General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (Ret); the late General Keith B. McCutcheon, USMC; the late Major General Wilburt S. Brown, USMC; and the late Major General Thomas A. Wornham. During my research on General Thomas, Generals Krulak and Nickerson furnished me with personal papers and did so again on this project. A more extensive discussion of Marine Corps sources may be found in the Thomas biography and my *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1991).

The official documents and perspectives of the senior officers of the X Corps and 1st Marine Division do not provide a complete picture of the campaign of 1951 in human terms. With his complete cooperation, I used the story of Corporal Clarence Jackson Davis, USMCR, as a way to see the fighting from the perspective of the enlisted combat Marine. I focused on the experiences of a special group of Marine officers, the 7th Basic Class, those Marine lieutenants commissioned in the spring of 1950 who became the platoon commanders of 1st Marine Division in 1951. Their contribution began with an interview with Captain Frederick F. Brower, USMC (Ret) in 1998 and went on to access to Lieutenant General Charles G. Cooper, USMC (Ret) "Blood and Tears," an unpublished memoir; Mr. John E. Nolan, "Korea Comments," 11 December 1999; and interviews at the 50th Reunion of the 7th Basic Class (4-7 May 2000) with Colonel Earl T. Roth, USMC (Ret), Mr. Harold Arutinian, and Colonel David J. Hytrek, USMC (Ret).

For sardonic views of the campaign of 1951, see Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., *The Taking of Hill 610* (Eaglet Books, 1992); Lieutenant Colonel Gerald P. Averill, USMC (Ret), *Mustang: A Combat Marine* (Presidio Press, 1987); [Private First Class] Burton F. Anderson, *We Claim the Title* (Tracy Publishing, 1994); and [Sergeant] A. Andy Andow, *Letters to Big Jim Regarding Narrul Purigo, Cashinum Iman* (Vantage, 1994).

The official histories of the 1951 campaign for the Marine Corps and Army are much used and often-cited, but should not be used as scripture: Lynn Montross, Major Hubard D. Kuokka, USMC, and Major Norman Hicks, USMC, *The East-Central Front*, Vol. IV, *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953* (Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1962) and Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951* in *U.S. Army in the Korean War*, five volumes to date (Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1990) and Walter G. Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (1966), another volume in the same series. The Air Force official history is Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953* (rev. ed., Office of Air Force History, 1983). The documentation for the close air support controversy may be found collected in Subject File K239-04291-1, "Close Air Support," Research Archives, Air Power Historical Research Center, Air Force University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Allan R. Millett, "Korea, 1950-1953," in Benjamin F. Cooling, ed., *Case Studies in the Development of Close Air Support* (Office of Air Force History, 1990) covers the issues and the source material in detail. Lynn Montross, *Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. MarineCombat Helicopters* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954) is a popular account of HMR-161's Korean War service. A more conventional official account is Lieutenant Colonel Eugene W. Rawlins, USMC, *Marines and Helicopters, 1946-1962* (History and Museums Division, HQMC, 1976).

I visited most of the battle sites described in this study in 1994 and 1998, and I have profited from the advice of Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret) and Colonel Franklin B. Nihart, USMC (Ret), both veterans of the campaign in infantry battalions. Gunnery Sergeant Leo J. Daugherty III, USMCR, provided valuable research assistance.

About the Author

The Raymond E. Mason, Jr., Professor of Military History, Ohio State University, Allan R. Millett is a specialist in the history of American military policy and institutions. He is the author of four books: *The Politics of Interven-tion: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909* (1968); *The General: Robert L. Bullard and Officership in the United States Army, 1881-1925* (1975); *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (1980, revised edition, 1991); and *In Many a Strife: General Gerald C. Thomas and the U.S. Marine Corps, 1917-1956* (1993). His most recent book, co-authored with Williamson Murray, is *A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War* (2000). He also co-authored and co-edited several other works on military affairs and has contributed original essays to 25 books and numerous journals on American historiography, foreign and defense policy, and military history. A noted lecturer and officeholder in many prestigious military history societies, Dr. Millett is now president of the U.S. Commission on Military History.

A graduate of DePauw University and Ohio State University, Dr. Millett served on both active and reserve duty, retiring in 1990 with a rank of colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

STALEMATE
U.S. Marines from Bunker Hill to the Hook

by Bernard C. Nalty

On a typical night during 1952, a Marine patrol set out from the very center of a company position on the Jamestown Line in west-central Korea. The group was following the trace of an abandoned trench-line when a Chinese machine gun cut loose, killing the leader, wounding some of his men, and forcing the patrol to return without completing its mission of setting an ambush.

Shortly afterward, about two hours before midnight, Second Lieutenant William A. Watson, who had recently joined the 1st Marine Division, received orders to move out with a squad from his platoon and set up the ambush, finishing what the ill-fated patrol had begun. The powerful searchlight aimed skyward to warn airmen of the location of Panmunjom, where the United Nations forces were conducting truce talks with the North Korean and Chinese, reflected from the clouds creating the impression that Watson's patrol was "walking in bright moonlight."

