Marine historian Edwin H. Simmons reminisced about that time, stating: "The 1st Marine Division in Korea was the finest fighting outfit I ever served with"; no small praise from a combat veteran of three wars.

Back to the Attack

While the 1st Marine Division was busy rebuilding at Masan and chasing guerrillas at Pohang, the vastly outnumbered Eighth Army continued to fall back in what eventually became the longest retreat in American military history. But, as soon as the CCF Third Phase Offensive ran out of gas, General Ridgway resumed offensive operations. In mid-January, he initiated the first in a series of drumbeat attacks that eventually carried U.N. forces back above the 38th Parallel. Unlike the reckless rush to the Yalu the previous year, however, this time Eighth Army relied upon cautious advances, which were both limited in scope and closely controlled by higher headquarters, carefully coordinated actions intended to punish the enemy as well as to gain ground.

In general, Ridgway eschewed flanking movements and objectives deep in the enemy rear. Instead, numerous phase lines strictly controlled U.N. activities and attacking units kept pace with those on each flank. The Marines—except for pilots flying close air support missions—missed the first three offensive operations (Wolfhound, Roundup, and Thunderbolt), but the 1st Marine Division was destined to play key roles in Operations Killer, Ripper, Rugged, and Dauntless.

Each of Ridgway’s successive operations was more ambitious than the previous one. By mid-February, the Eighth Army had gathered momentum and was on the move all across Korea. At that time the U.N. front was held from left to right by the U.S. I Corps, IX Corps, X Corps, and units of the South Korean army. The United Nations Command was in the process of rolling back the Communists in western Korea when General Ridgway met with General Smith at Suwon in late January to discuss the 1st Marine Division’s next mission. Ridgway wanted to send the Marines to central Korea, but Smith lobbied hard to have the 1st Marine Division placed on the far right flank in order to stay near the coast. Smith noted that his division was the only Eighth Army unit trained for amphibious operations and added that a position near the sea would allow the Marines to make maximum use of naval gunfire and carrier-based air, supporting arms with which they were intimately familiar and well-practiced in using. Such a disposition would also allow the Marines to use Pohang as the principal port of entry, a factor that would ease the logistical burden by shortening supply lines. Amplifying, Smith pointed out that "the 1st Marine Division with a strength of approximately 24,000 was larger that any of the Army infantry divisions or ROK divisions at this time and in that there were single . . . supply routes, for the corps and the divisions and it would be less of a strain upon transportation and less of a logistical problem to supply a smaller army division or ROK division inboard, well inland in Korea, than it would be in the case of the Marine division." This was a critical consideration because it would reduce overland transportation problems. Marine trucks were both few in number and in poor shape after hard use at the Chosin Reservoir. Smith’s logic won over the Eighth Army commander, and after that meeting Ridgway directed his staff to prepare plans for the Marines to remain on the east coast.

Unfortunately, these plans were overcome by events before they could be put into effect. The catalyst for the movement of the 1st Marine Division into central Korea was the third battle for Wonju, a vital communications and road link whose loss might well force the evacuation of Korea by U.N. forces. Wonju was put at great risk when Hoengsong, located about 10 miles north on Route 29, was lost. This near disaster occurred when the Communists launched their Fourth Phase Offensive in which the CCF 40th and 66th Armies and the NKPA V Corps initiated a series of devastating attacks out of the swirling snow beginning on the night of 11-12 February. The U.S. X Corps suffered a serious setback when three Republic of Korea Army divisions disintegrated and combat support elements of the U.S. 2d Division were cut off and then annihilated in “Massacre Valley” just north of Hoengsong. The 23d Infantry was cut up, the artillery overrun, and “only 800 had come in so far and only one in twenty had weapons,” General Puller told Smith. With the key city of Wonju threatened and X Corps reeling back, General Ridgway had no choice but to commit what he called “the most powerful division in Korea” to “where a great threat existed to that portion of the Eighth Army’s lines.” On 12 February 1951, General Smith received a warning order to prepare the 1st Marine Division to move to Chongju in south-central Korea “on 24 hours’ notice at any time after 0700, 14 February.” As Major Martin Sexton later commented: “The 1st Marine Division was deployed right in the center of Korea and its amphibious
A Marine light machine gun team boards a train for the trip from Pohang to Chungju in central Korea. The 1st Marine Division was to be positioned astride what LtGen Matthew Ridgway considered to be the logical route for the expected enemy counterattack.

 capabilities destroyed at the same time."

The Korean peninsula can be roughly described as a 600-by-150 mile parallelogram that descends ever downward from the Manchurian border and also slants down from the hilly eastern one-third that abuts the Sea of Japan until it gradually levels off along Yellow Sea to the west. The peninsula can be easily divided into several unique geographic areas: two horizontal sections, one in the north and one in the south, comprise the basic economic sectors; three vertical sections—the east, central, and west corridors—each comprise about one-third the width of the peninsula. Most of North Korea is rugged mountain territory whose fast-flowing rivers provide the water and electric power necessary for industrial development. South Korea, on the other hand, includes most of the agricultural land. Trans-peninsular communications, particularly roads and railways, are hampered by geography. The craggy Taebaek Mountain range roughly parallels the east coast where its irregular cliffs severely limit the number of suitable landing areas and provide no spacious flat lands to support agricultural or urban development.

There are few east-west overland links, and the only north-south route in the east runs tenuously along the narrow coast. Numerous fingers of the Taebaek intermittently reach west across the central corridor creating a washboard of alternating river valleys and spiny ridgelines. The flattest expanses are located along the west coast, an area that includes both Korea’s major port Inchon and its largest city, Seoul.

General Smith’s new orders focused Marine attention upon the central corridor, and all major combat actions during the spring of 1951 would take place in that zone. The dominating terrain feature was the Hwachon Reservoir, a 12-mile basin that blocked the southern flowing Pukhan River using a sizable dam. The reservoir was located just about at the peninsula’s dead center. It provide-
ed pre-war Seoul with most of its water and electricity, but that was no longer true. The Hwachon Reservoir did, however, have significant tactical value. Just north of the 38th Parallel and at the southern edge of a mountainous shelf, it marked both the political and geographic divisions of North and South Korea. This barrier effectively channeled all movement to either the east (Yanggu) or west (Hwachon), and the side holding the dam could threaten to flood the low-lying Chunchon and Soyang Valleys at will.

