, neutral, and threat—that influence perceptions and decisions. For example, if the intent of military operations is to influence the perception and behavior of the population—it includes combatants and noncombatants—virtually nothing is more important to the MCPP than understanding what both believe and how they are influenced. Some key questions Marines could ask to shape planning considerations are—

- Who lives in the area of operations? Marines must understand the population or the social environment within the area of operations. For example, the population is never monolithic, particularly within an urban environment, even within the same neighborhood or city block, and each person likely has different needs, requirements, interests, and loyalties.
- What matters to the population? What do the various population networks—friendly, neutral, and threat—value? What are their daily needs and requirements? What are their grievances? What issues have the greatest impact on women and girls? What issues are women and girls most concerned about?
- How do various segments of the population get their information? Does the population obtain their information through social media and specific influencers or through multiple means, to include the internet, television, newspapers, journals, or the radio?
- To whom or to what is their allegiance given? For example, are specific segments of the population loyal to the host-nation government and others loyal to a threat network, which could include criminal entities such as gangs, insurgents, proxy forces, or terrorist groups? Is there a specific reason(s) for loyalty to one organization versus another? For example, does the host nation lack law enforcement capabilities for which a criminal group or insurgent network could fill the gap?

Answers to these questions can help units identify segments of the population vulnerable to adversarial messaging as well as segments that may be supportive of friendly forces. See Figure 3-2 for an example of the tactical relevance of public perception, related planning implications, and controlling the narrative in the operational environment.



Figure 3-2. Perception and Narrative Relevance to Planning.

Integrating Information and Communication

Integrating information and communication is crucial to success during stabilization activities. This requires a narrative with a context that would be believable to the population. The friendly narrative requires a believable reason, motive, and goal or end state that is sustainable throughout the entirety of an operation. The friendly narrative must also withstand adversarial efforts to discredit that narrative. This is particularly important when conducting stabilization activities within an operational environment in which active adversarial threat networks exist, and where a continuing clash between competing narratives is the norm. Losing this battle of the narratives can translate to tactical, operational, or even strategic failure. The commander's communication plan should also support the broader interagency communication effort to include the coordination of support from other agencies and organizations. The plan must be commander-driven, proactive, and integrated with respect to all themes, messages, images, and actions. Proactive integration of the narrative helps to positively influence what the relevant population thinks is legitimate.

SELECTING A STABILIZATION ACTIVITY OR ACTIVITIES

Selecting a stabilization activity or activities requires consideration of the operational environment and the context. General planning considerations could include the—

- Higher commander's objectives. For example, what are the set of actions required to achieve the higher commander's objectives that align with US interests and that set the conditions for transition of operations to the host-nation government?
- Commander's assessment of the situation (i.e., refinements of higher headquarters' analysis), based on the unit's more granular understanding of the situation on the ground.
- Assessed difference between the current conditions and the desired end state.
- Pre-destabilization norms prior to Marines' arrival. For example, what would the various segments of the population perceive as a return to relative normalcy?
- Assessment of host-nation capacity. What would enable independent host-nation operations at an acceptable state of effectiveness without external support, whether from Marines, USG interagency partners, or NGOs?

Stabilization Activities Selection Guidance

An operational planning team identifies stability tasks, sub-tasks, and stabilization activities Marines should conduct to achieve the desired future state. The result of the operational planning team's analyses shapes the commander's decision-making, COA development, and unit task organization. The stabilization activities selection guidance consists of five steps with prompting questions and an example of the potential benefit(s) to each step. This tool helps planners sharpen their understanding of the operational environment and its specific challenges, while forming their recommendations to the commander. Planners then select those stabilization activities that would best serve an integrated effort that includes various stakeholders and perspectives.

The operational planning team can utilize the set of stabilization activities selection guidance displayed in Figure 3-3 to ensure—

- The staff comprehends the mission-relevant core stabilization activities and tasks.
- The associated stabilization sub-tasks and subordinate tasks have been examined to determine which are relevant and required for a specific area of operations.
- The intermediate objectives Marines need to achieve involving stabilization activities have been identified.
- Local norms have been considered to ensure the population understands and accepts the objectives of stabilization activities.

In addition, the questions posed in Figure 3-2 require that the operational planning team leverages information from multiple sources, the first being higher headquarters. The operational planning team must understand the end state for planning purposes. Some of the information sources that shape the desired end state include—

- Input from the host-nation government.
- Assessments of the operational environment and intelligence from HNSFs.
- Input from the G-2 (intelligence staff section).
- Assistance and input from the G-9 (civil affairs staff section).
- Assistance and input from CAGs.
- Coordination with COMMSTRAT.
- Coordination with teams that conduct MISO.
- Coordination with and input from USG interagency partners.
- Coordination with US allies and partners.
- Input from NGOs.
- Conducting an ASCOPE and PMESII analysis and crosswalk.
- Conducting a cultural analysis with input from subject matter experts to include the host-nation government, HNSFs, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs.

The input from these entities, in addition to the analytic effort, shapes the MCPP, COA development, and thereafter, the selection of the most realistic stabilization activity or activities for the operational environment.

Step 1 **Refer to HHQ objectives and the commander's desired end state.**

Ask *Out of the six core stability tasks, which would enable the achievement of HHQ's objectives and the commander's desired end state?*

Benefit Ensures tasks and activities are nested within larger objectives.

Step 2 **Identify relevant core stability tasks.**

Ask *What does this task actually include? How is this task relevant to the mission?*

Benefit Ensures a basic and common understanding among the staff of the task; informs the commander's decision masking.

Step 3 **Understanding the task-related factors and conditions in the operational environment.**

Ask *What are the critical issues in the environment that are associated with this task? How are these issues affecting stability? What related issues, if not addressed, would impede the achievement of the objective or pose risk to the mission?*

Benefit Helps staffs identify key factors that need to be addressed through the execution of the stability task and its associated activities.

Step 4 **Identify the intermediate objectives associated with the key factors from step 3.**

Ask *What changes in the operational environment will enable the achievement of the overall objective? What are the key incremental steps that lead to the desired end state? How would the host nation define progress in this area?*

Benefit Helps staffs envision the nature and sequences of the intermediate steps required to achieve the overall objective; takes local norms and culture into consideration.

Step 5 **Select appropriate sub-tasks and subordinate tasks or activities.**

Ask *Of all the tactical actions and activities associated with conducting this core stability task, which are most likely to:*

- *Enable the achievement of the intermediate objectives?*
- *Generate positive, stability-enhancing effects?*
- *Set conditions for stability and transition?*
- *Support the achievement of the desired future state?*
- *Be well-received by local authorities and the local populace?*

Benefit The commander is provided specificity regarding the key stability actions that support operational objectives and the desire future state.

Figure 3-3. Stabilization Activity Selection Guidance.

An overarching principle for COA selection for stabilization activities is the need to assess what is realistic. This includes logistical constraints, personnel constraints, and host-nation government capabilities and limitations. Doing so enables the operational planning team to manage the expectations of the host nation, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs as to what Marines can and cannot provide. The most important expectation to manage is that of the population. For example, if Marines have a set amount of supplies to distribute in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster, this must be made clear to the population. In addition, Marines should ensure for the equitable distribution of such supplies to prevent the appearance of favoritism to any one segment of the population over another, and subsequent exacerbation of any existing historical grievances. Achieving this requires effective understanding of the operational environment, but also effective messaging, such as when, where, and how Marines will distribute supplies in coordination with the host-nation government.

Stabilization planning must also identify the pre-existing strengths or resiliencies of the population within the operational environment. Pre-existing strengths enable a society to function and to rebound from a crisis. Pre-existing strengths vary but can include the ability to—

- Execute the continuity of government and services during a catastrophic event.
- Provide life-sustaining energy supplies and emergency shelter.
- Effectively manage the uncontrolled movement of people.
- Provide robust food, water, and wastewater resources.
- Manage mass casualties.
- Ensure durable and redundant communications systems.
- Plan and sustain transportation systems.

Population resiliencies combined with host-nation government capabilities, if identified ahead of time, can serve several purposes, to include—

- Supporting or enabling military operations.
- Enabling recovery from military operations.
- Mitigating damage, destruction, and civilian casualties
- Enabling the society to transition to stability, meaning an acceptable level of pre-crisis normalcy to the population.

The operational planning team must also identify external factors affecting the population. For example, are there adversarial nation states that seek to unduly influence a population or its government by funding and supplying threat networks? Adversarial nation states could also attempt to buy, a form of corruption, politicians or seek to influence the population through their own form of MISO. Could the latter include subsidizing influencers via podcasts, radio, or social media, etc.? How the population reacts to such external messaging, or the battle of the narratives could impact the level of support the population would likely provide to its government during a complex catastrophe.

ORDER OF EFFECTS ANALYSIS

Order of effects analysis refers to examining both the intended and the potential unintended consequences of military actions. Planners must understand how a given action could support (or potentially undermine) the achievement of the commander's end state; this requires analyzing the potential first-, second-, and third-order effects of military actions, and stabilization activities—specifically within the operational environment—and its potential impact on the population (e.g., how the population perceives the impact of military actions and how this impacts messaging requirements). The desired effect may have other cascading effects on one or more systems in the operational environment (see Figure 3-4). When the operational planning team considers potential first-, second-, or third-order effects during the MCPP or during an actual event, this helps them develop mitigation measures, or at the very least, provide the commander with additional, and detailed information, to form decisions based on risk management principles and mission priorities.



Figure 3-4. First-, Second-, and Third-Order Effects within the Operational Environment

Potential Effect: Loss of Electricity

The loss of electricity could become a destabilizing event. Marines should ask, what would be the impact if a power generation facility or a key power distribution hub such as a substation incurs damage or outright destruction involving military actions of US forces? The effects may extend beyond a temporary, inconvenient power outage of limited time duration—a first order effect—to a second order effect of a greater duration with increased consequences. A specific example of a second-order effect would include the loss of power to a hospital for hours, forcing it to run on generators. The hospital now must monitor its use of fuel and ensure for its continuous resupply. If the transportation system has also incurred damage, with the destruction of a key transportation node, whether a bridge or major road into a city, the loss of power combined with limited fuel resupply delivery options, could prove catastrophic for the hospital and patient care. Criminal groups, insurgents, or proxy forces could leverage the loss of power within the operational environment to their advantage by promoting an adversarial narrative that underscoring the inability of the host-nation government to restore electricity to functionality. This is an additional second order effect. What the population believes or not specific to messaging or the battle of the narratives is a third order effect. The operational planning team should anticipate the potential for first-, second-, and third-order effects for multiple events.

Potential Effect: Key Leader Engagement

Participating in a key leader engagement can create first-, second-, and third-order effects for everyone involved. Marines should ask, did a unit intentionally or unintentionally legitimize someone (a first order effect) by holding the meeting? Did the unit intentionally, or

unintentionally take a side in an unrelated dispute? Will this meeting increase or decrease support in other areas within the operational environment, a second order effect? Will this meeting entice other leaders to want to meet with Marines (a second order effect) or is there a risk of jeopardizing a key leader who meets with US forces (another second order effect)? It is important for Marines to analyze the likely effects outside their immediate area of operations and for the operational environment as a whole. This example underscores the need to recognize that every action has the potential to affect attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors, such as reactions, a third order-effect of segments of the population.

STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES VS. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Stabilization activities are not the same as development or what is generally referred to as nation building or development projects, such as those usually conducted during a counterinsurgency operation or in the aftermath of an armed conflict. Stabilization activities are, immediate, while development occurs over time. Both require cooperation, input, and participation from the host-nation government. There is little evidence that development projects, whether agrarian, construction, or modernization, have an inherent stabilizing effect. This is not to dismiss the utility of these types of projects during stabilization activities, as they can (ideally) help to increase public support for the host-nation government, HNSFs, and the activities of USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, or any other contributing foreign military forces.

The distinction between development projects and stabilization activities is often straightforward: development projects alone do not address underlying, destabilizing issues that are the root causes of conflict and instability, whereas the purpose and end state of stabilization activities is to address such causes to achieve stability. Stabilization activities focus on reducing the sources of conflict to establish the proper conditions for long term development to take place, while development aims to improve livelihoods over time. In some cases, the specific activities conducted may be similar, but only if the key issues driving instability in an operational environment also happens to be a developmental problem. One objective that remains constant is to develop courses of action that enable legitimate authorities and systems to manage the root causes of conflict and instability effectively and peacefully. The ideal result is to prevent the resurgence of violence or political instability.

Root causes refers to the features of the host-nation that contribute to its vulnerability or diminished resiliency in the face of internal or external stresses. These features often include a mix of cultural, demographic, sociological, economic, geographic, and political factors. Root causes can give rise to the more immediate drivers of instability: the opportunity, motive, and means for violence. Root causes can also produce grievances that, on their own, do not result in instability but can be exploited to mobilize portions of the population to violence or could result in political instability and ineffective governance (see JP 3-07). The operational planning team, when assessing their course of action development during the MCPP for the execution of stabilization activities, should note that root causes require long-term efforts to resolve. For example, an immediate goal within the operational environment could require a focus on security to achieve some semblance of stability. Once it is achieved, the next goal could include setting the conditions for longer term stability, such as economic and political reforms.

Some common examples of root causes could include rampant corruption within a host-nation government, a host nation's inability to provide essential goods and services, or a host nation's inability to adequately manage external pressure from nation states providing financial and military support to insurgents or proxy forces or funding radical political movements. Regardless of what cultural analysis reveals specific to root causes, the focus of stabilization activities versus development is the emphasis on the political nature instability. The cultural analysis requires that Marines understand and account for the current and historical grievances of segments of the population while also knowing who the key influences are within the operational environment. Doing so enables Marines conducting the information warfighting function to effectively identify and develop courses of action to counter adversarial messaging that seeks to undermine all friendly stabilization activities.

Legitimacy

The credibility of the host-nation government and its ability to generate consent is crucial. The population's attitude toward US or multinational forces can be a significant element in this but, ultimately, is of secondary importance. Consent for the presence of US forces conducting stability operations encompasses a spectrum of attitudes and varies from active opposition, through reluctant tolerance, to active support. To be seen as legitimate, the actions of the United States and its partner nations must progressively and inexorably convince much of the population and wider audiences, including adversaries, that the host-nation government will prevail and that an acceptable political settlement will be reached.

Restraint

During stabilization activities, securing and protecting the population is paramount. It is on this foundation of civil security that the political settlement becomes possible. This, coupled with the need to provide force protection (i.e., for the host-nation government and USG agencies and NGOs, if directed), may require conducting combat operations in combination with stability activities. However, using force or excessive force often antagonizes the population, possibly damaging the legitimacy of the host-nation government and the organization that uses force, while enhancing adversary legitimacy. Restraint requires the careful and disciplined balance between protecting the people and infrastructure, conducting military operations, and achieving the overarching objectives of the operation. A single act can cause significant military and political consequences; therefore, when force is used, it must be lawful and measured. Restraint is achieved when all military personnel understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions and when the rules of engagement are sensitive to political concerns but consistent with the right and obligation of self-defense. During conflict and stabilization activities the force adopting a de-escalation approach to operations. Additionally, non-lethal weapons could be used to protect life and limit civilian casualties in the case of riots or flash mobs when the perpetrators are unarmed.

CIVIL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

Civil preparation of the battlespace is used to examine civil considerations in support of problem framing and the overall intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) process. Civil preparation of the battlespace is conducted through the framework of METT-T, with a focus on civil

considerations as they relate to the overall operational environment and mission accomplishment. A CPB analyzes the various aspects of civil information and assesses the civil impact of friendly, adversary, and external actors, as well as the local populace, involving Fleet Marine Force operations. This typically involves the operations of a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), to help achieve its objectives. In addition, a CPB is a critical inject into network engagement operations and activities.

The CPB is a four-step, iterative process designed to support decision makers, staff, and the Fleet Marine Forces by filtering, recording, evaluating, analyzing, and producing civil information and staff products. The CPB obtains and assesses information about civil considerations within the operational environment to inform a cultural analysis and the MCPP, while simultaneously complementing the IPB. The four steps of the CPB of the battlespace are—

Step 1. Define the civil operational environment.

Step 2. Analyze the civil operational environment.

Step 3. Develop a civil environment model.

Step 4. Determine civil actions.

Each step in the process is refined continually to ensure that the CPB products are accurate and relevant for decision making.

Step One: Define The Civil Operational Environment

Defining the civil operational environment focuses on collecting and categorizing or organizing civil information. This is a disciplined approach to gather and organize civil information and categorize and record the results. It is the "What do I see?" approach to looking at information. At a minimum, information is filtered and recorded using standard civil considerations as the baseline. This product forms the basis of all further civil information collection and should result in an ASCOPE matrix.

Civil Considerations. Successfully executing stabilization activities involves assessing and planning for civil considerations through an ASCOPE assessment. It focuses on structures and capabilities and helps Marines determine priority of restoration effort. An assessment of civil considerations should also include an N-CARVER assessment. The operational planning team would conduct the N-CARVER assessment in coordination with fires planners prior to mission execution, and particularly during an armed conflict. An N-CARVER assessment helps the operational planning team determine the potential lethal and nonlethal impacts within the operational environment, such as when the mission requires targeting critical infrastructure or other high-value targets with the intent to damage or destroy (see JP 3-25).

When conducting an N-CARVER assessment, the ideal scenario would include input from multiple subject matter experts with multifunctional expertise. It could include the host nation, HNSFs, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and in some instances, NGOs. Input from multiple perspectives could reveal capabilities unknown to the operational planning team while providing information for the MCPP and course of action decision making, specifically, first-, second-, and third-order effects.

The operational planning team can use the following general questions as a starting point to develop their questions involving an ASCOPE and PMESII analysis and N-CARVER assessment when planning stabilization activities for a specific operational environment.

- *Areas*. Where do people live, work, play? Include political boundaries, religious boundaries, social boundaries, criminal enclaves, agricultural regions, industrial centers, education centers, and/or trade routes.
- *Structures*. Why are structures important to the people? Include government structures, religious structures, medical structures, warehouses, bridges, markets or shopping structures, airports and seaports.
- *Capabilities*. What capabilities are resident in the operational environment? Include sewer, water, electricity, academic, trash, medical, security and/or other capabilities.
- *Organizations*. What are the different groups in the area? Include political factions, international organizations, NGOs, social groups, religious organizations, media groups, and/or criminal groups.
- *People*. How do people organize and interact? Include political leaders, religious leaders, community leaders, business leaders, community professionals, education professionals, law enforcement leaders, and/or military leaders.
- *Events*. When and what events are important to the people? Include holidays, carnivals, religious celebrations, weather events, harvest periods, and/or migratory events.
- *Network affiliation*. What are the network affiliations of the population? For example, is the majority of the population friendly or neutral or do significant segments of the population align themselves to a threat network(s)? What are the best methods to influence network affiliations? For example, how would Marines implement an effective narrative that would influence a segment(s) of the population to change their network affiliation? What would be the best means of delivering that narrative? Would it occur through social media, leaflets, or through active engagements?
- *Criticality*. It is the target's value or importance. The operational planning team must assess how destruction, denial, disruption, and damage of a target would impair an adversary's political, economic, or military operations while simultaneously assessing the impact to the population. What would be the impact on stabilization activities? Is the most appropriate method to engage the target through lethal or nonlethal means?
- *Accessibility*. It is the ease with which a target can be damaged, destroyed, disrupted, or denied, in addition to the ease of collecting information on the target. Specific to stabilization activities, the operational planning team and fires personnel must determine whether they should damage, destroy, disrupt, or deny the target. If the need exists for a lethal effect, what is the first-, second-, and third-order effects within the operational environment involving both the adversary and the population? What would immediate and long-term impact would a lethal effect have on stabilization activities? Should the operational planning team consider the use of a nonlethal effect?
- *Resiliency and Recuperability*. How much time is required to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction or damage inflicted on a target. If a target is destroyed or damaged, what is the immediate or long-term impact on stabilization activities? Will destruction or damage of the target require that Marines lead the effort in replacing or repairing the destroyed or damaged target during stabilization activities? Would USG interagency partners or US allies and

partners or NGOs have the expertise to repair a damaged or destroyed target on the logistical capability to replace it?

- *Vulnerability*. What are the available assets to damage, destroy, disrupt, or deny an adversary the use of target? Specific to stabilization activities, the operational planning team would consider an adversary's ability to damage, destroy, disrupt, or deny friendly forces the use of target. What would be the impact of damage or destruction of the target to the population? What would impact on US forces to execute and sustain stabilization activities.
- *Effect*. What is the positive or negative influence on the population as a result of the action taken, meaning target engagement with lethal or nonlethal means? The operational planning team would need to assess and understand first-, second-, and third-order effects.
- *Recognizability*. Can US forces identify the target under all weather and battlespace conditions? What are the engagement criteria if identification becomes problematic? When is it appropriate to use nonlethal effects?

Operational Variables. In addition to an ASCOPE assessment, the operational planning team would assess the operational variables of the operational environment through a PMESII assessment. The following example of a PMESSII assessment can help an operational planning team develop their assessment of PMESSII considerations.

- *Political*. Describes the distribution of responsibility and power at all levels of government, to include political structure (both formal and informal).
- *Military*. Includes the military capabilities of armed forces, HNSFs, local militia(s), proxy forces, local police, border police, etc.
- *Economic*. Consists of general economic categories of the operational environment (energy, raw materials, labor distribution, income/food distribution, goods and services, and illicit markets).
- *Social*. Describes societies within an operational environment (a population whose members are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory, have a common culture, and share a sense of identity).
- *Information*. Involves the collection, access, use, manipulation, distribution and reliance on data, media, and knowledge systems (both civilian and military) by the local communities.
- *Infrastructure*. This includes the basic facilities, services and installations needed for a community or society to function.

The result of combining the two sets of results is the ASCOPE and PMESII cross walk. The ASCOPE and PMESII cross walk is an organizational tool designed to display and categorize information about the civil aspects of the operational environment (see Table 3-2).

Table 3-2. ASCOPE and PMESII Cross Walk.

