Chapter 4. Government and Politics



Official party banner combining Soviet and Bulgarian flags, hanging above national party congress of Bulgarian Communist Party, Sofia, 1970

ON NOVEMBER 10, 1989, after thirty-five years as undisputed leader, Todor Zhivkov resigned his positions as head of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and head of state of Bulgaria. This act, forced by political opposition and turmoil, was the symbolic watershed between two very different eras in Bulgarian governance. One year after Zhivkov's resignation, Bulgaria had at least some of the primary building blocks for a democratic state: a freely elected parliament, a coalition cabinet, independent newspapers, and vigorous, independent trade unions.

Beginning with Soviet occupation of Nazi-allied Bulgaria in September 1944, the political culture of that country had been totally dominated by a monolithic communist party. In the following three years, that party took advantage of the presence of Soviet troops, decades-long disorder in the Bulgarian political system, and its own high visibility as an anti-Nazi resistance force to complete a rapid communization process.

Postwar communist rule in Bulgaria can be divided into three periods with varying political characteristics. The first period, 1944 through 1947, saw the consolidation of communist power. The Fatherland Front, which began in 1942 as a small illegal antifascist coalition, led a coup that coincided with the 1944 Soviet invasion and installed communists for the first time in crucial government positions. In the next three years, the BCP gradually eliminated disorganized blocks of political opposition, cut Bulgaria off from foreign influences except that of the Soviet Bloc, and confiscated most private economic resources. By the end of 1947, the last effective political opposition had been eliminated and Soviet troops had left Bulgaria. Longtime communist leader Georgi Dimitrov was prime minister of a Bulgarian government that ruled according to a new constitution modeled after that of the Soviet Union. Although that constitution left the political institutions of prewar Bulgaria nominally intact, the consolidation period set the pattern for a very different set of political relationships. Actual political power was concentrated entirely in the national BCP. From 1947 until 1989, nominations and elections to judicial, legislative, and executive posts required party approval. During that time, a nominal second party existed, but party nominees were elected without opposition at all levels of government. The National Assembly (Narodno Sŭbranie) met only to rubber-stamp proposals from the party or the executive branch.

The second phase of the communist period, from 1948 through 1953, strengthened Bulgaria's traditionally close ties with the Soviet Union and established a pattern of imitating the Soviet Union in all major aspects of foreign and domestic policy. The first Bulgarian Five-Year Plan began in 1949, by which time most means of production were in state hands. In 1949 Dimitrov was succeeded by Vŭlko Chervenkov, a protégé of Soviet leader Joseph V. Stalin. Chervenkov imitated his patron's cult of personality by assuming total control of the BCP and the government and enforcing complete conformity to party policy through 1954. Chervenkov intensified the sovietization that began under Dimitrov; the only vestiges of political diversity at this point were a few national party leaders who survived Chervenkov's purges.

In 1953 the death of Stalin brought a strong reaction in Soviet politics against the cult of personality and in favor of collective leadership. Accordingly, in 1954 Todor Zhivkov replaced Chervenkov as first secretary of the BCP. In the next eight years, Zhivkov gradually consolidated his position as supreme leader. In doing so, he maintained the totalitarian state machinery of his predecessors but showed flexibility and resiliency—especially in maintaining power at home while following the winding path of Soviet policy to which Bulgaria remained scrupulously loyal. In spite of dramatic international changes and crises between 1954 and 1989, the Zhivkov era was the longest period of stable rule by a single administration in the history of the modern Bulgarian state.

In the 1980s, however, the Zhivkov regime was overtaken by the wave of political liberation that swept all of Eastern Europe, and by the lethargy and corruption of an administration totally without opposition for nearly thirty years. Immediately after Zhivkov's fall, Bulgaria returned to its precommunist political culture, a shifting mosaic of major and minor parties and coalitions. The National Assembly was resurrected as the vehicle for democratic representation, and the first free parliamentary election was held in 1990. Unlike the communist parties of other East European nations, the BCP (which changed its name in 1990 to the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP) was based on a domestic political movement that predated the 1917 Russian Revolution. Partly for this reason, the BSP was able to win the first free elections that followed overthrow of the old regime. But internal fragmentation, economic crisis, and the party's connection with the wrongs of the Zhivkov era diminished the BSP's popular support as the 1990s began.

Meanwhile, based on very brief experimentation with true parliamentary democracy before World War II, and imitating its

East European neighbors, Bulgaria had decisively rejected repressive one-party rule and professed allegiance to democracy. But formation of democratic institutions on the ruins of the early 1900s proved a formidable task in the early years of the postcommunist era. Coalition government, the main device of political stability in the precommunist era, functioned unevenly in solving the massive problems of the early 1990s, and the remaining power centers of the old regime hindered reform.

The Prewar Political Context

From its separation from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 until 1947, Bulgaria was ruled as a constitutional monarchy, with a parliamentary system based on the Tŭrnovo Constitution of 1879. Although that document was one of the most progressive national constitutions in the world when it was written, actual governance of Bulgaria under it was a constant struggle for power among the tsar, the unicameral parliament, and the Council of Ministers. The many political factions that proliferated in the twentieth century added another dimension to this struggle. Parliaments were elected and dissolved for purely political reasons; strong prime ministers such as Stefan Stambolov (1886–94) and Aleksandŭr Stamboliĭski (1918–23) ignored parliament to advance their own programs (the constitution had no provision for consultation among government branches, although the Council of Ministers was nominally subordinate to parliament); a succession of weak prime ministers were controlled by the tsar or by political factions such as the pro-fascist Zveno coalition of the 1930s; the need to placate the forces of Macedonian irredentism distorted both domestic and foreign politics throughout the post-independence period; and no prime minister survived without stitching together tenuous coalitions of parties, many of which had only narrow political agendas. Frequent appeals were made to amend the Tŭrnovo Constitution; in other cases, the constitution simply was ignored.

The last arrangement of Bulgarian political forces before World War II was the royal dictatorship of Boris III. Boris devised a system of "controlled democracy" after the short totalitarian regime of Zveno had virtually abolished conventional political parties in 1934 (see The Crises of the 1930s, ch. 1). Boris's system was based on judicious appointments and the balancing of civilian politicians against the army. His purpose was not authoritarian rule but to achieve a temporary centralization of power that would allow Bulgaria to return to stable constitutionality after the chaotic post-World War I period. Boris believed that independent parties would hinder this process, so such parties did not reemerge in Bulgaria under

his rule. National elections were not held between 1931 and 1938, and subsequent prewar elections were held under strong government control. In spite of that control, an opposition bloc including the communists gained sixty parliament seats in the 1938 election, compared with ninety-five for Boris's nonpartisan government candidates. In the late 1930s, Boris struggled in vain to form a lasting coalition that could provide solid middle ground between the communist and pro-Nazi factions, both of which rapidly gained support between 1935 and 1940. But when Bulgaria entered the war in 1940, the same "temporary" balance remained in place.

The Early Communist Era

During World War II, the BCP actively opposed Bulgaria's Axis alliance by forming partisan terrorist and sabotage groups. In 1942 the broad Fatherland Front coalition was formed as the communists attempted to involve legal opposition groups in exerting antiwar pressure on the government. The coalition's activities brought severe government reprisals. By 1944 partisan units also were being formed in the Bulgarian army.

The Red Army invasion of September 1944 found a temporary Bulgarian government desperately trying to avoid accommodation with the communist left or the pro-German right, but under intense diplomatic and military pressure from both Germany and the Soviet Union. Boris had died in 1943, and by 1944 severe wartime shortages (partly caused by peasants hoarding food supplies) had eroded support for the government.

When Soviet troops entered Bulgaria, the Fatherland Front engineered a bloodless coup displacing the government of Prime Minister Konstantin Muraviev. In 1946 the first Fatherland Front government divided ministries among the BCP, Zveno, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP). Within a year, the BCP had used that power base to purge the government of all key opposition figures and dominate the Fatherland Front. In 1946 a national referendum rejected the monarchy in favor of a people's republic, leading to the immediate exile of Simeon II, nine-year-old son of Boris III. The following month, the communists easily won a national election for representatives to a *sŭbranie* to write a new constitution over the objections of BANU, which sought a return to the Tŭrnovo Constitution. In early 1947, the conclusion of peace between Bulgaria and the Allies eliminated the Allied Control Commission, through which Britain had maintained some influence on domestic Bulgarian politics. By that time, the only remaining obstacle to total BCP domination was Nikola Petkov's BANU, in a

coalition with other noncommunist parties. The power struggle ended abruptly in mid-1947, when the Fatherland Front arrested and executed Petkov as a Western agent. This event paved the way for unanimous adoption of a new constitution in December 1947. The new document was closely modeled on the 1936 Soviet constitution.

The parliamentary election of fall 1946 gave the BCP 275 of 465 seats and made Georgi Dimitrov prime minister. The communists gained control of all significant ministries, beginning the last stage of consolidating communist dictatorship. The ensuing regimes of Dimitrov and Chervenkov defined Bulgaria as a highly conventional communist state and isolated it from nearly all noncommunist commercial and cultural influences.

The State under Dimitrov

In the 1946 elections, noncommunist parties in the Fatherland Front lost influence far out of proportion to the numerical election results. The most salient new feature of the Dimitrov Constitution was that it rejected the separation of powers among government branches in favor of a "unity of state power," lodged in a presidium wielding legislative, judicial, and executive powers and chosen by the National Assembly with party approval. As before, the National Assembly was a unicameral legislature; elections were to be held every four years, and members could be recalled at any time. The assembly would meet in regular sessions twice a year, or by special order of the Presidium—making the full assembly little more than a rubber-stamp body. The Presidium met continuously and exercised all constitutional powers of the National Assembly when the assembly was not in session. The Presidium's powers included controlling the selection of the Council of Ministers, amending the constitution, approving the national economic plan, declaring war, and making peace. The president of the nineteen-member Presidium thus became one of the two most powerful men in Bulgaria.

The Council of Ministers retained a nominal executive authority as a cabinet, but it was overshadowed by the designation of the National Assembly as "supreme organ of state power." In practice, the council chairman, who by office was prime minister of the country, was always the first secretary of the BCP. This gave the prime minister power equal to that of the Presidium president. The judiciary, now also chosen by the legislative branch at all levels of government, lost all independence. Independent local political power was eliminated when province and district jurisdictions were restructured into people's councils. The councils elected executive

committees analogous to the national Presidium and overseen by that body. As at the national level, local government bodies were filled primarily with party officials. Thus, the Dimitrov Constitution achieved unprecedented centralization of political power in Bulgaria.

Like its Soviet model, the 1947 constitution guaranteed broad freedoms to all citizens (religion, conscience, assembly, speech, the press, emancipation of women, and inviolability of person, domicile, and correspondence). The Bulgarian document differed from the Soviet by allowing private property, but only if the privilege were not used "to the detriment of the public good." All means of production shifted to state ownership. Universal suffrage was guaranteed, as were welfare and employment. Guaranteed employment was restricted to socially useful occupations, however.

Government practice soon eroded the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. Between 1948 and 1952, several official acts repressed the Bulgarian religious community. In 1948 the exarch of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was forced into retirement for his refusal to defend the communist state and the Soviet Union. In 1949 the Law on Religious Organizations put all churches under state control; over the next four years, Catholic and Protestant clergy were harrassed and imprisoned as part of an overall policy of preventing contact with the West. During this period, the Dimitrov government continued purging party and nonparty officials, imitating the contemporaneous Stalinist practice of eliminating all possible political rivals. The most notable victim was the hardline Stalinist and long-time party leader Traĭcho Kostov, convicted and executed in 1949 as a collaborator with the fascists and Josip Broz Tito, the heretical Yugoslav communist leader.

The Chervenkov Era

The Fifth Party Congress, held in December 1948, rightfully celebrated the complete political dominance of socialism in Bulgaria. When Dimitrov died in 1949, his successor, Stalin protégé Vŭlko Chervenkov, began four years of intense party purges (disqualifying nearly 100,000 of 460,000 Bulgarian communists). Chervenkov's cultivation of a cult of personality earned him the nickname "Little Stalin." The breakaway of Tito's Yugoslavia from the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau—see Glossary) in 1948 caused Stalin and Chervenkov to put additional pressure on the BCP to conform with the Soviet line. Stalin's death in 1953 introduced new Soviet leaders who disapproved of Chervenkov's methodology, but the Bulgarian leader remained prime minister and dominated politics until 1956. Chervenkov announced a "new

course'' in 1953, police terror abated, and some political prisoners were released. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian government under the communists followed a postwar East European pattern by creating large numbers of bureaucratic posts that were filled by party-approved functionaries, the *nomenklatura.* A swollen bureaucracy had been traditional in Bulgaria since the modern state was founded in 1878; but previously appointments had depended on membership in the civil service elite, not on membership in a particular party.

The Zhivkov Era

Todor Zhivkov was the dominant figure in Bulgarian government for about thirty-five years, during which time the political scene remained remarkably stable. In the context of post-Stalinist communist statecraft, Zhivkov was a masterful politician. In the context of popular demands for meaningful reform, he was an anachronism whose removal symbolized the beginning of a new approach to governance.

The Rise of Zhivkov

The Chervenkov era firmly established Bulgarian reliance on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for policy leadership and resolution of domestic party rivalries. Just as Stalin's condemnation had doomed Kostov, so condemnation of the cult of personality by Stalin's successors doomed Chervenkov and prepared the way for his successor, Todor Zhivkov. Zhivkov, who began his political career in the party youth organization and worked his way to the party Central Committee in 1948, became party chief when Chervenkov resigned that position in 1954. Both the Moscow authorities who ultimately chose new Bulgarian leaders and the BCP leaders in Sofia approved Zhivkov's flexibility, youth (he was forty-two when selected), and lack of powerful friends and enemies.

In 1956 Bulgarian politics again felt the influence of the Soviet Union. When Nikita S. Khrushchev became leader of the CPSU, he began a new phase of de-Stalinization and party reform that echoed strongly in Bulgaria. This action left Chervenkov without support outside Bulgaria. Then, in 1956 the April Plenum of the BCP Central Committee began a broad party liberalization policy that caused Chervenkov to resign as prime minister. Rather than break completely with the past, however, the party retained Chervenkov as a member of a de facto ruling triumvirate that included Zhivkov and longtime party leader and purge participant Anton Yugov, who became prime minister. Although party

liberalization was stalled by 1956 uprisings in Hungary and Poland, the April Plenum identified Zhivkov as the leader of the Politburo. In doing so, it also shifted power conclusively to the "home" branch of the BCP, more attuned to Bulgarian issues and less to total obedience to the Soviet line.

Zhivkov Takes Control

By the end of 1961, a new wave of Soviet anti-Stalinism gave Zhivkov the support he needed to oust Chervenkov and Yugov. Zhivkov's political position had deteriorated because his grandiose, failed plans for industrialization and agricultural collectivization had evoked strong social protests between 1959 and 1961, but he succeeded Yugov as prime minister in 1962 (see The First Five-Year Plans, ch. 3). Khrushchev formally endorsed Zhivkov with a state visit to Bulgaria in 1962. Although no additional changes occurred in the party or the government until 1971, Zhivkov began introducing a new generation of leaders in the mid-1960s, and political repression eased noticeably. The old guard of officials remaining from the 1944 revolution remained a powerful party element with important Soviet connections; therefore, Zhivkov provided that group enough Politburo positions to ensure its support. Meanwhile, Zhivkov selectively purged officials throughout the early period to prevent development of alternative power centers in the party. In 1964 Zhivkov earned peasant support by appointing Georgi Traikov, chief of the nominally independent BANU, head of state and by pardoning comrades of the executed BANU leader Petkov.

In 1966 a strong resurgence of the conservative wing of the BCP at the Ninth Party Congress curtailed Bulgarian diplomatic and economic overtures to the West and to its Balkan neighbors. The new conservatism also tightened government control over the media and the arts, and the government resumed anti-Western propaganda to protect Bulgarian society from bourgeois influences. As was the case in the 1956 invasion of Hungary, Bulgarian support for the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia brought tighter party control of all social organizations and reaffirmation of "democratic centralism" within the party—all with the goal of reassuring the Soviet Union that Bulgaria would not follow in the heretical footsteps of Czechoslovakia.

The Constitution of 1971

A later echo of the events of 1968 was the drafting of a new constitution at the Tenth Party Congress in 1971. Unlike the Dimitrov Constitution, the new document specified the role of the BCP as

Todor Zhivkov one year after his ouster, in confinement at his villa, November 1990
Courtesy Charles Sudetic

"the leading force in society and the state," and the role of the BANU as its collaborator within the Fatherland Front. The 1971 constitution also defined Bulgaria as a socialist state with membership in the international socialist community. As before, broad citizen rights were guaranteed but limited by the requirement that they be exercised only in the interest of the state. Citizen obligations included working according to one's ability to build the foundation of the socialist state and defend the state, compulsory military service, and paying taxes. Most of the governmental structure specified in the Dimitrov Constitution remained, but a new body, the State Council, replaced the Presidium as supreme organ of state power. This council consisted of twenty-two members and a chairman who was de facto head of state. The State Council was more powerful than the Presidium because it could initiate as well as approve legislation, and because it exercised some of the nongovernmental supervision normally delegated to ruling parties in East European communist states of that period. Council members, nominally elected by the National Assembly, were members of the BCP or other mass organizations (see Nongovernmental Political Institutions, this ch.).

In 1971 Zhivkov resigned as prime minister to become chairman of the State Council. The National Assembly, traditional center of political power in Bulgaria until the 1947 constitution stripped it of power, received some new responsibilities. Permanent commissions

were to supervise the work of ministries, and legislation could now be submitted by labor and youth groups (all of which were party-controlled). In practice, however, the National Assembly still rubber-stamped legislation and nominations for the State Council, Supreme Court, and Council of Ministers. As a follow-up to the constitution's prescription of private property rights, the 1973 Law on Citizens' Property virtually abolished private ownership of means of production, confining such ownership to "items for personal use."

The Tenth Party Congress also devised a new BCP program to coincide with the new constitutional description of party power. The program specified an orthodox hierarchical party structure of democratic centralism, each level responsible to the level above. The lowest-level party organizations were to be based in workplaces; all other levels would be determined by territorial divisions. Loyalty to the CPSU was reiterated. The BCP goal was described as building an advanced socialist society lacking differentiation by property and social standing—at that point, all of society was to be a single working class. Science and technology were to receive special attention by the party, to improve production that would make possible the next jump from advanced socialism to the first stage of communism (see The Bulgarian Communist (Socialist) Party, this ch.).

After a decade of political calm and only occasional purges of party officials by Zhivkov, social unrest stirred in the mid-1970s and alarmed the Zhivkov government. International events such as the Helsinki Accords (see Glossary) of 1975, the growth of Eurocommunism in the 1970s, and the 1973 oil crisis stimulated hope for liberalization and discontent with the domestic economy. Zhivkov responded in 1977 by purging Politburo member Boris Velchev and 38,500 party members—the largest such change since the early 1960s. Provincial party organizations also were substantially reorganized. In May 1978, the Bulgarian government acknowledged for the first time that an antigovernment demonstration had occurred—indicating that the 1977 measures had not quelled domestic discontent.

The Last Zhivkov Decade

The period between 1978 and 1988 was one of political calm. With minor exceptions, the structure and operations of the government and the BCP remained unchanged. But the avoidance of meaningful change, despite cosmetic adjustments in the Zhivkov government, assumed that Bulgarian governance was the same

uncomplicated procedure it had been in the 1970s and early 1980s—a major miscalculation.

Celebration of the 1,300th anniversary of the Bulgarian state in 1981 brought official liberalization and rehabilitation for some segments of Bulgarian society. Bourgeois political factions that had opposed the BCP before World War II were exonerated and described as comrades in the fight for Bulgarian democracy. Zhivkov also raised the official status of the Orthodox Church to codefender of the Bulgarian nationality, and restrictions on religious observances were eased.

By the second half of the 1980s, substantial maneuvering and speculation centered on identifying the successor to the seventy-four-year-old Zhivkov, who was increasingly isolated from everyday governance. Four younger politicians divided most of the key responsibilities of government and party in 1986. Although speculation grew that Zhivkov had become a figurehead or was preparing to resign, in the late 1980s he was still able to divide the power of his rivals and avoid naming a single successor.

The BCP maintained complete control over all major programs and policies in the Bulgarian government, although the role of the party in specific instances was not clear. In 1987, facing a budding opposition movement and pressure from the Soviet Union, the BCP began planning for multiple-candidate (not multiparty) regional elections to end citizen apathy toward both government and the party. Although some reforms were made in the nomination process, local electoral commissions retained control over final lists of nominees.

By February 1989, at least nine independent political groups had emerged. Spurred by the liberalized domestic policies of Mikhail S. Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, such groups demanded similar concessions from the Bulgarian government. Given Bulgaria's long record of mimicking Soviet policy changes, this was a natural expectation. In fact, the 1987 BCP Central Committee plenum had officially endorsed *perestroika* (see Glossary) and *glasnost* (see Glossary), the cornerstones of the Gorbachev reform program. The plenum also substantially reduced official state ceremonies, rituals, personal awards, and propaganda, explaining that such formalities alienated the people.

In the three years following the 1987 plenum, however, the Bulgarian government and the BCP gave lip service to Soviet reforms, while quietly taking a more hard-line approach to many issues. During this period, reform in the BCP and the government apparatus was confined to reshuffling ministries, departments, and personnel as a gesture of solidarity with *perestroika.* At the same time,

dissident groups were harrassed, put under surveillance, and accused of unpatriotic activities.

Issues of Dissent

In the late 1980s, official repression of the Turkish minority was the most visible domestic issue in Bulgaria. By 1989 this policy had brought harsh international condemnation and provided a human rights issue for the domestic opposition. A total of 310,000 ethnic Turks were expelled or emigrated voluntarily in 1989, and the Bulgarian economy suffered greatly from this depletion of its work force (see Labor Force, ch. 3, and The Turkish Problem, this ch.).

In July 1989, more than a hundred well-known Bulgarian intellectuals petitioned the National Assembly to restore rights to the ethnic Turks suffering forced emigration. Bulgarian Turks formed the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, advocating a wide range of government reforms besides the Turkish issue. The regime responded by accusing Turkish agents of fomenting ethnic strife, denying the existence of a Turkish minority in Bulgaria, and fanning the racial animosity of Bulgarians toward Turks.

In addition to ethnic and political problems, in the late 1980s Bulgaria faced the need for strenuous economic reforms to improve efficiency, technology, and product quality. Between 1987 and 1989, the Zhivkov regime promised expansion of trade and joint ventures with the West, banking reform, currency convertability, and decentralized planning. In actuality, however, the thirty-five-year-old regime lacked the political will and energy to press drastic economic reform (see Era of Experimentation and Reform, ch. 3). The economic stagnation that began in the early 1980s, with which Zhivkov had become identified, continued unchallenged and became another major cause of political discontent.

The Removal of Zhivkov

Despite the appearance of numerous opposition groups in the preceding year, the Zhivkov regime was unprepared for the successive fall of communist regimes across Eastern Europe in late 1989. In October an all-European environmental conference, Ecoforum, was held in Sofia under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—see Glossary). This event focused world attention on Bulgaria's history of repressing environmental activism and stimulated open demonstrations by human rights advocates and the Bulgarian Ekoglasnost environmental group (see Other Political Organizations, this ch.). Although some demonstrators were beaten and detained, direct communication with the West inspired them to greater self-expression. This

activity culminated in a mass demonstration in Sofia on November 3. Meanwhile, in a speech to a plenum of the BCP in late October, Zhivkov admitted that his latest restructuring program, begun in 1987 to achieve "fundamental renewal" of society, politics, and the economy, had been a failure. He unveiled a new, detailed program to counteract "alienation of the people from the government and the production process." Other party spokesmen increasingly noted recent drastic reforms in other socialist states and pointed to Bulgaria's failure to keep pace. Then, at the regular plenary meeting of the BCP Central Committee in November, Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov announced Zhivkov's resignation.

Although the resignation appeared voluntary, Western observers agreed that top party figures, increasingly dissatisfied with Zhivkov's refusal to recognize problems and deal with public protests, had exerted substantial pressure on him. The leaders of the movement to remove Zhivkov—Atanasov, Foreign Minister Petŭr Mladenov (who became head of state), and Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov—had received the advance blessing of Moscow and the majority of the Bulgarian Politburo. Soviet leader Gorbachev apparently approved the change because Zhivkov had not heeded warnings that cosmetic reform was insufficient given the drastic restructuring sought by Gorbachev. Within a month of his resignation, Zhivkov was expelled from the BCP, accused of abuse of power, and arrested. Mladenov became chairman of the State Council and chief of the BCP.

Governance after Zhivkov

The Zhivkov ouster brought rapid change in some political institutions, little or no change in others. The official name of the country, dropping the term "People's," became simply the Republic of Bulgaria. For two years, the BCP remained entrenched as the most powerful party, slowing reform and clinging tenaciously to economic and political positions gained under Zhivkov. But a new constitution was ratified in mid-1991, laying the basis for accelerated reform on all fronts.

The Mladenov Government

The first few months of the Mladenov regime brought few of the dramatic changes seen in Czechoslovakia or the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) in the same period. Mladenov, who came to power without a personal following, left much of the old government in power and failed to separate state from party functions. Although initial reforms came from the Politburo, Mladenov achieved popularity by immediately legalizing political protest,

giving the media unprecedented freedom, abolishing privileges of party officials, and scheduling free elections within six months. Article 1 of the 1971 constitution, which established the leading role of the BCP in Bulgarian government and society, was abolished in January 1990. Public repudiation of Zhivkov allowed his subordinates to treat him as a scapegoat, thus protecting themselves from blame by the proliferating opposition groups.

The Bulgarian communists avoided the immediate political rejection suffered by their East European comrades for several reasons. Because the BCP had begun as an indigenous Bulgarian movement in 1891, Bulgarians did not resent it as an artificially imposed foreign organization. In 1989 nearly one in nine Bulgarians belonged to the party, a very high ratio that included a large part of the intelligentsia. Early opposition groups were concentrated in Sofia and did not have the means to reach the more conservative hinterlands, reflecting a political dichotomy between town and country that had existed since pre-Ottoman times (see Electoral Procedures, this ch.). Visible reorganization and reform occurred in the BCP shortly after Zhivkov left power; the Politburo was abolished and some old-guard communists were purged. The BCP invited opposition representation in the government and conducted a series of round-table discussions with opposition leaders. In February 1990, Mladenov resigned as party chief, removing the stigma of party interference in government; in April, the State Council was abolished and Mladenov was named president.

The 1990 Stalemate

The first free election of the postwar era, the national election of June 1990, was anticipated as an indicator of Bulgaria's post-Zhivkov political mood and as an end to the extreme uncertainty that followed the Zhivkov era. But the election results provided no decisive answers or conclusions. During the political maneuvering that preceded the election, the contest for control of the National Assembly narrowed to the BCP and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), a coalition of several major and many minor parties and groups with diverse interests (see The Union of Democratic Forces, this ch.). The BCP presented a reformist image, liberally blaming Zhivkov for national problems and changing its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) to stress that a new era had begun. In March an agreement with opposition groups had made approval of legislative proposals by the round table necessary before the BCP-dominated National Assembly could consider passage (see The Role of Unofficial Organizations, this ch.). The round table also signed accords defining future legal changes in the political

system, including multiple parties, separation of powers, constitutional protection of media freedom, and legalization of private property.

