
Red Sea
ERITREA
Assab
Mocha
Ta'izz
YEMEN
Shuqrah
Aden
Gulf of Aden
Bab el Mandeb
Obock
Tadjoura
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
Saylac
Dikhil
Ayasha
Maydh
Erigavo
AWDAL
Berbera
Baki
Boorama
WOQOOYI GALBEED
SANAAG
SOMALILAND
Hargeysa
Burao
Dirē Dawa
Jijiga
Hārer
TOGDHEER
SOOL
Laascaanood
Fafen Shet
Degeh Bur
ETHIOPIA
Jirriba
SOMAL
K'ebrī Dehar
Werdēr
Galcaio
MUDUG
Īmī
Shilabo
Godē
Wabē Shebelē Wenz
Provisional Administrative Line
Dusa Marreb
Hargele
Feerfeer
GALGUDUUD
Beledweyne
Ceelbuur



Recognizing Somaliland: Forward Step in Countering Terrorism

by Kurt Shillinger

Royal United Services Institute Journal, April 2005

For the 14th time in as many years, the international community is attempting to restore central government to Somalia, which descended, into clan-based fragmentation, statelessness, and violence following the ousting of the Siad Barre military regime in 1991 and has yet to re-emerge. The new administration of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed is the product of more than two years of complex negotiations among rival groups hosted by neighbouring Kenya. Although the African Union (AU) has pledged thousands of regional peacekeepers to help the new government settle, prospects for its success are slim. Conceived and constituted in exile, the Ahmed government was met with varying degrees of praise and violent protest during its first foray into Somalia in early March 2005. This followed the killing of BBC producer Kate Peyton, who traveled to Mogadishu in February to prepare stories on the new government's arrival. Those with vested interests in the status quo, including neighbouring Ethiopia, remain powerful and exercised. Tellingly, Ahmed and his prime minister did not venture into the strife-torn capital.

At the same time, with much less fanfare, the secessionist province of Somaliland in the north-west was preparing for bicameral parliamentary elections to be held on 29 March 2005. While the south has festered, Somaliland has quietly and persistently demobilized its rival militias and erected the structures of statehood without external assistance. It has an elected president and a constitution that survived the death and succession of a head of state, and has drawn substan-

tial inflows of aid and remittances to help rebuild its infrastructure devastated by a decade of civil war with the Siad Barre government prior to 1991. It now boasts reconstructed airports, ports, hotels, power plants and universities—but it remains unrecognized by the international community. Recognition, as the varying fortunes of both Somalia and Somaliland demonstrate, is not a prerequisite for statehood but, in the case of the latter, may well consolidate the process of nation-building at a crucial time both for Somaliland and a world fighting global terrorism.

As the preeminent British anthropologist I M Lewis noted in 2004, "the overall achievement so far is truly remarkable, and all the more so in that it has been accomplished by the people of Somaliland themselves with very little external help or intervention. The contrast with the fate of southern Somalia hardly needs to be underlined."[1]

Prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, diplomatic attempts to restore order in Somalia were driven by desires to limit the potential for drug trafficking and regional destabilization caused by outflows of arms, banditry, and refugees into neighbouring states. The events of 9/11 added a new, more urgent dimension to international engagement in a region that had already experienced the devastation of terrorism. The key question since then, set against the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, was whether the absence of state security structures would enable terrorist organizations to set up bases inside Somalia. For reasons that will be explored below, it has not quite worked out that way, but the 2002 hotel bombing in Mombassa on the Kenya coast illustrated Somalia's potential as a staging ground for terrorist activity and punctuated the region's overall vulnerability.

Given Somalia's location at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East, its susceptibility to conflicting destabilizing interests from Ethiopia and the Arab Peninsula, and the Muslim identity of its people, it is time to rethink how to solve the country's enduring crisis in the context of global terrorism. Despite exhaustive debate, the Kenya peace talks on Somalia failed to convincingly resolve the key question of whether to pursue a federal or unitarian solution in a patch-quilt political landscape of rival clan-based factions.

A better solution is partition. Although it runs contrary to the AU commitment to territorial integrity, recognizing Somaliland is consistent with the imperatives driving global counterterrorism. Emotively, the international community would be supporting the democratic aspirations of a Muslim state—a central pillar of the Bush antiterror "Liberty Doctrine." Strategically, recognition would give the West expanded influence over 900 additional kilometres of coastline in a key transit zone off the Arab Peninsula and enable the international community to bolster regional security at a time when, according to the accumulated evidence of the different risks posed by failed and weak states, Somaliland is arguably becoming more vulnerable to exploitation by radical Islamist organizations the more it develops.

Bush Doctrine, Failed States, and Global Security

Recasting his central foreign policy doctrine for an age of terror in his second inaugural address in January 2005, President George W. Bush stated that

> it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. . . . America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.

Two immediate and correlative assumptions are implicit in this approach: that state repression promotes social radicalization, which in the current international security context poses threats to prosperous and peaceful nations; and that democracy is a universal and thus universally adaptable aspiration that, when realized, is the ultimate antidote to forms of ideological discontent that underpin transnational terrorism.