Korea's central corridor also included all of the major communications links between both the east and the west and the north and south. A string of road junctions spiraled south along Routes 17 and 29 from Hwachon at roughly 15-mile intervals. These included Chunchon, Hongchon, Hoengsong, and Wonju—each of which would become a major objective during the Ridgway offensives on the Central Front.

**Operation Killer**

Beginning on 16 February, the Marines mounted out from Pohang by regimental combat teams for Chungju. Fortunately, by that time the CCF and NKPA were being pounded by air and artillery until their attacks ran out of steam north of Wonju. Thus, when the Marines finally arrived at Chungju, they could be used to spearhead a U.N. counteroffensive, a closely coordinated pincer attack by the U.S. IX and X Corps intended to trap the NKPA III and V Corps called Operation Killer. Eighth Army released the 1st Marine Division from direct control when it joined Major General Bryant E. Moore's IX Corps for Operation Killer, a two-phase drive up the Wonju basin to retake and secure Hoengsong. An Army officer, General Moore had served side-by-side with the Marines at Guadalcanal in 1942. He ordered General Smith to seize the high ground south of Hoengsong hoping to cut off enemy forces to the south by denying them use of their main egress routes. Although Smith lost tactical control of the 1st KMC Regiment when the Marines departed Pohang, U.S. Army artillery and transportation units reinforced the division. Particularly welcome additions were the much-needed vehicles of the U.S. Army's 74th Truck Company, and the "Red Legs" of the 92d Armored Field Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Leon F. Levoie, Jr.,
USA. This was a first-rate Army self-propelled howitzer unit that had rendered outstanding support at the Chosin Reservoir. The artillerymen of the 92d were, as Major Martin J. Sexton noted, "trained basically as Marines are in that they were essentially riflemen too, if not first."

On 19 February, Smith and Puller attended a commander's conference. There, they learned the 1st Marine Division was to be the focus of the main effort for Operation Killer and would advance with the 6th ROK Division on the left and X Corps to the right. General Ridgway's orders were to "seek out the enemy and inflict the greatest possible damage." In Marine terms, Operation Killer was going to be "buttoned up"; all U.N. forces were to keep close lateral contact, to maintain tactical integrity at all times, and to strictly adhere to the timetable. Units would not bypass enemy positions and had to stop at each phase line even if there was no enemy resistance. Regrettably, the conference closed on a less than happy note for the Marines. Generals Smith and Puller were taken back to learn Operation Killer was to kick off in less than 48 hours, too short a time to move the entire division to the line of departure. The Marines were further dismayed when they were denied the use of a dedicated Marine fighter squadron. Their arguments to hold up the attack until the entire division could be assembled were dismissed by Ridgway who also refused to intervene to assure the Marines adequate close air support. In spite of Marine objections, H-hour was set for 1000 on 21 February.

General Smith elected to use two regiments (the 1st and 5th Marines) in the attack and keep one, the 7th Marines, in reserve. The line of departure was located just north of Wonju. The area in the Marine zone was uninviting, to say the least. In the words of official Marine Corps historian Lynn Montross: "There were too many crags [and] too few roads." Rocky, barren, snow-covered ridges boxed in the narrow Som Valley whose lowlands were awash with runoff from melting snow and flooded by overflowing streams. The weather was terrible, "a mixture of thawing snow, rain, mud, and slush," according to 3d Battalion, 5th Marines' commanding officer Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart. The axis of advance was generally northwest along Route 29, which was sarcastically known as the "Hoengsong-Wonju Highway" (it was actually a primitive one-lane packed-dirt trail totally unsuited to support vehicular traffic) that generally paralleled...
the Som River. The final objective was an east-west running ridgeline south of the ruins that had once been Hoengsong. The enemy defending this area was identified as the 196th Division from Chinese General Show Shiu Kwai's 66th Army.

Unfortunately, a series of events beyond General Smith's control hampered the start of operations. Transportation shortfalls meant that the 7th Marines would not be immediately available, so the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Glen E. Martin, a reserve officer who had been awarded a Navy Cross and served as a platoon and company commander during World War II, was designated the 1st Marine Division reserve for the first phase of Operation Killer. Snarled traffic, sticky mud, General MacArthur's visit to the 187th Airborne's zone, and the lack of trucks conspired to postpone the planned jump-off time. But, even with the logistical problems, the assault units of the 5th Marines—just like their World War I predecessors at Soissons—had to double time to get to the line of departure in time. Luckily, there was little enemy resistance.

Under the watchful eyes of Generals MacArthur, Ridgway, and Moore, the Marines advanced rapidly in a torrential rain opposed only by some ineffectual long distance small arms fire. Colonel Francis McAlister's 1st Marines moved up the muddy road in a column of battalions (Lieutenant Colonel Donald M. Schmuck's 1st Battalion, Major Clarence J. Mabry's 2d Battalion, and Lieutenant Colonel Virgil W. Banning's 3d Battalion, respectively). Colonel Raymond Murray's 5th Marines had a harder row to hoe advancing north (actually climbing up and sliding down the snow-covered terrain) across a series of steep ridges and narrow valleys. Lieutenant Colonel John L. Hopkins' 1st Battalion, with Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart's 3d Battalion in trail, maintained the high ground by hugging the regimental left boundary. The Marines made it almost four miles the first day and then covered half as much ground the following day. “Unlike the Inchon-Seoul Campaign,” recalled Private

Marines advance across a fog-filled valley in the Wonju-Hoengsong sector supported by machine gun fire. Elaborate weapons positions, common in the latter stages of the war, were unusual during the seesaw fighting in the spring of 1951.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A6843
First Class Morgan Brainard, “we were not moving out with what we infantrymen could recognize as a set goal, other than to kill gooks, and to move the lines steadily back north.”

