CHAPTER V

A PUNCHBOWL AND A PALACE

Thirty-one Marines were captured by the enemy during 1951. Of that number 11 enlisted Marines were captured in ground combat and 20 officers were downed over enemy territory by ground fire or aircraft accident. In general the aerial and ground combat actions were not directly related to each other. Although the paths of the captured Marines often crossed, the pattern of activity falls into perspective when viewed in the separate elements of ground and air action. For that reason the activities of the 1st Marine Division during 1951 will be set forth first, followed by the individual cases of plane losses and pilot experiences. Where possible, the movement of groups will be highlighted.

The 1st Marine Division was in Eighth Army reserve when 1951 dawned. The Marines performed in an antiguerrilla role until late February when a general advance, Operation Killer, was ordered to deny important positions to the enemy and to destroy as many hostile troops as could be found.[1] In order to use the Marines in the new

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[1]John Miller, Jr., Owen Carroll, and Margaret E. Tackley, Korea 1951-53 (Washington: Office of The Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1958), p. 18.

offensive the 1st Marine Division was committed near Wonju as part of U. S. Ninth Corps. The division's casualties jumped from 62, suffered during antiguerrilla operations in January, to 233 in February as the offensive operations got underway. By March 1st the United Nations offensive had gained positions roughly halfway between the 37th and 38th parallels. A second offensive was launched on March 7th, Operation Ripper, and for the next six weeks small inroads were made on a stubborn enemy.[1]

In April the 1st Marine Division was relieved in the Hongchon area by elements of the U. S. 2d and 7th Divisions. The Marines continued to operate as part of U. S. Ninth Corps; their mission was to advance and secure designated objectives north of the 38th parallel. On April 21st the 1st Marine Division launched its attack on Corps order and encountered moderate to heavy resistance. The 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment, attached to the 1st Marine Division, seized Hwachon Dam and the Division Reconnaissance Company entered the city of Hwachon. The 5th Marines on the right of the division zone captured the high ground dominating Sinpung-ni while on the left the 7th Marines advanced about 5,000 yards. At 10:15 P.M. that night the Chinese Communists launched their spring offensive with a large-scale attack along the eastern front. The 6th Republic of Korea Division on the left of the Marines began to fall back when the Chinese forced deep penetrations in their posi-

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[1] Ibid., p. 21.

tions. The enemy rushed into the void left by the ROK's and threatened the exposed flanks of the Marine Division.[1] The night of 22-23 April the Chinese overran the 213th Field Artillery Battalion, a U. S. Army unit which had been supporting the 6th ROK Division and whose positions had been uncovered by the unexpected withdrawal of the South Koreans. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, shifted west to protect the division left flank and rear from the new threat. The 4th Battalion, 11th Marines, was directed to provide liaison and forward observer teams to 1/1 and to lay one battery for direct support.[2] During the ensuing action on April 23, Corporal William E. Schultz of Headquarters Battery, 4/11 was captured by the enemy.

The U. S. 2d Division occupying positions to the right of the Marines withdrew and the Chinese quickly rushed troops forward. For several days Marines came under attack from both flanks as well as from the engagement raging across their entire front. In the general withdrawal ordered by the U. S. Ninth Corps commander, the 1st Marine Division fell back to the Soyang River near Chunchon. The 1st Marines covered the withdrawal of the 5th and 7th Regiments and other division units.[3]

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[1] 1st MarDiv, HistD, April, 1951, pp. 1-3.

[2] 11th Mar, HistD, April, 1951, p. 1. The 4th Battalion, a 155mm Howitzer Battalion, normally provides general supporting fires and does not customarily furnish forward observer teams to infantry units. Instead, missions are unually called for by forward observers of the three 105mm direct support battalions through the appropriate fire direction centers.

[3] 1st MarDiv, HistD, April, 1951, p. 3.

On April 28th and 29th U. S. Ninth Corps divisions again fell back, and formed a general defense north of Hongchon. While the Marine division slogged southward over rain-gutted roads, three captured Marines were taken north by the enemy.

On May 1, 1951, operational control of the 1st Marine Division shifted from U. S. Ninth to U. S. Tenth Corps. For the first three weeks of May the division defended in place and sent strong patrols forward to maintain contact with the enemy. On the 22d, as part of a general United Nations offensive, the Marines attacked northward along the Hongchon-Inje axis scoring gains of about 6,000 meters a day against the enemy's deliberate delaying action.[1] By the end of the month elements of the attached Korean Marines entered Yanggu. Two U. S. Marines had been captured in the ground fighting during May.

Eighth Army had more than restored the positions held the previous month before the Chinese "Fifth Phase Offensive" drove the United Nations forces backward. The new Army positions were established along a relatively narrow transpeninsular line, one which afforded defensible terrain, traversable road systems, and satisfactory lines of communication.[2] During June the United Nations Command continued pressing forward to secure local tactical victories. Termed Operation Piledriver, the June offensive

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[1] Ibid., pp. 1-2.

[2] Miller, et al., pp. 110-11.

succeeded in attaining its principal terrain objectives. Action for the last part of June was confined to developing defensive lines, patrolling and local skirmishes which, although fierce and bloody, did not materially affect the dispositions of either side.[1] The 1st Marine Division fought a violent battle in the Punchbowl area, a circular depression north of Inje, and suffered heavy casualties. Only the fighting at Inchon in September, 1950, and the Chinese onslaught of November, 1950, had produced greater casualties. The June battle along the southern rim of the Punchbowl cost the Marine Division 183 killed, 2,035 wounded, and 3 missing. The missing are presumed to have been killed during the fighting. No ground personnel were captured by the enemy during the month.

Truce negotiations commenced on July 10, 1951, and all along the front the fighting died down. Action was characterized by artillery fire, air strikes, and naval gunfire bombardment of key coastal areas. Offensive ground operations consisted of limited battalion and regimental attacks to attain favorable terrain, to capture prisoners, and to discourage enemy probes and attacks.[2] With the comparative lull in fighting casualties dropped perceptibly although they did not cease altogether.

An enlisted Marine from the 1st Division was captured

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[1] Ibid., pp. 111-12.

[2] Ibid., p. 115.

on July 2, 1951, under weird circumstances. PFC Billie J. Lessman of Headquarters Battery, 11th Marines, disappeared. At first there seemed to be no explanation for his absence, no combat action to account for a casualty in his unit, no real reason to explain his disappearance. He simply vanished. Subsequent investigation revealed a drinking party, a one man liquor-procuring detail, a wrong turn -- PFC Lessman was gone.[1]

The 1st Marine Division manned defensive positions throughout the first half of July. Contact with the enemy was maintained by aggressive patrolling. The KMC Regiment located on line between the 1st and 5th Marines attempted to establish a forward patrol base, but their four-day attack encountered extensive mine fields and heavy enemy fire which forced the Korean Marines to resume the defensive. The 1st Marine Division was scheduled to pass to Tenth Corps reserve, and relief of division elements started on July 15th, one day too late for PFC Alfred P. Graham, Jr.

Graham was a member of an H/3/5 patrol which was sent forward of the main line of resistance on July 14th, 1951, and he was captured while returning from the mission. When interviewed after the Korean armistice, Graham related the details of his capture and subsequent imprison-

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[1]Letter from 1stLt Lester A. Rowden, Jr., 045629, to the Commanding Officer, 11th Marines, August 5, 1951, subject: Report of investigation, case of PFC Billie J. Lessman.

ment.[1] As he told it, both he and another Marine were the rear guard following in trace of the patrol at a distance of about 100 yards when the enemy suddenly opened fire. Graham was knocked out by a concussion grenade, and his companion was killed. The Chinese took PFC Graham prisoner and marched him off to a nearby bunker where he was subjected to a brief interrogation. Shortly thereafter he was marched north a distance of about 25 miles to what he thought was a divisional headquarters. There he was interrogated by a Korean major who claimed to have attended the University of Chicago in 1932. He also encountered another Marine prisoner of war. The latter, although unnamed by Graham during his interview, could only have been PFC Billie Lessman who had wandered into captivity two weeks earlier. The two Marines were forced to stand all night long and were alternately questioned. The following afternoon when the guards seemed slack, the two captives sneaked away and went north hoping to elude their pursuers before eventually turning south. They stopped at a Korean farmhouse and tried to pass themselves off as Russian pilots by drawing a hammer and sickle in the dirt, this in spite of the Marine emblem and letters USMC stencilled on the breast pockets of their combat uniforms.

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[1] Albert P. Graham Jr., as told to Warren Unna, "Area POW Tells Own Dramatic Story", The Washington Post, August 16, 1953, pp. 1 and 11.

After approaching two farmhouses and getting raw potatoes and rice, they visited a third house where they stumbled into seven or eight Koreans and were recaptured. They were beaten with a submachine gun and their hands were bound behind their backs with communication wire. One of Graham's legs was tied to one of Lessman's legs, and the two Marines were marched back to the site of their escape. The Korean major beat them and interrogated them for three days.

Later in the week, their hands still bound behind their backs, the Marines were marched northward for about ten miles and then continued the trip in a truck to a North Korean collection center at Kung Dong about 16 miles south east of Pyongyang. Graham estimated that there were about 120 American and 3,000 South Korean POW's at Kung Dong when he arrived there early in August. After a six-week stay at the collection center, a period during which several POW's died from beriberi, the American POW's began a 31-day march north to a regular camp along the Yalu River.

The first leg of the march took them to Pyongyang. En route the prisoners ate apple cores, cabbage scraps, and whatever else they could find when they made short halts. Some POW's smoked paper, heavy wall paper or whatever else would burn and could be rolled into the shape of a cigarette. At Pyongyang the prisoners were formed into squads and platoons, and they were each given a blanket, a cotton padded overcoat and cheap shoes. A pair of shoes

Graham had been given earlier lasted only three days before falling apart, so he used the wornout pair for wading streams and the new pair for the northward march along Korean roads and trails.

As Graham later indicated, he became ill during the long march. PFC John R. Dunn, a soldier from the 2d Division who had been captured on July 24th, gave his blanket and sugar ration to the sick Marine.[1] Curiously, Dunn was one of the 21 soldiers who later refused repatriation, yet at the time of his association with Graham his conduct appears to have been above reproach. About 120 Americans began the gruelling 31 day march to the Yalu; 80 survived and reached Camp 3 at Changsong on October 16, 1951. Graham's weight had dropped from 155 to about 85 pounds.[2]

Only one Marine was in Camp 3 when Graham and Lessman arrived. He was PFC Robert L. Batdorff who, with two other Marines, had been captured on Fox Hill at Toktong Pass the previous November. The Marines who had been taken to Camp 3 from Kanggye and The Valley had been transferred to nearby Camp 1 in August, 1951.[3]

The relative lull in ground fighting continued until late August when truce negotiations were suspended. General James A. Van Fleet commanding Eighth Army ordered an offensive by Tenth Corps to seize the entire Punchbowl. The

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[1] Pasley, p. 163.

[2] The Washington Post, August 16, 1953, p. 11.

[3] Griffith letter.

1st Marine Division in concert with the other divisions of Tenth Corps attacked on August 31st. Initial objectives were seized by September 3d and on the 11th the division renewed the attack north to the Soyang River seizing planned objectives on September 18th. Two Marines were captured in the September fighting. They were PFC Delbert L. Marks, Company D, 1st Engineer Battalion, and Corporal Edwin B. Jones from Headquarters, 11th Marines.

After capture the two men were taken west to Kung Dong, probably arriving there shortly after the departure of Graham and Lessman who left with a large group in mid September. Marks and Jones were interned there with four Army enlisted men and one Air Force officer until it was their turn to march north in November.[1]

After the bitter actions at the Punchbowl in September, the 1st Marine Division devoted the following month to defending its gains and improving defenses. Only one ground Marine was captured in October. PFC Billy A. Brown, B/1/1, fell into enemy hands on the 9th. It would appear that he was processed to the rear without much delay because according to the Chinese he was in Camp 5 at Pyoktong in December.[2]

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[1] Personal notes of Major Gerald Fink made in 1953.

[2] Prisoner of War lists were exchanged by the United Nations Command and the Communist side on December 18, 1951, and Brown was reported in Camp 5 on that list. Major U. S. newspapers printed the complete list of American names on December 19, 1951. In this specific instance, I referred to The Call Bulletin (San Francisco), December 19, 1951, p. 16.

On November 12, 1951, General Matthew B. Ridgway, Commander in Chief, United Nations and Far East Commands, ordered the Eighth Army Commander, General Van Fleet, to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of the Eighth Army's front.[1] The character of the conflict returned to that of July and early August, minor patrol clashes and small unit struggles for key outpost positions. Only one other ground Marine was captured before the year closed. PFC Lester A. Ribbeck, F/2/1, was taken prisoner on December 29th and eventually reached Ogul, North Korea.

When the battle lines became comparatively stabilized in 1951, the enemy began to develop his antiaircraft defenses to peak efficiency. Marine pilots engaged in close support, observation, interdiction and armed reconnaissance missions began to encounter accurate and intense ground fire. The number of aircraft losses increased and with it the number of Marine aviators who fell into enemy hands.

Having covered the year 1951 from the standpoint of the 1st Marine Division, it is now necessary to retrace activities of 1951 from the standpoint of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.

The first Marine aviator to be captured in 1951 has already been introduced briefly; he was Captain Paul L. Martelli who was shot down by enemy small-arms fire on April 3, 1951. He was attacking ground targets when his

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[1]Miller *et al.*, p. 205.

oil cooler was hit, and 15 minutes later he was forced to parachute from his stricken plane. His wingman reported that he had fallen or broken loose from his parachute and had been killed. As a consequence Captain Martelli was reported killed in action at that time.[1]

The Marine Captain was taken to a temporary collection center the Chinese had established in the Chorwon area. There he met the 18 Marines who were about to be released.[2] Martelli was taken to "Pak's Palace", a notorious interrogation center near Pyongyang. The "Palace" was so named by prisoners of war who titled it after Major Pak, the sadistic North Korean officer who was the chief interrogator. The Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on POW's concluded that Pak's was the worst camp endured by American POW's in Korea,[3] and Captain Martelli was the first of several Marines who were processed through Pak's Palace.

On May 1st another Marine pilot was captured by the enemy. Captain Mercer Smith took off from K-3 airfield at Pohang-dong. It was 1:15 P.M. and Captain Smith and his wingmate were flying mission number 3320, an armed reconnaissance for Marine Fighter Squadron-311. The two F9F-2B jet fighters approached their objective at 6,000 feet.

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[1] VMF-323, HistD, April, 1951.

[2] ComNavFE Report of Chicom Indoctrination.

[3] The Secretary of Defense's Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, POW...The Fight Continues After the Battle. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 9. Cited hereafter as SecDef Advisory Committee Report POW.

The pilots had observed what appeared to be camouflaged vehicles when suddenly Captain Smith radioed that he had a fire in his cockpit. Smith climbed to 16,000 feet and then ejected from his aircraft. He landed safely and was observed to be alive. As the second pilot flew cover, he saw two enemy soldiers standing over the body of the downed pilot. A rescue helicopter appeared on the scene in response to an emergency call, but the helicopter pilot reported Captain Smith had been killed. From this hasty report Captain Smith, like Captain Martelli, was erroneously reported killed in action.[1]

On May 2, 1951, four Marine aircraft reported to the ground control for a close air support mission. It was 7:15 P.M. and almost dark when the initial attack runs were made. Captain Byron H. Beswick, flying his third mission of the day and his 135th mission of his tour, made a strafing run in an attempt to set fire to a napalm tank which had failed to ignite on impact. His plane was hit by small-arms fire during the run. The plane caught fire, and by the time Beswick was able to bail out burning fuel had been thrown back into the cockpit severely burning his entire face, his hands, one arm and part of his right leg. The wounds were raw and shortly covered by suppurating scabs.