The lieutenant and his men moved between the spine of a ridgeline and the trench they were following, watching carefully for signs of a Chinese ambush and maintaining enough space between Marines to minimize the effect of a sudden burst of fire. "Creep, sit, wait," Watson told his men. "Move on my order. A few feet and be still." The Marines were confident that their cautious advance, the 50 or so yards separating their route from the nearest concealment the enemy could use, the artificial moonlight, and the trench itself, which provided ready cover in case of an attack, would combine to prevent the Chinese from surprising them.

While two Marines provide protection by watching for enemy snipers, two other members of a patrol probe for mines. The Marines in the foreground wear armored vests. By November 1952 delivery of the new vests to the division was completed, including more than 400 sets of lower torso armor.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A160817



AT LEFT: *The 1st Marine Division engaged in static warfare during 1952 from typical segments of trench-line on the Jamestown Line.* Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A167091



The patrol drew no fire as it made its way to the objective, where the trench the two patrols had followed intersected with another shallower trench. Watson deployed the fire teams in a perimeter. The Marines strained their eyes and ears to detect movement over sandy soil that gleamed almost white in the cloud-reflected light. Nothing moved; Chinese mortars and machine guns remained silent.

At 0300 Watson's patrol started back, the fire team that had led the way out was now at the rear. The return, as cautious and methodical as the advance, took roughly two hours. When the lieutenant at last came through the wire, he realized he was soaking wet from perspiration, more from tension, he believed, than from exertion.

Fighting took place by day as well as by night, but an early morning attack often depended on preparations made under cover of darkness. For example, before Lieutenant Watson's platoon took part in an early morning attack on a Chinese outpost, Marine engineers moved out shortly after midnight to mark a path through the minefields protecting the Jamestown Line. This work took them past marshy ground inhabited by frogs that fell silent at the approach of the Marines, only to resume their croaking at about 0300 when the passage had been marked and the engineers returned to the main line of resistance. After daybreak, Watson's platoon advanced, staying between the lines of white-tape Xs that marked the presence of mines.

New Mission

The night patrol by Watson's Marines was one in a succession of probes and patrols—interspersed with attacks and counterattacks—that occurred during 1952 after the 1st Marine Division moved onto the Jamestown Line. The move there in March 1952 confirmed a shift to position warfare. Instead of making amphibious landings as at Inchon or Wonsan or seizing ground either to break out of encirclement or to advance, the division had the mission of defending its portion of the Jamestown Line and preparing to counterattack as ordered to contain or eliminate any Chinese penetration.

The enemy maintained pressure on the United Nations forces. He probed the line of combat outposts, which provided warning of attacks and disrupted or delayed them until the troops posted there could withdraw, and also tested at times the defenses of the main line

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A160928

A landing ship disgorges a Marine tank at Inchon during Operation Mixmaster, the deployment of the 1st Marine Division from east-central to western Korea.

of resistance. Because of the threat of a major Chinese offensive, the division assumed responsibility for two other lines, Wyoming and Kansas, which might serve as fallback positions if Jamestown should fail. More important than keeping the Wyoming and Kansas lines ready to be manned, was the division's mission, assigned on April 19, of standing by to rescue the United Nations truce negotiators, should the enemy try to trap them at Panmunjom.

Operation Mixmaster, the transfer of Major General John T. Selden's 1st Marine Division from X Corps positions in the vicinity of the Punchbowl in eastern Korea to the Jamestown Line north of the Imjin River under I Corps control, began on St. Patrick's Day, 17 March 1952. The division's major infantry units—the 1st, 5th, and 7th Marines, and the 1st Korean Marine Corps Regiment—the organic artillery of the 11th Marines, and the service and other support units moved over steep and twisting roads, with almost 6,000 truckloads required for the deployment. The heaviest equipment, totaling an estimated 50,000 tons, traveled on 63 flatbed trailers and 83 railroad cars, along with 14 Landing Ships Dock and Landing Ships Tank that sailed from Sokoho-ri and unloaded at Inchon. Two transport aircraft also figured in the move. By the time the division took over its segment of the Jamestown Line on 25 March, completing the relief of a Korean division, the officers who directed the move realized all too well how much excess equipment the unit had accumulated during the period of comparative stability that followed the capture of the Punchbowl in the summer of 1951.

Area of Operations

The segment of the Jamestown Line assigned to the 1st Marine Division extended southwest from the Samichon River and the left flank of the British 1st Commonwealth Division, crossed the 38th Parallel (the original demarcation between North and South Korea), shifted to the south bank of the Imjin in the vicinity of Munsan-ni,

The 5th Marines with reinforcing artillery, slowed by muddy roads, moves into its sector as the division occupied new positions along the Jamestown Line northeast of Seoul.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A160346



continued to the conflux of the Imjin and Han, and then followed the south bank of the Han past the Kimpo Peninsula. Initially, the 1st Marines, under Colonel Sidney S. Wade, held the right of the main line of resistance, the regiment's right flank on the heights beyond the Imjin River, some 1,100 yards north of the 38th Parallel. The 5th Marines, commanded by Colonel Thomas A. Culhane, Jr., held the center of the new line, with a regiment of Korean Marines on the left. Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz' 7th Marines served as division reserve. An adjustment in April resulted in the insertion of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion on the left of the Korean Marines.

