# The Forgotten Service in the Forgotten War: The U.S. Coast Guard's Role in the Korean Conflict

Scott T. Price

On June 25, 1950 six North Korean infantry divisions, supported by large armor and artillery forces, brutally attacked its neighbor, South Korea. The onslaught caught the South, as well as much of the world, completely by surprise. As the Soviet-equipped divisions advanced towards the capital, Seoul, Coast Guard officers stationed on the peninsula received word that they would have to evacuate.

The officers were based at the former Imperial Japanese naval facility of Chinae, South Korea where they had been training the nucleus of what would become the South Korean navy. This little known operation was a typical example of the Coast Guard's role during the coming conflict; based in obscurity but nevertheless important to the United Nations' efforts to halt and reverse the Communist onslaught.

The Coast Guard's missions for any post-World War II conflicts were largely spelled out by the Navy. In 1947 the Chief of Naval Operations suggested that in future conflicts the Coast Guard should limit its contribution to those peacetime tasks in which it specialized. His suggestion stated that the Coast Guard's "war time functions and duties assigned should be those which are an extension of normal peacetime tasks." Additionally, "Coast Guard personnel, ships, aircraft and facilities should be utilized as organized Coast Guard units rather than by indiscriminately integrating them into the naval establishment."[1] These duties included port security, maritime inspection and safety, search and rescue, and patrolling ocean stations. These, therefore, were the Coast Guard's primary missions during the Korean War.[2]

## Chinhae

In 1946 the U.S. Army, which commanded the military forces in South Korea, asked for a contingent of active-duty Coast Guard officers to organize, supervise, and train a small Korean coast guard. Captain George McCabe, a Coast Guard hero of World War II, was the first to command the Coast Guard contingent, which arrived in South Korea on 23 August 1946. Indeed, he actually commanded the nascent Korean Coast Guard until the Korean government appointed Lieutenant Commander Sohn Won Yil as its first native commanding officer. From then on, McCabe and Sohn commanded the service jointly.

Their task was extremely complicated. First, they had to establish an enlisted training facility and begin recruiting operations. Then they needed to establish an officer candidate program to train officers to command the service. They also agreed to develop an academy, complete with a four-year degree program much like the U.S. Coast Guard Academy in New London. Due to a pressing need for personnel, however, the degree program was cut to two years. Despite the language difficulties, a lack of equipment, and a high initial desertion rate, McCabe and his staff successfully nurtured the beginnings of a new coast guard.

They acquired former Japanese navy warships to serve as training vessels and refurbished equipment left behind by the Japanese occupation forces. In general the Coast Guard did what it has always done, successfully fulfilled an assigned task with little or no resources.[3] The whole structure of this effort, however, was soon to undergo a significant change.

In May 1948 Commander William C. Achurch arrived in Korea and became the "Head Advisor to Commander, Service Forces, Korean Coast Guard" and commanding officer of the U.S. Coast Guard Detachment at Chinhae.[4] When the South Korean government decided that it would change its coast guard to a navy in 1948, the active duty U.S. Coast Guard officers returned home. As one officer put it, "The U.S. Coast Guard didn't feel obligated to train a foreign navy and the U.S. Coast Guard Detachment was withdrawn."[5] The U.S. Army then hired a number of retired or reserve officers and men to assist the new Korean Navy, including

Commander Achurch.

Training continued unabated for the next few years. The training teams continued to struggle with a number of difficulties including cultural differences and as always, funding. The base gained some notoriety when Achurch hosted a conference between the Nationalist Chinese leader, Chiang Kai-shek and the president of South Korea, Syngman Rhee for a three-day meeting in August of 1949. Later, President Rhee became a frequent visitor to the base as his interest in his new navy grew.

On the 19th of August, 1949 a World War II Coast Guard veteran, Commander Clarence M. Speight, retired from the service for a physical disability, took over Achurch's duties as "Advisor Chief, Korean Navy."[6] Achurch remained as the commanding officer of the Coast Guard contingent. Both men wore their uniforms proudly and carried on the operation as a Coast Guard commanded team.

**Invasion**

Commander Speight found himself in Taiwan preparing a new vessel for the Korean Navy when the North Koreans attacked. His wife and two children in Seoul fled to Inchon. Speight arranged for their transport on board a freighter bound for Tokyo and he then returned to Seoul. Six hundred fifty other refugees swarmed on board the freighter designed to carry only twelv passengers. Mrs. Speight and her two children stayed on the main deck for the three-day trip despite the cold weather and rain. Speight barely managed to leave Seoul and watched as the large bridge over the Han River was blown up. After crossing the river on a small boat, he eventually made it to Pusan where he met up with Commander Achurch.[7] Both were ordered back to the United States in July.

**Pacific Ocean Stations**

The ocean station program, established before World War II, proved to be a vital war-time Coast Guard task and was perhaps the most direct contribution made by the Coast Guard to the United Nations' effort. Cutters assigned to the stations carried teams of meteorologists from the U.S. Weather Bureau. These men carried out weather observations, assisted by specialists in the Coast Guard crew. The cutters also served as aids to navigation by providing checkpoints for military and commercial maritime and air traffic and communication "relay" stations for aircraft on transoceanic flights. They provided needed medical services to merchant ship crews as well as any others in need and served as search and rescue platforms. Some aircraft actually ditched near the cutters and were quickly rescued, such as the famous rescue of the *Bermuda Sky Queen* by the crew of the *Bibb* in 1947.

Coast Guard cutters were stationed at two ocean stations in the Pacific prior to the outbreak of the Korean conflict. In concert with the Navy, the service decided to add three additional stations in the North Pacific.[8] The new stations provided complete weather data and greater search and rescue coverage for the growing trans-Pacific merchant and military traffic brought on by the Korean conflict. Indeed, 95 percent of the war material bound for Korea went by ship but nearly half of the personnel went by air, making the ocean station vessels a vital link in the United Nations' logistic effort. Furthermore, the Coast Guard established a chain of air search and rescue detachments on islands throughout the Pacific to supplement the search and rescue capabilities of the Ocean Station cutters. Cutters were also assigned to these search and rescue stations to augment their search and rescue capabilities.

With the addition of the new stations, the Coast Guard needed to find vessels to augment the already extended cutter fleet. Fortunately a ready source existed within the mothball fleets of the Navy. The Navy turned over a number of destroyer escorts, which the Coast Guard commissioned as cutters. The old war-horses had served as convoy escorts in World War II, 33 of which had been manned by Coast Guard crews during the war. These vessels were refitted with a shelter on the stern for weather balloon storage and armed with depth charges

and a variety of anti-aircraft weapons. The first two to join the Coast Guard fleet were the *Koiner* and the *Falgout*. Once commissioned, the new cutters underwent shakedown training under the supervision of the Navy and then sailed to their new homeports.[9]

Ocean station duty could be monotonous at one moment and terrifying the next, as the vessels rode out storms that made the saltiest sailors green. One crewman noted: “After twenty-one days of being slammed around by rough cold sea swells 20 to 50 feet high, and wild winds hitting gale force at times, within an ocean grid the size of a postage stamp, you can stand any kind of duty.”[10]

The *Koiner’s* operations provide a good example of the duty. After she arrived in Seattle, where she joined the cutters *Bering Strait*, *Klamath, Winona*, and the *Wachusett,* a hodge podge fleet of ex-Navy seaplane tenders and 255-foot Coast Guard cutters, she was first sent to Ocean Station Nan in the North Pacific. There she steamed in endless circles around the ocean station for three weeks before being relieved by the cutter *Lowe*.

While on the ocean station the crew quickly fell into a routine. They assisted the five weather observers from the San Francisco office of the U.S. Weather Bureau who accompanied each patrol. Radar and radio were manned around the clock. Twice daily the crew launched 6-foot diameter helium filled balloons that measured air temperature, pressure, and humidity to an altitude of 10 miles. They launched another smaller balloon to measure wind speed and direction.

The crew also checked water temperature every four hours down to a depth of 450 feet with a bathythermograph instrument. Serving as a floating aid to navigation, they contacted passing aircraft and ships by radio and provided radar and navigation fixes. The contact with anyone from the outside world, even if only for a brief moment, at least broke up the monotony for the crew. Then there were the daily drills such as fire, collision, and boat drills. For recreation they had movies, pistol matches, skeet shooting, volleyball games, and fishing. Though this was often enough to keep from going stir crazy, the crew invariably counted the days until their next liberty.[11]

After returning to Seattle the crew of the destroyer escort received welcome liberty. Then she set sail for Ocean Station Victor, midway between Japan and the Aleutian Islands, via the Midway Islands. While at Midway she stood search and rescue standby duty, then set sail for Victor for another three-week tour of duty. When relieved there, she sailed on to Yokosuka, Japan for a twelve-day layover, which included liberty for all hands. Afterward she steamed once again out to the North Pacific to Ocean Station Sugar. Another three weeks later her relief arrived and the *Koiner* returned to Seattle.[12] And so it went, month by month, year by year.

These cutters assisted a number of merchant ships and aircraft that were transiting the North Pacific during the war. The *Forster* assisted the largest number of vessels while on patrol. Her crew searched for and found the MV *Katori Maru* drifting and burning on 16-17 August 1952. Thereafter they assisted five more merchant and fishing vessels. The Pacific ocean station cutters in all assisted over 20 merchant and Navy vessels, including one transoceanic airliner, during the war.[13]

During 1950 Station Nan was the busiest of all the ocean stations, reporting that the cutters gave 357 radar fixes per patrol. Each patrol averaged over 700 hours on station. The cutters steamed an average of 4,000 miles per patrol.[14] These numbers increased considerably after the patrols were lengthened and expanded after the start of the Korean conflict. Twenty-four cutters served on the stations that fell within the perimeters of the Korean conflict and thus, they and their crews earned the Korean Service Medal (see Appendix B). Unsung but always ready, the cutters insured the timely and safe arrival of United Nations’ troops and supplies throughout the Korean conflict.

**Pacific Search and Rescue Airstations**

The Coast Guard established a number of Pacific air search and rescue detachments throughout the

Pacific in support of the Korean operation. The Coast Guard commissioned air detachments on Wake and Midway islands and increased the strengths of the existing detachments at Guam, Hawaii, and the Philippine Islands.[15]

One of the most dangerous search and rescue cases undertaken by the Coast Guard took place off the coast of mainland China in early 1953. Communist Chinese forces shot down a Navy P2V Neptune in the Formosa Strait while the aircraft was on a covert patrol along the Chinese coast. The crew ditched their burning plane and escaped into a life raft to await rescue. The Coast Guard search and rescue station at Sangley Point responded to the call for assistance by immediately scrambling one of its two Martin PBM-5G Mariner seaplanes. In command was Lieutenant "Big John" Vukic, one of the most experienced seaplane pilots in the Coast Guard. Vukic and his crew of seven took off and flew their large aircraft towards Communist China and imminent danger. They were followed by the other PBM shortly thereafter, piloted by then-Lieutenant Mitchell A. Perry.

After arriving on scene Vukic noticed that the seas were running 15-feet. Even though the survivors managed to climb into a raft he thought they must have been suffering from hypothermia. He decided to attempt an open water landing, always a dangerous affair but something he had done many times successfully. With darkness setting in he landed near the survivors. His crewman managed to pull these men on board while other crewman prepared a jet assisted packs for each side of the aircraft. These devices, known as JATO [Jet Assisted Take-Off] packs, permitted aircraft to lift off in an extremely short take-off run. While the Coast Guard crew rescued all eleven in the raft, two other Navy crew, in a separate raft, were swept ashore and captured by the communist Chinese. Not knowing their fate, Vukic taxied his big PBM near the crash site searching for them.

After fifteen minutes, with the seas rising he gave up the search and attempted to take off. The JATO rockets fired as the PBM lifted into the air. Vukic remembered: "There was a 15-foot sea and a 25-mile wind." He feared that the heavy seas would swamp the amphibian if he waited for the seas to abate or a surface ship to come to their aid. Weighing each of the consequences, he decided to fly. Vukic remembered "Everything was rolling very well and I thought it was in the bag. And so I fired my JATO bottles to help my plane get airborne." Suddenly the plane lurched to the left. He saw the left wing float rise above the sea but the port engine seemed to be losing power. He quickly decided to ditch and made for the crest of a wave with the plane's hull. "My seat suddenly broke and that was the last thing I knew."[16] The PBM slammed back into the sea and broke up.

Once again the Navy survivors were back in the water, at least, the seven that survived this crash. Vukic managed to escape as well and inflated a raft. He pulled two surviving Navy crew in with him. He said "We were so cold we didn't care who got us, just so they had a fire to keep us warm."[17] Two others of his Coast Guard crew, Aviation Machinists Mate Joseph Miller and Aviation Mechanic Robert Hewitt, also managed to escape before the PBM sank. These men were eventually rescued by the Navy destroyer U.S.S. *Halsey Powell* later that night. But the other five Coast Guard and four Navy crewmen never made it out of the sinking PBM and they perished. All five of these Coast Guardsmen received the Gold Lifesaving Medal posthumously (see Appendix A).

**Port Security**

Anticommunist sentiment in the country, already at a fever pitch after the communist victory in China the year before, was only aggravated by the North Korean attack. As a result, the government reacted against domestic communist activity. President Harry Truman signed Presidential Executive Order 10173, thereby implementing the Magnuson Act, which authorized the Coast Guard to conduct duties it had carried out during both World Wars to insure the security of U.S. ports "from subversive or clandestine attacks."[18]

The Coast Guard established port security units to take charge of and secure the major ports of the United States. Their function was to prevent sabotage and insure the timely loading and sailing of merchant ships,

especially those sailing to Japan and Korea to deliver ammunition needed by the United Nation forces. The most controversial power extended to the Coast Guard was the authority to check the backgrounds of merchant sailors, longshoremen, warehouse employees and harbor pilots, in order to determine their loyalty, or lack thereof, to the United States.[19]

The immediate problem with implementing these duties was the lack of personnel. There was no organized reserve program of any great scale as the World War II program had been emasculated with the demobilization of the United State's military at the end of the war. Indeed, in June 1949 there were only 252 enlisted reserve personnel, and a few women SPARs[the nickname of the Coast Guard's Women's Reserve] working at headquarters.[20] The President, through a supplemental appropriation, approved the immediate increase in financing necessary to implement an organized reserve. The budget for the following year did show a substantial funding increase that permitted the Coast Guard to expand and develop an adequate reserve to meet the service's new demands.

Fears of a Eastern-bloc freighter sailing into a port, armed with a nuclear bomb, gave the service a unique Cold War task. Since the Soviet Union and its communist allies had no long-range bomber force and ballistic missiles were ten years in the future, delivery of a bomb by a vessel sailing into an unsuspecting port and then being detonated was the most likely form of nuclear attack on the United States.[21] From August 1951 every vessel entering into a U.S. anchorage had to notify Customs of its intended destination and cargo 24 hours before it was to arrive. The names of these vessels were passed to the appropriate Captain of the Port and Coast Guard patrol boats identified and checked each, boarding and examining those that appeared suspicious.

The boats patrolling harbor entrances in the major ports were occupied 24 hours a day and in New York, for example, there were two stations on continuous duty. For the next two years off the coast of New York, near the Ambrose lightship station, the Coast Guard inspected over 1,500 ships. Each of the two patrols inspected an average of 40 vessels per month with each inspection lasting four hours. Armed with Geiger counters, they searched for atomic weapons, general explosives, and bacteriological weapons, but never found anything worth reporting.[22]

Special explosive loading detachment teams conducted the incredibly dangerous job of supervising the loading of ammunition. It was sometimes conducted under the most primitive conditions. On the coast of Oregon, for example, ammunition was transported from the Umatilla Ordnance Depot to a loading site on the Columbia River about 10 miles downstream from the Depot. A privately owned tow and barge company held the contract for transporting government goods down the river. Coast Guard officers and men supervised the loading of the ammunition onto barges that each held 500 tons. Typically one powered vessel would push two barges at a time down the 200 miles to the Beaver Ammunition Storage Point, accompanied by an armed Coast Guardsman.[23] The ammunition was then loaded onto cargo vessels for transportation to Korea.

