The first major surprise of the post World War II years came into play when in late June 1950, the United States found itself responding in crisis fashion to the North Korean invasion of the new republic of South Korea, just four years and nine months after VJ-Day. The nation became involved in Korea as a result of the Cairo and Yalta conferences in which the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the concept of a free and independent post-war Korea. Included in the agreement was a joint occupation of the country by the two powers, with the Soviets north of the 38th Parallel and the United States south. The concept of the occupation had a general objective of settling down Korea for a period so that it could learn to govern itself as a nation after many decades of Japanese rule. As the United States was painfully learning, however, it soon became apparent that what the Soviets said was one thing and what they intended was quite another with respect to a free, independent, and democratic Korea. When in 1948, they refused to participate in elections, supervised by the United Nations to form the first National Assembly, the hopes for a united Korea died. The Soviets formed a separate Communist state in their sector, the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea. With the elections completed for the National Assembly in the south, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established and the United States trusteeship in the country came to an end.

On 25 June 1950, the North Koreans attacked with nine well-equipped infantry divisions, spearheaded by one armored division equipped with Soviet-built T-34 tanks. The Republic of Korea’s army had been in existence for just about a year and could only oppose the invasion with four lightly-equipped divisions and one additional regiment. Needless to say, although there were some spirited but isolated small unit defensive actions, the Republic’s forces were no match for the invaders. The North Koreans reached out with rapidly advancing armored columns, moving almost at will during the first four days. Seoul fell on 28 June, and at that time, the ROK army had 34,000 troops missing, although many of them later returned to their units. With the capture of Seoul, the invaders halted to regroup and those ROK forces, which were still intact, fell back through Suwon to set up some form of new defensive positions. The South Korean government had displaced to Taejon well to the south when the fall of Seoul became imminent. This state of near collapse was the basic situation faced by the United States and the United Nations in the opening week of the war. It was the first...
The United Nations resolution, only three were opposed: the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

The United Nations participating pledges were substantial and included aircraft, naval vessels, medical supplies, field ambulances, foodstuffs, and strategic materials. In addition to the Army forces authorized by President Truman, a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast was ordered, and U.S. Air Force units based in Japan were authorized to bomb specific targets in North Korea. It is also important to note that these critical actions met with the whole-hearted approval of the American people. Americans also applauded the strong stance of the United Nations, and they repeatedly expressed their thoroughgoing pride in the responses of their nation to the seriously deteriorating international situation.

**Marine Brigade**

In response to urgent requests for American reinforcements from the Far East Command, and as a result of unit offerings and proposals from the United States, the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was activated on 7 July 1950. It was an air-ground team built around the 5th Marine Regiment and Marine Aircraft Group 33 (MAG-33), both based on the west coast at Camp Pendleton and Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, respectively. Brigadier General Edward A. Craig, with Brigadier General Thomas J. Cushman, a renowned and experienced Marine aviator, assigned as his deputy commander, commanded the brigade.

The time and space factors in the activation and deployment of the brigade were, to say the least, something extraordinary. Activated on 7 July, the unit was given...
at the same time a sailing date five to seven days later. In looking back at this first of the post-World War II surprises, it is again important to fully understand what the radical demobilization steps had accomplished. It is impossible to list them all in this short account, but it will suffice to point out that rifle companies were at two platoons instead of three, infantry battalions at two rifle companies instead of three, and deep cuts in normal logistic back-ups of all types of "ready" supplies of everything from ammunition to field rations were common. It also must be emphasized that normally, after the cutbacks and reductions following World War II, the division-wing teams on both coasts would have been very hard-pressed to deploy one reinforced brigade of regiment-group-sized in 30 days, let alone the seven days granted in this case. A super performance is simply a classic understatement for the mount-out of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to Korea.

In late June 1950, Marine Fighter Squadron 214 was the only Corsair squadron operating from El Toro. Marine Fighter Squadron 323 was in the process of returning to the air station following the

**Marine Corps Air Units and Primary Aircraft**

**Forward Echelon, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (July—September 1950)**

- Marine Aircraft Group 33
  - Headquarters Squadron 33
  - Service Squadron 33
  - Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (Vought F4U Corsair)
  - Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (Vought F4U Corsair)
  - Marine Night Fighter Squadron 513 (Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3D Skyknight)
  - Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2

**1st Marine Aircraft Wing (September 1950 – July 1953)**

- Headquarters Squadron 1
- Marine Wing Service Squadron 1
- Marine Wing Service Group 17
  - Headquarters Squadron 17
  - Marine Air Base Squadron 17
  - Marine Aircraft Repair Squadron 17
- Marine Aircraft Group 12
  - Headquarters Squadron 12 (Vought F4U Corsair, General Motors TBM Avenger)
  - Service Squadron 12
  - Marine Air Base Squadron 12
  - Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 12
- Marine Aircraft Group 33
  - Headquarters Squadron 33 (Vought F4U Corsair, General Motors TBM Avenger)
  - Service Squadron 33
  - Marine Air Base Squadron 33
  - Marine Aircraft Maintenance Squadron 33
- Marine Fighter Squadron 115 (Grumman F9F Panther)
- Marine Attack Squadron 121 (Douglas AD Skyraider)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 212 (Redesignated Marine Attack Squadron 212 on 10 June 1952)
  - (Vought F4U Corsair, Vought AU-1 Corsair)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (Vought F4U Corsair)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 311 (Grumman F9F Panther)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 312 (Redesignated Marine Attack Squadron 312 on 1 March 1952)
  - (Vought F4U Corsair)
- Marine Fighter Squadron 323 (Redesignated Marine Attack Squadron 323 on 30 June 1952)
  - (Vought F4U Corsair, Vought AU-1 Corsair)
- Marine Attack Squadron 332 (Vought F4U Corsair)
- Marine Attack Squadron 251 (Douglas AD Skyraider)
- Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 513 (Vought F4U Corsair, Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3D Skyknight)
- Marine Night-Fighter Squadron 542 (Grumman F7F Tigercat, Douglas F3D Skyknight)
- Marine Transport Squadron 152 (Douglas R4D Skytrain)
- Marine Ground Control Squadron 1
- Marine Air Control Group 2
- Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2
- Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1
- Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 3
- Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (McDonnell F2H-P Banshee)
- Marine Composite Squadron 1 (Douglas AD Skyraider)
- Marine Helicopter Transport Squadron 161 (Sikorsky HRS-1 Helicopter)
- Marine Observation Squadron 6 (Consolidated OY Sentinel, Sikorsky H03S Helicopter, Bell HTL Helicopter)
- 1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion
months of training at Camp Pendleton and on board the Essex-class carrier Philippine Sea (CV 47) off the California coast. Following its return, the aircraft and men of the squadron quickly prepared to deploy. The Black Sheep of Marine Fighter Squadron 214 likewise were in a high state of readiness, but had been "out of pocket" when the war broke out. The squadron was enroute to Hawaii on board the escort carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116), having been awarded the privilege of hosting the annual Naval Academy midshipman's cruise, when it received word of the North Korean invasion of South Korea. It was not long before the squadron's commanding officer, Major Robert P. Keller, was summoned to Headquarters Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at Camp Smith. After flying off the carrier, Keller met with Colonel Victor H. Krulak, Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.'s chief of staff. With a tone of dead seriousness only Krulak could project, he asked Keller: "Major, are you ready to go to war?" Keller, reflecting on the training and experience level of the squadron, assured him that the Black Sheep were ready. With no time to enjoy Hawaii, the midshipmen were offloaded and the carrier made a beeline back to California in anticipation of mobilization orders.

As can be readily imagined, Camp Pendleton and El Toro were twin scenes of mad confusion as Marines arrived hourly by train, bus, and plane, and "demothballed" equipment of all types arrived for marking and packing, literally at a rate measured in tons per hour. "Sleep on the boat" was the order of the day as the date of embarkation at San Diego and Long Beach for the first elements, 12 July, rapidly drew closer. By 14 July, all units were on board assigned shipping and underway westward.

At departure, the total strength of the brigade was 6,534. MAG-33 totaled 192 officers and 1,358 enlisted men, composed principally of the two fighter squadrons, VMF-214 and VMF-323, a night fighter squadron, VMF(N)-513, and an observation squadron, VMO-6. An important and historic component of VMO-6 was a detachment of four HO3S-1 Sikorsky helicopters, hurriedly assigned and moved to El Toro from the helicopter development squadron at Quantico, HMX-1. This was the first time that the United States Armed Services had actually deployed helicopters in a unit mounting out for combat service overseas, although a few had been

Marines of the wing's forward echelon receive their inoculations in early July at Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, before leaving for Korea on board the escort carrier Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) and transport General A. E. Anderson (AP 111).

The Badoeng Strait (CVE 116) was the carrier home from which the "Death Rattlers" of Marine Fighter Squadron 323 launched their initial Korean combat missions in August 1950.
tried out in both the European and Pacific theaters at the end of World War II on an experimental basis. Aircraft strength at deployment added up to 60 Vought F4U Corsairs, eight Consolidated OY “Sentinels,” and the four Sikorsky HO3S-1s.

By 16 July, the brigade commander and a key advance party took off by air for conferences and briefings at Honolulu and at the Far East Command in Tokyo. As these meetings progressed and the possibilities of immediate commitment on arrival of the main body came clearly into focus, an original plan to hold the brigade in Japan temporarily was abandoned. This was a result of the deteriorating position of the United Nations Command in Korea, which by the fourth week of the war had drawn into a perimeter-type defense of the port of Pusan at the southern tip of the peninsula. On 2 August, the brigade debarked at Pusan and on 3 August at 0600, departed Pusan for the front by rail and 50 borrowed Army trucks. MAG-33 shipping had been directed to Kobe when the force reached far eastern waters, and debarkation began there on 31 July. The fighter squadrons were flown off the Badoeng Strait to Itami near Osaka, where they were checked for combat by the ground crews and hastily transported overland from Kobe. With just one refresher hop at Itami, VMF-214, now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Lischeid, landed on board the escort carrier Sicily (CVE 118) for operations on 3 August, and on 5 August, Major Arnold A. Lund's VMF-323 returned to the Badoeng Strait for the same purpose. VMF(N)-513, under the command of Major Joseph H. Reinburg, was assigned to the Fifth Air Force for control and began shore-based operations from Itazuke Airfield on the southern island of Kyushu. Its mission was to provide night “heckler” operations over the brigade and the Korean combat area generally, while the two carrier-based units would provide close air support. To furnish the essential communications and tactical links for close air support and general direct support to the brigade, on arrival at Kobe a tank landing ship was waiting to reembark Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 (MTACS-2), led by Major Christian C. Lee, and the ground echelon of VMO-6, commanded by Major Vincent J. Gottschalk, for transport to Pusan. The aircraft of VMO-6 were readied at Kobe and Itami and ferried to Pusan by air. Thus the air-ground integrity of the brigade was
held intact as it entered its first combat less than 30 days after activation, a truly remarkable achievement.

**Pusan Perimeter Air Support**

At the time of the commitment to action of the brigade in early August 1950, the United Nations defense had contracted to a perimeter around the southernmost port of Pusan. It was vital that the perimeter contract no more, since the port was the logistic link to a viable base position in support of a United Nations recovery on the peninsula. In bringing this desirable outcome to reality, the brigade became known variously as the “Fire Brigade,” the “Marine Minutemen,” and other into the breach sobriquets. In the process of their month-in-the-perimeter employment, the Marines were accorded the honor of restoring the confidence of United Nations troops through destruction of the myth that the North Koreans were somehow invincible. Marine aviation carried its portion of the brigade load in this restoration of pride and stature, once again relying on its ability to operate afloat as well as ashore. Like the deployments on board the fast carriers in World War II, the basing of VMFs -214 and -323 on board the escort carriers Sicily and Badoeng Strait once again showed the lasting wisdom of the long-standing commonality policies between naval and Marine aviation.

From Sicily, in the form of eight Corsairs, came the first Marine offensive action of the war. Led by Major Robert P. Keller, the squadron’s executive officer, the eight VMF-214 Corsairs took off at 1630 on 3 August in a strike against Chinju and the Communist-held village of Sinhan-ni. Using incendiary bombs, rockets, and numerous strafing runs it was a more than suitable and impressive greeting for the previously almost unopposed North Korean troops. On the following day, 21 additional sorties were flown to help relieve the pressure on the Eighth Army southern flank. These struck at bridges, railroads, and troop concentrations in the Chinju and Sachon areas. With -214 continuing the march from
Against a backdrop of rugged Korean terrain, an OY Sentinel light observation aircraft of Marine Observation Squadron 6, piloted by the squadron's commanding officer Maj Vincent J. Gottschalk, spots concentrations of North Koreans


the deck of the Sicily, VMF-323 joined the fray from Badoeng Strait on 6 August with strikes west of Chinju along the Nam River, hitting large buildings and railroad lines with rockets and 500-pound bombs. Because the carriers were so close to the frontlines of the perimeter, the strikes could reach their targets in a matter of minutes at almost any point where support was requested. That the North Koreans realized something new had been added was apparent when on 11 August, -323 teamed up with North American F-51 Mustangs of the U.S. Air Force near Koseong in what became known as the "Kosong Turkey Shoot." In this action, the Corsairs hit a convoy of more than 100 vehicles of a North Korean motorized regiment, a mixed bag of jeeps, motorcycles, and troop-carrying trucks, stopping the convoy at both ends on the road. They got every one with the help of the F-51s. While hitting the jackpot in this manner was not an every-day occurrence, the daily sorties from the two carriers so conveniently nearby, began to climb in both number and effectiveness all along the length of the entire perimeter. MAG-33 aircraft were constantly orbiting on station over the frontline as the ground forces advanced, and communications within the air-ground team was steady from the Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP) with the battalions, all the way back to the brigade headquarters. The air support system, controlled by the active presence of Marine Tactical Air Control Squadron 2 and VMO-6 at brigade headquarters from 6 August on, worked to the wondrous amazement of the associated U.S. Army and other United Nations units.

