impossible to see anyone to fire at, so great was the darkness. But we all became satisfied afterwards that the cartridges were well expended for it convinced the enemy that we were well provided with ammunition and prevented him from attempting to get anywhere near us or in fact to show himself in the small open space to our front . . . . We had no information as to the strength of the force opposed to us but did know that the Spaniards had 7000 men at Guantanamo, only twelve miles distant. Furthermore we knew that we had no chance of reinforcements, as the Army had not even left the United States. Admiral Sampson could spare no ships from the blockade to assist us by landing an armed force, so that we knew our salvation was in our own hands . . . . 21

Cuzco Well

The day proved quiet. Attempts at repairing the Colt machine guns, which had broken during the night were completed. The cable ship Adria, the Glomar Explorer of her day, was successful in retrieving and splicing the submarine cable that the Marblehead had cut two weeks earlier. Direct contact with Washington would be possible the next day. Colonel Tomas of the Cuban insurgents arrived in camp and brought with him an additional 80 men. He suggested to Col Huntington "... the advisibility of sending out an attacking force in the morning to surprise the Spaniards and if possible to destroy their well, which project if successful would force them to retreat to Guantanamo their nearest water supply. Col. Huntington seeing that something desperate must be done to relieve the terrible strain under which his command was suffering, no one having had any rest or sleep for 100 hours, readily consented to the plan . . . ." 22

Captain George F. Elliott, soon to become the Brigadier General Commandant five years hence, was selected to lead the force to take the well at Cuzco . . . .

The hill ahead was almost vertical. At twelve noon the thermometer stood at 105 degrees. Although Elliott was not familiar with the terrain, it was clear that whoever could reach the top of the hill first--and hold it--would dominate the valley around Cuzco Well. Moving at a quickened pace, Stephen Crane heard George Elliott yell, "Now men, straight up this hill. The men charged up against the cactus, and, because I cared for the opinion of others, I found myself tagging along close at Elliott's heels." 23

The fight was now in the hands of the junior officers and sergeants. Cresting
the hill, they discovered that the ridge was no more than fifteen feet wide . . . . Horseshoe in shape it opened to the sea and commanded the encircled valley below. The commandancia of the Spanish garrison was in plain view, three hundred yards below, as was the well. Nearby was a thicket of shrubbery with large leaves which covered almost an acre. Going to ground on the razor back ridge, the Marines and Cubans lay in the noonday sun and poured a stream of fire into the enemy below.

Lieutenant Magill with 40 Marines had moved up on the ridge to the left of Elliotts' position and had begun to pour a flanking fire into the enemy below. Meanwhile, the Dolphin had moved towards the beach and again opened fire. Unbeknownst to her, Magill's men were now on the gun-target line. The shells went over the Spanish and crashed into Magill's position. Cursing Marines went to ground. At this point . . . it became necessary to stop the Dolphin at once. Captain Elliott . . . called hurriedly for another signalman. Sergeant Quick arose and announced that he was a signalman. He produced from somewhere a blue polka dot neckerchief as large as a quilt. He tied it on a long crooked stick. Then he went to the top of the ridge, and turning his back to the Spanish fire, began to signal the Dolphin . . . Suddenly someone shouted:

There they go! See 'em! See 'em! Forty rifles rang out. A number of figures and been seen to break from the other side of the thicket. The Spaniards were running. Now began one of the most extraordinary games ever played in war. The skirmish suddenly turned into something that was like a grim and frightful field sport. It did not appear so then for many reasons but when one reflects, it was trap-shooting . . . There were two open spaces which in their terror they did not attempt to avoid. One was 400 yards away, the other was 800. You could see the little figures, like pieces of white paper . . . Soon it was arranged on a system . . . a line of Marines was formed into a firing squad. Sometimes we could see a whole covey vanish miraculously after the volley . . .

Lieutenant Francisco Batista, one corporal, and sixteen privates made up the captured Spanish. One hundred and sixty bodies of their comrades littered the area. When interrogated, Batista revealed that the Spanish force was made up of six companies of the Siminca and Principe Regiments with two companies of Practicos. This force had been brought together from Guantanamo City and Caimanera the day previous, apparently with the intent of launching an assault against McCalla Hill . . . .
As the sun began its descent into the west, the march back to Camp McCalla began . . . The night was quiet. Cochrane wrote that there:

. . . was no attack today. The Spanish seem to have been driven off. Precautions continue. All rest in shoes and clothes and men carry rifles to meals . . . Most of the men are worn out and sleeping. Some so tired they could not eat. After breakfast half the command went to the beach for a bath. We were red with dirt, black streaks from smoke from our guns and our faces and hands covered with sores from the poisonous weeds we had been laying on. The red dirt wouldn't start with salt water and we had no soap or brushes, but the bath made us feel better any way.25

In Retrospect

In the space of four days, the battles for Guantanamo Bay marked the end of one era and the beginning of another. The battles were the crucible in which a new Corps of Marines was shaped. Forged in the fire of combat, using the weapons of modern warfare employed with tactics that reflected the best thinking of the day, a new generation of Marines was blooded.

In the Marine Corps classic, Soldiers of the Sea, Robert Debs Heinl, Jr. wrote that: "The operations of Huntington's battalion highlight important developments of the new Marine Corps of 1898. Like Reynold's battalion in 1861, the battalion was part of the Atlantic Fleet: an embryonic Fleet Marine Force if anybody in those days had thought of the term. Its organization was not that of the casual ship's landing party of the 19th century, but that of a self-contained unit built around the combined arms team. Its mobile base of operations was an 1898 attack transport, for the Panther, specifically fitted for expeditionary operations, was referred to repeatedly at the time as the Marine transport. The mission of Huntington's battalion was to land on hostile shores to seize an advanced base for the fleet . . . In other words, by action and not by theory, Colonel Huntington's fleet landing force had set a pattern for employment of U.S. Marines which would still stand more than half a century and three wars later."26

Writing in Semper Fidelis, Alan R. Millett noted that "Compared with the fighting soon to follow in the Army's campaign against Santiago, the action at Guantanamo was a minor skirmish of no consequence to the course of the war . . . ."27

In fact, Guantanamo Bay was the linch-pin to the entire invasion of Cuba and the ultimate capitulation of the Spanish government. Had the Marines retreated or been driven off by the Spanish, the Army landing at Santiago de Cuba would most certainly have been postponed. Simply put, it was a near thing.
Without a coaling station for the fleet, naval vessels would have had to journey to Key West to replenish their bunkers. Certainly the loss of Guantanamo Bay would have given the President and the War Department reason to pause. One can safely postulate that the invasion would have been postponed until the end of the malaria season in the fall, something that was part of the original war plan. Given the confusion of the Army at Tampa and the lack of planning and preparation for war, an assault against an enemy that had just driven American forces off a tactical landing in Cuba would have been relooked.

The strategic diversion that the seizure of Guantanamo Bay gave the United States, and with it the fixing in place of Spanish troops, would have been lost. Spanish morale, inspired by a victory, might well have caused the Spanish high command to awaken from its lethargy. A Marine withdrawal or defeat--politically one and the same--in spite of the loss of the Spanish fleet, would have stiffened their resolve after beating the American "mercenaries." The Spanish government, repeatedly blind to the honest estimate of the situation by men of the caliber of Admiral Cervera would have further locked their shields together, thus further blinding themselves to the facts.

A retreat in the face of the enemy would have meant the end of the Marine Corps. The Navy would have never tolerated a shipmate who turned tail. Interestingly, all who had knowledge of the attempt to withdraw remained silent. Bowman McCalla wrote of the affair in his autobiography in later life, but never called attention to the implications of such an event.

Henry Clay Cochrane interviewed all Marines who had knowledge of the near debacle and recorded their comments in his journal. Even when he could have used the information in a bid for the commandant's office, he remained silent. For those who question the impact of the near breaking of the First Battalion of Marines, it is instructive to note that in the 43 year span of his daily journal entries, the "100 hours of fighting" was the only time that he did not record in depth the events of the day. The intensity of the fighting was such that there simply was not time to place pen to paper. It was not until August, 1898 that he was able to catch up on his diary entries.

It would be another thirty-five years before the Marine Corps would finally seize upon and develop the amphibious mission that eluded it for so long. In 1945, a picture was taken of Marines raising the stars and Stripes on the Island of Iwo Jima. It was said that that the picture of that flag raising ensured that there would be a Corps for another five hundred years. If that was the case, then the flag raised by the First Battalion of Marines on McCalla Hill on the 12th of June 1898 ensured that there would be a Marine Corps.

Notes

1. McCalla to Sampson, 1Jun1898 (McCalla File, Naval Historical Center).
4. Ibid.
5. Henry Clay Cochrane, diary entry, 12Jun1898, Cochrane Papers, Marine Corps Historical Center.
7. Ibid.
10. Cochrane, diary entry, 12Jun1898.
11. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Col Cmndt to SecNav, 26July1861 as quoted in David M. Sullivan, The United States Marine Corps in the Civil War--The First Year (Shippensburg, PA, 1997) p. 145.
16. Huntington ltr to son, 19Jun1898, Col R. W. Huntington Papers, Marine Corps Historical Center.
17. Huntington ltr to Col Cmndt, 17Jun1898.
18. McCalla ltr to Sampson, 19Jun1898 (McCalla File, Naval Historical Center).
19. Huntington ltr to son, 18Jun1898.
20. Ibid., 19Jun1898.
22. Ibid.
25. Cochrane, diary entry, 14Jun1898.
"New Glory to Its Already Gallant Record";  
The First Marine Battalion in the Spanish-American War  
by Trevor K. Plante

On April 16, 1898, five days before war began between the United States and Spain, in preparation for what he believed was an inevitable conflict, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long ordered the commandant of the Marine Corps, Charles Heywood, to organize one battalion of marines for expeditionary duty with the North Atlantic Squadron. By war's end, the First Marine Battalion could boast they had fought in the first land battle in Cuba and had been the first to raise the American flag on the island. They could also claim that of the six marines killed in action in the Spanish-American War, five were from their unit. The battalion yielded one Medal of Honor recipient, and two of the unit's officers would later serve as commandants of the Marine Corps. The First Marine Battalion's action in the Caribbean and its favorable press coverage gave the American public and the U.S. Navy a glimpse of the Marine Corps of the future.

At approximately 9:40 P.M. on the evening of February 15, 1898, an explosion sank the USS Maine in Havana Harbor, Cuba. The ship was manned by 290 sailors, 39 marines, and 26 officers. Of these officers and men, 253 were killed either by the explosion or drowning; seven more died later of wounds. Included in this number of killed were twenty-eight enlisted men from the Maine's marine detachment.

The cause of the explosion was a source of contention between the United States and Spain. On March 21 a U.S. naval court of inquiry called to investigate the Maine incident concluded that a mine in the harbor had caused the explosion. A Spanish naval court of inquiry reported the next day that the explosion had been due to internal causes. Although the cause was never established to either side's satisfaction, the event eventually led Congress to declare on April 25 that a state of war existed starting April 21, 1898.

The job of organizing the First Marine Battalion was assigned to Lt. Col. Robert W. Huntington, who had just recently taken command of the Marine Barracks in Brooklyn, New York. Huntington was approaching almost forty years of service in the Marine Corps, having been commissioned soon after the start of the Civil War.

On April 17, Lt. Colonel Huntington began organizing the battalion, initially formed into four companies. A proposed second battalion was never formed because a number of marines were still needed to protect navy yards and installations in the United States. Instead, the First Marine Battalion was enlarged to six companies—five companies of infantry and one artillery. Each company had a
complement of 103 men: 1 first sergeant, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 1 drummer, 1 fifer, and 92 privates. The battalion was also accorded a quartermaster, adjutant, and surgeon. The color guard comprised 1 sergeant and 2 corporals.\(^5\)

Commandant Charles Heywood made mobilizing the battalion his highest priority. For this reason, both he and the Marine Corps quartermaster made sure that Charles McCawley, the battalion’s quartermaster, had the supplies he needed or the funds to get them. On April 18 the commandant went to New York to personally observe preparations, staying until the twenty-third.\(^6\) The battalion quartermaster supplied the unit with ammunition, camp equipment, mosquito netting, woolen and linen clothing, wheelbarrows, pushcarts, pickaxes, shelter tents, and medical stores.\(^7\)

On April 22 the marines were ready to sail. The men marched down the main street of the navy yard to the dock and at 5 P.M. boarded the recently purchased USS Panther. Lt. Colonel Huntington noted the "intense excitement manifested by people along the line of march, Navy Yard, docks, harbor front and shipping."\(^8\) At eight o’clock, as the ship pulled away from the dock, the naval band played "The Girl I Left Behind Me" to send off the marines.\(^9\)

The men were overcrowded on the Panther because the vessel was too small to hold such a large unit. The ship’s dining room accommodated only two hundred men, requiring three mess calls per meal.\(^10\) The ship, originally the Venezuela, had been recently purchased and converted to carry about 400 men, but after the additional companies were added, the battalion numbered close to 650 officers and men. The marines expected these crowded conditions to be temporary. At Key West, Florida, they were supposed to transfer to the Resolute, which was capable of carrying one thousand men and officers.\(^11\) Unfortunately, the marine battalion would not see the Resolute until after it arrived in Cuba in June. The battalion reached Fort Monroe off Hampton Roads, Virginia, on the evening of April 23 and waited for their convoy vessel to arrive. An escort was necessary, for the Panther was ill-equipped to defend itself should it encounter an enemy vessel. While at Hampton Roads, Maj. Percival C. Pope and 1st Lt. James E. Mahoney joined the battalion.\(^12\) On April 26 the Panther left Virginia accompanied by the cruiser Montgomery.

It was not long before tension developed on the Panther between the officers of the navy and the Marine Corps. Much of this strain was due to overcrowding, but some stemmed from questions regarding the men’s required duty and who was responsible for discipline.\(^13\) Despite these problems, Huntington made the most of precious time. On the twenty-sixth the battalion began its first drills on board ship. The marine infantry companies were armed with Lee straight-pull 6mm rifles. The artillery company was equipped with four three-inch rapid-fire guns. From 2 P.M. to 4 P.M., Companies A, B, C, D, and E (the infantry companies) drilled in volley and mass firing; each man using ten rounds each. Next, the artillery company fired one round from each of the four artillery pieces and then, like the infantry companies, drilled in volley and mass firing of the Lee rifles using ten rounds each.\(^14\)
The *Panther* arrived at Key West, on April 29. On May 24 Comdr. George C. Reiter, of the *Panther* ordered the battalion to disembark and set up camp. This action prompted the commandant of the Marine Corps to telegraph Key West inquiring why the battalion was unloaded when the *Panther* was the sole transport of the marine battalion and had no other duties. While the battalion remained in camp for two weeks, monotony was eased by the arrival of supplies that were more suited for tropical weather. The marines exchanged their heavier blue uniforms for new brown linen campaign suits. With the lighter, cooler uniforms came new-style shoes and lightweight underwear, all very popular items with the officers and men. Huntington continued drilling while at Key West, and the battalion received daily instruction and target practice with their rifles.

The officers were watching the men's health very closely. Huntington was keenly aware of health dangers caused by bad water and exposure to disease. Orders outlined procedures pertaining to water, cooking, and clothing. Water was prepared on board ship and brought to the marines on shore. No one was to drink unboiled water. Cooks were told how to prepare food and water for cooking, and any marine struck by diarrhea was to report it immediately to the medical officer. The men were also ordered to change their clothing whenever it got wet.

While in Key West the battalion sent small detachments to participate in several funeral services held for navy personnel. Colonel Huntington also detailed men to patrol the streets of Key West to guard against men causing trouble while on liberty. The unit received a number of Colt machine guns, and navy Assistant Surgeon John Blair Gibbs also joined the battalion.

On June 7 the naval base at Key West received a telegram from the acting secretary of the navy stressing, "Send the Marine Battalion at once to Sampson without waiting for the Army send Yosemite as convoy." The long wait was over, and that day the battalion finally sailed for Cuba, leaving behind Major Pope sick in the hospital.

On the voyage south, during the night of the ninth, the marines' transport collided with the *Scorpion*, causing damage to the converted yacht's stern rail. The *Panther* arrived off Santiago, Cuba, at 7 A.M. on June 10. Huntington reported to Adm. William T. Sampson, the commander in chief of the North Atlantic Fleet, on board the flagship *New York* and received orders to report to Comdr. Bowman H. McCalla of the *Marblehead*, commanding at Guantanamo Bay.

Shortly after the war began, Admiral Sampson established a blockade of major Cuban ports. Guantanamo Bay was chosen as a good site for coaling navy vessels. Guantanamo has both an inner and outer bay, and the outer bay offered a good anchorage site for ships because of its depth. Sampson sent the marine battalion to protect any ships in the bay from being harassed from Spanish troops ashore.

McCalla had entered Guantanamo Bay on June 7 to clear the outer harbor. A battery near the telegraph station at Cayo del Toro on the western side of the bay fired on the U.S. vessels *Marblehead* and *Yankee*. The Spanish gunboat *Sandoval* soon came down the channel from Caimanera. The two U.S. Navy ships
opened fire, silencing the gun battery and forcing the Sandoval to return back up the channel. On the morning of June 10, McCalla ordered marines from the Marblehead and Oregon to conduct a reconnaissance of an area just inside Guantanamo Bay. Capt. M. D. Goodrell led forty marines from the Oregon and twenty marines from the Marblehead. Goodrell selected a site for the marine battalion to establish their camp, and McCalla then sent him to brief Huntington on his intended position.23

The scene outside Guantanamo Bay was an awesome sight on June 10, for the outer bay was dominated by ships. The U.S. Navy vessels present were the cruisers Marblehead, Yankee, and Yosemite; the battleship Oregon; the torpedo boat Porter; the gunboat Dolphin; the collier Abarenda; the Vixen and Panther; and several private vessels carrying newspaper reporters. The battalion began landing at two o'clock. Four companies disembarked while the other two remained on board to help unload supplies.24 The marines were ordered to stack their rifles and begin unloading supplies from the Panther. Men from Company C, the first company ashore, were deployed up the top of the hill as skirmishers to protect the landing against enemy attack.25 Sgt. Richard Silvey, Company C, First Marine Battalion, planted the American flag for the first time on Cuban soil. One hundred and fifty feet below the hill where the American flag now flew, houses and huts were in flames, and smoke rose from the small fishing village. McCalla had ordered the marines to burn the village on Fisherman's Point for health reasons, and no one was allowed to enter into any buildings. The remaining two companies disembarked on June 11.26

Huntington believed the hill chosen for his camp to be a "faulty position." He did not want his men on top of a hill where "the ridge slopes downward and to the rear from the bay" and was "commanded by a mountain, the ridge of which is about 1,200 yards to the rear."27 The battalion's position was partially protected by the navy vessels in the bay. Several times the battalion commander requested McCalla's permission to move the marines from this site to a more defensible position, but these requests were repeatedly denied.28 Despite this difference, Huntington named the marines' position Camp McCalla. Lt. Herbert Draper raised the American flag on a flagpole for the first time in Cuba at Camp McCalla.29 Eleven days later, Huntington sent this same flag to the commandant of the Marine Corps:

Guantanamo Bay
June 22', 1898

My Dear Colonel:

I sent you by this mail in a starch box the first U.S. flag hoisted in Cuba. This flag was hoisted on the 11th June and during the various attacks on our camp floated serene above us. At
times, during the darkness, for a moment, it has been illumined by the search light from the ships. When bullets were flying, and the sight of the flag upon the midnight sky has thrilled our hearts.