The Kimpo Peninsula, bounded by the Han and Yom Rivers, complicated the defense of the 1st Marine Division's segment of the Jamestown Line, even though an attack there would require the Chinese to cross the broad and sometimes raging Han. Defending the peninsula became the mission of the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, led by Colonel Edward M. Staab, Jr., an improvised force made up of American and South Korean soldiers and Marines from a variety of combat and service units, with the 1st Armored Amphibian Battalion providing artillery support (thirty-six 75mm guns) and a battalion of the division reserve, at this time the 7th Marines, serving as a maneuver force.

The 1st Marine Division—including the Kimpo Provisional Regiment, the amphibian tractor battalion, the Korean Marines, and the two Marine regiments on line—defended some 60,000 yards, two to four times that normally assigned to a similarly reinforced division. Within the division, a battalion, one third of the infantry strength of a regiment, held a frontage of from 3,500 to 5,000 yards, while a rifle company, one-third the infantry strength of a battalion, could man a sector as wide as 1,700 yards. A line of outposts of varying strength located on hills as far as 2,500 yards in front of the main line of resistance, improved the security of the Jamestown positions, but forced the Marines to spread themselves even thinner along the front. To defend the division's broad segment of the Jamestown Line, General Selden commanded a total of 1,364 Marine officers, 24,846 enlisted Marines, 1,100 naval officers and sailors—mostly doctors, dentists, and medical corpsmen—and 4,400 Korean Marines.

The Imjin River, flowing southwest from the division's right flank, lay behind the main line of resistance until the defenses crossed the river west of Munsan-ni. Since only three bridges—all of them vulnerable to damage from floods—spanned the Imjin, the stream, when in flood, posed a formidable obstacle to the movement of supplies and reinforcements. A single rail line to Munsan-ni served the region and the existing road net required extensive improvement to support military traffic. The terrain varied from mountainous, with

sharp-backed ridges delineating narrow valleys, to rice paddies and mud flats along the major rivers. West-central Korea promised to be a difficult place for the reinforced but widely spread 1st Marine Division to conduct sustained military operations.

General Selden's Marines took over their portion of the Jamestown Line from South Korean soldiers manning an area that had become something of a backwater, perhaps because of its proximity to Kaesong, where truce talks had begun, and Panmunjom where they were continuing. "It was quite apparent," Seldon noted, "that the relieved ROK [Republic of Korea] Division had not been conducting an aggressive defense." As a result, the Marines inherited bunkers built to protect more against the elements than against enemy mortars and artillery. Korean noncombatants, taking advantage of the lull, had resumed farming in the area, moving about and creating concealment for possible Chinese infiltration.

To oppose the Marines on the Jamestown Line, the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) had the *65th* and *63d Armies*, totaling 49,800 troops. Probing the Marine outposts and the main line of resistance were an estimated 15 infantry battalions, equipped with small arms, automatic weapons, and mortars, and supported by 10 battalions of artillery, totaling 106 guns ranging from 75mm to 155mm. Unlike the defenses the Marines had inherited, the solidly built Chinese bunkers were protected by barbed wire, minefields, and other obstacles, and organized to provide defense in depth. A variety of automatic weapons, including 37mm guns, provided antiaircraft protection.

LtGen John W. "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, USA, I Corps commander, right, joins MajGen John T. Selden, center, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, and Col Thomas A. Culhane, left, commanding officer of the 5th Marines, on an inspection of the regiment's sector of the main line of resistance.

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A160325

1st Marine Aircraft Wing

Under the command of Major General Christian F. Schilt, who had earned the Medal of Honor during the Nicaraguan campaign for a daring rescue in January 1928, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing consisted of land- and carrier-based fixed-wing aircraft plus helicopters. The land-based fighter and attack squadrons, whether flying jets or propeller aircraft, came under the operational control of the Fifth Air Force, which in early 1952 was attempting to direct Marine Corps and Air Force activity from a Joint Operations Center at Seoul. With the exception of Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12), the components of the wing based in eastern South Korea remained there when the division moved westward. MAG-12's night fighter squadron, VMF (N)-513, shifted to the airfield at Kunsan, and the rest of the group, including two fighter outfits, began flying from Pyongtaek, also in April. Unlike the land-based fighter-bombers and attack aircraft—and the new jet-equipped photographic squadron, VMJ-1—the wing's helicopters, light observation planes, and carrier-based fighter-bombers directly supported the 1st Marine Division.

