discovered what a useful and flexible tool Marine air control was.\textsuperscript{413}\textsuperscript{a}

For the British the war began in much the same way as it had for I MEF headquarters. On 20 March, one of the incoming Iraqi theater ballistic missiles flew directly over the division headquarters, certainly capturing the attention of the staff. With British understatement, and humor, General Brims commented at the evening update brief that the “Iraqis were showing that they too had a vote” in how the war would run.\textsuperscript{414} By the afternoon of 21 March, 3 Commando Brigade, the Royal Marine formation, had successfully deployed into the Al Faw Peninsula, despite “blackened skies from burning oil infrastructure” and a deadly crash of a U.S. Marine helicopter carrying Royal Marines.\textsuperscript{415}

In the meantime, 15th MEU (SOC) took the port of Umm Qasr, encountering some stiff resistance, particularly from Saddam Fedayeen, but not enough to prevent it from making “excellent progress.”\textsuperscript{415} The next day, 3 Commando Brigade reported Umm Qasr “clear though 15 MEU continued to have sporadic contacts,” while 7 Armored Brigade and 16 Air Assault Brigade each carried out a relief in place with the 5th and 7th Regimental Combat Teams, respectively, in the Rumaylah oil fields. There was some friction, a blue-on-blue “friendly fire” incident with no casualties between 15th MEU and 7 Armored Brigade on 21 March, and some confusion “due to the large volume of Coalition traffic” when the British division relieved the American division in the oil fields, not surprising considering the volume of friendly forces passing through the area.\textsuperscript{416} But overall, the first days of the war went very well, and the British were pleased with the situation.

The 15th MEU (SOC), which was to chop back to U.S. control on 25 March after being relieved in Umm Qasr on 24 March, had meshed almost seamlessly with the British brigade. The Marine unit commander, Colonel Thomas D. Waldhauser, found it to be a great experience “by design and by default.” He commented that even though the expeditionary unit’s ground combat element had more organic combat power, there was a lot of congruence in the way both sides were organized. The Royal Marines were true to their doctrine, giving the U.S. Marines mission orders and then giving them the leeway to execute those orders, which were fourfold: to annihilate the enemy who fought; to accommodate the enemy who capitulated; not to destroy the infrastructure of the city; and not to get bogged down within city limits. Given the opportunity to make a contribution under unusual circumstances — this was not your normal cruise, the Marines of the 15th MEU (which, Waldhauser noted, had never carried out an exercise but only real-world operations) accomplished the mission with gusto.*

Overall, the British were on plan and the Iraqis were not; in particular, the British had been able to seize petroleum and shipping infrastructure before the Iraqis could do much harm to it. While it would prove impossible to get the oil flowing again quickly, it was soon possible to get ocean-going ships into Umm Qasr, especially to unload large quantities of supplies for the expected humanitarian crisis. The Royal Fleet Auxillary Sir Galabead (L3005), the first ship with a humanitarian load, began to unload on 28 March. Considering the overall situation, the Ministry of Defense postwar study concluded that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Four days into the campaign the Iraqi 51st Division had been removed from its defence of the oil fields. The 3 Commando Brigade held critical oil infrastructure at Al Faw and the port of Umm Qasr. The 16 Air Assault Brigade held
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{a}The value of the Marine contribution is suggested by the House of Commons report on the war, which stated that the British forces needed more practice and training when it came to close air support. To the same effect, Capt Arnold M. Kiefer of 1st ANGLICO, found that the British did not have as much experience with combined arms as did the Marine Corps and tended to view the employment of supporting arms in a sequential way. They did not use and deconflict all of their supporting arms options. Capt Kiefer added the comment that their light infantry skills were otherwise world-class. (House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, Vol. 1, p. 63; Capt Arnold M. Kiefer inrww, 17Mar03 [MCHC, Quantico, VA])

\textsuperscript{412}2 Commando's insertion started badly in appalling visibility, made worse by blowing sand and smoke from fires started the previous day. Tragically, the Marine CH-46 “Sea Knight” helicopter carrying the headquarters of the Brigade Reconnaissance Force crashed . . . With the cloud base dropping still further, the insertion was aborted, forcing the Brigade HQ rapidly to identify other aviation assets and plan a new insertion for 42 Commando at dawn, using RAF Chinook and Puma helicopters. Although the landing took place six hours late, onto insecure landing sites, and in some case miles away from those originally intended, all objectives were secured. “There was apparently some bad blood over the U.S. Marine Corps’ decision to abort, which may explain why the British decided to use their own assets. (Cmdr 1 (UK) Armored Division’s Diary, entry for 21Mar03 [Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA]; Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq, Lessons for the Future [London, UK: 11Dec03], p. 12)

\textsuperscript{413}Col Thomas Waldhauser also noted the 15th MEU’s air combat element was detached while the unit was in Iraq. He would have preferred to keep his own aviation combat element, but apart from that had no complaints about air support. This tracks with Task Force Tarawa’s experience; its aviation combat element had also been stripped away when it landed in Kuwait. (Col Thomas D. Waldhauser inrww, 14Apr03 [MCHC, Quantico, VA])
the vital oilfield at Rumaylah and threatened Iraq's 6th Armoured Division to the north of Basrah to such an extent that it could not interfere with Coalition operations. The 7 Armoured Brigade held the bridges over the Shatt-al-Basrah waterway to the west of Basrah (a canal that ran from Basrah to Umm Qasr to the sea, paralleling the much larger Shatt-al-Arab to the east). This was the most crucial ground to hold in order to achieve the overall plan of protecting the right flank of the U.S. advance to isolate Baghdad.417

Like their American allies to the west, the British were finding that the regular Iraqi Army was not as much of a threat as had been feared but that there might be more of an irregular threat than had been predicted. On the evening of 23 March, General Brims spoke with 7 Armored Brigade about "the changing nature of our understanding of the conflict. . . . There was not to be a solely conventional battle, rather resistance especially focused on urban areas, and troops either bypassed or deliberately inserted behind the forward line of our own troops."418

The issue confronting the British was what to do next. Ultimately they would have to occupy Basrah, Iraq's second city and that was not up for discussion. As General Brims commented: "to remove a regime you cannot leave [it] . . . in control of an urban area."419 So it became a matter of timing and method. As for timing, CFLCC did not want the British to get ahead of the rest of the force; General McKiernan had directed them not to occupy Basrah proper until he gave the word. He told General Brims that he wanted the fight for Basrah to wait until the Coalition had isolated Baghdad, because he did not want to risk a dramatic urban fight in the south that could drive Iraqis into the arms of the regime and make the overall mission that much more difficult.421 General Conway's guidance was similar but keyed to I MEF's scheme of maneuver; he directed Brims simply to make sure that whatever he chose to do in Basrah, he should remember the paramount goal of protecting I MEF's flank.421

What Generals McKiernan and Conway wanted was the reverse of what the Ba'athist strongman in Basrah wanted. He was Saddam Hussein's cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, commonly known as "Chemical Ali" for his murderous suppression of the Kurds in 1988 with chemical weapons. He had been equally brutal in his dealings with the Shia in the south in the 1990s after the Gulf War, and was one of the prime movers in the draining of the swampland north of Basrah, the ancestral home of the "Marsh Arabs" and their distinctive culture, in order to eliminate it as a haven for potential or actual rebels. The result was an ecological and economic disaster. Since Basrah's approximately 1.25 million citizens were predominantly Shia, he was feared far more than respected. At the beginning of the war, he presided over a mix of unreliable regular army units and more reliable but not particularly skilled irregulars like the Saddam Fedayeen. To the extent that he had a strategy, it appears to have been one of trying to draw the British into a drawn-out fight within the city limits of Basrah, with the attendant collateral damage to cultural and religious sites, and of course civilian casualties, the kind of thing that hurts the Coalition when it appears on the front page of an Arab daily, not to mention The Washington Post or Le Monde. British intelligence reports suggested just how basic the Iraqi plan for Basrah was: "Whenever the British intercepted enemy communications, Saddam's henchmen were merely urging loyalists to fight, fight, fight, without specifying how."422

This was exactly what the British were determined not to do, whatever the timing of the attack. British officers commented repeatedly that they were always determined to avoid the kind of bitter, costly, house-to-house, street-to-street fighting that had recently occurred in Chechnya, where the Russian army had become bogged down in its fight with rebels, or like the Eastern Front in World War II. "We were determined," Brims commented after the war, "not to have..."
any sort of Grozny or Stalingrad scenes.423

Over the period between 25 March and 6 April, through a process of thinking and experimentation, almost like a Warfighting Laboratory evolution, the British came up with the alternative approach that fit the situation. The preliminary experiment took place in the much smaller city of Az Zubayr, population about 100,000, to the southwest of Basrah in 7 Armored Brigade’s zone of action. The soldiers of 7 Armored, who wore the “Desert Rats” patch their predecessors had worn at the battle of El Alamein in World War II, found themselves taking heavy machine gun and rocket fire from irregulars every time they came near the city. The 7 Armored had the combat power to enter and reduce the city, but exercised restraint, starting out small with a raid into the city by 1 Black Watch battalion on 25 March. On 26 March, 7 Armored proceeded to isolate the city, which was not the same as besieging it but rather a matter of controlling ingress and egress or, just as important, demonstrating its ability to do so.424

General Brims tells the Basrah story in a very English way as if he and his subordinate, Brigadier Binns, had “casually” solved the problem in the same way a Londoner might “casually” solve the wickedly convoluted Times of London crossword puzzle, when in fact it was their lifelong devotion to the art of war that was manifesting itself:

I talked to the Brigade Commander . . . about four or five days into the thing . . . and he said, “I am going to work out how we are going to take Az Zubayr,” and I said, “Good, I will go away and consider Basrah.” And he said, “I have got the most powerful armoured brigade the British Army’s ever put in the field, and I will back-brief you on my bit, of Az Zubayr, tomorrow morning.” I arranged to see him first thing . . . and he asked me to come aside of him for a short time, and he said to me, “I have worked out, we cannot go into Az Zubayr . . . because that is what the regime want; we will inflict undue casualties, we will hurt the civilians . . . that is what he is after. We have got to do it in a more cunning way.” I said to him, “Well, that’s funny, because I have worked out precisely the same thing for Basrah.”425

On 26 March, General Brims convened a commander’s conference at Brigadier Binns’ headquarters, where they discussed the issue among...
themselves. Brims took the opportunity to announce the decision to make Basrah a divisional responsibility rather than delegating it to one of the brigades, as British commanders were more likely to do. The UK division would hope to foment popular unrest by conducting “deep operations” through the destruction of key targets while at the same time providing an opportunity for the people to receive humanitarian aid.466

What came next, in both Az Zubayr and Basrah, was a series of carefully orchestrated events, aimed as much at the enemy’s mind as at his body. One of the prerequisites was the collection of the kind of citizen-by-citizen, neighborhood-by-neighborhood intelligence that can seem more like police work than part of a military operation. This was apparently something that the British government in southern Iraq had been pursuing for years. It was also a skill that the British Army had learned in Northern Ireland and the Balkans. By working with recruited agents, some of whom were reporting by cell phone, and by simply networking, the British were able to create a detailed picture of the life of the city, from the bottom up.427 Next came a round of carefully calculated raids, sometimes synchronized with raids by joint direct attack munitions, or smart bombs, or other precision munitions, which could lead to sniping or to “lodgements,” something like the establishment of patrol bases that ranged in size up to the battalion level. For example, a British unit might stage a night-time raid and then, when withdrawing, leave a sniper team behind to observe the neighborhood for a few days, or to snipe at Ba’ath and Fedayeen leaders.428 At the same time, information operations worked on the minds of the citizenry, by means of leaflets, broadcasts, or even targeted mobile telephone calls by General Brims himself. Then there might be a carefully planned air or artillery raid against a pinpoint target, whose effects the division could observe on the live feed from the “Phoenix,” the British unmanned aerial vehicle. “The way we did it,” General Brims reported to the House of Commons, “was to build up an intelligence picture, focused raids, ground raids, air raids, mind raids . . . [the people] wanted to be freed but they could not do it themselves, they needed our support, and therefore actually we had them helping us, and they were feeding us . . . accurate intelligence, worthy targets . . . and we were able to conduct these raids, and they had a very significant effect.”469

General Brims made it clear he wanted some operations to occur simultaneously even though the focus of main effort would shift. Initially it would be on 7 Armored Brigade and Az Zubayr. After Az Zubayr was determined to have fallen on 4 April (there was of course no formal surrender ceremony) the lighter 3 Commando Brigade took over in Az Zubayr and 7 Armored moved on to augment the effort against Basrah, which remained a division-level operation. Resistance was becoming progressively lighter, while the population seemed to become more welcoming of the British.430 As time went on and the British became more successful, they received more information from the citizens of Basrah. On 5 April they received a tip about the whereabouts of Chemical Ali, and the Coalition launched a smart bomb attack on the building where he was believed to be hiding. Although unsuccessful, it was believed to have been successful at the time and, at the least, a potent demonstration of Coalition power for all on the Iraqi side to see. Chemical Ali was not in fact captured until the summer.431

By now the U.S. Army and Marines were launching probes into Baghdad, and there was little chance that anything that happened in Basrah could disrupt operations in the north. The most recent raids having been deemed “very successful,” General Brims ordered his division to execute “Operation Sinbad,” the final push against Basrah, which was to come from a number of directions. It met with “a minimum of resistance from individuals with small arms” who were
apparently either Ba'athist Party members or Fedayeen.432 One objective after another, the sewage plant, the party headquarters, the governor's palace, fell without heavy fighting, something of which Brims was justifiably proud. Each success created the next opportunity, which Brims exploited; he commented later that his intent was to seek the right opportunity to execute each phase of the plan. By twilight on 6 April, most of Basrah was in Coalition hands, if not secure.433

Murray and Scales recount a story about the next day that speaks volumes about the British Army's work in Iraq. On 7 April, the division committed paratroopers to the "old town" quarter of Basrah to finish off any lingering resistance. But the paratroopers found there was little for them to do and began to withdraw: "As the paras withdraw, Shia crowds began throwing rocks at British tanks and armored personnel carriers. One of the battle group commanders immediately sensed what was happening. He ordered his... crews, as well as the infantry, to get out of their vehicles, take off their helmets, stow most of their weapons, and walk out into the agitated crowd. Immediately the rock throwing ended and members of the crowd again smiled and clapped hands for the British troops."434

This remarkable story, which begins by reflecting Shia fears of abandonment by the Coalition, conveys something of the British sense for how to handle the transition to Phase IV, post combat operations. With his experience in Northern Ireland and the Balkans, the average British soldier may be one of the world's foremost experts on the three-block war. He could fight a conventional battle, defend himself against a guerrilla or paramilitary threat, and conduct humanitarian operations. He excelled at most of these tasks in southeastern Iraq. As early as 1 April, in Az Zubayr, British soldiers started to shed their helmets and patrol in berets. In Az Zubayr, Basrah, and, later, in

*According to Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, "the initial plan of attack was to punch deep into the city and pull back out at night. ...[But] the operation on this 'terribly long day' was going so successfully that Major General Brims decided to finish off the Iraqis with a final stroke." To similar effect, the British liaison officer to I MEF, Maj Simon Plummer, stated that what started out as a probe became a four-pronged, final assault when it became clear there was only minimal Iraqi resistance. While both sources are certainly consistent with the British practice of exploiting opportunities, as opposed to "fighting the plan," the firsthand sources suggest a slightly more deliberate, planned approach. As Gen Brims commented on 10 May, the division had developed a plan and waited for the right opportunity to execute it, as opposed to simply reacting to events. (Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p.151; Sudarsan Raghavan, "British Take Most of Basra," Miami Herald.com, 6Apr03; MajGen Robin V. Brims intvw, 10May03 [MCHC, Quantico, VA])
cans, the British expected there would be some residual Iraqi police or army structure with which they could cooperate, and they had considered the possibility that there might be some looting, but they were taken aback by its scope and breadth.436

As in most other areas in Iraq, once the fighting stopped virtually all levels of Iraqi government in and around Basrah simply ceased to exist. The looters stepped into the resulting power vacuum and went to work with a vengeance in southeast Iraq, "they ransacked schools, hospitals and took away things . . . beds, chairs, and so on, or they just wrecked things."437 The House of Commons Defence Committee judged that "the impact of this looting on the task of post-conflict reconstruction has been enormous," in terms of testing the goodwill of the people, making it difficult for them to return to work or school, get health care, or even accomplish the mundane tasks that local government performs for its citizens.438 They were not prepared to cope with it; even if they had had the will to do so, they clearly lacked the numbers and, except in a few dramatic cases, did not intervene. The I MEF situation report for 7 April contained the laconic comment about Basrah: "looting ongoing, looters are only engaged if looting arms depots."439 The committee concluded that the scale and shape of the force provided were best suited to achieving the Coalition's desired effects in the combat phase, but not to carrying those effects through into the post conflict phase.440

In the spring of 2003, the situation in southeast Iraq did not seem as bad as the House of Commons and others would later say it had been. The forces on the ground were generally upbeat and believed they were making good progress. Examples from the division commander's diary include, on 9 April, the observation that "the mood in the city is still jubilant and . . . the buses continue to run"; on 12 April the report that 16 Air Assault Brigade was able to proceed north to Al Amarah in Maysan province for the relief in place with Task Force Tarawa without incident; on 13 April the fact that "joint patrolling with the local police force commenced . . . in Basrah"; and the conclusion on 21 April that "the local population are becoming increasingly committed to policing themselves and preserving their own resources." Shortly thereafter, on 22 April the United Nations declared the British zone permissive, a few days before President Bush made his declaration that major combat operations had ended. For the British this was the end of the combat phase; parts of the division, to include General Brims, made preparations to rotate home, with a sense of having accomplished their mission.

