Newspapers and Periodicals

In 1994 there were more than thirty daily newspapers in Turkey. The mass-circulation dailies are based in Istanbul and are distributed nationally. These include the country's largest newspaper, *Hurriyet* (Freedom), which has a circulation of more than 850,000, and three other papers, each with daily circulations ranging from 200,000 to 300,000: *Günaydın* (Good Morning), *Tercuman* (Interpreter), and *Milliyet* (Nationality). A smaller paper, *Cumhuriyet* (Republic), is influential because it is read widely by the country's economic and political elite. In all, more than a dozen dailies are published in Istanbul. Nine dailies are published in Ankara and three in Izmir. Other major cities, including Adana, Bursa, Diyarbakır, Gaziantep, Konya, and Mersin, have at least one local daily newspaper. In addition to the newspapers, twenty weeklies and a variety of biweekly, monthly, bimonthly, and quarterly journals also are published.

The main news agency in Turkey is the official Anadolu Ajansi (Anatolian Agency), founded by Atatürk in 1920. Its primary function is to issue news bulletins and printed information within the country and for distribution abroad. As do most newspapers, Turkish radio and television depend on the agency as a primary source of domestic news. In 1994 it had regional offices in Turkey's major cities as well as correspondents throughout the country. It also had foreign correspondents in all major world cities. In addition to the Anatolian Agency, several private agencies serve the press.

Radio and Television

The government of Turkey began radio broadcasting in 1927. Atatürk and his colleagues perceived radio as a means to promote modernization and nationalism and thus created a Bureau of the Press Directorate to oversee programming and ensure that it served national goals. In 1964 the government established the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu—TRT) to expand radio facilities and develop public television. Subsequently, the transmission power of radio stations greatly increased, as did the number of licensed receivers. (The government required purchase of a license for ownership of radios, and later of televisions.) By 1994 almost the entire nation had radio coverage, with thirty-six transmitters beaming a total power of 5,500 kilowatts to an estimated 10 million receivers. TRT also broadcasts
programs abroad in Turkish and in several foreign languages, including Arabic, Bulgarian, Greek, and Persian.

Television developed more slowly than radio, mainly because the government considered it a luxury. Television broadcasting began through a technical-assistance agreement between Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). With the aid of the equipment and technical personnel provided under this agreement, TRT inaugurated the country's first public television station in Ankara in 1968. Gradually new stations were opened in Istanbul, Izmir, and other cities. Investment in television facilities accelerated after 1972, and during the following decade television replaced radio as the country's most important mass medium. By 1994 the estimated number of television sets—10 million—equaled the number of radio receivers.

TRT had a constitutionally mandated monopoly on radio and television broadcasting prior to 1993. It financed its operations through limited allocations it received from the government's general budget and income derived from radio and television license fees. TRT news presentations and documentaries tended to avoid controversy; television viewers often criticized the programs as dull. Dissatisfaction with public television prompted proposals beginning in the late 1980s to amend the constitution to permit private, commercial broadcasting. Opposition to private broadcasting came from the military and other groups that feared loss of government control over programming. It was not until 1993 that the National Assembly approved legislation to authorize private radio and television in tandem with public broadcasting. Even before their legalization, however, private stations had begun to broadcast programs, many of which disturbed officials in the national security bureaucracy. For example, in the summer of 1993 the State Security Court opened an investigation into a public affairs program of a private Istanbul channel, charging that the program had spread separatist propaganda by including Kurdish guests.

Foreign Relations

Turkey began reevaluating its foreign policy in 1991, when the United States-led war against Iraq and the collapse of the Soviet Union totally upset patterns of international relations that had been relatively consistent for more than forty years. Both of these developments intimately affected Turkey because
the former Soviet Union was its neighbor to the north and east, and Iraq its neighbor to the south. Political instability has plagued both these regions since 1991, causing some Turkish national security analysts to fear possible negative consequences for their own country. However, other Turks believe that the international changes since 1991 offer their country a unique opportunity to reassert its historical role as a bridge between two regions in which it has had only a marginal presence since 1918.

Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Since the end of World War II, Turkey had regarded the Soviet Union, the superpower with which it shared a 590-kilometer frontier, as its principal enemy. Fear of Soviet intentions was powerful enough to persuade Turkish leaders to join the United States-European collective defense agreement, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in 1952. Participation in NATO made Turkey a partisan on the side of the West in the Cold War that dominated international politics for more than forty years. Turkish suspicions of the Soviet Union gradually eased during the era of détente that began in the 1960s, paving the way for several bilateral economic cooperation agreements in the 1970s. However, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 revived Turkish concerns about Soviet expansionism and led to a cooling of relations that lasted more than five years. Beginning in the mid-1980s, Turkish fears again eased. Ankara and Moscow concluded a number of agreements, including plans for a pipeline to carry natural gas from Soviet gas fields to Turkey. Economic and diplomatic ties between the two countries were being expanded when the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen independent nations.

For Turkey the practical consequence of the Soviet Union's demise was the replacement of one large, powerful, and generally predictable neighbor with five smaller near neighbors characterized by domestic instability and troubling foreign policies. Like most states, Turkey perceives Russia as the principal inheritor of Soviet power and influence. Turkish officials likewise share in the widespread uncertainty over Russia's role in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), formed at the end of 1991, and thus try to avoid policies that might antagonize a traditional adversary. Diplomatic contacts with Russia and the CIS have focused on the renegotiation of numerous Soviet-era economic and technical cooperation agreements
that were in force when the Soviet Union was dissolved. Turkey also has initiated multilateral discussions with the five states that now border the Black Sea—Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania—on an economic cooperation project originally proposed before the demise of the Soviet Union. The inaugural meetings of the new group called for ambitious plans to increase trade among member states, encourage labor mobility, and establish a development bank.

In Transcaucasia and Central Asia, regions where Turkey is most keen to project its influence, Ankara has tended to defer to Moscow whenever such a course seems prudent. Turkey's efforts to make its presence felt in nearby Transcaucasia have been limited not so much by Russia as by the political realities that emerged in Transcaucasia itself after December 1991. All three new countries in the region—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia—share land borders with Turkey; thus political and economic leaders view them as natural partners for trade and development projects. Both President Özal's Motherland Party and Prime Minister Demirel's True Path Party embraced the idea of expanding ties with Azerbaijan, an oil-producing country whose people speak a Turkic language closely related to Anatolian Turkish.

Almost all the major parties have expressed reservations about an independent Armenia, probably on account of the historical bitterness between Armenians and Turks. In the mid-1990s, the revival of Ottoman-era animosities seemed inevitable because Armenia and Azerbaijan had become independent while fighting an undeclared war over the Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh, whose ethnic Armenian majority has been trying to secede. Turkey adopted an officially neutral position in the conflict, although its sympathies lie with Azerbaijan. Popular opinion against Armenia became especially intense in 1992 and 1993, when military successes by Armenian forces caused tens of thousands of Azerbaijani refugees to enter Turkey. Turkey responded by applying temporary economic pressure on Armenia, such as closing the transborder road to traffic bringing goods into the landlocked country and cutting Turkish electrical power to Armenian towns. However, Turkey's membership in NATO and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (from January 1995, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), its concerns about overall regional stability—adjacent Georgia was engulfed in its own civil war in 1993—and fears of unpredictable Iranian
and Russian reactions all combined to restrain Turkey from providing direct military assistance to Azerbaijan.

Disappointment over the inadequacy of Turkish support was one of the factors that prompted the 1993 coup against Azerbaijan's staunchly pro-Turkish government. This unexpected political change in Baku represented a major blow to Turkish policy. The new regime in Azerbaijan was not only cool toward Turkey but also determined to cultivate friendly relations with Iran and Russia. These developments provoked opposition deputies in Turkey's National Assembly to accuse the Ciller government of having "lost" Azerbaijan. As of late January 1995, Ankara's political influence in Baku still was limited, although Turkey's overall cultural influence in Azerbaijan seemed strong.

Turkey's policy in Central Asia has proved more successful than its Transcaucasian policy. As with Azerbaijan, a feeling of pan-Turkic solidarity has prompted Turkish interest in expanding ties with the countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In April 1992, in his first year as prime minister, Demirel traveled to the region to promote Turkey as a political and developmental model for the Central Asian states. He explicitly represented Turkey not only as a successful example of what an independent Turkic country could achieve but also as a more appropriate model than the Islamic alternative offered by Iran, which he perceived as Turkey's main rival for influence in the region. Subsequently, Turkey concluded numerous cultural, economic, and technical aid agreements with the Central Asian states, including non-Turkic Tajikistan. Turkey also sponsored full membership for the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan in the Economic Cooperation Organization, a regional trade pact whose original members were Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. In practice, however, Turkey lacks adequate economic resources to play the pivotal role in Central Asia to which it aspires. Because Iran also has insufficient capital for aid to and investment in the region, the anticipated rivalry between Iran and Turkey had failed by the mid-1990s to develop into a serious contest. By the time President Özal followed Demirel's trip with his own tour of the region in April 1993, Turkey recognized, albeit reluctantly, that Russia, rather than Turkey or Iran, had emerged as the dominant political force in Central Asia, and that this situation would prevail indefinitely. Nevertheless, the new countries have professed friendship toward Turkey and welcomed its overtures. In
response, Turkey has reoriented its policies to focus on strengthening bilateral cultural ties and encouraging Turkish private entrepreneurs to invest in the region. As of early 1995, Turkey enjoyed close diplomatic relations with the four Turkic republics of Central Asia and good relations with Persian-speaking Tajikistan.

Closely related to the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. This development had positive consequences in terms of Turkey's relations with Bulgaria, which borders the Turkish province of Thrace. Relations between Turkey and Bulgaria had been badly strained between 1985 and 1989 as a result of Bulgaria's campaign of forcibly assimilating its Turkish minority, estimated at 900,000 and comprising approximately 10 percent of the country's total population. Efforts by Bulgaria's ethnic Turks to protest government policies requiring them to change their Turkish and Muslim names to Bulgarian and Christian ones, end all Islamic teaching and practices, and stop speaking Turkish in public had led to increasingly severe repression. This repression culminated in the summer of 1989 with a mass exodus of an estimated 320,000 Turkish Bulgarians, who fled across the border into Turkey during a seven-week period in July and August. The exodus overwhelmed Turkey's refugee facilities and provoked an international crisis as well as an internal crisis within Bulgaria that contributed to the fall of the communist government. Subsequently, Bulgaria's new democratic government repealed the controversial assimilation decrees and invited those who had fled to return home. Relations between Turkey and Bulgaria steadily improved during the early 1990s, and the two countries have concluded several bilateral trade and technical assistance agreements. A similar spirit of cooperation was evident in the agreements signed with other East European countries, in particular Hungary and Romania.

In contrast to the generally positive evolution of relations with Bulgaria, the international politics surrounding the disintegration of Yugoslavia proved frustrating for Turkish diplomacy. The plight of the Muslim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the civil war that followed Bosnia's 1992 declaration of independence aroused popular sympathy in Turkey and support for interventionist policies to help the Bosnian Muslims. Although the government supported the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Bosnia and an auxiliary
NATO military role, Ankara criticized these efforts as inadequate. In the mid-1990s, Turkey favored firmer measures against Bosnian Serbs and the government of Serbia, which Turkey, like other countries, had accused of providing military aid and other assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. However, as of early 1995, Turkey was not prepared to take unilateral steps in Bosnia that might antagonize its NATO partners.

The Middle East

Turkey shares borders with three major Middle Eastern countries: Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey ruled much of the region during the Ottoman Empire, but between 1945 and 1990 Turkish leaders consciously avoided involvement in various Middle Eastern conflicts. President Özal broke with that tradition in 1990 when he sided with the United States-led coalition confronting Iraq following its invasion and annexation of Kuwait. To comply with the economic sanctions that the UN imposed on Iraq, Özal closed down the two pipelines used to transport Iraqi oil through Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea. Although Turkey did not formally join the military coalition that fought against Iraq, it deployed about 150,000 troops along its border with Iraq, which caused Baghdad to divert an equivalent number of forces from the south to the north of the country. Furthermore, Turkey authorized United States aircraft to use the military air base at Incirlik for raids over Iraq. A likely motive for Turkish support of the war against Iraq was a desire to strengthen ties with the United States and other NATO allies at a time of considerable uncertainty—at least in Turkey—about post-Cold War strategic relations.

The Persian Gulf War's main consequence for Turkey was the internationalization of the Kurdish issue. Following Iraq's defeat by the United States-led coalition at the end of February 1991, Iraq's Kurdish minority, which constituted approximately 15 percent of the approximately 19 million population, rebelled against the government of Saddam Husayn. Government forces repressed the rebellion within three weeks, precipitating a mass exodus of almost the entire Kurdish population of northern Iraq toward the Iranian and Turkish borders. Unable to deal with the refugee flood, Turkey closed its borders in April after more than 400,000 Kurds had fled into Hakkâri and Mardin provinces. Turkish soldiers prevented about 500,000 more Kurdish refugees on the Iraqi side of the border from crossing over to Turkey, forcing them to remain in
makeshift camps; an additional 1 million other Kurds fled into Iran. The humanitarian crisis and the international publicity surrounding it posed a major dilemma for Turkey, which was reluctant to absorb hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees. Furthermore, Turkey opposed the creation of permanent refugee camps, believing such camps would become breeding grounds for militant nationalism, as had happened in the Palestinian refugee camps established during the war that followed Israel's creation in 1948.

Turkey's preferred solution to the Kurdish refugee crisis has been for the Kurds to return to their homes in Iraq with guarantees for their safety within a political environment that would encourage their integration into a united Iraq. Negotiations with Britain, France, and the United States produced an agreement in June 1991 to establish an interim protected zone in northern Iraq in which all Iraqi military activities would be prohibited. Turkey would permit its allies to use the Incirlik Air Base for armed reconnaissance flights over the protected zone. The interim period originally was intended to last for six months but could be extended for an additional six months at the discretion of the National Assembly. Although the agreement created a de facto safe haven in Iraq's three northern provinces and prompted a majority of the Kurdish refugees to return home, it did not resolve the political problem between the refugees and the Iraqi government. On the contrary, Baghdad responded by imposing a blockade on the north, effectively making the Kurds economically dependent on Iran and Turkey. The Western powers saw Iraq's attitude as justifying prolongation of the safe-haven agreement; as of January 1995, it was still in force.

Turkey has opposed the creation of an autonomous Kurdish government in northern Iraq. However, Iraq's intransigence toward the UN after the Persian Gulf War and the determination of the United States to limit its involvement in the safehaven zone to air patrols made the formation of a local administration inevitable. Turkey reluctantly acquiesced after Iraqi Kurdish leaders reassured Ankara that an autonomous government would not pursue independence for the Kurds but would cooperate with all Iraqi opposition groups to create a democratic alternative to Saddam Husayn's regime. Following elections for a representative regional assembly in May 1992, an autonomous government claiming to operate in keeping with the Iraqi constitution was established at Irbil. Turkey has
accepted this government as the de facto authority in northern Iraq, but has not recognized it as a de jure provincial government. Turkey has made its continued cooperation with this autonomous government contingent on the Kurds' support of Iraq's territorial integrity and their assistance in controlling PKK camps in northern Iraq.

The Kurdish issue also assumed an important role in Turkey's relations with both Iran and Syria beginning in 1991. Ankara was concerned that Damascus and Tehran might exploit the Kurdish issue to put pressure on Turkey to compromise on other issues over which there were deep disagreements. For example, although Turkey had enjoyed relatively close political and diplomatic relations with Iran for more than fifty years following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, these ties were strained after 1979 when the Iranian Revolution brought to power an Islamic theocratic regime that frequently cites secular governments such as Turkey's as an evil that Muslims should resist. Although bilateral trade remained important to both countries throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, their economic ties have not prevented the regular eruption of tension. One source of intermittent friction has been the presence in Turkey of thousands of Iranians who fled their country during the 1980s because they opposed the religious government, preferred not to live under its puritanical legal codes, or wanted to evade military service during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88). Tehran has periodically protested that Ankara allows "terrorists" (i.e., members of various Iranian opposition groups) to reside in Turkey. Turkish security officials in turn suspect that Iranian diplomats in Turkey have been involved in assassinations of Iranian opposition leaders and also have assisted some of the militant Turkish Islamists who began resorting to violence in the late 1980s. With respect to international concerns, Turkey resents Iran's criticism of its membership in NATO, distrusts Iran's alliance with Syria and its cooperation with Armenia, and perceives Iran as a competitor for influence in Azerbaijan and Central Asia. Above all, Turkish leaders believe that Iran supports the PKK and even provides sanctuary and bases for it in the area of northwest Iran that borders Kars, Agri, Van, and Hakkâri provinces.

Turkish suspicions of Iranian support for the PKK probably originated in 1987, when Iran strongly protested Turkey's bombing of Iraqi Kurdish villages that Ankara claimed were bases for PKK guerrillas. At the time Iran condemned this vio-
lation of Iraqi sovereignty, Iran and Iraq were at war, with Iranian forces occupying parts of southern Iraq. Iran's protest may have been prompted by the fact that the area Turkey bombed was controlled by an Iraqi Kurdish opposition group to which Iran was allied. This group not only helped Iran by fighting against Saddam Husayn's regime but also cooperated with Iran to suppress Iranian Kurdish opposition. From Turkey's perspective, however, this same Kurdish group was too friendly toward the PKK.

This complex intertwining of domestic and international Kurdish politics continued to cause misunderstanding between Turkey and Iran for more than five years. However, beginning in 1992, Turkish and Iranian views on the Kurdish issue gradually converged as Iranian Kurdish opposition groups initiated operations in Iran from bases in territory controlled by the Kurdish autonomous authority in northern Iraq. Iran not only ceased protesting Turkish actions in Iraq, but it even followed Turkey's example in bombing opposition bases in Iraq. During 1993 Iran also responded favorably to Turkish proposals pertaining to security cooperation in the region along their common border and joined Turkey in affirming opposition to an independent Kurdish state being carved out of Iraq.

Syria joined Iran and Turkey in declaring support for the territorial integrity of Iraq, and representatives of the three states met periodically after 1991 to discuss mutual concerns about developments in northern Iraq. Nevertheless, Turkey has had serious reservations about Syria's motives; some Turkish officials believe that if an appropriate opportunity presented itself, Syria would use the Kurdish issue to create a Kurdish state in parts of both Iraq and Turkey. Such pessimistic views stem from Syria's long support of the PKK. Turks believe that Syria permits the PKK to maintain a training base in Lebanon—where Syrian troops have been stationed since 1976—and allows PKK leaders to live freely in Damascus. Tensions between Turkey and Syria actually had been accumulating long before the eruption of the PKK "dispute" in 1984. Like Iraq, Syria was an Ottoman province until 1918. Subsequently, it was governed by France as a League of Nations mandate. In 1939 France detached Hatay (formerly Alexandretta) province from Syria and ceded it to Turkey, an action bitterly opposed by Arab nationalists. Syria thus became independent in 1946 with an irredentist claim against Turkey. The Arab-Israeli conflict soon developed as another source of Syrian antagonism toward Tur-
Turkey's relations with other Arab countries, including Iraq prior to 1990, have been more positive than those with Syria. In early 1995, trade seemed to be the most important aspect of overall relations. Ankara had hoped that its support of the United States-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War would produce economic rewards. In fact, some Turkish business interests won contracts for construction projects in the Persian Gulf region, albeit not to the extent anticipated. Turkey's regional exports prior to 1990 had gone primarily to Iraq and secondarily to Iran. The loss of the Iraqi market because of Turkish compliance with sanctions initially represented a severe blow to export-dependent businesses and probably contributed to an economic recession in 1991. Beginning in 1992, however, Turkey gradually increased the level of its exports—particularly processed food and manufactured goods—to Kuwait and other Persian Gulf states. Although the prospects for expanding trade with Egypt and Israel appear limited because Turkey and these countries export similar products that compete in international markets, Turkey, nevertheless, has consolidated its
political ties to both countries. Since 1992, for example, Israeli and Turkish investors have undertaken several joint-venture development projects in Central Asia. Turkey also imports most of its oil from Middle Eastern countries, particularly Libya.

**European Union**

Since 1963, when it was accepted as an associate member of the European Community (EC), Turkey has striven for admission as a full member of that body, now called the European Union (EU—see Glossary), the association of fifteen West European nations that comprises the world’s wealthiest and most successful trading bloc. The Özal government, which had formulated its economic policies with the goal of meeting certain EC objections to a perceived lack of competitiveness in Turkish industry, formally applied for full membership in 1987. Much to Turkey's disappointment, the decision was deferred until 1993—or later—on grounds that the EC could not consider new members until after the implementation of tighter political integration scheduled for the end of 1992. The unexpected end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union actually delayed integration by one year, primarily to allow time for the EU to adjust to West Germany's absorption of East Germany. The new Demirel government, which strongly supported Özal's goal of joining the EC, was disappointed in 1992 when the EC agreed to consider membership applications from Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden without making a decision on Turkey's long-standing application. By then it seemed obvious that the EC was reluctant to act on Turkey's application. In fact, most EC members objected to full Turkish membership for a variety of economic, social, and political reasons.

The principal economic objections to Turkish membership center on the relative underdevelopment of Turkey's economy compared to the economies of EC/EU members and Turkey's high rate of population growth. The latter issue is perceived as a potentially serious problem because of free labor movement among EU members and the fact that Turkey's already large population is expected to surpass that of Germany—the most populous EU member—by 2010. Closely related to the concern about there being too many Turkish workers for too few jobs is the social problem of integrating those workers into European culture. Throughout Western Europe, the early
1990s witnessed a rise in anti-immigrant feeling directed primarily against Muslim workers from North Africa and Turkey. For the most part, EU governments have not developed policies to combat this resurgence of prejudice.

The political obstacles to EU membership concern Turkey's domestic and foreign policies. Because the European body prides itself on being an association of democracies, the 1980 military coup—in a country enjoying associate status—was a severe shock. The harshness of repression under the military regime further disturbed the EC—many EC leaders knew personally the former Turkish leaders whom the military put on trial for treason. The EC responded by freezing relations with Turkey and suspending economic aid. A related body, the Council of Europe, also expelled Turkey from its parliamentary assembly. The restoration of civilian rule gradually helped to improve Turkey's image. In 1985 Germany's prime minister signaled the EC's readiness to resume dialogue with Turkey by accepting an invitation to visit Ankara. The following year, the EC restored economic aid and permitted Turkey to reoccupy its seats in European deliberative councils. Nevertheless, frequent veiled threats by Turkey's senior military officers of future interventions if politicians "misbehaved" did not inspire confidence in Europe that democracy had taken permanent root in Turkey. As late as 1995, some Europeans remained apprehensive about the possibility of another military coup, a concern that was shared by various Turkish politicians.