	Political	Military	Economic	Social	Information	Infrastructure
Areas	Areas: Political (District Boundary, Party Affiliation areas)	Areas: Military (Coalition and local national bases, historic ambush or IED sites	Areas: Economic (bazaars, shops, markets)	Areas: Social (parks and other meeting areas)	Areas: Information (Radio or television, newspapers, places where people gather for discussions	Areas: Infrastructure (irrigation networks, water tables, medical coverage)
Structures	Structures: Political (town halls, government offices)	Structures: Military or Police (police headquarters, military HHQ locations)	Structures: Economic (banks, markets, storage facilities)	Structures: Social (churches, restaurants, bars)	Structures: Information (cell, radio, and television towers; print shops)	Structures: Infrastructure (roads, bridges, power lines, walls, dams)
Capabilities	Capabilities: Political (dispute resolution, insurgent capabilities	Capabilities: Military (security posture, strengths and weaknesses)	Capabilities: Economic (access to banks, ability to withstand natural disasters)	Capabilities: Social (strength of local and national ties)	Capabilities: Information (literacy rate, availability of media and phone service)	Capabilities: Infrastructure (ability to build or maintain roads, walls, dams)
Organizations	Organizations: Political (political parties and other power brokers, UN)	Organizations: Military (what units of military, police, insurgencies, are present?)	Organizations: Economic (banks, large land holders, big businesses)	Organizations: Social (tribes, clans, families, youth groups, NGOS, IGOs.	Organizations: Information (news groups, influential people who pass word)	Organizations: Infrastructure (government ministries, construction companies)
People	People: Political (governors, councils, elders)	People: Military (leaders from coalition, local national and insurgent forces	People: Economic (bankers, landholders, merchants)	People: Social (religious leaders, influential families)	People: Information (media owners, mullahs, heads of powerful families)	People: Infrastructure (builders, contractors, development councils)
Events	Events: Political (elections, council meetings)	Events: Military (lethal and nonlethal events, loss of leadership, operations, anniversaries)	Events: Economic (drought, harvest, business open and close times)	Events: Social (holidays, weddings, religious observances)	Events: Information (information activities, project openings, civilian casualty events)	Events: Infrastructure (road and bridge construction, well digging, scheduled maintenance)

Step Two: Analyze The Civil Operational Environment

The focus of step two is to analyze the civil operational environment, to include an evaluation of the information collected during step one. Step two assesses many variables, but the operational planning team must always include an assessment of the civil operational culture, instability/ stability dynamics, and input from a stakeholder analysis, described below.

Operational Culture. The CPB accounts for and anticipates civil impacts on MAGTF operations. An assessment of potential civil impacts requires an understanding of the operational culture. It consists of five planning considerations: the physical environment, the economy of a culture, social structures, political structures, and the beliefs and symbols of the population overall and its various segments.

The operational planning team should recognize that the focus of step one, define the civil operational environment, is on data collection and that no singular approach to applying a cultural lens exists. Step two, analyze the civil operational environment, however, requires careful consideration of operational culture, how that impacts the data, and what impact the operational culture will have on the commander's intent and guidance, as well as the nature of the MAGTF's operations.

One objective of the operational planning team during step two, in coordination with civil affairs Marines and CMO planners, is to apply a cultural perspective to the data collected from step one. For example, how would the population perceive stabilization activities through the framework of a cultural interpretation? Would the population perceive MAGTF operations as supporting a corrupt regime, and as such illegitimate? How would the operational planning team identify that the population perceives the host-nation government as corrupt? How would the population perceive the behavior and actions of US forces within the framework of a cultural interpretation?

A cultural interpretation is the process for deriving understanding and meaning of events, the observation of those events, and other information gathered by the population. What might be intuitive to members of a population—whether involving meaning with a specific phrase, gesture, or cultural reference—may prove difficult for the operational planning team to discern. The goal, however, of ensuring for an accurate cultural interpretation is to minimize mirroring, which is perceiving information solely from the perspective of the operational planning team, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs. Even with input from the aforementioned entities, a successful course of action wargamed during the MCPP may prove fruitless during execution if that course of action did not include an accurate cultural interpretation.

The operational planning team requires relevant cross-cultural competence to support the analysis within step two, or the end product could be no better than the raw data. Avoiding this outcome requires competent cultural expertise to assess the data and provide appropriate context. Cultural self-awareness, perspective taking and sense making are therefore, essential for step two. Cross-cultural competence is also essential to the process of reading and interpreting the raw data while mitigating cultural and analytical biases and engaging appropriate sense making skills and sociocultural analytic methods in such a way that they are relevant to understanding the operational environment. In this sense, cross-cultural expertise applied to the ASCOPE and PMESII matrix cross walk creates a product where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

The ideal result is that the operational planning team gains a balanced understanding of the operational culture, which will provide accurate information toward course of action development and wargaming while providing the commander with informed options.

Instability And Stability Dynamics. The operational planning team, in coordination with civil affairs Marines and CMO planners, should seek to understand instability and stability dynamics. Marines must understand the sources of conflict, historical grievances, and root causes (instability) and the resiliencies (stability) of the local population. Input from the ASCOPE, PMESII, and the cultural analysis shapes the understanding of instability and stability dynamics of the operational environment. In addition, the operational planning team needs specific input regarding the key influencers and events within the civil operational environment that could impact instability and stability dynamics (see MCTP 3-03A).

Social Network Analysis And Stakeholder Analysis. Social network analysis (SNA) helps a commander and staff understand the relevance of nodes and links within a network (see MCTP 3-02A). In essence, SNA examines social structures in light of the nodes and links of groups and individuals and their relationships and interactions within those groups. The operational planning team can use SNA as a means to conduct a stakeholder analysis within the civil operational environment.

Social network analysis can help the operational planning team identify new stakeholders, which itself could reflect a change in the tactical situation and the civil operational environment. For example, stakeholders may change from friendly, to neutral, to threat networks. Changes in stakeholder perspectives could reflect their reaction to the activities of US forces. The result could be either positive or negative. Unintended effects or consequences are often a result of a misinformed cultural interpretation or an inaccurate assessment of the civil operational environment. The SNA, as with the CPB, IPB, and cultural analysis, is a collaborative process. It requires input from the S-1, the host nation, HNSFs, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs. Marines can assess input from these entities in advance, during the MCPP through the Green Cell. It provides for the independent wills and needs of various groups and networks that might affect MAGTF operations. The outcome will aid Marines in conducting SNA, to include wargaming how identified stakeholders may change from friendly, to neutral, to threat. The results of the Green Cell analysis during the MCPP will also support the S-3 (see MCWP 5-10).

When considering the stability of a population and conducting a stakeholder analysis, closely assessing the appeal of individual leaders or the attraction of a particular group is critical, and often more informative than simply studying underlying cause of conflict, such as tribal or ethnic tension, or competition for resources. The SNA can help the operational planning team gain an appreciation of the present and potential spheres of influence held by key groups and individuals.

While SNA can reveal linkages, civil affairs Marines and CMO planners should also consider the three characteristics of power, legitimacy, and urgency as they relate to the stakeholders. The greater the overlap of these three characteristics, the greater the significance of a specific individual or key group(s). For example, a local population may perceive a leader as legitimate, but if that leader has neither a power base nor a motive for change, that leader is not likely to be

very active or influential. Social networks are dynamic; they do not remain stagnant, and they change over time. Given this reality, the operational planning team must continuously assess the civil operational environment and update the corresponding SNA.

Step Three: Develop A Civil Environment Model

A civil environment model depicts a system of key influences. The purpose is to model civilian life and activities to serve as a baseline for MAGTF planning. Step three of CPB provides an evaluation and interpretation of information about key influences to discern catalysts of behavior and the context that shapes behavior. A civil environment model is conceptually similar to the technique used in producing a modified combined obstacle overlay and may require multiple civil overlays that typically depict key terrain and infrastructure. Input for the civil environment model can include churches, mosques, synagogues, market centers, hospitals, government centers—to include political boundaries—ports, airfields, movement corridors, population centers, clan-family boundaries, dislocated civilian camps, and significant artifacts and monuments. Additional input can include threat networks' areas of criminal or malign activities.

The civil environment model provides input to the commander's understanding of key influences within the operational environment by identifying culturally significant details about a society, the population overall (in addition to specific segments), maps of activities and events, and depictions of networks and their respective links and relationships. For example, modeling the civil environment might include the graphic representation of social and cultural information for a given area presented spatially on a map and temporarily, or a snapshot in time. In addition, the operational planning team could include a narrative, in which they include a brief description of social norms, previous analysis, and all relevant civil factors such as relationships and activities of the population, an SNA, and a brief description of network engagement products.

Figure 3-5 provides an example of a civil environment model and the deployment of a special purpose Marine air-ground task force in support of a foreign humanitarian assistance mission. The example includes a brief assessment of the civil environment and key influences contributing to stability, a brief list of customs and norms identified during the MCPP, and areas affected by flooding and volcano eruption in the center. Under the "Social Norms" assessment, it is emphasized that the indigenous people assembled and cooked over open fires and locals consume significant amounts of alcohol. It also highlights education level, beach migration, and red meat and alcohol consumption by urban area in the affected region. Carrying this model through the planning process helps staff elements, such as the Green Cell, predict civil reactions to friendly actions and Red Cell reactions during a COA war game.

Step Four: Determine Civil Actions

The focus of this step is to use the information and analysis from previous steps to determine potential civil actions with respect to MAGTF operations within the area of operation. By civil actions, we mean modeling the independent will of the population and key influences relating to friendly and malign or threat actions within the area of operations. Civil-affairs groups develop an initial assessment of possible civil actions in a particular area within the MAGTF battlespace. This assessment could be an overall assessment for an operation, or an assessment based on a particular point in time for a plan.

The assessment may be described in two ways–the most likely or the most disruptive civil actions (see Figure 3-6). This assessment is further refined by the Green Cell and used during a COA war game. Like the Red Cell modeling adversary reactions, the Green Cell is used throughout the



Figure 3-5. Example Civil Environment Model.

entire planning process, but with a focus on testing, improving, and modifying friendly COAs to enhance the desired friendly effects on the civil environment, and to mitigate potential negative effects. The civil reactions paint a more complete picture of the operating environment focused on indigenous people and their leadership, but also on any international organizations and NGOs or other stakeholders in the area of operations. To that end, step 4 results in a graphic and narrative depicting most likely and most disruptive civil actions as depicted in Figure 3-6.

Phase 2, Stage A

Civil Most Likely. Follow historical patterns -Pakloban populace seeks families or clan members on higher ground. Populace will move to ad hoc encampments seeking aid and security. A LOW percentage of Paklobanese will remain in flood zone to protect property. Main MSRs will be congested, causing difficulty in the movement of relief supplies. Less security due to disrupted security apparatus. Local criminal elements will exploit with an increase in looting and theft. Local populace subject to Biddilonian Freedom Fighters increased broadcasts discrediting local officials and labeling MAGTF as an occupying force.