The parliamentary election was followed by three months of inactivity and drift in the summer of 1990. Although the Council of Ministers had resigned immediately after the election, a new government was not formed until late August. BSP party official Andreĭ Lukanov finally became prime minister in an all-socialist cabinet because UDF and other opposition parties refused to form a coalition. At the same time, the National Assembly required several weeks to agree on compromise candidate Zheliu Zhelev to replace Mladenov as president. The most significant political situation was outside government institutions. The two major parties became deadlocked over UDF demands that the BSP acknowledge its responsibility for the economic ruin of Bulgaria, and that the government adopt the UDF plan for radical economic reform similar to that in Poland (see Market Reform, ch. 3). Although much of the Zhivkov old guard had been forced out in favor of middle-of-the road socialists in 1990, the UDF demands activated strong pockets of reaction. Zhelev, a dissident philosopher and UDF leader, spent the rest of 1990 seeking compromises among the factions.

The Lukanov government, tied to an aging, largely conservative constituency and full of little-known BSP figures, met few of the reform demands. In October Lukanov presented a 100-day economic reform plan to serve as a transition to longer-term planning in 1991. The plan borrowed major parts of the program advocated by the UDF. The National Assembly remained too divided on the reform issue to give Lukanov the legislative support he needed. Meanwhile, polls showed a definite drop in popular support for the BSP; under these circumstances, the UDF intensified efforts to turn out the government by refusing to support any of Lukanov's proposals.

In November Bulgaria was paralyzed by student demonstrations and general strikes called to topple Lukanov (see Trade Unions, this ch.). Lukanov's resignation ended the opposition's refusal to form a coalition government. Zhelev, who then commanded more political power than any other figure, proposed a compromise candidate, Dimitŭr Popov, as prime minister. Popov, a judge with no party allegiance, received a mandate to form a new cabinet and proceed with reforms as soon as possible. After considerable deliberation, cabinet posts were distributed among major factions, and reform legislation began slowly moving into the National Assembly in the first half of 1991.

Government Structure

In the years immediately following the Zhivkov regime, the nominal structure of the Bulgarian government remained essentially unchanged. Actual decision making, however, moved from the elite level of the communist leadership to a variety of political figures and institutions.

The Role of Unofficial Organizations

An important quasigovernmental institution in the early stages of this process was the national round table. Conceived by opposition groups shortly after Zhivkov's fall, the round table format was accepted by the Atanasov government under threat of general strikes. In March 1990, a declaration on the role and status of the national round table, formulated by all major political groups, gave the round table approval rights to all major legislation proposed by the government, prior to formal consideration by the National Assembly. In 1990 round table discussions included key government figures and representatives of all constituent groups of the UDS and other opposition parties and trade unions. This forum was an effective bridge across the chaotic months preceding the first free election. It reached key compromises on election law, major provisions of the new constitution, and economic reforms. Compromise measures were then forwarded to the parliament for ratification. By mid-1990 round table proposals were dominated by the platform of the UDF, for which that forum had become the chief input to government policy. The national round table thus replaced the BCP as the de facto source of legislative initiatives, in the absence of a coalition government representing the major Bulgarian political factions.

In late 1990, President Zhelev convened a Political Consultative Council that was able to unite all major factions behind formation of a coalition government in December 1990. This step ended the threat that chaos would follow the resignation of the Lukanov government (see The Council of Ministers, this ch.). In January 1991, the parties represented in the National Assembly signed a detailed agreement describing political rights, the legislative agenda for 1991, BCP (BSP) responsibility for the mistakes of the Zhivkov regime, property rights, resolution of social conflicts, and ethnic questions. The stated purpose of this agreement was to ease national tensions and provide a proper working atmosphere for the immense reform program envisioned for 1991.

The National Assembly

In the post-Zhivkov reforms, the National Assembly returned

to its prewar status as a forum for debate of legislation among representatives of true political factions. This status had been lost completely from 1947 to 1989, when the assembly rubber-stamped legislation originating in the BCP hierarchy.

The Assembly under Zhivkov

According to the 1971 constitution, the unicameral National Assembly was the supreme organ of state power, acting as the national legislature and electing all the other bodies of the national government. In practice under the Zhivkov regime, the National Assembly met for three short sessions each year, long enough to approve policies and legislation formulated by the Council of Ministers and the State Council. The National Assembly had a chairman (until 1990 elected by the entire body at the recommendation of the BCP Central Committee) and four deputy chairs. In the intervals between sessions, the functions of the assembly were conducted by permanent commissions whose number and designation varied through the years. Not designated in the 1971 constitution, the duties of the commissions often overlapped those of the ministerial departments. The National Assembly had the power to dissolve itself or extend its term in emergency session.

During the Zhivkov years, new assemblies were elected every five years to coincide with party congresses; the Central Committee of the BCP met immediately before the first session of each new assembly to approve candidates who were then rubber-stamped by the National Assembly for the leadership positions of the assembly, State Council, and Council of Ministers. The ninth National Assembly (1986–90) was rarely even notified of policy decisions of the Zhivkov-led State Council. Nevertheless, election of the National Assembly remained the most important political ritual in Bulgaria throughout the communist period, and the return to free assembly elections in 1990 recalled the direct popular representation prescribed in the Tŭrnovo Constitution of 1879, still revered as a model for Bulgarian governance.

The First Freely Elected Assembly, 1990

The first significant post-Zhivkov act of the holdover (ninth) National Assembly was passage of twenty-one measures of constitutional reform. These measures included abolition of the article of the 1971 constitution giving the BCP sole right to govern. In April 1990, that National Assembly dissolved itself to make way for national election of a Grand National Assembly, charged with writing and ratifying a new constitution; this was the first voluntary adjournment of that body since World War II.

In accordance with the provisions under which the 1990 parliamentary elections were held, after passing the new constitution in July 1991 the Grand National Assembly voted to dissolve itself and continue working as a normal parliament until election of the new body. Thus, in the second half of 1991 work would continue on critical legislation covering issues such as privatization, election procedures, and local government reform.

After the 1990 national elections, the National Assembly remained a weak legislative body, but for a new reason. No longer required to follow party orders precisely, representatives often were split quite evenly on reform issues. The majority BSP included reform and reactionary factions, and the 144 UDF members were a formidable opposition group. Unlike the brief assemblies of the Zhivkov era, the new body remained in session several days a week throughout the remainder of 1990 and through mid-1991, struggling for compromise on reform legislation.

The State Council and the Presidency

The State Council, technically an executive committee within the National Assembly, was created by the 1971 constitution as the primary executive agency of the national government. Because of that role, the chairman of the council was automatically president of the country and thus one of the two most powerful figures in Bulgaria in the Zhivkov years. The State Council included representatives from trade unions, the Communist Youth League of Bulgaria (Komsomol), and other mass organizations. The council supervised the Council of Ministers and had the right to repeal ministry decisions—a function that clearly reduced the Council of Ministers to secondary executive status. In addition to its executive functions, the State Council could issue direct decrees with full legal authority when the National Assembly was not in session, with no provision for later approval by the full legislative body. Under Zhivkov most members of the State Council were high officials of the BCP. When Petŭr Mladenov replaced Zhivkov as chairman of the State Council, he did not automatically become head of state. When the State Council was abolished in April 1990, the round table named Mladenov president of the republic, a new title for the Bulgarian head of state. The appointment was made with the understanding that the new constitution would set guidelines for this office. Meanwhile, Mladenov and his successor Zheliu Zhelev retained the power to form cabinets with the consent of the National Assembly, to represent the country abroad, and to act as commander in chief of the armed forces.



President Zheliu Zhelev meets with United States president George H.W. Bush, Washington, fall 1990
Courtesy White House Photo Office

The Council of Ministers

The constitution of 1971 substantially diminished the power of the Council of Ministers, or cabinet, which had been an intermittent center of executive authority in Bulgarian governments since 1878. In the last two decades of the Zhivkov regime, the council acted as an advisory board to the State Council and directed everyday operations of the government bureaucracies. All members of the Council of Ministers belonged to the BCP or the BANU, and many held top party posts and ministries simultaneously. Longtime Politburo member Stanko Todorov headed the executive committee of the council from its creation in 1971 until 1989. Within their areas of responsibility, the ministries had authority to form administrative organs and to overturn acts by local government agencies. The exact makeup of the council was not prescribed in the constitution; the National Assembly had authority to make changes as necessary, and the council's shape and size changed often in the last Zhivkov years.

After the elections of 1986, the Council of Ministers was reorganized and reduced in size. In the last years of the Zhivkov regime, it included eleven ministers, a chairman (the prime minister),

a deputy prime minister, and the chairman of the Committee on State and People's Control (see Security and Intelligence Services, ch. 5). In early 1990, the new provisional council had fourteen ministries: agriculture and forests; construction, architecture, and public works; economy and planning; finance; foreign affairs; foreign economic relations; industry and technology; internal affairs; internal trade; justice; national defense; national education; public health and social welfare; and transport. The ambassador to the Soviet Union also had full cabinet status, as did the heads of the committees for protection of the environment and state and people's control. Five deputy prime ministers also sat in that cabinet, which was headed by Zhivkov-era holdover Georgi Atanasov. The second provisional cabinet, under Andreĭ Lukanov, included ministers of the environment, culture, and science and higher education in its seventeen departments. The ambassador to the Soviet Union was dropped, and a minister for economic reform added.

The new status of the Council of Ministers as the power center of Bulgarian government was signaled by the targeting of Prime Minister Lukanov for opposition pressure in the fall of 1990. A second signal was intense bargaining between the BSP and opposition parties for positions in the Popov cabinet. That bargaining produced a compromise agreement that gave the key ministries of foreign economic relations and finance to the BSP, with national defense going to the UDF. The Ministry of the Interior, very sensitive because of its role under Zhivkov as the enforcer of state security, was largely reorganized and headed by a nonpolitical figure whose two deputies represented the major parties. The splitting of the deputy minister positions was a key compromise to gain approval of the Popov cabinet. In all, five of the seventeen ministers in the new cabinet were politically unaffiliated; seven remained from the last Lukanov cabinet to soften the transition; and the UDF filled only three posts. The multiparty conference that reached this agreement also allowed for further adjustments in the cabinet structure for the Popov government. As an interim head of government, Popov's main goal was to establish minimal political and economic conditions favorable to long-term reforms.

The Judiciary

Members of the highest national judicial body, the Supreme Court, were elected to five-year terms by the National Assembly. Until 1990, however, National Assembly approval really meant control by the State Council, hence by the BCP. The national court system was divided into criminal, civil, and military courts; the Supreme Court had jurisdiction in both original and appellate cases,

and it controlled the activities of all lower courts. The 1971 constitution called the court system and state prosecutor's office "weapons of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The chief prosecutor, chief legal official of Bulgaria, was responsible for compliance with the law by ordinary citizens, local and national political entities and officials, and other public organizations. The powers of this office were extended by law in 1980 in an effort to forestall public dissatisfaction with the crime prevention system. Like the justices of the Supreme Court, the chief prosecutor served at the approval of the State Council. Together with the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the chief prosecutor provided absolute BCP control of the Bulgarian judicial system until 1990. The election of all judicial officials further guaranteed this control.

Lower courts functioned at the provincial and municipal levels; election was by people's councils at the provincial level and directly by citizens at the municipal level, using party-approved lists. In 1990 each of Bulgaria's provinces (including Sofia) had a province court. The 105 provincal courts tried minor offenses. Both professional judges and lay assessors sat in the lower courts. Specialized disputes were heard outside the regular court system. For example, international trade cases went to the Foreign Trade Court of Arbitration of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, civil disputes among enterprises and public organizations were heard by the State Court of Arbitration, and labor disputes were settled by the conciliation committees of enterprises.

Criticized before and after the fall of Zhivkov, the Bulgarian justice system changed little with the reform programs of 1990 and 1991. The round table resolutions of early 1990 alluded only to separation of the judicial, legislative, and executive branches to avoid concentration of power in any single branch. However, establishment of an independent, authoritative judiciary would be complicated by the universal view, instilled by forty-five years of complete control by the BCP, that the Bulgarian court system was only an extension of the state's executive power. In a 1991 poll, only 1.7 percent of Bulgarians expressed trust in the courts and the prosecutor's office. In 1990 the youngest judges were over forty years old, and the most talented had left for other careers because of the short term of office, poor pay, low professional status, and party control. In late 1990, Judge Dimitŭr Lozanchev became the first politically neutral chairman of the Supreme Court since World War II.

Local Government

In 1987 Bulgaria consolidated its local government structure by

combining its twenty-eight districts (*okrŭzi*; sing., *okrŭg*), into nine provinces (*oblasti*; sing., *oblast*), including the city of Sofia (see fig. 1). A tangible part of the Zhivkov regime's massive (and largely theoretical) plan for economic and political restructuring, the reorganization imitated restructuring plans in the Soviet Union. Local government consolidation was to eliminate the complex and inefficient *okrŭg* bureaucracies and improve the operation of "people's self-management," the system by which people's councils nominally managed area enterprises. The latter improvement was to result from narrowing the primary function of the new *oblast* government to the assistance of local workers' collectives. At the same time, municipalities and townships became somewhat more autonomous because the restructuring gave them some of the administrative power removed from the higher level.

Although the number of districts had remained stable from 1959 until the 1987 reform, the number and allocation of smaller urban and rural political entities changed rapidly during that period as the population shifted (see Population, ch. 2). In 1990 there were 299 political divisions smaller than the *oblast* and twenty-nine separate urban areas. Both *oblasti* and smaller constituencies were ruled by people's councils, elected for thirty-month terms. The local multiple-candidate elections of February 1988 were another aspect of the restructuring program. Although local election commissions retained considerable influence over nominations, about 26 percent of successful candidates were nonparty in 1988. At that time, 51,161 councillors and 3,953 mayors were elected.

The people's councils at all levels were run by elected executive committees that met continuously. These committees had full executive power to act between sessions of the people's councils, in the same way as the State Council acted for the National Assembly in the Zhivkov-era national government. Each council was responsible to the council at the next higher level; financial planning was to conform to the goals of national economic programs. Local councils had authority over the People's Militia, or police, as well as over local services and administration. The Popov government scheduled new local elections for February 1991, after which time reforms were expected in the local government system. Meanwhile, most provincial governments remained under the control of Zhivkovite officials, intensifying the schism between the urban and provincial political climates.

Electoral Procedures

The round table reforms of 1990 included a new election law ratified by the National Assembly. As in other aspects of governance,

A Bulgarian Orthodox priest participating in the election demonstrations of 1990, Sofia
Courtesy Charles Sudetic

prescribed election procedures did not change greatly under the new regime, but the intent and practice of the law did. The right to vote by direct secret ballot remained universal for all Bulgarians over eighteen, and the officials they elected remained theoretically responsible only to the voters. Prescriptions for eligibility for nomination and the nomination process changed little with the new law. The main difference was that in practice the BCP (BSP) no longer could indiscriminately remove elected representatives or members of people's councils, nor did it control the nomination function nominally given to public organizations, trade unions, youth groups, and cooperatives.

Under the election law of 1953, all candidate lists were approved by the communist-controlled Fatherland Front. Under the 1990 law, all parties and registered nonparty organizations could submit candidates; individuals could be nominated for the assembly with 500 signatures of voters from their district, and an unlimited number of candidates might run from each district. The State Council formerly had the power to call elections; for the 1990 Grand National Assembly election, the date was fixed by agreement of the UDF and the BCP. The Central Election Commission, formerly a creature of the State Council, was to supervise the equitable implementation of election laws, overseeing the operation of equivalent commissions at local levels. Election commissions at all levels included members from various parties; the Central Election

Commission was headed by a professor of law with no political connection.

The new law also revised the representational system of the National Assembly. The new assembly continued to have 400 seats, but it would sit for four instead of five years. A new electoral structure also was introduced. Half the National Assembly members were elected in multiple-seat districts, in proportion to total votes cast for each party in the district. A 4 percent minimum was required for a party to achieve representation. The law designated twenty-eight multiple-seat voting districts, based on the pre-1987 *okrŭzi*. The other 200 members were elected from 200 single-seat voting districts. A runoff election was held in each district where no candidate received 50 percent of the initial vote (this occurred in 81 of the 200 districts). All voters in the 1990 election had one vote in each type of district (see The National Assembly, this ch.).

The election was supervised by the CSCE. According to impartial observers and the parties themselves, the election was reasonably free of interference and coercion, considering that most of the electorate had never faced a true political choice and the registration and voting systems were quite complex. Party strategies were dictated by timing and geography. The UDF, lacking time and resources to campaign in the provinces, confined its efforts to the more congenial constituency in Sofia and other large cities. The BSP campaigned as a reform party in progressive Sofia, but it took advantage of the substantial residue of Zhivkovite local officials in the provinces (many of whom were accused of exerting pressure on their constituents to vote BSP) to gain 211 assembly seats to the UDF's 144. The UDF outpolled the BSP in Sofia, Plovdiv, Varna, and most other Bulgarian cities.

The timing of the next national election was the topic of heated debate in the first half of 1991 as political factions maneuvered for advantage. After the new constitution was ratified in July 1991 and a new election law was scheduled for August, elections were tentatively set for October 1991. The new election law was to free the system of the cumbersome procedure used in 1990. Controversial elements of the law were a BSP-backed clause disallowing absentee ballots from émigrés and the restriction of all campaign activities to the Bulgarian language. The 1991 law prescribed a Central Electoral Commission of twenty-five, to be appointed by the president in consultation with major political factions. The central commission would then appoint and oversee like commissions at lower jurisdictions and set policy for election administration. National elections were to be held by the proportional system, eliminating the two-part system of 1990. Recognized parties, coalitions of

parties, individual nominees, and combinations of individuals and parties would be eligible to run. The country was divided into thirty-one electoral constituencies, three of which were in Sofia.

Nongovernmental Political Institutions

Until 1989 the BCP exerted firm control over such nongovernmental political institutions as trade unions, youth groups, women's groups, and the nominally oppositionist BANU. The ouster of Zhivkov, however, brought a torrent of new and revived groups into the political arena. In the new open political climate, the groups' fragmented constituencies often spoke loudly for their own special interests, greatly complicating the process of coalition-building and compromise needed to accomplish national reform.

The Bulgarian Communist (Socialist) Party

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP), which renamed itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) several months after the fall of Zhivkov, boasted one of the highest membership-to-population ratios (one in nine Bulgarians) in any communist country in the late 1980s. Between 1958 and 1987, membership grew by 442,000, mainly by adding bureaucrats and blue-collar workers in younger age groups. In 1986 women made up 32.7 percent of party membership, but few women held high positions. The proportion of worker members had grown to 44.4 percent by 1986, and the proportion of farm members had dropped to 16.3 percent, reflecting an even sharper drop in the overall farming population of Bulgaria (see table 20, Appendix). Party recruitment in the 1980s targeted individuals already successful in public or economic life, and the proportion of white-collar members increased in that decade.

In 1987 the BCP was organized into 2,900 local units. Until 1990 primary party organizations were based primarily in workplaces. The next level in the hierarchy was municipal organizations, which were overseen by city or province and ultimately national bodies. At every level, party and government personnel were closely interwoven, and the principle of democratic centralism kept the lower levels strictly subordinate to the national party. The primary organizations were charged with recruitment and mobilization. A major concession by the post-Zhivkov party was removal of party cells from all state offices, the judiciary, educational and health agencies, as well as all nongovernmental workplaces—a concession forced by the UDF's threat to boycott the round table negotiations that would set a national agenda for political reform early in 1990. That change significantly altered the primary level of party organization.

Until 1990 the top level of party leadership was the Politburo, of which Zhivkov was general secretary. That position had been abolished in the 1950s in the BCP as part of de-Stalinization. It was restored in 1981, however, to recognize Zhivkov's long service and conform to Soviet restoration under Leonid Brezhnev. Politburo members usually were selected from the central committee and nominally elected by party congresses, which normally met every five years. In 1986 the Thirteenth Party Congress elected an eleven-member Politburo dominated by party loyalists of Zhivkov's generation but supplemented by a few younger specialists in politics and economics. Following tradition, the 1986 congress made few changes in the previous Politburo. The party congresses were nominally the top policy-making body of the party, but, like the National Assembly, they rubber-stamped decisions handed them by the party elite.

The BCP hierarchy also included the Central Committee, whose members the congress unanimously approved from candidates supplied by the party leadership. Through a number of specialized departments, the Central Committee performed administrative party work between sessions of congress. After considerable size variation, the last Central Committee included 190 members and 131 candidate members in early 1990. The third elite group was the BCP Secretariat, a group somewhat smaller than the Politburo (its number also varied during the Zhivkov years), entrusted with implementing party policy.

Membership in the BCP required recommendation by three established members; if accepted at the primary and next-highest level, a candidate received full membership with no probationary period. Criminal or unethical behavior caused withdrawal of membership. Without benefit of explanation, a varying number of members also failed to receive the new party cards issued before each party congress. Abrupt purging of cadre and membership elements deemed potentially hostile to current programs was a procedure that Zhivkov used with great skill to balance and weaken opposition forces throughout his tenure in office.

The fall of Zhivkov brought immediate and dramatic changes in the BCP, including removal of the word "communist" from its name. The Extraordinary Fourteenth Party Congress of the BCP was held in the winter of 1990, over a year sooner than scheduled. That congress abolished the Central Committee and the Politburo in favor of a Supreme Party Council headed by a presidency. To streamline party activity, the new council had only 131 members, 59 fewer than the last Central Committee. The Secretariat was abolished. The party emerged from the congress with significant

splits between reform and conservative factions and a new temporary program. Only about 10 percent of previous Central Committee members became members of the new Supreme Party Council; several party stalwarts who had survived the Zhivkov overthrow, including Prime Minister Atanasov, were not elected. The BCP's constitutional guarantee of the leading role in Bulgarian society already had been abolished. In a compromise with the UDF shortly after the congress, party organizations were banned from workplaces and the armed forces. The BSP had full control of the government (the UDF refused to form a coalition both before and after the 1990 elections), but BSP popularity and power ebbed rapidly during 1990 and 1991. By the first anniversary of Zhivkov's resignation, party membership had decreased to an estimated 250,000. (Membership had been reported as 984,000 at the time of the Fourteenth Party Congress.)

The Union of Democratic Forces

The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF; Bulgarian Sayuz na Demokratichnite Sili—SDS), which emerged as the chief opposition faction to the BCP after 1989, was a motley coalition of several major and many minor parties and groups. Some of the parties, such as the BANU, predated the communist era by several decades. Others, such as the Green Party, were organized after the overthrow of Zhivkov. When the UDF was founded in December 1989, it included ten organizations; by the following spring, six more parties and movements had joined.

The basis of the UDF was the dissident groups that formed under the faltering Zhivkov regime in the late 1980s. The all-European Ecoforum of October 1989 allowed many such groups to meet and exchange ideas for the first time; once Zhivkov fell, the initial contacts spawned an organizational declaration that envisioned a loose confederation. Within the confederation, constituent groups would continue to work for their own specific interests. The coordinating council was to include three members from each organization. Longtime dissident philosopher Zheliu Zhelev was elected chairman and Petŭr Beron, a well-known environmental scientist, was chosen secretary.

The diversity of membership required substantial compromise in the UDF program. At least one issue central to each member group was included in the program, however. The general goals of the program were a civil society, market economy, multiparty system, and constitutional government. Sixteen specific steps were outlined to achieve those goals. The main criterion for acceptance

of new member organizations was compatibility of their goals with those in the UDF program.

Shortly after the UDF was founded, a vital policy decision confronted its leaders: the BCP-dominated government revoked the Zhivkov program of Bulgarizing the names of all Turkish citizens. Alienating the extreme nationalist factions that opposed compromise with the ethnic minority, the UDF supported the government decision in its first major policy statement.

In the first half of 1990, the stature of the UDF was enhanced by its participation as an equal in round table discussions with the BCP (BSP) on a range of policy issues that would set future economic and political policy. By March 1990, the coalition's main goal was clearly stated: to push the interim National Assembly to draft a democratic constitution and urgent reform legislation as quickly as possible, over the opposition of remaining BSP hardliners and noncommunist splinter groups. All factions recognized that once this was completely accomplished, the coalition would dissolve and members would act as independent political parties with varying agendas.

In the parliamentary elections of June 1990, the UDF platform advocated a wide range of drastic reforms in government structure, the media, foreign policy, and the economy. Detailed proposals were offered for education, the environment, and a two-phase "shock therapy" reform leading to a free market economy. Finally, the UDF blamed the previous communist regime for Bulgaria's current crises. The UDF failed to gain a majority in the National Assembly because many rural areas remained in control of Zhivkovite BSP politicians. Many peasants had felt relatively secure under the old collective system, and the timing of the election had forced opposition parties to concentrate campaigns in the cities, their strongest regions. The BSP won 211 of the 400 seats.

In the year following parliamentary elections, BSP obstructionism stymied legalization of the UDF's reform goals. On the other hand, the UDF's refusal to participate in the Lukanov cabinet proved its popular strength by stalemating Lukanov's economic reform program. In the crisis-driven formation of the Popov government in December 1990, the UDF gained strategic cabinet posts. In January 1991, the UDF and the BSP agreed on a timetable for passage of the new constitution and other urgent legislation, but early in 1991 parliamentary disagreements set back the schedule. In March 1991, the UDF sponsored a protest rally attended by more than 50,000 people in Sofia. In May legislators from several smaller parties walked out of the National Assembly to protest its inaction; the BANU contingent promised to do the same if the parliament

A group of demonstrators for the Union of Democratic Forces (identified by SDS on their banner) prior to the election of June 1990
Courtesy Charles Sudetic

had not passed a new constitution by the end of June. Meanwhile, however, official UDF policy continued seeking to break the long stalemate by convincing the socialists in the National Assembly to abandon their go-slow approach to reform.

By mid-1991 a split developed between the largest member groups (the reconstituted BSDP, the BANU, Ekoglasnost, and the Green Party) and the smaller ones over using quotas and preferential lists in the next election—a practice that would contradict the UDF's role as a single national movement and give larger parties substantially more influence in policy making. Easily the largest member organizations with about 100,000 members each, the BANU and the BSDP would benefit most from such a shift. In July 1991, voting in the National Assembly on the new constitution clarified the split between factions viewing the UDF as a single national movement and those seeking individual identity within a loose confederation. The main issue was the constitutional prescription for legislative representation by party. By summer 1991, disagreements on ratification of the constitution had led splinter groups to form a new Political Consultative Council to rival the UDF's existing National Coordinating Council as a controlling agency of the UDF. This action threatened to split the UDF into two or three slates of candidates for the 1991 national elections. Thus, by mid-1991 the relative harmony of the UDF's first year had evolved into persistent divisiveness affecting tactics, organizational structure, and the pace of reform. In spite of conciliatory efforts by the coordinating council, the effective united front that had forced major concessions from the BSP in 1990 seemed less potent in 1991.

Trade Unions

The Bulgarian trade union movement was rejuvenated in the pluralist post-Zhivkov political atmosphere after being forced to adhere totally to BCP policy throughout the postwar period. By 1990 unions were a powerful policy-making force, using well-organized strikes and walkouts to emphasize their positions.

Unions under Communist Regimes

In the decade before World War II, the benign dictatorship of Tsar Boris III abolished independent trade unions in favor of a single government-sponsored Bulgarian Workers' Union. As Bulgaria emerged from the war under Soviet occupation, communists abolished that union and replaced it with a General Workers' Professional Union that included both white- and blue-collar workers. Gradually, independent union organizations were forced to

disband or join the communist organization. By 1947 union leaders were an important instrument in consolidation of the party's power. When capitalism was declared illegal in 1948, the Dimitrov government united thirteen unions under the Central Council of Trade Unions, which endured until 1989 as the single umbrella organization representing Bulgarian workers.