EU members have also expressed reservations about Turkey's human rights record. Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, two human rights monitoring organizations supported by the EU, have reported the persistence of practices such as arbitrary arrests, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture in prisons, and censorship. The Turkish Human Rights Association, itself subject to harassment and intimidation tactics, has prepared detailed chronologies and lists of human rights abuses, including the destruction of entire villages without due process, and has circulated these reports widely in Europe. The documented reports of human rights abuses, like the coup rumors, sustained questions about Turkey's qualifications to join a collective body of countries that have striven to achieve uniform standards for protecting citizen rights.

In terms of foreign policy, the main obstacle to EU membership remains the unresolved issues between Turkey and EU member Greece. The most serious issue between the two coun-
tries is their dispute over the island of Cyprus, which dates back to 1974. At that time, Turkish troops occupied the northeastern part of the island to protect the Turkish minority (20 percent of the population), which felt threatened by the Greek majority's proposals for unification with Greece. Years of negotiations have failed to resolve a stalemate based on the de facto partition of Cyprus into a Turkish Cypriot north and a Greek Cypriot south, a division that continues to be enforced by a Turkish force estimated at 25,000 troops in early 1995 (see Conflict and Diplomacy: Cyprus and Beyond, ch. 1).

Following the November 1983 declaration of independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—a government recognized only by Turkey in early 1995—Greece persuaded fellow EU members that progress on settling the dispute over Cyprus should be a prerequisite to accepting Turkey as a full member. Despite Ankara's position that such an obvious political condition was not appropriate for an economic association, once the EC agreed in 1990 to consider an application for membership from Cyprus, diplomatic efforts aimed at convincing individual EC members to veto the condition became futile. Since 1990 Turkey has supported UN-mediated talks between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders that are aimed at devising procedures for the island's reunification. As of January 1995, these intermittent discussions had made little progress, and the prospects for a resolution of the Cyprus problem appeared dim.

Equally as serious as the Cyprus issue is Turkey's dispute with Greece over territorial rights and interests in the Aegean Sea. Although both Greece and Turkey are de jure allies in NATO, their conflicting claims brought them to the brink of war in 1986 and 1987. A fundamental source of contention is exploration rights to minerals, primarily oil, beneath the Aegean Sea. International law recognizes the right of a country to explore the mineral wealth on its own continental shelf. Greece and Turkey, however, have been unable to agree on what constitutes the Aegean continental shelf. Turkey defines the Aegean shelf as a natural prolongation of the Anatolian coast, whereas Greece claims that every one of the more than 2,000 of its islands in the Aegean has its own shelf. The issue is complicated further by Greece's claim to the territorial waters surrounding its islands. Turkey rejected Greece's attempts to extend its six-nautical-mile territorial claim around each island to twelve nautical miles on grounds that such a move would
enable Greece to control 71 percent, rather than 43 percent, of the Aegean. Thus, it would be impossible for Turkish ships to reach the Mediterranean Sea without crossing Greek waters.

The issue of the right to control the airspace over the Aegean appears similarly intractable. Greece, which was granted control of air and sea operations over the entire Aegean region by various NATO agreements, closed the Aegean air corridors during the 1974 Cyprus crisis and only reopened them early in 1980 as part of the compromise arrangement for Greek reintegration into NATO. Disputes over the median line dividing the Aegean into approximately equal sectors of responsibility remain unresolved. In addition, Turkey refuses to recognize the ten-mile territorial air limit decreed by Greece in 1931; this line extends from the coast of Greece's mainland as well as from its islands. These unresolved issues contribute to the tensions over Cyprus and mineral exploration rights in the Aegean Sea.

Prime Minister Özal recognized the potential of Greece to block Turkish admission to the EC even before his government formally submitted its application. Thus, early in 1987 he attempted to defuse tensions by initiating a meeting with his Greek counterpart in Switzerland—the first meeting between Greek and Turkish heads of government in ten years. Their discussions resolved an immediate crisis over oil drilling in the Aegean and established channels for further diplomatic discussions. In June 1988, Özal accepted an unprecedented invitation to visit Athens, the first state visit by a Turkish leader in thirty-six years. Although Özal's initiatives did much to clear the political atmosphere, leaders in both countries remain unable to overcome their mutual suspicions. Thus, no progress has been achieved in resolving outstanding differences, although both countries are showing more restraint in their rhetoric and actions. Beginning in 1989, dramatic political developments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East caused Turkey and Greece to focus their attention beyond the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

The United States

In early 1995, Turkey's most important international relationship was with the United States. Turkey's association with the United States began in 1947 when the United States Congress designated Turkey, under the provisions of the Truman Doctrine, as the recipient of special economic and military
assistance intended to help it resist threats from the Soviet Union (see Politics and Foreign Relations in the 1960s, ch. 1). A mutual interest in containing Soviet expansion provided the foundation of United States-Turkish relations for the next forty years. In support of overall United States Cold War strategy, Turkey contributed personnel to the UN forces in the Korean War (1950–53), joined NATO in 1952, became a founding member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) collective defense pact established in 1955, and endorsed the principles of the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Turkey generally cooperated with other United States allies in the Middle East (Iran, Israel, and Jordan) to contain the influence of those countries (Egypt, Iraq, and Syria) regarded as Soviet clients.

The general tendency for relationships between nations to experience strain in the wake of domestic and international political changes has proved to be the rule for Turkey and the United States. The most difficult period in their relationship followed Turkey's invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974. In response to the military intervention, the United States halted arms supplies to Turkey. Ankara retaliated by suspending
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United States military operations at all Turkish installations that were not clearly connected with NATO missions. The Cyprus issue affected United States-Turkish relations for several years. Even after the United States Congress lifted the arms embargo in 1978, two years passed before bilateral defense cooperation and military assistance were restored to their 1974 level.

During the 1980s, relations between Turkey and the United States gradually recovered the closeness of earlier years. Although Ankara resented continued attempts by the United States Congress to restrict military assistance to Turkey because of Cyprus and to introduce congressional resolutions condemning the 1915-16 massacre of Armenians, the Özal government generally perceived the administrations of President Ronald Reagan and President George H.W. Bush as sympathetic to Turkish interests. For example, Washington demonstrated its support of Özal's market-oriented economic policies and efforts to open the Turkish economy to international trade by pushing for acceptance of an International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary) program to provide economic assistance to Turkey. Furthermore, the United States, unlike European countries, did not persistently and publicly criticize Turkey over allegations of human rights violations. Also, the United States did not pressure Özal on the Kurdish problem, another issue that seemed to preoccupy the Europeans. By 1989 the United States had recovered a generally positive image among the Turkish political elite.

The end of the Cold War forced Turkish leaders to reassess their country's international position. The disappearance of the Soviet threat and the perception of being excluded from Europe have created a sense of vulnerability with respect to Turkey's position in the fast-changing global political environment. Özal believed Turkey's future security depended on the continuation of a strong relationship with the United States. For that reason, he supported the United States position during the Persian Gulf War, although Turkey's economic ties to Iraq were extensive and their disruption hurt the country. After the war, he continued to support major United States initiatives in the region, including the creation of a no-fly zone over northern Iraq, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and expanded ties with the Central Asian members of the CIS. Özal's pro-United States policy was not accepted by all Turks. United States use of Turkish military installations during the
bombing of Iraq in 1991 led to antiwar demonstrations in several cities, and sporadic attacks on United States facilities continued in 1992 and 1993. Nevertheless, among Turkey's political elite a consensus had emerged by January 1995 that Turkey's security depended on remaining a strategic ally of the United States. For that reason, both the Demirel and Çiller governments undertook efforts to cultivate relations with the administrations of presidents George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton.

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George S. Harris analyzes Turkey's governmental framework, political dynamics, and foreign policy from both historical and contemporary perspectives in *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*. Frank Tachau describes the tension among authoritarianism, democracy, and economic development in *Turkey: The Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development*. Insight into the breakdown of Turkish democracy and the framing of a new constitution is provided in Clement H. Dodd's *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy* and in Lucille W. Pevsner's *Turkey's Political Crisis*.

Religion and religious movements in contemporary Turkey are examined in *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey*, by Serif A. Mardin, and in a volume edited by Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics, and Literature in a Secular State*. Information on patterns of political participation through specialized associations can be obtained from Robert Bianchi's detailed study, *Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey*. David Barchard examines aspects of Turkey's foreign policy in *Turkey and the West*. The complicated relationship between Turkey and Greece and its implications for the United States are examined in Theodore A. Couloumbis's *The United States, Greece, and Turkey* and Monteagle Stearns's *Entangled Allies: United States Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Chapter 5. National Security
The Rumeli Hisar or castle guards the Bosporus and Istanbul.
THE ARMED FORCES have figured prominently in Turkish national life for centuries. Under Ottoman rule, the government and the military establishment were virtually indistinguishable. After World War I, the army commander, Mustafa Kemal, later called Atatürk (meaning Father Turk), evicted the occupying forces of the victorious Allies from Anatolia and formulated the principles underlying the modern Turkish state. On three occasions since then, the military leadership has intervened to protect the nation's democratic framework. The third interlude of military rule, which lasted from 1980 to 1983, was welcomed by many Turkish citizens because it ended the terrorism of the 1970s. The military's actions, however, also limited the democratic process.

A member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952, Turkey long had the vital mission of anchoring the alliance's southern flank against the military power of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Turkish armed forces defended the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and Turkey's northeastern border with the Soviet Union in the Transcaucasus region. Vessels of the Soviet Union's Black Sea fleet had to transit the Turkish-controlled straits to enter the Mediterranean.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 fundamentally changed Turkey's security environment. Fear of Soviet aggression no longer looms over the nation, yet Turkey remains at the center of a region seething with political and economic discord. The stability of Turkey's borders is threatened by turbulence among the newly independent republics of the Caucasus and by hostile states in the Middle East. Turkey's concern over the fortunes of the Turkic states of Central Asia could bring it into conflict with Russia or Iran. Turkey is an advocate of the interests of Muslim peoples in the Balkans, but its modest military role as part of the United Nations (UN) Protection Force in Bosnia has generated controversy because of memories of the Ottoman Empire's long involvement there.

The Turkish government has taken sweeping measures to restructure and modernize the armed forces to deal with the new conditions, in which Soviet military might has been superseded by a multiplicity of threats near Turkey's eastern and southern borders. The new strategy emphasizes the ability to
perform a variety of missions, move forces rapidly from one region to another, and mount firepower sufficient to meet any foreseeable threat. Undergoing the most radical reorganization have been the land forces, which were reduced from about 525,000 troops in 1990 to about 393,000 in 1994. For added flexibility, the army has adopted a brigade structure in place of the previous divisional pattern. The army's stocks of tanks and armored vehicles have been enlarged and improved; self-propelled howitzers and multiple rocket launchers also have been added. Troop-carrying helicopters will ensure greater mobility.

An expanded Turkish defense industry has played a major role in the modernization of the armed forces. Under joint-venture programs with United States manufacturers, combat aircraft, armored vehicles, rocket systems, and tank upgrades have been supplied. Submarines and other vessels have been produced in cooperation with the German shipbuilding industry. The centerpiece of the modernization effort has been the United States-Turkey F-16 coproduction project, which is expected to add 240 high-performance fighter aircraft to the Turkish inventory during the 1990s.

Turkey and the United States developed many defense links and common goals after United States military and economic assistance began in 1947 in response to the threat of Soviet expansion. For instance, Turkey has permitted the United States to use forward bases and intelligence installations on Turkish territory. During the Cold War, these installations were of vital importance in monitoring military activity and weapons testing by the Soviet Union. Following the end of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, Turkish bases enabled the United States and coalition forces to conduct Operation Provide Comfort, an effort to supply humanitarian relief to Kurds in northern Iraq and enforce a "no-fly zone" in the area against Iraqi aircraft.

Overshadowing all external threats to Turkish security is the Kurdish insurgency, which began in 1984 in the southeastern region of the country. This movement, which involves only a small minority of Turkey's Kurdish population, is led by the extremist Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan—PKK). The conflict became particularly violent beginning in 1992. Some 4,000 Kurds and government security personnel were killed in 1993 alone, many of them noncombatants. The activities of the PKK complicate Turkey's relations with Syria, Iraq, and Iran, where the PKK insurgents have maintained supply and training bases. By early 1995, the Turkish government

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had deployed nearly 200,000 soldiers and police to the region, and had adopted a policy of forcibly evacuating and often burning Kurdish villages believed to be aiding the insurgents. These measures apparently dampened the insurgency, but at the cost of alienating large numbers of Kurds not involved in the separatist movement.

Historical Role of the Armed Forces

The professional armed forces of Turkey trace their origins back more than five centuries, to a permanent body of men recruited to form the nucleus of the much larger armies mobilized to conduct annual campaigns against selected objectives. A unique feature of the Ottoman military organization was the janissary army, whose members were conscripted as youths from among the empire's non-Muslim subjects in the Balkans, converted to Islam, and given military training. Gradually acquiring high status, prominence, and privilege, the janissaries ultimately constituted a reactionary palace guard resistant to reforms and of little military value to the reigning sultan.

Military conquest permitted the spread of the Ottoman Empire through the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans, and most of Eastern Europe. The sequence of Ottoman victories was finally halted and a gradual military eclipse ensued after the failure of the siege of Vienna in 1683 (see Koprulu Era, ch. 1). Vast territories were relinquished as a result of a century of setbacks in battles with the European powers.

The need to modernize a military system engaged in a losing struggle to maintain Ottoman control over the Mediterranean littoral and the Middle East was recognized by the first of the reforming sultans, Selim III (r. 1789–1807). He introduced French instructors to train the soldiers of a new volunteer army organized along the lines of contemporary European armed forces. However, his efforts were successfully resisted by the janissaries, who concluded that reform foreshadowed an end to their traditional privileges. Rising up in 1807, the janissaries precipitated the sultan's abdication and the dismantling of the new army. Mahmud II (r. 1808–39) eventually became strong enough to challenge the power of the traditional military caste. He reinstituted the reformed army and, in 1826, crushed the janissaries with a massive artillery barrage aimed at their barracks.

The internal decay of the Ottoman Empire during the late nineteenth century was accompanied by growing disaffection
and turmoil among younger military officers and civil servants. Coming together as the Committee of Union and Progress (better known as the Young Turks), and operating as secret cells within military units, the dissidents instigated a series of upheavals and mutinies within the military that culminated in the revolution of 1908 and the fall of Sultan Abdül Hamid II (see The Young Turks, ch. 1). Divided between nationalist and liberal factions, the Young Turk officers could not prevent foreign powers from seizing portions of the empire's Balkan holdings. After the empire's defeat at the hands of Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, and Serbia in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, a military dictatorship emerged, under the nominal control of the sultan. Motivated by their fear of Russia, the nationalist officers made the fateful error of joining the Central Powers in World War I. Initially, the Turkish army was successful, stubbornly resisting the landing of British and Australian forces at Gallipoli in 1915 and forcing their withdrawal the following year. But operations against Russia went badly, and tsarist forces advanced onto Turkish soil. In Mesopotamia and Palestine, British and Arab units also prevailed against the Turks (see World War I, ch. 1).

A new contingent of Young Turks led by the war hero Atatürk resisted the postwar occupation of most of Turkey by Greek, French, Italian, and British forces. A series of defeats were administered to the Greek troops, resulting in their withdrawal in 1922. The Turks subsequently forced the occupying Allies to accede to a peace treaty recognizing the present borders of Turkey and enabling the proclamation in 1923 of the Republic of Turkey, with Atatürk as its president (see War of Independence, ch. 1).

Atatürk envisioned Turkey as a modern, secular democracy in which the army would distance itself from the civil functions of government. The army nevertheless preserved the right to intervene as the ultimate guardian of the state if the political system became deadlocked or Atatürk's reforms were endangered. Although active-duty officers were forbidden to engage in politics, the interests of the military did not go unrepresented. Until 1950 many influential leadership posts and at least 20 percent of the seats in the Grand National Assembly were held by individuals with military backgrounds. For nearly thirty years, the nation was governed by two military heroes of the War of Independence—first Atatürk and then, after his death in 1938, Ismet İnönü—and a single political party in which retired senior officers were heavily represented.
The Armed Forces and Society

The armed forces traditionally have enjoyed a distinguished position in Turkish national life. Soldiers receive widespread respect as symbols of Turkish national identity and as legatees of the country's long martial traditions. A leading Turkish journalist has written that "the army is always praised, never criticized, and, in an emergency, it is seen as the nation's savior." Over the centuries, the army has been perceived as a civilizing and humanizing factor in society. In the modern era, it is considered the embodiment of the enlightened, progressive forces that inspired the revolution of 1908 against Ottoman rule and later prevented the nation's dismemberment by driving out the occupying armies after World War I. The army also has received credit for rescuing the nation from the turmoil and violence of the late 1970s.

Turks recognize that a career in the armed forces provides the opportunity for a quality education at no cost, followed by a lifetime of secure and respected employment. Although some members of the middle and upper classes hold the view that the specialized education and isolated life of the officer produce individuals inflexibly committed to a set of values remote from the real world, such criticism is rarely expressed openly. In any event, a career in the armed forces has become less of a lifetime commitment than in the past. Because of the superior technical education it provides, military service is often seen as an avenue to a successful civilian career.

Because of the large number of applicants for places in the military high schools and service academies, the standards for officer candidates remain high. In the course of their military education, students learn the values of Kemalism (the precepts of Atatürk) and are taught to take pride in the role of the military in protecting the democratic state against the extremes of left and right and the appeal of radical Islamism. Officers tend to develop an outlook that is nationalistic and hierarchical. In the early 1960s, a minority of junior officers had left-wing sympathies, but strict background checks, together with the emphasis on cohesiveness and discipline, are believed subsequently to have produced an officer corps immune to radicalism. The military maintains intense vigilance against the infiltration of leftist thought, as well as against Islamic activism (also seen as fundamentalism).

The officer corps enjoys certain privileges, but the military makes efforts to keep these from becoming conspicuous
enough to provoke civilian criticism. Officers consider clubs, attractive housing, vacation resorts, and sports facilities as necessary to compensate for the modest pay and other disadvantages of career military service. Officers are also expected to meet high standards of personal probity.

Most individuals entering the service academies are drawn from the lower-middle and middle classes. The results of one survey showed that about 40 percent of army and air force cadets and 55 percent of naval cadets were sons of military service members, gendarmes, or civil servants, in particular teachers. This suggests, one analyst has noted, a perpetuation of the sense of kinship with the spirit of Atatürk and the revolution of 1908. Less than 10 percent of those entering the army and air force academies in the early 1980s were from rural families; naval cadets with an agricultural background were almost unknown. Geographically, central Anatolia and areas adjacent to the Aegean Sea and the Sea of Marmara were overrepresented, whereas southeastern Turkey was most underrepresented, supplying only 1 to 2 percent of cadets (see fig. 1). Resistance to assimilation by Kurdish- and Arabic-speaking minorities in the southeast and strict political screening may account for the limited recruitment from this area to the officer corps.

In contrast to officer candidates, enlisted personnel, especially conscripts, are preponderantly from peasant households. At least 80 to 85 percent are ethnically Turkish, and the vast majority are Sunni (see Glossary) Muslims. Once rare, efforts to evade the draft or obtain unjustified deferments apparently are becoming more common (see Conditions of Service, this ch.). Nevertheless, for a young soldier facing doubtful employment prospects, active duty means a nutritious diet, access to medical care, and perhaps an opportunity to further one's education and acquire a useful job skill. Military service offers an interlude from the unvarying pace of village life and is a source of pride, linking one to the warrior tradition of Turkish society.

Politics and the Military

Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, six of the nation's nine presidents have had armed forces backgrounds. Until 1950 Atatürk and his successor and closest military associate, İnönü, ruled what was an essentially a one-party political system with a strong martial flavor. Atatürk encouraged the military to abjure politics, but the armed forces inter-
vened on three occasions—in 1960, 1971, and 1980. Although they did so under different circumstances in each case, their justification was their sworn duty to uphold national unity and the democratic order.

The military regime of 1980–83 was the longest lasting, and represented the armed forces’ most serious effort to transform traditional political behavior. The changes the regime introduced were intended to break what had become a cycle of decennial military interventions. The constitution introduced by the coup leaders in 1982, which forbade political activism in the universities and trade unions, abolished pre-existing parties, and banned political activity by pre-1980 party leaders, was the centerpiece of the military's efforts to curtail the factionalism and polarization that had stalemated the previous civilian government (see Political Developments since the 1980 Coup, ch. 4).

The leader of the 1980–83 junta, General Kenan Evren, remained as president after the return of civilian government, but the generals disavowed any desire for a continuing political role for the military. The public failed to respond to Evren's appeal to vote for the party favored by the generals, the Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi—MDP). A new grouping of retired officers and other leading citizens, the MDP had the same interests and goals as the military regime. Although disappointed by the party's lack of success, military leaders established good working relations with the victorious Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi—ANAP) of Turgut Özal. By promptly relinquishing control over public life, the military preserved its reputation as the ultimate protector of Turkish democratic institutions.

On two occasions, Özal prevailed when differences arose with the armed forces. In 1987, as prime minister, he overrode the military's choice of an army commander as the new chief of the General Staff, reportedly out of dissatisfaction with the conduct of the campaign against the Kurdish insurgency. In 1990, after Özal became president, the chief of staff resigned as a result of undisclosed disagreements assumed to have sprung from Özal's activist stance against Iraq's takeover of Kuwait but did not make a public issue of his difference with Özal.

Imbued with the concept that its mission is to safeguard Atatürk's heritage, the military establishment has often shown its impatience with political bickering and compromises that appear to slight Kemalist objectives. Civilian politicians indif-
Different to those goals or embracing other ideologies are viewed with suspicion or even as subversive. Much of the military education system is concerned with instilling the Kemalist spirit through study of the 1919–22 War of Independence, the concept of patriotism as embodied by Atatürk, and the values and principles of Kemalism, particularly the "Six Arrows" of secularism, republicanism, populism, etatism (see Glossary), reformism, and nationalism, as guidance for the future of the Turkish state.

A democratic system is fully accepted as the best form of government by the professional military. However, young career officers are indoctrinated with the view that the proper working of democracy demands discipline, organization, constructiveness, unity of purpose, and rejection of self-interest. Thus, the military has little tolerance of politicians whom it perceives as putting personal ambition before the good of the state or of political parties or groups acting in ways it considers to be dictated by a struggle for power and economic advantage.