Civil Most Disruptive. Local populace not supportive of HN evacuation efforts. Relief efforts delayed by blocked MSRs and looting of supply warehouses and relief stations in Pakloban District surrounds. Biddilonian Freedom Fighters infiltrate civilian encampments. Civilians "buy into" pirate Biddilonian Freedom Fighters radio station broadcasting "Colonial Power takeover." Kidnapping and murder of Clan leadership increases. Militias set up road blocks throughout Pakloban, blocking evacuation / relief efforts by HN.



Figure 3-6. Example Graphic Narrative of Most Likely and Most Disruptive Civil Actions.

ASSESSMENT

An assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. Marines typically use an assessment during stabilization activities to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. Assessment provides understanding that is vital to planning and executing stabilization activities. As much as possible, planners should study the culture, governance, history, formal and informal roles of women and girls, and the nature of the operational environment to shape the assessment and address the symptoms and possible sources of instability. An assessment should be collaborative and include the host-nation government, HNSFs, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs. In some cases, assessments take the form of initial staff or intelligence estimates. These serve as the basis for planning. Planners develop them into an operation assessment that determines the effectiveness of the plan, its execution, and whether objectives are being met. Marines, however, may change plans as required by the evolving situation (see Marine Corps reference publication [MCRP] 5-10.1, *Operation Assessment*).

Operation Assessment

An operation assessment consists of six steps Marines should use when developing plans and assessment requirements for the execution of stabilization activities:

Step 1. Develop an assessment approach. This is a planning consideration that describes desired end states, objectives, and tasks. For example, how will Marines coordinate security coordination missions with HNSF and participating allies and partners and what is the set of criteria that determines the effectiveness of such missions within the area of operations?

Step 2. Develop an assessment plan. This would include developing the feedback mechanisms to enable planners to make appropriate adjustments that reflect the reality of the area of operations based on input received from Marines conducting stabilization activities.

Step 3. Collect information and intelligence. Marine civil affairs teams provide input through their reconnaissance efforts involving the population, such as their immediate needs, values, and existing grievances. Additional input would include that from ASCOPE and PMESSII assessments, to include information on host-nation government and HNSF capabilities, such as whether or not corruption is a significant challenge. Marines would also want input regarding NGO capabilities and their organizational agendas and priorities, such as whether they will coordinate their activities with Marines. Planners also need information regarding the capabilities of participating military forces of US allies and partners and if they have military policing capabilities. Finally, planners need intelligence involving threat networks within the area of operations and information on key leaders and influencers, the means by which they disseminate information (e.g., podcasts, radio, social media) and their potential impact on the population.

Step 4. Analyze and synthesize the feedback. Planners monitor the nature, scope, and severity of a situation with input from Marines (e.g., those conducting security coordination missions), planner engagement with host-nation government personnel, HNSFs leadership, NGOs, and participating US allies and partners.

Step 5. Communicate the assessment and recommendations. Planners track implementation of the plan in combination with collaborating agencies to determine the effectiveness of stabilization activities within the area of operations.

Step 6. Adapt plans. Planners would evaluate progress toward achieving goals or objectives throughout the execution of stabilization activities, to answer the question, "So what?" That is, are the activities of Marines in support of the host-nation government impactful? Planners then inform the commander or higher headquarters to receive further guidance and feedback.

Planners use existing frameworks, such as the stability assessment framework and the interagency conflict assessment framework, to assess the status, evaluate the progress, and measure the effectiveness of stabilization activities.

Stability Assessment Framework

The stability assessment framework (SAF) is a holistic, analytical, planning, and programming tool designed to support the civil affairs methodology and nonlethal effects approaches during MAGTF operations. The SAF helps Marine and civilian practitioners identify sources of instability and stability and design programs or activities that address these sources and measure their effect in fostering stability. In addition, the SAF, both supports planning for CMO and nonlethal targeting approaches during MAGTF operations.

The SAF reflects lessons learned and best practices by focusing on understanding and integrating multiple perspectives into planning and assessment. The SAF four basic components—CPB, analysis, design and monitoring, and monitoring and evaluation—nested within the civil affairs methodology and the MCPP. These components complement and enhance existing planning and execution processes used during CAO. To the maximum extent possible, all relevant actors and organizations in the operational environment should be encouraged to participate in the SAF process to create comprehensive efforts while conducting stabilization activities.

Marines, in addition to supporting US allies and partners, USG agencies, and donor organizations, may find it difficult to step outside our own assumptions and experiences. The SAF is a data collection and analysis process designed to help us see the local perspective. Activities are based on knowledge—not assumptions. When used correctly, the SAF—

- Helps provide a common, prioritized view of the sources of instability in the area of operations.
- Fosters more effective programming.
- Provides a measure of the impact (i.e., effect) and not just the output (i.e., performance) for each activity.
- Improves the effectiveness of stabilization activities by providing data for trend analysis.
- Empowers the tactical units that are the focal point for successful stabilization.
- Provides a simple and useful decision-making tool for commanders.
- Provides operations in the information environment themes that resonate with the local population (see appendix A for more information.)

The SAF is used to determine stability dynamics—processes, relationships, or institutions that enable a society to function. With this assessment, Marines can plan programs and activities that address sources of instability, reinforce sources of stability (resilience), and measure their

effectiveness in fostering stability (see JP 3-07). Analysis of instability and stability dynamics, however, remains a continuous, cyclical process. The SAF provides a method to analyze both, as well as a means to assess mitigation and enhancement activities before executing stabilization activities.

When applying the SAF, Marines will need to understand any existing or historical grievances. Awareness of these will help Marines avoid any perception of favoritism of one group over another during CMO planning, such as when distributing relief supplies. Potential indicators that CMO are exacerbating existing grievances within a population could include a decrease in support for the host-nation government and an increase in support for criminal groups, gangs, insurgents, and proxy forces, or other activities that disrupt the normal functioning of a society. The converse is also true. Indicators that CMO are having a positive impact could include an increase in support for a host-nation government and a decrease in support for criminal groups, gangs, insurgents, or proxy forces.

Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

The purpose of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is to develop, across relevant USG departments and agencies, a commonly held understanding of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a country that shapes US policy and planning decisions. It may also include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated. It is a process and a tool available for use by any USG agency to supplement interagency planning.

To assess conflict, the ICAF draws on existing methodologies in use by various USG departments and agencies, as well as international organizations and NGOs. The ICAF is not intended to duplicate existing independent analytical processes, such as those conducted within the intelligence community. Rather, it builds on those and other analytical efforts to provide a common framework through which USG departments and agencies can leverage and share the knowledge from their own assessments to establish a common interagency perspective.

The ICAF is distinct from early warning and other forecasting tools that identify countries at risk of instability or collapse and describe conditions that lead to outbreaks of instability or violent conflict. Early warning and forecasting products aid ICAF analysis and help an interagency team understand why such conditions might exist and how to best engage those conditions to transform them. The ICAF draws on social science expertise to lay out a process by which an interagency team can identify societal and situational dynamics that are shown to increase or decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. In addition, an ICAF analysis provides a shared, strategic snapshot of the conflict against which future progress can be measured.

An ICAF analysis should be part of the first step in any interagency planning process to establish USG goals, design or reshape activities, implement, revise programs, and allocate or reallocate resources. The interagency planning process within which an ICAF analysis is conducted determines who initiates and participates in an ICAF analysis, the time and place for conducting the analysis, type of product needed and how the product will be used, and the level of classification required (see MCTP 3-03C, *MAGTF Interorganizational Coordination*).

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Security sector reform is the set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. The six guiding principles for SSR, which the operational planning team would incorporate into the MCPP include—

- Support host nation ownership.
- Incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights.
- Balance operational support with institutional reform.
- Link security and justice.
- Foster transparency.
- Do no harm.

In addition to the six guiding principles, the operational planning team would utilize the Interagency Security Sector Assessment Framework developed by the USAID to execute SSR. The framework provides 10-step process that Marines can use for planning and conducting SSR assessments (see the Department of State, Department of Defense, and the United State Agency for International Development, Security Sector Reform). Promulgated by USAID but recognized as guidance for the USG, the SSR provides a common foundation for the DoS, USG interagency partners, USAID, and US forces, to assess a country's security and justice context and make strategic program recommendations. The assessments focus on institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law while informing the strategic planning process and underlining program design. Below is the SSR 10-step framework for analysis and areas of inquiry:

Step 1. Define objectives: Clarify the purpose and scope of the assessment.

Step 2. Stakeholder mapping: Identify relevant stakeholders and their roles.

Step 3. Context analysis: Understand the political, social, and security context.

Step 4. Institutional mapping: Assess security institutions and their functions.

Step 5. Legal and policy review: Analyze existing laws and policies.

Step 6. Capacity assessment: Evaluate institutional capacities.

Step 7. Threat assessment: Identify security threats and challenges.

Step 8. Gender and social inclusion: Consider gender and social dimensions.

Step 9. Risk assessment: Evaluate risks associated with SSR efforts.

Step 10. Recommendations: Propose actionable recommendations.

The effective implementation of the SSR 10-step framework requires a coordinated effort between USG interagency partners and Marines. Six guidelines help effectively implement the program:

- *Assess*. Assess progress in coordination with USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, NGOs, the host nation, and HNSFs.
- *Plan*. Obtain input from USG interagency partners and others during the MCPP as inadequate planning can undermine the long-term success of SSR efforts.
- *Train*. Coordinate training of the host-nation and HNSFs with USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs.
- *Implement*. Synchronize programs to ensure for unity of effort.
- *Monitor*. Assess and monitor results throughout the execution of the SSR 10-step process.
- *Evaluate*. Establish key decision points in coordination with USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, the host nation, and HNSFs. If expected outcomes and effects do not occur, reassess planning assumptions and capabilities of all contributing partners.

Supplementary assessment tools that focus on specific sub-sector institutions and topics, such as law enforcement, criminal justice, defense, armed violence reduction, and gender, can be helpful in understanding particular subjects in greater detail. The purpose in doing so is to contribute to the broader assessment of the operational environment. A broader assessment enables the operational planning team in addition to Marines tasked with conducting assessments, such as civil affairs Marines, to examine the linkage among various components of the security sector and to identify entry points for integrated programs.

MEASURING PROGRESS IN CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS—A METRICS FRAMEWORK

The Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) is a framework for assessing conflict transformation and stabilization. The framework consists of a hierarchical metrics system of outcome-based goals, indicators, and measures. Once collected, the measures can be aggregated to provide indications of trends toward the achievement of stabilization goals over time. These metrics assist in formulating policy and implementing operational and strategic plans to transform conflict and bring stability to war-torn societies.

The MPICE framework provides a baseline operational and strategic-level assessment tool for policymakers to diagnose potential obstacles to stability prior to an intervention and an instrument for practitioners to track progress from the point of intervention through stability, development, and ultimately to a self-sustaining peace (see MCRP 5-10.1 and the United States Institute of Peace, *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE): A Metrics Framework*). The MPICE metrics framework identifies the conflict environment as falling into one of three objective states on the trajectory toward sustainable peace which includes—

- *State 0—Imposed Stability*. The operational environment remains violent, requiring the presence of external military forces, whether US forces, US allies and partners, or other foreign militaries, to perform vital functions, primarily security activities, that impose order, reduce violence, deliver essential services, moderate political conflict, and institute an acceptable political framework pursuant to a peace accord.