The inventory of Marine rotary-wing aircraft included Bell HTL-4 and Sikorsky HO3S-1 light helicopters and the larger Sikorsky HRS-1. The fixed-wing, piston-engine aircraft ranged in size from the unarmed, lightweight Cessna OE-1 to the Douglas AD-2 Skyraider the most powerful, heaviest, and deadliest single-engine attack plane of the era. Marines

Armistice Talks

During the summer of 1951, the succession of offensives and counteroffensives ended with the establishment of a line that stretched across the Korean peninsula generally along the 38th Parallel. The Chinese had suffered grievous losses after intervening in late 1950. Although they drove the United Nations forces out of North Korea, they failed to hold a bridgehead in the South that for a time included the capital city, Seoul. As the names of two United Nations counterattacks, Operations Killer and Ripper, indicated, the United States and its allies sought to inflict casualties rather than recapture ground. This strategy magnified the effect of the enemy's earlier losses and succeeded so well that Communist Chinese Forces (CCF)—and Chinese society, as well—needed a respite from the cumulative attrition of late 1950 and early 1951.

An armistice also seemed attractive to the United States for reasons of both strategy and domestic politics. The lengthening list of American casualties, and the continuation into a second and third year of a war described in November 1950 as on the verge of being won, undermined public support for the conflict, derisively described as Mr. Truman's war, as though the President had somehow started the fighting. In terms of strategy, Europe, where the Soviet Union and its satellites seemed ready to test the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), seemed more important than the Far East. Indeed, a ceasefire that would free American forces from their commitment in Korea, enabling them to strengthen NATO, should work to the long-term strategic advantage of the United States.

As a result, when the Soviet delegate to the United Nations, Jacob Malik, suggested discussing the possibility of negotiating an armistice in Korea, the United States and its allies agreed. The preliminary discussions began on 8 July 1951 at Kaesong, south of the 38th Parallel and some 35 miles northeast of Seoul. The Chinese and North Koreans showed little enthusiasm for negotiations until the United Nations, in July and August, mounted a limited offensive that resulted in the capture of the Punchbowl. On 25 October negotiations resumed at Panmunjom, a village just south of the 38th Parallel, which became a demilitarized island in a sea of fighting and was linked by a road to South Korean territory.

By the end of November, the negotiators had agreed that the battle line, rather than the 38th Parallel, would serve temporarily as the line of demarcation between the two Koreas, a boundary that became permanent, essentially by default as other issues took precedence in the negotiations. Military operations slowed, as did the pace of the talks, which, by the time the Marines entered the Jamestown Line, had encountered several obstacles, the most serious dealing with the repatriation of prisoners of war.

1stMarDiv Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Oct52

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A133271

BGen Clayton C. Jerome, right, the new commanding general of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, tours the front in a transport helicopter piloted by Col Keith B. McCutcheon, commanding officer of Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161. BGen Jerome replaced MajGen Christian F. Schilt in command of the wing on 12 April 1952.

also flew the Vought F4U-4 Corsair, a piston-powered fighter-bomber, a dozen of which operated from the escort carriers *Bataan* (CVL 29) and *Bairoko* (AKV 15), and later the light carrier *Badoeng Strait* (CVE 116). A more heavily armored version of the Corsair, the AU, served as an attack aircraft. The Marine Corps jets were the Grumman F9F Panther fighter-bomber, the McDonnell F2H-2P photo plane, and the Douglas F3D Skyknight, a two-seat night fighter. The Skyknight by year's end became the principal Marine night fighter, replacing the piston-engine Grum-man F7F Tigercat, which continued until the spring of 1953 to fly interdiction and close air support during darkness.

Like their fellow Marines on the ground, the airmen operated under restrictions peculiar to a limited war. Air strikes were prohibited in the vicinity of Panmunjom to avoid jeopardizing the truce talks. Moreover, to ease the task of the Joint Operations Center in exercising centralized control over tactical aviation, the number of close-support sorties flown over the battlefront could not exceed 96 each day. In general, the allocation of air power proved flexible enough to satisfy General Schilt. Although conceding that Marines on the ground "did not always get all that they wanted" because the wing was "sometimes . . . tied up with the Air Force," Schilt found that "if there was anything we particularly wanted to do and thought it necessary to support our ground forces, we'd go over and talk to them [representatives of the Fifth Air Force] and they'd go along with us."

Besides affecting aerial operations, the neutral zone around Panmunjom influenced the mission of the Marine division. On 19 April, General Selden, reacting to orders from higher headquarters, directed the regiment with the best access to Panmunjom to draft a plan to rescue the United Nations Truce Team if it should be trapped there. The regiment that fit this description, initially the 5th Marines, organized a tank-infantry team from within its reserve battalion. Supported by tanks and fire from mortars and artillery, a covering force would advance along the demilitarized corridor leading to the negotiation site and seize the dominant ground beyond Panmunjom so that a second group could move in and pick up the negotiators. A third contingent would escort the pick-up force as it brought the truce team to a safe area behind the Jamestown Line.

