CHAPTER 17
Mini-Tet and Its Aftermath in Southern I Corps

Going into the Go Noi—Mini-Tet and Operation Mameluke Thrust, May 1968
Operation Allen Brook Continues—Mameluke Thrust Also Continues

Going into the Go Noi

By the beginning of May 1968, both the Marines at Da Nang and the Communist forces in Quang Nam were in the midst of preparations to launch offensive operations against one another. While during April the enemy in Quang Nam had largely confined its activities to guerrilla activities, the increased number of reconnaissance Stingray sightings indicated that Communist regulars were reinfilttrating their old positions. The Marine command was especially concerned about the Go Noi Island sector, about 25 kilometers south of Da Nang, outlined by the confluence of the Ky Lam, Thu Bon, Ba Ren, and Chiem Son Rivers.

In the Go Noi, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines in April had conducted Operation Jasper Square* in the western sector with relatively limited contact. Nevertheless, the Communists had controlled the area for years. With the continued existence of both a Communist political and military command infrastructure there, the local populace maintained a strong Viet Cong orientation, making the island a relatively "safe haven" for both NVA and VC military units. III MAF knew Go Noi was home to three local Viet Cong units, the R—20 Battalion, V—25 Battalion, and T—3 Sapper Battalion, as well as Group 44, the headquarters for the enemy's operations in Quang Nam Province. It also suspected that elements of the 2d NVA Division were trying to reenter the sector.1

In early May, Major General Donn J. Robertson, the 1st Marine Division commander, ordered the 7th Marines into the Go Noi to forestall the NVA from staging a new offensive. On 4 May at 0500, Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Mueller's 2d Battalion, 7th Marines launched a two-company "No Name Operation" into the Go Noi. Crossing Liberty Bridge at 0500, Companies E and G, supported by a platoon of tanks, attacked eastward towards the main north-south railroad tracks. On the first day of the operation, the Marines evacuated some 220 civilians, mostly old men, women, and children, out of the Go Noi to the district capital of Dai Loc.2

In the first phase of the operation, which soon became Operation Allen Brook,* the battalion encountered light although persistent resistance from enemy local force and guerrilla units. For the next few days, the 2d Battalion attacked to the east towards the main north-south railroad tracks experiencing increasing but still relatively scattered opposition to their advance. Although the terrain was flat with relatively clear fields of fire, the local units were familiar with the locale and took full advantage of the advantages offered by the fortified hamlets that dotted the Go Noi. Surrounded and interlaced by dense hedges, these hamlets were connected one to another by a series of trenches and tunnels which provided "excellent cover and concealment" for their defenders.3

While Company A, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines relieved Company G on 7 May, Colonel Reverdy M. Hall, the 7th Marines' commander, also reinforced the 2d Battalion on the same day with Company K from the 3d Battalion. Through 8 May, the Marine companies accounted for some 88 enemy troops at a cost of 9 Marines killed and 57 wounded. On the 9th, about 1820, the sweep forces just west of the railroad tracks came under heavy small arms and machine gun fire as well as a mortar salvo outside of the hamlet of Xuan Dai (2). Taking casualties of 1 dead and 11 wounded, the infantry pulled back and called for artillery support and airstrikes. After the last air mission, the Marine companies clambered over the tracks which fronted the hamlet on the west and pushed into Xuan Dai (2). Thirty minutes after the initial action, the Marines secured the hamlet. As a result of this action, the Marine battalion reported 80 enemy killed. A Stingray patrol about 1900 observed some 200 enemy troops moving to the southwest of Xuan Dai and called in

*See Chapter 13.

**Lieutenant Colonel Mueller recalled that the operation "very quickly became operation Allen Brook" in that his two other companies "and a myriad of support was attached to my battalion." A "No Name" operation usually involved two companies with minimum support. The concept was to "reinforce quickly when significant contact was made." LtCol Charles E. Mueller, Comments on draft, n.d. [Jan95] (Vietnam Comment File).

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both artillery and another air strike which resulted in a secondary explosion.4

For the next four days, the Marines again met only sporadic resistance and encountered no regular NVA units. In fact, up through the 13th, the indications were that the enemy troops that the Marines had engaged to that point except for the fight for Xuan Dai were from the usual VC units known to be in the Go Noi. Even the enemy force in Xuan Dai did not appear to be an NVA tactical unit. According to recovered documents and to a prisoner captured in that fight, the enemy in Xuan Dai were from the 155th Battalion, 2d NVA Regiment. Marine intelligence officers believed the 155th to be a temporary infiltration group rather than a regular NVA battalion.5

Hoping to find the suspected NVA regular units from the 2d NVA Division believed to have returned to the Go Noi, the Marine command decided to reorient Allen Brook from east to west. On 13 May, General Robertson reinforced the 2d Battalion with Company I, 3d Battalion, 27th Marines. While the other three companies attached to the 2d Battalion reversed their direction, Marine helicopters lifted Company I, 27th Marines into a landing zone in the Que Son Mountains to the south overlooking Go Noi Island. The following day Company I moved down to blocking positions near the Ba Ren River where it was joined by the other Marine companies now advancing to the west. On the 15th, at 1400, the 2d Battalion with all four Marine companies with the attached tanks arrived back at Liberty Bridge. In their reverse march, the Marines had encountered the same "harassing small arms and mortar fires and fluid guerrilla tactics" that had characterized the operation for the most part up to that time.6

Operation Allen Brook appeared to be at an end. At least that was what the Marines wanted the enemy to believe. At 1800, on the 15th, Marine helicopters helilifted Company E and the command group of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines out of the operational area. The commander of the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Roger H. Barnard, then assumed command of the remaining forces in Allen Brook. To continue the "tactical deception," Lieutenant Colonel Barnard ordered the units still in Allen Brook to cross Liberty Bridge as if the Marines were closing out the operation. Then shortly after midnight on the 16th,
the command group of the 3d Battalion together with Companies A of the 1st Battalion and G of the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines, together with Company I, 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, recrossed the Thu Bon River and "moved in a single file under cover of darkness for security." Ironically, the 3d Battalion had none of its own organic companies in the operation as it reached its line of departure about 2,500 meters northeast of Liberty Bridge, just north of the objective area, a few hours prior to dawn. According to Barnard, Colonel Hall, who had monitored the radio traffic, "was beside himself with the success of the plan to reenter the Go Noi."* 

Lieutenant Colonel Barnard remembered that his objective "was a suspected NVA installation . . . . We had reason to believe they did not know we were there . . . ." According to the battalion commander he was to attack to the south with the mission "to search for, fix, and destroy the enemy." As the Marines advanced with two companies on line and one in reserve, they were "hoping to execute a major surprise." In fact, both sides were to surprise one another. About 0900 on the morning of the 16th, the 3d Battalion encountered an NVA battalion in the hamlet of Phu Dong (2) about 4,000 meters west of Xuan Dai, the scene of the latest heaviest fighting. According to Barnard, "we hit a hornet's nest." Two of his companies came under deadly machine gun fire and the battalion commander described the situation "like being in the butts at the rifle range." The Marine battalion tried to flank the enemy position, but as Barnard recalled, "we needed more resources than we had for the situation." He recalled that even maximum supporting artillery and mortar fire failed to break the NVA defenses. Finally, extensive close air support, including over 50 air strikes, "carried the day." By early evening, the Marine infantry which had fought continuously throughout the day in the oppressive heat finally forced the NVA out of their trenches and bunkers. Afraid of encirclement, the

*Colonel Barnard credited the 7th Marines commander, Colonel Hall, with the idea of openly pulling out the 2d Battalion, and unobtrusively bringing in the 3d Battalion under cover of darkness. According to Barnard, Hall "was convinced that after a week of 2/7 stirring up the AO [Areas of Operations], we could fool the enemy into believing the Marines had had enough." Col Roger H. Barnard, Comments on drafts, dated 13Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File).
enemy withdrew leaving more than 130 dead in the hamlet. Marine losses were also heavy: 25 dead and 38 wounded. One Marine, Second Lieutenant Paul F. Cobb, a platoon leader with Company A, and one Navy hospital corpsman, Robert M. Casey with Company G, were both awarded the Navy Cross posthumously for their actions in the fight for Phu Dong.

Despite the Marine losses, Colonel Hall, the 7th Marines commander, believed that his plan had been a success. Barnard’s unit had uncovered the North Vietnamese units in the Go Noi and hit them before they were able to mass their forces. Lieutenant Colonel Barnard later wrote, “when all enemy resistance ceased and the dust had settled it was clear we had . . . achieved a significant victory.” The suspected NVA installation was an “NVA regimental headquarters, with attendant security and a major staging area for supplies . . . .” The battalion commander remembered that the enemy supplies were so extensive, that they could not evacuate them to the rear. Marine helicopters, however, took out the casualties and the battalion “received water and ammo resupply.” Colonel Hall directed Barnard to continue his southward advance the next morning.

After an uneventful night, in which the battalion had moved twice, it started out at dawn from a line of departure, just north of the hamlet of Le Bac (2). Advancing southward, the battalion was again in a column of companies, with Company I, 27th Marines in the lead, and Companies A and G of the 7th Marines, and the battalion command group, following in trace. Lieutenant Colonel Barnard remembered, “We were in open country, without a defined objective.” If Company I made contact, Barnard planned to use Company A as a maneuver unit and Company G in reserve.

As events turned out, the Marine battalion ran into even stronger resistance than the previous day. That morning, as Company I came upon a dry river bed with a densely wooded treeline on the northern bank bordering the hamlet of Le Nam (1), just above Route 537, the North Vietnamese sprung an ambush from elaborate defenses “of significant width.” Strong enemy
resistance and the terrain combined to prevent Lieutenant Colonel Barnard’s initial efforts to come to the assistance of his embattled company. Upon hearing of the contact and the extent of the enemy defenses, he immediately ordered Company A to attempt to flank the enemy from the west. While the ground was flat, it was covered with tall grass which impeded the flanking movement. In the meantime, as the reports from Company I “were not good,” Barnard ordered Company G to join the embattled unit. Enemy resistance, however, proved too strong and prevented Company G from advancing. A frustrated battalion commander called for artillery and air support. He remembered that as his command group with Company A strug-
gled through the tall grass, he had his artillery and air officers "calling mission after mission . . . ." The situation for Company I was already desperate when Colonel Hall, the 7th Marines commander, radioed Barnard that the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines would make a helicopter assault to the south in order to relieve the pressure on his battalion.

Lieutenant Colonel Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., the commanding officer of the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, remembered that his unit had been on alert for Allen Brook and was to relieve the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. In fact the 27th Marines, under Colonel Adolph G. Schwenk, Jr., was scheduled to take responsibility for the operation from the 7th Marines later that day. Early on the morning of the 17th, Lieutenant Colonel Woodham had received orders to truck his battalion down to Liberty Bridge and then cross the bridge on foot to make the planned relief. At this point, he had only two of his companies with him, Companies K and L. His Company M was the Da Nang Air Base security company and Company I, of course, was attached to Barnard’s battalion. Upon learning of the predicament of his Company I, Woodham conferred with Schwenk and agreed upon the helicopter assault. For the time being, Woodham’s battalion would be under the operational control of the 7th Marines.

After some unexpected delays in the arrival of the aircraft and in coordination with the air preparation of the landing zone, about 1500 on the 17th, Marine helicopters finally brought the battalion into An Tam (1) about 1,000 meters southeast of Le Nam (1). Even

Heavily sweating Marines from the Command Group of the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines assist in the evacuation of an injured Capt Robert R. Anderson, who had attempted to reach the embattled Company I. With temperatures reaching 110 to 120 degrees, heat was as much the enemy as the NVA.

Photo courtesy of Col Tullis J. Woodham, Jr. USMC (Ret)
as the battalion landed, it came under mortar and longrange weapons fire. Despite the enemy fire, the two Marine companies immediately attacked northward to link up with the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. With extensive air and artillery support, Company K, 27th Marines broke through the enemy defenses in Le Nam (1), and finally linked up with Company I about 1930 that evening. According to Lieutenant Colonel Woodham, as darkness approached, the North Vietnamese resistance ceased and they began to withdraw from the battle area.\textsuperscript{15}

The heavy fighting for Le Nam (1) had resulted in 39 Marines dead and 105 wounded as opposed to 81 North Vietnamese dead. Company I especially had suffered grievous losses. Of the total Marine casualties in the battle, Company I had sustained 15 killed and 50 wounded. Among the dead were Captain Thomas H. Ralph and two of his platoon leaders. The casualties of the company may have been even higher if it had not been for the heroics of Private First Class Robert C. Burke. A machine gunner with the company, he quickly took his weapon "and launched a series of one-man assaults" against the enemy emplacements. Providing covering fire, he permitted other members of Company I to come up and remove the wounded from exposed positions. He continued to advance upon the enemy and to suppress enemy fire until he fell mortally wounded. He was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously.\textsuperscript{14}

During the night of 17–18 May, the two Marine battalions, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines and the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, remained in separate positions, but in radio contact. Lieutenant Colonel Barnard had moved to a night position near Cu Ban (4), about 1,000 meters to the northwest of Le Nam (1), while Lieutenant Colonel Woodham retained his command group at An Tam (1). About 1900, Lieutenant Colonel Barnard had turned over operational control of Company I to Woodham and then began preparations to start out at dawn on the 18th for Liberty Bridge. Essentially, Operation Allen Brook was over for the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines, which would leave as planned the next day and be replaced by the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines.\textsuperscript{15}

By that time the 27th Marines, under Colonel Schwenk, had assumed responsibility for Operation Allen Brook which would continue in the Go Noi. On the morning of the 18th, Lieutenant Colonel Woodham began to expand his perimeter around Le Nam (1). About 0930, the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines began to take sniper fire from Le Bac (2), about 300 meters to the north. Lieutenant Colonel Woodham immediately sent Companies K and L to clear out what he thought were a relatively few snipers. The "few snipers" turned out to be a formidable North Vietnamese force which quickly brought the Marine attack to a halt. Under an "exceedingly heavy" volume of fire, the lead elements of both Companies I and K remained isolated and unable to maneuver. Woodham called for both artillery and air, but their effectiveness was limited because of the proximity of the Marines to the enemy. Both companies, but especially Company K, sustained several casualties and the intolerable heat soon became as much a factor as the enemy bullets.\textsuperscript{16}

At 1500 that afternoon, Marine helicopters brought in Company M, which had already been alerted to replace the combat-impaired Company I. As the latter company boarded the helicopters for the return trip to Da Nang, Woodham thrust the newly arrived Company M into the battle for Le Bac (2). With the reinforcements, Company K, which had taken the most casualties, was able to pull back and Lieutenant Colonel Woodham placed it in reserve. The fighting raged on until the night when the NVA withdrew. The Marine companies pulled back to Le Nam (1) and Woodham brought in air and artillery to the rear of the former NVA positions. The battalion had sustained serious casualties: 15 Marines were dead, another 35 were wounded, and 94 troops had succumbed to the heat. In and around the abandoned enemy position lay 20 dead North Vietnamese.

Operation Allen Brook would continue to focus through 27 May largely on the Cu Ban, Phu Dong, and Le Bac village complexes. Beginning with the action of the 16th, the 7th, and later the 27th Marines, were in a more or less a conventional battle against well-dug-in and relatively fresh and well-trained North Vietnamese regulars. Colonel Schwenk, the 27th Marines commander, commented that while the enemy troops did not initiate any offensive actions, they fought back "tenaciously" from concealed positions within treelines and in the hamlets themselves. To offset the Marine advantage in supporting arms, the NVA would allow "the point of advancing units to pass through" and then open up on the "main body" with both intense small arms fire and mortars. At this close range, the Marine command could then make only limited use of artillery and air support.\textsuperscript{17}

To counter this tactic, the 27th Marines used heavy preparatory fires from both U.S. Navy gunfire ships offshore and artillery in coordination with air strikes to blast the enemy out of their bunkers and trenches.
before moving into an area. If a Marine unit encountered heavy small arms fire, it was either to hold its position or move back so that supporting arms could be employed as much as possible under the circumstances. Colonel Schwenk remarked that tanks with their 90mm guns proved most effective in these circumstances, both with high explosive rounds to breach enemy fortifications and with canister rounds against troops in the open. Schwenk wrote that once he committed the tanks, "the enemy would break contact almost immediately." The tanks were also at a disadvantage, however, in that the terrain "caused . . . [them] to become channelized making them highly vulnerable to RPG fire and mines." On 24 May, two Marines from the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, Corporal Richard W. Buchanan from Company M and Private First Class Charles R. Yordy, from Company K, were later awarded the Navy Cross for their actions that day in Le Bac (1) about 800 meters northwest of Le Bac (2). The fight for Le Bac (2) lasted until the 27th and featured some of the heaviest combat of the campaign until a torrential rain storm ended the fighting. Lieutenant Colonel Donald N. Rexroad, the commander of the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, remembered that his battalion near the end of the month overran "an apparent NVA regimental command post."\(^\text{18}\)

Casualties on both sides had been heavy. For the entire operation through the end of May, the Marines reported to have killed over 600 of the enemy. They themselves sustained since the beginning of the operation 138 killed, 686 wounded including 576 serious enough to be evacuated, and another 283 non-battle casualties that had to be evacuated. The number of heat-induced "non-battle casualties" had soared towards the end because of the extreme high temperatures averaging almost 110 degrees and the physical exertion expended in the firefights. In many engagements, the number of heat casualties equalled or exceeded the number of Marines killed and wounded.\(^\text{19}\)

In Operation Allen Brook, the Marines believed they had broken the back of a planned enemy attack on

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*The 7th Marines in its account reported only seven non-battle casualties through 17 May. It can be assumed then that the bulk of the heat casualties occurred after the 27th Marines took over the operation. For the period 4–17 May, the 7th Marines account showed that the Marine units in Allen Brook sustained 85 killed and 359 wounded, 323 of whom were evacuated in addition to the non-battle casualties. 1/7 AAR, Allen Brook.*
Da Nang, Colonel Hall of the 7th Marines later wrote that his 3d Battalion's reentry into the Go Noi under cover of darkness in the early morning hours of 16 May foiled the designs of the enemy which had begun to stage its forces. Hall observed that the North Vietnamese unit engaged by his units was from the 36th Regiment, 308th NVA Division. According to a North Vietnamese prisoner from the 2d Battalion of that regiment, his unit had departed North Vietnam in February and only arrived in the Go Noi the night of the 15th with orders to assault allied positions north of the Thu Bon and Ky Lam Rivers. The 27th Marines would engage both the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 36th during the fighting in the Cu Ban and Le Bac complex.20 The appearance of the 36th Regiment in the Go Noi was of some concern to the Marine command. III MAF and the 1st Marine Division had expected to find elements of the 2d NVA Division which previously had used the sector during the Tet offensive. This was the first evidence that any unit of the 308th NVA Division had ventured so far south. There were already indications that the North Vietnamese had built up their regular forces in the Da Nang sector. From 16–25 May, just to the east of the Marine units on the Go Noi, the 51st ARVN regiment, reinforced by two Ranger battalions, in a series of running battles engaged approximately two enemy battalions. While sustaining casualties of 53 dead and 144 wounded, the ARVN claimed to have killed 284 of the enemy during this period. Mini-Tet and Operation Mameluke Thrust, May 1968

By mid-May it was apparent that the enemy buildup in the Go Noi sector was part and parcel of the long-awaited second phase of the enemy's "Tet" offensive. Outside of the flareups in the capital city of Saigon and especially in the eastern DMZ near Dong Ha with some of the bloodiest combat of the war, the renewed fighting elsewhere was only a pale reflection of the first "Tet." Called "Mini-Tet" by the allies, this second enemy offensive largely confined itself to rocket and mortar fire and small ground probes against the major bases and attacks against the most vulnerable of the Special Forces camps near the Laotian border.

Still the enemy "Mini-Tet" could not be taken lightly. At Da Nang, in all probability it was the Marine thrust into the Go Noi that forestalled a renewed enemy ground assault on either the airfield or city itself. While enemy infantry units were unable to penetrate the Marine defenses, NVA rocketeers increased their efforts throughout I Corps. [See Chart] At Da Nang, from 5 May through 29 May, enemy rockets fell on major installations, including Marble Mountain, the main airfield, the FLC, and III MAF headquarters, on 12 separate occasions with the highest number of incidents, 4, on the first day of the attacks. In the Da Nang TAOR,
# ENEMY EFFORTS AGAINST MAJOR III MAF BASES: MAY 1968

## DANANG

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<td>0120</td>
<td>III MAF Hq</td>
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<td>0200</td>
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<td>15-122mm Rkts</td>
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<td>NSA Bridge Cargo Complex</td>
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<td>5-122mm Rkts</td>
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<td>2345</td>
<td>Airbase</td>
<td>6-140mm Rkts</td>
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<td>2 EA-6A and 1 RF-4B (minor), 1 crater in runway</td>
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<td>2 VNAF A-1 (minor)</td>
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<td>0004</td>
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<td>12-122mm Rkts</td>
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<td>5-140mm Rkts</td>
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## MARBLE MOUNTAIN

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<td>0151</td>
<td>Air Facility</td>
<td>41 Rds Mtr/Rkts</td>
<td>1 WIA</td>
<td>2 CH-53 (minor)</td>
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<td>12 May</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Air Facility</td>
<td>20 Rds Rkts</td>
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<td>4 CH-53 (2 substantial, 2 minor), 3 CH-46 and 1 O-1 (minor)</td>
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<td>11 Rds Mtr</td>
<td>3 WIA</td>
<td>7 UH-1E (1 substantial, 1 minor, 5 limited), 4 CH-46 (limited), Control Tower (minor) and Base Operations Building (minor)</td>
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<td>Air Facility</td>
<td>12 Rds Mtr</td>
<td>4 WIA</td>
<td>2 CH-46 (limited), 2 UH-1E (minor)</td>
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## CHU LAI

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<td>0151</td>
<td>MAG-13 and Runway</td>
<td>27-122mm Rkts</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>3 F-48 (minor), 1 HAWK missile launcher and 3 missiles destroyed</td>
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<td>8 May</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>MATCU-67</td>
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<td>2207</td>
<td>MAG-13 Ordnance Area</td>
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<td>2317</td>
<td>MAG-13 Barracks Area</td>
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## PHU BAI/CAMP EVANS/CAMP EAGLE

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<td>Camp Eagle</td>
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<td>1925</td>
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<td>Camp Eagle</td>
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<td>Phu Bai (Camp Hochmuth)</td>
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<td>33 WIA</td>
<td>Minor</td>
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<td>27 May</td>
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<td>Phu Bai Airfield</td>
<td>98-82mm Mtr</td>
<td>5 KIA, 32 WIA</td>
<td>5 US Army fixed wing aircraft (minor), 6 CH-46 (minor), 6 UH-1E and 3 CH-53 (limited)</td>
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## QUANG TRI

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<tr>
<td>5 May</td>
<td>0810</td>
<td>New Quang Tri Airfield</td>
<td>20-122mm Rkts</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1 CH-46 destroyed, 2 UH-34 and 1 UH-1E (limited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>0950</td>
<td>Old Airfield</td>
<td>4-122mm Rkts</td>
<td>4 WIA</td>
<td>3 US Army CH-47 (substantial)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart from FMFPac, MarOpsV, May68, p. 58
Under a covering smoke screen, Company D, 1st Battalion, 7th Marines crosses the Vu Gia River in Operation Mameluke Thrust. The battalion would follow the river into the western highlands near Thuong Duc.

The whereabouts of the 2d NVA Division also was worrisome. In their one major success during Mini-Tet, on 10—12 May 1968, elements of that North Vietnamese division had overrun the Special Forces camps at Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc in western Quang Tin Province near the Laotian border, about 60 miles southwest of Da Nang. Concerned about the buildup of enemy forces in the Go Noi and to the west near the Special Forces Camp at Thuong Duc about 35 miles closer to Da Nang than Kham Duc, General Cushman had few troops to commit to the relief of the other two Special Forces camps. Supported by both Generals Abrams and Westmoreland, Cushman ordered the evacuation of Kham Duc.*

Even before the abandonment of Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc, Cushman had planned an operation in the western highlands to include the region near Thuong Duc. On 9 May, III MAF had directed Major General Robertson, the 1st Marine Division commander, to conduct a spoiling attack deep into the valley region west of Da Nang, that was eventually to be codenamed “Mameluke Thrust.” While Allen Brook in the Go Noi delayed the initiation of the new operation, the possibility that the NVA units that overran the more southerly Special Forces camp might next try to take Thuong Duc was an ever-present consideration. This was the reason for the replacement of the 7th Marines’ battalions in the Go Noi by the 27th Marines.22

The 1st Marine Division’s mission for Operation Mameluke Thrust was to conduct “offensive operations to find, fix and destroy enemy forces in [the] tactical area of interest.” The NVA units believed to be located in the area of operations included the 31st Regiment, 341st Division, the 368B Rocket Regiment, two unidentified battalions, the headquarters of Military Region V, and possibly, command elements of Group 44. The expected duration of the operation was 21 days.23

On 19 May, the 1st Marine Division struck. Colonel Hall’s 7th Marines, with its own 1st Battalion, attacked west along the Song Vu Gia toward Thuong Duc. Further north, Colonel Bruce F. Meyers’ 26th Marines, which the previous day, on short notice, had deployed south to Da Nang from Quang Tri, attacked with its 3rd Battalion into the hills overlooking the eastern end of the Song Lo Dong Valley—known to

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*See Chapter 26 for more details about the fight and evacuation of Ngog Tavak and Kham Duc.
the Marines as "Happy Valley."* The 1st Recon-naissance Battalion placed Stingray patrols under the opera-
tional control of the two regiments to support the operation and, as the attack progressed westward, the artillerymen of Lieutenant Colonel Clayton V. Hend-

By the end of May, Lieutenant Colonel William S. Fagan's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines had swept the hills along both banks of the Song Vu Gia and its tributary, the Song Con, to a point four kilometers beyond Thuong Duc, and returned to their starting point at the eastern end of the valley. Lieutenant Colonel John C. Studt's 3d Battalion, 26th Marines was deep in the jungle-clad hills south of Happy Valley.** Neither unit made significant contact with the enemy, but both found large supply caches. While the much-heralded enemy "Mini-Tet" offensive appeared to have spent itself at least in the Da Nang area of operations, the 1st Division decided to keep both Operations Allen Brook and Mameluke Thrust going and carry the fight to the enemy in his former strongholds.

**Operation Allen Brook Continues

During the last four days of May, the 1st Marine Division rotated fresh units into the Allen Brook area of operations. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick J. McEwan's 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, veterans of the defense of Khe Sanh, arrived on the 26th, and Lieu-
tenant Colonel John E. Greenwood's 1st Battalion, 27th Marines relieved Lieutenant Colonel Woodham's 3d Battalion, 27th Marines two days later. As May

*Colonel Meyers recalled that he "received an excellent briefing from Lieutenant Colonel (Charles E.) Mueller [whose battalion, the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines]... had operated on the western edge of the valley for three weeks." Meyers described Happy Valley as having a triple canopy, with the first layer consisting of dense Kunai grass, elephant grass, and thick vines, extending up to 20 feet. The second layer contained trees rising up to 60 feet, and the third layer consisted of large tree, mahogany, and ironwood trees which reached heights of 110 feet. Colonel Meyers stated that he knew some jungle techniques, having "done deep jungle patrols with the Gurkhas in Malaya in their campaign in 1959..." Col Bruce F. Meyers, Comments on draft, dtd 20Feb95 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Meyers Comments.

**Colonel Studt described the Happy Valley operation as "a change of pace for 3/26, operating under triple canopy, constantly on the move." He observed that enemy tactics counted "on neutralizing our normally superior supporting arms by knocking down our point elements close in to their positions." Studt stated that, rather than walk blindly into any ambush, "we used dogs extensively... consequently in the several months that we spent operating in Happy Valley, we never had a man ambushed, although we lost a few dogs." Col John C. Studt, Comments on draft, dtd 22Nov94 (Vietnam Comment File).

ended, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines departed Go Noi Island and became the 1st Marine Division reserve.24

Thereafter, III MAF maintained at least two battal-
ions in Operation Allen Brook. At the beginning of June, both the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines and the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines were involved, still under the control of the 27th Marines headquarters. The 1st Marine Division expanded the area of operations to include the 27th Marines forward command post at Liberty Bridge, as well as about 35 square kilometers of rice farming area southwest of Go Noi Island.

The regiment's orders called for an ongoing "search and clear" operation, a euphemism for the tedious process of methodically searching an area for enemy personnel, facilities, supplies, and equipment. When carried out to the degree of thoroughness which pro-
vided a measure of success, the procedure was slow and sometimes ponderous. The extreme heat encountered during Operation Allen Brook, combined with terrain that included man-high elephant grass, as well as a hostile, uncooperative local population, and frequent encounters with boobytraps and mines, made the "search and clear" mission far more challenging than its name implied.

On the morning of 1 June, a flight of nine Lockheed C-130 Hercules aircraft conducted what was accurately known as an "inferno" mission, dropping more than 31,000 gallons of fuel in 55 gallon drums with ignit-
ers attached. While the intent was to burn away a con-
siderable portion of the island's foliage, the mission was not as successful as desired due to excessive dispersion of the fuel and a heavy thunderstorm which followed the drop.25

After this disappointment, the two battalions of Marines began the process of physically searching the area for signs of the enemy. The Marines trudged steadily across the island, from west to east and then back to the west again. Short, sharp contacts resulted when enemy troops fired from well-concealed positions, causing the Marines to return fire and call for supporting arms. Upon overrunning the area from which the enemy had fired, the Marines usually found little or nothing. Occasionally, Marines detonated mines or boobytraps (referred to as "surprise firing devices" in the reporting system), often disguised as soft-drink cans, tea bags, or even "Chieu Hoi" leaflets.26*** At night, with the Marines in defensive positions, the enemy would

***A leaflet distributed by hand or sirdrop as part of psychological operations in support of the "Chieu Hoi" or "Open Arms" Campaign, which urged enemy troops to rally to the government of South Vietnam.
fire on listening posts from close range, or use mortars to harass the main perimeters. These activities caused additional casualties and further frustration for the Marines, who could not strike back effectively.

By 3 June, the 27th Marines had found little evidence of the enemy, causing the 1st Marine Division to determine that the "recent lack of significant contact indicates enemy forces departed Allen Brook AO." Accordingly, the division reduced the scale of Operation Allen Brook, ordering the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines to depart Go Noi Island for operations elsewhere, and shrinking the Allen Brook AO. It would now include only that portion of Go Noi Island west of the National Railroad and a small area on the north bank of the Song Thu Bon, opposite the island.

The 27th Marines ordered the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines to move westward along Route 537 on its departure from the island, continuing the "search and clear" process along the way. Simultaneously, the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines also would move westward, on the right flank of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines.

By mid-morning on 5 June, the two battalions were approaching their final objectives, having lost 4 killed and 26 wounded to sniper fire and mines along the way. As Company D, 26th Marines, under First Lieutenant Daniel L. McGravey, neared the hamlet of Cu Ban (3), North Vietnamese hidden in a trenchline and bunkers to the south fired on the 1st Platoon. The Marines maneuvered to one flank, attempting to envelop the enemy, and Communist mortars joined the action. At the same time, 500 meters to the east, Company B, 26th Marines, under Captain James H. Champion, also came under heavy fire and had a platoon caught in the open, unable to maneuver.

As the Marines called for mortars, artillery, and air support to assist in suppressing the enemy fire, Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood, commanding the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, dispatched his Company C, commanded by Captain Martin T. Farmer, to assist the beleaguered 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. Company C hurried southward and made contact with the northernmost flank of Company B, 26th Marines, then swung to the west and assaulted the nearby Communist positions. Almost immediately, Captain Farmer and his second in command were wounded by mortar fire. Attacking without "a proper base of fire" and without time to "adequately reconnoiter" enemy positions, Company C, said Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood later, "lost momentum, faltered, and stopped."28

Company D, 26th Marines was still heavily engaged near Cu Ban (3) and now, both Company B, 26th Marines and Company C, 27th Marines were being held down by enemy fire 500 meters east of the hamlet. The Communists, fighting from well-covered and expertly concealed positions, kept up heavy fire with rifles, machine guns, and mortars. The Marines, long accustomed to the luxury of fire superiority, found that they were unable to employ their supporting arms effectively in such close quarters without endangering friendly troops.

As casualties mounted, helicopters landed under fire to evacuate the wounded. Two Sikorsky UH—34 "Sea Horse" helicopters suffered hits in the process, but neither were lost. In mid-afternoon, with the fight still raging, Company A, 27th Marines, accompanied by three tanks, departed Liberty Bridge to join the fray. Supported by the tanks and carefully using artillery and air support, the Marines attacked and overran the enemy positions.