- *State I—Assisted Stability*. External military forces have reduced the drivers of violent conflict to a level that enables HNSFs to take the lead in managing security challenges, thereby allowing external military forces to begin the process of reduction in forces.
- *State II—Self-Sustaining Peace*. Local institutions of the host nation, to include political, judicial, police, and military can effectively manage residual drivers of violent conflict and resolve internal disputes peacefully without the need for external military forces or a civilian administrative presence, such as USG interagency partners.

CHAPTER 4.
MARITIME STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

UNDERSTANDING MARITIME STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

The maritime domain includes the oceans, seas, seabed, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, rivers, littorals, and the airspace above and the water below (JP 3-32, *Joint Maritime Operations*). The maritime environment includes the environment corresponding to the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, coastal areas, including the littorals and their sub-surface features, and interfaces and interactions with the atmosphere (JP 3-59). The significant distinction between maritime domain and maritime environment is the inclusion of the word "littoral" in the definition of maritime domain. The littoral is a zone along a coastline, consisting of the seaward approaches from the open ocean to the shore; this is an area that must be controlled to support operations ashore as well as the landward approaches to the shore that can be supported and defend directly from the sea.

Operating from the sea, the naval Services extends its influence into the landward portion of the littorals in close coordination with ground or amphibious forces. The close coordination ensures for the safe flow of commerce and security cooperation with HNSFs within the maritime domain and maritime environment. Understanding maritime stabilization activities requires understanding such distinctions in terminology given the direct impact on legal requirements, responsibilities of US forces in addition to USG interagency partners.

Maritime security operations include operations to protect maritime sovereignty and natural resources and to counter illegal activity in the maritime domain. When conducting maritime security operations, the naval Services strengthen host-nation governance by denying the maritime domain to international terrorist organizations and their activities, preventing narcoterrorism, and preventing human smuggling. Naval Services provide overarching protection to the maritime population and maritime resources and strengthen host-nation governance in ways that promote economic and political progress. In addition, naval Services may also support other stability-related functions, such as providing humanitarian relief and emergency reconstruction of key infrastructure during an FDR or FHA mission. Naval Services also provide a forward presence to deter adversarial amphibious operations which, if conducted, could result in regional destabilization and significant interruption to economic commerce via the sea line of communications. Naval Services conduct maritime security operations in brown, green, and blue waters.

Brown Water

Brown water refers to navigable rivers, lakes, bays, and their estuaries and includes the littoral zone from the bays, inlets, rivers, and harbors landward from the navigational approach buoys. Often the term brown water navy refers to military or police forces that patrol harbors and rivers.

Green Water

Green water refers to coastal waters, ports, and harbors and includes the coastal area from the harbor approaches and coastlines seaward to the maximum effective range of coastal patrol craft of limited military and constabulary capability. Green water navies are regional powers who can extend their fleet a limited range.

Blue Water

Open ocean is the ocean limit defined as greater than 12 nautical miles from shore and the high seas is the open ocean that is more than 200 nautical miles from shore. Blue water refers to the open oceans and high seas, or waters beyond the coastal area unconstrained by land mass. Blue water navies are those that can travel the world while displaying overwhelming force.

National And International Waters

The world's oceans are divided into two parts, with each containing various maritime regimes or zones under international law. The first is national waters: internal waters, territorial seas, and archipelagic waters. These national waters are subject to the territorial sovereignty of coastal nations, with certain navigational rights reserved to the international community. The second is international waters, which include contiguous zones, waters of the economic exclusion zone, and the high seas. In international waters, all nations enjoy the high seas' freedoms of navigation, overflight, and the right to conduct military operations in these waters. Integrating these concepts in all planning phases of maritime stabilization activities is critical to mission success. A comprehensive description of these zones and their effects on operations in the maritime domain are contained in the tri-Service publication MCTP 11-10B, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*.

The US Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security and is an armed force and a law enforcement organization. The Coast Guard is mandated by law to effectively execute eleven distinct and diverse maritime missions and has the unique statutory authority to concurrently operate as a military Service under US Code, Title 10, and as a maritime law enforcement agency under US Code, Title 14, *Coast Guard*. United States Code, Title 14, explicitly authorizes the Coast Guard to enforce US Federal laws at sea. In addition, the Navy is statutorily authorized to engage in detection and monitoring in support of counternarcotics operations in certain areas of operation. The ability to actively engage in or support, law enforcement allows the maritime services to conduct an additional and important aspect of stabilization activities.

Maritime Stabilization Activities: A Legal Understanding

Another important distinction is that maritime operations in the maritime domain are subject to domestic law and policy, as well as international law. Domestic law includes the legal statutes of the coastal state that apply within its maritime jurisdiction. International law includes both customary international law and international law stemming from various treaties and conventions to which a nation is signatory, such as the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. Often participating nations enter into bilateral agreements cooperating in suppressing activities such as, illicit narcotics trafficking and unsafe transport and smuggling of migrants.

The underlying concept of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea is based on freedom of the seas, with a nation's control of the oceans limited to narrow bands adjacent to its coasts. This is the basis for the US policy of respecting and enforcing rights of freedom of navigation and high seas' freedoms for all states. This core element of national policy establishes the standards by which US forces operate in the maritime domain with respect to sovereign rights of coastal states and freedom of navigation of all states. It is a critical element of operational planning in the maritime environment, shaping operational norms and providing input regarding rules of engagement for concept of operations planning and execution.

The international instrument regulating the use of the seas and maritime rights of the world's nations is the 1982 LOSC. Although it is not a party to LOSC, the United States recognizes that LOSC's navigational provisions reflect customary international law (United States Presidential Proclamation of 10 March 1983). Navigational regimes under LOSC, reflective of customary international law, determine the degree of control that a coastal nation may exercise over the conduct of merchant ships, warships, and aircraft operating within these areas. Understanding these navigational regimes is critical to all phases of operational planning and execution. Planners must likewise integrate the principles regarding sovereignty, navigation, and overflight into any associated rules of engagement and other direction on the use of force to achieve mission objectives.

United States Code

An important distinction of maritime operations is the broad authorities provided to US forces that allow not only for a maritime military presence but provide for maritime law enforcement or the support of maritime law enforcement. The six uniformed Services covered by the term US Armed Forces are defined in US Code, Title 10, and include the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, Space Force, and Coast Guard. While the traditional Navy and Marine Corps functions (e.g., deterrence, sea control, power projection, forward presence) are generally understood, those of the Coast Guard are not. United States Code, Titles 10 and 14, states that the US Coast Guard is "…a military service and a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States at all times." The Coast Guard is, always, a federal maritime law enforcement agency but can, at any time, provide forces or perform its military functions in support of naval components or geographic combatant commanders or may operate as a specialized service in the Department of the Navy. "Upon the declaration of war if Congress so directs in the declaration or when the President directs, the Coast Guard shall operate as a service in the Navy."

Pursuant to US Code, Title 14, the Coast Guard has broad powers to "…make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches, seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of the laws of the United States." In other words, the Coast Guard is specifically authorized to enforce US federal laws in US and international waters. Under certain specific circumstances, the Navy can be authorized to assist or support the Coast Guard in executing their law enforcement authorities.

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE MARITIME ENVIRONMENT

A stable maritime environment contributes to global safety and security. An unstable maritime environment has the opposite effect, with immediate regional and global impacts, primarily involving the supply chain and the sea line of communications. Sources of instability in the maritime environment range from aggressive actions by nation states or various other, less powerful but often deadly non-state actors, to include pirates, proxy forces, terrorist organizations, and transnational criminal groups. An additional source of instability in the maritime environment is illegal seaborne migration, which can overwhelm the ability of local, regional, and national authorities to manage. The result is often an increase of criminal activity within the maritime environment, such as the urban littorals. Non-state actors can leverage what is often the result, a chaotic, maritime environment with significant levels of criminal activity and lawlessness, to further undermine a host nation's political, judicial, and economic institutions.

Complex catastrophes, whether man-made or a natural incident, such as hurricanes or tsunamis within the maritime environment can result in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, destruction, and disruption. The impacts to the population, particularly within the urban littorals (which generally have a significant population density), the environment, and economy are immediate and long-term. Events of such magnitude often stretch a host nation's ability to respond. During such complex catastrophes, a host nation either responds efficiently and needs minimal support, responds inefficiently, and needs significant support, or is incapable of responding, requiring international interventions. An overarching objective is to reduce human suffering by the host nation with support from US forces. However, if corruption is endemic within host-nation intuitions, complex catastrophes not only expose this but can exacerbate existing societal grievances, resulting in chaos within the area of operations, and, in the most extreme examples, societal collapse.

Traditional State Challenges

Traditional state challenges, or peer competitors, are challenging US naval primacy and projecting their power farther from their shores to compete for resources and influence. Global and regional powers exhibiting aggressive nationalism to test the resolve of the United States and its allies and partners. Failed or failing states provide safe havens for criminal and terrorist organizations that use these countries as bases of operations to export illicit activities globally through the maritime domain. A real danger is that a hostile state could provide critical advanced conventional weaponry, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) components, delivery systems and related materials, dual-use technologies, and weapons expertise to a rogue state or a terrorist organization willing to conduct WMD attacks. Weapons of mass destruction issues are of the greatest concern because the maritime domain is the most likely venue to accommodate their transport to the United States and its allies and partners.

Terrorist Challenges

Terrorism is "the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instill fear and coerce individuals, governments, or societies in pursuit of terrorist goals" (*DoD Dictionary*). Some terrorist challenges that Marines

could encounter during stabilization activities include nation-state-sponsored terrorist groups, individual terrorist actors, often referred to as "lone wolves" motivated by personal, political, or religious grievances, and narcoterrorism (which is terrorism that is linked to illicit drug trafficking).

Terrorist groups and individuals exploit open borders, challenge national sovereignty, and increasingly threaten international affairs. Advanced communications can enable anonymous coordination among dispersed terrorist cells, increase the effectiveness and reach of their message, and allow networking with or recruitment of other like-minded organizations around the globe. Specific to the maritime environment, terrorists use shipping to convey and position their agents, obtain logistical support, and generate revenue. In addition, terrorist groups take advantage of criminal smuggling networks to circumvent border security measures via the maritime domain. Some have capabilities to board and commandeer large underway vessels, as demonstrated in numerous piracy incidents, which are also employed to facilitate terrorist acts. Successful attacks in or through the maritime domain can disrupt regional and global economies.

Terrorists can employ a range of maritime attack capabilities from various platforms, to include:

- Explosives-laden suicide boats, light aircraft, and submersibles.
- Merchant and cruise ships used to ram vessels, warships, port facilities, or offshore drilling rigs to include natural gas and oil platforms.
- Commercial vessels used as launch platforms for missile attacks.
- Underwater swimmers to infiltrate ports.
- Unmanned, underwater, explosive-delivery vehicles.
- Mines, which are low cost, readily available, easily deployed, difficult to counter, and require minimal training.
- Using a vessel's legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, and liquefied natural gas, as the explosive component of an attack.

Combating terrorism involves the actions, including antiterrorism and counterterrorism, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the competition. Antiterrorism includes defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include rapid containment by local military and civilian forces and counterterrorism includes the activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.