From these assumptions, three critical ques-

tions arise. First, how are states or regimes determined to pose risks to global security serious enough to prompt foreign intervention? To put it differently, the selective application of force or coercion since 9/11 suggests that not all tyrants are regarded as the same, and some may even be acceptable. Saddam Hussein was overthrown on the premise—a false one, it turned out—that he was stockpiling weapons of mass destruction; Kim Jong Il is known to have nuclear weapons but is still in power. So is Robert Mugabe, who has neither long-range weaponry nor the desire to acquire them, but has dismantled the democratic edifice of Zimbabwe and suppressed popular aspirations through violence.

Second, how are 'democratic movements' identified and legitimated? The history of foreign meddling in the domestic affairs of far-off nations is troubled and inconsistent. Both Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the world's top terrorist, were once clients of Washington. Post-9/11, what interests—and whose—shape the process of helping "others find their own voice" and indeed determine which voices emerge?

Third, what forms of external "soft" engagement are implied by Bush's pledge, and how should they be weighed against the prevailing "rules" of regional politics? The war on terrorism has many fronts—Central Asia, Indonesia, North Africa, and the Horn as well as the Middle East. Effecting "regime change" through force as in Afghanistan and Iraq is neither logistically possible nor internationally justifiable. It follows, then, that "preemption" can utilize and, indeed, requires many means. These questions are most relevant and problematic with regard to dysfunctional states, where poverty and poor or repressive governance can give rise to radicalization. Before 9/11, such states were regarded primarily as regional problems, incubating threats such as disease, refugee flows, environmental destruction, drugs and arms trafficking, and so on. But the 2001 attacks convulsed thinking about the intersection between faltering states and security in the context of global terror, and it has taken a few years for both analysis and policy to unpack the question—indeed, to differentiate the relationship between terrorism and collapsed, failed, and weak states, respectively.

Two studies in 2002 illustrate the importance of clarifying those distinctions. John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan argued that '[o]ne of the principal lessons of the events of September 11 is that failed states matter—not just for humanitarian reasons, but for national security reasons as well. If left unattended, such states can become "sanctuaries for terrorist networks with global reach."[2] The Bush administration, meanwhile, concluded that "the events of September 11, 2001, taught U.S. that weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states.... [P]overty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders."[3]

More time has shown that the distinction between collapsed states, of which Somalia is the most glaring example, and weak states—such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Kenya, Tanzania and Pakistan—matters deeply and has important implications for policy. As Ken Menkhaus shows in his excellent analysis of Somalia and terrorism, failed states lack the physical and financial infrastructure that terrorist organizations need to operate and are therefore unsuitable as havens, whereas weak states provide both the tools and the cover in a relaxed security environment:

> Terrorists, like mafias, prefer weak and corrupt government rather than no government at all. In the Horn of Africa, weak states such as Kenya and Tanzania are much more likely bases of operations for al-Qaeda. They feature sprawling, multiethnic urban areas where foreign operatives can go unremarked; corrupt law enforcement agencies which can be bought off; and a rich array of Western targets.... [A] collapsed state such as Somalia is more likely to serve a niche role as a transit zone, through which men, money, or materiel are quickly moved into the country and then across the borders of neighbouring states.[4]

Similarly, Greg Mills concludes that the weakening of

state functions manifests in a number of

interrelated ways, including the alienation of sectors of society and the emergence of an alternative, anarchic counter-culture; the related inability to provide basic security functions and extend other state functions to the majority of its citizens; and the state's vulnerability to external influences, both state and non-state. . . . The weak nature of the African state and the corruptibility of the African political class have, over time, made it a soft target for terrorist groups.[5]

Thus, determining which states pose the greatest risk to international security in relation to terrorism and defining measures of effective intervention requires more than simply identifying tyrants, mobilizing coalitions of force, and orchestrating elections. Fledgling, faltering, and nominal democracies present equal or greater threats in terms of the exploitable advantages they provide to terrorist organizations. And while geography matters, it is not a limiting factor—a point underscored by Libya's ongoing material support for Mugabe. In this regard, countering terrorism by strengthening democracy must involve addressing the structural and causal elements of weak governance, risk to investment, and social radicalization: corruption, constitutional imbalance, political exclusion, social exclusion (health and education), economic exclusion (trade), monetary mismanagement, and resource depletion.

Somalia and Somaliland

Prior to colonialization, Somalis organized themselves on the basis of a singular national identity. One of the largest ethnic groups in Africa, divided into a matrix of clans and subclans spread across some 400,000 square miles of the Horn, they speak just two common and intertwined languages—Somali and Arabic—and are almost all of them Muslim. In the latter half of the 19th century, they were partitioned by the French, British, Italians, and Ethiopians, a process that introduced a political element to Somali identity and over time created a tension of definitions of nationhood that endure today.

The modern state of Somalia—at least geographically—is an experiment in joining two distinct historical entities: Italian Somalia in the south and British Somaliland in the North. In 1940, the Italians captured the north and combined the country, but the merger lasted only seven months before the British recaptured their protectorate. Five years later, the Italians lost much of their grip, and British control extended deep into the south. The to-ing and fro-ing continued until 1950, when Italian control was formally reestablished and the original boundaries reaffirmed under a 10-year plan overseen by the United Nations. Over the course of the next decade, a series of local elections and drafting of a constitution paved the way for independence in 1960—first for Somaliland on 26 June and then, five days later, for Somalia. Each side was recognized separately by the UN, including each of the five permanent members of the Security Council, according to their colonial boundaries.

