Ice-Breaker at Work—Amphibian tractor of 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion destroys thick-crusted ice to prevent its backing up against Spoonbill Bridge. Below, the 1st Engineer Battalion maintenance shop in operation at Ascom City.
Captured Enemy Weapons—Various types of mortar and artillery shells, machine guns, rifles, and a 60mm mortar are displayed at 1st Marine Division CP. Below, F9F Panther jet fighter taxies down runway for takeoff.
Outpost Defense—Inside view of one of the many sleeping caves, which shelter two to four men, on Marine outpost Carson. Below, COP Dagmar under artillery bombardment preceding enemy diversionary ground attack on 26 March 1953.
POW Exchange—Frontline Marines watch Army convoy bringing first UN prisoners to Freedom Village in Operation LITTLE SWITCH. Below, NKPA and CCF delegation upon adjournment of first day's truce talks, April 1953.
Ready to Strike—Ground crew loads rockets on "Devilcat" Corsair in preparation for day's mission. Below, protective screen of M-46 dozer of 1st Tank Battalion is designed to explode 3.5-inch rockets before they hit armored vehicle. The wire fence turns with the turret.
Evacuation from MLR—Improvised trolley rigged up by 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, safely transfers Marine casualty. Below, front view of first aid bunker, built on reverse slope, by 1st Engineer Battalion personnel.
Marine Relief—Advance party of the Turkish 3d Battalion arrives at 3/7 CP to reconnoiter its new sector preparatory to relief of 1st Marine Division, May 1953. Below, mine damage absorbed by thermo boot. Its sturdy construction saved limb of wounded Marine. Navy corpsman displays armored jacket worn by infantryman who survived blast of 5 lbs. of TNT accidentally exploded at close range.
Street Signs—Markers for the new Marine division CP at Camp Casey await completion of road work. Casey is command post of 1st MarDiv while in I Corps reserve. Marine tank fires in support of Turkish Brigade during May attack. Below, 5th Marines slog through flooded area on way back from day’s training.
Defense of Boulder City—Men of 1st and 7th Marines receive supplies during CCF assaults in July 1953 against Boulder City. Below, aerial view of pock-marked terrain in front of Boulder City as seen from HMR-161 helicopter.
Cease-fire—1st Marines move off MLR on 28 July, following cease-fire order. How Company marches to Camp Lee from position at the front. Below, contemplative Marine surveys trench line being filled in in accordance with armistice agreement.
Operation BIG SWITCH—Road map of route taken by repatriated UN prisoners of war as convoy reaches radio check points. Progress of convoy is immediately relayed to Freedom Village and entered on map.
UN Custodial Forces—Indian troops board Marine helicopter on deck of USS Point Cruz. They are then flown to the buffer zone to guard CCF and NKPA nonrepatriated POWs. Below, LtCol William G. Thrash receives naval aviator wings upon his release at Freedom Village from MajGen Vernon E. Megee, CG, 1st MAW.
Dismantling the MLR—KSCs, under Marine supervision, load and carry lumber from torn-down bunkers to new sector. Below, guard shack at entrance to 1/1 CP show results of flood waters, August 1952. Road approach to Spoonbill Bridge completely submerged by annual summer rains, in July 1953.
Shore-to-Ship Operation—F3D is hauled aboard ship after being ferried by four DUKWs, as 1st MAW redeploy from Korea to Japan in June 1956. Below, 1st Marine Division in Korea functions as security force. Marine DMZ policemen inspect enemy positions, February 1955.
Mission Completed—1st Marine Division equipment and records at dockside prior to loading for division's return to the States. Below, 1st Marines march across Freedom Gate Bridge on their way to Ascom City and thence home to U.S., March 1955.
One man was 56-year-old Master Sergeant Gust H. Dunis, who had barely survived the brutal, frozen death march to Kanggye in late December. The other was Staff Sergeant Charles L. Harrison, previously introduced as a unique two-time prisoner of war.

An additional four enlisted Marines returned to military control after a brief period of capture. Corporal William S. Blair, B/1/7, and PFC Bernard W. Insco, D/2/11, were taken prisoner on 24 April 1951 while the 1st Marine Division was operating as a component of IX Corps. Although originally sent north to a POW camp, both were released on 12 May by the enemy after less than a month's captivity. Another pair of lucky Marines were PFC Richard R. Grindle and Corporal Harold J. Kidd, both of B/1/7. Seized on 11 May in patrol actions, they were the only Marines captured in ground fighting that month, and escaped to return to the division four days later.

At least six escape attempts are known to have been made by Marine POWs, and another elaborate plan late in the war was foiled before it got under way. The incidents follow:

#1. In the early winter months of 1951, Sergeant Donald M. Griffith, F/2/5, became increasingly upset by the filth, steady attrition of POWs, and semi-starvation diet at The Valley. He vowed to escape. Late one night he pretended to go to the latrine and finding the guard asleep, instead hurried down the path leading out of the valley. He walked until dawn, then found a hut where he hid among a pile of rice bags for some much-needed sleep. Later, he knocked at a hut, asking for food. While he ate, however, his genial host's son was out contacting a military patrol which even then was on Griffith's trail.

A group of Communist soldiers closed in to recapture him. As early punishment, Griffith's shoe packs were taken from him and he was forced to walk back to the Valley in his threadbare ski socks. Returned to the camp, the Marine sergeant was beaten across the face. He was also directed to walk up a nearby hill and for three successive times a rifle bullet tearing by his head barely missed him. Later he learned that plans of his escape were leaked to the CCF by an informer, thus triggering an early search.

#2. In May 1951, Captain Bryon H. Beswick, VMF-323, was a member of a large POW column being marched north. Although still suffering severe burns on his face, hands, and leg incurred
while bailing out of his plane that had caught fire, Beswick and four others attempted to outwit their guards while on the march. All the would-be escapees were placed in solitary confinement.

#3. Shortly after his capture in July 1951, PFC Alfred P. Graham, Jr., H/3/5, was interned temporarily at what appeared to be a divisional headquarters. One afternoon when the guards seemed slack, Graham and another Marine sneaked off. Ultimately they approached a farmhouse to get food and there stumbled into a half dozen Koreans who took them into custody. The two Marines were beaten with a submachine gun and their hands were bound behind their back with communications wire. On their forced reappearance at the original site of escape, a Korean officer beat and interrogated them for three days.

#4. A short-lived escape attempt at Pak's Palace, not long after his capture in October 1951, had earned Lieutenant Gillette a solitary confinement tour. Arriving at Officers' camp in Pi-chong-ni the following spring, the former VMF(N)-513 squadron member and a South African air force pilot laid plans for a mutual escape. Gillette deliberately set himself on a course of reduced rations to prepare himself for the coming feat. When the two men made their break, they were shot at but managed to safely clear the camp.

The first night out the other pilot so badly injured himself in a fall that Gillette had to leave him and go on alone. Although the apparent escape route lay to the west, nearer the coast, the Marine chose to go east across rugged mountains that offered little in the way of cover, concealment, or food. His unorthodox planning nearly paid off. "Whereas most escapees were recaptured within hours, or at best within days, Lieutenant Gillette was free for several weeks before the Communists found him halfway across Korea."\footnote{MacDonald, \textit{POW}, p. 169.} One Royal Marine described the attempt as "the finest and most determined one he knew of."\footnote{\textit{Ibid}.}

#5. In July 1952, three Marine officers were involved in an abortive escape attempt at Camp 2. They were Lieutenant Colonel Thrash, Major McLaughlin, and Second Lieutenant Richard L. Sill, 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion. When detected outside of camp they were able to get back inside the compound, but the Chinese
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did identify Lieutenant Still. His escape attempt earned him a three-month sentence in the hole from which he later “emerged unbothered and steeled against the Communists.”92

#6. Captain Martelli escaped from the Camp 2 compound in September 1952. Retaken 10 days later, he was put in the same hole for two months. On release from the confinement, he was visibly upset by the experience, but quickly recovered. As a matter of interest, Martelli, like the other men whose exploits are recounted here, returned home in Operation BIG SWITCH.

#7. In the spring of 1953 a group of 30 officers, including two British Marines, at Camp 2 organized classes in mathematics, physics, and survival lectures. Conferences on escape and evasion techniques were held and the men formed escape groups. The teams drew straws to pick priorities for escape, and each one presented its plan to a senior body for approval. On 1 July, with support of the other teams, the first group went over the fence surrounding their house. Their freedom was brief, however, and the camp guard doubled. When rumors of armistice began circulating, further escape plans were cancelled. Clandestine prisoner escape committees—although unsuccessful in terms of actual results achieved—had existed at various camps. Second Lieutenant Rowland M. Murphy had been a member of such an organization at Obul. Major McLaughlin had assumed similar responsibilities at Camp 5, in 1951, and later at Camp 2 served on the secret all-UNC prisoners escape committee and senior officers’ organization within Camp 2. In early 1953 Major Harris became senior officer at the Camp 2 Annex. He organized Spanish classes as a facade for having a regular meeting place to announce policy and issue orders. Maps of North Korea were prepared for use in escape attempts and counter-Chinese political indoctrination was disseminated.

The Camp 2 officers performed another useful service. As rumor leaked out of the impending truce, they drafted a policy guide on POW behavior that was secretly circulated to other camps. UNC prisoners were directed to refrain from any appearance of fraternizing with the enemy, or acts of exuberance or violence. Specifically, they were reminded not to show any great enthusiasm upon

92 Ibid., p. 170.
their release, to prevent the Communist cameras on the scene from recording this as another propaganda victory.

**Evaluation and Aftermath**

With but a few exceptions, circumstances indicated that capture of most Marines was unavoidable. Theoretically, it can be argued that several seized in bunkers might have avoided captivity had they been occupying fighting-holes instead. On the other hand, they might just as readily have become statistics on a KIA list, instead, by falling victim to preparatory fire that preceded the enemy's main assault.

As Marine historian, then-Major, MacDonald has noted:

A shadow fell over American POWs in the aftermath of the Korean War. Courts-martial and other official inquiries revealed that a small segment of the Americans captured by the Communists had been guilty of behavior ranging from questionable to treasonable.

Both the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War and the United States Congress, which investigated the entire POW issue, returned favorable verdicts for Marine POW conduct. The U.S. Senate report summarized its findings:

The United States Marine Corps, the Turkish troops, and the Colombians as groups, did not succumb to the pressures exerted upon them by the Communists and did not co-operate or collaborate with the enemy. For this they deserve greatest admiration and credit.

In commenting on prisoner attitudes and activities that seemed to account for those men who became "survival types", an Army psychiatrist, Major William F. Mayer, observed:

The Marines were a statistically significant group from the standpoint of size, something over two hundred; the only thing I can say about them is that more of them survived than we. I think this is a function of discipline and morale and espirit; and the attitude in the Marine Corps I expressed a little while ago, that if something happens to me, these jokers will take care of me.

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93 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: HRS Subject File: VE23.2.S8 "CMC Statements on Korean POWs"; Biog File, HRB, HistDiv, HQMC; MacDonald, *POW*; Fehrenbach, *Kind of War*; Elliot Harris, *The "Un-American" Weapon—Psychological Warfare* (New York: M. W. Lads Publishing Co., 1967); Leckie, *Conflict*; Rees, *Korea*.

94 MacDonald, *POW*, p. 3.


In the nature of self-judgment, Sergeant Griffith referred to "that certain 'something' that seems to weld men together prevailed more among the Marine POWs than it did with the other captured UN Troops." The Marine with probably more experience as a POW than anyone else, Sergeant Harrison, noted that "without USMC training I would never have lived through several tight spots. I am not talking strictly about physical training as I am mental conditioning. It is something that causes you to think . . . about what the other guy will think or how it [your action] might affect or endanger them."

A senior Air Force officer, Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Brown, who headed POW units at Camp 2 and 5 between his tours of solitary confinement, declared:

I was extremely proud of the conduct of U.S. Marine Corps personnel with whom I came in contact during my period of confinement. Their esprit de corps was perhaps the highest of any branch of the Armed Forces of the United States during this period.

And Navy Chief Duane Thorin, a former inmate of the Camp 2 annex, who later inspired the character of the helicopter pilot in James A. Michener's *The Bridges of Toko-ri*, pointed out:

The Navy and Marine Corps POWs were generally excellent. The Marines who left something to be desired were more than compensated for by the majority of them.

Another view was offered by a prominent neurologist and consultant to the Secretary of Defense Advisory Committee, Dr. Harold G. Wolff. After investigating the performance of American POWs in Korea, Dr. Wolff concluded they had not "behaved much differently from other men in other armies and places" but that Americans had been made to appear much worse "by the enemy's propaganda devices and our own initial ineptitude in countering the Communist propaganda."

As a postscript to the POW story, five Marines received awards, on 11 January 1954, for their exceptionally meritorious conduct while serving as prisoners of the Communists in Korea. They were:

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Lieutenant Colonel Thrash—awarded a Gold Star in lieu of a second Legion of Merit;
Major McLaughlin—awarded the Legion of Merit;
Major Harris—also awarded the Legion of Merit;
Captain Flynn—awarded the Navy and Marine Corps Medal; and
Master Sergeant Cain—awarded a Letter of Commendation with Ribbon.

On the negative side, one enlisted Marine was disciplined for his cooperation with the enemy in writing a pro-Communist magazine article. A Court of Inquiry, convened in March 1954, did not recommend a court-martial for the 45-year-old pilot, Colonel Schwable. After a month-long review of circumstances involved in the case, the court opined that he had resisted Communist pressure and torture "to the limit of his ability before giving in." Its final judgment was that Schwable—a Naval Academy graduate, veteran of 20 years’ military service, and distinguished WW II night-fighter pilot and squadron CO—not be subjected to disciplinary action. At the same time the court held that his future usefulness as a Marine officer was "seriously impaired" by his conduct as a war prisoner.

On a larger scale, 192 Americans were found guilty of misconduct against fellow prisoners or various degrees of collaboration with the enemy. None of these was a Marine. In comparison with some 22,000 Communists who refused repatriation, 21 U.S. and 1 British prisoner succumbed to CCF brainwashing tactics. Twelve of the Americans have since returned to the U.S., apparently disenchanted with the Communist version of "people's democracy" after getting a closer look at it.

Investigations later showed that "only a handful of the POWs in Korea were able to maintain absolute silence under military interrogation. Nearly all of the American prisoners went beyond the [Geneva Convention] 'absolute', name, rank, serial number, and date of birth restriction." Although giving false or misleading information was a common occurrence in POW camps, such testimony was usually quickly detected. American military authorities, drawing up a revised Code of Conduct (1955) subsequently recom-

102 Ibid., p. 233.
103 Ibid., p. 230.
mended against making untruthful statements. Further, even though several Marines seemed to have suffered none the worse for giving false information, in at least one case a prisoner's own situation was weakened by enemy detection of his lie and increasing pressure was brought against him.

It was found too, that in every group of prisoners there were always gradations of those more cooperative with the enemy ("progressives") and those who offered open or passive resistance ("reactionaries"). One Korean War analyst, in seeking the final explanation of what POW tactics succeeded best against a dedicated enemy, cited the Turkish "chain of command that was never broken" and which helped to mold them together. He noted the "permissive" culture and background of Americans where freedom of choice and individual decisions are basic tenets. Despite the effect of military indoctrination and discipline, this concept of individualism and freedom appeared to be so strongly engrained that unless there was a corresponding emphasis on responsibility and strong beliefs it tended to weaken a man when his action and values were put to a prolonged test—as in the POW compound. The analyst concluded:

Only an extremely cohesive group, with tight leadership and great spiritual strengths, coupled with inner toughness and concern for one another, could have survived the shocks visited upon their minds and bodies... They [the Turks] remained united against the enemy, and they survived.104

This judgement, to a large degree, tells the Marine POW story.

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CHAPTER XI

While Guns Cool

The Postwar Transition—Control of the DMZ and the Military Police Company—Organization of New Defense Positions—Postwar Employment of Marine Units in FECOM

The Postwar Transition

TERMS OF THE Armistice Agreement required EUSAK components, including the 1st Marine Division, to carry out a number of major tasks in the months following the end of active hostilities. As stipulated by the cease-fire, UNC troops all along the front withdrew to a new main battle position (MBP) south of the main line of resistance. A military demarcation line (MDL) was established between enemy and friendly positions, corresponding to the end-of-war battle lines. Each side pulled back 2,000 yards from this MDL, with the combined 4,000-yard buffer strip on both sides being known as the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

A continuous double-strand barbed wire fence, known as the No-Pass Fence, or No-Pass Line, was erected 200 yards below the southern boundary of the DMZ by infantry units manning the MLR at the time of the cease-fire. Appropriate marking signs, in Chinese, Korean, and English, were placed at regular intervals along the

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1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: PacFlt EvalRpt No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10; 1stMarDiv ComdDs Jul-Sep 53; 1stMarDiv Type “C” Rpt—Defense of “C” Sector, 27 Jul–31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (this and following 1stMarDiv end-of-war records currently retired in 61 A2265, Box 74, FRC, Suitland, Md.); 1stMarDiv G-3 Jnls, 30 Jul–31 Aug 53; 1stMar Hist of Defense of “D” Sector, 27 Jul–31 Oct 53, Folder #3 (contains brief histories of 1/1, 2/1, 3/1, AT Co/1, 4.2-inch MortCo/1); 5thMar Hist of Def of “D” Sector, 27 Jul–31 Oct 53, Folder #3; 5thMar Hist, same period, Folder #4 (brief histories of 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, AT Co/5, 4.2-inch MortCo/5, DMZ Police Co/5), dtd 26 Dec 53; 7thMar Hist of Defense, 27 Jul 53–10 Feb 54 (brief histories 1/7, 2/7, 3/7, AT Co/7, 4.2-inch MortCo/7), Folder #5; 1stMarDiv-Type “C” Rpt—Defense of “C” Div Sect, 27 Jul–31 Dec 53, Folder #6 (containing, among others, brief rpts 11thMar, 1st TkBn, 1st Engr Bn, 1st MT Bn, 7th MT Bn, 1st KMC Regt, 2d KMC Regt).
fence, prohibiting unauthorized entry into the Demilitarized Zone.

Strict requirements by I Corps enjoined that the "fence on the southern boundary of the DMZ must present a continuous unbroken line except for gates and where it crosses large streams."\(^2\) Beginning late on 27 July 1953, the 1st Marine Division's modified mission became that of withdrawal to and organization of the post-armistice MBP, establishment of the No-Pass Line, and defense of the new position in readiness for any possible resumption of hostilities by the enemy.

Division officers, from commanding general to platoon leader level, repeatedly emphasized that the armistice agreement was only a cessation of active fighting. As such, it could be violated by the enemy at any time. The armistice was not a peace, but had simply paved the way for a political conference. As the UNC commander, General Mark W. Clark, had stated, the 27 July document was merely "a military agreement between opposing commanders to cease fire and to permit the opposing sides to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict."\(^3\) Since many felt the cease-fire might be only temporary and not necessarily a permanent peace, all hands showed an attitude of skepticism and watchful waiting. There was little disposition or time for celebration. The response of many men to the complete lack of noise across the front was one of simple restlessness and expectancy.

From the 7th Marines just engaged in the vicious Boulder City battle, the reaction

... was one of disbelief and caution. Extensive movements of the enemy during the night of 27 July only bolstered the feeling of wariness and suspicion. Only after dawn broke on 28 July, without any shots being fired, did the realism [reality] of the truce become apparent, followed by a wide-spread sensation of relief.\(^4\)

A 5th Marines representative noted:

The fact that negotiations had been going on for some time with numerous false alarms dulled the edge for most people, and a prior announcement that the agreement would be signed took most of the steam away from the actual culmination of the fighting ... in effect [the cease-fire]

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\(^2\) 1stMarDiv G—3 Jnl, dtd 2 Aug 53.
\(^4\) 7thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #5.
meant "we’re giving you ten dollars but don’t spend it for we might take it back." 8

The view expressed by a Korean regimental commander was that:

Many of the officers and men were relieved to see the fighting cease; others, particularly among the officers, would rather have seen the fighting continue until the country could be united. However, the officers and men accepted the cease-fire as a military order and acted accordingly. 6

Division MLR units on 27 July had been the 1st KMC, the 5th Marines, and 1st Marines in the left, center, and right regimental sectors, respectively. With the pullback of the division to new defensive positions, the 5th Marines—the infantry regiment that had not been heavily engaged in recent combat—was assigned the mission of defending the forward general outpost (GOP) line across the division front. In addition, the 5th Marines, or Northern Regiment as it came to be called since it was the only one remaining north of the Imjin River, was also charged with police duties and security of the UNC part of the DMZ located in the division sector.

Marine regiments, battalions, and companies began withdrawing from the DMZ to move to their new MBP early on the morning of 28 July, less than 24 hours after the signing of the Korean armistice. To some extent, the relocation of units was facilitated by the fact that the forward part of the division sector had been defended by the three MLR regiments. Since the lateral boundaries, initially, would remain the same, the three 5th Marines battalions were to occupy positions held by the three line regiments. Orders called for 2/5 to occupy the left regimental sector previously held by the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team; 1/5 to man the 5th Marines center sector; and 3/5 to assume the right regimental sector.

Whereas 5th Marines battalions were directed to occupy their new positions by D+84 hours (or 2200, 30 July), other units in some cases were not required to pull out of their respective positions until positions by D+108 hours (2000, 1 August). This was done to insure that no portion of the division front was left unmanned during this very critical period. It did, however, force small units to make two

moves and "in one instance, a battalion and a regimental head-
quarters were occupying the same area." Because of the need to
move almost immediately, only a hasty physical reconnaissance was
made. Small unit leaders were not always familiar with the area and
this gave rise, in some instances, to confusion about exact unit
boundaries. This resulted in a later relocation of several units.

For the first 72 hours after the armistice, Marines were engaged
in a maximum effort to tear down installations, salvage fortification
materials, and physically move out of the Demilitarized Zone. In-
fantry units were responsible for this destruction and salvage work
within assigned sectors, with 1st Engineer Battalion assistance and
supervision, as available. For the nearly 50 Marine infantry com-
panies and attached KMC units, the order of priorities for those first
three days generally appears to have been:

(1) Recovery of ordnance and removal to company supply
dumps;

(2) Removal of all combat equipment to supply dumps; and

(3) Destruction of field fortifications and salvage of all bunker
timbers and other building materials from the old MLR sector.

Specifications of the initial armistice agreement, as originally
drawn up in August 1952, had called for a complete withdrawal of
all military personnel, supplies, and equipment from the DMZ
within 72 hours after the cease-fire. Destruction of all fortifications
within the DMZ likewise was to be accomplished within this 72-hour
deadline. It subsequently became evident, however, that it would
be impossible to complete the entire job of dismantling and salvag-
ing MLR fortifications within a three-day period. In mid-June 1953,
CinCUNC had advised major commands that Communist and UNC
negotiators had agreed to extend the original 72 hours to an addi-
tional 45-day period, or until 13 September.\(^8\)

Division order 1MARD—OP—11—53, issued at 1600 on 27 July,
clearly stated that all "removable materials"\(^9\) would be taken out

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\(^7\) 5thMar Hist, dtd 26 Dec 53, p. 4, Folder #4.
\(^8\) Other modifications and deadline extensions included: (a) withdrawal of all mili-
tary forces, supplies, and equipment from coastal islands and waters north of the
38th Parallel within 5 days increased to 10 days; (b) Personnel and equipment to be
evacuated from Korea only through those ports of entry specified in the armistice
agreement. 1st MAW ComdD, Vol. III, Jun 53, Msg from CinCUNC to CG, AFFE,
COMNAVFE, CG FEAF, info 1st MAW and others, dtd 17 Jun 53.
\(^9\) 1stMarDiv Folder "Withdrawal to and Organization of Post Armistice MBP
of the DMZ within the immediate 72-hour period following the
effective date of the armistice (2200, 27 July). The end-of-war
order further directed that division personnel would "locate and list
all valuable materials which should be salvaged but cannot be
moved during this prescribed time . . . an additional period of 45
days, after the initial 72-hour period, will be used to complete sal-
vage operations within the Demilitarized Zone under the supervision
of the Military Armistice Commission. . . ."10

From top to lower echelons, however, a breakdown in communi-
cations seems to have taken place in the maze of post-truce orders.
At the pick and shovel level, initial instructions were sometimes
to the effect of:

Salvage everything possible in the 72 hours we have to get out of here.
If unable to salvage; then destroy. . . . No word was passed that there
would be a period following the truce in which we could conduct a thorough
salvage operation. Had this information been available, a more systematic
process could have been devised. . . .11

One regiment commented that early directives from higher
authorities did not clearly establish the relative priority for salvage
operations."12 More specifically, 1/7 related:

Periodically, messages would be received stressing certain items of salvage
as critical. This required revision of working schedules and shifting of
men to other jobs . . . if all salvageable material had been designated
as critical at the commencement of salvage operations, the work could have
been completed more expeditiously. . . .13

A 5th Marines observer commented on the confusion in these
words:

It is evident, however, that in dissemination to some of the lower
echelons, pertinent information was either ignored or improperly passed
. . . some Company Commanders were under the impression that the entire
job of dismantling and salvaging was to be completed in 72 hours. The
result of this misconception was that in some areas bunkers were filled
in with earth and then later had to be evacuated [excavated] in order
to salvage the materials.14

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10 Ibid.
12 7thMar Hist, dtd 28 Jan 54, p. 5, Folder #5.
13 1/7 Hist, in 7thMar Hist, p. 4, Folder #5.
14 5thMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #4.
Initial salvage operations were conducted from 28–30 July. Trenchlines were filled in; tank slots dozed under; bunkers torn down and usable timbers carried to salvage collecting points.

Beginning on 28 July, 1st Marines line units on the division right flank came under operational control of the 5th Marines, with their new mission being to “man an outpost line on the most formidable ground south of the southern boundary of the newly planned Demilitarized Zone in the MLR regimental sector.” Movement to the new outpost positions was under way by 29 July.

As the Marine units moved south to establish their new outpost positions in previously undeveloped areas, the limited engineering equipment available for simultaneously dismantling bunkers and constructing new camps tended to slow the latter job. Personnel of 1/1, which had utilized 124 vehicles for the transfer, were among those housed in widely scattered areas for several days during the moving and setting up of new camps. Torrential rains, of several days’ duration, which had engulfed the division’s transport operations on so many occasions in the past, caused the new campsites to turn into a muddy quagmire. Men of 2/5, during part of the relocation period, lived in shelter tents until regular tentage became available.

A short moratorium on salvage activities took place between 31 July–3 August while the details for entry into the DMZ were being settled. Marine division salvage efforts encompassed an area extending from the MLR to the sector rear, in the vicinity of the KANSAS Line, as far as the Imjin River. Work in the areas south of the DMZ did not begin, in most cases, until after 13 September, and fortifications of secondary defense lines were left in place.

All salvage materials removed from the DMZ were placed in battalion and regimental dumps where they would be readily available for use in building the new battle positions. Recovery of ammunition was accomplished in some sectors early on the 28th. At the far right flank of the division line, the scene of the Marines’ final action in the Korean War, salvage efforts took on an additional task. Most of the first day was allotted to recovery of the dead at Hills 119 and 111 and the removal of their bodies to rear areas.

Although the enemy had policed in front of Marine lines on the

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10 1/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 1, Folder #3.
night of 27–28 July, at first light the CCF indicated the desire to recover their dead from Marine positions. Enemy parties were thus permitted to temporarily enter 3/1 lines to retrieve these bodies. This procedure provoked some consternation and renewed vigilance by Marine personnel upon “seeing the enemy moving around within a stone’s throw of our front lines so soon after his determined attacks.”

As soon as the Marines’ own corresponding unhappy task was completed, ammunition was removed to supply dumps, a laborious task not finished in the 1st Marines sector until noon on 29 July. The fierce fighting that had started after dark on 24 July and lasted until the morning of the cease-fire also accounted for the large amount of salvageable items found in the area including M–1 rifles, helmets, armored vests, and quantities of blood serum. All ordnance, equipment, and building materials were separated into stockpiles of good or nonrepairable items. Ammunition in excess of a one-half a basic JAMESTOWN fire unit (a unit of fire is the amount of ammunition a weapon will use in a day of combat), was placed in company and battalion dumps for collection by regimental ordnance teams.

On occasion, salvage of friendly ammunition was made more difficult because COP stockpiles struck by enemy mortar fire contained both damaged and live, usable ammunition mixed together. Although 1st Engineer Battalion ordnance disposal teams covered the positions thoroughly, unexploded mortar and artillery rounds were often unearthed by Marines filling in the old trenches, knocking down bunkers, or recovering wire. Anti-personnel mines forward of the protective wire prevented full salvage operations in some cases.

Three Marine combat outposts required special attention. These were Bunker Hill and Esther, in the central part of the MLR, and Ava, in the right sector. Although occupied by Marines at the time of the cease-fire, the COPs fell north of the MDL and thus became inaccessible for salvage after the initial 72-hour period. The positions were reduced and materials salvaged in the allotted time.

During the first night, Marines of 3/5 (originally the right battalion, center sector) removed more than 11 truckloads of ammunition. Outposts Hedy and Bunker offered a particular problem due

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10 3/1 Hist, in 1stMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
to the distance from the MLR and nearest road. As described by some veterans of 24-hour work crews, the trail to Bunker was “particularly tortuous and made the packing of first the ammunition and later the fortification materials a physical ordeal.”

At Hedy the extreme proximity of CCF and Marine lines posed an additional difficulty. On the afternoon of the 28th, an interval of 20 yards separated the two; by the following day the enemy had completed his work in the area and was never again that close. Operations here were also somewhat delayed “by an influx of visitors: newspapermen and newsreel cameramen all interested in the great numbers of enemy visible to our front engaged in the same tasks that we were.”

Dismantling bunkers was the single biggest problem of the entire salvage program. This operation began at dawn on the 28th and was not completed until the second week of September. Ultimately, more than 500 bunkers were reclaimed from MLR materials and installed in the new division position. Most of the bunkers were built of 12x12 timbers, buried deep in the ground, fastened together with 10- to 16-inch spikes. Infantry organic tools and equipment were inadequate to dismember bunkers so constructed. Crowbars, picks, shovels, pinch bars, and sledge hammers were all in short supply. Engineer equipment and other tools were not stockpiled in sufficient quantity to buttress a demolition program of such magnitude.

In places where the terrain permitted operation of bulldozers, their use drastically shortened the time spent uncovering bunkers. Where these had been emplaced on reverse slope positions of steep hills, however, the timbers had to be removed by hand. The latter was the generally prevailing situation.

Not surprisingly, throughout the demolition program “basic equipment was usually the Marine himself and his ingenuity.” Effective on-the-spot, problem-solving was seen in the many “jury-rigged” levers or prybars fashioned from timbers and crowbars from scrap steel. The “Korean Sling Method,” with heavy rope and carrying poles, was often used to move heavy timbers. Trucks equipped

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18 Ibid.
with winches and wreckers were effective for this purpose. Dozer tanks were also used, but only after having their guns removed as required by the armistice agreement. Division engineers experimented at some length with three different ways to pull apart the larger 12x20 bunkers, in which the cross beams were secured to columns with two-feet spikes. The least technical approach which involved "winching the bunkers out of their positions and bouncing them down a steep slope until they broke apart proved the most successful and the quickest method."

Besides the lack of engineering tools, limited motor transport facilities and manpower shortages also created difficulties. Heavy commitments across the front, with virtually every division unit displacing to a new location, resulted in a shortage of trucks that slowed both salvage and logistics operations. Assignment of personnel to around-the-clock shifts during the critical initial 72-hour period and use of lighting trailers produced maximum results from the available equipment. Company G, 3/5 reported that its men were allowed "ten minute breaks every hour and, because of the heat, they were given from 1200 to 1500 hours for sleep and worked all through the darkness." During this three-day period alone, the 1st Tank Battalion transported 275 tons of ammunition and fortification material, or a total of 111 loads in 2½-ton trucks.

At this time, the restrictive provisions of the truce agreement led to a problem involving the use of heavy engineer vehicles. After 3 August, it was difficult to bring into the DMZ any hauling or motorized gear that could be construed as "combat equipment." The 2½-ton trucks, however, continued to be employed for much of the motor transport operations.

By 0930 on 1 August, the 1st Marine Division had completed its withdrawal and manned the new MBP south of the DMZ. The 5th Marines continued its mission as the northern outpost regiment. South of the Imjin, the 7th Marines occupied the right regimental sector; the 1st KMC moved into the center of the MBP; and the 1st Marines became the division reserve.

Between 3 August–13 September, each rifle company sent daily working parties into the DMZ to excavate those sectors occupied

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20 1st EngrBn Rpt, dtd 19 Apr 54, p. 3, Folder #6.
by Marine units on 27 July. Depending on available transportation, the size of the working parties varied from 25 to 100 men. These shortages were alleviated, to some extent, by KSC (Korean Service Corps) personnel. The heavy-duty, "pure drudgery without glamour," monotonous tasks performed in tropical weather, 103 degree-plus temperatures and high humidity, caused one Marine infantryman to comment ruefully:

Close officer supervision proved to be absolutely necessary due to the nature of the work, which made the maintenance of interest and enthusiasm in the average individual, very difficult.

In another 5th Marines unit the motivation gap was partially solved by "use of a graph posted on the bulletin board showing the money value of materials salvaged each day, with the exhortation to better the previous day's total."

Throughout the month of August and until 13 September, destruction of MLR positions and removal of materials took place concurrently with organization of defensive positions in the new sector. After the initial three-day period and its top priority of physical withdrawal of troops from the DMZ, division tactical requirements called for completion of the MBP as rapidly as possible. This now became the first priority. New company perimeter defense sites, battalion blocking positions, coordinated fire plans in event of attack, counterattack orders, and evacuation routes were mapped out. Construction began immediately. By 5 August, the new battalion camps had begun to take form and work on the blocking positions was in progress. Marine units, like other UNC forces, had to be prepared at all times for any act of enemy aggression. Whether the Communists would continue to respect the cease-fire agreement or not remained an open question.

Stockpiling, meanwhile, had been accomplished at company, battalion, and regimental dumps. All materials were stacked by size to facilitate reissue during construction of new positions. As much as 90 percent of the materials salvaged were usable in the new

22 KSC units were deactivated shortly thereafter. Following a EUSAK order in August to begin discontinuing use of the Korean laborers, the number of KSC workers was reduced. By the end of October, the 103d KSC Regiment attached to the division had been completely disbanded.

23 1/5 Hist, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.

24 4.2-inch Mort Co/5, in 5thMar Hist, p. 3, Folder #4.
While Guns Cool

fortification. Although a certain amount of inter-battalion exchange took place, battalion stocks—with the exception of sandbags—were usually adequate to provide sufficient fortification materials for the rebuilding. For 5th Marines units that had the least distance to relocate, timbers moved from the old MLR in the morning were sometimes emplaced in the new defensive positions by late afternoon. Helicopters, as well as trucks, were used extensively to move stockpiles from company and battalion areas to rear regimental supply dumps.

Division MLR supplies salvaged by the 5th Marines represented:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T/E material</td>
<td>12 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal equipment (wire)</td>
<td>2,000 miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer items</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>barbed wire</td>
<td>2,850 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>concertina</td>
<td>340 rolls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pickets, 6-foot</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pickets, 3-foot</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sandbags</td>
<td>339,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>timbers (from 3x8 to 12x12)</td>
<td>150,000 linear feet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total tonnage 2,000 short tons

The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines estimated that wire rolls, sandbags, timbers, and other materiel "recovered by this battalion and assisting units was valued at approximately $150,000."

By early September, the 1st Marine Division work priority once again had reverted from camp construction to salvage operations. It had become apparent that another maximum effort period would be necessary if all salvageable materials were to be removed from the DMZ no later than the 13 September deadline reaffirmed by I Corps on 2 September. During this last phase of salvage work, participating battalions again came under operational control of the 5th Marines. Elements of the 1st and 11th Marines, neither of which at that time had a sector of responsibility for salvage, as well as KMC troops, augmented the organic units. One battalion alone, 1/1, detailed 400 men in work parties. At 2130, on 13 September, the division completed its salvage mission in the Demilitarized Zone, thus meeting the specified time limit. Under terms of the armistice

agreement, after 13 September all personnel were prohibited from entering the Korean Demilitarized Zone. The only exceptions were members of the DMZ police companies of the Allied and Communist sides and other persons specifically authorized passage by the Military Armistice Commission (MAC).

Control of the DMZ and the Military Police Company

Since the late July signing of the armistice, one of the missions of the 5th Marines GOP regiment had been the marking, control of entry, and policing of the DMZ. At the time the No-Pass Fence was constructed, roadblocks, called “crossing stations” were located at each route leading into the DMZ. Initially, 21 crossing stations were opened across the regimental front. When it later became apparent that not all of these security points would be needed, some were closed and the roads barricaded. Each crossing station was manned by a minimum of two sentries who insured that no weapons were carried into the DMZ. Along the fence itself, signs printed in three languages prohibited unauthorized entry into the southern boundary of the DMZ. On roads and trails approaching the southern boundary fence, additional signs placed 200 yards from the fence warned of the proximity to this southern end of the military zone. Air panels and engineer tape also marked the DMZ.

After 31 July, entry into the DMZ was limited to those persons holding a valid pass, issued under the auspices of the Military Armistice Commission. Authority was also delegated to CG, U.S. I Corps to issue passes for the I Corps sector. With salvage operations requiring a large number of passes, authority was further delegated to the CO, 5th Marines, to issue permits for the regimental sector, good only for unarmed working parties engaged in salvage operations. The regimental S–2 established a pass control center, and anyone desiring to enter the DMZ made application through that office. Each pass contained the bearer’s name, rank, service number, organi-

26 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: 1stMarDiv G–3 Jnls, 30 Jul–31 Aug 53; Demilitarized Zone Police Co Rpt, dd 18 Dec 53, in 5thMar Hist, Folder #4; MSgt Paul Sarokin, “DMZ Marines,” Leatherneck, v. 37, no. 10 (Oct 54), hereafter Sarokin, “DMZ Marines.”

27 With the exception of the DMZ Police, all persons entering the DMZ for salvage were required to check their weapons at the zone entry.
organization, number of personnel and vehicles in the working party, and reason for entry.

Security procedures also required that a log book of all zone entries and exits be kept by crossing station guards. This information was ultimately telephoned or radioed to higher echelons. At battalion and regimental levels a master log or "status board" indicated the number of people, vehicles, passes, and pass identification numbers present in the DMZ at all times. As the salvage program reached its height in August and early September, just the "issuance and recording of passes and the checking of the working parties into the zone became a major operation." Between 4 August-13 September, a total of 3,523 vehicle passes and an unknown number of personnel permits were issued. With the ending of salvage operations on 13 September, the Marine regiment no longer issued DMZ passes, although I Corps continued to authorize MAC personnel entry permits.

A stipulation set by the armistice agreement was that both the Communist and UNC sides police their respective sections of the DMZ with "civil police," not to exceed 1,000 in the zone at any one time across the entire front. With further allocation of police personnel to army and I Corps units, the number of 1st Marine Division police on duty within the DMZ at any one time was originally set at 50. Since no civilian police were available to either side, requirements were modified so that a specially designated military unit, in lieu of civil police, could be employed and the original quota enlarged if this became feasible.

