

The task force's engineer staff consisted of 34 individuals from all Services. Under the leadership of Colonel Robert B. Flowers, USA, the task force engineer, they were divided into two sections. The facilities section was responsible for real estate management and all related functions, such as the location of the tent cities and bases, hazardous waste storage, and coordination of vehicle parks and wash down sites. This section also managed critical engineer supplies such as dust palliatives, plywood sheets, lumber, electrical, and concertina wire. The operations section

oversaw the work of the various engineer units of the components, ensuring it all fit within the task force's requirements. The UNITAF engineers' mission was to "protect U.S. and allied troops; repair and maintain needed sea and air ports, other logistics facilities, roads and bridges, and command and control facilities; and construct bases to support coalition forces."³⁸⁵

The first engineering task was to improve and repair the theater infrastructure. Ports and airfields were given top priority. In Mogadishu, the

engineers cleared the port's docks and warehouses. They also acquired additional adjacent space and more warehouses to increase the port's capacity. In Kismayo, engineer divers removed sunken hulks and prepared the port to receive shallow-draft vessels. As the area of operations expanded, repairs and maintenance were performed at each of the airfields.

As soon as the initial objectives were secured, Marine engineer assets were quickly put to work at Mogadishu port and the airfield. As the operation moved inland, and as the coalition grew in numbers, these Marines brought their skills to new sectors. Soon they were helping build a better quality of life for their comrades in the field. They repaired roads and constructed base camps, tent areas, heads, and mess facilities. Marine Corps explosive ordnance disposal personnel also destroyed confiscated ordnance and rounds and mines discovered in the field.³⁸⁶

The Navy supplied two mobile construction battalions to the engineer effort. These "Seabee" units were a part of the 30th Naval Construction Regiment. The first of the Seabees, a nine-man advance party, arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December and were immediately put to use repairing the runway lights at the Mogadishu airfield.³⁸⁷

The construction battalions' main mission was to provide "vertical construction support" to the United States forces and coalition partners. This translated to working on base camps in the relief sectors, to include building tent areas with wooden decks and siding, latrines, showers, and mess facilities. Like the Marines, the Seabees worked on the main supply routes, grading shoulders to widen the roads and making repairs to bridges. They also drilled wells and installed a new water pump for a refugee camp on the banks of the Jubba River near Bardera. They joined their Marine counterparts in the Clean Street operations in Mogadishu and prepared the site for the Army evacuation hospital.³⁸⁸

Both mobile construction battalions were heavily involved in the repair and maintenance of the airfields in the theater. Relief flights by C-130 aircraft into Baidoa caused that airstrip to deteriorate early in the operation. Repairs involved removing 300,000 square feet of the runway's asphalt surface and pulverizing it. This material was then mixed with Portland cement and poured, graded, and compacted to make a new surface. The Seabees then put down 600,000 square feet of AM2 interconnecting aluminum landing mat pan-

els for aircraft turnarounds, parking aprons, and helipads. Similar work, but on a lesser scale, was done at the airfields at Bale Dogle and Bardera. At the former site, the Seabees worked alongside Marines of Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 to build landing and staging areas for CH-53 helicopters and taxiways and turnaround areas for C-130 aircraft.³⁸⁹

The Air Force also had specialized engineers for airfield repair. These airmen belonged to an organization called "Red Horse," an acronym for rapid engineer deployable heavy operational repair squadron engineer. Like the Navy Seabees, these engineer specialists provided assistance in base camp construction. But their larger, and more important, mission was to "perform heavy damage repair" to facilities and utilities in an expeditionary environment. The austere setting and degraded infrastructure in Somalia made these airmen key players in the operation.³⁹⁰ *

They went to work early. On 10 December, a team was testing the airfield at Bale Dogle for serviceability for C-141 aircraft. With an Air Force combat control team on hand and Special Forces soldiers for protection at the remote location, the Red Horse team used a specialized piece of equipment to check the runway surface. This was a large, weighted rod that could be dropped from a set height. The weight was dropped on the runway surface and the depth of its penetration was measured.³⁹¹ Of the 10,500-foot runway, the first 4,500 feet were determined unserviceable and repairs were quickly begun.

The Army's 36th Engineer Group was responsible for one of the operation's most important construction projects. This was the repair of the main supply network and the construction of what became known as the "Somali Road."

The task force staff recognized that improvement of the road system would provide multiple benefits for the entire operation. First, it would enhance security by connecting all the humanitarian relief sectors and reducing the travel time

* Red Horse teams moved into each of the relief sectors as they were opened, often accompanying the troops. The author watched one such team operating the morning after the Italians secured Gialalassi airfield. When it was determined the dirt runway was not sturdy enough to take the wear of heavy aircraft, the Red Horse engineers discovered an abandoned roller on a part of the field. They soon had it in repair and running across the field in an early attempt to compact and upgrade it.



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Soldiers of Company A, 41st Engineer Battalion, 10th Mountain Division, celebrate the completion of a Bailey Bridge they erected between Kismayo and Jilib. The bridge was named for Sean Devereaux, a UNICEF worker killed while endeavoring to feed thousands of starving people in southern Somalia.

between them. This in turn would mean that fewer forces would be required in theater to cover the same amount of ground. Rapid-moving convoys could more efficiently deliver relief supplies. Safe and quick movement on the roads would also benefit the people of the interior by providing them with a means of getting their products from farms and herds to markets in the cities. Contracted labor would provide jobs for local Somalis and boost the overall economy. Finally, the roads would give the factions an easy means to move their forces and heavy weapons to transition sites and cantonment areas. The 36th Engineer Group was given the mission of working on the main supply routes and creating the Somali Road to connect all the sectors.³⁹² General Johnston, through his engineering staff, specified standards for the road system: "All supply and resupply routes were made to carry two-way traffic at military load class 30 and used soil stabilization where possible."³⁹³

Work began on 20 January 1993 and proceeded rapidly. Many difficulties were encountered but overcome. Mine removal operations were necessary on some stretches to open the way to the interior. Mines were a persistent problem throughout the entire area of operations and were not limited to roadways, although they caused considerable trouble there. Commander William F. Boudra, USN, of the UNITAF staff described what the engineers faced:

Massive quantities of land mines and unexploded ordnance dotted roads and the Somalian landscape. Our forces encountered a variety of mines and other munitions manufactured by many different countries. Because operational procedures called for marking and bypassing mines and unexploded ordnance, we used minesweeping teams frequently. Marking, however, had to be austere because any valuable materials would certainly be stolen. We settled on painting

mine warnings on rocks. Breaching mine and [unexploded ordnance] areas to open routes was required on numerous occasions. Several methods were employed. Teams equipped with metallic mine detectors were used but their value was limited because most mines and ordnance were non-metallic.* Therefore, we used field expedient mine rollers made from locally procured and modified construction compactors pushed by armored combat vehicles. This method proved very effective. Both explosive ordnance detachments and Sappers were put to work on countermine and [unexploded ordnance] neutralization operations.³⁹⁴

Other difficulties came from the condition of the road surface in various stretches, requiring decisions about whether these areas should be repaired or bypassed. Where available, locally procured surface aggregate was used to fill holes. In other cases, the roadways were patched with mixtures of soil and cement, and dust palliatives were put down throughout the routes. Bridges were repaired or strengthened as necessary. In some areas, the road had to be entirely rebuilt.³⁹⁵ The portion between Jilib and Bardera had to be laid down on a different route through new terrain. In the Kismayo sector, two Bailey bridges were constructed and a third was set up in Bardera.

Five weeks of heavy, hurried labor completed the job. On 24 February, the Somali Road was finished. The engineer group had constructed or repaired more than 1,100 kilometers of roadways, connecting all of the humanitarian relief sectors. The interior of the entire area of operations was opened to the movement of relief supplies, the transportation of local produce, and the resettlement of refugees. More importantly, driving time between sectors dropped dramatically. It had originally taken 26 hours to travel by vehicle from Mogadishu to Kismayo; now it took only 12. Travel time between other sectors dropped by 50 to 75 percent. This major engineering feat was a

* In Oddur, the author saw a stockpile of several hundred cases of such antipersonnel mines. These were simply made of wood with a hinged top for inserting the charge and a small opening in one side for placing the detonator. These devices could be placed in the ground with pressure-sensitive detonators or rigged as booby traps with trip wires. With little metallic content, they would have been difficult to find with traditional metal detectors.

great success, one that contributed to the security of the force and the completion of its mission.³⁹⁶

Communications

Another important method to link the area of operations was effective communications. For UNITAF, this responsibility fell to the communications section, whose members had to work closely with the components and with the forces of the coalition partners.

Colonel Robert G. Hill faced a daunting task as the UNITAF communications officer. In early December, as he was building his joint team through the Central Command administration officer, he was planning his own concept of support for the overall mission and the courses of action. The communications section would be responsible for identifying and sourcing needed equipment, and then installing and operating it. The system had to link the commander to his staff, the components, and the coalition partners, and had to provide support for operations, intelligence, and personnel and logistics functions.³⁹⁷ The communications network would have to work over long distances in theater and be able to reach literally around the world when needed, and be set up within the bare infrastructure environment that affected every other aspect of the operation.

Prior to deployment, the communications section worked with MarFor to set the basic communications plan. Communications nodes would be established at each of the relief sectors as they were secured. These nodes would be "constructed around an AN/TSC-93 spoke terminal and would consist of a switching capability, communications center, two high-frequency radios, two tactical satellite terminals, and a local area network server."³⁹⁸

Equipment came from a variety of sources. Colonel Hill knew I MEF's normal equipment load could not meet the dual requirements placed on it, to support both the new task force headquarters and the 1st Marine Division acting as MarFor. He therefore asked for augmentation of satellite communications and single-channel radio systems through the joint communications support element, an organization under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The communications element controlled a pool of equipment to support two joint task force headquarters; some of this was duly allotted for UNITAF's use. This equip-



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On a rise overlooking Mogadishu airport, TSgt Jack Richards, Sgt Derrick Hawkins, and A1C Charles Layne, of the U.S. Air Force's 5th Combat Communications Squadron, conduct daily maintenance on the microwave dish of a tropo satellite support radio system.

ment provided the connectivity from the task force headquarters to the components, which then supplied the necessary equipment on their end. Internal support came from the 9th Communications Battalion and the communications company of the 1st Marine Division.³⁹⁹

Communications with the outside world were established early in the deployment. The task force headquarters was connected to Central Command in Tampa, Florida, by a single-channel tactical communications satellite. Satellite communications also were established between Fort Meade, Maryland, and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.⁴⁰⁰

A communications support element van arrived with limited telephone connectivity. This helped to expand internal communications, albeit on a small scale. As the coalition's forces moved into the relief sectors, connectivity was provided to keep the soldiers and Marines on the ground linked to the headquarters at Mogadishu. An early problem was encountered when some component forces arrived before their command and control assets. This led to borrowing of equipment among U.S. forces to ensure that all missions were properly covered. As more equipment arrived, so too did the opportunity to normalize things along Service lines. But, even by late January, there

were still anomalies. Because of the mix of units and missions there, the American components at the port and airfield at Mogadishu displayed a corresponding mix of equipment. Marine units were using Air Force transmission systems, and Army units were using Marine gear. Overall, however, the ability to use whatever equipment was at hand was judged to have worked well.⁴⁰¹

The need to be prepared to operate in a bare environment caused one noticeable problem. As some units arrived they brought commercial satellite equipment with them that would ensure reliable communications anywhere in the world. By attaching a STU-III, secure communications could also be achieved.* Ironically, the convenience of this equipment was also its greatest weakness. This was a commercial system, and

* TacSat, InMarSat, and STU-III (secure telephone unit, third generation) are all communications systems and pieces of equipment. TacSat is a military satellite system that uses communication repeaters that work with the terminal equipment of land, sea, and air forces. InMarSat is a commercial satellite communications operator that provides telephone, fax, and data transmission services to client ground, sea, and air users. The STU-III is a voice encryption device that allows speakers to discuss classified matters over a telephone by scrambling the sound.

there was an expensive cost to its use. Some units had borrowed the equipment from their non-deployed comrades, creating an interesting dilemma: who would pay the user fees, the owner or the using unit? Colonel Hill soon recognized he had to get control of the number and use of these sets in theater.⁴⁰²

Communications with the coalition partners presented some challenges. Where NATO members were operating there was no great difficulty because of the interoperability of equipment and procedures. For the other nations, all manner of communication issues had to be resolved. Frequency assignment was a concern, but direct contact with the UNITAF frequency manager kept all partners on separate networks. Communications security was another matter that had to be addressed, both among the United States components and the partners. It would be inappropriate for every organization in theater to be receiving its own secure communications deliveries. So a joint communications security management office was formed as a central point for the delivery and distribution of all such messages and materials. This

office also was responsible for working with the Defense Courier System to ensure the proper receipt of all such materials. But the non-NATO coalition partners were not cleared to receive such classified information. For them, liaison officers were assigned. These officers accompanied the partners in the field, and they carried the appropriate U.S. communications equipment.⁴⁰³ In this manner, all units of the task force, no matter what their size or mission, were linked through UNITAF headquarters.

A greater difficulty was communicating with UNOSOM headquarters, even though it was located less than a half mile from the UNITAF compound. Telephone landlines, which would normally be an easy method of connecting with U.N. forces, could not be used because the wire would have been stolen as soon as it was strung. In addition, both headquarters used different radio communications equipment. A solution was to issue hand-held radios, called "bricks," for both headquarters. Even then difficulties were encountered due to the different voltages of the battery chargers each headquarters used. Such small mat-



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U.S. Air Force SSgt Rick Robinson of the 52d Combat Communications Squadron adjusts an SB3865 tactical telephone switch at the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu. The squadron provided communications support for the Air Force's Air Mobility element.