The Marines lost 7 killed and 55 wounded in this hard-fought, but confused, action. They found 30 North Vietnamese dead. A machine gunner with Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines summed up the battle from an infantryman's perspective: "We had a bad-ass fire fight...it lasted for awhile. Then we moved on."30

Although the Marines had finally made solid contact with the enemy, the plan to reduce the Operation Allen Brook commitment to a single battalion remained in effect. On 6 June, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines left the area and elements of the 1st Engineer Battalion arrived with the heavy equipment needed for the new task assigned to Operation Allen Brook forces: the virtual razing of Go Noi Island. The new mission called for the 27th Marines to "provide support and protection for [an] engineer effort to systematically eliminate all fortifications, dwellings, harbor sites, and hedgerows in [the] AO." The first area scheduled to be cleared was Cu Ban (3).

The clearing project presented many challenges especially since Go Noi Island was thoroughly infested with well-constructed enemy field fortifications. The typical Go Noi bunker, based on a deep hole, had overhead protection constructed from rails and ties from the nearby National Railroad. Some actually included concrete. Covered with earth and camouflaged effectively, these positions were invisible from the air and only barely apparent from the ground. In some areas, farmers had worked away the ground surrounding the
Carrying out a program of "total destruction," Marine engineers bulldoze the hamlets in the Go Noi after the civilian population has been evacuated.

bamboo groves for so long that the groves appeared to be raised on flat mounds of hard earth. The Communists burrowed under these groves to construct hidden bunkers with firing slits at ground level. In addition to the fortifications built by the NVA and VC for their own use, the hamlets contained bunkers built by the local populace for family protection. These bunkers, also built with materials salvaged from the National Railroad, featured sloped roofs which deflected bombs and artillery projectiles. So strong were these bunkers that some were undamaged by 2,000 pound bombs detonating 50 feet away.31

As the engineers went about the business of destroying bunkers and filling in trenchlines, Lieutenant Colonel Greenwood provided them security and continued a program of aggressive patrolling with his four companies. Contact with the enemy remained sporadic. As before the battle at Cu Ban, the enemy contented themselves with occasional sniping, attacks on listening posts, harassing mortar fire on company night positions, and an ever-increasing number of mines and boobytraps. Marines continued to fall prey to heat, as well as to enemy action, for the daily temperature averaged 100 degrees, with humidity greater than 80 percent. In the still, thick air, heat casualties sometimes ran as high as 10 percent, causing commanders to limit troop activity to the early morning and late afternoon. While moving, the Marines did not carry excess equipment, leaving behind even their flak jackets. To further exacerbate the Marine problems with the intense heat, the enemy contaminated the water wells in the area with oil and dead animal carcasses and the local river water was seemingly impervious to the attempts to purify it with halazone tablets.32*

The battalion continued the "search and clear" routine (while the engineers gave a whole new meaning to the "clearing" aspects of the mission) without significant contact until 15 June. At 0330 that morning, behind a curtain of B-40 rockets and heavy automatic weapons fire, Communist troops fell upon Company B's night position near the National Railroad. The Marines returned fire with all organic weapons, from rifles to antitank rockets, and called for artillery fire support. In the face of Company B's tenacious defense, the North Vietnamese broke off their attack and attempted to flee, but Company B Marines pursued the broken enemy into the night, ending the engagement decisively. The next day, the Marines tallied 21 dead North Vietnamese, all victims of the abortive attack. Company B suffered only three wounded.

The 1st Marine Division ordered the area of operations extended to permit the Allen Brook forces to venture east of the National Railroad in pursuit of the enemy. Early on 19 June, an ad hoc force composed of elements of Companies B and D (under the command

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*Halazone tablets were carried by the individual Marine for use in purifying locally gathered water.
of the executive officer of Company B) ran into a
North Vietnamese force near the hamlet of Bac Dong
Ban. One Marine platoon immediately went to
ground in the face of overwhelming enemy fire. As the
Marines called for air and artillery, another ad hoc
company (also composed of elements of Companies B
and D) moved to the rescue under the command of
Company B's commanding officer, First Lieutenant
Richard M. Wozar.

The North Vietnamese were thoroughly dug in,
occupying a line of trenches and bunkers with their
backs to the Song Ky Lam. For nine hours, the battle
raged with neither side able to gain the upper hand.
Finally, at 1800, the battalion command group, with
Company A and a platoon from Company C, arrived
and attacked from the west. Swinging northward, the
reinforcements assaulted the enemy positions while
Companies B and D provided a base of fire. By 1900,
the Marines overwhelmed the enemy, suffering 6 dead,
19 wounded, and 12 heat casualties. By noon the next
day, the Marines found 17 North Vietnamese dead.33

The fight at Bac Dong Ban was the 1st Battalion's
last major battle in Operation Allen Brook. After com-
pleting a sweep of the eastern portion of Go Noi Island,
they departed the area on 23 June and in their place, the
2d Battalion, 27th Marines assumed responsibility for
Operation Allen Brook. That night the North Viet-
namese welcomed the fresh battalion to Go Noi Island
with 60 rounds of mortar fire on Companies E, F, and H.

The 2d Battalion, tasked to continue the land clearing
operations on Go Noi Island, arrived intent on carrying
out a program of "total destruction." Their policy includ-
ed elimination of natural assembly areas, concealing
foliage, treelines, bamboo groves, hedgerows, trench-
lines, fighting holes, caves, bunkers, tunnels, building struc-
tures, and any natural or man-made feature providing
cover. Material which could be used to build bunkers,
such as concrete blocks, beams, posts, pillars, and tree
trunks, would be destroyed by crushing or burning. In
the words of the battalion commander, Lieutenant
Colonel Albert W. Keller, "we were to level that island."34

The 2d Battalion experienced only light enemy con-
tact throughout its stay at Go Noi Island. The enemy
appeared only in small groups, usually fleeing when
sighted by the Marines. Because of the sporadic nature of
enemy contact, much of the battalion's efforts centered
on land clearing. In one 18-day period, the engineers
completely leveled the largest forested area on Go Noi
Island.35 Lieutenant Colonel Keller later remarked that
"by the time we destroyed and leveled that whole area
. . . it looked almost like a parking lot for a major ball

park in the United States."36 As part of its land clearing
effort, the battalion arranged two air-delivered herbicide
missions which "were found to be quite effective."37

On 16 July, the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines depart-
ed Go Noi Island, having reported killing 144 enemy
at a cost of 4 Marines dead and 147 wounded. Simul-
taneously, the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines moved into
the area and assumed responsibility for Operation
Allen Brook. The character of the operation remained
unchanged as the companies of the 3d Battalion alter-
ated between patrolling and providing security for
the engineers who were methodically scraping the
island clean. The Communists continued to avoid sig-
nificant engagements, but they did muster the temer-
ity to fire on the aircraft which sprayed the island with
herbicides on 18 July and 21 July. Meanwhile, the
Marines continued to fire on small groups of enemy or
on Vietnamese voices heard in the night, then searched
the areas later to find an occasional body or blood trail.*

*Colonel Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., at the time the 3d Battalion,
27th Marines commander, commented that he positioned a sniper
and a 106mm recoilless rifle team on the north/south railroad trestle:
"The sniper would spot and kill or wound an enemy soldier. As other enemy
forces would attempt to aid the dead or wounded NVA the 106 would
take them under fire." Col Tullis J. Woodham, Jr., Comments on draft,
dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
Although it appeared that the NVA battalions once thought to be based on Go Noi Island were gone, intelligence sources indicated that the Communists would soon try to reoccupy the area. At the request of the 1st Marine Division, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/7 (Seventh Fleet Special Landing Force “B”) launched Operation Swift Play on 23 July 1968, only 17 hours after having embarked on board amphibious shipping at the close of Operation Eager Yankee in Thua Thien Province.

Designed to complement Operation Allen Brook, Operation Swift Play was a surprise thrust into the Da The Mountain area, six kilometers south of Go Noi Island. After landing by helicopter, BLT 2/7 swept north toward the Song Chiem Son and the Allen Brook area of operations. During the week-long sweep, the Marines of BLT 2/7 uncovered numerous enemy caches and base areas, including what appeared to be a training center, complete with lecture hall, carefully hidden in the steep, forested mountains. On 31 July, BLT 2/7 crossed the Chiem Son to Go Noi Island and relieved the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines of responsibility for Operation Allen Brook. Three days later, the 27th Marines ended its participation in the operation altogether, passing control of BLT 2/7 to the 5th Marines, which had previously exchanged its area of operations near Phu Bai with the 26th Marines.

Land-clearing operations continued until the Communists launched their long-awaited “third offensive” on 23 August. With enemy activity on Go Noi Island only minimal, the 1st Marine Division terminated Operation Allen Brook so that the forces could be employed to battle the enemy forces threatening Da Nang. Company E remained behind temporarily to escort the engineers to Liberty Bridge while the remainder of BLT 2/7 departed by helicopter. On 24 August, as Company E and the engineer convoy of trucks and earth-moving equipment headed westward, the enemy harassed them with sporadic sniper fire until they cleared Go Noi Island.

Operation Allen Brook lasted three and one half months and resulted in 917 enemy killed. An additional 11 were captured, and 2 rallied to the Government of Vietnam. The III MAF units which sought to bring Go Noi Island under government control lost 170 Marines and 2 sailors killed in action and a further 1,124 wounded. Even more fell to heat, disease, snakebite, accidents, and a host of other hazards. All the while they fought, Operation Mameluke Thrust continued in the west.

Mameluke Thrust Also Continues

On 3 June, General Robertson expanded the Mameluke Thrust area of operations eastward to include the Song Thu Bon-Song Tinh Yen valley.
The western portion of this basin was the ‘Arizona Territory’ and the area on the east bank of the river was the An Hoa sector. While the Arizona Territory, like Go Noi Island, had been tightly in the grip of the Viet Cong for many years, the Marines had managed to maintain a presence at An Hoa, even while committed to the fighting on the nearby Go Noi. While the 26th Marines took control of the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, General Robertson reinforced the 7th Marines with his only reserve, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines for operations in the An Hoa basin.

In the western sector of Mameluke Thrust under the 26th Marines, on 6 June, the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines established a patrol base on Hill 1235 (known locally as Tho Thenon), the dominant peak of the massif which overlooked the Da Nang-Hoi An-Dai Loc Triangle, the Arizona Territory, Happy Valley, and the valley of the Song Thu Bon. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines established its own battalion patrol base about two kilometers to the south, atop Hill 1062.

In the 7th Marines portion of the operation, Lieutenant Colonel McEwan’s 1st Battalion, 26th Marines began operations in the An Hoa area on the morning of 7 June. It did not have to wait long for action. At 0730, while moving southwest from Liberty Bridge, Company B came under fire from a North Vietnamese force atop a low hill only 1,200 meters from the bridge. The rest of the battalion quickly joined the action. As the Marines maneuvered, the North Vietnamese poured on a heavy fire, including machine guns and RPGs. The Marines called for artillery and close air support, but the enemy doggedly held the hill for nine hours, finally melting away at day’s end. Marine casualties totaled 17 killed in action and 46 wounded. They found 64 dead North Vietnamese.

In the mountains to the west, the enemy remained elusive, avoiding contact even at the risk of losing large caches and base areas to the Marines. On 9 June, Company L, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines, under the command of Captain Jesse D. Bennett, captured a recently abandoned NVA hospital. The complex contained 125 beds, medical supplies (including U.S.-made antibiotics), a clean operating room, a sterilizing area, a kitchen, food, medical records, a system of running water built with bamboo pipes, and 16 pounds of marijuana.

On 11 June, acting on a prisoner’s information, Company I, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines located what turned out to be the command post of the notorious 368B Rocket Regiment. The quantity of equipment captured there was staggering: rocket warheads, plotting boards, fire control devices, drafting tools, compasses, binoculars, hundreds of uniforms, and items of personal equipment. The entire haul totaled 18 helicopter loads.

During the second week in June, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines swept eastward, down from the mountains, then terminated participation in the operation. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines moved northward from An Hoa to the area bounded by the Thu Bon, Ai Nghia, and La Tho Rivers known as “Dodge City,” and Lieutenant Colonel Donald N. Rexroad’s 3d Battalion, 5th Marines moved to An Hoa.

The action seemed to follow the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. On 13 June, only two days after entering the Dodge City area, the battalion encountered a North Vietnamese force near the village of Ky Chau, one kilometer west of a line of ROK Marine blocking positions along the National Railroad. The Communists were cut off by the Song Ky Lam to the west and south, the ROK’s to the east, and the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines attacking from the north. They resolutely defended their position using heavy machine guns, 60mm mortars, and RPGs. In a nine-hour battle, the Marines lost 3 killed and 24 wounded, killing 44 of the enemy in the process. Late that night, as Company B lay in ambush at the junction of a trail and the railroad bed, approximately 30–50 North Vietnamese attempted to escape to the east. In the ensuing fight, 15 of the enemy died, with the Marines sustaining no casualties.

Two days later, the enemy again ran afoot of the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. Two kilometers southeast of the 7th Marines’ command post on Hill 55, a large North Vietnamese unit occupied a heavily fortified triangular-shaped position 500 meters wide, which included a trenchline and a number of bunkers. The

*Lieutenant Colonel McEwan related that Colonel Reverdy M. Hall, the commander of the 7th Marines, referred to him as the “magnet... since 1/26 always made contact with the enemy...” LtCol Frederick J. McClean, Comments on draft, dtd 7Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
Marines fought the Communists through the afternoon of 15 June and into the early evening, making liberal use of close air support and artillery. When they overran the enemy positions at 1930, the Marines reported 84 North Vietnamese dead. Their own casualties were 7 killed in action and 15 wounded.44

The action near Hill 55 marked the end of the sweep through the Dodge City area and the focus of Operation Mameluke Thrust moved once again to the western valleys. On 14 June, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines marched out from An Hoa, leaving Company-K to guard the fire support base, and crossed the Song Yen into the Arizona Territory. Just across the river from An Hoa, Company I came under attack. A Communist mortar round killed the company commander, a platoon commander, and the company gunnery sergeant and seriously wounded the company executive officer, First Lieutenant Joseph T. Campbell. As the only officer left alive, Lieutenant Campbell refused evacuation and assumed command of the company. He directed medevac helicopters into and out of the landing zone and organized suppressive fire on the Communist positions nearby. Before he himself could be flown out, Lieutenant Campbell succumbed to his wounds. For his heroic action, he received the Navy Cross, posthumously.45

Northeast of Thuong Duc, another dramatic action took place the following day when Company K, 3d Battalion, 26th Marines received mortar fire while escorting a convoy. Corporal David M. Sivak volunteered to recover a machine gun abandoned during the initial contact. He crept uphill toward the weapon until a North Vietnamese soldier in a nearby fighting hole spotted him and began throwing hand grenades. Although wounded in the chest by a fragment, Sivak emptied 12 full magazines from his M16 at his tormentor.

Sivak finally reached the machine gun and continued advancing into the enemy position. The NVA soldier suddenly stuck his head out from a hidden tunnel. Deciding against running toward his comrades for fear of being shot in the back, Corporal Sivak threw the machine gun at the North Vietnamese, who then ducked back into the tunnel.

The enemy soldier looked out from the tunnel a second time and Sivak attacked with his bare hands.
The Communist fired his rifle, creasing Sivak's leg, and Sivak knocked the weapon from the man's hands. As the two grappled in the confines of the hole, the North Vietnamese bit the Marine savagely on the arm. Angered, Sivak bit him back, then drew his Kabar* and stabbed his opponent. The enemy soldier produced his own knife and stabbed Sivak in the back, but it was too late. The Marine had gained the upper hand. Sivak continued stabbing until he realized that the man had died.

Corporal Sivak remained in the hole until his comrades overran the hill. From captured documents, the Marines learned that the dead man was part of a nine-man North Vietnamese mortar forward observer team. Only when Sivak lost consciousness did his fellow Marines realize that he was wounded.

Corporal Sivak's adventure was not yet over. The story of his experience at the 1st Hospital Company is best told in his own words, recorded only three weeks after the incident:

I went to 1st Hospital and the doctor started checking me out for malaria and I told him that wasn't wrong and he said, "What's wrong?" . . . I said, "Well, I got stabbed in the back, I got bit in the arm, I got shrapnel in the chest, and I got shot in the leg." He couldn't believe it until he looked at it. He thought it was kinda funny. I wasn't in a mood to laugh at it. They thought I might have to get rabies shots from where I got bit in the arm, but I made out. All I had to do was get a tetanus shot. I was scared because rabies shots, you get 16 of them, they said, in the stomach. I got a weak stomach.

Corporal Sivak's platoon sergeant, reflecting on Sivak's harrowing experience, said only, "I think the bite was worse than the stab." 47

Retaining control of the 3d Battalion, the 26th Marines now absorbed the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Roger H. Barnard's 3d Battalion, 7th Marines. At 0815 on 17 June, two of Barnard's companies conducted a helicopter assault into the Hill 1235 area and began the task of patrolling northward and following the trace of the Song Yang to the now-familiar tasks of establishing a battalion patrol base and sweeping the assigned area.

On 19 June, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines moved westward from the fire support base at Hill 52, following the Song Vu Gia toward Thuong Duc and searching the same ground covered one month before by the 3d Battalion at the beginning of the operation. It was the nature of the war that the only areas which were known to be secure were those areas physically occupied, thus, it was often necessary to retrace old steps in the search for the enemy. But this time, the Communists carefully avoided contact.

The 1st Battalion, 26th Marines continued to push through the valley, past Thuong Duc, then turned northward and followed the trace of the Song Yang to link up with the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines in Happy Valley on 27 June. The next day, the 3d Battalion, 7th Marines linked up with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines at the western edge of the Arizona Territory, southeast of Thuong Duc, then left the operation.

Southeast of An Hoa, in the Que Son area, the U.S. Army's Americal Division planned an offensive dubbed Operation Pocahontas Forest. The 1st Marine Division developed a plan to intercept Communist forces driven into the upper Song Thu Bon Valley by the Americal Division. At 1815 on 7 July, Battery A, 1st Battalion, 13th Marines established a fire support base on the west bank of the Song Thu Bon, near Nong Son, about 11 kilometers southwest of An Hoa. 48 Its mission was to provide artillery support to the Marine units which would be engaged in Operation Mameluke Thrust/Pocahontas Forest. The next morning, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines conducted a helicopter assault into a landing zone along the Khe Dienne, also just west of the Song Thu Bon, but about three kilometers upstream of the new fire support base at Nong Son.

Elsewhere, on 9 July, Mameluke Thrust began to expand once again as the 3d Battalion, 26th Marines attacked into the Dodge City area and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines entered the Song Cu De Valley (called "Elephant Valley") to conduct the "Northern Phase" of the operation. In Elephant Valley, the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines found "no signs of well-utilized trails, prepared positions, [or] camp and harbor sites of any sizeable enemy force." 49 On 19 July, the battalion secured from the operation and returned to Phu Bai.

As intelligence reports continued to indicate the enemy planned a major attack on Da Nang during late July, the 1st Marine Division redistributed forces to meet the threat. 50 On 20 July, the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines shifted from its blocking position near Nong Son, back to An Hoa. Two days later, the 26th Marines, with the 1st and 3d Battalions, went north to Phu Bai.

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*The Marine Corps issue combat knife.
relieving the 5th Marines in Operation Houston.

The expected Communist ground assault on Da Nang did not materialize during July. In place of it, the enemy launched the heaviest mortar and rocket attack on Da Nang since TET. On 23 July, 143 rounds of rocket and mortar fire fell on the city and air base, killing 6 and wounding 76. The enemy fire damaged a runway, six helicopters, a Rockwell International OV–10 Bronco, and an Air Force Fairchild C–123 Provider. Recognizing the need for further protection against the rocket threat, III MAF earlier had directed the erection of a Da Nang Anti-infiltration System (DAIS) in cooperation with ARVN forces. At the beginning of July, generally following the outer trace of the Da Nang rocket belt, the 1st Marine Division had started work on the DAIS, which was to include concertina and barbed wire fencing, sensors, towers, and bunkers. By the end of the month, Marine engineers and ARVN had completed about 65 percent of the first of two increments of the planned project. Obviously, the uncompleted DAIS offered only a minor impediment to the enemy rocketeers during the month.51*

The Marines attributed the enemy’s failure to carry out the expected ground attacks in the city to the success of Operation Mameluke Thrust. As one unit history recorded:

Prisoners and documents continued to indicate that the enemy had a definite plan for infiltration of Da Nang city proper with sapper and related forces. . . . It appeared that Group 44 (Quang Da Special Zone) Headquarters endeavored to carry out such a plan . . ., but was unable to consummate the action due to interdiction of his forces prior to initiation of his offensive.52

During the last week of July, Colonel Paul G. Graham’s 5th Marines redeployed to An Hoa from Phu Bai and began operations in the An Hoa basin immediately. The day it arrived, the 2d Battalion moved to the field, northeast of the fire support base, and soon encountered numerous small North Vietnamese units. After these initial engagements, contact tapered off dramatically. By the end of the month, the enemy appeared to have evacuated the An Hoa area.

In the Arizona Territory, the month ended with an unusual sighting reported by a reconnaissance team. On 28 July, Stingray patrol “Scandinavia” sighted four Soviet-built PT–76 tanks and a wheeled vehicle barely 3,500 meters northwest of the An Hoa fire support base. An air observer confirmed the sighting and Scandinavian called for close air support and artillery fire on the area, resulting in four secondary explosions.53 The following morning, Teams Albrook and Scandinavia reported two vehicles, at least one of which was tracked, moving in circles about a kilometer northeast of the previous sighting. Scandinavia directed artillery and air attacks against the vehicles, but could not observe the target effectively. Later that day, an agent report told of two destroyed armored fighting vehicles in the same location as the first sighting.54 To verify these reports, Companies D and F, 5th Marines searched the area of the sightings, but found no evidence of tanks.

August began with a significant enemy contact for Stingray patrol “Flaky Snow” in the Arizona Territory. At 0405 on 1 August, a company of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong rushed Flaky Snow’s position from the north, using grenades, satchel charges, bangalore torpedoes, and RPG fire to overwhelm the Marines. The enemy withdrew immediately, having killed 5 Marines and wounded 11. To complicate matters further for Flaky Snow, the attack temporarily knocked its radio out of action, which prevented it from calling for help. The team got the radio working again at 0600, and called for the reaction force. Within 20 minutes, help arrived. The reaction force landed by helicopter, under fire from the west, to find all of the observation post’s bunkers destroyed and a North Vietnamese flag flying over the position. The Flaky Snow Marines claimed to have killed seven of their attackers, but a search of the area revealed only three bodies.55

The frequency of enemy contact continued to rise in the beginning of August. In the Arizona Territory during the first two days of the month, A Troop, 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry, 1st Air Cavalry Division, under the operational control of the 5th Marines, killed 96 Communists in 30 hours.56 The 5th Marines continued search and clear operations with Lieutenant Colonel Robert H. Thompson’s 1st Battalion in the Arizona Territory and Lieutenant Colonel James W. Stemple’s 2d Battalion northeast of An Hoa. Lieutenant Colonel Stemple recalled that his battalion “was invested from the An Hoa combat base to Liberty Bridge, and was involved in activity with the enemy on a daily basis . . .”.57

At 0915, on 6 August, Companies E and F engaged a North Vietnamese company near the village of Cu Ban, scene of many fights between the Communists and Operation Allen Brook forces in the previous weeks. Corporal Robert G. Fante, a squad leader assigned to Company F, maneuvered his men forward, pressing home the attack on the Communist positions.

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*See Chapter 28 for further discussion of the Da Nang barrier.
Spotting a 75mm recoilless rifle, he singlehandedly assaulted the position, capturing the weapon and killing or driving off its crew members. Corporal Fante continued to lead his squad on a rampage through the enemy’s defenses, clearing bunkers with hand grenades and pursuing the retreating North Vietnamese. He was leading this advance when killed by enemy fire. For his courageous acts, Corporal Fante was awarded the Navy Cross posthumously.

After overrunning the enemy position, the Marines found 23 North Vietnamese dead and 34 tons of rice, in addition to the recoilless rifle captured by Corporal Fante. Fante was the only Marine killed in the fight, but 21 others and 1 Navy corpsman suffered wounds. An additional 46 Marines sustained injuries when an aircraft accidentally dropped a load of napalm bombs on Company F’s position during the fight. Lieutenant Colonel Stemple recalled that a bomb hit the reserve platoon of Company F and just missed his command group by a few yards.

The two battalions continued the search and clear operations in their assigned sectors for the next nine days without significant contact. The Marines searched caves, bunkers, and dwellings, patrolled roads and rice paddies, and killed Communists one or two at a time. Casualties continued to trickle into the hospitals and aid stations in the rear as Marines fell victim to the familiar enemy formula: mines, boobytraps, and sniper fire by day; harassing mortar fire by night.

Indications that the enemy was preparing to launch his expected offensive continued to build. On 10 August, acting on intelligence reports, the 1st Marine Division issued instructions directing subordinate units to prepare to assist in the defense of the Da Nang vital area. The order called for reduced “day workloads . . . to allow adequate rest [for] all hands” and a concomitant increase in night activities. The tanks sighted in the Arizona Territory a few weeks earlier now caused a flurry of interest in reviewing and updating the division’s antimechanized plans.

On 16 August, “usually reliable sources, in addition to two counterintelligence agents” disclosed that the 402d Sapper Battalion, the R–20 Battalion, and possibly a regimental headquarters were located three kilometers southeast of Liberty Bridge in the village of Chau Phong. The location of such a large concentration of enemy troops less than 30 kilometers south of Da Nang was a further indication that the enemy offensive would soon begin, accompanied by the previously anticipated sapper attacks on the city proper. The 1st Marine Division acted quickly, ordering the 5th Marines to surprise the enemy battalions at Chau Phong and to destroy them in their staging areas.

At 2300, the night of 16 August, three Marine infantry battalions silently converged on the hamlet of Chau Phong (2). Lieutenant Colonel LeRoy E. Watson’s BLT 2/7, participating in Operation Swift Play in the hills south of Go Noi Island, shifted into a blocking position 1,200 meters east of the objective along a major stream. Stemple’s 2d Battalion, 5th Marines sealed the west side of the objective along another stream 2,000 meters from Chau Phong. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Rufus A. Seymour, flew into An Hoa and conducted a night approach march into an assembly area near My Son (1), about five kilometers southwest of the Communist positions. H–hour was set for 0700, 17 August.

Lieutenant Colonel Ben A. Moore, Jr.’s gunners of the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines drew first blood with an artillery preparation that began at 0400 and lasted until 0700. The original plan called for the artillery barrage to be followed by a low-level air attack, also dropping smoke and CS gas on the objective area. According to Lieutenant Colonel Stemple, torrential rains after midnight, however, forced the cancellation of the air strikes until mid- and late-morning without the smoke or CS. The original plan called for his battalion to initiate a predawn “attack by fire” so as to confuse the NVA as to the direction of attack and to hold them in place. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines was then to make the main assault attacking northeast into Chau Pong (2). Stemple’s troops opened fire, according to plan, but he recalled that inadvertently, elements of BLT 2/7 moved in front of Seymour’s battalion and delayed the main assault. About 200 North Vietnamese, however, attempted to flee to the east at 1200, and Companies F and G, BLT 2/7 were waiting for them. Marines of these two companies reported killing 53 of the enemy while suffering only 11 men wounded. At 1500, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines finally assaulted and captured the hamlet, finding “many enemy dead, weapons, equipment, and food supplies.” The enemy cache yielded significant quantities of stores, including 88 tons of rice and enough medical supplies to support 500 men.

During the night of 17 August, the three battalions adjusted their lines. At first light, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines moved northward across a branch line of the National Railroad to search the hamlet of Chau Phong (1). At the same time, BLT 2/7 crossed...
the stream toward the hamlet, then swung northward with orders to attack and seize the hamlets of La Thap (1) and Le Nam (3), which were about 1,500 meters north of Chau Phong. At 0700, Company E, BLT 2/7 engaged a North Vietnamese company defending a low hill just northeast of Chau Phong. The enemy troops, described as “fresh” and “determined,” were well-equipped, even to the point of wearing helmets and body armor.6 The Marines returned fire and attempted to envelop the enemy, but the determined defense put up by the North Vietnamese drove them to cover. Taking up positions 600 meters away, the Marines directed artillery fire and airstrikes (the latter including CS gas) on the enemy, driving them from the hill. The North Vietnamese left 12 dead in the position, while Company E lost 6 Marines killed, and 25 wounded.66 On Company E’s left, Company G, BLT 2/7 also encountered a North Vietnamese unit which similarly impeded the battalion’s attack to the north. With BLT 2/7 bogged down by these pockets of resistance, the 5th Marines modified the original plan and ordered the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines to capture the hamlets of La Thap (1) and Le Nam (3).

At 1500, as Company G, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines approached the objective, they engaged an enemy platoon defending the hamlet of La Thap (1). The Marines advanced, returning fire, but enemy resistance increased. A five-hour shootout ensued, during which six flights of aircraft bombed the enemy, while the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines provided a heavy dose of artillery fire on the hamlet. At 2000, Company G assaulted and captured the position, killing 37 North Vietnamese and effectively ending the battle of Chau Phong. Seven Company G Marines died and 19 were wounded in the fight.67

Operation Mameluke Thrust continued for some time. But soon after the battle for Chau Phong, the Communists launched their long-awaited offensive in the Da Nang area, diverting III MAF’s energies to deal with the new threat. By this time in northern I Corps, the 3d Marine Division had launched its own offensive against the North Vietnamese Divisions in both the DMZ sector and in western Quang Tri Province.
PART IV
THE WAR CONTINUES:
OFFENSIVE AND
COUNTER-OFFENSIVE
CHAPTER 18

3d Division Takes the Offensive

The Enemy Situation—The Offensive Takes Shape—The Eastern DMZ
The Pressure Continues—Into the Western Mountains—Southern Quang Tri and Thua Thien

The Enemy Situation

In northern I Corps, enemy activity throughout Quang Tri Province was light and sporadic during the early days of June. With the virtual destruction of two regiments of the veteran 320th NVA Division in the eastern sector of the DMZ in late May, enemy ground activity in the province’s northeastern quadrant decreased markedly. What enemy activity there was, was generally limited to long-range rocket and artillery attacks on allied positions from within and north of the Demilitarized Zone. Although squad- and platoon-sized enemy units did engage wide-ranging allied patrols, no large North Vietnamese force attempted to attack allied installations or formations.

Further west, agent reports placed the 270th NVA Regiment and 27th Independent Regiment in Leatherneck Square, the area bounded by Con Thien (A-4), Gio Linh, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo. Intelligence analysts assumed that these two enemy units would not only attack allied installations in the region, but attempt to destroy the Cam Lo Refugee Resettlement Project and interdict Route 9.

Within the central portion of the province, units subordinate to the Quang Tri Liberation Front or 7th Front, including elements of the 812th Regiment, and the 808th and 818th Separate Battalions, although unlocated, were poised to venture out of their jungle sanctuaries on the Quang Tri-Thua Thien provincial border and launch attacks against Quang Tri City and surrounding allied bases. Forward elements of the three enemy units were known to be in the countryside surrounding the city, attempting to obtain rice and recruits.

In the western reaches of the province, centered on the Khe Sanh Plateau, the 304th NVA Division was joined in late May by the 88th and 102d Regiments, 308th NVA Division. The enemy regiments, which had arrived recently from Hanoi, were to reinforce the 304th and launch attacks against Khe Sanh Combat Base and Route 9, from Ca Lu west to the Laotian border. The number of enemy units located within the Demilitarized Zone area and in Quang Tri Province at the beginning of June was estimated at 36 infantry and 6 support battalions, and confirmed enemy combat strength placed at 23,100 troops.

The Offensive Takes Shape

Upon taking over in late May, the new 3d Marine Division commander, Major General Raymond G. Davis, found the maneuver elements of the division generally occupying fixed positions in four operational areas centered on the Demilitarized Zone from Cua Viet to Khe Sanh. In the coastal lowlands, or Napoleon-Saline area of operations, Colonel Milton A. Hull’s 3d Marines and Lieutenant Colonel George F. Meyers’ 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion occupied Camp Kistler at the Cua Viet’s port facility. The 1st and 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, located nearby, conducted periodic sweeps of the area north and northwest of the port facility, while companies of Lieutenant Colonel Meyers’ battalion occupied the C-4 strongpoint and conducted similar sweeps of the immediate area. Also under the operational control of the 3d Marines were elements of Lieutenant Colonel Michael V. Palatas’ 1st Battalion, 9th Marines.