I trust you may consider it worthy of preservation, with suitable inscription, at Headquarters. It was first lowered at sunset last evening.

I am very respectfully
R.W. Huntington
Lt Col Commd’g Bat’n

In an attack on the marine outposts, Privates Dumphy and McColgan of Company D were both killed. The bodies were first mistakenly reported mutilated. It was hard to tell the two apart, for both men had received a number of bullet wounds to the face; McColgan suffered twenty-one shots to the head and Dumphy fifteen. Soon the enemy made five small separate attacks on the marines’ camp. All of these were repulsed. At about 1 A.M. a superior number of Spanish forces made a more combined attack. In this assault Assistant Surgeon Gibbs was killed by a bullet to the head. Sporadic firing back and forth continued throughout the night. Using a lesson learned from the Cubans, the enemy was making good use of camouflage by covering their bodies with leaves and foliage from the jungle. The smokeless powder of the Spanish Mauser rifles also made the enemy harder to detect.

On the morning of the twelfth, Sgt. Charles H. Smith was killed. Colonel Huntington moved much of the camp down the hill closer to the beach to a place known as Playa del Este. Huntington had the marines entrench their positions on the crest of the hill. Eventually earthworks were constructed in the shape of a square, with the blockhouse in its center. The artillery pieces were placed in the corners of the square, and the Colt machine guns were along the sides. Several newspaper reporters came ashore at the lower camp and offered assistance. They helped the marines bring the artillery pieces and Colt machine guns up the hill. The earthworks were constructed about chest high. On the outside of the dirt walls, trenches were dug measuring about five feet deep and ten feet wide. Later on June 12, Pvt. Goode Taurman died during an engagement.

Harry Jones, the chaplain from the USS Texas, conducted a funeral service for the slain marines. He had heard about the marine deaths, and after receiving permission from his ship’s captain, offered his services to the battalion commander. A lieutenant and marine guards from the Texas provided the funeral escort. Colonel Huntington, the battalion’s surgeon, and as many officers and men
who could be spared from the trenches attended the ceremony. The camp was still being harassed by the enemy, and at one point Jones dove into a trench to escape enemy fire. When he got back to his feet, the chaplain found that the marines were still standing at parade rest awaiting the ceremony. The service was conducted almost entirely under enemy fire. The marines' Lee rifles and Colt machine guns returned fire. The chaplain was still being fired on when he returned to his launch with two reporters.35

McCalla ordered the captain of the Panther to unload fifty thousand rounds of 6mm ammunition. McCalla also cleared up some of the confusion regarding duties by stating in the same order, "In the future do not require Col. Huntington to break out and land his stores or ammo. Use your own officers and crew."36

On the night of the twelfth, Sgt. Maj. Henry Good was killed. Another attack was made on the camp the next morning. After almost three days of constant harassment from the enemy either by attack or sniper fire, Huntington decided to take action. He issued an order to destroy a well used by Spanish troops. On the fourteenth, Capt. George F. Elliott set out with Companies C and D and approximately fifty Cubans to destroy the well at Cuzco, which was the only water supply for the enemy within twelve miles. The well, about six miles from the camp, was close to shore, and the USS Dolphin was sent to support the mission from sea.37

Upon leaving camp, Huntington asked Elliott if he would like to take an officer to act as adjutant. The captain declined, citing the shortage of officers present for duty as the reason. Instead, upon learning that a reporter was accompanying his force, Elliott requested Stephen Crane to act as an aide if needed. Crane's Red Badge of Courage had been published in 1895. The marine officer later reported that Crane carried messages to the company commanders while on this mission.38

The marines soon engaged in a terrific fight. Near the well they encountered great resistance from superior enemy forces. Lt. Louis Magill was sent with fifty marines and ten Cubans to reinforce Elliott. He was to cut off the enemy's line of retreat but was blocked by the Dolphin's gunfire. To help direct the naval gunfire, Sgt. John Quick volunteered to signal the ship. Using a blue flag obtained from the Cubans, the sergeant began to signal the ship with his back to the enemy and bullets flying all around him.

Later, two lieutenants with fifty men each were also sent to help Elliott, but neither participated in the fight. The Spanish escaped, but not before the marines inflicted a crippling blow. Elliott's force had a remarkably low casualty rate. Only two Cubans had been killed, and two Cubans and three marine privates had been wounded. Lt. Wendell C. Neville had also been injured descending a mountainside during the engagement. Twenty-three marines suffered from heat exhaustion and had to be brought back on the Dolphin.39 McCalla offered his opinion stating, "I need hardly call attention to the fact that the marines would have suffered much less had their campaign hats not been on the Resolute" (the ship had not yet arrived at Guantanamo Bay).40 Overall, the mission was considered a success because the well had been destroyed. McCalla stated, "the
expedition was most successful; and I can not say too much in praise of the officers and men who took part in it."41 In fact, after the action, enemy attacks and sniper fire on the marine camp became almost nonexistent.

The following day, naval gunfire from the Texas, Marblehead, and Suwanee destroyed the Spanish fort at Caimanera on the eastern side of the bay. The three ships were accompanied by two press boats.42 Three days later, Huntington received orders that no reporters or civilians were to be allowed to land near his camp or enter his lines without a pass from McCalla. Those who disobeyed this order were to be arrested and taken on board the Marblehead as prisoners.43

At 4:30 P.M. on June 20 the USS Resolute arrived and unloaded stores for the battalion. The next day the captain of the Panther received orders from Admiral Sampson to transfer all stores including ammunition and quartermaster stores to the Resolute.44 The marines had finally received their larger transport. On June 24 the battalion placed headstones over the graves of Gibbs, Good, McColgan, Dumphy, and Taurman. A detail was sent out to place a headstone over the remains of Sergeant Smith, whose body could not be brought back to camp.45

McCalla ordered a reconnaissance to determine if Spanish forces still occupied the extremities of Punta del Jicacal on the eastern side of Guantanamo Bay. The enemy had been firing on American vessels from this point. At about 3 A.M. on the twenty-fifth, Huntington led a detail of 240 men encompassing Companies C and E of the First Marine Battalion and 60 Cubans under Colonel Thomas. The force used fifteen boats from the Helena, Annapolis, and Bancroft to travel to the other side of the bay. The landing was supported by the Marblehead and Helena, which took positions close to the beach south and west of the point. The landing force went ashore but made no contact with the enemy. They did, however, find signs that approximately one hundred men had been in the area and had left the previous day. The landing party withdrew at about 7:30 A.M.46

On July 3 the Spanish fleet was virtually annihilated during the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, and the U.S. Navy became responsible for a very large number of Spanish prisoners. It was decided to send the prisoners north to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, along with marines to guard them. On July 4 and 5, McCalla detached sixty marines from the battalion, including Capt. Allen Kelton and 1st Lt. Franklin Moses to join the Harvard. Prisoners on the St. Louis would be guarded by Capt. Benjamin Russell commanding twenty-one marines from the Marblehead and twenty-nine marines and a lieutenant from the Brooklyn.47

On July 10 the Harvard sailed north for New Hampshire, arriving with the Spanish prisoners at Camp Long just outside Portsmouth.

On the twelfth, McCalla ordered the harbor at Guantanamo under quarantine, with Huntington in charge of enforcing this order. On July 23 a letter from the commandant was read at parade acknowledging receipt of the first flag raised over Camp McCalla and praising the officers and men of the battalion for their conduct. Three days later, a large force of about eighty Cubans left camp. These men had fought and patrolled with the marines since June 12.48

The inactivity of the battalion soon led some marines to create their own diversions. On June 29, two privates from Company E left camp without
permission and boarded a schooner in the harbor. They remained on board for several hours and later were reported displaying "improper conduct." Both were disciplined with ten days at double irons. Another private was caught buying liquor using a Spanish dollar.49

Pvt. Robert Burns supplied some of the men with a good story to tell. One night while on guard duty, the private heard something moving in the bushes approximately one hundred yards ahead. Having orders to shoot anything that moved, the private gave three verbal warnings to halt. There being no response, and still hearing movement in the bushes, Burns fired his weapon into the bushes. In the morning, a sergeant took six men to investigate the situation and found that Burns had not fired on the enemy but rather had downed a very large black pig.50

On August 5 the battalion broke camp and embarked on the Resolute. The transport left Guantanamo Bay four days later for Manzanillo under convoy of USS Newark to assist in the capture of the town.51 The Resolute, Suwanee, Hist, Osceola, Alvarado, and Newark all approached Manzanillo and anchored three miles outside town on the twelfth. The Alvarado was sent under a flag of truce to demand a surrender from the military commander. The commander replied that Spanish military code would not allow him to surrender without being forced by a siege or military operation. Captain Goodrich allowed time for noncombatants to vacate the town before beginning the naval bombardment. Naval gunfire started at 3:40 and lasted until 4:15, when it appeared that flags of truce were flying over some of the town's buildings. Goodrich ordered a cease-fire, and the navy vessels flying flags of truce approached. The vessels were soon fired upon, and the Newark returned fire. The action was soon broken off, and all ships anchored for the night at 5:30 P.M. Naval gunfire resumed at 5:20 A.M. the next morning, and when daylight came, white flags were flying over many buildings in town. A small boat from Manzanillo approached the navy ships and brought word to Captain Goodrich that an armistice had been proclaimed: the war was over. The captain of the Newark, observing the disappointment of the battalion commander, reported, "As part of the contemplated plan of operations was the landing of some or all of the marines of Colonel Huntington's command. This officer's regret at the loss of an opportunity to win additional distinction for his corps and himself was only equaled by his careful study of the necessities of the case and his zealous entrance into the spirit of the enterprise."52

On the eighteenth, the Resolute took on board 275 men from four U.S. Army light artillery battery detachments for transport to Montauk Point, Long Island. The next day, the ship encountered rough seas, and most of the army detachment and marines were sick.53 After leaving Long Island, Resolute headed for New Hampshire, arriving at Portsmouth on August 26. The commandant had personally chosen this location for the battalion to recover from the tropical heat of the Caribbean. Huntington named their new site Camp Heywood in honor of the commandant of the Marine Corps. Six of the battalion's officers received promotions for gallantry, and the commandant commended all the battalion's officers and men and noted the favorable press coverage of the battalion's first few
days in Cuba. On September 19, Huntington received orders to disband the battalion.\textsuperscript{54}

On reporting that he had dispatched marines to their new duty stations, Huntington concluded his report by stating, "I believe this encampment has been of great benefit to the health of the battalion."\textsuperscript{55} The adjutant and inspector of the Marine Corps also found the men at Camp Heywood in good health. In his inspection report the adjutant concluded, "It is worthy of note that during the entire service of this battalion of 25 commissioned officers and 623 enlisted men, from April 22, when they embarked on board their transport at New York to the present time, there has not been a single case of yellow fever nor death from disease of any kind and but few cases of serious illness; a remarkable fact, when it is considered that these men were the first United States troops to land in Cuba, and during their entire service they were subject to the same climatic influences as other troops, among whom fever, diarrhea, dysentery, etc., caused so many casualties."\textsuperscript{56}

The quartermaster of the battalion reported to the commandant that because of the use of distilled water for drinking and cooking and the sanitary conditions aided by sufficient food and clothing, 98 percent of the battalion was brought home fit for duty, and "not a single man of the command died from disease."\textsuperscript{57} The men had used only distilled water obtained daily from the Panther, Resolute, or Vulcan. McCawley also had had the foresight to purchase empty wine casks in Key West for use as water containers, increasing the amount of water that could be kept on hand at camp. The excellent health of the battalion can be attributed to this careful preparation of water.

On September 18 a parade was held in the streets of Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{58} After the battalion was disbanded, detachments headed for New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Washington, and Annapolis left Portsmouth together and passed through the city of Boston. The Washington detachment consisted of 3 officers and 164 men who arrived in Washington on September 22. That morning President McKinley informed the commandant of the Marine Corps that he wanted to review the detachment. Remnants of the battalion were led by the U.S. Marine Band from the Marine Barracks in Washington, D.C. The parade proceeded despite heavy rains while President McKinley and several officers reviewed the troops.\textsuperscript{59}

Individual honors were bestowed upon Sergeant Quick and Assistant Surgeon Gibbs. Sgt. John Quick was awarded the Medal of Honor for "cool and gallant conduct" in signaling the Dolphin on June 14, 1898, at Cuzco, Cuba.\textsuperscript{60} The secretary of war honored John Gibbs, the assistant surgeon killed at Guantanamo, four months after his death by naming an army hospital in Lexington, Kentucky, after him.\textsuperscript{61}

Although the majority of marines during the Spanish-American War served aboard ship fulfilling various duties from ship guards to gunners mates, the First Marine Battalion received such wide newspaper attention that it dominated the public view of the marines' role in the war. They received favorable press coverage not only because they were among the first to see action, but because they
always encountered an enemy that had superior numbers. The battalion enhanced the reputation of the Marine Corps and showed the American public their usefulness as an American fighting force. Newspapers also reported on the low rate of disease and sickness in the battalion as opposed to the high rate found in army units.

The Spanish-American War showed the navy that the Marine Corps had a role in their future war plans. With the postwar acquisitions of the Philippines and Guam, the navy was now responsible for actively operating in the Pacific Ocean. The navy would need advanced bases and coaling stations if their ships were to successfully operate in this area. The marines would play a vital role, for these bases and coaling stations would need to be captured and held if necessary.62

During the Spanish-American War, the First Marine Battalion demonstrated the fast mobilization of the Marine Corps. The battalion was prepared and displayed something future marines would take pride in—the ability to be called and respond at a moment's notice. Marine Corps historian Alan Millett observed that for this era the First Marine Battalion "made the greatest contribution to the Marine Corps's reputation for combat valor and readiness."63 The battalion could be proud of its accomplishments. The unit dominated what was seen as the Marine Corps role in the war. In his general order acknowledging the one-hundredth anniversary of the Marine Corps in 1898, the secretary of the navy proclaimed that in the war with Spain the Marine Corps added "new glory to its already gallant record."64

Notes

1. Sgt. John Henry Quick received the Medal of Honor on June 14, 1898. Capt. George F. Elliott rose quickly through the ranks and went on to become the tenth commandant of the Marine Corps serving from October 3, 1903, to November 30, 1910. First Lt. Wendell C. Neville went on to serve as commandant of the Marine Corps from March 5, 1929, to July 8, 1930.


11. Chief of Bureau of Navigation to colonel commandant, Apr. 22, 1898, April 1898 folder, box 46, Historical Division Letters Received, 1818–1915, entry 42, RG 127, NARA.


15. Pvt. Edward A. Donahue, Company E, was sent to the U.S. Army Hospital in Key West after fracturing his arm from falling off of a Jacob's ladder, hitting the boat, and falling overboard. See entry for Apr. 29, Huntington Journal, p. 3.

16. Telegram #33, box 1, North Atlantic Station—Naval Base, Key West, Telegrams Recvd May 7–Aug. 15, 1898, Records of Naval Operating Forces, RG 313, NARA.


20. Telegram #107, box 1, North Atlantic Station—Naval Base, Key West, Telegrams Recvd May 7–Aug 15, 1898, RG 313, NARA.


26. Chief signal officer, War Department, to the secretary of the navy, June 11, 1898, and McCalla Report No. 86, June 12, 1898, June 11–12 folder, box 29, Area 8 File, RG 45, NARA; McCalla, "Marines at Guantanamo," p. 11.


29. McCawley to Huntington, June 10, 1902, and Huntington to McCawley, June 14, 1902, 1898—June Folder, box 47, entry 42, RG 127, NARA. These two letters identify Lieutenant Draper as raising the first flag over Camp McCalla.


38. Elliott to Huntington, June 15, 1898, ibid., p. 845.


40. McCalla to Sampson, June 16, 1898, ibid., p. 846.


44. Entry for June 20, Huntington Journal, p. 17; Sampson to Comdr. George C. Reiter, June 21, 1898, 1898—June 20–21 folder, Area 8 File, RG 45, NARA.

45. Entry for June 24, Huntington Journal, p. 18. Almost a year later the bodies were disinterred and buried in the United States. On April 29, 1899, the remains were buried in the following locations: Duphney and Good buried at Naval Cemetery, New York; McCollgan buried at Stoneham, Mass.; Smith buried in Smallwood, Md.; and Taurman buried at Richmond, Va. See 1898—April folder, box 46, entry 42, Historical Division Letters Received, 1818–1915, RG 127, NARA.

46. Entry for June 25, Huntington Journal, p. 18; Squadron Bulletin No. 13, Saturday, June 25, 1898, box 461, 00, Subject File, RG 45, NARA. On June 28 William F. Arnold, U.S. Navy, joined the battalion as P. Asst. Surgeon; see p. 278, June, 1898 Muster Rolls, RG 127, NARA.

47. Memos (three of July 4 and one of July 5) from New York to McCalla, *Marblehead*, and memo for Chief of Staff from McCalla, July 7, 1898, box 3, North Atlantic Station, Correspondence with Commanders of Vessels, Dec. 1897–Dec. 1899, RG 313, NARA.


49. Pages 24–25, July, 1898 Muster Rolls, RG 127, NARA.


53. Entries for Aug. 18–19, Huntington Journal pp. 28–29; *Correspondence Relating to Cuba, April 15 to September 1, 1898*, vol. 1, *Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain* (1902), pp. 234 and 240.


55. Huntington to commandant, Sept. 21, 1898, 1898–September folder, box 47, entry 42, RG 127, NARA.


57. McCawley to quartermaster, Sept. 27, 1898, ibid., pp. 884–888.


60. General Order 504, Navy Department, acting secretary, Dec. 13, 1898.


The US Navy cruiser Marblehead was the flagship of Cdr Bowman H. McCalla, USN, who was the overall commander of the task force off Guantanamo that landed the 1st Marine Battalion ashore.

Photograph of the irascible Bowman H. McCalla, the naval commander of the landing expedition at Guantanamo, who would have his differences with the Marine commander, LtCol Robert W. Huntington.

Photo courtesy of Naval Historical Center NH72745
First Battalion Marines at Guantanamo, under 1stLt Herbert L. Draper, the battalion adjutant raise the American flag at newly named Camp McCalla. The Marines were the first American forces to land in Cuba.

A contemporary painting pictures Marines of the 1st Battalion repelling a Spanish night attack on their position. Searchlights and naval gunfire from the U.S. cruiser Marblehead support the troops ashore.
Captain Francis H. Harrington stands in a fortified position which includes a 3-inch naval landing gun and Marine infantry at Camp McCalla. A navy ship can be seen offshore in support of the Marines.