During that entire period, all workers' and professional organizations followed faithfully the economic policies of the BCP. The official goals of the Bulgarian trade unions were first to help management to fulfill state economic plans, then to defend workers' interests when they did not conflict with such fulfillment. As institutions the unions had no policy input. In individual enterprises, union leaders and managers developed informal advisory relationships. The only official role of the unions was as transmitters of party policies to the working masses. Although union and BCP membership were theoretically separate, officials at the national and local levels often overlapped to give the party direct control of workers. For example, members of the district-level people's councils often were also union executives (see Local Government, this ch.).

General congresses of trade unions were held explicitly to carry out BCP policy; congress delegate structure (2,997 attended the ninth congress in 1982) and the holding of preliminary district congresses mimicked BCP procedures. The many industrial reorganization plans of the Zhivkov regime meant periodic restructuring, if not new roles, for the unions. In the early 1980s, for example, the decentralizing reforms of the New Economic Model (NEM) changed the labor union structure from one divided by region to one divided by brigade, collective, and enterprise, matching the NEM industrial structure of the time. Although this change was controversial, it did little to improve the influence of the Bulgarian working class on enterprise policy.

In the 1980s, union membership approached 4 million, encompassing an estimated 98 percent of Bulgarian workers. Almost a year before the fall of Zhivkov, the Independent Labor Federation, Podkrepa, organized as a white-collar opposition group inspired by the Polish Solidarity (see Glossary) movement. In 1989 Podkrepa consistently was persecuted for its outspoken criticism of Zhivkov's policies.

Independent Union Organizations

When the communist regime was overthrown, the central council began restructuring the trade union system, declaring the organization independent of the BCP and renaming its umbrella

organization the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (CITU). In 1990 BCP organizations were banned from work places, although the continuing overlap of party and union officials maintained substantial communist influence in the CITU at local levels. In the early reform years, the CITU and Podkrepa were the two major trade union federations, although many independent unions also emerged in this revival period for the movement. Early in 1990, Podkrepa established its credibility by exacting an agreement with CITU guaranteeing its members all the rights (and the substantial privileges) accorded official trade unions under the previous system. From the beginning, Podkrepa sought maximum influence on government policy, repeatedly demanding radical economic reform.

Podkrepa grew rapidly in 1990 because of its roles as a charter member of the UDF, as a participant in the policy round tables with the BCP, and as the organizer of strikes and demonstrations against the communist-dominated Lukanov government. In early 1990, an estimated 300 strikes helped convince the government that talks with opposition groups were necessary. Although Podkrepa ran no candidates in the national elections of 1990, it vigorously supported candidates who espoused labor views. In late 1990, another wave of strikes pushed the Lukanov government out and led to the coalition Popov government. Although CITU and other unions participitated, Podkrepa usually was the prime organizer in such actions.

CITU, whose membership of 3 million dwarfed the 400,000 of Podkrepa, remained politically passive in the early post-Zhivkov period. In mid-1990 CITU began issuing statements critical of government inactivity, and it mobilized 500,000 workers to participate in the November 1990 strikes initiated by Podkrepa against the Lukanov government.

The strikes that forced Lukanov's resignation also raised criticism of the political role of both labor organizations late in 1990 (see Governance after Zhivkov, this ch.). CITU received criticism for both its continued ties with the BSP and its aggressive reformist stance. The Supreme Party Council of the BSP declared a policy of noninterference in CITU affairs. Meanwhile, Podkrepa, led by controversial, outspokenly anticommunist Konstantin Trenchev, responded to internal and external criticism by changing from active membership to observor status in the UDF.

The unions continued active participation in political decision making in 1991, however. Because economic reforms brought substantial unemployment and workplace disruption, representing worker interests was synonymous with such involvement in this

period. In January 1991, CITU and Podkrepa signed a "social peace agreement" with the Popov government to refrain from striking during the first phase of economic reform in exchange for limitations on work-force cutbacks (see Market Reform, ch. 3). However, jurisdictional and policy disputes threatened to undermine the agreement. Although both organizations continued to support the Popov government, in March 1991 Podkrepa proposed that UDF representatives boycott the National Assembly because it failed to pass reform measures.

As opposition to the communists declined as a uniting factor, Bulgaria's trade unions maneuvered to shape new roles for themselves in 1991. Representing 40 percent of the population in a wide-open political culture, they exerted tremendous influence on policy even in the first post-Zhivkov year. The radical economic reform envisioned by Bulgarian leaders would include entirely new relationships among the government, enterprise management, and unions. Movement to a Western-style free-market economy would mean conceding some worker rights taken for granted under the command economy, but compromise with the Podkrepa-led union movement promised to be a severe test for other political institutions.

Youth Organizations

Following the model of the Soviet Union, the BCP put massive resources into its party youth organization when it came to power. Officially called the Communist Youth League of Bulgaria (later the Dimitrov Communist Youth League of Bulgaria) and abbreviated to Komsomol, the league sought to ensure that proper socialist values would pass to the next generation and to supply new members for the party. With a peak membership of 1.5 million in 1987, the Komsomol had the same organizational structure as the BCP, with a secretariat and executive bureau analogous to the Politburo at the top and a pyramid of local and regional sub-organizations. Besides instilling party dogma in Bulgarian youth, the organization was a vehicle for enforcing party directives, a source of reserve personnel, an organizer of social and recreational activities, and, in the 1980s, an instrument for encouraging computer training in the schools. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the Komsomol's lack of self-confidence was revealed in a series of party meetings, speeches, and programs aimed at explaining and combatting apathy and materialism in Bulgarian youth. By the late 1980s, the Komsomol was widely seen as a hollow facade; between 1987 and 1989, membership dropped by 30 percent after compulsory registration ended in secondary schools.

Immediately after the overthrow of Zhivkov, alternative youth groups began to form. One such group, the Federation of Independent Students' Unions (FISU), gained support by advocating complete separation of student groups from the BCP/BSP and its ideological constraints and by proclaiming itself a student voice on questions of national policy. FISU gained stature by being a charter member of the UDF.

Meanwhile, the Komsomol acknowledged past failures, changed its name to the Bulgarian Democratic Youth (BDY), and began issuing policy statements on student rights and broader social issues. The organization was decentralized by giving local affiliates substantial autonomy, and democratized by limiting the terms of officials. Election of a political unknown, Rosen Karadimov, as first secretary was another signal that the youth organization had broken with conventional communist party practices.

The BDY was overwhelmed by a wave of student activism in alternative groups. Student strikes in support of the anti-Lukanov labor strikes in late 1990 shut down major universities. And, like the BSP, the BDY faced reminders and accusations of its misdeeds in the prereform era. In late 1990, the BDY returned to the state much of the property the Komsomol had accumulated during decades of BCP funding. It also renounced socialism and recast itself as an apolitical social organization.

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms

With 120,000 members, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) was the fourth largest political organization in Bulgaria in 1991, but it occupied a special place in the political process. The leader of the movement, Ahmed Dogan, was imprisoned in 1986 for opposition to the Zhivkov policy of assimilating ethnic Turks (see Bulgaria in the 1980s, ch. 1). Founded in 1990 to represent the interests of the Turkish ethnic minority, the MRF gained twenty-three seats in the first parliamentary election that year, giving it the fourth-largest parliamentary voting bloc. Its agenda precluded mass media coverage or building coalitions with other parties, because of the strong anti-Turkish element in Bulgaria's political culture. By mid-1991, the UDF had held only one joint demonstration with the MRF; their failure to reconcile differences was considered a major weakness in the opposition to the majority BSP. In early 1990, the MRF protested vigorously but unsuccessfully its exclusion from national round table discussions among the major Bulgarian parties.

In 1991 the MRF broadened its platform to embrace all issues of civil rights in Bulgaria, aiming "to contribute to the unity of

the Bulgarian people and to the full and unequivocal compliance with the rights and freedoms of mankind and of all ethnic, religious, and cultural communities in Bulgaria." The MRF took this step partly to avoid the constitutional prohibition of political parties based on ethnic or religious groups. The group's specific goals were ensuring that the new constitution protect ethnic minorities adequately; introducing Turkish as an optional school subject; and bringing to trial the leaders of the assimilation campaign in the 1980s. To calm Bulgarian nationalist resentment, the MRF categorically renounced Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and ambitions for autonomy within Bulgaria. Political overtures were made regularly to the UDF, and some local cooperation occurred in 1991. Although the MRF remained the fastest growing party in Bulgaria, however, the sensitivity of the Turkish issue caused official UDF policy to keep the MRF in isolation.

Other Political Organizations

Besides the BSP and the BANU, parties officially sanctioned under Zhivkov, an unofficial list of political organizations in early 1990 contained fourteen political parties, seven unions and labor federations, and sixteen forums, clubs, movements, committees, and associations—diverging widely in scope, special interests, and size.

Ecological Organizations

Two ecological organizations, the Green Party in Bulgaria and Ekoglasnost, were founding members of the UDF. The Greens, which separated from Ekoglasnost shortly after Zhivkov's fall, included mostly scientists and academics. Their platform stressed decentralized government and a strong role for the individual in determining quality of life and preservation of the environment. The government was to play a leading role, however, in providing social security, health care, and support for scientific reasearch. Ekoglasnost, which described itself as nonpolitical despite its role in the UDF, was founded in early 1989 as an open association of environmentally concerned citizens. Its purpose was to collect and publicize ecological information about proposed projects, and to assist decision makers in following environmentally sound policy. Ekoglasnost had a membership of 35,000 at the end of 1990.

Revived Prewar Parties

The Bulgarian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) was an offshoot of the movement that produced the BCP. The main socialist party in Bulgaria between the world wars, the BSDP was disbanded by

the communists in 1948. It resurfaced in 1990, resuming its advocacy of government reform and elimination of social privilege. The BSDP saw a freely elected National Assembly as the chief instrument of popular democracy. The BSDP party platform also called for close economic ties with Europe, disarmament, and respect for private property. The BSDP was a founding member of the UDF and, under the controversial leadership of Petŭr Dertliev, one of its most active participants.

The history of the BSDP followed closely that of the communists, except that the latter had a larger following. The BSDP recovered official status in 1990 after being disbanded in 1948. Representing the middle class, the party stood for private property rights, a multiparty parliamentary system of government, radical reduction of the military budget, and active participation in the European Community. Membership in 1991 was 25,000 to 30,000.

The Petkov branch of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), the third of the prewar parties to emerge as an independent entity after Zhivkov, was the part of the agrarian movement that had actively opposed the communists between 1944 and 1947 and thus did not survive the postwar communist consolidation. The "official" BANU, showpiece opposition party to the BCP from 1947 until 1989, also was revitalized in 1990. In 1990 and 1991, efforts were made to reunite the two factions. (Petkov himself was officially rehabilitated by the National Assembly in 1990.) In its new incarnation, the Petkov branch advocated complete government decentralization, extensive support for agricultural privatization and investment, punishment of the communists and "official" agrarians for crimes against the Petkov branch, and a general return to the populist ideas of Stamboliĭski (see Stamboliĭski and Agrarian Reform, ch. 1). Together with the BSDP, the Petkov BANU was the largest (110,000 members in 1991) and most active constituent of the UDF.

The Monarchist Movement

Simeon II, exiled son of Tsar Boris III, was 54 years old in 1991, healthy, and popular with many Bulgarians. In the difficult reform years, he was the center of a small but significant movement that saw restoration of the monarchy as a solution to the dilemmas of governing society. Simeon encouraged the movement by agreeing to return if his people wished a restoration. Newly available publications on the history of the Bulgarian monarchy, especially Boris III, had evoked considerable public interest by 1991. A referendum on monarchy-versus-republic was scheduled for July 1991, then cancelled by the National Assembly because of its

potentially divisive impact and because of strong opposition from the BSP and most UDF factions. The new constitution's description of Bulgaria as a republic ended official consideration of restoration in 1991, but Simeon's personal popularity preserved monarchism as a political option for many disillusioned Bulgarians in the early 1990s.

The Public and Political Decision Making

In the post-Zhivkov era, extreme diversification of political organizations and activities paralleled a similar liberation in the media and the arts. Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria had followed the totalitarian formula for media control, allowing only official radio and television stations and newspapers that were conduits for the official party line on all subjects. Limited artistic freedom came in several "thaw" periods (notably in the mid-1960s and the late 1970s) that closely followed similar relaxation in the Soviet Union. The charisma of Liudmila Zhivkova, appointed by her father to oversee cultural affairs in 1975, notably lightened the Bulgarian cultural scene from the late 1970s through 1981. The early 1980s was a time of unprecedented freedom for media discussion of controversial topics; the Law on Plebiscites (1983) was to have promoted discussion of preselected issues of public interest, but by 1984 party reactionaries had reasserted control. The 1984 Bulgarian Writers' Conference called for more ideological content in literature, signaling a change that lasted through the end of the Zhivkov regime.

The Intelligentsia

Intellectual groups developed no formal organizations comparable to groups in other East European countries because the small intellectual community centered in one city (Sofia) required no such measures. Furthermore, the Bulgarian Writers' Union already contained a large percentage of the intelligentsia. Especially during the "thaw" periods, factions in the union showed substantial diversity in their approach to the role of art versus that of the state. A much smaller Bulgarian Artist's Union and Bulgarian Journalists' Union had similar status. A *samizdat* (underground publication) network did circulate dissident writings from the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Among official publications, *Narodna kultura* (People's Culture) gained a singular reputation between 1984 and 1988 by publishing provocative articles on politics, economics, education, and the environment. In 1988 Zhivkov fired its editor Stefan Prodev for helping found a dissident organization.

Zhivkov and the Intelligentsia

Until the late 1980s, Zhivkov successfully prevented unrest in the Bulgarian intellectual community. Membership in the writers' union brought enormous privilege and social stature, and that drew many dissident writers such as Georgi Dzhagarov and Liubomir Levchev into the circle of the officially approved intelligentsia. On the other hand, entry required intellectual compromise, and refusal to compromise led to dismissal from the union and loss of all privileges. The punishment of dissident writers sometimes went far beyond loss of privileges. In 1978 émigré writer Georgi Markov was murdered in London for his anticommunist broadcasts for the British Broadcasting Corporation, and Blaga Dimitrova was harshly denounced for her critical portrayal of party officials in her 1982 novel *Litse.*

Zhivkov also softened organized opposition by restoring symbols of the Bulgarian cultural past that had been cast aside in the postwar campaign to consolidate Soviet-style party control. Beginning in 1967, he appealed loudly to the people to remember "our motherland Bulgaria." In the late 1970s, Zhivkov mended relations with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and in 1981 Liudmila Zhivkova's national celebration of Bulgaria's 1,300th anniversary raised patriotic feeling. Zhivkov's extensive campaign of cultural restoration provided at least some common ground between him and the Bulgarian intelligentsia.

The Ferment of 1988–90

In late 1987, dissatisfaction with government corruption, pollution, the Turkish issue, and repeated failure of economic reform programs began to stimulate open political dissent. By that time, a younger generation had matured, unimpressed by communist doctrine and disinclined to blind obedience. In November 1987, the Federation of Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy (originally the Discussion Club for Support of Glasnost and Perestroika) was founded by communist intellectuals to promote openness in Bulgarian society. In early 1988, the appearance of the Independent Association for Defense of Human Rights in Bulgaria publicized the repression of the regime. Meanwhile, the fragmented intellectual community had been galvanized by a single issue: environmental degradation. In the winter of 1987–88, an ecological exhibition in Ruse, one of the most seriously polluted industrial centers in Bulgaria, received national media attention. The communist regime's failure to protect its people from such dangers became a symbol for the general aura of incompetence that surrounded Zhivkov in the late 1980s.

In mid-1988 Zhivkov responded to the new opposition by purging two high pro-*glasnost* party officials, signaling that the party would permit *glasnost* only on its own terms. The BCP also tried to preempt environmental opposition by forming the Movement for Environmental Protection and Restoration amid promises for stiffer environmental regulation.

In late 1988 and early 1989, many leaders of independent Bulgarian groups were deported or harrassed. Nevertheless, by mid-1989 at least thirteen independent associations and committees had been founded for the defense of human rights and the environment. Then in 1989, communism was discredited by successful freedom movements in Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. By that time, *glasnost* had stimulated political dialog in the Soviet Union, which was still the model for Bulgarian political behavior. Under these new conditions, government intimidation failed. Although Zhivkov sought reconciliation with the intelligentsia by proclaiming a "new cultural revolution" in early 1989, the unions of writers, journalists, and artists leveled strong criticism on the environment and other issues. When Ekoglasnost was formed that year, it made a formidable public appeal for an accounting of economic policies that harmed the environment (see Other Political Organizations, this ch.).

In 1989 the Federation of Clubs backed the National Assembly petition against Turkish assimilation by characterizing the policy as against the best traditions of the Bulgarian nation. According to one theory, the Zhivkov policy toward the Turks was calculated to alienate the intelligentsia from the ethnocentric Bulgarian majority by forcing the former to take sides with the Turks; whatever its purpose, the policy failed amid the massive Turkish exodus of 1989. Leaders of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, deported for defending the Turks, were welcomed at a session of the CSCE, severely damaging Zhivkov's image in Europe. In the fall of 1989, dissident groups received further validation at the CSCE Conference on the Environment in Sofia, where they held public meetings and were received by Western delegates. The mass demonstrations that followed convinced the BCP that the Zhivkov regime could not survive.

Dramatic expression of public discontent continued after the Zhivkov ouster. In mid-1990 tent-city demonstrations in Sofia continued for several weeks, encountering no effective official resistance. Patterned after peaceful antigovernment protests of the 1960s in the West, the Sofia campsite of over 100 tents near the BSP headquarters building began as a protest against communist retention of power in the national elections of June 1990. The protest

eventually included demonstrators of many political viewpoints. Besides election fraud by the BSP, issues targeted were the Chernobyl' coverup, corruption among former and present BCP/BSP officials, Bulgaria's role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and past actions of present government officials such as Lukanov and Interior Minister Atanas Semerdzhiev. The tent city played an important role in publicizing reform issues as a new national government was being formed.

The Media and Public Issues

In the wake of Zhivkov's overthrow, fast-spreading pluralism in the media and intellectual circles brought a din of conflicting opinion to the public. In 1987 Bulgaria had seventeen daily newspapers, most of which were local. By 1991 eight national newspapers were publishing, and an expanding variety of local and weekly papers was available. Until 1990 the chief daily newspaper was *Rabotnichesko delo,* the official organ of the BCP. After the fall of Zhivkov, the daily was renamed *Duma;* in its new format, it began to feature more balanced accounts of national problems, reflecting the moderate image now cultivated by its sponsoring organization. The fragmentation of politics in 1990 brought a newspaper boom that included a full spectrum of political views. In 1991 the leading papers by circulation were *Duma, Demokratsiya* (an independent), the trade union daily *Trud,* and *Zemia,* aimed primarily at rural readers. The most popular weeklies were *Stürshel,* featuring folk humor, and the long-running *Pogled.* The weekly *168 Chasa* went furthest in rejecting traditional Bulgarian journalism in favor of sophisticated parody and Western-style in-depth features.

Universities dropped their required study of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and student organizations emerged immediately to assert positions on a wide variety of issues (see Youth Organizations, this ch.). In numerous national polls, the public expressed dissatisfaction with government leaders, economic policies (as both too radical and too conservative), and the BSP. Vestiges of the traditional gap between city and village remained, however: on the average, rural Bulgarians expressed less support for market reform and noncommunist leaders, placed less blame on the communists for current problems, and opposed complete rights for the Turkish minority more strongly.

In 1990–91 the media featured major exposés on malfeasance by the Zhivkov regime (acknowledged by the present BSP under public pressure), coverups of radiation exposure from the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant and the Chernobyl' disaster in the Soviet

Demonstrators outside parliament building in Sofia demand resignation of the Bulgarian Socialist Party government, November 1990. Courtesy Charles Sudetic

Union, and the murder of Georgi Markov (a full-scale investigation of which opened in 1990). In mid-1991 Bulgaria opened its archives to an international commission investigating the 1981 assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. In spite of those developments, in 1991 government agencies and individuals still threatened independent publications with court action for "treasonous" statements. In a 1991 poll by the independent *168 Chasa,* 46 percent of respondents expressed the belief that a campaign had been organized to control the Bulgarian media (the BSP and party officials were most often named responsible), and 37 percent said that freedom of the press was not in danger in Bulgaria.

The Permanent Commission for Human Rights and the National Problem was created in 1990 as an advisory and investigatory agency of the National Assembly. Composed of thirty-nine members of parliament, the commission received the nominal assignment of investigating past and present human rights violations in Bulgaria, recommending appropriate compensation, and drafting new human rights legislation. Among the issues addressed in the commission's first year were restoration of government-confiscated property to churches and Turkish citizens; verifying complaints of unfair sentencing and inhumane prison conditions; proposing

laws to replace restrictive legislation such as the Law on Religious Beliefs and the Law on Passports; and erecting legal barriers against state persecution for political reasons (see Religion, ch. 2). In January 1991, commission chairman Svetoslav Shivarov reported that all political prisoners in Bulgaria had been freed.

The Turkish Problem

As in other parts of Eastern Europe, the repeal of single-party rule in Bulgaria exposed the long-standing grievances of an ethnic minority. Especially in the 1980s, the Zhivkov regime had systematically persecuted the Turkish population, which at one time numbered 1.5 million and was estimated at 1.25 million in 1991. Mosques were closed, Turks were forced to Slavicize their names, education in the native language was denied, and police brutality was used to discourage resistance (see Turks, ch. 2). The urban intelligentsia that partcipated in the 1990 reform movement pushed the post-Zhivkov governments toward restoring constitutionally guaranteed human rights to the Turks. But abrogation of Zhivkov's assimilation program soon after his fall brought massive protests by ethnic Bulgarians, even in Sofia.

In January 1990, the Social Council of Citizens, a national body representing all political and ethnic groups, reached a compromise that guaranteed the Turks freedom of religion, choice of names, and unimpeded practice of cultural traditions and use of Turkish within the community. In turn, the Bulgarian nationalists were promised that Bulgarian would remain the official language and that no movement for autonomy or separatism would be tolerated. Especially in areas where Turks outnumbered Bulgarians, the latter feared progressive "Islamification" or even invasion and annexation by Turkey—a fear that had been fed consciously by the Zhivkov assimilation campaign and was revived by the BSP in 1991. Because radical elements of the Turkish population did advocate separatism, however, the nonannexation provision of the compromise was vital.

The Bulgarian governments that followed Zhivkov tried to realize the conditions of the compromise as quickly as possible. In the multiparty election of 1990, the Turks won representation in the National Assembly by twenty-three candidates of the predominantly Turkish MRF (see The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, this ch.). At that point, ethnic Bulgarians, many remaining from the Zhivkov regime, still held nearly all top jobs in government and industry, even in predominantly Turkish Kŭrdzhali Province. Nevertheless, parts of Bulgarian society felt threatened by the rise of the MRF. In 1990 that faction collided with a hard-line Bulgarian

group, the National Committee for Defense of National Interests—an organization containing many former communists instrumental in the Zhivkov assimilation program. In November 1990, Bulgarian nationalists established the Razgrad Bulgarian Republic in a heavily Turkish region to protest the government's program of restoring rights to the Turks. In the first half of 1991, intermittent violence and demonstrations were directed at both Turks and Bulgarians in Razgrad.

These conditions forced the government to find a balance between Turkish demands and demonstrations for full recognition of their culture and language, and Bulgarian nationalist complaints against preferential treatment for the ethnic minority. In 1991 the most important issue of the controversy was restoring Turkish-language teaching in the schools of Turkish ethnic districts (see Education, ch. 2). In 1991 the Popov government took initial steps in this direction, but long delays brought massive Turkish protests, especially in Kŭrdzhali. In mid-1991 continuing strikes and protests on both sides of the issue had brought no new discussions of compromise. Frustration with unmet promises encouraged Turkish separatists in both Bulgaria and Turkey, which in turn fueled the ethnocentric fears of the Bulgarian majority—and the entire issue diverted valuable energy from the national reform effort. Although most political parties supported full minority rights, in 1991 the strength of Bulgarian nationalist sentiment, deeply rooted in centuries of conflict with the Ottoman Empire and not inclined to compromise, promised to make the Turkish question the most pressing human rights issue in Bulgaria for the foreseeable future.

Foreign Policy

From World War II until 1989, Bulgarian foreign policy revolved around the Soviet Union. Without exception Sofia imitated or supported Soviet twists and turns such as Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin in 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Substantial historical and economic ties supplemented the ideological foundation of the relationship. In the 1970s and 1980s, Bulgaria improved its diplomatic relations with nations outside the Soviet sphere. But in 1989, domestic and international events jolted Bulgaria from forty years of uniformity and forced it to consider for the first time major diversification of its foreign policy, abandoning its paramount reliance on the Soviet Union. This meant a lengthy period of reevaluation, during which general goals were agreed upon but specific policy was hotly debated.

In 1991 Foreign Affairs Minister Viktor Vŭlkov listed several general goals of his ministry: the integration of Bulgaria as fully

as possible into the unified European Community to facilitate development of a market economy and Western political institutions; improving relations with all Bulgaria's Balkan neighbors and the countries of the Black Sea region, with emphasis on mutual territorial integrity and sovereignty; active participation in the United Nations and other international organizations able to guarantee the security of small states; and maintaining as much as possible of Bulgaria's unique relationship with the Soviet Union while drawing much closer to the United States. Once the economic advantages of membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon—see Glossary) disappeared in 1990 and instability became chronic in the Soviet Union, other sources of economic and geopolitical security became the primary quest in Bulgaria's pragmatic search for foreign partners (see Bulgaria in Comecon, ch. 3). In 1990 indications of the new pragmatism were recognition of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Israel and an official invitation for the pope to visit Bulgaria.

The Foreign Policy Establishment

Major changes were made in the organizations conducting Bulgarian foreign affairs after the ouster of Zhivkov. Post-Zhivkov governments ended the practice of selecting members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for diplomatic positions in which they gathered intelligence and carried out subversive activities abroad (see Security and Intelligence Services, ch. 5). Admitting that the Bulgarian intelligence presence abroad had been extensive under Zhivkov, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in mid-1991 that henceforth only a single, identified intelligence officer would remain in each Western embassy. In a sharp streamlining of the diplomatic corps, 200 of Bulgaria's 544 foreign diplomats were called home in 1990 and 1991, and 20 of its 79 foreign missions were closed, mostly in Third World countries (relations with those countries continued, however).

Under the communist Lukanov government of 1990, President Zheliu Zhelev assumed major responsibilities as head of state in talks with foreign leaders; his nonpartisan political position at home and his direct approach to foreign and economic issues gained Zhelev respect as a spokesman in Bulgaria and abroad, as well as large-scale commitments of aid from several Western sources (see Domestic and International Economic Policies in the 1990s, ch. 3). When Popov formed his government in 1991, Vŭlkov (leader of the BANU) replaced a former Zhivkovite intelligence official as minister of foreign affairs, supplementing Zhelev's efforts and improving the world image of Bulgaria's official foreign policy agency.

