Angola in its confrontation with South Africa. By 1990 they hoped to celebrate the Pan-African News Agency’s opening of a Portuguese desk in Luanda.

**Foreign Relations Policy Making**

Angola’s foreign relations reflected the ambivalence of its formal commitment to Marxism-Leninism and its dependence on Western investment and trade. Overall policy goals were to resolve this dual dependence—to achieve regional and domestic peace, reduce the need for foreign military assistance, enhance economic self-sufficiency through diversified trade relations, and establish Angola as a strong socialist state. MPLA-PT politicians described Angola’s goal as geopolitical nonalignment, but throughout most of the 1980s Angola’s foreign policy had a pronounced pro-Soviet bias.

Two groups within the MPLA-PT and one council within the executive branch vied for influence over foreign policy, all under the direct authority of the president. Formal responsibility for foreign policy programs lay with the MPLA-PT Central Committee. Within this committee, the nine members of the Secretariat and the five others who were members of the Political Bureau wielded decisive influence. The Political Bureau, in its role as guardian of the revolution, usually succeeded in setting the Central Committee agenda.

During the 1980s, as head of both the party and the government, dos Santos strengthened the security role of the executive branch of government, thereby weakening the control of the Central Committee and Political Bureau. To accomplish this redistribution of power, in 1984 he created the Defense and Security Council as an executive advisory body, and he appointed to this council the six most influential ministers, the FAPLA chief of the general staff, and the Central Committee secretary for ideology, information, and culture. The mandate of this council was to review and coordinate the implementation of security-related policy efforts among ministries. The Ministry of Foreign Relations was more concerned with diplomatic and economic affairs than with security matters.

Southern Africa’s regional conflict determined much of Angola’s foreign policy direction during the 1980s. Negotiations to end South Africa’s illegal occupation of Namibia succeeded in linking Namibian independence to the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Cuban presence and that of South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and African National Congress (ANC)
bases in Angola bolstered Pretoria's claims of a Soviet-sponsored onslaught against the apartheid state. On the grounds that an independent Namibia would enlarge the territory available to Pretoria's enemies and make South Africa's borders even more vulnerable, South Africa maintained possession of Namibia, which it had held since World War I. Pretoria launched incursions into Angola throughout most of the 1980s and supported Savimbi’s UNITA forces as they extended their control throughout eastern Angola.

The MPLA-PT pursued its grass-roots campaign to mobilize peasant support, and UNITA sought to capitalize on the fear of communism to enhance its popularity outside rural Ovimbundu areas. Many Angolans accepted MPLA-PT condemnations of the West but balanced them against the fact that Western oil companies in Cabinda provided vital revenues and foreign exchange and the fact that the United States purchased much of Angola’s oil. Moreover, in one of Africa’s many ironies that arose from balancing the dual quest for political sovereignty and economic development, Cuban and Angolan troops guarded American and other Western companies against attack by South African commandos or UNITA forces (which were receiving United States assistance).

**Regional Politics**

Most African governments maintained generally cautious support of the Luanda regime during most of its first thirteen years in power. African leaders recognized Luanda’s right to reject Western alignments and opt for a Marxist state, following Angola’s long struggle to end colonial domination. This recognition of sovereignty, however, was accompanied by uncertainty about the MPLA-PT regime itself, shifting from a concern in the 1970s that spreading Soviet influence would destabilize African regimes across the continent to a fear in the 1980s that the MPLA-PT might be incapable of governing in the face of strong UNITA resistance. The large Cuban military presence came to symbolize both Angola’s political autonomy from the West and the MPLA-PT’s reliance on a Soviet client state to remain in power. By 1988 the party’s role in the struggle against South Africa had become its best guarantee of broad support across sub-Saharan Africa.

Pretoria’s goals in Angola were to eliminate SWAPO and ANC bases from Angolan territory, weaken MPLA-PT support for Pretoria’s foes through a combination of direct assault and aid to UNITA, and reinforce regional dependence on South Africa’s own extensive transportation system by closing down the Benguela Railway (see fig. 10). At the same time, however, South Africa’s
Having fled the UNITA insurgency, these youngsters faced malnourishment in a displacement camp. Courtesy Richard J. Hough
right-wing extremists relied on Marxist rhetoric from Angola and Mozambique as evidence of the predicted communist onslaught against Pretoria. The political ties of Angola and Mozambique to the Soviet Union also bolstered South Africa's determination to strengthen its security apparatus at home and provided a rationale for continued occupation of Namibia. Knowing this important prop for Pretoria's regional policies would diminish with the Cuban withdrawal from Angola, South Africa actually prolonged Angola's dependence on Soviet and Cuban military might by derailing negotiations for Namibian independence.

In 1984 South Africa and Angola agreed to end support for each other's rebels and work toward regional peace. This agreement, the Lusaka Accord, was not implemented, however, as Pretoria continued incursions into Angola, partly in response to new arrivals of Cuban forces.

**Regional Accord**

On December 22, 1988, after eight years of negotiations, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa concluded a regional accord that provided for the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. In a series of talks mediated by the United States, the three parties agreed to link Namibian independence from South African rule to a staged withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. Both processes were to begin in 1989. Cuban troops were to move north of the fifteenth parallel, away from the Namibian border, by August 1, 1989. All Cuban troops were to be withdrawn from Angolan territory by July 1, 1991 (see Appendix B).

The December 1988 regional accords did not attempt to resolve the ongoing conflict between Angolan forces and UNITA. Rather, it addressed the 1978 UN Security Council Resolution 435, which called for South African withdrawal and free elections in Namibia and prohibited further South African incursions into Angola. The United States promised continued support for UNITA until a negotiated truce and power-sharing arrangement were accomplished.

The December 1988 regional accords created a joint commission of representatives from Angola, Cuba, South Africa, the United States, and the Soviet Union to resolve conflicts that threatened to disrupt its implementation. However, immediate responsibility for the accord lay primarily with the UN, which still required an enabling resolution by the Security Council, a funding resolution by the General Assembly, and a concrete logistical plan for member states to establish and maintain a Namibian peacekeeping force as part of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) called for by Resolution 435.
Angola's participation in the regional accords was pragmatic. The accords promised overall gains, but not without costs. They entailed the eventual loss of Cuban military support for the MPLA-PT but countered this with the possible benefits of improved relations with South Africa—primarily an end to South African-supported insurgency. The accords also suggested possible benefits from improved regional trade, membership in the World Bank (see Glossary) and International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), and loans for development purposes. President dos Santos intended to reduce Angola's share of the cost of the Cuban presence, to reduce social tensions in areas where Cuban military units were stationed, and to weaken UNITA's argument that the MPLA-PT had allowed an occupation force to install itself in Angola. The MPLA-PT also hoped to gain a friendly SWAPO government in neighboring Namibia and an end to sanctuary for UNITA forces in Namibian territory. (This goal was complicated by the fact that Ovambo populations in southern Angola and Namibia provided the core of SWAPO, and, at the same time, many Ovambo people supported UNITA.)

As the first Cuban troops planned to withdraw from Angola, most parties to the accords still feared that it might fail. Angolan leaders worried that the UNITA insurgency would intensify in the face of the Cuban withdrawal; that UNITA leaders might find new sources of external assistance, possibly channeled through Zaire; and that South African incursions into Angola might recur on the grounds that ANC or SWAPO bases remained active in southern Angola. South African negotiators expressed the fear that the Cuban troop withdrawal, which could not be accurately verified, might not be complete; that Cuban troops might move into Zambia or other neighboring states, only to return to Angola in response to UNITA activity; or that SWAPO activity in Namibia might prompt new South African assaults on Namibian and Angolan territory. SWAPO negotiators, in turn, feared that South Africa or some of Namibia's 70,000 whites might block the elections guaranteed by UN Resolution 435, possibly bringing South African forces back into Namibia and scuttling the entire accords. These and other apprehensions were evident in late 1988, but substantial hope remained that all regional leaders supported the peace process and would work toward its implementation.

Relations with Other African States

Angola was wary of attempts at African solidarity during its first years of independence, an attitude that gave way to a more activist role in southern Africa during the 1980s. President Neto rejected
an offer of an OAU peacekeeping force in 1975, suspecting that OAU leaders would urge a negotiated settlement with UNITA. Neto also declined other efforts to find African solutions to Angola’s instability and reduce the Soviet and Cuban role in the region. A decade later, Angola had become a leader among front-line states (the others were Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) seeking Western pressure to end regional destabilization by Pretoria. Luanda also coordinated efforts by the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) to reduce the front-line states’ economic dependence on South Africa.

Angola’s relations were generally good with other African states that accepted its Marxist policies and strained with states that harbored or supported rebel forces opposed to the MPLA-PT. The most consistent rhetorical support for the MPLA-PT came from other former Portuguese states in Africa (Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique).

Nigeria, which led the OAU in recognizing the MPLA-PT regime in 1975, went on to seek a leadership role in the campaign against South Africa’s domination of the region, but Nigeria never forged very close ties with Angola. Nigeria’s own economic difficulties of the 1970s and 1980s, its close relations with the West, and other cultural and political differences prevented Luanda and Lagos from forming a strong alliance.

Zaire’s relations with Angola were unstable during the 1970s and 1980s. Zairian regular army units supported the FNLA in the years before and just after Angolan independence, and Angola harbored anti-Zairian rebels, who twice invaded Zaire’s Shaba Region (formerly Katanga Province). But Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko and President Neto reached a rapprochement before Neto’s death in 1979, and Zaire curtailed direct opposition to the MPLA-PT. Nonetheless, throughout most of the 1980s UNITA operated freely across Zaire’s southwestern border, and Western support for UNITA was channeled through Zaire (see National Security Environment, ch. 5). Complicating relations between these two nations were the numerous ethnic groups whose homelands had been divided by the boundary between Zaire and Angola a century earlier. The Bakongo, Lunda, Chokwe, and many smaller groups maintained long-standing cultural, economic, and religious ties with relatives in neighboring states. These ties often extended to support for antigovernment rebels.

Zambia, which had officially ousted UNITA bands from its western region in 1976, voiced strong support for the MPLA-PT at the same time that it turned a blind eye to financial and logistical support for UNITA by Zambian citizens. Without official
approval, but also without interference, UNITA forces continued to train in Zambia’s western region. Lusaka’s ambivalence toward Angola during the 1980s took into account the possibility of an eventual UNITA role in the government in Luanda. Both Zambia and Zaire had an interest in seeing an end to Angola’s civil war because the flow of refugees from Angola had reached several hundred thousand by the mid-1980s. Peace would also enable Zambia and Zaire to upgrade the Benguela Railway as an alternative to South African transport systems.

Elsewhere in the region, relations with Angola varied. Strained relations arose at times with Congo, where both FNLA and Cabin-dan rebels had close cultural ties and some semi-official encouragement. Senegal, Togo, Malawi, and Somalia were among the relatively conservative African states that provided material support to UNITA during the 1980s. Throughout most of the decade, UNITA also received financial assistance from several North African states, including Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, and these governments (along with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) pressured their African trading partners and client states to limit their support of the MPLA-PT.

**Communist Nations**

The Soviet Union supported the MPLA-PT as a liberation movement before independence and formalized its relationship with the MPLA-PT government through the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and a series of military agreements beginning in 1975. Once it became clear that the MPLA-PT could, with Cuban support, remain in power, the Soviet Union provided economic and technical assistance and granted Angola most-favored-nation status (see Foreign Trade and Assistance, ch. 3).

The support of the Soviet Union and its allies included diplomatic representations at the UN and in other international forums, military hardware and advisers, and more direct military support in the face of South African incursions into Angola. Civilian technical assistance extended to hydroelectric projects, bridge building and road building, agriculture, fisheries, public health, and a variety of educational projects. Technical assistance was often channeled through joint projects with a third country—for example, the Capanda hydroelectric project entailed cooperation between the Soviet Union and Brazil.

Soviet-Angolan relations were strained at times during the 1980s, however, in part because Angola sought to upgrade diplomatic ties with the United States. Soviet leadership factions were divided over their nation’s future role in Africa, and some Soviet negotiators
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objected to dos Santos's concessions to the United States on the issue of "linkage." The region's intractable political problems, and the cost of maintaining Cuban troop support and equipping the MPLA-PT, weakened the Soviet commitment to the building of a Marxist-Leninist state in Angola.

Angolan leaders, in turn, complained about Soviet neglect—low levels of assistance, poor-quality personnel and matériel, and inadequate responses to complaints. Angola shared the cost of the Cuban military presence and sought to reduce these expenses, in part because many Angolan citizens felt the immediate drain on economic resources and rising tensions in areas occupied by Cuban troops. Moreover, dos Santos complained that the Soviet Union dealt with Angola opportunistically—purchasing Angolan coffee at low prices and reexporting it at a substantial profit, overfishing in Angolan waters, and driving up local food prices.

For the first decade after independence, trade with communist states was not significant, but in the late 1980s dos Santos sought expanded economic ties with the Soviet Union, China, and Czechoslovakia and other nations of Eastern Europe as the MPLA-PT attempted to diversify its economic relations and reduce its dependence on the West. In October 1986, Angola signed a cooperative agreement with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon or CMEA), a consortium dedicated to economic cooperation among the Soviet Union and its allies.

As part of the Comecon agreement, Soviet support for Angolan educational and training programs was increased. In 1987 approximately 1,800 Angolan students attended institutions of higher education in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also provided about 100 lecturers to Agostinho Neto University in Luanda, and a variety of Soviet-sponsored training programs operated in Angola, most with Cuban instructors. Approximately 4,000 Angolans studied at the international school on Cuba's renowned Isle of Youth. More Angolan students were scheduled to attend the Union of Young Communists' School in Havana in 1989. Czechoslovakia granted scholarships to forty-four Angolan students in 1987, and during that year Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) also provided training for about 150 Angolan industrial workers.

Cuba's presence in Angola was more complex than it appeared to outsiders who viewed the Soviet Union's Third World clients as little more than surrogates for their powerful patron. The initiative in placing Cuban troops in Angola in the mid-1970s was taken by President Fidel Castro as part of his avowed mission of "Cuban internationalism." Facing widespread unemployment at
home, young Cuban men were urged to serve in the military overseas as their patriotic duty, and veterans enjoyed great prestige on their return. Castro also raised the possibility of a Cuban resettlement scheme in southern Angola, and several hundred Cubans received Angolan citizenship during the 1980s. Cuban immigration increased sharply in 1988. In addition to military support, Cuba provided Angola with several thousand teachers, physicians, and civilian laborers for construction, agriculture, and industry. Angolan dependence on Cuban medical personnel was so complete that during the 1980s Spanish became known as the language of medicine.

China’s relations with Angola were complicated by Beijing’s opposition to both Soviet and United States policies toward Africa. China supported the FNLA and UNITA after the MPLA seized power in Angola, and China provided military support to Zaire when Zairian troops clashed with Angolan forces along their common border in the late 1970s. China nonetheless took the initiative in improving relations with the MPLA-PT during the 1980s. The two states established diplomatic ties in 1983.

**United States and Western Europe**

Angola’s relations with the United States were ambivalent. The United States aided the FNLA and UNITA before independence. During most of 1976, the United States blocked Angola’s admission to the UN, and in late 1988 the two nations still lacked diplomatic ties. United States representatives pressured Luanda to reduce its military reliance on Cuba and the Soviet Union, made necessary in part by United States and South African opposition to the MPLA-PT and support for UNITA. In 1988 Angola’s government news agency quoted Minister of Foreign Relations Afonso Van Dúnem (nom de guerre Mbinda) as saying the United States had a “Cuban psychosis” that prevented it from engaging in talks about Namibia and Angola. Nevertheless, after the December 1988 regional accords to end the Cuban military presence in Angola, United States officials offered to normalize relations with Angola on the condition that an internal settlement of the civil war with UNITA be reached.