One of this British general's last official acts before leaving Iraq was to host a farewell reception for I MEF commanders and staff at his headquarters in Basrah International Airport on 10 May to celebrate not just success on the battlefield, but also the bond between the Marine and his division. Feelings that went beyond the usual routine expressions of official goodwill were on display. Senior Marines took the trouble to fly in from other parts of Iraq on KC-130s and went into the reception area in the airport's "VIP" quarters, which were opulent beyond belief or good taste, with gilded trimmings, high ceilings, marble floors, and thick carpets, but no working plumbing. Apart from the ultramodern Marine pattern desert digital utility uniforms, and the unusual British desert camouflage uniforms, it could have been a scene from the movie Patton, as white-coated stewards served gin and tonics to tired but happy officers who felt they had something to celebrate. The division band, very British and old-school, beat retreat as the sun went down, as if trying to close a chapter in history.

*A This led into a somewhat philosophical discussion of whether the division's actions and effects desired by the division were really in sync. The point was that the division had won the war, but was anyone on the British side set up to win the peace?*
Occupation was not a mission that Lieutenant General James T. Conway relished. He wanted his Marines to fight the war and then to “recock,” to get ready for the next war. This was the pattern that came naturally to him and to many other Marines; the idea was to assault the beaches, seize the objective, and then move on to prepare for the next assault, leaving the occupation duties to others. When he discussed the issue with a journalist before the war, General Conway enumerated some of the issues that an occupier would face in Iraq, including some no-win choices, such as whether to intervene when Iraqis turned on one another after Saddam’s fall. He concluded: “If I had a vote, I would say let us get [I MEF] out of here.” But he was quick to add that the Marines would probably have no choice but to involve themselves in the postwar occupation of Iraq in some form.44

There followed the decision for I MEF’s future operations and plans officers to think about Phase IV and to draft an operations plan, even before the shooting war started. One of their starting points was liaison with Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) planners and their counterparts at 1 (UK) Armored Division. By design or default, CentCom had left much of the responsibility for Phase IV planning to CFLCC, a dramatic change from its approach to Phases I-III. The I Marine Expeditionary Force turned to the British because they had some recent experience, as well as a useful staff study on the restoration of law and order after combat. The State Department’s comprehensive “Future of Iraq” study, which laid out many of the challenges the United States would face in Phase IV, was considered taboo for military planners, because it was not compatible with Pentagon policy-makers’ vision of postwar Iraq.

Retired U.S. Army LtGen Jay M. Garner heads the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, greets arriving delegates to the Iraqi Interim Authority Conference in Baghdad. The authority was to govern Iraq until formal elections could be held.
Coalition Forces Land Component Command also had a loosely defined relationship with a group known as Combined Joint Task Force IV (CJTF-IV), so poorly funded that its members had had to attend trade shows to obtain office supplies, and with what was, in effect, CJTF-IV's successor organization, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Both organizations were more or less under the tactical control of Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, but it was no secret that office's chief, retired Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, had direct lines of his own to the Pentagon.

Coalition Forces Land Component Command came to assign nine governates (roughly equivalent to provinces) in southern Iraq to I MEF, covering a territory three times the size of Virginia with a population of 9 to 10 million people, and eventually issued a formal plan known as "Eclipse II" to guide its subordinates in Phase IV. ("Eclipse I" had been the plan for the occupation of Germany after World War II.) Land Component Command focused on security and emergency repairs to the infrastructure. The assumption was that parts of the Iraqi government would still be in working order when the shooting stopped, able to maintain the infrastructure and that the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance would be able to step in to take on many tasks, especially those dealing with humanitarian assistance. As General McKiernan's special assistant, Terry Moran, commented, CFLCC planned to "leverage the Iraqi Army and . . . the [Iraqi] bureaucracy." The Pentagon's original assumption was that even reconstruction and humanitarian assistance office would not have to conduct operations for more than a few months in Iraq, and that after a relatively brief occupation the Coalition could turn the country over to an Iraqi government.

Within the framework of Eclipse II, I MEF had a considerable amount of leeway, and its planners developed their own approach to the matter. First they did an "intelligence preparation of the battlefield," looking at the tribes in the various regions, their infrastructure, and the various threats Marines were likely to face. They came up with two assumptions: that the first 6 to 12 weeks would be critical, this was when precedents would be set, and that it was important not to try to do too much. The Marines had to keep from involving themselves too deeply in local affairs and to let the Iraqis solve as many of their own problems as they could. One of the future operations officers, Lieutenant Colonel Brian K. McCravy, remembered the many and varied unknowns that he and his counterparts discussed: how to vet the...
and pay local police; how to provide routine municipal services (power and water); how to find, secure, and exploit suspected weapons of mass destruction sites; how to secure the many weapons caches from looting; how to secure and process mass grave sites of victims of the regime; even how to run prisons. The list did not include searching for Saddam Hussein and his sons, along with other prominent members of the regime; such high-priority tasks were taken for granted.

The interim result of the planners’ work was a scheme for dividing the various responsibilities among the 1st Marine Division, Task Force Tarawa, and the British division, which declared it did not need much U.S. assistance with Phase IV. During a briefing to General Conway in early March, the planners provided him with options for “transitioning the force” and “enabling” the subordinate commands, especially by way of groups that would be known as “governate support teams,” small teams of experts that could deploy to a locality. As plans officer, Lieutenant Colonel George W. Smith, remembered thinking, it was a good beginning; I MEF had defined the problem. But, he felt, the planners had only been able to point in the general direction of a solution but not to lay one out in detail.

General Conway announced on 15 April that it would soon take up its postwar stance in southern Iraq. The announcement contained the Marines’ trademark tinge of remorse about even having to conduct Phase IV operations. Lieutenant Colonel Smith, who doubled as the I MEF spokesman, explained to the press: “It is a tremendous responsibility and it’s very complex. We focus the majority of our efforts on war-fighting. That is what we do. And so post-hostilities introduce a whole new spectrum of challenges. . . . We see that [fighting remnants of the Fedayeen] . . . as the number one threat. . . . We are going to aggressively hunt these guys down and . . . destroy them.”

The next day, General Franks convened a meeting of his senior commanders at Saddam Hussein’s Abu Ghraib Palace in Baghdad, “an extravagant amalgam of marble, tile, gold fittings and massive chandeliers, all surrounded by an azure moat,” to seal the Coalition’s victory over the dictator and to ratify the plans for securing the country. The Marine expeditionary force apparently held its commander’s conference on Phase IV on the same day, and division followed suit shortly thereafter.

With input from the Army’s 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, which remained a welcome adjunct to the Marines during the occupation phase, I MEF published its order for Phase IV four days later. The planners’ assumptions and the Marines’ preference for keeping the occupation short and looking to the future after leaving Iraq, are clear from the text:

On order, I MEF transitions to security/stability operations—establishes military authority, defeats remaining Iraqi combatants, maintains Iraqi territorial integrity, secures WMD [weapons of mass destruction] in sectors, and supports humanitarian assistance [and] the restoration of Iraqi civilian administration/infrastructure IOT [in order to] . . . enable a rapid transition to follow-on Coalition forces. . . .

A guiding constant, to “enable,” will be the basis for all that we do. We must enable IOs/NGOs [international organizations/nongovernmental organizations] and follow-on Coalition partners to support the Iraqi people. . . . We must enable the Iraqi people to support and govern
themselves. . . . Our overarching focus will be establishment of a secure environment as we disarm remaining Iraqi forces, . . . [re-create] local police forces . . . and develop . . . [a small new] Iraqi military. . . .

We must clearly communicate to the Iraqi people the temporary nature of our mission and our desire to quickly transition to Iraqi self-determination. . . . While accomplishing . . . Phase IV, I MEF must also look "deep" toward the requirement of reconstitution, regeneration and redeployment [of the force].449*

As planned, there had been a blurred transition to Phase IV. Task Force Tarawa and the British and American divisions were conducting Phase IV operations before the force published its order, in Nasiriyah, Basrah, Baghdad, and many localities in between. This was partly by design, and partly the result of chance. The rolling transition from Phase III to Phase IV was expected, but the speed and suddenness of the regime's collapse had been breathtaking. The shift was perhaps clearest for the wing. From one day to the next, without a great deal of warning, the kill boxes (the targeting control measure in the air war) were simply "closed." This apparently happened on 11 April. There would still be calls for air support of various sorts, but it would no longer be a routine occurrence, and the wing could start thinking about drawing down in theater. On the ground, the violence also tapered off throughout the country, especially in the Marine area of operations in southern Iraq, although the change for an infantryman or the driver of a light armored vehicle was a little less dramatic. He still went out on patrol, with his weapons loaded, and had to be prepared for a fight at any time.450

While the British division ran its own occupation, with some success, by all accounts, General James Mattis' division set the pace for the occupation in the Marine governates. He already had a distinct vision

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449* I MEF Fires helped to prepare the order; once the need for planning deep fires had passed, both I MEF and CFLCC used their skills as planners of "effects-based operations" for planning and assessing Phase IV operations.
I MEF and the Law of War: How Marines Treated Iraqis

Before I MEF crossed the line of departure into Iraq on 20 March, every Marine received clear guidance: the enemy was the Iraqi regime, not the Iraqi people. Starting with General Conway, commanders went to considerable lengths to disseminate, down to the frontline Marine, the rules of engagement and the CentCom mandate to limit collateral damage, along with their own views on avoiding "triumphalism" or disrespect for the people and customs of Iraq. Marines were to be liberators, not conquerors, and they were to obey the Law of War. This was not an afterthought, an addendum to other kinds of training, but a theme that ran throughout the expeditionary force's preparations for war. It was especially true for 1st Marine Division, the major subordinate command most likely to encounter the enemy face-to-face.*

The force's legal office spent the months before the war working up the rules of engagement and then preparing and disseminating presentations for the major subordinate commands. Following I MEF's lead, General Mattis issued written, detailed guidance on the Law of War on at least two occasions, in addition to continuously repeating and explaining the division's motto, "No better friend, no worse enemy." In one prewar memorandum, he predicted that Marine "discipline will be severely tested by an unscrupulously led enemy who is likely to commit Law of War violations," and went on to outline 11 commonsense Law of War "principles."** To the same effect, in late 2002 as he sensed the approach of war, he urged his commanders to prepare their Marines for the probability of asymmetric attacks and, at the same time, reminded them that "both decisive force and chivalry will be critical to freeing Iraq."***

To drive the message home, General Mattis had his staff judge advocate, Lieutenant Colonel John R. Ewers, and his deputy, Major Joseph A. Lore, deliver classes on the Law of War and Rules of Engagement to division units both before and during the deployment; the general wanted the message to come from an independent expert on the subject, not the unit commander. Mattis went so far as to have Ewers create a team to travel around the battlefield and investigate allegations of wrongdoing before the smoke had cleared. The investigation involved a report that a media vehicle had been hit by fire from the 1st Tank Battalion. Riding in a soft-skinned humvee, Ewers was doing just that when he was wounded on 23 March 2003 near the town of Az Zubayr in southeastern Iraq.****

It is fair to ask whether the Marines followed this guidance before and after combat. At this stage, the evidence, recorded in situation reports and through contact with Marine lawyers, is largely anecdotal and may never progress much beyond that. It appears that by and large most Marines did as they were told, sometimes even going the extra mile for Iraqis, but some Marines occasionally departed from the spirit or the letter of the law.

Perhaps the best-known example of "triumphalism," which was nipped in the bud, was the incident at Firdos Square in which Corporal Edward Chin placed an American flag over Saddam's statue, but quickly replaced it with an Iraqi flag and left it to the citizens of Baghdad to complete the work of destroying that symbol of the regime. Other, less well-known examples have to do with the care many Marines took not to kill civilians, even when there were legitimate targets nearby. In one case on 2 April, which illustrates the dilemmas that conscientious Marines faced in Iraq, Major Peter S. Blake, an AV-8B Harrier pilot, waited for a gap in the civilian traffic, which had, maddeningly, continued to flow in and around the battlefield all over the country, before launching his attack against an Iraqi multiple rocket launcher with a "guided" bomb. Within the next few seconds, a civilian truck came into view, and Blake decided to "slew" (or misguide) the bomb into the Tigris River to save innocent lives. He waited again for a break in the traffic before launching a second, and final, attack. Even though at the last moment another civilian truck appeared, he felt this time he had no choice, since 5th Marines was almost literally around the corner.***** There are numerous other such examples, like the one in early April when Marines held their fire until they knew whether an approaching school bus was filled with enemy fighters or innocent civilians, which turned out to be the case.****** In another, more personal example, on 29 March members of the 1st Force Service Support Group took the trouble to bury a two-year-old Iraqi boy who had stepped on a landmine and been evacuated to Charlie Surgical Support Company, Health Services Battalion, then in the vicinity of Jabibah, where doctors tried in vain to save his life. The boy had come to the field hospital without identification or relatives, and the Marines and sailors who were present decided to give him a proper Muslim burial. They researched the subject carefully, and then found three Muslims to perform the ceremony in the prescribed tradition, which in-
cluded wrapping the body in a shroud and placing it in a grave with the child's face toward Mecca. The chief of staff of the force service support group, Colonel Darrell L. Moore, took time out of his busy day to assist in the ceremony. This small act was one of decency, pure and simple; no journalists or angry townspeople were present to demand that the Marines "do the right thing."******

On the other side of the ledger, a few sources record cases where Marines overstepped the bounds of fire discipline or military law. In December 2003, the Marine Corps Times reported on the case of eight Marines charged in the death of a 52-year-old Iraqi detainee who was found dead in his cell in An Nasiriyah in the spring of 2003. The charges included "willfully failing to properly safeguard the health" of those in custody, as well as assault and making false official statements.******** According to the deputy staff judge advocate of 1st Marine Division, Major Lore, this was one of a handful of similar incidents that was investigated and resulted either in nonjudicial punishment or court-martial. In their book The March Up, Major General Ray L. Smith and Bing West tell a story about the time when Brigadier General John F. Kelly, the assistant commander of 1st Marine Division, admonished an unnamed battalion commander on 26 March for letting his troops needlessly shoot at approaching civilians. The Marines had a legitimate concern about suicide bombers in civilian vehicles, but that did not mean every heedless civilian who came within half a mile of a Marine position had to be stopped with deadly force. Although West and Smith go on to discuss their impression that most Marines agonized over the decision to fire or not to fire, two journalists who spent time with different units during the combat phase of the war, Evan Wright and Peter Maas, convey the impression that some young Marines were all too ready to fire at civilians, and that their officers and noncommissioned officers did not always do a good job of restraining them. This was especially true after Marines learned about the fighting at An Nasiriyah, where the enemy had worn civilian clothes and Marine casualties were heavy. At that point, the enemy for many, if not most, Marines became any Iraqi with a gun.********

It is important to note that at least five such cases resulted in some form of disciplinary proceedings against the perpetrators. According to Major Lore, these proceedings ran the gamut from nonjudicial punishment to general court-martial. With the passage of time, there will be more clarity on these events. As of this writing, even basic statistics are difficult to come by. The I MEF staff judge advocate's command chronology for the first half of 2003 states that during Phase III of Operation Iraqi Freedom its primary focus was reporting and investigating violations of the laws of armed conflict. The same document shows that the I MEF staff judge advocate was involved in some way in one general court-martial, eight special courts-martial, and one summary court-martial, but without delving into the individual cases it is difficult to interpret the significance of these statistics.

The bottom line? The 1 MEF commander and his subordinates did the right thing. They told virtually every Marine what they expected, and they did so in some detail. During the war, the Marine leadership took measures to enforce the standards it had set. Most Marines appear to have met those standards, while a handful fell short and were disciplined when a case could be made against them.

**For basic data on 1 MEF-level staff judge advocates, see 1 MEF SJA ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA). See also Gen Conway's talks on the rules of engagement in Chapter 3 and Col William D. Durrett intrws, 11Feb03, 9Jun03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).**

"MajGen James N. Mattis, "Commanding General's Guidance on Law of War," u.d. (2002) (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). It is interesting to note that one of the six books on Gen Mattis' reading list for his subordinate commanders was Son Thang: An American War Crime, by Gary Solis, which was about how the 1st Marine Division handled a war crime in Vietnam.

"MajGen James N. Mattis, "Memorandum for All Commanders," 20Dec02 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). The division staff judge advocate, LtCol John R. Ewers, remembers having "a number of conversations with both Gen Mattis and Gen Kelly (the assistant division commander) . . . about law of war . . . and the challenges posed in . . . asymmetric warfare with a foe who was expected to . . . break the rules." LtCol John R. Ewers, e-mails to author, 6, 7Apr04 (Copies in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

Maj Melissa D. Kuo, "Field History Journal," entry for 29Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).


"Evan Wright, "The Killer Elite," Rolling Stone, 13Jun03, 24Jul03; Peter Maas, "Good Kills," The New York Times Magazine, 20Apr03. Wright's articles pull few punches and tell the story of a slice of the war from the corporals and sergeants perspective. They were subsequently expanded into the book Generation Kill (New York, NY: Putnam, 2004), which, while it is well written, has had mixed reviews from Marines."
for the way he wanted to implement the force order. Like I MEF, 1st Marine Division would issue general guidelines. Each of its governates would be run by a reinforced infantry battalion. The reinforcements might consist of a governate support team, a psychological operations team, a human intelligence exploitation team, civil affairs elements, and sometimes engineer or naval construction elements. The battalion commander would have a great deal of autonomy, but given the small size of his force, he would have no choice but to rely heavily on the international and nongovernmental organizations as well as whatever Iraqis he could mobilize. Interestingly, he would work not for his regiment but for division itself; General Mattis' plan was for the regimental staffs to focus on the retrograde and on preparations for the next contingency, the “recocking” that figured in so many plans and talks. This would enable him to satisfy the twin mandates in the I MEF order, not to mention the spirit of the order.