Captain Beswick's wingmates observed him parachute,

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[1]VMF-311, HistD, May, 1951.

land safely, and run up a hill.[1] Downed pilot procedure was followed, but there was only about an hour and a half before total darkness. The late hour and the intensity of ground fire prevented rescue even though the wingman, First Lieutenant Edwing, remained on station until 7:45P.M.[2]

Shortly afterward, the downed Marine was captured and placed with a column made up predominantly of British prisoners from the recently destroyed 1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment.[3] In all, about 300 Gloucestershires had been captured and were being taken north. It was Beswick's good fortune that two British medical officers were with the column. Shortly thereafter the Gloucestershire's doctor, Captain Robert Hickey, and the courageous adjutant, Anthony Farrar-Hockley, together with Beswick and about 40 others were separated from the rest of the column.[4]

The main group proceeded to Chongsong, Camp 1, where they were interned next to a large number of American POW's. A British POW who accompanied the main group and who was later decorated for his heroic behavior while a

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[1]Fiter [sic] Bomber Mission Report 1203, (pencilled) enclosure to VMF-323, HistD, May, 1951.

[2]VMF-323, HistD, May, 1951, p. 1.

[3]Eighth U. S. Army in Korea General Order 286, May 8, 1951, cited the 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, British Army, for holding a vital hill mass April 23-25, 1951, until overwhelmed by enemy masses. The Gloucesters received the Distinguished Unit Citation.

[4]Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The Edge of the Sword (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1954), pp. 116-22.

prisoner of war commented on the terrible condition of the American prisoners of war he found at Chongsong, stating that in those early days the Americans had it worse than the British.[1] It appears that no U. S. Marines had reached Camp 1 at this time although several were at nearby Camp 3.

Captain Beswick, with the smaller group, was led along trails and rough roads, unable to see through the crusted scab which covered his entire face. In spite of his painful burns and temporary blindness, he never cried out or complained. Beswick, a selfless man, even offered to give articles of his clothing to other prisoners to wear.[2]

After a few days, the column made its way to Munha-ri, about a quarter of a mile from the Taedong River. Beswick could see through his scabrous eyelids by this time and he was pronounced sufficiently fit by Doctor Hickey to attempt an escape. The doctor and two other British officers, one heroic young Filipino officer, Lieutenant Thomas Batilio, and the Marine Captain were to make up the escape party, but before they could make good their escape, the Chinese split the group into two segments. One group remained at Munha-ri, and the other, which included Beswick, began to march north again.

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[1]Francis S. Jones, as told to the author by Lance Corporal Robert F. Mathews, BEM *No Rice for Rebels* (London: Garden City Press, 1956), pp. 36-42.

[2]Letter from Major Anthony Farrar-Hockley, DSO, OBE, MC, September 26, 1960.

It was then June, 1951, and within a few days the wirebound figure of Marine Captain Beswick reappeared at Munha-ri. He and four others had tried to escape while on the march, but they had all been recaptured. In three week's time, most of the escapees were released from the solitary confinement to which they had been committed, but Beswick remained in solitary for an even longer period.[1] Eventually, he reached the officers' camp which was established in October, 1951.

The month of May claimed still another Marine pilot. On the 27th, Captain Arthur Wagner was on an armed reconnaissance strike between Hwachon and Kumhwa. He flew a night fighter, an F4U-5N aircraft, in company with two other Marines from All Weather Fighter Squadron-513. As he made a pass going up valley, northwest towards Kumhwa, one of his napalm tanks caught fire and he was forced to bail out of the flaming aircraft.[2]

Captain Wagner was taken to Pak's Palace where he stayed until mid November. He counselled other prisoners at Pak's and helped chop wood, draw water, and cook. In every way possible, he eased the burden of sick fellow prisoners.[3] The 26 year-old Marine resisted the Communists at every turn.

Captain Jack E. Perry, as briefing officer with

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[1]Farrar-Hockley, p. 123.

[2]VMF(N)-513, HistD, May, 1951.

[3]Day letter.

Marine Fighter Squadron-311, had to beg combat flights whenever he could. By mid June he had over 80 missions, and he was also acutely aware, at least from an intelligence standpoint, of the deadly accuracy of the Communist antiaircraft fire in Singosan Valley. He had drawn a large red circle around the valley on his briefing map and cautioned all squadron pilots about the 37mm mobile antiaircraft which infested the area between Hwachon and Wonsan.[1] On June 18, 1951, Captain Perry, scheduled another mission for himself, a predawn armed reconnaissance of Singosan Valley. Observing a truck convoy, he put his F9F in a dive to make a run on his target. As he released his first bomb, Captain Perry suddenly felt the impact of an antiaircraft round striking his fuel tank. He ejected and parachuted safely to earth where his wingmates last saw him running for cover.[2] Perry was captured within 30 minutes. His Chinese captors showed him bomb holes from numerous strikes in the area, and they pointed out several wounded soldiers. Then, as he describes it, "They laughed like hell." Although Captain Perry failed to see anything funny, he laughed along with them.[3]

Perry was taken to the Gold Mine, otherwise known as Camp 10, where he spent the next four weeks. Next he went to Pak's Palace, but encountered no particularly cruel or unusual treatment there. During his two week

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[1] Personal interview with Maj Jack Perry, August 18, 1960.

[2] VMF-311, HistD, June, 1951, pp. 1, 27.

[3] Perry interview.

stay at Pak's he observed what appeared to be Russians but had no direct contact with them. Within two months, some of the Russians were actually conducting interrogations of prisoners. Among the Marines whom Perry met at Pak's were Captains Mercer Smith and Arthur Wagner, both shot down in May.

On July 2, 1951, two additional Marines were captured by the enemy. First Lieutenant Leonard C. Taft, an aviator, was on a photo reconnaissance mission flying an OY-2, a liaison type aircraft which carries a pilot and one passenger. First Lieutenant Robert J. O'Shea, a ground officer rated as an aerial observer, accompanied Taft as his observer.[1] The light plane was unescorted and while over enemy lines it was struck by ground fire and shot down. Both Marines were captured. They were taken to Pak's Palace, and in early September Taft joined Captains Perry and Smith and Lieutenant Bell when they were taken north to the Yalu. Lieutenant O'Shea remained at Pak's for several months.

The following day another Marine aviator was lost to the enemy. Captain James V. Wilkins and First Lieutenant Harold Hintz were members of a four-plane armed reconnaissance flight near Yon-dong when Wilkins' plane was hit by small-arms fire.[2] He parachuted safely but was

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[1]VMO-6, HistD, July, 1951, p. 2.

[2]VMF-312, HistD, July, 1951, p. 3. The returning pilots reported that Captain Wilkins had been shot down by small-arms fire. However, according to a Hungarian

not seen to move after landing. Standard downed pilot procedures were followed and one of the aircraft flying cover was hit. The pilot was forced to make an emergency landing at a forward area landing strip.[1] Captain Wilkins was captured and taken westward across the peninsula moving only at night until he reached the "Bean Camp", 45 miles southeast of Pyongyang.[2] This area was also known as "The Gold Mine". Captain Wilkins was interviewed by Tibor Meray, correspondant for a Hungarian newspaper, and apparently the interview was printed in Hungarian newspapers as well as having been recounted in Meray's book.[3] The Hungarian referred to Captain Wilkins as an "officer of the Navy Air Force", a common error which persisted throughout most of the war since many of the Communists were unable to differentiate between Navy and Marine pilots.

Two Marine night intruders were lost along the Suan-Yuli road in the early morning hours of July 13th.[4] One pilot reported that he was making a napalm run on an enemy convoy. His napalm tank was seen to explode; presumably the second explosion observed was his aircraft. The pilot

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reporter, Tibor Meray, who interviewed Wilkins after his capture, antiaircraft fire and not small arms shot him down. See:
Tibor Meray, Korean Testimony (Budapest: Hungarian peace Council and the Institute for Cultural Relations, 1952), pp. 12-13.

[1]VMF-312, HistD, July, 1951, p. 3.

[2]Location based on British POW Report, p. 38.

[3]Meray, pp. 12-13.

[4]VMF(N)-513, HistD, July, 1951, p. 16 and Appendix I.

First Lieutenant W. D. Garmany, was never seen or heard from again. First Lieutenant A. E. Olson, the pilot who was scheduled to relieve him on station, disappeared in the same fashion minutes later, but Olson was taken prisoner only to die in enemy hands.

Most of the Marine aircraft downed in 1951 were hit by antiaircraft or small-arms fire. The Historical Diary of Marine Fighter Squadron-311 for July, 1951, however, bore the cryptic note that one pilot and aircraft were believed to have been shot down by enemy MIG jet aircraft on the 21st.[1] First Lieutenant Richard Bell was flying an F9F-2B jet as part of a 16-plane combat air patrol operating in northwestern Korea near Sinuiju. The area was better known as "MIG Alley." Lieutenant Bell's division of four aircraft had been reduced to three when one pilot aborted due to a pressurization failure in his cockpit. The remaining three planes of the division continued on their mission as did the three other four-plane divisions.

Some enemy MIG's had been observed at 11:15 A.M. near the Manchurian border north of the Yalu River but no contact had been made. The Marines were running low on fuel and they began to return to their base at Pohang-dong, heading on a 160° course at 200 knots and at 31,000 feet. Minutes later 15 MIG-15's attacked from four

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[1]VMF-311, HistD, July, 1951, Enclosure 1, p. 13.

o'clock high.[1] The enemy passed under the Marine aircraft and subsequent attempts to attack the formation were turned aside when the F9F's turned into the MIG's. The section leader noted that Lieutenant Bell was on his wing when he headed for cloud cover, but thereafter contact was lost.

When Bell failed to return to Pohang-dong he was presumed to have been shot down by the MIG's. Actually Lieutenant Bell engaged the MIG's thereby giving his wingmates the opportunity to break contact without further incident. In so doing he used up his fuel and was unable to return to his own lines safely. The Marine pilot parachuted over enemy territory and was captured. Lieutenant Bell was taken to Pak's Palace, and he made the trip north to a regular POW camp in August with Captains Perry and Smith and Lieutenant Taft.

On July 30, 1951, Lieutenant Harold Hintz was leading one of the three flights which formed a special 12-plane strike. On the approach to the target near Pyongyang his aircraft was apparently hit by ground fire. He began an erratic weave and collided with Lieutenant Colonel H. W. Reed leading one of the other two flights. Only one parachute was observed leaving the aircraft, and both planes

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[1]The "o'clock" system is normally used to designate direction. The direction of flight (nose of the aircraft) represents 12 o'clock. Thus four o'clock would indicate an attack from the right rear; high would indicate that the enemy attacked from a greater altitude.

spun in.[1] Poor weather and intense antiaircraft fire prevented any further investigation by the remaining members of the strike, so they continued on their mission. Hintz had parachuted safely and he was taken to Pak's Palace. He later recounted that Lieutenant Colonel Reed had also bailed out successfully but was hanged for shooting and killing four of the enemy as they closed in to capture him.[2]

In August, 1951, Korean intelligence personnel brought word to Modo Island that an American pilot had been dragged through the streets of Wonsan and later hanged. Modo was one of the seven islands in Wonsan Harbor that served as focal points for raiding activity by the 41st Commando which, by then, was no longer attached to the 1st Marine Division. In addition, several Korean intelligence organizations operated from the various islands, and Yodo, the main island, later became the headquarters of the East Coast Island Defense Command. Among those on Modo who heard of the unfortunate pilot's fate was Quartermaster Sergeant James Day of the Royal Marines. QMS Day was shortly to learn firsthand that the pilot who was supposedly hanged was Marine Captain Gerald Fink and the story of his death proved to be grossly exaggerated.

Captain Gerald Fink was flying an F4U Corsair on an

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[1]VMF-312, HistD, July, 1951, p. 21 and Appendix A.

[2]Fink MS comment.

interdiction mission on August 12, 1951. He was attacking vehicles on a main supply route near Sagaru-ri located southwest of Wonsan and about 18 miles from the east coast. Captain Fink came in low, intent on his target and unmindful of the hail of small-arms fire that rose to meet him. The throttle controls were hit and so severely damaged that the throttle quadrant came off in his hands, and he lost control of his engine. One of the pilots heard someone say, "I'm hit, I'm on fire." It was 10:58 A.M.[1]

When Captain Fink attempted to bail out, the canopy jammed crookedly on its tracks making it impossible for him to get free from the stricken aircraft. Fink punched the canopy with his fist causing it to blow off and at the same time inflicting several cuts to his hands. He finally bailed out at a low altitude and after three swings in his parachute he hit the ground.

North Koreans manning nearby positions opened fire and he was struck in the left knee by a bullet from a submachine gun. The Koreans left their position to rush the Marine, and when he reached for his revolver one soldier struck him in the mouth with the butt of his rifle and knocked out two upper front teeth. Later, the absence of the teeth provided some amusement for his fellow prisoners when he appeared in a Christmas show and sang, "All I Want For Christmas Is My Two Front Teeth." At the moment however, the pain was hardly amusing. The soldiers

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[1]Statement of Captain J. K. Davis, 038764, U. S. Marine Corps, Appendix A, VMF-312, HistD, August, 1951.

also deliberately broke his arm with a butt stroke. Fink set the arm himself later, and aside from a distinctive lump in his humorous bone his treatment proved highly successful.

The enemy took Captain Fink to a hole in the side of a hill where he was kept for about three days. During that time he was given no food, water, or medical attention. The interrogations to which he was subjected were basic and limited to such questions as: "Who are you? What is your name? Are you an American?"

After removal from the hole, Captain Fink was bound with his elbows crooked over a tree branch across his back and his hands tied tightly in front of him. His three North Korean guards dragged him along through several small villages en route to Wonsan. He was unshaven, unwashed, befouled and ill-smelling. The final humiliation occurred during the day and a half in which he lay outside a shattered building on a street in Wonsan. A virtual procession of Korean women spat on him and then squatted and urinated on him as he lay helpless. His flight suit rapidly took on the aspects of a Korean latrine. If he could pick out a single point in his captivity where his morale was at the lowest ebb, it was in Wonsan. Captain Fink felt that his survival was in the hands of God.[1]

After the ordeal in Wonsan, the Marine was taken on an overland trek towards Pyongyang. En route, he was

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[1]Fink interview.

temporarily held at a place called "Wu's" near Yangdok. Captain Wu, who had lost his testicles to an unfriendly bullet, bore little affection for United Nations pilots. The Communist demonstrated his attitude during the ten days of Captain Fink's stay by administering repeated beatings with a .45 caliber automatic as he tried to pry information concerning naval organization from his captive. The little information he did elicit could hardly have been of value because the ships Fink named had been sunk at Pearl Harbor or in the Battle of the Atlantic.