The first real resistance occurred when the 1st Marines, moving with the 1st and 2d Battalions abreast, and the 5th Marines in column, neared Objectives A (Hill 537 and Ridge 400) and B (Hill 533), overlooking Hoengsong. The 1st Marines was stopped by small arms and heavy automatic weapons fire from Hill 166 on the left and dug in for the night. Supported by air and artillery, the 1st Marines secured the heights at 1015 on 23 February. That afternoon, the 1st and 2d Battalions conducted a successful flanking attack to take the final hill line and were overlooking Hoengsong as darkness fell. The 5th Marines waited in vain that same morning for an air strike before mounting a two-battalion assault to clear a pair of hills on the left. The next morning, a mechanized patrol from the 1st Marines passed through Helmand on its way to rescue several survivors still holding out in Massacre Valley where U.S. Army artillery units had been overrun almost two weeks earlier. The Marines found a gruesome sight. Burned out vehicles, abandoned howitzers, and more than 200 unburied dead lay strewn across the valley floor. This movement also stirred up a hornet’s nest. Enemy mortars and artillery ranged the ridgeline held by the 1st Marines. The major combat action of the day then occurred when Marine cannoneers of Major Francis R. Schlesinger’s 2d Battalion, 11th Marines, bested their CCF counterparts in the ensuing late afternoon artillery duel. By dusk on 24 February, all Marine objectives for the first phase of Operation Killer had been secured. The Marines had suffered 23 killed in action and 182 wounded thus far.

The follow-on advance had to wait almost a week. Operations were placed on temporary hold for several reasons. One major reason was that General Moore, the IX Corps commander, died following a helicopter crash. Additionally, the low ground around Hoengsong had become a rain-soaked, muddy, impassible bog. Bad roads and poor weather stopped the Marines in their tracks because the assault units needed ammunition and food before they could renew the attack. Additionally, the Marine division was still fragmented because the 7th Marines was stranded at Wonju where a severe gasoline shortage idled most trucks. This shortfall was compounded by the poor trafficability of the road net, which had become a gooey morass due to the incessant rain. Army and Marine engineers labored night and day to shore up the deteriorating roads and bridges, but the supply situation became so critical that air-drops—an inefficient method heretofore used for emergencies only—had to become a logistics mainstay. Thirty-five airdrops were required to resupply the assault elements of the 1st Marine Division. Marine transport planes augmented the U.S. Air Force Combat Cargo Command participated in such drops all across the U.N. front. Also used in the resupply effort were 1,200 cargo handlers of the South Korean Civil Transport Corps. These hard-working indigenous laborers toiled under the direction of division Civil Affairs Officer First Lieutenant Oliver E. Dial. These hardy individuals each carried up to 50 pounds of supplies on A-frame backpacks to the forward most Marine units.

On 24 February, Major General Smith became the third Marine to assume command of a major U.S. Army formation (Brigadier General John A. Lejeune had commanded the U.S. 2d Division in France in 1918 and Major General Roy S. Geiger commanded the U.S. Tenth
Army at Okinawa in 1945) when he took over IX Corps after General Moore's fatal heart attack. Smith's reception at Yoju was subdued, according to his aide, Major Sexton:

"It was a very modest and unassuming entrance that was made when General Smith stepped out of the helicopter and was met by General [George B.] Peploe, who was the chief of staff of IX Corps. A brief introduction to the staff—the corps staff officers—followed, and I would say that it was approximately an hour, possibly an hour and a half after General Smith's arrival, that the first decision which he was required to make arose. It involved a seemingly complicated scheme of maneuver wherein IX Corps would execute a flanking maneuver to envelop a sizable North Korean force which lay in front of the left portion of X Corps' zone of action. After deliberation with the G-3 and the chief of staff, the decision was forthcoming. It was simply "No, thank you." At which time, the G-3 excitedly called his . . . G-3 of X Corps, repeated these words and happily hung up the phone. As there were at this time smiles all around the staff, it was my impression that the general had been accepted rapidly.

The following day, Smith conferred with General Ridgway regarding future operations. Although Ridgway warmed Smith with glowing words of encouragement, he concluded by saying "he didn't know what the War Department would do." Smith knew. Despite the recommendations of U.S. Army Major General Frank E. Lowe, sent to Korea by President Harry S. Truman to evaluate American units, that Smith be elevated to corps command, it was obvious no Marine general was going to be allowed to do so on a permanent basis; accordingly, Smith's tenure lasted only until a more senior U.S. Army general arrived in Korea. He also asked for recommendations as to the future employment of the 1st Marine Division, to which General Smith replied that he knew "of no better use for the Division than to continue north on the Hoensong-Hongchon axis" as the main threat would come from that direction. In addition, Ridgway announced that Operation Killer would not resume until 1 March and that he wanted a change in zones to reorient the division more to the north. The IX and X Corps boundary was shifted west in accord with the Eighth Army commander's wishes. To do this Brigadier General Puller, who was filling in as the 1st Marine Division commander, rearranged the Marine dispositions. He pulled the 5th Marines out of the line to become the division reserve and moved the 7th Marines up into the line on the left to replace a South Korean unit that had been holding that position.