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A soldier from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Airborne) hands leaflets to several Somalis on the streets of Kismayo.

ters were difficult to foresee, but each was resolved as it was encountered through the application of a cooperative attitude and a desire to get the job done.⁴⁰⁴

Psychological Operations

Lieutenant General Johnston knew the successful completion of his mission would be greatly helped by a well-run psychological operation effort. "Having understood the potential impact of PSYOP [psychological operations], I was extremely interested in having PSYOP up front for this operation because I knew ... that it would prevent armed conflict. ... You come in with tanks and people think you're there to hurt them. PSYOP worked well to convince [Somalis] that we were there with the military capability to take care of the factions and their little armies—that we were going to provide support and safety."⁴⁰⁵

To ensure this valuable support was planned and integrated into the UNITAF operation, a joint psychological operation task force was organized

under the supervision of the director of operations, Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni. This specialized task force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini, USA, was formed from elements of the Army's 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne). The nucleus of the task force came from the 8th Psychological Operations Battalion and the Product Dissemination Battalion. The 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical) provided two brigade psychological operations support elements and eight loudspeaker teams. These last units were attached to the 7th Marines, and the Army's 10th Mountain Division.⁴⁰⁶

The joint psychological operations task force had the mission of providing information and coordinating communications to two target audiences. The first group included those persons and organizations General Johnston had to work closely with to accomplish the mission: the special envoy, UNOSOM, United Nations agencies, and the humanitarian relief sectors. The second group was the Somalis, comprised of the general



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On the streets of Kismayo, a soldier from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion distributes copies of Rajo, the Somali-language newspaper. The paper proved to be an effective tool in providing UNITAF information to the Somali people.

Somali population, the leaders of the factions, elders from the clans and villages, religious leaders, and professionals and intellectuals.⁴⁰⁷

The task force accomplished its information dissemination mission through a variety of products. Leaflets were easily produced and widely distributed. These small sheets usually had a colorful picture on one side and a related message in Somali on the other. Themes ranged from an explanation of the purposes of the coalition forces to information about the dangers of mines and unexploded ordnance. These were distributed to target areas by aircraft. Throughout the operation several types of aircraft were used: Marine Corps CH-53 helicopters; USAF and Canadian C-130 Hercules airplanes; Army UH-60 and UH-1 helicopters; Navy S-3 Viking airplanes; and New Zealand C-748 Andover airplanes.⁴⁰⁸

Another printed product was a Somali-language newspaper named *Rajo*, the Somali word for hope. The staff of the paper included soldiers


from the 4th Psychological Operations Group, civilian area experts, and Somali linguists. They produced articles about military operations in Mogadishu and the other relief sectors, relief operations, redevelopment, and analyses of the peace and reconciliation talks. Other features dealt with public health information, articles about rebuilding the educational system and police forces, and interviews with relief staff members. One other popular feature was a cartoon featuring a Somali named Celmi and his camel Mandeeg. The conversations between these two characters emphasized the themes of the coalition's mission and what current operations were accomplishing. The first copy of this paper was published on 20 December 1992, and it soon had a daily run of 15,000 to 28,000 copies, depending on the availability of paper. It was distributed to every town and village in which UNITAF soldiers were deployed. The paper was apparently effective in getting out UNITAF information to the

Somalis. As U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Robert B. Oakley later told the *Rajo* staff: "We are using *Rajo* to get the correct information into the hands of the Somali population and to correct distortions. ... It has made a big difference. The faction leaders, I know, read it very, very carefully. Every once in a while [General Mohamed Farah Hassan] Aideed or Ali Mahdi [Mohamed] or one of the other faction leaders draws to my attention something that appeared in the newspaper. So they're very, very sensitive to it and they know its power."⁴⁰⁹

In cooperation with the newspaper, UNITAF established a Somali-language radio station, also named *Rajo*. Radio *Rajo* offered the Somali people a choice from the faction-controlled radio stations as a source of information. Twice a day, the station broadcast a 45-minute program consisting of news stories from the *Rajo* newspaper, world events, readings from the *Quran*, readings of Somali stories and poetry, and Somali music. The broadcasts were designed to encourage the Somali factions to settle their differences and rebuild their country. There were several specific themes the station staff wove into the broadcasts. These were to emphasize the neutrality of the coalition and ensure listeners that the rules of engagement would be applied fairly against all factions as necessary; to highlight the capabilities of the coalition and the work its members were doing, especially those from African or Islamic countries; to encourage disarmament and highlight the agreements made by the faction leaders; to reinforce the idea that only the Somali people could resolve their problems and encourage the rebuilding of the country's social infrastructure; to encourage displaced people to return home and harvest or plant crops; and to emphasize that there would be no change in the rules of engagement or capabilities during the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.⁴¹⁰

The radio station was located at UNITAF headquarters in the U.S. Embassy compound. It broadcast on a combination of midwave and shortwave frequencies. With extensive adjustments to the transmitting antenna, the *Rajo* shortwave programs could be received in every city and town in each of the relief sectors.⁴¹¹

One other method of getting out the UNITAF message was through loudspeaker teams. Accompanying troops during operations, these teams broadcast surrender appeals and gave instructions to crowds or to Somalis in arms mar-



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A young Somali boy holds one of several leaflets prepared and distributed as part of UNITAF's psychological operations effort. The leaflet portrays a Somali man shaking the hand of a U.S. soldier, thereby emphasizing that the United States was in Somali as a friend trying to help end the suffering.

kets or at roadblocks. The team members helped to distribute copies of the *Rajo* newspaper. They also worked closely among the people, gathering important information and assessing the security environment. They gave an added, personal emphasis to the coalition messages in the *Rajo* paper and radio broadcasts by meeting with village elders and local religious leaders.⁴¹²

Psychological operations teams supported every UNITAF action from the very start of the operation. On 9 December, loudspeaker teams accompanied the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit during the initial landings. A Marine CH-53 carried a team for the first leaflet drop over the city of Mogadishu. After that, loudspeakers and leaflet drops were a part of each movement of coalition forces into the relief sectors. Two to three days before the arrival of UNITAF soldiers into a town, the teams dropped special handshake leaflets that depicted a Somali and a coalition soldier shaking hands and explained the mission of the coalition to assist the relief operations. While emphasizing the peaceful intent of the coalition, these leaflets also clearly stated that UNITAF was prepared to take any necessary action: "We are prepared to use force to protect the relief operation and our soldiers. We will not allow interference with food

distribution or with our activities.” After UNITAF forces moved into a sector other leaflets were dropped over the cities and villages and along the routes leading to it. These showed Somali people waving to a guarded convoy of relief trucks, and explained: “We are here to protect relief convoys.” They also warned: “Do not block roadways! Force will be used to protect the convoys.”⁴¹³

Loudspeaker teams were conspicuous during the Marine assault against the weapons storage sites in Mogadishu in early January and in the Army’s efforts against the forces of Mohamed Said Hirsi (General Morgan) in Kismayo in February. They accompanied coalition forces on sweeps of arms markets and during Clean Street operations. Special leaflets explained the intent of these operations and in February a very specific one was directed at the forces of General Morgan. The leaflet explained the ultimatum issued by the UNITAF commander and told Morgan’s men they must move by the deadline of 25 February, “or risk destruction.”⁴¹⁴

These task force activities were of great value to UNITAF, clearly demonstrating a benign and neutral stance balanced with a will to use force if necessary. Speaking of the loudspeaker teams, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, the MarFor

commander, summed up the value of the psychological operations efforts: “They reduced the amount of unnecessary bloodshed by convincing Somali gunmen to surrender rather than fight.”⁴¹⁵

Civil-Military Operations

While most of the structures created by UNITAF were internal, that is, created to assist its own forces in accomplishing the mission, there was one that looked externally, to the humanitarian relief organizations. These organizations, working directly with the people of Somalia, were the link between the military security mission and the end of famine. They worked in a wide variety of areas, distributing food, providing medical care and assistance, helping with agricultural and veterinary problems, assisting refugees and displaced persons, digging wells for clean water and working on other small civil projects. They occupied a unique place in the mosaic of the operation; manned by civilian staffs and controlled by individual parent organizations, they were highly independent. They also were an important part of the solution to Somalia’s woes. They truly were partners in the operation, and their needs had to be considered and met.



DVIC DD-SD-00-00790

Soldiers from the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion ride in a humvee broadcasting messages to local Somalis gathered on a street in Kismayo. Elements of the 10th Mountain Division walk alongside providing security.

The relationships with the relief organizations did not have to be created entirely from whole cloth. During his time in Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, Brigadier General Zinni had seen the value of establishing an entity to coordinate civil and military efforts. He wanted to repeat the process used in the Kurdish relief operation by establishing a similar group in Somalia.⁴¹⁶ Also, the United States Government, through the State Department, had created a number of organizations whose primary mission was to provide disaster assistance and economic aid, as well as furnish the structures by which these could operate in foreign countries.

As early as August 1992, the United States Government had been supporting the relief organizations in Somalia through these agencies. The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, a part of the United States Agency for International Development, had established a disaster assistance response team for Somalia. Two disaster response teams also operated in Nairobi and Mombasa, as coordinating agencies for Operation Provide Relief.⁴¹⁷ With the military intervention in December the requirement grew for closer cooperation among all parties.

During Operation Provide Relief, humanitarian relief organizations had already begun to tax the military command with requests for assistance. To reduce these direct requests and to coordinate the military response to them, a humanitarian operations center was established. This center was staffed with military officers, workers from the Agency for International Development and some relief workers. This worked well for Provide Relief, and so a center was established in Mogadishu for Restore Hope. The operations center had a simple mission: to plan, support, and monitor the delivery of relief supplies; but it had a complex organization, reflecting the mix of military, governmental, international, and civilian humanitarian aid members. The director was Philip Johnston, a United Nations official and a member of UNOSOM.* There were two deputy directors; one, a civilian, was from the response team, and the other was a military officer from UNITAF. The center contained a standing liaison

committee, composed of members from UNOSOM, UNITAF, the disaster assistance response team, United Nations and Red Cross agencies, and an executive committee to represent the non-governmental organizations. A bloc called the "Core Groups" represented those relief organizations with specialty interests such as agriculture, sanitation, health, and education. The loose connections of all these groups into one organization meant it had little real authority. The director responded to the U.N., and the deputies to either the Agency for International Development or UNITAF. The relief agencies were responsible to their parent organizations. The center was able to do one thing well; it established the forum for all these organizations to discuss and coordinate their needs and efforts. The main center was established with the U.N. headquarters in Mogadishu on 11 December. Thereafter, a center was established in each humanitarian relief sector.⁴¹⁸

Colonel Kevin M. Kennedy, a veteran of cyclone relief operations in Bangladesh, had been the chief of staff for Operation Provide Relief since August. He was, therefore, familiar with many of the key players in the humanitarian operations community, whether they were United States Government workers or relief organization personnel. He was selected to be the military deputy director of the humanitarian operations center and head the main civil-military operations cell in Mogadishu.⁴¹⁹

As part of the operations center, the cell was the clearinghouse for requests of the relief organizations for military support such as convoy escorts, security of facilities, space-availability on military flights, and technical assistance.⁴²⁰ Colonel Kennedy saw his duties as working in two directions. The cell was the link for the relief organizations to the military of UNITAF and UNOSOM. He also had to work closely with Ambassador Oakley and the UNITAF staff to coordinate their support. He assisted the humanitarian organizations to define their logistics requests so they could get what they actually needed, such as the berthing of relief ships, the staging of containers, and setting convoy routes and times. Colonel Kennedy saw the cell needed to be an institution that continued beyond the life of UNITAF. He therefore worked with the Japanese, Germans, Canadians, and others in the solicitation of funds. He also was involved in the development and implementation of relief policy, working with the United Nation's 100-Day Plan,

* Philip Johnston was then the president of CARE USA, and had been appointed by United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to lead a 100-day action program for accelerated humanitarian assistance in Somalia.



Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz

Representatives of the major humanitarian relief organizations gather for a daily meeting in the civil-military operations center in Mogadishu. Based on a similar organization established during the Kurdish relief effort in Iraq, the center endeavored to coordinate the civil and military efforts.

and creating a similar plan through 1993 for presentation at the Addis Ababa conferences.⁴²¹

The main cell in Mogadishu did not have a large staff, but it was a busy organization. There were daily meetings to which all relief organizations were invited, along with representatives of the United Nations and the disaster response teams. This was in keeping with Colonel Kennedy's desire to be inclusive. These meetings were used to discuss upcoming humanitarian operations, exchange information, and pass on intelligence. The main cell also had a variety of relief-related responsibilities. It promulgated and explained UNITAF policies to the relief organizations, and it worked closely with the UNITAF operations section in conducting mission planning for requests that needed complicated support, required more than one military unit, or that involved more than one organization. It chaired the Mogadishu port shipping committee to coordinate access to the port and pier space. It maintained a

24-hour watch to respond to emergency requests from relief organizations and coordinate them with the UNITAF staff. It also helped to create a food logistics system for the organizations. This system monitored food stocks, tracked delivery dates, listed warehouse capacities, transport availability, and the repair and condition of the road system.⁴²²

Just as each relief sector had a humanitarian operations center, each also had its own civil-military cell, which maintained contact with Colonel Kennedy's central organization in Mogadishu. These small teams of Marine or Army officers worked closely with the sector commanders and helped provided the same types of support to their local relief organizations. They also were given latitude to work with the local security committees and councils.