Marines continue to improve their position at Camp McCalla. One Marine takes a break and rests on a wheelbarrow while two Cuban irregulars, allied with the Marines, look on.
The U.S. Navy gunboat USS Dolphin, originally built as a dispatch ship, provided naval gunfire support to the Marines under Capt George F. Elliott, who attacked the Spanish forces in the locality of Cuzco Well. Inadvertently the ship took a Marine platoon under fire, but redirected its guns after the Marines signaled the ship.

Sgt John H. Quick was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the Spanish-American War when he signaled the USS Dolphin to cease fire. He is pictured below as a sergeant major, the rank he reached in World War I.
Marines at Camp McCalla, Guantanamo rest behind three markers denoting the graves of Privates James McColgan and William Dumphy, and Navy Assistant Surgeon John B. Gibbs.

The officers of the 1st Marine Battalion pose for an official photograph at Guantanamo: Sitting left to right: IstLt James E. Mahoney; IstLt Lewis C. Lucas; IstLt Herbert L. Draper; Lt Col Robert W. Huntington; Capt Charles L. McCawley, A.Q.M.; Capt Francis H. Harrington; Capt William F. Spicer; IstLt Wendell C. Neville. Standing left to right: 2dLt George C. Reid; IstLt Charles G. Long; 2dLt Edwin A. Jonas; Lt John M Edgar, (M. C.) U.S. Navy; 2dLt Newt H. Hall; IstLt Clarence L.A. Ingate; IstLt William N McKelvey; Capt George F. Elliott; 2dLt Louis J. Magill; 2dLt Smedley D. Butler; 2dLt Philip M. Bannon; 2dLt Melville J. Shaw.

Defense Department (Marine) Photo 521218
Guantanamo Camp, June 22.--It has become known that Captain Elliott's expedition against the guerillas was more successful than any one could imagine at the time. The enemy was badly routed, but we expected him to recover in a few days, perhaps, and come back to renew his night attacks. But the firing of a shot near the camp has been a wonderfully rare thing since our advance and attack.

Inasmuch as this affair was the first serious engagement of our troops on Cuban soil, a few details of it may be of interest.

It was known that this large guerilla band had its headquarters some five miles back from our camp, at a point near the seacoast, where was located the only well, according to the Cubans, within four or five leagues of our position. Captain Elliott asked permission to take 200 marines and some Cubans to drive the enemy from the well and destroy it. Colonel Huntington granted this request, and it was my good fortune to get leave to accompany it.

After breakfast one morning the companies of Captain Elliott and Captain Spicer were formed on the sandy path below the fortified camp, while the Cubans, fifty in number, were bustling noisily into some kind of shape. Most of the latter were dressed in the white duck clothes of the American jack-tar, which had been dealt out to them from the stores of the fleet. Some had shoes on their feet and some had shoes slung around their necks with a string, all according to taste. They were a hard-bitten, under-sized lot, most of them negroes, and with the stoop and curious gait of men who had at one time labored at the soil. They were, in short, peasants--hardy, tireless, uncomplaining peasants--and they viewed in utter calm these early morning preparations for battle.

And also they viewed with the same calm the attempts of their ambitious officers to make them bear some resemblance to soldiers at "order arms." The officers had an idea that their men must drill the same as marines, and they howled over it a good deal. The men had to be adjusted one by one at the expense of considerable physical effort, but when once in place they viewed their new position with unalterable stolidity. Order arms? Oh, very well. What does it matter?

Further on the two companies of marines were going through a short, sharp inspection. Their linen suits and black corded accoutrements made their strong figures very businesslike and soldierly. Contrary to the Cubans, the bronze faces of the Americans were not stolid at all. One could note the prevalence of a curious expression--something dreamy, the symbol of minds striving to tear
aside the screen of the future and perhaps expose the ambush of death. It was not fear in the least. It was simply a moment in the lives of men who have staked themselves and have come to wonder which wins--red or black?

And glancing along that fine, silent rank at faces grown intimate through the association of four days and nights of almost constant fighting, it was impossible not to fall into deepest sympathy with this mood and wonder as to the dash and death there would presently be on the other side of those hills--those mysterious hills not far away, placidly in the sunlight veiling the scene of somebody's last gasp. And then the time. It was now 7 o'clock. What about 8 o'clock? Nine o'clock? Little absurd indications of time, redolent of coffee, steak, porridge, or what you like, emblems of the departure of trains for Yonkers, Newark, N.J., or anywhere--these indications of time now were sinister, sombre with the shadows of certain tragedy, not the tragedy of a street accident, but foreseen, inexorable, invincible tragedy.

Meanwhile the officers were thinking of business; their voices rang out.

The sailor-clad Cubans moved slowly off on a narrow path through the bushes, and presently the long brown line of marines followed them.

After the ascent of a chalky cliff, the camp on the hill, the ships in the harbor were all hidden by the bush we entered, a thick, tangled mass, penetrated by a winding path hardly wide enough for one man.

No word was spoken; one could only hear the dull trample of the men, mingling with the near and far drooning of insects raising their tiny voices under the blazing sky. From time to time in an hour's march we passed pickets of Cubans, poised with their rifles, scanning the woods with unchanging stares. They did not turn their heads as we passed them. They seemed like stone men.

The country at last grew clearer. We passed a stone house knocked to flinders by a Yankee gunboat some days previously, when it had been evacuated helter skelter by its little Spanish garrison. Tall, gaunt ridges covered with chaparral and cactus shouldered down to the sea, and on the spaces of bottom-land were palms and dry yellow grass. A halt was made to give the Cuban scouts more time; the Cuban colonel, revolver in one hand, machete in the other, waited their report before advancing.

Finally the word was given. The men arose from the grass and moved on around the foot of the ridges. Out at sea the Dolphin was steaming along slowly.

Presently the word was passed that the enemy were over the next ridge. Lieutenant Lucas had meantime been sent with the first platoon of Company C to keep the hills as the main body moved around them, and we could now see his force and some Cubans crawling slowly up the last ridge.

The main body was moving over a lower part of this ridge when the firing broke out. It needs little practice to tell the difference in sound between the Lee and the Mauser. The Lee says "Prut!" It is a fine note, not very metallic. The Mauser says "Pop!"--plainly and frankly pop, like a soda-water bottle being opened close to the ear. We could hear both sounds now in great plenty. Prut--prut--pr-r-r-rut--pr-rut! Pop--pop--poppetty--pop!

It was very evident that our men had come upon the enemy and were
slugging away for all they were worth, while the Spaniards were pegging away to the limit. To the tune of this furious shooting Captain Elliott with Lieutenant Bannon's platoon of C Company scrambled madly up the hill, tearing themselves on the cactus and fighting their way through the mesquite. To the left we could see that Captain Spicer's men had rapidly closed up and were racing us.

As we swung up to the crest we did not come upon Lucas and his men as we expected. He was on the next ridge, or rather this ridge was double-backed, being connected by a short transverse. But we came upon Mauser bullets in considerable numbers. They sang in the air until one thought that a good hand with a lacrosse stick could have bagged many.

Now the sound made by a bullet is a favorite subject for afternoon discussion, and it has been settled in many ways by many and eminent authorities. Some say bullets whistle. Bullets do not whistle, or rather the modern bullet does not whistle. The old-fashioned lead missile certainly did toot, and does toot, like a boy coming home from school; but the modern steel affair has nothing in common with it.

These Mauser projectiles sounded as if one string of a most delicate musical instrument had been touched by the wind into a long faint note, or that overhead some one had swiftly swung a long, thin-lashed whip. The men stooped as they ran to join Lucas.

Our fighting line was in plain view about one hundred yards away. The brown-clad marines and the white-clad Cubans were mingled in line on the crest. Some were flat, some were kneeling, some were erect. The marines were silent; the Cubans were cursing shrilly. There was no smoke; everything could be seen but the enemy, who was presumably below the hill in force.

It took only three minutes to reach the scene of activity, and, incidentally, the activity was considerable and fierce.

The sky was speckless; the sun blazed out of it as if it would melt the earth. Far away on one side were the white waters of Guantanamo Bay; on the other a vast expanse of blue sea was rippling in millions of wee waves. The surrounding country was nothing but miles upon miles of gaunt, brown ridges. It would have been a fine view if one had had time.

Then along the top of our particular hill, mingled with the cactus and chaparral, was a long, irregular line of men fighting the first part of the first action of the Spanish war. Toiling, sweating marines; shrill, jumping Cubans; officers shouting out the ranges, 200 Lee rifles crashing—these were the essentials. The razor-backed hill seemed to reel with it all.

And—mark you—a spruce young sergeant of marines, erect, his back to the showering bullets, solemnly and intently wigwagging to the distant Dolphin!

It was necessary that this man should stand at the very top of the ridge in order that his flag might appear in relief against the sky, and the Spaniards must have concentrated a fire of at least twenty rifles upon him. His society was at that moment sought by none. We gave him a wide berth. Presently into the din came the boom of the Dolphin's guns.

The whole thing was an infernal din. One wanted to clap one's hands to one's
ears and cry out in God's name for the noise to cease; it was past bearing. And--look--there fell a Cuban, a great hulking negro, shot just beneath the heart, the blood staining his soiled shirt. He seemed in no pain; it seemed as if he were senseless before he fell. He made no outcry; he simply toppled over, while a comrade made a semi-futile grab at him. Instantly one Cuban loaded the body upon the back of another and then took up the dying man's feet. The procession that moved off resembled a grotesque wheelbarrow. No one heeded it much. A marine remarked: "Well, there goes one of the Cubans."

Under a bush lay a D Company private shot through the ankle. Two comrades were ministering to him. He too did not seem then in pain. His expression was of a man weary, weary, weary.

Marines, drunk from the heat and the fumes of the powder, swung heavily with blazing faces out of the firing line and dropped panting two or three paces to the rear.

And still crashed the Lees and the Mausers, punctuated by the roar of the 
Dolphin's guns. Along our line the rifle locks were clicking incessantly, as if some giant loom was running wildly, and on the ground among the stones and weeds came dropping, dropping a rain of rolling brass shells. And what was two hundred yards down the hill? No grim array, no serried ranks. Two hundred yards down the hill there was a--a thicket, a thicket whose predominant bush wore large, oily, green leaves. It was about an acre in extent and on level ground, so that its whole expanse was plain from the hills. This thicket was alive with the loud popping of the Mausers. From end to end and from side to side it was alive. What mysterious underbrush! But--there--that was a bit of dirty, white jacket! That was a dodging head! P-r-r-rut!

This terrific exchange of fire lasted a year, or probably it was twenty minutes. Then a strange thing happened. Lieutenant Magill had been sent out with forty men from camp to reinforce us. He had come up on our left flank and taken a position there, covering us. The 
Dolphin swung a little further on and then suddenly turned loose with a fire that went clean over the Spaniards and straight as a die for Magill's position. Magill was immensely anxious to move out and intercept a possible Spanish retreat, but the 
Dolphin's guns not only held him in check, but made his men hunt cover with great celerity. It was no extraordinary blunder on the part of the 
Dolphin. It was improbable that the ship's commander should know of the presence of Magill's force, and he did know from our line of fire that the enemy was in the valley. But at any rate, in the heat and rage of this tight little fight there was a good deal of strong language used on the hill.

Suddenly some one shouted: "There they go! See 'em! See 'em!" Forty rifles rang out. A number of figures had been seen to break from the other side of the thicket. The Spaniards were running.

Now began one of the most extraordinary games ever played in war. The skirmish suddenly turned into something that was like a grim and frightful field sport. It did not appear so then--for many reasons--but when one reflects, it was trap-shooting. The thicket was the trap; the 
Dolphin marked the line for the
marines to toe. Coveys of guerillas got up in bunches of five or six and flew frantically up the opposite hillside.

There were two open spaces which in their terror they did not attempt to avoid. One was 400 yards away, the other was 800. You could see the little figures, like pieces of white paper. At first the whole line of marines and Cubans let go at sight. Soon it was arranged on a system. The Cubans, who cannot hit even the wide, wide world, lapsed into temporary peace, and a line of a score of marines was formed into a firing squad. Sometimes we could see a whole covey vanish miraculously after the volley. It was impossible to tell whether they were all hit, or whether all or part had plunged headlong for cover. Everybody on our side stood up. It was vastly exciting. "There they go; I See 'em! I See 'em!"

Dr. Gibbs, Sergeant-Major Goode, shot at night by a hidden enemy; Dunphy and McColgan, the two lads ambushed and riddled with bullets at ten yards; Sergeant Smith, whose body had to be left temporarily with the enemy--all these men were being terrifically avenged. The marines--raw men who had been harassed and harassed day and night since the first foot struck Cuba--the marines had come out in broad day, met a superior force and in twenty minutes had them panic-stricken and on the gallop. The Spanish commander had had plenty of time to take any position that pleased him, for as we marched out we had heard his scouts heralding our approach with their wooddove-cooing from hilltop to hilltop. He had chosen the thicket; in twenty minutes the thicket was too hot for his men.

The firing-drill of the marines was splendid. The men reloaded and got up their guns like lightning, but afterward there was always a rock-like beautiful poise as the aim was taken. One noticed it the more on account of the Cubans, who used the Lee as if it were a squirt-gun. The entire function of the lieutenant who commanded them in action was to stand back of the line, frenziedly beat his machete through the air, and with incredible rapidity howl: "Fuego! fuego! fuego! fuego! fuego!" He could not possibly have taken time to breathe during the action. His men were meanwhile screaming the most horrible language in a babble.

As for daring, that is another matter. They paid no heed whatever to the Spaniards' volleys, but simply lashed themselves into a delirium that disdained everything. Looking at them then one could hardly imagine that they were the silent, stealthy woodsmen, the splendid scouts of the previous hours.

At last it was over. The dripping marines looked with despair at their empty canteens. The wounded were carried down to the beach on the rifles of their comrades. The heaven-born Dolphin sent many casks of water ashore. A squad destroyed the Spanish well and burned the commander's house; the heavy tiles rang down from the caving roof like the sound of a new volley. The Cubans to the number of twenty chased on for a mile after the Spaniards.
A party went out to count the Spanish dead; the daylight began to soften. Save for the low murmur of the men a peace fell upon all the brown wilderness of hills.

In the meantime a blue-jacket from the *Dolphin* appeared among the marines; he had a rifle and belt; he had escaped from a landing party in order to join in the fray. He grinned joyously.

Possible stragglers were called in. As the dusk deepened the men closed for the homeward march. The Cubans appeared with prisoners and a cheer went up. Then the brown lines began to wind slowly homeward. The tired men grew silent; not a sound was heard except where, ahead, to the rear, on the flank, could be heard the low trample of many careful feet.

As to execution done, none was certain. Some said sixty; some said one hundred and sixty; some laughingly said six. It turns out to be a certain fifty-eight--dead. Which is many.

As we neared camp we saw somebody in the darkness--a watchful figure, eager and anxious, perhaps uncertain of the serpent-like thing swishing softly through the bushes.

"Hello" said a marine. "Who are you?"

A low voice came in reply: "Sergeant of the guard."

Sergeant of the guard! Saintly man! Protector of the weary! Coffee! Hard-tack! Beans! Rest! Sleep! Peace!
REPORT
OF THE
COMMANDANT OF UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS,
Washington, D. C., September 24, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the condition and services of the United States Marine Corps for the past year . . . .

Shortly before war was declared between the United States and Spain Congress appropriated $50,000,000 for the national defense, of which the Secretary allotted to the Marine Corps, at different times, $106,529.64, for ammunition, equipments, clothing, etc., and careful preparations were immediately begun looking to the thorough equipment, in every respect, of the marines for war service.

In accordance with the verbal instructions of the Department of April 16, 1898, to organize a battalion at New York for service in Cuba, I issued orders on the 17th and 18th of April for the immediate assembling at New York of detachments of men from all the Eastern posts of the Corps and receiving ships. On the night of April 18, by direction of the Secretary, I proceeded to New York for the purpose of organizing the marine battalion for service. The battalion, as organized, consisted of 23 commissioned officers of the Marine Corps, 1 surgeon of the Navy, and 623 enlisted men, all under command of Lieut. Col. R. W. Huntington, U. S. M. C. The battalion was divided into six companies, one of which was an artillery company, having four 3-inch rapid-fire guns, received from the ordnance department, navy-yard, New York, and was composed of young, strong, and healthy men. The following is the organization of the battalion:

Lieut. Col. R. W. Huntington, commanding.
Maj. P. C. Pope.
Maj. H. C. Cochrane.
First Lieut. H. L. Draper, adjutant.
Capt. C. L. McCawley, A. Q. M., quartermaster.
First Sergt. Henry Good, sergeant-major.
First Sergt. W. J. Limerick, quartermaster-sergeant.
Lieut. M. J. Shaw.
Color guard: One sergeant, two corporals.

Each company consisted of 1 first sergeant, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 1 drummer, 1 fifer, and 92 privates; total, 103.

Total in battalion, 23 commissioned officers, 623 enlisted men.

Before leaving Washington for New York, I was informed by the Department that the commandant, navy-yard, New York, had been directed to fit out the Panther, formerly the Venezuela, for the transportation of a battalion of 400 men, the number decided upon by the Department, and that he had been instructed to render me all possible assistance in fitting out the ship as a transport, having regard for the health and comfort of the men . . . .

The vessel was ready in two days for the battalion of 400 men, which could have sailed then. When the battalion was ready to sail, two days after the arrival of the men at New York, orders were received from the Department directing that two companies be added to the battalion, and accommodations for these additional men had to be immediately provided. Work was proceeded with night and day to make the necessary provision for the increased number of men, and two days later, on April 22, the Panther sailed, with the battalion of 24 commissioned officers and 623 enlisted men, for Cuba.

As the men marched from the barracks to the ship they were greeted with great enthusiasm by the officers, sailors, and others on the vessels at the navy-yard, as well as those on shore. The band of the yard was loaned by the commandant to escort the battalion to the landing. As the Panther left the navy-yard and proceeded down the river she was repeatedly greeted with cheers and whistles from the vessels passed.

The greatest care was exercised in fitting out the battalion by the quartermaster of the Corps, Maj. F. L. Denny, U.S.M.C., the quartermaster of the battalion, Capt. C. L. McCawley, U.S.M.C., and myself, and when the Panther sailed the battalion was thoroughly fitted out with all the equipments and necessities for field service under the conditions prevailing in Cuba which experience and careful consideration could suggest, including mosquito netting, woolen and linen clothing, heavy and light weight underwear, three months' supply of provisions, wheelbarrows, push carts, pickaxes, shovels, barbed-wire cutters, wall and shelter tents, and a full supply of medical stores. Campaign suits of brown linen and campaign hats were ordered, but owing to the great demand for these articles at the time by the Army it was impossible to send them
with the battalion. They were shipped later, however, and proved a great comfort to the men. Tent floors were purchased at Key West.

After orders were received to increase the strength of the battalion by two companies, making in all 623 men, it was found that the Panther would be very much crowded with this number on board. I reported the fact to the commandant of the station, and was informed by him that he had received orders to fit out the Resolute, formerly the Yorktown, as a permanent transport for the use of the battalion. After the Resolute was fitted out and ready to sail and provisions placed on board for the battalion, the exigencies of the service required that she be taken for other purposes, and she was not available for the use of the battalion until it embarked at Guantanamo for the Isle of Pines.