It was a dramatic move. General Mattis began the occupation by sending about 15,000 of his 23,000 Marines home, along with all of his tanks and assault amphibious vehicles, his armored personnel carriers, but not his light armored vehicles, which remained very useful. This was one way to reinforce his message about how to occupy a country, both to his Marines and to the Iraqis. He still intended for the Marines to patrol on foot and for the two groups to become intimately familiar with each other, even to trust each other. But he did not want “a heavy boot print” or the “sense of oppression” that could come if “everywhere you looked you saw a Marine. If we needed more people . . . I wanted to enlist the Iraqis [for] . . . our common cause.”

The 1st Marine Division had three basic policies. The first was “Do no harm,” expressed in the kind of Mattis aphorism that all Marines could understand: “If someone needs shooting, shoot him. If someone does not need shooting, protect him.” The second was to win heart and minds through good works. The third and final was to be ready at all times to win the 10-second gunfight. The general's statements of policy branched into specific guidance. Because he wanted the Marines and the Iraqis to trust each other, he literally wanted them to look each other in
the eye; in fact, one of his directives was for Marines to remove their sunglasses when speaking to Iraqis. Another piece of guidance followed from his commonsense observation that the Iraqis would cooperate more readily if the Marines helped their children, and he sent units into the local schools to clean them up and get them running again.

Again like the force, division began its work in each province with a survey, with a view to developing a campaign plan tailored to the needs of each province. Generally speaking, the routine was similar to the one that division had followed in Baghdad before I MEF had published its order for Phase IV. Reestablishing security was paramount. Marines themselves did some of that work, but wanted to vet and train Iraqi police to take over from them as quickly as possible. The Iraqis joined Marine-led patrols with a view to gradually switching roles.

The division's various locations included Al Muthanna (2d Battalion, 5th Marines); Karbala (3d Battalion, 7th Marines); Al Qadisiyah (3d Battalion, 5th Marines); An Najaf (1st Battalion, 7th Marines); and Babil (1st Battalion, 4th Marines). The provinces of Wasit and Dhi Qar were added when 2d Battalion, 5th Marines; An Najaf (1st Battalion, 7th Marines); and Babil (1st Battalion, 4th Marines). The provinces of Wasit and Dhi Qar were added when 2d Battalion, 5th Marines; 3d Battalion, 23d Marines; and the 4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion came over to division from Task Force Tarawa, which was rotating home at the end of May.

The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was blessed with an unusual Iraqi partner who became the local police chief, Brigadier General Fuad Hani Fans. A wounded veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, he was said to be critical of Saddam and appears to have been one of the many Iraqi soldiers who simply wrote their own travel orders when the war began. Fans moved himself from Hillah, where he had been assigned, to Ad Diwaniyah, where his wife's family lived. When the postwar looting began, he organized Iraqi soldiers into guard forces and protected some of the factories, ammunition supply points, and government buildings in the city until the U.S. Army appeared. He happily agreed to help rebuild the area and transferred his loyalties to the Marines when they replaced the Army in Ad Diwaniyah.

The experiences of the Weapons Company, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, in Ad Diwaniyah in early May illustrate what it was like for junior Marines charged with policing a city. The company was quartered in town in a villa that had belonged to a recently departed strongman. Set in a large, pleasant, walled compound next to a stream and including a vegetable garden and a more formal garden, the airy, two-story villa had been looted in early April, stripped even of doorframes and floor tiles. The Marines had to begin by cleaning it up and restoring it. The idea was to turn it into a police station, complete with armory and holding cells. Next the company put out the word that it would be paying local policemen, which quickly attracted them to the small base and allowed the Marines to begin the process of vetting, organizing, training, and equipping them. In the words of one observer:

This afternoon the Marines were going to pay the Iraqi policemen—and issue weapons. . . . The Marines frisked the Iraqis as they came into the compound, confiscated (temporarily) their AK-47s (the small version with the folding stock . . .) but let them keep their pistols if they were unloaded. Marines in HMMWs overwatched the process and armed Marines stood near the Iraqis as they formed themselves up. There were traffic police—dressed in white, with [peaked] hats like those worn by police all over the world—and security police—dressed in green outfits with the [black] Iraqi berets—all worn in different styles from the pillbox (which looks ridiculous) to the usual Iraqi mushroom shape (which is not that snappy either). No one looked hungry—unlike some of the people on the streets. A couple of the . . . [policemen] bordering on obesity. There were a few officers among them—men with more braid who looked like they were used to being in charge and leading (manipulating?) others. I watched one of them work his wiles on one of the translators used by the Marines. By and large, it seemed like a good-natured crowd. A few of them . . . [were] a little nervous as I took photographs—but most smiled and waved at me.

In the meantime Marines continued to patrol the streets, apprehend looters, and hold them for a day or two in a makeshift outdoor prison, performing various kinds of less than pleasant tasks around the compound, such as filling sandbags or burning waste in the latrines. Whether the looters learned their lesson was doubtful. One of the looters claimed he was innocent because he had been hired to loot, saying the man the Marines should arrest was his employer. One thing the Marines learned was that no one wanted to be a policeman in Ad Diwaniyah without a weapon, no one seemed to like policemen, who bore the double stigma of having worked for the former regime and now of collaborating with the occupiers, and so they quickly decided to allow the Iraqis
to carry sidearms and AK-47 rifles.

While some Marines addressed security, others worked on the infrastructure. At the battalion command post, located on the grounds of a modern but unfinished medical school campus, there was a thriving Civil Affairs section and a chart showing the lines of operation, which included such entries as "Water/Sewage, Electrical, Medical, Education and Law, Fire, Public Transportation, Food and Distribution." An officer's name was written in next to each entry. For example, Second Lieutenant Glen J. Bayliff, whose main qualification for the job was that he was
the logistics officer, was responsible for transportation, which meant conducting surveys, remaining abreast of developments, and helping to coordinate indigenous efforts with those of international or nongovernmental organizations. Sometimes Marine Reservists, described as the Corps’ “hidden asset” by one grateful battalion commander, came to the rescue with their civilian skill sets as policemen, lawyers, or city managers. Many Marines found that neither the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance nor the organization that replaced it, the Coalition Provisional Authority, had enough resources to weigh in at the day-to-day, working level. For the most part, they were left to their own devices.455

Some national events took place that did have repercussions on the local level. Before the war, President Bush is said to have approved a plan that would have put “several hundred thousand Iraqi soldiers on the U.S. payroll and kept them available” for various tasks from providing security to repairing roads. But in a surprise move on 23 May, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, issued a decree disbanding the army and canceling pensions.456 Some three weeks later, on 15 June, CFLCC turned over responsibility for the occupation of Iraq to V Corps, while keeping its responsibilities for supporting the force. This was the last day of the amnesty period under the Coalition decree, which limited the number and types of weapons Iraqis could possess. The predictable result of both policies was an upswing in violence against Coalition forces, especially in the area west of Baghdad around Ar Ramadi and Fallujah, two names that would become all too familiar to Marines in 2004.

This was not part of I MEF’s area of operations, but it was contiguous to it. Army convoys traveling from Kuwait to Ar Ramadi and Fallujah had to pass through northern Babil Province, which did fall under I MEF. The Marines’ future operations staff “began studying and planning to defeat this threat.” The result was a plan to set up an armored task force to patrol the area.457

Built around the Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, under the spirited command of Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Pappas, the task force took the name “Scorpion” and was clearly undeterred either by the challenge or the marginal living conditions it faced. A visiting journalist, Pamela Hess of United Press International, captured the spirit of Camp Scorpion:

Mad Max would turn up his nose... There is nothing but garbage and dirt and sand as far as the eye can see. Marines live and sleep in the open air of a gravel parking lot, except for the few one-story concrete buildings that are air-conditioned on the rare occasions the generators can be coaxed to work. They have no chow hall... and until... recently... [sanitary] facilities were a plywood bench with four holes... Powerful winds sweep the grounds, kicking up massive dust clouds that coat everything in dull brown powder several times a day.

In April and May 2003, there was almost universal praise for the young enlisted Marines who served in Kuwait and Iraq. The historians who deployed from Washington, D.C., to the field to conduct interviews during and after the war heard story after story praising the spirit, ingenuity, and “stick-to-itness” of the individual Marine, and they often experienced it themselves. It was the small acts that stood out, whether it was the Marines who sensed, rightly, that spare parts would be in short supply up the road in Iraq and stopped to strip them from wrecked vehicles as they moved north, or the amphibious assault vehicle mechanics who repaired vehicles while they were moving under tow, or the Marines performing the lonely work of unwinding the hose reel in the desert, or the determination “to get there” of the driver of a seven-ton truck making his way through the sand at night, or caring for children under fire. Whatever his assigned task, each of these Marines was also prepared to fight as a rifleman, revalidating one of the basic tenets of the Marine credo. What struck many officers after the war was how well combat infantrymen adapted to the demands of occupation duty, switching from a “weapons free” to a “weapons tight” frame of mind. They marveled at the restraint that these young men and women were now showing. The praise for the enlisted Marine sometimes contrasted with what Marine officers said about one another, with the friction that often comes from having too many senior officers with strong personalities gathered in one command or staff.
General Conway Sums Up

During the turnover to the multinational division at Camp Babylon on 3 September, General Conway summed up the past five months in a few words: "[A]s we headed south out of Baghdad for the provinces, we did so with a certain amount of trepidation. Marines do not traditionally do nation-building or security operations. We have no doctrine for it. We were not sure where the resources would come from. And we were not sure how we would be received by the people of southern Iraq, who had seen American troops attack up through their governates... [But] in some regards, a negative can become a positive. A lack of doctrine allowed us to pass some very simple rules to our Marines and soldiers. They were--treat others as you would like to be treated. Deal with the people with fairness and firmness and dignity. And among other things, we emphasized the children. They are the future of this country. It is hard to be angry with someone when he is doing good things for your children."  

"This is the best we have had it!" laughs Master Gunnery Sergeant Paul D. Clark from Austin, the battalion's operations chief.

The Marines used their imagination to defeat the enemy. They adopted a Trojan-horse approach, disguising their vehicles as Army supply trucks and then counter-ambushing the locals who had apparently been paid by Ba'athists to take potshots at the convoys. They experimented with various other ways to escort the convoys, training the Army truck drivers in convoy operations and molding Marines and soldiers into one team. Forced to seek cover some distance from the highway, the insurgents took to using increasingly sophisticated "improvised explosive devices," the small but often deadly bombs that could be rigged to detonate when vehicles passed by. The 1st Marine Division resisted advice to reply to attacks with heavy firepower, which its leaders felt might be counterproductive. Instead they decided to go to the source, that is trying to neutralize the perpetrators before they struck. This they did by collecting intelligence about them and conducting raids, often on the compounds of the relatively wealthy. It was possible to leverage the various civil affairs initiatives to get information; locals grateful for a month or two of electricity or clean water might give the Marines tips about potential insurgents, and the result might be a productive raid at dawn, a time chosen by the division to minimize the risk of harm to bystanders. Success reinforced success. When locals saw the Marines arrest and remove one perpetrator, other Iraqis were emboldened to pass on a tip that would lead to the next raid. Lieutenant Colonel Pappas commented that even if one of the attackers got away after an ambush, often the locals would approach his Marines later on and tell them where to find him.  

Colonel Pappas' intelligence officer, Major Steven B. Manber, added that even though the task force was rich in technical collection assets, 90 percent of its successful operations stemmed from local contacts.

Similar approaches were applied to more exotic locales: guarding the border with Iran in desert forts that looked like the set for a modern-day movie about the French Foreign Legion; defusing tensions in the holy Shia cities of Najaf and Karbala; uncovering and processing mass graves that were filled with the victims of the Saddam regime; patrolling the border with Saudi Arabia. Looking for weapons of mass destruction remained high on the Marines' agenda, and on that of other Coalition forces. The results were as frustrating as they were unexpected. General Conway commented that "in terms of... the weapons, we... certainly had our best guess... [based on what] the intelligence folks were giving us. We were simply wrong... It remains a surprise to me now that we have not uncovered weapons... It is not for lack of trying. We have been to virtually every ammunition supply point between the Kuwaiti border and Baghdad, and they are simply not there."  

By early summer, Babylon was the scene of turnover preparations. The location encompassed both the ancient city and the site of another sumptuous modern palace built by Saddam, on an artificial hill, where Marines could camp out. There being little electricity and no running water, but lots of big rooms with high ceilings and marble floors, it was a relatively cool and clean place to pitch a tent. There was a certain satisfaction to it; Marines were now in Saddam's bedroom and ballroom. Both force and division had their headquarters in Babylon, which was not far from CFLCC's forward headquarters in Bagh-
Marines of Company K, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, carrying their M16A2 rifles and gear, board a KC-130 Hercules aircraft at Blair Field in Al Kut, Iraq, for the trip home. By November 2003, all Marines and every piece of their equipment had been withdrawn.

With the exception of the city of An Najaf, General Conway was able to turn over responsibility for the zone to the commander of the multinational division in a ceremony at Babylon on 3 September and send his troops south.5 After the turnovers, there was a general sense of satisfaction among senior Marines with the force and division’s accomplishments. Although some civilian experts noted persistent problems, particularly unemployment and inability to communicate with Iraqis, there were some undeniable statistics. For example, the number of attacks on convoys in northern Babil Province was dramatically reduced. Najaf was the site of a powerful car bomb attack on 29 August. This postponed the turnover, as did a number of issues that the Spanish Brigade raised. The turnover finally occurred in early October. Reflecting his general frustration with the process, one I MEF officer cracked that the turnover with the multinational division was like “stuffing cats into a seabag,” while another found that many of the foreign soldiers seemed professional and ready to do their job.

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lower, and there were no Marines killed in action during the occupation phase, although some were wounded and, tragically, others killed in various accidents. General Mattis made the claim that since early summer the Iraqis had been “running the things that are most important to people. Are the street lights on? Is the neighborhood safe? These kinds of things are already in their hands with the Marines very much in the background.”

What was left for the dwindling number of Marines in Iraq and Kuwait was to complete the retrograde process. Through most of the summer, 1st Force Service Support Group Forward conducted redeployment operations from Kuwait while exercising command and control over Combat Service Support Group 11, which continued to support division. Until mid-October, I MEF Rear was still at Camp Commando, and CFLCC continued to lend its resources to support the Marines. With the assistance of the 377th Theater Support Command, Marines went through washdown and the loading onto various kinds of shipping and aircraft. The two amphibious task forces had preceded them, both setting sail in late May with heavy loads of troops and equipment, each going in a different direction. (Amphibious Task Force West had taken the more exotic route, stopping for liberty in Australia on the way.) Before flying home, other units left heavy equipment with the 1st Force Service Support Group’s “Regeneration Control Element,” which in turn consolidated its holdings for turn-in to the special purpose Marine air-ground task force. By 31 October, I MEF was completely gone from theater.

The Marine Logistics Command morphed into the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force under the new commanding general of 2d Force Service Support Group, Brigadier General Ronald S. Coleman, who came to Kuwait in June to replace Brigadier General Michael R. Lehnert, who was bound for a new job at Southern Command. General Coleman took up residence in the bleak expanses of Tactical Assembly Area Fox. His original charter was to repatriate and repair the Maritime Prepositioning Force equipment that had been used in Iraq, and the plan was for him to get it done by the spring of 2004. (Maritime Prepositioning Force equipment was the Marine equipment that had been prepositioned on chartered ships that made up the maritime prepositioning force.) But Coleman found a way to get the job done much faster. One of the threshold issues was whether it made more sense to do the maintenance and repairs in Kuwait and then reload the shipping, or to ship the gear first to the United States and then have it repaired at home. Various factors, in-
including cost and temperatures so high that much of the time his Marines were literally unable to touch anything that was made of metal, made it advisable to choose the second option, and General Coleman was able to get every piece of Marine equipment out of Kuwait, and his Marines home, in time for the Marine Corps Birthday in November.465

General Coleman left Tactical Assembly Area Fox more or less as it had been a year earlier. Now it was almost as if the Marines had never passed through Kuwait on their way to Iraq. But there were already inklings that they would return to theater. After his work was done, General Coleman remembered a meeting with General Mattis in the summer of 2003. The division commander was concerned about the gear that was now in the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force's charge, because he thought he would need it again shortly.466 He seemed to know there would not be much rest for his Marines.
Notes

Chapter 1

1. Col John A. Tempone, e-mail to author, 16Jan04 (Reynolds Working Papers, Marine Corps Historical Center [MCHC], Quantico, VA).
4. BGen Christian B. Cowdrey intvw, 26Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). For a snapshot of Marine operations on and after 11 September, see U.S. Marine Corps, Operation Enduring Freedom Combat Assessment Team Summary Report (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 2003), pp. 47-50, hereafter MCCDC, OEF Summary Report. This report, by Marines assigned to MCCDC’s Studies and Analysis Division, is a very useful all-around source, as are the thousands of documents and interviews that they collected.
5. Gen James L. Jones, Jr. intvw, 14Jun04 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
6. There are numerous sources on the history of C/JTF-CM. The Cowdrey interview is a good first-hand description of the first few months of its existence. C/JTF-CM also filed an excellent set of command chronologies.
7. Task Force 58 ComdCs, 27Oct01, 26Feb02 (GRC, Quantico, VA), p. 4; hereafter TF 58 ComdC. Although it contains some idiosyncrasies, this is an unusually well-written command chronology and gives the reader an excellent picture of Marine Corps operations against the Taliban.
9. See, for example, Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 116f.
12. Ibid., p. 9.
13. Ibid., p. 10.
15. Ibid.
17. BGen James N. Mattis intvw, 20Jan02 (Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC); hereafter Mattis intvw no. 1. For background, see U.S. Marine Corps, “Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare,” Marine Corps Gazette, Feb02, pp. A-1 through A-10. “Seabasing enables forces to move directly from ship to objectives deep inland and represents a significant advance from traditional, phased amphibious operations.”
18. Col Timothy C. Wells intvw, 27Feb03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also MarForPac ComdC, Jul-Dec01 (GRC, Quantico, VA).
19. MarForPac ComdC, Jul-Dec01 (GRC, Quantico, VA).
20. LtGen Earl B. Hailston intvw, 19May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Wells intvw.
22. TF 58 ComdC, p. 32.
23. For a discussion of this topic, see Charles J. Quilter II, With the 1 Marine Expeditionary Force in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, 1993), pp. 8-11. See, also Jones intvw.
25. Col Stephen W. Baird intvw, 31May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
27. LtGen James T. Conway intvw, 7Dec03 (MCHC,
Quantico, VA).