Unification became both a preoccupation and a source of enduring division. Although the two entities joined within the year, it was a tense marriage marked by deep-seated clan rivalries. During the next three decades, northern dissent was repeatedly crushed by the military regime of Mohamed Siad Barre in Mogadishu. When that government was finally overthrown in 1991, the south descended into factional fighting—and the north "seceded." Since then, the two parts have followed dramatically different paths. While the international community launched one peace process after another to try to restore central government in Mogadishu, factional fighting—much of it foreign-backed—carved deep ethnopolitical furrows across the south. In the north, meanwhile, stakeholders engaged in the lengthy process of demobilization, reconstruction, and nation-building. In the course of three national congresses, an interim national charter was drafted, a bicameral parliament was established, comprising an elected house of representatives and a nominated house of clan elders, and a president and vice president were voted in by congress delegates.

In 2001, the people of Somaliland ratified the new constitution in a nationwide referendum with impressive unanimity. Foreign-observed local elections followed in 2002, and when

President Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal died during a trip to South Africa, peaceful succession followed through the ballot box, in line with the constitution, in which the victor emerged with a razor-thin 280-vote margin. The 29 March parliamentary elections marked the last step in creating a fully popularly elected government.

How does that position affect the two Somali entities vis-à-vis terrorism? Immediately following the 9/11 attacks, Washington listed Somalia as a potential target in its war against terrorism and froze an estimated $500 million in foreign assets held by Somalia's al-Barakat bank and money transferring company.

But as Menkhaus observes, "Somalia is less than ideal as a safe haven for al-Qaeda for several reasons": one, the mono-ethnic nature of Somali society makes it harder for foreigners to blend in unobserved; two, there is an absence of Western targets; three, the south lacks the financial, physical, and communications infrastructure required by modern terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda; four, the prevailing lawlessness poses a threat to terrorists as much as to anyone else; and fifth, the lack of state control over security would enable U.S. special forces based in neighbouring Djibouti to mobilize within Somali territory faster and with fewer legal restraints.

Rather, two points are of greater and more realistic concern: one, the rise of al-Ittihad and al-Islah, respectively radical and progressive Somali Islamist movements that either espouse anti-Western violence or are prone to manipulation by those who do; and two, evidence that terrorist cells are using Somalia as a staging point for operations elsewhere in the region. According to UN Security Council assessments, those behind the December 2002 bombing of a hotel in Mombassa and attempt to bring down an Israeli airliner in the Kenyan port transferred materiel through and acquired missiles in Somalia.

No such activity has yet been evidenced in Somaliland, but it is arguable that the territory is becoming more attractive to foreign terrorist organizations the more developed it becomes. Somali-land's political progress has attracted a steady inflow of funds. The U.S. Congress allocated $9 million in 1997 for government and military salaries. The same year, the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development launched an $18 million project to improve communications links between the port of Berbera and other regional ports. The EU has funded road construction, the Italians water works, and the International Development Bank education. The British company Digital Exchange Projects, meanwhile, was contracted to rebuild Somaliland's telecommunications systems. The list goes on. In 2001, for example, the Great Wall Chinese Oil Company announced plans to sink offshore oil wells and the Somali Diaspora sent an estimated $250 million annually to Somaliland to offset low forex reserves. Currently, the Bank of Somaliland is pursuing ties with more established regional and German financial institutions.[6]

As the earlier discussion about failed and weak states indicated, Somaliland's development trend is also putting in place the very tools—banking systems, telecommunications, and transport links—that foreign terrorist organizations require in a tenuous security environment.

Notions of Territorial Integrity

Article Four of the Constitutive Act of the African Union states that "the Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: (b) respect of borders existing on achievement of independence." This rule, carried over from the AU's predecessor, the Organization of African States, has and remains the fundamental stumbling block in Somaliland's quest for statehood.

In January 2004, a delegation from the British Parliament's Select Committee on International Development conducted a visit to Somaliland. Upon their return, MP Tony Worthington questioned in a parliamentary debate British and international resistance to breaking from the sovereignty principle. He said:

> There is an understandable paranoia about changing old colonial borders in Africa because of the fear that the habit may spread to other countries. Somaliland is a rare exception, however; it wants to return to its old colonial boundaries at the time of independence. . . . The longer the world

ignores the achievement of Somaliland in creating stability and democratic institutions, the greater the risk that wilder elements will take over. Although the country has been governed by a moderate form of Islam since it declared independence, there is always the possibility that it will give way to a form of Islam that plays into the hands of those trying to stimulate terrorism, and there is tension in the country as a result.[7]

There is broad international sympathy for this argument, but there is also a kind of stasis akin to penguins on an ice bluff: no one wants to jump first. Washington, according to U.S. diplomats in the region, wants one of the African heavyweights—South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, or Senegal—to nod first. But Ethiopia, for one, has also stated that it would follow but won't lead an international movement for recognition.