Political and diplomatic differences between the United States and Angola were generally mitigated by close economic ties. American oil companies operating in Cabinda provided a substantial portion of Angola’s export earnings and foreign exchange, and this relationship continued despite political pressures on these companies to reduce their holdings in Cabinda in the mid-1980s. The divergence of private economic interests from United States
diplomatic policy was complicated by differences of opinion among American policymakers. By means of the Clark Amendment, from 1975 to 1985 the United States Congress prohibited aid to UNITA and slowed covert attempts to circumvent this legislation. After the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, however, trade between Angola and the United States continued to increase, and Cuban and Angolan troops attempted to prevent sabotage against United States interests by UNITA and South African commandos.

Western Europe, like the United States, feared the implications of a strong Soviet client state in southern Africa, but in general European relations with the MPLA-PT were based on economic interests rather than ideology. France and Portugal maintained good relations with the MPLA-PT at the same time that they provided financial assistance for UNITA and allowed UNITA representatives to operate freely in their capitals. Portugal was Angola's leading trading partner throughout most of the 1980s, and Brazil, another Lusophone state, strengthened economic ties with Angola during this period.


Gerald J. Bender analyzes Angola's contemporary predicament from a historical perspective in "American Policy Toward Angola" and "The Continuing Crisis in Angola." Catherine V. Scott, in "Socialism and the 'Soft State' in Africa," compares 1980s political developments in these two Marxist states in southern Africa. Tony Hodges's *Angola to the 1990s*, essentially an economic analysis, also contains insight into political trends. Fred Bridgland's "The Future of Angola" and Jonas Savimbi provide critical views of MPLA-PT rule, while Fola Soremekun's chapter on Angola in *The Political Economy of African Foreign Policy*, edited by Timothy M. Shaw and Olajide Aluko, and *Angola's Political Economy* by
M.R. Bhagavan view Angola’s 1980s leadership from a more favorable perspective. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
Chapter 5. National Security
An elderly member of the People’s Vigilance Brigades
IN THE LATE 1980s, ANGOLA was a nation at war, still struggling to escape the legacy that one standard history has characterized as “five centuries of conflict.” Since the 1960s, Angola had experienced, sometimes simultaneously, four types of war: a war of national liberation, a civil war, a regional war, and the global struggle between the superpowers. Angola had won its independence from Portugal in 1975 after a thirteen-year liberation struggle, during which the externally supported African nationalist movements splintered and subdivided. However, independence provided no respite, as the new nation was immediately engulfed in a civil war whose scope and effects were compounded by foreign military intervention. Although the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—MPLA) eventually won recognition as the legitimate government, it did so only with massive Soviet and Cuban military support, on which it remained heavily dependent in late 1988.

Despite the party’s international acceptance and domestic hegemony, Angola in the late 1980s remained at war with itself and its most powerful neighbor, South Africa. The insurgency led by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—UNITA), bolstered by growing foreign support, spread from the remote and sparsely populated southeast corner of the country throughout the entire nation. South African interventions on behalf of UNITA and against black South African and Namibian nationalist forces in southern Angola also escalated. Luanda’s reliance on the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other communist states for internal security and defense increased as these threats intensified. Intermittent diplomatic efforts since the late 1970s had failed to end the protracted war; indeed, each new initiative had been followed by an escalation of violence.

Nonetheless, a turning point in this history of conflict may have been reached in 1988. After the warring parties clashed in the early part of that year at Cuito Cuanavale, in Africa’s largest land battle since World War II, the exhausted parties succeeded in negotiating a regional peace agreement brokered by Chester A. Crocker, the United States assistant secretary of state for African affairs. On July 13, representatives of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa initialed an agreement on a “set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of Africa.”
They signed a cease-fire agreement on August 22, to be overseen by their Joint Military Monitoring Commission. Finally, their trilateral accord of December 22 provided for South African military withdrawal and cessation of assistance to UNITA; the phased removal of Cuban forces from Angola over a twenty-seven-month period ending on July 1, 1991; termination of Angolan assistance to African National Congress (ANC) exiles in the country; and South African withdrawal from Namibia coupled with independence for that territory under United Nations-supervised elections (see Appendix B). Although UNITA was not a party to this historic regional peace agreement, it was hoped that internal peace based on national reconciliation would also ensue. Whether the trilateral accord would be honored and whether Angolans would make peace among themselves were crucial issues in late 1988. History suggested that this would be but a brief respite from endemic conflict, but the promise of a future free of conflict may have provided the impetus to break with the burden of the past.

National Security Environment

Although Angola’s boundaries with neighboring states were not disputed, the country’s geopolitical position heavily affected national security. Luanda enjoyed fraternal relations with Congo and Zambia, but sporadic antagonism characterized the regime’s relations with Zaire. Since Pretoria’s intervention in the civil war of 1975-76, an undeclared state of war had existed with South Africa, which occupied Namibia, the territory to the south of Angola (see fig. 1).

Relations with Zaire, with which Angola shares its longest border, had been punctuated by hostility since the 1960s, when Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko sponsored and provided sanctuary to an MPLA rival, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola—FNLA), and to the separatist Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda—FLEC). Although there had been no conflicts over the positioning of the border itself, the direct intervention of regular Zairian forces in Angola on behalf of the FNLA in September 1975 exacerbated the three-way civil war and attendant intrusions by South African, Soviet, and Cuban forces.

Despite a February 1976 accord in which the Angolan and Zairian governments renounced further hostilities, Zaire not only continued to provide sanctuary and assistance to the FNLA, which made periodic raids into Angola, but also facilitated FLEC attacks on Angola’s oil-rich Cabinda Province. Aircraft based in Zaire also violated Angolan airspace, occasionally bombing villages on the
northern border. In retaliation, in 1977 and 1979 Luanda allowed Katangan dissidents based in Angola to invade Zaire’s Shaba Region (formerly Katanga Province), from which they were repelled only after the intervention of Egyptian, Moroccan, French, and Belgian forces (see Angola as a Refuge, this ch.). Having apparently evened their scores, Angola and Zaire normalized relations in 1978, and the two erstwhile antagonists entered into a nonaggression pact with Zambia in 1979. In February 1985, Luanda and Kinshasa signed a security and defense pact including mutual pledges not to allow the use of their territory for attacks on each other; the two governments also set up a joint defense and security commission to develop border security arrangements. In July 1986, Angola and Zaire set up joint working groups and regional commissions to implement their pledges, and in August 1988 they signed a border security pact.

Despite normalization and border security agreements, Angolan-Zairian relations remained strained and fraught with inconsistencies in the late 1980s. The two countries could not effectively control their 2,285-kilometer border, which UNITA forces continued to cross freely. Furthermore, Kinshasa continued indirect support of UNITA, particularly after 1986, by permitting United States use of the Kamina airbase in Shaba Region to deliver military aid to the insurgents and to train them in the use of new weapons. Despite numerous diplomatic and media reports of Zaire’s involvement in logistical support of UNITA, Kinshasa persisted in denying the charges.

Zaire’s erratic behavior did not constitute a direct threat to Angola. The activities of South Africa, however, were another matter. Whereas Zaire had limited itself to using its strategic location to support insurgencies against the Angolan government, Pretoria had the means to sponsor guerrilla resistance and to wage protracted war. In order to defend the 1,376-kilometer Angolan border with occupied Namibia against infiltration by South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas based in Angola, South African forces cleared a one-kilometer-wide strip along nearly half the border’s length. The Ovambo people, SWAPO’s main base of ethnic support, straddled the border, facilitating SWAPO’s movements and recruitment efforts (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2).

Starting in the late 1970s, South Africa had engaged in an escalating series of air and ground raids and prolonged operations in southern Angola against SWAPO and in defense of UNITA. The South African Defense Force (SADF) occupied parts of southern Angola between August 1981 and April 1985. During and
after that period, it undertook frequent air and ground attacks, hot pursuit operations, preemptive raids against SWAPO bases, and major interventions against Angolan armed forces on behalf of UNITA. In fact, large-scale South African air and ground attacks on Angolan government forces in 1985, 1987, and 1988 reversed the momentum of Luanda’s offensives and saved UNITA from almost certain defeat. South Africa finally withdrew its troops from Angola in September 1988 under the terms of the United States-brokered peace plan. South Africa had also provided UNITA with massive arms and logistical support, which was to be terminated under the tripartite regional peace accord (see Regional Politics, ch. 4).

To bolster its regional position, Luanda sought to regularize and strengthen its security ties with neighboring states. In addition to its nonaggression and border pacts with Zaire, Angola employed regular consultation, coordination, and cooperation with Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in an effort to enhance regional security. These ties were reinforced through bilateral defense accords with Tanzania and Mozambique signed in May 1988 and July 1988, respectively. A defense pact with Zambia was also reported to have been signed in March 1988, but this report was denied by the Zambian government.

Evolution of the Armed Forces

Background

Throughout history, relationships based on conflict, conquest, and exploitation existed among the Angolan peoples as well as between Angolans and their Portuguese colonizers. Following the initial contacts in the 1480s between Portugal and the Kongo and Ndongo kingdoms, relations were peaceful. However, by the early sixteenth century Angolans were enslaving Angolans for the purpose of trading them for Portuguese goods. This commerce in human beings stimulated a series of wars (see Precolonial Angola and the Arrival of the Portuguese, ch. 1). The Portuguese eventually intervened militarily in the kingdoms’ affairs and subsequently conquered and colonized Kongo and Ndongo. Whereas warfare among Africans traditionally had been limited in purpose, scale, intensity, duration, and destructiveness, the wars of slavery and Portuguese conquest were conducted with few restraints.

Intra-African and Portuguese-African warfare continued from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, as the slave and firearms trade penetrated the hinterland and Portugal attempted to extend its territorial control and mercantile interests. War and
commerce were the principal occupations of the Portuguese settlers, who represented the worst elements of their own society. Portugal was the first European nation to use deported convicts (degredados—see Glossary) to explore, conquer, and exploit an overseas empire. But unlike other European penal exiles, who were mostly impoverished petty criminals, these Portuguese exiles were the most serious offenders. By the mid-seventeenth century, virtually all non-African army, police, and commercial activities were dominated by the degredados. Indeed, until the early twentieth century the great majority of Portuguese in Angola were exiled convicts (see Settlement, Conquest, and Development, ch. 1).

During the nineteenth century, the degredados expanded and consolidated their hold on the political, military, and economic life of the territory. In 1822 degredado renegades joined garrison troops in Luanda in revolting against the Portuguese governor and setting up a junta. The degredados comprised the bulk of the Portuguese resident military and police forces, both of which engaged in plunder and extortion. In the 1870s, there were about 3,600 Portuguese officers and men stationed in Angola, and this number increased to 4,900 by the turn of the century. These were supplemented by African soldiers, auxiliaries, and Boer immigrants.

In contrast to the earlier pattern of episodic military campaigns with transient effect, the early twentieth century brought systematic conquest and the imposition of direct colonial rule. Taxation, forced labor, and intensified military recruitment were introduced. Although Portuguese policy officially permitted the assimilation of Africans, virtually all officers and noncommissioned officers remained white or mestiço (see Glossary). During the dictatorship of António Salazar (1932-68), the Portuguese army in Angola was 60 percent to 80 percent African, but not a single black Angolan achieved officer rank (see Angola under the Salazar Regime, ch. 1).

Independence Struggle, Civil War, and Intervention

When the African nationalist revolt erupted in early 1961, the Portuguese army in Angola numbered about 8,000 men, 5,000 of whom were African. The colonial forces responded brutally, and by the end of the summer they had regained control over most of the territory. The human cost, however, was enormous: more than 2,000 Europeans and up to 50,000 Africans died, and about 10 percent of Angola’s African population fled to Zaire. By early 1962, the Portuguese army in Angola had grown to 50,000 and thereafter averaged 60,000 into the mid-1970s. About half of this expansion was achieved by conscription in Angola, and most conscripts
were Africans. The Portuguese established a counterinsurgency program of population resettlement throughout the country. By the mid-1970s, more than 1 million peasants had been relocated into strategic settlements, and 30,000 males had been impressed into service in lightly armed militia units to defend them.

The thirteen-year Angolan war for independence, in which three rival nationalist groups fought the Portuguese to a stalemate, ended after the April 1974 military coup in Portugal. At that time, the MPLA and the FNLA had an estimated 10,000 guerrillas each, and UNITA had about 2,000. Within a year, these groups had become locked in a complex armed struggle for supremacy. By November 1975, when independence under a three-way coalition government was scheduled, the MPLA and the FNLA had built up their armies to 27,000 and 22,000, respectively, while UNITA had mustered some 8,000 to 10,000. Further complicating the situation was a substantial foreign military presence. Although the Portuguese forces numbered only 3,000 to 4,000 by late 1975, some 2,000 to 3,000 Cubans had arrived in support of the MPLA, from 1,000 to 2,000 Zairian regulars had crossed the border to aid the FNLA, and 4,000 to 5,000 SADF troops had intervened on behalf of UNITA. The civil war was soon decided in favor of the MPLA by virtue of the massive influx of Soviet weapons and advisers and Cuban troops.

The Development of FAPLA

In the early 1960s, the MPLA named its guerrilla forces the People’s Army for the Liberation of Angola (Exército Popular de Libertação de Angola—EPLA). Many of its first cadres had received training in Morocco and Algeria. In January 1963, in one of its early operations, the EPLA attacked a Portuguese military post in Cabinda, killing a number of troops. During the mid-1960s and early 1970s, the EPLA operated very successfully from bases in Zambia against the Portuguese in eastern Angola. After 1972, however, the EPLA’s effectiveness declined following several Portuguese victories, disputes with FNLA forces, and the movement of about 800 guerrillas from Zambia to Congo.

On August 1, 1974, a few months after a military coup d’état had overthrown the Lisbon regime and proclaimed its intention of granting independence to Angola, the MPLA announced the formation of the People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola—FAPLA), which replaced the EPLA. By 1976 FAPLA had been transformed from lightly armed guerrilla units into a national army capable of sustained field operations. This transformation was gradual until
Government recruits learning the mechanics of an AK-47 assault rifle
Courtesy United Nations (J. P. Laffont)

the Soviet-Cuban intervention and ensuing UNITA insurgency, when the sudden and large-scale inflow of heavy weapons and accompanying technicians and advisers quickened the pace of institutional change.

Unlike African states that acceded to independence by an orderly and peaceful process of institutional transfer, Angola inherited a disintegrating colonial state whose army was in retreat. Although Mozambique’s situation was similar in some respects, the confluence of civil war, foreign intervention, and large-scale insurgency made Angola’s experience unique. After independence, FAPLA had to reorganize for conventional war and counterinsurgency simultaneously and immediately to continue the new war with South Africa and UNITA. Ironically, a guerrilla army that conducted a successful insurgency for more than a decade came to endure the same kind of exhausting struggle for a similar period.

**Armed Forces**

**Constitutional and Political Context**

The Angolan Constitution provides a framework for both international and national security policies. Article 16 establishes the country’s official policy of military nonalignment and prohibits the construction of foreign military bases on Angolan territory. Reflecting its concern for territorial unity and the status of Cabinda
Province as an integral part of the national homeland, Article 4 also provides that "any attempt to separate or dismember" any territory will be "forcefully combated." The president, under Article 6, is designated commander in chief of the armed forces and in Article 53 is also given extraordinary powers to declare a state of emergency or a state of siege, to declare war, and to make peace.

The government's organization for security and defense reflected both ideological and national security considerations in its interlocking network of party, government, and military officials. The Council of the Revolution, which performed both executive and legislative functions before 1980, included the minister of defense, the chief of the general staff, and regional military commanders. In the first national People's Assembly (national legislature), which in 1980 replaced the Council of the Revolution as the supreme organ of state, defense and security personnel constituted 10 percent of the membership (see Structure of Government, ch. 4).