Due to the delicate political aspect of the DMZ as well as the non-repatriated POWs in the custody of Indian forces, security measures were of utmost importance. The Marine division activated a new unit, the 1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company at 0800 on 4 September. The new unit, charged with maintaining security throughout the 1st Marine Division sector, became operational three days later. Commanding officer was Captain Samuel G. Goich, formerly of F/2/7. Each regiment from the division furnished 25 enlisted men and 1 officer to form the company, including standby personnel. On 21 September, the DMZ Police Company was attached to the 5th Marines. Police Company personnel were required to have had at least three months' Korean service, a General Classifica-

28 5thMar Hist, p. 2, Folder #3.
tion Test score of at least 95, a minimum height of 5 feet 10 inches, and were "selected for physical stature and mental capacity required in coping with the delicate situation existing within the Demilitarized Zone." The average DMZ company member was said to know "map-reading on an officer level, first aid, radio, and understand the fine print of the cease-fire agreement like a striped-trouser diplomat." The mission of the Marine provisional police company as set up by the truce agreement was to furnish military police escort for special personnel visiting the DMZ and to apprehend truce violators or enemy line crossers. Visitors who rated a military escort were members of MAC, Joint Observer Teams, Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission personnel, NNSC inspection teams or agency assistants, or other VIPs authorized to enter the UN half by the Military Armistice Commission.

Six Marine DMZ military policemen, each armed with a .45 caliber pistol and M-1 rifle, accompanied UN joint observer teams to the demarcation line, midpoint between enemy and friendly boundaries, but did not cross the DML. I Corps orders directed that military police were to be "responsible for the safety of the United Nations members of the team and, when meetings are held south of the demarcation line, they will be responsible for the safety of the CCF members of the team as well."

Major tasks performed by the 104-man company operating within the 2,000-yard wide, 28-mile-long zone were:

To maintain surveillance over civilians within the UN half of the DMZ;

To apprehend and deliver to the Division Provost Marshal any line crossers encountered who did not possess an authorized pass, regardless of the direction from which such persons entered the DMZ; and

To provide check points on known routes through the zone and observation posts, especially during the hours of reduced visibility, and telephone all suspicious incidents to Regimental S-2.

31 The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission supervised all phases of implementation of the armistice. It consisted of the Secretariat and 20 neutral nations inspection teams staffed by personnel from Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
DMZ Police Company personnel operated in motorized patrol teams and traveled the entire division sector in radio or cargo jeeps. One platoon was kept on a standby basis at camp to serve as a mobile reserve in the event of an emergency. The roving patrols submitted reports of all incidents, which were then compiled in a company report. A copy was submitted to the S-2, the Northern Regiment, and 1st Marine Division G-2.

UNC security measures at all times were strict and uncompromising in the Korean DMZ buffer zone. This included the salvage period, the BIG SWITCH prisoner exchange that took place within the division sector at Freedom Village from 5 August–6 September, and the lengthy nonrepatriate POW settlement that extended through January 1954. In places where the military demarcation line was not marked on the ground or clearly recognizable, the conservative ruling was to stay at least 500 yards south of its estimated location. This applied both to body recovery and salvage operations. The No-Fly line was scrupulously verified.

Alleged violations charged by the CCF/NKPA were checked out with the Marine ground observation posts set up in August to record all movements of fixed-wing (reconnaissance) and rotary aircraft in the area. Helicopters were allowed to fly in the DMZ but no closer than the 500 yard limit from the MDL. Helicopters operating forward of CPs of 5th Marines units having sector responsibility were required to obtain clearance from the ground unit concerned for each flight. Medical evacuation copters, generally, were exempted from this restriction and authorized a standing clearance.

Commitments for the DMZ Police Company increased substantially with arrival of the nonrepatriated POWs at their camp in the DMZ corridor west of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines area. The Communist "explainers," as well as Polish and Czech members of the neutral Nations Commission, had to be escorted while in the UN half of the DMZ. This required that a 24-hour checkpoint and escort cadre be established in the zone. As the number of enemy sightings, a daily occurrence in the DMZ, continued to increase, the size of the police patrols increased correspondingly. A typical example was related by a member of the police company:

It was common practice of the Communists to have a group of their men, supposedly their DMZ Police, walk up to the Military Demarcation Line and either stand close to it or step across. When one of our patrols...
approached in superior numbers to attempt to apprehend them, the Communists would immediately reinforce with more men. This made it necessary to have our patrols at sufficient strength that they could protect themselves from being kidnapped. 33

As these requirements for security increased, the original complement of approximately 5 officers and 99 men became inadequate to patrol the DMZ. By late October the T/O strength of the 1st Provisional Demilitarized Zone Police Company had been increased to 6 officers and 314 men. Authorization for the number of police personnel on duty in the DMZ had similarly been augmented from 50 to 175.

During the September salvage operations, five Marines in the DMZ were taken into custody by the Chinese Communists. Charged with being in unauthorized territory and violating terms of the armistice agreement, they were later returned to United Nations jurisdiction.

Organization of New Defense Positions 34

Upon withdrawal from the demilitarized zone and organization of the MBP, the Eighth Army established its plan for defense on a wide front. This was based on the organization of strongpoints disposed in depth, with planned counterattacks by mobile reserves.

As it had during active hostilities, the 1st Marine Division in the post-armistice period continued as one of the four UNC divisions manning the general outpost and MBP in the U.S. I Corps sector. Immediately east of the division was its long-time neighbor, the 1st Commonwealth Division. Still further east in I Corps were the 1st ROK and U.S. 7th Infantry Divisions.

Since 1 August, the Marine division had continued to outpost the most favorable terrain in its sector below the southern boundary of

33 Demilitarized Zone Police Co/5 rpt, p. 4, in 5thMar Hist, Folder #4, op. cit.
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the DMZ. The division manned the No-Pass Line and prepared its defenses to resume full scale military operations, if necessary. The Munsan-ni Provisional Command, composed of the Marine-Navy-Army personnel responsible for implementing the final prisoner exchange, was also headquartered in the 1st Marine Division sector.

The strongpoint organization of the division's main battle position was accomplished by the deployment of the 5th Marines at the general outpost line of resistance (or OPLR, a term and concept not in use since April 1952). The outpost defense concept embodied a number of forward positions, lightly held in actual numbers of men but strongly defended in numbers of automatic weapons and firepower. (This capability was possible due to the excess number of automatic weapons on hand, above normal T/E allowances, which previously had been required by MLR defenses.) In the organization of the positions, emphasis was placed on construction of bunkerized observation posts, the emplacement of automatic weapons with flanking fires, and clearing of fields of fire for these weapons.

Basically, the general concept of OPLR defense was to establish mutually supporting defensive positions across the front, as well as to develop additional defense in depth positions whose strength increased from front to rear. The positions thus formed successive defense lines, from the southern DMZ boundary—the new Marine division front—south to the KANSAS Line, the Main Battle Position. (These defense lines were the old secondary defensive lines of WYOMING, KANSAS, and KANSAS SWITCH.) The KMC, 1st Marines, 7th Marines, and other units located in the KANSAS vicinity engaged in bunker construction and trench improvement. Battalion fire plans coordinated the organic, attached, and supporting weapons. Construction of the new positions and development of the KANSAS Line would be a continuing process throughout the rest of the year.

The 1st Marines received the assignment of developing the blocking positions, most of these battalion-sized strongpoints. As in the past, division support units continued to be located in the old rear supply areas south of the Imjin. In early August the division had stationed the 7th Marines in the right sector; the 1st KMC in the center; and the 1st Marines, to the south of the KMC sector. The 11th Marines, to the rear of the 7th Marines, had displaced its artillery, relaid, and was prepared to fire in support of the general outpost and MBP. (Map 35.) Additional artillery battalions included I Corps and
army units. Essentially these were the positions held until early October when, during a period of political unrest resulting from the prisoner exchange, the 1st Marines relieved the 1st KMC/RCT in the center sector (which held the southern approaches to Freedom Bridge and the nonrepatriate war compound). The Korean unit then relocated to blocking positions and assumed the mission of reserve regiment.

Marine support units—motor transport, tank, service, medical, aerial liaison (VMO/HMR)—were in the same general rear area, as was the headquarters of the U.S. 25th Infantry Division. The Marine Division CP continued to be located at Yongji-ri, although construction of a new site further south at Chormyon was due to be completed by engineer personnel on 1 October. The division railhead and truckhead remained, respectively, at Munsan-ni and Ascom City. To the left of the KMC sector was the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion. Still further west, separated from other units by the Han River, was the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, in its former wartime sector.

As the division OPLR regiment, the 5th Marines held a line 36,000 yards in length—about 21 miles—roughly corresponding to the front manned by three regiments during the war. The OPLR sector included the entire area in the divisional zone of responsibility north of the Imjin. Boundaries of the 5th Marines territory were the southern DMZ truce line on the west and north, the Samichon River to the east, and that major water barrier, the curving Imjin River, to the rear.

After establishment of the DMZ, the division occupied unfavorable low ground poorly suited to the defense and inferior to that held by the enemy—continuing the same situation that had existed during the period of stabilized combat operations in West Korea. Almost without exception the southern boundary of the DMZ prohibited the Marines from moving onto the commanding terrain, as the No-Pass Line was behind or along the reverse slopes of the high ground. On the other hand, in most cases the CCF had the advantage of having forward slope positions as well as the crests plus most of the commanding terrain in the area.

Communist territory in the northern DMZ sector included the former strongholds of Yoke, Bunker Hill, Carson, Reno, Vegas, Berlin, Fast Berlin and Warsaw. Within the Marine division postwar area
were the Panmunjom Corridor and outposts Marilyn, Kate, the Boulder City hills, and the Hook. Much of the terrain between the major hill positions along the 5th Marines regimental front and the Imjin River consisted of low-rolling hills rising abruptly out of the rice paddies.

Construction of new positions and the defense system of the 5th Marines was based on several assumptions about enemy capabilities, made by G–2 and the new regimental CO, Colonel Rathvon McC. Tompkins, who had assumed command on 2 August. These were: that in the event of resumption of hostilities by the CCF the enemy would use his jet fighters and bombers in support of operations; that he would continue to have numerical superiority in artillery; and that the northern outpost regiment would have no reinforcement or surface resupply from units south of the Imjin.

The defense plan for the forward part of the 5th Marines sector in event of a resumption of hostilities called for furnishing patrols equipped with radios and FO teams to occupy Hills 155, 229, and 181. (Hill 155 was directly south of the DMZ in the 2/5 left battalion sector; Hills 229 and 181 were, respectively, just inside and just outside the southern boundary of the truce line in the center 1/5 sector.) From these three elevations the patrols would then have the mission of bringing down artillery fire on enemy concentrations and relaying communications about the situation to the friendly main attack force. Other critical hill masses in the OPLR regimental sector were Hill 126 (in the 3/5 eastern battalion sector, just inside the Marine side of the DMZ) and Hill 163, in the Hook area. The latter hill was not as suitable for defense since it was located south of the military demarcation line and was thus less accessible.

These hill masses so completely dominated the major enemy approaches through the division sector to the Imjin, the lower river crossing sites and bridges, that their occupation by Marine personnel was considered essential in the event of any attack. Hill 229, adjacent to the Chan-dang corridor and part of the 229–181 axis, was considered the most critical terrain feature in the entire northern section.

Key areas to the rear of the 5th Marines' sector were the two operating bridges (Freedom in 2/5 territory and Libby on the 3/5 right) and the two interior crossing sites (Honker and Spoonbill). All provided access to the Imjin and division support units deployed on the south side of the river. In the event of threatened hostile
attack, the Northern Regiment was under orders to destroy the bridges to prevent their use by the enemy on any attempted advance to the rear.

Strong perimeter defenses, called "Bridgehead Positions" were to be built by 5th Marines' battalions. Two were to protect the two bridges and a third, to include both ferry sites. Between the forward defended localities and the rear bridgehead positions, alternate and secondary sites were organized to create mutually supporting defenses in depth. The bridgeheads were a combination of linear and strong-point defense, capable of withstanding severe pressure.

Organization of the defensive positions in the 5th Marine sector was complicated both by peculiarities of the terrain and political restrictions due to proximity of the DMZ. In addition to the regiment's excess frontage, the demilitarized zone immediately to the front precluded use of either aerial or motorized reconnaissance for early warning. Security measures for the OPLR were less than ideal. Neither proper patrols nor a covering force in front of the OPLR was possible; the best that could be done was to maintain patrols along the friendly side of the No-Pass Line.

As the regimental left battalion pointed out: "Location of the DMZ and the No-Pass Line made the trace of the OPLR follow an artificial and arbitrary line rather than that of the best terrain."35

The most critical terrain feature in the sector, Hill 155, was located just outside the southern boundary of the DMZ. Although its possession was essential to successful defense of the OPLR and the bridgehead defense positions being developed to the interior and rear of the battalion sector, Hill 155 could not be occupied because of the armistice agreement. The solution to the problem was simply to occupy the best ground adjacent to the No-Pass Line.

Placement of automatic weapons was a factor of great importance in organizing the defensive positions. In order to accomplish the mission of an OPLR, weapons had to be situated to bring the enemy under fire at maximum ranges. Accordingly, machine guns and other weapons were placed on high ground well to the front. Some Marines commented that:

Many individuals having the MLR concept in mind insisted that weapons should be located forward on low ground to provide grazing fire. A period

of education was required. For the same reason, it was necessary to place 81mm mortar and 4.2-inch mortar positions further forward than they would normally be in support of the MLR.36

The problem of establishing depth to the defensive positions was never solved to the satisfaction of everyone. This was due primarily to the extended front which necessitated using more units for support elements than would normally be done. This situation was partly alleviated by establishing some unit defensive sectors further to the rear in the company areas.

Another difficulty was the inadequate allocation of ammunition: one-half JAMESTOWN load on position, and another half-load available at the regimental dump. The JAMESTOWN load unit had been developed for use in a stabilized defense situation where automatic weapons were aimed as the enemy came in close proximity to the MLR. On the other hand, OPLR machine guns and weapons were required to open up at maximum ranges and might well be fired for extended periods of time. It was calculated that A4 machine guns firing at medium rate (75 rpm) would expend the one-half JAMESTOWN load in 22 minutes, while an A1 machine gun at medium rate (125 rpm) would exhaust the same load in 13 minutes. A partial improvement was obtained by moving the ammunition loads from regimental to battalion dumps although the basic problem of limited allocation—shared also by rear infantry regiments—continued to exist.

An unique situation that had confronted the 2d Battalion and at times the adjoining 1st Battalion stemmed from the large numbers of Army engineer personnel building the nonrepatriate POW camp in the DMZ immediately west of the 2/5 sector. During August and the first part of September, the area in front of 2/5 had been used as a base camp for 5,000-7,000 construction personnel. Although their area was crowded with these additional units, the Marine battalions could not exercise any control over them. The Marines were still responsible for security of the sector, however. Presence of as many as 22,000 nonrepatriate CCF and NKPA prisoners as well as the Indian custodial forces further complicated the matter. It was noted that:

36 Ibid.
At the same time the Army engineers were building the camp, the prisoners were situated in the middle of the 2/5 area and the MSR to Panmunjom led completely across the battalion position into the 1/5 sector [and thence] into the DMZ. Upon completion of the camp, the engineers withdrew from the area but as they withdrew the 5,500 troops of the Custodial Forces India were brought in to guard the nonrepatriate prisoners. With the arrival of the prisoners, the number of personnel in the regiment’s sector of responsibility rose to 28,000-30,000. Thus, the problem of having a GOP mission and at the same time having never less than 5,000 and as many as 30,000 friendly, neutral, and/or prisoner personnel in front of our most forward defended localities was always present.37

Camp construction and development of the new positions south of the river continued at a furious pace from August through early October. Since the new camp sites were in civilian populated areas, "it was necessary to secure real estate clearance before they could be occupied or improved."38 After clearance was obtained on 29 July, division engineers immediately began work on five separate camps. These camp building activities and reconnaissance of assigned blocking positions continued until 10 August. At this time, construction began on the major blocking positions, so organized and developed as to be self-sustaining for several days. Whether squad, platoon, or company, all positions were organized using a perimeter type defense and were mutually supporting laterally and in depth. Connecting trenches, bunkers, ammunition holes, and tank slots were also built.

By early October, construction of the blocking positions was completed by the 1st Marines despite the fierce summer heat, the numerous rock formations in the area that were difficult to dig out with limited tools and demolitions, and the shortage of personnel due to units participating in the new series of division MARLEX exercises, resumed in October. Within three months, the Marine division had thus largely completed building of a solid defense in its new main battle position. The importance of maintaining combat readiness for any renewed hostility on the part of the enemy demanded continuing vigilance at all times.

Defense specifications throughout the 5th Marines northern general outpost sector called for some 1,560 individual fighting positions, 400 automatic weapons sites, 8 bunkered infantry OPs, 30 bunkered

37 5thMar Hist, pp. 6–7, Folder #3.
CPs, 15,400 yards of trenchlines, and 70,000 yards of protective and tactical wire. In construction of the MBP, all bunkers were so blended and camouflaged with the natural terrain that they were almost impossible to be seen.

To the division rear, the location of recoilless rifle positions, FDC bunkers, and tank slots in the blocking positions and bridgeheads was the major priority. In the antimechanized defense plan, tanks covered likely avenues of approach into the general outpost area and also overlooked critical river crossing sites. Wherever possible old firing positions which had been previously prepared to support the secondary lines WYOMING and KANSAS were utilized. By the end of the year, 204 tank firing positions had been emplaced throughout the Marine division sector.

Three rehearsals for the occupation of the main battle position were held by the 1st Marine Division in September. All division units, both combat and service, participated in these exercises. Tactical units were required to occupy the MBP and be fully prepared for combat on four hours' notice; service units were to provide additional local security required for the elimination of enemy infiltrators or guerrilla agents. Divisional and I Corps test exercises indicated that three hours were necessary to man the MBP during daylight and approximately three and one half hours at night.

Postwar Employment of Marine Units in FECOM

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Post-Armistice Plan, as part of Fifth Air Force operations, was effective at 2200, on 27 July. Its purpose, basically, was to insure that wing elements carried out provisions of the armistice and yet continued to maintain a high level of combat readiness in the uneasy truce period.

Two major operational restrictions had been imposed on the UNC air force by the armistice. The first was establishment of the "No-
Fly Line" south of the Allied southern boundary of the DMZ. Any flight beyond that point had to be authorized by JOC and a barrier patrol was maintained by FAF to apprehend any violators of the truce provisions. The 1st MAW contribution to this aerial security team was night patrols performed by F3D–2s from VMF(N)–513 and radar-configured AD aircraft from VMC–1 (later, by the new VMA–251 squadron).

The second post-truce restriction, which affected wing logistic movements, limited the entry and departure of all Korean air traffic to five airfields. These aerial ports were K–2, K–8, K–9, K–14, and K–18. (K–16 was later added.) Neither K–3, the east coast home field of MAG–33 nor K–6, located just inland from the west coast and the site of MAG–12 operations, was included. All Marine traffic landed either at K–9 or K–2 for inventory, a procedure which subsequently developed into a bottleneck, and caused supply delays due to the substantial reduction in payload made to accommodate the necessary extra fuel due to greater overland distances between airfields. When the CG, 1st MAW requested that K–3 be made a port of entry to avoid the difficulties involved in use of the two FAF fields, ComNavFE disapproved the request with the following rationale:

ComNavFE feels that to ask for designation of K–3 as an additional port of entry would be politically inadvisable. It would provide the Communists with a basis for a propaganda claim that the United Nations were attempting to further delay an armistice agreement. Should the Communists propose an additional port of entry for their side, COMNAVFE states the UN Military Armistice Commission will offer designation of K–3 as a quid pro quo.40

Removal from Korea to Japan of operational combat aircraft for routine maintenance runs and their return thus had to be made through the same port of exit and reentry. Inspections were conducted by the USAF combat aircraft control officer at the port.

The post-truce 1st MAW mission, in part, comprised the following:

... to maintain assigned forces in a state of combat readiness, provide for security of assigned forces, areas, and installations; observe the conditions of the Armistice Agreement; support other elements of the United

40 *PacFlt EvalRpt*, No. 6, p. 10–74.
Nations Command as required; be prepared to counter any attempt on the part of the enemy to resume active hostilities; continue current missions other than combat; insure that 1st MAW personnel and combat material are not increased beyond the level present at the instant of the effective time of the Armistice Agreement; submit reports on 1st MAW personnel and controlled items of Wing equipment entering or leaving Korea; be prepared to disperse air units within or from Korea as necessary to provide maximum security during an Armistice.

The strict interpretation of replacing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition that were destroyed, worn out, or used up during the period of armistice was, of course, due to the sensitive political considerations. It was felt that replacement of combat equipment by UNC forces:

...would result in the Communists adopting the same liberal interpretation which is undesirable since it will lessen the control of combat material in North Korea and could permit them to replace phenomenal unauthorized quantities of material damaged, destroyed, worn out or used up prior to the effective date of the Armistice Agreement.

In August, postwar procedures were mapped out for 1st MAW personnel, as part of the overall quota limitations prescribed by FECOM (Far East Command) through FEAF and FAF echelons. A 1st MAW headquarters section, designated as 1st MAW, rear echelon, was established at Itami AFB, Japan, two hours' flight from Korea. All incoming or outgoing aviation personnel on permanent change of station orders were to report to the rear echelon, 1st MAW. Announcement of Marine Corps plans to initiate future postwar rotation on a stretch-out basis (for both air and ground personnel) was also made in August. Preliminary plans called for changing the current 11-month combat tour in Korea to 14 months by March 1954, and possibly 16-month tours by July 1954, if extension of Korean service proved necessary. As with division personnel, monthly cumulative arrivals were not to exceed the number of departing aviation Marines. The quota set by FEAF for 1st MAW rotation for the month of August was 600, compared to the Marine division quota of 3,000 for ground personnel.

With the 1st Marine Division engaged for an unknown length of time in its postwar mission as an occupation force and 1st MAW

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41 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #1, p. 1.
42 1st MAW ComdD, Aug 53, Folder #2, msg ComNavFE to all units, dtd 16 Aug 53.
units continuing to operate under FAF in Korea, new Marine ground and air units were assigned to the Far East theater shortly after the conclusion of Korean hostilities. On 23 July, the 3d Marine Division, together with supporting air units, was readied for deployment from Camp Pendleton to Japan the following month. On 13 August the division CP was opened afloat and units proceeded to Japan between 16–30 August. The mission of this division and the two major air units, MAGs–11 and -16, was to maintain a high state of readiness in the Far East Command and to assist in the air defense of Japan. As explained by the Commandant, their redeployment was accomplished "in order to provide the amphibious capability which is an important element of national strategy in that predominantly maritime theater."43

The new Marine units thus joined in the Pacific, the 1st Provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force44 that had been activated in Kaneohe, Hawaii in January of 1953. Commanded by Brigadier General James P. Risely, it was to include a headquarters company, reinforced regiment, and reinforced aircraft group. The special task force was designated as a hard-hitting, air-ground team that could respond immediately as a force-in-readiness to any emergency in the Pacific area.

Commanded by Major General Robert H. Pepper, the 21,100-man 3d Marine Division was called the "Three-Dimensional Division," in reference to its training in airborne, amphibious, and atomic warfare. Within six months, its components were to stretch from Kobe to Tokyo, with division headquarters and the 9th Marines at Gifu, the 4th Marines at Nara, and other units at Otsu.

New Marine air units, which included Marine Transport Squadron 253 and Marine Observation Squadron 2, as well as MAGs–11 and -16, all came under 1st MAW operational control. Commanded by Colonel John D. Harshberger, the all-jet MAG–11, formerly based at Edenton, N.C., arrived at NAS Atsugi on 10 September. It comprised three F9F squadrons, VMFs–222, -224, and -314. Also at Atsugi, the Marine Corps aerial gateway to Japan, was the new transport squadron, VMR–253, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel

44 The Task Force was subsequently redesignated as the 1st Marine Brigade, FMF, in May 1956.
Carl J. Fleps, which reported in to CG, 1st MAW, on 16 August. Following numerous FMFPac requests for additional air transport capability, the Commandant had authorized transfer of the squadron from El Toro to assist the veteran wartime carrier VMR-152 in the enormous postwar airlift program.

Flying new R4Q Fairchild Packets, which could carry 42 troops, the squadron from August to May 1954 logged more than 5,000,000 passenger miles in transporting Marine replacements for the 1st and 3d Marine Divisions. Additional air capability was provided by Marine Helicopter Transport Group 16 (at Hanshin AFB) under Colonel Harold J. Mitchener, with its two HRS-2 (HMR-162, HMR-163) and service squadrons (MAMs-16, MABS-16) and VMO-2, commanded by Major William G. MacLean (based at Itami). Both units reported to 1st MAW and FECOM on 13 August.

Major command changes within the 1st MAW that month were:
Brigadier General Verne J. McCaul, vice Brigadier General Alexander W. Kreiser, Jr. as ACG, 1st MAW, effective 16 August; and
Colonel William F. Hausman, vice Colonel Carney, CO, MAG-12, on 8 August. (The new MAG-33 CO, Colonel Smith, had succeeded Colonel Stacy in late July.)

In the immediate post-armistice period, extensive training programs were instituted by MAGs-12 and -33 to maintain high operational efficiency. Marine aircraft remained on JOC alert as required by the Fifth Air Force and flew training missions scheduled by 1st MAW and FAF. These consisted of practice strikes against heavily-defended targets, practice CAS for Eighth Army units, GCI (ground control intercept) flights under MGCIS-3 control, and bombing practice using the Naktong Bombing Range. Other training sorties were scheduled in reconnaissance navigation, weather penetration, determining fuel bingos,\(^45\) target location and identification, air defense patrolling, and coordination of tactical procedures in the target area.

The training schedules provided a well-balanced indoctrination program for new squadron flight leaders, pilots, radar operators, and other crew members arriving in Korea on the postwar personnel drafts.

A new work day schedule of 0700-1500 implemented in Aug-

\(^{45}\) A fuel bingo is the amount of fuel needed by a pilot to reach home base plus enough additional fuel to divert to an alternate airfield.
While Guns Cool

ust made more time available for athletics, swimming, studying, and R&R (Rest & Recreation). That same month the MAG–12 softball team won the Fifth Air Force "All Korea" softball championship. Following this achievement, the team left for Japan to compete in the FAF "Far East" softball tournament which included teams from all the major Pacific bases. Subsequently, the K–6 players "disguised in Air Force uniforms, went onward and upward to become FEAF champions in September."46 MAG–33 pilots, meanwhile, participated in Operation SPYGLASS, a FAF training exercise in August and Operation BACK DOOR, the following month. Both emphasized interception flying and work with GCI squadrons. As "aggressors," the Pohang-based airmen made simulated attacks on South Korean targets "defended" by Air Force and other land-based Marine units. In October, MAG–33 pilots flew CAS missions for the 1st Marine Division training problem, MARLEX IV, a battalion landing exercise staged by 1/7 on Tokchok-to Island. Beginning that month a new procedure was inaugurated by MAG–33 and the recently-arrived MAG–11. Every week, four MAG–11 pilots came to Korea for a week of orientation flying with a MAG–33 squadron to gain a better picture of typical flying conditions in the Korean theater.

Early in 1955 the 1st Marine Division, which had been in the Korean front lines almost continuously since September 1950, returned to Camp Pendleton. Redeployment by echelons began in February. By June, all units had returned to CONUS. The transfer from Korean occupation duty was effected in order that the division's "valuable capability as a highly trained amphibious force in readiness may be fully realized."47 Now under Major General Merrill B. Twining,48 the division had been a part of Eighth Army occupying postwar defense positions in Korea until its relief on 17–18 March 1955 by the U.S. 24th Infantry Division.

In addition to its official mission in the Eighth Army line, the 1st Marine Division had conducted an active small-unit amphibious training program during its postwar Korea duty. All but two of its infantry battalions had carried out assault landings on Tokchok-to,

46 Field, NavOps, Korea, pp. 456-457.
47 AnlRpt of CMC to SecNav FY 1955, dtd 15 Aug 55, p. 3, quoting statement made by SecDef in Dec 54 on forthcoming departure of 1stMarDiv from FECOM.
48 Postwar commanders of 1stMarDiv to date had been Major General Robert H. Pepper, who succeeded General Pate, and served from 12 May 54–22 Jul 54; Major General Robert E. Hogaboom, 23 Jul 54–17 Jan 55; and General Twining, beginning 18 Jan 55.
off the Korean west coast south of Inchon, prior to its departure for the United States. The 3d Marine Division had also conducted an active training program, with numerous small-unit exercises and regimental landings staged at Iwo Jima and Okinawa as part of its continuous readiness conditioning.

For Marine air personnel, their official departure from Korea following the 1st MAW wartime assignment there, came the next year. Beginning in June 1956, initial units of the Marine aircraft wing were withdrawn from Korea and relocated at NAS Iwakuni, Japan. Plans called for the wing, then under Brigadier General Samuel S. Jack⁴⁹ and occupying bases in both Korea and Japan, to be permanently headquartered at Iwakuni and revert to CinCPacFlt control. The wing remained on station in the Far East as a component of postwar United States defense strength in that area.

The prewar Fifth Air Force and Eighth U.S. Army commands, under which Marine Corps air and ground units had functioned during the Korean War, were permanently deployed in the Far East as operative military echelons. EUSAK-FAF transferred from its wartime JOC location at Seoul to Osan-ni in January 1954 and in September of that year relocated to Nagoya, Japan. Eighth Army headquarters remained at Seoul.

⁴⁹CGs, 1st MAW, in the immediate post-armistice period were: Major General Megee, until 4 Dec 53; Major General Albert D. Cooley, 5 Dec 53–25 Mar 54; Brigadier General McCaul, 26 May 54–24 Aug 54; Brigadier General Marion L. Dawson, 25 Aug 54–24 Sep 55; and Brigadier General Jack, 25 Sep 55–30 Jun 56.
CHAPTER XII

Korean Reflection

Marine Corps Role and Contributions to the Korean War:
Ground, Air, Helicopter—FMF and Readiness Posture—
Problems Peculiar to the Korean War—Korean Lessons

Marine Corps Role and Contribution
to the Korean War: Ground

Ground Operations of the 1st Marine Division during the Korean War can be divided into six periods. These are the Pusan Perimeter defense (August–September 1950), Inchon-Seoul assault (September–October 1950), the Chosin Reservoir campaign (October–December 1950), East-Central Korea (January 1951–March 1952), West Korea (March 1952–July 1953), and the post-armistice period (July 1953–February 1955).

Marine Corps traditional concepts of readiness and fast, effective deployment were never better illustrated than in the hectic weeks following 25 June 1950. The NKPA invasion of South Korea came at a time when U.S. military forces were in the final stages of a cutback

1 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: U.S. Dept. of Defense, Semiannual Reports of the Secretary of Defense, 1951–1954, hereafter Rpts of SecDef; PacFlt EvalRpts, No. 6, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 8, 9, No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10; Marine Corps Board Study, An Evaluation of the Influence of Marine Corps Forces on the Course of the Korean War (4 Aug 50–15 Dec 50), vs. I and II, hereafter USMC Board Rpts, held in James C. Breckinridge Library, MCDEC, Quantico, Va.; A Summary of the General Officers' Conference, HQMC, 19–21 Aug 53, hereafter Generals' Summary, at Breckinridge Library; 1stMarDiv ComdD, May 53, App. IX, Summary of USMC Action in Korean War; USMC Ops Korea, vs. I, II, III, IV, passim; Cagle and Manson, Sea War, Korea; Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775–1962 (Annapolis, Md.: United States Naval Institute, 1962), hereafter Heinl, Soldiers of Sea; Release "1st Marine Division The Old Breed" from 1st MarDiv folder, HRB RefFile; Release "Outline of the First Two Years of the 1st Marine Division in Korea," HistBr, G-3 Div, HRS Folder; CheVron, MCRD, San Diego, Calif., v. 27, no. 31 (2 Aug 68), p. 4–5, "From Camp Pendleton to Inchon—18 Years Later, LtGen E. A. Craig, 1st Provisional Brigade CG, Recalls Experiences in Korea," Cpl C. N. Damopoulos, hereafter CheVron.
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to peacetime size. Ships and planes were being "mothballed"; personnel of all the Armed Services were being reduced in number to the lowest possible effective manpower levels.

From the peak of its six-division, five-wing wartime strength of 475,600 in 1944-1945, the Marine Corps at the outbreak of the Korean emergency had only two skeletal divisions and two air wings. There were but 74,279 Marines on active duty, 97 percent of the Marine Corps authorized strength. Although a ceiling of 100,000 had been established for the Corps by law, it was a period of tight purse strings for all defense components. Fiscal austerity in the post-World War II period had whittled Corps numbers from 85,000 in FY 1947 to what was projected at 67,000 by the end of FY 1950.

This critically reduced strength found the normal Marine triangular infantry organization cut back to two companies per battalion, two battalions per regiment, and two regiments per division. The 1st Marine Division, at Camp Pendleton, and 2d Marine Division, at Camp Lejeune, were structured along the regular peacetime T/O of 10,232 USMC/USN vice the wartime minimum T/O of 22,355. No Marine units of any size were located in the Far East.

Despite its lean numbers in late June 1950, the Marine Corps once again would be in the forefront of American military response to the Communist aggression 6,000 miles across the Pacific. As hard-pressed South Korean forces and understrength U.S. occupation troops from Japan attempted to halt the Communist invaders, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, on 2 July, requested the JCS to send immediately a Marine RCT with supporting air to the Far East. On 7 July, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was formed at Camp Pendleton from units of the 1st Division. Major components of the brigade—a balanced force of ground, service, and aviation elements—were the 5th Marines and MAG-33. Five days later, the 6,534-man brigade had mounted out from San Diego to answer the CinCFE plea for Marines to help turn the Communist tide engulfing Korea.

The brigade buttressed the faltering UNC defense in the Pusan Perimeter. Employed as a mobile reserve it helped prevent three enemy breakthroughs—at Chinju and the two Naktong River battles. On 7 August, a month after its activation, the brigade launched an attack toward Chinju. The Marine brigade was the first unit sent from CONUS to see combat in what was then considered a short-term police action. Later, in leading the way to destruction of an enemy
bridgehead at the Naktong, the Marine brigade gave the defending Eighth Army its first victory against the NKPA in the Korean conflict.

Even before the brigade had been dispatched to the Far East, as the Korean situation continued to deteriorate, MacArthur had requested the JCS to expand the brigade to a full war-strength division. Between 10–21 July MacArthur, now CinCUNC, had made three separate requests for a Marine division. This persistence was reinforced by his growing determination to conduct a tactical amphibious operation to the rear of the over-extended NKPA lines and thereby seize the initiative from the enemy.

In the States, meanwhile, authorization was received to bring the badly understrength 1st and 2d Marine Divisions up to full 22,000-man war levels. By stripping posts and stations, reassignment and rerouting of units, and callup of additional reserve personnel, major elements of the 1st Marine Division were on their way to Korea by mid-August. Timing was critical in order to meet the projected D-Day target date of 15 September.

Pulled out of the Pusan line on 12 September, the brigade was absorbed by the newly arrived 1st Marine Division in preparation for the coming Inchon invasion. As the brigade commander, Lieutenant General Edward A. Craig, USMC, later reminisced:

> Although the 1st Provisional Brigade and the 1st MarDiv had never actually trained or worked together, they still combined and executed a successful landing. To me, this simply emphasized the fine training and techniques laid down for amphibious landings by the Marines.²

Organized as a unit less than four months, the brigade left behind it a reputation for mobility, effectiveness, and rapid deployment in the face of national emergency. Although Marine air and ground forces had operated together since 1919 in Haiti, formation of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade "marked the first time that the air and ground elements, task organized under a single commander, had engaged in combat."³

In the brilliant Inchon landing of 15 September 1950, Major General Oliver P. Smith's 1st Division Marines led the X Corps attack

² CheVron, pp. 4–5.
³ Ibid. Even though Marine air and ground forces had on occasion operated jointly ever since the 1920s, air support in the early days was considered a subsidiary rather than integral part of the team. The doctrine of Marine close air support was formulated in WW II but not fully employed before the end of hostilities.
in the first major counterstroke by United Nations forces on Com-
munist-held territory. This maneuver was closely timed against
evermous odds of personnel, logistics, and hydrography (tidal
fluctuations of 31 feet) which made 15 September the only suitable
assault date until mid-October. When outlined in earlier planning
sessions by General MacArthur, the mammoth difficulties of the oper-
ation had been so unsettling that the designated Attack Force Com-
mander for the landing, Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, expressed
the view that "the best I can say is that Inchon is not impossible." 4

Despite all the difficulties, the landing at Inchon and recapture
of Seoul, the South Korean Capital, and its adjacent Kimpo airfield
by the Marines was a stunning tactical blow by the UNC that broke
the backbone of the North Korean People's Army 1950 offensive.
The 1st Marine Division, in its successfully executed amphibious
landing, had offered UNC forces an opportunity to defeat the enemy
decisively before a Siberian-like Korean winter set in. Accomplished
under the most adverse weather and geographic conditions, the
assault proved anew the decisive power of amphibious forces em-
ployed at a critical time and place. This capability and readiness of
the Marine Corps had totally reversed the military situation, and a
battered enemy was on the run. The subsequent routing of the
NKPA divisions in the Inchon-Seoul campaign by X Corps and the
Eighth U.S. Army forces would have led to an early UN victory had
not the Chinese Communists intervened to support their Korean
counterparts. The operation had validated Far East Commander
General MacArthur's early premise that:

... air and naval action alone could not be decisive, and that nothing
short of the intervention of U.S. ground forces could give any assurance
of stopping the Communists and of later regaining the lost ground.5

The Inchon operation, moreover, had been planned in record time
—approximately 20 days. This was one of the shortest periods ever
allotted to a major amphibious assault, involving the planning,
assembly of shipping, and mounting out of a combined force of
29,000 Marines and support personnel.

4 Quoted in USMC Ops Korea, v. II, p. 46. Admiral Doyle was Commander of Amphibious Forces for the Pacific Fleet.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
With the Inchon-Seoul operation ended, the 1st Marine Division (including the 7th Marines which had reached Inchon in time for the liberation of Seoul) reembarked on 12 October for deployment to the east coast of Korea. A new military operation was envisioned north of the 38th Parallel against Pyongyang, the North Korean Capital. As part of the drive, X Corps was to make an amphibious envelopment on the east coast, in the area of the enemy-held port of Wonsan. From here X Corps would advance westward toward Pyongyang, to link up with Eighth Army troops and trap NKPA forces withdrawing from the south.

While the Marines were en route to the objective, word was received that ROK troops had overrun Wonsan and were pushing north. The revised X Corps plan of operation called for a three-pronged attack towards the Yalu. The Marine division would advance on the left, the U.S. Army 7th Division in the center, and 1st ROK Division on the right flank. This drive to the north and subsequent action at the Chosin Reservoir would rank as one of the most rigorous campaigns in the entire history of the Marine Corps.

Fighting as part of EUSAK, by this time fanned out throughout North Korea, the 1st Marine Division did not meet the expected NKPA resistance. Instead, large-scale Chinese Communist Forces had entered the war. As X Corps swept north toward the Yalu River in November 1950, the Marines became the first United States troops to defeat the Chinese Communists in battle. At Sudong, after four days of savage fighting, the Marine RCT-7 so badly crippled major elements of the 124th CCF Division that it was never again committed as an organic unit.

When the Chinese forces struck in full force at the Chosin Reservoir, X Corps units were forced back. Elements of a nine-division assault force, the CCF 9th Army Group, which had been sent into Korea with the specific mission of annihilating the 1st Marine Division, began to attack. On 27 November, the Chinese directed a massive frontal assault against 5th and 7th Marines positions at Yudam-ni, west of the reservoir. Another CCF division, moving up from the south, cut the MSR held by the 1st Marines so that the division at Yudam-ni, west of the reservoir, was completely encircled by Communist forces. Many experts considered the 1st Marine Division as lost. Others thought the only way to save it was to airlift it out, leaving its equipment behind. Instead, the Marines seized the
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initiative at Yudam-ni and cut a path through CCF units blocking a route to Hagaru. The division battled its way out in 20-degree-below-zero weather 78 miles over icy, winding mountain roads from the reservoir to the Hamhung-Hungnam area where, on 15 December, it redeployed to South Korea.