From a career point of view, it is said to be unwise for an officer to express opinions that can be construed as liberal or otherwise unorthodox. The armed forces have shown particular sensitivity to the threat of radical Islamism to military order. In 1991 the general staff disclosed that in the preceding decade 357 officers and seventy-one noncommissioned officers (NCOs) had been dismissed on charges of involvement in extreme leftist or separatist (presumably Kurdish) activities. During the same period, thirty-seven officers and 188 NCOs were discharged for involvement in extreme rightist or Islamist activities.

External Security Concerns

Throughout the Cold War, Turkey's security situation was shaped by the country's vulnerability to Soviet military strength. It was obliged to contend with the threat of twenty divisions of Soviet land forces close to the common border of more than 500 kilometers in the Transcaucasus region of northern Turkey. Turkey's heavily populated areas were within easy range of Soviet fighter aircraft and bombers; Soviet naval vessels and submarines were well positioned to dominate the Black Sea.

Turkish suspicion of Soviet motives had historical roots in the efforts of imperial Russia to extend its influence beyond the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle
Soldiers, armored unit, and mobile antiaircraft passing in review,
Republic Day parade (October 29)
Courtesy Embassy of Turkey, Washington
East. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was linked tactically and logistically to the Soviet Black Sea fleet. Transit of the Turkish-controlled Bosporus was essential to the projection of Soviet naval power in the Mediterranean.

For Turkey, perhaps the most important consequence of the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union was that it no longer shares a border with Russia and that the risk of conflict with the Russians has greatly receded. The appearance of several newly independent nations at Turkey's borders, however, has resulted in a less settled security environment because Turkey now feels a greater potential threat from other powers in the area such as Greece, Syria, and Iraq.

Although buffered by other new nations in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions, Russia remains a compelling presence in the minds of Turkish military planners. With Moscow increasingly willing to intervene in conflicts near Turkey's borders, concern has grown that a resurgent Russian nationalism might seek pretexts to gain control of former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia has repositioned to its southern flank some of the ground weapons withdrawn from Central Europe under the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990. Although the treaty placed a ceiling on the number of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces that could be redeployed to the North Caucasus Military District, the Russians have exceeded this limit, citing concerns over instability in their border regions.

Close to Turkey's northeastern border, three former republics of the Soviet Union—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—are beset by dissidence and fighting. Turkey has historical, cultural, religious, and linguistic ties with Azerbaijan and supported Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia. From the Turkish perspective, Armenia committed aggression against Azerbaijan by seizing the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is inhabited mostly by ethnic Armenians. Russia issued veiled warnings against Turkish involvement in the Armenian situation, which could pit Turkey against Russia. Turkey has ruled out the use of force, wary of a wider conflict between Christians and Muslims in the region.

**Middle Eastern Conflicts**

Despite its location, Turkey generally has been successful in pursuing a policy of noninterference and noninvolvement in Middle Eastern conflicts. For instance, Turkey refrained from
supporting either belligerent in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–88. Although both sides violated Turkish airspace, Turkey took no defensive action and sought to mediate an end to hostilities.

In the first days after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait in August 1990, the Turkish government tried to preserve its traditional neutral stance in what it perceived as an inter-Arab dispute. Ankara was quickly obliged to depart from this position, however, in light of the strong reaction in the UN against the invasion. Turkey responded to the UN Security Council's call for an embargo against Iraq by closing the Kirkuk-Yurmurtalik oil pipeline linking the two countries and halting trade with Iraq. These measures were crucial to the economic campaign against Saddam Husayn but imposed severe economic hardship on Turkey. The direct cost to its balance of payments was estimated at US$2 billion to US$2.5 billion annually. This burden was eased somewhat by aid from the United States and the Persian Gulf countries. Firm opposition in parliament and the cabinet prevented President Özal from offering a Turkish contingent for the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf. However, some 150,000 Turkish troops were deployed near the southeastern border with Iraq, tying down eight or nine Iraqi divisions. Turkey requested and received a defensive deployment of NATO air forces in the area to discourage attack by the Iraqi air force, which could easily outmatch the fighter aircraft and antiaircraft defenses that Turkey could muster. A total of forty German, Italian, and Belgian aircraft were dispatched to Turkey. In addition, United States and Dutch Patriot missile batteries were deployed against a possible Iraqi missile attack.

When the coalition air strikes on Iraq were launched in January 1991, ninety-six United States aircraft and several British bombers operated from the United States air base at Incirlik, refueling at Batman, a base about 150 kilometers from the Iraqi border. Sorties continued from Incirlik until the cease-fire on February 28, 1991, without provoking retaliation from Saddam Husayn.

The major consequence of the Persian Gulf War from the standpoint of Turkish security was the uprising of the Kurds in northern Iraq and the exodus of Kurds toward Turkish territory to escape Saddam Husayn's brutal suppression of the rebellion. Turkey was decidedly reluctant to accept the Kurds as refugees, considering them a potential destabilizing factor in its struggle with domestic Kurdish dissidents. As an alternative, Turkey supported the UN-approved Operation Provide Com-
fort, which distributed relief and set up a safe haven in northern Iraq whose security was guaranteed by a coalition force of 2,000 soldiers from five countries. Incirlik served as the base for a rapid deployment of air forces to enforce a no-fly zone in the region.

The Iraqi government's loss of control over Iraqi Kurdistan and elections in the area in May 1992 produced what was in effect an autonomous Kurdish government. Although Turkey permitted the lifeline to the Iraqi Kurdish enclave to originate on its territory, the Turks feared what they saw as the emerging outlines of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq. For this reason, Turkey resisted any international action that could lead to Iraq's dismemberment and thus endanger the regional status quo.

**Syria**

Several disputes make relations between Syria and Turkey uneasy. However, Syria's limited military potential and the alignment of Syrian forces on the Israeli front preclude any immediate threat along the 900-kilometer border between Turkey and Syria.

Syria has never abandoned its claim to the Turkish province of Hatay, which includes the city of Iskenderun. France, the mandatory power over Syria from 1920 to 1941, ceded the area to Turkey in 1939 after a disputed plebiscite, in violation of its League of Nations mandate.

Tensions with Syria are compounded by Turkey's control over distribution of the waters of the Euphrates River. Turkey's huge Southeast Anatolian Project, with its dams and hydroelectric plants, threatens to deplete Syria's water resources. In addition, Syria has a history of permitting hostile political movements—Armenian, Marxist, and Kurdish—to conduct anti-Turkish operations from Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. To a considerable degree, the issues of access to water and Syria's support for the Kurdish insurgency are linked. To the extent that Turkey attempts to accommodate Syria on water sharing, Syria limits its backing of the Kurds. In December 1993, the Syrian government took into custody the Kurdish rebel leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in what was seen as an attempt to strengthen Syria's hand in water negotiations.

**Iran**

Frictions with the Tehran government stem largely from
competing philosophies—the secularism at the root of the Turkish system and the Shia (see Glossary) orientation of Iran. The Turkish government has refrained from accusing Iran of direct responsibility for incidents of Islamist terrorism. However, the Turkish minister of interior declared in 1993 that the perpetrators of a series of murders of well-known secularist figures had been trained in Iran and helped by the staff of the Iranian Cultural Center in Ankara. Turkey considers such attacks a threat to national security because the government and laws of the modern Turkish state are so closely identified with its secular tradition.

Another source of potential tension is Turkey's support of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. Tehran fears that a nationalistic Azerbaijan friendly to Turkey could encourage unrest in northern Iran, which has a considerable Azerbaijani population. Turkey estimates that about 800 Kurdish guerrillas are based in Iranian territory. Tehran has denied supporting them, and in December 1993 the two countries announced that an agreement had been reached to prevent the guerrillas from using Iran as a sanctuary.

The Balkans

As the principal successor state to the Ottoman Empire, which controlled the Balkans for centuries until its defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, Turkey retains a keen interest in the fate of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM—the name under which independent Macedonia was recognized by the United Nations in 1995), and Albania. Turkey opposed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, fearing the resulting instability could create broader regional conflict. With the outbreak of war in Bosnia in 1992 and Serbian human rights violations, Turkey advocated Western military measures to contain the Serbs. It pressed for an end to the UN arms embargo to enable Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves more effectively against Serbian attack. Turkey contributed ships to the NATO naval force blockading Serbia and Montenegro and dispatched a squadron of eighteen F-16 aircraft to Italy to help enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. Unilateral Turkish military aid to Bosnia was impractical because of the interposition of Greek and Bulgarian territory in between. A Turkish offer of troops to the UN Protection Force in Bosnia was at first rejected by the UN Security Council because of Ankara's strong sympathies for the Bosnian Muslims
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and memories of the Ottoman role in the Balkans. In April 1994, however, after experiencing difficulties in obtaining force commitments, the UN accepted a Turkish deployment of about 1,500 soldiers in spite of objections by the Bosnian Serbs, Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria.

Albania also is receiving attention from Turkey. Once Albania ended its long isolation as a Stalinist state, Turkey proposed military cooperation accords that included officer training. The possibility of Serbian action against FYROM, whose independence Turkey recognized, and against Kosovo, a Serbian province largely populated by Albanians, is a concern of both Albania and Turkey. It seems unlikely, however, that Turkish military help will be forthcoming if the conflict in former Yugoslavia widens to Kosovo and FYROM.

Mutual distrust has long characterized Turkey's relations with Bulgaria, which, like Greece, has a short but strategically significant border with Turkish Thrace, the European region of Turkey. A major cause of friction was the Balkanization program instituted by the communist government of Bulgaria, which caused a mass migration of Bulgarian Turks to Turkey in the spring of 1989. After the communists fell in late 1989, Turkey moved to improve its security ties to Bulgaria's new government. A series of agreements were reached on formal notification of military movements, exchanges of military visits, and the establishment of a military security zone extending sixty to eighty kilometers on each side of the common border. Talks were also held in 1993 on cooperating in the production of military equipment, and the two countries conducted a joint military exercise with Romania.

Greece and Cyprus

In their first foreign combat operations since the Korean War, Turkish troops intervened in Cyprus in 1974 with the professed aim of protecting the Turkish minority population after a Greek-inspired coup brought a threat of union of the island with Greece. Against determined resistance by the lightly armed Greek Cypriot National Guard, the Turkish troops occupied the northern third of the island. The Turkish intervention force, which consisted of about 40,000 soldiers and 200 tanks, subsequently was reduced to a garrison of 30,000 troops. It greatly outnumbers the contingent of Greek national forces on the island, which is supplemented by the Greek Cypriot
National Guard. Air reinforcement of the Turkish troops can be effected, if necessary, within hours.

Ankara does not consider Cyprus one of its most pressing security issues because of Turkey's military superiority over Greece and the more serious strategic problems posed in the east. Nevertheless, the unresolved dispute over Cyprus complicates Turkish participation in NATO and remains an obstacle to NATO's effectiveness in the region. In addition, the question of the rights of 120,000 Muslims of Turkish ancestry in Grecian Thrace arouses Turkish sympathies, contributing to long-standing distrust between Greece and Turkey.

Other differences between the two NATO members contribute to contention. Greece, basing its claim on the Convention on the Law of the Sea passed by the UN in November 1994, which extends territorial waters from six to twelve nautical miles, seeks to claim this limit around each of the more than 2,000 Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Such a claim, if implemented, would give Greece about 70 percent of the Aegean Sea. Greece also claims a ten-nautical-mile airspace around each island. Turkish military aircraft and ships do not respect these claims. In addition, Turkey claims an Exclusive Economic Zone that is disputed by Greece.

Turkey maintains the Aegean Army, a force separate from its NATO-committed troops, ostensibly to defend the southwestern coastal areas. The force is a response to Greece's militarization of its islands close to the Turkish coast, which Turkey asserts violates the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne that set Turkey's present borders. The Aegean Army is considered a largely symbolic force; most of the troops assigned to it are kept in training status.

Turkey's Participation in NATO

Turkey's decision to seek Western assistance after being confronted by Soviet territorial demands at the conclusion of World War II and its subsequent participation in NATO's collective defense system have been the principal factors influencing the country's modern military evolution. In 1950 Turkey demonstrated its gratitude for the military aid received from the United States when it sent a brigade of 4,500 troops to serve under the UN command in Korea. The brigade became known for its valor on the battlefield after suffering proportionately the highest casualty rates of any UN element engaged in the fighting.
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Turkey's admission to NATO, effective in February 1952, was preceded by extensive study and debate of the strategy of extending the alliance's southern flank to include the eastern Mediterranean. Changes were needed in the wording of the treaty to expand its territorial reach to include Turkey. The admission of Turkey gave NATO a much longer land frontier with the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), as well as a treaty interest in Turkey's Black Sea coast and the straits through which the Soviet Union had access to the Mediterranean. At the same time, Turkey brought to the alliance its second largest body of military manpower after that of the United States, in addition to access to sites for forward deployment and intelligence gathering.

Under the provisions of the alliance, most of the Turkish armed forces are committed to NATO command in the event of hostilities. Turkish land, sea, and air units then come under the Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), with headquarters in Naples. The largest of NATO's four military regions, AFSOUTH encompasses Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea (including the Adriatic Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Ionian Sea, and the Tyrrhenian Sea). AFSOUTH develops joint contingency plans and conducts training exercises of assigned units.

One of the five principal subordinate commands under AFSOUTH, the Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe (LANDSOUTHEAST) is headquartered at Izmir under a Turkish lieutenant general, with a United States general officer as deputy. About 90 percent of Turkish land forces are committed to this command. The two other commands with Turkish forces assigned to them are Allied Air Forces Southern Europe (AIRSOUTH), under a United States general officer, and Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (NAVSOUTH), under command of an Italian vice admiral. Both commands have headquarters in the Naples area. Still under dispute is the matter of establishing LANDSOUTHCENT in Larissa, Greece. Initially, Turkey agreed and Greece objected, but in early 1995 Turkey objected unless a Turkish general were to command the center.

Important air, naval, and intelligence-gathering facilities are made available on Turkish soil to United States combat aircraft and to units of the United States Sixth Fleet committed to NATO (see Military Cooperation with the United States, this ch.). A detachment of NATO's Airborne Early Warning Force
was installed at the Konya Air Base in southwestern Turkey in 1983, using NATO-owned Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to provide low-level radar coverage and regional air and sea surveillance.

In the mid-1990s, Turkey allocated a mechanized infantry division consisting of one mechanized brigade and one armored brigade, as well as one combat engineering company, to the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force formed as part of NATO's restructuring. One commando brigade was earmarked for the southern multinational division, along with brigades from Italy and Greece. These forces remain under national command at their home bases until released to NATO.

Despite rapid changes in the European security environment that have replaced the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation with a less definable set of missions for the alliance, Turkey remains a strong partisan of the NATO linkage. Turkish participation gives the country a voice in major strategic decisions by Western democracies and a framework for multilateral cooperation in matters critical to its own security. Nevertheless, with NATO strategy based on the management of multidimensional threats rather than deterrence of the now-defunct Soviet Union, and with the admission of former members of the Warsaw Pact into a partnership relation with NATO, the importance of Turkey to European security has become less obvious. From a Turkish perspective, the protection of Turkey's eastern borders demands a continued high level of NATO involvement. In the shifting European security order, however, Turkey's geostrategic position could become a liability, potentially exposing the alliance to military action in an area where its commitments are ill defined.

Armed Forces

Composed of elements of regular cadre and conscripts, the armed forces in 1994 had an active-duty strength estimated by *The Military Balance, 1994–1995* at 503,800 officers and enlisted personnel. Of this total, some 93,600 were regulars in career assignments; the remaining 410,200 were draftees. The staffing level already had been reduced by 6 percent from that in 1990 as a consequence of forces reorganization.

Article 117 of the constitution stipulates that the president of the republic is the commander in chief of the armed forces. Responsibility for ensuring security and military preparedness
is delegated to the prime minister and the Council of Ministers (the cabinet), who are appointed by the president but are subject to a legislative vote of confidence. Article 118 of the constitution prescribes that the National Security Council (NSC—see Glossary) shall submit its views to the Council of Ministers on pending decisions and shall coordinate the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the state's national security policy. A joint body of the chief civilian and military officials concerned with national defense and internal security, the NSC meets twice monthly. Its meetings are chaired by the president or, in his or her absence, by the prime minister (see fig. 14).

In the view of one Turkish observer, the NSC has not been particularly successful as a forum for the armed forces and the government to debate and agree on security policies. At the meetings, the military speaks with a single voice, having worked out differences beforehand. Such unanimity is not conducive to an open dialogue, yet the military is disappointed when it fails to elicit concrete responses from the civilian leadership. Civilians sometimes have found the military insensitive to the government's problems in dealing with the bureaucracy, parliament, and the public when facing difficult decisions.

The constitution designates the chief of the General Staff as the commander of the armed forces. In wartime that officer also exercises the duties of commander in chief on behalf of the president. The chief of the General Staff is appointed by the president upon nomination by the Council of Ministers and is responsible to the prime minister in the exercise of his duties. In early 1995, the chief of the General Staff was General Ismail Hakki Karadayi, who was appointed in August 1994. The extensive authority of the Turkish chief of the General Staff contrasts strikingly with that of his counterparts in most NATO countries. He holds one of the highest positions in the government after the prime minister and is chosen strictly on the basis of seniority. As of 1994, the chief of the General Staff had always been an army officer, although an air force or naval officer might also be selected.

By law the chief of the General Staff determines the principles and policies of major programs concerned with operations, training, intelligence, and logistics. His views must be sought with respect to the military implications of proposed international treaties. He has the final say in the allocation of the military budget among programs and service branches.
The General Staff, a prestigious body that implements the decisions and guidance of the chief of the General Staff, in effect constitutes a joint headquarters with authority over the commanders of the service branches. It thus differs materially from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, who act as the immediate military staff of the secretary of defense, subject to the latter's authority and direction, and whose chair functions as presiding officer and spokesperson for the service commanders. The Turkish General Staff headquarters is administered by the deputy chief of the General Staff, who is responsible for preparing directives representing orders emanating from the General Staff, and for assuring their proper implementation.

The General Staff organization follows the same pattern as the United States system in most respects. Its departments are J-1 (personnel, including appointments and promotions), J-2 (internal and foreign intelligence), J-3 (operations, training, organization, war planning, and exercises), J-4 (logistics), J-5 (strategic-military policies, threat planning, targeting, budget allocations, and military agreements), J-6 (communications and electronics), and J-7 (studies of military history and strategy). The Turkish representative to NATO and the Turkish military representative to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) are both attached to the office of the deputy chief of the General Staff.

A separate body, the Supreme Military Council, consists of eighteen members, including the prime minister as chair, the chief of the General Staff as vice chair, the minister of national defense, the three service commanders, and other commanders of four-star rank. All promotions and other appointments to higher military positions are decided in this council, as are many internal policy matters affecting the military services. In practice, the chief of the General Staff initiates the appointments of service chiefs after consulting the civilian leadership and promotions to general rank after consulting the respective service chiefs.

The Ministry of National Defense executes defense policies and programs determined by the chief of the General Staff with respect to conscription, procurement of weapons and equipment, logistical needs, and other services such as health care, construction, infrastructure, and finances and auditing. The ministry compiles, coordinates, and steers the annual budget request through the National Assembly. The ministry is
Figure 14. Organization of the National Security Establishment, 1995
responsible for negotiating with other countries for military assistance and arms supplies but is not involved in discussions concerning the allocation of foreign aid among the service branches. The Ministry of National Defense reflects lesser civilian influence than its United States counterpart; many ministry staff officers are military officers, and the undersecretary of national defense is a general on active duty.

Defense Spending

The high cost of maintaining a credible military establishment in an age of rapidly changing technology has required heavy expenditures by the Ministry of National Defense in relation to other demands on the government's revenue. As a result, the Turkish government has allocated funds to defense in disproportion to widely acknowledged needs for social and economic development. In the decade between 1981 and 1991, defense was the largest category in the national budget, averaging in most years close to 20 percent of total government expenditures and 4 to 5 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary). The next largest budget category—education—commanded little more than half of the resources earmarked for defense.

Until the mid-1970s, the military budget covered only the domestic cost of maintaining the large armed forces establishment; most equipment costs and much of the expense of training military specialists were borne by the United States. A sharp increase in defense spending by Turkey itself was necessitated by the 1974 intervention in Cyprus. The immediate cost of the Cyprus operation, estimated at between US$350 million and US$700 million, was overshadowed by the burden of compensating for the embargo on military assistance imposed by the United States until 1978.

The Defense Industry Support Fund, which is separate from the regular defense budget, finances a US$15 billion military modernization program with earmarked taxes and assessments. The modernization fund is supplemented by a so-called Gulf Fund of grants from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States to compensate Turkey for the cost of maintaining the embargo against Iraq and the lost income from the closing of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline. By 1993 the Gulf Fund had accumulated more than US$4.8 billion (see Domestic Arms Industry, this ch.).
According to NATO estimates, personnel expenditures constituted almost exactly 50 percent of total defense expenditures in 1993. Equipment expenditures made up 25 percent of the total, infrastructure expenditures 3.2 percent, and other operating expenses the remaining 21.6 percent. The share of the budget going to personnel was lower than in most NATO countries, although higher than in the United States (38.6 percent in 1993). Low-paid conscripts who make up the bulk of the armed forces accounted for only 11 percent of overall personnel costs.

Equipment purchases absorbed 9.2 percent of defense outlays from 1980 to 1984 and 18.2 percent from 1985 to 1989. Such expenditures rose to 25.6 percent in 1993 because Turkey was obliged to assume an increasing share of the cost of new armaments, munitions, and supplies.

United States and German aid has been indispensable to Turkey's efforts to introduce advanced weapons systems. United States assistance has enabled Turkey to continue its modernization program in spite of the weakness of the Turkish lira (for value of the lira—see Glossary). The aid reached a high level during the Persian Gulf crisis, but tapered off with the end of the Cold War, its basis shifting from grants to concessionary loans.

The Military Balance, 1994–1995 has estimated the Turkish defense budget at US$4.1 billion in 1992, US$4.5 billion in 1993, and US$4.6 billion in 1994. Based on the NATO definition of military spending, the 1992 budget was US$6.1 billion, the 1993 budget US$7.1 billion, and the 1994 budget US$7.3 billion. Separate data published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) depict moderate real growth in Turkey's actual defense spending during most of the 1980s, from US$3.19 billion in 1981 to US$4.13 billion in 1989 (both expressed in constant 1991 dollars). Expenditures rose sharply to US$5.2 billion in 1990 and US$5.7 billion in 1991, largely as a result of the Persian Gulf War. The shrinkage of the armed forces was expected eventually to produce economies, but the initial effect was an increase in the defense budget to acquire and support more advanced weapons.