Artillery and Air

During the spring of 1952, the fighting along the Jamestown Line gradually intensified, requiring the support of artillery and aircraft. The 105mm and 155mm howitzers of the 11th Marines joined tanks and other weapons in battering Chinese

Battalion Tactical Air Control Party

On the Jamestown Line, the Tactical Air Control Party assigned to each battalion on the main line of resistance linked the ground forces with the aircraft supporting them. At this stage of the war, these parties consisted of two Marine Corps officers, both of them naval aviators, and eight enlisted men who handled radio and wire communications and drove the truck assigned to the group. Earlier in the fighting, the truck provided necessary mobility, but the controllers could now operate from command bunkers using radios located there instead of relying on the temperamental set mounted in the vehicle.

While the battlefront remained fluid, one officer served as a forward air controller with each of the two infantry companies, the third company normally being in reserve. After the move to the Jamestown Line, one of the officers took his place at a forward command post, usually a bunker more solidly built than those that sheltered the infantrymen, calling strikes in support of the Marines manning the defenses. The other remained at the battalion commander's supporting arms center, serving as air liaison officer. Every week or two, the airmen changed places.

positions. The artillerymen experimented successfully with variable-time fuses, actuated by radio waves. When fitted to a standard high-explosive shell, the fuse achieved airbursts at a height of about 20 meters above Marine defensive positions, which had overhead cover. Logs, sandbags, and earth protected the Marines, while a deadly hail of shell fragments scourged the attackers. Concentrations of variable-time fire, delivered in conjunction with so-called "box-me-in" barrages that placed a curtain of fire around friendly forces, became standard tactics. On 18 May 1952, for example, Chinese troops cut off a Marine platoon led by Second Lieutenant Theodore H. Watson, as it withdrew from the outpost line. Watson shepherded his men into two abandoned bunkers and called for airbursts overhead, which helped scatter the enemy.

Marine aviation also supported operations along the Jamestown Line. In May 1952, the Fifth Air Force granted the Marines an additional dozen sorties per day to train controllers, ground commanders, and pilots in the techniques of close air support. Although the number of these daily training sources increased to 20, the program lasted only until 3 August, largely because of Army complaints that General Selden's division was getting a lion's share of close air support in the theater.

Stabilization of the battle line enhanced the value of ground-based radar in nighttime close air support. The Air Force had begun using an improvised system in January 1951, and September of that year marked the introduction into combat of the Marine-developed MPQ-14 radar. Despite nagging technical problems, the Marine radar and its operators became increasingly precise until, by mid-1952, the Fifth Air Force granted permission to use the MPQ-14, supplemented by a tactical air controller with the troops on the ground, to direct close air support.

One supporting arm, artillery, sometimes came to the aid of another, Marine Corps aviation. Even before the 1st Marine

Offshore Islands

Even before the Marines occupied positions on the Jamestown Line, they were involved in the defense of several offshore islands on the east and west coasts of Korea. The 1st Marine Division provided officers and enlisted men to direct the Korean Marines actually manning the defenses, but in January Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, took over, usually employing Marines who volunteered for this duty after recovering from wounds suffered while serving with the division. The West Coast Island Defense Unit bore responsibility for six islands astride the 38th Parallel, while the East Coast Defense Unit guarded nine islands, seven clustered around Wonsan, within artillery range of the mainland, and the other two near Songjin.

The eastern islands proved tempting to the Chinese, who occasionally took them under fire, and attacked the two Yang-do Islands, 160 miles northeast of Wonsan, where the South Korean defenders, backed by United Nations ships, beat off the invaders. In March, the United Nations Command sought to strengthen its hold on the western islands by seizing Ho-do, an unoccupied islet north of the 38th Parallel, even though it lay within range of enemy snipers on the mainland and might be attacked in winter by advancing across the ice. The occupation nevertheless went ahead, but a Chinese amphibious attack on the night of 25-26 March overwhelmed the South Korean platoon that held Ho-do. Only six members of the platoon survived, and the United Nations Command made no attempt to recapture the tiny island. The Chinese refrained from further amphibious activity, but instead struck back with a rare aerial attack, bombing Cho -do, one of the western islands, though ineffectually.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A161586

Marine 105mm howitzer crews of the 11th Marines prepare to fire in support of the Jamestown Line by "clobbering" Chinese command posts, bivouac areas, artillery and mortar positions, and observation outposts.

Division deployed to the Jamestown Line, the 11th Marines was firing flak suppression missions in support of close air strikes. The batteries tried to neutralize or destroy known antiaircraft positions, some of them discovered when aircraft began an attack only to break it off deliberately after forcing the Chinese guns to cut loose and reveal their locations.