Integrated ground and air action enabled the 10,000 Marines and attached 4,000 Army-Royal Marine troops to break out of the entrapment and move south. During 13 tortuous days the Marines had withstood hostile strength representing elements of six to eight CCF divisions. The major result, from the military view, was that the Marine division properly evacuated its dead and wounded, brought out all operable equipment, and completed the retrograde movement with tactical integrity.

Not only had the Chinese (with a total of 60,000 men in assault or reserve) failed to accomplish their mission, destruction of the division, but the Marine defenders had dealt a savage blow to the enemy in return. POW debriefings later revealed that assault units of the CCF 9th Army Group had been rendered so militarily ineffective that nearly three months were required for its replacement, re-equipment, and reorganization.

Early in 1951, the 1st Marine Division was reassigned to IX Corps for Operation KILLER, a limited offensive ordered by the EUSAK Commander, General Matthew B. Ridgway. In Operation RIPPER, in March, the division led another IX Corps advance as it drove toward the 38th Parallel on the east-central front. When the Chinese struck back with their spring offensive on 22 April, the Marines were transferred to operational control of X Corps and counterattacked to restore the UNC defensive position in the far eastern sector. During May and June, the 1st Marine Division continued to punish the enemy in the Punchbowl area of eastern Korea, driving the CCF back to Yanggu and the Soyang River corridor.

Activity all along the UNC front came to an uncertain halt in July 1951 when Allied and Communist negotiators met at Kaesong for truce talks initiated by the enemy. In August the MLR flared into action again, and the Marine Division was engaged in new counter-thrusts in the Punchbowl area. Fighting during the next three weeks involved the division in some of its hardest offensive operations in Korea. It also developed that this would be the last offensive for the Marines. In November 1951, as a result of the truce talks and possi-
bility of ending hostilities, General Ridgway, now UNC Commander, ordered the Eighth Army to cease offensive operations and begin an active defense of the front.

The war of fire and movement had turned into one of positional warfare, a defensive posture by UN forces that would continue for the last 21 months of the three-year conflict. Throughout the winter of 1951–1952, the Marines conducted vigorous patrol activities in their sector of X Corps. Although it was a lackluster period of trench warfare for the average infantryman, major tactical innovations were being pioneered by the division with its use of the transport helicopter for logistical and resupply missions.

In March 1952, the 1st Marine Division was transferred from the eastern X Corps line 140 miles west to strengthen the far end of the Eighth Army MLR in the I Corps sector. The division was relocated in the path of the enemy's invasion route to Seoul, where weak defenses in the Kimpo coastal area had threatened the security of the UNC front. Here the division's four infantry regiments (including the 1st Korean Marine Corps RCT) held nearly 55 miles of front line in the critical Panmunjom-Munsan area. The demilitarized route for the United Nations negotiators led through the Marine lines. It was the most active sector of the UN front for the next 16 months. This key position guarded the best routes of advance from North Korea to Seoul and indicated the high regard in which General James A. Van Fleet, EUSAK commander, held the Marines.

West Korean terrain was rugged, hilly, and friendly to the CCF who had the advantage of high ground positions as well as considerably more manpower. Although cast in an unaccustomed defensive warfare role, rather than a true attack mission, the Marines repelled an almost continuous series of enemy probes. While truce talks went on at nearby Panmunjom, fighting as furious as at any time earlier in the war flared up intermittently as the CCF tried to gain additional terrain for bargaining purposes. During 1952–1953, the Marine division beat off determined CCF limited objective attacks on Bunker Hill, the Hook, Vegas, and Boulder City outposts up until—literally—the final day of the war, 27 July 1953.

In reviewing Marine actions during this period, the Secretary of the Navy commented:

Marines in Korea have established an enviable record of success in carrying out their assigned missions. The First Marine Division began its third
year in Korea holding an active sector of the United Nations front guarding the enemy's invasion route to Seoul. It was frequently subjected to fanatical Chinese attacks supported by intensive artillery fire. Some of the heaviest fighting during the year took place along the front held by this Division. Enemy attacks were well coordinated and numerically strong. Continued patrol activity to keep the enemy off balance frequently resulted in bitter hand-to-hand fighting with numerous casualties on both sides.6

This type of prolonged static warfare gave little real satisfaction to Marines accustomed to waging a war of movement and a more tangible "mission accomplished." The year of positional warfare in western Korea was costly, too. Total U.S. casualties in the Korean War numbered approximately 137,000 men killed, missing, or wounded. The Marine Corps toll was 30,544. Of this number, 4,262 were KIA, an additional 244 were listed as non-battle deaths, and 26,038 were wounded. During this last part of the war, Marine casualties (both ground and air) totaled 13,087, plus an additional 2,529 for the attached 1st KMC/RCT. Astonishingly, 1,586 Marines or 39.6 percent7 of the infantry Marines killed in the entire war were victims of the "static," outpost warfare in the west. Another 11,244 were listed WIA during this period—representing 43.9 percent of the total number of ground Marines wounded during the three years of conflict.

Conditions varied widely during the 1950–1952 and 1952–1953 periods of the war. The enemy's improved capability in artillery during the latter period of positional warfare largely accounts for the high casualty rate at this time. It has been noted that:

Prior to February 1952, with a warfare of mobility prevailing, the enemy was inferior in artillery, the causative agent of most personnel losses. Afterwards, during the outpost warfare of western Korea, the front remained more or less static, and the Chinese Reds had as much artillery support as the Marines.8

It might be valid to question the use of Marine Corps specialists in amphibious warfare in an Army-type conventional land war. The protracted land campaign that characterized the latter stages of the

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6 Semianl Rpt of SecNav (1 Jan–30 Jun) 1953, p. 185.
7 See Appendix E. Percentages represent Marine ground only; air casualties have been deducted. Of 1st MAW casualties of 432 (258 KIA, 174 WIA) during the entire war, 103 were KIA and 41 WIA during the April 1952–July 1953 period cited above.
Korean conflict actually was waged for the majority of the war period—from September 1951 to July 1953, or nearly two years. In terms of economy of manpower it could be considered an inefficient, though not ineffective use of Marines. On the other hand, the history of warfare down through the ages makes it repeatedly clear that a nation fights the pitched battle against its opponent with the arsenal of weapons and personnel at hand.

As an Eighth U.S. Army component (attached variously to the X, IX, and I Corps), the 1st Marine Division (one of nearly 20 divisions representing U.S. Army, British Commonwealth, and ROK troops) performed its assigned mission—to repulse and punish the enemy. It contributed heavily to maintaining the integrity of the EUSAK front and was considered one of the two crack EUSAK divisions—the other being the Marines' neighbor to the right, the British Commonwealth Division. With the attached KMCs, the 1st Marine Division, moreover, was also the biggest and strongest division in EUSAK.

Most importantly, fast deployment of the Marine division had made possible the brilliant tactical maneuver at Inchon. Many military experts, following World War II, had envisioned future conflicts only in terms of atomic warfare and massive strategic air assaults. Even the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "had predicted publicly, hardly six months before, that the world would never again see a large-scale amphibious landing." In contradiction to new atomic-age tactics, however, the United Nations commander in September 1950 had turned the tide of the battle by his use of a conventional maneuver—envelopment by amphibious assault. The performance of the Marine Corps was thus responsible, in part, for changing post-Korean War military doctrine from total reliance on new tactics and weaponry to a more balanced concept that combined both sophisticated innovations and viable, established procedures.

Although unemployed in its primary amphibious role after late 1950, the 1st Marine Division had originally been positioned on the eastern front because of this capability. It was the UN commander's desire to have EUSAK's only amphibious trained and equipped divi-

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sion near the coast in the event that an amphibious maneuver was required for offensive or defensive purposes. Again, in the division's 1952 move to the western coastal front in the Kimpo area, this fighting capability was a major consideration.

To a large extent, U.S. forces in Korea fought the early part of the Korean War with weapons from the preceding war—only five years removed. Three tactical innovations employed by the Marine Corps during the Korean War were highly successful and largely adopted by the other services. These were the thermal boot, individual body armor, and the helicopter. All were first combat tested in 1951.

Frostbite casualties during the first winter in Korea resulting from inadequate footwear made it necessary to provide combat troops with specially insulated footwear. The new thermal boot virtually eliminated frostbite for both Marine infantrymen and aviators. Armored utility jackets had been developed toward the end of World War II but were not actually battle tested. The Marine Corps had renewed the experimentation in 1947. First combat use of the plastic, light-weight body armor was made in July 1951 by Marines while fighting in the Punchbowl and Inje areas of X Corps. Improvements were made to the prototypes and by the following summer the Marine Corps, following a request made by the Army Quartermaster General, furnished some 4,000 vests to frontline Army troops. By 1953 the 1st Marine Division had received its authorized quota of 24,000 vests and new lower torso body armor had also been put into production.

Medical experts reported that the effectiveness of enemy low-velocity missile weapons striking a man wearing body armor was reduced from 30–80 percent. Chest and abdominal wounds decreased from 90–95 percent after issuance of the armored vests. Overall battle casualties were estimated to have been cut by 30 percent. By the time of the cease-fire, the protection offered by the Marine body armor had been extended to some 93,000 Marine and Army wearers. Hardly anywhere could the U.S. taxpayer or fighting man have found a better buy for the money: mass production had reduced the per unit cost of the Marine armored vest to just $37.50.
On 3 August 1950, eight VMF–214 Corsairs led by squadron executive officer, Major Robert P. Keller, catapulted from the deck of the USS Sicily to launch the first Marine air strikes in the Korean action. From then until 27 July 1953, units of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing flew 127,496 combat sorties in the Korean War, considerably in excess of the 80,000-odd sorties for all Marine aviation during World War II. Of this Korean number nearly a third, more than 39,500, represented the Marine Corps close air support specialty, even though 1st MAW pilots were heavily engaged in other assignments from Fifth Air Force. These included interdiction, general support, air defense patrols, air rescue operations, photo and armed reconnaissance, and related tasks to insure Allied air superiority.

With the outbreak of Korean hostilities, Stateside Marine air units were alerted for combat duty by 5 July. At Major General Field Harris’ 1st MAW headquarters, El Toro, MAG–33 elements were quickly readied for deployment to Japanese bases and thence to Korea. Commanded by Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, MAG–33 comprised Headquarters and Service Squadron 33, fighter squadrons VMF–214 and -323, an echelon of nightfighters from VMF(N)–513, two radar units (Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 and Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2), plus the observation squadron, VMO–6. Forward elements were quickly on their way, arriving in Japan on 19 July, while the rear echelon reached the Korean Theater on 31 July. Twenty R5Ds from Marine Transport Squadrons 152 and 352 were already providing logistical support for Pacific lift operations.

After practicing some last minute carrier landing approaches, the fighter pilots got into combat almost at once. Following –214 into

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10 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: PacFlt EvalRpts No. 6, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 4, Chap. 10; USMC Board Rpts, vs. 1–11; General's Summary; AnlRpt SecNav 1952–1953; USMC Ops Korea vs. I–IV, passim; Monograph, A Brief History of Marine Corps Aviation, (HistBr, G–3 Div, HQMC, 1960); Cagle and Manson, Sea War, Korea; Sherrod, Marine Aviation; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part I, Pusan to the Reservoir: The Acid Test,” Marine Corps Gazette, v. 41, no. 5 (May 57), pp. 22–27; LtCol C. A. Phillips and Maj H. D. Kuokka, “1st MAW in Korea, Part II, January 1951 to the Armistice,” Marine Corps Gazette, v. 41, no. 6 (Jun 57), pp. 22–26; Brochure, Change of Command Ceremonies, 11 Jul 56, First Marine Aircraft Wing, FMF, 1st MAW folder, HRB ref. file.
the war, VMF–323 started operations on 6 August, flying from USS Badoeng Strait in support of the Pusan ground defenders. When the brigade mounted out on 7 August on its drive to Chinju, the two MAG–33 carrier squadrons were there with their 5-inch HVARs, napalm, 100- to 500-pound bombs, and 20mm cannon. VMF(N)–513 began its regularly-scheduled night tours over the Korean perimeter that same date, lashing at enemy supply and transportation centers in the Sachon-Chinju area of southern Korea. VMO–6 had already started evacuating casualties from the Pusan area three days earlier.

Many Army ground commanders witnessed the Marine system of close air support for the first time during the Pusan fighting. After the second Naktong battle, when air strikes had silenced enemy guns and 300 troops near Obong-ni, the commander of the 23rd Regiment to the right of the brigade wrote General Ridgway in Washington:

Infantry and artillery is a good team, but only by adding adequate and efficient air support can we succeed without devastating losses. . . The Marines on our left were a sight to behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal to ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it like artillery. It was, 'Hey, Joe, this is Smitty, knock the left of that ridge in from Item Company.' They had it day and night.11

And while Marine, Army, and Navy staffs were completing plans for the forthcoming Inchon assault, MAG–33’s little aerial Photo Unit (part of Headquarters Squadron) took a series of reconnaissance photographs of the landing beaches in preparation for the closely coordinated maneuver.

During Inchon-Seoul operations, MAG–33 was joined by three MAG–12 fighter squadrons: VMF–212, VMF–312, and VMF(N)–542. After the capture of Kimpo airfield, 212’s “Devilcats” and 542’s nightfighters transferred from Itami to Kimpo. Flying out of 2d MAW headquarters, Cherry Point, N.C., on 18 August, the Devilcats had climaxed a hurried dash halfway around the world to get into action. The squadron flew its first combat mission from Kimpo a month after its departure from the East Coast. While the MAG–12 land-based squadrons and the carrier pilots functioned

as the division's flying artillery, MGCIS–1 set up a radar warning system and MTACS–2 established a Tactical Air Direction Center to direct all aircraft in the X Corps zone of action.

With the conclusion of the Inchon operation on 8 October, VMF–312 and VMF(N)–542 remained at Kimpo. Other Marine squadrons (VMF–212, VMF(N)–513, VMO–6, HqSq–12, and carrier-based VMF–323) shifted to the Korean east coast in readiness for the Wonsan landing and subsequent deployment north of the Marine infantry regiments. Wing elements began arriving at the port city's airfield on 13 October. Division Marines, meanwhile, on board ship in the Wonsan harbor while more than 3,000 expertly laid Communist mines were being removed, did not land until 26 October. For the men who fought the vertical war in Korea, it was "one of the rare times in the air-ground association, the 1st MAW had landed ahead of the 1st Marine Division. The aviators didn't miss putting up a big sign-board "Welcome, 1st Division!""

As 30 CCF divisions slammed into UNC forces all across the fighting front in late November to change the nature of ground operations (and the future of the war), so did the onset of the first Korean winter test 1st MAW aerial skills and ingenuity. Low hanging ceilings, icing conditions, and three-inch snows on the carrier decks were common operating hazards. For the shore-based pilots, the bad weather often caused changed flight plans as they were forced to land atalternate fields or on Navy carriers. Nonetheless, Marine RD4s flew up to the southern tip of the Chosin Reservoir, at Hagaru, to air-drop ammunition and supplies and evacuate casualties from the entrapment. Logistical support to this tiny frozen makeshift air strip was also provided by Air Force C–47s and C–119s. Later on, during the first step of the grinding movement south, Air Force pilots paradropped a sectionalized steel bridge vitally needed at Koto-ri to replace a destroyed span over a chasm.

Beginning with the load-out for Wonsan in early October, the 1st MAW was placed under operational control of the Seoul-based Fifth Air Force. Echelons of FAF air command and control initially

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13 Technically, FAF had also been the controlling agency for air support during Pusan operations. Marine aviation units, as a component of an integrated Fleet Marine Force, however, were directed to fly support for 1st ProvMarBrig as their highest priority. Ex-
slowed operational orders anywhere from 4 to 36 hours. Simplified interservice communications and command liaison between 1st MAW and FAF helped improve the situation. With a verbal agreement, on 1 December, for CG, 1st MAW to receive full control over X Corps area aircraft, problems eased substantially. To a large degree the close coordination of Marine aviation and ground forces during the Chosin campaign was due to the use of flexible, simplified, and fast battle-tested Marine Corps-Navy CAS techniques and to having increased the number of pilot FACs from one to two per battalion.

The Marine movement south from Hagaru was protected by one of the greatest concentrations of aircraft during the entire war. Twenty-four CAS aircraft covered the breakout column, while attack planes assaulted enemy forces in adjacent ridge approaches. Marine planes on station at Yonpo (south of the Hamhung-Hungnam axis) and carrier-based VMF–323 flew some 130 sorties daily. Another 100 attack sorties were flown daily by Navy carrier-based planes, while FAF flew interdiction missions beyond the bombline. Marine Panther jets of VMF–311, operating with the Air Force from the Pusan area, got into the action at Yonpo. It was also at this time that an airborne TADC (tactical air direction center) was first improvised when the radio jeeps moving south with the column had communication failures. For six days, a VMR–152 R5D transport orbited 2,000 to 4,000 feet above the Marine units to control air support between Hagaru and Chinhung-ni as a flying radio nerve center.

From late November to early December, as the division battled its way from Chosin to Hamhung, Marine, Navy, and Air Force aircraft evacuated more than 5,000 Marine, Army, and ROK casualties. And during the most critical period, the little OY spotter planes and HO3S–1 helicopters from VMO-6 provided the only physical contact between units separated by enemy action. Marine tactical squadrons in these three early major offensives of the war, from 3 August to 14 December, flew 7,822 sorties, 5,305 of them CAS for the battered UNC ground units.

cept for the formality of checking in with the FAF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) at JOC, 1st MAW units operated under the Marine Corps-Navy CAS doctrine. During the Seoul-Inchon campaign, control of air operations came under ComNavFE, since it was an amphibious operation, and the air system followed Marine-Navy doctrine. USMC Board Rpt, v. I, p. IV–B–9, 14.
From 1951–1953, 1st MAW pilots and planes came under direct control of FAF. They alternated between principal missions of interdiction raids to harass and destroy Communist supply lines north of the battlefront, general support sorties outside the bombline, and CAS flights to support infantry forces threatened by enemy penetration. Typical of FAF focus on massive aerial assaults were the following assignments that Marine flyers participated in:

In January 1951 (prior to Operation KILLER), the 1st MAW undertook a series of interdiction raids against the Communist supply net located in the Korean waist between the 38th and 39th Parallels, to disrupt the CCF transport-truck system.

On 9 May 1951, 75 1st MAW Corsairs and Panther jets were part of the 300-plane raid staged by FAF against Communist airfields at Sinuiju, on the Korean side of the Yalu.

Operation STRANGLE, a major Fifth Air Force all-out interdiction effort to cripple the enemy supply life line, was undertaken 20 May. When the Chinese Communist spring offensive broke shortly thereafter, MAG–12 Corsairs and -33 Panther jets delivered maximum support to the MLR regiments, the 1st and 7th Marines. When the truce talks began in Kaesong, in July 1951, 1st MAW planes and the radar searches of MACG–2 stood guard. Batteries of the Marine 1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion, attached to the wing, were also alerted to keep under surveillance the approaches to key military ports.

New tactical developments pioneered by 1st MAW during the Korean War advanced the UNC air effort and added to the 1st MAW reputation for versatility. Several major steps forward were taken toward Marine aviation's primary goal of providing real operational 24-hour CAS, regardless of foul weather conditions. The new MPQ–14 radar-controlled bombing equipment, developed between 1946 and 1950, was employed by MASRT–1, as a device to control night fighter sorties of a general support nature flown by day attack aircraft. By means of height-finding and directional radars, it enabled a pilot to leave his base, drop a bomb load on target, and return to home field without ever having seen the ground. It offered major practical improvement in blind bombing methods. MPQ was limited, however, in its use in sudden, moving battle situations because of some of its sophisticated, hand-built ABC components. A real tactical breakthrough in night CAS came in April
1953 when VMF(N)—513 and the VMO–6 spotter planes evolved the new searchlight beam control system which made possible 24-hour coverage for 1st Marine Division ground units.

In other innovations, it will be remembered that the Air Force in late 1952 had requested escort by VMF(N)—513's new two-place jet-intruder F3D Skyknights on Air Force B–29 night bombing missions. During a four-month period from 1952–1953, the Marine night fighters downed one enemy plane or more a month while escorting the B–29s. Once the F3Ds began their night escort role, Air Force bomber losses became negligible.

A unique capability of the long-range, jet-intruder night-fighter was that the F3D carried a radar operator who replaced the ground controller, thereby extending air-defense radar range to the aircraft. It could thus operate independently and effectively at great distance from its base. Without GCI (ground control intercept) aid, VMF(N)—513 direct escort to bombers at night was so successful that the squadron's planes were used as exclusive escort of the Bomber Command B–29s. In November 1952, the Marine squadron's two night kills were the first ever recorded by airborne intercept radar-equipped jet fighters. At the end of the war, Skyknights and -513 pilots (flying F3Ds as well as the earlier F7Fs) had destroyed more enemy aircraft than any other Marine or Navy day or night fighter plane. Tactics employed by VMF(N)—513 were original in concept and required a high-level of training and individual pilot-AIO (airborne intercept operator) proficiency. It was noted that:

The enthusiasm with which this Marine aid to the Air Force has been received by FEAF Bomber Command indicates that VMF(N)—513 had successfully adapted its equipment and personnel to a mission usually associated with Air Force operations, making an important contribution to interservice cooperation, but even more important, to tactical progress in the night escort of bomber formations.\(^\text{14}\)

An operation somewhat in reverse of the nightfighters was that of VMJ–1, the Marine photographic squadron, which had its own Air Force escort. Formerly the Wing Photo Unit, VMJ–1 was commissioned in February 1952 and flew a total of 5,025 combat flights. Under FAF operational control until late in the war, the squadron's 550-mph F2H–2P twin-jet Banshees flew unarmed deep into enemy

\(^{14}\) *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 9–82.
country—even as far as the MIG-guarded Yalu—photographing positions, airfields, power plants, and other targets. An escort plane flew cover while the photo ship took pictures. Photo missions to the Suiho Reservoir were rated so important that “24 Air Force F–86 jets flew an umbrella.” Introduction of the squadron’s jet Banshee early in 1952 was a major step in improved aerial photography. The Banshee was the superior photographic aircraft in the combat theater, because of its new advanced-design view finder and operating range.

Coverage from VMJ–1’s gross wartime output of 793,012 feet of processed prints was equal to a continuous photographic strip six and half times around the earth at the equator. The Marine photo squadron contributed a third to the entire UN photo reconnaissance effort and at times flew as much as 50 percent of all FAF intelligence missions.

Throughout the war the four attack squadrons of MAG–12 (VMAs–212, –251, –121; and –332 at the end of the war) had dumped seemingly endless bomb loads on CCF installations, while MAG–33’s two jet-fighter squadrons (VMF–115 and –311) had provided the Marine exchange pilots who scoured the lower side of the Yalu with the Air Force F–86s on fighter sweeps.

During Korea the Marine CVE/CVL squadrons (VMAs–214, –233, –312, and –251) flew more than 25,000 sorties, experimenting with improved techniques for carrier landings. The carrier qualification program of Marine air units, a regular part of their training, also proved its value in combat. In the earliest days of the war, VMF–214 and –323 had operated from two CVEs based off the south coast of Korea, thereby providing close support to the brigade and other Eighth Army elements at a time when all shore-based aircraft were forced to operate from Japan.

In other tactical refinements, the 1st MAW had employed an airborne tactical air control center in combat for the first time. In July 1952, when the static ground situation led to a build-up of enemy flak along the front lines that interfered with effective CAS delivery, the 11th Marines had instituted a flak suppression program in front of the division sector. Later that year, CG Eighth Army had ordered a similar program used by all other Eighth Army commands.

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16 With phaseout of the Corsairs in 1952, the VMF squadrons were subsequently re-designated as attack units.
By December, apparently because of lack of success with their own methods, EUSAK had adopted the system developed by the Marine artillery regiment. The antiaircraft program, together with a reduction in the number of runs per aircraft per mission, had measurably decreased casualties for CAS missions conducted within artillery range. During 1952–1953 this loss rate for pilots and planes had dropped by a third, with no corresponding reduction in the sortie rate.

Stabilized warfare and enemy AA build-up had also led to an increasing use of enemy radars. Passive electronics countermeasures (ECM) were instituted by FAF. This program was enhanced in September 1952 by the commissioning of VMC–1 (Marine Composite Squadron 1), administratively assigned to MACG–2. The squadron possessed the only Fifth Air Force ECM capability to locate enemy radars and was the primary source of ECM intercept equipment in FAF squadrons for early warning and radar control monitoring. Throughout the duration of hostilities, VMC–1 remained the only Navy-Marine unit in the Korean theater with ECM as its prime function.

For its combat action, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was awarded two Korean Presidential Unit Citations and the Army Distinguished Unit Citation for the Wonsan operation. Wing pilots were responsible for downing 35 enemy planes, including the first night kill made by a United Nations aircraft. Participation of the 1st MAW in the war could also be measured in a different way. On the inevitable red side of the ledger: 258 air Marines had been killed (including 65 MIA and presumed dead) and 174 WIA. A total of 436 aircraft were also lost in combat or operational accidents.

From the command level, Korean operations marked the first time the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had functioned for an extended period as a component in a broad, unified command structure such as FAF. Despite the weak links initially inherent in such a situation, the command structure did work. Marine-Navy and Air Force-Army differing aerial doctrines and tactics of close tactical air support, however, were never fully reconciled. The Marine wing made a notable contribution in providing really effective close, speedy tactical

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17 In August 1952, FAF had introduced a new policy limiting pilots to one pass on general support or interdiction missions and two passes on CAS flights.
support during the sudden fluid battle situation that erupted in mid-July 1953. Simplified Marine TACP control, request procedures, and fast radio net system enabled 1st MAW pilots to reach the target area quickly. During this final month of the war—and indicative of the enormous amount of coordination involved in the FAF administrative apparatus—1st MAW planes flew 1,500 CAS sorties for the 19 different EUSAK frontline divisions.

CG, 1st MAW noted in General Order No. 153 issued the last day of the war, that "the Wing's association with the Eighth Army, the Fifth Air Force and the Seventh U.S. Fleet in combined operations had been a professionally broadening experience—teaching tolerance, teamwork, and flexibility of operations."18

Besides the FAF interdiction work and support missions for frontline units, new 1st MAW tactics and equipment had diversified the wing's skills and capabilities in its primary role of providing CAS for Marine ground units. Of new tactical air support developments in the Korean action none had a more revolutionary effect than those created by the helicopter—which dramatically reshaped battlefield logistics and pointed the way to a new era in Marine Corps air-ground teamwork.

**Helicopter**

A promising newcomer on the Marine aviation scene was the helicopter, whose tactical employment in Korea was to far exceed all expectations. A few helicopters had been used experimentally in the European and Pacific theaters toward the end of World War II, too late to evaluate their performance. But it was the Marine Corps, beginning in 1947, that had pioneered the development of combat techniques utilizing the rotor-driven aircraft as a means of enhancing its capability for the amphibious assault. When the Korean incident erupted in June 1950, the Marine Corps was in a position to assign four HO3S–1 Sikorsky two-place helicopters and flight personnel from its Quantico test unit, HMX–1, together with fixed-wing planes and pilots to form the brigade observation squadron, VMO–6. These

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19 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from PacFlt EvalRpts No. 4, Chap. 9, No. 5, Chap. 8, No. 6, Chap. 9; USMC Board Rpt, v. I; Generals' Summary; USMC Ops Korea, vs. I–IV, passim; Montross, SkyCav.
Marines had the distinction of being the first helicopter pilots of any U.S. service to be formed into a unit for overseas duty.

Further, the Marine Corps also had 31 months' experience with the strange looking, pot-bellied, ungainly aircraft in diverse battlefield tasks. These included casualty evacuation, reconnaissance, wire-laying, liaison, and administrative missions. But promising test exercises at Quantico and Camp Lejeune were hardly enough. The real test would come at the front. There, the helicopter's military value would reflect and "depend to a large extent on how well the Marine Corps had worked out combat doctrines and techniques where none had existed before."

Landing with the brigade in August 1950, the choppers performed invaluable service from the earliest days of Pusan, Inchon, Seoul, and the Reservoir. During the most critical phase of the Chosin operation, the helicopters provided the only liaison between isolated commands. Wire-laying by air was first employed by VMO–6 during the second battle of the Naktong River, in September 1950. The ground had changed hands several times and control was uncertain. Using makeshift communication rigs, VMO–6 pilots unreeled telephone wire at a mile a minute. This method of putting telephone lines across Korean mountains became routine through the rest of the war, and Marine choppers strung miles of lines in rain and wind with the enemy blasting away at them. Wire was laid over terrain in a matter of hours where it would have taken men on foot weeks—if it could have been done.

Perhaps the greatest innovation of VMO–6, however, was its night casualty evacuation techniques first employed at Pusan. Darting in and out at treetop level around the Korean mountains, the light, easily maneuverable craft could land on a tiny patch of earth to evacuate injured men or bring in supplies. Once, during the early part of the war, when the aeronautical pioneer Igor Sikorsky was asked how his revolutionary vehicles were performing in combat, Mr. Sikorsky, bowing from the waist in his Old World manner, replied:

Thank you. Our things go very well in Korea. The helicopter has already saved the lives of several thousands of our boys in Korea and the score is still mounting.21

With the advent of the helicopter, as little as 43 minutes elapsed between the time a Marine was hit and the time he was on board the USS Repose or other hospital ships. Later on when the Marine transport copters arrived in Korea, HMR–161 pilots felt a new record had been set when only 30 minutes22 intervened between the time a frontline Marine was hit and delivered to a hospital facility 17 miles from the zone of action. The Consolation had been outfitted with a helicopter loading platform in July 1951, and eventually all hospital ships had such landing platforms. In Korea the flying ambulances could make the trip from rear area aid station to ship in five minutes and unload the wounded and clear the deck in 45 seconds flat.

Throughout the war nearly 10,000 wounded Marines were evacuated by helicopter; more than 1,000 such missions were carried out at night. Records indicate that VMO–6 flew out 7,067 casualties and that another 2,748 medical evacuations were made by HMR–161, for which the task ranked as a secondary mission. Although these humanitarian gains were important, major tactical innovations made by the helicopter were even more significant.

In the fall of 1951, HMR–161 successfully executed the first combat troop resupply mission in history. At this time while the division was deployed in the jagged razorback-ridge Punchbowl area, "a glimpse of future warfare was provided when Marine helicopter lifts on a company scale led to the lift of an entire battalion and its organic equipment."23 Arriving in Korea on 31 August, the squadron had a complement of 15 new 10-place HRS–1 transport vehicles, with cruising speed of 60–85 knots. Developed specifically to meet Marine Corps combat requirements, the HRS marked a new era in Marine airborne support to ground troops. Both VMO–6 and HMR–161 came under operational control of the division. (With 1st Division and Wing headquarters separated geographically by more than 200 miles, it was particularly expedient to have the two squadrons under division control.)

The first step toward using the rotor-blade aircraft in the mission most closely related to the USMC basic helicopter concept—that of

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22 By contrast, in 1945 World War II campaigns the Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal had visited hospital ships and praised the air evacuation methods then in use when he commented, "I went aboard the Samaritan, where Navy surgeons and corpsmen were already dealing with the casualties from the day and night before." Capt Clifford P. Morehouse, The Iwo Jima Campaign, (Washington: HistDiv, HQMC, 1946), p. 139.

23 HistBr outline, p. 4.
transporting troops and supplies by vertical envelopment—was accomplished 13 September 1951. In Operation WINDMILL I, HRS choppers carried out the first Marine mass helicopter combat resupply operation in history. A lift of one day's supplies was made to 2/1 in the Soyang River vicinity. A total of 28 flights were executed in overall time of 2½ hours (a total flight time of 14.1 hours) to transport 18,848 pounds of gear and 74 Marines a distance of seven miles.

HMR–161 first applied the Corps' new concept of vertical envelopment on 21 September when, despite heavy fog, it transported 224 fully equipped Marines and 17,772 pounds of cargo from the reserve area to the MLR. This was the first helicopter lift of a combat unit in history. Company-size troop lifts inevitably led to more complicated battalion-size transfers. In the 11 November Operation SWITCH, HMR–161 effected the relief of a frontline battalion, involving the lift of nearly 2,000 troops. Twelve of the 3½-ton aircraft made 262 flights in overall time of 10 hours (95.6 hours flight time).

The tactical and logistical possibilities of the multi-purpose rotor craft attracted considerable attention. So impressed, in fact, were Eighth Army officers by the mobility and utility displayed by Marine helicopters that in November 1951 General Ridgway had asked the Army to provide four Army helicopter transport battalions, each with 280 helicopters. Korea, Ridgway said, had "conclusively demonstrated that the Army vitally needed helicopters," and he recommended that the typical field army of the future have 10 helicopter transportation battalions.

Ridgway was thereby renewing requests for helicopters made in the early days of the war by both the Army (through General MacArthur) and the Air Force (by General Barcus). But the UN Commander's enthusiasm, although understandable, turned out to be the undoing for substantial Army use of the rotary-blade aircraft in Korea. The scale of operations envisioned by Ridgway unwittingly led to a "jurisdictional controversy" about possible duplication of aerial functions not reconciled by the two services until a year later. Although both services had helicopters in limited use, "hostilities were in their last stages before either the Army or the

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24 Futrell, USAF, Korea, pp. 533–534.
25 Hermes, Truce Tent, p. 184, comments: "In order to insure a steady flow of replacement craft, he [Ridgway] suggested that procurement be started on a scale that would permit manufacturers to expand production immediately."
26 Futrell, USAF, Korea, p. 554.
Air Force began to receive the cargo helicopters which they had put on order in 1950 and 1951."27

A successful three-day Army regimental supply exercise in May 1953 and a combat maneuver the following month in which the choppers formed an air bridge to a heavily attacked, isolated ROK unit caused General Taylor, then CG, EUSAK, to observe: "The cargo helicopter, employed in mass, can extend the tactical mobility of the Army far beyond its normal capability." He strongly recommended that the Army make "ample provisions for the full exploitation of the helicopter in the future."28

Pioneering developments by the Marine Corps had, of course, continued meanwhile. Logistical operations had grown increasingly complex and diversified. In Operation HAYLIFT II, 23–27 February 1953, Marine helicopters set an all time cargo-carrying record when they lifted 1,612,306 pounds of cargo to completely supply two JAMESTOWN regiments with daily requirements for the five-day period. This represented a total of 1,633 lifts and 583.4 flying hours for the operation. The record day's lift was 200 tons, whereas plans had called for lifting a maximum 130 tons per day. Experience gained during the operation indicated that similar tactical maneuvers in warmer weather would be even more successful when troop fuel oil requirements were reduced.

Other Marine innovations by HMR–161 included supplying ammunition from the rear area ASP to the MLR and redeployment of 1st 4.5-inch Rocket Battery personnel and guns from one firing area to another. And although VMO–6 executed most of the mercy missions, the transport squadron performed an unusual assignment in July 1952. Flood conditions throughout Korea brought an urgent request from the Army for use of HMR–161. On 30 July, the Marine squadron evacuated 1,172 Army troops from their positions in the Chunchon area where they had been trapped by the heavy rains.

With a new tactical exercise held nearly every month, HMR–161 operations that once had rated world-wide headlines were now practically routine. VTOL-style battalion troop lifts were no longer novel and regimental resupply operations were becoming almost standard practice. In both relocation of units and logistical support,

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., p. 535.
Operations in West Korea

Combat helicopters had provided high mobility and reasonable speed. They had introduced a new infantry technique of "hit and run" tactics. The transport helicopter squadron had proved most effective when employed in major tactical movements and not when used piecemeal on minor missions. Marine Corps wartime use of the new aerial vehicle had clearly proven that helicopters had become a necessary and integral component of the modern-day balanced military force.

**FMF and Readiness Posture**

The flexibility and readiness capability inherent in the Marine Corps FMF structure was a strong undergirding factor in its swift response to the Korean crisis. As noted, in June 1950 the Marine Corps had 74,279 officers and men on active duty. Its Fleet Marine Force, consisting of FMFPac and FMFLant, numbered 27,656. The 11,853 personnel of FMFPac included 7,779 men in General Smith's 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton and 3,733 in General Harris' 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at El Toro. On the East Coast, FMFLant numbered 15,803 with approximately 8,973 Marines in the 2d Division at Camp Lejeune and 5,297 air personnel attached to the 2d Wing at Cherry Point.

Outbreak of Korean hostilities thus presented the Marine Corps with the tasks of organizing and deploying for combat first a brigade and then a full war-strength reinforced division, each with supporting aviation elements. Despite the low strength to which FMFPac had shrunk due to stringent national defense economy measures, the heavy demands placed upon it were met. Both missions were accomplished quickly and effectively. In fact, "few achievements in

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the long history of the Marine Corps can equal what was achieved in the 11 weeks which elapsed between the outbreak of the Korean War and the amphibious assault of the 1st Marine Division at Inchon."

As early as 2 July, CinCFE MacArthur had requested that a Marine RCT-air unit be dispatched to the Far East. On 7 July the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated; on 12–14 July it embarked. With departure of the brigade, personnel shortages within the 1st Division and 1st Wing became acute. The division was reduced to 3,459, less than a RCT; and the wing to 2,300. Meanwhile, as the increasing demand had continued for a Marine Division deployed to Korea, it became equally apparent that if the Marine Corps were to fulfill this requirement of deploying a full-strength division to Korea, its reservists would have to be called up to alleviate these shortages.

Manpower potential of the Marine Corps Reserve was 128,959, nearly twice that of the regular establishment. In June 1950, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve (Ground) numbered 1,879 officers and 31,648 enlisted personnel being trained in 138 OMCR units of battalion size or less. Membership of the ground reserve was approximately 76 percent of its authorized strength. At the same time the Organized Reserve (Aviation) consisted of 30 fighter and 12 ground control intercept squadrons attached to the Marine Air Reserve Training Command organized at Glenview, Ill. in 1946. These MARTCOM squadrons numbered 1,588 officers and 4,753 enlisted, or approximately 95 percent of authorized strength. In addition to nearly 40,000 members of the OMCR, the Marine Volunteer (non-drill, nonpay status) Reserve carried approximately 90,000 on its rolls.

A warning notice went out on 19 July from the Commandant, General Cates, to District Directors that the OMCR would shortly be ordered to active duty; later that same day mobilization of the Reserve was authorized by President Truman, with Congressional sanction. On 20 July, the first 22 ground units, with nearly 5,000 men, were ordered to active duty on a schedule that took into account

30 Historical Outline of the Development of FMFPac, 1941–1950, p. 49.
31 With 7,779 men in 1stMarDiv and 8,973 in the 2dMarDiv, even "had they been combined into a single unit, its numbers would still have fallen 20 percent short of one war-strength division." Giusti, Mobilization, MCR, p. 9.
the unit's state of readiness, proximity to its initial duty station, and facilities there for handling the personnel overload.

Less than a month after hostilities began in Korea, key infantry, artillery, and engineer units of the OMCR had been ordered to extended active duty. On 31 July, West Coast ground reserve units from Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, and Phoenix were the first to report in to Camp Pendleton for augmentation into the 1st Marine Division. The following day their opposite numbers from the East Coast units arrived at Camp Lejeune. By 11 September, all of the organized ground units had reported for duty and the OMCR (Ground) had ceased to exist.

While the organized ground reserve was being mobilized, the first of the 42 MARTCOM fighter and intercept squadrons began arriving at El Toro. Personnel of six reserve VMF and three MGCI squadrons were ordered to duty on 23 July as replacements in the 1st MAW which had furnished units and men for the MAG–33 component of the brigade.

