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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.
FOREWORD

The battlefield has become increasingly complex and crowded. Interaction between military forces and the civilian populace influences operational plans and must be carefully considered. Integration of civil-military operations (CMO) can help the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) win by shaping the battlespace, enhancing freedom of action, isolating the enemy, meeting moral obligations to civilians, and providing access to additional capabilities. CMO can reduce friction that may disrupt MAGTF operations and create conditions for conflict resolution and the successful transition back to peaceful civilian administration. Ultimately, CMO are tools the commander can use to prevent conflict, support civil authorities, win battles, and secure peace.

MCWP 3-33.1, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations, provides an overview of CMO doctrine and tasks. This publication is intended for any Marine involved in the planning and execution of CMO.


Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

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CHAPTER 1
CIVIL DIMENSION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

Fundamentals

Military operations are more than the simple application of forces, arms, and equipment. Each operation has a civil dimension. The civil dimension requires that commanders consider how their actions affect, and are affected by, noncombatants.

Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02)

CMO apply at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Marines deploy across the globe to support regional engagement strategies. Marines further national goals through the forward presence of expeditionary units. Marines are involved in multinational training activities and exercises that contribute to international cooperation and stability. Marines respond to complex emergencies, such as natural disasters that overwhelm civil authorities. Marines also contribute to peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions and they are prepared to use force and/or the threat of force to deter conflict. If efforts to preserve peace fail, focused military capability is carefully employed to accomplish national objectives swiftly and with as little loss of life as possible. Once hostilities conclude, military forces contribute to stabilization, recovery, and the peaceful transition of control back to civil authorities.

MAGTFs will operate in close contact with civilians and governments. MAGTFs will need to carefully develop, nurture, and maintain positive relations between themselves and the people, governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in their area of operations (AO). Effective CMO help military commanders meet their international obligations to civilians and enhance the effective use of combat power.

Civil Affairs, Civil Affairs Activities, and Civil-Military Operations

Civil affairs (CA) is designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. (JP 1-02) CA is a term that only describes designated personnel and distinct units. CA is not a mission nor an objective, but is the name of a particular force that helps the MAGTF commander plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO. CA units bring expertise that is not normally available to the MAGTF. CA elements are organized and equipped specifically to support CMO and to conduct CA activities. CA activities embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities, and apply particular skills that are normally the responsibility of civil government. CA activities include public administration, public health, economic development, and utilities.

CMO build and use relationships with civilians and other groups to facilitate operational tasks across the full range of military operations. Any
MAGTF element may participate in the planning and execution of CMO. Whether a Marine is an operational planner dealing with a member of a foreign government, a member of a team working with an international relief organization or a rifleman at a checkpoint talking with a local farmer, that Marine is conducting CMO. CMO occur throughout the planning and execution of military operations and are not merely an adjunct specialty that occurs before or after hostilities.

**Challenge of Modern Operations**

**Act in the National Interest**

Whether demonstrating national commitment through forward presence, exercising with allies and strategic partners, engaging in armed combat or providing relief to victims of a natural catastrophe, all MAGTF operations are designed to support national objectives and policies.

**Serve in Expeditionary Environments**

MAGTFs may operate far from home. The requirements of a major theater war, a smaller-scale contingency, military operations other than war (MOOTW) or an important theater engagement mission may demand that the MAGTFs operate in varied locations that may not be accustomed or adapted to US military presence. Wherever MAGTFs deploy, they will interact with civilians and civilian organizations.

**New Team Members**

MAGTFs will have many partners and many of them will not wear uniforms. MAGTFs will work with other Services and Active, Reserve, and National Guard members. MAGTFs will work increasingly with representatives of various US Government (USG), international organizations (IOs), and NGOs who bring capabilities and expertise not usually found in the MAGTF. Many of these organizations may not have worked together before and will not be subordinate to a military commander. They will understand problems from their perspective and seek to resolve them in a manner they think fit, often without any obligation to accept military direction. Extraordinary effort will be required to establish a unified effort.

**Watched by the World**

The efforts of the MAGTF will be observed, commented upon, and selectively portrayed to the world and perceived differently by many viewers, some of whom will not necessarily be unbiased. The perceptions created by MAGTF operations may result in changes to political realities that may, in turn, affect the mission. CMO have a powerful information operations component. Not only do MAGTF actions matter, but so do the perceptions they create.

**Tactical Actions May Have Strategic Implications**

Small, apparently local actions may have strategic consequences. An event at a single checkpoint may change the relationship between the MAGTF and local residents, allied partners, and NGOs, and may affect public opinion. All Marines must be aware of their strategic responsibilities.

**Fight Alongside Allies**

MAGTF operations will likely involve the forces of other nations in a multinational, joint or combined effort. US allies will have different capabilities, equipment, procedures, and values, complicating attempts to achieve unity of effort. Operations must carefully consider the implications of actions taken by all members of the force.

**Account for the Presence of Civilians**

Civilians are a part of the battlefield. Their presence, infrastructure, resources, and moral and physical support may have military significance. The adversary may deliberately target civilians and may use civilians as shields or as a base of support. The MAGTF must always consider the presence of civilians and its moral and legal obligations to them.
Operate in Uncertainty

All military operations occur in an inherently uncertain and chaotic environment that is shaped by continuous human interaction. Civilian populations, organizations, and leaders will cause much of this uncertainty. The commander must shape events within this context of unpredictability. CMO help the commander assess the situation and focus the MAGTF effort and the efforts of other organizations. Although the MAGTF may not directly control the efforts of others, interaction, coordination, and cooperation with agencies external to the MAGTF may be critical to mission success.

Expeditionary Nature of MAGTF Civil-Military Operations

Task-Organizing

The Marine Corps operates as MAGTFs, integrated, combined-arms forces that include air, ground, and combat service support units under a single commander. MAGTFs are task-organized to accomplish a specific mission. Task organization permits a single commander to guide the civil-military interactions of the entire force and to integrate CMO into his concept of a “single battle.”

Serving as an Initial Entry Force

Marines are prepared to operate anywhere, providing a joint force enabler in three dimensions—air, land, and sea. MAGTF CMO help shape the civil dimension of the battlespace for later MAGTF, joint or international efforts. The perception the MAGTF creates as the first US force deployed to an operation will set the stage for the remainder of the effort. MAGTF CMO planners must create an information system and operational architecture that supports the follow-on deployment of CA elements. MAGTF CMO cannot be conducted independent of the wide variety of other governmental and relief agencies that may already be present in the battlespace.

Fighting from the Sea

During operations, some Marine forces may remain aboard amphibious shipping. This presents both advantages and disadvantages for CMO. As an advantage, the MAGTF may have the benefit of a secure and supported location from which to conduct planning and to begin initial coordination. The MAGTF may also have access to shipboard communications links that supply information and facilitate coordination. Maritime prepositioning shipping may provide equipment and supplies.

As a challenge, the MAGTF must be prepared to immediately execute CMO as power is rapidly projected ashore. The MAGTF may not have the luxury of time and space to build up the CMO effort. The development of preplanned, prepackaged, on-call CMO support, including supplies, equipment, and personnel, may be required to enhance responsiveness. Time and distance factors may make face-to-face coordination with civilian agencies difficult. Dedicated personnel may need to be deployed ashore even while the MAGTF remains based at sea.

External Civil-Military Operations Policy

When Marines operate as part of a joint task force (JTF), the joint force commander (JFC) establishes guidance and policies for CMO conducted within the JTF. The MAGTF contributes to unity of effort by being responsive to CMO policy while ensuring its own concerns are considered and effectively integrated into the overall CMO effort. Careful coordination, communication, and liaison will be required.
Decentralized Operations

MAGTF operations may be conducted with mission type orders that decentralize control and give subordinate commanders operational flexibility in the face of changing circumstances. A clear understanding of the mission and the commander’s intent allows Marines to make decisions in the absence of orders. Individual and unit initiative must be tempered with an understanding of the civil affects of their actions.

Interfacing with Civilians

The MAGTF will need to coordinate with a wide variety of nonmilitary populations, organizations, and leaders. This will impact the manner in which operations are planned and executed. Cooperation with civilians, with an understanding of their needs, can mitigate potential frictions, and can help keep MAGTF resources focused on operational objectives. Cooperation may also add to the capabilities and resources the MAGTF commander can access. MAGTF CMO consider the following questions about civilian populations, organizations, and leaders:

- What will they do?
- What does the MAGTF want them to do?
- How can the MAGTF make that happen?
- What does the MAGTF need to know to make that happen?

Operational Support

CMO support all MAGTF operations. CMO may also be employed as an economy of force measure, one that applies limited assets to prevent or solve operational problems where benefits outweigh costs. CMO facilitate the successful management of relations between the MAGTF and the wide variety of civilians present on the modern battlefield, helping to effectively shape the civil dimension of the battlespace.

Minimize Civilian Interference; Maximize Civilian Support

The MAGTF must assume that civilians will interfere with operations, generally unintentionally. Planning and execution must account for this interference by avoiding actions and locations that are likely to attract interference or by taking measures to minimize interference.

The MAGTF must actively seek to use civilian physical and human resources to operational advantage. Civilian supplies and logistics resources, appropriately and legally acquired, can reduce logistic requirements. Equally important, by creating a supportive moral environment among civilian populations and organizations, the MAGTF gains access to capabilities and information it may lack. This might include language, cultural, geographic or economic information. CMO facilitate the collection of information from civilian sources in support of force protection, operational planning, and intelligence. Whenever possible, the MAGTF hopes to make friends and allies and avoid creating grievances.

Meet Legal and Moral Obligations

Under international law and US policy, the MAGTF commander has responsibilities to the civilian populace in his AO. Adhering to these responsibilities has a positive affect on the relationship between the MAGTF and civilians. More importantly, it supports national policy objectives and its strategy to enhance America’s security while promoting economic prosperity, democracy, and human rights abroad.
Support the MAGTF Commander

Overlap of CMO objectives often occurs. However, military assistance is always done at the discretion of the MAGTF commander. Efforts to assist other organizations or groups are secondary to the military mission. CMO can support the commander by—

- Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with military operations.
- Identifying and coordinating acquisition of local resources.
- Assisting the commander in meeting legal and moral obligations to the local population.
- Advising the commander of CMO aspects and the implications of current and proposed plans and operations.

Win the Fight

CMO help the MAGTF win the fight at hand and prepare to win the fight of tomorrow; every MAGTF element must contribute. CMO help to understand and win in the civil dimension.

Gain Situational Awareness

CA personnel contribute to the commander’s ‘finger-tip feel’ of the battlespace, reducing the fog in which operations are planned and conducted and enhancing situational awareness. Through their interaction with civilians, NGOs, and IOs, CA personnel provide highly relevant and timely information to which the MAGTF may not normally have access. CMO provide information that supports the commander’s capability to make decisions, helps identify opportunities, and provides tactical information that supports combat operations.

Enhance Freedom of Action

Effective CMO influences the employment of forces and helps the commander take maximum advantage of the available battlespace. CMO help to extend operations to the fullest breadth feasible by minimizing political and logistics constraints. CMO help the commander to shape the battlespace. To counter CMO, the enemy may be required to disperse forces over a broad area, resulting in gaps that the MAGTF can exploit. For example, civil facilities and assets may allow MAGTF aviation combat elements to be forward-based, minimizing flight time to targets, increasing time available to support ground maneuver or enabling attacks on deep targets. CMO can make logistics lines of communication, airfields, and seaports available to the MAGTF, enhancing support to the force. Finally, by developing effective links to local governments and communities, CMO remove these stresses from subordinate commanders, freeing them to focus on mission accomplishment.

Isolate the Enemy

CMO can limit the enemy commander’s freedom of action, denying civilian support to his forces. These civilians might be within the AO, in neighboring countries or elsewhere within the region. Enemy forces may attempt to gain logistical support, information for use as intelligence, and economic or political support. CMO are conducted to minimize the support given to the enemy by solving civil problems, winning the information fight, and persuading the populace of the legitimacy of US operations. Aggressive CMO deny the enemy a support base and an operational environment by providing the populace a more attractive alternative than that offered by the enemy.
Support the Force

Effective CMO bring additional capabilities to the MAGTF, including assets provided by host nations (HNs), other government agencies (OGAs), and NGOs. CMO support sustainment and provide access to logistics and support capabilities external to the MAGTF. Supplementing MAGTF resources allows military capabilities to remain dedicated to supporting the force. By minimizing the logistics footprint, CMO reduce force vulnerabilities. However, integration of external resources may present new force protection and security challenges.

Employ as a Weapon

Aggressive CMO require the enemy commander to consider the relationship between his force and civil populations. CMO can shape the civil dimension of the battlespace and bring pressure on an adversary. Coordination of military activities with other governmental or international efforts can create a positive operational environment for the MAGTF. Likewise, coordinated CMO can reduce options for the adversary by reducing access to civilian material assets and reducing civilian grievances that may be exploited. Coordinated CMO can also enhance readiness and force protection by contributing to the collective protection of friendly vulnerabilities and civilian infrastructure.