After 10 days Captain Fink was moved to Yangdok where he remained for an additional 10 days when torrential rains made roads and bridges impassable. The journey then continued by foot and within two hours after leaving Yangdok Captain Fink was able to convince some of the Modo-based Commandos that the rumors of his death were purely rumor. Quartermaster Sergeant James Day and four of his Royal Marine enlisted men (other ranks) had been captured in Wonsan Harbor. Their small boat had lost power and they drifted helplessly ashore into enemy hands. The small group of Royal Marines was on the way to Pak's when they were joined by the U. S. Marine Captain. QMS Day describes their initial encounter thus:

> On the way we stopped at some wayside hut for the night, and early in the morning I heard some shocking language from outside. This was Jerry Fink, who, although wounded in the knee slightly, and having had a very rough time in the Wonsan area, was insisting very loudly and clearly that he should come in to meet us. I think we mutually decided for the guards, that it was better for

> them if we all were sent the same way together, as we were going in the same direction. After that, we had a very pleasant stroll to Pak's helped on the way by a lift in a truck engi-nerred by Jerry.[1]

They enjoyed at least one heartwarming experience before reaching Pak's when they spent the night in the hut of a North Korean tailor. Even though he had been subjected to many air attacks by United Nations aircraft, the little tailor showed compassion for the prisoners of war by purchasing some raw peanuts for the group. The peanuts played havoc with their bowels, but the POW's appreciated the kindness and the nourishment. At night, the tailor's mother sat with the prisoners in the hut, held their hands, and sang Christian songs to them in her native tongue. "Nearer My God To Thee" rendered in Korean far behind enemy lines had a strangely soothing effect. Seven years after his release, when reminiscing over some of the strange and terrible and wonderful experiences, Gerald Fink, by then a Major, asked, "How can you hate people like that? You can't call them all bastards."[2] He was, however, to meet several who could qualify for that opprobrious term.

The small group continued on towards the North Korean capital, and as they neared Pyongyang they began passing large numbers of Chinese troops. Their North Korean guards generally stopped them and made them sit

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[1]Day letter, April 14, 1960.

[2]Fink interview.

along side the road whenever Chinese units were encountered. On one occasion, a Chinese soldier tossed some apples to the United Nations prisoners who ate the fruit, cores and all.

At Pak's, the enemy singled out the Marine to be interrogated first while the Commandos looked on. His interrogator was a mountainous Russian woman so large across her posterior that she required the seating space of two chairs. She wore a filmy blue dress and cheap beads and earrings. To make matters more ludicrous, she wore Korean shoes which Fink later described as Korean boondockers, a Marine term for field shoes.

When the Russian behemoth asked through her interpreter why he had come to Korea, Fink replied, "To kill Communists." He was promptly kicked and beaten with sticks expertly wielded by the North Korean guards. After several minutes of beating, Fink was again interrogated, although as much time was devoted to lecturing him on his inhumanity as was devoted to questioning him about military matters.

The Russian inquisitor accused all Americans of bestiality and of murdering women and children. Fink noticed three blond hairs that were growing from the tip of her bulbous nose. As the interrogation continued, he became fascinated by the hairs. The fascination grew into an obsession, until, unable to restrain himself, he leaned forward and neatly plucked one of the hairs off her nose. The North Korean guards immediately set upon him with punches, kicks, and severe blows with their clubs. The

commandos, who were looking on, thought the incident amusing, but they were concerned over possible repercussions.[1] Fink spent the next three days in a vermin infested hole in solitary confinement.

It was at Pak's that Captain Fink first saw a man die from dysentery. One of the Royal Marines with QMS Day's party was unable to withstand the combination of starvation and dysentery. Fink helped QMS Day bury the corpse, and the latter described the act as, "Again ordinary you may say, but you see, most of the POW's at Pak's were in such a weak condition it was an effort to do anything."[2]

The weakened condition of the prisoners was the result of brutal treatment, bare subsistence, sickness, lack of medicine and medical care, hard labor, and the constant threats, beatings, and interrogations. In addition to the Royal Marine who died, an Air Force lieutenant colonel, an Army major and two Army captains died of malnutrition, dysentery and, in at least one case, severe beatings by the enemy.

Daily routine at Pak's consisted of digging bomb shelters, carrying water for the Koreans, chopping wood and carrying it into camp, carrying supplies and rice from Pak's Palace into the local town of Yong Song, digging

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[1]Day letter, September 29, 1960.

[2]Day letter, April 14, 1960.

trenches, and building mud shacks for the Koreans. The work was accomplished despite the poor condition of prisoners, and the Koreans threatened and beat the POW's with little or no provocation.

Other Marines at Pak's in September, 1951, were Captain Wagner and Lieutenants Ferranto and O'Shea. Lieutenant Ferranto had been alone in Chinese hands from the time of his capture in November, 1950, until he was taken to Chongsong in the spring of 1951. When Captain Perry and three other Marine aviators arrived at Chongsong on August 12, 1951, the Marines informed Ferranto that Captain Wagner was at Pak's Palace and that he could be trusted. The information was vital to Ferranto because he was taken south to Pak's shortly thereafter.[1]

Captains Fink, Amann and Wagner frequently held counsel to determine their courses of action and to coordinate their false stories. In general the interrogators pressed for information of naval organization and strategy, apparently not being able to differentiate between Navy and Marine pilots. Lieutenants Ferranto and O'Shea were given hot baths and clean clothes and then were separated from the other POW's[2] Lieutenant Ferranto later summed up his experience in these terms:

> Of my thirty-four months as prisoner more than two years were spent in solitary confinement or isolated with small groups of fellow reactionaries.

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[1] Perry interview.

[2] Fink interview.

> To my captors I was a hopeless capitolist [sic], an organizer with an "unsincere attitude."[1]

Captain Fink and the surviving commandos remained at Pak's Death Palace from September 8 until October 18th at which time they were sent 18 miles southwest to Kung Dong. The march column included nine Air Force officers and two enlisted men, eight Army officers, six British officers and three other United Nations personnel. They joined the small group of seven men already at Kung Dong, a group that included Marine Corporal Jones and PFC Marks.[2] There was no forced labor so the routine at Kung Dong was less wearing than at Pak's, but the diet was even more restricted. Dysentery, hepatitis and beriberi were rampant among the prisoners. On October 25th the North Koreans administered what they called a "Russian Five-in-One Inoculation." The shot produced high fevers, delirium and extreme diarrhea. Those who were suffering from septic wounds had their dressings changed only every few weeks, and a small aspirin-like tablet was given to the most serious cases.

United Nations air strikes against the Communists continued unabated. While prisoners of war were being collected at Kung Dong, pilots of several United Nations Air Forces were ranging over North Korea attacking ground targets, cutting roads and rail lines, and engaging enemy

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[1]Letter from LtCol Felix L. Ferranto, USMC (Retired), February 22, 1961.

[2]Major Gerald Fink, U. S. Marine Corps, personal notes dated 1954.

aircraft in MIG Alley. Marine pilots were primarily engaged in the familiar tasks of armed reconnaissance, interdiction, and close air support of ground forces. Some of these Marines were destined to visit Pak's Palace, Kung Dong, and similar places.

On October 4 Marine Fighter Squadron-323 launched a 12-plane strike to cut a railroad near Sariwon. The F4U's approached their target above the cloud cover at 2:30 P.M. After attacking with 100-pound general-purpose bombs, the flight leaders of each of the four-plane divisions held a radio check, and one pilot failed to answer.[1] He was Captain Emanual R. Amann. No one saw him crash, but the Fifth Air Force Joint Operations Center reported that an Air Force pilot had observed an F4U burning in the Sariwon area.[2] Presumably it was Captain Amann's aircraft.

Marine All-Weather Fighter Squadron-513 provided night armed reconnaissance flights as part of Fifth Air Force's interdiction program. Normally a single night-fighter operated with a Navy PB4Y-2 or an Air Force C-47 flare plane. On October 12, 1951, one of the F4U night-fighters was reported overdue.[3]

The Marine pilot, First Lieutenant Robert J.

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[1]VMF-323, HistD, October, 1951, p. 1, and Appendix D, pp. 1-2.

[2]Statement of Captain J. P. Desmond, 024862, USMCR, Appendix D, VMF-323, HistD, October, 1951, p. 2.

[3]VMF(N)-513, HistD, October, 1951, p. 1.

Gillette, survived a crash-landing, and his later exploits were an inspiration to his fellow POW's.

Two more Marine pilots were lost in October. The plane flown by Second Lieutenant Carl R. Lundquist of VMF-312 was hit by ground fire while on a prebriefed rail strike on October 16th. The aircraft lost oil pressure rapidly, and Lieutenant Lundquist was forced to crash-land. A second plane of his flight was also hit, but the pilot reached the coast and made a water landing. An SA-16 rescue plane was orbitting nearby andthe second pilot was rescued.[1] Lundquist however, was taken prisoner, but he was fortunate in one respect; he was the only Marine officer captured in 1951 who was not processed through Pak's Palace before being taken north.

On October 30, 1951, First Lieutenant Herman R. Stanfill was shot down while on a close air support mission. It was late afternoon, and Stanfill led another plane in on their target. It was to be the final run before returning to base. The second pilot following in line astern saw Stanfill's plane burst into flames, and then a parachute blossomed. The Marine's wingmates were joined by eight Air Force F-51's and 4 Marine F4U's. As the planes attacked the ridges surrounding the spot where the parachute landed, antiaircraft fire became intense. A helicopter arrived within 15 minutes, but the downed pilot had disappeared into nearby woods. The rescue attempt

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[1]VMF-312, HistD, October, 1951, p. 1 and Appendix A.

failed.[1] The lieutenant was captured, and eventually he made the trip which was familiar to so many others: Pak's Palace to Camp 2 at Pi-chong-ni.

Meanwhile, during October and early November, 1951, eight additional prisoners of war arrived at Kung Dong. They included Captain Anthony Farrar-Hockley of the Gloucesters, Major Thomas D. Harrison, USAF, and a Turkish private. Major Harrison had lost a leg when he bailed out of his aircraft over North Korea. Finally on November 12th another column of POW's arrived from Pak's. Marine Captains Amann and Wagner and Lieutenant Hintz were among the eight new arrivals. The following day a POW column of about 45 men left Kung Dong and began a death march that was to cover 225 miles in two weeks. The U. S. Marines with the column were Captains Fink, Amann, and Wagner, Lieutenant Hintz, Corporal Jones and PFC Marks.[2]

On the first day of the march North Korean guards threatened to push a sick Air Force captain over a bombed-out bridge. The captain had obviously been in critical condition even before the march began, but in spite of bitter protests by the prisoners the Communists forced the sick officer to attempt the trip. Only the intervention of Captain Arthur Wagner prevented the guards from carrying out their threat to abandon the Air Force

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[1]VMF-323, HistD, October, 1951, pp. 15-16.

[2]Except as otherwise noted the details of the march are based on an interview with Major Gerald Fink and use of his personal notes dated 1954.

officer.[1] Wagner's effort was to little avail, however, because the Air Force captain died that night. During the remainder of the march Captain Wagner continued to aid his fellow prisoners, frequently carrying those too exhausted to walk themselves.

On November 18th one of the Marines succumbed to muscular and nervous atrophy, extreme malnutrition, and dysentery. The victim was Lieutenant Harold Hintz who had had a mid air collision with another Marine aircraft over Pyongyang on July 30th. There were, in addition to his serious illnesses, some elements of "give-up-itis" in the Lieutenant's death. At least five more POW's died during the march. Six of the POW's were shoeless and they left a spoor of blood as they walked. The one-legged American flier, Major Harrison, hobbled along in rear of the column using a long pole as a crutch. Somehow he was able to complete the march although he finished the latter phase riding in an ox-cart with sick POW's who included Captain Farrar-Hockley.[2]

On November 22, 1951, the battered column reached the Chongsong River. Temperatures were in the low 30's, and there were chunks of ice in the fast flowing river. The prisoners were forced to strip naked and wade across the river, an undertaking which induced several cases of frostbite and caused the deaths of at least two prisoners.

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[1] Day letter, April 14, 1960.

[2] Farrar-Hockley, pp. 196-97.

The Marines banded together during the terrible march, and the Royal Marines were drawn close to the U. S. Marines.[1] QMS Day and Captain Fink had several long talks and they became fast friends. Day also helped take care of Captain Anthony Farrar-Hockley who fell seriously ill before the column finished its march.[2] On the last two days of their ordeal, Corporal Jones had to be carried and the other Marines shared the burden.

Of interest was the action of the Turkish POW. In turn for better rations, he was armed with a gun given him by the Koreans, and he stood guard over his fellow prisoners. On another occasion he attacked a French Warrant Officer, Fabien Falise, in a fit of pique.[3] His was one of the rare cases of misconduct by a Turk, and appropriate Turkish authorities were later notified of his behavior. It has been rumored that he was lost overboard en route home after the war.

The Koreans showed utter disregard for the welfare and lives of their prisoners during the death march. What was meant to be the POW food ration was sold on the black market. The guards confiscated wrist watches and the few valuable bits of clothing still retained by the United Nations personnel.

On November 26, 1951, after the excruciating march

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[1]Day letter, April 14, 1960.

[2]Farrar-Hockley, p. 196.

[3]Fink notes.

which had taken a toll in death and debilitation, the exhausted prisoners reached Chongsong. The officers and enlisted men were separated at this point, and Corporal Jones and PFC Marks were taken to Camp 3 where PFC's Graham, Lessman, and Batdorff were confined. The officers entrucked to Camp 2 at Pi-chong-ni which had opened in October. There they joined a number of the officers who had previously been at Kanggye and later Pyoktong: Major McLaughlin, Lieutenants Lloyd, Reid, Turner, and Messman, and Warrant Officer McCool. In addition, Captain Jesse V. Booker, the first Marine POW of the war, had been brought down with a large group from the Manpo Camp. Other Marine officers captured in 1951 who had preceded this column had also been taken to Camp 2, and these included Captains Perry, Martelli, Smith and Beswick, and Lieutenants Bell and Taft.

Four Marine officers were captured in the last few weeks of 1951. They joined their compatriots in Camp 2 the following year. These four officers included two whose planes were disabled by antiaircraft fire during bombing runs: they were Captain Charles F. Martin of VMA-121, lost on November 19th, and Major Judson C. Richardson of VMF(N)-513, lost on December 14th.[1]

Major Richardson, the executive officer of Marine All-Weather Squadron-513, was flying a night armed recon-

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[1]VMA-121, HistD, November, 1951, p. 2 and statement of Lt. J. C. Corthay, USNR, Appendix 2, VMF(N)-513, HistD, December, 1951.

naissance in a Corsair F4U-5N. When attacking three or four trucks on the enemy MSR near Singosan valley, he was taken under fire by automatic antiaircraft and his plane was hit several times. Major Richardson jettisoned his bomb load without arming it and prepared to bail out. After loosening his shoulder harness and seat belt he found that he was too low to parachute, so he attempted to land the aircraft in a ditching attitude. The impact threw him about 100 feet from the plane and he suffered a broken right arm and wrenched left shoulder. He was seized by Chinese soldiers while trying to crawl for cover.[1]

For the next two weeks Major Richardson was subjected to frequent interrogation dealing mainly with his political beliefs and family background. The Chinese kept him awake by slapping his face and blowing smoke in his eyes. Two days after Christmas the Marine major was taken to the Mining Camp near Pyongyang.[2]

Four days before Christmas Lieutenant Colonel William G. Thrash was flying a torpedo bomber, a TBM-3R, in conjunction with a major strike launched by VMA-121. Lieutenant Colonel Thrash's passengers were the commanding officer and the assistant operations officer of the 1st 90mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, 1st Marine Aircraft

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[1]Major Judson C. Richardson Jr., letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, February 23, 1954, Report on Period of Captivity. Filed in service record of Judson C. Richardson Jr., 011918, Code DF, HQMC, Washington 25, D. C. Hereafter all such reports will be cited as "--name-- Report of Captivity."