**Loran Station at Pusan**

The LORAN[*LO*ng *R*ange *A*id to *N*avigation] station at Pusan is one of the truly unsung Coast Guard stories of the war. Established to assist the growing air and sea traffic brought on by the Korean conflict, the station's crew has the distinction of being the only Coast Guard personnel serving under a Coast Guard command on the peninsula during the fighting. It was code named ELMO-4.[24]

The prospective commanding officer of the station, Lieutenant John D. McCann, USCG, reconnoitered the area around the city of Pusan, which gave the LORAN station its official Coast Guard designation, and picked a hill some twenty miles from the city. His crew consisted of twelve men who served on a one-year tour. On June 6 1952 the U.S. Air Force generously agreed to support the station logistically, relieving the 14th Coast Guard District of such responsibilities. The support included providing for the security of the station.

Despite attacks by local vandals and some guerrilla units, as well as a typhoon in August of 1952, construction progressed with the assistance of units of the U.S. Army and logistically supported by the U.S. Air Force. By the time ELMO-4 was ready to begin operation the station boasted modern plumbing, electric clothes washing machines, and a hot water heater. McCann noted “We are probably living on one of the most comfortable bases in Korea. But don’t forget that we built it ourselves. Last August all we had were tents.”[25] The only Coast Guard outfit in Korea began transmitting its signal on 5 January 1953. In concert with the other eight Coast Guard-manned LORAN stations in the Far East, including stations O’Shima Island in Tokyo Bay, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, these lonely Coast Guard outposts provided around-the-clock navigation assistance to United Nations’ maritime and air forces.

## Conclusions

With the signing of the cease-fire on 26 July 1953, the Coast Guard demobilized quickly. The Coast Guard abandoned the ocean stations added for wartime purposes and decommissioned the destroyer escorts. All of the overseas air detachments and search and rescue stations were decommissioned as well and the service returned to its normal peacetime operations.

The Korean War left a few legacies for the Coast Guard. Port security was now a preeminent mission of the service in large part due to fears generated by the Cold War. Force levels had increased to well over what they were before North Korea invaded its neighbor. Indeed, the service almost doubled in size from its 1947 low of just over 18,000 men and women until June, 1952 when 35,082 officers and enlisted men served on active duty, including 1,600 reservists.[26] Women also continued to serve in the Coast Guard, albeit in far fewer numbers than served during World War II. In November 1952, 215 SPAR officers and 108 enlisted SPARs served in the reserve and 15 officers and 19 enlisted served on active duty.[27]

The final and, perhaps, most important legacy was that the future leaders of the service would look for a more active role for the Coast Guard in any conflict. Worried that its vital duties during the Korean War still left the Coast Guard in obscurity, future commandants would offer Coast Guard forces for use in combat areas. This is exactly what happened some ten years later during another Communist onslaught in Asia, Vietnam.

**The Forgotten Service in the Forgotten War:**
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## Appendix A. Coast Guardsmen Who Received the Gold Lifesaving Medal in Korea

Aviation Ordnanceman First Class Joseph R. Bridge, USCG
Chief Aviation Electronicsman Winfield J. Hammond, USCG
Aviation Machinist's Mate Third Class Tracey W. Miller, USCG
Aviation Electronicsman First Class Carl R. Tornell, USCG
Lieutenant (junior grade) Gerald W. Stuart, USCG
These men perished in a rescue attempt off the coast of China on 18 January 1953. All were awarded the Gold Lifesaving Medal posthumously.

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## Appendix B. Coast Guard Units Eligible for the Korean Service Medal

USCGC *Bering Strait* (WAVP 382)
USCGC *Chautauqua* (WPG 41)
USCGC *Durant* (WDE 489)
USCGC *Escanaba* (WPG 64)
USCGC *Falgout* (WDE 424)
USCGC *Finch* (WDE 428)
USCGC *Forster* (WDE 434)
USCGC *Gresham* (WAVP 387)
USCGC *Ironwood* (WAGL 297)
USCGC *Iroquois* (WPG 43)
USCGC *Klamath* (WPG 66)
USCGC *Koiner* (WDE 431)
USCGC *Kukui* (WAK 186)
USCGC *Lowe* (WDE 425)
USCGC *Minnetonka* (WPG 67)
USCGC *Newell* (WDE 442)
USCGC *Planetree* (WAGL 307)
USCGC *Pontchartrain* (WPG 70)
USCGC *Ramsden* (WDE 482)
USCGC *Richey* (WDE 485)
USCGC *Taney* (WPG 37)
USCGC *Wachusett* (WPG 44)
USCGC *Winnebago* (WPG 40)
USCGC *Winona* (WPG 64)
Commander, Coast Guard Far East Section, Tokyo
Coast Guard Merchant Marine Detachment, Japan
LORAN Station Bataan
LORAN Station Pusan
LORAN Station Ichi Banare, Okinawa
LORAN Station Iwo Jima
LORAN Station Matsumae, Hokkaido
LORAN Station Niigata, Honshu
LORAN Station Oshima, Honshu
LORAN Station Riyako Jima
LORAN Station Tokyo, Honshu

**The Forgotten Service in the Forgotten War:**
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**Notes**

[1] As quoted in Robert Johnson, *Guardians of the Sea: A History of the United States Coast Guard 1915 to the Present*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), p. 281.
[2] The Coast Guard stayed under the control of the Treasury Department for the duration of the Korean conflict.
[3] "History of U.S. Coast Guard Detachment in Korea," no date. In possession of Coast Guard Historian's Office, Korean War subject file.
[4] Logbook: "Log of Advisors to Korean Coast Guard, U.S. Coast Guard Detachment, Chinhae, Korea," 12 Nat 1948 entry. Hereafter referred to as "Logbook." In possession of the Coast Guard Historian's Office, Korean War subject file.
[5] Copy of Memorandum, Commander Clarence M. Speight to the Office of Chief of Military History, Current Branch, 16 September, 1953. In possession of the Coast Guard Historian's Office, Korean War subject file.
[6] Logbook, 19 August 1950 entry.
[7] "Former Advisor to Head of Korean Navy Comes on Active Duty Again," *U.S. Coast Guard Bulletin* VI, No. 7 (January, 1951), p. 83.
[8] "Shifts in Ocean Station Assignments Announced," *U.S. Coast Guard Bulletin* VI, No. 7 (January, 1951), p. 84.
[9] Press Release, 13th Coast Guard District Information Officer LCDR M.L. Skaret, "The Coast Guard Cutter Koiner," 8 February 1952. Copy in Coast Guard Historian's Office Koiner cutter file. "Coast Guard Gets Destroyer Escorts," *Coast Guard Magazine* (August, 1951), p. 25.
[10] "On Ocean Station Charlie with the Coast Guard Cutter *Absecon*," Coast Guard Data Sheet USCGC *Absecon* Weather Patrol, 1958. Copy in possession of Coast Guard Historian's Office, Ocean Station subject file.
[11] Victor E. Bakanas, John W. Laine, Bob Everett, "A Pictorial Presentation of the Work and Play and Life and Laughter on Board the United States Coast Guard Cutter Minnetonka on a Typical Ocean Station Patrol." Copy in possession of the Coast Guard Historian's Office Ocean Station subject file.
[12] Robert Scheina, *U.S. Coast Guard Cutters & Craft, 1946-1990*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 7-9; *Koiner* WDE-431 Vessel Movement Record. Copy in possession of the Coast Guard Historian's Office *Koiner* cutter file.
[13] Scheina, pp. 7-9.
[14] "OSV's Travel 684,061 Miles," *U.S. Coast Guard Bulletin* VII, No. 7 (July, 1951), pp. 1-2.
[15] "Coast Guard Facilities Expanded in the Pacific," *U.S. Coast Guard Bulletin* VIII, No. 2 (August, 1952), p. 32.
[16] Don Huth, "Fliers Too Miserable to Fear Reds," *Kansas City Star* (January 21, 1953).
[17] Ibid.
[18] "Additional $26,500,000 Allows More Manpower, Equipment, and Benefits," *U.S. Coast Guard Bulletin* VI, No. 8 (February 1951), pp. 85-87.
[19] For an excellent summation and evaluation of the controversy see Johnson, pp. 282-283.
[20] Ibid., p. 281-282.
[21] Ibid., p. 281.
[22] Assistant Commandant Rear Admiral A.C. Richmond reported "To date we have found nothing that resembled an explosive of any kind." Joseph J. Ryan, "Coast Guard Checks 1,500 Ships But Turns Up No Atomic Weapons," *New York Times*, 26 February 1953.
[23] Letter, J.M. Jacobs to PACM Dave Cipra, 4 January 1983. Copy in possession of Coast Guard Historian's

Office Korean War subject file.
[24] "Historical Summary - USCG LORSTA Pusan," 1 July 1964. Copy in possession of Coast Guard Historian's Office Pusan LORAN Station unit file.
[25] "Only Coast Guard Outfit in Korea Attached to 17th," *Knight Life*, p. 4. Copy in possession of Coast Guard Historian's Office Pusan LORAN Station unit file.
[26] Johnson, p. 285; Although the Coast Guard demobilized to some extent after the signing of the Armistice, the service still stood at nearly 30,000 in 1954.
[27] "Spars Celebrate 10th Anniversary This Month," *U.S. Coast Guard Bulletin*, VIII, No. 5 (November, 1952), p. 112.

# Coast Guard Photo Essay

Click here to view photo

Coast Guard LORAN Station Pusan, code-named Elmo #4 near Pusan, South Korea in November, 1952. The Coast Guard quickly built the base and put it into operation to satisfy the need for adequate navigational services to United Nation's forces during the conflict.

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Coast Guard LORAN Station Pusan, code-named Elmo #4 near Pusan, South Korea in November, 1952. View of the transmitting antenna.

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Aerial view of the Coast Guard LORAN Station Pusan, code-named Elmo #4 near Pusan, South Korea in November, 1952. The station was the only Coast Guard manned station on the Korean peninsula during the war.

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A Coast Guard Martin PBM-5G Mariner. A seaplane such as this crashed while attempting to rescue the crew of a Navy P5M Neptune in 1953 off the coast of China. These large, twin-engine seaplanes were in wide use in the Coast Guard from 1943 through 1956. Note the detachable landing gear.

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A Coast Guard Martin PBM-5G Mariner. A seaplane such as this crashed while attempting to rescue the crew of a Navy P5M Neptune in 1953 off the coast of China. These large, twin-engine seaplanes were in wide use in the Coast Guard from 1943 through 1956. The "R-22" painted on the side of the seaplane's nose indicates its radio call sign "Rescue 22."

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A Coast Guard Martin PBM-5G Mariner taking off with the assistance of a JATO pack. A seaplane such as this crashed while attempting to rescue the crew of a Navy P5M Neptune in 1953 off the coast of China. These large, twin-engine seaplanes were in wide use in the Coast Guard from 1943 through 1956.

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John Vukic (as an Ensign in this photo) was the pilot of the Coast Guard PBM-5G that attempted to rescue the crew of a Navy P5M Neptune off the coast of China. He was one of the most experienced seaplane pilots in the Coast Guard.

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One of the Coast Guard's primary state-side tasks was to supervise the loading of ammunition and other

dangerous cargoes throughout U.S. ports. Here was a primitive loading site at Umatilla, Oregon. The barge is being loaded with bombs needed used by the U.N. air forces in Korea. Each barge carried 500 tons of explosives to the Beaver Ammunition Storage Point where it was offloaded onto ships for shipment to Japan and Korea.

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The Coast Guard contingent that assisted in developing a South Korean Coast Guard and Navy. The contingent first arrived soon after the end of World War II and members, including LCDR William Achurch, left, evacuated the peninsula on the heels of the North Korean attack in 1950.


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The USCGC Durant, a Navy destroyer escort commissioned into Coast Guard service. The Coast Guard acquired a number of Navy destroyer escorts to fill the gap in available cutters due to the increase in the number of ocean stations the service was tasked with operating. The DE's were outfitted essentially as they had been during World War II with the exception of the addition of a weather balloon shack and launching platform.

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The USCGC Bering Strait departing Honolulu Harbor on her way to her ocean station.

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The USCGC Bering Strait departing Honolulu Harbor on her way to her ocean station.

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The Coast Guard commissions the USCGC Finch, 24 August 1951. CPT Chauncey Moore, USN, the commander of Florida Group, supervises the transfer of the Finch to Coast Guard control. The Finch's commanding officer, CDR George R. Boyce, USCG, stands to the rear on the right.

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The USCGC Ramsden returns to Honolulu after a five month patrol in the Pacific. She served on the ocean station in the Northwest Pacific, 1953. Interestingly a Coast Guard crew manned the destroyer escort during World War II but remained a commissioned Navy warship. During her second career with a Coast Guard crew, she became a commissioned Coast Guard cutter.

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The cutter Lowe sails out for a trial run prior to sailing for the Pacific.

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The USCGC Vance in December, 1952. Note the PBM flying beyond her stern.

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The crew of the Coast Guard cutter Chincoteague rearm the hedgehog anti-submarine mortar. During the Korean conflict every cutter was heavily armed, including anti-aircraft and anti-submarine weapons.

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Senior Weather Bureau observer Edward J. Fencl seated at a RADIOSONDE receiver-recorder aboard the cutter Abesecon computes from a continuously moving graphic tape tracings transmitted from a balloon-borne RADIOSONDE transmitter high up in the atmosphere. His computations tell him the pressure, humidity, temperature, and wind velocity at various altitudes the balloon has reached.

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Duty on a weather station could be rough! Here, during a heavy storm, the cutter Matagorda's bow is thrust out of the water while on ocean station duty in 1951. The cutters maintained their stations through the worst weather.

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40mm gun drill on board a cutter while on ocean station duty.

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A Coast Guard crewman readies a bathythermograph. The device recorded sea water temperature to a depth of 450 feet.

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Crewmen prepare to release a weather balloon while on ocean station duty.

Click here to view photo

A crewman determines the velocity of surface winds by the use of an anemometer, one of the many instruments utilized by the ocean station cutters.

Click here to view photo

"In quest of 'PIBALS': That is to say: PIBALS are measurements of the direction and intensity of winds aloft obtained by tracking the movement of a small free balloon which has an assumed ascensional rate. The tracking is done visually with a speical type of transit known as a theodolite. As these men, on board a cutter, prepare to gather this type of weather information, the man at the theodolite gets the instrument set while his partner awaits the word to let the balloon go."



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"RADIOSONDE WEATHER BALLOON IN FLIGHT: A weather balloon is seen here at the instant of release from the deck of the cutter Absecon, just before the weight of the radiosonde transmitter is felt. Note the flattening of the upper side of the balloon."

Click here to view photo

The Korean naval base at Chinae, first established by a Coast Guard advisory team after the end of World War II. Chinae was a former base of the occupying Imperial Japanese.

Click here to view photo

7 February 1950. Discussing the value of and use of training aids with LCDR Chai, the liaison officer to the American advisors of the Korean Naval Academy. CDR William Achurch, the senior advisor to the Korean Navy, is on the left.

Click here to view photo

CDR Achurch and his wife entertain Chiang Kai-shek at the base at Chinae, during his visit to the base in August, 1949. He was establishing his Nationalist Chinese forces on the island of Formosa during this time after his defeat by the Communist Chinese.

**Historiography of the Korean War**
**Allan Millett**

[This review essay on the literature of the Korean War by Allan R. Millett appeared in the July 1997 issue of *The Journal of Military History* under the title, "A Reader's Guide to the Korean War." It is here reproduced in revised form with the gracious permission of Professor Millett, editor Dr. Henry Bausum, and the Society for Military History.]

Just which Korean War one reads about depends on what lessons the author intends to communicate, for the history of the war reeks with almost as much didacticism as blood. For an indictment of American and United Nations intentions and the conduct of the war, see Jon Halliday and Bruce Cumings, *The Unknown War* (New York: Pantheon, 1988). Their sympathy for the plight of Korea is admirable, but their bias toward the Communists is less appealing. In his new book, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), Cumings does not relent much from his position that the Communists had a slight edge in legitimacy and popularity and that America's conduct of the war was worse than a North Korean victory. British authors have written significant books: David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (London: Macmillan, 1964); Callum A. MacDonald, *Korea: The War before Vietnam* (New York: Free Press, 1986); Peter Lowe, *The Origins of the Korean War* (London: Longman, 1986); and Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). These authors give short shrift to American politics, but offer historical perspective and emotional distance. After publishing his book, however, MacDonald drifted into the Halliday-Cumings camp of anti-American criticism in his subsequent articles. William J. Stueck, Jr., *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995) provides the definitive history of the war as a test of the United Nations and postwar diplomatic deftness. Expanding in the anti-imperialist critique of the Peter Lowe genre is the interesting but overwrought Steven Hugh Lee, *Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).

