


## Chapter 4. Government and Politics



*Greek flag flies on windmills along a causeway, Rhodes*

THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY of the fall of the military junta dictatorship, in July 1994, afforded Greeks an opportunity to assess their country's progress since that event. Most political observers found that concrete gains had been made and that democracy had been consolidated. Although the political system of Greece still includes serious flaws, the democratic transition of 1974–94 has often been cited for the efficiency with which it has dealt with political problems lingering from the tumultuous past and put in place checks and balances that should resolve future dilemmas.

Foremost among the past problems were the final disposition of the monarchy and the legalization of the communist party. By resolving both of these questions within one year after the junta's fall in 1974, Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis removed two of the major deficiencies of the post-World War II political atmosphere that had made the accession of a military dictatorship possible in 1967 (see *The Junta*, ch. 1). The immediate result of World War II had been the three-year Civil War that left Greece with a stunted parliamentary system characterized by a meddling monarch, pervasive domestic surveillance tactics, and interventionist foreign allies throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.

Preparing Greece's political system for long-term stability was a formidable task. After seven years of political isolation ended in 1974, the government of Karamanlis's party, New Democracy (*Nea Demokratia*—ND), tried to recover the economic momentum that had propelled a rapid political evolution in the late 1950s and made possible the liberal agenda of Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou in the mid-1960s. The junta had separated Greece from the successful path being followed by its European neighbors, leaving the capitalist system that emerged from the early 1970s unprepared for the mounting social and political demands that it encountered.

The legalization of all leftist parties and the establishment of a presidential republic cleared the way for consolidation of the new democratic gains. The expanded political spectrum led to vigorous calls for further democratization and modernization, goals most eloquently expressed by Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Movement (*Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima*—PASOK). Founded in 1974 from a nucleus of antijunta

activists and Papandreou's close personal supporters, PASOK came to power in 1981, with change as its byword. PASOK's rapid rise confirmed that government power could now pass in orderly fashion from one party to another of quite different ideology.

The PASOK election also began a jarring and controversial era of sociopolitical transformations. Central features of that period were a climate of openness and a palpable sense of political disorientation. PASOK's fiery rhetoric fostered high public expectations that were frustrated by a deepening economic crisis and by PASOK's unfocused long-term political agenda.

To sidestep harsh domestic economic realities in the 1980s, the government used flamboyant diversionary tactics that made Greece appear unstable to its friends and allies. PASOK's first term brought new segments of society, which until that time had not been heard in policy discussions, into the political mainstream. However, by the middle of PASOK's second administration, this process was halted when the state could no longer afford to satisfy mounting interest-group demands. Experts saw PASOK's losses to the conservatives of Karamanlis in 1989, following a period of malaise and scandal, as the death knell of the party. Unhappily, the ND failed as badly as had PASOK, so the voters again turned to Papandreou in 1993. But neither the ND nor PASOK successes at the polls showed that the political system had evolved beyond a civilized exchange of power between two dominant parties. Greek parties had not yet become instruments for popular participation in the increasingly urgent process of reforming and modernizing national institutions—tasks that experts believe a national party must keep central in the electorate's attention.

## **The Constitutional Framework**

Greece is a parliamentary republic whose president is the head of state and whose prime minister is the head of government. The governmental and political system is based on the constitution of 1975. The latest revisions to the constitution, all of which had the purpose of curtailing presidential powers, were ratified in June 1986. Historically, the most frequent reason for changing the constitution had to do with the continuing dispute over whether monarchy or republic were the proper form of government for Greece. This conflict was a major source of political tensions for almost 150 years.

The 1975 constitution was drafted by a popularly elected legislature following the ouster of the last military dictatorship (see Karamanlis and the Restoration of Democracy, ch. 1). The document provides the basis for a republican form of governance, reflecting the overwhelming popular vote in the referendum of December 1974 to abolish the monarchy. According to the constitution, sovereignty rests with the people. Governmental structure and functional responsibilities are broadly divided into three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. These branches are to operate under the principle of checks and balances. The presidency of the republic is placed above the three branches and above partisan politics as well. The 1975 document limited the authority of the president in order to prevent a concentration of power in his hands, but it also left some important political initiatives within the definition of the office's power. On the other hand, the thrust of the 1986 amendments to the constitution was to ensure that the president would remain a strictly titular head of state.

A full range of human rights is protected under the constitution, which states that all persons residing within Greek territory may enjoy, "full protection of their life, honor, and freedom, irrespective of nationality, race, or language and of religious or political beliefs," unless otherwise disallowed by international law. Every adult citizen has the right to participate in the social, economic, and political life of the country. The state and all its agents are directed to ensure that individual rights and liberties are exercised fully. The state may, for its part, call on all citizens "to fulfill the duty of social and national solidarity."

The specification of basic rights and liberties includes freedom of speech, of the press, of peaceful assembly and association, and of travel; economic freedom and property ownership; privacy of correspondence and the inviolability of the home; due process of law; and the prohibition of retroactive legislation. Also guaranteed are the right to petition the state for redress of grievances and the right to employment, to social security and housing, to education, and to health care.

Traditionally, the Orthodox Church of Greece has maintained a close link with the state. The special status of the church is acknowledged in the constitution, which declares, "The prevailing religion in Greece is the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ." Nevertheless, the freedom of religious conscience is declared inviolable, and "all known religions" are to

be free, and their rites of worship are to be performed unhindered. They are also to be protected by law to an extent not prejudicial to public order or to moral principles. Nevertheless, the constitution provides special status for the Orthodox Church by prohibiting proselytization by all other religions. Instances of religious persecution have been rare and irregular, so the implications of this prohibition are unclear (see Human Rights, this ch.; Religion, ch. 2).

The constitution states that work is a right, and all workers are entitled to equal remuneration for equal services performed. The freedom of unionism, including the right to strike for higher wages and better employment conditions, is constitutionally protected, but judicial functionaries and members of the state security forces are prohibited from striking. Civil servants and employees of other public corporations may strike, subject to the limitations of the law.

All but the most basic articles of the constitution—such as those defining Greece as a parliamentary republic, those guaranteeing fundamental rights and liberties, and those vesting legislative, executive, and judicial powers in the appropriate branches of government—may be amended. To amend the constitution, a proposal must be introduced into the legislature by at least fifty members of parliament. It must then be confirmed by a three-fifths majority vote of the total parliamentary membership on each of two ballots held at least one month apart. The next session of parliament finally enacts the amendment by an absolute majority vote of the total membership. Constitutional revision is not permitted before the lapse of five years from the completion of a previous revision; this provision is designed to ensure the stability of constitutional order.

## **Government Organization**

Greece is a unitary state based on a system of parliamentary representation. The powers of the state are separated into three branches to prevent their concentration in a single authority. Despite constitutional provisions to strengthen local administration (article 102), in 1994 power still rested largely with the central government. For the first time in October 1994, local elections included direct election of province governors (*nomarchs*). Until that time, governors had been appointees of the national government.

## **The Presidency**

The president is the principal link among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. He or she is insulated from direct political pressures by virtue of being elected by open ballot (since 1986) of the Assembly (the Vouli). The presidential term is five years, and the maximum number of terms is two.

A candidate for the presidency must have a Greek father, have been a Greek citizen for at least five years, be at least forty years of age, and be entitled to vote in parliamentary elections. To be elected, an individual must receive a two-thirds majority in parliament (200 votes) on the first and second ballots, or, if no such majority is reached, a three-fifths majority (180 votes) on a third ballot. Failure to elect a president on the third round results in the dissolution of the Assembly within ten days and the holding of new elections within forty days. The new Assembly must begin immediately the process of electing a president. In this election, a three-fifths majority is required on the first ballot, an absolute majority (151 votes) on the second, and a simple majority on the third. Should the presidency be vacated at any time, the Assembly must meet within ten days to elect a successor for a full term. If the president is incapacitated, presidential duties are temporarily assumed by the speaker of the Assembly.

In 1985, as Karamanlis's first presidential term was ending and a presidential election approached, the rival PASOK government argued for expansion of the powers of the Assembly at the expense of the president, who was characterized as having excessive prerogatives under the 1975 constitution. The amendments passed in 1986 actually did not change the prescribed functions of the Assembly; instead, they simply shifted powers from the president to the office of the prime minister, leaving the former with largely ceremonial duties.

The presidency still retains numerous ceremonial functions. The president represents Greece in international relations and, with the concurrence of the Assembly, declares war and concludes agreements of peace, alliance, and participation in international organizations. The president also is the head of the armed forces, but actual command is exercised by the government. Much of the president's power in relation to the Assembly is limited by the constitutional provision that most presidential acts must be countersigned by the appropriate cabinet ministers. The president may be impeached if charges

against him or her are signed by at least one-third of the members of the Assembly and subsequently approved by at least two-thirds of the total membership. A special ad hoc court, presided over by the chief justice of the Supreme Court, would then try the president.

## **The Branches of Government**

The day-to-day governance of Greece is conducted by three branches of government arranged according to the parliamentary system, with an independent judiciary and an executive branch that serves with the approval of the Assembly (see fig. 11).

### ***The Executive Branch***

The executive establishment, or government, consists of the cabinet, which includes twenty-two departmental ministries led by the prime minister. Also included are one cabinet-rank minister to the prime minister and thirty-one alternate or deputy ministers. Ministers, who need not be members of the Assembly, are chosen by the prime minister and their names submitted to the president for formal appointment. Together with the prime minister, ministers are collectively responsible to the Assembly for the formulation and implementation of the general policy of the government; each minister is also individually responsible for all acts undertaken by his office as an agency of government. Cabinet members are free to attend sessions of the Assembly, and they must be heard when they request the floor. The Assembly also may request ministers to appear before it to explain policies or to answer questions.

The cabinet must receive and maintain the confidence of the Assembly; a confidence vote must be held within fifteen days from the date a new cabinet is announced. This vote focuses on what is officially called "the government program"—a broad outline of the government's proposed policies and programs. The Assembly may withdraw its confidence by passing a censure motion, which must be signed by a minimum of one-sixth of that body's membership and be adopted by an absolute majority. Only one such motion may be introduced every six months. Ministers and their deputies who are members of the Assembly may vote on confidence and censure motions. When a government resigns after a no-confidence motion is passed, it is customary for a temporary, nonpartisan caretaker government to be formed to administer the new elec-



tions. Unsuccessful censure votes were taken in 1988 and in 1993.

The 1986 constitutional amendments enlarged the legislative capacity of the prime minister and the cabinet. Combined with the absence of internal party controls in both major political parties, this development has rendered executive actions largely unaccountable.

### *The Legislative Branch*

The Assembly is a unicameral body of 300 deputies elected through direct, universal, and secret ballot (see *The Electoral System*, this ch.). The term is four years except in time of war, when it is extended for the duration. The Assembly convenes on the first Monday in October for an annual session of at least five months. It elects its own officers and a standing committee that determines the order of legislative work. At the beginning of each session, committees are formed to examine bills, with committee membership proportional to party representation in the chamber. In practice, only the law-making committees have performed as a regular part of this system however.

The Assembly generally conducts legislative business in plenary sessions, as required under the constitution when certain subjects are deliberated. The prescribed subjects include parliamentary standing orders and elections; church-state relations, religious freedom, and individual liberties; the operation of political parties; delegation of legislative authority to a cabinet minister; and authorization of the state budget. Plenary sessions may also be requested by the government to consider bills of particular importance for debate and passage.

When the Assembly is in recess, its legislative work (with the exception of subjects specifically reserved for consideration by full session) may be conducted by a legislative section. The Assembly usually divides into two sections, equal in size and proportionally representative of the strength of the political parties in the legislature. The jurisdiction of each section corresponds to the jurisdictions of roughly half the government ministries. A bill passed by a section has the same status as one adopted by the full Assembly.

Bills may be introduced by the government or by a member of the Assembly. In practice, however, the vast majority of laws passed originate with the government. To pass a bill in plenary session of the Assembly requires an absolute majority of those present, which must not be less than one-quarter of the total




Figure 11. Government Organization, 1994

membership. Passage of a bill by a section requires approval by a majority of those present; the majority must be at least two-fifths of the total sectional membership. A bill rejected by either a section or by the plenum cannot be reintroduced in the same annual session.

### *The Judiciary*

The current legal system of Greece is based on a combination of codified Roman civil law and French and German models, all of which in turn owe much to classical Greek precedents. Greek philosophy in general and the Greek-based tenets of rationalism and natural law in particular contributed significantly to the evolution of Roman law. Later, the eastern, or Greek, part of the Roman Empire played an important role in preserving Roman law after the collapse of the empire in the west in A.D. 476.

Justice is administered by an independent judiciary, which is divided into civil, criminal, and administrative courts. Judges enjoy personal immunity, and they are subject only to the constitution and the law in discharging their constitutional responsibilities. Judges and other judicial personnel are appointed, promoted, and transferred formally by presidential decree, based on the prior decisions of a self-policing Judicial Council. Lower-level judges, including those in the courts of appeal, serve until sixty-five years of age, and those in the highest courts serve until seventy-five years of age. In each case, criminal conviction, a grave breach of discipline, disability, or professional inadequacy are grounds for dismissal.

The Judicial Council comprises the presidents of the three highest courts of the land: the Supreme Court for civil and criminal justice, the Council of State for administrative cases, and the Comptrollers' Council for fiscal matters. Other members of the Judicial Council are chosen by lot from among those judges or councillors who have served in the high courts for a minimum of two years.

The lowest courts in the civil and criminal court structure are the justice of the peace courts and the magistrates' (or police) courts, which are responsible for minor civil and criminal cases. Above this level are the courts of first instance, which handle the bulk of civil and criminal litigations. More serious cases are tried before juries. Juvenile and commercial cases also may be tried by the courts of first instance. Twelve courts of appeal hear appeals from the courts of first instance. In excep-

tional cases, such as those involving major crimes, the appellate courts may function as courts of original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court hears appeals from the courts of appeal on questions of law. All court sessions are public unless a court decides that publicity would prejudice public morality or would endanger the safety of litigants or witnesses. Felonies and crimes against the state are decided by mixed juries that combine the functions of judge and jurors. Administrative cases are initially adjudicated by special courts, such as labor arbitration courts, social security courts, and tax courts of first instance. There are also tax appeals courts.

State finances, which also fall under the administration of the judiciary, are overseen by the Comptrollers' Council. The comptrollers audit the expenditures of central and local government agencies as well as public corporations, and they present an annual financial report to the Assembly. The comptrollers also rule on public pension disputes and try cases involving the liability of civil and military officials alleged to have caused financial loss to the state by fraud or negligence.

At the pinnacle of the judicial system is the Special Supreme Tribunal, comprising the presidents of the Supreme Court, the Council of State, and the Comptrollers' Council; four councilors of the Council of State; four members of the Supreme Court chosen by lot every two years; and, in some cases, two law professors also chosen by lot. The tribunal hears cases involving parliamentary election disputes, the results of public referenda, and jurisdictional disputes between courts and government agencies. The ultimate authority for judicial review, the Special Supreme Tribunal, also interprets and rules on the constitutional validity of laws in cases where the Council of State, the Supreme Court, or the Comptrollers' Council have rendered conflicting judgments. The ruling of the tribunal is irrevocable. Constitutional interpretation in all other cases is a matter for the legislature, not the judiciary.

Under this arrangement, the relative infrequency of conflicting interpretations on matters of constitutionality is because of the traditional self-restraint of the judiciary as a whole. Only in recent years has the Supreme Court been activist as it has ruled on a considerable body of new legislation regulating environmental and city planning practices. Beginning in 1982, the Greek judiciary sometimes was accused of corruption and political bias. Although the truth of such accusations was unclear, the PASOK administrations of the 1980s proclaimed

their intention of reforming the judicial system in order to eliminate corruption. However, few real changes resulted from that resolution.

In May 1994, a new law passed under PASOK sponsorship caused considerable controversy. The law, which introduced a new system of internal review and control within the judiciary, has met with strenuous opposition from the Supreme Court president and justices. Opponents denounced the government's tactics as interventionist, unconstitutional, and partisan. Among others, the minister of justice was accused by judges of promoting the new law to gain future political influence over the judiciary. After initial opposition, however, in the second half of 1994 dissenting judges began softening their previous position toward the new law, and full compliance was expected.

### **Local Government**

Traditionally, local government has been popularly viewed as the exclusive domain of the wealthy elite; the concept of popular involvement in local affairs was remote at best and failed to take any firm root in Greek governance. In 1982 the PASOK government, which had promised to foster administrative and economic independence at the local level, enacted a bill called Exercise of Government Policy and Establishment of Popular Representation in the Provinces. This legal framework was intended to transfer from the central government to provincial and local bodies the authority to make decisions on matters pertaining to provinces, municipalities, and communes.

PASOK's early initiatives on decentralization had lost momentum by the mid-1980s, however. The ND administration that succeeded the PASOK government in 1989 made no significant attempt to relax the hold of the central government on local affairs. Upon returning to power in 1993, PASOK renewed the promise of decentralization. The local elections of October 1994 included for the first time the popular election of province governors, who previously had been appointed in Athens. The democratic election of these officials did not guarantee the degree of authority or autonomy they would enjoy.

The 1994 local elections were seen as an especially important barometer of national party vigor at a time when the strength of the opposition ND and the ruling PASOK was approximately equal and a national election was possible within six months. ND candidates were elected mayor in Athens and Thessaloniki, and the PASOK mayor of Piraeus was

reelected by a slim margin. Overall, both the ND and PASOK gained higher percentages of the vote than they had in the most recent national elections, the June 1994 choice of delegates to the European Union (EU—see Glossary).

Greece is traditionally divided into nine regions, the boundaries of which are based on geographical, historical, and cultural factors (see fig. 7; Geographical Regions, ch. 2). The Greater Athens area is sometimes designated as an unofficial tenth region. Although used for statistical purposes, the regions have no administrative significance. They are, however, the basis for subdividing the nation into fifty-two provinces or prefectures, which are the main subnational administrative units and the principal links between the central and local government.

Besides the duties of local administration, the province governor or *nomarch* functions as the principal agent of the central government, with responsibility to coordinate the activities of ministerial field offices within his or her jurisdiction. The governor is assisted by a provincial council, which is composed of the mayor of the province's capital, two representatives drawn from the municipalities and communes, representatives of mass organizations for farmers, workers, professionals, and employers, and selected members of public corporations. For consultation on local matters of shared interest, two or more provincial councils may hold joint meetings with senior officials of the central government ministries.

The bottom level of local government in 1994 consisted of 359 municipalities and 5,600 communes, or wards. Usually a municipality is a town encompassing a population exceeding 10,000 inhabitants, and a commune has 5,000 to 10,000 persons. Municipalities and communes elect councils headed by a mayor and a president, respectively; the mandate of these councils is renewed every four years, with elections coinciding with local elections at the next highest level. The membership of the local councils varies from five to sixty-one deputies, depending on population.

The Mount Athos Peninsula, the site of a monastic center of the Orthodox Church of Greece since A.D. 959, has constitutionally guaranteed autonomous status apart from the regular administrative structure of Greece. Mount Athos, officially the Monastic Republic of Mount Athos, includes twenty monasteries governed by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Nevertheless, the state is represented there by a governor,

whose duty it is to ensure that public order and safety are maintained and that the charter of autonomy is faithfully implemented.

## **The Civil Service**

Government administration is entrusted to a network of public personnel within a vast civil service bureaucracy. Entry into the civil service is generally by competitive examination supervised by a board of civil servants, but government ministries sometimes avoid the regular recruitment channel and engage personnel by contract. In the latter case, recruitment depends on the discretion of each minister and hence is highly conducive to political favoritism. Specialists are hired through a noncompetitive procedure at higher salaries than otherwise would be possible. After several years of service, contract personnel often acquire civil service tenure.

Civil service personnel are organized into three categories. Personnel in category A are university graduates who perform administrative and executive functions. Category B is for high-school graduates who perform clerical duties. There are no educational requirements for personnel in category C, who are accepted without examination or other tests of skill. Promotion from a lower category to category A is automatic upon receipt of a university degree. In most cases, civil service tenure is lost only because of major political upheavals or dismissal for misconduct or incompetence. Mobility among ministries, or even among directorates and bureaus within a ministry, is minimal, and it is not unusual for a civil servant to spend an entire career working for the same office.

Inefficiency and favoritism have caused the general public to criticize the civil service and to attach little prestige to it. Despite periodic attempts to rationalize the goals and the methods of the system, public administration is probably the single most visibly inefficient sector of the Greek governmental process. Although a School for Public Administration provides the prospect of more efficient top-level personnel, the staffing of bureaucratic jobs continues to rely on anachronistic practices.

Since 1974 both ruling parties have offered programs to deal with the glaring inefficiencies of the civil service, especially in the area of personnel recruitment. In the 1980s, PASOK and ND administrations passed about a dozen laws altering the procedures of the state bureaucracy. However, the impact of this

legislation seemed meager apart from broadening the immediate political influence of the governing party.

Continued reliance on subjective criteria and personal connections in state agencies may be rooted in Greece's experience of administrative repression under right-wing governments during the early stages of the Cold War—a pattern that cultivated in Greek citizens a deep distrust for formal criteria such as exams, inspectors, and objective qualifications. Political parties are still able to sidestep rules in order to enhance their influence. Especially just before national elections, parties in power have routinely expanded their voter base by recklessly overstaffing the civil service ranks. This practice creates a short-term impression of social well-being by reducing unemployment. Such a policy reinforces negative effects of clientelism, upon which prewar parties relied in creating their constituencies (see *The Interwar Struggles 1922–36*, ch. 1). Since 1974 government spending on such short-term boondoggles has also inflated Greece's spiraling public debt. In 1990, employment in the public sector was estimated at nearly 30 percent of the total in Greece, including all enterprises under state control (see *The Public Sector and Taxation*, ch. 3).

### **The Electoral System**

Except during the junta regime of 1967–74, the electoral process has provided a relatively stable, if ill-used, structure for the exercise of democratic choice in postwar Greece. Elections are based on direct, universal, and secret ballot. Parliamentary and municipal elections are held every four years unless the dissolution of the Assembly necessitates an interim election. Voting is compulsory for all citizens aged eighteen and above, and nonvoters are subject to legal penalties.

The 300 members of the Assembly are elected from fifty-six local constituencies, which are represented by from one to thirty-two seats according to their population. Candidates are elected under a unique "reinforced" proportional representation system. Since the 1974 election, 288 members of the Assembly have been chosen directly on the basis of constituency votes; these members must belong to a particular constituency and must compete for election. The remaining twelve seats are occupied by "national deputies," elected at large from party lists in proportion to the popular vote the parties receive. These deputies thus represent the entire country. Their posi-





*President Konstantinos Karamanlis and government officials at religious ceremony, Christmas 1994  
Courtesy Press and Information Office, Embassy of Greece, Washington*

tion in the Assembly is largely honorary, although they have all the same functions as directly elected members.

In one form or another, the reinforced proportional representation system has been in force in national parliamentary elections for over forty years. The formula under which the October 1993 elections were held was the product of the seventeenth revision of the electoral system since the 1920s. Virtually every Greek government has modified the prevailing electoral scheme to optimize its own prospects in forthcoming elections.

Not surprisingly, the electoral system that results from this process is consistently biased in favor of larger parties. The ostensible justification for such a distortion is that the imbalance helps to preserve stable party politics and, more important, stable one-party governments.

A parliamentary majority can be achieved and a government formed even if the winning party fails to secure a simple majority of the popular vote. This outcome is made possible by awarding extra representation (essentially a bonus) to the larger parties that obtain more than a minimum percentage of the national vote. The various reinforced systems applied since

the 1920s vary only in the relative advantage that each version has bestowed upon the top two or three parties.

The electoral system under which PASOK won the October 1993 elections illustrates these points. The 47 percent of the popular vote obtained by PASOK resulted in that party's gaining 57 percent of the seats in the Assembly. In 1990 the incoming ND party anticipated that the next elections would continue its plurality with a reduced margin over the second party (PASOK). Therefore, Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis increased the bonus of the largest party (and, under some circumstances, of the third-ranking party, as well) at the expense of the second-ranking party. The new electoral system also stipulated that a party would need at least 3 percent of the national vote to gain parliamentary representation. As it turned out, the ND fell victim to its own miscalculations when PASOK outpolled the ND by 7.6 percent in 1993. Thus, Mitsotakis's change gave PASOK a substantial working margin in the Assembly when PASOK's 47 percent of the vote yielded the party 170 seats in the Assembly to the ND's 111. By contrast, the previous version of reinforced representation had yielded the ND only 152 seats in 1990 after it received exactly the same 47 percent share of the popular vote. Already in mid-1994, PASOK was considering another modification of the formula.

The reinforced proportional representation system has always been opposed by small parties, especially those on the left, to whom reinforcement had been an exclusionist instrument that minimized representation between the 1950s and the 1970s. Beginning in the 1950s, one of the principal demands of the left in Greece has been the adoption of a straight proportional representation system that would reflect the popular will more accurately in the Assembly (see *Political Developments, 1981-94*, this ch.).

As the fear of communism receded in the 1980s and 1990s, PASOK and the ND reached a *de facto* consensus in favor of a system that would make representation more in proportion to the ballots cast but still would significantly favor the largest parties. In the 1990s, the principle of reinforced proportional representation appears to be a less urgent issue than it was in the 1980s. Since the return of civilian elections in 1974, the electoral system has provided relative political stability; of the eight national parliamentary elections held since that time, only the two held in 1989 failed, despite reinforcement, to produce a one-party majority government in the Assembly.

Another electoral issue is whether the parliamentary candidates on a party's list should be nominated according to the preference of voters or according to a ranking determined by party leaders. Although it allows more direct public control of election results, the preference vote system is seen as undermining party discipline and enabling locally influential politicians to buy votes through the maintenance of patron-client networks. The existing election law calls for the preference vote, but in 1994 the leaders of both the major parties leaned toward strengthening discipline in their respective parties by installing a system based on the rank list.

## **Political Developments, 1981–94**

The 1980s and early 1990s saw the return to power of a left wing that had been forcibly isolated from the mainstream of Greek politics since the early 1930s. That period also saw the failure of the left's most radical policies, followed by a hesitation among the electorate between the left and the center, both of which failed to solve Greece's most pressing problems.

### **The Return of the Left**

In 1981 PASOK's triumph over the ND, which had governed Greece since the overthrow of the military junta in 1974, was a watershed event in Greek politics, about which much has been written. The victory and the proclamation of a grand new plan of government were greeted with elation by the party's most ardent supporters, and with fear and apprehension by many conservatives. By the end of PASOK's first four-year term in 1985, the strong feelings of both groups had largely dissipated. With the exception of some important pieces of social legislation and a massive influx of new faces into the top levels of government, PASOK had proved incapable or unwilling to make the dramatic transformation that it had promised.

Papandreou's populist economic policies resulted in an accelerating public debt and an unabated annual rate of inflation in excess of 20 percent. Despite occasional outbursts of anti-American rhetoric that generated frictions with Western allies, Greece remained firmly committed to the much-maligned North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary) alliance. And, far from being a modernizing force, PASOK had managed to make the civil service and the large, debt-ridden public companies even more inefficient and

unwieldy, through the massive hiring of employees that swelled the ranks of supernumeraries in these organizations.

### **PASOK's Second Term, 1985–89**

Sensing public disenchantment, PASOK abandoned the slogan of change and mounted a largely negative electoral campaign, arguing that it needed more time to implement its program and raising the specter of a return to power of a vengeful right. This strategy worked extremely well. In spite of an aggressive and massive campaign effort by the ND, in 1985 PASOK obtained 46 percent of the vote—a drop of just over 2 percent from 1981—and a comfortable parliamentary majority with 161 Assembly seats. The ND increased its 1981 share of the vote by 5 percent and its parliamentary representation by thirteen seats. The ND claimed these figures gave the party a moral victory, but the elections were nevertheless a bitter disappointment. The negative campaign tactics appeared to have been particularly effective in some key major city districts in Athens and Thessaloniki, where communist voters apparently abandoned their party to vote for PASOK, averting a victory by the conservatives.

In October 1985, just five months after the elections in which he had promised better days to come, Prime Minister Papandreu abruptly changed course. Alarmed by skyrocketing deficits, public debt, and inflation and seeking to satisfy the European Community (EC—see Glossary) conditions for low-cost loans to Greece, he announced an austerity program under the direction of Konstantinos Simitis, a former minister of agriculture whom Papandreu's had appointed minister of the national economy. In the painful two-year period that followed, some confidence was restored in the Greek economy at the cost of a rapid devaluation of the drachma (for the value of the drachma—see Glossary); significant reductions in public borrowing, consumer demand, and industrial production; and a fall in real wages of almost 12 percent (see *The Structure of Employment; Wages, Prices, and Inflation*, ch. 3).