[2]Ibid.

Wing, Colonel C. W. May and Second Lieutenant Richard L. Still respectively. The two ground officers were accompanying the attack planes in order to analyze the enemy's antiaircraft defenses which by this time were formidable indeed. The TBM was hit by flak at 11:30 A.M. The large torpedo bomber descended in a lazy 360-degree turn and crashed in the snow.[1] The pilot and Lieutenant Still parachuted and survived; Colonel May was apparently unable to open his canopy and he died in the crash.

Lieutenant Colonel Thrash and Lieutenant Still were brought to the Mining Camp where they joined Major Richardson during the last week of December. Their daily fare consisted of two skimpy meals of rice and bread occasionally supplemented with soup made from cabbage or pork rind. The POW's were required to dig coal in the nearby mine shafts, a labor which taxed their declining strength. The coal was loaded in baskets and passed by hand from the mine shaft to small hand carts in which it was hauled over icy roads to the nearby camp.

Interrogations by Chinese continued. They sought to confirm data already obtained and add to their information of UN aircraft and communications, organizations and equipment, and unit locations. The Marines were coerced and threatened with death. Major Richardson reported that he finally wrote untruthful answers to five

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[1] 1st 90mm Anti-Aircraft Gun Battalion, 1st Marine Air Wing, HistD, December, 1951, Enclosure 3, p. 2; and Speedletter from the Commanding Officer, 1st 90mm A.A.A. Bn., to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, dated December 31, 1951.

questions concerning the Navy.[1]

The three Marines remained at the Mining Camp from late December, 1951, until February 23d, 1952. On that date Major Richardson was taken to Pak's Palace where he was told his previous lies had been detected. A Korean officer asked what unit was employing bacteriological warfare and threatened that he would never leave Korea unless he answered. The pilot denied that any such warfare was being waged, and the next day he rejoined the other Marines for a journey north to Pyoktong and thence to Camp 2.

December, 1951, was important in still another way. It marked the first exchange of POW lists between the Communist side and the United Nations Command. The list handed to the United Nations representatives contained 11,559 names and the location of 11 camps. The distribution of names was as follows:

3,198	American
7,142	South Korean
919	British
234	Turk
40	Filipino
10	French
6	Australian
4	South African
3	Japanese (probably nisei)

[1]Richardson Report of Captivity.

1 Canadian

1 Greek

1 Netherlander

The American representative on the two-man Special Committee stated that with tens of thousands of South Koreans missing a figure of only 7,000 Koreans was wholly unbelievable.[1] In addition he claimed that the names of 1,058 Americans previously mentioned in broadcasts or publications were omitted from the list. The Communist side replied that 570 had died, 153 had escaped, and 3 had been released.[2]

The United Nations Command listed 111,734 North Koreans and 20,740 Chinese. In their turn, the Communists complained of romanized names and the omission of 40,000 names. The latter group consisted of South Koreans who had been pressed into service by the enemy; therefore they were not considered genuine POW's by the UNC.[3]

As for the Marines, 19 officers and 39 enlisted were accounted for. Two Navy hospital corpsmen attached to the 1st Marine Division were also listed. They were Hospitalman Chief E. L. Smith and Hospitalman 3d Class Herman Castle. The name of Associated Press correspondent Frank

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[1]Keesing's Contemporary Archives, III, January 5-12, 1952, p. 11931.

[2]Great Britain Foreign Office. Korea. A Summary of Developments in the Armistice Negotiations and the Prisoner of War Camps. Cmd. 8596. June, 1952, p.7.

[3]Ibid.

Noel also appeared. Mr. Noel had been captured on November 29, 1950 when he was trapped with Major McLaughlin's heterogeneous group en route from Koto-ri to Hagaru. Nine Marines later repatriated who were then in enemy hands were not listed. Major Richardson, Captain Martin, and Lieutenant Stanfill had been shot down late in the year and had not yet arrived at a regular POW camp when the Chinese compiled their list. The names of Lieutenant Ferranto, captured in November, 1950, and Lieutenant O'Shea, the air observer who was shot down in July 1951, were also omitted. These two officers were confined near Pak's Palace at the close of 1951. Since they were in Korean hands rather than with the Chinese, presumably their omission was unintentional. The names of four enlisted Marines captured in April and May, 1951, were also missing.

The Communists' list of POW's gave a picture of their growing camp system. Marines represented only a bare fraction of the total number of prisoners of war, but they were present in most of the regular camps then in existence.

The pattern had been established. Ground personnel were usually processed through one of the North Korean collection camps or interrogation centers near Pyongyang. When a sufficient number was gathered at any one point, the prisoners were moved north by truck or on foot. As a rule, they were taken to Camp 5 at Pyoktong. The entire POW Camp system was controlled from the Pyoktong headquarters. From this point the prisoners were usually

sent to another camp after a brief interrogation.

Aviation prisoners were led along much the same path but with one notable exception. In almost every case aviators were brought to Pak's Death Palace regardless of where they were shot down. Otherwise, in 1951, aviators were processed in a manner similar to ground troops.

The Chinese evolved a policy of segregating officers from enlisted personnel and separating noncommissioned officers from lower ranks. Initially, segregation meant placing officers in one squad or hut and enlisted men in another. Early in 1951 officers were put in separate companies and removed to different though nearby areas. By mid-1951 commissioned personnel were moved a short distance beyond the confines of enlisted camps. Noncommissioned officers were also separated from the men. Finally in October, 1951, a special camp had been opened for officers at Pi-chong-ni, about 10 miles east of Pyoktong and four miles south of the Yalu River.

The Chinese assigned more than 300 officers to two companies in Camp 2. Additional officers were assigned to the main camp later, but as a rule they were all captured before January, 1952. The officer-prisoners immediately established their own internal command structure based on seniority. The senior United Nations officer present (SOP) assumed responsibility for command of all POW's. This was a hazardous job. The senior officers of each service or national group were frequently jailed

and severely punished on the slightest excuse.

Major John N. McLaughlin was the senior Marine present. Lieutenant Commander Ralph Bagwell, USN, a Navy flyer, was the next senior officer of the naval service and thus on one occasion assumed Major McLaughlin's role when that officer was serving one of his many solitary confinements.[1]

Daily routine was established by the Chinese.[2] Prisoners were routed out at dawn and assembled for roll call and physical training exercise. On occasion they were taken for an early morning walk escorted by armed guards. An hour of reading was required before breakfast. This part of the indoctrination program was held by the POW squad leader or monitor appointed by the Chinese. Breakfast was usually a poor grade of rice sometimes supplemented with dikon (turnip) soup. At about 10:00 A.M. a bell in the school house living quarters signalled time for political study. Study in this sense generally meant a harangue by one of the Chinese political officers. At half past noon, the normal lunch hour, prisoners had a brief respite but no lunch. Hot drinking water was provided and even that was a much anticipated luxury. Political study was required again for two hours in the after-

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[1]The Navy and Marine Corps are separate and distinct services; yet because both are within the same military department (Department of the Navy) there is a close and, to an outsider, an often confusing relationship.

[2]Details of daily routine are derived from Farrar-Hockley, pp. 210-11; Davies, pp. 60-68; and Fink MS comments.

noon. The evening meal consisted of rice, though on occasion soya beans were added. The Sunday fare differed in that rice and pork soup were provided for breakfast, and pork gravy and bread appeared at the evening meal. One small pig was furnished each week as the pork ration for roughly 350 officers, and each person received one or two small cubes of fat.

In the evening the officers were marched to company headquarters and formed in ranks below the steps leading to the main entrance. They stood there to receive a lecture in Chinese from the company commander. About every five minutes an interpreter would break in and translate the message. The Chinese had the means to assure their prisoners participated in study periods and lectures. Food, water, and medicine can be strong persuaders.

Religious expression in Camp 2 was limited. Captain Samuel J. Davies, Anglican Chaplain of the Gloucesters, was the only one of four UN Chaplains captured who survived the war. Chaplain Davies was confined in the officers' camp from October, 1951, until the end of hostilities. Except for a period of solitary confinement he regularly held Sunday morning services at which the Collect, Epistle and Gospel were recited. On Sunday evenings he visited the POW's assigned to kitchen duty and the makeshift hospital located about 50 yards outside the barbed wire compound. The Anglican priest also held community services on Wednesdays.

The Roman Catholic community held its own services

under the leadership of Army Captain Ralph Nardella. This officer assumed responsibility for Catholic services by reason of one of Father Emil Kapaun's dying wishes. Marine officers took no more and no less interest in religious services than did their fellow prisoners.[1]

As 1951 drew to a close the Camp Commander, a fanatical Communist named Ding, ordered the United Nations prisoners of war to prepare and send a New Years greeting to the Commander of Chinese Forces in Korea, General Peng-Te-huai. The senior UN officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, USAF, was determined that the prisoners would not sign. Major John N. McLaughlin voluntarily organized Marine resistance. In the opinion of one of the senior Air Force officers, McLaughlin knew the risk he took and appreciated that severe punishment was virtually certain.[2] The senior officers of other groups also helped organize resistance, and no greetings were sent. An informer reported the resistance to the Chinese and furnished the names of the "reactionary leaders."

The Chinese bitterly resented the organized effort against them, and the United Nations officers who organized the resistance were soon tried by Chinese court-martial.[3]

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[1] For a more detailed description of life in Camp 2 at this period see:
Farrar-Hockley, pp. 208-52; and
Davies, pp. 66-86.

[2] Letter from LtCol Thomas D. Harrison, USAF, to Director of Personnel, USAF, forwarded to CMC 25Feb54.

[3] Ibid.

In January, 1952, the six ranking officers were sentenced to solitary confinement ranging from three to six months. These officers were Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, USAF; Lieutenant Colonel James P. Carne, D S O , former commander of the Gloucester Battalion; Major Dennis Harding of the Gloucesters; Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Fry, USA; Major David F. MacGhee, USAF; and Major John N. McLaughlin, USMC.[1]

This step was the first really organized resistance to the Chinese. Although the principals were subjected to months of solitary confinement, coercion, torture, and very limited rations during the bitterly cold months of early 1952, their joint effort laid the foundation for comparatively effective resistance within Camp 2 during the remainder of the war.

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[1]The "confessions" and sentencing of the six officers are described in the following:
Ibid.; and
LtCol Thomas D. Harrison, "Why Did Some G.I.'s Turn Communist?" Colliers November 27, 1953, p. 27; and
Farrar-Hockley, pp. 215-18; and
Davies, p. 90. Chaplain Davies was no longer permitted to visit the nearby hospital after the officers refused to sign a holiday greeting.

CHAPTER VI

A TUG OF WAR

As 1952 began, the two opposing ground forces settled down to bunker warfare much like the trench warfare of World War I. Air activity maintained the same pattern that had evolved during the previous year. For the sake of clarity ground and air combat in 1952 will be treated separately. There were important developments within the POW Camps, and these will also be considered.

No decisive actions were fought, and there was no significant change in the battlelines. For the Marines the fighting cost between 200 and 300 casualties each month in the Punchbowl area. Later, after shifting westward, the 1st Marine Division faced steadily increasing aggressiveness as the enemy launched larger and more frequent attacks against outpost positions. Enemy pressure reached its peak in October, a month in which 41 Marines were captured. Thereafter fighting slowed down as both sides prepared for another cruel winter in the bunkers.

Ground troops were mainly concerned with improving defensive positions, strengthening bunkers, increasing the amounts of defensive and protective barbed wire surrounding their fighting holes, and adding to the density of anti-personnel minefields. Offensive combat patrols and defen-

sive ambush patrols were widely employed. Reconnaissance patrols roamed the valleys between the opposing defensive lines in the mountains.

In April, 1952, the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, directed that living and fighting bunkers be combined and built to withstand a direct hit from a 105mm round. An extensive outpost line of resistance (OPLR) was established. A combat outpost line (COPL) backed up the OPLR and protected the main line of resistance (MLR).[1]

The dangers of outpost duty were illustrated forcibly in mid-April. At 11:30 P.M., April 15th, a green flare was observed opposite the 5th Marines' sector. Shortly thereafter an estimated 400 enemy probed the OPLR. The Chinese quickly overran a five-man outpost and assaulted the main part of outpost number 3. The defenders established a perimeter defense in the southeast corner of the outpost and after more than three hours of close combat and hand to hand fighting the Communists were driven off. They left 25 of their dead behind. An additional 45 Chinese were believed wounded and perhaps another 25 were killed but their bodies were evacuated. Three Chinese were captured. Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, with reinforcements from Weapons Company, 2/5, suffered six killed and 36 wounded.[2] The five Marines who had been overrun

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[1] 5th Marines Command Diary, April, 1952, p. 1. Historical Diaries were replaced by Command Diaries during 1952-53 which will be cited hereafter as CmdD's.

[2] Ibid., pp. 15-16.

in their forward outpost were reported missing. They were Privates First Class James L. Hale, John A. Jacobs, Jr., and Louis Romero of E/2/5 and Joe A. Glenn and Robert Kostich of W/2/5. All five were captured by the enemy.[1]

Preparations were being made even then to displace the 1st Marine Division from the Punchbowl area in U. S. Tenth Corps zone of action westward to the coast in U. S. First Corps' zone. The movement was completed by May 1st and the Marines occupied positions astride the historic invasion route to Seoul.[2]

On May 9, 1952, a combat patrol from Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was sent out to destroy an enemy outpost. The patrol met heavy resistance and Private First Class Arthur J. Gregory was seriously wounded by an artillery or mortar round. Other patrol members placed him on a stretcher and while attempting to evacuate him they came under attack by the enemy. A Chinese grenade landed on Gregory's stretcher inflicting additional wounds. The remainder of the patrol withdrew believing him to be dead. PFC Gregory was reported killed at action.[3]

Gregory was captured and immobilized for four months with serious wounds in arms, legs and feet, and in the right shoulder. The young Marine was treated at four

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[1]USMC Casualties.

[2]Miller, et al., p. 208.

[3]Commander Naval Forces Far East, Report of Intelligence Processing "Operation Little Switch-April 1953". Cited hereafter as ComNavFE Report of Little Switch.

medical processing centers en route north, living in a series of caves, bunkers and Korean huts. In describing his diet he wrote:

> For the first month I ate only boiled rice and roasted peanuts. I lost probably fifty pounds during the first month or two. The next place I was at, I was fed noodles much of the time. Still at another place we had a variety of food and much of it I thought was pretty good. I learned to like steamed rice and still do.[1]

In November, 1952, PFC Gregory was taken to the POW hospital at Camp 5, Pyoktong, where he remained until shortly before repatriation. He heard that five or six other Marines were somewhere in Camp 5, but never saw any of them. Later he was joined by a Marine PFC captured in October, 1952, and the two remained together thereafter.[2]

The intensity of ground combat fell off in June. The following month probes and patrol clashes increased and 700 Marines were killed or wounded. In August, 1952, the enemy threw company and battalion strength attacks against Marine outposts. Friendly casualties mounted; 159 Marines were killed and 1293 were wounded. Through June, July and August, however, the 1st Marine Division lost no prisoners to the enemy.

The heavy action of August carried over to September, with an intensive effort by the Chinese to seize Marine positions east of the Sachon River. There, positions afforded excellent observation of the Chinese main defensive line and enabled the Marines to lay accurate destruc-

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[1] Letter from Arthur J. Gregory, September 1, 1960.