Northwest of Cua Viet, in the Kentucky area of operations, the 9th Marines under Colonel Richard B. Smith provided security for the outposts within the area of operations, from Gio Linh to Cam Lo, as well as the major lines of communications, Routes 1, 9, and 561. Under Smith’s operational control was Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Heath, Jr.’s 2d Battalion, 26th Marines which secured the strongpoints at Con Thien, A-3, C-2, and C-2 bridge, all strung along Route 561, a north-south provincial road stretching from the Demilitarized Zone to Cam Lo. The regimental headquarters and 1st and 3d Battalions, 26th Marines had been deployed to Da Nang on 18 May from the Quang Tri sector to
participate in the 1st Marine Division’s operation Mameluke Thrust.*

Headquartered at Camp Carroll in the Lancaster II area of operations were Colonel Edward J. Miller’s 4th Marines and a battalion of the 9th Marines. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 4th Marines, the latter organized as a battalion landing team (BLT), and the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines secured combat bases at Camp Carroll, Thon Son Lam, and Ca Lu, all centered on Route 9. At Ca Lu, under the operational control of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines was Lieutenant Colonel Daniel J. Quick’s 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, which like the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, was organized as a battalion landing team.**

The largest of the division’s four operational areas was Scotland II, which encompassed the western third of Quang Tri Province. Primary responsibility for operations within this area lay with the 3d Marine Division’s Task Force Hotel, a multi-battalion task force commanded by Assistant Division Commander, Brigadier General Carl W. Hoffman. Hoffman’s task force consisted of two battalions of Colonel Stanley S. Hughes’ 1st Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Davis.

The three battalions under Brigadier General Hoffman’s command were assigned the task of maintaining the defense of Khe Sanh Combat Base and the surrounding outposts on Hills 881, 861, 950, and other prominent terrain features. In addition, troops of the task force secured Route 9, the vital overland resupply route for the division’s western-most fortified positions, from Landing Zone Stud and Ca Lu to Khe Sanh.

Providing artillery support for the division’s ground elements were the four organic battalions of the 12th Marines under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Wilson A. Kluckman. A battery from the regiment, or another allied artillery unit under its operational control, was in position at every combat base and strongpoint, ready to support the maneuver battalions and to respond to enemy attacks by fire on allied installations or populated areas.

With the ground elements of the division generally tied to fixed positions, the tactical effectiveness of such a disposition of forces was limited. A considerable number of troops were needed to defend these installations strung out along the Demilitarized Zone. In turn, these fixed installations presented lucrative targets for both North Vietnamese ground forces and artillery gunners. Beyond immediate allied patrol zones, large areas of Quang Tri Province virtually belonged to the enemy.

The overall tactical situation in late May, therefore, might be viewed as one of balance. On the one hand the North Vietnamese had been soundly defeated in their attempts against major Marine bases at Khe Sanh and Dong Ha. On the other, allied forces had not attempted to penetrate the enemy’s large base areas nor attempted to disrupt his supply and infiltration routes deep in the mountainous jungles of western Quang Tri.

This tactical disposition of the division’s forces would be turned around with General Davis’ assumption of command. Buttressed by the presence of two U.S. Army divisions, which greatly strengthened troop density in northern I Corps, Davis prepared to take the war to the enemy. After reducing the number of troops at fixed positions, he placed the 3d Marine Division in a more mobile posture, characteristic of ongoing Army air cavalry and airborne operations.

“The way to get it done,” Davis later recalled, “was to get out of those fixed positions and get mobility, to go and destroy the enemy on our terms—not sit there and absorb the shot and shell and frequent penetrations that he was able to mount.”

As Lieutenant General Rosson’s deputy at Provisional Corps, Vietnam, Davis had observed first-hand the mobile operations of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. With extensive helicopter support, air cavalry troops “forgot about real estate” and applied the necessary forces directly against enemy troop dispositions. Drawing not only on these experiences, but also on classical amphibious concepts, and deep vertical envelopment techniques developed during the late 1950s, he devised a synthesis that combined elements of all three.*

** BLT 2/4 and BLT 3/1 were the landing forces of SLFs Alpha and Bravo, respectively. Both battalions had been ashore and attached to the 3d Marine Division since late January. On 3 June, BLT 3/1 returned to the operational control of SLF Bravo. See Chapter 30.
due to his close working relationship with General Rosson, Davis had the promise of Army helicopter support if needed.

This was a fine thing about my command out there, Rosson...guaranteed me that when we'd go into these tactical operations, I never needed to look back over my shoulder a single time and wonder if I was going to be supported. I knew that they were going to give me the helicopters I would need.**

More important, however, was the creation of Provisional Marine Aircraft Group 39 at Quang Tri in April and the assignment later, initially on a temporary basis, of Assistant Wing Commander, Brigadier General Homer S. Hill, to the 3d Division headquarters. Acting as the Marine air commander for northern I Corps, General Hill, as Davis noted, "had enough authority delegated to him from the wing, where he could execute things, he could order air units to do things." Highly flexible mobile operations and the lives of individual Marines taking part in such operations would be totally dependent upon air. Without a responsive air commander on the scene, these operations, Davis continued, would be "a shambles" and Marines would suffer.6 With helicopter transport assured, division Marines would begin to move from relatively static positions south of the Demilitarized Zone, into the mountainous regions of Quang Tri Province in search of the enemy, his infiltration routes, and his supplies.**

In addition to moving the division toward a more mobile posture, General Davis instituted unit integrity. As a result of the promulgation of the M series table of organization, Marine battalions were delegated the capability of self-administration. The regiment was to be "responsive to an administrative concept in which fiscal, personnel, supply and maintenance functions and transactions usually proceed directly from subordinate elements to the division." The regiment, therefore, was essentially a tactical headquarters.

Prior to the reinstitution of unit integrity, there was a constant rotation of battalions among regiments. The 4th Marines in early June, for example, controlled a battalion of the 1st Marines, two battalions of the 9th Marines, and only one of its organic battalions. Under such circumstances, one of Davis' regimental commanders termed regiments "warlords" and the battalions "roving bands of mercenaries. The regiments had little interest in the logistics, personnel, supply, and maintenance fields of the battalions."8 Battalions, on the other hand, "felt...they were commanded by strangers. Every unit has kind of a personality of its own, often reflecting the personality of the commander, so you never got to know who did what best, or who would you give this mission to."9 Davis gradually changed that; each regiment, under normal operating circumstances, would now control its organic battalions. With the change came unit cohesion, cooperation, esprit de corps, and "a greater awareness on the part of the staff officers in the regiment and their counterparts in the battalions, about one another's capabilities and personalities."10 Davis later commented that this was "the key to our success."**

The most lucrative targets for the division's first mobile operation were the large enemy formations which remained to the south and west of Khe Sanh. These included remnants of the defeated 304th NVA Division and at least two regiments of the recently infiltrated 308th NVA Division. Elements of the two enemy divisions were concentrating their main efforts at intercepting the segment of Route 9 between Ca Lu and Khe Sanh and in constructing a new supply route from

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**Colonel Stuart, who assumed command of the 3d Marines on 15 July 68, took exception to the above statements. He wrote that the regiment "had absolute tactical authority over those organizations under its Op[erational] Con[rol], and the regimental commander with any leadership ability at all knew the full status of the subordinate units. If there were any deficiencies in supply, maintenance, or personnel, he had all of the authority necessary to get those deficiencies corrected." He also took exception to terms such as "warlord" and "roving bands of mercenaries." According to Stuart, the battalions "had missions directed by the regiments in response to missions given by the division." As regimental commander, he could not worry about such niceties concerning the personality or ability of a particular battalion commander to carry out a particular mission. During this period, his selection usually depended upon whatever "battalion was the least occupied." Stuart Comments. On the other hand, Colonel Billy R. Duncan, who commanded the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines from January to August 1968, wrote that the relationships of the attached battalions to the regiments was "...difficult at best." He stated that the regiments had little interest in the logistics and support elements of the battalions. Col Billy R. Duncan, Comments on draft, dtd 15Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File).
The crew chief's view through the "Hell Hole" of a Marine Sikorsky CH–53 Sea Stallion is of an artillery piece dangling below the helicopter. The crew chief had the responsibility to report any swinging of the load to the pilot. Laos across the southern portion of the Vietnamese Salient, that portion of southwestern Quang Tri Province which juts into Laos.

The primary responsibility for offensive operations within the Scotland II area of operation rested with Brigadier General Hoffman's Task Force Hotel. Working closely with representatives of the 3d Division and the 1st and 4th Marines, Hoffman and his staff prepared an operations plan which called for a series of heliborne assaults far to the south and west of Route 9. During discussions leading up to the final plan, Hoffman noted that in moving into the operational area, the Marine units involved would be placing themselves beyond the maximum range of allied artillery at Khe Sanh and Ca Lu. The solution was simple; the artillery would accompany the infantry. This was not the first time artillery would be moved to forward positions to support the maneuvering elements of the division. In this case, fire support bases would have to be established in the very heart of enemy-held territory.

Since these fire support bases would be constructed in mountainous, jungle-covered terrain, almost always on an easily defensible mountain peak or razorback ridgeline, the artillery would have to be inserted and extracted by helicopter. All resupply for the fire support bases and maneuver elements would likewise have to be accomplished by air. Once established in mutually supporting pairs, 8,000 meters apart with a 3,000-meter overshoot to cover enemy mortars, these fire bases would provide continuous, overlapping artillery support to infantry units operating beneath the fan. When infantry operations moved beyond the range of the 8,000-meter artillery fan, another fire support base would be established.

Initially, the construction of these forward artillery positions would prove to be a complicated and difficult
D 3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE

task. Often selected from the air, the sites had to meet three specific criteria in addition to satisfying the requirement that they be at specified ranges from each other to support the scheme of maneuver. The site needed to be large enough to accommodate at least one six-gun 105mm howitzer artillery battery and it had to be defensible by an infantry platoon, or in rare cases by a reinforced platoon. To meet the third criteria, the position itself had to be capable of being constructed within 24 to 36 hours. Once the Marines had selected a site that met the criteria, they accomplished the initial clearing with aerial ordnance or artillery. Engineers supported by infantry either moved overland or were helicoptered to the site and would then secure the area and complete the work of demolition. A small air-transportable bulldozer would be brought in to prepare berms and pits for the artillery. Finally, helicopters would transport to the fire support base the guns, battery personnel and their supplies, and the initial stock of ammunition.

Task Force Hotel initially established two fire support bases, Robin and Loon, to support the search operations south of Route 9. As in all subsequent operations of the division that involved the use of forward artillery positions, these two fire bases were positioned so that their artillery fans overlapped.

Following five days of extensive artillery preparation, which included 30 B-52 sorties, Colonel Stanley S. Hughes' 1st Marines launched the first phase of the operation on 2 June. Early that morning, the members of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines conducted heliborne assaults from their assembly areas on Hill 558 and Landing Zone Stud into Landing Zone Robin and then further south into Loon. Both landing zones, south of Route 9, were near the limit of the range of Khe Sanh-based artillery. The two battalions then swept north towards Route 9, encountering scattered but light enemy resistance.

While the 1st Marines conducted their sweep northward, four battalions under the operational control of Colonel Edward J. Miller's 4th Marines assaulted into the area and began search operations to the south and west of Robin and Loon, where they encountered stiff enemy opposition. A battalion-sized enemy ground attack on Loon coupled with heavy artillery support from guns based at Co Roc in Laos dictated that Loon be abandoned in favor of a new fire base, Torch, five kilometers to the southwest.

Despite heavy enemy resistance, not only directed against Torch, but also against the maneuvering elements, the 4th Marines destroyed sections of a newly constructed enemy road and large quantities of equipment and supplies. With the operations' end on 18 June, the 1st and 4th Marines moved out of the area, leaving more than 650 enemy dead. Four of the six battalions committed by the 308th NVA Division were decimated, and subsequently the division itself was dropped from the allied order of battle of enemy forces. First Lieutenant William J. Spangler, the commander of Company B, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, recalled the operation as very successful, but that the North Vietnamese "use of border sanctuaries precluded total destruction." Although the Marines patrolled up to the Laotian border and took both direct and indirect fire from NVA forces in Laos, Spangler observed, "we did not pursue them with troops or supporting arms."13

It was clear from the search operations conducted southwest of Khe Sanh that the enemy was not prepared to cope with this new form of highly mobile warfare. Artillery batteries providing a movable support fan under which the infantry could maneuver; maneuver from the high ground to the low in contrast to the older method of moving up to search the high ground. In these operations, each company of a battalion operated independently of the others in terms of mutual support. As long as they remained within the 8,000-meter artillery fan, there was no requirement that rifle companies operate together. Each company was assigned a four- to nine-kilometer-square area within which a landing zone was established to facilitate resupply and the evacuation of casualties. Patrols would then fan out from the landing zone until the company's assigned square was thoroughly searched and cleared. Once the initial square was cleared, the company was then lifted by helicopter to another area within the artillery fan and the search and clear process would begin again. This type of maneuver would continue until the entire area of operations had been given a careful and detailed search.

An alternative method developed during these operations was for a battalion to be inserted onto a heavily wooded ridgeline where an artillery fire support base would be quickly established. One company would then move out from the fire support base and seize a high knob along the ridgeline where a landing zone would be cut out of the jungle while the company's Platoons searched the fingers. At the same time, a second company would pass through the first and attack along the ridgeline, seize the next hilltop,

*A detailed account of Operations Robin North and Robin South can be found in Chapter 16.
cut a landing zone, and again search down the fingers. Using this technique a battalion could search a major ridgeline thoroughly and in the process discover major enemy trail networks and supply caches. Both of these search and clear methods proved highly successful in the operations carried out southwest of Khe Sanh and would become standard for all future division operations run in the mountainous areas of Quang Tri Province.

The use of these two search methods resulted in the disclosure of the enemy's mode of logistical support. The North Vietnamese, it was discovered, relied heavily on a series of pre-positioned store sites and interconnecting trail networks to support his forces. Along a trail at intervals of about an eight-hour walk apart, Marines would find a sizeable enemy way station, composed generally of bunkers, supply caches, huts, and a hospital. Enemy porters apparently would carry supplies from large depots in Laos or North Vietnam, stopping at a way station where they would remain hidden during the day and then proceed to the next station or return for another load. In general, most enemy porters relied on guides instead of maps and used well-marked, high-speed trails. "We came to realize," noted General Davis, "that if we were able to keep Marines on these trails, even from time to time, and were able to clean out his way stations, destroy his bunkers and his supplies periodically, that we could severely limit his activity." This realization, he concluded, "was a major reason for our change in our concept of operation."14

With the end of Operations Robin North and Robin South, the 1st Marines returned to the task of providing mobile security for Khe Sanh Combat Base, the surrounding high terrain, Route 9, and supply convoys travelling the road from Landing Zone Stud to Khe Sanh. Colonel Edward J. Miller's 4th Marines, instead of returning to Camp Carroll, were helilifted to Ca Lu where a temporary regimental headquarters was established, and the regiment's battalions were assigned the task of securing vital installations along Route 9, east from Khe Sanh to Camp Carroll.

In early June the decision was made to deactivate Khe Sanh Combat Base and shift the major Marine installation in western Quang Tri eastward to Landing Zone Stud. The 3d Marine Division units were now operating well beyond the range of Khe Sanh-based artillery, and the base itself had become more of a liability than an asset since it tied down large numbers of division troops to defend it, while they might have been better employed in mobile operations carried out on the pattern of Robin North and Robin South. Finally, the base presented a large and continuing target for North Vietnamese attacks, and was no longer considered as vital to allied defensive plans as it had under those championed by former MACV commander, General William C. Westmoreland.*

Echoing the views of General Creighton Abrams, who relieved Westmoreland in mid-June, General Cushman of III MAF, General Rosson of Prov Corps, and General Davis, the MACV press release noted:

Friendly forces must make maximum use of their superior fire power and mobility. Mobile forces, tied to no specific terrain, must be used to the utmost to attack, intercept, reinforce or take whatever action is most appropriate to meet the increased enemy threats. Therefore, we have decided to continue the mobile posture adopted in western Quang Tri Province with Operation Pegasus in April. This decision makes the operation of the base at Khe Sanh unnecessary.15

During the latter days of June as Marine engineers made steady progress in converting Landing Zone Stud into a permanent forward operating base, the 1st Marines, now under the command of Colonel Ross T. Dwyer, Jr., continued with the evacuation and destruction of Khe Sanh. The regiment also provided security for Route 9 and Fire Support Bases Shepherd and Cates, formerly known as Landing Zones Mike and Lima, respectively, and the development of Landing Zone Hawk. But the enemy, who in the past had exerted such strenuous efforts to dislodge Marine forces from the base, now appeared reluctant to let them leave. In a series of sharp engagements fought during late June and the early days of July, elements of the 1st and 4th Marines thwarted repeated enemy attempts to break the security screen around Khe Sanh and Route 9 and disrupt the orderly deactivation of the base.**

The closing of Khe Sanh marked the definite abandonment of the static defense concept against North Vietnamese Army units in western Quang Tri Province. The 3d Marine Division henceforth was committed to what General Davis termed the "mobile concept" of offensive operations. This concept, or combination of techniques, was to rely on forward artillery positions and deep vertical envelopment to carry the war to the enemy throughout the division's area of operations.

*See the discussion in Chapter 16.
**For a more detailed examination of the deactivation of Khe Sanh Combat Base, see again Chapter 16.
The Eastern DMZ

The enemy generally avoided contact with 3d Marine Division forces operating within the Lancaster II, Kentucky, and Napoleon-Saline areas of operation during the month of June. Although wide-ranging division patrols did engage small groups of enemy forces, no major engagements such as those of May took place.

Within the Napoleon-Saline area of operations, Colonel Hull's 3d Marines, with the assistance of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion and companies of the Army's 8th and 9th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, continued to patrol the northern and southern banks and tributaries of the Song Cua Viet with the mission to ensure both the uninterrupted passage of shipping and to deny the enemy access to possible rocket sites. Patrols from the 3d Marines also continued to scour the coastal region of the province to protect the ongoing rice harvest. In addition, the regiment provided security for both equipment and personnel involved in dredging operations throughout the Cua Viet river system.

Throughout the month the 3d Marines conducted numerous daily sweeps and ambushes within its area of operations, concentrating on trail networks, river crossings, and village complexes known to harbor enemy sympathizers. Although finding and destroying a large number of enemy bunkers, spider holes, and supply caches, the Marines encountered few enemy.

While avoiding direct contact with Colonel Hull's patrols, the enemy instead relied on his DMZ-based artillery to inflict casualties on friendly forces. On 19 June and again on the 21st and 24th, Camp Kistler received a total of 111 rounds of enemy artillery resulting in 10 minor casualties and the destruction of a large ammunition bunker and gasoline storage facility. Artillery and naval gunfire counter-batteries produced several secondary explosions.

On 25 June, the 3d Marines assumed responsibility for the eastern portion of Leatherneck Square. Despite the lack of enemy contact, the helicopter assault and five-day search of the area marked the first time in a year that the regiment, its three organic battalions, and direct support artillery had operated together.

To the west, in the Kentucky area, Colonel Richard B. Smith's 9th Marines continued to conduct numerous sweeps and ambushes from static positions at Con Thien, A–3, C–2, and C–3. At the same time, Colonel Smith gradually reduced the regiment's security commitment to these four positions by shifting an ever-increasing proportion of Marines under his command to field operations. In addition, regimental forces continued to develop a viable road network and a series of landing zones within the western portion of Leatherneck Square.

While there was a sharp decrease in enemy contact and artillery, mortar, and rocket fire compared to the previous month, the few engagements which took place were sharp and deadly. Shortly after noon on 6 June, for example, a reinforced platoon from Company E, 26th Marines observed and then engaged an estimated enemy company while on patrol 1,800 meters southeast of Con Thien. Reinforced by the command group and a rifle platoon from Company H, the patrol took the enemy under fire with small arms and 81mm mortars. The result was 14 enemy killed and 25 Marine casualties, 14 killed and 11 wounded.

The same day, the 9th Marines assumed responsibility for the Lancaster II area of operations from the 4th Marines, and a regimental command group was deployed from Dong Ha to Camp Carroll. Like the Kentucky area, the Lancaster area experienced no major enemy-initiated ground action during June, although the enemy did attempt to interdict Route 9 with ambushes and land mines and took Camp Carroll and Landing Zone Stud under rocket fire, resulting in the destruction of several ammunition and gasoline dumps and the wounding of 10 Marines.

Near the end of June, Lieutenant Colonel Michael V. Palatas' 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, in conjunction with Army Special Forces and Vietnamese regional, popular, and National Police Field forces, began a deliberate cordon in the Cua Valley, southeast of Camp Carroll. During operations around Khe Sanh earlier in the year, many native Montagnards were brought to the Cam Lo area where they were resettled temporarily with a large number of Vietnamese that had been evacuated from Leatherneck Square following Operation Hickory in 1967. In early June, it was decided to resettle the Montagnards permanently in the Cua Valley near the village of Thon Duc Kinh, four kilometers southeast of Camp Carroll. Palatas' battalion was given the task of clearing the village of known Viet Cong suspects and ensuring the area was secure enough to begin construction of the resettlement camp.

On the night of 21 June, squad-sized patrols from the battalion walked into the area, secured landing zone sites, and blocked likely enemy escape routes. At dawn the following morning, a platoon was helilifted into each landing zone, completing the cordon around Thon Duc Kinh. Later in the day, Marine and
Top, Marines of the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion help South Vietnamese villagers pack their worldly goods, even to the extent of placing a thatched roof on top of the vehicle, to be transported to a resettlement village. Below, Navy Corpsman HM-3 Forrest G. McDonald bandages a Montagnard child's head to prevent scalp sores from becoming infected, as the mother looks on.
Vietnamese forces conducted a house-to-house search of the village, arresting more than 100 Viet Cong suspects of whom half were detained. Once the village was secured, Marine engineers immediately began construction of the resettlement camp. Palatas' Marines remained in the area for a week, conducting medical and dental examinations of the refugees and participating in other civic action projects. Following the Thon Duc Kinh cordon, the 9th Marines passed control of the Lancaster II area of operations to Task Force Hotel and the regimental command group returned to Dong Ha and the battalions to patrol and security sweeps throughout Leatherneck Square and the remainder of the Kentucky area of operations.

**The Pressure Continues**

The enemy continued to remain reluctant to commit his forces to decisive combat in large numbers during July. Although the NVA's aversion may have been due to a planned, periodic pause to provide temporary respite for its combat units, it was clear this reluctance was in part due to the continuing and unrelenting pressure applied by 3d Marine Division forces during June. Enemy assembly and staging areas, bases, supply caches, and trail networks were subjected to constant allied air, artillery, naval gunfire, and ground attacks, taxing his capacity to maintain frontline and support units at an effective combat strength. Despite the enemy's reluctance, there was no diminution of the 3d Marine Division effort in July.

On the first day of the month, a massive combined supporting arms attack was launched against enemy artillery and antiaircraft concentrations located in the Cap Mui Lay Sector of North Vietnam. The sector encompassed that region from the southern edge of the Demilitarized Zone, north some 14 kilometers to Cap Mui Lay, and extended from the South China Sea westward to a point approximately 25 kilometers inland.

Planning for the attack began on 24 March when General Davis' predecessor, Major General Rathvon McC. Tompkins, proposed a combined and coordinated supporting arms attack against the Cap Mui Lay Sector to destroy enemy long-range shore batteries and artillery, limit the flow of enemy supplies to the south, and relieve the artillery threat against the Dong Ha-Cua Viet area. Provisional Corps, Vietnam developed a formal plan and submitted it to III MAF,
which in turn submitted a modification to MACV for approval. Following a preliminary planning conference which included representatives from MACV, Seventh Air Force, Seventh Fleet, III MAF, and Prov Corps, General Creighton Abrams, the MACV commander, approved the plan on 21 June, with D-Day set for 1 July.

To ensure that the operation, codenamed Thor, would be a success, several preparatory steps were taken. As a deceptive measure, work continued on Dyemarker or “McNamara” Line positions at A–2, A–3, and Con Thien to cover the construction of several forward artillery positions. In addition, the large amount of artillery ammunition, heavy artillery, and supporting ships were moved into place by 30 June. The destruction of the Dong Ha ammunition dump by enemy artillery on 20 June also in an ironic way helped the deception. According to Marine staff officers, the blast at the dump “practically blew the 3d Marine Division headquarters off of the map” and left the division “desperately short” of artillery ammunition. The execution of a massive supporting arms attack so shortly after a huge loss of ammunition seemed out of place, especially since the bulk of the artillery forces engaged in the attack would have to depend on the Dong Ha ammunition dump for supply.

Preceded by three days of target reconnaissance by both Marine and Air Force aircraft, the first phase of the operation began as scheduled with a massive bombing effort against the sector. Controlled by Seventh Air Force, 664 Marine, Navy, and Air Force attack aircraft and 114 B–52 sorties delivered more than 4,000 tons of ordnance against predetermined enemy targets during the first two days of the operation. In phases two and three, the artillery fire of 13 batteries, composed of 59 guns, was integrated with the naval gunfire support of two cruisers and six destroyers and the continuing air attacks against target lists which were continually updated by 1st Marine Aircraft Wing reconnaissance flights.

On the morning of 8 July, the artillery batteries involved in Operation Thor began withdrawing from their forward positions and by the 10th had returned to their normal support locations. Also on the 8th, control of the area reverted from Prov Corps, which since 1 July was under Army Lieu-
tenant General Richard G. Stilwell,* to the Seventh Air Force which would coordinate future surveillance and air attacks on reemerging targets.

Damage to the North Vietnamese combat capability in the Cap Mui Lay Sector as a result of Operation Thor was substantial: more than 500 artillery and antiaircraft positions, numerous bunkers and storage areas, and at least two surface-to-air missile sites were destroyed. Also, allied observers detected 352 secondary explosions and 236 secondary fires, providing evidence of probable hits on ammunition and supply dumps. The operation, however, was to have a more lasting effect. Artillery fire from north of the Demilitarized Zone declined significantly following Thor, as did the frequency of antiaircraft opposition experienced by reconnaissance aircraft at all altitudes. Two

While Operation Thor was in progress, the 3d and 9th Marines, in coordination with the 2d ARVN Regiment, launched attacks against enemy troops driven south of the Demilitarized Zone by the massive air and artillery bombardment. On 2 July, Colonel Hull's 3d Marines, composed initially of the 1st and 2d Battalions, began moving from the Cua Viet into an area north of A–1, centered on Jones Creek, a tributary of both the Song Cua Viet and Song Ben Hai. Lieutenant

--On 1 July, Army Lieutenant General William B. Rosson, the former Prov Corps commander, became Acting CG III MAF while General Cushman, the III MAF commander took a month leave in the United States. Major General Richard G. Stilwell, who had served a short tour as Deputy Commanding General, III MAF, Army, on 1 July assumed command of Provisional Corps, Vietnam. That same day, in a brief ceremony held at Phu Bai, he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General by Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor. Fifteen days later, Headquarters, XXIV Corps was activated and the personnel and equipment of Provisional Corps, Vietnam, were absorbed by the newly activated Army corps. Operational Report, Headquarters, XXIV Corps for Period Ending 31 October 1968, 15Nov68, p. 1. In contrast to Rosson, who enjoyed excellent relations with the Marine command, Stilwell's relations were somewhat more tenuous. Marine Brigadier General Earl E. Anderson, Cushman's Chief of Staff, wrote in May 1968 that Stilwell was rather "unpopular" at III MAF headquarters and predicted that when he assumed command of Prov Corps, "he's going to be a hard one to deal with after he gets his three stars." A few months later Anderson wrote that Stilwell was often "by-passing General Cushman and going directly to ComUSMACV. The boss has spoken to him about this on one or two occasions . . . ." BGen E. E. Anderson ltr to MajGen Murray, dd 17May68, and ltr to MajGen McCutcheon, dd 9Aug68, Encls, Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File). More diplomatically, General Cushman stated that Stilwell "could be abrasive . . . , but that "he was a fine combat man." Gen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., intvw, 1 Nov 1982, (Oral HissColl, MCHC, Washington, D.C.), pp. 34–35.

**For a detailed account of the artillery's role in Operation Thor, see Chapter 26.

Colonel Charles V. Jarman's 1st Battalion, the first unit to move out, swept north along the west bank of the tributary, while providing security for the ARVN engineer effort on the Lai An road. To the east, the 2d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Davis, swept north toward the village of Nui Trung.

As Jarman's Marines moved northward toward the abandoned and destroyed village of Lai An on the 4th, Captain Gary D. Dockendorff's Company C came under mortar and small arms fire from an estimated enemy platoon in the village ruins. The remainder of the battalion immediately maneuvered to exploit the contact, preventing the enemy from withdrawing. Pressing the attack, Jarman's Marines, covered by air, artillery, naval gunfire, and the direct fire of 90mm tank guns on the flanks, advanced from position to position. "If it gets too tough," Lieutenant Colonel Jarman told one of his company commanders, "pull back and we'll pound them some more. Then we'll see how tough they are." By the 6th, the battalion secured Lai An and reported 134 North Vietnamese dead among its ruins.

The following day, after endeavoring to regain contact with the retreating NVA, a battalion patrol encountered an enemy company occupying positions around Tai Nu, one kilometer northeast of Lai An. The NVA company, armed with an 85mm light field gun, mortars, and automatic weapons, was first taken under artillery fire and then overrun by a coordinated tank and infantry assault. In the Tai Nu action, the Marine

U.S. Army LtGen Richard G. Stilwell, left, the new CG, Prov Corps, talks with South Vietnamese BGen Ngo Quang Truong, CG, 1st ARVNDiv. Although under III MAF, Prov Corps had operational control of the two Army divisions and the 3d Marine Division in northern I Corps.

Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army Center of Military History

3D DIVISION TAKES THE OFFENSIVE 361
battalion reported another 42 NVA killed and 23 weapons captured, including two 82mm mortars.

Advancing on the right flank, Lieutenant Colonel Davis' 2d Battalion had swept through Nhi Trung and approached a rice paddy area, one kilometer south of the abandoned village of An My. At that point, North Vietnamese automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades opened up on the Marines. Maneuvering around the ARVN position at A-1, the battalion, with naval gunfire support, took the enemy position. Searching the area, the Marines found over 20 NVA dead. Battalion losses were placed at three killed and two wounded, all a result of sniper fire. Lieutenant Colonel James W. Marsh's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, which had been held in reserve, moved north on the 7th and seized the area around the destroyed village of Giem Ha Trung without incident. Captain Matthew G. McTiernan, the commanding officer of Company I of the 3d Battalion, remembered that his company's specific mission in Operation Thor "was to seize and then search a small abandoned fishing village on the coast just below the Ben Hai River." In the attack on the hamlet, he had a Navy cruiser in direct support. According to McTiernan, he had the guns of the ship "under my exclusive direction for about three to four hours." He described the effect on the troops as "truly electric" as he used the "8-inchers directly on the village" prior to the assault and then "shifted their fire to the high ground across the Ben Hai during our assault and search." His troops found no bunkers and obtained "no body counts," but the action "had a far more intangible, positive and lasting effect on the company's combat capability."22

The 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Marines, began withdrawing southward on the 8th, followed by the 3d Battalion on the 9th. On the evening of the 9th, as Lieutenant Colonel Davis' battalion, the last of the regiment's battalions to displace to Quang Tri to undergo rehabilitation, the 3d Marines ended their participation in Operation Napoleon-Saline and

Marines of Company F, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines throw grenades at suspected enemy positions in the coastal sector near the DMZ. They are taking part in the infantry portion of Operation Thor to counter any NVA forces moving south to escape the air, naval gunfire, and artillery bombardment of NVA positions north of the DMZ.

Department of Defense (USMC) A191900
passed responsibility for the area of operations to the 1st Marines. The following day, the 3d Marines assumed responsibility for the Lancaster II area of operations and the regimental headquarters was deployed to Camp Carroll.

Throughout the Napoleon-Saline area of operations during the remainder of the month, Colonel Dwyer’s 1st Marines continued search and sweep operations on both the northern and southern banks of the Song Cua Viet to insure the uninterrupted passage of allied shipping and to deny the enemy access to rocket positions oriented towards Dong Ha, Quang Tri, and Cua Viet. In addition, Dwyer’s Marines coordinated the defense of outposts at C–4 and Oceanview, both within a kilometer of the southern boundary of the DMZ.

While contact with elements of the 138th NVA Regiment, known to be operating in the area, was negligible, contact with the V–51 and C–59 Local Force Viet Cong units was light and widespread. One of the heaviest engagements took place on the 22d when Company H, 1st Marines, while occupying a patrol base south of the Cua Viet, 10 kilometers east of Dong Ha, spotted an armed enemy platoon dressed in black pajamas, moving along the coastal sand dune east of the village of Thon My Loc. The Viet Cong platoon was taken under fire with small arms, artillery, and 81mm mortars. A sweep of the area by the Marine company revealed numerous spider holes, punji traps, a bamboo house with hot food still on the tables. Supplies and equipment abandoned by the enemy in his flight included weapons, 935 mortar rounds, 500 pounds of explosives, 55 antitank mines, and 500 pounds of rice. LaMontagne’s Marines also found 29 NVA bodies, killed by artillery and airstrikes during the advance on the complex.