Win the Perception Battle

Information shapes and influences the battlespace. Crisis, amplified by the connectivity of global communications, will ignite passions, spark reaction, crystallize beliefs, and compel people, nations, and organizations to think and act in accordance with their worldview and in reaction to the media. As a related element of information operations, CMO put “meat on the message,” demonstrating in practical ways the MAGTF’s message and countering disinformation and propaganda.

Types of Civil-Military Operations

Populace and Resources Control

The MAGTF, usually in conjunction with civil authorities, will often exercise populace and resources control (PRC). PRC operations are designed and conducted to detect, isolate, and neutralize belligerents. PRC operations provide security for the civilian population, deny personnel and material to the enemy, mobilize civil material resources, and detect and reduce the effectiveness of enemy agents. Populace control measures include curfews, movement restrictions, checkpoints, travel permits, registration cards, identification cards, rationing, and the resettlement of dislocated civilians. Resources control measures include licensing, regulations or guidelines, checkpoints, ration controls, amnesty programs, and facility inspections. Successful PRC mobilizes population and material resources, denies the enemy ready access to the population and to internal and external sources of supply, and provides security for the population.

Foreign nation support (FNS) is the identification, coordination, and acquisition of foreign nation resources such as supplies, material, and labor to support military forces and operations. One means of fulfilling combat service support requirements is to get appropriate goods and services locally through FNS. FNS includes support from countries without mutual agreements or treaties. Alternatively, host-nation support (HNS) is civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 3-57).

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

The purpose of foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) is to relieve or reduce the results of manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as disease, hunger or privation that might
present a serious threat to life or loss of property. It encompasses short-range programs aimed at ending or alleviating human suffering. It is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civilian authorities or agencies that have primary responsibilities for providing relief. MAGTF resources will generally be used to assist and supplement, not replace, civilian resources. The guiding principle is to do only what the civilian authorities or humanitarian relief organizations cannot do or do what is mission essential.

**Military Civic Action**

Military civic action is the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which also serve to improve the standing of military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02) Military civic action (MCA) involves activities intended to win support of the local population for the foreign nation and its military. It is usually part of a comprehensive USG security assistance program.

MAGTFs may advise or engage in MCA overseas. Properly planned, executed, and promulgated in close cooperation with local authorities, military, and community leaders, MCA projects result in popular support for the MAGTF and its mission. MCA is predominantly planned as short-term projects. Due to the legal considerations when providing US resources to foreign military forces or governments, close attention to plans and procedures is required by the Staff Judge Advocate (SJA).

**Nation Assistance Operations**

Nation assistance is civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between the nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code Title 10 Department of Defense (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02) Nation assistance operations support an HN by promoting sustainable development of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability. All nation assistance actions are integrated through the US ambassador’s country plan.

**Civil Preparedness and/or Emergency Operations**

Civil preparedness and/or emergency operations are those activities and measures undertaken to: (1) minimize the effects upon the civilian population caused or which would have been caused by a disaster; (2) deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by any such disaster; and (3) effect emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such disaster. Disaster preparedness is primarily the responsibility of the civilian government and its agencies. It deals essentially with preparations for the immediate emergency conditions created by a disaster. (JP 3-57)

**Civil Administration**

Civil administration support consists of planning, coordinating, advising, or assisting those activities that reinforce or restore a civil administration that supports US and multinational objectives in friendly or hostile territory. (JP 3-57) Civil administration functions are undertaken by US commanders when directed or approved by the President and/or the Secretary of Defense. If there is a requirement for civil administration, the MAGTF will require support via the JFC, to include CA functional specialists, military judge advocates,
civilians security, public administration, and legal experts. The MAGTF must carefully consider and coordinate its requirements if there is any possibility it will perform civil administration.

**Domestic Support Operations**

Domestic support operations usually occur after a Presidential declaration of a major disaster and are designed to supplement the efforts and resources of state and local governments, and voluntary organizations. (JP 3-57) The US military normally responds to domestic emergencies in support of other Federal agencies; e.g., Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department of Justice. On the other hand, the DOD is the primary agency or lead Federal Agency responsible for public works and engineering under the Federal Response Plan. See also Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3440.7A, *Marine Corps Support to Civil Authorities*. 
CHAPTER 2
MAGTF CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT

Units and Personnel

CA is designated Active and Reserved component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct CA activities and to support CMO. (JP 1-02) CA is not a mission nor an objective, but is the name for designated personnel and units.

Marine CA units are trained, organized, and equipped to support the MAGTF commander’s need to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO. CA Marines support MAGTF missions across the full range of military operations and help the commander consider the civil implications of his military mission. CA personnel are an essential asset by virtue of their training, experience, cultural awareness, and knowledge of governmental and relief agencies. As special staff members, CA personnel are the commander’s principal advisors on civil-military relations.

Marine CA personnel are planners and executors. As planners, they consider the impact civilians have on military operations and the impact operations will have on civilians. They help the commander envision and achieve the desired operational end state, ensuring the consideration of civil factors is not overlooked. As executors, they make assessments and gather information in the field, directly supervise elements of CMO, coordinate with a wide variety of civil and military organizations, and provide advice to subordinate military commanders or civilian authorities. They coordinate local labor efforts, locate HN resources and coordinate their usage, gather critical information, identify key facilities and protected targets, deliver information to civilians, and provide assistance to the SJA.

CA activities are activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of CA functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of CMO. (JP 1-02)

Marine Corps CA units are primarily organized into civil affairs groups (CAGs), each designed to support a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The legal services support section of the force service support group (FSSG) provides a limited CA capability.

Civil Affairs Group

CA units consist of two CAGs that augment the capability of the MAGTF. CAGs provide a unique capability to the MAGTF as Selected Marine Corps Reserve units. When activated, they are capable of self-administration, but require logistical support from the MAGTF command element (CE). The 3d CAG is located at Camp Pendleton, CA. The 4th CAG is located at Anacostia, Washington, DC. Within the Active force, the legal services support section within the FSSG can provide a limited, interim CA capability by supporting the MAGTF commander’s need to plan and coordinate CA activities before the CAG is activated or in conjunction with advance CAG personnel.

When activated, the CAG provides CA support to a MEF. The CAG is organized with a group headquarters and a number of CA detachments. The group headquarters is organized into a command section and staff sections, along with communications, motor transport, and public
health sections. The group headquarters provides the nucleus of CA staff support to the MEF CE, and command and control of subordinate CA elements. In garrison, the CAG headquarters is responsible for training and equipping subordinate elements, preparing them for deployment, and coordinating their support to the operating forces. It maintains communications with supported MEFs, advising the MEF commander and ensuring that plans, exercises, and operations appropriately consider CMO.

CAGs are multipurpose units, equipped with a variety of skills, expertise, and experience. When activated, the CAG enhances the ability of the MAGTF to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO. CAGs can accomplish the following tasks in support of the MAGTF:

- Minimize civilian interference with MAGTF operations by executing PRC.
- Maximize use of civilian resources in support of the MAGTF mission.
- Assist the MAGTF commander in meeting his legal and moral obligations to civilian populations.
- Provide limited civilian administration.
- Provide integrated environmental health assessment and planning capabilities.
- Provide for operation of the civil-military operations center (CMOC) in support of the MAGTF combat operations center (COC).
- Act as the interface between the MAGTF commander and civilian agencies and organizations, including USG agencies; HN and OGAs; United Nations (UN) organizations; IOs; NGOs; the private sector; and displaced persons and refugee associations.
- Coordinate MAGTF CMO with higher, adjacent, and supporting commands.
- Provide cultural and regional expertise in support of MAGTF operations.
- Train and prepare the MAGTF for CMO.
- Ensure an orderly and prompt transition of CMO responsibilities to other authorities and agencies.

Civil Affairs Detachment

A CA detachment supports the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) or a major subordinate command (MSC) of the MEF. CA detachments may be organized with a headquarters, international law team, dislocated persons/refugees team, liaison team, and three general purpose CA teams. While all CA elements can assist the MAGTF in planning, coordinating, and executing CMO, the CA detachment is the smallest element that can execute the more specialized CA activities without further augmentation.

Civil Affairs Team

A CA team supports the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or major subordinate element of the MEB. A CA team helps the MAGTF plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO, but cannot support the full range of CMO functions.

Preplanned Support

As Reserve Component units, the CAGs provide continuous and worldwide support to the operating forces. Much of this support is provided prior to CAG unit activation. Preplanned events and contingencies are usually supported in an incremental fashion. Preplanned events support theater engagement strategies and Service or joint exercises. CAGs also support deliberate planning efforts for standing operational plans and deployments, and review the development of doctrine and training.

Many orders and authorization processes are used for preplanned support. Occasionally, “inactive duty for training” periods, usually called drills, can be devoted to types of CA support. With sufficient advance notice, annual training periods, generally 2 weeks, can be scheduled to provide appropriate support. When support is required for longer periods, a number of overlapping annual training increments might be planned, providing continuous support to the commander. Specific
missions also may be authorized with Active duty for special work orders, which are generally limited to 179 days in a fiscal year but may be much shorter in duration. Active duty special work orders are especially useful for regular commitments, such as billets continuously involved in theater engagement.

Schedules and locations for exercises and operations often change. This can jeopardize preplanned CA deployments and may result in degraded support. CAG personnel are reservists and may have a limited ability to respond quickly to schedule changes. Coordination for funding and the generation of individual orders are required to prevent delays.

Predeployment exercises, such as the Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable) MEU(SOC) workups, are prioritized for support. Supporting CA elements sharpen staff integration by participating in predeployment exercises with the deploying MAGTF. Preplanned exercises and deployed support serve as rehearsals and facilitate contingency support. Although these designated CA elements remain in the US, they are available for deployment overseas.

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### Contingency Support

When activated, the CAGs provide capabilities normally not resident in the MAGTF. CAGs are prepared to provide immediate support to MAGTFs engaged in contingency operations, generally within less than 72 hours. CA support is provided by echelon. Each CAG maintains a list of CA personnel ready to support time-sensitive contingency operations. Members volunteer for assignment. Ideally, at least the leader of the CA element has participated in the supported MAGTF’s exercise program. The CAG supports the deployed echelon by reach back, using stateside assets to support forward-deployed elements. Support might include cultural, economic or political research, and/or authorized coordination with US-based organizations. Follow-on increments of the CAG might be subject to involuntary activation such as Presidential Reserve Callup Authority. And finally, the entire CAG may be mobilized in support of a MEF. CA detachments and teams will often deploy prior to full mobilization of other reserve component forces.

As Reserve component units, CA elements may join a MAGTF that is already deeply involved in planning. The CA officer has a substantial challenge to begin assisting the MAGTF commander while preparing his own force for mission planning and execution. It is vital that the CA effort be prioritized and rapidly integrated within the MAGTF concept of operations.

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### MAGTF Civil Affairs Capabilities

Marine CA elements are not normally required to plan and conduct CMO at the strategic level; however, they may execute CMO to support strategic objectives in the MAGTF’s area of responsibility. CAGs and CA detachments are organized to provide a limited number of CA capabilities to the MAGTF. Marine CA personnel are considered generalists. They are skilled advisors, planners, coordinators, and supervisors who provide multipurpose support to the commander. When additional functional specialty skills are required to support operations, the CA officer will recommend that the MAGTF commander request external support. The MAGTF will assume civil sector responsibilities; e.g., public works and utilities, only as a last resort and will transition those responsibilities to the joint force or civilian authorities as rapidly as possible.

CAGs are broadly capable in nine functional areas. Without additional augmentation, Marine CA personnel have a limited capability in most
functional areas. Their skills are primarily focused on initial assessments of functional areas, which facilitates initial planning and identifies the need for further expertise. Additional expertise may be sourced from outside the MAGTF. It may be provided by functional specialists from US Army CA forces of the US Army Special Operations Command. It may also be provided by other USG agencies or by international, nongovernmental or HN organizations. The nine CAG functional areas follow:

- Dislocated civilians (DCs).
- Cultural relations.
- Public safety.
- Civilian supply.
- Civil information.
- International law.
- Public health.
- Public works and utilities.
- Public communications.

### Dislocated Civilian Operations

The five objectives of DC operations are to—

- Reduce the interference with military operations.
- Prevent civilians from becoming combat hazards.
- Prevent the outbreak of disease.
- Alleviate suffering.
- Centralize DCs.

DC is a broad term that includes a/an—

- **Displaced person**: a civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02)
- **Stateless person**: a civilian who has been denationalized or whose country of origin cannot be determined or who cannot establish a right to the nationality claimed. (JP 1-02)
- **Expellee**: a civilian outside the boundaries of the country of his or her nationality or ethnic origin who is being forcibly repatriated to that country or to a third country for political or other purposes. (JP 1-02)

- **Evacuee**: a civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02)
- **Refugee**: a person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 1-02)

The ultimate objective in handling DCs is to allow them to return to their homes. Control is the most critical issue in DC operations; therefore, civilian collection points and handling policies should be established. Movement is primarily a military police (MP) function. Route selection, route identification, control and assembly points, and emergency rest areas must be considered. Whenever possible, evacuation should be avoided. It may arouse resentment, complicate control, complicate security, and unnecessarily expend time and resources.

When accommodating DCs, the following should be considered: camp size, location, layout, administration, screening, segregation of sexes and ethnic groups, medical care, sanitation, supply, transportation, and information dissemination.