[2] ComNavFE Report of Little Switch.

tive and harassing fires on the enemy.[1]

On September 4th Chinese began a series of limited attacks to seize Bunker Hill, the dominating terrain in the 1st Marines sector, and Combat Outpost Bruce in the 5th Marines sector. Their effort coincided with the relief of the 5th Marines by the 7th Marines. The timing was excellent for their purposes because it exploited the natural confusion which exists during a relief of lines.

Shortly before midnight on the 4th the enemy directed intense mortar and artillery fires against Marine outposts and the main line of resistance. Waves of Chinese soldiers followed so closely behind the advancing fires that they suffered some casualties from their own fire. Forward bunkers on Combat Outpost Bruce were destroyed. A squad attempting to reinforce that outpost was hit by artillery fire and six Marines were wounded. The Chinese assaulted from three sides, but after an hour of close-in fighting they were driven off.[2] Three Marines were captured in the fight. They were Privates First Class James L. Irons, Donald W. Lynch, and Norbert Schnitzler.

Six days later Corporal Robert A. Strachan, G/3/7, was captured in the same general area. Like the Marines captured in April, 1952, those taken in September were

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[1] 1st MarDiv, CmdD, September, 1952, p. 1.

[2] 5th Marines CmdD, September, 1952, p. 6.

sent north to Camp 3 at Changsong where they had no contact with the men captured earlier in the war.[1]

In October the 7th Marines consolidated positions. They manned about eight platoon combat outposts and 15 ambushes of from two to four men each. Planned patrol activity included three squad combat patrols and six fire team reconnaissance patrols, each 24-hour period.[2]

On October 6th an estimated reinforced battalion of Chinese struck the 7th Marines combat outposts across the regimental front. The major action occurred on an H/3/7 outpost. The enemy attack was preceded by heavy preparatory fires beginning at 6:30 P.M. An hour later the outposts called for "Box Me In" fires. Supporting artillery complied by encircling the outposts with preplanned defensive fires. Communications with the outposts ceased. Friendly reinforcements were driven back to the main line of resistance. At 9:15 P.M. limited radio communications were re-established. Shortly thereafter Chinese voices were heard on one of the nets. Enemy troops entered the trenches at about 9:30 P.M. and forced the outnumbered Marines to withdraw.

After midnight two reinforced squads of H/3/7 fought their way out to restore the combat outpost. By 7:15 A.M. the following morning the COP was retaken and 12 Marines

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[1]Based upon an analysis of reports made by POW's recovered during Operation Little Switch.

[2]A Marine rifle squad contains three four-man fire teams commanded by a sergeant squad leader.

were rescued.[1] The bitterly contested action cost the Chinese an estimated 200 killed. The 7th Marines suffered 10 killed, 128 wounded and 22 missing of whom 13 were taken prisoner. Two of the POW's, Second Lieutenant Henry L. Conway, Jr., G/3/7, and Corporal Sonny Oehl of the regimental 4.2 inch Mortar Company, were taken to an annex of Camp 2; PFC Ollie Asher of H/3/7 never made it to an organized camp; the remaining 10 Marines eventually reached Camp 3 at Changsong.

Most of the Marines were wounded prior to capture. The seriously wounded were taken to the Camp 5 hospital at Pyoktong for treatment. For example, Private Alberto Pizarro-Baez was wounded in one leg and forced to walk on the damaged limb when taken off the outpost hill. Later two other Marines carried him for about two weeks as they moved to the rear, finally completing the trip to Pyoktong by truck. Upon arrival there part of Pizarro-Baez's leg was amputated in a small aid station. The following month his gangrenous stump was amputated a second time. In spite of having had anesthetic he felt the pain when the Chinese sawed through the bone.[2] When the leg was partially healed he was taken to an area of Camp 3 at Changsong and assigned to a company which included 12 other Marines. According to Pizarro-Baez none of these Marines co-operated with the enemy, and three of them actively

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[1] 7th Marines, CmdD, October, 1952, pp. 4-5.

[2] Letter from Alberto Pizarro-Baez, August 21, 1960.

resisted. He did not recall their names.[1]

While the Marines captured on the 6th and 7th of October were being taken north, the outposts along the 1st Marine Division front settled into an uneasy quiet. The enemy's interest in two of the 7th Marines outposts, Warsaw and Ronson, was well-known. These outposts straddled a nose of ground leading up to the main battle position called The Hook. Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, manned The Hook and outposts Ronson and Warsaw on October 26, 1952. In terms of men taken as prisoners of war, this proved the most costly single night in the entire Korean War.

As darkness settled the Communists opened fire with an intense bombardment of mortar and artillery fire on Marine positions. The enemy attacked in regimental strength following their well-established pattern of advancing directly behind their supporting fires. As soon as the bombardment rolled past the trenchworks Chinese soldiers invested the positions.

OP Ronson received heavy incoming fires at 6:10 P.M. and in 28 minutes the position was overrun by the attackers. OP Warsaw came under fire at 6:20 P.M. and the defenders requested "Box Me In" artillery support. Within three quarters of an hour Marines and Chinese were locked in a hand to hand struggle for possession of OP Warsaw. The outcome was uncertain for over three hours, but the Chinese

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[1] Ibid.

overran the position before midnight.

While the fight raged at the OP's, enemy soldiers slipped around both flanks of OP Ronson and struck at the main line of resistance. At about 7:30 P.M. they succeeded in penetrating the main position of C/1/7. Company A/1/7 was ordered to support C/1/7, to contain the penetration, and to restore the lost ground.

Marine PFC Eddie P. Vidal was manning a Browning Automatic Rifle on the The Hook when the Chinese struck. He described the bunkers and trenches as almost completely destroyed by the day-long fires and the sudden intense preparatory fires.[1] Vidal and two fellow PFC's, Billy J. Vitruls and Vodiska (first name unknown), were on a forward position. When the Chinese attacked, Vidal and Vodiska were in their fighting holes and Vitruls was inside the living bunker. An incoming round burst next to Vidal and threw him high in the air. He described a sensation resembling that of walking on a hot pavement, and when he tried to move he found one foot gone and the other leg mangled and hanging by shreds.[2]

Chinese assult troops closed on the position after Vidal had expended his ammunition and disassembled his automatic rifle. Vodiska had been killed and Vitruls was captured in the living bunker. According to Vidal the

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[1]Letter from Eddie Peno Vidal, Cpl, USMC (Retired), August 10, 1960, p. 1.

[2]Sworn statement of Cpl Eddie P. Vidal, January 25, 1954, made at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Filed in Vidal's record of service, Code D.F., HQMC, Washington 25, D. C.



THE HOOK

6:00 P. M. Oct. 26th to
6:35 A. M. Oct. 28, 1952

Enemy attack
Marine counter-attack
Marine patrol
Not to scale

MAP - 8

Communist soldiers pointed to their dead and wounded lying around the position and then beat the legless Marine severely with their submachine guns.[1]

Twenty-seven Marines were captured during the night and early morning hours. They were marched, carried, or dragged off the hill and taken into the Chinese lines. All 27 were recovered alive during the prisoner exchanges the following year.[2]

When action at The Hook reached its peak an estimated battalion struck Outpost Vegas 3,000 yards to the west. The enemy took Vegas under a cross-fire shortly after midnight, but the Marine platoon successfully defended its position. Forty minutes later the enemy withdrew. Two nearby outposts, named Carson and Reno, were relatively unbothered the night of the 26th.[3]

Action at The Hook continued throughout the 27th as the 7th Marines, with elements of the 1st Marines attached, struggled to regain their lost outposts. Finally at dawn on the 28th The Hook was restored and Outposts Ronson and Warsaw were reoccupied. In addition to the 27 Marines captured, the Marines suffered 70 killed and 386 wounded. The Chinese lost an estimated 532 killed and 216

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[1] Vidal letter, p. 5.

[2] USMC Casualties.

[3] 7th Marines, Summary of Action 26 October-1 November, 1952. "Hook, Reno, Ronson". G-3, Historical Branch Archives, HQMC; and
LtCol R. D. Heinl Jr., USMC, memorandum to Director of Marine Corps History, October 28, 1952.

wounded.

The deceptive nature of the Chinese lenient policy can be read in the experience of PFC Eddie P. Vidal after his capture. Two enemy soldiers grabbed him by the wrists and dragged him to their own lines. He was placed in a horseshoe-shaped bunker with another seriously wounded Marine, PFC Ollie Asher, who had been captured in the H/3/7 action on October 7th. Asher's right leg was mangled and gangrenous and he was blind. Vidal wrote that the two were reduced to drinking their own urine when the Chinese refused them water and food. Asher died about November 16, 1952, five weeks after his capture.[1]

PFC Vidal was operated on about November 1st. The Chinese took him to an underground bunker and removed most of his left leg with a hacksaw. No anesthesia was used. His right stump was trimmed at the same time.[2] Throughout the operation Chinese soldiers held the Marine down while the hacksaw rasped through the bone. Private Alberto Pizarro-Baez who had been captured on October 7, 1952, reported a similar experience.[3]

Vidal was kept in a cold, damp bunker after his operation. His clothes had been taken from him, and he had only two sacks to use as blankets. The Communists withheld water for a week and denied him food for 17 days.

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[1] Vidal letter, p. 6.

[2] Vidal sworn statement, January 25, 1954.

[3] Personal interview with Pvt Alberto Pizarro-Baez, April, 1953.

In describing his experience in the bunker he wrote:

> I don't remember how long I was in this hole. I do remember that some of the days they came to interrogate me and to tell me that I was a warmonger because I had blood in my hands and finger nailes [sic] Blood from the Peace Loving People. They kept telling me the Americans had come to Korea to kill inoccent [sic] people.
>
> I told them that if I could have my way, I would do it all over again.[1]

The legless Marine and several fellow prisoners of war were taken north by truck to Pyoktong. There the seriously wounded were assigned to a hospital in a large temple. Other Marines at the hospital were Corporal George E. Noeth, Privates First Class Theodore A. Jeurn, Lione E. Peterson, and David P. Lang, and Private Robert L. L. Dunn.[2] All five had been captured in the same action with Vidal.

The Chinese permitted POW's from the main camp to visit the hospital on Christmas Eve, 1952. Gifts of sweet rolls, candy, and cigarettes and, as a finale, Christmas carols lent an almost festive air to the holiday, the only pleasant day in nearly a year.

In January, 1953, the Marines were transferred to Camp 3 where they were assigned to Company 6. Here Vidal heard of six Marines who had been foiled in an escape attempt when a soldier informed on them. According to the rumor, the six would-be escapees were punished by being tied to poles and having cold water thrown on them

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[1] Vidal letter, p. 9.

[2] Ibid., p. 12.

in freezing weather. Vidal added:

> After this I didn't hear of any escape, or of any escape committee formed by U. S. Marines. If there was one, I didn't know of it.[1]

A soldier, Manuel D. Martinez, Jr., from Truchas, New Mexico, befriended Vidal in Camp 3. Martinez cared for the Marine, washed his bandages and dried them with the heat of his own body, carried him to the latrine, stole water from the Chinese to use for washing the wounds, and shared his food with the Marine.

Vidal reported that he was frequently placed in the hole for refusing to fill out an autobiography or make a propaganda recording. In recounting his experience in Camp 3, he indicated that he met PFC Vitruls, the member of his fire team who had been captured inside the living bunker. Vitruls was well-respected by his fellow prisoners and on one occasion struck a Chinese guard for pushing him, an act for which he was beaten and consigned to the hole for punishment.[2]

With but two exceptions the Marines captured in The Hook action were assigned to Camp 3. The exceptions were PFC Francis J. Kohus, A/1/7, who became squad leader of a small, isolated group, and PFC Lione Peterson who remained at Pyoktong. After his release from the temple hospital, Peterson joined a newly formed company of Camp 5 with

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[1] Ibid., p. 14.

[2] Ibid., p. 17.

PFC Arthur Gregory.[1]

In December, 1952, Radio Peking broadcast numerous recordings made by prisoners of war. Among them was a short Christmas greeting from Arthur J. Gregory to his parents. The message gave his name, rank, and service number, a brief hello, and a sentence to the effect that he had been well-treated. This was the first indication that Gregory was alive. He later indicated that the prisoners who made this series of broadcasts were required to write out their message for approval before recording it.[2] Private Pizarro-Baez had recorded a Christmas greeting in Puerto Rican, but there is no record of it having been broadcast.[3]

Several Marines voluntarily made recordings of this nature. In general they viewed it as an opportunity to get word out they were alive through the simple expedient of a holiday greeting. An exhaustive study of U. S. Army POW's revealed the same pattern. Recordings were made by more than one out of five soldiers. Three quarters of the

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[1] Gregory letter.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Foreign Broadcast Intercept Service in Tokyo, Japan, monitored English language broadcasts from major capitals in the Far East. Messages broadcast by POW's over Radio Peking were generally received by the FBIS. According to ComNavFE records, which would have been reflected in the Little Switch Report, there was no record of a broadcast by Pizarro-Baez. In his letter to the author, Pizarro-Baez stated that to the best of his knowledge his broadcast was never received by his mother in Puerto Rico.

recordings were made voluntarily and 84% viewed the results solely as holiday greetings.[1]

Ground action slacked off after the violent October fights. In the closing month of 1952 three other Marines were captured. They were Privates First Class Pedro Aviles of the Division Reconnaissance Company, captured on the 8th, and Albert T. Crabtree of the division, captured on the 27th. Corporal Gathern Kennedy of I/3/11 was captured on the last day of the year.

The Communist pattern for handling enlisted prisoners was clear; newly captured Marines were kept apart from those taken before January 1, 1952. Segregation of non-commissioned officers was advanced in August, 1952. The sergeants were removed from Chongsong and taken to the newly established Camp 4 at Wiwon.[2]

The year 1952 also marked a segregation of aviation personnel. Marine pilots and observers captured in that year encountered entirely different circumstances than those experienced by earlier captives. Some received surprisingly easy treatment. Others were handled brutally. Most of them experienced the constant harassment which was an important part of the Communist administration of

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[1]Julius Segal. Factors Related to the Collaboration and Resistance Behavior of U. S. Army PW's in Korea. Technical Report No. 33 for the Department of the Army. Prepared by the Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University (Washington: George Washington University, 1956), pp. iii, 35-36. Cited hereafter as HumRRO 33.

[2]Griffith letter.

their prisoners of war.

On January 1, 1952, Marine Captain Robert W. Gilardi of VMF-312 was shot down by the enemy. His aircraft caught fire and Gilardi was burned on the face, hands, and feet before he was able to free himself from the stricken plane. He parachuted and became tangled in a tree when he landed. Because of serious injuries, the Marine was unable to loosen his parachute harness, and he hung from the tree for almost twenty-four hours in the subzero cold. By the time Communist soldiers cut him down, his hands and feet were frozen. Captain Gilardi died before reaching a regular POW camp.[1]

In February another Marine was captured. First Lieutenant Kenneth W. Henry was assigned to the Marine Detachment aboard the light cruiser USS Manchester. This type of "sea-going" assignment normally involves performing aerial observation (air spot) for the cruiser's guns. Spotting is made possible by the helicopter carried aboard. On the afternoon of February 8, 1952, Lieutenant Henry accompanied Lieutenant Edwin C. Moore, USN, in an attempt to rescue a Navy fighter pilot. The latter had been shot down by antiaircraft fire at about 9:00 A.M. that morning, and he crashed on a mountainside about 25 miles northwest of Wonsan.[2]

The Manchester neared the search area at about

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[1]VMF-312, HistD, January, 1952, p. 1, and Fink interview.