The impasse is curious, and time will tell whether it may also be costly. Three points weaken the argument that recognition risks setting a precedent in Africa. First, as Foreign Minister Edna Adan Ismail argues, echoing the comment by Worthington, in the 44 years since it gained independence from Britain, Somaliland "neither resigned from our membership in the UN, nor given away our sovereignty to anyone, we still claim ownership of our independence and that of our membership in the UN."[8] Recognizing Somaliland, then, is more a case of affirming postcolonial boundaries rather than redrawing them.

Second, seen as an international rather than exclusively African issue, the principle of separation is already well entrenched. Recent examples include the peaceful and internationally recognized "Velvet Divorce" of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993.[9] Third, Africa already has the precedent for partition set by Ethiopia and Eritrea, which was based on almost identical issues as those between Somalia and Somaliland.[10] As part of a comprehensive peace settlement between those two countries, a UN boundary commission determined the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2002 based on historical and colonial maps. The European Union immediately endorsed the decision.

From legal, technical, and diplomatic perspectives, therefore, recognition of Somaliland is neither as problematic nor precedent-setting as claimed, nor is international resistance as strong as suggested by the unanimous failure so far to do so.

Strengthening Somaliland, Countering Terrorism

In Somalia today, the mild narcotic shrub khat is as common as AK-47s. Once chewed primarily by men for occasional recreation, the drug is now consumed daily by broad segments of the population, including women and, ominously, the heavily armed young boys and youths aligned to various factional leaders. At the peak, 150 flights ferried the drug into Somaliland from neighbouring states every day. Shortly after his election in 2002, President Dahir Rayale Kahin called for a decrease in inbound khat flights and banned all overland shipments. As Mills observes:

> If enforced, this would likely provoke a political backlash in a nation where unemployment is high and a fragile—if impressively nurtured—peace has drawn into government warring militias and clans. . . . Like the global drug problem, dealing with khat requires breaking a pattern of helplessness and addiction through offering better economic prospects.[11]

Somaliland is a fragile entity in a fragile region with large Islamic populations—all demonstrably susceptible to radicalization. Despite the various developmental initiatives, a relatively strong livestock export sector, and the generous inflow of annual remittances, unemployment hovers at destabilizing highs. The eastern border, meanwhile, although clearly defined and recognized at independence in 1960, has been the subject of increasing dispute with the adjacent Somali region of Puntland, which makes ethnic-based claims to the two easternmost Somaliland provinces of Sanaag and Sool.

Steven Simon has observed that in the current atmosphere of militancy and antipathy in much

of the Muslim world, "Islam's warm embrace of the West is too stark a reversal to expect in the foreseeable future. However, it is feasible to lay the foundation for a lasting accommodation by deploying the considerable economic and political advantages of the United States and its allies."[12]

In Somaliland, the West has an opportunity to broaden the terms of global counterterrorism strategy—to balance with carrots a policy meted thus far with sticks. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has dedicated himself to tackling Africa's developmental challenges in 2005. He holds the chair of the G8 in the first half of the year and the EU in the second. Both groupings will debate initiatives to double aid, cut debt, boost investment, combat disease, and improve governance on the world's poorest continent. Emerging from these discussions should also be clearly defined recommendations for recognizing Somaliland through the UN. Politically, recognition would send a powerful signal to the Muslim world that internally driven aspirations toward secular democracy will be acknowledged and supported.

Economically, strengthening Somaliland's nascent democratic institutions and underwriting its path toward viability will go some measure toward depriving radicalized elements of a potential recruiting ground, just as a stronger state and improved governance will assist in reducing the volatile cocktail of endemic poverty, social alienation, radicalization, and terrorism.

Withholding recognition from Somaliland runs contrary to the West's rhetoric about standing shoulder to shoulder with aspiring democracies. But the question is more urgent than that. Given what has been learned after 9/11 about broader security ramifications of weak states in an age of terror, it may be dangerous. If the West fails to assist a Muslim people striving to build their own safe, prosperous and, critically, democratic state, they may well end up looking for—and finding—other patrons.

Notes

1. I. M. Lewis, "As the Kenyan Somali 'Peace' Conference Falls Apart in Confusion, Recognition of Somaliland's Independence is Overdue," London School of Economics, 20 March 2004.
2. John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction," *Washington Quarterly* 25 (Autumn 2002).
3. National Security Strategy document dated 19 September 2002.
4. Ken Menkhaus, "Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism," Adelphi Paper 364, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004
5. Greg Mills, *The Security Intersection: The Paradox of Power in an Age of Terror* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2005), 237-9.
6. See the chapter on Somali in *Africa South of the Sahara 2005* (London: Europa Publications, 2005), for a fuller digest of assistance inflows into Somaliland in recent years.
7. For the full debate on 4 February 2004 in the House of Commons, see www.publications.parliament.uk.
8. Taken from comments presented at the South African Institute of International Affairs in Johannesburg on 3 February 2005.
9. The author is grateful to Dr. Chris Alden of the London School of Economics for discussions on this point.
10. See the final report of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission for detailed historical background.
11. Mills, 81.
12. Steven Simon, "The New Terrorism," in Henry J. Aaron, James M. Lindsay, and Pietro S. Nivola, eds., *Agenda for the Nation* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 425.