The austerity program also cost PASOK considerable popularity. Especially alarming for Papandreu were the local elections of 1986, in which the ND scored large gains in communities throughout the country and, more important psychologically, managed to elect mayors in the two largest cities of Greece—Athens and Thessaloniki—as well as Piraeus. In mid-1987, Papandreu unceremoniously dismissed Simitis and,

with national elections looming, the austerity policies were abandoned. PASOK resumed its strategy of seeking public approval by public-sector hiring, which reached massive proportions in the months before the 1989 elections. In the same period, public borrowing increased from 13.5 percent of the gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) in 1987 to 21.8 percent in 1989.

### **The Decline of PASOK**

In early 1989, PASOK modified the reinforced proportional representation structure to reduce the likelihood that the first-ranking party could gain an absolute majority of seats in the Assembly—a clear indication that PASOK expected to lose the election to the ND.

The most important political events between 1988 and the mid-1989 elections, however, were the serious illness of Papan-dreou and scandals and allegations of corruption within the PASOK government. In August 1988, the prime minister underwent multiple heart bypass surgery, following which he was constantly in frail health. His personal life also underwent a major change when he divorced his well-liked American-born wife of many years and, in the summer of 1989, married Dimitra Liani, a flight attendant some thirty-five years his junior.

Of the many scandals that emerged in Greek politics in the late 1980s, by far the most notorious was the so-called Koskotas affair. In 1986 Georgios Koskotas, an émigré who had spent several years in New York City, became governor and main stockholder of the privately owned Bank of Crete in Athens. During the next two years, Koskotas spent huge amounts of money building a large publishing empire that included major Athens newspapers and the most popular soccer team in Greece. Koskotas finally overstepped his financial limits in mid-1988 when several publicly owned companies, in an apparently orchestrated move, transferred their accounts to his bank at below-market interest rates. At about the same time, the Assembly passed a law that clearly eased matters for Koskotas in dealing with judicial inquiries. Under growing pressure and with his empire collapsing, Koskotas finally fled the country in early 1989 and was captured in the United States. Koskotas then confirmed from his United States prison cell the repeated allegations in the Greek press that he had paid PASOK large sums of money, some of which had gone directly to a close aide of the prime minister.

## **Coalition Government, 1989–90**

All opposition parties called for "cleansing" in the June 1989 elections, which nevertheless included an orgy of mudslinging from both left and right. PASOK alleged that some ND leaders, including Mitsotakis, also had dealt with Koskotas. The elections were a clear victory for the ND, which obtained 44 percent of the vote and 145 seats. A coalition of the left, which included the pro- and anti-Moscow branches of the Communist Party of Greece (Kommunistikon Komma Ellados—KKE) and smaller groups, running under the name Synaspismos (Coalition), also made its best showing of the postjunta years, gaining 13 percent of the vote and 27 seats. Given the circumstances, however, PASOK also did remarkably well, depriving the ND of a clear majority in the Assembly by gaining 39 percent of the vote and 125 seats.

Mitsotakis struck an unusual bargain with the two branches of the KKE to achieve a governing majority. The three parties formed a coalition government that would prepare the country for new national elections in the fall of 1989 while simultaneously pursuing the cleansing process in public life. The KKE agreed to join the coalition on condition that Mitsotakis not be appointed prime minister. Accordingly, the new government was led by ND deputy Tzannis Tzannetakis, a former naval officer, and KKE members were appointed to several ministries, including the Ministry of Justice. In a political system with a traditionally huge gulf between the right and the left, the notion of the ND governing together with the communists was truly novel. This coalition marked a major step toward national reconciliation and the legitimation of the communist party within the body politic.

After a hasty investigation and a number of emotional and tense parliamentary sessions in July and August 1989, the ND-KKE majority voted to indict Papandreou and several of his close political lieutenants for involvement in the Koskotas affair and also for illegal wiretapping activities. Both allegations were categorically denied by Papandreou. Under the law, the ex-prime minister and his associates would be tried by a special court of twenty-five judges, presided over by the chief justice of the Supreme Court.

In November 1989, Greece held its second national elections of the year, using the same system of reinforced proportional representation as in June. Papandreou, anticipating that the ND would be able to form a majority government this time,

pleaded with the Synaspismos leaders to join PASOK in entirely eliminating the reinforcement of parliamentary representation, fulfilling a long-standing aspiration of the left. However, KKE leaders, who had spent many years battling for exactly this type of electoral system, instead stood by their earlier promise to Mitsotakis that they would not seek to change the electoral law.

The ND won the second 1989 elections with 46 percent of the vote, but its 149 seats fell two short of a parliamentary majority. The biggest surprise of the election was the performance of PASOK, which most political observers expected to have a disastrous showing. Indeed, the election may be seen as the greatest political triumph in PASOK's history: with its leader in poor health and facing trial for corruption and other offenses and virulent attacks from the right and the left (both trying to deal PASOK a decisive blow), the party still obtained nearly 41 percent of the popular vote, an increase of 1.5 percent over its showing earlier in the year. The patronage that PASOK had dispensed before the June election was not available to it in November, meaning that the party depended more heavily on its own merits.

Synaspismos, by contrast, suffered a major defeat in November 1989, losing almost 20 percent of their previous national vote, most of it in the large cities where they had done particularly well in June. One explanation was that Synaspismos supporters felt betrayed by the close cooperation with the right under the Tzannetakis government and returned to the PASOK fold in November. Many voters apparently saw the KKE attack on PASOK as politically opportunistic, and the rush to indict the ailing Papandreou may have also generated sympathy for the him as the victim of a political conspiracy.

No party was able to form a government, and, with the KKE unwilling to enter another right-left coalition, Mitsotakis and Papandreou joined KKE leader Kharilaos Florakis in temporary support of a government of national unity, led by the respected octogenarian former governor of the Bank of Greece, Xenophon Zolotas. At a time of swift economic deterioration, the notion of a grand coalition of the ND, PASOK, and the KKE generated much popular relief initially. However, it soon became clear that constant bickering among the factions and deep animosity between Papandreou and Mitsotakis would undermine the government of national unity. In April 1990, yet another election was held.

## **The ND Returns to Power**

The elections of 1990 finally produced the parliamentary majority (a bare 152 seats) that Mitsotakis had been seeking since 1984. After nine years, the ND had regained sole power; Mitsotakis then served as prime minister for the next three and one half years, through October 1993.

The second major political event of 1990 was the Assembly's election, with the concurrence of PASOK, of Konstantinos Karamanlis to his second term as president. Coming five years after Papandreou had unexpectedly denied Karamanlis a second term in the presidency, this event was viewed as a vindication of Karamanlis and the capstone of a long and distinguished political career.

The new ND government promptly presented a medium-term economic recovery program designed to cut inflation (which had again reached 20 percent per year) by more than half (the target was 9.9 percent by the end of 1993), to reduce state expenditures and public employment, and to increase revenues by a variety of means including a crackdown on tax evasion, the privatization of many government-owned companies, and the sale of public land.

The EC strongly endorsed this program as a step toward stabilization of the national economy. However, indecisiveness and internal disagreements within the ND hampered implementation in the government's first two years. Government policy was pulled in opposite directions: free-market advocates wanted to move rapidly toward reducing the overwhelming dominance of the public sector in the country's economy, whereas a more moderate group argued for more cautious reform of the state system in order to preserve the social safety net.

In practice, both factions of the ND were usually overcome by large numbers of populists who simply wanted to enjoy the spoils of victory after nine years in opposition and to share their wealth with loyal party supporters. Thus, despite preelection promises to freeze appointments to the civil service and to public-sector companies, the ND contradicted its own economic recovery program by adding considerable numbers of its own supporters to patronage appointments. Clientelism and patronage became as integral to this "reform period" as it had been under the second PASOK administration of 1985-89.

The early 1990s also saw the continuation of trials of PASOK figures on corruption and other charges. By far the most





*The Assembly in session  
Courtesy Press and Information Office, Embassy of Greece, Washington*

important of these procedures was the special court trial of Papandreou and three top associates for involvement in the Koskotas affair. The trial, which lasted several months, was followed eagerly by Greek television viewers. The chaos of that trial was a public demonstration that the politicized Greek judicial system was incapable of dealing effectively with cases involving malfeasance by elected officials. Neither the government nor the judiciary attempted to bring Papandreou personally before the court, and Koskotas, the state's star witness, produced none of the evidence he claimed to have against Papandreou. The trial ended with Papandreou's acquittal by a narrow margin. After the Koskotas trial turned into a public relations disaster, the ND government retreated and canceled Papandreou's wiretapping trial.

The threat of privatization and the ND's austerity program triggered waves of strikes by public employee unions in 1991 and 1992. Particularly aggressive were the employees of the Public Power Corporation (Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou—DEI), who disrupted the electricity supply, and those of the Urban Transportation Company of the Athens region, who engaged in violence against nonstriking fellow employees.

Although the public showed little sympathy for the strikers, the government responded quite passively to their activities.

In 1991 the disarray in the ND government was partly corrected by the appointment of Stefanos Manos as minister of national economy. Under Manos, free-market advocates gained control of the ND's economic policies. A new austerity program was announced, together with an aggressive privatization program centered on the sale of most of the state-owned Greek Telecommunications Organization (OTE—Organismos Tilepikoinonion Ellados) to private investors (see *Transportation and Telecommunications*, ch. 3). Manos pursued these plans assiduously throughout the remainder of the ND's term in office, but he achieved very few of his ambitious goals. Manos was stymied by governmental ineffectiveness, dissension in ND ranks, and the premature collapse of the Mitsotakis government. The austerity program, which seemed to penalize wage earners most heavily, was also very unpopular and certainly contributed to the heavy losses that the ND suffered in the 1993 national elections.

Paralleling PASOK's embarrassments in 1989, the Mitsotakis administration also fell prey to allegations of scandal and corruption. Prominent among them was the affair of AGET, a large Greek cement company sold to the Italian Ferruzzi conglomerate, which in 1993 was implicated heavily in the government corruption scandals of Italy. Mitsotakis, his daughter, and a close military associate were accused of illegally wiretapping political opponents. In August 1994, the cement company affair and the wiretapping case were both under investigation by special parliamentary committees and by judicial authorities.

As a result of all these difficulties, the ND government was staggering by the end of its third year in office, and Papandreou was calling for new elections. The downfall of the government, however, was the festering feud between Mitsotakis and Antonis Samaras, who had been the first minister of foreign affairs in the Mitsotakis administration. Samaras had been forced to resign his post because of his radical nationalist position on the Macedonia issue (see *The Balkans*, this ch.). Then, in June 1993, he announced the establishment of a new party, Political Spring (Politiki Anixi—PA). About three months later, a Samaras ally in the Assembly withdrew his support of the government, ending the ND's tiny majority and forcing new elections in October 1993.

## **The Elections of 1993**

The ensuing campaign was perhaps the most negative in postjunta Greek politics. Rather than presenting coherent platforms, the two major parties ran extremely derogatory campaigns, evoking voters' fears about the dire consequences of electing their opponents. In a desperate tactic that apparently backfired with voters, the ND also stressed Papandreou's frail health and limited stamina. Sympathy also was generated for Samaras when the ND labeled him a traitor for his policy in Macedonia. Under these conditions, Papandreou made a political comeback that very few people believed possible four years earlier. The performance of PASOK (47 percent of the vote, 170 seats) surprised many international observers who had consigned Papandreou to history. Swing voters in 1993 (unlike 1981), were probably more motivated by the dismal performance of the ND than by a hope that PASOK somehow held the answers to the critical economic, social, and foreign policy problems facing Greece.

The defeat of the ND precipitated a change of leadership in the party, as Mitsotakis resigned in favor of Miltiadis Evert. At the same time, the ND repudiated its recent experiment with "neoliberalism." The formation of the PA undoubtedly shifted many votes away from the ND in 1993; indeed some 75 percent of all PA voters in 1993 had voted for the ND in 1990. It is not at all clear, however, that these voters would have supported the ND and not PASOK in 1993 if the PA had not formed.

Other major losers in 1993 were the KKE and the new version of Synaspismos, which now included only the anti-Moscow branch of the KKE and splinter leftist parties. The KKE lost to the PA its long-standing position as the third-largest party in Greece; Synaspismos fell below the 3 percent threshold for eligibility to send deputies to the Assembly. By contrast, the PA began its political existence with momentum as a new force with substantial support.

Despite the continuing polarization of voters between PASOK and the ND, the negative tone of the campaign clearly disenchanting large numbers of the electorate. In June 1994, this reaction was confirmed by the results of the elections for Greek representatives to the European Parliament (the governing body of the EU, for which the political parties of member nations submit candidates as they do for domestic representation). The combined vote for PASOK and the ND barely

exceeded 70 percent, compared with the 86 percent the two parties had totaled in the October 1993 national elections.

### **Prospects for Political Change**

In the summer of 1994, new national elections appeared possible in the spring of 1995 because of an unprecedented situation. The five-year presidential term of Karamanlis was due to end in May; if the Assembly failed to elect a new president by then, a new Assembly would have to be elected. In mid-1994, Papandreou had hinted broadly that he would seek the presidency as the crowning achievement of his political career. Because he was unlikely to garner the required 180 Assembly votes, a Papandreou candidacy would be problematic (see *The Presidency*, this ch.). Papandreou's withdrawal from consideration in November did not eliminate the prospect of a deadlock over the presidency, however, because several prominent candidates, including Mitsotakis, were likely to provoke strong opposition. Experts expected considerable political maneuvering over this issue in the first months of 1995.

The next elections would mark the first occasion since 1984 that the two major parties would not be headed by Mitsotakis and Papandreou, the two men whose personal rivalry defined and polarized Greek politics in that period. They would also force PASOK finally to confront the question of existence without Papandreou. Most importantly, the elections had the potential for a major realignment of political forces: they would give a more definite indication of the PA's strength, they could signal the end of Synaspismos, and they likely would require both the ND and PASOK to present new images to the Greek electorate.

### **Political Parties**

Greek political parties traditionally were based largely on personal connections and personalities, lacking real organizations with mass membership and tending to appeal to narrow segments of the electorate. Greeks pursued their own contacts—usually through a patron-client relationship—to promote their individual interests, rather than developing and pursuing common interests through mass political organizations or interest groups.

PASOK was the first mainstream party to apply discipline and organizational work to the process of party politics. Early

in its first term, the PASOK government also enacted a law to provide state subsidies to the parties to minimize the undue influences that private funding exerted on the operation of political parties. In the 1980s, the other parties, most notably the ND, were somewhat successful in emulating PASOK's organizational techniques. By the mid-1990s, Greek parties generally had become more mass-based and issue-oriented as they moved toward the model of West European political systems. This evolution was eased by the urbanization and industrialization that Greece had experienced for the previous forty years (see Demography, ch. 2).

Nevertheless, clientelism still pervades Greek politics in the mid-1990s. PASOK, which had made the abolition of *rousfeti* (personal favors arranged by politicians for their constituents) one of the principal themes of its message of change, itself became one of the most accomplished practitioners of mass clientelism in modern Greek history. In the early to mid-1990s, repeated allegations of corruption and misuse of public funds are indications that the corrosive party practices of the 1980s are still in force.

### **The Panhellenic Socialist Movement**

The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima—PASOK), which has alternated in power with the ND for more than twenty years, was founded in 1974 by Andreas Papandreou and enjoyed a meteoric rise in popularity that led to its massive electoral victory in 1981. PASOK's initial success has been attributed to three factors: Papandreou's charismatic personality; the party's unique, well-articulated, locally based internal structure; and a clear leftist and reformist ideological orientation that in many ways matched the electorate's readiness for change at that time.

PASOK began as an attempt to create a modern populist party that rejected the traditions of personalism and clientelism. The new movement brought into the body politic a new group of people who seemed to reinvigorate the political system. PASOK is a cadre party, organized geographically, with the local party members and organizations as the basic units. Local party organizations elect representatives to provincial assemblies, which are run by a provincial executive committee of eleven to fifteen members serving eighteen-month terms. These local functionaries perform the key organizational and mobilizing activities and serve as the intermediaries between

the national and local party levels. In addition, trade union, agricultural, youth, and professional organizations (some of which have considerable power) are affiliated with the party and are represented in the party's congress.

The PASOK party congress is the highest organ, which in theory determines party policy and controls the central committee and its disciplinary council. The congress consists of members of the Assembly, of the party central committee, and of the disciplinary council, as well as representatives of local, provincial, and affiliated organizations. In practice, the congress meets seldom; its major function is to provide symbolic democratic legitimacy to decisions made at the centers of true power, the central committee and its executive bureau.

The eighty-member central committee includes twenty members of the Assembly and sixty members elected by the party congress in consultation with the party's president (who has been Andreas Papandreou since the party's inception). The central committee meets at least once every three months. It elects an executive bureau composed of nine members (including the PASOK president) that meets twice weekly to develop policies in its role as the effective ruling body of the party. Papandreou has always exercised iron-fisted control over the ideology and the policy of the party's executive organizations, but he has allowed them much latitude on tactical and organizational matters and the operation of election campaigns.

PASOK has also made a concerted effort to instill party discipline and ideological coherence, which were previously unknown among noncommunist Greek parties. The nine-member disciplinary council, elected by the Party Congress, ensures the compliance of the general membership, and a separate four-member disciplinary committee oversees the activities of the party's parliamentary deputies. Discipline is strict, and a number of dissenters, including some deputies, have been expelled from the party.

Ideologically, PASOK has undergone a massive transformation since its creation, partly in response to Papandreou's own evolution, partly as a matter of practical necessity. The Marxist economics and rhetoric, the strident anti-Americanism, and the opposition to any affiliation with the EC, which marked the first party platforms in the mid-1970s, were gradually abandoned in the two decades that followed.

The general economic policies of the PASOK government that took power in October 1993 did not differ significantly from those of its ND predecessor. PASOK did not challenge the trend toward partial or total privatization of some public-sector companies, although the pace of implementation has been slower in specific cases than under the ND. In foreign policy, the PASOK administration has pursued avidly a close relationship with the administration of President William J. Clinton, making good United States relations a cornerstone of Papandreou's foreign policy (see *The United States*, this ch.). And the current PASOK government is at least as pro-European as its ND predecessor had been, enthusiastically supporting the EU. Overall, in the mid-1990s the party differed little in rhetoric, and even less in policy, from the social democratic parties of Western Europe.

In mid-1994, as Papandreou appeared ready to seek the presidency in 1995, intraparty bickering increased, and the struggle to succeed him became overt. At that point, six individuals, three "loyalists" and three "reformists", seemed likely contenders for the future leadership of PASOK. The "loyalists" were: Akis Tsohatzopoulos, who then held the powerful position of secretary general of the party; Kostas Laliotis, minister of environment, town planning, and public works; and Gerasimos Arsenis, minister of national defense. The "reformists" (so called because of their insistent calls for modernization, as well as a tendency to deviate somewhat from the party line and criticize Papandreou's policies) were: Vasso Papandreou (no relation to the prime minister), a PASOK deputy and former commissioner of the EC; Theodoros Pangalos, minister of transport and communications, who was highly praised for his handling of the Greek term of presidency of the EU in 1994; and Konstantinos Simitis, simultaneously minister of commerce and minister of industry, energy, and technology. Although all six contenders were long-time associates of Papandreou, he was said to favor one of the loyalists, who also enjoy much support among party members. On the other hand, in late 1994 the reformists were believed to enjoy growing support among rank-and-file PASOK supporters and uncommitted voters.

Experts believed that a radical realignment of forces at the top level of Greek political power was a possible outcome of the leadership struggle. If, for example, one of the loyalist candidates gained power in PASOK, some PASOK reformists might bolt the party in favor of a scheme that would bring together a

coalition of pro-European moderates from the ND, PASOK, and Synaspismos. The main basis for such uncertainty was Papandreou's domination of PASOK; his future absence would have an unpredictable impact on both the internal cohesion and the electoral fortunes of the party.

### **New Democracy**

New Democracy (Nea Demokratia—ND) is the other major pole around which postjunta Greek politics has evolved. The ND was founded in 1974 by Konstantinos Karamanlis. It was largely a revival of his National Radical Union (Ethniki Rizo-pastiti Enosis—ERE), which had dominated Greek politics from 1955 to 1963. The ND won large parliamentary majorities in both 1974 and 1977, and Karamanlis had remained prime minister until his election to the presidency in 1980. He was succeeded as the party's head and prime minister by Georgios Rallis, a long-time associate and a moderate. After the ND was defeated badly in the 1981 general elections, the party replaced Rallis with the more conservative Evangelos Averoff-Tositsas, another long-time Karamanlis loyalist. But in 1984 Averoff resigned his position after a poor party showing in that year's elections to the European Parliament. He was replaced by Konstantinos Mitsotakis, a moderate conservative and the long-time political arch-rival of Andreas Papandreou. Mitsotakis had joined the ND only six years earlier after playing important roles in various centrist parties.

In 1965 the defection of Mitsotakis and other senior ministers from Georgios Papandreou's Center Union government had caused a furor and was partly responsible for setting off a sequence of events that led to the colonels' coup and the imposition of military rule in 1967. Since that time, Georgios Papandreou's son Andreas has vilified Mitsotakis for his act of "treason," and Mitsotakis has never enjoyed personal popularity in Greek politics. However, in 1984 the ND saw Mitsotakis as the only politician who could rival Andreas Papandreou in terms of personality, toughness, and political adroitness.

Mitsotakis remained ND leader until immediately after the October 1993 elections, when he stepped down following the party's defeat. During his nine years as party chief, he controlled the ND by promoting personal supporters to key party positions. This preoccupation with personal allegiance, which sometimes made Mitsotakis dependent on friends and associates with dubious qualifications, generated strong resentment



among party loyalists. These forces gradually coalesced around Miltiadis Evert, the scion of a well-known Athenian family and a long-time party stalwart. In the early 1990s, the relationship between Mitsotakis and Evert grew increasingly cool and occasionally deteriorated to open hostility.

Evert voiced strong opposition to some of the bolder liberalization steps adopted by Mitsotakis's economic "tsar," Stefanos Manos, arguing in particular for the preservation of the "safety net" that protects Greek workers and employees from economic displacement. An open break nearly occurred when Manos attempted to privatize the OTE during the summer of 1993, and Evert threatened to bring down the government unless the privatization plan were halted. Although Evert won his point, the ND's one-vote majority collapsed shortly thereafter.

During the ensuing electoral campaign, the ND's internal divisions remained obvious to the nation. Under growing pressure from within the party, Mitsotakis promised to step down if the ND were defeated. In November 1994 Evert was overwhelmingly elected the new leader of the ND.

Evert became the first member of the post-Civil War generation to lead one of the two major Greek parties. At the same time, the leadership of the conservative movement in Greece reverted to favoring greater state control of economic resources. Evert's ascendancy also ended the polarizing and vituperative personal rivalry of Papandreou and Mitsotakis, which had occupied center stage for the previous ten years. Evert was fifty-four—young by Greek political standards—when he became the leader of the ND. He had risen through the party ranks from the youth organization of the ERE to hold several ministerial positions and the mayoralty of Athens. He enjoys a reputation for personal integrity and for decisiveness, a quality implied by his nickname, "Bulldozer," which also alludes to his considerable physical size.

Evert's first ten months leading the ND were not easy. He attempted simultaneously to restore party unity, take control of the party's apparatus, and signal a new style of leadership. Toward the first objective, he immediately appointed Ioannis Varvitsiotis, his main opponent in the contest for the party leadership in November 1993, as party vice president. Then, in the summer of 1994, Evert created a party political council as a top-level policy-making committee, to which he appointed the most prominent ND parliamentary delegates, including Manos

and Andreas Andrianopoulos, two of his most vocal critics in the party. To gain party control, he replaced many Mitsotakis appointees in the ND headquarters, and he used the April 1994 party congress to consolidate his leadership position.

To convey a sense of change and renewal to voters, Evert also tried to distance the ND from Mitsotakis personally. Evert was noticeably slow in defending his predecessor against charges of corruption and wiretapping before parliamentary committees and judicial authorities, angering the many Mitsotakis loyalists within the party. In mid-1994, the Evert and Mitsotakis factions also struggled for control of the ND's influential youth organization.

The June 1994 elections for the European Parliament were a setback for Evert. Although PASOK's share of the vote fell to 38 percent from its 47 percent share in the October 1993 national elections, the ND was not the beneficiary. On the contrary, the ND lost nearly 7 percent, achieving its lowest share in a national vote in its twenty-year history. The Mitsotakis faction, which had taken little part in the campaign, nevertheless blamed Evert for the party's poor showing.

The ND's most notable organizational success has been the Youth Organization of the New Democracy (Organisia Neon tis Neas Demokratias—ONNED), a vigorous and often fractious youth group that has been instrumental in recruiting new blood into the party, mobilizing public support, and occasionally challenging the constituent influence of powerful local politicians. The party has fared well in university student elections in the 1990s, as well as in organizing support in labor unions and professional associations.

Since the mid-1980s, the main ideological struggle within the ND has been between moderate reformists and neoliberals and free-market advocates who have called for a vigorous reversal of state intervention in the economy, accelerating privatization, and encouraging innovation and competition. The centrist domination has been evident in the party's conciliation toward the left in its consistent support of progressive social legislation. Experts believe, however, that a large part of the ND's grassroots supporters are to the right of the party's leadership in this respect.

### **Political Spring**

In July 1994, the former ND minister of foreign affairs, Antonis Samaras, formed a new party, Political Spring (Politiki

Anixi—PA). Samaras, seen as a likely successor to Mitsotakis until a bitter feud with the prime minister over the Macedonia issue, finally left the party in protest against the government's Macedonia policy. As he ran on the PA ticket in the October 1993 election, Samaras gained public sympathy from the name-calling campaign that the ND mounted against him. After struggling early, the PA received nearly 5 percent of the popular vote, becoming instantly the third largest party in Greece and electing ten deputies, including Samaras, to the Assembly.

After the election, Samaras maintained a high profile by criticizing the failures of both major rival parties. Not surprisingly, the PA became the self-appointed guardian of the hard-line position on the Macedonia issue. The party stated repeatedly that Greek acceptance of any form of the word "Macedonia" in the name for the nation that had been the southeastermost republic of Yugoslavia would amount to treason. The party has advocated a similarly tough stand on disputes with neighboring Albania (see Foreign Policy, this ch.).

In the elections for the European Parliament in June 1994, the PA benefitted further from continuing voter disaffection with PASOK and the ND, gaining nearly 9 percent of the vote. Beyond its strongly nationalistic positions on foreign affairs, the PA has not yet articulated clearly its ideology and economic policies. Most of them, however, are quite similar to those of the ND. Although the PA claims to represent a coalition of forces from all sides of the political spectrum (and indeed, has managed to attract to its ranks a few figures from the left), the majority of its constituency seems to be decidedly conservative: in a summer 1994 poll of PA voters, more than 95 percent of respondents identified themselves as either right-wing, right-of-center, or center, in approximately equal numbers. The PA's strongest support is in Athens, Thessaloniki, and regions such as the southern Peloponnese and northern Macedonia containing large concentrations of royalist and ultraconservative voters.

In the late summer of 1994, the PA stood at a crossroads. With little discernible difference between its positions and those of the ND (other than the approach to Balkan affairs), the party was increasingly perceived as simply a vehicle for the personal ambitions of Samaras. Under these conditions, the ND's electoral fate might determine that of the PA. If the ND seemed to have poor prospects in the next national elections, the PA might attract wavering and discouraged voters from the

larger party. If, on the other hand, the ND had a promising position as the elections approached, Samaras might come under intense pressure to avoid splitting the conservative vote by forming an electoral coalition or actually merging his party with the ND.

### **Communist Parties**

Formed in 1918 with strong support from the Bolshevik Party in Moscow, the communist party never gained more than a small minority in elections, but its presence often had a profound impact on government policies and the policies of the West toward Greece.

#### ***Background of the KKE***

Formerly called the Socialist Workers' Party, the Communist Party of Greece (Kommunistikon Komma Ellados—KKE) had strong ties with Moscow from its inception, and it was a loyal member of the Communist International (Comintern). Most of its support came from refugees from Turkey and linguistic and ethnic minorities. In the interwar period, the KKE participated in elections, but it polled only 9 percent of the vote in 1935. Nevertheless, that vote was a major influence in the imposition of an anticommunist military dictatorship under Ioannis Metaxas in 1936; from then until 1974, the KKE was outlawed.