Convoy escorts were probably the most visible support the military gave the relief organizations. When an organization was expecting to move a

convoy of trucks loaded with relief supplies, they filled out a standard request and submitted it to the operations cell at least 48 hours in advance. The cell then tasked either a U.S. or coalition partner with escort duty. The relief organization and the military unit then had authorization for direct liaison. The component or coalition partner controlling the relief sector that a convoy was going to was generally tasked with escort duty. Convoys going to those sectors closest to Mogadishu (Baidoa, Bardera, Merka, and Gialalassi) received security escorts all the way to their destinations, but farther districts would split the responsibility. For instance, if a convoy was going to Belet Weyne, the Italians would escort it beyond Gialalassi, and the Canadians would meet them and take it the rest of the way.⁴²³

This was a rather simple process that worked well. For the first 90 days of the operation, UNITAF averaged 70 escorts a month, with monthly averages of 700 trucks carry 9,000 metric tons.* Convoy security gave the relief organizations an additional benefit; they could use trucks to move food to distant areas, so they could provide more food at less cost than they had been able to bring in by airplane. This security not only allowed the World Food Program to bring in its own fleet of trucks, but also increased competition among the local transportation providers, further lowering costs.⁴²⁴

There were some difficulties. Coordination between relief organizations and military units was not always perfect. Occasionally an escort unit was not informed of delays in the formation and start times of convoys. Locally hired trucks were subject to breakdowns, often the result of deliberate sabotage by their drivers who sought to obtain a portion of the shipment when the rest of the convoy had to proceed without them. There were some days when there were simply not enough assets to provide security for all the requested convoys. Some would have to wait, but eventually all convoys received an escort.⁴²⁵

Convoys were not the only humanitarian relief organization assets that required security. The organization oversaw hundreds of offices, warehouses, distribution centers, clinics, and housing for their staff personnel. These facilities, located throughout the country, often fell prey to bandits

since they contained food, medicines, and cash. Many of the relief organizations hired armed guards before the arrival of UNITAF. These mercenaries were often unreliable and prone to resent any attempt to fire them, in which case they became a threat to their employers. While not every place needed UNITAF protection every day, there were times when threats, real or perceived, made it appropriate to call for such assistance.

At such times, staffs of the relief organizations could call a "911-type" emergency number in the civil-military operations center. The request was then passed on to the UNITAF joint operations center, where it was assigned to a component or coalition unit. Again, this was an easy process, but it had its limitations. First, there were four levels the request had to go through: the relief organization; the civil-military operations center; the joint operations center; and then on to the military unit. Response time was increased, therefore, by the request moving along this chain, no matter how quickly each entity tried to pass it on. Also, there were numerous sites that might have to be guarded. Mogadishu alone had 585, and there were more throughout the rest of the area of operations. Consolidation of facilities and spaces could have eased this problem, but the relief sites remained dispersed.⁴²⁶

In addition to simple security needs, the relief organizations also required advice and, from time to time, direct assistance. Brigadier General Zinni, in an assessment of the operation made in March, saw it proceeding on three tracks. There were the obvious military and political portions. Then there was the humanitarian aspect, which he described as going beyond the "short-term sense of getting food and emergency care to the people that are in jeopardy, but it's also the long-term reconstruction in terms of getting public services started: hospitals, public works, that sort of thing."⁴²⁷ He had praise for Philip Johnston and his work with the United Nations in the humanitarian operations center, and the establishment of the plan for the development of the country. But providing the kind of actions envisioned was difficult.

The problems with giving this kind of assistance were limitations under United States law of what the military could provide and the obscure boundary between legitimate civil affairs-type activities and nation-building, which was to be left to the United Nations. Within this gray area, however, there was room for work to be done by

* These figures are only for convoys going out of Mogadishu, and do not count the convoys traveling inside the city.



Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz

UNITAF's chief engineer briefs humanitarian relief workers on new and ongoing projects at the civil-military operations center in Mogadishu.

the troops in the field. As Colonel Kennedy said: "the [Civil Affairs] program has been laissez-faire; do it if you want to, do it if you can."⁴²⁸ The money that could be legally spent on such projects was limited (a small amount of operations and maintenance funds), as was the ability to define it as work that benefited UNITAF and thus assisted the overall security mission.⁴²⁹

Out in coalition units, soldiers and Marines had the desire to help the Somalis in more positive ways than simply providing security. They had another necessary asset; time in their off-duty hours to volunteer for such work if they so wished. It was not long before commanders took advantage of these attributes of their troops. On 24 December, Colonel Gregory S. Newbold, commanding officer of the 15th MEU (SOC), initiated Project Hand Clasp, a program to assist schools, orphanages, and other organizations in the town of Baidoa. Through these actions, Colonel Newbold sought to maintain a benevolent

image of his Marines in the minds of local Somalis. The work had the added benefit of keeping up the morale of the MarFor personnel involved. In January, these Marines began Operation Renaissance in Mogadishu. This civil affairs operation combined medical and dental assistance visits with security sweeps of the area between the airfield and the port. These actions helped to stabilize the neighborhood and make it safer for UNITAF troops.⁴³⁰

Later, MarFor in Mogadishu worked closely with local schools. The Marines saw two benefits to these actions. Schools represented a piece of normalcy for the population, and they would keep children off the streets and away from trouble and harm. The Marines wrote to relatives and friends at Marine Corps Bases Camp Pendleton and Twentynine Palms, California, soliciting school supplies. The United Nations Children's Fund provided special educational kits for teachers, school staff, and students. These were given to

schools close to the soccer stadium, a main MarFor site, and one was sent on to Bardera. In a particularly dangerous area of Mogadishu, which warring factions claimed, the schools needed more than just supplies. The presence and activities of a MarFor civil-military operations team at these schools kept them from being attacked or looted. The team also contacted the World Food Program on behalf of the teachers and staff and procured supplies of corn, cooking oil, and sugar.⁴³¹

In the farther relief sectors things were happening in much the same fashion. Colonel Werner Hellmer, the MarFor officer-in-charge of the civil-military operations center, had established civil-military operations teams in Bardera and Baidoa. Working on the adage that actions speak louder than words, the Marines in these sectors, noted Hellmer, "get actively involved with the people ... one on one. ... We went out there and got involved, saw what the people wanted, how we could help them, and we did that."⁴³² What they got involved in was the provision of security to wells, protection of schools by visible patrolling, and assistance to schools and orphanages. Repairing water mains, leveling of school grounds, repairing classroom spaces, and other small maintenance projects were coordinated with Marine combat engineers and Seabees. Materials were not specifically requisitioned for the projects; but in a land where any building materials were scarce, scrap lumber was kept and used for such purposes.⁴³³

These experiences of the Marines were not

unique. They were repeated in all the other sectors, whether run by Army Forces Somalia or a coalition member. Within a short while, the security operations, the work of the relief organizations, and that of the civil-military operations teams all had their effect on the daily lives of the Somali people. As Colonel Hellmer said of Bardera and Baidoa:

You could see them blossom. ... The shops were open, the kids were in the street, children were now taking the donkeys and water burros and getting [containers] filled without the adults there with them. You saw bicycles on the street, kids playing soccer, children carrying bags of rice, which they weren't able to do several weeks before because they got robbed. The storefronts, the signs were being painted. You saw electricity in Baidoa. ... They were rebuilding places. The economy was starting to thrive. The marketplace was open. There was music. People in the streets sitting in front of their houses now without barricading themselves in the compound. Those are just the changes we saw within thirty days.⁴³⁴

During the third phase of the operation, successes were observed throughout the theater. Coupled with the decrease of violence and the improved security situation, many members of UNITAF felt their part of the task of restoring Somalia to the community of nations was close to an end. They hoped they might soon return home, but for that to happen the United Nations had to be prepared to accept the mantle of responsibility.

Part III
Getting Out



Chapter 9

Transition and Return

United Nations Relationship

From the very beginning, United States military and civil leaders maintained close ties to their counterparts in the United Nations. Senior U.S. Government officials met with the U.N. staff “two or three times each week” about the Somalia operation.⁴³⁵ By January 1993, military planners from U.S. Central Command were in New York “to assist the undermanned U.N. Military Staff Committee in developing its concept of operations and list of logistics requirements. Those planners remained available to the United Nations while it stood up a functional staff in Mogadishu in April.”⁴³⁶

It was much the same in the field. Iraq’s Ismat T. Kittani, the special representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations, met regularly with his U.S. counterpart, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley. In particular, Kittani attended the very first meeting between Ambassador Oakley, Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston, and the faction leaders on 11 December.⁴³⁷ Thereafter, the military and political sides of Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) worked closely with the U.N. staff, most notably Lansana Kouyate of Guinea, the deputy U.N. special representative, in establishing and running the Addis Ababa conferences.⁴³⁸ On the military side, General Johnston’s staff maintained close cooperation and exchanged liaison officers with Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen’s United Nations Organization Somalia (UNOSOM) staff. The UNITAF operations staff was especially helpful to UNOSOM by drafting the plans for disarmament and ceasefire that came from the initial Addis Ababa talks. Also, Marine Colonel Kevin M. Kennedy, from the UNITAF civil-military operations cell, was the military deputy director of the humanitarian operations center, headed by Philip Johnston, a United Nations appointee.

This close cooperation would be strained as time went on. By early March, UNITAF had accomplished much in terms of creating security, ending famine, and helping to encourage reconciliation and the reconstruction of social structures.

The members of UNITAF also knew they were never intended to be the long-term solution to Somalia’s problems; that work fell more appropriately to the United Nations. Unfortunately, the U.N. was slow in coming. Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni summed up the general feeling at this time: “I think the process [of reconciliation] is well along the way. I think the faction leaders and the Somalis are ready to begin the process. Frankly, I don’t feel the U.N. is prepared at this point ... though I feel they’ve got to deal relatively quickly because they cannot lose this window of opportunity when everyone appears very cooperative.”⁴³⁹ General Zinni also was clear about what was necessary for the U.N. to be successful in taking over responsibilities in this transition period. “The key to the fourth phase is the U.N. structures to provide security and basic humanitarian needs. Nations of the world must provide funding and forces. The presence of security forces will be needed for a while. The factions must reconcile their differences and agree on how to restructure the government. The U.N. must help with basic services and infrastructure to allow them to be self-sustaining: [these are] growth and exports, security forces, police and militia, political development, humanitarian services.”⁴⁴⁰

The difficulties facing the United Nations in fielding its UNOSOM II force reflected its differences from UNITAF in operational capabilities and goals. The operation in Somalia presented the U.N. with many challenges, and, as an international organization, it had to work its way through them in accordance with its own structures and diplomatic methods. As Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated, the operation in Somalia was distinct from nearly every other operation in which the United Nations had been involved.

There was no precedent for the organization [U.N.] to follow as it embarked on this course, no example but the one it was about to set, and there were many unanswered questions about the undertaking to which the international community had committed itself. Would member Governments contribute sufficient troops, including the neces-

sary logistics elements, and place them under the command of the United Nations? Would these forces be deployed in time for a smooth transition from UNITAF? Would the troop-contributing countries follow through on an enforcement mission if hostile action by one or more of the factions led to casualties among their troops? And would member states be willing to pay for what would inevitably be an expensive operation at a time when the United Nations peace-keeping budget was growing faster than at any point in its history?⁴⁴¹

The United Nations did not have a readily available body of troops, nor did it have command elements from which it could draw to construct its new UNOSOM II force. These would all have to be solicited from member states, and this would take time.

Even more important to the United Nations were the conditions it saw as necessary to be in place for the transition. The question of building organizations and military systems was the easier

of the U.N.'s two hurdles in taking over the operation. The second, and more difficult, concerned specific aims for UNITAF. In a letter to President George H. W. Bush on 8 December, the Secretary-General emphasized two conditions, which he believed to be important for a successful transition:

The first was that UNITAF, before its withdrawal, should ensure that the heavy weapons of the organized factions were brought under international control and that the irregular gangs were disarmed. The second essential condition for a successful transition, I believed, was for UNITAF to exercise its mandate throughout Somalia. ... Countrywide deployment was indispensable as the militias could simply withdraw their heavy weapons to parts of Somalia where the task force had not been deployed and bide their time. The problems of reconciliation, disarmament, and demobilization were national in character and thus required UNITAF's presence throughout the country.⁴⁴²



Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz

On 3 April 1993, representatives of the 16 Somali factions meet at the United Nations headquarters in Mogadishu to discuss disarmament. At the head of the table is BGen Imtiaz Shaheen, Pakistani Army, UNOSOM I military commander.

This was very different from UNITAF's perception of its mission. As General Johnston stated in February 1993: "I had specific guidance ... that our mission was focused on an area that required humanitarian relief. Quite frankly, disarmament was only required for us to conduct our humanitarian mission."⁴⁴³ At the next level of the chain-of-command, General Joseph P. Hoar, the commander in chief of Central Command, agreed with General Johnston's assessment: "Disarmament was excluded from the mission because it was neither realistically achievable nor a prerequisite for the core mission of providing a secure environment for relief operations."⁴⁴⁴

Ambassador Oakley stated the United States Government's position in even more detail a few years later:

The United States was convinced that despite its own military superiority, the Somalis would fight rather than give up all their weapons under external coercion. Complete disarmament of all the factions would have required at least a doubling of the UNITAF personnel and, almost certainly, would have resulted in substantial casualties, as well as a disruption of humanitarian operations.

The United States was prepared to support and assist the United Nations on the broader, long-term issue of beginning a systematic program of voluntary demobilization and disarmament under United Nations auspices, but not willing to accept formal responsibility for this long-term, major program. Its UNITAF partners agreed with this proposal and were prepared to participate. The United Nations, however, refused responsibility. Consequently, the program was not undertaken.⁴⁴⁵

This wide gulf continued throughout February, March, and April, and it would affect the eventual transition. The result was a dilemma for both sides. For the U.N., the difference between its earlier peacekeeping missions and this one of peace enforcement meant it had to have a military organization of comparable size and strength to UNITAF working under similar rules of engagement. The time required to assemble a staff and build a force was lengthened by U.N. reluctance to assume responsibility before its conditions were met by UNITAF. The coalition partners were frustrated because they had fulfilled their own missions, and were providing the U.N. with exact-

ly the window of opportunity of which General Zinni spoke.