Relations with Balkan Neighbors

Although the Zhivkov regime often advocated closer relations and multilateral cooperation with Yugoslavia, Turkey, Greece, Albania, and Romania, a number of traditional issues barred significant improvement until the late 1980s. Bulgarian proposals to make the Balkans a zone free of chemical and nuclear weapons, or a "zone of peace and understanding" (advanced by Zhivkov at the behest of the Soviet Union, to eliminate weapons of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary) from the region) was vetoed on several occasions. But in 1990, Zhelev was able to remove some of the suspicion that had barred rapprochement by the Zhivkov regime. Post-Zhivkov regimes sought closer relations with both Greece and Turkey, partly in the hope that NATO would grant Bulgaria membership to form a bridge between its two mutually hostile members.

Yugoslavia

Bulgarian relations with Yugoslavia were conditioned by old issues of Balkan politics and by strong domestic political forces at work in both countries. Throughout the 1980s, the Yugoslav media complained loudly that Bulgaria mistreated its Macedonian citizens by insisting that Macedonians were ethnically Bulgarians, making separate ethnic recognition inappropriate. The Zhivkov regime (and its successors), fearing that inflamed nationalism in Yugoslavia would intensify demands for Macedonian autonomy across the border in Bulgaria, largely ignored the Yugoslav propaganda campaign on the Macedonian issue. The dispute over Macedonia survived and prospered after communism lost its grip on both countries. Bulgarian nationalists, stronger after Zhivkov, held that the Slavic population of the Republic of Macedonia was ethnically Bulgarian, a claim leading naturally to assertion of a Greater Bulgaria. To defuse nationalist fervor on both sides, and in keeping with the policy of improved relations with all neighbors, Zhelev officially advocated nonintervention in the ethnic affairs of other nations.

The nonintervention strategy assumed greater importance when the Republic of Macedonia sought independence from the Yugoslav federation in 1991 in an effort to escape the increasing dominance of the Republic of Serbia in the federation. That effort reinforced the protective attitude of Macedonian nationalists in Bulgaria toward Yugoslav Macedonia, which had been part of Serbia in the interwar period. Serbia's use of force to prevent the breakup

of the Yugoslav federation in 1991 triggered Bulgarian fears of wider destabilization in the Balkans if Serbian expansionism were fully revived.

In 1991 Bulgarian policy toward Yugoslavia was complicated by the rejuvenation of Macedonian national groups in Bulgaria. The largest of these was the Union of Macedonian Societies, a long-standing cultural and educational society that in 1990 took the prefix IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization), which was the name of the terrorist organization active in Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia between 1893 and 1935 (see The Macedonian Issue, ch. 1). But the threat posed by such groups remained small because the focus of Bulgarian nationalism was the Turkish issue in 1991, and because economic reform was the major concern of all factions. In spite of claims by the Serbian press that Bulgaria was aiding Croatia in the civil war of 1991 and that Bulgaria owed Serbia reparations from World War II, Bulgaria followed Zhelev's policy of nonintervention as the Yugoslav civil war continued.

Romania

In the early 1980s, Bulgarian relations with Romania featured regular official visits by Zhivkov and Romanian President Nicolae Ceauşescu and diplomatic avoidance of differing approaches to internal control (Romania being the more totalitarian) and the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) (Bulgaria being the more loyal member). At that point, both countries concentrated on more pressing foreign issues, and both advocated creating a Balkan nuclear-free zone. But during the 1980s, relations were strained by the independent foreign policy of Romania, its opposition to *perestroika* in the late 1980s, and mutual accusations of environmental pollution affecting the other country. Deteriorating personal relations between Zhivkov and the maverick Ceauşescu also may have contributed to the decline. But, in the name of Warsaw Pact solidarity, the Zhivkov regime subdued criticism of chemical pollution from Romanian plants across the Danube, and it remained neutral in the Hungarian-Romanian dispute over Romanian treatment of ethnic Hungarians in that country in the late 1980s. After the emergence of the environment as a political issue in 1989, however, accusations became more harsh on both sides. In 1991 joint commissions attempted to reach a compromise on the environmental issue and restore the pragmatic, relatively amicable relationship of the postwar years.

Greece

Bulgarian relations with Greece, a traditional enemy, were stable throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in spite of major government

changes in both countries. Zhivkov made this stability a model for the overall Balkan cooperation that was a centerpiece of his foreign policy in the 1980s. In 1986 the two countries signed a declaration of good-neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation that was based on mutual enmity toward Turkey and toward Yugoslav demands for recognition of Macedonian minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. An important motivation for friendship with Greece was to exploit NATO's Greek-Turkish split, which was based on the claims of the two countries in Cyprus. In early 1989, Bulgaria signed a ten-year bilateral economic agreement with Greece.

The main historical issue between Bulgaria and Greece, disposition of their Macedonian minorities, was settled during the 1970s; after that time, the parties adopted mutual policies of strict noninterference in internal affairs. In mid-1991 the possibility of independence for Yugoslav Macedonia threatened to renew tension in that area. Post-Zhivkov Bulgarian policy toward Greece remained very conciliatory, however; in 1991 Zhelev stressed cooperation with Greece as a foundation for Balkan stability and reassured the Greeks that Bulgarian rapprochement with Turkey did not threaten this relationship.

Turkey

In spite of intermittent rapprochement, Turkey was hostile to Bulgaria through most of the 1980s because of Zhivkov's mistreatment of Bulgarian Turks and the economic hardship caused in Turkey by mass immigration of Turks from Bulgaria in 1989. The last rapprochement, a protocol of friendship in early 1988, was signed by Bulgaria to defuse international criticism of its ethnic policy. That agreement dissolved rapidly in 1988, when Turkey saw no change in Bulgarian ethnic assimilation; by 1989 Turkey was vowing to defend the Turkish minority, while Bulgaria claimed that its "Turks" were all Bulgarians converted to Islam under the Ottoman Empire (see The Turkish Problem, this ch.).

The ouster of Zhivkov and subsequent Bulgarian commitment to repatriate deported Turks and grant them full human rights brought a marked change in Turkish policy. Despite delays and complaints from the Bulgarian Turks, Turkey remained patient and positive toward all signs of progress. The former dissident Zhelev, long a vocal critic of assimilation, became president and met with Turkish President Turgut Özal in September 1990. That meeting began a series of high-level economic talks in 1990-91 that yielded Turkish loans and technical assistance to Bulgaria and promised to bolster bilateral trade, which had shrunk by 80 to 90

percent in the mid-1980s. A new treaty of friendship and cooperation was prepared in the summer of 1991.

Despite the thaw, obstacles remained in Bulgarian-Turkish rapprochement. The ill will caused by Zhivkov's shrill anti-Turkish propaganda remained fresh in the early 1990s. Strident anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish statements in the media by Bulgarian nationalist factions kept tension high, and minor border incidents continued in 1991. And Bulgarian friendship with Greece created a precarious balancing act that required caution toward such moves as the Bulgarian-Turkish nonagression pact proposed by Turkey in late 1990.

The Soviet Union

In the post-Zhivkov era, the most controversial foreign policy problem was defining Bulgaria's new relationship with its traditional protector and best trading partner, the Soviet Union. Although Zhivkov's relations with Gorbachev had not been as warm as those with earlier Soviet leaders, Bulgaria remained strongly dependent on the Soviet Union economically even in the years immediately following Zhivkov's ouster (permission for which Bulgarian Politburo members duly sought and received from Moscow). In mid-1992 the 1967 Treaty for Cooperation, Security, and Friendship with the Soviet Union was to expire.

Because the treaty called for notice of abrogation to be given a year in advance, by mid-1991 Bulgarian national opinion was divided over what terms should be included in the National Assembly's draft of a new treaty. Led by the BSP, one body of Bulgarian opinion advocated essentially renewing the existing treaty, giving the Soviet Union top priority in the new foreign policy to ensure continued supply of fuels and other vital materials. A second body of opinion, led by the UDF and Podkrepa, conceded the pragmatic necessity of continued economic relations but urged that a new treaty eliminate all subordination of Bulgarian to Soviet interests and provide complete flexibility for Bulgaria to establish commercial and diplomatic ties with the West. Amid heated public debate, the Popov government reached agreement with the Soviet Union on a short-term abrogation followed by accelerated joint development of a new treaty reflecting the changed positions of both sides. The Bulgarian National Assembly was expected to pass a bill to that effect in August 1991 (see Foreign Trade, ch. 3; see Foreign Military Relations, ch. 5).

Because the two countries had no disputed territory and were on roughly parallel paths of political reform in 1991, major issues between them were mostly economic. The primary Bulgarian

concern was to protect its newborn geopolitical independence from any recurrence of the Warsaw Pact mentality in Moscow. Other critical goals in 1991 were stabilizing the unpredictable supply of Soviet oil, protecting large numbers of Bulgarian guest workers threatened with layoff in the Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Komi ASSR), and reestablishing Soviet markets for Bulgarian goods that had shrunk drastically in 1990. A new bilateral defense agreement also was a priority in the wake of Warsaw Pact disestablishment. In July 1991, Bulgaria set a precedent by signing a trade agreement with the Byelorussian Republic, the first intergovernmental pact made directly with one of the Soviet republics.

Western Europe and the United States

Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria's policy toward Western Europe and the United States was determined largely by the position of the Soviet Union. Events such as the invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan automatically distanced Bulgaria from the West; then, in the early 1980s Soviet efforts to split NATO by cultivating Western Europe brought Bulgaria closer to France and the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)—a position that continued through the 1980s. A 1988 application for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT—see Glossary) was refused because of the Turkish assimilation program, after widespread expectations of success.

Decades of complete isolation from the West left traces on Bulgarian policy even in the 1980s. In early 1989, President François Mitterrand of France was the first Western head of state to visit Bulgaria since before World War II. Between 1945 and 1989, the highest visiting United States official was an assistant secretary of state. And in 1985 Sir Jeffrey Howe became the first British foreign secretary to visit Bulgaria since the nineteenth century—an indication that isolation began before the onset of communism.

The first post-Zhivkov regime recognized quite early, however, that Cold War politics no longer could limit Bulgaria's choice of economic or diplomatic partners. Within a few months of the Zhivkov ouster, the National Assembly Committee on Foreign Policy had received the head of the Council of Europe and received a pledge of closer ties, and Bulgarian diplomats and businessmen had described reform goals, priorities, and investment opportunities to a CSCE Conference on Economic Cooperation. Shortly thereafter Prime Minister Lukanov visited the headquarters of the European Economic Community (EEC—see Glossary) in Brussels. Lukanov signed a treaty on trade and economic cooperation to remove all trade barriers by 1995 and guarantee Bulgarian access

to EEC markets. Lukanov also gained substantial support for Bulgarian membership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF—see Glossary), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and GATT.

A critical stage in the new policy was Zhelev's meeting with Western leaders in Europe and the United States in the fall of 1990. Zhelev explained Bulgaria's nonaligned position and its needs to United States President George H.W. Bush and to Mitterrand, receiving substantial pledges of aid from both leaders. Traditional trading partner Austria also pledged substantial new investment in the Bulgarian economy during Zhelev's tour of the West.

Bulgaria's new policy toward the West was reflected in a series of decisions taken in 1990. Diplomatic relations were restored with South Korea and Israel, Western allies in sensitive areas of Cold War confrontation. An official invitation for Pope John Paul II to visit Bulgaria constituted a new level of recognition of that religious leader's authority. And in early 1991, Bulgaria sent token noncombat forces in support of the United States-led Persian Gulf War effort. In 1991 Zhelev's cooperation with an international investigation of the Markov murder was another significant gesture to the Western world.

From the beginning, the success of Bulgaria's intense campaign for closer relations with the West depended on continued progress in economic and human rights reform and was measured in economic terms. As the stature of the Soviet Union dwindled steadily in 1991, the hope of gaining full status in the European community was a powerful weapon for reformers within Bulgaria. Given Bulgaria's strategic position and chronic instability elsewhere in the Balkans, Western nations monitored Bulgaria carefully and rewarded its progressive steps. Nonetheless, in 1991 Bulgaria remained far behind Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in receiving Western aid.

* * *

Few monographs have been written on the Bulgarian government and politics of the late 1980s. Background to that period is provided by the politics sections of Robert J. McIntyre's *Bulgaria: Politics, Economics and Society* and John D. Bell's *The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov*. More recent political events are reported authoritatively in numerous journal articles, including "Long Memories and Short Fuses," by F. Stephen Larrabee; "Bulgaria: An Eastern European Revolution in Suspension," by Steven Chiodini; "Bulgaria's Time Bind: The Search for Democracy and

a Viable Heritage'' by Joel Martin Halpern and Barbara Kerewsky-Halpern; and '''Post-Communist' Bulgaria,'' by John D. Bell. Also extremely valuable are the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty *Report on Eastern Europe,* each covering a particular aspect of the current political situation. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Chapter 5. National Security

Thracian warrior in Roman mural, Serditsa

IN 1991 BULGARIA GRAPPLED with political changes and economic difficulties that threatened its national security. The country's most intractable problems were internal crises rather than external threats. The Warsaw Pact (see Glossary), which had guided national security policy since 1955, became defunct as a military organization on April 1, 1991. A concurrent shift from one-party communist rule to multiparty politics made the future political character and role of the Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) uncertain. Grave economic problems also portended that a smaller proportion of national resources would be devoted to defense in the future. The European strategic environment seemed less tense and threatening than at any time in the recent past, largely because of the waning of the Cold War; however, the more immediate situation in the Balkans appeared less secure in 1991. Neighboring countries Yugoslavia and Greece were apprehensive that Bulgarians might renew their interest in the Greater Bulgaria established briefly under the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878.

The Bulgarian military establishment was substantial and well equipped considering the small size and population of the country. One expert observer described it aptly as a regional force of significance. The data exchanged at the signing of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE—see Glossary) on November 19, 1990, revealed previously unknown details on the command organization, structure, strength, and disposition of Bulgaria's ground and air forces. The BPA appeared to be a relatively cohesive force without serious ethnic or other internal fragmentation. Despite the end of the Warsaw Pact, a continued military relationship with the Soviet Union was expected, based on genuine affinity and mutual interest between the two countries. In the late 1980s, Bulgaria imitated several major military reforms then being introduced in the Soviet Armed Forces, which long had served as the model for developing Bulgaria's armed forces. The BPA instituted unilateral force reductions, restructuring, defense industry conversion, and a new openness in military affairs that imitated Soviet *glasnost* (see Glossary).

In 1991 Bulgaria's uncertain internal security situation reflected the unsettled state of politics and the economy. Increased political freedom, economic hardship, and the inability or reluctance of the governments that followed the regime of Todor Zhivkov (1962–89) to use force or coercion against the population created the potential

for domestic unrest. These factors made possible increased reliance on the internal security apparatus, and ultimately the BPA, to maintain order and even to carry out basic government functions. In the immediate post-Zhivkov years, the army was the pivotal institution protecting legitimate national security interests and territorial integrity during the transition to democracy and the rule of law.

Development of the Armed Forces

The ancestors of the modern Bulgarians established a respectable martial tradition during centuries of combat with the Byzantine and Ottoman empires. After Russian armies freed it from Ottoman control in the late nineteenth century, Bulgaria became an independent military force in the Balkans. Bulgaria's neighbors viewed it as the major regional power with outstanding territorial ambitions; for that reason, they joined forces to offset Bulgarian military power before 1914. Bulgaria participated actively in combat operations as a German ally in World War I. Although again allied with Germany in World War II, Bulgaria did not join in German offensive operations. After World War II, Bulgaria came under Soviet military influence and in 1955 joined the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact (see World War II, ch. 1). In that capacity, Bulgaria became an integral part of Soviet military and political policy toward the southern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary). Although the end of superpower confrontation in Europe had loosened the bilateral military connection to the Soviet Union by 1991, extensive military ties remained.

Early Development

For several centuries after they migrated to the Balkans in the middle of the seventh century A.D., the Bulgars were the primary rivals of the Byzantine Empire for control of the eastern Balkans. In the seventh and eighth centuries, Bulgar kings established an independent empire that inflicted several defeats on the Byzantines in Macedonia and Thrace. King Terbelis defeated the Byzantine army at the Battle of Anchialus in 708, drove through Thrace to the walls of Constantinople, and besieged the Byzantine capital in 712. In 717, however, Terbelis allied with the Byzantine Emperor Leo III against the Arabs. Terbelis led the Bulgar army into Thrace, won the Battle of Adrianople in 718, and defended Constantinople against a Muslim siege from across the Bosporus. Emperor Constantine V reasserted Byzantine control over the Bulgars in the mid- to late eighth century. King Kardan regained the initiative

by the end of the century and forced Byzantium to pay tribute to the Bulgars.

The power of the First Bulgarian Empire waxed during the ninth and early tenth centuries. The Bulgars continued their struggle with Byzantium and encountered new foes as well. They fought the Magyars and Pechenegs, who raided them from north of the Danube River (see fig. 2). Beginning in 808, Tsar Krum fought a successful war against the Byzantines, winning the Battle of Versinikia in 813, capturing Adrianople, and advancing to the walls of Constantinople. However, Krum's son was defeated at the Battle of Mesembria in 817. Tsar Simeon fought successful wars against the Byzantines in the late ninth and early tenth centuries, capturing Thessaly, Macedonia, and Albania from the Byzantines, conquering Serbia, and threatening Constantinople itself.

Between 967 and 969, the Byzantines and Russians invaded and annexed Bulgaria. Samuil, an expatriate noble, then regained control of eastern Bulgaria and Serbia by defeating the Byzantines near Sofia in 981. Throughout the late tenth and early eleventh centuries, he fought the Byzantines in Macedonia and Thrace. In 1014, however, the Byzantines crushed the Bulgarian army and reoccupied Bulgaria.

Bulgaria became a vassal state of the Byzantine Empire as well as a march route and battleground for advancing Mongols, Turks, Serbs, Magyars, and European crusaders beginning in the twelfth century. The Bulgarians fought alongside the Serbs in the unsuccessful Battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389—a defeat that began nearly five centuries of Ottoman domination during which tsarist Russia represented the only hope for liberation.

From the Struggle for National Independence to World War I

Uprisings against Ottoman control in 1875 and 1876 began military action that finally brought Bulgaria conditional independence in 1878. Bulgaria was a major battleground in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78. Russia fought the war as the champion of Slavs living under the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. Under the Treaty of San Stefano, signed March 3, 1878, Bulgaria became an autonomous state under Russian protection. The same year, the European powers forced Bulgaria to sign the Treaty of Berlin, returning substantial territory to the Ottoman Empire in the name of regional balance. Bulgaria retained its autonomy, however.

Conflict with Balkan neighbors began when the new nation sparked a brief war with Serbia in 1885 over control of the province of Eastern Rumelia. Seeking compensation for Bulgaria's annexation, Serbia invaded the province and was defeated by Prince

Alexander, modern Bulgaria's first ruler. After inconclusive fighting, Bulgaria and Serbia agreed to the Treaty of Bucharest, which restored prewar borders in 1886.

During the twentieth century, persistent territorial disputes and dissatisfaction with borders determined Bulgaria's position in four wars. In 1912 Bulgaria entered the Balkan League, a military alliance with Serbia and Greece, to eliminate the last vestiges of Turkish rule in the Balkans and to expand its own territory in the process. Fielding approximately 180,000 troops, Bulgaria provided the bulk of the military personnel for operations against Turkish forces in the First Balkan War. Bulgarian armies besieged Constantinople in November 1912, but they were driven back temporarily by the Turks. When the key city of Adrianople fell to Bulgarian and Serbian forces in March 1913, Turkey capitulated. It surrendered its European possessions under the Treaty of London in May 1913.

A dispute over the spoils of the First Balkan War led directly to the Second Balkan War. Bulgaria asserted that Serbia occupied more of Macedonia and Thessaloniki than it was allowed by the prewar agreement. In June 1913, Bulgarian armies attacked Serbian forces in Macedonia and another army advanced into Thessaloniki. After checking this offensive, Serbian and Greek forces pushed the Bulgarians back into Bulgaria in July. Romania then declared war on Bulgaria and advanced unopposed toward Sofia, while Turkey capitalized on the situation to retake Andrianople. Bulgaria sued for peace and lost territory in Macedonia, Thrace, and Southern Dobruja to Greece, Serbia, and Romania, respectively, in the Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913).

Bulgaria's rivalry with Serbia and Greece defined its participation in World War I. Bulgaria avoided involvement in the war until 1915 when it mobilized 1.2 million soldiers and joined the Central Powers in attacking Serbia. Bulgaria took this action in the expectation that a victory by the Central Powers would restore Greater Bulgaria. In October 1915, two of Bulgaria's armies drove west into Serbia while allied Austro-Hungarian and German armies drove south. Bulgarian forces blocked British and French troops in Thessaloniki from linking with Serbian forces.

In mid-1916 over 250,000 British, French, and Serbian troops prepared for an offensive from Thessaloniki northwest along the Vardar River. Although the Germans and Bulgarians preempted the offensive and drove this force beyond the Struma River by late August, the war then settled into a long, costly stalemate along the Vardar. Seriously weakened by a poor military supply system and widespread unrest among the soldiers, Bulgaria collapsed and

surrendered in 1918. The country suffered greatly during the war. Mobilization disrupted food production, and German requisitioning of grain and other foodstuffs taxed stored food supplies. About 100,000 Bulgarian soldiers were killed in combat, and 275,000 noncombatants died as a direct result of the war (see World War I, ch. 1).

The Interwar Years and World War II

The harsh terms of the Treaty of Neuilly-sur-Seine (November 1919) limited the postwar Bulgarian army to 20,000, and conscription was forbidden. Many embittered former officers became politically active in the Military League, a formidable and well-organized opposition faction in the 1920s and 1930s. Irredentism made Bulgaria a natural ally of Germany during the interwar years. After border skirmishes with Bulgaria in 1925 and 1931, Greece joined Romania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey in forming the Balkan Entente in 1934 to contain perceived Bulgarian expansionism. Bulgaria began to rearm in 1936 with German, British, and French assistance. Meanwhile, the Military League had been influential in staging coups in the early 1930s. In 1936, however, Tsar Boris III (1918–43) dismantled the organization, stripping the military of the political influence it had accumulated after World War I.

After several years of hesitating between alignment with Germany or the Soviet Union, Bulgaria finally sought to satisfy territorial claims to the south and west by signing the Tripartite Pact with the Axis powers in March 1941. But Bulgaria minimized its involvement in the war, managing to satisfy the terms of alliance with Germany without a declaration of war on the Soviet Union.

In spite of its passive policy, Bulgaria was a vital pivot for German operations in the Balkans, North Africa, and on the eastern front against the Soviet Union. Germany launched invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia from Bulgaria in April 1941, and Bulgaria occupied parts of the territory it expected to retain after the war. German forces used the country as a rear area for transporting troops and supplies and providing training, and as a rest and recreation point. Its railroads and ports were critical to the German war effort. More than fifty German ships and submarines were berthed in the harbor at Varna as late as the summer of 1944.

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) dominated the anti-German partisan movement that arose in 1941. Although the movement had a central military commission to direct armed activities, the partisans generally were poorly organized and armed. Their total number never exceeded 18,000 and, unlike partisans elsewhere, they were more active in the cities than in the countryside.

The partisans received arms and supplies from the Soviet Union and Britain. The most successful aspect of partisan activity was pro-Soviet propaganda, demonstrations, terrorism, and sabotage against installations in Bulgaria critical to the German war effort. Among assassination attempts against German officials and Bulgarian fascists, the assassination of Minister of War Khristo Lukov in 1943 had the greatest impact. Harsh recriminations discouraged such activities, however. In 1943 the partisans formed the first fighting units of the People's Revolutionary Army of Liberation (PRAL), which eventually included brigade-sized units. Still, their armed attacks on German forces generally ended in failure. As late as 1944, entire units were captured or killed in action.

The Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944, as the Red Army forces of the Third Ukrainian Front under General Fedor Tolbukhin crossed its northern border from Romania. Bulgaria changed sides on September 8 and declared war on Germany. Tolbukhin took command of the Bulgarian forces and reorganized them. By September 17, a Bulgarian army of 200,000 troops was mobilized and attached to the Third Ukrainian Front fighting German forces in Macedonia and Serbia. At the end of World War II, Bulgaria again returned the Greek and Yugoslav territory that it had occupied in 1941.

Postwar Development

The Red Army met little hostility during its occupation of Bulgaria from 1944 to 1947. At the time of invasion, the Soviet Union did not regard Bulgaria as an enemy state, because Bulgaria had not declared war or participated actively in the German eastern front. According to the Yalta agreements of 1945, the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, assigned to administer the country until a peace treaty was signed, was essentially an extension of the Red Army military administration. Under pressure from Britain, the preponderant interest of the Soviet Union in Bulgaria was recognized by giving it 75 percent control of the commission.

The Soviet Union immediately reorganized the Bulgarian Army to ensure that the BCP would have a leading role. More than 40 generals and 800 officers discredited by their association with the German Army were purged or resigned when Bulgaria switched sides in the war. Although former Minister of War Damian Velchev returned to his post in the Fatherland Front coalition government, the BCP used the presence of Soviet occupation forces to push the old officer corps out of domestic politics. In July 1946, control of the army shifted from the Ministry of War to the full cabinet, 2,000 allegedly reactionary officers were purged, and

Velchev resigned in protest. The combination of events provided an opening for the BCP to establish full control over the military. It conducted a decisive purge in October 1947. Accusing the remaining noncommunist senior officers of plotting to overthrow the Fatherland Front, the BCP dismissed one-third of the officer corps. After 1949 the BCP dominated the army, and party membership was obligatory for officers on active duty.

In the first postwar years, Bulgaria closely followed the example of Soviet military development and served Soviet interests in the Balkans. BCP leader Georgi Dimitrov exhorted Bulgarian officers to learn from the experience, strategy, and military art of the Soviet Union. He wanted the BPA to be exactly like the Soviet armed forces, with common missions, organization, weapons and equipment, and military science.

In 1946 Bulgaria participated in the initial conflict of the Cold War by aiding communist forces in the Greek civil war. Bulgarian support, including operating bases on Bulgarian territory, made possible communist victories near the border. As a result, Greece charged Bulgaria with numerous violations of its northern border. In 1947 the United Nations (UN) confirmed the Greek charges and later officially condemned Bulgaria for aiding communist guerrilla forces.

In the late 1940s, the Bulgarian armed forces were composed almost entirely of former partisans, peasants, and workers. Approximately 75 percent were members of the BCP or the Communist Youth League of Bulgaria (Komsomol). Many peasants and workers were attracted to the military by upward mobility and pay that was higher than in factories or farms. The armed forces were officially named the Bulgarian People's Army (BPA) in 1952. Bulgaria joined the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955, and contributed a token battalion to the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968. Bulgaria initiated a major military modernization program in the 1980s, adding its first T-72 tanks, MiG-23 fighters, Su-25 fighter-bombers, Mi-24 attack helicopters, and 130 surface-to-surface missiles to its inventory. During that period, the education level and technical competence of the officer corps rose; by 1985 nearly 85 percent had received at least a secondary education (see Education, ch. 2).

National Defense Posture

In 1991 the Warsaw Pact disbanded as a military alliance. Bulgarian commitment to the Soviet-led alliance accordingly ceased to be the main direction of its national defense. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact presaged a major shift in threat perception,

military doctrine, and strategy. Historical, geographic, and economic factors promised to assume greater importance in shaping Bulgaria's approach to national defense. Traditional allies and adversaries such as Germany and Turkey now exerted critical influence on decisions about military requirements, doctrine, and strategy. The country's geopolitical position in the volatile Balkans at the crossroads of Europe and Asia was another important determinant. Economic considerations limited the development and retention of military capabilities. In the early 1990s, Bulgarian officials began to stress guaranteeing national security through political agreements with neighboring countries rather than military force.