Between 1940 and 1944, the KKE formed the backbone for Greece's wartime resistance movement, a role that for the first time made it a popular party (see *Resistance, Exiles, and Collaborators*, ch. 1). During the war, an estimated 25 to 30 percent of the population was associated with one or another of the KKE's auxiliary organizations; however, the period of the Civil War (1946–49) cost it most of its popular support. The party leaders and much of the party membership fled to Eastern Europe; those that remained in Greece operated through surrogate parties: first the Democratic Front, then the United Democratic Left (Eniea Dimokratiki Aristera—EDA), which was disbanded by the military junta in 1967. In 1974 the civilian government of Karamanlis legalized the KKE after the ouster of the junta.

In 1968 the KKE split into two separate wings. The origin of the split lay in the 1950s and early 1960s, when the EDA served as the forum for communist activity within Greece. Over time a gap developed between communists who had remained in

Greece and those who had fled abroad, and in 1968 this gap was the ground for the formation of the KKE-Interior and the KKE-Exterior. The fundamental difference between the branches was that in the 1970s the KKE-Exterior, the larger faction, retained its leadership and loyalty to Moscow while the breakaway KKE-Interior was following the independent Eurocommunist parties of Western Europe as its models. The schism was formalized with the restoration of democracy and the legalization of the KKE-Interior in 1974.

Since that time, the two parties have grown completely apart as they developed different ideologies, internal structures, and constituencies. Tactically, however, their relationship has been more complicated. The two have formed electoral coalitions—first in the national elections of 1974, then in the elections of 1989 and 1990 under the name Synaspismos. Following the disastrous results of the 1990 elections, the parties embarked on completely divergent paths, seemingly heralding a final break. Together with several allied leftist groups, the KKE-Interior retained the name Synaspismos. Therefore, the KKE-Exterior is now referred to simply as the KKE.

### *Evolution of the KKE*

Between the dissolution of the Center Union following the 1977 election and the PA's ascendancy in 1993, the KKE was the third largest party in Greece. The best performance of the KKE standing on its own was the 11 percent of the vote achieved in 1981. (In coalition with the KKE-Interior under Synaspismos, a high of 13 percent was reached in the June 1989 elections.)

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) alliance in 1991, the KKE has become a more marginal player. In the 1993 elections, its 4.5 percent share of the vote made the future look bleak. The KKE has shown no signs of changing traditional communist dogma to project an image attractive to a large number of younger voters. Its constituency remains primarily traditional left-wing voters in some sections of the working class and the refugee population centered in the largest cities, in parts of Thessaly in north-central Greece, and on some of the Dodecanese and Ionian islands.

The KKE is organized according to the standard Soviet model: control of local party cells is centralized in the highest party organization, the politburo, which is headed by the secre-

tary general of the party. The politburo is elected by the central committee, which meets every six to eight months. The committee in turn is elected by the party congress, held every four years, which is in principle the highest policy-making authority. In practice, power within the party is highly concentrated in the politburo. In the 1980s, the party's mass organizations lost much of their strength among university student organizations and labor unions. The most notable loss has been in Greece's major trade union organization, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (Geniki Synomospondia Ergaton Ellados—GSEE), which until the mid-1980s was heavily influenced by the party.

### *Synapismos*

Synaspismos (SYN—Coalition), the party that has finally emerged from the union of KKE-Interior with several other leftist groups, has a small number of hard-core adherents but a much larger number of potential sympathizers. Thus, the party does much better in local elections and in elections for the European Parliament (seen by some Greek voters as an opportunity to express their real preferences), than in the national parliamentary elections, which, because of their impact on people's daily lives, are often perceived as a choice between the lesser of two evils, PASOK or the ND.

In 1981 Synaspismos received only 1 percent of the vote for the Assembly, but over 5 percent of the vote for the European Parliament. In 1993 SYN obtained only 2.9 percent of the vote in the national elections, narrowly missing the 3 percent required to send any deputy to the Assembly. Then, in June 1994, it secured two of the twenty-five Greek seats in the European Parliament by gaining over 6 percent of that vote.

SYN has adopted a strongly pro-European stance. Domestically, it advocates administrative reform and modernization, as well as moderate economic policies—policies not much different in late 1994 from those practiced by PASOK and advocated by Evert's ND. On foreign policy, SYN is clearly the most conciliatory party on the Macedonian issue and on relations with other Balkan nations, often warning against the dangers of unbridled nationalism. Its frequent inability to speak with a single voice accounts for much of the party's failure to establish itself as a viable alternative in the minds of many Greek voters. But its most fundamental problem is that, more than any other party, SYN is in direct competition with PASOK for issues and

supporters on the moderate-left of the spectrum. Experts believe that the end of Papandreou's tenure in PASOK could enhance SYN's role in representing that constituency, depending on the effectiveness of Papandreou's successor. SYN would be most likely to come to power as a member of a broad government coalition with centrist and center-left reform parties.

### **Other Parties**

More than thirty small parties contested the October 1993 national elections. Their combined share of the total vote was approximately 1.5 percent, and many of them obtained fewer than 1,000 votes in the entire country—a result typical of post-1974 Greek elections. In general, these small parties are concerned mainly with specific, narrow interests (for example, the Party of Greek Hunters), and they are often geographically limited and ideologically ambivalent.

To the left of the KKE, a number of splinter Marxist, Maoist, and anarchist groups have consistently participated in national elections and obtained minuscule support. On the far right, several attempts were made before the mid-1980s to field a viable slate of candidates. In 1974 a projunta grouping obtained 1 percent of the vote. In 1977 the National Front, a coalition of junta supporters, ultraconservatives, and royalists mounted the most serious right-wing challenge of the postjunta years, obtaining nearly 7 percent of the total vote and seating five deputies in the Assembly. In 1981 the Progressive Party, led by Spyros Markezinis, who served in 1973 as prime minister in the junta regime of Georgios Papadopoulos, obtained 2 percent of the vote. Since 1985, however, most of the votes of the far right have gone to the ND or the PA.

The only noteworthy mainstream minority party of the 1985–94 period was the Democratic Renewal Party, which was formed by Konstantinos Stefanopoulos, a widely respected ND politician and long-time Karamanlis loyalist, when he lost an ND leadership contest to Mitsotakis in 1985. Democratic Renewal never has made a significant impact in national elections, but the one deputy it elected in June 1990 made it possible for Mitsotakis to form a majority government by switching his support to the ND. Democratic Renewal was dissolved after another disappointing showing in the elections for the European Parliament in June 1994. Evert has invited Stefanopoulos back to the ND fold, and he may rejoin that party at some point.

The nascent Green Party has failed to attract significant electoral support. One Green deputy was elected to the Assembly in the 1990 elections, but the movement has been fractious, and the mainstream parties have been quick to pay lip service to environmental causes, thus preempting the development of any mass following for the Greens (see Environmental Policy, ch. 2).

## Interest Groups

Since the establishment of a modern Greek parliamentary system, the representation of individual interests has relied on direct, one-to-one relations between politicians and constituents. In contrast to other Western democracies, Greek civic culture has not encouraged the development of permanent pressure groups that would foster pluralism by combining individual demands into coherent interest groups. Joining a political party and establishing direct personal contacts with party officials are still considered to be the most effective methods for reaching individual goals.

Even in the latter half of the twentieth century, Greece differs from other industrialized countries by the presence of only a handful of fragile interest groups whose demands are almost always economic and activated on specific occasions rather than displaying a broader conception of the "public good." For example, once a labor dispute has been settled by the government (sometimes following strikes that have crippling effects on the economy), the seemingly intransigent labor organizers relapse into political inertia until the time for negotiating the next wage raise. The role of broader pressure groups, on the other hand, has traditionally been usurped by the ability of the political parties to represent and monopolize meaningful, long-term social issues—and by the willingness of citizens to have politicians carry their message.

This pattern originates in the politics of the protracted Ottoman occupation and in the patterns of political behavior resulting from delayed industrial development. A traditional Greek oligarchy, functioning as exclusive local employers in a predominantly agricultural economy, became the organizational center for the exchange of governmental favors for votes. Until 1900 the virtual absence of competing private employers, such as those that would have emerged in industries, established the state as the ultimate employer through the representation of the state by the oligarchy. As the oligarchy served the govern-



ment and perpetuated its mechanisms, for that class the state became the exclusive educator and bestower of legitimacy.

As industry grew slowly, the political party system emerged as the natural broker for aggregating interests, as it constantly refined the procedures for the personal exchange of favors. As a result, the political system failed to produce interest groups that would mobilize against the excessive concentration of power in the hands of political parties. Instead, the Greek political parties came to compete constantly for position within each and every interest group that appeared. Over time, personal favors granted by politicians replaced official procedures and became what one observer has termed the "lubricating oil of the system."

The platform of change on which PASOK rose to power in 1981 included a promise to abolish the exchange-of-favors system, which was universally viewed as the source of all political evil. But as PASOK governments ushered in an era of fresh politicians whose power came not from a local or provincial base but from the personal charisma of their party leader, clientelism merely assumed a new populist form. In attempting to enlarge its system of political mass participation and incorporation, PASOK sought to suffuse all cultural and civic domains with its own political spirit. As it continued into the 1980s, this politicization eventually weakened Greece's already feeble institutions of nonpolitical social advocacy. In the 1990s, this tendency caused potentially active advocacy groups such as labor unions, the church, the military, and the mass media—traditional sources of large-scale advocacy in Western democracies—to remain quiescent except for occasional strikes.

## **Organized Labor**

Labor union activities have frequently been subjected to legal restrictions by regimes that considered stable economic conditions the paramount domestic goal. Although the GSEE was established in 1918 and in 1994 comprises some 3,000 unions and fifty-seven federations, it rates low in public esteem, as does the Supreme Civil Servants' Administrative Committee (Anotati Dioikousa Epitropi Dimosion Ipallilon), known as ADEDI (see Labor Unions, ch. 3). In the early 1980s, PASOK attempted to cultivate a healthier activism in the GSEE after that organization's activities had been paralyzed for decades by extreme right- or left-wing dogmatism. By 1985, however, election setbacks were blamed partly on trade-union hostility, and

PASOK responded by packing the unions with party activists. Thus the unions reverted to political control after a largely unconsummated commitment to independent advocacy.

The cultural hostility toward the activity of permanent labor organizations is matched by the public attitude toward the Association of Greek Industrialists (Sindesmos Ellinon Viomikhanon—SEV), the powerful group that represents the interests of private industries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, SEV greatly improved its public image.

Party meddling in the unions and subsequent confrontational tactics became equally flagrant during the ND government that took office in 1990. In the summer of 1992, following the privatization of the Urban Transportation Company, prolonged strikes and social upheaval put the ND administration on the defensive. With the return of PASOK to power in the fall of 1993, renationalizations (socializations) were soon announced, and a fresh wave of confrontations was in full swing by the spring of 1994. Experts believed that plans for increased privatization of state-owned industries, set to begin in the winter of 1994–95, were likely to begin a new phase of active trade unionism.

### **Church and State**

The separation of church and state is a concept that is alien to Greece, because of the unusually close relationship between Orthodox Christianity and the Greek national identity. Historically, the Orthodox Church hierarchy has been a conservative political force that generally has supported the monarchy and opposed communism. Its organization and administration, if not its religious tenets, have been subject to state influence. For this reason, although the church is the only Greek nongovernmental institution built upon the concept of community, it does not contribute to the nation's narrow range of permanent interest groups. The church's politicization has meant frequent instances of internal factionalism. With this situation in mind, the PASOK administrations of the 1980s tried to end the church's reliance on the Ministry of National Education and Religious Affairs, which administers church property and employs all church officials. The goal of such a change was to achieve administrative separation of church and state.

In the 1980s, some indicators showed a decline in the church's capacity to exert influence on the political process. A case in point was the church's failure, despite public opposi-

tion, to prevent a PASOK-sponsored Family Law from being enacted in 1983. That law reformed a range of social traditions, for the first time permitting civil marriage and divorce (see *The Social Order*, ch. 2). On the other hand, in 1987 the government's attempt to confiscate and redistribute church property provoked bitter confrontations that eventually forced the state to back down and a government minister to resign in disgrace (see *Religion*, ch. 2).

At the end of the ND administration and the beginning of the new Papandreou regime of 1993, the government was embarrassed again by well-publicized church-state wrangling over a political issue. This time a series of episcopal appointments approved by Greece's Holy Synod collided with the vociferous and even violent refusal of incumbents to leave their positions.

### **The Military in Politics**

Unlike Greece's weak, politically impregnable civilian interest groups, the military has had a strong presence as an independent player in Greek politics, although traditionally it has been as factionalized as the rest of society. Originally an aristocratic institution, the military eventually grew into a powerful pressure group, based in the lower classes, whose middle-class aspirations and grievances have had a critical impact on the course of Greek political history at several junctures.

The military has intervened in politics a number of times, usually to install in power the political party of its choice. More rarely, most recently in 1967, it has seized power for itself. The period of junta rule was a disaster for Greece in both domestic and foreign policy, and it had a terrible effect on the public image of the military as an institution. After the inglorious failure of its coup in Cyprus led to the fall of the junta regime in 1974, many observers believed that the military could only play a political role again to save the country from an imminent catastrophe such as an invasion from Turkey. The end of bipolar geopolitics has eliminated the communist threat, but Greece's eastern neighbor remains a perennial concern that necessitates large military and defense expenditures, affording the opportunity for continued political input by the military establishment. The protracted Balkan crisis of the early to mid-1990s highlighted the military's politically sensitive role (see *Turkey*, this ch.; *Assessing the Turkish Threat*, ch. 5). Upon his return to office in 1993, Papandreou caused a national contro-

versy by recalling retired general officers with PASOK loyalties and giving them high staff positions—an extension of a practice well established by earlier administrations (see *The Command Structure*, ch. 5).

## **The Media**

The Greek press is highly politicized and actively competes for readership, at times in a sensationalist and intensely partisan manner. Since the state monopoly of radio and television ended in 1987, the number of independent radio and television stations and channels has grown rapidly. The constitution prohibits censorship and all other government practices hindering freedom of the press. The last remaining vestiges of press restriction were only removed in August 1994, however, fifty-six years after the Metaxas dictatorship first imposed them (see the *Metaxas Era*, ch. 1).

The role of the media in bringing down the Papandreou government after the Koskotas scandal in 1989 was evidence that the media liberalization of the 1980s had established a new and explosive range of power and patronage relationships. However, the PASOK administration had already devised an institutional response to media power by appointing an American-style government spokesperson to handle daily confrontations with the press. The ND administrations that followed found a spokesperson just as useful. Further confirmation of the new importance of media power came in 1994 when, in addition to the government spokesperson, the second reshuffle of the Papandreou government included a minister of the press among cabinet officials.

The main source of printed news is the Athens News Agency, also known as Athenagence or ANA, which has correspondents in all the larger towns in Greece and some foreign bureaus. Greece has more newspaper and magazine titles per capita than any other country in Europe—120 daily newspapers and about 1,000 weeklies and fortnightlies are published. No daily paper dominates—rather, all the major papers sell between 50,000 and 150,000 copies, providing fierce competition (see table 13, Appendix). All legal political parties have been able to rely on at least one newspaper to spread their views to constituents. Fifteen major dailies appear in Athens alone. Readership averages 150 per 1,000 population. Newspaper ownership is becoming more concentrated, although it is still diverse by European standards.

Initially established under the interwar Metaxas dictatorship, the national radio network remained under government control in the postwar period, becoming an important tool in promoting the strongly conservative and anticommunist views of the state. Although state control of radio never was explicitly set out in law, when television was introduced in 1968 the ruling military junta passed laws giving the government exclusive control of that medium.

In the newly democratic climate that followed the junta's fall in 1974, the public's thirst for political discourse was soon turned into a powerful weapon by governing parties. The prime-time news of all three television networks was dominated by positive portrayals of government and party activities. In 1987, however, Athens mayor Miltiadis Evert, an opposition candidate newly elected in an upset, became the first to exercise the legal possibility of opposition radio broadcasting. He opened an independent station in Athens, and soon hundreds of independent stations had begun broadcasting throughout Greece. In April 1989, Greek courts ruled that the state monopoly of broadcasting violated EC standards, and in October the Assembly legalized private ownership of television stations.

The introduction of privately owned radio and television stations has brought a new attitude from the government toward the mass media. Because state-controlled media outlets are now confronted with severe criticism and competition from media that the state had previously monopolized, the government has consistently attempted to improve the image carried by independent networks. Despite the liberalization of the late 1980s, however, the state-owned Greek Radio and Television (Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorasi—ERT) still dominates radio and television. In 1989 an independent committee was established to administer ERT, to loosen the control exercised since 1975 by the General Secretariat for Press and Information, and to improve programming.

## **Human Rights**

In the twenty years since the restoration of democratic rule in 1974, Greece has compiled a generally positive human rights record in accord with the strong commitment to democracy made by the Karamanlis regime of 1974. However, international human rights organizations have classified incidents of discrimination and unlawful treatment by government authori-

ties as violations of human rights. The most frequently cited situation involves Greek policy toward conscientious objectors. In 1992 about 420 conscientious objectors, mostly Jehovah's Witnesses, were in prison because Greece has no civilian alternative to military service, and unarmed military service lasts twice as long as ordinary service. In 1991 a European Parliament delegation was refused access to the military prison where conscientious objectors were being held. Some Greeks have also been imprisoned for publicly expressing opposition to Greek policies in Macedonia and toward domestic ethnic minorities. Occasional reports of torture and ill-treatment have emerged from Greek prisons in recent years.

Although the population of 120,000 ethnic Turks in western Thrace has had no major conflicts with the Greek majority, in 1991 a human rights report of the United States Department of State referred to a pattern of discrimination against that Muslim community. In 1993 a sizeable demonstration in the town of Xanthi protested the Greek government's choice of a new mufti, the highest official of the Muslim hierarchy in Greece.

Another disturbing note is reported discrimination against non-Orthodox individuals in filling positions in the government, the military, the judiciary, and teaching. An apparent result of the unusually close connection between church and state in Greece, the practice has long been criticized by European human rights groups and the United Nations (UN). In addition, members of minor religious groups have been imprisoned for violating the law against proselytizing. More tolerance has been displayed toward the religious activities of representatives of the mainstream Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim religions, although in late 1994 the Greek Roman Catholic Church protested discrimination by a local public prosecutor.

In 1994 the Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs (the word national was dropped from its title in 1994) established a pilot program against racism and xenophobia in schools near immigrant and Muslim communities, as well as a National Committee Against Racism, Xenophobia, Anti-Semitism, and Intolerance.

## **Foreign Policy**

Greece's geographic position has made inevitable a continuous involvement with close neighbors and the constant attention from great powers with vested interests in the eastern Mediterranean. In the years since World War II, Greek govern-

ments have been required to assume positions on local crises such as those in Cyprus and the Balkans while protecting Greece's best interests in the larger context of European geopolitics. The end of the Cold War left Greece with major foreign policy concerns to its immediate north and east.

## **Historical Background**

Throughout its modern history, Greece's strategic location in the Mediterranean and the Balkan Peninsula has been seen as an invitation for foreign intervention in the domestic and external affairs of the country. The policies and actions of foreign powers were mostly dictated by their competition for influence in the region rather than by the likely impact on Greece. While deploring foreign influence, Greeks usually accepted it grudgingly when national security and continued independence were the likely results of such acceptance. Since the foundation of the modern Greek state, however, foreign policy orientation, and especially the attitude toward potential foreign dominance, has been one of the foremost criteria distinguishing one political party from another.

After World War II and the Greek Civil War, the United States emerged as Greece's principal patron, a special relationship that Britain had maintained from the late eighteenth century until about 1950. In the postwar years, foreign involvement became synonymous with United States involvement because of Greece's heavy dependence on the United States for military and economic aid. Such dependence evoked mixed reactions; it was generally popular with right-wing Greek leaders, but it was harshly attacked by communist and other left-wing groups. By the early 1960s, a growing number of moderate and centrist Greeks had come to voice the need for more independence in foreign affairs, but without jeopardizing their nation's close relationships with its Western allies and especially the United States.

Greek assertiveness toward the United States was especially heightened in the years after the junta and the 1974 Turkish military intervention in Cyprus because of alleged United States complicity in the series of events that began with the junta's assumption of power in 1967. In the 1970s, the Greek government sought to renegotiate its United States military bases agreement and to reassess its ties with NATO. Both NATO and the United States had come under heavy criticism in Greek society for their alleged tacit support of the colonels

and favoritism toward Turkey. After the return of civilian government in 1974, the Karamanlis administration's foreign policy did not deviate significantly from Greece's pre-1974 posture, except where Turkey was concerned. Relations with arch-rival Turkey remained acrimonious because of unresolved disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean Sea (see *Assessing the Turkish Threat*, ch. 5).

The PASOK administrations of the 1980s increased anti-Western rhetoric, largely through symbolic gestures favoring Arab and Central European communist states. However, on the level of Greece's membership in the EC and NATO, little or no change was made in the substance of Greece's fundamentally pro-Western foreign policy stand (see *PASOK Foreign Policy*, ch. 1).

By the end of the 1980s, several developments had led to an almost complete reversal of the climate of strong anti-Westernism of the previous decade. Papandreou's overtures toward the Soviet Union and Arab and Mediterranean states had failed to produce the regional support he had expected to obtain against Turkey and its continued occupation of Cyprus. Moreover, Greece was clearly gaining economic benefits from its participation in the EC, which was also proving useful in penetrating the slowly awakening markets of Greece's Balkan neighbors. By 1989 PASOK was also able to claim that it had restored national pride and fulfilled its campaign promises, as arrangements on phasing out most of the United States military bases in Greece were about to be completed.

The collapse of the Berlin Wall, the ousting of PASOK from power in 1989, and the unprecedented left-conservative coalition that followed it, all but silenced remaining leftist opposition to a solid pro-Western stance. Most decisive in this respect was Greece's signing of the Maastricht Treaty and its enthusiastic membership in the European Union, which was created by ratification of that agreement in 1993. In the summer of 1994, as Greece completed a third, rather successful presidency of the European organization, the country's foreign policy orientation and commitments toward the West were no longer in question.

Nevertheless, distinct underlying differences on strategy and tactics remained among the Greek political parties. Two of them, Synaspismos and the newly established PA, had renewed calls for the creation of a national council for foreign policy,



which would be an apolitical source of consistency that would make foreign policy more independent of alternations between ND and PASOK administrations.

In late 1994, however, the PASOK government had achieved a rather broad consensus on Greece's foreign policy priorities: Turkey was universally perceived as the principal threat and regional adversary; membership in the EU and in NATO was viewed as the essential pillar of Greece's position in the world; and a continuing close relationship with the United States was a goal with wide approval. A flare-up in Greek-Albanian relations, the "Macedonian question," the threat of a spillover of hostilities after the fragmentation of Yugoslavia, and the Cyprus stalemate continued to constitute salient problems that colored Greece's relations with Turkey, the most crucial neighbor, and the United States, the key ally.

### **Greece and the European Community**

In his address to the nation on July 24, 1994, to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the return to parliamentary democracy, President Karamanlis pointed to Greek membership in the EC and then the EU as the single most fateful (and fortunate) move in determining the country's foreign policy orientation and economic development in the last two decades. Shortly thereafter, however, the relationship with the EU was under some strain because of Greece's chronically lagging economy and EU pressures for strict implementation of the economic convergence measures called for by the Maastricht Treaty (see *International Economic Policy in the 1990s*, ch. 3).


Considerable political friction had also developed between Greece and the EU. In February 1994, Greece's unilateral embargo against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM—as the nations of the world officially recognized that nation) provoked sharp disapproval and the threat of legal measures from all the European allies.

Greece's initial associate membership in what was then the EC was arranged in 1961 by Karamanlis for strictly economic reasons. Then, soon after the end of the military junta in 1974, Karamanlis again steered Greece into the EC associate membership that the junta had relinquished in 1969, this time on unequivocally political grounds. In his view, close association with the economic organizations of the democratic West would institutionalize democracy and make another military coup less likely. The move would also relieve the pressures stemming

from Greece's dependency on a single foreign power (the United States) in the bipolar world of the Cold War. (Ironically, PASOK then used the danger of overdependency in its propaganda against maintaining full membership in the EC between 1981 and 1985, by which time the benefits of the relationship had become clear to all.)

By signing the Single European Act in 1985, the PASOK government committed Greece to a broad set of social, environmental, and technological goals set by the EC with the expectation that a single European market could be established in 1992. In the event, the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which upon its ratification in 1993 established the EU as the basis of the single market, found fervent support from Greece. Being the sole Balkan member of the EU has boosted its leverage against Turkey, and membership has enabled Greece to narrow the focus of its defense and security interests. Greece is also a member of the other major Western political and defense alliances: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—see Glossary), NATO, and the Western European Union (WEU—see Glossary). On occasion, Greece has taken advantage of these European ties in the pursuit of its national interests. Greece has resorted to a battery of political ploys to block the inflow of large EU loans to Turkey, for example, while also calling into question that country's domestic political practices and human rights record. These moves have also had a significant influence on the EU's continued denial of Turkey's applications for EU membership.

Similarly, while presiding over the EU in 1994, Greece sought to block FYROM's entry into the CSCE, without prejudicing the general principle of adding new members to that organization. Another important goal on the Greek agenda was the implementation of economic development projects in Albania and Bulgaria under the EU's interregional program (see *Security in the Balkans*, ch. 5). Greece felt that improving economies in neighboring countries were in its long-term interest; by 1992 Greece was the largest foreign investor in Bulgaria's manufacturing sector, and it was among the leaders in Romania as well. On the other hand, the massive influx of Albanian refugees into Greece placed serious strain on Greek-Albanian relations in the early 1990s. In early 1994, an incident on the Albanian-Greek border escalated into a severe crisis and forced Greece to reverse its support of the EU Alba-



*European leaders at the conclusion of Greek presidency of the European Union, Corfu, June 1994  
Courtesy Press and Information Office, Embassy of Greece, Washington*

nian aid program in order to gain leverage over human rights practices in Albania.

In its tenure as head of the EU, Greece successfully conducted negotiations on the future membership of Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, all of which held domestic referenda on that issue in 1994. Experts believed that further involvement in the political networks and federalist institutions of Europe, as opposed to strictly defense-oriented organizations, would benefit Greece's international posture and provide valuable experience in negotiation of economic issues.

## **Turkey**

In late 1994, relations with Turkey remained Greece's most intractable international problem, with strong ramifications in domestic economic and defense planning. For Greece the end of superpower politics and the enlargement of the EU had little effect on the long-standing disputes with Turkey over Cyprus and adjacent sea-lanes and airspace. The end of the Warsaw Pact meant that both Greece and Turkey found themselves competing even more intensively than during the Cold

War for the attentions of their common defensive patron, the United States. Meanwhile, Greece's advantageous position in the EU appeared to intensify Turkish intransigence and complicate any compromise settlement of bilateral conflicts.

After the fall of East European communist regimes in 1991, several of the conflicts and stresses that occurred to Greece's north and west had an effect on its relations with Turkey when Muslim populations, chiefly in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, were threatened. Greece's position as an economic supporter of Serbia, blockaded by NATO because of its role against the Bosnian Muslims, injected additional distrust into relations between Greece and Turkey.

Disputes between the two countries over treatment of minorities date back, however, to the aftermath of the Greco-Turkish War of 1921–22. Following the end of that war, which was a disaster for Greece, the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne prescribed the exchange of large numbers of each state's nationals living within the other country's boundaries (see *The Interwar Struggles, 1922–36*, ch. 1). The exchange did not include two significant groups, however: Greeks living in the Istanbul area and Turks living in Greek Thrace, across the border from European Turkey. Each community numbered approximately 100,000 in 1923. The treatment of the two ethnic minorities has been an issue ever since.

A partial solution to the establishment of minority rights was achieved in 1968, when Greece and Turkey signed a treaty agreeing to allow the groups to be educated in their own languages. But the press in both countries continued to publish inflammatory articles on the issue, and the groups were the objects of periodic hostility from the indigenous populations of their adopted countries.

Turkey has sought to relocate members of its Greek community to Greece. Whereas in 1965 some 48,000 inhabitants of Turkey claimed Greek as their mother tongue, by 1990 official estimates put the number of Greeks at about 3,000. On the other hand, Greece has not attempted to repatriate its Turkish minority. In 1990 unofficial estimates placed the size of the Turkish population in Greece at approximately 120,000. Some Greeks were reportedly worried that the size of the Muslim community might serve as a justification for future Turkish territorial claims in Thrace, although no hint of such a claim had been observed. Meanwhile, the Muslim minority in Thrace

appeared to be generally tolerated by the surrounding Greek population.