The country's economic sacrifice in building a strong defense establishment has been greater than that of its more affluent NATO partners. In 1991 Turkey's military expenditures were 5.4 percent of gross national product (GDP—see Glossary); this was roughly the same proportion as a decade
earlier, although defense spending had dropped to as low as 3.9 percent of GNP in 1988. Military spending constituted 20.3 percent of total central government expenditures in 1990 and 17.9 percent in 1991 by ACDA's calculations. The budget of the Ministry of National Defense, which excludes some defense-related costs, was 10.4 percent of the entire budget in 1993 and was scheduled to fall to 9.4 percent in 1994. Within NATO only the United States expended a larger percentage of government outlays on defense, and only Greece spent as high a share of GNP on defense. However, Turkey's defense expenditures per capita, amounting to US$97 annually, were the lowest among NATO countries.

Sources and Quality of Personnel

As expressed in Article 72 of the constitution, "National service is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in which this service shall be performed, or considered as performed, either in the armed forces or in the public service, shall be regulated by law." The required period of active-duty service has been scaled back periodically, from two years to eighteen months and, in 1992, to fifteen months. Male citizens who pass a physical examination are called up during their twentieth year, but induction can be deferred until completion of an education program.

University and college graduates may fulfill their military obligation as reserve officers with an eighteen-month period of active service following some previous preparation at their education institution. Four months of the service period consist of cadet training, followed by fourteen months of service in the branch to which the individual is appointed. With the dwindling need for reserve officers, complete professionalization of the officer corps is contemplated. Most university graduates would serve as conscripts in the regular army, but their active duty would be limited to nine months. An exception would be made for graduates of technical universities who could be called up for longer periods of specialized service.

Reserve officers seem not to be held in high esteem in the services, being regarded as less dependable than regulars, lacking in motivation, and inadequately trained. Regulars are reluctant to accept reservists as equals in personal and social relations. Reservists, on the other hand, tend to look down on regulars as narrowly educated.
After completing four months of basic training, conscripts are sent to their assigned units for more training and unit exercises. Recruits who have graduated from senior high school are eligible to serve as sergeants after NCO training. Promising but less educated recruits can become corporals after a two-week training course. In 1993 a program was introduced to increase the number of career NCOs. The intent was to enlist 100,000 regulars as privates and corporals in the course of the first year. As inducements, the maximum age of enlistment was raised from thirty to thirty-five, and new financial and social benefits were introduced.

The period of active service is an important educational experience for many young men. In addition to mastering weapons, they learn personal hygiene, table manners, and the basics of social conduct. They receive a wholesome diet and, in most cases, better medical and dental care than they will have at any other time in their lives. Literacy classes were formerly an important feature of military training, but by the 1980s fewer than 5 percent of recruits needed to be taught to read and write.

Many conscripts are taught useful skills, such as truck driving and machinery repair. The army's training of technicians and artisans may rival the contribution of civilian technical secondary schools, which produce only about 100,000 graduates a year.

Draft evasion apparently had become a serious problem by the mid-1990s, perhaps because of young men's reluctance to risk their lives against Kurdish insurgents. In December 1993, the chief of staff said that 30 percent of all men of draft age had deferred their service (in many cases in order to complete higher education), 22 percent were evading conscription, and 7 percent were medically unfit. The total of those who had avoided conscription came to about 250,000 but, as the chief of staff pointed out, the armed forces did not have facilities to induct all these men even if they were available. Desertions were also said to have increased, although military leaders were unwilling to confirm this fact.

After completing their active-duty obligation, conscripts are subject to recall in periods of national emergency until age forty-six if physically fit and not otherwise exempted. In practice, it is only for a few years after discharge that conscripts are considered part of the reserve system with specific unit assignments. In 1994 the number in this category was reported to be
about 952,300 (831,700 in the army, 55,600 in the navy, and 65,000 in the air force).

Turkey has always had an ample supply of personnel to meet its military needs. In 1994 roughly 3 million men were between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two. The annual call-up for all branches totaled about 300,000 but was likely to shrink rapidly with the reduction of the army complement and the effort to enlist more regulars. Nevertheless, in January 1994 all discharges were frozen for three months to ensure that the army had enough trained soldiers for operations against the Kurdish guerrillas.

Military discipline is strict. Turkish officers are taught to believe that softness is a sign of weakness, which soldiers will quickly take advantage of. Discipline is considered necessary to ensure quality performance and to prevent the slackness that officers feel pervades the civilian labor force. Corporal punishment is strictly prohibited under the Law of the Armed Services. Yet beatings and slappings, although not common, appear to be accepted forms of punishment. NCOs and sometimes second lieutenants are those most likely to employ corporal punishment for acts considered disruptive of discipline. The alternative is to institute legal proceedings for minor
offenses. Such proceedings can be delayed so long that they have little deterrent effect; they may also be perceived as reflecting poorly on the effectiveness of the officer involved. Major offenses, such as theft, desertion, or prohibited ideological activities, are normally the subject of courts-martial.

From the squad level up, soldiers engage in daily training exercises. The armed forces hold a number of combined exercises and participate in several NATO exercises each year. Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s Turkish observers felt that the quality of training still suffered from shortcomings. They noted, for example, that training often has a theoretical quality, traceable in part to the need to conserve ammunition, vehicles, and aircraft.

Since 1955, when the government opened certain military specialties to women, moderate numbers have volunteered for active duty. Recruitment of women was suspended for a time but was resumed in the early 1980s when some female university graduates were again taken in as pharmacists, doctors, dentists, and administrative or communications specialists. No women were accepted in the enlisted ranks or for assignments that could expose them to combat or hazardous duty. In 1992 access to military service was increased when 154 women were allowed to enter the service academies, half of them as army cadets.

**Education and Training**

The sole source of regular commissioned officers is the army academy at Harbiye, near Istanbul; the naval academy at Tuzla, on the Sea of Marmara near Istanbul; and the air force academy at Istanbul. Cadets who complete officer training receive commissions as second lieutenants or naval ensigns. The three services also operate five military high schools, from which half or more of the cadets are recruited. The selection process is highly selective, based on school grades, especially in the sciences, an oral interview in which appearance and demeanor are appraised, graded fitness tests, and a confidential investigation of the political background of the applicant and his or her family.

The military high schools have superior facilities, and classes are as little as one-third the size of those in civilian high schools. Scholastic performance is closely monitored. A summer camp is devoted to sports and military instruction.
The selection process for the military academies is even more rigorous than for the military high schools. Only about one in seven applicants is successful. A further weeding out occurs after an initial one-month adaptation course. The academies offer the opportunity of a free higher education under conditions of instruction that cannot be matched at civilian universities. Classroom and laboratory equipment is much superior, and sports facilities are unequaled elsewhere.

Candidates for the academies must be high-school graduates under twenty years of age and must have studied the sciences and a foreign language. Candidates must also score well in the regular university entrance examinations. An academy appointment is not offered until test scores are available. Applicants who score high enough for a place at a leading university often shift to a civilian career path. Each of the service acade-
mies must accept at least one cadet from each of Turkey's seventy-six provinces.

Founded on Prussian principles of military education, the service academies since the 1950s have been strongly influenced by the United States approach to officer training. The emphasis of the curriculum has been modified from time to time, often to ensure an acceptable ideological outlook among students. Since the late 1970s, the curriculum has been 56 percent military, including sports, and 44 percent academic. The political and economic areas have been strengthened and managerial training added. Foreign languages are stressed; some classes are taught in English. It is estimated that 20 percent of the curriculum is devoted, directly or indirectly, to study of the principles and reforms of Atatürk. Much attention is given to appearance, social polish, and a proper public deportment. Available books and periodicals have an orthodox outlook; left-wing and religious publications are forbidden. To limit exposure of cadets to political theories inconsistent with the Atatürk model, the academies permit conservative guest lecturers only. Many cadets are expelled for ideological reasons, primarily if they are suspected of leftist sympathies, given that graduates of Islamic high schools are not admitted in the first place. The role played by the army academy in the 1960 coup and in the abortive coup of 1962 led to the expulsion of 1,400 cadets, as a result of which there were no army graduating classes in 1963 and 1964.

The most prestigious training assignment for career officers is to one of the staff academies, which usually occurs after about six years of service, at the rank of captain or the equivalent. There are separate land, air, and naval staff academies, but they share a location in an Istanbul suburb. The staff academies constitute a self-sufficient town with modern accommodations for all officers, day care for the children of officers whose spouses have jobs, and complete sports facilities.

Only 120 to 130 officers are accepted into the staff academies each year for the two-year program. About 60 percent of the curriculum is devoted to military subjects—the principles of war, strategy, and weapons technology—and the remainder to administrative and management skills and general cultural subjects at a postgraduate level. An officer completing the course is credited with an extra three years of seniority, receives a higher salary, progresses faster, and is more likely to be
offered a coveted foreign posting. About 75 percent of those reaching the rank of general are staff officers.

Within ten years of commissioning, staff officers who have attained the rank of major or lieutenant colonel or their equivalents are expected to attend the Armed Forces Academy. This academy has a program twice a year for about seventy-five staff officers in subjects such as joint operations, campaign planning, strategy, global conflict, and new concepts and doctrines.

A five-month course is presented once a year at the National Security Academy to twenty civilians and ten officers, usually colonels and sometimes brigadier generals or the equivalent. The civilians typically include high-level civil servants, ambassadors, provincial governors, and subgovernors. Presented in seminar form, the program deals with international political, economic, and military trends, joint planning, and national security problems. Like the staff academies, the Armed Forces Academy and the National Security Academy are located outside Istanbul.

Conditions of Service

The average military academy graduate serves at least ten years in the three lowest officer grades in a combination of training and field assignments as a platoon or company commander. The pace of promotion is usually fairly steady through the rank of colonel or its equivalent, assuming satisfactory performance reports graded by three superior officers. A particularly high rating can advance a promotion by a year. In normal times, an army officer can expect at least two "eastern" assignments, once while a lieutenant or captain and once between the ranks of major and colonel or their equivalents. A post in eastern Turkey is considered undesirable because of its isolation, the severe weather, and the lack of medical and education facilities for families. Since the early 1990s, a much larger part of the army has been deployed in the east to deal with the Kurdish insurgency. Personal influence has little effect on where people in the military are posted.

Most career officers can expect to retire with the rank of colonel or the equivalent. With the number of generals and admirals ranging between 280 and 300, only forty-eight of the hundreds of colonels and navy captains are promoted to flag rank each year. People being considered for general officer rank are subjected to a minute review of their entire service record. General officers must not be involved in political activi-
ties and must show discretion and conservatism in social and domestic life. Treated with great deference in civilian society, general officers are entitled to full-time use of an official car and chauffeur, as well as the services of an adjutant and several orderlies. Protocol activities take up much of a general officer's time. A general serving as a field commander exercises authority and responsibility comparable to those of a provincial governor.

Except during periods of high inflation, the net salary of career officers is slightly more than the pay of civil servants of comparable standing, although the difference narrows at higher ranks. The living standards of career officers clearly surpass those of other government workers when special benefits are included. Quarters are provided for more than 70 percent of permanent military personnel. Rents, deducted directly from salaries, may be no more than one-eighth of equivalent civilian rents. Security and the maintenance of grounds and buildings, duties assigned to enlisted personnel, are of high quality.

Salaries of noncareer soldiers are very low and during the first half of the 1990s were eroded by inflation. As of January 1994, the monthly wage of a private was TL37,000, then equivalent to only US$2.25. A corporal earned TL57,000 and a sergeant, TL75,000. Pensions for families of soldiers who had died in service were minimal; compensation for the widow of a private came to about US$37 a month.

Military hospitals provide medical care to all active-duty and retired officers and enlisted personnel and their families. Reservists are eligible on a space-available basis. The quality of treatment and personnel at military hospitals is at least as good as at university hospitals, and superior to what is available in general hospitals.

There are officers' clubs in about forty of the provinces, most with excellent facilities for leisure and recreation, as well as temporary accommodations for officers and their families. The clubs are heavily patronized by retired officers as well. Prices are far lower than in comparable commercial establishments. NCO clubs traditionally were much more modest, but a program was initiated in the mid-1980s to bring them up to officers' club standards. Twenty-five rest camps enable service members and their families to enjoy two-week holidays at a fraction of the cost of commercial resorts. Accommodations
are awarded on a point system ensuring an opening at least every four years.

An unusual feature of the national defense establishment is the existence of a semiautonomous foundation known as the Army Mutual Aid Association (Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu—OYAK), which is essentially a military social security organization. Career officers and warrant officers contribute 10 percent of their basic salaries to the association's fund. Reserve officers contribute 5 percent. OYAK's business activities, which include holdings in eight major companies, have an annual turnover of US$5 billion, and are tax exempt. Participants may obtain housing loans from OYAK and may purchase homes built by OYAK's own construction companies at prices well below commercial rates. Upon retirement, OYAK makes a lump sum payment to career (but not reserve) officers, based on the members' investment plus accrued interest and dividends. OYAK also operates post exchanges selling items at 15 percent below prices at civilian outlets and offering durable consumer goods on highly favorable credit terms.

Army

The army (officially referred to as the Turkish Land Forces) is by far the largest of the three service components. During 1992 the army introduced a sweeping reorganization, shifting from a predominantly divisional and regimental structure to one based on corps and brigades. The personnel strength of the army was reduced in 1994 to about 393,000 (including about 345,000 conscripts). Major equipment acquisitions have enabled the army to upgrade firepower and mobility while enhancing command and control.

Until the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1990, the army had a static defense mission of countering Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in the Caucasus and any possible attack on Thrace. When the General Staff attempted to shift 120,000 troops to the frontier with Iraq in 1990, they discovered that there were serious deficiencies in the army's ability to respond to crises that could erupt suddenly in distant regions. The army was even less prepared for a situation requiring the deployment and logistical support of forces in operations beyond Turkey's borders.

Prior to the army reorganization, the principal tactical units consisted of sixteen infantry divisions and one armored division, plus twenty-three independent brigades, of which six were
armored and four mechanized. Under the reorganization, all divisions except three were dismantled. The existing nine corps were retained, with brigades directly responsible to the corps commands. The brigades were reconfigured as seventeen mechanized infantry brigades, fourteen armored brigades, nine infantry brigades, and four commando brigades. Each armored brigade consisted in late 1994 of six battalions: two armored, two mechanized, and two artillery. The mechanized brigades consisted of one armored battalion, two mechanized battalions, and one artillery battalion, plus a reconnaissance squadron. The infantry brigades consisted of four infantry battalions and one artillery battalion. Each commando brigade consisted of three commando battalions and one artillery battalion.

*The Military Balance, 1994–1995* also lists a Presidential Guard regiment, an infantry regiment, five border defense regiments, and twenty-six border defense battalions. The fate of these independent units under the reorganization remained unclear in early 1995.

General Hikmet Bayar, the commander of Turkish land forces in early 1995, operated from headquarters in Ankara. The capital is also the home of the Ankara garrison and of the training and logistics commands. The country is divided into four military sectors on the basis of strategic conditions of terrain, logistics, communications, and the potential external threat. The sectors are assigned to four field armies, the first three of which would come under NATO command in the event of a NATO reinforced alert (see fig. 15).

The First Army, with headquarters in Istanbul, is widely deployed in the European part of Turkey known historically as Thrace, with responsibility for the defense of that province, the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits, and the Kocaeli Peninsula. The Second Army, headquartered at Malatya, is deployed in southeastern Anatolia with a defensive mission facing Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The Third Army, with headquarters at Erzincan, is deployed throughout the rugged mountains and deep valleys of eastern Anatolia, covering the borders with Georgia and Armenia and the historical invasion routes from the east. During the buildup preceding the Persian Gulf War, the Second Army was deployed along the Iraqi border along with some units from the Third Army. Under the new structure, most of the armored, mechanized, and commando brigades are
located in the central region with the mission of rapidly reinforcing brigades in each theater as required.

The Aegean Army (sometimes called the Fourth Army) was organized in the mid-1970s in response to tensions with Greece in the Aegean Sea. Headquartered in Izmir, it is responsible for the vast area facing the Aegean coast from the Dardanelles in the north to the southernmost Greek offshore islands. Turkish commanders describe the Aegean Army as composed simply of training elements from which the major army units are supplied. They presumably would have the mission of defending the Aegean coast and keeping lines of communication open in the Aegean district in an emergency, although their capability for this mission seems highly limited. The Turkish corps on Cyprus is within the Aegean Army command structure. Known as the Cyprus Turkish Peace Force, it is said in The Military Balance, 1994–1995 to consist of 30,000 troops, equipped with 235 M-48 tanks, 107 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and numerous pieces of towed and self-propelled artillery.

In late 1994, in addition to 1,500 troops who served with the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia, a contingent of about 300 Turkish soldiers had participated in the UN operation in Somalia. The overall commander of the UN force in Somalia in 1993 was Turkish general Cevik Bir.

Accompanying the reorganization of the land forces was a significant upgrading of weapons systems, armor, and transport. Under the NATO harmonization program adopted under the CFE Treaty, considerable equipment subject to removal from the central front was passed on to other NATO armies, notably those of Greece and Turkey. Turkey's share included more than 1,000 United States M-60 and German Leopard main battle tanks and some 700 armored combat vehicles, as well as self-propelled howitzers and United States Cobra attack helicopters.

Under the CFE Treaty, NATO and Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact countries also were to reduce the size of their conventional forces. Russia has sought to change this commitment on the grounds that it needs forces for "police" actions and to assist former member states of the Soviet Union, such as Armenia, where Russian troops are stationed. Turkey has endeavored to prevent Russia's backing out on its commitment because, among other reasons, Turkey shares a border with Armenia.
Figure 15. Disposition of Major Units of the Turkish Armed Forces and Major Military Installations Used by the United States, 1995
In addition to the arms received as a result of the CFE Treaty, Turkey's arsenal of more than 3,000 M-48 tanks was being upgraded with advanced fire controls. By 1994 deliveries had begun of armored infantry fighting vehicles, large numbers of which were to be supplied under a Turkey/United States coproduction program. Procurement of a multiple-launch rocket system was proceeding under a similar program (see table 13, Appendix A).

Turkey acquired 300 Russian BTR-60 APCs for use in the struggle against the Kurds because weapons of NATO origin were not approved for this purpose. In spite of the fact that the engines and transmissions of the BTR-60s had to be replaced after brief use, Ankara announced in 1994 that it had acquired 110 BTR-80s. These APCs were assigned to the gendarmerie, who were actively engaged in the war against the Kurds (see Police System, this ch.).

More effective employment of commando and infantry units would become possible with the United States UH-1H Iroquois (of which Turkey had ninety-six in 1994) and other modern troop-lift helicopters entering the army aviation inventory. The addition of missile-armed Cobra AH-1 (Bell 209) assault helicopters and five Super Cobras promised by the United States was expected to improve antitank capabilities.

Air Force

The Turkish air force is the youngest of the three branches of the armed services. Founded in 1911, it saw action in the Balkan Wars and World War I, as well as the War of Independence. The first Turkish pilots were trained in France. The air force has a high priority in Turkey's strategic planning because control of the air would be indispensable for successful defense against a ground attack by well-equipped forces. Moreover, reinforcement and supply of Turkish ground forces by Turkey's NATO allies would not be feasible without control of the air. The air force role in interdicting an invasion force would be to provide close support of ground troops in tactical defensive actions and to airlift troops and supplies. Upon declaration of a NATO reinforced alert, the Turkish air force would be committed to action as part of NATO's Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force (SIXATAF) headquartered at Izmir.

In late 1994, the air force was staffed by about 56,800 officers and enlisted personnel. It is organized around two basic combat elements operating east and west of the thirty-fifth
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meridian of longitude. The First Tactical Air Force has its headquarters at Eskisehir Air Base in western Turkey. It defends the Turkish straits and provides air cover in the First Army's area of operations. The Second Tactical Air Force, commanded from its headquarters at Diyarbakir in eastern Turkey, is charged with defending the Third Army and part of the Second Army. Separate air training and logistics commands with their own aircraft squadrons are headquartered at Ankara. The air transport units are assigned directly to specific air force commands. Air force headquarters is located at Ankara; the air force commander in 1994 was General Halis Burhan.

The air force in late 1994 was organized tactically into fourteen fighter-ground attack squadrons, six fighter squadrons, four transport squadrons, two reconnaissance squadrons, one antisubmarine warfare squadron, and three training squadrons. The fighter-ground attack squadrons and three of the four transport squadrons are assigned to NATO. There are eight surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons. In 1994 six of the SAM squadrons were equipped with 128 obsolete United States Nike-Hercules missiles; the remaining two were supplied with twenty-four Rapier SAMs of British manufacture. Many Turkish bases and large cities are within range of Russian, Chinese, and North Korean missile systems possessed by Syria and Iran. Iraq supposedly has relinquished its longer-range missiles but still may have some Scud-Bs from North Korea. Turkish officers acknowledge their limited ability to defend against these threats.

In the mid-1990s, Turkey was phasing in advanced F-16 fighter aircraft produced domestically under a cooperative program with the General Dynamics and General Electric corporations. An initial shipment of 160 aircraft was to be supplemented with a second package of eighty aircraft. The F-16s were to replace a combat fleet of obsolete F-5s and F-104s; the force also included somewhat more up-to-date F-4Es (see table 14, Appendix A).

In 1994 the air force's fixed-wing transport squadrons consisted of United States-manufactured C-130E Hercules and German C-160D Transall medium transports and CN-235 light transports. Fifty-two CN-235s coproduced with a Spanish manufacturer have replaced the United States-manufactured C-47s for troop-transport and cargo missions.

Upon completion of the four-year air force academy program, air force pilots are trained for two to two-and-a-half years
on a variety of United States propeller and jet training aircraft. The Italian SF-260 coproduced in Turkey is being introduced as an advanced combat trainer. Nonflying officers are trained by the Air Technical Schools Command. NCOs are also trained in twelve- to eighteen-month programs in administrative and technical skills at specialized institutions of this command.

Upgrading of the air force flight inventory is expected to include acquisition from the United States of two surplus KC-135A tanker aircraft—scaled back from seven for financial reasons—that would permit air refueling and thus dramatically increase the range of fighter aircraft. The air force also hopes to receive airborne early warning aircraft and airborne command and control aircraft. The planned transfer of fifty surplus United States A-10 attack aircraft for close support of ground troops was canceled because Turkey's tight foreign-exchange situation did not permit acquisition of the needed reconditioning and support equipment. Ankara considers the acquisition of United States Patriot missiles essential to reducing Turkey's vulnerability to conventional air and missile attack, but in early 1995 such an acquisition did not appear imminent.