Since the early days of the liberation struggle, the MPLA had recognized the need for firm political direction of FAPLA. Political control was established and maintained by two complementary means: political indoctrination and institutional penetration and subordination. Political education was an integral part of FAPLA's military training, and political commissars were attached to guerrilla units to ensure compliance with party directives.

MPLA politicization and controls were formalized and expanded after the transformation of FAPLA into a conventional army during 1975 and 1976. Many of the independence leaders continued to hold concurrent positions in the party, government, and military establishment. At the regional level, the overlaying of military and political leadership was also common, as many of the provincial commissars were both MPLA Central Committee members and FAPLA lieutenant colonels. Within the armed forces, political commissars in each unit reported not to the military chain of command but to the political leadership of the region or province.

Extensive politicization of the military by institutional means did not preclude the possibility of military intervention in politics. In 1977 Nito Alves led an abortive coup in which several MPLA and FAPLA leaders were killed. In the aftermath, Alves's supporters were executed or purged, and the top military and political posts in the armed forces were assigned to loyalists: David António Moises was appointed FAPLA chief of the general staff, and Julião Mateus Paulo (nom de guerre Dino Matross) became FAPLA national political commissar.
The interpenetration of the MPLA and FAPLA was maintained throughout both organizations' hierarchies. In 1983, six years after the MPLA had designated itself a "workers' party" (Partido de Trabalho; henceforth the party was known as the MPLA-PT), a series of party committee seminars for the political organs of the defense and security forces was inaugurated by Paulo, then Central Committee secretary for defense and security. The purpose of these seminars was to review the implementation of party directives and structures within the armed forces. In 1985 seminar members recommended that the party's provincial departments of defense and security implement the 1984 directive to award membership to armed forces veterans and disabled soldiers and that the local party and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-Youth Movement (Juventude do Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—JMPLA) participate more actively in defense and security. For its part, FAPLA had a political directorate that maintained party liaison and supervision.

In the 1980s, the need for total mobilization and coordination of the nation's resources to combat the escalating UNITA insurgency and South African intervention led to reorganizations of both the central and the provincial governments. President José Eduardo dos Santos created the Defense and Security Council under his chairmanship in April 1984 to plan and coordinate national security policy. Originally, the council included the ministers of defense, state security, and interior; the FAPLA chief of the general staff; and the party Central Committee secretary for ideology, information, and culture as an ex officio member. In May 1986, the Defense and Security Council expanded to include the ministers of state for inspection and control, for the productive sphere, and for economic and social spheres, posts that had been created in a February 1986 government reorganization. In effect, the Defense and Security Council became the standing body of the Council of Ministers when the latter was not in session. The Defense and Security Council met in two sessions: a weekly meeting on defense and security matters, and a biweekly meeting on economic issues.

In July 1983, the MPLA-PT Political Bureau decided to form regional military councils as an "exceptional and temporary measure" to coordinate political, military, economic, and social leadership in areas "affected by armed acts of aggression, vandalism and banditry." The councils reported directly to the president as FAPLA commander in chief, who was empowered to determine which areas warranted such councils and to appoint council members. The councils were authorized to requisition and restrict the movement of people and goods, and their newly created military
tribunals tried crimes “against state security, economic sabotage, speculation and disobedience of directives from the regional military councils, as well as those who may damage or endanger the interests of collective defense and security” (see Criminal Justice System, this ch.). Eleven of Angola’s eighteen provinces were immediately made subject to regional military councils, whose chairmen were FAPLA colonels.

Before 1988 FAPLA’s areas of operations were divided into ten military regions (see fig. 13). In early 1988, however, calling this structure inadequate, the Ministry of Defense announced the formation of northern, eastern, southern, and central fronts. The northern front encompassed Zaire, Uíge, Malanje, Cuanza Norte, and Bengo provinces. The eastern front covered Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, and Moxico provinces. No official information on the other fronts was available in late 1988, but presumably the southern front included Cuando Cubango, Cunene, Huíla, and Namibe provinces, and the central front may have comprised Bié, Huambo, Benguela, and Cuanza Sul provinces. There was no information on the status of Cabinda and Luanda provinces, but perhaps they remained separate regions because of their strategic importance and small size. Because of the uncertain boundaries of these fronts, most news accounts referred to the military regions when describing FAPLA’s areas of operation.

**Armed Forces Organization and Mission**

The minister of defense served under both the political and the military authority of the president in his dual role as head of government and FAPLA commander in chief. Because defense and security matters were of extreme urgency, the minister of defense was considered second in importance only to the president. The minister was responsible for the entire defense establishment, including the army, air force, navy, and local militias. The commanders of the three major military services each held the title of vice minister of defense. Colonel Henrique Carreira (nom de guerre Iko), the first minister of defense, held the post from 1975 to 1980; as of late 1988 Pedro Maria Tonha (nom de guerre Pedalê) had been minister of defense since July 1980 (see fig. 14).

The Angolan armed forces were collectively known as FAPLA. The army was officially termed the People’s Army of Angola (Exército Popular de Angola—EPA). The government and most press reports, however, referred to the army as FAPLA. The triple mission of the military was to protect and defend the authority of the party and government from internal subversion, to defend the country from external attack, and to assist regional allies in
meeting their internal and external security needs. Accordingly, FAPLA was organized and equipped to fight both counterinsurgency and conventional wars and to deploy abroad when ordered; it had engaged in all these tasks continuously since independence. Its main counterinsurgency effort was directed against UNITA in the southeast, and its conventional capabilities were demonstrated principally in the undeclared war with South Africa. FAPLA first performed its external assistance mission with the dispatch of 1,000 to 1,500 troops to São Tomé and Príncipe in 1977 to bolster the socialist regime of President Manuel Pinto da Costa. During the next several years, Angolan forces conducted joint exercises with their counterparts and exchanged technical operational visits. The Angolan expeditionary force was reduced to about 500 in early 1985. It is probable that FAPLA would have undertaken other "internationalist" missions, in Mozambique for example, had it not been absorbed in war at home.

In 1988 the strength of the Angolan armed forces was estimated at 100,000 active-duty and 50,000 reserve personnel, organized into a regular army and a supporting militia, air and air defense force, and navy. The active-duty forces had expanded greatly since independence as UNITA's insurgency spread throughout the country and South African interventions increased in frequency and magnitude. As of late 1988, Lieutenant General António dos Santos Franca (nom de guerre Ndalu) was FAPLA chief of the general staff and army commander. He had held these positions since 1982.

**Ground Forces**

The regular army's 91,500 troops were organized into more than seventy brigades ranging from 750 to 1,200 men each and deployed throughout the ten military regions. Most regions were commanded by lieutenant colonels, with majors as deputy commanders, but some regions were commanded by majors. Each region consisted of one to four provinces, with one or more infantry brigades assigned to it. The brigades were generally dispersed in battalion or smaller unit formations to protect strategic terrain, urban centers, settlements, and critical infrastructure such as bridges and factories. Counterintelligence agents were assigned to all field units to thwart UNITA infiltration. The army's diverse combat capabilities were indicated by its many regular and motorized infantry brigades with organic or attached armor, artillery, and air defense units; two militia infantry brigades; four antiaircraft artillery brigades; ten tank battalions; and six artillery battalions. These forces were concentrated most heavily in places of strategic importance and
Figure 13. Military Regions and Principal Bases, 1987
recurring conflict: the oil-producing Cabinda Province, the area around the capital, and the southern provinces where UNITA and South African forces operated.

Special commands, military formations, and security arrangements were also created in extraordinary circumstances. Thus, for example, in June 1985 the provincial military authorities in the Tenth Military Region established a unified command to include both FAPLA and the People’s Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas Populares de Vigilância—BPV) to confront UNITA’s expanding operations in the region (see Internal Security Forces and Organization, this ch.). Similarly, special railroad defense committees were formed in the Ninth Military Region to protect the Luanda Railway between Malanje and Luanda (see fig. 10). These municipal committees were composed of party, government, FAPLA, JMPLA, and BPV units. In 1987 FAPLA was reported to be recruiting regional defense forces to assist the regular army against the UNITA insurgency, but in late 1988 no additional details were available.

FAPLA was equipped almost exclusively by the Soviet Union. In early 1988, it was reported to have at least 550 tanks and 520 armored vehicles, more than 500 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers, 500 mortars, at least 900 antitank weapons, and more than 300 air defense guns and surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries (see table 12, Appendix A). However, in view of continuous losses and the influx of new and replacement matériel, these figures were only approximate. For example, the South African minister of defense reported in late 1988 that Angola’s inventory of T-54 and T-55 tanks had increased from 531 to 1,590 between September 1987 and September 1988. Moreover, FAPLA and UNITA exaggerated successes and underestimated losses in military actions. In the major battle of Mavinga in 1986, UNITA claimed to have killed 5,000 FAPLA troops and to have destroyed 41 combat aircraft, 202 tanks and armored vehicles, 351 military transport vehicles, 200 trucks, and 40 SAMs, figures that represented 15 percent to 25 percent of FAPLA’s inventory.

In addition to combat troops and equipment, logistical support units, and extensive headquarters organizations, the armed forces established a growing infrastructure to service, repair, and manufacture defense equipment. In 1983 the government created a new company under the Ministry of Defense to rehabilitate and repair armored military vehicles, infantry weapons, and artillery. A maintenance and repair center for Soviet-made light and heavy vehicles, located at Viana near Luanda, was turned over to Angolan authorities by the Soviet Union in 1984 to strengthen Angolan
Figure 14. Organization of the Ministry of Defense, 1988

*In the late 1980s, the Chief of the General Staff may have exercised the authority of that position over the armed forces as a whole, thus placing him between the Minister of Defense and the commanders of the other services.*
self-sufficiency. This center, reportedly capable of servicing 600 military and commercial vehicles a day, was one of the largest of its kind in Africa. Viana was also the site of an assembly plant for commercial vehicles as well as military trucks and jeeps. In June 1986, the government signed a contract with the Brazilian company Engesa for the purchase of military trucks and construction of a facility with the capacity to repair about 30 percent of the country's heavy trucks, military vehicles foremost.

The regular army was also supported by a 50,000-member citizens' militia, the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops, an organization under the minister of defense that had both counterinsurgency and police functions. The directorate was established in September 1985 as a successor to the People's Defense Organization (Organização de Defesa Popular—ODP). The ODP had been formed in September 1975 as an adjunct to FAPLA to defend against Portuguese settler resistance and attacks by anti-MPLA insurgents. After the civil war, it retained its territorial defense and counterguerrilla supporting roles but served more as a reserve than as an active paramilitary force. Indeed, some 20,000 ODP militia were inducted into the regular army in the early 1980s, apparently to satisfy an urgent requirement to expand FAPLA. In 1988 the Directorate of People’s Defense and Territorial Troops was organized into eleven “Guerrilla Force” brigades, two of which (about 10,000 members) were to be on active duty with FAPLA at any given time. They were deployed in battalion and smaller formations, and they often operated in proximity to or jointly with FAPLA units, defending factories, farms, and villages and maintaining vigilance against insurgents. Although some estimates put the troop strength of the Guerrilla Force as high as 500,000, such figures were probably based on data from the late 1970s or reflected the inclusion of reserve components. Lieutenant Colonel Domingos Paiva da Silva was commander of the Guerrilla Force from 1978 until his death from natural causes in July 1987 (see Internal Security Forces and Organization, this ch.).

Air and Air Defense Force

The People's Air and Air Defense Force of Angola (Força Aérea Popular de Angola/Defesa Aérea y Antiaérea—FAPA/DAA), officially established on January 21, 1976, was the largest air force in sub-Saharan Africa. Colonel Alberto Correia Neto became vice minister of defense and FAPA/DAA commander in September 1986. He succeeded Colonel Carreira, who had held that post since 1983. The 7,000-member FAPA/DAA included about 180 fixed-wing combat attack and interceptor aircraft; an equal number of
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Angola's army had about fifteen years to develop an organization and gain combat experience prior to independence. In contrast, FAPAJDAA had to acquire personnel, experience, and equipment immediately, and in the context of a civil war. These unusual circumstances affected both recruitment and force development. FAPAJDAA's pilots, mostly in their mid-twenties, got combat experience immediately. Moreover, given FAPAJDAA's virtually instantaneous creation, its long-term dependence on external assistance was inevitable. Soviet, Cuban, and other communist forces provided pilots and technicians to fly and maintain FAPAJDAA's growing, diversified, and increasingly complex air fleet. The principal tasks of this new branch of the Angolan military were to protect the capital, guard major cities and military installations in the south against South African air raids, and extend the air defense network and combat operations southward to confront UNITA forces and South African invaders.

According to a 1987 press report, FAPAJDAA was reorganized into three regiments: a fighter-bomber regiment headquartered in Lubango, a transport regiment in Luanda, and a helicopter regiment in Huambo. In addition, FAPAJDAA aircraft and air defense units were deployed in strategic locations throughout the country. Of Angola's 229 usable airfields, 25 had permanent-surface runways, 13 of which exceeded 2,440 meters.

The capabilities and effectiveness of FAPAJDAA have increased markedly following its creation. FAPAJDAA's expanded capacity to provide air cover and supplies to forward ground forces, strike at UNITA bases and interdict South African aircraft, evacuate wounded personnel, and perform reconnaissance and liaison missions became particularly apparent during combined offensives after 1985. Like the army, FAPAJDAA developed modern facilities to repair and service both military and civilian aircraft for Angola and other African states.

Navy

The People's Navy of Angola (Marinha de Guerra Popular de Angola—MGPA) remained a relatively unimportant branch of the armed forces because of the exigencies of the ground and air wars in the interior. The navy's fortified headquarters and home port,
as well as major ship repair facilities, were at Luanda. Although there were several good harbors along Angola's coastline, the only other ports used regularly were Lobito and Namibe, and these were used only to support temporary southern deployments. The latter two ports were located near railheads and airfields. Lobito had minor repair facilities as well.

The navy's mission was to defend the 1,600-kilometer coastline and territorial waters against South African sabotage, attacks, and resupply operations to UNITA; to protect against unlicensed fishing in Angolan waters; and to interdict smugglers. In early 1985, President dos Santos transferred responsibility for protecting the rich offshore fisheries from the coast guard to the MGPA to provide more effective enforcement of fishing regulations. After Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Augusto Alfredo, vice minister of defense and MGPA commander, was killed in a road accident in June 1985, he was succeeded by Rear Admiral António José Condessa de Carvalho (nom de guerre Toka), who had spent the previous four years in the Soviet Union studying military science.

The MGPA officially dates from July 10, 1976, when late-President Agostinho Neto visited the naval facilities at Luanda. Its senior officers had actually begun training in 1970, during the war of liberation, when the MPLA sent the first cadre of twenty-four naval trainees abroad for a three-year training program. However, there was no navy awaiting their return. The MPLA inherited a small number of Portuguese ships at independence, which were subsequently augmented by various Soviet warships and support craft. In 1988 the MGPA was reported to have 1,500 personnel (thought to be volunteers) and a fleet of about fifty vessels that included guided-missile fast patrol boats, torpedo boats, inland-water and coastal patrol vessels, mine warfare craft, and amphibious landing craft. The independent merchant marine fleet had about 100 vessels that could be impressed into service (see table 14, Appendix A).

Most of the navy's maintenance, repair, and training were provided by Soviet and Cuban technicians and advisers; Portugal and Nigeria also provided training assistance. Despite extensive foreign support, in late 1988 the serviceability of many of the vessels and equipment was in question. Moreover, naval recruitment and the proficiency of MGPA personnel remained problematic; indeed, the MPLA and Ministry of Defense leadership repeatedly appealed to youth (the JMPLA in particular) to join the navy.