Arguably, the 1st Marine Division had the most difficult assignment of any unit in the Eighth Army. It had to cross a muddy triangular open area and then eject a dug-in enemy from a ridgeline located about a mile-and-a-half north of Hoengsong. Phase Line Arizona, as the final objective was known, consisted of five distinct hill masses (Hills 536, 333, 321, 335, and 201). The 1st Marines' commander, Colonel McAlister, assigned two intermediate objectives (Hills 303 and 208) as well. The nature of the terrain, which required a river crossing..."
and prohibited extensive vehicle movement, dictated a complex scheme of maneuver. The 7th Marines on the left would have to seize the hills in its zone to eliminate flanking fires before a battalion of the 1st Marines advancing through the 7th Marines' zone could assault its assigned objectives on the right. The CCF rear-guard, consisting of elements of the 196th and 197th Divisions, was situated inside a sophisticated reverse-slope defense system anchored by log bunkers and zigzag trenches immune to direct fire. Where possible, the Marines would use fire by tanks and self-propelled guns to reduce point targets, but emplacements on reverse slopes would have to be hit by unobserved close air support or high angle artillery and mortar fires. This meant if the Chinese defended in place the Marines would have to reduce the reverse slope defenses using close combat. The most important terrain obstacle was the chilly, chest-deep, fast-flowing Som River. During the plenary conference Colonel McAlister was informed that no engineer support would be available and was further told the river was not fordable. Major Edwin H. Simmons, commanding 3d Battalion's Weapons Company, offered a solution. He recommended building a "Swiss bent bridge" composed of "A" shaped timber platforms with planking held in place by communications wire. This field expedient did the trick, and the 3d Battalion safely crossed the Som the night before the attack began.

The battle for Hoengsong was a classic four-day slugging match in which the Marines slowly advanced against dug-in enemy troops under the cover of a wide array of supporting arms. On the first day (1 March), the 11th Marines fired 54 artillery missions, Marine Grumman F9F Panther jets and Corsairs flew 30 sorties, and Marine tanks lined up like a row of battleships using their 90mm guns to clear the way. Colonel Litzenberg's 7th Marines moved out with Major James I. Glendinning's 2d Battalion on the left and Major Maurice E. Roach, Jr.'s 3d Battalion on the right headed north toward Hills 536 and 385 respectively. Lieutenant Colonel Banning's 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, which was in the 7th Marines' zone, moved in echelon with Hill 303 in the 1st Marines' zone on the right as its final goal; concurrently, the other two battalions of the 1st Marines held fast and furnished fire support. Three artillery battalions (3d and 4th Battalions, 11th Marines, and the U.S. Army's 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion) were on call to support the 7th Marines. Major Webb D. Sawyer's 1st Battalion patrolled the left flank and main-
The attacks on 3 March to secure the heights north of "Massacre Valley" featured the bloodiest single day of the operation. The 1st Marines secured Hills 321, 335, and 201 after some very tough hand-to-hand fighting which required the intervention of Captain Thomas J. Bohannon's Company A. The 7th Marines also continued the attack against a determined foe. Major Sawyer's 1st Battalion was called up from reserve to take and secure Hill 536 on the extreme left. The 3d Battalion then attacked Hill 333 with fire support from the stationary 2d Battalion. It was slow going for both assault units, and neither was able to secure its objectives before nightfall despite suffering 14 killed and 104 wounded since daybreak. These same two assault battalions determinedly "went over the top" amid snow flurries the next morning (4 March) only to discover most of the enemy had quietly slipped away during the night. Combat clearing duties ended at dark with the Marines firmly in possession of Phase Line Arizona.

The Marines had suffered almost 400 casualties (48 dead, 345 wounded, and 2 missing), while eliminating an estimated 2,000 enemy in two weeks of combat near Hoengsong. The bottom line, however, was that Operation Killer closed on an anticlimactic note. The Marines drove the enemy out of Hoengsong, but General Ridgway was dissatisfied with the punishment meted out. Although all terrain objectives had been taken, the enemy had deftly avoided a costly set piece battle and slipped out of the United Nations Command's trap. As a result, the Eighth Army commander ordered a new attack, Operation Ripper, to begin immediately.

There were several administrative changes during the brief respite between the end of Operation Killer and the onset of Operation Ripper. On 4 March, the 6th Replacement Draft (29 officers and 1,785 enlisted men) arrived, bringing with them 63 postal pouches—the first mail the Marines received since leaving Pohang. Concurrently, Lieutenant Colonel Erwin F. Wann, Jr.'s 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel Francis H. Cooper's 1st Armed Amphibian Battalion were detached to support the U.S. Army crossing of the Han River and were thereafter sent to Inchon to conduct amphibious training. The amphibian tractors would not rejoin the 1st Marine Division until it moved to western Korea the following year. On the plus side, a 250-man South Korean National Police company joined the Marines. These "Wharrangs" primarily served as scouts and interpreters, but were occasionally used as auxiliary combat troops as well. On 5 March, the day after Operation Killer ended, General Smith returned to the 1st Marine Division upon the arrival at IX Corps headquarters of his replacement, Major General William H. Hoge, USA, who had quickly flown out from Trieste, Italy. An engineer by training, Hoge supervised the Alaska-Canadian Highway effort and commanded Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, during World War II, the lead elements of which seized the only major bridge over the Rhine River at Remagen.

**Operation Ripper**

Operation Ripper was the fifth consecutive limited U.N. offensive. It would follow the same basic design as the previous attacks. As before, the real goals were to
inflict maximum punishment and keep the Communists off balance, but this time General Ridgway added a major territorial goal as well. He wanted to outflank the enemy near Seoul and force them to withdraw north of the Imjin River, a movement that would carry the United Nations Command almost back to the 38th Parallel. The plan was for IX and X Corps to drive north with I Corps holding in the west and the South Korean Army maintaining its positions along the east flank. The Central Front would be Eighth Army’s primary arena. Hoge’s plan was to drive north with the towns of Hongchon and Chunchon as major objectives in the IX Corps zone. Intermediate objectives included Phase Lines Albany, Buffalo, and Cairo; the final objective was Line Idaho. General Hoge inserted an intermediate phase line, Baker, between Eighth Army-designated Lines Albany and Buffalo. The enemy in zone continued to be the CCF 66th Army, but intelligence officers were uncertain as to whether the enemy would continue to retreat or would finally stand and fight. Operation Ripper would, therefore, once again be a cautious advance, another limited, strictly controlled, "buttoned up" operation.