Despite the doctrinal emphasis on close air support, in the summer of 1952 Marine pilots were attacking targets far beyond the battle line as a part of the Fifth Air Force's Operation Pressure, designed to destroy important North Korean industrial facilities. During one such mission, Colonel Robert E. Galer, who commanded MAG-12 in Korea and had earned the Medal of Honor at Guadalcanal in World War II, led 31 attack aircraft against targets in the mountains southwest of Wonsan. His Vought AU Corsair sustained damage from antiaircraft fire that forced him to parachute. One foot became wedged in the cockpit, but he managed to kick free of the doomed airplane, which almost ran him down in its gyrations. He succeeded, however, in opening his chute and drifted to earth within 10 feet of his crashed aircraft. He got away from the wreckage, which was sure to attract the enemy, found concealment, and with his survival radio contacted a rescue force orbiting overhead. As a helicopter darted in his direction at treetop height, he ignited a smoke grenade to mark his position and enable the rescue craft to pick him up. The flight to a ship off the coast proved more dangerous than the actual pick up, for enroute to safety antiaircraft shells exploded so close that the concussion spun the helicopter around, fuel ran low, and patches of fog concealed landmarks making navigation difficult.

Ground Fighting Intensifies

The Marines and the Chinese soon began clashing over the high ground between the frontlines that could accommodate combat

Gen Holland M. Smith, a leader of the amphibious war against Japan and whose Marines fought their way from Tarawa to Okinawa, visits the Jamestown Line in Korea. From the left are: Col Russell E. Honsowetz, commander of the 7th Marines; Col Frederick P. Henderson, commander of the 11th Marines; Gen Smith; and MajGen John T. Selden, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A161123

outposts or observation posts. A series of objectives that the Marines designated by letters of the alphabet became a bone of contention early in May. These were Objective S, a small outcropping northwest of the main line of resistance, and V, X, Y, and Z, three separate peaks on a ridge extending northeastward from S and forming an angle of roughly 45 degrees with the main line of resistance. As part of the continued probing that occurred almost every night, First Lieutenant Ernest S. Lee, commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, led his unit, reinforced with light and heavy .30-caliber machine guns, to occupy the high ground south of Objective Y, arriving there before sunrise on 4 May. The Chinese immediately opened fire with mortars, but an aerial observer spotted a half-dozen of the weapons and called in Marine F4U-4Bs that destroyed them. The enemy then attacked unsuccessfully, but since more powerful attacks seemed certain, the reinforced platoon pulled back.

Twice during the withdrawal, Chinese troops tried to ambush the patrol, which used its own weapons to beat off the first attempt and called down artillery fire to help frustrate the second. Forced from their route by the second ambush, Marines carrying the patrol's casualties, one dead and four wounded, entered an unmarked and uncharted minefield left behind by United Nations troops; two stretcher bearers were killed and three others wounded by the mines, which later were cleared.

Colonel Thomas A. Culhane, in command of the 5th Marines, directed the 1st Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Franklin B. Nihart, to drive the enemy from the vicinity of Objective Y, in the process taking prisoners and inflicting casualties, before seizing Objective Z. Nihart decided to capture Objectives S, V, and X before attacking Objective Y; if all went well, he could then move against Z.

Nihart used his battalion's Company C to feint toward Objective T, located between the ridge and the Marine division's main line of resistance, in an attempt to neutralize the Chinese there and prevent them from interfering with the attack, which began when Company A, the 1st Platoon leading the way, quickly overran Objective S. Fire from the Marine division's rocket battery shook the defenders of Objective V, enabling the attackers to capture it. Both Marine and Chinese artillery stepped up their firing as the Nihart's men reorganized to advance on Objective X. In preparation for that move, friendly fire from artillery, mortars, tanks, and even machine guns scourged the knob raising a cloud of dust that enveloped it and blinded the attacking Marines, who encountered increasingly savage fire as they climbed the slope.

At this point, the Chinese counterattacked. Although the Marines beat back this thrust, other probes followed, as infiltrators tried to isolate the 1st Platoon from the rest of Company A. To maintain the integrity of his unit, the company commander, First Lieutenant Ernest S. Lee, pulled back the endangered platoon, while Chinese artillery rained fire on Objective X, some 400 rounds exploding in five minutes. The deadly fire forced Company A to abandon the toehold on X and then fall back to the main line of resistance under the cover of fire from the division's tanks. The Marines, however, set up a part-time outpost on

Marines on patrol forward of the main line check out a cache of enemy ammunition found in an abandoned farmhouse. In addition to denying the enemy use of critical terrain, inflicting casualties and capturing prisoners were added tasks assigned to daily patrols.

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-442340



Objective Y, at first manning it mostly during daylight. In the bloodiest single day of fighting since the capture of the Punchbowl, the Marines suffered seven killed and 66 wounded, perhaps one-fourth the number of the Chinese casualties.