28. See, for example, MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, p. 63. Such comments were made to the author by various Marines during a visit to Tampa in December 2001.

29. MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, p. 57.

30. See, for example, MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, pp. 9-15, which argues that the operation did not fully validate expeditionary maneuver warfare but showed the utility of some of its tenets.

31. LtGen David D. McKiernan intvw, 30Jun03 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.), hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 4. To cite other examples: Gen Hailston also commented on his good relations with Gen Franks; Gen Mattis repeatedly stressed the value of establishing good relations with neighboring commanders of all Services, both joint and combined. (Hailston intvw; Mattis intvw no. 1; TF 58 ComdC) See also Reynolds, Journal, entry for 10Nov03, describing a talk by Williamson Murray and MajGen Robert H. Scales, Jr., during which they contrasted the personalities, and their relationships, in the two wars.

32. See, for example, Zinni intvw.

33. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 47f.


35. McKiernan intvw no. 4.


37. Zinni intvw.


41. Conway intvw.

42. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 65.

43. See, for example, Col Christopher G. Wright intvw, 4Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

44. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 10May03.

45. Conway intvw.


Chapter 2


48. Gregory Fontenot, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), p. 31. This is a very useful and detailed early work on the conflict. On directives in 2001 to prepare for a possible war with Iraq, see, for example, Purdum, Time of Our Choosing, p. 20. For the point of view of a Marine planner at Headquarters Marine Corps in 2001, see, for example, LtCol James L. Western intvw, 30Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Western intvw.

49. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun02 (GRC, Quantico, VA), Sec 2, p. 16.

50. Ibid., pp. 28-29, 59.

51. LtCol George W. Smith, Jr. intvw, 8Jun04 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter G.W. Smith intvw no. 2. For general background on the planning process, see also Col Christopher J. Gunther intvw, 24-25May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), and LtCol Gregory M. Douquet, 29Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). Although he did not become the I MEF planner until the middle of 2002, Col Gunther describes how the planning for Iraq evolved from February 2002 onward. LtCol Douquet was the senior 3d MAW planner, serving with I MEF future operations from February 2002 to April 2003.

52. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 92.

53. Zinni intvw.

54. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 54.

55. Ibid.

56. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. Franks, American Soldier, pp. 382-431, describes the evolution of the various plans in 2002 from his point of view, especially his broad-brush briefings to the president and the secretary of defense, which led to general guidance for the planners.

57. LtCol G.W. Smith intvw, 18Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA.), hereafter G. W. Smith intvw no. 1.

58. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
Notes

59. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1 Jul 04, based on a conversation with former PP&O current operations officer Col Ronald J. Johnson.
60. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
61. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jul 02 (GRC, Quantico, VA).
62. MCCDC, OIF Summary Report, p. 54; Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 42.
63. McKiernan intvw no. 4.
64. Conway intvw; Hailston intvw.
65. See, for example, MajGen Robert R. Blackman intvw, 31 May 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. On Gen McKiernan’s approach to joint operations from a Marine point of view, see Col Marc A. Workman intvw, 30 Nov 02 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
66. McKiernan intvw no. 4.
67. See, for example, the comment on this subject in Zinni intvw.
68. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 45. This conclusion assumes that the subordinate commands had the requisite clearances to access highly classified files.
70. Zinni intvw.
72. There was a complicated set of agreements about this, which are examined in detail in LtCol LeRoy D. Stearns, The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing in Desert Shield and Desert Storm (Washington, D.C.: Marine Corps History and Museums Division, 1999), pp. 45-49, hereafter Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing. See also Michael R. Gordon and Gen Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1995), p. 311. This is a basic source on Desert Shield/Desert Storm.
73. MajGen James F. Amos intvw, 16 May 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Hailston intwav.
74. Stearns, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, p. 47.
75. See G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; Reynolds, Journal, entry for 29 Jul 03, describing a postwar briefing by the general officers who commanded I MEF’s major subordinate commands. Capt Ryan M. Walker intvw, 22 Apr 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). By and large, once the war started, the system worked. See MCCDC, OIF Summary Report, p. 40.
77. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 154-183. For a comment on Iraqi exiles in general, see, for example, Clancy, Battle Ready, p. 345.
78. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
79. The issue of synchronicity is addressed in, among other sources, LtCol Richard T. Johnson intvw, 26 Apr 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); McKeldin Journal, entry for 28 Feb 03; and LtCol Paul J. Kennedy intvw, 6 Nov 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). See, for example, G. W. Smith intvw no. 2, and Douquet intwav.
80. There are numerous sources on this topic. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2 contains details of meetings on the subject, including a meeting between Gens McKiernan and Conway on 29 January 2003 when they discussed, and agreed on, this subject.
81. Quoted in House of Commons Defence Committee, Lessons of Iraq (London, UK: Stationery Office, 2004), vol. 1, pp. 34-35. This is a useful source with many lengthy, and candid, quotations by British officers. It appears to be more candid than the Ministry of Defence’s “lessons learned” publications on the war.
82. Fontenot, et al., On Point, pp. 93-94; Terry Moran intvw, 23 Aug 03 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.); Col Reed R. Bonadonna, “Notes from Address by LtGen Conway, CG I MEF to Officers of Task Force Tarawa,” 1 Mar 03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun 03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), “FuOps” (Documents), “I MEF ROC Drill, 10 Mar 03.”
83. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; see also Gunther intvw.
85. G. W. Smith intvw no. 1.
86. Maj Evan A. Huelfer intvw, 16 Mar 03 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.); G. W. Smith intvw no 2; Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 45.
87. On the neoconservative movement, see James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York, NY: Viking, 2004). On some of the neoconservative plans that were presented to Franks, see Franks, American Soldier, p. 373. For a general source on the planning process, see Woodward, Plan of Attack. Although Woodward and Franks cover much of the same ground, Woodward describes a slightly different dynamic from Franks, suggesting that the Pentagon, and not CentCom, generally took the lead in proposing various plans. For a more critical view of the development of the administration’s policy on Iraq, see W. Patrick Lang, “Drinking the Kool-Aid,” Middle East Policy, summer 2004, pp. 39-60.
88. Although Franks said he had a productive relationship with Donald Rumsfeld and liked working with the Secretary of Defense, he also expressed
reservations about his "centralized management style." See Franks, American Soldier, pp. 313, 333, 362, 373, and 545. Col Kevin Benson, the senior CFLCC planner, reported similar frustrations with the Pentagon during the planning stage. Colonel Kevin Benson, "Brief at Naval War College," 25Aug04 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2003), p. 150, and questions about "alleged meddling...by the Office of the Secretary of Defense—especially in the planning process" down to the CFLCC/MEF level, in U.S. Naval Institute, "Interview: LtGen James T. Conway, USMC," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 2003). Some have suggested that war planning for Iraq needs to be understood in the context of relations between the secretary and the military starting in 2000. See, for example, Elaine M. Grossman, "To Understand Insurgency in Iraq: Read Something Old, Something New," Insider, 2Dec04, containing a comment by LtGen Gregory Newbold, who retired in 2002 from a senior position in the J-3 at the Pentagon, that a cautionary tale about the Pentagon during the Vietnam years "contains remarkable parallels with today's environment." The book is H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1997). It will be a number of years before the sources are available for anyone to analyze the Iraq War in the same way.

89. Zinni intvw; Jones intvw.
91. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; Huelfer intvw; Moran intvw. Moran, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, was General McKiernan's special assistant, privy to a great deal of information about the plan for the war.
92. Huelfer intvw; Benson, "Brief at Naval War College." Benson and Huelfer cover much the same ground.
93. Huelfer intvw.
94. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
95. There is an excellent discussion of this topic in Fontenot, et al., On Point, pp. 44-47. Once again, Huelfer and Smith also offer excellent descriptions of the process from the planner's perspective. Huelfer intvw; G. W. Smith intvw nos. 1 and 2.
96. Huelfer intvw; G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
97. Huelfer intvw.
98. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
99. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
100. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; intvw with LtCol Yanni Marok, Royal Marines, 14Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). Marok joined I MEF future operations staff in September and developed an excellent relationship with other planners, including Smith. His interview is particularly useful for the data it contains on Al Faw.
101. Marok intvw. This occurred in the 12-13 December time frame at a conference in Bahrain. Col Gunther was acting with the knowledge and approval of his superiors.
102. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2: Franks, American Soldier, p. 396, contains his schematic of the various lines of operation.
103. I MEF ComdC, Jul-Dec02 (GRC, Quantico, VA); Col George F. Milburn intvw, 1Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); P. J. Kennedy intvw.
104. Reynolds Journal, entry for 19Jul04, quoting from journal kept by one of the officers present.
106. LtGen David D. McKiernan intvw, 20Jun03 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.), hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 3. See also Blackman intvw, Workman intvw, and the television documentary about CFLCC by CNN Presents, "Inside the War Room" (Atlanta, GA: CNN, 2003), hereafter CNN, "The War Room."
107. There are numerous sources about this approach, defined as "a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing operations...to attain the effects required to achieve desired...outcomes." Edward C. Mann III, Gary Endersby, Thomas R. Searle, Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002), p. 2.
108. Col Gregory J. Plush intvw, 15Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Workman intvw.
109. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 43; Blackman intvw; CNN, "The War Room."
110. Col Patrick J. Burger intvw, 16Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). There were approximately 12 Marine liaison officers at CFLCC.
111. See MCCDC, OEF Summary Report, p. 11, reporting its finding that providing adequate numbers of staff officers for such components was a challenge for the Marine Corps.
112. Blackman intvw. See also Workman and Cowdrey intvw. BGen Cowdrey was one of the "January" augmentees. In February 2003 there were some 1,300 members of the CFLCC staff. LtCol Terrance J. Johns and Maj Robert F. McTague II intvw, 22Feb03 (CFLCC Military History Group intvw, 322-332).
113. Huelfer intvw.
114. See, for example, Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 41.
115. Jones intvw.
116. Blackman intvw. This tracks with the comments by Gen McKiernan and Moran with respect to the plans that were under discussion in the fall of 2003, but diverges somewhat from the lead planners' comments. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; R. T. Johnson intvw; I MEF ComdC, Jul-Aug02 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2 narrative summaries for G-3 Future Operations and G-5 Plans. For a more general discussion of planning issues at this time, see Cordesman, Iraq War, pp. 149-159.
117. LtGen David D. McKiernan intvw, 19Dec02 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC), hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 1. See also R. T. Johnson intvw.
118. Intvw with LtGen David D. McKiernan, 1May03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter McKiernan intvw no. 2. This was a group interview with officers representing both the Military History Group at Camp Doha and various Army lessons-learned initiatives. Much of the same ground is also covered in McKiernan intvw no. 1.
119. Huelfer intvw.
120. Moran intvw.
121. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), “command element,” p. 41; Blackman intvw.
123. Zinni intvw.
124. I MEF ComdC, 1Jan03-30Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), Future Operations Folder, “Chg 1 to I MEF OPLAN 1003V,” 16Mar03.
125. McKiernan intvw no. 4; G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
126. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
127. Ibid.
128. BGen Richard F. Natonski intvw, 26Mar04 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Natonski intvw no. 2.
129. See, for example, Huelfer intvw.
130. McKiernan intvw no. 1.
131. Ibid. The phases are nicely laid out in Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. xxiii.
132. G. W. Smith intvw no. 1; P. J. Kennedy intvw. The Conway quote is from a 7 August 2003 interview published in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November 2003), which also appeared on the internet at www.usni.org/proceedings/articles03. See also Reynolds Journal, entry for 1 July 2004.
133. LtCol Jim Hutton intvw, Royal Marines, 4May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
134. Col George F. Milburn intvw, 3Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); hereafter Milburn intvw no. 2. This is another great topic for a paper, if not a dissertation. The researcher could compare Marine, Army, and British plans and orders in this conflict and consider questions like: Had the British adapted to the information age, or were they simply applying lessons long since learned? How has American planning adapted to the information age? In a war of “shock and awe,” when do planners reach the point of diminishing returns?
135. Rick Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers (New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2004), p. 26. This is, in my view, one of the best books about the war by an embedded journalist, or by anyone else. Atkinson does an excellent job of portraying the frame of mind of the staff of the 101st Airborne Division and of putting its accomplishments in context.
136. Bonadonna, “Notes from Address by LtGen Conway.”
137. McKiernan intvw no. 4.
138. Huelfer intvw.
139. See, for example, Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, p. 107.
140. McKiernan intvw no. 2, 1May03 (group interview at Camp Doha, KU, copy at MCHC, Washington, DC). Fontenot, et al., On Point, pp. 99,102, offers a summary of the enemy order of battle as it appeared before the campaign. See also I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), especially Future Operations folder containing “Chg 1 to MEF OPLAN 1003V,” dated 16Mar03, and containing an assessment of enemy capabilities.
142. MajGen James N. Mattis intvw, 23Jan04 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Wright intvw.
143. Bonadonna, “Notes from Address by LtGen Conway.”
144. Steve Col, “Hussein Was Sure of Own Survival: Aide Says Confusion Reigned on Eve of War,” The Washington Post, 3 Nov03, p. A-i. This would certainly not have been out of character for Saddam Hussein, many of whose past decisions were not thought through, to put it mildly. See also Franks, American Soldier, p. 558, for a comment on the work of a Joint Forces Command lessons-learned team that debriefed Iraqi officers after the war. The team found that while some Iraqi units were well prepared, Iraqi command and control, especially at senior levels, was next to nonexistent. Finally, see various sources on a CIA report made public in 2004, including Douglas Jehl, “Inspector’s Report Says Hussein Expected Guerrilla War,” The New York
These issues surfaced repeatedly in oral history interviews. See for example, Blackman intvw; Reynolds, Journal, entry for 1Jul04; G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; Zinni intvw; and Clancy, *Battle Ready*, pp. 19-20.

**Chapter 3**

146. Conway intvw.

147. Capt Lara A. Bennett, et al., *No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy* (Camp Pendleton, CA: 1st Marine Division, 2004), pp. 6-8. This book has pictures and text about the division in Operation Iraqi Freedom and was distributed by the Marine Corps Association.

148. Wright intvw; Col John A. Toolan intvw, 10Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

149. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jul03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 3, p. 21. There are numerous other sources on the division's preparations for war, including Toolan intvw; Wright intvw; and Col Joseph F. Dunford intvw, 2May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

150. Jones intvw.

151. BG Edward G. Usher III intvw, 19Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Usher intvw no. 1; the Commanders and Staff of 1st FSSG, “Brute Force Logistics,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, Aug03, pp. 34-39. A field historian was attached to 1st Force Service Support Group during Operation Iraqi Freedom. She was Maj Melissa D. Kuo, who is preparing a monograph on combat service support in OIF I. I am indebted to her for reviewing my remarks on logistics and making suggestions.

152. Hailston intvw; Usher intvw no. 1; LtCol Michael D. Visconage, “OIF Field History Journal,” 2003 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for 15Mar03, hereafter Visconage, Journal; BG Michael R. Lehner intvw, 8May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). One of the Marine field historians assigned to cover OIF I, CWO-2 William E. Hutson, conducted numerous interviews at the Marine Logistics Command that are available at the MCHC.

153. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 29Jul03. This entry contains detailed notes on a set of briefings given by the OIF commanders, including Generals Conway, Mattis, and Amos, at Quantico. The author worked for General Amos at The Basic School.

154. This is a topic that the U.S. Air Force has explored over the years. See, for example, Robert P. Givens, *Turning the Vertical Flank* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2002). Col Givens outlines the criteria for thinking of air as a maneuver force, able to exert influence over enemy units and terrain on its own.

155. These topics are addressed in two excellent interviews with the 3d MAW G-3, Col Jonathan G. McClot, on 20Mar03-19Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

156. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-Jul03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, p. 6.

157. See ibid., and, for a discussion of FARPs, LtCol David P. Lobik intvw, 24Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

158. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-Jul03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, “G-5 Plans and Exercises.”

159. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 29Jul03.

160. MCCDC, *OIF Summary Report*, p. 18. This is a quote from a video teleconference; members of the Combat Assessment Team routinely attended these VTCs and made shorthand notes.

161. R. T. Johnson intvw; 1 MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, “G-5 Plans and Exercises.”

162. See, for example, MCCDC, *OIF Summary Report*, pp. 20-21.

163. LtCol James W. Western intvw, 20Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

164. Peraino, “Low-Key Leader.” There are other representative discussions of this issue in Mattis intvw no. 1; Lehner intvw; and Moran intvw.

165. 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 3, “Significant Events.”

166. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 2, p. 28.

167. The offload took about 16 days, a few days less than the allotted time. MCCDC, *OIF Summary Report*, p. 55.

168. Ibid., p. 20. See also Milburn intvw no. 2 for comments by the 1 MEF G-5 on the process.

169. For a discussion of this topic, see Plush intvw.

170. Maj Grant A. Williams, “A Marine’s Eye View of Kuwait,” Milinet (an internet service provider that posted news about the military on the web), 27Feb03. This excerpt is from a report originally dated 19Feb03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).