As in just-ended Operation Killer, the Marines would again be the focus of the IX Corps’ main effort. A pair of U.S. Army units, the 1st Cavalry Division on the left and the 2d Infantry Division on the right, would guard the Marine flanks. Hongchon, an important communications hub located in the shadow of towering Oum Mountain, about five miles north of the line of departure, was the initial Marine objective. The coarse terrain included formidable Hill 930 and consisted of thickly wooded hills and swift-flowing streams. There were so few roads and trails that gravel-bottom streambeds were often pressed into use as roadways. The only thoroughfare (single-lane National Route 29) passed through Kunsamma Pass as it wound its way north to Hongchon from Hoengsong, and it initially served as the regimental boundary line inside the Marine zone. Intermittent snow, cold nights, and rainy days meant that the weather would continue to be a factor with which to be reckoned. The Marines in Korea, just as had Napoleon’s army in Russia a century-and-a-half before, would have to deal with “General Mud” as well as enemy soldiers.

The 1st Marine Division mission was to seize all objectives and destroy all enemy south of Line.
North of Hoengsong. The cold weather and sticky mud were as difficult to overcome as was the enemy during Operation Killer.

Albany, then seize Hongchon and destroy all enemy south of Line Buffalo and be prepared to continue the attack to Lines Cairo and Idaho on order, with operations commencing at 0800 on 7 March. One regiment would constitute the corps reserve and would be under the operational control of the IX Corps commander during the latter portion of the operation. The 1st Marine Division would advance up the Hoengsong-Hongchon axis with “two up and one back.” General Smith initially placed 1st and 7th Marines in the assault and earmarked the 5th Marines as the reserve. The two assault regiments (7th on the left and 1st on the right) were to advance astride Route 29 with all three battalions on line whenever possible. The difficult supply situation left Colonel Joseph L. Winecoff’s 11th Marines short of artillery ammunition, so an emergency agreement between Major General Field Harris, Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, and Major General Earl E. Partridge, Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, temporarily placed a Marine fighter squadron in direct support of the 1st Marine Division.

The operation started as ordered. The Marines advanced in the afternoon snow against only light resistance, primarily small arms and mortar fires. The enemy once again relied upon delaying tactics, opening fire at long range to slow the attackers then withdrawing before close combat could be initiated. Additionally, Marine tankers noted increased use of road mines. During the first three days awful weather and difficult terrain were the main obstacles. The Marine attack was finally stopped in place by orders from above which halted the advance on 9 March until flanking units could catch up. The next two days were devoted to reconnaissance and security patrols as the division marked time. On 11 March, the Marines resumed the advance. This time the enemy put up a stiff fight in the 1st Marines zone, and the 1st Battalion had to use artillery and tank guns to reduce log bunkers atop Hill 549 before that position fell. This single battle cost the Marines more casualties (one killed and nine wounded) than had been inflicted in the previous five days (seven wounded). The first phase of Operation Ripper ended on 13 March when the 1st Marine Division successfully occupied all of its objectives on Line Albany.

General Ridgway decided to change tactics for the next phase of Ripper. This time he opted to maneuver instead of slugging forward on a single line. His plan was a complex one. He decided to try an airborne drop north of Hongchon to be coordinated with a double envelopment by the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Cavalry Division, but this bold strike never came about because the Chinese 39th Army slipped away before Ridgway’s trap could be slammed shut. The reasons for this were divulged in a later intelligence find. A captured CCF directive indicated the enemy had adopted a “roving defensive” whereby units were no longer to hold at all costs, but should defend using movement to entice the United Nations Command to overextend itself as it had the previous November so the CCF could launch a “backhand” counteroffensive to isolate and annihilate the U.N. vanguard. It was a good scheme, but the wily Ridgway did not take the bait. Instead of mounting a headlong rush, his offensives continued to be strictly

Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, commanding Marine Observation Squadron 6, discusses the tactical situation with Col Richard W. Hayward, commanding officer of the 5th Marines. The high-wing, single-engine OY-1 Sentinel in the background was used primarily as an artillery spotter.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A131207
to the 38th Parallel.

"buttoned up" affairs.

In the 1st Marine Division zone, General Smith retained the same basic plan of attack. The 1st and 7th Marines would mount the assault, and the 5th Marines, now commanded by Nicaragua-veteran and World War II Marine parachutist Colonel Richard W. Hayward, would be the reserve. As before, the Marine advance on 14 March moved forward against almost no resistance. The 7th Marines did not need to call for artillery or close air support, and the 1st Marines encountered only scattered fire as it moved forward. General Ridgway’s hopes of cutting off the enemy at Hongchon were dashed when an intercepted message from the enemy commander reported, "We must move back . . . . Enemy troops approaching fast," before the planned airdrop could be made. True to his word, General Liu Chen’s troops were long gone by the time a motorized patrol from Major Sawyer’s 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, entered the devastated town of Hongchon. Although the patrol located no enemy, it did discover a large number of "butterfly" bomblets dropped by U.S. Air Force aircraft. These deadly missiles so inundated the area that it took Captain Byron C. Turner’s Company D, 1st Engineers, and all available division personnel three days to locate and disarm most of the explosive devices before they could produce casualties. The 7th Marines also found a treasure trove: three ammunition dumps that yielded more than two thousand small arms; a dozen heavy machine guns; a dozen mortars; a dozen recoilless rifles; numerous captured U.S. weapons; assorted demolitions; and four dozen cases of ammunition. This was one of the biggest finds of the war.

When the 7th Marines attacked the high ground north of Hongchon on the 15th, the 2d and 3d Battalions ran into a buzz saw. 120mm mortars and 76mm antitank guns pinned them down as they approached Hill 356. This Chinese fire was unusually accurate and intense, so much so that three 81mm mortars were knocked out. Likewise, the enemy was holding firm at Hills 246 and 248 in the 1st Marines zone. Lieutenant Colonel Robert K. McClelland’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, performed an extremely complicated maneuver when it moved from the right flank on the east across the entire zone behind the front lines, trucked up to the village of Yangjimal in the 7th Marines zone.