MAGTF CA elements can—

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing DC activities, including locations and movement within the MAGTF AO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, caring for, controlling, processing, and repatriating DCs. Supervise MAGTF planning and operation of DC camps.
- Plan movement control measures, emergency care, and evacuation of DCs. Coordinate provision of transportation, MP support, military intelligence screening/interrogation, and medical services as required.
Assist the SJA in advising the commander on legal and moral responsibilities with respect to DCs in accordance with US policy and international law.

### Cultural Relations

Cultural relations can—

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance on foreign nation social and cultural matters and determine the impact of those matters on CMO.
- Assist in familiarizing, educating, and training US personnel in the foreign nation social, cultural, religious, ethnic characteristics, codes of behavior, and language.
- Advise and assist in locating, preserving, and protecting significant cultural property. Identify protected targets.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in protecting, preserving, and restoring significant cultural property and facilities (religious buildings, shrines, and consecrated places; museums, monuments, art, archives, and libraries).
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
- Assist in coordinating foreign nation, IO, NGO, and USG assistance and resources to support local government relations as part of CMO.

### Public Safety

Public safety can—

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing foreign nations public safety systems, agencies, services, personnel, and resources.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of public safety systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public safety systems, equipment, and facilities.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for government public safety systems to support government administration (police and law enforcement administration, fire protection, emergency rescue, and penal systems).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government public safety systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing public safety resources to support government administration, CMO, and military use.
- Assist in coordinating foreign nation, IO, NGO, and USG assistance and resources to support local government relations as part of CMO.

### Civilian Supply

Civilian supply can—

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing public and commercial supply systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of civilian supply systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Determine the availability of local supplies.
- Identify private and public property available for military use.
- Coordinate the use of government, commercial, and private property, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other resources for military use, for CMO, and in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist the SJA and contracting officials in foreign nations cultural considerations
when acquiring and using local resources (supplies, equipment, and facilities).

- Establish policies and procedures on custody and administration of public and private property.
- Assist in coordinating foreign nation, IO, NGO, and USG assistance and resources to support local civilian supply needs as part of CMO.

**Civil Information**

Civil information can—

- Advise and assist in developing and coordinating public relations activities to support and legitimize the HN government administration.
- Coordinate with all US and multinational information activities to provide the “single voice” message.
- Advise, assist, develop plans, and provide operational oversight and supervision in the employment of civil information mass media (radio, television, print, and newspaper) agencies, both public and private, and resources to support CMO.
- Assist psychological operations (PSYOP) forces in planning, developing, and disseminating proclamations, ordinances, and notices.
- Advise and assist the public affairs officer (PAO) in maintaining cultural awareness while dealing with the media.
- Recommend information control and civil censorship policies.

**International Law**

International law can—

- Provide area expertise, advice, and assistance to the SJA in identifying and assessing HN legal systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, laws, codes, and statutes.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of legal systems and the impact of those on CMO.
- Assist the SJA in educating and training US personnel in the HN legal system, obligations, and consequences.
- Assist the SJA in international law issues.
- Coordinate with the SJA to assist and advise HN judicial agencies.
- Conduct liaison and monitor the HN judiciary system to resolve differences in administration of laws, agreements, and policies.

**Public Health**

To support public health, MAGTF CA elements and organic US Navy public health personnel—

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing HN public and private health systems, sanitation systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of health and sanitation systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Develop plans and provide operational oversight and supervision in rehabilitating or establishing public health systems, agencies, equipment, and facilities.
- Coordinate with the HN government private resources for CMO use in support of government administration.
- Advise and assist in establishing the technical requirements for public health services and resources to support government administration (clinics, hospitals, pharmacies, food preparation and storage, ambulance transportation, skilled personnel, and education).
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, delivering, and maintaining government public health systems and agencies.
- Assist in coordinating HN, IOs, NGOs, and USG assistance and resources to support local government public health systems as part of CMO.
- Advise and assist HN, IOs, NGOs, and US agencies in preventing, controlling, and treating diseases (education, immunization, and sanitation). Additionally, preventive medicine assets can be requested through the chain of command from either the MEF surgeon (G-4 medical) or from the preventive medicine assets in the medical battalion of the FSSG.
Public Works and Utilities

Public works and utilities can—

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing foreign nation public and commercial works and utilities systems, agencies, services, and facilities.
- Determine capabilities and effectiveness of public works and utilities systems and the impact of those systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, operating, and maintaining government works and utilities systems and agencies.
- Assist in coordinating public works and utilities resources to support government administration and CMO.

Public Communications

Public communications can—

- Provide technical expertise, advice, and assistance in identifying and assessing government and commercial communication systems, agencies, services, personnel, resources, and facilities.
- Determine the capabilities and effectiveness of communication systems and the impact of these systems on CMO.
- Advise and assist in rehabilitating, establishing, and maintaining government communications systems and agencies.
- Assist in employing public communications resources to support government administration and CMO.
CHAPTER 3
INTEGRATED PLANNING

The Role of the MAGTF
Civil Affairs Officer

The MAGTF CA officer is normally the CAG commanding officer, CA detachment commander or CA team leader, and is often dual-hatted (commander and staff officer). The CA officer supports the MAGTF commander’s need to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO, and is responsible for enhancing the relationship between the MAGTF, civil authorities, and civilian populations for mission success. Since CA units reside in the Selected Marine Corps Reserve, the MAGTF may deploy without a CA officer. When trained CA personnel are not immediately available, the commander may designate a staff member to undertake the function.

The CA officer’s first responsibility is to advise the MAGTF commander on CMO-related matters and support operational planning. Next, the CA officer coordinates CMO with military CA elements and the civilian organizations within the AO. Finally, the MAGTF executes CMO. During execution the MAGTF may require additional functional expertise.

The CA officer normally operates under the staff cognizance of the operations officer (G-3/S-3). However, when civil-military considerations are a priority, the MAGTF commander may designate the CA officer as a member of the special staff. CA elements also support the plans function and assist in planning operations. At the MEU, smaller special-purpose MAGTF or in a major subordinate element, future planning is the responsibility of the G-3/S-3. At the Marine forces, MEF, and MEB levels, the G-5, future operations group, is the principal staff assistant for future and joint planning. Like all commanders, the CA officer positions himself from where he can best influence the action. As a planner and advisor, he must place himself to best support the MAGTF planning effort. Duties include—

- Serve as a member of the battlestaff.
- Advise the commander of the potential civilian impact on military operations.
- Advise the commander on the potential impact of military operations on civilian populations.
- Advise the commander on employment of other military units and US assets that can perform or assist CMO.
- Assist the commander in meeting his legal and moral obligations to civilian populations under his control.
- Serve as the commander’s principal interface with external nonmilitary agencies that may be operating within the AO. For example, NGOs, IOs, the USG, and foreign government agencies.
- Advise the commander of changes in the political environment that may change the military situation.
- Identify CMO goals and objectives to support the mission and the commander’s intent, and to develop plans accordingly.
- Coordinate preparation of Annex G to the operation order (OPORD).
- Employ CA elements to support effective command and control and the scheme of maneuver.

Command and Control

Command Element

Marine CA elements primarily facilitate CMO by assisting the MAGTF commander’s plan and coordinating efforts for other MAGTF elements to execute. CA elements are typically initially assigned to the CE. The CA element may be task-organized to directly support other MAGTF
elements, usually for particular phases of an operation and for a limited duration. The operations officer has staff cognizance for CMO and primary responsibility for CMO integration within the CE. As the MAGTF operations and plans staff sections organize for combat, they form integrated staff cells (ISCs). CA personnel support the ISC s and the battlestaff.

The Battlestaff

The battlestaff consists of the principal staff officers, assistant chief of staff G-1 through G-6, and designated special staff, including the MAGTF CA officer. Battlestaff members are the MEF commander’s primary advisors. They will closely monitor the areas under their staff cognizance, and provide detailed recommendations, information, and analysis to the future plans and future operations cells. As a member of the battlestaff, the MAGTF CA officer will—

- Assist the commander in developing and achieving his vision for operations.
- Integrate CA concerns into plans and operations.
- Recommend priority intelligence requirements (PIR) to the G-2.
- Manage the commander’s interface with inter-agency, IO, NGO, and HN civil agencies.
- Plan, direct, and supervise MEF CA liaisons to external commands.
- Monitor the battle.

Civil Affairs Operations Cell

The MAGTF CA officer may determine that a distinct CA operations cell is the most efficient means to support all of the MAGTF’s ISC s. The CA operations cell is located in future operations, which leads the MAGTF’s integrated planning effort. It is useful when limited personnel and facilities prevent the assignment of dedicated CA elements to each ISC. Instead, the CA operations cell performs the majority of CA planning in a central location, while providing representation in each ISC as continuously as possible. The CA officer continues to provide comprehensive support to the battlestaff. The CA operations cell is not a location for interface with organizations or persons external to the MAGTF. That interface takes place primarily in the CMOC. Tasks include the following:

- Develop concepts and plans for CMO in support of the MAGTF mission.
- Direct assigned CA elements to support the future plans, future operations, and current operations ISC s.
- Recommend CMO-related PIR and other intelligence requirements (IRs) to the G-2/S-2.
- Provide the G-2/S-2 with information gained from civilians in the AO.
- Provide for limited civil administration of areas under the commander’s control.
- Prepare and coordinate Annex G (Civil Affairs) to the OPORD.
- Advise the commander on employment of military units in support of CA programs.
- Assist the G-4/S-4 in identifying local goods, services, and facilities available to support military operations including civilian medical capabilities.
- Assist the G-4/S-4 and the medical officer in identifying the basic needs of the civilian population in terms of emergency food, shelter, and health care, and develop programs to satisfy these needs.
- Coordinate with the SJA on the rules of engagement (ROE) as applied to civilians in the AO. Recommend changes to the commander to ensure to the maximum extent permissible civilian personal, cultural, and property rights are safeguarded.
- Coordinate with the comptroller, contracting officer, and SJA the identification, validation, payment, and accounting of claims and vouchers. This may include compensation for death, personal injury, property damage or for public contractors and vendors.
- Plan and implement—in coordination with the provost marshal (PM) and the SJA—necessary PRC measures in support of rear area security, law and order, and to minimize civilian interference with combat operations. Such measures may include relocations, curfews, and movement restrictions.

- Establish and operate a CMOC for the commander to maintain liaison and coordinate the operations of OGAs, HN civil authorities, IOs, and NGOs.

- Identify and recommend protected targets to G-3/S-3 fires.

- Plan, in coordination with the PAO, public affairs (PA) and community relations programs supporting CA objectives. Focus on gaining and maintaining public understanding, goodwill, and support.

- Provide for liaison with CA/CMO elements at higher and adjacent headquarters.

- Assist the G-1/S-1 with coordinating local labor resources.

- Recommend humanitarian and civil assistance.

## Civil-Military Operations Center

During sustained operations, the MAGTF may establish a CMOC. The CMOC is the focal point for coordination between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external organizations, including other USG agencies, IOs, NGOs, local governmental leaders, and civilian populations. The CMOC relays information and recommendations to the MAGTF CA officer and ISCs. MAGTF CMO are planned by the battlestaff. The CMOC provides the interface between the MAGTF and external organizations. It must minimize disruptions to the MAGTF staff and facilitate communication and cooperation with external organizations. Since external organizations cannot be commanded to use the CMOC, it must be useful to them to encourage their participation. The CMOC must be easily accessible and may be placed beyond perimeter security; e.g., “outside the wire.” See figure 3-1.

The CMOC’s location must be known throughout the MAGTF. With their specialized training and

![Figure 3-1. Civil-Military Operations Center.](image)
focus, CA personnel generally direct CMOC operation under the guidance of the MAGTF CA officer. When relationships with civilian organizations require the most senior representation, the MAGTF commander may designate a deputy commander or chief of staff as the CMOC director. The CMOC should also be staffed with a number of functional representatives from the MAGTF. Depending on the situation, MAGTF subordinate elements may also be authorized to establish a local CMOC.

The CMOC must be organized to promote information exchange between participating organizations, including those that otherwise will not have a mechanism for coordination and cooperation. Agency points of contact, agency capability lists, daily information summaries, population density, demographic, and dislocated civilian overlays should be maintained and displayed in the CMOC. Depending on the MAGTF mission, certain operational graphics may be inappropriate. When possible, the CMOC can help identify civilian capabilities that can satisfy civilian requirements, entirely avoiding the use of MAGTF resources. More than just a location, the CMOC is a process that ensures the effective coordination and the highest possible degree of interagency planning is achieved, even when the CMOC is no more formal than the seats of a tactical vehicle. Major CMOC functions include the following:

- Provide OGAs, IOs, and NGOs with a single, accessible point of contact for civil-military activities and matters.
- Facilitate collaborative civil-military efforts with US and/or allied commands, UN, HN, and other nonmilitary agencies.
- Act as a clearinghouse for all civilian requests for support from the MAGTF and the US military. The CMO section attempts to meet civilian requirements with civilian capabilities via coordination at the CMOC before passing validated support request to MAGTF (see figure 3-2).
- Organize outside agency support to reduce or eliminate redundancy and prioritize relief efforts.
- Request FNS from civilian organizations.
- Maintain maps and charts for collaboration that depict current and future CA activities and CMO; current enemy and friendly situations; current and planned dislocated civilian operations; the status of arts, monuments, and archives; and other details. Displays should also be developed that depict important ongoing requirements such as work requests, logistic requirements, DC statistics or situation report information.
- Assist in the transfer of authority and/or hand-off of operations from US military forces to Department of State, UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), HN or other nonmilitary agency control.