After 10 months as commanding officer of the 9th Marines, Colonel Richard B. Smith was relieved on 13 July by Colonel Robert H. Barrow. A veteran of China service during World War II and the Chosin Reservoir campaign in Korea, Colonel Barrow was assigned to the division at the request of General Davis. Three days later, the regiment displaced to Landing Zone Stud in preparation for future operations under Task Force Hotel in the Lancaster II area of operations. With the move to Stud, the regiment’s battalions were brought together for the first time since May 1967, “to the enthusiasm and jubilation of all hands.”

As the 9th Marines departed, Colonel Dwyer’s 1st Marines assumed tactical responsibility for the Kentucky area. The regiment also had operational control of newly created Task Force Mike, consisting of a command group from the 3d Tank Battalion and a company of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion Marines, and Lieutenant Colonel Francis J. Heath’s 2d Battalion, 26th Marines. During the remaining days of July, Dwyer’s Marines concentrated on aggressive day and night ambushes, patrols, searches, and minesweeping operations, while concurrently securing fixed installations throughout the area of operations. Although enemy contact was very light, the 1st Marines did take a number of casualties from mines and surprise firing devices.
On 23 July, Lieutenant Colonel Heath's battalion began assuming operational control of the rifle companies of the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines as they were phased into the battalion's positions in preparation for a relief in lines. Company E, 26th Marines, relieved by Company G, 1st Marines, proceeded to Quang Tri Combat Base on the 24th and assumed positions along the base's defensive perimeter. Following a brief, unproductive, one-day sweep northward from Con Thien along the Kinh Mon Trail to the DMZ and southward from A–3 through Leatherneck Square, the remaining elements of Heath's battalion departed the Kentucky area of operations. On 28 July, they proceeded to Quang Tri Combat Base to prepare and train for service afloat with Seventh Fleet's Special Landing Force. The battalion, by 8 August, had embarked on board ships of Amphibious Ready Group Alpha, and the battalion, on the 13th, once operational control had been passed to the 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade, was redesignated Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/26.26

Into the Western Mountains

During June, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion patrols reported increased enemy activity north of Thon Son Lam, an area that had seen little enemy activity for the previous several months. It appeared that the enemy, estimated to be of battalion strength, possibly an element of the 64th Regiment, 320th NVA Division, was moving through the large valley to the north of the Dong Ha-Dong Ma Mountain ridgeline into the region around Thon Son Lam.27

The vital allied area straddled not only Route 9, the major east-west line of communication in Quang Tri Province, but also included two major III MAF artillery positions, Camp Carroll and Thon Son Lam. Although these fire support complexes presented the enemy with inviting targets, the successful destruction of which would provide both a tactical as well as a propaganda victory, the enemy had yet to mount a strong attack upon either position. Instead, his forces had concentrated on periodically interdicting Route 9 and harassing the installations with artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks. With the Demilitarized Zone and North Vietnam less than 20 kilometers distant, the enemy threat to the area remained constant.

In mid-June, upon receipt of a warning order from General Davis, Task Force Hotel began planning an operation in the area north and northwest of Camp Carroll over which the enemy had long enjoyed control. General Davis informed Task Force Hotel, however, that the necessary forces, two Marine infantry regiments, the 3d and 9th Marines, and elements of the 2d ARVN regiment, and accompanying resources, would not be available until mid-July. On 5 July, General Davis approved the concept for the proposed operation, which "for want of a better name, we dubbed . . . July Action."28

The approved scheme of maneuver was one of area saturation. Davis simultaneously placed the forces involved at various locations throughout the region—including three battalions near the DMZ—in order to "upset the enemy quickly and decisively."29 The 9th Marines' zone of action would include a wide swath of piedmont from the DMZ to Route 9, west of Con Thien, while the zone assigned the 3d Marines embraced the rugged National Forest Reserve, which included Dong Ha Mountain and Mutter Ridge, a high ridgeline which generally parallels the southern boundary of the DMZ. The zone assigned the 2d ARVN Regiment lay west and northwest of the Rockpile and consisted of a maze of valleys and sheer ridgelines.

General Davis directed that the operation begin on 16 July, following a series of B–52 Arclight strikes throughout the area. However, on the 15th, MACV canceled the proposed Arclight strikes for the lack of sufficient intelligence justification.* Later in the day, Lieutenant General Stilwell, the Prov Corps commander, suggested that if the operation were postponed 24 hours, the strikes would be carried out. The promised B–52 strikes never occurred and, instead, Marine tactical air and artillery strikes carried out the preparation of the area. While air and artillery strikes were effective, General Davis noted that they "lacked the mass destructive effect and shock power of the Arclights." According to Davis, "intelligence reports indicated that the enemy was surprised and confused by the operation but due to the protection afforded by bunkers from our fires, he was not disorganized to the point where he lost his capacity to resist."30

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*The selection process for Arclight targets required the submission of only current, hard intelligence restricted to the proposed target nomination. The division's request for Arclights included not only specific target intelligence, but an immediate area intelligence summary. Prov Corps forwarded the request without the area intelligence summary to MACV where it was reviewed and subsequently rejected on the basis of insufficient specific target intelligence in comparison with other proposed targets. CG3dMarDiv msg to CGProvCorpsV, dt 20Jul68, in III MAF Message File.
Shortly after dawn on the 17th, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines assaulted two landing zones in what was commonly called Helicopter Valley, three kilometers south of the DMZ. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines walked from the vicinity of C–2 into blocking positions south of the 2d Battalion in the area of operations most eastern sector. To the west, the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines assaulted into a landing zone at the upper end of Helicopter Valley, while the 1st and 3d Battalions, 2d ARVN Regiment moved overland into blocking positions west of the Song Cam Lo valley. The remaining battalions, the 1st and 3d, of the 3d Marines, since 15 July under Lieutenant Colonel Vaughn R. Stuart, would join the operation on the 18th and 19th, respectively, with a heliborne assault into landing zones just north of Dong Ha Mountain.

As Captain Jack D. Schaeffer’s Company K, 9th Marines moved from Landing Zone Sparrow north toward Mutter Ridge, it was engaged by an estimated reinforced NVA squad deployed in an extensive, well-fortified bunker system. Schaeffer’s Marines immediately returned fire and moved back a sufficient distance to employ artillery and air. While four Marine A–4 Skyhawks and two F–4 Phantoms flew close support missions directed at destroying enemy automatic weapons and mortar emplacements, it became evident that the NVA unit was at least of company size. As the battalion’s other forward companies moved into position for a flanking assault, Schaeffer’s Marines carried the enemy complex late in the afternoon. The Marines lost 9 killed and 29 wounded while counting 38 NVA dead.

During the course of the operation, elements of Lieutenant Colonel Frederic S. Knight’s 2d Battalion, 9th Marines maneuvered northward to secure the high ground in preparation for the final attack. Moving to within one kilometer of the DMZ on the afternoon of 21 July, the battalion came under a heavy 82mm mortar attack, which caused the death of one Marine and the wounding of nine others. Within an hour of the mortar attack, First Lieutenant Arthur A. Pierce’s Company F observed approximately 35 NVA, carrying two mortars, moving west on a trail paralleling the southern bound-

ary of the DMZ. The company took the enemy force under fire with mortars and artillery, and then moved to close with the NVA unit. Preceded by eight fixed-wing sorties, one of which scored a direct hit on an active 82mm mortar position, Pierce’s Marines reached the trail and found over 20 NVA dead. A subsequent search of the area revealed 10 weapons, 59 packs, 41 gas masks, and a large variety of equipment, all of which were new, indicating that the enemy unit recently had infiltrated from the north or had been resupplied.

Lieutenant Pierce’s company contact on the 21st prompted Colonel Barrow to request permission to enter the southern half of the DMZ if the tactical situation so dictated. The request went forward rapidly through the chain of command to MACV, which denied it to the surprise of Colonel Barrow. As he later commented:

… it … still has not been sufficiently explained to me why at any time we seemingly arbitrarily give the enemy our half of the DMZ, particularly when we know he uses it not only as a sanctuary, but as an area from which he can launch mortar attacks against our forces.

Without the permission to enter the southern half of the DMZ, the regiment swung its attack to the south, “the direction which he [the enemy] was primarily oriented anyway.”

Although the sweep south through jungle-covered hills and valleys produced little contact, the 9th Marines did discover a number of large elaborate base areas, which the enemy had been able to construct and maintain during more than a year without allied interference. One fortification, located by Lieutenant Colonel Knight’s battalion, six kilometers southwest of Con Thien, was unique. Composed of 60 A-frame timbered bunkers built into the sides of bomb craters, each with an average overhead cover 10-feet-thick, the system was connected to a large command bunker by a network of interconnecting tunnels. The command bunker, capable of accommodating up to 40 personnel, featured an aperture overlooking Con Thien and C–2. Documents found in the bunker indicated that the NVA had been plotting, tallying, and reporting the traffic patterns of helicopters, tanks, and trucks entering and leaving those two positions.

In addition to fortifications, the attacking forces also uncovered tons of enemy ordnance, ranging from 122mm rockets to small arms ammunition and explosives. On the 19th, Captain Matthew G. McTierman’s Company I, 3d Marines unearthed the most significant
Capt David N. Buckner, right, and 1stLt Kenneth Tolpingrud of the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines examine two captured NVA 12.7mm antiaircraft guns near the DMZ.

weapons cache on the northeast slope of Dong Ha Mountain. Dug into the side of the mountain were six large bunkers, which, upon closer inspection were found to have false floors. Beneath the flooring, McTiernan’s Marines discovered two complete 75mm pack howitzers and 26 rounds of howitzer ammunition. The howitzers were believed to be the ones that had harassed Camp Carroll sporadically during the preceding months.*

A second phase of the operation followed quickly on the heels of the first. One enemy infiltration corridor within the area of operation had not been touched by the 9th Marines, 3d Marines, or the 2d ARVN Regiment: it was the upper Song Cam Lo basin. On 27 July, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 3d Marines simultaneously assaulted three landing zones, Joan, Margo, and Becky, which subsequently were developed into fire support bases for future operations.** In addition, a permanent observation post was established on Dong Ha Mountain. During the two-battalion sweep of the river basin, “the enemy chose to avoid contact,” observed Brigadier General Carl Hoffman, the Task Force Hotel commander, “and therefore we can’t point at any statistics to prove the worth of this particular effort.” Hoffman noted, however that “in penetrating this corridor we demonstrated our capacity to do this and we also opened another half dozen landing zones.”

Colonel Barrow’s 9th Marines was phased out of the operation on the 31st, followed on 3 August by the 3d Marines, now under Colonel Richard L.

*Captain McTiernan remembered that they assembled one of the pack howitzers in the enemy bunker and that “you could fire and hit Camp Carroll by simply using line of sight to elevate and traverse the gun.” McTiernan Comments. Colonel Stuart recalled that the Marine Corps Commandant, General Leonard F. Chapman, directed that the 75mm pack howitzers be sent to the Marine Barracks in Washington, D.C. Stuart Comments.

**Colonel Vaughn R. Stuart, the 3d Marines commander at the time, stated that according to Marine Corps intelligence this was a major NVA infiltration route into Vietnam from Laos. Stuart remembered that General Davis told him “that if we made a sizeable contact, he would give me as many battalions as I needed . . . [and] that I was free to cross the Laotian border, provided the contact we made was sizeable. He attached one proviso to this verbal directive . . . I was to call before my first troops crossed . . . he would not stop me from going, but he wanted to know just before I commenced to cross.” Stuart Comments.
Top, members of the 9th Marines stack boxes of captured enemy mortar and artillery rounds found in an NVA base area. Below, members of a U.S. Army artillery battery at Camp Carroll pose with one of the two 75mm pack howitzers captured by Company I, 3d Battalion, 3d Marines.
Michael, Jr., who had assumed command two days earlier. The operation was considered a success not only in terms of enemy troops and equipment destroyed, but also in providing the units involved with additional experience in the conduct of highly mobile mountain warfare. The operation, as the task force commander later wrote, "taught us that, with effort and energy properly focused on a selected location, we can prepare LZs, build FSB's, virtually anywhere. The tougher the terrain, the more vital the systematic application of resources. But we reject the notion that there are areas too difficult to conquer." Operation July Action, he continued, "also reminded the enemy that he has no safe havens. . . . Most important, perhaps, our pioneering greatly facilitates our return whenever we choose."

While the planning for operations in the Dong Ha Mountain and Mutter Ridge complex took place, Task Force Hotel looked longingly at the rugged terrain west of Landing Zone Stud in the Scotland II area of operations. The area was known to contain the base area of the 8th Battalion, 29th NVA Regiment and was a source of a variety of nasty enemy activities. Allied fixed-wing planes and helicopters that wandered over the region often received antiaircraft fire which resulted in a number of lost aircraft. Supply convoys traveling Route 9 to Landing Zone Stud faced a constant threat of ambush as they turned south at the Rockpile. Also, with the closing of Khe Sanh and the movement of Task Force Hotel to Landing Zone Stud, the new combat base was increasingly a target for enemy rocket gunners.

General Hoffman’s task force originally planned to employ a battalion of the 1st Marines, upon its departure from Khe Sanh, to land on Dong Ca Lu or Hill 715—the area’s dominant feature—and search the surrounding terrain, six kilometers west of Landing Zone Stud or Vandegrift as it was to be renamed. Colonel Dwyer nominated the 1st Battalion, but by 6 July, when the 1st Marines departed Khe Sanh, the 1st Battalion remained behind to battle an enemy force on Hill 689. The battalion spent another six days in battle before it could retrieve eight Marine bodies from the forward slope of the hill.

On 9 July, the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines arrived at Landing Zone Stud and relieved the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines temporarily as the combat base’s security force. The following day, Landing Zone Stud took several volleys of enemy 122mm rockets. On the 11th, Task Force Hotel assumed direct operational control of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, as no other battalion was available, and the battalion was transported by helicopter to Hill 715.

The first wave of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Galbraith’s Marines scrambled from their CH-46s, and like the two waves that followed, encountered no enemy opposition. But a helicopter in the fourth wave, while hovering a few feet above the landing zone, took several bursts of .50-caliber machine gun fire and crashed in a ball of flames. Miraculously, the CH-46’s full load of troops made it to safety, and only one of the air crewman sustained injury.

Braving constant mortar and sniper fire as they swept the area, Galbraith’s Marines found numerous heavily fortified enemy positions that recently had been occupied. On the 13th, as Company B moved westward down a trail, the company’s point element was struck by a command detonated mine. The company immediately pulled back, set up a perimeter, and sent a squad forward to retrieve the body of one Marine and to look for another. As the squad inched forward, the enemy detonated another mine and raked the company’s position with .50-caliber, mortar, and grenade fire. The following day, Company A assisted with the recovery of casualties, but it too encountered command detonated mines, resulting in four additional killed, including the company’s commanding officer, Captain Henry D. Banks. **The company withdrew, and on the 15th, Galbraith’s battalion was flown to Landing Zone Stud to relieve forces slated to participate in Operation July Action.

During the next ten days, Colonel Edward J. Miller’s 4th Marines conducted mobile defense operations to the west of Fire Support Bases Shepherd and Cates with little enemy contact. In addition, elements of the regiment secured Ca Lu, Landing Zone Stud, and Route 9 from Ca Lu north. As the division’s reserve regiment, it could, if ordered, provide forces for operations anywhere within the division’s area of operations.

On 25 July, Lieutenant Colonel Galbraith’s battalion was ordered back to Hill 715, not only to expand

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*Elements of the 4th Marines were committed to assisting the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines with the fighting on Hill 689 and securing Fire Support Bases Shepherd and Cates.

**This was the same Captain Banks, who had commanded Company A, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, and had been seriously wounded in that company’s engagement on Hill 689 near Khe Sanh on 16 April. See Chapter 16. Colonel Galbraith wrote that when he assumed command of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, Captain Banks was the battalion assistant S-3 and that the Company A commander had just been transferred: "Hank asked for the company, and I gave it to him. His death has always weighed heavily on me." Col Thomas H. Galbraith, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec68] (Vietnam Comment File).
its previous search, but also to recover the bodies of the two Marines killed on 13 July. BLT 2/4, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Louis A. Rann, simultaneously massed on Hill 679, 12 kilometers west of Stud, and began search operations to the north.

Split into two command groups of two companies each, Galbraith’s battalion advanced toward Hill 715 from the south and east, under heavy enemy small arms, rocket-propelled grenade, and mortar fire. The Marines found the hill, once secured, to be heavily mined and boobytrapped. While seating an 81mm mortar baseplate, for example, Company B Marines detonated a booby-trapped antitank mine which killed one and wounded four. Continuing the search, Galbraith’s Marines recovered the bodies of the two missing Marines, and at the same time discovered sizable caches of weapons, ammunition, and rice scattered throughout the hill complex, but encountered no enemy forces. While destroying the captured weapons and ammunition, the battalion prepared to evacuate the rice for distribution to refugees in the province. On 4 August, after the completion of the search mission, Marine helicopters lifted the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines out of the area and returned the unit to Landing Zone Stud.

By the morning of 29 July, Lieutenant Colonel Rann’s Marines had reached Hill 606, four kilometers north of Hill 679. Shortly before noon, Marines from Company G observed and took under fire 15 enemy troops. Later a platoon moved forward to check the area and encountered a well-concealed and well-entrenched enemy force. Four Marines were killed and nine wounded by the enemy’s initial heavy burst of claymores and small arms and grenade fire. The bodies of three of the four Marines killed remained unrecovered as artillery and air pounded the bunker complex throughout the remainder of the day. The following morning, after an additional artillery mission, Company G moved forward and recovered the bodies without incident.

*Landing Zone Stud has now become Vandegrift Combat Base, complete with a makeshift radio tower to control helicopter traffic. LCpl John L. Phillips, in the tower, is bringing in for a landing a resupply Boeing CH–46 Sea Knight aircraft*
On 3 August, after establishing a temporary fire support base, named Shoup, on Hill 606, Rann's battalion received the additional mission of searching the northern slope of the Khe Giang Thoan Valley, three kilometers to the northeast. The area was believed to harbor the launching sites of rockets that had harassed Thon Son Lam and the Rockpile for several months. As Company F moved down Hill 606 toward the valley the following day, it discovered seven abandoned huts. Below each, Marines found caches of arms, ammunition, and equipment, the total of which they estimated at 20 tons.37

The search of the Khe Giang Thoan Valley during the next two days produced no additional weapons caches and few rocket launch sites. However, the companies involved were probed continually once they had moved into night defensive positions. In one instance, Company E Marines heard movement along their perimeter throughout the night, and awoke the following morning to find their claymores turned inward toward the company's lines. In another, Company G's lines were probed by an estimated force of 10 NVA under cover of small arms and grenade fire. The company sustained four killed and six wounded in the attack. On 6 August, Rann's battalion ended its search of the valley and was helilifted to Landing Zone Stud, now officially designated Vandegrift Combat Base.

The 3d Marine Division, during the months of June and July, slowly and methodically shifted from the defensive posture of the past to a more flexible mobile offensive posture which would characterize future division operations. It established large numbers of fire support bases and landing zones in areas that the enemy once considered havens and untouchable by allied forces. In addition, these months witnessed the reorientation of division forces from the coastal lowlands to the mountainous region of western Quang Tri Province. The remaining months of 1968 would see this move accelerated.

Southern Quang Tri and Thua Thien

While Marine operations were conducted in central and western Quang Tri Province, responsibility for the coastal lowlands, piedmont, and jungle-covered mountains south of Dong Ha and north of Hue was shared by the 3d ARVN Regiment and the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division. The ARVN Regiment operated mainly in jungle canopy of enemy Base Area 114, southwest of Quang Tri City, while the 1st Cavalry Division's three brigades, under the command of Major General John J. Tolson III, USA, secured the coast and piedmont from Quang Tri City south to Camp Evans. It also conducted search and clear operations in enemy Base Areas 114 and 101.38

During June and July, the division continued its participation in Operation Jeb Stuart III, accomplishing the two-fold mission of rice denial and offensive operations in the two enemy base areas within the division's area of operations. In the coastal plains, it conducted rice denial operations in conjunction with elements of the 1st and 3d ARVN Regiments to ensure that rice from the spring harvest was withheld from the enemy. In Base Area 101, west of Quang Tri City, the division's 1st Brigade initiated combat operations in search of enemy forces. At the same time, in Base Area 114, elements of the division's 3d Brigade and a battalion of the 3d ARVN Regiment conducted operations over rugged terrain in search of not only enemy forces, but also known headquarters and support installations.

During the middle of June, advancing elements of the 3d ARVN Regiment encountered heavy enemy resistance in the southeastern portion of Base Area 114 as elements of the 803d NVA Regiment defended a large cache area. The battle for the area continued with sporadic, but heavy contact through the 21st. This action resulted not only in the demolition of the enemy cache area and the capture of large quantities of ammunition, but also in the destruction of the enemy regiment's antiaircraft company and the seizure of the regiment's headquarters complex. South of the base area, elements of the cavalry division's 2d Brigade entered what appeared to be the enemy's Tri-Thien Military Region headquarters bunker and tunnel complex, occupied during the attack on Hue. While searching the complex, the Army troopers captured numerous maps and documents relating to the enemy's activities from the DMZ south to Da Nang. Among the maps was one which detailed the construction of a supply road from the A Shau Valley east into Base Area 114. Reaction to this information resulted in the destruction of several enemy trucks, construction sites, and a large portion of the road.

While elements of the ARVN regiment and the division's 2d Brigade battled the enemy's 803d Regiment in the mountains, two other enemy regiments were on the move in the coastal lowlands, centered in the Trieu Phong area, northeast of Quang Tri City. On

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*Major General Tolson was replaced on 15 July as division commander by Brigadier General Richard L. Irby.
26 June, elements of the 1st ARVN Regiment made heavy contact with the 4th Battalion, 812th NVA Regiment, and claimed killing 128 enemy troops. The following day, in a two-day battle, elements of the Air Cavalry's 5th Armored trapped the 814th NVA Battalion in the coastal village of Binh An, 14 kilometers northeast of Quang Tri, and reported more than 230 enemy soldiers dead and 44 prisoners taken.

At the conclusion of the spring rice harvest, the 1st Cavalry Division shifted tactical emphasis to an even more intensified campaign against the two enemy base areas. Elements of all three brigades air assaulted deep into the base areas, established new landing zones and constructed fire support bases capable of interdicting the enemy's communication routes through the A Shau Valley. Although numerous NVA complexes, arms caches, and training areas were discovered and destroyed, the enemy increasingly employed anti-aircraft fire against troop-laden helicopters to limit the mobility and flexibility of the division's ground forces operating in the jungle-covered base areas. By the end of July, the 1st Air Cavalry Division had driven several combat and support elements of the enemy's 7th Front further west, possibly into the northern A Shau Valley, the site of a major logistical storage area.*

In central Thua Thien Province to the south, the 101st Airborne Division, under the command of Major General Olinio M. Barsanti, continued to conduct the follow-on, division-level operation, Nevada Eagle, which began in mid-May with the termination of Operation Delaware.** During June and July, the division coordinated rice denial operations in Thua Thien Province and conducted offensive operations to defeat North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces and destroy the enemy's base areas and lines of communication. The division's 1st Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force operations along Route 547, which parallels the Song Bo, west of Hue; the 2d Brigade continued reconnaissance in force operations in the coastal plains north and east of Hue and provided security and support for the rice collection effort; and the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, to a limited extent, secured major fire support bases astride Route 547 and conducted search and clear operations along major enemy entry and exit routes to the coastal plains.***

The division's combat operations during the summer months were characterized by infrequent enemy contact, increased boobytrap incidents, and the capture of rice caches. With the defeat of multi-battalion NVA attempts to seize and hold areas of the coastal plains in May and their retreat into mountain base camps, a tactical void was created that eventually was filled by local guerrillas and the Viet Cong infrastructure. Despite extensive reconnaissance in force operations and numerous saturation patrols and ambushes, the enemy, which had broken down into squad-sized or smaller units, chose not to engage the division's maneuver elements. When he was engaged, the contacts were of short duration and involved few casualties on both sides.

As guerrilla activity increased, so did division casualties from surprise firing devices. Of the 40 airborne troopers killed and 375 wounded during June and July, Viet Cong-emplaced boobytraps, generally hand grenades or 105mm artillery rounds with trip wire devices attached, accounted for 18 killed and 173 wounded. Despite increased friendly and few enemy casualties, the division's vigorous program of patrols and ambushes did result in the discovery and capture of numerous rice caches. Working closely with South Vietnamese Regional, Popular, and National Police Field Forces, the division's rice denial campaign resulted in the capture of more than 345 tons of rice and in impeding enemy movement through the area of operations.

During the last week of July, the division began preparations for a return to the A Shau Valley, with a logistical build-up and the construction of fire support bases. The plan called for one brigade of the division and elements of the 1st ARVN Regiment to conduct a combined helicopter and ground assault into the valley.

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*On 27 June, the Department of the Army directed that the 1st Cavalry Division be redesignated the 1st Air Cavalry Division and the 101st Airborne Division redesignated the 101st Air Cavalry Division. However, the terminology was withdrawn on 26 August and the new designations established were 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), to preserve the "heritage and traditions and to enhance further long established esprit associated with these famous divisions." MACV ComdHist, 1968, p. 245.

**Major General Melvin Zais assumed command of the division from Major General Barsanti on 19 July 1968.

***The 3d Brigade, undergoing a reorganization from its deployment task force organization to that of a light infantry brigade, was experiencing extreme personnel turbulence. The upheaval was caused not only by the reorganization, but also by a decision by the Department of the Army to give each individual who had deployed with the brigade in February the option of returning to Fort Bragg or remaining in Vietnam with the unit. Of the 3,650 personnel who deployed from Fort Bragg, 2,513 chose to return. The training of more than 2,900 replacements therefore limited combat operations. By the end of July, the brigade was declared combat ready and began full-time operations in its assigned area.
along Route 547A. The 1st Air Cavalry Division was to conduct concurrent operations, partially as a deception, to the north and east of the valley.

South of the 101st Airborne Division’s area of operations in Thua Thien Province lay that of Marine Task Force X-Ray, under the command of Brigadier General George D. Webster. On 1 June, Phase III of Operation Houston began under the control of the 5th Marines. National Route 1, from Phu Bai south to the Hai Van Pass, was successfully kept open as elements of Colonel Paul G. Graham’s regiment provided security for key bridges and installations and conducted patrols and ambushes on avenues of approach to the vital highway. In addition, the regiment conducted extensive rice denial operations in the Phu Thu and Vinh Loc Districts, east and southeast of Phu Bai, in conjunction with South Vietnamese Regional and Popular Forces. During the month, the Marines captured more than 31,000 pounds of rice and returned them to government control, and relocated more than 44 tons to secure storage areas. The regiment also conducted a number of short operations in the jungle canopy south of the Phu Bai vital area, in the Phu Loc and Hai Van Pass areas of the operation, to locate and destroy enemy forces, supply caches, and base areas.

During Phase IV of Operation Houston, which began on 1 July, Task Force X-Ray assumed operational control of BLT 2/7, which on 9 July assaulted into the Vinh Loc District by helicopter and amphibian tractors, and continued the task force’s vigorous rice denial campaign. A week later, the battalion landing team joined the 5th Marines and was helilifted to the Thon Mu Kham Valley, southwest of Phu Bai, where fire support bases were constructed and search operations begun. With the departure of the battalion landing team and the 5th Marines, Colonel Bruce F. Meyers’ 26th Marines, assumed tactical responsibility for the Task Force X-Ray area of operations and began Phase V of Operation Houston on 25 July.

Throughout the summer months, Marine, U.S. Army, and ARVN troops continued the relentless and successful pursuit and destruction of enemy forces in northern I Corps. From Thon Mu Kham Valley in the south to the Demilitarized Zone in the north, allied forces aggressively and repeatedly forced the North Vietnamese troops and their Viet Cong allies to withdraw deeper into their border sanctuaries, thereby delaying any enemy attempt at initiating a major offensive in the northern two provinces of South Vietnam.

*For the beginning of Operation Houston see Chapter 13.
Chapter 19

The Third Offensive: Da Nang

Indicators—The Storm Breaks—Counterattack—Pursuit—Typhoon Bess

Indicators

As the 1st Marine Division Operations Allen Brook and Mameluke Thrust entered their later stages in the summer of 1968, the Communists cautiously avoided decisive contact, giving rise to the theory that they were husbanding their resources for another offensive. Rumors of an impending major attack by the enemy began to take on lives of their own. The expected Communist thrust was referred to variously as the "third offensive" (the Tet and the May offensives being the first and second, respectively), the "autumn offensive," or the "summer offensive." South Vietnamese President Thieu had warned on 10 July that "the expected Communist summer offensive against Saigon and other major cities might come in two weeks and could be the last battle, the last all-out effort by the Communists." Ironically, 10 days later, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh seemed to have confirmed this statement when he exhorted his countrymen to "a final victory during the third offensive." 2

Marine infantry units captured prisoners, who, and documents, which, further indicated Communist intentions. By late July, III MAF intelligence officers knew enough about the enemy's plan to be certain that Da Nang was the target of the threatened offensive. The Da Nang National Police service captured a North Vietnamese officer who revealed details of what he referred to as the "X2 Offensive." The objective of this attack, he claimed, was to create a "favorable political situation for the North Vietnamese delegation at the Paris peace talks to commemorate the forthcoming VC holidays and to attempt to gain the support of the civilian populace." The prisoner claimed that the VC had collected 30 U.S. servicemen (deserters) who would assist them in fomenting an uprising. * If the attack on Da Nang and the military revolt were successful, the Communists would gather South Vietnamese intellectuals to coordinate with the National Liberation Front for the formation of local coalition governments in Da Nang and other captured areas and eventually, a national-level coalition government. 4

The enemy appeared to be throwing everything he had into the effort against Da Nang. Enemy units scheduled to participate in the attacks in the Da Nang TAOR included the 31st, 36th, and 38th North Vietnamese Army Regiments, the R–20, V–25, and T–89 Battalions, as well as the 368B Rocket Regiment.** A raider later reported that the Communist plan even included a contingency for the use of North Vietnamese tanks and aircraft to turn the tide as a last resort. Indeed, in late July, Marine reconnaissance teams and air

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*Indeed, Marine reconnaissance and infantry units operating in the Da Nang TAOR during this period reported numerous sightings of Caucasians moving with enemy units. One reconnaissance team shot and wounded one of the Caucasians in an ambush, then heard the man call for help in English.

**The 38th NVA Regiment represented no actual increase of enemy units in the Da Nang TAOR. It was basically a coordinating headquarters for several VC battalions that had operated there over the years. According to Marine intelligence sources, it was established in early May 1968 and collocated with Group 44 "to afford greater control" during the mini-Tet and Third offensives. It consisted of the V–25, R–20, and V–7 VC Infantry Battalions, and the 3d and T–87 Sapper Battalions. III MAF PerIntRep No. 35–68, dtd 3Sep68, p. A–47, in III MAF PerIntReps, 14Jul–31Aug68.
observers had twice sighted enemy armored fighting vehicles west of An Hoa.

Originally, intelligence estimates had set the start date for the offensive on 20 July, to coincide with the new moon when illumination would be low. Although speculative, this theory fit a pattern of increased enemy activity during the darkest nights of a given month. However, when this date passed without serious incident, intelligence officers revised their estimates to reflect the next new moon phase as the start date: 23 August 1968. In tenuous confirmation of this supposition, a prisoner revealed that the month of August was to bring the "decisive battle for revolutionary history." As III MAF developed intelligence concerning the third offensive, subordinate units prepared for the coming battle. Acting on the reports of enemy tanks and extensive Communist road-building activity southwest of Da Nang, the 1st Marine Division revised its anti-mechanized defense plan to meet the new threat. Major General Carl A. Youngdale, who had relieved Major General Robertson as division commander in June, directed his subordinate commanders to review plans for the defense of the Da Nang TAOR and to increase the readiness of their units. Anticipating that the enemy would strike during darkness, he ordered that all units maximize night activities and "reduce day workloads accordingly to allow adequate rest for all hands." In the area surrounding Da Nang, Operations Allen Brook and Mameluke Thrust continued with the participating units frequently shifting their areas of operations in an effort to engage and destroy the major Communist units which would have to concentrate to conduct an offensive of the magnitude III MAF anticipated.