Commenting on the success with which the Marine Corps achieved this expansion, the Secretary of Defense was to note later:

The speed with which this mobilization was effected was an important factor in the rapid buildup of the First Marine Division, the first units of which sailed for the Far East in July 1950.\(^{32}\)

As late as 20 July, the Joint Chiefs of Stay had informed MacArthur that a Marine division could not be sent before November or even December. Finally, on 25 July, the CinCUNCs third request for the division was approved. It would, however, be a division minus one RCT, and the Joint Chiefs were "adamant in their decision that MacArthur must wait until autumn or even winter for his third RCT."\(^{33}\)

The JCS also directed on 25 July that the Marine Corps build its division (less one RCT) to full war strength. The date of 10–15 August was set for its departure to the Far East. Among the many steps taken in the mobilization schedule, the JCS directed that the Camp Lejeune-based 2d Marine Division be expanded immediately to war strength.

Fleshing out personnel—against short-fuzed manpower and time

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\(^{32}\) Semianl Rpt of SecDef (1 Jan-30 Jun) 1953, p. 187.

\(^{33}\) USMC Ops Korea, v. II, p. 23.
transfer of FMFLant-selected, 2d Division/Wing air and ground units, of 6,800 men, to FMFPac;
transfer of 3,600 regular Marines from 105 posts and stations throughout the U.S.;
mobilization of 2,900 from early OMCR ground and air units;
and utilization of two replacement drafts, number 900, intended for the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade.

Expansion of the 1st Marine Division was in two phases, bringing the division (less one RCT) up to war strength and then organizing its third reinforced infantry regiment, the 7th Marines. With the cadre of 3,459 men in the division after the brigade left and the influx of regulars and reservists, the 1st Division embarked for Korea between 10 and 24 August. It had reached wartime strength (less one RCT) on 15 August, just 27 days after beginning its buildup from a peacetime T/O. As it had approached war strength, the Division CG, General Smith, was directed by CMC ltr of 4 August to activate a third RCT and prepare it for departure to Korea no later than 1 September.

While mounting out, the division transferred approximately 1,000 of its rear echelon to be used in the buildup of the 7th Marines. The 6th Marines of the 2d Division provided the base for building this new regiment. (Approximately 800 Marines of 3/6 were reassigned from Mediterranean duty and ordered to the Far East, via the Suez Canal, to join the 7th Marines upon its arrival there.) By drawing men from widely scattered sources, it was possible to activate the 7th Marines on 17 August. Departure of this regiment on 1 September was thus far in advance of the late fall or winter target date originally set by the JCS.

With all OMCR ground units called up and absorbed into the 1st and 2d Divisions, and air squadrons being mobilized on a slower schedule (due to less-urgent combat needs for air personnel in the early war stage), the Marine Corps dealt with its remaining body of reserve strength. Bulk orders went out beginning 15 August to the Volunteer Reserve, and by the end of the year 58,480 men and
women in this category were on active duty. More than 80 percent of the volunteer reservists on Marine Corps rolls served during the Korean War.

Attesting to the impact of events in Korea is the fact that "following the epic withdrawal of the 1st Division from the Chosin Reservoir, the number of new enlistments into the active Volunteer Reserve jumped from 877 in December to 3,477 in January."34

Complete mobilization of the organized ground reserve had been accomplished in just 53 days, from 20 July to 11 September. A previous estimate had shown an expected 80 percent availability of ground reserve on M-Day; the actual mobilization figure was 90 percent. Of 33,528 OMCR ordered to active duty, a total of 30,183 (1,550 officers/28,633 enlisted) reported. Marine aviation also expanded rapidly. By January 1951, 32 organized reserve air units (20 of the 30 existing VMFs and all 12 MGCIs) had been activated and by October of that year all of the reserve squadrons had been called to active duty. Of the 6,341 organized air reservists, 5,240 received orders; 4,893, or 93.4 percent, reported in. In contrast to the ground reserve, air units had been recalled on a staggered or partial mobilization schedule, a matter which was later to receive Congressional attention (and ultimately to set a new trend) when the Nation's entire Korean War mobilization procedures were reviewed and subsequently revised.

Of the Marines participating in the Inchon invasion, 17 percent were reservists. By June 1951 the proportion of reservists in Marine Corps units in Korea had increased to nearly 50 percent. Between July 1950 and June 1953, approximately 122,000 reservists, both recruits and veterans, saw active duty with the Marine Corps.

Throughout the war the Marine Corps effected approximately 34 replacement drafts and another 31 rotation drafts. Ground Marines served an average tour of 13 months overseas (although actual time attached to the division was about 10½ months). The collapse of North Korean forces after the Inchon-Seoul operation and the unopposed landing at Wonsan had pointed to an early end of the Korean conflict. Massive Chinese intervention in November 1950, however, changed the prospect of a short war to a long one and made it necessary to implement a rotation and release policy. By

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34 Giusti, op. cit., p. 36.
March 1951, HQMC had worked out a preliminary phaseout program for reserve personnel (based on the various categories and length of service prior to recall) which was put into effect in June 1951.

During 1952 and up until July 1953, approximately 500 officers and 15,500 enlisted men joined the 1st Marine Division in Korea every six months. Individual monthly replacement drafts generally ranged from 1,900 to 2,500, depending on the combat situation and other personnel needs within the Marine Corps. Monthly rotation drafts of Marines assigned to the States or other duty stations from Korea were usually somewhat smaller than their corresponding incoming numbers. Ranks and MOS of replacement personnel to the end of the war, however, did not always meet the needs of the division. Specialty training conducted by the 1st Marine Division in Korea helped remedy most of the worst deficiencies.

During the latter half of 1952 and throughout 1953, tours for Marine pilots/combat air crews averaged 9 months, and for aviation ground officer/enlisted personnel, 12 months. Following a detailed HQMC study of the advantages of tactical unit as opposed to individual pilot rotation, a new squadron replacement policy was instituted. This procedure assured standard precombat training of all pilots and development of a team spirit prior to the squadron's arrival in the combat theater. Previously this had not been possible with the continuing turnover of 1st MAW personnel under the individual release system. Despite plans during 1952–1953 for replacement and rotation of squadrons as an entity, this did not come about until late in the war when carrier squadron VMA–312 was replaced by VMA–332 in June 1953. With the end of hostilities, tours were extended to approximately 14 months for both aviation and ground Marines.

Buildup of Marine Corps personnel during the Korean War from the June 1950 base of 74,279 is seen in the following strength figures:

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35 Even as late as July 1952, the influx of Class III volunteer reserve pilots, many of whom lacked adequate recent precombat flying experience, had presented a serious wing personnel problem and resulted in on-the-job training for pilots in the VMO–6 fixed-wing section. As another measure to improve squadron operational proficiency and partially correct weaknesses of the individual pilot rotation system and fast turnover, a 100-mission ceiling was inaugurated in February 1953. This applied to aviators in the VMF/VMA tactical units, with the exception of VMF(N)–513 pilots who were rotated after 60 missions.
June 1951 192,620 Marines on active duty
June 1952 231,967 Marines on active duty
June 1953 249,219 Marines on active duty

Altogether, an estimated 424,000 Marines served during the period of hostilities. The war also witnessed a sizable increase in the number of Negro Marines on active duty. This figure grew from 2 officers/1,965 enlisted in 1950 to 19 officers/14,468 enlisted by 1953. Marine officials commented on their fine combat performance, including that of many outstanding NCOs. In line with the changing climate of events and legislation, the Korean War marked the first time that Negro personnel were fully integrated into the military services, in contrast to the segregated units before and during World War II.

Peak strength of the Marine Corps during the Korean emergency occurred on 30 September 1953, when 261,343 were on duty. At the end of the war, 33,107 Marines (26,072 division, 7,035 wing) were stationed in Korea. The time of peak deployed strength in Korea during 1950–1953 appears to have been April 1953, when Marines of the 1st Division/Wing numbered 35,306.37

While the Korean War was still in progress, Congress passed new legislation to remedy certain shortcomings that had become apparent during the emergency, particularly the Nation's recent experience with partial mobilization. These new laws affected the size of the FMF structure of the Marine Corps, its active-duty strength, and its reserve component.

Public Law 416, enacted 28 June 1952, represented several major advances for the Marine Corps. It authorized an increase of Marine Corps strength to a minimum of three combat divisions and three wings; raised the ceiling of regular active-duty personnel to 400,000 (except for normal expansion in a national emergency or war); and provided for the Commandant to sit as co-equal member of the

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36 Assignment of Negro personnel in the armed forces continued to expand as a result of the President's 1948 Executive Order on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity. The Far East Command in July 1951 and the European Command in April 1952 initiated steps towards the racial integration of combat units, followed by similar programs for service units. Semianl Rpt SecDef (1 Jan–30 Jun 1952), p. 21.

37 For detailed breakdown of figures, see 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW ComdDs, Apr 53 and PacFlt Eval Rpt No. 6, Chap. 9, p. 9–54, Chap. 10, p. 10–29. Also, PacFlt EvalRpt No. 5, Chap. 8, p. 8–33 and No. 4, Chap. 9, p. 9–26.
Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of direct concern to the Marine Corps. In reaffirming the role of Marine Corps in the seizure and defense of advanced naval bases, as well as land operations incident to naval campaigns, the law also cited the corollary Marine Corps mission of "performing such other duties as the President may direct." Commenting on Public Law 416, the Commandant observed: "Our views are considered. Our interests are protected. The entire Marine Corps has benefited greatly by these gains." General Shepherd further noted that the new legislation "expresses clearly the intent that the Marine Corps shall be maintained as a ready fighting force prepared to move promptly in time of peace or war to areas of trouble. It recognizes that in the future there may be a series of continuing international crises—each short of all-out war, but each requiring our nation . . . to move shock forces into action on the shortest of notice."  

The two new laws affecting the future training and composition of the Marine Corps and other services were: (1) the Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMT&S), as amended, approved 19 June 1951; and (2) the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 (Public Law 476), approved 9 July 1952. Basically, the two laws sought to establish a sounder mobilization base and were complementary in nature. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 implemented a new mobilization concept: either a partial or total callup of the Nation's reserve forces. In the past, the M–Day target had been geared to a total war only. A limited war, resulting in a partial, Korean-type mobilization, had not been envisioned. The 1952 act thereby provided greater flexibility for dealing with both contingencies and also consolidated much of the existing legislation affecting reserve forces.

Members of the reserve were newly designated by different categories of M–Day priority: ready, standby, and retired reserve. These varying degrees of availability for callup reflected training status (OMCR/volunteer), length of prior service, and related factors (i.e., men with the least service were designated for first callup, or the "Ready" category.) Previously, they were all equally subject for recall in an emergency, regardless of prior service.

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38 Previously, Marine Corps views had been represented at the JCS level by the SecNav or CNO.
40 Thomas, Heinl, and Ageton, op. cit., p. 70.
The 1952 act and its new provisions thereby distinguished between a future national emergency and an all-out war. Theoretically, at least, a national emergency could be proclaimed by the President, calling for a partial mobilization, as in Korea. A declaration of war by Congress, as in World War II, would call for total mobilization. Thus the Marine Corps Reserve was newly earmarked for either a partial or total mobilization.

Under UMT&S, a military service obligation of eight years was established for all young men under age 26 entering the armed forces (whether by enlistment, draft, appointment, or reserve) after 19 June 1951. The act also authorized drafting of male citizens for two-year active duty periods. This new system of eight-year obligors provided the post-Korean MCR with a stable body of personnel who had received their basic training but still had a reserve obligation.

Also as a result of the Korean mobilization, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve troop list was modified in order to provide a manpower pool for additional elements of the regular establishment. Supply, service, and security units were added to provide more of an FMF type of augmentation than that furnished by reserve units in the past. Reestablishment of the OMCR began in October 1951, when the first group of recalled reservists were released from Korean duty. Plans called for a larger reserve and more comprehensive training. Ground units were to be increased from 138 to approximately 255, with the air squadrons to number 42. The Volunteer Reserve was similarly to be strengthened by stricter requirements for participation.

Traditionally the mission of the Marine Corps Reserve, since 1916, had been defined as "providing trained personnel for integration into the Marine Corps in time of national emergency." The strengthened MCR program as a result of Korea and the new laws led to a more serious reappraisal of its role. In looking to its post-Korea future, the Marine Corps planned a revitalized training program that would now "assist in extending the 'force-in-readiness' concept to the Marine Corps Reserve."41 More than ever before, the Marine Corps sought to make its reserve a mirror-image of the regular establishment.

41 Generals' Summary, p. 96.
Problems Peculiar to the Korean War

The undeclared war of Communist China against United Nations forces resulted in major changes in high-level policy and strategy that affected military tactics for the rest of the war. In an attempt to prevent escalation of Korean hostilities into an all-out nuclear war, the decision was made that U.N. forces, both ground and air, would not strike enemy bases in Chinese territory. After the beginning of truce negotiations in July 1951, the mission of Allied ground forces was changed from initiating offensive operations to one of maintaining an active defense of the MLR across Korea. The basic strategy became one of containment and prevention of any further enemy gains south of the 38th Parallel. It involved attempting to inflict maximum losses on the enemy while attempting to minimize those of the UNC. Militarily, these restrictions removed the possibility of winning a decisive victory. For the next two years, fighting seesawed back and forth across the parallel.

Static and defensive warfare thus characterized the greater part of the Korean War. During this period, the Marine division performed a land war mission similar to other Eighth Army components while Marine aviation squadrons flew under control of Fifth Air Force. Both the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing faced tactical restrictions that resulted from the strategic policies governing the overall role of EUSAK and FAF. Problem areas arose from the limited nature of this particular war. These involved not only the shift in the UNC strategy from an offensive posture to a defensive ("active defense") concept, but also from the paralyzing effect of the protracted truce negotiations on battlefield tactics.

For nearly two years (16 months in West Korea and 5 months earlier while in IX Corps on the East-Central front), the Marine division assumed an unaccustomed defensive role. Such a sustained, basically non-win position was hardly morale-building to the average Marine unable to see personally any yardage gained, any progress made in his particular war. Not surprisingly, such a passive battle assignment did result in a temporary loss of amphibious skills on

42 Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: PacFlt Eval Rpts No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, 9, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9, 10; USMC Board Rpt vs. I—II; 1st Marine Division Training Bulletin No. 5—53, "Lessons Learned," dtd 10 Jun 53; hereafter Lessons Learned 5—53; Generals' Summary; Futrell, USAF, Korea; Heinl, Soldiers of Sea.
the part of both individual Marines and the division. End-of-war evaluations noted that "long and indecisive defensive situations such as existed in Korea do little to foster the offensive spirit so long traditional with the Marine Corps and certainly tend to detract from the immediate amphibious readiness required of a Marine Division." 43

Prior to its tour of duty as I Corps reserve in mid-1953, the 1st Marine Division had noted that it would "require intensive training and reequipping for a period of at least 60 days" upon release from active combat in order to "reach a desirable standard of amphibious readiness." 44 Rigorous MARLEX and RCT exercises initiated in June 1952 after the division had moved to the western coastal sector off the Yellow Sea and expanded during its I Corps reserve period, were important steps in rectifying this skill attrition. This was, of course, in addition to the continuous training schedule in offensive and defensive warfare maintained by the division for the battalions and regiment periodically in regular reserve status.

Outpost warfare in West Korea was characterized by overextended MLR frontage. The more than 60,000 yards held by the division while in the I Corps sector resulted in a thinly-held line which invited penetration and encirclement. "Normal" frontage for an infantry division in defense with two regiments on line was considered by U.S. Army doctrine to be 8-9,000 yards. Even with four MLR regiments (two Marine, 1st KMC/RCT, and KPR) and the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion on line (the third Marine regiment in reserve with a counterattack mission), this was a very lengthy sector. It was further complicated by the Han River obstacle on the left flank and the Imjin River to the rear of the sector that separated Marine frontline troops from rear support and reserve units.

Infantry battalions thus occupied "extremely wide fronts, as a rule 3,500 to 5,000 yards," while individual rifle companies were assigned anywhere from "1,200 to 1,700 yards of the MLR to occupy and defend." 45 Prior to the battle of the Hook in October 1952, one of the major engagements on the western front, the 7th Marines at the far right end of the division sector had emplaced all three battalions

43 PacFlt EvalRpt No. 6, p. 9-2.
44 PacFlt EvalRpt No. 5, p. 8-5. Subsequently, the division's ground readiness was rated as excellent; a conservative estimate placed individual unit amphibious readiness at between 25 and 60 percent; and indicated a 30-day training period would bring the division to complete amphibious readiness. General's Summary, p. 53.
45 Lessons Learned 5-53, p. 19.
on line, rather than the customary procedure of two on line and the third in reserve. There was little other choice, for the regimental sector exceeded 10,000 yards, "more properly the frontage for a division rather than a regiment." 46

During a 100 percent watch, at least theoretically, a Marine could be spaced at intervals about every 10 to 15 yards along the MLR. A night 50 percent watch—with personnel of rifle platoons assigned to COPs, listening posts, combat patrols, repair of fortifications, and the KSC nightly supply trains—not infrequently spread personnel to a point where the MLR was dangerously thin, often with 50 yards between men. 47 Such an over-wide lineal deployment dissipated defensive strength and made mutually supporting fires difficult.

Division artillery, too, was thinly positioned across the wide sector, making it difficult to execute counterbattery missions. This led to development of the innovative counter-counterbattery program (or "roving guns") devised by the 11th Marines in May 1952 to deliberately mislead the CCF as to the strength and location of divisional artillery; the situation resulted as well in the reinforcement of the four Marine artillery battalions by heavier I Corps 155mm and 8-inch howitzers. The static situation in the prolonged land campaign also led to the growth of large, semi-permanent type camps which somewhat hampered traditional Marine mobility. Organizations had additional personnel and equipment above T/O and T/E because of the peculiar defense requirements of the sustained battle situation.

The lack of depth in the defense did not provide for receiving the shock of a determined enemy attack, particularly since the normal OPLR had been withdrawn to strengthen the overextended MLR in April 1952, shortly after the division's arrival in West Korea. Ultimately, as we have seen, this main line of resistance concept was modified and rather than a long thin trenchline the Marine division employed a defense-in-depth concept using a series of strongpoints, as in Boulder City and the organization of the postwar main battle position. In contrast to the Marine situation (and that of most other divisions in the EUSAK line), the CCF confronting the 1st Marine Division beyond No-Man's-Land deployed their forces in great depth, boasted unlimited manpower, and employed an elastic type of defense on mutually supporting key terrain features. The

46 Hicks, Outpost Warfare, p. 107.
47 Lessons Learned, op. cit.
enemy had also developed an artillery capability that was numerically superior to ours. And they held high ground positions that overlooked virtually the entire Marine front.

As in World War II, Korean operations provided another instance in which various military services and components were coordinated by joint commands: EUSAK for the ground defense and FAF for air. These massive operational command structures accomplished the desired goals. On lower level echelons, however, some policies tended to be so restrictive that they precluded normal combat initiative and aggressiveness. The net result was thus to allow the enemy to maintain the tactical initiative while, in effect, hampering UNC counter-defense measures.

New directives issued by I Corps in late 1952, for example, changed the corps policy of large-scale raids for prisoners, previously encouraged in the spring of 1952, which affected infantry raids and patrol activities for the rest of the war. Plans for all raids, company size or larger, required both I Corps and EUSAK approval, and were to be submitted 10 days prior to planned execution. Complete patrol plans for even platoon-size operations had to be submitted at least 24 hours in advance. Although the reason for the new policy stemmed from a desire to minimize casualties during the prolonged stalemate, negative effects of such a lead-time factor were quickly apparent. Battalion or regimental commanders frequently were unable to capitalize on targets of opportunity that developed or changes in local conditions, such as weather or troop deployment, to gain maximum effectiveness from the operation.

Directives covering offensive maneuvers that could be taken on local initiative were so restrictive that "any independent action below the level of the Division Commander became practically nonexistent." Similarly, counterattack plans to retake previously considered major COPs were countermanded, on several occasions, by corps or army higher echelons shortly before jump-off time with the reason given that the action was not worth the cost of further UNC casualties or possible jeopardy to the fragile peace negotiations.

Allied offensive capability was further restricted by various EUSAK and I Corps orders issued during the protracted period of truce talks. Many directives had as their well-intentioned rationale the desire

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48 *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9-84.
not to upset the precarious balance in UNC-Communist negotiations by providing the enemy further opportunities for exploitative propaganda victories. The actual record shows, however, that the Communists were never at a loss to conjure up and capitalize on fabricated "events" that suited their purpose—whether charging UNC aircraft had violated the Kaesong neutrality strip, that American fliers were engaging in germ warfare, or deliberately instigating POW camp disruptions and breakouts.

Neutrality restrictions on supporting arms within the entire Kaesong-Panmunjom-Munsan-ni area further complicated the UNC tactical situation and hampered both offensive and defensive operations of the 1st Marine Division. This was particularly true of the center Marine regimental sector which was bisected by the Panmunjom corridor and the no-fire lines. The truce talk neutral zone restrictions prevented the Marines in this area from massing their artillery fires on a desirable scale and also, at times, interfered with proper CAS delivery forward of the MLR. The numerous and sometimes conflicting "no-fly, no-fire" restricting lines stemmed from original agreements made between UNC and Communist representatives in 1951. Subsequently, however, the prohibitions against firing any type of weapon in the area were modified from time to time and added to by FAF, EUSAK, and I Corps, "each time adding to the frustration of the local commanders."50

The double-standard effect of the neutrality restrictions became readily apparent, however. The CCF artfully used this area, by means of his tactics of "creeping" toward the Allied MLR, as a supply and reserve buildup location. The enemy emplaced artillery, assembled troops, and even used the neutral territory for equipment buildups, including tanks, in the Kaesong vicinity.51 Thus the restrictive lines gave the enemy an opportunity to maneuver within an approximate 12 square-mile area, all within effective artillery range and outside of the Kaesong-Panmunjom restricted territory, but UNC units were powerless to take any action.

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49 Basically, these consisted of a no-hostile-act three-mile circular area radiating from Kaesong; a six-mile radius forbidding FAF planes in the skies over Kaesong and another two-mile, no-fly radius over Panmunjom; and various other prohibitions on military craft, air-dropped leaflets, and firing of artillery to include propaganda shell leaflets.
50 PacFlt EvalRpt No. 6, 9-78.
51 PacFlt EvalRpt No. 4, p. 9-37.
Intelligence operations, during the latter stages of the war, were not considered optimum—for either the division or wing. While dug in on the western end of I Corps, the Marine information effort had been "seriously hampered by the lack of prisoners of war."

Only 94 CCF had been captured by the division during the period, compared with more than 2,000 prisoners taken earlier on the East-Central front. This deficiency was attributed to the "static defensive situation, the reluctance of the Chinese to surrender and the heavy volume of fire placed on our reconnaissance patrols."

In the air, photo reconnaissance results were not rated entirely satisfactory as a source of current information by either air or ground Marines. The command channels in effect designated the Air Force as responsible agent for control and coordination of all photo missions in Korea. Requests for photographic missions thus were relayed on to FAF and flown by its Reconnaissance Wing or the Marines' own VMJ–1 squadron. The system produced relatively good vertical coverage with photos available in about 10 days. Special requests for immediate coverage on areas of local importance, however, customarily were either not flown or "delayed to the point where they were of no value" because the tactical situation had been changed.

Delays were due to the shortage of photographic aircraft throughout FAF and the limited provision in T/Os for photo interpretation. Intelligence of air-strike targets (particularly post-strike) was consistently mediocre. Oblique photos of frontline positions took an average of three-four days to be processed and sometimes longer. As an expedient, aerial observers began to shoot their own vertical and oblique photos with hand-held cameras slung over the side of a VMO–6 plane.

Probably the most serious problem of all, from the Marine Corps point of view, was that during much of the Korean War Marine air-ground components, trained to work as a team, were to a large

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62 Generals' Summary, p. 39.
63 Between December 1950–July 1953, the 1st Marine Division took 2,445 NKPA/CCF, with an additional 656 enemy seized by its attached 1st KMC/RTC, or a total of 3,101. Marine capturing units included Headquarters Battalion, 1st Tank Battalion, 11th Marines, the three infantry regiments, and 7th Motor Transport Battalion. An additional 4,792 POWs were also taken by the 1st Division in the early Inchon-Seoul operations. G–1 Folder, Aug 53 (Box 4), "Personnel Periodic Rpt. No. 94, dtd 15–31 Aug 53; USMC Board Rpt, v. I, p. II–B–46.
64 Generals' Summary, p. 39.
65 Ibid.
extent precluded from operating together. The separate missions of
the wing and division reflected, on a smaller scale, the divergent
UNC air and ground doctrine and tactics. After the early moving
battles, Korean hostilities had settled down to a protracted land war
in which ground and air tactical commands did not operate jointly
and were never coordinated to deal a truly devastating blow to the
enemy. Since the Korean War was a limited one most of the fighting
was confined to the stabilized front across Korea. Both air and naval
forces were viewed largely as supporting arms for the ground
operation.

Due to political-military considerations, UNC tactical air power
had been, in effect, handcuffed so that its use would not appear
"overly aggressive" and threaten an enlargement of the Korean
hostilities into a nuclear armageddon of World War III.\footnote{Much of the unwritten but basic policy mitigating against full use of Allied air superiority stemmed from the desire to employ "humanitarian" standards in the UNC war effort. Following WWII there had been wide criticism of the "moral wrong of massed air bombardment" as well as employment of the atomic bomb by the U.S. to hasten the end of the war. The UNC goal, in Korea, was to avoid needless civilian casualties and for air strikes to be directed against purely military targets. Futrell, \textit{USAF Korea}, p. 41.} Since the earliest days of the war, a strict embargo had been placed on any bombing of Chinese rear supply areas or industrial complexes although it was obvious that much of the enemy's logistical strength lay beyond the Manchurian border.

Air efforts were concentrated largely on nuisance or harassing
raids within North Korea and close air support efforts of various
types, rather than a systematic destruction of the enemy's primary
supply installations. Some ranking officers had informally interpreted
official Washington policy as "Don't employ airpower so that the
enemy will get mad and won't sign the armistice."\footnote{Ibid., p. 402.} Indeed, it was
not until after the Communists had rejected what the UNC called
its "final truce package," in April 1952, that it was decided to exert
greater pressure against the Communists. The list of approved aerial
targets was then enlarged to include North Korean hydro-electric
power facilities, previously exempted from air attack.

From late 1950 until early 1953, Marine air squadrons were as-
signed directly by FAF, with CG, 1st MAW, having virtually no
tactical control over his own units. Marine Corps aerial doctrine
traditionally employed close air support of ground operations as the
primary role of its air arm. FEAF and FAF, however, in their interpretation of employment of tactical air power directed FAF maximum efforts toward interdiction missions, sometimes even to the expense of immediate CAS needs.\textsuperscript{58} As Far East Air Forces stated late in 1951, "when required, close air support of United Nations Army forces may take precedence over other FEAF programs."\textsuperscript{59} Interdiction, general support, and close support missions were the normal order of priorities flown by FEAF-FAF.

Operation STRANGLE, the 10-month, all-out, air interdiction campaign during 1951-1952 originally had as its objective the destruction of the North Korean road-rail network. The interdiction program had been defined at first as a move to "paralyze enemy transportation in the zone between the railheads at the 39th Parallel and the front lines."\textsuperscript{60} and later somewhat more conservatively as a measure to so "disrupt the enemy's lines of communication . . . that he will be unable to contain a determined offensive by friendly forces . . . or to mount a sustained offensive himself."\textsuperscript{61}

Despite more than 87,552 interdiction sorties flown during the period, CinCFE daily intelligence summaries showed that aerial harassment of the CCF had not hindered their defensive efforts. Instead, by the summer of 1952 the enemy had "actually doubled in troop strength, reinforced their artillery strength to equal that of the UN forces, developed a tremendous AA capability, and established the capability for launching a general offensive."\textsuperscript{62} With UNC air and sea superiority, the Chinese Communists had still succeeded in keeping their main supply route open. Rail track cuts were being repaired in as little as 36 hours. And the CCF was employing

\textsuperscript{58} Comments Futrell, \textit{USAF, Korea}, pp. 430-431: "Despite the fact that responsible Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force commanders had decided that the rail-interdiction attacks would best accomplish the United Nations mission in Korea, Eighth Army subordinate commanders were gravely dissatisfied with the limitations [96 sorties daily for the entire Eighth Army front, decided upon by EUSA-FAF in November 1951] placed on close support." One of those dissenting subordinates at the time was CG, 1st Mar Div. Following the September 1951 heavy fighting in the Punchbowl area, General Thomas officially described the Marine division's air support as unsatisfactory and stated his division had "taken unnecessary casualties because its air support had not been adequate or timely." Average elapsed time between the division's CAS requests and its 187 approved missions that month had been nearly two hours. Only 32 immediate air-support requests had been filled within 30 minutes.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid., p. 432.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 296.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., pp. 435-436.

\textsuperscript{62} PacFlt EvalRpt No. 5, p. 9-58.
Korean Reflection

more fire power than ever: in May 1952, some 102,000 rounds fell against UNC positions compared to only 8,000 the previous July.

Even the retiring UNC Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, admitted before Congressional representatives in 1952 that the enemy had greater offensive potential than ever before, and the Commander, Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark, declared flatly: "The interdiction program was a failure... It did not interdict."63 USAF spokesmen felt it had attained its limited purpose but opined: "Seen abstractly, the United Nations railway-interdiction campaign was defensive and preventive rather than offensive and positive."64 In early 1952, CG, FAF, General Everest, recognizing that his pilots "had been so long engaged in interdiction attacks that they were losing their skills in close support"65 inaugurated a new system. Beginning in March all fighter-bomber squadrons were to be rotated on weekly close-support missions.

Actually, the skies had begun to clear for Marine aviation operational difficulties by the latter half of 1952. A better understanding had developed between both high-level officials and the working day-to-day liaison operations at JOC. CG, 1st MAW had "established his position so firmly he was able to guide establishment of the policies which governed his operations merely by expressing his desires to CG 5th AF."66 The battle for Bunker Hill in August 1952 had marked excellent cooperation between Eighth Army and FAF, with the 1st Marine Division receiving air priority for two days. In any event, matters were substantially improved from late 1951-early 1952 when, during a 12-month period, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1st MarDiv had plummeted to the incredibly low figure of 1,95667 or 15.8 percent of the wing's total 12,372 CAS sorties during FY 1952 (1Jul51–30Jun52).

Commenting on this unhappy period for both air and infantry Marines, Lieutenant General Richard C. Mangrum, USMC (Retired), who was CO, MAG–12 during part of the STRANGLE operations, said "for the rest of 1951 and well into 1952 the major effort

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63 Cagle and Manson, Sea War, Korea, p. 270.
64 Futrell, USAF, Korea, pp. 437-438.
65 Ibid., p. 434.
66 Ibid., p. 9-45.
67 By contrast: in FY 1951, 1st MAW CAS sorties for 1st MarDiv were 7,000 of total 14,028 CAS sorties, or 50 percent; for FY 1953, the figure was 4,912 of total 14,540 CAS sorties, or 32.4 percent. Generals' Summary, Chart C, following p. 58.
of my Group and of MAG-33 was devoted to cutting the rail lines in North Korea. Without success, of course. Little by little we were able to increase the percentages of effort devoted to close support of the troops.  

And by the last six months of the war the bulk of all CAS missions received by the division were flown by 1st MAW aircraft, in contrast to earlier periods when a third or half of the division's sorties were Marine-flown. As the last Korean War Wing CG noted, despite basic differences between Army-Air Force and Marine Corps-Navy concept and tactics, ultimately "the commanders of the Fifth Air Force in actual daily practice decentralized control to a marked degree."  

Throughout the war, however, a lack of standardized terms and differences in request procedures continued to exist. (This was resolved by using Marine control procedures when flying for the division, and Army-Air Force procedures when scrambled on flights for other divisions.) Whereas EUSAK-FAF considered strikes inside the bombline as "close air support" and those outside it as "general support," the Marine CAS concept was one of support in close proximity to frontlines (ranging from 50 to 500 yards out) that affects the fire and maneuver of those ground units. In the hands of Marine FACs, Marine planes employed on close support strikes had a definite influence on the MLR tactical situation.  

Then, too, the Marine system of maintaining aircraft "on air alert" resulted in CAS requests being filled in 5 to 15 minutes. Air support requests screened in the regular manner by Eighth Army and FAF at the JOC level resulted in a delivery of ordnance to the target in a minimum of 30 minutes and delays sometimes of nearly four hours.  

During fluid situations, when the division required more than 40 sorties per day, the "on station" system proved more tactically effective than the FAF preplanned "on call" procedure.  

Operational differences between the Marine-Navy and Army-Air Force type of CAS in a critical ground situation were never more apparent than in a major CCF last-ditch effort when the enemy
slammed against ROK defenses in the Kumsong area. An end-of-
war report noted:

CCF penetration of the II ROK Corps sector, in July, 1953, brought
clearly into focus the ineffectiveness of the Air Force-Army close air
support (CAS) system during periods of fluid operations. CCF eruption
through the II ROK Corps MLR and deep into friendly territory eliminated,
as effective or practical, the complete reliance by 5th AF on pre-planned
CAS strikes (using aircraft from the ground-alert pool), against fleeting
targets or targets of an immediate nature. These types of targets are con-
sidered normal during a fluid situation.

The inadequacy of communications for rapid transmission of air sup-
port requests in the CAS system employed in Korea, the impossibility of
only four TACP's per division (U.S. and ROK Army) to keep up with
frontline battalion battle actions in order to control CAS strikes, and the
over-centralization of control of CAS request approvals and CAS aircraft
allocation were all clearly demonstrated during that period of fluid ground
operations in July.\textsuperscript{72}

Despite the accommodation reached during the Korean War, many
of these fundamental differences in doctrine and employment of air
support to ground troops in combat persisted until recent years.\textsuperscript{73}

As military history has shown countless times in the past, wars
are fought under the prevailing difficulties of the time. There never
was a war waged under ideal conditions. A reflection on operational
problems of the Korean period is predicated on the thought that a
review of them—and the solutions effected where possible—may
help avoid their repetition in a conflict of the future.

\textit{Korean Lessons}\textsuperscript{74}

In the early phase of the Korean War, the 1st Marine Division
deployment was in a moving battle situation similar to numerous

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{PacFlt EvalRpt} No. 6, p. 10-3.
\textsuperscript{73} For a penetrating discussion of interservice problems dealing with air-ground liaison
and communications, use of FACs, and CAS capability, etc., see U.S. Congress, Rpt of
Special Subcommittee on Tactical Air Support of the Committee on Armed Services,
Otis G. Pike, Chairman (House of Reps., 89th Congress, 1 Feb 66), Washington: GPO,
1966.
\textsuperscript{74} Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived from: \textit{PacFlt EvalRpts}
No. 4, Chaps. 9, 10, No. 5, Chaps. 1, 8, No. 6, Chaps. 1, 9; \textit{Generals' Summary; Lessons Learned 5–53; 1stMarDiv PIR 942, dt d 7 Aug 53; 1st MAW PIR 127–53, dt d 7 May 53, Encl (1) Estimate of Enemy Ground Situation #1–53 (end-of-war analysis);
engagements it had fought in the past 175 years. Most of the "lessons" learned from the enemy, the tactical situation itself, and the terrain in Korea are derived largely from the later outpost warfare stage when the Marines were employed in a stabilized and sustained defensive situation similar to that facing other Allied units across the entire Eighth Army front. Tactics of defense on a wide front, construction of permanent type field fortifications, and organization of the battle position in difficult terrain was a new experience to Marines. This period of limited objective attacks and battles of attrition highlighted the importance of small unit tactics and demonstrated some modified concepts regarding employment of supporting arms.

During the period of outpost warfare, the 1st Marine Division was never confronted by a general enemy offensive or combined infantry-armor-artillery-air assault. The nature of the conflict was one of limited objective attacks, with strong and sometimes sustained probes. Typically, these were two-battalion assaults against a platoon-size outpost.

Time after time, as UNC defending troops learned, the CCF characteristic pattern of attack was repetitive and almost predictable. After dark, heavy preparatory fires deluged an isolated advance outpost. Crude, but effective, improvised demolitions often reduced COP fortifications so that the enemy could assail the position. Waves of attacking Chinese then overwhelmed the greatly outnumbered defenders. Almost invariably the initial attack made on the front of the position was a feint; the real attack would be made by troops that had enveloped the position and moved to the rear. Enemy ambush forces were also located to the rear of the outpost, between the COP and MLR, at normal reinforcement routes to prevent both

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75 If the enemy advanced closer than 50 yards, by closely following under heavy preparatory fires, he could penetrate the position. At this close range, normal box-me-in artillery fires were not close enough to break up the attack. Lessons Learned 5-53, p. 10.
a pullback by the defenders to the MLR and to stop reinforcements from reaching the outpost.

Effective defensive fire plans for the COPs covered all likely enemy approaches and assembly areas, as well as close-in boxing fires of the COP on all sides. Marine defense positions were sited for all-round defense, with special attention paid to covering the rear approaches at night. This tactic of rear envelopment also applied on a smaller scale to patrols. Invariably the CCF maneuvered to the flanks and rear of a friendly patrol in an attempt to encircle it. The CCF skillfully employed both the terrain and troops and regularly attacked from more than one direction.

Experience with Communist combat techniques forced UNC leaders to reevaluate their own night-fighting tactics. The Chinese had a marked superiority in night operations. Every major attack on Marine outposts during the last year of the war was made at night. When they were not directly assaulting a friendly site, the CCF advanced their own ground positions by digging and their well-known creeping tactics. This enabled them to establish an OP line within small arms and mortar range of Marine COPs and the MLR. The battle for Bunker Hill came about as a result of this enemy tactic. Organization in early 1952 of COP–2A, adjacent to the Panmunjom corridor, was in direct rebuttal to this same tactic. By such indirect methods, the Chinese were further able to extend their already favorable high ground positions which gave them observation over practically all of the Marine front line. Defensively the enemy used the cover of darkness equally well: mountain roads were aswarm with trucks and supply movements, which UNC nightfighters and bombers slowed with only moderate success.

Skilled, rapid construction of field fortifications and excellent camouflage discipline by the enemy were also object lessons. Entrances to tunnels and caves, as well as the bunkers themselves were so carefully disguised by fresh branches, weeds, logs, and other natural foliage that they were rarely visible either by air observer or aerial photographs. Active weapons positions were also effectively camouflaged. Often 60mm and 82mm mortars were housed in bunkers and fired through a narrow opening at the top. If moved out temporarily to an open slope, they were quickly returned to the bunker to avoid detection. The Chinese elaborate underground system of trenchworks and radial tunnels between forward and rear
bunkers was sometimes as much as 35 yards long. Underground bunkers and tunnels often had 20 feet or more of protective dirt cover and offered security from anything except a direct aerial hit.

Destruction of the enemy's trenches, bunkers, and cave network by medium and heavy artillery was only partially successful. Napalm was generally ineffective due to the lack of combustible materials in CCF ground defenses. The well-prepared, deeply dug fortifications were virtually impervious to anything less than air assaults with heavy ordnance (1,000-pound bombs and over) which were required to destroy CCF reverse slope positions.

A well dug-in secondary line was located four to eight miles to the rear of the Chinese MLR. Intelligence indicated that an attack to infiltrate CCF defenses would "require the penetration of a fortified area to a minimum depth of 10 miles." Some Korean War analysts maintained that behind their front line the Chinese had entrenched the ridges to an average depth of 14 miles and that the enemy "could have fallen back upon successive prepared positions for all that distance." Although the trench warfare period of the Korean War was often likened to World War I, the Chinese defensive works were estimated to have "ten times the depth of any belt of entrenchments in World War I." Some areas had even been engineered for defense against nuclear attack. Caves, tunnels, and particularly reverse slope positions also showed CCF skill in the selection and organization of terrain features.