[2]Letter from Maj Kenneth L. Henry, August 25, 1960.

1:00 P.M. Lieutenants Moore and Henry took off in an H03S helicopter and headed inland. They arrived over Ensign Marvin Broomhead, the downed aviator, at about 2:00 P.M. Lieutenant Henry was manipulating the winch and sling when the helicopter suddenly crashed. Moore and Henry climbed out of the wreckage and crawled toward Ensign Broomhead. An enemy machine gun could be heard and it appeared to be firing at a combat air patrol overhead.

The two officers from the Manchester found that Broomhead was seriously injured, having broken both ankles in his crash.[1] Lieutenant Henry was unable to walk due to injuries he sustained in the helicopter crash. Henry and Moore dragged the Ensign to a position hidden from the enemy machine gun. They waited to be rescued, but with darkness setting in, the other friendly helicopters in the area were unable to operate in the treacherous mountains. The three Americans were discovered by a Chinese patrol shortly before midnight.

During the two days following, the officers were processed through a series of headquarters. Lieutenant Moore walked while Broomhead was carried on a litter and the Marine rode on horseback. They were asked the reason for their presence in the area as well as technical data related to their aircraft and radios. Lieutenant Moore caught the brunt of the enemy's interrogation effort.

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[1] ComNavFE Little Switch Report, p. 14, and enclosure E, pp. 1-3.

Several days later the trio arrived at what Lieutenant Henry identified only as an interrogation center about 10 miles east of Pyongyang. Evidently they were to be sent to Pak's Palace, but the Chinese made a mistake and sent the two Navy pilots north. According to Lieutenant Henry the Chinese had intended to keep Moore at Pyongyang. When they learned that the Marine was an aerial observer and not a helicopter pilot, they did not press their interrogation.[1]

Henry caught pneumonia and recalls little of what occurred until he partially recovered in Camp 5 at Pyoktong some weeks later. During his early days at Pyoktong, he was visited by Captain Wilkins and Captain Gillette, both of whom had been shot down the previous year. Two enlisted Marines talked to him there, but he does not recall their names.

In June, 1952, he was taken to a Korean house in Pyoktong village for three months of intensive interrogation. An Army private had previously suggested to him that by pretending to be ignorant he might evade interrogation. Henry used that device by claiming to have had only three years of high school. Under pressure of the interrogation Lieutenant Henry admitted to duties in such fields as motor transport, legal, and sea duty. He successfully concealed the fact that he had attended certain specialist schools and had fairly extensive theoretical

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[1] Henry letter.

knowledge of atomic, biological and chemical warfare. As he describes it, "They finally got fed up with me and I spent the rest of my 'tour' living in Korean homes along with Lieutenant James Stanley, USAF, and adding roommates periodically to a total of 14 men before we were admitted to Camp 2 annex in a valley 15 miles east of Camp 2 proper after the Armistice was signed."[1]

On March 4, 1952, Marine Captain Roy C. Gray, VMF-311, was on a railcut mission when he was shot down by ground fire. It was nearly dark when he crash landed in a rice paddy near Sibunni. The impact knocked him unconscious, and he was burned about the face, head, hands, and arms. A North Korean soldier dragged him from the cockpit within minutes after the crash.[2]

Captain Gray reported that he was taken to a bunker nearby and that a Korean soldier cut his flight jacket off to apply ointment to the burns. The next day he was marched westward to a Chinese Army Headquarters. A Chinese girl applied vaseline gauze to his burns. He was interrogated briefly by a young soldier who spoke poor English and who referred to a printed form to ask questions. The interrogator did not force the issue when Captain Gray refused to answer and he seemed sympathetic about the severity of the officer's burns.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Maj Roy C. Gray Jr., Report of Captivity, December 7, 1953. All details of then Captain Gray's captivity are based upon his report.

Next Gray was taken to a hospital in a small village between Sariwon and Sinmak. Of roughly 500 patients about five were prisoners of war and the rest mainly Chinese wounded. There appeared to Captain Gray to be no difference in the treatment proferred the patients. Medical facilities were primitive and bandages were changed only sparingly with sometimes as much as two weeks between changes. Wounds became badly infected.

A month after his capture Gray and the five other POW's were moved to a second hospital about 10 miles north of Pyongyang. At their new location the POW's lived in a Korean house and were permitted to move about freely in the sunshine. Their wounds were tended regularly and dressings were changed more frequently. There were no interrogators or political officers at the hospital, and the few doctors who spoke English did not interrogate them for military information.

Because the hospital was not part of the regular POW system and communications were generally poor, this small group of prisoners enjoyed a comparatively pleasant existence. In July, 1952, four months after his capture, Captain Gray was questioned by a North Korean major who came from a nearby interrogation center. Gray was recuperating from a recent skin graft at the time and he was able to evade interrogation by complaining of postoperative pain. The Korean major left and did not return.

The POW's secreted food and gave it to the local Korean civilians who sometimes came to visit them. In

turn the Americans received some fresh vegetables. In their association with the civilians the POW's hoped to establish contact with friendly underground agents.

During his first year of captivity Captain Gray did not experience any form of indoctrination or Communist schooling. He encountered his first brief required reading before going north to Pyoktong and eventually to a branch of the officers camp.

In May of 1952 four Marine pilots were shot down and captured in a ten-day period. Major Walter R. Harris of VMF-323 was shot down on May 6, 1952. A week later, on May 13th, First Lieutenant Milton H. "Sammy" Baugh's plane was struck in the engine section by antiaircraft fire near Sukchon during a bombing run. His engine quit and Baugh tried to glide out to sea. Although he tried to stretch his glide he was forced to belly-land a quarter of a mile before reaching the shore. After detonating his IFF emergency switch (Identification-Friend or Foe), the Lieutenant attempted to run for the beach. A group of Chinese soldiers took him prisoner within half an hour.[1]

Baugh was taken to an Antiaircraft Headquarters where he was interrogated at length concerning operational tactics. When he refused to answer he was threatened with death, and thereafter he replied to the questions, providing considerable misinformation on speeds, altitudes

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[1]Capt Milton H. Baugh, Report of Captivity, December 22, 1953.

and dive angles. For the next five days he was exhibited at a series of antiaircraft units, probably to boost morale with tangible evidence of their shooting prowess.

Antiaircraft fire was responsible for downing Captain John P. Flynn Jr. on May 14th. Flynn parachuted from his stricken two engine night-fighter, an F7F-3N Tigercat, at about 11:00 P.M. when a fire in his right engine burned the wing off.[1] He was subjected to intensive interrogation by North Korean and Chinese Communist Air Force personnel. On about June 25th he was taken to an area commonly referred to as Pike's Peak.

First Lieutenant Duke Williams, Jr., was shot down on May 16th. He was searching for a downed pilot when his plane was hit by antiaircraft fire and he was forced to parachute. His wingmates observed him on the ground in a position indicating that he was under fire. About 15 natives dressed in white were observed taking Williams prisoner.[2] He was eventually taken to an interrogation center about five miles east of Pyongyang and put in a room with four Air Force Lieutenants.

About May 29th Lieutenant Baugh, who had spent a week in solitary confinement, joined Williams and the Air Force officers. The group was taken to 14th Army Headquarters located several miles northest of Pyongyang. This

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[1]Maj John P. Flynn Jr., Report of Captivity, March 8, 1954.

[2]Statement of Capt John N. Snapper, 031895, USMC, of May 16, 1952, TabR to VMF-212, HistD, May, 1952. Note: VMF-212 was changed to VMA-212 in June, 1952.

was the same area referred to as Pike's Peak. Major Harris was already there. Lieutenant Rowland M. Murphy, a ground officer captured on May 7 near Panmunjom, arrived about June 13. He was kept in a makeshift hospital at the interrogation center where he was subjected to lengthy questioning.[1] Captain Flynn arrived at Pike's Peak about June 25th, but he, too, was kept apart from the other Marines.

Baugh and Williams lived in a dugout from June 1st to July 15th. Along with other captured officers they were required to work on the construction of more dugouts. The Chinese conducted frequent interrogations and required their prisoners to attend political lectures which included Communist ideology and vicious charges accusing Americans of warmongering and waging bacteriological warfare.[2]

In the middle of July Major Harris and Lieutenant Murphy joined Lieutenants Baugh and Williams as members of a draft being taken north. The trip took two days by truck. Upon arrival at Pyoktong the prisoners were confined in two rooms of a Korean hut for about ten days. They were then taken eastward to a steeply walled valley near Obul, North Korea.[3]

The Obul camp was known by various names. All of

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[1] 1stLt Rowland M. Murphy, Report of Captivity, January 5, 1954.

[2] Baugh Report of Captivity.

[3] Ibid., and Murphy Report of Captivity.

these descriptions are correct. Some called it The Annex. Others referred to it as No Name Valley. The British considered it to be Branch 3, Camp 2, at Chang-ni.[1] The POW unit designations were platoons one and two of Company C. But for the sake of clarity we can consider that Obul housed two groups of prisoners in close proximity to each other. The groups had limited contact initially, but in December, 1952, they were joined in a single unit. In addition, more than 100 POW's were confined alone or in groups of two or three scattered throughout the valley. They were all under heavy guard and no contact was permitted between groups. The prisoners were aware of the presence nearby of other POW's, and they went to great lengths to exchange information. Notes were hidden under rocks at common bathing points or latrines. Songs were sung loudly to convey information. Messages were baked in bread by POW's in the Obul kitchen and information was passed in this way to solitary inmates of the sheltered valley.[2]

Major William Wilson, USAF, was the senior United Nations officer with the two platoons at Obul. Major Walter Harris was the senior Marine, and he commanded the 1st Platoon. The senior officers set about secretly organizing the camp on military lines. Lieutenant Murphy was assigned duties as a member of the escape committee

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[1] British POW Report, p. 37.

[2] Thorin interview, and Baugh Report of Captivity.

and he shared duty as officer of the day.[1]

Lieutenants O'Shea and Ferranto had arrived in mid May, 1952. O'Shea joined a platoon at Obul while Ferranto was placed in solitary confinement in a North Korean house in the valley.[2]

This period of 1952 represented a turning point in the routine of the main officer's camp. The population of Pi-chong-ni was stabilized in one sense. Only a few new prisoners of war were added to the older camp, but many of the 375 officers frequently disappeared into solitary confinement for real or imagined infractions of camp regulations.

In late January, 1952, Major McLaughlin and five other senior officers had been sentenced to long periods of solitary confinement by a sham court on charges of organizing the camp. When Major Judson C. Richardson, Jr., arrived at Pi-chong-ni in March he found that the Marine officers had formed a tightly knit group and consulted among themselves on every major issue. Yet the atmosphere within Camp 2 was strained. Major Richardson later described the situation in these terms:

> On arrival at Camp 2 on 23 March 1952 I found myself among a group of prisoners haunted and plagued with suspicion that there were informers and opportunists among them. The activities of these suspected persons in the compound had so undermined the morale of the prisoners that American officers talked in whispers, feeling

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[1] Murphy Report of Captivity.

[2] McDaniel interview.

> that no one could place any confidence or trust in another. The low state of morale had so effected the discipline that it was impossible to rectify the situation by normal leadership.[1]

The officers in Camp 2 were generally agreed that Marine Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, who joined the group June 1, 1952, was highly instrumental in restoring discipline and harmony within camp. With Lieutenant Colonel Carne of the Gloucesters in solitary confinement, Colonel Thrash was senior to all other United Nations officers in the compound at Pi-chong-ni and he readily accepted the grave responsibility of leadership.

The Marine officer issued orders concerning the behavior of all personnel in camp. His order included the following:

> There would be no fraternizing with Chinese or competing in athletic events with them.
>
> Study of Communist propaganda would not be countenanced. If study was forced on them, POW's were to offer passive resistance and no arguments.
>
> If POW's were taken from camp and offered alcoholic beverages they were not to drink with their captors under any circumstances.
>
> POW's would not perform labor for the Communists unless that labor benefited the prisoners.
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> If prisoners were subject to trial or punishment they were to involve no one but themselves.
>
> There would be no letters written using any

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[1] Letter from Maj Judson C. Richardson Jr., to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, September 21, 1953, subject Exemplary conduct; case of Lieutenant Colonel William G. Thrash, 06141, USMC, Report of.

titles or return address which might prove beneficial to the Communists for propaganda value.1

By September 15th Lieutenant Colonel Thrash's efforts to influence and organize his fellow prisoners of war outraged the Chinese. The Communists removed him from the compound for "Criminal Acts and Hostile Attitude against the Chinese People's Volunteers." Lieutenant Colonel Thrash spent the next eight months in solitary confinement where he was subjected to constant interrogation, harassment, and duress.[2] He endured long hours of torture and on one occasion was bound, severely beaten and thrown outside half naked in subzero weather.[3] The shock of the severe temperature rendered him unconscious and he nearly died. During his eight-month ordeal there were demands for confessions and for pledges that he would co-operate with the lenient Chinese on his return to the compound.[4]

Marines and many officers from other services formed a steady procession between the school house barracks and either the local Korean jails or a series of small holes which were used for confining prisoners on virtually any

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[1] Fink notes.

[2] U. S. Fighting Man's Code, p. 126., and Letter from LtCol John N. McLaughlin, USMC, to Commandant of the Marine Corps, December 9, 1953 with endorsement from CMC to the Secretary of the Navy on December 21, 1953.

[3] Farrar-Hockley, p. 263.

[4] Richardson letter to CMC.

pretext.

"The hole" was a familiar term to POW's. It could mean any given hole, but the experience was about the same. Only the duration of confinement differed. One of the most graphic descriptions of confinement in the hole was tape-recorded by Warrant Officer Felix McCool after his return to the United States.[1] The warrant officer was confined in the hole for spitting out a window and accidentally hitting a guard.

McCool described the hole as three feet square and three and a half feet deep. Spikes were driven down through the lid of the hole forcing an occupant to sit in a hunched position. The bottom was a slimy ooze; the result of prisoners having to void themselves in the hole. Lice and fleas abounded.

In his fiftieth hour McCool was taken to headquarters where he proclaimed his innocence. The Chinese demanded a confession of rape and pillage, and when the Marine refused to comply he was escorted back to the hole. By his seventieth hour he heard POW's in a jail across the street yell, "Keep your chin up, Mac." He reflected on his experience aboard a "Hell Ship" and later working in a coal mine while a prisoner of the Japanese in World War II, and he knew that he hated the Chinese Communists far more than he had hated the Japanese. He described the latter as

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[1]Tape recording by CWO Felix J. McCool, USMC, Enclosure 1 to letter from CWO McCool to CMC dated September 24, 1954. Filed with G-2 Division, HQMC.

brutal but having character which he felt the Communists lacked.

When he was taken out to sign a confession he caught a glimpse of Lieutenant Colonel Thrash in a solitary cell in the nearby jail. Finally he confessed that he cursed the Koreans and hated the Communists. He refused the demand that he inform on his fellow officers. He thought of an old movie, The Informer , with Victor McLaglen, and he said he might have cried a little. He considered suicide and then cast the idea aside resolving to live and tell about the Chinese Communist lenient policy.