Foreign Auxiliary Forces

FAPLA was augmented in the late 1980s by exiled Namibian
and South African black nationalist forces, which enjoyed refuge in Angola. SWAPO had some 9,000 guerrillas encamped primarily in the south. Their location near UNITA's area of operations permitted them to collect intelligence and conduct operations, and about 2,500 SWAPO troops regularly engaged in fighting UNITA. Moreover, about 1,000 ANC guerrillas, exiles from South Africa, also cooperated with FAPLA in action against UNITA and South African forces. Upon implementation of the 1988 regional accords signed by Angola, South Africa, and Cuba, it seemed likely that SWAPO guerrillas would return to Namibia and that the ANC members would be relocated to other African states outside the region.

**Troop Strength, Recruitment, and Conscription**

FAPLA relied heavily on conscription to meet its staffing requirements. Voluntary enlistments were important, too, especially in FAPA/DAA and MGPA, where greater technical competence was required. Recruitment and conscription were carried out by the General Staff's Directorate for Organization and Mobilization through provincial and local authorities.

Although two-year conscription had been initiated in 1978 pursuant to the Mobilization and Recruitment Law, the First Extraordinary Party Congress held in 1980 decided that increased troop requirements warranted introduction of universal and compulsory military training. Angola thus became the first black-ruled state in sub-Saharan Africa to make its citizens subject to compulsory military service. Of Angola's more than 8.2 million people, males in the fifteen to forty-five age-group numbered almost 2 million, half of whom were considered fit for military service. About 87,000 reached the military recruitment age of eighteen each year, but a sizable proportion, perhaps a majority, were unavailable because of rural dislocation and UNITA's control of at least one-third of the country. The Ministry of Defense issued periodic conscription orders for all men born during a given calendar year. Thus, for example, in February 1988 the Ministry of Defense ordered all male Angolan citizens born during calendar year 1970 to report to local registration centers to be recruited and inducted into active military service as of March 1. Separate days were reserved for teachers and students to report, and officials in charge of workplaces and schools were instructed to deny admission to anyone not properly registered for military service. After military service, all personnel were obliged to enroll in the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops.
Particularly in the late 1980s, FAPLA apparently resorted to other means besides conscription to satisfy military requirements; political needs were sometimes also met in the process. For instance, in the 1980s several hundred former FNLA rebels were integrated into FAPLA after accepting amnesty. According to UNITA sources, FAPLA also had begun to organize new recruits into battalions formed along ethnic lines, with Mbundu and Bakongo elite forces kept in the rear while Ovimbundu, Kwanhama (also spelled Kwanyama), Chokwe (also spelled Cokwe), and Nganguela (also spelled Ganguela) were sent to the front lines (see Ethnic Groups and Languages, ch. 2). Children of government and party leaders were reported to be exempt from conscription or spared service on the front lines. FAPLA was also reported by UNITA to have forcibly conscripted hospital workers, convicts, youth, and old men after suffering heavy losses in the offensive of late 1987.

Women played a definite but poorly documented role in national defense. They too were subject to conscription, but their numbers and terms of service were not reported. FAPLA included women's units and female officers, whose duties included staffing certain schools, particularly in contested areas. Other details on the size, type, and activities of these units were not available.

**Conditions of Service, Ranks, and Military Justice**

It was difficult to gauge the conditions of service and morale among FAPLA troops. Little public information was available in the late 1980s, and much of what existed was propagandistic. Nonetheless, service did seem difficult. Conscription was intensive in government-controlled areas, and the spread of the insurgency undermined security everywhere. The constant infusion of raw recruits, the rapid growth of FAPLA, the increasing scope and intensity of military operations, and escalating casualties imposed substantial personal and institutional hardships. The continued dependence on foreign technicians and advisers, many of whom were not deployed in combat zones, had adverse consequences for operations and morale.

Pay and living conditions in garrison were probably adequate but not particularly attractive; in the field, amenities were either sparse or lacking altogether. The expansion of quarters and facilities for troops did not keep pace with the rapid growth of FAPLA, especially in the late 1980s. There were periodic reports of ill-equipped and poorly trained soldiers, as well as breakdowns in administration and services. But given the lack of alternative employment in the war-torn economy, military service at least provided many Angolans with short-term opportunities. UNITA frequently
reported incidents of flight to avoid government conscription; demoralization among FAPLA troops from high casualties and deteriorating conditions of service; and battlefield desertions, mutinies, and revolts among FAPLA units. These reports became more frequent during annual FAPLA offensives against UNITA strongholds after 1985.

In early December 1986, the People's Assembly approved new military ranks for the three military services,不同iating those of the army and air force from the navy. FAPLA and FAPA/DAA were authorized to establish the ranks (in descending order) of general, colonel general, major general, and lieutenant general. The MGPA was to have the ranks of admiral, vice admiral, and rear admiral; the ranks of colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major were replaced by captain, commander, and lieutenant commander, respectively. Future navy second lieutenants would be given rank equivalent to that of their counterparts in the army and air force. Later that month, President dos Santos received the rank of general as commander in chief of the armed forces, the minister of defense was appointed colonel general, and ten other senior military officers were promoted to newly established higher ranks (see fig. 15).

Little information was available on the military justice system. Military tribunals were created in each military region, and a higher court, the Armed Forces Military Tribunal, served as a military court of appeal. Some observers inferred from the criminal justice system and the prevalent wartime conditions, however, that Angolan military justice was harsh, if not arbitrary (see Crime and Punishment, this ch.).

**Foreign Influences**

**Communist Nations**

The Angolan armed forces were equipped, trained, and supported almost exclusively by communist countries. The Soviet Union provided the bulk of FAPLA's armaments and some advisers, whereas Cuba furnished most of the technical assistance, combat support, and training advisory services. Cubans also participated to a limited extent in ground and air combat. Other communist countries, particularly Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Poland, and Yugoslavia, also furnished arms and related aid. In the 1980s, Angola also obtained limited amounts of matériel, military assistance, and training from countries such as Belgium, Brazil, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), France, Spain, and Switzerland.
Broadly speaking, there was an international division of labor in which the Soviet Union supplied large quantities of heavy weapons and equipment, other communist states furnished small arms, and the noncommunist suppliers provided mostly nonlethal items.

The MPLA owed its ascendancy in the civil war in large part to the massive Soviet airlift of arms and Cuban troops during 1975 and 1976. Subsequently, Moscow and Havana remained the mainstays of the regime as far as its military needs were concerned. From 1982 to 1986, the Soviet Union delivered military equipment valued at US$4.9 billion, which represented more than 90 percent of Angola’s arms imports and one-fourth of all Soviet arms deliveries to Africa. Poland and Czechoslovakia transferred arms valued at US$10 million and US$5 million, respectively, over the same five-year period. During 1987 and 1988, Moscow more than compensated for FAPLA losses with accelerated shipments of heavy armaments. In addition to the tanks noted earlier, dozens of aircraft, heavy weapons, and air defense systems were delivered.

Beyond matériel deliveries, Moscow and its allies continued to provide extensive technical aid. Soviet military, security, and intelligence personnel and advisers helped establish the defense and security forces and served as advisers at all levels, from ministries in Luanda to major field commands. The Soviet Union’s civilian
and military intelligence services, in coordination with their counterpart organizations from other communist countries, particularly East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba, assisted in the creation and development of the Angolan state security and intelligence services.

The Soviet Union provided most of the air force pilot and technician training as well as technical assistance in the operation and maintenance of the most advanced equipment: aircraft and warships, major weapons such as missiles, artillery, and rockets, and sophisticated radar and communications equipment. The number of Soviet service members and advisers varied. In 1988 it was estimated by most sources to range between 1,000 and 1,500 personnel, including some fighter pilots. UNITA claimed that the Soviet military presence increased during 1988 to 2,500 or 3,000 and that seven officers were assigned to each FAPLA brigade.

Cuba was the main provider of combat troops, pilots, advisers, engineers, and technicians. As the insurgency war expanded, so did Cuba's military presence. By 1982 there were 35,000 Cubans in Angola, of which about 27,000 were combat troops and the remainder advisers, instructors, and technicians. In 1985 their strength increased to 40,000, in 1986 to 45,000, and in 1988 to nearly 50,000. All told, more than 300,000 Cuban soldiers had served in Angola since 1975. Angola paid for the services of the Cubans at an estimated rate of US$300 million to US$600 million annually.

The Cuban forces, despite their numbers, generally did not engage directly in combat after 1976. Most of the Cubans were organized and deployed in motorized infantry, air defense, and artillery units. Their main missions were to deter and defend against attacks beyond the southern combat zone, protect strategic and economically critical sites and facilities, and provide combat support, such as rear-area security, logistic coordination, air defense, and security for major military installations and Luanda itself. At least 2,000 Cuban troops were stationed in oil-producing Cabinda Province. Cubans also trained Angolan pilots, and flew some combat missions against UNITA and the SADF. In addition, Cuban military personnel provided technical and operational support to SWAPO and the ANC within Angola (see Angola as a Refuge, this ch.).

In mid-1988 Cuba substantially reinforced its military presence in Angola and deployed about one-fifth of its total forces toward the front lines in the south for the first time. This cohort was reported to include commando and SAM units, which raised concerns about direct clashes with South African forces. The move was
apparently made to keep UNITA and the SADF at bay and to strengthen the negotiating position of Luanda and Havana in the United States-brokered peace talks.

East Germany and North Korea followed the Soviet Union and Cuba as Angola’s most active and influential communist supporters. The East Germans played key roles in the intelligence and security agencies, as well as in the ideology and propaganda organs. They provided communications security services, technicians, mechanics, and instructors to maintain and operate equipment and vehicles and to train artillery crews, radar operators, and combat pilots. The East Germans also reportedly operated a training camp south of Luanda for ANC and SWAPO guerrillas. Estimates of the number of East Germans in Angola ranged from 500 to 5,000, the higher estimates probably including family members and other nonmilitary technicians and advisers.

During the 1980s, North Korea expanded and intensified its diplomatic and military assistance activities in Africa, particularly in the southern part of the continent. After training Zimbabwe’s Fifth Brigade in 1981 and 1982 and furnishing arms to that country, North Korea made a major military commitment in Angola. Although denied by Angolan officials, several sources reported that Luanda concluded a military aid agreement with Pyongyang in September 1983 that led to the dispatch of some 3,000 North Korean combat troops and military advisers by May 1984.

The reported activities of the North Koreans included the training of special units, such as hit-and-run forces and sniper squads. North Korean troops also reportedly engaged in combat operations, including FAPLA’s early 1986 offensive. North Koreans were also reported to be providing military and ideological instruction to SWAPO and ANC militants in five training camps north and northeast of Luanda.

Other communist states provided more modest military support. Arms deliveries by Poland and Czechoslovakia were noted earlier. A military cooperation agreement was signed in 1982 with Hungary, which was reported to have provided small arms. Yugoslavia furnished grenade launchers, trip-wire grenades, antipersonnel mines, hollow-charge rockets, and air defense artillery; a Yugoslav firm also built a runway and other facilities at Lubango airport. Romania was reported to have given unspecified military aid.

Noncommunist Nations

In the 1980s, Angola diversified its foreign arms acquisitions for political and practical reasons. Politically, Luanda was anxious to gain international legitimacy, counter UNITA’s international
**COMMISSIONED OFFICERS**

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<td>U.S. ARMY RANK TITLES</td>
<td>PRIVATE</td>
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*Figure 15. Military Ranks and Insignia, 1988*
diplomatic offensive, reduce its dependence on its communist allies, and gain leverage in dealing with its traditional arms suppliers. The practical reason was dissatisfaction with the level of support given by the Soviet Union and its allies, the poor quality of some equipment, and the inability to obtain certain military matériel. Perhaps in deference to the Soviet Union and other communist benefactors, most procurements from other sources consisted of relatively inexpensive support equipment. This policy left Moscow with a virtual monopoly on the provision of major weapons systems.

Diversification was evident in FAPLA's purchase of jeeps, Land Rovers, and radios from Britain, trucks and communications equipment from West Germany, small-caliber ammunition and artillery shells from Belgium, uniforms from Japan, and jeeps, trucks, and truck engines from Brazil. The MGPA also discussed the acquisition of corvettes with French, Spanish, and Portuguese shipbuilders. Among the larger purchases made from Western Europe were Swiss Pilatus training aircraft; Spanish CASA C-212 Aviocar transport aircraft; French Dauphin, Gazelle, and Alouette helicopters; French Thomson-CSF tactical military transceivers; and British Racal radio communications equipment.

Ironically, Portugal continued to play a role in the Angolan conflict. Although the Portuguese government did not officially provide arms, military assistance, or troops, private Portuguese "mercenaries" and advisers apparently served with both FAPLA and UNITA. In 1983 retired Portuguese admiral Rosa Coutinho set up a company to hire former military and reserve officers, many of whom had served in Angola during the war of liberation, as contract military advisers and to train FAPLA counterinsurgency units. Twelve were reported to be training FAPLA instructors in early 1984, and a total of thirty-two were reportedly hired in 1986. However, several of these advisers were killed in action against UNITA, and most left by late 1987. UNITA also claimed that some 3,000 Portuguese "communists" were in the country assisting Luanda in late 1986, but this claim may have been either an exaggeration or a reference to civilian technicians. MPLA-PT sources charged that there were more than 2,000 South African-trained Portuguese commandos fighting with UNITA.

Training

Regular and informal training was provided throughout the country at troop recruitment centers, officer candidate schools, specialized technical training centers, and field units. The military regional headquarters were responsible for providing individual training in basic military subjects to troops and noncommissioned officers.
In 1985 the government cited as major accomplishments the establishment of formal training programs for military cadres, the creation of military education centers throughout the country (particularly at the intermediate level for officers and specialists), and the creation of various specialized branches of the armed forces. The Soviet Union and other communist countries provided most of the formal military training. The United States Department of State estimated that 3,260 Angolan military personnel had been trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through the end of 1986 and that 1,700 Warsaw Pact military technicians were present in Angola that year. Most of the technicians were engaged in maintaining and otherwise servicing military equipment furnished by the Soviet Union and other communist states.

Individual officer candidate training was conducted at the Comandante Zhika Political-Military Academy in Luanda, which opened in 1984. Most of the instruction was originally given by Soviet and Cuban officers and specialists, but since then qualified Angolan instructors reportedly had joined the staff. As the academy's name suggested, the curriculum included training in such military subjects as strategy, tactics, and weapons, as well as political and ideological indoctrination. Another training program at the academy—a condensed version of the officer candidate political-military curriculum—was attended by senior party officials on weekends over a ten-month period.

Senior military officers participated in an eight-month advanced course at the Escola de Oficiais Superiores Gomes Spencer at Huambo, but details on the curriculum were not available. The school's eighth class, which graduated in 1984, included about fifty senior FAPLA officers. Advanced officer training and high-level training for officers and enlisted personnel in armor, artillery, and other specialties was also conducted in Huambo. The Gomes Spencer academy was attacked and extensively damaged by a UNITA commando raid in July 1986.

Although information on unit-level training was not available, battalion-level exercises had been reported in the northern and western provinces, far removed from the war zone. It is likely that such large unit-training exercises immediately preceded deployment to the combat zone. Reserve units also trained, as indicated by the report of a reserve battalion having completed a three-month course that included physical conditioning, hand-to-hand combat, and infantry tactics.

In addition to basic individual and unit-level training, technical training was provided in such specialized functional areas as communications, intelligence, artillery, armor, air defense, motor
transport, and logistics. This training was provided at facilities such as the Comandante Econômica Communications School. FAPA/DAA inaugurated a two-year course for cadets in 1979 at the National Air Force School in Negage. In early 1983, 176 cadets completed the nine-subject course, which was administered by Angolan instructors and “internationalists” (presumably Soviet and Cuban advisers). A course for radio technicians and radar specialists was also offered at the Negage training center.