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Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn

by David H. Shinn

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Six years after the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the region do not yet measure up to the threat.

Before September 11, 2001, most Americans paid little attention to terrorism, particularly in the Third World. Since then, though the Middle East and Central Asia have figured most prominently in the war on terrorism, Africa is increasingly coming into focus as an important battleground.

This is especially true of East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) and the Horn of Africa (Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia), where the practice of targeting Americans for political violence has deep roots. The Black September organization assassinated the American ambassador to Sudan, Cleo A. Noel Jr., and his deputy chief of mission, George Curtis Moore, in 1973. And following the U.S. air attack against Libya in 1986, Libyan terrorists retaliated by severely wounding an American embassy communications technician, William Caldwell, also in Khartoum. There have been a number of other terrorist attacks dating back more than two decades against Western and Israeli interests in this dangerous region.

But it took the coordinated bombings by al-Qaida in 1998 of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam to make clear the full scope of the organization's menace. While the attacks killed far more Kenyans and Tanzanians than Americans, 12 Americans perished in Nairobi and many were injured in both capitals. (American and Ugandan authorities foiled another attack planned against the U.S. embassy in Kampala.)

Those bombings were, in many respects, even more of a seminal event than the 9/11 attacks for the American war on terrorism in East Africa and the Horn. The State Department responded by building new fortified embassies in both capitals, and in Kampala, with considerably more setback from the street. Other embassies in the region enhanced their physical security as well.

There were also policy ramifications. Prior to the embassy bombings, the U.S. had a cool relationship with Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi as a result of concerns over corruption and the pace of democratization. When senior American officials visited Africa, they rarely went to Kenya. In sympathy for Kenyans killed in the bombing and in appreciation for Kenya's close counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. following the attack, significant numbers of senior American officials traveled to Nairobi. President Moi even received a long-desired invitation to the White House before he stepped down at the end of 2002. Tanzania also experienced an increase in high-level American attention.

A Focal Point of Terrorism

Unfortunately, however, U.S. counterterrorism policy perspectives and programs in the region do not yet measure up to the threat Islamic fundamentalism and al-Qaeda activity jointly pose. There are several reasons for this. Most of the countries have experienced severe internal conflict, which is frequently supported by neighbors, either directly or via dissident groups—which tends to lead to tit-for-tat support of an opposition group in the offending state. Examples of this phenomenon range from the long-standing civil war in Sudan and the collapse of any central authority in Somalia to Tanzanian support for the overthrow of the Idi Amin regime in Uganda, Somalia's invasion of Ethiopia in the late 1970s, Eritrea's war of independence, and the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict.

Such instability prevents most governments in the region from exercising full control over their territory, providing terrorists easy access to weapons. Somalia remains a vacuum and is prey to any terrorist with money and a plan. Although Sudan appears to be nearing the end of a civil war that dates back to 1983, it now faces a new and worsening conflict in the Darfur region, along the border with Chad. Uganda has been unable to eliminate the Lord's Resistance Army in the northern part of the country. The Somali-inhabited Ogaden in southeastern Ethiopia experiences regular security incidents. And the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement seems to have refocused attention against Eritrea, operating out of Sudan.

Although the groups behind these attacks are not normally considered international terrorists, they engage in terrorist tactics, and some, such as the EIJM, are believed to have links with al-Qaeda. Recent actions by these groups illustrate conclusively that the security and intelligence services in all of the countries are underfunded and ill-equipped to counter terrorist tactics by local organizations or international terrorists.

Geography also plays an important role. Most of these states are located near, and have long-standing ties to, the Arabian Peninsula, the source of many of today's Islamic militants. It is easy to move between the Persian Gulf states and this region by air and sea. The governments are virtually incapable of monitoring the lengthy coastline from Eritrea to Tanzania. The land borders between all of the states are unusually porous as well.

Further, the region sits on a religious fault line of Christianity, Islam, and traditional African beliefs. All eight of the countries are either predominantly Muslim or have important Muslim minorities. Sudan, Djibouti, and Somalia, including self-declared independent Somaliland, are heavily Muslim. Ethiopia and Eritrea are about half Islamic. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania contain significant Muslim minorities, some of whose members have become radicalized in recent years. It is true that Sufism, which tends to resist the ideas of Islamic fundamentalists, remains strong throughout the region. This traditionally moderate form of Islam has not always been sufficient, however, to overcome the appeal of fundamentalism, especially when it is backed with funds from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. As a result, nearly all of the international terrorism in the

region, as opposed to local groups that use terrorist tactics, has ties to extremist Islamic elements.

Poverty, Social Injustice and Political Alienation

Finally, the region's endemic corruption is another factor that attracts terrorists, allowing them to buy off immigration and local security officials. Transparency International surveyed 133 countries in 2003 as part of its corruption perceptions index. Five of the eight countries located in the region ranked poorly. Ethiopia and Tanzania received the best ranking of the five, tied with several other countries at the 92d position. Sudan tied with a number of countries for position 106, while Uganda tied with others for 113. Kenya, although its standing improved from past years, tied with Indonesia at 122. (Transparency International did not rank Eritrea, Djibouti or Somalia.)