Both the nature of the ground fighting and weather in Korea quickly indicated that our bunker construction needed to be improved. Siting them lower into the ground, so that the outline of the bunkers would not make them such ready targets, and reinforcing them to withstand a 105mm direct hit were steps in this direction. Use of sandbags (of which there was a continuing shortage) for both bunkers and trenches proved to be almost as much a problem as a solution. Bunkers above ground shored up with sandbags frequently collapsed in times of heavy rains or Korean spring thawing conditions.

Outpost warfare also proved that the average bunker often became a deathtrap when used defensively. This was due to the enemy

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76 *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 5, p. 8-29.
78 Ibid., p. 116.
proclivity for sealing entrances with their satchel charges, as occurred in the Vegas Cities battle. It became evident that large living-fighting bunkers could easily turn into traps in which many men could become casualties simultaneously, and from which few could fight. Despite their exposed nature, fighting holes were often safer. Some Korean combat officers were of the opinion that rather than our six-to eight-man bunkers, smaller two-man fighting units would be obviously faster to build, more effective, and safer since they would present a smaller target.

A 1st Marine Division training bulletin issued near the end of the war stated categorically:

As a rule no bunker or cave should be large enough to accommodate more than four men. If the cave is bombardment proof, there is another greater danger that the men will fail to man their fighting positions quickly enough after the enemy fire lifts or ceases.\(^7^9\)

UNC reconnaissance and security activities also showed need for improvement. Night raids, patrol operations, and ambushes were conducted continuously to maintain contact with the enemy, keep him off balance, and obtain intelligence. This type of mobile, small-unit action repeatedly indicated an urgent need for more basic training in night combat operations at the squad and platoon level. The frequent breakdown of communications in night fighting, whether it involved a small patrol or besieged outpost, was particularly critical. Some regimental commanders noted the failure to employ properly organic small arms in combat action during darkness before requesting heavier supporting fires. It was felt that the practice of calling for mortar or artillery fire to the exclusion of using small arms was a dangerous practice which was being overused and that "even in the defense the spirit of the offensive must be maintained."\(^8^0\)

Meticulous planning was vital for effective fire plans, alternate avenues of approach, and evacuation. Detailed rehearsals of raids were essential.

Night operations proved it was necessary to have a combat patrol sufficiently large to allow for both the accomplishment of the mission and evacuation of casualties. In evaluating the Korean experience, Marine officers pointed to the difficulties of operating effectively on "pitch black nights when a man could barely see his own hand in

\(^{79}\) Lessons Learned, 5–53, p. 11.

\(^{80}\) 5thMar ComdD, Nov 52, App. VI, p. 4.
front of him or when the most prominent terrain feature could not be silhouetted.\textsuperscript{81} Some commanders declared that such circumstances often lead to patrols accidentally walking into minefields—their own, as well as the enemy’s.

In their security measures, CCF strict policing of the battlefield after either a small raid or major assault was well known to every Marine infantryman as part of the Chinese elaborate precautions to preserve order of battle identity. CCF counterintelligence efforts were equally scrupulous. Despite extensive precautions to keep the relief of the Marines by the 25th Infantry Division secret in May 1953, enemy psychological warfare loudspeakers predicted the relief date one week in advance. Later they broadcast a change in date that was equally accurate. Two heavy enemy probes made in July while individual battalion reliefs were in process also demonstrated the Chinese acuity in intelligence activities.

The necessity for UNC commanders to avoid a fixed pattern in operations was insufficiently recognized. A battle diary found on a CCF soldier killed in early 1953, had observed about the Americans:

Two days before an enemy relief they clamor in their trenches, and at the same time heavily bombard our positions.

For small scale attacks, the enemy sends out a small group of men crawling on their hands and knees; however, in large scale attacks, they intensly bombard our positions.

An enemy artillery bombardment following air reconnaissance indicates that the enemy will probably launch a ground attack within a short period.\textsuperscript{82}

As the CG, 1st Marine Division further commented about overuse of established procedures:

The same tactics and techniques should not be followed in every raid. The pattern should be altered to the extent that the tactics and techniques employed will not indicate the objective to the enemy. The time selected for raids should vary to permit the conduct of both daylight and night raids. Employment of supporting arms including the delivery of smoke must be varied to prevent indication of the objective.\textsuperscript{83}

Enemy ability to locate listening posts and take them under direct fire or mortar attack also dictated the need for frequent change in location.

\textsuperscript{81} Batterton, Korea Notes, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{82} PacFlt EvalRpt No. 6 p. 9–58 citing Eighth U.S. Army PIR No. 948.
\textsuperscript{83} Lessons Learned 5–53, p. 2.
Regarding the use of supporting arms, the Korean terrain itself dictated a need for modification of traditional practices of employing both direct and indirect fire weapons in order to achieve maximum effectiveness. Standard Marine Corps use of both crew-served infantry weapons and artillery centered around the concept of interlocking and mutually reinforcing bands of fire. Neither the frontage nor terrain in Korea was what could be termed “normal.” Battalion frontages were often more than twice the accepted maximum. The terrain consisted of steep main ridge lines with many steep finger ridges leading off both sides. Such contours require twice as many machine guns for adequate defense against enemy attacks if employed in positions affording the usual interlocking grazing fire.

For both infantry weapons on the forward COPs and MLR, and supporting artillery batteries, the combination of “stretching unit fronts and unstretchable ranges”84 of the weapons caused them to lose a considerable amount of their mutual support capability, as one artillery regimental commander commented about the experience of the 1st Marine Division in Korea. As a result, a compromise was often effected whereby machine guns were emplaced on the high ground of the ridge line, with their individual sectors of fire extended to 180 degrees. Although the guns were no longer mutually supporting, the numerous finger ridges could be better covered by fire to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on them prior to assault on the main ridge line.

As previously noted, the Marine division also modified its concept about occupying the military crest, rather than the topographical crest, of forward slopes.85 In view of CCF tactics, forward slope positions offered the advantage of observation and superior fields of fire and assisted in bringing fire on the enemy in those areas and approaches masked from the view of reverse slope positions.

Under conditions of stabilized defensive lines in Korea, the great offensive power of Marine tanks was somewhat limited. They were used extensively as direct fire weapons and supplemented the artillery regiment by firing deep H&I (harassing and interdiction) missions. In West Korea, it proved expedient to have friendly tanks positioned in defiladed assembly areas where they were on call and

85 See Chapter VI.
ready to move into MLR firing slots on short notice. They often provided close fire support to Marine patrols and outpost defense actions, sometimes being called in for fire missions before the direct support artillery.

Since tanks under enemy observation invariably drew retaliatory fire, they usually remained in firing positions on the MLR only long enough to complete their fire mission. Deployment of several M-46s in mutually supporting MLR positions, however, tended to reduce the volume of hostile fire. When operating forward of the MLR, it was important that the armored vehicles be protected by infantry from enemy tank-killer teams. Often the Marine artillery observer's knowledge of the terrain and familiarity with objective targets upon which the tank could be effectively used was thus relayed to the tanker, particularly when such targets were themselves obscured to the tank gunner. In registering the target, however, the adjustment system used by the gunner differed from that of the artillery FOs. It was recommended that use of tank guns and lights be made part of the regular COP fire plan.

The Korean experience demonstrated in particular the need for better rehearsed tank-infantry patrols. It also showed the need for a reliable tank-mounted searchlight with a range up to 2,000 yards. Smoke and muzzle blast of the 90mm gun often reduced the effectiveness of the tank searchlight. When two tanks were employed as a team (one spotting targets and adjusting fire with the light, while the other zeroed in on the illuminated targets), the searchlight was markedly more effective.

Outpost warfare, which was predominantly night fighting, was thus characterized by patrolling and ambushes, artillery dueling, and sharp battles for contested terrain that would offer improved observation. In this stand-off period of positional warfare, ground defenses were developed to the point where "both sides were incomparably stronger than they had been in actual [moving] battle."86

Lessons from Korea dealt not only with modified battle tactics, but involved an evaluation of enemy performance and capabilities, as well as certain strategic considerations which had so markedly affected the course of the war. UNC forces in Korea faced an adversary who had vast resources of manpower and, accordingly, was

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wholly indifferent to the cost of victory in terms of personnel and time. In fact, the enemy believed that mass was the key to victory. In many instances Chinese commanders did not launch an offensive unless their attack force had a three-to-one superiority over the defending friendly unit.

Combat effectiveness of the CCF was evaluated as good to excellent. Chinese officers demonstrated good combat leadership. They were well schooled in both offensive and defensive military tactics. Some units had been trained for amphibious operations. During the long period of positional warfare, the CCF had built up their military capability (troops, artillery, AA guns) and resupplied their forward units. Maintaining a steady flow of supplies had been an earlier weakness of the CCF logistics system. During the last six months of the war Chinese stockpiles were adequate for 35 days of offensive operations; the enemy was capable of supporting a major offensive for a 17–24 day period.

By contrast, the North Korean soldier was considerably less effective. The larger number of NKPA prisoners taken and their greater desertion rate indicated poorer discipline and lower morale. NKPA units were rated from poor to good. After 1951, NKPA forces decreased in importance while the CCF assumed a greater role in the combat effort as well as in the truce negotiations.

Chinese weapons and equipment were characterized by a lack of standardization due to the absence of a central system of production or ordnance supply. Their weapons included a wide assortment of foreign manufacture—Japanese, U.S., German, Czechoslovakian, Soviet, and Chinese design. Because of a shortage of small arms, usually not more than a third of the personnel in their combat units were individually armed. Despite this fact the CCF soldier was convinced he was good and had “proved himself to be a formidable opponent in combat.”

Individually and as units, the CCF exhibited the traditional Oriental characteristics of extreme patience, passivity, and determination. Some authorities went so far as to declare that the Chinese ability to:

\[\ldots\text{remain quiet for a long period and to patrol stealthily are the main reasons for the success of his engagements.}\]

The enemy’s successes which

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have resulted from his patience and stealth show that our troops need more training in the same technique.\(^8\)

The enemy’s tenacious determination to hold key terrain, regardless of the costs of lives, was well known. Another evaluation concluded:

The Chinese [is] well and courageously led at the small unit level. He is thoroughly disciplined. He is an industrious digger. His conduct of the defense is accomplished in spite of UN superiority in the air, his inferior communications equipment and his hodgepodge of weapons and equipment.\(^8\)

Battlefront lightweightness and mobility, particularly in Korean winter operations, was another important object lesson from the enemy. Marine cold weather clothing, including thermal boot and body armor which had saved so many lives, was of excellent design and quality. Despite this, some authorities felt that during the Korean War the Marine was “placed at a disadvantage when he met the CCF soldier,”\(^9\) because of bulky cold-weather clothing that hindered freedom of movement. The weight of some of the Marine infantryman’s weapons, such as the 16½ lb. BAR (plus magazines) and the 9½ lb. M–1 rifle, was felt to contribute further to this lack of mobility. In contrast, “the CCF soldier dressed in his quilted uniform and armed with a ‘burp’ [submachine] gun, moved freely and quietly over the roughest of terrain, thereby gaining a not inconsiderable advantage over his heavily burdened adversary.”\(^10\)

This superior mobility led to the related advantage of tactical surprise. Since CCF units were unencumbered by heavy weapons they could readily use primitive routes of approach in the darkness. Their movements through disputed terrain were typically so furtive that often there was no preliminary warning until the CCF were virtually within grenade-throwing distance of friendly patrols or installations. The enemy practice of hiding by day and moving by night also concealed their presence from UN air reconnaissance.

One observer of the Korean scene, both in the early battles of 1950 and again in 1953, has compared the CCF development of military skills during this period, as follows:

\(^8\) *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9–41.
\(^10\) *PacFlt EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 9–82.
\(^1\) *Ibid.*
In 1950, the Red Chinese were a crude lot, given more to pell-mell attacks and diehard stands than to deception and protection. But they stayed and they learned as they went along. When they entered the war, apart from their exceptional skill and persistence with the machine gun, they were not accurate users of hand weapons... by 1953, few of the old signs remained. They had become as tenacious and as earth-seeking as ants, and in that lay a great part of their success. Two and one-half years of war in Korea were a bonanza for Communist China. On that training ground her armies became as skilled as any in the world in the techniques of hitting, evading and surviving.92

The most telling characteristic of the Chinese Communist soldier, who essentially was a guerrilla fighter, may thus be his ready capacity to learn from experience, particularly the fine art of deception.

As important as any of the lessons from the battlefield was the experience of dealing with the Communists at the truce table. Cease-fire talks dragged on interminably over a period of 2 years and 17 days. Some 158 meetings were held, with more than 18 million words recorded, most of these dealing with the prisoner exchange that had been the major stumbling block since early 1952. During the two years of the truce talks, from July 1951–July 1953, an additional 56,000 Americans had been killed or wounded, bringing total U.S. combat losses to more than 136,000.93 (U.S. forces suffered some 80,000 casualties in the first year of the war.) And in the end, the final solution to the POW problem was substantially that first proposed by the UNC in April 1952.

Commenting on the Communist stratagem that opened the truce talks in July 1951, U.S. government officials observed at the time the negotiations began:

The suggestion was received with caution since the free people of the world have learned that Communist words and Communist intent seldom coincide. Regardless, our leaders initiated action for preliminary ceasefire talks with the hope that the Communists were acting in good faith.94

Despite this early realistic appraisal of the enemy, the degree to which the Communists were to employ truce negotiations as simply an extension of the battlefield was not immediately evident.

A key factor is involved here. The proverbial Chinese quality of passivity and seemingly endless patience, both on the individual and

94 Semianl Rpt SecNav (1 Jan–30 Jun), 1951, p. 187.
national level, was fully utilized to their advantage. In contrast, the Western people, particularly Americans, are characteristically impatient to complete a task once it is started. As Admiral C. Turner Joy, USN, who initially headed the UNC delegation to the Korean Armistice Conference, commented, "We are a people who like to get things done . . . The Communist negotiating method recognizes and seeks to gain advantage by aggravating our American tendency to impatience through the imposition of endless delays." The American attitude is to feel that a deadlocked issue should be resolved by mutual concessions, which puts the enemy on favorable ground in employing his delaying tactics. The Communist view is that by deliberately slowing the progress toward completion of the armistice the position of their opponent will gradually be undermined. Thus, Communists regard any concession made by their opponents as a sign of weakness. Whereas Westerners often feel that to accept part of a negotiating proposal will encourage the Communists to respond in kind, such an action is apt to lead to an even more unyielding position on their part.

The armistice effort in Korea also taught the following lessons:

Never weaken your pressure when the enemy sues for [an] armistice. Increase it.
Armistice conferences should be brief . . . to allow . . . talks to become protracted is to indicate weakness on your part. This encourages your Communist opponents.
The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside the area of conflict.
Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, merely to make progress.

Possibly no one had more first-hand experience in negotiating with the enemy in the Korean War than Colonel James C. Murray, the Marine Corps staff officer who was involved in the truce talks from 8 July 1951 to 27 July 1953. In these two years he served as liaison officer between the delegations of the two sides and participated actively in meetings. On three different occasions he negotiated the truce line which was to separate UNC and Communist forces. In July 1953, as Senior Liaison Officer, he was in charge of

95 Joy, Truce Negotiations, p. 39.
96 Ibid., pp. 166-173, passim.
the UNC staff group that determined the final line of demarcation. He has noted that Communist rationalizations readily disregard whatever facts or logic which do not fit their purpose, no matter how inconsistent.

While customarily ignoring all restrictions of the Geneva Convention in dealing with prisoners, for example, when it was expedient to their interests the Communists would then argue for an incredibly narrow interpretation of the Convention’s provisions. Declared Colonel Murray: “Having come to the conference table only because they were near defeat, the Communists were prepared from the very first to make the most of the negotiations to create... a ‘climate of victory’.” This accounts for their concern with even the smallest detail of ”stage setting,” for maintaining ”face,” and for practical advantages from negotiating conditions, such as the physical setting of the truce talk site.

As the Marine officer further observed:

A fundamental objective of the Communists in respect to the truce was the appearance of the Communist victory in Korea... An armistice, no less than war, could be looked upon only as a means to an end... to this end they negotiate patiently and skillfully... temporary inconveniences must be borne for... the attainment of long-range political objectives.”

Certainly, the close interaction between Communist military operations and truce negotiations, a key factor since 1951, was particularly apparent during April–July 1953 as the war drew to an end.

In addition to Communist China which had emerged stronger and with considerably more prestige from the war, the other Asian nation to have undergone marked military growth was the Republic of Korea. In June 1950, the ROK army had numbered approximately 98,000 inadequately trained troops, armed chiefly with hand-carried weapons such as rifles and carbines, ill-prepared to hold back a determined enemy attack. The ROK army was little more than a constabulary force organized by KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group) for internal police duty. Only 65,000 men had actually received unit combat training. ROK armed forces during the three years of the war had increased six-fold and by July 1953 totaled nearly 600,000 men.

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98 Ibid., p. 29.
Training and equipment had steadily improved the ROK battle efficiency which, in the 1950–1951 period, had been handicapped by lack of heavy tanks, mortars, artillery, antitank mines and shells, and other heavy weapons. By the spring of 1951 the ROK army was being transformed into an effective fighting force, due largely to the determination of General Van Fleet, then EUSAK commander. In 1952 the ROK army had been enlarged to 12 divisions and the ROK Marine forces had been similarly expanded. Gradual augmentation resulted in a total of 16 ROK divisions, most of these with organic artillery; by July 1953 ROK troops had assumed responsibility for the majority of the UN line.

Marine Corps experience with its ROK counterpart had been instructive and generally encouraging. Organized in 1949 by the Republic of Korea with assistance from KMAG, the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment had taken part in antiguerilla operations until the NKPA invasion. With the outbreak of hostilities, the KMCs engaged in UN delaying actions in southwest Korea until September 1950 when the Korean regiment of nearly 3,000 men was attached to the 5th Marines as part of the Inchon assault force. Later the KMCs were involved in defense of Wonsan and the Hamhung-Hungnam beachhead as well as the Pohang patrol. After serving as a maneuver element with the ROK forces in early 1951, the 1st KMC Regiment was attached permanently to the 1st Marine Division in March of that year, participating in the Hwachon Reservoir fighting and performing valuable service in the interrogation of POWs.

The KMCs modeled themselves after U.S. Marines, particularly emulating the traditional offensive Marine esprit de corps and overriding goal to “close with the enemy and seize the objective” regardless of strong resistance. The combat courage and determination of the KMCs was cited by CG, 1st Marine Division, on several occasions.

During the 1952–1953 period, the KMC/RCT provided the Marine division with nearly a quarter of its combat strength and became the fourth regiment of the division. The ROK Marine Corps also consisted of the 2d KMC Regiment, which furnished personnel for the WCIDU/ECIDU island security forces, and the 5th KMC Battalion, attached to the Marine division in 1952. Classes in infantry tactics for KMC officer and enlisted personnel were conducted

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99 See “1stMarDiv, 1st KMC Regt. and Its Relationship to the 1stMarDiv,” “SAR” File (Korea), Type “C” Rpt.
at the Korean Marine Corps Training Center at Chinhae. This was patterned after U.S. Marine Corps recruit and officers' basic schools, under supervision of USMC staff personnel. Coupled with an offensive spirit and desire to attain U.S. Marine Corps standards and combat performance, the Korean Marines largely overcame early major problems resulting from the language barrier, translation of U.S. basic training materials, and the insufficient number of qualified and experienced Korean military instructors. One early recruit class possibly established a record for brevity in training when its members, after only a few weeks, were ordered to participate in the Inchon assault which was the Korean Marines' first specialized amphibious operation.

Many of the hard lessons of Korea—as well as some of its unique problems—resulted from the fact that this was America's first major experience in a modern, undeclared, and limited war. Accustomed to the tradition of hard-hitting, all-out war and decisive victory, both the fighting man at the front and Nation tended to view the conflict as well as its ultimate accomplishments as inconclusive.\(^{100}\)

Most importantly, immediate collective security action by the UNC had prevented another small country from being subdued by direct, armed aggression. And the Communists had failed to attain their objective: the forced unification of Korea, not as a free nation but as a Russian satellite, as was North Korea. The balance sheet for UNC military intervention showed that 22 nations (including the ROK) had provided assistance, either personnel or materiel in defense of South Korea. Many of these countries had supplied token units of battalion-size or less and several had furnished noncombat medical facilities. Despite the fact these detachments from other Allied countries totalled "only 44,000 men they were disproportionately valuable in emphasizing the collective, coalition nature of the Korean war effort."\(^{101}\) Major losses, however, had been borne by ROK and American troops.

UNC casualties numbered 996,937 killed, wounded, and missing.

\(^{100}\) The course of the war, particularly its protracted and static nature, had led to growing national apathy and opposition, particularly on the U.S. home front. In late 1950, national opinion polls found that 80 percent of the people were in favor of the war and seven months later that 67 percent were against it. On the Korean front lines, morale was generally highest during heavy ground actions or large scale air attacks. *Washington Post*, dtd 12 Jul 70, p. A–17; *PacFlts EvalRpt* No. 6, p. 1–16.

\(^{101}\) Rees, *Korea*, p. 33.
U.S. losses were 136,937, of which 33,629 represented battle deaths and 103,308 wounded in action. A measure of the role that ground forces played in Korea "may be judged from the fact that, of the total United States battle casualties for the entire conflict, the Army and Marines accounted for 97 percent."¹⁰² Casualties of other UNC countries, exclusive of the U.S. and ROK, totaled approximately 17,000 although no other Allied nation lost as many as 1,000 dead. ROK casualties were listed at 850,000. Communist losses were estimated at 1,420,000 (CCF: 900,000 killed and wounded; NKPA: 520,000 killed and wounded).

For the Republic of South Korea, the end of the war in some respects represented a status quo ante bellum. Korea still remained politically partitioned and geographically divided. Whereas the 38th Parallel had been the territorial boundary prior to the Communist attack of 25 June 1950, the cease-fire line dividing North and South Korea in 1953 was the point of contact between ground forces at the time the armistice was signed. This demarcation line, however, "represented a stronger defense than the 38th Parallel as it possessed a geographical basis all along its approximately 155-mile length."¹⁰³ The new boundary ran above the KANSAS Line, the commanding ground north of the 38th Parallel.

Possibly the single, most important lesson to be drawn from the Korean War is that many of our nation's military assumptions—and resulting tactical decisions—tended to be based on a lack of appreciation of enemy capabilities. In many instances intelligence evaluations focused on "probable intentions of the enemy rather than on his capabilities."¹⁰⁴

While America put great military value and reliance on its massive destructive air power, for example, we were confronted by an enemy who practically never employed his own air capability, but instead moved freely at night and hid by day and was thus little deterred by our aerial harassment. And while our own battle summaries regularly cited kill ratios of 1 USMC to 3.75 CCF and sub-

¹⁰² Ridgway, Korean War, p. viii.
¹⁰³ Rees, Korea, p. 431. In the three years of war, North Korea had gained 850 square miles of territory southwest of the Parallel, while the ROK acquired 2,350 square miles north of the original June 1950 boundary.
¹⁰⁴ Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 175.
Korean Reflection

stantial Communist losses,\textsuperscript{105} we seemed to ignore an enemy mind that thought in terms of numerical superiority and was little concerned about the high human cost of holding key terrain or annexing a desired position. In the last month of the war alone, Eighth Army estimated that CCF casualties numbered 72,000, with more than 25,000 killed.

In both battlefield tactics and high-level strategy, the Korean War revealed a strong tendency on the part of the UNC to predict enemy action by values and ideology largely reflecting our own. Whether because of wishful thinking, basic mistakes in judgment, or international naiveté, the 1950–1953 experience repeatedly indicated a need on the part of Allied nations for considerably more head- 

headed realism in dealing with a Communist adversary. The original UNC military objective of halting Communist aggression in Korea had been successfully accomplished, without enlarging the conflict into a nuclear war. At the same time, Korea had also provided a sobering lesson. It demonstrated how, in a limited war, overriding political considerations may permit the enemy to operate from a privileged sanctuary and allow him to seize and, in many respects, retain the initiative.

The Korean War had made America more aware of the threat of world Communism and had resulted in the strengthening of our national defense commitments in the Far East as well as in Europe. It had also validated the concept of a balanced defense force. In contrast to the emphasis on air capability and atomic power that had dominated the strategic thinking in the post-World War II era, the Korean hostilities pointed to the requirement for a balanced, diversified military force of sufficient strength and readiness to cope effectively and on short notice with any emergency. Korea had underscored how severe peacetime budgetary cut-backs had led to unpreparedness. The Korean experience had also shown the need for flexibility in mobilization planning. Previously, this had been projected for an all-out, general war, based on America’s role in World War II. The Nation’s post-Korean policy thus sought, for the first

105 Official records show that the 1stMarDiv inflicted approximately 59,805 CCF casualties (11,957 KIA; 15,111 estimated WIA or KIA; 32,643 estimated WIA; and 94 POWs) during the Apr 52–Jul 53 period on the western front. For the same time, Marine infantry casualties were approximately 13,000 plus some 2,500 for its 1st KMC/RCT.
time, a military strategy that would effectively deter either a major
war or local aggression.

Korean hostilities illustrated another important lesson. South
Korea had been attacked by an act of direct aggression, in flagrant
violation of the Cairo Declaration and U.N. Charter. It was apparent
that, despite the defense treaties and mutual aid pacts which the
United States had signed during and after World War II, "any
number of alliances, if not supported by strong military prepared-
ness, would never restrain aggression." It had taken the Korean
War to drive home the harsh reality that military preparedness,
possession of superior power, and the willingness to use that power
were the only deterrent to enemy aggression throughout the world.

The Korean War also caused the Communists to modify their
strategy from one of overt aggression to more insidious means of
gaining their political and economic objectives. As the Marine Corps
Commandant, General Shepherd, warned: "Their tactic is to use war
by proxy, war by satellite, war by threat and subversion." And,
although it was not fully apparent at the time, the Korean attack
"was to prove to be one of the first in a series of 'wars of libera-
tion'" that the world would be witness to.

In the final analysis, the Korean War evolved into a prolonged
battle of position and attrition in which the Communists, operating
close to their base of supply, were fought to a standstill by United
Nations forces under unfavorable conditions of climate and logistics.
In countering the enemy threat in Korea, the American units com-
mitted there initially suffered from the effects of peacetime apathy
that had followed the rapid demobilization following World War
II. As the Korean War, originally visualized as a "police action" of
brief duration, ground on into a major effort spanning a period of
three years and one month, loud voices were raised on the home
front to protest the expenditure of lives and materiel in a venture
that was not always clearly understood by all Americans.

Among the U.S. forces committed on this far flung battlefront,
it was once again the Marine Corps component that stood out in its
sacrifice, military skills, and devotion to duty. When rushed into
the battle during the first desperate weeks and months of the war,

107 Anl Rpt of the CMC to SecNav, FY 1955, p. 3.
the quickly-augmented Marine units helped to restore stability to the shattered EUSAK front line. During the daringly conceived and executed operation at Inchon, Marines accomplished this incredibly complex amphibious operation with their customary spirit and precision. Never was their courage and tenacity more conspicuous than during those bitter days of the Chosin Reservoir campaign following the Chinese Communist intervention.

In the static, or positional, warfare that marked the final operations in Korea, the 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing executed their respective missions with professional skill and dispatch, regardless of tactical problems and the dreary monotony that characterized a large part of the Korean War. U.S. Marines had seen combat throughout much of the Korean peninsula. The fighting had taken them from Pusan to Inchon and Seoul, to the Chosin, to Inje and the Hwachon Reservoir in the Punchbowl area, and finally, in 1952–1953, to the critical 35-mile front in West Korea near Panmunjom. In Korea, as in past wars, Marines demonstrated the versatility, aggressiveness, and readiness which has always been a tradition of the Corps.

Marine courage and combat performance went far toward removing the image of Western softness and decadence which the Communists had so mistakenly construed in their own minds. It is a record of which all Americans and the Free World can be proud.
APPENDIX A

Glossary of Technical Terms and Abbreviations

AAA—Antiaircraft Artillery
AA—Antiaircraft
AD—Douglas "Skyraider" Single-Engine Attack Aircraft
ADC—Assistant Division Commander
ANGLICO—Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO—Aerial Observer
ASP—Ammunition Supply Point
AT—Antitank
AU—Attack model of Vought F4U "Corsair"
BAR—Browning Automatic Rifle
BLT—Battalion Landing Team
Bn—Battalion
Brig—Brigade
Btry—Battery
CAS—Close Air Support
CCF—Chinese Communist Forces
CG—Commanding General
CinCFE—Commander in Chief, Far East
CinCUNC—Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CinCPacFlt—Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CMC—Commandant of the Marine Corps
CNO—Chief of Naval Operations
Co—Company
CO—Commanding Officer
ComdD—Command Diary (also called Historical Diary, or War Diary)

ComNavFE—Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
ComServPac—Commander, Service Force, Pacific
CONUS—Continental United States
COP—Combat Outpost
CP—Command Post
CPX—Command Post Exercise
CSG—Combat Service Group
CTE—Commander Task Element
CTF—Commander Task Force
CTG—Commander Task Group
CVE—Escort Aircraft Carrier
CVL—Light Aircraft Carrier
Div—Division
DMZ—Demilitarized Zone
DOW—Died of Wounds
Dtd—Dated
DUKW—Marine Amphibious Truck
ECIDE(U)—East Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)
ECM—Electronic Countermeasures
Engr—Engineer
EUSAK—Eighth United States Army in Korea
F2H–2P—McDonnell "Banshee" Two-Engine Jet Fighter (photo model)
F3D–2—Douglas "Skyknight" Two-Engine Jet Fighter
F4U—Vought "Corsair" Single-Engine Fighter
F7F–3N—Grumman "Tigercat" Twin-Engine Night Fighter
F9F–2,4,5—Grumman "Panther" Single-Engine Jet Fighter
F–80—Air Force "Shooting Star" Fighter Aircraft
F–84—Air Force "Thunderjet" Fighter Aircraft
FAC—Forward Air Controller
FAF—Fifth Air Force
FASRon—Fleet Air Service Squadron
FDC—Fire Direction Center
FEAF—Far East Air Forces
FECOM—Far East Command
FMFLant—Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
FMFPac—Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FO—Forward Observer (artillery)
FY—Fiscal Year
HE—High Explosive
Hedron—Headquarters Squadron
H&I—Harassing & Interdiction
HMR—Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron
HO3S–1—Sikorsky Three-Place Observation Helicopter
Hq—Headquarters
HQMC—Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
HRS–1—Sikorsky Single-Engine Helicopter
H&S—Headquarters and Service
HTL–4—Bell Two-Place Helicopter Interceptor
JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
JOC—Joint Operations Center
KCOMZ—Korean Communication Zone (sometimes KComZ)
KIA—Killed in Action
KMAG—Korean Military Advisory Group
KMC—Korean Marine Corps
KMC/RCT—Korean Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team
KPR—Kimpo Provisional Regiment
KSC—Korean Service Corps
LogCom—Logistical Command
Ltr—Letter
LST—Landing Ship, Tank
LVT—Landing Vehicle, Tracked
M4A3E8—Flame Tank, Medium
M–46—Medium Tank
MAC—Military Armistice Commission
MACG—Marine Air Control Group
MAG—Marine Aircraft Group
Mar—Marine(s)
MARLEX—Marine Landing Exercise
MASRT—Marine Air Support Radar Team
MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing
MBP—Main Battle Position
MDL—Military Demarcation Line
MGCIS—Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron
MIA—Missing in Action
MIG—Russian Single-Seat Jet Fighter-Interceptor
MLR—Main Line of Resistance
MOH—Medal of Honor
MOS—Military Occupation Specialty
Mosquito—Single Engine Plane used as Airborne FAC and for Target Spotting
MP—Military Police
MPQ—Ground Radar-Controlled Bombing
MS—Manuscript
Msg—Message
MSR—Main Supply Route
MTACS—Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron
MT—Motor Transport
NCAS—Night Close Air Support
NCO—Noncommissioned Officer
NGF—Naval Gunfire
NKPA—North Korean People’s Army
N.d.—Date not given
NNRC—Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
NNSC—Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission
N.t.—Title not given
OCMH—Office of the Chief of Military History (USA)
OE—1—Cessna Single-Engine Light Observation Plane
OOB—Order of Battle
OP—Observation Post (Sometimes used to refer to an Outpost)
OPLR—Outpost Line of Resistance
OOY—Consolidated—Vultee Light Observation Plane
PIR—Periodic Intelligence Report
PO-2—Russian Trainer Aircraft
POW—Prisoner of War
PPSH—Soviet-made 7.62mm Submachine ("Burp") Gun
Prov—Provisional
PUC—Presidential Unit Citation
R4D—Douglas Twin-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps designation of C-47)
R5D—Douglas Four-Engine Transport (Navy and Marine Corps designation of C-54)
RCT—Regimental Combat Team
ROK—Republic of Korea
SAR—Special Action Report
SecDef—Secretary of Defense
SecNav—Secretary of Navy
Serv—Service
Sig—Signal
SOP—Standing Operating Procedure
TACC—Tactical Air Coordination Center
TADC—Tactical Air Direction Center
TAFC—Turkish Armed Forces Command
TAO—Tactical Air Observer
TE—Task Element
T/E—Table of Equipment
TF—Task Force
TG—Task Group
Tk—Tank
T/O—Table of Organization
TOT—Time on Target Fuze
TU—Task Unit
UN—United Nations
UNC—United Nations Command
USA—United States Army
USAF—United States Air Force
USMC—United States Marine Corps
USN—United States Navy
VMA—Marine Attack Squadron
VMC—Marine Composite Squadron
VMF—Marine Fighter Squadron
VMF(N)—Marine Night (All-Weather) Fighter Squadron
VMJ—Marine Photographic Squadron
VMO—Marine Observation Squadron
VMR—Marine Transport Squadron
VT—Variable Time Fuze
WCIDE(U)—West Coast Island Defense Element (Unit)
WIA—Wounded in Action
WP—White Phosphorous Shell
YAK—Russian Fighter Aircraft
## APPENDIX B

### Korean War Chronology

**1950**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 Jun</td>
<td>North Korean People's Army, with 60,000 troops and 100 Russian tanks, crosses 38th Parallel to invade South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jun</td>
<td>UN, adopting a U.S. resolution, proclaims NKPA attack a breach of world peace. Asks member nations to assist ROK in repelling invasion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Jun</td>
<td>Pres Truman orders U.S. air-sea units to support ROK and for U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize Formosan Strait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jun</td>
<td>NKPA captures Seoul, South Korean capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Jun</td>
<td>Pres Truman orders naval blockade of Korean coast; authorizes Far East Commander, Gen MacArthur, to send U.S. ground troops into Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jun</td>
<td>Pres Truman receives Congressional authorization to order into active service any or all reserve components of Armed Forces for a period of 21 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jul</td>
<td>CNO directs that Marine reinforced regiment with supporting air be prepared for assignment to Far East.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Jul</td>
<td>CinCFE requests Marine RCT-air unit for Far East. This was inception of 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, formed less than a week later.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Jul</td>
<td>Inchon captured by North Koreans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jul–</td>
<td>UNC fights series of delaying actions in Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Jul</td>
<td>1st ProvMarBrig activated at Camp Pendleton, under BGen Edward A. Craig. Basic elements of 6,534-man Brigade are 5th Marines and MAG–33.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jul</td>
<td>Gen MacArthur named Commander, UNC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Jul</td>
<td>CinCUNC asks Joint Chiefs of Staff to authorize expansion of Marine Brigade to full war-strength division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12–14 Jul</td>
<td>1st ProvMarBrigembarks for Korean theater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jul</td>
<td>LtGen Walton H. Walker named CG, Eighth U.S. Army in Korea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19 Jul  CinCUNC makes 2d request for Marine division.
19 Jul  Pres Truman authorizes Defense Dept to call up reserve units and individuals.
19 Jul  CMC alerts Marine Corps organized reserve units for call to active duty following Presidential announcement.
20 Jul  CMC, Gen Clifton B. Cates, orders to duty Organized Marine Corps ground reserve units, consisting of 22 units and 4,830 personnel. Partial callup for 6,000 air reservists in 30 Marine VMF and 12 MGCI squadrons.
20 Jul  Taejon, temporary ROK capital, captured.
21 Jul  CinCUNC makes 3d request for Marine division.
25 Jul  UNC defense at Pusan deteriorates. CinCUNC orders 1st MarProvBrig directly to Korea.
25 Jul  JCS directs Marine Corps to build 1stMarDiv to war-strength.
31 Jul  Masan and Chinju fall to enemy.
3 Aug  First Marine air strike launched by VMF—214.
4 Aug  Pusan Perimeter established by UNC in southeastern end of Korea.
4 Aug  First evacuation of casualties from Pusan by Marine VMO–6 helicopters.
6 Aug  First air mission flown by VMF—323.
6–8 Aug  CinCUNC confers with U.S. military-diplomatic officials about proposed Inchon amphibious landing.
7–13 Aug  Marine Brigade engaged in first combat operations at Chinju.
10 Aug  First Marine helicopter rescue made by VMO–6 to recover downed pilot.
10–24 Aug  1stMarDiv units embark for Korea.
16 Aug  EUSAK X Corps activated for coming Inchon-Seoul operation. Principal elements are 1stMarDiv and Army 7thInfDiv.
17 Aug  Marine Brigade opens battle for Obong-ni ("No Name") Ridge, leading way to destruction of enemy bridgehead at Naktong and first UNC victory in Korea.
17 Aug  7th Marines activated at Camp Pendleton and on 1 Sep embarks for Far East, arriving 21 Sep.
1–5 Sep  NKPA launches all-out offensive to break UNC perimeter defense at Pusan. In Second Naktong Battle, Brigade contains enemy at Yongsan.
13 Sep  1st ProvMarBrig deactivated and absorbed by 1stMarDiv for Inchon operation.
17 Sep  1stMarDiv (5th Marines) recaptures Kimpo Airfield.
19–25 Sep  Enemy resistance at Pusan begins to collapse. NKPA troops in retreat north from Pusan.
27 Sep  1stMarDiv recaptures Seoul. ROK Capital officially liberated 29 Sep.
Korean War Chronology

30 Sep  Communist China Foreign Minister Chou En-lai warns: "The Chinese people will not supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by the imperialists."

30 Sep–  ROK 3d Div crosses 38th Parallel in pursuit of retreating NKPA.

1 Oct  UN General Assembly authorizes UNC forces to cross 38th Parallel to defeat NKPA.

7 Oct  Wonsan, east coast port at 39th Parallel, captured by ROK troops.

10 Oct  Chinese repeat warning of intervention in Korean conflict.

16 Oct  First Chinese Communist troops secretly enter Korea from Manchuria.

19 Oct  Pyongyang, North Korean Capital at 39th Parallel, captured by EUSAK.

26 Oct  Chinese troops attack ROK units at Yalu River and points south of Sino-Korean border.

26 Oct  1stMarDiv lands at Wonsan, establishes security for port, and drives north.

1 Nov  UNC forward elements reach positions along Yalu. First Russian-built MIG appears along Yalu to attack U.S. aircraft.


3–7 Nov  Initial Marine encounter with CCF. 7th Marines units defeat major elements of 124th CCF Division.

6 Nov  MacArthur warns JCS that movement of CCF across Yalu threatens UNC position.

15 Nov  Marine units reach Chosin Reservoir area in X Corps drive north.

24 Nov  MacArthur announced "win the war" offensive. EUSAK begins advance toward Yalu.

26–27 Nov  CCF, 200,000-strong, attack EUSAK troops forcing withdrawal. 1stMarDiv isolated at Yudam-ni, west of Chosin. MSR cut.


3 Dec  Regroups at Hagaru-ri for drive to Hungnam.

4 Dec  Pyongyang recaptured by enemy.

5–7 Dec  1stMarDiv evacuates wounded by air and fights through to Koto-ri.