Some military training was conducted abroad, particularly in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba. In mid-1985 the commander of the Fifth Military Region’s FAPA/DAA reported the arrival in the region of many new pilots and technicians who had recently completed their training program in the Soviet Union. From 1977 to 1981, Soviet specialists trained more than 3,000 motor mechanics and drivers and 100 aircraft technicians in both Angola and the Soviet Union.

FAPLA’s Combat Performance

FAPLA’s military performance was difficult to gauge, particularly in view of the propagandistic reports issued by the various forces contending in the region. On the one hand, UNITA had extended its range of operations from the remote southeastern extremities throughout the entire country within a few years of Portugal’s withdrawal. The SADF had occupied parts of southern Angola for extended periods, virtually without contest, for the purposes of resupplying UNITA, intervening on its behalf, conducting reconnaissance flights and patrols, and attacking SWAPO encampments. UNITA reported low morale among captured FAPLA conscripts, lack of discipline among troops, heavy losses of personnel and equipment in battle, countless ambushes and attacks on FAPLA forces, successful sabotage operations, and desertions by battalion-size FAPLA units. In the late 1980s, Angola’s minister of defense publicly called for greater discipline in FAPLA, citing reports of theft, assaults, and drunken military drivers. As late as 1988, in the wake of reports of increased FAPA/DAA effectiveness, the South African Air Force (SAAF) commander dismissed the Angolans as “extremely unprofessional,” noting that “50 percent of the threat against us is Cuban.”

On the other hand, it could be argued that FAPLA had substantially improved its capabilities and performance. In the first place, FAPLA had begun to develop and acquire the organization, doctrine, and equipment of a conventional army only during the civil war of 1975–76. It was then forced to fight a counterinsurgency war in the most remote and inaccessible parts of the country
over extended lines of communications, without the requisite air or ground transport or logistical infrastructure. UNITA also enjoyed the advantages of operating in thinly populated areas along porous borders with Zambia and Zaire, with extensive SADF combat and logistic support, making it impossible for FAPLA to isolate or outflank UNITA. Moreover, military experts believe that counterinsurgency troops must outnumber guerrillas by ten to one in order to win such wars, a ratio FAPLA could never approximate. The air force and navy were even further behind and had required years to acquire the assets and the expertise needed for effective operations. Although the navy was of marginal use in the war, air power was critical. It was only after sufficient aircraft and air defense systems had been deployed in the mid-1980s that Luanda was able to launch and sustain large offensives in the south. Although they suffered heavy losses and perhaps relied too heavily on Soviet military doctrine, FAPLA and FAPA/DAA in the late 1980s showed increased strength, put greater pressure on UNITA, and raised the costs of South Africa’s support for UNITA. Luanda’s resolve and the improved capabilities and performance of its armed forces were among the essential conditions under which South Africa agreed to negotiate its withdrawal from Angola.

War and the Role of the Armed Forces in Society

The Costs of Endemic Conflict

Persistent internal and external conflict have wrought havoc on Angola. The human cost has been awesome and tragic. It was estimated that as a consequence of war, between 60,000 and 90,000 people had died, and 20,000 to 50,000 persons had become amputees as of 1988 (see Effects of the Insurgency, ch. 2). From 1975 to 1988, almost 700,000 people were forced to flee their rural homes for relative safety in displacement camps or in burgeoning cities and towns, where they suffered gross deprivations in the absence of basic services. About 400,000 Angolans became refugees in neighboring states. Moreover, in 1986 some 600,000 people needed nutritional assistance.

The Angolan economy was also ravaged by wartime destruction and the heavy defense burden. Iron production virtually stopped, diamond mining and timber harvesting were severely curtailed, and smuggling siphoned off needed export earnings. Economic sabotage and attacks on infrastructure by UNITA and South Africa damaged or destroyed hundreds of facilities and made development impossible. The destruction attributed to South African military actions alone was estimated at US$20 billion.
Devastation of the once-prosperous agricultural sector was forcing the government to import about 80 percent of its food requirements in the mid-1980s, at a cost of US$250 million to US$300 million annually. It was only because of oil production in relatively secure Cabinda Province that the country could pay the high cost of defense and keep itself from total economic ruin (see Background to Economic Development; Structure of the Economy, ch. 3).

Military recruitment placed a growing burden on the Angolan population. According to statistics published by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the number of soldiers per 1,000 people increased from five in 1975 to more than seven in the 1980s, which ranked Angola fifty-seventh among 144 countries in 1985. Any reckoning of the military burden borne by the Angolan people, however, must also take into account UNITA’s armed forces. And because both FAPLA and UNITA expanded considerably in the late 1980s as the internal war intensified, the number of combatants per 1,000 people was actually twenty (based on 1988 population and combined armed forces estimates), a figure that moved Angola’s global ranking into the top fifteen.

War and the Military in National Perspective

Perpetual war magnified and multiplied the social and economic impact of defense spending. Military expenditures and arms
imports were the most obvious indicators of the intensified war effort. Luanda's defense spending nearly quadrupled from US$343 million in 1978 to US$1.3 billion in 1986 (in constant 1980 dollars), the bulk of that increase coming after 1983. In 1986 defense accounted for 40.4 percent of government expenditures. Military expenditure as a percentage of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary), estimated at 12 percent to 14 percent from 1980 to 1982, rose steadily to 28.5 percent by 1985.

Arms imports also increased dramatically. Measured in constant 1984 dollars, the value of arms imports nearly doubled after 1980. During the late 1970s, arms deliveries remained relatively constant at a bit more than US$500 million per year, but after 1980 they surged to an annual average of more than US$1 billion. Since the 1970s, Angola's arms imports had ranged between 45 percent and 88 percent of total imports. In mid-1988 Angolan government officials estimated the country's external debt at US$4 billion, most of which was owed to the Soviet Union for military purchases, and they were considering the possibility of imposing a compulsory public loan to cover revenue requirements.

Angola's heavy defense burden was evident by comparative standards as well. According to 1985 statistics published by ACDA, Angola ranked sixty-third of 144 countries in both military expenditure and size of its armed forces. These absolute measures of military effort were consistent with Angola's ranking of between sixty-eight and seventy-three in GNP, central government expenditures, and population. However, the militarizing effects were seen more clearly and dramatically in relative measures of defense effort: Angola ranked seventeenth in level of arms imports and sixth in arms imports as a percentage of total imports, twenty-sixth in military expenditure as a percentage of GNP, thirty-second in military expenditure as a percentage of the government's budget, fiftieth in military expenditure per capita, and fifty-seventh in military expenditure relative to the size of the armed forces. The continued growth of the armed forces, military expenditures, and arms imports into the late 1980s further increased the burden of defense and ensured that few resources would be left for social and economic development.

Not only did the armed forces command and consume an enormous share of national wealth and revenue, their increased political power was institutionalized at every level of government. The defense and security forces were heavily represented in the highest organs of the party and government; indeed, the exigencies of war virtually transformed the integrated party-government system into a military machine dedicated to prosecuting war at an increasingly
higher price. The reorganization of the territorial administration into military regions and provincial defense councils carried the process even further. It remained to be seen whether the December 1988 regional accords—which excluded UNITA—would result in a reversal of the process.

**Civic Action and Veterans’ Groups**

Like those of many other developing countries, Angola’s armed forces were intended to play an important role in nation building through civic-action programs. The Constitution, in fact, specially assigns “production” and “reconstruction” duties to FAPLA. In the late 1970s, FAPLA units were encouraged to grow their own food and to undertake civic action, emergency relief, and public construction projects. However, such tasks were given only nominal attention as the war intensified.

Veterans of the liberation struggle and families of those who died in that protracted conflict enjoyed “special protection” under the Angolan Constitution, but this status was not further defined. The rapidly expanding pool of war veterans in the 1980s could make a substantial contribution to national reconstruction and development if their political, ideological, organizational, social, and technical skills could be mobilized or channeled in such directions. However, the continuation of the war and the absence of information about their postservice occupations and activities precluded observation of veterans’ actual roles in society. The MPLA-PT did attend to veterans’ interests through party and government organs. As noted earlier, veterans were eligible for party membership, and a high government post, the secretary of state for war veterans, was also dedicated to veterans’ affairs. The Angolan War Veterans Committee, with government endorsement, sought aid from the Soviet Union and presumably other potentially sympathetic international donors.

**Internal Security**

Since independence, the MPLA-PT government had faced several internal opponents and rivals for power. Broadly speaking, one can distinguish between antigovernment and antiregime opposition groups. These groups differed in their goals, methods, and bases of support. On the one hand, antigovernment groups protested or sought to change the incumbent leadership, used conventional means of political opposition ranging from passive resistance to attempted coups, and drew support from constituencies almost entirely within the country. The main source of such
political opposition was factionalism within the MPLA-PT. Clan-
destine opposition groups and religious sects also contributed to
antigovernment tensions (see Political Opposition, ch. 4).

On the other hand, antiregime groups sought to transform the
political system or overthrow the ruling MPLA-PT, resorted to
efforts at secession and armed rebellion, and received substantial
external support. The most prominent of these political opponents
were FLEC, the FNLA, and UNITA. Whereas the first two had
become spent forces by the 1980s, UNITA continued to pose a
serious national security challenge.

The MPLA-PT government survived this host of threats by
developing an extensive internal security apparatus to supplement
the armed forces. This system consisted of a paramilitary territorial
militia; a state security ministry with penal functions, political
police, and border guards; a national police force; and a nation-
wide popular vigilance brigade organization.

Antigovernment Opposition

The history of the MPLA party and government is ridden with
factional strife based on ideological, political, ethnic, and personal
rivalries. In the early 1970s, Daniel Chipenda, a member of the
MPLA Central Committee, was thought to have instigated two
assassination attempts against President Neto and was expelled from
the party in December 1974. As leader of the so-called Eastern
Revolt faction, he joined the rival FNLA, based in Kinshasa, Zaire,
as assistant secretary general. Former MPLA president Mário de
Andrade also opposed Neto’s leadership and attempted to rally sup-
port for his so-called Active Revolt faction in 1974. In May 1977,
Nito Alves, former commander of the first military division and
minister of interior, spearheaded an abortive coup with the sup-
port of an extremist faction. Many MPLA officials were killed,
including seven Central Committee members (see Independence
and the Rise of the MPLA Government, ch. 1). And in early 1988,
seven military intelligence officers were reported to have been sen-
tenced to imprisonment for fifteen to twenty years and expelled
from FAPLA for plotting a coup against President dos Santos.

Other sources of dissent included several small clandestine
groups, which, to avoid infiltration, remained anonymous and re-
stricted recruitment mainly to Angolan expatriates and exiles. They
reportedly represented a variety of ideological inclinations, were
disaffected by the continuing civil war, economic chaos, and political
intolerance, and advocated development and a pluralistic political
system. In 1987 about two dozen members of one such group,
the Independent Democrats, were imprisoned and their leader
sentenced to death. These events cast doubt on the group’s continued ability to survive.

Religious sects were another source of antigovernment agitation. The Roman Catholic Church was often at odds with the MPLA-PT government but did not openly challenge it. More problematic was the government’s clashes with such independent sects as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Our Lord Jesus Christ Church in the World (Kimbanguist), whose members were popularly called Mtokoists, after the sect’s founder, Simon Mtoko (also spelled Simão Toco). After Mtoko’s death in 1984, elements of the Mtokoist sect engaged in alleged “antipatriotic activities” that were supposedly responsible for riots that occurred in at least three cities. Angolan security forces were believed to have sponsored rebellious factions within the leadership. During 1986 and 1987, more than 100 Mtokoists were killed in riots and demonstrations, and the sect was banned for one year. Jehovah’s Witnesses were banned from practicing their religion for their refusal to perform military service (see Interest Groups, ch. 4).

Erstwhile Opposition: FLEC and the FNLA

FLEC waged an intermittent independence struggle between its establishment in 1963 and its virtual demise by the mid-1980s. Zaire’s withdrawal of support and internal dissension in the late 1970s caused FLEC to fragment into five factions, three of which remained marginally active militarily in the late 1980s. A combination of the factions’ internal divisions and lack of external support, on the one hand, and the heavy concentration in Cabinda of Cuban troops and FAPLA forces, on the other hand, reduced FLEC to little more than a nuisance. In 1983 Luanda granted an unofficial amnesty to the guerrilla separatists, and more than 8,000 refugees returned home. In February 1985, a cease-fire agreement was signed and talks began, but no formal resolution was reached. In late 1988, FLEC existed in little more than name only.

Holden Roberto’s FNLA was also defunct by 1988. After losing to the MPLA in the civil war, the FNLA retreated to its traditional refuge in Zaire and continued to wage a low-level insurgency. However, in 1978 Zaire withdrew its support of the FNLA as part of the Angolan-Zairian accord signed in the wake of the second invasion of Shaba Region. Ousted by his own commanders, Roberto was exiled to Paris in 1979. He emerged again in 1983 in an unsuccessful effort to generate international support and material aid for his 7,000 to 10,000 poorly armed troops, who operated (but did not control territory) in six northern Angolan provinces.
FNLA remnants formed the Military Council of Angolan Resistance (Conselho Militar de Resistência Angolana—Comira) in August 1980 to replace the moribund movement. Comira claimed to have 2,000 troops training in Zaire for an invasion of northern Angola, but it never offered more than sporadic challenges. Its lack of strength was the result of the loss of its major external patron, the broadening of the leadership of the MPLA-PT to include more Bakongo people (the primary source of FNLA support), and more aggressive FAPLA operations. Several Comira leaders defected to the Angolan side, and in 1984 more than 1,500 armed rebels and 20,000 civilian supporters accepted the amnesty originally offered in 1978 and surrendered to Angolan authorities. Hundreds were integrated into FAPLA and the security forces. Luanda reported in October 1988 that 11,000 former FNLA/Comira members had been “reintegrated into national reconstruction tasks,” and in November the exiled Roberto was reported to have accepted amnesty.

The Enduring Rival: UNITA

UNITA in the 1980s was a state within a state. Under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi, it survived defeat during the civil war, retreated to the remote southeastern corner of the country, regrouped and made its headquarters at Jamba, and launched a determined campaign to overturn the MPLA-PT regime or at least force it to accept UNITA in a coalition government (see fig. 16). With increasing international support and military aid, particularly from South Africa and, after 1985, the United States, UNITA extended its campaign of destruction throughout the entire country. It enlarged its military forces and scope of operations and withstood several major FAPLA offensives.

Starting with a small army of a few thousand defeated and poorly armed followers at the end of 1976, Savimbi built a credible political organization and fighting force. Unlike what became of the MPLA under its faction-ridden leadership, UNITA remained the creation and vehicle of its founder. Internal opposition occasionally surfaced, but the lack of independent reporting made it difficult to assess its significance. South Africa kept FAPLA and Cuban forces at bay and intervened whenever FAPLA offensives threatened, leaving UNITA comparatively free to consolidate its control throughout the south and to extend its range of operations northward. In February 1988, Savimbi announced the formation of a UNITA government in “Free Angola,” the area he controlled. Although his intent was to regularize administration, rather than to secede or seek international recognition, this event marked a
new stage in UNITA's organizational development and consolidation, and many Africans states maintained at least informal ties to the movement.

Savimbi's strategy and tactics were designed to raise the costs of foreign "occupation" through maximum disruption and dislocation, while minimizing his own casualties. UNITA's forces infiltrated new areas and contested as much territory as possible, wresting it away from FAPLA control whenever feasible. They rarely seized and held towns, except near their bases in the south. Rather, they sabotaged strategic targets of economic or military value and ambushed FAPLA units when the latter attempted to return to or retake their positions. FAPLA access was also obstructed by extensive mine laying along lines of communication, approaches to settlements, and infrastructure sites. To undermine support for the MPLA-PT, UNITA indiscriminately attacked or took hostage hundreds of expatriate technicians and advisers, and Savimbi repeatedly threatened multinational companies with retaliation for their support of the government. Apparently abandoning hope of military victory, Savimbi sought instead to strengthen UNITA's bargaining position in demanding direct negotiations with Luanda for the establishment of a government of national unity.