UNITAF restructuring also caused concern. While General Johnston had no doubts about the ability of UNITAF to do its job as it drew back to its two light brigades, not everyone shared his optimism. In his mind, the two actions of reduction and transition were separate issues. He also knew he had to keep his superiors comfortable about what he was doing. As he put it, he wanted to "de-link" the two actions in the minds of those at Joint Chiefs of Staff and Central Command. That was difficult, because the lack of U.N. movement delayed high-level approval for shipping units out of Somalia.⁴⁴⁶

The draw down was also affected by events in the area of operations. The confrontations between factional groups under Mohamed Said Hirsi (known as General Morgan) and Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in Kismayo in February and March were handled quickly by UNITAF, but they were indications the situation was still volatile. To U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali "the events in Kismayo were a serious violation of the ceasefire and a setback to hopes that the factions would hand over their heavy weapons. Action by just one faction was enough to risk unraveling the progress made in Addis Ababa and jeopardize the delicate stability established by UNITAF."⁴⁴⁷ UNITAF did not see the situation as being so delicate as did the U.N., but these actions did delay the return of some U.S. Army units from Kismayo and slowed the overall reduction of units.⁴⁴⁸

With the slower pace of the reductions and the wait for the arrival of UNOSOM II, UNITAF continued its work from February to May. One additional aspect, on the political side, was to support the next round of talks in Addis Ababa in March.

Lansana Kouyate led this important conference, sponsored by the United Nations. The talks opened on schedule on the 15th and continued for 12 days. All factions were represented except the Somali National Movement, which controlled the northwest portion of the country it declared to be the independent nation of Somaliland.* By 27 March, the representatives had adopted a unanimous "Addis Ababa Agreement of the First

* The Somali National Movement did send observers to the conference.

Session of the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia.” This agreement committed all factions to ending their armed conflict and to a peaceful reconciliation of differences. The agreement also set a two-year transition period for a new central government that would come into being in March 1995. All parties recognized the need for local governments, district and regional councils, and a national police force. Of concern for UNITAF was the provision by which the factions agreed to a “complete and simultaneous disarmament” throughout the country. UNITAF and UNOSOM were asked to assist in this process by accepting the weapons of the factions. The turn-in process was to be completed within 90 days. These two organizations were also asked to react strongly against those who might violate the ceasefire.⁴⁴⁹

Despite the impressive cooperation by the factions expressed in the wording of the agreements, success depended on the willingness of all parties to make the accords work. No one was fooled into an unrealistic sense of optimism, yet the next several weeks remained a quiet time throughout the area of operations. It was during this period the U.N. forces began to arrive.

Slow Transition to U.N. Control

UNITAF and Central Command had begun to plan for the transition as early as 23 December 1992. On that date, a point paper was issued setting very broad guidance for the transfer of responsibilities, the establishment of a quick reaction force, and the residual support the United States would provide to UNOSOM II. It even included a notional U.N. peacekeeping organization. While some points of this paper eventually changed, this was a start for planning. The proposed plan required UNITAF to maintain control over the entire area of operations until it was secure; suggested that coalition partners remaining under UNOSOM II be emplaced in the humanitarian relief sectors they would eventually control; and called for the UNITAF staff to gradually work with and give responsibility to the UNOSOM II staff.⁴⁵⁰ But such a broad plan left many specifics to be worked out on the ground, actions considered to be appropriate to the UNOSOM II staff, and this planning would fall by default to UNITAF. General Johnston expressed some of the anxiety felt by UNITAF members

who had to do this work on their own in January, February, and March:

I could see all of these frustrations that affected our mission, of things that we knew had to be done by UNOSOM II in the big picture [reconstitution of the police force, working with the humanitarian relief organizations, civil-military operations, refugee resettlement, disarmament, and cantonment], not just our limited mission. You know, professionally, you take some pride in looking ahead and saying what needs to be done. ... But for the last month at least ... I have been making decisions for him [Turkish Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, the incoming UNOSOM II commander]. ... I don't want to make decisions on where the cantonment areas are, where the resettlement areas are, because I won't be here. General Bir is going to have to execute, and should have been here to do the planning. ... We are only now, in the first few days of March ... seeing the blue hats starting to form in here. ... The U.N. still does not have a staff.⁴⁵¹

General Johnston also was busy pushing his superiors, within the bounds allowed him as a military officer, to bring pressure on the United Nations to move more quickly. “Ambassador Oakley was very useful in doing that. I mean, he came on publicly. I came on in message traffic. Some of them were [in the form of] daily telephone calls to the [Commander in Chief of Central Command] saying, ‘We need some help. Who is pushing the U.N.’”⁴⁵²

While the United Nations was not moving as quickly as it might have, it had chosen the commander of its new UNOSOM II force. Lieutenant General Cevik Bir was a Turkish officer, described by General Johnston as having “a good operational background, good reputation.”⁴⁵³ He was chosen to be the commanding general of UNOSOM II because of his military background and his religion. Placing a Muslim in charge was a bow to the sensibilities of the vast majority of the Somali people. It was hoped this would establish a bond between the populace and the new United Nations presence.

General Bir had been on one brief inspection to Somalia in late February. Unfortunately, the timing of this visit was poor. He had arrived at the time of the troubles in Kismayo and Mogadishu, and the UNITAF staff's attention was not focused

on the general who would lead their replacements. As noted in a Navy Forces Somalia situation report: "The unfortunate timing of these clashes near the American Embassy compound has caused the curtailment of briefings for Gen Bir. [General] Johnston has concluded it is difficult to focus on briefings with this activity nearby."⁴⁵⁴

General Bir returned on 15 March, but his command was still in an embryonic stage. Members of the UNOSOM staff came in individually or in small groups at this time. The UNITAF staff did its best to accommodate and inform them about the operation and the duties they would fulfill. On 11 March, for instance, UNITAF held a meeting for the UNOSOM II chief of staff, Brigadier General James S. Cox, Canadian Army, who had arrived a few days before. He met with the deputy commanders of the chiefs of staff of all those forces that would participate in UNOSOM II. Three days prior, General Cox and UNOSOM II communications personnel had moved into the embassy compound with their equipment. That same day, the UNITAF operations staff officially started their transition to UNOSOM II. Less than a week later, on the 14th, General Johnston approved UNITAF's final transition plan. The next day, UNOSOM II staff members began to integrate with the UNITAF operations watch center in a process called "twinning."⁴⁵⁵ General Johnston described this twinning process as "sitting counterparts next to our counterparts, and we'll work with them ... until they're ready to take the hand-off."⁴⁵⁶

On 3 March, Secretary General Boutros-Ghali reported to the U.N. Security Council, "the effort undertaken by UNITAF to establish a secure environment is far from complete and in any case has not attempted to address the situation throughout all of Somalia." Following the advice given to him by United States officials as early as 18 December, Boutros-Ghali sought a new mandate for UNOSOM that would change it from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. UNOSOM II should, in his words, "cover all of Somalia ... and include disarmament."⁴⁵⁷ To ensure the success of

this mission, he sought a mandate for the new force that would achieve several goals: to monitor all factions with respect to the ceasefire agreements; to prevent resumption of violence, using force if necessary; to maintain control of the factions' heavy weapons; to seize the small arms of unauthorized armed groups; to maintain the security of all ports, airfields, and lines of communications; to protect the lives of United Nations and relief organization personnel; to clear mines; and to assist refugees.⁴⁵⁷

With the exception of the extension of the mission to "all of Somalia" and the emphasis on total disarmament, none of this was different from what UNITAF had been doing for months. The document did, however, show that the U.N. recognized the new UNOSOM II organization needed to be very strong to match this mandate. Boutros-Ghali proposed to the Security Council that UNOSOM II have 28,000 troops, including 8,000 in logistics roles. Logistical support was to come primarily from UNITAF troops already in Somalia. This meant the Support Command would continue to be a major contributor. Also, the United States was asked to provide a quick reaction force. On 26 March, the Security Council adopted Resolution 814, which provided a mandate for UNOSOM II and included all the conditions Boutros-Ghali had asked for.⁴⁵⁸ A tentative transition date was set for 1 May.

Following these actions, personnel began arriving in Somalia to prepare for the transition. Two important additions to the United Nations staff were both Americans. Retired U.S. Navy Admiral Jonathan T. Howe was appointed as the new Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, and Major General Thomas Montgomery, USA, was selected as the UNOSOM II deputy force commander.

General Montgomery's appointment revealed a strange dichotomy in the force structure. Not only was he UNOSOM II deputy commander, he also was the commanding general of the United States Forces in Somalia for UNOSOM. These forces were split along two chains-of-command. Most of the U.S. troops were part of the logistics support to the operation as well as part of the United Nations force. There was also the 1,100-man quick reaction force for UNOSOM II, the 10th Mountain Division "Warrior Brigade," which had been filling the same role for UNITAF. It also reported to General Montgomery. But others reported through their own chains-of-command.

* This was written less than one week after the Kismayo-Mogadishu disturbances of late February, which likely influenced the Secretary General's perception.

** UNOSOM II's area of responsibility eventually extended farther north than that of UNITAF, but only to the city of Galcaio.



Photo courtesy of Col Frederick M. Lorenz

Leaders from U.S. Marine Forces Somalia, from left, Col Jack W. Klimp, Marine Forces deputy commander, Col Emil R. Bedard, Task Force Mogadishu commander, and Col Werner Hellmer, staff judge advocate and head of the Marine Forces civil-military operations team, wait to meet Somali elders.

These included a U.S. Marine expeditionary unit, which would remain on call as the theater reserve. In August, another United States unit independent of U.N. control was sent to Somalia. This was Task Force Ranger and was composed of Army Rangers and Special Forces. Major General William F. Garrison, USA, commanded the force, which reported directly to Central Command's commander, General Hoar.

Several of UNITAF's coalition partners would remain to participate in UNOSOM II, which made the United Nations' search for contributing nations easier and enabled the transition to progress more rapidly. Pakistan, already present in UNOSOM I and UNITAF, sent two additional battalions, creating an infantry brigade. Several other nations made commitments. India, Ireland, Norway, Bangladesh, Nepal, Romania, Republic of Korea, and Malaysia eventually sent troops. Many of these forces were slow to join UNOSOM II. At the time of the official transition, the force was still 11,000 soldiers short of its goal.

UNITAF had been realigning forces to ensure those remaining would be in place and operating in their designated relief sectors by the time of the transition. These included the French, Italians, Belgians, Australians, Moroccans, Pakistanis, Botswanans, and Turks. At the same time, United States forces continued their redeployment schedules. Army and Marine Corps units withdrew from the field and moved back to Mogadishu prior to embarkation. Both Army Forces Somalia and Marine Forces Somalia (MarFor) were down to light brigade strengths by late March and early April.

On 4 March, Army Forces Somalia directed Task Force Kismayo to prepare to turn over full responsibility for the relief sectors to the Belgians the next day and then return to Mogadishu. On the 11th, the task force completed this movement and redeployed from Somalia. The 10th Mountain Division's main command post was on the same flight, and its commander, Major General Steven L. Arnold, departed two days later.⁴⁵⁹ On 9 April,

the Warrior Brigade, which would stay as part of UNOSOM II, assumed all responsibility for Merka sector, the quick reaction force, and all remaining Army operations in Somalia. This flexible brigade was composed of the 1st Battalion, 22d Infantry; 3d Battalion, 25th Aviation; 10th Forward Support Battalion; and other support detachments. When the Merka sector was turned over to the Pakistani forces on 28 April, the Warrior Brigade moved into new quarters at the university complex and airport in Mogadishu.⁴⁶⁰

The Marines continued their redeployments leading to the light brigade level, and by the 13th they had realigned their forces between Bardera and Mogadishu. By 17 March, the 7th Marines had consolidated in Mogadishu, and Task Force Bardera remained in that city for the time being. On 21 March, the light brigade staff "assumed all watches in the MarFor CP [Command Post]," while the staff of the 7th Marines moved from the soccer stadium to the embassy compound. Two days later, Major General Charles E. Wilhelm left for Camp Pendleton. Colonel Jack W. Klimp replaced him as MarFor commander. Over the next few weeks, the focus of the remaining Marines was to work with coalition forces to turn over responsibilities. In Mogadishu, these were

Pakistani soldiers and those of the United Arab Emirates. In Bardera, the task force worked with the Botswanans. On 9 April, Colonel Klimp returned to the United States and Colonel Emil R. Bedard, commanding officer of the 7th Marines, assumed duties as commander of MarFor. On 18 April, the Botswanans assumed responsibility for Bardera sector. In Mogadishu, the Marines passed operational control of the United Arab Emirates forces to the Italians on 15 April. On the 24th, MarFor ceased patrolling in the city and turned over their principle areas of interest to the Pakistanis. On the 26th, the MarFor Marine Aircraft Group 16 made its last flights and ceased operations. That day, MarFor formally turned over all its responsibilities to the Pakistani forces of UNOSOM II during a ceremony attended by members of the UNOSOM II and UNITAF staffs, members of the Somali auxiliary security force, and representatives of all the remaining coalition forces. Remaining MarFor elements began redeploying the next day.⁴⁶¹

By the beginning of May, the work of UNITAF was done. In five months of unrelenting effort it had formed itself from four branches of the American Armed Forces and 22 coalition nations; deployed rapidly to Somalia; worked through a



Photo courtesy of the Italian Armed Forces

LtGen Robert B. Johnston transfers responsibility for operations in Somalia to Turkish LtGen Cevik Bir at a formal ceremony held in May 1993 at the U.S. Embassy compound in Mogadishu.