### Joint Force Civil Affairs Staff

During joint operations, a regionally oriented CA staff provided by US Special Operations Command will normally support the JFC. US Army CA commands are aligned with one of four geographic combatant commands (Pacific Command, Central Command, European Command, Southern Command). They provide CMO staff augmentation to component and joint theater staff, as required. They may develop the combatant commander’s policy for CA activities, which the MAGTF supports at the operational and tactical levels. The MAGTF CA staff may require a liaison to this staff.

### Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force

Depending upon the mission, the JFC may consolidate assets capable of performing CMO under a subordinate JTF, a CMO JTF or a joint special operations task force. With appropriate augmentation, the MAGTF could be assigned the role of CMO JTF. Whenever an element is established having CMO responsibilities and authority
across the joint operations area, the MAGTF CA element must establish liaison.

**Civil Affairs Element’s Priority:**
**Staff Integration**

Importantly, CA brings a different perspective to the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP). While other staff members look inward to the battlespace, the CA element looks outward. Immediately upon assignment, the CA element’s priority is staff integration.

**Supported Commander**

The MAGTF commander ensures that the civil implications of the military mission are considered. He actively considers CMO as part of his single-battle concept, using the planning process to integrate CMO and using civil-military input as part of the decisionmaking process. CMO can provide additional capabilities that can be applied to the mission and can minimize friction that would otherwise slow the tempo of operations.

**Personnel**

The personnel section includes CMO considerations when it establishes appropriate standards of conduct between MAGTF personnel and the local civilian population. G-1/S-1, contracting, and CA personnel will coordinate and develop MAGTF policy regarding recruitment, hiring, and payment of civilian workers. MP operations in the AO should be mutually supportive when integrated with HN security forces.

**Intelligence**

CMO are a consumer of intelligence and a provider of information. Information of value to the MAGTF commander will be available through the intellectual, operational, and cultural resources found in government agencies, NGOs, commercial interests, and academia. CA elements can help obtain this information. Information about civil factors may be essential to the commander, including identifying key civilian leaders, their support for US operations, and how they might be influenced.
The information requirements for CMO will challenge the intelligence process. CA elements must interact with the intelligence cycle, in part by recommending PIR and other IR to the staff. CMO also produce information that must be provided to MAGTF G-2/S-2. This information supports the commander’s situational awareness and will be fused with other sources, adding to the common operational picture shared by all joint force elements.

The intelligence function must be prepared to provide information or intelligence to a number of civilian agencies. This information may be critical in gaining the cooperation of organizations. Providing information is one of the means by which it is demonstrated that working with the MAGTF is beneficial and helps the MAGTF gain trust and cooperation.

**Counterintelligence**

CMO and counterintelligence (CI) are separate but mutually supporting. CMO provide information that CI personnel use to plan and execute human intelligence operations. CI personnel support the civil-military interface, ensuring that critical information is not made available to adversaries. CI participation in the design and operation of the CMOC and of DC centers is of great value in minimizing the risks of enemy exploitation. This will be challenging since the exchange of information between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external agencies will often be important for mission accomplishment. Generally, a complete ban on information exchange will not be acceptable.

The separation between CMO and intelligence must be maintained. CMO will be made less effective or impossible if they are seen as a cover for intelligence operations. CA personnel may be more likely to be targeted if they are perceived as intelligence operatives. Most CI information will come from conducting periodic and thorough debriefings of personnel involved in CMO. This information must be passed on the MAGTF G-2/S-2.

**Operations**

The G-3/S-3 has staff cognizance over CMO. As with all other MAGTF capabilities, the operations officer integrates CMO into the single-battle concept. The civil dimension of the battlespace changes constantly and can be influenced by the MAGTF and its enemies. The operations officer ensures that MAGTF operations take maximum advantage of CMO to support mission accomplishment, while minimizing friction and the negative impact of enemy CMO. The MAGTF CA officer must provide concise and considered input to the commander and the operations officer.

The operations officer must consider the actions of external organizations in the battlespace, many of them civilian. CA elements can help the operations officer coordinate and integrate the actions of IOs, NGOs, and OGAs through the CMOC.

**Fires**

MAGTF fire support planners and coordinators must consider CMO. CA elements may provide input to the target list and the protected target list. The target list contains those targets the commander intends to engage with supporting arms. The protected target list consists of targets requiring special consideration such as religious buildings, schools or monuments important to the civil populace. The protected target list will be published by the MAGTF or the joint force and may be directed by the President and/or Secretary of Defense. It may have law of armed conflict implications. Measures should be established so that protected targets are engaged only when necessary and with the minimum amount of damage required for mission accomplishment. This may involve specifying the types of weapons/munitions that may be used on a target. CA personnel may also sit on the targeting board as a check against unnecessary engagement of
targets. The MAGTF must use caution when targeting infrastructure since it may be required later for successful transition and redeployment of the MAGTF.

**Force Protection**

Force protection and CMO are mutually supporting. Effective CMO enhance the legitimacy of MAGTF operations. CMO increase the support civilian populations and organizations provide to the MAGTF and decrease the support civilians might provide to the adversary. CMO encourage civilian populations to cooperate with MAGTF operations. The local population should understand how US intervention benefits their lives. Force protection may also support CMO by providing force protection training to CA elements. The MAGTF may also need to assist civilian agencies in developing force protection strategies of their own.

**Logistics**

Many MAGTF logistics capabilities can be duplicated and expanded upon by civilian organizations; e.g., water purification and long-haul transport. The MAGTF brings command and control to CMO, ensuring the effective employment of limited resources in the face of competing demands. When MAGTF assets are used as “muscle,” they should be employed primarily to enable more extensive efforts by external agencies. This facilitation might include efforts such as control of air and seaports, material and cargo handling or the repair of critical transportation infrastructure. CMO may also facilitate MAGTF access to civilian resources by identifying sources and providing information on appropriate personal and business practices. This expands the range of operations the commander can support, and enables increased operational tempo. The G-4/S-4, in consultation with the MAGTF medical officer, will also help determine policy for the use of military health service capabilities and resources in support of civilian populations.

**Plans**

The CA staff will support planning by identifying CMO objectives and additional requirements for elements to support CMO. The CA staff also ensures that CMO supports the commander’s intent and is synchronized within the operation. The CA staff will take the lead when coordinating with external civilian agencies.

**Communications**

MAGTF communications elements must be prepared to provide communications pathways between the MAGTF and a wide variety of external organizations. Many will be civilian and will not have access to military communications. Effective communications are required for planning and external coordination.

**Reach Back**

Much of the information needed to advise the commander and support CMO planning can be provided to the MAGTF via reach back. This process collects, checks, and deconflicts information from a location in the rear and pushes material forward in a usable format for use in the field. Reach back minimizes the footprint of forces deployed in the AO and takes advantage of substantial information resources not available in the field. It also takes advantage of better communication methods, including face-to-face coordination, between Marines and external organizations that might not be available in an expeditionary environment. Deployed MAGTF CA elements can be supported by the CAGs via reach back. Similarly, CA elements on station at sea can take advantage of the command, control and communications, computers, and intelligence capabilities of the amphibious force to push tailored information to CA elements ashore.

**Public Affairs**

PA and CMO are mutually supportive. Coordination and staff interaction between CA and PA
elements are required to ensure that the activities of one staff element do not conflict with or complicate the work of another. PA and CMO personnel may disseminate information to local populations. However, PA elements have the responsibility to deal with media outlets.

**Staff Judge Advocate**

The SJA is the commander’s principal legal advisor. CMO may make substantial demands upon the SJA beyond his usual responsibilities, including the commander’s requirement for assistance with contract and international law issues. The international law section of the CAG can support SJA subject matter experts in a variety of topics.

**Chaplain**

Chaplains are of enormous value in CMO. The chaplain’s primary responsibility will be to support the Marines and Sailors of the MAGTF. Peace operations and FHA are especially challenging for personnel who may be under exceptional stress, faced with great tragedy, and constrained with potentially complicated ROE. Chaplains assist the commander to strengthen the moral and spiritual well-being of personnel under his command to strengthen operational readiness and mission capability. This support to the commander may be critical, as the actions of individual Marines, even though under great stress, may have strategic implications during CMO.

Chaplains may also provide important support directly to operations. First, their presence among units of the MAGTF demonstrates core US principles to civilians, enhancing the legitimacy of effort and gaining cooperation. Second, they may be able to establish channels of communications with civilian religious leaders, supplementing communication and coordination efforts of the commander and his staff. Finally, during certain operations, they may be available to minister directly to civilians, calming them and gaining their cooperation. At no time should the chaplain’s support to civilians be executed without the knowledge and support of the commander. The chaplain may be an important source of information to the commander on the overall attitude of the population. See also, MCWP 6-12, Religious Ministry Support in the U.S. Marine Corps and JP 1-05, Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations.

**Subordinate Units**

As the mission requires, subordinate units execute CMO as planned and directed by the MAGTF commander. These units may require dedicated CA elements. The MAGTF CA officer should recommend appropriate employment of CA personnel to support the entire force.

**Civil-Military Operations Planning Principles**

**Objective**

All CMO should be directed toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Effective CMO focus the efforts of the MAGTF and all other governmental and nongovernmental agencies on a common objective. Common objectives help ensure that unity of effort is maintained. Objectives should clearly state what will constitute mission success and should consider what might cause the operation to be terminated before this success is achieved. Changes in political objectives may affect operational objectives.

**Unity of Effort**

All CMO should achieve common purpose and direction through unity of effort. While the MAGTF does not exercise command and control over external agencies, it can use communication, coordination, and liaison to help focus the overall CMO effort. The goal is to achieve unity of effort among all agencies by identifying common goals and coordinating the means to achieve them.
Security

Security enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. However, the principle of security presents unique challenges to CMO, which inherently depends on human interaction and communication. Unit force protection must be carefully considered, as well as the degree to which civilian facilities and agencies will be provided with protection.

Restraint

Military capabilities must be applied prudently. Judicious use of force is necessary, carefully balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Commanders at all levels must ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes. ROE during CMO are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns.

Perseverance

Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some peace operations may require years to achieve the desired results. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option’s impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. Often the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is the requirement for success.

Legitimacy

Legitimate use of force will convince the adversary that it is unwise and ultimately wrong to seek conflict. CMO must contribute to the real and perceived legitimacy of our operations. The operation must be legally and morally correct, supporting internationally agreed upon objectives while employing acceptable means. The MAGTF should anticipate how adversaries might misrepresent its actions to affect local and international opinion.

Impartiality

Crisis often includes conflicts between people, parties, and organizations. These factions may be parties involved in an armed conflict; religious, ethnic or regional groups battling over power and resources; or political leaders and organizations seeking to enhance their power, prestige or position. Whenever possible, CMO observe strict impartiality, leaving all but armed conflicts to be resolved by local methods without outside interference. The perception of impartiality is at least as important as actions. During planning and execution the MAGTF should consider whether its actions may be inadvertently perceived as favoring one or another of competing individuals and parties, and take steps to counter negative impressions.

Consent

Almost exclusively, interactions with civilians are based on their consent. CMO may be specifically tasked to provide support to a civil organization such as an HN and its agencies. The relief agencies the MAGTF interact with are not subject to its directions and may actively work to demonstrate their independence from the military. Representatives of other USG agencies often operate outside of the MAGTF chain of command. Even when law permits us to require certain actions of civilian populations, a campaign to obtain their consent will greatly enhance the MAGTF ability to achieve its objectives.
Regional and Cultural Considerations

MAGTF plans and actions must take into account the goals, norms, and values of the people with whom they work, never assuming that they are the same as the MAGTF. MAGTF expectations of other people and organizations may not be met if they are taken for granted that others will act the same, and for the same reasons.

Support to Civil Authority

Some CMO, such as consequence management or FHA, will place the MAGTF in direct support of civilian leaders and agencies. Operations within the US will take the lead from the designated lead Federal Agency. Abroad, CMO may support an HN government. These operations will be closely coordinated with and may be directed by the ambassador, chief of mission or the UN.

Combined Action

CMO are most effective when they embrace people and their institutions. The cooperative inclusion of local organizations and authorities can strengthen the MAGTF. For example, MPs are more effective when teamed with HN civil police. Operational planners are wise to consult with local authorities when making decisions. In each case, actions taken with the participation of respected local individuals and institutions will enhance the legitimacy of MAGTF operations. The MAGTF should always operate from a basis of partnership and mutual respect.

The Marine Corps Planning Process

The MCPP is a flexible system that supports decisionmaking by the commander and helps to convey his decisions to all members of the force. Depending on the time and staff resources available, it can be detailed or it may be abbreviated. Its tenets are top-down planning, a single battle concept, and integrated planning. CMO must be consistently considered throughout the MCPP. As SMEs tasked to help the commander plan, coordinate, and execute CMO, it is essential that CA personnel use the MCPP. The CA staff helps ensure the commander considers critical civil-military concerns, while not overburdening him with nonessential inputs.