Combating terrorism includes maritime counterterrorism activities. Marines, however, do not conduct these independently, but coordinate such activities with the host nation's political and judiciary bodies, HNSFs, USG interagency partners, US forces, and US allies and partners. The objective is to leverage the capabilities and subject matter expertise of all entities whenever appropriate. For example, combating maritime counterterrorism may include visit, board, search, and seizures which are maritime boarding actions and tactics designed to capture enemy vessels; combat terrorism, piracy, and smuggling; and conduct customs, safety, and other inspections as employed by modern navies, marine, and maritime services, and military and police forces. When executing maritime boarding actions, Marines would seek to leverage the capabilities and subject

matter expertise of the Coast Guard and Navy in addition to HNSFs, to include local law enforcement, who would know the topography of the littorals, criminal and terrorist capabilities, and smuggling routes.

Transnational Organized Crime and Piracy Challenges

The use of the maritime domain for legitimate international commerce has increased exponentially since the 1970s with the introduction of container ships and container ports. Their introduction has standardized port operations, reducing the time to load and unload ships, with a corresponding reduction in costs and an increase in profit margins. The increased use of the maritime domain for international trade, however, has resulted in a parallel increase in the use of the maritime domain—its harbors and ports—for criminal activity, specifically transnational organized crime. It can include smuggling people, illegal narcotics, weapons, and other contraband.

The increase in transnational organized crime contributes to instability in the urban littorals. This instability often expands elsewhere within a country. For example, maritime drug trafficking generates vast amounts of money for international criminal syndicates, insurgents, and international terrorist organizations; laundered through the international financial system, this money provides a substantial source of virtually untraceable funds. International criminal syndicates, insurgents, and international terrorist organizations can then use laundered monetary assets to bribe government officials, bypass established financial controls, and fund arms trafficking, migrant smuggling, and insurgent and international terrorist activities. These activities can ensure a steady supply of weapons and cash for international terrorist organizations as well as the means for their clandestine movement. Counterthreat finance (CTF) activities can be conducted during stabilization efforts to thwart threat networks illicit generation, movement and storage of illicit funds (see JP 3-25.)

In addition to an increase in transnational organized crime, a corresponding increase in piracy challenges within maritime domain and the sea line of communications has also occurred and is a cause of instability. Pirates conduct acts of armed robbery, either commandeering or stealing the contents of container ships and tanker ships or holding passengers and crews hostage. Pirates profit by selling the cargo carried by the vessels or ransoming passengers and crews. Lost revenue due to paid ransoms, damaged cargo, and increased insurance premiums can adversely affect maritime shipping companies and the national economies they support. The financial impact on regional or state economies and the fear associated with piracy also contribute to instability within the maritime domain.

When coordinating with HNSFs, USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, and NGOs, the operational planning team should request input specific to any criminal intelligence or intelligence or insight into international terrorist activities within the maritime domain. For example, transnational organized crime and piracy challenges tend to be concentrated in areas of heavy commercial maritime activity, particularly in regions with significant political or economic instability and little or no maritime host-nation law enforcement capacity.

Natural Disasters

Earthquakes, mudslides, hurricanes, and tsunamis are natural disasters that often occur in the increasingly crowded littoral regions of the world. Depending on the severity of the disaster, a regional or international response may be required. Naval forces are frequently provided to assist

countries struggling to recover from a natural disaster because of their forward deployed posture and organic capabilities (e.g., vertical and surface lift, medical capabilities, access to food and water supplies; command and control), and their ability to remain offshore in international waters.

Environmental Destruction

Intentional acts or acts of nature that result in environmental disasters can have far-reaching, negative effects on the economic viability, and political stability of a region. In recent years, competition for declining marine resources has resulted in several violent confrontations in the maritime environment, as entities ranging from nation states to criminal organizations, resort to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing practices. These actions continue to cause conflict and regional instability. For example, massive pollution of the oceans results in significant damage to ecosystems and undermines the national and economic security of the nations that depend on them. A common result is the increased competition for increasingly scarce resources, which simultaneously increases the risk of confrontation over those resources.

Illegal Seaborne Migration

The unsafe transfer and smuggling of undocumented migrants is a long-standing issue that remains a major challenge to regional stability and will probably grow in scope and severity, particularly if the number of failed or failing states increases. Transnational migration, spurred by a decline of social well-being or internal political unrest, has become common over the past decades. It will likely continue to drive the movement of many people, with the potential to upset regional stability because of the strain that migrants and refugees place on fragile economies and political systems. In some countries, the collapse of political and social order prompts maritime mass migrations, such as the recent and ongoing migrations from Cuba and Haiti to the United States or from North Africa to Europe. When mass migrations occur over water, the response to the humanitarian and enforcement challenges requires a significant commitment of maritime security resources.

Immigration as a Political Tool: Migration Coercion

Immigration can be used as a political tool, often referred to as migration coercion. It is a means to achieve political, military, or economic concessions, between two nation-states. In short, migration coercion is either compulsory or permissive, involving either economic refuges or the forced migration of a specific ethnic group(s) from one country or region to another. This occurred during the Bosnian War (1992-1995), with the expulsion of various ethnic groups to other European countries (see MCTP 12-10B, Urban Operations*, for a brief description of US forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Objectives involving migration coercion could include demands for financial aid, political support, rescinding a foreign policy decision(s) (e.g., reinstating foreign aid or military assistance, ending support for insurgents), obtaining additional aid for displaced persons, or simply to wreak havoc by opening previously sealed borders. An ongoing example includes the Russian Federation and the Republic of Finland. The former continues to redirect migrants from evolving countries to the northern (arctic) international border between the two countries. Russia's goal is twofold: to overwhelm Finland's northern border and immigration system with un-vetted, undocumented, migrants, and as a means to express displeasure with Finland's decision to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).*

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing does not respect rules adopted at either the national or international level. It threatens economic growth, food security, and ocean ecosystems around the world by undermining sustainable fisheries and the law-abiding fishers and communities that depend on them. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing can range from small-scale vessels misreporting their catch or straying into a neighboring country's waters, to coordinated efforts by transnational crime syndicates, or even the coordinated actions by nation states, such as the People's Republic of China. It possesses a massive, distant water fishing fleet which operates around the world, and often in exclusive economic zones of foreign countries, conducting illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, often undetected. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing can undermine port and maritime security, as criminal elements may use similar trade routes, landing sites, and vessels as those used for trafficking arms, migrants, drugs, and other contraband.

Over one-third of fish and fish products enter international trade, generating billions in trade revenue. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, however, avoids the operational costs associated with sustainable fisheries management to access the lucrative global fisheries market. In addition, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing puts legitimate producers at a disadvantage in this global market, and results in global losses in the tens of billions of dollars each year while also jeopardizing the food security of a nation. Keys to tackling illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing include eliminating the economic incentives that drive it, ensuring that governments effectively monitor and control their fishing vessels, and building capacity in developing countries for fisheries management, enforcement, and good governance.

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL SERVICE

The United States Naval Service provides a multipurpose, expeditionary team whose capabilities are applicable across the competition continuum. While most frequently employed to prevent conflict and prevail during an armed conflict, United States Naval Service has the staffing, training, and equipment to provide the CCMD these capabilities during stabilization activities:

- *Forward presence*. Given the dynamic nature of stability challenges, forward presence provides opportunity to response to disasters (i.e., FDR and FHA missions) and deter aggression from state and nonstate actors (e.g., those operating in the littorals of a host nation friendly to the United States). Forward presence also permits more effective response by United States Naval Service by, simply, being within a specific operational environment, negating the need to sail from the United States, in addition to creating conditions (i.e., deterrence through sheer presence that prevent external interference) that provide the time and set the conditions to allow a host-nation government to improve its capabilities (e.g., enabling the host-nation government to focus on training and internal threat networks).
- *Persistent presence*. The United States Naval Service provides persistent presence while operating forward, respecting the sovereignty of other nation states. Naval forces conduct military engagements, secure cooperation, and prevent and deter conflict. They communicate US intent; conduct crisis response and limited contingency operations; and, when necessary, facilitate the introduction of additional naval, joint, or multinational forces, as well as USG interagency or multinational organizations, or NGOs. The ability of the Naval Service to operate in the maritime domain allows it to operate offshore, providing critical support while decision makers determine the full scope of US Navy involvement and that of other Services.

- *Self-sustaining, sea-based expeditionary forces*. These have the capability to prevent and prevail from the sea with minimum reliance on ports or airfields in an objective area. For the Naval Service, expeditionary is not limited to being an armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. Being expeditionary is one of the defining characteristics of the Naval Service—ready to respond when leaving the pier, persistently forward postured, and self-sustaining.
- *Maintain maritime domain expertise*. Since the naval forces are skilled at operating in this maneuver space, they are fully cognizant of the complexities of the sea, air, and land interfaces.
- *Flexible force options*. The Naval Service provides flexible, scalable force options with respect to capability, capacity, and legal authorities. Naval force posture is a cost-effective means for influencing events in the littorals while remaining ready to respond to a crisis. When required, other naval forces, surged from globally dispersed locations, can rapidly reinforce those with a specific CCMD. The inherent mobility, organizational agility, and self-sustainability of a maritime force provides the geographical combatant commander with a variety of options, including the ability to command and control JTFs from afloat and ashore across the competition continuum.
- *Expanded deterrence*. The Naval Service can expend deterrence by presenting a credible threat to an adversary, a threat that remains maneuverable and forward deployed, with scalable power projection capabilities (e.g., ballistic-missile defense, nuclear strike, prevention activities).
- *Multinational operations*. The Naval Service conducts multinational operations (e.g., those involving US allies and partners, USG interagency personnel, and HNSFs) to facilitate the execution of stabilization activities (e.g., FDR and FHA missions) and build interoperability capabilities during exercises.

MARITIME STABILIZATION ACTIVITIES

Maritime, stability-related activities are distinctly maritime in orientation and may require US Navy, Coast Guard, or Marine Corps participation.

Maritime Interception

Maritime interception activities employ measures to intercept the movement of designated illegal items, such as drugs, illegal immigrants, or WMD, into or out of a nation or specified area to hold the actors responsible for their illegal behavior pursuant to the objectives of the nation or international body that establishes the sanctions. Maritime interception activities include enhanced maritime interdictions, which are designed to stop a threat deemed a clear and present danger. Enhanced maritime interdictions can be executed to support countering WMDs (including associated dual-use technologies and materials) and to stop the exchange of WMD expertise and delivery systems between states of concern and state/nonstate actors.

Visit, Board, Search, And Seizure

Visit, board, search, and seizure is the term for maritime boarding actions and tactics designed to capture enemy vessels; combat terrorism, piracy, and smuggling; and conduct customs, safety, and other inspections as employed by modern navies, marine and maritime services, and military and police forces. It has evolved over time to include three distinct actions—the right to visit; the ability to stop, board, and search; and the ability to seize the vessel and crew if there is jurisdiction and the authority exists.