172. Ibid.

173. Col Steven A. Hummer intvw, 13Feb04 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also McKeldin Journal, entry for 7Feb03.

174. BG Cornell A. Wilson intvw, 6Mar03, 3Apr03, 17May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). MCIIC holds a number of other interviews on Consequence Management, along with the task force’s command chronology.
175. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 8Apr03.
177. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 7Feb03.
178. For additional details see, I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, "FutOps Narrative Summary"; McKeldin, Journal; CWO-2 William E. Hutson, "OIF Field History Journal," (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entry for 4 Feb. 2003, hereafter Hutson, Journal. There is a discussion of this phase in the intvw of the I MEF's current operations officer, who pointed out all of the work involved in bringing the I MEF staff together and producing the plan. Col Dennis Judge intvw, 11Aug03 and 4Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Judge intvws no. 1 and no. 2.
179. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), Future Operations Folder, "I MEF ROC Drill, 10 Mar 03"; McKeldin, Journal, entries for 27Feb03 and 10Mar03. For Task Force Tarawa, see Col Reed R. Bonadonna, "Field Historian Journal" (MCHC, Quantico, VA), entries for 2 and 10Mar03, hereafter Bonadonna, Journal. This journal is very well written and gives the reader a good sense of what it was like to participate in OIF as a member of Task Force Tarawa. I recommend it highly both to the general reader and the reader who wants to learn more about Task Force Tarawa. In the run-up to combat operations, subordinate commanders down to the division level would use the terrain model at Doha again to brief General McKiernan and his staff on their plans. MajGen James D. Thurman intvw, 27May03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
180. Mattis intvw no. 1; Hutson Journal, entry for 27Feb03. See also lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, "Narrative Summary," chap 3. The division has written an unusually comprehensive narrative summary from its point of view. See, for example, McKeldin, Journal, entry for 18Mar03; and Reynolds, Journal, entry for 17Mar03. There is a discussion of this phase in the interview of the I MEF's current operations officer, who pointed out all of the work involved in bringing the I MEF staff together and producing the plan. Col Dennis Judge interviews, 11Aug03 and 4Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Judge interviews no. 1 and no. 2.
182. McKiernan intvw no. 1. 
183. "Notes from Address by LtGen Conway." 
184. Ibid.
185. I MEF Sitrep 181800Z to 191759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
186. I MEF Sitrep 171800Z to 181759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); McKeldin Journal, entry for 18 March 2003; I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), command element, sec 2, Current Operations Narrative.
187. Bonadonna, Journal, entry for 1Mar03; Conway intvw.
188. Bonadonna, "Notes from Address by LtGen Conway."
189. Ibid.
190. I MEF Sitrep 181800Z to 191759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
191. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 93; I MEF Sitrep 171800Z to 181759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); McKeldin Journal, entry for 18 March 2003; I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), command element, sec 2, Current Operations Narrative.
Operations, sec 2.
203. I MEF Sitrep 181800Z to 1981759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
204. I MEF Sitrep 191800Z to 201759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
205. See, for example, Kuo, Journal, entry for 20Mar03.
206. Col John C. Coleman intvw, 11Dec03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
208. I MEF Sitrep 191800Z to 201759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); McKeldin, Journal, entry for 20Mar03.
209. Dunford intvw.
210. I MEF Sitrep 191800Z to 201759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); General Mattis’ comment is in the 20-21Mar03 Sitrep.
211. I MEF Sitrep 181800ZMar03 to 191759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers at MCHC, Quantico, VA). On the issue of synchronicity, see 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 2, p. 12, and chap 3, p. 6.
212. 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-Jun03, sec 3, “Sequential Listing of Significant Events.” See also Acosta, Journal, entry for 20May03, containing an excellent overview of the war from the standpoint of the I MEF G-3, Col Larry Brown.
213. See, for example, 3d MAW ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, p. 6; Lobik intvw.
214. GySgt Melba L. Garza intvw, 26May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
216. I MEF Sitrep 201800Z to 211759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
217. I MEF sitreps 201800Z20Mar03 to 211759ZMar03, 211800ZMar03 to 221759ZMar03, and 221800ZMar03 to 231759ZMar03 (Copies in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 4.

Chapter 5

219. Capt Daniel J. Wittnam intvw, 1May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Bonadonna, Journal, entries for 2 and 10Mar03; 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2.
220. Maj Daniel T. Canfield intvw, 12Dec03; LtCol Rickey L. Grabowski intvw, 6Apr03; LtCol Royal P. Mertenson intvw, 7Nov03; Col Ronald L. Bailey intvw, 8May03, hereafter Bailey intvw (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
221. I MEF Sitrep 211800ZMar03 to 221759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), p. 125.
222. I MEF Sitrep 221800ZMar03 to 231759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
223. See West and Smith, March Up, pp. 41, 59; Company Commanders, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, “The Battle of An Nasiriyah,” Marine Corps Gazette, Sep03, pp. 40, 46, hereafter Company Commanders, “Battle of An Nasiriyah.” This is a good general source on the battle.
224. Bailey intvw.
225. See 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2.
226. Natonski intvw no. 2; BGen Richard F. Natonski intvw, 25Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Natonski intvw no. 1; Bailey intvw.
227. See Maj Walker M. Field, “Marine Artillery in the Battle of An Nasiriyah,” Marine Corps Gazette, Jun04, pp. 26, 30; Natonski intvw no. 2. The Bonadonna journal entries for 31 March 2003 and 30 April 2003 discuss his conclusion that the “big problems” were scant intelligence and fire support. See also Gary Livingston, An Nasiriyah: The Fight for the Bridges (Ver- non, NY: Caisson Press, 2004), pp. 172-173, hereafter Livingston, An Nasiriyah. This is a useful book with a number of oral histories.
228. Bailey intvw. Col Bailey elaborated on this interview in a conversation with Col Bonadonna, which was subsequently relayed to the author.
229. Livingston, An Nasiriyah, p. 70.
231. SSgt Lonnie O. Parker intvw, 29Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Natonski intvw no. 2; Parker intvw.
232. Livingston, An Nasiriyah, p. 91; Wittnam intvw; Natonski intvw no. 2; Parker intvw.
233. 1stLt Michael S. Seeley intvw, 3May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
234. Wittnam intvw.
235. Ibid.
237. Parker intvw.
238. Col Reed R. Bonadonna, “A Short History of
Task Force Tarawa,” unpublished manuscript included with Task Force Tarawa ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA).


240. I MEF Sitrep 241800ZMar03 to 251752ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

241. See, for example, Reynolds, Journal, entries for 1Apr03, 3Apr03; Cordesman, Iraq War, p. 390, quoting a report: “Nasiriyah saw the culmination of this confusion over MOUT [military operations in urban terrain]. Commanders were not prepared to go in and clear a town no bigger than Victorville”; Helene Cooper, “U.S. Troops Bypass Cities to Avoid Urban Warfare,” Wall Street Journal, 28Mar03; Bonadonna, Journal, entries for 28Mar03, 31Mar03.


243. McKiernan intvw no. 4. See also West and Smith, March Up, pp. 35, 41, 48, and C. Cooper, “How a Marine Lost His Command.” Cooper discusses Dowdy’s thought process.


247. West and Smith, March Up, p. 47; LtCol Willard A. Buhl intvw, 4Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

248. Conway intvw; Buhl intvw; Natonski intvw no. 2; West and Smith, March Up, p. 45.


250. McKiernan intvw no. 4.


252. McKiernan intvw no. 4.


254. Amos intvw.

255. Mattis intvw no. 1; I MEF Sitrep 241800ZMar03 to 251752ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

256. BGen Edward G. Usher III intvw, 11May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Usher intvw no. 2.

257. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03, sec 2, chap 5.


259. Hummer intvw.

260. Judge intvw no. 1.

261. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 26Mar03; I MEF Sitrep 261800ZMar03 to 271759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), which contains a reference to the suspension of air operations at the Jalibah airfield until 0300Z on that day. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, reports that the skies finally cleared on the morning of 27 March.


263. McKiernan intvw no. 3.

Chapter 6


265. Mattis intvw no. 1.

266. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, executive summary, p. 2.


268. Usher intvw no. 2; I MEF Sitrep 241800ZMar03 to 251752ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

270. BGen Michael R. Lehnert, 7May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). The division G-3 commented on shortages from his perspective in interview with LtCol Clarke R. Lethin, 6Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). For a frank discussion of the MLC and praise for General Lehnert’s innovative leadership, see Hutson, Journal, entry for 25Apr03.

271. Usher intvw no. 2.


273. Mattis intvw no. 1. The stop order is reported in I MEF Sitrep 261800ZMar03 to 271759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

274. See, for example, comments by the I MEF G-3, Larry K. Brown, in Acosta, Journal, entry for 20May03 (describing a postwar symposium in Bahrain and Brown’s comment to the effect that the Army had wanted a 30-day pause), and G. W. Smith intvw no. 2. Atkinson, In the Company of Soldiers, pp. 168, 171, 177, offers a good reflection of thinking by some senior army officers. They had a combination of concerns over supply shortages and the Fedayeen, leading to a natural inclination to wait on reinforcements.


276. Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 245, relies on two basic kinds of sources, Army note takers who were present at the meeting, and his interview with General McKiernan on 8Dec03. The note takers’ records are the only firsthand, contemporary, and currently available, source on the meeting.

277. Quoted in Fontenot, et al., On Point, p. 245; see also Conway intvw.

278. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 28Mar03. The source for the “several days” quote is “CFLCC Update, 26 Mar 03” (OIF CD No. 65, GRC, Quantico, VA).

279. I MEF Sitrep 271800ZMar03 to 281759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).


282. I MEF Sitrep 271800ZMar03 to 281759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

283. I MEF Sitrep 281800ZMar03 to 291759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).


285. 1 MEF Sitrep 271800ZMar03 to 281759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6.

286. 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA).

287. Mattis intvw no. 1.

288. Col Charles J. Quilter II, e-mail to author, 19Feb04 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also I MEF Sitrep 301800ZMar03 to 311759Z Mar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), containing a brief account of the Amos-Mattis meeting: “True to form, 3rd MAW pledged its utmost support to the Div’s planned scheme of maneuver against the Baghdad Div, to include addressing critical resupply needs.”


290. The concept of operations is clearly outlined in I MEF Sitrep 01800ZMar03 to 311759ZMar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 5.

291. Mattis intvw no. 1.

292. Ibid.; Toolan intvw; Conway intvw. It was reported in the press at the time. See, for example, Tony Perry, “Marine Commander Relieved of Duties,” Los Angeles Times, 5Apr03, p. A-15. A later article offered a comprehensive picture of the affair: C. Cooper, “How a Marine Lost His Command.” The History and Museums Division conducted an interview with Col Dowdy in December 2003.

Chapter 7

293. Fontenot, et al., On Point, pp. 49-50, provides an excellent discussion of this topic, which is the basis for this paragraph.

294. See Blackman intvw; 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 3.

295. McKiernan intvw no. 1. For further discussion, see for example, 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC,
Quantico, VA), chap 3, p. 13; and Atkinson, *In the Company of Soldiers*, p. 26, quoting Army Brig. General Benjamin C. Freakley, the assistant division commander for operations of the 101st Airborne Division; West and Smith, *March Up*, p. 186, also discuss urban tactics.

296. See Reynolds, Journal, entries for 3-4Apr03; Col Thomas C. Latsko intvw, 22Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).


298. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 3, pp. 19-20. For information on Urban Warrior, see Randolph Gangle intvw, 18Oct02 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Gangle intvw.

299. Gangle intvw.

300. Mattis intvw no. 1.

301. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6; West and Smith, *March Up*, p. 207.

302. McKiernan intvws no. 1 and no. 4; Capt Matthew H. Bazarian intvw, 12Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), containing the comment that during Internal Look, General McKiernan made it clear he did not want to have two commands splitting Baghdad.

303. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, future operations command chronology and future operations folder, “CG Guidance/discussion with OPT 25 Mar 03”; Buhl intvw.

304. McKiernan intvw no. 4.

305. McKiernan intvw no. 1. For a slightly different view, see Acosta, Journal, entry for 20May03, reporting a briefing by the I MEF G-3 and his statement that “about a week before the war began, COMCFLCC gave I MEF the mission to secure eastern Baghdad.” This is probably a slightly garbled reference to the branch plan.

306. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA) sec 2, future operations; Fontenot, et al., *On Point*, chapter 6 offers a detailed discussion of the Army’s movements.

311. Milburn intvw no. 2.

312. For an excellent discussion of the BUA, see Maj Robert K. Casey intvw, 27Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). There is an equally good description of how the CFLCC staff worked in R. T. Johnson intvw. The author attended numerous BUA’s in March and April 2003 and heard Generals McKiernan and Blackman talk about how they wanted them to work. See also Blackman intvw.

313. Judge intvws no. 1 and 2.

314. There are already numerous books and articles that address the subject of embedding. An excellent example is Atkinson, *In the Company of Soldiers*. On the Marine Corps side, there is Capt Dan McSweeney, “Clowns to the Left of Me,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Nov03, pp. 46-48.

315. I MEF Sitrep 051800ZApr03 to 061759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

316. West and Smith, *March Up*, p. 207. This was certainly consistent with General McKiernan’s command style, which was to tell commanders what he wanted them to do and then leave the rest up to them.

317. McKiernan intvw no. 4; Fontenot, et al., *On Point*, chapter 6 offers a detailed discussion of the Army’s movements.

318. P. J. Kennedy intvw.

319. I MEF Sitrep 051800ZApr03 to 061759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

320. I MEF Sitrep 061800ZApr03 to 071759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

321. I MEF Sitrep 071800ZApr03 to 081759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

322. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 41.

326. I MEF Sitrep 071800ZApr03 to 081759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

327. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 51.

328. McKiernan, Journal, entry for 6Apr03; Judge intvw no. 1; Hummer intvw.

329. 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA) sec 2, chap 6, p. 49; I MEF Sitrep 061800ZApr03 to 071759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

332. I MEF Sitrep 071800ZApr03 to 081759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

334. The “digital divide” is explored in some detail in MCCDC, *OIF Summary Report*. 

335. McKiernan intvw no. 2.

331. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 50.
332. Capt Brian B. Smalley intvw, 3May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
336. I MEF Sitrep 081800ZApr03 to 091759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); Hummer intvw.
337. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 53; McKeldin, Journal, entry for 9Apr03; Fontenot, et al., *On Point*, pp. 337-338, quotes a good firsthand account.
338. Reynolds journal, entry for 9Apr03.
339. Dunford intvw; lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6.
340. McKiernan intvw no. 4. See also G. W. Smith intvw no. 1, especially the comment that the Coalition spent a lot of time and effort working out how it would break things but not a lot on how it would put things back together.
343. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 10Apr03; I MEF Sitrep 091800ZApr03 to 101759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
344. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 65.
345. I MEF Sitrep 091800ZApr03 to 101759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
346. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 6, p. 65.
347. See, for example, Jehl, "Inspector's Report Says Hussein Expected Guerrilla War." This does not mean a guerrilla war was carefully planned.
348. 2d MEB ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, Text of Cmdr, MarForPac, "I MEF (Rein) Unit Award Recommendation for Presidential Unit Citation," covering the period 21Mar-24Apr03.
349. Mazetti, "Lt General James Conway." See also Conway intvw for a report of his discussions with CFLCC on the north. For an excellent discussion of the strategic dimension, see McKiernan intvw no. 1.
351. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 10Apr03; I MEF Sitreps 081800ZApr03 to 091759ZApr03 and 091800ZApr03 to 101759ZApr03 (Copies in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
352. I MEF Sitrep 071800ZApr03 to 081759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
353. West and Smith, *March Up*, p. 247, report that in September 2002, General Mattis ordered a contingency plan for a quick-moving task force to assist the Kurds if Turkey did not agree to open a northern front.
354. I MEF Sitrep 091800ZApr03 to 101759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA); lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 7. Except where indicated, the rest of this chapter is based on these two sources. The oral histories at MCHC offer additional detail, such as that of Capt Brian B. Smalley on 3 May 2003, who provides a vivid description of this operation from a company command's point of view.
355. Amos intvw.
356. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 12Apr03; Conway intvw.
357. I MEF Sitrep 121800ZApr03 to 131759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
358. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 7, p. 21.
359. McKeldin, Journal, entry for 12Apr03.
360. I MEF Sitreps 121800ZApr03 to 131759ZApr03, 141800ZApr03 to 151759ZApr03 (Copies in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
361. I MEF Sitrep 181800ZApr03 to 191759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
362. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 8, pp. 4, 6, discuss this phase of the operation.
363. Ibid.; and Reynolds, Journal, entry for 4May03. Col Christopher C. Conlin came to much the same conclusion in his article, "What do you do for an encore?" *Marine Corps Gazette*, Sep04, pp. 74, 80.
364. lstMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 8, p. 6.
365. Taken from the I MEF Casualty Report as of
14 May 03, reported in Acosta, Journal, entry for 20 May 03. These statistics include the casualties from the British division (20 KIA, 36 WIA). For the other MSCs, the breakdown was 1stMarDiv (22 KIA, 188 WIA); 1st FSSG (2 KIA, 2 WIA); 3d MAW (11 KIA, 8 WIA); Task Force Tarawa (19 KIA, 58 WIA).