The fact that East Africa and the Horn are home to some of the poorest countries in the world, with high levels of social injustice and political alienation, is frequently cited as a reason why the region has become a breeding ground for terrorism. But not everyone agrees that poverty is closely linked to international terrorism. State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism Cofer Black, during a May digital videoconference with journalists and government officials in Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa, downplayed the link between terrorism and poverty. He cited the Saudis who took part in the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., pointing out that they tended to come from middle-class families and had access to a university education. He concluded that they "turned into terrorists because they fell under the influence of the wrong people and became seriously misguided."

Yet while this may be true, it misses the point, at least as far as East Africa and the Horn are concerned. The environment created by poverty, social injustice and political alienation enhances the ability of religious extremists to export their philosophy and of terrorists to find local support for their nefarious acts. Black went on to say that instead of blaming economic conditions, "we need to encourage moderation" and follow guidelines "our mothers and fathers taught us." Good luck!

To be sure, poverty may not be a direct cause of terrorism. To dismiss its role, however, is misguided. Together with abysmally low wages for immigration and security personnel, poverty significantly increases the prospect of widespread corruption that, in turn, creates a climate amenable to terrorism. Even the president's National Security Strategy issued in September 2002 commented that although poverty does not make poor people into terrorists, "poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders." In a recent issue of *Foreign Affairs,* Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) argued that terrorism finds sanctuary in "the misery of endemic poverty and despair." He added that "although poverty and despair do not 'cause' terrorism, they provide a fertile environment for it to prosper." In East Africa and the Horn, and probably much of the rest of the world, it is time to accept the important role that poverty plays and put in place long-term measures to deal with it.

Financing Terrorism

Charities sponsored by Saudi Arabia and several other Persian Gulf states have probably financed most of the international terrorist activity in the region, with funds coming both from private individuals and governments. In the case of Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent Qatar, the charities are closely linked to efforts to promote the fundamentalist Sunni Islamic creed known popularly as Wahhabism. Toward that end, in 1962 Saudi Arabia created the state-financed Muslim World League to underwrite mosques, schools, libraries, hospitals, and clinics around the world. Saudi Arabia's grand mufti, its highest religious authority, serves as the organization's president.

The league encompasses a wide range of entities, including the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the International Islamic Relief

Organization. These charities have been active in East Africa and the Horn for years, building mosques and implementing useful social programs. But some of their branches have also funneled money to al-Qaeda and associated terrorist organizations, and the U.S. has accused the former director of al-Haramain in Tanzania of planning the 1998 attacks on the embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.

After the 9/11 attacks, Washington stepped up pressure on Saudi Arabia to control these charities. In 2002, the two countries jointly designated the Somali branch of al-Haramain as an organization that had supported terrorist groups such as al-Qaida and the Somali-based al-Ittihad al-Islamiya. Early in 2004, both countries notified the U.N. Sanctions Committee that the branches of al-Haramain in Kenya and Tanzania provide financial, material, and logistical support to al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. They asked Kenya and Tanzania to seize the assets of both branches. At the request of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the government of Tanzania recently deported the two top al-Haramain officials and closed the office. In mid-2004, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. designated the al-Haramain branch in Ethiopia as a financier of terrorism. At the same time, under pressure from the U.S., Saudi Arabia outlined plans to dismantle its network of international charities and place their assets under a new Saudi National Commission for Relief and Charity. It remains to be seen if this crackdown by Saudi Arabia will put an end to the diversion of charitable donations to terrorists.

A Major Change in Policy toward Sudan

U.S. relations with Sudan began a downward spiral after an Islamic government entrenched itself in power in the early 1990s and stepped up the war against southerners. Sudan opened the door slightly in 1996, however, when it responded positively to a U.S. request to expel Osama bin Laden, who had lived in Khartoum since 1991. This offered the possibility for improved relations, but there was no follow-through by the Clinton administration. The nadir in the relationship then occurred in 1998 following the bombing of the embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, when the U.S. launched cruise missiles against a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum. The U.S. linked the factory to the production of chemical weapons based on a soil sample containing a precursor for the production of weapons found outside the factory. The U.S. also alleged there were ties between the factory owner and al-Qaeda. Sudan strongly denied any link, and a number of experts who studied the case have raised serious questions about the rationale for the attack. The Clinton administration, which had been under pressure from domestic groups to take a hard line toward Sudan, nevertheless made overtures in 2000 to Khartoum concerning possible cooperation on counterterrorism. Sudan responded positively; by the time the Bush administration took power, the scene was set for improved ties.

Following the 9/11 attacks, Khartoum quickly concluded it was in its interest to increase cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism. This provided the Bush administration an opportunity to advance the war on terrorism and make progress on ending the long-standing civil war in Sudan. President Bush named former Missouri Senator John Danforth as his special envoy for Sudan in an effort to end the civil war. This appointment and policy not only neutralized the American domestic constituency that wanted strong action against Sudan, but turned Sudan into an important ally in the war against terrorism.