Threat Perception

Bulgaria was the only Warsaw Pact country without a frontier with the Soviet Union. Of the nearly 1,900 kilometers of land borders, 520 were with Romania, 500 with Yugoslavia, 480 with Greece, and 380 with Turkey. With the general exception of Romania, Bulgaria had had serious past conflicts with each of these countries. Bulgaria and neighboring NATO members Greece and Turkey had historical disputes that long predated the establishment of their respective rival alliances after World War II. However, unlike its former Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, Bulgaria's traditional enemies were NATO members or nonaligned nations. Relations with Greece had been friendly since 1980, based primarily on a shared antipathy toward Turkey. In 1986 Bulgaria and Greece signed a joint declaration of friendship and cooperation.

The issue of Macedonia was a source of potential conflict between Bulgaria and its neighbors. In 1991 the prospect of civil war in Yugoslavia raised concern that Bulgaria could reclaim Macedonia as a step toward reestablishing the Greater Bulgaria prescribed in the Treaty of San Stefano (see San Stefano, Berlin, and Independence, ch. 1). Bulgaria's Macedonian border had been tense since the Second Balkan War; in 1989 the ouster of Zhivkov escalated the risk that Macedonia would set off political or military conflict with all of Yugoslavia or with its neighboring Republic of Serbia. Bulgarian spokesmen denied having territorial ambitions against Yugoslav Macedonia, but they added ambiguity by referring to it as an open issue. Unlike the Yugoslavs, the Bulgarians did not recognize Macedonians as an ethnic group distinct from Bulgarians.

Proximity to NATO members Greece and Turkey, both with strong armed forces and significant military potential, was Bulgaria's primary strategic concern in the post-Warsaw Pact era. The plan for the development of the BPA was measured against the

military programs of those two neighbors. The BPA leadership openly rated both their armies as superior to its own forces, stressing that Turkey boasted military manpower second only to the United States among NATO countries and a population of over 100 million. In the view of the Bulgarian military establishment, the size of the Turkish armed forces was the primary standard for determining appropriate reductions in BPA forces, as well as in strategic defense planning. Despite the relative lack of tension in bilateral relations with Turkey and an apparent absence of hostile intentions on its part in 1990, the treatment of ethnic Turks in Bulgaria remained an irritating and potentially explosive issue in bilateral relations. In 1987 veiled threats by Turkey to resolve the issue by force had caused alarm in Bulgaria. The outburst of pro-Turkish and Bulgarian nationalist rhetoric that followed the fall of the BCP regime, which had been willing to suppress ethnic unrest by force, raised ethnic tensions in a period when central government control over society had substantially decreased (see The Turkish Problem, ch. 4).

Even in decline, the Warsaw Pact alliance remained a major factor in Bulgarian threat perception and military planning. Bulgaria continued to count on an ongoing close military relationship and practical cooperation with the Soviet Union to balance perceived security threats. In 1991 the Bulgarian government conducted negotiations for a new bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union to guarantee it against external aggression. In return Bulgaria would pledge not to join any organization, such as NATO, perceived hostile to the Soviet Union. Whatever its relation to the Soviet Union, by 1991 Bulgaria was entering a new, shifting local balance of power similar to the balance that existed in the Balkans before World War II.

Doctrine and Strategy

The assigned mission of the BPA under the Warsaw Pact was to defend the southwestern border of the alliance. In practice, this mission was considerably more oriented to offensive operations than official pronouncements implied. Located within what the Soviet General Staff called the Southwest Theater of Military Operations, Bulgaria would have confronted Turkey in case of a Warsaw Pact conflict with NATO. As indicated by several joint amphibious landing exercises undertaken with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria's principal objectives would have been to control Thrace and to help Soviet forces seize and hold the critical straits at the Bosporus and the Dardanelles.

In the new geopolitical climate of 1991, military spokespersons emphasized different sources of military doctrine, including the constitution, resolutions passed by the National Assembly (Sŭbranie), the United Nations Charter, international law, and declarations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—see Glossary). Military spokespersons cited active efforts to pursue mutual security and trust with Turkey and Greece as well as good relations with Yugoslavia, Romania, and other European nations. The military denied all territorial claims against neighboring countries and stressed that participation in the CSCE process indicated its respect for the inviolability of European borders. It publicly rejected the threat or use of force against any country except in legitimate self-defense of territorial integrity, national independence, and sovereignty. Arms control was an important element of military doctrine before and after the overthrow of Zhivkov. Bulgaria had long advocated, without success, the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans. In the mid-1980s, the Zhivkov government arranged several unproductive meetings of the Balkan countries on nuclear disarmament. The primary aim of this effort was elimination of NATO nuclear weapons in Turkey. A signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968, Bulgaria regularly pledged not to possess or produce nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. In 1990 the country was embarrassed, however, by the revelation that it possessed eight Soviet-made SS-23 missile launchers eliminated from the Soviet inventory under the terms of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Missiles in 1987. Although acknowledging receipt of SS-23 missiles and launchers in 1986, Bulgaria categorically denied having any nuclear capability associated with them. It offered to dismantle the systems in accordance with the treaty. Similar allegations about the presence of intermediate-range Soviet SS-20 missile launchers in Bulgaria had appeared in the foreign press in 1984 but were never substantiated. Zhivkov called for a ban on chemical weapons in the Balkans in 1985 at the same time as the United States accused Bulgaria of storing chemical weapons on its territory.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was a contentious issue within the Warsaw Pact in 1990. The treaty committed Bulgaria to limiting its ground and air forces to a percentage of the Warsaw Pact's combined ceiling of 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 4,000 attack helicopters. However, the Warsaw Pact divided its overall ceilings so that the Soviet Union received most of the apportionment and the other former Warsaw Pact

countries were limited to smaller quotas. Bulgaria's quotas were 1,475 tanks, 2,000 armored combat vehicles, 1,750 artillery pieces, 235 combat aircraft, and 67 attack helicopters. In 1990 the minister of national defense disclosed that the Warsaw Pact debate over weapons allocation had been acrimonious because each member had tried to maximize its quota, hence its security, before the alliance's military organization dissolved.

In 1991 Bulgaria did not have a formal law on national defense, and its military doctrine was still largely defined by Warsaw Pact declarations and documents. The Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee had formally adopted a defense doctrine and the principle of reasonable sufficiency during its May 1987 meeting in Berlin. Closely following this doctrine and the Soviet example, Bulgaria then implemented a new national defensive doctrine calling for reasonable sufficiency. In the inexact and halting process of quantifying this term, military leaders basically agreed on the need to ensure national security at the lowest possible level of armaments. But the levels required to deter potential enemies or defend the country against them proved to be more debatable. By 1990 some clear steps had been taken toward reducing offensive weapons systems in favor of defensive ones (see Armed Services, this ch.).

Like professional military officers in other countries, the Bulgarian general staff viewed doctrine less from its political and diplomatic aspect than from its strictly technical military aspect. The technical side of doctrine focused on planning for a number of likely military contingencies and scenarios threatening national security. Although Bulgaria's political stance was based on a lack of enemies, the technical or worst-case military planning aspect of doctrine was dictated by the country's geopolitical position, the decline of the Warsaw Pact, and the possibility of instability in the Balkans.

Defense Organization

Like most other national institutions, the defense establishment was in the midst of a major transition in 1991. The new political course brought changes to a military system long based on the Soviet model. Democratic, multiparty politics brought the issue of depoliticization in the armed forces to the forefront. The state organization for national security and defense decision making, including the high command, retained its former structure. Major changes, including unilateral reductions and restructuring in accordance with defensive doctrine, were carried out in the ground, air and air defense, and naval forces.

The Military in the Political System

In 1991 Bulgaria was in the midst of shifting from a highly politicized army to a depoliticized one. The military had always been involved in domestic political struggles. The Military League exerted strong political influence through its support for the Zveno coalition after World War I (see The Crises of the 1930s, ch. 1). In 1934 the Military League took a leading role in overthrowing the government, and as recently as 1965 military officers were involved in political intrigue. The reported 1965 coup attempt led by General Ivan Todorov-Gorunia was allegedly aimed at replacing Zhivkov and establishing a more nationalist, less pro-Soviet leadership in the country. By 1990 communist Bulgaria had apparently made more progress in separating the military from politics than the Soviet Union, but perhaps less than other communist countries of Eastern Europe.

After World War II, the BCP quickly established control over the army. It purged old officers and made political loyalty to the new regime a more important criterion than professional competence for the selection of new officers (see Postwar Development, this ch.). Political officers in the ranks of the BPA ensured loyalty by extending the party apparatus throughout the military establishment. As in the Soviet Union and other Soviet-allied countries, party membership in the officer corps exceeded 80 percent.

Despite more than forty years of efforts to ensure communist control of the armed forces, the BPA took no action when BCP General Secretary Todor Zhivkov was ousted by party officials in November 1989. According to many reports, the conspicuous lack of military support for Zhivkov dissuaded his security forces from intervening to prevent the overthrow. In the immediate post-Zhivkov era, the BPA and its leadership declared an intention to be an apolitical, stabilizing factor in the peaceful transition to democracy.

The shift to multiparty politics brought opposition pressure to depoliticize the armed forces, in part because all parties feared the BPA could split into partisan armed factions or become the instrument of one party as it had been for the BCP. In the new climate of open political discourse, national security and defense became frequent topics of debate among political parties. The military leadership, however, complained that some parties failed to show a sufficiently responsible attitude toward these issues.

In January 1990, at the direction of the reform wing of the BCP, the State Council repealed the section of Article 1 of the constitution that had institutionalized the exclusive political role of the party

in the armed forces. The decree replaced BCP political organs in the army with educational work organs. The State Council followed that action with a more specific decree ordering complete depoliticization of the armed forces. The Military Administration Department of the BCP Central Committee and the Main Political Administration of the BPA were removed from the Ministry of National Defense and their functions curtailed. The decree effectively eliminated control by the BCP (which in early 1990 renamed itself the Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP) over the army by removing cells of the party and the Komsomol from the army. In September 1990, the National Assembly approved a new law on political parties. The law depoliticized several government institutions, including the army, and required them to respond to the state rather than the ruling party. By the end of the year, 98 percent of all soldiers reportedly had relinquished their membership in political parties in accordance with the law. If they refused to do so, they were discharged from the service. In 1991 the Ministry of National Defense campaigned for exclusion of active-duty military personnel from voting in elections.

Besides changing the legal framework for the relationship between the military and the political system, the new political course in Bulgaria brought practical changes in everyday army life. The content of military education shifted dramatically from emphasizing the defense of the communist system to the defense of the homeland without regard to political considerations. Bulgarian sources indicated that the adjective *People's* in Bulgarian People's Army now was interpreted to mean "national" and not "proletarian." Defense of national independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity replaced the defense of socialism as the primary mission of the military. Professional competence replaced political allegiance and reliability as the most important measure of officer qualifications. The military post of political officer was eliminated officially, although plans called for retraining some political officers for new educational duties within the armed forces. The remainder would have to qualify as regular line officers or leave the service. Nevertheless, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) opposition coalition accused the BSP of continued party recruitment among cadets and newly enlisted personnel after the State Council decree on depoliticization.

Government Organization for Defense

Prior to November 1989, the chairman of the State Defense Committee was the commander in chief of the BPA, and as such made every important decision about internal and external security. The

secretary general of the BCP and president of the State Council automatically held the position of chairman of the State Defense Committee as well. The consolidation of these three positions had enabled a single person, Todor Zhivkov, to make political decisions on security issues and supervise their implementation within the government apparatus, especially as they concerned the economy and defense industries.

In the post-Zhivkov order, the commander in chief of the armed forces was the president of the republic, a position independent of party affiliation. In 1990 the National Security Council was formed as a consultative organ under the president after the State Defense Committee was abolished. The National Security Council advised the president in making decisions on a range of domestic and foreign policy issues related to national security, including defense preparedness, organization, training, and deployment of the armed forces, public order, and use of the internal security forces. The National Security Council included the vice president; the chairman of the Council of Ministers; the ministers of foreign affairs, national defense, internal affairs, and economy and planning; and the chief of the General Staff. Decisions were implemented through the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of National Defense, and the General Staff.

The democratization of 1990 allowed the National Assembly to participate in making decisions on security issues rather than merely rubber-stamping decisions made elsewhere. In 1990 the National Assembly established a new legislative body, the Commission on National Security, to provide oversight for government activities in internal and external security. The commission's role remained largely undefined in 1991, but its nominal function was to enforce government compliance with the rule of law in security matters and to protect the rights of citizens.

Despite these organizational changes, the constitutional provisions, most laws and statutes, and instructions and regulations pertaining to national security and defense adopted by the government under the former BCP remained in effect. A complex of laws, drafted for inclusion in the new constitution ratified by the National Assembly in 1991, were designed to codify the many individual changes made in military practice and institutions after 1989.

During and after the ouster of Zhivkov, the prestige of the military among the people appeared to remain quite high. Despite its association with the former BCP regime, the military was credited for remaining in the barracks during the political transition. Although some long-serving, high-ranking officers were removed later, others remained and even advanced as a result of the ouster.

Longtime Minister of National Defense and BCP Politburo member Army General Dobri Dzhurov was dismissed in 1990 in the aftermath of the democratic opening. However, Colonel General Atanas Semerdzhiev, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the General Staff under Zhivkov, rose to the post of minister of the interior in 1990. The retention and promotion of an officer like Semerdzhiev, formerly decorated and favored by Zhivkov himself, indicated the value placed on the stabilizing role of the military during this turbulent period.

High Command

The high command consisted of the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff. The minister of national defense was always a professional officer bearing the rank of army general or colonel general. In 1990, however, reformers called for a civilian defense minister to ensure civilian control over the armed forces. The military flatly rejected such demands, insisting that the minister of national defense must be a professional officer because civilians lacked the required expertise—despite evidence of able civilian administration of defense ministries in other countries.

The Ministry of National Defense was responsible for implementing the decisions of the National Security Council and the National Assembly within the armed forces. The ministry recruited, equipped, and administered the armed forces according to directives of the executive and legislative branches of government. The ministry linked the armed forces to the national economy for the purpose of procuring weapons and military equipment. The Ministry of National Defense was organized according to a Soviet model. The first deputy minister of national defense was also the chief of the General Staff, responsible for planning and directing the operational deployment of the armed forces and coordinating the actions of the three armed services in peacetime and wartime. The deputy minister's staff included a first deputy, several deputy chiefs, and a disarmament inspectorate. All military commands reported to the General Staff. The country was divided into three military districts. Daily military administration, however, was performed at the level of military regions corresponding to the eight provinces and the city of Sofia (see Local Government, ch. 4). Besides two communications brigades and the usual service and support battalions, the General Staff controlled several other organizations, including a military scientific research institute, military history institute, military mapping and topography institutes, the Georgi Rakovski Military Academy, the Military Medical Academy, and the military medical infrastructure throughout the country.

The commanders of the ground, air, and naval forces were deputy ministers of national defense controlling separate service commands within the Ministry of National Defense. The service commands were concerned primarily with training and maintaining combat readiness in their units. Other deputy ministers of national defense included the chief of weapons and military equipment, the chief of the Material-Technical and Rear Support Command, and the chief of civil defense. Other elements reporting to the minister of national defense included the office of the inspector general; the departments of personnel, military education, medical services, international relations, military counterintelligence, military justice and procuracy, cultural institutions, and public information; and the radiation and chemical detection command post. The International Relations Department maintained contacts with foreign military establishments and their attachés in Bulgaria. The Cultural Institutions Department was responsible for several military museums, officers' clubs, theaters, cinema and art studios, and the BPA performing ensemble. The Public Information Department managed the press center, military publishing house, nine military newspapers and journals, and television and radio programs for the Ministry of National Defense.

In late 1990, the minister of national defense announced that reductions in the armed services would affect the command elements and administrative organizations within the Ministry of National Defense in proportion to reductions in operational forces. Some directorates with related functions reportedly were merged, but the full extent of reductions in the Ministry of National Defense was not yet evident in 1991.

Armed Services

In 1991 the three armed services of the BPA were the ground, air and air defense, and naval forces. The ground forces, or army, clearly was the most important service. In addition, each service had several combat arms and support branches. Some support services, such as the construction or civil defense troops, were not subordinate to a particular armed service. In 1991 the BPA was reducing, restructuring, and modernizing its forces. The Ministry of National Defense announced that, while the air and air defense and naval forces would retain their basic structure, substantial changes in the ground forces were expected.

In 1991 the military had 107,000 personnel, a reduction of more than 45,000 since 1988 (see Military Personnel, this ch.). More than 80 percent were conscripts. In late 1990, the minister of national defense had announced plans for further reductions in 1991,

Observation post in military exercises in Khaskovo District, 1985
Courtesy Sofia Press Agency

including elimination of one motorized rifle division, one tank brigade, and one air force regiment—a total of 10,000 personnel, 200 T-62 tanks, 200 artillery pieces, and 20 MiG-21 aircraft. The minister also announced that over 500 T-34 tanks held in storage were to be destroyed. The navy planned to decommission five older combat ships in 1991.

At the same time, the minister of national defense stressed a need to restructure the BPA into a more modern, professional, and better trained force. Such a force could be smaller because the new defensive doctrine required fewer forces. Tank and mechanized infantry units were reduced in favor of more antitank, air defense, and other defensive systems. The major problem for the BPA's future development was improving the quality of armaments while reducing their quantity. However, the minister of national defense publicly expressed concern that domestic industries could not produce many types of modern weapons that used new technologies. In the area of personnel, the minister announced plans to modernize military training programs by updating curricula at military educational establishments and making field training and exercises more realistic.

Ground Forces

Ground forces combat units included motorized rifle, tank,

artillery and missile, and antiaircraft troops, as well as several combat support branches. The ground forces numbered over 70,000 soldiers, the majority of whom were conscripts. As recently as 1990, they had consisted mainly of eight motorized rifle divisions and five tank brigades. In 1991 the active ground forces deployed four motorized rifle divisions and two tank brigades, with four divisions and one brigade in reserve status. In implementing the new defensive doctrine, the ground forces further reduced tanks in the remaining motorized rifle divisions by 30 percent, converting their tank regiments into motorized rifle regiments. Defensive weapons in divisions were increased by adding more antitank, combat engineering, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare units. The attachment of several antiaircraft elements to the ground forces command indicated that the command operated its own air defense network to protect deployed ground units. The antiaircraft attachments included one air defense command post, one air defense brigade, several antiaircraft maintenance brigades, one radiotechnical or radar battalion, and one antiaircraft artillery test range.

In all, the ground forces had over 2,400 tanks, including more than 300 T-72, 1,300 T-55, and 600 older T-34 vehicles. The more than 2,000 armored combat vehicles included nearly 150 modern BMP armored fighting vehicles and over 600 BTR-60 and 1,100 MT-LB armored personnel carriers. The ground forces operated 2,500 large-caliber artillery systems. These included 450 85mm D-44 and 100mm SU-100 and T-12 antitank guns; 200 122mm BM-21 multiple rocket launchers; over 1,600 122mm and 152mm howitzers and guns, including nearly 700 self-propelled 2S1, 500 M-30, and smaller numbers of D-20, M-1937, and M-46 towed guns; and 350 mortars, including the self-propelled 120mm Tundzha produced in Bulgaria. The ground forces had 64 launchers for surface-to-surface missiles. That number included modern SS-1 missiles and older, less accurate FROG-7 missiles with respective ranges of 300 and 75 kilometers. Besides these battlefield missiles, eight longer-range SS-23 launchers were available (see *Doctrine and Strategy,* this ch.). The Soviet-made AT-3 was the main antitank guided missile in the inventory. Air defense for the ground forces consisted of 50 mobile SA-4, SA-6, and man-portable SA-13 tactical surface-to-air missiles and nearly 400 self-propelled and towed 100mm, 85mm, 57mm, and 23mm air defense guns.

The bulk of the ground forces were deployed along two primary operational directions: the west-southwest, opposite Yugoslavia and Greece, and the southeast, opposite Turkey. Stationed in Sofia, Plovdiv, and southern Khaskovo provinces, the First Army faced Yugoslavia and Greece with more than 600 tanks, 700 armored

combat vehicles, and 800 large-caliber artillery weapons. The Third Army was located primarily in Burgas and northern Khaskovo provinces facing Turkey and had over 800 tanks, 900 armored combat vehicles, and 700 heavy artillery pieces. The active units of the Second Army, a low-strength formation to be staffed by reserves in wartime, were based in central Bulgaria, in Plovdiv, and northern Khaskovo provinces. The Second Army was positioned to support either the First Army in the west or the Third Army in the east when fully mobilized during wartime. Relatively few ground forces were deployed in the north opposite Romania or in the east along the Black Sea coast.

At nearly full strength, the First and Third Armies had two motorized rifle divisions each. Strategic reserves consisted of one independent tank brigade and one artillery, antitank, and antiaircraft regiment each. In 1991 the Third Army opposite Turkey had a second independent tank brigade reinforced with two artillery battalions. The tank brigades each had four to six battalions and as many as 200 tanks. Support units included supply, maintenance, and artillery-technical brigades; communications and combat engineering regiments; and radio relay cable, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, artillery-reconnaissance, parachute-reconnaissance, radio-technical, bridging, and chemical defense battalions. The armies also controlled their own artillery, chemical, communications, vehicle and armor, combat engineering, medical-sanitary, fuel, and food depots, military hospitals, and maintenance and mobilization bases to support their maneuver units. They had one or two territorial training centers that functioned as reserve divisions for their respective armies. The centers were organized into reserve detachments for motorized rifle, tank, artillery, and antiaircraft troops, and specialist training groups for artillery-technical, antitank, reconnaissance, communications, combat engineering, maintenance, and rear support troops. Many reserve detachments were significant forces in themselves, often as large as motorized rifle regiments but lacking a full contingent of personnel. The low-strength Second Army itself was similar in organization and purpose to a territorial training center. It had one full-strength tank brigade, one artillery regiment, several combat support regiments and battalions, several reserve detachments and groups, depots, one military hospital, and one maintenance base.

The typical motorized rifle division had four motorized rifle regiments, one artillery regiment, one antiaircraft artillery regiment, one independent tank battalion, one independent artillery battalion, one antitank battalion, and several machine gun-artillery battalions. Reconnaissance, communications, combat engineering,

maintenance, and supply battalions provided necessary combat support to the division.

A typical motorized rifle regiment had three motorized rifle battalions with ninety armored combat vehicles and one tank battalion with thirty tanks. Its artillery battalion had two to four batteries of nine artillery pieces. It had one antiaircraft artillery battalion, one antitank battery, and one or two machine gun-artillery batteries.

Air and Air Defense Forces

Air and air defense force units were rather evenly dispersed throughout the country. They operated approximately 300 combat aircraft, including over 160 MiG-21, 70 MiG-23, 40 Su-25, and 20 MiG-29 fighters and more than 100 L-29 and L-39 combat trainers. Two MiG fighter and three MiG interceptor regiments were operational. The air forces had two regiments of Mi-24 attack helicopters, two regiments of Mi-17, Mi-8, and Mi-2 multipurpose combat support helicopters, and one squadron of Mi-2 and Mi-8 transport helicopters. The air and air defense forces had over 22,000 personnel, about 75 percent of whom were conscripts.

The First Air Defense Division and Second Air Defense Division, deployed in Sofia and Burgas provinces, respectively, were composed of two interceptor regiments with eighteen aircraft each. They operated Soviet-made MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-29 fighters. A third air defense division controlled the strategic air defense network of approximately 280 Soviet-made SA-2, SA-3, SA-5, and more modern SA-10 surface-to-air missile launchers dispersed at about thirty sites throughout the country. In 1991 the division probably had four regiments, each composed of several battalions. Battalions provided central command and control for as many as ten launchers, with each launcher corresponding to a battery.

The Tenth Composite Air Corps in central Bulgaria was the largest air formation. It had more than 225 aircraft. Its principal mission was to provide air support, tactical reconnaissance, and mobility for the ground forces. It had two fighter-bomber regiments, one fighter regiment, one reconnaissance aircraft regiment, and four helicopter regiments, as well as large numbers of radar, maintenance, and communications support units under its command. Its aircraft included MiG-21 and MiG-17 fighters and MiG-23 and Su-25 fighter-bombers, Su-22, MiG-21, and MiG-25 reconnaissance variants, and over forty specialized Mi-24 attack helicopters and forty Mi-2, Mi-8, and Mi-17 combat and transport helicopters.

The Higher Aviation School of the air and air defense forces command also controlled two aviation training regiments and one aviation training squadron with over eighty L-29 and L-39 primary

trainers and over eighty MiG-15, MiG-17, and MiG-21 armed combat trainers in northern Bulgaria (see Officer Education, this ch.). The Higher Aviation School also had a large number of logistics and other support units to train specialists for the service.

Naval Forces

The navy defended approximately 350 kilometers of coastline along the Black Sea. Its major bases were located at Varna (the headquarters), Atiya, Sozopol, Balchik, and Burgas. Naval forces included over twenty submarines and minor surface combatants that could be deployed in coastal defense operations. As recently as 1989, Bulgarian naval forces defended claims to their territorial waters in incidents with Turkish forces at sea. As in the case of the ground forces, the Ministry of National Defense announced some unilateral naval reductions in 1990. In all, five vessels were to be retired or sold abroad: two submarine chasers, two coastal patrol boats, and one submarine. They were basically obsolete and had little residual military value. This deletion was more than balanced by the addition of three Soviet Poti-class corvettes to the operational inventory. In 1990 the navy had about 10,000 personnel, half of them conscripts.

The navy had four components: the Black Sea Fleet, Danube Flotilla, Coastal Defense, and a shore establishment. The Black Sea Fleet was organized into submarine, escort ship, missile and torpedo boat, amphibious craft, and minesweeping squadrons and brigades. The Danube Flotilla operated patrol craft along the riverine border with Romania. Coastal Defense included amphibious landing and mine countermeasures forces. The shore establishment controlled naval bases, training facilities, and naval aviation, coastal artillery, and naval infantry units.

Bulgaria obtained its minor surface combatant crafts from the Soviet Union. Its main forces consisted of four Pobeda-class submarines, two Druzki-class frigates, five Poti-class corvettes, six Osa-class missile patrol boats, six Shershen-class torpedo boats, and three SO-1-class and seven Zhuk-class patrol craft. The navy received its Pobeda- (formerly Romeo-) class submarines from the Soviet Union beginning in 1972. Originally built in the 1950s, they were armed with eight 533mm torpedo tubes. The Druzki- (formerly Riga-) class frigates were built in 1957 and 1958. They were modernized extensively during the early 1980s. They had three 100mm guns, three 533mm torpedo tubes, and four five-tube antisubmarine rocket launchers. The navy acquired its first three Poti-class corvettes from the Soviet Union in 1975 and another three in 1990. These were lightly armed antisubmarine warfare platforms carrying

four 406mm torpedo tubes and two antisubmarine rocket launchers. The Osa-class missile patrol boats carried four SS-N-2 surface-to-surface missile launchers. The Soviet Union built them in the 1960s and first transferred them to Bulgaria in the early 1970s. The Shershen-class torpedo boats had four 533mm torpedo tubes and were built and acquired at approximately the same time as the Osa-class boats.