Navy

Numbering 54,000 individuals in late 1994, nearly 70 percent conscripts, the navy is responsible for defending the country against seaborne attack in time of war, for safeguarding the Turkish straits at all times, and for patrol and coastal protection along the extensive coastline that borders about two-thirds of the nation. The navy has an assigned NATO role in which it is responsible to the alliance's commander of NAVSOUTH in Naples. The commander of Turkish naval forces serves concurrently as commander, North-East Mediterranean (COME-DNOREAST), under NAVSOUTH. The Turkish navy shares in NAVSOUTH's mission of protecting a line of communications through the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and conducting antisubmarine operations in the event of a general war.

Turkish strategists feel that the creation of new countries in the Black Sea area, following the end of the Cold War, has imposed new missions on the navy. They point out that, whereas there were previously four littoral states on the Black Sea, since the breakup of the Soviet Union there are seven—Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. Russia retains the major share of the former Soviet Black Sea fleet, but Ukraine claims a number of vessels and
base facilities. Because Turkey considers the Central Asian republics likely to make heavy use of the Black Sea for foreign trade, the maintenance of open sea-lanes is expected to become more important. Turkey foresees a greater flow of oil from the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Russia via pipelines to terminals at Iskenderun in the eastern Mediterranean, imposing additional requirements on the navy to ensure the safety of ports and sea-lanes in an increasingly strategic area.

The navy has three operational commands: the Northern Sea Area Command, based at Istanbul; the Fleet Command at Gölcük; and the Southern Sea Area Command at Izmir. The Fleet Command, the largest of the naval components, consists of specialized elements: the war fleet, the submarine fleet, the mine fleet, and the landing units. The zonal commands are the Black Sea (headquartered at Eregli), the Aegean (headquartered at Izmir), two straits commands (headquartered at Istanbul and Çanakkale), and the Mediterranean (headquartered at Mersin). The commander in chief of the Turkish navy in early 1995 was Admiral Vural Bayazit.

The Naval Training Command is based at Karamürsel on the southern coast of the Sea of Marmara. The naval academy near Istanbul is colocated with the Naval Lyceum, a four-year secondary school. Graduates of the lyceum and other high schools who are accepted as midshipmen at the naval academy are promoted to subensign after the four-year program, and then are assigned to sea duty for two probationary years before being commissioned in the regular navy. Entrance to the lyceum is highly competitive; only a small percentage of applicants pass the qualifying examinations.

The Petty Officers School at Istanbul receives applicants at age twelve for four years of secondary and naval preparatory instruction. Graduates are then admitted as petty officer candidates and, after four years of specialist training, are designated career petty officers at the entry grade. Conscripts assigned to the navy receive about four months of basic training and are then assigned to sea or shore duties for the balance of their required service.

The navy's inventory of ships is well maintained, and its officers and crews are considered to possess high levels of professionalism and readiness. Turkey participates in NATO exercises in its region and frequently takes part in national exercises of other NATO members. Its relations with other Black Sea naval powers are good. Mutual high-level naval visits
have been exchanged with Russia, and negotiations have been opened on agreements to prevent incidents on and over the high seas with both Russia and Ukraine. Turkey conducted joint mine and search-and-rescue exercises with Bulgaria in 1993.

The main categories of Turkish fighting ships are destroyers, frigates, submarines, and fast-attack craft (see table 15, Appendix A). Most of the older ships are of United States origin. More modern units have been supplied by Germany or constructed in Turkish shipyards with German technical assistance and components. The largest vessels are United States destroyers, most of them launched at the close of World War II. They are considered obsolete and incapable of operating with
other NATO ships in battle-group formations. One of the destroyers, the *Muavenet*, was hit by two Sea Sparrow surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) launched accidentally by a United States warship during exercises in 1992. The Turkish captain and four other personnel were killed and a number injured. The destroyer subsequently was scrapped. In 1993 and 1994, eight newer Knox-class frigates were transferred to Turkey by the United States.

In 1994 four MEKO-200 class frigates of German design were in the inventory, and an additional four modernized MEKO-200 frigates are to be delivered between 1995 and 1998. Construction is split, with the first four frigates having been built in Germany and four being built at the naval shipyard at Gölcük, with German equipment packages. The vessels are armed with five-inch guns, Harpoon SSMs, and Sea Sparrow SAMs.

The submarine force consisted originally of United States World War II-era diesel-powered attack vessels of the Guppy class. Seven of these were still listed in 1994, but their utility was doubtful. Since 1975 Turkey has been acquiring German 20-class (type-1200) submarines, quiet-running craft smaller than the Guppies but suitable for defending the approaches to the straits as well as Turkey's coastal waters. The first three of the six vessels were built in Germany and the next three were built at Gölcük. Four additional 209-class submarines of the more advanced type-1400, armed with sub-Harpoon SSMs, are to be added between 1994 and 1998.

The sixteen missile-armed fast-attack craft in the Turkish fleet in 1994 were a mixture of older and newer technologies. The most up-to-date units were eight Dogan-class vessels equipped with Harpoon SSMs. They were built in Turkey along the lines of the German Lürssen 57. Two more fast-attack craft of the Yildiz class are to be delivered in 1995. These high-speed vessels would be especially effective against ships attempting to transit the confined waters in and around the Turkish straits.

The amphibious force of sixty-six vessels in the inventory at the end of 1994 would be sufficient to land Turkish infantry and tanks in individual operations or in conjunction with other NATO assault forces. The inventory of twenty-nine minelayers and minesweepers would have the task of implementing a NATO decision to seal off the Black Sea. Turkish officers are considered to be highly qualified in such operations, but in the
mid-1990s minesweepers and minelayers were due for modernization.

In 1994 the naval air arm included fourteen Italian-built Agusta-Bell AB–204 and AB–212 antisubmarine helicopters, which could be flown off frigate flight decks. United States-manufactured Grumman S–2E Tracker aircraft, flown by air force personnel and used for land-based antisubmarine and marine reconnaissance, were due to be replaced. The marine contingent of some 3,000 officers and troops was organized as a brigade of three infantry battalions and one artillery battalion, plus support units.

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia

Uniforms worn in Turkey's three military services are similar in design to those worn by United States military personnel and by troops of other NATO countries. The army winter service dress uniform is a shade of olive drab; a khaki shirt and trousers are worn in summer. Troops wear a field-gray shirt and trousers for winter field duty, and a camouflage battle-fatigue uniform during the summer. The navy wears a black uniform in winter and a white one in summer. The air force uniforms are the same shade of blue worn by the United States and British air forces.

Army and air force officers wear their rank insignia on shoulder straps. Generals are identified by a red lapel patch; their rank is denoted by a shoulder device combining a wreath with star and crescent and superimposed crossed sabers, plus one to four gold stars. Field-grade officers have one to three gold stars with a wreath and star and crescent. Company-grade officers wear one to three gold stars on plain shoulder straps (see fig. 16).

A red backing to an army officer's wreath indicates general's rank. Among officers at lower grades, the backing's color indicates service corps; for example, green for infantry, dark blue for artillery, black for armor, and light blue for signals. The same wreath device forms part of the badge on the peaked cap. Variations in the cap's peak and chin strap decorations provide further indications of rank. The air force's method of displaying rank is virtually the same as the army's. Naval officers' ranks are indicated by gold stripes around the lower sleeves of their jackets (the upper stripe looped as in the British navy), on shoulder boards, and on the chin straps of visored caps.
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*Figure 16. Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1995*
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<th>ASTSUBAY USTÇAVUŞ</th>
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<td>STAFF SERGEANT</td>
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Figure 17. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1995
NCO ranks are denoted by arm chevrons (see fig. 17). Insignia of the army and air force are almost identical in design, resembling those of the United States Air Force, with a star and crescent rather than a star at the center. Enlisted personnel wear tabs colored to indicate service corps on their lapels and service caps.

Military Cooperation with the United States

During the postwar era, Turkey's foremost ally has been the United States. Because of Turkey's strategic location in the Middle East, its proximity to the Soviet Union's military installations and test sites, and its control of the Black Sea straits, military ties with the United States were a crucial factor in the East-West confrontation. The alliance originated soon after the end of World War II, when Soviet dictator Josef V. Stalin made a series of demands on Turkey that the Turkish government and the Western powers interpreted as a possible prelude to military action. The begrudging withdrawal of Soviet occupation forces from northern Iran in May 1946 and communist guerrilla warfare in Greece heightened fears of a Soviet drive into the Middle East. The United States responded with proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. Both Greece and Turkey were provided with aid to resist the Soviet threat.

Because of concerns over extending a United States military commitment to the Middle East, the United States initially was not convinced that Turkey's admission to NATO should be approved. Turkish troops' noteworthy participation in the Korean War changed this view; Turkey entered NATO in 1952.

In accordance with bilateral defense arrangements under NATO auspices, the United States has developed and maintained several major military installations on Turkish bases. Of particular significance are several electronic intelligence posts considered vital for monitoring Russian weapons and Moscow's compliance with strategic arms limitation agreements. A long-range radar system has been established at Pirinçlik, near Diyarbakır, to monitor Russian missile testing. At Belbasi, near Ankara, nuclear testing can be monitored by means of seismic data collection.

No United States combat forces are based in Turkey, but elements of two United States Air Force fighter squadrons based in Italy are rotated periodically to Incirlik—the West's farthest forward-based tactical combat aircraft in the eastern Mediterranean. Çigli, a Turkish air base north of Izmir, is used by United
States Air Force units in connection with NATO exercises. Three bases in eastern Turkey—at Erzurum, Batman, and Mus—were upgraded following a 1982 agreement to make them available for forward deployment of United States tactical aircraft under conditions of a NATO alert. Aircraft operating from them could cover the entire Turkish-Iranian-Transcaucasian border region without aerial refueling.

A Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), first negotiated in 1969 and renewed numerous times, consolidated various bilateral accords governing the United States military presence in Turkey. As a result of its 1988 renegotiation, the agreement is now known as the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA). Under the DECA, the number of United States personnel, including dependents, in Turkey—which had reached a peak of 25,000 in 1968—was reduced to 16,000 in 1970 and 9,000 by 1980. In 1991 the total was slightly above 10,000. Since that year, nearly all of the communications and naval facilities have been closed. In late 1994, United States personnel remained only at the air stations at Incirlik, Ankara, and Çiğli, the intelligence posts at Pirinçlik and Belbasi, and a communications station at Karatas, near Incirlik. The number of United States personnel had been reduced to about 4,000.

It is common practice to refer to installations staffed by United States personnel—even those solely connected with the NATO mission—as "American." Turkey has never waived its sovereignty over them; they have Turkish commanders and are officially regarded as joint-use facilities. Even so, Turkish sensitivity about their control and the conspicuous United States presence have at times provoked incidents and disputes. Extremist political factions tend to exploit these issues for their own purposes.

Turkey regarded the arms embargo imposed by the United States Congress after the Cyprus invasion of 1974 as a serious affront. Put into effect in 1975, the embargo was opposed by the executive branch of the United States government, which considered it an obstruction in the quest for an equitable settlement of the Cyprus situation. Turkey retaliated by abrogating the 1969 DCA and suspending operations of United States-used installations not clearly linked to the NATO mission. The intelligence collection sites were closed down, and the United States Navy was denied use of its loran (long-range) navigation station in Turkey. The embargo ended in 1978 when Congress repealed its earlier restrictions, although the president of the
Turkey was required to make periodic certifications that Turkey was contributing to efforts to settle the Cyprus issue.

Turkish public opinion has been sensitive to suggestions that United States rapid deployment forces or other units might make use of facilities on Turkish territory for non-NATO purposes. The only Muslim country in NATO, Turkey is determined to avoid giving open support to controversial or unpopular actions by the United States in the Middle East. The Turkish government did not permit use of the bases for United States operations during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and allowed only nonmilitary supplies to be shipped via Turkey to the United States-led multinational contingent in Lebanon in 1983.

Repeated attempts by members of Congress to pass resolutions commemorating the Ottoman government's massacre of Armenians during World War I have prompted strong reactions by the Turkish government. For instance, in 1989, after such a resolution was approved in the Senate Judiciary Committee, Turkey prohibited some United States training flights, reduced port calls, and halted military construction.

Military assistance has been an intrinsic feature of the defense relationship between Turkey and the United States. Turkey's limited economic resources, juxtaposed against its heavy NATO obligation to contain Soviet power in the eastern Mediterranean, made such support indispensable until the Soviet threat receded in the late 1980s. Between 1950 and 1991, the United States provided military assistance valued at US$9.4 billion, of which about US$6.1 billion was in grant form and US$3.3 billion was on a concessional loan basis.

At the insistence of Congress, the appropriation of military funds for Greece and Turkey has for many years been on a seven-to-ten ratio. The Turkish government regards the aid formula as inequitable given that Turkey has a population about six times that of Greece, has correspondingly heavier NATO commitments, and is host to many NATO and United States military facilities. In 1994 the United States Congress held back 10 percent of the funds appropriated for Turkey until the Department of State could verify improvement of Turkey's human rights record and progress on confidence-building measures in Cyprus. Turkey considered this interference in its internal affairs and made no effort to have the funds restored.

Turkey nevertheless has been the third largest recipient of United States military aid, after Israel and Egypt. Despite the
end of the Soviet threat, Turkey's military needs during the Persian Gulf crisis resulted in a rise in the level of grant aid to US$500 million in fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1991. Although the administrations of presidents George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton sought to maintain a similar level in subsequent years, citing heavy United States reliance on Turkish air bases for support of the Iraqi Kurds in Provide Comfort II. Congress approved only US$450 million in FY 1993 and shifted the financing from grants to loans. In FY 1994, a move in Congress to charge interest at market rather than concessional rates was barely deflected. Such a change would have been a blow to Turkey, which was already saddled with heavy foreign debts. Ultimately, US$405 million in low-interest loans was approved. The Department of Defense also provides training to about 160 Turkish officers each year. These include students at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, as well as individuals assigned to technical schools and those receiving specialized training in management, language instruction, medical logistics, and air-traffic control.

Domestic Arms Industry

Since the mid-1980s, Turkey has been engaged in a wide-ranging program to develop a modern defense industry based on cooperation with firms in other countries. Previously, Turkey's economic and industrial capacity was insufficient to produce weapons as sophisticated as those of Western Europe. In the early years of the republic, the government sponsored a number of arms factories intended primarily to supply basic infantry weapons and ammunition. After World War II, Turkey's efforts to bring its military establishment up to modern standards depended almost totally on military assistance and credits from its NATO partners. After the imposition of the limited embargo by the United States in 1975, Turkey launched a series of projects to reduce its dependence on imports of major military items. Initial results took the form of a broader range of domestically produced light weapons and artillery and the development of an electronics industry oriented toward battlefield communications and the requirements of military aircraft.

In 1985 new legislation centralized efforts to launch an up-to-date arms industry under a new agency—the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration (later the Ministry of National Defense Undersecretariat for Defense Indus-
tries, known as SSM) with its own source of capital, the Defense Industry Support Fund. The fund does not depend on national defense budget appropriations but receives earmarked revenues directly—10 percent of taxes on fuel, 5 percent of individual and corporate income taxes, and taxes on alcohol and tobacco. Most of the major projects encouraged by SSM have been international joint ventures and coproduction enterprises. In most cases, the foreign partner must agree to an offset provision, that is, a commitment to purchase some part of the resulting production, or components or other goods manufactured in Turkey.

The Turkish defense industry employs about 50,000 individuals at 110 firms, many of them state owned. About 1,000 additional firms participate in defense business as subcontractors. The largest producer of weaponry in Turkey, with about 12,000 employees, is Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKEK), controlled by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. MKEK meets the requirements of the Turkish armed forces for light arms (including the M-3 and MG-3 rifles and a machine gun of German design), ammunition, and explosives. It also produces antiaircraft and antitank guns.

In 1988 rocket and missile production was shifted from MKEK to a new company, Roket Sanayii (ROKETSAN). ROKETSAN has the largest share in the production of the propulsion system and rocket assembly for the four-country European consortium manufacturing the Stinger SAM. The company also plans to produce multi-launch rocket systems (MLRS) in partnership with a United States firm, the LTV Corporation. A consortium formed by a United States firm, FMC Corporation, and a Turkish firm, Nurol, is projected to produce 1,700 APCs and armored fighting vehicles by 1997.

Turkish arms manufacturers' most ambitious undertaking has been a consortium with United States firms to produce F-16 fighter aircraft. Under this arrangement, airframes for the F-16s are produced in a factory at Mûrted Air Base near Ankara by TÜSAS (Türk Uçak Sanayi Sirketi) Aerospace Industries, with 51 percent ownership by Turkish interests, 42 percent by General Dynamics, and 7 percent by General Electric. The engine plant near Eskisehir is a joint venture with General Electric.

The project, whose total cost is projected at US$4.2 billion, is expected to result in the delivery of 240 F-16C/Ds to the Turkish air force between the late 1980s and the late 1990s.
Additional funds were pledged to the Turkish Defense Fund (TDF) after the Persian Gulf War by the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, to be paid over a five-year period. Under an October 1994 agreement, Turkey requested that the TDF, which thus far amounted to some US$1.8 billion, be transferred to Turkey. Most of the TDF funds are to be used to cover the cost of eighty F-16 aircraft, of which forty were agreed upon in March 1992 and forty more in February 1994. Through offset arrangements, F-16 components and engines produced in Turkey are exported to the United States. Egypt ordered forty-six F-16s to be delivered between 1993 and 1995.

Communications equipment and electronic warfare systems for the Turkish military are produced by ASELSAN Military Electronics Industries, a state-owned company whose dominant shareholder is OYAK. ASELSAN manufactures under license a United States-designed family of manpack and vehicular battlefield radios and voice scramblers. It supplies the inertial navigation systems and fire control for the TUSAS F-16 project and produces components for the Stinger missile program.

In addition to its coproduction role in the F-16 project, TUSAS has contracted with Agusta, the Italian aircraft manufacturer, to produce forty SF-260 trainers at the Mûrte plant. A contract with Construcciones Aeronáuticas, S.A. (CASA) of Spain calls for joint production of fifty-two CN-235 light transport aircraft. A US$1.1 billion agreement was concluded in 1992 with Sikorsky covering direct procurement of forty-five Black Hawk helicopters, with an additional fifty helicopters to be coproduced in Turkey by 1999.

Much of Turkey's indigenous naval construction has been carried out with cooperation from German shipbuilders. Four frigates of the MEKO-200 class were being built in 1995 at the main naval shipyard at Gölçük where three submarines of the 209-class (type-1200) had been built; four type-1400 submarines are scheduled to be commissioned between 1994 and 1998. Dogan-class fast-attack boats armed with Harpoon missiles have been produced in Turkish yards, as well as destroyer escorts, patrol boats, landing craft, and auxiliary craft. In 1993 private shipyards were invited to bid on construction of minesweepers and patrol boats.

The effort to create a modern defense industry on a narrow technological base was risky for Turkish defense planners. However, it appears to have been successful in enabling Turkey
to rely on domestic sources to meet an increasing portion of its advanced equipment needs. The results have included reductions in costs and in the demand for foreign exchange, as well as the opening of foreign markets, mainly through offset provisions. As of the mid-1990s, the anticipated development of a Middle Eastern market for finished products did not appear to have occurred, based on available arms export data. A broader goal was to set new standards for quality and productivity in Turkish industry generally and thus increase the country's competitiveness through the lead established by the defense industry.

Internal Security Concerns

Since the late 1960s, Turkey has been plagued by recurrent political violence. Radical groups responsible for terrorism have included movements of both leftist and rightist orientation, as well as ethnic and religious extremists. By far the most serious source of violence since the mid-1980s has been the Kurdish separatist insurgency, which by the mid-1990s had nearly assumed the character of a civil war in the southeastern area of the country bordering Syria and Iraq.

During the 1970s, various political groups—particularly ones on the left—used violence in the hope that civil disorder and the consequent suppression by the state might lead to revolution. In the months preceding the assumption of power by Turkey's generals in September 1980, the toll of political killings rose to more than twenty a day. The government's repression of political activism and the detention of an estimated 30,000 persons suspected of terrorism were accompanied by arrests of union members, university students, and journalists. The stern measures of the military commanders were vehemently criticized by Turkish intellectuals and foreign observers; however, the measures did reduce the violence.

Even after civilian rule was restored in 1983, the continuation of martial law in certain areas, the expansion of police powers, and legal constraints on political movements dampened politically inspired violence. Terrorist incidents continued to occur in urban areas, but these were for the most part individually targeted bombings and assassinations, including attacks on United States installations and personnel. The number of such incidents peaked at seventy-five in 1991, most of them attributed to leftist protests against Turkey's strategic role in the international coalition against Iraq. Nevertheless, the
preoccupying security issue for the Turkish government continued to be the mounting separatist insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kurdistan—PKK). The uprising of Kurds in northern Iraq after the Persian Gulf War focused attention on the condition of Kurds in general; the PKK used the occasion to intensify its military operations in the Kurdish region of southeastern Turkey.

Kurdish Separatists

The Kurdish national movement dates back at least to 1925, when Atatürk ruthlessly suppressed a revolt against the new Turkish republic motivated by the regime's renunciation of Muslim religious practices. Uprisings in the 1930s and 1940s prompted by opposition to the modernizing and centralizing reforms of the Turkish government in Ankara also were put down by the Turkish army. Kurdish opposition to the government's emphasis on linguistic homogeneity was spurred in the 1960s and 1970s by agitation in neighboring Iran and Iraq on behalf of an autonomous Kurdistan, to include Kurds from Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The majority of Kurds, however, continued to participate in Turkish political parties and to assimilate into Turkish society.

The best known and most radical of the Kurdish movements, the PKK, which does not represent the majority of Kurds, seeks to establish an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey where the Kurdish population predominates. Beginning in 1984, a resurgence of Kurdish attacks attributed to the PKK necessitated the deployment of Turkish army units and elite police forces. Fighting in the mountain terrain favored the insurgents, who could intimidate local Kurdish families and ambush regular troops. The violence has mounted since 1991, with PKK guerrillas from camps in Syria, Iran, and Iraq, as well as from inside Turkey itself, attacking Turkish military and police outposts and targeting civilian community leaders and teachers. In 1993 PKK gunmen sought military targets outside the southeastern region; they also conducted coordinated attacks in many West European cities, particularly in Germany where more than 1 million Kurds live, against Turkish diplomatic installations and Turkish businesses, often operated by Kurds. Such attacks on commercial firms can be seen as efforts at intimidation to gain contributions to PKK fundraising.
Increased numbers of security forces were mobilized in 1994 against the Kurds in a government campaign of mounting intensity. One government strategy has been the forced evacuation and in a number of instances burning some 850 Kurdish villages to prevent them from harboring PKK insurgents. Although militarily successful, the evacuations have caused great hardship to the villagers.