After leaving New York the Panther proceeded to Hampton Roads for the purpose of awaiting a convoy to Cuba, arriving on April 23, 1898. Maj. P. C. Pope and First Lieut. J. E. Mahoney, who had been ordered to the battalion, joined it at Hampton Roads. The Panther left Hampton Roads April 26, under convoy of the U. S. S. Montgomery, arriving at Key West April 29. During the time the Panther remained at Key West, from the date last mentioned to June 7, the men were landed and went into camp there. The battalion received orders at 5:30 in the afternoon of May 24 to land, with all stores, by 3 o'clock the following morning, which was accomplished. Just before the Panther sailed from Key West, Maj. P. C. Pope was detached from the battalion. The Panther sailed from Key West for Cuba on June 7, 1898, and arrived at Santiago de Cuba on the morning of the 10th. On the same day, at 1 p.m., the ship arrived at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and at 2 p.m. of that day the battalion landed, with stores, and prepared to go into camp. On the 11th the camp was attacked by a much superior force of Spaniards, and from that time until the 14th the battalion was constantly under fire, and repulsed the enemy on every attack. The holding of the position at Guantanamo Bay was of the utmost importance to the Navy, as it was the only harbor where the vessels could seek shelter during the hurricane season. Owing to the dense undergrowth, affording safe shelter to the Spanish sharpshooters, it would have been impossible for the vessels, by shelling the shore, to keep the enemy from harassing those on board the ships with their Mauser rifles to such an extent as to make it dangerous for them to remain there.

Capt. Geo. F. Elliott, of the battalion, was sent out on June 14 with a detachment of two companies of the battalion, and 50 Cubans, for the purpose of destroying a well at Cuzco, about 6 miles from the camp, which was the only water supply of the enemy within 12 miles. This small force attacked and defeated a body of about 500 Spaniards and accomplished the destruction of the well.

About 1 a.m. on the morning of the 12th of June, during a very severe attack on the camp, Asst. Surg. John Blair Gibbs, U. S. N., was killed by a Mauser bullet, reported by Surg. John M. Edgar, of the battalion, to have been fired at a range of from 600 to 800 yards. The death of Assistant Surgeon Gibbs cast a gloom over the whole command, as he was a most popular officer, liked by all,
and his services were very much missed and the battalion could ill afford to lose them.

I regret to have to report the following list of the enlisted men of the Corps who lost their lives in the brave defense of the flag at Guantanamo Bay:


On the 5th of August the battalion embarked on the *Resolute*, which had been previously carefully fitted out as a transport as stated above, and on the 9th of the same month sailed for the Isle of Pines. After sailing, the destination of the vessel was changed to Manzanillo, where the ship arrived on August 12.

On August 13, news having been received of the signing of the peace protocol, the town surrendered, and on the 14th the *Resolute*, with the battalion on board, sailed for Playa del Este. On the 18th of the same month the *Resolute*, having taken on board certain officers and men of the artillery of the Army, sailed for Montauk Point, at which place she arrived on the 23d. Having landed the army detachment, and getting a clean bill of health, she proceeded to Portsmouth, N.H., where the battalion disembarked on August 26.

On the 16th, [September] the men having improved so much in condition as to make it safe to return them to their stations, some of which are in the South, and wishing to get them away from Portsmouth before the equinoctial storm, I issued orders to disband the battalion. The marked improvement in the condition of the officers and men shows that it was a wise provision to put them in camp in the healthful climate of the coast of New England, when they arrived from Cuba, instead of distributing them immediately to their respective stations. Colonel Huntington, in reporting the disbandment of the battalion, states his belief that the encampment has been of great benefit to the health of the officers and men.

The Washington detachment, consisting of 3 officers and 164 men, arrived in the city September 22. The morning of the day of their arrival the President notified me that he desired to review the detachment. The honor thus tendered being unsolicited was highly appreciated, and the men upon their arrival were marched through quite a heavy downpour of rain to the White House and reviewed by the President. The men were enthusiastically greeted all along the line of march and many compliments upon their appearance were heard. The next morning, in spite of their long trip of the day before, and their march through the rain, every man of the detachment was reported well and present for duty.

The fact that this battalion was attacked by overwhelming numbers, and for over three days and nights was under constant fire, and that the following day a
portion of the battalion attacked and repulsed a superior force of Spaniards, shows that Colonel Huntington and his officers and men displayed great gallantry, and that all were well drilled and under the most effective discipline. The battalion has not lost a man by disease from the time it left for Cuba until its return, and the percentage of sickness was only 2 per cent, and in camp, after arrival at Portsmouth, only nine-tenths of 1 per cent, showing the good results of the extremely careful and complete preparation of the battalion for the service which devolved upon it, by the quartermaster of the Corps, Maj. F. L. Denny, the quartermaster of the battalion, Capt. C. L. McCawley, U.S.M.C., the medical officer, Surg. John M. Edgar, U.S.N., and myself, in procuring all the necessary clothing, medicines, and other necessaries for a tropical climate, and the care exercised by the officers for the health and comfort of the men, by the constant inspection of the camp, of provisions and meals before being served, as well as a rigid discipline always enforced in the Corps . . . .

The naval appropriation act, approved May 4, 1898, appropriated for 473 additional men for the Marine Corps, thus bringing the Corps up to its full authorized strength, as provided for in section 1596 of the Revised Statutes, viz, 3,073 enlisted men . . . .

During the war 57 vessels had marine guards, varying in strength from 80 down to 6 men, making a total of 2,055 enlisted men at sea. There were 623 in the battalion and 50 at Key West, making a total of 2,728. Deducting those on the Pacific coast, 275, this left only 71 enlisted men of the regular service available for duty at all eastern posts.

Thus it will be seen that if the additional 473 men had not been appropriated for, the Corps would have been unable to meet the demands for men required for the guards on board ship and men for the battalion and at Key West, and even after these 473 men were added to the Corps, it is shown that there were but 71 men of the permanent establishment available for duty at the different posts, and therefore, if the 1,500 additional men for service during the war had not been provided, the Corps would have been unable to furnish adequate guards for the various navy-yards and stations, where millions of dollars worth of public property is stored, which required most watchful guarding, on account of the many Spanish emissaries in the country. As the men enlisted for the war became sufficiently drilled, some of them were distributed among the various marine guards on board ship, relieving older men for positions as noncommissioned officers at the different posts. In addition to the men required at the navy-yards, guards composed of selected men were ordered to be established at the magazines at Norfolk and Philadelphia, as attempts had been made by Spanish spies to blow them up.

The men enlisted for the war were required to pass the same physical examination as those enlisted for the permanent establishment, except a reduction of 1 inch in height and the extension of the age limit to 35 years, as it was not thought advisable to reduce the general standard. For this reason the
enlistments were somewhat slow, and upon the cessation of hostilities
enlistments were stopped.

This act of May 4 also provided for a number of additional officers for
service during the war, to be appointed from civil life, and from worthy
noncommissioned officers of the Corps. Under the act, 40 second lieutenants
were appointed from civil life and 3 from noncommissioned officers. These
officers were very much needed, as there were but 4 line officers on shore for
service at all the Eastern posts, and many of the guards on board ships were
without officers before the act was passed. The newly appointed officers were
hurriedly drilled and otherwise prepared for duty as rapidly as possible, and
distributed among the auxiliary cruiser, the various posts, and the First Marine
Battalion . . . .

In accordance with the order of the Secretary of the Navy, on account of the
lawlessness in Key West of vicious persons congregating there as a result of the
war, a number of men having been shot by desperate characters, a detachment,
under command of Second Lieut. Henry C. Davis, consisting of 2 commissioned
officers and 50 enlisted men, were sent from Washington to the naval base, Key
West, Fla., for duty at that station. Capt. H. K. White was detached from the
marine battalion before it sailed for Cuba and placed in command . . . .

Admiral Cervera and the other officers captured in the battle of July 3 off
Santiago not confined at Portsmouth, were sent to Annapolis, Md. All the
marines having been taken away from that station and sent to the front, a guard,
under command of Maj. W. S. Muse, consisting of 2 officers and 60 enlisted
men, was reestablished for the purpose of guarding these prisoners and
performing guard duty at the Academy. On September 8 the prisoners left the
Academy and returned to their country. Many of the Spanish wounded in the
battle of July 3 were sent to the naval hospital, Norfolk, Va., and a guard was
established there and camped in the hospital grounds. This guard was maintained
until the prisoners were discharged from the hospital and was then returned to
the barracks.

For some time after the establishment of the new Navy it was a question
whether or not it would be advisable to station marines at the rapid-fire and
secondary batteries. I maintained that the men of the Corps could do this work,
and do it well, as the marines are thoroughly trained as sharpshooters, and it has
been demonstrated that a good marksman with the rifle is a good gunner, and,
furthermore, many of the men are thoroughly drilled at the small guns before
going on board ship. I accordingly urged that the marines should be given a trial
at these guns. After due consideration the Department accepted my suggestion,
and included in the regulations orders to station them at the secondary batteries
and rapid-fire guns. By the reports received after the battle of the 3d of July,
when the Spanish fleet off Santiago was annihilated, and the reports of the
Spanish officers who were on board these ships, it was shown that the greatest
damage on the enemy's vessels resulted from the fire of the secondary batteries
and the rapid-fire guns, this fire being so effective that the enemy were driven
from their guns. As a great number of these guns on the ships engaged were manned by marines, I feel safe in asserting that the Department did not make a mistake when it directed that the small guns should be manned by marines. I have received reports from many commanding officers of marine guards of ships which took a prominent part in this action, indorsed very favorably by the commanding officers of the vessels, showing the stations and services of the marines.

The marine battalion in Cuba was armed with the Lee straight-pull 6-millimeter rifle. Col. R. W. Huntington, who commanded the battalion, states concerning this arm: "The Lee straight-pull rifle has a few defects, which, if I am informed, have been corrected. If this is the case the Lee will be a very superior military arm." . . .

The discipline and instruction of the Marine Corps have been maintained at a high standard, and to this is attributed in a large measure the efficiency of the services rendered by the marines in the war between the United States and Spain. One of the instances of discipline connected with the war, which attracted public attention, was the conduct of Private William Anthony in performing the very letter of his duty as orderly on the occasion of the destruction of the battle ship Maine in Havana Harbor by going below to the captain's cabin, irrespective of danger, and informing him that the ship had been blown up and was sinking. For his action on this occasion Private Anthony received commendatory letters from Capt. C. D. Sigsbee, of the Maine, and the Secretary of the Navy, and was promoted to the rank of sergeant by myself. The letters mentioned are appended, and I request that they be printed with this report . . .

Although the corps has been restored to its statutory strength of 3,073 men, it seems certain that the demands which will probably be made upon it in the near future for foreign service, growing out of the present war, and on account of the growth of the Navy, will be greater than can be met by the corps with its present strength, and it is submitted that its enlisted strength should be increased by at least 1,000 men . . .

As stated elsewhere in this report, 43 second lieutenants have been appointed under the authority contained in the act approved May 4, 1898, and their services have been of much value during the war. As these appointments are only temporary, being limited by the act to the emergency under which they were provided for, these officers will soon have to be mustered out, which will not leave enough officers to perform the required duties at the various posts and on the ships now in commission, and will leave none available for any additional ships which may be placed in commission or for any other duty which might be required.

The duty the officers are now performing at the posts of the corps requires an immediate increase of numbers, and the mustering out of the temporary officers at present in the service will make the duty on the regular officers extremely rigorous, requiring them to perform duty day on and day off at many of the posts, which should not be the case in any service.
This bill provides the rank of brigadier-general for the commandant of the corps. The authorized strength of the Marine Corps is at this time 116 officers and 4,700 men. There is no service in the world, except the Marine Corps, where a colonel has command of this number of men. The peace strength of the corps is over 3,000 men, which is an appropriate command for a brigadier-general. It is further submitted that the Marine Corps, as one of the coordinate military branches of the Government, is entitled to have as its head a brigadier-general, thus placing the commandant on an equality in this respect with the corresponding rank held by the heads of departments in the Army and bureaus of the Navy.

It gives me pleasure to mention the fact that, notwithstanding the great increase in the strength of the corps, it being almost double its strength at the commencement of the war, and the consequent large increase of work in all departments, without any addition in the clerical force, the paymaster, adjutant and inspector, and quartermaster have rendered all assistance possible in every emergency, and have promptly and efficiently transacted all the business of their respective departments, the work having been at all times kept up to date. The great number of men enlisted in a short period of time at the beginning of the war devolved upon the Quartermaster's Department the duty of procuring material and manufacturing large quantities of clothing of all kinds, as well as the procuring of other supplies of various sorts, at very short notice. All of this work was performed in the most satisfactory manner, and the Department met all the demands made upon it without any delay. When orders were received to assemble the battalion at New York, it was necessary to procure large quantities of clothing, equipments, and various other stores for the use of the battalion in the tropics, and there were but four days in which to collect all the articles at New York, many of which had to be obtained from manufacturers and dealers at a considerable distance. By the energetic work of the quartermaster of the Corps, Maj. F. L. Denny, all the articles required arrived in ample time to be placed on board the Panther before the battalion sailed.

The same strict recruiting regulations in force last year have been continued this year, with the exception that the authorized minimum height of men enlisted for the war was reduced 1 inch, and the age limit increased to 35 years, and an excellent class of men have been obtained. There are now 484 aliens in the Corps, and of these 179 have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States; 302 live in the United States but have not declared their intention to become citizens, and only 3 claim foreign residence.

There are 1,898 men on duty at the various shore stations and 1,678 on board ships in commission.

Very respectfully,

Charles Heywood,
Colonel Commandant.

The Secretary of the Navy.
SIR: I have the honor to make the following report:

Before leaving New York on the 22d instant the force placed under my command was divided into five companies of infantry and one of artillery, the battery of artillery consisting of four 3-inch B. L. R. of the latest navy pattern.

The battalion marched aboard the transport Panther at 6:15 p.m. on that date, and sailed for Fort Monroe at 7:30 p.m., the departure being marked by intense enthusiasm in the navy-yard, docks, harbor front, and shipping of New York and Brooklyn.

At 8 p.m. on the 23d the ship anchored at Fort Monroe to await orders. Maj. P. C. Pope and First Lieut. J. E. Mahoney joined the battalion, reporting on board soon after the Panther dropped anchor.

At 8:05 a.m. on the 26th instant this ship sailed from Fort Monroe, under convoy of the U. S. S. Montgomery, and arrived at Key West at 11 a.m. on the 29th.

At the request of the commanding officer of the ship, six men were detailed for signal duty, and they have satisfactorily received and transmitted all signals and messages . . . .

The men of this command have been frequently and carefully instructed and drilled to such an extent as the limited facilities of the ship would permit; and, on the 26th instant, each of the six companies was practically instructed in loadings and firing at sea, each man firing ten rounds; and the battery of artillery received similar practical instruction, one round being fired from each gun.

The mechanism of the new rifle worked fairly well.

The accouterments have been marked in black, with the letter of the company and each man's company number.

Very respectfully,

R.W. HUNTINGTON,

Lieutenant-Colonel, United States Marine Corps,

Commanding First Battalion.

THE COLONEL COMMANDANT UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,

Headquarters, Washington, D.C.
HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BATTALION,
Camp Sampson, Key West, Fla., May 25, 1898.

SIR: In obedience to your telegram of the 25th instant, I respectfully report that the battalion under my command was sent ashore from the Panther on the 24th instant, the order to this effect having been received about 5:30 p.m. on the 23d instant, this order being to land the battalion at 3 a.m.

We had permission to get out such stores as we could before 3 a.m. There was considerable delay in procuring the first lighter, and, it having been loaded, there was considerable more delay in getting the ship alongside the wharf. The ship was put alongside about 9:30 p.m.

Owing to my representations, Commodore Remey, commanding the base, extended the time allowed to take stores out and get out of the ship until the Amphitrite, which the Panther was to tow, should be ready to sail.

Subsequently I received orders from Commander Reiter that the battalion would leave the ship at 4:15 a.m. It was necessary to knock off work at 3:45 a.m. in order that the men might get ready to go ashore.

I was ordered by Commander Reiter, against my earnest plea, to leave on board the Panther one-half of our 6-millimeter ammunition (225,000 rounds) and one-half of the 3-inch ammunition (18 boxes), the Panther having two 3-inch guns and we having four. This 6-millimeter ammunition was retained, Commander Reiter informed me, to serve as ballast, as the Panther has no 6-millimeter rifles. This ammunition weighed about 14,000 pounds, and was stowed aft.

Commodore Remey modified this order so that we were able to take our 6-millimeter ammunition, but Commander Reiter retained one-half of the 3-inch.

Owing to the short time allowed for the removal of the stores, and notwithstanding the fact that the men worked hard and worked fast, considerable quantities of our property and part of the ten days' rations I requested were left on board.

Lieutenant Draper was present a part of the time when the matter of sending the battalion on shore was debated between Commodores Remey and Watson and Commander Reiter, and from his report of this conversation I am convinced that the order for the transfer of the battalion, and partially the extreme hurry in getting out of the ship, was due to the earnest solicitation and representations of Commander Reiter.

The battalion moved from the ship shortly after 4:15 a.m., and moved out to the beach, short 2 miles from the wharf, and after we had been there some time the Panther came out of the harbor and apparently lay to in the offing about two and one-half hours, waiting for the Amphitrite.
The *Saturn* was available for the service assigned the *Panther* and has much greater towing power, and was fitted for towing until her steel towing hawser was ripped out for the *Panther*.

The battalion is now strung out in camp along the beach for over half a mile.

About May 10 Commander Reiter attempted to get the battalion on shore, and an order was issued to that effect. I addressed a letter (copy annexed) to the commandant of the station against this transfer and the order was revoked. The same reasons that I then urged against the transfer held good on the 23d instant. In referring to this letter I find the expense for water is greater and for wood it is less than I had estimated. The expense for transportation is also greater than I had estimated.

The quartermaster has been compelled to hire a storehouse for the protection and preservation of the stores.

The battalion is established in camp, and the sick list shows a decided increase this morning, owing in part to the sun, heat, and exposure.

The usual routine of camp has been established, and a guard of 33 men and an officer has been sent into Key West for the protection of public property at the naval station, by order of the commandant of the base, this to continue daily.

Cooked meats have to be sent to these men, the transportation of which is paid by the Marine Corps.

Six men are on duty, two at a time, as orderlies for the commandant, from 8 a.m. to 10 p.m. daily.

I have no objection to these details except that the men are necessarily absent from their drill and from their places in squads and companies, and their military instruction at the present juncture is of great importance.

I think that, notwithstanding the annoyance, trouble, and expense this transfer has caused, the experience will be some value to the battalion.

Very respectfully,

R.W. HUNTINGTON,

Lieutenant-Colonel, United States Marine Corps,

Commanding Battalion

THE COLONEL COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Headquarters, Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MARINE BATTALION,

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, June 17, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to make the following report: The stores of this battalion were sent to the dock at Key West from Camp Sampson, on Sunday, June 5. We broke camp at 2 a.m. on June 6, and went on board the *Panther*, Major Pope going to Key West hospital.
On June 7 at 7:10 p.m., we sailed from Key West and arrived off Santiago de Cuba on the morning of the 10th; on the same day, at 1 p.m., we arrived in Guantanamo Bay; at 2 p.m. the battalion landed with stores. Company C was landed and deployed up the hill near the beach on the right of the entrance to the harbor. This hill is about 150 feet high and on top was formerly occupied by the Spanish troops, but when the position was vacated the day before our landing, the blockhouse on top of the hill was burned.