Chapter 9

367. MajGen Henry P. Osman intvw, 19 Nov 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
368. Ibid. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 186, 195, is an excellent potted history of this campaign within a campaign. For information on Provide Comfort, as well as general background, see LtCol Ronald J. Brown, Humanitarian Operations in Northern Iraq, 1991: With Marines in Operation Provide Comfort (Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, 1995).
369. Jones intvw.
370. Col Robert L. Hayes III intvw, 19 Nov 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Osman intvw; Zinni intvw.
371. Hayes intvw, LtCol James E. Bacchus intvw, 20 Nov 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Bacchus intvw.
372. David Josar, “Marines, Army to Coordinate Humanitarian Aid,” European Stars and Stripes, 30 Mar 03.
373. Bacchus intvw; Notes on meeting with Col Keith A. Lawless, 25 Nov 03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Lawless notes. For the MCLC, reach back worked well, validating a 21st century model for staffing.
374. Lawless notes.
375. Gen H. P. Osman sitrep to Gen J. P. Abizaid, 7 Apr 03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
376. Bacchus intvw.
377. Osman sitrep for 24 Mar 03.
379. Lawless notes.
380. Osman intvw.
381. Osman sitreps for 12, 13 Apr 03.
382. See Col John P. Holden intvw, 9 Jun 03 (Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC). At the time, Col Holden was serving as the deputy chief of staff for plans for the Sixth Fleet.
383. Col Andrew P. Frick intvw, 12 Sep 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
385. Frick intvw. Colon, “A Certain Force,” describes the command arrangement in some detail and is generally a very good source like a command chronology narrative. It tracks closely with my other basic source on 26th MEU, the narrative summary in the command chronology, 1 Jan 03-30 Jun 03, but includes more detail.
386. 1st Lt Sunny-James M. Risler intvw, 15 Oct 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
387. Sgt Bryan L. Gilstrap intvw, 16 Oct 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
390. Frick intvw.
391. Osman sitrep for 22 Apr 03.
392. Jones intvw.

Chapter 10

393. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, p. 45. As noted, this is a great source, full of direct quotations, without the “happy” feel of many British and American lessons-learned reports.
394. McKiernan intvw no. 1. See Huelfer intvw for evidence of early consideration of this option by CFLCC planners.
396. R. T. Johnson intvw; Col Jeremy M. F. Robbins RM, intvw, 16 Apr 03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Murray and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 135-136. Murray and Scales place the relationship between the British and the Americans in the Gulf in a larger context, discussing developments over the preceding decade. A recent arrival on the bookshelves, John Keegan’s The Iraq War (New York, NY: Knopf, 2004) is said to contain useful data on the British division. Excerpts from the book on I MEF, however, contain inaccuracies and add little to the literature.
398. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 22 Apr 03.
399. GOC Directive 1, 3 Feb 03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
Working Papers, (MCHC, Quantico, VA). House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, p. 195, describes the British “manoeuverist” approach in much the same terms as FMFM 1: “long at the heart of British defense doctrine it is ‘one in which shattering the enemy’s cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel, is paramount.’”

400. See, for examples, G. W. Smith intvw no. 2 and Hummer intvw.

401. Cmdr 1(UK) Armd Div’s Diary, entry for 7Mar03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), hereafter Commander’s Diary.


404. Ibid., p. 93.

405. Ibid., p. 94.

406. MajGen Robin V. Brims intvw, 10May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). To be sure, there were one or two instances of friction between British and American officers.

407. For an excellent discussion of this topic from the British point of view, see House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, v. 1, pp. 193, 195. This report points out that the distance from being a maneuverist to espousing effects-based planning is not far, they are certainly consistent.

408. See, for example, Capt Tracey A. Morris intvw, 30Mar03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).

409. Latsko intvw; LtCol Edward C. Quinonez intvw, 12May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). See also Ministry of Defence, Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future (London, UK: 11Dec03), p. 34: “the implications of maintaining contact and congruence with US technological and doctrinal advances should continue to be assessed.”

410. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 22Apr03.

411. Jones intvw.


414. Commander’s Diary, entry for 20Mar03. The implication was that the Iraqi missiles were fired in retaliation for the U.S. missile strikes against Baghdad the night before.


416. Commander’s Diary, entry for 22Mar03.


418. Commander’s Diary, entry for 23Mar03.


420. Ibid.

421. Latsko intvw.

422. Max Hastings, “The real story is how we won,” Sunday Telegraph (London), 7Sep03, p. 4; Murray and Scales, Iraq War, pp. 144, 153, gives a good overview of the situation in Basrah.


424. Ibid.; Commander’s Diary, entry for 26Mar03


426. Commander’s Diary, entry for 26Mar03.

427. LtCol Donald C. Wilson intvw, 22Apr03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA), described the working of British intelligence.

428. See also Latsko intvw.

429. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 98.

430. Commander’s Diary, entry for 4Apr03.


432. Commander’s Diary, entry for 6Apr03. See also I MEF sitrep 061800ZApr03 to 071759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

433. Brims intvw; Latsko intvw.

434. Murray and Scales, Iraq War, p. 152.

435. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, pp. 149-150.

436. Ibid., p. 62.


438. Ibid.

439. I MEF sitrep 061800ZApr03 to 071759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

440. House of Commons, Lessons of Iraq, p. 156. This led into a somewhat philosophical discussion of whether the division’s actions and effects desired by the division were really in sync. The point was that the division had won the war, but was anyone on the British side set up to win the peace?

Chapter 11


442. Benson, “Brief at Naval War College.” Benson was the senior planner at CFCCC. See, for example, Bacevich, “Modern Major General,” p. 129.

443. Moran intvw. See also G. W. Smith intvw no. 2; BG Gen Stephen Hawkins, USA (CG of CJTF-IV) intvw,
14Mar03 (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC); Benson, “Brief at Naval War College.”

444. LtCol Brian K. McCravy intvw, 6Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
445. G. W. Smith intvw no. 2.
448. I MEF sitrep 141800ZApr03 to 151759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA), announcing the upcoming meeting.
449. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA) “I MEF Sequel (“Post Hostility Operations” to I MEF OpOrd 1003V “Basic Order” and “FutOps Command Chronology,” Jan-Jun03.
450. I MEF sitrep 111800ZApr03 to 121759ZApr03 (Copy in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).
451. Margaret Warner, “A Marine’s View,” Public Broadcasting System Online News Hour, 26Sep03. Good sources on the division during this period are 1stMarDiv ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, chap 8; BGen John F. Kelly, “Tikrit, South to Babylon,” Marine Corps Gazette, Feb-Apr04.
453. LtCol Patrick J. Malay intvw, 23Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
454. Reynolds, Journal, entry for 4May03.
455. See, for example, 2dLt Glen J. Bayliff intvw, 4May03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); LtCol Christopher C. Conlin intvw, 24Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); LtCol Andrew Pappas intvw, 20Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); Maj Joseph A. Cabell intvw, 28Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). LtCol Conlin, “mayor” of An Najaf, described his experiences in that city, while LtCol Pappas, head of a counter-insurgency task force, expressed considerable frustration at the lack of support from CPA in restoring the infrastructure. Criticism of ORHA and CPA was almost universal among Marines interviewed by field historians. See, for additional examples, Maj David P. Holahan intvw, 6Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA); LtCol Robert O. Sinclair intvw, 7Nov03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA). Both LtCol Conlin and Maj Cabell commented on how useful the reservists’ skills, and temperament, were.
456. For a balanced discussion of this policy, see Peter Slevin, “Wrong Turn at a Postwar Crossroads,” The Washington Post, 20Nov03, p. A-1. This was a Pentagon decision, opposed by many in the field, including General Franks. Franks, American Soldier, p. 441.
457. I MEF ComdC, Jan-Jun03 (GRC, Quantico, VA), sec 2, “FutOps Command Chronology.”
459. Pappas intvw.
460. Maj Steven B. Manber intvw, 21Aug03 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
465. BGen Ronald S. Coleman intvw, 20Apr04 (MCHC, Quantico, VA).
466. Ibid.
Appendix A

Data Collection and Lessons Learned Process

Although history is not about lessons learned, even an overview of the first phase of the Iraq War would be incomplete without a few words about data collection. Not only did various teams collect a great deal of material that may be of use to future historians, but the process itself has an interesting development, not to mention some of the lessons learned themselves.

There was a time, especially after the combat phase, when it seemed that not enough tent space and computer terminals existed for all of the lessons-learned teams in theater. The senior lessons-learned team was from Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, tasked by the Pentagon to produce the official joint report. The Army had at least two lessons-learned groups in theater, including one whose officers produced the admirable preliminary Army history of Operation Iraqi Freedom, titled On Point (published by the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth in 2004). The Marine Corps had the combat assessment team from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico, Virginia. Then there were the various groups of field historians, embedded with “supported” commands. Once deployed, Marine historians worked closely with historians from other branches, especially their counterparts from the Army and the joint history staffs, as well as the Marine assessors and, to a lesser extent, other Services. Though there was a distinct pecking order among these various groups, with historians generally coming from organizations with relatively little bureaucratic clout, most got along well. Data was usually shared freely across the board. There has probably never been so much available, retrievable, and useful historical data.¹

The recent history of the Marine assessors goes back to Desert Storm, when battle assessment teams deployed from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command to theater to conduct interviews and generally gather data to drive postwar analyses and complement the young Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, described as “a passive system,” which relied on units to report their observations. Most of their interviews were anonymous, which limited their usefulness to historians. Their reports tended to go into established “channels,” that is, they did not necessarily turn into front-burner action items. Today, more than 250 four-inch binders of Desert Storm material sit quietly on the shelves of the Gray Research Center at Quantico, and Marine Corps Lessons Learned System is largely unknown to many parts of the Marine Corps public. After 11 September, Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, Jr., commanding Marine Corps Combat Development Command, ordered the creation of a combat assessment team that deployed to theater for Afghanistan to conduct data during, not after, combat operations and to turn it around quickly, in useful form, to the advocates, that is, representatives of the various communities of operators in the Marine Corps. Afghanistan was a useful opportunity to discover good and bad ways to learn lessons, and the result, less than a year later, was a sophisticated operation for the Iraq War led by Colonel Philip J. Exner, a dynamic thinker and operator out of the Combat Development Command’s Studies and Analysis Division. He began by surveying the process:

We . . . looked at past “lessons learned” efforts. Both authors and audiences were somewhat skeptical of the value of traditional approaches, which usually involved publication of a large tome or collection of documents. . . . One of the other services published an after action for a more recent operations that consisted of a 5,000-page main report with an 800-page executive summary and nearly 100,000 pages of appendices. Such monumental efforts often miss the very change agents who are essential to converting lessons into lessons learned because the action officers and decision-makers are often overwhelmed with information and chronically short of time.²

With the support of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Exner worked to embed his assessors in the operating forces for the duration, in much the same way that journalists and historians were embedded, so that they could develop better access and understanding and collect better data. The data, in the form of interviews and surveys, went into a massive database in Quantico that was searchable and, to
some extent, linked with data collected by historians working alongside the assessors. The assessment teams gave briefings to general officers, posted their findings on Web sites, and produced timely, reader-friendly reports for the advocates. For the more general Marine Corps public, Combat Development Command published the teams' findings in mercifully brief summary reports that initially were limited to official use but will no doubt find their ways into libraries and research centers before long.

This is not to say that the operators themselves neglected the after-action process. What was probably the first comprehensive “hot wash” took place in Bahrain at MarCent headquarters on 20 May 2003. The highlight was a blow-by-blow, chronological review of the operation by the I MEF operations officer, Colonel Larry K. Brown. The next major evolution was sponsored by the Marine Corps Association at Quantico on 29 July 2003 and featured briefings by Generals James Conway, James Mattis, James Amos, and Richard Natonski. General Conway’s brief was a very good “executive summary” of the operation. Some of the specific objectives learned, covered on that day, were:

The utility of the medical surgical units at the front; the use of SAPI, or small arms protective inserts, for the flak jackets; the positive impact of the embedded media; the concept of combat maintenance being performed with units on the fly; and the merit in organizing large, flexible combat battalions. Challenges [that is, problem areas] included . . . having two Marine Corps supply systems (ATLASS I and ATLASS II), integration with special operations forces, casualty reporting, combat identification to prevent fratricide, and the need to sharpen Coalition intelligence sharing.

A few weeks later, on 4 September 2003 there was another conference along the same lines, the Marine Corps Association and U.S. Naval Institute Forum 2003, which featured talks by General Mattis and retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, who was not afraid to strike out on his own and offer some pithy comments about how he saw the situation in Iraq. On 4 September, and then again in May 2004, Zinni criticized the Bush Administration’s policy in language a drill instructor might have used; he said he remembered the official “garbage and lies” during the Vietnam era and asked if it was happening again. Zinni also offered a thoughtful analysis of what had gone wrong, the “10 mistakes” that “history is going to record.” He attacked the reasons for going to war, arguing that the United States had successfully contained Saddam and that it needed first to resolve the conflict between Israel and Palestine. “I could not believe what I was hearing about the benefits of this strategic move. That the road to Jerusalem led through Baghdad, when just the opposite is true.” He went on to make a number of points about Phase IV, citing the inadequate planning at both the Pentagon and CentCom levels, the inadequate number of troops for occupation duties, and the, to him amazing, decision to disband the Iraqi Army.

Marines are likely to remember the observations about Phase III that emerged from these sessions. The first had to do with maneuver warfare and the Marine air-ground task force concept. There was general agreement that the Iraq War had revalidated Marine doctrine in at least two respects, speed and organization. The I Marine Expeditionary Force was organized and equipped for speed. It had moved much faster than the enemy; the enemy never had time to visualize the outlines of our “observation/orientation/decision/action” loop, let alone get inside it. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing had remarkable new precision technologies (and new doctrines to go with them) to enable it to fight with unprecedented effectiveness. The wing and the 1st Force Service Support Group had not just supported division, which was itself organized into mobile, independent combat teams; they also had been maneuver elements in their own right, integrated into the overall scheme of maneuver. With the Marine Logistics Command’s and the 1st Force Service Support Group’s contributions, and the wing’s willingness to switch from the deep battle to close air support to cargo missions on short notice, the division had been able to go the distance, to project Marine power on the ground far from salt-water. This was another way of saying that Operation Iraqi Freedom had revalidated the concept of the “MEF single battle.” The I Marine Expeditionary Force had demonstrated, yet again, that the whole was greater than the sum of its parts, whether the issue was deep fires, rear area security, or keeping the supplies flowing to the front.

Conclusions about Phase IV were more cautious. No one contradicted General Zinni and claimed there had been elaborate preparations for Phase IV. Nowhere in CentCom or Coalition Forces Land Component Command had there been a plan for Phase IV that was like the plan for Phase III, let alone all of the preparations that accompanied it, including the cross talk during its development, the many rehearsals of concept drills, and the exchange of liaison officers.
There were the arguments, like General Zinni’s, for bringing many more American troops to theater for occupation service. He wanted them to be on hand before anyone crossed the line of departure, available to stabilize the country as soon as the fighting ended. A corollary advanced by some was that the Coalition could have moved more slowly from Kuwait to Baghdad in order to secure the objectives that had just been seized. Still, General Mattis repeated his assertion that he had had the right force mix on the ground in the summer of 2003: a battalion for each province, some aviation, and not much by way of mechanized assets. It was not necessarily how many troops there were on the ground, but what their skills were and what they were being told to do. That was why he had sent his mechanized Marines home in May. The mostly infantry Marines who stayed through the summer quickly proved their ability to shift and learn on the fly, and they did a more than creditable job as interim occupiers in the southern half of Iraq during the relatively brief period between the end of combat operations and their return home. Like General Mattis, at least one other senior I MEF officer stressed that one of the keys to success was getting the timing right, the longer the occupiers stayed, the greater the challenges would become. The implication was that the Marines succeeded in the short term but that any occupier would face problems in the medium and long term.8

Generals Earl Hailston, James Conway, James Mattis, and Anthony Zinni made one overarching point that will find favor with historians. It was that since the Iraqi military was comparatively weak, and since every contingency is unique in its own way, it is dangerous to over generalize from the Iraq War, to imagine that the next war will necessarily be like the last.


2. MCCDC, OIF Summary Report, p. 5. For further information, see MCCDC, “Memorandum for the Commandant of the Marine Corps/Battle Assessment Proposal,” 19Jan91, and Officer-in-Charge, MarCent Assessment Team, “Letter of Instruction (Draft),” 3Dec01 (Copies in Reynolds Working Papers, MCHC, Quantico, VA).

3. Acosta, Journal, entry for 20May03.


5. Glasgow, “Editorial.”


7. The focus here is on Marine lessons learned. The report of the Joint Forces Command’s Joint Center for Lessons Learned highlighted achievements in the joint arena and, except for the issue of fratricide, was generally complimentary about the “jointness” of OIF. See, for example, Vernon Loeb, “Pentagon Credits Success in Iraq War to Joint Operations,” The Washington Post, 3Oct03, p. A-15.