Photo courtesy of the Clinton Presidential Library (P3276-04)

President William J. Clinton welcomes LtGen Robert B. Johnston to the White House, where he presented him with the Defense Distinguished Service Medal. "I'm receiving the medal," LtGen Johnston said, "but a lot of 18 and 19-year-old men and women in uniform demonstrated enormous discipline, good judgment, and a good deal of patience in performing a rather unique mission."

number of complex issues while conducting demanding military operations; succeeded in its security mission; and prepared the way for its replacement, UNOSOM II. On 4 May, in a ceremony held at the embassy compound, Lieutenant General Johnston passed responsibility for operations in Somalia to Lieutenant General Bir. Shortly after, General Johnston and the remaining members of his staff boarded an airplane for the long flight home.

They arrived in Washington the next day. There the new U.S. president, William J. Clinton, met them in a special ceremony on the south lawn of the White House and thanked them for all they had done and accomplished. In his remarks, the President summed up what had been done in a short time:

You represent the thousands who served in this crucial operation—in the First Marine Expeditionary Force, in the 10th Mountain

Division, aboard the Navy's Tripoli Amphibious Ready Group, in the Air Force and Air National Guard airlift squadrons, and in other units in each of our services. Over 30,000 American military personnel served at sometime in these last five months in Somalia. And serving alongside you were thousands of others from 20 nations.

Although your mission was humanitarian and not combat, you nonetheless faced difficult and dangerous conditions. You sometimes were subjected to abuse and forced to dodge rocks and even bullets. You saw firsthand the horror of hunger, disease, and death. But you pressed on with what you set out to do and were successful. You have served in the best tradition of the Armed Forces of the United States.

To understand the magnitude of what our forces in Somalia accomplished, the world need only look back at Somalia's condition

just six months ago. Hundreds of thousands of people were starving; armed anarchy ruled the land and the streets of every city and town. Today, food is flowing, crops are growing, schools and hospitals are reopening. Although there is still much to be done if enduring peace is to prevail, one can now envision a day when Somalia will be reconstructed as a functioning civil society.⁴⁶²

After the ceremony, the former members of UNITAF continued their journey home to resume their lives and various duties, and the Unified Task Force dissolved back into its individual units.

In Somalia, the forces of UNOSOM II did not wait long to be tested. On 6 and 7 May, the forces of factional leader General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed's ally, Colonel Omar Jess, clashed with the Belgians while trying to retake the city of Kismayo. This was the precursor to bloody fights in June, July, and October.

Epilogue

On 1 March 1995, Lieutenant General Anthony C. Zinni returned to Mogadishu as the commanding general of a combined coalition task force. Seven nations provided ships and amphibious forces for Operation United Shield.* The mission was to protect the last UNOSOM II forces, Pakistani and Bangladeshi soldiers, as they withdrew from Somalia. Earlier that day, 1,800 U.S. Marines of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) and 350 Italian Marines landed and set up a defensive perimeter. The operation was completed 73 hours later.

The intervening two years since the departure of UNITAF had not been kind to either the United Nations forces or to the Somalis. Shortly after the departure of the Unified Task Force, a subtle but important change in the mission came about that had profound effects on UNOSOM II and the participation of the United States in the operation.

General Aideed had not forgotten the incidents of late February 1993 in Mogadishu and Kismayo. On 5 June that year, in a bold and confrontational move, his forces attacked a contingent of Pakistani troops, killing 24 of the UNOSOM sol-

diers.* This challenge to the United Nations was answered by trying to destroy Aideed's power structure. He was declared a criminal and UNOSOM II, with the support of the Clinton administration and United States forces, began to actively seek to capture him to bring him to justice. This action may have appeared appropriate, but it overlooked the fact that Aideed was still a respected and influential figure to a large number of his countrymen. This act also tore the fabric of neutrality by singling out Aideed as a specific target, which fed his propaganda machine. Finally, it placed UNOSOM troops in direct confrontation with Aideed's strong political faction, and its militia forces in the city.

American forces, notably Task Force Ranger, tracked down and captured several of Aideed's high-ranking subordinates. In an unfortunate incident on 12 July, missiles fired from helicopter gunships burst into a house at which leaders of Aideed's United Somali Congress faction and elders of Aideed's Habr Gedr clan were holding a meeting. Many Somalis were killed, some estimates of the number dead reached as high as 70. Many previously neutral Somalis believed they had to defend their homes and their land against the United Nations and joined Aideed's camp. Although lightly armed, these soldiers were aware of American tactics and conformed their own to make the best use of what was available. On 25 September, a militiaman shot down a helicopter with a rocket-propelled grenade, a highly unusual feat. Having proven it could be done, Aideed's forces awaited their next opportunity, which came on 3 October.

That day, Aideed was to attend a meeting with some of his chief lieutenants. The site for the meeting was identified and a task force of U.S. Rangers and Special Forces was sent to capture him. The mission ran into trouble even as the helicopters carrying the assault force approached the

* The Pakistani soldiers were on an operation to inspect one of General Aideed's compounds in Mogadishu. During Operation Restore Hope, these inspections were announced shortly before they would take place, but not with enough lead time for the factions to move or hide anything. The inspections were thus not a total surprise to the factions, and they knew why they were taking place. Unlike such inspections under UNITAF, this one was unannounced. The compound also adjoined the site of Aideed's Radio Mogadishu transmitting station. Claiming the United Nations soldiers were there to shut down the station, Aideed was able to rally his followers in a deadly attack.

* Nations participating in Operation United Shield were the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh.



DVIC DD-SD-00-00884

Somali men carry bags of wheat delivered by a Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopter assigned to Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 363.

target building. A rocket-propelled grenade struck one helicopter, forcing it to land close to the target. Another was shot down shortly thereafter, also by a rocket, and crashed a few blocks away. The mission then turned from one of capturing Somali leaders into one of also rescuing the survivors of the downed aircraft and bringing out the force. The Rangers were soon surrounded by hundreds of Somali militiamen firing on them with small arms and rocket-propelled grenade. The reaction force, composed of soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, had to fight its way through the streets of the city, which were now filled with thousands of militiamen and civilians trying to kill as many UNOSOM troops as they could. After 15 hours of fighting, the convoys returned to the base at the airport, bringing the survivors and most of the dead. The price was 18 Americans killed and 78 wounded. The cost, along with the pictures of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets by gloating Somalis, was more than the administration was willing to pay.

A decision to withdraw American forces from Somalia was made shortly after. With the most powerful member state of UNOSOM II leaving, other nations followed suit. By the beginning of 1995, the United Nations announced that UNO-

SOM II was to end on 31 March. Operation United Shield was actually conducted weeks before that date. As the final U.N. troops were ready for their withdrawal from Mogadishu, Marines were ordered to provide security for the operation. The last U.N. and American forces left the country on 4 March.

After the U.N. departure from Somalia, things continued as they had before. Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed still vied for power and bloodshed continued unabated, along with suffering of innocent people. All this happened as if a curtain had descended around the country's borders. What occurred in Somalia received little attention in the world press. Only unusual news came out. For instance, General Mohamed Farah Aideed was killed in a gun battle in Mogadishu on 1 August 1996. Shortly afterwards, his son, Hussein, who had served with UNITAF as a United States Marine Corps corporal and translator, returned to Somalia and took over his father's position. Somalia is still divided. The northern portion claims its independence as Somaliland, although it is not, as yet, recognized. In the south, the area of Operation Restore Hope, the fighting and dying continues. Cities and towns change hands, and a few humanitarian relief organiza-

tions still try to bring some assistance. The talks between the factions continue amid reshuffling alliances. The State Department still issues strongly worded warnings about travel in Somalia, and the country is listed as one of the world's most dangerous places.

But, in spite of such results, some good came from Operation Restore Hope. UNITAF did succeed in ending the famine and holding down the violence during its time in Somalia. Some accounts claim more than 200,000 lives were saved by the efforts of UNITAF in getting relief supplies through. As the Joint Meritorious Unit Award citation to UNITAF states:

Unified Task Force Somalia enabled the delivery of over 42,000 metric tons of relief supplies to the starving population, disarmed warring factions, fostered a ceasefire, and restored police and judiciary systems. Through the intervention and leadership of Unified Task Force Somalia, relief efforts of over 60 different aid and relief organizations and the support of 23 nations were coordinated and focused to reverse a human tragedy of famine and disease that was claiming the lives of thousands each day.


Operation Restore Hope, along with its predecessor Operation Provide Comfort, opened a decade of humanitarian relief and peacemaking operations. The experience of each has contributed to the success of the next, and many of the issues that were of importance during Restore Hope have remained through subsequent operations. They are part of the current military world.

One of the operation's greatest strengths was the close relationship that existed between the military and the political sides. The cooperation between the commanding general and the special envoy was seamless and presented a united front to the Somali factions. It also ensured the members of the coalition were working toward goals established for UNITAF. The support that Lieutenant General Johnston and Ambassador Oakley provided to each other set a standard for future joint task forces assigned to such humanitarian missions.

The idea of force protection continues to permeate military planning at the beginning of the new century. In a humanitarian or peacekeeping role, how many casualties are Americans willing to tolerate? This question was forcefully answered for the specific instance of Somalia in October

1993. However, with each new operation commanders must consider how success depends on keeping their soldiers safe and casualties within acceptable limits. The measures taken to ensure this safety can range from permissive rules of engagement which allow individual soldiers to take action against perceived threats to the wearing of protective vests and helmets at all times. These latter measures especially can impose a burden on soldiers or Marines working in tropical or desert climates. Equally important, they can become a physical reminder to any opposing force of the unacceptability of loss to Americans. This can become a weakness in itself, if only in perception. Finding the proper balance is a commander's responsibility.

Nation building is another term that has been heard referring to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In any situation characterized by civil war and the destruction of civil institutions and structures, the successful completion of the mission will depend in some part on the reconstitution of those agencies. What is appropriate in one case may not be in another. In Somalia, the intent of UNITAF was to encourage the Somalis to take responsibility for their own governance and inter-



DVIC DD-SD-00-01026

Two Somali men load large bags of Australian wheat on the back of a truck for transport to the village of Maleel. The distribution was a cooperative effort of U.S. Marines, who provided the helicopter support, and the Australian Army, which secured the delivery perimeter.

nal security. In Bosnia, the active assistance with civil structures and economic development was more deliberate. Again, the responsible commander will have to determine how much support to provide without entangling his unit or his government in the affairs of a recovering nation.

The reconstitution of police forces was another issue that first became important in Somalia and then came up elsewhere. The United States-led intervention in Haiti quickly worked with an international police component to recruit, train, and deploy police forces throughout the country. If this latter case was more successful, it was because of the recent experience in Somalia.*

The long wait for the United Nations to field its UNOSOM II force tried the patience of UNITAF. The fact that the United Nations might have an agenda that differed from that of the United States and its coalition partners was hardly surprising, but it foreshadowed the vast difference in mission that would come after UNITAF turned over responsibility. The nature of the relationship between the U.N. and those U.S. forces assigned to it was also fraught with difficulty, because the United States tried to keep a course, which allowed it to maintain its national objectives while concurrently serving as part of a larger peace-keeping force. The split between United States and United Nations forces may have been a contributing factor in the clash of 3 October 1993. The experience of Somalia was helpful in Haiti, where the United Nations force came in more quickly and better prepared for its mission.

While the original mission was seemingly very straightforward, it soon was necessary to determine the bounds of what was acceptable to accomplish that mission. The term mission creep was invoked as a check for every extra action UNITAF was asked to perform. The repair of roads, building of bridges, and other physical improvements were permissible if they would aid the task force mission. The internal operation of the country was to be left to the Somalis, with encouragement from UNITAF. Full disarmament was never an option for UNITAF, but with the transition to the United Nations, the definition of what was appropriate began to change. From the

initial goal of providing a secure environment, the forces under the United Nations were drawn more and more into the internal affairs of Somalia, and eventually lost the neutrality maintained with such rigor under UNITAF.

The experiences of the staff of I Marine Expeditionary Force creating a joint task force headquarters and bringing together a coalition force have been incorporated into several missions that followed. Provisions for standing joint task force headquarters, and the recognition of the needs and capabilities of coalition partners, are now a part of the joint warfare doctrine of the United States.

Relations with civilian organizations were important during Restore Hope. Working from the recent experience of the Kurdish relief operation, the staff of UNITAF quickly built an effective civil-military operations structure that extended throughout the country. While relations with some of the humanitarian relief organizations or their staff members proved difficult at times, it was recognized they had legitimate concerns, they were a source of valuable information, and they were important to the successful completion of the operation. The civil-military structures in each succeeding operation have improved based on the experience of Somalia, and the need to work cooperatively with these organizations is now incorporated into service and joint doctrine.

Each military operation is unique. The conditions that existed in Restore Hope have not been duplicated exactly in the campaigns that followed. Each of these has been a beneficiary of the ideas, structures, and solutions that were so carefully thought out and implemented for the first time in the deserts and cities of Somalia. The legacy of Operation Restore Hope lies in these: the examples of the good work of the Unified Task Force in difficult and dangerous conditions; the restraint and good order of its personnel; and the maintenance of its political balance and neutrality.

The men and women, Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen who served in Restore Hope were challenged to replace anarchy and fear with order and security. They faced situations that were then novel, but have since become familiar. Their efforts made them the first of General Zinni's new thinking American military.

* This operation had some of the same troops as well. The ground component for Operation Restore Democracy was formed around the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division.

Notes

Chapter 1

There have not been many books available on Somali history and culture until recently. Even the most current books deal mainly with the events of October 1993, and give only a cursory view of how Somalia came to its condition of 1992. However, there are a few official sources that deal with these topics in some detail. Headquarters, Department of the Army, publishes a series of area studies for the nations of the world. The one for Somalia was published in 1982 (third edition) and updated in a fourth edition in 1993. These books provide information about Somali culture, clan affiliation, political and military structures, terrain and climate, and the important history of this nation. These are important sources for anyone researching the history of Somalia prior to the 1990s. At the start of Operation Restore Hope, the United States Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center published a small volume entitled *Restore Hope Socaliinta Rajada: Soldier Handbook*. This handy guide was intended for troops deploying to Somalia, and provided basic information about climate and terrain, diseases and preventive medicine, weapons of the factions, and a lexicon of basic Somali words and phrases. More importantly, it described the Somali clans, identifying the armed factions and their leaders. Adam B. Siegel wrote an excellent monograph study of Operation Eastern Exit for the Center for Naval Analyses. It was used extensively for the portion of this chapter relating to the evacuation of the American Embassy in Mogadishu in January 1991.