The Fifth Air Force exercised overall control of tactical air operations in Korea, but Marine aviation units, as components of an integrated Fleet Marine Force, operated in support of the brigade as their highest priority, and in support of other United Nations units as a lower priority. The brigade control organization consisted of three battalion Tactical Air Control Parties and one regimental TACP, each consisting of one aviation officer, an experienced and fully qualified pilot, and six enlisted technicians. Each party was equipped with a radio jeep, portable radios, and remoting communications gear. In addition, there were the facilities and personnel of MTACS-2 at brigade headquarters, as well as the brigade air section of the staff, one officer and one enlisted. The air section was responsible for air planning, tactical control, and coordination of supporting aircraft. Lastly, but certainly of no lesser importance, there was also the brigade observation section consisting of the tactical air observer, three gunnery observers, and the light observation and rotary-wing aircraft of VMO-6. When supporting other United Nations forces, Marine air units operated under the Air Force-Army system for tactical air control.

The foregoing gives an abbreviated description of the brigade air support system, which operated very effectively through some of the most rugged fighting of the Korean War. The operations in the Pusan Perimeter basically were divided during the six-week period into three major actions. The first was the counterattack in the extreme southwest which ran approximately from 3 to 15 August, and was known as the Sachon offensive; the second was the First Naktong counteroffensive, from 16 to 19 August; and the third was the Second Naktong from 3 to 5 September. All three, rugged as they were, resulted in thorough defeats for the Communist forces but were not without cost to the
brigade: 170 killed, 2 missing, and 730 wounded. Estimates showed that the brigade had inflicted almost 10,000 casualties in killed and wounded on the enemy units faced in the six weeks of its participation in the perimeter operation.

Throughout these three vital actions the morale and confidence of the United Nations forces facing the North Koreans was restored. Marine air units of the brigade carried their part of the rebuilding process on a daily, and nightly, basis. In addition, Major Vincent J. Gottschalk's VMO-6 established so many “firsts” with its helicopters during the period that it was obvious that a major tactical innovation was in the making. The new steed that Brigadier General Craig, his chief of staff, Colonel Edward W. Snedeker, and G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Stewart, had discovered clearly indicated that the helicopter was fully capable of working a revolution in command observation, inspection, and staff procedures.

Most importantly, it was apparent from action in the Pusan Perimeter that the Marine Corps air-ground team concept was a winner. The tight knit integration of close air support into the ground scheme of maneuver proved to be devastatingly effective. From 3 August to 14 September 1950, the two squadrons of MAG-33 on board the carriers (VMFs -214 and -323) and the shore-based night fighters of VMF(N)-513, flew 1,511 sorties, of which 995 were close air support missions in response to requests from engaged ground troops.

The strikes by Marine aircraft not only decimated the enemy’s forces, but they rekindled the bond between air and ground that characterizes the Marine air-ground team. Ground Marines gained courage from seeing their fellow Marines in Corsairs swoop in to deliver ordnance oftentimes within 100 yards of the frontlines. The pilots became part of the fight on the ground and as a result gained a sense of pride and accomplishment in helping ground troops accomplish their mission. Captain John E. Barnett, one of the Corsair pilots summed up how aviators felt about their relationship with ground Marines: “With consummate conceit we doubted not that Marines were the best pilots supporting the best infantry, employing the best tactics; a brotherhood non-parallel. Pilots were in awe of the infantry, lavish praise from whom (regarding close air support) fed our ego.”

To sum up the air component performance in the perimeter, the words of General Craig said it all: “The best close air support in the history of the Marine Corps... outstanding in its effectiveness.” And from the envious viewpoint of an adjacent Army infantry regiment:

For the first time in any war helicopters were used on the battlefront as liaison aircraft and in evacuating the wounded. Although underpowered and hard-pressed to carry more than a pilot, crew chief, and one evacuee, the Sikorsky HO3S was relatively dependable.

The Marines on our left were a sight to behold. Not only was their equipment superior or equal to ours, but they had squadrons of air in direct support. They used it like artillery. It was 'Hey, Joe—This is Smitty—Knock the left off that ridge in front of Item Company.' They had it day and night. It came off nearby carriers, and not from Japan with only 15 minutes of fuel to accomplish the mission.

While there was literally no air opposition from the North Korean Air Force because it had been wiped out by the initial U.S. Air Force efforts at the beginning of the war, such accolades in addition to others were pleasant music to Marine aviation and to the brigade.
as a whole. The performance of the brigade was a vital factor in stopping the invasion in August. The punishment meted out to the North Korean units was so severe that it set them up for the crushing defeat, which followed in September.

**Inchon Landing**

The North Korean invasion of South Korea occurred while Lieutenant General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., was en route to Hawaii to take over as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific. He cut short his trip on 25 June when he received word of the North Korean action and immediately proceeded to San Francisco and then directly to Hawaii. Following a rapid succession of conferences and briefings, he was off to Japan for meetings with the Far East Command. History was truly made in one of these meetings at Far East Command in which General MacArthur and General Shepherd were the major participants. In a sense, it was a reunion between the two because a few years before on New Britain, General Shepherd had been the assistant division commander of the 1st Marine Division when it was under the operational control of General MacArthur. It had long been a plan of MacArthur's that should a serious overrun of any part of his forces occur, he would attempt to recoup through the use of appropriate delay followed by an amphibious landing in the enemy rear. This was the primary subject to be discussed in the 10 July meeting.

The upshot of this historic conference was that following General Shepherd's assurance that the 1st Marine Division could be made available, MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff for it, with appropriate air in the form of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. As it was approved, almost immediately, it was "less the Brigade units" which would revert to the division and wing upon their arrival in the theater. General Shepherd knew full well that the under-strength division could hardly deploy the reinforced 5th Marines to the brigade, let alone field the balance of the division, but he had an abiding and deep faith in the loyalty and performance potential of the Marine Corps Reserve. The Reserve, ground and air, came through like the proverbial gang-busters, and in less than 60 days after receiving the initial orders, both wing and division made the landing at Inchon on 15 September, just 67 days after the 10 July conference in Tokyo.

The response of the Marine Corps Reserve was so much a key to the success not only of Inchon, but also to the firm establishment of the United Nations effort in Korea. By about 20 July, the exchanges between Far East Command and Washington had settled out that what would be deployed for Inchon would be a war-strength 1st Marine Division and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. With the strengths of the two being only at 7,779 and 3,733 respectively, there was no way the war-strength manning levels could be reached and maintained without drawing heavily on both the ground and aviation organized Reserve contingents. Division war-strength ran about 25,000 and the wing about 9,500. On 19 July, President Truman authorized the mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve and things began to move at a record pace. Minimum time warnings went out to all Reserve District Directors, and alerts were given to Camp Pendleton, El Toro, Camp Lejeune, and Cherry Point to expect literally thousands of reservists in a matter of days. The first reservists arrived at Camp Pendleton and El Toro on 31 July, and by utilizing some units and personnel of the 2d Marine Division and 2d Marine Aircraft Wing on the east coast, the 1st Marine Division and the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing were able to realistically consider their scheduled mount-out dates of 10-15 August. Because a very high percentage of the reservists were combat veterans of World War II, only about 10 percent required any form of basic indoctrination and training. This was a key factor, particularly in aviation, since the total time required from commencement of pilot training to operational status was a matter of some two years. To be called up so soon after World War II, was the theme of many a barracks-room and ready-room ballad that...
1st Marine Aircraft Wing Leaders

Major General Field Harris

Speaking before a crowded gathering of the Wings Club at the Ambassador Hotel in Washington, D.C., in May of 1945, Major General Field Harris ended his address on Marine aviation in the scheme of National Defense with the words: “We are not an air force. We are a part of an air-ground team. I believe we will ever be a necessary part of our Nation’s air-ground-sea team. As always, we will aspire to be a useful and helpful arm of the United States Marines.” A little more than five years later, Harris’ remarks would ring true. As Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, wrote to Major General Harris, then commanding the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea, following the successful breakout from the Chosin Reservoir: “Never in its history has Marine aviation given more convincing proof of its indispensable value to the ground Marines... A bond of understanding [between brother Marines on the ground and in the air] has been established that will never be broken.”

Born in 1895 in Versailles, Kentucky, he received his wings at Pensacola in 1929. But before that he had 12 years of seasoning in the Marine Corps that included sea duty on board the Nevada and Wyoming and tours ashore with the 3d Provisional Brigade at Guantanamo, Cuba, and at Marine Barracks, Cavite, Philippines, and the Office of the Judge Advocate in Washington.

After obtaining his gold wings, Harris served with a squadron of the West Coast Expeditionary Force in San Diego, followed by additional flight training and assignments at sea and on shore, including Egypt as assistant naval attaché. During World War II he was sent to the South Pacific where he served successively as Chief of Staff, Aircraft, Guadalcanal; Commander, Aircraft, North Solomons; and commander of air for the Green Island operation. Following the war, he became Director of Marine Aviation and in 1948 was given command of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and a year later, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing at El Toro, California.

His Korean War service as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was rewarded with both the Army’s and Navy’s Distinguished Service Medal. Harris returned to the United States in the summer of the 1951 and again became the commanding general of Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic. Upon his retirement in 1954 he was advanced to the rank of lieutenant general. He died in December 1967 at the age of 72.

Major General Christian F. Schilt

Major General Christian F. “Frank” Schilt, Major General Field Harris’ replacement as Commanding General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, brought a vast amount of flying experience to his new post in Korea.

Born in Richland County, Illinois, in 1895, Schilt
entered the Marine Corps in June 1917 and served as an
enlisted man in the Azores with the 1st Marine
Aeronautical Company, a seaplane squadron assigned to
anti-submarine patrol. In June 1919, on completion of
flight training at Marine Flying Field, Miami, Florida, he
received his wings and was commissioned a Marine sec-
ond lieutenant, beginning a near 40-year career in
Marine Corps aviation.

His initial assignments were to aviation units in Santo
Domingo and Haiti, and in 1927, he was assigned to
Nicaragua. As a first lieutenant in 1928, he received the
Medal of Honor for his bravery and “almost superhuman
skill” in flying out wounded Marines from Quilali. Schilt’s
career pattern during the interwar years consisted of a
mix or school and flight assignments.

Prior to the United States entry into World War II, Colonel
Schilt was assigned to the American Embassy in
London as assistant naval attaché for air, and as such,
traveled extensively in the war zones observing British
air tactics in North Africa and the Middle East. During the
war, he served as the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’s chief of
staff at Guadalcanal, was later commanding officer of
Marine Aircraft Group 11, and participated in the con-
solidation of the Southern Solomons and air defense of
Peleliu and Okinawa.

In April 1952, on his return from Korea, Schilt became
Deputy Commander, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and the
next year he was given control of aircraft in the Pacific
command. His last assignment was as Director of

Major General Clayton C. Jerome
MajGen Clayton C. Jerome, USMC

Major General Clayton C. Jerome

Like his predecessor, Major General Clayton C. Jerome
had a distinguished flying career.

A native of Hutchinson, Kansas, born in 1901, he was
commissioned a second lieutenant in 1922 upon gradu-
atation from the Naval Academy. After a year at Marine
Barracks, Washington, D.C., he reported to Pensacola for
flight training and received his naval aviator’s wings in
1925. Foreign service in China, the Philippines, and
Guam followed his first duty assignment at Naval Air
Station, Marine Corps Base, San Diego.

In the mid-1930s, Jerome became naval attaché for air
in Bogota, Columbia, and several other Latin and Central
American republics. While serving as naval attaché he
earned the Distinguished Flying Cross for his daring res-
cue of the survivors of a Venezuelan plane crash. Using
an amphibious plane, he repeatedly flew over the treach-
erous jungles of Cuyuni in search of the wreck. After
finding it he made two hazardous landings on the nar-
row Cuyuni River to rescue four survivors.

During World War II, he took part in the consolidation
of the Northern Solomons and the Treasury-Bougainville
operation as operations officer and later chief of staff to
Commander, Aircraft, Northern Solomons. He was later
Commander, Aircraft and Island Commander, Emirau,
before serving with the U.S. Army in the Philippines.
During the Luzon campaign, he commanded Mangalden
Airfield and Marine aircraft groups at Dagupan, directing
Marine air support for the Army ground operations.