Port Security

Port security includes safeguarding vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from internal threats such as destruction, loss, injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, thefts, or other causes of similar nature. Port security generally involves two major subtasks, which require simultaneous execution to accomplish successfully:

- Defend critical loading and unloading sites, piers, and container facilities and petroleum, oils, and lubricants on load/off-load points in a seaport of debarkation, both from seaward and landward threats.
- Escort high-value shipping in and out of the port and the handoff to and from the maritime component commander at sea.

Counter Illicit Trafficking—Drugs, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Humans

The DoD serves as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. The DoD also supports federal law enforcement agencies, including the Coast Guard and foreign law enforcement departments and agencies, in their efforts to disrupt the illicit trafficking of drugs, WMD, and humans transited outside the United States. Military forces assist in detecting and monitoring trafficking; support interdiction efforts of the Coast Guard and other federal and foreign law enforcement departments and agencies; provide intelligence and logistic support; and integrate command and control, communications systems, and intelligence assets dedicated to interdicting the movement of traffickers. Through its organic law enforcement authority, the Coast Guard uses a multifaceted layered approach to conduct maritime interdiction operations. This includes—

- Deploying littoral and deep-water assets.
- Supporting joint and combined operations with partner nations.
- Deploying law enforcement detachments on US Navy and allied assets.
- Supporting detection and monitoring operations.
- Supporting the tactical control and coordination of interdiction operations.

Arms Control

Arms control includes activities performed by military forces to verify conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical arms control agreements. Those actions may include seizing or destroying weapons, dismantling or disposing weapons and hazardous materials, and escorting weapons delivery. Arms control also encompasses any plan, arrangement, or process controlling the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of any weapon system. Furthermore, these activities help reduce threats to regional security and implement arms agreements.

Economic Exclusion Zone Enforcement

These activities employ coercive measures to prohibit specified events in a specific geographic area. An exclusion zone is established by a sanctioning body to persuade either a nation or a group to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body. Failure to modify behavior can result in initiation or continuation of sanctions by the sanctioning body or the use of or threat of use of force.

Offshore Resource Protection

Most host-nation offshore resources, such as oil-related infrastructures, seabed mining, and fishing grounds, are vital to its economic and political stability. When threatened by state or nonstate actors, securing these resources requires patrol and interdiction capabilities as well as law enforcement authorities. The Naval Service can employ embarked Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard personnel to secure critical offshore resources and temporarily enforce a country's exclusive economic zone as provided for within existing host-nation and international laws. If an adversary's force has gained control of an offshore resource, such as a gas-oil platform, expeditionary naval forces can conduct or support specialized interdiction operations to regain control as directed.

Mine Countermeasures

Undersea mines, both improvised explosive devices or manufactured by foreign militaries, can be used to harass, disrupt, or prevent maritime stabilization activities or disrupt commercial maritime commerce. Since mines can be implanted quickly, a bottom survey should be conducted of all essential routes to sustain sea-based stabilization activities.

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Unexploded ordnance is a lethal hazard to personnel. The importance of securing and destroying unexploded ordnance cannot be overemphasized. Failure to secure unexploded ordnance may result in its widespread use as an agent of instability.

Maritime Counterterrorism

Counterterrorism is activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks, to render them incapable of using violence, and to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals. This applies to countering all irregular threats occurring in the maritime domain—both host-nation territorial waters and international waters—that affect the stabilization efforts of optimal end states.

Natural Gas-oil Platform

Natural gas-oil platform actions attempt to prevent adversaries from interrupting the normal functions of these facilities. Naval forces can provide point security for these facilities. For example, if an adversary gains control of a natural gas-oil platform, a specialized interdiction operation involving the takedown of the platform may be required.

Antipiracy Activities

Antipiracy activities are actions taken to thwart an illegal act of violence, depredation (e.g., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against persons or

property on board. For US-flagged vessels, appropriate preventive actions should be taken in accordance with *Maritime Security Directive 104-6.*

Counterpiracy

Counterpiracy activities are actions taken in response to an illegal act of violence, depredation (e.g., plundering, robbing, or pillaging), or detention in or over international waters by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft against another ship or aircraft or against persons or property on-board. Counterpiracy activities include US or coalition naval escorts for vessels transiting areas prone to acts of piracy; surface and aerial patrols and educating private and commercial shipping about best practices to avoid falling victim to piracy.

Aid To Distressed Mariners

Under customary international law, masters of vessels have an obligation to render assistance to other mariners in distress. Furthermore, US law requires a master to render assistance, but only if it can be done without posing danger to the master's own vessel or passengers. The goal of this task is to strengthen the coastal states' ability to render aid to distressed persons and to protect and save property and life at sea. This goal is accomplished by promoting the governmental processes, competencies, capabilities, and professionalism of a national search and rescue service in cooperation and coordination with other search and rescue organizations; bilateral and regional cooperation; and adherence to international laws, standards, and practices.

Show Of Force

Show of force is an operation planned to demonstrate United States resolve. It involves increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. Naval forces are uniquely suited for show-of-force operations because of their forward-deployed posture, self-sustainable capability, and ability to maintain presence offshore indefinitely.

Vessel Escort

Naval forces protect US flagged vessels and US citizens and their property embarked on US or foreign vessels as well as nearby critical infrastructure from external attack or other unlawful violence in waters where the US has jurisdiction. Such protection can take many forms but is most often accomplished by—

- Employing armed surface vessels or a combination of armed surface vessels and armed aircraft to enforce a moving security zone or naval vessel protection zone.
- Accompanying a transiting vessel.
- Using armed, embarked security forces.

Expeditionary Diving And Salvage

Harbor and port infrastructure is critical to stabilization activities, particularly when needed in response to a crisis. An underwater assessment of approaches to the port and piers can reveal damage that must be repaired before the port can function properly. Mobile dive and salvage units conduct underwater surveys and perform light clearance operations. Underwater construction teams can perform more extensive repairs. Specialized diving and salvage support vessels may be required to support underwater repairs.

APPENDIX A.
STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

The SAF is an analytical, planning, and programming tool designed to support the civil affairs methodology and nonlethal targeting approaches used during Marine Corps operations. The SAF helps Marines and civilian practitioners identify sources of instability and stability and design programs or activities that address sources of instability and stability and measure their effect in fostering stability.

According to MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, "The military profession is a thinking profession. Since war is a fluid phenomenon, its conduct requires flexibility of thought." This framework does not take the place of the MCPP. It simply adds a tool and encourages warfighters to include population-focused information into their planning and execution processes. It is also a good way to gather atmospherics because it uses structured questions. In this way the SAF supports and complements the commander's decision-making cycle.

The SAF focuses on "understanding" and integrating multiple stability perspectives into planning and assessment to—

- Understand the local population and environment.
- Realize how to influence the local environment.
- Implement activities to foster stability.
- Measure the effectiveness of activities in fostering stability.

STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK COMPONENTS AND VARIABLES

The SAF methodology has four basic components, complementing both the civil affairs methodology and the MCPP.

- *Civil preparation of the battlespace*. The goal of the CPB component in the SAF is to gather information to understand the causes of conflict and instability in the local environment through the perspective of the local population.
- *Analysis*. The goal of the analysis component is to understand how to mitigate the local conditions that are fostering instability by identifying the root causes of instability.
- *Design*. The goal of the design component is to create activities that foster stability in the local environment.
- *Execution*. The goal of the execution component is to implement and measure the effectiveness of activities in fostering stability over time and space.

The SAF has distinct steps or variables within each of the four components (See Figure A-1).



Figure A-1. Stability Assessment Framework Components and Variables.

The operational planning team can use these components and variables of the stability assessment framework to shape their understanding of the operational environment as they contribute to the MCPP, COA selection, MOEs, and MOPs.

Component One: Civil Preparation of the Battlespace

In SAF methodology, the CPB is the first component of the process. During the VPB, the SAF examines the following three variables to achieve a heightened understanding of the battlespace:

Variable One—Understanding the Operational Environment. Understanding the operational environment entails collecting and analyzing civil considerations through an ASCOPE assessment and operational variables through a PMESII assessment. Both are relevant to understanding the local population. For example, unlike a typical ASCOPE and PMESII product, the SAF does not simply generate a list of facts about the operating environment but would analyzes relevant factors further as it relates to local population perceptions and the MAGTF mission.

Variable Two—Understanding the Cultural Environment. Understanding the cultural environment requires an accurate cultural analysis of ASCOPE and PMESII assessments. It should include input from USG interagency partners, US allies and partners, NGOs, and the host-nation government and its HNSFs. An effective understanding of the cultural environment stems from an understanding population dynamics. This includes friendly, neutral, and threat networks. In addition, in some operational environments, understanding the cultural environment requires understanding various clans, tribes, religions, languages, and customs and how their actions can foster stability or instability, such as historical grievances, territorial disputes, etc.

Variable Three—Understanding Instability and Stability Dynamics. The stability assessment framework is a tool used to identify local perceptions. A key to situational awareness, understanding the grievances and resiliencies of the local population, who and what the key influencers are, their motivations toward enhancing stability or fomenting instability, what means they have at their disposal, and what kinds of events might foster instability and stability. Using the lens of the local population's perceptions and gathering data completes the variable of understanding the instability and stability dynamic.

Local Perceptions. By working with the local population, it is possible to foster stability in unstable regions. The first requirement is to understand what the population views as the causes of instability. This information enables us to identify and prioritize the causes of instability and design activities to mitigate them. The activities carried should make a difference to the population. Only when the host nation addresses the local population's perceptions can stability occur.

Data Gathering. In the 21st century, data is gathered on all aspects of life at unprecedented levels. The mere act of carrying mobile devices, such as laptops, tablets, and smartphones, enables the collection and dissemination of massive amounts of data. Stability-focused data can be gathered through surveys, polling data, social media, etc. A consistent source of data and the core of the SAF process is to ask the local population to identify local problems. A questionnaire of four carefully crafted questions serves to gather initial data and monitor the impact of activities in fostering instability.

The SAF Questionnaire is designed for use at the tactical level to facilitate discussions with locals to identify local causes of instability. Each answer creates a data point that the staff can use to statistically measure local perceptions of the causes of instability. The four questions are:

- Has the number of people in the village changed in the past year?
- What is the most important problem facing the village?
- Who do you believe can solve your problems?
- What should be done first to help the village?

Remember to always ask "Why," as it provides the context. After interviewing local people, the data is entered into a spreadsheet. Data entry is facilitated with drop-down menus.

Component Two: Analysis

The primary purpose of analysis is to narrow relevant factors to a lessor number of issues that are indeed actual sources of instability or to identify stability factors. The spreadsheet used to log data has embedded macros that create pie charts. This allows responses to the SAF Questionnaire to be laid over a map to visually identify the differences among neighborhoods. For example, responses to the question "What is the most important problem facing the village?" may reveal different answers in different neighborhoods. Potable water may be the largest issue in one area, while security is the most important problem in a different area. The following paragraphs relate to the columns of the (in)stability matrix that is used in the SAF process.

Causes of Instability. The first step of analysis is determining the causes of instability. Consider symptoms verses causes. The mistake can be made of targeting the "obvious" symptoms instead of targeting the underlying causes. For stabilization to be successful, the root cause(s) of symptoms must be addressed. Sometimes, it may be necessary to target symptoms to stabilize a situation or to collect information that identifies the underlying cause(s) of instability.