6 Dec  Innovation of using airborne TADC as tactical CP to control air support.

10 Dec  First Marine jet squadron to fly in combat, VMF–311, begins operations.

11 Dec  1stMarDiv completes fighting breakout from Chosin entrapment. Begins march to join rest of X Corps at Hungnam.

15 Dec  1stMarDiv deployed from Hungnam to Pusan.

15 Dec  UNC establishes new defensive line at 38th Parallel.

18 Dec–  Marine division routes enemy guerrilla forces in Masan-Pohang-27 Jan  Sondong-Andong area.
23 Dec  EUSAK CG Walker killed in jeep accident. Gen Matthew B. Ridgway named to succeed him.
24 Dec  Hungnam evacuation completed by X Corps.
29 Dec  Large enemy buildup reported north of 38th Parallel, preparing for new attack.

1951

31 Dec–  Enemy launches all-out offensive against UNC across 38th Parallel, pushing EUSAK back 10-12 miles.
1 Jan    Parallel, pushing EUSAK back 10-12 miles.
4 Jan    Seoul recaptured by Communists.
7–15 Jan  Enemy offensive halted, UNC sets up new defense line along Pyongtaek-Wonju axis, at 37th Parallel.
25 Jan   UNC reasserts offensive. Operation THUNDERBOLT launched by I and IX Corps to regain territory south of Han River.
Jan–Feb  1stMarDiv continues antiguerrilla operations in Masan area.
7 Feb    Communists forced north of Han River. UNC retakes Inchon peninsula.
mid-Feb  1stMarDiv reassigned from X to IX Corps.
21 Feb   Operation KILLER, a general limited objective advance by U.S. IX and X Corps, ordered by Gen Ridgway. 1stMarDiv reenters frontlines for operation.
7 Mar    Operation RIPPER begins in central and eastern zones, with advance across Han by IX and X Corps.
14 Mar   Seoul retaken by U.S. Eighth Army for second time.
1–21 Apr 1stMarDiv in general advance north to the Hwachon Reservoir.
8 Apr    Operation RIPPER clears enemy troops from South Korea east of Imjin River.
11 Apr   Pres Truman relieves Gen MacArthur as CinCUNC, replacing him by Gen Ridgway, CG, EUSAK. LtGen James A. Van Fleet named Commander, EUSAK.
15 Apr   UNC establishes defensive line along 38th Parallel, or KANSAS Line. Enemy heavily emplaced in Chorwon-Kumhwa-Pyonggang ("The Iron Triangle") assembly area.
22 Apr–  CCF launches all-out "Spring Offensive."
8 Jul
23–27 Apr 1stMarDiv halts CCF left flank breakthrough of IX Corps, establishes defense line in Chunchon vicinity.
30 Apr   UNC completes withdrawal to new defense line north of Seoul. Intelligence reports indicate CCF plans renewed attack.
1 May    1stMarDiv reassigned to X Corps.
9 May    1st MAW squadrons participate in FAF 300-plane strike on Sinuiju, near Yalu. Biggest raid of war to date.
16 May   Second phase of enemy offensive begins. CCF drives south from Iron Triangle area, making penetrations 15–20 miles deep along the front.
20 May  FAF launches Operation STRANGLE, massive all-out interdiction effort.

21 May  UNC launches counter offensive, pushes enemy north of 38th Parallel again. 1stMarDiv drives toward Yanggu at eastern end of Hwachon Reservoir.

30 May  Eighth Army back on KANSAS Line again.

1-16 Jun  1stMarDiv advances northeast from Hwachon Reservoir to Punchbowl. Claws out daily gains of 1,000–2,000 meters, reaching objective despite heavy NKPA fire.

mid-Jun  UNC forces consolidate positions at 38th Parallel. UNC front approximately the same line as when Communist spring offensive began.

23 Jun  UN Soviet delegate, Jacob Malik, proposes cease-fire discussions.

30 Jun  UN notifies enemy of its readiness to discuss an armistice.

10 Jul  Truce talks begin at Kaesong and fighting dies down along front. UN delegation led by U.S. Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy. Communists represented by LtGen Nam I., NKPA.

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1952

2 Jan  UNC proposes principle of "voluntary repatriation" in POW exchange.

3 Jan  UNC proposal violently rejected by Communists.

Jan–Apr Disorders in UNC prison camps as screening of prisoners begins.

22 Feb  Communist Korean Foreign Affairs Minister charges America with renewed bacteriological warfare attacks in North Korea. Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai, issues similar statement on 8 Mar, alleging U.S. flyers participate in "germ warfare."

17 Mar  1stMarDiv reassigned from X Corps eastern-Korea position to I Corps far western end of EUSAK line. Takes over approximately 35 miles of Line JAMESTOWN on 24 Mar.

28 Apr  Adm Joy presents UN "final offer," insists on voluntary repatriation principle.

7–11 May  Rioting prisoners at Koje-do camp seize Gen Dodd and hold him hostage, until order restored.

12 May  Gen Mark W. Clark succeeds Ridgway as CinCUNC, upon latter's departure to assume NATO command from Gen Eisenhower.

22 May  MajGen William K. Harrison succeeds Adm Joy as chief of UN delegation at Panmunjom.

Jun–Oct  General stalemate along battlefront while truce talks deadlocked on POW repatriation question. Sharp limited objective attacks made by enemy against UNC defensive line.

9–16 Aug  First major Marine ground action in western Korea, Battle of Bunker Hill (1st Marines).

19–20 Aug  HMR–161 Operation RIPPLE introduces tactical innovation of transporting 4.5-inch rocket battery weapons and personnel to new firing position.

29 Aug  Largest one-day FAF air assault of entire war, "All United Nations Air Effort" sends 1,403 sorties against North Korean Capital, Pyongyang.

22–26 Sep  First resupply of MLR regiment by helicopter in Operation HAYLIGHT.

8 Oct  UNC adjourns armistice talks "indefinitely"; complete deadlock on POW question.

26–28 Oct  Battle of the Hook (7th Marines).

4 Nov  Dwight D. Eisenhower elected President.

17 Nov  India introduces compromise truce plan at United Nations.

2 Dec  President-elect Eisenhower begins three-day tour of Korea.

3 Dec  UN General Assembly adopts compromise Indian resolution by 54 to 5 vote.
### 1953

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan–Feb</td>
<td>Winter lull in fighting. Cease-fire talks remain suspended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Feb</td>
<td>President Eisenhower, in State of Union message, ends &quot;neutralization&quot; of Formosa Strait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Feb</td>
<td>Gen Maxwell D. Taylor assumes EUSAK command from Gen Van Fleet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Feb</td>
<td>UNC proposes exchange of sick and wounded POWs, as preliminary step in full exchange of prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Mar</td>
<td>Premier Joseph Stalin of Russia dies. Georgi Malenkov named to succeed him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26–30 Mar</td>
<td>1stMarDiv combat outposts Vegas-Reno-Carson (5th Marines) under heavy attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Mar</td>
<td>Communists accept UN proposal to discuss exchange of sick and wounded POWs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Mar</td>
<td>Chou En-lai indicates Communists will accept Indian UN compromise proposal. Truce talks to be resumed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Mar</td>
<td>Truce talks resumed at Panmunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20–26 Apr</td>
<td>Exchange of sick and wounded POWs, &quot;Operation LITTLE SWITCH,&quot; takes place at Panmunjom, under direction of Mun-san-ni Provisional Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Apr</td>
<td>Truce talks resumed at Panmunjom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>1stMarDiv relieved by U.S. 25thInfDiv; 1st Division assigned mission of I Corps Reserve.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May</td>
<td>Communists accept UN proposal that prisoners unwilling to be repatriated be kept in neutral custody within Korea, rather than be removed elsewhere to a neutral nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28–30 May</td>
<td>Savage fighting while truce details worked out by negotiators. CCF launches regimental-strength attack against I Corps sector. Heavy action in Nevada Cities and Hook area outposts. Marine tanks and artillery in support of defending 25thInfDiv line units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jun</td>
<td>ROK national Assembly demands freedom for anti-Communist North Koreans held in South Korean POW camps. Civilian demonstrations break out in various EUSAK and I Corps localities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Jun</td>
<td>Agreement reached on POW question. POW nonrepatriates to be turned over to five-member neutral commission to decide disposition of POW cases. Pres Rhee declares armistice terms unacceptable to South Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Jun</td>
<td>ROK National Assembly unanimously rejects truce terms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10–17 Jun</td>
<td>Communists launch heaviest offensive in two years against ROK II Corps sector in Kumsong area. Heavy penetrations, with ROK II Corps pushed 4000 yards south to new MLR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Jun</td>
<td>Breakout of 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist prisoners from South Korean POW camps, assisted by ROK guards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Release ordered by Pres Rhee as protest against proposed armistice.

18–20 Jun Communists accuse UNC of complicity in freeing prisoners; truce talks suspended.


7–8 Jul COPs Berlin-East Berlin (7th Marines right regimental sector) under attack during Marine relief of 25thInfDiv.

8 Jul 1stMarDiv assumes operational control of its former MLR sector, relieving 25thInfDiv.

8 Jul Communists agree to resume armistice negotiations; talks reconvened 10 July.

11 Jul Robertson announces that Pres Rhee will no longer oppose truce terms.

11 Jul Maj John F. Bolt, VMF–115, becomes first Marine jet ace with kill of his fifth and sixth MIGs.

13–20 Jul CCF launches even larger offensive than June attack along central Korean front. IX and ROK II Corps MLR reestablished south of Kumsong River.

19 Jul Negotiators at Panmunjom reach agreement on truce.

19 Jul Marine outposts Berlin-East Berlin overrun; I Corps decrees positions should not be retaken.

24–27 Jul Heavy enemy attack in Berlin Complex ("Boulder City") area held by 7th and 1st Marines.

27 Jul Cease-fire agreement signed at Panmunjom at 1000. Fighting ends. Armistice effective at 2200.

5 Aug–6 Sep Final exchange of prisoners in Operation BIG SWITCH, at Panmunjom.
APPENDIX C

Command and Staff List

1ST MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)
AND
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
MARCH 1952—JULY 1953

1st Marine Division

Commanding General .... MajGen John T. Selden (to 28 Aug 1952)
MajGen Edwin A. Pollock (from 29 Aug)
MajGen Randolph McC. Pate (from 16 Jun 1953)

Asst Division Commander .... BGen William J. Whaling (to 23 Mar 1952)
BGen Merrill B. Twining (from 24 Mar)
BGen Robert O. Bare (from 13 Jun)
BGen Joseph C. Burger (from 31 Mar 1953)

Chief of Staff ................. Col Austin R. Brunelli (to 10 Oct 1952)
Col Henry W. Buse, Jr. (from 11 Oct)
Col Lewis W. Walt (from 15 Jun 1953)

G—1 ......................... Col Walter N. Flournoy (to 31 Mar 1952)
Col John F. Dunlap (from 1 Apr)
Col Sidney M. Kelly (from 11 Sep)
Col Albert F. Metze (from 1 Jun 1953)
Col Wendell H. Duplantis (from 20 Jul)

G—2 ......................... LtCol James H. Tinsley (to 9 Apr 1952)
Col Sidney S. Wade (from 10 Apr)
LtCol William R. Watson, Jr. (from 24 Apr)
Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from 11 Oct)
Col William F. Prickett (from 20 Dec)
Col Loren E. Haffner (from 1 Apr 1953)
Col James E. Mills (from 10 Jul)

G—3 ......................... LtCol Gordon D. Gayle (to 22 Apr 1952)
LtCol James H. Tinsley (from 24 Apr)
Col Russell E. Honsowetz (from 15 Jun)
Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Dec)
Col Lewis W. Walt (from 18 Apr 1953)
LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 15 Jun)

G—4 ......................... Col Robert A. McGill (to 27 Aug 1952)
Col Thomas A. Culhane (from 28 Aug)
Col Kenneth A. King (from 12 Nov)
Col Richard H. Crockett (from 15 Dec)
Col Thomas S. Ivey (from 15 May 1953)
### Special Staff

**Adjutant**
- Maj James K. Young (to 5 May 1952)
- Maj Charles T. Lamb (from 6 May)
- Maj Clyde W. Shealy (from 24 Feb 1953)
- Maj George K. Acker (from 1 Jun)

**Air Officer**
- LtCol Edward V. Finn (to 14 Mar 1952)
- LtCol Walter F. Cornnell (from 15 Mar)
- LtCol William E. Abblitt (from 12 Feb 1953)

**Anti-Tank Officer**
- Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952)
- Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug)
- LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov)
- Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan 1953)
- Capt William F. Doehler (from 6 Apr)

**Amphibian Tractor Officer**
- LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug 1952)
- LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug)
- LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7 Nov)
- LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from 16 Mar 1953)
- Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun)

**Armored Amphibian Officer**
- LtCol John T. O'Neill (to 5 Aug 1952)
- Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug)
- LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12 Aug)
- LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec)
- Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May 1953)
- LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15 Jul)

**Artillery Officer**
- Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep 1952)
- Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep)
- Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953)
- Col Manley L. Curry (from 5 Jul)

**Chaplain**
- Cdr Walter S. Peck, Jr., USN (to 16 Apr 1952)
- Cdr Edward A. Slattery, USN (from 17 Apr)
- Cdr Lonnie W. Meachum, USN (from 28 Dec)

**Chemical Warfare and Radiological Defense Officer**
- Maj Harold C. Howard (to 4 Aug 1952)
- Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 5 Aug)
- LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 18 Nov)
- Maj Marshall Salvaggio (from 10 Jan 1953)
- Capt Gerald W. Gibson (from 30 Jan)

**Dental Officer**
- Capt Francis C. Snyder, USN (to 26 Apr 1952)
- Cdr Clifford H. Rice, USN (from 27 Apr)
- Capt William M. Fowler, USN (from 26 May)
- Capt James R. Justice, USN (from 12 Mar 1953)
Embarkation Officer .......... LtCol John H. Papurca (to 1 Mar 1952)
                          LtCol James F. Coady (from 2 Mar)
                          LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 5 Sep)
                          Maj Edwin J. St. Peter (from 6 Nov)
                          LtCol John N. Rentz (from 24 Nov)
                          LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 12 May 1953)

Engineer Officer .......... Col August L. Vogt (to 5 Jul 1952)
                          (None listed for 6-16 July)
                          Col Robert E. Fojt (from 17 Jul)
                          LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 1 Feb 1953)
                          Col Walter R. Lytz (from 1 Apr)

Exchange Officer .......... Capt Benjamin Reed (to 28 Nov 1952)
                          Capt John H. Thomas (from 29 Nov)

Food Director .......... 1stLt Herbert E. McNabb (to 15 Jun 1952)
                          Maj Louis P. Penny (from 16 Jun)
                          Maj Francis K. Bernardini (from 23 Apr 1953)

Historical Officer .......... 2dLt Francis X. Goss (to 22 Mar 1952)
                          Capt Robert F. Seward (from 23 Mar)
                          Capt William R. Smith (from 16 Jul)
                          1stLt Virgil S. Price (from 8 Nov)
                          2dLt John J. Creamer, Jr. (from 7 Dec)
                          Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 6 Apr 1953)
                          2dLt Thomas A. MacCalla (from 22 Jul)

Inspector .......... Col William K. Davenport, Jr. (to 17 Mar 1952)
                          Col Thomas C. Moore (from 18 Mar)
                          Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 18 Jul)
                          Col Clayton O. Totman (from 9 Aug)
                          Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 5 Dec)
                          Col Albert F. Metze (from 29 Apr 1953)
                          Col Manley L. Curry (from 1 Jun)
                          Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 13 Jul)

Legal Officer .......... LCDr Arnold W. Eggen, USN (to 12 Jan 1953)
                          Cdr Earl C. Collins, USN (from 13 Jan)
                          LtCol Raymond G. Coyne (from 8 Jul)

Motor Transport Officer .. Maj Walter R. O Quinn (to 14 May 1952)
                          LtCol Kenneth E. Martin (from 15 May)
                          LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 12 Mar 1953)
                          LtCol Jack F. McCollum (from 29 Jun)

Naval Gunfire Officer .... Maj John V. Downs (to 5 Aug 1952)
                          LtCol William P. Pala (from 6 Aug)
                          LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 16 Sep)
                          LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 20 Dec)
                          LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 26 Apr 1953)
                          Capt Robert J. Daeschler (from 15 Jul)
Operations in West Korea

Ordnance Officer
- Maj Harold C. Both (to 5 May 1952)
- LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May)
- Maj Joseph O. Weist (from 4 Jun)
- Maj Stanley Tesko (from 21 Oct)
- LtCol Marshall R. Pilcher (from 1 Apr 1953)
- LtCol Samuel L. Grigsby (from 1 Jun)

Postal Officer
- CWO George C. Hunter (to 25 Jun 1952)
- 2dLt Frederick T. McNamara, Jr. (from 26 Jun)
- 2dLt Rudolph R. Hendrick (from 18 May 1953)
- CWO Emerson R. Murrell (from 2 Jun)

Provost Marshal
- LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar 1952)
- LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr)
- LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15 Aug)
- LtCol Jess P. Ferrill (from 12 Jan 1953)
- LtCol Harold R. Warner, Jr. (from 18 Apr)
- Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul)

Public Information Officer
- lstLt Robert S. Gray (to 5 May 1952)
- lstLt Robert F. Coll (from 6 May)
- Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 5 Jul)
- Capt Bem Price (from 7 Nov)
- Capt Verle E. Ludwig (from 21 Jul 1953)

Shore Party Officer
- LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul 1952)
- Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul)
- LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct)
- Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec)
- Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar 1953)

Signal Officer
- LtCol Jino J. D'Allessandro (to 5 Apr 1952)
- LtCol John E. Morris (from 6 Apr)
- LtCol Eugene A. Dueber (from 18 Aug)
- LtCol Ralph M. Wismer (from 14 Nov)
- LtCol Frank G. Casserly (from 27 Jul 1953)

Supply Officer
- Col Chester R. Allen (to 27 Apr 1952)
- Col Hawley C. Waterman (from 28 Apr)
- Col LeRoy Hauser (from 1 Feb 1953)

Special Services Officer
- LtCol John E. Gorman (to 23 Jul 1952)
- Maj Alfred A. Tillmann (from 24 Jul)
- Maj William J. Kohler (from 8 Nov)
- Capt Don H. Blanchard (from 20 Apr 1953)

Surgeon
- Capt Louis P. Kirkpatrick, USN (to 18 Jun 1952)
- Capt Lawrence E. Bach, USN (from 19 Jun)
- Capt Walter R. Miller, USN (from 25 Apr 1953)

Tank Officer
- Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20 May 1952)
- LtCol John I. Williamson, Jr. (from 21 May)
- LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr 1953)
## Command and Staff List

### Headquarters Battalion

**Commanding Officer**
- Col Robert T. Stivers, Jr. (to 5 Jul 1952)
- Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 6 Jul)
- LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 12 Jul)
- LtCol John F. Corbett (from 11 Sep)
- Col Alexander W. Gentlemen (from 21 Nov)
- LtCol John C. Landrun (from 16 May 1953)

**Executive Officer**
- Maj Corbin L. West (to 16 Mar 1952)
- Maj Anthony R. Frankiewicz (from 17 Mar)
- Maj Charles F. McKiever (from 10 Nov)
- Maj John K. Hogan (from 31 Jan 1953)
- (None listed for 29Feb—14May)
- Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 May)

**Commanding Officer, Headquarters Company**
- Capt "J" E. Hancey (to 9 Mar 1952)
- Capt Robert J. McKay (from 10 Mar)
- 1stLt George C. Schatteman (from 6 May)
- Maj Louis A. Cortright (from 1 Jul)
- 2dLt Neil O. Snepp (from 17 Jul)
- Maj Val Price, Jr. (from 29 Aug)
- Capt Joseph Hornstein (from 15 Jan 1953)
- Capt Robert A. Hohmann (from 15 May)
- Capt Martin S. Hauge (from 28 May)

**Commanding Officer, Military Police Company**
- LtCol William F. Pulver (to 31 Mar 1952)
- LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 1 Apr)
- LtCol Frederick R. Findtner (from 15 Aug)
- LtCol Jess P. Fertill, Jr. (from 12 Jan 1953)
- LtCol Harold B. Warner, Jr. (from 18 Apr)
- Maj Walter L. Williams (from 23 Jul)

**Commanding Officer, Reconnaissance Company**
- Maj Ephraim Kirby-Smith (to 10 Jun 1952)
- Capt James O. Webb (from 11 Jun)
- Capt James H. A. Flood (from 11 Sep)
- Maj Dermott H. MacDonnell (from 3 Dec)
- Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 21 Jun 1953)

### 1st Marines

**Commanding Officer**
- Col Sidney S. Wade (to 9 Apr 1952)
- Col Walter N. Flournoy (from 10 Apr)
- Col Walter F. Layer (from 25 Jul)
- Col Hewitt D. Adams (from 21 Nov)
- Col Wallace M. Nelson (from 1 May 1953)
Executive Officer ............ LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (to 26 Mar 1952)
                              Col Clarence A. Barninger, Jr. (from 27 Mar)
                              LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 2 May)
                              LtCol Glenn R. Long (from 16 Sep)
                              LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 4 Feb 1953)
                              LtCol Lowell E. English (from 8 May)
                              LtCol Harold C. Boehm (from 2 Jul)

1st Battalion, 1st Marines

Commanding Officer ............. LtCol John H. Papurca (to 2 Aug 1952)
                                  LtCol Louis N. King (from 3 Aug)
                                  LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 13 Sep)
                                  Col Frederick R. Findtner (from 14 Jan 1953)
                                  LtCol Stanley M. Adams (from 5 Jun)

Executive Officer ............. Maj Ralph "C" Rosacker (to 5 Apr 1952)
                                  Maj Leo V. Gross (from 6 Apr)
                                  Maj John K. Logan (from 14 Jul)
                                  Maj William C. Chip (from 20 Aug)
                                  Maj John K. Hogan (from 30 Dec)
                                  Maj Marvin D. Perskie (from 4 Feb 1953)
                                  Maj Roger D. Peterson (from 19 Jun)

2d Battalion, 1st Marines

Commanding Officer ............. LtCol Thell H. Fisher (to 1 Apr 1952)
                                  LtCol Clifford F. Quilici (from 2 Apr)
                                  LtCol Roy J. Batterton, Jr. (from 23 Jun)
                                  LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 18 Oct)
                                  LtCol George A. Gililland (from 9 Feb 1953)
                                  LtCol Frank A. Long (from 1 Jul)

Executive Officer ............. Maj Frank J. Harte (to 5 May 1952)
                                  Maj Fletcher R. Wycoff (from 6 May)
                                  Maj John N. Rentz (from 29 Jul)
                                  Maj John P. McNeill (from 21 Aug)
                                  Maj Horace C. Reifel (from 9 Mar 1953)
                                  Maj John B. Bristow (from 20 Apr)
                                  Maj Albert S. Dooley, Jr. (from 1 Jul)

3d Battalion, 1st Marines

Commanding Officer ............. LtCol Spencer H. Pratt (to 11 Apr 1952)
                                  LtCol Carlo A. Rovetta (from 12 Apr)
                                  LtCol Gerard T. Armitage (from 2 May)
                                  LtCol Sidney J. Altman (from 20 Aug)
                                  LtCol Ernest G. Atkin, Jr. (from 6 Dec)
                                  LtCol Lowell E. English (from 1 Apr 1953)
                                  LtCol Roy D. Miller (from 6 May)
Command and Staff List

Executive Officer ............ Maj Robert V. Perkins (to 2 Jul 1952)
   Maj Wesley R. Christie (from 3 Jul)
   Maj Charles S. Robertson (from 27 Oct)
   Maj Norman C. Smyle (from 3 Jan 1953)
   Maj Robert D. Thurston (from 26 Mar)
   Maj Walter L. Williams (from 20 May)
   Maj John T. Quinn (from 2 Jul)

5th Marines

Commanding Officer ....... Col Thomas A. Culhane, Jr. (to 15 Aug 1952)
   Col Eustace R. Smoak (from 16 Aug)
   Col Lewis W. Walt (from 10 Dec)
   Col Harvey C. Tschirgi (from 14 Apr 1953)

Executive Officer .......... LtCol John A. Saxten (to 1 Jun 1952)
   LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (from 2 Jun)
   LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20 Jul)
   LtCol Jess P. Ferrill, Jr. (from 21 Aug)
   LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Jan 1953)
   LtCol James H. Finch (from 23 May)
   LtCol James Taul (from 18 Jul)

1st Battalion, 5th Marines

Commanding Officer ....... LtCol Franklin B. Nihart (to 24 May 1952)
   Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (from 25 May)
   LtCol Alexander W. Gentleman (from 15 Jul)
   LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 11 Nov)
   LtCol Jonas M. Platt (from 26 Dec)
   LtCol Jackson B. Butterfield (from 29 Apr 1953)

Executive Officer .......... Maj Hildeburn R. Martin (to 4 May 1952)
   Maj Lyle K. London (from 5 May)
   Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 29 Aug)
   Maj William C. Doty, Jr. (from 25 Jan 1953)
   Maj Thomas W. Pearson (from 2 Apr)
   Maj George R. Burke (from 11 Jun)
   Maj Charles E. McPartlin, Jr. (from 22 Jun)

2d Battalion, 5th Marines

Commanding Officer ....... LtCol William H. Cushing (to 10 Jun 1952)
   LtCol Thomas J. Cross (from 11 Jun)
   LtCol William S. McLaughlin (from 20 Aug)
   LtCol Oscar F. Peatross (from 11 Sep)
   LtCol James H. Finch (from 27 Feb 1953)
   LtCol Andrew C. Geer (from 14 May)
Executive Officer .......... Maj Robert S. Hudson (to 10 Jun 1952)
  Maj John C. Lundrigan (from 11 Jun)
  Maj Philip H. McArdle (from 16 Jul)
  Maj Paul C. Scofield (from 19 Dec)
  Maj Thomas M. Fields (from 26 Jun 1953)

3d Battalion, 5th Marines

Commanding Officer ...... LtCol William S. McLaughlin (to 15 Jul 1952)
  LtCol Oscar T. Jensen, Jr. (from 16 Jul)
  LtCol Robert J. Oddy (from 16 Nov)
  LtCol John T. Hill (from 11 Apr 1953)

Executive Officer ......... Maj Paul H. Bratten, Jr. (to 22 May 1952)
  Maj Clifford J. Robichaud, Jr. (from 23 May)
  Maj Joseph A. Bruder, Jr. (from 7 Jul)
  Maj Vernon Burtman (from 1 Nov)
  Maj Joseph S. Buntin (from 7 Feb 1953)

7th Marines

Commanding Officer ...... Col Russell E. Honowetz (to 10 Jun 1952)
  Col Thomas C. Moore, Jr. (from 11 Jun)
  Col Loren E. Haffner (from 5 Nov)
  Col Glenn C. Funk (from 27 Mar 1953)

Executive Officer ......... LtCol John D. Wiggins (to 17 Jul 1952)
  LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 18 Jul)
  LtCol Richard D. Strickler (from 24 Nov)
  LtCol Robert S. Howell (from 22 Mar 1953)
  LtCol Russell Duncan (from 26 May)
  LtCol Stanley J. Nelson (from 31 Jul)

1st Battalion, 7th Marines

Commanding Officer ...... LtCol George W. E. Daughtry (to 2 Aug 1952)
  LtCol Leo J. Dulacki (from 3 Aug)
  LtCol James C. Short (from 22 Nov)
  LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 28 Dec)
  LtCol Harry A. Hadd (from 18 May 1953)

Executive Officer .......... Maj Henry V. Joslin (to 14 Jul 1952)
  Maj Theodore R. Cathey (from 15 Jul)
  Maj James C. Short (from 23 Jul)
  Maj Floyd M. Johnson, Jr. (from 2 Aug)
  Maj Roy H. Thompson (from 1 Dec)
  Maj Glenn E. Ferguson (from 3 Jun 1953)
  Maj Joseph R. Motelewski (from 25 Jun)
Commanding Officer .......... LtCol Noel C. Gregory (to 18 Jul 1952)
LtCol Anthony Caputo (from 19 Jul)
LtCol Richard S. Johnson (from 12 Nov)
LtCol Alexander D. Cereghino (from 19 Mar 1953)
LtCol Joseph C. Missar (from 21 Jul)

Executive Officer .......... Maj Erwin Madsen (to 19 Apr 1952)
Maj William J. Zaro (from 20 Apr)
Maj James C. Fetters (from 8 Jun)
Maj Richard H. Mickle (from 24 Oct)
Maj Littleton K. Smith (from 16 Apr 1953)
Maj Ralph E. June (from 17 Jun)
Maj Don P. Wyckoff (from 17 Jul)

Commanding Officer .......... LtCol Houston Stiff (to 26 Apr 1952)
Maj Franklin C. Bacon (from 27 Apr)
LtCol Gerald F. Russell (from 17 Jun)
LtCol Charles D. Barrett, Jr. (from 13 Oct)
LtCol Russell Duncan (from 14 Mar 1953)
LtCol Paul M. Jones (from 26 May)

Executive Officer .......... Maj Franklin C. Bacon (to 26 Apr 1952)
Maj Richard M. Remington (from 27 Apr)
Maj Harold T. Clemens (from 28 Aug)
Maj Guy L. Wade (from 13 Oct)
Maj Alfred A. Tillman (from 23 Oct)
Maj John Mesko (from 25 May 1953)

Commanding Officer .......... Col Frederick P. Henderson (to 20 Sep 1952)
Col Harry N. Shea (from 21 Sep)
Col James E. Mills (from 22 Feb 1953)
Col Manly L. Curry (from 5 Jul)

Executive Officer .......... LtCol Lewis A. Jones (to 4 Jun 1952)
LtCol Robert F. Steidtmann (from 5 Jun)
LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 16 Jan 1953)
LtCol Robert D. Heinl, Jr. (from 6 May)
Maj Joseph E. Fogg (from 6 Jul)
LtCol Wade H. Hitt (from 9 Jul)

Commanding Officer .......... LtCol James R. Haynes (to 24 Jun 1952)
LtCol David S. Randall (from 25 Jun)
LtCol Olin W. Jones, Jr. (from 2 Nov)
LtCol Earl W. Gardner (from 8 May 1953)
Operations in West Korea

Executive Officer............. Maj Harold E. Nelson (to 21 Jun 1952)
Maj Herbert E. L. Zastrow (from 22 Jun)
Maj Lee P. Vance (from 26 Jul)
Maj Harry L. Sherwood, Jr. (from 14 Nov)
Maj Thomas L. Randall (from 17 Dec)
Maj John J. Jarvis, Jr. (from 25 Mar 1953)

2d Battalion, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer............. LtCol George B. Thomas (to 2 May 1952)
LtCol William P. Pala (from 3 May)
LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 6 Aug)
LtCol Arthur J. Bachhuber (from 17 Nov)
LtCol William H. Atkinson (from 10 Feb 1953)
Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 21 May)
LtCol Gordon H. West (from 18 Jul)

Executive Officer............. Maj Morris R. Snead (to 10 Jun 1952)
Maj Edward L. Fossum (from 11 Jun)
LtCol Bert Davis, Jr. (from 1 Jul)
Maj Roy E. Moffett (from 10 Aug)
Maj Max Berueffy, Jr. (from 2 Sep)
Maj Joseph F. Donahoe, Jr. (from 24 May 1953)
Maj Herman Poggemeyer, Jr. (from 13 Jul)

3d Battalion, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer............. LtCol Henry E. W. Barnes (to 13 Jul 1952)
LtCol Charles O. Rogers (from 14 Jul)
LtCol Daniel S. Pregnall (from 27 Nov)
LtCol Alfred L. Owens (from 25 Mar 1953)
Maj Dale D. Meyers (from 28 Jul)

Executive Officer............. LtCol Charles A. Lipot (to 5 Jul 1952)
Maj Joseph S. Gardner (from 6 Jul)
Maj William J. Kohler (from 27 Jul)
Maj Lawrence L. Graham (from 17 Nov)
Maj Robert M. Jenkins (from 15 Dec)
Maj Adoph J. Honeycutt (from 28 Mar 1953)
Maj Robert C. Hilliard (from 7 May)
Maj Leslie L. Page (from 12 Jun to 26 Jul)

4th Battalion, 11th Marines

Commanding Officer............. LtCol William M. Gilliam (to 11 Apr 1952)
LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (from 12 Apr)
Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 16 Jun)
LtCol Raymond D. Wright (from 16 Jul)
Maj William J. Sullivan (from 18 Dec)
Command and Staff List

Executive Officer

LtCol Robert D. Shaffer (from 20 Dec)
Maj David L. Moberly (from 23 Apr 1953)
LtCol Henry H. Reichner, Jr. (from 27 Apr)

Executive Officer

LtCol Bruce F. Hillam (to 16 Apr 1952)
Maj Richard H. Jeschke, Jr. (from 17 Apr)
Maj Carl A. Nielsen (from 11 Jun)
Maj Edward E. Davis (from 16 Jun)
Maj William J. Sullivan (from 17 Oct)
Maj David L. Moberly (from 22 Feb 1953)
Maj Johnny Jennings (from 2 May)
Maj George W. Carrington, Jr. (from 13 Jun)

7th Motor Transport Battalion

Commanding Officer

Maj Herbert E. Pierce (to 1 Jul 1952)
LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 2 Jul)
Maj John H. Faggart (from 27 Jul)
Maj Robert S. Anderson (from 16 Jun 1953)

Executive Officer

Maj Ben Sutts (to 15 Aug 1952)
Maj John J. Howe (from 16 Aug)
Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 20 Nov)
Maj Alfred G. McCormick (from 26 Apr 1953)

1st Ordnance Battalion

Commanding Officer

Maj Harold C. Borth (to 5 May 1952)
LtCol William F. Pulver (from 6 May)
Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 26 Aug)
Maj Maurice C. Pulliam (from 25 Mar 1953)

Executive Officer

Capt Frederick V. Osborn (to 5 May 1952)
Maj Harold C. Borth (from 6 May)
Maj Marshall R. Pilcher (from 16 Jul)
Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 26 Aug)
Maj Allen F. Stockdale (from 1 Sep)
Maj Frederick V. Osborn (from 15 Sep)
Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 4 Nov)
Maj Maurice C. Pulliam (from 21 Dec)
Maj Stanley P. Bulkowski (from 25 Mar 1953)
Maj Jack G. Fitzgerald (from 4 Jul)

1st Service Battalion

Commanding Officer

LtCol Bernard W. McLean (to 18 May 1952)
LtCol Charles E. Warren (from 19 May)
LtCol Edwin A. Law (from 1 Oct)
LtCol Hugh J. Chapman (from 5 Jul 1953)

Executive Officer

Maj George E. Allison (to 27 Oct 1952)
Maj James C. Fetters (from 28 Oct)
Maj Robert "J" Vroegindewey (from 19 Mar 1953)
Operations in West Korea

1st Tank Battalion

Commanding Officer ........... Maj Walter E. Reynolds, Jr. (to 20 May 1952)
LtCol John I. Williamson (from 21 May)
LtCol Charles W. McCoy (from 16 Apr 1953)

Executive Officer ............. Maj Edward C. Nelson, Jr. (to 15 Jun 1952)
Maj Robert B. Jeter (from 16 Jun)
Maj William W. Day (from 21 Feb 1953)
Maj Francis C. Hogan (from 6 May)

1st Armored Amphibian Battalion

Commanding Officer ............. LtCol John T. O'Neill (to 5 Aug 1952)
Maj James L. Jones (from 6 Aug)
LtCol Henry G. Lawrence, Jr. (from 12 Aug)
LtCol Fenlon A. Durand (from 4 Dec)
Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 16 May 1953)
LtCol Maurice C. Goodpasture (from 15 Jul)

Executive Officer ............... Maj James L. Jones (to 5 Aug 1952)
Maj David Young (from 6 Aug)
Maj James L. Jones (from 12 Aug)
Maj Ralph J. Parker, Jr. (from 21 Nov)
Maj Robert S. Wilson (from 16 May 1953)

1st Motor Transport Battalion

Commanding Officer ............. LtCol Howard E. Wertman (to 15 May 1952)
Maj Walter R. O'Quinn (from 16 May)
LtCol Robert B. McBroom (from 27 Jul)
LtCol Robert E. McCook (from 24 Mar 1953)

Executive Officer ............... Maj Raymond L. Luckel (to 2 Aug 1952)
Maj Marvin D. Grush (from 3 Aug)
Maj Joseph P. Cushing (from 6 Sep)
Maj Gobe Smith, Jr. (from 4 Oct)
Maj Robert C. McNab, Jr. (from 17 Feb 1953)

1st Combat Service Group

Commanding Officer ............. Col Russell N. Jordahl (to 29 Jun 1952)
Col Kenneth A. King (from 30 Jun)
LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Nov)
Col James T. Wilbur (from 8 Dec)
Col Edwin C. Ferguson (from 8 Feb 1953)
Col James A. Moreau (from 8 Jul)

Executive Officer ............... LtCol James G. Kelly (to 20 May 1952)
Col Frank M. Reinecke (from 21 May)
LtCol William H. Cushing (from 11 Jun)
LtCol Sidney F. Jenkins (from 8 Dec)
Command and Staff List

LtCol Max H. LaGrone (from 28 Jan 1953)
LtCol Tillman N. Peters (from 15 Mar)
Maj Harvey B. Atkins (from 11 May)

1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion

Commanding Officer . . . . LtCol Michiel Dobervich (to 1 Aug 1952)
LtCol Edwin B. Wheeler (from 2 Aug)
LtCol George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 7 Nov)
LtCol Frank R. Wilkinson, Jr. (from 16 Mar 1953)
Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 16 Jun)

Executive Officer . . . . . Maj William L. Eubank (to 3 Jun 1952)
Maj George S. Saussy, Jr. (from 4 Jun)
Maj William E. Lunn (from 7 Nov)
Maj John McN. Rosebush (from 24 Mar 1953)
Maj John J. DePalma (from 20 Jun)

1st Shore Party Battalion

Commanding Officer . . . . LtCol Warren S. Sivertsen (to 26 Jul 1952)
Col William G. Robb (from 27 Jul)
LtCol Russell Duncan (from 2 Oct)
Col Glenn C. Funk (from 3 Dec)
Col William H. Barba (from 21 Mar 1953)

Executive Officer . . . . . Maj Frederick F. Draper (to 3 Jun 1952)
Maj William E. Buron (from 4 Jun)
LtCol Clyde P. Ford (from 12 Aug)
LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 3 Mar 1953)
LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 18 Apr)
LtCol James M. Joyner (from 8 Jul)

1st Engineer Battalion

Commanding Officer . . . . LtCol John V. Kelsey (to 5 May 1952)
LtCol Harry D. Clarke (from 6 May)
LtCol Francis W. Augustine (from 1 Dec)
LtCol Francis X. Witt, Jr. (from 20 Apr 1953)

Executive Officer . . . . . Maj Grover C. Williams, Jr. (to 5 Jun 1952)
Maj Francis W. Augustine (from 6 Jun)
Maj George W. Torbert (from 1 Dec)
Maj Donald V. Nahrgang (from 26 Jun 1953)

1st Medical Battalion

Commanding Officer . . . . Cdr Richard Lawrence, Jr., USN (to 31 Aug 1952)
Cdr William W. Ayres, USN (from 1 Sep)
Executive Officer .......... Cdr James C. Luce, USN (to 12 May 1952)
(none listed from 13 May to 8 Jun)
LCdr James A. McLaughlin, USN (from 9 Jun)
Cdr Roald N. Grant, USN (from 24 Aug to 21 Sep)
(none listed from 22 Sep to 25 Apr 1953)
Lt Roger D. Williams, USN (from 26 Apr)

1st Signal Battalion

Commanding Officer ........ LtCol John E. Morris (to 3 Apr 1952)
LtCol Alton L. Hicks (from 4 Apr)
LtCol Jacob E. Glick (from 3 Aug)
LtCol Eugene A. Dueber, Jr. (from 16 Feb 1953 to 22 Apr 1953)

Executive Officer .......... Maj Ernest C. Bennett (to 4 Apr 1952)
Maj Bolish J. Kozak (from 5 Apr)
Maj Mauro J. Padalino (from 12 Jul)
Maj Frederick J. Cramer (from 30 Dec)
Maj John J. Reber (from 8 Feb 1953 to 22 Apr 1953)
(This battalion was disbanded on 22 Apr 1953.)