On the landing all houses and huts lately occupied by the Spanish forces were burned.

The hill occupied by us is a faulty position, but the best to be had at this point. The ridge slopes downward and to the rear from the bay; the space at the top is very small, and all the surrounding country is covered with thick and almost impenetrable brush. The position is commanded by a mountain, the ridge of which is about 1,200 yards to the rear.

On the afternoon of landing, tents were pitched and outposts established.

On the 11th, about 5 p.m., an attack was made upon one of the outposts and two privates, McColgan and Dumphy, of Company D, were killed, each receiving more than eight wounds, each of which would have caused death. These two men were patrols. A detachment was sent out from camp to support the outpost, and we found only faint traces of the enemy. After nightfall fire was opened upon our camp by small parties from different directions on five different occasions. The men turned out each time under arms with promptitude and courage. About 1 a.m. a more combined attack was made, and noisy fire from south, southeast, and southwest, was opened. During this attack Acting Assistant Surgeon John Blair Gibbs, United States Navy, was killed. From the best information attainable about 160 men were engaged in this attack.

On the morning of the 12th Sergeant C. H. Smith was killed and Corporal Glass, Privates McGowan and Dalton, all of Company D, were wounded—not dangerously.

On the morning of the 12th all tents and material were removed from the position and taken on the bay side of the hill, and a trench was dug on the south front, about 40 yards across, and a barricade made around the position, which would enable us to hold it, as I was informed that more troops were being assembled by the enemy in this immediate vicinity.

On the night of the 12th many persistent and trifling attacks were made, in reply to which we used a good deal of ammunition. About 2 a.m. Srgt. Maj. Henry Good was killed. On the 12th we were joined by 60 insurgent troops, and they, being acquainted with the country, and excellent woodsmen and fearless, were of the greatest assistance.

On the 13th, about 8 a.m., fire was opened upon the camp and subdued without loss or difficulty. About 8 a.m. of the 14th a rather smart fire was opened for a few moments on the camp and easily repelled. About 20 Cubans came from below the hill at this alarm, but their help was not needed. They opened fire.
At 9 a.m., 14th, a force consisting of Companies C and D, the native troops above mentioned, with about 25 more from Guantanamo, all under the direction of Colonel Tomas, Cuban army, proceeded through the hills about 6 miles and destroyed a well, said to be the only available water supply within 9 miles.

From the best information I can gather, this force was opposed by four regular companies of Spanish infantry and two companies of guerrillas, making a total of a little short of 500 men.

The engagement between these forces lasted from about 11 a.m. until 3.30 p.m. Our troops drove the enemy at every point, being obliged to make the first advance under fire, which, owing to the lay of the country, they could not return.

Captain Elliott reports that the men in many cases coolly estimated distances, borrowed his field glass to pick up parties of the enemy, and at a distance of 1,000 yards often inflicted damage and caused withdrawal.

Second Lieutenant Magill, with 50 men and 10 Cubans, joined Captain Elliott, climbing the mountain through cactus and brush; this advance was intended to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards, which unfortunately failed of its principal object, owing to the fact that his advance was stopped by the fire of the U. S. S. Dolphin.

Being apprehensive for the success of the movement, I ordered First Lieutenant Mahoney to be joined by First Lieutenant Ingate--these officers each having 50 men with them on picket--this combined force to proceed to Captain Elliott's assistance. Lieutenant Ingate failed to find his way to Lieutenant Mahoney, and Lieutenant Mahoney advanced alone, arriving too late to take an active part in the affair.

Our losses were 2 Cubans killed, 2 wounded, and 3 privates wounded, not dangerously; after the affair, while descending the mountain, Lieutenant Neville wrenched his hip and will probably be unfit for service for a month; about 10 or 12 of our men and 2 Cubans were overcome by the heat.

From information received from prisoners, which I believe to be reliable, about 60 of the Spanish force were killed and something more than 150 wounded, and 1 lieutenant and 17 privates were captured. The forces returned to camp at 8 p.m., exhausted by the long, hard march through this mountainous and tropical country.

This affair was planned by the Cubans, but too much praise can not be awarded to the coolness, skill, and bravery of our officers and men, by which alone its success was achieved.

Captain Elliott's cool advance up a rocky, steep mountain path, under fire for twenty minutes without being able to return it, and the gallantry and skill displayed by him throughout this affair were essential to the great success attained by the expedition, and are worthy of and I earnestly recommend that he be advanced in rank one grade. Captain Elliott mentions, in terms of high praise, the conduct of First Lieutenants Lucas and Neville, and Second Lieutenants Magill and Bannon.

Your attention is called to a report made by Captain Elliott, attached hereto.
Very respectfully,

R. W. Huntington,
Lieutenant-Colonel, United States Marine Corps,
Commanding First Battalion.

Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood,
United States Marine Corps, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

[First indorsement.]

U. S. S. Marblehead (third rate)
June 19, 1898.

Respectfully referred to the commander in chief.
This report requires several corrections.
The blockhouse referred to on page 2 was burned by the gun fire from the Yankee on the 7th instant.
The position referred to on the same page was not occupied again after a small Spanish force had been driven away, when the Marblehead took permanent possession of the bay on the 8th instant.
Early on the morning of the 10th instant Captain Goodrell, with 40 marines from the Oregon and 20 marines from the Marblehead, examined the locality occupied by the marines, who arrived shortly after he had completed this duty. On the arrival of the Panther Captain Goodrell was sent on board to give Colonel Huntington the benefit of his observations.
Referring to paragraph 4, page 2, the position occupied by the marines has been pronounced by Major-General Perez, of the Cuban army, on the 17th instant, to be the only tenable position on the bay which could be successfully held by a small force. He also stated that 5,000 Spaniards could not take it.
If the marine position is commanded by a mountain ridge, that mountain ridge is commanded in turn by the ten 5-inch rapid-fire guns of the Marblehead, and of such other ships as may be here.
The mistake of locating the camp between the main position and the outpost was corrected on the 11th instant, at my suggestion.
The expedition was suggested by Colonel La Borde, and the Dolphin was sent to cover the sea front of our force.
Twenty-three marines overcome by the heat were brought back by the Dolphin.
This exhaustion was due, I believe, mainly to the fact that the campaign hats of the marines were on the Resolute, and not in the marine camp.
The behavior of the officers and men of the marine battalion generally has been most gallant, and is in general worthy of all praise.

Very respectfully,

B. H. McCalla,
Commander, United States Navy, Commanding.
[Second indorsement.]

U. S. FLAGSHIP NEW YORK,
Off Santiago De Cuba, June 20, 1898.

Respectfully referred to the Secretary of the Navy.

W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, Commander in Chief U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

Headquarters First Marine Battalion,
Playa Del Este, Cuba, July 31, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to make the following report: After the action of June 14 the enemy retreated farther up country and has never since annoyed us.

On June 25, at 3 a.m., Companies C and E and about 40 Cubans, under my command, crossed to the west side of Guantanamo Bay in small boats for the purpose of cutting off a body of the enemy who had been annoying small boats from the Marblehead in their search for mines. A landing was made and the troops disposed to cut off any retreat of the enemy on the point, while the Marblehead watched the isthmus leading from the mainland to our position.

A heavy patrol was then sent to search the point, but none of the enemy were found, although unmistakable signs showed that a force of 100 or 150 had occupied this point a day or two before.

This force reembarked at 7:30 a.m. and returned to the camp.

The regular pickets have been maintained--15 men by day and a full company with all its officers by night. This line of observation is about 800 yards to a mile from our position. One-half of this line--the left--is the same as that established on the 10th day of June, when we first landed. The right half of this line has been drawn back to easier supporting distance.

Sentries on each face of the fortified position occupied by us are maintained, but I have reduced these materially from the number which were kept on duty from the 10th to the 30th of June, inclusive.

Strong scouting parties, in addition to those sent out by the Cubans, have been sent out frequently to examine the surrounding country for the enemy.

During the past few days water has been reported in the well at Cuzco which was filled up by our force after the affair on the 14th ultimo, as reported to you in my communication of June 17, but inasmuch as rations have been sent from here to the Spaniards in Caimanara it does not seem necessary to fill up the well, but it is being closely observed by scouting parties from this camp.

The graves of our dead have been appropriately marked with headstones and a record placed in a bottle beneath the headstone in each case.
The strength of the battalion at this date is 515. Of this number 23 are commissioned and 482 enlisted; deducting 21 sick, leaves 484 available.

Your attention is invited to the reduction in the strength of the battalion as shown by the muster rolls forwarded herewith.

Very respectfully,

R. W. Huntington,
Lieutenant-Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding Battalion.

The Colonel Commandant United States Marine Corps,
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

Headquarters First Marine Battalion,
Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N.H., August 26, 1898.

Sir: I respectfully report that from the date of my last report, July 31, up to August 5, the battalion remained in camp at Playa del Este.

On the latter date we embarked on board the U. S. S. Resolute, and on the 9th instant sailed, under convoy of the U. S. S. Newark, bound for the Isle of Pines.

In an interview with the commander in chief before our departure, I asked if there was any military information available for my use there, and was told by him that there was a paper of which a copy should be sent to me.

This paper proved to contain certain general information relative to the island and the approaches to it. I had no information as to whether there was a hostile force in any part of the island.

The available draft of water at the principal port was, according to the above mentioned paper, 6 or 7 feet; as the Suwanee drew $\frac{8}{2}$, and was the lightest draft of any vessel in the expedition, I suggested to Capt. C. F. Goodrich, who was in command, the great desirability of the addition of the Manit, a captured tug drawing 4 feet, to his force; and by his direction and in his name applied to the chief of staff of the fleet for her.

My application was very positively and somewhat contemptuously denied, and I was told by him that the Suwanee could go anywhere, as she drew 8 feet.

By the chart 18 feet could be carried just into the Bay of Seguranca, but the Newark drew 21 feet and the Resolute $18\frac{1}{2}$. Two fathoms are marked on the chart several miles--8 or 10--from shore in the bay; the Hist, Osceola, and Wompatuek all drew more water than this.

Information received off Cape Cruz by Captain Goodrich induced him to resolve to demand the surrender of Manzanillo. I append herewith a copy of a report of Captain Goodrich, giving the details of his action under this resolve.

On the 14th instant the Resolute, with the battalion on board, sailed for Playa del Este.
On the 18th instant the *Resolute*, having taken on board certain officers and men of the United States artillery, sailed for Montauk Point, at which place she arrived on the 23d instant, and, having disembarked the detachment belonging to the Army proceeded to this place, where the battalion disembarked.

This report completes the history of the service for which the battalion was collected.

From May 24 to June 7 the battalion was in camp at Key West, and during this time--just previous to our departure for Cuba--diarrhea was very prevalent. The camping ground in Key West is bad and the water is bad.

Notwithstanding this the battalion disembarked at Play del Este in good condition, and during our stay there the sick list was at no time large. The gradual deterioration of the battalion was, however, clearly marked. The men seemed willing to work, but tasks that were comparatively easy at first became hard. The men seemed to have no reserve supply of strength, and, I doubt not, would during the last month of our stay there have yielded easily to any disease.

*Campaign suits.*--The material is not suitable, the color after washing being nearly as distinct as white at night, and not offering enough resistance to dews; and the cut is not desirable. The coat is too tight in the chest and back, and it should have more and larger pockets. These suits were, however, a great boon to officers and men during the scorching days.

*Cartridge belts.*--I respectfully recommend that the color of these belts be changed to that of the leggings or to conform to the color that may be selected for campaign suits.

*Leggings.*--These should be cut longer and, in my opinion, should be bound with leather, and fitted with rawhide laces.

*Campaign hats.*--The material of which they are made is very poor, and this kind of headgear is unsuitable for a very hot climate, as it is heavy and warm.

*Shoes.*--Those of the new issue, after hard wear, have proven very satisfactory.

*Buzzicott cookers.*--These have given entire satisfaction.

The Lee straight-pull rifle has a few defects which, I have been informed, have been corrected. If this is the case, the Lee will be a very superior military arm.

I have also to recommend that canister be issued with the 3-inch navy rifle. The only ammunition issued to the battalion for these pieces was shrapnel, and it was very difficult to explode this projectile, with any certainty, at short ranges.

*Water.*--The battalion at Playa del Este was subjected to frequent inconvenience and discomfort owing to lack of fresh water.

*Underclothing.*--The so-called light-weight underclothes would be much better if they were lighter in weight.

After the *Resolute* had gotten under way for Manzanillo I received a telegraphic order from you to make recommendations for brevets of officers who were deserving of that honor.
In obedience to that order I have the honor to renew the recommendation made in my letter of June 17, 1898, in reference to Capt. George F. Elliott.

I also recommend that the following-named officers receive brevets of the next higher grade, viz: Capt. A. C. Kelton, First Lieuts. C. G. Long, A. S. McLemore, and W. N. McKelvy for gallant conduct on June 11, 12, and 13; also First Lieuts. L. C. Lucas and W. C. Neville, and Second Lieuts. L. J. Magill, M. J. Shaw, and P. M. Bannon for gallant conduct on June 11, 12, and 13, in the various attacks upon our position, and on the 14th for gallant conduct in our attack on the Spaniards, which resulted in their utter discomfiture.

First Lieut. James E. Mahoney succeeded to the command of Company E by the detachment of Capt. H. K. White at Key West; although Lieutenant Mahoney was not the senior lieutenant of the battalion, and as such entitled to succeed to this vacancy, the fact that I had received information from you that Captain Goodrell had been ordered to the battalion and my unwillingness to sever the association already formed between company officers and men led me to continue him in command of Company E.

This company was the last formed of the battalion; it was formed from recruits and from men who had been rejected for Company C, and under Lieutenant Mahoney, and owing to him, its efficiency increased remarkably. From regarding it as the worst company in the battalion I came to look upon it as among the best.

On the 11th, 12th, and 13th of June, Lieutenant Mahoney's coolness under fire and the excellent example he set for his men were conspicuous.

Lieutenant Mahoney's prompt and soldierly action, as set forth in my report of June 17, is deserving of high praise.

While under my command he has shown no tendency to commit the fault for which he was tried; and, deeming it for the best interests of the Government that he should receive promotion as soon as possible, I recommend that he be now advanced two numbers, so as to be placed in his original position upon the list, and also that he be brevetted captain.

From the time of the organization of the battalion to the present Lieutenant Draper, the adjutant of the battalion, has been untiring in assisting me. His duties have been performed with zeal and discretion. On June 11, 12, and 13 his conduct was marked by imperturbable coolness and courage, and I most heartily recommend that he be brevetted captain for his services on those days.

I have nothing but praise to award Capt. C. L. McCawley, A. Q. M. for the manner in which his duties have been performed, often under very trying circumstances. He has never seemed to consider his own ease in comparison with the service, and this means a great deal when the climate of Cuba is considered. During the various attacks on our position on June 11, 12, and 13 he was, a great part of the time, with me, and his deportment was becoming to a soldier. He acted often on those days as aid. I recommend that he be brevetted to the grade of major for gallant conduct.
I also recommend to the most favorable consideration of the Department Surg. John M. Edgar, U.S.N., for zealous and faithful performance of his duties under fire on June 11, 12, and 13.

Very respectfully,

R.W. HUNTINGTON,
Lieutenant-Colonel, United States Marine Corps,
Commanding First Battalion.

THE COLONEL COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,
Headquarters, Washington, D.C.

CAMP MCCALLA,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, June 15, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

In accordance with your verbal directions, I left camp at 9 a.m. yesterday with two companies of the battalion, C and D, commanded respectively by First Lieut. L. C. Lucas and Capt. William F. Spicer, with an aggregate of 160 men, and 50 Cubans under command of Lieut. Col. E. Eugene Tomas. Colonel Laborde, Cuban Army, was also present, but without command.

My orders were to destroy the well at Cuzco, about 6 miles from this camp, which was the only water supply of the enemy within 12 miles of this place, and the existence of which made possible the continuance of the annoying attacks upon our force in camp here.

Two miles and a half from Cuzco half the Cubans and the first platoon of C Company, under Lieutenant Lucas's command, passed over a mountain on our left, hoping to cut off the enemy's pickets. In this we failed, and our force was discovered by the Spanish outpost, which retreated immediately and gave the alarm to the main body, whose headquarters were in a house at Cuzco.

A high mountain separated the two forces at this point, and each attempted to gain its crest as a point of advantage. In this we were successful, but were fired on heavily by the enemy from the valley, at a distance of 800 yards. This fire was replied to by the Cubans of the main body. Lieutenant Lucas, with 32 men of his platoon and the remaining Cubans, came into the fight at 11:15. The other nine men of his platoon becoming exhausted were obliged to return to Camp McCalla. Lieutenant Bannon conducted the second platoon of C company just below the crest of the hill, out of fire from the enemy, leaving the narrow path, which was the only road, and making their way through the cacti. Just in rear of this platoon and following in single file was D company. The crest of the hill was in the shape of a horseshoe, two-thirds encircling Cuzco Valley and the well. The Cubans, C and D companies occupied one-half of this horseshoe ridge, while Second Lieut. L. J. Magill, with one platoon (50 men) of A company, came up from the valley on the opposite side, where he had been stationed as an
outpost from Camp McCalla, having been attracted by the heavy fire, and believing his force necessary to our assistance, and occupied the left center of this horseshoe ridge. As soon as he saw our position he sent one of his men around the ridge to report to me. For fifteen minutes we were marching under a heavy fire, to which no reply was made, to gain this position. By the use of glasses and careful search by the men, individuals were discovered here and there, and, fire being opened upon them, they would break from cover to cover, and we were thus enabled to gain targets at which to fire, which had been heretofore impossible owing to the dense chaparral in which the enemy sought successful cover.

Many of the men fired as coolly as at target practice, consulting with each other and their officers as to the range. Among these were Privates Carter, Faulkner, and Boniface, all of whom did noticeable execution. This movement of the enemy gave Lieutenant Magill an opportunity to get in a cross fire, which was well taken advantage of.

Having reduced the enemy's fire to straggling shots, the U. S. S. *Dolphin*, Commander H. W. Lyon, U.S.N., which had been sent along the coast to cooperate with us if possible, was signaled to shell the house used as the enemy's headquarters and also the valley, but she was so far to the front, having mistaken the valley intended, that her fire was in Lieutenant Magill's direction, driving him to the reverse side of the ridge.

However, this shell fire started the enemy from his hiding places, which gave the other companies the opportunity to fire on them on the move.

Signal was made to the *Dolphin* to cease firing, and Lieutenant Magill was directed to form skirmish line and move down the valley in front of him toward the sea. This was defeated by renewed shell fire from the *Dolphin*.

The fight, which began at 11 a.m., was now drawing to a close, being over at 3 p.m. The enemy began a straggling retreat at 2 p.m., getting out of the valley as best they could.