John Toland and Clay Blair, two of America's most popular (in both senses of the term) military historians, have few reservations about the legitimacy of intervention or the Republic of Korea's right of self-defense. They are more interested in assessing U.S. military performance, however, individual as well as collective. Although Toland integrates South Korean and Chinese interviews to good effect, his focus is on the American effort. Blair's strengths are his knowledge of the Eighth Army and a keen eye for operational matters and sharp characterization of U.S. Army leaders. The two books in question are John Toland, *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Morrow, 1991), and Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War. America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987).

Works by disgruntled critics of America, the Truman administration, and the Army have a place in a Korean War library. The key political jeremiad is I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War, 1950-1951* (Boston: Little Brown, 1952), which portrays Truman as the dupe of the sinister Asia First partisans at home and abroad, led by John Foster Dulles and Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek). The military counterpoint to Stone is T. R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study of Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), a sharp critique of American culture's weakening effect on soldiers and politics, a book reprinted by the Army in 1993 with its errors and misrepresentations intact. More recent books in the same genre are Bevin Alexander, *Korea: The First War We Lost* (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), and Joseph Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story* (New York: Times Books, 1982), both short on original information and insight. Robert Leckie's *Conflict: The History of the Korean War* (New York: Putnam, 1962) reflects an admiration for the American infantryman and supports the war. Burton I. Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986) is a measured study of the Truman administration's conduct of the war. A new effort to look at the war's domestic context is Lisle A. Rose, *The Cold War Comes to Main Street: America in 1950*

(Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 1999).

Anthologies of informed, scholarly essays (sometimes mixed with good oral history) offer easy entrée to the issues. The best of a full field are Francis H. Heller, ed., *The Korean War. A 25-Year Perspective* (Lawrence: Regent's Press of Kansas for the Harry S. Truman Library, 1977); Bruce Cumings, ed., *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983); Frank Baldwin, ed., *Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945* (New York: Random House, 1973); William J. Williams, ed., *A Revolutionary War: Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World* (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1993); James I. Matray and Kim Chull-Baum, ed., *Korea and the Cold War* (Claremont, Calif.: Regina Books, 1993); Nagai Yonosuke and Akira Iriye, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977); Korean War Research Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, *The Historical Reillumination of the Korean War* (Seoul: War Memorial Service, 1990); and James Cotton and Ian Neary, eds., *The Korean War in History* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989).

**Causes of the War**

A civil war--as Korea surely was--has internal and international dynamics and its own shifting set of political actors, all of whom have agendas of their own. The Korean War is no exception. It was one of many such wars in this century in which the "great powers" chose to make a smaller nation a battleground. Of course, small nations (often plagued with politicians with large ambitions and imaginations) are perfectly capable of enticing larger nations to help sway the local political balance against domestic rivals or other great powers. The Chosin dynasty in Korea, for example, struggled to maintain its isolation and independence by playing the Chinese off against the Japanese, then appealed to Czarist Russia and the United States to protect it from its patrons. This too-clever but desperate bit of diplomacy resulted in two wars, the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, and thirty-five years of misery.

Just how much background one seeks is a matter of taste and time. There is ample reading: Carter J. Eckert, Lee Ki-Baik, Young Ick Lew, Michael Robinson, and Edward W. Wagner, *Korea: Old and New* (Seoul: Ilchokak, Publishers for the Korea Institute, Harvard University, 1990); George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, *Korea Today* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950); Choi Bong-Youn, *Korea--A History* (Rutland, Vt.: C. E. Tuttle Co., 1971); Donald Stone Macdonald, *The Koreans* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988); and Andrew C. Nahm, *Korea, Tradition and Transformation: A History of the Korean People* (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1988).

Literature on Korean-American relations before 1950 stands as a monument to the power of after-the-fact wisdom. Nevertheless, the idea of a communist plot, orchestrated by Moscow, that fell on an innocent South Korea basking in peace and prosperity, belongs in the dustbin of history. Ravaged by forced participation in World War II, with an elite compromised by two generations which survived under Japanese rule, Korea was divided by more than occupying armies and the 38th Parallel. It was caught between two modernizing movements, tainted legitimacy, authoritarian instincts, romantic economic dreams, and a dedication to political victory and control over a unified Korea. Kim Il Sung or Syngman Rhee would have felt comfortable on the throne of the kings of Unified Silla at Kyingju. For perspective on the conflicts before 1950, see Kwak Tae-Han, John Chay, Cho Soon-Sung, and Shannon McCune, eds., *U.S.-Korean Relations, 1882-1982* (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1982).

Works notable for their successful effort to link U.S. foreign policy with Korean political history include James I. Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985); Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968); James Merrill, *Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War* (Newark: University of

Delaware Press, 1989); William J. Stueck, Jr., *The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Charles M. Dobbs, *The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1981); and Lisle Rose, *Roots of Tragedy: The United States and the Struggle for Asia, 1945-1953* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976). For a more comprehensive and fresh look at the politics of Korean War mobilization and its effects on American domestic policy, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr., *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999).

Whether regarded with awe or dismay (or both), an inquiry that stands alone for its ability to define the causes of the conflict is Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, vol. 1, *Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), and vol. 2, *The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990). While Cumings may see wheels within wheels where none exist and be a master of inference, he knows Korean politics and recoils from the cant of American politicians, generals, and diplomats. He is no admirer of the communists and especially Kim Il Sung, but his political bias prevents him from seeing any legitimacy in the noncommunist leadership in South Korea, and he ignores the power of organized Christianity in the struggle for the soul of Korea. Also, Cumings has a limited understanding of the armed forces, so he often finds a malevolent purpose in simple bungling. While he writes too much, most of it is required reading.

The convoluted course of American diplomacy did not change in 1950. Arguments on the political direction of the war are found in Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1985), as well as in *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990).

A major work by a Japanese scholar-journalist, Ryo Hagiwara, who covered North Korean politics for a Japanese communist newspaper, places the onus for initiating the 1950 invasion on Kim Il Sung. In *The Korean War: The Conspiracies by Kim Il Sung and MacArthur* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju Press, 1993), he concluded that P'yingyang pursued a course of risky opportunism that assumed reluctant support from China and Russia.

Assessments of the literature are found in Rosemary Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean Conflict in the Last Decade," *Diplomatic History* 15 (Summer 1991): 411-31, and Judith Munro-Leighton, "A Postrevisionist Scrutiny of America's Role in the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1950," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 1 (Spring 1992): 73-98. In addition, see Keith D. McFarland, *The Korean War: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York: Garland, 1986). Other valuable references are James I. Matray, ed., *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991); Harry G. Summers, *Korean War Almanac* (New York: Facts-on-File, 1990); Lester Brune, ed., *The Korean War. Handbook of the Literature and Research* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Stanley Sandler, ed., *The Korean War: An Encyclopedia* (New York: Garland, 1995); and three finding aids of films, the Inchon landing, and the defense of the Pusan Perimeter, all edited by Paul M. Edwards and published by Greenwood Press. Professor Edwards compiled a comprehensive bibliography, *The Korean War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Brune anthology is especially useful since it provides a series of essays that review the scholarship and historiography of a wide-range of Cold War subjects. The bibliographical listing of essays and articles is the most comprehensive one now available, a rival to the electronic bibliography that can be provided by the Air University Library for serious researchers.

## U.S. Political Direction

After presiding over the end of World War II as an accidental President, Harry S. Truman certainly did not need another war but got one. His version of events is found in his two-volume *Memoirs* (Garden City, N.Y.:

Doubleday, 1955-56), a selective but vital account to understanding problems at home and abroad. Truman biographies abound in uneven quality: David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992); Robert Donovan, *Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Norton, 1982); Richard F. Haynes, *The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973); Robert H. Ferrell, *Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency* (Boston: Little Brown, 1983); Donald R. McCoy, *The Presidency of Harry S. Truman* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1984); Bert Cochran, *Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1973); William E. Pemberton, *Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989), and Alonzo L. Hamby, *Man of the People: The Life of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Secretary of State Dean Acheson provided a personal interpretation of the war in *Present at the Creation* (New York: Norton, 1969) and in an abridged account, *The Korean War* (New York: Norton, 1971). The standard biographies of Acheson is Gaddis Smith, *Dean Acheson* (New York: Cooper Square, 1971), vol. 16 in the American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy series and James Chace's *Acheson; the Secretary of State Who Created the Modern World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); see also Ronald L. McGlothlen, *Controlling the Waves: Dean Acheson and U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia* (New York: Norton, 1993), and Douglas Brinkley, ed., *Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

Accounts by other participants include U. Alexis Johnson and J. Olivarius McAllister, *The Right Hand of Power* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), and Harold J. Noble, *Embassy at War* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1975). The institutional participation of the Department of State must be gleaned from documents published in *The Foreign Relations of the United States*, a standard though controversial publications program; volumes covering the period 1950 to 1953 total twenty-nine and were published between 1976 and 1984. National Security Council documents are also available in the National Security Archive, George Washington University.

The basic study on American intervention is Glenn D. Paige, *The Korean Decision, June 24-30* (New York: Free Press, 1968). Distressed by postwar Korean politics, Paige later denounced the book as too sympathetic to Truman and Acheson, but it remains a good work.

**Koreans on the War**

Treatments of the war written by Koreans and translated into English reflect a wide range of perspectives--except, of course, in official (there is no other) accounts by North Korea. Among the South Korean sources, however, one can find various degrees of outrage over intervention, remorse over the role of the Koreans themselves in encouraging foreign intervention, deep sadness over the consequences of the war, pride and contempt over the military performance of Koreans, a tendency to see conspiracy everywhere, and a yearning for eventual unification, peace, economic well-being, and social justice. There is no consensus on how to accomplish these goals, only the certainty that the war ruined the hope of a better Korea for the balance of the century. The literature also reflects a search for innate order and the rule of law, against a pessimistic conclusion that politics knows no moral order. Among the more scholarly and insightful works by Korean scholars are Kim Myung-Ki, *The Korean War and International Law* (Clairmont, Calif.: Paige Press, 1991); Pak Chi-Young, *Political Opposition in Korea, 1945-1960* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980); Cheong Sung-Hwa, "Japanese-South Korean Relations under the American Occupation, 1945-1950" (doctoral dissertation, University of Iowa, 1988); Kim Chum-Kon, *The Korean War, 1950-1953* (Seoul: Kwangmyong, 1980); Kim Joung-Won, *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development, 1945-1972* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975); Kim Gye-Dong, *Foreign Intervention in Korea* (Aldershot, U.K.: Dartmouth Publishing, 1993); Cho Soon-Sung, *Korea in World Politics, 1940-1950* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967); and, in Korean, Kim Yang-Myong,

*The History of the Korean War* (Seoul: Ilshin-sa, 1976).

Syngman Rhee is mythic in the depth of his failure and the height of his success, including keeping America involved in Korea, more or less on his terms. He succeeded where Jiang Jieshi, Ferdinand Marcos, and Ngo Dinh Diem failed. Robert T. Oliver, Rhee's American advisor and information agent, wrote two admiring books noted for their conversations and speeches: Robert T. Oliver, *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1955) and *Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960* (Seoul: Panmun Books, 1978). A less sympathetic view is found in Richard C. Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait* (Rutland, Vt.: Tuttle, 1960). Rhee's political contemporaries, who often shifted between being rivals and supporters, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. An exception is Louise Yim, *My Forty Year Fight for Korea* (London: Gollancz, 1952). Collective portraits of Korea's civilian and military leaders are found in Lee Chong-Sik, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), and Kim Se-Jin, *The Politics of the Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971).

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's account is *The U.S. Imperialists Started the Korean War* (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1977). For general background, see Robert A. Scalapino and Lee Chong-Sik, *Communism in Korea*, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), and Suh Dae-Sook, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univesity Press, 1967). For a biography of the late Great Supreme Leader, see Suh Dae-Sook, *Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), which is rich in data and insight. Expatriate North Korean officers discuss the war in Kim Chull Baum, ed., *The Truth About the Korean War* (Seoul: Eulyoo Publishing, 1991), along with Russian and Chinese participants.

**Military Allies, Political Doubters**

The study of political and military relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea is not exactly a "black hole" in Korean War historiography, but it is certainly a gray crevice. Activities of the Military Advisory Group Korea (KMAG) are described in very measured terms by Robert K. Sawyer, *KMAG in War and Peace* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1962), which is largely silent on atrocities, corruption, nepotism, and incompetence in the ROKA officer corps. Little of the work deals with the 1950-53 period, and it ignores the impressive fighting ability of some ROKA units and the professionalism of some of its officers. Sawyer is also less than frank in discussing U.S. Army policies that crippled the ability of the ROKA to resist the Korean People's Army invasion from the North. How, for example, could a ROKA division manage with no tanks and only one battalion of limited-range 105-mm howitzers? Some of these problems receive attention in Paek Sin-Yip, *From Pusan to Panmunjom* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992), the memoirs of an outstanding corps and division commander. Paik, however, and his brother General Paek In-Yip, are quiet on their past in the Japanese army and their dogged pursuit of the communist guerrillas in the South, 1948-50. The late Ching Il-Kwin, another ROKA officer, left extensive but untranslated memoirs. Frustrations over nation-building are more directly addressed in Gene M. Lyons, *Military Policy and Economic Aid: The Korean Case, 1950-1953* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961).

The American military of 1950-53, absorbed with its own problems of survival, showed little understanding of the greater agony of Korea, including a much-maligned South Korean army. But there is no longer any excuse for such insensitivity. A novel by Richard Kim, *The Martyred* (New York: George Braziller, 1964) and Donald K. Chung, *The Three Day Promise* (Tallahassee, Fla.: Father and Son Publishing, 1989), an autobiography, both relate heart-rending stories of family separation and ravaged dreams. The war is summarized in a work published by the Korean Ministry of National Defense, *The Brief History of ROK Armed Forces* (Seoul: Troop Information and Education Bureau, 1986). Soldiers of the Eighth Army could not avoid dealing with

Koreans since many served in American units under the Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) program, still in effect today, but often a haven for affluent conscripts who speak some English. An official history of the KATUSA program prepared by Richard Weinert and later revised by David C. Skaggs was published as "The KATUSA Experiment: The Integration of Korean Nationals into the U.S. Army, 1950-1965," *Military Affairs* 38 (April 1974): 53-58. For an interesting Korean perspective on the American war effort, see Bill Shinn, *The Forgotten War Remembered, Korea: 1950-1953* (Elizabeth, N.J.: Hollym International, 1996), the memoir of a Korean-American newspaper correspondent.

**The Armed Forces**

The body of literature on the strategic and operational performance of the armed forces in the Korean War is substantial and dependable, at least for operational concerns. Building on its commitment to a critical history in World War II, the military establishment worked with the same stubborn conviction that both the public and future generations deserved to know what happened in Korea and why. The products are generally admirable. For a big picture, start with Doris Condit, *The Test of War, 1950-1953* (Washington: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), the second volume in the "History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense" series. For the perspective on the Joint Chiefs, see James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, vol. 3, *The Korean War* (Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier, 1979), reissued in 1998 by the JCS Joint History Office in a more polished format.

The Department of the Army went to work with a vengeance on the history of the Korean War, but faded in the stretch. It produced an important policy volume: James F. Schnabel, *United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972). It published two theater-level operational titles: Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (1961), which covered the Eighth Army and X Corps from June until late November 1950, and Walter Hermes, Jr., *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (1966), on the "stalemate" period from October 1951 to July 1953. A much-delayed third volume by Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow* (1990), plugged the chronological gap from November 1950 to July 1951. The candor void is filled by Roy Appleman who dedicated his later years to writing tough-minded critiques, all published by the Texas A&M University Press: *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea* (1987); *Escaping the Trap: The U.S. Army in Northeast Korea, 1950* (1987); *Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur* (1989); and *Ridgway Duels for Korea* (1990). His work is required reading for anyone interested in tactical expertise on cold weather and night operations. While Appleman does not quite supersede S. L. A. Marshall, *The River and the Gauntlet* (New York: Morrow, 1953) or *Pork Chop Hill* (New York: Morrow, 1956), he shares the battlefield. So does Shelby Stanton with *America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1989), which resurrects the reputation of U.S. Army Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, a commander endowed with intelligence and skill yet cursed by a wretched personality. Battle books of the coffeetable variety abound. For a detached analysis, see Russell A. Gugeler, *Combat Actions in Korea* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954; reissued in 1970 and 1987).

The official Marine history is Lynn Montross et al., *History of U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953*, 5 vols. (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, Marine Corps, 1954-72), which covers the experience of the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Fleet Marine Force Pacific. Of other semiofficial Marine Corps books, the best is Robert D. Heinl, *Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968), and Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combat Helicopters* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).