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Chapter 2

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Chapter 4

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Chapter 5

The information for this chapter was taken primarily from interviews conducted in the field by the author and other historians. Those by the author were with LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter Johnston-Mroczkowski intvw; BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw; Col Peter A. Dotto, hereafter Dotto-Mroczkowski intvw; and LtCol Donald C. Spiece, Jr., USA, hereafter Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw. A second interview between the author and LtGen Zinni was conducted on 14 May 1994, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2. Interviews conducted by LtCol Charles H. Cureton, USMCR, and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, were with LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw; Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, hereafter Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw; BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw; and Col Peter A. Dotto, hereafter Dotto-Cureton-Wright intvw. The author also used his personal journal, referred to as Mroczkowski journal with appropriate date citations, and his field notebook, referred to as Mroczkowski field notebook, which contained copies of many of the interviews.

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This chapter was based mainly on interviews the author and other historians conducted in the field. Those by the author were with BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Mroczkowski intvw 2; Colonel Major Omar Ess-Akalli, Royal Moroccan Army, hereafter Ess-Akalli-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol John M. Taylor, hereafter Taylor-Mroczkowski intvw; Col. Werner Hellmer, hereafter Hellmer-Mroczkowski intvw; Maj John Caligari, Royal Australian Army, hereafter Caligari-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Ailen Pietrantoni, French Army, hereafter Pietrantoni-Mroczkowski intvw; Maj Daniel M. Lizzul, hereafter Lizzul-Mroczkowski intvw; Maj Leland W. Carroll, USA, hereafter Carroll-Mroczkowski intvw; SFC Kenneth W. Barriger, USA, hereafter Barriger-Mroczkowski intvw; Capt Geoff Kyle, Canadian Army, hereafter Kyle-Mroczkowski intvw; LtCol Carol J. Mathieu, Canadian Army, hereafter Mathieu-Mroczkowski intvw; and LtCol Donald C. Spiece, Jr., USA, hereafter Spiece-Mroczkowski intvw. Many of these interviews were copied in the author's field notebook, cited as Mroczkowski field notebook. Interviews made by other historians included in this chapter were by LtCol Charles H. Cureton and Maj Robert K. Wright, Jr., USAR, with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, hereafter Oakley-Cureton-Wright intvw; LtGen Robert B. Johnston, hereafter Johnston-Cureton-Wright intvw; and BGen Anthony C. Zinni, hereafter Zinni-Cureton-Wright intvw. Also used was the oral history inter-view between Capt David A.

Dawson and Col Jack W. Klimp, hereafter Klimp-Dawson intvw. The author also used his personal journal, referred to as Mroczkowski journal with appropriate date citations. He was also provided a copy of the personal journal of Col Dayre C. Lias, USAF, hereafter Lias journal, with appropriate date citations.

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Appendix A

Unified Task Force Somalia Organization

Command and Staff

Commanding General: Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston
Special Envoy: Ambassador Robert B. Oakley
Deputy Commanding General: Major General W. D. Moore, USA
Joint Force Air Component Commander: Major General Harold W. Blot
Chief of Staff: Colonel Billy C. Steed
Political Advisor: Mr. John Hirsch
Administration (J-1): Colonel L. Rehberger III
Intelligence (J-2): Colonel W. M. Handley, USA
Operations (J-3): Brigadier General Anthony C. Zinni
Logistics (J-4): Colonel Sam E. Hatton, USA
Plans and Policy (J-5): Colonel John W. Moffett
Command, Control, Communications (J-6): Colonel Robert G. Hill
Executive Assistant (J-8/EA): Colonel Michael W. Hagee
Joint Information Bureau: Colonel Frederick C. Peck
Joint Visitor's Bureau: Colonel R. J. Agro
Civil-Military Operations Center: Colonel Kevin M. Kennedy
Unified Task Force Surgeon: Captain Michael L. Cowan, USN
Unified Task Force Engineer: Colonel Robert B. Flowers, USA
Headquarters Commandant: Major Eric C. Holt
Joint Combat Camera Detachment: Lieutenant Commander James P. Kiser, USN

Coalition Forces

Australia

Commanding Officer
Colonel William J. Mellor, Australian Army

1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment
Battalion Group
1st Battalion, The Royal Australian
Regiment

Battalion Headquarters
Alpha Company
Bravo Company
Charlie Company
Delta Company
Support Company
Administration Company
1st Battalion, Support Group
Battalion Headquarters
Transport Troop
Field Supply Platoon
Medical Platoon
Dental Section
Field Workshop
B Squadron, 3d/4th Cavalry Regiment
Battery Commander's Party, 107th Field
Battery
17th Troop, 18th Field Squadron, 3d Combat
Engineer Regiment
Detachment, 103d Signals Squadron

Naval Contingent

HMAS *Jervis Bay*
HMAS *Tobruk*

Belgium

Commanding Officer
Colonel Marc Jacqumin, Belgian Army

1st Parachute Battalion (Reinforced)
Headquarters Company
Support Company
11th Company
13th Company
21st Company
Reconnaissance Company
Engineer Platoon
Supply Platoon (Reinforced)
Surgical Team
Signal Platoon
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team
Aviation Detachment
Judge Advocate General Team

Naval Contingent

HMS *Zinnia*

Botswana

Commanding Officer
Lieutenant Colonel Thulanganyo Masisi,
Botswana Defense Force

Composite Reinforced Company

Command Section
1st Platoon (Mechanized)
2d Platoon (Light Infantry)
3d Platoon (Light Infantry)
4th Platoon (Light Infantry)
Special Forces Troop
Mortar Platoon
Medical Section
Transportation Section
Signals Section
Stores Section
Messing Section
Central Arms Depot
Engineer Section

Canada

Commanding Officer
Colonel Serge Labbe, Canadian Army

Canadian Joint Force Somalia
Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group
1 Commando
2 Commando
3 Commando
Service Commando
DFS Platoon
Reconnaissance Platoon
A Squadron, Royal Canadian Dragoons
Engineer Troop
Signal Troop
Aviation Detachment

Naval Contingent

HMCS *Preserver*

Egypt

Commanding Officer
Colonel Al-Fakhrani, Egyptian Army

Composite Reinforced Company

1st Platoon (Light Armored)
2d Platoon (Light Armored)
Logistics Platoon
Medical Section
Engineer Section
Maintenance Section
Logistics Section

France

Commanding General
Major General Rene Delhome, French Army

Command Element, 9th Marine Infantry Division
Battalion, 13th Foreign Legion Demi-Brigade
Battalion, 5th Combined Arms Overseas
Regiment
3d Company, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment
4th Company, 3d Marine Infantry Regiment
3d Company, 6th Foreign Legion Engineer
Regiment
Detachment, 5th Combat Helicopter Regiment
Detachment, Special Forces
Detachment, Logistics Support Battalion

Naval Contingent

Frigate *Georges Leygues*
Light Transport *La Grandiere*
Amphibious Ship *Foudre*
Tanker *Var*

Germany

Commanding Officer
Lieutenant Colonel Meitzner, German Air
Force

The German contingent consisted of three
Luftwaffe C-160 Transall aircraft operating from
Mombasa, Kenya, as a part of Operation Provide
Relief.

Greece

Commanding Officer
Colonel Spilitios, Greek Army

Infantry Battalion (-)

India

Commanding Officer
Commodore Sam Pillai, Indian Navy

Naval Contingent

Tanker INS *Deepak*
Amphibious Landing Ship INS *Cheetah*
Frigate INS *Kuthar*

Italy

Commanding General
Major General Gianpietro Rossi, Italian Army

Headquarters Element

Folgore Parachute Brigade
Headquarters Regiment
186th Parachute Regiment
187th Parachute Regiment
9th Assault Parachute Battalion
Logistics Battalion
Armored Vehicle Company
Engineer Company
Tank Company

Field Hospital "Centaurio"

Surgical Detachment

San Marco Battalion (Marine Infantry)

Composite Helicopter Regiment

Detachment, 46th Aviation Brigade

Naval Contingent

Frigate ITS *Grecale*
Logistical Landing Ship ITS *Vesuvio*
Landing Ship Tank ITS *San Giorgio*

Kuwait

Commanding Officers

Lieutenant Colonel Mohamad al-Obaid,
Kuwaiti Army
Major Al Muzien, Kuwaiti Army

Composite Reinforced Motorized Company

Company Headquarters
Armored Car Platoon
Scout Platoon
Scout Platoon
Medical Section
Engineer Section

Logistics Section
Communications Section
Military Police Section
Post Exchange Section
Public Affairs Section

Morocco

Commanding Officer

Colonel Major (brigadier general equivalent)
Omar Ess-Akalli, Royal Moroccan Army

Base Section

3d Motorized Infantry Regiment
Infantry Company
Infantry Company
Cavalry Company
Air Defense Artillery element
Medical Section

New Zealand

Commanding Officers

Colonel Dunne, Royal New Zealand Air Force, 9 December 1992 to 18 March 1993
Wing Commander Duxfield, Royal New Zealand Air Force, 18 March 1993

Detachment, 42 Squadron (Three Andover transport aircraft)

Nigeria

Commanding Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Olagunsoye Oyinlola,
Nigerian Army

245 Reconnaissance Battalion

Battalion Headquarters
Administration Company
Company Headquarters
Quartermaster Platoon
Engineer Troop
Light Aid Detachment
Signals Section
Mobile Shop
Company A (Mechanized Infantry)
Company B (Mechanized Infantry)
Company C (Reconnaissance Company)
Company D (Reconnaissance Company)

Pakistan

(Note: Does not include Pakistani forces in Somalia as part of UNOSOM I)

Commanding Officers

Colonel Asif, Pakistani Army
Lieutenant Colonel Tariq S. Malik, Pakistani Army

6th Battalion, The Punjab Regiment

Battalion Headquarters
Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D
Support Company
Company Headquarters
Signals Platoon
Administrative Platoon
Transport Section
Administrative Section
Assault Engineer Platoon
81mm Mortar Platoon

7th Battalion, Frontier Forces

10th Battalion, Baluch Regiment

1st Battalion, Sind Regiment

Saudi Arabia

Commanding Officer

Colonel Ali al Shehri, Royal Saudi Land Forces

5th Royal Saudi Land forces Airborne Battalion (Reinforced)

Headquarters Company
1 Company
2 Company
3 Company
Combat Service Support Element
Medical Platoon
Engineer Platoon
Maintenance Platoon

Sweden

Commanding Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Lars A. Hedman, Swedish Army

1st Field Hospital

Tunisia

Commanding Officer

Lieutenant Colonel Sharif, Tunisian Army

Infantry Battalion (-)

Turkey

Commanding Officers

Colonel Huseyin Erim, Turkish Army, 9 December 1992 to 25 March 1993
Major Haldun Solmazturk, Turkish Army, 25 March 1993

1 Company, 1 Battalion Mechanized, 28 Brigade

Headquarters Section
1st Platoon (Mechanized Infantry)
2d Platoon (Mechanized Infantry)
3d Platoon (Mechanized Infantry)
Fire Support Platoon
Quartermaster Platoon
Transport and Maintenance Platoon
Signal Section
Medical Section
Engineer Section

Naval Contingent

Landing Ship *Tank Ertugrul*
Logistics Ship *Derya*
Destroyer *Fatih*

United Arab Emirates

Commanding Officers

Lieutenant Colonel Alkefbi, United Arab Emirates Army, 9 February 1993
Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah Ketbi, United Arab Emirates Army

Al Wajeb Battalion

Headquarters Company
Services Section
Combat Engineer Platoon
81Mm Mortar Platoon
Reconnaissance Company
2d Company (Mechanized Infantry)
3d Company (Mechanized Infantry)

United Kingdom

Commanding Officer
Wing Commander Humphrey, Royal Air Force

The United Kingdom contingent consisted of two Royal Air Force C-130 aircraft flying out of Mombasa, Kenya, as part of Operation Provide Relief.