The fire of the force under my command was at all times deliberate and aimed, sights being adjusted and volleys were fired when sufficiently large bodies of the enemy could be seen to justify it. The two platoons of Company C, under First Lieutenant Lucas and Second Lieut. P. M. Bannon, were handled with the best of judgment. D Company overcrowded on the firing line and men needlessly exposed themselves by standing in groups. First Lieut. W. C. Neville, commanding the first platoon, did his best with the men in front of him. Captain Spicer, commanding D Company, was overcome by the sun on the top of the hill and had to be sent on board the *Dolphin*. Lieutenant Neville injured his hip and ankle in catching his foot and falling down the mountain side after the fight was over. These accidents left Second Lieut. M. J. Shaw in command of D Company, which he handled with entire satisfaction. Forty men left the crest of the hill at 3:15 p.m. under Lieutenant Lucas and destroyed the well and burned the house lately occupied by the enemy. Canteens were taken from the men still holding the crest and filled with water required by signal from the *Dolphin*.
The marines fired on an average about 60 shots each, the Cubans' belts being filled during the action from the belts of the marines, each having to furnish 6 clips or 30 cartridges.

The loss to our force was 1 private of D Company wounded slightly, and 10 or 12 overcome by heat. These latter were kindly taken on board the *Dolphin* and cared for. This ship rendered every possible assistance to the expedition. Two Cubans were wounded during the fight on the hill, one being accidentally shot by Colonel Laborde by a pistol.

While destroying the well the Cubans were placed up the valley from which the enemy retreated and began a noisy and hot fight with guerrillas who had not been dislodged. In this fight the Cubans lost 2 killed and 2 wounded, but killed 5 of the enemy.

The march home began at 5:30 p.m., camp being reached at 8 p.m.

From the best information since obtained, which is believed to be reliable, 60 of the enemy, among whom were 2 officers, were killed. The wounded were numerous, but the wounds were probably light, owing to the range of 600 or 1,000 yards, at which distance all the explosive effect of the bullets are lost. Eighteen prisoners, including 1 lieutenant, were captured; about 30 Mauser rifles and a quantity of ammunition.

Lieutenant Magill also captured a complete heliograph outfit and destroyed the signal station. This had been used ever since our arrival here and could be seen at all times. Before closing I desire to commend Lieutenant Magill's good judgment in coming up and the excellent manner in which he handled his men.

Sergt. John H. Quick was obliged to stand on the open ridge under fire to signal the *Dolphin*, which he did with the utmost coolness, using his rifle with equal judgment while not thus engaged. My only regret is that E Company, under the command of First Lieut. James E. Mahoney, which had been sent to us from an outpost near Camp McCalla when the heavy firing was heard there, was unable to report to me until 4 p.m. Had he been an hour and a half sooner, I am satisfied that the entire force of the enemy, which was about 500 men, would have been captured. This delay was not due to any lack of zeal on his part.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

G. F. Elliott,
Captain, United States Marine Corps,
Commanding C Company.

Lieut. Col. R. W. Huntington,
Commanding First Battalion of Marines,
Camp McCalla, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Headquarters First Marine Battalion,
Guantanamo, Cuba, June 18, 1898.
Sir: I desire to make the following supplementary report: Upon leaving camp you asked me if I wanted an adjutant. I declined to take one, the command being short of officers for duty; but having been notified that a Mr. Stephen Crane would be allowed to accompany the expedition, I requested him to act as an aid if one should be needed. He accepted the duty and was of material aid during the action, carrying messages to fire volleys, etc., to the different company commanders.

Very respectfully,

G. F. ELLIOTT,
Captain, United States Marine Corps, Commanding C.

Lieut. Col. R.W. HUNTINGTON, U.S.M.C.,
Commanding Battalion.

[First indorsement]

U.S.S. MARBLEHEAD, June 19, 1898.

Respectfully forwarded to the commander in chief.
The expedition was most successful, and I can not say too much in praise of the officers and men who took part in it.

B. H. McCALLA, Commander, S.O.P.

U.S.S. MARBLEHEAD, (THIRD RATE)
Guantanamo, Cuba, June 16, 1898.

Sir: I have the honor to inform you that on the 14th instant, at the suggestion of Colonel Laborde, the Cubans under the command of himself and Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas, supported by two companies of marines under the command of Captain Spicer and Lieutenant Elliott, routed the force of about 300 Spaniards stationed in the pass between the marine camp and the south coast.

One portion of the command advanced by the cliffs so far as the well and blockhouse, which I referred to in my No. 88, supported by the Dolphin.

The other portion diverged from the coast line and advanced up the valley to the southeast, the two forces eventually uniting on the sides of the mountain in the vicinity of the blockhouse and well.

In this vicinity the Spaniards, numbering about 300, were encountered and driven from their position, sustaining a loss of between 40 and 60 killed and 1 officer and 17 soldiers captured.

As the day was well advanced, it was not possible for our force to make a search for the Spanish wounded, and I fear that many were left on the field uncared for.

We suffered a loss of 2 Cuban soldiers killed; 6 wounded, 4 of whom were Cubans. In addition, 23 marines were prostrated by the heat and, with the
wounded, were transferred to the _Dolphin_, from which ship the force was also supplied with ammunition during the engagement.

The well and blockhouse referred to, on the south coast, were destroyed and a set of heliograph instruments taken.

The object of the movement was for the purpose of relieving the pressure on the marine camp by an offensive movement and it was, I believe, entirely successful.

I need hardly call attention to the fact that the marines would have suffered much less had their campaign hats not been on the _Resolute_.

I desire to call particular attention to the devotion of the Cubans to the cause of freeing their island, shown in so many ways, by stating that the last words of the Cuban who was shot through the heart and buried on the field were, "Viva Cuba Libre."

Inclosed, marked "A," is a list of the Spanish soldiers captured.

The second lieutenant, also captured, is Francisco Batista, of Guantanamo City.

The marines who were prostrated by the heat were nearly all able to return to their camp early in the evening.

Very respectfully,

B. H. McCalla,
_Commander, United States Navy, Commanding._

The COMMANDER IN CHIEF
_North Atlantic Station._

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MARINE BATTALION,
_CAMP HEYWOOD, SEAVEY ISLAND,
Navy-Yard, Portsmouth, N. H., September 19, 1898._

_SIR: I inclose herewith a letter to myself from Capt. G. F. Elliott, U. S. M. C., relating to errors in the report of Commander B. H. McCalla, United States Navy, about the fight at Cuzco, Cuba, June 14, 1898, which letter I ask to be filed with the report referred to._

_Upon the morning of June 14, 1898, Captain Elliott asked me who commanded the projected expedition to Cuzco. I told him that he was not under the command of the Cuban colonel, Laborde, but that he would consult with him, and if Laborde saw fit to issue orders he would obey them only if the movement approved itself to his judgment. I have cause to believe that Laborde's authority was not recognized by the officer in command of the Cubans._

Very respectfully,

R. W. Huntington,
_Colonel Commanding First Marine Battalion._

The COLONEL COMMANDANT,
_UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS._
HEADQUARTERS FIRST BATTALION OF MARINES,
CAMP HEYWOOD, SEAVEY ISLAND,
Kittery, Me., September 16, 1898.

SIR: I respectfully call your attention to the errors in the official report of
Capt. B. H. McCalla, United States Navy, in regard to the military status taken
by the battalion of marines under my command at the Cuzco fight, near
Guantanamo Bay, June 14, 1898.

As this report will be filed for general publication with other archives of
Government relating to the Spanish war, it should be correct.

Captain McCalla states in his report as follows:
"Cubans under the command of himself (Colonel Laborde) and of
Lieutenant Colonel Tomas, supported by two companies of marines under the
command of Captain Spicer and Lieutenant Elliott, routed a force of 300
Spaniards."

The facts are these: Two companies of marines formed a battalion under my
command, and the companies were commanded, as stated in my report, by
Captain Spicer and First Lieut. L. C. Lucas.

My command was not a supporting body for the Cubans, and before leaving
camp, after conversation with you on the subject, I left with the understanding
that I was to act with the Cubans so far as in my judgment it was for the good of
the expedition, but that I was not under the command of either of the insurgent
commanders.

This word "support," as used, is a military misnomer, for the marines
numbered 225 and the Cubans 50 in the fight, and although the latter were brave
enough, their quality as efficient fighting men was on a par with that of the
enemy.

My report states that there were 500 of the enemy engaged, and it is now
known that the force was a little larger, and not 300, as stated by Captain
McCalla.

I believe Captain McCalla's report was made from the statements received
from Colonel Laborde, and if he had believed mine, made to you and forwarded
to him for his information, incorrect, he had many opportunities to call my
attention to the facts at the time, but he left me for months believing it accepted
unquestioned while controverting it in his own.

Very respectfully,

G. F. ELLIOTT
Captain, United States Marine Corps,

Col R. W. HUNTINGTON,
United States Marine Corps, Commanding First Battalion of Marines.
1. First Marine Battalion Headquarters
2. Dumphy/McColgan Monument
3. The Crossroads
4. The Old Stone Fort
5. Hill 350
6. Hill 400
7. Elliott's Position 14 June 1898
8. Quick Signaling Position 14 June 1898
9. Lieutenant Lucas' Starting Point
10. Lucas' Position when he rejoins Elliott 14 June 1898
11. Spanish Main Battle Position
12. Spanish Command Post on Cuzco Beach
13. Lieutenant Ingate's Objective (never reached)
14. Lieutenant Magill's Route
15. Spanish Signal Station overrun by Lieutenant Magill
16. Hill fired upon by the Dolphin

*Map taken from sketch map and locations provided by Colonel Robert R. Hull, USMC (Ret). NOTE: 1898 locations are overlaid on present-day map of Guantanamo.
Research Trip to Guantanamo Bay
by Colonel Robert R. Hull, USMC (Retired)

16 June, 1997

From: Colonel Robert R. Hull USMC (Ret)
To: Distribution

Subj: June 10-15 Research Trip to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; Report of

Ref: (a) COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY 190520Z MAY97
(b) Map Sheet GUANTANAMO BAY 1:25000 Series 824S
(c) SECNAV/CMC Annual Report FY 1898
(d) R. R. HULL Field Notes 11-14 JUN 1997

Summary

Historical - On 10 June 1898, the First Marine Battalion (Huntington's Battalion), commanded by Lt. Col. R. W. Huntington USMC landed at Fisherman's Point, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and established a camp on the plateau area now called McCalla Field. From 11-13 June, Spanish forces launched numerous attacks against the Marines. The Marines held the position but not without sustaining casualties. On 14 June, a 2 company task force supported by a Cuban Army detachment attacked the main Spanish position at Cuzco Well causing the Spanish to retreat in the direction of Guantanamo City. From that day, the Spanish ceased to be a bother to the First Marine Battalion.

Research Trip - During the period 10-15 June 1997, field research was conducted in the area occupied and fought over by the First Marine Battalion. With the 1898 participant's accounts for guidance, and using a metal detector, efforts concentrated on discovering and/or verifying locations associated with the exploits of the First Marine Battalion. Areas of concentration included McCalla Field, Cuzco Hills and adjacent terrain features. Artifacts discovered in situ plus the contemporary narrative accounts aided the research team findings. Based on this, the team developed a conjectural reconstruction of key events, including the Battle of Cuzco Well. Significant terrain features and related areas of interest were identified by grid coordinates using a current military map (Ref B), providing a correlation with the eyewitness accounts of 1898. These efforts, including a description of the artifacts, and the team's findings and conjecture are discussed in detail.
1. Background

In accordance with the area clearance granted by ref (a), facilitated by CGMARFORLANT Liaison Element, Norfolk and with the concurrence of CO MARINE BARRACKS GD/SF Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the undersigned accompanied by his son, Maj. Michael P. Hull USMC visited the Guantanamo Bay command during the period 10-13 June (for Maj. Hull) and 10-15 June (for the undersigned).

The purpose of the trip was to conduct field research of the Guantanamo Bay area in which the First Marine Battalion (Huntington's Battalion), commanded by Lt. Col. R.W. Huntington USMC, operated during the Spanish-American War. The field research concept included traversing the ground where the First Marine Battalion ("the Battalion") maintained its base of operations and further to critically examine the terrain associated with the battle of the campaign, the latter being known as the Battle of Cuzco Well. A prime objective of the research was, insofar as possible, to locate the Battalion's outposts, the routes to the Cuzco area, the main battle positions of both the Marines and the Spanish at Cuzco, and other locations significant to the Battalion's operations. Ideally, the discovery of war material in situ would assist in developing a conjectural reconstruction. The use of a metal detector was envisioned as an aid in discovering such items, particularly in the Cuzco Hills area.


A significant body of documentary evidence; both published and unpublished, had been assembled and consulted prior to the research trip. The two most important items were the contemporary reports by Lt. Col. Huntington and Capt. G. F. Elliott contained as enclosures to the Commandant's Annual Report to the Secretary of the Navy in 1898 (Ref C) . . . . These officer's reports have become the basis for most published accounts found as either articles or as included in general histories. However, located in various archives are numerous other items relating to the Battalion's operations. These include diaries, letters, sketches, photos, newspaper clippings and other unpublished official amounts.

Analysis of this material, prior to the conduct of the research trip, provided a reasonably clear and surprisingly detailed overview of the Battalion's operations, particularly in the vicinity of the camp established at McCalla Field. A notable exception to the documentation were contemporary maps or sketches of the Cuzco Well battle area. Narrative descriptions of this action were available and the general area was known. It remained to walk the ground in an effort to determine with some specificity the respective battle positions. Accordingly, most of the field research time was spent in the Cuzco Hills area including the hills overlooking Cuzco Beach and the Cuzco Beach area itself. The Battalion's initial base at Fisherman's Point, although greatly altered since 1898, was not neglected by the field research. This area, where most of the Battalion's casualties were incurred was visited on several occasions by the research team.
The findings below, include conjectural descriptions based on an analysis of extant documentation, a physical inspection of the area, and in the case of the Cuzco Well battle, analysis of material located by a metal detector.

In addition to the undersigned, the research team consisted of Maj. Michael P. Hull USMC, Capt. Tom Riordan USMC, Asst. Operations Officer MB Guantanamo, and Ssgt. P. W. Whitten, Minefield Maintenance Section MB Guantanamo. The enthusiasm and professionalism of these active duty Marines contributed materially to the findings in this report. Particularly noteworthy was Ssgt. Whitten's dedication to the effort. A highly motivated Marine, he was primarily responsible for the location of numerous artifacts in the Cuzco Hills area whose discovery provided convincing proof to the events which occurred there on 14 June, 1898.


The report's findings and conjectural reconstructions are presented below by phases. These phases coincide generally with the sequence with which the field research was conducted. The report is not intended to be a definitive account of the Battalion's operations. Rather it is presented to supplement and amplify the existing body of knowledge surrounding the Battalion's exploits during the period 10-14 June, 1898. Using this report and the existing documentation should permit the development of a reasonably accurate reconstruction of certain key events during this period. In order to aid this reconstruction, the key locations discussed below have been assigned grid coordinates based on the current military map (Ref B) . . . . Assuming the accuracy of the grid coordinates with relation to the 1898 activities described, these coordinates can be used by future researchers as a common base of data concerning the activities of the First Battalion from 10-14 June, 1898.

4. Findings and Conjectural Reconstructions.

A. Phase I--First Marine Battalion Base Camp encompassing area from Fisherman's Point to and including McCalla Field (inactive)

(1) First Marine Battalion Headquarters and Base of Supplies

McCalla Field and the surrounding plateau area was the site of the Battalion's Headquarters and its "base of supplies". It has been drastically altered by the construction of buildings, roads, and an airfield. Considerable quantities of earth were removed in the process which has also had an effect on the 1898 terrain contours. At the extreme northern end of this area, there is a small, well maintained park site upon which sits a large monument dedicated to the First Marine Battalion. Immediately adjacent to the monument is a tall flagpole. The
grade at this location appears to be original and undisturbed. This location, coordinates 832021, conforms to the descriptions, sketches and photographs depicting the Battalion's headquarters. On June 10, 1898, the Battalion, having landed at Fisherman's Point from the USS *Panther*, established a tent camp in this vicinity. Oriented in a north-south direction, it was rectangular in shape and measured approximately 25 by 125 yards. On 12 June, following the first Spanish attack on the camp the previous night, the tent camp was dismantled. In its place, the Battalion constructed a fortified position approximately 40 yards square with the north side resting close to the edge of the hill. Concurrently, a "base of supplies" was established on the beach just below the fortified position, and connected by a path to the hilltop position. The "base of supplies" was placed in charge of the Battalion's next senior officer, Maj. H. C. Cochrane. The main power station now covers the beach area where the "base of supplies" was located. The beach area of 1898 is now completely covered by concrete and industrial type structures and also serves as the site of the current ferry landing. The conjectural site of the Battalion's initial tent camp is in the vicinity of a rectangular multi-storied office building (unoccupied) and the nearby WWII era multi-storied square sided concrete blockhouse (disused).

(2) Memorial to Privates Dumphy and McColgan

In a flat valley floor, and adjacent to a dirt road running between two steep ridges is a small white memorial marking the site where Privates Dumphy and McColgan, both from D. Co. were killed in action. The two Marines, at the time of their deaths, were manning a sentinel post as part of the forward outpost that screened the Battalion's main position. As such, they marked the Battalion's front line. At approximately 1700 on 11 June they were killed by the Spanish at their post. The Spanish fire alerted the Battalion to an impending attack, launched later that night. The monument is located at coordinates 833010.

From the memorial to the Battalion Headquarters measures approximately 1100 yards, on a direct line. The monument's current location was subject to evaluation by the research team to determine the plausibility that its current location did in fact occupy the exact position where the two Marines were killed. This evaluation considered primarily the surrounding terrain as well as reference to 19th century infantry doctrine. This doctrine prescribed the use of sentinel posts on a line covering the outermost approaches to a main position. In a position of support, and to the rear of this line of sentinels was positioned a small support force. ("Vedettes," term used to describe the sentinels; "Cossack Post", the support). It is probable that Dumphy/McColgan was only one of several posts established on a line in the small valley. About 300 yards south of the monument, lies a now obscured terrain feature, that in 1898 was known as the "crossroads." (Sec (3) below). Later that night (12th) somewhere between the memorial and the "crossroads", Sgt. Smith, also of D. Co. was killed in action.
The monument sits just next to an existing dirt road that begins near the current Sherman Road. Near the monument, the road veers toward the southeast. Both from a map study of the road’s trace, and by viewing the site from the crest of nearby hills, it becomes apparent that the memorial lies astride the 1898 trail from Cuzco Well to Fisherman’s Point. On the afternoon of 11 June, Pvt. Dumphy and McColgan were directly in the path of the lead elements of the 3rd (Principe) Spanish Infantry Regiment. Surprised while eating their evening meal of hardtack, and apparently unaware of the advancing Spanish, the two Marines were shot numerous times by the Spanish. The number of rounds each Marine received (21 in one and 15 in the other) led to early reports that the Spanish had mutilated them.