Just past noon on 18 August, less than a kilometer west of Marble Mountain Air Facility, a patrol from Company B, 1st Military Police Battalion apprehended a 16-year-old Vietnamese boy who confessed that he was a member of a VC platoon which was hiding nearby. The MPs cordoned off the area and, with the assistance of the South Vietnamese 106th Regional Force Company and Company C, 3d Military Police Battalion, conducted a thorough search. Several light contacts with small groups of VC resulted, leading to the discovery of weapons, ammunition, and explosives caches as well as a radio receiver.

Major General Youngdale, in a report to Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman at III MAF headquarters, noted:

...enemy activity has increased...there are indications that the enemy may be in the latter stages of preparation for his third offensive. As yet, however, there are no indications that the enemy is prepared to conduct a major attack within the next twenty-four hours.
Early the following day, 19 August, a Viet Cong company attacked and overran Combined Action Platoon 2–4–3 northeast of Hoi An. At 2100 that night, 30 to 40 VC attacked recon team "Trailer Park," atop Hon Coc Mountain, south of Go Noi Island. Only the quick intervention of a Douglas AC–47 Spooky gunship, with its potent, multiple Gatling guns, saved the team from destruction.

Following a battalion-sized VC attack on Combined Action Platoon 2–3–4 during the early morning hours of 20 August, Youngdale's view of the situation changed. In a report to General Cushman that day, he estimated that the enemy could "close on principal targets in the First Division area in one night in launching his 3d phase offensive."13

While the 5th Marines, under Colonel Paul G. Graham, pursued Communist survivors of the Battle of Chau Phong south of Da Nang,* the 27th Marines continued final preparations for redeployment to the U.S. and the 1st Marines began arranging its move from Quang Tri Province to the Da Nang TAOR.** It was a hectic period in the 1st Marine Division and the specter of the heralded third offensive continued to grow. General Youngdale made minor adjustments to the plan for the defense of Da Nang, reinforcing those sectors which appeared to be most in danger.14 His daily report for 21 August concluded that:

The enemy appears to have completed his preparation for his offensive. Small scale mortar attacks on Dai Loc and Thuong Duc in the last 24 hours possibly reflect last minute registration. The enemy may launch his offensive at any time . . . .15

The Storm Breaks

The streams which drain the rugged mountains of central Quang Nam Province follow the slope of the land toward the South China Sea, growing in size and strength as they meet other streams. By the time they reach the flat coastal plain, the streams have become rivers which twist through the populated farmlands, branching and rejoining again in a crazy patchwork. In every area through which a river passes, the local Vietnamese give it a name, so that by the time it reaches the South China Sea, it has acquired many titles along the way. The river which flows along the southern boundary of Da Nang, separating the city from the fertile paddy region of the coastal plain, is called Song Cau Do, at least along that particular stretch. About

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*See Chapter 17.

**From the beginning, the President had indicated that the deployment of the 27th Marines to Vietnam was temporary and in March he and his advisors directed that the regiment return in July. This was later delayed until September. See Chapter 27 for the deployment and redeployment of the 27th Marines. See also Chapter 13 for the initial deployment.
two kilometers south of the river, Highway 1 forks, sending each of its branches across the Song Cau Do toward Da Nang on its own bridge. The easternmost of these, called the Cam Le Bridge, after the hamlet on its northern side, led directly to the Da Nang Airbase, less than two kilometers away. Two kilometers upstream from the Cam Le Bridge, to the west, lay a combination highway bridge-railroad trestle known as the Song Cau Do Bridge.

Marines guarded these bridges, both to prevent VC saboteurs from destroying them and to prevent enemy infiltrators from crossing them with weapons and explosives for use in the city. The numerous support units stationed in Da Nang each assumed responsibility for a sector within the city and its suburbs. The 1st Tank Battalion's area included the Song Cau Do Bridge; the 1st Military Police Battalion's area included the Cam Le Bridge. For the most part, bridge security consisted of checking the identification papers and packages of civilians crossing the bridge and keeping a lookout beneath the bridge to foil sapper attacks. At random intervals, bridge sentries dropped small explosive charges into the water nearby to discourage enemy swimmers from approaching the pilings.

At the Song Cau Do and Cam Le Bridges, the duty was routine, the only excitement being the occasional detention of a Vietnamese whose identity papers were not in order. South of the river, infantry units of the 1st Marine Division formed an additional screen protecting the city from major attacks, so it seemed unlikely that the enemy, in force, would ever get as far as the bridges.

Company D, 1st Military Police Battalion was responsible for security at the Cam Le Bridge. The company command post was in a bunker at the north end of the bridge, alongside of which stood an observation tower. An old French bunker and another observation tower stood at the approach to the south end. Normally, one of Company D's platoons occupied the bunkers, towers, and several listening posts and ambush sites on both sides of the river, while the other two platoons remained in the company's rear area at the edge of the Da Nang Airbase, two kilometers to the north.

On the afternoon of 22 August, the company commander departed Da Nang for an "R&R" in Hawaii, leaving his executive officer, First Lieutenant Michael J. Kelly, in command.* Lieutenant Kelly was scheduled to begin his own R&R in Hawaii on 28 August, but for the next six days, he would bear responsibility for the protection of the Cam Le Bridge.16 Unknown to him, during the early morning hours of 22 August, 80 Viet Cong of the Q.91 Company, 2nd District, Quang Da Special Zone, in disguise and using forged identification papers, had individually crossed the Cam Le Bridge, then took a city bus to a safe house on Quang Tung Street to retrieve previously cached weapons and equipment and to await the hour for their attack.17

At 2130, responding to reports of movement along the Song Cau Do, Lieutenant Kelly ordered the 2d Platoon to move from its barracks to reinforce the 3d Platoon at the bridge. Within an hour, the Marines had reached the bridge and took up positions on the peninsula that curves out from the north bank to touch the span itself. At midnight, the Marines of the 1st Tank Battalion who were guarding the Song Cau Do Bridge, two kilometers to the west, spotted six people in the water and took them under fire, but because of the extreme darkness, could not determine whether the fire was effective.18

The Marines at the Cam Le Bridge did not have to wait long for their share of the action. At 0100, 23 August, Sergeant Larry K. Bucklew, the platoon sergeant of the 2d Platoon, spotted six sampans crossing the river near his position on the peninsula. The 2d Platoon opened fire, driving some of the sampans back across the river, while others pressed on, landing on the north bank.19

Before the Marines on the Cam Le Bridge could react to the firefight on the river to their west, exploding RPG rounds and mortar shells engulfed the security position on the south bank. The 1st Squad, 3d Platoon, under Lance Corporal Stephen D. Hott, was taken by surprise as Communist troops swarmed over its position. Lance Corporal Arthur Costello, manning a .50-caliber machine gun mounted in an old French bunker, tried to get his gun into action, but an enemy soldier outside the bunker held the barrel fast, and Costello could not bring it to bear.20

Lance Corporal Hott, in the nearby observation tower with Private First Class Pedro L. G. Francisco, ordered Costello to disable the machine gun and withdraw. Hott then grabbed an M60 machine gun and ammunition and ran for the bridge. Costello, finding the enemy already inside his bunker, fought his way out, then paused to throw in a fragmentation grenade in hopes of "spiking" the machine gun.21 Making his way onto the bridge, Costello joined Lance Corporals John W. Thomas and Hylan L. Crowder running with

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*Abbreviation commonly used for "Rest and Recreation." Each Marine was authorized one "R&R" during his 13-month tour of duty in Vietnam. Many sites were available throughout the Pacific area, including Hong Kong, Australia, Thailand, Japan, and Malaysia.
Hott towards the company command post on the north bank. Francisco was still on the south side, his fate unknown. The rest of the squad, dispersed in listening posts and ambush sites near the bridge's southern approaches, remained in their positions, unseen by the enemy.

Moments after the Communists struck, Lieutenant Kelly organized a counterattack from the north bank of the river. Corporal Wayne D. Brown led his squad across the bridge toward the fight, meeting Hott's squad halfway. Hott had been wounded in the head, so Brown ordered him back to the command post at the north end for treatment and, in the confusion, Hott took the machine gun with him. Unwilling to risk an attack without the machine gun, Brown organized his men for a defense of the middle of the bridge, using a sandbagged position already in place, then sent Lance Corporal John A. Eller back for the gun.

Eller returned with the gun, but with no ammunition. Brown himself went back to the north side, which was now under heavy mortar and rocket fire, and retrieved the ammunition. Finally ready to counterattack, the Marines charged across the bridge, hugging the sides for protection as Eller, leading the way, sprayed the enemy with machine gun fire. Reaching the observation tower, Eller was felled by a long burst from an enemy automatic weapon. While down, a ricochet struck him in the chest, wounding him a second time. He tossed a grenade into an enemy fighting hole, then died.22

Within one minute of Eller being hit, Brown himself and two of his men were wounded. With the machine gun lost and enemy fire mounting, Brown ordered a withdrawal to the bridge. As the Marines assumed new fighting positions near the water's edge, the enemy hit them with either tear gas or CS gas.** Only one Marine in the squad had a protective mask, and the effects of the gas soon made the position untenable. The Marines withdrew further, to the sandbagged position in the middle of the bridge from which they had counterattacked. The gas, although still present, was not as strong there and the men were able to keep fighting. Brown reported the situation to Lieutenant Kelly. The lieutenant's response was, "Hang tight."

At that moment, there was little Lieutenant Kelly could do to help Corporal Brown. Enemy troops on the north bank were pressing hard against the company command post, advancing under heavy mortar, RPG, and small arms fire. The north bank observation tower, pounded by Communist shells, collapsed at 0200, burying three Marines sheltering beneath it, and immediately afterwards, the enemy used gas against the Marines on the north bank. As with Corporal Brown's squad, the Marines had no protective masks. Some withdrew to the middle of the bridge where the gas was not as strong, while others dipped their heads in the water to clear their eyes and throats, and desperately tried to hang onto their positions.23

While Company D, 1st Military Police Battalion fought to hold the Cam Le Bridge, the third offensive erupted all over the Da Nang area. The security force at the nearby Song Cau Do Bridge, although not under ground attack, was shelled by enemy mortars. Downstream from them, toward the Cam Le Bridge, Communists continued to cross the river in sampans and the Marines on the Song Cau Do Bridge kept up steady machine gun fire into the enemy boats. Between 0245 and 0315, 19 units in the Da Nang area recorded over 300 rounds of mortar and 122mm rocket fire detonating on or near their positions. Enemy infantry attacked the 1st Tank Battalion, three company positions held by the 27th Marines, the headquarters of the 11th Marines, and three Combined Action platoons in the 7th Marines TAOR. Many other units received mortar fire. Viet Cong sappers struck the Special Forces compound two kilometers south of Marble Mountain Air Facility. Advancing under a mortar barrage, the sappers penetrated the perimeter and swept through the position with satchel charges, killing 16 Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group personnel and wounding 125 more. When finally driven off, the enemy left behind 32 dead. Later, a prisoner revealed that this enemy force was a company of the R–20 Battalion, reinforced by a platoon of the Q–92 Sapper Company. Their mission was to seize the Marble Mountain Air Facility and hold it for one day, destroying as many aircraft and facilities as possible.24

The 2d and 3d Platoons of Company D, 1st Military Police Battalion were still under heavy attack at the Cam Le Bridge when the 1st Platoon left the airbase shortly after 0300 to relieve them. Moving in trucks down Highway 1, the rescuers came to a sudden stop after moving only a few hundred meters from the

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* For his courageous action, Lance Corporal Eller was posthumously decorated with the Silver Star.

** "CS" is the designation of a chemical riot control agent used in Vietnam. Its effects are similar to those caused by tear gas: burning of the eyes, throat, and mucous membranes. Although powerful, the effects are temporary, usually disappearing within minutes of the gas dissipating.
In fighting for the Hoa Vang headquarters in August, Marines take cover from an unseen VC sniper. The interior of a destroyed structure can be seen with only the floor and a chair still undamaged.

airbase because a battle was raging around the Hoa Vang District headquarters, which lay along the highway, midway between Da Nang and the north end of the bridge. A company of the 402d Sapper Battalion had assaulted the district headquarters and blocked movement along Highway 1. In their initial attack, the sappers penetrated the headquarters defenses and were repulsed only after hand-to-hand fighting inside the compound with U.S. advisors, South Vietnamese National Police, and even local government officials taking part. In their initial attack, the sappers penetrated the headquarters defenses and were repulsed only after hand-to-hand fighting inside the compound with U.S. advisors, South Vietnamese National Police, and even local government officials taking part.32 The attack waned at about 0400, allowing the relief force to move into the headquarters where they left eight Marines as reinforcements before continuing toward the bridge. No sooner had the platoon started toward the bridge than the enemy sappers resumed their attack.26

The 1st Platoon reached the river at 0430, just in time to meet another enemy onslaught directed against the bridge. From the airbase, a larger, combined relief force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. N. Gambardella, Commanding Officer, 3d Military Police Battalion, moved south toward the bridge.* This force, designated Task Force Kilo, consisted of two platoons from the 3d Military Police Battalion; Company K, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines; Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion; and Ontos antitank vehicles, reinforced by a company of ARVN Rangers mounted in armored personnel carriers. Behind them, crash crews from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing followed with firefighting equipment, attempting to extinguish the fires caused by the attack on the Hoa Vang District headquarters.27

At 0500, Lance Corporal Henry Lowery, leading a nine-man ambush patrol southwest of the bridge, radioed Lieutenant Kelly that he intended to attack and recapture the south end. Lowery’s squad advanced to within 25 meters of the south tower, receiving only sniper fire. Two Bell UH–1 Iroquois “Huey” helicopter gunships appeared overhead and Lowery attempted to signal them to provide supporting fire on the tower. The helicopters mistakenly attacked the Marines instead of the entrenched Communists. With one man killed and two wounded, Lowery withdrew his squad to the relative safety of a nearby rice paddy to await help.28

When dawn broke over Da Nang just after 0600, aircraft began attacking the Viet Cong in the bunkers at the south end of the Cam Le Bridge. The two “Hueys” were joined by a Douglas AC–47 Spooky gunship, a Douglas A–1 Skyraider, and McDonnell-Douglas F–4 Phantom jets which unsuccessfully pounded the enemy bunkers with napalm, high explosive bombs, and cannon fire.29

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* Colonel Gambardella, the MP battalion commander, recalled that this was the second call for assistance on the night of 22–23 August. Just before midnight, he responded to a request for assistance from the commander of the ARVN Special Forces headquarters in the center of Da Nang city which was under attack. He deployed two platoons from his battalion who cordoned off the headquarters. Four of the attackers were killed and two were captured. Col Joseph J. N. Gambardella, Comments on draft, dtd 16Jan95 (Vietnam Comment File).
Counterattack

The infantry unit nearest the south end of the bridge was the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, with its command post at Duong Son, four kilometers to the southwest. At 0645, the battalion commander, Major Kenneth J. Skipper, ordered Company A, located at the battalion command post, to launch an immediate counterattack to recapture the Cam Le Bridge. Two of the company's three platoons were already detached, with one deployed to Christmas Island, 1,000 meters northeast of the bridge, and the other supporting a Combined Action platoon in the hamlet of Lo Giang (1), 1,000 meters southeast of the bridge. Further, one squad from the remaining platoon was on a patrol, leaving a total of two rifle squads available to the company. The company commander, Captain William O. Moore, reinforced these two squads with other members of the company who were present in the command post. Marines trained to operate mortars, rocket launchers, and even typewriters suddenly became riflemen again. Said Captain Moore, "we took our clerks, we took our sick, lame, and lazy, we took everybody we had and moved out."30 Within five minutes of receiving the order, the small force was on the march.

Having departed without full knowledge of the enemy situation, Captain Moore tried to gather information along the way. Passing through an ARVN compound, he spoke with the U.S. Army advisors who pointed out suspected Communist positions lining both sides of Highway 1. The company continued north along the highway, stopping outside of Cam Nam, only two kilometers from the Communist positions on the south end of the bridge. While there, Captain Moore received orders from Major Skipper to detach yet another squad from his seriously depleted force to assist the platoon in Lo Giang (1), which had reported being surrounded and under attack. He sent 16 Marines to reinforce the supposedly beleaguered garrison and requested permission to proceed toward the bridge. Major Skipper, however, told him to remain in position and wait for a platoon of tanks which would support the attack.

The Marines sent to Lo Giang (1) soon radioed back that they had arrived to find the hamlet quiet, with the Combined Action Marines reporting they had not had contact with the enemy for three hours. Captain Moore, assuming that someone had "cried `wolf," asked for the return of the 16 Marines, but Major Skipper denied his request.

At 1145, the tanks arrived: four 90mm gun tanks and a flame tank from Company B, 5th Tank Battalion. The Marines of Company A had never operated with tanks before. Indeed, many of those with Captain Moore had never participated as riflemen in any operation before. Nevertheless, the "company," reduced in strength once again to two ad-hoc squads, pressed forward toward the hamlet of Cam Nam on their way to the Cam Le Bridge. The road was raised above the surrounding paddies with a sharp drop down on both shoulders, so the tanks were forced to advance in column, with one infantry squad on either side. At the same time, Company D, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines prepared to attack Cam Nam from the west.

When Captain Moore and his men were less than 400 meters from Cam Nam, the enemy opened fire with RPGs, mortars, and small arms. The initial burst killed two Marines and wounded four others, but the rest continued the attack, firing and maneuvering toward the enemy, inching forward with only low paddy dikes for cover. Two hundred meters from the hamlet, an RPG hit the lead tank, causing minor damage. Captain Moore spotted the RPG and pointed it out to the tankers, who returned fire with 40 rounds of high explosive, 4 rounds of "Beehive," and 3 rounds of white phosphorous.31 With this, Communist troops began to run from one dwelling to another within the hamlet, the tanks cutting them down with machine gun fire and blasting with 90mm rounds any structure they entered. A machine gun fired at the Marines from within a straw hut, and the flame tank drenched the hut liberally with burning fuel. Soon, the entire hamlet was ablaze, with virtually every structure leveled. "This," related Captain Moore, "about ended our problem."32

The Communists had blocked the highway with vehicles, which also provided cover for the enemy. Five more rounds of 90mm fire blasted away this makeshift obstacle and the tiny force again surged forward toward the Cam Le Bridge. As they passed through the burning hamlet, the company received word that a platoon from Company E, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines would soon join them. Captain Moore ordered his platoon on Christmas Island, which had already made one unsuccessful bid to recapture the bridge, to join the counterattack from the east.

The .50-caliber machine gun abandoned in the bunker the previous night had not been destroyed by Lance Corporal Costello's hand grenade and the Viet Cong now had it in action against the Marines. Even after a fearful pounding by aircraft, there was no sign
that the Communists in the old French bunker were
ready to quit. The tanks led the attack toward the
south end of the bridge, pumping round after round of
90mm cannon fire into the bunker and the nearby
observation tower. The accurate, concentrated fire
proved to be too much for the Communists, who
rushed from their positions, attempting to escape. Sev-
eral of them jumped into a vehicle and tried to drive
away, but a tank fired into the vehicle, sending it up in
flames. Other enemy soldiers leaped into the river and
tried to swim to safety, but the Marines rushed to the
riverbank and shot them in the water.

At 1545, nine hours after receiving the order to
counterattack, Captain Moore reported to his battalion
headquarters that the objective was secured, then set
about reorganizing the position. Several local Popular

Marine Cpl Henry A. Casselli, holding his M16 rifle, is
seen returning to the northern end of the Cam Le Bridge over
the Cau Do River after helping to secure the bridge. Other
Marines cross in the background. An ad hoc force from the
1st and 2d Battalions, 27th Marines and including
tankers and MPs had taken part in the fighting.

Force troops were found under the bridge where they
had been hiding since the previous night. Beneath the
tower, the Marines found the body of the gallant John
Eller, and in the vicinity of the bridge, 22 enemy dead.
Company A had suffered three dead and eight wound-
ed. Captain Moore linked up with Lieutenant Kelly's
military policemen on the north bank and his own pla-
toon from Christmas Island, then sent a squad down
the riverbank to the west to ferret out any Viet Cong
who might be hiding there.

To the north, Lieutenant Colonel Gambardella's
Task Force Kilo fought through the remnants of the
enemy sapper company which had laid siege to the
Hoa Vang District headquarters, reaching the north
bank of the river at approximately 1900. Lieutenant
Colonel Gambardella recalled that in the attack south
to the Cam Le Bridge, Task Force Kilo came under
heavy fire and took several casualties. In the two fights,
the Marines sustained 4 killed and 12 wounded and
the RVN forces with them 3 dead and 21 wounded.
Among the casualties was Navy Hospitalman Allan R.
Gerrish, who placed himself between a wounded
Marine and enemy machine gun fire and posthumous-
lly was awarded the Navy Cross for this action. Enemy
casualties in the battles for the district headquarters
and the Cam Le Bridge totaled 184. ARVN Rangers
took control of the area, allowing Captain Moore and
his company to move to Christmas Island. Although
weary from the day's hard fighting, Company A main-
tained 100 percent alert in their new positions.33

Through the night of 23–24 August, there were
several incidents, relatively minor as compared to the
events of the previous night, indicating that the "third
offensive," though seriously compromised locally, was
not yet over. At 2200, a short firefight erupted at the
Song Cau Do Bridge when two sampans filled with
enemy troops attempted to cross the river from south
to north under the cover of small arms fire and a brief
mortar barrage. Return fire directed at the Communist
positions resulted in 11 secondary explosions.34
Between 0200 and 0400, over 100 rounds of mortar
fire fell on the command post of the 5th Marines, posi-
tions held by Company M, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines,
and Battery H, 3d Battalion, 11th Marines.35

With the situation in Da Nang restored, it
remained for III MAF to pursue and destroy the
escaping Communist units while at the same time
remaining vigilant for another wave of attacks on the
city. The heaviest fighting of the "third offensive" was
yet to come.
**Pursuit**

At dawn on 24 August, a patrol from Company C, 1st Battalion, 27th Marines made contact with two companies of the Viet Cong V-25 Battalion, five kilometers south-southwest of the Cam Le Bridge in a hamlet named Qua Giang (2). The ARVN 1st Battalion, 51st Infantry, an ARVN armored cavalry unit, Company F, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, and the 3d Platoon, Company B, 5th Tank Battalion surrounded the hamlet and directed supporting arms fire on enemy positions throughout the day and night.36

On 24 August, elements of the 1st Military Police Battalion, Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion and the South Vietnamese 111th Regional Force Company swept Highway 1 from the airbase to the bridge. Despite the previous sweep by Task Force Kilo, pockets of enemy resistance remained. Rooting them out, the task force counted 1 prisoner and 30 enemy dead at a cost of 6 Marines wounded.37

On 24 August, General Youngdale reported to General Cush that:

... infantry and sapper units may have aborted their attempts to penetrate Da Nang from the south and may move to the south to reposition in the vicinity of Go Noi Island. However, rocket and mortar attacks may resume.41

Acting on this analysis, General Youngdale issued orders to mount an operation which would block the withdrawal of the Communists from the Da Nang area and defeat them in detail.42 Named Operation Sussex Bay, it would employ elements of the 5th Marines and the 7th Marines, supported by ARVN and Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) units. H-hour was set for 0900, 29 August.

At 0815, 29 August, while occupying a blocking position in preparation for Operation Sussex Bay, Company M, 3d Battalion, 7th Marines made heavy contact with the enemy in the “Dodge City” area, four kilometers south of Hill 55. While maneuvering against the enemy flank, the company came under heavy fire from three sides which wounded several men. A corporal, Hospitalman Richard L. Powell, braved the enemy fire to assist the wounded and was himself hit by machine gun fire, rendering his arm useless. Despite his wounds, Powell continued to treat the casualties, at one point advancing to assist a fallen Marine who lay within 15 meters of a Communist machine gun. Here, Powell was hit again and killed. For his selfless act, Powell posthumously received the Navy Cross.43

Company D, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines and Company G, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines joined the action with tanks. Assisted by aircraft and artillery, the Marines dislodged the North Vietnamese. Friendly losses totalled 2 dead and 41 wounded and the Marines reported killing 42 of the enemy.44

While Company M fought, the other units involved in Operation Sussex Bay assumed their positions. Just east of the National Railroad, a contingent of Korean Marines established a blocking position along the Co Ca stream. To the south, the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines occupied its own blocking position in the western half of Go Noi Island, along the Song Ky Lam, while the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines began a sweep of the eastern half of the island. The 3d Battalion, 7th Marines hemmed in the area of operations by establishing a defensive line two kilometers west of the railroad. Finally, two ARVN units, the 21st and 37th Ranger Battalions, attacked south along the railroad from their line of departure along the Song La Tho.

Shortly after launching their sweep, the ARVN Ranger battalions engaged a large enemy unit spread out between the hamlets of Dong Lien and Ha Nong Tay (2). The Rangers returned fire and called for fire support from the 2d Battalion, 11th Marines and ARVN artillery units. The battle resulted in over 80 North Vietnamese dead at a cost of 8 ARVN Rangers killed and 33 wounded.45

Further south, in the Arizona Territory, Marine units participating in Operation Mameluke Thrust recorded significant contact with the enemy. An NVA platoon ambushed a platoon of Company D, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines on 29 August near the Song Tinh Yen, killing 12 Marines and wounding 18. The
Marines directed 5 airstrikes and over 700 rounds of artillery fire onto enemy positions only 200 meters away, reporting as a result 25 Communists dead.46

General Youngdale remained convinced that the enemy intended to attack Da Nang from the west and northwest.47 To counter this threat, he requested that a B-52 mission be diverted from a previously scheduled target to strike the valley of the Song Cu De (called Elephant Valley by the Marines), 10 kilometers northwest of the city.48

The action, despite Youngdale's analysis, remained centered to the south, mainly in the Operation Sussex Bay area. Just after midnight on 30 August, Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines ambushed a group of approximately 30 North Vietnamese fording the Song Ky Lam in an apparent effort to reach Go Noi Island. A search of the area conducted at first light revealed 29 enemy dead. There were no Marine casualties.49 Later that morning, the ARVN Ranger battalions swept south once again, claiming to have killed 27 Viet Cong and 4 North Vietnamese.50

On 31 August, the units involved in Operation Sussex Bay closed the net around the escaping Communists. During the morning, both of the ARVN battalions pressed the enemy into a bend in the Song Ky Lam on the other side of which the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines waited in blocking positions. The encircled Communists fought desperately, but artillery and airstrikes flown by Marine helicopter gunships and RVNAF fixed-wing aircraft smashed them in the trap. The attack resulted in over 80 North Vietnamese dead and netted 1 prisoner at a cost of 7 ARVN Rangers killed and 45 others wounded.51

The fighting of 31 August crushed the major Communist force attempting to flee south after the failed attack on Da Nang, but small units still slipped through the net and continued to work their way toward Go Noi Island. At 2000, 31 August, Company H, 2d Battalion, 5th Marines ambushed one of these groups, approximately 30 North Vietnamese attempting to cross the Song Ky Lam. Unlike the group engaged two nights earlier, these

Two Marines from Company M, 3d Battalion, 5th Marines rush to a landing zone to pick up supplies left by a Boeing Vertol CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter from HMM-164, during Operation Sussex Bay near An Hoa and Go Noi Island sectors.

Photo from Abel Collection
latest prey of Company H started to cross the river in boats. Under illumination provided by the battalion’s 81mm mortar platoon, the Marines sunk both boats with small arms fire. Amid the efforts to defend Da Nang and the pursuit of the fleeing enemy by Operation Sussex Bay forces, the 1st Marine Division continued its preparations for the redeployment of the 27th Marines. As elements of Colonel Robert G. Lauffer’s 1st Marines arrived at Da Nang, they took up positions in the 27th Marines sector, the first phase of an orderly turnover. By 1 September, Colonel Lauffer had two of his battalions in place and controlled two others of the 27th Marines. Those battalions, the 1st and 2d, still occupied defensive positions in the area. General Youngdale reorganized the Da Nang TAOR, extending the 1st Marines’ new area of operations east to the sea, thereby relieving the 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion of the responsibility for securing the area south of the Marble Mountain Air Facility. This move allowed the amphibian tractor Marines to concentrate on their primary mission of supporting infantry units in the field.

Operation Sussex Bay continued into September, but the area of operations shifted to Go Noi Island. During the evening of 1 September, Battery E, 2d Battalion, 11th Marines moved by helicopter to the Go Noi to support an operation to be carried out by the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines. On 2 September, the 5th Marines launched its attack into the eastern half of the island. Lieutenant Colonel James W. Stemple, the commander of the 2d Battalion, remembered that the aim was “to sweep Go Noi from the railroad berm to the eastern end of the island with the two battalions advancing abreast by phase lines.” Contact was light. By 5 September, the Marines had rooted out and killed only 6 North Vietnamese and 5 Viet Cong, and had suffered 5 dead and 22 wounded. Of the Marine casualties, 4 dead and 11 wounded were the direct result of enemy action, while the remainder were victims of accidents and incidents including short mortar rounds and a friendly airstrike. The last two Marines to become casualties during this phase of Operation Sussex Bay were wounded by an aroused denizen of Go Noi Island, a water buffalo who embodied the hostile attitude held by the rest of the island’s population toward the Marines. The heavy rains of Typhoon Bess would force the Marines temporarily off the Go Noi.

On 5 September, Typhoon Bess struck the I Corps Tactical Zone, catching many units far afield. Winds in excess of 50 knots, accompanied by heavy rain and a ceiling of less than 100 feet, grounded all aircraft for two days. The 3d Battalion, 5th Marines quit Go Noi Island and marched to nearby Liberty Bridge. The 2d Battalion, 5th Marines was not as lucky, since it was, as Lieutenant Colonel Stemple recalled, “occupy positions at the very east end of the island.” The battalion moved to what high ground there was along the railroad berm as Stemple “knew there would be no way we would be able to ‘walk off’ the island.” The next day Marine Corps helicopters lifted the 2d Battalion out of the Go Noi except for Company H. This latter company was supposed to remain on the island, directly under the operational control of the 5th Marines, and then sweep back to Liberty Bridge the following morning. According to Lieutenant Colonel Stemple, he convinced Colonel Graham, the 5th Marines commander, to helilift this company out after one Marine in the company drowned in the attempt. By this time ground units all over ICTZ suspended operations and moved to high ground to wait out the storm.

Even units in base areas were not safe from the typhoon’s effects. Rising water flooded defensive perimeters, filling trenches and washing away bunkers. Some minefields were under a foot of water. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, scheduled to relieve the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, halted movement, as the storm’s effects threatened the fragile timetable for the 27th Marines’ redeployment to the United States.

The civilian populace suffered as well. A III MAF intelligence report estimated that, in addition to the thousands of homes blown down or washed away by Typhoon Bess, the storm destroyed 60 percent of the rice crop and 55 percent of the stored rice. Intelligence officers speculated the flooding damaged enemy caches, bunkers, and tunnels, as well.

By 7 September, the storm abated and the weather improved enough that field operations could resume, although the flooding still hampered movement considerably. Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines provided security for a recovery unit of Company B, 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion attempting to retrieve two inoperative amphibian tractors abandoned by the 5th Marines on Go Noi Island during the storm. Normally, when a vehicle broke down in
the field, it was guarded until it could be repaired or recovered. To abandon a vehicle was highly unusual, but in this instance necessary, because of the flooding. When the Marines reached the vehicles on the morning of 8 September, they found both destroyed by demolition and fire, the result of enemy action.60*

The Communists, hardly heard from during the typhoon, also resumed operations. At 1800, 8 September, a Stingray patrol in the mountains west of the Arizona Territory sighted 146 enemy moving through a rice paddy at the base of Charlie Ridge. The reconnaissance team called for air and artillery support, killing 25 of the Viet Cong. The following morning, an enemy burial party appeared to recover the bodies. The Stingray patrol directed an airstrike against them, as well, accounting for another 20 Viet Cong.61

The 1st Marine Division ended Operation Sussex Bay on 9 September, citing as the reason the disruption caused by the “unfavorable weather conditions which prevailed during Typhoon ‘Bess’.”62 In fact, enemy activity in the Da Nang TAOR and the area to the immediate south was minimal, indicating that the combination of Operation Sussex Bay and Typhoon Bess had taken the fight out of the Communist units which had originally struck Da Nang on 23 August.

Group 44, the Communist unit which carried out the third offensive in the Da Nang TAOR, suffered heavily during the effort. According to Marine intelligence sources, Group 44 units lost 637 killed while staging for the offensive. In the attacks of 23 August, the main effort of the offensive, III MAF estimated over 230 enemy died. The heaviest Communist casualties, however, occurred during the next two weeks, when III MAF intelligence reports listed another 1,200 enemy killed, thus bringing the total estimated enemy losses during their offensive to more than 2,000 dead.63

Although not everyone in III MAF was certain at the time, the “third offensive” was over.64 Bold in concept but unspectacular in results, the offensive did not materially affect the progress of the negotiations in Paris, nor the balance of power in the Da Nang TAOR. In fact, it signalled the end of an enemy effort begun during Tet and continued in May, whose purpose was to inflict a decisive military defeat on Free World Forces in the Republic of Vietnam. Communist losses in these offensives were staggering, forcing them to change tactics. For now, their timetable would be delayed once more.