UNITA's military progress was remarkable. By 1982 it had declared all but six of the eighteen Angolan provinces to be war zones. In late 1983, with direct air support from South Africa, UNITA took the town of Cangamba, the last FAPLA stronghold in southeastern Angola. This operation marked a shift from guerrilla tactics to conventional warfare, at least in the countryside. In 1984 UNITA announced the beginning of an urban guerrilla campaign and claimed responsibility for acts of sabotage in Luanda itself and even in Cabinda. The movement gained control of the regions bordering Zambia and Zaire, enabling it to develop secure supply lines plus infiltration and escape routes. From 1984 to 1987, UNITA not only continued to advance north and northwest but also repulsed major FAPLA offensives backed by heavy Cuban and Soviet logistic and combat support, in the latter instances relying on SADF air and ground support. In spite of the 1988 regional accords, according to which FAPLA and UNITA were to lose much of their external support, no military solution to the war was expected.

Military Organization and Capability

UNITA's military wing, the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola—FALA), was under the supreme authority of Savimbi as commander in chief.
The chief of staff was second in command and controlled the headquarters elements of intelligence, personnel, logistics, and operations. In January 1985, the FALA chief of staff, Brigadier
Demosthenes Amos Chilingutila, who had held that post since 1979, was removed and made chief of operations, possibly because of Savimbi's dissatisfaction with his performance, and replaced by Brigadier Alberto Joaquim Vinama. However, following Vinama's death in an automobile accident in October 1986, Chilingutila was reappointed chief of staff.

By the mid-1980s, FALA had evolved into a well-defined conventional military organization with command and specialized staff organs, a formal hierarchy of ranks, an impressive array of weapons and equipment, and considerable international support. Geographically, UNITA's nationwide area of operations consisted of five fronts commanded by a colonel or brigadier, which were subdivided into twenty-two military regions under a colonel or lieutenant colonel. The regions in turn were divided into sectors (usually three) commanded by a major and further subdivided into zones under captains or lieutenants.

FALA had a four-tiered hierarchical structure. The lowest level, the local defense forces, had six battalions of poorly armed men recruited as guards and local militia in contested areas. The next stratum consisted of dispersed guerrillas who trained in their local areas for about sixty days and then conducted operations there, either in small groups of about twenty or in larger units of up to 150. They were armed with automatic weapons and trained to attack and harass FAPLA convoys, bases, and aircraft. The third level included forty-four semi-regular battalions that received a three-month training course and were sent back to the field in units of up to 600. These forces were capable of attacking and defending small towns and strategic terrain and infrastructure. Finally, FALA regular battalions of about 1,000 troops each completed a six-month to nine-month training period, and about a quarter of them also received specialized training in South Africa or Namibia in artillery, communications, and other technical disciplines. Armed with heavy weapons plus supporting arms such as artillery, rockets, mortars, and antitank and air defense weapons, these FALA regulars had the tasks of taking territory and holding it.

By 1987 UNITA claimed to have 65,000 troops (37,000 guerrilla fighters—those in the first three categories cited above—and 28,000 regulars), but other estimates put FALA's total strength closer to 40,000. Among its specialized forces were sixteen platoons of commandos and other support units, including engineering, medicine, communications, and intelligence. In late 1987, women were integrated into FALA for the first time when a unit of fifty completed training as semi-regulars. Seven members of this group received commissions as officers.
In addition to combat forces, UNITA had an extensive logistical support infrastructure of at least 10,000 people, about 1,000 vehicles (mostly South African trucks), an expanding network of roads and landing strips, schools, hospitals, supply depots, and specialized factories, workshops and other facilities used to manufacture, repair, and refurbish equipment and weapons. The main logistical support center and munitions factory was Licua. Many smaller centers were scattered throughout UNITA-controlled territory. Like Jamba, UNITA’s capital, these centers were mobile.

It was difficult to determine the conditions of service with UNITA guerrillas. Military service was voluntary and uncompensated, but soldiers and their families normally received their livelihood, even if it sometimes meant appropriating local food supplies. Moreover, political indoctrination was an essential part of military life and training. Although visitors to UNITA-controlled territory reported that the armed forces were highly motivated, FALA defectors and captives allegedly reported coercive recruiting and low morale.

FALA had a substantial arsenal of weapons and equipment of diverse origin, most of which was captured from FAPLA during attacks on convoys, raids, or pitched battles, or donated by the SADF as war booty. The remainder came from various countries and the international black market. Included in FALA’s inventory were captured T-34 and T-55 tanks, armored vehicles, vehicle-mounted rocket launchers, 76mm and 122mm field guns, mortars (up to 120mm), RPG-7 and 106mm antitank weapons, heavy and light machine guns, various antiaircraft guns, SA-7 and United States-manufactured Redeye and Stinger SAMs, and G-3 and AK-47 assault rifles.

**External Support**

FALA, like FAPLA, would not have been able to expand its size, capabilities, and range of operations without extensive external assistance. By supplying UNITA with US$80 million worth of assistance annually during the 1980s, Pretoria remained the group’s principal source of arms, training, logistical, and intelligence support. The SAAF made regular air drops of weapons, ammunition, medicine, food, and equipment, sometimes at night to avoid interception, and was reported occasionally to have ferried FALA troops. South African instructors provided training in both Namibia and UNITA-controlled areas of southern Angola. The largest training center in Namibia was at Rundu, where intensive three-month training courses were conducted. In late 1988, amidst regional peace negotiations, there were reports that UNITA was planning to relocate its main external logistical supply lines from South Africa to
Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
Courtesy Free Angola Information Service

UNITA troops atop a Soviet-built BTR-60 captured in Mavinga in 1987
Courtesy Free Angola Information Service
In addition to aid from South Africa, UNITA received support in varying degrees from numerous black African and North African states. Zaire provided sanctuary and allowed its territory to be used by others to train and resupply UNITA forces, and Zambia and Malawi were suspected of granting clandestine overflight and landing privileges. During the 1970s, UNITA troops were trained in Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and other African countries. Subsequently, Egypt, Morocco, Senegal, Somalia, and Tunisia also furnished financial and military aid. Morocco, which had supplied arms to the MPLA during the liberation struggle, switched sides and became a major source of military training for FALA, especially for officers, paratroops, and artillery personnel. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Arab states furnished financial support valued at US$60 million to US$70 million annually. Israel was also reported to have provided military aid and training to UNITA soldiers at Kamina in Zaire. Although Savimbi denied that UNITA had ever employed foreign mercenaries or advisers, there had been reports of South African, French, Israeli, and Portuguese combatants among his forces.

Beginning in 1986, the United States had supplied UNITA with US$15 million to US$20 million annually in "covert" military aid funded out of the budget of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The first acknowledged shipments of United States aid consisted of nonlethal items such as trucks, medical equipment, and uniforms, but antitank and air defense weapons soon followed. The bulk of this matériel was reportedly airlifted through Kamina airbase in Zaire’s Shaba Region, where a UNITA liaison detachment was stationed and CIA operatives were believed by Luanda to have trained 3,000 UNITA guerrillas. The remainder was thought to have been delivered through South Africa, Gabon, and Central African Republic.

Angola as a Refuge

The MPLA-PT government, conscious of its own revolutionary and anticolonial origins and committed to the liberation of South African-occupied Namibia and of South Africa itself, provided both sanctuary and material support to SWAPO and the ANC. Although FAPLA never made a preemptive attack south of the Namibian border, Pretoria’s forces repeatedly invaded or otherwise intervened militarily in Angola. South Africa’s regional strategy was to ensure UNITA’s success, contain and disrupt SWAPO, prevent
the establishment of ANC bases in southern Angola, and halt Cuban and Soviet expansion southward. In addition to SWAPO and the ANC, a large contingent of Katangan gendarmes (remnants of the force that had invaded Zaire's Shaba Region in 1977 and 1978) enjoyed the protection of the Angolan government.

SWAPO was headquartered in Luanda and directed camps primarily in southern Angola from which its militants could infiltrate Namibia in small units. SWAPO's military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), had main command centers in Luanda and Lubango and training camps in Huila, Benguela, and Cuanza Sul provinces. To avoid identification, infiltration, and attack by the SADF, most of its camps were mobile. SWAPO recruits were trained at Angolan and Cuban military facilities, whence they were dispatched to SWAPO camps and formally organized into battalions of 400 to 800 troops each. PLAN's strength in 1988 was estimated at 9,000 troops, most of whom were engaged in operations in Angola against UNITA, rather than against the SADF in Namibia. It was uncertain whether PLAN's anti-UNITA operations represented a quid pro quo for Angolan sanctuary and material support or reflected limited chances to operate in Namibia because of South African defenses. In the Angolan government's 1986 offensive against UNITA, for example, it was estimated that 6,000 to 8,000 SWAPO guerrillas operated with FAPLA.

In May 1978, South African forces made their first major cross-border raid into Angola, attacking SWAPO's main camp at Cassinga. Other major South African incursions against SWAPO bases and forces occurred in 1981 and 1983. These attacks and the many that followed, coupled with UNITA's territorial expansion, disrupted SWAPO and forced it to disperse and move northward. The Lusaka Accord of February 1984 provided for a ceasefire, South African withdrawal, and relocation of SWAPO under FAPLA control to monitored camps north of a neutral zone along the Namibian border. But Pretoria, alleging that SWAPO's redeployment was incomplete, delayed its own pullout until April 1985. In September 1985, however, South Africa launched another major air and ground attack on SWAPO and later claimed to have killed about 600 guerrillas in 1985 and 1986.

The southern African peace negotiations in 1988 rekindled rumors of debate within the MPLA-PT about continued support for SWAPO. The regional accords required Angola to restrict PLAN to an area north of 16° south latitude, about 150 kilometers from the Namibian border. South Africa accused SWAPO of violating the agreement by remaining in the proscribed area and
Angola: A Country Study

intensifying its operations from a military command headquarters at Xangongo. Accusations aside, SWAPO intended PLAN to form the nucleus of a future Namibian national army, into which it would integrate the existing territorial forces after a period of reorientation and rehabilitation.

The ANC, banned in South Africa, operated mainly in Angola under the protection and control of Luanda. At least seven major training camps for an estimated 1,000 to 1,400 members of the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (Zulu for “Spear of the Nation”), were in Angola. Most of the ANC’s personnel, which were organized into three battalions, had their encampment at Viana, outside Luanda. This location in northern Angola provided security from South African attacks but restricted the ANC’s ability to infiltrate or mount attacks on South Africa. Other major camps were also in the north at Caculama, Pango, and Quibaxe. ANC militants, like those of PLAN, were engaged along with FAPLA forces in fighting UNITA. Some ANC forces may have been integrated into FAPLA units. Such joint training and operations facilitated the ANC’s access to weapons and supplies, which came mostly from the Soviet Union and its allies. Sanctuary in Angola became all the more important after the March 1984 Mozambique-South Africa nonaggression and mutual security pact, the Nkomati Accord, which obliged Maputo to control ANC activities. By 1988 a combination of internal and external pressures had considerably weakened the ANC, including assassinations of its leadership, South African infiltration and crackdowns at home, attacks on ANC cadres in Botswana, and the United States-brokered peace accords under which Luanda agreed to terminate its assistance to the ANC. As 1988 ended, the ANC decided to relocate its bases out of Angola; reportedly, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Uganda had been mentioned as possible destinations.

Finally, Angola was a refuge for some 1,400 Zairian dissidents. Although quiescent since 1978, these former Katangan gendarmes, who formed the National Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front National pour la Libération du Congo—FNLC), remained Luanda’s potential trump card if relations with Zaire became intolerable.

Internal Security Forces and Organization

Internal security responsibilities in Angola were distributed among the ministries of defense, state security, and interior, plus the People’s Vigilance Brigades (Brigadas Populares de Vigilância—BPV). This elaborate internal security establishment was another manifestation of endemic crises and the mass mobilization undertaken to cope with them. The Ministry of Defense’s
Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops, established as the ODP in late 1975, had 600,000 members, with some of these personnel in virtually every village by 1979. By that time, 50,000 ODP troops were also reported to be fighting alongside the regular army against UNITA and the SADF. Estimates of the size of the ODP militia in the late 1980s varied widely, from an effective strength of 50,000, one-fifth of whom served with FAPLA, to a nominal (possibly reserve) strength of 500,000. This militia had both armed and unarmed units dispersed in villages throughout the country to guard likely UNITA targets such as bridges, power plants, wells, schools, and clinics. The ODP also cooperated with FAPLA, sometimes in joint operations, to thwart infiltration and attacks by small units in areas where UNITA or other insurgent forces were operating.

State security functions were assigned to the Angolan Directorate of Intelligence and Security (Direcção de Informação e Segurança de Angola—DISA) in the Ministry of Interior. As the principal internal security organ with intelligence collection and political police functions, the DISA was powerful and feared. Its national security police force had wide-ranging powers and discretion to conduct investigations, make arrests, detain individuals, and determine how they would be treated. Indeed, during Colonel Ludy Kissassunda's tenure as director (1975–79), the agency came into disrepute for excesses that included torture and summary executions. In mid-1979 President Neto announced the dissolution of the DISA, the arrest of Kissassunda and several other top security officials, and the reorganization of the state security apparatus. Although officially abolished, the DISA remained the colloquial term for the state security police. Its agents were trained at a school in Luanda by East German and Soviet instructors. The DISA reportedly also operated out of the Angolan chancery in Portugal to maintain surveillance over expatriate activities and received assistance from counterparts in various communist embassies in Lisbon.

The Ministry of State Security was created in July 1980 as part of a government reorganization by dividing the Ministry of Interior into two separate ministries. The new ministry consolidated the DISA's internal security functions with those relating to counterintelligence, control of foreigners, anti-UNITA operations, and frontier security. Colonel Kundi Paihama, the former minister of interior, became the minister of state security upon creation of the ministry, but in late 1981 Colonel Paulo succeeded Paihama.

In early 1986, after having revitalized the party organs and formed a new Political Bureau, President dos Santos undertook
to purge and reorganize the Ministry of State Security. He removed Paulo and Deputy Minister Mendes António de Castro, took over the portfolio himself, and appointed Major Fernando Dias da Piedade dos Santos, deputy minister of interior since mid-1984, as new deputy minister of state security. In March 1986, the president formed the Commission for Reorganization of the Ministry of State Security, composed of all the directors at the ministries of interior and state security, under Piedade dos Santos’s leadership. After the arrest and jailing of several senior state security officials for abuse of their positions, corruption, and other irregularities, the commission was disbanded in March 1988. In May 1988, President dos Santos relinquished the state security portfolio to Paihama, who also retained the position of minister of state for inspection and control.

The Angolan Border Guard (Tropa Guarda Fronteira Angolana—TGFA), under the Ministry of State Security, was responsible for maintaining security along more than 5,000 kilometers of land borders with Congo, Zaire, Zambia, and Namibia; maritime border surveillance may also have been included in the TGFA’s mission. The TGFA’s strength was estimated at 7,000 in 1988. Local training took place under Cuban instructors at several centers, including Omupanda, Saurimo, Negage, and Caota, although some border guards were sent to Cuba, presumably for advanced or specialized training.

After its reorganization in 1980, the Ministry of Interior supervised the national police, provincial administration, and investigation of economic activities. Although the Ministry of State Security was responsible for administering the national prison system, certain prison camps were run by the Ministry of Interior. It was unclear how territorial administration was carried out in relation to the regional military and provincial defense councils. Colonel Manuel Alexandre Rodrigues (nom de guerre Kito), who had been vice minister of interior in charge of internal order and the national police, was promoted to minister in the 1980 reorganization and was still serving in that post in late 1988. At that time, however, in response to reports that “special forces of a commando nature” had been established within the ministry without authorization, President dos Santos ordered an investigation as a prelude to a restructuring and personnel purge.