The Navy published a one-volume official history: James A. Field, Jr., *History of United States Naval Operations Korea* (Washington: Director of Naval History, 1962); but two officers with line experience in World

War II produced an earlier and livelier account: Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *The Sea War in Korea* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1957). Walter Karig, Malcolm W. Cagle, and Frank Manson, *Battle Report, The War in Korea* (New York: Rinehart, 1952) is Navy journalism and instant history at its finest, strong on immediacy and short on perspective. Naval aviation receives special treatment in Richard P. Hallion, *The Naval Air War in Korea* (Baltimore: Nautical and Aviation Publishing, 1986).

The Air Force published one large monograph on the Korean War, the literary equivalent of a one-megaton blast with endless fallout: Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953*, rev. ed. (Washington: Office of the Chief of Air Force History, 1983), which is encyclopedic on the Air Force's effort to win the war alone and too coy about the actual results. Recent anthologies from the Office of Air Force History on the uses of combat aviation include essays on air superiority, strategic bombing, and close air support in Korea. Their modification of Futrell will be slow, but will start with Conrad C. Crane's history of the Korean air war, *A Rather Bizarre War: American Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950-1953* (University Press of Kansas, 1999).

Convinced of the value of their historical programs during and after World War II, the American armed forces mounted programs of field history and interviewing that served as documentary and internal-use histories as well as the grist for the official history publications series and unsponsored histories by private authors. Scholarly Resources has published on microfilm four sets of documents: (1) U.S. Army historical studies and supporting documents done during the war over virtually every aspect of the conflict; (2) the interim evaluation reports done as periodic operational reports done for the Commander Pacific Fleet (1950-1953) as periodic operational reports prepared by the Seventh Fleet and the Marine division and aircraft wing; (3) documents and reports preserved by the Department of State on Korea, 1950-1954; and (4) the documents created and stored by the United Nations armistice commission, 1951-1953. University Publications of America has produced a similar collection on microfiche of unpublished histories and after-action reports collected during and shortly after the war by the Far East Command's military history detachment. The sources of these studies are largely the participants themselves, the interviews then supplemented with Army records. The studies not only reconstruct operations from the division to the platoon level, but they also deal with a wide range of topical subjects. Books by or about senior American leaders are generally well done and show how wedded these officers were to World War II norms. Two Army officers of high repute wrote histories of the war: J. Lawton Collins, *War in Peacetime* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), and Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1967). But larger shadows blur the Collins-Ridgway war: Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, Statesman, 1945-1959* (New York: Viking, 1987); D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985); and Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crises in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Free Press, 1993), argues that World War II spoiled generals and distorted understanding of such concepts as proportionality and the relationship between ends and means. Limited war did not suit the high commanders of the 1950s, but only MacArthur challenged Truman's policy. This cautionary tale remains best told in John W. Spanier, *The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1959). For naval leaders, see Robert W. Love, Jr., ed., *The Chiefs of Naval Operations* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1980). The view from the top of the Air Force is found in Phillip S. Meilinger, *Hoyt S. Vandenberg* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). For the use of Army reserve forces, see William Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea* (Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane Press, 1996).

**Logistics and Coalition Warfare**

Korea provided an early test of whether the U.S. armed forces could support a limited war, coalition

expeditionary force and extemporize a regional, long-term base system at the same time. The answer, with many qualifications, was yes. The global picture (for one service) is described in James A. Huston, *Outposts and Allies: U.S. Army Logistics in the Cold War, 1945-1953* (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1988). A more detailed account of the combat theater by the same author is *Guns and Butter, Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in the Korean War* (Selinsgrove, Pa.: Susquehanna University Press, 1989). An earlier study is John G. Westover, *Combat Support in Korea* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1955). The best place to start the study of Korean War manpower and matériel mobilization is Terrence J. Gough, *U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War* (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1987). The medical experience may be found in Alfred E. Cowdrey, *The Medic's War* (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), another volume in the "United States Army in the Korean War" series. There are no comparable separate logistical histories for the other services, whose historians dealt with such matters as part of their operational histories.

**The Allies**

The political environment on Korean affairs at the United Nations is found in the works of Stueck (see above); Yoo Tae-Hoo, *The Korean War and the United Nations* (Louvain, Belgium: Librairie Desbarax, 1965); and Leon Gordenker, *The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959).

At the height of the war, the U.N. Command included ground forces from fourteen countries, excluding the United States. Nineteen nations offered to send ground combat units as part of the U.S. Eighth Army, but four proposed contributions were too little, too late. Three infantry divisions offered by the Chinese Nationalist government fell into another category: too large, too controversial. The largest non-U.S. contribution was the 1st Commonwealth Division, organized in 1951 from British army battalions and similar units from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The smallest was a platoon from Luxembourg. The ground forces included a Canadian brigade, Turkish brigade, New Zealand field artillery regiment, and battalions from France, Thailand, Ethiopia, Greece, the Philippines, Belgium, Australia, Colombia, and the Netherlands. The force reveals a careful political and geographical balance: contingents from Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Air and naval forces were similarly reinforced. Eight navies and four air arms deployed combat elements while eight nations sent air and sea transport. Five nations sent only medical units: Denmark, lndia, Italy, Norway, and Sweden.

Since the limited size of non-U.S. and non-ROKA contingents precluded them from having a great impact on the operational course of the war, their participation has been largely ignored in the United States. The exception is the dramatic participation of one or other units in a specific battle, for example, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment, which fought to the last bullet and trumpet call on the Imjin River in April 1951. This approach overlooks the potential lessons about coalition warfare represented in U.N. Command. It also ignores the useful exercise of seeing one's military practices through the eyes of allies, in this case nations that sent their best and toughest soldiers to Korea for experience. To honor them, Korea published short accounts in English of these national military contingents: Republic of Korea, Ministry of National Defense, *The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War*, 6 vols. (Seoul: War History Compilation Commission, 1975). The battlefields of Korea also have excellent monuments (most erected by Korea) to U.N. forces. The United States has made no comparable effort to recognize these forces, many of which were more effective than comparable American units. (For example, the most vulnerable corridor into the Han River Valley was defended in 1952 and 1953 by the 1st Marine Division and 1st Commonwealth Division.) Most American treatments of foreign contributions, however modest, are incorporated in U.S. organizational histories.

The 1st Commonwealth Division experience provides the most accessible account of service with the

Eighth Army and only muted criticism of the high command. The British history was written by a member of 1st Glosters, an esteemed general, and able historian, Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley. His books are *The British Part in the Korean War*, vol. 1, *A Distant Obligation* (London: HMSO, 1990), and vol. 2, *An Honourable Discharge* (London: HMSO, 1994). They supersede C. N. Barclay's *The First Commonwealth Division: The Story of British Commonwealth Land Forces in Korea, 1950-1953* (Aldershot, U.K.: Gale and Polden, 1954). Other accounts include Norman Bartlett, *With the Australians in Korea* (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954); Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War*, 2 vols. (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1981 and 1985); Herbert Fairlie Wood, *Strange Battleground: The Official History of the Canadian Army in Korea* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966); Historical Section, General Staff, Canadian Army, *Canada's Army in Korea* (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1956); and Tim Carew, *Korea: The Commonwealth at War* (London: Cassell, 1967). For an insightful review, see Jeffrey Grey, *The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988). An ambitious effort to integrate national history and the war is Ian McGibbon's *New Zealand and the Korean War*, vol. 1, *Politics and Diplomacy* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992) and vol. 2, *Combat Operations* (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1996). Dennis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974) is a comparable work. On naval cooperation, see Thor Thorgrimsson and E. C. Russell, *Canadian Naval Operations in Korean Waters, 1950-1953* (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1965). See also Adrian Walker, *A Barren Place: National Servicemen in Korea, 1950-1954* (London: Leo Cooper, 1994).

**Special Operations**

The story of United Nations Command (UNC) special operations is full of sound, fury, and secrecy, signifying more promise than performance. Much of the story remains unexplored and, perhaps, classified, as in the case of communications intelligence and cryptography. It is not easy, for example, to trace the story of Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activities Korea (CCRAK), Major Don Nichols's Detachment 2, 6004th Air Intelligence Service Squadron, and the international commandos of the Special Activities Group (SAG). The most "exposed" UNC special operations are those that involved UNC-ROKA partisan forces (eventually the United Nations Partisan Forces Korea) and U.S. Army airborne ranger companies. These units are the central characters in Ed Evanhoe, *Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), and William B. Breuer, *Shadow Warriors: The Covert War in Korea* (New York: John Wiley, 1996), with a good advisor's memoir, Col. Ben S. Malcom, *White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea* (Washington: Brassey's, 1996). Air Force special operations are described in Colonel Michael E. Haas, *Apollo's Warriors: United States Air Force Special Operations during the Cold War* (Montgomery, AL: Air University Press, 1997).

**Russia and the War**

From the beginning there were the Soviets--until they were written out of the history of the Korean War by their own hand and by those Western historians who could not identify a bear even if he was eating out of one's garbage can. The Soviet Union may not have started the war, but it certainly gave it a big bear hug and embraced it past Stalin's death and a period of détente in the mid-1950s. The collapse of the Soviet Union has reopened the issue of Russian connivance and collaboration, bolstered by tantalizing glimpses of Communist internally oriented histories and supporting documents. Retired Russian generals and diplomats have become regular participants in Korean War conferences, but Russian official histories are not translated or widely available to Western scholars with the requisite language skills. Nevertheless, the Russian role as sponsor

continues to receive clarification and is not diminished. Early plans emerge in Eric Van Ree, *Socialism in One Zone: Stalin's Policy in Korea, 1945-1947* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). Most recent admissions and revelations come from Soviet veterans who have talked to the media or participated in international conferences, including pilots and air defense specialists. Documentaary evidence has come primarily from Communist Party and foreign ministry archives. Material from the armed forces and KGB has been limited. Few documents have been translated and published, although Kathryn Weathersby--a Russian historian at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.--has taken up the grail of translation and interpretation through the *Bulletin* of the Cold War International History Project and the working papers issued by the Wilson Center. The British scholar Jon Halliday has also been active in interviewing Russian veterans.

Much of Moscow's involvement is found in works on Sino-Soviet relations primarily interpreted from a Chinese perspective. Two titles in this genre are Robert R. Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Politics of the Korean War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), and Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993).

Closer to the Russian sources are Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Mark A. O'Neil, "The Other Side of the Yalu: Soviet Pilots in the Korean War, Phase One, 1 November 1950-12 April 1951" (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1996).

**China and the War**

The recent release or leakage of Chinese sources, especially the wartime correspondence of Mao Zedong, has resulted in a new wave of scholarship by Hao Zrifan, Zhai Zhihai, Zhang Shu-gang, Chen Jian, and Michael Hunt in both article and essay form. These scholars add texture to such earlier works as Joseph Camilleri, *Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and Its Aftermath* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980); Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China: 1941-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963); and Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Mo Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

The continued complexity of Sino-American relations (with Korean history subsumed in this fatal and enduring attrati attraction) continues to draw serious scholars to issues intricate and elusive: Thomas Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr., *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1994); and Stephen Endicott and Edward Hagerman, *The United States and Biological Warfare* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1998). The latter work will attract special attention since the principal scholars at the Cold War International History Project, The Woodrow Wilson Center, announced in November 1998 that they had found Russian documents that proved that the Chinese and North Korean germ warfare charges were a hoax. The documents were then published in the CWIHP *Bulletin* (Winter, 1998/99).

One result of international collaboration on exploring the conflict between the United States and China is Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1989). A critical view of the People's Liberition Army is found in Zhang Shu-gang, *Mao's Military Romatiticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), based largely on a self-assessment, but this work should be matched with Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), on China's intervention and also based on Chinese sources. Unfortunately, the People's Liberation Army's official history,

Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui et al., *Zhongguo renmin Zhiguanjun Kangmei yuanchao zhanshi* [A history of the war to resist America and assist Korea by the Chinese People's Volunteers] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988), remains untranslated--at least for public use. Three Western works of lasting value are Alexander L. George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960); and Walter A. Zelman, *Chinese Intervention in the Korean War* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). For a face-of-battle account of People's Liberation Army struggles in the winter of 1950-51, see Russell Spurr, *Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. in Korea, 1950-1951* (New York: Henry Holt, 1988), which is based on interviews with veterans. Charles R. Shrader, *Communist Logistics in the Korean War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995), provides an able introduction to a critical subject on Sino-Korean operational limitations.

**Aftermath**

Finally, the impact of the war is discussed with care in the anthologies by Heller and Williams cited earlier. Also see the work edited by Lee Chae-Jin, *The Korean War: A 40-Year Perspective* (Claremont, Calif.: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1991). One beneficiary of the war was Japan---or at least those Japanese political groups allied to America, capitalism, and the social status quo. War-fueled prosperity and the diminished ardor for social reform is captured in Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War. Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989), and Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 2 (Spring 1993), is dedicated to "The Impact of the Korean War" with essays on Korea, China, Japan, and the United States. An especially interesting and stimulating effort at comparative, cross-cultural analysis of the effects of the Korean and Vietnam Wars is Philip West, Steven I. Levine, and Jackie Hiltz, eds., *America's Wars in Asia: A Cultural Approach to History and Memory* (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), which is an anthology of essays produced by a conference held in 1995 at the University of Montana's Mansfield Center. Although the authors, especially the Asians, offer stimulating interpretations of the war's effects, they are ill-informed about the military events upon which some of their analysis rests.

The publishing event of the fiftieth anniversary will be the appearance of an English-language translation of the War History Compilation Committee, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, *Han'guk Chinjaeng-sa* (1966-1977) in six volumes. *The Korean War*, of which one (1977) volume of three has appeared, is much more than abridged version of the original series. Organized by professional historians of the new Korea Institute of Military History, physically located at the War Memorial, Yongsan, Seoul, the *Korean War* is a major revision that incorporates the most recent Soviet documents and Chinese writing on the war, enhanced by extensive interviews with ROK Army veterans. The direction of the project is Colonel (Doctor) Chae Han Kook, chief of the Institute's new history department.

*Table 1.*—THE FAR EAST COMMAND, JUNE–AUGUST 1950




*Commands assigned or created subsequent to commencement of Korean hostilities.

*Table* 2.—Naval Forces in Japanese Waters, 25 June 1950

TASK FORCE 90. Amphibious Force, Far East. — Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle.

- *Mount McKinley* (F) ..... 1 AGC
- *Cavalier* ..... 1 APA
- *Union* ..... 1 AKA
- *LST 611* ..... 1 LST
- *Arikara* ..... 1 ATF

TASK FORCE 96. Naval Forces, Japan. — Vice Admiral C. T. Joy.

Task Group 96.5. Support Group. — Rear Admiral J. M. Higgins.

Task Unit 96.5.1. Flagship Element. — Captain J. C. Sowell.

- *Juneau* (F) ..... 1 CLAA.

Task Unit 96.5.2. Destroyer Element. — Captain H. C. Allan, Jr.

- Destroyer Division 91: *Mansfield* (F), *De Haven, Collett, Lyman K. Swenson* ..... 4 DD.

Task Unit 96.5.3. British Commonwealth Support Element. — Comdr. I. H. McDonald, RAN.

- HMAS *Shoalhaven* ..... 1 PF.

Task Unit 96.5.6. Submarine Element. — Lt. Comdr. L. V. Young.

- *Remora*[1] ..... 1 SS.

Task Group 96.6. Minesweeping Group. — Lt. Comdr. D. V. Shouldice.

Mine Squadron 3:

- Mine Division 31: *Redhead, Mocking Bird, Osprey, Partridge, Chatterer, Kite* ..... 6 AMS.
- Mine Division 32: *Pledge* (F),[2] *Incredible*,[3] *Mainstay*,[3] *Pirate*[3] ... 4 AM.

[1] On loan from Seventh Fleet. [2] In reduced commission. [3] In reserve.

## *Table* 3.—Seventh Fleet, 25 June 1950

SEVENTH FLEET — Vice Admiral A. D. Struble.

Task Group 70.6. Fleet Air Wing 1. — Captain E. Grant.
- VP 28 — 9 P4Y–2.
- VP 47 — 9 PBM–5.

Task Group 70.7. Service Group. — Captain J. R. Topper.
- *Piedmont* (F) — 1 AD.
- *Navasota* — 1 AO.
- *Karin* — 1 AF.
- *Mataco* — 1 ATF.