1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW)

Commanding General ........ MajGen Christian F. Schilt (to 11 Apr 1952)
MajGen Clayton C. Jerome (from 12 Apr 1952)
MajGen Vernon E. Megee (from 9 Jan 1953)

Asst Commanding General ... BGen Frank H. Lamson-Scribner (to 30 Aug 1952)
BGen Alexander W. Kreiser, Jr. (from 31 Aug)

Chief of Staff ............... Col Arthur F. Binney (to 30 Apr 1952)
Col Frank H. Schwable (from 1 May)
Col John Wehle (from 9 Jul)
Col Samuel S. Jack (from 8 Sep)
Col John C. Munn (from 8 May 1953)

Asst Chief of Staff, G-1 .... Col Robert O. Bisson (to 7 Sep 1952)
Col Lewis H. Delano, Jr. (from 8 Sep)
LtCol William M. Frash (from 11 May 1953)
Col Lawrence B. Clark (from 29 May)

Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 .... Col John W. Stage (to 14 May 1952)
LtCol Chester A. Henry, Sr. (from 15 May)
Maj Donald E. Kramer (from 22 Jul)
LtCol Harold Granger (from 16 Sep)
Col Arthur R. Stacy (from 25 Jul 1953)

Asst Chief of Staff, G-3 .... Col Stanley W. Trachta (to 8 Apr 1952)
Col William R. Wendt (from 9 Apr)
Col Louis B. Robertshaw (from 2 Sep)
Col Charles H. Hayes (from 29 Sep)
Col William D. Roberson (from 30 May 1953)
Col Frank H. Wirsig (from 5 Jul)

Asst Chief of Staff, G-4
Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 Mar 1952)
Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 Mar)
Col Robert W. Clark (from 24 May)
Col Richard D. Hughes (from 11 Feb 1953)
Col Richard M. Baker (from 4 Jul)

Headquarters Squadron, 1st MAW

Commanding Officer
Maj Earl C. Miles (to 29 May 1952)
Maj David R. Moak (from 30 May)
Maj Charles H. Woodley (from 1 Sep)
Maj Lionel D. Hastings (from 26 Sep)
Maj Charles W. Boggs, Jr. (from 1 Mar 1953)
Maj Fred J. Gilhuly (from 1 Jul)

Marine Wing Service Squadron 1 (MWSS-1)
(Decommissioned 1 Jul 1953)

Marine Wing Service Group 17 (MWSG-17)
(Commissioned 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer
Col John Wehle (to 8 Apr 1952)
LtCol Birney B. Truitt (from 9 Apr)
LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 17 Jul)
Col Lyle H. Meyer (from 21 Sep)
LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 11 May 1953)
Col Robert J. Johnson (from 30 Jun)

Executive Officer
LtCol Birney B. Truitt (to 8 Apr 1952)
Maj William L. Woodruff (from 9 Apr)
Maj Edward L. Schnettler (from 4 Jun)
Maj Franklin L. Kemper (from 26 Aug)
LtCol William G. Voss (from 20 Dec)
LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 21 Apr 1953)
Maj Elswin P. Dunn (from 11 May)
LtCol Charles J. Prall (from 6 Jul)

Headquarters Squadron, MWSG-17
(Commissioned 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer
Capt James D. Ireland (from 1 Jul 1953)

Marine Air Base Squadron 17 (MABS-17)
(Activated 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer
Maj Bryce Howerton (from 1 Jul 1953)
Marine Aircraft Repair Squadron 17 (MARS-17)
(Activated 1 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer .... Maj Vincent Franano (from 1 Jul 1953)
Maj James G. Fox (from 29 Jul)

Marine Air Control Group 2 (MACG-2)

Commanding Officer .... Col Frederick R. Payne (to 18 May 1952)
Col John W. Stage (from 19 May)
Col Jack R. Cram (from 11 Jul)
Col Kenneth D. Kerby (from 16 Feb 1953)

Executive Officer ......... LtCol Russell D. Rupp (to 1 May 1952)
LtCol Philip "L" Crawford (from 2 May)
LtCol William A. Houston, Jr. (from 20 Jun)
LtCol Harold L. Lantz (from 11 Aug)
LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (from 24 Feb 1953)
LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from 23 May)
LtCol John S. Flickinger (from 10 Jun)
LtCol Morris E. Flater (from 21 Jun)

Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2)

Commanding Officer .... LtCol Hensley Williams (to 2 Jun 1952)
Maj Clinton E. Jones (from 3 Jun)
LtCol William H. Whitaker, Jr. (from 1 Aug)
LtCol Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from 21 Aug)
LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 28 Jan 1953)
Col Joseph A. Gerath, Jr. (from 20 Feb)
LtCol Randolph C. Berkeley, Jr. (from 11 Jun)

Executive Officer ......... Maj Clinton E. Jones (to 2 Jun 1952)
Capt John F. Driftmier (from 3 Jun)
Maj George C. Henshaw (from 28 Aug)
Maj Thomas H. Hughes, Jr. (from 25 Sep)
LtCol Arthur C. Lowell (from 20 Feb 1953)
(none listed from 15 Mar to 9 Jul)
Capt Robert L. Dietrichson (from 10 Jul)

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 (MGCIS-1)

Commanding Officer .... Maj Fred A. Steele (to 15 Aug 1952)
Maj Henry W. Hise (from 16 Aug)
Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 16 Oct)
LtCol Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 3 Feb 1953)
Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 1 Jun)
LtCol Harold F. Brown (from 23 Jun)
Executive Officer ........... Maj Marvin R. Bridges, Jr (to 11 Apr 1952)
                        Capt William J. Wachsler (from 12 Apr)
                        Capt Francis K. McManus (from 22 May)
                        Maj William Sloane (from 1 Aug)
                        Maj Romeo F. Bordigon (from 4 Oct)
                        Maj Tolbert T. Gentry (from 2 Nov)
                        Maj Francis F. Rotter (from 8 Jan 1953)
                        Capt John E. Dixon (from 31 May)
                        Maj Randal A. Yarberry (from 23 Jun)

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3 (MGCIS-3)

Commanding Officer ........... LtCol Owen M. Hines (to 20 May 1952)
                        Maj James H. Foster (from 21 May)
                        LtCol Robert J. Hoey (from 14 Jun)
                        LtCol Kenneth D. Frazier (from 16 Aug)
                        Lt Col John B. Maas, Jr. (from 3 Feb 1953)
                        Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 19 May)
                        Maj James E. Lovin, Jr. (from 1 Jul)
                        LtCol Lowell D. Grow (from 27 Jul)

Executive Officer ........... Maj James H. Foster (to 1 Jun 1952)
                        Capt Lee B. Swindall (from 2 Jun)
                        Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 21 Jun)
                        Maj Raleigh E. Fletcher (from 5 Sep)
                        Maj Francis E. Lee, Jr. (from 29 Oct)
                        Maj Nathan B. Peevey, Jr. (from 19 May)
                        Capt William K. Lebo (from 27 Jul)
                        Maj Thomas E. Archer (from 27 Jul)

Marine Composite Squadron 1 (VMC-1)
(Activated 15 Sep 1952)

Commanding Officer ........... LtCol Lawrence F. Fox (to 24 Jan 1953)
                        LtCol Ernest C. Fusan (from 25 Jan)
                        LtCol Thomas "H" Mann, Jr. (from 16 Mar)
                        Maj George H. Linnemeier (from 6 Apr)
                        LtCol Wilbur A. Free (from 1 Jun)

Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12)

Commanding Officer ........... Col Elmer T. Dorsey (to 24 May 1952)
                        Col Robert E. Galer (from 25 May)
                        Col John P. Condon (from 10 Aug)
                        Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 13 Jan 1953)
                        Col Edward B. Carney (from 1 Apr)
Operations in West Korea

Executive Officer ............... Lt Col Robert J. Hoey (to 5 Jun 1952)
                      Lt Col Joseph A. Gray (from 6 Jun)
                      Col George S. Bowman, Jr. (from 17 Aug)
                      Lt Col Barnette Robinson (from 20 Feb 1953)
                      Col Robert J. Johnson (from 19 Mar)
                      Col William F. Hausman (from 30 Jun)

Headquarters Squadron, MAG-12

Commanding Officer ............ Capt George Byers, Jr. (to 22 Apr 1952)
                      1stLt Daniel F. McConnell (from 24 Apr)
                      Maj Godfrey Muller (from 1 Jul)
                      Capt William M. Crooks (from 18 Sep)
                      Capt Edgar F. Remington (from 21 Dec)
                      Capt Bradford N. Slenning (from 15 May 1953)

Marine Air Base Squadron 12 (MABS-12)

Commanding Officer ............ LtCol Carl M. Longley (to 31 Mar 1952)
                      Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 1 Apr)
                      LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 25 Aug)
                      LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 11 Oct)
                      LtCol Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Jan 1953)
                      LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 1 Mar)
                      LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 1 Jul)

Executive Officer ............... Maj Robert A. Collett (to 31 Mar 1952)
                      Maj LeRoy T. Frey (from 1 Apr)
                      Maj Oscar C. Hauge, Jr. (from 26 May)
                      Maj Sumner H. Whitten (from 18 Aug)
                      LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 18 Sep)
                      Maj Frank Hick (from 11 Oct)
                      Maj Harry J. Anderson (from 20 Jan 1953)
                      LtCol Rufus D. Sams (from 14 Apr)
                      Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 11 Jul)

Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12 (MAMS-12)

Commanding Officer ............ LtCol Joseph A. Gray (to 31 May 1952)
                      Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 1 Jun)
                      Maj William M. Johnston, Jr. (from 19 Aug)
                      Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 29 Dec)
                      LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 20 Feb 1953)
                      LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 27 Jun)
                      Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 18 Jul)
Command and Staff List

Executive Officer ........... Maj Robert E. Will (to 26 Apr 1952)
                           Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 27 Apr)
                           Capt Robert T. Kinsey (from 1 Jun)
                           Maj James G. G. Taylor (from 19 Aug)
                           Maj Warren L. MacQuarrie (from 1 Sep)
                           Maj John R. Hyneman (from 15 Dec)
                           Maj Leonard I. Beatty (from 20 Feb 1953)
                           Maj Alexander Gagy (from 15 Apr)
                           Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 12 Jul)

Marine Attack Squadron 121 (VMA—121)

Commanding Officer ....... LtCol William Q. Houston, Jr. (to 19 Jun 1952)
                           LtCol Philip "L" Crawford (from 20 Jun)
                           LtCol Wayne M. Cargill (from 11 Sep)
                           LtCol Richard M. Huizenga (from 7 Dec)
                           LtCol John E. Hughes (from 1 Mar 1953)
                           Maj Richard L. Braun (from 21 Apr)
                           LtCol Harold B. Penne (from 16 Jul)

Executive Officer ........... Maj Henry W. Horst (to 31 May 1952)
                           Maj Robert H. Brumley (from 1 Jun)
                           Maj Julius B. Griffin (from 30 Jul)
                           LtCol Donald D. Blue (from 2 Nov)
                           LtCol Roy R. Hewitt (from 11 Dec)
                           LtCol John E. Hughes (from 17 Jan 1953)
                           Maj Mervin L. Taylor (from 1 Mar)
                           Maj Robert C. Woten (from 16 Jul)

Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (VMF—212)

Commanding Officer ....... LtCol Robert L. Bryson (to 9 Jun 1952)
                           LtCol Graham H. Benson (from 10 Jun)
                           LtCol Maurice W. Fletcher (from 5 Sep)
                           LtCol Charles E. Dobson, Jr. (from 25 Oct)
                           LtCol Barnette Robinson (from 1 Jan 1953)
                           LtCol Louis R. Smunk (from 20 Feb)
                           Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 1 Jun)
                           LtCol James R. Wallace (from 19 Jun)

Executive Officer ........... Maj Richard B. Elliott (to 29 Feb 1952)
                           Maj Roy A. Thorson (from 8 Mar)
                           Maj Leslie C. Reed (from 10 Jun)
LtCol Walter E. Gregory (from 25 Oct)
Maj Norman O'Bryan (from 20 Feb 1953)
Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 7 Mar)
Maj Donald A. McMillan (from 1 Jun)
Maj Edward C. Kicklighter (from 19 Jun)
Maj Boris J. Frankovic (from 20 Jul)

Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (VMF–323)
redesignated
Marine Attack Squadron 323 (VMA–323)
on 30 Jun 1952)
(Transferred from operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
on 7 Jul 1953)

Commanding Officer ........... LtCol Richard L. Blume (to 25 Apr 1952)
Maj William A. Weir (from 26 Apr)
LtCol Henry S. Miller (from 1 Jun)
LtCol Kenneth R. Chamberlain (from 1 Sep)
LtCol William C. Lemke (from 20 Nov)
LtCol William M. Frash (from 13 Jan 1953)
LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 11 Apr to 26 Jun)

Executive Officer ............. Maj William A. Weir (to 8 Jun 1952)
Maj Richard E. Pryor (from 9 Jun)
Maj Eystein J. Nelson (from 1 Sep)
Maj Thomas M. Forsyth, Jr. (from 20 Nov)
LtCol Clarence H. Moore (from 2 Jan 1953)
LtCol Frederick M. Rauschenbach (from 29 Jan)
Maj Robert C. Woten (from 3 May to 26 Jun)

Marine Attack Squadron 332 (VMA–332)
(Came under the operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
on 29 May 1953)

Commanding Officer .......... LtCol John B. Berteling (from 29 May 1953)
Executive Officer ............ Maj Gordon L. Allen (from 29 May 1953)

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA–251)
attached to
1st Marine Aircraft Wing
on 9 Jun 1953

Commanding Officer ........... LtCol Harold A. Harwood (from 9 Jun 1953)
Executive Officer ............ Maj James W. Merritt (from 9 Jun 1953)
### Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (VMF(N)-513)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
<td>LtCol John R. Burnett</td>
<td>to 11 Jun 1952</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Col Peter D. Lambrecht</td>
<td>from 12 Jun</td>
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<td>LtCol Jack C. Scott</td>
<td>from 19 Jun</td>
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<td>LtCol Homer G. Hutchinson, Jr.</td>
<td>from 9 Sep</td>
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<td>LtCol Robert F. Conley</td>
<td>from 20 Jan 1953</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LtCol Ross S. Mickey</td>
<td>from 6 May</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LtCol Robert L. Conrad</td>
<td>from 10 Jul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>Maj Frank H. Simonds</td>
<td>to 19 Apr 1952</td>
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<td>Maj William D. Patterson, Jr.</td>
<td>from 23 Apr</td>
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<td>Lt Col Jack C. Scott</td>
<td>from 15 Aug</td>
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<td>Maj Gorden E. Gray</td>
<td>from 20 Aug</td>
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<td>LtCol Jack C. Scott</td>
<td>from 8 Sep</td>
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<td>LtCol Jack B. Winters</td>
<td>from 14 Sep</td>
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<td>Maj Dave E. Severance</td>
<td>from 20 Jan 1953</td>
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<td>Maj Richard M. Hunt</td>
<td>from 9 Jun</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Robert L. Conrad</td>
<td>from 24 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Richard M. Hunt</td>
<td>from 10 Jul</td>
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### Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33)

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<thead>
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<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
<td>Col Martin A. Severson</td>
<td>to 23 May 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Col John P. Condon</td>
<td>from 24 May</td>
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<td>Col Herbert H. Williamson</td>
<td>from 11 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col Louis B. Robertshaw</td>
<td>from 22 Oct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col Arthur R. Stacy</td>
<td>from 10 May 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col John L. Smith</td>
<td>from 24 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Officer</td>
<td>LtCol Vernon O. Ullman</td>
<td>to 13 May 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Graham H. Benson</td>
<td>from 14 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col Herbert H. Williamson</td>
<td>from 26 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Darrell D. Irwin</td>
<td>from 11 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col John P. Coursey</td>
<td>from 17 Aug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col Arthur R. Stacy</td>
<td>from 25 Mar 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol James K. Dill</td>
<td>from 11 May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LtCol Thomas V. Murto, Jr.</td>
<td>from 26 Jul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Headquarters Squadron, MAG-33

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commanding Officer</td>
<td>Capt Allen R. Schutter</td>
<td>to 30 May 1952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Guy M. Cloud</td>
<td>from 1 Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Richard J. Collins</td>
<td>from 21 Jul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Reuel H. Pietz</td>
<td>from 1 Nov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maj Thomas J. Cushman, Jr.</td>
<td>from 14 Apr 1953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Capt Jerry N. Hendershot</td>
<td>from 26 May</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Operations in West Korea

**Marine Air Base Squadron 33 (MABS-33)**

Commanding Officer . . . . . Maj Frank P. Barker, Jr. (to 9 Jun 1952)
Maj John W. Zuber (from 10 Jun)
Maj William D. Patterson, Jr. (from 6 Aug)
Maj Kenneth B. Nelson (from 9 Dec)
Lt Col Bernard McShane (from 21 Apr 1953)
LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 1 Jun)
LtCol Jack Cosley (from 26 Jul)

Executive Officer . . . . . Maj George K. Harshberger (to 1 May 1952)
Maj Summerfield M. Taylor, Jr. (from 2 May)
Capt Frederic T. Watts, Jr. (from 11 Aug)
Maj Harold N. McLaffey (from 2 Oct)
Maj Darwin P. Glaese (from 23 Dec)
Capt George J. Collins (from 22 May 1953)

**Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33 (MAMS-33)**

Commanding Officer . . . . . Maj Zadik Collier (to 1 Sep 1952)
Maj William N. Case (from 2 Sep)
Maj Patrick Harrison (from 5 Feb 1953)
Maj Julian P. Craigmiles (from 29 Jun)

Executive Officer . . . . . Maj Alton C. Bennett (from 1 Aug 1952)
Maj John L. Herndon (from 12 Aug)
Maj James Aldworth (from 2 Dec)
Capt Marshall S. Austin (from 22 April 1953)

**Marine Fighter Squadron 115 (VMF-115)**

Commanding Officer . . . . . LtCol Thomas M. Coles (to 20 May 1952)
Maj John W. Zuber (from 21 May)
LtCol Robert C. Armstead (from 5 Jun)
Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 17 Jul)
LtCol Royce W. Coln (from 18 Aug)
LtCol John B. Maas, Jr. (from 29 Sep)
LtCol Stoddard G. Cortelyou (from 1 Feb 1953)
LtCol Joe L. Warren (from 31 Mar)
LtCol Lynn H. Stewart (from 5 Jun)

Executive Officer . . . . . Maj Conrad G. Winter (to 26 Apr 1952)
Maj John W. Zuber (from 27 Apr)
Maj Griffith B. Doyle (from 21 May)
Maj Wallace G. Wethe (from 10 Jun)
Maj Arthur N. Nehf, Jr. (from 5 Aug)
LtCol Joseph F. Wagner, Jr. (from 19 Nov)
Lt Col Joe L. Warren (from 2 Feb 1953)
Maj Carol Bernard (from 31 Mar)
Maj James H. Phillips (from 25 Jun)
Marine Fighter Squadron 311 (WMF—311)

Commanding Officer ........ LtCol Darrell D. Irwin (to 2 Jun 1952)
   Maj Henry W. Hise (from 3 Jun)
   Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 10 Jun)
   Maj William J. Sims (from 26 Jun)
   LtCol Arthur H. Adams (from 1 Oct)
   LtCol Francis K. Coss (from 1 Feb 1953)
   LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 21 Apr)
   LtCol Bernard McShane (from 1 Jun)

Executive Officer .......... Major Jay E. McDonald (to 27 Mar 1952)
   Maj Henry W. Hise (from 28 Mar)
   Maj Kenneth D. Frazier (from 26 Jun)
   Maj Harold A. Langstaff, Jr. (from 22 Aug)
   Maj William J. Sims (from 1 Oct)
   LtCol Walter R. Bartosh (from 12 Oct)
   LtCol Arthur M. Moran (from 20 Jan 1953)
   Maj John Skinner, Jr. (from 21 Apr)
   Maj William D. Heier (from 3 Jul)

Marine Attack Squadron (VMA—312)
(On 16 Jun 1953, this squadron was reassigned to the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing.)

Commanding Officer ........ LtCol Joe H. McGlothlin, Jr. (to 8 Apr 1952)
   LtCol Robert E. Smith, Jr. (from 9 Apr)
   LtCol George C. Axtell, Jr. (from 11 Jul)
   LtCol Robert E. Cameron (from 4 Oct)
   LtCol Winston E. Jewson (from 25 Jan to 15 Jun 1953)

Executive Officer .......... Major Alexander S. Walker, Jr. (to 7 Apr 1952)
   Maj Edmond P. Hartsock (from 9 Apr)
   Maj Walter D. Persons (from 11 Jul)
   Maj Marshall C. Gregory (from 1 Sep)
   Maj James W. Baker (from 13 Jan 1953)
   Maj Grover R. Betzer (from 2 Feb)
   Maj James L. Cooper (from 4 May to 10 Jun)

Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ—1)

Commanding Officer ........ Major Robert R. Read (to 13 May 1952)
   LtCol Vernon O. Ullman (from 14 May)
   LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 11 Sep)
   LtCol Howard L. Walter (from 1 Nov)
   LtCol William M. Ritchey (from 16 Feb 1953)
   LtCol Leslie T. Bryan, Jr. (from 15 May)
Executive Officer ........... Maj Albert E. James (to 3 Jun 1952)
Maj Marion B. Bowers (from 4 Jun)
Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 18 Jul)
LtCol William H. Whitaker (from 28 Aug)
Maj Grant W. McCombs (from 11 Sep)
Maj Howard L. Walter (from 2 Oct)
Maj Louis Conti (from 6 Nov)
LtCol Grant W. McCombs (from 14 Dec)
Maj Louis Conti (from 5 Feb 1953)
Maj John E. Worlund (from 1 Apr)

Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 (HMR-161)

Commanding Officer ........... Col. Keith B. McCutcheon (to 7 Aug 1952)
LtCol John F. Carey (from 8 Aug)
Col Owen A. Chambers (from 15 Mar 1953)

Executive Officer ........... Maj James R. Dyer (to 10 May 1952)
Maj Zigmund J. Radolinski (from 11 May)
LtCol David M. Danser (from 28 May)
LtCol Russel R. Riley (from 1 Sep)
Maj Gilbert Percy (from 3 Jun 1953)
Lt Col John H. King, Jr. (from 1 Jul)

Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6)

Commanding Officer ........... LtCol William H. Herring (to 10 May 1952)
Maj Wallace J. Slappey, Jr. (from 11 May)
LtCol Elkin S. Dew (from 11 Sep)
LtCol William A. Cloman, Jr. (from 2 Feb 1953)
LtCol Earl E. Anderson (from 1 Jul)

Executive Officer ........... Maj William G. MacLean, Jr. (to 25 Jun 1952)
Maj Lynn E. Midkiff (from 26 Jun)
Maj Alton W. McCully (from 5 Feb 1953)
Maj John A. Hood (from 15 May)

1st 90mm AAA Gun Battalion

Battalion Commander ........... Col Max C. Chapman (to 22 Nov 1952)
Col Edgar O. Price (from 23 Nov)
LtCol Henry S. Massie (from 7 Apr 1953)

Executive Officer ........... LtCol Kenneth P. Dunkle (to 30 Apr 1952)
Maj Thomas J. Matthews (from 1 May)
Maj Robert H. Twisdale (from 15 Mar 1953)
Maj Henry V. Leasure (from 9 Jun)
APPENDIX D

Effective Strength

1ST MARINE DIVISION
AND
1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING^1

Listed below are selected dates and figures which represent the effective strength of 1stMarDiv and 1st MAW throughout the 1952-1953 period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31 Mar 52</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>30,790</td>
<td>33,028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ground (1,412)</td>
<td>(24,811)</td>
<td>(26,223)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>aviation (826)</td>
<td>(5,979)</td>
<td>(6,805)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 52</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>34,509</td>
<td>37,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ground (1,684)</td>
<td>(28,549)</td>
<td>(30,233)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>aviation (876)</td>
<td>(5,960)</td>
<td>(6,836)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Oct 52</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>33,726</td>
<td>36,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ground (1,423)</td>
<td>(26,795)</td>
<td>(28,218)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>aviation (980)</td>
<td>(6,931)</td>
<td>(7,911)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 53</td>
<td>2,329</td>
<td>32,976</td>
<td>35,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ground (1,352)</td>
<td>(26,766)</td>
<td>(28,118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>aviation (977)</td>
<td>(6,210)</td>
<td>(7,187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Apr 53</td>
<td>2,307</td>
<td>33,995</td>
<td>36,302</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ground (1,370)</td>
<td>(28,172)</td>
<td>(29,542)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>aviation (937)</td>
<td>(5,823)</td>
<td>(6,760)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jul 53</td>
<td>2,335</td>
<td>31,881</td>
<td>34,216^2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ground (1,412)</td>
<td>(25,299)</td>
<td>(26,711)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>aviation (923)</td>
<td>(6,582)</td>
<td>(7,505)</td>
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</table>

^2 In addition, the 1stMarDiv was reinforced throughout this period by other indigenous military and civilian personnel.
APPENDIX E

Marine Corps Casualties
(Ground and Air)

**Korean War 1950–1953**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>KIA²</th>
<th>Killed non-Battle</th>
<th>WIA</th>
<th>Cumulative Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug–Dec 1950</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6,229</td>
<td>7,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan–Dec 1951</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>7,924</td>
<td>8,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan–Mar 1952</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1950–Mar 1952</td>
<td>2,573</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>14,753</td>
<td>17,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr–Dec 1952</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>6,815</td>
<td>7,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan–Jul 1953</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>4,470</td>
<td>5,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 1952–Jul 1953</td>
<td>1,689</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>11,285</td>
<td>13,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1950 to Jul 1953</td>
<td>4,262</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>26,038</td>
<td>30,544</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


² KIA includes DOW, Captured and Died, and Missing In Action, Presumed Dead.
APPENDIX F

Marine Pilots and Enemy Aircraft Downed in Korean War

21 Apr 51 1st Lt Harold D. Daigh  
(VMF-312, F4U-4, USS Bataan) ............... 1 YAK

21 Apr 51 Capt Phillip C. DeLong  
(VMF-312, F4U-4, USS Bataan) ............... 2 YAKs

30 Jun 51 †Capt Edwin B. Long  
(VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N) .................. 1 PO-2

12 Jul 51 Capt Donald L. Fenton  
(VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL) .................. 1 PO-2

23 Sep 51 Maj Eugene A. Van Gundy  
(VMF(N)-513, F7F-3N) .................. 1 PO-2

4 Nov 51 *Maj William F. Guss  
(VMF-311) .................................. 1 MIG

5 Mar 52 *Capt Vincent J. Marzello  
(VMF-311) .................................. 1 MIG

16 Mar 52 *Lt Col John S. Payne  
(1st MAW) .................................. 1 MIG

7 Jun 52 1st Lt John W. Andre  
(VMF(N)-513, F4U-5NL) .................. 1 YAK-9

10 Sep 52 Capt Jesse G. Folmar  
(VMA-312, F4U, USS Sicily) .............. 1 MIG

15 Sep 52 *Maj Alexander J. Gillis  
(VMF-311) .................................. 1 MIG

28 Sep 52 *Maj Alexander J. Gillis  
(VMF-311) .................................. 2 MIGs

3 Nov 52 ‡Maj William T. Stratton, Jr.  
(VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) .................. 1 YAK-15

8 Nov 52 Capt Oliver R. Davis  
(VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) .................. 1 MIG

10 Dec 52 §1st Lt Joseph A. Corvi  
(VMF(N)-513, F3D-2) .................. 1 PO-2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Unit/Model</th>
<th>Aircrafts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Jan 53</td>
<td>Maj Elswin P. Dunn</td>
<td>VMF(N)-513, F3D-2</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jan 53</td>
<td>*Capt Robert Wade</td>
<td>MAG-33</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan 53</td>
<td>Capt James R. Weaver</td>
<td>VMF(N)-513, F3D-2</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 53</td>
<td>LtCol Robert F. Conley</td>
<td>VMF(N)-513, F3D-2</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Apr 53</td>
<td>*Maj Roy L. Reed</td>
<td>VMF-115</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Apr 53</td>
<td>*Maj Roy L. Reed</td>
<td>VMF-115</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 May 53</td>
<td>*Maj John F. Bolt</td>
<td>VMF-115</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 May 53</td>
<td>*Capt Harvey L. Jensen</td>
<td>VMF-115</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jun 53</td>
<td>*Maj John F. Bolt</td>
<td>VMF-115</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Jun 53</td>
<td>*Maj John F. Bolt</td>
<td>VMF-115</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
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<td>30 Jun 53</td>
<td>*Maj John F. Bolt</td>
<td>VMF-115</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Jul 53</td>
<td>*Maj John F. Bolt</td>
<td>VMF-115</td>
<td>2 MIGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Jul 53</td>
<td>*Maj John H. Glenn</td>
<td>VMF-311</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Jul 53</td>
<td>*Maj John H. Glenn</td>
<td>VMF-311</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Jul 53</td>
<td>*Maj Thomas M. Sellers</td>
<td>VMF-115</td>
<td>2 MIGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Jul 53</td>
<td>*Maj John H. Glenn</td>
<td>VMF-311</td>
<td>1 MIG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Marines on temporary exchange duty with Fifth Air Force.
† First enemy aircraft destroyed at night by UNC.
‡ First enemy jet aircraft destroyed through use of airborne intercept radar equipped fighter.
§ First enemy aircraft destroyed by means of lock-on radar gear.
APPENDIX G

Unit Citations

PRESIDENTAL UNIT CITATION

The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in citing

for outstanding and superior performance of duty during the period 26 October 1950 to 27 July 1953

THE FIRST UNITED STATES MARINE DIVISION (REINFORCED)

for the award of

PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION

Landing at Wonsan on 26 October 1950 the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) advanced to Yudam-ni where they engaged the Chinese Communist Forces. The heroic and courageous fighting of the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), which was outnumbered but never out-fought by the Chinese Communist Forces; coupled with its fight against the terrible winter weather in this return to Hungnam, has added another glorious page to the brilliant history of the United States Marines. After regrouping and retraining, the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) rejoined the United Nations Forces and began the attack to the north which drove the aggressors relentlessly before them. The enemy spring offensive during April 1951 which threatened to nullify the recent United Nations gains was successfully repulsed by the First Marine Division (Reinforced) and when other Republic of Korea Forces were heavily pressed and fighting for survival the timely offensive by this Division gave heart to the peoples of Korea. In March 1952 the First Marine Division (Reinforced) assumed responsibility of defending the western flank of the Eighth Army. In carrying out the responsibilities of this assignment the Marines won everlasting glory at Bunker Hill. Continuing active operations against the Communist enemy until the Armistice, the First Marine Division (Reinforced) inflicted heavy losses upon the aggressors and successfully repulsed their assaults upon strong point Vegas and Reno during March 1953, and during July 1953, just prior to the signing of the Armistice, again threw back the enemy in several days of severe fighting at strong points Berlin and East Berlin. Although suffering heavy losses during

1 For text of previous awards to 1stMarDiv, 1st MAW, and 1st ProvMarBrig, see earlier volumes of this series.

2 The Korean PUC, for the period 26 Oct 50 to 15 Feb 53, was presented to the 1stMarDiv in March 1953. Later, President Syngman Rhee furnished a second citation extending the period to include 16 Feb–27 Jul 53. The division was thus cited for the overall period 26 Oct 50 to 27 Jul 53, and the entire period is considered one award. Decorations & Medals Br., HQMC.
these engagements the First Marine Division (Reinforced) was at all times successful in maintaining the integrity of the United Nations’ positions within their assigned sector. The First United States Marine Division (Reinforced), by its unparalleled fighting courage and steadfast devotion to duty, has won the undying affection and gratitude of the Korean people. During its entire campaign the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) remained true to its motto of “Semper Fidelis”. In keeping faith with the highest traditions of its own country the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) kindled new hope in the breasts of all free men and women in the Republic of Korea. This Citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual member of the First United States Marine Division (Reinforced) who served in Korea during the stated period.

/S/ SYNGMAN Rhee
President

The President of the Republic of Korea takes profound pleasure in citing

for outstanding and superior performance of duty

THE FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

The First Marine Aircraft Wing has distinguished itself in support of United Nations Forces in Korea from 27 February 1951 to 11 June 1953. During this period, Marine Aircraft flew over 80,000 combat sorties braving intense opposition to strike enemy fortifications, weapons and logistical installations throughout North Korea. These extensive combat operations, often conducted in hazardous weather, have provided United Nations’ ground forces with unparalleled close air support and have inflicted heavy casualties and tremendous damage on enemy forces. Flying from forward Korean bases and from naval aircraft carriers, Marine aircraft have continually harassed enemy communication and transportation systems, successfully curtailing the resupply of hostile front line troops. The exceptional achievements of the officers and men of the First Marine Aircraft Wing have materially assisted the Republic of Korea in its fight for freedom. Their outstanding performance of duty reflects great credit upon themselves and is in accord with the highest traditions of military service.

The citation carries with it the right to wear the Presidential Unit Citation Ribbon by each individual member of the First Marine Aircraft Wing who served in Korea during the stated period.

/S/ SYNGMAN Rhee
President
**Unit Citations**

**PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION**

_The President of the Republic of Korea takes pleasure in citing_  

**THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS ADVISORY COMPONENT**  
United States Naval Advisory Group

for outstanding service to the people of Korea and for aid in the development of the Korean Marine Corps during the period February 1953 to 27 July 1954.

While attached to the Republic of Korea Marine Corps the United States Marine Advisory Component performed commendable service by giving valuable advice and guidance thus enabling the Korean Marine Corps to attain a ready status for any emergency.

By their initiative and constant attention the officers and men have contributed materially to the effective operation of all offices and departments of the Korean Marine Corps. Their thorough knowledge of techniques and military matters has helped in the practical routine training and in the fitting of the Korean Marine Corps for effective combat duty.

By exemplary conduct and indomitable spirit the United States Marine Corps Advisory Component has left a permanent imprint on the Korean Marine Corps which will assist in the accomplishment of the missions assigned to it in the future.

The outstanding service of the officers and men of the United States Marine Corps Advisory Component is in the best tradition of the United States Naval Service and this Presidential Unit Citation is given in recognition of their significant contribution to the welfare of the Republic of Korea.

/S/ SYNGMAN RHEE  
President

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**THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY**  
WASHINGTON

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the  

**FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED**

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953 and from 7 to 27 July 1953. During these periods the First Marine Division, Reinforced, maintained the integrity of over thirty-five miles of defense line in Pan-
munjom Truce Area against the constant aggressions of the enemy. During the time the Division was in the lines, it was under fire and attack by a resolute, well-equipped and fanatical hostile force. The Division maintained an aggressive defense and constantly kept the enemy off balance by continuously patrolling, probing and raiding enemy positions, accompanied by the full weight of artillery and air support. Commencing in August 1952, and frequently thereafter, during the months of October 1952, March 1953, and July 1953, the enemy launched a series of large scale attacks to capture certain terrain features critical to the defense of friendly lines. The outposts and main defensive positions called Bunker Hill, The Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, along with certain smaller outposts, gave title to battles of unsurpassed ferocity in which the full effort of the Marine Division was required to hurl back the attackers at heavy cost to both the Division and the enemy. That the lines in the Division sector remained firm and unbreached at the cessation of hostilities on 27 July 1953 gave eloquent tribute to the resourcefulness, courage, professional acumen and stamina of the members of the First Marine Division, Reinforced. Their inspiring and unyielding devotion to the fulfillment of their vital mission reflects the highest credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Division, Reinforced, during the periods 11 August 1952 to 5 May 1953 and 7 to 27 July 1953, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This includes all organic units of the Division and the following reinforcing units:

**FLEET MARINE FORCE UNITS AND DETACHMENTS:** 1st 4.5 Rocket Battery; 1st Combat Service Group; 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion; 7th Motor Transport Battalion; 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion; 1st Amphibian Truck Company; Team #1, 1st Provisional Historical Platoon; 1st Fumigation and Bath Platoon; 1st Air Delivery Platoon; Radio Relay Team, 1st Signal Operations Company; Detachment, 1st Explosive Ordnance Disposal Company; 2nd Platoon, Auto Field Maintenance Company; 1st Provisional Truck Company; Detachment, 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.

**UNITED STATES ARMY UNITS:** (For such periods not included in Army Unit Awards) 1st Bn, 32nd Regt, 7th Inf Div; 7th Inf Div; 74th Truck Co.; 513th Truck Co.; 3rd Plt, 86th Engr Searchlight Co (passed to operational control of 11th Marines); 558th Trans Truck Co (Amphibious, was attached to 7th MT Bn, FMF); 196th Field Arty Bn; 92nd Army Engr Searchlight Plt; 181st CIC Det USA; 163rd MIS Det USA (Unit redesignated 1 Sep 1952 to MIS Plt); TLO Det USA; UNMACK Civil Affairs Team USA; 61st Engr Co; 159th Field Arty Bn (155 Howitzer); 623rd Field Arty Bn; 17th Field Arty Bn "C" Btry; 204th Field Arty Bn "B" Btry; 84th Engr Construction Bn; 1st Bn, 15th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 65th US Inf Regt; 1st Bn, 9th Regt, 2nd US Div (attached to KPR); Recon Co, 7th US Inf Div; 461st Inf Bn; Heavy Mortars, 7th Inf Div; 204th Field Arty Bn "A" Btry; 69th Field Arty Bn; 64th Field Arty Bn; 8th Field Arty Bn; 90th Field Arty Bn; 21st AAA-AW Bn; 89th Tank Bn; 441st CIC Det, USA; Prov Bn, USA (Dets
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, REINFORCED

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

"For exceptionally meritorious service during operations against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from 1 August 1952 to 27 July 1953. Flying more than 45,000 combat sorties against determined opposition during this period, the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, struck repeatedly and effectively at enemy troops, fortifications, logistical installations and lines of communication throughout North Korea. These extensive combat operations provided friendly ground forces with decisive close air support during such battles as Bunker Hill, The Hook, Reno, Carson, Vegas, Berlin and East Berlin, and inflicted heavy casualties and tremendous damage upon the enemy. Operating from naval aircraft carriers and from forward Korean bases, Marine aircraft continually harassed enemy communication and transportation systems, curtailing the movement of hostile troops to the front lines, and provided the air defense of South Korea. The notable record achieved by the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, is an eloquent tribute to the resourcefulness, courage and stamina of all her gallant officers and men. Their inspiring and unyielding devotion to duty in the fulfillment of these vital tasks reflect the highest credit upon themselves and the United States Naval Service."

All personnel attached to and serving with the First Marine Aircraft Wing, Reinforced, during the above period, or any part thereof, are hereby authorized to wear the NAVY UNIT COMMENDATION RIBBON. This includes all organic units and the following reinforcing units: Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 1; 1st 90mm Anti-Aircraft Artillery Gun Battalion; and Ground Control Approach Unit 41M.