By all accounts, the regime's cooperation on counterterrorism has been excellent. In addition, it and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, under pressure from the U.S. and others, have also made enormous progress in ending the civil war. Consequently, Secretary Powell announced in May that the U.S. had removed Sudan from a blacklist of countries deemed not to be cooperating fully on counterterrorism. There is still in place a maze of American sanctions, including the listing of Sudan as a "state sponsor" of terrorism, but this was the first step in unraveling U.S. sanctions

against Sudan. The policy change probably would not have occurred except for the traumatic events of 9/11. However, a new crisis in the Darfur region in western Sudan threatens to set back significantly the improvement in relations.

Quandary over Somalia

American and allied forces intervened massively in Somalia late in 1992 to end a famine. They stopped the famine, and all U.S. troops left Somalia by March 1994 following the "Blackhawk Down" episode in Mogadishu. The U.S. and international community effectively abandoned the failed state, though 9/11 and the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan briefly brought Somalia back into prominence in 2002, due to fears that the vacuum there would provide a safe haven for al-Qaeda supporters being chased from Afghanistan. Some of the ideas being discussed in the government for dealing with the country were wildly off the mark, however—no surprise given the loss of expertise that occurred during the post-1994 interregnum. Fortunately, calmer minds prevailed and Washington did not do anything really stupid in Somalia.

That said, the country is still a failed state where terrorist elements can move with impunity. Somalia has been home to al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, a fundamentalist organization that has carried out terrorist attacks against Ethiopia and is believed to have connections with al-Qaeda. The U.S. added al-Ittihad in 2001 to its Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups. It also included the Somali money transfer organization, al-Barakat, on the list. There is evidence that an al-Qaida cell based in Mogadishu took part in the 2002 attack on an Israeli-owned hotel outside Mombasa and a simultaneous but unsuccessful attempt to shoot down an Israeli charter aircraft. At the same time, Somalis generally are not predisposed toward Islamic fundamentalism or entreaties by international terrorists. The situation in Somalia is worrisome and merits close monitoring, but it is not even close to the threat once posed by Taliban-governed Afghanistan. There appears, however, to be no agreed-upon U.S. policy for dealing with Somalia. It is long past time to adopt one.

A Base in Djibouti

The U.S. embassy in Djibouti has traditionally been small and sleepy. But that changed after 9/11. The country now hosts the only U.S. military base in Africa and welcomes coalition forces from France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. Some 1,800 American military and civilian personnel currently occupy a former French Foreign Legion facility at Camp Lemonier outside the capital city. Established in October 2002 and known as the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, it is responsible for fighting terrorism in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Yemen, and in the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. CJTF-HOA's stated mission is to detect, disrupt, and defeat transnational terrorist groups, to counter the reemergence of transnational terrorism, and to enhance long-term stability in the region. The establishment of the base represents a dramatic change for U.S. security policy in Africa since the closure many years ago of the Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya and Kagnew Communications Station in Ethiopia.

CJTF-HOA has devoted most of its effort so far to training with allied forces and the armies of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. It has conducted an impressive number of civic action programs that refurbish schools and clinics and provide medical services in the same three countries. CJTF-HOA established a temporary training facility for the Ethiopian military outside Dire Dawa in the southeastern part of the country. Training has begun for the first of three Ethiopian antiterrorism battalions. It is less clear how much terrorist interdiction CJTF-HOA has accomplished. Without providing details, the departing commander stated in May that they have captured "dozens of terrorists" and averted at least five terrorist attacks.

Although a good effort, the operation is not free of problems. Relations with Sudan, especially after disagreements over the new conflict in Darfur, have not improved sufficiently to

engage in military cooperation. Somalia remains in too much disarray to think in terms of projects in country except for the more peaceful and self-declared independent Republic of Somaliland. The U.S. has so far been unwilling to undertake activities in Somaliland that might suggest it recognizes the country. Eritrea claims to seek cooperation with the U.S. on counterterrorism, but there have been problems translating this intention into action. There are also some operational issues. Turnover of CJTF-HOA personnel is too frequent, and area and indigenous language expertise are in short supply. American ambassadors in the region, most of whom have only dealt with a military attaché on their own staff, are still learning how to interact with an independent military commander.

The East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative

After 9/11 the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism identified East Africa and the Horn, especially Djibouti, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, and Tanzania, to be at particular risk. In response, in 2003 the U.S. created a $100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative. This encompasses military training for border and coastal security, programs to strengthen control of the movement of people and goods across borders, aviation security, assistance for regional programs to curb terrorist financing, police training, and an education program to counter extremist influence. There are separate programs to combat money laundering.

The major beneficiary so far of this funding has been Kenya. The U.S. is working with Kenyan officials to develop a comprehensive anti-money laundering/counterterrorist financing regime. The State Department's Terrorist Interdiction Program has established a computer system that is now operational at select airports in Kenya, Tanzania, and Ethiopia and is scheduled to go online this year in Djibouti and Uganda. The TIP system provides nations with a state-of-the-art computer network that enables immigration and border control officials to identify suspects attempting to enter or leave the country. The U.S. is also funding a police development program in Tanzania, Uganda, and Ethiopia, developing a training and equipment program for Kenya's law enforcement agencies, and setting up forensic laboratories in Tanzania and Uganda.