Postwar duty included command of Marine Corps Air
Station, Quantico; duty as Chief of Staff, Marine Corps
Schools, Quantico; and simultaneous service as Director
of Public Information, Recruiting, and Marine Corps
History at Headquarters Marine Corps.

He was serving as Director of Aviation and Assistant
Commandant for Air when reassigned as Commanding
General, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea in April 1952.

In January 1953, Major General Jerome reported to
Cherry Point, North Carolina, as Commanding General,
2d Marine Aircraft Wing, and Commander, Aircraft, Fleet
Marine Force, Atlantic. Two years later he moved to El
Toro, becoming the air commander for Fleet Marine
Force, Pacific. Retiring in 1959 as a lieutenant general, he
died in 1978 at the age of 77.

Major General Vernon E. Megee

A Marine aviator for more than 20 years, Major
General Megee assumed command of the 1st Marine
Aircraft Wing on 9 January 1953.

Born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 1900, he enlisted in the
Marine Corps in 1919 after attending Oklahoma A&M
College. Commissioned in 1922, Megee served in
Major General Vernon E. Mcgee

infantry, artillery, and expeditionary billets before undergoing pilot training in 1931. A year before, while quartermaster with the Aircraft Squadrons, 2d Marine Brigade, in Nicaragua, he earned the Navy and Marine Corps Medal for commendatory achievement while flying as an observer and machine gunner in an attack on a large force of Sandinista rebels.

Receiving his naval aviator’s wings in 1932, Megee spent the pre-war decade as a flight instructor at Quantico; student at the Air Corps Tactical School, Maxwell Field, Alabama; and commander of a Marine fighter squadron. In 1940, Major Megee was assigned to the U.S. Naval Aviation Mission to Peru and spent the next three years as a special advisor to that government’s Minister of Aviation.

During World War II, he was the first commander of an Air Support Control Unit, which was created specifically to provide close air support for ground troops. In combat operations at Iwo Jima, Megee was said to have told his pilots to "go in and scrape your bellies on the beach" in support of Marines on the ground. Later, at Okinawa, he commanded all Marine Corps Landing Force Air Support Control Units.

After promotion to brigadier general in 1949, Megee was named Chief of Staff, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, and after receiving his second star in 1951, he served as Commanding General, Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, prior to his assignment in 1953 to command the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing in Korea.

In 1956 he became the first Marine aviator to serve as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff. After having served as Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, he retired in 1959. In retirement, General Megee earned a master’s degree from the University of Texas, Austin, and served as superintendent of the Marine Military Academy in Harlingen. He died in 1992 at the age of 91.

Air Support Plan

Major General Field Harris, commanding general of the 1st

sustained both ground and aviation troops on the lighter side throughout the conflict. The “two-time losers,” as they referred to themselves, put a lot of morale-building humor into Korea, but the factor of overriding importance was that they were well trained, experienced, and seasoned, ground and air.

Any discussion of Inchon must be considered incomplete if it fails to mention the difficult problem the site itself presented to the amphibious planners. First, the tidal variation at Inchon is one of the greatest ranges of rise and fall on the entire Korean coastline, east or west. Secondly, the approach channels to the landing sites essential to successful establishment of a major force ashore, were not only narrow and winding, but also were through extensive mud flats. The combination of these two factors alone meant that much of the unloading of heavy equipment would be over mud flats at low tide with the amphibious force ships on the bottom until the next tidal change. In order to accommodate to this problem somewhat and also meet the D-Day date of 15 September, and manage to negotiate the very narrow approach channels, it was essential to make the approach during daylight hours on the fall of the tide, thus deriving an assault H-Hour of late afternoon.

While the complexities of Inchon as a site were much discussed, with sides taken both at Far East Command and all the way back to Washington, General MacArthur held firm in his confidence in the amphibious experts of the Navy and Marine Corps. He believed that any other site or date would not yield the opportunity to quickly cut the North Korean supply lines to their forces in the south. MacArthur was right, and Inchon has achieved its place in history as the most audacious, daring, difficult, risky—and successful—amphibious landing, perhaps of all time.

1st MAW Historical Diary Photo Supplement, Apr53

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VMF(N)-513. Joint Task Force 7 counted on its fast carrier task force, Task Force 77, to gain air superiority in the area, as well as to furnish deep support and interdiction strikes. Close support for the landing was assigned to the task group including the two small carriers, Sicily and Badoeng Strait, still operating VMFs-214 and -323, which had supported the brigade so well in the Pusan Perimeter.

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing designated MTACS-2, which had controlled air support for the brigade, to function in that capacity for the landing, and upon the establishment of X Corps ashore, to then continue to control for Tactical Air Command, X Corps.

Assault Phase Air Support

A primary and crucial objective in the Inchon landing was Wolmi-do Island, very close in to the main landing beaches of Inchon. Preparation of Wolmi-do began on 10 September with attacks by VMFs -214 and -323 with bombs, rockets, and napalm. The island was only about 1,000 yards wide and about the same dimension on the north-south axis, except that a long causeway extending to the south added another 1,000 yards to the length of the island. At the end of the causeway, a small circular islet with a lighthouse marked the entrance to the harbor. The main part of the island was dominated by a centrally situated piece of high ground known as Radio Hill. The Corsairs literally blackened the entire island with napalm to the extent that during the second day of attacks, the whole island appeared to be ablaze.

When the air strikes began, First Lieutenant John S. Perrin, a pilot with VMF-214, recalled that several North Korean military vehicles were flushed out. Evidently the enemy drivers believed that a moving target would be harder to hit. Perrin said that they got their Corsairs as low and slow as they could and literally chased the vehicles up and down streets and around corners in the island’s small industrial sector. Eventually all the vehicles felt the wrath of the blue fighters.

While the two carriers were busy with replenishment at Sasebo on the third day of the pre-landing strikes, Task Force 77 took over the preparation effort with extensive bombing attacks, augmented by the Shore Bombardment Group of four cruisers and six destroyers, the latter closing to within 800 yards of the island. In five days of continuous pounding by this combined air and naval gunfire, Wolmi-do was one blasted piece of real estate as the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, prepared to land at Green Beach on the morning of 15 September. Testifying to the effectiveness of the pre-landing preparation, Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Taplett’s battalion had completed their mopping-up operations by noon and its total casualties for the day were 17 wounded. In return, the battalion could count 136 prisoners, 108 enemy dead, and from interrogations of the prisoners, at least 150 more entombed in caves and emplacements throughout the island. During the afternoon of 15 September, from observation posts at the north tip of the island and at the top of Radio Hill, targets were picked out for special attention during the pre-H-Hour bombardment preparation for the landings at Red and Blue beaches at 1730. While the afternoon wore on, VMFs -214 and -323, in addition to three squadrons of Navy AD Skyraiders, alternately blasted Inchon, integrating their strikes with naval gunfire from 1430 right
up to H-Hour. In addition, Task Force 77 kept a continuous strike group of another 12 planes over the objective area to keep any movement of defensive forces toward the beaches at an absolute minimum. With this type and intensity of air and naval gunfire preparation, in addition to the support given the Red and Blue beach landings from Wolmi-do, plus the strong element of surprise carried by the Inchon assault, success of the operation was assured. In view of the very heavy element of risk involved with the hydrographic characteristics of the harbor and the many other departures from normal planning patterns for an amphibious assault of the magnitude of Inchon, a completely successful outcome was indeed welcome.

During the advance out of the beachhead, which commenced the day following the landing, the air support control system functioned precisely as previously described. On the first day of the advance toward Seoul, the obviously confused North Koreans learned even more about close air support and its effects than they had absorbed in the Pusan Perimeter a few weeks before. While the attack on D+1 had barely gotten underway, just five miles away from the advancing 5th and 1st Marines, six North Korean T-34 tanks were spotted in broad daylight rumbling along the Seoul-Inchon highway without escort of any kind, apparently ordered out to bust up the landing. An eight plane strike of VMF-214 hit the enemy armor near the village of Kansong-ni with napalm and rockets as 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, applauded from their positions less than two miles away. The Corsairs destroyed two of the T-34s and a third was damaged, but the North Korean crews abandoned some of the tanks and tried to take shelter in huts near the side of the road, which were promptly napalmed by the strike. This threw up large quantities of smoke and
The assault itself was successful only through the perfect teamwork that existed between the participating Naval and Marine elements. Only the United States Marines through their many years of specialized training in amphibious warfare, in conjunction with the Navy, had the requisite know-how to formulate the plans within the limited time available and execute those plans flawlessly without additional training or rehearsal.

**Kimpo Airfield**

One of the key objectives of the assault phase and the advance toward Seoul was the capture of Kimpo Airfield, the major air installation of the city, about seven miles west on the other side of the Han River from Seoul. While still in the relatively confined operating areas of the assault phase of the operation, the forces assigned could meet air support require-

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To briefly summarize all aspects of the Inchon landing, a quote from Rear Admiral James H. Doyle, the veteran amphibious group commander, does the job nicely:

_In a destroyed hanger at Kimpo Airfield, Marines found one of several near-flyable North Korean Soviet-built aircraft. Captured by 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, Marines engineers quickly made the airfield operational with temporary repairs, ready to receive elements of MAG-33._

led the pilots to believe that all six tanks had been destroyed, so they switched to other targets in the beachhead area.

Destruction of the tanks came at a price. Captain William F. Simpson, Jr., a pilot with VMF-214 was killed. Fellow pilot Captain Emmons S. Maloney recalled that Simpson "got so involved in it, hitting these tanks coming up, that, he almost flew straight into the tank. By the time he realized he was too low, it was too late to pull out."

Shortly after, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, with a tank escort, came into Kansong-ni and as they were coming into the position, surprised three of the remaining T-34s, which were promptly destroyed by the escorting M-26 Pershing tanks. The close contacts between air and ground, as typified by this example, permitted the continuous and synergistic employment of the capabilities of the air-ground team during the advance to Seoul and beyond.

A curious Marine passes three destroyed North Korean T-34 tanks five miles east of Inchon. The rocket-laden Corsairs of VMF-214 knocked out the tanks, part of a group of six ordered to break-up the landing.
ments. As the objective areas widened and expanded with the advance, however, it was essential to bring in more shore-based aviation to meet the demand quickly and with optimized dispatch on a constantly broadening front. The field was captured and declared secure in the mid-morning of 18 September. It was in such good shape after the assault that it was possible to almost immediately move in the first operating units. The first aircraft to land officially at Kimpo was an H03S helicopter of VMO-6, piloted by Captain Victor A. Armstrong, which brought in General Shepherd and his G-3, Colonel Victor H. Krulak, to confer with General Craig, who had just arrived by jeep. Later in the afternoon, Generals Harris and Cushman also arrived to make final plans for the deployment of the Marine squadrons from Japan and those that would fill out MAGs -33 and -12 for the follow-on operations.

On 19 September, Tactical Air Command X Corps, General Cushman, established his headquarters at Kimpo, and was quickly followed by Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1, MTACS-2, and VMO-6. The first fighter squadron of MAG-33 to check in was Lieutenant Colonel Max J. Volcansek, Jr.'s VMF(N)-542 with five Grumman F7F Tigercats landing late in the afternoon of the 19th. They also flew the first combat mission from the field early the next morning when they destroyed two locomotives near Seoul. Corsairs of Lieutenant Colonel Richard W. Wyczawski's VMF-212 and Lieutenant Colonel J. Frank Cole's VMF-312 landed shortly after -542 and also got into action on the 20th.

During the transition of the squadrons assigned to MAG-33...
The Corsairs from VMF-312 take off from Kimpo Airfield as clock attacks on retreating North Korean forces.

from MAG-12 in Japan, the operational burden of Marine air support was handled entirely by the two carrier-based Corsair squadrons, VMF-214 and VMF-323, now administratively assigned to MAG-12. Also supporting the displacement of the division-wing team into the Korean peninsula was Major Joseph H. Reinburg’s VMF(N)-513, still operating from Itazuke Air Force Base in Japan.

The flexibility of Marine aviation in supporting a forward displacement of such magnitude with hardly a break in the continuity of operations is well illustrated in the rapid establishment of Tactical Air Command X Corps at Kimpo. Once again, the value of commonality between Marine and Naval aviation was effectively demonstrated in the coverage, without a break, of air support requirements of the 1st Marine Division, utilizing the two carrier-based squadrons. Regarding the capture of Kimpo, Lieutenant General George E. Stratemeyer, Commander, Far East Air Forces, had this to say to Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division: “I want to take this opportunity of expressing my admiration and gratification for the manner in which elements of your Division recently captured Kimpo Airfield and so secured it as to make it available for use by Far East Air Forces and Marine Corps aircraft in shortest possible time.”