8. This is not necessarily an argument against medium- or long-term occupations. See, for example, Gunther intvw. With respect to troop strengths, some lessons-learned analysts disagreed with Gen Mattis’ point of view and argued that especially for Phase IV the force had to be much heavier than it had been; the Army Chief of Staff, Gen Eric Shinseki, made the famous comment that it would take some 400,000 troops to occupy Iraq, and that it would have been better to sacrifice some speed in order to have deployed more force. A slower, heavier force might have gotten the job done better than the fast, light force that conquered Iraq in 21 days; the argument is generally inconsistent with current Marine thinking about how to fight the Marine air-ground task force, is that since the Iraqis were unable to put up much of a fight, it would have been better to proceed more methodically, securing and occupying terrain as the Coalition moved forward. This is one of the general implications of Fontenot, et al., On Point, and of the 3rd Infantry Division’s after-action report. See, for example, John L. Lumpkin and Dafna Linzer, “Army: Plan for Iraq Flawed,” Hartford Journal, 28Nov03, p. A-1. Two thoughtful articles that explore the background to Phase IV in more depth are George Packer, “Letter from Baghdad: War after the War; What Washington Doesn’t See in Iraq,” New Yorker, 24Nov03, pp. 59, 85; Tom Donnelly and Gary Schmitt, “The Right Fight Now,” The Washington Post, 26Oct03, p. B-1. Packer’s article addresses the general topic of postwar reconstructions in the 21st century, and concludes that (a) it is a lengthy process, (b) it is better when internationalized, and (c) the foundation of success is security. He then goes on to discuss the Pentagon’s initial decision not to plan for a long-term occupation. Donnelly and Schmitt highlight the Marines’ Small Wars Manual, which they say is as good a guide as any to postwar reconstruction.
Appendix B

Command List

U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command
March–November 2003*

Commanding General: LtGen Earl B. Hailston
Chief of Staff: Col Peter T. Miller
G-1: Col Richard B. Harris
G-2: Col William E. Rizzio
G-3: Col Timothy C. Wells
G-4: Col Philip N. Yff
G-5: Col Timothy L. Hunter
G-6: Col Kevin B. Jordan
SJA: LtCol Robert E. Pinder
Comptroller: Col Robert J. Herkenham

Combined/Joint Task Force-Consequence Management
Commanding General: BGen Cornell A. Wilson

Marine Logistics Command
Commanding General: BGen Michael R. Lehnert

Special Purpose MAGTF
Commanding General: BGen Ronald S. Coleman

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced)
Commanding General: LtGen James T. Conway
Deputy: MajGen Keith J. Stalder
Chief of Staff: Col John C. Coleman
G-1: Col William J. Hartig
G-2: Col Alan R. Baldwin
Col James R. Howcroft
G-3: Col Larry K. Brown
G-4: Col Matthew W. Blackledge
G-5: Col Christopher J. Gunther
Col Anthony L. Jackson
G-6: Col George J. Allen (to 15 June)
Col Marshall I. Considine (after 30 June)
SJA: Col William D. Durrett
Surgeon: Captain Joel A. Lees, USN
Chaplain: Captain John S. Gwudz, USN
I MEF Headquarters Group: Col John T. Cunnings
15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)
Commanding Officer: Col Thomas D. Waldhauser
24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC)
Commanding Officer: Col Richard P. Mills (to 6 June)
Col Ronald J. Johnson (after 6 June)
11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Element (-)
Commanding Officer: Col Anthony M. Haslam

**Marine Ground Combat Element**

1st Marine Division (Reinforced)
Commanding General: MajGen James N. Mattis
Assistant Division Commander: BGen John F. Kelly
Chief of Staff: Col Bennett W. Saylor
Col Joseph F. Dunford

1st Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 1)
Commanding Officer: Col Joseph D. Dowdy (to 4 April)
Col John A. Toolan (after 4 April)

5th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 5)
Commanding Officer: Col Joseph F. Dunford (to 23 May)
Col R. Stewart Navarre (after 23 May)

7th Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 7)
Commanding Officer: Col Steven A. Hummer

11th Marine Regiment (-)(Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Michael P. Marletto

2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa)
Commanding General: BGen Richard F. Natonski
Chief of Staff: Col James W. Smoot

2d Marine Regiment (-) (Reinforced) (Regimental Combat Team 2)
Commanding Officer: Col Ronald L. Bailey

**Marine Aviation Combat Element**

3d Marine Aircraft Wing
Commanding General: MajGen James F. Amos
Assistant Wing Commander: BGen Terry G. Robling
Chief of Staff: Col Gerald A. Yingling, Jr.

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Randolph D. Alles

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Mark R. Saverese

Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Stuart L. Knoll

Marine Aircraft Group 29 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Robert E. Milstead, Jr.

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Michael C. Anderson
Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Ronnell R. McFarland
Marine Aircraft Group 39 (-)(Reinforced)
Commanding Officer: Col Richard W. Spender
Col Kenneth P. Gardiner

**Marine Combat Service Support Element**

1st Force Service Support Group
Commanding General: BGen Edward G. Usher III
BGen Richard S. Kramlich
Deputy Commander: Col John L. Sweeney, Jr.
Chief of Staff: Col Darrell L. Moore

Combat Service Support Group 16 (Headquarters Elements)
Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael J. Taylor

Combat Service Support Group 11 (Brigade Service Support Group G 1)
Commanding Officer: Col John J. Pomfret
Col Charles L. Hudson

Combat Service Support Battalion 13 (4th Landing Support Battalion)
Commanding Officer: LtCol Michael D. Malone

Combat Service Support Group 14 (4th Supply Battalion)
Commanding Officer: Col John T. Larson

Combat Service Support Group 15 (1st Supply Battalion)
Commanding Officer: Col Bruce E. Bissett

Transportation Support Group
Commanding Officer: Col David G. Reist

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group
Commanding Officer: RAdm (UH) Charles R. Kubic, USN

**United Kingdom Forces**

1 Armoured Division (UK) (-)(Reinforced)
Commanding General: MajGen Robin V. Brims
Chief of Staff: Col Patrick Marriott

7 Armored Brigade (British Army)
Commanding Officer: Brig Graham Binns

16 Air Assault Brigade (British Army)
Commanding Officer: Brig Jacko Page

3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines (-)
Commanding Officer: Brig Jim Dutton

*Includes billets in units which served in theater for part but not all of the period covered. Basic sources are MarAdmin 507/03, various versions, Oct-Dec 03, with “Modifications to the I MEF Presidential Unit Citation Unit Listing,” and unit command chronologies.*
Appendix C:

Unit List

U.S. Marines In Operation Iraqi Freedom
March-November 2003*

U.S. Marine Forces, Central Command [USMarCent]

Command Element
Combined Joint Task Force-Consequence Management [CJTF-CM]
Marine Corps Logistics Command [MarLogCom]
Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force [SPMAGTF]

I Marine Expeditionary Force (Reinforced) [I MEF]

Command Element

15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [15th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 1st Marines [BLT 2/1]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 (Reinforced) [HMM-161]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 15 [MSSG-15]

24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [24th MEU (SOC)]

Battalion Landing Team 2d Battalion, 2d Marines [BLT 2/2]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 263 (Reinforced) [HMM-263]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 24 [MSSG-24]

Task Force Yankee [TF Yankee]

11th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Command Element (-) [11th MEU, CmdEle]
2d Battalion, 6th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [2d Bn, 6th Mar]
Sensitive Site Team Number 3, U.S. Army [SenSiteTm #3, USA]
75th Exploitation Task Force, U.S. Army [75th ExpTF, USA]
Company C, 478th Engineer Battalion, U.S. Army [Co C, 478th EngrBn, USA]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [I MEF HqGru]

6th Communications Battalion (-) [6th CommBn]
9th Communications Battalion (-) [9th CommBn]
1st Radio Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st RadBn]
1st Intelligence Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st IntelBn]
1st Force Reconnaissance Company (-) (Reinforced) [1st ForReconCo]
I Marine Expeditionary Force Liaison Element [I MEF LsnEle]
3d Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [3d ANGLICO]
4th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company [4th ANGLICO]
3d Civil Affairs Group [3d CAG]
4th Civil Affairs Group [4th CAG]
Marine Ground Combat Element

1st Marine Division (Reinforced) [1st MarDiv]

Headquarters Battalion [HqBn]

1st Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 1 [1st Mar/RCT-1]

Headquarters Company [HqCo]
3d Battalion, 1st Marines [3d Bn, 1st Mar]
1st Battalion, 4th Marines [1st Bn, 1st Mar]
2d Battalion, 23d Marines [2d Bn, 23d Mar]
2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [2d LARBn]

5th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 5 [5th Mar/RCT-5]

Headquarters Company [HqCo]
1st Battalion, 5th Marines [1st Bn, 5th Mar]
2d Battalion, 5th Marines [2d Bn, 5th Mar]
3d Battalion, 5th Marines [3d Bn, 5th Mar]
2d Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d TkBn]
1st Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [1st LARBn]
Company C, 4th Combat Engineer Battalion [Co C, 4th CbtEngrBn]

7th Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 7 [7th Mar/RCT-7]

Headquarters Company [HqCo]
1st Battalion, 7th Marines [1st Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 7th Marines [3d Bn, 7th Mar]
3d Battalion, 4th Marines [3d Bn, 4th Mar]
1st Tank Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st TkBn]
3d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, (-) (Reinforced) [3d LARBn]

11th Marines (-) (Reinforced) [11th Mar]

Headquarters Battery (-) [HqBtry]
Detachment, Headquarters Battery, 10th Marines [Det, HqBtry, 10th Mar]
1st Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [1st Bn, 11th Mar]
2d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [2d Bn, 11th Mar]
3d Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [3d Bn, 11th Mar]
5th Battalion, 11th Marines (-) [5th Bn, 11th Mar]
1st Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st CbtEngrBn]
2d Combat Engineer Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d CbtEngrBn]
1st Reconnaissance Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [1st ReconBn]
2d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [2d AABn]
3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [3d AABn]
4th Assault Amphibian Battalion [4th AABn]
2d Radio Battalion [2d RadBn]
Military Police Company, 4th Marine Division [MPCo, 4th MarDiv]
Communications Company, 4th Marine Division [CommCo, 4th MarDiv]
Battery I, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry I, 3d Bn, 10th Mar]
Battery R, 5th Battalion, 10th Marines [Btry R, 5th Bn, 10th Mar]
2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Task Force Tarawa) [2d MEB TF Tarawa]

Command Element
- Detachment, II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters Group [Det, II MEF HqGrp]
- II Marine Expeditionary Force Liaison Element [II MEF LsnEle]
- 2d Battalion, 6th Marines (Originally with Task Force Yankee) [2d Bn, 6th Mar]
- Company C, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion [Co C, 4th ReconBn]
- 2d Force Reconnaissance Company [2d ForReconCo]
- 2d Intelligence Battalion (-) [2d IntelBn]

2d Marines (-) (Reinforced)/Regimental Combat Team 2 [2d Mar/RCT-2]
- Headquarters Company [HqCo]
- 1st Battalion, 2d Marines [1st Bn, 2d Mar]
- 3d Battalion, 2d Marines [3d Bn, 2d Mar]
- 2d Battalion, 8th Marines [2d Bn, 8th Mar]
- 1st Battalion, 10th Marines [1st Bn, 10th Mar]
- Battery F, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines [Bty F, 2d Bn, 10th Mar]
- Company A, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion [Co A, 2d CbtEngrBn]
- Company A, 8th Tank Battalion [Co A, 8th TkBn]
- Company C, 2d Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion [Co C, 2d LARBn]
- Company A, 2d Assault Amphibious Battalion [Co A, 2d AABn]
- Company A, 2d Reconnaissance Battalion (Reinforced) [Co A, 2d ReconBn]

Marine Aviation Combat Element

3d Marine Aircraft Wing [3d MAW]
- Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3 [MWHS-3]
- Detachment, Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 2 [Det, MWHS-2]

Marine Aircraft Group 11 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-11]
- Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 11 (-) (Reinforced) [MALS-11]
- Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14 (-) [MALS-14]
- Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 31 [Det, MALS-31]
- Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 352 (-) (Reinforced) [VMGR-352]
- Detachment, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 234 [Det, VMGR-234]
- Detachment, Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron 452 [Det, VMGR-452]
- Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 232 [VMFA-232]
- Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 251 [VMFA-251]
- Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 121 [VMFA(AW)-121]
- Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 225 [VMFA(AW)-225]
- Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadron 533 [VMFA(AW)-533]
- Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 1 [VMAQ-1]
- Marine Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron 2 [VMAQ-2]

Marine Aircraft Group 13 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-13]
- Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13 (-) [MALS-13]
- Marine Attack Squadron 211 (-) [VMA-211]
- Marine Attack Squadron 214 [VMA-214]
- Marine Attack Squadron 223 (-) [VMA-223]
Marine Attack Squadron 311 [VMA-311]
Marine Attack Squadron 542 [VMA-542]
Marine Aircraft Group 16 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-16]
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16 (-) [MALS-16]
Detachment, Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26 [Det, MALS-26]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 163 [HMM-163]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 462 [HMH-462]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 465 [HMH-465]

Marine Aircraft Group 29 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-29]
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 29 (-) [MALS-29]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 162 [HMM-162]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 365 (-) [HMM-365]
Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464 [HMH-464]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 269 [HMLA-269]

Marine Wing Support Group 37 (-) (Reinforced) [MWSG-37]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 [MWSS-271]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 [MWSS-272]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 [MWSS-371]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 [MWSS-372]
Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 [MWSS-373]
Company C, 1st Battalion, 24th Marines [Co C, 1st Bn, 24th Mar]
Detachment, Military Police, 4th Marine Air Wing [Det, MP, 4th MAW]

Marine Air Control Group 38 (-) (Reinforced) [MACG-38]
Air Traffic Control Detachment B, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 [ATCDet B, MTACS-2]
Marine Air Control Squadron 1 (Reinforced) [MACS-1]
Detachment, Marine Air Control Squadron 2 [Det, MACS-2]
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 28 (-) [MWCS-28]
Marine Wing Communications Squadron 38 (Reinforced) [MWCS-38]
Detachment, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 28 [Det, MTACS-28]
Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 38 (Reinforced) [MTACS-38]
Detachment, Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 48 [Det, MTACS-48]
Marine Air Support Squadron 1 [MASS-1]
Marine Air Support Squadron 3 (Reinforced) [MASS-3]
Battery B, 2d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [Btry B, 2d LAADBn]
3d Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion [3d LAADBn]
Detachments, Marine Air Support Squadron 6 [CA, MA Dets, MASS-6]
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 1 [VMU-1]
Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron 2 [VMU-2]

Marine Aircraft Group 39 (-) (Reinforced) [MAG-39]
Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39 (-) [MALS-39]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 169 [HMLA-169]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 267 [HMLA-267]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 268 [HMM-268]
Appendix C

Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 364 [HMM-364]
Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 [HMLA-369]
Atlantic Ordnance, Command Expeditionary Force [LantOrd, CmdExpedFor]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Marine Corps Air Station,
Miramar [Det, HHS, MCAS Miramar]

**Marine Combat Service Support Element**

1st Force Service Support Group [1st FSSG]*

Detachment, Headquarters and Service Battalion [Det, H&SBN]

Combat Service Support Group 11 (Brigade Service Support Group 1) [CSSG 11]

Headquarters [Hq]
Combat Service Support Battalion 10 (Combat Service Support Group 1) [CSSB 10]
Combat Service Support Company 111 [CSSC 111]
Combat Service Support Company 115 [CSSC 115]
Combat Service Support Company 117 [CSSC 117]

Combat Service Support Group 13 (4th Landing Support Battalion) [CSSG 13]

Headquarters, 4th Landing Support Battalion [Hq, 4th LdgSptBn]
Combat Service Support Company 133 [CSSC 133]
Combat Service Support Company 134 [CSSC 134]
Combat Service Support Company 135 [CSSC 135]

Combat Service Support Group 14 (4th Supply Battalion) [CSSG 14]
4th Supply Battalion (-) [4th SupBn]

Combat Service Support Group 15 (1st Supply Battalion) [CSSG 15]
1st Supply Battalion (-) [1st SupBn]
Combat Service Support Battalion 12 (1st Maintenance Battalion) [CSSB 12]
Combat Service Support Battalion 18 (Headquarters and Service Battalion, 1st Force
Service Support Group) [CSSB 18]
Combat Service Support Battalion 22 [CSSB 22]
Combat Service Support Company 151 [CSSC 151]

Transportation Support Group [TransSuptGrp]
1st Transportation Support Battalion (-) [1st TSptBn]
6th Motor Transport Battalion [6th MTBn]

7th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [7th EngrSptBn]
6th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [6th EngrSptBn]
8th Engineer Support Battalion (-) (Reinforced) [8th EngrSptBn]
Communications Company, 4th Force Service Support Group [CommCo, 4th FSSG]
Mortuary Affairs Company, 4th Force Service Support Group [MortAffairsCo, 4th FSSG]
Company A, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co A, MP, 4th FSSG]
Company B, Military Police, 4th Force Service Support Group [Co B, MP, 4th FSSG]
Combat Service Support Battalion 16 (Combat Service Support Detachment 16) [CSSB 16]
Combat Service Support Battalion 19 (Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group-11)
(CSSB 19)
1st Dental Battalion (-) [1st DentBn]
Fleet Hospital Three, U.S. Navy [FH 3, USN]
Fleet Hospital Fifteen, U.S. Navy [FH 15, USN]
Preventive Medicine Unit, Navy Environmental Health Center [PM-MMART-5]
Preventive Medicine Unit, Navy Environmental Health Center [PM-MMART-2]
Health Services Battalion (1st Medical Battalion) [Health ServBn/1st MedBn]
  Company A [Co A]
  Company B [Co B]
  Company C [Co C]
  Company E [Co E]
  Company F [Co F]

I Marine Expeditionary Force Engineer Group [I MEFEngrGru]
  Command Element:
    30th Naval Construction Regiment [30th NCR]
    Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 5 [NMCB 5]
    Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 7 [NMCB 7]
    Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 74 [NMCB 74]
    Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 [NMCB 133]
    Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 4 [NMCB 4]
    Naval Construction Force Support Unit 2 (-) [NCFSU 2]
    Air Detachment, Underwater Construction Team 2 [AirDet, UCT 2]

22d Naval Construction Regiment [22d NCR]
  Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 15 [AirDet, NMCB 15]
  Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 21 [AirDet, NMCB 21]
  Air Detachment, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 25 [AirDet, NMCB 25]
  Detachment, Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 303 [Det, CBMU 303]

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1 Armoured Division (UK) (-) (Reinforced) [1 ArmdDiv (UK)]
7 Armoured Brigade (UK) [7 ArmdBde (UK)]
  1st Battalion, The Black Watch [1st Bn, BlackWatch]
  1st Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers [1st Bn, RoyalFusiliers]
  The Royal Scots Dragoon Guards [RoyalScotsDragoons]
  2d Royal Tank Regiment [2d Royal TkRegt]
  3d Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery [3d Regt, RoyalHorseArty]
  32 Engineer Regiment [32 EngrRegt]
16 Air Assault Brigade (UK) [16 AirAsltBde (UK)]
  1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment [1st Bn, ParaRegt]
  3d Battalion, The Parachute Regiment [3d Bn, ParaRegt]
  1st Battalion, The Royal Irish Regiment [1st Bn, RoyallIrishRegt]
7th Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery (Parachute) [7th Regt, RoyalHorseArty (Para)]
  3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines (-) [3 CdoBde, RM]
40 Commando Group [40 Cdo, RM]
42 Commando Group [42 Cdo, RM]
29 Commando Regiment, Royal Artillery [29 Cdo, RoyalArty]