In the mid-1990s, Cyprus remained the primary issue that defined and limited relations between Greece and Turkey. Together with Britain, the two neighbors were the guarantors of Cypriot independence under the 1960 treaties. Since the island republic was partitioned *de facto* in 1974, the Cyprus problem has been a vital national issue for Greece and a critical election-year litmus test of the patriotism of Greek candidates as well as Turkish intentions and policies. Both Greece and Turkey have taken the position that they have the legal right and obligation to render active support to the Cypriots of their respective nationalities—a Greek Cypriot majority and a Turkish Cypriot minority. Since 1974 the UN and Western nations have sponsored numerous talks between the Cypriot communities, but no permanent settlement has been reached.

Essentially, the Greek Cypriots advocate a strong central government, a single constitution, a parliament with representation proportionate to the Greek majority and Turkish minority populations, and substantial autonomy for the bicomunal regions. Seeing such a division of power as prejudicial to their own interests, the Turkish Cypriots demand a federation of the two regions, each with its own constitution and an equal voice in decision making on major intercommunal issues. To protect their minority status, the Turks also demand veto power over majority decisions.

Intransigence on both sides—each accusing the other of failing to negotiate in good faith—hardened the split on the status of the island republic. In November 1983, the Turkish Cypriots unilaterally declared the northern region (about 37 percent of the island) to be an independent Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Greece was quick to condemn the "pseudostate" as a base for aggressive expansionism, declaring that no solution was possible without the withdrawal of Turkish troops.

In the 1980s, despite occasional rapprochement between the two sides and regular Greek-Turkish summits at Davos, Switzerland, PASOK administrations deviated little from the nationalist course of the Karamanlis era. In 1993, after a period of relative inaction under the 1990–93 ND administration, the new Papandreou government announced a "common defense policy" for Greece and Cyprus, to counter the psychological pressure of the Turkish military presence along Greece's eastern borders. At the same time, Greece committed itself to

regional "confidence-building measures," to be sponsored by the UN and the United States as part of the Partnership for Peace doctrine advanced by United States president William J. Clinton in 1993.

By late summer 1994, however, the Turkish position in Cyprus had not changed. The UN Security Council Resolution 938 registered strong international displeasure over the twenty-year-old military occupation of the island, and it also noted Turkey's unwillingness to participate in the UN confidence-building program. During the same period, as it was working on the addition of four new members to the EU, the Greek presidency was also promoting full EU membership for Cyprus. In response, Rauf Denktas, the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, complained that UN resolutions did not guarantee the rights of Turkish Cypriots, and that further efforts to include Cyprus in the EU would be viewed as a national threat that would be answered by annexing Turkish Cyprus to Turkey.

The Greek government has also been critical of Turkey for its human rights practices and the treatment of the Kurdish minority in Turkey. In mid-1994, terrorist bombings on the island of Rhodes, believed in Greece to have been carried out by Turkish agents, caused a new wave of suspicion and bitterness between the two neighbors. In the bilateral negotiations of fall 1994, Greece placed its hopes on demilitarization of Cyprus and rapid inclusion of the island into the EU. These hopes were partially founded on a recent decision by the European Court of Justice refusing to recognize products from the Turkish-Cypriot north as coming from a separate state.

The Greek-Turkish conflict involves several additional issues, such as the demarcation of the continental shelf for the purpose of establishing underwater mineral rights. Authority over airspace and air traffic control in the Aegean, militarization of the Greek islands near the Turkish coast, and the deployment of the Turkish Aegean Army in western Turkey are also key concerns.

Greek oil exploration in the Aegean began in 1970 and resulted in small natural gas and oil strikes off the west coast of Thasos, close to the coast of Thrace, in 1974 (see *Energy*, ch. 3). In 1973, however, Turkey also granted concessions to Turkish oil companies in several parts of the Aegean. Greece regarded some of those areas as within the limits of the Greek continental shelf, entitling Greece to economic rights, if not

full sovereignty, over the area. The islands are part of Greece, so Greece applied the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which provides that a state has the same seabed rights in its offshore islands as it does in its mainland coast. In short, islands extend a state's continental shelf past the landmass to which they belong politically. Turkey's position was that strict application of this principle would deprive Turkey of a continental shelf in areas where Greek islands are very close to the Turkish coast, thus requiring a special exception in this case. In August 1976, Greece brought the question before the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice. The council adopted Security Council Resolution 395, urging the Greeks and the Turks to resolve their differences by negotiation, a recommendation reiterated by the court. In mid-1994, the continental shelf issue remained unresolved, and no negotiations had been scheduled.

In late 1994, all Greek political parties regarded Turkey as the principal threat to Greek security. This perception has been used to justify increased emphasis on military spending in the 1990s (see Defense Expenditures, ch. 5). That spending has included deployment of military forces to demonstrate Greek resolve at a time of reduced reliance on NATO—an organization that Greece has decried for its inability to prevent the invasion of Cyprus by another member of the alliance. In 1994, demonstrating the "common defense space" of Greece and Cyprus, the Greek navy executed a series of exercises in Cypriot and international waters, under the close observation of the Turks (see Greece in NATO, ch. 5).

## **The United States**

Since World War II, Greece has had an ambivalent attitude toward its most powerful ally of the period, the United States, mostly because of the role the latter played in the years following the war. United States reorganization of and assistance to the Greek armed forces were generally credited with thwarting a communist seizure of power during the Civil War, and United States economic aid provided under the Truman Doctrine proved the major factor in Greece's postwar economic reconstruction (see The Marshall Plan in Greece, ch. 1). Nevertheless, many Greeks felt that the United States acted more in opposition to the expansionist Soviet Union than in support of Greek prosperity. In the 1960s and 1970s, as Turkey became a major issue in Greek-American relations, most Greeks main-

tained that United States policy toward Greece was only one aspect of a broader strategic policy aimed at the stabilization of NATO's flank in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Serious strains appeared in Greek-American relations after the 1967 military coup, concentrating the general resentment over Cold War policy on a single issue. Many Greeks believed that a more forceful United States reaction against the colonels' takeover could have prevented the seven years of military dictatorship that followed. Although the United States publicly pressed the colonels to restore democracy and heavy weapons deliveries were halted between 1967 and 1970, no drastic change was made in the execution of United States security policy. The United States continued delivery of light weapons to Greece and advised other Western allies not to impose sanctions on the military regime. Greece's strategic location was a strong influence against destabilizing even a military dictatorship, but Washington's prudence unwittingly deepened the Greek suspicion of United States complicity in junta rule.

A second major source of strain was the Cyprus crisis of 1974, whose impact on Greek-American relations was still reverberating in the mid-1990s. Turkey invaded Cyprus, beginning over twenty years of occupation of the northeast part of the island, in response to an abortive coup against the Cypriot government backed by the Greek junta. As in 1967, most Greeks felt that stronger United States pressure would have prevented a major crisis for Greece, in this case by forcing a Turkish troop withdrawal, or at least ensuring better treatment for Greek Cypriots caught in the Turkish-occupied zone. Under pressure from the United States Congress, the United States soon stopped supplying arms to Turkey, but relations with Greece had already been damaged.

Although the United States had welcomed heartily the return of democracy in July 1974, the postjunta government of Karamanlis withdrew from the military wing of NATO to dramatize its displeasure with NATO's response to the Turkish invasion and Greece's financial and military independence from the United States. Shortly thereafter Karamanlis began talks aimed at recovering full sovereignty over the United States bases in Greece.

A series of bilateral Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreements (DECAs) largely defined relations between the two countries from passage of the first agreement in 1976 until the dismantling of the Soviet empire. Greece withheld





*Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu on official visit with United States President William J. Clinton, Washington, April 1994  
Courtesy White House Photo Office*

approval of the 1976 agreement, however, until it was sure that a defense cooperation pact that the United States had signed with Turkey in the preceding month would not adversely affect the balance of power between Greece and Turkey. When the United States ended its arms embargo on Turkey in 1978, Greece and the United States negotiated an informal understanding that a seven-to-ten ratio would be applied in the United States provision of aid to Greece and Turkey, respectively.

Although many Greeks continued to believe that the United States favored Turkey over Greece in security matters, relations remained generally cordial under the Karamanlis administration. In 1980 the two countries signed an umbrella agreement for cooperation in the economic, scientific, technological, educational, and cultural fields.

During the 1980s, PASOK's new foreign policy included opposition to all military blocs and condemnation of United States support of dictatorial militarist and oppressive regimes such as those of Turkey and Latin America. In an apparent gesture of evenhandedness, PASOK also condemned Soviet inter-

vention in Afghanistan. Papandreu also called for the removal of United States bases from Greece and Greek withdrawal from NATO, but not before the Cold War military alliances were phased out.

In 1983, after resuming negotiations suspended under the previous ND government, the Papandreu government signed a new DECA that provided for the presence of four United States bases through 1988, to be followed by their dismantling some months later. The accord also called for United States assistance in the modernization and maintenance of Greek defense capabilities in such a way as to preserve the military balance between Greece and Turkey using the seven-to-ten formula. The Greeks unilaterally stipulated that Greece had the right to terminate the DECA if in its judgment the United States tilted the balance of power in favor of Turkey. The DECA signatories acknowledged the linkage between national security and economic development, pledging cooperation in economic, industrial, scientific, and technological fields.

The new world order that emerged after 1989 marked a transition in the relations between Greece and the United States. The tensions caused by constant criticism from Papandreu's government in the mid-1980s began to ease when PASOK rhetoric cooled in 1987. The conservative Mitsotakis quickly began mending fences when he came to power in 1990. In July 1990, Mitsotakis made a courtesy visit to Washington, the first official Greek visit in decades. When the prime minister returned, a new DECA was signed. Then, as a token of its moral support for the Persian Gulf War of early 1991, Greece dispatched a frigate to the scene.

According to the 1990 DECA, Greece allows the United States the use of defense facilities at Souda Bay in Crete, a nearby communications network at Heraklion, some secondary communications stations around the Athens area, and facilities on the Ionian island of Leucas. The United States Hellinikon Air Base at Athens's main airport was closed, and its Nea Makri Naval Communications Station near Athens was to be quickly phased out. The treaty also contains numerous economic and administrative provisions related to existing and future installations and personnel.

The reduction of United States military facilities on Greek soil brought a rather smooth resolution to the friction that had existed between the two allies since the early 1950s (see *The Role of the United States*, ch. 5). For the United States, a lower

profile in Greece was consistent with the general downsizing of United States military installations on foreign soil. For Greece, the agreement achieved two important objectives. First, the reductions satisfied the elements of the Greek public that linked the issue of national sovereignty with the United States military presence in Greece. At the same time, Greece's national defense maintained the benefit of the traditional seven-to-ten aid apportionment ratio between Greece and Turkey. Indeed, it was now possible for Greece to argue that, after the end of the Soviet menace, only Turkish intransigence was responsible for making this ratio necessary. The Greek perception of the United States now changed from a superpower that had aided Greece as a policy instrument against the Soviet Union to a defender of Greece's interests.

The withdrawal of United States forces was celebrated when President George H.W. Bush visited Crete in 1992 to recognize Greece's symbolic contribution to the allied Persian Gulf War effort. The tension that had persisted since World War II thus came to a gracious conclusion that maintained the dignity of all sides and yielded a new Greek-United States DECA, reaffirming the existing military assistance formula.

When PASOK returned to power in October 1993, it was clear that the four-year absence had given the party time to revise its thinking about Greece's long-term interests in the post-Cold War geopolitical context. In fact, PASOK's attitude toward the United States had now turned full circle. Soon after taking power, Papandreou avidly sought support from the Clinton administration on the issues of FYROM, Cyprus, and Greek-Turkish relations. In April 1994, a meeting of Papandreou and Clinton in Washington was pronounced a success by both sides, despite the apparent lack of substantive commitments by the United States on the FYROM dispute. In the late summer of 1994, the United States was actively involved with UN efforts to settle the disputes in Cyprus and FYROM and was also watching closely the disturbing turn of events in the relations between Albania and Greece.

## **The Balkans**

In the fall of 1994, Greece prepared for a period of difficult relations with Balkan neighbors far weaker than itself. In the turbulence of the post-Cold War Balkans, only Greece displayed homogeneity, stable democratic institutions, and the multidimensional support of the EU. However, it was unclear

whether these attributes would prove sufficient to place Greece in a dynamic and leading role. The festering disputes with Turkey had made Greece defensive and vulnerable at a moment when general Balkan instability created precisely the type of regional vacuum that Turkey might fill by citing its solidarity with the Muslims of southeastern Europe.

Throughout the 1980s, Greece's relations with neighboring Balkan countries had generally continued on the friendly and mutually beneficial course that the Karamanlis government had initiated in the postjunta years. Greece desired stability in an area that had long suffered from conflicting territorial claims and political turmoil. Greece also hoped to win its neighbors' support for its position on Cyprus.

### *Bulgaria, Romania, and Yugoslavia*

In 1976 Greece initiated an inter-Balkan conference on cooperation that was attended by representatives of Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Albania initially refused to take part because of its conflicts with Turkey. Observers noted that Greece and Romania seemed to be the most enthusiastic about inter-Balkan regionalism, perhaps heralding some form of bilateral political cooperation. Turkey and Bulgaria were more hesitant. Turkey's position was that the settlement of bilateral differences had to precede regional cooperation. Similar conferences on economic and technical cooperation followed in 1979 and 1982; the latter meeting led to a 1984 conference on denuclearizing the Balkans.

Friendly and productive relations between Greece and neighbors Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania continued to be the rule throughout the 1980s and beyond the end of the Cold War. In 1991 brisk trade with Bulgaria was coupled with expanded military cooperation agreements. A series of consultations between the prime ministers of Bulgaria and Greece finally yielded a twenty-year treaty on friendship, good neighborliness, cooperation, and security. In the same year, similar diplomatic exchanges with Romanian leaders resulted in broad agreements on commercial ties and investments, as well as a mutual defense treaty in the same year.

The breakup of Yugoslavia deprived Greece of an important market and a friendly neighbor, as well as easy land access to other European states—in 1990 nearly 40 percent of Greek exports traveled by land across Yugoslavia into Western Europe. Far more important, however, the Yugoslav crisis has

reopened old wounds that had been festering from the onset of communist rule in that country until its demise in 1989–90.

### ***Policy Toward Serbia***

In mid-1992, the UN responded to Serbian offensives in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by declaring a full embargo on trade with Serbia by all member nations. The sanctions placed Greece, which had recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina shortly after its declaration in 1992, in a difficult position. Serbia was an important trading partner with strong religious and historical ties to Greece, and Serbia had supported the Greek position on the FYROM issue. Beginning in 1992, the Mitsotakis and Papandreou governments, fearing that the Bosnian war would spread in a direction that would involve Turkey, Albania, and Greece, undertook a long but fruitless series of peace negotiations with Serbia's president, Slobodan Milosevic, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and the Bosnian government. Meanwhile, food, oil, and arms were reported moving from Greece into Serbia in violation of the UN embargo. Before, during, and after its 1994 presidency of the EU, Greece was the only EU nation to back the Serbian position that Serbian forces had entered Bosnian territory in response to Bosnian provocations. In early 1994, Greece incurred the displeasure of its European allies by voting against NATO air strikes on Serbian positions. Greece also refused the use of its NATO air bases at Preveza on the Ionian Sea for such attacks and refused to supply Greek troops to the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. In NATO, Greece's position was diametrically opposed to that of Turkey, which supported the Bosnian Muslims.

In December 1994, after official talks with Milosevic in Athens, Papandreou reiterated that the positions of Greece and Serbia on the Bosnia issue were virtually identical. A Milosevic proposal for a confederation of Greece and Serbia with FYROM failed to gain support among any faction in Greece.

### ***The Macedonian Dispute***

The dissolution of Yugoslavia also fueled a bitter confrontation between Greece and the neighboring Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Initially fashioned into a republic in the late 1940s under Marshall Josip Broz Tito, the ethnically mixed territory that Tito called the Republic of Macedonia sought international recognition of its indepen-

dence under terms that many Greeks consider threatening to their territorial integrity. Greece contended that by calling itself *Macedonia*, the new state usurped the glory associated with the Hellenic empire of Philip of Macedonia and his son Alexander the Great (fourth century B.C.). That era has been a proud historical heritage of the large northern Greek region that throughout history has borne the name of Macedonia.

Greece's position has been that the 1913 division of the larger territory of Macedonia never was meant to create ethnic claims by a separate and distinct Macedonian nation. Greece has charged that the newly created state has irredentist and expansionist designs against its neighbors, Greece in particular. Besides the use of the name Macedonia, FYROM has used the ancient Macedonian "star of Vergina," a Greek-treasured symbol of Philip's kingdom, in its national flag. On a more substantive level, the preamble to FYROM's constitution calls on Macedonians everywhere to rise and unite under FYROM's flag—a rallying cry that Greeks find incendiary.

Since September 1991, two different Greek administrations have attempted to convince the international community of the seriousness of FYROM's threat by bringing the dispute before the UN, while at the same time trying to conduct a dialogue with President Kiro Gligorov of FYROM. The UN-sponsored efforts almost came to fruition in the summer of 1993, but hopes for a settlement faded soon thereafter. Meanwhile, on the Greek domestic front, the formation of the nationalist PA party just before the 1993 elections forced all Greek parties to harden their positions on the FYROM issue.

In February 1994, after only a few months of frustrating negotiations, and during its six-month term in the rotating presidency of the EU, the new Papandreou government imposed a trade embargo on all nonhumanitarian goods bound for FYROM via Greek ports of entry. Although all Greek political parties and the general public supported Papandreou's initiative, foreign reactions, especially those of NATO and the EU, ranged from negative to outraged. Dissenting voices inside Greece pointed out that the country's largely symbolic stance had isolated it from its European partners and increased the threat of a generalized conflict in an already explosive situation in the Balkans.

None of these arguments affected the official Greek stand. Two months later, the European Commission (see Glossary)

asked the European Court of Justice for an injunction against the Greek embargo as a serious breach of EU law.

Despite the general success of its 1994 EU presidency, Greece did not manage to use that opportunity to advance its position on FYROM. UN-sponsored mediation by veteran United States negotiator Cyrus Vance and, subsequently, by Clinton emissary Matthew Nimetz, succeeded only in establishing that the question of the country's name and its connotations remained the central stumbling block to any agreement.

In late June 1994, the European Court of Justice rejected the European Commission's request for an immediate temporary injunction against the Greek embargo. Although resolution of the case itself was still several months away, this decision restored national confidence in diplomatic approaches. After FYROM president Kiro Gligorov was reelected in November, negotiations resumed, but the participants broke them off almost immediately, and Greece again appealed to the EU for redress.

### ***Relations with Albania***

During most of the Cold War, relations between Greece and its northwestern neighbor Albania were tense, mainly because the large Greek minority population (estimated at between 250,000 and 400,000) in Albania was deprived of basic human rights by the Stalinist Albanian regime of Enver Hoxha. Relations with Albania made great strides in the mid-1980s, however, although the two countries were still technically at war under a Greek royal decree issued in 1940.

After 1978, when Albania began friendly overtures to Greece, cooperation in trade expanded steadily. In January 1985, the border between the two countries was reopened for the first time in forty-five years; this event was greeted by both sides as heralding a new era in their relations, although full normalization required another two years.

The fall of the last Albanian communist regime in 1990 was followed by total economic collapse, however; after a short period of liberalization, tensions increased again between the two countries. The key issue was the thousands of Albanian and Greek-Albanian refugees who began pouring into Greece once the Albanian border was opened fully. Greece was unable to stem this flow, which at times exceeded 900 persons per day and reportedly included some criminal elements.

In 1991, in an effort to limit the influx of refugees by improving economic conditions in Albania, the Mitsotakis government signed an interbank agreement granting Albania US\$20 million in credits. These funds were largely wasted, however, and five months later, after Albania had joined the CSCE, several international organizations called for an end to relief aid until the money's proper application could be ensured. Albanian president Sali Berisha was accused of corruption and misappropriating loans from the World Bank (see Glossary). After these allegations, as well as renewed charges of human rights violations, Greece, as president of the EU, supported the suspension of some 35 million European currency units (ECUs—see Glossary) that had been earmarked for Albanian aid by the European Community Finance Organization (ECO-FIN). As economic conditions in Albania worsened, Berisha tried to divert public opinion by harassing human rights activists, among whom were the leaders of Omonia, an opposition political party representing the Greek minority in the south of Albania (referred to in Greece as Northern Epirus) that had elected five deputies in the 1991 Albanian parliamentary election.

Meanwhile, refugee traffic at Greece's borders increased until the Greek minority in Albania was reduced to an estimated 35 percent of its former size at the end of 1993. Minor incidents at the Greek-Albanian border became daily occurrences as resentments built up on both sides. In April 1994, two Albanians were killed at a military camp close to the Greek border. Although the killers were never caught, the Greek-Albanian population received the blame. In May six leading members of Omonia were arrested for crimes against the state. The Stalinist-style trial that began in August attracted the attention and concern of European jurists and President Clinton. Meanwhile, the Greek government had started large daily deportations of Albanian illegal immigrants.

Although Prime Minister Papandreou offered to loosen aid restrictions if the trial were ended, the Omonia leaders were convicted and jailed. As Greece vowed to seek redress, Greek-Albanian relations reached another low point, and their future was thrown into uncertainty.

## **Russia**

The process of democratic consolidation pursued by the Karamanlis governments during the 1970s had included



among its objectives the steady improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. Several bilateral economic cooperation agreements included large and sensitive projects ranging from the construction of energy plants to arranging for the servicing of Soviet ships in Greece. Regular exchanges of top-level visits, initiated by Karamanlis, continued under the two PASOK administrations in the 1980s.

In the 1980s, Western observers and Greek opposition leaders frequently charged that PASOK's "independent and multi-dimensional" foreign policy gave the appearance of a pro-Soviet bias. For example, Papandreou described the United States as "the metropolis of imperialism," and in 1983 he praised Polish communist party first secretary Wojciech Jaruzelski as a patriot rather than condemning Jaruzelski's declaration of martial law in Poland.

Explaining these statements, Papandreou argued that he was trying to wean Greece from total dependence on the United States and to end "one-sided alignment with one specific bloc." Although the prime minister's comments clearly irritated Greece's American and European allies, the Greek-Soviet ties established in the 1980s survived the political upheaval that ended the Soviet Union in quite good condition. Russian president Boris N. Yeltsin made a successful visit to Athens in 1993, and in July 1994 a high-level delegation from the Greek defense ministry continued a long series of official visits to Russia.

## **The Middle East**

Greek governments have traditionally pursued a policy of friendship with the Arab states. This relationship is based on both historical and contemporary factors. Greece shares with the Arabs a common history of subjugation by the Ottoman Turks, and a large proportion of Christian Arabs are of the Greek Orthodox faith. Many Arab states have had large and prosperous Greek communities within their boundaries. The largest such community was in Egypt. In the 1950s, however, the Egyptian government forced most resident foreign businessmen, including Greeks, to leave the country in an effort to foster growth in the Egyptian middle class by reducing foreign business competition.

After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, as the politics of the Middle East grew more complex, Greece called for Israel's evacuation of all occupied Arab land and supported the Palestinian strug-

gle for an independent homeland. At the same time, Greece supported Israel's right to exist within safe and internationally guaranteed borders; this position was consistent with Greece's *de facto* recognition since 1948 of Israel's right to statehood.

In the wake of the oil crisis and the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, both in the mid-1970s, Greece's Middle East policy appeared to slant strongly toward the Arabs. The change was dictated by two needs: Arab support for Greece's Cyprus policies and stable oil supplies from the Arab oil producers.

In the 1980s, PASOK administrations followed an actively pro-Arab policy, culminating in the granting of diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), whose connection with terrorist acts had made it an outcast to most Western nations. Even while PASOK support of the PLO was unwavering and contacts increased with hard-line Arab states such as Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, the Greek socialist regime also pursued a parallel policy of greater accommodation with Israel.

The end of the 1980s brought a significant change in Greek policy in the Middle East, an event not unexpected in view of the negligible gains that the pro-Arab policy had made for the Greek cause in Cyprus. The end of the Cold War and the outcome of the 1991 Persian Gulf War pointed to a potentially different Mediterranean region free from the chilling prospect of superpower confrontations. Since its full *de jure* recognition of Israel in 1990, Greece has maintained cordial ties and strong economic bonds with all the states at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Greek political system showed signs of stabilization after many decades of drastic shifts from civilian to military and liberal to conservative governance. In the 1980s, ND changed leaders without dissolving into factions, and PASOK was expected to do the same eventually upon the retirement of Andreas Papandreou. The year 1994 marked twenty years of domination by those two parties. Although political power has continued to shift frequently between conservative and liberal parties, both main party platforms have moderated in domestic and foreign policy. The largest remaining question for Greek democracy is how quickly the old clientalist relationships, which still prosper in many quarters, can be shed in favor of a more appropriately varied representation of public interests.

As it entered the mid-1990s, Greece found itself in a generally better-balanced geopolitical environment than it had enjoyed during most of the twentieth century. The heavy reliance on the United States and NATO for national security eased greatly when the bipolar nature of European military configuration ended and NATO began considering new international roles (and new members) for itself. The chronic and multifaceted disputes with Turkey remained an unresolved threat to national security, however, and multiple crises with the former communist nations to the north found Greece taking controversial positions that earned the disapproval of Western allies.

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Among the most useful recent works on Greek politics are several collections of articles on social, political, and economic facets of socialist rule in the 1980s. They include two volumes edited by Richard Clogg, *Greece in the 1980s* and *Greece 1981–1989: The Populist Decade*; *Political Change in Greece Before and after the Colonels*, edited by Kevin Featherstone and D.K. Katsoudas; *The Greek Socialist Experiment*, edited by Theodore C. Kariotis; and *Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order*, edited by Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros Thomadakis.

Nicos Mouzelis's *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America* provides insight into the current Greek political setting. English and Greek editions of the *Southeast European Yearbook* focus on additional aspects of foreign affairs and document official government positions, facts, and figures. In *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus*, Monteagle Stearns covers a central problem in Greek foreign relations; an equally timely discussion of Greek attitudes toward the outside world is *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, edited by Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)



## Chapter 5. National Security



*Member of the Evzone (Presidential Honor Guard) on parade*

THE EARLY TO MID-1990S have been a period of drastic change in the national security conditions of the member nations of the European Union (EU—see Glossary) and of the Balkan countries. For Greece, this change has been complicated by a domestic political metamorphosis that began in 1974 and has continued into the 1990s. Among the factors exerting influence on Greece's security situation during this period are political, economic, social, and leadership variables; Greece's regional setting in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean; and, in a broader global context, the replacement of Cold War bipolarity with the more transitional and fluid geopolitical order that emerged in the early 1990s.

In the post-Cold War world, the geopolitical environment of Greece includes a security network of stable nations—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary) and the EU—working toward common goals. A second element of that environment, however, is an increasingly active group of less stable nations characterized by conflicting territorial claims, violent ethnic disharmony, and the threat of conflict. The characteristics of the latter group are similar to those that prevailed in the region before World War I and during the interwar period. In the mid-1990s, Greece finds itself along the border between the two groups: a solidly entrenched member of Western military and economic alliances but strongly linked to the less stable communities by a combination of historical alliances (with Serbia, for example) and antagonistic territorial claims (against the Ottoman Empire, for example).

Greece is located at the junction of three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. It is an integral part of the Balkans, where it is the only country that is a member of the EU, the Western European Union (WEU—see Glossary), and NATO. Greece also is in close proximity to the oil-rich and politically sensitive Middle East. Most important, Greece's position in the Mediterranean region—a crucial area of contact between North and South—enhances its strategic importance.

This strategic position accounts for Greece's 1952 entry into NATO. During the Cold War, Greece provided an essential link in NATO's southeastern flank. The linkage was especially important considering Greece's proximity to Turkey, a fellow NATO member whose location has two unique aspects: it is the

only NATO member nation bordering the former Soviet Union below the Arctic Circle, and it is the only member nation bordering potentially hostile countries of the Middle East. Greece thus constitutes the most direct connection between Turkey and Western Europe (although Greece itself has no land connection with a NATO nation except Turkey). In the opinion of many Greek decision makers, the country's strategic importance has been underestimated by the West and, at times, even neglected.

As early as the mid-1950s, NATO's southeastern flank was experiencing periodic cycles of international tension. The emergence of the Cyprus problem in the 1950s, the Greek-Turkish crises of the 1960s, the Greek junta-sponsored coup in Cyprus in 1974, and the resultant Turkish military intervention in Cyprus (beginning a standoff on the island that continues to the present day) were complicated by a series of Greek-Turkish frictions in the Aegean Sea (see Turkey, ch. 4).