Control of air support passed from the Amphibious Force Commander to MTACS-2 ashore on D+2 when the landing force commander (Major General Oliver P. Smith, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division) declared he was ready to assume control. Requests for close air support increased rapidly as the enemy recovered from the initial shock of the assault. For example, on 18-19 September, VMFs -323, -214, and -513 flew a total of 50 close support sorties, delivering napalm, rockets, and 500-pound bombs against troop concentrations in front of the 1st Marines, who were finding the going a bit tougher in the vicinity of Sosa on the Inchon-Seoul highway. In addition, -513 flew a total of 15 daylight close support missions during the period 17-19 September for Army units along the Pusan Perimeter, where the accompanying breakout to the north and west was being initiated.

With Kimpo in hand, the next major objective became the forced crossing of the Han River and the taking of essential key terrain from which to launch the assault on Seoul. MAG-33 and MAG-12 made their principal contributions to these major endeavors by steadily and rapidly increasing their strengths and capabilities at Kimpo, and through strikes against redeployment and reinforcing moves by the North Koreans attempting to improve the defenses of the city. Logistically, there was a vehicle shortage for the movement of aviation gasoline, ammunition, and oil from the port dumps at Inchon and Ascom City to Kimpo, but a timely offer from the Far East Air Force's Combat Cargo Command solved the problem. During the week of 18-24 September, the Command hauled a total of 1,545 tons of these vital aviation supplies in from Japan. Once again the theorem that the farther from Washington, the greater the inter-Service cooperation was proven, just as it was in the South Pacific a few years before. In addition to this air effort, about 1,450 tons were trucked to Kimpo from the port during the same period. Also, Marine Transport Squadron 152 flew in spare parts and urgently needed ground equipment from Japan or wherever it could be made available, practically around-the-clock.

The crossing of the Han was assigned to the 5th Marines in the vicinity of Haengju, and after an
abortive attempt during the night of 19 September; the 3d Battalion accomplished it during daylight hours on the 20th. Four Corsairs of VMF-214 provided supporting fires against a key hill from which the North Koreans were directing accurate fire at the crossing tracked landing vehicles. As the assault on this hill continued, the Corsairs reported enemy in numbers hastily evacuating with strafing Marine aircraft in full pursuit. The three primary objectives were secured by mid-morning and the advance down the north bank of the river toward Seoul began immediately. The general plan was for the 5th Marines to continue the advance toward Seoul and to seize vantage points in support of the 1st Marines crossing at Yongdungpo. Yongdungpo, the industrial area of the city, was situated on the south bank of the Han on a large sandspit. The fighting on the north bank and in the attack on Yongdungpo both served notice to the division that it was going to be a “to the last man” defense of the city. By the 24th, after an extremely severe minute-to-minute three days of intensive battling, night and day, the 1st Marines was able to make the crossing and the battle for Seoul was underway.

From the 19th on, both MAGs -12 and -33 flew maximum effort schedules in close support of both the 1st and the 5th Marines in their assaults toward the city. Typical of the squadron performances during this period was a flight of five Corsairs led by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Lischeid of VMF-214, which effectively broke up a threatened counterattack on Hill 105 South, held by the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines. It was one of six close support missions flown by -214 on the 23d in the zone of the 5th Marines. As a counter to the air support rendered during the daylight hours, Marine artillery took over the complete support job after dark when the “closest” close support possibilities became somewhat diminished. When the terrain cooperates, this one-two counter to enemy counterattacks around the clock was most effective.

On the 24th, in front of Company F, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, on the east slope of Hill 56, VMF-323 dropped 500-pound

Marines of the Second Platoon, Company G, 5th Marines, clean snipers out of a residential section of Seoul. Due to the confined nature of much of the fighting within the city, Marine close air support was used sparingly and at deeper distances from the advancing troops.
One area where the Marine Corps was probably alone among the aviation Services was the degree it used enlisted pilots, especially in combat. Enlisted pilots were not new. France in World War I and the Axis powers, Germany, Japan, and Italy, in World War II made considerable use of their enlisted aviators. The Royal Air Force would have been in even worse straits during the Battle of Britain in 1940 had it not been for its sergeant-pilots. For the most part, however, the United States required its pilots to be commissioned officers and, with few exceptions, that is the way it continues to be.

The Navy had instituted its Naval Aviation Pilot (NAP) designation in 1919 because of a pilot shortage. The Marines, too, authorized selection of enlisted members to become pilots and First Sergeant Benjamin Belcher was the first Marine NAP in 1923.

With the country's hurried and somewhat unexpected entry into World War II, the need for pilots transcended the niceties of rank and tradition. Therefore all the Services, at one time or another during the war, made use of enlisted pilots, sometimes elevating them to commissioned rank later. Marine ace Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth A. Walsh, who scored 21 kills and earned the Medal of Honor during the war, was an enlisted pilot until he was commissioned in 1942.

The Marine Corps probably had the largest number of noncommissioned aviators (131 in 1942), and not in second-line transport squadrons; many of these NAPs later flew helicopters and jets in very heavy action in Korea. Flying sergeants flew Corsairs and Tigercats at Pusan and Chosin, Panthers in close air support against the Chinese, and OYs on dangerous artillery-spotting missions.

Technical Sergeant Robert A. Hill accumulated 76 combat missions as an OY pilot, earning the moniker "Bulletproof" after coming home in planes that were more holes than aircraft. He received a Distinguished Flying Cross for evacuating wounded Marines near Chosin under heavy enemy fire. Marine NAPs piloted several of the R4D transports that also evacuated wounded from Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri during the Chosin breakout.

But the jet pilots were the glamour boys and NAPs were among the first Marine jet pilots, taking their training in Lockheed T0-1s along with their commissioned squadron mates. The training met some resistance from senior squadron commanders, a few of whom did not want enlisted pilots flying their new jets. NAPs were not allowed to train in jets until 1949. This provided a cadre of experienced and motivated personnel to draw upon during the action in Korea.

This somewhat, confusing situation had the added facet that several now-enlisted NAPs had been commissioned lieutenants in World War II. However, after mus-tering out in 1945 and 1946, many of the former Corsair drivers regretted their decision to leave the active Marine Corps; several missed flying such powerful aircraft as the tough F4U. The Corps also found itself short of qualified aviators to fly its new jets and to man its remaining squadrons.

A program was developed whereby former Marine officer aviators could return as master sergeants (E-7 was the highest enlisted rating at the time), if they re-upped 90 days or less after leaving active duty. After the 90-day limit, the former aviator could rejoin as a technical sergeant, a grade below that of master sergeant.

When VMF-311 brought its F9F Panthers to Korea, several of its pilots were enlisted aviators. Master Sergeant Avery C. Snow was the first NAP to complete 100 combat missions in a jet. Snow had been a captain with Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron 232 during World War II.
One specialized squadron that made heavy use of its NAPs was Marine Photographic Squadron 1 (VMJ-1), established on 25 February 1952, flying modified McDonnell F2H-2P Banshees with a long nose to accommodate several reconnaissance cameras. VMJ-1 established an enviable record in Korea. Several of its pilots, who were specially trained volunteers, were enlisted men who could double as lab technicians if the situation warranted. Squadron crews flew 5,025 sorties, shooting 793,012 feet of film, one-third of all United Nations photo reconnaissance output, and at times, 50 percent of all Far East Air Force intelligence missions. However, even with this outstanding record, the Banshee drivers of VMJ-1 could not respond to all requests, and as such, overall reconnaissance requirements suffered throughout the war, primarily because of a lack of assets—mainly planes, pilots, and trained photo interpreters. Real-time imagery for field commanders and their units was not available at times when it was most needed. This problem, although well known and accepted, especially by the ground units, continued through Vietnam, and even into the Gulf War.

Aerial photo reconnaissance is one of the most exacting and dangerous jobs in all military aviation. The "recce" pilot must be more than just a good pilot; that is just a base from which to start. He must be a crackerjack navigator and know his camera systems inside and out, their capabilities and their limitations. And he must be resourceful, as well as have an inexhaustible supply of courage. Sometimes these last qualities are all that enable him to bring the film home and successfully complete his mission.

Most jet reconnaissance aircraft were unarmed, relying upon their speed to get them home before being intercepted. During World War II, there were no specifically dedicated reconnaissance aircraft, merely modified fighters, which had cameras stuck in the most convenient space, sometimes behind the pilot in the cockpit, or below him in the belly. The F6F Hellcat and P-51 Mustang are examples of such modification. Usually, these aircraft retained most, if not all, their machine gun armament and could therefore fight their way to and from the target. During Korea, however, the dedicated photo-Banshees of VMJ-1 were toothless and needed

Five master sergeant NAPs of VMJ-1 pose by one of their Banshees. From left to right are: MSgt James R. Todd, MSgt Samuel W. Cooper, MSgt Lee R. Copland, MSgt Marvin D. Myers, and MSgt Lowell L. Truex. As a second lieutenant with VMF-224 during World War II, Truex shot down a Japanese "George" fighter during an engagement off Okinawa.

Courtesy of MSgt Lowell L. Truex
Sergeant Truex again recalled: it compare with their shiny, silver F-86s? As Master big, blue Banshee their Marine charges flew. How could pilot. Force pilots precisely, even though some of them took a fied," he recalled, "and they wouldn't let me into their Marine compatriot. In Master Sergeant Truex's case, he was allowed to conduct his brief. I had to be veri-

My memories of the photo unit, which became a squadron during my tour, and all the plankowners, are good ones. We were completely self-contained and operated with field equipment from the wellpoint, water tank to the generators. The technicians were all superior guys, who worked with energy and diligence.

While standing squadron watches, besides flying their regular missions, the NAPs were also required to work as division officers in the squadron photo lab and on the flight line. There was also the need to brief escort pilots, who were often Air Force F-86 pilots. The Sabre pilots did not always appreciate being briefed by an enlisted aviator, and occasionally made things difficult for their Marine compatriot. In Master Sergeant Truex's case, he had to submit to annoying identification exercises before he was allowed to conduct his brief. "I had to be verified," he recalled, "and they wouldn't let me into their briefing room without identification. But, I briefed the Air Force pilots precisely, even though some of them took a casual attitude about escorting a Marine reconnaissance pilot."

The haughty Sabre pilots tended to look down on the big, blue Banshee their Marine charges flew. How could it compare with their shiny, silver F-86s? As Master Sergeant Truex again recalled:

They underestimated the Banshee's speed and climb, as well as the intensity our mission required. With our small J-34 engines and big tip tanks, our F2Hs had superior range. Although their F-86s looked good, and the Air Force did take care of us—and we certainly appreciated their presence—they usually bingoed before we were finished. We usually flew back alone.

Master Sergeant James R. Todd was VMJ-1's high-mis-

Like many of the enlisted aviators, Todd had been commissioned a second lieutenant in World War II, although he had just missed seeing combat service when the war ended, having spent much of his post-wing time as an instructor. He was mustered out in September 1946, but returned in November. He resigned his first lieutenant's commission, raised his hand as a private, then was immediately advanced to master sergeant and sent to El Toro and then to Pensacola. Arriving at the Florida air station, he joined other re-enlistees at the Naval School of Photography, where they learned the art of aerial reconnaissance. The training was to stand them in good stead in the coming years. By 1950, Todd and his friends had gained a lot of experience in Corsairs and Tigercats.

In September 1951, they were sent to Korea to supplement the meager photographic assets at K-3 (Pohang). At the time the Marines flew F7F-3Ps and F4U-5Ps. But Todd managed to check out in the F9F-2P, and thus, when VMJ-1 was commissioned the following February with brand-new McDonnell F2H-2P Banshees, he was a natural to slide into the new jet's cockpit. For a while, though, the squadron operated five different types: F7F-3P, F4U-5P, F4U-4B (for escort), F9F-2P, and F2H-2P. The props and Panthers remained until April 1952.

Several of VMJ-1's enlisted aviators also worked in the squadron's photo section, interpreting mission film. Although the squadron was administratively under MAG-33 and 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, it was the Air Force at K-14 (Kimpo) that tasked the targets, which was in keeping with the agreement with the Fifth Air Force. Occasionally, the 1st Marine Division could call in a requirement, but for the most part, Fifth Air Force called the shots.

Two MiGs near Chosin set on one of Todd's squadron mates, Master Sergeant Calvin R. Duke, who laid claim to being the oldest Marine NAP in Korea. In a dogfight that went from 10,000 feet to 30,000 feet, Duke outmaneuvered the Communist fighters and ran for home at 600 miles per hour.

Enlisted aviators were an integral part of the Marine Corps' capability. However, by Vietnam, there were only a few NAPs on active duty, and fewer still actually involved in flying duties. Some of these pioneers served with distinction throughout Vietnam. But by 1973, only four NAPs were still on active service with the Marines, and all four were simultaneously retired on 1 February 1973, closing a colorful era in naval aviation and Marine Corps history.
bombs only 100 yards from the attacking Marines, enabling them to seize the high ground. On the same day, to further illustrate the intensity of the air support effort, VMF-212 set a squadron record for the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing for combat operations by flying 12 missions and a total of 46 single-plane sorties. When refueling, rearming, and mechanical check times are considered, this became a rather remarkable achievement under the more or less "primitive" conditions of the first five days at Kimpo Airfield after moving in from Japan.