CHARLES S. THOMAS
Secretary of the Navy
Distinguished Unit Citation—Citation of Unit—Section 1

1—Distinguished Unit Citation.—As authorized by Executive Order 9396 (sec. I, WD Bul, 22, 1943), superseding Executive Order 9075 (sec. III, WD Bul 11, 1942), the following unit is cited under AR 220-315 in the name of the President of the United States as public evidence of deserved honor and distinction. The citation reads as follows:

1. The Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and the following attached units: The Turkish Liaison Detachment, 8215th Army Unit; Company B, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division; and Company C, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 1st Marine Division, are cited for outstanding performance of duty and extraordinary heroism in action against the enemy near Munsan-ni, Korea, during the period 28 to 29 May 1953. On the night of 28 May, an assault, supported by a heavy barrage, was launched by a powerful enemy force, determined to wrest outposts "Elko," "Carson," and "Vegas" from friendly hands. The valiant troops occupying these positions were soon surrounded and hand-to-hand combat ensued. With great tenacity and courage, the friendly troops fought on until, with only three of them still standing on outpost "Carson," the first position fell. Despite the tremendous number of casualties they had suffered, the foe intensified the attack on the two remaining terrain features, rushing repeatedly up the slopes only to be hurled back by the gallant defenders. Friendly reinforcements arrived together with concentrated artillery support. All fire power was brought to bear on the charging enemy, as the defending troops fought desperately to hold. The foe came on in seemingly endless numbers and friendly tanks moved into highly vulnerable positions to fire at close range. Friendly casualties were heavy, but the toll of enemy dead was enormous. The determined foe paid apparently no attention to their thousands of casualties and appeared prepared to sacrifice thousands more to gain their objectives. Realizing that these friendly outposts could not hope to stand in the face of the endless waves of hostile troops, the friendly command ordered the outpost defenders to withdraw to the main line of resistance. The extraordinary heroism, singleness of purpose, and magnificent fighting spirit exhibited by the members of the Third Turkish Brigade, Turkish Armed Forces Command, and attached units throughout this crucial battle, resulted in the frustration of enemy plans to breach the main line of resistance, thus reflecting the greatest credit on themselves and the military profession.

By order of the Secretary of the Army:

Official:

WM. E. BERGIN
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

M. B. RIDGWAY
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON SIX

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy aggressor forces in Korea from August 1950 to 27 July 1953. Pioneering in the development of front-line helicopter evacuation of casualties, Marine Observation Squadron Six skillfully carried out unprecedented low-altitude evacuation flights during all hours of the day and night over rugged mountainous terrain in the face of enemy fire and extremely adverse weather, thereby saving untold lives and lessening the suffering of wounded marines. In addition, this valiant squadron completed thousands of day and night artillery spotting, reconnaissance and tactical air control missions, contributing materially to the extensive damage inflicted upon enemy positions, supply lines and troop concentrations. The splendid record achieved by Marine Observation Squadron Six attests to the courage, determination and esprit de corps of the officers and men of this unit and was in keeping with the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service."

For the President,
CHARLES S. THOMAS
Secretary of the Navy
APPENDIX H

Armistice Agreement

Volume I

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

Agreement between the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, concerning a military armistice in Korea.

PREAMBLE

The undersigned, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, on the one hand, and the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, on the other hand, in the interest of stopping the Korean conflict, with its great toll of suffering and bloodshed on both sides, and with the objective of establishing an armistice which will insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved, do individually, collectively, and mutually agree to accept and to be bound and governed by the conditions and terms of armistice set forth in the following Articles and Paragraphs, which said conditions and terms are intended to be purely military in character and to pertain solely to the belligerents in Korea.

Article I

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE

1. A Military Demarcation Line shall be fixed and both sides shall withdraw two (2) kilometers from this line so as to establish a Demilitarized Zone between the opposing forces. A Demilitarized Zone shall be established as a buffer zone to prevent the occurrence of incidents which might lead to a resumption of hostilities.

2. The Military Demarcation Line is located as indicated on the attached map.

3. The Demilitarized Zone is defined by a northern and a southern boundary as indicated on the attached map.

4. The Military Demarcation Line shall be plainly marked as directed by the Military Armistice Commission hereinafter established. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall have suitable markers erected along the boundary between the Demilitarized Zone and their respective areas. The Military
Armistice Commission shall supervise the erection of all markers placed along the Military Demarcation Line and along the boundaries of the Demilitarized Zone.

5. The waters of the Han River Estuary shall be open to civil shipping of both sides wherever one bank is controlled by one side and the other bank is controlled by the other side. The Military Armistice Commission shall prescribe rules for the shipping in that part of the Han River Estuary indicated on the attached map. Civil shipping of each side shall have unrestricted access to the land under the military control of that side.

6. Neither side shall execute any hostile act within, from, or against the Demilitarized Zone.

7. No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the Military Demarcation Line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

8. No person, military or civilian, in the Demilitarized Zone shall be permitted to enter the territory under the military control of either side unless specifically authorized to do so by the Commander into whose territory entry is sought.

9. No person, military or civilian shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Military Armistice Commission.

10. Civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is south of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and civil administration and relief in that part of the Demilitarized Zone which is north of the Military Demarcation Line shall be the joint responsibility of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be as determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed one thousand (1,000) persons at any one time. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be as prescribed by the Military Armistice Commission. Other personnel shall not carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Military Armistice Commission.

11. Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed to prevent the complete freedom of movement to, from, and within the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission, its assistants, its Joint Observer Teams with their assistants, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission hereinafter established, its assistants, its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with their assistants, and of any other persons, materials, and equipment specifically authorized to enter the Demilitarized Zone by the Military Armistice Commission. Convenience of movement shall be permitted through the territory under the military control of either side over any route necessary to move between points within the Demilitarized Zone where such points are not connected by roads lying completely within the Demilitarized Zone.
Article II
CONCRETE ARRANGEMENTS FOR CEASE-FIRE
AND ARMISTICE

A. General

12. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall order and enforce a complete cessation of all hostilities in Korea by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces, effective twelve (12) hours after this Armistice Agreement is signed. (See Paragraph 63 hereof for effective date and hour of the remaining provisions of this Armistice Agreement.)

13. In order to insure the stability of the Military Armistice so as to facilitate the attainment of a peaceful settlement through the holding by both sides of a political conference of a higher level, the Commanders of the opposing sides shall:

a. Within seventy-two (72) hours after this Armistice becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies, and equipment from the Demilitarized Zone except as otherwise provided herein. All demolitions, minefields, wire entanglements, and other hazards to the safe movement of personnel of the Military Armistice Commission or its Joint Observer Teams, known to exist within the Demilitarized Zone after the withdrawal of military forces therefrom, together with lanes known to be free of all hazards, shall be reported to the Military Armistice Commission by the Commander of the side whose forces emplaced such hazards. Subsequently, additional safe lanes shall be cleared; and eventually, within forty-five (45) days after the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, all such hazards shall be removed from the Demilitarized Zone as directed by and under the supervision of the Military Armistice Commission. At the termination of the seventy-two (72) hour period, except for unarmed troops authorized a forty-five (45) day period to complete salvage operations under Military Armistice Commission supervision, such units of a police nature as may be specifically requested by the Military Armistice Commission and agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides, and personnel authorized under Paragraphs 10 and 11 hereof, no personnel of either side shall be permitted to enter the Demilitarized Zone.

b. Within ten (10) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, withdraw all of their military forces, supplies and equipment from the rear and the coastal islands and waters of Korea of the other side. If such military forces are not withdrawn within the stated time limit, and there is no mutually agreed and valid reason for the delay, the other side shall have the right to take any action which it deems necessary for the maintenance of security and order. The term "coastal islands," as used above, refers to those islands which, though occupied by one side at the time when this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, were controlled by the other side on 24 June 1950; provided, however, that all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line between HWANGHAE-DO and KYONGGI-DO shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers.
except the island groups of PAENGYONG-DO (37°58'N, 124°40'E), TAÉCHONG-DO (37°50'N, 124°42'E), SOCHONG-DO (37°46'N, 124°46'E), YONPYONG-DO (37°38'N, 125°40'E), and U-DO (37°36'N, 125°58'E), which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above-mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

c. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing military personnel; provided, however, that the rotation of units and personnel, the arrival in Korea of personnel on a temporary duty basis, and the return to Korea of personnel after short periods of leave or temporary duty outside of Korea shall be permitted within the scope prescribed below. "Rotation" is defined as the replacement of units or personnel by other units or personnel who are commencing a tour of duty in Korea. Rotation personnel shall be introduced into and evacuated from Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. Rotation shall be conducted on a man-for-man basis; provided, however, that no more than thirty-five thousand (35,000) persons in the military service shall be admitted into Korea by either side in any calendar month under the rotation policy. No military personnel of either side shall be introduced into Korea if the introduction of such personnel will cause the aggregate of the military personnel of that side admitted into Korea since the effective date of this Armistice Agreement to exceed the cumulative total of the military personnel of that side who have departed from Korea since that date. Reports concerning arrivals in and departures from Korea of military personnel shall be made daily to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, such reports shall include places of arrival and departure and the number of persons arriving at or departing from each such place. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, shall conduct supervision and inspection of the rotation of units and personnel authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

d. Cease the introduction into Korea of reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition; provided, however, that combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition which are destroyed, damaged worn out, or used up during the period of the armistice may be replaced on the basis of piece-for-piece of the same effectiveness and the same type. Such combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition shall be introduced into Korea only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. In order to justify the requirement for combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to be introduced into Korea for replacement purposes, reports concerning every incoming shipment of these items shall be made to the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; such reports shall include statements regarding the disposition of the items being replaced. Items to be replaced which are removed from Korea shall be removed only through the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, through its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall conduct supervision and
inspection of the replacement of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition authorized above, at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof.

e. Insure that personnel of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement are adequately punished.

f. In those cases where places of burial are a matter of record and graves are actually found to exist, permit graves registration personnel of the other side to enter, within a definite time limit after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the territory of Korea under their Military control, for the purpose of proceeding to such graves to recover and evacuate the bodies of the deceased military personnel of that side, including deceased prisoners of war. The specific procedures and the time limit for the performance of the above task shall be determined by the Military Armistice Commission. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall furnish to the other side all available information pertaining to the places of burial of the deceased military personnel of the other side.

g. Afford full protection and all possible assistance and cooperation to the Military Armistice Commission, its Joint Observer Teams, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, in the carrying out of their functions and responsibilities hereinafter assigned; and accord to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and to its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, full convenience of movement between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof over main lines of communication agreed upon by both sides, and between the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. In order to prevent unnecessary delays, the use of alternate routes and means of transportation will be permitted whenever the main lines of communication are closed or impassable.

h. Provide such logistic support, including communications and transportation facilities, as may be required by the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and their Teams.

i. Each construct, operate, and maintain a suitable airfield in their respective ports of the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission, for such uses as the Commission may determine.

j. Insure that all members and other personnel of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission hereinafter established shall enjoy the freedom and facilities necessary for the proper exercise of their function, including privileges, treatment, and immunities equivalent to those ordinarily enjoyed by accredited diplomatic personnel under international usage.

14. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing ground forces under the military control of either side, which ground forces shall respect the Demilitarized Zone and the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side.

15. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces,
which naval forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not engage in blockade of any kind of Korea.

16. This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing air forces, which air forces shall respect the air space over the Demilitarized Zone and over the area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and over the waters contiguous to both.

17. Responsibility for compliance with and enforcement of the terms and provisions of this Armistice Agreement is that of the signatories hereto and their successors in command. The Commanders of the opposing sides shall establish within their respective commands all measures and procedures necessary to insure complete compliance with all of the provisions hereof by all elements of their commands. They shall actively cooperate with one another and with the Military Armistice Commission and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in requiring observance of both the letter and the spirit of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement.

18. The costs of the operations of the Military Armistice Commission and of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of their Teams shall be shared equally by the two opposing sides.

B. **Military Armistice Commission**

1. Composition

19. A Military Armistice Commission is hereby established.

20. The Military Armistice Commission shall be composed of ten (10) senior officers, five (5) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and five (5) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Of the ten members, three (3) from each side shall be of general or flag rank. The two (2) remaining members on each side may be major generals, brigadier generals, colonels, or their equivalents.

21. Members of the Military Armistice Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants as required.

22. The Military Armistice Commission shall be provided with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it. Each side shall appoint to the Secretariat a Secretary and an Assistant Secretary and such clerical and specialized personnel as required by the Secretariat. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese, all of which shall be equally authentic.

23. a. The Military Armistice Commission shall be initially provided with and assisted by ten (10) Joint Observer Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission.

   b. Each Joint Observer Team shall be composed of not less than four
(4) nor more than six (6) officers of field grade, half of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters shall be furnished by each side as required for the functioning of the Joint Observer Teams.

2. Functions and Authority

24. The general mission of the Military Armistice Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement and to settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

25. The Military Armistice Commission shall:

a. Locate its headquarters in the vicinity of PANMUNJOM (37°57'29" N, 126°40'00" E). The Military Armistice Commission may relocate its headquarters at another point within the Demilitarized Zone by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Commission.

b. Operate as a joint organization without a chairman.

c. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.

d. Supervise the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement pertaining to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

e. Direct the operations of the Joint Observer Teams.

f. Settle through negotiations any violations of this Armistice Agreement.

g. Transmit immediately to the Commanders of the opposing sides all reports of investigations of violations of this Armistice Agreement and all other reports and records of proceedings received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission.

h. Give general supervision and direction to the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians, hereinafter established.

i. Act as an intermediary in transmitting communications between the Commanders of the opposing sides; provided however, that the foregoing shall not be construed to preclude the Commanders of both sides from communicating with each other by any other means which they may desire to employ.

j. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Joint Observer Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.

26. The mission of the Joint Observer Teams shall be to assist the Military Armistice Commission in supervising the carrying out of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement to the Demilitarized Zone and to the Han River Estuary.

27. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to dispatch Joint Observer Teams to investigate violations of this Armistice Agreement reported to have occurred in the Demilitarized Zone or in the Han River Estuary; provided, however, that not more than one half of the Joint Observer Teams which have not been dis-
patched by the Military Armistice Commission may be dispatched at any one time by the senior member of either side on the Commission.

28. The Military Armistice Commission, or the senior member of either side thereof, is authorized to request the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to conduct special observations and inspections at places outside the Demilitarized Zone where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred.

29. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has occurred, it shall immediately report such violation to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

30. When the Military Armistice Commission determines that a violation of this Armistice Agreement has been corrected to its satisfaction, it shall so report to the Commanders of the opposing sides.

3. General

31. The Military Armistice Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the senior members of both sides; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by the senior member of either side.

32. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Military Armistice Commission shall be forwarded to the Commanders of the opposing sides as soon as possible after each meeting.

33. The Joint Observer Teams shall make periodic reports to the Military Armistice Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them, or as may be required by the Commission.

34. The Military Armistice Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

35. The Military Armistice Commission may make recommendations to the Commanders of the opposing sides with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

C. Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission

1. Composition

36. A Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is hereby established.

37. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be composed of four (4) senior officers, two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, namely, SWEDEN and SWITZERLAND, and two (2) of whom shall be appointed by neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of
the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, namely, POLAND and CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The term "neutral nations" as herein used is defined as those nations whose combatant forces have not participated in the hostilities in Korea. Members appointed to the Commission may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. Each member shall designate an alternate member to attend those meetings which for any reason the principal member is unable to attend. Such alternate members shall be of the same nationality as their principals. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may take action whenever the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by one side is equal to the number of members present from the neutral nations nominated by the other side.

38. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be permitted to use staff assistants furnished by the neutral nations as required. These staff assistants may be appointed as alternate members of the Commission.

39. The neutral nations shall be requested to furnish the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission with the necessary administrative personnel to establish a Secretariat charged with assisting the Commission by performing necessary record-keeping, secretarial, interpreting, and such other functions as the Commission may assign to it.

40. a. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be initially provided with, and assisted by, twenty (20) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be responsible to, shall report to, and shall be subject to the direction of, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission only.

b. Each Neutral Nations Inspection Team shall be composed of not less than four (4) officers, preferably of field grade, half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and half of whom shall be from the neutral nations nominated jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. Members appointed to the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams may be from the armed forces of the appointing nations. In order to facilitate the functioning of the Teams, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members, one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and one of whom shall be from a neutral nation nominated by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, may be formed as circumstances require. Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, interpreters, and communications personnel, and such equipment as may be required by the Teams to perform their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side, as required, in the Demilitarized Zone and in the territory under his military control. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission may provide itself and the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams with such of the above personnel and equipment of its own as it may desire; provided, however, that such personnel shall be personnel of the same neutral nations of which the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission is composed.
2. Functions and Authority

41. The mission of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to carry out the functions of supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation, as stipulated in Subparagraphs 13c and 13d and Paragraph 28 hereof, and to report the results of such supervision, observation, inspection, and investigation to the Military Armistice Commission.

42. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall:
   a. Locate its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.
   b. Adopt such rules of procedure as it may, from time to time, deem necessary.
   c. Conduct, through its members and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, the supervision and inspection provided for in Sub-paragraphs 13c and 13d of this Armistice Agreement at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof, and the special observations and inspections provided for in Paragraph 28 hereof at those places where violations of this Armistice Agreement have been reported to have occurred. The inspection of combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be such as to enable them to properly insure that reinforcing combat aircraft, armored vehicles, weapons, and ammunition are not being introduced into Korea; but this shall not be construed as authorizing inspections or examinations of any secret designs or characteristics of any combat aircraft, armored vehicle, weapon, or ammunition.
   d. Direct and supervise the operations of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams.
   e. Station five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; and five (5) Neutral Nations Inspection Teams at the ports of entry enumerated in Paragraph 43 hereof located in the territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People’s Army and the Commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers; and establish initially ten (10) mobile neutral Nations Inspection Teams in reserve, stationed in the general vicinity of the headquarters of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, which number may be reduced by agreement of the senior members of both sides on the Military Armistice Commission. Not more than half of the mobile Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be dispatched at any one time in accordance with requests of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission.
   f. Subject to the provisions of the preceding Sub-paragraph, conduct without delay investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement, including such investigations of reported violations of this Armistice Agreement as may be requested by the Military Armistice Commission or by the senior member of either-side on the Commission.
   g. Provide credentials and distinctive insignia for its staff and its Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, and a distinctive marking for all vehicles, aircraft, and vessels, used in the performance of its mission.
43. Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be stationed at the following ports of entry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Territory under the military control of the United Nations command</th>
<th>Territory under the military control of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCHON (37^\circ 28'N, 126^\circ 38'E)</td>
<td>SINUIJU (40^\circ 06'N, 124^\circ 24'E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAEGU (35^\circ 52'N, 128^\circ 36'E)</td>
<td>CHONGJIN (41^\circ 46'N, 129^\circ 49'E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUSAN (35^\circ 06'N, 129^\circ 02'E)</td>
<td>HUNGNAM (39^\circ 50'N, 127^\circ 37'E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KANGNUNG (37^\circ 45'N, 128^\circ 54'E)</td>
<td>MANPO (41^\circ 09'N, 126^\circ 18'E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUNSAN (35^\circ 59'N, 126^\circ 43'E)</td>
<td>SINANJU (39^\circ 36'N, 125^\circ 36'E)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be accorded full convenience of movement within the areas and over the routes of communication set forth on the attached map.

3. General

44. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall meet daily. Recesses of not to exceed seven (7) days may be agreed upon by the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission; provided, that such recesses may be terminated on twenty-four (24) hour notice by any member.

45. Copies of the record of the proceedings of all meetings of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission as soon as possible after each meeting. Records shall be kept in English, Korean, and Chinese.

46. The Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall make periodic reports concerning the results of their supervision, observations, inspections, and investigations to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission as required by the Commission and, in addition, shall make such special reports as may be deemed necessary by them; or may be required by the Commission. Reports shall be submitted by a Team as a whole, but may also be submitted by one or more individual members thereof; provided, that the reports submitted by one or more individual members thereof shall be considered as informational only.

47. Copies of the reports made by the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams shall be forwarded to the Military Armistice Commission by the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission without delay and in the language in which received. They shall not be delayed by the process of translation or evaluation. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall evaluate such reports at the earliest practicable time and shall forward their findings to the Military Armistice Commission as a matter of priority. The Military Armistice Commission shall not take final action with regard to any such report until the evaluation thereof has been received from the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and of its Teams shall be subject to appearance before the Military Armistice Commission, at the request of the senior member of either side on the Military Armistice Commission, for clarification of any report submitted.

48. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall maintain duplicate files of the reports and records of proceedings required by this Armistice
Agreement. The Commission is authorized to maintain duplicate files of such other reports, records, etc., as may be necessary in the conduct of its business. Upon eventual dissolution of the Commission, one set of the above files shall be turned over to each side.

49. The Neutral Supervisory Commission may make recommendations to the Military Armistice Commission with respect to amendments or additions to this Armistice Agreement. Such recommended changes should generally be those designed to insure a more effective armistice.

50. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, or any member thereof, shall be authorized to communicate with any member of the Military Armistice Commission.

Article III
Arrangements Relating to Prisoners of War

51. The release and repatriation of all prisoners of war held in the custody of each side at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective shall be effected in conformity with the following provisions agreed upon by both sides prior to the signing of this Armistice Agreement.

a. Within sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, each side shall, without offering any hindrance, directly repatriate and hand over in groups all those prisoners of war in its custody who insist on repatriation to the side to which they belonged at the time of capture. Repatriation shall be accomplished in accordance with the related provisions of this Article. In order to expedite the repatriation process of such personnel, each side shall, prior to the signing of the Armistice Agreement, exchange the total numbers, by nationalities, of personnel to be directly repatriated. Each group of prisoners of war delivered to the other side shall be accompanied by rosters, prepared by nationality, to include name, rank (if any) and internment or military serial number.

b. Each side shall release all those remaining prisoners of war, who are not directly repatriated, from its military control and from its custody and hand them over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for disposition in accordance with the provisions in the Annex hereto: "Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission."

c. So that there may be no misunderstanding owing to the equal use of three languages, the act of delivery of a prisoner of war by one side to the other side shall, for the purposes of this Armistice Agreement, be called "repatriation" in English, "song hwan" in Korean, and "ch'ien fan" in Chinese, notwithstanding the nationality or place of residence of such prisoner of war.

52. Each side insures that it will not employ in acts of war in the Korean conflict any prisoner of war released and repatriated incident to the coming into effect of this Armistice Agreement.

53. All the sick and injured prisoners of war who insist upon repatriation shall be repatriated with priority. Insofar as possible, there shall be captured medical personnel repatriated concurrently with the sick and injured prisoners of war, so as to provide medical care and attendance en route.
54. The repatriation of all the prisoners of war required by Sub-paragraph 51a hereof shall be completed within a time limit of sixty (60) days after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective. Within this time limit each side undertakes to complete the repatriation of the above-mentioned prisoners of war in its custody at the earliest practicable time.

55. PANMUNJOM is designated as the place where prisoners of war will be delivered and received by both sides. Additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war in the Demilitarized Zone may be designated, if necessary, by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

56. a. A Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War is hereby established. It shall be composed of six (6) officers of field grade, three (3) of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and three (3) of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for the repatriation of prisoners of war and for supervising the execution by both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of prisoners of war. It shall be the duty of this Committee to coordinate the timing of the arrival of prisoners of war at the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war from the prisoner of war camps of both sides; to make, when necessary, such special arrangements as may be required with regard to the transportation and welfare of sick and injured prisoners of war; to coordinate the work of the joint Red Cross teams, established in Paragraph 57 hereof, in assisting in the repatriation of prisoners of war; to supervise the implementation of the arrangements for the actual repatriation of prisoners of war stipulated in Paragraphs 53 and 54 hereof; to select, when necessary, additional place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war, and to carry out such other related functions as are required for the repatriation of prisoners of war.

b. When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Commission for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

c. The Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon completion of the program of repatriation of prisoners of war.

57. a. Immediately after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, joint Red Cross teams composed of representatives of the national Red Cross Societies of the countries contributing forces to the United Nations Command on the one hand, and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and representatives of the Red Cross Society of the People's Republic of China on the other hand, shall be established. The joint Red Cross teams shall assist in the execution by both sides of those provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph 51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation, by the performance of such humanitarian services as are neces-
sary and desirable for the welfare of the prisoners of war. To accomplish this
task, the joint Red Cross teams shall provide assistance in the delivering and
receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at the place(s) of delivery and
reception of prisoners of war, and shall visit the prisoner of war camps of
both sides to comfort the prisoners of war and to bring in and distribute
gift articles for the comfort and welfare of the prisoners of war. The joint
Red Cross teams may provide services to prisoners of war while en route from
prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of
war.

b. The Joint Red Cross teams shall be organized as set forth below:

(1) One team shall be composed of twenty (20) members, namely,
ten (10) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side,
to assist in the delivering and receiving of prisoners of war by both sides at
the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. The chairmanship
of this team shall alternate daily between representatives from the Red Cross
Societies of the two sides. The work and services of this team shall be coordi-
nated by the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

(2) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely,
thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side,
to visit the prisoners of war camps under the administration of the Korean
People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. This team may provide
services to prisoners of war while en route from the prisoner of war camps
to the place(s) of delivery and reception of prisoners of war. A representative
of the Red Cross Society of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or of
the Red Cross Society of the People’s Republic of China shall serve as chair-
man of this team.

(3) One team shall be composed of sixty (60) members, namely,
thirty (30) representatives from the national Red Cross Societies of each side,
to visit the prisoner of war camps under the administration of the United
Nations Command. This team may provide services to prisoners of war while
en route from the prisoner of war camps to the place(s) of delivery and recep-
tion of prisoners of war. A representative of a Red Cross Society of a nation
contributing forces to the United Nations Command shall serve as chairman
of this team.

(4) In order to facilitate the functioning of each joint Red Cross
team, sub-teams composed of not less than two (2) members from the team,
with an equal number of representatives from each side, may be formed as
circumstances require.

(5) Additional personnel such as drivers, clerks, and interpreters,
and such equipment as may be required by the joint Red Cross teams to per-
form their missions, shall be furnished by the Commander of each side to the
team operating in the territory under his military control.

(6) Whenever jointly agreed upon by the representatives of both
sides or any joint Red Cross team, the size of such team may be increased or
decreased, subject to confirmation by the Committee for Repatriation of Pris-
oners of War.

c. The Commander of each side shall cooperate fully with the joint Red
Cross teams in the performance of their functions, and undertakes to insure
the security of the personnel of the joint Red Cross team in the area under his
military control. The Commander of each side shall provide such logistic,
administrative, and communications facilities as may be required by the team
operating in the territory under his military control.

d. The joint Red Cross teams shall be dissolved upon completion of the
program of repatriation of all the prisoners of war specified in Sub-paragraph
51a hereof, who insist upon repatriation.

58. a. The Commander of each side shall furnish to the Commander of
the other side as soon as practicable, but not later than ten (10) days after
this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the following information con-
cerning prisoners of war:

(1) Complete data pertaining to the prisoners of war who escaped
since the effective date of the data last exchanged.
(2) Insofar as practicable, information regarding name, nationality,
rank, and other identification data, date and cause of death, and place of burial,
of those prisoners of war who died while in his custody.

b. If any prisoners of war escape or die after the effective date of the
supplementary information specified above, the detaining side shall furnish
to the other side, through the Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners of War,
the data pertaining thereto in accordance with the provisions of Sub-paragraph
58a hereof. Such data shall be furnished at ten-day intervals until the com-
pletion of the program of delivery and reception of prisoners of war.

c. Any escaped prisoner of war who returns to the custody of the de-
taining side after the completion of the program of delivery and reception
of prisoners of war shall be delivered to the Military Armistice Commis-

59. a. All civilians who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes
effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief,
United Nations Command, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided north of the
Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if
they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Commander-in-
Chief, United Nations Command, to return to the area north of the Military
Demarcation Line; and all civilians, who, at the time this Armistice Agree-
ment becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the
Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the
Chinese People's Volunteers, and who, on 24 June 1950, resided south of the
Military Demarcation Line established in this Armistice Agreement shall, if
they desire to return home, be permitted and assisted by the Supreme Com-
mander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese
People's Volunteers to return to the area south of the Military Demarcation
Line. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely
throughout territory under his military control the contents of the provisions
of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities
to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians who desire to
return home.

b. All civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice
Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, be permitted and assisted to do so; all civilians of foreign nationality who, at the time this Armistice Agreement becomes effective, are in territory under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, shall, if they desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers, be permitted and assisted to do so. The Commander of each side shall be responsible for publicizing widely throughout the territory under his military control the contents of the provisions of this Sub-paragraph, and for calling upon the appropriate civil authorities to give necessary guidance and assistance to all such civilians of foreign nationality who desire to proceed to territory under the military control of the Commander of the other side.

c. Measures to assist in the return of civilians provided for in Subparagraph 59a hereof and the movement of civilians provided for in Subparagraph 59b hereof shall be commenced by both sides as soon as possible after this Armistice Agreement becomes effective.

d. (1) A Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians is hereby established. It shall be composed of four (4) officers of field grade, two of whom shall be appointed by the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, and two of whom shall be appointed jointly by the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's Volunteers. This Committee shall, under the general supervision and direction of the Military Armistice Commission, be responsible for coordinating the specific plans of both sides for assistance to the return of the above-mentioned civilians, and for supervising the execution of both sides of all of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement relating to the return of the above-mentioned civilians. It shall be the duty of this Committee to make necessary arrangements, including those of transportation, for expediting and coordinating the movement of the above-mentioned civilians; to select the crossing point(s) through which the above-mentioned civilians will cross the Military Demarcation Line; to arrange for security at the crossing points; and to carry out such other functions as are required to accomplish the return of the above-mentioned civilians.

(2) When unable to reach agreement on any matter relating to its responsibilities, the Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall immediately refer such matter to the Military Armistice Commission for decision. The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall maintain its headquarters in proximity to the headquarters of the Military Armistice Commission.

(3) The Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced Civilians shall be dissolved by the Military Armistice Commission upon fulfillment of its mission.
Armistice Agreement

Article IV
Recommendation to the Governments Concerned on Both Sides

60. In order to insure the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the military Commanders of both sides hereby recommend to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides that, within three (3) months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.

Article V
Miscellaneous

61. Amendments and additions to this Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the Commanders of the opposing sides.

62. The Articles and Paragraphs of this Armistice Agreement shall remain in effect until expressly superseded either by mutually acceptable amendments and additions or by provision in an appropriate agreement for a peaceful settlement at a political level between both sides.

63. All of the provisions of this Armistice Agreement, other than Paragraph 12, shall become effective at 2200 hours on 27 July 1953.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1000 hours on the 27th day of July 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

Kim Il Sung
Marshall, Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Supreme Commander, Korean People's Army

Peng Teh-Huai
Commander, Chinese People's Volunteers

Mark W. Clark
General, United States Army
Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command

Present

Nam Il
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate, Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

William K. Harrison, Jr.
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Senior Delegate, United Nations Command Delegation

Annex
Terms of Reference for Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
(See Sub-paragraph 51b)

1. In order to ensure that all prisoners of war have the opportunity to exercise their right to be repatriated following an armistice, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India shall each be requested by both sides
to appoint a member to a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which
shall be established to take custody in Korea of those prisoners of war who,
while in the custody of the detaining powers, have not exercised their right
to be repatriated. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall establish
its headquarters within the Demilitarized Zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom,
and shall station subordinate bodies of the same composition as the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission at those locations at which the Repatriation
Commission assumes custody of prisoners of war. Representatives of both
sides shall be permitted to observe the operations of the Repatriation Com-
mmission and its subordinate bodies to include explanations and interviews.

2. Sufficient armed forces and any other operating personnel required to
assist the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in carrying out its func-
tions and responsibilities shall be provided exclusively by India, whose repre-
sentative shall be the umpire in accordance with the provisions of Article 132
of the Geneva Convention and shall also be chairman and executive agent of
the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Representatives from each of
the other four powers shall be allowed staff assistants in equal number not to
exceed fifty (50) each. When any of the representatives of the neutral nations
is absent for some reason, that representative shall designate an alternate
representative of his own nationality to exercise his functions and authority.
The arms of all personnel provided for in this Paragraph shall be limited to
military police type small arms.

3. No force or threat of force shall be used against the prisoners of war
specified in Paragraph 1 above to prevent or effect their repatriation, and no
violence to their persons or affront to their dignity or self-respect shall be per-
mitted in any manner for any purpose whatsoever (but see Paragraph 7 be-
low). This duty is enjoined on and entrusted to the Neutral Nations Repa-
triation Commission. This Commission shall ensure that prisoners of war
shall at all times be treated humanely in accordance with the specific pro-
visions of the Geneva Convention, and with the general spirit of that
Convention.

II

CUSTODY OF PRISONERS OF WAR

4. All prisoners of war who have not exercised their right of repatriation
following the effective date of the Armistice Agreement shall be released
from the military control and from the custody of the detaining side as soon
as practicable, and, in all cases, within sixty (60) days subsequent to the
effective date of the Armistice Agreement to the Neutral Nations Repatriation
Commission at locations in Korea to be designated by the detaining side.

5. At the time the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission assumes
control of the prisoner of war installations, the military forces of the detain-
ing side shall be withdrawn therefrom, so that the locations specified in the
preceding Paragraph shall be taken over completely by the armed forces of
India.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 5 above, the detaining side shall have the responsibility for maintaining and ensuring security and order in the areas around the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody and for preventing and restraining any armed forces (including irregular armed forces) in the area under its control from any acts of disturbance and intrusion against the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 3 above, nothing in this agreement shall be construed as derogating from the authority of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to exercise its legitimate functions and responsibilities for the control of the prisoners of war under its temporary jurisdiction.

III
EXPLANATION

8. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, after having received and taken into custody all those prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated, shall immediately make arrangements so that within ninety (90) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission takes over the custody, the nations to which the prisoners of war belong shall have freedom and facilities to send representatives to locations where such prisoners of war are in custody to explain to all the prisoners of war depending upon these nations their rights and to inform them of any matters relating to their return to their homelands, particularly of their full freedom to return home to lead a peaceful life, under the following provisions:

a. The number of such explaining representatives shall not exceed seven (7) per thousand prisoners of war held in custody by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission; and the minimum authorized shall not be less than a total of five (5);

b. The hours during which the explaining representatives shall have access to the prisoners shall be as determined by the Neutral Repatriation Commission, and generally in accord with Article 53 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;

c. All explanations and interviews shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and a representative from the detaining side;

d. Additional provisions governing the explanation work shall be prescribed by the Neutral Repatriation Commission, and will be designed to employ the principles enumerated in Paragraph 3 above and in this Paragraph;

e. The explaining representatives, while engaging in their work, shall be allowed to bring with them necessary facilities and personnel for wireless communications. The number of communications personnel shall be limited to one team per location at which explaining representatives are in residence, except in the event all prisoners of war are concentrated in one location, in which case, two (2) teams shall be permitted. Each team shall consist of not more than six (6) communications personnel.
9. Prisoners of war in its custody shall have freedom and facilities to make representations and communications to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to representatives and subordinate bodies of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and to inform them of their desires on any matter concerning the prisoners of war themselves, in accordance with arrangements made for the purpose by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

IV

DISPOSITION OF PRISONERS OF WAR

10. Any prisoner of war who, while in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, decides to exercise the right of repatriation, shall make an application requesting repatriation to a body consisting of a representative of each member nation of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Once such an application is made, it shall be considered immediately by majority vote the validity of such application. Once such an application is made to and validated by the Commission or one of its subordinate bodies, the prisoner of war concerned shall immediately be transferred to and accommodated in the tents set up for those who are ready to be repatriated. Thereafter, he shall, while still in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, be delivered forthwith to the prisoner of war exchange point at Panmunjom for repatriation under the procedure prescribed in the Armistice Agreement.

11. At the expiration of ninety (90) days after the transfer of custody of the prisoners of war to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, access of representatives to captured personnel as provided for in Paragraph 8 above, shall terminate, and the question of disposition of the prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated shall be submitted to the Political Conference recommended to be convened in Paragraph 60, Draft Armistice Agreement, which shall endeavor to settle this question within thirty (30) days, during which period the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall continue to retain custody of those prisoners of war. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall declare the relief from the prisoners of war status to civilian status of any prisoners of war who have not exercised their right to be repatriated and for whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the Political Conference within one hundred and twenty (120) days after the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission has assumed their custody. Thereafter, according to the application of each individual, and those who choose to go to neutral nations shall be assisted by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the Red Cross Society of India. This operation shall be completed within thirty (30) days, and upon its completion, the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall immediately cease its functions and declare its dissolution. After the dissolution of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, whenever and wherever any of those above-mentioned civilians who have been relieved from the prisoner of war status desire to return to their fatherlands, the authorities of the localities where they are shall be responsible for assisting them in returning to their fatherlands.
Red Cross Visitation

12. Essential Red Cross service for prisoners of war in custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be provided by India in accordance with regulations issued by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Press Coverage

13. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall ensure freedom of the press and other news media in observing the entire operation as enumerated herein, in accordance with procedures to be established by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

Logistical Support for Prisoners of War

14. Each side shall provide logistical support for the prisoners of war in the area under its military control, delivering required support to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission at an agreed delivery point in the vicinity of each prisoner of war installation.

15. The cost of repatriating prisoners to the exchange point at Panmunjom shall be borne by the detaining side and the cost from the exchange point by the side on which said prisoners depend in accordance with Article 118 of the Geneva Convention.

16. The Red Cross Society of India shall be responsible for providing such general service personnel in the prisoner of war installations as required by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.

17. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall provide medical support for the prisoners of war as may be practicable. The detaining side shall provide medical support as practicable upon the request of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and specifically for those cases requiring extensive treatment or hospitalization. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall maintain custody of prisoners of war during such hospitalization. The detaining side shall facilitate such custody. Upon completion of treatment, prisoners of war shall be returned to a prisoners of war installation as specified in Paragraph 4 above.

18. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is entitled to obtain from both sides such legitimate assistance as it may require in carrying out its duties and tasks, but both sides shall not under any name and in any form interfere or exert influence.
19. Each side shall be responsible for providing logistical support for the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission stationed in the area under its military control, and both sides shall contribute on an equal basis to such support within the Demilitarized Zone. The precise arrangements shall be subject to determination between the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the detaining side in each case.

20. Each of the detaining sides shall be responsible for protecting the explaining representatives from the other side while in transit over lines of communication within its area, as set forth in Paragraph 23 for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, to a place of residence and while in residence in the vicinity of but not within each of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be responsible for the security of such representatives within the actual limits of the locations where the prisoners of war are in custody.

21. Each of the detaining sides shall provide transportation, housing, communication, and other agreed logistical support to the explaining representatives of the other side while they are in the area under its military control. Such services shall be provided on a reimbursable basis.

22. After the Armistice Agreement becomes effective, the terms of this agreement shall be made known to all prisoners of war who, while in the custody of the detaining side, have not exercised their right to be repatriated.

23. The movement of the personnel of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and repatriated prisoners of war shall be over lines of communication, as determined by the command(s) of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. A map showing these lines of communication shall be furnished the command of the opposing side and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Movement of such personnel, except within locations as designated in Paragraph 4 above, shall be under the control of, and escorted by, personnel of the side in whose area the travel is being undertaken; however, such movement shall not be subject to any obstruction and coercion.
XI
PROCEDURAL MATTERS

24. The interpretation of this agreement shall rest with the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. The Neutral Repatriation Commission, and/or any subordinate bodies to which functions are designed or assigned by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, shall operate on the basis of majority vote.

25. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall submit a weekly report to the opposing Commanders on the status of prisoners of war in its custody, indicating the numbers repatriated and remaining at the end of each week.

26. When this agreement has been acceded to by both sides and by the five powers named herein, it shall become effective upon the date the Armistice becomes effective.

Done at Panmunjom, Korea, at 1400 hours on the 8th day of June 1953, in English, Korean, and Chinese, all texts being equally authentic.

NAM IL
General, Korean People's Army
Senior Delegate,
Delegation of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers

WILLIAM K. HARRISON, JR.
Lieutenant General,
United States Army
Senior Delegate,
United Nations Command Delegation
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