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* Both the 2d and 3d Battalions, 5th Marines had to abandon tanks and LVTs that had accompanied the battalions into the Go Noi. The VC or NVA burned two LVTs that had been left by the 3d Battalion, but Colonel Stemple, the 2d Battalion commander, recalled that the Navy several months later provided a LCU (Landing Craft Utility) with a tank retriever and recovered all of the tanks and the two remaining LVTs. According to Stemple, “miraculously, the enemy had not discovered them and except for the water damage, they were recovered intact.” Col James W. Stemple, Comments on draft, n.d. [1995] (Vietnam Comment File).
CHAPTER 20

Autumn Offensive Halted

A New Orientation—The Eastern DMZ—Defeat of the 320th Division
Coastal Quang Tri and Thua Thien: A Shift

A New Orientation

Combat action throughout Quang Tri Province had been intermittent during June and July. Enemy forces engaged by 3d Marine Division, U.S. Army, and ARVN forces were, by and large, elements of the 304th, 308th, and 320th NVA Divisions, and the 27th, 138th, and 270th Independent NVA Regiments. Only occasionally encountered or employed in strength, these units primarily undertook reconnaissance in force missions, shellings, ambushes, probing attacks, and assisted in the movement of arms and supplies to local force Viet Cong units and guerrillas. The aggressive air and infantry attacks had caused the enemy to keep his forces dispersed, off balance, and denied him access to many areas and avenues of approach necessary to carry out a large-scale ground attack against major population centers and allied military units and installations. By the end of July, allied forces in the north had blunt-ed but not curtailed the forward deployment and position-ing of forces for the forthcoming autumn or "Third Wave" Offensive by elements of the 320th NVA Division and the three independent regiments.

With an area of operation that encompassed more than 3,000 square kilometers, the 3d Marine Division could not continue to rely on battalion- or regimental-sized operations as it had done in the past. "In my field visits," Major General Raymond G. Davis noted, "I find that battalion level operations mentality still exists in most instances." With the dispersal of enemy forces over such a large area, General Davis, in an effort to standardize operations, reemphasized the need for the employment of numerous coordinat-ed infantry company patrols working under the pro-tection umbrella of supporting arms. The idea was not only to increase coverage, but also to deny the enemy sanctuary and discourage him from developing extensive logistics bases and resupply caches during the coming months.

Incorporating lessons learned during June and July as the division moved toward a more mobile posture, Davis urged his regimental and battalion commanders to reorient "their thinking and staff planning toward infantry company operations to find and fix enemy forces within their AO's." Even though an operation would be planned at the regimental- and battalion-level, it was not now necessary for it to be executed by the regiment or battalion as a single unit. Companies would be given specific objectives within the area of operations and encouraged to operate independently within a particular area oriented to terrain rather than grid lines and within reinforcing distance of another company. Night operations would be emphasized.

The division commander, likewise, encouraged rifle company commanders to employ the highly successful tactics developed during the past two months. Once a company entered the area of operations, either by foot or by air, it would immediately and unobtrusively select the first of what would become a series of defens-ible patrol bases. Before eating or resting, Marines dug in and registered the company's defensive weapons on all possible avenues of enemy approach.

In sweeping out from the base toward a series of pre-selected, limited objectives, companies and platoons would move cross-country in two or more mutually supporting columns. They were to avoid well-travelled trails and draws, while remaining within supporting and reinforcing distance of the patrol base. Supporting arms would be registered at frequent intervals, normally 500 meters to the front and flanks of the column. In addition, landing zones would be cut to facilitate the evacuation of casualties and resupply. The Marine unit on the move, Davis stressed, would have "what it needs, where it needs it, and at the time it needs it." The pursuit of small groups of enemy troops, com-posed of fewer than five individuals would be avoided, as the North Vietnamese frequently relied on this tactic to lure the advancing unit into an ambush.

Once the advancing Marine unit established contact, massive, coordinated supporting arms fire would be employed prior to launching an assault on the enemy's position. Blocking forces, simultaneously, would be moved up or inserted to seal off all possible avenues of escape. Upon the lifting of supporting arms fire, the combined force would then conduct a method-
rical search of the area with the objective of destroying the enemy position and capturing weapons, equipment, and personnel.

While both reemphasizing time-honored infantry company operations and incorporating a number of recently learned tactics, General Davis reiterated that "any tactic which denies the enemy sanctuary—physical or psychological for rest, resupply and security—will enhance the effectiveness of future operations by the Division."*

In addition to placing a greater emphasis on infantry company operations as the basis for all future division operations, Davis also stressed the importance of intelligence, specifically intelligence gathered by long-range reconnaissance patrols, which would be continuously employed throughout the division's area of responsibility. Lieutenant Colonel Donald R. Berg's 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, reinforced by the 3d Force Reconnaissance Company, would continue to maintain a large number of teams in the field at any one time.** "This has meant," Davis noted, "that every indication of enemy activity from whatever means is explored by the insertion of reconnaissance teams . . . everywhere—on a continuing basis, a massive reconnaissance team effort is maintained."6

Reconnaissance Marines generally employed two types of long-range patrols in this massive intelligence effort. The 8- to 12-man, heavily armed Stingray patrols operated within range of friendly artillery. Their mission was to seek, fix, and destroy the enemy with all available supporting arms. These patrols would be reinforced by "Sparrow Hawk" or "Bald Eagle" rapid-reaction forces, if the opportunity arose to destroy the entire enemy force. In the more remote areas of Quang Tri Province, beyond artillery range, "Key Hole" patrols would be used. Much smaller in size, normally composed of four to five men, and armed with only essential small arms, ammunition, and communications equipment, "Key Hole" patrols were to remain out of sight and observe. If discovered, they were to evade the enemy and attempt escape. These long-range patrols would not normally be reinforced unless artillery could be inserted; if under fire and taking casualties, the team would be extracted by helicopter.7 The 3d Marine Division, as Davis later stated, "never launched an operation without acquiring clear definition of the targets and objectives through intelligence confirmed by recon patrols. High mobility operations [were] too difficult and complex to come up empty or in disaster."8

The increased number of operations and clear weather experienced during the mid-summer months increased the ability of Marine forces to observe the enemy's movement, provide close air support, and interdict his lines of communication and logistic operations, causing him difficulties in the resupply of personnel and equipment. This, coupled with a steady increase in the loss of food, ammunition, personnel, and previously prepared forward positions, forced the North Vietnamese to reassess or alter their plans for the major offensive, slated to be launched sometime in mid-August. Despite inroads by the 3d Division, the infiltration of personnel, supplies, and equipment into Quang Tri Province continued, but at a slower pace. Division intelligence analysts, however, still considered the 320th Division and three independent regiments to be combat ready and capable of conducting regiment or division-sized attacks on allied units, fire support bases, and installations along the Demilitarized Zone. In addition, the disposition of these four enemy units was such that a large-scale attack could come at any time.9

*Colonel Thomas H. Galbraith, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines at the time, observed that actual company tactics employed by his battalion differed very much in practice than the ideal described by General Davis. Galbraith wrote that these tactics "may have been feasible in the eastern portion of Quang Tri Province, but in the mountainous jungle terrain of the western portion, particularly north of Route 9, they were virtually impossible to employ." He explained that "conditions simply would not permit companies and platoons to 'sweep out' of patrol bases in 'mutually supporting columns,' registering supporting arms and cutting LZs as they went." Col Thomas H. Galbraith, Comments on draft, n.d. [Dec94] (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Galbraith Comments.

**See Chapter 26 for chart showing average number of 3d Reconnaissance Battalion daily patrols for the months July—December 1968. Lieutenant Colonel Berg observed that the number of patrols varied for several reasons. For example during September and October, monsoon rains "made inserts and extraction schedules unpredictable and difficult." Other variables besides the weather included operations by other battalions and changes in enemy locations. LtCol Donald R. Berg, Comments on draft, dtd 4Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Berg Comments.

The Eastern DMZ

As August began, allied forces continued the pressure on enemy units throughout Quang Tri Province. The heaviest fighting was to take place in the northeastern portion of the province in the Napoleon-Saline area of operation. The first significant contact occurred on 2 August when several squads of North Vietnamese attacked the forward naval gunfire observation post at Oceanview, 10 kilometers north of Cua Viet. Support-
ed by Marine tanks, amphibian tractors, and naval gunfire, the defenders drove off the enemy who left eight dead. Later the same day, allied observers spotted a platoon of NVA in the same area and called in artillery and naval gunfire, resulting in two reported additional enemy killed.

On 8 August, two battalions of Lieutenant Colonel Vu Van Giai’s 2d ARVN Regiment engaged elements of the 1st Battalion, 138th NVA Regiment, two kilometers east of Gio Linh and two and one-half kilometers south of the DMZ. As the engagement intensified during the afternoon, the ARVN committed the remaining two battalions of the regiment. Despite receiving more than 150 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire, the ARVN battalions pressed the attack, supported by artillery and tactical airstrikes. Suffering more than 100 casualties the enemy battalion withdrew northward under the cover of darkness after the six-hour battle.

Following a week of brief, but sharp clashes around Gio Linh, Lieutenant Colonel Giai’s 2d ARVN Regiment launched an attack into the southern half of the Demilitarized Zone in an effort to reestablish contact with the enemy regiment. Early on the morning of 15 August, elements of Company A, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, with 15 LVTs and 2 tanks, rolled out of Outpost C–4 and proceeded to within one kilometer of the zone’s southern boundary, turned, and proceeded back to C–4. Company A’s diversion was to set the stage for the ARVN attack.

The raid into the DMZ, planned and controlled by the South Vietnamese, was to be executed by the elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment, 11th ARVN Armored Cavalry, and the 3d Marine Division’s tank battalion, organized into four cross-reinforced task elements. According to the plan, the combined infantry and tank force was to attack north of the Song Cua Viet into the DMZ. The task force would then turn west, envelop the 1st Battalion, 138th NVA Regiment, and attack south.

The combined elements of the ARVN and Marine task force departed their respective bases at 0400 on the 15th, and by dawn had moved up the beach to the northernmost point of advance without detection. The task force then turned west, moving from the beach into an area composed of abandoned rice paddies. Although a number of tracked vehicles and tanks became mired in the swampy ground, 10 tanks from Companies A and B, 3d Tank Battalion, continued to sweep northwestward toward the Song Ben Hai and then south, where they surprised the enemy “who were eating breakfast.” After preplanned B–52 Arclight strikes and under covering artillery and tank fire, the allied task force eventually overran the well-entrenched enemy command post, supported by its own 105mm artillery. Marine tankers, who described the day’s action as a “turkey shoot,” were credited with 189 killed and 70 probables out of a total of 421 reported enemy dead. Although the Marine tank companies suffered no casualties, two tanks and a retriever were damaged by mines.

Lieutenant Colonel Giai in his report on the raid, stated the mission was only 50 percent accomplished; Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, the XXIV Corps (formerly Prov Corps) commander, was less restrained in his observations about the success of the ARVN. He reported to General Creighton Abrams, the MACV commander, that the 1st Battalion, 138th NVA Regiment, “was, . . . to have attacked south across DMZ last night; it will do no attacking for some time to come. Meanwhile, the morale of the 2d ARVN Regiment has never been higher. It was a good days work.”

Several days later, in Paris, Ambassador W. Averill Harriman informed North Vietnamese negotiators that South Vietnamese infantrymen had conducted a reconnaissance of a suspected North Vietnamese concentration south of the Song Ben Hai in the “South Vietnamese portion of the Demilitarized Zone. Here they encountered the 1st Battalion of the 138th North Vietnamese Army Regiment . . . . Once again, I urge that you accept my proposal for restoration of the Demilitarized Zone to its original status.”

For the balance of the month, the remaining elements of the 138th NVA Regiment evaded all but minor engagements with Marine and ARVN patrols in the area. The North Vietnamese, however, continued to use the Demilitarized Zone as a base for attacks into South Vietnam, especially into the central and western portions of Quang Tri Province.

In the Kentucky area of operations, to the west, Colonel Ross T. Dwyer’s 1st Marines experienced little activity other than minor squad-sized encounters during the first half of August. The exception was an encounter with 30 enemy troops by First Lieutenant Arthur A. Pierce’s Company F, 9th Marines, three kilometers east of Con Thien. In the face of U.S. artillery and fixed-wing support, the enemy broke contact and Pierce’s Marines began a sweep through the area. During the sweep, the Marines regained contact, but the enemy again broke and ran, and Company F moved through the area, capturing a number of weapons and packs while counting 11 enemy dead.
With enemy activity in the eastern DMZ, particularly north of Con Thien, on the rise, General Davis decided to act. In addition to sightings of enemy tanks, Marine tactical fighter pilots and aerial observers reported spotting trucks, truck parks, camouflaged revetments, storage bunkers, and trenches. Of special interest were repeated sightings of low, slow moving lights during hours of darkness, which it was assumed, emanated from enemy helicopters or some other vertical take-off and landing aircraft. The enemy, it was thought, "might well be using aircraft to resupply forward positions with high priority cargo such as ammunition and medical supplies or conducting medevacs after our techniques."14

Having strengthened his tactical position, but having committed all of his available forces, General Davis requested that Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2/26 be made available to conduct a raid into the DMZ. In the event the landing team could not be committed to the incursion, Davis asked that the battalion relieve the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, so that it could initiate the raid. On 17 August, Lieutenant General Cushman approved Davis’ request for BLT 2/26 to relieve the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, but stipulated that the battalion landing team would have to return to its amphibious shipping by 20 August.

Davis, however, was concerned. In a message to General Stilwell the following day, Davis noted that the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines had been alerted to deploy to the Da Nang area on 22 August. In addition, "there are other indications, that two battalions of the First Regiment will be moved prior to the first of September. These moves follow on the heels of the loss of the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines in May and the 2d Battalion, 26th Marines earlier this month." The Army’s 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized), over which the division had assumed operational control on 1 August, not only would not offset the loss, but also was not scheduled to be fully operational before September. "It is obvious," he concluded, "that a severe draw down on 3d Mar Div capability at this time will seriously limit my ability to maintain the present flexible, mobile posture which I feel is necessary if I am to continue the effective suppression of enemy activity in this area." He therefore recommended that the present 12 maneuver battalion strength of the division be maintained.15

In discussions with General Cushman, Stilwell reported Davis’ concern. General Cushman responded that only the two battalions of the 1st Marines were to be reassigned to the 1st Marine Division. General Stilwell immediately informed Davis of the decision: "You are advised to plan on moving the two bns of the First Marines to First Mar Div in the latter part of this month and to plan on retaining the Second Bn, Third Marines, as an organic element of Third Mar Div."16 The maneuver strength of the division would remain at 12 battalions, nine Marine and the equivalent of three Army.

In the event of a crisis in the northern sector, Stilwell notified the 101st Airborne Division to prepare to assume Task Force X-Ray’s area of operations in Thua Thien Province, which was occupied by the 1st and 3d Battalions, 26th Marines. These two battalions then could be airlifted to Quang Tri Province to reinforce the 3d Marine Division.

On 18 August, Marine helicopters brought BLT 2/26 ashore into the Mai Xa Thi area on the Song Cua Viet, relieving the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines. Following two days of vigorous day and night patrols and ambushes, the battalion returned to its amphibious shipping off Cua Viet.17

Within a hour of the last of 60 B-52 Arclight strikes on 19 August, Lieutenant Colonel John E. Poindexter’s 2d Battalion, 1st Marines assaulted three landing zones in the Trung Son region of the southern DMZ, five kilometers north of Con Thien. Covered by Companies A and B, 1st Marines and a platoon of tanks from Companies A and B, 3d Tank Battalion, deployed near Hill 56, 4,000 meters to the east, Poindexter’s Marines swept east for approximately four kilometers.

*The 1st Marines was to replace the 27th Marines, which regiment would return to the United States in September. In personal correspondence in September 1968, Brigadier General E. E. Anderson, the III MAF Chief of Staff, outlined the hard bargaining that occurred over the displacement of the 1st Marines. He wrote: "We’ve had a considerable hassle over the move of the 1st Marines . . . ." He declared that General Cushman made the original decision because the 3d Division would have operational control of the 1st Brigade, 5th Mechanized Division, but that "Davis [the 3d Division commander] really complained that he just couldn’t get along with eight maneuver battalions plus an SLF, but had to have a minimum of nine, plus a BLT." According to Anderson, "General Cushman stood his ground for quite some time, but then Stilwell and Davis came down and came forth with a counter-proposal . . . ." According to the proposal, XXIV Corps would assume responsibility for the area between Phu Bai and Phu Loc, then controlled by the 1st Marine Division Task Force X-Ray. The III MAF commander then "reluctantly accepted the proposal . . . ." III MAF and XXIV Corps, however, continued to discuss the specific details about responsibilities and command structure in the former Task Force X-Ray sector. BGen E. E. Anderson to LtGen W. J. Van Ryzin, dtd 11Sep68, Encl, Gen Earl E. Anderson, Comments on draft, dtd 18Dec94 (Vietnam Comment File), hereafter Anderson Itr to Van Ryzin, Sep68 and Anderson Comments, Dec94.
exploiting the effects of the Arclight strikes. The battalion found many potential landing zone sites, but discovered no evidence of current or past use of the area by enemy aircraft.

As Companies G and H consolidated at several landing zones in preparation for extraction by helicopter, Poindexter's Marines suffered their only casualty during the day-long raid. While one flight of helicopters attempted to set down at one of the landing zones, a command detonated claymore rigged to an 82mm mortar round exploded, destroying one CH–46 helicopter and damaging several others. Three of the CH–46's crewmen and one of the battalion's Marines were killed, while two Marine pilots were wounded.18

Because of darkness and sporadic enemy fire, Companies E and F and the battalion command group remained in the DMZ until the following morning. At 0700 they began moving south on foot. The heat was overwhelming, making the cross-country movement slow and, as a result, helicopters eventually extracted the battalion at 1730 from landing zones five kilometers north of Con Thien.

Although the raid into the DMZ uncovered no evidence of enemy helicopter or other air activity, it did force out a large number of enemy troops from the area. Scattered by the combination of air and artillery attacks and Poindexter's heliborne assault, the fleeing enemy fell prey to other Marine blocking forces in both the Kentucky and Lancaster areas of operation. The first contacts were initiated by Company B, 1st Marines and the Army's Company A, 77th Armored Regiment near Hill 56. On the morning of the 19th, both companies, whose defensive positions had been probed continuously during the night, engaged an enemy platoon attempting to escape to the east. Supported by the platoon of tanks from the 3d Tank Battalion, which at the time was advancing toward the hill from the east, the combined Army and Marine force killed a reported 26 enemy troops.

Also on the 19th, while moving eastward through the piedmont, six kilometers southwest of Con Thien, Company M, 9th Marines intercepted an estimated reinforced enemy platoon fleeing in its direction. Company M Marines suppressed the enemy's small arms, automatic weapons, and RPG fire, and maneuvered toward the commanding terrain under an umbrella of artillery fire and fixed-wing airstrikes. A later search of the area resulted in the discovery of over 30 enemy bodies and the capture of two prisoners of war.

Sporadic contact with fleeing enemy forces continued throughout the night of the 19th and into the following day. As five tanks of the 3d Tank Battalion returned to Hill 56 on the morning of 20 August, with Companies G and H, 9th Marines serving as blocking forces, two enemy squads attacked the advancing Marines with small arms, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and artillery. Responding with a similar combination of weapons, the Marines forced the two enemy units to withdraw northward, leaving their dead, all of whom were credited to the marksmanship of Marine tankers.

Less than 1,000 meters northwest of Company M's encounter on the 19th, shortly after noon on the 21st, Company I, 9th Marines began receiving sniper fire. Within a hour, the company had engaged an enemy unit of undetermined size, firing small arms and grenades at the Marines. Countering with accurate rocket, mortar, and artillery fire, the Marine company forced the enemy to break contact and withdraw to the north. In one instance during the two-hour engagement, a grenadier with an M72 (LAW) rocket destroyed an enemy 60mm mortar emplacement. A search of the area before dark revealed a reported 14 North Vietnamese bodies and 12 weapons.

While the enemy seemed reluctant to expose his large units to combat along the eastern DMZ, he displayed no hesitation in attacking small Marine reconnaissance patrols in the Kentucky area of operations during the month. In two Leatherneck Square actions, he paid a high price for his efforts, miscalculating on the proximity of reinforcing units and the immediate availability of supporting arms.

At 1000 on 15 August, an estimated enemy company attacked a four-man reconnaissance team southeast of Con Thien near the abandoned airstrip at Nam Dong. The patrol returned fire and requested reinforcement, while simultaneously calling in preplanned artillery fires. Within minutes a platoon from Company A, 1st Marines, accompanied by three tanks, moved out of positions a kilometer away and headed south to assist. The coordinated attack, which included more than 150 rounds of 105mm artillery, 40 rounds of 4.2-inch mortar, 75 rounds from the 90mm guns of the tanks, and airstrikes by Marine UH–1E gunships accounted for several enemy dead.

In a second attack, the enemy paid an even greater price. At 1700 on 24 August, reconnaissance team "Tender Rancho" was moving north through high grass, seven kilometers southeast of Con Thien near Dao Xuyen, when the point man observed 15 khaki-clothed enemy troops cooking and talking. The team in a burst of small arms fire killed three, then another
three. Within minutes the team received a barrage of 82mm mortars and immediately formed a 360-degree security. A hour and a half after the first burst of fire, gunships arrived on station and informed the team that enemy troops surrounded them. The team later reported that 30 to 40 enemy "to the east, north and west" got up and ran when the gunships arrived.19

In immediate response to Tender Rancho's request for assistance, a Marine helicopter lift brought in a reinforced platoon from Company D, 1st Marines to help. Despite receiving .50-caliber and mortar fire in the landing zone, the Company D platoon fought through to link up with the reconnaissance team at 1930. Once consolidated, the team and reaction force received "a fire for effect" of 60 82mm mortar rounds, resulting in the death of three and wounding of eight Marines.20

Moving overland from the east, additional Platoons from Company D, along with Company C, reached blocking positions just north of the encircled reconnaissance team before dark. At daylight on 25 August, Marine helicopters inserted the remainder of Company D. During the insertion, however, a UH-34, while dodging enemy fire, struck a tree breaking off the tail section, killing 3 and wounding 14. With the arrival of elements of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines and Company M, 9th Marines later in the day, the Marines effectively cordoned the area, preventing an enemy withdrawal.

During the remainder of the 25th and into the 26th, as Companies C and D, 1st Marines pushed southward toward the other blocking forces, the enemy made several determined, but unsuccessful attempts to break the cordon. Just before midnight on the 25th, Company B, 1st Marines, which anchored the western portion of the cordon, began to receive enemy artillery fire. For the next seven hours the company was subjected to an artillery attack of more than 220 rounds. The enemy fire was so inaccurate that only one Marine was wounded. By 26 August, after three days of fighting, the enemy had lost a reported 78 killed and 28 weapons captured; Marine casualties were 11 killed and 58 wounded.

With the end of the cordon in Leatherneck Square, the 1st Marines, now commanded by Colonel Robert G. Lauffer, with its 1st and 2d Battalions, was relieved of the responsibility for the Napoleon-Saline and Kentucky areas of operations. The regiment boarded trucks for Dong Ha and then flew in Air Force C-130s to Da Nang, while Navy LCUs and LSTs carried the regiment's equipment south. On 31 August, the 1st Marines assumed the area of operations and mission formerly assigned to the 27th Marines.*

Upon the departure of the 1st Marines from Quang Tri Province, the Army's 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) assumed control of the Kentucky and Napoleon-Saline areas of operation. Composed of the 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry; 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry (Mechanized); and 1st Battalion, 77th Armored Regiment, Colonel Richard J. Glikes' brigade was reorganized at Fort Carson, Colorado in late March for movement to Vietnam.** After months of training, the brigade's main body began moving on 22 July, and by the 31st the brigade had completed the movement of personnel from Fort Carson to Da Nang and then to Quang Tri. At Da Nang, the brigade off-loaded 148 armored personnel carriers and 67 tanks which were then transshipped to Wunder Beach, southeast of Quang Tri City.

Glikes' brigade originally was to assume the area of operations then assigned to the Army's 1st Cavalry Division, and possibly a portion of the Napoleon-Saline area. But because of enemy pressure and the approaching monsoon season, the 3d Marine Division ordered a realignment of forces and changes in areas of operations. The brigade, in conjunction with the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, would assume responsibility for a reduced Kentucky and Napoleon-Saline area of operation. The remaining portion of the sector was to be given to the 2d ARVN Regiment. The 3d Marines would take over a modified Lancaster area of operation, while the 4th Marines retained responsibility for the slightly altered Scotland II area of operations. The 9th Marines, the division's "swing" regiment, would be given the responsibility for a new area of operations, southwest of Quang Tri City.

In addition, General Davis requested that the Seventh Fleet's Amphibious Ready Group 76-4, with its accompanying special landing force be held off shore, near the entrance to the Song Cua Viet. The landing

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* At Da Nang, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines, which had moved south in late May to participate in operations during "Mini-Tet" in the Elephant Valley, northwest of Da Nang, rejoined its parent regiment on 7 September. The same day, the 1st Marines passed operational control of the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines to Regimental Landing Team (RLT) 27. See Chapter 19 relative to the arrival of the 1st Marines and departure of the 27th Marines at Da Nang.

** Included as part of the 24,500 additional military personnel spaces approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for deployment to Southeast Asia in 1968, was a 4,769-man mechanized brigade (separate) requested by U.S. Army, Vietnam. The mechanized brigade was to replace the 1st Marines who, in turn, would replace RLT 27. MACV ComdHist, 1968, pp. 225-228. See also Chapter 27.
force was to be prepared to assume responsibility for the Napoleon-Saline area of operations on six-hours notice. General Cushman approved the request and asked the task force commander to place a hold on the movement of the amphibious ready group.

The shift of forces in Quang Tri Province was part of a general realignment of units then taking place in Northern I Corps Tactical Zone. In early June, MACV undertook a study to determine the feasibility and desirability of reassigning tactical responsibilities within I Corps, a continuation of the long-range force deployment planning study, “Military Posture, Northern I Corps, 1 September 1968,” submitted on 31 March 1968. The March study expressed the desirability of having the two Marine divisions operate in contiguous areas, areas which included deep-water port facilities and existing Marine logistic installations. Over the next several months the proposals contained in the March study were refined, and in June the MACV study group suggested that the 1st and 3rd Marine Divisions be assigned the three southern provinces of I Corps under III MAF, while the 23rd Infantry (Americal) Division and 101st Airborne Division be given the northern two provinces of the corps tactical zone.

While the proposal had a number of obvious tactical and logistical advantages, there were a number of drawbacks. First, if such a readjustment were to take place, the Army would, in all probability, create another field force that would report directly to MACV. More importantly, Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, as Commanding General, I Corps Tactical Zone, would be placed in the position of having to deal with two separate and competing commands within the zone, each of which reported directly to MACV. The proposed transplacement of Army and Marine units within I Corps, however, would be quashed for the moment by General Cushman with the support of Lieutenant General Rosson, who at the time was still Provisional Corps commander. In a message at the end of June, General Cushman observed that “Gen Rosson continues to share my views [and] . . . that current command relationships and projected troop dispositions should not be disturbed at this crucial period of the conflict . . . . However, if COMUSMACV decides to transplace . . . the earliest practical time to consider changes of this nature is late spring 1969.”

General Chapman, the Marine Corps Commandant, noted that the Marines would acquiesce to the plan only if “CG, III MAF retains overall command of U.S. forces in ICTZ for the purpose of facilitating coordination with ARVN, CORDS and the advisory effort, and for coordinating tactical operations.”

As a collateral result of the proposed transplacement of Army and Marine units within I Corps was the approval in early August of the exchange of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, under the operational control of the 101st Airborne Division, with the 101st’s own 3d Brigade, then operating in III Corps. Conversion, involving the formation of two new companies per battalion of the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne to a separate light infantry brigade, was to be completed before the exchange, scheduled to take place in September or October.

While Lieutenant Colonel George F. Meyers’ 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, split between two positions on the Song Cua Viet and outposts at C–4 and Oceanview, continued a vigorous program of patrols and ambushes throughout the Napoleon-Saline area of operations, elements of Colonel Glikes’ 1st Brigade concentrated on company and platoon patrols in Leatherneck Square, that area bounded by Con Thien, Gio Linh, Dong Ha, and Cam Lo. On 4 September, a platoon from Company A, 61st Mechanized Infantry was sent to the relief of Company M, 9th Marines, engaged in battle with a reinforced NVA company in bunkers west of Con Thien. Joined by a reaction force from Company C, 61st Infantry, and supported by artillery and airstrikes, the combined Marine and Army force fought back. In the two-and-one-half hour battle that followed, the American units reported killing more than 20 enemy soldiers. Friendly losses were placed at 6 killed and 55 wounded, the majority as a result of enemy rocket-propelled grenade hits on armored personnel carriers. Darkness and typhoon warnings prevented further exploitation of the battle area.

Beginning late on 4 September, the rains came to Quang Tri Province and the Marine command took precautions to prepare for Typhoon Bess. First MAW units in Quang Tri either secured their helicopters or flew them to safe areas away from the storm. Other Marines sandbagged the collections of Southeast Asia huts with their tin roofs and other structures that characterized U.S. bases in the province. These preparations together with the expected heavy downpours and high winds greatly hampered military operations.

The typhoon struck the coast of northern I Corps between Da Nang and Phu Bai on the afternoon of the 5th. As the rains and wind began to subside, the
A member of the 9th Marines operating near the DMZ bunches up as best he can under his poncho to protect himself from the torrential rains that struck Quang Tri Province in September.

typhoon instead of moving on shore and dissipating, had moved back to sea and was rapidly regaining strength. During the night of the 5th and the early morning hours of the 6th, Typhoon Bess began slowly to move up the South Vietnamese coastline. At a point almost due east of Hue, the typhoon plunged ashore with heavy rains and strong winds.

Slamming into the mountains, west of Hue, late in the day, the typhoon began to dissipate and by late afternoon, Bess was relegated to a tropical storm. But as the typhoon roared across northern I Corps, Bess dropped torrents of rain, collapsing tents and bunkers, and flooding much of the low-lying areas of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Disaster relief operations initiated by the division took priority over all other activities not directly related to combat support.

Although the torrential rains sharply curtailed both allied and enemy ground combat activity, it did not halt future planning. Due to steadily increasing enemy ground, artillery, and mortar activity along the eastern half of the DMZ, south of the Ben Hai, the 3d Marine Division again proposed a one-day raid into the zone, scheduled for 12 September. The plan called for Colonel Glikes' 1st Brigade to conduct an armored attack to the Ben Hai, composed of three task forces: one tank heavy, one mechanized infantry heavy, and an armored cavalry force. As before, the armored attack was to exploit B-52 Arclight strikes. To the brigade's east, Lieutenant Colonel Giai's 2d ARVN Regiment would also launch an armor attack into the Demilitarized Zone. Both forces were to withdraw to positions south of the zone before darkness.

As Glikes' forces prepared for the DMZ strike, the enemy resumed artillery, rocket, and mortar attacks on allied installations throughout Quang Tri Province, following a three-day lull brought about by Typhoon Bess. In addition, small groups of enemy began to be sighted along the DMZ. On the 8th, Companies A and C, 61st Infantry, dismounted, and Company B, 11th Infantry assaulted into three landing zones, eight kilometers northwest of Cam Lo. Meeting no resistance in the landing zones, the companies attacked to the southwest the following day, encountering only a few pockets of enemy resistance.

Shortly after noon on 11 September, Company D, 11th Infantry engaged an enemy force of unknown strength occupying bunkers near the "Market Place," four kilometers northeast of Con Thien. The company called for Marine tactical airstrikes against the enemy, followed by artillery. A platoon of tanks from the 1st Battalion, 77th Armor moved up to reinforce. At 1830 the enemy attempted to break contact, but the artillery hampered the enemy withdrawal. Fixed in position by the heavy shelling, one group of enemy raised a white flag. The American gunners ceased fire momentarily to allow the group to surrender. Instead the North Vietnamese broke and ran and the artillery barrage resumed. A later sweep of the area revealed more than 40 enemy bodies. Of seven enemy soldiers captured, one identified his unit as belonging to the 27th Independent NVA Regiment, a unit identified in frequent contacts with allied forces in the area since March.