During the difficult and very heavy fighting in the city, there were many occasions where close air support could be called in with effect. But because of the confined nature of much of the action, the preponderance of air support was rendered at greater distances from the advancing troops. VMO-6 helicopters and OYs rendered yeoman service in evacuating wounded, flying constant observation missions, and in providing helicopter communication, conference, and observation flights for the troop commanders.

By 28 September, the intensive fighting in the city was drawing to a close. The newly arrived 7th Marines joined the 1st and 5th Marines on the left after the assault on the city began on the 24th, and things began to move out with dispatch. By the 28th, the 5th Marines, according to plan, had been placed into division reserve and the 7th was preparing to push off in pursuit of the North Koreans fleeing the city toward Uijongbu, 10 miles to the north. On the 29th, the 1st Marines were to establish blocking positions about three miles east of the city and the 5th was assigned a similar mission to the northwest at Suyuhyon. These missions were carried out with relatively minor difficulty, as the North Korean resistance appeared to be collapsing.

The 7th Marines moved out for Uijongbu early on 1 October and ran into firm resistance about half way to the objective. The developing firefight exposed the enemy positions and enabled VMF-312 Corsairs to work them over heavily during the remainder of the day. The advance was renewed the second day and again -312 was busy around-the-clock in support of two battalions forcing their way through a tough defile on the main road, essential for tank and heavy vehicle passage. In addition to the close support missions, the Corsairs caught eight trucks in convoy and destroyed seven in one attack. It was a heavy day all around and two Corsairs were lost to North Korean antiaircraft fire, but one landed in friendly territory and the pilot was recovered in good shape. On the third day, with the progress that had been made to that point, one battalion was assigned to each side of the road to mop up while the third passed through on the road straight for Uijongbu. It soon became apparent that the enemy was in full flight, but the 7th Marines was in Uijongbu by afternoon.

Establishment of the blocking positions marked the last large-scale fight of the Inchon-Seoul operation. The supply lines of the North Korean invading forces had been cut totally and the Inchon landing had crushed the North Korean army.

With the end of this phase of the war, U.S. Army and Republic of Korea Army units began to relieve the Marine forces of their area responsibilities. Division units were issued orders for movement to staging areas in Inchon and all were in place by 7 October to mount out for what looked like a follow-on amphibious assault on the east coast.

A few of the major highlights drawn from the operation will suffice to summarize the division-wing performance: (1) Expansion from a reduced peace strength to a reinforced war strength, less one regimental combat team, was completed in 15 days; (2) Movement of more than 15,000 personnel, organic heavy equipment, and partial resupply from San Diego to the Far East Command began in less than three weeks after the expansion order was issued; (3) Unloading, reembarkation, and combat loading for the Inchon landing was done at Kobe, Japan, in seven days, including two days lost to a typhoon in the Kobe area; (4) The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was disengaged from active combat in the Pusan Perimeter at midnight on 5 September, moved to Pusan, and unloaded in combat shipping in less than seven days; (5) A successful assault landing was executed at Inchon on 15 September, under some of the most adverse hydrographic conditions in the history of amphibious operations; (6) Kimpo Airfield, one of the finest in the Far East, was captured 50 hours after H-Hour; (7) The Han River was crossed, without major bridging equipment, and Seoul was seized 12 days after the Inchon landing; and (9) The effectiveness of the Marine air-ground team and close air support doctrine was reaffirmed with outstanding success.

Two more days of fighting remained for the squadrons of MAGs -12 and -33 at Kimpo after the relief of the ground units. During the 33-day period from 7
September to 9 October, the five squadrons flew a total of 2,774 sorties, most of them being in close support of infantry units. The accolades from all units supported under the Marine air support control system were many, and welcome, but one from the division artillery commander and fire support coordinator of the Army’s 7th Infantry Division was particularly noteworthy. As Brigadier General Homer W. Kiefer said: "Allow me to reemphasize my appreciation for the outstanding air support received by this division. The Marine system of control... approaches the ideal and I firmly believe that a similar system should be adopted as standard for Army Divisions."

During the period of the Inchon-Seoul operation, 15 September-7 October, the 1st Marine Division suffered losses of 415 dead, of whom 366 were killed in action and 49 died of wounds; six were declared missing in action and 2,029 were wounded in action, for a total of 2,450 battle casualties. The division took 6,492 North Koreans prisoner and the estimates of total casualties inflicted on the enemy added up to 13,666, most of whom were counted dead on the battlefield. These figures represent a ratio of better than 8 to 1, a thoroughly commendable performance considering the speed with which the air-ground team was put together and deployed.

Chosin Reservoir

Before the end of the Inchon-Seoul operation, when it became clear that the effect of the landing was a total rout of the North Koreans, the Commander in Chief, Far East, was formulating plans for the follow-up. With much prudence and caution emphasized from both Washington and the United Nations regarding the possible entry of either Soviet or Chinese Communist forces into Korea, it was decided that the United Nations Command could conduct pursuit operations beyond the 38th Parallel into North Korea. Concern over the possible outbreak of a general war remained strong, however, and the authority for General MacArthur to utilize his forces north of the 38th was burdened with several limitations. Briefly, there could be no entry of other than Republic of Korea forces if there was a clear indication of either Soviet or Chinese entry. Also, there could be no attack of any type against any portion of either Chinese or Soviet territory, including the use of Naval or Air forces. Further, only South Korean forces would be utilized in those provinces of North Korea bordering on the Soviet Union or Manchuria. It is interesting to note that in spite of these qualifications, on 29 September Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall included the following in a message to MacArthur: "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel." Coming so soon after the world-shaking experiences of World War II, there was justifiable cause for concern, but limitations and cautions over and above normal prudence certainly added much to the difficulties of the decisions faced by MacArthur as the move into North Korea was being executed.

Generally, the plan was for Eighth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, USA, to advance along the Kaesong-Sariwon-Pyongyang axis; the II ROK Corps in the center along the Kumhwa-Yangdok-Sunchon axis; and the I ROK Corps up the east coast direct to Wonsan. The 1st Marine Division would make an assault landing at Wonsan and the Army’s 7th Infantry Division would follow ashore in an administrative landing. After establishment ashore at Wonsan, X Corps, under the command of Major General Edward M. Almond, USA, would then advance west to Pyongyang, joining up with Eighth Army. The entire force would then advance north to two phase lines, the second being along the general line Songjin in the east, southwest to Chongju on the west coast. Only South Korean forces would advance beyond the second phase line, in keeping with MacArthur’s restrictions. Eighth Army would cross the 38th Parallel on 15 October and the Wonsan landing was set for 20 October.

Wonsan Landing

As has been seen before in military operations, surprise comes in many different packages, and Wonsan indeed had its share. While the division was in the throes of feverishly meeting its tight combat loading schedules at Inchon, at 0815 on 10 October, the I ROK Corps in its rapid advance up the east coast entered Wonsan. By the next day they had completed mopping up the town and were guarding the airfield on Kalma Peninsula. MacArthur then zigzagged back and forth with the idea of a new assault objective at Hungnam, 50 miles north. However, by the time the harbor characteristics and the availability of both landing craft and ships for unloading at two ports were reviewed, the original plan for Wonsan was retained with D-Day still set for 20 October.

The next surprise was a combination of circumstances. First was the discovery that the harbor and approaches to Wonsan were thor-
oughly sown with rather sophisticated Soviet mines of all kinds, from drifting contact types to magnetic ship-counting designs. It was determined that no entry for landing could possibly be made until the harbor was safely swept and the threat eliminated. The delays entailed in the sweeping combined with the early taking of Wonsan by the I ROK Corps to bring about an unusual reversal of the normal order in amphibious operations. When the assault elements of the division finally landed at Wonsan, they were welcomed ashore by the already well-established Marine aviation units.

Planning for 1st Marine Aircraft Wing operations in the northeast had kept up with the rapidly changing strategic situation. On 13 October, General Harris flew into Wonsan and on inspecting the condition of the field, decided to begin operations there immediately. With that decision, VMF-312 flew in from Kimpo on the 14th and wing transports flew in 210 personnel of the headquarters and VMF(N)-513 the same day. Two tank landing ships sailed from Kobe with equipment and personnel of MAG-12, and Far East Air Forces' Combat Cargo Command began flying in aviation fuel. Some bombs and rockets to "get 'em started" were flown in on the planes of VMF(N)-513. On the 16th, VMFs -214 and -323, still on the Sicily and the Badoeng Strait, began operations at Wonsan, covering the minesweeping activities until 27 October.

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fuel from a tank landing ship, floating clear of the minefield, ashore. In accomplishing the feat, the drums were manhandled into World War II vintage landing craft, now under Japanese operation, using Korean laborers. When close to the beach, the drums had to be manually lifted over the side, as the ramp had been welded shut. Once in the surf the drums were waded ashore through the icy water.

The squadrons also were faced with added difficulties resulting from few bomb carts, trucks, and refuelers. Consequently, the fuel trucks had to be loaded by hand from 55-gallon drums which had been rolled more than a mile from the dumps, also by hand. This slowed operations somewhat, but judicious planning and steady effort maintained a useful sortie rate. Armed reconnaissance flights were flown regularly which resulted in productive attacks on retreating North Korean troops. On the 24th, for example, a -312 flight surprised a column of about 800 North Koreans near Kojo, 39 miles south of Wonsan, and dispersed it with heavy losses.

With the change from an assault to an administrative landing at Wonsan, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was placed under the control of Far East Air Force, with delegation of that control to Fifth Air Force, north of the 38th Parallel. This required the daily operations schedule to be submitted to Fifth Air Force at Seoul by 1800 the previous day. Because of the distance involved and the poor communications that existed, it made it extremely difficult at best to get clearance back in time. This was resolved between General Harris and General Earl E. Partridge, Commanding General, Fifth Air Force, with permission for the former to plan and execute missions for X Corps in northeast Korea without waiting for Air Force clearance. Direction of support for X Corps was exercised for the wing by MAG-12 from 15 October to 9 November. Night operations did not begin until late in the month because of delay in getting runway lights at Wonsan, but -513 flew day missions along with -312 from the beginning. After the administrative landing on the 27th, the two carrier squadrons operated in similar fashion to the way they functioned at Inchon.

Generally, Marine aircraft reported to specified Tactical Air Control Parties at times given in the Fifth Air Force daily order, in response to previous requests by ground units for air support. Close air support requests, which were of a more urgent nature, were usually handled by aircraft on runway alert or by flights orbiting a specific point on stand-by status.

As at Inchon, Major Vincent Gottschalk's VMO-6 was under the operational control of the 1st Marine Division. Two helicopters were flown from Kimpo to Wonsan on the 23rd and the rest of the squadron came in by tank landing ship on the 27th. A flight echelon of helicopters remained at Kimpo until early November at the request of Fifth Air Force, for evacuation of casualties of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team in the Sukchon area.

After the landing of the initial elements of the division at Wonsan on the 26th, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, was ordered to Kojo, southeast of Wonsan. The battalion occupied positions in the vicinity with the mission of protecting the I ROK Corps supply dump there in preparation for its displacement to the north. It developed that a size-
able remnant of North Korean troops was in the area and a series of significant actions took place toward the end of the month. It soon became clear that the "remnant" was actually a seasoned unit of experienced troops, and that possibly a major counterattack was in the offing in the Kojo area. However, as it evolved, most of these actions were confined to night attacks by smaller units than were at first suspected. Aviation supplied the need for emergency evacuation of wounded by helicopter, and although there was a significant loss in killed and wounded, there was no need to reinforce the battalion from Wonsan. Ironically, the South Korean supply dump had been essentially moved out before the attacks occurred and when the North Koreans were finally beaten off and dispersed, the battalion was ordered back to Wonsan.

Ordnance men operate a "belting" machine that inserted ammunition into a metal belt to be used in the 20mm cannons of the Corsair. The machine loaded the belts at a rate of 6,000 rounds per hour in comparison with the hand operation of 500 rounds per hour.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A130762

In 1st Marine Division operations around Wonsan, evacuation of the wounded was accomplished by jeep ambulance, and in the case of more seriously wounded, by helicopter. The Sikorsky H03S and later Bell HTL helicopters attached to Marine Observation Squadron 6 were the cornerstones of the Korean War medical evacuation and rescue efforts.

With the major changes in strategy that accompanied the collapse of the North Koreans, and the rapid advances of Eighth Army and the two Republic of Korea Army corps to the north, MacArthur issued new directions, which affected X Corps and the Marines. One was an order for the 1st Marine Division to "advance rapidly in zone to the Korean northern border." With the Eighth Army entering Pyongyang on 18 October, X Corps on the east coast was being left behind and the right flank of Eighth Army was becoming exposed. Hence the corps was under pressure to move north at the earliest. With the exception of a significant engagement of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, in the Majon-ni area near Wonsan, similar to the action of the 1st Battalion at Kojo, most of the security requirements laid on the 1st Marines in and around Wonsan had been met by early November.