The government has been accused of harassment, destruction of villages, and the slaying of Kurds believed to be sympathetic to the PKK. Its tactics have resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties and turned thousands into refugees, who have crowded into major Turkish cities. The insurgents, in turn, have targeted villages known to be sympathetic to the government, murdering state officials, teachers, government collaborators, and paramilitary village guards. In an especially cruel incident in May 1993 that ended a two-month cease-fire announced by the PKK, a PKK unit executed thirty unarmed military recruits after ambushing several buses.

As of early 1994, about 160,000 Turkish troops and gendarmerie had been mobilized for operations against the PKK. Some 40,000 civilians formed a village guard of progovernment Kurds. A new mobile security force of about 10,000 troops was undergoing special training in antiguerilla operations. The United States Department of State estimated that there were 10,000 to 15,000 full-time PKK guerrillas, 5,000 to 6,000 of whom were in Turkey and the others in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. There were thought to be an additional 60,000 to 75,000 part-time guerrillas.

The number of deaths since the war's outbreak in 1984 had risen beyond 12,000 by 1994. According to official figures, more than 1,500 PKK guerrillas were killed and 7,600 captured during the first eleven months of 1993. During the same period, the number of government security personnel killed came to 676. Civilian deaths totaled 1,249, more than double the 1992 total.

The PKK cause was not helped by the Kurds of Iraq, who depended on Turkey to keep their enclave protected from the forces of Iraqi president Saddam Husayn. In October 1992, Iraqi Kurds and the Turkish army carried out a joint offensive against PKK bases in Iraqi Kurdistan, forcing the surrender of more than 1,000 PKK fighters. Turkey also enlisted Syria's cooperation in closing the PKK base in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon. The government's flexibility in seeking a negotiated
solution to the conflict was limited by the growing anger of the Turkish public over PKK terrorism and the killing of troops in the southeast and by the military's uncompromising anti-Kurdish stance.

**Terrorism of the Left**

Marxists and other groups of the extreme left have never been more than marginal factors in national politics, even during those periods when they were permitted to function as legal parties. Just before the military crackdown in 1980, four of the seven Marxist-oriented parties legally recognized at the time contested local elections but were able to gather a total of only 1 percent of the national vote. During the 1970s, the leftist movement turned increasingly to violence and terrorism; at the same time, left-wing ideologies became popular in the universities and among alienated and often unemployed urban youth.

In 1987 the leaders of the banned Turkish Workers' Party and of the Turkish Communist Party returned from exile to form a new Turkish United Communist Party. Both politicians were arrested and charged under the provision of the penal code that specifically outlawed communist organizations and the dissemination of Marxist-Leninist theories. After being decriminalized in 1991, the Turkish United Communist Party was again proscribed after the Constitutional Court upheld a ban on the grounds that it had violated Article 14 of the constitution, which prohibits "establishing the hegemony of one social class over another."

The most active of the left-wing terrorist groups is the Revolutionary Left Party (Devrimçi Sol—Dev Sol). Virulently anti-American and anti-NATO, Dev Sol was responsible for most of the attacks against United States targets and other political violence during the Persian Gulf War. In one incident, two United States civilians working for a United States defense contractor were killed. The Turkish government reacted vigorously, conducting raids against Dev Sol safe houses and enacting new antiterrorist legislation. Dev Sol is believed to have several hundred members, including several dozen armed militants. Because of police raids and internal factionalism, attacks by Dev Sol have been less numerous since 1991. Sympathizers among the foreign Turkish population in Western Europe have helped fund the organization; training support is believed to come from radical Palestinians in Lebanon.
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The Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army and the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit committed numerous acts of terrorism in the 1970s and early 1980s, including bank robberies and bombings of businesses, courts, and key government offices. Members of the latter group were sentenced in 1984 after convictions for eighty-seven killings, including the murders of five United States servicemen in 1979. Since 1990, however, the other extremist groups of the left have been overshadowed by Dev Sol.

Armenian Terrorism

The primary objective of Armenian terrorists during the 1970s and 1980s was to inflict revenge for the massacres of Armenians during World War I. Armenians regard these killings as systematic genocide, but Turks claim they were the unfortunate outgrowth of deportations intended to prevent Armenians from assisting the invading Russian armies. Terrorist groups also demanded that Turkey admit its guilt for crimes committed against Armenians and provide reparations in the form of money and territory for an Armenian homeland.

Most of the violence by Armenian terrorists has been inflicted on Turkish agencies and representatives outside Turkey. The best known of these groups, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), apparently was formed in 1975 among leftist Armenians living in Beirut, Lebanon, with the help of sympathetic Palestinians. In reaction, rightists from the Armenian community in Lebanon formed the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG). A number of other groups claimed responsibility for terrorist acts, but ASALA and JCAG were judged to be the two main groups. It was not clear whether lawful Armenian political blocs in Lebanon sponsored these terrorist units, but they did not openly condone the terrorist acts of their offshoots.

Among the Armenian diaspora, numbering more than 6 million worldwide, probably fewer than 1,000 persons belong to terrorist factions. Members generally are young, recent immigrants to their countries of residence, or reside in places such as Lebanon where political violence is common. Assassination and bombing are the principal techniques used by the two main terrorist organizations. However, JCAG has limited its attacks to Turkish embassy officials in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe, refraining from indiscriminate violence to avoid alienating Western public opinion. Since 1983
responsibility for most of the attacks has been claimed by a group called the Armenian Revolutionary Army, possibly a cover name for JCAG.

ASALA has carried out a number of bombings of ticket offices and airport counters of United States airlines in Western Europe. Following the bombing of a Turkish airline counter at Orly Airport in Paris in 1983, which resulted in several deaths and injuries, a split developed within ASALA over the rationale of indiscriminate terrorism in advancing the Armenian cause. An offshoot, the ASALA Revolutionary Movement (ASALA-RM), regarded indiscriminate terrorism as counterproductive, while ASALA-Militant (ASALA-M) continued to favor unrestricted violence against both Turkish and "imperialist" targets. After the split, the ASALA membership appeared to become preoccupied with its internal differences and has since been relatively inactive.

Islamists

A legal, nonviolent Islamic political movement exists in Turkey. Its main locus is the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi—RP; also seen as Prosperity Party), which obtained the votes of 16.9 percent of the electorate in the 1991 general elections and captured 19 percent in the municipal elections of 1994. The Welfare Party also won mayoral contests in Ankara, Istanbul, and twenty-seven other large cities. The party stresses economic goals; to cast its appeal in religious terms would bring it into conflict with the constitutional ban on the organization of parties on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or political ideas considered authoritarian.

Turkey's political system is more open than those of most Middle Eastern states, and to a large extent it has been able to accommodate Muslim political expression while marginalizing its radical elements. Nevertheless, radical Muslim groups are considered a threat to the secular political establishment. Although a link with the Iranian government has not been proven, Iranian mullahs are believed to give support and encouragement to extremist Muslims.

Radical Islamic activism—sometimes described as fundamentalism—has been the source of some terrorism, in particular the murders of journalists, politicians, and academics who were outspoken defenders of Turkish secularism. Several Islamic groups have claimed responsibility for these deaths, among them the Islamic Movement Organization, about which
little is known. Another obscure group, composed of local Islamists linked to the Iranian government, has targeted external enemies of Iran. One of the worst incidents of religious violence occurred in the city of Sivas in 1993 when religious fanatics set fire to a hotel where a well-known author and translator of Salman Rushdie's *The Satanic Verses* was staying. The author escaped, but thirty-seven people perished and 100 were injured. Anxious to avoid unnecessary tension in relations with Iran, Turkish officials have avoided placing blame directly on the Tehran government for sponsoring terrorist activity. Evidence, however, has been presented to Iran implicating extremists within the revolutionary power structure, if not the Iranian government itself.

Since 1991 a shadowy group known as Hizballah-Contra has sprung up in Kurdish areas, carrying out a campaign of assassination and terrorism against the PKK and its sympathizers. The organization is not connected to Hizballah (Party of God, also known as Islamic Jihad), a Shia terrorist movement dedicated to establishing an Iranian-style government in Lebanon. Although the Turkish government denies any link to Hizballah-Contra, the group's hit squads are believed to be tolerated by the police and gendarmerie, along with other Kurdish groups violently hostile to the PKK.

The leadership of Turkey's armed forces is highly sensitive to the possibility of soldiers becoming exposed to extremist Islamic influences. Orders issued in 1991 instructed troops to avoid "illegal, destructive, separatist trends, either from the right or left, which threaten the military's discipline." Commanders were urged to be especially careful with regard to staff members living outside military compounds in large cities where they could come into contact with Islamist groups. They were ordered to take stern measures—in some cases, expulsion—against officers and NCOs who adopted strong religious views, who refrained from certain social activities on religious grounds, or whose spouses wore Islamic garb.

**Police System**

The principal agencies devoted to internal security and law enforcement are the National Police and the gendarmerie, both headquartered in Ankara and both administered by the Ministry of Interior. Broadly, the National Police handles police functions (including traffic control) in the cities and towns, and the gendarmerie serves principally as a rural con-
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stabulary. In times of crisis, the prime minister can direct the chief of the General Staff to assist the police and gendarmerie in maintaining internal security. The gendarmerie is regarded as a military security force; during wartime or in areas placed under martial law, it functions under the army.

National Police

The territorial organization of the National Police corresponds roughly to Turkey's administrative subdivisions (see Provincial and Local Government, ch. 4). Below the general directorate are police directorates in all of the country's seventy-six provinces and police posts (district commands) in most of the administrative districts. Despite their wide territorial distribution, a very large proportion of the police are clustered in the major cities. No reliable data are available on the size of the police force, whose members are believed to number more than 50,000. Regardless of its size, the force does not appear large enough to keep up with the need generated by Turkey's urban growth and ordinary crime and traffic problems.

The laws establishing the organization of police at the provincial and local levels distinguish three categories of functions: administrative, judicial, and political. In this context, the administrative police perform the usual functions relating to the safety of persons and property: enforcement of laws and regulations, prevention of smuggling and apprehension of smugglers, quelling of public disorder, fingerprinting and photographing, public licensing, controlling traffic and inspecting motor vehicles, apprehending thieves and military deserters, locating missing persons, and keeping track of foreigners residing or traveling in Turkey. Film censorship is also considered an administrative responsibility. In some cases, municipalities provide all or part of the funding for administrative police functions in their localities.

The judicial police work closely with the administrators of justice. Attached to the offices of public prosecutors, the judicial police assist in investigating crimes, issue arrest warrants, and help prosecutors assemble evidence for trials. The political police combat activities considered subversive and deal with those groups whose actions or plans are identified as contrary to the security of the republic.

To carry out the police's broad and sometimes overlapping functions, specialized squads focusing on such problems as
smuggling and the narcotics trade are located in the larger commands. At the other end of the scale, the police employ unskilled auxiliaries in many towns and in some neighborhoods of larger communities. These are selected local men, not armed, who are engaged to prevent local theft and to give the alarm in case of emergency.

Police ranks range from constable through sergeant, lieutenant, captain, superintendent second and first class, and several grades of police chief. A commissioner of police commands each of the seventy-six provincial directorates of police. Provincial directorates are divided into district police commands headed by superintendents.

In earlier years, an entrant to the lowest police grade was expected to have completed junior high school. But police authorities recognized that the low education level of the force contributed to violations of legal rights and mistreatment of prisoners. Thus, recent recruits have been required to have completed secondary school. Training consists of a six-month basic course at one of five police schools. Candidates for higher rank are sent to a police college (equivalent to a senior high school offering university preparation) and then to the Police Institute at Ankara, from which students graduate as sergeants after a three-year course.

The performance of the Turkish police has been the subject of persistent criticism for violations of fundamental human rights. These problems, which have received growing international and domestic attention, involve torture during questioning, incommunicado detention, politically motivated disappearances, "mystery killings," and excessive use of force. Successive governments have repeatedly promised to curb abuses by the security forces, but little if any improvement has been recorded (see Individual Rights, this ch.).

Gendarmerie

Primarily a rural police force, the gendarmerie maintains public order outside the municipal boundaries of cities and provincial towns and guards Turkey's land borders against illegal entry and smuggling. It has jurisdiction over 90 percent of the territory of Turkey and 50 percent of the population. The gendarmerie's recruits are supplied through the military conscription system, and its officers and NCOs are transferred from the army. New career junior officers are obtained by quotas from the graduating classes of the Turkish army academy.
In late 1994, the gendarmerie's headquarters in Ankara was commanded by Aydin Ilter, a four-star general. Subordinate to the commanding general's chief of staff, a two-star general, are typical military staff sections for personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics, as well as the headquarters commandant. The major operational category consists of the internal security units, divided into stationary forces and mobile infantry brigades. These forces may be supplemented by air units and commando units equipped with Russian APCs and towed artillery weapons. In 1994 Turkey announced the purchase of nineteen Russian helicopters to assist in operations against the PKK. Elite fighting formations that distinguished themselves in Cyprus in 1974, the commando units execute many of the operations against the PKK in the southeast. The gendarmerie also includes headquarters and border forces, administrative control and logistical support units, and training staff.

The total number of gendarmes was estimated at 70,000 active members and 50,000 reserves in late 1994. They are organized into thirteen regional commands encompassing the seventy-six provinces. In each province, the principal gendarmerie commander, a colonel or lieutenant colonel, advises the governor on matters of security and maintains direct charge of
the district gendarmerie commands, usually headed by captains. Below the district commanders are commanders of the administrative subdistricts, each of whom controls the fixed posts in his area. There are some 3,600 posts, exclusive of border posts, usually located at intervals along the main roads and staffed by a sergeant and six or more gendarmes. To foster detachment from local groups and their interests and quarrels, gendarmes are usually assigned away from their home areas.

The administrative functions of the gendarmerie correspond roughly to those of the National Police but include such distinctive requirements as enforcing hunting and fishing laws, fighting forest fires, and patrolling borders. The gendarmes' judicial tasks include guarding prisons and assisting in investigations and preparations for trial. They also have military duties: serving as adjuncts to the army in emergencies, enforcing conscription, apprehending military deserters, and working in military courts.

Gendarmerie officers are chosen from cadets during the second year of training at the military academy, an aptitude for law being a prime factor in the selection. After completing their academy training, officers attend the infantry school for six months and the commando school for four months. Further professional training follows at the Gendarmerie Schools Command. NCOs are selected by examination from army personnel who have already served at least one year. They are then trained at the Gendarmerie Schools Command for five months. Basic military training is given to conscripts by the Gendarmerie Schools Command, followed by specialized training in various areas.

Writing in the late 1980s, the noted political journalist Mehmet Ali Birand commented that the gendarmerie had had an unfavorable reputation since its founding in 1839 and its later reorganization on the pattern of the French gendarmerie. It began as the agent of brute force for the government, putting down civil conflicts, pursuing criminals, and collecting taxes. From the early days of the republic, the gendarmerie was the only body available to subdue unrest, enforce the principles of Atatürk, suppress opposition, and collect levies.

The gendarmerie has relatively few officers and NCOs; the main burden of the service falls on ordinary conscripts who predominate in the force of 70,000. The conscripts are poorly trained in matters of law and regulations and in the manner of enforcing them, contributing to the harsh image of the gen-
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darmerie. As Birand notes, in contrast to Turkish gendarmerie operations, operations of the French, Belgian, and Italian gendarmeries are carried out primarily by officers and NCOs, privates being assigned sentry duty and other tasks that will not bring them into contact with the public.

The commander of the gendarmerie said in 1993 that efforts were being made to tailor the personnel structure to enable the force to perform its missions more effectively. Specialized sergeants were being recruited instead of conscripts. No longer standardized, unit training was being tailored to conditions in various regions and particular types of missions. New equipment had been introduced to improve air transportation and surface movement, and to provide mobile command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities.

Formed in 1982 as the maritime wing of the gendarmerie, the coast guard is now separate but also reports to the Ministry of Interior. With a personnel strength of about 1,100, the coast guard is responsible for maintaining the security of the coast and territorial waters, for conducting missions to protect its Exclusive Economic Zone in the Aegean—the boundaries of which are under dispute with Greece—for search-and-air-rescue operations, and for protecting the marine environment. The coast guard is organized into four area commands: the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara and adjacent straits, the Aegean Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. Surface patrols are carried out by fifty-two patrol vessels and smaller craft. The most effective of these are fourteen search-and-rescue vessels of 220 tons, all built within recent years in Turkish shipyards. Smaller 150-ton and 70-ton patrol boats of German origin were nearing obsolescence in the mid-1990s. An ambitious construction plan foresaw a major strengthening of the service with eight new vessels of 350 to 400 tons and forty-eight ships of 180 to 300 tons. A number of helicopters and aircraft were to be acquired to expand a small maritime air unit of three United States-manufactured OH-58 (Jet Ranger) helicopters.

Intelligence Services

Intelligence gathering is the primary responsibility of the National Intelligence Organization (Milli Istihbarat Teskilati—MIT), which combines the functions of internal and external intelligence agencies. In 1993 a career diplomat, Sonmez Koksal, was named undersecretary in charge of MIT, the first civilian to head the organization. Each branch of the military has
its own intelligence arm, as do the National Police and the gendarmerie. Military intelligence activities in martial law areas aim to prevent seditious activities against the state. Intelligence personnel also engage in electronic eavesdropping and rely on reports of overseas military attachés and exchange information with foreign intelligence services.

Military and civil intelligence requirements are formulated by the National Intelligence Coordination Committee. This committee includes members of the staff of the National Security Council, to which it is directly responsible. Nevertheless, a lack of coordination among the intelligence services is said to be a weakness that hampers MIT effectiveness.

MIT has no police powers; it is authorized only to gather intelligence and conduct counterintelligence abroad and to uncover communist, extreme right-wing, and separatist—that is, Kurdish and Armenian—groups internally. The MIT chief reports to the prime minister but was in the past considered close to the military. MIT has been charged with failing to notify the government when it became aware of past plots, if not actual complicity in military coup attempts. The organization functions under strict discipline and secrecy. Housing and headquarters offices for its personnel are collocated in a compound in Ankara.

Kurdish groups in Western Europe have charged the Turkish intelligence service with fomenting dissension and unrest among their various factions. Although these claims have not been verified, it seems likely that infiltration of the Kurdish separatist movement is a high priority for MIT. Members of the agency are also suspected of having acted as agents provocateurs in leftist organizations during the 1970s. Dev Sol is believed to have been infiltrated by intelligence agents, as raids on its establishments in the early 1990s seemed to demonstrate.

Crime and Punishment

The Turkish court system and judicial procedures are based on European models adopted after the establishment of the republic. For example, the system of criminal justice that replaced the Islamic justice system of the Ottoman Empire derives from the Italian penal code, and civil law follows the Swiss model (see Secularist Reforms, ch. 2).

Crimes are defined as either felonies or misdemeanors, the latter including minor infractions such as traffic violations. Fel-
onies include premeditated homicide, theft, arson, armed robbery, embezzlement of state property, perjury, and rape.

Punishments for felonies fall into the categories of strict imprisonment, ordinary imprisonment, and heavy fines. Under the Criminal Code of 1926, as amended, certain crimes against the state and premeditated murder were punished with the death penalty. In practice, executions were suspended in 1984. More than 1,000 death sentences were pending when blanket commutations were granted in 1986, and capital punishment ended formally with passage of the Anti-Terror Law of 1991. Strict imprisonment entails labor for between one year and life and, for a recidivist, could begin with a period of solitary confinement. Ordinary imprisonment can range up to twenty years and also requires labor. In serious cases, convictions may disqualify a person from holding public office and from practicing a profession or trade. Withdrawal of the right to vote and payment of damages or restitution also may result from conviction for a felony. In 1986 the Execution of Sentences Act halved the time for prisoners then serving jail sentences. Life sentences were reduced to twenty years and death sentences commuted to thirty-year terms.

Procedures in Criminal Law

When the police (or gendarmerie) believe that a person has committed a crime, the suspect is taken to the nearest police station for registration and interrogation. A police magistrate informs the suspect of the charges and questions the suspect and any witnesses to determine whether a prima facie case exists. A warrant of arrest is issued when detention of the accused is indicated. In principle, individuals can be detained pending trial only when there is a strong presumption that they have committed the offense with which they are charged and when there is reason to believe that they intend to escape, to destroy traces of the crime, to induce accomplices or witnesses to make false statements, or to evade the obligation to testify.

Important changes in the treatment of suspects occurred in 1992 with the introduction of the Criminal Trials Procedure Law. This law affirms the right of common criminal suspects to immediate access to legal counsel and the right to meet with an attorney at any time. Permissible prearrainment detention was shortened to twenty-four hours for common individual crimes and to four days for common crimes involving conspir-
The practical effect of the new law has been improved attorney access for those charged with common crimes.

The 1991 Anti-Terror Law nullified the "thought crimes" articles of the penal code. However, it introduced a broad and ambiguous definition of terrorism, enabling the government to use the law not only to combat alleged terrorism but also to impose sentences of two to five years on ordinary citizens for written and oral propaganda, meetings, and demonstrations aimed at "damaging the indivisible unity of the state."

Persons detained for individual crimes under the Anti-Terror Law must be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours. Anyone charged with crimes of a collective political or conspiratorial nature may be detained for up to fifteen days and up to thirty days in the ten southeastern provinces under a state of emergency in early 1995. The law does not guarantee access to counsel in such cases, leaving this decision to prosecutors, who routinely deny access.

Cases involving minor offenses are tried by a justice of the peace, a single judge who has limited penal and civil jurisdiction. Somewhat more serious offenses are tried by courts of first instance, with a single judge. Central criminal courts that have a president and two judges deal with crimes punishable by more than five years' imprisonment. Three-judge commercial courts also exist.

Ordinary defendants have the right to a public trial and must be provided with free counsel if they are indigent. However, the constitution does provide for closed trials in the interest of "public morality and public security." There is no jury system; all cases are decided by a judge or panel of judges. The constitution requires that judges be independent of the executive in the discharge of their duties, and, in practice, judges are not subject to government interference. Defense lawyers have access to the prosecutor's files after arraignment and prior to the trial. Release may be granted after arraignment upon payment of bail or presentation of an appropriate guarantee.