A 81mm mortar crew fires in support of an attack. Under the leadership of a sergeant, a mortar squad was composed of seven Marines and was known as the infantry commander’s "hip pocket" artillery.
on the west, then dismounted for a difficult overland march to join the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, for the assault on Hill 248. Unfortunately, the ensuing joint attack—including an air strike by Corsairs of Marine Fighter Squadron 214 and plentiful mortar and artillery fire—was not successful. After suffering about 100 casualties, the Marines pulled back to Hill 246 as darkness closed in. Another rifle battalion joined the assault force when Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Kennedy’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, was attached to the 1st Marines that night. Fortunately, a morning assault by the 1st Marines the next day found Hill 248 undefended. Back in the 7th Marines’ zone the 1st Battalion had to clear Hill 399 with hand grenades and bayonets on its way to Line Baker.

Despite the progress, IX Corps complained of the lack of speed in the advance. General Smith pointed out that the division was “making a conscientious effort to comply with the Army’s directive to keep buttoned up and comb the terrain.” “This takes time,” he said. Smith asked if there was any relaxation of the Army directive. General Hoge’s answer was “No,” but he still wanted more speed. On 17 March, Hoge ordered the 1st Marine Division to continue the attack to Line Buffalo and beyond. To comply, Smith moved the 5th Marines up on the left and pulled the 7th Marines out of the line. The 5th Marines advanced against scattered resistance and reached Line Buffalo without a major fight. In fact, no Marine in that zone was killed or wounded in action for three straight days. The CCF had pulled back, but left elements of the 12th NKPA Division behind to delay the Marines. The biggest engagement occurred on 19 March in the 1st Marines’ zone. There, the enemy was well dug in on a series of north-south ridges joining Hills 330 and 381. Fortunately, the terrain allowed the tanks of Captain Bruce F. Williams’ Company B, 1st Tank Battalion, to support the 2d Battalion attack. After F4U Corsairs from Marine Fighter Squadrons 214 and 323 delivered napalm and high explosive bombs on suspected enemy entrenchments, artillery pounded the objective, then tanks moved up on each side of the ridge keeping pace with the advancing infantry. The powerful 90mm tank guns eliminated enemy bunkers with very accurate direct fire as their machine guns kept enemy heads down. This coordinated direct fire allowed the rifle companies to successfully leapfrog each other over the next couple of days. This formula was so successful that the NKPA finally panicked on 20 March. At that time the enemy fleeing Hill 381 were hammered by supporting arms and infantry fires until they were virtually wiped out. With the end of that action the 1st Marine Division was ready to renew the attack.

The advance to Line Cairo was made with Colonel Kim’s 1st KMC Regiment, once again attached to the 1st Marine Division. This allowed General Smith to use three regiments (5th Marines, 1st Korean, and 1st Marines) on line. The 7th Marines was placed in corps reserve. The 5th Marines made it to Line Cairo without serious opposition, but this was not true for the 1st Marines or the Korean Marines. The Koreans relied upon aerial resupply as they moved forward in the undulating and trackless central sector. The biggest fight took place when the Korean regiment, supported by Major Jack C. Newell’s 2d Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel William McReynolds’ 3d Battalion, 11th Marines, fought a three-day battle to capture Hill 975. The position finally fell to a flanking maneuver. On 22 March, the 1st Marines encountered some fire from Hills 505, 691, and 627 before reaching the Idaho Line where it made contact with the U.S. Army’s 38th Infantry Regiment. Elements of the
1st Marines encountered some stiff resistance at Wongo-ri in the Tuchon-Myon hills while patrolling on the 27th. Two days later, the 1st Marines and the Korean Marine regiment extended their lines north to the New Cairo Line without a fight and brought Operation Ripper to a close.

On 31 March, the 1st Marine Division mustered 21,798 men in addition to 3,069 Korean Marines and 234 attached U.S. Army soldiers. Most Marines were at Hongchon, but some service support detachments were located farther back at Masan, Pohang, and Wonju. Unfortunately, when the artillery ammunition crisis abated Marine air once again reverted to Fifth Air Force control, and Marine aviators were no longer in direct support of their comrades on the ground. In two major operations (Killer and Ripper), the 1st Marine Division suffered 958 combat casualties (110 killed and 848 wounded), while inflicting an estimated 7,000 enemy casualties and capturing 150 enemy prisoners. For five weeks the Marines spearheaded each of IX Corps' advances from Wonju to Chunchon and lead the Eighth Army in ground gained during that time.

Although the men at the forward edge of the battlefield did not yet realize it, the nature of the Korean War had changed radically. In fact, strategic discussions now centered on whether to once again invade North Korea or not and, if so, how far that penetration should be. The military situation was so favorable that U.N. diplomats actually began to entertain the notion that the other side might be ready to ask for an armistice if the pressure was kept up. The most controversial element of strategy thus became what to do when U.N. forces reached the 38th Parallel. After much high-level discussion, American national command authorities agreed to go ahead and cross, but they warned General Douglas MacArthur that the conclusion of the next offensive would probably mark the limit of advance. Concurrently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the U.N.
commander that, since these actions would terminate maneuver warfare, a diplomatic settlement to end the conflict after all pre-war South Korean territory had been liberated would be pursued. Unfortunately, these high hopes for an early end to the fighting were dashed by General MacArthur's imprudent public ultimatum demanding that the enemy either stop fighting or face annihilation. This presumptuous announcement on 24 March had several far-reaching effects. First, it so offended the Communists that it torpedoed some promising secret negotiations and actually triggered an aggressive battlefield response. Second, this action also sowed the seed that later sprouted into one of the most famous controversies in American military history.

Operations Rugged and Dauntless

All of Operation Ripper's terrain objectives had been taken, but General Ridgway felt not enough punishment had been meted out and this, coupled with a desire to secure a more defensible line, led him to continue offensive operations without a break. This time he envisioned a "double whammy" in the form of Operations Rugged and Dauntless. The goal of Rugged was to carry the Eighth Army back above the 38th Parallel to occupy a trans-peninsular defense line anchored upon the centrally located Hwachon Reservoir. Dauntless, on the other hand, was to be a spoiling attack to threaten the enemy's major staging area located northwest of Hwachon. This was the so-called "Iron Triangle" that included the terminus of several railway lines running down from Manchuria and incorporated the intersection of all major roads in north-central Korea. Its forested flat lands were bounded by protective ridges and included the towns of Chorwan, Pyonggang (not to be confused with the North Korean capital of Pyongyang), and Kumhwa. The geographic shape of the road net connecting these towns gave the Iron Triangle its name.