United States

Air Force Contingent

Commanding Officers
Brigadier General Thomas R. Mikolajcik, USAF, 9 December 1992 to 29 March 1993
Colonel Wirthe, USAF, 9 March 1993

Air Force Forces Somalia
Air Force Forces Somalia Staff, Mogadishu
437th Tactical Airlift Wing
5th Combat Communications Group
823d Civil Engineering Squadron
Mogadishu Airfield Tactical Airlift Control Element
Mogadishu Airfield Support
Deployed Tactical Airlift Control Element

Army Contingent

Commanding Generals
Brigadier General William Magruder III, USA
Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA, 22 December 1992 to 13 March 1993
Brigadier Greg L. Gile, USA, 13 March to 4 May 1993

Army Forces Somalia
10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)
2d Brigade (Commando Brigade)
3d Battalion, 14th Infantry
Headquarters Company
Company A
Company B
Company C
2d Battalion, 87th Infantry
Headquarters Company
Company A
Company B
Company C
A Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry

E Company, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry (Provisional)
Scout Platoon, Headquarters, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry
Aviation Brigade (Falcon Brigade)
3d Battalion (Assault), 25th Aviation
Headquarters Company
Company B
Company C
Company D
3d Squadron, 17th Cavalry
Headquarters Troop
A Troop
B Troop
C Troop
D Troop
10th Mountain Division Support Command
210th Support Battalion (Forward)
Headquarters and Company A
Company B
Company C
710th Support Battalion (Main)
Headquarters and Company A
Company B
Company C
Company D
Company E, 25th Aviation
10th Signal Battalion
Headquarters Company
Company A
Company B
Company C
41st Engineer Battalion
Headquarters Company
Company A
Company B
110th Military Intelligence Battalion
Technical Control And Analysis Element
Military Intelligence Support Team
Counter Intelligence Team
Ground Surveillance Radar Team
Long Range Surveillance Detachment
10th Military Police Company
Battery B, 3d Battalion, 62d Air Defense Artillery
Detachment, Battery A, 3d Battalion, 62d Air Defense Artillery
Joint Task Force Support Command
Commanding General
Brigadier General Billy K. Solomon, USA

- 36th Engineer Group
 43d Engineer Battalion
 Company A
 Company B
 Company C
 Direct Support Maintenance Unit
 63d Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment)
 642d Engineer Company (Combat Support Equipment)
 74th Engineer Detachment (Diving)
 95th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)
 520th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)
 597th Engineer Detachment (Fire Fighting)
 33d Finance Battalion (Provisional) (FSU)(-)
 602d Maintenance Company
 Detachment, 514th Maintenance Company
 62d Medical Group
 32d Medical Battalion (Logistics)
 86th Evacuation Hospital
 159th Medical Company (Air Ambulance)
 423d Medical Company (Clearing)
 514th Medical Company (Ambulance)
 61st Medical Detachment (Preventive Medicine Sanitation)
 73d Medical Detachment (Veterinary)
 224th Medical Detachment (Preventive Medicine Sanitation)
 227th Medical Detachment (Epidemiology)
 248th Medical Detachment (Veterinary)
 257th Medical Detachment (Dental)
 485th Medical Detachment (Preventive Medicine Entomology)
 528th Medical Detachment (Combat Stress Team)
 555th Medical Detachment (Surgical)
 Detachment 513th Military Intelligence Brigade
 593d Support Group (Area)
 4th Support Center Material Management)
 548th Supply and Services Battalion
 62d Supply Company
 266th Supply Company (Direct Support)
 364th Supply Company
 7th Transportation Group
 49th Transportation Center (Movement Control)
 6th Transportation Battalion
 24th Transportation Battalion
 24th Transportation Company
 57th Transportation Company
 100th Transportation Company
 119th Transportation Company
 155th Transportation Company
 360th Transportation Company
 710th Transportation Company (Provisional) (Boat)
 870th Transportation Company
 22d Transportation Detachment
 160th Transportation Detachment
 169th Transportation Detachment
 329th Transportation Detachment
 491st Transportation Detachment
 Military Traffic Management Command
 "Tiger" Team
 2d Chemical Battalion
 720th Military Police Battalion
 511th Military Police Company
 571st Military Police Company
 978th Military Police Company
 984th Military Police Company
 Military Police Criminal Investigation Element
 240th Quartermaster Battalion
 110th Quartermaster Company (POL)
 267th Quartermaster Company
 18th Quartermaster Platoon
 26th Quartermaster Detachment (ROWPU Barge Team)
 30th Quartermaster Detachment (ROWPU Barge Team)
 82d Quartermaster Detachment
 22d Quartermaster Laboratory
 Detachment, 54th Quartermaster Company (Graves Registration)
 Task Force Thunderbird (Signal)
 209th Signal Company
 516th Signal Company
 Company C, 327th Signal Battalion
 Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 11th Signal Brigade
 Detachment, 63d Signal Battalion
 Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 86th Signal Battalion
 Detachment, 19th Signal Company
 Detachment, 69th Signal Company
 Detachment, 385th Signal Company
 Detachment, 505th Signal Company
 Detachment, 521st Signal Company
 Detachment, 526th Signal Company
 Detachment, 593d Signal Company
 10th Personnel Services Company
 546th Personnel Services Company
 129th Postal Company
 711th Postal Company
 Detachment, Company B (Air Traffic Control), 1st Battalion, 58th Aviation
 Task Force 5-158 Aviation

13th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
 60th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
 542d Ordnance Detachment (EOD) (Control Team)
 27th Public Affairs Team
 28th Public Affairs Team

Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
 Commanding Officer
 Lieutenant Colonel Charles Borchini, USA

8th Psychological Operations Battalion
 Product Dissemination Battalion
 9th Psychological Operations Battalion (Tactical)

Marine Corps Contingent

Commanding Officers
 Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, 9 December 1992 to 23 March 1993
 Colonel Jack W. Klimp, 23 March 1993 to 9 April 1993
 Colonel Emil R. Bedard, 9-28 April 1993
 Colonel Kenneth W. Hillman, 28 April 1993 to 4 May 1993

Marine Forces Somalia

1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)
 Headquarters Battalion, 1st Marine Division (-) (Reinforced)
 7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)
 Headquarters Company, 7th Marines
 1st Battalion, 7th Marines
 3d Battalion, 9th Marines
 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) (Reinforced)
 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion (-)
 1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-)
 Reconnaissance Company, 5th Marines
 Company C, 1st Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced)
 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
 Headquarters, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
 Battalion Landing Team, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 (Composite)
 Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 15

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
 Headquarters, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
 Battalion Landing Team, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines
 Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (Composite)
 Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 24
 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group
 Headquarters Company, 1st Surveillance, Reconnaissance and Intelligence Group (-)
 1st Intelligence Company (-)
 1st Force Service Support Group
 Headquarters, 1st Service Support Group (Forward)
 Headquarters and Service Battalion (-)
 7th Engineer Battalion (-)
 7th Motor Transport Battalion (-)
 1st Landing Support Battalion (-)
 1st Supply Battalion (-)
 1st Maintenance Battalion (-)
 1st Medical Battalion (-)
 1st Dental Battalion (-)
 Marine Aircraft Group 16
 Headquarters, Marine Aircraft Group 16
 Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369
 Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 363
 Marine Aerial Transport Refueler Squadron 352
 Detachment, Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466
 Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 38 (-)
 Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Service Squadron
 Detachment, Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38
 Detachment, Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 38
 Detachment, Marine Air Support Squadron 3
 Detachment, Marine Air Control Squadron 1
 Detachment, Marine Wing Support Squadron 1
 Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16
 30th Naval Construction Regiment

Headquarters, 30th Naval Construction
Regiment
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 1
Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 40
9th Communications Battalion
1st Radio Battalion
1st Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (-)
MAGTF Integration Instruction Team
National Intelligence Support Team

Naval Contingent

Commanding Officers

Rear Admiral William J. Hancock, USN, 19-
28 December 1992
Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, USN, 19-28
December 1992
Rear Admiral (LH) James B. Perkins III,
USN, 28 December 1992 to 15 January 1993
Captain J. W. Peterson, USN, 15 January
1993 to 1 February 1993
Captain Terry R. Sheffield, USN, 1 February
1993 to 5 March 1993
Captain Nathan H. Beason, USN, 5-23
March 1993
Commodore Pyle, USN, 23 March

Naval Forces Somalia

Ranger Battle Group

Cruiser Destroyer Group 1
Destroyer Squadron 7
USS *Ranger*
Carrier Air Wing 2
Fighter Squadron 1
Fighter Squadron 2
Attack Squadron 145
Attack Squadron 155
Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 38
Tactical Electronic Warfare
Squadron 31
Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron
14
VAW 116
HSL 47 Detachment 2
HC 11 Detachment 10

USS *Wabash*

USS *Valley Forge*

Kitty Hawk Battle Group

Cruiser Destroyer Group 5
Destroyer Squadron 17
USS *Kitty Hawk*
Carrier Air Wing 15
Fighter Squadron 111
Fighter Squadron 51
VAW 114

Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron
4
Air Anti-Submarine Squadron 37
Fighter/Attack Squadron 27
Fighter/Attack Squadron 97
Tactical Electronic Warfare
Squadron 134
Attack Squadron 52
Marine Detachment
Detachment, Explosive Ordnance
Unit 3

USS *Leahy*

USS *W. H. Standley*

USS *Sacramento*

USS *Tripoli*

USS *Juneau*

USS *Rushmore*

CTF 156

USS *Tripoli*

USS *Juneau*

USS *Rushmore*

USS *Niagara Falls*

CTF 155

Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron 2
Wasp Amphibious Ready Group

CTF 156

Amphibious Squadron 2

TF 156

USS *Wasp*

USS *El Paso*

USS *Louisville*

USS *Nashville*

USS *Barnstable County*

Naval Beach Group 1

Assault Craft Unit 1

Beachmaster Unit 1

Amphibious Construction Battalion 1

Cargo Handling Group 1

Military Sealift Command Office, Mogadishu

Patrol Squadron Special Project Unit

Special Operations Contingent

Commanding Officers

Colonel Thomas Smith, USA

Lieutenant Colonel William L.

Faistenhammer, USA, after 20 January 1993

1st Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group

Company B

ODA 526

ODA 54

ODA 543

ODA 546

ODB 560

ODA 561
ODA 562
ODA 563
ODA 564
ODA 565

2d Battalion, 5th Special Forces Group
Company A (Operation Provide Relief)
Company C

Zimbabwe

Commanding Officer
Major Vitalis Chigume, Zimbabwe Army

S Company, 42 Infantry Battalion (Reinforced)

Headquarters Section
Administration
Operations
Signals
Engineering
Public Affairs
Electrical and Mechanical
Engineering/Stores
Chaplain

1st Platoon
2d Platoon
3d Platoon
81mm Mortar/Antitank Platoon
Medical Platoon

Appendix B

Glossary of Terms, Abbreviations and Somali Spelling

| | |
|---------|--|
| AAV | Amphibious Assault Vehicle |
| ACA | Airspace Control Authority |
| ACE | Air Combat Element |
| ACO | Air Control Order |
| AES | Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron |
| AFFor | Air Force Forces Somalia |
| AMC | Air Mobility Command |
| AME | Air Mobility Element |
| APOD | Aerial Port Of Debarkation |
| APOE | Aerial Port Of Embarkation |
| ArFor | Army Forces Somalia |
| ARG | Amphibious Ready Group |
| ASG | Area Support Group |
| ATF | Amphibious Task Force |
| AWSS | Authorized Weapons Storage Site |
| CA | Civil Affair |
| CentCom | U.S. Central Command |
| CinC | Commander in Chief. In the United States military, used as the title of a commander of a specified or unified command, as in CinCCent, the commander in chief of the United States Central Command. |
| CJTF | Combined/Joint Task Force Somalia. One of the names given to the organization responsible for Operation Restore Hope, when it included both United States Armed Forces and coalition partners (thus making it a combined and joint force). Note that this acronym is sometimes also used for Commander Joint Task Force Somalia, especially in message traffic. See also JTF and UNITAF. |
| CMOC | Civil-Military Operations Center |
| CMOT | Civil-Military Operations Team |
| CoSCom | Corps Support Command |
| CSSE | Combat Service Support Element |
| CWT | Coalition Warfare Team |
| FIR | Flight Information Region |
| FSS | Fast Sealift Ship |
| FSSG | Force Service Support Group |
| GCE | Ground Combat Element |
| Humvee | High Mobility Multiwheeled Vehicle |
| HRO | Humanitarian Relief Organization |
| HRS | Humanitarian Relief Sector |
| ICAO | International Civil Aviation Organization |
| I MEF | I Marine Expeditionary Force |
| JTF | Joint Task Force Somalia. The original name given to the organization that would conduct Operation Restore Hope. As a joint task force, it referred only to the organization when it was composed of United States forces. It was changed over time to CJTF Somalia and to UNITAF |

| | |
|-----------|--|
| JTFSC | Joint Task Force Support Command. Sometimes referred to as the Joint Logistics Command, or JLC |
| LCAC | Landing Craft Amphibious Cargo |
| MarFor | Marine Forces Somalia |
| METT-T | Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time Available |
| MEU (SOC) | Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) |
| MPF | Maritime Prepositioning Force |
| MPS | Maritime Prepositioning Squadron or Ships |
| MSSG | MEU Service Support Group |
| MSR | Main Supply Route |
| NavFor | Navy Forces Somalia |
| NGO | Nongovernmental Organization |
| NoTAM | Notice to Airmen |
| OpCon | Operational Control. It is defined as a level of command authority used frequently in the execution of joint operations. It is the command authority, which may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and can be delegated or transferred. It is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. |
| PhibRon | Amphibious Squadron |
| PsyOps | Psychological Operations |
| PVO | Private Voluntary Organization |
| RoE | Rules of Engagement |
| ROWPU | Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit |
| SNA | Somali National Army |
| SNF | Somali National Front |
| SPF | Somali Patriotic Front |
| SPM | Somali Patriotic Movement |
| SOCCent | Special Operations Command, Central Command |
| SOFor | Special Operations Forces |
| SPMAGTF | Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force |
| SYL | Somali Youth League |
| TaCon | Tactical Control. It is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TaCon may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TaCon is inherent in OpCon. |
| TransCom | The United States Transportation Command |
| TPFDD | Time phased force deployment data |
| ULN | Unit Line Number. A number assigned to a unit, with its personnel and equipment, which is to be shipped as an entity. The ULN is used to tell units when to be prepared to load onto transport. It also informs the receiving headquarters when they can expect the arrival of a unit in theater. It can also be used to track the unit while it is enroute. |
| UNITAF | Unified Task Force Somalia. The name given to the organization responsible for Operation Restore Hope, encompassing the headquarters, the United States Armed Forces components, and the coalition partners. |

Notes on Somali Spelling

There was no standard written form of the Somali language until the 1960s. Fortunately for those in the West, the government decided to adopt the Latin alphabet as the basis for the written form. However, the exact spellings of place and personal names vary from one source to another, depending on the understanding of the phonetics by the individual transliterating. To further complicate matters, the major clans often speak different dialects. There are also differences between Italian and English forms of the sounds and words.