In the 1970s and 1980s, the strategic importance of NATO's southeastern flank increased significantly with the continuing oil crises of 1973 and 1979 and the growing tensions and instability in the region of the Persian Gulf. Important elements of that instability were the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979; the fall of Western ally Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, ruler of Iran, in 1979; the outbreak of all-out war between Iran and Iraq in 1980; and the increased involvement of the United States in protecting vital oil shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf.

## **Historical Background**

The national security history of twentieth-century Greece can be divided into a pre-1974 period and a post-1974 period, when full civilian control of the military emerged, too late to forestall a disastrous misadventure in Cyprus but in time to end the continual internal political conflict that had made Greece vulnerable to outside domination and needing the support of powerful allies throughout the early twentieth century. The post-1974 period has brought enhanced internal stability and the desire for greater independence in national security matters.

### **National Security Before 1974**

In the period 1912–74, Greece experienced considerable turbulence in its external and internal relations. Economically,



Greece was classified with the poor, agrarian, raw material-producing, trade-dependent, and externally indebted nations—in short, it was underdeveloped. The polarized political world of Greece featured political parties based on personality and patron-client relations and the largesse of a bloated state sector offered to supporters when the parties gained power. The years 1915–74 were marked by deep schisms between royalists and republicans, communists and nationalists, whose bitter struggles sapped the energy of reform (see *The Venizelos Era*, ch. 1). These conflicts resulted in frequent military interventions in politics, including military dictatorships in 1925–26, 1936–41, and 1967–74. In 1946–49, a bloody and destructive Civil War, following soon after the German occupation in World War II, deeply scarred all of Greek society (see *The Terrible Decade: Occupation and Civil War, 1940–50*, ch. 1).

Although modern Greece had enjoyed sustained and functional democratic institutions throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the twentieth century brought with it nearly constant challenges to democratic institutions by competing models of monarchical authoritarianism and communist totalitarianism. For this reason, during most of the twentieth century, political scientists classified Greece in the "praetorian zone" on the fringe of Western democracy, together with states such as Spain, Portugal, and Turkey.

In the turbulent twentieth century, the external relations of Greece were shaped by two world wars, totalitarian ideologies, competing nationalisms, and the Holocaust, as well as by more specific international conflicts such as the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the Greco-Turkish War of 1921–22. All these events, which were very much a reflection of general turbulence in Europe (and particularly in the Balkans), affected the setting of Greece's boundaries as they were formally defined in 1923 by the Treaty of Lausanne and in 1947 by the Treaty of Paris.

Given its strategic location, throughout the twentieth century Greece was subject to competing bids for Great Power penetration. Being nearly totally surrounded by the sea placed the nation under the direct influence of two Great Powers that exercised naval control in the Mediterranean—Britain throughout the nineteenth century and up to 1947, and the United States after that time. The collapse of the last Greek military dictatorship, which was triggered by that government's attempt to establish a compatible regime in Cyprus in the sum-

mer of 1974, began a new era. The preconditions for change had already been put in position: extremely high rates of economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, the rapid postwar urbanization of the population, and the consequent creation of a sizable middle class.

### **The Postjunta Transition**

In 1974, following the collapse of the military dictatorship, Konstantinos Karamanlis returned from political exile to preside over a remarkably smooth transition process leading to the establishment of democratic institutions that proved durable over the next twenty years. Under Karamanlis the deep divisions of the past were gradually bridged, and the effective reintegration of Greek society commenced. Karamanlis's pragmatic approach to the thorny issues of domestic communists, the fate of the monarchy (whose abolition was confirmed in a December 1974 referendum), the recent show of power by Turkey in Cyprus, and punishment for the junta ended decades of mutual recrimination in the Greek political arena while reducing clashes among outside powers competing for influence within Greece.

### ***The Cyprus Situation***

In 1960 the Republic of Cyprus was created from a former British colony off the southern coast of Turkey in the north-eastern corner of the Mediterranean Sea. The international agreements that created the nation attempted to guarantee the rights of the Turkish Cypriot minority (about 20 percent of a population that was otherwise almost entirely Greek Cypriot) in a fair allocation of governmental power and social privileges. In the years immediately following independence, however, the relative welfare and the interaction of the two ethnic groups in Cyprus became the object of constant quarrels, in which the nearby nations of Greece and Turkey naturally took great interest. A series of crises and armed conflicts, capped by the intervention of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in mid-1964, forced the Turkish Cypriot population into enclaves that were circumscribed by the increasingly active Greek Cypriot National Guard. By 1964 the government devised by the 1960 agreements included only Greek Cypriots. In the years that followed, confrontations alternated with international mediation efforts; twice in that period, in 1964 and in 1967, Turkey made military preparations to invade the island and protect the Turk-

ish Cypriot minority. At the same time, underground partisan groups, which had emerged in the early 1960s, gained much wider support in both communities. Such circumstances doomed the efforts of Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios III to preserve the island's independence. By the early 1970s, Cyprus was in fact a partitioned country, Makarios had lost all authority in the Turkish sector, and the government continued to function without its prescribed Turkish Cypriot contingent.

Makarios's position was further complicated by the support of the Greek ruling junta for Greek Cypriot backers of enosis (union with Greece). Finally, in July 1974 the junta backed the guerrilla organization EOKA B in a coup against Makarios, whose policies had blocked enosis. From the Turkish viewpoint, the attempt to join Cyprus to Greece was an unacceptable threat to the already isolated position of the Turkish Cypriot minority on the island. Acting officially as one of the three guarantors of Cypriot independence under the 1960 treaties (the others were Britain and Greece), Turkey responded to the coup with a swift and effective military occupation of northeastern Cyprus, which reinforced the de facto partition of the island into Greek and Turkish sectors.

### *Karamanlis Establishes Policy*

When Karamanlis came to office in Greece in 1974, he was faced with three options in the Cyprus situation. The first was to go to war with Turkey. But the Greek dictators, paradoxically, had kept Greece militarily exposed by leaving the Aegean Islands undefended against a possible Turkish military operation. The second option was to seek a truce so as to gain time and later begin a massive rearmament that would enable Greece to push the Turks out of Cyprus at an opportune moment. Had this option been chosen, Greece and Turkey likely would have initiated a chain reaction of revanchist wars similar to those that occurred between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The result of that decision would have been a climate of high tension that would have prevented Greece from securing membership in the EC. The third option was to arm Greece for purposes of adequate deterrence of future Turkish expansionism in Cyprus, the Aegean, and Thrace, while at the same time applying political, economic, and diplomatic pressures to promote a viable settlement in Cyprus and the Aegean.

Karamanlis took the third option, believing that at that point Greek national security required maximum integration into

the European Community (EC—see Glossary), even though from the Greek viewpoint that course meant abandoning certain territorial and nationalistic goals. Although Greece subsequently withdrew from the military structures of NATO in protest against perceived Western failure to prevent the Cyprus "invasion," Karamanlis's decision set an important precedent for Greek national security policy for the ensuing twenty years.

### **Policy in the 1980s and 1990s**

Spirited debate in the 1970s preceded Greece's entry into the EC. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panhellinion Socialistiko Kinima—PASOK), which had gained a significant political following in opposition to Karamanlis's weakening New Democracy (Nea Demokratia—ND) party, strongly opposed Greek membership. Since Greece formally entered the EC in January 1981, however, membership in the EC and its successor organization, the EU, has become almost universally accepted by all political parties as the centerpiece of Greece's foreign policy and national security institutions. Especially after 1990, that association exerted influence on nearly every aspect of Greek life (see International Economic Policy in the 1990s, ch. 3).

Between 1981 and 1994, EC/EU membership provided Greece an important foreign policy tool in relations with Turkey (see Greece and the European Community, ch. 4). Because membership in the EU is an important goal of Turkish foreign policy, Greece has used its membership as a lever to try to prevent Turkish membership (and large-scale EU aid to Turkey) until Cyprus and other Aegean issues are resolved to Greece's satisfaction. While presiding over the EU in the first half of 1994, Greece also attempted to capitalize on its EU status in its dispute against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM—the internationally accepted name of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia after it declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991) in order to prevent the latter from assuming (or expropriating, in the Greek view) the historical name of ancient Greek Macedonia. (Other issues, such as FYROM's use of Alexander the Great's sunburst symbol on its new flag, became subordinate to the "name" issue as negotiations proceeded.)

At the same time, membership in a highly institutionalized structure has restrained Greek foreign policy. In issues concerning both Turkey and northern neighbors such as FYROM,

Greece has found that its membership in the EC/EU has prevented it from pursuing nationalist or irredentist goals. The stabilizing influence of the EC/EU prevented Greece from taking sides in the chronic hostilities that followed the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991, and instead promoted participation in a constructive (if self-interested and futile) search for Balkan solutions (see *The Balkans*, ch. 4).

### **New Post-Cold War Concerns**

During the four decades of the Cold War, the undisguised adversarial relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (see Glossary) provided a high degree of stability in the Northern Hemisphere, albeit under the threat of general nuclear war. The end of the Cold War left previously well-defined global structures in a state of flux and raised the potential for new kinds of conflict—based, for example, on long-standing ethnic animosities—to erupt in many areas of the formerly stable North. To promote its security interests most effectively in this context, Greece has sought to integrate its policies with those of its EU partners and its NATO allies. In particular, this attitude has meant wide acceptance of the notion that collective Atlantic-European policies will facilitate a stable, conflict-free transition to political democracy and a market economy in postcommunist societies in the Balkans, hence meeting Greece's national security goals.

Since late 1991, however, adherence to these general guidelines has been considerably impeded by Greece's high-profile involvement in an emotional dispute over the nomenclature to be used for newly independent Slavic Macedonia. In the mid-1990s, there was considerable political friction between Greece and fellow EU members as a result of Greece's unilateral embargo against FYROM. The action provoked sharp disapproval and threats of legal action by the EU (see *Greece and the European Community*, ch. 4). In addition, Greece's pro-Serbian sympathies and its refusal to back or in any way facilitate NATO air strikes on Serbian positions in Bosnia, as well as its refusal to contribute troops to peacekeeping forces in Bosnia, exacerbated Greek-EU tensions. Greece's efforts in the early 1990s to broaden and deepen ties with the EU, the WEU, and NATO were also complicated by disunity in the NATO alliance in the face of the strategic and ideological vacuum that remained after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

## **The External Elements of National Security**

The three most important external elements of Greece's security profile are the EU, the WEU, and NATO. The nations of the EU, whose extensive commitment to regional governance has indirectly solidified and supplemented Greece's national defense position, would assumedly use diplomatic and military force to protect their investments in Greece against potential attack from outside.

The second element is the WEU, originally intended as the military arm of a united Europe, then resurrected after being abandoned in the 1970s and the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, the WEU was touted as the European pillar of NATO's defense forces. For Greece's security structure, however, the WEU offers uncertain benefits, mainly because the organization's eventual role remains unknown. The unanswered question is whether the WEU will evolve into the exclusive defense component of the EU, or whether other, non-EU European states might be brought into an inclusive European pillar of NATO. The WEU could assume quite substantial significance for Greece if the United States were to reduce dramatically its military presence in Central Europe and the Mediterranean. In any case, in the future Greece is likely to rely on the WEU for at least some part of the collective security of its region.

Finally, the most far-reaching element of national defense and security is the collective defense structure of NATO. Membership in the "Atlantic community" represented by NATO integrates Greece into the most powerful military alliance ever assembled. Although internal politics have made Greek relations with NATO problematic in past decades, reliance on the alliance's security mechanisms has become a firm foundation of national security policy in the 1990s—even though the alliance's automatic support would be doubtful in case of dispute or hostilities with Turkey.

Membership in other international institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—see Glossary) and the Council of Europe (see Glossary) further enhances the likelihood that Greece can settle disputes through peaceful processes. Greece's participation in the CSCE process (which now has been applied in the Caucasus, beyond the southeastern border of Europe) ensures that Greek perspectives are heard in an international forum where human rights, minority issues, and confidence-building measures are discussed.

## **The Role of the United States**

In 1953 the first defense cooperation agreement between Greece and the United States was signed, providing for the establishment and operation of American military installations on Greek territory. Major installations included the Hellinikon Air Base and Nea Makri Naval Communications Station (both near Athens), Heraklion Air Station, Gournes Communications Station, and Souda Bay Air Base and Port (all in Crete). In the mid-1990s, the only operating facility that remains is the base at Souda Bay, which provides direct operational support for the United States Sixth Fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. In the past, bases in Greece also provided the United States surveillance of Soviet naval activities in the eastern Mediterranean, ammunition and supply storage sites, and support for the United States Air Force Europe and Military Airlift Command (MAC). The installations were under joint Greek and United States command. In 1972 an agreement with the military dictatorship provided home-port access for the Sixth Fleet at the port of Eleusis near Athens. A controversial issue in Greece even under the dictatorship, the project was abandoned in 1975 after the fall of the military regime.

Bilateral defense relations between Greece and the United States have been regulated by Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreements (DECAs), as well as Defense and Industrial Cooperation Agreements (DICAs). Despite occasionally harsh rhetoric toward the United States in the early 1980s, the socialist government of Andreas Papandreou nevertheless signed a new DECA in September 1983. In 1990, after several years of negotiation, a Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) on the establishment and operation of United States forces in Greece was signed. The 1990 agreement was facilitated by unilateral United States decisions to close some of its military installations in Greece (see *The United States*, ch. 4). The 1990 agreement is scheduled to expire in 1998.

## **Geopolitical Considerations of National Security**

In the mid-1990s, Greece's most critical concerns were chronic disagreements with and a perceived security threat from fellow NATO member Turkey and instability in the Balkans. Greece's tense relationship with Turkey is its most intractable international problem and has colored postwar economic and defense planning. In the mid-1990s, the public and all

Greek political parties continued to regard Turkey as the principal threat to Greek security, and this perception was used to justify increased military spending (see Turkey, ch. 4). The effects of instability in three former communist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, and the disparate elements of the former Yugoslavia), where various degrees of internal friction could overflow into neighboring countries, are also of immediate concern to Greece. Protection of human rights for the Greek minority in Albania and the need to resolve the domestically delicate question of recognition of FYROM and the conflicts this question arouses between Greece and its allies in the EU and NATO are primary security worries as well (see The Balkans, ch. 4).

### **Assessing the Turkish Threat**

Assessment of the potential military threat from Turkey has long been a key concern of public opinion and the topic of constant debate among Greek security planners. The issue's urgency is rooted in the 1974 Cyprus crisis, which can be regarded as a turning point in post-World War II Greek security orientations. The alarm caused in Greece by the Turkish military intervention was the stimulus for a general reevaluation of national security doctrine.

Since the invasion, periodic nationalist declarations by radical factions in Turkey, which usually make headlines in Greek newspapers, have intensified Greek fears. A second factor in Greece's fear of Turkey is the program of armed forces modernization that Turkey has undertaken since 1991. Greece's perception of Turkey as a threat to national security has long been used to justify increased military expenditures and weapons procurements by Greece. But a continued, major expansion of Greek arms procurement is something the Greek economy can ill afford.

Greek military planners envision that the Turkish threat might take one of several forms: a Turkish attempt to extend its Cyprus occupation zone; to take over Greece's easternmost islands in the Aegean Sea, control of whose continental shelf is a burning issue; and/or to "protect" the Muslim minority in Thrace.

In late 1994, the issue of territorial waters between Greece's Aegean Islands and the Turkish mainland assumed greater urgency, at least on a rhetorical level. From the Greek perspective, a major concern is the prospect of a Turkish seizure of





*Military parade on National Day (Independence Day), March 25  
Courtesy Press and Information Office,  
Embassy of Greece, Washington*

Greek islands in response to a de facto Greek extension of the territorial waters limit of its islands from six to twelve miles. Such a move would be in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which went into effect for most of the world in November 1994. (Through the end of 1994, Greece had signed but not ratified the treaty.) Were Greece to ratify and activate the terms of the treaty, it would in effect control sea access to ports on Turkey's west coast and to the Black Sea to the north. Turkey has repeatedly warned that such an act would be considered a *casus belli* (see Turkey, ch. 4). The Greek position has been that Greece has the right to extend territorial waters at some time in the future, but that Greece has no immediate intention of doing so. When the treaty went into effect for signatories in November 1994, Greece and Turkey both were holding naval maneuvers in the Aegean, and the rhetoric of both countries escalated.

A related source of Greek-Turkish tension is the dispute over the airspace above the Aegean. The issue, which surfaced in 1931, when Turkey refused to recognize the ten-mile territorial air limit first claimed that year by Greece, gained intensity after 1974. In the early 1990s, mock dogfights occurred frequently between Greek and Turkish pilots, whose interpretation of appropriate use of airspace differed. The frequency of these incidents plus the speed of the aircraft and the compactness of the airspace markedly increase the probability of a real air engagement with potential for escalation. Moreover, resolution of the airspace issue is a key to gaining both Greek and Turkish support for funding of NATO airbases at Larisa in Greece and at Izmir in Turkey.

Greek policy makers also view the Muslim population of northeastern Greece (Greek Thrace), estimated at 120,000, as a potential threat to national security. The Muslim population is composed of 50 percent Turks, 34 percent Pomaks (Muslim Bulgarians), and 16 percent Roma (Gypsies). By mutual consent of Greece and Turkey, the status of this minority has been tied to the fortunes of the Greek population in Istanbul and on the offshore islands of Gokceada (Imroz) and Bozcaada (over 200,000 strong in 1923 but only about 3,000 in 1994). The gradual depletion of the Greek minority in Turkey has changed the balance of this understanding, however. The demographic strength of the Muslims, coupled with pro-Turkish activity in Greek Thrace, occasionally has created tense relations between Christian and Muslim citizens in Greece.

Occasional threats by Turkish nationalist extremists such as the Bati Trakya organization to intervene in Thrace "to liberate their oppressed kin" have not been echoed by responsible Turkish authorities, nor have they attracted significant attention outside the immediate region. Nevertheless, Greek planners take potential Turkish aspirations in Greek Thrace seriously. In addition, in the Greek view, Bulgaria's treatment of its own Turkish minority, which the communist regime of Todor Zhivkov attempted to Bulgarianize in the 1980s, could play a role in ethnic conditions in Thrace because of that region's close proximity to Bulgaria's Turkish communities.

## **Security in the Balkans**

For reasons of geographical proximity and historical connections, Greece has a compelling interest in the Balkan region. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, several factors have radically altered the basic premises of Greece's traditional Balkan policy. Those factors are Turkey's increasing Balkan activism, regional political and economic instability, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the prospect of revisions in its southern border, and the strategic reorientation of Bulgaria.

Besides the other burdens on the Greek-Turkish relationship, Turkey's perceived desire to become a regional power in the Balkans is a security worry for Greece. In the Greek view, the existence of Muslim communities and minorities in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Bulgaria, and FYROM might tempt Ankara to develop a "Turkish network" in the Balkans that would isolate Greece and Bulgaria in this area.

Greece's fears of outside orchestration of events in the Balkan region have inflated the "Macedonia issue" into a far wider international concern than normally would be warranted by a small, land-locked entity such as FYROM. This distraction has been particularly worrisome because Greece's responses to the FYROM situation (as well as its divergent views on Bosnia and Serbia) have created animosity toward Greece within the EU (see Greece and the European Community; the Balkans, ch. 4).

Greece seeks stability in the Balkans, and, as the Balkan state that is comparatively the most affluent, stable, democratic, and Western-oriented, it is ideally situated to play the role of interlocutor in the region. But it is unclear whether such a role is now possible, given Greece's festering disputes with Turkey and its strained relations with the EU.

Greece's approach to its security interests in the Balkans has not been influenced by irredentist claims on its neighbors. Although the Megali Idea (Great Idea) of including all Greeks in the Greek state played an important role in foreign policy before World War II, the Greek government has renounced all territorial claims on southern Albania, still called Northern Epirus by Greek nationalists. An important national security consideration in this region, however, is the possibility that violent ethnic hostilities in FYROM could bring outside powers into the region or trigger a large-scale refugee movement into Greek territory. In a period of recession and high unemployment, large numbers of illegal workers place extra pressure on the struggling Greek economy (see Emigration and Immigration, ch. 2).

In the 1980s, Greece's security doctrine deemphasized the Warsaw Pact as a security threat, in spite of the shared border with Bulgaria, the Soviet Union's most loyal Warsaw Pact ally. Because of its defense relationship with the United States, complemented by participation in NATO, Athens could afford to devote relatively minor resources and energy toward security measures to its north. In an age of mutual nuclear vulnerability, it was correctly assumed, neither superpower would tolerate a regional interbloc conflict in the Balkans.

In the Cold War era, Greek-Bulgarian consultations on security matters were encouraged by the common threat felt by both countries from Turkish military power and political interests in the Balkans (Bulgarian-Turkish relations were particularly difficult as a result of Bulgaria's official efforts to Slavify

its large Turkish minority in the mid-1980s). In this context, commentators began to discuss an Athens-Sofia axis in the late 1980s. More recently Greece has become concerned about Bulgaria's potential role in encouraging integrative policies between Bulgaria and FYROM, especially considering that political relations between Sofia and Ankara have improved considerably since Bulgaria ended its status as a client-state of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the prospects for a true Turkish-Bulgarian rapprochement seemed remote in the mid-1990s, and Greek-Bulgarian relations began to improve again as Bulgaria adopted a more balanced approach in its relations with its two NATO neighbors. For example, in 1994 Greece and Bulgaria agreed on construction of an oil pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece, connecting the Black Sea to the Aegean and bypassing Turkey.

The deepening crisis in former Yugoslavia concerns Athens for economic and strategic reasons. First, there is the fear that Balkan instability, either limited to former Yugoslavia or more general, will inhibit the integration of Greece into the European mainstream. The economic dimensions of this problem are quite significant. Until the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991, Greece had relied on road and rail communications through that country for some 40 percent of its trade with the European market. Prolonged disruption of this vital link has crippled that connection, as did the imposition of UN sanctions against the rump Yugoslav state (consisting of Montenegro and Serbia) in 1992. In 1994 Greek authorities estimated that sanctions have caused losses of up to US\$10 million per day, although Greece is known to have violated the embargo.

Also of concern to Greece is the fear that ethnic violence between the 90 percent Albanian Muslim majority and the Montenegrin and Serbian minority in the Serbian province of Kosovo might spill over into adjacent territory. Were an outbreak of Albanian separatism to include the neighboring Albanian-populated Tetovo region of FYROM, Serbian efforts to subdue Albanian Kosovan separatism might also cross the frontier, bringing FYROM into the conflict. But even if hostilities were to be contained within Kosovo, the movement of thousands of refugees to Albania or farther south might cause ethnic Greeks living in southern Albania to flee to Greece. The increasing role of Albanians in secessionism within FYROM, where they now constitute about 30 percent of the population, could further destabilize the area. Great population move-

ments southward could have serious consequences for Greece as well as for the whole region.

## **National Security Doctrine**

The evolution of Greece's national security doctrine since World War II has been determined by the country's own relative strength and by changes in threat perception. The Cyprus events of 1974 dramatically changed the country's view of its primary threat. Attention since then has focused almost exclusively on Turkey.

### **Historical Development**

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the difference between Greek conservatives and liberals (the communist party having been banned after the Civil War) on security issues and participation in NATO was one of emphasis. Both groups basically believed that Greece's main security threat emanated from the Warsaw Pact military power across its northern borders. NATO was viewed, therefore, as indispensable for the defense of the country, and the United States was treated as Greece's natural ally and guarantor.

From the end of the Civil War in 1949, Greek governments, given the nation's dependence on the United States, yielded to that power on most issues concerning national defense and security arrangements. The Greek armed forces were equipped exclusively with American arms, and the hundreds of Greek officers who received advanced military training in the United States welcomed the continuity of their host country's influence on the Greek armed forces.

The orientation of Greece's national defense doctrine until the mid-1960s was based on the United States credo that the main security threat was internal rather than external. The Greek army was primarily supplied and organized to face a domestic communist threat. According to NATO planning, in case of global war between the superpowers, Greece was only expected to cause some delay to Soviet and satellite forces.

When international tension relaxed somewhat in the late 1960s, the perception of a domestic communist threat being supported by Greece's communist neighbors diminished considerably. Rather, after the 1964 and 1974 Cyprus crises, a main concern became a confrontation between the two Balkan

NATO allies. Greek security planning could no longer focus only on internal danger and NATO defense prescriptions.

The end of the Cold War, the overthrow of Soviet-supported communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the collapse of the Soviet Union have led, rather paradoxically, to a darkening of Greece's security horizons and a rather complete reassessment of national security requirements. Until the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Hellenic Armed Forces had two primary missions: defending the country against an attack by the Soviet Union or its Balkan satellites and assisting in the maintenance of Western control over the eastern Mediterranean Sea in time of conflict. After the 1974 invasion, the security focus shifted.

### **Defense Posture after 1974**

Since 1974, the Hellenic Armed Forces' primary mission has been maintaining a balance of power with Turkey, specifically deterring infringement of Greek national interests and sovereignty and preventing a Turkish attack on the Greek Cypriot portion of Cyprus. As a secondary mission, Greece's status as a member of NATO requires military contributions to that alliance's efforts to deter threats in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Mediterranean originating outside the region.

Greece's military doctrine is defensive on the strategic level, in accordance with the overall doctrine of NATO. The objective is to deter any threat or actual attack against Greece and to protect Greek national interests. The doctrine of forward defense has been adopted by the Hellenic Armed Forces.

On the tactical level, the doctrine may have a defensive or a counteroffensive orientation, according to circumstances. The impressive performance of the United States Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf War prompted Greece to reorganize its land forces, putting greater emphasis on smaller units (moving primary focus from divisions and regiments to brigades and battalions), combining the increased mobility of armored personnel carriers and helicopters with enhanced firepower. The main task of the air and naval components of the armed forces in case of armed conflict with Turkey would be to deter Turkish attempts to occupy Greek islands in the Aegean Sea and, concurrently, to support the defense of Cyprus. More specifically, the Hellenic Navy is expected to maintain control of the seas, intercept and destroy enemy amphibious forces, protect lines of communication, and transport reinforcements to the islands. The Hellenic Air Force is expected to maintain air

superiority, support land and naval operations, attack first- and second-echelon forces in Thrace (providing at the same time close air support for Greek land forces), neutralize amphibious forces in the Aegean, and strike at vital targets on the enemy's territory.

In 1994 Greece and Cyprus announced the creation of a Joint Defense Area. According to this doctrine, as long as Turkey maintained an occupation force of more than 30,000 troops in Cyprus, Greek and Cypriot forces would remain in the posture of joint defense. In this context, any attack against the Republic of Cyprus would constitute a *casus belli* for Greece. In 1994 some 950 regular Greek troops were in Cyprus, and 1,300 Greek noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers were detailed to the Greek Cypriot National Guard, the republic's active armed force. That force's senior officer corps is composed mainly of Greeks; the commanding officer is a general of the Hellenic Army selected by the Ministry of Defense of Greece in consultation with the Hellenic General Staff when the command becomes vacant.

## **Greece in NATO**

The evolution of NATO's post-Cold War European strategies toward deterrence and crisis management has played an important role in the development of Greece's military doctrine. Greek policy is to adopt new doctrines and strategic options prescribed by NATO whenever such changes are compatible with its national security interests. Greece has expressed its intention to contribute troops in the near future to the Allied Mobile Force of NATO's Allied Command Europe (ACE). In 1994 Greece was contributing one division to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), and it will participate in the Multinational Division in the Southern Region.

Greece participates in NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), which consists of destroyers and escort ships, and the Strategic Allied Command Europe prescribes a pivotal role for the Hellenic Navy in the Multinational Maritime Force in instances of limited aggression in the Mediterranean. The E-3A aircraft of NATO's Airborne Early Warning Force are manned by integrated crews from eleven nations, including Greece. The main forward operating base of the E-3A component is maintained at Preveza on Greece's Ionian coast. A number of NATO air defense installations also are

located in Greece. Greece has offered headquarters facilities for the Multinational Division in Thessaloniki.

Nevertheless, disagreements between Greece and Turkey have hindered some aspects of the two nations' participation in the NATO alliance and have complicated the strategic preparations of the alliance. At the end of 1994, NATO was attempting to finalize establishment at Larisa of the NATO headquarters responsible for land defense of Greece and Italy (LAND-SOUTHCENT). Greece had reversed its 1993 blockage of the arrangement, but in 1994 Turkey refused its support until Greek and Turkish airspace over the Aegean Sea is firmly defined. The Joint Staff of NATO had set its manning plan for the LANDSOUTHCENT headquarters in early 1994, but subsequent Turkish and Greek disagreements defied NATO efforts to find a satisfactory compromise on the timing of commitments. Until a comprehensive settlement of their differences is reached, such bickering will prevent both Greece and Turkey from making full contributions to NATO activities in the strategically sensitive eastern Mediterranean.