At Majon-ni, the various actions were supported by Marine aviation in the normal manner during daylight hours, but most of the attacks on the perimeter defenses occurred at night. Evacuations of wounded were by helicopter primarily, and several airdrops of supplies were included in the general air support. Marine losses in these actions included 20 killed and 45 wounded. Enemy casualties were estimated at 525 killed and 1,395 prisoners were taken. More than 4,000 Korean refugees were screened at the roadblocks along
the main supply route (MSR). The MSR itself was so precipitous, narrow, and difficult, the Marines lost 9 killed and 81 injured along one very tough stretch known as “ambush alley.”

While the 1st Marines were busy at Kojo and Majon-ni, the 5th and 7th Marines had taken up their new assignments to the north. This meant that the division stretched a total of 130-road-miles from the 1st Marines in the south to the 7th in the north. It would be a gross understatement to only say that this complicated the delivery of the usual air support by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to its brothers on the ground. With the arrival of additional Army elements of X Corps in the area, however, it became possible to shorten lines somewhat. The division’s command post was moved to Hungnam on 4 November, with the 5th and 7th Marines operating north. By 17 November, the 1st Marines were at Chigyong, 14 miles south of Hungnam, thus closing the stretch to less than 60 miles. This was a definite improvement, but Wonsan from the viewpoint of Marine aviation, was looking like a by-passed Japanese base from World War II. The concentration of the division north of Hungnam in its march to the Yalu River made the airfield at Yonpo increasingly attractive to the wing because it was in the center of the Hungnam-Hamhung area. This meant that response times for close air support would be considerably reduced for any actions that occurred to the north. Accordingly, on 6 November, MAG-33 was ordered to Yonpo from Japan, and by 10 November, was in operation there in time to receive VMF-212 from Wonsan. On the 15th, VMF-214 was ordered ashore from the Sicily and set up at Wonsan with MAG-12 support-

ing the squadron as best it could, bearing in mind that many pieces of vehicular equipment needed ashore are not required nor used on board carriers. Also, because of a shortage of shipping in the Far East, it took much longer to move essential shore-based equipment from where it was stored in Japan, in the case of both -214 and -212, to where it was needed in Korea. This meant that for a considerable period, bombs often had to be loaded by “muscle power,” aircraft refueled by small hand "wobble" pumps from 55-gallon drums, weighing 450 pounds, and many other operational and maintenance factors that revert to the hard way when the equipment just is not there. It was just another throwback to the sustaining principle of Marine aviation of doing the best with what you have got because the job must get done—and in this case, again, it was done.

Ground Situation

At the time of the Wonsan landing, the Marines had been informed that X Corps would be a part of the dash north to the Yalu under the revised Far East Command/United Nations Command plans, and Eighth Army would be doing the same on the western side of the peninsula. The jump-off dates were set for 24 November for Eighth Army and the 27th for X Corps. There had been many sightings and identifications of Communist Chinese Forces (CCF) well below the Yalu as early as late October and in the first few days of November. Far East Command press releases, however, treated these sightings as being only “volunteers” to help the North Koreans resolve their problems. The usual sighting reports were invariably small groups in remote areas, but in some instances the sightings were characterized also by thousands of footprints and tracks in the snow. Furthermore, in a significant five-day battle from 4 to 9 November, the 7th Marines took 62 Chinese prisoners at Chinhung-ni, enroute to their objective at Hagaru-ri. The Chinese were interrogated and precisely identified as part of the
By the 27th, the 1st Marine Division was concentrated in the vicinity of the Chosin Reservoir, with the command post at Hagaru-ri, the 5th and 7th Marines at Yudam-ni, and the 1st Marines along the MSR with a battalion each at Chinhung-ni, Koto-ri, and Hagaru-ri. Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, Jr., commanding the 7th Marines, while enroute from Hagaru-ri to Yudam-ni, had dropped off Company F at Toktong Pass to hold that critical point for any eventuality. On 25 November, Generals Smith and Almond conferred and the news was not good from the Eighth Army sector. The II ROK Corps had been overrun on Eighth Army’s right and the Army itself was falling back before a wholesale CCF onslaught. In spite of these results, Almond ordered Smith to attack on the 27th as planned. At the time, 1st Marine Division intelligence had identified five more divisions from prisoner interrogations, and line-crossing agents had given firm indications of even more Chinese forces just to the immediate north.

On the morning of the 27th, the division began its attack from Yudam-ni on schedule but the lead regiment had only advanced about 2,000 yards when stiff resistance stopped it. On the night of the 27th, the CCF in great strength attacked all Marine positions from Yudam-ni to Koto-ri, including a division attack on Company F at Toktong Pass, and a strong assault of division-sized against the three-battalion task force of the 7th Infantry Division east of the reservoir. As the intelligence reports were gathered and analyzed, the results showed clearly that opposing the Marines and associated troops in the Chosin Reservoir area was the 9th Army Group, 3d Field Army. This comprised a total of four corps-sized armies, a force that added to the five divisions already identified by the 1st Marine Division, totaled, by some estimates, almost 100,000 seasoned Chinese infantry troops. With the disposition of the division north of Hungnam and Hamhung, in addition to attached units of Royal Marines and assorted Army units totaling only 20,500 in all, the balance of the two forces favored the Chinese by better than 5 to 1. The fact that much of this was known to Far East Command and the Chinese by better than 5 to 1.

The situation had changed so radically and so quickly that on the 28th, General MacArthur called Generals Walker and Almond to Tokyo for a lengthy conference. The result of these deliberations was a change of strategy. The previous plan for North Korea was abandoned and both the Eighth Army and X Corps were to pull back to a more defensible line to the south. General Smith had already decided to start moving without any further delay and ordered the 5th and 7th Marines to move back to Hagaru-ri from Yudam-ni, the first leg of what would be a 68-mile fight through thousands of enemy troops.

**Air Situation**

The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing’s command post and attached Headquarters and Service units, in addition to five fighter squadrons, had moved to Yonpo from Wonsan and Japan by late in November. The sixth squadron, VMF-323, was still launching its maximum efforts from the Badoeng Strait. Rounding out the wing’s combat lineup was VMO-6 with its OYs and H03S helicopters, operating mainly from Yonpo, but also from wherever else required. This was a crowd for Yonpo, especially when it is remembered that much of the ordnance and maintenance equipment of the squadrons was not available. Also included in the serious shortage category were both transportation generally, and provision of any form of heated space for bare-handed engine and aircraft engineering maintenance.

Cold weather maintenance proved difficult. Touching the metal surface of an aircraft parked on the flight line with bare skin would cause the skin to stick to it. Aircraft engines had to be started throughout the night to keep them warm.
from freezing. Tires on the planes would be frozen on the bottom in the morning and they would thump out for take off or slide along the snow and ice. Staff Sergeant Floyd P. Stocks, a plane captain with VMF-214 recalled the difficulties in accomplishing the simplest maintenance tasks, such as changing a spark plug in a F4U.

"It isn't too bad removing the plugs, that can be done wearing gloves. Installing them is a different story. You can't start a plug wearing gloves, not enough clearance around the plug port. To change a sparkplug you have the old plug out and the new plug warm before you start. Wrap a new warm plug in a rag and hurry to the man standing by at the engine. That man pulls off his glove and gets the plug started. Once started he puts on his glove and completes the installation using a plug wrench."

Bombs, rockets, ammunition, and fuel were on hand at Yonpo, and with Marines to manhandle them all, the air part of the air-ground team was ready to do its job. The task it had to do was probably the heaviest responsibility ever placed on a supporting arm in relatively modern Marine Corps history. As Lieutenant General Leslie E. Brown, a Marine aviator who witnessed combat in three wars, recalled: "The Chosin Reservoir thing was the proudest I had ever been of Marine aviation...because those guys were just flying around the clock, everything that would start and move. And those ordnance kids out there dragging ass after loading 500-pound bombs for 20 hours. And aviation's mood and commitment to that division, my God it was total. There was nothing that would have kept them off those targets—nothing!"

From the time of the decision to fight their way south to the sea, Fifth Air Force had given the wing the sole mission of supporting the division and the rest of X Corps.

Backup was provided by Task Force 77 aircraft for additional close support as required, and both the Navy and Fifth Air Force tactical squadrons attacked troop concentrations and interdicted approach routes all along the withdrawal fronts of Eighth Army and X Corps. The Combat Cargo Command was in constant support with requested airdrops of food and ammunition, and did a major job in aerial resupply of all types from basic supplies to bridge sections, as well as hazardous casualty evacuation from improvised landing strips at both Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri.

When reviewing the fighting withdrawal of the Marine air-ground team from the reservoir against these horrendous odds, and assessing the part Marine aviation played in the operation, it is important to remember the Tactical Air Control Party structure of the Marine air control system. Every strike against enemy positions

Marine Corsairs operating out of frozen Yonpo Airfield experienced a number of problems. The airstrip had to be continually cleared and sanded, aircraft had to be run every two hours during the night to keep the engine oil warm enough for morning takeoffs, and ordnance efficiency declined.
Marine Corsairs hit enemy troop concentrations with rockets and napalm in support of Marines fighting around the Chosin Reservoir. However, approximately half of the Marine air missions were in support of South Korean and U.S. Army units.

along the route wherever the column was held up or pinned down, was under the direct control of an experienced Marine pilot on the ground in the column, known to the pilots in the air delivering the attack. Other methods had been tried repeatedly, but to put it colloquially, “there ain’t no substitute for the TACP.”

The Breakout

From the start of the 68-mile battle to the sea on 1 December to its completion at Hungnam on 12 December, so much happened on a daily basis that only shelves of books could tell the story in detail. It was one of the high watermarks for the Marine Corps, ground and air, cementing permanently a mutual understanding and appreciation between the two line branches of the Corps that would never be broken. It must be borne in mind that the same air support principles in almost every detail were followed in support of the division on its fight up to Hagaruri and Yudam-ni as were applied in supporting its fight back down to the sea.

Underlying the air support plan for the operation was the idea of having a flight over the key movement of the day at first light. This initial flight would be assigned to the forward air controller (FAC) of the unit most likely to be shortly in need of close air support. In turn, as soon as that flight had been called on to a target, another flight would be assigned to relieve it on station. This meant that response times from request to delivery on target could be reduced to the minimum. Naturally, the weather had to cooperate and communications had to stay on, but if minimum visibility and ceiling held so that positive delivery of weapons was possible, the targets were hit in minimum time. If the attack of
the aircraft on station was not sufficient to eliminate that target, additional strength would be called in, either from Yonpo or from Task Force 77, or from time to time, by simply calling in any suitable aircraft in the area for a possible diversion from its assigned mission. The last possibility was usually handled by the Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) of the air support system, or often by the tactical air coordinator airborne on the scene.

After dark each night, the column would be defended through unit assignments to key perimeters of defense. This was when they were most vulnerable to attacks by the Chinese. During daylight when Corsairs were on station, the Chinese could not mass their troops to mount such attacks because when they tried they would be immediately subjected to devastating air strikes with napalm, bombs, rockets, and overwhelming 20mm strafing. Not one enemy mass attack was delivered against the column during daylight hours. The night “heckler” missions over the column were effective in reducing enemy artillery, mortar, and heavy machine gun fires. But there was no way that they could do the things that were done in daylight controlled close air support, although the night controlled strikes against enemy positions revealed by their fires against the column were extremely effective as well. The general feeling in the column, however, was invariably one of relief with the arrival of daybreak.

The desire to have Marine aircraft overhead during daylight hours bears witness to the faith the Marines on the ground had in the potency and accuracy of Marine close air support. This was apparent to Captain William T. Witt, Jr., who led a flight of eight VMF-214 Corsairs that appeared over the Marine column one cold day as morning broke. As he checked in with the forward air controller on the ground he advised the controller that he had seen an enemy jeep heading north across the frozen reservoir and asked “if they wanted it shot up.” The foot weary controller said: “Hell no, just shoot the driver.”

The first leg of the fight south was from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri, a movement that would bring the 5th and 7th Marines together with elements of the 1st Marines, division headquarters and command post. It was essential that Hagaru-ri be held because it gave the division its first chance to evacuate the seriously wounded by air. The evacuation was done from the hazardous but serviceable strip that had been hacked out of the frozen turf on a fairly level piece of ground near the town. Company D, 1st Engineer Battalion, accomplished this extraordinary job. Under fire much of the time, the work went on around-the-clock, under floodlights at night, and with flights from the two Marine night fighter squadrons orbiting overhead whenever possible. During the period from the first airstrip landing on 1 December to 6 December, the Combat Cargo Command’s Douglas C-47 “Sky-trains,” augmented by every Marine Douglas R4D in the area, flew out a total of 4,312 wounded, including 3,150 Marines, 1,137 Army personnel, and 25 Royal Marines. Until the Hagaru-ri strip became operational on 1 December, evacuation of the seriously wounded was limited as the only aircraft that could land at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Koto-ri were the OYs and helicopters of VMO-6. For example, from 27 November to 1 December, VMO-6 evacuated a total of 152 casualties, including 109 from Yudam-ni, 36 from Hagaru-ri, and 7 from Koto-ri.