After eighty hours in the hole McCool was returned to camp. Army Captain Clarence Anderson, a doctor, gave him soap and clean clothes. Marine Lieutenant "Ding" Bell and three others poured water over him to help wash off the stink. Captain Gerald Fink sat up half the night with him while he talked and talked.[1]

Lieutenant Gillette had considerable experience in the hole. An abortive escape attempt at Pak's Palace after his capture in October, 1951, earned him a period of solitary confinement. Gillette arrived at Pi-chong-ni in the spring of 1952, and his reactionary attitude caused him to be placed in the hole on more than one occasion.[2]

The Marine and a South African Air Force pilot, Lieutenant Chris Lombard, laid plans for an escape. The two

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[1] Ibid., and Fink interview.

[2] Fink interview.

were confined in a hilltop school overlooking Camp 2. Gillette began training for the escape by reducing his rations and running whenever possible to improve his wind.[1]

When the two lieutenants made their break they were shot at but managed to get clear of camp. During the night Lombard fell down a mountainside and was so badly injured the Chinese recaptured him shortly thereafter. Gillette carried on alone. The obvious escape route lay to the west, the shortest distance to the coast where a boat might be stolen for the journey south. The Marine officer chose to go east, however, across rugged mountains which offered little in the way of crops or other foods. Whereas most escapees were recaptured within hours, or at best within days, Lieutenant Gillette was free for several weeks before the Communists found him half way across Korea. Quartermaster Sergeant James Day described the attempt as the finest and most determined one he knew of.[2]

Gillette was placed in the hole again, but he was not returned to Camp 2. Instead he became one of the many isolated prisoners secreted in No Name Valley. While in the hole he scribbled a novel on toilet paper, and it later served to amuse his fellow POW's.[3]

Other Marines were committed to the hole, too.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Day letter. QMS Day was a member with Captain Farrar-Hockley of a party which planned to escape in 1953. The attempt was thwarted before it got underway.

[3] Fink interview.

Captain Mercer R. Smith was sentenced to four days for arguing with a Chinese officer. In July, 1952, Lieutenant Richard Still was seized in an abortive escape attempt and sentenced to three months in the hole. He emerged unbothered and steeled against the Communists. In September Captain Paul Martelli escaped from the compound. He was captured ten days later and put in the same hole for two months. When released from confinement he was visibly disturbed by the experience but recovered rapidly with no traumatic effect.[1]

In October, 1952, Captain Gerald Fink was put in the hole. No formal charges were lodged against him, but his efforts on behalf of religion no doubt paved the way for his stint of solitary in the hole. In July Fink had discussed with other prisoners the need for a religious symbol in camp and he decided to carve a crucifix. His artistic and mechanical talents were well known. The Marine had already made stethescopes for the captive doctors using resonant wood and rubber tubing stolen from Chinese trucks. His greatest achievement had been construction of an artificial leg for Air Force Major Thomas D. Harrison. The leg was so expertly made that Harrison was able to play volley ball on his new limb. Homemade knives fashioned from the metal arch supports of field boots served as the carving blades. Short lengths of barbed wire hammered into wedge-like points made convenient drills.

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[1] Ibid.

Using these same crude but effective tools, Captain Fink set about to carve the figure of Christ on the cross. He finished the rough corpus in September. At one point a Chinese guard caught him in the act of carving, and he explained that the bearded figure was Abraham Lincoln. Since the Communists considered Lincoln a kindred spirit, in light of Marxian teachings, Fink was permitted to continue his labors.[1]

The final job of smoothing the corpus required different tools than those already available. After making sure no one was watching him, Captain Fink broke a window in the Chinese company commander's house and used the glass shards to complete the final scraping. Barbed wire was fashioned into a crown resembling the crown of thorns that adorned Christ's head. When the 22-inch corpus was placed on the cross which Fink had prepared, the crucifix was unveiled in camp and christened "Christ in Barbed Wire."

The Chinese seemed to fear the crucifix. They made no attempt to seize it or restrict its use, but Captain Fink was destined for punishment. Within a few days he heard the familiar summons to bring his rice bowl and come. Fellow POW's, seeing him walk down the central passageway of the barracks sang "Comrade Fink is in the clink" to the tune of "You'll never get to Heaven."

He was, indeed, in the clink for ten days. His sentence might have been longer. When the guard kicked

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[1] Ibid.

"CHRIST IN BARBED WIRE"



Carved in Camp 2, Pi-chong-ni
by Captain Gerald Fink, USMC

The 22-inch corpus is mounted on a four-foot crucifix. The crucifix was brought back to freedom by the POW's who were confined in Camp 2, and it is now at the Father Kapaun High School in Wichita, Kansas.

him into the hole part of the dirt wall caved in dirtying his clothes and rice bowl. Enraged, the Marine leaped out of the hole and struck the guard in the face with his bowl cutting him across the nose. A few anxious minutes passed during which the camp authorities milled around investigating the incident. Captain Fink seized the initiative, dramatically pointed to the guard, and shouted vehemently "If I die from dysentery because of a dirty rice bowl, this man killed me!" He spent the prescribed ten days in the hole and returned to the main compound to find himself the senior Marine present.

In October the senior officers in Camp 2 were removed to a newly built camp some distance down the road. Half the officers were formed into a second company and marched away to their new home. The junior officers remained in Company 1 in old Camp 2.

The aviation personnel captured during 1952 had encountered a new subject in their interrogations. Lieutenant Henry was asked about bacteriological warfare in February when he was captured, but the enemy did not force the issue. The pilots shot down in May were questioned about bacteriological warfare, but most of them were not pressed for information. Captain Flynn, however, was under brutal pressure throughout July when the enemy ~~made~~ made an intensive effort to obtain a confession of participation in bacteriological warfare. Others were to meet similar pressure.

The subject of bacteriological warfare was not new in the Korean war, but the year 1952 saw the Chinese give it a new twist and they made significant gains in their propaganda venture. The earlier history of the war should have given some hint of what the Chinese were attempting to do.

After suffering their first major reverses in Korea in September, 1950, the Communists had charged that Americans were waging bacteriological warfare. Their campaign of vilification continued even after they regained the initiative in November and December of 1950. In early 1951, while the United Nations Command battled epidemics of smallpox, typhus and amebic dysentery, these and other strange diseases raged among the civil population and within the prisoner of war camps. The enemy branded medical efforts to curb these diseases as experiments in germ warfare.[1] On May 8, 1951, the Communist Government of the Korean Democratic People's Republic lodged a formal protest with the United Nations, charging that America was waging bacteriological warfare. Their campaign seemed to abate during the remainder of 1951.

Then on January 13, 1952, the Communists shot down a U. S. Air Force B-26 which was then bombing their positions. Some five weeks after the crew parachuted into North Korea from their stricken bomber, the enemy's propa-

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[1] Charles Stevenson, "The Truth About Germ Warfare in Korea", The Readers Digest, April 1953, pp. 17-20.

ganda campaign picked up momentum. First Lieutenants Kenneth L. Enoch, the navigator, and John Quinn, the pilot, were the first American prisoners of the enemy to be exploited successfully for purposes of germ warfare confessions.[1]

The Chinese had obviously planned their propaganda onslaught well. After they successfully extracted false confessions from Enoch and Quinn, they exposed both prisoners to interrogation by a select group of Oriental medical specialists and newspapermen.[2] The two Americans apparently performed according to plan, and a relentless flood of Communist propaganda was loosed on the world.

The effects of the confessions were far reaching. From that time until the end of hostilities captured aviators of all services were subjected to a degree of pressure and coercion previously unknown by prisoners of war. Prior to the turn of the year aviation and ground personnel received relatively the same treatment in Communist hands. After January, 1952, aviators were singled out for a special brand of treatment designed to wring bacteriological warfare confessions from them.

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[1] People's China (Peking), May 16, 1952, supplement section. This issue contains an article entitled "Statements By Two American Air Force Officers, Kenneth Lloyd Enoch and John Quinn, Admitting Their Participation in Germ Warfare in Korea and Other Documents."

[2] The Chinese People's Committee for World Peace. Report of the Joint Interrogation Group of Korean and Chinese Specialists and Newspaper Correspondants on the Interrogation of War Prisoners Enoch and Quinn (Peking: The Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, 1952), pp. 1-32.

It may be more than sheer coincidence that the new series of germ warfare allegations was initiated on George Washington's birthday, 1952. On that day, Bak Hon Yong, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Communist Korean Democratic People's Republic, charged the Americans with renewed bacteriological attacks in North Korea. Bak claimed that flies, fleas, ticks, mosquitoes, and spiders had been spread by aircraft to disseminate contagious diseases over frontline and rear area positions. He did not explain how insects could survive in subzero weather. In what was obviously a co-ordinated effort, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En-Lai, followed this up with a similar statement on March 8, 1952. He claimed that 68 formations of American military aircraft made 448 sorties over Northeast China scattering large quantities of germ-carrying insects at Fushun, Hsinmin, Antung, Kuantien, Linkiang, and other areas.[1]

Chou En-Lai's efforts were aided and abetted from another quarter. Tibor Meray, correspondant for the Hungarian daily newspaper, Budapest Szabad Nep, reported in March, 1952, from Korea concerning the fantastic fabrication. His interviews with villagers and his obvious sympathy with the Communist cause helped weave the fabric

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[1] The Chinese People's Committee for World Peace. Exhibition on Bacteriological War Crimes Committed by the Government of the United States of America (Peking: The Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, 1952), pp. 1-52. Cited hereafter as "Peking Exhibit".

of the lie.[1]

Early in May, 1952, the Chinese People's Committee for World Peace opened their War Crimes Exhibit in Peking.[2] Displays included the written and sound-recorded confessions of Lieutenants Enoch and Quinn, a collection of psychological warfare leaflet containers which they labeled bacteria bombs, specimens of germ-laden insects, a clever array of photographs depicting bomb containers and their supposed cargo of insects, and reports of investigations by various committees and investigating bodies which tended to support their allegations.[3] The display was most convincing. Later a similar display was set up in the officers camp at Pi-chong-ni. Enoch and Quinn and two additional air force officers conducted playlets in the various camps depicting how they were supposedly given orders to perform their germ warfare mission.[4]

Then on July 8, 1952, there occurred the first of a chain of events to link the Marine Corps with bacteriological propaganda.[5] Colonel Frank H. Schwable, Chief of

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[1] Meray, pp. 42-60.

[2] "Peking Exhibit", p. 2.

[3] Ibid., pp. 15-36.

[4] Fink MS comments.

[5] Except as noted this section is derived from the following sources:
Letter dated March 5, 1953 from the Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly, Agenda item 73, Document No. A/C.1/L.28. Cited hereafter as UN Document A/C.1/L.28. This letter transmits documents entitled "Deposition by

Staff of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, accompanied by Major Roy H. Bley, Ordnance Officer of the wing, made an authorized administrative flight in an SNB aircraft. Both officers were newly arrived in Korea, and they inadvertently flew over enemy lines. By this time Communist antiaircraft fire had come to be respected by the pilots flying close support and interdiction missions. Many sturdy combat aircraft had fallen victim to the deadly ground fire. The SNB, or Beechcraft, was not a combat aircraft nor was it suitable for overflying enemy lines, and it was blasted out of the sky by Communist antiaircraft fire within sight of the United Nations front lines.

The two Marine officers parachuted from their stricken plane. Major Bley had received several disabling wounds, and when the two landed, Colonel Schwable went to the Major's assistance. Before ten minutes elapsed the Chinese Communist forces in the vicinity closed in and took them prisoner.

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the Captured United States Colonel, Frank H. Schwable", and "Deposition of the Captured American Prisoner Major Roy H. Bley"; and

Sworn statement of Col Frank H. Schwable, USMC, September 25, 1953, San Francisco, California. Published in United Nations General Assembly, Eighth Session, First Committee, Agenda Item 24, Document No. A/C.1/L.66, of October 26, 1953. Cited hereafter as UN Document A/C.1/L.66; and

Findings of Fact and Recommendations, U. S. Marine Corps Court of Inquiry, case of Col Frank H. Schwable, USMC, April 1954. Cited hereafter as Schwable Court of Inquiry; and

New York Times, February 21, 1954, p. 6E; and April 28, 1954, pp. 1, 16, and 18; and

Washington Post, March 12, 1954, p. 8.

The enemy had little difficulty in compiling Colonel Schwable's biography. He was in uniform with insignia of rank and naval aviator wings, and he had on his person many articles of identification which a pilot on a routine administrative flight might carry. These included his Armed Services Identification Card, a Virginia driver's license, a flight instrument ticket, membership card to officers' messes in Bethesda and Anacostia, Maryland, pictures of his family, and a copy of his flight plan. If these were not enough, the Red cause was helped four days later when the Department of Defense issued a press release giving considerable data concerning the missing aviator. The Chinese knew they had a prize.

Two weeks after his capture, Colonel Schwable was taken to an interrogation center known as "Pick-up Camp." He remained there in solitary confinement until December 8, 1952. About six weeks after his arrival at the camp Colonel Schwable became aware of Chinese intentions to use him for propaganda. Throughout the period of his captivity the Marine Colonel lived in a filthy lean-to under the eaves of a Korean house. He was badgered, accused of being a war criminal, fed a near starvation diet, denied proper latrine privileges, refused medical and dental attention, and subjected to extremes of temperature. Except for a "two week thinking period" he was intensively interrogated throughout his internment. This was the standard Soviet technique, and the Communists' purpose was served. According to a sworn statement made shortly after his

release Colonel Schwable felt sure that had he resisted Communist demands for a BW Confession the enemy would have affixed his forged signature to a document to achieve their ends. The Chinese had taken several samples of his signature before their bacteriological program began. The discomfort, almost constant diarrhea, extreme pain from being forced to sit in unnatural positions, fatigue, and naked threats wore him down. After applying all manner of means to break him down mentally, morally and physically, he states that he was confused and convinced that there was no alternative in the matter.

As he commented later, "In making my most difficult decision to seek the only way out, my primary consideration was that I would be of greater value to my country in exposing this hideous means of slanderous propaganda than I would be by sacrificing my life through non-submission or remaining a prisoner of the Chinese Communists for life, a matter over which they left me no doubt."

There followed many drafts of his confession. The Chinese required specific information; reference by name to key commanders in the chain of command, and compatability of places, dates and times with other confessions already obtained. Colonel Schwable was often told to include certain material in his confession if he was finally to clear his problem.

Near the end of December, almost six months after his capture, the Marine Colonel finally submitted a confession satisfactory to his captors. Late in January, 1953,

he was given a typewritten statement containing those extracts of his confession which suited the over-all pattern. He was told to copy it in his own handwriting.

Instead of being left alone as orginally promised, yet another requirement was levied on the Colonel. He was made to record his confession. Later he was photographed reading it. Enoch and Quinn and others knew all about that -- they had gone through much the same routine a year earlier.

The pattern was familiar: degradation and humiliation, physical and mental exhaustion, extensive writing of relatively harmless topics to condition the subject for the ultimate step, intimidation and threats, and finally false hopes and promises combined with instilling a sense of war guilt.

Yet throughout his internment, Colonel Schwable was never physically beaten. He was never starved, though his meals were skimpy and barely adequate by American standards. He was given shelter at all times though it was barely sufficient to prevent frost-bite. This was the lenient policy of the Chinese Communist Peoples' Volunteers.