The battlefield situation was very complicated. Eighth Army intelligence officers were not sure if the enemy was going to defend in place along the former international dividing line or continue to give ground. Large troop movements into the Iron Triangle had been noted, but it was a point of contention as to whether these were part of a Communist "rotation" policy or if they constituted an offensive build up. (Actually, both events were occurring simultaneously; worn out elements of the CCF Fourth Field Army were moving back to Manchuria while the fresh CCF Third Field Army was entering Korea.) Unsure of enemy intentions, General Ridgway ordered a cautious advance, but warned his corps commanders to be ready to fall back to prepared defensive lines if ordered to do so. Ridgway's primary intent was to seize Line Kansas, a phase line purposely drawn so that it included the best defensive terrain in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel. In IX Corps' zone this line carried eastward from the Imjin River to the western tip of the Hwachon Reservoir and included that body of water's southern shoreline. IX Corps' axis of advance was to be about a dozen miles almost due north from Chunchon astride the Pukhan River using National Route 17 as the main supply route. The terrain in this zone was uneven. It was mostly flat west of the Pukhan River, but high hills on the right dominated the approaches to the Hwachon Reservoir. The enemy was believed to be stay-behind elements of the CCF 39th Army, but it was uncertain if those forces would flee or fight.

On 29 March, Ridgway issued orders to initiate Operation Rugged. This time the hard-working Marines did not spearhead the attack as they had during Killer and Ripper. The U.S. 1st Cavalry and 6th ROK Divisions would carry that load, while the 1st Marine Division was IX Corps...
reserve. General Smith hoped his men could get some well-deserved rest after replacing elements of X Corps at Line Ready near Chunchon. An unusual exception was the 7th Marines, which was actually slated to participate in the drive north.

There was a small modification to the plan almost immediately. Instead of going into reserve, the 1st Marine Division (less the 7th Marines) was ordered to continue the attack. "This arrangement," noted General Smith, "gives me responsibility for 28,000 meters of front and I have for the time being no reserve." The 1st Marines became IX Corps reserve and moved back to Hongchon. The 5th Marines and the Korean Marines continued to move forward toward Line Ready. To do this the 5th Marines had to force a crossing of the Soyang River and seize Hills 734, 578, and 392 against moderate to heavy resistance. Once this was accomplished, elements of the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division took over, and the Marines began making their way back to the assembly area near Chunchon on the afternoon of 4 April for what promised to be five days off the firing line, the first real rest for the division since moving up from Pohang in mid-February.

On 1 April, the 7th Marines was placed under the operational control of Major General Charles D. Palmer's 1st Cavalry Division. The plan was for the division to advance about three miles from Line Dover to secure Line Kansas just north of the 38th Parallel. Colonel Litzenberg's regimental combat team, composed of the 7th Marines; 3d Battalion, 11th Marines; Company D, 1st Tanks; Company D, 1st Engineers; and various service detachments, was assigned the left (western) sector for the advance with specific

Hospital Corpsman Richard De Wert, USNR

Born in 1931 in Taunton, Massachusetts, Richard De Wert enlisted in the Navy in 1948. Following "boot camp" and Hospital Corps training at Great Lakes, Illinois, he was assigned to the Naval Hospital, Portsmouth, Virginia. Attached to the 1st Medical Battalion, 1st Marine Division, in July 1950, he participated in the Inchon, Seoul, and Chosin operations. On 5 April 1951, while serving with the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, on Hill 439 near Hongchon and the 38th Parallel, he gave his life while administering first aid to an injured Marine. His Medal of Honor award said, in part:

When a fire team from the point platoon of his company was pinned down by a deadly barrage of hostile automatic weapons fire and suffered many casualties, De Wert rushed to the assistance of one of the more seriously wounded and, despite a painful leg wound sustained while dragging the stricken Marine to safety, steadfastly refused medical treatment for himself and immediately dashed back through the fire-swept area to carry a second wounded man out of the line of fire.

Undaunted by the mounting hail of devastating enemy fire, he bravely moved forward a third time and received another serious wound in the shoulder, after discovering that a wounded Marine had already died. Still persistent in his refusal to submit to first aid, he resolutely answered the call of a fourth stricken comrade and, while rendering medical assistance, was himself mortally wounded by a burst of enemy fire.

The Secretary of the Navy on 27 May 1952 presented Corpsman De Wert's Medal of Honor to his mother, Mrs. Evelyn H. De Wert. The guided missile frigate, USS De Wert (FFG 45), bears his name.

—Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)
instructions to keep the main supply route clear, protect the ferry site, and maintain liaison with the 6th ROK Division.

Colonel Litzenberg closed his command post at Hongchon and moved it to the assembly area near Chunchon. By 1000 on 2 April, the lead element of the 7th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Wilbur F. Meyerhoff’s 2d Battalion, had crossed the line of departure and was moving up Route 17 with the other two battalions in trail. The attack proceeded against very light opposition, and no Marine casualties were reported. The major holdup was the time it took to ferry the Marines across the Pukhan River. Army amphibian trucks took the men across. Most large vehicles were able to ford the river, and smaller ones used rafts operated by an Army assault boat detachment. By the end of the day all objectives had been secured. The next day’s mission was to take an intermediate objective, Phase Line Troy. Again, all assigned objectives were reached, without enemy interference, by darkness on 3 April. The main stumbling blocks were torturous terrain, craters and debris blocking the road, and land mines.