Task Group 70.9. Submarine Group. — Comdr. F. W. Scanland.
- *Segundo* (F), *Catfish*, *Cabezon*,[1] *Remora*[2] — 4 SS.
- *Florikan*[3] — 1 ASR.

Task Force 77. Striking Force. — Vice Admiral A. D. Struble.

Task Group 77.1. Support Group. — Captain E. L. Woodyard.
- *Rochester* (FF) — 1 CA.

Task Group 77.2. Screening Group. — Captain C. W. Parker.
- Destroyer Division 31 less *Keyes* and *Hollister* plus *Radford* and *Fletcher*: *Shelton*, *Eversole*, *Radford*, *Fletcher* — 4 DD.
- Destroyer Division 32: *Maddox*, *Samuel L. Moore*, *Brush*, *Taussig* — 4 DD.

Task Group 77.4 Carrier Group. — Rear Admiral J. M. Hoskins.
- *Valley Forge* (F) — 1 CV.

[1] Relieved by *Pickerel* 11 July. [2] On loan to Naval Forces Japan. [3] Relieved by *Greenlet* 30 June.

## *Table* 4.—Commonwealth Naval Forces, 30 June 1950

Task Group 96.8. British Commonwealth Forces.

Rear Admiral Sir W. G. Andrewes, RN.

| | |
|---|---|
| HMS *Triumph* | 1 CVL. |
| HMS *Belfast* (F), HMS *Jamaica* | 2 CL. |
| HMS *Cossack*, HMS *Consort*, HMAS *Bataan* | 3 DD. |
| HMS *Black Swan*, HMS *Alacrity*, *HMS Hart*, *HMAS Shoalhaven* | 4 PF. |

*Table* 5.—Naval Operating Commands, 25 June–20 July 1950 (NavFE OpOrds 5–50 (revised), 8–50)




WAR BEGINS
26 June - 5 July, 1950
0 50
Nautical miles
2.
Limit of Blockade
Korea Bay
38° parallel
6 Divisions
1 Div.
2 Divisions
1 Division
1 Div.
1 Div.
AREA Z SWENSON
AREA Y MANSFIELD
TF77 3-4 July
TF Smith 5 July
TF Smith One battalion
Air attack on BLACK SWAN 3 July
Bombardments by JUNEAU, BLACK SWAN, & JAMAICA 29 June - 5 July
JUNEAU sinks surface target 290204
ROKN sinks 3 small craft 3 July
JUNEAU departs 281900
NK transport sunk by ROKN 260030
24th DIV. 1 July ff.
JUNEAU dep. 271930
TF 90 arr. 3 July ff.
Enemy movement
U.N. movement
Course of JUNEAU
Bombardment
Air attack
Sinking
Chongjin
Wonsan
Kangnung
Seoul
Inchon
Pohang
Pusan
Sasebo
Fukuoka
Korea Strait
Tsushima Str.
JAPAN
CHEJU-DO
126°
127°
128°
129°
130°
41°
40°
39°
38°
37°
36°
35°
34°

**The Sea War in Korea**

**Notes**

**Chapter 1. Gathering War Clouds**

[1] Defense treaty signed 1 January 1948 by Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
[2] The Brussels Treaty was signed 17 March 1948 by the Benelux countries, plus England and France. It was another regional collective defense arrangement within the framework of the United Nations and modeled to a considerable extent after the Rio Treaty. (*A Decade of American Foreign Policy 1941–49*, Department of State, p. 1333.)
[2A] The treaty was originally signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, The Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, Italy, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Later, in February 1952, Greece and Turkey signed, and Western Germany entered in May of 1955, to make a total of 15 nations.
[2B] The 38th parallel of North Latitude measures 19,648 miles around the globe. The part that crosses Korea—196 miles—is exactly one percent of the whole. Few latitude lines span more land than 38º North; it crosses 12 countries, including the United States, China, and Russia.
[3] Soviet forces first entered Korea on 12 August 1945, and proceeded with immediate occupation.
[4] *Background Information on Korea. Report from the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report No. 2495, July 11, 1950,* p. 3.
[5] *Ibid*, p. 10.
[6] *Unification and Strategy. A Report of the Investigation by the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, March 1, 1950,* p. 1.
[7] *Ibid,* p. 42.
[8] *Ibid,* p. 2
[9] *Ibid,* p. 9.
[10] During the *"National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy"* hearings which followed, Chairman Vinson stated as follows: ". . . The rumors became so prevalent and it was floating around to such an extent in Congress that it was necessary for me, speaking on behalf of the Committee, to see the Secretary of Defense and get a statement to the effect that he wasn't going to transfer the Marines to the Army and he wasn't going to transfer Marine aviation to the Air Force." p. 386.
[11] From copy of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson's letter to Mr. Carl Vinson, reprinted in a *Report of Investigation by the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, on Unification and Strategy, March 1, 1950,* p. 6.
[12] *Ibid,* p. 7.
[13] *"The National Defense Program—Unification and Strategy." Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, First Session, October 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1949,* p. 63.
[14] *Ibid,* p. 64; also 402–3.
[15] *Ibid,* p. 401.
[15A] General Vandenberg is referring to the CVA-58, the USS *United States,* whose construction had been cancelled by the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson.
[16] *Ibid,* pp. 471–473.
[16A] General Carl Spaatz, USAF, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force, had written in *Newsweek*, 17 October, 1949, that "The Navy now spends more than half its total appropriations in support of naval aviation. The result is that the nation is dissipating its wealth and wasting aviation talent in supporting two air forces.

"This is dangerous. Nothing less than United States air supremacy is at stake. This leadership can not be

maintained unless the country's military air resources are pooled and placed under the control of one organization. . "

[17] *Ibid,* p. 52; also p. 525.

[18] *Ibid,* Testimony of General Omar Bradley, pp. 515–541.

[19] *Ibid,* p. 41.

[20] *Ibid,* p. 41.

[21] *Ibid,* p. 57.

[22] *Ibid,* Testimony of Admiral (then Captain) Arleigh A. Burke, who was to become Chief of Naval Operations on 17 August 1955, p. 255.

[23] *Ibid,* Testimony of Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations,. p. 349, *et al*. Admiral Denfeld was to be subsequently relieved as CNO on the recommendation of the Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews.

[24] *Ibid,* p. 302–3.

[25] *Ibid,* p. 257.

[26] *Unification and Strategy. A Report of Investigation, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, March 1, 1950,* p. 15.

[27] *Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, October 6–21, 1949,* p. 536.

[28] *Ibid,* p. 466.

[29] *Ibid,* p. 559.

[29A] On 10 June 1956, the Italian Catholic Action newspaper, *Il Quotidiano,* published what is said were missing portions of Nikita Khrushchev's now famous speech attacking Stalin which were not included in the version released by the U.S. State Department. Herein, the newspaper stated that Khrushchev recognized Soviet responsibility for the Korean War. The theory advanced is that Stalin's jealousy of Red China's dictator, Mao Tzetung, caused him to embroil Red China and the U.S. in Korea so that he might emerge the undisputed dictator. According to the Roman newspaper, these were Khrushchev's words:

"His (Stalin's) anti-realistic consideration of the attitude of the Western Nations in the face of developments in Asia has contributed to the risky situation for the entire socialist cause such as developed around the war in Korea."

[30] On page 1740, *Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on "Military Situation in the Far East,"* Secretary Acheson explained how Korea came to be excluded from the U.S.'s defensive perimeter: ". . . The United States had certain points which were a defensive perimeter. At those points (Okinawa, Philippines) United States troops were stationed; there they would stay and there they would fight.

"In regard to other areas, I said nobody can guarantee that; but what we can say is that if people will stand up and fight for their own independence, their own country, the guaranties under the United Nations have never proved a weak reed before, and they won't in the future. I think that is a fairly accurate statement of what has happened. . . . . .

"What I said here (in the Press Club Speech of 12 Jan. 1950) is almost exactly what Mr. Dulles was saying in Korea in June 1950."

[31] See pages 1990–2, *Hearings before House Armed Services Committee.* Regarding these intelligence reports, Secretary of State Dean Acheson said: "I do not believe there was a failure of intelligence. . . . . Intelligence was available to the Department prior to the 25th of June, made available by the Far East Command, the CIA, the Department of the Army, and by the State Department representatives here and overseas, and shows that all agencies were in agreement that the possibility for an attack on the Korean Republic existed at that time, but they were all in agreement that its launching in the summer of 1950 did not appear imminent.

"The view was generally held that since the Communists had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimidation, such means would continue to be used rather than overt military aggression."

[31A] To this particular dispatch, the G-2 section of the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) headquarters attached the following comment:

"Comment: The People's Army will be prepared to invade South Korea by fall and possibly by spring of this year indicated in the current report of armed force expansion and major troop movements at critical 38th parallel areas. Even if future reports bear out the present indication, it is believed civil war will not necessarily be precipitated. . . ." Secretary Acheson also called attention to a G-2 CINCFE comment made 25 March 1950 on their estimate of the probability of civil war in Korea:

"It is believed there will be no civil war in Korea this spring or summer. The most probable course of North Korean action this spring or summer is furtherance of its attempt to overthrow the South Korean government by the creation of chaotic conditions in the Republic through guerilla activities and psychological warfare."

[32] Dispatches quoted from *MacArthur 1941–1951* by C. A. Willoughby, p. 352.

[32A] An observation team of the UN commission on Korea forwarded a report of an inspection trip dated 24 June 1950 which said that they "had, in the course of a two-weeks inspection trip, been left with the impression that the Republican Army was organized entirely for defense and (was) in no condition to carry out a large scale attack against the forces in the north." The observers found that the ROK forces were disposed in depth all along the 38th parallel with no concentration of troops at any point, that a large number of ROK forces were actively engaged in rounding up guerrillas, and were, in any case, entirely lacking in the armor, heavy artillery, and air support necessary to carry off an invasion of North Korea.

[32B] Blair House, in Washington, was being used as the temporary Executive Mansion pending repairs to the White House itself.

[33] All paraphrased excerpts.

[34] *Background Information on Korea, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Report No. 2495, 11 July 1950,* p. 48.

[35] *Ibid,* p. 53.


3.
Manchurian Plain
Mukden
Harlung
Sungari R.
Liao R.
Chinhsien
Yingkow
Liaotung Peninsula
Antung
Sinuiju
Yalu R.
Suiho Res.
Taitzu R.
Dairen
Port Arthur
Port Arthur Naval Base Area
38th Parallel
Pyongyang
Chinnampo
Kyomipo
Taedong R.
Sinanju
Kaoggye
Hyesanjin
Pai Shan
Hoeryong
Najin
Tumen R.
Chongjin
Songjin
Hungnam
Wonsan
Korean Gulf
Imjin R.
Kumgang San
Yangyang
Kaesong
Seoul
Inchon
Wonju
Samchok
Ulleung do
Pusan
Taegu
Pohang
Kunsan
Taejon
Kum R.
Mokpo
Yosu
Chinju
Kwangju
Sunchon
Yellow Sea
Korean Strait
Tsushima Strait
Pt. Hamilton
Shimonoseki
Fukuoka
Saseba
KYUSHU
HONSHU
JAPAN
SHANTUNG
CHEJU DO
THE KOREAN THEATER
Nautical miles
122°
124°
126°
128°
130°
42°
40°
38°
36°
34°


4. BOMBARDMENT and REINFORCEMENT.
6-14 July, 1950
50 Nautical miles
Coastal raid by JUNEAU and MANSFIELD, 12 July
Blockade Limit
Korea Bay
Bombarding ships:
British 6-8 July JAMAICA, BLACK, SWAN, HART
U.S. 8-14 July SWENSON, JUNEAU, MANSFIELD, DE HAVEN, COLLETT
11 July
7-11 July
6 July
11 July
10 July
10 July
13 July
10-13 July
10 July
8 July
7 July
13 July
8-14 July
Seoul
Inchon
Wonju
Chungju
Yongju
ROK
ROK
ROK
Andong
24
25
Taejon
Kunsan
Chonju
Taegu
Pohang
Yongil Man
Harbor Recce 11 July
Kyongju
Ulsan
Pusan
Masan
Chinju
Kwangju
Mokpo
Kangjin
Korea Strait
Tsushima
Tsushima Str
25. DIV 9. July ff.
Sasebo
CHEJU-DO
XX Division
Enemy movement
U.N. movement
Naval bombardment

## *Table 6.*—Pohang Attack Force

Task Force 90. Attack Force. — Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle.

- Task Force 91. Landing Force. — Major General Hobart Gay, USA.
- Task Group 90.1. Tactical Air Control Group. — Comdr. E. Moore.
  Tacron 1.
- Task Group 90.2. Transport Group.
  1 AGC, 1 APA, 3 AKA.
- Task Group 90.3. Tractor Group. — Captain N. W. Sears.
  1 USN LST, 15 Scajap LST, 2 ATF, 1 ARS, 6 LSU.
- Task Group 90.4. Protective Group. — Lt. Comdr. D. V. Shouldice.
  2 DD, 1 AM, 6 AMS.
- Task Group 90.7. Reconnaissance Group. — Lt. Comdr. J. R. Wilson.
  1 APD, 1 UDT detachment.
- Task Group 90.8. Control Group. — Lt. Comdr. C. E. Allmon.
  1 APD,[1] 1 ATF.[2]
- Task Group 90.9. Beach Group. — Lt. Comdr. J. L. Lowentrout.
  1 Beachmaster Unit detachment, 1 UDT detachment.
- Task Group 90.0. Follow-up Shipping Group. — Captain D. J. Sweeney.
  3 AP, 12 Scajap LST, 4 *Maru*.
- Task Group 96.5. Gunfire Support Group. — Rear Admiral J. H. Higgins.
  1 CLAA, 3 DD,[3] 1 RAN DD.

Close air support from Seventh Fleet; deep air support from FEAF; patrol aircraft from Task Group 96.2.

[1] From Task Group 90.7. [2] From Task Group 90.3. [3] 2 DD from Task Group 90.4.


5.
POHANG LANDING
CARRIER STRIKES
15-23 July, 1950
50
Nautical Miles
Blockade limit
Korea Bay
JUNEAU & Destroyers 15-17 and 19-23 July
BELFAST & Destroyers 17-21 July
Sweep 19 July
18 July
16-17 July
15-19 July
20-23 July
TF 77 22 July
TF 77 18-19 July
TF 90
I. CAVDIV landing 18 July ff.
I. CAV
ROK Action 22-23 July
NK
Pohang
Pusan
Seoul
Inchon
Taegu
Chonju
Kyongju
Ulsan
Masan
Mokpo
Kangjin
Korea Strait
Tsushima Str.
TSUSHIMA
CHEJU-DO
Perimeter forming
Sasebo
CRUDIV.3 and DESDIV.111 arr. from U.S. 23 July ff.
125
126
127
128
129
130
33
34
35
36
37
38
39


6.
THE PERIMETER TAKES FORM
24 July - 1 Aug.
0 50
Nautical miles
Blockade limit
Korea Bay
Bombardment by BELFAST & BATAAN 1 Aug.
ROKN 27 July
Tokchok-to
Attacking enemy MSR
Intermittent sweeps
FIS by destroyers 24-26 July. TOLEDO & destr. 27 July - 1 Aug.
I CAVDIV landg ops completed 30 July
ROKN 30 July
TF 77 28-29 July
TF 77 26 July
TF 77 25 July
TF 77 27 July fuelling
29 RCT
Perimeter
Seoul
Inchon
Pusan
Pohang
Chonju
Taegu
Kunsan
Anma-do
CHEJU-DO
Korea Strait
Tsushima Sts.
Sasebo
ROKN action K
Fire support FIS

*Table* 7.—Naval Operating Commands, 21 July–11 September 1950

(NavFE Opord 5–50, revisions of 21 July ff)