When dedicated CA personnel are not available, the commander should identify this shortfall and request support from higher headquarters. The commander should always consider the civil-military implications of his mission and its accomplishment. The MCPP is organized into six steps: mission analysis, course of action (COA) development, COA war game, COA comparison/decision, orders development, and transition.

Mission Analysis

Mission analysis reviews and analyzes all available information, including orders and guidance from higher headquarters. It drives the remainder of the MCPP, so it is essential that civil considerations be identified at this stage. Mission analysis begins with the commander’s orientation. Critical CMO inputs will include political, social, and cultural characteristics of the AO. Information from nonmilitary sources, such as NGOs, IOs, OGAs, businesses, and academia will be important. CA personnel can support the commander’s orientation by gathering information from nonmilitary sources. The CA staff should help the commander identify friendly and enemy centers of gravity.

For example, the MAGTF’s cohesiveness with allies, coalition partners, and the citizens of the HN may be identified as a center of gravity. This will help the staff develop a concept of operations that protects these sources of strength from
enemy disinformation campaigns and helps limit our own potentially negative actions. Depending on the mission, civil considerations may help define the operational end state. The CA staff may begin to determine milestones that will help evaluate the operation, adjusting it as necessary. The CA staff may also recommend commander’s critical information requirements, elements of information that the commander determines are essential to maintaining situational awareness, making decisions, and developing plans.

During the mission analysis process, civil-military factors are considered as the commander and staff identify specified, implied, and essential tasks, as well as constraints and restraints. CA personnel are especially valuable during the identification of implied tasks. Their special focus and experience aid them in planning for civil-military considerations. Similarly, the CA staff may recommend additional constraints and restraints. Restraints limit the force’s freedom of action, including directions to avoid damaging key civilian infrastructure or limiting the type of weapons that may be used in populated areas. Constraints are things the force must do, such as conducting DC operations or providing medical attention to civilians.

During mission analysis, the CA staff begins development of the CMO estimate, which is a summary of all civil-military factors that may affect mission accomplishment. The CMO estimate supports decisionmaking throughout the planning process and subsequent execution of the mission. It is maintained and continuously refined throughout the operation. Depending on the level of command and the time available, the CMO estimate may be as informal as an oral briefing or as formal as a detailed written document. The CA staff identifies resource shortfalls during mission analysis. This includes the requirement for additional functional specialists, translators, liaisons or SMEs.

The most important product of mission analysis will be the mission statement, accompanied by a refined statement of commander’s intent and commander’s planning guidance. The mission statement is the commander’s answer to the fundamental question “What do I want to do?” In operations with a large civil-military component, the mission statement from higher headquarters may allow the MAGTF commander considerable latitude in defining the MAGTF mission statement. For example, the higher mission statement may be phrased as “Support the Government of” or “Provide FHA to.” The CA staff works along with other staff sections to refine this guidance and produce a MAGTF mission statement that is achievable and that notifies higher headquarters of the specific limits to MAGTF capabilities and intentions. During combat operations, CMO may be an element of the MAGTF’s battlespace shaping actions, which will set conditions for decisive action. Once the mission statement is written, the MAGTF staff begins to develop COAs that will solve the now clearly stated problem.

Course of Action Development

COA development generates options that meet the requirements of the mission, the commander’s intent, and the commander’s planning guidance. In essence, COA development suggests answers to the commander’s question “How do I want to do it?” These options will be compared and weighed to ensure they are suitable, feasible, and complete. After wargaming, the commander will eventually select one COA for further planning and execution. During the development stage, the CA staff must identify COAs that require CMO support. At this point the staff will also begin to consider the task organization required to support each COA. During operations that are CMO intensive, such as FHA, the commander might explore whether or not the MAGTF will directly accomplish specific functions or instead concentrate on facilitating the operations of other agencies.
Developed COAs are briefed to the commander. This brief may include initial estimates of supportability from subordinate commanders and staff estimates, including those provided by the CA staff. The CA staff estimate will briefly summarize the civil-military aspects of the situation that influence each COA and how each of the CMO aspects of the COA are vulnerable to enemy efforts. The CMO estimate will identify those COA that are supportable or not supportable, with regard to assets available and civil-military impact in the AO.

Course of Action War Game

COA wargaming involves a detailed assessment of each approved COA as it pertains to the enemy and the battlespace. The CMO considerations of each COA are contained within this battlespace evaluation. The CA staff can be especially valuable in considering the possible actions of civilian populations and organizations, the impact of military forces, and enemy CMO efforts, since wargaming relies heavily on the operational experience and judgment of the commander and his staff. As the staff evaluates each COA against enemy COA, the CA staff must consider the likely civilian actions and reactions to MAGTF operations.

Course of Action Comparison and Decision

During the course of wargaming, the staff (including CA staff) will record the advantages and disadvantages of each COA, and identify possible branch plans and sequels. For example, a particular COA may direct DC traffic along key lines of communication that may disrupt operations. A branch plan will be required to resolve this source of friction. Wargaming might also indicate that MAGTF operations are vulnerable to enemy CMO, in that they might be portrayed in a negative light to an undecided civilian population. In this case, the COA might require either modification or supporting civil information or PSYOP efforts. COA wargaming may also indicate requirements for additional communication, coordination, and liaison with civilian organizations. The COA war game will help refine the CA staff estimate of supportability.

During COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates all friendly COAs and selects the one that will best accomplish the mission. The commander may also refine the mission statement (including his commanders intent and essential tasks) and identify any branches of the chosen COA for further staff attention. The MAGTF CA officer supports a COA both as a staff officer and as a subordinate commander. As a staff officer, he provides his expertise to indicate which of the various COAs is most likely to achieve success with regard to civil-military concerns. As a commander, the CA officer might provide such an estimate in terms of the CA personnel available to support the various COAs.

Orders Development

The orders development step in the MCPP enables the commander to communicate his decisions and intent across the MAGTF. Development includes detailed planning of the basic order and necessary annexes and appendices. Throughout development, it is important to consider that the output will be given to commanders and other members of the force who may not have participated in the previous planning process. Therefore, the approved order or plan must contain enough information to guide required actions, while enabling effective independent decisionmaking as opportunities and threats arise during the operation.

The CA staff is typically responsible for preparing Annex G (Civil Affairs) to the OPORD, along with appropriate appendices. The CA staff assists in orders reconciliation, ensuring that the basic order and all the annexes and appendices are complete and in agreement. The orders development process may also include the preparation of branch plans; guiding actions to be taken in the event of likely
incidents during operations. The OPORD should also deliberate CA-related reporting requirements (see appendices B and C). Once the OPORD is developed, it must be transitioned to the force for execution.

**Transition**

The transition process provides a shift from planning to execution. It enhances the situational awareness of those who will execute the order, maintains the intent of the commander’s concept of operations, and promotes unity of effort. The transition process may include transition briefs, transition drills, and/or confirmation briefs. The CA staff may participate in any of these efforts, ensuring that those who will execute the order know and understand the actions they must accomplish.

The MAGTF CA officer may have dual responsibilities during transition, serving as a member of the staff and as a commander. First, he must ensure that all MAGTF elements are prepared to execute the order. Second, he must ensure his subordinate CA elements are specifically prepared and equipped for any tasks they are required to execute. Participation of all CA elements in planning is essential. Table 3-1 illustrates CMO integration into the MCPP. Appendix D provides a sample deployment checklist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>CMO Concern</th>
<th>Continuing Actions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mission Analysis</td>
<td>Support commander’s battlespace area evaluation.</td>
<td>Update political, cultural, social information. Identify and evaluate external civilian organizations.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identify centers of gravity.</td>
<td>Analyze/determine critical vulnerabilities.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify constraints/restraints.</td>
<td>Same.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommend CMO Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).</td>
<td>Identify and forward requests for information.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify MAGTF and CMO tasks.</td>
<td>Same.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initiate CMO staff estimate.</td>
<td>Update/refine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Present mission analysis.</td>
<td>Update/refine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. COA Development</td>
<td>Develop one or more COA.</td>
<td>Ensure suitability, feasibility, acceptability, completeness.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Brief COA.</td>
<td>Consider required task organization.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Select COA for wargaming.</td>
<td>Same.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop commander’s evaluation criteria.</td>
<td>Impact of civilians on each COA.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Impact of each COA on civilians.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political/informational considerations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. COA War Game</td>
<td>War game each COA.</td>
<td>Consider “what if?”</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Record advantages/disadvantages of each COA.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify additional tasks.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identify branches and sequels.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Identify tasking for CA element; e.g., supported units, liaison requirements.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify MAGTF elements requiring CA support.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Refine CMO staff estimate.</td>
<td>Same.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refine CMO estimate of supportability.</td>
<td>Same.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Interagency Coordination Process

MAGTF operations are increasingly likely to be conducted in an interagency environment. OGAs, IOs, and NGOs will often be involved in a crisis before the arrival of the MAGTF. Interagency coordination forges a vital link between the military and the economic, political, diplomatic, humanitarian, and informational entities of the USG, the HN, and NGOs. Effective communication and cooperation enables access to capabilities and resources not typically under MAGTF control. Synchronization of efforts leads to synergy with the application of each capability adding to the effectiveness of the others.

United States Government Agency Coordination

CMO and the missions they support are complex and may require the effective coordination of many USG agencies. Detailed coordination develops and maintains a common framework for planning and an understanding of common purpose. Many agencies have unique skills, resources, and experience. Cooperation and coordination based on respect and moral purpose, can unify the effort. To facilitate coordination, a clear chain of command should be defined.

Facilitation of Effort

CMO are best used to facilitate the efforts of other organizations. For example, there may be a requirement to feed a group of civilians. The MAGTF could task the combat service support element with this mission, providing not only the food but also the logistics to deliver it. Preferably, however, MAGTF CA personnel might identify an agency with available food stocks, and perhaps another with logistics capabilities. By coordinating their activities, and perhaps by providing enabling capabilities such as security, communications, and air or seaport access, the mission is accomplished without unnecessary use of military resources. By developing and advertising simple procedures and points of contact, the MAGTF enables other agencies, many with substantial resources, to meet requirements with minimum use of MAGTF resources. Whenever possible, CMO seek synergy; the combination of efforts and resources, which has a combined effect greater than those same resources if left to work in isolation.

Assessment and Analysis

CA personnel can assist the MAGTF in assessing social, cultural, and economic factors. They can provide the commander with area
assessments that can provide a basis for developing guidance and for planning. They can analyze the role of other agencies and recommend COAs that synchronize CMO.

**Information Component**

CMO are inherently suited to support the battle for influence. At the ground level, actions between the MAGTF and civilian organizations put deeds into words, providing positive, tangible examples of US intentions. Conversely, when MAGTF interactions with civilians can be portrayed in a negative light by an adversary, there can be no doubt that they will be. The information component of CMO must not merely be anticipated, it must be aggressively exploited. It will help win public support, solidify coalitions, support diplomacy, and isolate the enemy. Popular support contributes to the success of CMO. The importance of coordinating CMO with PA and PSYOP cannot be overstressed. Information released through any one of these channels potentially affects all audiences.

**Combatant Commander**

Within a theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementing regional military strategies that require interagency coordination. The geographic combatant commander’s civil counterpart in a particular country is the US ambassador, who usually has overall direction, coordination, and supervision of USG activities and personnel in that nation. His authority does not extend to military forces assigned to the combatant commander. The ambassador chairs the country team, which includes the ranking representatives of embassy sections and other USG agencies operating within a country. Close coordination among the combatant commander and the ambassador and country team is essential and must complement the coordination achieved at the policy level between the various agencies involved.

When the UN, NATO or other IO establishes a mandate for a particular operation, a senior civilian coordinator is often appointed, such as a UN special representative. The international community may also designate a lead agency to coordinate the activities of civilian organizations. This lead agency and its partners may operate under legal agreements with HN governments. In any case, US military forces will need to establish methods of communicating and coordinating with these international structures while also conducting coordination among US agencies.

**Mutual Objectives**

Successful interagency operations bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. Interagency partners are unlikely to be under the command of the MAGTF, and there may be a wide interpretation of the desired goal. In the interagency environment, communication and coordination often replace command and control. The interagency process must establish common objectives and polices. Organizations must also develop mechanisms to share a common operational picture. A mutual appreciation of planned and current operations can help prevent problems and may lead to better opportunities for mutual support.

Across the full range of military operations, any MAGTF effort is likely to be an interagency operation conducted in support of US national interests. The relationship between military and civil authorities is based on mutual trust and confidence. A strong interagency relationship is often the difference between the success and failure. Communication and coordination complements command and control in the interagency process.
To establish mutual objectives and achieve effective coordination, the MAGTF may—

- Identify all agencies and organizations that are or should be involved in the operation.
- Identify the resources of each participant to reduce duplication of effort and increase coherence in the collective effort.
- Determine mutually supportable objectives for the operation.
- Define the desired end state and exit criteria.
- Define the types of information that can and cannot be exchanged. Establish agreed upon formats for data and develop means to share information useful to everyone.
- Plan for the transition of responsibilities to agencies with long-term duties and interests.
- Establish an interagency hierarchy when possible.
- Solicit from each agency, department or organization a clear understanding of the role that each plays.
- Define COAs for both military operations and agency activities.
- Identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities.
- Maximize the mission’s assets to support the long-term goals of the enterprise.
- Establish interagency assessment teams.