The fighting now shifted eastward. After relieving the 5th Marines, the 7th Marines, commanded by Colonel Russell E. Honsowetz, attacked Hill 104 and the adjacent ridgeline, located on the regimental right. Advancing during darkness on the early morning of 28 May, Companies A and C of Lieutenant Colonel George W. E. Daughtry's 1st Battalion, seized their objectives but could not hold them against fierce Chinese reaction and fell back to the Jamestown Line. The fighting proved costlier than the struggle for Objectives S, T, V, W, and X, with seven Marines killed and 107 wounded. Two of those killed in action were honored posthumously with the Medal of Honor: Corporal David B. Champagne for throwing himself on a grenade to save the lives of other Marines; and Private First Class John D. Kelly for sacrificing his life while gallantly attacking enemy positions.

Despite the developing stalemate, the Marine division continued probing, sending out patrols as large as a company to raid Chinese positions, killing or wounding the defenders and keeping the enemy off balance. Both American and South Korean Marines conducted these actions, and the Chinese retaliated in kind, as on the night of 24 June, when they cut off the elements of the 5th Marines manning an outpost on Objective Y, now redesignated Hill 159. Hostile mortar and artillery fire prevented the Marines from withdrawing over the trails leading back to the Jamestown Line, but they were able to take cover in their bunkers while fire from the 11th Marines helped frustrate the attack. The Marines could not hold the hill against a determined enemy, and by the end of the month, a Chinese battalion occupied it.

The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, used its Company G to attack Hill 159, occupying an assault position on the night of 2 July and attacking at dawn of the following morning. The first phase went smoothly, and the assault began at 0630. Deadly fire from the battalion holding Hill 159 stalled the attack until the leader of a Marine machine gun squad, Staff Sergeant William E. Shuck, Jr., took over a rifle squad whose leader had been wounded. Shuck maneuvered the combined squads up the hill and clung to the exposed position until ordered to withdraw. While pulling his Marines back, the sergeant suffered a third and fatal wound. Shuck's daring and initiative earned him a posthumous Medal of Honor, but the hill remained in Chinese hands, even though the defenders may have suffered 200

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A162789

On the forward slope of Outpost Yoke (Hill 159) exhausted members of the 34-man 5th Marines outpost relax on the morning of 25 June. The night before they withstood an assault on the position by an estimated enemy battalion, killing or wounding more than 100 Chinese soldiers.

casualties compared to four Marines killed and 40 wounded.

On the right of the division's line, the portion now held by the 5th Marines, Company A of the regiment's 1st Battalion overran two unoccupied outposts on the night of 2-3 July before receiving orders to return to the main line of resistance. A patrol from the regiment's 2d Battalion ambushed a Chinese patrol shortly before midnight on 2 July, suffering no casualties while killing six of the enemy and wounding eight. Another patrol from the same battalion set out shortly after dawn on 3 July and engaged in an hour-long firefight that killed or wounded an unknown number of Chinese at the cost of one Marine killed and 11 wounded.

Within the next few days, two ambitious operations would involve the 1st Marine Division. The first was Operation Firecracker, a fire mission planned for 4 July when I Corps would mass artillery fire on targets all along the battle line, timing the shoot so that all the shells would detonate within one minute, a technique known as time on target. The 11th Marines opened fire with its howitzers, and the 4.5-inch rocket battery joined in as did corps artillery, so that 3,202 shells detonated almost simultaneously on Chinese positions in front of the Marine division.

Besides thus helping celebrate Independence Day, the Marines took part, over General Selden's objections, in large-scale raids, directed by Major General Paul W. Kendall, USA, I Corps commander, to gather additional intelligence on Chinese defenses. The division's commanding general believed that his Marines were spread so thin that he could not pull together a force strong enough to conduct such a raid without jeopardizing the overall security of the Jamestown Line. Selden suggested that smaller patrols could obtain the necessary information with less risk. The Marine general also pointed out that 2,651 officers and enlisted men were in the process of returning to the United States and that their replacements would not be in place until 11 July. Although the British commander of the adjacent 1st Commonwealth Division, Brigadier C. N. Barclay, agreed that the more ambitious raids might well prove too costly for the results achieved, Selden's

One enemy soldier reached the Marine entrenchment at Yoke before being killed. He was armed with nothing but stick hand grenades carried in a belt under his arm and a gas mask, the first known instance of the enemy being equipped with masks in the division's sector of the line.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A162793

Corporal Duane E. Dewey

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A48747

Born in 1931 in Grand Rapids, Michigan, he enlisted in the Marine Corps Reserves in 1951. In Korea, he served as a machine gun squad leader with Company E, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, and was critically wounded near Panmunjom on 16 April 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

> When an enemy grenade landed close to this position, while he and his assistant gunner were receiving medical attention for their wounds during a fierce night attack by numerically superior hostile forces, Corporal Dewey, although suffering intense pain, immediately pulled the corpsman to the ground and, shouting a warning to the other Marines around him, bravely smothered the deadly missile with his body, personally absorbing the full force of the explosion to save his comrades from possible injury or death.

The survivors of his heroic self-sacrifice never forgot his remarkable shout, as he threw himself on the grenade, "Doc, I got it in my hip pocket!" After presenting the Medal on 12 March 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower told him: "You must have a body of steel."