U.S. Army Reinforcing Units

Detachment, 9th Psychological Operations Battalion [Det, 9th PsyOpsBn]
354th Public Affairs Detachment [354th PADet]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 468th Chemical Battalion
[Det, HHCo, 468th ChemBn]
U.S. Army Space Support Team [USASpaceSptTm]
86th Signal Battalion [86th SigBn]
208th Signal Company [208th SigCo]
Company C, 40th Signal Battalion [Co C, 40th SigBn]
3d Battalion, 27th Field Artillery [3d Bn, 27th FIdArty]
1st Field Artillery Detachment [1st FldArtyDet]
498th Medical Company [498th MedCo]
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 108th Air Defense Artillery Brigade [HHBtry, 108th AirDefArtyBde]
2d Battalion, 43d Air Defense Artillery [2d Bn, 43d AirDefArty]
3d Battalion, 124th Infantry [3d Bn, 124th Inf]
555th Maintenance Company [555th MaintCo]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 378th Support Battalion
[Det, HHCo, 378th SptBn]
777th Maintenance Company [777th MaintCo]
727th Transportation Company [727th TransCo]
319th Transportation Company [319th TransCo]
319th Transportation Detachment [319th TransDet]
299th Engineer Company [299th EngrCo]
459th Engineer Company [459th EngrCo]
Detachment, Headquarters and Headquarters Co., 716th Military Police Battalion
[Det, HHCo, 716th MPBn]
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 265th Engineer Group [HHCo, 265th EngrGrp]
130th Engineer Battalion [130th EngrBn]
478th Engineer Battalion [478th EngrBn]
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 358th Civil Affairs Brigade
[HHCo, 358th CABde]
304th Civil Affairs Brigade [304th CABde]
402d Civil Affairs Brigade [402d CABde]
432d Civil Affairs Battalion [432d CABn]
367th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment [367th MOPADet]
305th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [305th TacPsyOpsCo]
307th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [307th TacPsyOpsCo]
312th Tactical Psychological Operations Company [312th TacPsyOpsCo]
1092d Engineer Battalion [1092d EngrBn]

Marine Follow-on Forces

3d Battalion, 23d Marines [3d Bn, 23d Mar]
4th Combat Engineer Battalion (-) [4th CbtEngrBn]
4th Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (-) [4th LARBn]
2d Battalion 25th Marines [2d Bn, 25th Mar]
Truck Company, 4th Marine Division [TkCo, 4th MarDiv]

Marine Forces with Fifth and Sixth Fleets

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) [26th MEU (SOC)]
Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 8th Marines [BLT 1/8]
Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 264 [HMM-264]
Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 26 [MSSG 26]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (USS *Harry S. Truman* CVN 75) [VMFA-115]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312 (USS *Enterprise* CVN 65) [VMFA-312]
Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323 (USS *Constellation* CV 64) [VMFA-323]

*Unit list based on I Marine Expeditionary Force Presidential Unit Citation Award Recommendation, 7Aug03; MarAdmin 507/03, various versions, Oct-Dec03; “Modifications to the I MEF Presidential Unit Citation Unit Listing,” with additions and/or corrections provided by Ms. Annette Amerman, Historian, Reference Branch; and Col Nicholas E. Reynolds’ troop list of Oct04. Unit abbreviations are provided in brackets.

***1st Force Service Support Group reorganized shortly before deployment; previous unit designations are shown in parentheses after the unit’s designation in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The 1st Force Service Support Group’s headquarters elements were reorganized into Combat Service Support Group 16 [CSSG 16] in April 2003.*
Appendix D

Selected Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations

AA—Assault Amphibian
AAA—Antiaircraft Artillery
AAOE—Arrival and Assembly Operations Echelon
AAV—Amphibious Assault Vehicle
ACE—Aviation Combat Element
ADC—Assistant Division Commander
ADOCS—Automated Deep Operations Coordination System
APOD—Air Port of Debarkation
APOE—Air Port of Embarkation
ASLT—Air Support Liaison Team
ASOC—Air Support Operations Center
ASP—Ammunition Supply Point
ATARS—Advanced Tactical Air Reconnaissance System
ATO—Air Tasking Order
BCL—Battlefield Coordination Line
BCT—Brigade Combat Team
BDA—Battle Damage Assessment
BFT—Blue Force Tracker
BSSG—Brigade Service Support Group
C2PC—Command and Control Personal Computer
CBR—Counter Battery Radar
CE—Command Element
CEB—Combat Engineering Battalion
CENTCOM—U.S. Central Command
CFACC—Coalition Forces Air Component Commander
CFLCC—Coalition Forces Land Component Commander
CG—Commanding General
CGS—Common Ground Station
CIP—Combat Identification Panel
Class II—Batteries
Class VIII—Medical Supplies
Class IX—Repair Parts
CMOC—Civil-Military Operations Center
CPAC—Consolidated Public Affairs Office
CP—Command Post
CPX—Command Post Exercise
CRAF—Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CSS—Combat Service Support
CSSB—Combat Service Support Battalion
CSSC–Combat Service Support Company
CONPLAN–Contingency Plan
CONUS–Continental United States
COP–Common Operational Picture
DA–Dispersal Area
DAC–Division Administration Center
DASC–Direct Air Support Center
DIA–Defense Intelligence Agency
DOC–Deployment Operations Center
DS–Direct Support
DSA–Division Support Area
EMCON–Emissions Control
EOD–Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPW–Enemy Prisoner of War
FAC–Forward Air Controller
FAD–Field Artillery Detachment
FARP–Forward Arming and Refueling Point
FOB–Forward Operating Base
FOE–Follow on Echelon
FPOL–Forward Passage of Lines
FRAGO–Fragmented Order
FRSS–Forward Resuscitative Surgery System
FSCC–Fire Support Coordination Center
FSS–Fast Sealift Ships
FSSG–Force Service Support Group
GBS–Global Broadcasting System
GCE–Ground Combat Element
GOSP–Gas-Oil Separation Plant
HDR–Humanitarian Daily Ration
HET–Human Exploitation Team
HF–High Frequency
HHA–Hand Held Assay
HUMINT–Human Intelligence
IC–Intelligence Community
IMINT–Image Intelligence
IMO–Information Management Officer
IO–Information Officer
IPSA–Intermediate Pumping Stations
JDAM–Joint Direct Attack Munition
JMEM–Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual
JSTARS–Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
KAF–Kuwaiti Armed Forces
KI–Killbox Interdiction
KLF–Kuwaiti Land Forces
KMOD–Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense
LAR—Light Armored Reconnaissance
LASER—Light Amplification through Stimulated Emission of Radiation
LAV—Light Armored Vehicle
LD—Line of Departure
LOC—Line of Communication
LSA—Life Support Area; Logistical Support Area
LTO—Logistics Tasking Order
LZ—Landing Zone
MACCS—Marine Air Command and Control Squadron
MAG—Marine Air Group
MAGTF—Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MANPAD—Man-Portable Air Defense
MARCORSYSCOM—Marine Corps Systems Command
MAW—Marine Aircraft Wing
MCIA—Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
MCRE—Marine Corps Readiness Evaluation
MCWL—Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
MDACT—Mobile Data Automated Communication Terminal
MEB—Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF—Marine Expeditionary Force
MEFEX—Marine Expeditionary Force Exercise
MEG—MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) Engineer Group
MEWSS—Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System
MLC—Marine Logistics Command
MOD—Ministry of Defense (Kuwait)
MOI—Ministry of the Interior (Kuwait)
MOPP—Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MOS—Military Occupational Specialty
MOUT—Military Operations on Urban Terrain
MP—Military Policy
MPF—Maritime Prepositional Force
MPRON—Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron
MRLS—Multiply Rocket Launcher System
MSC—Major Subordinate Command
MSTP—MAGTF Staff Training Program
MWSG—Marine Wing Support Squadron
MWSS—Marine Wing Support Squadron
NBC—Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NBCRS—Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System
OCB—Obstacle Clearing Detachment
OMC-K—Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait
OPCON—Operation Control
OPLAN—Operations Plan
OPP—Offload Preparation Party
OPT—Operational Planning Team
ORCON—Originator Controlled
OSW—Operation Southern Watch
PA—Public Affairs
PALT—Public Affairs Liaison Team
PIR—Priority Intelligence Requirement
PLI—Position Location Information
POL—Passage of Lines
POW—Prisoner of War
PRR—Personal Role Radio
QRF—Quick Reaction Force
RA—Regular Army
RCT—Regimental Combat Team
RFF—Requested for Forces
RG—Republican Guard
RGFC—Republican Guard Forces Command
RIP—Relief in Place
ROC—Rehearsal of Concept
ROZ—Restrictive Operation Zone
RRP—Refueling and Replenishment Point
RSO&I—Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
RUC—Reporting Unit Code
SAPOE—Sea and Aerial Ports of Embarkation
SAM—Surface-to-Air-Missile
SASO—Security and Stabilization Operations
SIGINT—Signal Intelligence
SIPRNET—Secret Internet Protocol Routed Network
SLTLP—Survey, Liaison, and Reconnaissance Party
SMART-T—Secure Mobile Antijam Reliable Tactical Terminal
SOP—Standing Operating Procedure
SRG—Special Republican Guard
SPINS—Special Instructions
SPODE—Sea Port of Debarkation
SPOE—Sea Port of Embarkation
SSE—Sensitive Site Exploitation
SSM—Surface-to-Surface Missile
TAA—Tactical Assembly Areas
TACON—Tactical Control
T/E—Table of Equipment
TEWT—Tactical Exercise Without Troops
TIO—Target Information Officer
TIP—Thermal Identification Officer
T/O—Table of Organization
TPC—Target Processing Center
TPFDD—Time-Phased Force Deployment Data
Appendix E

Chronology of Events

2001

11 September
Al Qaeda terrorists attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

25 November
Marines of Task Force 58 land in Afghanistan as part of operations to deprive Al Qaeda of its base in that country.

2002

January
Marine Forces, Pacific, orders I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) to focus on preparing for contingencies in the U.S. CentCom theater; I MEF planners begin more than a year of work on plans to invade Iraq.

2 August
MajGen James N. Mattis becomes Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, and puts the division on a virtual war footing.

11 October
The Pentagon orders I MEF to deploy its headquarters staff to Kuwait for service with Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) under U.S. Army LtGen David D. McKiernan.

15 November
I MEF headquarters deploys to Kuwait; newly appointed I MEF commander LtGen James T. Conway deploys with his headquarters.

16 November
3d Marine Aircraft Wing (3d MAW) forward command post, under MajGen James F. Amos, arrives in Kuwait.

18 November
1st Marine Division forward command post arrives in Kuwait.

24 November
CFLCC exercise to test command and control links with I MEF and other commands, “Lucky Warrior 03-1,” begins.

9 December
CentCom exercise “Internal Look,” based on the current version of the plan for the invasion of Iraq, begins.

2003

January
Intense preparations to integrate 1st Armoured Division (UK) into I MEF occur; this division assumes responsibility for securing southeast Iraq.

2 January
Pentagon issues Deployment Order 177A, soon to be followed by 177B, which orders the wholesale deployment of I MEF forces to theater.
Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill occurs at 3d MAW in Miramar, California; many ROC drills at various levels follow in the coming weeks.

Gen Michael W. Hagee becomes the 33d Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Amphibious Task Force (ATF) East departs Morehead City, North Carolina, for Kuwait with 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade (2d MEB).

Amphibious Task Force (ATF) West departs San Diego, California, for Kuwait carrying elements of 1 MEF.

With 1 MEF, participation, CFLCC exercise "Lucky Warrior 03-2," labeled "a dress rehearsal" for war, begins.

2d MEB begins to go ashore in Kuwait to reinforce 1 MEF; its aviation elements transfer to 3d MAW control and the ground elements are redesignated Task Force Tarawa.

Amphibious Task Force West begins offloading its West Coast Marine units in Kuwait; most other Marines follow by air.

First leaflets dropped on Baghdad urging noninterference with Coalition operations and soliciting support from Iraqi people.

President Bush issues an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq within 48 hours.

Operation Southern Watch aircraft conduct air strikes against Iraqi early warning radars and command-and-control capabilities; Marine forces are ordered to staging areas.

U.S. Air Force aircraft and Navy vessels conduct unplanned attack against Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leadership targets in what becomes popularly known as the "decapitation strike," which does not succeed but does initiate hostilities

Iraq retaliates by firing surface-to-surface missiles against Coalition troops in Kuwait; ground combat operations begin at night; 1 MEF is supporting attack to Army's V Corps; Regimental Combat Team (RCT 5) is leading Marine unit.

Marines capture the Rumaylah oil fields, a key CentCom objective; Marines and British forces secure the port of Umm Qasr before moving on the city of Basrah, the most important British objective.

Task Force Tarawa begins to secure the city of An Nasiriyah and its key bridges over the Euphrates River and the Saddam Canal; heavy fighting ensues; friendly fire incident occurs at bridge over canal; II Marine Expeditionary Force commander MG En Henry P. Osman deploys to northern Iraq to establish the Military Coordination and Liaison
Command (MCLC) under operational control of CentCom in order to maintain political stability.

Night of 24–25 March  "Mother of all sandstorms" begins, slowing operations’ tempo for approximately two days.

24–27 March  1st Marine Division continues to advance up Routes 1 and 7 towards Baghdad.

27 March  Operational pause begins to consolidate supply lines and address threats by irregular Iraqi formations on the ground; 3d MAW air offensive continues unimpeded, rendering many Iraqi units combat ineffective.

1 April  1st Marine Division resumes progress towards Baghdad; 1st Force Service Support Group performs herculean feats of resupply with cooperation of wing and Marine Logistics Command.

3 April  U.S. Army troops move on Saddam International Airport, key terrain outside Baghdad.

5 April  U.S. Army conducts first “Thunder Run,” armored raid, into Baghdad.

6 April  Most of Basrah, Iraq’s “second city,” is in British hands.

7 April  Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT 7) crosses the Diyala River and moves on outskirts of Baghdad from the east; U.S. Army conducts second “Thunder Run” into capital.

9 April  Marines of 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, part of RCT 7, assist Iraqi civilians in toppling a large statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square in Marine area of operations, eastern Baghdad.

10 April  RCT 5 engaged in heavy fighting at Al Azimilyah Palace and Abu Hanifah mosque in Baghdad; looting begins as fighting tapers off; Marines begin post-combat operations.

11–12 April  After the collapse of Iraqi authority in northern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk, Kurdish forces fill the resulting power vacuum, followed by U.S. forces over succeeding days, including Marines from 26th MEU (SOC).

13–14 April  Task Force Tripoli, out of 1st Marine Division, takes control of Tikrit, Saddam Hussein’s hometown.

20 April  The relief in place with U.S. Army in eastern Baghdad is complete; I MEF redeploy its forces to the southern third of Iraq; mission is now security, humanitarian assistance, and reconstruction; focus of effort is seven infantry battalions from 1st Marine Division in seven governates or districts.

22 April  24th MEU (SOC), which had supported Task Force Tarawa, begins
redeploying to its ships; other Marine units soon follow suit as part of drawn-down to reduced manning levels that are maintained throughout the summer.

1 May
Under a banner reading "Mission Accomplished," President George W. Bush announces that major combat operations are over; 26th MEU (SOC) departs Mosul and returns to its ships in the Mediterranean.

12 May
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer takes over as civil administrator in Iraq, replacing Jay M. Garner; Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority soon replaces Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.

22 July
Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay are killed in firefight with U.S. Army in Mosul.

19 August
A truck bomb explodes at the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad, killing 20 people, including the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights.

3 September
In Babylon, I MEF conducts a transfer of authority to a Polish-led international Coalition force; most remaining Marines return to Continental United States.

10 November
Marines of Special Purpose MAGTF celebrate the Marine Corps birthday in Continental United States after completing the work of repatriating all Marine Corps equipment from theater.
Appendix F

Presidential Unit Citation

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-1000
3 November 2003

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the PRESIDENTIAL UNIT CITATION to

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

for service as set forth in the following CITATION:

For extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance in action against enemy forces in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from 21 March to 24 April 2003. During this period, I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) (REIN) conducted the longest sequence of coordinated combined arms overland attacks in the history of the Marine Corps. From the border between Kuwait and Iraq, to the culmination of hostilities north of Baghdad, I MEF advanced nearly 800 kilometers under sustained and heavy combat. Utilizing the devastating combat power of organic aviation assets, coupled with the awesome power resident in the ground combat elements, and maintaining momentum through the herculean efforts of combat service support elements, I MEF destroyed nine Iraqi Divisions. This awesome display of combat power was accomplished while simultaneously freeing the Iraqi people from more than 30 years of oppression and reestablishing basic infrastructure in the country. During the 33 days of combat, to the transition to civil-military operations, I MEF sustained a tempo of operations never before seen on the modern battlefield, conducting four major river crossings, maintaining the initiative, and sustaining forces. The ferocity and duration of the campaign was made possible through the skills and determination of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coalition Partners comprising I MEF at all levels, all echelons, and in all occupational fields. By their outstanding courage, aggressive fighting spirit, and untiring devotion to duty, the officers and enlisted personnel of I Marine Expeditionary Force (REIN) reflected great credit upon themselves and upheld the highest traditions of the Marine Corps and the United States Naval Service.

For the President,

[Signature]

Secretary of the Navy
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