The navy operated more than thirty mine-warfare countermeasures ships, including four modern Soviet-built Sonya-class oceangoing minesweepers acquired in the early 1980s. The other minesweepers, including the Vanya-class, Yevgenya-class, and several miscellaneous ships, were restricted to coastal or inshore operations. The inventory also included two Polish-built Polnocny-class medium landing ships. These amphibious ships each could transport and land six tanks and 150 troops. The navy had nineteen additional Vydra-class medium landing craft, each of which could carry 100 troops and 250 tons of equipment on their open tank decks.

Naval aviation, coastal artillery, and naval infantry were small support arms of the navy. Naval aviation consisted of one squadron of three armed and nine unarmed search-and-rescue and antisubmarine warfare helicopters. These Mi-14, Mi-8, Mi-4, and Mi-2 naval helicopters were obtained from the Soviet Union. Coastal artillery had two regiments with about 150 guns of 100mm or 130mm caliber. They were organized into several battalions with five batteries each. Coastal artillery units also operated an unknown number of Soviet SS-C-1 and more modern SSC-3 antiship missile launchers. Their mission was to direct fire against combatants offshore, supporting amphibious assaults on the Bulgarian coastline. The naval infantry force consisted of three companies of 100 troops each. Their small size limited them to guard duty and ground defense of important coastal installations against commando raids and other assault forces.

Border Troops

The Border Troops were part of the BPA. Composed of 13,000 troops in sixteen light infantry regiments, they resembled military units more than a police force. The mission was to defend the country's frontiers against illegal crossings. The Border Troops regulated the movement of people within a strip twelve kilometers wide along the border. They cooperated with other authorities to prevent smuggling, although contraband control was not primarily their responsibility (see Crime, this ch.). During wartime the Border Troops were to coordinate their actions with the ground forces as

a first line of national defense. The majority of the Border Troops were deployed to guard frontiers with Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, but they also defended the Romanian border. Several light patrol boats operated along the Danube River where it separated Bulgaria from Romania and along the Black Sea coast.

Construction Troops

Between 12,000 and 15,000 conscripts traditionally served as construction troops. They had their origin in the compulsory labor service established by the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU) government in 1920 (see Stamboliĭski and Agrarian Reform, ch. 1). Commanded by a general and organized into military units, this labor service built roads, railroads, and entire industrial enterprises. Although service in the Construction Troops satisfied military service requirements, these units were controlled by the Ministry of Construction, Architecture, and Public Services, and they received little or no military training. According to the chairman of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, these units typically drafted Turks and other ethnic minorities considered unsuitable for service in combat units because of linguistic barriers or perceived political unreliability (see Turks, ch. 2; The Movement for Rights and Freedoms, ch. 4).

After the fall of Zhivkov, the Construction Troops received considerable attention. It was alleged that the Construction Troops had built over 20,000 apartments and houses for members of the BCP elite during the last ten years of the Zhivkov regime. High-ranking officers reportedly could requisition labor crews from the Construction Troops to work on their apartments or country homes. The Construction Troops often were reported as working in uranium mines, metallurgical industries, and other unsafe environments that did not attract enough civilian workers.

In 1991 the future of the Construction Troops depended on the status of professionalization in the armed forces. Opponents argued that these units were not a necessary component of professional armed forces, and that their functions should devolve to the civilian economy. Proponents insisted that the Construction Troops provided a low-cost labor force for important national projects, including factories, power plants, and other capital investment projects, as well as useful occupational training in the building trades for a large number of conscripts. In the first half of the 1980s, a reported 1.2 billion leva (for value of the lev, see Glossary) worth of labor came from this source for more than 700 projects. Similar debates surrounded specially designated railroad troops and transportation troops.

Civil Defense Troops

A strong emphasis on civil defense resulted from Bulgaria's participation in the Warsaw Pact and the BCP's efforts to mobilize the population. The civil defense program developed in the 1960s from the recognition that nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons delivered by long-range missiles and artillery ended the clear distinction between the front lines and civilian areas. Planning for civil defense was intended to meliorate the worst effects of weapons of mass destruction and to ensure continuity in communications, transportation, supply, and power generation during wartime.

The Ministry of National Defense operated the National Radiation and Chemical Defense Warning System and planned the overall direction and financing of civil defense activities. Civil defense committees attached to people's councils at the province or municipality level implemented civil defense plans for those jurisdictions. Civil defense organizations in manufacturing plants, enterprises, schools, and other collectives had similar responsibilities. Staffed with conscripts and organized into battalions, the civil defense troops trained the civilian population in individual and collective defensive measures, including dispersal and evacuation. They maintained firefighting, decontamination, civil engineering, salvage, rescue, and medical assistance programs and skills needed for the civil defense program. Despite these preparations for civil defense, construction of protective shelters for the population was a relatively low priority, primarily because of economic constraints. A network of hardened command posts for the military and civilian leadership was believed to exist.

Logistics and Arms Procurement

The Material-Technical and Rear Support Command had wide responsibility for logistical support to the BPA, ranging from routine supply operations to maintenance and arms procurement. Its base and depot network included petroleum-oil-lubricant (POL) depots, special fuel bases, POL and special fuel equipment maintenance battalions, central supply bases, food and general supply depots, central maintenance bases, central vehicle and armor-tank depots, vehicle and armor-tank maintenance bases, artillery depots, central artillery ammunition bases, and central missile maintenance bases.

One major directorate of the Material-Technical and Rear Support Command was responsible for military repair bases and factories. This directorate controlled general equipment repair factories, electro-mechanical factories, vehicle repair factories, and

an institute for research and development in maintenance of weapons and equipment. In addition to this directorate, the command ran a military technology research institute, a laser technology laboratory, an electro-mechanical training equipment factory, a central artillery-technical test range, and a billeting service. It also operated several schools for maintenance specialist training (see Military Training, this ch.).

Despite the range of these activities, Bulgaria produced relatively few of its own armaments and other combat equipment. Defense production plants were located in Gabrovo, Karlovo, Kazanlŭk, Plovdiv, Sofia, and Varna, but the vast majority of arms and equipment came from the Soviet Union, with smaller amounts from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Zhivkov regime also occasionally purchased military equipment from at least three NATO members, including the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany). The exact nature and amount of weapons systems produced for domestic use remained largely unknown during that period, however. The Tundzha mortar and a few types of armored combat vehicles were produced domestically. Bulgarian shipyards did not produce surface combat ships or submarines.

Following the lead of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria announced a major program of defense industry conversion in 1990. The section of the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Services responsible for arms production was renamed the Special Production and Conversion Department to reflect conversion to civilian manufacture. Bulgaria planned to convert an unspecified number of military plants and to require firms producing both military and civilian goods to double their output of the latter. By the end of 1990, defense plants were required to produce a total of 246 million leva worth of nonmilitary goods, increasing to 394 million leva in 1991, and to 1,130 million leva by 1995. In this period, their production mix was to change to 60 percent civilian and 40 percent military goods. Fully and partially converted military enterprises would manufacture textiles, capital equipment and machine tools, tractors and cultivators, durable consumer appliances, industrial and medical lasers, and canned food. The encouragement of joint ventures between Bulgarian and foreign firms was another element of the conversion program. Despite these changes in the defense industries, the government planned to retain complete authority over military production.

Military Budget

Bulgaria traditionally spent less on defense than other Warsaw Pact countries, but military spending was a greater burden on its

economy than on those of its allies. During the late 1980s, the military budget amounted to more than 10 percent of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) because Bulgaria had the lowest GNP in the Warsaw Pact. Measured in terms of total government spending, the military budget typically accounted for more than 20 percent of the national budget. In contrast, BPA leaders complained that by 1990 defense spending had dropped to about 6 percent of state expenditures, a smaller proportion than that spent by the governments of Greece or Turkey.

Between 1986 and 1989, the military budget increased gradually from 1.67 to 1.8 billion leva. In January 1989, however, the State Council and the Council of Ministers reduced the appropriated defense budget for 1989 by 12 percent to 1.6 billion leva. The announcement cited restructuring in the armed forces and economic considerations as reasons for the reduction. The Ministry of National Defense stated its intention to absorb the cut by reducing expenditures on operations, maintenance, and procurement, which were the largest components of the military budget.

Military Personnel

Bulgaria traditionally had more troops in uniform per capita than the other Warsaw Pact countries. At one time, it had almost as many soldiers as Romania, a country with a population three times larger than Bulgaria's. Total personnel in the BPA were drastically reduced from 152,000 to 107,000 between 1988 and 1991, however. The Ministry of National Defense cut the officer corps by over 1,700 and general officers by 78. The military strongly opposed additional reductions on the grounds that they would seriously jeopardize national security. Military spokesmen pointed to the 300,000- to 350,000-soldier Turkish force in eastern Thrace and western Anatolia as the key factor in determining the appropriate personnel level for the BPA. The unilateral reduction between 1988 and 1991 occurred against a backdrop of sharp domestic political debate over reducing the basic two-year military conscription term to eighteen months.

Recruitment and Service Obligations

The standard two-year term of military service for most conscripts was reduced to eighteen months by the National Assembly in 1990. At the same time, the three-year term for sailors and other specialists was changed to two years. Bulgarian males entered the armed forces at the age of nineteen. Although the BPA was smaller than before, the new eighteen-month service term caused a turnover of one-third of all conscripts every six months, making universal

conscription of nineteen-year-old males a necessity to maintain force levels. A population growth rate barely above zero exacerbated the manpower problem. In 1991 the minister of national defense noted an increased incidence of potential conscripts avoiding military service. He stated that 6,000 young men over seventeen years of age were known to have departed the country illegally for this reason, and another 3,500 failed to appear before the conscription commission and were presumed to be living abroad. The existing law on the armed forces prohibited men in this age category from leaving Bulgaria before performing their compulsory service. Although young men enrolled in a higher school or university could defer fulfillment of their military obligation until they had completed their education, draft deferments for other reasons were granted infrequently and reluctantly.

In 1991 political parties debated additional adjustments in the conscription system. The UDF and the BANU argued for a further reduction to a one-year term for most conscripts and six months for university graduates. They also called for extending contracts to some soldiers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to shift the BPA to a more professional force. Other aspects of military service discussed by the Commission on National Security of the National Assembly in 1990 were possible voluntary service by women and service in the national police force as an alternative to military conscription.

Supported by the BSP, the military argued that one year of military service was insufficient to provide required training for conscripts. It maintained that at any given time only 50 percent of the army would have completed basic training and be in a state of minimum combat readiness. Furthermore, shorter service would make the training of Bulgarian troops inferior to that of other armies in the region. Military spokesmen argued that the country could not afford the wages or the benefits required in a professional army, nor could it attract enough volunteers under the austere conditions of military service throughout the country. The army viewed the draft and mobilization as essential to ensure an adequate force in wartime. Some military leaders charged that the UDF and the BANU sought to reduce service terms in order to gain votes from servicemen who would gain early release. The military opposed alternative service on the grounds that the Construction Troops were the existing alternative to combat service.

Military Training

Military training began with mandatory premilitary training through the Organization for Cooperation in Defense, a mass

organization with more than 10,000 affiliates in schools, cooperative farms, and enterprises throughout the country. Under its auspices, reserve officers and active-duty junior officers trained thousands of young men and women between the ages of sixteen and eighteen in a year-round program. In classroom and field exercises, trainees learned marksmanship, radio communications, scuba diving, and technical military specialties such as aircraft and vehicle operations and maintenance. For the last, the Organization for Cooperation in Defense had an inventory of more than seventy BTR-60 and MT-LB armored personnel carriers. Although the organization also sponsored sports competitions and summer camps less directly related to military service, the main goal of premilitary training was to reduce the time required to adapt young inductees to military life.

Military training followed the Soviet model because the Soviet-made weapons and equipment in the inventory required specialized training in operation and maintenance. Training, which also followed Soviet tactical concepts, moved in an annual cycle under the two-year service term. Adjustments in the training cycle were expected to compensate for the shorter eighteen-month service term. On the other hand, in 1990 elimination of political indoctrination requirements freed as much as 25 percent of conscript training time for military and physical training. Immediately after induction, conscripts began basic physical conditioning, training in handling and maintenance of small arms, drill, and general military indoctrination. They learned a range of individual skills required in small unit combat situations, including first aid, radiation and chemical decontamination, and camouflage techniques. After basic training, soldiers formed crews for training on larger weapons and equipment. They participated in exercises of increasing scale until the training cycle culminated in a large-scale combined arms maneuver held each year. In 1990 the minister of national defense called for more realistic training, especially for combat at night and in poor visibility conditions. Conscripts received specialist training in a variety of fields. Separate schools trained junior specialists in transport and rear services, tank and vehicle maintenance, POL handling, and military music.

The majority of NCOs were new inductees selected at induction for special training at service schools. NCOs served longer than the usual conscription period. In the early 1970s, special secondary schools were also established for NCO training. These schools were available to acceptable applicants who had completed the eighth grade. The course of study lasted three years and graduates were obligated to serve in the armed forces for ten years.

Military life was generally austere but not significantly different from conditions throughout the country. The greatest hardship was the requirement that conscripts serve outside their home provinces. In 1991 increasing criticism was leveled at the negative aspects of military service, especially the hazing of new conscripts. The press widely reported complaints from conscripts and parents that hazing often included intimidation and violence against young recruits by senior soldiers. In response, junior officers were assigned barracks duty to prevent such excesses. A general decline in military discipline also had become a problem in 1991. The press reported widespread cases of soldiers failing to wear proper uniforms or to carry proper identity papers, increased rates of absence without leave, and black market activities by soldiers. Misappropriation of money and property, theft of weapons and ammunition, and violent assault and murder were cited as increasingly common occurrences. The Plovdiv garrison alone reported 600 violations of military conduct rules during the last six months of 1990. Burgas, Stara Zagora, and other garrisons in southeastern Bulgaria were cited as particular problem areas. A spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense voiced concern that the process of democratization had the unintended side effect of undermining order in the ranks of the BPA. The spokesperson accused the media and political parties of encouraging disciplinary violations and disobedience among conscripts without regard to the need to maintain the integrity and capabilities of the BPA. On the other hand, the military leadership tended to label all agitation for better living conditions as simply a failure of discipline.

Officer Education

The level of education of Bulgarian officers rose in the 1970s and 1980s. In the early 1970s, only 40 percent had degrees from higher military or civilian schools, but this figure rose to nearly two-thirds of the entire officer corps by 1980. Cadet programs in several higher military schools provided officers for the armed forces. These programs were equivalent to a civilian university curriculum. Applicants were required to have a secondary school education and to be single, in excellent physical condition, and under twenty-four years of age. Many applicants had completed their compulsory military service as conscripts and had decided to pursue a professional military career. The ground forces had three higher military schools for training combined arms officers, artillery officers, and reserve officers. The air and air defense forces had one Higher Aviation School that provided firsthand experience with aircraft besides its classroom training. The Higher Aviation School

had three flight training regiments with supporting aviation engineering, communications, and radio-technical (radar) support battalions (see Armed Services, this ch.). The naval forces had a Higher Naval School to train officers for the service. Cadets in training to be line officers had four-year courses of study; those preparing for technical specialties such as artillery, aviation, and communications had five-year courses of study. Cadets received their commissions immediately after they graduated.

Selected officers could obtain advanced academic training. Mid-grade officers could apply for acceptance in the Georgi Rakovski Military Academy in Sofia. Graduation from the academy, which was similar to a Western war college or command and staff course, was a prerequisite for advancement into the senior officer ranks. Approximately one-third of all career officers completed that course. Most active-duty officers studied in one of several Soviet military academies. Completion of a two-year program in the Soviet Union and fluency in Russian were requirements for field-grade officers. In 1991 the minister of national defense raised the possibility of sending officers to study in Western military academies, but he cited the language barrier and the country's financial difficulties as obstacles. The General Staff had several other specialized academic institutes for the study of military science and history (see High Command, this ch.). It also operated the Military Medical Academy, which was established as a training and research center in the military aspects of the medical sciences, to upgrade training of military physicians and to provide medical services for the armed forces.

A professional military career was considered relatively prestigious in Bulgaria, although prestige began to wane in the post-Zhivkov era. Depending on whether nonmonetary benefits like housing and food were considered, an officer's pay was generally 25 to 50 percent higher than that offered in civilian positions with comparable responsibilities. Only in 1990 did the defense establishment begin to address problems familiar to military officers in all countries, however. For example, spouses frequently were unable to find work in the vicinity of military posts. In 1991 a special cash allowance to military families was being considered to cover these instances. Day-care and school accommodations often were scarce, and adequate housing unavailable. The quasi-official Georgi Rakovski Officer Legion was established in 1990 to promote a broad range of professional interests and address issues such as living standards within the Ministry of National Defense.

In the early 1990s, tenure became a vital concern to officers. In 1991 the minister of national defense announced that reductions

in the armed forces would reduce the officer corps by nearly 15 percent. A military affiliate of the Podkrepa labor federation was founded in 1991 by a group of junior officers and NCOs (see Trade Unions, ch. 4). As an independent organization, it was seen as a more formidable adversary to the Ministry of National Defense than the Georgi Rakovski Officer Legion. Some of the Podkrepa affiliate's founders were dismissed from the service, apparently in retaliation for their activities.

Reserves and Mobilization

In 1991 Bulgaria had a force of approximately 500,000 in reserve for service in the event of mobilization. This figure included over 400,000 in the ground forces, nearly 50,000 in the air and air defense forces, and smaller numbers in the naval forces. Individuals were counted in the active reserves for the first five years after their release from military service. Their reserve obligation continued until age fifty for former conscripts and until age sixty for officers. The demand for labor in the civilian economy and a lack of training put a practical limit on the effectiveness of the reserves. Soldiers discharged in the latest five-year period represented the largest contingent in the reserves, and they could be mobilized after a short period of refresher training and physical conditioning. The deactivation of four motorized rifle divisions and increased emphasis on territorial training centers indicated that reserves could become a more important part of the force structure.

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia

The ground forces and air and air defense forces used the same system of ranks. The air and air defense forces and naval forces lacked an equivalent to the four-star army general rank in the ground forces. Below army general, there were three general-grade, three field-grade, and four company-grade officer ranks. In descending order, the ranks were colonel general, lieutenant general, major general, colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, captain, senior lieutenant, lieutenant, and junior lieutenant. Naval officer ranks included three admiral, four captain, and three lieutenant ranks. The ground forces and air and air defense forces had six enlisted grades, four sergeant and two private. The naval forces had equivalent petty officer and seaman grades.

Officers wore a service uniform consisting of a tailored blouse with patch pockets and trousers that tucked into high boots. A Sam Browne belt and sidearms were optional. The ground forces wore stripes and piping on caps and rank insignia that varied in color according to the branch of service (motorized rifle, tank, artillery,

and others). Enlisted uniforms were similar in design but had less ornate trim. The air and air defense forces and naval forces had the same uniforms but could be distinguished by blue stripes and piping for the former and traditional naval blues and whites for the latter.

Rank insignia on uniforms consisted of stars or stripes on shoulder boards. Officer ranks were identified by varying numbers of stars and increasingly ornate shoulder boards with higher ranks. Those of company-grade officers were relatively plain; those of general officers were very ornate. Enlisted grades were denoted by increasing numbers of stripes. Privates and seamen wore no stripes and plain shoulder boards. The number and width of stripes increased with promotion to higher grades (see fig. 13; fig. 14; fig. 15).

Foreign Military Relations

For most of the postwar era, Bulgaria's strictly defined relations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact limited its relations with the military establishments of other countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, Bulgaria established military contacts with a few developing countries in the Middle East and Africa because of their relations with the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact raised a question about Bulgaria's future external military ties. Options included continuing a bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union, establishing a multilateral security arrangement with neighboring Balkan countries or former Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe, mounting an effort to join NATO, or withholding military commitments to other countries.

The Warsaw Pact

Geographically isolated from the strategically more important northern-tier countries of the alliance, Bulgaria participated in a few joint exercises of the Warsaw Pact along the central front opposite NATO in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) and Czechoslovakia. Participation in that front usually was limited to small contingents. Small-scale maneuvers or command and staff exercises were held in Bulgaria in 1964 and 1972. Shield-82 was the first major Warsaw Pact exercise in Bulgaria. That exercise involved 60,000 allied troops and included units from the northern-tier Warsaw Pact countries for the first time. The majority of participants were Soviet soldiers, however. The use of air or sea transportation instead of ground transportation across Romania, which allowed no foreign troops on its territory, restricted participation by the northern-tier Warsaw Pact countries. Part of the rationale for the Varna-Odessa ferry completed in the late 1970s

was to bypass this obstacle and provide direct Soviet-Bulgarian transport of equipment and troops. The Warsaw Pact conducted a major command and staff exercise for its Southwestern Theater of Military Operations in Bulgaria in March 1984. Union-84 included general staff elements from the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria in simulated coordination of their respective ground and naval forces.

Military Cooperation and Exchanges

Bulgaria had fewer military contacts with developing countries than did its Warsaw Pact allies, instead stressing economic, agricultural, and technological exchanges. Military cooperation with developing countries occurred primarily as part of assistance programs to Soviet allies rather than as an independent policy.

Beginning in the late 1970s, Bulgaria developed military relations with several key countries in the Middle East and Africa. By the mid-1980s, friendship treaties were in effect with Angola, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, and Syria—all of which were receiving substantial military aid from the Soviet Union. These treaties mentioned unspecified military cooperation between the two signatories. In the 1980s, the Bulgarian minister of national defense paid official visits and received military delegations of developing countries without further elaboration of those terms. During this period, Bulgaria also had limited military relations with several developing countries that were not Soviet client states, including India, Nigeria, and Zambia.

More recently, Bulgaria extended its policy of military cooperation to immediate neighbors. In 1987 and 1988, Bulgaria and Greece exchanged visits by the chiefs of their respective general staffs. In 1990 the National Assembly ordered several units of special troops deployed to the Persian Gulf. Over 270 troops, consisting of a medical team, chemical defense company, and rear services unit, supported the United States-led coalition that forced the Iraqi army to withdraw from Kuwait in February 1991. In November 1990, the Bulgarian General Staff sent a delegation to Turkey, signaling a decisive warming of relations with that traditional enemy. In 1991 a Bulgarian-Turkish nonaggression pact was discussed, but Bulgaria feared that a bilateral treaty would damage its close relations with Greece.

Arms Sales

During the 1980s, Bulgaria annually exported an estimated US$250 to US$500 million worth of arms and military equipment. On one occasion, Zhivkov personally boasted of having arms supply

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

BULGARIA	MLADSHI LEĬTENANT	LEĬTE-NANT	STARSHI LEĬTENANT	KAPITAN	MAYOR	PODPOLKOVNIK	POLKOVNIK
GROUND FORCES							
U.S. RANK TITLES	2D LIEUTENANT		1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL
BULGARIA	GENERAL-MAYOR		GENERAL-LEĬTENANT	GENERAL-POLKOVNIK	ARMEĬSKI GENERAL		
GROUND FORCES							
U.S. RANK TITLES	BRIGADIER GENERAL		MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL		

NOTE--Insignia of rank are silver (gold for general); shoulder boards are gold and red.

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

BULGARIA	REDNIK	EFREYTOR		MLADSHI SERZHANT		SERZHANT		STARSHI SERZHANT		STARSHINA	
GROUND FORCES											
U.S. RANK TITLES	BASIC PRIVATE	PRIVATE	PRIVATE 1ST CLASS	CORPORAL	SERGEANT	STAFF SERGEANT	SERGEANT 1ST CLASS	MASTER SERGEANT	FIRST SERGEANT	SERGEANT MAJOR	COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR

NOTE--Insignia of rank are gold in color; shoulder boards are red.

Figure 13. Ranks and Insignia of Ground Forces, 1990

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

BULGARIA	MLADSHI LEITENANT / LEITE-NANT	STARSHI LEITENANT	KAPITAN LEITENANT	KAPITAN III RANG	KAPITAN II RANG	KAPITAN I RANG
NAVAL FORCES						
U.S. RANK TITLES	ENSIGN	LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE	LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER	COMMANDER	CAPTAIN
BULGARIA	KONTRAADMIRAL	VITSEADMIRAL	ADMIRAL			
NAVAL FORCES						
U.S. RANK TITLES	REAR ADMIRAL LOWER HALF	REAR ADMIRAL UPPER HALF	VICE ADMIRAL			

NOTE--Insignia of rank are gold; shoulder boards are blue.

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

BULGARIA	MATROS	STARSHI MATROS		STARSHINA II STEPEN		STARSHINA I STEPEN		GLAVEN STARSHINA	MICHMAN
NAVAL FORCES									
U.S. RANK TITLES	SEAMAN RECRUIT	SEAMAN APPRENTICE	SEAMAN	PETTY OFFICER 3D CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 2D CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS	CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER

NOTE--Insignia of rank are gold; shoulder boards are navy blue.

Figure 14. Ranks and Insignia of Naval Forces, 1990

relationships with thirty-six different countries. The Kintex foreign trade organization had responsibility for managing arms sales abroad. Beginning in the early 1960s, Bulgaria reportedly used its merchant ship fleet to deliver arms to socialist-oriented forces fighting civil wars in Algeria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique and to leftist terrorist groups in Italy, Turkey, and the Middle East. Kintex allegedly was willing to accept narcotics from Turkish terrorists and other insurgent groups as payment for arms, a charge Bulgarian officials denied. A captured leader of the Italian Red Brigades asserted that Bulgaria was willing to provide weapons to his group during the early 1980s. One of Bulgaria's more infamous sales transferred sixty Soviet tanks to Nicaragua and trained seventy Nicaraguan pilots in 1983 and 1984, at the height of the Sandinista government's war against anticommunist rebels in that country.

Political change removed Kintex and its activities from the category of state secrets. In 1990 the trade organization revealed that it maintained contacts in fifty countries and sold them mainly small arms, ammunition, and tanks and combat aircraft retired from service with the BPA. The democratization of post-Zhivkov Bulgaria reportedly had the same downsizing effect on Kintex as it had on other defense-related enterprises (see Logistics and Arms Procurement, this ch.). According to one source, arms exports to the Soviet Union declined from billions to several hundred million leva between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Plans were announced to continue Bulgaria's arms sales under stricter legislative scrutiny and government control in the 1990s.

Law and Order

The BCP gained control of the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Fatherland Front coalition after the overthrow of the wartime government on September 9, 1944. The party used these posts to increase its political power and ultimately to push all noncommunists out of the cabinet. In the subsequent reorganization of the national police force, party loyalists replaced officers suspected of having cooperated with the Gestapo. BCP cadres held every important national, regional, and municipal position in the new People's Militia that replaced the prewar local police force. The BCP also replaced the prewar court system with People's Courts, in which party members served as judges and jurors. With some modifications, the internal security and justice systems established in the mid-1940s remained in place for the next forty years, bolstering one-party rule.

The fall of Zhivkov in November 1989 and the end of the communist monopoly on political power brought overt pressure for

democratic reform of the justice system. In 1991 some improvements were evident, but other problems persisted. The Ministry of Internal Affairs retained its broad responsibility for maintaining law and order, law enforcement, internal security, and foreign intelligence activities. Before 1989 it had been more powerful and important than the judicial system it was supposed to serve; in 1991 many still considered the ministry a reactionary and sinister force because of past involvement in repressive activities and indications of continued party influence within its ranks. However, a new union of its employees called for significant reforms, including the depoliticization and professionalization of its work force. Immediately after the Zhivkov ouster, substantial public pressure called for depoliticizing the ministry, which one high official described as the "armed detachment of the party." Early in 1990, a reorganization plan proposed drastic cuts in budgeting and personnel and a complete revision of the ministry's functions.