For the sake of clarity, a standard of spelling for the most common names has been used in this volume. However, where a name or word is quoted, the spelling used in the quotation may have been kept. The following is a list of these names, with alternate spellings as they may be found in other sources, atlases, or histories.

Afgooye; Afgoi
 Aideed; Aidid
 Baidoa; Baydhabo
 Balcad; Balad
 Bale Dogle; Bali Dogle; Baali Doogle
 Bardera; Baardheere
 Beer Hanni; Bir Xanni; Bir Hane
 Buulobarde; Bulu Burti; Buulo Berde
 Buurhakaba; Buurhabaka (note transposition of the k and b); Bur Acaba; Buur Hakaba
 Belet Weyne; Beled Weyne; Belet Uen; Belet Huen
 Djibouti; Djibuti
 Dhoble; Doble; Dhooble
 Fer Fer; Ferfer; Feer Feer
 Galcaio; Galkayo; Gaalkacyo
 Gialalassi; Jialalaqsi; Xialalaksi
 Habr Gedr; Habir Gedirh; Habr Gidr
 Hargeisa; Hargeysa
 Hawadle; Xawaadle
 Hussein; Huseyn
 Jawhar; Giohar; Johar
 Jilib; Gelib
 Jubba; Juba; Giuba
 Kismayo; Kismayu; Cismayo; Chisimayu; Chisimaio; Kismaayo
 Merka; Marka; Merca
 Mogadishu; Mogadisho; Muqdishu
 Mursade; Murasade; Mursida
 Oddur; Huddur; Xuddur
 Shabele; Shabele; Shabeelle; Shebelle; Shebeli; Scebeli
 Tiyegloo; Tayeeglow; Tigieglo; Tayeegle
 Webi; Uebe
 Wajid; Waajid; Wadjid
 Yet; Yeet; Yeed

Appendix C

Chronology of Events and Operations

| | |
|------------------|---|
| 26 June 1960 | British Somaliland receives independence. |
| 1 July 1960 | British Somaliland joins with the Trust Territory to form the Somali Republic. |
| 15 October 1969 | President Shermarke is assassinated. |
| 21 October 1969 | Siad Barre takes over the government of Somalia in a military coup. |
| July 1977 | Somali Army invades Ethiopia. |
| November 1977 | Barre abrogates Somali treaties with the Soviet Union. |
| 1978 | Somalia signs an agreement with the United States allowing U.S. military access to Somali military facilities. |
| 1980 | An agreement is signed between Somalia and the United States. In return for military aid, the United States receives use of the port and airfield at Berbera. |
| 1988 | Armed opposition to the Barre government begins with a rebellion in the north of the country. |
| 1990 | Three main opposition groups are fighting against the Barre regime. These are the Somali National Movement, the Somali Patriotic Movement, and the United Somali Congress. |
| December 1990 | Fighting nears Mogadishu. Civil order breaks down in the city. |
| 5 December 1990 | U.S. Ambassador James K. Bishop orders the evacuation of all non-essential United States Embassy personnel. |
| 30 December 1990 | All remaining Americans are brought into the United States Embassy compound. |
| 31 December 1990 | The commander of U.S. Naval Central Command orders his staff to prepare for an evacuation of the American Embassy in Mogadishu. |
| 1 January 1991 | Ambassador Bishop requests permission from the State Department to evacuate the U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu. |
| 2 January 1991 | The State Department grants permission for evacuation of the embassy. |
| 2 January 1991 | Joint Chiefs of Staff issues an execute order for Operation Eastern Exit. |
| 2 January 1991 | Four ships carrying Marine forces get underway from the Persian Gulf to conduct noncombatant evacuation of the embassy. |
| 5 January 1991 | Ships arrive off the coast of Mogadishu. Operation Eastern Exit begins. First helicopters leave the ships at 0345; the last helicopters return at 2323. The operation is declared complete at 2340. |
| 22 January 1991 | Siad Barre flees Mogadishu |
| May 1992 | Barre's forces are defeated and he flees Somalia. Fighting between the factions for control of the country begins. |
| 17 November 1991 | Fighting and civil disorder force United Nations staff to evacuate Somalia. |
| 18 August 1992 | President George H. W. Bush orders the airlift of 145,000 tons of food to Somalia in Operation Provide Relief. |
| 23 November 1992 | <i>Tripoli</i> Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), carrying the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (15th MEU (SOC)), departs Singapore enroute to the Persian Gulf. |

- 25 November 1992 President Bush announces to the United Nations that the United States was prepared to provide military forces to assist in the delivery of food and relief supplies to Somalia.
- 27 November 1992 Commanding general of Central Command (CentCom) designates I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) as the headquarters of Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia.
- 29 November 1992 United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali states that the U.N. Security Council would consider authorizing an operation by member states.
- 1 December 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a warning order to the commander in chief of Central Command (CinCCent).
- 2 December 1992 Joint Chiefs of Staff order the commander in chief, Pacific, to assign I MEF to CinCCent.
- 3 December 1992 The United Nations Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 794, authorizing military intervention in Somalia. CinCCent issues deployment to I MEF. Tripoli ARG arrives off southern Somali coast.
- 4 December 1992 JTF Somalia headquarters established. Lieutenant General Robert B. Johnston briefs his concept of operations to component commanders.
- 5 December 1992 CentCom issues its operation order for Restore Hope. CinCCent assigns commanding general I MEF as commanding general, JTF Somalia.
- 6 December 1992 JTF Somalia issues its operation order for Restore Hope.
- 7 December 1992 First trainload of Army equipment departs Fort Drum for the port of Bayonne, New Jersey.
- 9 December 1992 At 0330, landing vehicles carrying Marines and Navy Sea, Air, Land personnel (SEALs) are launched from the ARG for initial landings and arrive at Mogadishu at 0540. By 1145, the Mogadishu airport is declared secure and the first military aircraft lands. One company of the 2d French Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment joins the JTF in Mogadishu.
- 10 December 1992 General Johnston arrives in Mogadishu. Headquarters for Combined JTF Somalia is established in the United States Embassy compound. Unified Task Force Somalia (UNITAF) decides to move up the deployment of Army forces, originally scheduled to begin on 19 December, by eight days.
- 11 December 1992 Major General Charles E. Wilhelm, commanding general of Marine Forces Somalia (MarFor) arrives in Mogadishu. General Johnston and Ambassador Robert B. Oakley begin talks with faction leaders. General Mohamed Farah Hassan Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed agree to respect the ceasefire and to remove heavy weapons from the city. United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali invites 11 political faction leaders to a preparatory meeting for a conference of national reconciliation.
- 12 December 1992 Three helicopters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 164 are fired on by Somalis in two separate incidents. The helicopters destroy two "technicals" and damage one M113 armored personnel carrier. HMCS Preserver arrives at Mogadishu port, beginning the Canadian Operation Deliverance. First Army unit, Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry, arrives at Bale Dogle.
- 13 December 1992 Bale Dogle secured by Marines of the 15th MEU (SOC). First Army unit, Company A, 2d Battalion, 87th Infantry arrives in Bale Dogle. The Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of the Italian Folgore Brigade, a reconnaissance unit, arrive in Mogadishu.
- 14 December 1992 Advance party of Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of Kuwaiti force arrive in Mogadishu.
- 15 December 1992 Army forces assume control of Bale Dogle sector from Marines.

- 16 December 1992 Turkish advance party arrives in Mogadishu. Task Force Hope, composed of elements of the 15th MEU (SOC) and French forces, secures the airfield at Baidoa. Italian reconnaissance unit reoccupies the Italian Embassy. Phase I of Operation Restore Hope is completed.
- 19 December 1992 Turkish reconnaissance party arrives in Mogadishu. First elements of Saudi Arabian force arrive in Mogadishu.
- 20 December 1992 Kismayo port and airfield are secured by elements of the 15th MEU (SOC) and the Belgian 1st Parachute Battalion.
- 22 December 1992 Australian forces reconnaissance party arrives in Mogadishu. Major General Steven L. Arnold, commanding general of Army Forces Somalia, arrives in Mogadishu.
- 23 December 1992 A mine near Bardera kills Lawrence N. Freedman, a U.S. Government civilian employee. Mr. Freedman is the first member of the Unified Task Force to die in the performance of duty. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., arrives at the embassy compound in Mogadishu for a formal visit. The San Marco Battalion arrives with the Italian Naval Group.
- 24 December 1992 Bardera is secured by elements of the 7th Marines. Task Force Kismayo is formed from the Army forces under the command of Brigadier General Lawson W. Magruder, III, USA. Main body of Italian Folgore Brigade arrives.
- 25 December 1992 French forces secure Oddur.
- 27 December 1992 Italian forces secure Gialalassi. General Aideed and Ali Mahdi meet on the "green line" dividing Mogadishu, declaring it abolished. 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, relieves the 15th MEU (SOC) of responsibility for Baidoa sector.
- 28 December 1992 Elements of Army Forces Somalia and the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group secure Belet Weyne, last of the originally planned relief sector. Phase II of Operation Restore Hope is completed. Operation Clean Street begins in Mogadishu, continuing until 6 January 1993. General Aideed and Ali Mahdi meet in Mogadishu and agree to dismantle the "green line" separating the city.
- 31 December 1992 Merka port and airfield are secured by elements of Army Forces Somalia and the Italian San Marco Brigade. President Bush arrives in Mogadishu, visiting units in the city and aboard ship.
- 1 January 1993 President Bush visits units in Baidoa and Bale Dogle.
- 2 January 1993 Main body of Turkish forces arrives in Mogadishu.
- 4 January 1993 First reconciliation conference begins at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; 14 factions are represented.
- 6 January 1993 Commanding general issues guidance for the draw down and restructuring of the force. Members of General Aideed's faction fire on a UNITAF convoy traveling through Mogadishu. A plan is developed for the seizure of the weapons storage areas involved.
- 7 January 1993 In a dawn assault, the two weapons storage areas are seized by Marines of Task Force Mogadishu.
- 8 January 1993 Identification card system for weapons control goes into effect. Task Force Mogadishu conducts its first raid against the Argentine arms market. Australian forces advance party arrives in Baidoa.
- 8-15 January 1993 All participants to the Addis Ababa conference sign a series of agreements, calling for a ceasefire, the cessation of all hostile propaganda, cooperation with international organizations, free movement of the Somali people, and specific agreements on disarmament.
- 11 January 1993 Task Force Mogadishu conducts its first raid against the Barkera arms market.

- 12 January 1993 Private First Class Domingo Arroyo is killed by small arms fire while on patrol in Mogadishu. Private Arroyo is the first uniformed member of UNITAF to be killed in action. Royal Moroccan forces are placed under the operational control of Army Forces Somalia.
- 13 January 1993 Somali Security Committee in Mogadishu approaches UNITAF about the reestablishment of the Somali National Police Force.
- 16 January 1993 Baidoa sector transferred to Army Forces Somalia.
- 17 January 1993 Main body of Australian forces arrives in Baidoa.
- 19 January 1993 Australian forces assume responsibility for Baidoa sector.
- 30 January 1993 3,000 Somali auxiliary security force personnel are reported as prepared to start police duties.
- 8 February 1993 General Johnston and Brigadier General Imtiaz Shaheen send a joint letter to all signatories of the 8 January Accords calling on them to begin the disarmament process.
- 23 February 1993 Supporters of Aideed begin rioting in Mogadishu as a result of incidents in Kismayo.
- 24 February 1993 Rioting continues in Mogadishu, especially in the vicinity of the K-4 traffic circle.
- 25 February 1993 U.S. Marines and Botswana soldiers conduct clearing operations in the vicinity of the K-4 traffic circle. Calm returns to Mogadishu by the evening.
- 2 March 1993 Royal Moroccan forces are placed under the direct control of UNITAF and given responsibility for Bale Dogle sector.
- 4 March 1993 Members of the Reconnaissance Platoon, Canadian Airborne Regiment, shoot two unarmed intruders in the engineer compound in Belet Weyne, killing one of them.
- 16 March 1993 Two Canadian soldiers torture and beat to death a Somali teenager caught infiltrating the Canadian compound in Belet Weyne.
- 24 March 1993 The final day of Ramadan, and the start of two days of celebration. This is the first time in two years the citizens of Mogadishu have been able to celebrate this religious feast day in peace.
- 4 May 1993 UNITAF turns over responsibility for operations in Somalia to the United Nations forces, under the command of Lieutenant General Cevik Bir, Turkish Army. The last of UNITAF headquarters staff depart Somalia.
- 5 May 1993 President William J. Clinton welcomes General Johnston and his staff back to the United States in a special ceremony on the White House lawn.

Appendix D

Citation

Joint Meritorious Unit Award Unified Task Force Somalia

Citation:

Unified Task Force Somalia, United States Central Command, distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service in Operation RESTORE HOPE from 5 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. During this period, the Unified Task Force organized and deployed the largest humanitarian assistance mission in history, a joint and combined task force of over 38,000 personnel. Rapidly establishing security in eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors in war-torn and famine-raged Somalia, they effectively neutralized warring factions that had paralyzed and devastated the country. Unified Task Force Somalia enabled the delivery of over 42,000 metric tons of relief supplies to the starving population, disarmed warring factions, fostered a cease fire, and restored police and judiciary systems. It accomplished a major infrastructure rebuilding effort, restoring roads, airfields, seaports and public utilities that had been destroyed by two years of civil war. Through the intervention and leadership of Unified Task Force Somalia, relief efforts of over 60 different air and relief organizations and the support of 23 nations were coordinated and focused to reverse a human tragedy of famine and disease that was claiming the lives of thousands each day. Under the stability provided by Unified Task Force Somalia, the process of reconciliation and rebuilding began. The successes of the members of Unified Task Force Somalia in the accomplishment of national security objectives, and their exemplary performance of duty have brought great credit to themselves, their Services, the United States Central Command, and to the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 29th day of June 1993

Colin L. Powell
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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