In addition to the HN government, the MAGTF will generally operate alongside three different types of civilian agencies: OGAs, NGOs, and IOs.

**Other Government Agencies**

Many organizations in the USG are structured and equipped to apply resources to resolve crisis, including diplomatic, economic, and informational. Careful communication and coordination are required to ensure mutual support between the MAGTF and these agencies.

**Nongovernmental Organizations and International Organizations**

NGOs and IOs are likely to be working wherever the MAGTF operates. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs/IOs are frequently on the scene long before US forces arrive. They are often willing to operate in high-risk areas and will likely remain after military forces have departed. Generally these organizations are guided by three principles: humanity, impartiality, and neutrality. NGOs and IOs are flexible, grassroots-focused, and involved in many diverse activities such as education, public health, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. They often refer to their efforts in a crisis as a “response.” The military refers to them as an “operation.”

These relief agencies may have substantial resources and can respond quickly and effectively to crises. They can help limit the resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Their extensive and long-term involvement, local contacts, and experience in various nations also make these organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional governments and civilian attitudes toward the operation. The large number of lives they affect and the resources they provide make them key centers for communication and coordination. They must be factored into the commander’s assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the MAGTF concept of operations.

NGOs are voluntary organizations. They write their own charter and missions and are legally different from governmental and international agencies. NGOs are funded by private donors, IOs, and governments. While not answerable to profit-making institutions, they are accountable to their various donors for their resources. NGOs
vary from long-standing organizations with substantial staffs and budgets, to charities operated by local community organizations. Properly conducted, the relationship between military forces and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting, but rather an associate or partnership relationship.

Inherent differences between the cultures and organization of military forces and NGOs present challenges to successful cooperation.

To protect their freedom to operate, NGOs are likely to be hesitant to identify too closely with the MAGTF. Collaboration or perceived collaboration with military forces may endanger both the missions of NGOs and the lives of their field staff, especially when a particular response or operation has strong political or military implications.

NGOs often operate without detailed planning. This is a by-product of their small staffs, limited ability to assess the situation prior to arrival on location, and inability to prejudge the degree to which donors will provide resources. However, NGOs can also reorient their efforts and assets with great agility.

Finally, the MAGTF may not be able to share information, especially about future plans or operations. Cooperation that identifies common objectives and establishes a clear understanding of what information can and cannot be shared is beneficial to all parties.

International organizations are established by intergovernmental agreements. They operate at the international level and are chartered by organizations such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe or the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office. Some IOs that are likely to be active during a crisis include the United Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme (WFP). The International Committee of the Red Cross is also an IO. While IOs conduct operations very much like NGOs, their support may be detailed to a designated civilian agency.

At the strategic level, countries work together in various ways to achieve agreement on policy. However, in the field, commanders and staffs must devote personal effort to develop effective mechanisms to create consensus among external organizations and achieve unity of purpose.

**Domestic Operations**

Military operations inside the US and its territories are limited by law and regulation. However, military assistance may be requested when situations require resources beyond civil capabilities. Guidance and direction for the command and control of these operations vary depending on the mission and support to be provided, but generally follow a similar pattern. The Federal Response Plan outlines how Federal agencies, including the DOD, assist State and local agencies that request assistance when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively. Additional DOD directives (DODDs), memoranda of understanding, and agreements provide details for military response for particular missions. For example, DODD 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*. See also MCO 3440.7A, *Marine Corps Support to Civil Authorities*.

Depending on the type of emergency, a civil command and control focal point for Federal response will be established. The FEMA has primary responsibility for coordinating Federal emergency preparedness, planning, management, and disaster assistance functions. Acting for the President, the FEMA will appoint a Federal coordinating officer who is responsible for coordinating Federal disaster assistance to States and territories. Plans for other emergencies designate a distinct lead Federal agency. For example,
the Attorney General is responsible for the management of the Federal response to civil disturbance. In any case, the Federal manager may request military resources from the DOD.

The Secretary of Defense retains approval authority for military involvement in domestic support operations. Typically, a military official will be specifically designated as the defense coordinating officer to orchestrate defense department support on-scene. Upon assignment, military forces will usually be formed into a JTF. This task force is typically placed in support of the Federal coordinating officer or the lead Federal agency.
This appendix contains a sample annex G (Civil Affairs) for MAGTF operations. It is generic and should be adjusted for the particular operation to be supported. Careful attention must be paid to the classification of this annex and individual paragraphs to share this document or appropriate portions with other agencies. Appendices to annex G are not mandated by joint or Marine Corps doctrine, but are used as necessary. These appendices are suggested as useful guides.

ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)  
(Operation CODEWORD) (U)

CIVIL AFFAIRS (U)

(U) REFERENCES: Cite references necessary for a complete understanding of this annex.

a. (U) Map.
b. (U) OPORD.
c. (U) Applicable operation/concept plan.

1. (U) Situation

   a. (U) General. Refer to basic plan and other annexes, as appropriate. Summarize the situation as it applies to civilian populace in the battlespace and the intentions and capabilities of the government, if any. Do not repeat information contained in the general situation paragraph of the basic OPORD or plan or detailed information in the appendices. Emphasize areas affecting displaced persons, government stability, and destruction or degradation of civilian infrastructure. Consider the support of the government by the populace, and the probable reaction of the populace towards US intervention. Consider the civil impact of MAGTF operations in the battlespace and elsewhere in the region.
CLASSIFICATION

(1) (U) Establish the legal basis for, and expected scope of, CMO in this operation and include identification of pertinent international and civil-military agreements.

For example, the MAGTF will meet legal and moral obligations to the civilian populace in the area of influence. Operations will be planned to cause the minimum suffering for noncombatants. It is US policy that operations must meet, and if possible exceed, the ROE, laws of warfare, and the Geneva Convention.

(2) (U) State the purpose of this annex, which normally is to provide instructions for guiding all relationships between the military force and civil organizations, authorities, and inhabitants in the AO.

For example, this annex with supporting appendices identifies CMO for all phases of the operation, and guides all relationships between the MAGTF and civil authorities, inhabitants, IOs and NGOs, and third country nationals (TCNs). When the MAGTF is employed as an enabling force for larger, follow-on forces, CMO may be directed towards obtaining and reporting an accurate assessment of the current civil-military situation, and creating an information infrastructure to support future CMO.

b. (U) Enemy. Refer to annex B (Intelligence). Assess the impact of enemy capabilities and probable COA on the civil-military situation, with particular emphasis on identifying requirements for CMO. Consider the potential for enemy disruption of MAGTF CMO and the potential for the presentation of MAGTF operations to the local and world populace in a negative light. Summarize the expected civil-military situation, including government institutions, customs, and attitudes of the population, and availability of indigenous resources. Consider the effects of climate and terrain on CMO. Consider prevailing sociological conditions, including ethnic, religious, language or cultural tendencies that may present obstacles to effective MAGTF operations and CMO.

c. (U) Friendly. State the CA functions to be performed by civilian authorities of the US and allied governments in the AO. Identify local indigenous assets available to support and assist in CMO. Identify elements providing staff augmentation and expertise to the MAGTF. State location and capability of CMOC if established.

(1) (U) Identify unified commander’s structure for CMO. Restate policy and direction for the conduct of CMO.
(2) (U) Identify senior operational commander’s structure for CMO. Include commander naval forces when he is the supported commander. Restate mission for the conduct of CMO.

(3) (U) Consider OGA plans and activities in the battlespace. Consider Department of State (DOS)/American Embassy (AMEMB) guidance and activities. DOS/AMEMB provides general information on US and other TCNs in the AO, and provides information on the requirements of international law, agreements, principles or policies that apply to the MAGTF. This may include status-of-force agreement, staging and basing rights, logistical support or purchasing rights. Identify non-DOS US agencies and personnel with experience in the AO. This may include agencies operating from within the AMEMB, such as Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Justice (DOJ), Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), and United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).

d. (U) Assumptions. List the basic assumptions upon which CMO planning is based. Consider assumptions concerning US policy, international and civil-military agreements, enemy COAs, and availability of HN resources. Consider making appropriate assumptions about NGO COAs. Consider the need and opportunity to plan and/or to execute CMO during each planned phase of the operation.

2. (U) Mission. State the mission to be accomplished by CMO in support of the operations envisaged in the basic plan.

For example, on order, conduct CMO to support MAGTF operations as identified in the basic plan. Enhance MAGTF freedom of action. Prevent civilian interference with the MAGTF’s military mission. Identify and coordinate civilian resources that support MAGTF’s operations. Deny a supportive operational environment to the enemy, especially to asymmetric threats. Be prepared to support mass casualty operations and consequence management. Desired end state typically includes a stable and secure environment permitting redeployment of the MAGTF from the AO and/or a return to amphibious shipping.

3. (U) Execution. Include alternative plans. Use appendixes to provide long, detailed guidance.

a. (U) Concept of the Operations. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution of CMO from beginning to end of the operation. Describe how CMO will support the MAGTF’s operational mission.
CLASSIFICATION

(1) (U) Time-phasing of the operation.

(2) (U) Include the principal types of CMO to be performed. Consider describing
the concept for PRC, FNS, FHA, military civil assistance, and domestic support
operations. (The MAGTF is not capable of the execution of civil administration
with organic assets.)

(3) (U) Deployment and employment of assets and elements in CMO support.

(4) (U) Scope and duration, to include post-conflict operations. Consider
pre-operation, immediate, sustained, and redeployment requirements.

(5) (U) Clear and concise end states for CMO that describe the successful
completion of each phase and COA.

(6) (U) Function and operation of the CMOC, if established.

b. (U) Tasks. List the tasks assigned to each element of the MAGTF in separate
numbered subparagraphs. Tasks should reflect the task organization in the basic plan.
Each task should be a concise statement of a mission to be performed.

(1) (U) Command element: When directed, establish a CMOC to
provide an accessible point of contact and to serve as an interface between the
MAGTF and civilian organizations, leaders, and the population.

(2) (U) Ground combat element: Execute CMO within assigned boundaries
to minimize civilian interference and maximize civilian support for MAGTF
operations. Provide security to designated CMO. Be prepared to establish a “911”
system for emergency support of designated external agencies and organizations.
Be prepared to provide representation to the CMOC when established.

(3) (U) Aviation combat element: Execute CMO within assigned boundaries in
order to minimize civilian interference and maximize civilian support for MAGTF
operations. Provide representation to the CMOC when established. Be prepared to
support MAGTF CMO when directed. Be prepared to support ground combat ele-
ment response operations.

(4) (U) Combat service support element: Execute CMO within assigned
boundaries to minimize civilian interference and maximize civilian support for
MAGTF operations. Be prepared to support the establishment of the CMOC.
Be prepared to provide representation and planning support to the CMOC. Be
prepared to conduct mass casualty operations. Be prepared to provide FHA. Be
prepared to establish DC camps. Be prepared to support validated requests by the
HN, NGOs, and allies for logistics support.

Page number

CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION

(5) (U) Civil affairs element: Consider describing in terms of CA functions to be performed; DCs, cultural relations, public safety, civilian supply, civil information, legal, public health, public works and utilities, public communications.

(6) (U) Psychological operations element:

(7) (U) Military police element:

(8) (U) Staff Judge Advocate:

(9) (U) Public affairs officer:

(10) (U) Contracting officer:

(11) (U) Environmental health/US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIDE) element:

(12) (U) MAGTF surgeon:

(13) (U) Counterintelligence:

c. (U) Coordinating Instructions. List the instructions common to two or more elements of the MAGTF. Areas or events requiring coordination include but are not limited to:

(1) (U) Establishment of CMO boundaries.

(2) (U) Liaison arrangements with allied forces and between subordinate commands.

(3) (U) Claims policies, in consonance with legal policies.

(4) (U) Liaison and coordination with USG agencies. This includes coordination of IO.

(5) (U) Liaison and coordination with host country, other friendly countries, governments, and NGO’s.

(6) (U) PSYOP support to CMO.

(7) (U) CMO will be planned centrally and executed locally.

(8) Use non-MAGTF resources to support CMO whenever possible.
CLASSIFICATION

(9) (U) Direction on providing medical support to external agencies and individuals.

(10) (U) Units will avoid establishing positions in the vicinity of civilian locations. Under no circumstances allow hostile forces to create an incident that requires you to fire into civilian locations. When the situation demands it, include civilian locations within your defensive scheme of maneuver.

(11) (U) Commanders will attempt to coordinate with civilian authorities within their zones, and make every effort to be responsive to their needs.

(12) (U) Every effort will be made to interact with civilians through their own authorities.

(13) (U) Displaced persons routes and camps will be planned to avoid MAGTF high-value targets.

(14) (U) Establish measures to protect religious, culturally significant, and other specified properties (see appendix 2).

(15) (U) Barrier plans must be approved by MAGTF commanding officer, and will be coordinated with HN government.