The national Angolan People’s Police evolved from the Portuguese colonial police and the People’s Police Corps of Angola, which was set up in 1976 under the Ministry of Defense. Headquartered in Luanda but organized under provincial and local commands, the police numbered about 8,000 men and women and
reportedly was supported by a paramilitary force of 10,000 that resembled a national guard. Cuban advisers provided most recruit training at the Kapolo Martyrs Practical Police School in Lunda, but some police training was also given in Cuba and Nigeria. In 1984 Minister of Interior Rodrigues dismissed Fernando da Conceição as police director and named Piedrade dos Santos as his provisional replacement. Rodrigues relieved Major Bartolomeu Feliciano Ferreira Neto as chief of the general command in November 1987, appointing Inspector José Adão de Silva as interim chief of the general staff pending a permanent posting. In December 1988, Armando Fernandes do Espírito Santo Vieira was appointed commander general of the Angolan People's Police (apparently the top police post, formerly titled director). At the same time, police functions were being reorganized and consolidated within the Ministry of Interior to eliminate unauthorized activities, give the police more autonomy, and make them more responsive to party and government direction.

Finally, President dos Santos created the BPV in August 1983 as a mass public order, law enforcement, and public service force in urban areas. Organizationally, the BPV had ministerial status, and its commander reported directly to the president. In some ways, the BPV was the urban counterpart of the Directorate of People's Defense and Territorial Troops. Unlike this directorate, however, whose members served alongside the army, the BPV was strictly defensive. Some BPV units were armed, but most performed public security and welfare duties and local political and ideological work—including intelligence gathering, surveillance and security patrols, civil defense, crime prevention and detection, and the organization of health, sanitation, recreation, beautification, and other social services—with and through local government and the field offices of central government agencies. The brigades were organized at the provincial level and below, operated in small units of up to 100 members, and expanded rapidly, particularly in areas affected by UNITA insurgency. In late 1984, a large number of FAPLA soldiers were integrated into the BPV to strengthen its numbers and technical military skills. The BPV was also reported to serve as a recruitment pool for FAPLA. By 1987 the BPV's strength was estimated by various sources to be from 800,000 to 1.5 million. A third of its members were said to be women, organized into 30,000 brigades under Colonel Alexandre Lemos de Lucas (nom de guerre Bota Militar).

The rapid growth and diverse social composition of the BPV were illustrated by reports from Namibe and Huambo provinces. In early 1985, there were about 500 vigilantes organized into twenty-six
squads in Namibe, capital of Namibe Province. These vigilante units had just been credited with neutralizing a network of “saboteurs” who were stealing and selling large quantities of food and housewares at high prices. Two years later, the Namibe provincial BPV was reported to have 11,885 men and women organized into 6 municipal and 228 intermediary brigades. Among the ranks were 305 MPLA-PT members, 266 members of the Organization of Angolan Women (Organização da Mulher Angolana—OMA), 401 members of the JMPLA, and 448 members of the National Union of Angolan Workers (União Nacional dos Trabalhadores Angolanos—UNTA). In Huambo Province, there were reportedly about 100,000 brigade members in early 1986, one-third of them women, and the authorities planned continued expansion to 300,000 by the end of that year.

As in the case of the armed forces, the Angolan internal security organs were subject to ideological and institutional controls. They were also heavily influenced by Soviet, East German, and Cuban state security doctrines, organizational methods, techniques, and practices. Advisers from these countries were posted throughout the security ministries, where their presence, access, and influence ironically became a security problem for the Angolan government. They reportedly penetrated the internal security apparatus so thoroughly and recruited so many Angolan security officials that President dos Santos removed foreigners from some sensitive areas and dismissed several Angolan security officers for “collaboration” with foreign elements. A security school, staffed entirely by Angolan personnel, also opened in late 1987, thereby reducing the need and attendant risks of sending officers abroad for training.

**Crime and Punishment**

**Criminal Justice System**

The Ministry of Justice administered the civil legal and penal systems, although its jurisdictional boundaries with the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense, and the regional military councils were unclear. The civilian court system, known as the People’s Revolutionary Tribunal (Tribunal Popular Revolucionário), was established in 1976 to deal with capital offenses against national security. These courts had jurisdiction over crimes against the security of the state, mercenary activities, war crimes, and so-called crimes against humanity, and they could unilaterally assume jurisdiction over any criminal case that had a significant impact on national security (see Judicial System, ch. 4). Such tribunals, composed of three to five judges, were
established in each provincial capital but administered by a national
directorate in Luanda. In late 1988, Fernando José de Franca Dias
Van Dúnem had been minister of justice since February 1986, when
he had succeeded Diógenes Boavida.

In 1983 military tribunals were set up in each military region
and empowered to try crimes against the security of the state,
including alleged offenses committed on behalf of UNITA such
as terrorism, espionage, treason, sabotage, destabilization, and
armed rebellion; "economic crimes" such as speculation, hoard-
ing, and currency violations; disobedience of directives from the
regional military council; and other acts that might "damage or
endanger the interests of collective defense and security." The
independence of the judicial structure and process was severely cir-
cumscribed by political control of the court system and the fact that
the judges of the military tribunals were military officers whose
appointment, reassignment, and removal were controlled by the
minister of defense. Military courts frequently handed down death
sentences, which were usually carried out by firing squad. Although
persons sentenced to death by military courts were legally entitled
to automatic appeal to the Armed Forces Military Tribunal, the
highest military court, such appeals were not known to have been
lodged.

Article 23 of the Constitution provides that citizens shall not be
arrested and tried except in accordance with the terms of law and
states the right of accused persons to legal defense. However, the
extent to which these provisions were observed was uncertain.
Amnesty International, a human rights organization, reported
the detention without charge or trial of dozens of political pri-
soners and trials by military tribunals of hundreds who were not
given adequate opportunity to prepare their defense or appeal
sentences.

Angolan law provided that persons suspected of having commit-
ted serious crimes against the security of the state could be detained
without charge by the Ministry of State Security for up to three
months and that this period could be extended an additional three
months. Unlike common criminals, such detainees did not have
to be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours of arrest and
could not challenge the basis of detention. Political prisoners had
to be informed of the accusations against them after six months
in detention and then had to be referred to a public prosecutor or
released. If charges were pressed, there was no stated time period
within which a trial had to be held, and delays of several years were
common.
Prison System

Little information was available on the Angolan prison system. Prisons were primitive, and authorities apparently had wide discretion in dealing with prisoners. As in most Third World countries, prisons were designed for custodial and punitive purposes, not for rehabilitation. Detention facilities were overcrowded, diets were substandard, and sanitation and medical facilities were minimal. Intimidation, prolonged interrogations, torture, and maltreatment, especially of political prisoners, were common. Visits by families, friends, and others appeared to be restricted arbitrarily. Prisoners were sometimes held incommunicado or moved from one prison to another without notification of family.

The ministries of state security and interior reportedly administered penal institutions, but their respective jurisdictions were unknown. The principal prisons were located in Luanda, where a maximum security institution was opened in early 1981, and in several provincial and local jurisdictions. The main detention centers for political prisoners were the Estrada de Catete prison in the capital and the Bentiaba detention camp in Namibe Province. The government-run detention center at Tari in Cuanza Sul Province was identified as one of the main rural detention centers. Tari was a former sisal plantation turned into a labor farm, where prisoners lived in barracks or in their own huts while doing forced labor. In 1983 it was reported that Tari's prisoners included those already sentenced, awaiting trial, or detained without trial as security risks. Political reeducation, once an integral element of rehabilitation, was not widely or consistently practiced. Foreign advisers, principally East German and Cuban security specialists, assisted in operating detention centers and in training Angolan state security service personnel. Elsewhere, East Germans were reported to be in charge of a political reeducation camp.

Incidence and Trends in Crime

It is difficult to generalize about the incidence of crime in Angola. Indeed, the government's characterization of UNITA and other insurgent groups as bandits, gangsters, criminals, puppet gangs, rebels, and counterrevolutionaries suggested a complex mixture of civil, criminal, and political criteria. However, it is likely that Angolan society exhibited criminal patterns similar to those of societies in other developing countries experiencing uncontrolled rural-to-urban migration, rapid social change, unemployment and
underemployment, the spread of urban slums, and the lack or breakdown of urban and social services. It is also likely that such patterns were even more pronounced because of three decades of endemic conflict and massive dislocation. Historical and comparative patterns suggest that crimes against property increased with urban growth and that juveniles accounted for most of the increase.

Available evidence, although fragmentary, indicated that the crime rate was rising. Smuggling, particularly of diamonds and timber, was frequently reported as a major criminal offense, occasionally involving senior government and party officials. Dealing in illegal currency was another common crime. Persons acting as police or state security agents sometimes abused their writs by illegally entering homes and stealing property. Intermittent police crackdowns on black market activities had only short-term effects. Endemic production and distribution problems and shortages gave rise to embezzlement, pilfering, and other forms of criminal misappropriation. The enormous extent of this problem was indicated by an official estimate in 1988 that 40 percent of imported goods did not reach their intended consumers because of the highly organized parallel market system. The government later approved new measures to combat economic crime on a national scale.
Human Rights

Angola was a signatory to several international human rights conventions, including the Convention on the Political Rights of Women of 1953, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, and the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1967. However, as of 1988 Angola was not a signatory to the Slavery Conventions of 1926 and 1956; the Genocide Convention of 1948; or the International Conventions on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights of 1966.

Although Angola had acceded to such conventions, and its Constitution guarantees most human rights, actual observance was subject to severe abridgments, qualifications, and contrary practices. A human rights organization, Freedom House, consistently gave Angola the lowest ratings on its scale of political rights and civil liberties, and The Economist World Human Rights Guide assigned Angola an overall rating of "poor." Amnesty International and the United States Department of State also issued reports highly critical of human rights practices in Angola.

The lack or disregard of international human rights standards in Angola was evident in several respects. Arbitrary arrest and imprisonment without due process were among the most common abuses. Although Angolan law limited the amount of time one could be detained without charge, there did not appear to be a specific period within which a suspect had to be tried, and as many as several hundred political prisoners may have been detained for years without trial. The regional military councils had broad authority to impose restrictions on the movement of people and material, to requisition supplies and labor without compensation, and to try crimes against state security. The BPV also had functions relating to maintenance of public order, the exercise of which was not subject to normal judicial safeguards and due process.

Constitutional protections of the inviolability of the home and privacy of correspondence were routinely ignored by government authorities, who made arbitrary home searches, censored correspondence, and monitored private communications. Arbitrary executions of political prisoners, especially those accused of supporting UNITA or perpetrating "economic crimes," occurred despite international protests and periodic reorganizations of the security services. The government maintained strict censorship, did not tolerate criticism or opposition, and denied freedom of assembly
to any group that was not sanctioned or sponsored by the MPLA-PT. UNITA alleged that compulsory military service was meted out as punishment by the Ministry of State Security and the BPV. Furthermore, the government did not permit the International Committee of the Red Cross access to persons arrested for reasons related to internal security or military conflict.

Amnesty International also reported numerous instances of torture during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Ministry of State Security officials were reported to have permitted or sanctioned torture of criminals and political prisoners by such methods as beating, whipping, and electric shock. Political detainees arrested for offenses such as criticizing government policies were deprived of food and water for several days and subjected to frequent and severe beatings during interrogation and confinement. Although allegations of torture and mistreatment remained common in the mid-1980s, such practices did not appear to have been systematic.

* * *

There is voluminous material available on Angola’s military history and contemporary national security affairs. The Angolan independence struggle is thoroughly examined in John A. Marcum’s two-volume *The Angolan Revolution*. The civil war of 1975–76 is covered by some of the excellent essays in *Southern Africa since the Portuguese Coup*, edited by John Seiler. The external dimension of the civil war is treated in Charles K. Ebinger’s *Foreign Intervention in Civil War*, Arthur Jay Klinghoffer’s *The Angolan War*, and Ernest Harsch and Tony Thomas’s *Angola: The Hidden History of Washington’s War*.

The UNITA movement has been extensively studied as well. One sympathetic treatment is Fred Bridgland’s *Jonas Savimbi*. Two excellent politico-military analyses of the UNITA insurgency are Donald J. Alberts’s “Armed Struggle in Angola” in *Insurgency in the Modern World* and James W. Martin III’s unpublished doctoral dissertation, “UNITA Insurgency in Angola.”

The human cost of the war—at least in terms of refugees—is well covered by the U.S. Committee for Refugees’ *Uprooted Angolans*. The devastating economic impact of the protracted war is most fully and systematically examined in Tony Hodges’s *Angola to the 1990s*.

A standard reference work on military forces and order of battle data is *The Military Balance*, issued annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Supplementary information is available in the annual *Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook*, specialized
annuals such as *Jane's Fighting Ships*, *Jane's Weapon Systems*, and *Jane's All the World's Aircraft*, and *Combat Fleets of the World*, edited by Jean Labayle Couhat and Bernard Prézelin. Other useful reference works are John M. Andrade's *World Police and Paramilitary Forces* and Michael J.H. Taylor's *Encyclopedia of the World's Air Forces*. Statistics and other information on arms transfers, military spending, and armed forces are contained in the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's annual *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's annual *SIPRI Yearbook*.


Finally, specialized current news sources and surveys are indispensable to research on contemporary national security affairs. The most relevant and accessible include the annual *Africa Contemporary Record* and periodicals such as *Africa Research Bulletin*, *Africa Confidential*, *Africa Diary*, *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly*, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, and *International Defense Review*. The most useful sources are *African Defence Journal* and its sister publication, *Afrique Défense*. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)
### Appendix A

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Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

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<tr>
<th>When you know</th>
<th>Multiply by</th>
<th>To find</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millimeters</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centimeters</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>inches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meters</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kilometers</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>miles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hectares (10,000 m²)</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>acres</td>
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<tr>
<td>Square kilometers</td>
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<td>square miles</td>
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<td>Cubic meters</td>
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<td>cubic feet</td>
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<td>Liters</td>
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<td>Kilograms</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metric tons</td>
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<td>long tons</td>
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<td>short tons</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,204</td>
<td>pounds</td>
</tr>
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<td>Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)</td>
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<td>degrees Fahrenheit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>divide by 5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and add 32</td>
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Table 2. Urban-Rural Breakdown of Population by Province, 1988

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<th>Province</th>
<th>Urban 1</th>
<th>Rural 2</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td>137,400</td>
<td>156,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>297,700</td>
<td>308,800</td>
<td>606,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bié</td>
<td>201,600</td>
<td>842,400</td>
<td>1,044,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinda</td>
<td>73,600</td>
<td>73,600</td>
<td>147,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuando Cubango</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>122,000</td>
<td>125,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuanza Norte</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>347,100</td>
<td>365,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuanza Sul</td>
<td>52,700</td>
<td>576,600</td>
<td>629,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cunene</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>215,200</td>
<td>219,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>214,400</td>
<td>1,201,900</td>
<td>1,416,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huila</td>
<td>250,800</td>
<td>578,200</td>
<td>829,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>1,363,900</td>
<td>15,900</td>
<td>1,379,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda Norte</td>
<td>36,300</td>
<td>243,000</td>
<td>279,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda Sul</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>71,400</td>
<td>151,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malanje</td>
<td>174,900</td>
<td>643,400</td>
<td>818,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moxico</td>
<td>39,600</td>
<td>255,700</td>
<td>295,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibe</td>
<td>75,200</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>102,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Úige</td>
<td>211,000</td>
<td>550,100</td>
<td>761,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>92,800</td>
<td>63,700</td>
<td>156,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>3,209,400</td>
<td>6,273,900</td>
<td>9,483,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes cities and towns.
2 Includes villages and open countryside.