Casualties are helped on board a Marine R4D Skytrain at Hagaru-ri. From there, and later at Koto-ri to the south, more than 4,000 wounded men were snatched from death and flown to safety and hospitalization.
In the extreme cold and at the altitudes of the operation, these light aircraft had much less power and considerably reduced lift from normal conditions, but in spite of these handicaps, saved scores of lives.

The Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri leg was completed by the afternoon of 4 December, with the first unit reaching Hagaru-ri in the early evening of the 3d. With most of the heavy action occurring on the 1st and 2d, wing aircraft flew more than 100 close support sorties both days, all in support of the division and the three Army battalions of the 7th Division, which were heavily hit east of the reservoir trying to withdraw to Hagaru-ri. The Marine FAC with the Army battalions, Captain Edward P. Stamford, directed saving strikes against the Chinese on 1 December, but during the night, they were overwhelmed and he was captured. However, the next day he managed to escape and made his way into Hagaru-ri. Of the three battalions, only a few hundred scattered troops survived to reach Hagaru-ri. On 4 and 5 December, wing aircraft continued the march with almost 300 sorties against enemy positions, vehicles, and troop concentrations throughout the reservoir area. But on 6 December, they resumed their primary role over the division as the second leg, Hagaru-ri to Koto-ri, began.

Air planning for the second leg drew heavily on the experience gained during the move from Yudam-ni. The FACs were again spotted along the column and with each flanking battalion, and were augmented with two airborne tactical air controllers who flew their Corsairs ahead and to each side of the advancing column. The addition of a four-engine R5D (C-54) transport configured to carry a complete TADG controlled all support aircraft as they reported on station, and assigned them to the various FACs or TACs, as appropriate for the missions requested. The system worked smoothly and made it possible for the column to keep moving on the road most of the time; even while the support aircraft were eliminating a hot spot. By evening of the 7th, the division rear guard was inside the perimeter of the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, at Koto-ri. During the two days, Marine aircraft flew a total of 240 sorties in support of X Corps' withdrawal, with almost 60 percent of these being in support of the division, with the remainder being in support of other units. In addition, 245 sorties from Task Force 77 carriers and 83 from Fifth Air Force supported X Corps. The Navy sorties were almost entirely close support while the Air Force were mostly supply drops. The Koto-ri strip, although widened and lengthened, was not even as operable as the more or less "hairy" one at Hagaru-ri, but an additional 375 wounded were flown out. VMQ-6, augmented by three TBMs on 7 December, also evacuated 163 more up to 10 December.

An enlisted squadron mechanic with VMF-214 noted the unpleasantness of unloading the TBMs in his diary: "Not only are the people seriously wounded, they are frozen too. This morning I helped with a Marine who never moved as we handled his stretcher. His head, framed by his parka, looked frozen and discolored. His breath fogging as it escaped his purple lips was the only sign of life. Between fingers on his right hand was a cold cigarette that had burned down between his fingers before going out. The flesh had burned but he had not noticed. His fingers were swollen and at places had ruptured now looking like a wiener that splits from heat."

With just one more leg to go, the epochal move was almost completed. But the third leg, Koto-ri to
Chinhung-ni, was tough to contemplate because it included an extremely hazardous passage of a precipitous defile called Funchilin Pass, in addition to a blown bridge just three miles from Koto-ri that had to be made passable. The latter was the occasion of engineering conferences from Tokyo to Koto-ri, a test drop of a bridge section at Yonpo as an experiment, revision of parachutes and rigging, and finally the successful drops of the necessary material at Koto-ri.

The air and ground plans for the descent to Chinhung-ni amounted to essentially using the same coverage and column movement coordination that had been so successful on the first two legs, only this time there was one very effective addition. The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, from its position in Chinhung-ni, would attack up the gorge and seize a dominating hill mass overlooking the major portion of the MSR. The battalion’s attack was set for dawn on 8 December, simultaneous with the start of the attack south from Koto-ri. The night of 7-8 December brought a raging blizzard to the area, reducing visibility almost to zero and denying any air operations during most of the 8th. As a result, although both attacks jumped off on schedule, little progress was made from Koto-ri and the installation of the bridge sections was delayed. The one bright spot that day was the complete surprise achieved by the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, in taking Hill 1081. Using the blizzard as cover, Captain Robert H. Barrow’s Company A employed total silence and a double-envelopment maneuver by two of the company’s three platoons with the third in frontal assault, to take an enemy strongpoint and command post, wiping out the entire garrison.

The night of the 8th saw the end of the weather problem and the clear skies and good visibility promised a full day for the 9th. From the break of day complete air coverage was over the MSR under the direction of the airborne TADC, the TACs, and the battalion FACs. The installation of the bridge was covered, and when it
was in place, the column began its move down to Chinhung-ni on the plain below. It is interesting to note that the bridge was installed at the base of the penstocks of one of the several hydroelectric plants fed by the reservoir. (Eighteen months later in June 1952, two of these plants were totally destroyed by MAGs -12 and -33 in one attack, Chosin 3 by MAG -12 and Chosin 4 by MAG -33, the latter in one of the largest mass jet attacks of the war.)

The good weather continued on the 10th and the passage over the tortuous MSR was completed by nightfall. Early in the morning of the 11th, the truck movement from Chinhung-ni to Hungnam began, and by early afternoon, the last unit cleared the town. With the division loading out from Hungnam, the three shore-based fighter squadrons moved to Japan on the 14th, and by the 18th the last of the wing's equipment was flown out of Yonpo. Air coverage of the evacuation of Hungnam became the responsibility of the light carriers with the displacement of the wing. Under a gradual contraction of the perimeter, with the heavy support of the naval gunfire group, the movement and outloading were completed by the afternoon of the 24th.

The statistics of the outloading from Hungnam cannot go unmentioned. Included were 105,000 military personnel (Marine, Army, South Korean, and other United Nations units), 91,000 Korean refugees, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of cargo in 193 shiploads by 109 ships. That would have been a treasure trove for the Chinese if it had not been for the leadership of General Smith who said that the division would bring its vehicles, equipment, and people out by the way they got in, by "attacking in a different direction."

A few summary statistics serve to give an order of magnitude of the support 1st Marine Aircraft Wing rendered to the operation as a whole. From 26 October to 11 December, the TACPs of Marine, Army, and South Korean units controlled 3,703 sorties in 1,053 missions. Close air support missions accounted for 599 of the total (more than 50 percent), with 468 of these going to the 1st Marine Division, 8 to the 3d Infantry Division, 56 to the 7th Infantry Division, and 67 to the South Koreans. The balance of 454 missions were search and attack. On the logistics side, VMR-152, the wing's transport squadron, averaged a commitment of five R5Ds a day to the Combat Cargo Command during the operation, serving all units across the United Nations front. With its aircraft not committed to the Cargo Command, from 1 November to the completion of the Hungnam evacuation, 152 carried more than 5,000,000 pounds of supplies to the front and evacuated more than 4,000 casualties.

One other statistic for Marine aviation was its first jet squadron to see combat when VMF-311, under Lieutenant Colonel Neil R. McIntyre, operated at Yonpo for the last few days of the breakout. It is of interest to note that the tactical groups of 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, MAGs -12 and -33, were so constituted that just a year later MAG-33 was all jet and MAG-12 was the last of the props, for about a 50-50 split on the tactical strength of the wing.

On casualty statistics, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing had eight pilots killed, four missing, and three wounded, while the division had 718 killed, 192 missing, and 3,485 wounded. The division also suffered a total of 7,338 non-battle casualties, most of which were induced by the severe cold in some form of frostbite or worse. The division estimated that about one third of these casualties returned to duty without requiring
evacuation or additional hospitalization. Against these figures stands a post-action estimate of enemy losses at 37,500, with 15,000 killed and 7,500 wounded by the division, in addition to 10,000 killed and 5,000 wounded by the wing. In this case these estimates are based on enemy testimony regarding the heavy losses sustained by the Communists, and there is some verification in the fact that there was no determined attempt to interfere with the Hungnam evacuation.

In a letter from General Smith to General Harris on 20 December, Smith stated the sincere feeling of the division when he wrote:

> Without your support our task would have been infinitely more difficult and more costly. During the long reaches of the night and in the snow storms many a Marine prayed for the coming of day or clearing weather when he knew he would again hear the welcome roar of your planes as they dealt out destruction to the enemy. Even the presence of a night heckler was reassuring.

> Never in its history has Marine aviation given more convincing proof of its indispensable value to the ground Marines. . . . A bond of understanding has been established that will never be broken.

In any historical treatment of this epic fighting withdrawal, it is important to emphasize that there was total control of the air during the entire operation. Without that, not only would the action have been far more costly, but also it may have been impossible. It is well to keep firmly in mind that not one single enemy aircraft appeared in any form to register its objection.

### Air Support: 1951-1953

After the breakout from the Chosin Reservoir and the evacuation from Hungnam, the Korean War went into a lengthy phase of extremely fierce fighting between the ground forces as the Eighth Army checked its withdrawal, south of Seoul. The line surged back and forth for months of intensive combat, in many ways reminiscent of World War I in France, with breakthroughs being followed by heavy counteroffensives, until it finally stabilized back at the same 38th Parallel where the conflict began in June 1950. In 1951, there were many moves of both the 1st Marine Division and elements of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. The basic thrust of the wing was to keep its units as close to the zone of action of the division as possible in order to reduce to the minimum the response time to requests for close air support. Coming under Fifth Air Force without any special agreements as to priority for X Corps, response times from some points of view often became ridiculous, measuring from several hours all the way to no response at all. The Joint Operations Center, manned by Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force, processed all requests for air support, promulgated a daily operations order, approved all emergency requests for air support, and generally controlled all air operations across the entire front. With the front stretching across the Korean peninsula, with a communications net that tied in many division and corps headquarters in addition to subordinate units, and many Air Force and other aviation commands, there was much room for error and very fertile ground for costly delays. Since such delays often could mean losses to enemy action, which might have been avoided, had close support been responsive and readily available, the Joint Operations Center was not highly regarded by Marines who had become used to the responsiveness of Marine air during the Chosin breakout, Inchon-Seoul campaign, and the Pusan Perimeter. This was a difficult time for the wing because every time the Fifth Air Force was approached with a proposal to improve wing support of the division, the attempt ran head-on into the statement that there were 10 or more divisions on the main line of resistance and there was no reason why one should have more air support than the others. There is without question something to be said for that position. But on the other hand, it could never be sufficient to block all efforts to improve close air support response across the front by examining in detail the elements of different air control systems contributing to fast responsiveness.

Throughout the period from 1951 to mid-1953, there were various agreements between the wing and Fifth Air Force relative to the wing's support of 1st Marine Division. These covered emergency situations in the division sector, daily allocations of training close air support sorties, special concentrations for unusual efforts, and other special assignments of Marine air for Marine ground. While these were indeed helpful, they never succeeded in answering the guts of the Marine Corps question, which essentially was: “We developed the finest system of air support known and equipped ourselves accordingly; we brought it out here intact; why can't we use it?”
If the Army-Air Force Joint Operations Center system had been compared in that combat environment to the Marine system, and statistically evaluated with the objective of improved response to the needs of the ground forces, something more meaningful might have been accomplished. Instead, what improvements were tried did not seem to be tried all the way. What studies or assessments were made of possibilities such as putting qualified Air Force pilots into TACPs with Army battalions, seemed to receive too quick a dismissal. They were said to be impractical, or would undercut other standard Air Force missions such as interdiction and isolation of the battlefield. Since the air superiority mission was confined almost entirely to the vicinity of the Yalu River in this war, a good laboratory-type chance to examine the Joint Operations Center and Marine systems under the same microscope was lost, probably irretrievably. As if to prove the loss,

*The 1st Marine Aircraft Wing made a notable contribution in providing effective and speedy tactical air support. Simplified TACP control, request procedures, and fast radio system enabled wing pilots to reach the target area quickly and support troops on the ground successfully.*

National Archives Photo (USN) 80-G-42965
In mid-1952, -513 received Douglas F3D Skyknights under Colonel Peter D. Lambrecht, the first jet night fighter unit of the wing. Colonel Lambrecht had trained the squadron in the United States as -542, moving in the new unit as -513, making MAG-33 entirely jet.

MAG-12 was the prop side of the house with VMAs -212, -323, and -312 equipped with the last of the Corsairs, and VMA-121 with Douglas AD Skyraiders. The AD was a very popular aircraft with ground Marines just like the Corsair, because of its great ordnance carrying capability. VMA-312, under the administrative control of MAG-12, and operating for short periods at K-6, maintained the wing's leg at sea and was based on board the carrier Bataan (CVL 29). The wing was supported on the air transport side by a detachment of VMR-152, in addition to its own organic R4Ds, and by Far East Air Force's Combat Cargo Command when required for major airlift. The rear echelon of the wing was at Itami, Japan, where it functioned as a supply base, a receiving station for incoming replacements, a facility for special aircraft maintenance efforts, and a center for periodic rest and recreation visits for combat personnel.