(16) (U) When CA assets are assigned below the CE, the supported element provides support, to include communications and logistics requirements.

d. (U) Commander’s Critical Information Requirements. Identify information on friendly, enemy, and civilian activities in the battlespace that the commander deems as critical for the conduct of CMO.

   (1) (U) Report any US or enemy violation of international law.

   (2) (U) Report any groups of 50 or more DCs as a spot report.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

   a. (U) Military Resource Requirements. State any applicable requirements to maintain military equipment and supplies for support of CMO. (Refer to annex D, [Logistics].)

   b. (U) Civilian Personnel. Estimate the local civilian labor required and available to support military operations. (Refer to annex E [Personnel].)
c. (U) Civilian Facilities and Supplies. Estimate the local civilian facilities and supplies required and available to support the operation. (Refer to annex D [Logistics].)

d. (U) Reports. Establish any necessary administrative reporting requirements.

   (1) (U) Report location of CMOC and provide daily CMOC report when established below the CE level.

   (2) (U) Locate, record, and report names of potential translators.

5. (U) Command and Control. Indicate the difference, if any, between the command channels for the conduct of CMO and the command relationships established in annex J. Specify command relationships and logistics of CMO efforts and forces (emphasize difference between efforts and forces). Include any changes or transitions between command and control organizations and the time of the expected shift. Identify all agreements and memorandums of understanding used and those requiring development.

   a. (U) CMO are a command responsibility at all levels.

   b. (U) The G-3/S-3 operations officer (or MAGTF CA officer) has staff cognizance over all CA activities and planning.

   c. (U) The CA officer is generally located with the landing force operations center.

   d. (U) When assigned an operational role, CA personnel are generally established in a location that facilitates interface with civilian authorities and has reliable communications with the supported commander. This is usually in the vicinity of the main command post. CA personnel may also be assigned to the forward CE, if inserted. They may be assigned to support subordinate elements when appropriate.

   e. (U) Location of a CMOC is to be determined, generally in a location that provides adequate access and security for all parties (civilian and military) while ensuring adequate operational security and force protection.
ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

APPENDIXES:

1 – Information Requirements
2 – Protected Target Guidance
3 – CMOC Operations
4 – Transition Matrix)

OFFICIAL:

/s/
Name
Rank and Service
Title
APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)
(Operation CODEWORD) (U)

INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS (U)

1. (U) Availability of US Personnel Experienced in AO
   a. (U) US law enforcement/Government; e.g., FBI, NCIS, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).
   b. (U) US business leaders.

2. (U) Civil Authority
   a. (U) Perceived legitimacy of national and local police forces by civilian populace.
      (1) (U) By urban populace.
      (2) (U) By rural populace.
   b. (U) Location of civil authority headquarters. Names and method to contact commanders.
      (1) (U) Local government.
      (2) (U) Police forces.
      (3) (U) Fire services.
      (4) (U) Hospitals/medical services.
      (5) (U) Public works and sanitation.
      (6) (U) Emergency management operations centers.
CLASSIFICATION

c. (U) Availability of identity rosters, photos. Description or samples of identification cards.
d. (U) Attitude of local authorities towards US intervention.
e. (U) Location of government facilities in AO.
f. (U) NGOs/IOs operating in AO.
   (1) (U) In-country headquarters locations, points of contact, methods of contact.
   (2) (U) Worldwide headquarters, points of contact, methods of contact.
   (3) (U) Missions, capabilities, experience of organizations operating in AO.
g. (U) Hospitals.
   (1) (U) Names, locations, capacity.
   (2) (U) Specialties, adequacy, condition.
h. (U) Water supply.
   (1) (U) Type and location of source.
   (2) (U) Delivery methods.
   (3) (U) Treatment plants.
   (4) (U) Storage facilities.
   (5) (U) Average consumption by industry, agriculture.
   (6) (U) Total system, capacity.
i. (U) Food distribution centers.
   (1) (U) Location.
   (2) (U) Projected stocks.
   (3) (U) Managers/NGO operators.
j. (U) Engineer/construction facilities and equipment.
   (1) (U) Location and type.
   (2) (U) Stocks of construction equipment and materials.
CLASSIFICATION

k. (U) Sociological and cultural makeup of the populace.
   (1) (U) Languages/dialects.
      (a) (U) Spoken.
      (b) (U) Written.
      (c) (U) Literacy rate.
   (2) (U) Customs.
   (3) (U) Typical diet, prevalent medical concerns.
   (4) (U) Basic physical condition.

l. (U) History of past foreign/US military involvement on AO.
m. (U) Existing treaties, status of forces agreement with US.

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/s/
Name
Rank and Service
Title
APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number)
(Operation CODEWORD) (U)

PROTECTED TARGET GUIDANCE (U)

1. (U) General
   a. (U) This appendix provides guidance for commanders and fire support planners to assist in the development of the MAGTF protected targets list. Protected targets are those locations that the law of war deems exempt from fires of combatant forces because of cultural, religious or population support functions. MAGTF planners will consider the cultural, economic, political, and informational aspects of all operations.
   
b. (U) Deliberate targeting avoids the following types of facilities due to their cultural, economic, and social significance:
      1. (U) Religious facilities.
      2. (U) Cultural and historic institutions, to include museums, art galleries, and commemorative parks.
      3. (U) Nonmilitary schools.
      4. (U) Hospitals, clinics, and medical treatment and supply facilities.
   c. (U) MAGTF planners will consider establishing the following as protected targets, due to their population support functions and the potential impact of their destruction on post-hostility reconstruction:
      1. (U) Water supply facilities.
      2. (U) Electric power generation and control facilities.
      3. (U) Waste water treatment facilities.
   d. (U) MAGTF planners will consider establishing archival and recordkeeping facilities such as libraries as protected targets, due to their unique value in re-establishing post-hostility public order and economic stability.
CIVIL MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER OPERATIONS (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

a. (U) Relevant OPORD.

b. (U) Maps and Overlays.

1. (U) Situation. Include governmental, international, and NGOs present in the AO.

2. (U) Mission. On order the MAGTF establishes a CMOC ashore to facilitate communication, coordination between the MAGTF and external civilian organizations and populations. Facilitate communications and coordination between civilian organizations to minimize the requirements for MAGTF personnel, equipment, and supplies by coordinating and facilitating the usage of non-MAGTF resources. Minimize the use of MAGTF resources to meet civilian requirements, including the demands on the time of commanders and staffs. Maximize civilian support for MAGTF operations. Assist the MAGTF to meet the commander’s legal and moral obligations to civilians in the MAGTF AO.

3. (U) Execution

   a. (U) Concept of CMO. The CMOC is intended to provide “one-stop shopping” for interface between the MAGTF and civilians.

      (1) (U) The term civilian includes—

         (a) (U) Other US and allied government agencies; e.g., NATO, USAID, OFDA, FEMA.

         (b) (U) HN security/law enforcement agencies.
(c) (U) HN nonmilitary agencies; e.g., religious, relief efforts.

(d) (U) HN political bodies; e.g., governor, mayor, emergency operations center.

(e) (U) IOs; e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

(f) (U) NGOs; e.g., Oxford Famine Relief, Islamic African Relief Agency, Doctors without Borders.

(g) (U) Civilian inhabitants of the AO.

(2) (U) The functions the CMOC provides may include the following:

(a) (U) Validating civilian requests for support from MAGTF including—

1 (U) Security escort.

2 (U) Command, control, and communications support.

3 (U) Engineer support/civil engineering.

4 (U) Provide daily situation and security briefs to civilian agencies (not intended to replace the joint information bureau).

5 (U) Promulgate and explain MAGTF policies to civilian agencies/ HN (command continues to show personal respect to senior political structures).

6 (U) Host/convene planning sessions among multiple agencies with differing skills, interests.

7 (U) Administer and issue identification cards/passes to validated agencies and personnel.

8 (U) Develop/promulgate “911” system for response to civilian security contingencies.

9 (U) Coordinate access to airport, air traffic control, ramp space, materials handling equipment, maintenance facilities, and equipment.
CLASSIFICATION

10 (U) Coordinate seaport access, mooring locations, pilot/tug support, pier space, cargo handling, and materials handling equipment assets.

11 (U) Frequency management.

12 (U) Validate and process civilian requests for space available transport on military aircraft/sealift (passenger and cargo).

(b) (U) Tasks

1 (U) Command element: Establish CMOC.

2 (U) Combat service support element: Provide required facilities to maintain a 24-hour CMOC. Provide logistics and embarkation planning representatives.

3 (U) Aviation combat element: Be prepared to support airfield operations and strategic lift tasking and requirements.

4 (U) Ground combat element: Provide planning representatives to coordinate security escort for civilian operations.

(c) (U) Coordinating Instructions: Major subordinate elements may establish local CMOCs in zone.

4. (U) Administration and Logistics

a. (U) Equipment required by priority:

(1) (U) Tentage:

(a) (U) Operations tent.

(b) (U) Briefing tent.

(2) (U) Communications:

(a) (U) Wire to supported COC.

(b) (U) Very high frequency/high frequency/cell phone to assessment personnel.

(c) (U) Plain old telephone system (access to combatant commander/JTF J-5, as required).

(d) (U) Facsimile capability.
CLASSIFICATION

(e) (U) Local area network to MAGTF/Marine Corps forces operations centers.

(f) (U) Local area network/wide area network to AMEMB.

(g) (U) Nonsecure internet protocol router network/Internet access.

(h) (U) Defense Switched Network access.

(i) (U) Secure telephone unit-III.

(3) (U) Transportation:

(a) (U) Any 4-wheel drive.

(b) (U) Any M998 (4 seat, high back).

(c) (U) Civilian vehicle.

(d) (U) Eight plus passenger vehicle.

(4) (U) Manning (as available): (Note: Notional only)

(a) (U) Director (policy, future operations).

(b) (U) Deputy director (next 24 hours).

(c) (U) Operations chief (current operations, communications guard).

(d) (U) Administrative assistant (security, driver).

(e) (U) Log planner (surface/air transport).

(f) (U) Force protection planner (security planning).

(5) (U) Command and Control.

(a) (U) CMOC location: Located in vicinity of MAGTF operations center, allowing for simplest coordination. Walking distance best, outside protective wire of operations center. Allows use of field wire communications. For FHA and noncombatant evacuation operation missions, CMOC may be the combat service support element’s combat service support operations center.
CLASSIFICATION

(b) (U) Information Management. (Example)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
<td>Repatriation</td>
<td>35 large lorries, 4 contract interpreters</td>
<td>International Maritime Satellite System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Food Programme (WFP)</td>
<td>Dislocated civilian feeding</td>
<td>12 large lorries, 120 tons wheat flour</td>
<td>Internet address <a href="http://www.wfp.org">www.wfp.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name
Rank and Service
Title

OFFICIAL:
/s/
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Rank and Service
Title
APPENDIX 4 TO ANNEX G TO OPERATION ORDER OR PLAN (Number) (U)
(Operation CODEWORD) (U)

TRANSITION MATRIX (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

   a. (U) Relevant OPORD.

   b. (U) Maps and overlays.

1. (U) The transition matrix (table A-1) is a planning and coordination tool. It is primarily useful for communication between the MAGTF and external organizations and should be designed or modified so that it can be shared among all appropriate agencies. It should usually be posted at the CMOC. The transition matrix is a working document. CMO planners should expect that it will require frequent updating and dissemination as operations progress.

2. (U) The transition matrix should be prepared to support MAGTF and CMO concepts of operations with respect to timelines and responsibilities.

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/s/

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Rank and Service
Title

CLASSIFICATION
Table A-1. Transition Matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>Week 1</th>
<th>Week 2</th>
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<th>Week 4</th>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
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<td>USMC/UNHCR</td>
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<td>Blankets/Sleeping</td>
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<td>HCR/UNICEF</td>
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<td>Cots</td>
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<td>USMC/UNHCR</td>
<td>UNHCR/OXFAM</td>
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<td>UNHCR/OXFAM</td>
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<td>USMC/UNHCR</td>
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<td>Shower Facilities</td>
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<td>Portable Toilet</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>UNHCR/Contractor</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>UNICEF/NGO</td>
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<td>Testing/Training</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Source</td>
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<td>USMC/Contractor</td>
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Table A-1. Transition Matrix (Continued).

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<td>Response Procedures</td>
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</table>

**LEGEND:**

AICF = Action Internationale Contre la Faim (International Action Against Hunger)
MNF = Multinational force
MSF = Medicins San Frontiers (“Doctors without Borders”)
NGO = nongovernmental organization
OXFAM = Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
UNICEF = United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
UNHCR = United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees
USMC = United States Marine Corps
WFP = World Food Programme
This report provides a timely summary of significant CMO in the AO. This report is usually unclassified.

PERIODIC CIVIL AFFAIRS REPORT (Number) (U)

PERIOD COVERED: date and time to date and time
REFERENCES: List maps (serial number, sheets, edition, scale) or charts.

1. (U) Civil Affairs Situation at End of Period. Location of CA units and major activities of each; any important changes in CA operational zones or areas; principal incidents and events since last report. Indicated on map or overlay annex whenever possible.