Eight state security courts, each composed of five members—two civilian judges, one military judge, and two prosecutors—may try defendants accused of terrorism, drug smuggling, membership in illegal organizations, or espousing and disseminating prohibited ideas. The state security courts mainly handle cases under the Anti-Terror Law. As of the end of 1993, a total of 3,792 persons had been detained under the law, and 811 persons were serving sentences under its provi-
sions. In addition to the longer prearraignment detention the law permits, the state security courts can hold closed hearings and may admit testimony gathered during police interrogation in the absence of counsel. Verdicts of the courts may be appealed to a special State Security Court of Appeals.

Martial law courts established after the 1980 coup continue to function in those provinces under martial law. Military courts hear cases involving infractions of military law by members of the armed forces. A separate military court appeals system applies. In late 1993, two television journalists received two-month sentences from a military court for presenting a program on military deserters and draft evaders in the first known case of civilians tried in a military court while Turkey was under civilian rule.

Incidence of Crime

The incidence of ordinary crime is considered low in comparison to rates in other Middle Eastern and some West European countries. As in many other countries with even better data-gathering capabilities, the statistics on criminal acts may be unreliable. The penal registry maintained by the Ministry of Justice offers only a partial indication of the actual extent of crime. Moreover, in much of rural Turkey acts formally considered police matters may be addressed in the local community without coming to the attention of the gendarmerie.

Official statistics indicate a doubling of prison admissions between 1984 and 1991. This increase was due almost entirely to a rapid rise in the number of persons jailed "according to special laws," meaning presumably those convicted of terrorism or illegal political activity. In numerous categories of ordinary crime, the number of prison admissions actually fell from 1984 to 1991. Nevertheless, it is generally believed that the incidence of ordinary crime has been growing because of the economic, social, and cultural stresses associated with relatively rapid urbanization and the weakening of traditional social controls among urban immigrants.

According to the *Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1993*, the number of convicts entering prisons in 1991 was 53,912, and the number discharged was 72,885. In most years, the number of admissions and discharges is nearly equal; the higher rate of discharges in 1991 was probably a result of the release of those convicted under political clauses of the penal code repealed that year. Among the most common felonies resulting in incar-
eration in 1991 were crimes against property (8,360), crimes against individuals (5,879), and crimes against "public decency and family order" (2,681). The numbers of persons admitted to prison bore little relation to the number of cases brought before the various criminal courts. According to official statistics, more than 52,000 new cases were brought before the central criminal courts, 632,000 before the criminal courts of first instance, and 493,000 before the justices of the peace.

The number entering prisons under special laws rose rapidly, from 7,514 in 1985 to 32,645 in 1991. Although Turkish sources offer no explanation of the increase, the period corresponds to the spiraling Kurdish dissidence and the strict laws then in effect dealing with "thought crimes."

**Narcotics Trafficking**

Turkey plays a major role in the narcotics trade, primarily as a natural route for the movement of hashish from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran to destinations in Europe. The disintegration of the Soviet Union has resulted in a loss of control over drug production in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Unrest in Azerbaijan and Georgia facilitates smuggling from the Caucasus area. Turkish police maintain that the PKK is heavily involved in the heroin trade. The use of air and sea routes for narcotics transshipment through Turkey has grown as the conflict in former Yugoslavia has disrupted the traditional overland routes through the Balkans.

Turkey is an important processing point for morphine base and heroin base imported into the country. Also, the Turks traditionally have grown the opium poppy for medicinal purposes. The government effectively controls the cultivation and production of opiates, paying high prices for the crop and carefully monitoring growing areas. Local drug consumption and abuse are considered minor problems, although there are some indications that heroin and cocaine use is increasing among the more affluent segments of the population.

Nationwide there are more than 1,000 narcotics law enforcement officers. The principal law enforcement agencies concerned with narcotics are the National Police and the gendarmerie. Turkish customs agencies have lacked a professional cadre of narcotics interdiction agents, but in the mid-1990s were working toward creating such a body with United States training assistance. The coast guard has also begun playing a larger role in interdiction. In spite of Turkey's efforts, it is
believed that little of the heroin passing through the country is seized because of insufficient staff to screen cargoes adequately, particularly at the key transfer point of Istanbul.

There is no evidence of widespread corruption among senior officials engaged in drug law enforcement. In some cases, however, drug investigations have been compromised by corruption at lower levels of the criminal justice system, as well as within the judicial system once traffickers have been apprehended. Because Turkey has no legislation prohibiting money laundering, it is almost impossible to track inflows of drug profits. However, the Turkish government has indicated its intention to introduce laws to deal with this practice.

Data on seizures of heroin and hashish show an upward trend in the five-year period between 1989 and 1993. Hashish seizures increased from 6.9 tons in 1989 to 28.7 tons in 1993. However, a major factor was a single seizure of more than 2.7 tons of morphine base and 13.5 tons of hashish aboard a Turkish merchant ship in January 1993.

**Individual Rights**

Under the martial-law regime established after the 1980 coup, Turkey's citizens suffered a serious curtailment of normal civil rights. Starting in 1983, when parliamentary elections were held, the government gradually lifted restraints on individual liberties and progressively withdrew martial law from major cities and provinces. Restrictions on the press were removed in 1985, making it permissible to publish all views except those banned by the penal code. The 1987 state of emergency declared in ten southeastern provinces where the government faced terrorist violence allowed the civilian governor to exercise certain powers verging on martial law, including warrantless searches and restrictions on the press.

Although progress has been made in reducing human rights abuses since the military government period, mistreatment by the police in the form of beatings and torture has remained a seemingly intractable problem. Reports of illegal practices, in some cases extrajudicial killings, deaths in custody, and disappearances, have become more widespread since 1992, when violence resulting from the Kurdish insurgency reached unprecedented levels. The Turkish government has renewed previous pledges to end the use of torture by the security forces, but little has been achieved in curbing the excesses of the police and military.
The widespread evidence of torture and severe ill-treatment of detainees has been condemned by numerous international groups, such as the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and the United Nations Committee on Torture. Within Turkey, illegal police activities have been monitored by the Human Rights Association since that organization received official approval in 1987. The association subsequently attracted a membership of about 20,000 and opened branches in fifty of the provincial capitals. The companion Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, established in 1990, operates torture-rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul, and serves as a clearinghouse for human rights information. Besides enduring government-imposed restrictions, the Human Rights Association has seen nine people associated with the organization slain. The group's leadership has charged that nearly half of its offices have been forced to close because of police pressure.

The Human Rights Foundation has claimed that government security forces were responsible for ninety-one extrajudicial killings during the first nine months of 1993, and that security forces were implicated in many of the 291 "mystery killings" during the same period. Perhaps twenty persons died in official custody, some allegedly as a result of torture. Other killings occurred during raids on terrorist safe houses, or when deadly force was used against unarmed civilians participating in peaceful demonstrations.

Turkish human rights advocates believe that most persons charged with political crimes undergo torture, usually while in incommunicado detention in the hands of the police or gendarmerie before being brought before a court. About half of the ordinary criminal suspects are thought to undergo torture while under police interrogation. In the event that law enforcement officers are charged in torture cases, the sentences imposed are generally light or the cases drag on for years.

The constitution guarantees inviolability of the domicile and privacy of communications except upon issuance of a judicial warrant. However, in the southeastern provinces that are under state of emergency the governor may authorize warrantless search. In these areas, security personnel at roadblocks regularly search travelers and vehicles in an effort to apprehend smugglers and terrorists.

University students and faculty members may not be members of political parties or become involved in political activi-
ties. Youth branches of political parties are forbidden, and the university rector must grant permission for a student to join any association. Political activity by trade unions is also banned. Thus, unions may neither endorse candidates nor make contributions to their campaigns; they are, however, able to make known their opposition to or support of political parties and government policies. Collective bargaining and strikes are strictly regulated. Unions must have government permission to hold meetings and rallies but are permitted to organize workplaces freely and to engage in collective bargaining (see Human Resources and Trade Unions, ch. 3; Political Interest Groups, ch. 4).

In March 1994, seven Kurdish legislators were arrested on the parliament grounds. Indictments were prepared against them for writings and speeches deemed supportive of Kurdish separatism. The incident aroused considerable controversy both domestically and internationally; all seven assembly members were given long prison terms in late 1994.

Freedom of conscience and religious belief is guaranteed by the constitution, as is private dissemination of religious ideas. However, religious activity is strictly supervised in accordance with the principles of secularism and separation of church and state. No political party advocating a theocracy or government founded on religious principles is permitted. The operation of churches, monasteries, synagogues, and schools must be approved by the state. Armenian and Greek churches are carefully monitored, and prosecutors have brought charges of proselytism against Islamists and evangelical Christian groups deemed to have political overtones. Courts have not been sympathetic to such charges, but the police have acted against some evangelical Christians by refusing to renew their residence permits and expelling them.

Penal System

The civil penal system is administered by the General Directorate of Prisons and Houses of Detention in the Ministry of Justice. There is a prison or jail in almost every town and at least one in every district. The older penal institutions include most of the town and district jails and the larger provincial prisons in use since Ottoman times. These are gradually being supplemented by newer "penitentiary labor establishments" whose distinguishing feature is the availability of equipment for labor. Prison labor is compulsory for all in old and new prisons. Pris-
Turkish prisoners are allowed to send up to one-half of their prison earnings to a dependent; part is withheld for rations, and the remainder goes to the prisoner upon discharge. Prisons were previously known to be overcrowded, but the apparent reduction in jail sentences for common crimes and the commutation of longer sentences may have mitigated the problem.

According to official data, the number of convicts in prisons declined from more than 46,000 in 1984 to 10,656 in 1991. The drop in the prison population took place mainly between 1986 and 1991, when mass releases occurred. When the large number sentenced to prison is compared with the small prison population at any one time, it appears that many convicts serve sentences of only a few months. Persons classified as political prisoners or terrorists are apparently regarded separately because more than 32,000 were incarcerated in 1991 under the "special laws" category.

By and large, Turks accept the Muslim view that crime is a willful act and thus regard penalties as punishment for the act and as a means to deter similar acts, not as instruments of rehabilitation or reeducation. There has been a trend among some specialists and Turkish officials to view criminal acts as the product of social conditions and therefore to emphasize rehabilitation, but this view has had only limited influence on penal practice.

Whereas torture of both political and ordinary prisoners by security forces is a deep-rooted problem, much of it occurs prior to court hearings. Incidents arising from mistreatment in prisons have been decreasing in recent years. However, in two cases mentioned in 1992 by the international human rights group Amnesty International, large numbers of prisoners were beaten, some seriously, for protesting against prison disciplinary measures.

After widespread hunger strikes in 1989, the minister of justice introduced a number of reforms to improve prison conditions, including an end to corporal punishment, bread-and-water diets, and solitary confinement in unlighted cells. The government, however, continued to be faced with domestic and international criticism and subsequently announced a prison reform bill in 1993. At the end of 1994, parliament had not enacted promised prison reforms.

* * *

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An authoritative statement by Turkish chief of staff General Dogan Güres on the new strategy and restructuring of the armed forces is contained in the June 1993 issue of the *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*. Graham E. Fuller and other authors address Turkey’s changed geopolitical situation following the collapse of the Soviet Union in *Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*. Turkish military leaders analyze the missions and capabilities of the individual service branches in a series of articles in a special 1993 issue of *NATO’s Sixteen Nations* called "Defence of Turkey."

A book by a noted Turkish journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, *Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces*, provides previously unfamiliar details on the military education system, military traditions and institutions, and the perspectives and aspirations of career officers.

Discussion of Turkey's human rights record can be found in publications by Amnesty International and in the annual *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* published by the United States Department of State. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Table
1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors
2 The House of Osman: Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, 1281–1922
3 Presidents and Prime Ministers, 1920–95
5 Economically Active Population by Sector, Selected Years, 1970–93
6 Summary of Consolidated Budget, 1988–93
7 Production of Major Agricultural Commodities, 1987–92
8 Energy Production, 1988–92
9 Exports by Commodity, 1987–92
10 Imports by Commodity, 1987–92
11 Major Trading Partners, 1988–95
12 Summary of Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1985–93
13 Major Army Equipment, 1994
14 Major Air Force Equipment, 1994
15 Major Naval Equipment, 1994
### Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>When you know</th>
<th>Multiply by</th>
<th>To find</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Millimeters</td>
<td>0.04</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centimeters</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters</td>
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<td>feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilometers</td>
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<td>miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hectares</td>
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<td>acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Square kilometers</td>
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<td>square miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubic meters</td>
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<td>cubic feet</td>
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<td>Liters</td>
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<td>gallons</td>
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<td>Kilograms</td>
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<td>Metric tons</td>
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<td>long tons</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>short tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,204.0</td>
<td>pounds</td>
</tr>
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</table>
| Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)  | 1.8         | degrees Fahrenheit and add 32
Table 2. The House of Osman: Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, 1281–1922

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Lineage</th>
<th>Reigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Osman I</td>
<td>Son of the gazi Ertugrul</td>
<td>1281–1324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orhan</td>
<td>Son of Osman</td>
<td>1324–60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murad I</td>
<td>Son of Orhan</td>
<td>1360–89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayezid I²</td>
<td>Son of Murad I</td>
<td>1389–1402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleyman I²</td>
<td>Son of Bayezid I</td>
<td>1402–11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musta²</td>
<td>Son of Bayezid I</td>
<td>1411–15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet I²</td>
<td>Son of Bayezid I</td>
<td>1415–21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murad II</td>
<td>Son of Mehmet I</td>
<td>1421–44, 1446–51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet II</td>
<td>Son of Murad II</td>
<td>1444–46, 1451–81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayezid II</td>
<td>Son of Mehmet II</td>
<td>1481–1512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selim I</td>
<td>Son of Bayezid II</td>
<td>1512–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleyman I³</td>
<td>Son of Selim I</td>
<td>1520–66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selim II</td>
<td>Son of Suleyman I</td>
<td>1566–74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murad III</td>
<td>Son of Selim II</td>
<td>1574–95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet III</td>
<td>Son of Murad III</td>
<td>1595–1605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet I</td>
<td>Son of Mehmet III</td>
<td>1605–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa I</td>
<td>Son of Ahmet I</td>
<td>1617–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osman II</td>
<td>Son of Ahmet I</td>
<td>1618–22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa I</td>
<td>Son of Ahmet I</td>
<td>1622–23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murad IV</td>
<td>Nephew of Mustafa I</td>
<td>1625–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahim</td>
<td>Brother of Murad IV</td>
<td>1640–48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet IV</td>
<td>Son of Ibrahim</td>
<td>1648–87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleyman II⁴</td>
<td>Son of Ibrahim</td>
<td>1687–91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet II</td>
<td>Son of Ibrahim</td>
<td>1691–95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa II</td>
<td>Son of Mehmet IV</td>
<td>1695–1703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmet III</td>
<td>Son of Mehmet IV</td>
<td>1703–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmud I</td>
<td>Son of Mustafa II</td>
<td>1730–54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osman III</td>
<td>Son of Mustafa II</td>
<td>1754–57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa III</td>
<td>Son of Ahmet III</td>
<td>1757–74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdül Hamid I</td>
<td>Brother of Mustafa III</td>
<td>1774–89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selim III</td>
<td>Nephew of Abdül Hamid I</td>
<td>1789–1807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa IV</td>
<td>Cousin of Selim III</td>
<td>1807–08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahmud II</td>
<td>Brother of Mustafa IV</td>
<td>1808–59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdülmecid I</td>
<td>Son of Mahmud II</td>
<td>1859–61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdülaziz</td>
<td>Son of Mahmud II</td>
<td>1861–76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murad V</td>
<td>Son of Abdülmecid I</td>
<td>1876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdül Hamid II</td>
<td>Son of Abdülmecid I</td>
<td>1876–1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet V</td>
<td>Son of Abdülmecid I</td>
<td>1909–18</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix A

Table 2. The House of Osman: Sultans of the Ottoman Empire, 1281–1922

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Lineage</th>
<th>Reigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet VI</td>
<td>Son of Abdülmecid I</td>
<td>1918–22²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Date of beginning of reign is approximate.
² The period 1403–15, during which the sons of Bayezid I contested succession to the sultanate, is cited as an interregnum by many sources. Other sources date the beginning of the reign of Mehmet I from 1403.
³ Süleyman II in some sources.
⁴ Süleyman III in some sources.
⁵ Sultanate abolished 1922; Abdülmecid II (brother of Mehmet VI) remained as caliph 1922–24.

Table 3. Presidents and Prime Ministers, 1920–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Period in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atatürk (1923–58)</td>
<td>Atatürk¹</td>
<td>May 1920–January 1921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fevzi Çakmak¹</td>
<td>January 1921–July 1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rauf Orbay¹</td>
<td>July 1922–August 1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fethi Okyar¹</td>
<td>August–October 1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ismet İnönü (CHP)²</td>
<td>November 1923–November 1924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fethi Okyar (Progressive Republican Party)</td>
<td>November 1924–March 1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ismet İnönü (CHP)</td>
<td>March 1925–October 1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Celal Bayar (CHP)</td>
<td>October 1937–January 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Refik Saydam (CHP)</td>
<td>January 1959–July 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sükrü Saracoğlu (CHP)</td>
<td>July 1942–August 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recep Peker (CHP)</td>
<td>August 1946–September 1947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hasan Saka (CHP)</td>
<td>September 1947–January 1949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Semsettin Gümaltay (CHP)</td>
<td>January 1949–May 1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adnan Menderes (DP)³</td>
<td>May 1950–May 1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ismet İnönü (CHP)</td>
<td>November 1961–February 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suat Hayri Ürgüplü (Independent)</td>
<td>February–October 1965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Süleyman Demirel (AP)⁵</td>
<td>October 1965–March 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nihat Erim (Independent)</td>
<td>March 1971–April 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cevdet Sunay (1966–73)</td>
<td>Ferit Melen⁶ (NRP)⁷</td>
<td>April 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Suat Hayri Ürgüplü (Independent)</td>
<td>April–May 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ferit Melen (Independent)</td>
<td>May 1972–April 1973</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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### Table 3. Presidents and Prime Ministers, 1920–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Period in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fahri Korutürk</td>
<td>Büleínt Ecevit (CHP)</td>
<td>January–November 1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Büleínt Ecevit (CHP)</td>
<td>January 1978–October 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Süleyman Demirel (AP)</td>
<td>October 1979–September 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenan Evren*</td>
<td>Büleínt Ulusu (appointed)</td>
<td>September 1980–December 1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ali Bozer 6 (ANAP)</td>
<td>October–November 1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Süleyman Demirel (DYP)</td>
<td>November 1991–May 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Erdal İnönü 11</td>
<td>May–June 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Süleyman Demirel</td>
<td>Tansu Çiller (DYP)</td>
<td>June 1993–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 President of the Grand National Assembly.
2 CHP—Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party).
3 DP—Demokrat Partisi (Democrat Party).
4 Interim government under Committee of National Unity.
5 AP—Adalet Partisi (Justice Party).
6 Acting prime minister.
7 NRP—National Reliance Party.
8 Evren functioned as head of the National Security Council, or de facto chief of state, from September 1980 to November 1982.
9 ANAP—Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party).
10 DYP—Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party).
11 Caretaker prime minister.
### Table 4. Population by Age-Group, 1980, 1990, and 2000 (in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age-Group</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000(^1)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–14</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15–64</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>62.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Over 65</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL(^2)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Projected.
2 Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from The Dorling Kindersley World Reference Atlas, New York, 1994, 546

### Table 5. Economically Active Population by Sector, Selected Years, 1970–93 (in thousands of workers over age fifteen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, fishing, and forestry</td>
<td>8,237</td>
<td>8,353</td>
<td>8,723</td>
<td>8,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>973</td>
<td>1,141</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>2,057</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td>2,693</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>151</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade and hotels</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>1,429</td>
<td>2,093</td>
<td>2,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and communications</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>898</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other, including services</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>2,168</td>
<td>3,012</td>
<td>3,104</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total civilian employment</td>
<td>13,034</td>
<td>15,702</td>
<td>18,364</td>
<td>18,702</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1,376</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>1,530</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (in percentages)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE</td>
<td>13,905</td>
<td>17,078</td>
<td>19,994</td>
<td>20,232</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenues</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tax revenues</td>
<td>14,232</td>
<td>25,550</td>
<td>45,599</td>
<td>78,643</td>
<td>141,602</td>
<td>264,273</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-tax revenues</td>
<td>5,355</td>
<td>5,819</td>
<td>11,174</td>
<td>18,104</td>
<td>32,622</td>
<td>87,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total revenues</td>
<td>17,587</td>
<td>31,369</td>
<td>56,573</td>
<td>96,747</td>
<td>174,224</td>
<td>351,392</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Current expendi-</td>
<td>7,460</td>
<td>16,660</td>
<td>35,452</td>
<td>60,403</td>
<td>114,221</td>
<td>204,829</td>
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<tr>
<td>tures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>3,564</td>
<td>5,818</td>
<td>10,055</td>
<td>17,146</td>
<td>29,239</td>
<td>53,161</td>
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<td>Transfers to</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>1,265</td>
<td>12,191</td>
<td>8,145</td>
<td>25,850</td>
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<td>SEE$^{2}$</td>
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<td>Interest pay-</td>
<td>4,998</td>
<td>8,259</td>
<td>13,966</td>
<td>24,073</td>
<td>40,298</td>
<td>116,470</td>
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<td>ments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other transfers</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>6,911</td>
<td>9,789</td>
<td>16,450</td>
<td>29,765</td>
<td>89,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ex-</td>
<td>21,447</td>
<td>38,871</td>
<td>68,527</td>
<td>130,263</td>
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<td>Deferred minus</td>
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<td>90</td>
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<td>Short-term bor-</td>
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<td>Other (including</td>
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<td>1,111</td>
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<td>omissions)</td>
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1. For value of the Turkish lira—see Glossary.
2. SEE$^{2}$—State Economic Enterprises.