7
SUPPORT OF THE PERIMETER, 2-13 Aug.
50 Nautical miles
Blockade Stations
Escort Carriers
Operating areas of TF 77 A-F
ROKN engagements K
Korea Bay
Blockade Limit
H.A. BASS raid 13-14 Aug
Blockade St 13 Aug.
AREA 7
Est 12 Aug.
HELENA and 4 destroyers 7 Aug
Hungnam Bl. Sta. 13 Aug.
HELENA and 4 destroyers 8 Aug.
TOLEDO and 2 destroyers 7-8 Aug.
Blo. Sta est 5 Aug.
BELFAST, KENYA CHARITY, COSSACK 5 Aug.
TF 77 13 Aug '50
SICILY 5 Aug.
Ochong do ROKN base
TF 77 10 Aug
TF 77 12 Aug.
TF 77 9 Aug.
TF 77 7 Aug.
COCKADE COSSACK 2 Aug.
F/S TOLEDO GROUP 2-8 Aug.
HELENA GR. 8-13 Aug.
Perimeter
Arrivals:
1 Aug. RCT 5 and elements of 2 Div.
2 Aug. 1st MARBRIG.
Pusan
COLLETT 12 Aug.
DIACHENKO 4-5 Aug.
CAYUGA + ATHABASKAN sweep 9 Aug.
HIGBEE sweep 2-3 Aug
Korea Strait
Tsushima
Tsushima Str
BADOENG STRAIT 6 Aug
R/V SICILY
CHEJU-DO
Fuelling TF 77 11 Aug
TF 77 6 Aug
CVE OPAREA 3-4, 7-13 Aug.
Sasebo
Fuelling TF 77 8 Aug.
TF 77 5 Aug. 40 n miles to south


8.
SUPPORT OF THE PERIMETER
Carrier strikes of 6. Aug. 1950
Nautical miles
Perimeter
PHILIPP SEA Bridge strike
4 AD Troops
5 AD Troops
6 F4U Bridges
12 F4U Troops
7 AD Trucks Troops
7 AD Supply dumps Troops
4 F4U + 6 F4U Troops
5 AD Bridge
FIS
TOLEDO
DE HAVEN
SWENSON
Chonan
Chongju
Hamchang
Andong
Taechon
Taejon
Hunggan
Kumchon
Waegwan
Taegu
Yongdok
Chongha
Pohang
Kunsan
Chonju
Kochang
Kwangju
Namwon
Sanchung
Yongsan
Miryang
Masan
Chinhae
Pusan
Haadong
Sunchon
Samchon
Tongyong
Mokpo
Yosu
Chindo
TSUSHIMA
126°
127°
128°
129°
130°
36°
35°


9. SUPPORT OF THE PERIMETER, 14-24 Aug. 1950
50 Nautical miles
Blockade limit
AREA 7
TOLEDO • 3 destr. 17 Aug.
MANSFIELD 22 Aug.
HELENA • 4 destr. 24 Aug.
H.A. BASS raid 14 Aug.
TF 77 17 Aug.
H.A. BASS raid 15 Aug.
WILTSIE 24 Aug.
TF 77 16 Aug.
DE HAVEN 20 Aug.
ATHABASKAN 18 Aug.
TF 77 20 Aug.
COMUS air attack 22 Aug.
BASS beach Recco 23-24
TRIUMPH OPAREA 13-16, 19-21 Aug.
TF 77 19 Aug.
H.A. BASS beach Recco 20-21 Aug.
JAMAICA 15 Aug.
F/S HELENA group 14-18 Aug.
TOLEDO gr. 18-26.
Evacuation ROK 3 DIV. 16-17 Aug.
MOUNTS BAY JAMAICA 14 Aug.
SWENSON 20 Aug.
MANSFIELD 23 Aug.
Korea Bay
Korea Strait
Tsushima Str.
Seoul
Pusan
Inchon
Wonsan
Pohang
Kunsan
Chonju
Taegu
Kuryongpo
Chinhae
Masan
Kojo
Kosong
Chumunjin
Chongjin
Twon
Hungnam
Hamhung
Sokto
Cho do
Yonan
Chongju
Kongju
Taejon
Yongdok
Chongha
Waegwan
Kyongju
Ulsan
Hyopchon
Yongchon
Haeinsa
Kwangju
Sunchon
Yosu
Mokpo
Kangjin
Chindo
Kum R.
ROKN engagement K
Blockade station
Fuelling TF 77 18 Aug. 40m to south
CVE OPAREA supports sea perimeter
CHEJU-DO
A
B
C
D
E
F
K


10. THE PERIOD OF CRISIS
25 Aug.-4 Sept. 1950
0 50 Nautical miles
Chongjin
Blockade limit
BLO. STA.
HELENA & 4 DD 25 Aug.
AREA 7
Hungnam
Wonsan
TF 77 27 Aug.
Blockade limit
Korea
Bay
Russian bomber 4 Sept. See map
Floating mines 4 Sept.
Kosong
CHANDLER 25 Aug.
BLO. STA.
TF 77 4 Sept.
BLO. STA
Seoul
Inchon
Ullung-do
TF 77 1 Sept.
TF 77 26 Aug.
BLO. STA.
HMS. TRIUMPH 25-26 Aug - 4 Sept.
TF 77 30 Aug.
TF 77 2 Sept.
TF 77 29 Aug.
F/s TOLEDO Gr. 25-26 Aug - 1 Sep. ff
HELENA Group 26 Aug - Sept. 1
Pohang
BASS, Beach Recco 24-25 Aug.
Okku
Chonju
Taegu
Kwangju
Fuksong
Pusan
ROKN engagement
Blockade station
F/s by one DD 26 Aug. ff
Korea Strait
Tsushima Str.
TF 77 3 Sept. Replenishg
TF 77 31 Aug. Replenishg
CHEJU-DO
25-30 Aug. CVE OPAREA Supporting southern perimeter
TF 77 28 Aug. fuelling
Sasebo
A
B
C
D
E
F

160


11.
123°
124°
125°
PORT ARTHUR NAVAL BASE AREA
U.S.S.R.
HAIYANG TAO
Radar contact 1329
1335
1331
Shot down 1343
Contact splits 1333
THOMAS DD
1335
Bomber opens fire
Estim. speed 180 kts
alt. 12,000 feet
1337
1338 Merged plot
1337 Twin-engine bomber sighted
1335
CAP-4F4U
10,000 feet
TF 77
1330
CAP-4F4U
12,000 feet
Mud banks
Chinnampo
Sok-to
Cho-do
Sir James Hall Is.
SHANTUNG PEN.
(China)
THE RUSSIAN BOMBER INCIDENT 4. Sep. 1950
30
Naut. miles

*Table 8.*—FAR EAST COMMAND ORGANIZATION, INCHON AND WONSAN LANDINGS




*When Commanding General assumes command ashore, X Corps reverts to the direct control of CincFE and Joint Task Force 7 is dissolved.

## *Table 9.*—Joint Task Force 7: Inchon

Joint Task Force 7. — Vice Admiral A. D. Struble.

Task Force 90. Attack Force. — Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle.

1–2 AGC, 1 AH, 1 AM, 6 AMS, 3 APD, 1 ARL, 1 ARS, 1 ATF, 2 CVE, 2 CA, 3 CL (1 USN, 2 RN), 1 DE, 12 DD, 5 LSD, 3 LSMR, 4 ROKN PC, 1 PCEC, 8 PF (3 USN, 2 RN, 2 RNZN, 1 French), 7 ROKN YMS, 47 LST (30 Scajap), plus transports, cargo ships, etc., to a total of approximately 180.

Task Force 91. Blockade and Covering Force.
Rear Admiral Sir W. G. Andrewes, RN.

1 CVL, 1 CL, 8 DD.

Task Force 92. X Corps. — Major General E. M. Almond, USA.

1st Marine Division, Reinforced; 7th Infantry Division, Reinforced; Corps Troops.

Task Force 99. Patrol and Reconnaissance Force.
Rear Admiral G. R. Henderson.

2 AV, 1 AVP, 3 USN and 2 RAF Patrol Squadrons.

Task Force 77. Fast Carrier Force. — Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen.

2–3 CV, 1 CL, 14 DD.

Task Force 79. Service Squadron. — Captain B. L. Austin.

2 AD, 1 AE, 2 AF, 1 AK, 3 AKA, 3 AKL, 4 AO, 1 AOG, 1 ARG, 1 ARH, 1 ARS, 1 ATF.


12.
THE INCHON APPROACHES
Aug.-Sep. 1950
0 10 20 30
Nautical miles
Changyon
Taedong Man
Paengyong-do
SIR JAMES HALL I.
Taechong-do
Sochang-do
HMS CEYLON Ldg. 29 Sep.
ROKN Ldg 26 Sep.
Ongjin
Haeju
Kaesong
Yonan
Yongmae-do
ROKN Ldg 20 Sep.
Yonpyong-do
ROKN Ldg 8 Sep.
Turugsan-got
Bombardment and air strike 27 Sep.
Air Operating Joint Task Force 7
KUMPO PEN
Kimpo
Sosa
Seoul
Inchon
Yongdungpo
Uijongbu
Suwon
Osan
Chonan
Charwon
ROKN Ldg 17 Aug.
Air attack on COMUS, 22 Aug.
Tokchok to
SO SUDO
Yonghong-do
Palmi-do
Taehu-do
ROKN Ldg 20 Aug.
Asan Man
ATTACK FORCE APPROACH ROUTE
H.A. BASS Beach recco 23-24 Aug.
Area
38°
37°
125°
126°
127°


13. NORTH TO THE PARALLEL, 5-30 Sept. 1950
Nautical miles
Blockade limit
BRUSH mined 26 Sept.
SEGUNDO Spec. Mission 23 Sept.
AREA 7
HELENA, BRUSH, THOMAS, 10 Sept.
Blockade Limit
Korea Bay
TRIUMPH 8 Sept.
MANSFIELD mined 30 Sept.
Line of 30 Sept.
SirJames Hall Is.
MANCHESTER 4 DD 27 Sept.
HELENA, BRUSH 14 Sep. MISSOURI, HELENA BRUSH, MADDOX 15 Sept.
TRIUMPH 16-17+22-25 Sept.
JTF 7 AIR
CVE OPAREA 13 Sept. - 2 Oct.
PRESERVE
TRIUMPH 9 Sep.
ROKN YMS 309 mined 28 Sept.
HELENA, ENDICOTT 9 Sept.
TF 77 OPAREA 12 Sept. - 30 Oct.
BASS Beach Recco 22-23 Sept.
Changsadong
Fls 5-23 Sept.
HMS TRIUMPH 13-15 Sept.
TF 77 REPLENISHMENT AREA
Pusan
Korea Strait
Tsushima Str.
Inchon Attack Force sailed from Yokohama 5-9 Sept. from Kobe 10-12 Sept. from Pusan 13 Sept. Arrived Inchon 15 Sept.
CHEJU-DO
to Inchon
Sasebo
to Inchon
30 Sept.
26 Sept.
23 Sept.
16 Sept.
5 Sept.


THE INCHON ASSAULT, 15 Sept. 1950
14.
126°34'
36'
38'
YONGJONG DO
203
Chagyak-to
One nautical mile
LSMR
MANSFIELD
DE HAVEN
RED BEACH
INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT
SWENSON
GREEN BEACH
330
WOLMI DO
Mud
28'
INCHON
Salt pans
Tidal Basin
Tidal Basin under constr.
Sowolmi-do
COLLETT
Mud
LSMR
BLUE BEACH
1st MARINES
GURKE
26'
495
308
LSMR
590
Shipping Channel. Soundings in fathoms
HENDERSON
KENYA
37°24'
TOLEDO
Mud bank at very low tide
Tidal range averages 30 feet. Datum of soundings is 5 feet below mean low tide.
to Transport Area
JAMAICA further south
ROCHESTER
Limit of D-day objectives
Rois2

## TABLE 10.—NAVAL OPERATING COMMANDS, REORGANIZATION OF 12 SEPTEMBER 1950



## *Table 11.*—Joint Task Force 7: Wonsan

Joint Task Force 7. — Vice Admiral A. D. Struble.

Task Force 90. Attack Force. — Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle.

2 AGC, 2 APD, 4 PF (1 RN, 2 RNZN, 1 French), 1 PCEC, 9 APA, 15 T-AP, 10 AKA, 5 LSD, 1 LSM, 3 LSMR, 48 LST (30 Scajap), 20 LSU, MSTS shipping as assigned.

Task Force 92, X Corps. — Major General E. M. Almond, USA.

Task Force 95. Advance Force. — Rear Admiral A. E. Smith.

Task Group 95.2. Covering and Support Group. — Rear Admiral C. C. Hartman.

3 CA, 1 RNCL, 6 DD (1 RN, 1 RAN, 1 RCN).

Task Group 95.6. Minesweeping Group. — Captain R. T. Spofford.

1 DD, 1 APD, 2 DMS, 3 AM, 7 AMS, 1 ARG, 1 ARS, 8 JMS.

Task Group 96.2. Patrol and Reconnaissance Group. — Rear Admiral G. R. Henderson.

1 AV, 1 AVP; 3 USN, 1 RAF Patrol Squadrons.

Task Group 96.8. Escort Carrier Group. — Rear Admiral R. W. Ruble.

2 CVE, 6 DD.

Task Force 77. Fast Carrier Force. — Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen.

4 CV, 1 BB, 1 CL, 16 DD.

Task Force 79. Logistic Support Force. — Captain B. L. Austin.

Units assigned from Service Squadron 3 and Service Division 31.


THE ADVANCE INTO NORTH KOREA
1-26 Oct. 1950
0 50 Naut. miles
15.
Restraining line 21-24 Oct
Restraining line 2-21 Oct
Bombt Chongjin 12-13 Oct.
BASS & WANTUCK raid 6-7 & 7-8 Oct.
Bombardments by MISSOURI, cruisers and destroyers 12-17 Oct.
PERCH raid 1-2 Oct.
Mine sweep 25-27 Oct.
TF 77 OPAREA 10 Oct ff.
CVE OPAREA
TF 77 REPLENISHMENT AREA
EIGHTH ARMY 19 Oct.
ROKA II CORPS
ROKA I CORPS
Jongjoson Man
Mine sweep 10 Oct-2 Nov.
Arrivals: ROKA, 10 Oct. MAW 2, 11 Oct. 1 MARDIV 26 Oct.
Landing 3-8 Nov.
Swept 11 Oct ff. Bombt 13 Oct ff.
HQ of EIGHTH ARMY & FIFTH AIR FORCE
1st MARDIV for Wonsan 15-17 Oct.
MAGPIE 1 Oct. sunk by mine
Swept 2-3 & 21 Oct ff.
7th DIV loading for Wonsan
Landing ROKN 3 Oct.
ROKN YMS 504 mined 2 Oct.
Korea Bay
Korea Strait
Tsushima Str.
Antung
Unsan
Pyongyang
Wonsan
Kojo
Kosong
Seoul
Inchon
Kunsan
Chonju
Taejon
Taegu
Pusan
Pohang
Kyongju
Ulsan
Masan
Kangjin
Mokpo
Chinhae
Yongdok
Samchok
Ulchin
Sokcho
Yangyang
Kaesong
Kumchon
Suwon
Sariwon
Pyongyang
Sinanju
Chongju
Hungnam
Hamhung
Songjin
Chosin Res.
Hagaru
Kapsan
Kanggye
Sinuiju
Yalu R.
Taedong R.
Han R.
Naktong R.
Imjin R.
Kum R.
Yesu Ld.
Tsushima
100 f
100 f


THE CLEARANCE OF WONSAN
10 Oct.–2 Nov. 1950
16
Nautical Miles
Moored mines
Magnetic mines
Hamhung 39 miles
Kowon
Plain
SONGJON MAN
SONGJON PANDO
HO-DO PANDO
Munchon
YONGHUNG MAN
Okpyong
Mumpyong
Tsegang-got
Ung-do
Swept 11 October ff.
PIRATE
PLEDGE
Yo-do
Sin-do
Tae-do
YMS-516
KALMA PANDO
Hwangto-do
Umi-do
Hapchin-ni
Airstrip
Wonsan
Pyongyang 110 miles
Original sweeping plan
Swept 10 Oct.
39° 10
127° 20
128


17. ON TO THE BORDER
27 Oct.-25 Nov. 1950
0 50 Naut. miles
FIS One CA
one DD
Chongjin
1 ROKA CORPS
7th DIV
Mine sweep 15-19 Nov.
Striking the Yalu bridges
Namsanni
Chongkongjin
Manpojin
Hupyongni
C C F
Antung
Unsan
Hungnam
1 MARDIV
7th DIV from Pusan 27 Oct-8 Nov.
HQ. X CORPS
X CORPS shuttle from Wonsan
2nd E.S.B. Iwon to Hungnam
Mine sweep 6-11 Nov.
3rd DIV. from Moji Japan 5-20 Nov.
TF 77
TF 77 Replenishment Area
Korea
Bay
HQ EIGHTH ARMY-FIFTH AIR FORCE
Majonni
Wonsan
USMC action 21-31 Oct.
Mine sweep 29 Oct ff.
Kosong
Mine sweep 2 Nov Landing 3-8 Nov.
Mine sweep completed 1 Nov
Seoul
Inchon
Mine sweep completed 2 Nov
Chonju
Pohang
Pusan
Korea Strait
TSUSHIMA
125
126
127
128
129
130
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42