Bulgaria lost social stability between 1989 and 1991. Increased social tension, crime, violence, and civil disorder were the unintended consequences of greater freedom. A crisis of law enforcement followed in the wake of political relaxation and democratization. The police seemed unsure whether to enforce the laws of the legal system of the discredited Zhivkov regime. This uncertainty was reflected when the People's Militia, formerly an efficient and feared instrument of the communist regime, took no action to stop vandals and arsonists who attacked and burned the BSP headquarters in August 1990.

Crime

More than 700,000 crimes were reported in Bulgaria between 1970 and 1990. The People's Militia reported an annual rate of 570 crimes per 100,000 people in 1989. By 1989, homicides had increased by 30 percent, burglaries by nearly 40 percent, and rapes by 45 percent over the rates in the mid-1980s. In 1990, the incidence of crime again increased sharply. Compared with the 15,000 crimes committed during 1989, the People's Militia received reports of more than 4,600 crimes in Sofia alone during the first six months of 1990. Approximately 70 percent of these crimes were committed by repeat offenders, and a very high percentage were petty crimes against property. Organized crime was increasingly evident; more than ten criminal organizations reportedly operated in Sofia. They were involved in black-market activities and were reputed to have connections to organized crime in other countries.

In an effort to curb another aspect of the crime problem, the National Assembly appealed in 1990 for citizens to surrender their

COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

BULGARIA	MLADSHI LEĬTENANT	LEĬTE-NANT	STARSHI LEĬTENANT	KAPITAN	MAYOR	PODPOLKOVNIK	POLKOVNIK
AIR FORCES AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES							
U.S. RANK TITLES	2D LIEUTENANT		1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL
BULGARIA	GENERAL-MAYOR		GENERAL-LEĬTENANT	GENERAL-POLKOVNIK			
AIR FORCES AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES							
U.S. RANK TITLES	BRIGADIER GENERAL		MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL			

NOTE--Insignia of rank are silver; shoulder boards are gold and blue.

ENLISTED PERSONNEL

BULGARIA	REDNIK	EFREYTOR		MLADSHI SERZHANT		SERZHANT		STARSHI SERZHANT	STARSHINA
AIR FORCES AND AIR DEFENSE FORCES									
U.S. RANK TITLES	AIRMAN BASIC	AIRMAN	AIRMAN 1ST CLASS	SERGEANT	STAFF SERGEANT	TECHNICAL SERGEANT	MASTER SERGEANT	SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT	CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT

NOTE--Insignia of rank are gold; shoulder boards are light blue.

Figure 15. Ranks and Insignia of Air Forces and Air Defense Forces, 1990

unregistered firearms and ammunition. The People's Militia reported that 145 crimes were committed with firearms between 1985 and 1989 and that in that period 60 people were killed and more than 120 people were wounded by illegal firearms. In 1989 authorities seized nearly 800 illegal firearms, and 2,500 firearms were surrendered voluntarily. That year approximately 85,000 firearms had been registered in the country. In 1990 the government revoked a law allowing party members and government officials to carry weapons.

Smuggling of drugs, arms, and other contraband was a persistent problem during and after the Zhivkov regime. Allegations of official involvement in smuggling appeared frequently in the foreign press (see Arms Sales, this ch.). Government spokespersons denied these charges and routinely asserted that the geographical situation of Bulgaria at the crossroads of Europe and Asia made it a natural route for illegal trade. They pointed out instances in which customs officials arrested foreigners, particularly Turks and Yugoslavs, passing through Bulgaria with illegal narcotics bound for Europe. The press noted cooperation between customs authorities and the UN Commission for Narcotics Control in efforts to curtail international drug trafficking. The UN supported these efforts by funding construction of modern border checkpoints in Bulgaria. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) also certified that Bulgaria had a good record in international law enforcement. In Bulgaria the Directorate of Customs and Customs Control of the Ministry of Finance was responsible for preventing drug trafficking; however, the People's Militia and Border Troops also were active in the counternarcotics effort.

The Judicial System

In 1991 the court system operated basically as it had before 1989. The administration of justice was based on the penal code of 1968 and several subsequent amendments to it, and on the constitution of 1971. In general, the courts had little independence and the Ministry of Justice had few powers under the former regime. In 1991, however, the National Assembly was considering draft laws on penal procedure, punishment, courts, amnesty, state secrets, and travel abroad. It sought to guarantee accused persons access to defense counsel during each phase of the legal process, to eliminate detention on suspicion, and to ensure that three judges and four lay jurors, called assessors, would preside over trials involving particularly grievous crimes in which the death penalty would be a possible sentence.

The court system consisted of municipal, provincial, and military courts; the Supreme Court; and public prosecutors at corresponding levels. The National Assembly elected the judges of the Supreme Court, its president, and the chief prosecutor to five-year terms. The chief prosecutor selected and supervised prosecutors to serve at the municipal and province levels and enforced compliance with legal standards by the government, its officials, and all citizens, prosecuting cases involving major crimes detrimental to the national interests or economy of Bulgaria. Judges at lower levels were elected to five-year terms by their respective constituencies. Conciliation committees in enterprises or municipal courts ruled on labor disputes. The arbitration court adjudicated civil cases and disputes between enterprises.

Under the penal code inherited from the Zhivkov era, crimes against the socialist economy or socialist property generally were punished more severely than crimes against persons. Major economic crimes, misappropriation, and serious malfeasance were punished rigorously. Directors and managers could be held criminally liable for the shortcomings of their enterprises. Six-year prison terms were levied for crimes such as conducting private economic activity while representing a state enterprise and receiving economic benefits for work or services not rendered. Illegally crossing national borders was punishable by a fine of 3,000 leva and a five-year prison term, with heavier penalties for recidivists. In the reform period, an increasing number of minor offenses were changed to receive administrative punishments such as fines up to 300 leva. These administrative proceedings represented rather arbitrary justice because the accused did not have the right to trial or legal counsel. The administrative proceedings were an expedient designed to alleviate a tremendous backlog of minor cases. Beginning in 1990, the dismantling of the state enterprise system called for shifting the emphasis of the criminal code from protection of state property to protection of the individual. This shift was attempted in the new constitution ratified by the National Assembly in July 1991. Independence of the judicial system, needed to standardize and clarify the administration of justice, received little attention in initial rounds of reform, however (see The Judiciary, ch. 4).

The Ministry of Internal Affairs

Under Zhivkov the Ministry of Internal Affairs had been charged with all aspects of internal and external security in peacetime. Given this assignment, the forces under the ministry had vast jurisdiction over society and were a feared and hated part of the communist government. For that reason, reorganization of internal security and intelligence operations was one of the first goals of the post-Zhivkov

Troops disembarking from armored personnel carrier during military exercises in Khaskovo District, 1985
Courtesy Sofia Press Agency

regimes. The overthrow of Zhivkov revealed the activities of Department Six, the "thought police" division of State Security that had been in charge of monitoring the activity of dissidents. Liquidation of that department was announced within a month of Zhivkov's ouster; it also was blamed for the assaults on demonstrators that had received world publicity at the time of the 1989 ecological conference in Sofia (see The Ferment of 1988–90, ch. 4). The UDF and other political organizations called for a complete review of past investigations to identify violations of civil rights by the ministry, review accusations of physical abuse during detention, improve prison conditions, and overturn sentences applied after improper investigation. The remaining prestige of the ministry was demonstrated in December 1990, however, when it and the defense ministry were the posts most hotly contested between the BSP and the UDF in formation of the first multiparty cabinet. At that time, a civilian became head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the first time since 1944.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs controlled the People's Militia (police) and the special militarized Internal Security Troops known as the Red Berets. In response to public demands for reform, a new Independent Trade Union Organization of Militia Employees

set forth reforms to improve the organization's public relations, which remained very poor in 1990. Declaring that membership in a party was incompatible with nonpartisan law enforcement, the union called for the depoliticization and professionalization of the militia through training programs, legal definition of its authority, and visible separation from influence by the BSP, with which the public still linked the militia. The force also sought to change its name from "militia" to "police." The Commission on National Security of the National Assembly supported this proposal, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs itself drafted a new law on the People's Militia for consideration by the National Assembly.

The People's Militia controlled several subordinate organizations, including the Territorial Militia, Road Militia, Commercial Militia, Central Investigations Department, Training Department, and Administration Department. The Territorial Militia provided law enforcement at the local level. Directorates for the Territorial Militia in each province of the country reported to the People's Militia at the national level. The Road Militia acted as a traffic enforcement authority similar to a highway patrol or state police force. The Commercial Militia investigated economic crimes, fraud, and thefts. The Training Department supervised the training of personnel for the People's Militia. It operated a special secondary school to train sergeants and a national academy to train officers. Candidates studied law codes, criminology, criminal procedure, and foreign languages.

The Red Berets were also part of the Ministry for Internal Security. They were a militarized, light infantry force responsible for preventing riots and other civil disturbances. Their 15,000 personnel were organized into fifteen regiments; they operated over 100 BTR-60 armored personnel carriers equipped for riot control. Together with the People's Militia and the secret police, the Red Berets were involved in the infamous Bulgarization campaign during 1984 and 1985 (see Bulgaria in the 1980s, ch. 1; The Turkish Problem, ch. 4). They were deployed in November 1990 to maintain order in Sofia during the general strike that toppled the BSP government.

The Penal System

Until 1990 the Ministry of Internal Affairs operated the penal system through its Central Prison Institutions Department and its Prison Service. The latter organization trained and administered prison guards. In 1990 the system included thirteen prisons and twenty-six minimum-security facilities housing 6,600 prisoners.

Military personnel used in crowd control during Union of Democratic Forces rally, Sofia 1990
Courtesy Charles Sudetic

Major prisons were located in Bobov Dol, Pazardzhik, Plovdiv, Sofia, Stara Zagora, Varna, and Vratsa. In 1990 authorities reported that the total prison population had declined by 10,000 as a result of amnesties granted to political prisoners during the previous three years. The remaining prison population included a high percentage of repeat offenders and prisoners convicted of serious crimes. The institution at Pazardzhik reported more than 560 inmates, including more than 50 imprisoned for murder, 60 for rape, 140 for other crimes against persons, and the balance for crimes against property. Offenders guilty of less serious crimes served time in minimum-security facilities, including open and semi-open labor camps. Prison strikes and demonstrations began with the Zhivkov ouster, continuing and escalating through the first half of 1990. Sparked by the release of large numbers of political prisoners, massive strikes elsewhere, and the suddenly volatile sociopolitical climate, the strikes became violent, and several inmates reportedly immolated themselves to protest prison conditions. Red Berets were called upon to reinforce Prison Service guards. By 1991 Bulgaria had already implemented one stage of prison reform to improve its international human rights image: prisons were put under the Ministry of Justice instead of the Ministry of Internal Security.

Security and Intelligence Services

In 1990 the Bulgarian state security system was substantially revamped in response to opposition pressure to improve the sinister, oppressive reputation gained by agencies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs during the Zhivkov era. After encountering strong resistance from party functionaries accustomed to using their positions for personal gain, the realignment used the American security system as a model to create three services under a streamlined Ministry of Internal Affairs. The National Security Service (before mid-1991 called the National Service for Defense of the Constitution) was given responsibility for identifying and countering foreign intelligence, subversive, or terrorist activities affecting the security, territorial integrity, or sovereignty of the country. It had authority for domestic law enforcement in cases involving international criminal activity, organized crime, smuggling, political corruption, and illegal fascist or nationalist organizations. The new philosophy announced for conduct of these activities included independence from all political parties, oversight by the Commission on National Security of the National Assembly, and recruitment according to professional rather than political qualification. In 1990 the service was given the important new role of preventing violence during elections.

Unlike the catchall National Security Service, the other two intelligence agencies had very specific roles. The National Protection Service was formed from the Department of Security and Protection, which Zhivkov had turned into a massive organization with unspecified functions ranging from personal protection to supplying imported cars to high party officials. The new protection service was much smaller and was confined to physical protection of government officials and foreign dignitaries.

The third security agency, the National Intelligence Service, was responsible for counterespionage and monitoring activities in neighboring countries, roles filled by the State Security (Dŭrzhavna sigurnost, DS) prior to 1990. The National Intelligence Service announced a personnel cut of 20 percent in 1991, but even in the new atmosphere of disclosure little else was reported about its activity or staffing. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Bulgarian counterintelligence effort continued to be directed against the NATO countries adjacent to Bulgaria; counterintelligence against former Warsaw Pact allies remained forbidden under a mutual cooperation agreement. The work of the National Intelligence Service was supplemented by the Military Counterintelligence Service, which was moved from DS jurisdiction to the Ministry

of National Defense in 1990. The military service reported to the General Staff. According to its chief, military intelligence was responsible for identifying and countering subversive actions, including terrorism, sabotage, and espionage. Besides foreign intelligence services, the activities of military intelligence were directed against domestic political extremism and crime.

After reorganization of the DS agencies, substantial public skepticism remained about the role of the secret services in monitoring Bulgarian society. Some Department Six agents remained active, and in 1991 the existence of still undisclosed Department Six files fueled much media speculation. Revelations that the KGB had overseen DS activity under Zhivkov brought speculation that KGB agents might still be active in Bulgaria after the Warsaw Pact ended. The Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed that only two agents remained in 1991, attached to the Soviet Embassy.

Terrorist and Espionage Activities

Bulgaria's involvement in international terrorism began in the early twentieth century when it provided sanctuary and a base of operations to the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) for terrorist activities against Yugoslavia and Greece. In the 1920s and 1930s, IMRO became a virtual state within a state in southwestern Bulgaria, also known as Pirin Macedonia.

From the beginning of the first communist regime, the State Security service was involved in conventional intelligence collection, illegal technology transfer, and covert actions abroad. The more recent notoriety of the State Security began in 1978 when it was accused of murdering prominent émigré Georgi Markov in London. Once a protégé of Zhivkov, Markov had fled Bulgaria in 1969 and was frequently critical of his former mentor in Bulgarian language broadcasts for the British Broadcasting Corporation. He was stabbed with a poison-tipped umbrella in London, assumedly by a Bulgarian agent. During the same period, at least two similar assassination attempts were made on émigrés, and a number of Bulgarian dissidents received threatening letters. In 1991 President Zheliu Zhelev agreed to open a full investigation of the Markov murder, using State Security files.

Other incidents of State Security activity abroad received international attention. The Bulgarian Embassy in Egypt was closed in 1978 after authorities found evidence of a plot to incite the Egyptian population to overthrow President Anwar al Sadat. In the 1980s, Bulgaria engaged in retaliatory expulsions of Italian and Turkish diplomats on charges of espionage at a time when relations with both countries were strained. The most infamous incident

was the State Security's alleged involvement in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981. In that case, the attacker, a Turkish radical, claimed that the Bulgarian and Soviet intelligence agencies had masterminded his plan in order to eliminate the Polish pope's political influence in Eastern Europe. Three Bulgarians identified as coconspirators were acquitted in 1986, but the incident caused the United States Department of State to place Bulgaria on its list of countries sponsoring terrorism.

A leader of the Red Brigades, an Italian terrorist group that kidnapped a U.S. Army general in 1981, later implicated Bulgaria in the kidnap plot. The terrorist asserted that the aim of Bulgarian intelligence was to destabilize Italy and gain information about NATO. The terrorists were ostensibly offered training, arms, and logistical assistance in this operation. A Bulgarian diplomat was expelled from Japan for spying on the Japanese biotechnology and genetic engineering industry in 1983. In 1990 the UDF asserted that it possessed documents detailing the connections between the ousted Zhivkov regime and international terrorists as well as the operation of terrorist training centers in Bulgaria. In 1991 the government of Prime Minister Dimitŭr Popov pledged to disclose additional information on intelligence activities under Zhivkov.

During the Turkish assimilation campaign of 1984–85, the DS, People's Militia, Red Berets, and the army were reported as using violence against ethnic Turks who resisted adopting Bulgarian names in place of their Turkish ones. As many as several hundred ethnic Turks may have been killed by secret police during this campaign. Additional hundreds of Turks were forcibly resettled, arrested, or imprisoned for refusing to cooperate with the assimilation measures. Bulgarian authorities blamed ethnic Turks for a bombing campaign in which thirty Bulgarians were killed in public places in 1984 and 1985. Although guilt was never established, the terrorist acts aroused ethnic feeling that supported the Bulgarization campaign. As the 1990s began, the Bulgarian civilian government had asserted control over all internal security agencies, inspiring the hope that a more open society would result.

* * *

English-language sources on Bulgarian national security, the armed forces, and law and order are relatively few. Stephen Ashley's 1989 article in *The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans,* edited by Jonathan Eyal, is the best treatment of the BPA and Bulgarian security. F. Stephen Larrabee's article "Long Memories and Short Fuses" sets a context for understanding the security environment in which the

country found itself as the Warsaw Pact disbanded and traditional conflicts reemerged in the Balkans. A 1982 book by Ivan Volgyes, *The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies,* remains a good overview of BPA force structure and personnel. Michael M. Boll's *The Soviet-Bulgarian Alliance* on Bulgarian security policies is useful but dated. Official Bulgarian data supplied for the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and *The Military Balance* provide detail on the organization, structure, strength, and disposition of ground forces and air and air defense forces. Milan Vego covers the naval forces in "Special Focus: The Bulgarian Navy" in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.* Given increasingly open coverage of national security issues in primary sources, translations of the Bulgarian press by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and Joint Publications Research Service provide information on current developments. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m²)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	1.8 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Area and Estimated Population of Provinces, 1987

Province	Area *	Population
Burgas	14,657	872,700
Khaskovo	13,892	1,044,400
Lovech	15,150	1,072,100
Mikhaylovgrad	10,607	668,200
Plovdiv	13,628	1,258,000
Razgrad	10,842	850,000
Sofia (city)	1,331	1,208,200
Sofiya	18,979	1,017,000
Varna	11,929	980,100
TOTAL	111,015	8,970,700

* In square kilometers.

Source: Based on information from *The Statesman's Year-Book, 1990–1991,* Ed., John Paxton, New York, 1990, 243.

Table 3. Population of the Largest Cities, 1987

City	Population	City	Population
Sofia	1,128,859	Sliven	106,610
Plovdiv	356,596	Shumen	106,496
Varna	305,891	Pernik	97,225
Burgas	197,555	Yambol	94,951
Ruse	190,450	Khaskovo	91,409
Stara Zagora	156,441	Gabrovo	81,554
Pleven	133,747	Pazardzhik	81,513
Dobrich (Tolbukhin)	111,037		

Source: Based on information from *The Stateman's Year-Book, 1990-1991,* Ed., John Paxton, New York, 1990, 243.

Table 4. Urban Growth, Selected Years, 1946-87

Year	Urban Population	Percentage of Total Population	Natural Urban Population Increase
1946	1,735,200	24.7	19,800
1956	2,556,100	33.6	25,500
1965	3,828,400	46.5	31,800
1975	5,067,000	58.0	58,100
1985	5,807,500	64.9	30,200
1987	5,959,400	66.4	29,000

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), *Bulgarien,* Göttingen, Germany, 1990, 445, 447.

Table 5. Birth Rates and Death Rates, Selected Years, 1946-87

Year	Births		Deaths	
	Number	Birth Rate *	Number	Death Rate *
1946	179,200	26.5	95,800	13.7
1956	147,900	19.5	71,200	9.4
1965	125,800	15.3	67,000	8.1
1975	144,700	16.6	90,000	10.3
1985	119,000	13.3	107,500	12.0
1987	116,700	13.0	107,200	12.09

* Per 1,000 population.

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), *Bulgarien,* Göttingen, Germany, 1990, 437, 440.

Table 6. Major Ethnic Groups, 1956 and 1965

Ethnic Group	1956		1965	
	Population	Percentage	Population	Percentage
Bulgarian	6,506,541	85.5	7,231,243	87.9
Turkish	656,025	8.6	780,928	9.5
Gypsy	197,865	2.6	148,874	1.8
Macedonian *	187,789	2.5	9,632	0.1
Armenian	21,954	0.3	20,282	0.3
Greek	7,437	0.1	8,241	0.1
Tatar	5,993	0.1	6,430	0.1

* Official census category. Figures do not represent actual size of this group.

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), *Bulgarien,* Göttingen, Germany, 1990, 475.

Table 7. Protestant Denominations, 1975

Denominations	Membership	Clergy	Parishes
Pentecostal	5,000-6,000	36	43
Adventist	3,500	40	20
Congregationalist	2,600	24	26
Methodist	1,000	15	13
Baptist	700	7	10

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), *Bulgarien,* Göttingen, Germany, 1990, 564.

Table 8. Employees in the State Economy by Sector, 1985, 1986, and 1987
(in thousands)

Sector	1985	1986	1987
Agriculture	878.8	848.1	821.5
Industry	1,411.1	1,403.0	1,422.3
Construction	360.6	359.2	359.1
Commerce	355.2	360.7	361.4
Transportation and communications	299.5	306.3	303.3
Education and culture	311.7	317.2	317.6
Health, welfare, and recreation	201.1	201.8	207.7
Administration	54.1	54.3	57.2
Science and research	82.1	83.0	85.8
Housing and community services	54.4	56.7	58.7
Other	86.2	86.2	89.0
TOTAL	4,094.8	4,076.5	4,083.6

Source: Based on information from *The Europa World Year Book, 1989,* 1, London, 1989, 567.

Table 9. Population Distribution as Related to Working Age, Selected Years, 1956-87

Year	Under Working Age		Working Age *		Over Working Age	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
1956	2,136,700	28.1	4,486,800	58.9	980,200	13.0
1965	2,112,400	25.7	4,789,000	58.2	1,326,500	16.1
1975	2,061,400	23.6	5,058,100	58.0	1,608,100	18.4
1985	2,046,700	22.9	5,013,200	56.0	1,888,800	21.1
1987	2,029,300	22.6	5,004,500	55.8	1,942,400	21.6

* 16 to 54 for women; 16 to 59 for men.

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), *Bulgarien,* Göttingen, Germany, 1990, 456.

Table 10. Number of Schools, Teachers, and Students by Kind of School, Selected Years, 1951-88

School	1951	1961	1971	1981	1988
Trade schools					
Number	187	236	328	300	264
Teachers	1,564	2,835	8,454	9,435	7,457
Students	35,724	42,123	130,292	151,200	107,967
Schools for the handicapped *					
Number	11	20	116	129	128
Teachers	115	987	2,155	2,373	2,364
Students	976	8,090	16,870	17,420	16,764
Professional schools					
Number	175	231	246	234	248
Teachers	2,690	5,307	9,045	9,415	10,619
Students	61,591	93,944	152,919	97,575	115,036
General middle schools					
Number	129	144	134	112	74
Teachers	4,627	8,021	6,270	7,419	9,637
Students	113,259	158,004	100,949	97,089	167,845

* Includes schools for mentally handicapped, maladjusted, deaf-mute, blind, and speech-impaired individuals.

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), *Bulgarien,* Göttingen, Germany, 1990, 502, 506, 508, 510.

Table 11. Investment Apportionment in the State Economy, Selected Years, 1949-88
(in percentages)

Category	1949	1960	1965	1970	1980	1985	1988
Industry	31.4	34.2	44.8	45.2	41.9	46.8	51.0
Agriculture	12.4	29.7	19.7	15.8	12.4	8.2	7.0
Construction	2.2	1.6	2.7	2.9	2.5	3.8	3.4
Transportation	16.5	5.4	6.1	7.8	9.7	8.5	9.7
Housing	22.9	19.2	16.9	15.8	20.2	19.5	17.3
Other	14.6	9.9	9.8	12.5	13.3	13.2	11.6

Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. *Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bŭlgariia, 1989,* Sofia, 1989, 38; and John R. Lampe, *The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century,* New York, 1986, 165.

Table 12. Average Annual Growth Rate of Net Material Product by Five-Year Plan, 1949-88 *

Five-Year Plan	Total Economy	Industry	Agriculture
First (1949-52)	8.4	20.7	-0.9
Second (1953-57)	7.8	12.7	4.9
Third (1958-60)	11.6	16.2	6.6
Fourth (1961-65)	6.7	11.7	3.2
Fifth (1966-70)	8.7	10.9	3.5
Sixth (1971-75)	7.8	9.1	2.9
Seventh (1976-80)	6.1	6.0	0.9
Eighth (1981-85)	3.7	7.0	-3.9
Ninth (1986-88)	5.5	5.6	1.2

* Official government figures. First, third, and ninth plans were abandoned or declared fulfilled before the full five years had elapsed. For definition of net material product—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. *Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bŭlgariia, 1989,* Sofia, 1989, 42, 43, 46; and John R. Lampe, *The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century,* New York, 1986, 144, 162.

Table 13. Government Budget, Selected Years, 1980–90 [1]
(in millions of leva) [2]

	1980	1986	1988	1990
Expenditures				
Current expenditures				
Wages and salaries	1,162	1,729	1,778	2,316
Maintenance and operation	3,403	4,756	5,167	5,904
Defense and security	1,139	1,914	1,929	2,114
State subsidies	3,128	5,301	6,767	6,050
Interest	422	369	795	2,125
Social security	2,392	3,627	3,895	4,446
Total current expenditures	11,646	17,696	20,331	22,955
Capital investments	1,237	3,447	2,062	1,488
Total expenditures	12,883	21,143	22,393	24,443
Revenues				
Tax revenues				
Taxes on profits	2,302	6,440	8,110	9,734
Income taxes	945	1,372	1,538	1,721
Turnover and excise taxes	3,431	5,672	4,442	4,565
Customs duties	0	159	310	355
Social security contributions	2,753	3,325	3,628	4,027
Other	36	56	133	126
Total tax revenues	9,467	17,024	18,161	20,528
Nontax revenues				
Trade-related revenues	1,975	920	1,551	1,510
Other	1,574	2,197	2,092	2,010
Total nontax revenues	3,549	3,117	3,643	3,520
Total revenues	13,016	20,141	21,804	24,048

[1] Figures may not add to total because of rounding.
[2] For value of the lev—see Glossary.

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Bulgaria: Crisis and Transition to a Market Economy,* 1, Washington: 1991, 28.

Table 14. Ownership of Selected Consumer Products, 1980, 1983, and 1987
(in percentages of households)

Item	1980	1983	1987
Radio	88	92	94
Refrigerator	76	88	94
Television	75	87	97
Washing machine	71	81	91
Automobile	29	34	39
Telephone	24	34	47

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), *Bulgarien,* Göttingen, Germany, 1990, 470.

Table 15. Conversion Values of the Lev to Major World Currencies, 1991

Currency	Symbol	Per	Lev Value
Austrian schilling	ATS	1	1.5146
Belgian franc	BEF	100	51.719
British pound	GBP	1	31.417
Dutch gulden	NLG	1	9.4505
French franc	FRF	100	313.86
German mark	DEM	1	10.642
Greek drachma	GRD	100	9.718
Japanese yen	JPY	100	13.307
Swiss franc	CHF	1	12.489
United States dollar	USD	1	18.367

Source: Based on information from Bulgarian National Bank notification to domestic foreign-exchange bankers, June 3, 1991.