2. (U) Governmental Affairs. Use annexes as necessary.
   a. (U) Civil administration.
   b. (U) Legal.
   c. (U) Public safety.
   d. (U) Public health.
   e. (U) Public welfare.
   f. (U) Public education.
   g. (U) Labor.
   h. (U) Public finance.
   i. (U) Civil defense.
CLASSIFICATION

3. (U) Economics. Use annexes as necessary and practicable.
   a. (U) Economics and commerce.
   b. (U) Food and agriculture.
   c. (U) Property control.
   d. (U) Civilian supply.

4. (U) Public facilities. Use annexes as necessary.
   a. (U) Public works and utilities.
   b. (U) Public transportation.
   c. (U) Public communications.

5. (U) Special Functions
   a. (U) Civil information.
   b. (U) Dislocated civilians.
   c. (U) Arts, monuments, and archives.
   d. (U) Cultural affairs.

6. (U) Miscellaneous. Indicate any special recommendations and requests, such as special CA personnel problems existing or anticipated; requisition of additional units; recommendations for lifting of controls and restrictions; recommendations for troop indoctrination and other matters not properly covered in the paragraphs above.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name
Rank and Service
Title

Authentication:
Annexes:
Distribution:

Page number

CLASSIFICATION
APPENDIX C
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STATUS REPORT

The CMO status report is a joint format. It is appropriate for use by any echelon of command. During joint operations it may be required by the JFC. When used within MAGTF elements, it may be abbreviated as required. It is generally used to provide a status of the CA and civilian-military cooperation and relations situation. (See FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.)

**TITLE: CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STATUS REPORT NUMBER:**
C015 {UNITED STATES MESSAGE TEXT FORMAT# B991}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LINE 1 - DATE-TIME GROUP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LINE 2 - UNIT (Unit making report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 3 - LIAISON (Establishment of and changes in liaison arrangements between civil and military personnel)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 4 - CONTROL (Establishment and changes in location, status, activity of control nodes and in the CMO AO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 5 - AREA OF OPERATIONS (CMO AO name)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 6 - US CIVILIANS (Total number of US civilians in AO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 7 - THIRD COUNTRY (Total number of third country civilians in AO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 8 - FOREIGN NATION (Total number of foreign nation civilians in AO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 9 - TOTAL CIVILIAN POPULATION (Total civilian population in the AO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 10 - MALES UNDER 16 (Total number of dislocated males under 16 years of age)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 11 - UNACCOMPANIED MALES UNDER 16 (Total number of dislocated unaccompanied males under 16 years of age)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 12 - MALES OVER 60 (Total number of dislocated males over 60 years of age)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 13 - MARRIED MALES (Total number of dislocated married males)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 14 - SINGLE MALES (Total number of dislocated single males)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LINE 15 - FEMALES UNDER 16 (Total number of dislocated females under 16 years of age)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>LINE 17 - FEMALES OVER 60 (Total number of females over 60 years of age)</td>
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<td>LINE 18 - MARRIED FEMALES (Total number of dislocated married females)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LINE 19 - SINGLE FEMALES (Total number of dislocated single females)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LINE 20 - DISLOCATED MALES (Total number of dislocated males in AO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LINE 21 - DISLOCATED FEMALES (Total number of dislocated males in AO)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>LINE 22</strong> - TOTAL MALES AND FEMALES</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 23</strong> - CONTROLLED</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 24</strong> - UNCONTROLLED</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 25</strong> - MANPOWER</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 26</strong> - PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 27</strong> - LEGAL</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 28</strong> - INTELLIGENCE</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 29</strong> - LAW AND ORDER</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 30</strong> - PUBLIC HEALTH</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 31</strong> - SUPPLY</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 32</strong> - TRANSPORTATION</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 34</strong> - WATER PRODUCTION</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 35</strong> - SEWAGE TREATMENT</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 36</strong> - REFUSE</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 37</strong> - RADIO</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 38</strong> - TELEVISION</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 39</strong> - NEWSPAPER</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 40</strong> - POSTAL</td>
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<td><strong>LINE 43</strong> - TELETYPE</td>
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APPENDIX D
SAMPLE DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST

Step 1: Pre-Operation

- Begin information gathering.
  - Identify and request information required or desired for planning.
  - Explore systems that failed and led to the present operation.
  - Explore systems that succeeded previously and that might be regenerated efficiently.
  - Deploy a forward liaison element to develop information requirements.
- Prepare the force.
  - Educate Marines in the civil-military context of the operation to include language. (See Appendix E for sample language and customs card.)
  - Prepare leaders and individual Marines to make effective decisions based on civil-military considerations.
  - Prepare Marines to support information operations.
  - Establish coordination and communication channels with external civilian organizations.

Step 2: Arrival in the Area of Operations

- Perform CMO to support MAGTF deployment.
- Validate, update, and disseminate CMO estimate of the situation.
  - Perform area assessments to validate area studies.
  - Recommend adjustments to the force task organization to support CMO, including CA elements.
- Prioritize the CMO effort appropriately to the mission.
  - Identify what is immediately necessary.
  - Accomplish what is immediately possible, enhancing MAGTF legitimacy, civil support, and force protection.
  - Enhance the legitimacy of the HN government.
- Define specific desired end states and refine plans.
- Confirm communication and coordination channels.
  - Higher, adjacent, and supporting CMO and CA elements.
  - Civilian agencies in the AO.
  - Reach back elements.

Step 3: Sustainable Operations

- Perform CMO to support the MAGTF.
- Repair/create social, cultural or physical (when authorized) infrastructure that will support long-term success.
  - Conduct DC operations; move DCs to locations where they can be supported by other agencies or move the agencies to DC centers.
  - Develop civilian capabilities that can assume responsibility for civil concerns after MAGTF redeployment.
  - Be cautious in simply recreating systems that previously existed; they failed and led to the MAGTF’s introduction. Fix problems.
- Complete planning for transition of responsibilities to external agencies.
- Enhance the legitimacy of governments and agencies that will provide support after the MAGTF redeploy.
- Facilitate the repatriation of civilians.
- Process claims against the MAGTF.

Step 4: Redeployment

- Perform CMO to support MAGTF redeployment.
- Transition civil responsibilities back to civilian organizations.
# APPENDIX E
## SAMPLE LANGUAGE AND CUSTOMS CARD

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<th>ENGLISH</th>
<th>ALBANIAN</th>
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<td>How are you?</td>
<td>Si Je? (F) Si Jeni?</td>
<td>Si JAY/jAYnee?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hello</td>
<td>Tungjatjeta</td>
<td>ToonjAHyehtah</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes/No</td>
<td>PoJo</td>
<td>Poh/Yoh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Now</td>
<td>Tani</td>
<td>THAN-ee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodbye</td>
<td>Lamtunire</td>
<td>LahmontooMEER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please</td>
<td>Ju lutem</td>
<td>yoo IOOtehm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thank you</td>
<td>Ju falem nderit</td>
<td>yoo fAHtehm ndEHree</td>
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<td>Bathroom</td>
<td>Nevojotre</td>
<td>NAyvoTORay</td>
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<tr>
<td>To eat</td>
<td>Ha</td>
<td>HA</td>
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<tr>
<td>To drink</td>
<td>Pi</td>
<td>PEE</td>
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<td>Food</td>
<td>Ushqim</td>
<td>OOSHkim</td>
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<td>That way</td>
<td>Ande</td>
<td>AN-day</td>
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<td>To the right</td>
<td>Djathias</td>
<td>DYT-tas</td>
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<tr>
<td>To the left</td>
<td>Majtas</td>
<td>MAJ-tas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outside</td>
<td>Jashta</td>
<td>YASH-tay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inside</td>
<td>Brenda</td>
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<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>Veri</td>
<td>VAIRee</td>
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<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Jug</td>
<td>Yug</td>
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<td>East</td>
<td>Lindje</td>
<td>LINDay</td>
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<td>West</td>
<td>Perendim</td>
<td>PerENdim</td>
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<td>Safe</td>
<td>Kasaforte</td>
<td>KasahFORRay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>Armik</td>
<td>ahrrmEEK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>Mjek</td>
<td>Myeck</td>
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<td>Hospital</td>
<td>Spital</td>
<td>SPEElat</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pistol</td>
<td>Revolver</td>
<td>rehvohVERr</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifle</td>
<td>Pushike</td>
<td>pOOshk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man</td>
<td>Burre</td>
<td>BOORay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>Grua</td>
<td>GROOah</td>
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Religion: 85% Muslim 10% Greek Orthodox
Family/clan MORE IMPORTANT than town/country/religion.
Nod of head UP AND DOWN means “NO”.
Shaking head from SIDE TO SIDE means “YES”.

**RULES FOR BEHAVIOR WITH CIVILIANS**

- Do smile!!! KEEP MILITARY BEARING.
- Do treat civilians with respect and dignity.
- Do show respect for all religions.
- Do shake hands upon meeting and departing.
- Do allow civilians to stand within one foot of you.
- Do respect their cultures and traditions.
- Do not turn down a request directly. Suggest you will ask your OIC and try to help.
- Do not directly disagree about politics or religion.
- Do not photograph civilians, especially women, without their permission.
- Do not discuss operational details with civilians, including US media.
# APPENDIX F

## GLOSSARY

### Section I. Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>AICF</td>
<td>Action Internationale Contre La Faim (International Action Against Hunger)</td>
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<td>AMEMB</td>
<td>American Embassy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAG</td>
<td>civil affairs group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirements</td>
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<td>CE</td>
<td>command element</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COC</td>
<td>combat operations center</td>
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<td>DC</td>
<td>dislocated civilian</td>
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<td>DEA</td>
<td>Drug Enforcement Administration</td>
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<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<td>DOJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>FNS</td>
<td>foreign nation support</td>
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<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
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<td>FSSG</td>
<td>force service support group</td>
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<td>G-1</td>
<td>manpower or personnel officer (major subordinate commands and larger organizations)</td>
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<td>intelligence officer (major subordinate commands and larger organizations)</td>
</tr>
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<td>G-3</td>
<td>operations officer (major subordinate commands and larger organizations)</td>
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<td>logistics officer (major subordinate commands and larger organizations)</td>
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<td>G-5</td>
<td>plans officer (major subordinate commands and larger organizations)</td>
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<tr>
<td>G-6</td>
<td>communications and information systems officer (major subordinate commands and larger organizations)</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>international organization</td>
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<td>IR</td>
<td>intelligence requirement</td>
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<td>ISC</td>
<td>integrated staff cell</td>
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<td>J-5</td>
<td>plans officer (joint staff)</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>military civic action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCO</td>
<td>Marine Corps action</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCPP</td>
<td>Marine Corps Planning Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU(SOC)</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit (special operations capable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>military police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>maritime prepositioning force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>major subordinate command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Medicins Sans Frontieres (“Doctors Without Borders”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCIS</td>
<td>Naval Criminal Investigative Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OGA</td>
<td>other government agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
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<tr>
<td>OXFAM</td>
<td>Oxford Committee for Famine Relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAO</td>
<td>public affairs officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>provost marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>populace and resources control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-1</td>
<td>manpower or personnel officer (units and organizations below the major subordinate command level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>intelligence officer (units and organizations below the major subordinate command level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>operations officer (units and organizations below the major subordinate command level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-4</td>
<td>logistics officer (units and organizations below the major subordinate command level)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCN</td>
<td>third country national</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAMRID</td>
<td>US Army Medical Research of Infectious Diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Section II. Definitions

civil affairs—Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities—Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations—The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center—An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. (JP 1-02)

dislocated civilian—A broad term that includes a displaced person, a stateless person, an evacuee, an expellee, or a refugee. Also called DC. (JP 1-02)

displaced person—A civilian who is voluntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. (JP 1-02)

end state—The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander’s objectives. (JP 1-02)

evacuee—A civilian removed from a place of residence by military direction for reasons of personal security or the requirements of the military situation. (JP 1-02)

foreign humanitarian assistance—Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)

host nation—A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination—Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engages US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional
and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (JP 1-02)

**international organizations**—Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and the United Nation agencies. (JP 1-02)

**military civic action**—The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at timed advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

**nation assistance**—Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

**nongovernmental organizations**—Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGO’s. (JP 1-02)

**reach back**—The ability to exploit resources, capabilities expertise, etc., not physically located in the theater or a joint operations area, when established. (MCRP 5-12C)

**refugee**—A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 1-02)
APPENDIX G
REFERENCES AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

Department of Defense Directives (DODDs)

2000.1 Civil Affairs
3025.1 Military Support to Civil Authorities

Joint Publications (JPs)

| 1-02 | Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms |
| 1-05 | Religious Ministry Support for Joint Operations |
| 3-07.6 | Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance |
| 3-57 | Joint Doctrine for Civilian-Military Operations |

Marine Corps Doctrine Publications (MCDPs)

| 1-2 | Warfighting |
| 1-2 | Campaigning |

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

| 5-1 | Marine Corps Planning Process |
| 6-12 | Religious Ministry Support in the U.S. Marine Corps |

Marine Corps Order (MCO)

3440.7A Marine Corps Support to Civil Authorities

Army Field Manual (FM)

| 27-10 | The Law of Land Warfare |
| 41-10 | Civil Affairs Operations |

Miscellaneous

Law of Land Warfare
Geneva Convention