Objective. The objective is a statement of conditions that will diminish or eliminate the identified problem.

Measures of Effectiveness. Measures of effectiveness measure the effectiveness of an activity against a determined objective. They are crucial for determining the success or failure of stability programming. Changes can be very subtle and might take time—possibly an entire rotation or longer to observe.

Data Sources. The methods for monitoring the measures of effectiveness are planned in the analysis phase.

Component Three: Design

In the next step of the SAF, Marines design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities. Activities designed to foster stability must meet the criteria of the Stability Fundamentals—they must simultaneously increase support for the host-nation government, decrease support for malign actors, and increase societal and institutional capacity. If they meet the first set of criteria, they should also meet a range of criteria referred to as design principles that—

- Fit into the local political and cultural context.
- Include the local government and population in the design process.
- Allow the local government and population to implement it.
- Increase existing governmental or civil society capacity.
- Are flexible.
- Support other governmental agencies, international organizations, and NGO programs.
- Strengthen government accountability and transparency.
- Allow for a quick response to unforeseen crises (e.g., violence, natural disasters).

In the design component of the SAF, designers also plan for MOPs and their related data sources to monitor and demonstrate progress. The stability matrix is a tool that helps with the analysis and design steps. The stability matrix helps ensure that each problem is thought through before Marines jump straight to implementing specific activities. The columns of the stability matrix and their purpose are:

- *Source of instability*. A very brief (often just a couple words) description, consolidation of the grievances problem, or issue area, as identified by the population.
- *Causes (perception)*. A more specific statement or statements of the problem. The answer should come from asking the follow-up question "Why?" when using the SAF Questionnaire. Use quotes from the population.
- *Causes (systemic)*. The systemic causes of these grievances (i.e., the root problems or issues that may lie behind the population's statements). This step helps ensure we are addressing the real problems with our activities, not just symptoms.
- *Objective*. A statement of the conditions that will diminish or eliminate the identified problem. Often this is simply the reverse of the grievance and its associated conditions.
- *Measures of effectiveness*. Impact indicators measure the effectiveness of the activities against the objective.
- *Measures of effectiveness data sources*. Sources for the data that track the impact indicators.
- *Activities*. The actions taken to achieve the identified objective. The previous steps are necessary to accurately understand the issue being addressed. This left-to-right process helps avoid the natural tendency to jump straight to solutions, without adequately thinking through the problems and the goal for addressing them. Activities should be linked primarily to systemic causes, though in some cases it may also be necessary to address symptoms (i.e., perceived causes), if only to help the population see near-term improvements in the situation.
- *Measures of performance*. Output indicators determine whether an activity has been implemented. Although impact indicators are far more important, due diligence requires output indicators, so the implementation of activities and progress towards their completion is tracked.
- *Measures of performance data sources*. Sources of data to obtain the information identified in the output indicators.

Component Four: Execution

The fourth component of the SAF deals with executing the stabilization activities developed. This includes finalizing the stability matrix and submitting it into MAGTF operations as a nonlethal targeting package, monitoring and evaluating the activity's execution, and transitioning the activity. There are three levels of evaluation: MOPs, MOEs and overall stability. The first asks, "Have your activities been completed?" This is the measure of performance from the stability matrix. For example, if the objective is to increase police effectiveness, activities might include—

- Training the local police and HNSFs.
- Conducting joint patrols with local police, HNSFs, and in some instances, foreign militaries.
- Investigating police corruption (i.e., assisting in the execution of the rule of law).

Measures of performance determine whether these activities have been completed.

The second level of evaluation asks, "Has your stability program objective(s) been achieved?" This is an MOE on the stability matrix. As in the above example, the objective is, "increase police effectiveness." Another example of an MOE might be more information provided to the police by the population. Measuring overall stability, rather than the effect of individual activities, considers the effect of all the activities conducted over a longer period, as well as the influence of external factors.

The third level of evaluation is the big picture question. "Is overall stability increasing?" Ask the same questions as in the design phase.

- Is there more support for the government?
- Is there less support for malign actors?
- Is institutional and societal capability and capacity increasing?

Transition

The final step of the SAF process is to transition operations and to redeploy MAGTF assets to other contingencies or back to the United States for retrofit and reassignment. As alluded to earlier, initial transition criteria are established when activities are submitted for implementation; however, more definitive transition criteria is established as operations progress and is based on progress and overall MAGTF transition criteria.

GLOSSARY

Section I. Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASCOPE	areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events
BPC	building partnership capacity
CAG	civil affairs group
CAO	civil affairs operations
CCMD	combatant command
CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
COA	course of action
COIN	counterinsurgency
COMMSTRAT	communication strategy operations
CPB	civil preparation of the battlespace
DDR	disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDD	Department of Defense Directive
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DOS	Department of State
FDR	foreign disaster response
FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
FID	foreign internal defense
FMF	Fleet Marine Forces
FSF	foreign security forces
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence/intelligence staff section
G-9	assistant chief of staff, civil affairs/civil affairs staff section
HNSF	host-nation security forces
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
IDP	internally displaced person
IPB	information preparation of the battlespace

JAG	judge advocate general
JFC	joint force commander
JP	joint publication
LOSC	Law of the Sea Convention
MAGTF	Marine air-ground task force
MCPP	Marine Corps Planning Process
MCRP	Marine Corps reference publication
MCTP	Marine Corps tactical publication
MCWP	Marine Corps warfighting publication
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
N-CARVER	network affiliation, criticality, accessibility resiliency, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability
NGO	nongovernmental organization
PMESII	political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure
PRC	population and resource control
S-1	personnel officer/office
SAF	stability assessment framework
SNA	social network analysis
SSR	security sector reform
US	United States
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WPS	women, peace, and security
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

SECTION II. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

assessment
A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations. (DoD Dictionary, part 1 of a 4-part definition)

civil affairs
Designated Active and Reserve Component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs operations and to support civil-military operations. Also called **CA**. See also civil-military operations. (DoD Dictionary)

civil-military operations
Activities of a commander performed by designated military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and indigenous populations and institutions by directly supporting the achievement of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or host nation. Also called **CMO**. See also civil affairs operations. (DoD Dictionary)

civil-military operations center
An organization, normally comprised of civil affairs, established to plan and facilitate coordination of activities of the Armed Forces of the United States within indigenous populations and institutions, the private sector, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, multinational forces, and other governmental agencies in support of the joint force commander. Also called **CMOC**. See also civil-military operations. (DoD Dictionary)

civil reconnaissance
A targeted, planned, and coordinated observation and evaluation of specific civil aspects of the environment such as areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, or events. Also called **CR**. (DoD Dictionary)

complex catastrophe
Any natural or man-made incident, including cyberspace attack, power grid failure, and terrorism, which results in cascading failures of multiple, interdependent, critical, life-sustaining infrastructure sectors and caused extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, environment, economy, public health, national morale, response efforts, and/or government functions.

effect
The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. (DoD Dictionary, part 2 of a 3-part definition.)

foreign assistance
Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment and support for foreign internal defense to donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters that may be provided through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and security assistance. See also foreign humanitarian assistance, security assistance. (DoD Dictionary)

foreign disaster relief
Assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims that normally includes services and commodities, as well as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and transportation of food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, bedding, and temporary shelter, the furnishing of medical equipment and medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services.

foreign humanitarian assistance
Department of Defense activities conducted outside the United States and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. Also called **FHA**. See also foreign assistance. (DoD Dictionary)

foreign internal defense
Participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host-nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. Also called **FID**. (DoD Dictionary)

foreign nation support
Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation when operating outside its national boundaries during military operations based on agreements mutually concluded between nations or on behalf of intergovernmental organizations. (DoD Dictionary)

gender analysis
An examination of the relationships and interactions between men and women, their access to and control of resources, the constraints they face relative to each other, and related sociocultural power structures. (DoD Dictionary)

host nation
A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (DoD Dictionary)

interagency
Of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (DoD Dictionary)

interorganizational
Elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of the USMC Dictionary.)

irregular activities
Activities conducted with, though, or against non-state actors across the competition continuum. (Proposed for inclusion in the next edition of the USMC Dictionary.)

network engagement
Interactions with friendly, neutral, and threat networks, conducted continuously and simultaneously at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. (DoD Dictionary)

nongovernmental organization
A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called **NGO**. (DoD Dictionary)

operational environment
A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Also called **OE**. (DoD Dictionary)

personnel recovery
The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for an execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Also called **PR**. (DoD Dictionary)

security assistance
Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended; the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended; or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives, and those that are funded and authorized through the Department of State to be administered by Department of Defense/Defense Security

Cooperation Agency are considered part of security cooperation. Also called **SA**. See also security cooperation. (DoD Dictionary)

security cooperation
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. Also called **SC**. See also security assistance. (DoD Dictionary)

security force assistance
The Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capability and capacity of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. Also called **SFA**. (DoD Dictionary)

security sector reform
A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Also called **SSR**. (DoD Dictionary)

subversion
Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. (DoD Dictionary)

stabilization activities
Various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (DoD Dictionary)

transitional military authority
Temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. (DoD Dictionary)

unified action
The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (DoD Dictionary)

unified command
A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See also combatant command, subordinate unified command. (DoD Dictionary)

unity of effort
Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action. (DoD Dictionary)

REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Department of Defense Publications

Department of Defense Directives

3000.05	Stabilization
3000.07	Irregular Warfare
5100.46	Foreign Disaster Relief
5132.03	DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation

Department of Defense Instructions

3000.17	Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response

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Joint Publications (JPs)

1	Vol 1. Joint Warfighting
2-0	Joint Intelligence (Incorporating Change 1)
3-0	Joint Campaigns and Operations
3-05	Joint Doctrine for Special Operations
3-07	Joint Stabilization Activities
3-08	Interorganizational Cooperation
3-16	Multinational Operations (Incorporating Change 1)
3-20	Security Cooperation (Incorporating Change 1)
3-22	Foreign Internal Defense
3-24	Counterinsurgency
3-25	Joint Countering Threat Networks (Publication is CUI)
3-29	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
3-32	Joint Maritime Operations
3-57	Civil-Military Operations
3-59	Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations
4-0	Joint Logistics
5-0	Joint Planning

Navy Publications

Naval Doctrinal Publication

1	Naval Warfare
4	Naval Logistics

Naval Warfighting Publication

1.14M	The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations
4-04	Naval Engineering

Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1	Warfighting
1-0	Marine Corps Operations
1-4	Competing
3	Expeditionary Operations

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3-01	Offensive and Defensive Tactics
3-34	Engineering Operations
3-40	Marine Corps Logistics
5-10	Marine Corps Planning Process
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3-02A	Network Engagement: Targeting and Engaging Networks
3-03A	Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil Military Operations
3-03C	MAGTF Interorganizational Coordination
11-10B	The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

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Marine Corps Order

5710.6D	Marine Corps Security Cooperation

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Maritime Security Sector Reform Guide, US Agency for International Development Pamphlet

United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security

Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (Public Law 115-68-Oct. 6, 2017)