### Table 3. Major Civilian Hospitals by Province, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Beds</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>Caxito</td>
<td>Civilian Hospital</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>Central Hospital</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>General medical, X-ray, and laboratory; staffed by Cuban personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobito</td>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian Hospital</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bié</td>
<td>Catabola</td>
<td>Catabola Municipal Hospital</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>General medical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chissamba</td>
<td>Civilian Hospital</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kuito</td>
<td>Regional Hospital</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinda</td>
<td>Cabinda</td>
<td>Lombe-Lombe Hospital</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, and teaching facility for rural workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuando Cubango</td>
<td>Menongue</td>
<td>Regional Hospital</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>Huambo Hospital</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>General medical, orthopedic; depends on UNICEF and International Committee of the Red Cross for equipment and food. ²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longonjo</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bongo Mission Hospital</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>General medical Seventh-Day Adventists hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huila</td>
<td>Caluquembe</td>
<td>Missionary Hospital</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, and teaching facility for rural workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubango</td>
<td></td>
<td>Central Hospital</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.—Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Beds</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>Luanda</td>
<td>Americo Boavoia</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>University Hospital</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, X-ray, laboratory, and teaching facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-do-</td>
<td>Central Hospital</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td></td>
<td>General medical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunda Sul</td>
<td>Saurimo</td>
<td>Regional Hospital</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>General medical, surgical, X-ray, and laboratory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibe</td>
<td>Namibe</td>
<td>N’Gola Kimbanda Hospital</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>General medical, X-ray, and laboratory; staffed by 13 specialized physicians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uíge</td>
<td>Uíge</td>
<td>Uíge Regional Hospital</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>General medical, X-ray, and laboratory.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

1 Does not include hospitals in areas claimed by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola—UNITA).
## Appendix A

### Table 4. Revenues, Expenditures, and Deficits, 1980–86 (in billions of kwanzas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Revenues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State enterprises</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total revenues</strong></td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expenditures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense and security</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditures</strong></td>
<td>87.2</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deficits</strong></td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. For value of the kwanza—see Glossary.
2. Figures may not add to total because of rounding.


### Table 5. Agricultural Production Marketed by State Enterprises, 1982–85 (in tons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seed cotton</td>
<td>3,130</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>15,290</td>
<td>10,775</td>
<td>21,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>12,790</td>
<td>8,370</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>5,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>23,470</td>
<td>15,630</td>
<td>10,589</td>
<td>13,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus fruit</td>
<td>3,320</td>
<td>2,290</td>
<td>2,435</td>
<td>2,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>14,370</td>
<td>16,920</td>
<td>9,866</td>
<td>16,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry cassava</td>
<td>17,610</td>
<td>6,730</td>
<td>4,164</td>
<td>5,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>32,570</td>
<td>22,700</td>
<td>16,343</td>
<td>11,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>1,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>3,140</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6. Value of Exports, 1980-86
(in millions of United States dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crude oil</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>1,234</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>1,748</td>
<td>1,905</td>
<td>1,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refined oil and liquefied petroleum gas</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coffee</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>1,888</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>1,810</td>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>2,125</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Figures may not add to total because of rounding.


### Table 7. Multilateral Development Assistance, 1979–84
(in millions of United States dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Community</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

### Table 8. Crude Oil Production by Area, 1981–85
(in thousands of barrels per day)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cabinda</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>130.3</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>165.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block 2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Block 3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo River Basin</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuanza River Basin</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong>*</td>
<td>129.4</td>
<td>129.6</td>
<td>178.0</td>
<td>204.0</td>
<td>231.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures may not add to total because of rounding.


### Table 9. Production and Exports of Diamonds, 1977–87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volume ¹</td>
<td>Value ²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>707</td>
<td>3,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>4,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>6,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,397</td>
<td>4,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1,221</td>
<td>3,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>2,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

n.a.—not available.

¹ In thousands of carats.

² In millions of kwanzas (for value of the kwanza—see Glossary).

Angola: A Country Study

Table 10. Coffee Production, Exports, and Closing Stocks, 1971–86
(in thousands of bags)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Closing Stocks 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,888</td>
<td>3,019</td>
<td>4,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4,031</td>
<td>3,097</td>
<td>5,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>4,135</td>
<td>4,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3,206</td>
<td>2,961</td>
<td>5,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>3,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>1,123</td>
<td>3,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>3,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>1,245</td>
<td>2,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1,012</td>
<td>1,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>1,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>1,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>1,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 2</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Coffee held in storage at end of year.
2 Government forecast.

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 92.

Table 11. Balance of Payments, 1982–85
(in billions of kwanzas) 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exports 2</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports 2</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance 3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invisibles (net)</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current account balance</td>
<td>-7.2</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-term and long-term capital</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserves at end of year</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 For value of the kwanza—see Glossary.
2 Free on board.
3 Figures may not result in balance because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Tony Hodges, Angola to the 1990s, London, 1987, 42-43.
**Table 12. Major Army Equipment, 1988**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main battle tanks</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-34</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-54/55</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-62</td>
<td>100+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-72</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Light tanks</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT-76</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Armored vehicles</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRDM-1/-2</td>
<td>200+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AML-60/-90</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTR-40/-50/-60/-152</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP-2</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhard M3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Artillery</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assortment of 76mm, 85mm, 100mm, 122mm, 130mm, and 152mm guns</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SU-100 (self-propelled)</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM-21/-24 multiple rocket launchers</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120mm mortars</td>
<td>40+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82mm mortars</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Antitank weapons</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm, 82mm, and 107mm recoilless rifles</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Air defense guns</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZSU-23-4 (self-propelled)</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>ZSU-57-2 (self-propelled)</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-60</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZPU-1/-2/-4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZU-23-2</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-1939</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-55</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surface-to-air missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-7/-4</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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n.a.—not available.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attack aircraft</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-23 Flogger</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21MF Fishbed</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-22 Fitter</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interceptors</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-17F Fresco</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-19 Farmer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-21bis Fishbed</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counterinsurgency and reconnaissance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC-7 Turbo-Trainer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maritime patrol</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fokker F-27MPA Friendship</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMB-111 Bandeirante</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fixed-wing transports</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Douglas C-47 Dakota</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASA C-212 Aviocar</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L-100-30</td>
<td>1 or 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do-27</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nord 262</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BN-2A Islander</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TU-134A Crusty</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yak-40 Codling</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander 690A</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC-6B Turbo-Porter</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-2 Colt</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-12 Cub</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-26 Curl</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-32 Cline</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trainers</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MiG-15UTI Midget</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yak-11 Moose</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cessna 172</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC-7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC-9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Helicopters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-8 Hip</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mi-17</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mi-24 Hind C</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi-25</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-316B Alouette III</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAR-316B Alouette III</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-342 Gazelle</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-365N Dauphin</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-315B Lama</td>
<td>1</td>
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</table>
### Table 13. —Continued.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>In Inventory</th>
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<tr>
<td>Surface-to-air missiles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-2 Guideline</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-3 Goa</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-6 Gainful</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-8 Gecko</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-9 Gaskin</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA-13 Gopher</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
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n.a. — not available.

### Table 14. Major Navy Equipment, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fast missile craft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSA-II with four SS-N-2 Styx missiles</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast torpedo craft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shershen with four 533mm heavyweight torpedo tubes</td>
<td>4 or 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inland-water and coastal patrol boats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argos</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poluchat-I</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhuk</td>
<td>1 or 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jupiter</td>
<td>1 or 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellatrix</td>
<td>4 or 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine warfare craft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yevgenya MH1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious vessels</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polnocny-B</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfrange</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-4</td>
<td>4 or 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDM-400</td>
<td>9 or 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal defense equipment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS-C1 Sepal radar system at Luanda</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1988 REGIONAL ACCORDS

Tripartite Agreement, December 22, 1988


The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter designated as "the Parties,"

Taking into account the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa," approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988, and the subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these Principles, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement,


Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the redeployment toward the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola,

Recognizing the role of the United Nations Security Council in implementing UNSCR 435/78 and in supporting the implementation of the present agreement,

Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of all states of southwestern Africa,

Affirming the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states,

Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states,

Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights, and of the states of southwestern Africa to peace, development, and social progress,

Urging African and international cooperation for the settlement
of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa,

Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America,

Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in southwestern Africa,

Agree to the provisions set forth below:

(1) The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary General of the United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council to commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989.

(2) All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart Namibia in accordance with UNSCR 435/78.

(3) Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435/78, the Republic of South Africa and People’s Republic of Angola shall cooperate with the Secretary General to ensure the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections and shall abstain from any action that could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The Parties shall respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Namibia and shall ensure that their territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with acts of war, aggression, or violence against the territorial integrity or inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other action which could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78.

(4) The People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature of this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the north and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People’s Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the Security Council of the United Nations for the on-site verification of that withdrawal.

(5) Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, organization, or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression, or violence, against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, or independence of any state of southwestern Africa.

(6) The Parties shall respect the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the states of southwestern Africa.

(7) The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations undertaken in this agreement and shall resolve through negotiation and in a spirit of cooperation any disputes with respect to the interpretation or implementation thereof.

(8) This agreement shall enter into force upon signature.
Signed at New York in triplicate in the Portuguese, Spanish, and English languages, each language being equally authentic, this 22nd day of December 1988.

FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA  
Afonso Van Dúnem  
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA  
Isidoro Octavio Malmierca  
FOR THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA  
Roelof F. Botha

Bilateral Agreement, December 22, 1988
Following is the unofficial United States translation of the original Portuguese and Spanish texts of the agreement, with annex.


The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba hereinafter designated as the Parties,

Considering,

That the implementation of Resolution 435 of the Security Council of the United Nations for the independence of Namibia shall commence on the 1st of April,

That the question of the independence of Namibia and the safeguarding of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of the People's Republic of Angola are closely interrelated with each other and with peace and security in the region of southwestern Africa.

That on the date of signature of this agreement a tripartite agreement among the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and Republic of South Africa shall be signed, containing the essential elements for the achievement of peace in the region of southwestern Africa,

That acceptance of and strict compliance with the foregoing will bring to an end the reasons which compelled the Government of the People's Republic of Angola to request, in the legitimate exercise of its rights under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the deployment of Angolan territory of a Cuban internationalist
military contingent to guarantee, in cooperation with the FAPLA [the Angolan Government army], its territorial integrity and sovereignty in view of the invasion and occupation of part of its territory,

Noting,

The agreements signed by the Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba on 4 February 1982 and 19 March 1984, the platform of the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola approved in November 1984, and the Protocol of Brazzaville signed by the Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa on December 13, 1988,

Taking into account,

That conditions now exist which make possible the repatriation of the Cuban military contingent currently in Angolan territory and the successful accomplishment of their internationalist mission,

The Parties agree as follows:

Article 1

To commence the redeployment by stages to the 15th and 13th parallels and the total withdrawal to Cuba of the 50,000 men who constitute the Cuban troops contingent stationed in the People’s Republic of Angola, in accordance with the pace and time frame established in the attached calendar, which is an integral part of this agreement. The total withdrawal shall be completed by the 1st of July, 1991.

Article 2

The Governments of the People’s Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba reserve the right to modify or alter their obligations deriving from Article 1 of this agreement in the event that flagrant violations of the tripartite agreement are verified.

Article 3

The Parties, through the Secretary General of the United Nations, hereby request that the Security Council verify the redeployment and phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People’s Republic of Angola, and to this end shall agree on a matching protocol.

Article 4

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the tripartite agreement among the People’s Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa.

Signed on 22 December 1988, at the Headquarters of the United
Nations, in two copies, in the Portuguese and Spanish languages, each being equally authentic.

FOR THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA
Afonso Van Dúnem

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA
Isidoro Octavio Malmierca

Annex on Troop Withdrawal Schedule

CALENDAR

In compliance with Article 1 of the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People’s Republic of Angola for the termination of the mission of the Cuban internationalist military contingent stationed in Angolan territory, the Parties establish the following calendar for the withdrawal:

**Time Frames**

Prior to the first of April, 1989
(date of the beginning of implementation of Resolution 435) 3,000 men

Total duration of the calendar
Starting from the first of April, 1989 27 months

Redeployment to the north:

- to the 15th parallel by 1 August 1989
- to the 13th parallel by 31 October 1989

Total men to be withdrawn:

- by 1 November 1989 25,000 men
- by 1 April 1990 33,000 men
- by 1 October 1990 38,000 men
- by July 1991 50,000 men

Taking as its base a Cuban force of 50,000 men.
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Chapter 1


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Chapter 5

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assimilado(s)—Those Africans and mestiços (q.v.) considered by the colonial authorities to have met certain formal standards indicating that they had successfully absorbed (assimilated) the Portuguese language and culture. Individuals legally assigned to the status of assimilado assumed (in principle) the privileges and obligations of Portuguese citizens and escaped the burdens, e.g., that of forced labor, imposed on most Africans (indígenas—q.v.). The status of assimilado and its legal implications were formally abolished in 1961.

barrels per day (bpd)—Production of crude oil and petroleum products is frequently measured in barrels per day. A barrel is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons. Conversion of barrels to metric tons depends on the density of the special product. About 7.3 barrels of average crude oil weigh one metric ton. Heavy products would be about seven barrels per metric ton. Light products, such as gasoline and kerosene, would average eight barrels per metric ton.

degredado(s)—Exiled convicts; refers to convicted criminals sent from Portugal to Angola. Degredados constituted a very substantial part of the Portuguese who came to Angola from the sixteenth century to the early twentieth century.

fiscal year (FY)—January 1 to December 31.

gross domestic product (GDP)—A value measure of the flow of domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods for final consumption and intermediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. See also gross national product.

gross national product (GNP)—Gross domestic product (GDP—q.v.) plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions with foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measurement of the output of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at factor cost, removing indirect taxes and subsidies.
indígena(s)—An African or mestiço (q. v.) without assimilado (q. v.) status. In Portuguese terms, it means unassimilated or uncivilized. Before the abolition of the status (and the distinction between it and that of assimilado) in 1961, roughly 99 percent of all Africans were indígenas.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the World Bank (q. v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. The main business of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members (including industrialized and developing countries) when they experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal economic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

kwanza—Angolan currency unit that replaced the Angolan escudo after January 8, 1977. The kwanza, named for the Cuanza (Kwanza) River, consists of 100 lwei (lw), named for one of the river’s tributaries. The kwanza was a nonconvertible currency, but exchange rates for authorized transactions were established regularly. In late 1988, US$1 officially equaled Kz29.3; reportedly, the kwanza traded on the parallel market for up to Kz2,100 per US$1.

Lomé Convention—An agreement between the European Community (EC) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) states whose provisions call for the EC to extend economic assistance to ACP countries. Much of the aid is for project development or rehabilitation, but a large portion is set aside for the Stabilization of Export Earnings (STABEX) system, designed to help developing countries withstand fluctuations in the prices of their agricultural exports.

mestiço(s)—An individual of mixed white and African ancestry. Several varieties, depending on the nature and degree of mixture, were recognized by the Portuguese and mesticos in the colonial era. Before 1961 most mesticos had the status of assimilado (q. v.).

Paris Club—A noninstitutional framework whereby developed nations that make loans or guarantee official or private export credits to lesser developed states meet to discuss borrowers’ ability to repay debts. The organization, which met for the first time in 1956, has no formal or institutional existence and no fixed membership. Its secretariat is run by the French treasury, and it has a close relationship with the World Bank (q. v.), the International Monetary Fund (IMF—q. v.), and the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance specifically designed to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The three institutions are owned by the governments of the nations that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—q.v.).
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