18 RETREAT IN THE WEST, CONCENTRATION IN THE EAST
26 Nov.-11 Dec. 1950
50 Nautical miles
ROKA I. CORPS
7th DIV
Attack of Chinese Communist Forces 25 Nov. FF
Evac. 6-7 Dec. to Hungnam
1 MAR DIV
Air supply by Combat Cargo Command and VMR from Japan
TV 77 Replenishment Area
TF 77 A/C Checkpoint
3rd DIV 3-10 Dec.
CVE Oparea
TF 77 OPAREA
Jongjoson Man
Evac. 3-10 Dec.
Part of 3rd DIV evac. 10. Dec. to Pusan
Chinnampo evacuated 4-6 Dec.
Korea Bay
Korea Strait
Pusan
Seoul
Inchon
Sunchon
Hungnam
Wonsan
Chongjin
Pohang
Taegu
Kyongju
Chonju
Kunsan
Kwangju
Mokpo
Yongyang
Sariwon
Haeju
Kaesong
Manpojin
Mupyongni
Antung
Sinuiju
Kapsan
Hapsu
Iwon
Kilchu
Najin
Songjin
Hamhung
Kojo
Yangyang
Ulchin
Andong
Taejon
Hyopchon
Namwon
Masan
Mokpo
Yosu
Kangjin
Suchon
Kumchon
Kalsong
Chorwon
Kumhwa
Pyongyang
Chinnampo
Sokto
Cho do
Yonghung Man
Songchon
Samchok
Ullung Do
TSUSHIMA

*Table 12.*—AIRCRAFT EMPLOYMENT AND CONTROL IN X CORPS ZONE DURING THE PASSAGE OF TOKTONG PASS, 3 DECEMBER 1950

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Total effort handled by Air Defense Section, MTACS 2, Hamhung: | | |
| Flights | | 140 |
| Aircraft | | 359 |
| Average number of aircraft per flight | | 2.6 |
| Portion assigned to Close Support Section, MTACS 2, Hagaru: | | |
| Flights | | 45 (32%) |
| Aircraft | | 197 (55%) |
| Average number of aircraft per flight | | 4.4 |
| Source of aircraft assigned to Close Support Section, Hagaru: | | |
| VMF | | 117 (59%) |
| TF 77 | | 80 (41%) |
| Assignment of flights by Close Support Section, Hagaru: | | |
| To close-in search and attack in the Yudam-ni-Hagaru area | | 17 |
| To close support of the movement from Yudam-ni | | 18 |
| Controlled by: | | |
| 3d Bn RCT 5, leading the advance, then center column | 4 | |
| 2d Bn RCT 7, in forward part of column | 1 | |
| RCT 5, in Toktong Pass | 2 | |
| 3d Bn RCT 7, covering right flank, then rearguard | 3 | |
| 2d Bn RCT 5, rearguard until passed through 3/7 | 8 | |
| To support at Hagaru, controlled by 3d Bn RCT 1 | | 2 |
| To support at Koto-ri, controlled by 2d Bn RCT 1 | | 8 |
| | | 45 |


19.
A DAY AT THE RESERVOIR. TF 77 air strikes
Not shown 117 marine sorties from Yonpo and BADOENG STRAIT
3 Dec. 1950
0 5
Nautical miles
35'
30'
25'
40°20'
4 F4U Buildings
9 F4U, 5 AD Troops, Troops in foxholes
CHOSIN RESERVOIR
Sinhungni
Yudamni
7 F4U Troops
5 AD Many troops
9 F4U, 5AD Troop concentrations
Toktong Pass
RCT 5 & 7
4 F4U Troops, C.P. Buildings
8 AD Troop emplacements
2 F4U Arty and Obs post
Hagaru
2 AD Road block Troops
4 AD Troops on ridges
10 F4U Troops in buildings
4 F4U 6 F4U Much troop activity Troops on ridges
Kotori
CCF DEPLOYMENT
Tongmungo
Kanggye
27
26
20
79
80
89
59
58
76
60
77
Pujon Res
Chosin Res
Kwangdae
Changgol
Pass
Hagaru
0 10 20
Nautical miles
Bridge out
Chinghungni
Sudong
Hungnam
26 miles
15'
127°20
25'
40°10'
35
30
25
20
15
Raisz


Songchon R.
to Kogaru 35 miles
Hamhung
MLR II
MLR I
Air strip
Yonpo
Hungnam
Anchorage Area
Songchon
to Wonsan 52 miles
Hwa Do
Unswept mines
South Fire Support Ch.
TONGJOSON BAY
39°40'
Swept Channel
North Fire Support Channel
Samho
JAPAN SEA
20 fathom line
100 fathom
128°
Moored mines
Perimeters
Nautical miles
THE EVACUATION OF HUNGNAM
10-24 Dec. 1950
20.

## *Table 13.*—Hungnam Task Organization

Task Force 90. — Rear Admiral J. H. Doyle.

- Task Element 90.00. Flagship Element. — Captain C. A. Printup.
  1 AGC
- Task Element 90.01. Tactical Air Control Element. — Comdr. R. W. Arndt.
  Tacron 1.
- Task Element 90.02. Repair and Salvage Element. — Comdr. L. C. Conwell.
  1 ARG, 1 ARL, 2 ARS, 1 ATF.
- Task Element 90.03. Control Element. — Lt. Comdr. C. E. Allmon.
  2 APD,[1] 1 PCEC.[1]

Task Group 90.2. Transport Group. — Captain S. G. Kelly.

- Task Element 90.21. Transport Element. — Captain A. E. Jarrell.
  3 APA, 3 AKA, 2 APD,[1] 1 PCEC,[1] 3 LSD (9 LSU embarked), 11 LST, 27 Scajap LST, plus MSTS shipping assigned.

Task Group 90.8. Gunfire Support Group. — Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter.
1 CA, 4 DD, 3 LSMR, plus 1 CA and DD from TG 95.2.

Task Group 95.2. Blockade, Escort, and Minesweeping Group. — Rear Admiral J. M. Higgins.
1 CA, 4 DD, 6 PF, plus DMS, AM, AMS from TG 95.6.

Seventh Fleet. — Vice Admiral A. D. Struble.

Task Force 77. Fast Carrier Force. — Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen.

- Task Group 77.1. Support Group. — Captain I. T. Duke.
  1 BB, 1 CL, 1 CLAA.
- Task Group 77.2. Screening Group. — Captain J. R. Clark.
  17–22 DD.
- Task Group 77.3. Carrier Group. — Rear Admiral E. C. Ewen.
  3–4 CV.
- Task Group 96.8. Escort Carrier Group. — Rear Admiral R. W. Ruble.
  1–2 CVE, 0–1 CVL, 3–8 DD.
- Task Group 79.2. Logistic Support Group. — Captain B. L. Austin.
  Units assigned from Service Squadron 3 and Service Division 31.

[1] Units assigned to two task elements.

## *Table 14.*—HUNGNAM AIR DEPLOYMENT

### U.N. SQUADRONS ON HAND

| | *At Yonpo* | | | *Embarked* | | | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *F9F* | *F4U* | *F7FN* | *F9F* | *F4U* | *AD* | |
| 1 December | 0 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 2 | [1] 15 |
| 10 December | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 9 | 3 | 20 |
| 16 December | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 17 |
| 23 December | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 14 | 4 | 22 |

### AIRCRAFT ON HAND (Computed on the basis of complements: CV 80, CVL 30, CVE 24, VMF 24, VMFN 12)

| | *Shore Based* | *Embarked* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 December | [1] 96 | 184 | [1] 280 |
| 10 December | 72 | 288 | 360 |
| 16 December | 0 | 318 | 318 |
| 23 December | 0 | 398 | 398 |

[1] Plus 35th Fighter-Bomber Group (2 USAF, 1 RAAF F–51 squadrons).


21. WITHDRAWAL from HUNGNAM and INCHON
12 Dec.'50 - 15 Jan.'51
0 50
Nautical miles
Korea Bay
Hungnam evac. 15-24 Dec.
CVE-s to 24 Dec.
TF 77 to 24 Dec.
TF 77 Replenishm't Area
F/S
Hungnam
Wonsan
Chongjin
Antung
Pyongyang
HWANGHAE PROVINCE
CCF Second Offensive 31 Dec 1950
15 Dec.
15 Jan.
X CORPS
1. MARDIV
7. INFDIV
3. INFDIV
I. ROK. CORPS 18. Dec.
Inchon evacuation 7 Dec.-5 Jan.
Inchon
Seoul
Hongchon
CVE-s 27 Dec.-7 Jan.
to Pusan
Taechon
Taejon
Chonan
Ochong do
Kunsan
Chonju
HQ. EIGHTH ARMY & FIFTH AIR FORCE 22 Dec.ff
Taegu
Pohang
Kyongju
Ulsan
Masan
Pusan
Mokpo
Korea Strait
Tsushima Str.
124 125 126 127 128 129 130
41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34
Raisz


Blockade limit
Ka-do
Tan-do
Taehwa-do
Simni-do
Korea Bay
Islands held by ROK
Sok-to
Cho-do
Mine sweep Amph. feint 2-4 March
Paengnyong
Taechong-do
Sochong-do
TE 95-11 1 CVL
to East Coast 8-16 April
Held by ROK
F/s S. PAUL + DD, 25 Jan Amph. feint, 8 Feb. Evac. alert 14 Feb.
Tokchok-to
Yonpyong-do
Mine sweep 12 Feb. Siege begun 16 Feb. Islands occup 24 Feb
TF 77 to Formosa 8-16 Ap. relieved by BATAAN & THESEUS
TF 77 2 CV
TF 95 Oper. ASCENDANT 30-31 Jan.
PARTRIDGE mined and sunk 2 Feb.
20 Ap line
28 Feb. line
24 Jan. line
F/s
Nautical miles
Yalu R.
Chongju
Sinuiju
Sinanju
Pyongyang
Chinnampo
Taedong R.
Haeju
Haeju Man
Kumchon
Kaesong
Imjin R.
Inchon
Seoul
Han R.
Suwon
Osan
Chonan
Chunchon
Hamhung
Hungnam
Wonsan
Kojo
Kosong
Kansong
Yangyang
Chumunjin
Kangnung
Hoengsong
Wonju
Samchok
Chungju
Yongchu
Ullchin Gap
Sinpo
Tokchon
Sinanju
Taedong
Yalu R.
100f
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
40
39
38
37
50
Raisz

*Table 15.*—AMMUNITION EXPENDED IN BOMBARDMENT

| *Caliber* | *December* | *January* | *February* | *March* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16-inch | 162 | 0 | 997 | 994 |
| 8-inch | 3,357 | 651 | 2,395 | 1,577 |
| 6-inch | 0 | 159 | 3,290 | 6,050 |
| 5-inch | 15,357 | 3,468 | 13,385 | 43,360 |


23. INTERDICTION, 1951.
0 50 Nautical miles
KOREAN AIR DEPLOYMENT
1. March 1951
9 USN squadrons
6 USMC -
8 USAF -
1 RAAF -
CHINA
KOREA
Blockade limit
Chongjin
23 Nov. FE bridge targets
TF 77 Area of Responsibility
Carlson's Canyon
TF 74 raid 7 April
25 Nov. FE bridge targets
Hungnam
Blockade limit
Korea Bay
13 Nov. FE bridge targets
TF 77
3 F9F 4 F4U
2 AD
STRANGLE AREA
Line of 25 June
Line of 1st March
TASK ELEMENT 95.11
1 F4U
Kangnung
Seoul
POHANG
1 F9F
TAEGU
3 F80
PUSAN WEST
3 F4U + 1 F7FN
PUSAN EAST
3 F5I
Pusan
CHINHAE
2 F5I
Korea Strait
3 FIFTH AIR FORCE Fighter Groups in Kyushu
Raisz.

*Table 16.*—Task Force 77 Rail Interdiction, February–April 1951

| *Area* | *Rail bridges inoperable 4 April 1951* |
|---|---|
| Hoeryong south to Chongjin | 3 |
| Chongjin south to Pukchong | 23 |
| Inland from Tanchon, Songjin, and Kilchu | 3 |
| Pukchong south to Wonsan and inland to the Chosin and Fusen Reservoirs | 12 |
| Wonsan west to Yangdok | 4 |
| Wonsan south to Chorwon and Kumwha | 9 |

## *Table 17.*—GHQ United Nations Command Analysis of Enemy Transport, January–April 1951

| *Daily average sightings* | *January* | *February* | *March* | *April* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Railroad cars | 147 | 155 | 199 | 179 |
| Vehicles | 236 | 398 | 633 | 1,048 |
| Estimated percent of total enemy rail or road traffic, transpeninsular route excluded: | | | | |
| East coast rail | 55 | 64 | 49 | 29 |
| East coast road | 37 | 38 | 36 | 29 |
| West coast rail | 35 | 23 | 46 | 59 |
| West coast road | 37 | 59 | 59 | 61 |


"Strangle" routes
Battle lines
Blockade Limit
Korea
Bridges dropped by TF 77 A/c 11 May
Naval siege
BEGOR clandestine landgs 30 Ap ff.
TF 77
2 CV
3 CV, 1-3 May
29-30 Ap
24 Apr
Amphib feints
1 May
30 June line
WALKE mined 12 June
ROK JML 306 sunk, 5 May
British Commandos 20-21 May
Pyongyang
Kumhwa
Torpedoed May
Kansong F/s
21 April line
F/s
19 May line
ROK raid 27 June
TE 95.11
1 CVL
2 CVL, 2-6 May
Evac. alerts 26 Ap & 20 May
F/s
Seoul
Nautical miles
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
40
39
38
37

## *Table 18.*—Growth of Western Pacific Naval Strength

| *Type* | *U.S. only June 1950* | *U.S. and U.N. October 1950* |
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Carriers | 1 | 4 |
| Escort and Light Carriers | 0 | 4 |
| Battleships | 0 | 1 |
| Cruisers | 2 | 9 |
| Destroyer Types | 16 | 54 |
| Submarines | 4 | 6 |
| Minecraft | 10 | 16 |
| AGC/APA/AKA | 3 | 22 |
| APD | 0 | 3 |
| LST (including Scajap) | 50 | 75 |
| LSD | 0 | 5 |
| T-AP/Merchant Ships | 0 | 75 |
| | 86 | 274 |

### *U.S. Navy Personnel, Western Pacific*

| | |
|---|---|
| June 1950 | 10,990 |
| August 1950 | 33,465 |
| October 1950 | 59,375 |
| January 1951 | 66,930 |
| April 1951 | 70,315 |
| July 1951 | 74,335 |

*Table 19.*—Service Force Deployment to the Western Pacific
(Yard Types Omitted)

| *Type* | *29 June 1950* | *1 August 1950* | *15 September 1950* |
|---|---|---|---|
| AD | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| AE | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| AF | 1 | 2 | 2 |
| AK | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| AKA | 0 | 1 | 4 |
| AKL | 0 | 1 | 3 |
| AN | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| AO | 1 | 3 | 5 |
| AOG | 0 | 1 | 1 |
| ARH | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ARS | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| ATF | 1 | 3 | 4 |
| LSD | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| LST | 0 | 1 | 0 |
| | 4 | 17 | 27 |

## *Table 20.*—MSTS Trans-Pacific Shipping Requirements

| *Cargo* | *Required monthly quantities* | *Required monthly arrivals* | *Required ships in the pipe line* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Provisions | 78,000 tons | 9.7 | 24 |
| General cargo | 381,000 tons | 38 | 95 |
| Ammunition | 103,000 tons | 17.7 | 44 |
| Aircraft | 50,000 tons | 1.6 | 3 |
| Personnel | 39,000 | 16 | 24 |
| Fuel oil | 1,663,000 bbls. | 17 | 29 |
| Diesel oil | 675,000 bbls. | 6 | 11 |
| Gasoline | 1,419,000 bbls. | 11 | 21 |
| Shipping required | | 117 | 251 |
| Grand total | | | 368 |

## *Table 21.*—Distribution of Major Combat Ships

| Type | June 1950 | | | October 1950 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Atlantic Fleet* | *Pacific Fleet* | *Total* | *Atlantic Fleet* | *Pacific Fleet* | *Total* |
| Fleet carriers | 4 | 3 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 9 |
| Light carriers | 3 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 5 |
| Escort carriers | 2 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 6 |
| Battleships | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Cruisers | 7 | 6 | 13 | 8 | 8 | 16 |
| Totals | 17 | 12 | 29 | 20 | 18 | 38 |