If Pvt. Dumphy and McColgan were two lone Marines on sentry duty with no support to back them up, the monument would appear to be in the wrong place. Assuming however, that the two Marines were part of a larger outpost with the center of their support located at the "crossroads" then their position (the monument) would be consistent with 19th [century] existing doctrine. A terrain analysis confirms the importance of the path through the valley. Given the importance of the "crossroads" position (it was a major outpost occupied by at least one platoon later that night as well as on the 13th and 14th) then the site of the monument appears to represent the approximate exact location of the two Marines when they were killed.

(3) The "Crossroads"

The "crossroads" appears in several contemporary narrative accounts. Extant sketch maps of the area also depict a confluence of trails labeled "crossroads". An early 1900s map shows a trail running from the vicinity of the current flagpole at McCalla Field, south across Sherman Road, then between two ridge lines where it veers to the southeast (site of Dumphy/McColgan memorial) through a saddle, then down the valley terminating at Cuzco Beach. Clearly, this was the main Spanish route between Cuzco Beach and Fisherman’s Point in 1898. On the current map, trace the western leg of McCalla Road from the flagpole south. It veers to the southwest to avoid the old short east-west runway of McCalla Field. However, if the road instead of veering continues in a straight line to intersect with Sherman Road, the route would conform closely to the trail outlined on the early 1900s map. Further, the route, once across Sherman Road would neatly connect with the current dirt road where the Dumphy/McColgan monument sits. The other trail that defined the "crossroads" was a trail which started at water's edge in the basin to the east of McCalla Field, headed west, then south around the base of the hill toward the lighthouse at Windward Point. i.e. part of this trail is now Sherman Road.

Given the importance given to the "crossroads", it seemed important to discover its approximate 1898 position. After reviewing the earlier map and after a detailed walk over the area, it appears that the "crossroads" is located at
coordinates 831012. This places the "crossroads" approximately 700-800 yards south of the Battalion Headquarters. Another 200-300 [yards] southeast of this position lies the monument to Dumphy/McColgan.

The "crossroads" was recognized early by Lt. Col. Huntington as a critical piece of terrain. He had posted sentinels south of this location (Dumphy/McColgan). On the night of the 11th, he had Lt. Neville stationed here and Lt. Shaw stationed to the southwest of this location. That night, Shaw came under attack, withdrew to the "crossroads" where he joined Neville's platoon, and withstood all efforts by the Spanish to overrun the group. At dawn the next day the combined force returned to the Battalion Headquarters having been away from the main body for over 12 hours. The "crossroads" was the Lt. Mahoney's outpost position on the morning of 14 June. Lt. Magill, on that same day, had to pass through the "crossroads" on his way to reinforce Capt. Elliott's force in battle with the Spanish at Cuzco. In addition to the deaths of Dumphy and McColgan at their post just south of the "crossroads", Sgt. Smith D. Co. was killed late on the night of the 11th in this vicinity. Like the dirt path near where Dumphy/McColgan were killed, the crossroads lay astride the main trail Fisherman's Point-Cuzco Well.

(4) The "Old Stone Fort"

Virtually silent on the subject in the official contemporary accounts are a series of night patrol actions on 11 and 12 June. The actions on 11 June are discussed above in (3) where Lt. Shaw's platoon initially operated southwest of the "crossroads" and later joined forces with Lt. Neville at the "Crossroads" position, where they remained until daylight. The 11 June night attack on the Battalion's main position came from a southwest direction.

On the night of 12 June, the Battalion's position was attacked several times from a number of directions. While these attacks were in progress, Lt. Neville's platoon was operating in the plateau area (McCalla Field) southwest of the Battalion's position. At some point in time, he came under fire from a group of Spaniards located near the remains of an old stone building. Lt. Neville ordered his force to spread out in the prone position on a line at the cliff edge. After a series of rifle volleys, he led his group in a charge against the building driving out the Spanish. During the preparations for the attack one Marine, Pvt. Taubman fell from the cliffs to the rocks below and was killed. His body was recovered the next day by a ship's boat. During the exchange of fire three Marines were wounded.

On the 14th, Elliott's route to Cuzco followed the cliff trail towards Windward Point. Along this route, Stephen Crane noted that they had passed the Spanish stone fort. Today this area is either covered with McCalla Field runway, or by structures along the cliff edge. In an effort to locate the approximate location of the "Old Stone Fort", the team worked along the existing roads until coming upon two concrete batteries erected in 1906 as coast artillery
emplacements. Now minus their guns, the emplacements, a light yellow color, are in near pristine condition otherwise. They are sited to cover the sea approaches to the harbor and are directly opposite the harbor's first entrance buoy. From the flagpole at McCalla Field, the twin emplacements bear roughly southwest at a distance of approximately 750 yards. Conjecturally, the research team places the "Old Stone Fort", at coordinates 827016, or about where a short circular stub of the old runway is located.

B. Phase II--Cable Beach-Cuzco Hills-Cuzco Beach.

(1) Elliott's Approach March 14 June 1898.

Shortly after breakfast on 14 June 1898, Capt. G. F. Elliott (Co. C), Capt. W. F. Spicer (Co. D) and a supporting force of Cubans, Lt. Col. Tomas departed the "Base of Supplies" on the beach below the Battalion's fortified position. (Coordinates 832022). Elliott, the senior, was in command of the force. Its mission was to "destroy the well at Cuzco". Following the coastal path and passing the "Old Stone Fort" (See A (4) above), they continued toward Windward Point. At sea, the USS Dolphin was providing escort duty. Prior to reaching Windward Point, Elliott ordered Lt. Lucas' platoon to scale the hills, head eastward upon reaching the crest line, and attempt to surprise the Spanish sentinels believed to be screening the Spanish main position at Cuzco Well. (See B (3) below for Lt. Lucas' route to the battlefield.) Rounding Windward Point, Elliott's force came to Cable Beach (the paved road turns abruptly north at the beach). Looking north at this point, he was able to look up the valley to the top of the crest where he observed Lt. Lucas group heading eastward.

(2) Hill 350 (in feet)--Elliott's first view of Cuzco Beach.

To Elliott's immediate front, rose a steep hill which seemed to start its ascent almost from the sea which was then on his right. The massive hill continued on in a north-south direction. To get to Cuzco meant a steep climb up the west face of the hill, which was soon accomplished. Reaching the top of the hill, Hill 350, coordinates 839996, and looking east Elliott now had a view of Cuzco Beach and the main Spanish position. The battle may have started here but the range to Cuzco Beach is about 1000 yards. Initially, the undersigned had presumed this location as Elliott's command post for the entire battle. This was based on a map study. Upon actually viewing the terrain from this location, it became obvious that Hill 350 was not the primary battle position of the battle. Nevertheless, a sweep of the hill top and the terrain leading north to Hill 400, coordinates 839001, was conducted but with negative results. It should be noted that at the crest of Hill 350 is a circular concrete gun position probably dating from WWII. Also, fragments of old field communication wire was in the vicinity. Obviously, this location had been worked over in modern times. From Hill 350 and looking both north and east one can easily see how the intervening terrain could be
described as a "horseshoe" in shape, as Elliott did in his report. From the top of Hill 350 to the next peak in the ridge system, which trends north at this point, is a peak labeled Hill 400. From that peak, part of the hill mass turns east in a gently curving arc. Between these two peaks, the ground was searched thoroughly by the metal detector with negative results. This ground was eliminated by the team as the site of the Marine's main battle position. The Team now continued from Hill 400 following the ridge line as it trended easterly and slightly southerly.

(3) Elliot's Main Battle Position--Lucas rejoins Elliott.

From just below the Crest of Hill 400, the team continued along the crest line in a generally east slightly southerly direction. Almost immediately, the metal detector recorded buried metal. At this point, 6mm cartridge cases and cartridge clips began to be recovered. On the cartridge bottom were stamped letters and numbers. All had stamped 6mm USN on the lower half of the rim. Some had WRA CO stamped above this, others UMC. (WRA CO was the Winchester Repeating Arms company; UMC the Union Metallic Cartridge company, the forerunner of Remington Arms company.) The initial find of these items began at coordinates 840000 and continued along the ridge line for about 300 yards to coordinates 843000. Usually, they were found just beneath the surface, although a few were discovered on top of the ground. Often, clusters of cartridges were found in a small area near one of the small (12-18 inch) rocks littering the hillside. This would indicate that an individual Marine chose this location as his firing position.

As the ridge line continues east/south it begins to slope more directly in a southeastern direction. At this point, at about the 250 foot contour level, the nose of the hill refuses to a fairly sharp angle heading northeast. At about this position, metal indication ceases. This point appears to conform with the flank of Elliott's force nearest the enemy. It measures approximately 500-600 yards from the old building at Cuzco Well (See C (2) below). The entire Marine position is at an angle to the Spanish position. Consequently, the other flank of the position is farther from the Cuzco Well by about 200-250 yards. i.e. about 700-850 yards from Cuzco Well. Using the traces of metal found on the ridge leads to the conjecture Elliott's main battle position on the ridge line, consisting of D Co. and one platoon of C Co. (Lt. Bannon) plus Cubans is occupying a battle line 300 yards in length at a distance from the enemy of between 500 to 850 yards. This line is traced by coordinates 840000-843001.

As Elliott's force engaged the Spanish below, Lt. Lucas "now rejoined the fight". When last seen by Elliott, Lucas was on the skyline having climbed the steep hill by the coast road in order to cut off any Spanish outposts. The first part of the climb was strenuous and cost him several heat casualties. Once on the peaks, the route became easier as he followed the ridge lines in that area. (Power lines on that ridge line may be following his route). In any event, when he
rejoined Elliott he most likely came around in view from the northern side of the ridge, coordinates 843002, where the rest of the force was now engaged with the Spanish. The Marine position now had more depth on the nose of that ridge line.

The team selected this position as the most likely CP for Elliott. (Final CP until beginning of Spanish retreat.) This conjectural CP would have given him the needed visibility and control. Accordingly, Elliott's CP is fixed at coordinates 843000. At this point, the terrain overlooks the Cuzco valley toward the east and also begins to slope rapidly to the south where it then levels off at 200 feet before sloping again sharply in the sea. This latter piece of terrain is about 500 yards from the Cuzco Well position at its top, and is almost parallel to the position. Early speculation on the part of the team had made this a possible Marine battle position. However, a thorough sweep of this terrain registered no metallic hits whatsoever, and this terrain was ruled out as a battle position. It may have been a position used by the Spanish in the opening stage of the battle. Coming off the slope, a small brass buckle usually associated with a harness was discovered.

Based on the material evidence discovered in this location, we place the Marine main battle position along the trace of the ridge defined by coordinates 84000 to 843001. On this firing line was D. Co. commanded by Capt. Spicer, Lt. Bannon's platoon from C. Co. plus a number of Cubans. Elliott commanded from this position with his probable final CP at coordinates 843000. Lt Lucas' platoon came up on the other (north) side of this ridge and came into view (by the Marines) as the ridge line narrows and forms the nose overlooking Cuzco valley. As he came into this position at coordinates 843002 Elliott was able to communicate with him by messenger, thus Elliott's original force was together for the first time since Lucas was detached on his scouting mission, during the force's approach march.

(4) Signaling Position of Sgt. Quick and Pvt. Fitzgerald

A prime objective of the research team was to determine the possible location from which Sgt. Quick and Pvt. Fitzgerald signaled to the USS Dolphin. Both Marines received the Medal of Honor for these exploits. All contemporary accounts agree that in order for the Dolphin to see the signals (Elliott's force did not have the standard issue signal flags used for "WigWag" signaling; the Marines tied cloth neckerchiefs to the end of their rifles and waved these to and fro in the approved manner), the Marines had to stand on the top of the ridge line, which put them in full view of the Spanish. Some accounts note that Sgt. Quick had his back to the enemy while facing the ship.

An early assumption based on a prior map study suggested that Hill 350, coordinates 839996, served as Elliott's CP throughout the battle and also would have served as the signal location for Quick and Fitzgerald. As noted above in B. (2), this location was rejected as the CP after the field visit to the area. At this location, the range to the Spanish was over 1000 yards.
The key to discerning the Quick/Fitzgerald signaling location then depended on finding the Marine's main battle position, and with that, Elliott's probable CP in the final moments prior to the Spanish retreat. As noted in (3) above we place Elliott's CP in the vicinity of coordinates 843000. Building on that data, the probable location of both Quick and Fitzgerald as they signaled the Dolphin is also in this vicinity. They probably needed to move around this point to find the right location for the ship to see them. This location is also sufficiently close to the Spanish in the valley below (estimate between 500-600 yards) such that their bravery would be specifically noted by those around them. Accordingly, we estimate their position to have been in the same general vicinity as Elliott’s CP at coordinates 843000.

C. Phase III The Spanish position at Cuzco Beach-Magill's Hill

(1) Cuzco Beach--Naval Cemetery

The team returned to the Cuzco area the following day, this time approaching the area by the road (Magazine Road) to the Naval Cemetery. The objective was to find evidence of the Spanish position. A related objective was to determine if the hill rising north and overlooking the Cuzco valley would reveal evidence of naval gunfire. At the first peak of this hill (in fact the hill extends further northward as part of a ridge complex) is located a monument erected in 1988 to commemorate Sgt. Quick's and Pvt. Fitzgerald's exploits.

The flat terrain that defines the cemetery and the adjacent terrain that leads to the beach has been worked over both by manmade works as well as the effects of nature. Specifically, evidence includes concrete block construction of field heads plus strands of early model field communication wire. From the beach inland, evidence exists of tidal storm surges that have on occasion swept inland. In short, a thorough sweep of the level area south of the cemetery road revealed nothing of interest attributable to the late 19th century. It should be noted that the small hills south of the cemetery and overlooking the water were not swept. The area swept south of the road is in the vicinity of coordinates 849998.

(2) The Old Foundation at Cuzco Beach

At the foot of the hill where the monument is located, Magazine Road makes a sharp turn to the north, bisecting Cuzco Valley and leading into the magazine area. Here, the north edge of the road is bounded by the beginning of a hill trending north. In this immediate vicinity were the ruins of yellow brick steps. There was no above ground evidence of the building to which these steps led. As one climbed the steps, immediately to the right was an old concrete water reservoir, rectangular in shape and about the size of a good sized backyard swimming pool. A fairly elaborate system of pipes and valves were part of this structure. Clearly, this had been a significant source of well water at an earlier time in this century.
About 30 feet to the right (east) of the concrete tank was a relatively level patch of ground overgrown with small trees and cactus. In one corner of this area was a large number of red curved roof tiles, many in near perfect condition. Their quantity, condition and location suggested modern manufacture. They were probably the roof tile to the demolished building related to the yellow brick steps. At one edge of this relatively flat area, were the remains of a stone foundation. It was dry laid, constructed of rubble (local rocks) material, and chinked with the peculiarly oval local coral found in the vicinity. Although only one corner was obvious to visual inspection, a closer look at the outlines revealed the shape and size of the foundation. The outside dimensions were measured. The structure size was 35 feet 3" (east-west and facing the beach) by 27 feet 9". This was certainly an important early structure in the area.

The foundation's perimeter was carefully swept. Located by the detector were a quantity of framing nails, cut nails and a few wire nails plus the remains of an iron door hinge. Small fragments that might have been part of a jar or similar vessel were located. The framing nails, cut nails, and door hinge were consistent with 19th century building materials. The team concluded that this was the foundation to one of the important 19th century ranch buildings at Cuzco, and probably served as the Spanish headquarters during the Cuzco Well battle. Its location is coordinates 847998.

(3) Magill's Route to Cuzco Well

On the morning of 14 June, Lt. Col. Huntington not only dispatched the two company task force under Capt. Elliott to Cuzco Well, but also established three platoon size outposts to screen his main position at Fisherman's Point, and to be prepared to assist Elliott. To the southwest was Lt. Ingate's platoon from Co. B, augmented by a corpsman and a correspondent. His instructions were to take up a screening position at coordinates 828002, where the cliff trail is constricted by the hills. Here he was to wait for Elliott's column to arrive and then to take his orders from Elliott. Unfortunately, this was Ingate's first experience away from the main headquarters. He wandered around the plateau area, missed Elliott, ended up back at the main position. He was then ordered to join Lt. Mahoney at the "crossroads" (coordinates 831012) and then reinforce Elliott at Cuzco. The shooting from that location now noticeable at the main camp. He missed this landmark also, Mahoney waited for him, finally departed for Cuzco and arrived after the battle was essentially over.

Also near the "crossroads" was the third force sent out by Huntington to screen/reinforce. This was the Co. A. platoon led by Lt. Magill. Based on his subsequent actions, Magill's platoon was probably "leaning" into the direction of Cuzco, probably at the saddle beginning just southeast of the location of the memorial to Dumphy/McColgan. Assuming this as his start point, coordinates 835008. Magill, keeping to the ridge lines north and east of the Cuzco Valley trail (Magazine Road) led his force toward the Spanish position. On the way, he
overran a Spanish signal station (Heliograph). The reflections from this station had been noted by the Marines at Fisherman's Point. A logical location for this station would be the hill at coordinates 848007. For the Marines at Fisherman's Point to see the reflected signals, which were essentially "line of sight", the Spanish were most likely communicating with a Spanish outpost near Conde Beach, coordinates 808042.

As Magill continued on the ridge line, it now turned south and led directly to a hill overlooking the Cuzco Well area. The trace of Magill's path from the "crossroads" area to the Cuzco Well location is described by the coordinates 831012-835008-848007-848003. At this latter point (site of the Quick/Fitzgerald monument), Magill was nearly in a position to seal off the Spanish retreat from Cuzco Well.

(4) Magill's Hill/Monument Hill

An early conjecture, based on a map study and analysis of the contemporary accounts, made the hill mass coordinates 848998-848001 the logical location of the hill into which the USS Dolphin fired on the afternoon of 14 June. The naval gunfire precipitated the Spanish retreat. Lt. Magill was reported in a position to seal off the Spanish retreat until the Dolphin's shells impacting on a hill drove his force back up the ridge line out of the line of fire. It remained to discover evidence of naval shells on this hill to positively identify this position. As discussed in (2) above, the old stone foundation was at the foot of this hill at coordinates 847998.

An old fire break traces a straight line up the face of the hill for about 300 yards to where the Quick/Fitzgerald monument is located. Reasoning that the bulldozer had disturbed the original soil, the detector began to sweep a path to the immediate left of the fire break. In the course of the sweep which continued up to and past the monument, numerous items were recovered. These included fragments of a 4-inch naval shell (verified by EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] Gtmo detachment), suspected 6 and 3 pounder naval shell fragments, and numerous cartridge cases and clips.

The latter were identified as 6mm with markings identical to those found previously on the opposite ridge line. Several larger cartridge cases were discovered, initially thought to be used in the Spanish Mauser rifles. On further analysis, they turned out to be 30-06 cartridge cases from the Frankfort Arsenal and manufactured in . . . 1905-1906 (Probably used by U.S. Army personnel on a hunting expedition; note the coastal artillery positions previously discussed were constructed in 1906).