On 10 September, General Abrams informed General Davis that the proposed allied raids into the Demilitarized Zone had been approved and that two Arclight strikes would be provided. Preceded by the pre-planned B-52 strikes and a 55-minute artillery and naval gunfire barrage of the objective area, the attacking force moved into the DMZ on the morning of 13 September. Two 1st Brigade reinforced company-size task forces, one tank heavy and the other mechanized infantry heavy, attacked on an axis to the northeast of Con Thien. A third brigade task force, armored cavalry heavy, moved into position five kilometers west of Gio Linh. Lieutenant Colonel Giai's 2d Battalion,
with the 1st Squadron, 7th ARVN Armored Cavalry, supported by two platoons from Company A, 3d Tank Battalion, simultaneously attacked to the north and northeast of A-2 and Gio Linh.

South Vietnamese infantry troops on the right flank achieved almost immediate contact. Providing a base of fire for the advancing ARVN infantry, Marine tanks, firing 90mm canister and high-explosive rounds, led the assault, killing a reported 73 North Vietnamese troops. Contact was so close at times that Marine tankers were forced to use machine gun, as well as main gun fire, to break through the enemy's defenses and reach their objective.27 Following in the wake of the tanks, and supported by helicopter gunships, the ARVN infantry claimed to have killed an additional 68 enemy and captured one NVA soldier. On the left flank, after encountering mines and antitank fire, the three Army task forces soon joined the action, accounting for another reported 35 dead enemy soldiers and seizing a large cache of mortar rounds.28 The allied forces reached their northernmost objectives, turned south, and returned to their bases by late afternoon.

Demoralized and unable to defend against yet another combined ground and massive supporting arms attack, the enemy withdrew northward. The captured North Vietnamese soldier identified his unit as an element of the 138th NVA Regiment. He further indicated that the 138th Regiment had assumed control of the 27th Independent Regiment's area of operations, due to the heavy casualties suffered by the regiment in recent months.29

On 20 September, continuing the mission of denying the enemy freedom of action and movement throughout the Kentucky area of operations, Colonel Glikes' brigade began a series of search and clear operations in the Khe Chua Valley, eight kilometers north of Cam Lo. While elements of the 1st Battalion, 61st Infantry occupied blocking positions stretching for 2,000 meters at the head of the valley, Companies B and C, 77th Armor moved from positions at C–2 Bridge and C–4, along Route 561, and swept up the valley toward the 61st's blocking positions.30 During the next three days, the units cleared the valley of small enemy units that could threaten not only nearby brigade outposts, but also Cam Lo. At the same time, the Army troops discovered and destroyed several large enemy tunnel complexes.

Heavy monsoon rains during the later part of September had swollen the Ben Bai, forcing remnants of the 320th NVA Division and independent regiments northward across the river. Intelligence, however, indicated that some groups had been trapped in the south by the rising water. Despite the weather, Companies B, C, and D, 11th Infantry moved out from C–2 and C–2 Bridge at 0400 on the morning of 26 September. In coordination with the 2d and 3d Battalions, 2d ARVN Regiment, and the 3d Marines, the companies moved to a position west of Con Thien and then attacked north across the southern boundary of the DMZ, toward the Dong Be Lao mountain complex.

During an eight-day foray into the DMZ, the attacking elements of the 11th Infantry encountered no opposition. What few engagements took place were with the enemy's rear guard, which attempted to slow the advance. Searches of numerous bunkers and other complexes indicated that the enemy had abandoned the positions only recently. In his hasty retreat the enemy left behind numerous poorly concealed booby-traps and mines, and several large caches of ammunition and equipment which were destroyed by advancing forces. From all indications what enemy troops had been in the area had withdrawn north across the Ben Hai to the relative safety of North Vietnam.31

The battleship New Jersey (BB 62), arrived on station, off the DMZ, on 29 September, and fired her first mission in support of division and ARVN troops the following day. The arrival of the New Jersey considerably enhanced the range and destructive power of fire support available to the division. Her nine 16-inch guns could each hurl a 2,760-pound shell to a maximum range of more than 38,000 meters, exceeding the range of a cruiser's 8-inch gun by 9,000 meters.

By the end of September enemy forces normally positioned along the eastern DMZ had withdrawn north of the Ben Hai, possibly into North Vietnam. The enemy had not been able, because of continued Army, Marine, and ARVN pressure, to initiate any portion of his planned Autumn Offensive. His attacks by fire and attempts at interdicting friendly lines of communication continued. Allied installations and tactical units in the northern portion of the province received periodic mortar, artillery, and rocket attacks. The heaviest attack occurred on 3 October when elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment received 170 rounds of 105mm artillery fire while engaged in a search and clear operation northeast of Gio Linh.

In addition, enemy sappers continued in their attempts to deny friendly forces the use of the Cua Viet. There were several instances when Navy patrol craft were hit by rocket propelled grenades, small arms, and automatic weapons fire from the banks of the river. Although the Navy continually swept the river for
mines, mining incidents along the vital waterway continued.

In October the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel George F. Meyers, maintained security of the Cua Viet waterway and conducted numerous patrols, cordons, and sweeps in the Napoleon-Saline area of operations. North of Lieutenant Colonel Meyers' battalion, elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment continued reconnaissance-in-force operations in the vicinity of A-1 and Gio Linh. To the west, in the Kentucky area of operations, Colonel Glikes' 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) emphasized offensive actions away from fixed positions, focusing on the enemy rather than terrain, employing infantry/armed task forces.

The first significant ground contact occurred on the 11th, when a brigade mechanized infantry and tank force, composed of Companies B and C, 61st Infantry and Company B, 77th Armor, engaged an estimated platoon of well-entrenched NVA troops. From heavily fortified bunkers, 2,500 meters northeast of Con Thien, the enemy effectively employed rocket-propelled grenades and 60mm mortars, crippling three tanks and one armored personnel carrier (APC). Mines disabled another two tanks and one APC, killing a total of 3 and wounding 20 brigade troops. Fighting back with 90mm tank, artillery, and small arms fire, the companies swept through the area after five hours of battle and counted 26 North Vietnamese bodies.

Heavy monsoon rains again fell throughout the area during mid-October, curtailing both ground and air operations. On 15 October, nevertheless, elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment engaged an estimated enemy company, four kilometers east of Gio Linh. Artillery, gunships, and Marine tactical air supported the ARVN infantrymen. One troop of the 11th ARVN Armored Cavalry moved up to reinforce, but was delayed due to the water-logged ground. Fighting continued throughout the 15th and into the next day. On the morning of 16 October, the 1st and 3d Troops, 11th Cavalry joined with the ARVN infantry, and by noon the enemy force now estimated at battalion-size was supported by artillery and mortar fire. The proximity of the opposing forces prohibited the use of airstrikes and the ARVN, like their opponent, relied heavily on accurate artillery fire. When the enemy force, thought to be an element of the 138th NVA Regiment, broke contact at the end of the day, it had suffered more than a reported 105 killed in two days of fighting, while the ARVN units sustained 5 killed.

Marines from the 3d Marine Division visiting the New Jersey (BB 62) watch as the 16-inch guns of the battleship blast North Vietnamese positions near the DMZ.

Photo from the Abel Collection
South of the ARVN encounter on the 16th, in the Napoleon-Saline area of operations, Lieutenant Colonel Meyers' battalion assumed operational control of BLT 2/26. The following day, the battalion landing team cordoned the Xuan Khanh Resettlement Hamlet, five kilometers northeast of Cua Viet, in conjunction with a sweep and search of the hamlet by elements of the Vietnamese Coastal Group 11, National Police, and the local Marine Combined Action company. While detaining no villagers, the Marines evacuated two civilians for medical treatment. Before returning to its control of Company H, 9th Marines, which unit, LVTs transported to Outpost C-4, five kilometers northeast of Cua Viet. The following morning Company H, supported by tanks and amtracs, moved up the coast and took up blocking positions in the vicinity of Ha Loi Trung, within one kilometer of the southern boundary of the DMZ.

In preparation for the strike, on 21 October, Lieutenant Colonel Meyers' battalion assumed operational control of Company H, 9th Marines, which unit, LVTs transported to Outpost C-4, five kilometers northeast of Cua Viet. The following morning Company H, supported by tanks and amtracs, moved up the coast and took up blocking positions in the vicinity of Ha Loi Trung, within one kilometer of the southern boundary of the DMZ.

At 0800 on 23 October, elements of the 2d ARVN Regiment attacked on two axes into the DMZ, north of Ha Loi Trung. The main attack, led by the 1st Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment, supported by two troops of the 11th ARVN Armored Cavalry and a platoon of tanks from Company C, 3d Tank Battalion, moved across the boundary, approximately two kilometers from the coast. Three kilometers to the west, the secondary attack, led by the 2d Battalion, 2d ARVN Regiment, supported by Company H, 9th Marines and a platoon of tanks from Company A, 3d Tank Battalion, was launched. By noon, the two ARVN and Marine task forces were not only heavily engaged, but also had trapped an enemy unit of undetermined size between their positions and the sea. With artillery, U.S. Army gunships, and naval gunfire reinforcing friendly tank fire, the combined tank and infantry assault swept through the area, killing a reported 112 enemy soldiers, 63 of whom were credited to the tank crewmen of Company A. By dusk, the enemy broke contact and what remained of the North Vietnamese unit escaped further up the coast.

On the same day, attacking north from A–3 and Con Thien into the DMZ and then eastward along the Ben Hai toward the site of the Marine and ARVN action, the brigade task force, composed of three companies of the dismounted 1st Battalion, 61st Mechanized Infantry, encountered only light resistance. As the task force continued eastward during the 24th, through Kinh Mon, Tan Mon, and An Xa along an abandoned railroad, Company A engaged an enemy platoon, reporting another seven NVA killed. At 0830 the following morning, Company A reestablished contact, this time with an estimated enemy battalion in well-fortified bunkers. Minutes later, Company B took a volley of heavy small arms and mortar fire. By 1030 the engaged companies had linked up, and while Company A attacked to the northeast against the enemy's flank, Company B assaulted and overran the enemy position, capturing one 82mm mortar, two 60mm mortars, and two .50-caliber antiaircraft weapons. Both companies, later reinforced by Company B, 77th Armor, remained in contact until 1800, during which time they made maximum use of air, artillery, and naval gunfire support. As a result of the action, the Americans reported 231 enemy dead. Brigade losses were 4 killed and 24 wounded. The task force withdrew southward on the 26th and during the remainder of the month, brigade troops continued to exploit minor contacts north of A–3 and recover their destroyed and damaged tanks in the DMZ.

Despite the destruction of major elements of the 138th and 270th NVA Regiments, the victory was cause for concern. The reappearance of these two regiments in northeast Quang Tri Province, after suffering heavy casualties in several engagements during the past three months, not only confirmed their capacity to regroup rapidly and assimilate replacements, but also attested to both their flexibility and their maneuverability in frequently attacking and then withdrawing across the Ben Hai.
The combined ARVN, U.S. Army, and Marine attack into the Demilitarized Zone during the last week of October would be the last. Effective 2100 hours, 1 November, Saigon time, as announced by President Lyndon Johnson, the United States would cease all offensive operations against the territory of North Vietnam. The halt in no way applied to offensive operations within the Republic of Vietnam, but it did apply to offensive operations north of the Demilitarized Zone's southern boundary. The pre-November rules of engagement authorizing operations by ground forces in the DMZ south of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line were now revoked. However, General Abrams later sought authority, and gained approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to send squad-size patrols into the southern portion of the DMZ to "capture prisoners and obtain other positive proof that the NVA rather than the VC are operating in the southern portion of the DMZ." What these patrols would find would be disturbing.

Defeat of the 320th Division

Unlike the Napoleon-Saline and Kentucky areas of operations at the beginning of August, the Lancaster II and Scotland II areas remained relatively quiet. Colonel Edward J. Miller's 4th Marines continued extensive company patrol operations throughout the central portion of the Scotland area of operations with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Galbraith's 1st Battalion searching the jungle canopy 10 kilometers west of LZ Stud. The battalion also retained responsibility for security operations in the immediate area of the combat base. Lieutenant Colonel Louis A. Rann's 2d Battalion operated out of Fire Support Base Cates and the 3d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Bourne, Jr., operated out of Fire Support Base Shepherd.

To the east, in the Lancaster area of operations, the 3d Marines, under the command of Colonel Richard L. Michael, Jr., continued to conduct search and destroy operations and to provide security for Thon Son Lam, Camp Carroll, and Route 9. Lieutenant Colonel Charles V. Jarman's 1st Battalion provided security for the Marine installation at Thon Son Lam, Khe Gio Bridge, and conducted company patrols and daily road sweeps of Route 9. The 2d Battalion, under Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Davis, secured not only Thon Son Lam, but Camp Carroll, Dong Ha Mountain Observation Post, and the battalion's assigned portion of Route 9. Commanded by Lieutenant Colonel William H. Bates, who, on 28 July, had replaced Lieutenant Colonel James W. Marsh, the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines continued anti-infiltration operations from Fire Support Bases Margo and Joan, northwest of Camp Carroll.

To the south of the Lancaster area, lay a small area of operations in the Ba Long Valley, carved out of the east portion of the Scotland area and western portion of that assigned to the 1st Air Cavalry Division, being swept by Colonel Robert H. Barrow's 9th Marines. Originally planned as a multi-battalion sweep of the long fertile valley, which extends west from Quang Tri City to LZ Stud, the 9th Marines soon lost Lieutenant Colonel Francis X. Colleton's 1st Battalion to the defensive needs of both LZ Stud, now renamed Vandegrift Combat Base, and Ca Lu, and Lieutenant Colonel Frederic S. Knight's 2d Battalion to a competing operation in Leatherneck Square.

On 2 August, following a 48-hour delay due to a lack of helicopter transports, Company I, 3d Battalion, 9th Marines under Captain Gary E. Todd, was helilifted onto Hill 385, 12 kilometers southeast of Ca Lu. After the infantry company had established a defensive perimeter and had the artillery register supporting fires, Marine helicopters brought in the following day an engineer detachment and its equipment to begin construction of a new fire base there, Fire Support Base Holcomb. As Captain Todd later remarked, "the engineers couldn't contribute much until we established security." In the meantime, other helicopters had inserted Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. LaMontagne, the 3d Battalion commander, and his command group and two rifle companies into the Cua Valley, or Mai Loc area, to the north, who initiated a sweep south along Route 558 toward Holcomb and the Ba Long Valley.

The construction of Holcomb was, as Colonel Barrow recalled, a new experience for the regiment:

We went about it in a very methodical, carefully planned manner. We reconnoitered with the engineers, who would have a large hand in building it; the artillery, who would have to shoot from it; the infantry, who would have to defend it; and helicopter personnel, who, of course, would have to use it to resupply and build up the forces.

Following two days of air preparation, which included the dropping of several "daisy cutters," the Marines occupied the hill, and infantry and engineers working side by side using demolitions, chain saw, and
hand tools, cleared the site. A bulldozer was then brought in to build ammunition berms and gun pits, later to be occupied by Battery F, 12th Marines and elements of the 1st Provisional 155mm Howitzer Battery. Captain Todd remembered that as soon as the bulldozer arrived, "the artillery position quickly began taking shape" after relatively slow progress by hand until that time. The building of Holcomb was, Barrow concluded, "rather amusing because we almost over-killed the effort with detail planning. But it was an experience that led us into refining our techniques."

During the next 13 days, LaMontagne's Marines swept through the rice paddies and cornfields that dotted the valley floor and into the double-canopied jungle that covered the high ground to the north and south of the valley. LaMontagne temporarily closed Fire Support Base Holcomb as the battalion began construction of Fire Support Base Henderson, five kilometers to the southwest. The lack of contact and any evidence to indicate recent enemy activity brought the Base Long Valley operation to a close on 16 August. The battalion then abandoned the two fire support bases and returned to Vandegrift Combat Base.

Reconnaissance patrols operating north of Route 9 in the Lancaster and Scotland areas of operation reported a dramatic upsurge in enemy activity during the first two weeks of August. In the region around Helicopter Valley, south of the DMZ, patrols sighted numerous small bands of enemy troops moving south, indicating that the area was either a much-used infiltration route or the possible site of several enemy base camps. The area further west, and north of the Rockpile, also witnessed an increase in enemy activity. A document captured by one patrol in the area indicated that elements of the 52d Regiment, 320th NVA Division had moved into the region recently. The Khe Sanh plateau and the mountains west of Thon Son Lam and Ca Lu likewise were sites of increased enemy activity.

Taken together, these indicators pointed to the fact that following several abortive attempts in the coastal flatlands during the first half of the year, the division's three infantry regiments again were moving south through the DMZ and into the mountains north and west of the Rockpile, toward prepositioned caches of equipment and supplies.

Colonel Michael's 3d Marines was the first to establish contact with the forward elements of the enemy division. On 4 August, while conducting a two-company sweep on the southern slope of Dong Ha Mountain, Lieutenant Colonel Davis' battalion uncovered a 20-bunker complex just north of the Cam Lo River. The following day, Davis' battalion was joined in the area by three companies of Lieutenant Colonel Bates' 3d Battalion which assaulted into landing zones near Cam Hung, five kilometers further north. During the next seven days, elements of both battalions discovered and destroyed more than 400 newly constructed bunkers and captured large quantities of enemy equipment and munitions.

On 12 August, a North Vietnamese sergeant belonging to the 7th Battalion, 64th Regiment, 320th Division rallied to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines at Con Thien. He informed the Marines that his regiment had crossed the DMZ in the vicinity of Bay Nha, seven kilometers west of Con Thien, and would move south along Mutter Ridge to Co Dinh within three days. From there, the enemy planned to move southeast toward Cam Lo and Route 9. With the confirmation of the sergeant's information by aerial and ground intelligence, elements of Colonel Michael's regiment deployed rapidly to block the enemy.

On the 13th, Companies B, C, and D, 3d Marines assaulted into Landing Zones Amy and Mack at the western end of Mutter Ridge. Finding little activity in the area, the three companies, on the morning of the 15th, moved by helicopter to Landing Zone Dick, six kilometers further east. Lieutenant Colonel Davis' 2d Battalion simultaneously began deploying north, while Lieutenant Colonel Bates' 3d Battalion moved into blocking positions centered on the Dong Kio Mountain complex. As Davis' Marines moved north of the Cam Lo River, sporadic sniper and occasional automatic weapons fire soon turned into a full-scale engagement. The Marine companies had run headlong into two companies from the 64th's 8th Battalion entrenched on Kho Xa, one-half kilometer north of the river. The Marines reported 43 of the enemy killed during this initial engagement.

On 16 August, in a further effort to cordon elements of the enemy regiment, the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Twohey, who had replaced Lieutenant
Colonel Jarman, moved by helicopter to Hill 162, northwest of the supposed enemy position. With Twohey's Marines blocking enemy movement to the north, Bates' battalion occupying positions to the northwest, and Davis' troops pushing from the south, the forward elements of the enemy regiment could only turn east or west. If they did so, batteries of the 12th Marines located at Thon Son Lam, Camp Carroll, and C-2 could seal off the enemy's movement in either direction.

Learning that the assault by Twohey's battalion had split the 64th Regiment, General Davis decided to commit the 9th Marines in an effort to halt any attempt by the regiment to reinforce its forward elements. Early on the morning of the 17th, Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne's 3d Battalion helo-assaulted into Landing Zone Sparrow, nine kilometers southwest of Con Thien and the site of the battalion's 17 July engagement.* Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's 1st Battalion landed at LZ Saturn, three kilometers west of C-2, later that morning, and with elements of Company A, 3d Tank Battalion in direct support, moved west. But as Colleton's Marines left the open, rolling terrain and entered the canopy, where the tanks found it impossible to maneuver, the tank company returned to C-2.

With Colleton's battalion moving west toward the 3d Battalion, LaMontagne's Marines began a series of intense and aggressive company-size patrols throughout its assigned area of search. While on patrol near Sparrow on the morning of the 19th, Captain Richard A. O'Neil's Company M surprised and engaged a squad of North Vietnamese soldiers with small arms fire as well as artillery and airstrikes. As the enemy reinforced, swelled his tanks to two companies, LaMontagne ordered Captain Jack D. Schaeffer's Company K to join O'Neil's Marines. During Schaeffer's reinforcement of O'Neil, enemy ground fire hit and destroyed a Marine F-4 Phantom flying in support of the two companies. Both pilots ejected and were later rescued. A sweep of the battle area resulted in a reported 38 enemy bodies and miscellaneous weapons and equipment. The Marines also captured two enemy soldiers from the 7th Battalion, 64th Regiment.

Two days later, on the 21st, Captain Gary E. Todd's Company I, while on patrol one kilometer west of Company M's contact on the 19th, encountered an enemy unit of undetermined size. Using artillery and airstrike to the maximum extent possible, Todd's Marines forced the enemy to break contact leaving 14 dead behind. During a sweep of the area, the Marines of Company I discovered a large enemy complex containing 60 well-constructed bunkers, a mess area, and laundry hanging out to dry. On 23 August, helicopters returned Company I and the remainder of the battalion to Vandegrift Combat Base.

While Company I was engaged west of Lang Dong Bao Thuong on 19 August, Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's battalion assaulted into three landing zones, two kilometers further west, leap-frogging over LaMontagne's Marines. Moving toward the high ground, within one kilometer of the DMZ's southern boundary, a patrol from First Lieutenant Stephen E. Stacy's Company B encountered an enemy company armed with small arms, automatic weapons, and 60mm mortars. Within minutes an aerial observer arrived on station and called in air and artillery strikes. But as darkness fell, the patrol was unable to break contact and return to the company's main position, 600 meters away. Early the following morning, a misdirected fixed-wing airstrike resulted in the wounding of 10 other Marines, part of a relief force attempting to make its way to the patrol's position. The first patrol eventually rejoined the company, but was forced to leave its dead on the battlefield. Lieutenant Stacy's company, on the 24th, recovered the bodies of seven Marines and one Marine earlier reported as missing. The following day, Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's battalion rejoined the regiment at Vandegrift Combat Base.**

Although the 9th Marines reported 72 enemy soldiers killed in eight days, Colonel Barrow believed that the 64th NVA Regiment lost many more. "I believe very much," he later stated, "that we killed a great many more because we had an unusual operation in which the 1st Battalion, 9th was on a narrow ridgeline and brought under heavy attack from within the DMZ and we responded with massive air, artillery, and mortar fire on forces that were observed by the AOs as being massed and large in number, and we brought great devastation on the area, on these forces." Although unable to enter the DMZ and confirm enemy casualties, Barrow believed, "that our activities in that area

**Colonel Thomas H. Galbraith, who commanded the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines at the time, commented "What happened to Stacy's patrol was the kind of thing we constantly worried about. Simply getting food, water, and ammo to small units that were operating any distance from an LZ was difficult, and getting help to them in a timely manner when they were in trouble was sometimes almost impossible. Supporting arms and air were the best you could hope for, and, of course, if the weather was bad, you couldn't count on air." Galbraith Comments.
deal that regiment a pretty severe blow, far beyond the confirmed body count.”

While Colonel Barrow’s 1st and 3d Battalions were heavily engaged to the north, Colonel Michael’s 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Twohey, continued to sweep south down Mutter Ridge, finding numerous platoon- and company-sized bunker complexes. Each find led to a more sophisticated one further south. The most significant finds were an enemy supply battalion’s storage area and what appeared to be a regimental command post. The supply cache included more than 1,000 82mm mortar rounds and close to 15,000 AK-47 rounds. In the regimental complex, the Marines found numerous ammunition storage bunkers, messhalls, kitchens, several 60mm and 82mm mortar positions, and an extensive Chinese-built field phone communications system.

On 19 August, Lieutenant Colonel Twohey’s battalion continued southwest along Mutter Ridge while Lieutenant Colonel Davis’ 2d Battalion swept west through Helicopter Valley, between Dong Ha Mountain and Mutter Ridge. At the same time, Lieutenant Colonel Bates’ 3d Battalion moved four kilometers northwest of the Rockpile to the Razorback, a large sharp ridgeline paralleling the Cam Lo River. With two companies conducting company-sized patrol operations on either side of the river, Bates’ Marines engaged numerous small enemy groups in short, but sharp encounters, and frequently came under heavy artillery and mortar fire. With the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines in place, blocking the western end of both Mutter Ridge and Helicopter Valley, Marine helicopters lifted the 1st and 2d Battalions, once they had completed their searches, to Thon Son Lam and Camp Carroll for refurbishment.

During the last week of August, the enemy was once more on the move. He not only increased his artillery and rocket attacks against Thon Son Lam and Camp Carroll, but the large number of contacts and sightings indicated he had entered the upper Cam Lo Valley, north of Thon Son Lam and northwest of Dong Ha Mountain. With this information in hand, General Davis decided to insert the 1st and 2d Battalions, 9th Marines west of the 3d Battalion, 3d Marines positions, into a rugged, jungle-covered, mountainous region never before entered by Marines in force.

Prior to the insertion of the two battalions, Marine aircraft dropped a large quantity of heavy ordnance to
create landing zones on the ridgelines. The idea was to facilitate entry on the high ground instead of the low, but it did not succeed. On the morning of 27 August, Lieutenant Colonel Knight's 2d Battalion lifted into three dispersed landing zones along the Suoi Tien Hien Valley floor, six kilometers west of the Rockpile, and immediately encountered stiff resistance. The flight of helicopters carrying Captain Joel D. Ward's Company E, as it approached the proposed landing zone near the river, received a heavy volume of ground fire. Enemy gunners shot down one CH-46 in the zone and damaged two others but there were no Marine casualties. While employing Marine UH-1E gunships in an attempt to suppress enemy fire in the zone, however, Ward's Marines were hit with a pod of rockets, resulting in two killed and two wounded.

Unlike elements of Knight's battalion, the insertion of Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's battalion into the broad Khe Giang Thoan Valley, southwest of the Rockpile, was unopposed. Once in the area of operations, the two battalions immediately moved up the ridges and secured positions on the high ground. The Marines established Fire Support Base Sandy atop the needle-point pinnacle, Dong Khe Soc, seven kilometers west of the Rockpile, to support the two battalions. Sandy, because of its size, could only accommodate one battery of 105mm howitzers, but it was the first of many that would be constructed throughout the area.

As September began, Lieutenant Colonel Bates' 3d Battalion, 3d Marines found itself heavily engaged with elements of the enemy's 52d NVA Regiment, attempting a reinforcing thrust north and northwest of the Razorback. On the 3d, the enemy shelled Captain William B. Gray's Company L with 172 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortars and 25 rounds of 130mm artillery. Immediately following the enemy artillery preparation, two companies of NVA troops assaulted the Marine company's position. But, before the enemy had an opportunity to open fire, Ward's Marines pelted the enemy force with more than 300 hand grenades. A search of the area revealed a reported 11 enemy bodies and 19 weapons, three of which were machine guns that had been fired.
Companies B and C, 3d Marines reentered the area of operations on 3 September, and the following day began search and destroy operations west and then south along the slopes of Mutter Ridge. Four days later, after the torrential rains of Typhoon Bess had eased, the remaining two companies of the 1st Battalion were helilifted onto the ridge to assist, while Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion secured and established blocking positions on the high ground to the west. As Lieutenant Colonel Twohey's 1st Battalion Marines moved southwest, they increasingly came into contact with the forward elements of the 48th NVA Regiment which were endeavoring to reinforce the scattered remnants of the 52d. Late, on the 7th, First Lieutenant Richard A. Andrews' Company A encountered an enemy squad in bunkers on the southern slope of Hill 461. The company immediately formed a defensive position, but the enemy unit continually probed its lines throughout the night. A check of the area at first light revealed an assortment of miscellaneous equipment and arms, but no enemy bodies. Andrews' Marines lost three killed and an equal number of wounded during the engagement. The most significant contact began on the 8th as Company A and the rest of the battalion continued to move up Hill 461. An estimated two companies from the 48th Regiment, from well-camouflaged bunkers, tenaciously defended themselves using 60mm and 82mm mortar and 130mm artillery supporting fires. As Twohey's Marines pressed on, the enemy counterattacked twice, first on the 10th and then on the 11th, when they attempted to employ a double envelopment of Company B. During the three-day battle, the enemy regiment lost an estimated 50 killed and numerous weapons captured.

While Twohey's battalion moved slowly through the triple canopy toward the northwest, Lieutenant Colonel Knight's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines turned its attention to two large hill masses southwest of the Rockpile, Nui Tia Pong and Nui Ba Lao.

The battalion's search of the Suoi Tien Hien Valley had not proved fruitful. There were no trails nor evidence of the enemy which had fired on the battalion from the high ground to the northeast of the valley in late August. Knight decided to split the battalion. He placed Bravo Command Group and Companies E and H on the Nui Ba Lao ridgeline and directed them to attack east. Alpha Command Group and Companies F and G were lifted out of the valley, inserted into landing zones on eastern slopes of Nui Tia Pong, and ordered to attack west up the mountain.

Both elements made contact shortly after entering their new landing zones, the most significant occurring on Nui Tia Pong. As the two rifle companies, alternating in the attack, slowly moved up the narrow ridge, punctuated with peaks and saddles, from the 200-meter level to the first prominent high ground at 800 meters, they encountered a small but determined, well-dug in enemy force. "It was difficult fighting," recalled Colonel Barrow, "there was no opportunity for maneuver because you could not attempt any sort of enveloping movement because the terrain was so precipitous. So it was a masterful use of firepower and moving straight ahead against the resistance." While suffering few casualties of their own, the companies inflicted a damaging blow upon the defending enemy force.

Once atop Nui Tia Pong, the heavy rains associated with Typhoon Bess struck, cutting off resupply to the two companies for several days. According to Barrow:

> We had units down to zero availability rations; they tightened their belts. They conserved their rations and had no problem with water, of course. It was an experience in learning how to endure the monsoon-type weather in this very inhospitable terrain, and they did it well.

As soon as the heavy rains ended, Companies F and G moved down off the ridge, searching the fingers and finding numerous small ordnance and ration caches. On 8 September, in an effort to increase troop density, Marine helicopters brought in Company C, 9th Marines. The pattern of search during the next several days had one company ahead, moving up the ridgeline to the west, pushing the enemy back, while the remaining two companies searched the fingers off the ridgeline and, when required, alternated with the lead company. This pattern of company search would continue as the regiment moved further north.

On 9 September, as the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines prepared to leave the Khe Giang Thoan Valley and return to Vandegrift Combat Base, Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne's 3d Battalion assaulted into Landing Zone Winchester on Dong Tien, six kilometers north of Nui Tia Pong, and immediately developed contact to its east and west. LaMontagne's battalion easily dealt with the enemy forces on its eastern flank, killing more than an estimated 20 NVA, and then threw its weight toward the western flank. As the battalion moved further west, it encountered successive delaying actions by well-dug-in enemy platoons and companies, employing command detonated mines, mortars, and automatic weapons, the same tactics experienced by the 2d Batt-
Top, a covey of Boeing Vertol CH—46s carrying elements of the 4th Marines into a landing zone just south of the DMZ is viewed through the door of one of the helicopters. The outline of the helicopter's machine gun can be seen at the opening. In the bottom photo, Marines in the same operation, now on the ground, wade through a stream whose water comes up to their waists.
talion on Nui Tia Pong. Colonel Barrow later reflected, "our tactics were to employ massive firepower, air, artillery, and mortars, and 106s, and when the area was virtually devastated, move in." He observed, "always there seemed to be enough left for the infantry to have to do a little of its own fighting, but most of it result-
ed in counting confirmed dead." In its drive west, the battalion reported killing more than 200 enemy sol-
diers and uncovered large caches of mortar rounds, Chi-
nese Communist hand grenades, anti-personnel mines, and long-range rockets.

As the 2d and 3d Battalions, 9th Marines pushed westward, the 3d Marines continued in heavy contact north of the Razorback. Lieutenant Colonel Bates' 3d Battalion, with three companies on line, swept through the low ground, northwest of Mutter Ridge, against dug-in enemy troops who resisted with heavy 60mm, 82mm, and artillery fire. Although Bates' Marines reported killing more than 17 enemy, they suffered in turn 8 dead and 87 wounded, most as a result of the enemy's indirect fire.

Replacing Bates' 3d Battalion on 13 September, Lieutenant Colonel William F. Sparks' BLT 2/26 landed at LZ Margo, two kilometers north of Landing Zone Winchester. Three days later, as the battalion's four companies pushed east and then north from the landing zone, a hill overlooking the deep, prominent bend in the Cam Lo River, the command post on Margo underwent a 158-round 82mm mortar barrage at 1520. Despite returning fire initially with machine gun and small arms and then with 81mm mortar and artillery fire in an effort to silence the enemy mortars, the command group suffered 21 killed and 135 wounded. The command post took another 64 rounds two hours later, resulting in 1 killed and 11 wounded. The following day, the command group was again bombarded with 117 mortar rounds and lost another 1 dead and 16 wounded.