Nautical miles
Strangle routes
Korea Bay
Blockade limit
Ka-do
Tan-do
Taehwa-do
Lost 30 Nov.
Evac. 9 Oct.
Lost 6 Nov.
MIG recovered 20-22 July
Enemy pressure Dec.
Bomb't Jan.
Sok-to
Amgak Pen.
Wolsa-ri Pen.
Cho-do
ROK raid 5 July
Guerilla raid. 11 Aug.
HWANGHAE PROV.
Paengnyong-do
HQ CTE 95.15
Taechong-do
TE 95.11
Enemy attacks Dec '51
Refugee evac. from islands by TF-90 Jan. '52
Yonpyong-do
Patrol + bombt 24 July ff
Seoul
Inchon
Truce talks begin July
Takchok-to
Hungnam
Hwa-do
Mayang-do Bombt 5 Oct
SMALL mined 7 Oct.
ROK. PC 704 26 Dec
HQ CTE 95.23
18 Sep
10 Oct
Yo-do
Wonsan
COMMONWEALTH CVL
TF 77 2 CV
Nan-do
Amphib. feint 27-31 Aug.
Changjon
Kosong
TF 95.9
MISSOURI
TOLEDO
Fls of MARDIV Sept-Oct
Kangnung
Mukho
Samchok
Chumunjin
Sokcho
Yangyang
Kunsan
Chonju
Kwangju
Mokpo
Pusan
38°
37
124
125
126
127
128
129

*Table* 22.—COMMUNIST AND U.N. TRANSPORT, WINTER 1951–52

| | *Vehicles* | *Locomotives* | *Rolling Stock* |
|---|---|---|---|
| North Korea | 6–7, 000 | 275 | 7, 700 |
| South Korea | 22, 000 | 486 | 8, 314 |


26. STALEMATE
March '52 - Feb. '53
0 50 Nautical miles
Blockade Limit
F9F v. MIG 18 Nov. '52
Summer 1952, Inter service air strikes
"MIG ALLEY"
Blockade Limit
Korea
Bay
NOOTKA captures mine layer 28 Sept.
Guerilla operations Coastal raids
HWANGHAE PROVINCE
Paenghyong-do
TU-95 I. One CVL/CVE
Tokchok-to
Ochong-do
Rail Interdiction TF 95
SARSI sunk 27 Aug.
Air strip June '52
EUSAK
JTF 7 Amphibious feint 15 Oct '52
CHEROKEE AREA
TF 95 FIRE SUPPORT
MARDIV lift to Inchon by TF 90 March '52
Truce negotiations
POW riots relocations by TF 90 Ap - June '52
Korea Strait
TF 77
ROKN PT Base
BARTON mined 16 Sept. '52
Chongjin
Hoeamdong
Yang-do
Mayang-do
Yodo
Wonsan
Nan-do
Kosong
Panmunjom
Seoul
Inchon
Pusan
Chonju
Taegu
Pohang
Kyongju
Ulsan
Masan
Kunsan
Taejon
Chonan
Suwon
Kaesong
Pyongyang
Sinanju
Antung
Kapsan
Kyosen Res.
Hungnam
Hamhung
Yonan
Haeju
Sakchu
Yangyang
Chumunjin
Samchok
Ulchin
Andong
Yongdok
Hyopchon
Namwon
Kwangju
Mokpo
Kangjin
Chinhae
Tadong
Chinnampo
Sakto-do
Cho-do
Kumchon
Taedong
Chongju
Taechon
Sunchon
Yosu
Kuje-do
Tsushima
Raisz


MANCHURIA
U.S.S.R.
Manchurian
Mukden
Yingkow
Antung
Yalu R.
Suiho Res.
Sinuiju
MIG ALLEY
Hoeryong
Blockade limit
Chongjin
Hoemun
Hyesanjin
Kanggye
Yangdo
Songjin
Hamhung
Hungnam
Civilians evac. June
Bombardment
Yo-do
Wonsan
TF-77
Air field strikes. July
Sinanju
Pyongyang
Chinnampo
Dairen
Port Arthur
Port Arthur Naval Base Area
Coastal batteries engaged Civilians evac. in June
Sok-to
Cho-do
Sariwon
CCF attack June-July
Nando
Fls
Kosong
HEROKEE AREA
Kumsong
Demarcation Line
Sir James Hall Is.
Truce talks
Haeju
Panmunjom
Sakcho
Chunchon
U-do
Inchon
Seoul
TU 95.1.1
Enemy night hecklers April-June
SHANTUNG
TF-90
17-20 July
160th RCT
from Koje do
Taejon
Kunsan
Chonju
Taegu
Pohang
Ulsan
100 fathoms
Kwangju
Chinju
Pusan
Mokpo
KOJE-DO
TF-90 Emerg. redepl. July.
24 INFDIV
2 Amph. Sp. Brig
NAVBEACH GR. I
TSU SHIMA
TF-90 Little Switch POW April-May
CHEJU DO
Fukuoka
Sasebo
YELLOW SEA
JAPAN
SEA OF
27.
THE FINAL MONTHS
March - July, 1953
100
Nautical Miles
122°
124°
126°
128°
130°
42°
40°
38°
36°
34°

AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

(RADM J. H. Doyle)

USS *Mt. McKinley* (AGC-7)
(CAPT C. A. Printup)

USS *Cavalier* (APA-37)
(CAPT S. S. Bowling)

USS *Union* (AKA-106)
(CAPT G. D. Zurmuhlen)

USS *LST 611*
(LT J. C. Wilson)

USS *Arikara* (ATF-98)
(LCDR K. A. Mundy)

SUPPORT FORCE

(RADM J. M. Higgins, ComCruDiv 5)

1 CL—*Juneau*
(CAPT J. C. Sowell)

DesDiv 91 (CAPT H. C. Allan)
4 DDs—*Mansfield*
(CDR E. H. Headland)

*De Haven*
(CDR O. B. Lundgren)

*Collett*
(CDR R. H. Close)

*Swenson*
(CDR R. A. Schilling)

Minron 3
6 AMs—*Redhead*
(LTJG T. R. Howard)

*Mocking Bird*
(LTJG S. P. Gary)

*Osprey*
(LTJG P. Levin)

*Partridge*
(LTJG R. C. Fuller, Jr.)

*Chatterer*
(LTJG J. P. McMahon)

*Kite*
(LTJG N. Grkovic)

**The Sea War in Korea**
**Notes**
**Chapter 2. Retreat to Pusan**

[1] Interview, October 1950.
[1A] A time difference of fourteen hours exists between Korea and Washington. For example, Sunday noon in Washington is two o'clock Monday morning in Korea. Crossing the international dateline westward in mid-Pacific at the 180th degree of longitude, the calendar is moved forward one day. The time used hereafter in this book will be that of the place in which the event occurred.
[2] *State NR 260405Z, June 1950* (paraphrased excerpt).
[2A] Destroyers were HMS *Cossack* (CAPT R. T. White, DSO) and HMS *Consort* (CDR J. R. Carr); frigates were HMS *Black Swan* (CAPT A. D. H. Jay, DSO, DSC), *Alacrity* (CDR H. S. Barber) and HMS *Hart* (CDR N. H. H. Mulleneux, DSC).
[2B] Thus, for the first time, General MacArthur received operational (but not tactical) control over large carriers. This operational control was exercised through COMNAVFE and ComSeventhFleet:

"Never once throughout the course of the Pacific war did that Headquarters (MacArthur's) exercise direct tactical command of a single fast carrier. . . . Both King and Nimitz feared the consequences of placing fast carriers under the supervision of a headquarters (MacArthur's) which so evidently looked upon them as expendable. Marines and escort carriers were later assigned to the Southwest Pacific area." (*The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War*, Isley and Crowl, p. 92.)

[3] Summarized *Report of Proceedings No. 1, 25 June 2950— 9 July 1950, Flag Officer Second in Command Far East Stations,* F02F2/2960/24 of 4 NOV 1950.
[3A] The term "Striking Force" was retained until 25 August 1950 when, by Commander Seventh Fleet Operation Order #14-50, the term "Fast Carrier Force" was used.
[4] For a complete list of Navy kills in Korea, see Chapter 13, entitled "On The Line," and Appendix 7.
[4A] The North Korean Air Force before the war had been estimated at 54 aircraft—33 YAK-type fighters and 21 IL-type attack bombers. Their primary operating fields were Pyongyang, Wonsan, Sinanju, and Sinuiju.
[5] The forces which carried the 24th Division to Korea as designated by COMNAVFE OpOrder 7–50 were the following:
TF 90
*Mount McKinley* (Captain Carter A. Printup)
*Cavalier* (Captain Daniel J. Sweeney)
*Union* (Captain G. D. Zurmuehlen)
*LST 611*
14 SCAJAP LSTs
TG 96.6
*Juneau*
HMS *Jamaica*
*Mansfield*
*De Haven*
*Swenson*
*Collett*
HMS *Black Swan*
HMS *Alacrity*
HMS *Shoalhaven*

HMS *Hart*
*Arikara*
[6] Personal interview, 30 January 1956.
[7] Commander Pollock was killed in an air accident in the United States on 6 November 1952.
[7A] High velocity aircraft rocket.
[8] Interview, *Valley Forge,* November 1950.
[8A] The Key West Agreement resulted from a conference in Key West, Florida, 11-14 March 1948, between the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following this conference, the Secretary of Defense issued a statement which, in seven parts, laid down the common functions of the Armed Forces and the specific functions of the JCS, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. The second listed primary function of the Air Force was "To be responsible for strategic air warfare." This is defined as: "Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's warmaking capacity to a point where he no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentrations of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems."
[9] *EUSAK 231025K July 1950* (paraphrased excerpt).
[10] *Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage (1st Revision).*
[11] *Crusade in Europe,* General D. D. Eisenhower, p. 46
[12] Thus, in 1943, the Army Air Force in the War Department publication FM 100-20, (*Command and Employment of Air Power,* July 1943, p. 12, para 16) stated its opinion of close air support: "In the zone of contact, missions against hostile units are most difficult to control, are most expensive, and are, in general, least effective. Targets are small, well-dispersed, and difficult to locate. In addition, there is always a considerable chance of striking friendly forces. . . . ."
[13] During the Hearings before the House Armed Services Committee in October 1949, Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, made a statement about close air support that read like prophesy in July 1950: ". . . If war should come tomorrow, the Tactical Air Squadrons of the Navy and Marine Corps would have to provide the major part of the troop air support, even as they did in the beginning of the last war. What we have is able to move on short notice—would that it were more." (Page 197, *National Defense Program—Unification & Strategy*).
[14] Captain Walter Karig, USNR, CDR Malcolm W. Cagle, USN, and LCDR Frank A. Manson, USN, from official sources, *Battle Report VI, The War in Korea* (New York, 1954), pp. 103–4.
[14A] This suggestion was vetoed in Tokyo because of TacRonOne's participation in the preliminary planning for Inchon landing, already then underway.
[15] *COMNAVFE dispatch 230736Z July 1950* (excerpt paraphrased).
[15A] JOC, Taegu was a joint Army-Air Force center located at Taegu, although it temporarily retreated to Pusan when the perimeter shrank. Still later, the JOC moved to Seoul where it remained for the duration.
[15B] With the arrival in Korea on 3 July of the one under-strength battalion of the 21st Infantry, 24th Division, were two TACPs (Tactical Air Patrol Parties) and one L-5 VHF-equipped flivver airplane known as "Mosquito." One of the two TACPs was assigned to the 24th Division, one to the ROK forces. The L-5 airplane was put to use as an independent observation and spotting plane. As additional units of the 24th Division arrived, other TACPs and "Mosquito" aircraft arrived. But it was with these first TACPs and airplanes that the Task Force 77 airplanes were trying to perform close air support.
[15C] In addition to the communication trouble, there was the practical difficulty of Korean names. They were difficult to pronounce and understand over the radio, and many names were similar.

[15D] ANGLICO is an abbreviation for “Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.”
[16] *COMNAVFE dispatch 270732Z July* (paraphrased excerpt). Between 26 August and 4 September, Captain Charles E. Crew, USMC, of the ANGLICO trained a total of nine TACPs, all Air Force personnel. These TACPs were trained at Camp McGill, near Tokyo, and later served with the Army’s 7th Division. Of the nine officers in charge of these parties, four were pilots who had done close support in Korea. Eight of the nine thought the Navy system of close air support superior.
[16A] Use of the WAC charts meant that pin-pointing a target was impossible. Only a general area, such as a village or stream, could be indicated.
[17] Personal interview on 6 April 1955.
[17A] At this conference, FEAF was represented by four generals and one colonel; the Navy, by one captain from COMNAVFE, two commanders and two lieutenant commanders representing ComCarDiv-3.
[17B] For the Philippine Sea, her appearance in the Korean theater culminated two months of intense effort. An Atlantic Fleet carrier, the *Philippine Sea* had arrived in San Diego on 10 June 1950. She was originally scheduled to relieve *Valley Forge* on 1 October 1950. Upon outbreak of the Korean war, *Philippine Sea* was ordered forward. CAG-11 (CDR R. C. Vogel, USN) received emergency orders to embark prior to sailing 5 July. This air group had not finished its training cycle, and its jet squadrons had only recently received new aircraft. An intensive ten days’ training was accomplished in the Hawaiian area en-route to the Far East.

It is a high compliment to both ship and air group that despite these handicaps, their performance in Korea was outstanding.
[17C] Typical load for close air support: (a) F4U: 800 rounds ammunition; one 1,000-pound bomb; eight 5-inch rockets; four hours’ endurance; (b) AD: 400 rounds ammunition; three 500-pound bombs; twelve 5-inch rockets; four hours’ endurance.
[17D] During this period, the two carriers operated for two days, replenishing each third day.
[18] Letter to authors, 9 February 1956.
[19] *COMCARDIVONE dispatch 901003Z Aug* (paraphrased excerpt).
[20] *COMNAVFE 190046Z Aug 50* (excerpt paraphrased).
[21] *COMNAVFE 220945Z Aug 50* (excerpt paraphrased).
[21A] A few days before this major attack, a novel effort was made to use B-29s in a “close air support” role. On the 16th of August, 98 Superfortress B-29s made a “carpet bombing” attack on the enemy build-up northwest of Waegwan. Some 40,000 troops were reported in this area. Eight hundred fifty tons of bombs were dropped in an area 7,000 yards wide by 13,000 yards long, one bomb to each five acres. The next day, the Communists launched one of the heaviest attacks of the war through this area.
[22] *COMSEVENTHFLT 010344Z Sept 50* (paraphrased).
[23] *USS Valley Forge Preliminary Action Report, 1 September 1950.*
[24] *USS Philippine Sea ltr 080, 1 September 1950.*
[24A] The First Provisional Marine Brigade was basically a reinforced Marine regiment. The infantry element thereof was three battalions, but each with only two instead of the regular three companies. This meant approximately 1,500 men were available for front-line engagement. Subtracting a reserve, company clerks, etc., the First Provisional Marine Brigade did its job with less than 1,000 riflemen in the frontline.
[24B] Army Task Forces take the name of the senior commander.
[25] CVG-5 ltr 073-50 of 30 October 1950.
[26] For a complete account of these Marine battles, see *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea; the Pusan Perimeter,* by CAPT Nicholas A. Canzona, USMC, and Lynn Montross.
[27] *Battle Report, op. cit.,* pp. 170–171.
[28] Sec. VII, SecDef memo dtd 21 April 1948. Incidentally, this same definition remains in Naval Warfare

Informative Publication (NWIP) 22–3.
[29] In a Far East Air Force Mission Summary dated 16 Nov 1950, missions as far distant as twenty miles in advance of friendly forces were listed as “close air support.”
[30] In the period between 26 July and 3 Sept 1950, almost *half* of the Navy’s close air support sorties were delivered *outside* the bombline.
[30A] In comparison, the 12th Army in Europe during World War II had only 35 close support aircraft per division.
[30B] Records indicate that 80 percent of the Marine strikes were *directed* by Tactical Air Control Parties.
[31] Army Air Support Center letter ATASC-D 373.21 of 1 December 1950, Encl 1, Sect 2, para 12.
[32] *PacFlt Interim Evaluation Report No. 1,* Vol. 1, p. 8.