The Greek armed forces made a significant contribution to the UN effort in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. The Hellenic Air Force carried out air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance, and it relocated aircraft and deployed radar stations in its southeast sector. Most Greek airfields were made available to United States and allied aircraft. During the war, bases on Crete and Rhodes received nearly 3,000 aircraft from United States aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. Greece also contributed a frigate to the allied Maritime Interdiction Force and supported UN sanctions against Iraq.

## **The National Defense Establishment**

The current national defense system is designed to guarantee civilian control of the armed forces, a vital constraint in view of the 1967 coup and the seven-year military dictatorship that followed. The 1975 constitution, ratified one year after the collapse of the junta, fixes the mechanism of command. After the restoration of democratic rule in 1974 and the limited purge in the Hellenic Armed Forces that followed in its wake, civilian control over the military has never been in question (see *The Junta*, ch. 1). The role of the military has been limited to defense matters, and all significant decisions concerning national security issues are made by the government.




## **The Command Structure**

According to the Greek constitution, as amended in 1986, the president of the republic is the supreme commander of the armed forces, but his powers are largely symbolic. Military command decisions are made by the prime minister and the government. The Government Council for Foreign Policy and National Defense, which convenes once a year and in emergency conditions, appoints the chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff (English acronym HNDGS) and the chiefs of staff of the three military branches: the Hellenic Army, Hellenic Navy, and Hellenic Air Force. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Council is an advisory board to the chief of the HNDGS.

The chief of the HNDGS is the supreme military commander of the armed forces in times of crisis or war. In peacetime, the chiefs of staff of the three branches report directly to the minister of defense (see fig. 12). The post of chief of the HNDGS alternates every two years on an almost regular basis among officers of the three branches. The branch chiefs of staff serve two-year terms, although the term can be extended if deemed necessary.

## **The Officer Corps**

Officers have enjoyed a unique status in Greek society, to the extent that in some respects they have formed a separate caste. During the twentieth century, the military has repeatedly intervened in Greek political life, establishing a military dictatorship on three occasions, in 1925, 1936, and 1967 (see *The Military in Politics*, ch. 4). Since the restoration of democracy and the trial and incarceration of the leaders of the 1967 coup, however, officers have consistently refrained from intervening in political life. The converse of that statement has not always been true, however, particularly given that general and flag officers serve at the pleasure of the prime minister. In addition, shortly after PASOK's 1993 election victory, a new law legalized the recall of retired officers to active duty. When four retired officers with political connections with PASOK were recalled and appointed chiefs of staff, thirty-five senior army, navy, and air force officers resigned in protest. Although changes in top staff positions had occurred after previous changes of government, this was the first time in the postjunta era that officers had resigned in protest of a government action.



Source: Based on information from "Defence and Economics in Greece," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, 37, No. 5, 1992, 45.

Figure 12. Organization of Defense Establishment, 1994

During the political schism between royalists and republicans that continued for most of the first half of the twentieth century, the armed forces were first strongly monarchist and then also strongly anticommunist. Then, the events of the Civil War (1946–49) pitted the World War II resistance forces, which were dominated by the republican Communist Party of Greece (Kommunistikon Komma Ellados—KKE), against a royalist Greek army that had largely spent the war in exile. This conflict further bolstered anticommunism in the officer corps. In the postwar period, however, time and the process of national reconciliation have largely altered the strong conservative atti-

tude of the military—especially once the Karamanlis government reestablished democracy in 1974.

## **Military Personnel**

The organization of the Hellenic Armed Forces of the 1990s is based mainly on United States standards. The number of individuals serving in the Greek military decreased by about 21 percent between 1985 and 1994; over the same period, defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) decreased by slightly less than 1 percent. National defense planning stresses training modernization in keeping with the selected goals of military doctrine.

## **Personnel Policy**

According to the constitution, every male citizen capable of bearing arms has the obligation to serve in the Hellenic Armed Forces upon reaching his twentieth year. During the period of eligibility, exemptions may be granted for serious health problems and in some other cases, such as to fathers of more than four children and church officials. Deferments are granted for completion of university studies until the age of twenty-seven for undergraduate studies and until the age of thirty for graduate studies. It is estimated that 40 percent of each conscript "class" request and receive deferments for completion of their studies. Women are not subject to conscription, but they may enlist voluntarily in the armed forces.

The recruitment pool for the Greek armed forces has been shrinking gradually since about 1980 because the population is aging and each recruiting age-group is accordingly smaller (see Population Characteristics, ch. 2). In 1994 the prime recruiting group, ages eighteen to twenty-two, included 370,000 men. Because of the country's demographics, the Ministry of National Defense announced in 1994 that women may be required to participate in some military training in National Guard units.

In 1985 the armed forces had 201,500 persons. In 1994 the total number was 159,300, of whom 122,300 (77 percent) were conscripts and 5,900 were women. The Hellenic Army numbered 113,000, the air force 26,800, and the navy 19,500. Every year six "classes" of conscripts are inducted.

The youngest age at which a person may enlist voluntarily is seventeen. Each individual's case is reviewed by the local draft

board, which evaluates all conscripts to determine the person's appropriate branch, specialization, and grade (officer, non-commissioned officer, or private). Classifications are computer-processed on the basis of qualifications. Those entrants selected to serve as officers spend four months at a reserve officers' school, after which they are designated "reserve officers." A few months before their release from active service, they are commissioned as second lieutenants.

In addition to active-duty personnel, the Greek military includes about 406,000 reservists. They are divided into three categories, according to age. Categories A, B, and C include personnel below age forty, between forty and fifty, and above age fifty, respectively. Reservists are subject to recall to participate in military exercises lasting one to two weeks per year.

Greece's conscription system operates effectively overall, and it is widely accepted by most Greeks. In the last few years, however, the issue of conscientious objectors has received increased publicity. Greece allows conscientious objectors who are religious ministers of "known religions" to serve in non-combatant assignments, but these are for twice as long as regular military service. In addition, the recruiting service of the armed forces has refused to recognize Jehovah's Witnesses as a known religion, and so has called them up for service, then prosecuted them for refusal. They may appeal for an exemption from service only after a conviction. As a consequence, these ministers have spent periods of a few months to over a year in jail while appealing their cases. Several human rights organizations have urged Greece to resolve this problem.

## **Induction and Training**

The standard term of service for inductees is eighteen months in the air force, twenty months in the army, and twenty-one months in the navy, with maximum terms of nineteen, twenty-three, and twenty-one months, respectively. Male and female personnel may become career noncommissioned officers (NCOs) by serving an initial five-year term, after which they have the option to remain in the service as a career or return to civilian life. In 1994 some 24 percent of armed forces personnel were classified as professional soldiers (career NCOs or officers). Recent efforts to increase this percentage have been frustrated by the lack of funds to raise the pay scale and induce reenlistment.

Male and female volunteer NCOs undergo eight weeks of basic training at recruit training centers, after which they receive specialized NCO training, the duration of which depends on their specialization. The training cycle is completed with on-the-job training in the units to which the individuals are assigned.

Conscripts go through three training cycles. An eight-week orientation period provides physical training and knowledge of basic military skills. The twenty-six-week cycle that follows is conducted in special training centers that teach battlefield survival, fighting skills, and carrying out missions. The third cycle, which continues until the individual is demobilized into the reserves, aims to maintain the skills learned previously. All personnel participate in small-scale or large-scale army or interservice exercises at the conclusion of training. Reservists are called up periodically to refresh their skills or familiarize them with new equipment.

In 1994 about 16,700 officers served in the Hellenic Armed Forces. Officers receive training at one of four military schools. The Army Cadet Academy accepts 250 new students annually, the Air Force Cadet Academy adds 130 students annually, and the Navy Cadet Academy accepts seventy-five students annually. All three academies offer four-year programs. Entry to the service academies is very competitive; between 10 and 15 percent of applicants normally are selected. The Corps Officers' Military School offers a four- to six-year training program for medical and administrative officers, accepting 100 new officers annually. In addition, each service branch has several schools for NCOs, each offering a two-year course of study. The law provides that a fixed percentage of academy NCO graduates be commissioned every year.

In the course of their careers, selected officers are trained in higher military schools such as the Army War College, the Air Force War College, and the Navy War College, which accept captains and majors, and the National Defense Academy, which accepts lieutenant colonels and colonels. The course of study in all those schools is one year. A number of officers also study at military schools and academies in NATO-member countries and other allied nations.

## **The Hellenic Armed Forces**

The structure and alignment of the Hellenic Armed Forces reflect the assessment that the most serious potential threat

comes from the east. Accordingly, force deployment emphasizes Greek Thrace, the Aegean Islands, and Cyprus, and funding for modernization and expansion has been targeted to specific eventualities.

### **Modernization Plans**

The Ministry of Defense's plans for modernizing its armed forces have concentrated on improving capabilities in eight areas: command, control, and information systems; electronic warfare; capability to conduct sustained operations; armor support firepower; air defense; achievement of air and sea control; logistics personnel; and survivability of forces. Modernization plans are funded by the state budget together with foreign and domestic loans. Planners place special emphasis on force-multiplier factors, such as electronic warfare and telecommunications, and on factors such as mobility that will enhance the position of Greek forces in the Aegean.

Also included in the modernization program in the planning period 1992–96 are improvements in training and living conditions and acquisition of more vessels for use in surveillance of the eastern Aegean. Where the purchase of new equipment is too expensive, refurbished equipment is acquired with German and United States assistance, as permitted by the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty—see Glossary) signed in 1991 by NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations.

### **The Hellenic Army**

The Hellenic Army, the Greek ground forces, includes 113,000 troops, of whom 100,000 are conscripts, and 2,200 of whom are women. The ground forces reserves include 350,000 troops, of whom 230,000 are trained for field army activity. The First Army, the only field army in the ground forces, is headquartered at Larisa in Central Greece and is divided into four corps, headquartered, respectively, at Kozani (First Corps, north-central Greece), Veroia (Second Corps, north-central Greece), Thessaloniki (Third Corps, on the north Aegean shore), and Xanthi (Fourth Corps, in Greek Thrace). The Higher Military Command of the Interior and the Islands (ASDEN HQ) is located in Athens.

The First Corps and Second Corps are responsible for protection of the country's northern borders. The Third Corps and Fourth Corps share responsibility for the Greek-Turkish border in Thrace and the islands. ASDEN, designated as a terri-



*Hellenic Army armored and  
special forces troops  
participating in training  
exercises  
Courtesy Embassy of Greece,  
Washington*



torial defense force, is responsible for the rest of the country, as well as for the islands, acting in a complementary role to the field army.

The field army has a total strength of 82,000 troops. Besides the four corps headquarters, there are also one armored divisional headquarters and one mechanized divisional headquarters. The army includes nine infantry divisions, each of which has three infantry and one artillery regiment and one armored battalion. Of the divisions, two are category A (85 percent full combat readiness), three are category B (60 percent combat ready within twenty-four hours), and four are category C (20 percent combat ready in forty-eight hours). The army also includes five independent armored brigades, each of which has two armored battalions, one mechanized battalion, and one self-propelled artillery battalion, all of which are category A.

In addition, the army has one independent mechanized brigade, including two mechanized battalions and one armored and one self-propelled artillery battalion, all in category A. Those units are supported by two infantry brigades; one marine brigade, including three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, and one armored squadron, all category A; one commando and one raider regiment; four reconnaissance battalions; ten field artillery battalions; six air defense artillery battalions; two surface-to-air missile battalions with upgraded Hawk missiles; two army aviation battalions; and one independent aviation company.

The ASDEN territorial defense forces are divided into four military command headquarters, one of which is in Athens. The forces include one infantry division, one paratroop regiment, eight field artillery battalions, four air-defense artillery battalions, and one army aviation battalion. A reserve force of 34,000 National Guard troops is responsible for internal security in wartime.

In the early 1990s, significant arms expenditures for the ground forces have included the purchase of new attack helicopters, modernization of tanks and transport helicopters, and modernization and enhancement of artillery firepower (see table 14, Appendix).

## **The Hellenic Air Force**

The Hellenic Air Force lists several critical objectives in fulfilling its mission. Development of a modern command, control, and information system will aid in crisis management by





*F-16 fighter jet of the Hellenic Air Force  
Courtesy Press and Information Office, Embassy of Greece, Washington*

linking the air force with other branches and commands in allied countries in a timely manner. An upgraded early warning system is considered another high-priority element of communications, to provide time for decision making. A second requirement is the capability for immediate reaction to unforeseen threats; to achieve that goal, the air force is emphasizing interoperability and compatibility of armaments and suppression of enemy air defenses.

A third goal is improving mobility, especially considering the requirement for Greece's assigned participation in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps in the NATO force structure of the 1990s (see Greece in NATO, this ch.). An important element of this requirement is improved air transport capability. A fourth goal is improving support of ground-force operations by using air transport to preposition ammunition and supplies. Finally, the development of air defense is considered critical to maintaining control of the air in the cramped airspace of the eastern Mediterranean Sea. In its combat doctrine, the Hellenic Air Force aims not at permanently establishing air superiority (a prohibitively expensive goal) but at being able to control air space at specific times and places.

Greek military experts believe that between 1987 and 1994 the air force achieved satisfactory turn-around time for service and repair of aircraft, elements that are complex given the diversity of fighter types in the present NATO inventory. All major airfields in the country now can provide quick repair of battle damage. Most training in aircraft repair work is carried out abroad. Flight and ground safety were improved in 1992 by the reorganization of the Hellenic Air Force General Staff to include a Flight Safety Directorate.

The air force modernization program has aimed at reducing the number of aircraft in operation and increasing flexibility and tactical reconnaissance capability. Specifically, this policy has meant the procurement of F-4E and A-7E aircraft from the United States and NF-5A/B and RF-4E aircraft from the Netherlands and Germany, respectively, and phasing out outdated F/RF-104s and F-5A/B aircraft. Two squadrons of F-16 jets with modern weapon systems have been added to upgrade defensive capacity, and the addition of C-130 and medium transport aircraft improved deployment and support capability in the early 1990s (see table 15, Appendix).

The Hellenic Air Force includes 26,800 troops, of whom 14,400 are conscripts and 1,100 are women. The three commands are the Tactical Air Command, headquartered at Larisa, and the Air Support Command and the Air Training Command, both based in Athens. The Tactical Air Command includes eight combat wings and one transport wing. The combat wings have six fighter ground-attack squadrons. There are ten fighter squadrons, one regular reconnaissance squadron, and one marine reconnaissance squadron. Three transport squadrons and two helicopter squadrons form the organization of the air portion of the Tactical Air Command. The Air Training Command includes four training squadrons.

The eight major air force installations are located at Larisa, Nea Ankhialos southeast of Larisa, Eleusina west of Athens, Thessaloniki, Tanagra north of Athens, Souda Bay, Araxos in the northern Peloponnesus, and Andravida. Other airports supporting military operations are located on the Aegean Islands of Karpathos, Santorini (Thira), Rhodes, Skiros, and Lemnos, and at Kavala (Macedonia), Heraklion (Crete), and Tatoi/Dekelia, north of Athens.

## **The Hellenic Navy**

Greece's location in the Mediterranean Sea and its long maritime tradition have led to emphasis on the role of the Hellenic Navy. The chief of the Hellenic Navy General Staff also is Commander Eastern Mediterranean (COMED EAST) in the NATO command structure. Among the navy's missions is control of vital choke points in the Aegean and Ionian seas to ensure safe passage of NATO and domestic naval forces.

In the early 1990s, the navy was increasingly active in NATO exercises and in the STANAVFORMED, which was formed in

1992. Base facilities are provided to NATO ships at Souda Bay in Crete and at Salamis, near Athens.

The navy is divided into three commands: the Fleet, the Naval Training Command, and the Naval Logistics Command. The most important operational part of the navy is the fleet. Greece's geographic position places special demands on the fleet because its possible area of operations ranges from the coastal areas and shallow waters of the Aegean to open waters in the Ionian Sea and the eastern Mediterranean Basin. All those areas are within range of land-based aircraft.

The demands of national security and NATO participation have inspired an expensive modernization program in the Hellenic Navy. Given fiscal restrictions, planners have concentrated on acquisition of modern naval platforms to replace outmoded Fletcher-class and Gearing FRAM I/II-class destroyers. The goals of the replacement program include manufacture of four MEKO-200H-class frigates—the first of which was delivered from Germany in 1993 and the other three of which are scheduled for later completion in the Hellenic Shipyards (see *The Greek Defense Industry*, this ch.).

Four Adams-class destroyers were leased from the United States Navy in 1992 and placed in the Greek Kimon class. The next year, three Knox-class frigates also were leased from the United States Navy and placed in the Makedonia class, and three Standard (Dutch Kortenaer)-class frigates were acquired from the Dutch Navy for use in the Greek Elli class. In all, the Hellenic Navy had fourteen major surface combatants in 1994. In 1993 Greek shipyards began construction of five tank landing ships (LSTs). The modernization program also includes acquisition of five Sikorsky antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopters from the United States to support the fleet's antisubmarine defenses. Four of Greece's eight Glavkos-type (GeT-209/1100) submarines have updated power plants and upgraded electronic equipment; Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles have been added to one. One of the submarines was modernized in Germany, the others at the Salamis Shipyard near Piraeus. The navy's command, control, and communications information systems are also in the process of modernization to improve information flow. A number of small combatants and support ships also have been built in the early 1990s.

Plans for the immediate future called for acquisition of eight P3 maritime patrol aircraft to replace the nine outmoded Albatross aircraft currently in use. The addition of new units also

requires upgrading the naval facilities at Greece's two main bases, Salamis and Souda Bay, as well as the forward bases on the island of Skiros and on the Khalkidiki Peninsula, both in the Aegean Sea.

The Hellenic Navy includes 19,500 active-duty personnel, of whom 7,900 are conscripts and 2,700 are officers; 2,600 of the number are women. Greece is divided into three naval districts, covering the Ionian Sea, the Aegean Sea, and northern Greece. Besides fleet headquarters, which is the combat command component, the organization includes the Naval Logistics Command and the Naval Training Command. Other naval bases are located at Kavala and Patras in the Peloponnese and at Thessaloniki. The navy's total equipment strength includes a wide range of vessels (see table 16, Appendix).

The Coast Guard is a paramilitary branch of the navy that comes under the purview of the Ministry of Merchant Marine in peacetime. The force has 158 patrol craft of various types and four light aircraft. The Coast Guard patrols all Greek harbors, coastlines, and territorial waters, monitoring antipollution measures and controlling merchant shipping. Officers train at the Navy Cadet Academy.

### **The Merchant Marine**

In wartime, the Greek merchant marine, possessing one of the largest fleets of peacetime vessels in the world, would make an important contribution to NATO combat operations in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1990 NATO combat contingency plans called for 780 Greek merchant ships to be activated for military transport duty compared with 626 for the United States. This disparity is largely because Western shipping is increasingly configured for container transport, but most types of military equipment cannot be containerized. Thus Greece's large number of break-bulk ships and ferries would be very valuable in transporting military vehicles and helicopters. In 1992 the estimated capacity of the merchant marine was 85,000 passengers and 15,000 vehicles, and the fleet undergoes continuous modernization. The Ministry of Merchant Marine actively supported UN forces in the 1991 Persian Gulf War with immediate transport of fuel and equipment.

### **Overseas Basing**

The only Greek armed forces overseas in 1994 were in Cyprus, where 2,250 troops are assigned, including two infan-

try battalions together with officers and NCOs assigned directly to the forces of the Joint Defense Area (see National Security Doctrine, this ch.). In addition, Greece has seven observers with United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) peacekeeping forces along the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and one observer with the UN's Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) peacekeeping effort in Western Sahara. The only foreign troops stationed in Greece are from the United States: sixty army and 200 navy troops at Souda Bay, and 500 air force troops located in two air base groups at Heraklion.

### Ranks and Uniforms

The officer ranks of the three branches of the armed forces correspond precisely to those of the United States armed forces (see fig. 13). For enlisted personnel, the Hellenic Army promotes directly from sergeant first class (*archilochias*) to sergeant major (*anthypaspistis*), and the Hellenic Air Force promotes directly from master sergeant (*archisminias*) to chief master sergeant (*anthypaspistis*). The Hellenic Navy promotes enlisted personnel directly from seaman apprentice (*naftis*) to petty officer third class (*diopos*) and from chief petty officer (*archikelefstis*) to master chief petty officer (*anthypaspistis*) (see fig. 14).

Until the end of World War II, Greek military dress showed the strong influence of British uniform styles. After the war, however, Greek uniforms gradually came to resemble those of the United States, which also was the country that replaced Britain as Greece's strongest military ally.

Standard duty uniforms of army officers and senior NCOs are olive green. Army officers' dress uniforms are dark green, navy officers' are dark blue (a white dress uniform is used in the summer), and air force officers' dress uniforms are light blue. Trim and accessories for the dress uniforms may be changed to satisfy the requirements of various types of formal occasions.

Until 1994 battle dress consisted mainly of United States-style field uniforms. That year new camouflage uniforms were issued to replace the previous field uniform. Branches of the army can be distinguished by the color of the beret, which is worn with service dress, and in some cases with battle dress. The air corps of the ground forces is issued red berets; com-































GREEK RANK	ANTHY-POLOCHAGOS	YPOLOCHAGOS	LOCHAGOS	TAGMATARCHIS	ANTISYNTAG-MATARCHIS	SYNTAG-MATARCHIS	TAXIARCHOS	YPOSTRATIGOS	ANTISTRATIGOS	STRATIGOS
ARMY										
U.S. RANK TITLE	2ND LIEUTENANT	1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL
GREEK RANK	ANTHY-POSSINAGOS	YPOSSINAGOS	SINAGOS	EPISMINAGOS	ANTISMINARCHOS	SMINARCHOS	TAXIARCHOS	YPOSTERARCHOS	ANTIPTERARCHOS	PTERARCHOS
AIR FORCE										
U.S. RANK TITLE	2D LIEUTENANT	1ST LIEUTENANT	CAPTAIN	MAJOR	LIEUTENANT COLONEL	COLONEL	BRIGADIER GENERAL	MAJOR GENERAL	LIEUTENANT GENERAL	GENERAL
GREEK RANK	SIMANOFOROS	ANTHY-POPLIARCHOS	YPOPLIARCHOS	PLOTARCHIS	ANTIPLIARCHOS	PLIARCHOS	ARCHIPLIARCHOS	YPONAVARCHOS	ANTINAVARCHOS	NAVARCHOS
NAVY										
U.S. RANK TITLE	ENSIGN	LIEUTENANT JUNIOR GRADE	LIEUTENANT	LIEUTENANT COMMANDER	COMMANDER	CAPTAIN	REAR ADMIRAL LOWER HALF	REAR ADMIRAL UPPER HALF	VICE ADMIRAL	ADMIRAL

Figure 13. Officer Ranks and Insignia




















GREEK RANK	STRATIOTIS	YPODEKANEAS	DEKANEAS	EFEDEBROS LOCHIAS	LOCHIAS	EPILOCHIAS	ARCHILOCHIAS		ANTHYPASPISTIS
ARMY	NO INSIGNIA							NO RANK	
U.S. RANK TITLE	BASIC PRIVATE	PRIVATE	PRIVATE 1ST CLASS	CORPORAL/SPECIALIST	SERGEANT	STAFF SERGEANT	SERGEANT 1ST CLASS	MASTER SERGEANT	SERGEANT MAJOR
GREEK RANK	SMINITIS	ANTHY- POSMINIAS	YPOSMINIAS	EFEDEBROS SMINIAS	SMINIAS	EPISMINIAS	ARCH- SMINIAS		ANTHYPASPISTIS
AIR FORCE	NO INSIGNIA	NO INSIGNIA						NO RANK	
U.S. RANK TITLE	AIRMAN BASIC	AIRMAN	AIRMAN 1ST CLASS	SENIOR AIRMAN	STAFF SERGEANT	TECHNICAL SERGEANT	MASTER SERGEANT	SENIOR MASTER SERGEANT	CHIEF MASTER SERGEANT
GREEK RANK	NAFTIS	NAFTIS		DIOPOS DOKIMOS KELEFSTIS	KELEFSTIS	EPIKELEFSTIS	ARCH- KELEFSTIS		ANTHYPASPISTIS
NAVY	NO INSIGNIA		NO RANK					NO RANK	
U.S. RANK TITLE	SEAMAN RECRUIT	SEAMAN APPRENTICE	SEAMAN	PETTY OFFICER 3RD CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 2ND CLASS	PETTY OFFICER 1ST CLASS	CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER	MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER

Figure 14. Enlisted Ranks and Insignia

mandos and airborne forces, green; armored troops, black; infantry and artillery, khaki.

When on parade or standing guard, the Evzone (Presidential Honor Guard) wear the colorful traditional costume of the mountain warriors who fought the Ottomans in the Greek War of Independence (1821–32). This dress uniform includes tasseled cap and shoes, white stockings and the *fustanella*, a shirt-waist with pleated skirt of white fustian.

The navy's winter service uniform coat is navy blue, and its summer equivalent is white. The eight-buttoned, double-breasted blouses, blue caps, and white shirts, worn by naval commissioned and petty officers in winter, are of British cut, as are the summer blouses, which are buttoned to the collar. Short-sleeved shirts, worn open collared without blouses, are standard daytime wear for naval officers and petty officers in warm weather. Uniforms for sailors are also patterned on British styles.

The air force has adopted uniforms and insignia modeled after those of the United States Air Force. For all ranks, the uniform, including cap, is light blue; it is worn with a gray-blue shirt and black tie.

## **Roles in International Security**

Greece's membership in NATO and the EU brings with it active participation in Western defense organizations and activities connected with those organizations. In the 1990s, Greece took an increasingly active role, in proportion to its resources, in peacekeeping and arms control around the world.

### **United Nations Peacekeeping**

Greece has been generally supportive of UN peacekeeping operations. In the Korean War, the first UN military action, Greece contributed one infantry battalion and one air transport squadron. More recently Greek military personnel have participated in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and other missions in Kuwait, Northern Iraq, Western Sahara, and the former Yugoslavia. Through the end of 1994, Greece chose not to contribute troops to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, arguing that participation by any Balkan country or former colonial power would have a destabilizing effect. Greece has, however, contributed one major combat vessel to



Operation Sharp Guard, the UN's offshore observation force in the Adriatic Sea. In 1994 the Greek Ministry of National Defense declared the country's readiness to contribute troops to a new peacekeeping force in the Middle East if peace negotiations between Israel and Syria are successful and require international border monitors. Greece is also considering participation in UN peacekeeping forces maintaining cease-fires between Georgian and Abkhazian forces in Abkhazia and Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as assisting in an eventual withdrawal of UN forces from Bosnia. Greece has also borne the second-largest share of the expenses of the UN's Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), contributing about US\$7.5 million of the estimated total expense of US\$52.5 in 1994.

### **Arms Control**

Greece has signed nearly all the multilateral arms control agreements concluded in the 1980s and the 1990s, as well as many older pacts still in force. Among those agreements are the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the Antarctic Treaty, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the Seabed Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Enmod Convention, the "Inhumane Weapons" Convention, the CFE Treaty, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Greece's very limited nuclear activities have been for peaceful purposes. The only nuclear installations in the country are a five-megawatt pool-type research reactor at the Demokritos National Research Center, which uses 20 percent enriched uranium, and a subcritical installation at the National Polytechnic University of Athens. The Demokritos reactor is mainly used for the training of scientists and for the production of radioisotopes for medical uses. Both facilities operate under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Atomic Energy Program. Although Greece exports almost no nuclear materials, it has pledged to apply international safeguards on any shipments of nuclear technology through its territory. In preparation for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Greece has expressed strong support for indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty.

Greece is also a member of the Australia Group for the Control of Chemical Exports and of the Missile Technology Con-

trol Regime. It has also signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and is preparing to implement the treaty's provisions fully. Greece was a member of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), an international organization aimed at controlling international movement of strategically sensitive items. As an upgraded export control organization was being established to replace CoCom in 1994, Greece prepared for full participation in the new regime. Greece's official view, however, is that the most effective arms control measures are political solutions to conflicts causing security threats, rather than exclusive reliance on international policing.

## **Military Funding and Procurement**

### **Defense Expenditures**

Since 1974, when Turkey began its occupation of Cypriot territory, Greece has maintained the highest level of defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product (GNP—see Glossary) among NATO countries. More specifically, high military expenditures and intensive training have been deemed by Greece to be necessary to compensate for Turkey's quantitative advantage in military equipment and manpower. Although there is consensus among major political parties and the Greek people that this expense is necessary for national security, military expenditures constitute a heavy burden for the Greek economy.