The USS Dolphin's log for his period is in the National Archive[s]. On 14 June, 1898, the log records expenditures of 14 rounds of 4".-Common, 11 rounds of 6 pounder, and 12 rounds of 3 pounder ammunition in the support of the Marines at Cuzco. Based on this evidence, Magill's final position just prior to the battle's end is located at coordinates 848003 (site of Quick/Fitzgerald
monument). Several 6mm rounds were found beyond the monument (at this point . . . [there] is a saddle in the ridge line) an indication that the enemy position extended around the base of the hill facing west (across the valley was Elliott's main body with Lt. Lucas on Elliott's northern flank facing east).

On this particular day, the team had brought a thermometer to the field. At 1030 on 12 June, the reading on the thermometer as it was taken from the backpack read 99 degrees. When placed in the shade, it eventually settled at only 90 degrees.

5. Conclusions.

The above findings were based on three factors.
1) analysis of the existing body of accounts by 1898 participants
2) physical study of the terrain
3) identification of material discovered at particular locations.

As the field research progressed, and in particular as physical evidence was located, the team soon developed a consensus opinion. This opinion is reflected in the findings and discussion in paragraph 4 above. At the same time, the members recognized that reconstructing the operations of the First Marine Battalion (Huntington's Battalion), events that occurred nearly 100 years ago, could not be done with 100% certainty. While the team is confident of its findings, it is recognized that future researchers may come to different conclusions. As a minimum, it is hoped that this report will add to the existing body of knowledge concerning the subject events and serve as a guide to any future research efforts.

6. Acknowledgments.

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Robert R. Hull

Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret)
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The armored cruiser USS New York, the flagship of Rear Admiral William T Sampson, is shown after the decisive battle of Santiago Bay. In the battle, the American fleet destroyed the seven ships of the Spanish squadron without the loss of any U.S. ships. The Spaniards suffered casualties of over 350 dead, and over 150 wounded. More than 1,600 Spaniards including Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, the Spanish commander, were taken prisoner. American losses were 1 man killed and 10 wounded.

An American sailor poses before the former Spanish fort Santa Cruz, on the island of Guam. On 20 June 1898, the American cruiser USS Charleston entered Apra harbor and took the surrender of the Spanish forces on Guam.
Marine 1stLt John T. Myers landed on 21 June 1898 with 30 Marines from the USS Charleston on the island of Guam and disarmed the small Spanish garrison there. In the above photograph, taken in December 1899, Myers is shown as a Marine captain commanding the Marine Barracks, Subic Bay, in the Philippines.

Marine 1stLt John A. Lejeune commanded the Marine detachment from the American cruiser Cincinnati, which landed on 9 August 1898 at Cape San Juan, Puerto Rico, to relieve a U.S. naval force under attack by Spanish forces. Pictured above as a Major General, Lejeune was the commander of the U.S. 2d Division in World War I and in 1920 became Commandant of the US. Marine Corps.

Photo courtesy of Naval Historical Center

Photo History and Museums Division, USMC
Marine 1stLt Wendell C. Neville served with the 1st Marine Battalion at Guantanamo. Like Lejuene, Neville served in World War I and became Commandant of the Marine Corps, in 1929. He is photographed above as Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Charles Heywood was Commandant of the Marine Corps during the Spanish-American War. He retired in 1903 as a major general. Heywood zealously protected the traditional mission of the Marine Corps while at the same time seizing the opportunity to form a Marine battalion to be deployed with the fleet.

Department of Defense (Marine) Photo A413182
Captain George F. Elliott (pictured above as a brigadier general) commanded the Marine attack on 14 June 1898 on the Spanish forces in the Cuzco Well area. With the destruction of the well which was the only source of fresh water in the sector, Spanish forces withdrew and no longer presented a viable threat to the Marine battalion on Guantanamo. In 1903, Elliott succeeded MajGen Charles Heywood as Brigadier General Commandant of the Marine Corps (the rank of the Commandant reverted by law to brigadier general upon the retirement of Heywood).

In September 1898, the 1st Marine Battalion is seen marching through the streets of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. On 22 September 1898, the Marines paraded before President William McKinley at the White House in a driving rainstorm.

Photo courtesy of Naval Historical Center NH 46345
A photograph taken in June of 1997 shows the flagpole at the US Marine Barracks Guantanamo marking the 1st Marine Battalion's command post in June 1898. The view is north and overlooking Guantanamo beach and harbor.
Chronology of Events Involving the Spanish-American War

1895

12 June--President Grover Cleveland issues proclamation of neutrality concerning the revolt in Cuba.

15 July--Cuban insurgents declare that the Cuban Republic is independent of Spain.

1896

10 February--Spanish General Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau takes over the Spanish effort to end the revolt in Cuba.

6 April--United States Congress passes joint resolution calling for Executive to recognize Cuban independence.

1897

4 March--President William McKinley takes office.

16 June--Annexation Treaty with the Hawaiian Republic signed at the White House on 16 June. However, President McKinley was unable to gain the two-thirds majority in the Senate for ratification.

8 August--Spanish Prime Minister Antonio Canovas del Castillo assassinated by an Italian anarchist, leading eventually to a change of government in Spain.

13 September--General Stewart Lyndon Woodford arrives in Spain as U.S. Minister to put pressure on Spanish government for an early and certain peace in Cuba.

23 October--Spanish government announces to Woodford that Spain would grant autonomy to Cuba.

4 November--Assistant Navy Secretary Theodore Roosevelt convenes special board "to consider the reorganization of the Navy." Suggestion made to transfer officers and men of the Marine Corps to the line of the Navy. Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood argues to keep Marine Corps separate.

December--U.S. State Department announces arrangements for contributions to those suffering due to the Spanish policy of reconcentration in Cuba. Spain had agreed to permit entry of food, clothing, and medicines into Cuba free of duty.
January--Spain declares autonomy for Cuba and Puerto Rico.

12 January--Anti-American riots occur in Havana, led by pro-Weyler Spanish army officers.

25 January--USS Maine anchors in Havana harbor on port visit.

9 February--Letter of Enrique de Lome, Spanish Minister to the U.S., critical of President McKinley is published by the New York Journal.

15 February--USS Maine explodes in Havana Harbor, 28 Marines die along with 238 sailors.

21 February--U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry begins session in Havana.

25 February--Acting Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt orders Commodore George Dewey to move squadron to Hong Kong and "Keep full of coal."

26 February--Secretary of Navy John Davis Long orders naval units in Pacific and Caribbean to take on coal.

9 March--President McKinley's "50 Million Dollar Bill" for national defense passes 311 to 0 in the House and 76 to 0 in the Senate.

21 March--Navy Court of Inquiry declares that USS Maine blown up by external agency, believed to be a submarine mine.

29 March--President McKinley sends ultimatum to Spain calling for abandonment of reconcentration, the declaration of an armistice between Spain and Cuba, and that Spain accept U.S. mediation.

10 April--Spanish Captain General Ramon Blanco y Arenas announces an unconditional armistice with Cuba, but refused to submit to U.S. mediation upon Cuban sovereignty.

16 April--Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood USMC, receives orders to organize two Marine battalions to serve in Cuba.

17 April--Colonel Heywood issues orders to assemble men from all East Coast ports and stations at the Brooklyn Navy Yard under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Huntington, USMC.

19 April--Congress passes resolution that Cuba is free and independent, and authorizes the President to employ U.S. troops to force Spain to relinquish control over the island.
22 April--President McKinley declares a blockade of Cuban ports. Also, at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Huntington's Battalion parades to the transport USS Panther and sails south.

23 April--President McKinley calls for 125,000 volunteers.

24 April--Spain declares war on U.S.

25 April--U.S. recognizes that a state of war has existed between the U.S. and Spain since 21 April.

25 April--Commodore Dewey moves his squadron into Mirs Bay (Tai Pang Han), thirty miles up the coast from Hong Kong.

26 April--Huntington's battalion sails for Key West, Florida from Fortress Monroe, Virginia.

27 April--Commodore Dewey's squadron leaves Mirs Bay for Philippines.

29 April--Spanish squadron under Vice Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete departs Cape Verde Islands, headed west.

30 April--Commodore Dewey and naval squadron enter Manila Bay at 11:30 p.m.

1 May--Commodore Dewey opens fire on Spanish fleet near Cavite Naval Station. Spanish fleet destroyed by 12:30 p.m., and signals surrender at 12:37 p.m.

3 May--Lieutenant Dion Williams USMC and Marines from USS Baltimore take Cavite Naval Station unopposed.

4 May--Congress authorizes USMC to increase strength by 24 officers and 1,640 enlisted men.

11 May--Sailors and Marines from USS Marblehead and USS Nashville cut two (of three) transoceanic cables off Cienfuegos, Cuba. Twelve Marines receive Medal of Honor.

19 May--Filipino insurgent leader Emilio Aguinaldo returns to the Philippines from Hong Kong to rally the people against the Spanish. On the same date, Admiral Cervera's squadron anchors in Santiago Harbor, Cuba.

3 June--U.S. Navy sinks the collier Merrimac in Santiago Harbor in an attempt to bottle up the Spanish squadron.

5 June--A U.S. naval force of three ships under Commander Bowman H. McCalla enters Guantánamo Harbor to destroy a blockhouse above Fisherman's Point.
6 June--U.S. warships of the North Atlantic Fleet under Rear Admiral William T. Sampson bombard fortifications at Santiago Harbor.

7 June--Forty Marines from USS Oregon and 20 from USS Marblehead check for a suitable landing area in Guantanamo at Fisherman's Point, destroy cable station at Playa del Este, and withdraw.

10 June--Huntington's Battalion of Marines lands at Fisherman's Point.

11-14 June--Huntington's Battalion holds off Spanish regulars and Cuban loyalist troops at Guantanamo.

14 June--Marines at Guantanamo under Captain George F. Elliott destroy Cuzco Well. Sergeant John Quick and Private John Fitzgerald, USMC, both win Medal of Honors signaling USS Dolphin to shift fire.

20 June--USS Charleston under Captain Henry Glass, USN, captures Guam. Lieutenant John T. Myers, USMC, and 30 Marines accept the surrender of the Spanish garrison.

22 June--U.S. Army V Corps under General William Shafter, USA, lands off Daiquiri to begin drive on Santiago, Cuba.

30 June--First U.S. troops land at Luzon, Philippines.

1 July--Emilio Aguinaldo proclaims the Philippine Republic.

1 July--U.S. Army captures El Caney outside Santiago, Cuba.

3 July--Spanish Admiral Cervera's squadron attempts to break out of Santiago Harbor and is destroyed by the American fleet.

17 July--Spanish garrison at Santiago, Cuba, surrenders to General Shafter.


31 July--BGen Arthur MacArthur USA, arrives at Manila with 4000 soldiers.

5 August--Huntington's Battalion departs Guantanamo for another objective area in Cuba.
9 August--Spanish attack lighthouse manned by U.S. sailors overlooking San Juan Passage, Puerto Rico.

10 August--1st Lieutenant John A. LeJeune USMC and 37 Marines from USS Cincinnati and USS Amphitrite reinforces sailors at San Juan Lighthouse.

12 August--U.S. Navy squadron bombards Manzanillo, Cuba, to prepare for Marine landing.

12 August--Peace Protocol between Spain and U.S. suspends Caribbean operations. Landing of Huntington's Battalion at Manzanilla, Cuba, called off.

12 August--The United States officially annexes the Hawaiian Islands.

13 August--Admiral Dewey's fleet and U.S. Army under Major General Wesley Merritt make simultaneous attacks on Manila, Philippines. Spanish authorities surrender and 7,000 Spanish troops taken prisoner.

15 August--Huntington's Battalion ordered to return to U.S.

26 August--Huntington's Battalion arrives at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

10 December--Treaty of Paris signed to end war with Spain.

1899

1 January--Spain transfers Cuba to U.S. control.

6 February--Senate ratifies Treaty of Paris, which formally ends the war with Spain, and the U.S. annexes the Philippines, Guam, and Puerto Rico.

3 March--Congress passes Navy and Marine Corps Personnel Bill, doubling the size of USMC to 225 officers and 6,000 enlisted.

23 May--Colonel Percival C. Pope USMC arrives at Cavite Naval Station, Philippines with the First Battalion of Marines.
Spanish-American War
Marine Corps Medal of Honor Awardees

11 May 1898, Cable-cutting expedition off Cienfuegos, Cuba:

from USS *Nashville*:

Private Frank Hall
Private Joseph H. Franklin
Private Joseph F. Scott
Sergeant Philip Gaughn
Private Pomeroy Parker
Private Oscar W. Field
Private Michael L. Kearney

from USS *Marblehead*:

Private Herman Kuchneister
Private Walter S. West
Private James Meredith
Private Edward Sullivan
Private Daniel Campbell

14 June 1898, Action against Spanish at Cuzco Well, Cuba

Sergeant John Henry Quick
Private John Fitzgerald

3 July 1898, On USS *Brooklyn* during actions off Santiago, Cuba

Private Harry Lewis MacNeill
Selected Annotated Bibliography

Spanish-American War

Compiled by LtCol David E. Kelly, USMCR

Books with * indicate titles in Marine Corps Historical Center library. Updated versions of this bibliography to be available on the History and Museums Division Web Site or on diskette from the Historical Center's library.

General Marine Corps History


Chapter 4, "The Expeditionary Years," covers Spanish-American War and discusses the development of the Advance Base Force.


An early general history of the Corps.


A valuable general history of the Marine Corps, written on the eve of World War II. Chapter 10, "The War with Spain and Operations in the Far East," gives succinct coverage of that era. Lacks a bibliography and footnotes.


Chapter VII, "The Four Month War With Spain 1898," has a general discussion of the war, together with several good photos of the First Battalion of Marines at Guantanamo.


**Marines in the Spanish-American War**


A self published, rare booklet. A firsthand account by a Marine from his enlistment in 1898, through the fighting at Guantanamo, Cuba and the return to the United States after the war. Has listing of every Marine in the battalion.


A personal account of Frank Keeler's service in the Marine Corps during the Spanish-American War.


Small mimeographed monograph of the War. One sketch map of Cuba.


Early chapters deal with reform and professionalism issues in the Marine Corps at the time. Chapter 6 deals with the "new" Navy. Lots of information on Navy Lieutenant William Fullam's pressure to remove Marines from modern naval ships. Chapter 9 discusses the Spanish American War and its aftermath. Comprehensive discussions of reforms, roles, development of postwar roles for Marine Corps.


Includes copies of reports from Colonel Robert Huntington and the Battalion at Guantanamo.
Sources Located at the Marine Corps Historical Center

Subject Files. Reference Section. Washington, D.C.

Personal Papers Collection, Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington, D.C.

Cochrane, Henry C. Papers: Diaries and letters contain firsthand account of the Guantanamo battle.

Huntington, Robert W. Papers: Contemporary letters by the commanding officer of the 1st Marine Battalion relative to the war.

Spanish-American War History


Section by Dr. Jack Shulimson, pp. 127-151, "Marines in the Spanish-American War."


A concise, general history of the war. Diplomatic background, Army and Navy operations.


Extensively illustrated general history of the war. Photos emphasize Army actions, also includes paintings and illustrations from the time, and many Navy photos. A few Marines appear on board ship in some photos.


A general history of the conflict, written during the anti-war period between World Wars I and II, questions the motives for, conduct of, and results of the war. Critical of Army preparations and actions. Brief mention of Marines at Guantanamo in three paragraphs on page 259.


Outlines preparations of Navy Department in the late 1890's; the building of new war ships and President McKinley's efforts to avoid war by undertaking negotiations with Spain. Discusses Battle of Manila Bay, and explains why Admiral George Dewey could not take control of the city of Manila until reinforcements arrived from the United States.


Staff Correspondents. *The Chicago Record's War Stories.* Chicago, Ill: Chicago Record. 1898

Articles filed by newspaper reporters covering the War. Includes coverage of the prelude to the war; speech from a U.S. senator describing conditions in Cuba under "Reconcentration;" Stephen Crane's description of Marines fighting at Guantanamo and night time signaling from shore to ship for gunfire from the ships while under attack; and Hobart Billman's story of night attack on western shore of harbor at Guantanamo by two companies of Huntington's First Battalion of Marines.

Excellent overview of the War. Lots of information on background to the war, pressures by the Cuban Junta on U.S. public opinion, Spanish General Valeriano Weyler's policy of "reconcentration" in Cuba, outcry by U.S. newspapers demanding action, mobilization of U.S. Army, and destruction of the USS *Maine*.


**Bibliographies/Reference Works**


**Biography/Memoirs**


Serious examination of Butler's career as a Marine officer and his controversial post-retirement career as an anti-war and anti-imperialist activist. Early chapter covers his first eight months as one of the officers commissioned for the duration of the war, and his reentry into active service as the Corps expanded in colonial conflicts in the Philippines and the Caribbean area.


A glowing, almost hagiographic biography of Butler's career written for the popular press which romanticizes Butler's colorful time in the Corps until his forced retirement in 1931.


**Related Topics of Interest**

**Uniforms, Weapons, Etc.**


Illustrates uniforms, arms, and flags.

**U.S. Army**


Describes problems for U.S. Army in the 1890’s, political difficulties during mobilization for war between regular Army units, volunteers, and state militias, effects of this on the fighting at Santiago, Cuba, and how the American public perceived these problems. Also outlines problems between the Army and the Navy at Santiago.

African-American Units


Naval Operations


Short booklet, the English translation of the Spanish naval commander's outline of the Spanish Navy's deficiencies in the war due to lack of proper funding in the 1890's.


*The Development of the Modern Navy and the Spanish War.* Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1936.


Clearly written account of naval actions in the Atlantic and Caribbean. Chapter 6, "The Cable Cutting at Cienfuegos" describes the action where Marines won their first Medal of Honor in the war. Chapter 10, "The Capture of Guantanamo," is a very complete account of the actions of the First Battalion of Marines in Cuba, with a thorough description of the three days of defensive fighting which led to the decision to attack the Spanish-held well at Cuzco, and operations in the harbor to clear Spanish mines. Chapter 16, "Captain Littleton Waller Tazwell Waller's Story", gives Waller's account of Marines on the USS Indiana during the 3 July naval battle off Santiago, Cuba.


General Navy history, includes photos of Navy and Marines during the war.


Results of Admiral Rickover's study on physical causes of the explosion which sunk the ship. He concludes that it was due to spontaneous combustion of the coal on board the ship, not an external mine.


**Literature**


Crane's versions of events involving Marines, Army personnel, and correspondents during the war. Also has other stories from war in Turkey.


**Pictorial Works**

*King, Lt Nephew, W., USN, with MajGen O. O. Howard, USA, and Capt Robley D. Evans, USN. *The Story of the War of 1898 and the Revolt in the Philippines.* New York: Peter Fenelon Collier, 1899.
A rare, out of print, oversized picture book. Photographs, drawings and some full color lithographs, concentrate on Army and Navy operations, but includes several pages on Huntington's First Battalion of Marines.


**Diplomacy**


**Imperialism**


**Intelligence**


Powe, Marc B. *The Emergence of the War Department Intelligence Agency 1885-1918.* Manhattan, KS: Military Affairs, 1975.
Public Opinion


Casualties

Roddis, Louis H. *Naval and Marine Corps Casualties in the Wars of the United States.* N.p., 1946?.