Corporal David B. Champagne

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A240117

Born in Wakefield, Rhode Island, in 1932, Corporal Champagne enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1951. Serving as a fire team leader with Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, he was killed on 28 May 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

> Corporal Champagne skillfully led his fire team through a veritable hail of intense enemy machine-gun, small-arms and grenade fire, overrunning trenches and a series of almost impregnable bunker positions before reaching the crest of the hill and placing his men in defensive positions. Suffering a painful leg wound while assisting in repelling the ensuing hostile counterattack, which was launched under cover of a murderous hail of mortar and artillery fire, he steadfastly refused evacuation and fearlessly continued to control his fire team. When the enemy counterattack increased in intensity, and a hostile grenade landed in the midst of the fire team, Corporal Champagne unhesitatingly seized the deadly missile and hurled it in the direction of the approaching enemy. As the grenade left his hand, it exploded, blowing off his hand and throwing him out of the trench. [He was] mortally wounded by enemy mortar fire while in this exposed position.

Corporal Champagne's Medal of Honor was presented to his younger brother during ceremonies held in July 1953 at the Old Mountain Baseball Field in Wakefield.

Private First Class John D. Kelly

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A403015

A 23-year-old native of Youngstown, Ohio, he enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1951. As a radio operator in Company C, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, he volunteered to join an assault and was killed on 28 May 1952. His Medal of Honor citation reads, in part:

> Fearlessly charging forward in the face of a murderous hail of machine-gun fire and hand grenades, he initiated a daring attack against a hostile strongpoint and personally neutralized the position, killing two of the enemy. Unyielding in the face of heavy odds, he continued forward and single-handedly assaulted a machine-gun bunker. Although painfully wounded, he bravely charged the bunker and destroyed it, killing three of the enemy. Courageously continuing his one-man assault, he again stormed forward in a valiant attempt to wipe out a third bunker and boldly delivered point-blank fire into the aperture of the hostile emplacement.
> —Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

National Archives Photo (USMC) 127-N-A161138

Marines hug the trench as a Communist mortar lands nearby. Marine Corsairs were often called upon to destroy troublesome enemy mortar positions in support of the division outpost line.

arguments for waiting until his division returned to full numerical strength and in the meantime dispatching smaller patrols did not prevail.

A tank-infantry team made the Marine division's contribution to large-scale patrolling with Buckshot 2B, an operation launched on 6 July. At 2200, two companies of Lieutenant Colonel Daughtry's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, supported by elements of the 1st Tank Battalion, advanced against Hill 159. The assault force braved deadly fire to gain a lodgment on the hill. Because they were in danger of encirclement, the Marines had to pull back before daylight. General Selden had been correct; the intelligence gained did not justify the effort and the casualties—12 dead, 85 wounded, and five missing. Until the incorporation of

The war on the Jamestown Line became a battle for the combat outposts that provided security for the main line of resistance. These Marines are preparing to join in the fighting on the outpost line.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A163311

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A164200

Marine observers direct an air strike on Hill 122, later called Bunker Hill, a Communist position critical to the fighting.

replacements had restored the strength of the division, emphasis shifted to smaller patrols with less ambitious objectives than raiding a stoutly defended hill.

Siberia

The bunker symbolized the fighting along the Jamestown Line and its combat outposts like Siberia. To build bunkers for future fighting, Marine engineers and truck drivers, and some 500 members of the Korean Service Corps, cut trees, shaped timbers, and hauled the rough-hewn beams some 50 miles to the sector held by the 1st Marine Division. When some 35,000 timbers proved insufficient, the Eighth Army made up the difference, and work went ahead on the Jamestown Line, its combat outposts, and the two back-up lines, Wyoming and Kansas. Although a company of Marine engineers, assisted as necessary by members of the 1st Shore Party Battalion, provided supervision, infantrymen did most of the work, following plans prepared by the Army for the assembly of the ready-cut timbers. The Marines set up each standard bunker in a hole 12-feet square and seven-foot deep, excavated using shovels, without the aid of earth-moving machinery. Once the timbers were in place, some of them shaped from tree trunks eight inches in diameter, and the basic structure finished, the Marines covered the roof, some four feet of timbers, with another three or four feet of earth, rock, and sandbags. If carefully built, the structure could withstand a direct hit from a 105mm shell, besides affording protection against shrapnel from time-fused shells exploding overhead. The living bunker provided sleeping quarters and the fighting bunker featured firing ports for machine guns and rifles.

Bunker construction failed, however, to keep pace with plans or achieve the desired degree of protection. Fatigue contributed to the shortcomings, since the infantrymen who by day dug holes and manhandled timbers into

PFC James McIntosh of Company H, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, aims a .50-caliber machine gun with mounted scope at Communist positions from Hill 229. The 750-foot-high Paekhak Hill, a mile east of the road leading to Panmunjom and Kaesong, was the goal of Communist forces who hoped to acquire the dominant terrain necessary for controlling access to Seoul.

National Archives Photo (USA) 111-SC411556