In the early 1990s, total defense expenditures remained relatively even. Between 1992 and 1994, the amount increased from US\$4.4 billion to US\$4.5 billion. As a percentage of GNP, expenditures in the same period remained at 5.5 percent, compared with an average of 6.3 percent in the last years of the Cold War (1985–88). As a standard of comparison, in 1992 Turkey spent an estimated 3.6 percent of its GNP on defense, Italy 1.7 percent, and the United States 4.9 percent.

### **The Greek Defense Industry**

Efforts to develop a defense industry began in Greece in the mid-1970s, although several isolated industries existed long before that date. In the mid-1990s, the defense industry supplied a wide variety of equipment to the Hellenic Armed Forces, and it has had moderate success in exporting military equipment to other countries.

### ***Development of the Industry***

The objectives of the initial policy were to satisfy national military needs and to increase the participation of domestic manufacturers, reducing Greece's heavy dependency on foreign military suppliers. Beginning in the 1970s, Greece was able to establish the technological base for producing military vehicles, aircraft components, guns, and ships. By the early 1980s, a substantial base of regional sales outside Greece had developed. However, significant economic problems have arisen because of the small domestic market, which seriously affects the viability of production lines, and because of management mistakes. The latter difficulty has included delayed response to technological developments and the changing needs of the armed forces and the rather inefficient use of offset agreements (by which Greek plants supply components to foreign military manufacturers in return for aircraft and equipment). Military aid programs, Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreements (DECAs) with the United States, and memoranda of understanding with partners in Western Europe have not been used effectively.

As a result, some state-owned defense industries are in a precarious financial position that may necessitate privatization to ensure profitable operation. Furthermore, defense planners now generally agree that the only way for the Greek defense industry to survive is through the coproduction of equipment with defense enterprises of other countries. In 1994 the industry, which employed 22,000 persons, had an annual turnover of about US\$250 million.

The Defense Industry Directorate (DID) is the advisory body of the Ministry of National Defense for formulating and implementing national policy toward enterprises engaged in defense manufacturing. The DID constitutes the connecting link between the armed forces and the defense industries; its general purpose is to foster an increase in the domestic production of military equipment. The responsibilities of the DID also include management of specific new projects in the defense industry and the modernization and expansion of already existing industries that are either wholly or partially state-owned, as well as the codification and standardization of the armed forces matériel.

### ***Defense Enterprises***

The defense sector of Greek industry is dominated by a few major companies. The Greek Vehicle Industry (Elliniki

Viomikhania Okhimaton—ELVO) manufactures a wide range of special-purpose vehicles for civilian and military use. ELVO obtained its technical expertise by license from Austria's Steyr Daimler Puch and the Mercedes Benz corporation of Germany. Among other items, ELVO produces or coproduces Leonidas I, Leonidas II, and Pandur APCs, and a 2.75-ton jeep. At the end of 1994, the firm had made about 400 vehicles for domestic use and export, with current contracts calling for delivery of about 100 more vehicles to the ground forces in 1995 and 1996. At the end of 1994, the Hellenic Army was considering purchase of a new mechanized infantry combat vehicle from Norway's NFT, the DAF Special Products Company of the Netherlands, or the Santa Barbara corporation of Spain. The new model would be built by ELVO under license, under the name Alexandros.

After beginning in 1908 as a producer of commercial explosives for the domestic market, the Powder and Cartridge Company (Piromakhika kai Kalikes—PIRKAL) has a workforce of 1,500 that now produces three types of hand grenades, five types of rifle grenades and smoke hand grenades, flares, and mining boosters. The firm also has manufactured many types of ammunition used in a wide range of military operations. PIRKAL cooperates with leading European and American industries in ammunition manufacture, and since 1985 it has participated in Europe's Stinger missile production program.

Established in 1975, the Greek Aerospace Industry (Elliniki Aeroporiki Viomikhania—EAV) now employs 3,250 workers. It has become one of the region's leading aeronautical companies, supplying more than seventy customers. Among these customers are the Greek armed forces and buyers in more than twenty foreign countries, including the United States, Britain, France, Portugal, and various Arab states. EAV has the capability to maintain, overhaul, modify, and test almost all types of Western aircraft and helicopters, offering particular expertise in Mirage, F-1, and C-130 airplanes and Bell helicopters. EAV services more than twenty types of engines and related accessories and components. It also manufactures and puts together subassemblies for large commercial aircraft such as the Boeing 757 and military aircraft such as the F-16, small and medium-size static subassemblies for military and commercial engines, and aircraft modification and upgrade kits for military and commercial markets. EAV's custom design of electronic and telecommunications products also sells to military and com-

mercial markets. The firm provides training services in all phases of aircraft engine and electronics support, modification, and manufacturing, as well as management and logistics.

The Greek Arms Industry (Elliniki Viotekhnia Oplon—EVO) is a group of companies established in 1977. The industry has five plants with a total workforce of 1,450 employees, making it the largest private defense industrial group in Greece. In 1994 EVO purchased PIRKAL. EVO manufactures a wide variety of small arms, light and heavy machine guns, mortars, nitrocellulose, trinitrotoluene (TNT), aircraft bombs, complete rounds of artillery ammunition, drop fuel tanks, pylons, external stores, anti-aircraft defense systems, medium-caliber guns, and components for howitzer retrofitting. In the 1980s, EVO's proposed sale of its sophisticated Artemis-30 anti-aircraft system to Libya, as part of a larger economic agreement, caused an international controversy. The group's companies also have produced sophisticated electro-optics (night-vision systems) and communications equipment, precision mechanical equipment for the modernization of tanks and APCs, and metallic components for both military and civilian applications.

The Hellenic Shipyards and the Eleusis Shipyards, which employ 3,150 and 2,350 workers, respectively, were scheduled for privatization in the mid-1990s. The Hellenic Shipyards at Piraeus on the Gulf of Saronikos is the largest shipbuilding, ship-repairing, and rolling-stock operation in the eastern Mediterranean and one of the largest in Europe. In the thirty-five years of the firm's operation, its two dry docks and three floating docks have accommodated repairs for over 8,200 vessels of all types and sizes. Its two slipways have seen the construction of 110 commercial vessels and warships, including frigates, fast-patrol missile boats, replenishment tankers, and fast-attack boats, up to 40,000 deadweight tons. At the end of 1994, the Hellenic Shipyards were completing the first Greek-built MEKO-200H (Hydra-class) frigate. Two additional frigates were in earlier stages of construction for the Hellenic Navy, and Hellenic Shipyards had designed three offshore-patrol vessels for delivery to a foreign customer in 1996. The yards also build railroad freight and passenger cars and electrically powered trains.

Greece's second major shipbuilding firm, the Eleusis Shipyards (also located on the Gulf of Saronikos near Athens), has a wide range of activities, including shipbuilding, ship repairs


and conversions, and industrial construction. In late 1994, the major military contract at Eleusis was for five large LST landing craft for the Hellenic Navy.

### **Military Procurement from Abroad**

The beginning of the post-Cold War period stimulated diversification of Greece's foreign military contacts and agreements. Diversification has occurred in both arms supply contracts and broader military cooperation agreements.

The Hellenic Armed Forces were built up progressively after World War II with British and United States aid. Between World War II and 1985, Greece received more than US\$3 billion in military aid from the United States. During that period, the United States furnished the majority of Greece's major weapon systems. Between 1980 and 1990, the average annual value of United States military sales to Greece was about US\$400 million. For the period 1991–93, the United States sold Greece a total of US\$410 million worth of arms; at that point, Germany was the top supplier (US\$480 million), followed by the United States and France (US\$360 million). The United States also has exerted considerable influence in all other areas of the military, including organization, doctrine, training, and even uniforms. After 1974, and in view of the perceived United States bias toward Turkey in the Greek-Turkish conflict, Greece tried to lessen this dependence, turning to France as a partial alternative (see Karamanlis and the Restoration of Democracy, ch. 1). Nevertheless, since 1974 the United States has remained the main source of defense equipment for the Hellenic Armed Forces.

In 1964 Greece received military aid for the first time from the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), within the framework of assistance programs to other NATO members. In the decades that followed, German arms sales to Greece have increased steadily. Between 1967 and 1976, they averaged US\$16.1 million per year; then, between 1979 and 1983 they averaged US\$60 million per year. Under the cascading process provided for by the CFE Treaty, since 1991 Greece has received a large number of main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, mortars, and other equipment from NATO allies reducing their armaments as required by the CFE Treaty to balance reductions in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. In the early 1990s, Greece signed new defense cooperation agreements with Britain, France, Ger-



*Presidential Honor Guard greets visiting United States President George H.W. Bush, summer 1991. Courtesy Press and Information Office, Embassy of Greece, Washington*

many, Spain, and Norway. In 1994 Greece signed military agreements with nations of the former Soviet sphere in the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative.

In upgrading equipment to incorporate recent technological developments, the Hellenic Armed Forces have ordered a number of major weapons systems since 1990. Special emphasis has fallen on weapons platforms whose smart-weapon capability provides a force-multiplier effect.

In the foreseeable future, Greece will continue to import most of its defense equipment, especially for its land and air forces, mainly from the United States, with France as a secondary source. For naval equipment, Germany will remain a major supplier. The possibility of equipment purchase agreements or equipment coproduction with Russia and Israel has been considered, although no concrete measures had been taken at the end of 1994.

## **Military Justice**

The Greek system of military justice is based on Article 96 of

the constitution. Each branch of the armed forces has first-degree courts, and a single second-degree (appeals) court serves all three branches. In accordance with Article 406 of the Military Code of Justice, the appeals court has the power to hear cases referred to it and to annul decisions from lower courts.

All enlisted personnel (including conscripts) accused of criminal acts are tried by military courts, with specific exceptions cited in articles 247 and 248 of the Military Code of Justice. Those exceptions, which are tried by civil rather than military courts, include robberies, drug-related crimes, and embezzlement of more than million drachmas (for the value of the drachma—see Glossary).

In 1994 the Military Code of Justice was amended. Changes include lighter sentences for a variety of crimes, abolition of the death penalty for any act during peacetime, and a more balanced composition of military courts (now to be divided almost equally between military and civilian judges).

## **Public Order**

For many years after the end of the Civil War, Greek police forces were employed by national administrations to persecute communist and leftist activists and sympathizers. Thousands of persons were exiled to various "prison islands" in the Aegean. The military dictatorship of 1967–74 widened this practice to include subjecting all of its critics, regardless of their political or ideological orientation, to arrest and exile. The threat of communism, however, was most often the pretext for such procedures. The military regime rarely respected articles of the constitution prescribing civil and political liberties, although no steps were taken to suspend such articles. During that period, military courts tried many civilian crimes, and in many cases such trials deprived opponents of the regime of their citizenship.

Immediately after the fall of the junta, the Karamanlis government restored civil liberties, and the constitution ratified in 1975 fully guarantees equality before the law, due process of law, and the inviolability of individual rights. In the mid-1990s, police brutality is a rare occurrence, and police officers who exceed the limits of their authority during arrests or police interrogations are immediately suspended pending the results of an official inquiry on each case.



The crime rate in Greece is fairly low. A recent increase is attributed to the large influx of illegal immigrants. According to Greek police sources, among the refugees who left Albania in the early 1990s were a large number of convicted criminals who were encouraged to depart by the regime of Albania's President Ramiz Alia. For the indigenous population of Greece, however, ethnic and religious homogeneity has combined with close-knit family structures to instill a sense of social discipline and acceptance of authority (see *The Social Order*, ch. 2).

Nevertheless, the police still do not enjoy great popularity in Greece. After governments had used them repeatedly to oppress the people (most notably after the end of the Civil War and during the rule of the 1967–74 junta), the police were treated by the public with suspicion and even animosity. In the aftermath of the junta, a number of police officers were tried for human rights violations, and others were dismissed from service. In 1984 a series of reforms culminated in the merging of the City Police and the Gendarmerie, placing routine police activities under local rather than national control.

### **Organization of Public Security**

Before the 1984 reform, the public security establishment was divided into the City Police, which had jurisdiction in the cities of Athens, Piraeus, and Patras and the island of Corfu, and the Gendarmerie, which had jurisdiction in the rest of the country. Today, there is a single national police force, the Hellenic Police (Elliniki Astinomia—EL.AS), which operates under the direct supervision and control of the Ministry of Public Order. The commandant of the EL.AS is an officer with the rank of lieutenant general.

The police force remains paramilitary in character, and officers carry sidearms and clubs while on duty. The police occasionally receive training with heavier weapons. Special riot units are equipped with UR-416 APCs, and six NH-300 helicopters are in service, mainly for traffic monitoring. In 1994 the strength of all branches of the EL.AS was approximately 26,500 men and women. In the past, women served only in an auxiliary capacity, but the number of women in the regular force is gradually increasing.

Other branches of the police include the Tourist Police, which operates in Athens and various other tourist areas to protect and assist tourists in any way possible; the Forest Police;

and the Customs Police, whose task is to combat smuggling and collect duties at various points of entry into the country. The departmental structure of the ELAS is similar to that of most major Western police forces. The force includes contingents specializing in cases of homicide, counterfeiting and white-collar crimes, vice, narcotics, and traffic control, as well as special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams.

The problem of illegal migrants has become so acute in the mid-1990s that the government is considering creation of a special body of border guards. The objective is to enable Greece to comply with the Schengen accords, which prescribe EU standards for border controls among member-states.

### **Special Security Forces**

The Operations Division of the ELAS has two types of special security units. The main objective of the special tasks and missions units is to maintain or restore order in case of riots, mass protests, and other types of civil disturbance. The Special Forces Squad, which receives military commando training, is deployed in airports and other sensitive points to deal with emergencies such as hijackings, terrorist activities, and attacks against public officials and foreign diplomats (see *Terrorism*, this ch.). The squad's tactics and equipment resemble those of the police SWAT teams.

Another specialized police force, the Counterterrorism Squad, is under the jurisdiction of the Security Department of the Ministry of Public Order. Equipped and trained to deal with the activities of terrorist groups, this unit emphasizes investigative work that is conducted in close cooperation with counterpart agencies in other countries. In October 1994, the Ministry of Public Order began negotiating changes in the verbal agreement by which United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) units assisted in terrorism investigations. (To avoid charges of United States interference in domestic security matters, no formal agreement has existed.)

In August 1994, the Papandreou government announced a new support program to reduce crime and terrorism. The program included restructuring of the antiterrorism forces, emphasizing specialized personnel; coordination with other police forces in antiterrorism activities; and the addition of 2,000 personnel to antiterrorism and general crime forces. The changes were not implemented in 1994, however.

## **Training and Conditions of Police Service**

There are two police academies, one for officers and one for rank-and-file policemen. Candidates are required to be high-school graduates to qualify for the competitive enrollment. The program, which includes courses in law, criminology, sociology, psychology and other academic subjects, law enforcement methods, physical education, and paramilitary tactics, lasts seven months for policemen and three years for officers. A number of officers receive advanced training abroad. NCOs with good service records can be promoted to officer rank after passing an examination and studying further at the academy. All police recruits are required to meet certain physical standards. The ministries of public order and justice lifted some constraints on trade unionism in the police force in late 1994.

## **Crime**

The crime rate in Greece has risen in the 1990s, but the incidence of most types of crime has remained relatively low. Narcotics-related crime, however, has accelerated markedly and has been identified as the most serious challenge to public security.

### **Conventional Crime**

The crime rate in Greece is relatively low compared with other nations in the region. The majority of offenses are crimes against property (especially in the big cities), simple assaults, and infractions of commercial and motor vehicle regulations. An increased rate of armed robberies since 1990 has been attributed to the influx of illegal aliens and economic refugees from the Balkans and the Middle East. In 1994 the rates for major crimes were two rapes and two murders per 100,000 population and 475 thefts per 100,000 population.

Narcotics-related crime is an ever-increasing area of concern. Greece is an important transshipment point for illegal narcotics moving from Asia to markets in Western Europe and the United States. Drug-related crimes began to increase in Greece in the late 1980s, and control of domestic drug abuse and shipment has become a major emphasis of the legal authorities (see *Narcotics Sales*, this ch.)

Gun control is strictly enforced in Greece. Possession of firearms of any type, except those licensed for hunting, is forbidden. Any violation of gun-control regulations (possessing,

importing, selling, or transporting weapons and ammunition of a military type) brings a multiyear prison sentence.

In traditional Greek society, acts of revenge against a person perceived as having assaulted a family's honor often went unpunished. In the 1980s and the 1990s, some incidents of "vigilante justice" still occurred in rural areas, but authorities have become far less lenient in cases of assault and property damage instigated by a revenge motive.

### **Narcotics Sales**

Greece's location, on the route for illegal narcotics from production centers in the Middle East and Asia into Europe and North America, exacerbates two drug-related problems. Those problems are the control of drug transfers through Greek territory and the increase of drug use by Greek citizens.

One of the major routes for the transportation of heroin and opium from Turkey and the Middle East to Western Europe is through the Greek-Turkish border in Thrace and then through the Balkans. Greek authorities have, however, been quite successful in intercepting a high percentage of shipments along this route. Drugs also move on small boats from western Greece to Italy.

As the EU member country located farthest to the east, Greece requires increased cooperation both from its European partners and from other neighboring countries to gain multilateral control of the problem. The Greek government has been active in the EU's narcotics control groups and in the Dublin Group, which monitors international drug movements in strategic corridors such as the "Balkan route" from the Middle East into Europe. In 1992 Greece signed an agreement with Russia for cooperation and mutual assistance in narcotics cases. Greece has ratified the 1988 United Nations Convention on Drugs, although its drug legislation is not yet in full conformity with the terms of that agreement.

The Customs Police and the Hellenic Police are the primary agencies of drug law enforcement. A new state narcotics agency, the Okana, was established under the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Social Security in 1993 to coordinate the reduction of narcotics demand. The Central Narcotics Council, activated in 1993, coordinates drug enforcement activities among the Hellenic Police, the Coast Guard, and the Customs Police. In 1992 several heroin dealers apprehended in Greece received life sentences in prison. Although several police offic-

ers were convicted of drug trafficking in 1992, narcotics-related corruption among government officials has been rare in Greece. Legislation passed in 1993 stiffened penalties for drug trafficking and use.

### **Narcotics Abuse**

Although the number of drug users is proportionally lower than in most Western countries, in the early 1990s drug use of various kinds rose sharply, especially among unemployed urban youth. Deaths from drug overdoses increased steadily between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, and heroin use became a regular occurrence in urban schools and parks. Amphetamines and barbiturates are widely available. Marijuana is grown in many parts of Greece for local use, and a high quality of opium is also produced locally. The annual turnover for drugs has been estimated at over US\$1.5 billion, and in the early 1990s evidence appeared that organized crime was becoming involved in domestic drug sales.

A sudden increase in the number of deaths from drug overdoses during 1994 (reportedly 290) has led to greater attention to the problem and to increased interagency cooperation in the government to curtail supply and to assist users through special counseling programs and clinics. Nevertheless, drug users are still treated predominantly as criminals, meaning that they often go to prison, where drugs are easily obtained, rather than receiving medical assistance. The issue of decriminalizing drug use has involved a continuing debate among ministries that have jurisdiction, political parties, youth organizations, medical associations, and interested social groups.

### **Terrorism**

In the mid-1980s, Greece was affected by the wave of terrorism that originated in the Middle East and swept Western Europe. Terrorist incidents declined elsewhere in Western Europe in the early 1990s; however, the rate remained quite constant in Greece, bringing accusations that Greek governments had created a permissive atmosphere for such acts of violence.

In the 1990s, two domestic terrorist organizations have been active. The 17 November organization is a small Marxist group (membership estimated at below fifty) established in 1975 and named after the student uprising that protested against the military regime in November 1973, contributing to the

regime's fall the next year. Within its general opposition to any foreign military and economic presence in Greece, the group's position is anti-United States, anti-Turkey, anti-NATO, and anti-business. It is committed to violent overthrow of the government and removal of all United States military bases. The 17 November group may have links with the Red Brigades terrorists in Italy and Middle Eastern terrorist groups. The main activities have been bombings and assassinations of politicians, business executives, newspaper publishers, and United States citizens living in Greece.

The second group, the Revolutionary People's Struggle (Ellinikos Laikos Agonas—ELA), is a small, left-wing, anticapitalist, anti-imperialist revolutionary group. Its primary mode of operation is bombing buildings after giving half-hour warnings, apparently to avoid endangering lives. Connections have been established between ELA and 17 November, although the precise relationship is not known. A total of sixteen smaller terrorist organizations have been identified in Athens and Thessaloniki; all mimic the tactics and the anarchistic posture of the larger groups.

The two most serious terrorist incidents of 1994 were assassinations in Athens. The 17 November organization claimed responsibility for (and apparently used the same gun in) the January killing of a former director of the Greek National Bank and the July killing of an undersecretary of the Turkish Embassy—in the name of Kurdish and Cypriot victims of Turkish "ethnic cleansing." The latter act was the third assassination of a Turkish official in the last five years. (In the fall of 1993, the newly elected PASOK government had repealed the law prohibiting media publication of terrorist statements of responsibility for assassinations, a move that brought substantial criticism when the January 1994 assassination occurred.)

United States personnel and facilities have been frequent targets of terrorist attacks. In June 1988, a United States military attaché was assassinated. In 1994 a series of rocket attacks struck United States business establishments. Among United States offices and property attacked in 1994 were the American Life Insurance and IBM offices in Athens. An unsuccessful rocket attack at Piraeus on the British aircraft carrier *Ark Royal* was discovered only later. There also were frequent bombings of diplomatic, business, and government cars and buildings, often with prior telephone warnings. Almost all such incidents were traced directly or indirectly to one of the two terrorist

organizations; both 17 November and ELA took credit for one bus bombing in September. Experts noted that most targets were European, and the acts of 1994 were defined as statements on Europe's role in Bosnia or on the treatment of Kurds in Europe (especially Germany).

Meanwhile, Turkish authorities have accused Greece of supporting the Kurdish Workers' Party (Partiya Karkere Kürdistan—PKK), which has operated to destabilize Turkish society, and tourist trade in particular, in its terrorist campaign for separatism for the Kurdish minority in southeastern Turkey. The PKK mode of operation often has included the killing of Turkish security personnel and the planting of explosives in urban areas. Turkey has cited the existence of a Greek-Kurdish Solidarity Committee and visits to Greece in 1994 by a top PKK official as evidence of Greek complicity. In 1994 Turkey accused Greece of training PKK terrorists and then allowing them to cross the border into Turkey.

In the 1980s and the early 1990s, Greek antiterrorism measures received substantial international criticism because of the frequency of terrorist incidents after new enforcement campaigns had been announced. To combat terrorism, the ELAS operates an Antiterrorist Service, which cooperates closely with its American counterparts, as well as with agencies in the other member-states of the EU and in Russia, Israel, Turkey, and Armenia. The terms of United States cooperation, which has focused on elimination of 17 November, caused controversy in Greece in 1994 when the level of involvement by the United States CIA and FBI was disclosed publicly for the first time. The four-year-old informal agreement was revised in the fall of 1994 as part of the reorganization of the Antiterrorist Service. The revision, like its predecessor a nonpaper agreement, calls for a more equal sharing of intelligence. The Greek service had complained that its American counterparts were not disclosing information and that information leaks were jeopardizing operations. The other steps of the reorganization added analytic staff and streamlined nonessential functions.

## **Criminal Justice**

The Greek criminal justice system is based on West European models. The constitution and civil laws include strict protections for the rights of the accused. The judiciary is an independent branch of government within which jurisdiction

in various types of criminal justice proceedings is clearly defined.

### **The Criminal Code**

The criminal code is based on the Bavarian codes, which were transferred by King Otto, the first king of independent Greece (r. 1833–62) from his homeland in the 1830s, but considerable revision has occurred since that time. According to the constitution, the judiciary is independent and judicial powers are vested in the courts of law, while the creation of extraordinary courts is expressly prohibited. The court system is divided into administrative, civil, and criminal sections (see *The Branches of Government*, ch. 4).

The criminal code defines three grades of crime: petty offenses, misdemeanors, and felonies. Sentences at the lower court level can be appealed. Unusual punishment is prohibited by the constitution. Custodial sentences for petty offenses and misdemeanors range from ten days to five years, while those for felonies range from five to twenty years. Offenders sentenced to imprisonment for a term of less than eighteen months can have their sentences converted into fines. The option of capital punishment is maintained for some categories of serious crime (not including political crimes), but the death penalty has not been imposed since the late 1970s.

### **How the System Works**

Greek law classifies any person between seven and seventeen years of age as a juvenile. The crime rate among juveniles in Greece is rather low compared with those in other Western countries. It is confined mainly to petty theft and property damage. Police officers may arrest persons caught in the act of committing a crime; citizen's arrests also may be considered valid. In no other case can a person be arrested without a judicial warrant. Suspects must be brought before an examining magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest. Within three to five days of arraignment, magistrates are required either to release a suspect or to issue a warrant for imprisonment pending trial. The maximum detention permissible before trial is nine months, or, if cause is demonstrated by the prosecutor, eighteen months. Administrative measures to restrict the movement of citizens are prohibited unless they are backed by a court ruling.



Public prosecutors represent the state whenever a criminal case is brought before a court. Before a suspect is remanded by the police to court authorities, the public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation, the results of which are passed to the court for further investigation or establishment of a trial date. An injured party may initiate prosecution when the appropriate public prosecutor fails to act.

The constitution provides full protection of the rights of the accused. The public prosecutor must explain comprehensibly to the accused all aspects of the case, including his or her rights and options and all documents bearing on the case. Illegally obtained confessions may not be used against the accused. Bail may be posted except for the most serious crimes. Criminal and political offenses are tried by juries composed of judges and lay people in so-called mixed courts that combine the functions of judge and jury in common law courts. The accused is present during the trial and may compel the appearance in court of defense witnesses. The court must appoint legal counsel if the accused lacks a lawyer. Criminal trials are open to the adult public. Although the criminal code specifies rules for the presentation of evidence, judicial panels are given considerable latitude in arriving at their verdict. The burden of proof rests with the prosecution.

Legal limits restrict the length of sentence or amount of fine that a presiding judge may levy at each level of the judicial system, as well as the applicable penalty for each kind of offense. Magistrates in juvenile courts are permitted considerable discretion in sentencing youthful offenders. Punishment for juvenile delinquency may range from a reprimand to committal to a training school or correctional institution.

The Greek court system is overburdened, especially at the lower levels of magistrates' courts and courts of first instance. Because of the large number of trivial cases (mostly misdemeanors, traffic violations, and accidents) that are not resolved before reaching the stage of trial, many cases wait for trial for two or three years.

## **The Penal System**

Greece has several types of penal facilities, including central penitentiaries (the basis of the penal system), correctional farms, open and minimum-security prisons, reformatories, and training schools for juvenile offenders. Additional facilities include prison hospitals and sanatoriums. Conditions inside

the great majority of those facilities are generally regarded as satisfactory. Since the 1980s, a major building program has replaced outdated buildings with modern facilities. No distinction is made inside prisons on the basis of social class, race, or religion, but men and women and adults and juveniles are housed in separate facilities. Occasionally, people serving life sentences for execrable crimes are housed in separate prison wings, although they are free to mix with other prisoners in social and athletic activities. The death penalty is prescribed by law for heinous crimes, but it has not been put into effect since 1972, and in the 1990s there was considerable support for abolishing it. Visits by family members are allowed three times per week. Under a 1994 law, a prison director may grant permission to prisoners to leave the prison and stay with their families for periods of five to ten days.

The Greek penal system emphasizes the rehabilitation of prisoners through education, vocational training, and productive labor. Probation officers assist ex-convicts in securing employment upon release from prison. Particular emphasis is placed on rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. Special training schools and institutions provide academic and vocational education.

## **Trends and Problems in Domestic Security**

Besides ordinary crime, the main problems in maintaining public order in the 1990s are narcotics control and the influx of illegal migrants from the Balkans and the Middle East. In order to meet those challenges, the Hellenic Police is trying to modernize its structure and methods along the lines of Western police forces. To assist in modernization, in 1994 Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou promised US\$27 million to upgrade police equipment and acquire helicopters. Experts have also identified improved police training as a major requirement, both at the basic level and at the more advanced level of modern investigative methods. To expedite achievement of those goals, Greece has developed numerous programs for cooperation with Western countries, including the United States, as well as with Russia, Israel, and other countries that have well-developed security institutions.