The enemy's continued use of delaying tactics such as that employed against the command post of BLT 2/26 and the oftentimes tenacious defense of caches throughout the rest of the area of operations, indicated that the remnants of the three regiments of the 320th NVA Division were endeavoring to gain time in order to make their escape north of the DMZ. "It was appar-
ent," General Davis later wrote, "that the situation was ripe for the lift of two battalions into the DMZ to trap as many of these scattered units as possible." Colonel Barrow noted the idea was "to move south against the enemy that was believed to be between the Ben Hai and Cam Lo." On 16 September, the regimental command post of the 9th Marines displaced from Vandegrift to Landing Zone, now Fire Support Base, Winchester. From Win-
chester, Colonel Barrow would direct the northward deployment of additional Marine battalions and over-
see the destruction of the enemy division. With the movement of the regimental command post forward, the regiment assumed operational control of BLT 2/26 and the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines.

The next morning following nine B-52 Arclight strikes on the DMZ north of the operational area, Lieutenant Colonel Colleton's 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and Lieutenant Colonel Galbraith's 1st Bat-
talion, 4th Marines were inserted into the DMZ, within a kilometer of the Ben Hai River. "The mission which we assigned 1/9 and 1/4," Colonel Barrow recalled, "was to attack on multi-axes to the south in a most deliberate, methodical manner, searching out ridgelines, draws, looking both for the enemy and for any caches which he might have in the area. It was by no means a matter of land and move rapidly to the south. It was to be a deliberate search." Meanwhile, Barrow directed Lieutenant Colonel Sparks' BLT 2/26 to attack rapidly to the north on two axes, one generally in the direction of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines and the other toward the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines.++

Pushing south toward the high ground, the two battalions captured a number of prisoners who con-
firmed that their units were moving north, attempting to cross the Ben Hai and escape into North Vietnam. They also indicated that they were plagued by severe food shortages, low morale, and had been seriously hurt by Arclight strikes. In addition to prisoners, both Col-
leton's and Galbraith's Marines, when not engaging small groups of enemy troops moving north, found a number of mass graves, containing the bodies of more

At 1330 on 17 September, a Marine UH-1E bound for Win-
chester from Vandegrift, hit a tree and crashed 200 meters south of the fire support base. Among the passengers on board the aircraft were Brigadier General William C. Chip, who had replaced Brigadier General Carl W. Hoffman as Commanding General, Task Force Hotel on 22 August, and Lieutenant Colonel Frederic S. Knight, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines. Although injured, both men sur-
vived the crash.
than 150 enemy soldiers, and large stores of arms, ammunition, and food.

The 2d Battalion, 3d Marines, which was operating in an area generally east of Sparks' battalion and south of Galbraith's battalion, was placed under the control of Colonel Barrow's regiment on 19 September. For the next several days, the 9th Marines controlled six battalions, two thirds of the division's infantry battalions. These six battalions were attacking in all directions and Colonel Barrow noted:

The 2d Battalion, 9th Marines . . . [was] still attacking generally to the west with part of . . . [its] forces and generally to the east with another; the 3d Battalion, 9th was attacking to the west; the 1st Battalion, 9th and 1st Battalion, 4th were attacking to the south; the 2d Battalion, 26th was attacking to the north; and the 2d Battalion, 3d Marines was generally conducting heavy patrol activities in all directions. So the pattern of activity was one that would frustrate the Marine Corps School's problem directors I am sure, but the tactical situation dictated this type of maneuver.

According to Barrow, "this was all done from a very austere regimental command post in the field." He continued: "It is a great credit to my staff that they performed all of the fire control effort and the rest of the activities related to fire and maneuver in the most exemplary fashion."

There were indications by 23 September that the north-south push was having an effect on the scattered elements of the three enemy regiments. Instead of moving north and being trapped, the enemy forces began to reorient their attempts at escape to the east and west. Responding to this apparent shift, Colleton's battalion was directed to drive west while Galbraith's Marines pushed east.

Lieutenant Colonel Twohey's 1st Battalion, 3d Marines would continue its attack east along Mutter Ridge as Lieutenant Colonel Sparks' battalion landing team and Lieutenant Colonel Byron T. Chen's 2d Battalion, 3d Marines attacked north.* This maneuver, coupled with an attack on 26 September by three companies of the Army's 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry and two battalions of the 2d ARVN Regiment west from C-2, was designed to cut the enemy's escape routes and destroy what remained of the three regiments.

While Colleton's Marines continued to search the 400-meter high ridgeline generally paralleling the southern boundary of the DMZ, sweep operations west of the Rockpile came to an end. On 29 September, the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, now commanded by Major Frederick E. Sisley, was helilifted to Vandegrift Combat Base, followed on 1 October, by the regimental command group and Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne's 3d Battalion, 9th Marines. With the departure of the 9th Marines from Winchester, operational control of Sparks' BLT 2/26 was passed to the 3d Marines.

The division expanded its search operations within the DMZ as the new month began. On 1 October, BLT 2/26 replaced the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines in the DMZ and was tasked with destroying a recently built road, an extension of North Vietnam Route 1022 southward into the DMZ. Discovered by Galbraith's Marines,** with the assistance of an aerial observer, in late September, the road complex generally followed the Ben Hai River before turning south, two kilometers west of Dong Ong Cay, and ending 2,000 meters north of the DMZ southern boundary. North of the river, the road was well-developed, open and easily located from the air as well as from prominent terrain features in the southern DMZ. Once it crossed the river, it was well-camouflaged and difficult to spot because of overhead cover. Built entirely by hand labor, the road was hacked out of the jungle, lined with timber, and ringed with base camps and fighting positions.

Sparks' battalion, with two companies in the attack and one in reserve, moved slowly north along the road, destroying all enemy structures as they searched for elements of the 52d Regiment and its suspected command and control complex. Continually bombarded by artillery and mortars, the battalion's Marines fought small groups of determined and well-trained enemy soldiers in well-concealed and heavily bunkered reverse-slope defensive positions. Once friendly supporting arms were brought to bear, the enemy would withdraw, only to take up a defensive posture in yet another prepared position.

*Lieutenant Colonel Chen replaced Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Davis on 20 September as Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 3d Marines.

**Colonel Thomas H. Galbraith, then the commander of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, later remembered that his battalion discovered the road on about the third or fourth night after they had entered the DMZ and started to move south: "I heard motors off in the distance. Seemed that I heard them for two or three nights and couldn't figure out who had trucks operating in these hills." His recollection was that he "reported hearing them to Colonel Barrow . . . and in the next day or so a helicopter came to pick me up to see if I could point out where the sounds had come from." Galbraith wrote: "I recall having been very disappointed in not being able to see anything at all—I felt like the boy who had cried 'wolf'—but as it turned out, the road was indeed there, superbly hidden by canopy and camouflage, and what I had heard was the motors of the trucks and/or heavy equipment that were being used to build it." Galbraith Comments.
On 4 October, Company H found a 152mm artillery position, ringed with machine gun and mortar emplacements, and 12 rounds of 152mm ammunition, 1,600 meters south of the Ben Hai. To the northeast, Marines discovered two 85mm howitzer positions with accompanying antiaircraft guns. Several hundred meters from the howitzer positions, they found a partially burned Soviet, six-cylinder diesel, full-tracked prime mover, capable of towing a 152mm artillery gun, which appeared to have been hit by a 105mm howitzer round. It was suspected that the 152mm guns were removed from the area shortly after the insertion of the battalion. Not only were there signs indicating the use of tracked vehicles, but one night Sparks’ Marines reported hearing heavy engine noises to the north.

The most significant enemy contact occurred on 8 October as First Lieutenant Tyrus F. Rudd’s Company H approached Dong Ong Cay from the south. Despite a tenacious fight the defenders lost a reported 17 dead, while Rudd’s Company suffered 2 killed and 11 wounded. During the engagement the Marines observed numerous bodies being dragged away, 11 of which were found the following morning. In a search of the hill, the Marines found another vehicle, a 12-cylinder diesel Soviet medium tracked artillery tractor with a rear winch.

BLT 2/26 continued to search the road until 16 October when it returned to the Cua Viet area by helicopter. There it participated in two short operations, the cordon of Xuan Khanh Resettlement Village and a sweep north from Oceanview to DMZ. With the departure of Lieutenant Colonel Sparks’ battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Twohey’s 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, which had moved into the DMZ on the 8th and was sweeping to the east and west of the BLT, assumed the mission of searching the road and destroying enemy installations in the area.

Twohey’s Marines discovered more than 488 rounds of 152mm artillery ammunition, truck parks, and support camps as they moved north. By 17 October they had reached the Ben Hai, one kilometer north of Dong Ong Cay, where they found a shallow fording site built of rock and three cable bridges over the river. The rock, or “underwater bridge” was rendered unserviceable by several 8-inch howitzer missions and the cable bridges were destroyed by fixed-wing and artillery strikes. Using 422 of the captured 152mm artillery rounds, 3,000 pounds of C-4, and cratering charges placed in and along the road, Twohey’s battalion, working together with a detachment of engineers, destroyed major portions of the road. They also blasted holes in the canopy to make the road more visible from the air. The 1st Battalion, 3d Marines was helilifted from the DMZ on 22 October to provide security for installations along Route 9. Although both Sparks’ and Twohey’s Marines continually heard tracked vehicles moving north and responded with a massive artillery and air assault, the 320th NVA Division was able to remove its heavy artillery from the area.

As October began, 8,000 meters to the west, Lieutenant Colonel Colleton’s 1st Battalion, 9th Marines continued to sweep westward in the DMZ. The search, however proved fruitless and on the 7th the battalion withdrew. The same day, Lieutenant Colonel Chen’s 2d Battalion, 3d Marines was inserted into the DMZ, 8,000 meters further west. Unlike September, when enemy contact was heavy, Chen’s Marines engaged few enemy troops, mostly logistical support personnel who seemed startled that Marines had invaded what they considered their rear area. Although numerous caches, supply trails, and rest centers were discovered, the greatest enemy soon became the weather. The rain, constant and torrential, not only caused difficulties in movement and resupply, but numerous cases of immersion foot. After 17 days in the DMZ, the battalion was helilifted to Camp Carroll and from there by foot moved to the Mai Loc area for operations with Regional and Popular Forces. By 26 October all Marine units had left the DMZ and the allies terminated the series of operations against the three regiments of the 320th NVA Division.

Thwarted in two attempts at victory in the lowlands during April and May, the enemy division, in August, chose another route which, as Colonel Barrow stated, led to a third defeat:

He had to choose some other way to attempt to do his dirty work of interdicting our roads and attacking civilian settlements. And so he chose this inhospitable area, northwest of the Rockpile, and if one will look at a map you can see that to him that it was a wise choice because, one, it was an area that made his targets quite accessible. He was only six, eight, or ten clicks away from the Rockpile. It was an area that was so rugged that he could assume that it was inaccessible to us, that we would not have the means to enter it unless we chose to do it overland and we would pay a heavy price if we did. The fact that we moved in and forced our way, if you will, onto the ridgelines on an equal footing with him and showed great determination in seeking out his supplies which were so carefully concealed, upset his plans. He had prepared this area as his battlefield... We couldn't have hit him at a better time. We hit him...
when his forces had not yet gotten to their battlefield
and we dealt his forces a blow.60

During three months of fighting, the Marine command estimated that the 320th NVA Division lost more than 1,500 killed as well as large numbers of individual and crew-served weapons. The Marines, in addition, destroyed hundreds of prepared positions and huge stockpiles of munitions. In contrast to the heavy losses of the enemy, Marine casualties were less that 200, many from indirect artillery and mortar fire.

When the 9th Marines left the battle with the 320th Division, they turned their efforts toward the expanding pacification program. At 1000 on the morning of 1 October, as the regimental headquarters prepared to depart Fire Support Base Winchester, it received an order from Task Force Hotel to place a three battalion cordon that night around the Beng Son-Doc Kinh or Mai Loc village complex, a known Viet Cong haven in the Cua Valley. Throughout the day, Army helicopters made a visual reconnaissance of the area, battalions briefed down to the squad level, and the regiment carried out coordination with South Vietnamese officials and the U.S. Army district advisor. At dusk the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines and 3d Battalion, 4th Marines arrived by truck at Camp Carroll, and shortly after dark, the two battalions began their overland movement. Lieutenant Colonel Bourne’s 3d Battalion travelled in a easterly direction, while Major Sisley’s 2d Battalion headed south and then turned east. According to Colonel Barrow:

Their movements were sort of like the pincers of a crab, moving out into the night, getting around the village and the open side of the cordon was then to be filled in by the 3d Battalion, 9th, landing at night into two landing zones, one up near where the 3d Battalion, 4th would have the head of its column and one not too far from where the 2d Battalion, 9th would have the head of its column.61

Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne’s 3d Battalion, 9th Marines lifted out of Vandegrift and touched down in the area two hours before midnight. Within 30 minutes his lead elements made contact with Bourne’s and Sisley’s Marines, closing the cordon. Early the following morning, Colonel Barrow made a helicopter reconnaissance of the area: “It was a very dramatic sight to see the next morning an entire infantry regiment wrapped around this large village complex with a Marine every 5 to 10 meters in physical contact all the way around the cordon.”62 During the next several days, the regiment tightened the cordon and completely searched the village complex.

While detaining only 40 individuals, who were later identified as prominent members of the local Viet Cong infrastructure, Barrow considered the cordon a success. “We were particularly proud of it,” he stated, “because it showed the versatility of this regiment and our capability to respond rapidly, having come out of a month-long mountain jungle operation and that very same night of the same day we came out we conducted a very successful cordon operation, which was, of course, entirely different and involved operating with other forces and involved working in an area that was heavily populated.”63

While the 3d Marines, and later 9th Marines, were pursuing the regiments of the 320th NVA Division, Colonel Edward J. Miller’s 4th Marines continued to conduct mobile defensive operations within the Scotland area of operations. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas H. Galbraith’s 1st Battalion, 4th Marines conducted extensive company patrols, searching for enemy troops, caches, and constructing landing zones for future helicopter assaults throughout August and into September. On 7 August, the battalion command group and three companies were helilifted to Hills 679 and 505 in the Huong Vinh region, approximately 10 kilometers west of Vandegrift. The Marines cut landing zones and conducted numerous patrols throughout the area without

[Image of a soldier and a village scene with text: Department of Defense (USMC) Photo A80136 1stLt James Luker, Jr., a member of the fire support group with the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, pauses for a moment near LZ Cates in Operation Scotland to fill a canteen with water. He apparently has the water duty as three more canteens are on the rocks waiting to be filled as well.]
results. On the 23d, in an effort to assist the 3d Battalion, Galbraith's Marines assaulted into the Huong Phuc region, south of Route 9, approximately 17 kilometers southwest of Vandegrift. Once again the troops, except for two short encounters with small groups of enemy soldiers as they attacked to the northwest, found little of interest. The Dong Ca Lu mountain complex west of Vandegrift, a favorite harboring site for the North Vietnamese, became the battalion's chief interest during the last days of August and first two weeks of September. Although Galbraith's Marines sighted several large groups of enemy in the area and responded with mortar, artillery, and airstrikes, no significant engagements took place.

Between these series of short operations, the battalion maintained responsibility for the defense of Vandegrift Combat Base and Ca Lu. Assigned the mission of planning a new perimeter defense, Galbraith's Marines, in coordination with the 11th Engineers, cleared fields of fire, laid defensive wire, and assisted with the placement of tanks, Ontos, M42 “Dusters”, and searchlights at strategic points along the perimeter. On 17 September, the battalion was placed under the operational control of the 9th Marines and assaulted into the DMZ.

Further west, Lieutenant Colonel Louis A. Rann's 2d Battalion, 4th Marines maintained a continuous series of patrols from Fire Support Base Cates. The 2d Battalion also manned strategic hills overlooking the abandoned base at Khe Sanh. Enemy contact was light during August, consisting of small unit probes of all battalion defensive positions. September brought long periods of rain and overcast weather to the western mountains, hindering the battalion’s long-range patrol effort and resulting in numerous accidents and several collapsed bunkers.

On 17 September, Rann's Marines observed enemy activity around the abandoned Khe Sanh Combat Base. Several artillery missions were called in on a possible enemy truck convoy, antiaircraft positions, and on the former helicopter revetments, but without success. Later, several patrols reported hearing and seeing an unidentified aircraft near the base, but no positive identification could be made due to heavy fog.

To the southeast of Rann's battalion, the 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, under Lieutenant Colonel Frank L. Bourne, Jr., continued to defend Fire Support Base

FSB Shepherd, in this aerial view, overlooks Route 9 where two rivers, the Song Rao Quan and Da Krong come together. Unfortunately neither the road nor the rivers can be made out in this picture.

Photo from the 12th Mars ComdC, Dec68
Shepherd, overlooking Route 9 and the confluence of the Song Rao Quan and Da Krong. Bourne maintained one rifle company at the fire support base and employed the three remaining companies, on a rotating basis, in a mobile defense. According to the plan, the companies moved from patrol base to patrol base in the field every two to three days. In addition to company patrols out of Shepherd, the battalion conducted a two-company search operation in the Huong Phuc region to the southwest near Hills 549 and 587. Soon after entering the region on 21 August, Companies L and M came under heavy and continuous rocket-propelled grenade, 75mm recoilless rifle, 60mm, and 82mm mortar fire. The companies maintained a tight defensive position on Hill 549 for several days before being relieved by elements of the 1st Battalion.

Despite extended periods of inclement weather during September, Bourne's battalion continued the program of constantly patrolling its sector of the regimental area of operations. On 13 September, the battalion was split with the Bravo command group and Companies I and L displacing to Vandegrift Combat Base. The Alpha command group and Companies K and M remained on Shepherd.

Although the two remaining companies continued to send out long-range patrols, the Marines encountered only friendly Montagnards and no enemy troops during the month. However, while on patrol, north of Ra Co Ap, three kilometers west of Shepherd, elements of Company M captured two Vietnamese males, carrying a white flag. Initially thought to be North Vietnamese soldiers, they later revealed that they were ARVN officers who had been captured at Hue during the Tet Offensive in February. They reported that they had escaped from an enemy prisoner of war camp, located near the junction of Route 9 and Xe Pon, on the Laotian border, and said to have contained at least 30 American prisoners. The enemy, they noted, were in the process of taking them and others to a camp in North Vietnam.

During August and early September there were indications that the 246th Independent NVA Regiment had reentered South Vietnam and was moving east toward Huong Hoa, south of the Khe Sanh Combat Base. In addition, the elements of the 83d Engineer Regiment were believed to be constructing a road from Laos into the Vietnam Salient. The 1st Battalion, 66th NVA

Marines of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines on side of hill prepare to fire LAAWs (light antiarmor weapons) at enemy positions in the valley below. The Marine with the soft hat in the background apparently is holding a M14, rather than the M16 rifle.

Although Brigadier General Frank E. Garretson, who assumed command of Task Force Hotel at the end of August, had hoped to begin operations in the area during September, inclement weather forced a series of postponements. But by early October, with the completion of four fire support bases and the movement of Marine 155mm howitzers and 8-inch self-propelled guns eight kilometers west along Route 9 to Fire Support Base Stormy, and a battery of Army 175mm guns to Ca Lu, all was ready.

While the 9th Marines secured all fire support bases east of Khe Sanh and patrolled the high ground surrounding Vandegrift Combat Base, the 4th Marines, now under the command of Colonel Martin J. Sexton, began search and clear operations to the west of Khe Sanh. On 5 October, Major John E. O'Neill's 2d Battalion, 4th Marines assaulted into landing zones just south of Lang Vei (2) and Lieutenant Colonel Bourne's 3d Battalion was helilifted into the area just north of Lang Vei (1). Seizing the two objectives without enemy opposition, both battalions began to sweep east astride Route 9. The following day, Lieutenant Colonel Galbraith's 1st Battalion assaulted into landing zones near Hill 503, three kilometers southwest of Huong Hoa, on the southern flank of the two attacking battalions. The battalion's mission was to interdict enemy movement along the north-south routes leading to and out of the Khe Sanh area. Simultaneously, the 3d and 4th Battalions, 2d ARVN Regiment were helilifted into landing zones seven kilometers north of Bourne's Marines and moved toward Hills 881 North and 881 South.

Galbraith's and O'Neill's battalions travelling east toward the Da Krong Valley, uncovered numerous munitions caches and grave sites while engaging several small, but isolated groups of enemy soldiers. On 16 October, the 2d Battalion, now under the command of Major William L. Kent, returned to Vandegrift Combat Base for a period of rehabilitation prior to a helicopter lift into the northwestern portion of the Scotland area of operations. Elements of Galbraith's battalion left the Khe Sanh area the same day and deployed to various fire support bases throughout the regimental area. Marines of the 1st Battalion spent the remainder of October in a normal perimeter defensive posture, manning patrols, listening and observation posts, and killer teams. Composed of artillery and 81mm mortar forward observers, a forward air con-
troller, an M60 machine gun team, grenadier, radioman, corpsman, team leader, and a sufficient number of riflemen to accomplish the assigned mission, the killer teams, which ranged in size from 14 to 22 men, operated in remote areas for a three to five-day period. Unlike long-range reconnaissance patrols, these teams were encouraged to engage enemy forces attempting to move within striking distance of regimental fire support bases.

By 10 October, Lieutenant Colonel Bourne’s Marines had taken their final objectives: Hills 689, 552, and 471; and the villages of Khe Sanh and Houng Hoa. The 3d Battalion and the two ARVN Battalions then shifted the emphasis of their attacks. The 3d and 4th Battalions, 2d ARVN Regiment swept north off Hill 881 toward Lang Suat until the 19th when they returned to Dong Ha. At the same time, Bourne’s battalion conducted extensive reconnaissance and search operations in the Khe Xa Bai Valley where it was believed that the enemy had stored extensive caches of ammunition, food, and weapons. After establishing Fire Support Base Gurkha, atop Hill 632, on 12 October, 3d Battalion Marines moved off the hill and into the surrounding river valley. During the last days of October, they were in the process of slowly working their way toward the summit of Dong Pa Thien, one of the highest pieces of terrain in South Vietnam. Their search failed to uncover any evidence of recent enemy activity in the area. What they did find were three to four-month old grave sites, unserviceable bunkers, and four to six-month old enemy equipment and weapons. What enemy that they did find were three to four-month old grave sites, unserviceable bunkers, and four to six-month old enemy equipment and weapons. What enemy that the Marines sighted showed no inclination to contest the battalion’s forward movement.

The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James L. Fowler, was joined during the last week of October by Major Kent’s 2d Battalion which was helilifted onto Hill 665 and established Fire Support Base Alpine before sweeping north in an effort to seize a regimental objective near Lang Ho. After Kent’s Marines reached the objective, they conducted extensive patrols in the area, uncovering small caches of new and used medical equipment and supplies. On 30 October, Companies F and G assaulted into landing zones west of Alpine and began a sweep to the east, encountering no enemy resistance.

The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Elliott R. Laine, Jr., who had replaced Lieutenant Colonel LaMontagne on the 24th, searched Dong Ca Lu and the hills west of Vandegrift without success. Meanwhile, Major Sisley’s 2d Battal-
east of Quang Tri City.* Three companies of the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry and two troops of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry air assaulted into the area and eventually placed a cordon around the suspected villages, trapping the 808th VC Battalion. Fighting over the next three days resulted in the capture of 14 prisoners, 58 weapons, and the reported deaths of 144 enemy soldiers.

During late August a gradual concentration of Communist forces was noted in the eastern portion of Base Area 101, a region known to be heavily fortified and believed to contain several battalion base areas and storage facilities. The area also lay across a major rice route and was an important link in the transportation of rice from Hai Lang District to the western mountains. On 11 September, Operation Comanche Falls-Lam Son 261 began in the base area in an effort to destroy enemy forces, caches and bunker complexes prior to the arrival of the northeast monsoon. Two battalions of the 5th and 8th Cavalry and two battalions from the 1st and 3d ARVN Regiments assaulted into landing zones along the southern boundary of the base area. One battalion of the 7th Cavalry seized landing zones in the southeast portion and a Regional Force battalion from Quang Tri secured landing zones in the northeast portion. As the latter two battalions established blocking positions and interdicted enemy trails in the piedmont, the four maneuvering battalions attacked through jungle canopy to the northeast. After 21 days of sustained combat, the combined cavalry and ARVN force had succeeded in denying the enemy his forward support base area and disrupting his lines of communication. In addition to destroying several large base camps, allied forces reported killing more than 270 NVA soldiers.

With the destruction of enemy installations in Base Area 101, the division began operations to interdict enemy movement toward the A Shau Valley and to destroy reported large supply installations west of the base area. On 2 October, the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, followed by two battalions of the 1st ARVN Regiment, assaulted into landing zones southwest of the base area and began a sweep to the western limits of the division’s area of operations. Although contact was light and sporadic during the remainder of the month, the combined allied force destroyed several large enemy supply installations and captured tons of ammunition.

As elements of the 1st Cavalry Division continued their search for enemy forces in the mountains and throughout the coastal plains, General Stilwell, on 26 October, alerted the division’s commanding general, U.S. Army Major General George Forsythe, that his forces would be deployed to III Corps Tactical Zone. Once in place, II Field Force, Vietnam would assume operational control of the division. In a message to General Cushman, General Abrams outlined the threat in III Corps which necessitated the move. He noted:

I have directed the move on the basis of the tactical situation in South Vietnam and my continuing assessment of the enemy’s capabilities throughout the country to include his capability to reinforce from out of country. I believe that a part of his problem in northern I Corps is inadequate logistic support. This may be temporary. The absence of some enemy units from northern I Corps may also be temporary. In the meantime he has steadily built his capability in III Corps and the sanctuaries in Cambodia.

As Abrams viewed the situation, the mounting enemy threat to III Corps had to be blunted and therefore he was forced to make the decision to move the 1st Cavalry Division sooner instead of later. Should a change in situation warrant it, he concluded, the division could be moved quickly back to I Corps. Although it had no bearing on his decision, Abrams saw the move as an opportunity for the 1st ARVN Division to “shoulder a bigger part of the load.”

The advance party of the Army’s cavalry division departed I Corps on 27 October. The following day the 3d Brigade was airlifted to Quan Loi and put under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division. Combat elements of the 1st Brigade simultaneously deployed to Tay Ninh and came under the control of the 25th Infantry Division.

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*“Snatch” operations were conducted in restricted areas, along waterways or roads and in populated areas. Using a UH–1H “Huey” helicopter with an infantry fire team, interpreter, and a national policeman on board and an armed OH–6A “Loach,” the snatch team patrolled restricted areas looking for targets. If individuals were discovered, the team would sweep out of the sky and round them up. After interrogation by the policeman, Viet Cong suspects would be transported to detainee collection points and innocent civilians transferred to the district headquarters.

**General Earl E. Anderson, in 1968 the III MAF Chief of Staff, observed that the Marine command lost the 1st Air Cavalry Division, “just on the basis of a phone call.” As early as 11 September 1968, III MAF had received a message from General Abrams, “asking us to comment on the effect upon III MAF of our furnishing an AirCav troop and an air-mobile brigade for use in III Corps, commencing 1 Dec.” BGen E. E. Anderson ltr to MajGen F. E. Leek, dtd 4Nov68, encl, Anderson Comments, Dec94; Anderson ltr to Van Ryzin, Sep68; Anderson Comments, Dec94.
An Army company commander from the 1st Air Cavalry Division points out terrain features to Capt William O. Moore, Jr., whose company will relieve the Army unit south of Quang Tri City. The 1st Air Cavalry Division began departing I Corps in October for III Corps.

In light of the anticipated loss of the 1st Cavalry Division, XXIV Corps ordered an adjustment in the boundary between the 3d Marine and 101st Airborne Divisions. The adjustment, scheduled to be completed on 8 November, would generally correspond to the provincial boundary between Quang Tri and Thua Thien. To fill the void, the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division would be shifted south and a brigade of the 101st Airborne Division would move north. In an attempt to make the transition as smooth as possible, the remaining elements of the cavalry division were directed to cordon the village of Thon My Chanh and eliminate the Viet Cong infrastructure from the village to the coast. On 2 November, the cordon around Thon My Chanh was established by an armored battalion task force from the 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division, an armored battalion from the 101st Airborne Division, and a cavalry squadron from the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. U.S. helicopters brought into forward landing zones maneuver elements of the 1st ARVN Regiment which began search operations throughout the area. Although enemy resistance was light, the combined Army and ARVN force discovered several food caches, containing more than 12 tons of unpolished rice. With the end of the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division's participation in the cordon on 7 November, the area was released to the 1st Brigade and the 2d Brigade deployed to Phuoc Vinh.67

South of the 1st Cavalry Division, the 101st Airborne Division continued to conduct operations in coordination with the 1st ARVN Regiment to provide security for Hue City; interdict Routes 547 and 547A; implement the rice denial program; destroy the enemy's main force units and infrastructure; and assist in the Thua Thien Province pacification program. In late July, the division finalized plans, marshalled forces, and constructed fire support bases for a combined Army and ARVN two-brigade airmobile assault into the A Shau Valley. On 4 August, Army helicopters flew the 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry and 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry into landing zones in the vicinity of A Luoi and Ta Bat. While the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry secured landing zones near Ta Bat, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 1st ARVN Regiment were helilifted into the valley on the 5th. The combined reconnaissance in force encountered only a few squad- and company-sized enemy units, much smaller than anticipated by intelligence sources. The enemy employed a series of delaying and harassing tactics to slow the advance. While finding no major enemy caches or installations, the maneuver forces implanted minefields and sensors at three choke points in the valley before withdrawing on the 20th.

On the heels of the A Shau Valley operation, the 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry assaulted into landing zones in the Nui Ke mountain complex southeast of Hue. Led by a North Vietnamese Army corporal who had rallied to a local Marine Combined Action platoon, the battalion moved west toward the suspected base camps of the 5th NVA Regiment. Following two weeks of heavy fighting, the 1st Battalion reported killing more than 180 enemy troops and captured numerous individual weapons and tons of munitions.

As a result of the decreasing number of engagements in August with North Vietnamese main force and Viet Cong local force units in the coastal lowlands surrounding Hue, a series of operations, or "soft cordons," were carried out to destroy the Viet Cong infrastructure in the area. These operations, targeted at Vinh Loc, Phu Vang, Huong Thuy, Phu Thu Districts, emphasized coordination with and use of local South Vietnamese forces, surprise, isolation of the battlefield, detailed search, minimum destruction of civilian property, and population control. The soft cordon normally took place in populated areas where enemy forces were suspected to be widely dispersed among the civilian population. The expectation was that the enemy forces would
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attempt to escape rather than establish an organized resistance. Preparatory fires would be placed only on barren areas near landing zones and fires on other targets, such as known or suspected enemy locations, would be planned but not fired unless necessary to prevent friendly casualties. The soft cordon proved to be an effective technique for the division and local South Vietnamese authorities to find the Viet Cong and blunt its influence.

In mid-September, in an effort to prevent enemy reinforcement and recovery from the losses suffered in Phu Vang, Phu Thu, and Vinh Loc Districts, the 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry and 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry assaulted into the Dong Truoi mountain complex south of Hue. For the next month, the two battalions conducted extensive company operations in search of five infantry battalions of the 4th and 5th NVA Regiments, known to be in the area. Although not encountered in large numbers, the enemy fled to the southwest, relieving the pressure on Da Nang, Route 1 from Phu Bai to the Hai Van Pass, and on Phu Loc District to the east.

While the division's 2d Brigade continued to conduct the series of cordon operations in the coastal plains and the 1st Brigade operated in the mountains to the south and west of Hue, the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division prepared to deploy from I Corps to III Corps. The 82d Airborne brigade was released from the operational control of the division on 4 October and, simultaneously, the division's own 3d Brigade moved from III Corps to I Corps and returned to the operational control of the 101st.

As the division regained its 3d Brigade, its boundary was extended to the east to include the Phu Loc District and south to include the remaining portion of Thua Thien Province, with the exception of the Hai Van Pass. With the deactivation of Marine Task Force X-Ray in August and the subsequent movement of the 26th Marines south, General Abrams authorized the boundary extension. In late October, the division's area of operations was extended north to the Thua Thien-Quang Tri boundary as the 1st Cavalry Division was alerted to deploy to III Corps.

In recalling the memory of his service, Lieutenant Colonel Galbraith, the commander of the 1st Battalion, 4th Marines, probably expressed the feelings of most Marine and Army officers and troops who fought in northern I Corps during this period:

Much of what stands out in my mind... is the totally miserable existence of the squad and fire team grunt, the guy who lived day after day in a hole he just dug, trying to do his job and at the same time stay halfway dry, opening his can of C-rations, wondering when he was going to get his next hot meal and a new pair of utility trousers to replace the ripped and torn pair he sort of had on, and remembering the hot shower he'd had a month ago when he was herded through the shower unit at Vandegrift.

*See also Chapter 21.