Table 7. Production of Major Agricultural Commodities, 1987–92
(in thousands of tons)

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<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
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<td>Wheat</td>
<td>18,932</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>16,300</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>20,400</td>
<td>19,318</td>
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<td>Barley</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>6,900</td>
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<td>Corn</td>
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<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<td>2,100</td>
<td>2,100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rye</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>225</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>215</td>
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<td>Total cereals</td>
<td>29,307</td>
<td>30,714</td>
<td>23,288</td>
<td>30,140</td>
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<td>Sugar beets</td>
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<td>11,554</td>
<td>10,929</td>
<td>13,986</td>
<td>15,097</td>
<td>14,800</td>
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<td>Cotton (lint)</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>605</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>320</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total industrial crops</td>
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<td>12,403</td>
<td>11,764</td>
<td>14,929</td>
<td>15,879</td>
<td>15,725</td>
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<td>Sunflower seed</td>
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<td>1,150</td>
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<td>860</td>
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<td>950</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cottonseed</td>
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<td>904</td>
<td>1,702</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>1,573</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sesame seed</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>1/5</td>
<td>1/5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total oilseeds</td>
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<td>2,191</td>
<td>2,601</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>2,557</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vegetables, fruits, and nuts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
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<td>4,350</td>
<td>4,080</td>
<td>4,300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grapes</td>
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<td>3,550</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>3,460</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oranges</td>
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<td>740</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>824</td>
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<td>Olives</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lemons</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>420</td>
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<td>Hazelnuts (in shell)</td>
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<td>353</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>520</td>
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<td>Raisins</td>
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<td>129</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>120</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dried figs</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olive oil</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total vegetables, fruits, and nuts</td>
<td>9,770</td>
<td>10,522</td>
<td>9,801</td>
<td>10,661</td>
<td>10,690</td>
<td>10,629</td>
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</table>

n.a.—not available.

**Turkey: A Country Study**

**Table 8. Energy Production, 1988–92**

(in thousands of tons unless otherwise indicated)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total coal (including lignite)</td>
<td>11,530</td>
<td>12,940</td>
<td>12,550</td>
<td>11,880</td>
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<td>Crude petroleum</td>
<td>2,564</td>
<td>2,876</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>4,557</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main petroleum products</td>
<td>19,265</td>
<td>17,789</td>
<td>18,563</td>
<td>18,409</td>
<td>18,811</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electricity (in thousands of kilowatt hours)</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>67</td>
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</table>


**Table 9. Exports by Commodity, 1987–92**

(in millions of United States dollars)

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<tr>
<td>Agricultural products</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>419</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hazelnuts</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>291</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other fruits and vegetables</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>692</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cotton</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>909</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other industrial crops and forestry products</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>268</td>
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<tr>
<td>Live animals and sea products</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>178</td>
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<td>Total agricultural products</td>
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<td>2,127</td>
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<td>2,683</td>
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<td>Mineral products</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>265</td>
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<tr>
<td>Processed and manufactured products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Processed agricultural products</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1,212</td>
<td>1,337</td>
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<td>Textiles and clothing</td>
<td>2,707</td>
<td>5,201</td>
<td>3,505</td>
<td>4,060</td>
<td>4,328</td>
<td>5,268</td>
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386
### Table 9. Exports by Commodity, 1987–92
(in millions of United States dollars)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hides and leather</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>568</td>
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<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>774</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>491</td>
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<tr>
<td>Petroleum products</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Glass and ceramics</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>395</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iron and steel</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>1,349</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>1,452</td>
<td>1,558</td>
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<td>Metal products and machinery</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>398</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electrical equipment and products</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>591</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>911</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>1,410</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total processed and manufactured products</td>
<td>8,065</td>
<td>8,944</td>
<td>9,087</td>
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<td>10,629</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>11,662</td>
<td>11,627</td>
<td>12,959</td>
<td>13,598</td>
<td>14,715</td>
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</table>

Table 10. Imports by Commodity, 1987–92
(in millions of United States dollars) ¹

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<td>Agricultural products and livestock</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>1,323</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>1,184</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mineral products</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Crude oil</td>
<td>2,711</td>
<td>2,434</td>
<td>2,456</td>
<td>3,817</td>
<td>2,794</td>
<td>2,894</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oil products</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>865</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total oil</td>
<td>2,956</td>
<td>2,777</td>
<td>2,980</td>
<td>4,622</td>
<td>3,756</td>
<td>3,759</td>
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<td>Other</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>161</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total mineral products</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>3,204</td>
<td>3,426</td>
<td>4,794</td>
<td>3,954</td>
<td>3,920</td>
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<tr>
<td>Processed and manufactured products</td>
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<tr>
<td>Processed agricultural products</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>935</td>
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<td>Manufactured products</td>
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<td>Chemicals</td>
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<td>1,710</td>
<td>2,451</td>
<td>2,463</td>
<td>2,624</td>
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<td>Rubber and plastics</td>
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<td>525</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>986</td>
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<td>Iron and steel</td>
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<td>1,655</td>
<td>2,217</td>
<td>1,992</td>
<td>2,009</td>
<td>2,118</td>
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<td>Non ferrous metals</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>426</td>
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<td>Electrical appliances</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>1,877</td>
<td>1,762</td>
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<td>Motor vehicles</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>2,221</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other machinery</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>655</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>Other industrial products</td>
<td>2,799</td>
<td>3,121</td>
<td>3,461</td>
<td>5,541</td>
<td>5,760</td>
<td>6,635</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total manufactured products</td>
<td>9,381</td>
<td>9,894</td>
<td>10,482</td>
<td>15,023</td>
<td>15,291</td>
<td>16,835</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total processed and manufactured products</td>
<td>10,101</td>
<td>10,622</td>
<td>11,325</td>
<td>16,185</td>
<td>16,280</td>
<td>17,768</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>14,355</td>
<td>15,792</td>
<td>22,502</td>
<td>21,047</td>
<td>22,872</td>
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¹ C.I.F.—Cost, insurance, and freight.

## Table 11. Major Trading Partners, 1988–95

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<td>Britain</td>
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<td>616</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>796</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>809</td>
<td>771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,178</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>3,076</td>
<td>3,413</td>
<td>6,660</td>
<td>3,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>1,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total EU</td>
<td>5,128</td>
<td>5,432</td>
<td>6,904</td>
<td>7,042</td>
<td>7,601</td>
<td>7,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>913</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other OECD</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total OECD</td>
<td>6,737</td>
<td>7,201</td>
<td>8,211</td>
<td>8,857</td>
<td>9,346</td>
<td>9,072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and East European countries</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>1,053</td>
<td>1,217</td>
<td>1,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,924</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>1,742</td>
<td>2,085</td>
<td>2,096</td>
<td>2,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>3,456</td>
<td>2,804</td>
<td>2,452</td>
<td>2,694</td>
<td>2,768</td>
<td>2,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>949</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>1,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL EXPORTS</td>
<td>11,662</td>
<td>11,627</td>
<td>12,957</td>
<td>13,593</td>
<td>14,715</td>
<td>15,549</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **IMPORTS**                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| OECD countries               |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| EU countries                 |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Britain                      | 739  | 728  | 1,014| 1,166| 1,187| 1,546|
| France                       | 829  | 745  | 1,540| 1,227| 1,351| 1,952|
| Germany                      | 2,067| 2,225| 3,523| 3,232| 5,754| 4,533|
| Italy                        | 1,006| 1,071| 1,727| 1,845| 1,919| 2,558|
| Other                        | 1,267| 1,307| 1,750| 1,753| 1,898| 2,361|
| Total EU                     | 5,908| 6,076| 9,554| 9,223| 10,049| 12,960|
| Japan                        | 555  | 580  | 1,120| 1,092| 1,113| 1,621|
| Switzerland                  | 344  | 412  | 537  | 489  | 688  | 651  |
| United States                | 1,520| 2,094| 2,282| 2,255| 2,601| 3,351|
| Other OECD                   | 924  | 892  | 958  | 1,015| 972  | 1,402|
| Total OECD                   | 9,251| 9,984| 14,251|14,072|15,423|19,975|
| Central and East European countries | 857 | 1,124| 1,947| 1,875| 2,094| 3,253|

---

1. OECD countries
2. EU countries
### Table 11. Major Trading Partners, 1988–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>2,890</td>
<td>2,872</td>
<td>2,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Middle East and North Africa</strong></td>
<td>2,841</td>
<td>2,830</td>
<td>3,659</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>3,238</td>
<td>3,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>2,445</td>
<td>2,119</td>
<td>2,116</td>
<td>2,961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL IMPORTS</strong></td>
<td>14,340</td>
<td>15,790</td>
<td>22,302</td>
<td>21,047</td>
<td>22,871</td>
<td>29,429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 OECD—Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
2 EU—European Union.


### Table 12. Summary of Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1985–93

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports (f.o.b.)</td>
<td>8,255</td>
<td>10,322</td>
<td>11,780</td>
<td>13,667</td>
<td>15,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports (f.o.b.)</td>
<td>-11,230</td>
<td>-15,551</td>
<td>15,999</td>
<td>21,007</td>
<td>29,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade balance</td>
<td>-2,975</td>
<td>-5,299</td>
<td>-4,219</td>
<td>-7,340</td>
<td>-14,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,622</td>
<td>2,499</td>
<td>4,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private transfers (net)</td>
<td>1,762</td>
<td>2,066</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>2,854</td>
<td>3,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official transfers (net)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>2,245</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance</td>
<td>-969</td>
<td>-806</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>-6,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private long-term capital (net)</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>2,456</td>
<td>1,562</td>
<td>6,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official long-term capital (net)</td>
<td>-594</td>
<td>-455</td>
<td>-1,092</td>
<td>-929</td>
<td>-950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital account balance</td>
<td>-262</td>
<td>1,841</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>5,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance of payments</td>
<td>-707</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>1,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in reserves</td>
<td>-561</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>2,471</td>
<td>-1,197</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 f.o.b.—free on board.

## Appendix A

### Table 13. Major Army Equipment, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tanks</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leopard</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-48</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-60</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored vehicles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry fighting vehicles</td>
<td>Turkey/United States</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored personnel carriers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAPC</td>
<td>United States/Turkey</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR 60</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWC</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-propelled guns and howitzers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm: M-52A1 and M-108</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm: M-44</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175mm: M-107</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203mm: M-55 and M-110</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Towed artillery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm: M-101A1 and others</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150mm: Skoda</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm: M-114A1 and M-59</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>203mm: M-115</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mortars</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107mm: M-30, some self-propelled</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120mm: various</td>
<td>United States/Germany/France</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm: various, including self-propelled</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>5,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multiple rocket launchers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>227mm: MLRS</td>
<td>United States/Turkey</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107mm</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antitank guided weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobra</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOW self-propelled</strong></td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helicopters</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobra AH–1W/P</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S–70A Sikorsky</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB–204 Agusta Bell</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB–205 Agusta Bell</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB–212 Agusta Bell</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH–1H Iroquois</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 14. Major Air Force Equipment, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter-bombers and fighter-ground attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16C/D</td>
<td>United States/Turkey</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-5A/B</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4E</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-104G</td>
<td>Various NATO</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance (armed)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF-5A</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RF-4E</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-130E Hercules</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-160D Transall</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CN-235</td>
<td>Spain/Turkey</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH-1H Blackhawk utility</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air missile launchers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nike-Hercules</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapier</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 15. Major Naval Equipment, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Destroyers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gearing-class</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter-class</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumner-class</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frigates</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEKO-200 with Sub Harpoon SSM</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEKO-200</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4 (on order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berk-class</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolin-class</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knox-class with Sub Harpoon SSM</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Submarines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guppy-class</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-209/1200</td>
<td>Germany/Turkey</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type-209/1400</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang-class</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fast-attack craft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dogan-class (Lurssen 57) with Harpoon SSM</td>
<td>Germany/Turkey</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kartal-class (Jaguar) with Penguin SSM</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yildiz-class</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2 (on order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Patrol craft</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal and inshore</td>
<td>United States/Germany/Turkey</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minelayers</td>
<td>United States/Denmark</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minesweepers</td>
<td>United States/France/Canada</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amphibious</strong></td>
<td>United States/Turkey</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing ships, tank</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing craft, tank</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landing craft, utility</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Naval Aviation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agusta-Bell AB-212 ASW shipborne helicopters</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grumman ST-2E Tracker ASW search</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B

Selected Political Parties and Labor Organizations

ANAP—Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party). Founded in May 1983 under the leadership of Turgut Özal. The ruling party following the 1983 election, the center-right ANAP included mostly former members of the pre-1980 AP (Adalet Partisi) (q.v.).

AP—Adalet Partisi (Justice Party). Established in 1961, one of the two major parties prior to the September 1980 coup, led by Süleyman Demirel. Following its dissolution by the National Security Council, many of its members subsequently joined the ANAP (q.v.) or the DYP (q.v.).


BTP—Büyük Türkiye Partisi (Grand Turkey Party). Founded in May 1983 and banned the same month for having connections with the dissolved AP (q.v.). Its supporters then formed the center-right DYP (q.v.).

CHP—Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party). Founded in the 1920s and led by Atatürk until his death in 1938. Headed by Bülent Ecevit in the 1970s, it was one of the major parties prior to the 1980 coup. A majority of its deputies ultimately regrouped in the left-of-center SHP (q.v.); others joined the DSP (q.v.). Party reactivated by Deniz Baykal in 1992. In 1995 the SHP dissolved itself, and many members joined the CHP.

CNU—Committee of National Unity. Composed of thirty-eight officers who executed the May 1960 coup; the CNU governed the country until a constituent assembly was formed in January 1961.

Demokratik Partisi (Democratic Party)—Formed in 1971 by former AP (q.v.) members who disapproved of Süleyman Demirel's leadership; merged with the AP shortly before the 1980 coup. Not a successor to the DP (q.v.).


Dev Sol—Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left Party). A radical movement espousing Marxist ideology and advocating vio-
lent tactics against state institutions.

DISK—Türkiye Devrimçi İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Trade Unions of Turkey). Federation of trade unions second in importance only to Türk-İş (q.v.) before 1980. Banned after 1980, DISK was less influential in the mid-1990s than some of the other labor organizations.

DP—Demokrat Partisi (Democrat Party). Founded in 1946, the party secured power in the 1950 election. It was overthrown and declared illegal by the armed forces in 1960. Should not be confused with the Demokratik Partisi (q.v.). Party reactivated in 1992.

DSP—Demokratik Sol Partisi (Democratic Left Party). Founded in November 1985 by Rahsan Ecevit, wife of former CHP (q.v.) leader Bülent Ecevit, who had been banned from political activity. The party advocated a more radical variety of democratic socialism than the SHP (q.v.).

DYP—Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party). Founded in June 1983 after the dissolution of the BTP (q.v.). The center-right party was considered to be the successor to the banned AP (q.v.). Former AP leader Süleyman Demirel was its leader before becoming president. Head in 1995 was Prime Minister Tansu Çiller.


Hak-İs—Türkiye Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Turkish Just Workers' Unions). Pro-Islamist union.

HDP—Hür Demokrat Partisi (Free Democratic Party). A short-lived right-wing party founded in 1983 by former members of the MDP (q.v.) under the leadership of Mehmet Yazar. The HDP was disbanded the same year.


HP—Halkçı Partisi (Populist Party). Founded in May 1983, it was one of the three parties allowed to compete in the 1983 general election. It merged with Sodep (q.v.) in November 1985 to form the SHP (q.v.).

MCP—Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi (Nationalist Labor Party). Founded in July 1983 and originally named the Conservative Party, it changed its name in November 1985 to MCP. The conservative nationalist party is considered to be the
successor to the MHP (q.v). In 1993 the party reassumed the name of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP).

MDP—Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party).Founded in May 1983 under the leadership of General Turgut Sunalp, the party never gained popular support and was dissolved in April 1986.

MHP—Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party). A militant, nationalist party led by Alparslan Türkes. It was associated with the pre-1980 violence and was banned following the coup. The MCP (q.v.) was considered to be its successor prior to changing its name to MHP in 1993.

MISK—Türkiye Milliyetçi İsci Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Turkish Nationalist Workers' Unions). Government-sponsored federation of labor unions.

MSP—Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party). Founded in 1972 and dissolved in 1980, this conservative, religiously oriented party served in various government coalitions prior to the 1980 coup. Many of its members subsequently supported the RP (q.v).


RP—Refah Partisi (Welfare Party; also seen as Prosperity Party). A religious party based on Islamic principles; successor to the MSP (q.v.)

SHP—Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti (Social Democratic Populist Party). Formed in November 1985 by the merger of two left-of-center parties, Sodep (q.v.) and the HP (q.v). Dissolved itself in mid-1995, and many members joined the CHP (q.v).

Sodep—Sosyal Demokrat Parti (Social Democratic Party). Founded in July 1983, it had the support of the moderate left that had backed the pre-coup CHP (q.v). Merged with the HP (q.v) in 1985 to form the SHP (q.v).

TISK—Türkiye Isveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Turkish Confederation of Employers' Associations). A confederation of employers' associations, concerned primarily with labor-management relations.

TOB—Türkiye Odalar Birliği (Turkish Trade Association). Organization that has represented the interests of mer-
chants and industrialists since the early 1950s. In later years, it has been identified primarily with small and medium-sized firms.

Türk-İş—Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions). The largest and most influential of the union federations.

Turkish Communist Party—Joined TWP (q.v.) in 1987 to form Turkish United Communist Party.

Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi (Turkish United Communist Party). Created in 1987 by merger of TWP and Turkish Communist Party. Party was banned shortly thereafter, decriminalized in 1991, and then again proscribed.

TÜSİAD—Türk Sanayicileri ve İş Adamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association). Organization that represents the interests of big business.

TWP—Turkish Workers' Party. Joined with Turkish Communist Party in 1987 to form the Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi (q.v.).

VAP—Vatandaş Partisi (Citizens' Party). Founded in March 1986 under the leadership of former ANAP (q.v.) member Vural Arıkan. A small center-right party, its two parliamentary deputies joined the DYP (q.v.) in December 1986.
Chapter 1


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**Chapter 2**


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Alevi—(Alawi in Arabic), a heterodox Shia \( q.v. \) Islamic sect that has many followers in Turkey.

barrels per day—Production of crude oil and petroleum products is frequently measured in barrels per day, often abbreviated bpd or bd. A barrel is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons. Conversion of barrels to tons depends on the density of the specific product. About 7.3 barrels of average crude oil weigh one ton. Heavy crude weighs about seven barrels per ton. Light products, such as gasoline and kerosene, average close to eight barrels per ton.

capitulations—Special agreements between the Ottoman Empire and various foreign governments giving those governments and their citizens and subjects specific exemptions from the laws of the empire.

Common Agricultural Policy—Agricultural support system of the EU \( q.v. \), under which farmers' incomes are maintained through a system of target prices for agricultural commodities.

etatism—Often considered as state socialism. In Turkish use, it involves state control of some industries and public services.

European Community (EC)—See European Union (EU).

European Currency Unit (ECU)—Instituted in 1979, the ECU is the unit of account of the EU \( q.v. \). The value of the ECU is determined by the value of a basket that includes the currencies of all EU member states. In establishing the value of the basket, each member's currency receives a share that reflects the relative strength and importance of the member's economy. In 1995 one ECU was equivalent to about one United States dollar.

European Union (EU)—Until November 1993, the EU was known as the European Community (EC). The EU comprises three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Each community is a legally distinct body, but since 1967 they have shared common governing institutions. The EU forms more than a framework for free trade
and economic cooperation: the signatories to the treaties governing the communities have agreed in principle to integrate their economies and ultimately to form a political union. Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) were charter members of the EU; Britain, Denmark, and Ireland joined on January 1, 1973; Greece became a member on January 1, 1981; Portugal and Spain entered on January 1, 1986; and Austria, Finland, and Sweden became members on January 1, 1995.

fiscal year—Calendar year since 1983.

gecekondus—Literally, "built overnight"; term used for shanty-like squatter housing erected on outskirts of large cities. Ottoman custom dictated that once a structure was built, it could not be destroyed.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flow of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final consumption and intermediate production are assumed to be included in the final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these indirect taxes and subsidies have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. See also gross national product.

gross national product (GNP)—The gross domestic product (q.v.) plus net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries including income received from abroad by residents and subtracting payments remitted abroad to nonresidents. GNP is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies.

imam—A word used in several senses. In general use and lower-cased, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as such it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond sufficient education to carry out this function. Imam is also used figuratively by many Sunni (q.v.) Muslims to mean the leader of the Islamic community. Among Shia (q.v.) the word takes on many complex and contro-
versial meanings; in general, however, it indicates that par-
ticular descendant of the House of Ali who is believed to
have been God's designated repository of the spiritual
authority inherent in that line. The identity of this individ-
ual and the means of ascertaining his identity have been
major issues causing divisions among Shia.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with
the World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized
agency affiliated with the United Nations and is respon-
sible for stabilizing international exchange rates and pay-
ments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of
loans to its members (including industrialized and devel-
oping countries) when they experience balance of pay-
ments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions
that require substantial internal economic adjustments by
the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

lira—Turkish currency; 1 Turkish lira (TL) = 100 kurus. Value
of the lira has fluctuated considerably. In 1989 US$1.00 =
TL2,122; in 1991 US$1.00 = TL4,172; in 1993 US$1.00 =
TL10,983; in January 1994 US$1.00 = TL15,196; as of

millet—A non-Muslim group or community in the Ottoman
Empire organized under its own religious head, who also
exercised important civil functions.

National Security Council (NSC—Mili Güvenlik Kurulu)—
Under both the 1961 and the 1982 constitutions, the NSC
comprised military and civilian personnel and was charged
with reviewing national security policy. The generals who
took control of Turkey's government in 1980 also consti-
tuted themselves as a National Security Council (Milli
Güvenlik Konseyi); this body was abolished following the
reestablishment of civilian government after the 1983 elec-
tion. The former members of the 1980–83 NSC, except for
President Evren, subsequently formed the Presidential
Council, whose function was to advise the president. The
Presidential Council was dissolved in 1989.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—In 1995 mem-
bership composed of Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark,
Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and United States.

Shia (from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali)—A member of the
smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shia origi-
nated in a dispute over who should be the legitimate suc-
cessor to the Prophet; a majority of early Muslims accepted the tradition of community consensus to choose the leader, but a minority supported the claim of Ali, the Prophet's cousin, to inherit the mantle of leadership. Over time, theological differences emerged between the Shia and Sunni. The Alevi, Ismaili, Twelve Imam, and Zayidi all are distinct Shia sects.

Sublime Porte (or Porte)—Ottoman Empire palace entrance that provided access to the chief minister, who represented the government and the sultan. Term came to mean the Ottoman government.

Sunni—(from Arabic sunna, tradition or precedent)—A follower of the larger of the two primary denominations of Islam.

tarikat (pl., tarikatlar)—A Sufi order or lodge, usually headed by a teacher or master known as a seyh, in which devotees undertake a path of instruction toward spiritual perfection.


World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the
growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign investment in developing countries against various noncommercial risks. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—q.v.).
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