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For current information about Greece's national security position and policies, a number of publications of the Hellenic

Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy are authoritative sources, but most of them are available only in Greek. Among the topics the foundation's publications cover are the Cyprus situation, Greece in relation to the Middle East, United States policy toward Greece and Turkey, and Greece's policy toward Yugoslavia. For current statistics and a complete description of the Greek armed forces, the best source is *Jane's Sentinel: The Balkans*, which is updated annually. *Southern European Security in the 1990s*, edited by Roberto Aliboni, describes the security concerns of nations in Greece's region of the Mediterranean. Tozun Bahcheli's *Greek-Turkish Relations since 1955* reviews the history of the relationship, with special emphasis on Cyprus. Theodore Couloumbis's *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle* and Monteagle Stearns's *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* provide historical background on the United States role in the 1974 Cyprus crisis and its results over the following two decades. *Greece and EC Membership Evaluated*, edited by Panos Kazakos and Panayotis Ioakimidis, describes the impact of EC (now EU) membership on Greece's economic and national security situation. Greece's narcotics problems and policies are described in the *International Narcotics Strategy Report*, an annual publication of the United States Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. Specific national security topics such as arms purchases and events in the eastern Mediterranean are reported in the Federal Broadcast Information Service's *Daily Report: West Europe*, a daily summary of press items. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)



## Appendix

- 1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors
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Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you know	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters .....	0.04	inches
Centimeters .....	0.39	inches
Meters .....	3.3	feet
Kilometers .....	0.62	miles
Hectares .....	2.47	acres
Square kilometers .....	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters .....	35.3	cubic feet
Liters .....	0.26	gallons
Kilograms .....	2.2	pounds
Metric tons .....	0.98	long tons
.....	1.1	short tons
.....	2,204	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) .....	1.8	degrees Fahrenheit
	and add 32	

Table 2. Economic Activity in the Adult Population, 1989, 1990,  
1991  
(in thousands of persons over fourteen years of age)

Activity	1989	1990	1991
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing .....	929.9	889.2	806.5
Mining and quarrying .....	21.4	22.6	19.3
Manufacturing .....	714.9	719.9	699.0
Utilities .....	36.0	36.6	36.6
Construction .....	238.9	252.4	245.7
Trade, restaurants, and hotels .....	624.2	653.9	660.4
Transportation and communications .....	240.9	249.4	252.4
Finance, insurance, real estate, and business services .....	169.2	184.1	192.7
Community and social services .....	694.8	709.5	719.8
Other .....	0.7	1.5	0.0
Total employed .....	3,670.9	3,719.0	3,632.4
Total unemployed .....	296.0	280.8	301.1
Total labor force .....	3,966.9	3,719.0	3,933.5
Males .....	2,500.1	2,516.4	2,527.5
Females .....	1,466.8	1,483.4	1,406.0

Source: Based on information from *The Europa World Year Book, 1994, 1*, London, 1994, 1305.

Table 3. *Urbanization, Selected Years, 1941-71*  
(in percentages of total population)

Year	Athens	Thessaloniki	Other Urban	Rural
1941 .....	15.3	3.7	13.0	68.0
1951 .....	18.0	4.0	14.9	63.1
1961 .....	22.1	4.5	16.1	57.3
1971 .....	29.0	6.4	17.4	47.2

Source: Based on information from Lila Leontidou, *The Mediterranean City in Transition*, Cambridge, 1989, 104.

Table 4. *Evolution of the Greek Language, ca. 2000 B.C. to 1976*

Period	Description
First half of second millennium B.C.	Greek speakers arrive in southern Balkan peninsula.
Second half of second millennium B.C.	Greek first written, then syllabary lost after fall of Mycenaean around 1100 B.C.
Late eighth century B.C.	Phoenician alphabet adopted and modified.
Sixth century B.C.	Greek literary tradition established.
404 B.C.	End of dominance of Athens, which had made Attic Greek lingua franca and literary language.
Mid-fourth century B.C.	End of predominance of several mutually intelligible dialects of city-states and literary variants depending on genre.
323 B.C.	Death of Alexander the Great ends expansion of Macedonian Empire, which had spread with it Attic Greek.
Third century B.C. to fourth century A.D.	Common language (Koine) develops for international trade, politics, and administration.
A.D. 330	Christian church adopts educated form of Koine as its official language.
Sixth century A.D. to fifteenth century	Byzantine period; complex, undocumented evolution of spoken form from that used in written texts.
Seventh century	Demotic (modern spoken Greek) assumes modern morphological and syntactic form.
Seventh to ninth century	During struggles against Arabs, Attic literary model not used.
Ninth to fifteenth century	Revived use of Attic model.
1261-1453	"Declassified" texts simplify literary form for the uneducated.
Early fourteenth century	Vernacular literature (poetry) approximates spoken form.
Late sixteenth to early seventeenth century	Cretan vernacular used in drama and poetry.
Late eighteenth century	Influence of Enlightenment politicizes language in Greek communities of Ottoman Empire and in Western Europe.



Table 4. *Evolution of the Greek Language, ca. 2000 B.C. to 1976*

Period	Description
1834-36	Katharevousa adopted as official state language of Greece after being devised by Adamantios Korais (1748-1833).
1888	Ioannis Psicharis, champion of demotic, publishes <i>My Journey</i> , model for demotic literary movement.
1901	Riots in Athens to oppose demotic New Testament translation.
1917	Introduction of demotic in lower grades of elementary school.
1946-57	Prose writing career of Nikos Kazantzakis, influential writer in demotic movement.
1967-74	Military junta government attempts to reinstate Katharevousa in schools at all levels.
1970s-1980s	Regional dialects lost in many parts of Greece.
1976	Demotic of Athens becomes official language, called common or standard Greek (Neohelliniki).

Source: Based on information from Robert Browning, *Medieval and Modern Greek*, London, 1969.

Table 5. Schools, Teachers, and Students at Various Education Levels, Selected Years, 1975-89

	1975	1980	1985	1989
<b>Preschools</b>				
Schools .....	3,279	4,576	5,203	5,474
Teachers .....	4,137	6,514	7,617	8,307
Percent female teachers .....	100	100	100	100
Pupils .....	108,357	145,924	160,079	141,756
Percent female pupils .....	48	49	49	49
<b>Primary schools</b>				
Schools .....	9,633	9,461	8,675	7,755
Teachers .....	30,953	37,315	37,994	42,485
Percent female teachers .....	47	48	49	41
Pupils .....	935,730	900,641	897,735	839,688
Percent female pupils .....	48	48	48	48
<b>All secondary schools</b>				
Teachers .....	n.a. <sup>1</sup>	39,571	50,388	57,975
Percent female teachers .....	n.a.	49	53	54
Students .....	661,796	740,085	813,534	843,732
Percent female students .....	43	46	48	48
<b>Vocational (secondary) schools</b>				
Teachers .....	n.a.	7,834	8,138	9,434
Percent female teachers .....	n.a.	24	34	35
Students .....	132,591	100,415	109,415	130,738
Percent female students .....	13	20	29	32
<b>All postsecondary schools</b>				
Teachers .....	n.a.	10,542	11,878	13,451
Percent female teachers .....	n.a.	32	30	32
Students .....	117,246	121,116	181,901	194,419
Percent female students .....	37	41	49	50
<b>Universities</b>				
Teachers .....	5,956	6,924	6,934	8,104
Percent female teachers .....	35	35	28	29
Students .....	95,385	85,718	110,917	117,260
Percent female students .....	37	42	48	53

<sup>1</sup> n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis, Statistical Division, *Statistical Yearbook, 1992*, New York, 1994, 62, 74, 86, 99.

Table 6. *Financial Structure of the Public Sector, 1989–93*  
(in percentages of GDP)<sup>1</sup>

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
<b>Budgetary indicators</b>					
Primary receipts <sup>2</sup> .....	28.8	31.4	32.0	32.7	33.0
Primary expenditures <sup>2</sup> .....	<u>37.7</u>	<u>37.6</u>	<u>36.5</u>	<u>35.7</u>	<u>35.8</u>
Primary budget balance .....	-8.9	-6.2	-4.5	-3.0	-2.8
Net interest .....	<u>-5.6</u>	<u>-7.7</u>	<u>-8.5</u>	<u>-8.7</u>	<u>-10.7</u>
General government budget balance .....	-14.5	-13.9	-13.0	-11.8	-13.5
Savings .....	-10.3	-10.2	-8.9	-7.8	-10.1
<b>Expenditure and tax structure</b>					
General current expenditures .....	40.3	43.1	42.3	42.3	44.7
Transfers .....	13.1	12.7	12.7	12.2	12.7
Subsidies .....	4.1	4.4	4.2	4.1	4.7
Tax receipts .....	28.8	31.4	32.0	32.7	33.0
Personal income tax .....	3.5	4.0	3.6	3.1	3.2
Corporate tax .....	1.2	1.6	2.0	2.3	2.3
Social security contributions .....	11.8	12.2	11.8	11.7	12.5
Consumption taxes .....	12.2	13.7	14.6	15.6	15.0
Value-added tax <sup>3</sup> .....	6.6	7.4	7.6	7.9	n.a. <sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> GDP—gross domestic product (see Glossary).

<sup>2</sup> Excluding interest.

<sup>3</sup> Largest category of consumption taxes.

<sup>4</sup> n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 1995*, Paris, 1994, 101.

Table 7. Price and Wage Movement, Selected Years, 1985–93

	1985	1990	1991	1992	1993
Consumer price index <sup>1</sup>					
Food .....	66.4	144.3	172.2	196.4	221.3
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco .....	54.0	146.7	176.8	218.2	258.2
Clothing and footwear .....	55.5	134.4	156.5	178.4	198.0
Housing .....	63.7	136.1	172.0	201.8	233.7
Durable goods and household supplies .....	59.1	127.5	149.5	167.9	182.7
Transportation and communications .....	65.5	134.9	161.1	193.8	230.3
Overall consumer prices .....	61.5	136.9	163.6	189.5	216.8
Wholesale price index <sup>2</sup> .....					
Domestic finished products consumed in Greece .....	245.3	474.3	563.2	631.2	706.9
Foreign-produced finished products .....	281.1	541.7	620.6	699.0	783.9
Exported domestic products .....	269.7	413.4	457.8	487.1	542.3
Overall wholesale prices .....	255.2	473.7	553.0	615.7	689.1
Hourly wages in manufacturing <sup>3</sup> .....	100.0	210.5	245.7	279.4	308.8

<sup>1</sup> 1988 = 100.0.

<sup>2</sup> 1980 = 100.0.

<sup>3</sup> In enterprises employing at least ten persons.

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 1995*, Paris, 1994, 94.

Table 8. Structure of Economic Output, 1989–93  
(in percentage of GDP)<sup>1</sup>

Economic Activity	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing . . . . .	12.8	11.0	12.5	12.1	11.9
Mining and quarrying . . . . .	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.7
Total manufacturing . . . . .	18.8	18.6	17.9	17.4	16.9
Food, drink, and tobacco . . . . .	4.3	4.1	4.2	4.4	n.a. <sup>2</sup>
Textiles . . . . .	3.1	3.1	2.7	2.5	n.a.
Chemical and related industries . . . . .	3.2	3.1	2.9	2.8	n.a.
Stone, clay, and glass . . . . .	1.5	1.6	1.3	1.3	n.a.
Metals, engineering, and electric goods . . . . .	1.9	1.7	1.8	1.8	n.a.
Construction . . . . .	5.4	5.8	5.4	5.2	5.0
Utilities . . . . .	4.2	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.6
Trade services <sup>3</sup> . . . . .	26.8	27.7	27.8	28.6	29.0
Nontrade services <sup>4</sup> . . . . .	24.0	24.6	24.4	24.0	24.4
Other . . . . .	6.1	6.4	6.0	6.4	6.6

<sup>1</sup> GDP—gross domestic product.

<sup>2</sup> n.a.—not available.

<sup>3</sup> Transportation, communications, wholesale and retail trade, banking, insurance, and real estate.

<sup>4</sup> Ownership of dwellings, public administration and defense, and health and education services.

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 1995*, Paris, 1995, 100.

Table 9. *Export Trade by World Economic Group, 1989-93*  
(in millions of United States dollars)

Group	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Total OECD <sup>1</sup> .....	6,088.6	6,425.5	6,759.1	7,347.9	5,850.0
European Community <sup>2</sup> .....	4,990.9	5,202.6	5,515.2	6,108.0	4,748.4
Britain .....	558.6	587.7	592.8	660.5	484.7
France .....	664.3	777.1	656.0	689.2	526.0
Germany <sup>3</sup> .....	1,623.5	1,792.5	2,073.0	2,197.8	2,012.8
Italy .....	1,535.5	1,384.0	1,441.4	1,718.2	1,127.1
Other OECD Europe <sup>4</sup> .....	484.7	570.0	580.7	646.7	547.9
North America .....	480.5	498.9	528.7	436.0	417.9
Central and East					
European countries <sup>5</sup> .....	348.4	342.6	431.4	608.5	886.5
OPEC <sup>6</sup> .....	284.2	318.0	321.5	323.8	312.1
Other .....	<u>845.8</u>	<u>934.4</u>	<u>1,151.0</u>	<u>934.2</u>	<u>1,085.7</u>
Total exports <sup>7</sup> .....	7,567.1	8,020.6	8,663.0	9,842.0	8,777.3

<sup>1</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, whose twenty-five members include all of Western Europe, all of North America, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Turkey.

<sup>2</sup> Until 1994, included Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany (West Germany through 1990), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.

<sup>3</sup> West Germany through 1990.

<sup>4</sup> Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

<sup>5</sup> In 1993 included Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

<sup>6</sup> Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, whose members in 1993 included Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela (Ecuador left in 1992).

<sup>7</sup> Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 1995*, Paris, 1994, 96.

Table 10. *Import Trade by World Economic Group, 1989–93*  
(in millions of United States dollars)

Group	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Total OECD <sup>1</sup> .....	12,938.2	16,049.5	16,858.5	18,385.8	16,914.2
European Community <sup>2</sup> ..	10,052.4	12,697.6	12,955.7	14,514.6	13,190.7
Britain .....	935.7	1,040.3	1,149.8	1,277.4	1,337.9
France .....	1,106.1	1,595.9	1,668.0	1,814.5	1,739.7
Germany <sup>3</sup> .....	3,244.2	4,104.0	4,168.6	4,668.2	3,727.6
Italy .....	2,393.4	3,038.3	3,054.6	3,290.4	3,074.3
Other OECD Europe <sup>4</sup> ...	1,137.6	1,305.8	1,405.5	1,398.6	1,292.9
North America .....	623.3	792.2	985.3	902.0	880.7
Central and East					
European countries <sup>5</sup> ...	647.7	787.4	973.1	930.9	1,007.7
OPEC <sup>6</sup> .....	792.6	1,129.1	1,575.6	1,595.6	1,492.2
Other .....	<u>1,700.9</u>	<u>1,735.4</u>	<u>2,243.0</u>	<u>2,494.4</u>	<u>3,345.6</u>
Total imports <sup>7</sup> .....	16,079.5	19,701.4	21,650.1	23,406.8	22,759.8

<sup>1</sup> Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, whose twenty-five members include all of Western Europe, all of North America, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Turkey.

<sup>2</sup> Until 1994, included Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany (West Germany through 1990), Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.

<sup>3</sup> West Germany through 1990.

<sup>4</sup> Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

<sup>5</sup> In 1993 included Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

<sup>6</sup> Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, whose members in 1993 included Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela (Ecuador left in 1992).

<sup>7</sup> Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 1995*, Paris, 1994, 96.

Table 11. Exports by Commodity, 1990-93  
(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity	1990	1991	1992	1993
Food and live animals .....	1,627.7	1,922.3	2,085.3	1,736.7
Beverages and tobacco .....	443.6	493.2	650.8	550.2
Inedible crude material except fuels .....	456.7	455.7	425.3	506.2
Mineral fuels and lubricants .....	588.0	773.4	518.9	688.5
Animal and vegetable oils and fats ....	302.5	222.2	550.7	314.2
Chemicals .....	314.9	338.0	372.7	409.7
Manufactured goods .....	3,754.1	3,888.0	4,527.8	3,878.9
Textiles .....	500.1	533.3	520.2	446.0
Iron and steel .....	415.0	412.4	471.1	251.2
Aluminum .....	279.3	287.2	311.9	269.5
Clothing .....	1,675.2	1,749.6	2,146.0	1,844.0
Machinery and transportation equipment .....	1,864.5	1,935.5	2,360.1	2,115.2
Other .....	532.1	197.9	238.2	143.0
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>8,020.6</b>	<b>8,663.0</b>	<b>9,842.0</b>	<b>8,777.3</b>

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 1995*, Paris, 1994, 95.

Table 12. Imports by Commodity, 1990-93  
(in millions of United States dollars)

Commodity	1990	1991	1992	1993
Food and live animals .....	2,506.9	2,379.3	2,762.6	2,561.1
Beverages and tobacco .....	323.7	366.5	464.1	493.4
Inedible crude materials except fuels ..	954.1	945.7	723.1	643.4
Mineral fuels and lubricants .....	1,530.5	2,097.3	2,301.3	2,430.7
Crude petroleum .....	997.2	1,368.9	1,718.3	1,733.0
Petroleum products .....	456.1	623.7	490.8	612.0
Chemicals .....	2,068.1	2,238.7	2,472.5	2,504.4
Manufactured goods .....	4,306.3	4,300.9	4,263.0	3,809.8
Machinery and transportation equipment .....	6,120.4	7,124.1	7,969.6	8,012.5
Road motor vehicles .....	1,981.0	2,417.0	3,112.0	2,437.3
Aircraft .....	109.9	324.5	165.7	266.8
Ships and boats .....	527.1	886.1	819.7	1,486.0
Other .....	1,891.4	2,197.6	2,450.6	2,304.7
<b>TOTAL .....</b>	<b>19,701.4</b>	<b>21,650.1</b>	<b>23,406.8</b>	<b>22,759.8</b>

Source: Based on information from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 1995*, Paris, 1994, 95.



Table 13. Circulation of Leading Newspapers, 1991

Newspaper	Circulation	Orientation
<i>Akropolis</i> . . . . .	50,800 M <sup>1</sup>	Center-right, independent
<i>Apogevmatini</i> . . . . .	80,000 A <sup>2</sup>	-do-
<i>Avgi</i> . . . . .	55,000 M	Organ of Greek Left Party
<i>Avriani</i> . . . . .	51,000 A	Center-left
<i>Eleftheros Typos</i> . . . . .	135,000 A	Right-wing, independent
<i>Eleftherotypia</i> . . . . .	108,000 A	Center-left, independent
<i>Ethnos</i> . . . . .	150,000 A	Left-wing, independent
<i>Express</i> . . . . .	25,000	Business, independent
<i>Kathimerini</i> . . . . .	935,000 M	Center-right
<i>Makedonia</i> . . . . .	55,000 M	Independent
<i>Rizopastis</i> . . . . .	40,000 M	Organ of Communist Party of Greece
<i>Ta Nea</i> . . . . .	133,000 A	Center-left
<i>To Vima</i> . . . . .	195,000 S <sup>3</sup>	-do-

<sup>1</sup> M—Daily, morning.

<sup>2</sup> A—Daily, afternoon.

<sup>3</sup> S—Sundays only.

Source: Based on information from Harry Drost, ed., *The World's News Media*, New York, 1991, 192–94.

Table 14. Major Army Equipment, 1994

Type	Model	Number
Main battle tank . . . . .	M-26	250 (in storage)
	M-47	396 (in storage)
	AMX-30	156 (in storage)
	Leopard 1A4	170
	Leopard 1A3	109
	M-48A1	299
	M-48A3	212
	M-48A5	599
	M-60A1	359
	M-60A3	312
Light tank . . . . .	M-24	67
Reconnaissance vehicle . . . . .	M-8	48
	M-20	180 (reserve)
Armored infantry fighting vehicle . . .	BMP-1	500
	AMX-10P	96
Armored personnel carrier . . . . .	Leonidas	130
	M-2	114
	M-3 half track	403

Table 14. Major Army Equipment, 1994

Type	Model	Number
	M-59	372
	M-113A1 and M-113A2	1,346
105mm howitzer . . . . .	M-56	18
	M-101	469
140mm howitzer . . . . .	5.5 inch	32
155mm howitzer . . . . .	M-114	271
203mm howitzer . . . . .	M-115	85
105mm self-propelled howitzer . . . . .	M-52	76
155mm self-propelled howitzer . . . . .	M-44A1	48
	M-109A1	51
	M-109A2	84
175mm self-propelled howitzer . . . . .	M-107	12
203mm self-propelled howitzer . . . . .	M-110A2	100
107mm mortar . . . . .	M-30	773
81mm mortar . . . . .		690
122mm multiple rocket launcher . . . . .	RM-70	150
Antitank guided weapon (ATGW) . . . . .	Milan	394
64mm rocket launcher . . . . .	RPG-18	
90mm recoilless launcher . . . . .	EM-67	1,057
	M-40A1	763
20mm air defense gun . . . . .	RH-202 twin	101
23mm air defense gun . . . . .	ZU-23-2	300
40mm air defense gun . . . . .	M-1	227
	M-42A twin self-propelled	95
Surface-to-air missile . . . . .	Improved Hawk and Redeye	42
Aircraft . . . . .	Aero Commander	2
	Super King Air	2
	U-17A	20
Helicopter . . . . .	CH-47C1	9
	UH-1D/H/AB-205	85
	AH-1P	9
	AB-212	1
	AB-206	15
	Bell 47G	10
	Hughes 300C	30

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1994-1995*, London, 1994, 53.

Table 15. Major Air Force Equipment, 1994

Type	Model	Number	
A-7 fighter aircraft .....	A-7H	38	
	TA-7H	7	
	A-7E	40	
	A-7K	7	
F-5 fighter aircraft .....	F-5A	64	
	F-5B	8	
	NF-5A	11	
	NF-5B	1	
F-4 fighter aircraft .....	RF-5A	6	
	F-4E	52	
	RF-4E	20	
F-16 fighter aircraft .....	F-16C	32	
	F-16D	6	
Mirage fighter aircraft .....	F-1	25	
Transport and training aircraft .....	HU-16B	2	
	C-47	4	
	C-130H	10	
	C-130B	5	
	CL-215	11	
	Do-28	12	
	Gulfstream I	1	
	T-2	36	
	T-33A	30	
	T-37B/C	29	
	T-41D	19	
	Ys-11-200	6	
	Helicopter .....	AB-205A transport	14
		AB-212 transport	3
Bell 47G liaison		5	
AH-64 attack		12	
Surface-to-air missile .....	Nike Hercules	36	
	Sparrow	40	

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1994-1995*, London, 1994, 53.

Table 16. Major Navy Equipment, 1994

Type	Model/Class	Number
Submarine	Glavkos (GeT-209/1100)	8
Destroyer	Kimon (U.S. Adams)	4
	Themistocles (U.S. Gearing-FRAM I)	2
Frigate	Hydra (MEKO-200H)	1
	Elli (Kortenaer)	4
	Makedonia (U.S. Knox)	3
Corvette	Niki (Ge-Thetis)	5
Missile craft	Laskos (La Combattante II/III)	14
	I. Votis (La Combattante IIA)	2
	Stamou	2
Torpedo craft	Hesperos (Jaguar)	6
	"Nasty"	4
Coastal patrol craft	Armatolos (Osprey)	2
Inshore patrol craft	Tolmi/PCI	5
Minelayer	Aktion (LSM-1)	2
Mine countermeasure craft	Alkyon (MSC-294)	9
	Atalanti (Adjutant)	5
	Samos tank-landing ship	1
Amphibious craft	Nafkratourssa (Cabaldo) dock landing ship	1
	Inouse (County) tank-landing ship	2
	Ikarria (LST-510)	4
	Ipopliarhos Grigoropoulos (LSM-1)	2
	Medium landing ship	2
Antisubmarine helicopter		
Helicopter	AB-212	22
	SA-319	4
Antiship missile battery	Exocet MM40	2

Source: Based on information from *The Military Balance, 1994-1995*, London, 1994, 54.

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## Glossary

**Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)**—Established as an international process in 1972, the group consisted of fifty-three nations in 1994, including all European countries, sponsoring joint sessions and consultations on political issues vital to European security. Charter of Paris (1990) changed CSCE from ad hoc forum to organization with permanent institutions. In 1992 new CSCE roles in conflict prevention and management were defined, potentially making CSCE the center of a Europe-based collective security system. In the early 1990s, however, applications of these instruments to conflicts in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus did not have a decisive impact. In January 1995, renamed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

**Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty)**—An agreement signed in 1990 by the member nations of the Warsaw Pact (*q.v.*) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (*q.v.*) to establish parity in conventional weapons between the two organizations from the Atlantic to the Urals. The treaty included a strict system of inspection and information exchange and remained in force, although not strictly observed by all parties, in the mid-1990s.

**Council of Europe**—Founded in 1949, a thirty-three-member (1994) organization overseeing intergovernmental cooperation in designated areas such as environmental planning, finance, sport, crime, migration, and legal matters.

**drachma**—National currency unit of Greece, with an exchange rate of approximately Dr230 to US\$1 in May 1995.

**European Commission**—A governing body of the European Union (*q.v.*) that oversees the organization's treaties, recommends actions under the treaties, and issues independent decisions on EU matters.

**European Community (EC)**—A grouping of three primarily economic organizations of West European countries, including the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom or EAEC), and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Founded separately in 1952 and 1957, the three came to be known collectively as the EC. Executive power

rested with the European Commission (*q.v.*), which implemented and defended the community treaties in the interests of the EC as a whole. Greece gained full membership in January 1981. Members in 1993 were Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Name changed to European Union (*q.v.*) in December 1993.

European currency unit (ECU)—Established in 1979 as a composite of monetary systems of European Community (*q.v.*) member nations, to function in the European Monetary System. Acts as the unit for exchange-rate establishment, credit and intervention operations, and settlements between monetary authorities of member nations.

European Union (EU)—Successor organization to the European Community (*q.v.*), officially established by ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, November 1993. Goal is closer economic unification of Western Europe leading to single monetary system and closer cooperation in matters of justice and foreign and security policy. To the members of the European Community (*q.v.*), the EU added Austria, Finland, and Sweden, effective January 1, 1995.

gross domestic product (GDP)—The total value of goods and services provided exclusively within a nation's domestic economy, in contrast to gross national product (*q.v.*), usually computed over a one-year period.

gross national product (GNP)—The total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders plus the income received from abroad by residents, minus payments remitted abroad by nonresidents. Normally computed over one year.

*millet*—In the Ottoman Empire's policy for governance of non-Muslim minorities, an autonomous community ruled by religious leaders responsible to the central government.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—An alliance founded in 1949 by the United States, Canada, and their postwar European allies to counter the Soviet military presence in Europe. Greece joined in 1952 but withdrew from military commitments 1975–80. Until the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact (*q.v.*) in 1991, NATO was the primary collective defense agreement of the Western powers. Its military and administrative structure remained intact after the threat of Soviet expansionism had subsided. The Partnership for Peace, originated in 1993, offered limited par-

participation in NATO to East European countries and former Soviet republics with the possibility of eventual full membership by some or all of those nations.

**Ottoman Empire**—A Muslim empire, based in Istanbul (formerly Constantinople), that controlled southeastern Europe, the Middle East, and most of North Africa between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, and lesser territories between 1300 and 1913. Ottoman occupation was a major influence on all civilizations of southeastern Europe and caused ethnic animosities that remained long after the disintegration of the empire.

**Sunni**—The larger of the two fundamental divisions of Islam, opposed to the Shia (the other main division) on the issue of succession to Muslim leadership.

**value-added tax (VAT)**—A tax applied to the additional value created at a given stage of production and calculated as a percentage of the difference between the product value at that stage and the cost of all materials and services purchased as inputs. The VAT is the primary form of indirect taxation applied in the European Union (*q.v.*), and it is the basis of each country's contribution to the community budget.

**Warsaw Pact**—Informal name for Warsaw Treaty Organization, a mutual defense organization founded in 1955, including the Soviet Union, Albania (which withdrew in 1961), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The Warsaw Pact enabled the Soviet Union to station troops in the countries to its west to oppose the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, *q.v.*). The pact was the basis of the invasions of Hungary (1956) and of Czechoslovakia (1968); it was disbanded in July 1991.

**Western European Union (WEU)**—Based on the 1948 Treaty of Brussels and set up in 1955, the council is a forum for coordination of regional defense policy among its members, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. Denmark and Ireland have observer status, and Iceland, Norway, and Turkey are associate members. After lying dormant for many years, the WEU was reactivated in 1984 to serve as the European pillar of NATO (*q.v.*) defenses and the defense component of the European Community (*q.v.*). In 1993 the WEU and NATO ran a joint arms embargo oper-

ation against Yugoslavia in the Adriatic. A Eurocorps of Belgian, French, and German troops was established at the end of 1993.

**World Bank**—Informal name for a group of four affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital for credit and investment in developing countries; each institution has a specialized agenda for aiding economic growth in target countries.

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