The 6th ROK Division on the left moved up against virtually no opposition until it reached Line Kansas. Unfortunately, things did not go so smoothly in the 1st Cavalry zone of action where the enemy increased the pressure near the 38th Parallel and stubbornly held out in the hills south of Hwachon. While the 7th Marines had thus far encountered few enemy, the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments became entangled in a fierce slugging match and fell far

Truman Fires MacArthur

**National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC353130**

*Gen Douglas MacArthur greets President Harry S. Truman on his arrival at Wake Island for their October 1950 conference. Within five months the President would be forced to relieve his Far East commander.*

Fighting men in Korea, as were people all across the United States, were shocked to learn American President Harry S. Truman had relieved General of the Army Douglas MacArthur of his commands (Commander in Chief, Far East; United Nations Command; and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers) on 11 April 1951. This removal of America’s longest-serving warrior turned out to be one of the most controversial military decisions in American history. The President was well within his constitutional authority to depose a field commander, but Truman’s action initiated an acrimonious debate about both U.S. political leadership and America’s proper role in world affairs that deeply divided the country.

This incident was the result of long-standing policy disagreements about grand strategy and the ultimate purpose of military action. General MacArthur sought an absolute commitment to victory and felt anything less than surrender by the Communists was an unacceptable outcome of the conflict. President Truman, on the other hand, believed that Korea was only one theater in the Cold War and insisted the Communists would be deterred in other arenas if the viability of South Korea could be maintained. In short, the general wanted a military victory akin to those that ended the two World Wars, but the leader of the free world viewed Korea as a limited military action intended to achieve very specific diplomatic aims without embroiling the world in global warfare. President Truman framed the essence of this dispute when he wrote about Korea: “General MacArthur was willing to risk general war, I was not.”

The roots of the dispute began almost as soon as the United States became enmeshed in Korea. MacArthur bristled over what he considered political meddling in military affairs in August 1950, and then more frequent-
ity judgements. The general predicted, despite intelligence reports to the contrary, that China would not intervene in Korea; then, after his U.N. forces were roughly pushed out of North Korea, demanded measures well outside of the U.N. mandate (i.e. bombing Red China, blockading the Chinese coast, and intervention by Nationalist Chinese forces). His recommendations were immediately rejected by all allied nations even though MacArthur proclaimed failure to adopt his plan would mean the annihilation of the United Nations Command. MacArthur suffered a loss of face when his dismal forecast did not come true, but instead United Nations forces rolled back the enemy and regained the 38th Parallel without drastic measures in the spring of 1951.

The most egregious of MacArthur's forays into the diplomatic arena came when he purposely torpedoed secret peace feelers in late March 1951 by publicly taunting the enemy commander and threatening to widen the war. The near simultaneous publication of an earlier letter to Republican House Leader Joseph Martin, which many viewed as a thinly veiled attack on the Truman Administration that closed with the inflammatory statement, "There is no substitute for victory," finally brought the Truman-MacArthur controversy to a head. Thus, at half-past midnight on 11 April 1951, President Truman issued orders to recall General MacArthur.

This unexpected and seemingly rash act, spurred by the insensitive manner in which the relief was handled, created a firestorm on the home front. MacArthur returned from Korea a hero. He was welcomed across the country by an adoring public before he culminated his 52-year military career with a moving and eloquent speech to Congress. MacArthur's popularity was at an all-time high as he enjoyed his final triumph—a gala ticker tape parade through New York City—before, like the old soldier in his speech, he "faded away" by dropping out of the public eye. On the other hand, Truman's action was so controversial that his popularity dropped to an all-time low. The President's opponents flamed the fires of public dissatisfaction with the war when they demanded public hearings. These were held, but did not turn out as expected. In the end, the Senate reaffirmed the President's right to dismiss a subordinate and surprisingly vindicated Truman's decision after equally venerated General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asserted MacArthur's plan would have resulted in "the wrong war, at the wrong time, at the wrong place, and with the wrong enemy."

behind schedule as they battled their way north. Still, a milestone was achieved on 4 April when a Marine patrol from First Lieutenant Orville W. Brauss' Company B became one of the first Eighth Army units to recross the 38th Parallel. The 11th Marines fired 17 missions hitting some enemy troops in the open and peppering suspected emplacements with excellent results, and a four-plane flight scattered an enemy column.

The next day, the Marines became heavily engaged and had to fight their way forward for the next 48 hours. On 5 April, the 1st Battalion met very stiff resistance. Automatic weapons and mortar fire pinned down two companies. The 2d Battalion likewise met stubborn resistance and had to call for tank support to overrun its objectives. Navy Corpsman Richard D. De Wert, serving with Company D, was mortally wounded after fearlessly exposing himself to enemy fire four times and being hit twice as he dragged injured men to safety at Mapyong-ni. De Wert was awarded a posthumous Medal of Honor for his actions. Ten very accurate close air strikes coordinated with artillery fire enabled the Marines to push forward late in the day. Good coordination between the assault and support companies (Captain Jerome D. Gordon's Company D, Captain Merlin T. Matthews' Company E, Captain Raymond N. Bowman's Company F, and Captain William C. Airheart's Company G) provided textbook examples of infantry fire and maneuver. The next day enemy opposition was less formidable, but First Lieutenant Victor Stoyanow's Company I took a beating when it became pinned by automatic weapons fire in some low ground which was also zeroed in on by enemy mortars. There was no air support available because of weather (low-lying cloud cover, high winds, and heavy rain), but artillery counter-battery fire, as well as American tank and mortar fires, eventually silenced the enemy guns. The enemy suffered about 150 casualties trying to hold out. The Marines lost five killed and 22 wounded.

On the afternoon of 6 April, the 7th Marines finally reached the Kansas Line after some tough fighting. Twenty Marines were wounded during the day, most by enemy 76mm fire but some to small arms and mortars. With the Kansas Line reached, the men of Colonel Litzengberg's regiment patiently waited for the 1st Marine Division to relieve the 1st Cavalry. General Smith received orders to do so on 8 April, and the relief was tentatively slated for the 10th. General Ridgway also told General Smith that the 1st Marine Division (less the 1st Marines in corps reserve) would then attack north to seize the northwest end of the Hwachon Reservoir. The situation did not look promising. The 1st Cavalry Division had been stopped by