Table 16. Distribution of Imports by Country, Selected Years, 1950–88
(in percentages)

Country	1950	1960	1970	1980	1988
Comecon countries *					
Soviet Union	50.2	52.6	52.2	57.3	53.5
East Germany	3.8	11.1	8.6	6.6	5.9
Other	31.6	20.3	15.3	18.8	17.3
Western countries					
West Germany	3.4	5.9	2.7	4.8	4.9
Other	1.3	7.7	16.5	8.6	10.6
Third World countries	n.a.	2.4	4.7	3.9	7.8

n.a.—not available.
* Comecon—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (see Glossary).

Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. *Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bŭlgariia, 1989,* Sofia, 1989, 84–85; and John R. Lampe, *The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century,* New York, 1986, 152, 188.

Table 17. Distribution of Exports by Country, Selected Years, 1950-88
(in percentages)

Country	1950	1960	1970	1980	1988
Comecon countries *					
Soviet Union	54.4	53.8	53.8	49.9	62.5
East Germany	5.5	10.2	8.7	5.5	5.2
Other	32.0	20.2	17.2	15.4	16.9
Western countries					
West Germany	0.7	3.3	2.6	2.5	1.0
Other	7.2	9.1	11.6	13.3	5.3
Third World countries	0.2	3.4	6.1	13.4	9.1

* Comecon—Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (see Glossary).

Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. *Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bŭlgariia, 1989,* Sofia, 1989, 84-85; and John R. Lampe, *The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century,* New York, 1986, 152, 188.

Table 18. Distribution of Major Imports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1980-88
(in percentages at constant prices)

Commodity	1980	1985	1987	1988
Machinery and equipment	45.4	47.2	43.5	43.5
Fuels, metals, and minerals	28.3	24.0	32.4	32.2
Consumer goods	7.2	6.8	5.4	5.7
Chemicals	6.7	6.6	6.4	5.6
Raw materials	5.9	6.2	5.4	5.6
Foodstuffs	2.9	5.0	4.1	4.3
Other	3.6	4.2	2.8	3.1

Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. *Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bŭlgariia, 1989,* Sofia, 1989, 83.

Table 19. Distribution of Major Exports by Commodity, Selected Years, 1980-88
(in percentages at constant prices)

Commodity	1980	1985	1987	1988
Machinery and equipment	50.7	54.1	58.8	58.7
Processed foods	15.6	12.7	11.4	11.2
Fuels, metals, and minerals	12.7	10.4	8.8	8.2
Consumer goods	9.4	9.4	10.2	11.0
Foodstuffs	3.6	3.2	2.8	2.8
Chemicals	2.8	3.9	3.7	4.0
Construction materials	2.2	1.9	1.9	1.7
Other	3.0	4.4	2.4	2.4

Source: Based on information from Bulgaria, Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. *Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bŭlgariia, 1989,* Sofia, 1989, 83.

Table 20. Social Categories in Bulgarian Communist Party Membership, Selected Years, 1944–86
(in percentages)

Year	Workers	Farmers	Professionals and Intelligentsia	Women	Under 30
1944	26.5	51.9	8.0	n.a.	n.a.
1948	26.5	44.7	16.3	13.0	26.0
1954	34.1	39.8	17.9	1.3	n.a.
1962	37.2	32.1	23.6	21.3	15.6
1971	40.1	26.1	28.2	25.2	16.1
1976	41.4	23.0	30.2	27.5	15.0
1986	44.4	16.3	n.a.	32.7	11.9

n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from Klaus-Detlev Grothusen (ed.), *Bulgarien,* Göttingen, Germany, 1990, 183, 185.

Bibliography

Chapter 1

Anastasoff, Christ. *The Bulgarians.* Hicksville, New York: Exposition Press, 1977.

Bankowicz, Marek. "Bulgaria—The Limited Revolution." Pages 195-210 in Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (eds.), *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe.* Aldershot, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 1991.

Bell, John D. *The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov.* Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

_____. *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Berglund, Sten, and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (eds.). *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe.* Aldershot, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 1991.

Bokov, Georgi (ed.). *Modern Bulgaria: History, Policy, Economy, Culture.* Sofia: Sofia Press, 1981.

Bokova, Irina. "Bulgaria and Ethnic Tensions in the Balkans," *Mediterranean Quarterly,* 2, No. 1, Winter 1991, 88-98.

Bromke, Adam, and Derry Novak (eds.). *The Communist States in the Era of Detente, 1971-1977.* Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1979.

Bromke, Adam, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone (eds.). *The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1972.

Bukowski, Charles. "The Dilemma of Economic Reform and Political Legitimacy in Eastern Europe," *Coexistence,* 23, No. 3, 1986, 227-45.

Constant, Stephen. *Foxy Ferdinand: Tsar of Bulgaria.* New York: Franklin Watts, 1980.

Crampton, Richard J. *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Debove, Alain. "The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria," *Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* [Oslo], 4, No. 3, 1987, 53-63.

Dellin, L.A.D. (ed.). *Bulgaria.* New York: Praeger, 1957.

Devedjiev, Hristo H. *Stalinization of the Bulgarian Society, 1949-1953.* Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1975.

Dimitrov, Ilcho (ed.). *Kratka istoriia na Bŭlgariia.* Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1981.

Evans, Stanley G. *A Short History of Bulgaria.* London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1960.

Genchev, Nikolai. *The Bulgarian National Revival Period.* Sofia: Sofia Press, 1977.

Georgiev, Emil, et al. *Bulgaria's Share in Human Culture.* Sofia: Sofia Press, 1968.

Groueff, Stephane. *Crown of Thorns.* Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1987.

Holden, Gerard. *The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Security and Bloc Politics.* Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1989.

Hristov, Hristo. *A History of Bulgaria.* Sofia: Sofia Press, 1985.

Jelavich, Barbara. *The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814–1918.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.

_____. *History of the Balkans.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Jelavich, Charles. *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977.

Kaplan, Robert D. "History's Cauldron," *Atlantic Monthly,* 267, No. 6, June 1991, 93–96.

Kinder, Hermann, and Werner Hilgemann. *The Anchor Atlas of World History,* 1. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1974.

Lang, David. *The Bulgarians.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1976.

McIntyre, Robert J. *Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society.* London: Pinter, 1988.

Miller, Marshall Lee. *Bulgaria During the Second World War.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Mishev, Dimitur. *The Bulgarians in the Past.* New York: Arno Press, 1971.

Nicoloff, Assen. *The Bulgarian Resurgence.* Cleveland, 1987.

Oren, Nissan. *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power, 1934–1944.* Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1971.

_____. *Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973.

Parker, John. "The Macedonian Problem Solved?" *South Slav Journal* [London], 6, No. 4, Autumn 1983, 12–21.

Perl, Lila. *Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria.* Camden: Thomas Nelson, 1970.

Rusinov, Spas. *Bulgaria: A Survey.* Sofia: Sofia Press, 1969.

Schöpflin, George (ed.). *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* New York: Praeger, 1970.

Staar, Richard F. *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe.* Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1988.

The Statesman's Year-Book, 1990-1991. (Ed., John Paxton.) New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Wolff, Robert. *The Balkans in Our Time.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.

Chapter 2

Amnesty International. *Bulgaria: Imprisonment of Ethnic Turks.* London: 1986.

Asenov, Boncho. *Religiiata v Bŭlgariia.* Sofia: Narodna Mladezh, 1987.

Boiadzhiev, Stefan. "Za prestŭpnoto prebroiavane v Pirinskiia krai prez 1946 g.," *Makedoniia* [Sofia], No. 11, 1990.

Bokov, Georgi (ed.). *Modern Bulgaria: History, Policy, Economy, Culture.* Sofia: Sofia Press, 1981.

"Brachnost, razhdaemost, smŭrtnost, estestven prirast na naselenieto i detska smŭrtnost," *Statisticheski izvestiia* [Sofia], No. 4, 1989, 12.

Bulgaria. Ministerstvo na obshtestvena prosvetata. *The School in the Republic of Bulgaria.* Sofia: Ministry of Public Education, 1991.

Delinski, Dimitŭr. "Strukturi za visoka efektivnost," *Rabotnichesko delo* [Sofia], September 1987, 1.

Dimitrov, G. *Kniazhestvo Bŭlgariia.* Sofia: Pridvorna pechatnitsa B. Shimachek, 1894.

The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 1. London: Europa, 1989.

Foreign Policy Institute. *The Tragedy of the Turkish Muslim Minority in Bulgaria.* Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1989.

Genchev, Stoian (ed.). *Etnografski problemi na narodnata dukhovna kultura* [Sofia], Bŭlgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1989.

Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev (ed.). *Bulgarien.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990.

Hadjihristev, Argir. *Life-styles for Long Life: Longevity in Bulgaria.* Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1988.

Iordanov, Borislav. "Shte izbegnem li insulta?," *Rabotnichesko delo* [Sofia], March 1987, 5.

Iordanov, Tianko (ed.). *Geografiia na Bŭlgariia.* Sofia: Bŭlgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1981.

Karakachanov, Krasimir. "Makedoniia ne zhelae da bŭde srŭbska banovina," *Makedoniia* [Sofia], No. 12, 1990, 4.

Khadzhiiski, Ivan. *Bit i dushevnost na nashiia narod.* Sofia: Bŭlgarski pisatel, 1974.

Khristov, Khristo (ed.). *Stranitsi ot bŭlgarskata istoriia.* Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1989.

Kŭstanova, Kipriana. "Vŭzrastovi regulativni funkstsii na narodnata sotsialnonormativna kultura." Pages 224–26 in Stoian Genchev, (ed.), *Etnografski problemi na narodnata dukhovna kultura.* Sofia: Bŭlgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1989.

Laber, Jeri. *Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Bulgaria.* New York: Helsinki Watch Committee, 1987.

"Makedoniia dnes," *Vesti Makedoniia* [Skopje], Nos. 11–12, 1990, 1.

Marinov, Dimitŭr. *Etnograficheskо (folklorno) izuchavane na zapadna Bŭlgariia.* Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1984.

McIntyre, Robert J. *Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society.* London: Pinter, 1988.

Mijalkovic, Sava. "Sofija—zatvoreni grad," *Borba* [Belgrade], September 23, 1986, 5.

Oppression and Discrimination in Bulgaria. London: K. Rustem, 1986.

Pamukchiev, Minko. "Intelektualen pazar, demokratizŭm i akademichna avtonomiia na VUZ," *Problemi na vissheto obrazovanie [Sofia],* No. 2, 1990, 3–7.

Poulton, Hugh. *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict.* London: Minority Rights, 1991.

_____. *Minorities in the Balkans.* London: Minority Rights, 1989.

Stoyanov, Peter (ed.). *Churches and Religions in the People's Republic of Bulgaria.* Sofia: Synodal, 1975.

Todorov, Tzvetan. *Les morales de l'histoire.* Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1991.

Todorova, Maria. "Population Structure, Marriage Patterns, Family and Household," *Etudes Balkaniques* [Sofia], 1983, 63–68.

Vakarelski, Khristo. *Etnografiia na Bŭlgariia.* Sofia: Bŭlgarskata akademiia na naukite, 1979.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe;* Joint Publication Research Service, *JPRS Report: East Europe;* and *Kak Zhiveem* [Sofia]).

Chapter 3

Alton, Thad, et al. *Economic Growth in Eastern Europe, 1965, 1970, 1975–81.* New York: L.W. International Financial Research, 1982.

Bell, John D. *The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov.* Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

Bulgaria. Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie. *Statisticheski godishnik na Narodna Republika Bŭlgariia, 1989.* Sofia: Tsentralno statistichesko upravlenie, 1989.

"Bulgarian Investment Climate Improving," *Eastern Europe Business Bulletin*, August-September 1991, 3.

Cochrane, Nancy J., and Miles J. Lambert. "Agricultural Performance in Eastern Europe, 1988," *East European Agriculture*, 89, No. 38, August 1989, 1-27.

Crampton, Richard J. *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

_____. "'Stumbling and Dusting Off,' or an Attempt to Pick a Path Through the Thicket of Bulgaria's New Economic Mechanism," *Eastern European Politics and Societies*, 2, No. 2, Spring 1988, 333-95.

Economist Intelligence Unit. *County Report: Romania, Bulgaria, Albania* [London], No. 1, 1992, 28-37.

Engelbrekt, Kjell. "Bulgaria's Industrial Crisis and the Coming Election," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Report on Eastern Europe* [Munich], 1, No. 23, June 8, 1990, 1-4.

_____. "Round-Table Talks on Economic Reform: Gradual Approach or Shock Therapy?" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Report on Eastern Europe* [Munich], 1, No. 13, March 30, 1990, 1-3.

The Europa World Year Book, 1989, 1. London: Europa, 1989.

Feiwel, George R. *Growth and Reforms in Centrally Planned Economies*. New York: Praeger, 1977.

Gherardi, Sophie. "Bulgaria No Longer Able to Feed Itself," *Guardian Weekly* [Manchester, United Kingdom], 143, No. 26, December 9, 1990, 16.

Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev (ed.). *Bulgarien*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990.

Lampe, John R. *The Bulgarian Economy in the Twentieth Century*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

McIntyre, Robert J. *Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society*. London: Pinter, 1988.

Nikolaev, Rada. "The Government's Economic Program," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Report on Eastern Europe* [Munich], 1, No. 47, November 23, 1990, 6-10.

_____. "Lukanov's Report on the Economic Crisis," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, *Report on Eastern Europe* [Munich], 1, No. 38, September 21, 1990, 4-9.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. "Accelerating Privatization in Eastern Europe." (Paper presented at World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1991.) Washington: World Bank, 1991.

Semov, Marco, and Atanas Semov. "Bulgaria on the Threshold of Drama and Hope," *International Affairs* [Moscow], No. 1, January 1991, 13-22.

Sjoberg, Orjan, and Michael L. Wyzan (eds.). *Economic Change in the Balkan States: Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

United States. Congress. 99th, 2d Session. Joint Economic Committee. *East European Economies: Slow Growth in the 1980s.* Washington: GPO, 1986.

World Bank. *Bulgaria: Crisis and Transition to a Market Economy.* Washington: 1991.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: *Business Eastern Europe;* Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe;* and Joint Publications Research Service, *JPRS Report: East Europe.*)

Chapter 4

Bankowicz, Marek. "Bulgaria—The Limited Revolution." Pages 195-210 in Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (eds.), *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe.* Aldershot, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 1991.)

Bell, John D. *The Bulgarian Communist Party from Blagoev to Zhivkov.* Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

_____. "'Post-Communist' Bulgaria," *Current History,* 89, No. 12, December 1990, 417-420.

Berglund, Sten, and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (eds.). *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe.* Aldershot, United Kingdom: Edward Elgar, 1991.

Binder, David. "Going Back: Bulgaria, 20 Years Later," *New York Times Magazine,* December 8, 1985, 154-55.

Bokova, Irina. "Bulgaria and Ethnic Tensions in the Balkans," *Mediterranean Quarterly,* 2, No. 1, Winter 1991, 88-98.

Bromke, Adam, and Derry Novak (eds.). *The Communist States in the Era of Detente, 1971-1977.* Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1979.

Chiodini, Steven. "Bulgaria: An Eastern European Revolution in Suspension," *Harvard International Review,* 13, No. 1, Winter 1990-91, 47-49.

Bromke, Adam, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone (eds.). *The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972.

Crampton, Richard J. *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Danevski, Valentin. *Political Parties, Movements and Organizations in Bulgaria and their Leaders.* Sofia: Sofia Press, 1990.

Devedjiev, Hristo H. *Stalinization of the Bulgarian Society, 1949–1953.* Philadelphia: Dorrance, 1975.

"Exodus," *The Economist* [London], 312, No. 7610, July 8, 1989, 36.

"The Experience of Being Bulgarised," *The Economist* [London], 297, No. 7424, December 14, 1985, 32.

Gati, Charles. "Gorbachev and Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* 65, No. 5, Summer 1987, 958–75.

Grothusen, Klaus-Detlev (ed.). *Bulgarien.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1990.

Halpern, Joel Martin, and Barbara Kerewsky-Halpern. *Bulgaria's Time Bind: The Search for Democracy and a Viable Heritage.* (Universities Field Staff International, UFSI Reports, Eastern Europe, No. 12.) Indianapolis: 1990.

Larrabee, F. Stephen. "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," *International Security* [Cambridge], 15, No. 3, Winter 1990/91, 58–91.

Luers, William H. "The U.S. and Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs,* 65, No. 5, Summer 1987, 976–94.

McIntyre, Robert J. *Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society.* London: Pinter, 1988.

Nelson, Daniel N. *Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

_____. "Political Dynamics and the Bulgarian Military," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* [Cologne], 1990, No. 43, July 1990.

Oren, Nissan. *Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973.

"The Other Side of the Moon," *The Economist* [London], 297, No. 7425, December 21, 1985, 14.

Prins, Gwyn, et al. "After the Collapse of Communism," *Political Quarterly,* 62, No. 1, January–March 1991, 1–74.

Semov, Marco, and Atanas Semov. "Bulgaria on the Threshold of Drama and Hope," *International Affairs* [Moscow], No. 1, January 1991, 13–22.

Starr, Richard F. *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe.* Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1988.

Statkov, Dimiter. "Monarchists and Nationalists in Bulgaria," *Swiss Review of Western Affairs* [Zurich], 41, No. 5, August 1991, 8–10.

Tzvetkov, Plamen S. "The Politics of Transition in Bulgaria," *Problems of Communism,* 41, No. 3, May–June 1992, 34–43.

Wolff, Robert. *The Balkans in Our Time.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe;* Joint Publications Research Service, *JPRS Report: East Europe;* and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute, *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich].)

Chapter 5

Ashley, Stephen. "Bulgaria: Between Loyalty and Nationalism." Pages 109-53 in Jonathan Eyal (ed.), *The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans: Moscow's Southern Flank.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989 [Munich].)

Boll, Michael M. *Cold War in the Balkans: American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria, 1943-1974.* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984.

_____. "The Soviet-Bulgarian Alliance: From Subservience to Partnership," *Parameters,* 24, No. 4, Winter 1984, 47-55.

Bulgaria. Ministry of Defense. *Republic of Bulgaria Data Provided in Accordance with the Data Exchange Protocol of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.* Sofia: 1990.

Crampton, Richard J. *A Short History of Modern Bulgaria.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Dupuy, R. Ernest, and Trevor N. Dupuy. *The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 BC to the Present.* New York: Harper and Row, 1986.

Economist Intelligence Unit. *Country Profile: Bulgaria, 1990-91.* London: 1991.

Eyal, Jonathan (ed.). *The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans: Moscow's Southern Flank.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.

Foss, Christopher, F. (ed.). *Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1989-90.* Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's, 1989.

"High Command of the Bulgarian People's Army (BNA)," *Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review* [Surrey, United Kingdom], 2, No. 9, September 1990, 412-13.

Lambert, Mark (ed.). *Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1990-91.* Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's, 1990.

Larrabee, F. Stephen. "Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the Balkans," *International Security* [Cambridge], 15, No. 3, Winter 1990/91, 58-91.

McIntyre, Robert J. *Bulgaria: Politics, Economics, and Society.* London: Pinter, 1988.

The Military Balance, 1990–1991. London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990.

Miller, Marshall Lee. *Bulgaria During the Second World War.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975.

Nelson, Daniel N. *Balkan Imbroglio: Politics and Security in Southeastern Europe.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.

_____. "Political Dynamics and the Bulgarian Military," *Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien* [Cologne], 1990, No. 43, July 1990.

Sharpe, Richard (ed.). *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1990–91.* Surrey, United Kingdom: Jane's, 1990.

United States. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, 1989.* Washington: GPO, 1990.

Vego, Milan. "Special Focus: The Bulgarian Navy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.* (No. 114/3/1021.) March 1988, 52–54.

Volgyes, Ivan. *The Political Reliability of the Warsaw Pact Armies: The Southern Tier.* Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1982.

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in the preparation of this chapter: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* and Joint Publications Research Service, *JPRS Report: East Europe.*)

Glossary

Asia Minor—The Asian portion of what is now Turkey.

Bogomilism—A religious sect founded in Bulgaria and flourishing in the Balkans between the tenth and fifteenth centuries. It combined beliefs from several contemporaneous religions, most notably the Paulicians from Asia Minor (*q.v.*). The central belief was that the material world was created by the devil.

Cominform (Communist Information Bureau)—An international communist organization (1947–56) including communist parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia (expelled in 1948). Formed as a tool of Soviet foreign policy, it issued propaganda advocating international communist solidarity.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—Originating at the Helsinki meeting that produced the Helsinki Accords (*q.v.*) in 1975, a grouping of all European nations (the lone exception, Albania, joined in 1991) that subsequently sponsored joint sessions and consultations on political issues vital to European security.

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE)—An agreement signed in 1990 by the members of the Warsaw Pact (*q.v.*) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (*q.v.*) to establish parity in conventional weapons between the two organizations from the Atlantic to the Urals. Included a strict system of inspections and information exchange.

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon)—A multilateral economic alliance headquartered in Moscow until it disbanded in 1991. Members in 1991: Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Also known as CMEA and CEMA.

Cyrillic—Alphabet ascribed to the missionary Cyril (ninth century), developed from Greek for recording church literature in Old Church Slavonic. Now the alphabet of Belarus, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, and several former Soviet republics in Central Asia, it is considered one of the three principal alphabets of the world.

Enlightenment—Intellectual and spiritual movement in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concerned with the relationship of God, nature, reason, and man, often challenging the tenets of Christianity.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)—A bank founded under sponsorship of the European Community (EC) in 1990, to provide loans to East European countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia) to establish independent, market-type economies and democratic political institutions. Some forty-one countries were shareholders in 1991.

European currency unit (ECU)—The unit of account of the European Economic Community (*q.v.*), value of which is determined by the value of the currencies of the member states, apportioned by relative strength and importance of the member's economy. In 1988 one ECU equalled about one United States dollar.

European Economic Community (EEC)—The "Common Market" of primarily West European countries, organized to promote coordinated development of economic activities, expansion, stability, and closer relations among member states. Methods included elimination of customs duties and import regulations among member states, a common tariff and commercial policy toward outside countries, and a common agricultural and transport policy. A significant further reduction of intraorganizational barriers was planned in 1992.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—An integrated set of bilateral trade agreements among nations, formed in 1947 to abolish quotas and reduce tariffs. Bulgaria applied for membership in 1991.

glasnost—Russian term, literally meaning "openness," applied beginning in the mid-1980s in the Soviet Union to official permission for public discussion of issues and access to information. Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union (1985-91).

gross national product (GNP)—The sum of the value of goods and services produced within a country's borders and the income received from abroad by residents, minus payments remitted abroad by nonresidents. Normally computed over one year.

Helskinki Accords—Signed in 1975 by all countries of Europe except Albania (which signed in 1991) plus Canada and the United States at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (*q.v.*), a pact outlining general principles of international behavior and security and addressing some economic, environmental, and humanitarian issues.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established with the World Bank (*q.v.*) in 1945, a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. Its main business was providing

loans to its members when they experienced balance of payments difficulties. Bulgaria became a member in 1991.

League of Nations—An organization for international cooperation established by the Allied powers after World War I. Discredited by failure to oppose aggression in the 1930s, it became inactive at the beginning of World War II and was replaced in 1946 by the United Nations.

lev (pl., leva)—The national currency unit of Bulgaria, consisting of 100 *stotinki*. Exchange rate to the U.S. dollar in 1991 was 18 leva.

Marshall Plan—In full, the European Recovery Program, a United States-sponsored program to rehabilitate European nations after World War II and prevent communist subversion of countries weakened by war.

net material product (NMP)—The total economic value of production in the productive sectors of a national economy (not counting administration, defense, finance, education, health, and housing) after depreciation has been deducted.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—An organization founded in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and their postwar European allies to oppose the Soviet military presence in Europe. Until the dissolution of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact (*q.v.*) in 1991, it was the primary collective defense agreement of the Western powers. Its military and administrative structure remained intact after the threat of Soviet expansionism had subsided.

passenger kilometers—The total number of kilometers traveled by passengers by a given mode of transportation in a specified period of time.

perestroika—Russian word meaning "restructuring," applied in the late 1980s to official Soviet program of revitalization of the communist party, economy, and society by adjusting economic, social, and political mechanisms. Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union (1985–91).

Shia—A member of the smaller of the two divisions of Islam, supporting the claims of Ali to leadership of the Muslim community, in opposition to the Sunni (*q.v.*) view of succession to Muslim leadership—the issue causing the central schism within Islam.

Solidarity—An independent trade union founded in 1980 in communist Poland. For its defiance of the communist system, the union attained great political power through the loyalty of a large part of the Polish population. Under the leadership of Lech Wałęsa, it eventually formed the basis of the first postwar noncommunist Polish government.

Sunni—A member of the larger of the two fundamental divisions of Islam, opposed to the Shia (*q.v.*) on the issue of succession to Muslim leadership.

ton kilometers—The total number of tons of cargo conveyed via a given mode of transportation in a specified period of time.

Warsaw Pact—In full, Warsaw Treaty Organization, a mutual defense organization including the Soviet Union, Albania (which withdrew in 1961), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Founded in 1955, it enabled the Soviet Union to station troops in most of the other countries to oppose the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, *q.v.*) and was the basis of invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Disbanded in 1991.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of four affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises in the less-developed countries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign investment in developing countries against various non-commercial risks. The president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—*q.v.*).

Index

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65	Afghanistan	550-87	Greece
550-98	Albania	550-78	Guatemala
550-44	Algeria	550-174	Guinea
550-59	Angola	550-82	Guyana and Belize
550-73	Argentina	550-151	Honduras
550-169	Australia	550-165	Hungary
550-176	Austria	550-21	India
550-175	Bangladesh	550-154	Indian Ocean
550-170	Belgium	550-39	Indonesia
550-66	Bolivia	550-68	Iran
550-20	Brazil	550-31	Iraq
550-168	Bulgaria	550-25	Israel
550-61	Burma	550-182	Italy
550-50	Cambodia	550-30	Japan
550-166	Cameroon	550-34	Jordan
550-159	Chad	550-56	Kenya
550-77	Chile	550-81	Korea, North
550-60	China	550-41	Korea, South
550-26	Colombia	550-58	Laos
550-33	Commonwealth Caribbean, Islands of the	550-24	Lebanon
550-91	Congo	550-38	Liberia
550-90	Costa Rica	550-85	Libya
550-69	Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)	550-172	Malawi
550-152	Cuba	550-45	Malaysia
550-22	Cyprus	550-161	Mauritania
550-158	Czechoslovakia	550-79	Mexico
550-36	Dominican Republic and Haiti	550-76	Mongolia
550-52	Ecuador	550-49	Morocco
550-43	Egypt	550-64	Mozambique
550-150	El Salvador	550-35	Nepal and Bhutan
550-28	Ethiopia	550-88	Nicaragua
550-167	Finland	550-157	Nigeria
550-155	Germany, East	550-94	Oceania
550-173	Germany, Fed. Rep. of	550-48	Pakistan
550-153	Ghana	550-46	Panama

550-156	Paraguay
550-185	Persian Gulf States
550-42	Peru
550-72	Philippines
550-162	Poland
550-181	Portugal
550-160	Romania
550-37	Rwanda and Burundi
550-51	Saudi Arabia
550-70	Senegal
550-180	Sierra Leone
550-184	Singapore
550-86	Somalia
550-93	South Africa
550-95	Soviet Union
550-179	Spain
550-96	Sri Lanka
550-27	Sudan
550-47	Syria
550-62	Tanzania
550-53	Thailand
550-89	Tunisia
550-80	Turkey
550-74	Uganda
550-97	Uruguay
550-71	Venezuela
550-32	Vietnam
550-183	Yemens, The
550-99	Yugoslavia
550-67	Zaire
550-75	Zambia
550-171	Zimbabwe