As welcome as this new assistance is, it has not stemmed complaints from countries in the region. Uganda claims it is being shortchanged because it has dealt successfully with international terrorist threats on its own. In addition, Kampala's priority is dealing with local terrorist groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army and Allied Democratic Front, while Washington is focused on international terrorists like al-Qaeda. Eritrea offered the U.S. access to its port facilities and, together with Ethiopia, joined the "coalition of the willing" against Iraq. But it now finds itself frozen out of counterterrorist assistance because of U.S. concerns over the continued detention of two Eritreans employed by the American embassy and other human rights issues. Both Eritrean and Ethiopian cooperation on counterterrorism are also linked to the two countries' desire to gain favor with the U.S. on their festering border demarcation disagreement.

Looking Ahead

The resources and attention devoted to counterterrorism in East Africa and the Horn are impressive but inadequate. At a House subcommittee hearing on terrorism in April, Chairman Ed Royee (R-Calif.) emphasized that the U.S. needs to devote more resources for counterterrorism in Africa. He is correct. President Bush's FY 2005 international affairs budget request has as its top priority the winning of the war on terrorism. Exclusive of Iraq and Afghanistan, it requests $5.7 billion for assistance to countries around the world that have joined the war on terrorism and another $3.5 billion that indirectly supports the war by strengthening the U.S. ability to respond to emergencies and conflict situations. The $100 million East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative and several other modest programs just don't measure up to the threat.

The components of the counterterrorism program for East Africa and the Horn are good as far as they go. But the focus is primarily short- and medium-term: catching bad guys, providing training and, to a limited extent, building up counterterrorism infrastructure. What is missing is a major, new, long-term program to reduce poverty and social alienation.

U.S. foreign assistance worldwide in constant dollars has declined about 44 percent since 1985 and another 18 percent since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Until the U.S. and the international community generally are prepared to put far more resources into improving the environment that encourages terrorism—namely poverty—it is difficult to see lasting progress against this enemy. If only the U.S. had had the foresight years ago to devote to counterterrorism and economic development the equivalent cost of overthrowing the Taliban and rebuilding a destroyed Afghanistan!

Assuming adequate financial assistance from outside, countries in the region must bear the primary responsibility for curbing terrorism. They know the different cultures, speak the local languages, and control the security forces. Foreigners will never be able to function as effectively in the native environment as local nationals. Accordingly, action on the recent recommendation by the Africa Policy Advisory Panel (organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies) for an annual $200 million Muslim outreach initiative in Africa is long overdue.

Finally, the U.S. has allowed its language and area expertise among foreign affairs personnel to degrade to dangerous levels. The time has come to rebuild this expertise. In the case of East Africa and the Horn, there should be adequate numbers of Arabic, Somali, Swahili, and Amharic speakers from State, the CIA, USAID, and the military assigned to appropriate countries. Only then will the U.S. be able to engage in reliable information-gathering and increase the public affairs outreach to communities where Islamic fundamentalism and sympathy for terrorists are taking hold.

About the Author

David H. Shinn was a Foreign Service officer from 1964 to 2000, serving as ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, among many other postings, including deputy chief of mission in Sudan and Cameroun. He was also State Department coordinator for Somalia during the American intervention there. Since 2001 he has been adjunct professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.

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Selected Bibliography

The following list of further readings constitutes merely an initial point of departure from which readers might embark on their own, longer journeys to explore any of the many topics that have been presented in this work. Like the articles presented in the anthology itself, most of the readings found in the following selected references are introductory in nature and should prove useful to a broad range of readers. The bibliographic entries are presented in separate sections that correspond directly with the chapter headings found in this book (with the exception of the "General Historical and Multiple-Topic Works" in the initial section found immediately below).

The reading list is not meant to be definitive in scope, but acts instead as a preliminary guide for readers, introducing them to a wide range of materials from a variety of highly divergent sources, running the academic gamut from traditional military, government, and university studies and publications to those produced by newer "think-tank" and nongovernmental organizations. In addition, almost all of the works found on the following pages possess their own, often extensive, bibliographies that should be of interest to many of the readers of this volume. The corpus of entries found here—representing only a small fraction of the enormous body of works that have been written on these subjects—was selected to illustrate the complexity involved in conducting counterinsurgency and irregular war efforts, both historically and in the contemporary Global War on Terrorism ("Long War"), as well as the elements of national power that can be employed to achieve the nation's policy objectives in these types of conflicts.

Finally, several things should be noted in regard to what was considered for inclusion in the bibliography and what was not. First, like the anthology, the bibliographic entries deal with topics pertaining to counterinsurgency and irregular warfare involving only the United States—the great expanse of works addressing the experiences of European nations, the Soviet Union, and others are left largely unexplored. Beyond this, the entries referenced comprise English-language sources only; works written in foreign languages are found more appropriately in specialized works. In addition, primary sources have been excluded for the same reason, and the analysis provided in many of the secondary sources is better suited for mention in an introductory work in any event. Lastly, it should be evident that the following works have a distinct emphasis on one (or more) of several broad subjects: on higher-end operational/strategic level of war considerations, on geopolitical context, and on an array of related topics—political theory, historical case studies, failed states, cultural studies and analysis, and others—that all provide context or play a role in conducting a counterinsurgency and achieving success in the realm of irregular warfare.

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