Operationally, the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing was in a unique position with respect to the Fifth Air Force because the air command treated the two MAGs in the same manner as they did their own organic wings. (Wing, in Air Force parlance, is practically identical to MAG in Marine talk.) This left the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing as kind of an additional command echelon between Fifth Air Force and the two MAGs which was absent in the line to all the other Air Force tactical wings. On bal-

Sketch by TSgt Tom Murray, USMC

Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadron 1 radio and radar van set-up atop Chon-san—the imposing 3,000-foot peak near Pusan. During the early years of the war, the squadron was hard-pressed to identify and control the hundreds of aircraft flying daily over Korea.
Used as a night fighter during the early years of the war, the two-seat, twin-engine Grumman F7F Tigercat, with its distinctive nose-mounted radar and taller vertical tail, proved its capabilities time after time.

The Douglas AD Skyraider, one of the most versatile aircraft then in existence, was used on electronic countermeasure, night fighter, and attack missions. It could carry more than 5,000 pounds of ordnance in addition to its two wing-mounted 20mm cannon.
The twin-engine Douglas F3D Skyknight jet night fighter gained the respect of many “former” members of the Chinese Air Force. With its state-of-the-art avionics, the big jet was soon tasked with escorting Air Force B-29s, which had been decimated by enemy MiGs.

The first Marine jet to see action in Korea, the Grumman F9F Panther compiled an enviable record in supporting United Nations forces. It speed however was offset by its relatively short endurance and poor service reliability.
ance, the presence of the wing in the act was a definite plus of the most supportive kind for the two MAGs. For instance, the daily operation order for air operations came in to the two MAGs during the night and was popularly known as the “frag order,” or simply, “the frag.” The wing also received the frag at the same time by teletype and could check it over with MAG operations or even intercede with the Air Force if considered desirable. Relations between Fifth Air Force and wing were consistently good and although communications were somewhat hectic from time to time, the basic daily operational plans got through so that planned schedules could be met most of the time.

Maintenance of good command relations between the wing and the Fifth Air Force in the sometimes-difficult structure of the Korean War was a direct function of the personalities involved. Marine aviation was fortunate in this regard with a succession of wing commanders who not only gained the respect of their Air Force counterparts, but also did not permit doctrinal differences, which might occur from adversely affecting the mutuality of that respect. Relationships were very much aided also by the presence of a liaison colonel from the wing on duty at the Joint Operations Center, a post that smoothed many an operational problem before it could grow into something out of proportion. The teams of leaders of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the Fifth Air Force were hard to match. Generals Field Harris—Earl E. Partridge, Christian F. Schilt—Frank E. Everest, Clayton C. Jerome—Glenn O. Barcus, and Vernon E. Megee—Glenn O. Barcus, constituted some of the most experienced and talented airmen the country had produced up to that time.

Operations of both MAGs generally ran to the same pattern throughout the war. Neither group was engaged in any except chance encounters with respect to air-to-air, and some of these brought an occasional startling result as when a Corsair shot down a Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15. However, since air combat was confined to the Yalu River area, the chance encounters were very infrequent. Considering the types of aircraft with which both groups were equipped, it is probably just as well that the Communists worked their MiGs largely in that confined sector. This left the usual frag order assignments to Marine aircraft mostly in the interdiction and close air support categories, with a lesser number in night interdiction and photo reconnaissance.

Interdiction as a category took a heavy percentage of the daily availability of aircraft because of the determination of the Air Force to show that by cutting the enemy’s supply lines his ability to fight effectively at the front could be dried up. No one can deny the wisdom of this as a tenet. But in Korea at various stages of the war, it was conclusively shown that the North Koreans and the Chinese had an uncanny ability to fix roads, rails, and bridges in jury-rigged fashion with very little break in the flow of supplies. This was most evident at the main line of resistance where no drying up was noted. Because interdiction was not proving effective, any dissatisfaction stemmed from the low allocation of aircraft to close air support where air support was needed almost daily. To many, it seemed that having tried the emphasis on interdiction at the expense of close air support, pru-
Major-League Reservists

The Marine Corps Air Reserve, like other Reserve components of the United States military, had contracted after World War II. Unlike today's active organization, many reservists simply went inactive, remaining on the roles for call-up, but not drilling. Former SBD pilot, Guadalcanal veteran, and a greatly admired officer, Colonel Richard C. Mangrum (later lieutenant general) helped to establish a Aviation Reserve program, resulting in the Marine Corps Air Reserve Training Command that would be the nucleus of the “mobilizable” 4th Marine Aircraft Wing in 1962. By July 1948, there were 27 fighter-bomber squadrons, flying mostly F4U Corsairs, although VMF-321 at Naval Air Station Anacostia in Washington, D.C., flew Grumman F8Fs for a time, and eight ground control intercept squadrons. Major General Christian F. Shilt, who received the Medal of Honor for his service in Nicaragua, ran the revamped Air Reserves from his headquarters at Naval Air Station Glenview, Illinois.

When the North Koreans invaded South Korea, the Regular Marine forces were desperately below manning levels required to participate in a full-scale war halfway around the world. The Commandant, General Clifton B. Cates, requested a Reserve call-up. At the time, there were 30 Marine Corps Air Reserve squadrons and 12 Marine Ground Control Intercept Squadrons. These squadrons included 1,588 officers and 4,753 enlisted members. By late July 1950, Marines from three fighter and six ground control intercept squadrons had been mobilized—others followed. These participated in such early actions as the Inchon landing; 17 percent of the Marines involved were reservists.

The call-up affected people from all stations, from shopkeepers to accountants to baseball players. Two big-league players, Captain Gerald F. “Jerry” Coleman of the New York Yankees and Captain Theodore S. “Ted” Williams of the Boston Red Sox, were recalled at the same time, and even took their physicals at Jacksonville on the same day in May 1952. Another member of the 1952 Yankees, third baseman Robert W. “Bobby” Brown, was actually a physician, and upon his recall, served with an Army ground unit in Korea as battalion surgeon.

Capt Gerald F. “Jerry” Coleman poses in an F4U Corsair of VMF-323. Playing second base for the New York Yankees, the former World War II SBD dive-bomber pilot was recalled to duty for Korea.

Courtesy of Gerald F. Coleman
At 34, Williams was not a young man by either baseball or military standards when he was recalled to active duty in Korea in 1952. Of course, he was not alone in being recalled, but his visibility as a public figure made his case special. The star hitter took the event stoically. In an article, which appeared the August 1953 issue of The American Weekly, he said: “The recall wasn’t exactly joyous news, but I tried to be philosophical about it. It was happening to a lot of fellows, I thought. I was no better than the rest.”

Many in the press could not understand the need to recall “second hand warriors,” as one reporter wrote somewhat unkindly. Most sports writers bemoaned the fact that Williams was really kind of old for a ball player as well as for a combat jet pilot.

However, the Boston outfielder reported for duty on 2 May 1952, received a checkout in Panthers with VMF-223 at Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, North Carolina, and was assigned to VMF-311 in Korea. His squadron mates got used to having a celebrity in their midst. Future astronaut and United States Senator John H. Glenn, then a major, was his flight leader for nearly half his missions.

On 16 February 1953, Williams was part of a 35-plane strike against Highway 1, south of Pyongyang, North Korea. As the aircraft from VMF-115 and VMF-311 dove on the target, Williams felt his plane shudder as he reached 5,000 feet. “Until that day I had never put a scratch on a plane in almost four years of military flying. But I really did it up good. I got hit just as I dropped my bombs on the target—a big Communist tank and infantry training school near Pyongyang. The hit knocked out my hydraulic and electrical systems and started a slow burn.”

Unable to locate his flight leader for instructions and help, Williams was relieved to see another pilot, Lieutenant Lawrence R. Hawkins, slide into view. Hawkins gave his plane a once-over and told Williams that the F9F was leaking fluid (it turned out later to be hydraulic fluid). Joining up on the damaged Panther, Hawkins led Williams back to K-3 (Pohang), calling on the radio for a clear runway and crash crews. The baseball player was going to try to bring his plane back, instead of bailing out.

With most of his flight instruments gone, Williams was flying on instinct and the feel of the plane as he circled wide of the field, setting himself up for the approach.

It took a few, long minutes for the battered Panther to come down the final approach, but perhaps his athlete’s instincts and control enabled Williams to do the job. The F9F finally crossed over the end of the runway, and slid along on its belly, as Williams flicked switches to prevent a fire. As the plane swerved to a stop, the shaken pilot blew off the canopy and jumped from his aircraft, a little worse for wear, but alive.

Later that month, after returning to El Toro, he wrote a friend in Philadelphia describing the mission:

No doubt you read about my very hairy experience. I am being called lucky by all the boys and with good cause. Some lucky bastard hit me with small arms and... started a fire. I had no radio, fuel pressure, no air speed, and I couldn’t cut it off and slide on my belly... Why the thing didn’t really blow I don’t know. My wingman was screaming for me to bail out, but of course, with the electrical equipment out, I didn’t hear anything.

Williams received the Air Medal for bringing the plane back. He flew 38 missions before an old ear infection acted up, and he was eventually brought back to the States in June. After convalescing, Williams returned to the Boston Red Sox for the 1954 season, eventually retiring in 1960. Although obviously glad to come back to his team, his closing comment in the letter to his friend in Philadelphia indicates concern about the squadron mates he left behind: “We had quite a few boys hit lately. Some seem to think the bastards have a new computer to get the range. Hope Not.”
Unlike Williams, who had spent his World War II duty as an instructor, Yankees second-baseman Coleman had seen his share of combat in the Philippines in 1945 as an SBD pilot with Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 341, the “Torrid Turtles,” flying 57 missions in General Douglas MacArthur’s campaign to wrest the archipelago from the Japanese.

Coleman had wanted gold wings right out of high school in 1942, when two young naval aviators strode into a class assembly to entice the male graduates with their snappy uniforms and flashy wings. He had signed up and eventually received his wings of gold. When Marine ace Captain Joseph J. “Joe” Foss appeared at his base, however, Coleman decided he would join the Marines. And he soon found himself dive-bombing the Japanese on Luzon.

Returning home, he went inactive and pursued a career in professional baseball. Before the war, Coleman had been a member of a semi-pro team in the San Francisco area, and he returned to it as a part of the Yankees farm system.

He joined the Yankees as a shortstop in 1948, but was moved to second base. Coleman exhibited gymnastic agility at the pivotal position, frequently taking to the air as he twisted to make a play at first base or third. His colorful manager, Casey Stengel, remarked: “Best man I ever saw on a double play. Once, I saw him make a throw while standin’ on his head. He just goes ‘whisht!’ and he’s got the feller at first.” By 1950, the young starter had established himself as a dependable member of one of the game’s most colorful teams. He had not flown since 1945.

As the situation in Korea deteriorated for the allies, the resulting call-up of Marine Reserve aviators finally reached Coleman. The 28-year-old second baseman, however, accepted the recall with patriotic understanding: “If my country needed me, I was ready. Besides, the highlight of my life had always been—even including baseball—flying for the Marines.” After a refresher flight course, Coleman was assigned to the Death Rattlers of VMF-323, equipped with F4U-4 and AU-1 Corsairs.

Younger than Williams, whom he never encountered overseas, the second baseman had one or two close calls in Korea. He narrowly averted a collision with an Air Force F-86, which had been cleared from the opposite end of the same runway for a landing. Later, he experienced an engine failure while carrying a full bomb load. With no place to go, he continued his forward direction to a crash landing. Miraculously, the bombs did not detonate, but his Corsair flipped over, and the force jerked the straps of Coleman’s flight helmet so tight that he nearly choked to death. Fortunately, a quick-thinking Navy corpsman reached him in time.

Coleman flew 63 missions from January to May 1953, adding another Distinguished Flying Cross and seven Air Medals to his World War II tally. With 120 total combat missions in two wars, he served out the remainder of his Korea tour as a forward air controller.

When the armistice was signed in July 1953, he got a call from the Yankees home office, asking if he could get an early release to hurry home for the rest of the season. At first the Marine Corps balked at expediting the captain’s trip home. But when the Commandant intervened, it was amazing how quickly Coleman found himself on a Flying Tigers transport leaving Iwakuni bound for California.

Coleman had to settle for rejoining his team for the 1954 season, but he felt he never regained his game after returning from Korea. Retiring in 1959, he became a manager in the front office, indulged in several commercial ventures, and finally began announcing for the expansion team San Diego Padres in 1971, where he can still be found today.

The press occasionally quipped that the military was trying to form its own baseball club in Korea. However, the players never touched a bat or ball in their squadrons. In the privacy of the examination room, Dr. Robert “Bobby” Brown did try to show an injured soldier how to better his slide technique—all in the interests of morale.

According to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air at the time, John F. Floberg, every third airplane that flew on a combat mission in Korea was flown by a Navy or Marine reservist. Of the total combat sorties conducted by the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Marine Air Reserves flew 48 percent.