Colonel Schwable was the senior Marine captured. Next to Major General Dean, Commander of the 24th Infantry Division of U. S. Eighth Army, the Marine Colonel was the senior United Nations prisoner taken by the Communists. Although General Dean spent three years in enemy hands, he was the only prisoner held exclusively by the North Koreans. The General sagely evaluated the greatest

problem facing a prisoner of war---that of maintaining his judgment--he has no one on whom he can try out his ideas before turning them into decisions.[1] Perhaps that was Colonel Schwable's problem, too.

The confession which finally evolved suited the Communists master plan admirably well. By cleverly combining factual order of battle data and technical sounding terminology in a text obviously prepared by an American, the enemy, through the medium of Colonel Schwable, created a most convincing lie. It was a much more sophisticated version than the efforts of earlier captives and one of the most damaging to emerge from North Korea.

During Colonel Schwable's ordeal Major Bley was subjected to similar treatment, but he reported that he was beaten on numerous occasions in addition to the mental pressures, constant harassment, marginal diet, and deplorable living conditions during the winter. He signed a confession on January 21, 1953, purporting knowledge of germ warfare activities by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing.[2]

The Marine officers mentioned in Schwable's statement promptly refuted the germ warfare allegations in sworn statements but even this could hardly counteract the damning effects of the false confession.[3]

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[1] William F. Dean, General Dean's Story, as told to William L. Worden (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), p. 131.

[2] UN Document No. A/C.1/L.28; and Document No.A/C.1/L.66.

[3] UN Document No.A/C.1/L.37.

Captain Samuel J. Davies, chaplain of the Gloucester's who had been captured in April, 1951, referred to Colonel Schwable's confession, which was broadcast over Radio Peking, as the greatest triumph of the Chinese. The chaplain observed that when the Communists first began their bacteriological campaign the officer prisoners in Camp 2 viewed it with sheer unbelief and ribald amusement. This attitude changed to more serious consideration of the problem, and finally, according to Chaplain Davies, the American officers became apologetic in their relations with the British.[1]

To add credence to their fantastic lie, the Communists had staged massive "bug hunts" by local civilians throughout North Korea and China, and in February, 1952, they had embarked on an extensive inoculation program. Even Major General Dean, isolated though he was, had to bare his arm for a monstrous shot designed, or so he was told, to protect him from the insidious bacteria loosed by the American imperialists.[2]

Marine Lieutenant Turner and Army Captain Joseph Manto conspired to make the Chinese appear ridiculous. Turner fashioned a miniature parachute and painted an Air Force insignia on the canopy. Manto tied a dead mouse to the parachute and hung it on a bush where the Chinese would be certain to find it. The Chinese guard who discovered

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[1] Davies, p. 133.

[2] Dean, pp. 275-77.

the mouse pointed his rifle at it and yelled for help. A comrade responding to his nearly hysterical call gingerly lifted the mouse with a pair of pincers and dropped it into a glass bottle. This evidence was placed in the bacteriological warfare exhibit in the school house. The Chinese were deadly serious and failed to understand that they were the butt of what to the prisoners was a hilarious joke.[1]

Colonel Schwable and Major Bley were not the only Marines to be pressured for germ warfare confessions. Captain Flynn was under intensive interrogation during the same period. On July 18th a well known Marine naval aviation pilot, Master Sergeant John T. Cain, was shot down while flying an OE light observation plane and he, too, was questioned about bacteriological warfare.[2] Sergeant Cain of VMO-6 had just paid for six months education for nine Korean children who lived near his air base before he was shot down and captured.[3] Four planes made a search of the area but they were unable to find the downed pilot.[4]

Once in enemy hands Sergeant Cain was mistaken for a senior officer because of his graying hair and lack of rank insignia. A week after his capture Master Sergeant

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[1] Fink interview. This incident is also described by: Edward Hunter, Brainwashing: The Story of the Men Who Defied It. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1956), p. 154.

[2] MSgt John T. Cain, USMC, Report of Captivity.

[3] Naval Aviation News. NavAer No. 00-75R-3. November, 1953, p. 10.

[4] VMO-6, HistD, July, 1952, Appendix G.

Cain experienced his first organized interrogation. He later reported that he made a mistake at that time by lying about inconsequential things. On August 2d he was put in a jeep and driven north, an experience that nearly cost him his life. The driver ran over a cliff killing himself and two guards. Cain was thrown on a small ledge and temporarily paralyzed when the jeep rolled over him. Other Chinese found him later and took him to 14th Army Headquarters at Pike's Peak where he joined Captain Flynn. According to the sergeant the POW's owed much to Flynn who kept them amused.[1]

In mid August, 1952, Captain Flynn, Master Sergeant Cain, and 11 other POW's were taken north to Obul.[2] A month later the enlisted Marine was removed from Obul and taken to an isolated part of Pi-chong-ni for intensive interrogation. The Chinese insisted that he was actually a lieutenant colonel. Cain was confined in a hole five feet square and six feet deep. Water stood two inches deep in the hole and by October 8th it froze. In an effort to prove that the sergeant was a field officer the Chinese paraded several people in front of him. With a light shining in his eyes Master Sergeant Cain was unable to do more than pick out shadowy forms. When the line-up was completed he was informed that other POW's had identified him as Lieutenant Colonel Cain, Commanding Officer of

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[1]Cain Report of Captivity.

[2]Flynn Report of Captivity.

VMF-121.[1] How the fanciful identification was arrived at remains a mystery but it is highly probable that the Chinese planted the very answers they sought.

Sergeant Cain was made to stand at attention for periods of five to eight hours. When guards were slack, a Korean woman secretly fed him rice in exchange for which he gave her sugar, soap, and tobacco accumulated while writing a fanciful report concerning the Fleet Logistic Wing, an organization about which he knew absolutely nothing.

In mid November his captors informed him they were through sparring with him. The enlisted pilot was taken to a hillside, blindfolded, and placed in front of a firing squad. He heard rifle bolts click. The commander of the firing squad asked if he was ready to tell all. When Sergeant Cain replied that he was not going to talk, the Chinese returned him to solitary confinement. After a political interrogation he was eventually taken back to Obul where he rejoined Captain Flynn and others.[2]

Later when platoons one and two were combined, Master Sergeant Cain proved to be invaluable in counseling and guiding other enlisted personnel. Major Harris, the senior Marine officer in the annex, later reported that Sergeant Cain assumed more than his share of duties and responsi-

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[1] Cain Report of Captivity.

[2] Ibid.

bility and set an example for all to follow.[1]

On September 9, 1952, another pilot from VMO-6 was shot down and captured. Captain Robert B. Lipscomb was at the controls of an OE-1 with Second Lieutenant Roland L. McDaniel from the 11th Marines as his observer. The plane was hit near Taedok San, a mountain located north of The Hook where ground action was then building up for the October climax.[2]

Lipscomb and McDaniel parachuted into enemy lines where they were seized by the enemy. They were still within artillery range of the front on October 7th when the Chinese launched strong assaults against outposts of the 7th Marines. Most of the Marines captured in the outpost battles were brought to the same collection center at which McDaniel and Lipscomb were being held. Second Lieutenant Henry L. Conway Jr., G/3/7, who was captured on October 6th, joined them and the trio remained together thereafter except during occasional periods of solitary confinement.[3]

In November the three officers were taken to a coal mine about midway between Kaesong and Pyongyang. A brutal North Korean major, called Yellow Jacket because of the color jacket he wore, was in charge of POW's at that loca-

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[1]Letter from Maj Walter R. Harris, USMCR, to CMC, December 9, 1953.

[2]VMO-6, HistD, September 1952, Appendix G.

[3]Personal interview with Capt Roland McDaniel, USMC, July 26 and December 27, 1960.

tion. The Marines were temporarily separated and McDaniel was tied to a Korean who had been accused as a spy. In recounting this experience McDaniel said:

> The one thing I can't stand is to be tied up. I was tied up with a Korean for about ten days. We were in a hole, and a hole means vermin and rats. It means you can't move, and it means defecating and urinating in your pants. I thought I'd do almost anything to get untied. I really had to think about it to keep my sense of balance. I came out with pneumonia and T.B.[1]

At the coal mine Lieutenant McDaniel was approached by a North Korean interrogator on only one occasion. The Marine refused to talk and he recalls the following conversation. "If you won't co-operate this will be the last time I see you." McDaniel answered, "I have nothing to say." Surprisingly he was not pressed for more information nor was he molested further.

Captain Lipscomb, Lieutenants McDaniel and Conway, and three other officers were taken north to Camp 2 Annex in December, 1952. On arrival at Obul they were placed in solitary confinement before eventually joining Company C. McDaniel, a bachelor, told the Chinese he was married and had two children to avoid giving them any factual information to exploit. His captors were surprised when he refused to write letters to his family. Later he refused an opportunity to make a recording of greeting to his family. On a third occasion he was removed from the annex and interrogated concerning which officer was organizing the POW's in a military manner. Again he refused to answer.

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[1] Ibid.

Work details in the annex had been organized by this time, and all of the POW's who were physically able to participate were busy unloading food from barges on the Yalu River. At other times they dug root cellars, built a field kitchen, and improved the primitive conditions of sanitation in and around camp.

When Lieutenant O'Shea was shot down in July, 1951, he knew that his pregnant wife was expecting the birth of twins. Although McDaniel did not know O'Shea, he had dated O'Shea's sister and had learned from her that the twins had been born. He was able to inform O'Shea of the successful birth when they met in the annex. He could not, however, recall the sex of the twins.[1] This was just another of the frustrations which so often face a POW.

Two events occurred in the closing weeks of 1952 which bear telling. One event was a birthday celebration and the other, which took place at the same time, was an athletic event.

The birth of the Continental Marines on November 10, 1775, has been honored by U. S. Marines since 1921 as their own birthday. The ceremony is prescribed in the Marine Corps Manual and on each November 10th the same ritual is observed at every post and station and every command and detachment throughout the Corps.[2] Most units also hold a party or ball in conjunction with the traditional program.

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[1] McDaniel MS comment.

[2] Marine Corps Manual, 1949, Vol. 1 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1949), para. 24451.

Camp 2 was no exception in 1952.

Preparations for a suitable celebration began long before November 10th. Marine officers stole eggs, sugar, and flour and the kitchen staff made a cake suitably decorated with the Marine Corps Globe and Anchor by Captain Fink. Another group was assigned the bootlegging task of preparing rice wine.[1] When November 10th arrived, the Marines of Company 1 filed into the library of the old schoolhouse. Quartermaster Sergeant James Day, Royal Marine, was among the invited guests. The small group toasted the President of the United States, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and finally the Marine Corps itself. The National Anthem and Marine Corps hymn were sung loudly and resoundingly despite regulations to the contrary. In evaluating the ceremony and the reaction of non-Marines QMS Day wrote:

> Firstly some were apprehensive in case of trouble with the Chinese, and its always consequent rash of gaol victims. Some thought it a little childish, and not worth the trouble of interrupting the daily routine of the place. And I feel that quite a lot were rather envious that the small band of USMC should be able to get together and do this sort of thing quite seriously, quite sincerely, and with no thought of any consequence.[2]

It was also in November, 1952, that the Chinese staged a "Prisoner of War Command Olympics." When the idea was first broached to the officer prisoners there was considerable discussion as to whether or not they should parti-

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[1] Fink interview.

[2] Day letter.

cipate.[1] Most of the Marines in Company 1, Camp 2, were opposed to the idea. According to Major Fink, the Marines in the second company and most of the British were also opposed to participation.[2] When the final decision was rendered by the senior United Nations officer, however, Camp 2 was to be represented.

The senior Air Force officer in camp was designated leader of the officers athletic teams. All services including the British were represented. U. S. Marine athletes were Major McLaughlin, Captains Wagner and Perry, and Lieutenants Stanfill, Turner, and Lundquist.

On arrival at Pyoktong, scene of the POW Olympics, the participants were issued athletic uniforms bearing their respective camp designations. The Chinese did not force the prisoners of war to hold "Fight for Peace" parades as they had attempted to do in the past although a review of competitors was held.

A large number of Communist photographers arrived. They took pictures of athletic events, spectators, and meals. The quantity and quality of food were vastly improved for the occasion, and the Chinese were determined to wring every possible advantage from their effort. Photos taken at the Olympics appeared in the propaganda

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[1] Farrar-Hockley, pp. 246-48.

[2] Fink interview.

THE OLYMPICS AT PYOKTONG-NOVEMBER 1952

Soccer game.



Tug of war-the officer's team from Camp 2.

THE OLYMPICS AT PYOKTONG-NOVEMBER 1952

~~Enlisted~~ Basketball game.

Unidentified photograph-probably not taken at the November Olympics.

Pyoktong Photos courtesy of
Cpl Eddie P. Vidal, USMC (Ret)

brochure entitled "United Nations P.O.W.'s in Korea".[1] Copies of the brochure were distributed at a meeting of the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva, Switzerland.[2]

A biased though basically accurate description of the event can be found in a book containing a collection of articles written by prisoners of war and later edited by three turncoats. One article in the book, credited to PFC Billy J. Lessman, U. S. Marine Corps, describes the Olympics in the following terms:

> During the athletic meet the spirit of these P.O.W.'s was very high. This includes both contestants and the spectators who cheered for their favorite sportsmen.
>
> The field was decorated by Korean P.O.W.'s who took pride in their work. Flags of every color represented each camp and the contestants were issued sports uniforms of their camp color.
>
> The food at Pyoktong was also an outstanding factor which helped make the meet the big success it was; pork, chicken, fish and goat were on the menu. The bread was prepared stuffed with meat, sugar, or vegetables.[3]

This sort of description coupled with the visual evidence of photographs must be very convincing to the un-

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[1]Chinese People's Committee for World Peace. United Nations P.O.W.'s in Korea. (Peking: Chinese People's Committee for World Peace, 1953). A very clever piece of propaganda. This 92-page pictorial purports to show the lenient treatment of the Chinese Communist Forces in Korea toward their POW's.

[2]U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Un-American Activities. Investigation of Communist Propaganda Among Prisoners of War in Korea. 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 1956, p. 5142.

[3]Andrew M. Condron, Richard G. Corden, and Larance V. Sullivan, (eds.), Thinking Soldiers (Peking: New World Press, 1955), pp. 161-62.

initiated. The Olympics at Pyoktong did furnish entertainment and relaxation for the POW's who participated in the events and for those confined in Camp 5 who could observe the games. It must be remembered, however, that the affair was one brief event in the long course of the war and the benefit of the good food did not trickle down to other POW's.

When the officers discussed fielding teams for the various contests they recognized the potential propaganda value which might, and did, accrue to the Communists. No other factor loomed larger in their minds to dissuade them from going. But in the end, the possibility for making contact with other camps and exchanging vital information proved the deciding factor.

The one legged Air Force pilot, Major Thomas D. Harrison, described Major McLaughlin's role as follows:

> In November 1952 he attended an athletic meet in Pyoktong. While there, his skill as an athlete helped restore the prestige of the officers torn down by the enemy's propaganda. In addition he defied the guards by circulating among the enlisted men and pointing out lies contained in the enemy propaganda designed to slander this country, its government, and its leaders. At the same time he collected the names of many U. S. prisoners held in isolated places whom it was suspected that the enemy might attempt to hold after the end of the war.[1]

This seeming preoccupation with names was motivated by the fear expressed by Major Harrison; that the Communists

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[1]Letter from LtCol Thomas D. Harrison, USAF, to Chief of Staff, USAF, March 11, 1954.

might not repatriate certain prisoners of war. The fear was shared by Marine intelligence officers in Japan who were responsible for keeping records of developments in this sensitive area.[1]

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[1]Personal observation.